

Russian Oriental Studies

CURRENT RESEARCH ON PAST & PRESENT

ASIAN AND AFRICAN SOCIETIES

EDITED BY

VITALY NAUMKIN

RUSSIAN ORIENTAL STUDIES

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*Current Research on Past & Present Asian
and African Societies*

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VITALY NAUMKIN



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PREFACE

In Russia, the study of the countries of Asia and Africa has a long history and is part of an old tradition. Its foundation was laid in the Middle Ages by the Russian travellers and pilgrims to the Holy places, who penned the first works on countries of the Orient that were published in Russia. The very geographical position of Russia predetermined its close contact with the countries of the Orient. Wars, conquests, and migrations of the population predestined an active interaction between the Russians and the peoples of Asia. An acute interest in the Orient and the knowledge accumulated laid the groundwork for Russian Orientalism that was born in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Contemporary dictionaries usually describe Orientalism, first, as the knowledge and study of Oriental languages, literature, history, etc., and second, as a quality or usage characteristic of Eastern (Oriental) peoples. A. L. Macfie traces this twofold interpretation to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where the word *Orientalism* was used to refer to both the work of the Orientalist and also, in the world of arts, “to identify a character, style or quality commonly associated with the Eastern nations.” This word was even used, in the context of British rule in India, “to refer to or identify a ‘conservative and romantic’ approach to the problem of government.”¹

The Russian word for Orientalism—*vostokovedenie*—has always had only one meaning and has never referred to anything but Oriental studies; it has never had any other connotation. As distinct from Western Orientalism, Russian Orientalism has long (at any rate until the emergence of the Soviet Union) been predominantly engaged in the study of the Middle East, to a lesser degree with China, and to a still lesser degree with Japan, despite the geographical proximity of these countries to Russia. The study of Oriental languages in Russia started with the Turkish–Persian Department in Muscovy.

¹ Introduction to: *Orientalism. A Reader*. Edited by A. L. Macfie, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (2000).

The territories more distant from Russia, including so major a country of the East as India, were not a focus of attention for the Russian Orientalists, probably because, in contrast to European powers, Russia limited its expansion to lands lying directly to the south of its frontiers. Furthermore, the centuries-old sharp rivalry with the Turks and the Persians was the paramount factor that conditioned the initial concentration of Russian Orientalism on the study of Iran and Turkey.

A forte of Russian, and particularly Soviet, Orientalism was the knowledge of Oriental languages (both dead and living). Speaking of the modern Russian tradition of Islamic studies, Dale Eickelman, for instance, noted that many of his Russian counterparts “received training in a strong tradition of analysis of classical Muslim texts and a commitment to the mastery of ‘Eastern’ languages, which is often superior to that offered in Western training.”²

Since their emergence and continuing to our time, Oriental studies in Russia have traditionally been considered a separate, all-round humanitarian discipline. History, economics, culture, and literature of the countries of the East as well as Oriental languages are taught at Russian universities. Graduates receive qualification in the specialty of “Oriental Studies.” At some large universities there are separate Oriental studies faculties, as, for example, in the M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU) (this faculty is called the Institute of Asian and African Countries) or in the St. Petersburg State University. At these faculties Oriental studies are supplemented by African studies, which, in turn, are also considered a separate, all-round discipline in research institutes.

Oriental research institutes or sections of institutes function within the framework of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). These are the Institute of Oriental Studies (IOS) in Moscow and its branch in St. Petersburg, and the faculties or sectors of Oriental studies in many research institutes of general humanitarian studies in Russia’s regions. Within the RAS there is a specialised Institute of Africa. Oceania is likewise studied in the framework of Oriental studies. Naturally, the Institute of Africa partly duplicates the Institute of

² Preface to: *Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis*. Edited by Dale Eickelman, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1993), p. viii.

Oriental Studies, being engaged, for example, in the study of the general questions of history, economics, civilisations of developing countries or, particularly, of Arab countries of North Africa.

Since Soviet times, Russian science has inherited one more 'duplicating' institute of Oriental studies—the RAS Institute of the Far East (IFE). In the Cold War era, the creation of this institute, just like the Institute of Africa, reflected the Soviet Union's sharply increased interest in the Afro-Asian world at the time, as a result of Soviet policymakers' needs for research in the countries of the contemporary East and Africa. Some attempts to eliminate this duplication were, nevertheless, undertaken: at the creation of the IFE, this institute was assigned the task of engaging in all studies of the 'modern cycle,' while the IOS mostly retained the study of the subjects of 'the traditional cycle' (history, literature, languages of China and other Far Eastern countries). Inside the IOS itself there existed an earlier-established 'division of labour': the institute in Moscow was engaged in the entire range of research, and the Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) branch only in the study of ancient and medieval history of the Oriental countries, philology, the study of written sources, and the monuments of written literature. The St. Petersburg branch is the repository of an extremely valuable collection of Oriental manuscripts.

In Soviet times there was a concept of the 'Soviet East,' of which the republics of Central Asia were a part (in the process, it was customary to speak of 'Central Asia and Kazakhstan', with an implication that a section of the territory of Kazakhstan did not belong to Asia) as well as (in part) Transcaucasia (the term 'South Caucasus' was not used). In accordance with this conception, the study of the history of these territories before 1917 (i.e., the Bolshevik revolution and the formation of Soviet Russia) was included in the specialty of 'the history of the USSR,' which caused some difficulties for the Orientalists engaged in the study of 'the foreign East' alone. It is possible, though, that the fact that the southern republics of the Soviet Union were left beyond the framework of Oriental studies relieved the Orientalists of the time of the tough pressure of censorship and ideological rigidity that inevitably attended any scholarly research involving questions of internal Soviet reality.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia's Oriental studies began to be engaged in the whole range of problems concerning the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and also the Asian

regions of Russia itself and those questions of internal Russian life that ‘touch upon’ the East, for example, those of Russia’s Islam or the diasporas from Oriental countries in Russia. In this, the structure of the Russian research corps differs from that of the West, where, however, a certain inconsistency is also in evidence: the study of Central Asian and Caucasian states is incorporated sometimes into Eurasian studies (together with Russian studies), and other times into the Middle Eastern ones, though some specialised institutes have already appeared.

