

Towards a Social Science of Language

Volume 2: Social interaction and discourse
structures

EDITED BY

Gregory R. Guy

Crawford Feagin

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TOWARDS A SOCIAL SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE

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Towards a Social Science of Language 2

TOWARDS A SOCIAL SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE

PAPERS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM LABOV

VOLUME 2

SOCIAL INTERACTION
AND DISCOURSE STRUCTURES

Edited by

GREGORY R. GUY
CRAWFORD FEAGIN
DEBORAH SCHIFFRIN
JOHN BAUGH

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
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William Labov

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Preface

This book is intended to provide a survey and a synthesis of the field that may be called ‘Labovian linguistics’ — the research areas and methods that were pioneered, and are still being sustained and inspired, by William Labov. This discipline has long lacked a suitable name. The term most commonly applied to it is ‘sociolinguistics’, which has its merits, but is often misconstrued as involving nothing more than the enumeration of the social correlates of certain linguistic features — a sort of perpetual rewriting of a few chapters of *The Social Stratification of English in New York City* (Labov 1966). For this reason, Labov himself has often preferred to characterize his own work merely as ‘linguistics’. While this makes a rhetorically effective aphorism, it is deficient as a general term for the Labovian field, because it neither captures the distinctive characteristics of that approach, nor contrasts it with other areas of linguistics that are not Labovian. And even the term ‘Labovian’ is inappropriate; although convenient and readily apprehensible for informal purposes, it tends to undermine what it tries to describe. The central feature of the approach to the study of language that Labov has always espoused is the ‘dynamic paradigm’: that is, seeing language not as a static structure but as a dynamic social system, which is continuously moving, changing, interacting, and working. It would be profoundly undynamic of us to fix a cult of personality around the pioneer, and name the field after him.

We have therefore preferred to define the field in terms of its methods and goals, rather than its subject matter or its practitioners. Hence, the title of this book is *Towards a Social Science of Language*. We want to pursue a “science of language”, because we seek to do work that is empirically founded, and follows Labov’s ‘principle of accountability’; it is a “social science”, because we want to account for language use, and because language itself is quintessentially social, the fundamental medium for the creation and maintenance of distinctively human society. And finally, we say “towards” in recognition of the dynamism of the discipline itself: we are part of a process, not an edifice.

In keeping with the dynamic theme of the enterprise, it is appropriate to say something about the process by which this book came about. Some of the story is personal, about my own involvement with linguistics, and with this project. My part of the story began a quarter-century ago, almost exactly, when I was an undergraduate at Boston University. In my junior year, I was sort-of-a-linguistics major; I say ‘sort of’ because there was no linguistics department there, so I couldn’t be the real thing, but I had taken whatever linguistics courses were offered and I used to hang around the library reading all kinds of things on linguistics.

One afternoon I picked up a journal and read something that changed my life. That article was “The logic of nonstandard English”, and it was the first piece of work I had ever seen by William Labov. To me, the experience was absolutely electrifying. I can still feel, to this day, the shock of excitement and recognition that I felt when I read it. The BU library was poorly lit and uncomfortable, and it was a grey and blustery afternoon, so I was sitting in a carrel by the window in the spreading gloom. I started to turn the pages of this article, and it was like the whole room suddenly lit up from what was on them.

My initial entry into linguistics was through historical linguistics, and one of the things that fascinated me about the field was the fact that human history was alive in language: remote events like the Norman Conquest, the Black Death, and the colonization of the Americas still materially affect how we speak today! This human drama was what first drew me into the discipline, but meanwhile, the things I was studying in synchronic linguistics were rather pale and bloodless by comparison. Linguistic form does have its own appeal, but I was beginning, as an undergraduate, to be nagged by uneasy questions such as: Where are the people? What happened to communication? I was also feeling, in 1970, a lack of relevance in the field. I was a social activist, deeply involved in the anti-war movement, civil rights, and social justice, and it made me uneasy that the linguistics I was studying seemed to be so remote from these concerns.

So this was my state of mind the day I picked up that article, and in it I found the people. I also found the history, the communication, the relevance that was lacking in the rest of the field. Reading Labov’s work, I saw that it matters who the speakers are, and what they have to say, and what they are doing with their language. And he showed me that linguistics as a discipline

matters; that it can have something to say about how we organize our society, and about the search for equality, and dignity, and justice. And the truth of those words shone off that page at me like a revelation, and drew me in, and kept me going along a path that has brought me to where I am today.

But this is not the important thing about William Labov's work. It is not remarkable that he had that effect on me; what is remarkable is that he had a similar effect on so many people. Many people whom I know in the field, including many contributors to these volumes, have similar stories to tell. And all of us in the field are indebted to him in some way. Obviously all of sociolinguistics is in his debt, especially studies of variation, discourse, and nonstandard language varieties. But this is true of many other areas as well: dialectology and historical linguistics, language contact, language education, language acquisition; he has made important contributions right across the field. And, perhaps even more important, he has worked outside the field, and outside of academia, for social justice, against racism and prejudice, and for recognition of the importance of the words and language and logic of the people, the people that are missing from too much of linguistics.

So, in recognition of my mentor and friend, Bill Labov, and to satisfy some of the debt that I and all of us owe him, I wanted to do something to honor him, and carry forward the enterprise that I learned in his laboratory. Now in his case, this was not the simple thing it might seem. When I was a student at Penn, Bill always used to rail against respect for authority. I think that he thinks academic prestige is like linguistic prestige, representing the arbitrary norms of the dominant group, and since he was an iconoclast and a fan of the vernacular in his own work, he never wanted to become part of a respected elite. Nevertheless, there is another kind of importance that is not arbitrary, or based on power and authority, and that is why Bill Labov merits recognition. He is important to all of us in the field because of his stature, not his status; because of the substance of what he has done. So we undertook this project not in deference or reverence for his authority, but in recognition and appreciation of what he has meant to us all.

The next part of the story of this book might be called "The Philadelphia Story", but it is not the Philadelphia story of Hepburn, the Main Line and the upperclass (although some of their story is told herein as well; see the paper by Anthony Kroch). Rather, this is the Other Philadelphia story. It begins in

the early '70s, when Bill Labov moved himself and his work from New York to Philadelphia, to the University of Pennsylvania. That move has turned out to be highly significant for the history of sociolinguistics, and in particular for many of the people involved in this project. Much of Labov's work in the last 25 years has been drawn from his continuing research on language change and variation in Philadelphia. And it was through Labov's Philadelphia projects and other work at Penn that three of the editors (John Baugh, Deborah Schiffrin, and myself), as well as 18 other contributors to this book, got our real education as linguists, and began working towards a social science of language. As it happens, Deborah Schiffrin and I are native Philadelphians, and John Baugh is a native once removed. We all met as students at Penn studying with Labov. Our co-editor Crawford Feagin, as any sociolinguist who hears her speak will realize, is not a native Philadelphian; nevertheless, Labov was her dissertation advisor, and she has had a long involvement with his laboratory and research facilities at Penn, and this is what led to her participation in this project. And there are still other Philadelphia connections among the people involved in this work; Anthony Kroch and Ellen Prince are adopted Philadelphians and colleagues of Bill's at Penn, and Charles Ferguson is a native, as well as a long-time student of the Philadelphia dialect.

Thus it came about that we assembled this cabal of the Other Philadelphians, together with their spiritual kin, the Other New Yorkers, Norwichers, Montrealers, Mineiros, and all the rest, to try to repay part of the debt that we all owe to William Labov, and in the process, to carry forward the enterprise that he in such large measure inspired. In pursuit of this goal, we have put together this book: a two-volume collection of original research papers that are designed to reflect the breadth and depth of the impact that William Labov has had on our discipline. We see his impact as having its greatest effect in four main areas, which are the focus of these volumes. These are areas of linguistic research that would hardly exist, or would be unrecognizably different, without their Labovian content.

First is the study of variation and change; sections I and II of the first volume comprise papers that take this as their central theme, with a focus on either the social context and uses of language (I) or on the internal linguistic dynamics of variation and change (II). Second is the study of African Ameri-

can English, and other language varieties in the Americas spoken by people of African descent and influenced by their linguistic heritage. This, of course, is the area of Labov's work that drew me into the field, and it is the subject of the papers in section III of the first volume. Third is the study of discourse, in which Labov's involvement goes back to his work on narrative (Labov & Waletzky 1967), dwelling descriptions (Linde & Labov 1975), and therapeutic discourse (Labov & Fanshel 1975). The papers in section I of our second volume extend this strand of Labovian linguistics. Fourth is the emphasis on language use, the search for discursive, interactive, and meaningful determinants of the complexity that appears in human communication. Papers with these themes appear in section II of our second volume.

The Philadelphia motif of the story of these volumes appears again in connection with their publication; we are particularly pleased to bring this work to print with the support the John Benjamins Publishing Company, of Philadelphia and Amsterdam. The editors would like to express our appreciation to the people at Benjamins, and particularly to the general editor of the *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory* series, Konrad Koerner.

There are a number of other people who were part of this effort to honor William Labov, and lent their support in many ways, even though their names may not appear on the dustjacket. We cannot do justice to them all, but we particularly want to thank Joshua Fishman, Marilyn Merritt, Arvilla Payne, Haj Ross, and Arthur Spears for all of their efforts. The editors also wish to express our deep appreciation for the assistance we received at various stages in the work on these volumes from the following individuals: Catherine Ball and Kathryn Taylor for help with computer applications beyond our own skills, Joyce Albergotti for providing us with bibliographic materials, James W. Stone for his computer assistance and his editorial pinch-hitting, and especially Marie Kopf and Kaarin Kruus for all their diligent editorial work and long hours at the keyboard. We also thank the York University Department of Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics for the provision of financial support, facilities and supplies, without which this project might never have been completed. Gregory Guy's participation in this project was also supported in part by grant number 410-92-1765 from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Although the publication of these volumes is a happy occasion, our joy is tempered by the loss of one of our contributors, our departed friend, Fernando Tarallo. All who knew him grieve that he cannot be here to celebrate with us. Nevertheless, we take some consolation in being able to memorialize Fernando by publishing here what is his last work.

Finally, a few words about the timing of this project: these volumes are not intended to mark the completion, or even the culmination, of Labov's career. Of course, it is true that he has attained an honorable age, but honors can be given at any age, and this one is, if anything, long overdue. Part of the continuing dynamism of this field is the ongoing contribution that Bill has made and continues to make, and we fully expect to go on being excited by his new ideas for decades to come.

Gregory R. Guy
York University, Toronto
25 February 1995

Foreword
Present at the Creation:
A Reminiscence of the Summer of '63

Michael B. Kac
University of Minnesota

How I, a sophomore at a small college at which linguistics was not among the subjects taught, came to be at the 1963 annual meeting of the Linguistic Circle of New York (now the International Linguistics Society) is a tale best saved for another time. Suffice it to say that on perusing the program I could not help but notice a paper bearing the intriguing title 'The social stratification of *r* in New York City department stores' to be given by one William Labov of Columbia University. As luck would have it, we ended up as lunch companions that Saturday in New York (conferences were shorter in those days!), arguing spiritedly about whether pragmatics could or should be made a part of linguistics. (I believed the answer was 'yes'; Labov was not so sure.)

A month or so passed, summer vacation arrived, and I returned to my parents' home in Westchester County. Since I was only 20 miles north of Manhattan and wanted to take advantage of a golden opportunity to discuss linguistics with someone who actually knew something about it, it seemed reasonable to get in touch with Labov. So I wrote to him and got an answer back in short order inviting me to come to Columbia and see him. He also set me straight on a misapprehension under which I had been operating to that point. I had written to Prof. Labov and had to be told that this was a bit premature, since he was still a graduate student about to begin research on his dissertation.

When we met a few days later, he explained to me something of what the thesis involved. He also told me that he had money from the ACLS for the engagement of an assistant and asked if I might be interested. I told him I was, and that was that — I was hired.

The work in which I participated that summer is reported in Bill's now classic study *The Social Stratification of English in New York City*. The techniques employed therein to obtain reliable data regarding linguistic variability and its relationship to changes in the (perceived) social context, in such common use today, were pioneer stuff back then. It's not often that one gets a chance to see a whole new field of investigation in the making, but that is what I was given in 1963. Bill Labov was inventing quantitative social dialectology, and I was watching him do it.

My first few days on the job were spent mostly in the offices of Columbia's School of Social Work (wherein resided the files containing demographic data on the population from which the sample of subjects for the study was to be drawn) and at the Lower East Side headquarters of Mobilization for Youth — an antipoverty program responsible for conducting the survey in which the data had been compiled.

In the evenings, I accompanied Bill to the sites of a number of pilot interviews. There was a certain amount of agonizing over recording equipment, the state of which would strike anyone brought up in the era of cassettes and integrated circuits as appallingly primitive. The advent of the transistor had at least made it possible to create portable machines of reasonable quality but even they were awkward and bulky; I will confess to having been more than a little anxious about being seen in the streets of some of New York's grimmer neighborhoods carrying valuable electronic gear in a manner that couldn't help but be conspicuous. That the summer passed without incident may partly explain why, my general dislike of New York City notwithstanding, I have never in these many years since felt fearful there for my personal safety.

When the work started in earnest, I went into it with some trepidation. I am not by nature especially gregarious and the thought of approaching complete strangers — let alone ones with the built-in brusqueness and suspicious nature of lifelong New Yorkers — was daunting. At the same time, I could not help but be fascinated by the way in which the nitty-gritty of everyday urban life bore on certain fundamental questions about the nature of language, some of them of a highly abstract nature.

One particular incident, perhaps more than any other, stands out in my mind today as emblematic of the entire experience of that remarkable summer. In an attempt to secure at least limited data from prospective informants who had refused to participate in the study, Bill developed the following

strategy. Taking advantage of the fact that we had worked in different neighbourhoods, and were therefore each unknown on the other's turf, we exchanged territories and, pretending to be conducting a survey regarding television reception under various conditions, had much less difficulty in persuading the recalcitrant subjects to answer a few quick questions which could be asked without requiring that we actually be allowed inside their homes.*

The questions were designed to elicit responses containing certain specific words, such as *off* (to check on the (oh) variable) and *bad* (to do the same for (eh)). Getting the former was easy, requiring only that the informant answer the question 'Is your television set on or off at the following times?' and including some ridiculous hour of the night among the choices. But getting the latter turned out to be considerably less straightforward. The question put was 'Is your reception bad or not so bad when ...' followed by a list of conditions including 'when the vacuum cleaner is running' and others which typically produce electrical interference. But for whatever reason, it turned out to be far more difficult to get people to actually utter the word *bad*.

As luck would have it, I ended up with the toughest nut of all. Angela P. submitted readily to my questioning, but no matter how I tried to put the question about reception with the vacuum cleaner on, all I could get out of her was 'It's okay' and other equally useless variants of this answer. I tried every trick I knew to no avail until finally, with almost no way left to prolong the encounter without beginning to arouse suspicion, I somehow managed to get her to say the magic word. I still remember Bill's delight on listening to the tape afterward, as well as the excellent Chinese dinner he bought me that evening by way of reward.

Bill and I no doubt remember the summer of '63 in quite different ways. For him it was an important step in the advancement of a second career, undertaken at considerable cost both monetarily and psychologically by a person in full maturity. For me it represented a crucial step in a maturation process that still had quite a way to go (and not just intellectually either!). Some of what went into taking that step was exhilarating, some difficult and painful. But it confirmed me more than ever in my vision of what I wanted to do with my life. Others helped later to keep me on course, but it was with Bill looking over my shoulder that I took the first, decisive steps. The readers of this festschrift do not need me to recount the subsequent progress of Bill's distinguished career, nor is there any reason to suppose that they should have

any interest in the small part that I played in it. But it seems appropriate to try to convey some sense of the excitement that accompanied the chance to be a part of what Bill brought into being when it was still in its infancy, and to acknowledge my own indebtedness to my first real linguistic mentor on a significant occasion in his own life.

So thanks, Bill. I needed that.

Note

This entailed recording subjects without their knowledge via a concealed microphone, a breach of ethics with which I will admit to some discomfort. I console myself with the thought that the data elicited by this means could not in any way cause harm to those from whom it was obtained.

I

Social Interaction and Discourse Structures

Discourse Analysis, Structuralism, and the Description of Social Practice*

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1. Introduction

At the time of this writing, it is almost 25 years since Labov's pioneering work on narrative brought discourse analysis squarely within the field of linguistics proper. Previous work in folklore had shown the possibility of structural analysis of traditional and formulaic forms such as folktales (Propp 1968) and oral epics (Lord 1960). Labov extended this analysis to spontaneous forms such as oral narrative of personal experience, and formulated this move as the necessary next level of linguistic analysis: phonology, morphology, syntax, and now, on to discourse.

After a quarter century of work in this model, we have the accumulated experience to ask what a structuralist discourse analysis is, and whether it is sufficient. This paper will argue that any analysis of discourse must have a structural component, but that restricting the analysis to a purely structuralist one necessarily misses most of the important social action which discourse constitutes and in which it participates. We have found that a structuralist discourse analysis is both possible, and necessary, but not sufficient. By this I mean that a purely structuralist account of discourse does not provide us with tools for describing the use of discourse, or to put it in Labov's terms, to explain why anyone says anything. To accomplish this, a discourse theory would have to be completely integrated with an account of the social practices in which discourses are embedded, in order to actually fulfill the initial promise of sociolinguistics: the description of the mutual constitution of linguistic structure, social structure, and social practice.

The last section of this paper attempts to detail what such a theory would look like. To foreshadow this account, we want a theory of discourse structure integrated with an account of social practice which can describe what happens when people talk and what talk makes happen, and which can link the discourse to other social structures and social processes. Further, as we have seen from some previous attempts to incorporate pre-existing social theories into linguistic descriptions, such a theory of social practice must be co-developed with a theory of discourse structure.

2. What is a Structuralist Theory of Language?

In discussing the possible relation between structuralism and a description of social practice, let us begin by examining what is meant by structuralism. Structuralist theories have a number of assumptions.

Assumption 1. It is possible to identify linguistic structures.

This assumption is foundational for every branch of American structural linguistics, and is almost never questioned at the level of phonology, morphology, and syntax. In fact, however, the units at these levels such as word, part of speech, sentence, etc., come out of millennia of social practice of definition. We might even say that the effort of structural linguistics is to develop a technical definition that matches these folk theories at those levels where there is a possible match. That is, we would want there to be a match between any formal definition of the sentence and the folk category of the sentence, as embodied in the social practices of schooling in normative grammar, copy editing for published works such as this one, etc., and we would want to be articulate about the degree to which the match was successful. We would not expect a match for structures like syntactic deep structures, which have no equivalents in social practices outside the practices of linguistics itself.

When Labov first began his work in discourse analysis, it was necessary to establish the study of discourse as a legitimate part of linguistics, by showing that there are indeed units at this level which are accessible to the familiar methods of linguistic analysis. The fear was that the discourse level consisted of a linguistically undifferentiated soup of interaction, which lasted as long as the interaction or conversation lasted. If this were the case, it would mean that there were no units, or at least no units of a size amenable to

linguistic analysis. It was the demonstration of the existence of bounded discourse units of manageable size which made it possible to include discourse as the next level of linguistic analysis above the sentence. The first units so described were the narrative (Labov & Waletzky 1967; Labov 1972b) and the pseudo-narrative of spatial description (Linde 1974; Linde & Labov 1975).

Assumption 2. Structures consist of boundaries, substructures, and their internal relations.

A fundamental assumption of American structural linguistics is that any object of study can best be understood by the identification of its component parts and the rules for properly combining them. In the case of linguistic units, it is assumed that the internal relations of substructures are hierarchical, organized by a principle of inclusion. That is, units at a given level of structure are composed of several units of the immediately preceding level of structure (Lyons 1968). This assumption of hierarchical organization is common to the American structural linguistics of the 1930's, 40's and 50's, as well as to the many varieties of transformational and generative grammar which stem from Chomsky's initial work.

Until Labov's groundbreaking work, however, the existence and the position of the discourse unit in the linguistic hierarchy was not acknowledged. Most theories of syntax did not consider units larger than the sentence. For example, Bloomfield defines the sentence as "an independent form, not included in any larger (complex) linguistic form" (1933:170). This definition was the result of analytic convenience: it was felt that the majority of linguistic regularities could be described at the sentence level and that the description of these regularities provided problems sufficient to occupy as many linguists as cared to participate in the enterprise. For Chomsky, the restriction goes further; the sentence is the basic unit of a formal system which can be exhaustively described by accounting for all the sentences and only the sentences of a given language (Chomsky 1957; Chomsky 1965). However, even working within this approach, it was found that there are relationships between sentences, such as various forms of reference and anaphora, which must be considered in order to understand all the semantic and referential relationships in a text. One strategy which avoids dealing with the problems this raises is to view an entire text as a long sentence composed of shorter sentences joined by *and* or other connectives (Katz & Fodor 1963).

Related to these schools of syntax have been approaches which assume that the sentence is the highest level of linguistic structure, and that anything beyond the boundaries of the sentences is to be treated as the study of context, or the study of pragmatic rules of use. Such approaches are explicitly not structuralist, in that they are not concerned with UNITS of linguistic structure, but with rules or principles of use of linguistic units which may be described by some other theory. The most influential of these theories is Grice's theory of conversational implicature (Grice 1975; Grice 1978), which posits principles of interpretation, and speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969, 1979), which posits a non-linguistic taxonomy of possible illocutionary forces which sentences may convey.

Assumption 3. Structural descriptions are atemporal.

A structural description does not describe the course of a particular production of an instance of a linguistic unit, but a structure abstracted from the situation of its use. This is a necessary move if the description of the discourse unit is to be part of a formal grammar of linguistic structures, since such grammars are necessarily atemporal, being responsible to a description of competence rather to a specifically time-based instance of performance. Therefore, a structuralist discourse analysis necessarily omits the social practice of the production of the discourse unit, and the role that the discourse unit plays in the ongoing creation of the interaction, since these are fundamentally temporal, social and historical questions.

3. Is Structuralism Necessary for Discourse Analysis?

We may now ask why discourse analysis should be a structuralist enterprise. One obvious answer is that the entire project of American linguistics is fundamentally structuralist: to be seen as doing real linguistics, one must do structuralism. More specifically, when Labov began his work on narrative, there was some hope that by describing narrative as a structural unit, it could be used as an environment for specifying contexts of syntactic variables. For example, a formal grammar of English gives active and passive constructions as variants, since they have the same truth conditions. Showing that there were social constraints on such syntactic variation would be extremely important, since it would extend the entire sociolinguistic enterprise of describing the conditioning of variation beyond the phonological and morphological to

the syntactic level. In attempting to do such studies, it was necessary to specify the contexts in which we can expect to find, for example, active/passive alternation. And in order to specify these contexts, it was necessary to go to the next linguistic level up, just as specification of phonological contexts required the specification not only of phonological contexts, but morphological and word classes as well.

This possibility of extending the sociolinguistic enterprise to syntax through the use of discourse seemed to be a promising venture, and had some early successes. For example, the study of apartment layout descriptions as a discourse unit (Linde 1974; Linde & Labov 1975) was able to show the effects of discourse structure on such syntactic features as the placement of sentence boundaries, the choice of mobile verbs versus static prepositional phrases, and the matching of the social importance of a room with the importance of the syntactic component in which it is placed (i.e., rooms are introduced in main clauses, closets in prepositional phrases). Another success was the demonstration of the historical present in narrative as a variable conditioned by the speaker's perception of the relation between speaker and addressees (Wolfson 1978).

However, this approach has not been as fruitful as was originally hoped. There have been limited successes, but they have not led the way to a flourishing study of the conditioning of syntactic variables by discourse. Why has this been the case? Many researchers would claim that the problem is that the notion of variables does not apply at the syntactic level in the same way as it does at the phonetic level. That is, (aeh) may have variants whose raising is conditioned by social rather than phonological factors. But it is not the case that active and passive can be assumed, a priori, to be meaning-free variants of the same underlying syntactic structure. For example, Lavandera (1978) argues that such an analysis is problematic, since each syntactic construction must be understood to have a distinct referential meaning; that is, there are no exact equivalents at the level of syntax, and hence the model of phonological variation does not apply.

Looking at the problem from the other direction, what discourse constrains is not syntactic variants, but meaning variants. That is, at any given point in a narrative, the narrative may require the expression of the event which happened next. But there is a wide range of different kinds of variants which can express this: lexical choice of transitive or intransitive verbs, which thereby permits or blocks the possibility of active/passive variation, nominalization versus choice of a full sentence, etc.

This suggests that earlier successes in grammatical description in discourse contexts such as the apartment layout description were partially due to the constraints imposed on the choice of syntactic and discourse structure by the structure of the material being described. These limited cases, which were, in effect, naturally occurring experiments, could not be expected to yield a methodology that could generalize to less constrained discourse units such as narrative.

The above discussion speaks to the question of the use that was to be made of a structuralist discourse analysis, and the reasons why this did not succeed. We may also ask whether the description of narrative structure can actually be fully structuralist. Note that even the choice of narrative as the unit to be described smuggles in social practice. "Recapitulation of past events" is itself a social practice, and an enormously important one in the constitution of social life. This is the reason for choosing narrative rather than any one of a large number of other discourse units: for reasons that are social rather than structural, it is the primary discourse unit (Linde 1992). In addition, what counts as a past event can not be specified as a structural unit; it is rather the result of the convergence of individual experience and creativity with social conventions on reportability: what counts as an event is what a speaker can formulate as something that addressees can accept as a recognizable and reportable event. In contrast, there is no such negotiation necessary for what is to count as a well-formed word or sentence. Thus, to describe what will be accepted as a well-formed narrative requires a description of social facts and assumptions of a given community, as well as a formal description of syntactic and discourse structures.

4. What Other Approaches are Possible?

Let us consider what other approaches could be taken to the study of discourse. It is possible to produce an entirely non-structuralist description of the function of a discourse, that is, a description of its use within a matrix of social practices. Within anthropology and folklore, there have been a number of excellent examples of this approach. For example, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1975) looks at the use of traditional Yiddish folk tales, and shows that they are not used as a purely recreational art form, but, at least on some occasions, are told with reference to a particular context of current activities, and gain

their relevance by the connection their tellers and hearers draw between the events which are narrated and the circumstances of participants in the occasion of a retelling. She examines an instance of a Yiddish speaker describing how she had used a traditional parable to defuse a tense situation in her brother's family.

- (1) Dvora: I have to tell you something and this was a true fact. Once I was at my brother's and the atmosphere was tense. My brother had promised the kids to take them to a show over and over again and he was busy in the office and he had no time. Are you listening?

Al: Yea.

Dvora: Next time. And he was busy and each time he made an appointment something else come up and the kids were disappointed. It was an afternoon show, a morning show. Nothing worked.

I come in and my sister-in-law, Ruth, was upset and the kids were crying and my brother says, "O.K." This was nine o'clock. "We can go to a show now." Nine o'clock nobody wants to go to a show. It was late and there was just no point. So I saw there was going to be a revolution because he couldn't understand why they can't go to a show. The kids realized that he should have gone when he made the promise to go so many times. Ruth felt that he was unfair and I thought at this point they need something to break the ice because the atmosphere was just too thick. So I says, "You know, this reminds me of a story."

No. My brother comes up and he says, "Dvora, tell me, what is wrong with a father wanting to take his children to a show? What have I done? Have I committed a crime? I want my children to go with me to a show. They all say I'm doing something wrong. What's wrong?"

So I says, "I'll tell you. It reminds me of a story my mother used to tell me."

A man once came to a rabbi to ask a *shayle* ['question regarding ritual purity'] forgiveness.

He says, "What is it? What did you do?"

He says, "I didn't wash, I didn't say the prayer before the meal."

He says, "How come?"

He says, "Because I didn't wash my hands."

He says, "Well, why didn't you wash your hands?"

He says, "Because I wasn't eating Jewish food."

He says, "How come you weren't eating Jewish food?"

"Because I was eating in a Gentile restaurant."

He says, "How come?"

"Because it was *Yonkiper* [Yom Kippur, the day of Atonement, most solemn Jewish holiday and fast day, when every man's fate for the coming year is said to be decided] and the Jewish restaurants were closed."

So this, I said, reminds me of my brother. "Why can't I take them to the show?" Here he had made so many promises and so many disappointments. He couldn't understand how come the kids didn't want to go to the show. (1975:109-110)

In its context, this tale was extraordinarily effective, causing everyone, even the rebuked brother, to laugh, and leading to a family reconciliation about the father's string of broken promises. Note that both the speaker, in her analysis of the event, and the analyst who agrees with this analysis, focus on the parallelism between the events playing out in the family, and the events described by the folktale. The parallelism of events suggests but does not insist upon the possibility of a parallelism of evaluation between the two situations: the incorrectness of focusing on the narrowest possible description of an improper action, rather than the widest.

Narayan (1989), in a study of the religious function of the telling of traditional stories by an Indian guru, similarly stresses the function of parallelism between the interpretation of the story and the proposed interpretation of the conduct or beliefs of the addressees, but shows the openness of the interpretive process. This work adds the additional component of follow-up interviews with the members of the audience of a number of these storytelling sessions. The interviews find that different members of the audience may draw diametrically opposed interpretations of a given story told at a given time. For example, one of the stories concerned a false guru, who had had his nose cut off for theft, and who then drew a group of disciples around him and convinced them that by cutting off their noses too, they too could come to see God. In the course of the story, the guru telling it made references to members of the audience, identifying gullible characters in the story as being like this one or that one in the audience. When the ethnographer later questioned the

members of the audience, she found a range of different interpretations. One disciple recently arrived in India took the story as providing historical insight on the complexities of what happens in mysterious India. Another hearer, an older Indian woman, identified it as an anti-cult story which was explosive to tell in a cult setting. A third member of the audience mentioned that when he was going to America, the guru instructed him not to cut off noses. While the ethnographer interpreted this as an obvious and unambiguous injunction not to set up as a false guru, the addressee interpreted it as an injunction not to destroy people's faith. This range of possible interpretations suggests an additional function of traditional religious storytelling: rather than an invariant doctrinal formulation, it is a mode of teaching which is interpretatively open depending on the situation and level of understanding of the addressees.

In both of these cases, the speaker appears to be exploiting the ambiguity of possible similarities between the content of the story and the content of the situation in which it is told. The exploitation of ambiguity comes from the fact that the speaker does not explicitly draw the parallels; they are left for the audience to recognize or not recognize. It is important to note that both of these examples from the field of folklore represent a developing re-examination of that field: a move from a purely structural orientation to an interest in the situations of performance and the rekeyings and reproductions effected by performance (Bauman 1992; Bauman & Sherzer 1989; Briggs, 1989).

A more complex example of a description of the interaction of varying discourses comes from Kondo (1990). This ethnography of modern Japanese craft and small-factory workers examines the uses of what she calls "the discourse of the family" as deployed by both employer and employees to negotiate their shifting identities. (Note that the use of the term *discourse* here is similar to Foucault's (1972, 1980), rather than that employed within linguistics. That is, rather than discourse as a bounded unit, discourse here refers to the characteristic talk (or writing) by persons in specified power relations, as part of given kinds of social practice. In this sense, we can talk about medical discourse, psychoanalytic discourse, etc.) The social basis of the discourse which Kondo studied is the traditional view of the employer and employee as being in a familial or quasi-familial relation. This represents an alternative to the modern Western view of the relation of employer and employee as contractual, a rationally negotiated and legally enforceable set of rights and obligations. This Western view is also present in modern Japan, and provides an alternate form of discourse which speakers may use as the basis

for critique. Thus an employer may criticize an employee for not feeling properly grateful; a critique from within a discourse of the family. Or an employee may complain that the boss does not understand how crucial part-timers are to the working of the business, and some day, she will just up and quit; a critique from within the discourse of contractual obligations. What is particularly interesting about the Japanese case is that what the author calls the discourse of the family actually has linguistic consequences: a whole range of morphological and lexical choices which are only appropriate in the intimacy of the family situation, and by extension, the quasi-family. A shift in the morphological choices can be used to signal a shift from a construction of the situation as being familial, 'inside' to one which is formal, 'outside'. This can have serious consequences; "there is no more chilling or more sardonic way to quarrel in Japanese than to suddenly become icily polite with people you know well, ... precisely because it puts one's intimate friends in the category of outsider." This study gives us part of a very valuable insight into the interaction of social practice and the discourses which constitute it. In order to complete the description, we would need a detailed analysis of the linguistic structure of the discourses themselves.

5. Unified Approach to the Analysis of Discourse

The approaches described in the last section give accounts of the ways that various discourses or discourse units function in specified social contexts. That is, they give an account of the discourse as social practice. But in general, such accounts of social practice do not require an account of the discourse structure; they concentrate on the content of the discourse. We may now consider the possibility of combining the two approaches; that is, to describe the social, collaborative creation of discourse structures.

Some would argue that such a combination is impossible, offering conversation analysis (CA) as the only empirical functional approach to interaction, which stands in fundamental opposition to a structuralist discourse analysis (see, for example, Levinson 1983). The strict view of CA presents it as relentlessly anti-structural. It rejects the possibility of an *a priori* account of an abstract discourse structure, preferring instead to focus on the moment by moment creation of social order. However, when we look at actual studies in CA, such accounts actually make use of categories of linguistic structure,

either explicitly, or by smuggling them in through the back door. For example, the classic account of turntaking (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974) requires the *a priori* categories of surface sentential syntax: in order to know when it is permissible to self-select as a next speaker, a participant must be able to identify a possible ending of a sentence. And this is a structural category, not an interactional one. That is, the speaker must attend not only to the subject matter and the ongoing interaction, but also to the syntax.

Similarly, we see in Charles and Marjorie Goodwin's work on narrative (C. Goodwin 1984, 1986; C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin 1987) exactly the combination of the two approaches which I have been arguing for here: a use of the categories provided by discourse analysis for the internal structure of narratives as part of a description of the practice of how speakers collaboratively construct these units. For example, they show that such subunits of narrative structure as preface, background, climax, and parenthesis sections are relevant to the task of the participants, who must exhibit different types of reactions in different sections (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987). Although this analysis does not cite the existing literature on the structure of discourse units, these units match exactly the categories posited by Labov (1972b). The important point is that this work shows that the two approaches can be profitably combined, with no loss of theoretical rigor. What remains to be specified is an explicit discussion of the consequences of such a combination.

6. Relation of Structural Units and Social Practice

As the previous section has attempted to show, there is in principle no necessary opposition between the discourse units and structures postulated by a structural analysis, and the patterns discovered by a study of the practices of speakers as they create those discourse units. However, when we examine the ways in which the two types of analysis can be properly combined, we find that for the combination to work, the postulated discourse structure must be part of the social practice of creating the unit. The claim such a complementary approach would make is that if a discourse structure is correctly described, it has a reality for the way in which speakers actually use it, and that it is possible to see this reflected in speakers' practice.

Note that this claim is made for units at the discourse level, where it is possible to see evidence of the social reality or unreality of these units. This

discussion does not require settling the question of the psychological reality of any linguistic units such as sentential syntactic structures, or especially postulated deep structures. Much of the research done on this issue does not bear directly on the point being argued here, since it is not the demonstration of PSYCHOLOGICAL reality that is required, but rather SOCIAL reality.

In order to demonstrate the importance of describing discourse structures which form part of the social practice of speakers, let us compare two analyses from Labov's work on discourse. In the first case, we see a structural category posited which is shown to have social meaning for the participants; in the second case, the posited category has meaning for the analyst but has not been shown to be part of the social practice of the speakers.

In his classic paper on ritual insults in the African American English vernacular (AAVE), Labov discusses not only the structure of this speech event, but also the ways in which particular examples of *sounds* (i.e., ritual insults) are evaluated by participants in this speech event (Labov 1972a). The issue of evaluation by participants, which arises for every speech event and discourse unit, is particularly salient for sounds since this is an explicitly competitive speech event, in which the quality of each sound is evaluated overtly and immediately by the audience. Sounds which participants admire as excellent are greeted by laughter, overt comments, or repetition of part of the sound; poor sounds are labeled as phony, corny, or lame. Labov shows that at least one dimension of evaluation which members use corresponds to the linguist's judgment of syntactic complexity. That is, sounds which a syntactic analysis would identify as complex are highly evaluated by participants. Some examples are:

- (2) Bell grandmother got so many wrinkles in her face, when they walk down the street, her mother would say, "Wrinkles and ruffles."
- (3) J1: Who father wear raggedy drawers?
J2: Yeh, the ones with so many holes in them when-a-you walk, they whistle.

This point has political as well as theoretical importance, since in early discussions of AAVE, it was important to demonstrate the potential of this dialect for syntactic complexity, in order to defuse arguments that this was not a dialect at all but a compendium of mistakes, or that it was a primitive and essentially worthless dialect (Labov 1972c). Labov's argument about sounds shows (albeit by anecdotal rather than quantitative evidence) that an abstract

property, syntactic complexity, which is identifiable and valued by linguists, is also identifiable and valued by speakers themselves. That is, syntactic complexity is implicitly a members' category.

In contrast, let us consider Labov's account of internal versus external evaluation in narrative (Labov 1972b). This account establishes the crucial point that evaluation is what narrative is about, why the narrator tells the story, what the addressee is intended to understand. A taxonomy of evaluation is developed which ranges from external to internal evaluation, where internal evaluation is expressed by events or characters within the narrative, and external evaluation is expressed by the narrator stepping outside the frame of the narrative to explain directly to the addressee the meaning of the events narrated. Examples of external evaluation are given in (4), taken from a narrative about a plane trip in which the plane almost didn't make it over the mountains:

- (4) ... and it was the strangest feeling because you couldn't tell if they were really gonna make it
if they didn't make it, it was such a small little plane, there was no chance for anyone
But it was really quite terrific
But it was quite an experience

In contrast, internal evaluation takes place within the flow of the narrative, and does not break out to address the addressee. So the narrator may report something which he or she said that indicates the meaning of the experience:

- (5) I just closed my eyes. I said, "Oh my God, here it is!"

Or the speaker may introduce a third person who evaluates the meaning of the actions:

- (6) But that night the manager, Lloyd Burrows, said, "You better pack up and get out because that son of a bitch never forgives anything once he gets it in his head."

Or the speaker may tell about actions which highlight the meaning of the events, as in this example from a narrative about an accident at maritime training school, when a rope broke and left the speaker hanging on a mast-head:

- (7) I never prayed to God so fast and so hard in my life!
(What happened?)

Well the boys came up and they got me. I couldn't touch nuttin'. I was shakin' like a leaf.

This taxonomy of external versus internal evaluation is an interesting construction which gives us a scheme for coding types of evaluations. It is an attempt by an analyst to impose a structuralist categorization system on the apparently unbounded range of ways in which people can effect evaluations in their narratives. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that it corresponds to any categories which speakers themselves use to evaluate good versus bad storytelling. (It should be noted that speakers do judge narratives and narrators. They regularly decide that someone should tell a given story because she tells it well. And they are certainly capable of identifying the best storytellers in their social circles.)

Let us then consider what such a taxonomy of evaluative devices could mean. It might be the case that although this category system does not correspond to speakers' own evaluative judgments, it does in fact vary along the familiar sociolinguistic dimensions of class, gender, age, etc. Such a finding would indicate that the classification scheme had some reflex in practice. It would, however, still leave open the question of what the status of such a taxonomy is, if it is not a system of variables which speakers themselves recognize or attach meaning to. However, in the absence of such a demonstration, its status is simply one of an indefinite number of categorizations which could be made. The argument of this paper is that it is exactly those category systems that correspond to social practice that are most fruitful in extending discourse analysis.

7. Future Directions for Discourse Analysis

Thus far, we have examined the ways in which discourse analysis is a structuralist enterprise, and the ways in which it can go beyond the structure of the discourse to give an account of discourse as a social practice. In this section, we will first make an explicit statement of the appropriate ways in which a formal description of discourse structures and an ethnographic description of discourse as a social practice can properly be, and must be interwoven. We will then discuss a number of different levels on which this can be done.

An adequate description of discourse structure as social practice must have three properties. First, the structural units described must be natural units, that is, units which speakers themselves recognize and preferably name. (This is one of the key insights which the ethnography of speaking gives us about speech events: the ethnographer describes those units which the speakers themselves pick out.)

Second, the description must show that speakers and addressees not only pick out the units, but respond to the internal structural divisions with different forms of interaction. We see the beginning of this kind of description in Sacks (1974). The Goodwins' work on the collaborative construction of narratives provides an important demonstration that during a session when a narrative is being produced the primary speaker and the other interlocutors respond to different interactional requirements in different sections of the narrative. Demonstrations of this sort are essential for building up a grounded linkage between discourse structure and social practice.

An important next step in this project would be to study speakers' own practices of meta-evaluation: that is, the ways in which speakers label, judge, accept, reject, alter and retool discourse units such as stories, descriptions, jokes, etc. (Briggs 1989). It would also be very important to study the reputations as speakers that people develop within a community, the basis of these reputations, their relation to other forms of power and membership in the community, and the social consequences of such attributions. That is, as we have noted, members of a given community can identify good storytellers, people who should not be allowed to try to tell a joke, people who are not worth listening to, people who talk too much, who never have anything to say for themselves, and so on. It would be very important to discover how these specializations develop, and how many identifiable discourse roles can exist, both for individuals and groups of people. Particularly, for many years, the question of what makes a good storyteller has haunted almost everyone who has looked at oral narration. I believe that this is because the difference between good and bad storytellers is so striking that no *a priori* belief in equal linguistic competence is enough to eradicate one's marveling. It is finally time, therefore, for us to get serious about trying to answer that question, using not our own judgments as analysts, but the judgments of the members of the speech communities themselves.

The third property necessary for a description of discourse structure and social practice is an integration of linguistic and social theory. That is, it is insufficient to import categories and analyses wholesale from existing social

theories, since a social theory developed prior to any linguistic analysis could not be adequate to the task of specifying how linguistic structure and social practice co-emerge. This is the case not only for discourse theory, but at any level of linguistic analysis (cf. Eckert 1990, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992). That is, neither the social theory nor the linguistic theory can be viewed as a plug-in add-on to the other. Rather, the social theory must be developed in parallel with the linguistic theory.

To illustrate what this would mean, I will describe three attempts at different levels to describe the relation of linguistic structure and social practice. The first extends the limits of what can count as a unit, the second makes a link between discourse level presuppositions of relevance and social ideology, and the third begins with the social practice of evaluation and considers its role in building discourses.

7.1 *The extension of units*

The extension of discourse units attempts to allow us to study discontinuous, open discourse units, that is, units which are always under construction and which speakers return to again and again. One such example is the life story (Linde 1987a, 1993). I have defined the life story as a discontinuous unit which is told over the course of a speaker's entire lifetime, which consists of all the stories, and associated discourse units, such as explanations and chronicles, and the connections between them, that satisfy the following two criteria: (1) the stories and associated discourse units contained in the life story have as their primary evaluation a point about the speaker, not a general point about the way the world is; (2) the stories and associated discourse units have extended reportability. That is, they are tellable and are told and retold over the course of a long period of time.

The unit which this definition picks out is unlike the units of discourse which we have examined so far: it is temporally discontinuous, and incomplete at any given telling of one of its component parts. The usual assumption is that the unmarked linguistic unit is a continuous one. In practice, of course there are many marked cases which show that this assumption is not universally true. At the level of morphology, we find discontinuous constituents. Some English examples are: *not only ... but also, if ... then*, and *on the one hand ... on the other hand*. At the sentence level, we recognize the existence

both of interruptions by others and parenthetical remarks by the speaker. At the discourse level we can observe both side sequences by addressees, which temporally interrupt the speaker's ongoing discourse but do not take command of the floor from the speaker, and actual interruptions, either linguistic or nonlinguistic, which stop, either temporarily or permanently, the speaker's ongoing discourse (Jefferson 1972).

These examples, however, are marked, both linguistically and socially. The life story, however, is a unit which is *NECESSARILY* discontinuous. As the definition states, parts of it are told on different occasions, to different addressees. And it is defined as the total of all the stories of a particular kind, told in the course of a lifetime; it would be impossible to tell the entire life story continuously, even on one's deathbed.

In addition to being a discontinuous unit, the life story is also an open unit, one which is begun and continued without a clear requirement at any given time of what its final shape will turn out to be. An open unit is one whose structure is not tightly constrained, so that the beginning of the unit does not strongly predict the possibilities of what the middle and end may be. The life story is thus a unit which is both structurally and interpretively open; it is much more like an ongoing soap opera than a single grand opera or even a cycle of operas (like Wagner's Ring Cycle). The structural property of temporal discontinuity has the consequence that a life story necessarily is constantly changing, by the addition of stories about new events, by the loss of certain old stories, and by the reinterpretation of old stories to express new evaluations.

7.2 Coherence systems and discourse presuppositions

The life story is a unit which, although discontinuous and open, can still be viewed as a structural unit. We now turn to the coherence system, which is not itself a structural linguistic unit, but which stands at the boundary between linguistic structure and discursive practice, linking the presuppositions which serve to make a statement relevant within a discourse unit, and larger issues of ideology and belief systems within a given culture. Such an example is the coherence system, which is a system of beliefs and relations between beliefs which provide the environment in which one statement may or may not be taken as a cause for another statement, and which is historically derived from systems of expert practice (Linde 1993).

To illustrate this definition of the coherence system, let us turn to two (constructed) example pairs. Example (8) gives a reason which relies on common sense beliefs to account for professional choice.

- (8) a. How did you come to be an accountant?
 b. Well, I guess I have a precise mind, and I enjoy getting all the little details right.

In contrast, in order to understand (9b) as a relevant answer to (9a), the hearer must know if not share the popular Freudian coherence system which locates the real causes of events in early childhood.

- (9) a. How did you come to be an accountant?
 b. Well, my mother started toilet training me when I was six months old.

I have defined the coherence system as a system of beliefs and relations between beliefs which provides the conceptual environment in which something may or may not be understood as a cause of something else (Linde 1987b). Thus, within a Freudian coherence system, the course of development of childhood sexuality may be seen as causal for adult personality, while in other systems, one would look elsewhere for the shaping of character, or might not seek it at all.

The coherence systems which I have found in the life story data are either popular versions of expert systems or the system of common sense, the most pervasive coherence system and the most unnoticed. Common sense is that system of beliefs which is assumed to be shared by everyone in a given culture, and which requires no special circumstances or standing for its use. Thus, a speaker who said *I quit banking because I didn't like it* would be invoking a coherence principle from common sense coherence system. In contrast, a speaker who said *I quit banking because my father was a banker, and I've always had a love-hate thing with my father* would be constructing an explanation which relies on the semi-expert coherence system of psychology.

The coherence system is not itself a linguistic unit in the structuralist sense. That is, it is not a unit of discourse, but rather a related set of beliefs, with historical roots in social practice. These beliefs function as presuppositions, which permit the easy establishment of certain discourses and make others very difficult or impossible.

The postulation of such coherence systems allows us to demonstrate how discourse structures are part of the reproduction of ideologies, an extremely

important part of understanding discourse as social practice. That is, they allow us to make the link between narration and larger scale levels of belief and practice. For example, Kondo (1990) demonstrates how craft workers use life story narratives not only to understand their position in the contemporary Japanese economy, but also to negotiate it with others, using narratives as a strategic tool for bettering their own position and treatment. This is an excellent example of the kind of study that is necessary to understand the micro-structure of social practice. However, Kondo does not make the link between coherence systems, ideology, and the structure of the discourse, exactly because she makes no use of the structuralist category of evaluation. This link is crucial for actually building up from the solid work of discourse analysis to what has been up to now the somewhat gaseous discussion of ideology and the reproduction of social structure in discourse.

Let us briefly sketch what such a link would have to look like. Danziger (1989:225-226) gives an example which we can use as a starting point. He describes a forum on "Returning to Judaism" in which two newly Orthodox Jews described their process of returning to Judaism. The first speaker was a young woman who had had a non-religious upbringing, knowing only that her family was Jewish. She had moved directly from a period as a Jesus freak to a return to Jewish Orthodoxy after an encounter over several days with a powerful and convincing speaker.

In closing, she said,

- (10) "I found Ha-Shem [Hebrew for "the Name", a reference to God]. I was at peace, I felt great joy. I felt Ha-Shem was in me, that He loved me and cared for me." Turning to the audience, she said, "You have to find Ha-Shem, to feel His love, to let Him come into your heart."

Somehow this struck a false note with the audience of modernistic Orthodox ranging in age from fifteen to about fifty-five, with most in the thirty-five to forty-five age bracket. Most were professionals, both men and women. Those who were more involved and educated in Judaism were particularly skeptical of the young woman. They doubted that she would long remain Orthodox.

The young man followed with a description of his return. He had become friendly with a neighbor who was Orthodox. His neighbor's practices intrigued him. He enjoyed the warmth and family life that accompanied the observance of the Sabbath and the

holidays. Slowly he began some of these practices himself. His neighbor, while not affiliated with Lubavitch, admired the group's welcoming approach to other Jews and suggested that he contact Lubavitch to learn more about Orthodox Judaism. Through his neighbor and Lubavitcher tutors he has learned about Orthodoxy. He currently observes the laws of Shabbat and kashrut and continues to study with Lubavitch.

This young man's talk was accepted by the audience as the story of someone who would probably remain Orthodox. Somehow his story was authentic while hers was inauthentic. Her story attaches her to Ha-Shem; his attaches him to the Jewish people, to community. Her story speaks of the sense of being loved by God; his speaks of study, of growing knowledge and awareness of Jewish law and practice. Her transformation was swift; his was slow. Finally, his story leaves him a beginner, one still learning from others. Her story places her in a position to proclaim a message to others, to be a leader.

Both, of course, are telling their own stories as they knew them. Inquiry several years later revealed that both had remained Orthodox. But whereas her story was acceptable in Christianity, it was not acceptable in Judaism. The audience considered it false because it did not fit into the patterns of accepted motivation for Judaism. [Returnees] who tell such stories describing their motivation meet with incredulity. The repetition of such stories is discouraged, and a different account or biography of return is constructed, with neither the community nor the returnee aware of this process.

This account is important because it gives a sketch of the kind of research we would need to make the link between narrative structure, coherence systems, and social practices. To recast the author's analysis, the young man told a narrative whose structure, including what it picks out as events, its evaluations, and its coherence system was compatible with the ideology to which he had converted. The young woman told a narrative whose structure would have been appropriate for a Christian fundamentalist conversion, but was inappropriate for Judaism. On this basis, the audience made a judgment, which was in fact wrong, about the sincerity and likely duration of these people's conversions. Unfortunately the author does not give full verbatim transcripts of these narratives. An extremely important direction for future

research would be to gather such narratives, and the social process of converts learning to tell narratives whose structure fits the ideology or religion to which they have been converted.

For another example of the same sort, let us consider Alcoholics Anonymous. AA is an organization which is based on the conversion of people's lives through the process of narrative recounting. That is, one of the important parts of the program is that a newcomer learns to understand, and usually tell his or her story as the story of an alcoholic, to recast the entire past life as demonstrating that the narrator is indeed powerless over alcohol, just as the ideology describes (Cain 1991; "Elpenor" 1987). A newcomer learns by hearing stories told in meetings, whose structure is exactly the telling of one exemplary narrative with comments, by reading the "Big Book", a collection of stories of alcoholics of the effects of drinking on their lives and the process of coming to admit that they are powerless over their drinking, and by beginning to tell their own stories and the social process of the shaping and correction of those stories. The shaping is to a structure of recounting: What it was like, what it is like now, and how sobriety is maintained on a daily basis. That is, certain formulations of stories accord with the beliefs of AA, and can be told and their telling will be approved, even if they recount what is normally considered socially reprehensible behavior. For example, auto accidents caused by driving while drunk, or stealing money from one's children to buy liquor will fit into the kinds of narratives which work within the AA ideology. Other stories do not accord with the beliefs of AA, and could not be told without argument or correction, although the behavior they recount is not in other contexts reprehensible (or perhaps even reportable). For example, a story, proudly told at an AA meeting, about going to Uncle Henry and Aunt Matilda's 50th wedding anniversary, and having one glass of champagne to toast them, and then stopping, or a story about taking pain pills for a root canal operation would challenge the fundamental AA tenet that alcoholics are incapable of normal social drinking or use of drugs, and should never try it. Cain (1991) gives examples in which speakers are corrected for contradicting basic AA tenets or for misinterpreting the events of their own lives. We see here constraints not only on what evaluations are possible, that is, what meanings an event may be given, but even constraints on what is allowed as a possible event in a narrative.

The AA example is of particular interest because it is a group which uses narration as a central practice of transformation. This is a strong contrast to

the previous case of returnees to Orthodox Judaism, where an audience on a particular occasion judged the likelihood of speakers' remaining Orthodox on the basis of their story structure. However, the practices that they must continue as part of remaining Orthodox were not primarily narrative, but involved a complex set of practices around study, prayer, food preparation, observation of the Sabbath, etc.

7.3 *From social practice to discourse construction*

Finally, a different approach would be to start with a social practice, and attempt to determine all the factors which lead to its linguistic realization in a particular form, in a particular discourse unit. A valuable site for deploying this analytic strategy is found in the practice of evaluation. As we have already seen, evaluation is a vital component of narrative. But in fact, evaluation is also an extremely pervasive social practice by which interactants identify or negotiate the social meaning or value of a person, thing, event or relationship. Evaluation comes into play not only when we recount the past, but also when something new enters our joint world, and requires a response.

The classic sociolinguistic approach to evaluation would be to study it in a corpus of examples of a given discourse unit. But we can also begin with a consideration of evaluation as a social practice, studying all examples of evaluation in all the discourse units of a given data corpus. This approach has been taken to the study of the socially negotiated evaluation of a new communications technology (Linde 1991, 1995).

Let us first consider evaluation as a social practice in this situation: a new technology has been introduced into a work site. Any new object can call for a social determination of its value. A communications technology in particular requires joint work to learn it, and will alter the nature of the group's work. In addition, an individual's ability or inability to learn the new technology, or the decision to do so or not, has serious consequences for that person's identity and position in the work world. All of these factors lead to the presence of a great deal of negotiation of the group's opinion of the technology.

Secondly, there are instances of evaluation which result from the interaction of technological factors and conversational rules. One frequent use of evaluation is a form of gap management in ongoing activities. Because of the nature of this technology, it is necessarily the case that people will be working together on the telephone, with large gaps in the interaction introduced by the

technology. That is, if one person decides to send another a fax, it can take between one and two minutes for the fax to be received. If the work group needs the document to continue with their work, the technological delay has introduced an interactional gap. Further, the technology does not give an accurate indication of how long the gap will be. This delay of uncertain duration is particularly problematic since many of the work sessions we have filmed involve communication by the telephone. This means that the co-workers can not see one another, do not know what the other is doing in the gap, and may not be sure that the channel is still open. This leads to filling the gap with talk. One very common filler for this gap is evaluation of the technology. In this kind of case, we see three factors working together to shape the discourse: the availability of evaluation as social practice, the presence of technologically introduced gaps in the interaction, and the turn-taking rules which prefer no extended gaps.

Finally, we may consider the discourse functions of evaluation. One major discourse function of evaluation is as an end marker for a discourse unit or a section of activity. This finding is familiar from studies of narrative and planning. In work on the management of the agendas of informal meetings (Linde 1991), I have shown that evaluation can serve as a preclosing bid. This work showed that one very common way of ending an agenda item at a meeting is by an evaluation of some feature of the discussion: whether it is the work that has just been done, the plans that have been made, one of the topics discussed, or the value of the entire prior discussion. Thus, the discourse structure itself gives preferred locations for this ongoing and pervasive social practice.

Work of this sort provides an important demonstration of the value of description of the interaction of constraints at the level of discourse structure, social practice, interactional structure and the operational demands of a situation in which interaction takes place. It is integrated descriptions of this kind which will take us the furthest in linking linguistic structure and social practice.

8. Conclusion

The previous section has sketched a series of proposals which show how it is possible to build up in a principled way from the level of the structure of the

discourse unit to much larger scale descriptions of linguistic and social practice, and further, that such larger scale descriptions can be adequate only if the structure of discourse is rigorously described. This is obviously important for such fields as the description of social practice, ethnography of speaking, and social history. It might be argued that this represents linguistics used in the service of other fields, rather than an integral part of linguistics proper. But such an argument would stem from an unnecessarily restricted sense of the domain of linguistics.

At the heart of this argument is the question of the proper domain of linguistics. If the scope of linguistics is to account for abstract structures, then studies of social practices of language use are of no direct value. But this is certainly not the only possible formulation of the task. Functional grammar has already extended the task of linguistics to account for some of the cognitive and pragmatic factors which determine syntactic structure. We must now extend the scope of linguistics to account for the production of individual instances of linguistic structure. Linguistics must account for the factors which led a given sentence to be shaped in the way it was, and how that is similar or different to others of its type. For such an enterprise, the study of social practice becomes invaluable.

What I am proposing here is a large-scale research program, which requires its own free-standing manifesto. I here sketch some few examples of how this might proceed.

It is systems of social practice which form the context for what can count as a major event, a minor event, or a non-event. These have effects on the choice of sentential syntax: for example, the choice of a syntactic component for reporting the presence of a room versus a closet (Linde 1974). Similar constraints apply at the discourse level for what can be framed as a key event: Danziger's account (1989) of acceptable and non-acceptable reasons for a return to Orthodox Judaism provides an example.

Similarly, it is a system of social practice which shapes presupposition: what can be presupposed to be true, what must be stated, and what can not be presupposed and must be defended if it is introduced at all. A study of presupposition in Alcoholics Anonymous narratives would be an ideal site for exploring this issue.

One key issue which sentential syntax expresses is agency and causality. Again, it is systems of social practice which delimit what kinds of agency and causality can be assumed in different contexts. As an example, let us consider

some life story narratives told by a speaker using a behaviorist coherence system. This system, derived from Skinner's psychology, denies agency to individual, locating causality in external re-enforcement. The syntax mirrors this belief, using forms which are startlingly non-agentive.

This speaker does not express personal agency in the way that most speakers do. Normally, speakers describe their experiences in such a way that they are active agents in their stories: *I did so and so, I decided such and such, I solved the problem facing me*. The following narrative describes the speaker's investigation of the possibility of becoming a computer programmer by speaking to a professor of computer science.

- (11) I spoke to Dr. K a long time. He decided, oh yeah, I had really gone over there, wasn't asking to go to graduate school. I was asking to take a course in the evening. And I figured I could qualify because I had graduated from R and it wouldn't, what big deal would it be for him to let me take a course. I, *by the time I was out of there*, he had me enrolled in this whole program, and he says, "Oh you have to do it this way." And *it must have appealed to me*, because I went ahead and did it.

At the discourse level, Dr. K is the agent, not the speaker. It is his somewhat surprising actions that move events along. The speaker had intended to take a single course, but as a result of Dr. K's actions, finds herself enrolled in a master's program and a simultaneous BS in mathematics. Even at the sentential level, the speaker is framed not the agent. For example, note the non-agency of the phrase *By the time I was out of there* as compared with the more conventional *By the time I left there*. The relation between the coherence system and the syntactic choices is clear. Extensive studies of such relations for a range of coherence systems would clarify our understanding of speaker's strategic use of the language's resources for expressing agency and causality.

These are just a few examples of possible studies that could link social practice to linguistic structure, both at the discourse and syntactic levels. This perspective opens vistas onto extremely exciting work, and work which would allow us to take seriously the enterprise which Labov pioneered for us: to place at the heart of our practice as linguists the belief that linguistics can and must be SOCIOLinguistics.

Notes

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Third Turn Repair*

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1. Introduction

When parties to ordinary conversation address some trouble or problem in speaking, hearing or understanding the talk, they virtually always do so from one of a very few sequentially-situated moments or positions. When dealing with the trouble is initiated by someone other than the speaker of the trouble's source, it is almost always initiated in the turn following the one in which the trouble source occurred.¹ When dealing with the trouble is initiated by the SPEAKER of the trouble, the effort is initiated in the same turn as was the site of the trouble-source,² just after the possible completion of that turn (in what Sacks et al. 1974:705-6 called 'the transition place'), or in "third turn to the trouble-source turn, i.e., in the turn subsequent to that which follows the trouble-source turn" (Schegloff et al. 1977:366).

When one searches a corpus of conversation for instances of the last of these three — for "repairs initiated after next turn" — several quite different sorts of repairs turn up.³ The most common can be termed 'third position repair'. In such instances, some party to the conversation has produced an utterance, the response to which (ordinarily in the following turn) reveals an apparently problematic understanding. The 'misunderstood' speaker may then undertake to set the matter straight, and does so in the turn following the one which displayed the problematic understanding. Such repairs regularly take the form, "No, I don't mean X, I mean Y." Although this is most often in the third consecutive turn, it can sometimes occur later, as for example, when the trouble-source utterance is addressed later than in the following turn. Such repairs are termed 'third POSITION repair' because they show themselves

to be prompted by the response (position 2) to some earlier utterance (position 1). Because such responses are ordinarily in the next turn, such repairs are ordinarily in the third turn. But they need not be; they can be later (Schegloff 1992:1317ff.).

There is, however, another sort of repair initiated in this position — “...the turn subsequent to that which follows the trouble-source turn...” — the circumstances of whose production are quite different, as is the form of their realization. These I will call ‘third TURN repair’. I want to describe these circumstances and forms, develop an account of their organization and proper understanding, and explicate an ‘upshot’ for analytic approaches to the study of language.

2. Environments of Third Turn Repair

The sequential contexts of third turn repair unfold in the following manner. Some participant produces an utterance in a turn which will turn out to be a trouble-source turn (I will refer to this as T1). This turn is followed by a contribution from another participant which neither claims nor embodies ‘trouble’ with what preceded. Three forms of such ‘responses’ may be mentioned, which recur in the corpus of such occurrences on which the present account is based.

First, the following ‘contribution’ may be something less than a full turn; it may, for example, be a ‘continuer’ such as “mm hmm”, as in excerpts (1)-(3) below (in which ‘TS’ designates ‘trouble-source turn’, ‘NT’ designates ‘next turn’, and ‘→’ indicates the third turn repair).

(1) SBL, 1:1:12:10

TS B: hhh And he’s going to make his own paintings,
 NT A: Mm hmm
 → B: And- or I mean his own frames.
 A: Yeah

(2) BC: Gray, 42-43

Call: I never saw a single piece of action while I was there.
 Brad: Mhmm,
 TS Call: I was (manning the) civil affairs, and I had a very good time.

NT Brad: Mm hm,
 → Call: Nothing uh lewd in any- by way of a good time, I mean
 Brad: Yes, [I know whatchu mean
 Call: [(Perfectly) honest good time.

(3) CDHQ, 1:131

Lehr: So, now the sand problem will be solved. when we-
 TS we get sand. Now it's- it's a matter of first getting a
 TS good reading on this levee.
 NT Sch: Mm hm.
 → Lehr: That is not- not this one. See this- this project is solved. I mean that's- they- they gonna- they gonna work like the dickens and they'll they'll bag that up. But it's along here...

On the one hand, such 'continuer' tokens do not constitute full turns at talk; indeed, they pass the opportunity to produce full turns.⁴ On the other hand, in-process speakers may leave an opening for the interpolation of such tokens, and they can be found to be 'missing'; they are not, therefore, 'nothing'. We may think of them as 'quasi-turns'. But if these quasi-turns 'pass' anything, they pass the opportunity to voice some trouble with the just-preceding utterance or part thereof. In (1)-(3) such opportunities have in just this manner been passed.

Second, the talk following T1 can be a fully-fledged next turn, albeit a minimal one, such as a 'receipt' or 'change-of-state token' (Heritage 1984), as in (4).

(4) TG, 286-289

Bee: Y'have any cla- y'have a class with Billy this term?
 TS Ava: Yeah, he's in my Abnormal class.
 NT Bee: Oh yeah [how
 → Ava: [Abnormal Psych.

Third, the talk following T1 can be a sequentially implicated response to a preceding sequence initiation. In excerpt (5) the next turn is an 'answer' to a question. In excerpt (6) it responds to a 'story preface' (Sacks 1974) with a 'forwarding' or 'go ahead' response.

- (5) NYI, 3-4
 TS Jim: Is it goin to be at your house?
 NT Bonnie: Yeah.=
 → Jim: =Your apartment?=
 Bonnie: =My place.=
- (6) Super Seedy
 TS Louise: I read a very interesting story today.
 NT Mom: Uhm what's that.
 → Louise: W'll not today, maybe yesterday, aw who knows
 when hu-it's called Dragon Stew.

In each of these instances (and types of instances), although the utterance at T1 is received unproblematically, and/or is 'successful' in being sequentially implicative for what follows it in next turn, its speaker then goes back to repair it.

Although these are third turn repairs in the sense of "third turn to the trouble-source turn, i.e., in the turn subsequent to that which follows the trouble-source turn" (Schegloff et al. 1977:366), I want to argue that they are so only incidentally. Although 'subsequent' to the following turn, they are not in any organizational or procedural sense '*relevantly* after' next turn. Their positioning is not by reference to next turn.

3. The Relevant Positioning of Third Turn Repair

Several observations about the environments in which third turn repairs occur may serve to set their placement in appropriate context.

First, in the trouble-source turns to which third turn repair is addressed, the trouble-source itself is with great regularity in terminal position. In the excerpts already cited these are, respectively, "his own paintings" in (1), "good time" in (2), "this levee" in (3), "Abnormal class" in (4), "your house" in (5), and "today" in (6).⁵

Second, between the end of the trouble-source turn and the start of the third turn repair, the intervening talk by another is very brief. In instances (1)-(3) above, it is composed of "mm hm", in (4)-(6) it is composed respectively of "oh yeah", "yeah", and "uhm what's that", in (7)-(8) (in note 5) they are

“mm” and “yeah I know.” This is in contrast to the ‘next turns’ which follow trouble-source turns in instances of third *position* repair, which are virtually without exception more substantial (cf. Schegloff 1992; for an exception, Schegloff 1991:164-7).

Third, because of a general practice of initiating self-repair as soon as possible, most self-repair is initiated within the same turn (indeed, within the same turn-constructional unit) as contains the trouble-source or repairable. However, if the repairable is the terminal element of its turn, most repairs initiated by the same speaker (except for those which are initiated in mid-production of the repairable) will necessarily be initiated in the transition space, that is, in the moments just following possible completion of the turn. Indeed, although some transition space repairs are ‘delayed’ repairs on mid-turn components of an utterance, most transition space repairs do have as their repairables terminal components of the turn.

Then: it appears that if a turn-terminal component is to be repaired by its speaker, such repair will be initiated in the transition space. But if, in the interval between the end of the trouble-source turn and the initiation of repair, some brief utterance is interpolated by another party, then the same repair which would otherwise have been in the transition space now appears in/as third turn.

If this is the case, then transition space repairs and third turn repairs are really instances of the same sort of repair operation, being discriminated by what is, relative to their production, an organizationally incidental occurrence. These repairs are not engendered *by virtue* of the next turn; they just turn out (as it were) to have been placed after it. In that sense, although in the turn subsequent to the next turn, they are not relevantly ‘after’ it.

On this account, we should expect transition space repairs and third turn repairs to be similar in most respects; for example, to be similar in form or in type of operation. Several exemplars may be offered to indicate that this is the case.

In (4) and (5) above, the penultimate word of the trouble-source turn is used to ‘frame’ the repairable on which some operation is to be performed, and the next (i.e., final) word is then replaced by another: “Abnormal class/ Abnormal Psych” and “your house/your apartment”, respectively. The following transition space repairs (from Schegloff et al. 1977:370) are alike in all relevant respects, except for the intervening talk by another in (4)-(5).

- (9) GTS 5, 33
 Roger: We're just workin on a different thing, the same thing.
- (10) SBL 3:1:2
 B: ...then more people will show up. Cuz they won't feel obligated tuh sell. tuh buy.

What differentiates (9) and (10) from (4) and (5) is only the presence or absence of talk by another between repairable and repair.

Similarly, in (6) above, the repair takes the form of first rejecting one component of the prior talk ("not today") and then replacing it with another ("maybe yesterday"). Compare (11) (from Schegloff et al. 1977:376), which takes the same form.

- (11) AT:FN
 TS A: That store has terra cotta floors.
 ((pause))
 → Not terra cotta. Terrazzo.

Once again, what differentiates the cases is the presence or absence of talk by another between repairable and repair.⁶ Otherwise, they are cut from the same cloth.

4. Differential Interactional Import

Even if transition space and third turn repair are understood as of a piece except for the presence in the latter of intervening talk by recipient, they may nonetheless be seen to involve different interactional imports and contingencies. One instance will have to suffice.