The Russian Orientalists and Africa-watchers have their publishing base. There is a small special publishing house that issues scholarly literature on Oriental and African studies. Also produced is an academic bi-monthly journal *Vostok-Oriens* and a popular science journal *Aziya I Afrika segodnya* (Asia and Africa today). The Oriental studies centres of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities also issue some periodicals, among which one may mention *Vestnik MGU: seriya “Vostokovedenie”* (the Moscow State University Bulletin: Series ‘Oriental studies’, *Vostochnaya kolleksiya* (Oriental collection), and others.

The collection of articles being published here pursues the aim of representing contemporary Russian Oriental and African studies. The selection of articles is made in a way to allow the reader to be acquainted with multilateral works belonging to Orientalists and Africa-watchers from different points of view. Their division by rubrics is somewhat relative, as it is very difficult to draw a clear line between them. The authors of the collection are Prof. Dr. Nadezhda Bektimirova (the Institute of Asian and African Countries, MSU), Prof. Dr. Leonid Geveling (Institute of Asian and African Countries, MSU), Dr. Alekber Alekberov (IOS, Moscow), the late Dr. Gennadi Bandilenko (Institute of Asian and African Countries, MSU), Prof. Dr. Irina Smilyanskaya (IOS, Moscow), Prof. Dr. Victor Dyatlov (Irkutsk State University), Prof. Dr. Victor Rastyannikov, Prof. Dr. Anna Dybo (Russian State Humanitarian University, Moscow), RAS Corresponding Member, Prof. Dr. Sergei Starostin (Russian State Humanitarian University, Moscow), Prof. Dr. Tawfiq Ibrahim (IOS, Moscow), Prof. Dr. Dmitry Frolov (Institute of Asian and African Countries, MSU), RAS member Prof. Dr. Vladimir Toporov (Institute of Slavonic Studies, RAS).

Prof. Dr. Vitaly Naumkin

PART ONE
POLITICS & POWER

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MONARCHY IN THE KHMER POLITICAL CULTURE

Nadezhda Bektimirova

The entire history of Khmer society is inextricably linked with the institution of monarchical government, which has had an abiding influence on the formation of the traditional Khmer political culture. The Europeans—Portuguese and Spanish missionaries in the sixteenth century, French colonialists in the nineteenth—noted the Khmers' extraordinary allegiance to the monarchical form of government. A French resident in Cambodia, E. Aymonier, wrote: "The nation is accustomed to the idea of the indissolubility of its existence from the royal house. The monarch is the living embodiment of greatness and its supreme personification."¹ At all times, the sovereign of Cambodia was "the lord of the land, water, property and life of his subjects. . . . the lord of all human existence."² Khmer history as reflected in the chronicles is a history of the monarchs' lives.

The concept of monarchical authority in the form in which it existed in Cambodia from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century was formed as a synthesis of autochthonous cults, elements of Hinduism, and the Buddhist doctrine of government. In the ninth century, the Khmer civilization formed a cult of Devaraja, which represented one of the most absolute forms of despotism, under which the monarch himself was the emanation of Shiva, a bearer of the divine principle of authority derived by him through the mediation of the Brahman priests. The *linga*, upon whose well-being the prosperity of the state depended, was the symbol of the monarch's might. The *linga*'s sanctuary was situated at the top of a shrine mountain, natural or artificial, located in the centre of the capital and considered to be the axis of the universe.³ Underlying the deification of monarchical rule was the autochthonous

¹ E. Aymonier, *Le Cambodge*, vol. 1 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1900–1903), 56.

² A. Leclère, *Les codes Cambodgiens*, vol. 1 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1898), 23.

³ G. Coedes, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: W. F. Velia, 1967), 101.

cult of the mountain, and the ancestor cult spread far and wide in Southeast Asia. The social function of Devaraja lay in the demonstration of the “divine supernatural power of the monarch.”⁴ The Devaraja cult implied the sacral character of power and the divine, charismatic nature of the state, and it imparted a despotic line of political tradition to the Khmer political culture.

Theravada Buddhism had entrenched itself in Cambodia at the end of the thirteenth century and it modified the initial Brahman model of the body politic. From that time on, the secular authority no longer needed legitimization on the part of the supreme religious caste, the Brahmins, it was in itself viewed as a source and an upper instance of religious authority. A Buddhist monarch was a bearer of righteousness, as he himself was the Dhammaraja and the Bodhisattva. Righteousness in Buddhism is a source of authority. The monarch as the major donor and protector of the *sangha*, has always been endowed with the greatest dimensions of sanctity, because relations between the sangha and secular society are built on the principle of exchange of material patronage for charisma.

Although the institution of Brahman priests, the *baku*, was retained at court, the role of priests fundamentally changed and diminished; they lost their political functions.⁵ At the same time, being just councilors to the king and courtly ministers of religion, the baku retained a number of privileges, including the title to the Khmer throne on a par with members of the royal family.⁶ The erstwhile influence of the Hindu concept of power was also felt in the developed practice of cult and ritual associated with the formalization of statehood (coronation, the oath of the king), where the leading role of the Brahmins was likewise preserved.

During coronation, it was from the hands of the baku that the Khmer monarch accepted the sacred regalia of royal authority and all the patrimony of the realm: “the subjects, land, rivers, mountains and forests.”⁷ They also performed the unction. The functional role of sangha representatives at ceremonies was minimal. The palace

⁴ See *Istoriya Kampuchii. Kratkii ocherk* (The history of Kampuchea. A short outline) (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 40–42.