In third turn repair, a recipient will have claimed to understand the speaker's turn, and indeed may have acted with respect to it, based on (and displaying) that understanding. For example, in (2), repeated here for convenience, Brad (a radio talk-show host) has in effect claimed adequate understanding of what his interlocutor has just said.

- (2) BC: Gray, 42-43
 Call: I never saw a single piece of action while I was there.
 Brad: Mhmm,

- TS Call: I was (manning the) civil affairs, and I had a very good time.
- NT Brad: Mm hm,
- Call: Nothing uh lewd in any- by way of a good time, I mean
- Brad: Yes, [I know whatchu mean
- Call: [(Perfectly) honest good time.

The subsequent self-repair of that prior turn can imply that its recipient was not right to claim such understanding. As can be seen in (2), the recipient may address just that implication, here with “Yes, I know whatchu mean.”⁷ Repair in the transition space involves no such contingencies, coming as it does before any talk by the recipient can have laid claim to understanding.

5. An Upshot to be Drawn from Third Turn Repair

Those who approach the study of language from a functional point of view, interested in the ways in which the uses and communicative goals which it serves shape its structure and organization — understanding ‘form’ by reference to ‘function’ — may wish to take a special interest in the excerpts offered here as exemplars of third turn repair. What is striking about them is that the repair is undertaken AFTER the communicative adequacy of the utterance seems to have been assured, in some instances after responsive talk — adequate responsive talk — has sealed that functional success.

To be sure, in some cases a speaker may hasten to correct something in their prior talk precisely BECAUSE it seems to have been successful — if, for example, it had inadvertently included incorrect information; (1) above might be a case in point. But in other of the instances we have examined — (4), (5), or (6) for example — something other than functional or communicative adequacy seems to be involved. Attention and effort are devoted to ‘getting it right’, even though getting it right seems to have little bearing on the undertaking of the moment.

Third turn repair is not the only locus of such undertakings. Persons trying unsuccessfully to remember the name of a mutual acquaintance may satisfy themselves that they are thinking of the same person and may bring to successful closure whatever they were talking about in that connection. And then they may return to the collaborative effort to remember the name, although it is seemingly no longer in point for their interaction.

So, as Labov (1982) pointed out from his own perspective some years ago, a narrow functionalism will not do; a juxtaposition of linguistic usage and particular communicational tasks will take too constricted a view of the way in which the place of language use in social conduct bears on our understanding of its organization and its forms. The practices by which humans conduct their commerce and sociality with one another — including the practices of language — involve an attention to the integrity of its own forms and its own smooth operation. When these lapse momentarily, attention WILL be paid, even if the needs of the moment themselves do not otherwise require it.

Notes

- * The present paper draws on a larger project undertaken while I was a Fellow of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences and Humanities during 1978-79. My thanks again to NIAS for that year, and to the National Science Foundation, from whose support (under grant BNS 87-20388) I benefitted while drafting this paper in 1990. Other related papers from the same project include Schegloff 1987, 1991, 1992.

Bill Labov and I were colleagues on the faculty of Columbia University in the late 1960's and early 1970's. When he played an important role in organizing the Linguistic Institute at the University of Michigan during the summer of 1973, he was kind enough to invite my late colleague Harvey Sacks and me to participate as members of its faculty. That was as fulfilling an academic experience as I have enjoyed, in no small measure by virtue of his contribution to it. He has always been a colleague in the best sense — supportive of our undertaking in his distinctive enthusiastic way, holding us to the highest standards of craftsmanship as he understood them, and insistent that the shape of scholarship and science does not respect traditional academic boundaries. Personally, he has been supportive both in the earlier days and in later, more difficult, times. It is a pleasure to contribute to this volume of esteem.

- 1 The major exception (and it is uncommon) is what I have called elsewhere (Schegloff 1992:1320-26) 'fourth position repair'.
- 2 This is the primary site of those repairs (in contrast to 'corrections' of 'errors') which have managed to attract the attention of linguists. Among the very earliest to take the phenomena of repair at all seriously was William Labov, whose interest in assessing how much of ordinary speech is actually grammatical, or separated only slightly from grammaticality, led him to formulate "...rules of ellipsis...and certain editing rules to take care of stammering and false starts..." (Labov 1970:42) as early as 1966 (Labov 1966).
- 3 As was recognized by Gillian Sankoff when commenting on the three data excerpts exemplifying such repairs in Schegloff et al. (1977) in refereeing that paper for *Language*.

- 4 The set of what I am calling ‘continuers’ partially overlaps with what Duncan and his colleagues (Duncan & Fiske 1977, following Yngve 1970) call ‘backchannels’. For the differences between the two accounts, and other points in this paragraph, cf. Schegloff (1982), especially pp. 91-2, fn. 16.
- 5 That the party initiating repair may be oriented to some special affinity between repair in third turn and trouble-sources at the very ends of their turns is suggested in (7):

- (7) Super Seedy, 9
 TS Louise: I’m dying for a sh- tha’ cat had it in Debbie’s closet
 NT Mom: Mm
 → Louise: Had the::m in [Debbie’s clo-

“Had them” is clearly directed at repairing “had it” (the reference is to kittens) in the trouble-source turn. But Louise does not stop at “had it”, which would leave the target ‘repairable’ as having been located in ‘the middle of the trouble-source turn’. By including the whole rest of the turn, she embraces the whole ‘rest of the turn’ in the repair as possibly part of the trouble-source, thereby positioning the trouble-source as ‘terminal’, albeit a very generously defined ‘terminal’ (the same sense of terminal as is exploited in the aphorism “today is the first day of the rest of your life”, an aphorism which can be used however long that “rest” may be expected to be). Much the same effect is achieved in (8) as well:

- (8) BB Gun, 3
 Jim: Yuh goin’ be doin’ it up on stage in front of the whole school?
 Bonnie: No no no::,
 Jim: No.
 TS Bonnie: Jis’ in my drama class.
 NT Jim: Yeah I know.=
 → Bonnie: =In front of my [drama class.]
 Jim: [I m e a : :n] in your class.

- 6 Third turn repair contrasts here with third POSITION repair as well. Both may contain ‘rejection components’. But whereas what is named as the target of rejection in third turn repair is (as it is in (6)) in the same speaker’s prior turn, in third position repair it is NOT found in the same speaker’s prior turn. There it takes such forms as “I don’t mean X, I mean Y”, and it is understood as attributing ‘X’ to the recipient of the trouble-source turn as their understanding of it, and is treated as a problematic understanding, to be rectified by operating on the speaker’s misunderstood turn so as to produce an understanding more acceptable to its speaker; (on rejection components in third position repair, see Schegloff 1992:1306-8).
- 7 This instance involves another kind of complexity as well. Having remarked (in note 6) on the difference between rejection components in third turn and third position repair, re-analysis of some of the excerpts previously presented may be warranted. Example (2) is a case in point. In it there are rejection components which are not clearly addressed to elements of the speaker’s prior turn (“nothing lewd...”). This raises the possibility that in (2) the continuer following the trouble-source turn may have been as delivered with ‘leer-prosody’, and it is the understanding which this alludes to that is being rejected in the repair turn. In that case, the repair would have been occasioned by that ‘next turn’, and (2) would present an instance of third *position* repair rather than third *turn* repair.

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The Transformation of Experience, Identity, and Context*

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1. Introduction

Narratives have always been considered a special type of discourse by sociolinguists. As Labov (1972a; Labov & Waletzky 1967) has shown, narratives are a discourse unit with a fairly regular structure in which syntactic and semantic variants serve not only referential functions, but social and expressive (i.e., interpersonal and evaluative) functions as well. Another important feature is associated with narratives of personal experience (the type most often focused upon by sociolinguists): the creation of involvement. Self-involvement, i.e., the speaker's involvement with his/her own talk, results in a lack of attention to speech and what Labov (1972b) calls "casual" style. Other-involvement, i.e., a hearer's involvement in someone else's talk, allows for a transformation of the speaker/hearer relationship into one more akin to a performer/audience relationship, such that hearers "emphatically insert themselves into [an experience], vicariously reexperiencing what took place" (Goffman 1974:504). The self and other involvement created by a single rendition of an experience can also lead to the sort of interpersonal involvement focused upon by interactional sociolinguists Gumperz (1982) and Tannen (1979). The creation of interpersonal involvement by narratives provides as important a methodological tool for interactional analyses as the creation of self-involvement does for variationist analyses: interpersonal involvement is both a prerequisite to communication and an outcome of shared contextualization cues.

As my title suggests, narratives are important in still other ways: narratives transform not only experience, but also identity and context. Narratives can provide what I will call a *SOCIOLINGUISTIC SELF-PORTRAIT*: a linguistic lens through which to discover peoples' own views of themselves (as situated within both an ongoing interaction and a larger social structure) and their experiences. Since the situations that speakers create through narratives — the transformations of experience enabled by the story world — are also open to evaluation in the interactional world, these self-portraits can create an interactive arena in which the speaker's view of self and world can be reinforced or challenged. To continue the portrait metaphor for a moment, we might say that the form and composition of a sociolinguistic self-portrait are derived from the actions and reactions of participants in two intersecting worlds (a story world, an interactional world).

In order to make these points, I analyze a single narrative through which a speaker locates herself within a particular social world (§2). I then compare the view of identity and context that emerges from such an analysis with two other views also current within sociolinguistics, and suggest that we use the insights from narrative analyses to view identity and context as more dynamic variables (§3).

2. Stories, Identity, and Context

I have suggested above that telling stories is a speech activity during which speakers can work to actively construct a view of themselves as people of certain types with certain identities who are engaged in particular activities. One type of identity that is constructed is what we can call *situated identity*: stories allow people to locate themselves within an interactional world in which identities and statuses are continually open to negotiation (cf. Schiffrin 1984a). Stories can also reveal identities that are often thought to supersede local occasions of talk (such as class, gender, ethnic, or regional identities; cf. Blum-Kulka 1993; Johnstone 1990), both through the style in which they are told (cf. Tannen 1979) and, more critically for my purposes here, through the material that they transform into a text. Similarly, stories can alter interactional contexts. Participation rights (who speaks when, how the floor is allocated) shift during a story. A question/answer series can switch to a story round, such that referent/response pairs (Goffman 1976) are not semantically and pragmatically linked as question and answer, but as prior story and next story.

To illustrate how narratives reveal identity and context, I focus on one story told by Irene, a lower middle class, Jewish American woman living in Philadelphia. Irene was about 35 years old when she told the story during a sociolinguistic interview.¹ The story situates Irene as a daughter in a family: it reports a conflict that Irene had with her mother. It is important to note however, that Irene's story does not report conflict per se. Analyses of conflict talk (e.g., Maynard 1985; Schiffrin 1984b; Vuchinich 1990) agree that conflict is sustained disagreement — in other words, conflict requires at least three moves (e.g., assertion/challenge/defense, claim/opposition /counter opposition). As we will see, the story told by Irene reports just two conflictual moves within the complicating action of the story world. Following my discussion of this story, I briefly mention other stories in which Irene uses conflictual material to locate herself in other sectors of her social world.

At the beginning of one of my interviews with Irene and her neighbors Henry and Zelda, Irene and Zelda were talking about a teacher from the neighborhood school who had recently died. Henry had a box of candy that he was passing around the kitchen table where we were all seated. I had finished setting up my tape recorder and was gathering papers together. The story in (1) occurred during this setting-up phase of my interview.

- (1) Henry: (a) Y'want a piece of candy?
 Irene: (b) No.
 Zelda: (c) She's on a diet.
 Debby: (d) Who's not on [a diet].
 Irene: (e) = [I'm on-
 I'm on a diet
 (f) and my mother [buys-=]
 Zelda: (g) [You're] not!
 Irene: (h) =my [mother buys-=
 Debby: (i) [Oh yes I amhhhh!
 Irene: =these mints.=
 Zelda: (j) Oh yeh,
 Irene: (k) =The Russell Stouffer mints.
 (l) I said "I don't want any Mom."
 (m) "Well I don't wanna eat the whole thing."
 (n) She gives me a little tiny piece.
 (o) I eat it.
 (p) Then she gives me an[other=
 Henry: (q) [Was=

- Irene: (r) =[so I threw it out the window=
 Henry: =[there a lot of people?
 Irene: (s) I didn't [tell her.
 Henry: (t) [Was there=
 Irene: (u) =[She'd kill me.
 Henry: =[a lot of people at the house?
 Zelda: (v) All: the teachers.
 Irene: (w) A lot of teachers will- probably will all be there till late.
 Henry: (x) Je:sus Christ.

The section in (1) from lines (a) through (i) focuses initially on Henry's offer of candy *Y' want a piece of candy*: Irene rejects that offer with *no* and Zelda and Irene provide accounts of that rejection. Zelda's *she's on a diet* (c) is the first account for Irene's rejection: it is an account that "speaks for" Irene in a way that provides solidarity through the meta-message (Tannen 1979) that "we are such good friends that we can speak for one another" (Schiffrin 1994: Ch. 4). I pick up on Zelda's mention of diet with *Who's not on a diet* (d): this can be seen as a positive politeness strategy (Brown & Levinson 1987) that establishes a shared identity and affiliation with Irene. Zelda's remark *You're not!* (g) is a negative politeness strategy (Brown & Levinson 1987) directed to me: as an indirect compliment, it protects my identity by extracting me from a set of people with potentially undesirable characteristics (i.e., overweight people who should diet). My *Oh yes I amhhh!* (i) reestablishes affiliation with Irene through positive politeness. Although Zelda accounts for Irene's refusal of Henry's offer of candy, Irene also provides her own account, first in (e) *I'm on a diet*, and then in her story. (As I describe below, Irene's story provides an account by showing that she is so serious about dieting that she throws candy offered by her mother out the window.) Notice that Irene begins her own account during the face-saving work in which Zelda and I are involved: *I'm on a diet* (e) is a narrative abstract that is immediately followed (with no intonational break) by a narrative orientation *my mother buys* (f) repeated and expanded in (h) as the floor becomes available for a story.

Before discussing how Irene's story fits the speech act sequence of offer/rejection/account, it is important to describe how the story is also part of an ongoing interaction in which the women participants (me, Zelda, Irene) engage in a cooperative byplay, i.e., an interactively managed interlude whose topic is subordinate to an ongoing (but temporarily suspended) interactive focus (cf. Goodwin, this volume). As noted briefly above, Henry's offer of

candy and the subsequent talk about diets are both subordinate to a main topic of talk. Audience participation in Irene’s story is also subordinated to the main goals of the interaction: the participation structure of the interaction is not substantially altered to give either Irene, or the audience for her story, sustained identities as storyteller or audience respectively. As we noted earlier, for example, Irene begins her story during my exchange with Zelda, and when she tells her story (for the most part without interruption) the story is never reacted to (except for Zelda’s initial acknowledgement of the mints (j)). Henry is especially negligent: his return to the main topic (the teacher’s funeral) overlaps a key event in the complicating action: *then she gives me another* (p).

As Irene finishes her story, participants gradually realign with the main topic of talk. Henry repeats his main-topic question *Was there a lot of people at the house?* (t) during the resolution and evaluative coda of Irene’s complicating action. Zelda answers Henry with *All: the teachers* (v) immediately after Irene’s evaluative coda *She’d kill me* (u). Irene herself then also joins the main topic of talk (and the question/answer sequence established by Henry and Zelda) to build on Zelda’s response about teachers: *A lot of teachers will probably will all be there till late* (w). Henry’s evaluation *Je:sus Christ* (x) is a commentary not on the subordinate topic covered by Irene’s story, but on the main topic of talk. Thus the story ends much as it began: without overt acknowledgement, without participant evaluation.

Now that we have seen that Irene’s story is part of a cooperative byplay among women participants, we can return to the way the story fits a specific interactional slot — how it addresses a current topic and accomplishes a sequentially relevant act. A convenient way to see how Irene constructs a version of her experience that works as an ‘account’ is to dissect the story into actions — in effect, to perform a speech act analysis on the events in the story (cf. Labov 1981). Figure 1 shows the content of Irene’s story as a sequence of speech acts within the story world.

ACTIONS IN THE STORY WORLD		
MOTHER	OFFER 1	unstated (non)verbal action
IRENE	REJECTS OFFER 1	verbal action (l)
MOTHER	ACCOUNTS FOR OFFER 1	verbal action (m)
	FULFILLS OFFER 1	nonverbal action (m)
IRENE	ACCEPTS OFFER 1	nonverbal action (o)
MOTHER	FULFILLS OFFER 2	nonverbal action (p)
IRENE	ACCEPTS OFFER 2	nonverbal action (r)

Figure 1. *Actions in Irene’s Story*

After Irene's initial refusal (*I said "I don't want any Mom."* (l)) of her mother's offer (not reported in the story, but inferrable), Irene does accept the candy: *I eat it* (o). Note that Irene's mother has forced a compromise by appealing to Irene for help: *Well, I don't wanna eat the whole thing* (m) solicits Irene's help in preventing her from doing something that she herself does not want to do. This appeal transforms the mother's offer into an act that will not just benefit Irene (offers are assumed to be beneficial to the recipient, e.g., candy is supposed to taste good), but will also benefit the mother herself. In a sense, then, *Well, I don't wanna eat the whole thing* provides not only an account for the mother's offer, but a request that Irene take the candy: taking the candy is an act that is presumed to benefit not only the hearer (i.e., a preparatory condition of offers), but also an act that will benefit the speaker (a preparatory condition of requests). If Irene does accept the candy, she can thus be seen to be putting aside her own best judgement in an effort to help her mother. And if Irene helps her mother, she can be seen as a good daughter — one who ignores her own reservations in order to comply with her mother's wishes.

Because Irene has given into her mother's wishes, the mother's second (also implicit) offer of candy has added social and personal implications. As Irene reports in (p), her mother just gives her the candy the second time around, i.e., she just fulfills the offer without either making it explicit or trying to motivate it. This action is partially justified by Irene's own prior action of taking the candy despite what she said; it is also unjustified, however, simply because it again ignores Irene's earlier refusal. Irene does not attempt to reject the candy when her mother gives it to her a second time. Rather than disagree with her mother (apparently to no avail anyway), Irene throws the candy out the window (r). This action is important for it allows Irene to maintain the appearance of deference to her mother (to look as if she is doing what her mother wants, and thus preserve her mother's positive face and ACCEPT OFFER 2), but to maintain her own desire not to have her own wants impinged upon (to stay on her diet and maintain her own negative face). Schiffrin (forthcoming) discusses this type of dual stance in mother/daughter stories more generally.

As Irene reports, there are consequences if her mother discovers this deception: *she'd kill me* (t). But it is precisely the fact that Irene is willing to risk these consequences that underline her seriousness about her diet, and, thus take us back into the interactional world in which her story provides an

account for why she is refusing Henry's offer of candy. Irene has gone to such great efforts to avoid eating candy — even to the extent of deceiving her mother — that she is not going to undo the product of those efforts just for Henry.

Notice, now, that we can paraphrase the acts in (l) and (n) — Irene REJECTS OFFER 1 (*I don't want any, Mom*) and Irene's mother FULFILLS OFFER 1 (*She gives me a little tiny piece*) — as two opposing propositions: 'I don't want candy' (Irene) vs. 'You do want candy' (Irene's mother). This opposition creates a potential for conflict, a potential that is avoided when Irene takes the candy instead of maintaining her initial position. Thus, Irene's deception of her mother actually avoids creating a conflict. I discuss the significance of this below.

So far I have described how Irene's story is part of a cooperative byplay, and how it provides a story world in which participants have a conflict with one another without actually engaging in direct conflict. I want to return now to my point about identity and context to suggest that Irene's story reveals two related facets of her identity. Both facets concern gender: the first locates Irene in the interactional world as a female participating in a cooperative byplay centered on a personal topic; the second locates Irene in the larger social world as a daughter who is expected to do what her mother wants her to do.

Consider the gender-specific byplay first. I noted above that Irene's story is part of talk about diets, a topic that is pursued by the women and is secondary to the main topic (the teacher's funeral). Although diets may very well be a topic of more interest to women than men (because women are traditionally assumed to be more concerned than men with personal matters, and to talk about them more, cf. Deakins 1989; Kipers 1987; Tannen 1990), there might be another explanation for the women's pursuit of the diet topic that centers around women's conceptions of interactional needs. A great deal of work on gender and discourse has observed that women pursue topics of talk more interactively than men, that women attend more to maintaining solidarity during interaction (e.g., avoiding conflict, minimizing threats), and that women focus more, in general, on the expressive implications of what is said (cf. Tannen 1990). Such observations are consistent with Gilligan's (1982) findings that instead of focusing on abstract principles and the impartial application of rules of right and wrong (the moral path followed by men), women emphasize human connections, caring, and the needs and situations of those affected by a problem.

We can easily consider what happens in (1) from this perspective. Recall that the remarks about diet all functioned to minimize potential insults to weight and physical appearance, and to build solidarity: my generalization of ‘diet’ (e, i), and Zelda’s remark that I was not on a diet (g) both work to minimize any one particular person’s need to diet. Although Irene’s story is not directly geared toward others’ face needs, it builds positive politeness in another way: because it describes issues easily recognizable to others on diets (having will power, resisting temptation), it provides an account of a dilemma with which others can identify. Thus, like the face preservation efforts in which Zelda and I engage, Irene’s story locates Irene in an activity that seems to bear some relation to gender identity.

In addition to locating and defining her identity within the interactional world, Irene’s story also conveys her identity as a member of a social category outside of the immediate interaction. Here, too, the story does gender-relevant work for Irene, although as we see in a moment, the gender category *per se* intersects with familial status. Recall that Irene accepted the candy in the story world only because refusing the candy would create greater social and personal damage. It is this action that provides the clearest portrait of Irene as a daughter interacting with her mother. To be sure, Irene is partially to blame for her mother’s undesired action: if she really doesn’t want the candy, why does she take it? Why not refuse a second time? As I suggested above, refusing the candy yet again would have altered the act sequence dramatically: a repeated refusal would have been the third act (‘I don’t want the candy’) in a sequence that already has two potentially conflictual moves. Even worse, repeatedly refusing the candy would have been the one act to create, rather than avoid, an actual conflict. Thus, by taking *a little tiny piece* (n) and eating it (o), and then by taking it again (implied through the achievement verb ‘give’ in *Then she gives me another* (r)), Irene shows herself to be someone who prefers to maintain a personal connection (cf. Gilligan) and the appearance of deference, even though that connection requires a small deception.

Of course if Irene’s refusal of her mother’s offer (l) had been accepted by her mother with its intended illocutionary force, then Irene would not have had to deceive her mother at all. But it is precisely this dilemma — of wanting to be taken seriously, even when she is aware that she may not be — that characterizes Irene’s status not just as a female, and not just as a daughter, but as an adult daughter. Because ‘daughter’ is a family status that is structurally

subordinate to 'parent', daughters are expected to give into parental perceptions of inequity in power and status, in short, to do what parents want. But as an adult, Irene is also expected to exercise her own will and her own control (especially, perhaps, over matters of body and self image) and not to have to do what her mother wants.

It is important to note that these sentiments about responsibility to oneself (autonomy) and responsibility to others (compromise or sacrifice) are openly expressed by Irene and her neighbors. Irene, for example, says that she is careful to visit both her mother and her mother-in-law (who live in the same apartment building, one block from Irene's house) on the same days, so that neither will be insulted. Irene and Henry agree that children should respect their parents and do what they say (although they disagree on whether their children nowadays do so as much as they themselves did). Henry and Zelda boast that their sons followed their advice in marrying someone of their own religion. Thus, the norms of responsibility to one's parents that underlie Irene's deference to her mother (don't offend your parents, respect your parents, take your parents' advice) are actively endorsed during other occasions of talk. But Henry also presents the dilemma of following these norms (albeit from the advice-giver's point of view), when talking about the failure of some adult relatives to take his advice: *You can't take your head and put it on someone else's shoulders.*

Thus, what creates Irene's dilemma in the story that we have discussed here is not just a desire to avoid conflict, but a desire to maintain her own rights as an adult within a relationship which assigns her status as a child, a position of structurally defined subordination to her mother. These familial values are replicated by Irene's story, as is the inherent ambiguity in Irene's position in relation to those values: she is both the child who should defer to her mother, and the adult to whom others should grant some autonomy. Put another way, Irene's story replicates the ambiguities inherent in the role of adult daughter by turning words into action: the actions that Irene reports show her as a daughter who behaves in the overtly endorsed ways, but who also circumvents those ways to show distance from the implied role (Goffman 1964).

Before closing this section, I want to briefly mention some other stories told by Irene that situate her in different social worlds, acting in different social capacities: e.g., as a citizen in a world of bureaucratic rules, as a white parent in a racially integrated neighborhood school. Some of these stories also

concern conflict: conflict with a policeman who gives her a parking ticket, conflict with an African-American parent in her son's classroom who claims that Irene behaved inappropriately during a class visitation. Irene is at least partially to blame for each of the conflicts. Nevertheless, she presents each as a violation of her rights, and she never admits any wrongdoing. Nor does she pursue conflict — despite her reported perception of being treated in an unjust manner as a daughter, as a citizen, as a white parent.

The injunction not to argue, or not to report oneself as having argued — even if one feels it is warranted — is an interesting one within a community where argument is a form of sociable behavior (Schiffrin 1984b). But notice that what Irene gains by engaging in sociable arguments is actually similar to what she gains by telling conflict-avoidance stories such as these. When Irene avoids argument within the story world, but reveals her moral indignation in the interactional world, Irene gains solidarity and, more to the point here, an endorsement of herself as a reasonable person. As we saw in discussion of Irene's diet story, for example, Irene's interlocutors do not challenge her version of her experience, e.g., they do not say "You should have just said 'no' to your mother!" In the other stories noted above, Irene's audience takes an even more active role in endorsing her story world actions. Thus, instead of presenting a third conflict move (comparable, for example, to a defense or counter opposition) within the story world, Irene's audience helps her transfer that move from the story world to the interactive world. And it is this interplay between the story world and the interactional world that allows Irene's transformed experience, including both its potential for conflict and her own conflict-avoiding strategy, to provide an interactional arena in which her actions and her view of the world can be reinforced.

3. Conclusion

I began this paper by reviewing some well-founded reasons for the central role of narratives within sociolinguistics. I then suggested another role for narratives by showing how one particular speaker (Irene) constructs a version of her experience that positions her in an interactional world and in the larger social structure. In my conclusion, I briefly contrast the view of identity and context that has emerged from this analysis with two other views also current within sociolinguistics. I then suggest the relevance of this analysis for variationist studies.

Although many linguists and sociolinguists readily accept and use the term ‘sociolinguistics’, Labov (1972c:183) himself has argued against the use of this term: “sociolinguistics...is a somewhat misleading use of an oddly redundant form. Language is a form of social behavior:... it is used by human beings in a social context, communicating their needs, ideas, and emotions to one another”. Labov’s statement is eloquent and convincing: linguistics is by definition *sociolinguistics* simply because language is social behavior. When we consider the above statement in relation to the study of narrative, however, it actually seems more psychological — more centered on an individual self — than seems warranted by the notion of “social” behavior. People are said to communicate needs and emotions (internal states) and ideas (internal representations of the world); nothing is said or implied about a self in interaction with others, a self in society, or a self in relation to symbol systems that are socially constituted.

Labov’s view that social behavior is individually centered (or even psychogenic) is compatible with (and maybe even inherited from) commonly held assumptions about language and communication. The assumption that communication involves the transmission of information that is internal to a source (and that that transmission is enabled by a shared code such as language) is well entrenched within linguistics (Schiffrin 1991; Taylor & Cameron 1987). However, there are clearly other ways that language is a form of social behavior, and our understanding of these ways is actually due largely to the kind of linguistics envisioned by Labov and to many of the studies that he himself has pioneered: studies of linguistic variation and change. It is well known that the social identity of a speaker (derived from constructs such as class, race, gender, age, ethnicity, region), and the social context of speech (including parameters such as setting, participants, and so on) are critical to our discovery of linguistic patterns within a speech community. Studies of such patterns suggest that language is not just a code through which individuals convey their needs, ideas, and emotions, but also a socially and culturally available resource for the display of identity and the definition of situation. Thus, what underlies studies of linguistic variation is the idea that language can give off, as well as give, information (Goffman 1957) and that the information that is given off (i.e., unintentionally displayed) is social information. Put still another way, variationist studies view language as a form of social behavior through which people unintentionally give off social information: information about who they are and the contexts in which they are situated.

When we tell stories, something different can happen — something no less social, but something slightly more under an individual's control and something a great deal more situated in the here and now being created by self and other. Although information about identity and context can very well be given off by a story, telling stories is also a speech activity during which speakers work to actively construct a view of themselves as people of certain types with certain identities who are engaged in particular activities. As we saw in §2, stories situate people not only within an interactional world in which identities and statuses are continually open to negotiation, but also within a social world that is created by the story world itself — a world in which people behave as members of certain social categories in conflict with (or in cooperation with) members of other social categories.

What I have suggested thus far, then, is that three different views of identity and context emerge from a linguistics that takes seriously the idea that language is social behavior. First is the view noted above by Labov himself: language is social behavior that reveals individual states of mind. Second is the view assumed by variationist studies: identity and context are social and cultural givens, categories that we “step into”. In other words, identities are like fixed attributes, contexts are like frames; neither are easily open to intentional control by an individual or to change by another. Note that this view of identity and context underlies the variationist practice of coding both identity and context as categorical variables. A speaker is coded as a white, middle class, middle aged male from Philadelphia, for example, and he is assumed to maintain that very same identity regardless of the activity or interaction in which he is engaged; similarly, once engaged in a particular activity (such as an interview), that is the context in which he is said to be participating.

A third view of identity and context is suggested by studies of narrative, and more generally, by studies of discourse (e.g., Labov & Fanshel 1977). As I illustrated above, such studies suggest that identity and context are locally situated. Rather than maintain an identity throughout an extended period of time (be it a speech activity, a situation, a span of life, or even a lifetime), different facets of identity may be highlighted or submerged during different periods of time. Similarly open to definition and redefinition are contexts: participants' sense of “what is happening” is not supplied when an activity begins, but is molded and remolded during different phases of the activity, such that definitions of the situation emerge at the same time as the situation itself. These dynamic views of both identity and context suggest that both are

open not only to intentional manipulation by self, but to interpersonal negotiation between self and other. And since neither identity nor context are viewed as static categories, they are less amenable to the sort of 'once and for all' coding used by variationists. Thus, like variationist studies, narrative and discourse studies also allow language to display social information (e.g., identity and context); such information, however, is constituted and reconstituted by joint work from those who produce, and those who interpret, the utterances situated in social activities.

In closing, I would like to suggest that the view of identity and context made available through narrative analyses can also serve variationists. As I have suggested through this paper, narratives can provide a sociolinguistic self-portrait: a way to discover peoples' own views of themselves as situated within a particular interaction and in terms of a larger social structure. Variationists can build upon what is provided by such portraits not only to rethink the way identity and context provide webs of social meaning into which linguistic patterns are woven, but on a very practical level, to rethink the way identity and context are coded as constraints. Just as variationist studies already build into coding procedures the belief that there are no single style speakers (Labov 1972b), so too can they incorporate the notion that identity and context are dynamic, i.e., that there are no single-identity speakers and no single contexts even within a given span of time. In coding Irene's identity during her diet story, for example, one might emphasize her gender role (a role that might be downplayed in other sections of the interview); in coding context, one might focus upon the fact that Irene reveals a somewhat paradoxical relationship of both power and solidarity with her mother in the story world (i.e., her deference is motivated by her subordination), or the emergent solidarity displayed by the women participants' cooperative byplay in the interactional world.

The general point, then, is that the identities that emerge during sociolinguistic interviews, and during the narratives that are told in such interviews, are no less situated — and the contexts no less dynamic and emergent — than those that emerge during other activities. Just as people pay different amounts of attention to their speech when talking to linguists, so too do they continually locate and relocate themselves in different sectors of their social worlds. It is this process of continually defining and redefining oneself and one's world that is so clearly revealed by narrative analyses, and the understanding of this process that can be so useful for analyses of linguistic variation and change.

Notes

- * An earlier version of this paper was presented during "A Quarter-century Retrospective in Honor of William Labov's *Social Stratification of English in New York City*" Annual Meeting of the American Dialect Society, Philadelphia, Pa., 1992.
- 1 See Schiffrin 1987, Chapter 2 for fuller description of Irene and her neighbors; Schiffrin 1994, Chapter 3 also discusses the story.

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Deliberative Action Constructs: Reference and Evaluation in Narrative

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1. Introduction

A unique linguistic configuration emerges in the narratives of some speakers when they tell about their interpersonal conflict with neighbors, co-workers, and families.* This configuration will be ponderously referred to here as a deliberative action construct (DAC) for reasons that will be apparent later in the discussion. DACs are linguistic constructions that occur in the complicating action sections of oral narratives, and allow us to see in some detail how referential and evaluative components at multiple levels in the complicating action section operate to communicate both action and meaning.

The purpose of this discussion is to describe this linguistic configuration as it appears in confrontation narratives, and to examine it in light of Labov's theoretical perspectives on evaluation in oral narrative of personal experience. In my view, the theoretical and descriptive approach to narrative proposed by Labov & Waletzky (1967) and subsequently amplified by Labov (1972, 1982) represents one of the most fruitful frameworks for a clause-by-clause analysis of oral narrative available to narrative scholars (see, for example, studies of historical present alternation in Schiffrin 1981; Wolfson 1982; Johnstone 1987; Fludernick 1991; of narrative structure and language among adolescent African-Americans in Goodwin 1990; Myhill & Harris 1986; of extrathematic detail in Johnstone 1990; of personal and other forms of narrative structure in Linde 1993). However, a large proportion of narrative scholarship over the past two decades takes Labov's framework as its starting point, but focuses largely on how this perspective fails to account for the particular analyst's

discourse of choice (see, for example, Watson 1973; Robinson 1981; Polanyi 1989; McCabe & Peterson 1983; Gee 1991). Again, in my view, the Labovian model offers a battery of under-utilized and under-researched concepts for the analysis of oral narrative, particularly with regard to issues surrounding evaluation. Consequently, the present discussion will draw on Labov's framework for narrative analysis, applying and extending several key aspects of the Labovian theory of evaluation.

The reader's familiarity with the framework for narrative analysis of Labov & Waletzky (1967) and Labov (1972) is assumed, but a brief review of key concepts relevant to the present discussion may be useful, specifically, REFERENCE, COMPLICATING ACTION and EVALUATION. In the Labovian framework, oral narrative of personal experience has two functions: reference and evaluation. The referential function recapitulates objective actions and events through the sequencing of temporally ordered independent clauses (called narrative clauses) in the complication segment of the narrative. Action is the point of departure in this view of narrative, but evaluation is its critical counterpart. Through the evaluative component, speakers reveal their personal understanding of the meaning and significance of the events recounted in narrative. The evaluative component is realized through a battery of technical linguistic devices as well as a distinctive pattern of distribution in the narrative.

In the discussion to follow, DACs will first be introduced and illustrated by narrative examples and then described in terms of their linguistic profile, or footprint. Attention will then turn to DACs as a linguistic configuration within the narrative's complicating action segment, and the meaning that emerges from it. Finally, DACs are discussed in the context of other evaluative mechanisms. The discussion will conclude by suggesting that DACs' unique linguistic configuration and their location in the complication section advances our conceptualization of narrative evaluation in relation to narrative's referential structures.

2. Data

Several examples will serve to illustrate DAC structure and the type of conflict narrative in which they typically appear. DACs are highlighted in boldface type. Pronominal references are occasionally clarified in square brackets and remarks in parentheses are interviewer's comments.¹

The first narrative recounts Sandy Steigl's reaction to having been "felt up" by a customer at the diner where she works as a waitress:

- (a) I had one time,
it was the first and only time
anybody ever touched me.

(What happened?)

- (b) I threw a cup of coffee in his face.
- (c) And I meant it.

(Holy cow!)

- (d) Well—I—you know, I belong to one man.
- (e) And that's the only one
that's gonna touch me.
- (f) Well, he was with a girl.
- (g) She was walking in front of him.
- (h) I had four cups of coffee in my hand.
- (i) And with that, he grabbed my behind.
- (j) And so I set down the three cups of coffee.**
- (k) I walked up with the other one,**
- (l) and threw it right in his face.**
- (m) and-uh-I don't believe in that.

(What did he do?)

He didn't do nothin'. He was too embarrassed.

(What did your boss say?)

Nothin'.

In the second narrative, John Kilhane, a bartender at his neighborhood's taproom, reports his experience with a drunken neighbor:

- (a) I can remember one time in the past-uh-this past July.
- (b) I was pushed into a corner.
- (c) Well, I was-eh-had just gotten done work.
- (d) And it was-eh-it happened to be my birthday.
- (e) It was July the twelfth.
- (f) It was on a Friday. [Clears throat]
- (g) So, I was half-smashed.
- (h) And—which I never drink behind the bar!
- (i) But this day I did
because of my birthday and this and that.

- (j) So, one fellow had come in.
 (k) He had—has a deaf mute brother.
 (l) And I've known him—off and on I've seen him.
 (m) You know, like, maybe once a month he'd stop in.
 (n) So he happened to be in there with his mother that day.
 (o) And he was half-juiced up.
 (p) So I walked up,
 (q) and I says "How you doin'?"
 (r) That's all I said!
 (s) And he jumped up,
 (t) and he said he was gonna wreck the bar.
 (u) Naturally, I says—uh—you know, being—workin' there,
 I feel that I'm part of it, you know?
 (v) So I says—uh—"No. You're not."
 (w) So we had gone outside.
 (x) We were messin' around a li'l bit.
 (y) And I finally, you know, I started thinkin' to myself,
 "You know, this is crazy.
 I-I get involved with this guy,
 I'm liable to lose a job—"
 you know, makin' maybe 17 thousand dollars a year—
 "—over a fight."
(z) So, I walked away from him,
(aa) walked in the bar,
(bb) walked behind the counter,
(cc) sat on the stool.
 (dd) He come back in,
 (ee) and it's this, this, that.
 (ff) "Do me a favor. Go home."
 (gg) So he leaned over the bar
 (hh) and threw a sucker punch at me.
 (ii) And it—that—that really woke me up.
 (jj) So I went outside.
 (kk) And we messed around a little bit.
 (ll) and I finally hit him.
 (mm) And I actually split his whole face wide open.
 (nn) And-uh-he-had-you know, he was just bleeding
 from the nose, the mouth, everything.

- (oo) And it really scared me.
- (pp) It did,
because I didn't want to hurt the guy to begin with.

The narrative continues and resolves in the following way: after seeing how he has hurt the guy, Kilhane backs away from the fight again. The police arrive. The guy offers to shake hands. As Kilhane puts his hand out, the guy throws another punch at him. John does not respond, and the police take the guy away. Kilhane goes to the emergency room for stitches to his fist, which was cut when he hit the guy in the mouth. He points to the scar he still carries.

In the third example, Maureen Keyes recounts how she stopped her neighbors' harassment, specifically that of one woman named Iris:

- (a) One time I was comin' out of my girlfriend's house.
- (b) And Iris walked up behind me.
- (c) and they were all standin' on the steps.
- (d) And Iris bumped into me.
- (e) And I had—[my son] was a baby,
- (f) and I almost dropped him.
- (g) And I said "O.K. Poor judgment.
She didn't know where she was going."
- (h) They get in front of me,
- (i) and [Iris' little boy] turns around
and spits on me.
- (j) And she started laughin': "You're not supposed to spit on
people.
- (k) And I thought "Oh. O.K."
- (l) And I came into the house,**
- (m) and I sat down,**
- (n) and I thought "What the hell am I doin' here?
I'm going out to kill her."**
- (o) When I came out——
and she saw me come out and get mad——
she crossed over on the other side of the street.
- (p) She backed down.
- (q) But they were all standin' on the top step, watchin'.
- (r) They wanted to be amused.
- (s) I finally went down

- (t) and I told them “If you have anything to say,
you come to me and you say it.
And I don’t appreciate your talking about me.
And if I have to fight her,
I’m fightin’ every one of you.”
- (u) And they didn’t.
- (v) They stopped bothering me after that.

Finally, Molly Stavros reports how her brother-in-law Harry “snubbed” her one Sunday afternoon:

- (a) Now, Harry and I never had no words, right?
- (b) And Tom hadda go to the track on Sunday
- (c) So he said
Harry would bring [the kids] home, right, after church.
- (d) This was the three of them: Chris, Tommy, and Tina.
- (e) Well, I was outside—and my neighbor—across the street.
- (f) And it’s hot weather.
- (g) It’s in the summertime.
- (h) [Harry] drove up the street.
- (i) And he had an older couple in the car, plus the three kids.
- (j) And [my neighbor] was sittin’ there with me.
- (k) And you could ask—I mean, like,
if you wanted to, you could ask her, and she’d tell you.
- (l) **He got out of the car.**
- (m) Well, it was a station wagon.
- (n) **Went to the back,**
- (o) **left the kids out,**
- (p) **shut the door,**
- (q) **got back in the car,**
- (r) never said “Hi, Molly”.
“Hi”, “Yes”, “No”, “Kiss my ass”, “Go to hell”, or anything else.
- (s) So, that was on Sunday.

DACs are an infrequent phenomenon. The data for this study are 24 deliberate action constructs that occur in 24 oral narratives about interpersonal conflict with family, friends, and neighbors in residential and workplace situations. These DAC narratives comprise roughly a quarter of the 107

conflict narratives collected during 6 years of participant-observation fieldwork in Kensington, northern Philadelphia's working-class, Irish-American neighborhood.

Only 10 speakers, out of 32 total, produce DACs in their conflict narratives. These 5 men and 5 women range in age between 23 and 72, with one 16 year old boy represented. Respondents are all working-class native Philadelphians of third or fourth generation Irish descent.

3. Linguistic Description of DACs

DACs are short. They are typically 3 to 4 clauses in length but can be longer. Six clauses is the longest construct in the data.

DACs predominate in the complicating action sequence of narratives (22 of 24 DACs). Less frequently, they appear in orientation (1 of 24) and resolution (1 of 24) sections.

DAC syntax is simple, offering no syntactic elaboration. DAC clauses are narrative clauses, i.e., independent clauses that are temporally ordered so that a change in their order implies a change in the order of the events as they occurred (Labov 1972:375).

DAC verbs are the narrative heads characteristic of the narrative clause in complication sections (Labov & Waletzky 1967:28). Semantically, they convey a single act that moves the narrative action forward, specifically verbs of motion that refer to physical movements (e.g., *walk, throw, push, get hold of, lift, come, go, walk*, etc.) as well as a limited number of verbs that indicate speech actions (e.g., *say, call, tell*). Consequently, DAC events tend to be objective actions that can be verified by a witness other than the narrator (Labov 1982). Subjective thoughts and feelings do appear occasionally as the end point of the sequence, as in Maureen Keyes' clause (n) "and I thought 'What the hell am I doin' here?...'"

DAC verb tense is either the simple preterite or the historical present. The alternation between preterite and historical present characteristic of personal narrative (Fludernick 1991; Johnstone 1987; Wolfson 1982; Schiffrin 1981) does not appear in these data.

The subject NPs of DAC clauses always refer to the same person, typically the narrator. Occasionally the DAC subject is a third person, as it is in Molly Stavros' narrative.

Thus, the DAC in Steigl's narrative is comprised of clauses (j, k, l) and illustrates a sequence of three same subject clauses with simple preterites. In this case, the DAC constitutes most of the complication section, clauses (i-l). In John Kilhane's narrative, four same subject, simple preterite narrative clauses (z,aa,bb,cc) compose the DAC which is deeply embedded in the lengthy complication section clauses (p-ll). The DAC in Maureen Keyes' narrative comprises clauses (l,m,n) of the complication sequence (d-o). In Molly Stavros' narrative, the DAC and complication section coincide in clauses (l,n,o,p,q). Clause (m) is not included in the DAC because it does not have temporal juncture with preceding and following clauses. Rather, it functions as an embedded orientation clause.

To summarize, at first review DACs appear to be simply complication clauses that perform the central, referential function of relating a sequence of clauses in the narrative to an inferred sequence of events presumed to have occurred in reality (Labov 1972:360). They are syntactically simple, single subject sequences of independent, narrative clauses, located in the narrative's complication sequence. However, a closer examination will reveal several processes at work, from which DACs emerge as a tightly cohesive structure within the complication. As a result, its evaluative function comes into focus.

4. DACs as a Structure Within the Complication

Three distinctive processes transform the DAC from a short sequence of narrative clauses in the complication into a structure with an identity and cohesion of its own. These processes involve a typical subject pronominal pattern in the narrative clauses, a high frequency of subject NP ellipsis, and the elaboration of apparently trivial components of the central action.

4.1 The pronominal pattern in DACs

Different narrative topics demonstrate characteristic patterns of subject NP occurrences in their complication sequences. For example, narratives that report individual experiences with the supernatural or near-encounters with death generate long sequences of single subject NP clauses, usually first person singular, e.g., I/I/I (Bower 1985; Bennett 1986). In contrast, narratives that recount interpersonal conflict or interaction tend to generate se-

quences of alternating pronouns, e.g., *I/she/I/she/I/she* in the familiar “he said, she said” pattern (Bower 1985; Schuman 1986; Wachs 1988; Goodwin 1990).

Because DACs are composed of single subject NP sequences, i.e., *I/I/I/I*, they contrast with the “he said, she said” pattern typical of conflict narratives. This contrast represents a subtle deviation from anticipated textual norms (Polanyi 1989) pertaining to the pronominal patterns a particular topical genre is likely to manifest. It has the well-recognized effect of foregrounding the reported action (Hopper 1979), which in turn suggests that the actions hold special significance for the narrator.

4.2 *Ellipsis in DACs*

Pronominal patterns in DACs are further distinguished by the ellipsis of subject NP across the sequence of clauses. As mentioned above, same subject NP sequences are the norm in supernatural or danger of death narratives; the subject NP is repeated at each clause. Despite the fact that the grammatical environment in such sequences favors NP ellipsis (Givon 1983; Halliday 1978; Quirk et al. 1972), supernatural or danger of death narrative complications are very likely to preserve their long sequences of single subject clauses (Bower 1985).

In DACs, however, same subject NP sequences are less likely to be preserved. Although subject NP must be present in the DAC’s first clause in order to establish the referent, roughly two thirds of the DACs (17 of 24) reveal subsequent deleted subject NPs. Since DACs are already marked as somewhat aberrant in conflict narrative complications by their single subject clause sequences, ellipsis in second and subsequent subject NPs further distinguishes this construct. Two examples will illustrate this characteristic elliptical pattern. The DAC in John Kilhane’s fight narrative demonstrates the pattern in clauses (aa,bb,cc), with (z) preserving the subject NP:

- (y) I’m liable to lose a job, you know, makin’ 17 grand a year, over a fight.
- (z) **So, I walked away from him,**
- (aa) **walked in the bar,**
- (bb) **walked behind the counter,**
- (cc) **sat on the stool.**
- (dd) He come back in.

Molly Stavros describes her brother-in-law's personal snub in clauses (k, m-p). This DAC illustrates a third person subject NP with the elliptical pattern in clauses (n,o,p,q):

- (h) Harry drove up the street.
- (i) And he had an older couple in the car, plus the three kids.
- (l) **He got out of the car.**
- (m) Well, it was a station wagon.
- (n) **Went to the back,**
- (o) **left the kids out,**
- (p) **shut the door,**
- (q) **got back in the car.**
- (r) Never said "Hi, Molly."
 "Hi", "Yes", "No", "Kiss my ass", "Go to hell"
 or anything else.²

Ellipsis is important because it produces a strong cohesive relation among the grammatical elements it implicates (Halliday 1976; Givon 1983). In the case of DACs, this cohesive relation imposes a structural unity upon the clauses concerned. Further, absence of subject NPs in DAC clauses intensifies focus on the VP (Quirk et al. 1972) and foregrounds the action it conveys (Hopper 1979). This foregrounding becomes all the more important since DAC verbs, as narrative heads, are the main carriers of the narrative action. Main action foregrounding in this manner has been reported in studies of personal narrative from speakers of Ga'dang, a Luzon language of the north-eastern Phillipines, where subject NP ellipsis has been integrally linked to "peak" narrative action (Walrod 1984:99) or to a "full, fast-moving event line" (Longacre 1983:26).

4.3 *The discrete identity and unremarkable nature of DAC actions*

DAC actions constitute discrete events with a beginning and end. The initiating action leads to the next, and the next carries through to the end. Actions reported in DACs are presented as close-ordered, i.e., occurring one after the other, with a minimum time lapse between the end of one and the beginning of the next (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974).³ The temporal juncture between the narrative clauses both reflects and conveys the temporal proximity of the actions, thereby underscoring their identity as a unit.

Identifiable clusters of formally and semantically related units like DACs are not uncommon in discourse, although different functions may be served. For example, Jefferson (undated) points to three-part list constructions (“While you’ve been talking to me, I’ve mended two nightshirts, a pillow case and a pair of pants.”) in conversational talk and alludes to their poetic or expressive effect. Halliday notes that collocational relationships, i.e., groupings of semantically related, textually proximate lexical items like DACs, generate considerable cohesion in the narrative discourse (1976:285). However, DAC actions are eminently forgettable. They are unremarkable, often mechanical aspects of the main action. The DAC in Sandy Steigl’s narrative reviews the actions of putting down three of the four cups she holds and walking over to a table; all predictable actions of a waitress. John Kilhane’s step-by-step progress back to his bar-stool is prosaic, as is Maureen Keyes’ return to her house after being pushed. Getting out of a station wagon, going around to the back, letting out a bunch of kids, shutting the door, and getting back into the car as described in Molly Stavros’ narrative narrowly merit comment in themselves. These are not the reportable actions widely claimed to contribute to a tellable narrative (Labov 1972; Robinson 1981; Polanyi 1989; Linde 1993).

4.4 *The emergence of meaning*

Despite their forgettable nature, not only are these taken-for-granted actions enumerated, they are thrust into prominence through foregrounding and by virtue of their temporal identity and semantic relationship. They take on a coherence and convey a sense of purpose that suggests deliberation or intentionality. The routine, thought-less actions of DACs are presented as the opposite of what they are, namely as thought-filled actions performed with deliberation. Sandy Steigl’s reaction to the customer appears intentional and deliberate. The ordinary aspects of her handling of the coffee cups are invested with deliberate purpose as prelude to the extraordinary act of throwing the coffee in the customer’s face. In both John Kilhane’s and Maureen Keyes’ narratives, intent to walk away from the fight is palpable in the step-by-step performance of the mechanical actions that lead away from the scene of provocation. In Molly’s narrative, the DAC communicates the absence of an expected exchange of greetings and talk that normally accompanies such activities. By representing Harry’s actions in such a way, Molly not only

reveals his actions but evaluates them as a deliberate silence intended to insult. However, intention is never mentioned outright. Rather, intentionality, deliberation or purposefulness emerge from the DAC sequence.

4.5 *Summary*

Although DACs are relatively simple at the syntactic level, they are elaborate at the discourse level. The basic narrative syntax demonstrated in DAC clauses combined with the presentation of a discrete but unremarkable sequence of actions, foregrounded by subject NP ellipsis (in some cases), played out against a backdrop of below-conscious expectations about what patterns of pronominal alternations are likely to be encountered in conflict narrative and what types of actions are likely to be reported, all operate to unify and delineate this sequence of clauses. A distinctive configuration emerges, with, it might be suggested, a recognizable footprint. Identification does not require an intuitive judgment, but is readily based on the confluence of these properties.

Actions recounted in this manner strongly connect those actions with thought. Consequently, a superordinate meaning of intent or deliberation emerges from narrative clauses that appear in this configuration. The construct derives its ponderous name from the meaning of intentionality or deliberation that results from the co-occurrence of these multiple processes.

5. **DACs as an Evaluative Mechanism**

The identification of DACs and their location in the complication advances our conceptualization of the relationship between evaluative and referential structures. Earlier, DACs were described as structures within the complication. But what kind of structures are they? Evaluative, referential or both? DACs simultaneously convey both objective (referential) and subjective (evaluative) information. They display properties of the primary narrative sequence of clauses which constitute the referential function, including the maintenance of temporal order, simple syntax, location in the complication; in short, they report objective information. DACs also display the characteristic most closely associated with evaluation in personal narrative, namely the communication of subjective information, in this case, 'deliberative action' or 'purposeful intent'. In DAC narratives, 'intent' reflects the speaker's orienta-

tion toward her or his own actions, by asserting the purposefulness with which the DAC's actions are executed.

DACs appear to combine the referential and evaluative functions of narrative by conveying both objective action and subjective intent. How can DAC form and function be accounted for within the Labovian theory of evaluation in oral narrative of personal experience? The theory of narrative evaluation developed by Labov & Waletzky (1967) and expanded by Labov (1972, 1982) offers several concepts that help locate and explain the notion of combined reference and evaluation as it applies to DACs. In the Labovian perspective, two issues are relevant to understanding the function of evaluative language: first, the degree to which evaluative meaning is explicitly or overtly stated in the narrative; and second, the extent to which the narrative's evaluative language displaces the primary sequence of action reported in the narrative.

Labov frames the issue of explicitness in stated meaning in terms of external and internal evaluation, alluding to this parameter (Labov 1972:371), but discussing it only briefly. External evaluation is represented by the narrator's overt, explicit, forthright statements of meaning. It is typically associated with identifiable evaluative language at the clause level. The greater the extent to which evaluative meaning is realized through covert, implicit or veiled statements, the greater the degree of internalization is said to be. In this regard, DACs are highly internalized evaluative mechanisms. Intentionality hangs over DACs like a smoky haze. It is never overtly articulated and consequently cannot be tied to specific evaluative language at the clause level. Indeed, DACs convey deliberative action or purposeful intent so indirectly that meaning might more accurately be described as emerging from the construct.

Labov assigns evaluative structures to two categories, large scale and small scale mechanisms. Large scale evaluative mechanisms (LSEMs) are single or clusters of clauses that extend across narrative clause sequences. As such, they typically (but not always) interrupt the primary narrative sequence, drawing evaluative force from the suspension of the narrative action (Labov 1972:370). In contrast, small scale evaluative mechanisms (SSEMs) apply at clause level.⁴ These mechanisms are typically specific words, grammatical elements or grammatical relationships that alter the simple syntax characteristic of the narrative clause. Their evaluative effect derives from this permutation, which draws attention to the action described in the clause (Labov 1972:375).

To more clearly identify what type of evaluative mechanism DACs are, it is useful to first identify what type they are not. DACs do not qualify as SSEMs because they are not grammatical elements occurring at the clause internal level. They are further unlike SSEMs in that they do not achieve their evaluative effect by permuting clause internal language in such a way as to depart from basic narrative syntax. To the contrary, DACs extend across clauses and the simplicity of DAC clause structure preserves or reinforces basic narrative syntax. DACs can thus be squarely placed in the LSEM category. However, in one respect, DACs do depart significantly from a key aspect of the LSEM profile. They do not interrupt or suspend the narrative. Rather, as part or whole of the complicating action, DACs maintain the primary narrative sequence or advance it.

In sum, DACs appear to be a highly internalized evaluative structure, although this evaluative force lacks a linguistic presence in clause level semantics. DACs manifest a clause structure that identifies it as an LSEM, but unlike the majority of such mechanisms, they preserve narrative action rather than suspending it. These functions occur simultaneously in DACs. While Labovian theory recognizes the dual referential/evaluative status of some narrative clauses, it does not completely account for the simultaneity characteristic of DACs.

For example, Labov has observed that a clause may technically qualify as a narrative clause, while its semantic content also defines it as an evaluative clause. But he does not develop this perspective further, and never addresses it in terms of multiple clause structures like DACs. Labov returns obliquely to the issue of combined referential/evaluative function in another context. In later comments focused largely on the extent to which LSEMs do or do not interrupt the primary narrative sequence, Labov identifies several types of LSEMs. These are evaluated action, embedded action and fused action. Each specifically invokes both referential and evaluative force, and each is more deeply integrated into the narrative clause sequence so that objective action and subjective meaning become increasingly difficult to separate.

Labov identifies evaluated actions as those actions which do not interfere with the narrative sequence, but which are overtly evaluated as to their meaning for the speaker, e.g., "I was shaking like a leaf." (Labov 1972:373). Despite their status as primary narrative clauses, DACs fail to qualify as evaluated action because they are not attended by overt evaluative statements from the narrator about his or her purposeful intent. Because speech is action

in some cases (Toolan 1988:159), quoted speech can function in both referential and evaluative capacities, constituting embedded action in the Labovian framework. Some DAC clauses are quoted speech actions, e.g., clause (n) in Maureen Keyes' narrative "and I thought 'What the hell am I doin' here? I'm going out to kill her!'"

DACs most closely resemble fused evaluations (Labov & Waletzky 1967:38). Fused evaluations are single clauses which both refer and evaluate, and tend to be constituted by symbolic actions. Symbolic actions have culturally defined meanings, that is, they require cultural knowledge to correctly interpret their meaning and to perceive their evaluative force (Labov 1972:372). For example, Labov cites a case in which a narrator described her experience on an aircraft that had lost power and was plummeting earthward. She concluded her complication sequence with the narrative clause "[and everybody] put away their prayer beads" (Labov 1972:374). Such a statement conveys both action (reference) and attitude (evaluation) in one clausal unit. Cultural knowledge is prerequisite to understanding the implications of a situation in which taking out and using a rosary is a reasonable, meaningful response. Each DAC represents an action that must be culturally defined and locally identified as a discrete, purposeful action in order to interpret it as other than a banal report of unimportant detail. In Sandy Steigl's and Maureen Keyes' case, both women are "not taking anything from anybody". John Kilhane is "walking away from a fight", and Harry is "snubbing" Molly. As such, they offer action as well as attitude that is relevant to the reported confrontation.⁵

Labov and Waletzky consign fused or symbolic actions to the outfield, largely due to the difficulty of identifying them by other than intuitive means. However, the distinctive footprint of DACs permits easy identification of these interesting constructs. Further, DACs offer a clearer view of what this fusion entails, and how it is achieved.

In DACs the evaluative is laminated onto the referential. Meaning is achieved where reference and evaluation are fused through the simultaneous operation of several different and disparate processes which are both cultural and grammatical. DACs violate expectations about the likely structural and clausal configurations of oral narrative. These expectations are rooted in sociocultural knowledge about the speech event (confrontation) which is being narrated about, for example, who the participants are likely to be, how they will comport themselves, the parameters of what may be said and done

and how this social organization is likely to be realized in the linguistic configurations of the narrative. These expectations include that confrontation narrative complications will be dominated by the *I/he/I/he* pronominal sequences that capture the verbal exchanges of the confrontation itself. Consequently, in DACs, the appearance of *I/I/I/I* pronominal sequences in the complication violates this expectation.

At the intra-clause level, cultural and linguistic processes again operate to produce intensive cohesion among DAC clauses. Among speakers in this community, the DAC event is perceived as a discrete, identifiable action, with deliberation and intent as its motivating force. The temporal ordering of the sequence of central, detailed actions realizes its close-ordered timing in reality. Of course, the relationship between event and clause is at the heart of narrated experience. In this regard, the presence of DACs in the narrative provides strong support for the view that narrative coherence exists at the level of the events that the narrative reports, and the real world knowledge that supports its interpretation (Labov 1982; Schifffrin 1984; Goodwin 1990). Finally, ellipsis, as a grammatical process, intensifies the already strongly cohesive nature of this construct.

The evaluative effect of DACs is produced not by any single grammatical feature, grammatical relationship or discourse process, but by a confluence of cultural and grammatical knowledge that infuses the sequence of clauses that reports the objective action. This relationship is less a combination than it is a fusion, a lamination.

6. Conclusion

DACs are formally and functionally unlike other evaluative mechanisms discussed in the literature on narratives. The present discussion has extended the Labovian view of LSEMs as single sentence constructs to include the multi-clause deliberative action construct. DACs also demonstrate that such LSEMs can extend across clauses without suspending the narrative action sequence. To the contrary, DACs preserve or advance the narrative action. Further, DACs sharpen the perspective on how deeply internalized internal evaluation can actually be in that they reveal evaluation which emerges without being tied to clause level semantics.

Finally, examination of the multiple and disparate processes that produce this extraordinarily dense, cohesive narrative construct deepens insight into how referential and evaluative material are fused with each other to achieve their powerful effect. DACs reveal a highly subjective, evanescent inner state, namely, intent. Intent is subjective experience and in that capacity, it is evaluative. It conveys the motivation or force behind a sequence of actions that reflects the narrator's orientation toward the action. But the evaluative work of DACs does not stop there. DACs are linguistic indicators of the presence of an inner negotiation taking place within the narrator/actor (Bower 1994). Indeed, DACs frame the moral turning point in the narrator's reaction to the confrontation situation.

Notes

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- 1 Narrative examples are presented following the conventions developed by Labov & Waletzky (1967). Independent clauses are listed on separate, lettered lines. Dependent clauses are indented on separate, unlettered lines. The narrative examples are verbatim transcriptions of the oral narrative as spoken. Pronominal references are occasionally clarified in square brackets, and material enclosed in parentheses are listeners' comments. Any textual material enclosed in quotations represents actual verbatim quotes of speakers.
- 2 The DAC in Molly Stavros' narrative ends with clause (q) "got back in the car" and not with clause (r) "Never said "Hi, Molly..." because temporal juncture does not obtain between the two clauses. Clause (r) can appear at any point in the DAC sequence or elsewhere in the narrative without disturbing the temporal ordering of the event. Clause (r) confirms the interpretation of Harry's behavior as silence with the intent to snub.
- 3 CLOSE-ORDERED is a term introduced in Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974) to refer to a type of timing in speakers' turns at talk. It specifically refers to a minimal lapse in time between one speaker's utterance and the initiation of a following utterance by another speaker.
- 4 Labov does not specifically use the term small 'scale evaluative mechanism' to apply to clause-internal devices. However, in my view, the term is apt because it captures a conceptual counterpoint to the notion of mechanisms that apply across clauses.

- 5 The full evaluative impact of DACs emerges out of a careful review and analysis of material preceding and following the construct itself. For a fuller discussion of narrative roles and social types see Bower (1984; 1996) which provides a more complete ethnographic analysis of conflict narrative in this Irish-American working-class community.

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Byplay: Negotiating Evaluation in Storytelling*

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Labov's early formulation of the importance of evaluation in narrative (1972: 366-375) stimulated the investigation of evaluation in storytelling by a wide range of scholars, including folklorists (Bauman 1975:290-234; Robinson 1981), linguists (Polanyi 1979), and anthropologists (Watson 1973). Labov argued that *evaluation*, the means by which the narrator indicates "the point of the narrative, its *raison d'être*: why it was told, and what the narrator is getting at" was perhaps "the most important element in addition to the basic narrative clause" (Labov 1972:366). In this paper I want to explore the notion that evaluation is a critical component of a story's telling by not only investigating the procedures through which a narrator evaluates events she is recounting (cueing her recipients as to her alignment and affect towards these events), but also how recipients themselves may shape the evolving telling event by offering their own, sometimes competing, evaluations.

1. Introduction

Much research on discourse deals largely with the actions of the **SPEAKER**. For example the main focus of traditional speech act theory has been the speaker's intentions and utterances. In traditional speech act theory if the hearer is considered at all it is in terms of speaker's projection about the hearer. Here I want to consider the possibility that the basic unit of analysis could instead be talk-invoked **PARTICIPATION FRAMEWORKS** (Goffman 1981:137) in which the

hearer is just as active a coparticipant as the speaker. The concept of participation framework includes the talk in progress, as well as alignment to it, of both speaker and hearer. I will explore a range of different kinds of RECIPIENT STRUCTURES, participation frameworks that provide recipients with various sorts of options for dealing with talk in progress, including possibilities for dealing with it that actively *oppose* the interpretive frameworks proposed by speaker. Recipients' renderings of talk can effectively shape the meaning of the speaker's talk and even its status as central or subordinate talk on the floor.

This paper examines the construction of performances of commentary on ongoing talk subordinate to a main storyline (which serves to delineate the principal conversational activity in progress), or what I'll call BYPLAY. Forms of "subordinate communication" which Goffman (1981:133-134) distinguishes include "byplay" (a form of subordinated communication of a subset of ratified participants who make little effort to conceal the ways in which they are dealing with the speaker's talk), "crossplay" (communication between ratified participants and bystanders across the boundaries of the dominant encounter), and "sideplay" (respectfully hushed words exchanged entirely among bystanders). Goffman's model of participation includes the notion of ratified participants who can be distinguished from "bystanders". At dinner all those around the table are potential ratified participants, though through gaze direction and body orientation a speaker may select certain individuals as principal addressed recipients, and recipients may choose to attend or disattend a speaker's talk in a variety of ways.

In discussing the organization of listener participation in conversation Goffman (1981:28-29) argues that participants who do not officially have the floor may interject their "evaluative expression of what they take to be occurring" through "asides, parenthetical remarks and even quips, all of whose point depends upon their not being given any apparent sequence space in the flow of events" (1981:29). In the course of a description or a storytelling, participants (those who are not principal speakers) may elect to deal with talk in progress in other than story-relevant ways. Rather than displaying appropriate enthusiasm for current descriptions or stories through questions, exclamations, or brief comments, participants may open up a complex conversational floor which is simultaneous yet subordinate to the main floor being managed by the storyteller and principal addressed recipient(s), through byplay — teasing, heckling, or playfully dealing with a description or story. These different footings (Goffman 1981) which recipients assume with re-

spect to the talk can affect the development of a story. Playful commentary about talk in progress can provide for two simultaneous lines of talk, even embellishing what speaker is saying, while repair-like moves that critique speaker's talk can lead to the closing up of a story.

This paper will focus on several critical issues regarding the construction of byplay: 1) How do people collaborate in allowing it take place? 2) What are the vocal and nonvocal ways — the contextualization cues (Gumperz 1982) — through which participants in byplay mark their talk as either a) attemptedly nonintrusive such that the principal speaker disattends it and it is not disruptive of the storyteller's line or b) designedly “on the floor” available for others, including principal speaker, to react to in the midst of speaker's talk? 3) How can such talk open up frameworks for participation alternative to that of speaker/audience? In examining such issues I want to describe byplay as a negotiated feature of interaction, showing how participants' footing may change through the course of a telling.

2. Alternative Trajectories of Byplay

Two sets of examples will be presented, the first set showing the range of possible types of byplay and the second set dealing with negotiated features of byplay. All the data are drawn from a videotape of an American suburban family dinner. All of the instances involve stories being told by 'Fran', who has been away working with a group called the Christian Coalition and has visited a mansion of one of its members. The participants in the encounter will be referred to by alphabetically sequenced pseudonyms, with respect to their seating positions from left to right around a round table: Al is father of Cathy and Fran, Bob is boyfriend in good standing of younger daughter Cathy (aged 18), Dianne is mother of Cathy and Fran and principal bread-winner of the family, Ed is current (though by no means exclusive) boyfriend of Fran (aged 20). Figure 1 shows these seating positions.

It will be important in this analysis to consider that those in the encounter participate in different ways during it and assume different types of footings vis-à-vis the talk. Fran is the party who may be considered principal speaker, or storyteller. With respect to her talk participants take up different types of alignment toward what they are hearing. In response to stories generally recipients have multiple options: they may (1) actively attend the talk in




Figure 1. *Seating positions of participants*

progress in the manner proposed by speaker and take on the position of the principal addressed recipient, (2) disattend the talk by engaging in activities alternative to it such as eating, food distribution, child care, or initiating a competing focus (creating a second conversational floor) resulting in the fissioning of the conversational group, (3) distance themselves from the talk by superimposing metacommentary on the main focus (not processing talk as it is unfolding) or (4) embellish the talk by exploiting possibilities for playful rendering, reframing it while appreciating it. Moreover, as Goffman (1974: 528) argues, in replaying past experience the present speaker maintains both the identity of teller to listeners in the present and animator of “cited figures” within it. During the course of this particular dinner Dianne, Fran’s mother, takes up the position of principal addressed recipient, while Bob, Cathy, Ed, and to a lesser extent Al (her father) engage in byplay during its course.

Some examples of byplay which display the range of types of participation possible in byplay exchanges will now be examined. In each of the sequences to be analyzed, in the midst of a description recipients treat the talk by primary speaker in ways other than it was intended. That is, rather than displaying interest in what speaker has to say they instead initiate comments on focal participants’ talk which can overlap the description while maintaining two simultaneous lines of talk (as in example 1) or take over the sequence

and close it down (example 2). Yet in that the talk on the floor is presented as a story, it nonetheless remains a point of focus which can be returned to following simultaneous talk (see M. Goodwin 1982).

In the transcriptions to follow elapsed time in tenths of seconds is indicated by numbers in parentheses (0.5) or dashes within parentheses (–). Stress is marked by underlining. Tildes (~) indicate rapidly spoken speech. Whispered talk is indicated by degree signs (°). Inbreath is shown by asterix (*h). Double obliques (//) indicate the point at which a current speaker's talk overlaps the talk of another. An alternative system is to place a left bracket (⌊) at the point of overlapping talk. Punctuation marks are not used as grammatical symbols, but mark intonation. A period indicates falling intonation. A comma is used for falling rising intonation. Question marks are used for rising intonation. A colon indicates that the sound preceding the colon has been lengthened. When one strip of talk follows another with noticeable quickness an equal sign is placed between the two utterances. Vocal data are transcribed according to the system developed by Jefferson and described in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974:731-733) while nonvocal data are transcribed using the system developed by C. Goodwin (1981:46-53).

In the first example Fran is describing a table in a mansion belonging to the Christian Coalition group she is a member of which she recently visited.

(1) G.126:P:648

- | | | |
|----|--------|---|
| 1 | Fran | <u>They</u> have a hu:ge lon::g table in the <u>middle</u> |
| 2 | | that would seat *h I~don't~know |
| 3 | | <u>how~many~people.</u> = [*h And <u>then they</u> have- a |
| 4 | Bob: → | ⌊ <u>Hundreds.</u> |
| 5 | Fran: | <u>little</u> ⌊ dining room <u>table</u> at the e:nd. |
| 6 | Al: → | ⌊ ° <u>Hundreds~at~least.</u>) |
| 7 | Fran: | Which ⌊ is the~size~of <u>ours.</u> |
| 8 | Ed: → | ⌊ °King <u>Arthur</u> : 's. <u>table.</u> |
| 9 | Fran: | *h <u>BY</u> ⌊ <u>their ba:y window.</u> |
| 10 | Bob: → | ⌊ <u>Was it rou:nd?</u> |
| 11 | Fran: | Y'know? <u>Plus</u> they have- *h in <u>all</u> their |
| 12 | | <u>bedrooms</u> they have: <u>what~are</u> they |
| 13 | | called.= <u>Window seats</u> :? |

In describing the table Fran uses a rhetorical device to indicate the table's expansiveness. When she says “*h I~don't~know how~many~people” she is indicating the large size of the table and evaluating it (as seeable from

nonvocal appreciative lateral head shakes) rather than asking help in locating a specific number; as shown by the “=” (latched talk) sign following her sentence completion she continues quickly on with her talk, not dwelling on the number. Nonetheless this talk is hearable as a perturbation and constitutes one sort of conversational object which regularly engenders entry of recipients in a byplay mode. Bob playfully treats “I don’t know how many people” as the initiation of a *word search*. Providing a candidate solution — “hundreds” — he overlaps her continuing talk (as indicated by the bracket) with a guess at the number and looks toward Ed, signaling his invitation to him to coparticipate in commentary on the talk. Al speaks next in a low voice looking towards his plate; rather than attending to Fran, he builds on and elaborates Bob’s guess with “°Hundreds~at~least.” This theme now gets developed into fanciful versions of the table with Ed’s “°King Arthur:’s. table.” (produced looking toward Bob with his head in an arched mode; see Figure 2) and Bob’s subsequent elaboration built on the King Arthur theme with “Was it rou:nd?” (talk addressed directly to Fran with no attempt made to modulate it).




Figure 2. *Alignment axes of participants*

Fran’s original attempt to indicate the expansiveness of the table has been extracted for treatment in ways that are not relevant to the story and becomes a point of departure for an extended playful sequence that occurs simultaneously with the continuation of her description. Indeed another important feature of byplay is the timing of byplay with respect to the story

proper. Both Al and Ed chain their talk to Bob's commentary rather than advancing talk in the way Fran proposes. Rather than attending to Fran's currently relevant utterances they instead deal with talk of Fran which occurred earlier; time lag in dealing with talk on the floor is frequently a feature of byplay.

Though technically the byplay overlaps speaker's continuing talk, byplay is produced in such a way as to not intrude upon it. It is spoken with lowered volume, as indicated by a degree "o" sign, and participants exhibit a particular spatial organization of gaze and gesture. As Ed says "King Arthur's- table" he angles his head (tilting it backwards; Figure 2), projecting an arc over the official talk space so as not to intrude upon it, thus partitioning off two separate alignment axes, one between Ed and Bob and the other between Fran, her principal addressed recipient, Dianne, and Cathy.

Despite the byplay Fran provides no official recognition of the fact that byplay is occurring. However, during the byplay, in line 5 as she says "little dining room table" Fran leans her body towards Dianne, her addressed recipient, and increases her volume and the expansiveness of her gestures over "BY their bay window." (She draws an elaborate half moon circle to illustrate a bay window.) Such moves display attempts by the speaker to secure enhanced recipient response from her recipient Dianne in the midst of simultaneously occurring talk.

The next example (2) provides an instance of a kind of byplay which presents a different alignment towards talk on the floor and verges upon heckling. Despite the fact that Fran (line 4) initiates the story sequence in response to a request for a story — "Tell us about whatshernames." — the commentary on talk which follows (lines 8-29) displays little interest in it and leads to a temporary closing up of the story. Commentary begins here during the "orientation" (Labov 1972:364) section of speaker's story. Video camera icons locate the frame grabs that will be examined in Figure 3.

(2) G.126:P:425

- 1 Cathy: Alright. Tell us about whatshernames.=
 2 Fran: =Okay.
 3 (0.6)
 4 Fran: [We go driving,
 5 Bob: [Okay,
 6 (0.4)



- 7 Fran: uh:m,
 8 Ed: You went to a drive in,
 9 Al: Yea p.
 [redacted] II
 10 Bob: [redacted] What~are~you~doin~in~a drive in.
 11 Cathy: Wi th who.
 [redacted] III
 12 Al: [redacted] Mm hm.
 13 Ed: Uh huh.
 14 (0.8)
 [redacted] IV
 15 Cathy: Su re.
 16 Ed: [redacted] All the Christia//ns go to~the dirty
 17 movies together. // That way they don't think
 it's a si:n.
 18 Bob: Maybe THA:T'S what Pete- Pete Derrick wanted.
 19 Cathy: h h h h huh uh huh- uh huh

Following the perturbations in Fran's talk — the (0.4) second pause and the “um,” — Ed playfully mishears “We go driving,” as “going to a drive in”. Other recipients build on this interpretation providing queries about and characterizations of the speaker's activities which are at odds with those of the Christian Coalition group that the teller and story characters belong to. In contrast to utterances in the previous example produced with lowered volume while avoiding speaker's gaze, these utterances are spoken in a normal voice tone while looking toward speaker.

As this example shows, the placement of byplay during the initiation of a story can be threatening to the story's production. Recipients' commentary rather than speaker's story becomes the focus of interaction. A visual inspection of speaker's posture displays her orientation towards progressive loss of the floor. She collapses her body tonus at junctures in the commentary; she first relaxes her wrist (line 9), then her head rests on her hand (line 11), and finally she bends over her plate and re-engages in eating (line 14). However, in that a story has been requested, it is possible for this to be reintroduced at a later point, which indeed occurs.



I
Initiates Story



II
Relaxes Wrist



III
Rests Head
on Hand



IV
Moves from Talk
to Eating

Figure 3. *F's changing posture during byplay.*

These examples provide instances of alternative directions commentary on talk may take. In example (1) despite playful talk the speaker proceeds, disattending byplay. By way of contrast in example (2) commentary becomes the principal focus for talk on the floor and the telling is abandoned. The only party who has not participated in byplay is Dianne (Fran's principal addressed recipient).

Given the possibility for disruption of ongoing talk I now want to look more precisely at how participants might work together to construct non-intrusive playful commentary. In the next section I examine more precisely how commentary on talk may engender alternative forms of participation given the ways in which the principal speaker's main recipient(s), as well as the principal speaker herself, choose to deal with it.

3. Procedures for Inviting Coparticipation in Byplay

Two examples of byplay will be examined in some detail to investigate how through body posture, gesture, and speech the activity of byplay is interactively achieved. Non-vocal data are transcribed in the following way. Gaze is indicated by the presence of a line above speaker's talk or by a line adjacent to a letter standing for recipient. The specific party toward whom gaze is directed is indicated by an initial on the line. Movement of gaze toward a recipient is indicated by periods; movement of gaze away from recipient is indicated by commas. The absence of a line above a speaker's name indicates the absence of gaze toward the party eventually or previously gazed at. The presence of a letter without a gaze line indicates that that party makes only a brief glance at the party who is initialed. Relevant nonvocal activities of participants are indicated within parentheses.

In example (3), Fran describes her arrival at the gate of a mansion. The byplay utterances of interest in these data occur in lines 10 and 14 with Bob's comment to Cathy — "The other entrance you can go in. °Clever." — inviting her coparticipation. While providing a metacommentary, this talk is produced in such a way as to not bid for the floor or intrude upon speaker's talk.

(3) G.126:P460

- | | | |
|---|-------|--|
| 1 | Fran: | Well it e:nded up *hh we ca-uh followed our |
| 2 | | <u>map</u> wrong.=Of course we'd been lost |
| 3 | | f'so long 'n we <u>came</u> in the <u>wrong</u> |
| 4 | | <u>entrance</u> .=cuz the <u>other</u> <u>entrance</u> , (0.2) |

- 5 you could go i:n, *hh So I get outa
 6 the ca:r // you know I haf tuh open the
 7 thing open the ga:te,=
 8 Bob: (hmph!)
 9 Fran: [So I-
 10 Bob: [The other [entrance you can go in.
 11 Fran: [I told us ta y'know Jenny "Come
 12 on through."
 13 (.)
 14 Bob: °Clever.
 15 Fran: *hhh An uh:m,
 16 (1.0)
 17 Fran: We drive up t' this place, (0.4)
 18 I thought we were inna °museum er something.

Although the byplay utterances provide talk about primary speaker's story, this talk is not fitted to what the storyteller is currently saying. While Fran is describing the activity of getting up to the entrance of a mansion (during the "orientation" section of the story), having to open the gate, and then beckoning Jenny through (lines 5-7, 11-12), concurrently Bob deals with talk of Fran which occurred a bit back, in lines 3-5 — Fran's having "come in the wrong entrance.=cuz the *other* entrance, (0.2) you could go i:n,". He selects out part of speaker's prior utterance (a part which can arguably be heard as repetitious with respect to speaker's prior talk) and repeats it, thereby marking *it* rather than ongoing current talk as talk to be commented upon and then provides an explicit evaluation: "°Clever." While with his repetition Bob is setting up the reference of his current comment to Fran, he is also remarking on it (Goffman 1981:43), as will become evident when the nonvocal head bobbings he produces in his talk's midst are discussed.

Bob ties his talk to a part of speaker's talk which is not the current focus of attention in much the same way that recipients operate on talk by selecting out part of a speaker's prior utterance and repeating it, thereby marking it as talk to be repaired, mimicked, countered or disagreed with. The form of alignment or attentiveness which Bob gives to speaker's talk is markedly different from that of Dianne, who acts as the principal addressed recipient of speaker's story and deals with speaker's talk as it is ongoing. To understand the differences in Bob's and Dianne's orientations toward speaker's talk, we will first examine in more detail what Dianne is doing. As the story proceeds Dianne gazes at Fran and provides visual displays of acknowledgement in

response to Fran's story. As stated above, the presence of a line indicates gaze directed toward the party who is initialed at the onset of the line.

(3a) G.126:P460

- 5-6 Fran: = *hh So I get outa the ca:r you know I haf
 Dianne: F _____
- 6-7 Fran: tuh open the thing open the ga:te,=
 Dianne: F _____
- 9-11 Fran: so I- I told us ta y'know Jenny "Come on through."
 Dianne: F (nods)

Dianne's gazing and nods during "I told us ta y'know" shows she is monitoring Fran's talk as it is being produced. Though she stops gazing after "y'know" she shows heightened attentiveness to the talk as she exits by nodding her head. On the other hand Bob's talk to Cathy is different; it neither deals with the focus of speaker's talk nor acknowledges what speaker is saying.

Although Bob does not deal with Fran's talk in an official way, the organization of his byplay demonstrates that he is taking into account the talk in progress on some level. He attends to the sequential structure of Fran's talk by slotting his own talk at junctures in Fran's talk — that is, after the completion of a clause, in line 7, and after a micropause in line 13. Moreover, he initiates talk when he can observe that speaker has secured a ratified participant; only after Dianne gazes continuously at Fran during and after "So I get outa the ca:r you know" does Bob initiate byplay. Thus, though the byplayer ignores the current content of speaker's talk (that is, he does not treat speaker's talk in its ongoing course but rather selectively operates upon part of it) its sequential structure is still attended to and remains relevant, being used by byplayer to place and slot his talk.

Examining the nonvocal movements of Bob as well as his vocal actions, one finds that Bob provides a stepwise portrait of his involvement in principal speaker's talk. In the midst of Fran's talk (in line 8) Bob provides a "hmp!" response to the talk accompanied by a smile. This response is followed by a series of small head bobbings which serve to move Bob's gaze from principal speaker to someone to his side, Cathy. Gazing toward someone is one way in which a speaker can attempt to solicit coparticipation of another as hearer to their talk (C. Goodwin 1981, chapter 5).



Figure 4. *Alignment axes during F's talk*

speaker to participate in Bob's talk. In the face of this minimal attention given his byplay, Bob terminates it. However, as he does so he intensifies and makes explicit his alignment toward principal speaker by putting his hand to his head in a stereotypic gesture that Morris et al. (1979:31) argue is conventionally understood to mean "something wrong with the brain" and at the same time ironically commenting on speaker's talk by saying "°Clever."

However despite the elaborateness of his commentary Bob performs it in such a way as to not disrupt and only minimally intrude on principal speaker's talk. First, he produces "°Clever." with lowered volume, as indicated by the "°" sign. Second, he quickly returns his gaze to principal speaker. Finally, he slots his talk at a juncture in speaker's talk.

Principal speaker, for her part, collaborates in letting the byplay run its course. She actively disattends the activities of Bob and Cathy. Not only does she never explicitly address the fact that there is talk going on during her own; but, in addition, she averts her gaze from those involved in byplay through most of its duration. Figure 4 above shows Fran's talk and gaze during the byplay with respect to the actions of other participants. Of particular importance are Fran's actions in conjunction with Bob's:

(3d) G.126:P460

	D _____	
Fran:	*hh So I get outta the ga:r	[you know I
Bob:	F _____	(hmp!) _____

Bob: _____ (*smile*).
 Al: F (*eating*) _____
 Fran: D _____, , , , , , , B, , , , A, , , , , B ,
 Fran: haf tuh open the thing open the ga:te,
 Bob: C _____
 (*head bobs . . .*)
 Al: F (*eating*) _____

When Fran gazes in the direction of Bob over “thing” and is in a position to observe Bob’s head bobbings away from storyteller (Fran) toward Cathy, she withdraws her gaze from Bob and looks toward Al over “open”. Even though she has lost one recipient, the integrity of having an attending recipient has not been called into question, because she is able to redirect her gaze to another party. However, Al provides no visible displays of acknowledgement as had, for example Dianne, with her gaze and nods; instead he occupies himself with eating. Given Al’s minimal participation in her line, Fran moves past Al to Bob once again. She finds, however, that Bob is still engaged with Cathy. Fran quickly cuts off her talk — “So I-” — and then moves toward Dianne, a recipient who has been systematically attending her (see 3e below).

In producing her talk “So I- I told us ta y’know Jenny ‘Come on through.’”, Fran makes her body a locus for gaze through the motions she does with her hands (see Figure 4 above). Her right hand is extended in space as she produces a beckoning hand movement on “So I- I told us ta y’know Jenny ‘Come on through.’” Her left elbow is held out during “I told us ta y’know Jenny” as she puts her hand up to her hair and head in a preening gesture. The extension of her elbow in space provides a kind of momentary barrier partitioning off space, so that Fran and Dianne are in one alignment axis while Bob and Cathy are in another.

(3e) G.126:P460

	<i>elbow extended</i>		
	<i>hand</i>	<i>hand</i>	
	<i>beckon</i>	<i>beckon</i>	<i>hand to tea</i>
	B, .	D _____, ,	
Fran:	[So I- I told us ta y’know Jenny “Come <u>on through</u> .”		
Bob:	[The other entrance you can go in.		
Dianne:	F _____ (<i>nods</i>)		

As example (3e) shows, in response to Fran, Dianne not only gazes toward speaker but also nods, showing solidarity with her talk. When Dianne stops gazing toward speaker, Fran removes her gaze from Dianne shortly afterwards. In so doing, instead of looking out toward those who beforehand had not been attending her, she re-engages herself in a task-relevant activity. Directing her gaze toward the table while stirring her iced tea and turning away from the direction of Bob and Cathy she manages to skillfully disengage from byplay before reintroducing her story once more.

Though speaker never explicitly acknowledges the byplay between Bob and Cathy, she demonstrates an orientation toward byplay having occurred. An examination of the visual record has shown how she averts her gaze from those involved in byplay, never officially recognizing what takes place between Bob and Cathy. We find a similar phenomenon occurring in the organization of talk. The conversation Fran produces in overlap is treated as a form of side sequence in the midst of her story. As she resumes her description (line 11) she makes use of the connective “an”; this establishes that what she is about to say is tied to prior talk. As she continues, with “We drive up t’this place,” she recaps the actions which she had described prior to the onset of simultaneous talk.

As has been seen with this example, byplay provides a form of running commentary upon what principal speaker is saying. It makes possible for recipients of a story a selective form of listening which deals with the story in ways other than those which principal speaker displays she wants the story to be treated. Initiators of byplay can propose a certain way in which they want primary speaker’s talk to be treated. However, in that such proposals can be responded to in various ways, recipients of byplay can influence the ways in which the byplay sequence as well as the storyline will be developed.

4. Stepwise Entry of Principal Addressed Recipient and Speaker into Byplay

In the sequences we have examined thus far byplay has been actively disattended in an official way by principal speaker. With the next example we can begin to examine how critical the principal speaker’s orientation toward byplay is for the organization of the participation of others present. As principal speaker progressively escalates her coparticipation in byplay, this has consequences for how others (particularly principal attending recipient) begin to deal with byplay.

To begin to examine speaker's step-by-step attending to byplay it will first be relevant to consider how byplay is initiated in the particular example to be looked at. In the following example Fran is describing bedtime with the Christian Coalition group. She opens with a preface stating that recently something remarkable happened to one of her dorm-mates in the group, Yeager, while she was getting into her bunk bed. In this particular sequence Dianne's identity as the mother of Fran and Cathy is important for understanding the stance she takes in the face of intrusions into Fran's talk by Cathy and her boyfriend Bob.

- (6) G.126:P348
- 1 Fran: Okay. D'you wanna hear:r?- (0.2) First of~all
 2 d'you wanna hear what happened to
 3 Yeager the other night?
- 4 Dianne: [Yeah.= What~happened~to Yea//ger.
 5 Cathy: [Ye:s. Let's:
 6 Dianne: Let's hear [what happened~to~you.
 7 Fran: [We have the top bunks y'know in
 8 the uh:m,
 9 (1.6)
- 10 Cathy: No we didn ['t.
 11 Fran: [In the roo//m?=
 12 Bob: Mm I don't think [I wanna hear this.
 13 Dianne: [Yeah I knew that.
- 14 Fran: [°Don't interrupt.
 [uhhh heh!
 15 ((fork to plate clatter during (0.5) pause))
- 16 Fran: [Eh heh hhuuh hhuuh HHUH-uh huh-aa *hhu::h
 17 Ed: [I heard that!
 18 (0.4)
- 19 Ed: ehh ha:
 20 (0.3)
- 21 Fran: Anywa:y, (0.4) uh:m, (0.4) We went ta- I
 22 went to bed really early.

After asking permission to tell a story (line 1) and receiving permission to proceed (1. 4-6) Fran begins her story (1. 7). She then hesitates in her speech, pausing for 1.6 seconds. Before she comes to the pause there are signals of trouble in her talk. Both "uh:m" and the "y'know" which precede it alert

listeners that speaker is encountering difficulty in completing her thought (perhaps because she is beginning to speak on a topic which is recognizably dangerous). As such, the expression “y’know” is not a focal component of speaker’s talk. However, recipient Cathy (l. 10) treats speaker’s “y’know” as the major topic of her utterance; in stating “No we didn’t” (implying “No we didn’t know”) Cathy provides a correction to Fran’s talk. This action, a first instance of entry into byplay, is, however, ignored by principal storyteller, who continues on with her turn (“In the room?”).

In line 12 a second instance of playing upon principal speaker’s talk occurs with Bob’s “I don’t think I wanna hear this.” This talk is directly contradictory to Cathy’s and Dianne’s initial responses to the preface that they wanted to hear the story (l. 4-6). It does not, however, have the character of Cathy’s correction (l. 10). Rather it alludes to the fact that talking about “beds” is a touchy one (especially in the presence of parents). That Bob’s talk is primarily playful rather than heckling is shown by his production, while looking directly at the storyteller, of exaggerated gestures that portray him as someone not wanting to hear. Bob moves his left hand to eye over “I” and his ear during “hear”; he then begins movements with his right hand to his other ear, bringing his hand up and then quickly dropping his fork. Bob’s action draws the attention of Fran, principal speaker, who produces “uhhh heh!”, a small laugh, synchronously with Bob’s right hand movement (following his talk; see Figure 5):

(6a) G.126:P348

<i>left hand</i>	<i>left hand</i>	<i>Right hand</i>	<i>Right</i>
<i>to eye</i>	<i>to ear</i>	<i>up</i>	<i>hand down</i>
F _____			
Bob: I don’t think I wanna <u>hear</u> this.		uhhh	<u>heh!</u>
Fran:			

These actions, produced with Bob’s gaze direction toward Fran, invite her to coparticipate in the byplay. Fran does respond to the byplay, but deals with Bob’s movement in a way that does not necessarily project further coparticipation. Her “uhhh heh!” laugh is short and produced with terminal intonation. Its minimal nature may be responsive to the fact that Bob’s right hand goes down just as Fran produces her second laugh particle, which could be interpreted as signaling the end of his gesture of putting his hand to his head.



Figure 5. *B's byplay gaining F's attention.*



Figure 6. *F's coparticipation in A's byplay.*

Once principal speaker participates in the sequence she ratifies Bob's actions as an event that she as speaker has seen and can be officially attended to by others. Al looks quickly at Bob, and then returns to his initial position facing Fran, and puts his hands on his ears just as Bob had:

(6b) G.126:P348

F _____
 Bob: (*drops fork*) (*right hand to ear*)
 | |
 Al: (*looks at B*) (*Turns back, puts hands on ears*)

By imitating Bob's gesture Al provides a strong form of coparticipation in the byplay that Bob had initiated. Fran attends to Bob's gesture as well. She immediately begins to laugh, looking quickly from Bob to Al (see Figure 6.):

(6c) G.126:P348

Bob: F _____
 Bob: (*hands on ears*)
 Al: (*hands to ears*)
 Fran: B _____ . A _____
 Fran: eh heh hhuh hhuh HHUH-uh huh-aa
hhu::h

This time her laughter is both elaborated and escalated; a series of particles are produced with ever increasing volume.

When the speaker begins to coparticipate in byplay, this activity rather than storytelling, becomes the focal activity on the floor. Al's mimicking of Bob's gestures follows shortly after Fran's attention to Bob's byplay. This suggests that speaker's participation in byplay is important. Is there any way we can show in a stronger way that speaker's activity is especially relevant to the coordination of activity in byplay? By looking at the activities of Dianne, speaker's principal addressed recipient, and by examining her gaze and facial expressions throughout the sequence, we can see how Dianne adapts her response to byplay with regard to the position that Fran takes up to it to show that Fran's response is important for Dianne.

We observed in example (3) that despite overlapping byplay talk the main line of talk was sustained through principal addressed recipient's, Dianne's, continued coparticipation to Fran's talk. In this example as well Dianne gives Fran's talk close attention:

(6d) G.126:P348

Dianne: F _____

Fran: We have the top bunks y'know in the uh:m,
 Dianne: F _____
 Fran: (- - - - - + - - - - -)
 |
 (*hand gesture*)
 Dianne: (*nod*)
 F _____ . .
 Dianne: C _____
 Dianne: [Yeah I knew that.
 Cathy: [No we didn' [t.
 Fran: [In the roo [m?
 Bob: [Mm I don't think
 Bob: [I wanna hear this.
 B _____
 Dianne: [Don't interrupt.
 Fran: Eh heh!

Dianne is gazing at Fran throughout her talk, displaying her alignment as addressed recipient to her talk. In the midst of producing a word search, signaled by “uh:m,” and a pause, Fran provides a circular gesture shortly before producing the outcome of the search. In response to the gesture Dianne nods, indicating that though Fran has not made explicit what she was about to say, she had sufficient information to be able to project what was intended (Goodwin & Goodwin 1986).

In dealing with the ongoing byplay Dianne sanctions Cathy's intrusions into Fran's talk with her “Yeah I knew that.” and an admonishing look toward Cathy. She follows up this first sanctioning move with a second, “Don't interrupt.” directed to Bob. However, when Fran, principal storyteller, through her laughter focuses on the byplay initiated by Bob, Dianne follows suit; the last syllable of Dianne's “interrupt” is produced looking toward Bob. Even before Dianne has finished her action with Cathy, then, she begins to observe the new focus of storyteller's attention, looking toward Bob.

When principal speaker provides more laughter into the byplay, Dianne returns her gaze to the initiator of the byplay, Bob, a second time:

(6e) F.126:P348

(smile)

Dianne: .B_____ , (look to plate)

Bob: (hands to ears)

Fran: eh heh hhuh hhuh HHUH-uh huh-aa *hhu:::h
(0.4)

Ed: eh [ha:

Fran: [Anywa:y,

Dianne's actions are quite closely synchronized to those of speaker. Upon hearing Fran's escalated laugh Dianne upgrades the form of her own participation in the byplay, changing her looking into a smile (see Figure 6). This smile is carried over until her look toward her plate which occurs when Fran's talk gets underway once again.

Speaker's coparticipation in byplay is thus consequential for how the byplay is treated. Her own participation is built step by step as participants in byplay, Bob and Al, escalate their involvement, putting their hands to their ears. The type of coparticipation Fran engages in influences the form of coparticipation of her primary recipient, Dianne, who changes her face into a smile in response to Fran's escalated laugh.

Despite the fact that Bob's byplay receives responses from coparticipants, Bob carries off the sequence in such a way as to show only minimal expectation of appreciation of his activity. Bob does not extend gaze towards others. Rather no sooner does he have both hands up to his ears, then he takes them down. He then gazes downward and continues his prior activity of eating. In that Bob puts up no roadblocks to Fran's further continuing of her story, Fran can again return to her story line, having participated briefly in a diversionary time out.

5. Conclusion

In the examples we have examined in this paper both principal speaker and her recipients can attempt in various ways to keep byplay from becoming the official focus on the floor. For her part, principal speaker continues her talk with an addressed recipient during the byplay. She avoids glances at those who intrude on her talk. Though her talk may take recognition of byplay

through restarts, shifts in gaze, etc., she avoids any explicit comment upon the talk of those involved in byplay. Initiators of byplay also display an orientation towards minimizing its intrusiveness. In the examples we have examined byplay occurs in turns of relatively short duration. Byplay participants slot their comments on the ongoing stream of talk at junctures in speaker's talk. Then when principal speaker begins to talk, byplay assumes a subsidiary role to principal speaker's talk on the floor. In (3) byplay was produced as its initiator was looking away from speaker. Through avoidance of gaze, lowered volume and various postural positionings byplay participants may attempt to prohibit byplay from becoming the official focus of talk.

In that participants in conversation have available a range of optional ways in which to respond to talk, byplay sequences may take a variety of forms. Although byplay initiators may call for more elaborated coparticipation, as in (3), the sequence may be closed down in short order if others refuse to coparticipate. If principal speaker selects to enter into byplay her coparticipation may affect the alignment of her principal addressed recipient. In (4) principal addressed recipient changes from the position of sanctioner of those intruding into the sequence to a party appreciative of the byplay, smiling into the comments of a byplay participant, when she takes note of speaker's own laughing engagement in byplay. In other instances such as (2) playful commentary may become so intrusive that speaker has to stop her storyline. The status of byplay as a momentary or more extensive activity is negotiated through the types of coparticipation given its invitation and at each point in its development.

The study of activities concurrent to ongoing talk is relevant to theories concerning *participation structures* in conversation (Goodwin 1990; Hanks 1990; Levinson 1987). The type of interactive floor participants maintain in the fragments presented here exhibits an alternative to the model of speaker and audience commonly assumed to be operative during conversation. However the participation structure is not one of two simultaneous competing conversations, as reported for "contrapuntal conversations" (Reisman 1974) or "multiple conversational floors" (Erickson 1982). Neither is it the type of cooperative floor (F2) described by Edelsky (1981) or Kalčik (1975). Rather it is an instance of a floor in which participants may provide side commentary on principal speaker's talk which may invite a range of different forms of involvement in collusive talk, eventually even including principal speaker.

Careful examination of participation structures during talk also has obvious relevance for the analysis of storytelling process. The study of activities

concurrent to storytelling reveals ways in which coparticipants to stories may deal with a telling by separating out parts of the story to be played with, providing realms of discourse allowing for differentiated forms of hearership. In that the talk on the floor is a focused description, it can be readily returned to following time-outs. Indeed an important arena for study, long neglected by students of storytelling, are the optional ways listeners may actively select how they are to attend — not merely promoting the teller's rendering but also providing side comments or even heckling (Sacks 1974:342-343) — thus displaying a variety of forms of alignment during a story's course. Attention to the details of how recipients treat talk in progress provides a view of stories or descriptions as dynamically constructed speech events. It also allows us to view interpretation and evaluation as a negotiated phenomenon. Though a speaker may propose a particular reading of her talk, hearers have available multiple, optional ways of rendering the talk they hear.

From a slightly different perspective, with regard to hearership, Goffman (1961a) defines an individual as a “stance-taking entity”. This was first elaborated in terms of the participation possibilities open to inmates in ‘total institutions’. In *Asylums* Goffman argued that an institution, such as a prison, mental hospital, or business establishment, demanded particular types of participation from those caught within it. However, rather than fully engrossing themselves in the participation frameworks provided by the institution, inmates could take a stance that distances themselves from the institution, and thus reclaim some of their freedom from it. Thus he argues (Goffman 1961a: 320) that

Our sense of being a person can come from being drawn into a wider social unit; our sense of selfhood can arise through the little ways in which we resist the pull. Our status is backed by the solid buildings of the world, while our sense of personal identity often resides in the cracks.

The present analysis suggests that rather than being confined to the analysis of total institutions Goffman's insights are also relevant to the investigation of storytelling and the “role distance” (Goffman 1961b) recipients assume vis-à-vis talk of the moment. While the teller, through narrative evaluation, proposes that her recipients display engrossment in the talk in progress in particular ways, recipients in fact have the ability to distance themselves from such proposals and use speaker's talk as a point of departure for interpretive possibilities and participation frameworks of their own making.

Notes

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An Empirical Study of Textual Structure: Horse Race Calls*

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1. Introduction

While the study of phonological variables most closely realizes the vision articulated by Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog (1968) of a sociolinguistics focused on language change in progress, the study of narratives (Labov & Waletzky 1967; Labov 1972), of ritual insults (Labov 1972), of apartment descriptions (Linde & Labov 1975) and of therapeutic discourse (Labov & Fanshel 1971) represent early, important steps in the empirical study of discourse. That there is a clear methodological break between sociolinguistic discourse analysis (SDA) and the quantitative analysis of phonological variables has not gone without notice (Lavandera 1978; Labov 1978; Romaine 1981; Schiffrin 1987). One of the fundamental difficulties in the empirical study of discourse modelled on quantitative studies of language is defining the unit of analysis; unlike studies of phonological variation, where the unit of analysis has received a great deal of attention by linguists, studies of discourse variation more often than not require the initial identification and definition of the unit under investigation. Progress on this front requires the study of text types whose structures are fairly simple and with boundaries at the beginning and end that are fairly sharply marked.

The principle of accountability, which assumes that the distributional characteristics of the variable under investigation are understood well enough for the data to be reliably coded, presents another challenge for SDA. (For a

more thorough discussion of these issues, see Labov & Fanshel 1977: Chaps. 1, 11; Schiffrin 1987:66-71). Schiffrin (1987: 69) draws attention to two kinds of accountability, both of which were first discussed by Labov: the one most familiar to sociolinguists is labelled distributional accountability and the one specifically associated with discourse studies is called sequential accountability. The latter type was discussed in Labov and Fanshel (1977:354); it requires the investigator to be accountable to “. . . an entire body of conversation, attempting to account for the interpretation of all utterances and the coherent sequencing among them”. Schiffrin extends the notion of sequential accountability to include not only an entire body of conversation but to data sets limited to the analysis of a particular genre, episode, or exchange.

A third obstacle to the development of a sound methodology for SDA is quantitative: how can we test hypotheses about the patterning of the textual structure within the linguistic and social structure of the speech community using statistical procedures such as VARBRUL analysis? It is perhaps quantitative analysis that is most neglected within SDA, although even in the earliest work on discourse within sociolinguistics, the point is made that the model of narratives of personal experience represents a ‘normal form’; the narratives examined were described as “. . . not uniform; there are considerable differences in the degree of complexity, in the number of structural elements present, and how various functions are carried out” (Labov & Waletzky 1967:40). Schiffrin (1987:68) exploits the notion of ‘normality’, suggesting that “. . . one can find typical instances of an occurrence which represent more general patterns”; for her study of discourse markers, for instance, she limits herself to discussing only instances for which there are multiple examples in her data. In the early, descriptive stages of linguistic analysis, it is sometimes not possible to demonstrate ‘typicality’ through quantitative analysis but it should be a clearly articulated goal of sociolinguistic discourse analysis to search for statistical models that will allow us to go beyond reliance on the investigator’s intuitive sense of ‘typicality’. In fact, it must be our goal to eventually bring discourse analysis in line with phonological and morphological studies and achieve distributional accountability.

The study reported on here is an attempt to bring distributional and sequential accountability somewhat closer together in discourse studies. It is an investigation of a particular genre, horse race calls. In defining the structure of the genre, I propose a model or schematic structure of the horse race call consisting of a number of substructures (elements of schematic structure,

hereafter referred to as ESS). I then identify a set of linguistic and nonlinguistic variables which characterize this genre and its ESS; finally, I use a statistical technique known as entropy analysis (Johnston & Semple 1983) to test whether the ESS are identifiable by distributional patterns of the linguistic variables.

I have chosen this particular genre for a number of reasons. My primary goal is to develop an empirical and quantitative methodology for the study of texts. In earlier work (Horvath 1985: Chap. 6) I noted the difficulties of identifying the beginning, middle, and end structures of texts that are embedded in interviews or conversations. My goal is to isolate methodological issues by studying a genre in which the schematic structure is more transparent and the linguistic variability less complex than it is for narratives or arguments. This has led me to the study of types of texts characterized by highly formulaic speech.

The data set consists of the calls made of the eight races at the Canterbury Race Track in Sydney, Australia on October 13, 1984. Three different radio stations, 2BL, 2KY, and 2UE, broadcast the calls made by three different callers for the eight races; all of the calls were tape recorded. The data set has a number of attractive characteristics for anyone interested in developing an appropriate methodology for quantitative discourse analysis:

1. It involves a practical data collection exercise. Twenty-four texts can be collected in one afternoon: the same eight races called by three different race callers on three different radio stations.

2. The calls are responses to the same set of events.

3. The comparability of the texts is without question because they are so highly structured.

4. Performance characteristics, such as voice quality, pitch, and rate of utterance, clearly mark beginning and end structures.

5. The speakers share a common understanding of the linguistic requirements of horse race calling.

6. The calls are not so routinized as to be invariant.

7. The sources of variation associated with speakers, the event, and the grammar are more obvious than they are in texts collected in conversational settings. In some measure this may be because the calls cannot be interrupted. The speaker can 'realize' the text he 'intended' because the audience cannot interrupt and thus change the course of the text, which is typical in dialogic discourse.

2. Event Structure and Linguistic Structure

A horse race is a socially constructed competitive event which takes place on a specially designed site — a track — and has a highly structured linguistic event associated with it — a call. The calls vary according to local traditions; the variety described here is Australian. Table 1 shows the structure of the event itself in the first column, the textual structure of the horse race call in the second column, and gives an example of a horse race call in the third column.

Other features of the horse race and the call are also intimately related. Paralinguistic features such as an unusually fast rate of utterance and a gradually rising pitch of the voice as the race proceeds, followed by a gradual falling of the pitch as each horse in the race passes the finish line, emulate the pace and excitement of the event.

The schematic structure of the call consists of the six substructures or ESS identified in the second column of Table 1. The table shows that the ESS of the text match the structure of the physical event, though not perfectly; the third and fourth ESS of the horse race call match only one of the event structures of the horse race. This fact will become important in the analysis.

The call and the race are meant to take place simultaneously so it is not surprising that the schematic structure of the call directly mirrors the staging of the physical event. The call cannot, of course, actually be produced simultaneously with the race and the caller succeeds in giving that impression to the audience only by linguistic 'sleight of hand'. The task set for the linguistic system is an impossible one from a number of perspectives. While the race flows without any breaks from beginning to end, one gets the impression of a text that has a 'jerky', start-stop structure upon reading a transcript of a horse race call. The text is not unlike a sequential verbal description of the pictures in a comic strip; the caller takes a mental snapshot several times during the race and describes how the horses are aligned with respect to each other and to locations on the track at a particular point in time. The task of keeping up with the race is also impossible for the linguistic system because the race happens faster and the positions of the horses on the track and relative to each other change faster than language can be produced to describe it. Nevertheless, the overall impression upon hearing a call is that it DOES keep up with the race; certainly, the race and the call start within milliseconds of each other and the winning horse is often called before its tail has crossed the finish line. The imperative to keep up with the race, or at least to give that impression, has an effect not only on the textual structure of the call but also on the grammatical

variables that characterize the call; the extraordinary use of ellipsis, for instance, plays an important role in bringing the physical event and the linguistic event as close to being simultaneous as possible. The speed of utterance also helps to keep up with the event but plays another important role by iconically representing the horses travelling as quickly as possible around the track. The rising pitch of the voice, which reaches its highest point just as the first horse goes over the finish line, is also an iconic representation which measures the progression of the race over both time and space as well as reflecting the excitement of the competition of horse against horse and punter against bookmaker. Kuiper and Austin (1991:197) argue further that horse race calls take the form they do because of “. . . constraints on speech processing occasioned by heavy loading on short-term memory”. Certainly the use of oral formulae means that the caller does not have to be constantly creative, but what distinguishes a great caller from the rest is the ability to be clever and witty under such circumstances.

2.1 *The textual structure of horse race calls*

The horse race call has both a pre-sequence and a post-sequence. The pre-sequence consists of what Kuiper and Austin (1991:206) call ‘color commentary mode’ and occurs while the horses are being put into the barrier; the post-sequence occurs after the call and consists of commentary on the race that has just been completed. The call is distinguished from the pre- and post-sequences by the speed of utterance and the gradual rising and falling of the pitch of the voice; at the end of the call, there is a significant pause before the post-sequence begins. The fact that the caller will interrupt the commentary at the beginning of the race if the gates are opened unexpectedly or that a radio station will not always broadcast the pre- and post-sequences if they are interrupting an ongoing program to broadcast the horse races are good indications that the pre- and post-sequences are not part of the call proper; the call proper cannot be interrupted. The structure of the horse race call, then, consists of the following:

Pre-sequence ^ Horse Race Call ^ Post-sequence

Although the description of the call would hold in its general outline for most horse racing communities influenced by the British version of this sport, there are differences, if not in the event, then in the call. Australian callers are obliged to call off the position of ALL the horses entered in the race at the

Table 1. *Horse Race Calls*

The Event Structure	The Text Structure
1. Horses with riders wait in a line in a gate one beside the other at the starting place on the track	Pre-sequence
2. An official signals horses and riders to start running	1. Announcing the start of the race
3. Horses change position from being beside each other to one behind the other and only sometimes beside	2. Evaluation of the start (E)
4. Horses run at varying speeds and so change their relative positions with respect to each other frequently; they also change their location on the track along both the length and width of the track although their location along the length is more important	3. Locating all the horses starting with the lead horse 4. Locating the leading horses at a point on the track, giving the relative position of the horses closest to the leader (3 iterations) (IL)
5. The first to run across the finish line is declared winner unofficially by the caller and officially by judges	5. Calling the winner (W)
6. All the horses cross over the finish line one behind the other or beside each other;	6. Identifying all the horses as they cross the finish line (LL)
7. Horses and riders slowly leave the track; winner goes to the winner's circle to receive reward	Post-sequence

2BL/Race 3

And they're racing

And Diamond Toes got the best of the start/Cushla and Radiant Vista slow/but Miss Leemont shot to the lead on the settling down/followed by Super Swift/and they're followed by Alcibia/then came /getting into a good place is/along the inside/ Luncheon Star

and when they get settled into full stride /Miss Leemont led the way now from Alcibia/ Luncheon Star/Buster's Pride/ and they're followed by Super Swift and Magique/and they're followed by Nightcamp and Diamond Toes/ then Milanese/well back Radiant Vista /followed by Bonnie Walk/and then Shalishan /who dropped out next to last/and Cushla

(i)Miss Leemont has the lead over Buster's Pride now/and on the outside Alcibia makes a line of three/Luncheon Star's running on well/ so is Super Swift/ and they're followed by Magique/and then Nightcamp/well back Radiant Vista /Milanese/and Diamond Toes (ii)Miss Leemont led the way/but Luncheon Star's coming at it hard /then Buster's Pride/Super Swift will have to hurry from there/and Magique's putting in a run (iii)but Luncheon Star is forging clear now from Miss Leemont/in front with a hundred to go

And Luncheon Star races home to win it

it's tight for second/Super Swift got the second/Miss Leemont third/then Magique/and then Milanese/Salishan /Diamond Toes/Bonnie Walk/followed by Buster's Pride/who weakened/Alcibia /Nightcamp followed by Radiant Vista/and Cushla came home a long last

beginning and end of the race; the common explanation given is that punters want to know how the horse they have wagered money on is doing, not just where the lead horses are.

The textual structure proposed consists of elements of schematic structure (ESS) and is based on the analytical model used by Labov and Waletzky (1967:32-41) in their study of narratives. Ruqaiya Hasan (Halliday & Hasan 1985:64) has formalized the concept of schematic structure naming it generic structure potential (GSP); the formalization allows one to capture generalizations about whether an element of structure is obligatory or optional, what the patterns of sequencing are, whether elements of structure are iterative or not, and other relations of dependency between and among the elements. A GSP is generative and is meant to account for the actual, observed structures of texts. Both the narratives and the kinds of texts studied by Hasan, such as service encounters, indicate that we can expect quite complex GSP formulae for most genres. Australian horse race calls, by contrast, have the following simple structure: all elements are obligatory and the sequencing does not vary from one 'actualization' to another; the only source of variation in the GSP is the number of iterations of the Intermediate Lineup. The GSP for an Australian Horse Race Call is:

$$A \wedge E \wedge FL \wedge \overset{\curvearrowright}{IL} \wedge W \wedge LL$$

where:

- A = Announcing the Start
- E = Evaluating the start
- FL = First Lineup
- IL = Intermediate Lineup (iterative)
(The curved arrow indicates that this structure is iterative.)
- W = Calling the Winner
- LL = Last Lineup

Hereafter I will refer to these six substructures comprising the GSP for horse race calls as the six ESS of the horse race call.

2.2 *Selecting the variables*

The selection of variables is critical for the identification of the unit and for analysis of the textual structure. In their work on narrative, Labov and Waletzky distinguished at least two ways in which narratives of personal

experience can be identified: 1) by the GSP, i.e., the textual structure, and 2) by the presence of the narrative clause. One goal of this study is to determine whether the textual substructures proposed for the GSP, i.e., the ESS of the horse race call, are associated with grammatical structures that uniquely characterize them. This goal takes the position of Labov and Waletzky one step further; not only can whole text types be characterized by the presence of particular grammatical structures, but the ESS can as well. In fact this approach to text analysis hypothesizes that there is a relationship between the textual structure and the grammatical structure such that each ESS is associated with a grammatical structure or, more likely, a characteristic configuration of grammatical structures. Ferguson (1983) has shown that a combination of syntactic characteristics, such as the deletion of copula and sentence initial nominals, inversions, and heavy modifiers, constitute the register he names Sports Announcer Talk; many of these syntactic characteristics are also found in horse race calls. By studying this phenomenon empirically and quantitatively, we will be able to begin to test the validity of that hypothesis.

Two kinds of variables were identified: those having to do with the race as a whole and those having to do with the grammatical structure of the text. The former will allow us to show the comparability of texts as well as to see whether any external variables, such as the number of horses in the race or the length of the race, have an effect on the texts; the linguistic variables directly address the goals of the study outlined above. The three speakers, each of whom call the same eight races, will allow us to investigate individual variability. The variables are listed in Table 2. The linguistic variables are based on Halliday's description of the English clause; this description was chosen because it allows an appropriate account of the grammatical structure of texts (Halliday 1985). Often the syntactic structures which interest formal grammarians appear, at least at face value, to hold little promise for the description of the functional categories of texts. Examples of each of the grammatical categories and some explanation of the categories are given in Table 2.

The choice of the set of linguistic variables is a claim that the difference between horse race calls and other text types will be reflected in the patterning of this particular set of grammatical variables. This claim can only be tested in a study of multiple text types, which is beyond the scope of this paper. It is possible to pick out one marker of horse race calls that bears the same relationship that the narrative clause has to narratives of personal experience:

Table 2. *The Variables (with Examples)*¹

<i>Race and Call Variables:</i>		<i>Speaker Variables:</i>
Total number of horses in the race		The 2UE caller
Length of the race		The 2KY caller
Number of clauses in the call		The 2BL caller
Number of iterations of ESS 4 (Intermediate Lineup)		
Linguistic Variables	Examples (caller/race/clause number)	
TENSE		
past	and Diamond Toes got the best of the start (2BL/3/2)	
present	and they're followed then by Alcibia (2BL/3/6)	
future	it'll be in front (2UE/2/7)	
no finite	Cushla and Radiant Vista slow (2BL/3/3)	
ELLIPSIS		
subject	can't muster much early pace (2UE/4/5)	
tense	Cushla and Radiant Vista slow (2BL/3/5)	
mood (tense + subj)	followed by Bonnie Walk (2BL/3/18)	
list	then Melanese (2BL/3/16)	
no ellipsis	Miss Leemont has the lead over Buster's Pride now (2BL/3/22)	
PROCESS		
material	and they're followed then by Alcibia (2BL/3/6)	
relational	Dublin Prince is back to second last now (2UE/2/54)	
mental	you've never seen a race like it (2UE/8/34)	
no predicate	Cushla and Radiant Vista slow (2BL/3/3)	
CIRCUMSTANTIAL		
sequence	well back Radiant Vista (2BL/3/17)	
location (length)	in front with a hundred to go (2BL/3/37)	
location (width)	on the outside was No Vanity (2UE/2/14)	
no circumstantial	Cushla and Radiant Vista slow (2BL/3/3)	
EVALUATION		
clause	<u>it's tight for second</u> (2BL/3/39)	
verb	but Miss Leemont <u>shot</u> to the lead on the settling down (2BL/3/4)	
noun	and last is the <u>bolter</u> Newington Road (2UE/6/64)	
adjective	and Diamond Toes got the <u>best</u> of the start (2BL/3/2)	
adverb	Eureka Stockade began <u>well</u> (2UE/4/3)	
no evaluation	followed by Super Swift (2BL/3/5)	
NO MATCH	and Buster's Pride a length second from Luncheon Star (2KY/3/24)	
RELATIVE		
CLAUSE	who dropped out next to last (2BL/3/20)	

that is the process of ellipsis. Ellipsis is an obligatory feature of Australian horse race calls; however, it is also important to note that ellipsis is found in a large number of text types. In order to go beyond just pointing out the marker of calls, we need to identify more specifically the role of ellipsis in the text type. What distinguishes horse race calls from other text types is not the presence of ellipsis but the relative degree of ellipsis in the text as a whole and the particular role it has in this text type. Furthermore, the patterns among this whole set of linguistic features must be examined in order to understand the textual structure of the calls.

2.3 *Coding the data*

The twenty-four texts were analysed and were found to have all the six ESS proposed for the GSP of horse race calls, which leads to the proposition that all of the ESS are obligatory. The analysis of the ESS has been replicated a number of times by advanced students of linguistics; disagreements have developed about whether the pre- and post-sequences ought to be considered part of the call, but there was unequivocal agreement about the boundaries of the call proper. There were also disagreements about whether the structure First Lineup ought to be considered distinctive or whether it was simply the first iteration of the structure Intermediate Lineup. The identification of the boundaries for the six ESS within the call proper was replicated in most cases. However, even with these highly structured texts, clear borderlines between ESS were not always found. All the races were divided into ESS and then each clause² within an ESS was analysed for tense, ellipsis, process type, circumstantials, evaluation, and for two other characteristics: whether the order of the horses on the track and the order of the horses named in the call matched, and the number of relative clauses; these latter two variables were used to see whether any grammatical complexity might be found in the texts, which are by and large characterized by extremely simple syntax.

2.4 *Statistical analysis*

In this data set there are 144 ESS (8 races x 6 ESS x 3 callers) consisting of 24 Announcements of the Start, 24 Evaluations of the Start, 24 First Lineups and so forth; all of the ESS have been coded according to the variables listed in Table 2. By treating each of the 144 ESS as an independent observation, one can use a grouping statistic to confirm whether the ESS identified on functional grounds can also be identified on linguistic grounds; that is, we can

investigate the hypothesis that there is a characteristic configuration of grammatical variables associated with each ESS in the GSP. In particular we will be interested to see whether the ESS First Lineup and Intermediate Lineup have distinctive grammatical configurations; we have already noted that they are not associated with distinctive parts of the event structure.

Entropy maximization, a nonparametric grouping statistic, was used on the data set to test whether the ESS identified in the analysis would be grouped together on the basis of the grammatical variables. Entropy analysis starts with the entire data matrix, taking each stage as an observation, and successively divides the data set into two classes, or three classes, or four classes, etc., each time sorting the ESS in the horse race call (the observations) among the classes. These are called the two-class solution, the three-class solution, and so on. Summary statistics are given for each successive solution; these are the mean value for each of the variables in each of the classes of a solution, a z-score for each variable for each class of a solution and the percentage of the variance accounted for by each solution. The solution is selected which, as in principal components analysis, allows the researcher to name or make theoretical sense of the classes. If each of the six ESS of the race were made up of a unique configuration of the linguistic variables, then the six class entropy solution would account for all of the variation except that associated with the individual speakers or with external variables such as the number of horses in the race.

2.5 Textual structure and entropy analysis

The data used for the entropy analysis consisted of the 25 linguistic variables listed on Table 2 plus one other variable, the number of clauses in the stage expressed as a percentage of the total number of clauses in the call. Entropy then grouped the functionally defined ESS by searching for similarity of patterning among these variables. There are a number of approaches to selecting the 'best' solution from among the possible 144 entropy analysis solutions (the total number of 'observations'). Perhaps the obvious approach would seem to be to select that solution which accounts for the highest amount of the variance in the data; however, since each subsequent solution adds to the overall explanation of the variance, the 144 class solution would have to be chosen in our case. The usual approach is to observe the pattern of percentage variance explained and select that solution which accounts for the

Table 3. *Entropy Analysis: 2 - 10 Class Solutions*

Entropy Classes	% Variance Explained	Increase in % Variance Explained
2	23.46	
3	30.78	7.32
4	35.08	4.30
5	38.99	3.91
6	49.09	10.10
7	52.60	3.51
8	56.01	3.41
9	57.87	1.86
10	58.97	1.10

greatest amount of variance before the percentage explained begins to tail off. Table 3 shows the percentage of the variance explained for the two-class to the ten-class entropy solutions.

Another approach is to select a solution which tests the hypothesis, such as the one developed here, that the horse race call consists of six identifiable functional/grammatical structures and so select the six class solution. Importantly, the approaches converge with this data set: the greatest jump in variance explained comes with the six class solution and the explanation begins to tail off with the seven-class solution.

Table 4 is a cross tabulation of the six entropy classes and the six ESS in the horse race call. Since there are 24 occurrences of each ESS, a perfect correlation would occur when 24 of the same ESS were found in a single entropy class, e.g., 24 Announcements of the Start in the same entropy class. The columns on Table 4 show the distribution of the 24 occurrences of each of the six ESS across the entropy classes while the rows indicate the variety of ESS from the call included in each entropy class. Table 4 indicates, for instance, that fifteen of the 24 Announcements of the Start were grouped together in entropy class 2 and eighteen Last Lineups were grouped in entropy class 3. Looking at the rows, we can also see that entropy class 2 contained a total of sixteen ESS, fifteen Announcements and one Calling the Winner. Table 5 shows the names, i.e., the ESS of the horse race call, assigned to the entropy classes based on the dominant ESS found in that class; the table also shows the percentage of ESS that were grouped in the entropy classes. The results are by and large encouraging although closer examination is required to understand the grouping of the ESS in the entropy classes. In this paper we will examine only entropy class 1 but other classes need clarification as well.

Table 4. *Cross-tabulation of Entropy Classes and Stages of the Call*

Entropy Classes	ESS in Horse Race Call					
	A	E	FL	IL	W	LL
1		1	21	23	1	6
2	15				1	
3	5	4	2		1	18
4	2				8	
5	2	8	1	1	8	
6		11			5	
Totals	24	24	24	24	24	24

Let us first examine First Lineup and Intermediate Lineup which are grouped together in entropy class 1, meaning that they share similar linguistic patterns. It is not altogether surprising that these two ESS fall together; other analysts have not separated them into distinct discourse structures (Kuiper & Austin 1991:208) and these two stages in the call are associated with only one element in the event structure. The fact that they also share the same linguistic patterns raises the question of the basis for determining the textual structure of a text type. If First Lineup is not associated with a particular part of the event structure and if it has the same grammatical structure as Intermediate Lineup, what is the basis for the claim that it is a separate textual substructure or ESS? There are several arguments that can be made for maintaining the functional structure of six ESS for the horse race call. It is clear why First Lineup was picked out in the first place: it is the only stage in which it is obligatory to name all the horses and the naming of all of the horses always occurs in this position in the text (just after Evaluation of the Start). In addition, this stage may well differentiate 'regional text dialects': Australian, and perhaps New Zealand, horse race calls appear to have this stage as a unique characteristic and the callers are quite aware of its regional character. In a newspaper article on the subject of race calling, for instance, this stage of the call was singled out: "All (callers) are subject to the Australian code, which, unlike that of the unschooled callers of the Northern Hemisphere, demands that all runners be named, not just two or three . . ." (Hutchinson 1984:54).

Failure to differentiate these ESS would leave the sociolinguist without an explanation for potential variability in a text type and hence potential points in the structure vulnerable to change. Until further empirical work is done, I adopt the working hypothesis that the ESS of the GSP will have unique

Table 5. *Naming the Entropy Classes*

Naming: ESS	Entropy Class	% of Stages in Entropy Class
Announcing	2	62.5%
Evaluating	6	45.8%
First Lineup/ Intermediate Lineup	1	91.7%
Winner	4	33.3%
Last Lineup	3	75.0%
Evaluating/Winner	5	66.6%

grammatical configurations but be prepared to acknowledge that under some circumstances this strict relationship between the textual and grammatical structures of texts might not be found. This result of the entropy analysis indicates how critical it is to develop criteria for making the same/different judgements so familiar to linguists at other levels of linguistic organization.

Clearly, Evaluation of the Start and Calling the Winner present another serious problem. This, however, is a problem of another type which requires further analysis using the z-scores to identify the configuration of linguistic variables associated with the entropy classes involved. This is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that Evaluation and Calling the Winner display similar grammatical configurations when the event that is described is difficult and the caller becomes tentative about which horse was first out of the gate or first over the finish.

3. Summary and Discussion

The immediate task in the further development of a sociolinguistic approach to the study of text, especially if we want to achieve descriptive as well as sequential accountability, is to find a way of identifying and classifying texts, a way that is both reliable and replicable. There are at least four dimensions to the task: the first is to differentiate one text type from another; the second is to differentiate substructures within a text type; the third is to identify sources of variability between texts of the same type; and the fourth is to identify the variability within a text type attributable to individual speakers. Let me try to indicate how the study of horse race calls contributes to this task.

Text types are differentiated on the basis of the functional structure,

which I have referred to as the schematic structure or, borrowing from Hasan, the Generic Structure Potential. The functional structure consists of substructures (the ESS of the race), which are sequentially organized, optional or obligatory, singular or iterative, etc. The text types as a whole are associated with a set of grammatical variables, one or more of which may be a marker of the text type. Horse race calls are characterised particularly by the set of grammatical variables selected for this study: a relatively narrow range of choices among tense, process, and circumstantials, and marked use of ellipsis. It is, however, clear that the differentiation of text types will not be a qualitative one nor will it necessarily be based on the identification of a particular grammatical structure (narrative clauses or ellipsis). Therefore, appropriate statistical models, such as entropy analysis, are necessary adjuncts to the description of the complex, interrelated grammatical patterning of texts. We can expect to find some of these grammatical variables in all text types, which suggests that it is both the particular selection of grammatical variables AND the quantitative mix that differentiates text types.

Devising a reliable and replicable means for the identification of the functional structure of a text type has been an important goal of the study. The approach begins with the assumption that each structure of the GSP is associated with a grammatical configuration, itself a subset of the grammatical variables which characterize the text type. Entropy analysis in large measure confirmed that the approach was a viable one but at the same time allowed the identification of more complex possibilities for the relationship between the grammatical and functional structures, e.g., ESS which have more than one potential grammatical configuration (Evaluation of the Start and Calling the Winner) or ESS which are arguably distinct on functional grounds but which have the same grammatical configuration (First Lineup and Intermediate Lineup). Although there were deviations found in the relationship between grammatical and functional structure, no deviations were found in the GSP. This may well be because horse race calls are so highly routinized; one would not expect other text types to behave similarly, but only empirical study will be able to shed light on this matter.

Notes

- * I would like to thank Ronald Horvath for suggesting that entropy analysis might be useful in the description of the data set and for continued help throughout the project; I would also like to thank Natalie Shea for assistance in selecting the grammatical variables used in the study.
- 1 Explanation of terms on Table 2: (1) 'no finite' and 'no predicate' indicates that the surface realizations of these variables have been ellipsed; (2) 'list' ellipsis may be appropriate only for texts similar to horse race calls where almost every element in the clause has been ellipsed except for the name of the horse; (3) 'circumstantials' in horse race calls are all locational and refer to the sequence of horses on the track, their location along the length of the track or their location across the width of the track; (4) 'no match' identifies those rare instances where the order of the participants in the clause does NOT match the order of the horses named on the track; (5) 'relative clause' indicates that an explicit relativizer is present.
- 2 The identification of clauses characterized by rampant ellipsis proved to be more problematic than usual in the analysis of actual speech; therefore, we could not require that a clause have a verb. All segments of text where a horse's name was linked with some element expressing distance or position was counted as a clause. Thus, "a length to x", since it can be reconstituted as "There is a length to x" is counted as a clause in which the finite has been ellipsed. The same would be true for "Then x," which is an elliptical form of the clause "then there is x." A horse's name alone was also counted as a clause; in the ellipsis variable, however, it is identified as a 'list' but no attempt was made to reconstitute the clause; hence it would be coded as 'no finite' and 'no predicate'.

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Discourse Clues to Coded Language in an Impeachment Hearing

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Conversation is normally intended to be forthright and mutually understood. Occasionally, however, people use a language code to disguise the meaning of what they are saying. Like language itself, a code is a formal system of communication shared by its users. In fact, a language is itself a code. Sometimes, when people are speaking in a specific language, they employ a further code for the purpose of secrecy. Such codes are designed to isolate information from outsiders in a way that regularly understood words would not. Codes are used for many reasons, including security (as in war time), efficiency (as in occupations), intimacy (as in clubs or other social groups) or secrecy (as in the prevention of detection).

In February of 1988, I was given twelve tape-recorded conversations to review on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the United States House of Representatives. These tapes involved two (October 5 and October 8) 1981 conversations between Federal Judge Alcee L. Hastings and William A. Borders, a Washington D.C. attorney, and ten other conversations involving Borders with both undercover agent H. Paul Rico and another man named William Dredge. The single question that this committee asked me to address was whether or not the October 5 conversation between Hastings and Borders contained coded language. I was not asked to decode the language if I should find it to be coded at all.

Although I was not told this until after my conclusions were reached, it was the government's theory that the October 5 conversation was indeed coded. The ostensible topic of this conversation was the judge's plan to write

support letters for Hemphill Pride, a South Carolina attorney who had run afoul of the law and was trying to reverse his disbarment. The government believed that Hastings and Borders were involved in a much more complicated plot to extort money from a man they believed to be Frank Romano (but who was actually undercover agent Rico). Borders had assured Rico that he could get a judge to provide a favorable sentencing report if Rico would pay \$50,000. The government further believed that some of this money was for Judge Hastings.

Both men had been tried in federal court on charges of extortion. Borders was convicted while Hastings was acquitted. Months after this acquittal, the House of Representatives decided to review the case in order to determine whether or not Hastings had acted unethically or illegally and whether or not he should be impeached as a federal judge. No previous linguistic analysis had been made of the tape-recorded conversations used as evidence in that trial.

One's first reaction on listening to this short conversation is that the men are talking about writing support letters for a man named Hemphill Pride but that they are doing so in a very odd way. This oddness is what attracted the attention of the attorneys for the Subcommittee, but they could not determine exactly what was odd. This is why they sought the services of a linguist in the first place. After completing my analysis, I concluded that the two men were indeed using a code to communicate information not obvious from the actual words they used.

I began my analysis by differentiating various types of codes and by establishing criteria by which codedness can be determined.

1. Types of Codes

There are at least three types of language codes:

- **TOTAL AND OBVIOUS CODES.** Such codes are the subject of study by cryptologists. In most cases the intent of the code is to be so unclear that the message cannot be deciphered by outsiders to the code. There is no concern about whether or not the code looks like a code; to those who intercept it, this is obvious.

- **PARTIAL AND OBVIOUS CODES.** Such codes make use of the function words and even many of the nouns and verbs of a language but they also substitute other, often ludicrous words as code in that same language in

regular syntactic positions. The fact that these substitute words are coded is quite obvious. An example of partial and obvious codes can be found in Colonel Oliver North's *Taking the Stand* (North, 1989:143), when he quotes himself as saying "If these conditions are acceptable to the banana, then oranges are ready to proceed."

• **PARTIAL AND DISGUISED CODES.** Such codes resemble partial and obvious codes except for the fact that the substituted or coded words are carefully selected to make it appear to anyone who should happen to intercept the conversation that the participants are talking about one thing when, in reality, they are talking about something quite different. Crystal (1987:58) cites an example of such a code in India when a sentence translated as "Go clean the bowl" was used by a murderer to an associate in front of his victim. The intended meaning was "Prepare the grave."

2. Criteria for Partial and Disguised Codes

It was immediately obvious from the October 5 tape that if the conversation was coded at all, it was a code of the third type, partial and disguised, at least as far as word substitutions are concerned. The criteria that must be met, if this conversation were determined to be coded, were as follows:

1. The code must be understood by both participants. Otherwise it would not be code at all. It would simply sound very odd and confusing.

2. The code must be relevant to real life situations. That is, the coded language must be realistic enough, when intermingled with regular uncoded language, to appear to be plausible. An outsider will not be able to ascertain the exact meaning of the code but will understand it to mean something else. The farther a code gets from a plausible meaning or from a potential real life meaning, the more it can be recognized as a code. Since some who use codes for secrecy do not wish outsiders to know that a code is being used, they must create a code with plausible, real world meanings as a diversion to their actual intent.

3. The code must be specific. Several code words are not used for the same meaning unless the coding system is so elaborate and its users are so practiced in it that several layers of hidden meaning can be communicated. The most simple, unpracticed codes preserve one-to-one specificity of meaning. As with normal language, referencing words can be less specific, or

general, but only after the specific code word has been used. That is, pronouns and general nouns, such as *it*, *they*, *the things*, etc. can be used in code, just as they can in uncoded English, once the defined reference has been established.

4. The code must be consistent. That is, once a code word is used to mean one thing, it cannot be used again to mean something else. It should be noted that highly developed code systems that are used by practiced professionals may be so elaborate as to appear inconsistent, even though there is a coded internal consistency. In the simple codes of the average person, such complexity is not found and code words have a single consistent meaning throughout.

5. The code requires more direct confirmation of understanding than does normal conversation. In the coded language of average persons it is common to hear expressions such as, "If you get what I mean" or "Do you get my drift?" These are requests for confirmation that the code is being understood. Likewise there are proportionally more direct confirmations of understanding than in normal conversation. Such confirmations include "I get you" or "I understand". The less practiced the code users are at such language, the more such confirmation occurs.

As these criteria were applied to the October 5 conversation, it became apparent that the analytical procedures of discourse analysis would be the key to answering the question of whether or not the men were using coded speech.

3. The Use of Discourse Analysis in Identifying Coded Language

Early research on the principles of sequencing in conversation was carried out by Schegloff (1986) on telephone conversations and by Sacks (1972) on therapy sessions. Both concentrated on the rules of sequencing in conversation but it was Labov and Fanshel (1977) who described the units that are sequenced with more precision: "Sequencing rules do not appear to relate words, sentences, and other linguistic forms, but rather form the connections between abstract actions such as requests, compliments, challenges, and defenses" (Labov & Fanshel 1977:25). According to Labov and Fanshel, the rules of conversational sequencing presuppose relationships "between the words spoken and the actions being performed" (Labov & Fanshel 1977:25). This insight, along with many others, undergirds the following analysis.

Although code is most noticeable primarily at the level of lexicon or vocabulary, the use of code also affects the syntax and discourse structure of a conversation. Such effects also contribute to the identification of the language

as coded. For example, the following sequence in the October 5 conversation would be marked as very peculiar in normal, uncoded conversation. (Hereafter, numbers in parentheses preceding text refer to line numbers of the conversation, as found in the appendix.)

- (6) AH: You hear from him after we talked?
- (7) WB: Yeah.
- (8) AH: Oh, okay.
- (9) WB: Uh-huh.
- (10) AH: Alright then.

For one thing, the response, “Yeah” in line 7 suggests an elaboration such as “Yeah, he’ll be here soon” or “Yeah, I saw him last night.” Hastings’ response to “Yeah” is the “Oh, okay” of line 8, which is a confirmation that Hastings understands what Borders meant by his “Yeah” in line 7. The “Uh-huh” response to this in line 9 is a feedback marker. This indicates acknowledgment and gives up a turn of talk. At best it can be taken to mean “I’m listening.” In any case, “uh-huh” is a very unusual response to “Oh, okay,” which is an equally unusual response to “Yeah.” Finally, in line 10 Hastings says “alright then” to Borders’ “Uh-huh.” Once again, Hastings acknowledges what Borders has said and confirms that he understands the meaning of Borders’ “Yeah” in line 7.

The point of this example is that although all of the individual words are normal, the conversational structure is so different from normal dialogue as to be marked as peculiar. In normal conversation we simply do not reconfirm with such regularity the simple confirmation that we have heard from somebody. The need for such confirmation strongly indicates that the meaning of “hearing from” is different from its regular lexical meaning or that both parties understand it to go beyond the normal meaning of “hear from.” Likewise, Borders’ failure to elaborate his “Yeah” response in line 7 is an indication that this is not normal dialogue. But if Hastings’ “Did you hear from him?” actually means something else, such as “Did you get it?”, then “Yeah” is actually an appropriate answer. A question involving “hear from” requires the responder to elaborate with more facts about when, how or where. It is not a simple yes/no question which can be satisfied with a yes or no answer. The hypothetical meaning, “Did you get it yet?”, on the other hand, can be answered with a yes or no.

Further evidence that “hear from” is code for something else can be found in Hastings’ acceptance of Borders’ “Yeah” response with “Oh, okay.”

If the topic were actually about “hearing from him,” the obvious expectation would be to want to know what he heard. Borders never answers this and Hastings does not ask for it. Instead, Hastings accepts Borders’ “Yeah” as a complete answer. Hastings’ use of “Oh” before “okay” indicates either surprise or acknowledgment that new information has been presented. Unless this is a coded message, no new information exists here. All we know is that Borders has heard from him. There is no information about the underlying basic question about what he heard. To be sure, conversational routines regularly go through a kind of information dispensing process, doling out a little at a time. A more natural conversation on the topic of hearing from someone would read as follows:

- *AH: You hear from him after we talked?
- *WB: Yeah, I talked to him last night. (+ when)
- *AH: What did he tell you?
- *WB: He said he’d do it next week. (+ what)
- *AH: No sooner than that?
- *WB: That’s all he told me.
- *AH: Oh, okay.