⁵ See A. Leclère, *Recherches sur le droit public des Cambodgiens*, (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1894).

⁶ Only the 1947 constitution abolished that title of the Brahman priests.

⁷ Leclère, *Recherches sur le droit public des Cambodgiens*, 29.

and the capital were also “magically” arranged with the help of Brahman deities and protective spirits, the *neak ta*. The ceremony of “the monarch’s provisional abdication in favour of the baku” was also a constant reminder of former greatness of the court Brahmins.⁸ A practice of building posthumous mausoleums on the hills in the city was a vestige of the Devaraja cult. This facilitated the retention of elements of divine character by the Khmer monarchy, although a desire to dissociate the king from the magic halo was increasingly apparent in the nineteenth century. Thus, in the Buddhist legends and tales of Cambodia, even if the king was associated with magic, his magic actions had unfolded earlier and previously, not “here” but “elsewhere.” There was a manifest wish to show that the future sovereign, after having matured in trying experiences, set aside every sort of magic in order to rule wisely in the here and now. Khmer myths and legends try to convince the reader that the royal magic is in fact nothing but the monarch’s special capabilities, albeit normalized within the framework of Buddhism. Subsequently, under some Khmer monarchs, notably Ang Duong (1845–1860), attempts were made to free the religion from the Brahmanic elements and the king’s image from the magic halo. Thus the ceremony of “baku coronation in the month of *Meas*” was abolished and some court ceremonies were simplified.

However, the urgency and persistence that have always been applied in reproducing the image of the ideal monarch display the enduring beliefs that the king must still be in command of magic so as to gain power and retain it. The king’s nature is always dichotomous: a “Buddhist” king—a magical, ideal and real king. Khmer continue to believe in the magical faculties of their monarch, which is certified by the fact that he is an object of appeals in case of natural disasters, drought and so forth.

With the entrenchment of Theravada Buddhism, the Hindu concept of divine origins of supreme authority was superseded by the concept of elected and contractual supreme authority. The personality of the monarch is central to the Buddhist political tradition:

⁸ Each year, in the month of *Meas* (the third month according to the lunar calendar, which corresponds to November–December), during the full moon, the king used to transfer power for one day to the *baku* who was named a “Brahman who rules in the month of *Meas*.” See Leclère, *Recherches sur le droit public des Cambodgiens*, 14.

the most righteous of men is designated for the throne. The Khmer monarch possesses not so much the charisma of power as the charisma of the personality. Power must conform to the highest moral principles, and is conceived as an earthly incarnation of sacral values, which means that secular authority is sacralized, religiously coloured in itself. The sacralization and ethicization of authority are key features of the Khmer political culture.

The ruler Dhammaraja is a righteous man, a supreme patron protecting the sangha, who considers the observance of the law, the education of his subjects and their moral perfection to be the central aims of his government. The supreme authority has belonged to the most virtuous, for human status in the power hierarchy is conditioned by the magnitude of his religious merits. Karma is a medium for explaining the social order, regulating it and legitimizing changes in it. If order reigns in the country, no one will doubt the legitimacy of the monarch and his fortunate karma. However, any weakening of royal authority, any disaster or conflict, in short, any upsetting of natural order in the state without apparent possibility of restoring stability, might be interpreted as a change of karma. By legitimizing governance, karma might also justify usurpation. The ambivalence and unpredictability of the law of karma, in many ways correlated with the political processes, instill social and political life with instability.

A monarch in Cambodia has traditionally been the embodiment of the idea of patronage accorded to the sangha, the officials and the people. The paternalism of the supreme authority is the primary characteristic of the traditional concept of government, which has always been regarded as the ability of patronage. A system of patron-client relationships was officially entrenched in Cambodia through the *komlang* institution.⁹ In the Khmer language, particular terms are still used to denote patron-client relationships permeating all dyadic ties: *ksae* (rope) and *pakpuokniyum* (fatherhood). In the Khmer *chbaps*,¹⁰ the patron-client relationships are treated as follows: “What can a

⁹ The *komlang* institution is a specific association of free peasants, within which each peasant chooses a patron for himself triennially from the ranks of members of the royal house or high officials.

¹⁰ The *chbaps* are the medieval collections of advice and moral rules written in a poetical form and designed for various strata of society.

man do without a master? Without a master, a patron he is unhappy, he is a bad character.”¹¹

Relative to the inaccessible cult of the god-king, the Buddhist monarchy of the post-Angkor period (from the fourteenth century) seemed more democratic. This was expressed in the possibility of direct intercourse between the people and the king, of addressing a plea or a petition directly to the palace. Such practices were intimately linked with the judicial function of the monarch. The monarch was the highest arbitrator. Thus one of the first decrees promulgated by Ang Duong after his coronation ran as follows: “In cases where the population is unsatisfied with a court decision, it may address a written request for its revision directly to the king.”¹² However, the task of the monarch consisted not so much in upholding justice as in relaxing tensions and establishing harmony. For if a conflict situation arose, the monarch himself was to blame for it, as the ideal ruler cannot have conflicts among his subjects. The role of the monarch as arbitrator is widely apparent in Khmer tales and legends.¹³

The persisting influence of certain traits of the former Hindu model of the monarchy, particularly the hierarchy of official ranks and the commanding type of administration, fostered a belief that power always implied the ability to order and subdue without demur. A strong authority was a guarantee against anarchy and lawlessness. The sovereign’s titles “the lord of life” and “the lord of the land” indicated that he was a subject of ownership of everything and power over everyone in the nation.¹⁴ The monarch stood outside the hierarchy. E. Aymonier wrote, “The monarch stands above the laws, he is often prone to despotism.”¹⁵ The two contrasting contents of authority—the paternalistic and the despotic—were characteristic of Cambodia. The singular unity of these within Cambodian paternalist despotism was conditioned by the ambivalence of the entire political

¹¹ S. Pou, *Études sur le Rāmakerti (XVI–XVII siècles)*, vol. CXI (Paris: École Française d’Extrême Orient, 1977), 44–45.