In this hypothetical example, the final “Oh, okay” occurs after it has been determined that this is all the new information available. But notice how this hypothetical exchange unfolds, starting from the same beginning point as the previous example from the actual tape:

- Yes/no question implying more than yes/no answer.
- Yes answer and elaboration of when.
- Probe question about what.
- Direct answer to what question.
- Probe question for completeness of response (validation).
- Confirmation of completion.
- Acceptance of condition of information given.

Now, contrast the above analysis with the conversation in the original tape:

- Yes/no question implying more than yes/no answer.
- Yes answer.
- Acceptance of yes answer.
- Reconfirmation of yes answer.
- Reacceptance of yes answer.

It should be clear, then, that in this passage there is not only a violation of the expected, normal dialogue routine following a yes/no question that requires more than a yes/no answer, but also Hastings' recognition ("Oh, okay") that he has received a yes answer to his question. A simple yes answer to "did you hear from" is insufficient in a regular, normal conversation. Therefore, "hear from" is being treated here as though it performs in the same way as "get it" or other verbs to which yes/no answers are sufficient.

From the structure of this discourse there is still further evidence that a partial, disguised code is being used. This further evidence is the additional confirmation sequence that follows ("uh-huh" and "alright then"). Borders confirms that his "yeah" answer is complete and Hastings accepts this completion of response for the second time, even though in normal uncoded conversation it cannot be considered as completed.

To this point I have described the criteria for partial and disguised coded language and I have illustrated how the structure of conversational discourse can provide evidence that code is being used. It is not just the words that contain code. It is also the way the words are used in discourse that provide such evidence. I will now turn to the beginning of the October 5 conversation between Borders and Hastings to illustrate other evidence that this conversation was a partial, disguised code.

4. Discourse Analysis of the Conversation

At the beginning of the conversation we hear:

- (1) WB: Yes, my brother.
- (2) AH: Hey, my man.
- (3) WB: Uh-huh.

Lines 1 and 2 are a standard greeting routine between two friends, not unusual. In line 3, however, Borders says "uh-huh," a feedback marker. He is expected to say something and he does. In normal conversation, as indeed we find in the later October 8 conversation between the same men, we expect to hear the second part of the normal greeting routine. In the October 8 conversation we hear:

- AH: This is Alcee. How are you?
WB: How you doin'?

That is, in normal conversation, the greeting is a two-part routine, each party saying an equivalent of “hello” followed by the optional “how are you?” The second part of the routine is aborted in the October 5 tape by Borders who utters the feedback marker “uh-huh” at a very unusual time, suggesting an unwillingness to speak normally and giving up his turn of talk to Hastings immediately. Although this is, in itself, unusual, what follows it offers even more insight to the analysis of this conversation.

Instead of “uh-huh,” one might expect Borders, since he was being called by Hastings, to inquire about why Hastings was calling. For example, he might have asked “What’s up?” or “What’s on your mind?” He might also have seized the opportunity of Hastings’ call to insert his own agenda, responding, for example, “I’m glad you called because I . . .” Absent either of these strategies, we can conclude that Borders knew why Hastings was calling, or at least suspected it strongly. Analysis of Borders’ language behavior in all other phone calls reveals no other occasion when he does this, even with Hastings. Later, Hastings asks, “you hear from him after we talked?,” suggesting strongly that Borders and Hastings had spoken with each other at some recent time.

From the seemingly mild and innocent words used by both men, the appearance of normal conversation might be assumed. But from an analysis of the structure of the language used, it is clear that there is considerably more to it than the words used. From these three lines above we learn that this is a tense enough situation for Borders to skip the second part of the normal greeting routine, to not request the reason for Hastings’ call, to not take advantage of Hastings’ call to insert his own agenda, and to give up his turn to talk as soon as he got one. The text then continues:

- (4) AH: I’ve drafted all those, uh, uh, letters, uh, for Hemp.
- (5) WB: Uh-huh.

What we can learn from this exchange is made evident by the language strategy not employed by Borders in his response, “uh-huh.” For example, he does not request clarification (*“What letters?”). (In contrast, in the October 8 call, Borders shows that he can, indeed request clarification when he says “Eastern?,” requesting confirmation of the airline on which Hastings will arrive.) On October 5, on the other hand, he does not clarify or elaborate (*“Oh, you mean the support letters”). He does not evaluate (*“Good. I’d hoped you’d do that,” as, indeed, Borders does in the October 8 conversation when he says “Goddamn, you move around man.”) Instead, Borders uses the

feedback marker “uh-huh,” saying very little and accomplishing nothing more than his required turn in the conversation. When a person responds in this way it means either that she or he either does not understand exactly what is meant and is stalling for more clues, or does understand, but is hesitant to talk and makes the minimal noise possible, turning control over to the other person.

Of particular interest here is Hastings’ use of “uh” three times in his statement. “Uh” is a pause filler, a noise uttered in the absence of a word, for one of three reasons: the speaker is struggling to remember something, the speaker has been distracted temporarily, or the speaker is being extremely cautious about word choice.

In normal conversation, the function of such pause fillers is to prevent interruption and to provide assurance that more is coming if the listener will only be patient. It is a signal that the speaker is not yet willing to give up a turn of talk. If code is being used, especially a recently or hastily constructed code, one expects to hear the “uh” pause filler in exactly those places where the code word is to follow. Such practice evidences a struggle to remember the code and an effort to be careful in not slipping into uncoded language.

In the October 5 conversation Hastings uses pause fillers five times in four utterances:

- (4) uh, uh, letters
- (4) uh, for Hemp
- (6) uh, you hear from him
- (14) uh, I communicate with him

All of these instances occur before codable words. Of particular interest here is the comparison of these pause fillers in the October 5 conversation with the October 8 conversation between these same two men. The October 8 conversation is twice as long, yet it contains no “uh” pause fillers. Information is exchanged about flight numbers, hotels, Hastings’ speech in Georgia, backup plans and a man named John Crump, without a single pause filler.

Returning to the tape, we next hear the following:

- (6) AH: And everything’s okay. The only thing I was concerned with was, did you hear if, uh, you hear from him after we talked?
- (7) WB: Yeah.
- (8) AH: Oh, okay.
- (9) WB: Uh-huh.
- (10) AH: Alright, then.

This passage was analyzed earlier as an example of how the structure of a conversation contributes to our understanding of its use as code. Borders' "yeah" of line 7 is an inappropriate response to a yes/no question involving a broad spectrum topic such as "did you hear from him." The expectation of normal conversation is to say "yes," then add some further information about when or what. Hastings' response of "Oh, okay" to Borders' "yeah," is equally inappropriate in normal uncoded conversation since it confirms that complete information has been given when, indeed, it has not. On the other hand, if "hear from" is code for words such as "did you get X," then Borders' "yeah" is an appropriate answer since completion is indicated internally (as opposed to "hear from," which requires a response of what one heard). If code is being used, then Hastings' "Oh, okay" indeed confirms that the information is complete. If this is not code, then Hastings' "Oh, okay" is strangely inappropriate. Finally, the double reconfirmation of completed information in lines 9 and 10 only heightens the evidence that this is coded language, in the same way as lines 7 and 8.

Next we hear:

- (11) WB: See I had, I talked to him and he, he wrote some things down
for me.
(12) AH: I understand.

Here we see Borders' first substantive contribution to this conversation. After four consecutive turns of talk saying no more than "uh-huh" and "yeah," Borders now attempts a carefully worded contribution. The care he takes is clear from his false start ("See I had, I talked to...") and his repeated pronouns ("he, he wrote..."). False starts and word repetitions offer the same type of evidence as presented earlier with the use of "uh" pause fillers. Such practice suggests a struggle to be careful in not slipping into uncoded language and an effort to remember and use the code consistently. Again, like the pause filler "uh," false starts and word repetitions immediately precede the code words, as follows:

- (11) See I had, I talked
(11) And he, he wrote

Hastings' use of the response, "I understand" is of particular interest here. In the many thousands of tape recorded conversations I have listened to over the years, I have yet to find a person who habitually used "I understand"

as an equivalent expression to the far more common feedback markers, “uh-huh,” “okay” and “yeah.” In current English practice, “I understand” serves as a confirmation of the truth or existence of facts presented by the other party. What is curious here is why a prosaic sentence such as “I talked to him and he wrote some things down for me” would require a confirmation of understanding unless it is code for something else. Hastings had already confirmed multiple times that Borders’ “yeah” was an adequate and conclusive answer to his question, “You hear from him after we talked?” Borders by now appears to feel familiar enough with the code to launch out on his own. He recycles the “hear from him” topic and elaborates, several lines after it would have been more appropriate to do so, that “he wrote some things down.” Hastings’ “I understand” can be only to the “He wrote some things down” part of Borders’ sentence, since it had already been established that Borders had heard from “him.” Even so, writing some things down is hardly monumental enough to require a confirmation of understanding. It is, however, completely appropriate as an indication of confirmation of the coded meaning for something else.

The tape then continues:

- (13) WB: And then I was supposed to go back and get some more things.
- (14) AH: Alright. I understand. Well, then, there’s no great big problem at all. I’ll, I’ll see to it that, uh, I communicate with him. I’ll send the stuff off to Columbia in the morning.
- (15) WB: Okay.

Again, this dialogue is very odd. The initial reference to “things” had occurred in Borders’ previous statement, “He wrote some things down for me.” Now he elaborates a bit, “And then I was supposed to go back and get some more things.” If “more things” are things to say in support of Hemp, one might expect it to be said quite differently, with considerably more elaboration, such as:

*He couldn’t think of everything you should say in your support letter. He’ll think about it more, then get back to me.

Whereas Borders’ first use of “things” (line 11) is grammatically and lexically appropriate, his second use of “things” (line 13) does not ring true. One can write “things” down but one does not normally say that one will go back and get more “things” that can be written down. The second reference to

a substance called “things” requires, by referencing rules, a more explicit identification, especially when used with the verb “get.” “Get,” in this sentence, requires a noun such as “information” or “ideas,” words readily available to almost any speaker of English, unless “things” is a code word that refers to something other than information or ideas. It is interesting to note, by comparison, that neither Borders nor Hastings uses the words “things” or “stuff” in their October 8 conversation.

5. The Test of Logical Consistency

The test of whether or not the October 5 conversation was a partial, disguised code can be found in the search for logical consistency.

5.1 “*Going back*”

We have already noted that if this conversation were really about the support letters that Hastings was writing for Hemphill Pride, it is odd that Borders would have to “go back” to Hemp to get more information. Why wouldn’t a telephone call be sufficient? And, for that matter, why wouldn’t Hemp be able to think of the “things” that Hastings could say on his behalf at the first meeting referred to here? In addition, one notes the use of the past tense passive voice in Borders’ representation, “I was supposed to.” The past tense here is of interest. If Borders was referring to new information gleaned from his meeting when Hemp “wrote some things down,” then normal syntax rules indicate that he would have said, **“I am supposed to go back and get some more things,”* or **“He wants me to come back and get some things.”* If, however, the plan was originally to go there twice, then “I was supposed to” reflects this clearly. Borders’ syntax indicates that this is not new information but that Borders was simply reiterating a mutually known plan or procedure.

5.2 “*Going back*” versus “*coming back*”

Further evidence for this being mutually known information is found in Borders’ use of the verb, “go.” If he is reporting that Hemp wanted him to return for more things, normal English syntax would expect the verb to be “come,” whether in the active or passive voice, i.e., **“And then I was*

supposed to *come* back and get some more things” or **“Hemp wants me to come back and get some more things.”* That is, if Hemp was the initiator of this action, the verb would emanate from him. On the other hand, if the plan to see someone twice were already known, then the appropriate verb would be *“go,”* since *“go”* does not indicate emanation from Hemp.

5.3 *“No great big problem”*

Hastings’ response to Border’s remark about *“going back”* is, once again, evidence that he understands Borders’ use of the code. Hastings says *“Alright. I understand,”* a double confirmation which, as has already been pointed out, is common when code is being used. Hastings’ next utterance, *“Well then, there’s no great big problem at all”* is couched in the negative. A negative statement, by definition, implies that its opposite, a positive, is possible. Since the presumed support letters were for Hemp and since Hastings is not obligated to write such letters, *“no great big problem”* could ever have existed concerning this matter. Then why would Hastings say that there was *“no great big problem”*? The answer is that there was a great big problem but not the one concerning support letters for Hemp. This, in itself, is an argument that code exists here. Whatever else has happened in this conversation, Hastings is now assured that his problem no longer exists.

Hastings continues *“I’ll, I’ll see to it that, uh, I communicate with him. I’ll send the stuff off to Columbia in the morning.”* Note once again the repeated words and pause filler *“uh”* in this sentence:

(14) I’ll, I’ll see to it

(14) uh, I communicate

I have already noted that such phenomena occur, in coded language, immediately before the crucial code words. Hastings is being very careful not to slip up on the code.

5.4 *“Change in plan”*

One of the greatest dangers in code usage is being inconsistent. Borders said that he (Borders) *“was supposed to go back and get some more things.”* Now, without any reference to Borders’ statement, Hastings says that he (Hastings) will communicate with *“him”* (Hemp). To this dramatic contradiction in

procedure, Borders offers only a weak “okay.” Hastings here is overriding the reported agreement between Borders and Hemp, namely that Borders will go back and get “some more things.” What has happened to the Borders-Hemp arrangement? If the “more things” are necessary as fuel for Hastings’ support letters, why is this plan abandoned without any discussion or without Borders’ objection?

If the topic had really been about support letters for Hemp, a felicitous response by Borders would not have been “okay.” If Borders wanted to disagree with Hastings’ override, it might have been something like the following:

*No, he told me to get this information first.

But even if Borders wished to assent to Hastings’ change of procedure, Borders would still be expected to say something, perhaps like this:

*Okay, if you really want to, but I told Hemp I’d do it.

or

*Whatever you want to do, Alcee.

By contrast, in the October 8 conversation, Borders does offer a suggestion of assent to Hastings’ complaint about not being able to get a room at L’Enfant Plaza: “We can always get you in there.” Borders here shows that he is capable of dealing with changes of future procedure. Dramatic changes in procedure are normally explained or discussed in conversation. Here we have such a change but with no such explanation, discussion, objection or even assent. On the other hand, if “things” refers to something else, perhaps getting something, instead of information for support letters, the conversation is consistent. Likewise if a “problem” of getting something a second time has existed in the past but is no longer seen as a problem since the thing initially to be received is now reported to have been received (“he wrote some things down for me”), then Hastings’ comment, “Well then, there is no great big problem at all,” is indeed consistent with the code.

5.5 “Send stuff off”

Hastings then continues by saying, “I’ll, I’ll see to it that, uh, I communicate with him. I’ll send the stuff off to Columbia in the morning.” This two-part

statement is consistent with the two-part procedure that Hastings would utilize in his role as a judge who would first instruct an assistant to prepare an order (“I’ll see to it”) and, second, sign and send the order off. Here Hastings slips in his use of the code. This procedure proposed by Hastings is inconsistent with a scenario of support letters. If he believed that there was no need for Borders to go back and get more information from Hemp before he (Hastings) wrote these letters, he fails to say so. Instead, he changes the plan dramatically, says there’s no problem, and offers to see to it that the letters get sent in the morning. Even if this plan called for Borders to go back to Hemp that evening (it is now after 5 p.m.), get more information and telephone it to Hastings in time for the letters to be sent on the following morning, such an intricate procedure would call for some discussion and planning. There is none here.

5.6 “Things” versus “stuff”

Hastings slips again in his referencing. To this point the following referencing to letters has been used:

- (4) AH: letters
- (11) WB: wrote some things down
- (13) WB: get some more things
- (14) AH: I’ll communicate
- (14) AH: Send the stuff

The code of “letters” is introduced originally by Hastings in line 4. Borders picks up on it in line 11, substituting “things”. But by using this word after the verb “wrote”, he preserves the code consistency. Borders’ next reference continues as “things” but this time without a reference to writing. In fact, as noted earlier, Borders’ use of “get” here is very odd when used with “more things” for any reference to ideas or information. This is the first code inconsistency. Hastings’ use of “communicate” in line 14 is more consistent, putting the code back on track, but his use of “stuff” in line 14 again calls into question the consistency of the code. By referring to support letters as “stuff”, Hastings appears to try hard to be vague to anyone who might hear this except Borders. The natural way to reference at this point would be to say “letters”. Grammatical anaphora can go only so far in conversation without being reestablished. If Hastings had continued to use “things” (instead of “stuff”)

the referencing would have appeared more natural. But by changing to “stuff”, especially in light of his overriding the presumed Borders-Hemp agreement to get “more things”, Hastings opens the door to suspicion. There is no reason for Hastings not to use either “letters” or “things” here unless “things” has taken on a different meaning. And this seems to be what has happened. On the surface it was to be apparent that writing letters is the single topic of this conversation. But Hastings’ use of “stuff”, coupled with a flat-out rejection (without discussion) of Borders’ agreement to get “more things”, makes it clear that two separate actions are being discussed. The “things” that Borders has gotten and the “more things” that he plans to get form a different topic from the “letters” Hastings has drafted and his promise to “communicate” and “send the stuff”. Perhaps realizing the code was getting confused and complicated, Hastings chose to find a new vague referencing term “stuff”, since to say that he would send the “things” (letters) tomorrow would appear to be so contradictory to the presumed Borders-Hemp arrangement to get some more “things.” At any rate, the code became inconsistent once again.

6. Conclusion

Linguistic evidence indicates that the October 5 conversation between Judge Alcee L. Hastings and William A. Borders was a partial and disguised code. It has been shown that Hastings and Borders are using a hastily constructed, but not well practiced, vocabulary code. Average non-linguists listening to this taped conversation would find it peculiar but probably could not determine exactly why. The first place they would look would be to the words themselves, but if the disguised code is relevant to real life situations, if it is specific and if it is consistent, such words may seem to be uncoded. The key to determining whether or not code is used is not obvious in the words alone. It is in the syntax and discourse structures that code becomes apparent; how the words are used.

I testified to all this before both the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives on May 24, 1988, and before the Special Impeachment Committee of the U.S. Senate on July 14 and 17, 1989. Both legislative bodies voted to impeach the judge.

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Appendix

Transcript of Conversation of October 5, 1981, 5:12 p.m.

UF: Unidentified female

AH: Alcee L. Hastings

WB: William A. Borders, Jr.

UF: Law Office. One moment.

(Placed on hold)

UF: May I help you?

AH: Girl, I called long distance and you put me on hold. This is Alcee. How you doing?

UF: I'm sorry; but I have all these lines going in here and I didn't know, if I'd known it was you, they could've waited.

AH: I understand. Bill's gone?

UF: No. Hold on just a minute.

AH: Alright.

(Placed on hold)

1 WB: Yes, my brother

2 AH: Hey, my man

3 WB: Um-hum.

4 AH: I've drafted all those uh, uh, letters, uh for Hemp ...

5 WB: Um-hum.

6 AH: and everything's okay. The only thing I was concerned with was, did you hear if, uh, you hear from him after we talked?

7 WB: Yeah.

8 AH: Oh. Okay.

9 WB: Uh- huh.

10 AH: Alright, then.

11 WB: See, I had, I talked to him and he, he wrote some things down for me.

12 AH: I understand.

13 WB: And then I was supposed to go back and get some more things.

14 AH: Alright. I understand. Well, then, there's no great big problem at all. I'll, I'll see to it that, uh, I communicate with him. I'll send the stuff off to Columbia in the morning.

15 WB: Okay.

AH: Okay.

WB: Right

AH: Bye bye.

WB: Bye.

The Incongruity of Jokes, Riddles and Humorous Situations*

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1. Introduction

Although many researchers have noted that incongruity is fundamental to humor (e.g., Navon 1988; Schultz 1976; Suls 1972) the concept of incongruity itself has not been thoroughly investigated. This paper explores the nature of this notion and the way in which it relates to humor by addressing two fundamental questions:

- What does it mean for something to be incongruous?
- What does it mean to say that a situation or the punchline of a joke is incongruous and therefore (perhaps) funny?¹

It is clear from other studies in discourse analysis that much of what is responsible for coherent discourse is not provided by the surface structure of a text. In Labov and Fanshel (1977), for example, coherence within discourse is demonstrated to be dependent upon sequencing rules governing speech acts. These rules in turn depend upon knowledge shared among the participants of a discourse.

A basic assumption underlying the present work is also that members of a speech community share a representation of some subset of world knowledge which is fundamental to verbal communication. 'World knowledge' is used here in the broadest possible sense encompassing everything from conceptual definitions to rules for processing speech acts.

To the extent that there exists a system of shared world knowledge, we might say that a situation or discourse is congruous in so far as it doesn't

violate the structure, content or rules of the system. If we knew more about the nature of these human representations of knowledge, we would be in a position to understand more precisely the meaning of 'congruity' and analogously, 'incongruity'.

Clearly, we have knowledge of concepts and their definitions, their attributes, predications made of them, and their relationships to other concepts. We have various kinds of rules of inference. People also have knowledge of the pragmatic rules of language. The major focus of this paper is on the kind of incongruity which involves some violation of these pragmatic rules. Thus, a goal of the present research is to understand some of the pragmatic factors which contribute to making up a coherent system of world knowledge. This paper will focus specifically on four areas of shared pragmatic knowledge: salience, accessibility, parallelism, and sublanguage constraints and how they can be manipulated to humorous ends.

2. Simple Incongruity — Surprise

The working definition of 'surprise' which I am using in this paper is "deliberate, abrupt, unresolved incongruity". 'Surprise' then can also be thought of as a kind of abrupt Gricean (1975) 'irrelevance' for which no implicature can offer a resolution. It will similarly violate Wilson and Sperber's 'principle of relevance': "Any utterance addressed to someone automatically conveys a presumption of its own relevance" (1988:140). The assumption is also made that this definition of surprise can be applied to non-verbal as well as verbal situations.

Although surprise is not always funny, surely, some simply surprising things are funny to some people, particularly young children. Infants laugh at peekaboo games, possibly because a person who disappears actually may leave an infant's scheme of world knowledge. The reappearance is abruptly incongruous, i.e., surprising. Many infants appear to find the peekaboo game funny as evidenced by their laughter. If a person appears with his or her clothing on backwards, shoes on head, etc., older children may laugh. If they have a notion of 'the right way to dress', even a missing sock might seem funny. An infant however, probably wouldn't notice this incongruity since his/her system of world knowledge is not well-developed enough to recognize it.

Some types of surprise aren't ever funny. If a long-lost relative shows up suddenly, the effect may be more shocking than humorous. Beyond a certain level of emotional arousal, the effect may be one of shock instead of surprise. Alternatively, if something arouses negative emotions, it isn't funny. If a person feels offended by a joke, to that person the joke isn't funny. A surprise attack by enemy troops is hardly funny.

Slapstick falls within the category of unresolved surprise and undoubtedly, some adults find slapstick funny. If, within a context, a person gets hit with pie in the face, that may be abruptly surprising and thus funny to some people. Other people don't find these slapstick antics funny at all; most likely, for these people, the painful aspects of slapstick prevent it from being funny.

Incongruity may not be funny when the violation is accidental. People may inadvertently speak or act incongruously. While some people may find other's mistakes funny, and laugh at their stupidity or naivete, whether it be verbal (e.g., misuse of a word) or physical (e.g., falling down a flight of stairs), these events are questionably humorous — at the least, it is considered in bad taste to laugh.² Thus, generally speaking, the incongruity must be deliberate.

3. Suls' Two-Stage Model

Beyond the questionable funniness of surprise is the more sophisticated humor consistent with the two-stage model of Suls (1972). Suls' paper deals with jokes and cartoons, but the theory appears to apply more generally to other humorous modes or situations. In Suls' first stage, a hearer encounters a punchline which is incongruous with the content of the joke because "a joke's ending does not follow logically from its preceding text" (Suls 1972:84). The second stage involves a reconciliation of the incongruity. In this stage, the recipient of the humor "engages in a form of problem solving to find a cognitive rule which makes the punch line follow from the main part of the joke and reconciles the incongruous parts. A cognitive rule is defined as a logical proposition, a definition, or a fact of experience." Both stages must be present in order to have humor. Suls summarizes the process: "humor derives from experiencing a sudden incongruity which is then made congruous" (p. 82).

Navon (1988) argues that the two-stage model is inadequate for jokes since it doesn't account for other situations or stimuli, such as mystery stories, in which there is incongruity plus resolution but which aren't necessarily funny. He adds the requirement that the 'resolution' conflict with valid reasoning made previously. In other words, the resolution is "seemingly appropriate but virtually inappropriate" as in the joke which he presents:

- (1) A housewife asked her daughter to go to the butcher to see if he had pig's feet. The daughter returned later and said, 'I couldn't tell, because the butcher has his shoes on.' (p. 210)

Navon (1988:211) claims that such a resolution is "virtually inappropriate, because the interpretation it is based on is actually ruled out by the context if some pragmatic knowledge retrieved from memory is brought to bear."³ It is "made insensible in view of stored generic knowledge that must be consulted for the disambiguating potential of the cues to come into effect." Labov and Fanshel (1977:75) similarly state: "The rules of discourse ... are like the rules of syntax in their conscious, invariant character... A person can make a joke by refusing to apply them."

What does it mean to "not follow logically from ... preceding text" as Suls observes? What is the nature of the pragmatic knowledge which Navon claims causes punchlines to be "virtually inappropriate"? What are some "rules of discourse" which people can refuse to apply? In the following sections, I will explore some specific types of pragmatic knowledge, which by virtue of not being used, render resolutions "virtually inappropriate."

4. Violations Leading to Incongruity

The premise of this paper is that humor can occur simply with deliberate, sudden incongruity (surprise) or with resolved incongruity a la Suls. In either case, I am proposing that it is a violation of pragmatic knowledge which is the cause of the incongruity. This can take many forms. The following sections present a number of possibilities.

4.1 Violations of salience

Given a concept and its description, it is necessary to note that some aspects of that description are more salient than others. I am using the term 'salience'

here to refer to the “prominence of a particular attribute with respect to a concept to which it does or could apply” (Ortony 1979a:162), with Ortony’s (1979b:191) later substitution of ‘predicates’ for ‘attributes’.⁴ ‘Predicates’ allows more breadth than ‘attributes’, essentially referring to *anything* which can be said about a concept. This is consistent with a consideration of the wide scope of world knowledge which can be associated with concepts. For example, that many people are afraid of snakes represents a generally held belief which can be ‘predicated’ of snakes more easily than ‘attributed’ to them. Functional and physical predicates are, of course, also considered. A salient feature of chairs is that you sit on them; a salient feature of cups is their characteristic shape.

It has been noted that salience is of importance for the understanding of metaphorical language (Ortony 1979a, 1979b; Weiner 1984, 1985). While it may well be the case that it is vital for describing other language phenomena as well, it is reasonable to propose that a model of language processing would include this notion if for no other reason than that it is necessary for metaphor processing.

Human knowledge of salience can be taken advantage of for humorous effects. Consider, for example:

- (2) a. How would you fit four elephants in a VW bug?
- b. Two in the front seat, and two in the back.

Navon (1988:213), in discussing jokes, writes of “ignoring a most *essential* piece of information which, nonetheless, is *not explicitly stated*.” The notion of salience is helpful here. Salience appears to lead the hearer astray in a riddling situation by causing him/her to focus on salient aspects of a concept’s description. The riddle then ignores or violates these aspects in some way. In this example, size unquestionably is a salient characteristic of the concept of ‘elephants’. This riddle is funny because it leads the hearer to try to solve a problem of incompatible sizes. The punchline causes a salient feature of elephants to be ignored after which the resolution of the problem becomes trivial.

Knowledge of salience is part of people’s knowledge of the world. Violating this pragmatic knowledge can cause incongruity to occur. If the incongruity allows a resolution, as in (2) above, humor can result. One can imagine alternative punchlines that don’t play on salience. These could be considered unfunny or even nonsensical:

- (3) a. How would you fit four elephants in a VW bug?
 c. They weren't elephants. They were mice.
 d. Cut off all appendages and trim off parts of the body.

Navon (1988) has ruled out punchlines of the type given in (3c) since they contradict information which is EXPLICITLY stated, i.e., that there are four elephants. (3d) wouldn't work as a joke because it is a reasonable solution, i.e., it doesn't violate our pragmatic knowledge. Jokes and other forms of humor must be unreasonable in some way.

4.2 *Violations of the accessibility hierarchy*

It is generally accepted that much of human conceptual knowledge is categorizable. People can usually recognize that a dog is a mammal, for example. The relationship between DOG and MAMMAL holds between categories existing at different levels of abstraction. In Figure 1, different levels of abstraction are represented along the vertical dimension, i.e., MAMMALS are more abstract than DOGS. Categories can also be viewed along the horizontal dimension within one level of abstraction, e.g., COLLIES, TERRIERS and COCKER SPANIELS.




Figure 1. *A simple taxonomy of concepts*

Many categories have a certain measure of stability within a culture. But studies have shown that people also form ad hoc categories for specific purposes (Barsalou 1983). For example, in a fire one is likely to categorize children, jewels and TV sets in the category THINGS-TO-TAKE-OUT-OF-A-BURNING-HOUSE (Murphy & Medin 1985).

Another basis for the instability within cognitive structures is believed to be differences in the accessibility of some aspects of the knowledge associated with a given category over other aspects of this knowledge (Barsalou 1982, 1987). Barsalou (1982) recognizes a distinction between context-independent (CI) and context-dependent (CD) information. CI information always comes to mind when a particular category is invoked (e.g., 'smells' for the category SKUNK), whereas only those aspects of CD information relevant within the current context (linguistic or extralinguistic) are accessed (e.g., 'floats' for the category BASKETBALL in the context of 'water'). The CI information is considered to be more accessible than the CD information.

Barsalou's model posits a division between long-term memory and working memory. Long-term memory is the repository of all knowledge about a category, both CD and CI. For a given category in a given context, a composite of all the CI information along with the relevant CD information is assembled in working memory and is available for a given task. This can be thought of loosely as the 'meaning' of a category in a given context.⁵

Differences in accessibility also obtain in situations in which, within a given context, more than one interpretation of a category is possible, i.e., more than one portion of CD knowledge can combine with the CI knowledge in working memory. The more accessible CD knowledge should be accessed first. This model may partially explain how ambiguous expressions are disambiguated.

By extending these notions to apply to homophonous forms, one meaning may be more accessible than — may come to mind before — another.⁶ For example, in an informal survey in which we asked people to respond to FOUR LEGS (out of context), results were overwhelmingly animate members of the category (*dog, horse, etc.*) (Weiner & De Palma 1993). Given that members of a category can be thought of as representing part of the meaning of the category, it is reasonable to assume that an evoked response to a given stimulus would generally produce the more accessible as opposed to the less accessible members of a category. Weiner and De Palma (1993) drew the tentative conclusion that the four-legged animate meaning of the phrase is the

more accessible meaning of the (probably ad hoc) category FOUR-LEGGED-THINGS than is the four-legged inanimate meaning.

Humor can exploit this aspect of our knowledge by having a punchline that is incongruous because of its "misuse" of these accessibility ratings. Some riddles, for example, appear to function by encouraging the hearer to form an ad hoc category of homophonous forms on which an accessibility continuum is imposed. The category is formed with the goal of humor. The old riddle,

- (4) a. What has four legs and only one foot?
b. A bed.

works because the hearer focuses on the more accessible four-legged meaning, the animate one, as opposed to the four-legged inanimate meaning. So this riddle appears to operate by leading us to focus on our natural response, i.e., the more accessible meaning, and then surprises us with the less accessible response which permits a resolution of the incongruity (Weiner & De Palma 1993).

4.3 *Violations of parallelism*

In a study of variation between the use of agentless passive constructions and corresponding active ones in English natural speech, Weiner and Labov (1983) observed that one of the factors favoring the use of a passive clause over an active one is a surface phenomenon: preceding clauses given in the passive tend to produce more passive clauses.⁷ It appears as though people get on a syntactic track and stay on it in their production of certain syntactic forms.

This tendency toward parallelism appears to have broader application which can be exploited to humorous ends (De Palma & Weiner 1990; Weiner & De Palma 1993). In (5)

- (5) a. What is black and white and /red/ all over?
b. A newspaper.

it would seem reasonable to conclude that a similar mechanism is functioning. While black and white function unambiguously as adjectives in the first two conjuncts, also interpreting the third, /red/, as an adjective is encouraged by the presence of the first two. Further, black and white are also of the same conceptual category, i.e., COLORS, pressing for a similar interpretation of

/red/. The syntactic and conceptual categories of preceding elements in the riddle seem to be a force which can be exploited in humor.

4.4 Violations of constraints within a sublanguage

Within linguistics, it is widely acknowledged that there are sublanguages for different situations, e.g., within a community of technical specialists (biologists, architects, etc.) participating in talk about technical subjects. There are also stylistic variants of language. It seems logical that these each must be supported by altered or alternative systems of world knowledge, which can be exploited for humorous goals.⁸

The movie *Crazy People* (1990) makes the assumption that there is an advertising sublanguage (supported by an advertising version of a world knowledge base) which rests on the premise that advertisements must not be honest in the things they say about their products in order to make them look good (and of course in order to sell them). It is, rather, a field which thrives on implicatures.

Crazy People is about an advertising copywriter who, due to stress in his life, decides that it is time for a change within the advertising industry. He begins producing ads which make explicit the implicit messages of some popular ads. Normally, the explicit message (what is actually said) is only part of what is presented in the ad. Much of what is 'said' in ads is implicit. These implicit things may have to do with topics dealing with sex and bodily functions. Within the advertising sublanguage, there is a prohibition against making those things explicit. Revealing these hidden sales pitches by making them explicit is so counter to the rules of advertising that this unexpected honesty produces humorous results:

- (6) VOLVO:
BUY VOLVOS.
THEY'RE BOXY
BUT THEY'RE GOOD.
We know they're not sexy.
This is not a smart time to
 be sexy anyway with
 so many new diseases around.
BE SAFE INSTEAD OF SEXY.
VOLVO
 Boxy but good.

Jaguar. Sleek and smart.
 For men who'd like hand jobs
 from beautiful women they hardly know.

Metamusil
 It helps you go to the toilet.
 If you don't use it, you'll get cancer and die.

The movie makes the point that explicit honesty within the advertising industry is so incongruous that people producing such commercials must be crazy. Shortly after producing some of these strange ads, the copywriter gets committed to a mental institution.

5. The Gricean Model and Humor

Grice (1975:49) has stated that to violate a maxim is to mislead, to lie. How can we describe the difference between a lie and a joke? While a lie may violate a Gricean maxim, it should fit neatly into our system of world knowledge. It should not raise the alarm of incongruity by violating any pragmatic rules of discourse such as those presented above. An effective liar must be careful that this is the case. Jokes, like lies, have the goal of misleading. The difference between jokes and lies is that joke tellers generally assume that the hearer is aware of the fact that he or she is misleading for the sake of humor. Joke hearers are sensitized to the possibility of incongruity and resolution although they also know that the joker hopes they won't resolve the joke's punchline. In contrast, people telling lies hope that their victims won't even notice that they have been misled.

In cooperative conversation, as opposed to lies, a person can flout a maxim, i.e., "BLATANTLY fail to fulfill it". The exploitation of the maxim "gives rise to a conversational implicature" (Grice 1975:49). The implicature is consistent with world knowledge and rules of context.

Jokes also give rise to implicatures, but unlike the implicatures of cooperative conversation, jokes will violate some facet of our pragmatic knowledge. We can think of jokes then, as following a kind of 'uncooperative principle'. In jokes, any implicatures based on the usual pragmatic rules will be the wrong ones. The goal of humor is to violate pragmatic knowledge to a funny end.

6. Conclusions

Incongruity then, is a violation of what our “normal” expectations are as described by a human knowledge base incorporating the above pragmatic factors and no doubt some others as well. These factors have been observed as operating in linguistic phenomena having nothing to do with humor.

One of the pragmatic factors needed for congruity (and incongruity) to occur, salience, has been recognized as necessary for comprehension of metaphors (Ortony 1979a, 1979b; Weiner 1984). Parallelism has been recognized as a factor in the variation between the agentless passive and its corresponding active construction (Weiner & Labov 1983) and as an important principle elsewhere in language (Kuno 1974; Prince 1981). Sublanguages have also long been recognized in linguistics; it seems that pragmatic rules such as those exploited in *Crazy People* fall under the heading of sublanguage violations. Finally, the notion of accessibility in the context of a Barsalou-like model appears to be significant in an approach to understanding ambiguity in language.

Computer scientists have also been interested in the problem of representing world knowledge for the purposes of designing artificially intelligent systems that can understand and produce natural language discourses. In the field of artificial intelligence, knowledge representation systems are usually used to implement things like concepts, attributes of concepts and inferencing mechanisms. Since these are necessary for the production and comprehension of humor, and also for other linguistic phenomena, pragmatic factors must be represented in intelligent computer systems.

A theory of language use, then, must be built on a foundation of pragmatic knowledge. Among other things, pragmatic issues have implications for understanding the phenomenon of garden path sentences such as:

- (7) The cotton clothing is made of grows in Mississippi.

These sentences are ambiguous up to some point in the sentence. When taken in isolation, one interpretation (the wrong one) seems to predominate in the ambiguous portion of the sentence. A second interpretation must be made in order to make sense of the rest of the sentence (and therefore the whole sentence). Since in natural speech, people rarely appear to suffer this kind of confusion, a study of pragmatic factors of the discourse in which the garden path sentence is embedded may shed light on what influences the hearer in making the correct interpretation.

The study of humor indirectly allows us to explore pragmatic issues of natural language since it is the violations of these mechanisms which makes things funny. Studies of large corpora of jokes may be useful in the discovery of other relevant pragmatic rules. By isolating and analysing these rules then, we can hope to clarify the rules themselves and the way in which they operate in normal discourse.⁹

Notes

- * I would like to thank Muffy Siegel and David Weiner for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
- 1 I say "perhaps" because incongruity may be necessary but not sufficient for humor. Also, all incongruous things may not be funny (see below).
- 2 Except in the case of slapstick.
- 3 This doesn't seem to adequately explain the funniness of jokes and the unfunniness of mystery stories. The reason why punchlines of jokes are funny but solutions of mysteries generally not funny is a fertile and interesting area for further research.
- 4 A more detailed discussion of 'salience' is given in Weiner (1985).
- 5 Barsalou (1987:119) views the knowledge base in long-term memory as constantly changing presumably due to acquiring new and changing old knowledge.
- 6 Although he does not elaborate on the notion in this paper, Barsalou (1982:83) notes that ambiguous words are neither strictly context-independent nor context-dependent: "This is because they often come to mind without context, but they are also influenced by sentence contexts in which they occur."
- 7 Other linguists have also recognized the importance of parallelism (e.g., Kuno 1974; Prince 1981).
- 8 This seems to be compatible with Barsalou's model. An exploration of the details of how to extend the model to include sublanguages and stylistic variants of language is beyond the scope of this study.
- 9 While this paper was in press, I became aware of the work of Giora (1991) in which a similar approach to humor is taken.

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Discourse Enumerators and Schegloff's Denominator*

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1. Introduction

Voices too numerous to cite have been raised against the imposition of statistical regression formalism on Labov's (1969) theory of the quantitative conditioning of inherent variability and his epistemological principle of accountability, especially as they pertain to linguistic variability 'above and beyond phonology'. This 'variable rule' formalization requires of all linguistic entities in an analysis that they play one, and only one, of three roles, as schematized in Figure 1: There is a single underlying feature, form, meaning, structure, or function; there are several groups of conditioning factors — within each group the factors are all mutually exclusive but all factors potentially co-occur with factors in other groups; and, finally, there is a small number, usually two, of surface variants.




Figure 1. *Relationships among components of regression analysis.*

The benefit of this highly constrained analytical framework is an accurate and replicable account of the role of each of the conditioning factors in realizing one of the surface manifestations of the underlying entity. The drawback at the conceptual level is the rigid set of relationships implicit in the analysis. The relationship between the underlying form and each of the surface variants is formally identical: each of the variants has the same underlying meaning, form, or function. This relationship is asymmetrical: the underlying form is primordial, the surface variants are derived. The relations between each conditioning factor and the surface variants, and between each conditioning factor and the underlying form are also asymmetrical: the factors 'act' on the underlying form in concert, according to a probabilistic model, in 'choosing' one of the variants. Relationships among the occurrences of the different cross-cutting factors do not enter into the schema at all.

While this schema may well be suited to, for example, many phonological studies, or to research on morphophonological change, or analyses of meaning-preserving transformations in syntax, it is less natural in other contexts and in other frameworks. The uniform relationship between the single underlying form and the different variants is controversial whenever there are nuances in meaning or function of the surface forms, even if these differences appear to be neutralized in use. And the relationships *among* the conditioning factors are often of as much interest as their influence on the variants. Indeed, in studies where semantic, pragmatic, functional, discourse or interactional variables are of interest, it is often far from obvious which should be the underlying form, which the conditioning factors, and which the 'dependent' surface variants. Imposing any such relationships *a priori* on the set of factors in this context threatens to prejudice the results of the analysis in a rather arbitrary way and to preclude the discovery of many of the most interesting connections inherent in the data set.

Schegloff (1988) underlined some of these points at the NWAVE XVII meeting, casting doubt on the applicability of the principle of accountability to the analysis of discourse. While one can describe the form of a conversational device and the work that it carries out, and even count how many times it recurs in a corpus, there is no general way of deciding where it may have occurred but did not, what other devices might have accomplished the same work, or what other work the same form could have accomplished. Computing the rate of use of a variant, the prototypical statistical calculation for variable rule and other analyses, requires dividing its frequency (the numerator) by a denominator measuring the number of eligible contexts, but there is

generally no principled way of identifying such contexts in discourse, because there is no underlying form.

We contend that quantitative analysis of the conditioning that holds among elements of a set of linguistic variables may proceed without recourse to regression-type analyses, and yet still respect the principle of accountability. In this paper we analyze over three thousand instances of the rhetorical figure of speech 'enumeration' in the 1984 Montreal French corpus. While this figure can be rigorously defined in terms of its surface manifestations and certain referential conditions, there would be no point in attempting to establish an underlying commonality at the referential, discursive or interactional levels. There is no possibility of substitutability in most cases without referential, functional or interactional consequences, and there are always other locutions or structures that could accomplish the same or similar referential, functional or interactional work. Instead, we systematically work out the associations among some 15 factor groups (from the 34 groups coded in our data), in terms of pairwise tabulations, as well as three-way tabulations where the connections are more complex. Instead of imposing particular asymmetrical relationships on the data beforehand, the relationships, and to some extent their directions, emerge during the data analysis itself.

2. Enumerations and Their Levels of Analysis

The following are typical examples of enumeration in context, drawn from our corpus. 'I' represents the interviewer, 'S' the speaker; the enumerations themselves are in boldface, each component on a separate line; and back-channel activity on the part of the interviewer is represented in angled brackets. Number codes in parentheses after examples locate the extract in the corpus by speaker, year and page.

- (1) I: Est-ce-que tu te déplaces toi pour aller voir des spectacles comme le Salon des Métiers d'Art, ou le Salon de l'Auto, au Forum, puis au Stade Olympique?
S: Oui, oui
I: Oui ?
S: Oui
Salon de l'Auto on y a été,
Salon du Camping,

Salon de l'Agriculture

tout ça. Ça on y va à ça (1-84:72)

I. Do you travel to shows like the Crafts Fair, the Auto Show, at the Forum or the Olympic Stadium?

S. Oh yes.

I. Yes?

S. Yes, the Auto Show we went to, the Camping Show, the Agriculture Show all of them. We go to those.

- (2) On mangeait pas ça étant jeune. <humhum> On connaissait

la pomme

l'orange

le citron

le pamplemousse

on connaissait la banane

les raisins

Mais il y a certains aliments qui ont changé, c'est sûr.

Pas beaucoup, mais certains. (1-84:79)

We didn't eat that when we were young. <humhum> We had apples

oranges

lemons

grapefruit

we had bananas

grapes

But some of our foods have changed, that's for sure. Not many, but some.

- (3) Dans les cégeps la venue des cégeps tu-sais c'était un peu 'Bon bien écoute là.' Faut apprendre

à partir de soi

à partir de son vécu

à partir de sa propre expérience

Ça t'amène pas bien bien loin si tu as pas de base ça. <humhum>

Bon. Bien à l'université c'est pareil tu-sais il faut apprendre à partir

de soi

de son vécu puis etcetera. C'est vrai. (13-84:23)

In the junior colleges, with the coming of the junior colleges, you know, it was a bit like 'alright now, listen here'. You have to learn from yourself

from what you have lived through

from your own experience

That won't get you far if you haven't got any background. Alright.

Well at university it's the same you know, you have to learn

from yourself

from what you have lived through and so on. It's true.

- (4) Je veux lui faire toucher plein plein plein plein plein plein de choses pour que quand elle va t être rendue

une bonne-femme

une madame

ou une jeune fille

ou une adolescente <humhum> ou je sais pas quoi là, elle va pouvoir choisir elle va elle s'ennuiera jamais, faudra pas qu'elle s'ennuie, <hum hum hum> faudra pas. (93-84:20)

I want her to experience many many many many many things so that when she gets to be

a woman

a lady

or a young girl

or an adolescent <humhum> or whatever, she will be able to choose she will - she won't be bored, she mustn't be bored <humhum> she mustn't.

- (5) Je pense qu'il y a une classe

une classe de joul

puis tu sais de de français commun là <oui>

puis une classe de français poli. <humhum>

français poli là quand tu te fais *polish*. Pas poli <hum> de politesse là mais <oui oui> *polish*. <ah> (49-84:23)

I think that there is a class

a class of slang

and, you know, of ordinary French <yes>

and a class of polished French <humhum>

Polished French like when you polish something. Not polite <hum> as in politeness but <yes yes> polished <ah>

- (6) Fait-que donc les principes de vie ont pas changé. Il y a eu aucune évolution là-dedans. <humhum> Des idiots
tu en as eus,
tu vas en avoir,
puis tu vas en avoir encore
puis il y en aura tout le temps. (2-84:18)
So the principles of life haven't changed. There has been no evolution in that. <humhum> The idiots
we've had some
we will have some
and then we'll have some more
and there will always be some
- (7) Puis là il y avait ah disons: deux tiers du garage qui était plein, compté la couverture je veux dire <oui> jusqu'à la couverture là, le deux tiers du garage plein de matériel,
du poêle,
des frigidaires n'importe quoi
des tables,
des chaises,
du linge.
 Bien on avait pas ramassé d'argent. (90-84:16)
And there, there was say two-thirds of the garage that was full, including the cover, I mean <yes> until the cover, two-thirds of the garage full of stuff,
stoves
fridges anything
tables
chairs
clothes.
Well we didn't collect money.
- (8) Tout le monde dans la salle. 'Je te salue ô drapeau.' Puis le principal lit des mentions puis ci, puis ça. <oui oui oui> Là un moment donné c'est le salut au drapeau,
les brigadiers en avant
la ceinture blanche
le porte-drapeau
le premier de classe
le deuxième

**puis le troisième de classe
celui du Québec
celui des Etats-Unis. Fantastique.
Celui du Canada dans le milieu.**

Tu vois la scène? <oui (rire)> Bon, parfait.

**Les filles sur un bord,
les gars sur l'autre. (2-84:51)**

Everybody in the hall. 'I salute the flag.' And the principal reads the prize-winners, and this and that <yes yes yes> Finally it's time to salute the flag,

the brigadiers in front

the white belt

the flag carrier

the first in the class

the second

and the third in the class

the Quebec one

the American one. Fantastic.

The Canadian one in the middle.

You get the picture? <yes (laughs)> Good, perfect.

The girls on one side,

the guys on the other.

- (9) Je veux dire [la langue] c'est probablement pas important quand tu t'en vas travailler dans une usine, je pense pas que ça soit bien important. <humhum>

Quand tu es médecin à la rigueur je suis même pas sûr c'est important.

Mais quand tu es-t-avocat ce l'est sûrement. <humhum>

Quand tu es journaliste ce l'est sûrement.

Quand tu es professeur d'université ce l'est.

<oui oui oui> Oui oui. (117-84:43)

I mean [language] it's probably not important

when you go to work in a factory, I don't think it's very important. <humhum>

When you're a doctor really I am not even sure it's important.

But when you're a lawyer, then it surely is. <humhum>

When you're a journalist, then it surely is.

When you're a university professor, then it is.

<yes yes yes> Yes yes.

Enumeration has been of interest to rhetoricians for generations (see Gilbert (1989) and Dubois (1992) for surveys of the literature). They are to be distinguished from coordinate constructions, narrative sequences, appositive constructions, simple repetitions, and other related constructions and figures, some of which overlap with enumeration or are special cases of it. Enumerations are frequent in natural speech; we extracted some 3464 examples from the 72 interviews of the 1984 Montreal French Corpus (Thibault & Vincent 1990), representing about 50 enumerations per hour-long conversation. A summary definition of enumeration would be: *A cumulative discourse process made up of at least two different components that belong to the same or equivalent morphological and functional classes, that expresses a homogeneous whole, i.e., a cognitive schema or referential scene of which the enumerated elements form a part.*

We used the following operational criteria to identify enumerations:

- at least two components. Traditionally three have been required, but when two are followed by an 'extension particle' as in the second sequence in example (3), a generalizing particle, or some similar indication that the two components refer to a larger set, then the example was included in our sample. There were 411 with two components, 2146 with three, and 907 with four or more, to a maximum of seventeen.
- distinct and autonomous components. Each component must constitute an autonomous prosodic and syntactic unit, and it cannot simply be a repeated item.
- coordination. The components are explicitly (by a conjunction) or implicitly linked in a coordinate structure.
- identical functional role. The components are subjects of the same verb, adjectivals qualifying the same noun, subordinate clauses attached to the same noun or the same verb, a series of independent sentences, etc.
- morphological equivalence. Though the components are not necessarily in the same word class, they must be paradigmatically substitutable from the syntactic viewpoint.
- reference to a common whole. The components of the enumeration evoke the larger set of which they are part and which is larger than any one of them.
- prosodic coherence. The same rhythmic value is assigned to each component which distinguishes the enumerative sequence from its general context.

2.1 *Method*

Each enumeration was coded for 34 factor groups. These were organized into structural, referential, discursive and interactional levels, based on the following principles.

- the referential level refers to the representations (schemas, scenes, images, etc.) associated with a discourse unit, relatively independent of neighboring discourse units.
- the discourse level refers strictly to the usage of a unit *within* the context of the discourse; the insertion of the unit in the larger discourse.
- the structural level refers to the surface linguistic elements making up the token.
- the interactional level refers to the internal organization of the communicative situation, both its setting and the dynamics of the exchanges between the participants.

Note that the latter two levels are coded relatively directly from observation; the former two require greater interpretive decision on the part of the analyst.

In each of the following four sections, we first describe the factor groups within one level and then statistically analyze the relationship among them. It should be pointed out that the construction of the factor groups represents the outcome of a lengthy confrontation of the major patterns of variability in the data — differences and similarities repeatedly observed among the examples — with the categories and definitions of rhetoric, discourse analysis and linguistics. Each factor represents a distinctive property observed in a non-negligible proportion of our enumerations, and operationalizes some concept of theoretical significance. Not all of the 34 factor groups are analyzed here. Some only involve alternative codings of another group and some pertain to certain complex enumerations — enumerations whose components are themselves enumerations — whose analysis is to be undertaken separately. Of the remaining groups, we chose for this analysis 15, divided almost evenly across the four levels and representing as much as possible the different dimensions of variability within the levels.

Cross-tabulations are carried out for each pair of factor groups, both within and across levels; (the classification into levels does not constrain the statistical analysis; it only organizes it into coherent phases). To construct a

two-way table of percentages we must first decide whether the rows or the columns are to add up to 100%. This choice is often clear from external considerations, since one factor can usually be considered as potentially (though not necessarily) influencing the other, and not vice-versa. Thus 'communicative situation' might affect back-channel activity, but in the present context back-channel activity cannot be considered as affecting the choice of communicative situation. The type of referent or topic might affect whether synonymous links tend to hold among components of the enumeration, but the mechanism of semantic linking of the components will generally not determine referential topic. It is the percentages of factors in the potentially influenced or determined factor group that must add up to 100%, for each factor of the influencing (determining, 'causal') factor group. Of course, in different factor group pairs, the same group may be influential in one, and influenced in another: discourse type (dialogue or monologue) is influenced by communicative situation, but in turn influences back-channel activity. Where there is no clear direction, both types of tabulation may be examined.

We suggest that this methodology constitutes a solution to the problem of Schegloff's denominator without abandoning the principle of accountability. The co-occurrence of pairs of properties can be analyzed without assuming they are properties of entities sharing some identical function, meaning or role. A denominator (indeed, many denominators) is used to calculate percentages, so that the analysis is fully accountable, but there is no notion of underlying form or 'eligible context', nor any problem of searching for 'zero forms'.

3. Relationships Among Structural Factors

The first structural factor is simply the number of components in the enumerative sequence. Example (1) has three components, example (2) has six, etc. In some tables we combine all enumerations of length 5 or more, in others the crosscutting factor is evenly enough distributed so that we can present the results separately for 5, 6 and 7 components.

The factor of component complexity (syntactic role) contrasts enumeration via independent propositions (ex. 6) with the situation where the components constitute part of a sentence (ex. 2). We also distinguish a category of dislocated, independent or detached units, as in (7), that are associated with a sentence but do not form part of the basic sentence matrix.

When the third, fourth, etc. component shows an ellipsis of an element that 'should have' appeared by analogy with the first two components, the enumeration was coded as 'reduced'. In some circumstances, the second component could also be reduced. Example (9) shows several degrees of reduction. Inversely, when lexical elements are added to the purely paradigmatic content of the second or later component, this was coded as 'expanded'. The fifth component in (2) is expanded. Enumerations where some elements are repeated in at least two components were coded as such (cf. 3, 6, 9). Recall that a series consisting only of identical repeated components with identical referents was not considered an enumeration.

Table 1 shows that the number of components in an enumerative sequence is correlated with the complexity of the components: If many components make up the enumeration, these are more likely to be complete sentences, while detached clauses, single words or short phrases are characteristic of the shortest (two-component) sequences. The strength of this result is somewhat surprising; it might have been expected that as the number of components increased, the complexity of each would *decrease* to compensate.

Next we examine the relation between the number of components in an enumerative sequence and the use of reduction, expansion, and repetition. We set aside 2-component enumerations for later discussion. Table 2 shows how reduction seems to be associated with longer sequences, while expansion affects 3-component sequences more than longer ones. Proportionally, the use of repetition seems to increase but very little.

In Table 3 it appears that reduction is associated with enumerations containing complex components while expansion affects those consisting of parts of sentences. In fact these relations are illusory; three-way tabulations (not shown) indicate that they are just the result of the strong relation of

Table 1. *Complexity of components as a function of length of enumeration.*

Complexity: no. of components	Full sentences		Detached		Parts of sentences	
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%
2 (N=411)	100	24.3	61	14.9	250	60.8
3 (N=2146)	1000	46.6	175	8.2	971	45.2
4 (N=624)	349	55.9	49	7.9	226	36.2
5 (N=180)	106	58.9	9	5.0	65	36.1
6 (N=63)	38	60.3	2	3.2	23	36.5
7 (N=22)	17	77.3	1	4.5	4	18.2
8+ (N=18)	15	83.3	0	0	3	16.7

Table 2. *Use of reduction, expansion and repetition in enumerative sequences.*

no. of components	Reduction		Expansion		Repetition	
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%
2 (N=411)	10	2.4	3	0.7	110	26.8
3 (N=2146)	236	11.0	193	9.0	938	43.7
4 (N=624)	96	15.4	39	6.2	281	45.0
5+ (N=283)	44	15.5	19	6.7	137	48.4

Table 3. *Use of reduction, expansion and repetition, as a function of the complexity of the components in the enumeration.*

Complexity	Reduction		Expansion		Repetition	
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%
Full sentences (N=1625)	262	16.1	73	4.5	927	57.0
Parts of sentences (N=1542)	110	7.1	166	10.8	488	32.0
Detached (N=297)	14	4.7	15	5.1	51	17.2

Table 4. *Number of enumerations containing repetitions, as a function of reduction and expansion.*

	Repetition	
	tokens	%
Ø Reduction/Expansion (N= 2794)	1117	40.0
Expansion (N= 254)	144	56.7
Reduction (N=386)	205	53.1

repetition with both complexity (Table 3) and reduction (Table 4), on the one hand, and the inverse relations of number of components with both complexity (Table 1) and expansion (Table 2), on the other.

Table 4 indicates that repetition occurs more often in enumerations that also show reduction/expansion. The three-way tabulation (Table 5) of the data according to these variables, however, reveals a much more complex relationship. Again leaving aside the two-component enumerations, we note that where there is no repetition, the amount of reduction/expansion (about 15%) does not change significantly according to the number of components. Where there is repetition, the components are affected by these processes, and in a dramatically different manner, with the rate of reduction increasing from 11% with 3 components to 22% with 4 components, to 26% with longer enumerations. The rate of expansion, by contrast, declines from 13% to 6% and 6%, respectively.

Table 5. *Three-way tabulation of enumerations by number of components, presence of repetitions, and reduction/expansion.*

No. of components ↓	Process	Ø Repetition		Repetition	
		tokens	%	tokens	%
2	Ø Reduct/Exp.	296	98.3	102	92.7
	Reduction	3	1.0	7	6.4
	Expansion	2	0.6	1	0.9
	total (411)	301	100	110	100
3	Ø Reduct/Exp.	1000	82.8	717	76.4
	Reduction	133	11.0	103	11.0
	Expansion	75	6.2	118	12.6
	total (2146)	1208	100	938	100
4	Ø Reduct/Exp.	285	83.0	204	72.0
	Reduction	36	10.5	60	21.8
	Expansion	22	6.5	17	6.2
	total (624)	343	100	281	100
5+	Ø Reduct/Exp.	126	86.3	94	68.6
	Reduction	9	6.2	35	25.5
	Expansion	11	7.5	8	5.8
	total (283)	146	100	137	100

Returning to the special case of two-component enumerations, how can we explain the low rates of reduction, expansion and repetition? For reduction and expansion, this is largely a matter of definition, since it generally takes two components to analytically establish the basic structure which is to be expanded or reduced. As for repetition, it could have been the presence of the (almost obligatory) extension particle in the two-component case that is responsible for the low rate, but as we shall see in Section 7, this is not the case. The relationships among the structural factors are schematized in Figure 2. For a more detailed interpretation of the co-occurrence tendencies among the structural factors, see Dubois (1995).

4. Relationships Among the Referential Factors

Three referential factor groups were considered for this analysis. The specific/generic distinction was operationalized as follows: The speaker's recounting




Figure 2. *Relationships among structural factors. Thinner arrows indicate weak relationships.*

of her or his own experience, ideas or opinions, often manifested by the presence of pronouns with personal referents, was coded as specific (ex. 1, 4). Generic referents involve common and widespread knowledge about the community (3, 6), and are sometimes characterized by proverbs and other common sayings or by impersonal pronouns and generic reference.

The type of referent, to which we will refer loosely as 'topic', is divided into personal experience ('biographical') as in (1); the experience of 'others' related to or known to the speaker; 'objects' and 'ideas': events, things (2, 7), activities, people, etc.; 'metalinguistic' — discussion of language or reported conversation; and 'evaluation' — discussing or applying rules, norms, conventions to society or individuals (5, 6, 9).

Semantic linking devices distinguish among inventories (ex. 1, 2, 7, 8), gradations (5, 6), synonymy (3, 4) and antonymy (9). In inventories, the components as presented are basically unrelated except, of course, for their common reference to a larger set. In gradations, the components fall into some inherent order, while in synonymy the components share the same referent or indicate the same reality, with some degree of semantic or stylistic nuance. Since they tend to cross-tabulate in a similar way with the other factor groups, we have generally combined the data on synonymy and antonymy.

Tables 6-9 summarize the relationships among the three referential factors. As Table 6 shows, reference becomes increasingly generalized as the type of referent proceeds from the biographical, to discussion of others, and especially to objects and ideas. In other words, the closer, or more similar, to the speaker are the items being enumerated, the more specific is the reference. Evaluative enumerations and those in metalinguistic discussion, which are not as readily classified on a proximity/distance axis, have intermediate values.

Table 6. *Specific and generic enumerations according to referent.*

Referent:	Biographical		Others		Evaluation		Metaling.		Objects/Ideas	
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%
Specific (N=2214)	1242	100	289	90	435	63	80	39	121	13
Generic (N=1250)	0	0	33	10	259	37	124	61	828	87
total	1242	100	322	100	694	100	204	100	949	100

Table 7. *Semantic linking devices according to type of referent. 53 tokens of miscellaneous types not included in tabulation.*

Device: Referent	Inventory		Synon./Anton.		Gradation		total
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%	
Biographical	1006	81	87	7	149	12	1242
Others	249	77	24	7	49	15	322
Evaluation	366	53	300	43	28	4	694
Objects/Ideas	741	78	72	8	136	14	949
Metalinguistic	130	64	57	28	17	8	204

When referent type is cross-tabulated with semantic linking devices, we find a distinct pattern for the devices used in evaluative enumerations. In Table 7 we see that although inventories predominate with every type of referent, and synonymy/antonymy is generally the rarest device, the latter is very frequent in evaluative enumerations. Gradations, on the other hand, almost disappear in evaluative enumerations. The pattern for metalinguistic enumerations falls midway between that for the evaluative ones and the common pattern for the three other types. The slight predominance of the inventory rate in the case of biographical versus other referents is, as we discuss in Section 7, an artifact of the fact that the interview contains a structured questionnaire treating biographical matters.

Finally, when we classify semantic device in Table 8 according to the generality or specificity of the referent, it seems as if the 'unmarked' class, the inventories, tends to be more specific than synonymy/antonymy and the gradations. But this is an artifact of the distribution of the data among referent types. By definition, all 1242 biographical references are specific, and these are largely inventories. This outweighs the 828 out of 949 'objects and ideas' that are generic and also tend to have the structure of an inventory. Indeed, in a three-way classification of the data shown in Table 9, the order of inventories, synonymies and gradations with respect to tendency towards specificity

Table 8. *Specific and generic enumerations according to semantic linking device.*

Device:	Inventory		Synon./Anton.		Gradation	
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%
Specific (N=2214)	1651	64	313	56.7	222	56.5
Generic (N=1250)	868	34	239	43.3	171	44.5
total	2519	100	552	100	393	100

Table 9. *Proportion and percentage of specific referents for each combination of referent type and semantic linking device.*

Device: Referent	Inventory		Synon./Anton.		Gradation	
	proportion	%	proportion	%	proportion	%
Biographical	1006/1006	100	87/87	100	149/149	100
Others	233/249	93.6	15/24	62.5	41/49	83.7
Evaluation	239/366	65.3	183/300	61.0	13/28	46.4
Objects/Ideas	102/741	14.0	9/72	12.5	10/136	7.4
Metalinguistic	52/130	40.0	19/57	33.0	9/17	52.9

is 1 2 3 for evaluations and for objects and ideas, and 2 3 1 for the metalinguistic type and for other persons, so that there is no consistent pattern.

In summary, on the referential level we have found that the topic or type of referent helps determine the semantic linking device of the referent and also its degree of generality or specificity, but there is no independent tendency (i.e., not explained by topic distribution) for any one linking device to be associated more or less than another to generic enumerations. We represent this schematically as in Figure 3.

5. Relationships Among the Interactional Factors

Three of the interactional factor groups assess the interaction at increasing levels of detail. The 'communication situation' indicates in which of the two sections of the interview the enumeration is found, the formal questionnaire about personal interests, likes and dislikes, and lifestyle, from which examples (1) and (2) were drawn, or the rest of the interview, more informal in style. In the latter, the interviewer's task was simply to elicit free-flowing discourse on a range of topics, but in the former, the goal was to obtain specific types of information necessary for a projected content-analysis.




Figure 3. *Relationships among referential factor groups*

The 'type of discourse' was coded as dialogic, monologic or mixed. Each of the general themes discussed in the interview was evaluated to see whether the organization of the conversation was essentially a cooperative process, involving relatively many substantive contributions from the interviewer, or essentially a series of monologues by the speaker, with only back-channel activity from the interviewer or the occasional re-directing question when the speaker exhausted a subject.

At the finest level of detail, the enumerations were also coded as to whether they formed part of an immediate response to something the interviewer said ('interviewer-oriented') as in (1), or arose in the context of a larger discourse on the part of the speaker. In the latter case ('speaker-oriented'), the token is related more closely to the neighboring segments of the speaker's own discourse, and only indirectly to the interviewer's turn.

The fourth interactional factor group involved the presence or absence of back-channel activity as in (5) and (9). Besides the kinds of form appearing in the examples, we also counted interviewer's interjections: *oh!*, *ah bon!*, *ouf!*, *bien!* "good", *mon doux!* "my gosh", meta-questions: *ah oui?*, *oui?* "yes", *ah non?* "no", as well as echoes of elements of the enumeration, contributions of the interviewer to the enumeration itself, etc.

Two-way tabulations suggest a high degree of association among the four interactional factors. Tables 10(a,b) indicate that the interactional situation affects both whether the enumeration is found in dialogue or monologue, and whether it is a direct response to something the interviewer said, or is part of the speaker's own line of discourse. Table 10(c) shows the association between the latter two factors. All of these relationships are readily understandable in terms of the nature of the interview situation. The more structured questionnaire segment of the interview is naturally characterized by more frequent changes of turn, and the speaker's discourse, including the enumera-

Table 10. *Relationships among three interactional variables: situation, discourse type and origin of the enumeration.*

(a)	Dialogue		Mixed		Monologue		total
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%	
Interview	613	26	786	34	939	40	2338
Questionnaire	690	61	286	25	150	14	1126

(b)	Speaker-oriented		Interviewer-oriented		total
	tokens	%	tokens	%	
Interview	1191	51	1147	49	2338
Questionnaire	254	23	872	77	1126

(c)	Speaker-oriented		Interviewer-oriented		total
	tokens	%	tokens	%	
Dialogue	178	14	1125	86	1303
Mixed	496	46	576	54	1072
Monologue	771	71	318	29	1089

tions, is more likely to be in direct response to a question, than in the rest of the interview, where one of the interviewer's goals is to try to elicit free-flowing discourse. And it seems reasonable that interviewer-oriented enumerations predominate in dialogic discourse.

Tables 11(a-c) indicate that back-channel activity seems to be affected by all three of the other factors, though there are no compelling theoretical reasons for these results. Back-channel activity involves vocalization by the interviewer, so it is not surprising to find more in dialogic discourse where the interviewer is actually taking turns, in enumerations directly stimulated by the interviewer, and in the questionnaire situation in general. But it would not have been too surprising to find more back-channel activity with monologic discourse, self-provoked enumerations, and in the less formal segment of the interview, given the function of back-channel activity in validating speaker activity and licensing extensions of the speaker's turn. Instead, we find more of this phenomenon where there is already change-of-turn activity — in dialogic discourse, for example, suggesting that its function, even in the case of *humhum* (90% of back-channel occurrences), is one of relaunching the enumeration, rather than just acknowledgement of the speaker's discourse.

Now, the effect in Table 10(c) might very well be a consequence of the

Table 11. *Effect of three interactional factors on back-channel activity. 57 tokens not tabulated due to inaudibility of back-channel activity in one recording.*

(a)	Back-channel		
	tokens	%	total
Dialogue	710	54.7	1298
Mixed	480	45.6	1056
Monologue	382	36.3	1053

(b)	Back-channel		
	tokens	%	total
Speaker-oriented	563	40.0	1408
Interviewer-oriented	1009	50.5	1999

(c)	Back-channel		
	tokens	%	total
Interview	1000	43.7	2287
Questionnaire	572	51.1	1120

effects in Tables 10(a,b). The association of enumerations in dialogic discourse with interviewer-orientation might simply appear as a result of both of these being more frequent in the questionnaire segment of the interview. To investigate this, we do a three-way tabulation of the data and examine whether the pattern in Table 10(c) holds when we examine only the enumerations in the questionnaire and when we examine only those in the rest of the interview. Tables 12(a) and 12(b) show that although the overall rate of interviewer-oriented enumerations is higher in the questionnaire segment, in both segments dialogic discourse shows by far the highest rate, followed by mixed discourse, with monologic discourse having the lowest rate.

Thus the relationship between type of discourse and orientation of the enumeration is genuine and not simply a consequence of both factors being related to the interview situation. The data used for these two tables can similarly be analyzed to show that the tendency for the questionnaire to have a higher rate of interviewer-oriented enumerations than the rest of the interview holds true within the category of dialogic discourse alone, within the mixed discourse alone, and even within monologic discourse alone, though there is relatively little (150 tokens) of the latter category in the questionnaire segment. Finally the tendency for dialogic discourse to characterize a larger

Table 12. *Association of origin of enumeration with type of discourse.*

(a) Questionnaire	Speaker-oriented		Interviewer-oriented		total
	tokens	%	tokens	%	
Dialogue	75	11	615	89	690
Mixed	103	36	183	64	286
Monologue	76	51	74	49	150

(b) Interview	Speaker-oriented		Interviewer-oriented		total
	tokens	%	tokens	%	
Dialogue	103	17	510	83	613
Mixed	393	50	393	50	786
Monologue	695	74	244	26	939

proportion of the questionnaire segment than of the rest of the interview (61% vs. 26%) holds true within both speaker-oriented (26% vs. 9%) and interviewer-oriented (71% vs. 44%) while monologic discourse constitutes less (14% in questionnaires vs. 40% elsewhere overall; 31% vs. 58% in the speaker-oriented enumerations and 8% vs. 21% in interviewer-oriented ones). Thus the associations revealed by two-way tabulations are all confirmed in the three-way tabulation.

When we apply the same test to the association involving back-channel activity, the results are quite different. The differential (51% vs. 44%) in enumerations with back-channel activity between the questionnaire and the rest of the interview is maintained only in mixed discourse. In dialogic discourse, it is reduced to 56% vs. 53%, and in monologic discourse it is actually reversed: 26% vs. 37%. The effect apparent in the two-way tabulation in Table 11(c) was a spurious result of the relatively small number of monologic enumerations in the questionnaire segment, so that their effect was overwhelmed by the dialogic and mixed data.

In the same way the difference in back-channel rate between speaker-oriented and interviewer-oriented enumerations (40% vs. 51%) in Table 11(b) is an artifactual result of the preponderance of the former in monologic discourse and the latter in dialogic discourse. When dialogic, mixed and monologic discourse are examined separately, the difference in back-channel rate almost disappears (49% vs. 55%, 47% vs. 48%, and 35% vs. 36%, respectively). Only the results in Table 11(a) hold up unchanged in three-way




Figure 4. Relationships among interactional factor groups

tabulations, whether the data are separated by origin of the enumeration or by the interactional situation.

Summarizing our analysis of the four interactional factors in Figure 4, the situation, type of discourse, and origin of the enumeration are all inter-related, but back-channel activity is related directly only to discourse type.

6. Relationships Among the Discourse Factors

Many enumerations are preceded by an 'opening theme', furnished by either the speaker (ex. 7, 8) or the interviewer (1). This does not constitute a component of the enumeration but part of its framework, and often helps in identifying and interpreting it. Thus one factor group includes the factors 'furnished by speaker', 'furnished by interviewer', and 'absent'.

A smaller proportion of the enumerations have a closing theme (8). These were classified as to whether they help identify the larger set to which the components belong, or whether they were rather 'closing theme-shifts', a device for changing to some extent the theme of the speaker's discourse (5).

Another mechanism for terminating an enumeration is an extension particle (*tout ça* 'all that', *des affaires de même* 'things like that', *un tas de trucs du genre* 'a pile of things of the sort', *et cetera, ainsi de suite* 'and so on', *patatipatata*, *tout ce que tu voudras* 'everything you could want' and other generalizing formulae (*des chars de même* 'cars like that', *tous ces légumes là*

Table 13. *Effect of an opening theme on use of closing theme.*

	Ø CT		CT shift		CT final		total
	tokens	%	tokens	%	tokens	%	
Ø OT	1474	72.4	114	5.6	448	22.0	2036
OT (speaker)	475	61.8	53	6.9	240	31.3	768
OT (interv.)	422	63.9	83	12.6	155	23.5	660

Table 14. *Enumerations with extension particles, by opening and closing themes.*

	tokens	Ext. part.		total
		tokens	%	
Ø OT	402	19.7		2036
OT (speaker)	166	21.6		768
OT (interv.)	97	14.7		660
Ø CT	503	21.2		2371
CT shift	14	5.6		250
CT final	148	17.6		843

Table 15. *Percentage of enumerations prefaced by opening themes (a) and followed by extension particles (b), by discourse function.*

(a)	Inform	Opinion	Narrative	Conseq	Counter	Illust	Justif
Ø OT	22.3	39.5	75.3	77.5	85.1	63.6	79.0
OT (speaker)	21.6	30.9	23.6	20.2	14.2	32.7	17.4
OT (interv.)	56.1	29.6	1.1	2.3	0.6	3.7	3.6
total	906	301	89	524	309	492	843

(b)	Inform	Opinion	Narrative	Conseq	Counter	Illust	Justif
Ø Ext part	83.0	80.1	88.8	78.8	80.6	78.3	80.7
Ext part	17.0	19.9	11.2	21.2	19.4	21.7	19.3
total	906	301	89	524	309	492	843

'all those vegetables'; cf. Dubois 1992). These, seen in (1, 3, 4), overlap in function with true closing themes; they were coded as to presence or absence.

Finally, we coded the discourse function of the complete enumerative structure including not only the components of the enumeration but also its opening and closing themes, when present. We distinguished the functions 'informative' (1, 2, 7); 'narrative'; 'opinion' (5), setting forth the speaker's arguments, ideas and beliefs; 'counter-argument', which responds to a previ-




Figure 5. *Relationships among discourse factor groups. Thinner arrows indicate weak connections.*

ous thesis implicit or explicit in the discourse; 'consequences', which summarize or conclude an argumentative discourse (cf. 6); 'illustration' (3, 8), which concretizes an abstract discussion; and 'justification' (4, 9).

Tables 13 and 14 show that the occurrence of an opening theme makes the use of a closing theme more likely and that neither an opening theme nor a closing theme have much effect on the use of an extension particle, other than an irregular tendency for a closing theme to preclude the use of an extension particle. This might be explained by the fact that the two devices have similar functions and occupy the same position syntagmatically.

An interesting result in Table 15 relates the presence of an opening theme to the discourse function of the enumeration. Opening themes are frequent when the function is descriptive, either of the outside world (informative), or of the speaker's ideas (opinion), in the former case due largely to the interviewer, in the latter evenly shared between speaker and interviewer. Enumerations with argumentative functions do not favour opening themes, especially as supplied by the interviewer. Speakers often preface enumerations having illustrative functions with opening themes.

Despite the association between opening and closing themes, there is little if any connection between discursive function of the enumeration and the use of a closing theme. Nor is there much of a connection between discourse function and the use of extension particles except perhaps for the lack of these particles with enumerations in narrative discourse, as can be verified in Table 15. All of these relations among discourse factors are summarized in Figure 5.

7. Connections Among Levels

When factor groups at different levels are compared, some additional relationships appear. There is very little connection between structural factors and interactional ones; they are distributed fairly independently of each other. Otherwise, at least some factors at each level are related to factors at all other levels. In this section we will briefly sketch these relationships, without presenting further numerical detail.

The fact that the interview was split into two sections enables us to identify many of the relationships. The interaction-level association (§5) among the factors ‘questionnaire’, ‘dialogic discourse’ and ‘interviewer-oriented’ has ramifications at the referential level, these factors also being associated with ‘specific’ and ‘biographical’ referents, and with the ‘inventory’ style of enumeration, whose mutual relationships we analyzed in §4. At the discourse level they are also all related to the presence of an opening theme furnished by the interviewer and the ‘informative’ and ‘opinion’ discourse functions, all of which were found to be related in §6. This does not mean that the results we found previously are artifacts of the structure of the interview. For example, the connection between opening theme and discourse functions holds when we analyze dialogic, monologic and mixed discourse separately in a three-way analysis. Similarly, the relationships in Table 6 between type of referent and their specificity hold up when the data are analyzed separately for the questionnaire and the rest of the interview. (However, the slight tendency in Table 7 for biographical referents to have a higher rate of inventory enumerations is an artifact, holding only in the questionnaire.) Nevertheless, the inclusion in the interview of a more formal questionnaire segment contributes to balanced distribution of the data across the factors ‘type of discourse’ (dialogic versus monologic) and ‘origin of the enumeration’, allowing a clearer delineation of the relations within this interactional-discursive-referential nexus of factor groups. We will return later to the relationships between the discourse and referential factors in this nexus.

The remaining interactional factor is back-channel activity. We previously found that, among interactional factors, it directly related only to dialogic discourse. Among structural factors, an increasing number of components in an enumeration seems to lead to increased back-channel activity. This is of interest in that longer enumerations are not associated at all with dialogic discourse; on the contrary, there are proportionately more two-component

enumerations with dialogue than with monologue (14% vs. 9.5%) and fewer with four or more components (25% vs. 29%). A three-way analysis confirms both the effect of longer enumerations and of dialogic discourse on increasing back-channel activity.

Back-channel activity is also associated with the informative discourse function and with an opening theme offered by the interviewer, though both these associations are marginal when a three-way analysis is done separating the data by type of discourse. It is the unequal distribution of the dialogic enumerations with respect to these factors that gives rise to the appearance of an association between them and back-channel activity. On the other hand, the narrative discourse function seems to discourage back-channel activity. In three-way analyses, this is seen to be especially true in monologues, but independent of the type of referent. Also, the use of a closing theme-shift seems to prompt back-channel activity independent of the type of discourse.

Finally, back-channel activity is rare with metalinguistic referents, but elevated with biographical referents, both independent of interactional and functional factors.

In summary, back-channel activity is a feature of enumerations in dialogic discourse, and is also prompted by biographical referents, by long enumerations or by a closing theme-shift. The rate of back-channel activity is depressed in monologues, especially in narratives and metalinguistic enumerations.

A factor at the discourse level that appears to have very few connections is the use of an extension particle following the enumeration; this is possibly due to an insufficient number of examples to establish statistical relationships. The factor does appear to be related (inversely) to all the structural variables: number of components, repetition, reduction/expansion and complexity of components. As discussed in §2 and §3, however, two-component enumerations could only be identified by the presence of extension particles (except for 10% of the cases where other criteria were available). And for enumerations with more than two components, the trend for shorter enumerations to have more extension particles is not very convincing. Moreover, when the data for the three other structural factors are re-examined, each time controlling for number of components, the connection with extension particle presence also disappears or becomes marginal.

The presence of an extension particle is associated on the referential level with the inventory type of enumeration. Again, this relation is reduced




Figure 6. *Inter-level relationships among factor groups. Factors in large ellipse form central nexus of pairwise related groups, with the exception of back-channel activity which is influenced neither by semantic link, nor opening theme, nor two of the three other interactional variables, and 'complexity', which is not directly related to any interactional factors. Single arrows and arrows attached to ellipses indicate a number of other relationships.*

when the length of the enumeration is taken into account; it remains small but consistent.

The structural factors 'number of components' and 'complexity of components' are strongly associated with the presence of an opening theme, and these associations remain unchanged in a three-way analysis. As the number of components in an enumeration increases, the more likely it is to be accompanied by an opening theme in the speaker's own discourse, and the more likely it is to be stimulated by an opening theme furnished by the interviewer. If there is no opening theme, the enumeration is much more likely to consist of parts of sentences than if there is one. When the opening theme is offered by the interviewer, it is most likely that the enumeration consists of full sentences. Finally, it is only when there is an opening theme in

the speaker's own discourse that the enumeration is likely to be made up of detached elements. Connections between the structural factors and the presence of a closing theme exist, but are weak.

Structural factor groups are also related to the referential variables 'semantic linking device' and 'type of referent'. Repetition is related to synonymy and antonymy and to evaluative and metalinguistic referents while reduction/expansion is linked only to antonymy and evaluative referents. Evaluative enumerations and enumerations of things and ideas use less complex components.

Returning to the cluster of factor groups examined at the beginning of this section, we now focus on the connections between the referential factor groups 'semantic linking device' and 'type of referent' on one hand, and the discursive groups 'opening theme' and 'discourse function'. First, an opening theme is associated with a high likelihood of an inventory and relatively few evaluative and metalinguistic enumerations. Narrative enumerations evidence high use of gradation structures and relatively fewer inventories, and refer to 'others' and metalinguistic referents, while informative enumerations have a very high rate of inventories and biographical referents.

Figure 6 summarizes the pattern of relationships among factor groups at different levels. We can see that there is a central nexus of mutually related factor groups, plus a number of other connections involving more 'peripheral' factors (peripheral only in terms of the diagram, not in terms of their importance in discourse). In general, determining influences across levels (and within levels) proceed from the bottom of the diagram towards the top, with the exception of back-channel activity which is influenced by factors at every level.

8. A Methodological Apology

In comparing cross-tabulations with different numbers of rows and columns, how can we (and how did we) decide which indicate real relationships between factor groups or between individual factors, and which cannot be statistically distinguished from the cross-tabulations of two independent factors? There is no simple answer to this question and no statistical criterion that serves in every case, certainly not the traditional chi-square test. Were all factor groups binary, all tables of dimension two-by-two, there are any

number of measures of association that might be used, including a corrected chi-square. But with many rows and columns a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. One cell of a table representing the association between two factors, one from each of two groups, may contain a value completely out of line with the values in the same row and column, indicating a strong relationship. But where there are many other rows and columns, a statistical test of significance will not necessarily be significant; although unquantifiable, prior linguistic considerations might help us recognize the importance of the results anyway.

This problem is compounded when some of the factors are quasi-ordinal. For example, the complexity factor group may be ordered by increasing complexity as follows: part of sentence, detached unit, full sentence. But this is not a strict order; a part of one sentence may be more complex than all of another, etc. Similarly 'number of constituents' might seem a prototypical ordinal variable, but we know that the class of two-component enumerations differs from the others in more than just the number of components.

While procedures exist for dealing fairly with trends involving ordinal variables, and fair tests of association exist for strictly nominal or categorial tables (aside from their decreased power with increased numbers of rows and columns), there is no fair procedure for handling factor groups which contain some, unknown, degree of ordinality.

By presenting many of the tables we used to determine the existence of strong, weak or no relationships, we leave it to the reader to judge the coherence and validity of our approach. Perhaps in further work factor groups could be constrained to be either binary or ordinal, so a more automated and objective procedure might be applicable. Indeed, our approach involves the tedious examination of three-way tabulations to detect spurious associations and, at least in theory, four-way cross-tabulations and more. A true multivariate analysis would be feasible only with a computer-programmed algorithm for assessing all combinations of factors automatically. Log-linear analysis does this, and is available in statistical packages such as SPSS, but for the reasons listed above, we do not have confidence in its use for non-binary nominal variables such as many of those used in this study. For the moment, then, we must content ourselves with detecting 'interaction' by using three-way tabulations.

9. Discussion

It is true that every enumeration refers to a set that transcends each of its components. Why could not this fact be used as the underlying function for a traditional variable rule study? The answer is simple: this is one of the defining properties of enumerations, not their function. Reference to sets is not a particularly natural linguistic category nor is it analytically useful. Plurals, collective nouns, many quantifiers, coordinate constructions, etc. all refer to sets, but this is generally a minor aspect of their syntactic and semantic function and they have little of interest in common.

What is important is that enumerators have many aspects and many properties. They have discourse functions, for example, which we have classified in one factor group. Similarly they may do a variety of referential work, some of which we have coded in another factor group. But their semantic linking device may be considered as an important aspect. Or their link with neighboring discourse via opening and closing themes and extension particles. It seems arbitrary to privilege one level of analysis or one factor group.

Indeed, enumerations do not necessarily have anything in common at the level of reference, function or role, and everything they do at these levels is also done in any number of other ways, not necessarily involving special devices or structures. The problem of Schegloff's denominator is perfectly exemplified by the data on this figure of speech. We believe that our approach circumvents this problem with the study of variation in discourse while still evaluating the mutual conditioning of linguistic entities on various levels in an accountable way.

Many of the insights obtained through this analysis are only loosely tied to the topic of enumeration. For example, the connection between predominantly dialogic conversation and back-channel activity is likely to prevail widely in the conversation, and not just in the context of enumeration. The connections between type of referent and discourse function could be validated with a range of other structures. This transcendence of the central object of study is another consequence of our not assuming one analytic level to underlie the others, such as the referential or the functional levels privileged in variable rule studies.

Further work is planned to analyze the variability in our data along sociodemographic dimensions. Of interest is not so much the socially-condi-

tioned distribution of the structural, referential, discursive and interactional factors, but rather the social distribution of the *relations* between these factors.

Note

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On the Interactional Bases of Speech Community Membership

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1. Introduction

If there is anything that sociolinguistic research of all kinds has in common, it is the premise that studies of language in society must be grounded in direct observation and analysis of the everyday discursive practices of human populations. Thus the starting point of sociolinguistic analysis is a community, broadly defined as group of interacting individuals, not the grammatical system of one or a set of languages or dialects. Discursive practices are by their very nature — to use Labov's words — “inherently variable”, so that speakers have knowledge of and can select among a variety of grammatical and lexical options to express what from the perspective of propositional semantics would count as the same message. They cannot therefore be adequately described in terms of the formal rules and categories of idealized, internally homogeneous Saussurean grammatical structures. To generalize from situated speech, it becomes necessary to abstract along different dimensions and to pay attention to aspects of pronunciation, grammar and regularities of speaking that do not ordinarily enter into grammatical analysis.

It is, moreover, generally assumed that speakers' selection among available communicative options is governed by both linguistic and social constraints. Yet the question of how these two types of factors interact in communication and how what is said at any one time comes to be seen as indexical of broader social forces, as well as such questions as: at what level of signaling variability is to be studied and what constitutes a descriptively

adequate body of data for its analysis, are still far from resolved. What we have at the moment is a variety of distinct traditions which, because of differing theoretical premises and differing research goals often yield incommensurable results.

My own perspective on these issues is that of a linguistic anthropologist who has turned to the study of discourse and conversation in post-industrial societies after a decade and a half of field work in relatively isolated, rural settings in India and Europe. The main goal of my earlier work (Gumperz 1958, 1971) was to investigate the relationship of linguistic variability to social categories, a problem which even now is far from well understood. The then commonly accepted view was that of Leonard Bloomfield (1933), who argued that the degree of linguistic diversity in any one region is a direct function of the patterning of interpersonal communication over time. Following Bloomfield, I viewed the villagers among whom I worked as belonging to a single local speech community, which I defined in behaviorist terms as population aggregates bounded and set off from other adjoining units by differences in frequency of communication, and whose members have at least one speech variety in common (Gumperz 1965).

My fieldwork concentrated on the discovery of differences in the everyday speech of a stratified sample of local residents within such a territorially defined unit, relying on ethnographically based elicitation procedures that combined direct observation and tape recording of everyday speech with the structuralist strategies of clause level grammatical analysis. I was, of course, aware of the fact that most local residents also spoke a variety of standard Hindi or Urdu, and were thus bi- or multi-dialectal. In fact, my initial data were obtained by interviewing in Hindi-Urdu to elicit speech samples in the local dialect, while at the same time taking care to insure that my informants did not lapse into Hindi in their responses. That is to say, the Hindi my informants spoke and the code switching they most probably engaged in did not count as data; only what I saw as their "dialect" utterances entered into the analysis.

The early speech community studies, along with other related work (Ferguson & Gumperz 1960; Labov 1966; Gumperz & Hymes 1972), demonstrate that linguistic variability is indeed socially motivated. In so doing they provide important arguments against the structuralist assumption that shared linguistic rules can only be studied and valid comparisons only be made at the

emic level of *langue* by abstracting forms from the material environments in which utterances are produced and interpreted. If it is true that not only *langue* but also *parole* is patterned, and if this patterning is intrinsically related to the division of labor in society, then, as Hilary Putnam's discussion of the division of labor implies (1975), to assume that grammatical knowledge resides in ideally uniform, and therefore hypothetical, communities peopled by speakers who share perfect knowledge of what is significant about their language is to engage in a kind of reductionism that denies the very qualities of human cooperation that makes organized social life possible.

Yet what are the implications of saying that speech communities are internally diverse? More specifically, what social dynamic relates language use to extralinguistic forces? And how do we distinguish between inter- and intra-community variability? Clearly, once we admit that internal variability is systematic, the very notion of the structurally homogeneous speech community becomes problematic. In this paper, I intend to deal with this issue by suggesting a perspective on interpretation and on the social and linguistic knowledge it presupposes that is capable of accounting for both shared and variable patterns of language usage. But first some more history.

1.1 *Community norms of interaction*

The above cited speech community studies accept the structural grammarians' assumption that community level regularities can be inductively derived from in-depth study of clause level grammatical form. Although my own early attempts to relate linguistic to social boundaries also relied on this premise, the results I obtained are of interest for the present discussion. Fundamental social categories such as ethnic identity, caste, class and religion, which loom so large in the social science literature, were not directly coded in systematic features of speech variation. It was interaction itself that was the most immediate determinant. Yet what was at work was not frequency of interpersonal contact as such, as Bloomfield might have predicted. Rather, systematic linguistic variability seemed to reflect constraints on interaction governed by principles of etiquette concerning such matters as what topics can be raised and what types of interactive activities, speech acts and linguistic forms can be employed. These matters are in the domain of what Erving Goffman (1983) calls the 'interaction order': the norms and constraints that regulate the conduct of interpersonal relations in everyday life.

But to what extent are these findings generalizable? William Labov, who perhaps more than anyone else is responsible for what by now is the general acceptance of the premise that linguistic variability is socially patterned, argues that linguistic analysis of everyday speech is only the first step in sociolinguistics. It must be combined with quantitative measurement of the distribution of key, clause level grammatical elements employed by a sample of local speakers that is representative of the community. Implicit in this approach is a Parsonian notion of community according to which human social systems are governed by community wide norms superimposed upon locally organized diversity. As Labov sees it, it is the sociolinguist's task to show how language enters into such a social system by means of quantitative methods that relate the incidence of linguistic variables in everyday speech to independently determined social variables. The aim is to discover the common dynamic by which trends in the distribution of linguistic variables are tied to trends at the level of social variables.

Labovian variability analysis has revolutionized our understanding of ongoing processes of language change, but it also has some serious limitations. How, for example, can we relate community wide patterns to individual action? Parsonian theory would lead us to assume that norms are internalized as part of an individual's socialization processes and are thus automatically reflected in behavior (Heritage 1984). Yet if this assumption holds true, it becomes difficult to explain some of Labov's own most interesting findings (Gal 1989; Irvine 1987). In an early study (1972), for example, he shows that recent changes in the speech on the island of Martha's Vineyard can be explained by the fact that islanders seek to set themselves apart from mainland summer visitors. Elsewhere he presents a highly interesting discussion of the phenomenon of hypercorrection which demonstrates that speech variants regularly used by individuals of lower class background are nevertheless heavily stigmatized by these same speakers, so that in some types of encounters they respond by overcompensating in the direction of middle class English. In both of these cases, speakers are engaging in conscious action. They are not just automatically following rules or norms of usage.

1.2 *Ethnography of communication*

Ethnographers of communication (Gumperz & Hymes 1972; Bauman & Sherzer 1974; Hymes 1974) sought to bridge the gap between community

wide patterns and situation specific talk by postulating an intermediate level of analysis: the speech event. Following arguments first made by Roman Jakobson (1960), they hold that the speech event, constituted by the interaction of several components of which language is only one, is the basic unit of everyday communication, not the clause or sentence. Events are viewed as miniature social systems governed by appropriateness norms specifying what is to be accomplished, by what linguistic means it is to be communicated, who can participate and in what capacity. Analysis, then, concentrates on the discovery of rules specifying which modes of discourse and types of social relationships are appropriate for the situation at hand.

Ethnography of communication has led to new and highly productive research, which has greatly enriched our understanding of how discourse works and in what ways it is culturally variable. The best and most persuasive studies we have describe bounded and, frequently, named events, for example, ceremonies, rituals or political oratory, for which appropriateness rules can usually readily be obtained from ethnographic observation and interviewing. However, the concept of rules as extralinguistically defined norms of speaking also raises significant theoretical problems. Events, as Goffman (1963) points out, constitute distinct social environments where participants respond to each other's situated moves and engage in types of reciprocity that depend on context-bound expectations and principles of etiquette. Participating in an encounter thus activates interpretive frames that transform generalized cultural knowledge and affect situated practices in somewhat the same way as syntax frames and reinterprets context-free meanings. How do we know what that knowledge is apart from looking at actual talk? If the approach is to have validity for language usage in general, it must also be able to account for everyday behavior where the relevant context is problematic and cannot be predicted in advance. In fact, recent, in-depth, discourse-level analyses of named performances argue that quite frequently everyday styles of talking co-occur along with formal or ritual styles so that these events are by no means as separate from everyday talk as had commonly been thought (Briggs 1989; Hanks 1988; Haviland 1987). It would seem, therefore, that any analysis of formal events must also be able to account for everyday talk as well.

There is also the question of the basic social unit with reference to which norms of speaking are specified. Behaviorist definitions of speech communities based solely on surface aspects of interaction or on members' social

background have been largely abandoned, and communities have now come to be seen as knowledge-based, somewhat along the lines of the structural linguist's notion of ideal communities (Irvine 1987). This is to say that from the perspective of talk community membership is a function of what people know, rather than what they do or how they are categorized by others. Both variationists and ethnographers of communication speak of norms as arising out of the historical experience of specific communities, but since they do not specify how these communities are defined, we must assume that they simply accept the established social scientists' definitions. This neglects the fact that, because of the ever increasing pace of change during the last decade and the large scale population migrations, sociologists as well as anthropologists have all but given up attempts at finding empirical ways of defining the bounds of a community.

Furthermore, to treat speech communities as social isolates is, as Gal points out (1989) to suggest that the social factors in speech can be explained purely in local terms. Considering the pervasive code switching between local dialects and standard language that both investigators and informants rely on to communicate at all, such a treatment becomes counterfactual. Studies of code switching have taught us that when speakers employ national and regional language varieties alongside local dialects, they do so to allude to national and regional power relationships as experienced within the local setting. So that, ultimately, even local speech practices enter into broader, nonlocal fields. It seems evident that the relationship between outside and local forces must at least be examined if we are to understand how meaning is produced in local settings.

Yet while the common assumptions that human populations can be segmented into bounded speech communities and that individuals can be described as members one or another of a finite set of cultures seen as unitary systems may no longer be warranted, social and cultural distinctions persist and affect action. How are these reflected in speech behavior? I propose that we can avoid the problems that arise in connection with attempts to delimit speech communities in terms of extralinguistically defined, shared normative systems by adopting an interactional sociolinguistic approach to the study of everyday discourse. Following what is by now widely accepted practice, we can assume that understanding in everyday encounters is in large part a matter of inferences that rely both on linguistic presuppositions and on knowledge of the world, much of which is culturally specific. From this perspective, lexical

and grammatical knowledge as well as knowledge of potentially applicable general norms and values provide only a rough template, to be fleshed out by additional interpretive mechanisms that operate in a cultural environment which shapes and constrains the ways in which utterances are interpreted. A second basic assumption is that all understanding is framed understanding in the sense that it rests both on shared grammatical knowledge and on shared knowledge of what the frame or schema is in terms of which what is said is to be understood. Framing yields situated knowledge which can then be seen in Garfinkel's terms as part of the cognitive resources we rely on to make sense of the world around us (1967). It is the analysis of inferential processes from this perspective: of the signaling mechanisms on which they rest, and of their distribution in human populations that provides the initial basis for determining how and along what lines speaking practices are shared.

2. Conversational Cooperation

Inferences are made within the context of temporally organized speech events in which speakers and listeners cooperate in the creation and maintenance of involvement as a precondition of getting their messages heard. Verbal communication, thus, is not simply a matter of putting one's ideas into words; it requires active cooperation among producers of messages and recipients whose responses provide feedback at key stages in the interaction. Such cooperation cannot be taken for granted. To induce others to cooperate, speakers must convey at least some advance information about what the exchange is about and what the outcomes are likely to be. Once talk has begun, problems of conversational management set in. Initial frames are subject to constant and often quite subtle changes that have to be negotiated as part of the interaction. Further management problems arise with the allocation of turns at speaking. That is, individuals do not automatically have space to present or develop an argument. They must work to gain and retain their turn and make it possible for others to predict where their own responses can fit in.

Studies of nonverbal communication have shown that the creation and maintenance of conversational involvement depends on participants' production and interpretation of a variety of nonverbal signaling mechanisms which serve to guide and channel the necessary inferences (Goodwin & Goodwin 1990; Heath 1986; Kendon 1990). On the basis of my own work on conversa-

tional inference, I want to argue that there is a class of linguistic signs, 'contextualization cues', that serves similar functions (Gumperz 1982a, 1992). Contextualization is an integral part of speaking in the sense that everything we say also conveys information as to how it relates to what we know and to preceding and following talk. It serves both to retrieve the contextual frames in terms of which we interpret what we hear and significantly affects the interpretive processes through which we understand conversational management cues.

Contextualization cues function both to suggest what the intended frames are and how these change within the context of an interaction. Furthermore, if understanding is a matter of culture bound inference and rests on presuppositions about context and interpersonal relationships, and if the relevant inferential processes must derive from a shared tradition, then understanding itself rests on assumptions about how that shared tradition is distributed and assumptions about the community with reference to which inferences are made.

2.1 *Conversation: ESL teachers in California*

Before going on to a discussion of how knowledge of discursive practices is distributed in human populations, let me illustrate what I have said about conversational cooperation and the signaling mechanisms on which it is based on the basis of the following three examples. Example 1 is an informal narrative recorded in the United States. Two teachers of English as a Second Language (R and J) have taken a group of foreign students on a trip to San Francisco for sight-seeing and are jointly reporting the events of the day for a group of their colleagues.

Example 1: Excursion to San Francisco

1. P: yeah, {[hi] where'd you *go/} where'd you all *go/
2. J: well, y'wanna *tell 'em, where we went?
3. R: we went uh..., almost **everywhere/ except that it was *foggy/ for {[lo]*half} the time we were over there/
4. M: {[hi] yeah,} you don't seem too enthusiastic about it/
5. R: {[hi] oh} it =was a good *trip/ {[hi] yeah, it *was/ *yeah//=}
6. J: =[ac] [hi] well, it was a great *trip/} except=that/ [dc] it was a *foggy *day//

- and we started out by going to Twin Peaks,
at nine thirty in the morning/
on a *foggy *day// you know what we *saw?
we saw **fog, {[lo] up to*here//}
7. R: ==we saw *fire down the *hill//
8. J: {[lo] a *fire down the *hill, =that's right//=
9. R: =there was a (f —) was on*fire//=
10. P: {[hi] that was {[lo] good}=(—)//}=
11. J: =and then= after the *fog,
and it was *windy, we..., decided to go to the beach//
we went to the beach, and it *was-, we saw some sea lions,
though//
12. R: ==there were about *three//
13. J: ==then we had a ho- ..*hot dogs on a *stick//
14. M: ==uh-huh/
15. R: **some of them/ **some of them,
had *hot dogs on *stick//
16. M: () hi G/
17. G: [enters]
18. J: hi G/ ..and uh, we uh ...,
talked () about *tourists there, and we {[lo] left},
and went to the *Palace,..of the Legion of Honor/ right?
19. R ==again, for a view of the Golden *Gate//
20. J: ==for a *view, of the {[lo] Golden} Gate *Bridge
{[ca] and there was/} {[lo] no} view//
21. G: ah::

In response to P's question, J asks R to tell where they went. When R mentions that it was foggy, M, another colleague, comments, "You don't seem too enthusiastic about it." Apparently he assumes that R is giving his own reactions to the trip. Beginning with turn 5, R and J launch into their narrative. Of interest here is the way in which the two narrators cooperate in producing their account, frequently playing off each other's turns, with one person completing or elaborating on what the other one has said, and sometimes even anticipating what is about to be said. To do this the two interactants must rely on shared knowledge that goes beyond knowledge of narrative techniques, as that term is commonly understood, and of what happened on the trip. But they must also build on shared knowledge of linguistic form, particularly, contextualization strategies.

At first glance, the referential content suggests that the story is told from the narrators' perspective. And this is what M's comment assumes. Yet note that the description is quite general and lacks the detail that we associate with narrative accounts under the circumstances. Mention is made of the major sites visited, such as Twin Peaks, the beach, the Palace of the Legion of Honor, etc. and of what the group saw: fog, a fire, sea lions, and of what they ate: hot dogs on a stick. In conversations among local residents, we might expect additional comments specifying what about these items is interesting. All we get is a list, which, in this context, sounds strangely uninformative. And no one queries the account or asks for more detail. It is only in turns 13-17, when J repairs his "We had hotdogs on a stick" in response to M's "uh-huh," that we begin to suspect the interpretive import of this apparent violation of the Gricean maxim of relevance.

I propose that, although there is nothing in the surface form of the account to indicate this, beginning with turn 5, the story is basically being told from the foreign students' perspective. Consider the way stress is used in turn 5. The word "trip" is stressed and the statement is then reinforced with an emphatic, "Yeah, it was." In turn 6, J mirrors the prosody of R's turn 3 in constructing what is in effect a play of words in his response to M's previous question. "Fog" and "foggy" are repeated several times. R's first statement, "It was foggy," is taken up by J's "except that it was a foggy day," and then again in the next clause in, "on a foggy day," and later, "and then after the fog it was windy." Clearly, the narrator here is not just reporting that it was foggy. Why would local residents, for whom fog is a daily occurrence, play with the word "fog" without further explanatory detail? The repetition, along with the prosody, evokes a stereotypical picture of non-natives talking about San Francisco fog. That is, any speaker who makes such an issue of fogginess is most probably a non-native. R's turn 7 again has an odd stress pattern which is then echoed by J. Note, furthermore, that J's first comments overlap R's. In line 6, J's "It was a great trip" is partially identical with R's evaluative comment, "It was a good trip." In everyday conversation, positive evaluations are, as Pomerantz has pointed out, ordinarily followed by upgraded praise. If this is what J had intended, we would have expected contrastive stress on "great," rather than a simple repetition of R's intonation. In sum, we conclude that the two narrators are contextualizing their talk as if they were speaking in the students' voice.

As was pointed out above, the narrative is jointly produced. Having just returned from the trip, it is unlikely that J and R have told the story before. Yet J knows more than just content of what R is about to convey, he is also familiar with and able to tune into R's rhetorical strategies. The two narrators seem to fall into a performance mode in which J plays the "joker" to R's "straight man." We must assume that J's performance rests in large part on indirect inferences made on the basis of his understanding of R's contextualization conventions and what these convey.

2.2 *Interview: English speaking South Asians*

The next example consists of a counseling session recorded in an advice center associated with a neighborhood housing association in an industrial city in the English Midlands. The discourse strategies employed here are quite different from those in Example I. Speaker A, a house-owner whose property adjoins property owned by the housing association and a native speaker of a South Asian language who has lived in the region for a number of years, wants to find out if the association is willing to share in the cost of reconstructing the boundary wall, which was destroyed in a recent storm. B, also of South Asian background, is a native speaker of English. The transcript begins after an initial question, not included in the transcript, where the interviewer B has asked for A's address.

Example 2. The Walls Tumble Down

1. A: #name# Arundel Street//
2. B: Arundel Street//
3. A: ==yes// I got walls/ *tumble down*//
...friday...eh/ *saturday night yeah*//
4. B: the walls tumble down/ you mean they fell down//
5. A: fell down yeah/ *..fell down*//
but could you tell me/ *which*//
[pointing to a small map he has with him]
...that's my wall/ ya somebody else's wall//
6. B: hm well is your wall here? [pointing]
7. A: both sides/ *..and the front of that*//
8. B: here here and here//

9. A: hm yes//
10. B: aha um there would be/
...it would be a party wall between you and your next
door neighbor here// this guy and this guy here//
11. A: yes but see next door/ *I think is your house/*
Calmore Center's//
12. B: Calmore Center//
13. A: yes/.. forty one/ .. *and thirty nine mine//*
14. B: hm/
15. A: but that up there/ *Lisit-Lisit's garden/*
this/..Cambridge Street here//*and eh I want to know-*
16. B: you want to know who is responsible to put them back up//
17. A: up for this front one/
18. B: I see/ .. so if you want that/
..so if you want that, ..uh that wall to be put up/
19. A: only here//
20. B: this one here//
21. A: uh up there yes//
22. B: you want to know if you are the only one who is liable
to pay for it//
23. A: pay for it/ that's what I want to know//

Although the English in this passage is perfectly grammatical, the reader who approaches it without special background knowledge may have difficulty in determining what the talk is about. It appears from what transpires towards the end of the passage that A has come to make an inquiry, yet he never explicitly says what he wants. He begins in turn 3 by saying that his walls have fallen down, and then goes on to point to a map and inquires if the interviewer can tell him where his own wall is, as if he did not know that himself. The interviewer, however, never asks for verbal clarification, instead he repeats what has just been said, as if by way of confirmation. Occasionally he rephrases A's statements, sometimes supplying information that he assumes the client wants to convey but has not put into words. For example, in turn 10 and particularly in turns 18 and 22, it is he the counselor, not the client himself, who puts the client's request into words. Clearly, the two interactants understand each other and cooperate well in the conduct of the encounter. What is of interest to this analysis is that, in so doing, they rely on shared presuppositions and a set of shared contextualization conventions that are

quite distinct from those commonly used among majority group native speakers of English in the United States or, for that matter, in England.

Consider the turn-by-turn sequential organization of the encounter. For the most part, this has a tripartite structure of move, counter move, confirmation; as, for example, in turns 1/2/3, 3/4/5, 7/8/9 and 19/20/21. Among native speakers of English, the question/answer pattern is more common. Several additional aspects of the talk seem odd by British or American standards. First, note that the client begins by presenting facts about what happened, about the location of his house, etc., carefully avoiding making statements that are potentially controversial or embarrassing. Secondly, at the level of prosody, the client's talk sounds strangely halting, that is, what he has to say is chunked in relatively short phrases, as in turn 11 and 15, and there are frequent pauses. The interviewer, however, gives no sign that this causes him any difficulty. He seems to be treating the pauses as cues to suggest that he is being asked to infer what is wanted. A responds to B's inferences as if they had been expected. Then somewhat later, in turn 16, when A has ended with "eh I want to know" and a pause, B goes on to put on-record what he assumes A has come to ask, which A then simply confirms without further elaboration. Finally, A's use of pitch register is also odd. I have marked this for A's speech in turns 1-15 but the pattern continues throughout the example. The first one of a set of two clauses carries high and the second one carries low pitch register. The speaker does not use contrastive stress of the type that we find in Example 1. The practice is typical of certain speakers of Indian English who seem to be carrying over their native language prosody into English, and has been shown to lead to significant misunderstandings in some interethnic encounters (Gumperz & Roberts 1991).

My claim is that the interactants in each of the examples rely on shared knowledge to generate the inferences about what their co-participant intends to communicate that are necessary for maintaining conversational cooperation and successfully carrying out the interaction. For purposes of exposition, we can say that at least two levels of inferences are involved. First, there are those inferences that retrieve background knowledge on what the frame or activity is. That is, knowledge that suggests what the interaction involves, what the appropriate relationships among interactants are, and what outcomes are expected. Secondly, there are the inferences that enter into what we may call conversational management, such as the allocation of turns at speaking, the maintenance of thematic cohesion and the signaling of topic change.

Inferences at both levels are cued in part by choice of lexicon and in part by contextualization conventions and nonverbal cues. This is illustrated by the discussion of such matters as the wordplay on “fog” and the communicative import of the narrators’ listing of sites and of the house-owner’s strategies for presenting his case. In each case, the discussion focuses both on lexical choice and on the use of pausing as well as prosody and pitch register shifts as contextualization strategies.

I use the term ‘rhetorical strategies’ to cover all the above abilities. What these strategies do, apart from what has already been mentioned, is to enable us to integrate what is heard into what is already known, and thus to recognize the world around us as orderly. They are conventional in nature and learned as part of an individual’s socialization processes. Once learned, they tend to be employed automatically without conscious reflection, and, in that sense, they are somewhat like grammatical abilities. But the conversational processes into which they enter also have characteristics of their own that derive from the very nature of conversations as multi-party performances.

To begin with, although it is true that all conversations are governed by general and in large part universal organizing principles, these principles operate in a manner that is quite different from the operation of all or none categorical grammatical rules. Conversational principles, as Levinson (1983) has argued, are defeasible; that is, they do not determine what counts as an utterance in a language or what can or cannot be said or understood. On the contrary, they act as guidelines or standards of evaluations that give rise to expectations which when violated generate the implicatures on which interpretation of so much of what a speaker intends to convey rests.

Secondly, the phonetic, prosodic and stylistic cues that participants in face to face encounters rely on in contextualizing their performances are frequently quite fleeting and transitory in nature. This means that, since the relevant information is not coded in lexical form, it is hard to retrieve or to report on after the event. It cannot easily be communicated in contexts other than those in which it originally occurs, so that recalling what was actually perceived at any one time for the purpose of later analysis and preservation of information in the form of adequate transcripts presents a major problem. In fact, until about ten years ago, when unobtrusive means for recording everyday talk were only just becoming available, we simply did not have the data necessary for systematic investigation.

Thus, while theory suggests good reasons to believe that indepth methods of analysis patterned on those employed in the study of spoken language can yield insights into conversational processes not otherwise obtainable through quantitative correlational techniques, the phenomena to be studied, by their very nature, also present serious empirical and analytical problems. It seems clear that although conversationalists build on phonological, syntactic and semantic knowledge in contextualizing what they hear, contextualization conventions are as distinct from sentence-level linguistic rules as phonology is from syntax and syntax from semantics. They must therefore be analyzed in their own terms.

2.3 Group discussion: African-American teenagers

The next example is an extract from a 1968 tape recording of a group discussion session involving a white researcher (G), his white assistant (C) and a group of black teenagers in the home of the group leader, a black university graduate student. The researchers had asked the graduate student to get together a group of teenagers for informal discussion. They had explained to her that they were interested in collecting data on informal black speech styles for a research project designed to dispel the then common stereotype among educators and many others that black teenagers lacked verbal abilities they needed to profit from instruction in school. To establish the rapport necessary for getting the discussion going by focusing on common interests, C, who has been studying jazz drumming in New York, responds to A's general comment in turn 1 on the music playing in the background, by naming the musician, then going on to point out that this musician is a friend of a friend, thus making an indirect claim to what some people have called "co-membership." Yet the teenagers' reactions are quite different from what C might have expected.

Example 3. Verbal Games

1. A: #commenting on background music# you know that- that's a nice song/
#Six turns of informal talk and laughter omitted.#
8. C: oh/ ... i met him once/ ...
{[ac] like he's a friend of ah ..of my cousin's from new york/}

9. A: .. {[dc] [f] oh *is he?} you met {[hi] (co::leman)?} #name#
 10. C: ==yeah/
 11. A: {[very hi] oh *is he?}
 12. C: yeah/
 13. A: {[f] relative/\ka=hu*~h::?}=
 14. C: *a=well= i mean friend of a- a friend of-
 15. A: of-of=-
 16. C: =of= a relative/
 17. A: () oh of a relative/ <.5 sec>
 {[very hi] orne*~::tte/}
 18. <1.5sec>
 19. A: {[f] so you met him one time/} huh?
 20. C: =={[pp] yeah/}
 21. A: {[ac] one of the great pleasures/} {[lo] you know/}
 22. B: [laughs]
 23. D: really/ {[very ac] shake hands/\ka=(you know/=
 24. C: *a=he was at the =Both-And/ #name of a local nightclub#
 25. A: ==pardon me?
 26. C: ==the Both-And in the city? .. the Both-And club?
 27. A: {[f] yeah/} yeah/ yeah/ yeah/ yeah/ so that's where you
 met him at?
 28. C: yeah/
 29. A: oh: i see/ you go nightclubbing (), or-
 30. C: occasionally, yeah/
 31. A: hm:::/

Although in the first seven turns the words, which are not reproduced here, are difficult to hear, the prosody and tone of voice have all the characteristics of relatively relaxed, informal conversation. The situation changes dramatically with C's claim in turn 8. A responds to C by questioning him, raising his pitch and increasing his loudness, and adopting, what compared to his earlier talk, seems like exaggeratedly black phonology. A additional relevant cues are the exaggerated black dialect timbre of the vowels and prosody of "is he," "Coleman", "relative" and "Ornette." The marked contrast between A's speech here and A's earlier remarks, not reproduced here, suggest that C is being challenged, as in a verbal game. In turn 21, after C has given an affirmative answer to a question, A suddenly shifts to informal English pronunciation and prosody which is much more like C's. His move

evokes laughter and an elaboration on the part of one of the other black participants. The sequence ends with what is clearly a putdown. Throughout the interaction, C maintains the same informal style in which he began and responds to A as if he were answering factual questions. It is possible that, intent on trying to get an informal conversation going, C did not notice that he was being made fun of. Or, if he did recognize A's strategy, perhaps he thought that, as a stranger and as a researcher, it would be inappropriate for him to respond in kind. In any case, as far as the teenagers are concerned, he has clearly shown himself incapable of entering into the spirit of the interaction, thus not only invalidating his claim to co-membership but also allowing his opponent to demonstrate his superior verbal skills. The black participants, in their responses to him, relied on culturally based rhetorical strategies. Since C did not have the background knowledge and the verbal means to respond in kind, he reveals himself as the outsider he is.

3. Ethnicity and Discourse

So far I have concentrated on illustrating how shared interpretive strategies and rhetorical practices relate to and arise out of shared communicative experience. But some further explanation is needed to show what this has to do with the kind of speech communities discussed at the beginning of this paper. Considering what has been said about the social background of the interactants in our three examples, one might want to argue that the examples reflect ethnically based differences in discourse strategies. This would imply that speakers are members of three distinct ethnic groups, that is, Afro-Americans, British-South Asians and middle class, white Americans, and that these ethnic groups constitute distinct speech communities. Such discourse level analyses are useful because they enable us to isolate significant and systematic, socially motivated distinctions, even in those cases where, as with Example 1, the established utterance level analyses of linguistic variables would not yield significant results. But there are also some problems with this approach in that it neglects significant facts of language usage and can thus be said to lead to the same kind of reductionism that characterized the earlier speech community studies. Speaker A in Example 3, for instance, regularly alternates between black dialect and standard English, and the interviewer in Example 2 is a native speaker of English and thus also controls native English strategies.

The two individuals, therefore, are bilingual and bicultural. But to say this is also to admit that ethnic group membership is a function of a person's command over rhetorical strategies, and that these strategies define membership. That is, ethnic groups, when seen in these terms, are as I suggested above knowledge-based. But the relevant knowledge is not knowledge of what the ethnographers of communication call "rules of speaking" and of the norms that govern them. Rather, it is both rhetorically grounded and rhetorically controlled in the sense that ability to employ the relevant strategies is a precondition for entering into the kind of social relationships that being a member of a group involves, and, by implication, profiting from the advantages that participation entails.

To what extent are we justified in using the term 'community' to refer to the populations we have described? One reason for the widespread use of terms such as group or community is that it enables us to distinguish those with whom we identify from those whom we sense are different. But clearly what is referred to here are not regionally separate population aggregates. The black teenagers in Example 3 and the white middle class speakers in Example 1 live in the same urban environment. They go to the same schools and work in similar occupational environments. Furthermore, to the extent that there are language differences between them, these differences resemble those alluded to in studies of counter-cultural phenomena (Willis 1981). That is, they do not just reflect historically given forces but arise as a result of conscious forms of resistance on the part of some individuals, and as part of their attempts to set themselves off from others.

4. Social Networks

The social science concept that perhaps comes closest to capturing what is involved here is the notion of network. Although this term has other definitions, I use it here to refer to the kind of sharing that is likely to evolve among individuals who have a common history and have undergone similar communicative experiences within the context of institutional networks of relationships where members cooperate over relatively long periods of time in the achievement of common goals. Where such communality of experience exists, much information that under other circumstances would have to be made lexically explicit can either be taken for granted or alluded to through routi-

nized ways of speaking and special enunciations and prosodic patterns, to the extent that these have become indexically associated with specific taken-for-granted premises. To quote Edward Sapir's famous lines, "Generally speaking, the smaller the circle and the more complex the understandings already arrived at within it, the more economical can the act of communication afford to become. A single word passed between members of an intimate group, in spite of its apparent vagueness and ambiguity, may constitute far more precise communication than volumes of carefully prepared correspondence exchanged by two governments." In other words, sharing of interpretive practices speeds up and intensifies communication among those who are "in the know," although, as Example 3 shows, similar, taken for granted, interpretive presuppositions, when relied upon in interaction with those who are not in the know, may not only give rise to serious communicative difficulties but also thwart an individual's attempt to enter into cooperative relationships with some types of others.

Once persons are defined as outsiders, they are likely to be discouraged from learning or employing the strategies that make for membership. The relevant knowledge is acquired in the course of socialization processes that rest on informal peer contact such as is characteristic of institutionalized relationships. Family networks are a prime example, but occupational ties, including academic networks bounded along disciplinary lines, and certain types of voluntary organizations also qualify. It is because of the relationship of knowledge to actual participation in human groups that knowledge of rhetorical strategies can become a badge of membership.

How are the above described population units tied into the society at large? One explanation is that community wide power relationships determine the types of networks and associations available to a particular local population. Such nonlocal relations are reflected in language in two ways. To begin with, many of the inferences on which conversational cooperation rests rely on knowledge acquired as part of the history of participation in the economy. Secondly, since the relevant learning processes involve long-term cooperation in the pursuit of shared goals, we can argue that learning is ultimately constrained by the political economy that controls access to learning opportunities. A useful way to visualize how these interactive constraints work is in terms of Bourdieu's metaphor of the linguistic marketplace and of the field which sets the values that are assigned to various practices (1982). In this way, the commonalties that we talk of can be seen to be directly responsive to the realities of everyday social and political life.

Any individual can, of course, and will normally enter into a number of networks of relationships. Where these relationships overlap for a number of individuals, we can speak of closed networks. Where there is relatively little overlap, we speak of open networks. Closed networks on the other hand are constitutive of communities in the traditional sense of the word. Speech community membership when seen in this way is to a significant extent interactionally constituted. This is, of course, not to say that the communicative processes illustrated in this paper account for all that is important about speech communities. The history of nationalism has shown that today's ethnic communities are in large part ideological constructs and Labov has provided much evidence to show that speech community members act in accordance with shared norms that supersede local diversity. Moreover in the last few years many sociolinguists have argued that linguistic ideologies affect both what we say and the way we evaluate talk (Kroskrity 1992). My main point is that subconsciously internalized communicative conventions acquired through interaction are a key factor that we need to account for if we are to understand how community membership enters into communication.

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II

Language in use: Syntactic and Lexical Variation

On Focussing Sentences in Brazilian Portuguese

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1. Introduction

To speak a language is much more than putting words together in a certain order. When we speak we also ‘say’ what we think about what is being said. That is, we can be ironic, we can make fun of a propositional content, we can put all the propositional content under suspicion, etc. We can also focus on a proposition or a part of it. Indeed, there are many kinds of focussing mechanisms available in language, situated at different levels of the grammar. Thus focussing can be instantiated by pitch, lengthening, affixation, lexical choice, etc., and especially by syntactic mechanisms. In this paper we concentrate on one class of syntactic constructions that can be used for focussing in Brazilian Portuguese.

Focussing constructions (henceforth FC) can be roughly classified, in syntactic terms, in two types. The first is what is usually called ‘topicalization’. Here the focussing process does not entail the appearance of any new morphological material, but is performed only by reordering. For instance, the underlined constituent in (1) can be focussed by moving it to the first position in the sentence, as in (2):

- (1) *João quer dinheiro*
“John wants money”
- (2) *Dinheiro João quer.*
“It is money that John wants”

The second type of FC involves the introduction of new morphological material, accompanied, under certain circumstances, by reordering. Brazilian Portuguese (BP) has a variety of FCs of this type, illustrated in the sentences in (3), which are all focussed versions of (1), with the new morphological material underlined.

- (3) a. *João quer é dinheiro.*
 b. *Dinheiro é que João quer.*
 c. *Dinheiro que João quer.*
 d. *É dinheiro que João quer.F*
 e. *O que João quer é dinheiro.*
 “It is money that John wants”

This paper will concentrate on the five sentence types illustrated in (3). We treat the five constructions as a class, because they all share certain properties. First, they share functional properties, to the extent that all of them are used for focussing; second, they share structural properties in that they all involve the addition of morphological material, specifically the auxiliary verb *ser* ‘to be’ and/or a WH-pronoun. On the other hand, each one has certain functional and structural idiosyncrasies, as we will see in what follows.

Following Prince (1978) we may label and describe the FCs in (3) as follows. Most of these FCs show a falling intonational contour and primary stress on the focussed constituent (C¹). All of them are very frequent in colloquial BP.:

- (3a) BE-FOCUS (BE)
João quer é dinheiro
 “John wants is money”
 SD: S-C¹ SER C¹, where S-C¹= Sentence minus Constituent¹
- (3b) É QUE-SENTENCE (EQ)
Dinheiro é que João quer
 “Money is that John wants”
 SD: C¹ SER QU- S-C¹
- (3c) QUE SENTENCE (QU)
Dinheiro que João quer
 “Money that John wants”
 SD: C¹ QU- S-C¹

- (3d) CLEFT-SENTENCE (CS)
É dinheiro que João quer
 "Is money that John wants"
 SD: SER C¹ QU- S-C¹
- (3e) PSEUDO-CLEFT (PC)
O que João quer é dinheiro
 "The what John wants is money"
 SD: QU- S-C¹ SER C¹

FCs have received considerable attention in the past twenty years. In the 70's they were studied under a classical generative approach (cf. Chomsky 1970; Jackendoff 1972; Akmajian 1970; Schachter 1973; Gundel 1977; among others) and in the 80's they were treated under a functional/pragmatic perspective, as in the work of Prince (1978), Contreras (1978), Sedano (1987), Lambrecht (1988), Geluykens (1988), among others. Our paper can be situated in this second approach, and we will be looking for structural and discursive conditioning of the use of the first four of these five FCs¹.

2. Methodology

Our analysis is based on sentences from two corpora which were collected in two speech communities located in different dialect areas, Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and Belo Horizonte (BH). These sentences were extracted from interviews carried out with 48 informants, 24 in RJ and 24 in BH. All informants have similar socioeconomic characteristics and were interviewed using the same interview techniques.

Although FCs occur in both speech communities they are more frequent in RJ, as can be seen from Table 1. It is important to note that these two dialects also differ in a number of other linguistic properties that will not be addressed here. For example, there are phonological differences, which are perhaps the most salient, and also differences in morphology and lexicon.

A quantitative analysis of the data was conducted using variable rule methodology and the GOLDVARB program. This analysis examined a number of grammatical and discursive-interactional variables; we will report on six of these here: Grammatical Category of C¹; Syntactic Function of C¹; Transitivity; Contrast; Topical Structure; and Informational Status of C¹.

Table 1. *Number of FC types in Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte.*

FC type	RJ	BH
CS	66	25
BE	59	97
EQ	77	58
QU	117	38
PC	52	12
Totals:	371	230
Total N=601		

Table 2. *Quantitative results for the (excluded) Grammatical Category factor group. BH data.*

FC type: Grammatical Category	BE		CS		EQ		QU	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
Nominals	36	.62	9	.61	9	.32	9	.44
Pronouns	3	.14	8	.78	9	.56	10	.71
Adverbs	38	.61	2	.22	24	.60	10	.45
Other	20	.45	7	.59	16	.55	9	.50

Table 3. *Quantitative results for the (partially selected) Grammatical Category factor group. RJ data.*

FC type: Grammatical Category	BE		CS		EQ		QU	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
Nominals	18	.56	20	.54	28	.52	25	.38
Pronouns	4	.21	41	.74	21	.45	50	.62
Adverbs	11	.59	4	.27	22	.63	35	.58
Other	26	.91	1	.13	6	.37	7	.36

3. Grammatical Factors

3.1 Grammatical category of C^1

This factor group was investigated in order to address the question of whether or not the grammatical category of the focussed constituent was significantly correlated with any specific FC construction. In our quantitative analysis we distinguished the following factors in this group: nominals; adverbs (including adverbial phrases); personal and demonstrative pronouns; and a residual category of 'other' including everything else.

Our expectation for this factor group was that it would prove to be insignificant, since there was no obvious reason to expect that a grammatical

category x would be significantly correlated with a FC y . Indeed, except for a few limitations², we find in our data examples of all sorts of combinations involving different grammatical categories and different FCs. For instance, for the attested sentence (4) any of the non-attested sentences of (5) would be equally possible:

- (4) *Não! Isso que eu ia falar!* (QU)
 “No! This is what I was going to say!”
- (5) a. *Não! Isso é que eu ia falar!* (EQ)
 b. *Não! Eu ia falar era isso!* (BE)
 c. *Não! Era isso que eu ia falar!* (CS)
 “No! This is what I was going to say!”

The same is true for the other factors as can be seen in examples (6) to (8), where case (a) is always an attested sentence and cases (b,c,d) are other possible sentences:

- (6) a. *Ele que fazia a festa toda.* (QU)
 b. *Ele é que fazia a festa toda.* (EQ)
 c. *Era ele que fazia a festa toda.* (CS)
 “It was he who provided everything for the party.”
 d. *Eu vi foi ele.*³ (BE)
 “It was he that I saw.”
- (7) a. *Eu tenho que comprar é carne boa.* (BE)
 b. *Carne boa que eu tenho que comprar.* (QU)
 c. *Carne boa é que eu tenho que comprar.* (EQ)
 d. *É carne boa que eu tenho que comprar.* (CS)
 “It is good meat that I have to buy”
- (8) a. *Eu vou é no centro.* (BE)
 b. *No centro que eu vou.* (QU)
 c. *No centro é que eu vou.* (EQ)
 d. *É no centro que eu vou.* (CS)
 “It is downtown that I’ll go”

In the quantitative analysis of the BH data, our hypothesis was confirmed: Grammatical Category of C^1 was not selected by the program as being significantly associated with any of the FCs. The results, given in Table 2, show no obvious correlation between FC type and grammatical categories. However, the results for the RJ data, shown in Table 3, are different. Here, the program has selected Grammatical Category as being relevant for CS and QU types, but not for BE and EQ types.

Table 4. *Quantitative results for Syntactic Function of C¹. BH data.*

FC type: Grammatical Function	BE		CS		QU		EQ	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
Subject	2	.02	14	.86	14	.65	17	.59
Direct Object	27	.47	7	.45	5	.39	6	.32
Circumstantial	40	.83	4	.45	13	.50	24	.56
Other	28	.82	1	.18	6	.42	11	.47

Notice however that, except for the category 'other', the tendencies exhibited in Tables 2 and 3 are very similar and, again, no obvious correlation can be pointed out between FC type and grammatical category. This being the case we suggest that Grammatical Category of C1 plays no systematic role in the selection of FC types.

3.2 *Syntactic function of C¹*

In contrast to the effect of grammatical category, we expected that the Syntactic Function of the focussed constituent would be a significant predictive factor in the choice of FCs. We distinguished, for our final quantitative analysis, three main syntactic functions: subject, direct object and circumstantials, plus a residual factor 'other'. Given the fact that Portuguese is, by and large, an SVO language, and given that this order tends to be preserved (unless there is functional pressure acting on one of these constituents), we may predict that some FC types will fit some syntactic functions better than others. For instance, we expect direct objects to disfavor QU and EQ constructions, since these FCs would disrupt the SVO order if they were used to focus objects. Also, and for the same reason, we expect BE constructions to be disfavored by subjects. On the other hand, nothing can be anticipated about circumstantials since they may occur in many different places in a sentence.

These predictions are confirmed in Tables 4 and 5, which show the results for the Syntactic Function factor group for the BH and the RJ data, respectively. As expected, QU and EQ constructions are disfavored by direct object, while BE constructions are disfavored by subject.

Given these findings about the negative effect of direct object on QU and EQ constructions, and the negative effect of subject on BE constructions, in both corpora, we may suggest that these common results should be predicted from general principles of the language. Such a principle might state, e.g., that

Table 5. *Quantitative results for Syntactic Function of C¹. RJ data.*

FC type: Grammatical Function	BE		CS		QU		EQ	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
Subject	3	.17	31	.52	53	.51	41	.51
Direct Object	16	.93	11	.68	5	.28	4	.37
Circumstantial	10	.53	22	.54	54	.63	29	.61
Other	30	.97	2	.19	5	.31	3	.22

any disruption of the canonical order involving a verb and its arguments should be kept to a minimum. In this sense we suggest that variation is restricted by deeply settled principles of the language and, as such, it will not differentiate Dialect A from Dialect B (in our case, RJ and BH dialects).

On the other hand, when we come to those cases that cannot be said to be controlled on deeper levels, we witness the drifting apart of (different) dialects. As our first example we may take the QU and EQ constructions: in the BH data (Table 4) they are slightly more frequent with subjects, but in the RJ corpus (Table 5) this effect is neutralized. On the other hand, we find the reverse situation for the effect of circumstantials. This being the case we can say that there is a slight syntactic isogloss separating the dialects of BH and RJ in terms of EQ and QU constructions.⁴

Our second example is a more dramatic one. It has to do with the effects of subjects, direct objects and circumstantials on BE and CS constructions, and can be summarized as follows: (a) subjects show a positive effect on the occurrence of CS constructions in BH and a neutral effect in RJ; (b) direct objects show a positive effect on the occurrence of BE constructions in RJ and a neutral effect in BH; and (c) circumstantials show a positive effect on the occurrence of BE constructions in BH and a neutral effect in RJ.

Hence, we conclude from all of this that dialect differences cannot rest on deeply controlled phenomena but only on differences that cannot be predicted on the basis of general principles of the language (in our case a tendency to preserve a specific ordering between the verb and its arguments).

3.3 *Transitivity*

Our third grammatical factor is Transitivity, which, in our final analysis, we treated in terms of three levels: high, medium, and low transitivity. 'High transitivity' includes structures where there is either a transitive verb followed

Table 6. Occurrence of FCs by Transitivity. BH data

FC type: Transitivity	BE		CS		QU		EQ	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
High	66	.61	15	.60	16	.44	20	.39
Medium	6	.34	9	.72	11	.66	12	.59
Low	25	.39	2	.22	11	.49	26	.63

by its complement (e.g., *John ate the cake*) or a verb followed by a place PP (e.g., *John went to Rio*). ‘Medium transitivity’ describes structures where there is a transitive verb whose complement, although recoverable from the context, is not phonetically realized. ‘Low transitivity’ stands for structures where there is either an intransitive verb (e.g., *to happen, to last*), or a verb followed by a predicative phrase (e.g., *to be, to seem, etc.*), or the verb *ter* ‘to have’ in the sense of ‘to exist’ (e.g., *tem banana na mesa* ‘there are bananas on the table’).

Given the results and conclusions from section 3.2, there are some predictions that can be advanced here. Since our FCs may imply the reordering of constituents, depending on their syntactic function, we may suppose that QU and EQ constructions will be disfavored by high transitivity since their probability is bled by direct objects. On the other hand, high transitivity might favor BE constructions, CS constructions, or both. Also, since BE constructions are disfavored by subjects we may suppose that they will also be disfavored by low transitivity, where subjects are the only arguments of the verbs. To check on these points let us consider Tables 6 and 7 for our BH and RJ data, respectively.

From Tables 6 and 7 we can say that:

1. Our predictions are all confirmed in the BH data (Table 6). The RJ results in Table 7 are not quite as clear, but they do not actually contradict our predictions, and they follow the same general patterns found in Table 6 (although in a variable form). This being the case, we may say that the results for cells QU-High, EQ-High and BE-High in both tables are a by-product of more general principles of the language, which are valid for all dialects of Brazilian Portuguese.

2. Taking Table 7 as a whole, we notice that, except for the predicted cases, all p-values are close to .500. This means that for the RJ data, Transitivity has little effect on FC variation. In fact, this factor group was rejected by the program for our RJ data.

Table 7. Occurrence of FCs by Transitivity. RJ data.

FC type: Transitivity	BE		CS		QU		E Q	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
High	40	.57	38	.51	61	.48	42	.50
Medium	4	.35	6	.42	21	.66	8	.46
Low	15	.43	22	.50	35	.46	27	.51

To conclude this section, we may say that surface variation among FCs is partially controlled by general grammatical principles, and partially determined by individual choices internal to each dialect. In the first case, dialects will not differ from each other; in the second case they may look different from each other, in varying degrees. Let us now turn our attention to the discourse functions of focussing constructions.

4. Discourse Analysis

Several authors have considered contrast to be a main function of FCs (cf. Chafe 1976; Gelyukens 1988). FCs in Brazilian Portuguese, however, exhibit more complex behavior to the extent that they involve many other discourse factors besides contrast. The formal variety of FCs, which we presented in section 1, is also regulated by, among other factors that we omit here, the topical structure of the discourse sequence in which the FC occurs, and by the informational status of C¹. It should be noted, however, that the impact of each of these discourse factors is not the same for (a) all dialects of BP, nor (b) all FC types. Thus a more precise characterization of the discourse functions of FCs requires distinguishing them in terms of their relative functional specialization. In other words, even though all FCs may express contrast and collaborate in the structuring of the discourse topic, certain of them will be more appropriate for one discourse function than for another.

4.1 Contrast

Let us first consider Contrast. The definition of Contrast that we adopt here conforms to the intonational and contextual approach of Taglicht, according to whom:

... 'contrastive' means presented as one of a pair of opposites (...). Oppositeness is a contextual-pragmatic concept. It may be represented by opposite terms in semantic structure, e.g., pos/neg, alive/dead (...). Oppositeness is characteristically expressed by the use of syntactically parallel items, e.g., popular and unpopular in *Peter was popular and Paul is unpopular*; but this, too, is not necessary; cf. *Everyone disliked Paul but Peter was a universal favourite*. (1984:46)

Contrast may be explicit or implicit. It is explicit whenever both members of the pair are present in the utterance; it is implicit when only one of the members of the pair is present in the utterance and, in this case, it is the formal properties of the utterance that guarantee the existence of the other member of the pair. Needless to say, it is obvious that the detection of implicit contrast is a delicate task since any primary stressed constituent may suggest contrast. Below we present examples (9) and (10) for explicit and implicit contrast, respectively:

EXPLICIT CONTRAST

- (9) I: *Mas você cozinha. E você deve ter algum prato que seus fregueses gostam mais.*
 S:
 I: Qual é?
 S: *Ah, eu cozinho não. A minha tia é que cozinha.*
 (JO 1154 B133)
 I: "Well, you cook. And you must make some dish that your customers like more."
 S:
 I: What is it?
 S: Oh, I don't cook. It is my aunt that cooks."

IMPLICIT CONTRAST

- (10) S: *É. Porque no...no dois, até o nome já diz: O Império Contra Ataca. Então no dois o Darth vence. Aí quem tem que fugir agora é o bando do Luke.* (GU 1075 B011)
 S: "Yeah. Because in...in the second (film), the title itself tells you: The Empire Strikes Back. So in the second one Darth wins. So then the ones who have to run away now are Lukes's gang."

Table 8. Contrast. BH and RJ data.

FC type:	BE		CS		QU		EQ	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
BH +Contrast	65	.50	21	.57	27	.52	30	.44
BH -Contrast	32	.48	5	.36	11	.45	28	.60
RJ +Contrast	41	.57	23	.44	57	.45	52	.56
RJ -Contrast	18	.40	43	.56	60	.55	25	.41

Our Contrast factor group contains two factors, +contrast and -contrast. The first one, +contrast, codifies both implicit and explicit contrast as well as all the cases of expectation breaks (cf. van Dijk 1977). The second one, -contrast, includes everything else. Table 8 shows the results for our BH and RJ data.

Table 8 shows that any FC may be used to express contrast. But it also shows some differences between the two dialects. In the RJ dialect it is the BE and EQ constructions that seem to be more suitable for the contrastive function. The other FCs, and in particular the CS constructions, are, in fact, related to other discourse functions, as we will show. In the BH dialect, the results in Table 8 show that (a) any FC type may express contrast, but (b) it is the CS and the QU constructions that are more suitable for this function, a tendency which is reversed for EQ constructions and neutralized by BE constructions. These results show that there is more involved in dialect differences than just formal differences.

4.2 Topical structure

Now let us consider the Topical Structure factor group. The relevance of topical structure for the ordering of clauses has been pointed out by many authors (cf. Schiffrin 1985; Thompson 1985; Ford 1988; Ramsay 1987; among others). Due to their grammatical characteristics, their stress pattern and the constituent ordering that each FC type requires, they may either signal the segmentation of textual sequences, act as parenthetical islands in the flow of the discourse, or express propositional relations which are necessary to the construction of the text. By limiting our attention to FCs we can say that what is at stake is which type of FC plays which role in the structuring of the discourse topic. Discourse topic has been characterized as "the proposition entailed by the joint set of propositions expressed by the sequence" (cf. van Dijk 1977:136).