¹² *Tussanavoatdey aksosah* (Revue littéraire) 16 (Phnom Penh: L’Association des Écrivains Khmers, 1964), 20–21 (in the Khmer language).

¹³ See *Pracum rveg pren khmaer* (Recueil des contes et légendes khmers) (Phnom Penh: L’Institut Bouddhique, 1962–1968) (in the Khmer language).

¹⁴ L. D. Spektorov, *Feodal’nye otnosheniya v Kambodzhie nakanune ustanovleniya frantsuzskogo protektorata* (The feudal relations in Cambodia on the eve of the establishment of the French protectorate) (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 45–46.

¹⁵ Aymonier, *Le Cambodge*, vol. 1, 56.

and cultural context of Cambodia and generated a certain internal structural stability. Both lines of political culture coexisted and actively interacted, although historically the centre would sometimes shift now toward one, now toward the other.

The charisma of the righteous Buddhist king is the supreme type of religious charisma in Buddhism, while righteousness, which includes participation in the ritual process, large donations to the sangha, and particular attention toward moral commandments, is the supreme source of authority.¹⁶

The first component of the idea of righteousness is participation in the ritual process. Life in Cambodian society had at all levels a ceremonial and ritual character. Especially complex ceremonies took place at the royal court, and the Buddhist ruler was their central figure. The physical presence of the monarch himself became the essence and meaning of the state ceremony. The ritual and mystical practice that surrounded the supreme authority also predetermined the sacrament of decision-making.

Royal behaviour was also ritualized, and it was that type of behaviour that brought political results, which, in turn, increased or reduced the royal merits. The ritual practices, like the finest web, enveloped all strata of society. They were centred around the monarch, for he also exercised his main functions—the defense and patronage of the sangha and the people—partly through the medium of ritual.

For the officialdom, the social significance of the ruler was manifested in his awarding them with titles and ranks that defined their rights and duties as officials. It was also manifested as the value of his personality, for the hierarchy of status corresponded to that of sanctity, whose criterion was the official's merits, that is, his karma. Title and rank rested upon the monarchical authority and determined everyone's place in courtly ritual—this structured the operators of the officialdom. The life of the Khmer peasant was also linked to the monarchy by the threads of this ceremonial. The monarch had always been the “organizer of the living space” of his subjects. In the Angkor period (the ninth to fourteenth centuries), due to the

¹⁶ A. S. Agajanyan, *Buddiiskii put' v XX vek. Religioznye tsennosti v sovremennoi istorii stran buddizma Teravady* (The Buddhist path toward the twentieth century: Religious values in the modern history of Theravada Buddhist countries) (Moscow: Nauka, 1993).

divine character of his authority, the monarch enjoyed absolute power over the people and the forces of nature. He contacted the invisible spirits of nature, directing their powers toward the prosperity of the country and the people. In the post-Angkor period, the faculties of pacifying the spirits of the waters and the earth were also attributed to the monarch, but from that time on this was due to his righteousness and was exercised by means of ritual. Although the very ritual of worshipping the spirits retained its former magical character, the Buddhist concepts of guilt and punishment were incorporated into it. The monarch performed the rituals that had previously defined the limits of the agricultural year and determined the success of the future harvest.¹⁷ Meanwhile, the whole life of the Khmer peasant in peacetime was defined by the patterns of the agricultural year.

The Khmers perceived a guiding function in the ceremonial life of society, while Europeans tended to see there only the suppression of the personality. The ritualization of power and of the entire political process was a major feature of traditional Khmer political culture. Sharing ritual gave a feeling of identity with the ruler and was the society's most important integrating and cross-linking forces not only at the local level, but also nationwide. Khmer researchers observed the Khmers' allegiance toward ritual as late as the 1980s, noting that the "psychology of the Khmer people is profoundly traditional and ritualistic."¹⁸ Participation in the ceremony presided over by the king, as well as the performance of certain agricultural,

¹⁷ Thus, for example, the peasants could not start the ploughing before the ceremony of the royal ploughing. The ceremonies of the 'first royal furrow' were preceded by celebrations in honour of Krong Balei—the spirits of the water and the earth, from whom the king asked permission to begin agricultural work. All ceremonies in honour of the beginning of the agricultural year ended in a solemn ritual of feeding the buffaloes which, as it were, symbolically governed the fate of the coming year. Food and drink—rice (the symbol of good harvest), water (the symbol of abundant rains), and alcohol (the symbol of a happy year)—were placed in front of the buffaloes, and their choice of them foretold the character of the coming year. It was only after the feast of the royal furrow that the monarch would issue an edict for the start of peasant ploughing. Anyone who dared start their ploughing earlier was punished. In this ceremony the king was called "the lord of the land." The king also held annual ceremonies of worshipping the gods to bring about the timely coming of the rains. See E. Porée-Maspéro, *Études sur les rites agraires des cambodgiens*, vol. 1 (Paris, La Haye: Mouton, 1962), 292.

¹⁸ Vandy Kaonn, Ly Kimsok. *Les intellectuels khmers* (Phnom Penh: L'Institut de Sociologie, 1981), 14.

family and domestic rites formed an enduring religious and psychological climate that seemed to protect it from adversity. The Khmers' traditional allegiance toward two kinds of activity—farming and civil service, which depended on the goodwill of the monarch—perpetuated a vision of society centred around the monarch.