Table 9. *Topical Structure. BH and RJ data*⁵.

FC type:	BE		CS		QU		EQ	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
BH Coda	60	.54	20	.65	14	.39	28	.45
BH Other	37	.44	5	.31	24	.63	30	.56
RJ Coda	31	.63	46	.64	49	.43	32	.46
RJ Other	14	.36	19	.35	68	.56	41	.53

Our Topical Structure factor group contains two factors: the first includes FCs that function as codas (cf. Labov 1976; Labov & Waletzky 1967), or that either segment the textual sequences or act as parenthetical islands in the flow of the discourse (cf. ex. 11); whereas the second factor includes FCs that express contrast or any other propositional relations (cf. Mann & Thompson 1987) that are necessary for the construction of the text (cf. examples (9-10) above).

- (11) *Daí veio um médico. Tava cheio de polícia lá. Veio um médico. Daí o médico... Daí acho que mandaram dar injeção na moça pra moça morrer. Daí a moça... Daí enterraram a moça de novo. Foi isso que aconteceu.* (RO 1691 B354)

“Then a doctor came. It was full of police there. The doctor came. Then the doctor... Then I think they gave the girl a shot so she could die. Then the girl... Then they buried the girl again. That was what happened.”

The quantitative results for this factor group, for both dialects, can be seen in Table 9.⁵ These results show that both dialects present similar behaviour concerning Topical Structure: CS and BE constructions are mainly related to the introduction of codas and evaluations while the other FCs do not seem to play any significant role in factoring the sequencing of the discourse topic. Their role seems to be concentrated in the domain of the sentence, where it is mainly related to contrast.

Tables 8 and 9, taken together, constitute strong evidence for our initial hypothesis that FCs in Brazilian Portuguese, when considered in terms of their general distributional trends, are strongly influenced by discourse factors. On the one hand, there is a correlation between QU and EQ constructions and the expression of propositional relations (cf. Mann & Thompson 1987), mainly Contrast, and on the other hand we find a correlation between CS and

Table 10. *Informational Status of C¹. BH and RJ data*

FC type:	BE		CS		QU		E Q	
	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.	N	Prob.
BH New	36	.70	8	.58	8	.42	7	.34
BH Evoked	12	.30	8	.30	15	.62	22	.63
BH Inferred	3	.37	5	.91	1	.30	—	—
RJ New	22	.65	5	.25	24	.46	20	.54
RJ Evoked	22	.47	25	.50	49	.50	38	.55
RJ Inferred	15	.42	36	.67	43	.52	19	.40

BE constructions and the necessity to signal either the end of a sequence or the evaluation of points of view to which the speaker is committed. We would like to suggest, however, that the FCs we are analysing are relatively flexible in functional terms.

4.3 *Informational status of C¹*

Finally, let us consider the Informational Status of C¹. Although earlier analyses of FCs suggested a correlation between FCs and presupposition, it was the pioneering work of Prince (1978) that opened up the possibility of distinguishing among the several different types of FCs in terms of the codification of information. The categories EVOKED, NEW, and INFERRED, which constitute our factors here, come directly from Prince's work (1981). Table 10 gives us the quantitative results for this factor group, for both dialects.

Again, the results indicate important dialect differences. The most striking have to do with QU and EQ constructions, which are sensitive to the Informational Status of C¹ in BH but not RJ. The differences involving CS and BE constructions are more subtle and have to do with the effects of the factors 'new' and 'evoked' in CS constructions, and with the factors 'evoked' and 'inferred' in BE constructions. In this case we may have, again, a small formal difference between the two dialects. Notice, finally, that the results for CS and BE constructions are in nearly complementary distribution. We could say that this is just a consequence of the formal differences between the two constructions: C¹ in CS constructions tends to be mainly represented by demonstratives while the whole construction functions as a coda or an evaluation. This fact, then, accounts for the high probability values associated with inferred information. BE constructions, on other hand, involve primarily post-verbal constituents, a traditional locus for new information.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have seen that: (a) both grammatical and discourse factors control surface variation among FCs in Brazilian Portuguese; (b) grammatical isoglosses may show up whenever grammatical factors affecting variation are not rooted in general principles of the language; and (c) discourse functions are assigned to grammatical variants, and this is a task that is determined differently within each dialect. Future research on focussing should pursue these matters further, investigating other grammatical and discourse factors and their effect on FCs in BP and other languages.

Notes

- 1 Pseudo-cleft (PC) constructions are excluded from our quantitative analyses because they occurred only 12 times in the BH corpus.
- 2 Some of the limitations that we have are that verbs can only be focussed by BE whereas sentences can only be focussed by BE, QU, EQ.
- 3 We cannot have as (6d) a sentence like *Fazia a festa toda era ela* (BE). But the reason for this has nothing to do with category 'personal and demonstrative pronouns', as can be seen by (6d). Rather, it has to do with syntactic function and position in the sentence, as we will see later in this section.
- 4 QU and EQ constructions, which have very similar syntactic behavior, can be seen as reduced and full forms, respectively, of the same construction.
- 5 18 tokens have been removed from the RJ corpus because their status could not be clearly determined.

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On *Kind*-Sentences, Resumptive Pronouns, and Relative Clauses*

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1. Introduction

This paper will study the relation between syntactic form and discourse function and will attempt to show that neither is predictable from the other and that the correlations between them are neither iconic nor commonsensical but must be determined on a language-specific basis.

Consider sentences like (1), well-formed and in fact not infrequent in the grammar of the spoken language of standard as well as nonstandard speakers:

- (1) He's the kind of guy that he gets into a lot of fights.

The subordinate clause in (1) has the appearance of a relative clause containing a resumptive pronoun. In fact, a similar sentence is so construed in Newmeyer 1990, and, furthermore, the bulk of the naturally-occurring English tokens in this paper come from a corpus collected a decade ago by Anthony Kroch as a corpus of resumptive pronoun relative clauses. That is, the sentence in (1) appears to be analogous to the sentence in (2), where a gap occurs instead of a pronoun:

- (2) He's the kind of guy that [e] gets into a lot of fights.

However, in this paper, I shall present evidence that the sentence in (1) in fact does not contain a relative clause and is syntactically unrelated to the sentence in (2). I shall then show how this, in fact, is predictable on the basis of the discourse functions of resumptive pronoun relative clauses argued for

in Prince (1990). Finally, I shall compare briefly the analogs of these sentences in Yiddish, where the situation is syntactically and functionally as in English, and in Hebrew and Arabic, where a very different pattern appears, both syntactically and functionally.

2. Corpus

The English data are drawn mainly from the corpus collected by Anthony Kroch in the early 1980s at the University of Pennsylvania. Examples from the Kroch corpus are marked 'AK' in this paper. The Yiddish data is from Olsvanger's (1949) *Royte pomerantsn*, a compilation of over 200 anecdotes; examples from that corpus are marked 'RP' in this paper.

3. Syntactic Evidence

On the basis of (1) or the naturally-occurring tokens in (3), there is no reason to suspect that the subordinate clause is not a relative clause containing a resumptive pronoun:

- (3) a. He's the type that he don't bother with the neighbors. (AK: T. O'Malley)
 b. She was the kind that she made such a racket that you knew whenever she was doing something bad. (AK: Amalia S.)
 c. He's the kind of guy that I think he respects the job we did. (AK: D. Vermeil)

That is, we assume that they are resumptive pronoun versions of the gap-containing relative clauses in (4):

- (4) a. He's the type that [e] don't bother with the neighbors.
 b. She was the kind that [e] made such a racket that you knew whenever she was doing something bad.
 c. He's the kind of guy that I think [e] respects the job we did.

However, consider the variants of (2) in (5), as well as the naturally-occurring examples in (6):

- (5) a. I'm the type that I/*he don't bother with the neighbors.
- b. I was the kind that I/*she made such a racket that you knew whenever I(/*she) was doing something bad.
- c. I'm the kind of guy that I think I/*he respect/*respects the job we did.
- (6) a. But, see, I was the type that I didn't care. (AK: E. Walesky)
- b. I'm the type of person I like to be positive. (AK: unknown speaker, TV or radio)
- c. I'm the kind of person I don't like anything gooey on my hands. (TV, 1/22/90)
- d. I just happen to be somebody who they know I've been looking around and... (AK: Eugene Kroch)

The facts in (5) and (6) are puzzling indeed on the assumption that the subordinate clauses are relative clauses containing resumptive pronouns. In (5), although the putative heads have not changed, a change in person in the subject of the matrix clause necessitates a concomitant change in the putative resumptive pronoun in the subordinate clause. Likewise, in (6), the pronoun in the subordinate clause agrees in person not with the putative head but with the subject of the higher clause, and a pronoun that in fact agreed in person with the putative head would be impossible, as in (7):

- (7) a. *I was the type that he didn't care.
- b. *I'm the type of person he likes to be positive.
- c. *I'm the kind of person she doesn't like anything gooey on her hands.
- d. *I just happen to be somebody who they know he's been looking around...

Similarly, when there is a difference between the number of the matrix subject and the putative head, the pronoun agrees in number with the matrix subject, as in (8):

- (8) a. So, he was one of those that I would say he was certainly in command of the family. (AK: N. Biddle)
- b. He was one of those comedians that he could make the whole audience laugh without even saying a word. (Barry Reisman, WIBF-FM)

We may now ask what sort of clauses these are, if not relative clauses. I propose that they are simply complete subordinate clauses and, as such, do not form a complex NP with the putative head. If this is correct, then it should be impossible to move the string formed by the putative head and the subordinate clause as a single constituent; this in fact is the case:

- (9) a. *The type that he doesn't bother with the neighbors is what he is.
 b. *The type that he doesn't bother with the neighbors is hard for him to be.
 c. *I expect the type that he doesn't bother with the neighbors to be unfriendly.
 d. *He is — and he always will be — the type that he doesn't bother with the neighbors.

Note that there is nothing semantically or pragmatically anomalous about such sentences: if there is a gap instead of the pronoun, i.e., if in fact we are dealing with a relative clause, where the head and the subordinate clause do form a constituent, then the sentences are of course grammatical with that constituent moved, as shown in (10):

- (10) a. The type that [e] doesn't bother with the neighbors is what he is.
 b. The type that [e] doesn't bother with the neighbors is hard for him to be.
 c. I expect the type that [e] doesn't bother with the neighbors to be unfriendly.
 d. He is — and he always will be — the type that [e] doesn't bother with the neighbors.

Similarly, if the (putative) head plus subordinate clause is the subject of a simple sentence, the variant with a pronoun is impossible:

- (11) The type that [e]/*he doesn't bother with the neighbors has the right idea.

These facts would defy explanation if the variant with the pronoun were analyzed as containing a resumptive pronoun relative clause, but they would be entirely predictable if the subordinate clause were simply a complete subordinate clause not forming a higher complex NP.

4. A Problem with the Analysis

A serious problem arises, however, under the analysis just proposed. If subordinate clauses like those in (1) are full subordinate clauses, then we can explain the apparent disagreement facts presented in the previous section. However, consider (12):

- (12) a. I have a friend who she does all the platters. (AK: Ellen Prince)
b. That's a suggestion of yours which I followed, which I didn't even want to do that. (AK: Gregory Ward)
c. They were just towed across the Midway onto the bridle path, where they were just sitting there peacefully. (AK: Laurence Horn)
d. I had a handout and notes from her talk that that was lost too. (AK: Gillian Sankoff)
e. I had made this joke which she didn't get it at first, that you had done his... (AK: Bill Labov)
f. There was a wall that we took it down. (AK: Henrietta Cedergren)
g. I thought I'd bring up a fact that Robert Louis Stevenson noted it a while ago. (AK: Bonnie Webber)
h. There really may be a lot of interaction which the kid doesn't hear any of it. (AK: Lila Gleitman)

As argued in Prince (1990), the grammar of spoken English does in fact have resumptive pronoun relative clauses, as exemplified by the naturally-occurring examples from the speech of allegedly standard speakers in (12). The problem facing us now is the following: what prevents sentences like (1) from being structurally ambiguous, from having one parse where the subordinate clause is a complete subordinate clause not forming any higher NP, but also another parse in which the subordinate clause is a resumptive pronoun relative clause, akin to those in (12)? If sentences like (1) are ambiguous in this way, then all the starred examples above should be grammatical, on the reading where the subordinate clause is a resumptive pronoun relative clause. They are, however, impossible, and we must still account for their impossibility.¹

5. Relevant Discourse Factors

The story I should like to suggest is the following. First, the starred sentences above, where the resumptive pronoun agrees with the actual head, are in fact grammatical, since there is nothing in the grammar that can prevent them from being generated, so long as the grammar can generate resumptive pronoun relative clauses like those in (12). Their impossibility stems not from any syntactic deviance but from their pragmatic deviance. That is, resumptive pronoun relative clauses have particular functions that cannot be served in the context of *kind*-sentences, and the use of this syntactic form in the wrong context is what is responsible for their gross infelicity. We shall now turn briefly to the functions of resumptive pronoun relative clauses in English.

5.1 *'Island-amnestying' resumptive pronoun relative clauses*

In Prince (1990), I argued that resumptive pronoun relative clauses in English were of two varieties, only one of which is relevant here. The one that is not relevant occurs when the resumptive pronoun is in an 'island', that is, where an extraction would violate Subjacency. Following Kroch (1981), we may think of this type of resumptive pronoun relative clause as 'amnestying island constraints'. Examples are presented in (13):

- (13) a. That's why you have to collect a whole bunch of little shit that you don't know what you're going to use it for. (AK: Erving Goffman)
- b. Living in a house that I like and it's where I want it to be is a lot different than living in a rented house that I don't like. (AK: Don Hindle)
- c. He seems to agree with the claim Chomsky made and which I think Labov was the one who disputed it. (AK: Ann Houston)

In (13a), the extraction site is within an indirect question; in (13b), it is within a conjunct of a coordinate structure (and of a different grammatical role from the coreferential NP in the other conjunct); in (13c), it is within a relative clause. Extraction from any of these syntactic environments is impossible; hence, a resumptive pronoun is used as a means of salvaging the situation. Following Langendoen (1970), Kroch (1981), and Sells (1987), such 'island-amnestying' resumptive pronoun relative clauses are ungrammatical, though

said; following Kayne (1981) and Newmeyer (1990), they are grammatical. In any event, they have a well-defined syntactic form and processing function, and it is clear that they are distinct from the *kind*-sentences considered above, where Subjacency was not at issue.

5.2 'Predicational' resumptive pronoun relative clauses

We may now turn to the type of resumptive pronoun relative clause that is relevant here, the 'predicational' type exemplified in (12) above. As I have argued elsewhere, such clauses may occur just in case the entity evoked by the whole complex NP is in fact evoked by the head alone, the relative clause serving simply to predicate some property of that entity. In Heim's (1983) 'filecard' terms, the hearer is instructed to construct or select the appropriate filecard simply on the basis of the head; once that card is constructed or selected, the information in the relative clause is added to it. Therefore, it turns out that nonrestrictive relative clauses may always occur with resumptive pronouns, since the head is always solely responsible for ensuring that the appropriate filecard will be constructed or selected. With restrictive relatives, however, the situation is more complex: in general, if the head is indefinite, then the relative clause is not required for the construction of the filecard and a resumptive pronoun may occur. On the other hand, if the head is definite, it is usually the case that the hearer must wait for the relative clause before selecting the appropriate filecard and thus a resumptive pronoun may not occur.

Let us illustrate these differences with some concrete examples. Consider first (14):

- (14) a. I have a friend who [e] does all the platters.
- b. I have a friend who she does all the platters.

In (14a), we have a restrictive relative on an indefinite head. The hearer can and presumably does construct a filecard for the friend in question before hearing the relative clause. Once the relative clause is processed, the information that this friend does all the platters is simply added to that card. Thus, the variant with a resumptive pronoun in (14b) (=12a) is possible. Now consider (15):

- (15) a. You should invite the friend who [e] does all the platters.
- b. #You should invite the friend who she does all the platters.

In (15a), we have a restrictive relative on a definite head. The hearer infers from the definiteness that the speaker believes that *s/he* already has a filecard for this friend, and, therefore, the hearer must select that filecard rather than construct a new one. Which filecard is to be selected, however, cannot be known until the hearer has processed the relative clause. It is for this reason, I am claiming, that the variant with a resumptive pronoun in (15b) does not occur.

Let us now return to the *kind*-sentences and reconsider (1) and (2), repeated here for convenience as (16b) and (16a), respectively:

- (16) a. He's the kind of guy that [e] gets into a lot of fights.
 b. He's the kind of guy that he gets into a lot of fights.

If we examine the complex NP in (16a) in light of what we have just said about the discourse functions of resumptive pronoun relative clauses, we see that the hearer has a very different task here from the task in (15a). In particular, it appears that neither the head alone, *the kind of guy*, nor the whole complex NP leads the hearer to construct or select a filecard. Rather, what (16a) as a whole says is that some 'he' has a property, which is that he gets into a lot of fights. A paraphrase of (16a) which lacks a relative clause entirely is presented in (17):

- (17) He's such that he gets into a lot of fights.²

In filecard terms, the only relevant filecard for (16a), as well as for (17), is the one for the entity evoked by the subject *he*, and, in fact, if we reconsider the apparent disagreement facts presented above, it is with this subject that the putative resumptive pronoun agrees, not with the putative head.

5.3 Summary

Thus we have an explanation for why the sentences which I starred in (5), (7), and (9) above are infelicitous: the extraction site is not in an island and therefore they are not appropriate loci for the processing-functional (i.e., island-amnestying) type of resumptive pronoun relative clause, and they do not predicate a property of an entity evoked by the head alone and are therefore not appropriate loci for the discourse-functional (i.e., predicational) type of resumptive pronoun relative clause.

Interestingly, however, we can see that predicational resumptive pronoun relative clauses and *kind*-sentences do in fact have something in common in terms of their discourse function: both predicate a property of an independently evoked entity. The difference is in the syntactic relation between the NP that evokes that entity and the clause that conveys the property: for *kind*-sentences, the entity is evoked by some syntactically unrelated NP in the matrix clause, whereas, in the predicational resumptive pronoun relative clauses, the entity is evoked by the head of the complex NP which contains the relative clause.

6. Crosslinguistic Comparisons

I should now like to look briefly at the correlates of both resumptive pronoun relative clauses and *kind*-sentences in another Germanic language, Yiddish, and in two Semitic languages, Hebrew and Arabic.

6.1. *Yiddish*

In Prince (1990), evidence was presented that the only relevant difference between English and Yiddish with respect to resumptive pronoun relative clauses is their social status: in Yiddish they are accepted as grammatical in the standard language, whereas in Modern English they are highly stigmatized.³ In terms of discourse function and therefore discourse context, they are identical. Some Yiddish examples are presented in (18):

- (18) a. In der zelibiker shtetl iz geven a yid, vos er iz geven a groysen lamdn un a gvir... (RP: 178)
“In the same village was a guy that he was a big scholar and a rich man.”
- b. Nor eyner iz do, a yid Feterzon, vos er iz a groysen apikoyres... (RP: 123)
“But there is one, a guy Feterzon, that he is a big heretic.”
- c. Er heybt im on redn a shidekh mit a yidene, vos zi hot geheysn Yente... (RP: 29)
“He began to propose to him a match with a hag that she was called Yente.”

As for the Yiddish correlate of *kind*-sentences, they typically involve an indefinite putative head meaning “a guy” or “a person”, as shown in (19):

- (19) a. Nor ikh bin a yid, vos ikh/*er hob/*hot lib a sakh tsuker... (RP: 186)
 “But I’m a guy that I/*he like/*likes a lot of sugar.”
 b. Ikh bin a yid, vos ikh/*er es/*est veynik... (RP: 241)
 “I’m a guy that I/*he eat/*eats little.”
 c. Ikh bin a yid, vos ikh/*er hob/*hot keyn gelt nit... (RP: 241)
 “I’m a guy that I/*he have/*has no money.”

Thus we see that Yiddish is like English, with respect to *kind*-sentences as well as with respect to predicational resumptive pronoun relative clauses.

6.2 *Semitic*

Let us now look briefly at the situation in Hebrew and Arabic. As is well known, Semitic languages have resumptive pronoun relative clauses obligatorily when the pronoun is the object of a preposition, never when it would be the subject of the relative clause, and optionally when it is a direct object. The function of these resumptive pronouns, when in fact there is an option, is not clear. With respect to Hebrew, Erteschik-Shir (1989) argues for a notion of ‘restrictive set’, while Ariel (1990) argues in terms of ‘accessibility’. In any event, Hebrew resumptive pronoun relative clauses have very different discourse functions from English and Yiddish, as can be seen in (20), from Erteschik-Shir (1989):

- (20) Hebrew:
 a. [In the context where H knows that S bought a dress.]
 Hine ha-simla she-kaniti [e].
 “here-is the-dress that-I-bought [e].”
 b. [In the context where H knows S had three dresses in mind originally.]
 hine ha-simla she-kaniti ota.
 “here-is the-dress that-I-bought it.”

With respect to Arabic, the judgments are even fuzzier. Both the gap-containing relative clause and the resumptive pronoun relative clause are possible in each of the two contexts, but one Egyptian Arabic informant

thought she had a possible preference for the correlate of the distribution seen in Hebrew in (20). The Arabic data are presented in (21):

- (21) Egyptian Arabic:
- a. [In the context where H knows that S bought a dress.]
Da el fostan elle eshtaret [e].
“here-is the dress that I-bought [e].”
 - b. [In the context where H knows S had three dresses in mind originally.]
Da el fostan elle eshtaretu.
“here-is the dress that I-bought-it.”

Thus, as in the case of Hebrew, it is not clear what the discourse functions are of Arabic resumptive pronoun relative clauses, but it is clear that they are significantly different from those of English and Yiddish resumptive pronoun relative clauses.

Interestingly, if we consider the correlates of *kind*-sentences in Hebrew and Arabic, we see that they, too, are totally different from those of English and Yiddish: in Semitic, the pronoun necessarily agrees with the head, suggesting that they are in fact true resumptive pronoun relative clauses. This is shown in (22) and (23):

- (22) Hebrew:
- a. Anashim medaber alav/alay.
“People talk about-him/about-me.”
 - b. Ani adam she anashim medaber alav/*alay.
“I [am] [a] person that people talk about-him/*about-me.”
- (23) Egyptian Arabic:
- a. El nas beyetkallemu ?a-le/?alayya.
“The people they-talk about-him/about-me.”
 - b. Ana ragel el nas beyetkallemu ?a-le/*?alayya
“I [am] [a] person the people they-talk about-him/*about-me.”

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, I have tried to show that English contains a construction, called here *kind*-sentences, which consists of a full subordinate clause introduced by a *that*-complementizer, *wh*-complementizer, or zero, and which serves to

predicate some attribute of some entity evoked by the subject of the matrix clause. In certain cases, such sentences are ambiguous, having both this structure and also a parse in which the subordinate clause is a resumptive pronoun relative clause. However, they are uniformly unacceptable with the latter parse. This unacceptability, I have tried to show, is due entirely to pragmatic deviance, since the functions of resumptive pronoun relative clauses cannot be served in the contexts in which *kind*-sentences occur. Interestingly, the situation is identical in Yiddish, correlating with the fact that Yiddish resumptive pronoun relative clauses have identical functions to those of English.

On the other hand, in Hebrew and Arabic, and perhaps in Semitic in general, we find resumptive pronoun relative clauses with some unknown but different discourse function, and we find no special type of *kind*-clauses, the correlates of the English and Yiddish ones being ordinary relative clauses, which of course may have a resumptive pronoun following independent rules of Semitic grammar. These crosslinguistic contrasts support the view not only that syntactic form cannot be predicted from discourse function but also that discourse function cannot be predicted from syntactic form: that there is a correlation between them appears to be a universal feature of language, but what that correlation is, for an arbitrary form and an arbitrary function, is a language-specific fact.

Notes

* I should like to thank Tony Kroch for his generosity in letting me use his corpus. I also thank Nekhama Sataty for her help with the Hebrew data, and Rita Prince and Gerry Prince for their help with the Arabic data.

1 A second structural ambiguity which follows from the analysis proposed is that sentences like those in 12 would also have a parse in which the relative clause is an independent subordinate clause not being part of a higher complex NP. This, however, seems quite plausible, especially in view of examples like (i), in which the subordinate clauses were uttered and transcribed as separate sentences:

- (i) a. Today is Movie Day. No other station has one. Which you ought to think about that. (AK: David Dye, WIOQ-FM, 4/24/80).
- b. Going to church is like the icing on the cake. It's like a ceremony. That you shouldn't really need it but it's there to... (AK: Polly Biddle)

Of course, there is the possibility that all apparent resumptive pronoun relative clauses like those in 12 are, in fact, independent subordinate clauses not part of a higher complex NP. There are arguments against this, but space limitations do not permit us to explore them.

- 2 While the syntax of such-that clauses is not at all obvious, it appears that they come in different varieties. One common type, especially in academic prose, seems to be an adverbial clause, as in (i), while another type, the type at issue here and exemplified in 17 and in (ii), is adjectival:
- (i) Scheduling: ordering the execution of tasks such that their timing constraints are met and the consistency of resources is maintained... (From announcement for colloquium by K. Ramamrithan, University of Pennsylvania, 10/16/90)
 - (ii) ...some young men are quite proficient in toe shoes before they come to us to audition. Most of them have already taken pointe classes and their muscles are such that either their feet can take it or they can't. (GW: San Diego Union, 1/27/86, p. C-5)
- Note that the timing/accent is different in the two types, adverbial *such that* being uttered as a single word whereas adjectival *such that* is clearly two phonological words, with an accent on *such* and a slight pause before *that*.
- 3 In earlier stages of English, resumptive pronoun relative clauses were not stigmatized as they are today. Consider (i):
- (i) Or those eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them. (AK: Luke 13.4)

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Viewpoint, Sequencing, and Pronoun Usage in Javanese Short Stories*

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1. Introduction

In Javanese, human beings can be referred to in four different ways, with a noun, an independent pronoun, a bound pronoun, or zero. As in all languages, a noun is in many cases necessary, because any of the other means of reference would result in ambiguity. However, when the referent is obvious from the context, any of the four means of reference is in theory possible. Since all of these convey the same basic information, there might seem to be more choices here than are really necessary; in particular, it is not clear what purpose is served by the distinction between the bound and free pronouns.

In the present paper, I will discuss the usage of these different forms in cases where any would be adequate to convey who the referent is, focusing particularly on the two 3rd person pronouns, *di-* (bound) and *dheweke* (free); both of these are unmarked for gender.¹ I will argue that the use of these pronouns allows language users to code the role of the referent and the clause in the discourse. The use of the free pronoun *dheweke* indicates that the language user is viewing the referent of the pronoun subjectively; the emotions and thoughts of the referent are in some sense public knowledge in that they are known to the reader/listener. The bound pronoun *di-*, on the other hand, is associated with clauses which are temporally sequenced, reporting the next thing which happens in a story line. (Hopper 1979 makes a similar observation about the function of the cognate form in Malay.) This characterization of the factors affecting the choice of how to refer to a person accounts

for much of the variation in the choice between these forms; it does not, to be sure, account for all uses, but it does account for the great majority.

The fundamental criteria distinguishing these usages basically follow the work of Labov (1972), who categorizes different clause types according to the function they serve in a narrative. According to Labov (1972:360-361), in narrative:

...the clauses are characteristically ordered in temporal sequence; if narrative clauses are reversed, the inferred temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation is altered: *I punched this boy/and he punched me* instead of *This boy punched me/and I punched him...* The skeleton of a narrative then consists of a series of temporally ordered clauses which we may call NARRATIVE CLAUSES.

I will show that the use of *di-* is associated with narrative clauses.

Labov (1972) also discusses the use of EVALUATION in narrative, which is related to what I am referring to as 'subjective viewpoint'. A strictly objective narrative has no evaluation; the narrator simply tells what happened, reporting events which any observer would report in essentially the same way. Usually, however, narratives include not only an objective report of what happened but also a subjective evaluation of it; this evaluation gives the narrative human interest and makes it worth telling. In an evaluative clause, the narrator can 'go inside the mind' of one of the characters in the narrative (including him/herself) and report their reaction to the events. For example consider (1):

- (1) ...and this girl says 'Where's the candy?', I said 'I don't have it', she says, powww! So I says to myself, 'There's gonna be times my mother won't give me money, because (we're) a poor family, And I can't take this all, you know, every time she don't give me any money.' So I say, 'Well, I just gotta fight this girl. She gonna hafta whup me. I hope she don't whup me.' And I hit the girl: powwwww! (Labov 1972:359)

The narrator interrupts the narrative clauses (*this girl says...I said...she says*) to give an evaluation, commenting on what he was thinking at the time. A speaker can also evaluate by reporting (or guessing at) the thoughts of another participant, as in the last sentence of (2):

- (2) So, you know, the dude, he looks at me, an' he—I 'on' know, he jus' thought he gon' rough that motherfucker up. (Labov 1972:357)

I argue that the use of *dheweke* is restricted to evaluative contexts, and specifically to those people who are being viewed subjectively, with the reader being given access to their thought processes and feelings. In section 2, I describe the data to be used and briefly discuss a number of preliminary

considerations. Section 3 will show the use of *di-* in temporally sequenced clauses, while section 4 will discuss the use of *dheweke*.

2. Data and Other Preliminary Considerations

The data for the study of *di-* were taken from two short stories, Susilomurti (1979) and Widayat (1979). The data for the study of *dheweke* were taken from these stories and also from Brata (1979) and Peni (1979).

It should be noted that Labov's categorization system was originally designed for narratives of personal experience; here, on the other hand, I am applying it to a different genre, short stories. Narratives of personal experience are spoken, while short stories are written, and thus we expect to find a number of stylistic and structural differences between them. For one thing, personal narratives are embedded in conversations and therefore typically have sections effecting a transition from and back to conversational mode (which Labov refers to as 'abstract' and 'coda'), while short stories do not have such transitions. However, the difference in medium is mitigated by the fact that these genres clearly share a number of features: both are organized around a more or less sequentially related series of events, interspersed with various subjective and objective comments describing the physical setting, reporting or speculating on the thoughts of the people involved, etc. Tannen (1982:1) in fact argues that:

Comparative analysis of spoken and written versions of a narrative demonstrates (1) that features which have been identified as characterizing oral discourse are also found in written discourse, and (2) that the written short story combines syntactic complexity expected in writing with features which create involvement expected in speaking.

Thus the differences between spoken and written language are not as discrete as they might seem to be, especially in functionally related genres such as personal narratives and short stories, and I encountered very few problems applying Labov's categorization system to the stories I analyzed.

The terms 'subject' and 'object' are not really appropriate to the description of Javanese (or Western Austronesian languages in general). I will therefore use the term AGENT to refer to the Javanese argument translating into English as a transitive subject or the agent of a passive, while PATIENT will refer to the Javanese argument translating as the transitive object or the subject in a passive construction.²

3. *Di-* and Narrative Clauses

There is a strong tendency to limit the use of *di-* to temporally sequenced clauses: In unsequenced clauses *di-* is only used 6/72 times, or 8% of the time, while in sequenced clauses, *di-* is used 20/40 times, or 50% of the time ($p < .001$).³ However, half of the sequenced clauses do not use *di-*. There are a number of reasons for this. The discourse status of the patient also affects the use of *di-*: Even in sequenced clauses, *di-* is not normally used when the patient is low in topicality, particularly if it is indefinite (see Myhill 1993 for discussion). Another motivation for not using *di-* in all sequenced clauses is that it may be analyzed as serving to mark actions which are not only sequenced but also particularly significant events in the story line. Schiffrin (1981) found that the Historic Present in English is almost entirely restricted to temporally sequenced clauses, but it was only used in 30% of the temporally sequenced clauses in her data base, being most common for the most important events in the narrative. More detailed research is necessary to determine whether this can account for the distribution of *di-* in sequenced clauses. It is clear, however, that it is generally associated with sequenced clauses.

The pattern of restricting the use of *di-* to sequenced clauses is illustrated in (3); I follow standard Javanese orthography in writing *di-* as a prefix without a hyphen; in the interest of saving space I omit the gloss:

- (3) ... saka njero ngomah mencungul sawijining wanita kang nyengangik menganggo potongan lawas, gita-gita olehe mapagake tekane Mardikani. Mardikani kaget. Ajaa enggal keprungu panjelihe yu Uki, dheweke ora ngerti yen iku mbakyune dhewe. Saiki dheweke lagi ngerti ananing owah-owahaning kulawargane. Tangan mbakyune digegem kenceng banget. Rasane kaya ana kang longsor ing dhadhane. Mbakyune samono uga ora bisa mbendung emosine, adhine nuli ditubruk lan padha rerangkalan tangisan. Mardikani ora ngerti kena apa enggal wae tangis metu dadakan ndeleng kahanan yu Uki kang babarpisan ora bisa digambarake sadurunge.

'O Allah, An, Ani!' pamingseke Uki karo ngarasi adhine bola-bali. Mardikani isih mlenggong wae karo ngumbar gagasane. (Susilomurti 1979:197)

'... from inside the house came a woman looking (at her) wearing old-style clothes, hurriedly (0) greeting Mardikani.

Mardikani was surprised. If she hadn't heard (and recognized) the shout of her older sister Uki, she wouldn't have realized it was her own older sister. Then she become aware of the changes in her family. She (*di-*) clenched the hand of her older sister very tightly. It felt like something was moving inside

her chest. Her older sister also couldn't control her emotions, she (*di-*) leaped on her younger sister and hugged her, crying. Mardikani didn't know why her tears came out so quickly on seeing (0) the situation of her older sister Uki, which she couldn't have imagined beforehand.
 "Oh, God, An, Ani," sobbed Uki, (0) kissing her younger sister repeatedly. Mardikani just stared dumbly, (0) letting her thoughts run wild.'

I have marked the places where either *di-* or zero are possible, and which of these are used, in the translation.⁴ There are six roots in (3) which can take either *di-* or a zero subject. Of these, two are temporally sequenced and both take *di-* (*digegem* and *ditubruk*). There are four roots in this passage which could take *di-* and instead take a zero subject; these are *mapagake* "greet", *ndeleng* "see", *ngarasi* "kiss", and *ngumbar* "let loose", and all of these are unsequenced.

In English, there is a distinction between finite and non-finite verb forms, with only non-finite verb forms being able to take zero subjects. I have taken advantage of this by using non-finite verb forms in English to translate the Javanese verb forms with zero subjects. This type of usage in English creates the same feeling of simultaneity which is conveyed here in Javanese by the use of zero subjects.⁵ In Javanese, there is no distinction between finite and non-finite verbs, and all of the verbs with zero agents (unlike the English forms I have used to translate them) can be used as verbs in independent clauses. The reason they have zero subjects, then, is not because they are non-finite (as in the English translations), but because they are not sequenced.

4. *Dheweke* and Subjectivity

For present purposes I will characterize 'subjectivity' in a narrative or story as having and making use of access to the thought processes and feelings of a character in the story; 'objectivity', on the other hand, is not having or making use of such thought processes or feelings. I am using the term 'subjectivity' here in a technical sense which does not exactly correspond to the common (looser) usage of this term. My definition of 'subjectivity' has the advantage that it can be applied to naturally-occurring data in a systematic fashion, so that it is possible to go through a text and say with the great majority of sentences whether they are 'subjective' or 'objective'; I have found that this type of categorization is not possible using a more intuitive (traditional) understanding of the term 'subjective'.

There is a general tendency for 1st person narratives to be subjective with respect to the referent of *I* and for 3rd person stories to be generally objective, but neither of these is necessarily the case. First person narrators can claim knowledge of the thought processes and feelings of other people, for example by saying *He was mad* because there was externally visible and audible evidence that he was mad, even if the speaker did not have direct access to the other person's thought processes. Even when a 1st person narrator refrains from directly representing the thought processes of someone else, there are cases where a sense of empathy with another person combined with an accumulation of observations about that person's externally observable behavior can result in some subjective understanding of that person.

It is even easier in a 3rd person story to represent characters subjectively. There are several ways in which a narrator can do this. The narrator can simply claim omniscience, referring to the thought processes of any character whenever it is convenient. Alternatively, the narrator can essentially tell the story from the point of view of one character, freely referring to the thoughts of that character but no one else (in its most extreme form this is functionally equivalent to a 1st person narrative). Or, the narrator can remain basically objective but refer to the thoughts of a particular character when it is convenient. It is of course normal for a narrator to use some combination of these strategies.

First person narratives and stories do not have to be entirely subjective. The narrator can simply tell what s/he saw and heard, with no reference to his/her thoughts and feelings. This is most common when the events reported were done by other people, but it is even possible to report objectively things done by the narrator. Perhaps the best-known example of objective 1st person narration is the section of Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* narrated by Benji, an imbecile incapable of speech. However, any 1st person narration will contain some objective statements.

We can characterize the use of *dheweke* by saying that it is used in sections of a story which are subjective with respect to the referent of *dheweke*. I will show this by discussing in detail the use of *dheweke* in four short stories.⁶ In order to see how this works it will be necessary to describe in some depth the plots of the stories to be analyzed. Each of the subsections in this section will be devoted to discussion of a particular story.

Before beginning it will be helpful to point out some differences in Western and Javanese views regarding the expression of emotions. The Javanese court culture, which has recently had considerable effect on popular

attitudes, views the display of emotions as unsophisticated, spiritually dangerous, and basically not a good thing to do. As a result, it is in general more difficult to tell what a Javanese person is thinking in a given situation (even for another Javanese) than it would be to tell what a Westerner is thinking in that situation. This does not mean that Javanese never express their emotions. They do, but expression of emotion is evaluated negatively and associated with people with low prestige, in socially inferior positions, and for this reason showing one's emotions in general lowers one's prestige. As a result, social situations which would from a Western point of view seem to call for an open display of emotions (e.g., a romantic encounter, a reunion with long-lost relatives) can sometimes have no discernible emotional effect upon a Javanese person. The reader should keep this in mind when reading the following discussion.

4.1 *Lintang panjer sore* — “Evening star” (Brata 1979)

The two main characters here are Reka, a male writer, and Nilakandhi, a female dancer. Reka has been invited by a reporter friend to sit in the reporter's box at a dance contest. There he sees and is entranced by Nilakandhi, who is one of the contestants. After the contest, he goes up to the group of people she is talking to, hoping to meet her. She accidentally hits him with a piece of the popsicle she's eating. They go off to get him cleaned up, and they talk. He tells her he's a reporter and wants to ask her some questions about her dancing, and he manages to get invited to her house. When he goes there, they talk for a while and eventually Reka makes his romantic interest known in an indirect but unmistakable way. Nilakandhi then indicates, also indirectly but unmistakably, that she too is romantically interested.

This story is in the 3rd person, and the perspective goes back and forth between Reka and an objective observer. There are 6 references to Reka with *dheweke*, of which (4) (Brata 1979:171) and (5) (p. 167) may be taken as typical:

- (4) Reka krasa tenan, mripat gebyar-gebyar kuwi saiki kerthil-kerthil nyawang dheweke...
'Reka really felt it, those shining eyes were now looking at him (*dheweke*), twinkling...'
- (5) Weruh grombolan kang sajak angker iki, Reka Perbawa saya samar atine. Dheweke njegreg ing cedhake cah ayu kang dierami.
'Seeing this group he was awed by, Reka Perbawa felt more nervous. He (*dheweke*) stopped close to the beautiful girl he was entranced with.'

In each case here the clause preceding the clause with *dheweke* contains a word explicitly indicating that at this point the story is viewing Reka subjectively: *krasa* “feel” in (4) and *samar* “worried” in (5). Two of the other occurrences of *dheweke* referring to Reka are of this type (the words in the preceding clauses being *gragapan* “flustered” and *usreg* “fidgety”) while the other two have such words in the same clause as *dheweke* (*srawung* “be acquainted with” and *wedi* “fear”). This can be contrasted with the reference to Reka in (6):

- (6) Kajaba para wartawan uga kanca-kanca jaged utawa famili-famili sing arep nraktir ing buffet akeh mrana parane. Kadi dene wartawan Reka wis nyabut ballpoint lan notes, nanging enggal didlesepake ing sake. (p. 167)
 ‘Aside from the reporters there were also many friends and family of the dancers who wanted to treat them going that way. Like a reporter, Reka had taken out his pen and notes, but he (*di-*) quickly put them back in his bag.’

Here the events are being viewed objectively, and Reka is referred to with *di-* rather than *dheweke*.

The story never takes Nilakandhi’s perspective. However, there is one point where she is referred to with *dheweke* (p. 167-8):

- (7) Embuh Nilakandhi lagi crita apa, sajak rame. Bareng tangan sing nyekel es lilin disabetake munggah, prongkalane es mrucut saka sada, wer, plok, nemplok ngenani raine pemudha sing ngadeg ing ngarepe. Ger, spontan kanca-kancane ngguyu. Nila dhewe ya ngguyu, nanging gage diampet, rumangsa salah. Raine mbrabak abang, bareng ngreti sing ketemplok es lilin dudu balane dhewe.
 ‘Oh! Oh! Anu lo, mas, nuwun sewu! Piye ta aku mau! Nyuwun duka, yektos. Ora kejarag, kok!’
 Gage wae dheweke ndudut kacune saka dhadhane...

‘Who knows what Nilakandhi was talking about, she (0) was loud. When she (*di-*) swung up the hand holding the popsicle, a lump of ice came loose from the stick and stuck in the face of the young man standing in front of her. Her friends burst into laughter. Nila herself also laughed, but then she stifled it, feeling she’d done something wrong. Her face turned red when she (0) realized that the one she’d hit with her popsicle wasn’t a friend of hers.

“Oh, oh, gosh, I’m sorry. How could I have done that? I’m sorry, really, I didn’t mean to!”

Quickly she (*dheweke*) pulled her handkerchief out of her pocket...’

At first here Reka is approaching Nilakandhi and we are looking at her from his point of view. *Embuh* clearly indicates that the perspective taken here is that of Reka. Nilakandhi is here seen objectively, and she is accordingly

represented with *di-* in *disabetake*. When Reka is hit, the perspective switches to that of an outside observer, essentially ignorant of the identities of the people involved, as Reka is described as ‘the young man in front of her’. The viewpoint remains that of an objective observer, and so when Nila stifles her laughter she is again represented with *di-*. But immediately after this, Nilakandhi begins to be viewed subjectively, as the narrator states that she feels like she made a mistake and she realizes that the person she hit wasn’t a friend of hers. Consequently, when she takes out the handkerchief, she is still being viewed subjectively, and even though this clause is temporally sequenced she is represented with *dheweke*.

In the rest of the story we are never given direct access to Nilakandhi’s thoughts. She is always described objectively. Consider for example the exchange where they establish their mutual romantic interest:

- (8) ‘Lintang Panjer Sore, enggone dhuwur ing langit...apa klakon sawijine dina dipethik wong? Apa ana sing bisa nggayuh?’ celathune pemudha iku kanthi tembung-tembung kebak maksud sandi.

Nilakandhi nanggapi. Nyawang manther marang pemudha kang lungguh sandhinge. Nyawangi njajagi. Sepisan kuwi Reka ora ngedhap atine. Kenceng karepe.

‘Yen pancen dikarepake, lintang kae ora dhuwur kaya katone. Bisa wae diranggeh,’ umak-umik ujare lambe abang.

‘Yen sing ngranggeh wong kaya aku, apa gadug, ya?’

‘Yen pancen dikarepake, kena apa ora bisa?’

‘Aku mung pengarang mlarat ki?’

Ing kene Nilakandhi tumungkul, ngekep buku isi potret. Sajak mikir.

“Evening Star, high in the sky, has it ever been taken by anyone? Can anyone reach it?” said the youth (Reka) with words full of hidden meaning. Nilakandhi responded. She (0) looked unwaveringly at the young man who was sitting next to her. She (0) was evaluating him. For the first time, Reka didn’t feel afraid. He was determined (lit. “his will was tight”).

“If someone really wants it, that star isn’t as high as it looks. It can be reached,” she said (lit. “her words”), moving her red lips.

“If the one reaching for it is someone like me, is it within reach?”

“If that person really wants it, why not?”

“A poor writer like me?”

Here Nilakandhi bowed her head, (0) clasping the picture book. She (0) seemed to be thinking.

In understanding this passage it is important to separate Western presuppositions about what would be expected in such a passage from what actually happens in the Javanese. As Nilakandhi is clearly expressing romantic interest

here, a Western reader might be waiting for some sort of an emotional explosion. However, this explosion never comes; the conversation continues for a few more exchanges with Nilakandhi continuing to be opaque, and then the story ends. In fact, she is viewed completely objectively in this passage; the reader is not given direct access to her thoughts, and she only makes them known in an indirect way. She looks at Reka *manther* “unwaveringly”. She is *njajagi* “weighing, evaluating” him. She is described as *sajak pikir* “as though thinking”.⁷ All of this shows that the narrator is describing her objectively, and she is not forcing a subjective description by behaving emotionally. There are a number of places in this passage where using *dheweke* to refer to her would be syntactically possible, before both occurrences of *nyawang* and then *nyawangi* in the second paragraph and before *ngekep* and *mikir* in the seventh; however, in all of these cases it is avoided, because this would imply looking at her subjectively.

4.2 *Sadulur angkat* - “The adopted sibling” (Widayat 1979)

A young man, Mulyana, visits a married couple, Gunawan (male) and Harwani (female) and has dinner with them. He then stays around to talk alone with Harwani’s sister, Haryani, with whom he is engaged to be married. They have a personal conversation in which Haryani asks Mulyana why he chose her to marry and he explains. Then Haryani confesses to him that she is actually not Harwani’s real sister but the child of a beggar. She then tells him the story of how she came into Harwani’s family. One night a long time ago, when Harwani was only seven, she and her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Santa, were at home, when they heard a baby crying outside. They went out and found an infant wrapped in rags and an unconscious woman. They brought them inside. Eventually the woman regained consciousness and the Santas fed and clothed her and the infant (her daughter). The woman then told them her story. She had grown up in a village and gotten married. After she got pregnant, her husband moved to Solo (the city where the Santas lived) to look for work. She didn’t hear from him for some time, her baby was born, and then, against the advice of her parents, she came to the city to look for him. After some searching, it turned out that he had been killed in a car accident. At that point, she had broken with her parents and so she couldn’t go back to her village, and because of her baby it was hard for her to get work. Eventually she ran out of food and money. The Santas decided to take her in as a servant and adopted

her baby, Haryani.

This story is told mostly from an objective viewpoint rather than taking the viewpoint of any particular character, and so there are relatively few tokens of *dheweke* (7 in 7 pages). *Dheweke* is used once near the beginning of the story, when Mulyana is with Gunawan and Harwani, when Mulyana's thoughts are being explained (Widayat 1979:125):

- (9) Kabeh mau tumrape Mulyana tiwas kebeneran. Dheweke pancen ngrasa oweling sore iki arep ninggalake Haryani.
'All of that was really pointless for Mulyana. He (*dheweke*) felt very reluctant that evening to leave Haryani...'

Four of the uses of *dheweke* occur during the intimate conversation between Haryani and Mulyana, which is the most subjectively reported section of the story, with the reader being given access to both of their thoughts and feelings. Each of them are referred to with *dheweke*, for example in (10) (p. 126):

- (10) Dheweke duwe rasa tresna marang Haryani...
'He (*dheweke* =Mulyana) loved Haryani...'

The remaining two uses of *dheweke* in the story are during Haryani's story about how she was adopted. In general, this story is told objectively. It is obviously not from Haryani's own recollection because she was an infant at the time. Both usages of *dheweke* refer to her mother. The first is (11) (p. 128):

- (11) Dheweke banjur nangis.
'Then she (*dheweke*) burst into tears.'

This occurs right after the mother is reported as being deeply moved by seeing her baby for the first time after she regains consciousness (she is described as *karanta-ranta* "grieved"). The second use of *dheweke* referring to the mother occurs during a pause while she is telling her sad story. In both of these cases we are being given access to her thoughts, so that the story departs from its usual objective mode.

It is interesting that Mr. and Mrs. Santa are never referred to with *dheweke*, although both of them are referred to about as frequently as the mother, and there are several places where referencing them with *dheweke* would be appropriate in the sense that they have been referred to recently. The reason is that they are also referred to objectively. They are portrayed as kind people, but also as being in control of the situation, and in the Javanese view this means not giving reign to their emotions or even letting them show. They

address Haryani's mother in the informal language and are addressed in the formal language, which further shows that they are in control of the situation. An example of how reference to Mrs. Santa with *dheweke* is avoided appears in (12) (p. 129):

- (12) Bu Santa banjur mlebu kamar dhahar perlu njupukake pangan. Ora suwe maneh wis bali. Biyung mau banjur dilawani bu Santa supaya lungguh. Nuli kanthi asih bu Santa ngandika...
 'Mrs. Santa then went into the dining room to get some food. Not long after she (0) came back. She (lit. "Mrs. Santa") got the mother to sit up. Then she (lit. "Mrs. Santa") compassionately said...'

Here again (from an English perspective) the writer goes to considerable length to avoid a pronominal reference to Mrs. Santa, using a zero once and a full NP twice where English would use pronouns.

4.3 *Ulihe ing wayah sore* - "Going home in the late afternoon" (Susilomurti 1979)

A young woman, Mardikani, rushes to catch a train and barely gets on in time. She sits next to a woman who tries to talk to her, but she ignores the woman and spends the trip thinking. She has just been telegraphed to come home from Jakarta because her mother is dying. She reminisces about her family life. Her father constantly had affairs, and her mother quietly put up with it. Her father forced her older sister Uki to get married to someone that he chose rather than to her own boyfriend. To avoid being forced to get married, Mardikani went off to Jakarta, supposedly to continue her studies. After she left, her father took a second wife (allowed for a Muslim) and almost never saw his first family anymore. Mardikani arrives at her home where she meets her mother, her older brother Harta, and Uki. Her mother says almost nothing. Mardikani soon begins arguing with Harta; he is disgusted with her for abandoning her family and adopting a modern lifestyle, while she is the Javanese version of an angry young woman. Uki attempts to mediate between them. Harta finally storms out of the house as neighbors start to come over to pay their respects.

The first part of this story is unlike either of the stories discussed thus far in that, although it is 3rd person, it is told almost entirely from the point of view of one character, Mardikani. Unlike the other stories, where subjective sections showing the feelings of one of the characters interrupt longer objective sections, here there is consistent reference to one character's thought processes for an extended period of time. This is most clearly the case during

the fairly lengthy section (almost two pages) where she is reminiscing, but it is also true in other sections. Not surprisingly, there are frequent references to *Mardikani* with *dheweke* in this section, 48 in less than four pages, and no other character is referred to with *dheweke*. The section where the woman on the train is trying to talk to *Mardikani* is particularly interesting (Susilomurti 1979:193-4):

- (13) Sakwise lungguh kepenak lan rada aso, dheweke lagi ngerti yen dadi obyeking panyawange penumpang-penumpang sacedhake. Enggal-enggal dheweke ndandani rambute kang madhul-madhul lan ngulapi kringete kang isih tansah dleweran wae iku.

'Wah, meh kepancal nggih, ning', panyaruwene jejerane lungguh sawijining wanita tuwa kang sajake bakul jarit saka nJawa.

Dheweke mung manthuk karo mesem, nimbangi eseme jejerane lungguh.

'Badhe tindhak pundi, ning?' pitakone jejerane maneh.

'Jokja. Panjenengan?' wangsulane ngiras mbalekake pitakonan.

'Sami, ning. Kula Ngadiwinatan.'

Dheweke njur mbenakake lungguhe, karepe ora gelem diganggu maneh.

'Taksih sekolah menapa sampun ngasta?'

'Oh...sekolah', wangsulane cekak njur nyawang menjaba.

Nanging sedhela maneh dheweke kaget jalaran jenenge diundang cetha banget.

'Mardikani!' tembung si bakul jarit karo nyawang tulisan kang tumemplek ana kopere.

Dheweke klincutan, jalaran jejerane ora ngundang dheweke ning maca tulisan jenenge kang tumemplek ana kopere.

'After she (0) was comfortably seated and rested, she (*dheweke*) realized that the other passengers nearby were looking at her. Quickly, she (*dheweke*) fixed her hair, which was messed up, and wiped away the sweat which was dripping (down her face).

"Wow, you almost got left behind, miss", said the person sitting next to her, an old woman who seemed to be a Javanese batik seller.

She (*dheweke*) (the young woman) just nodded and smiled back.

"Where are you going, miss?" her neighbor asked.

"Jokja. And you?" she answered (lit. "her answer"), returning the question.

"The same, miss. I'm going to Ngadiwinatan."

She (*dheweke*) (the young woman) readjusted her sitting position, not wanting to be bothered any more.

"Are you still going to school or have you started working?"

"Oh...I'm going to school" she answered (lit. "her answer") briefly, then looked outside.

But a moment later she (*dheweke*) was surprised because she heard her name called very clearly.

"Mardikani!" said the seamstress (=her neighbor)...

She (*dheweke*) (the young woman) was embarrassed, because her neighbor

wasn't calling her but reading the label on her suitcase with her name on it.'

In the non-dialogue section of this passage, *Mardikani* is only referred to with *dheweke*, never with her name. In some sense *dheweke* functions as her name; this is only possible in situations where the writer completely takes the perspective of a particular character, freely reporting that character's thoughts and feelings, while still telling the story in the 3rd person. The seamstress here is described objectively, as *Mardikani* perceives her; while it might be possible for subjective comments about the seamstress to be made from *Mardikani*'s point of view, she is clearly not interested in doing this. Particularly striking here are the three tokens of *dheweke* immediately following something said by the seamstress (*Dheweke mung manthuk*, *Dheweke njur mbenakake lungguhe*, and *Dheweke klincutan*). From the English point of view, the natural first reaction would be to assume that the pronoun here refers to the seamstress, because that is who we were just paying attention to. But this is not how *dheweke* works; it takes as its antecedent not the last person focused on, but the last person focused on SUBJECTIVELY, and this cannot be the seamstress, because she is only characterized objectively.

When *Mardikani* gets back to her house, she first interacts with her sister *Uki* for a while. Here things are still basically seen from her point of view and she is referred to with *dheweke* four more times. Then *Harta*, her older brother, appears and immediately begins making hostile (though opaque) statements. We can deduce that he is angry because *Mardikani* has abandoned her family and is embracing non-Javanese values (specifically schooling and wearing pants). However, in typical Javanese fashion, he does not express this directly. His first five contributions to his conversation with *Mardikani* can be translated as "Hmm, all of you are avoiding us. What do you want to do now?... Do you know why mom's gotten so sick? Huh, I shouldn't have to explain, you should know yourself... You shouldn't put too much faith in your schooling. You're old enough to know better, to be able to think for yourself... Huh, you're pretending not to understand. That's the result of three years in Jakarta!" (pp. 198-199). These are interspersed with replies from *Mardikani* basically indicating she doesn't understand what *Harta* is saying and comments from the storyteller which still take *Mardikani*'s point of view and, where syntactically appropriate, refer to her with *dheweke*, as in (14):

- (14) *Dheweke* durung dhamang marang apa kang dikarepake kangmase.
'She (*dheweke*) didn't understand what her brother meant. (p. 198)

Until the point where *Harta* says 'This is the result of three years in

Jakarta', only Mardikani is being viewed subjectively; we know what she is thinking. Harta is maintaining his self-control and not expressing his feelings directly (in fact, it is not clear even to Mardikani exactly what he is trying to say), and we are not given direct access to his thoughts. However, shortly after this, he loses control, and this is the only time he is referred to with *dheweke* (p. 199):

- 15) Harta ngadeg nyat. Mripate isih sumorot ladak marang adhine ragil. Ora suwe dheweke ngringkesi rokoke ana meja karo isih gumrenggeng. 'Jane wis ora patut kowe mulih barang. Wis ora ana perlune!'
 'Harta suddenly stood up. His eyes were still flashing at his youngest sister. Then he (*dheweke*) pressed his cigarette on the table, saying "Actually, you shouldn't even come home. There's no point."

4.4 *Keluwargane Bu Nyai Blorong* - "Mrs. Blorong's family" (Peni 1979)

This is a 1st person narrative. The storyteller is a young woman named Larasati who has come from Surabaya to Surakarta because she has received a telegram telling her that her aunt Sudarawerti has just died and she will be inheriting some money. Larasati's father was the older brother of Sudarawerti and he moved away to the Surabaya area while the rest of the family stayed in Surakarta. Both of Larasati's parents have died and she has never met any of her other relatives. At the beginning of the story she runs into her aunt's younger brother, Baskara, and his servant, Sukinah. After a short conversation, they go to a larger room where the rest of the family is waiting. There, Larasati meets a number of her relatives: Talikepuh (Sudarawerti's second husband), Murdanu (Sudarawerti's stepson from her first husband), Dewimurni (Murdanu's younger sister), and Truna (Sudarawerti's servant). These characters make small talk for several pages, during which we are told how they are related to each other and how Larasati reacts to them. Finally, Larasati speaks out in front of the assembled people to ask what is going on and why no one has mentioned anything about why she was asked to come there. There is some embarrassment, but shortly thereafter, a government official, Jayatenaya, arrives and reads Sudarawerti's will. Each person mentioned is given an envelope containing money; the last person on the list is not mentioned by name, but is only specified as the child of Sudarawerti's older brother. There is at this point some skepticism expressed that Larasati is indeed this person, since no one there has seen her before, but Dewimurni notes that when Larasati challenged the group to explain why she had been

called she acted just like Sudarawerti (Dewimurni's stepmother) used to. This is accepted and Larasati is given the envelope. Everyone returns to their rooms to open their envelopes. The story ends with Larasati and Dewimurni talking as they walk to their rooms (which adjoin each other) about their futures.

I will first make a few points which will be helpful in understanding the discussion of this story. Surakarta is one of the traditional centers of Javanese culture, and people from Surakarta may be said to epitomize the values of Javanese court culture which were discussed at the beginning of section 4. This is especially true of aristocrats such as Larasati's family, who in general place great value on controlling one's emotions and accepting (and asserting) one's position in the rigidly defined social hierarchy. People from Surabaya are in general somewhat less attached to this value system, give freer reign to their emotions, and consequently have less prestige. This difference makes Larasati feel uncomfortable. Additionally, she is poorer than her relatives, and this makes her feel more out of place at the family gathering.

There are six tokens of *dheweke* in the story. The first two occur on the first page, referring to the servant Sukinah, and are of a familiar type: Sukinah is characterized subjectively as *nepsu* "angry" and *ora dipreduli* "not paying attention" and then referred to twice with *dheweke*. Sukinah is a servant, of a lower social class than Larasati's relatives, and would therefore be expected to show her emotions more directly.

The remaining four tokens of *dheweke* all refer to Dewimurni, the stepdaughter of Larasati's late aunt. Two are in (16) (Peni 1979:95-6) and the other two in (17) (p. 100):

- (16) Swarane renyah nyengkleng, tatag, ora wedi wong anyar, ora wedi petenge omah, ora wedi ambu menyan, ora isin, ora mikir pincange sikile. Dheweke uga ora mreduli aku nyawang dheweke nganti ndomblong.

'Her (Dewimurni's) voice was clear, strident, confident, not afraid of new people, not afraid of the darkness of the house, not afraid of the smell of the incense, not embarrassed, not thinking about the lameness of her leg. She (*dheweke*) was also not paying attention to me looking at her (*dheweke*) in wonder.'

- (17) Aku noleh marang jeng Murni. Dheweke ngulu idu. Dheweke nyekeli layange karo ndhredheg, mripate nyawang aku kanthi kuwatir marang tindhakku.

'I turned to Murni. She (*dheweke*) gulped. She (*dheweke*) held her letter, shaking, her eyes looking fearfully at what I was doing.'

In (16), Dewimurni is described as controlling her emotions effectively.

In (17), she is described as “fearful”; however, this is AFTER she has been referred to with *dheweke* twice, and we have seen that characters are usually described as revealing their emotions BEFORE they are referred to with *dheweke*. Neither of these are as clearly subjective as the uses of *dheweke* we have looked at thus far. It is not, then, immediately clear why Dewimurni and no one else in the family is referred to with *dheweke*. There are a number of occasions where *dheweke* could be used to refer to someone else without risk of ambiguity, but this is avoided. One example of this is (18); in the preceding paragraph, Jayatenaya was talking about Sudarawerti’s will (p. 99):

- 18) Sawise ngandharake bangsane kaya ngono iku sawetara maneh, Den-bei Jayatenaya banjur mbukak actentase lan banjur njupuk amplop-amplop. Wong sagandhok memeng cep ngawasake Den-Bei.
 ‘After talking to the group like this for a while longer, Duke Jayatenaya then opened his briefcase and took out the envelopes. All the people in the wing of the house fell silent, watching the Duke.’

Here and in similar places referring to other characters besides Dewimurni, use of *dheweke* is avoided. She is not particularly central to the narrative in terms of frequency of mention.

In understanding why, during the meeting of the family, only Dewimurni is referred to with *dheweke*, it should be kept in mind that there is practically no display of emotions on the part of ANYONE at this meeting; this is, after all, a meeting of an aristocratic Surakartan family. Dewimurni, too, is constrained by these social norms. However, the writer wishes to convey the feeling of a special empathy between Larasati and Dewimurni at the meeting while still maintaining the emotionally controlled atmosphere, and he uses a number of devices to do this. Using *dheweke* only in reference to Dewimurni is one of these devices. (I am not, of course, implying that this is a conscious decision by the author.)

Larasati has a feeling of empathy towards Dewimurni as opposed to any of her other relatives. There are several reasons for this empathy. Perhaps the most important is the fact that they have a number of things in common. Both have physical defects: Larasati is physically unattractive (she notes this several times) and Dewimurni is lame. Both are young women (unlike any of the other relatives present), and so are lowest on the social hierarchy. Both are unmarried and neither has any suitors. Both have some questionable aspect of their relationship with Sudarawerti; Dewimurni is a stepdaughter rather than related by blood, while Larasati has grown up apart from the rest of the family,

with relatively little money, in the less prestigious region of Surabaya, and even her identity as Sudarawerti's niece is questioned. Adding to this feeling of empathy is the fact that Dewimurni speaks up for Larasati when her identity as Sudarawerti's niece is questioned. Also, after the meeting when they are alone together, they have a personal discussion about their futures. As a result of all of these factors, we can say that Dewimurni is clearly the person with whom Larasati feels the most empathy and the one who is characterized the most subjectively.

Larasati's other relatives, on the other hand, are characterized quite objectively and coldly. They are sophisticated aristocrats of Surakarta, who use the complicated respect language skillfully and in general are much more comfortable within the traditional hierarchical Javanese social system than are Larasati and Dewimurni (not surprisingly, since their position within this system is higher). They do not reveal their emotions and Larasati does not attempt to guess them.

It might be thought that Murdanu, who is a stepchild just as his sister Dewimurni is, might also be an object of empathy for Larasati, but this is not the case. He is depicted as quite content with his place in the family hierarchy and with the aristocratic social system in general, and in this respect he differs sharply from Larasati and Dewimurni. According to the etiquette of this system, the three of them are unequivocally lower in status than all members of their parents' generation, even Baskara, who is probably only about 10-15 years older than them. The members of the older generation are all entitled by the social system to treat the members of the younger generation in what seems to Westerners like a cruel and condescending fashion, for example referring to Murdanu with forms normally reserved for children and commenting obliquely on Dewimurni's lameness, Larasati's unattractiveness and unsophisticated speech, and the unmarried status and lack of suitors of both. The members of the younger generation are expected not only to grin and bear it, but also to use respect language in addressing the members of the older generation. Murdanu accepts this position and behaves in an entirely appropriate fashion within the system. Dewimurni, on the other hand, noticeably avoids using the elaborate formulas characteristic of the respect language and responds to condescending comments in an uncooperative fashion. Larasati does not even know the respect language and a number of times expresses disapproval (in her thoughts) of the teasing behavior of some members of the older generation. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that she

should empathize most with Dewimurni.

One of the major themes of the story, then, is the bond and empathy between Larasati and Dewimurni. Two factors in particular complicate the task of the writer in conveying the feeling of this connection, that is, the highly unemotional nature of the family meeting, which makes it difficult or impossible for the characters to say what they are feeling, and the fact that it is a 1st person narrative, so that we do not have direct access to Dewimurni's thoughts. The use of *dheweke* in referring to Dewimurni, then, is one of the stylistic devices the writer uses to create empathy with this character and to underscore her bond with Larasati.

5. Conclusion

I have shown that the distribution of the Javanese 3rd person pronouns, *dheweke* and *di-*, is largely explained by the narrative function of the clause the pronoun appears in. *Di-* is used in narrative clauses which are temporally sequenced, while *dheweke* is used in clauses which view the referent of *dheweke* subjectively.

However, although it can be said that viewing a character subjectively is necessary to refer to him/her with *dheweke*, it is clearly not sufficient. Even in the illustrative examples cited here, there have been cases where there is independent evidence that a character is being viewed subjectively but still s/he is not referred to with *dheweke*. If simply being viewed subjectively alone were enough to require the use of *dheweke*, we would expect to find many places where a number of consecutive clauses containing references to the same character all use *dheweke*; this does in fact sometimes happen, but it is rare.

I noted at the beginning of section 3 that there is a statistical relationship between sequencing and the use of *di-*; it is clear on the basis of the data presented here that a similar relationship holds between subjectivity and the use of *dheweke*, as this pronoun is only used when its referent is viewed subjectively. However, of the total number of clauses in which a given 3rd person referent is viewed subjectively, a relatively small proportion actually use *dheweke*. A discussion of exactly which subjective sentences have *dheweke* and which do not is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will make a few speculative observations here. It appears that there is a stylistic constraint

against using *dheweke* too frequently, much as there is a stylistic constraint in English against continually referring to the same person with a noun if a pronoun would be sufficient to identify the referent. On this view, a single token of *dheweke* serves the function of helping to establish the referent as a character who is being described subjectively; this function is of course also served through direct reference to the character's thoughts and devices intended to create empathy with a certain character (e.g., the way Dewimurni is portrayed in *Keluwargane Bu Nyai Blorong*). Once this empathy has been established, there is no need to continually use *dheweke* to refer to that character (unless the perspective shifts and that character is no longer the center of empathy). This seems to be a reasonable way to understand the situation, but more research is needed to test this empirically.

In English, the function of temporal sequencing is associated with the use of the Historic Present (Schiffrin 1981), while the function of evaluation is associated with intensifiers, comparators, correlatives, and explicatives (Labov 1972); this latter association is probably universal, although I do not know of any studies investigating this.⁸ What is perhaps most interesting about the Javanese data presented here is that they show that in this language the same functional categories of sequencing and evaluation are marked through a completely different type of structural representation (the choice of noun, free pronoun, bound pronoun, or zero). This suggests that these functional categories are basic to language and can be manifested in any number of ways. If this is the case, then descriptive linguistics and typologists can benefit greatly from adopting Labov's narrative categories as a standard tool of analysis.

Notes

- * I thank Peter Hook, Margaret Luebs, and Debby Schiffrin for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
- 1 *Di-* has a variant, *dipun-*, which conveys respect to the person talked to. I suspect this has the same narrative function as *di-*; however, it did not occur at all in the data base I analyzed. *Dheweke* has variants *piyambake* and *piyambakipun*, which convey respect to the person spoken about. These appear to be quite rare; each occurs only once in the four short stories I looked at, and so I cannot draw any conclusions regarding how their use compares with that of *dheweke*. The statement that *di-* is a bound form of the 3rd person pronoun is not a traditional analysis, although it does fit with analyses of Indonesian which have appeared in the literature (e.g., Givón 1976). Javanese *di-* has been most

commonly referred to as a 'passive' marker (Horne 1962), presumably because it is largely restricted to transitive roots and because some (about one-third) of the constructions using *di-* can be translated into English as passives (Myhill 1993). However, I would argue that there are actually two (syntactically identical) uses of *di-*; one is a passive marker, used with transitive roots when the referent of the agent is completely vague, while the other is a 3rd person pronominal prefix, used when there is an overt agent or when the agent is obvious from the context. This type of syncretism between 3rd person pronoun and passive marker is not uncommon (see Givón 1976 for discussion), and probably indicates that some sort of diachronic reanalysis from pronoun to passive marker is in progress. The evidence for the non-passive function of *di-* is that the majority of *di-* constructions do not have passive function (i.e., they have a specific, and generally highly topical, referent); the evidence for analyzing this non-passive function as specifically 3rd person is that the use of *di-* is limited to 3rd person agents, and as a pronominal prefix *di-* contrasts paradigmatically with 1st and 2nd person pronominal prefixes, e.g., *taketesake* "I sprinkled", *koktetesake* "you sprinkled", *ditetesake* "s/he sprinkled".