A second element of righteousness was the making of particularly large donations to the sangha. The monarch had always been the largest donor to the sangha and its protector, which enhanced the sanctity of his supreme authority. In Khmer historiography, a ruler's attitude toward the sangha was a crucial criterion in assessing him.

The third element of righteousness was a particular attention shown toward moral precepts. This presupposed, first and foremost, the presence in the monarch often noble merits, which included the qualities of generosity, clemency, tolerance, abstinence, justice, kindness, humanity.¹⁹ The ethical commandments regulated both the social and the private behaviour of the ruler, who was obliged not only to show justice in holding the balance of fate of his subjects, but also to restrain his own whims. Thus, according to the materials of the Khmer chronicles, an unrighteous monarch was blamed for such traits as “abuse of alcohol, and excessive passion for hunting, fishing, amusements.”²⁰

The main obligation of the monarch is to be concerned for the well-being of his subjects and to protect them. The idea of the universal good was the keynote of the conception of the Buddhist monarch, and ran through all the social programs of the realm. The Khmer monarch is the “lord of life and the land,” whose power is limited by moral criteria alone. The social program of the realm was also linked to the title of the reigning monarch, which was considered one of the five secret regalia of kingly authority. In the nineteenth century, the Khmer monarchs' title of Dhammaraja, which pertained to the character of the regal person himself and to the moral, soft methods of government, prevailed.²¹

¹⁹ A. Leclère, *Histoire du Cambodge depuis 1-er siècle de notre ère* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1914), 89.

²⁰ Mak Phoeun, *Les chroniques royales du Cambodge (de 1594 a 1677). Traduction française avec comparaison des différentes versions et introduction* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1981), 81.

²¹ Thus the full title name of King Norodom was as follows: “Dhammaraja, the best descendant of the angels and gods of Vishnu who have an excellent heart, the possessor of supreme power on earth, firmly supporting the weak, knowing and

The Khmer chronicles placed greater stress on enumerating the monarch's obligations than on describing his might. The didactical literature was also attentive to the monarch's obligations. The chbap *Trey niti*, written by a royal guru in the seventeenth century and dedicated to that topic, is widely known in Cambodia. The book *Kram reach niti satth*, on the art of governance, analyzed above all the moral categories necessary for ideal government, particularly the moral qualities of the monarch.²² The art of governance was viewed as the ruler's conformity to normative, moral categories and to tradition. The nation's prosperity was directly linked to the monarch's righteousness. The sovereign's function lay in supervising the affairs of the state. The government did not directly meddle in the subjects' lives. What was meant by supervision was the defense and patronage of the subjects. The specific practical knowledge of governance required for the monarch included knowledge of the military arts so as to be able to defend himself from adversaries. He also needed the legal knowledge to pass fair judgments, and the ability to select officials well.

A mechanism for subordination and resistance to the authority was implanted in the monarch's duties to take care of the well-being of his subjects. The society, having no clear-cut institutional levers to influence the authority, and being powerless in the face of the despotic principle of government, nonetheless placed upon it rather strict cultural and ideological demands, and reduced its legitimacy if these were not met. As soon as the monarch neglected his duties and ceased to think about his subjects, thereby failing to observe tradition, he began to lose power over them. His legitimacy was called into question, and his karma was believed to have changed. This legitimated revolt against him (which could find different expressions) and lead to his replacement with someone more worthy and righteous. In the Khmer society there existed well-developed ideological and cultural conceptions of the righteous and unrighteous ruler. Anarchy, unrest, distempers and even various natural cataclysms

understanding everything better than others, victorious, the greatest among the greatest, whose authority extends across the whole of Cambodia, always pure as crystal, a great monarch with absolute power, the possessor of qualities necessary to protect the people," See J. Moura, *Le Royaume du Cambodge*, (Paris: E. Leroux, 1883), 222.

²² Leclère, *Les codes cambodgiens*, vol. 1, 65–68.

were associated with his unrighteousness, and his fate in such cases was not to be envied. In the Khmer chronicle *Pongsavadar*, a story of such a neglectful ruler is cited: “His Excellency Kaev Hva does not care about the affairs of the kingdom, does not fulfill the ten royal duties. He does not stick to the royal norms of behaviour and commits only unworthy deeds.”²³ Further on, it is reported that the population and the officials were dissatisfied with that monarch and that the ministers decided to oust him from the throne. The negligent monarch was put in jail, then stuffed into a sack and drowned. The punishment of the unrighteous monarch, recorded in the chronicle, was meant to reverberate through the ruling circles as well.

The Khmer monarchy bore a character that was both dynastic and elected. That is to say, it was ideal from a Buddhist standpoint, in accordance with which the people elected the most worthy individuals for kingship. The Khmers did not renounce the electoral character of the monarchy, despite its many negative consequences; more than that, they constitutionally solidified it in 1947, 1955 and 1993. The crown was inherited by succession among members of the royal family of up to five degrees of descent, with no more clear-cut rules of succession. The king was elected by the five supreme officials of the state who were expected to choose the most deserving candidate. This procedure on the one hand secured the country against fortuities and against the enthronement of minor heirs. On the other hand, it created a major problem due to the polygamy that existed in the country.²⁴ Buddhism taught that what was of prime importance was not so much dynastic roots, as righteousness, karma as their manifestation. This added to the uncertainties involved in questions of succession. This may explain the legend that the contemporary Buddhist dynasty of Khmer monarchs stems from the first Buddhist king, an ordinary gardener named Ta Trasok Phaem.²⁵ The baku, from whom the dignitaries might choose the most deserving candidate, also had the right to the Khmer throne, although other criteria—age, title, and status within the baku group itself—underlay the definition of merits.²⁶

²³ Phoeun, *Les chroniques royales du Cambodge*, vol. 1, 81–89, 99.