- 2 The use of one or another pronominal form also has some syntactic consequences. When *di-* serves as a transitive agent, it replaces the prefix *N-* and the patient must precede the verb (the same is true of the other bound pronominal prefixes such as *tak-* "I" and *kok-* "you"). When *dheweke* serves as a transitive agent, it must precede the verb, the patient must follow the verb, and the *N-* prefix is used. In patient relatives with 3rd person agents, *di-* must be used; this is part of a general Western Austronesian constraint on relativization.
- 3 The data for zero and *dheweke* also include a single token of *piyambakipun*, an honorific 3rd person singular pronoun. *Di-* is normally only possible on transitive roots, and the data I give here only include roots allowing the use of *di-*. These data also only include the 'pronominal' use of *di-*, where its referent is obvious from the context, and exclude 'passive' uses of *di-* (see fn. 1) and patient relatives, which require *di-* for syntactic reasons (see fn. 2). Only pronominal *di-* is associated with sequencing; a count from the texts used here showed that constrictions with the 'passive' *di-* were only sequenced 1/22 (5%) times.
- 4 The *N-* prefix must be used on the verb in the cases I have marked '0'. Intransitive verbs and certain verbs translating into English as transitive cannot take either *N-* or *di-* prefixes, and these are excluded from consideration in discussion of (3). For example, although *keprungu* translates into English as a transitive verb, it cannot take the *di-* prefix (**dikeprungu*) and so I have not counted it as either *di-* or 0; similarly the intransitives *mencungul* and *lagi ngerti* cannot take *di-* and are excluded from consideration. I am also not counting *digambarake*, where *di-* is used because it is in a patient relative rather than because of sequencing, or *mbendung*, because it has a nominal agent.
- 5 The use of the zero subject in these cases also requires the *N-* prefix on the verb, and so the meaning of simultaneity is actually associated with both the zero subject and the *N-* form of the verb.
- 6 I will only discuss the use of *dheweke* in the narrative sections of the stories. *Dheweke* is used a few times in the dialogues in these stories, basically when the person using it knows some personal fact about the person referred to with *dheweke*. This usage is consistent with the general characterization I am giving of the function of *dheweke*; however, there are very few examples of the use of *dheweke* in dialogue in the stories I

looked at, so I am hesitant to draw any firm conclusions at this point.

- 7 If the narrator had access to Nila's thoughts, he would know whether or not she was thinking—thus using *pikir* “thinking” without *sajak* “as though” would be viewing her subjectively. By using *sajak*, the narrator is not reporting Nila's thoughts from the inside but rather reporting what seemed to be case based on outward appearances, and thus taking an objective viewpoint external to Nila.
- 8 Deborah Schiffrin (p.c.) points out that there are also uses of the English Historic Present which are evaluative.

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Patterns of Incorporation of Lexemes in Language Contact: Language typology or sociolinguistics?*

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1. Introduction

In the introduction to *Principles of Linguistic Change* (1994:5), Labov has written:

“it is not likely that the explanation of language change can be drawn from linguistic structure alone, since the fact of language change itself is not consistent with our fundamental conception of what language is.”

This paper will address the question of what factors come into play which affect changes in the lexicon arising in language contact situations. The evidence that such changes may be going on includes what we might call lexical incorporations in bilingual speech. Most researchers in the field of language contact recognize two basic patterns of incorporation of lexical material from one language to another: what we will call **BORROWING** and **CODE-SWITCHING** (see definitions below). Claims have been made that incorporations from one language in contact to another tend to favor one of these

two patterns, and that this preference can be at least partly predicted from a typological comparison of the languages in contact. In other words, these claims imply that linguistic structure can provide the primary explanation of this aspect of linguistic change.

In this paper, we present data from three bilingual communities: two in Sweden and one in Central Africa. These communities represent three quite different language contact situations, and the three pairs of languages have quite different typological relationships. Since one-word incorporations predominate in all three communities, our analysis concentrates on such cases, which are notoriously difficult to classify unequivocally as borrowing or code-switching. We argue that typological comparison of the languages in each pair does not explain everything about the observed patterns of morphological integration. Rather, we believe that the historical and present-day sociolinguistic situation of language contact must play a larger explanatory role.

1.1 *Definitions*

In this paper, we will use the term *incorporation* to denote all cases of productive use by bilingual speakers of lexical material from one language in speech basically in another language. We use the terms *embedded language* (EL) for the former language and *matrix language* (ML) for the latter. Since our primary focus is on one-word incorporations, it is not difficult for the purposes of the present paper to distinguish ML and EL.

In an earlier paper, Boyd (1993) has argued that it is difficult to establish a non-arbitrary boundary between what she and others call *code-switching* and *borrowing*, especially in the analysis of one-item incorporations. Rather, if one views these two phenomena as ideal types, it then seems most accurate to think of them as end-points of a continuum, with actual cases of incorporation often falling somewhere in between the two. The ideal types can be defined as follows (after Poplack et al. 1987):

•BORROWING is ideally incorporation of EL material in ML discourse such that the EL material is (a) phonologically, (b) morphologically, and (c) syntactically integrated into the ML; and (d) use of the same EL material, integrated in similar ways, and occurring in similar contexts is widespread in the ML speech community, including among ML monolinguals, who may be

unaware of its origins in EL. Furthermore, (e) borrowing is often limited to one lexeme.

•CODE-SWITCHING is ideally incorporation of EL material in a ML discourse such that the EL material is *not* (a) phonologically, (b) morphologically or (c) syntactically integrated into ML. (That is, the phonology, morphology and syntax of the EL material follows EL grammar, not ML grammar.) Also, (d) no claims are made as to recurrence of switching in the wider community; and (e) code-switching often involves longer stretches of speech in EL, but in a limiting case may also be applied to single words .

In practice, however, there are numerous problems applying any of these criteria to specific cases. Even if we accept the view of a continuum, it is difficult to quantify in a non-arbitrary manner the degree of phonological, morphological and syntactic integration of specific cases of incorporation, as well as recurrence in a corpus. Nevertheless, we find these ideal types useful, as they seem to function as goals or norms of incorporation for the members of at least two of the three bilingual speech communities we have studied.

Most of the researchers who uphold a strict distinction between code-switching and borrowing do so primarily or solely on the basis of the morphological criterion (Poplack, Sankoff and their associates). This criterion makes it possible to classify a large number of cases unequivocally as code-switches or borrowings, although for many language pairs it still results in a number of indeterminate cases. In this paper, we, too, will concentrate our analyses on morphological integration, but we also discuss phonological integration in all three communities, as we believe it has an important relation to morphological integration.

1.2 *Typology and incorporation patterns*

In several recent papers, various researchers have claimed or implied that different bilingual speech communities tend to favor one or the other of the ideal types as models of incorporation of single lexemes, based on the typology of the languages in contact (cf. Poplack et al. 1987:3-4; Sankoff et al. 1986:7). If the languages are morphosyntactically similar, then the equivalence constraint (Poplack 1980) allows for many opportunities for code-switching, which are utilized in varying degrees by different communities. If the languages are morphosyntactically of different types, the tendency will be

to integrate EL items into ML morphologically in contexts where the equivalence constraint prohibits code-switching. Other researchers have suggested (Berk-Seligson 1986; Nortier 1990) that a pattern of morphological integration of EL items into ML is especially to be expected where ML is a relatively synthetic language. If we try to systematize these hypotheses somewhat we might come up with the following alternatives as at least logical possibilities:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPOLOGY AND MORPHOLOGICAL INTEGRATION

General constraint:

•If ML and EL are similar in the analytic-synthetic dimension, then ML will tend NOT to integrate EL items morphologically (e.g., Spanish-English contact). In this case the incorporation pattern approaches ideal code-switching.

•If ML and EL are dissimilar in this dimension, then EITHER:

(A) ML will tend to integrate EL items morphologically (hypothesis suggested in Poplack et al. 1987 concerning Finnish-English). In this case, the pattern will be similar to ideal borrowing above.

or:

(B) the more synthetic language's morphology will tend to be chosen in general, regardless of which language is ML and which is EL (Backus 1993 concerning Turkish-Dutch). This alternative may resemble ideal borrowing or code-switching, depending on whether ML or EL is the more synthetic language.

Specific constraint:

•If ML and EL differ on the analytic-synthetic dimension *for a particular grammatical function*, then several logical possibilities present themselves:

1. the free morpheme alternative is chosen, whether it originates in ML or EL (suggested by Berk-Seligson 1986 for Spanish-Hebrew definiteness)
2. the bound morpheme alternative is chosen, whether from ML or EL.

(Both (1) and (2) could resemble either code-switching or borrowing, depending on whether bound or free morphemes originate in EL or ML.)

3. the EL alternative is chosen, regardless of whether it is bound or

free. (This means the free morpheme constraint is upheld, sometimes at the expense of the equivalence constraint; this approaches ideal code-switching.)

4. the ML alternative is chosen, regardless of whether it is bound or free. (In this case, the free morpheme constraint is violated, but it could be argued that the items are nonce borrowings.)

The three bilingual communities that we will examine in this paper are: Finnish speakers and American English speakers in Göteborg, both groups with Swedish as a second language, and French-Sango bilinguals in Carnot, Central Africa. In the last case, all the speakers are native speakers of various African languages, but are highly skilled in French and Sango. (There are currently only a few native speakers of Sango.)

Comparing the languages involved in these contact situations on an analytic/synthetic continuum, Sango, an "extended pidgin" with limited morphology, is the most analytic, and Finnish clearly the most synthetic. English, French, and Swedish are in between, with English generally the most analytic of the three. Thus of the three language pairs in contact examined here, in terms of morphology, English-Swedish would be the most similar typologically, while the other two pairs would involve typologically different languages. In the case of Sango-French language contact, the more analytic language is ML; in the case of Finnish-Swedish the more synthetic language is ML. All five languages are basically SVO, although word order is freer in Finnish than in the others, and Swedish is probably most accurately described as a verb-second language.

Since the typological difference is small between English and Swedish, we would expect Americans in Sweden not to integrate their incorporations from Swedish, following the general constraint stated above. That is, they would code-switch, rather than borrow. In the other two cases, by hypothesis (A) we would expect the Finns in Sweden and the French-Sango bilinguals to show a stronger tendency to integrate their EL items into ML morphologically than the Americans; according to the alternative general hypothesis (B), we would expect the French-Sango bilinguals to retain at least some aspects of French morphology and Finns to integrate Swedish incorporations morphologically.

The following sections of the paper present the data which partially support and partially refute these general hypotheses, as well as several of the specific ones.

2. The Data

The corpora for all three communities were collected in much the same way as those for investigations of code-switching and borrowing in other communities. Informants were interviewed for 2-3 hours in a familiar environment. The data below was gathered in interviews with 18 Finns, 12 Americans and 12 Central Africans. In each section, we briefly sketch the social context of language contact before presenting the data on incorporation in terms of word and phrase types and morphological integration.

2.1 *Incorporations with Finnish as ML and Swedish as EL*

Finns in Göteborg comprise by far the largest immigrant group in the city, numbering about 30,000 individuals, including children. Migration to Sweden from Finland has been largely labor migration, which reached a peak in the early 1970s. The group is still predominantly working-class, including many people who work in local industries such as Volvo. The Finns tend to live in working class or upper working class apartment areas in the north and east of the city (De Geer 1989). According to Jaakkola (1984), during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the community of Finnish immigrants in Sweden has gradually acquired the characteristics of a permanent ethnic minority. Elementary schooling is, for example, available for Finnish children in Finnish, and about half of the Finnish families in the city take advantage of this opportunity. Cultural similarity between Finns and Swedes leads to relative ease of contact between the groups, including, for example, a high rate of intermarriage between Finns and Swedes. There is also a long history of contact between the languages in both Finland and Sweden, a point we will return to below.

The entire set of incorporations from Swedish into Finnish in our corpus totals 614 relatively clear cases. The questions we wish to address are: can these items be considered as borrowings or code-switches, and what grammatical properties do they display? Also, can we identify any pattern among our informants for the incorporation of Swedish lexemes into Finnish, and if so, which of the above hypotheses does the pattern support?

The 614 cases can be divided into different word and phrase types as in Table 1. Single words, particularly single nouns, predominate. However, a certain number of other word classes and longer items do occur, which are rare or absent in other language contact situations. Based on the length and

Table 1. *Word and phrase types: Swedish EL and Finnish ML*

Single nouns	397	64.7%
Single verbs	92	15.0%
Single adjectives	49	8.0%
Interjections, feedback etc.	29	4.7%
NP	19	3.1%
Adverbs	11	1.8%
VP	6	1.0%
Conjunctions	5	0.7%
Other	6	1.0%
TOTAL	614	100.0%

Table 2. *Morphosyntactic integration of incorporations: Swedish EL and Finnish ML*

Finnish inflection (e.g. case, finite verb morphology)	320	52.1%
No inflectional morphology		
Finnish morphology other than inflection (e.g. deriv.+ compounding)	78	12.7%
Unmarked: nominative singular etc.	120	19.5%
Unmarked: other contexts	25	4.1%
Swedish inflection or syntax	71	11.6%
TOTAL	614	100.0%

word/phrase class alone, our first guess would be that most of these items are borrowings, or what Clyne (1987) calls lexical transfers.

The pattern of morphological integration shown in Table 2 supports the assumption that these items are borrowings or nonce borrowings, at least in part. Thus, of the 614 cases, 320 were clearly marked with a Finnish inflection, as in example (1) (incorporated material in bold, its equivalents underlined):

- (1) Mirja: minä oon jo kotona ku toiset **templaa** (< Swe. stämpla)
 “I am already home when the others are punching out.”

At the Swedish end of the continuum of marking, 71 items showed Swedish morphology or syntax (e.g., plural marking, verb + verb particle, or a prepositional phrase). The majority of these also had Swedish phonology, and many were longer stretches of speech, so they seem to be clear cases of intra-sentential code switching, e.g.:

- (2) Tuulikki: Ruotsissa ei ollu vielä rasismia eikä + ja todella tuli tänne ninku tämmönen **ärad gäst+**
 “There wasn’t any racism in Sweden yet, and you really came here as a sort of honored guest.”

The remaining 223 cases consist of items lacking inflectional morphology. Because most occur in a context that is unmarked in both languages, if we take the (inflectional) morphological criterion for code-switching as crucial, they are ambiguous as to their status as code-switches or nonce loans. Of these, 78 had either a Finnish derivational suffix, were part of a Swedish-Finnish compound, or were phonotactically integrated, e.g., with a vocalic ‘suffix’, and thus would seem more similar to borrowings than to code-switches. Of the remainder, 120 were single morphs or compounds in nominative singular or other inflectionally unmarked contexts (e.g., interjections, adverbs). Only 25 cases could possibly have been inflected for case, but were left without inflection. In many of these cases, it seemed that informants used circumlocutions to transform non-nominative singular contexts to contexts which could be interpreted as nominative singular. In all of these cases lacking inflectional morphology, phonological integration is highly variable, while in the cases with Finnish or Swedish inflection, the phonology seems to follow the morphology, so there is less variation in phonological integration (cf. Andersson 1990, 1993).

The results as a whole show that a majority of the Swedish items which should have received morphological marking were marked with Finnish inflections or derivations, rather than Swedish ones. Many of these incorporations involved conflicts between Swedish and Finnish morphosyntactic structure, so that, for example, what is expressed with a prepositional phrase (Prep-NP) in Swedish is expressed with a case-marked noun in Finnish. We have noted no greater difficulty with case-marking of Swedish nouns in contexts where they would have occurred in a prepositional phrase in Swedish than e.g., marking of Swedish verbs with inflections for tense, which is marked with inflections in both languages. However, in cases where Swedish verbs have, for example, a reflexive pronoun, and Finnish would have a reflexive derivational suffix, we notice an increase in variation. We found the following three treatments of the Swedish verb + reflexive pronoun *klara sig* ‘manage, get by’ in Sweden Finnish:

- (3) *klaarata ittensä* (Swe *klara* +Fi inf marker + Fi refl pro)
klaarata (Swe *klara* + Fi inf marker + no refl pro)
klara sig (Swe *klara* + no Fi inf marker + Swe refl pro)

And for the related verb + particle *klara av* “manage” we also have examples of:

klaarata av (Swe *klara* + Fi inf marker + Swe particle)

The greater part of the unmarked items occurred in nominative singular contexts. Thus, the general tendency seems to be one of morphological integration, although strictly speaking almost half the cases lack inflectional morphology. To sum up, the general picture for incorporations of Swedish lexemes into Finnish is one where:

- single items dominate, especially single nouns, but other word classes and phrases also occur;
- there is a variable tendency to integrate phonologically (only about a third clearly have Swedish phonology; about 2/3 have been adapted at least partially to Finnish phonology, cf. Andersson 1990, 1993; Boyd 1993);
- there is a stronger but variable tendency to integrate morphologically (about 2/3 seem to be morphologically integrated).

This case of language contact therefore seems to follow the hypothesis of favoring the morphology of ML, the more synthetic language, and of bound vs. free morphemes, both generally and specifically when there is a conflict in EL and ML’s language structure. Thus, general hypotheses A and B would be upheld, as well as specific hypotheses 2 and 4 as stated above.

2.2 Incorporations from English (EL) into Swedish (ML)

Americans in Göteborg number about 1200 persons, including about 300 children with one or both parents born in the U.S. All informants interviewed for this project have lived in Göteborg for at least ten years. The major reason for migration was to marry or cohabit with Swedes; secondary reasons include study or work. Most of our informants are middle class, with some university education. Americans live in all parts of the city, and have a varying degree of contact with other Americans, but all have frequent contacts with Swedes. Since the norm is to speak Swedish with Swedes and English with Americans,

Table 3. *Word and phrase types: Swedish EL and American English ML*

single nouns	178	86.0%
single verbs or verb + prt	3	1.4%
single adjectives	14	6.8%
noun phrases	3	1.4%
vocatives	3	1.4%
other + indeterminate	6	2.9%
TOTAL	207	99.9%

Table 4. *Occurrence of compounds : Swedish EL and American English ML*

Compound nouns Swe + Swe	133	64.3%
Compound nouns Swe + Eng	4	1.9%
Compound nouns Eng + Swe	5	2.4%
All other cases of incorporation	65	31.4%
TOTAL	207	100.0%

all informants use Swedish and most use English on a daily basis. In terms of institutional support (education, mass media, etc.), the Americans are in an unusually advantaged position, despite the small size of the group in Sweden. This is, of course, due to the number, power and influence of English speakers in the world at large, and the concomitant fact that English is the first foreign language studied by Swedes.

In the American English corpus, there was a total of only 207 cases of incorporation from Swedish as defined above. This frequency is low, and contrasts sharply both with the rate in the Finnish corpus and with that in the Sango corpus, as well as with e.g., Poplack's (1987) corpus of English incorporations in Finnish in Canada. The 207 examples can be categorized as shown in Table 3 in relation to word and phrase type.

The set of incorporations are clearly dominated by single nouns, even more strongly than was the case for Finnish. Other word classes occur, but in significantly fewer numbers compared to the Finnish material. It is furthermore interesting to note the domination of compound Swedish words in the English material, as Table 4 indicates.

Over two thirds of all cases of incorporation of Swedish material into English involve Swedish or partly Swedish compounds. This suggests that Swedish words are resorted to primarily for semantically 'heavy' concepts which in many cases do not have a direct English equivalent. In most of these cases, the entire compound is incorporated, but in a few cases, a compound,

Table 5. *Morphological integration: Swedish EL and English ML*

Swedish (unintegrated)	21	77.8%
English (integrated)	4	14.8%
No marking at all	2	7.4%
TOTAL	27	100.0%

modelled on Swedish, will include only one Swedish morpheme as in example (4):

- (4) Roberta B531 they're high school friends/ **gymnasie**-friends of our friends in Ö, who now live in S. "high school"

According to some characterizations of borrowing (e.g., Poplack et al. 1988, 4.1), the predominance of single nouns and of compounds in this material would suggest that these items would be borrowings or nonce borrowings, rather than single word code-switches. The question is, then, are they treated like other English nouns morphologically?

Inflectional suffixes.

We will discuss morphological integration under two headings. First we consider morphological marking other than for definiteness. This affects only a minority of the examples found, primarily nouns in the plural, and a few tense markings on verbs. In these cases, both Swedish and English have inflectional suffixes. There are only 27 items of the 207 which should have received some sort of inflectional suffix. Of these 27, 21 were not morphologically integrated, i.e., they retained Swedish inflections.

Table 5 shows a clear tendency towards not integrating morphologically, but not as overwhelming a tendency as was found for phonological integration (Boyd 1993). There were, in other words, a few cases like the second item below, in contrast to the first one:

- (5) Roberta B367: I had classes in the // special classes, the **hjälpklass-er**. "remedial education classes"
Jean B011: but there were/ I think four or five foreign lecturer **tjänst-s**. "positions"

This evidence, together with the fact that there was an even stronger tendency to integrate phonologically, suggests that what we have here should be considered as one-word code-switches, rather than borrowings.

Table 6. *Definiteness marking of incorporations: Swedish EL, English ML*

English def marking only ex: <u>the</u> folkhögskola	22	25.0%
Swe def marking only ex: folkhögskolan	40	45.5%
Both Swe and Eng marking ex: <u>the</u> folkhögskolan	3	3.4%
No marking at all ex: folkhögskola	7	7.9%
Demonstrative without suffix ex: <u>this</u> folkhögskola	14	15.9%
Demonstrative with suffix ex: <u>this</u> folkhögskolan	2	2.3%
TOTAL	88	100.0%

Morphological marking: typological conflict.

The picture is not as clear, however, when we consider marking for definiteness. This shows a more complex pattern, due to a lack of congruence between the two languages in definiteness marking. In Swedish, definiteness of single nouns is marked by a suffix. In English, it is marked by a pre-posed article. This implies that definite single nouns will be difficult to incorporate, because of the morphosyntactic difference between the ways the languages mark definiteness. The lack of congruence in surface order applies to cases of nouns in definite form. How do the American informants handle such cases?

A total of 88 cases of semantically definite Swedish-origin single nouns occurred in the corpus. Table 6 shows how these were treated by the American informants. (The example, *Folkhögskola*, means “folk high school”.)

In general, we don't seem to get so clear a pattern with the definite nouns as with other cases of morphological integration, probably partly because of the fact that Swedish and English have different systems of marking definiteness, one word-internal suffix and one word-external. Some clarity is provided, however, when we distinguish between common nouns and what we would like to call namey-nouns, i.e., near-proper nouns such as *bostadsförmedlingen* “the housing exchange” and *fortbildningsavdelningen* “department for further education”. The namey nouns total 49 cases out of the 88 above. (See Table 7).

Here, there seems to be a clear preference for using Swedish definiteness for the “namey nouns”, but their use is certainly not categorical. For the less “namey” common nouns, there is a preference for English marking, but there

Table 7. *Definiteness marking of semantically definite single nouns: Swe EL, Eng ML*

	Namey nouns	%	Common nouns	%
Eng def marking only	3	6.1	19	48.7
Swe def marking only	31	63.3	9	23.1
Both Swe + Eng marking	2	4.1	1	2.6
No marking	4	8.2	3	7.7
Dem + 0	7	14.3	7	17.9
Dem + suffix	2	4.1	0	0.0
TOTAL	49	100.1	39	100.0

is certainly a lot of variation, especially if we compare with indefinites, which all used English marking.

If we sum up the general pattern of incorporation of Swedish lexemes into English, the tendency seems to be:

- Single, semantically heavy items (especially Swedish compounds) are incorporated.
- They tend not to be phonologically integrated (Boyd 1993).
- They tend not to be morphologically integrated when both languages use inflections for a grammatical function, but there is more variation with definiteness marking; no clear pattern emerges.

These tendencies uphold the first general hypothesis, since the languages are typologically similar and the morphological integration pattern tends towards non-integration, when both languages use inflectional suffixes. The specific hypotheses are neither upheld nor refuted, because no clear pattern seems to emerge in the case of definiteness marking, when there is typological conflict between the marking systems.

2.3 *Incorporations with Sango as ML and French as EL*

Sango is a vernacular-based extended pidgin spoken virtually everywhere in the Central African Republic (CAR). Because of the fact that CAR was formerly a French colony, French has played and continues to play a very important role as a superposed language in the country. French is the only official language in the country — almost all education and administration take place in French, but Sango is growing rapidly since it became a national language in 1963. It is used as a lingua franca between speakers of different vernacular languages, and between Europeans and Africans, as a language of

the mass media (especially radio) and public speeches, and is beginning to be used in literacy programs and other Christian mission-sponsored educational programs. It is the native language of a small but growing number of young people born in urban areas. Just about everyone in the country is multilingual: they know at least one vernacular language, Sango and sometimes French. Sango is in many respects coming to symbolize CAR as an independent nation. French is the ex-colonial language, which is still used in education, but since only a small minority of the population were able to go to school at all, only about 7% of the population are literate. We would estimate the percentage of the population bilingual in French and Sango to be only slightly larger (Thornell 1989, undated).

Sango is both lexically and grammatically based on a vernacular language usually known as Sango Riverain, a language in the Gbandi group. Like other pidgin languages, Sango has a limited morphology and lexicon. Because it is what Mühlhäusler (1986) would call an extended pidgin, in the early stages of creolization, Sango's lexicon is changing rapidly, both by compounding and derivation and by borrowing, primarily from French, but also from various vernacular languages. According to Cassidy's (1971) study of the basic vocabulary of Sango, 97 of Swadesh's basic concepts were normally expressed by African-origin lexical items in Sango, and the remaining 3 were borrowed from French. (These three concepts now have Sango terms.) In a later study of French lexemes in a Sango corpus of 32,217 tokens, Taber (1979) found a total of 51% of the lexeme types to derive from French, and the remainder from African languages, primarily Sango Riverain. In terms of tokens, however, Sango items totalled 91.3%, and French only 6.8%. It should be noted, however, that because Sango lacks a standardized written language, and is changing rapidly, any word count, whether it be of types or tokens, must be somewhat arbitrary, since it is difficult to determine word boundaries. Many items, previously considered to be grammatical particles, are now considered to be suffixes (Thornell undated). It is also difficult to draw the line between compounds and phrases.

The data for this paper are drawn from interview material, but the interviews are with multilinguals in French, Sango and at least one vernacular language. Because we were interested in the incorporation process, which includes both code-switching and borrowing, we limited the informant group to French-Sango bilinguals, even though this group is small in the population of Sango speakers as a whole. It could be argued that Sango-speakers who do

Table 8. *Word and phrase classes of incorporations, French EL, Sango ML, four speaker groups taken together*

Single N	259	42.2%
Single V	60	9.8%
Adjective	11	1.8%
Adverb	44	7.2%
Prepositions	4	0.7%
Conjunctions	93	15.1%
Interjections etc	45	7.3%
NP	38	6.2%
VP	5	0.8%
PP	5	0.8%
Longer phrases	50	8.1%
TOTAL	614	100.0%

not speak French could only use French items as loans, (according to Pfaff 1979; Bentahila & Davis 1983; and others, ourselves included).

Four groups of three speakers each (all male) were interviewed by Thornell:

- Group HS (high/Sango) consists of highly educated speakers with a nationalistic (i.e., presumably pro-Sango) orientation. All three have studied Sango formally, which is quite unusual.
- Group HF (high/French) is also highly educated, but more oriented towards French. They are teachers, who use French daily in their work.
- Group TF (teen/French) consists of teenagers, who are all in school, and thus also use French daily. This group was included mainly to get an idea of possible lexical change processes.
- Group LE (little education) are men who have little or no education, who have learned French outside of school, e.g., in the French armed forces.

Table 8 shows the breakdown of the entire corpus of 614 French incorporations into Sango by word/phrase type. (The problem touched on above regarding word status also applies to this table, of course.)

While a majority (ca. 83%) of the incorporations consisted of single words, the domination of nouns is not as great as in the Finnish and American material. If we include incorporated NPs in the figures for all three corpora (since in many cases a Swedish compound would correspond to an English or Sango NP), the Sango corpus has only 48.4% N or NP, while the English has

87.4% and the Finnish 67.8%. French-origin conjunctions are much more common here than in the other two language pairs, also, as they represent the second largest word class of incorporations. This probably can be explained by the fact that Sango is currently building up its stock of function words. One way this is done is by using a combination of an ambiguous vernacular-origin function word together with a more specific French-origin one.

The total frequency of incorporations is also strikingly different in the three bilingual communities. In order to collect about 50 tokens of incorporation per informant, Thornell only had to code between 2;45 and 8;17 minutes of the interviews. This contrasts sharply with Boyd's informants, who used between 5 and 48 incorporations in interviews of between 2 and 3 hours. Andersson's Finnish-Swedish bilinguals had the widest range in total number of incorporations: between 0 and 148. Although it is strictly speaking not possible to consider these figures as frequencies, the great differences between (and, for Andersson's informants within) the informant groups suggests that the different communities utilize the possibilities offered by incorporation to differing extents. A hypothesis as to relative ease of incorporation based on typological similarity would have predicted, however, that incorporations from French to Sango and Swedish to Finnish would have been less frequent than those from Swedish to English, while the opposite appears to be true.

Morphological integration: plural marking.

Plural marking is one of the few fairly frequent examples of Sango inflectional morphology. It can take the following forms:

- | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|
| (6) | Plural marking in Sango | | |
| | $\hat{a} + N$ | e.g. <i>âélève</i> | "pupils" |
| | $\hat{a} + \text{DET} + N$ | e.g. <i>âmbênî élève</i> | "some pupils" |
| | $\hat{a} + \text{DET} + \hat{a} + N$ | e.g. <i>âmbênî élève</i> | "some pupils" |
| | $\text{DET} + \hat{a} + N$ | e.g. <i>mbênî élève</i> | "some pupils" |

But coding the rate of integration of French plural nominals into Sango is difficult for several reasons. First, in standard French, plurality is marked by changes in the pre-posed article, rather than by affixation, while Sango generally lacks articles. Secondly, plural marking is variable even for African-origin Sango nouns. According to Samarin (1968), plural marking is

Table 9. Rate of plural marking in % for French-origin and Sango-origin nouns in four speaker groups.

Speaker groups	FRENCH-origin N and NP's		SANGO-origin N & NP's	
	"usually marked"	"usually unmarked"	"usually marked"	"usually unmarked"
HS	92,3%	52.4%	79.4%	53.8%
HF	72.2%	28.2%	68.9%	25.0%
TF	100.0%	25.0%	96.3%	38.5%
LE	82.3%	14.3%	76.2%	5.2%

more prevalent on living things, nouns followed by a quantifier, such as *mîngi* 'many', and phrases of the type N *tî* N (i.e. lit. N 'of' N or genitive/possessive). In the last case, it is normally the second N (denoting owner) which is marked for plural. (Incorporations falling into one of these categories are called "usually marked" in the table below.)

Since overt plural marking is variable, we have compared the rate of plural marking on French-origin nouns with that on African-origin nouns. Thornell compared the rate of plural marking on Sango and French-origin nouns for 216 items from each language. The results are summarized in the table below, divided by speaker groups.

This table shows first of all that Samarin's observations about which types of N and NP are more often marked for plural seem to hold true. What is surprising is that the rate of marking on French-origin nouns and NPs is actually greater than that on vernacular-origin Ns and NPs, in the informant group as a whole, and in each sub-group, at least for the items "usually marked", according to Samarin. The group that most consistently marks both incorporations and vernacular-origin nominals is group TF, the youngest speakers in the informant group. This is an indication that a change process may be going on making plural marking more obligatory than before. The group that marks plural on both incorporations and vernacular origin nominals least often is group HF, the group chosen for its positive orientation towards the French language. The low rate of plural marking (paralleling the \emptyset -plural inflection in French) can reflect this attitude. The fact that the rate of plural marking in group LE is between that of groups HS and HF both for Sango-origin and French-origin Ns and NPs indicates that their lack of education is not a factor in this variable.

The general tendency, however, clearly seems to be that (i) a wide variety of French-origin items are incorporated, but single items dominate the examples; (ii) these items tend not to be integrated phonologically, but (iii) they tend to be integrated morphologically (at least in the case of plural marking for those classes of items which Samarin claims are most often marked generally in Sango).

The tendency to integrate morphologically (if it is a general tendency, and not limited to plural marking) is in line with the general typologically-based hypothesis A above, since French and Sango are relatively different typologically, and the ML system of marking is employed (i.e., integration). But it contradicts general hypothesis B, since the morphology of Sango — the more analytic language — is employed, rather than that of the more synthetic language. In relation to the specific hypotheses, it supports hypotheses 2 and 4, since Sango's plural marking (i.e., that of ML) is bound, while that of French is free for this particular grammatical function.

2.4 *Summary of findings*

In summary, the following tendencies were observed in the three bilingual communities described here and in earlier papers:

Finns:

1. medium frequency of incorporation
2. clear domination of nouns, but quite a few verbs and adjectives
3. phonological integration highly variable
4. morphological integration also variable, but along a single dimension; norm is to integrate.
5. strong negative attitudes toward incorporation
6. points 3 + 4 suggest a pattern approaching the borrowing ideal, perhaps in competition with a newer pattern closer to the code-switching ideal (see below).

Americans:

1. lowest frequency of incorporation
2. nouns dominate heavily, especially compounds
3. clear tendency not to integrate phonologically
4. tendency not to integrate morphologically: for inflections, non-integration; for definiteness, variable, minor tendency towards integration.

5. strong negative attitudes toward incorporation
6. Points 3 + 4 suggest a pattern approaching ideal code-switching.

Sango-French bilinguals:

1. highest frequency of incorporation
2. nouns not as dominant. Many verbs and conjunctions incorporated also.
3. little or no phonological integration.
4. morphological integration for plural seems to be the pattern. (In fact, more plural marking of incorporations than vernacular-origin nominals.)
5. negative attitudes toward incorporation mainly among speakers represented by group HN. Others are either positive or indifferent to incorporations. Attitude seems not to be reflected in pattern of incorporations.

3. Discussion

The hypothesis that typologically different languages in contact would tend to favor morphological integration of one-word switches and typologically similar languages to favor non-integration seems to be upheld in these three cases, at least to some extent (cf. general constraint above). The Finnish and Sango speakers both tend to integrate their incorporations from Swedish and French respectively to a rather high degree, while the Americans retain Swedish inflectional morphology in general, integrating variably where the languages have typologically different realizations of a grammatical function. When Sango and Finnish incorporate French and Swedish items, in both cases the bound alternative is chosen, which is also the ML alternative (specific constraints 2 & 4). This despite the fact that Sango (ML) is in general more analytic than French (EL). It would be interesting to see how incorporations are handled where other grammatical functions might be expressed, and where French offers a bound and Sango a free alternative.

So, although our data supports general constraint A and specific constraints 2 and 4, there are other cases in the code-switching literature, where typologically different languages are in contact, but morphological integration clearly is rare. This is the case for example for Arabic-Dutch, according to Nortier (1990), and for Spanish-Hebrew according to Berk-Seligson

(1986). In addition, the overall rate of incorporations in these three communities — most by Sango-French and least by Swedish-American bilinguals — is not what would be predicted by simply comparing language typologies.

We think at least part of the explanation for the differing strategies of morphological incorporation among our American, Finnish and African informants can be found by looking at the social context of the language contact. In particular, in view of these results and those of others, we think the view of code-switching and borrowing advanced by Heath (1989) and by Nortier (1990) has some attractiveness. They have suggested that code-switching (i.e., morphological non-integration) of single items is the norm during the early stages of language contact, and borrowing becomes a norm when the language contact becomes more established and older.

There may be different partial explanations for this observation. The one we suggest here has to do with bilingual proficiency and with social networks during different phases of the language contact. Early in the language contact, there are no established norms of phonological or morphological incorporation of EL items into ML. The most obvious solution when bilinguals want to incorporate items from EL is not to integrate these, at least as long as conversation using these items is among bilinguals. As some of these one word code-switches get used more often, they may begin to be used in speech with less skilled bilinguals or monolinguals in ML. If we accept the claim that code-switching is only possible for speakers with a high level of skill in both languages, accommodation on the part of more highly skilled speakers towards less skilled or monolingual speakers would lead the former to begin to integrate these EL items morphologically and phonologically into ML. Alternatively, the one-term switches may be used by skilled bilinguals without integration, even in conversations with less skilled bilinguals. The latter then, when they begin to use these items actively, naturally begin to integrate them phonologically and morphologically, because their skill in EL doesn't permit them to use these items in an unintegrated form. In brief, our hypothesis is the following:

Hypothesis:

In order for the norm for incorporation of EL lexemes into ML in a particular bilingual community to be that of morphological integration, the following conditions should hold true:

1. There is a range of bilingual skill within the ML-speaking community. In particular, there is a substantial group of speakers with limited skill in EL.
2. There is a well-functioning (dense and multiplex) network of communication within the ML-speaking community, including both more skilled and less skilled speakers of EL, so that norms of integration of EL items into ML can be established and spread.

These two would seem to go hand-in-hand, since, if there are many monolinguals in ML, at least their networks will tend to be dominated by other speakers of ML. In the sections that follow, we will examine the extent to which this hypothesis is supported in the three cases of language contact examined in this paper.

3.1 *Finnish in Sweden*

Finnish-Swedish language contact has a long history. Swedish has been a minority language with equal or dominant status in Finland for centuries, so there is a large number of established Swedish loan words already in the Finnish language, current even in areas of Finland where few Swedish-speakers live (Andersson 1990). Since the original Swedish-Finnish language contact originated in a situation where Finnish was the dominated majority language, and the group of Finnish speakers skilled in Swedish was small, it was natural for the bilingual speakers to integrate their incorporations from Swedish into Finnish: they must often use them with speakers with little or no knowledge of Swedish. This stock of established loans follow similar patterns of both phonological, phonotactic and morphological integration. These patterns can presumably be easily “discovered” by Finnish immigrants to Sweden, when they begin learning Swedish (cf. Heath 1990, ch. 10-11: “standard borrowing routines”). They then have the tools for integrating virtually any Swedish word in their vocabulary into Finnish. The relatively tight social networks of Finns in Göteborg mean that new loan words can quickly be established in Sweden Finnish, some of these replacing Finnish equivalents currently used in Finland, e.g., Swe-Fi *kommuniseerata* “to communicate” (< swe. *kommunicera*) instead of Fi-Fi *kommunikoida*.

The Finnish-Swedish language contact is particularly interesting in light

of this hypothesis about the relationship between age of language contact and pattern of incorporation, because the contact can be considered both old and new. Although the contact is several centuries old on both sides of the Baltic, the language contact in Sweden has become much greater since 1960. We think these historical facts are reflected in the pattern of incorporations of Swedish words. In the Finnish group in Göteborg, some speakers follow strictly the “old” Finland Finnish norms of integration of Swedish words, and apply them to new Swedish words. Other speakers integrate more variably and partially, perhaps reflecting the fact that the Swedish-Finnish language contact is old in Finland but relatively young in Sweden, and that the proportion of skilled bilinguals in Swedish and Finnish is growing. This suggests perhaps that it is not only the age of the contact, as Heath and Nortier suggest, but rather the intensity of contact, and the relative sizes of the group of more-skilled and less-skilled bilinguals during various periods. The gradual and variable nature of the integration process can sometimes be observed in alternations between competing forms, even in the speech of a single informant (see examples of Swe. *klara sig* and *klara av* in (3) above).

In an earlier paper we have shown that the more fully integrated forms are favored by speakers whose contacts with other Finns are more frequent and intense, while the less integrated forms occur more frequently among more skilled bilingual speakers who have contacts in both the majority and minority groups (Boyd 1993). Hence this pattern seems to be emerging as a new, competing norm among some Sweden Finns.

3.2 *Americans in Göteborg*

The context of language contact of Finns in Göteborg is clearly different from that of Americans there. Although Göteborg has had an English-speaking community for about the last 300 years, there is no real continuity in the language contact. Each Swedish-born generation assimilates into the majority group, and language maintenance (if we can call it that) is achieved by the steady inflow of small numbers of new English speakers. Among those Americans who remain in Sweden, bilingual skills are consistently quite high, and contact with Swedes intense. Contacts within the group vary, but ties are generally relatively weak, so the possibility of establishing norms of integration of Swedish words into English are poor: the contact is short, and the networks are weak. This is particularly evident in treatments of definite single nouns, but our corpus gives other evidence for widely different treatments of

the same item by different speakers, including awkward loan translations (not counted as incorporations).

Since speakers are usually highly skilled in Swedish, they can normally “manage” to code-switch: to retain Swedish inflections on their incorporations, as long as there is a parallelism in structure between the two languages. Because the language contact is not continuous, and social ties within the group are weak and sporadic, there is not enough time or opportunity to establish patterns of integration for difficult cases, such as definite NPs. Boyd (1993) shows that American speakers with networks less dominated by Swedes are the most frequent users of incorporations, and actually begin to integrate a few of their incorporations from Swedish both phonologically and morphologically. However, these patterns presumably never get a chance to spread through the community (cf. Milroy & Milroy 1985).

3.3 *Sango-French bilinguals in CAR*

In the Sango case, language contact has existed for about 100 years, an intermediate length of time in relative terms. Here, a majority language, in this case a new language that emerged or at least spread during the colonial period, is dominated by a superposed minority language. French-Sango bilingualism is limited to a small group within the native population. Incorporations from French to Sango tend to be morphologically integrated, at least for plural marking, but the linguist interested in incorporation faces the problem that Sango doesn't have much morphology to integrate into. But the fact that plural is marked more frequently for French-origin than Sango-origin words suggests that integration is the norm for this community. Younger bilinguals in the community mark plural most often. We have no immediate explanation for the fact that the phonology of French incorporations seems to be retained by our informants, but the fact that less-educated Sango speakers integrate phonologically more than other groups supports the view that integration could be at least partly explained by accommodation to less-skilled bilinguals.

In both Swedish-Finnish language contact (especially earlier in its history in Finland), and Sango-French language contact, the group of skilled bilinguals presumably have plenty of contact with large numbers of less skilled bilinguals and monolinguals in Finnish and Sango, and might often feel the need to incorporate items from Swedish and French into their speech in Finnish and Sango, respectively. Even when their interlocutors are virtually monolingual in Finnish and Sango, they live in a multilingual community, and

have enough contact with EL to be somewhat familiar with certain lexical items. By integrating these items, phonologically and morphologically, the skilled bilinguals accommodate to their interlocutors, who are not proficient enough in EL to code-switch themselves. In contrast, in the American group in Sweden, virtually the entire group is bilingual in Swedish and English, so no such accommodation process is called for. When bilinguals meet newly-arrived Americans, they may very well integrate partially or completely, so as to accommodate to them. But there don't seem to be any established patterns of how this should be done, and, presumably, this happens so seldom and networks are so loosely knit that no particular pattern ever becomes established as a norm within the community.

Although we propose this hypothesis regarding the relationship between the socio-historical context of language contact and patterns of incorporations, we do not wish to discount completely other explanations. For example, typology may play another sort of role in helping to determine which classes of items are easiest to integrate in a particular ML/EL pair. These items can then act as what Heath calls a "foot in the door" for the introduction of more difficult items. EL items can easily be incorporated if the context doesn't require any morphology in either language, e.g., nouns in nominative singular contexts in Finnish and Swedish. When phonology or morphology overlap, and a particular function is expressed in a similar way in both languages, (e.g., Swedish and English s-genitive) then integration seems to be facilitated (Andersson 1993).

We also do not suggest that the sociolinguistic factors expressed in our hypothesis will explain preferences for integration or non-integration everywhere. Other potentially important factors which few have considered in looking at patterns of incorporation include attitudes towards incorporation in the community, and the uniformity or diversity of dialect backgrounds of informants who make up an immigrant community. But in the search for structurally-based universals of code-switching or borrowing, we should not ignore the sociolinguistic context of language contact, which we believe has an important impact on which structural solutions to the "problem" of incorporation are "chosen" by any particular multilingual community.

Notes

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The Sociolinguistic Dynamics of Apparent Convergence*

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1. Introduction

The transfer of grammatical structure in a situation of language contact has had a contentious history in linguistic thought, and no consensus has yet been reached regarding its nature, extent, or even its existence. Positions on the matter range from outright denial of the possibility of a mixed grammar to the claim that any linguistic feature can be transferred from one system to another, with a whole continuum of intermediate positions, e.g., that grammatical loans are only possible between very similar systems, or when they already correspond to the recipient language's developmental tendencies (Appel & Muysken 1987; Thomason & Kaufman 1988).

Moreover, as with many other language-contact phenomena, there is as yet no principled means of predicting which contact-induced changes will occur under which circumstances. As Thomason & Kaufman (1988) point out, study of the structural properties of language alone can not lead to a predictive theory of linguistic interference. This is because the direction and extent of interference, as well as the kinds of features transferred, are socially determined. Interestingly, the study of language contact, traditionally the province of historical linguistics, has until recently received very little attention from sociolinguists. As a result, many of the reports on the consequences of language contact have consisted of isolated observations of uncertain provenience or laundry lists of loanwords or other 'deviations'. Now, how-

ever, we have at our disposal a respectable number of empirically accountable studies of a wide variety of linguistic phenomena in different types of bilingual contexts, including those undergoing minority-language restriction (Mougeon & Bényak 1991), shift (Silva-Corvalán 1990, 1991a,b), obsolescence and death (Dorian 1981, 1989). Many of these studies report, in addition to lexical borrowing, the alteration of grammatical mechanisms in the minority language, changes that often involve the loss of distinctions inherent in this language, but which differ or are absent from the majority language.

Among the social factors considered relevant to contact-induced change (Thomason & Kaufman 1988; Weinreich 1953) are prestige of the contact languages, speaker attitudes towards them, degree of bilingualism, amount of 'cultural pressure', and intensity and length of contact, among others. But the traditional prerequisite for structural borrowing in historical linguistics is long-term contact, with widespread bilingualism. Grammatical convergence will presumably be even more likely in the presence of a constellation of favorable social factors.

In this context, the situation of French and English in Canada may be said to exemplify the classic scenario promoting structural borrowing. The languages have been in contact for over two centuries, but francophones outside of Quebec have been slowly but inexorably shifting toward English, the traditional language of business, administration and the media. French Canadian attitudes toward French have been characterized, in a large body of research, as demonstrating linguistic insecurity, which is widely considered to increase the susceptibility of the minority language to contact-induced change. Francophones, in contrast with their English-speaking counterparts, are also massively bilingual, typically active bilinguals who use French regularly for at least some aspects of ordinary communication. Their high level of bilingualism reflects in turn the more nebulous factor of 'cultural pressure' exerted on them by the politically and numerically dominant anglophones. Thus they score positively on all factors promoting even the most intimate borrowings.

Although we have documented extensive code switching (Poplack 1987), lexical borrowing and assimilation of integrated loanwords into the lexicon (Poplack et al. 1988) among highly bilingual French speakers in the Ottawa-Hull region, we have not succeeded in verifying the replacement of the grammatical structure of French by more English-like mechanisms. In this context, this paper examines the current use of the subjunctive mood in

Ottawa-Hull French, an excellent feature for this kind of investigation, since it has been reported to be disappearing elsewhere in Canadian French (Laurier 1989) as well as in Spanish-English contact situations (García 1985; Lantolf 1978; Ocampo 1990).

2. French-English Contact along the Quebec-Ontario Border

We focus here on the cities of Ottawa, Ontario, and Hull, Quebec, which together form the national capital region of Canada. The Ottawa/Hull urban complex is divided by the Ottawa River, which is simultaneously a provincial, geographic, and linguistic border, making the area an ideal laboratory for the synchronic study of contact-induced change: on the Quebec side, French is the majority language, while on the Ontario side it has minority status. Several years ago we initiated a large-scale empirical study of five core francophone neighborhoods on both sides of the border, each with a different ratio of anglophones, in order to investigate empirically the relationship between minority status and interlingual influence. Sampling procedures and corpus construction are detailed in Poplack (1989). The 120 randomly selected francophone informants constituting our sample were classified according to standard extralinguistic factors, as well as factors pertaining more directly to contact-related issues. We focus here on 1) bilingual ability on the individual level, as measured by an index of proficiency in English, and 2) intensity of contact on the community level, as measured by the factor of neighborhood of residence.¹ The received wisdom is that control of the minority language grammar is inversely correlated with degree of bilingualism on the individual level and exposure to the majority language in the wider environment. Although the individuals in our sample display degrees of proficiency in English ranging from 'low' to 'high', and reside in neighborhoods alongside varying proportions of anglophones, we note that their French cannot be said to be 'restricted' in the sense, say, of the Franco-Ontarians studied by Mougeon & Beniak (1991). Indeed, native ability in French was a prerequisite for inclusion in the sample. Nor do any of these neighborhoods appear to be undergoing language shift or loss. The 'bilingual' character of these speakers, insofar as they employ *both* languages regularly in the course of ordinary interaction and enjoy membership in stable bilingual communities, is perhaps what most distinguishes them from communities that have been studied in this regard by

other scholars of language contact. Although for some speakers French may be argued to be the ‘minority’ language in terms of numerical or prestige status on the national, or even local, level, it is not necessarily a minority language in terms of usage.

Informal sociolinguistic interviews were carried out with each of the informants by local in-group members, yielding a vast compendium of naturally occurring (and largely vernacular) bilingual discourse (Poplack 1989). As part of our ongoing research program, we have been assessing the existence in these materials of contact-induced change at various levels of linguistic structure.

3. The French Subjunctive: A Candidate for Contact-Induced Change?

At the syntactic level, one widespread phenomenon is the coexistence of indicative and conditional with the subjunctive mood in ‘subjunctive-selecting’ contexts, as illustrated in (1).

- (1) a. J’espère qu’ils *soient* (S) pas trop ingrats parce que je pense qu’il y en a beaucoup qui sont ingrats aujourd’hui. (015/887)²
 “I hope that they’re not too ungrateful, because I think that there are a lot of ingrates these days.”
- b. Mais j’espère que je *serais* (C) capable de passer à travers. (111/1616)
 “But I hope that I would be able to go through with it.”
- c. Mais j’espère que l’Église *est* (I) pas contre moi pour ça. (053/1525)
 “But I hope that the Church doesn’t hold that against me.”

Consultation of prescriptive grammars reveals, somewhat contradictorily, that 1) the subjunctive mood should be selected when the speaker wishes to convey notions of uncertainty, doubt or unrealis, but 2) a specific class of matrix verbs subcategorizes for subjunctive in the embedded clause. In the Ottawa-Hull French corpus, in contrast, we find each of the subjunctive, indicative and conditional embedded under the same matrix verb, in the same tense, sometimes by the same speaker, even when s/he is repeating the same thing to the same interlocutor (Poplack 1992). This is illustrated in (2).

- (2) a. Mais j'*aimerais* qu'elle *soit* (S) plus ouverte, mais on dirait qu'en vieillissant sont plus gênés. (040/1021) "But I'd like her to be more open, but it seems that as they get older, they get more shy."
- b. Je trouve qu'en vieillissant tu sais, j'*aimerais* qu'elle *serait* (C) plus proche. (040/1032) "I think that as she gets older you know, I'd like her to be closer."
- c. *Fallait* qu'elle *répond* (I) 'oui, tu peux faire trois pas de géant'. *Fallait* qu'elle *réponde* (S) la phrase complète. (025/2186) "She had to say 'yes, you may take three giant steps'. She had to say the whole sentence."

Faced with data like these in a language contact situation, the tendency is to infer that we are in the presence of contact-induced change, more specifically, convergence, which Silva-Corvalán (1991) defines, after Gumperz and Wilson (1971), as the "achievement of structural similarity in a given aspect of the grammar of two or more languages, assumed to be different at the onset of contact". In contrast to lexical borrowing, convergence need not involve any visible other-language material. Indeed, convergence may not involve any transfer at all: it may simply consist, as pointed out by Klein (1980), in the selection and favoring of one of two (or more) already existing native-language forms which coincides with a counterpart in the contact language. In this sense, since English no longer makes productive use of the subjunctive, the observed alternation between subjunctive, indicative and conditional could be interpreted as a gradual replacement by French speakers of a mood with no real counterpart in English by an already existing tense/mood form — the indicative — which mirrors one in the dominant/majority language. This may also be viewed in terms of what Mougeon and Beniak (1991:11) call 'covert interference': a minority-language feature undergoes gradual decline and eventual loss because it lacks an interlingual counterpart in the majority language. This form of interference does not result in the emergence of innovations; it simply impinges on the frequency of use of minority-language features. Parenthetically, if speakers were in fact no longer able to employ the device of mood selection to convey nuances of doubt and assertion, as required by prescriptive grammar, the variation could qualify as simplification. Indeed, Silva-Corvalán (1990) suggests that "simplification and loss ... affect first those forms used in contexts of higher hypotheticality or weaker assertiveness", i.e., conditional and subjunctive forms.

But in order to identify mood variation as convergence, it must first be established 1) that change has in fact occurred, i.e., that pre-contact stages of the language, as well as sister varieties not in close contact, did not feature the alternation in question, at least not to its present quantitative extent, and 2) that such change, if there is one, is due, if not entirely then at least partially, to contact with another language, i.e., is not internally-motivated.

Contemporary variationist sociolinguistic studies tend to accomplish this kind of demonstration by incorporating into the analysis some social factor representing the contact axis, such as informants of varying bilingual abilities or different ages of arrival in the dominant-language speaking region. An apparent-time dimension based on age-groups or 'generations' may also be included. With the aid of quantitative analysis it now becomes possible to test whether the putative converging structure is associated statistically with a certain subgroup of the population: typically the younger and/or more bilingual or majority language-dominant speakers. On this basis, Laurier (1989) concluded, from data much like those in (1), that a contact-induced syntactic change was taking place. His English-dominant Franco-Ontarian informants (members of Mougeon & Beniak's 1991 sample) were 'losing' mood distinctions in French when compared with French-dominant speakers in his sample, and those he qualified as 'bilinguals' were not far behind. Ocampo (1990) studied the distribution of mood usage among Spanish-English bilinguals in Los Angeles (members of Silva-Corvalán's sample) and concluded too that the tendency was toward loss of the subjunctive. He further asserts that higher rates of subjunctive absence among the third generation in optional contexts is evidence that this mood has lost its semantic features, a 'change' he characterizes as "simplification" (p.45). Similarly, Silva-Corvalán (1990, 1991a, 1991b) has noted an increase in grammatical innovations among her English-dominant Chicano informants.

Analysis of the effect of social factors on subjunctive usage among francophones in the Ottawa-Hull region (Table 1) reveals exactly this sort of result as well.

Table 1 depicts a variable rule analysis of the contribution of extralinguistic factors to the probability that subjunctive will be chosen under subjunctive-selecting verbal matrices. Four factors appear to play a role, albeit often contradictory. First, there is a small, but regular, sex effect, with women favoring subjunctive use, a result that is not surprising given the widely reported tendency of women toward socially normative linguistic behavior. Speaker age also contributes a statistically significant effect, but the distribu-

Table 1. Variable rule analysis of the contribution of social factors to the choice of subjunctive mood under verbal matrices.³

Corrected Mean: .715							
	SEX	AGE	NEIGHBORHOOD OF RESIDENCE		ENGLISH PROFICIENCY		
Female	.52	45-54	.55	Vieux Hull (Q)	.57	mid-low	.54
		55-64	.53	West End	.51	low	.53
Male	.46	15-24	.52	Vanier	.50	mid-high	.48
		25-34	.50	Basse-Ville	.50	high	.42
		65+	.48	Mont Bleu (Q)	.43		
		35-44	.44				

Factors not selected: Socioeconomic class, Educational level.

tion of age groups does not point to change in progress toward indicative usage, nor to any other readily interpretable pattern. Neighborhood of residence (which can be construed as an informal measure of intensity of contact on the community level) is also significant, albeit again not in the direction predicted of a contact-induced change. Instead, the working class Quebec neighborhood, Vieux Hull, inexplicably shows the highest probability of subjunctive usage, at .57, while the upper middle-class Quebec neighborhood, Mont Bleu, shows the lowest (.43). This result is not consistent with expectations of this variable either with regard to social class or to status of French in the neighborhood. The factor of English proficiency, interpretable as a measure of individual bilingual ability, shows a much clearer pattern. Speakers with only 'low' and 'mid-low' proficiency in English are precisely those with the greatest probability of subjunctive usage, while those with greater knowledge of that language tend to use it less. This is as would be expected if contact with English were causing the loss of the French subjunctive, and is exactly the kind of result that led the aforementioned authors to infer that grammatical transfer had occurred.

Is it reasonable to conclude that convergence has taken place on the basis of data like those in Table 1? As a first observation, we would like all the factor effects to point in the same direction before pronouncing unambiguously in favor of convergence. The fact that only the English proficiency factor is negatively correlated with subjunctive use, while its partners in contact-induced change, speaker age and neighborhood of residence, show different and even opposing trends, is a warning that the observed patterns may be masking other effects, perhaps of factors not selected as significant. We return to this issue below.

The question of inferring convergence from the results of Table 1 also raises the issue of causation. While Thomason and Kaufman's (1988) contention that social factors are primordial in determining existence and degree of convergence seems uncontroversial, they do not rule out the possibility of multiple causation; it remains to be determined whether they outweigh other, purely internal, causes. So definitive interpretation of the patterns of Table 1 must be reserved until the internal conditioning of mood choice is known. Specifically, is subjunctive in fact used to convey nuances in meaning, as asserted in many prescriptive grammars? Is mood choice regularly conditioned by features of the linguistic context, or do the different tense/mood forms appear randomly under the different matrices, as would be expected if the rule were being lost? Finally, are there any historical or non-contact precursors for the observed synchronic variability in the bilingual setting?

A massive study of the internal conditioning of mood choice under verbal matrices in this same corpus (Poplack 1992) revealed that all subjunctive-selecting matrices of even moderate frequency showed variability in actual mood choice. This variability was found to be constrained, not by differences in semantic nuances, but by factors of a purely morphosyntactic nature. Moreover, the contemporary patterns are most appropriately viewed as a synchronic reflex of long-term stable variation throughout the history of French, making it difficult to characterize them as resulting from *change*. How then can the finding that the most proficient bilinguals used least subjunctive (Table 1) be explained?

4. The Social Conditioning of Mood Choice

An often unremarked problem with quantitative analysis is that apparent quantitative effects of social factors may be artifacts of differences on other levels. An individual coded as female, say, will also simultaneously belong to a certain age group, socioeconomic class, educational level, etc. If, due to poor data distribution in a corpus, most of the women also happen to have completed university, and education is not taken into account in the analysis, then a feature which appears to be promoted by women might really be due to high education. Previous studies have shown, similarly, that quantitative effects on the syntactic, morphological or phonological levels are on occasion artifacts of differences on the lexical level. If speakers from two groups show

Table 2. *Distribution of verbal matrices across categories of text frequency and propensity to select subjunctive mood.*

HIGH FREQUENCY/ HIGH SUBJUNCTIVE		% SUBJUNCTIVE	% DATA
<i>Falloir</i>	“have to”	89	62
<i>Vouloir</i>	“want”	91	11
<i>Aimer</i>	“like”	67	
HIGH FREQUENCY/ LOW SUBJUNCTIVE			
<i>Croire (neg)</i>	“not believe”	13	15
<i>Penser (neg)</i>	“not think”	14	
<i>Admettre</i>	“admit”	9	
<i>Avoir l'air</i>	“seem”	0	
<i>Espérer</i>	“hope”	21	
LOW FREQUENCY/ VARIABLE SUBJUNCTIVE			
All other verbal matrices			12

quantitatively different preferences for two lexical items, and these items behave differently with respect to some linguistic variable, this will show up as a difference between the two groups with respect to that variable, if no provision is made for factoring out the lexical effect.

Poplack (1992) notes an overwhelming association of the subjunctive with *falloir* “must, have to”, representing 62% of all verbal matrices used. In fact, the distribution of subjunctive-selecting verbal matrices is even more skewed than this, as can be observed from Table 2.⁶

An additional 11% of the matrices is made up of the two verbs *vouloir* “want” and *aimer* “like”, also highly associated with subjunctive, at 91% and 67%, respectively. Members of another class of verbs occur quite frequently, but rarely, if ever, with the subjunctive. If the distribution of matrix types differs across the various subgroups of speakers, this could generate apparent social effects like those observed in the aggregate analysis. To verify whether this is a reasonable explanation for the patterns displayed in Table 1, the lexical factor must be taken into account during the statistical analysis.

4.1 *The lexical effect on social distribution*

Tables 3 and 4 cross-tabulate verb class use by social category. Table 3 shows that *falloir*, *vouloir* and *aimer*, which we have seen to be high frequency/high

Table 3. *Distribution of classes of subjunctive-selecting verbal matrices according to sex.*⁴

	FEMALE	MALE
	%	%
<i>Falloir</i>	62	58
<i>Vouloir/ Aimer</i>	15	10
High frequency/ Low S	12	19
Low frequency/ Variable S	12	13
TOTAL Ns	1747	1044

Table 4. *Distribution of classes of subjunctive-selecting verbal matrices according to neighborhood of residence.*

	OTTAWA, ONTARIO			HULL, QUEBEC	
	VANIER	BASSE-VILLE	WEST END	VIEUX HULL	MONT BLEU
	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Falloir</i>	59	61	67	61	53
<i>Vouloir/ Aimer</i>	11	13	11	16	13
High frequency/ Low S	18	13	14	12	18
Low frequency/ Variable S	12	13	8	10	16
TOTAL Ns	411	661	583	588	548

subjunctive verbs, are clearly used more by women than by men. The opposite is true for the high frequency/low subjunctive verbs, which represent 19% of the data for men. This may explain the apparent sex effect in the aggregate analysis (Table 1).

The distribution of matrices across neighborhoods (Table 4) offers a straightforward explanation of the surprisingly low rate of subjunctive usage in the upper-middle-class francophone neighborhood of Mont Bleu observed in Table 1, especially compared to the adjacent working-class neighborhoods of Vieux Hull in Quebec, and the predominantly English-speaking West End of Ottawa, both of which favored subjunctive in the aggregate analysis. That result was counter-intuitive, but can now be explained by the large amounts of *falloir*, *vouloir* and *aimer* in the latter two neighborhoods, and the disproportionately small amount in Mont Bleu. Mont Bleu in turn has the largest proportion of variable and low subjunctive matrices, perhaps pointing to the

Table 5. Variable rule analyses of the contribution of English proficiency to the choice of subjunctive mood in verbs embedded under four classes of verbal matrix.⁵

VERBS EMBEDDED UNDER:	ENGLISH PROFICIENCY			
	LOW	MID-LOW	MID-HIGH	HIGH
<i>Falloir</i> } High frequency/ High S	.55	.58	.40	.42
<i>Vouloir / aimer</i> }	.46	.58	.42	.60
High frequency/Low S verbs	.68	.47	.49	.31
Low frequency/Variable S verbs	.34	.60	.61	.39

more diverse vocabulary associated with middle-class speakers. The same exercise applied to the age and English proficiency effects suggests that these are not artifacts of frequencies of use of different subjunctive-selecting matrices. Neither education nor social class were selected as significant to mood choice in the aggregate analysis. It seems evident, then, that the variable rule results in Table 1 are due, at least to some extent, to the confounding effects of the uneven distribution across the population of the verbal matrices.

4.2 Factoring out the lexical effect

To confirm these impressions, we reran the variable rule analysis four times, once for each class of matrix verb, so that there could be no effect of distribution on the social factors. As predicted, sex and neighborhood were no longer selected as significant. Also predictably, age was found to be significant, though its effects differed in each analysis. Thus, the effect of this factor cannot be interpreted as indicating change in progress, or age-grading, or any other systematic tendency. It is simply an artifact of the original sampling of the speakers, as confirmed in all four analyses.

Most important are the changes in the new analyses with respect to English proficiency and social class. Table 5 shows that the factor of English proficiency continues to be selected as significant for each class of verbal matrix, but comparison of factor weights for the four proficiency levels reveals no systematic trend: the proficiency level which most favors the subjunctive differs for each class. The pattern represented by these results, in fact there is one, is not readily interpretable. For present purposes we note only the negative finding that increased proficiency in English shows no evidence of being associated with a loss or even decrease of subjunctive usage.

On the other hand, socioeconomic class, which was not previously retained as significant in the aggregate analysis, is now selected in two of the four analyses in which the lexical effect is factored out (Table 6). Comparison of factor weights for the four occupational groupings reveals that professionals, the highest category distinguished, favor the subjunctive most in three of the four analyses, while unskilled workers contribute the lowest or second-lowest probabilities in three analyses.

Thus a class-based explanation of the propensity towards subjunctive usage emerges as the only one that is systematically supported by the data when the distribution of verbal matrices is taken into account. Neither age nor contact with English, whether on the community level, as represented by the factor of neighborhood, or on the individual level, as represented by the factor of English proficiency, plays a consistent role. This despite the fact that both factors were selected as significant, since no trend emerges from all or even most of the independent verb class analyses.

5. Subjunctive Usage under Non-verbal Matrices

Aside from the embedded noun clauses discussed in preceding sections, a number of other contexts require subjunctive mood according to prescriptive sources, including adverbial and adjectival clauses governed by a variety of conjunctions and temporal, causal, concessive, comparative, circumstantial, final, and other impersonal expressions. Two of these are illustrated in (3).

- (3) a. *Moi-même, je serais craintive de sortir sur la rue à moins que je serais (C) en auto. (019/1768)*
 “Even I would be afraid to go out on the street unless I’d be in a car.”
- b. *On les évite à moins que ça soit (S) de l’urgence. (019/324)*
 “We avoid them unless it’s an emergency.”
- c. *A moins tu es (I) pas une buveuse de lait. (063/2460)*
 “Unless you’re not a milk drinker.”

Table 7 indicates that the distribution of non-verbal matrices as well as the distribution of mood choice across them are again highly skewed. Three matrices highly associated with the subjunctive — *avant que* “before”, *mais que* “as soon as” and *pour que* “so that” — are also very frequent, accounting

Table 6. Variable rule analyses of the contribution of socioeconomic class to the choice of subjunctive mood in verbs embedded under four classes of verbal matrix.

VERBS EMBEDDED UNDER:	SOCIOECONOMIC CLASS				
	UNSKILLED	SKILLED	SALES/ SERVICE	PROFES- SIONAL	
<i>Falloir</i>	} High frequency/ High S	.45	.53	.47	.69
<i>Vouloir / aimer</i>		.36	.62	.64	.52
High frequency/Low S verbs		.56	.47	.42	.58
Low frequency/ Variable S verbs		.50	.51	.42	.68

Table 7. Distribution of non-verbal matrices across categories of text frequency and propensity to select subjunctive mood.

HIGH FREQUENCY/ HIGH SUBJUNCTIVE		% SUBJUNCTIVE	% DATA
<i>Avant (que)</i>	"before"	91	9
<i>Mais que</i>	"as soon as"	89	7
<i>Pour (que)</i>	"so that"	96	12
HIGH FREQUENCY/ LOW SUBJUNCTIVE			
<i>Le premier (que)</i>	"the first"	1	6
<i>Le seul (que)</i>	"the only"	1	13
<i>Malgré (que)</i>	"despite"	1	11
<i>être rare (que)</i>	"it's rare that"	0	6
LOW FREQUENCY/VARIABLE SUBJUNCTIVE			
All others			36

by themselves for almost a third of the data. Another class of matrices, including the superlatives *le premier (que)* "the first" and *le seul (que)* "the only", the concessive conjunction *malgré (que)* "despite" and the impersonal expression *être rare (que)* "to be rare" constitute more than another third of the data, and only exceedingly rarely take the subjunctive, if at all. The remaining matrices make up the final third of the data. Each occurs relatively infrequently, with or without the subjunctive.

We now examine the contribution of social factors to the choice of subjunctive mood in verbs embedded under these non-verbal matrices. The variable rule analysis displayed in Table 8 shows that only two factors were selected as significantly affecting the probability that subjunctive will be selected under non-verbal matrices: speaker age and neighborhood of residence. Although the suggestion that older speakers use somewhat more

Table 8. *Variable rule analysis of the contribution of social factors to the choice of subjunctive mood under non-verbal matrices.*

Corrected mean: .46		NEIGHBORHOOD	
AGE			
45-54	.55	QUEBEC	Vieux Hull .59
55-64	.54		Mont Bleu .53
65+	.54		West End .51
15-24	.49	ONTARIO	Basse-Ville .44
35-44	.45		Vanier .43
25-34	.44		

FACTORS NOT SELECTED: Sex, Educational level, Socioeconomic class, English proficiency.