²⁴ Thus, for instance, King Norodom had fourteen sons by different wives and Sisowath twelve. See A. Forest, *Le Cambodge et la colonisation française Histoire d'une colonisation sans heurts (1897–1920)* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1979), 81.

²⁵ Leclère, *Histoire du Cambodge depuis 1-er siècle de notre ère*, 132–133.

²⁶ Leclère, *Recherches sur le droit public des Cambodgiens*, 11–12.

The absence of a clear-cut order of succession to the throne spawned constant intrigues and plots among members of the royal family in the struggle for the throne. This led to the rather singular practice of preterm abdications—the ruling monarch, wishing to guarantee the succession of power to his son or some other member of the royal family selected by him, abdicated in favour of a pretender during his lifetime. Sometimes he would retain effective power and the possibility of subsequently returning to the throne. Such practice, as a rule, was characteristic of strong monarchs aspiring toward the entrenchment of personal, not family power. The practice was officially consolidated through the institution of the *obbaïoureach*, the office of the abdicated king. Preterm abdication served to keep unwelcome candidates from seeking the throne.²⁷

The prince who was most interested in the stability of the ruling monarch's authority was the *obbareach*—the vice-king. As a rule, the king's brother enjoyed advantages over his children and received that title, guaranteeing his succession to the throne. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the personal power of the monarch tended to increase as a counter to family power, something which fostered the consolidation of the *obbareach* institution.²⁸ Since Cambodia's throne was often inherited by the king's junior brother, Khmer literature paid particular attention to the treatment of relations between older and younger brothers. The relations between the main personages of the medieval Khmer *Reamker* epic—Rama and his junior brother Lakshmana—were considered classic in this respect. They reflected a suzerain-vassal relationship—Rama is the master and enjoys primacy, but at the same time he is a patron and protector of his brother. The junior's duty is to demonstrate absolute fidelity and loyalty to the senior.²⁹

The Buddhist concept of royal reign imparted laxity and instability to the polity due to its underlying idea of personal charisma with strong moral and religious motives. While possessing the requisite means of symbolic integration, the Buddhist supreme power

²⁷ Thus, for instance, in 1664 Preah Barom Reachea conferred that title on his brother Ang Ton who had not reigned before, thus barring his path to the throne and paving the way for his own son.

²⁸ See *Istoriya Kampuchii*, 98.

²⁹ S. Pou, *Études sur le Rāmakerti (XVI–XVII siècles)*, vol. CXI (Paris: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1977), 63.

could not be the nucleus of stable structural integration.³⁰ For the sake of effective consolidation, the Khmer monarchy retained certain Hindu principles of a bureaucratic state machine, such as a well-developed cult and ritual practice, the baku institution, and the hierarchy of office ranks. Nonetheless, the gap between the effective and the symbolic power of the monarch in Cambodia remained substantial. This was especially so from the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when the situation was aggravated by struggles for power within the royal family. These weakened the Khmer state and minimized the monarch's real power.

The entire post-Angkor history of Cambodia was marked by opposing tendencies toward centralization and separatism. The balance between these varied with shifting internal factors and external influences. However, the tendency toward centralization was continually present, even when the political centre was at its weakest. The crucial element was that even a symbolic monarchy had to at least display the potential of insuring against social breakdowns within the nation.

The territory of Cambodia was divided into four houses (*samrap*) of crowned persons: the king, the obbaioureach, the obbareach and the queen mother,³¹ in which the key posts were held by *preah vongsa*—the king's relatives by up to five degrees of descent. The three latter houses fully replicated the royal house in miniature, although with less pomp. Each had its own council of ministers and official staff, and administered a certain number of provinces from which they derived income.

The provinces that formed part of the house of the king himself were divided into five lands (*dey*) governed by the “kings of lands”—high-ranking officials with plenary powers. The sovereign tried to entrench himself as the “king of kings” dominating the other “kings of lands”/heads of houses by virtue of a vow (an oath of allegiance taken twice a year), by obliging them to render tribute, and by distributing titles and official posts to all three houses. The obligation to render tribute represented the sovereign's supreme authority over many other kings and lands. He also repaid vassals who had given

³⁰ See Agajanyan, *Buddiiskii put' v XX vek*, 176.

³¹ In the nineteenth century, due to the absence of an obbaioureach, his house was made into part of the royal house.

support to his supreme power by granting them a certain independence in managing local affairs. Characteristic of Khmer society was the persistence of a sort of vassal dependence of the periphery upon the centre, conditioned mainly by their administrative and economic functions. Underlying this was the hierarchical relationship between the centre and the periphery, linked vertically by the bonds of personal oath and loyalty.³² Even with increased centralization, uniformity and orderliness of the administrative system, the cross-links between the centre and local units retained their former character, that is, a combination of the supreme principle of the state, tending toward bureaucratization, with patriarchal and autonomous local units. The centre, the capital, in which government authority and all of its national symbols were concentrated, maintained a weak and fragile integration of the periphery.

Despite the administrative reforms, the creation of a more coherent system of government, education, ministries (*kroms*) in charge of internal affairs, and the tightening of central control over the provincial administration, the Khmer system remained basically state-controlled and patriarchal, albeit somewhat modified.

The classical example of the traditional perception of the monarch by Khmers is contained in the “Sakava sacred song” sung once each year during the Waters and Moon Worship Feast. It contains words expressing the essence of the Khmer concept of monarchic power: “The monarch is the lord of the land; as a patron he rules over people in the capital, grants ranks and titles, and maintains the royal chronicles. It is raining heavily this year because the lord of the land governs his land properly.”³³ The king confirmed that, being the supreme owner of the land, he himself would not meddle in the activity and arrangement of the people living outside of his capital.

The absence of clear-cut rules of succession to the throne and the high degree of autonomy of the local wielders of power caused separatist tendencies of members of the royal family and the governors to become more pronounced during certain historical periods. The

³² V. Tyurin, “Tipy sotsial’no-politicheskoi struktury srednevekovogo obschestva YuVA” (Types of sociopolitical structure of the medieval society of Southeast Asia) in *Tipy obschestvennykh otnoshenii na Vostoke v srednie veka* (Types of social relations in the East in the middle ages) (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 207.

³³ *Baeb piek Sakava somrap chnam 1932* (Chants de Sakava pour l’année 1932) (Phnom Penh: L’Institut Bouddhique, 1970), 8–12 (in the Khmer language).

country frequently found itself divided between the monarch and pretenders. The latter did not always strive to take control of the royal centre, the capital, but rather contented themselves with the territory they conquered.³⁴ Thus the pretender (and sometimes there were more than one) was crowned on his territory, and had a council of ministers and a court of his own. Since it is the whole sangha that is the bearer of charisma, each of the pretenders, after having secured the support of any of its parts, could legitimize his authority. True, that legitimacy was not total in the Khmer tradition, since the pretender had no regalia of royal authority; but it was sufficient for recognition in his territory. The detachment of several power centres within a single state could last for fairly long periods of time. However, separatist tendencies were also attended by desires to usurp central power.

The most important tenet of the Buddhist Theravada concept of statehood is the idea of sovereignty, according to which the monarch is the ruler of the people, not the territory, and his riches are measured in human resources, not in lands. Therefore, the Khmers believed they were living not so much on the territory of a particular state as under a particular monarch. This was reflected in the way the Khmers' addressed the monarch, whom they most often called "the lord of life," although his full title included "the lord of the land."

Another important feature of Cambodia's political life was that amid the decay of royal power, especially in the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, the court struggles were

³⁴ For instance, according to the Khmer chronicle, from 1467 till 1473 the country was divided between King Srei Reachea, who controlled the northern provinces, his nephew Srei Suriyodai, who established his fief in the east, and his brother Prince Thommo Reachea, who made his stronghold in the southern regions. Sometimes the title of the usurper king included the name of the area he controlled. Thus Prince Srei Suriyodai's title included the designation "king of the country of Srei Sa Jhar." In 1505–1515, the country was effectively divided between King Ang Ton and the "peasant king" Kan. In the 1880s, Prince Si Votha was an uncrowned king of the northwestern regions; he did not recognize the authority of Norodom, fixed the borders of his territory, set up a customs house, and established his court with a council of ministers. See *Istoriya Kampuchii. Kratkii ocherk*, 81; Leclère, *Histoire du Cambodge depuis 1-er siècle de notre ère*, 226–230; Khin Sok, *Les Chroniques Royales du Cambodge (de Bana Yat jusqu'à la prise de Lanwæk)*. Traduction française avec comparaison des différentes versions et introduction (Thèse pour le doctorat de 3ème cycle, Université de Paris IV, 1975), 114–128.

accompanied by a constant resorting to outside aid for the solution of internal problems. The neighbouring states of Siam and Vietnam were particularly important sources. During this period the monarchy persevered due, not only to the power of the sovereign—which had in fact been lost—but rather due to the enduring reproductive mechanism of the sovereign's power, supported and legitimized by the Buddhist sangha.

In the colonial period, the monarchical traditions were not interrupted. The colonialists realized the significance of the monarchy in Khmer society after the broad anti-French movement of 1884–1886, and they concluded that cooperation with it would bring much greater benefits than confrontation. In 1899, the French resident in Kampot wrote, “The Cambodians are extremely attached to the royal family which constitutes the salt of their realm and religion. Their king is considered to be the protector of the nation, the Khmer individuality and religion.”³⁵ In accordance with the convention of 11 July 1897, King Norodom (1860–1904) was barred from participating in government administration. Any edicts and enactments could become valid only with the signature of the French supreme resident in Cambodia. The French, having formally kept the throne intact and reserved for Norodom certain nonessential functions, began to reformulate the country's internal and external policies.

Most scholars specializing in Khmer studies believe that, after the French-Cambodian agreements of 1884 and 1897, real power gradually passed into the hands of the French, and the throne was retained as a mere formality. However, it is useful to look at that situation somewhat differently, taking the Khmer concept of monarchical authority as a point of reference. While the French deprived the monarch of real power, they nonetheless substantially enhanced his symbolic role.

What then was the symbolic role of the monarch under the French for the Khmers themselves? He remained the organizing centre of the state and his authority was still the incarnation of the Buddhist doctrine. Being formally the supreme ruler, he reserved the entire body of ritual as his prerogative. A complex ceremonial was fully observed in the palace, and it was the precise performance of this ritual that, in the Khmer view, guaranteed the continuity of the

³⁵ Leclère, *Histoire du Cambodge depuis 1-er siècle de notre ère*, 68.

social order and the well-being of society.³⁶ Moreover, under French rule the celebrations and ceremonies became even more sumptuous. Under kings Sisowath (1904–1927) and Monivong (1927–1941), who did not conflict with the French administration, protectorate authorities spared no expense in organizing traditional festivals. Under Norodom, a new festival, Tang Tok, was instituted dedicated to the king's birthday. Thus the ritual aspect of authority was retained. The king's departures from the palace became more frequent and more gorgeously arranged than before as were many other ceremonies. By the early twentieth century, the Silver Pagoda and a new royal palace had been built in Phnom Penh, and the monarch had acquired a yacht. These were outward manifestations of the monarch's authority. At all public ceremonies and festivals the French resident was alongside the king, paying honour to him. For the Khmers this was convincing testimony of French respect for their monarch.

The king retained still another major function of power: as before, he remained the defender and patron of religion and sangha. And it is through their common link with Buddhism that the Khmers feel national unity. Under the colonial regime the bond between the authority and religion was not broken.