Table 9. *Variable rule analysis of the contribution of social factors to the choice of subjunctive mood under high frequency/ high subjunctive non-verbal matrices.*

Corrected Mean: .92		SOCIOECONOMIC CLASS	
AGE			
55-64	.73	PROFESSIONAL	.74
65+	.55	SALES/SERVICE	.55
45-54	.52	UNSKILLED	.49
25-34	.48	SKILLED	.35
15-24	.45		
35-44	.28		

FACTORS NOT SELECTED: Sex, Educational level, English proficiency, Neighborhood.

subjunctive than younger ones is clearer here than in the aggregate analysis of verbal matrices (Table 1), the same curvilinear distribution of age groups is apparent, with middle-aged speakers using less subjunctive than the youngest ones. Similarly, although the neighborhood effect indicates that subjunctive is preferred in Quebec, as would be expected under a theory of convergence, we again note the same counter-intuitive result observed earlier: the working-class Vieux Hull neighborhood favors subjunctive more than its upper-middle-class counterpart, Mont Bleu. The latter in turn shows a rate of subjunctive usage similar to the largely working-class and predominantly anglophone West End neighborhood in Ottawa, where French is a minority language. To ascertain whether the distribution of subjunctive governors was responsible for these results, as suggested by the data in Table 7, and as was found for the matrix verbs studied above, we repeated the calculations of Tables 3 and 4, this time crosstabulating non-verbal matrix class with social category.

Table 10. *Variable rule analysis of the contribution of social factors to the choice of subjunctive mood under low frequency/variable subjunctive non-verbal matrices.*

Corrected Mean: .49									
		SOCIOECONOMIC		ENGLISH		NEIGHBORHOOD			
AGE		CLASS		PROFICIENCY					
15-24	.70	PROFESSIONAL	.67	HIGH	.76	QUEBEC	Mont Bleu	.72	
45-54	.56	SKILLED	.57	MID-HIGH	.58		Vieux Hull	.63	
35-34	.51	UNSKILLED	.51	LOW	.49		Basse-Ville	.45	
65+	.48	SALES/SERVICE	.33	MID-LOW	.35	ONTARIO	West End	.35	
55-64	.38						Vanier	.25	
35-44	.30								

FACTORS NOT SELECTED: Sex, Educational level.

The three oldest age groups were found to use most high frequency/high subjunctive matrices, and least high frequency/low subjunctive matrices, apparently explaining their contributions in the variable rule analysis in Table 8. Similarly, speakers residing in both Vieux Hull (Quebec) and the West End of Ottawa employ many high frequency/high subjunctive matrices, likely explaining their comparatively elevated probabilities of .59 and .51 respectively. But interestingly, the upper-middle-class Mont Bleu speakers actually use more high frequency/low subjunctive non-verbal matrices, just as they did with the verbs. This suggests that their propensity toward subjunctive usage depicted in Table 8 is due to a real preference for this mood, even with matrices not statistically associated with it, a result which is supported by the class effect observed earlier with the verbal matrices.⁷

As previously, we factor out the lexical effect of the matrix by redoing the variable rule analysis, first including only high frequency/high subjunctive matrices, then low frequency/variable subjunctive matrices.⁸ As predicted, Table 9 shows that the age factor has been retained as significant for high frequency/high subjunctive matrices. But the neighborhood factor, as we had suspected, has now been replaced by the factor of class. Once again, professionals, the highest occupational class distinguished, favor subjunctive mood more than any other group.


For low frequency/variable subjunctive matrices (Table 10), two factors were selected besides age and class: neighborhood and English proficiency. The elevated contribution of upper-middle-class Mont Bleu is exactly as predicted, and confirms that its residents use more subjunctive than warranted, particularly with verbs that may require this mood prescriptively, but are not otherwise statistically associated with subjunctive. Somewhat more

surprising is the effect of English proficiency: the speakers with *most* bilingual ability are those who favor subjunctive the most, precisely the opposite result of what would be required to conclude positively in favor of contact-induced grammatical change. Analyses of the non-verbal matrices again fail to provide consistent evidence for convergence, or for the most bilingual speakers as its agents. What we do find, in contrast, is a consistent class effect, which we may interpret as suggesting that the social meaning of the subjunctive includes the prestige features associated with the upper classes.

6. Summary and Discussion

By way of summary, Figure 1 recapitulates the sometimes contradictory trends of Tables 1-10, and illustrates their relationship to the establishment of convergence. For the verbal and non-verbal matrices, the upper levels of each part of the diagram (abstracted from Tables 1 and 8 respectively) depict the factors selected by the stepwise multiple regression procedure as significant (enclosed in boxes) to the probability that subjunctive mood will be selected in verbs embedded under the respective subjunctive-selecting context. The lower levels display the factors selected as significant after the lexical effect is factored out through separate analysis of each class of matrix.

The calculations may be interpreted in terms of three major hypotheses. The first is that individual level of bilingualism, or degree of proficiency in the dominant language, is inversely correlated with mastery of the minority language grammar, including conditions for use of the subjunctive. Under this hypothesis, bilingualism entails simplification and/or loss, a scenario consistent with the comparatively depressed probabilities of subjunctive usage among the high English proficiency speakers. The second is that insufficient exposure to French resulting from a predominance of anglophones in the (local or wider) environment reduces the input necessary for acquisition and use of the subjunctive, particularly among younger speakers. This might result in 'interference' or 'restructuring' of various types (Mougeon & B niak 1991). Such an effect would be evidenced by lower probabilities of subjunctive usage among residents of the Ontario communities and/or among the youngest speakers. The third possibility is that the subjunctive is selected because it reflects the prestige (overtly or covertly) associated with the upper classes. The factor of prestige is traditionally inferred when the variant in question is preferred by upper-middle class speakers, but it can also be argued



LEGEND:

Selected as significant by the stepwise multiple regression procedure

BILINGUALISM ENTAILS LOSS OF SUBJUNCTIVE
REDUCED EXPOSURE ENTAILS ACQUISITION
SUBJUNCTIVE REFLECTS PRESTIGE

Figure 1. Factors selected as significant to the probability that subjunctive will be selected under verbal and non-verbal matrices before and after the lexical effect is factored out.

to be operating when the abovementioned trends are reversed, e.g., when the youngest or the most highly bilingual speakers use *most* subjunctive. The direction of the effect contributed by each factor, when discernible, is indicated by its font.

At least one factor relevant to the establishment of contact-induced grammatical change was selected in each of the original analyses: degree of individual bilingualism in the case of the verbal matrices, and exposure to English on the community level in the case of the non-verbal matrices, both in the expected directions. But though the results for the verbal matrices suggest that proficiency in English is negatively correlated with subjunctive usage, the factors of neighborhood of residence and age lend no support to the hypothesis of 'loss'. In the case of the non-verbal matrices, the Quebec neighborhoods were found to contribute greater probabilities to subjunctive usage than the Ontario neighborhoods, a result which may be attributed to reduced opportunity to acquire and use the subjunctive. However, this same analysis also yielded the counter-intuitive result that the working-class Quebec neighborhood displayed a greater propensity to use the subjunctive than its upper-middle-class counterpart, which in turn used the subjunctive at a rate almost identical with that of the predominantly anglophone and working-class West End of Ottawa. Though the factor of age was also retained in both data sets, only in the non-verbal matrices do we find a trend toward decreased subjunctive usage among the younger speakers, albeit minimal.

As detailed in §4.1 and §5, the uneven associations of matrices with mood, in terms of both frequency of occurrence and propensity to co-occur with the subjunctive, mean that preference for use of a given class of matrix on the part of a subgroup of the population must inevitably result in an overall tendency to favor or disfavor subjunctive. We thus factored out the lexical effect by reanalyzing the data on each matrix class separately, as depicted in the lower half of Figure 1. Interestingly enough, exposure to English on the community level, as represented by the factor of neighborhood, is now only significant to subjunctive use in one analysis: with low frequency/variable subjunctive non-verbal matrices, residents of the two Quebec neighborhoods use more subjunctive than their Ontario counterparts (Table 8), a result suggestive of contact-induced change. The behavior of the factor of individual bilingualism, as represented by proficiency in English, though selected as significant in four of the six analyses, only displays results interpretable in terms of convergence in one: speakers with the least proficiency in English favor subjunctive most in high frequency/low subjunctive verbal matrices

(cf. Table 5). With low frequency/variable subjunctive non-verbal matrices, however, the trend is reversed: speakers with the most proficiency in English display the greatest propensity by far to *use* the subjunctive (cf. Table 10). Similarly, the factor of age, though selected as significant in each of the analyses, points in the direction of loss in only one: older speakers favor subjunctive usage with high frequency/high subjunctive non-verbal matrices somewhat more than younger ones (Table 9). In contrast, the youngest speakers lead in subjunctive usage with low frequency/variable subjunctive matrices (Table 10).

The only factor to contribute a significant *and* consistent effect to the choice of subjunctive mood is one whose effects had been entirely obscured by the lexical effect in the original analyses: social class. In five out of six analyses we find the confirmation of earlier indications (Tables 6 and 10) that professionals favor subjunctive usage, *regardless* of the lexical nature of the matrix. This result makes sense in light of the opaque nature of the subjunctive/indicative alternation detailed in Poplack (1992) and also corresponds well to speaker attitudes toward use of this mood. Moreover, other results in Figure 1, such as its increased use by the youngest and most bilingual speakers (Tables 5 and 10) also confirm the prestige nature of the subjunctive.

6.1 *Interpreting the effects of uneven distribution*

The results of Tables 2, 4, and 7, in which the uneven distribution of the matrices is detailed, raise the inevitable question of how to interpret this effect. *Why* do women use more volitive matrices than men, or older speakers more temporal and purpose matrices than younger ones? There is no consistent age effect on distribution, so it is not due to the phasing in or out of lexical items. There is a neighborhood effect, but it is not likely to be a dialectological phenomenon, since the geographically closest neighborhoods differ the most. Indeed, the neighborhood effect coincides with the effect of class (though they are not coterminous) insofar as professionals and residents of the bourgeois neighborhood use fewer high frequency matrices than unskilled workers and residents of working-class neighborhoods. In view of the known differences in communicative behavior with respect to speech acts associated with many, though clearly not all, of the matrices in this study, a pragmatic explanation seems most likely. Such an analysis, requiring detailed examination of the content of the interviews, the nature of the interaction between the participants in the conversation, etc., is beyond the scope of this paper. On the

basis of the available data, we limit ourselves to the observation that whatever the ultimate explanation, it is not relevant to the contact situation, nor to the establishment of contact-induced change.

6.2 *The orthogonality of linguistic and extra-linguistic factors*

Experience shows that the social and linguistic factors influencing a linguistic variable can usually be analyzed separately. In other words, results for linguistic factors in a variable rule run that also includes social factors will usually differ little from one where no account is taken of which speaker produced which token. Similarly, results for social factors will not depend strongly on whether linguistic factors are included in the run or not. This orthogonality of the linguistic and the social stems from the fact that whereas different speakers may treat a variable very differently, the different contexts in which this variable shows up will themselves be fairly uniformly distributed from speaker to speaker. One speaker may delete many *-t, d'*s and another very few, but the proportion of monomorphemic versus past tense environments, or prevocalic versus postvocalic environments will not differ substantially.

In the data presented here, in contrast, matrix class does *not* behave like a typical linguistic factor. Its distribution does differ from speaker to speaker, so that in interpreting the original variable rule run, the analyst is misled by the assumption of orthogonality between linguistic and social factors. When a number of apparently significant social factors were reanalyzed, their effects were found to be epiphenomenal: they were due in large part to the hidden factor of lexical distribution. Once the type of subjunctive governor was factored out, it became possible to distinguish the true from the apparent effects. The obvious danger for the analyst in this sort of data configuration lies in inferring extralinguistic conditioning (here, external motivation for mood variability) where it may not in fact be warranted. This is the case for the putative contact-induced grammatical change we have investigated here.

6.3 *Implications for a theory of convergence*

The results of this study also raise some more general questions about convergence. In theory, the view that anything can be borrowed under the right circumstances seems uncontroversial. But in practice, when an apparent case of convergence is pursued scientifically, it often disappears.

Why are these results so different from those reported by other scholars of language contact? It has been suggested that internal explanations for minority-language change originate in the politically laudable (though intellectually suspect) desire to champion the 'integrity' of the minority language, usually the domain of the underprivileged. Mougeon and Beniak observe that:

in contrast and perhaps even in reaction to contrastivism, other linguists, for whom it is important that minority languages be presented in a favorable light so as to counter exaggerated claims that they are hybrid and that their speakers are inferior, have overemphasized internal explanations of minority-language change... (1991:9).

This observation is of course reminiscent of Lavandera's (1978) critique of Laberge's (1980) recognition of functional equivalence of the French pronominal forms *tu/vous* "you" with *on* "one" in indefinite contexts. Lavandera dismissed the 'social conviction' she detected behind Laberge's caveat against equating loss of *on* with loss of a referential distinction, and called for more empirical proof that loss had not occurred and that it had no cognitive consequences.⁹ Perhaps there is a more objective explanation. Because the studies of Dorian, Mougeon and Beniak, Silva-Corvalán and our own are all quantitative, the tendency is to consider them directly comparable. But we may be comparing apples and oranges. Thomason and Kaufman (1988) distinguish two basic mechanisms for contact-induced language change: borrowing and substratum interference, which they consider fundamental in that some of the constraints proposed on them are in fact relevant only to one. Borrowing refers to the "incorporation of foreign features into a group's *native* language by speakers of that language. The native language is maintained, but is changed by the addition of the incorporated features". In substratum interference, the changes result from imperfect L₂ acquisition and are initiated by the *shifting* speakers. Moreover, the greatest amount of interference through shift will occur in the absence of full bilingualism. In the contexts of language restriction, shift and obsolescence studied by these scholars, structural change may in fact be inevitable, given that many of the informants in the samples analyzed are already majority-language-dominant or 'semi'-speakers. Though ethnically minority-group members, such speakers may in effect be L₂ speakers of the minority language. Another important difference between borrowing and interference through shift, according to Thomason and Kaufman (1988:41), concerns the time required for far-reaching structural modifications to come about. All cases of borrowing involving extensive structural change in the borrowing language have a history of

several hundred years of contact. In contrast, shift may take as little as a generation. As mentioned earlier, the French-English contact situation studied here qualifies as eligible for structural interference on all of Thomason and Kaufman's criteria (with the possible exception of length of contact). Nonetheless, as they also point out (p. 35), the sociolinguistic history of the speakers is the primary determinant of the linguistic outcomes of language contact.

The results of this study suggest that findings about restricted minority-language usage, interesting and valuable though they may be in their own right, are not necessarily applicable to bilinguals who make *regular* use of a minority *and* a dominant language, and who neither individually nor as a group are undergoing language shift or loss. This is the case of the franco-phone communities of Ottawa and Hull we have studied here.

What then is the source of the variation? We submit that claims regarding loss or simplification of the French subjunctive derive from notions of the 'standard' and/or of an earlier stage of the language that are highly idealized. Thus Laurier (1989) and Ocampo (1990) divided the subjunctive-selecting contexts in their studies into 'obligatory' and 'optional' on the basis of prescription only, and then set out to ascertain how many times subjunctive mood was absent from each. The accumulating body of evidence has shown beyond a doubt (Auger 1988; Davies 1979; Laurier 1989; Poplack 1992; Sand 1981) that the 'obligatory' contexts for subjunctive usage in French are currently obligatory in name only. According to Torres (1989) this may be the case in Spanish as well.

Moreover, the elusive 'earlier stage' may well have been considerably more similar to the synchronic situation than it is given credit for, at least with regard to the mood phenomena studied here. Certainly close inspection of the historical record on mood variation in French suggests that there was at least as much variability at earlier periods as is observed today. This has been reflected in the superhuman efforts of French-language prescriptivists to compress all the variability into a few categorical classes and rules. Their efforts have been reflected over the duration in literary and intellectual and upper-class discourse, but not necessarily in speaker vernaculars, either in Canada or in other French-speaking areas, then or now.

Notes

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- 1 Proficiency in English was calculated on the basis of the cumulative scores of each speaker on the following measures: 1) Reported language used most frequently overall; 2) Reported language used most frequently to specific interlocutors (parents, children, spouse, boss, coworkers, neighbors and friends); 3) Reported skills in reading, writing, speaking and understanding English; and 4) Proportion of schooling in which *both* French and English were the medium of instruction. Speakers were divided into four rough levels of proficiency in English according to their scores on a Cumulative English Index, ranging from 0 to .829, which we have arbitrarily labelled 'low', 'mid-low', 'mid-high' and 'high'. Intensity of contact in a neighborhood was measured by the official status of English at the provincial level and number of English-mother-tongue claimants at the local level, according to Census reports.
 - 2 Codes identify speaker and line number of her utterance in the Ottawa-Hull French Corpus (Poplack 1989). Bold-face capital letters refer to Subjunctive, Conditional and (present) Indicative respectively.
 - 3 The calculations in this and ensuing variable rule analyses were carried out using Goldvarb, a logistic regression application for the Macintosh (Rand and Sankoff 1988). Neighborhoods identified with 'Q' are located in Quebec, where French is the official and majority language.
 - 4 The percentages given in tables 3 and 4 are *not* percentages of subjunctive use, but simply percentages of use of a given class of verb. When the class is highly correlated with subjunctive, as indicated in Table 2, we can assume that a fair percentage of subjunctive was also used.
 - 5 Tables 5 and 6 each display part of the results of four separate variable rule analyses.
 - 6 This skewing is not a result of sampling bias, but reflects actual speaker behavior.
 - 7 The distribution of matrix classes in the other two neighborhoods corresponds to their associated probabilities.
 - 8 There were not enough applications in the class of high frequency/low subjunctive matrices to permit statistical analysis.
 - 9 See Sankoff 1988 for discussion.

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Varbrul and the Human/Inanimate Polarization of the Swahili Object Marker

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1. Introductory Remarks

Perhaps the single innovation which most indicates the uniqueness of Labov's contributions to linguistics is his recognition of the LINGUISTIC VARIABLE as a feature of an adequate linguistic description, furthest developed in the Varbrul algorithm as a tool of linguistic analysis. There are several things to note about this choice. One is the view that the analysis of a language cannot achieve genuine descriptive adequacy unless it includes observations about the set of structural elements that are subject to variation. Accepting Chomsky's (1964:62ff) classic notion about levels of adequacy in linguistic analysis, Labov's contribution implies that we will never achieve explanatory adequacy if we restrict our notion of descriptive adequacy to categorical grammars. Thus, while there are an increasing number of informative categorical descriptions of an increasing number of languages, Labov's innovation leads us to ask about them, 'which elements are subject to what kinds of variation?'

Another thing to note is that Labov's innovation presupposes the use of data from conversational speech behavior in performing a linguistic analysis, since this is where linguistic variation is immediately and abundantly obvious, and susceptible to analysis. The reliance on speech behavior, as opposed to less inclusive 'grammaticality' judgments (with associated problems that are particularly clear to investigators of natural speech), is the motivation for several subsequent directions taken in Labov's work, including the develop-

ment of the Varbrul framework to describe linguistic variation, and has been unarguably established by Labov as a major source of data for investigating fundamental linguistic issues. Nevertheless I have not chosen the use of speech behavior to characterize Labov's contribution to linguistics because (a) it is already implied in mention of Varbrul-type analyses, and (b) it has become common in areas of inquiry which are far from Labov's most persistent linguistic concerns. With regard to the second point here, I am thinking, for example, of conversational analysis, a vigorous area of sociolinguistics which owes much to Labov's pioneering work. Also demanding mention in this context is the anticipatory work on variation in speech behavior by Fischer (1958), a work which did not escape Labov's attention (and it would be interesting to know to what extent it influenced Labov's approach). It remains clear that without Labov's development of the approach, Fischer's insightful study would have remained a curiosity in the linguistic literature, as it led to no further research apart from that initiated by Labov.

Despite his own important contributions to conversational analysis, of which Labov and Fanshel (1977) was a milestone, the unbroken thread of Labov's lifework, persisting from his early study of sound change on Martha's Vineyard (Labov 1963) to his work more than three decades later on the principles and effects of sound change in progress, is addressed to traditional issues of linguistic evolution, issues which transmuted the older philosophical tradition in grammar (still very much a part of current linguistics) into the SCIENCE of linguistics in the nineteenth century. I note here with Bailey (e.g., 1973) that as a mid to late twentieth century continuation of linguistic science, Labov's work can be viewed as attempting to resolve the fundamental tension between synchrony and diachrony established by Saussure when he shaped the early direction of twentieth century linguistics. From this perspective, Labov's concerns are as close to the core issues of twentieth century linguistics as one can get. Varbrul is a tool which helps resolve the Saussurean tension, although it does not completely eliminate it.

The following study of the evolution of human/inanimate polarization of the Swahili object marker explores Varbrul as a tool of linguistic analysis where meaningful elements are involved, as opposed to its use in the study of sound change. Two issues are involved: (1) the INTEGRAL PHENOMENON issue, (2) the MEANINGFUL VARIATION issue. The integral phenomenon issue extends to all linguistic analysis, directly addressing the notion of 'linguistically significant generalization'. The meaningful variation issue is specific to the

extension of Varbrul from phonology to grammar, where ‘grammar’ refers to the organization and use of a language’s meaningful elements. The paper is organized as follows: §2 presents the general issues at stake, and §3 provides a general description of the human/inanimate polarization of the Swahili object marker; in §4 I offer an evolutionary interpretation of the phenomenon independent of Varbrul analysis, while in §5 a Varbrul analysis of several corpora of data provides a crucial test of the evolutionary interpretation and current status of the phenomenon; §6 consists of concluding remarks. By delaying the Varbrul analysis until other common methods of linguistic analysis have been applied, this order of exposition seeks to highlight Varbrul as an additional tool which can, in appropriate cases, bring an issue one step closer to resolution. A different order of exposition might be used to demonstrate Varbrul’s heuristic value, where the significance of a Varbrul analysis would remain to be interpreted by other methods.

2. The General Issues at Stake

Labov’s earliest and most fundamental methodological contribution to linguistics was the expansion of its data base to include speech behavior, emphasizing SPONTANEOUS, unguarded and emotionally involved speech as the most highly valued form of linguistic data for pursuing the most basic linguistic issues. These issues, as recognized by Labov, address the relation of synchrony to diachrony, most particularly in the basic notion of ‘linguistic system’ — how linguistic units are related to each other within and across individual and groups of speakers, and how the relationships may change in the course of time. Although ultimately not confined to the analysis of speech behavior, variable analysis arose to address problems encountered in the analysis of speech data. It was discovered that in addition to ‘yes or no’ relations between linguistic units, relations of ‘more or less’ were needed to replace the older concept of ‘free variation’, where the latter implies randomness and unpredictability, i.e., lack of structure. Thus, for example, social dialects were found to be distinguished by ‘more or less’ relationships, e.g., the relative effects of phonological and grammatical context on English final stop deletion (cf. Labov 1972:36ff). The Varbrul analysis of quantitative, ‘more or less’ relations derives from a probabilistic model adapted to the variable analysis of speech data. It replaced earlier variation models which

were less able to resolve quantitative problems when a relatively large number of factors are involved. The analytical issues that arise in using Varbrul as a basic tool of variation studies are not related to the choice of a particular formalism, but involve the interpretation of its quantitative results.

Among early criticisms of variation models, Bickerton (1971) suggested on the basis of dissimilar data that the need for quantitative analysis was an artifact of aggregating individual speakers. In a separate criticism he expressed skepticism, on the basis of assumed properties of the human mind, that a variable analysis could be a valid reflection of relations among elements in a linguistic system. Labov (1971) demonstrated that a variable analysis DID hold for individual speakers, and countered that Bickerton's concept of human mental properties was *a priori*, and thus ideological, rather than based on empirical observation or proof. He reserved judgment on how or whether such analyses were to be interpreted in terms of human mental processes, but insisted that the variable analysis expresses a LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION which could not be adequately expressed by any other known method of analysis.

The notion of a significant generalization is at the root of the integral phenomenon issue. In cases like English final stop deletion (e.g., Guy 1980), and the chain shift rotation of vowels in phonological space (cf. Labov et al. 1972, Labov 1994), variable analysis has been interpreted to indicate that a SINGLE phenomenon is involved, not a set of superficially similar but separate phenomena. Thus, for example, according to this interpretation, the deletion of final stops is a single phenomenon, whether constrained by the phonological status of the following segment or the morphological status of the deletable segment. Similarly, the rotation of two or more vowels in the same direction has been interpreted as a chain shift form of generalization, not as separate and coincidental shifts in the phonetic quality of distinct vowels. In general, then, the integral phenomenon issue is one of whether or not apparently separable linguistic processes amenable to one variable analysis should indeed be interpreted as an integral (single) process.

Although there have been no serious challenges to the integral phenomenon interpretation of the particular cases mentioned above, criticism of similar interpretation of variable analysis arose in cases where the variable is a meaningful element. Paradigmatic of this criticism was Lavandera's (1978) proposal that variable analysis directly reflects basic systematic relations among units only when the units are meaningless *per se*, i.e., phonological

segments or pleonastic processes (e.g., multiple negation). Using cases like variation in expressions of mood and aspect, Lavandera's proposal implied that each unit has an invariant meaning in all (or maybe most) contexts, so that the variation captured by the variable analysis is the result of variable selection among larger alternative discourse strategies, not a reflection of systematic GRAMMATICAL relations among units in a semantic paradigm. In response, Labov (1978) acknowledged the problem in terms of traditional concepts of meaning, but denied that an a priori assumption of the correctness, or even the heuristic value, of the traditional approach was justified. He made clear his view that Varbrul was a technique or tool of analysis which could be open to different interpretations, depending on what else was known, or remained to be discovered, about the particular case to be interpreted. He rejected an a priori limitation on interpretation of variable analysis as ideological and implicitly unscientific. The basic issue involved here, the meaningful variation issue, is whether or not the elements in a variable analysis may also have distinct meanings. If they can, how does that affect interpretation of a variable analysis, if at all?

It will be seen that the polarization of the Swahili object marker embodies both the integral phenomenon and meaningful variation issues. Human/inanimate polarization turns out to be a specific interpretation of a set of facts, amounting to the claim that the urban Swahili tendencies toward (1) unconditional use of an object marker in reference to a human object, and (2) avoidance of object marker reference to an inanimate object, are phenomena intimately related to the point of covariation, historically and synchronically. The object marker itself is historically, and in some contexts remains synchronically, a meaningful linguistic element. The particular nature of its evolution in Swahili indicates why it is difficult to account for its current uses in terms of an INVARIANT meaning.

3. Human/Inanimate Polarization of the Swahili Object Marker

The object marker (henceforth OM) is a variable inflectional category which occurs immediately before the verb root and refers to a grammatical object, either expressed or understood (see Wald 1979 for more extended discussion). The following examples illustrate the OM as a linguistic variable in relevant dialects of Swahili.

- (1) si-(**ki**)-on-i (**kitu**) [Neg.I-([**it**]OM)-see-Neg (**thing**)]
 a. I don't see it /one /any (thing)
 b. I don't see the /a /any thing
- (2) si-?(**mw**)-on-i (**mtu**) [Neg.I-([**3s**]OM)-see-Neg (**person**)]
 a. I don't see him /her /one /any (person)
 b. I don't see the /a /any person

The translations in (1a) and (2a) indicate the closest English equivalents when there is no lexical object. The (1b, 2b) translations indicate the closest equivalents when there is a postverbal object in the clause. Both sets of translations indicate that there is no invariant relationship between the OM and the information status of the referent object (e.g., as given, inferable, old, new, definite, indefinite, generic, etc.). The metacomment “?” distinguishes the human (2) from the inanimate (1) OM reference in general urban Swahili judgment, e.g., Mombasa and Dar es Salaam (and cf. discussion in Maw 1969:41 for urban Tanga). Urban judgment, then, unconditionally prefers an OM in reference to a human object, understood or expressed. It would seem to follow that the human OM option must be perceived by such speakers as minimally, if at all, meaningful. It is less clear how to draw conclusions about speakers' perceptions of the function of inanimate OM reference. Such speakers sometimes fix on definite interpretation of the inanimate (or non-human animate) OM referent for reasons which will become apparent in subsequent discussion, but concede the acceptability of OM reference when the object is manifestly indefinite, e.g., *kitu cho chote* “anything (at all)”.

Speech reveals a different pattern of distinction between human and inanimate OM reference. In contrast to the judgments just discussed, speech behavior consistently shows a situation in which human OM reference, though still highly favored, is less categorical than judgments would lead one to assume, and in which inanimate OM reference is much less favored than the decontextualized indifference in speaker judgments reflected in (1) above might suggest, even when the inanimate object is definite. This is the phenomenon referred to here as human/inanimate (henceforth h/i) polarization. It is directly observed in speech behavior, not in overt judgments.

If h/i polarization in urban Swahili speech is an integral phenomenon, human OM favorability and inanimate OM unfavorability are directly related. One plausible alternative possibility is that they are only indirectly related through some intervening factor. For example, the OM might have an invariant meaning which favors but does not require human OM reference, but disfavors inanimate reference. This, then, is how the meaningful variation

issue interacts with the integral phenomenon issue in this study. It is, of course, typical of how the meaningful variation issue arises in all grammatical studies. Essentially, the alternative possibility might suggest that h/i polarization is a pragmatic feature of discourse, not of internal grammatical relations, so that it is possible, given appropriate discourse circumstances, to find a reverse favorability, such that the inanimate OM is more favored than the human OM. The next section will consider this possibility in terms of an OM meaning 'topicality', either 'contextual', meaning that the OM is favored according to the topicality of its referent in the discourse context (and human objects turn out to be much more frequently topical than inanimate objects in most samples of natural discourse), or 'inherent', the meaning of which will be discussed in relation to Bantu evolution (and human objects are inherently more topical than inanimates).

Before turning to that discussion, it is worth mentioning that the h/i polarization in Swahili is specific to the North/Central East Coast Bantu area. There have been other outcomes to Bantu OM evolution in other areas. These other areas do not exhibit h/i polarization, at least not in the way that makes Swahili relevant to the integral phenomenon issue discussed in this paper. Thus some Bantu languages have lost inanimate OMs completely, retaining only human OMs (e.g., Zombo, among other varieties of Kongo and adjacent languages in the Central West Bantu area, cf. Carter 1973). This could be the ultimate outcome of Swahili h/i polarization. However, most such languages do not have obligatory human OM reference, and, in fact, generally do not use the OM in reference to a postverbal human object in the same clause. Much closer to the traditional Swahili-speaking area, Makua (Central East Coast: Southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique) has also lost inanimate OMs, clearly independently of the Central West Bantu area. Makua is more similar to Swahili evolution in that there is a strong tendency for human OMs to be obligatory (cf. Stucky 1985 for further complications in Makua OM behavior). Finally, in Zulu and Sotho (Southeast Coast: South Africa), the OM is obligatory in some syntactic contexts and optional in others, regardless of the animacy of its referent (e.g., Doke 1968; Morolong & Hyman 1977). It is quite possible, even likely, that the OM has a specific (possibly invariant) meaning in these languages, neutral to the animacy of its referent. Discussion below will suggest that such languages are more conservative than Swahili, so that they reflect a stage of OM evolution similar, though not necessarily identical, to that through which urban Swahili passed before evolving h/i polarization.

4. An Evolutionary Interpretation of Human/Inanimate Polarization

This section will briefly sketch the evolution of h/i polarization of the Swahili OM. The sketch is based on comparative Bantu evidence, and is therefore independent of the Varbrul analysis of the Swahili data discussed in the next section. For present purposes the important point will be how the sketch leads to interpretation of the Varbrul analysis of Swahili h/i polarization (see Wald 1993 for further discussion and justification of the reconstructed path of evolution).

4.1 *Early anaphoric and contextual topicality properties of the OM*

The Bantu OM can be traced back to the cliticization of a simple set of Pre-Bantu pronouns placed immediately before the verb in reference to an informationally OLD object (Wald 1993). Its origin, then, is similar to the Romance preverbal object clitic, though there are important grammatical differences, most notably the absence of case-marking of the Bantu clitics at any stage of evolution, and the impossibility of positioning them after the verb in any grammatical context (where the variable position of the object clitic within and across Romance languages is traceable to early Romance prosodic constraints). It is clear that in Pre-Bantu, OM function was anaphoric, as it has remained in some Bantu languages. At the same time, some of the details of Pre-Bantu anaphora are less clear, particularly whether anaphora was an obligatory or optional process. Most Bantu and other Niger-Congo languages suggest that anaphora was optional, in the sense that it was subject to further conditions. The most transparent further condition, still typical of most Bantu languages though not of Swahili, is that the OM was obligatory if it referred to a lexical object which was positioned before the verb, but NOT in a preceding clause. Whether its referent was preverbal in the same clause, or was an independent appositional fragment with no clause of its own, does not seem to be relevant, only that it was specifically not in a preceding clause. Example (3) illustrates the relevant context in current Swahili:

- (3) vitu vyote hivyo u-na-weza ku-**vi**-iba...
things all those you-TM-can Inf-**[them]OM**-steal
 “all those kinds of things, you can steal them (and) ...” (JK25m DSM)¹

This syntactic context will be referred to as the OV context. It is anaphoric, but it is opposed to another anaphoric context, the V context, in which lexical reference to the object is in a preceding clause. The immediate continuation of (3) above in (4) below exemplifies:

- (4) ... na kwenda ku-**0**-uza na watu wa-na-**0**-nunua
and go Inf-[**NO OM**]-sell and people they-TM-[**NO OM**]-buy
“... and go sell (them) and people buy (them)”

In (4), the transitive verbs (“sell”, “buy”) are not marked with OMs, but it is understood in the larger discourse context including (3) above that the particular object is “all those kinds of things”. It can be seen from (3) and (4) that the Swahili OM has somewhat different anaphoric constraints from English object pronouns, cf. (4’):

- (4’) all those kinds of things you can steal (them) and go sell (them) and people buy ?(them)

In (4’) the optionality of the English object pronoun in the second full clause is questioned, especially when the anaphoric pronoun is used in the first clause. The initial NP of (3) has object scope over the entire discourse segment of the three successive verbs of (3) and (4) above, but OM tracking of that scope seems to have been obligatory in earlier Bantu only in the OV context of (3), not in the V contexts of (4). This, too, is different from English anaphoric object tracking, so that an English anaphoric reference to the preposed object is optional for the first verb in (4’). Comparative Bantu evidence suggests that the OM never became obligatory in the V context with inanimate objects. The V contexts remain *possible* contexts for OM marking, so that it is perfectly acceptable to track the object with OM marking of each of the verbs in (4). In sum, the V contexts of (4) seem to have been sites of inanimate OM variation throughout the evolution of Bantu. In contrast, the OV context has BECOME a site for inanimate OM variation in Swahili. That is, it is possible, and not at all unusual, for a preposed inanimate object NOT to be referred to by an OM in the OV context. Thus, in Swahili, though apparently not in earlier Bantu, the OV context, like the V context, has become a possible context for OM variation, as discussed below. For the moment, discussion remains focused on the difference between the OV and V contexts; in order to develop a hypothesis about the meaning of the OM in earlier Bantu.

The difference between OM use in OV and V contexts in Bantu as a whole suggests that the additional condition under which anaphoric use of the OM was obligatory in early Bantu involved the CONTEXTUAL TOPICALITY of its referent. From this derives the ‘meaning’ of the OM as an indication that its referent was topical to the clause. Topicality is a discourse notion. It is not an easy notion to demonstrate with respect to OM reference. However, it is not a difficult notion to demonstrate in OV contexts, not only in Bantu but more generally, perhaps universally. The OV context reflects the traditionally recognized topic/comment strategy. According to this strategy, any NP can be selected as a topic by preposing it to any clause (or chain of clauses), which functions as its comment. The relation between the topic and the comment is simply one of ‘relevance’. The topic does not necessarily have a grammatical relationship to any unit within the comment. Sometimes the relevance is pragmatically transparent, cf.

[(as for) dessert]NP=TOPIC [I’m on a diet]CL=COMMENT

Sometimes it is not, cf.

[(as for) dessert]NP=TOPIC [here comes the bride]CL=COMMENT

In any case, the juxtaposition implies that there is a relevance relationship between the topic and the comment. Competent speakers recognize this relationship, whether or not they can deduce what the particular relevance relationship is (e.g., *after the bride comes, we can/ can’t get dessert?*). Bantu has the same strategy. However, in contrast to English, it does not use any morphology to indicate that the preposed NP is a topic, cf. Swahili (5):

(5) kazi yake jana a-li-fanya nini?

[work his]NP=TOP [yesterday he-Past-do what]CL=COMMENT
 “as far as his work, what did he do yesterday?” (Maw 1969:44)

Although the topic/comment strategy does not require a grammatical relation between the topic and the comment, there is one in the OV context — the topic has an object relation to the (first transitive) verb of the comment. Thus, the obligatory OM reconstructed for this context in earlier Bantu suggests that the OM was not simply an anaphoric marker, but a marker of the object’s contextual topicality to the relevant clause. By its nature as a topic/comment strategy, the OV context requires the object to be topical to the comment clause. Therefore, the OM was obligatory. Despite example (3), the

OM is no longer obligatory in the OV context in Swahili. It is not immediately obvious whether this is because the OV context no longer invariably implies the topic/comment strategy, or because the OM is no longer obligatory as a marker of the contextual topicality of the object.

The apparent non-obligatory status of anaphoric OM reference in the early Bantu V context suggests that topicality as 'relevance' was not a matter of 'yes or no', but of 'more or less'. Thus, for example, in early Bantu V contexts analogous to (4) above, if not in (4) itself, the use or non-use of the OM might crucially depend on its discourse relation to the verb of the clause. The verb could be emphasized by withholding the topicality of OM reference from the understood object. The understood object would still be relevant and topical to the clause, but it would be less a focus of immediate attention than the verb. This would explain why a Bantu verb can have a specifically understood object but not use an OM to refer to it. The object might have topical scope over a discourse segment consisting of an indefinite number of following clauses, as in (3) and (4) above, but in early Bantu, its more local topicality to a clause in the V context was evaluated in terms of whether or not it merited as much attention as the verb of the clause. Iconically, OM reference detracts from the degree of focus on the lexical verb by adding additional information to the verb (or predicate) complex. According to the suggestion here, it might be withheld in order to allow greater emphasis to the activity expressed by the verb. In sum, the topicality of the object and focus on the verb work at cross purposes in local clauses in discourse. In OV contexts, early Bantu gave priority to the topicality of the object, but in V contexts it weighed the topicality of the object against the degree of focus desired for the verb.

The above topicality hypothesis of OM reference is a case of the meaningful variation issue. Like other instances of this issue, the hypothesis suggests that OM variation is meaningful, so that using and not using the option have different 'meanings'. In the present case, the OM indicates that its referent's immediate topicality to the clause is not inferior to the degree of focus asserted for the verb of the clause. The problem with the hypothesis is, of course, that in V contexts there is no obvious independent evidence that the OM indeed has this function. Therefore, at first glance, the hypothesis seems circular and vacuous. At the same time, it is understandable why the topicality function of the OM would be difficult to demonstrate, in view of its discourse origin. Like the topicality hypothesis of OM reference, the topic/comment

strategy offers no clues beyond their relative positions to buttress speaker intuition that the two parts of the strategy are related by a relevance implication between them. However, where the topic/comment strategy may be universal, and thus directly represent some innate linguistic strategy, the topicality hypothesis of the OM is language-specific, and will be shown to have changed over time.

So far discussion has considered only anaphoric uses of the OM, typical of the OV and V contexts. It is the difference between the OV and V contexts in the transparency with which the early Bantu OM functioned to indicate the immediate topicality of its referent which justifies distinguishing these two contexts for purposes of analysis.

4.2 *OM evolution in the VO context*

A third context in which the OM option occurs in Swahili arose later than the anaphoric contexts (OV and V). It is the VO context exemplified in (1b) and (2b) above. In the VO context the OM refers to a postverbal object in the same clause. As an innovative context, it is most characteristic of East Coast Bantu, and is not a possible context for OM reference in most other Bantu areas.

In the context of the preceding discussion, the emergence of the OM in the VO context can be seen as an extension of contextual topicality marking to postverbal objects. In the VO context, OM reference is not necessarily anaphoric. In this way it departs from OM reference in V and OV contexts. In some Bantu areas, e.g., the Southeast Coast, investigators have emphasized the usual use of OM reference to refer to an 'old' (previously mentioned) object (e.g., Doke 1968 for Zulu). Thus, it might be concluded that OM reference extended to VO contexts by losing its specific contextual topicality implication in favor of more generally indicating the old information status of its referent, previously a necessary but not sufficient condition for OM reference.

While the Southeast Coast suggests that the OM first extended to VO contexts in cases where the object had already been established as topical to the specific discourse, Swahili shows further evolution in which the OM may refer to a VO object which has not yet been established as topical. That is, it may be new, whether or not it is somehow given in the larger situational context. Of particular importance to understanding the Swahili direction of OM evolution is the context in which the OM refers to an object to which is attributed the status of 'given' information. This applies to first and second

persons in all contexts by the nature of the discourse situation. In Swahili the OM is invariably used in reference to first and second person objects. There is NO variation, e.g.:

- (6) we h-u-n-shind-i mimi (you Neg-you-[me]OM-defeat-Neg me)
 “you can’t beat (= defeat /win) ME!” (RM18m DSM)

The independent pronoun object, e.g., mimi, is optional, and serves a focus purpose in Swahili discourse similar to that served by stress in English. However, the OM n(i) is obligatory, with or without the independent pronoun object.

Swahili obligatory OM reference to first and second persons establishes a strong link between OM reference and the ‘inherently given’ dimension. As will be seen in example (8) below, the same link has not been established on the Southeast Coast, where inherently given objects are treated no differently than other objects with respect to OM reference. Thus, the Swahili OM seems to reflect a change of OM function from emphasis on the *old/new* dimension, where old is closely associated with CONTEXTUAL topicality, to emphasis on the more general *given/non-given* dimension which includes new but given referents. While OM reference to an old referent is a necessary condition of contextual topicality, OM reference to an inherently given referent (first/second person) suggests a shift of OM reference from contextual to INHERENT topicality. The bridge between contextual and inherent topicality is the third person. Third person independent pronouns are no less inherently given than first and second persons. They also obligate OM reference in Swahili. The difference is that third person pronouns usually presuppose that their referents are old information. This is even more true of Swahili, and most other Bantu languages, than of languages like English, because Swahili uses demonstratives rather than independent pronouns for exophoric (new but situationally given) reference to humans. That is, where English uses a pronominal strategy in utterances such as “look at HER!” as a topic starter, Swahili uses a demonstrative strategy equivalent to the (unidiomatic) English “look at THAT (one)!” In English, exophoric use of a demonstrative in reference to a human would imply that the referent exemplifies a topic which had already been initiated.

Both overt judgments favoring human OM reference under all conditions and favorability of speech to human OM reference suggest that inherent topicality has been generalizing from inherently given referents, particularly first and second persons (pragmatically human as the only referents capable of

conversing and thus of mutual reference) to human referents in general. Inanimates are being correspondingly polarized as inherently non-topical, so that the more OM reference is favored for humans, regardless of further conditions, the less it is favored for inanimates. This proposal posits a specific motivation for h/i polarization in the notion of an increasing Swahili sensitivity of OM use to inherent rather than contextual topicality. The proposal offers a specific explanation for why h/i polarization should be viewed as an integral phenomenon in Swahili, rather than as two overlapping but distinct evolutionary processes, which they may very well be in some other Bantu areas. Before turning to the supporting evidence of Varbrul analysis, the following discussion briefly considers two independent supporting factors.

4.3 *Absence of inanimate independent pronouns in Swahili discourse*

One supporting factor is only indirectly relevant to the OM. It was noted above that Swahili requires OM reference to an object represented by an independent pronoun. But in contrast to most Bantu languages, it does not use inanimate independent pronouns; for inanimate reference it uses demonstratives. Therefore, it has lost a condition under which inanimate objects might have come to require OM reference. As discussed above, both demonstratives and independent pronouns are used for human reference. Independent pronouns differ from OMs in indicating a degree of focus (handled by stress in English) as well as topicality. Demonstratives, in distinguishing “this”, “that” etc., contain even more information than independent pronouns. To the extent that more information implies an even higher degree of focus and correspondingly lower degree of topicality, demonstratives have inherently higher focus and lower topicality than pronouns. Thus, the loss of inanimate personal pronouns suggests a weakening of compatibility between inanimacy and inherent topicality as a grammatical strategy. It follows that to the extent that the OM option becomes increasingly influenced by the inherent topicality of its referent, the inanimate object is further discouraged from receiving OM reference, regardless of its contextual topicality. It is noteworthy that to a more limited extent English shows a similar polarization between humans and inanimates in its choice between pronouns and demonstratives, such that alongside “look at HIM/HER/THEM!” it chooses a demonstrative for inanimate exophoric reference: “look at THAT/THOSE!”, rather than “look at ?IT/THEM!” Unlike the animate pronouns, the inanimate pronoun *it* is weak in English, and not suitable for accepting focus (in contrast to lexicalized nomi-

nal uses of *it* in American English, e.g., *it* in reference to the human pursuer in the game of tag, called *man* in Northern England, or to sex appeal in 1920s-30s slang, cf. Clara Bowe, the ‘it’ girl).

4.4 *Inherent topicality as a factor in OM selection in multiple object contexts*

The second supporting factor is more directly involved with OM reference, and is the result of the somewhat complex evolution of Swahili OM restrictions in multiple object contexts. Swahili multiple object contexts reflect two relevant innovations over more conservative Bantu languages: (1) only one object per clause may receive the OM option; and (2) only the inherently more topical object may receive OM reference under a pragmatically likely interpretation. Innovation (1) is very widespread in East Bantu, but innovation (2) is areally more restricted, and includes the North/Central East Coast area in which h/i polarization of OM reference has evolved. Example (7) below demonstrates the categorical nature of h/i polarization of the OM option in a multiple object context.

- (7) wa-na-m/?/?zi-tak-ia mwanamke pesa
 they-TM-[her/?/?it]OM-want-APP woman money
 “they want (the) money for the woman/the woman for (her) money”

Note that under the condition that one object is human and the other inanimate, only the human is allowed the OM option. The alternative translations show that the transitivity roles of the two objects may vary. This would not be true if we substitute a human object, e.g., “children” for “money”. In that case, the clause could only mean “they wanted (i.e., wished) children for the woman”, and NOT “they wanted the woman for the children”. This is because where there is no inherent topicality difference between two objects, transitivity does play a role in selection of the OM referent. Again, in (7) transitivity does not play a role because there is an inherent topicality difference between the two objects.

Assuming that the use of the OM option was originally dependent on the relative contextual topicality of concurrent objects (cf. Wald 1993), the presence of a human object has come to preclude OM reference to a concurrent inanimate object, even if the latter is indeed contextually more topical to the clause than the human object. In contrast, Zulu, among all other Southeast

Bantu languages, shows a more conservative OM strategy in which OM reference is still determined by relative contextual topicality, as illustrated in (8):

- (8) izintombi zi-(ya-si/wa-)fund-ela thina amazwi
 girls they-(TM-[us/them=words]OM-)read-APP us words
 “the girls read (the) words to us” (Doke 1968:303)

Note that in contrast to Swahili, the options in Zulu (8) show that the independent human pronoun (“us”) does not obligate OM reference.² In Swahili, selection of the OM reference to the inanimate object “words” would result in the anti-pragmatic reading “the girls read us to the words”, reifying “us” as somehow not an inherently topical entity but capable of being read, and animating “words”. It is interesting to note that, in my experience, where use of an inanimate OM results in an anti-pragmatic reading, as in the Swahili equivalent of (8), Swahili speakers find the interpretable anti-pragmatic role reversal amusing. However, in examples like (7), where role reversal does not result in an anti-pragmatic reading, they are not amused and reject the inanimate OM reference in favor of human OM reference. I suggest that this behavior does not imply a semi-categorical status for Swahili OM selection according to inherent topicality, but Swahili tolerance in linguistic humor for putting inanimates in human roles.

Swahili (9a,b) below show the two single object contexts corresponding to the two different interpretations of Swahili (7) above.

- (9) a. wa-na-m-taka mwanamke (they-TM-[her]OM-want woman)
 “they want the woman (e.g., for her money)”
 b. wa-na-zi-taka pesa (...[it]OM-want money)
 “they want the money (e.g., for the woman)”

Only (9a) shows the same OM option as the multiple object context of (7) above. In (9b), the inanimate object is not in competition with an inherently more topical human object. Therefore, it is allowed the OM option. In view of the clear grammatical difference between the OM option in contexts like (7) and (9b), it is striking that h/i polarization moves toward minimizing the difference between OM reference in single and multiple object contexts. By discouraging OM reference to an inanimate object, OM sensitivity to inherent topicality variably extends to single object contexts restrictions which are already categorical in multiple object contexts.

In sum, there are various kinds of evidence independent of a Varbrul analysis which support the notion that h/i polarization of the OM has long been evolving as an integral phenomenon based on the inherent topicality difference between humans and inanimates.

5. Varbrul Analysis of the Evolution of Human/Inanimate Polarization

As strong as the relationship between the favorability of humans and disfavorability of inanimates to OM reference may appear from the preceding discussion, it remains to Varbrul analysis to indicate just how intimate that relationship has been in the evolution of Swahili. To the extent that these two features of OM reference are changing *at the same rate*, the integral phenomenon interpretation of OM reference is most strongly supported, as is characterization of the phenomenon in terms of a single dimension of inherent topicality. Any other result of a Varbrul analysis, while not disproving a historical relationship between the two trends, would suggest at best the development of a weaker relationship, and at worst a total loss of relationship. In this section, Varbrul analysis of OM variation is applied to various current and historical Swahili samples. No direct historical line of evolution is assumed a priori for any two samples, since the samples differ not only for time but for community, mode (spoken/written) and genre. Therefore, evolutionary interpretation depends on factors beyond the results of Varbrul analysis, and is guided by the view of OM evolution discussed above. The Varbrul and historical analyses support each other to the effect that urban Swahili OM polarization has been, and continues to be, an integral phenomenon evolving along the dimension of inherent topicality.

5.1 The historical samples used in the Varbrul analyses

The samples used are as follows. In the code labels, the two digits refer to the century; N and S distinguish Northern and Southern dialects; and genre is characterized as S, P, or V for speech, prose writing, and verse.

1) 20NS. The same composite sample of late twentieth century Mombasa Swahili speech discussed in Wald (1979).

2) 20SS. A sample of speech from one adult male Dar es Salaam Swahili speaker, covering a range of topics including elements of autobiography.

3) 20SP. A written text sample of mid-twentieth century prose. The sample is representative of the range of standard Swahili, historically based on the urban South Swahili dialect of Zanzibar City. It consists of two texts: (a) a selection from Abdulla (1960:19-41), agreed by scholars to epitomize standardized Zanzibari prose, and (b) all and only the news articles of the 7.30.70 issue of *Uhuru*, a Dar-es-Salaam based Swahili newspaper of the period. The factor values presented for this sample in Table 2 below show an analysis which has factored out the independent genre effects of the two texts. That is, the Varbrul analysis was able to treat the factors of interest to us as having the same effect in both texts, while recognizing a distinct genre factor differentiating the two texts.³

4) 20SV. A composite sample of 20th C. Swahili verse by well-known Tanga poets (Knappert 1979:266-87). An observation will be made on the intermediate geographical position of Tanga between Dar es Salaam (to the south) and Mombasa (to the north).

5) 19SV. A composite sample of 19th C. Tanga verse, antecedent to the tradition of 4) above (Knappert 1979:213-31).

6) 19NV. A sample of early 19th C. Mombasa verse by Muyaka, Mombasa's most celebrated poet (Abdulaziz 1979:142-82).

7) 18NV. A sample of 18th C. North Swahili verse, mostly of the Lamu/Pate area (Knappert 1979:110-37). This area, north of Mombasa near the Kenya/Somalia border, is the area in which the major Swahili written poetic tradition began. Such older northern dialects became the basis of a general standard for urban Swahili poetic language, even in more southern areas. Although written, poetry was always intended to be recited aloud.

8) 17NV. A composite of two samples of 17th C. North Swahili verse of the Lamu/Pate area, among the oldest known documents of any variety of Swahili: (a) the verse in Knappert (1979:67-108), and (b) the verses of the *Hamziya*, written in one of the most archaic-looking documented varieties of written Swahili (Knappert 1968). The results presented below derive from an analysis which controls for the individual sample values.⁴

5.2 Factor groups used in the Varbrul analyses

The analyses discussed below take as the dependent variable the presence or absence of the OM in reference to an expressed or understood object. That is, the analysis identifies all possible contexts for OM reference, whether or not

the OM actually occurred in each of those contexts. Various contextual factors, discussed at length above, are tested for effect on OM variation. For general analysis, two factor groups were distinguished:

- SYNTACTIC. This group has three factors; the VO, V and OV contexts, as discussed in section 4 above.⁵
- INHERENT TOPICALITY. This group has two factors: human and inanimate. Non-human animate objects are rare in all samples. They generally pattern like inanimates, not humans, disfavoring OM reference, but were excluded from Varbrul analysis.

For test purposes a third factor group was used which approximates CONTEXTUAL TOPICALITY by recognizing the historically important relationship between contextual topicality and the information status of the OM referent. As noted above, the hypothesis that the OM once functioned to indicate the contextual topicality of an object is not clearly verifiable, but the evolution of the OM option from anaphoric to VO contexts indicates that old or definite objects once favored OM reference more than objects of other information statuses. Thus, whatever may have determined the contextual topicality of an object was relatively favorable to old/definite objects. Wald (1979:518) shows that this remains true of late twentieth century Mombasa Swahili speech, independent of animacy. Varbrul analysis supports the hypothesis of an information status effect on OM variation independent of animacy. Thus, h/i polarization has not totally eliminated the influence of contextual topicality on OM use. Instead, the two influences coexist to a great extent. Three factors were recognized for the contextual topicality factor group:

- definite: specific and previously mentioned, i.e., old.
- indefinite: specific but not old, i.e., either 'brand new' (the most frequent case of indefinite by far in the texts), or inferable by pragmatic anchoring to an old referent (e.g., a predictable part of an already mentioned whole), but not previously mentioned.
- non-specific: either generic or non-individuated, so that 'specific' is inapplicable.

Always excluded from all counts are contexts in which no variation was observed. In effect, OM variation occurs only with third persons, and in OV and VO contexts only with a fully lexical (non-pronominal) object. In prac-

Table 1. Comparison of contextual and inherent topicality factor effects on OM variation in the VO context and inherent topicality factor effects independent of syntactic contexts, for a sample of 20NS (Mombasa speech) and 20SS (Dar es Salaam speech).

	VO analysis				syntactic analysis		
	def	indef	non-spec	hum	in	hum	in
20NS	.899	.513	.097	.886	.114	.866	.134
20SS	.793	.319	.358	.861	.139	.871	.129

tice, the object in a V or OV context could always be interpreted as definite. Therefore, the Varbrul values of different contextual topicality factors on OM reference were only analyzable for the VO context. These results will be called the VO ANALYSIS. Conversely, since there was no independent variation among contextual topicality factors across syntactic contexts, contextual topicality was *not* factored out in analyses of the relative effects of the syntactic factors. These results will be called the SYNTACTIC ANALYSIS.

5.3 Results of the Varbrul analyses

Table 1 compares the results of the VO and syntactic analyses for the 20th C. speech samples. The results show two clear points. First, there is a strong independent effect of the contextual topicality factor of *definiteness* in the VO context in favor of OM reference. This may be a more indirect reflection of the lingering historic contextual topicality function of OM reference. Second, the alternative analyses differ by only a negligible amount ($\leq .02$) in the values of the *inherent topicality* factors. Theoretically, there should be no difference whatsoever. However, the Varbrul algorithm is sensitive to input data quantity, and its output factor values, showing the relative rankings of effects, are weighted accordingly. The input data are more numerous in the syntactic analysis, because they include V and OV contexts (in addition to VO), where the objects are invariably definite, while the VO analysis is restricted to the VO context, where there is variation in the information status of the object. Since the V context in particular adds a substantial amount of data to the syntactic analysis, it is all the more impressive that the differences in the values of the inherent topicality factors are as slight as they are between the VO and syntactic analyses. In sum, the slightness of the difference supports the notion that inherent topicality factors operate independently of the contextual topicality factors, even though there is a very high discourse

Table 2. *Inherent topicality and syntactic effects on OM use in the eight Swahili samples.*
(Total N = total number of possible contexts in each sample.)

	hum	in	VO	V	OV	(input)	(χ^2)	(Total N)
17NV	.748	.252	.227	.905	.264	(.361)	(16.541)	(264)
18NV	.723	.277	.232	.835	.395	(.464)	(1.957)	(125)
19NV	.717	.283	.269	.701	.537	(.508)	(2.56)	(128)
19SV	.851	.149	.116	.703	.763	(.644)	(0.143)	(76)
20SV	.836	.164	.290	.538	.677	(.685)	(4.05)	(186)
20SP	.915	.085	.107	.808	.664	(.952)	(4.77)	(467)
20SS	.871	.129	.166	.837	.495	(.624)	(0.954)	(164)
20NS	.866	.134	.414	.590	.496	(.485)	(10.42)	(759)

correlation between definiteness and human objects on one hand, and non-definiteness and inanimate objects on the other (cf. Wald 1979).

In view of the invariant relationship between definite objects and non-VO contexts, Table 2 ignores the considerable independent effects of contextual topicality, and focuses on the effects of inherent topicality and syntactic context on OM use in the eight samples according to the syntactic analysis. It is important to note in passing, then, that none of the samples showed invariant OM use according to the contextual topicality factors. The samples are listed chronologically.

For the sake of completeness Table 2 presents the global input effect and Chi-square (χ^2) values obtained for each Varbrul analysis, and the total number of possible contexts analyzed for each sample. These values do not warrant further linguistic discussion. The linguistically relevant values for comparison are the inherent topicality effects (h/i) and the syntactic context effects (VO/V/OV).

Table 2 is consistent with the notion that h/i polarization is an integral linguistic process in Swahili. For each sample the Varbrul analysis represents the inverse covariation by a mathematical model in which the human and inanimate effects add up to a constant sum of 1.000. Polarization favoring OM reference with human objects and disfavoring it with inanimate ones is observed in each sample.

As cautioned earlier in this section, the diversity of the samples presents problems for direct evolutionary interpretation of Table 2. For example, the least polarization is not found in the oldest text (17NV), but in 19NV some 150-200 years later (although the difference of .03 between the two samples is very small). It is further evident from the most comparable sample pairs (in

terms of area and genre), i.e., 17NV and 18NV (Lamu/Pate area verse), for one, and 19SV and 20SV (Tanga area verse), for another, that small differences in the factor values do NOT support the notion of constantly increasing polarization over time. They seem to require other explanations.

Increasing polarization is generally discernible across time, beginning with 19SV. However, evolutionary interpretation is confounded by questions about genre and mode differences; only verse samples are available for analysis before the late nineteenth century. The least that can be said is that large step effect differences among the samples (.050 or greater) are consistent with evolutionary interpretation of increasing polarization. Most suggestive is the difference in the inherent topicality effects between 19SV and 19NV. 19NV (Mombasa) does not show significantly greater polarization than the preceding 200 years of 17NV and 18NV (Lamu/Pate). However, 19SV (Tanga) shows a much larger degree of h/i polarization. This suggests that the polarization increased earlier in the south, and has been spreading northward. Thus, in the twentieth century we observe that 20SS (Dar es Salaam speech) shows an expected but relatively slight increase in polarization over 19SV (Tanga verse), but, much more strikingly, 20NS (Mombasa speech) shows a very substantial increase in polarization over 19NV (Mombasa verse). In effect, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are no longer distinct with respect to polarization, according to Table 2, while nineteenth century Tanga and Mombasa verse are quite distinct.⁶

Finally, with regard to genre effects, the analysis of 20SP (southern/standard Swahili prose) suggests that standard Swahili is even more advanced with respect to h/i polarization than contemporary urban vernacular speech (20SS and 20NS). The maximum sample value for the inherent topicality effect may reflect a stereotyping tendency in the standard closely approaching the judgmental norm of unconditional OM reference to a human object. At the same time, there is no corresponding stereotypical norm disfavoring inanimate OM reference. Thus, the inanimate OM disfavorability in standard prose is readily interpretable as a result of h/i polarization rather than as the direct stereotyping of an overt norm.

The syntactic factor group in Table 2 provides information for conclusions about Swahili OM evolution which go beyond the focus of this paper on h/i polarization. However, since it was noted above that standard Swahili seems to be most advanced in terms of h/i polarization, it is worth pointing out, for balance, that its OM evolution is not the most advanced in all other respects. For example, it is much more conservative than 20NS (current

Mombasa speech) with respect to the favorability of the V context to OM reference. Table 2 indicates that the general decline in favorability of the V context to OM marking is geographically oriented toward the north. This is most evident in the different values of the V context effect in 20NS (Mombasa speech) and 20SS (Dar es Salaam speech). The northern orientation includes the 19SV and 20SV samples, from Tanga, the most northern of the mainland southern dialects. Thus, the loss of the V context as highly favorable for OM reference (most noticeable when the referent is inanimate) seems to have diffused southward as far as Tanga, but has not yet reached the more southern urban dialects such as Dar es Salaam (20SS) or the standard. In sum, different trends in OM reference have been diffusing in different directions. The main concern of this paper, h/i polarization, has been diffusing northward from southern Swahili at least since the late nineteenth century. The loss of favorability of the V context to OM marking has been diffusing southward from northern Swahili at least since the early nineteenth century.

6. Concluding Remarks

These results on the h/i polarization of Swahili OM reference illustrate how Varbrul and other methods of analysis can be constructively combined in arriving at linguistic conclusions. On one hand, the Varbrul analysis alone is not linguistically interpretable in an unambiguous way. On the other hand, it provides a useful test of conclusions arrived at by other analytical methods. Thus, the conclusion that h/i polarization is an integral phenomenon is supported by the Varbrul analysis. If and where h/i polarization is not amenable to a unitary Varbrul analysis, the implication is that the polarization is not an integral phenomenon, despite the certainty of a historical relationship between increasing use of the human OM and decreasing use of the inanimate OM.

With respect to the meaningful variation issue, the Varbrul analysis itself cannot reveal whether or not the OM has or ever had an invariant meaning. An invariant meaning like '(relative) contextual topicality (within the clause)' may make sense as an earlier invariant meaning for the OM, according to the discussion in section 4.1 above. It may even remain an as yet unprovable factor (most likely variable rather than invariant) in current Swahili OM use. What the Varbrul analysis has done in the case studied here is provide a basis for recognizing the *independence* of inherent and contextual topicality factors

in OM use. The independence of these two types of factors is of great interest for various reasons. One is the implications for possible paths of grammatical evolution. For example, it allows the view that while OM sensitivity has been shifting from the contextual to the inherent topicality of its referent, the contextual topicality of the object has not by any means ceased to influence OM use, although it is obscured by the very high inherent topicality effect when the object is human. The shift has not been sudden, and is not complete. Even more basically, the inherent topicality factors can be easily recognized without great appeal to the larger discourse context. They are essentially lexical features of sets of nouns used as referents in discourse. In contrast, the contextual topicality features are highly dependent on the discourse context for recognition. This is why it remains possible that the analysis given above has failed to identify some more basic contextual topicality factor which resolves some or all of the observed variation in OM use. The essence of this point was explicitly recognized by Cedergren and Sankoff (1974:335), where they identified the following position, which has implications for the notion of invariant meaning:

“[there] ... is a belief that all linguistic variability eventually can be deterministically accounted for, through careful enough attention to linguistic and social-interactional conditioning....”

To this they responded:

“while the .. claim is of course logically incapable of being disproved by data, it is certainly not warranted by any of the relevant existing data or analyses.”

It is Labov's legacy that the belief they referred to has not gone unchallenged. Before Labov, the construction of invariant and categorical grammars was generally taken as the goal of linguistic analysis, even to the extent that a failure to achieve that goal, with its *a priori* notion of the nature of grammar and its users, was generally considered a weakness in the analysis or perhaps even a 'weakness' in the grammars of particular languages (cf. “all grammars leak”). The present paper tries to support the Sankoff and Cedergren response with the substitution of a concrete linguistic analysis for their more abstract logical principle.

To a great extent, in referring to “relevant existing data or analyses”, Cedergren and Sankoff had in mind cases of phonological variation, discussed elsewhere in their paper, so invariant meaning as an example of strict deter-

minism was not a salient issue. I have been more circumspect about this issue in discussing OM variation because I have noted some possible factors which as yet elude replicable analysis, e.g., conditioning of OM variation according to relative focus on the verb as opposed to the object. At the same time, it is quite clear that there are *grammatical* differences between OM use in Swahili and, say, Zulu (as already discussed in 4.4 above), while both OM systems have undeniably evolved from a common earlier system, and it is clear that the differences involve sensitivity of the Swahili OM system to the inherent topicality of the referent. It stands to reason that something in the Swahili OM system (not to mention the Zulu OM system) has changed from the ancestral system. The transparency of inherent topicality, as opposed to the opacity of a complete notion of contextual topicality, suggests simply that the direction of change in the Swahili OM system is toward DECONTEXTUALIZATION, a form of grammaticalization by which grammatical options become less sensitive to complex discourse conditions and more sensitive to simpler, local (clause-size) conditions. The Varbrul analysis supports the notion that this is the direction of change that the Swahili OM system has been following with respect to h/i polarization, and further allows that the transition to this decontextualized system is still in progress. Strict determinism in the form of an invariant meaning is incompatible with this transition, as it logically must be with all other changes in meaning. As Labov has consistently pointed out, the alternative is to posit two invariant coexisting systems during a transitional period (which may be of indeterminate length), and that such an approach will most often miss linguistically significant generalizations to the effect that the same linguistic conditions affect both (or all) of the coexisting systems. The evolution of the Swahili OM system has been offered as a case in point. Neither the evolutionary nor the diverse sociolinguistic trends discussed in the preceding section could be detected under the arbitrary assumption of two (or more) Swahili OM systems. In sum, the Varbrul analysis suggests that the role of inherent topicality is direct in OM use, and not merely an indirect reflection of a more restricted invariant discourse factor of 'contextual topicality' which determines OM use in all contexts but eludes direct detection.

Notes

- 1 In citing recorded speech data I follow the example with two initials referring to the speaker, and then the age and sex of the speaker. An abbreviated form of the speech community that the speaker represents is then given. In text example (3) the speaker is identified as JK. DSM abbreviates the Swahili speech community Dar es Salaam.
- 2 The inclusion of the TM in the Zulu optionality parentheses in (8) reflects the obligatoriness of TM ya when the OM option is used. Where the OM option is not used, the TM may be omitted, in which case the postverbal objects are in greater focus than the verb.
- 3 Novels and newspaper articles are demonstrably different genres in terms of topics and rhetorical organization, and even some specific syntactic processes. However, variable rule analysis revealed only a minor effect of genre on OM variation differentiating the two texts: .533 for (a) and .467 for (b), both very close to the .500 mean, which would signify that the genre difference had no independent effect on OM use.
- 4 The factor values for the separate samples were .265 for the Hamziya and .735 for the other sample. The great difference between these two factor values remains to be accounted for, but is not of any obvious relevance to the factor values shared by the samples, and presented in Table 2.
- 5 With regard to coding decisions, OM reference from the verb of a relative clause to its object head was included among V contexts, even in the few cases in which the clause was headless, e.g.,

ni-ya-sem-e 'taka-yo-ya-sema

I-[it]OM-say-Sjn I.want-RelM-[it]OM-say

"let me say what (lit. the [things] which) I want to say" (Knappert 1979:83)

The relative clause in the example was counted as a V context. The OM in the preceding matrix clause is taken as the object head of the relative clause. Naturally, the matrix clause represents a VO context in which the following 'headless' relative clause is the object. The reasons for the object relative clause coding decision are not directly relevant to the issues discussed in the text. However, since the object relative clause could justifiably be set up as a fourth syntactic context, distinct from all other V contexts, it is worth noting that object relative clauses were not frequent enough in any sample to suspect that the decision had a significant effect on the V factor value.

- 6 Areal support for this conclusion includes the greater overt preference for unconditional human OM reference reported by speakers of coterritorial languages in the southern area (e.g., Zaramo in the vicinity of Dar es Salaam) than in the northern area (e.g., Giriama and even Digo in the vicinity of Mombasa). Lexical loss of the inanimate OMs in some languages of the southern area, e.g., Makua and some varieties of Makonde, is also relevant, especially when it is noted that such loss does not occur anywhere in the north.

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