The fact that the monarch was deprived of the right to appoint and dismiss officials, which caused bitter discontent on the part of the then King Norodom, is always cited as a major argument confirming the transfer of real power into the hands of the French. Indeed, this seriously affected the king's income (this was the primary motivation for Norodom's protest), which had been largely derived by providing appointments to officials. With the introduction of the king's civil list, this source of income took on an increasing significance.

When the king's power is seen as curtailed because he no longer took part in the formation of the government apparatus, another side of the problem, no less important in our view, is overlooked: the government apparatus continued to be based on monarchical authority. Firstly, the monarch officially remained head of the Khmer administration. As had been the case in precolonial times, all officials came to the capital twice a year, bringing him donations and an oath of allegiance. Secondly, officials, even if appointed to office by

³⁶ See Vandy Kaonn and Ly Kimsok, *Les intellectuels khmers* (Phnom Penh, 1982).

the French administration, could not take up their duties without a seal handed to them by the king—no one recognized him as an office-holder without that seal. Thus the legitimation of officials remained a kingly function. Thirdly, all edicts and enactments necessarily bore his signature, even if he had taken no part in drafting them. For the officials in the provinces it was his seal that mattered, since it acknowledged the monarch's traditional role as the nation's main legislator.

One should not forget another factor that cushioned the blow the French dealt to the relationship between the monarch and officials. In the precolonial period, the circle of officials appointed by the king was traditionally restricted, encompassing only the very top of the apparatus. It was only under Ang Duong—who strove to unite the country and strengthen centralization through enhancing the dependence of local officials on monarchical authority—that the king began appointing provincial governors. This previously had been the ministers' prerogative. Norodom intervened in appointing petty provincial officials chiefly to replenish his treasury, and drew a negative reaction from that very officialdom. Thus in the precolonial period the relations between the monarch and the official apparatus were mostly regulated by the oath of allegiance, donations, the royal seal, and the granting of titles. The Khmers' traditional view of power as the source of titles and ranks was not shaken by the actions of the colonial administration. Although in accordance with the laws of 1892 and 1897 conflicts between Cambodians and the French were liable to examination in the French courts, the monarch reserved the right to pardon his subjects. One power that Norodom tried vigorously to protect was his right to appoint his own successor. His son, Prince Yukanthor, went to Paris to ensure the retention of this prerogative. Indeed, he himself was expected to mount the throne. However, while preserving the trappings of local input (the convocation of the council of ministers, the conference therewith), the French took the appointment of the successor fully into their own hands by choosing the prince who was most suitable for them. Keep in mind, however, that throughout the entire precolonial history of Cambodia we often find the king's opinions on questions of succession failing to prevail.

In assessing the monarch's situation during the years of the protectorate, most Khmer studies specialists see the monarch's inability to make independent decisions as a negative feature. Yet this was

in full conformity with the Khmer concept of power. The supreme authority had always been spared the necessity of making concrete decisions; these were made by lower-ranking officials, the entourage. The rituals and the multitude of rules pertaining to the monarch's behaviour had always limited his freedom of choice. Power in its highest spheres was perceived as deliverance from the necessity of making particular decisions, and this was merely consolidated by the colonial administration in the years of the protectorate. To some extent it marked the concept of power and the exercise thereof in the postcolonial period. Be it as it may, from the standpoint of the Khmer concept of monarchical authority this had minimal influence on Khmer loyalist sentiments. The monarchy was not politically discredited in the eyes of the population in view of the nation's loss of independence. By reserving four major functions—ideological, religious, ritual and legitimizing—for the sovereign, the French enhanced his symbolic role, which was the predominant one in the Khmer conception of the monarchy. The monarch's prestige was also fostered by a certain internal stability in the country after the French put an end to pretenders' struggling for power.

What all of this tells us is that the Western influence to which the Khmers were subjected had a superficial character. They did not have to experience a crisis of world outlook, since the vast majority of the population continued to look to the monarch, whose image did not fade under the French. As in colonial times, the monarch remained for the Khmers the centre of the political system, the principal figure in the ideological and ceremonial spheres. More than that, during the protectorate era aspects of the traditional concept of power were not only retained but enhanced in the public mind.

Some have said that whereas the rank-and-file Khmers were not conscious of all the changes in the status of the monarch, his entourage, the high-ranking officials, saw clearly the king's complete dependence on the French. However, it should be remembered that the Khmers had not always attached a negative meaning to the idea of dependence. Indeed, traditional patron-client relationships presumed a search for a voluntary, beneficial dependence. From that perspective, was not the French presence in the eyes of a certain part of the royal court a beneficial dependence? Naturally, it implied the maintenance of all the symbols of power, all the more so since the mechanism of colonial exploitation in Cambodia was fully implemented rather late, in the 1920s.

Under the French, the might and importance of monarchical government was bolstered and, as it were, newly legitimized by its glorious historical past. The French School of the Far East (*L'École Française d'Extrême Orient*), founded in 1898, and the work undertaken by it for the restoration of the Angkor monuments in the 1900s–1920s, the creation of the museum of archeology in Phnom Penh, reminded the Khmers of their former greatness, and the superposition of the contemporary monarchy upon the traditions of the past not only heightened its prestige. It also created an image of a monarchy more humane and viable within the framework of tradition, sustaining and justifying its existence from the standpoint of the nation's historical fate.

The colonial period saw the formation of an influential symbolic power of the monarch and a strong political centre personified by the French supreme resident. In the postcolonial period, King Norodom Sihanouk tried to solidify this duality. In 1955, he abdicated from the throne, hoping to gain real power while transferring the symbolic power of the throne into the trusty hands of his father, King Suramarit. However, as subsequent events would show, the political centre created by Sihanouk, was less powerful than it had initially seemed. In 1970, monarchy in the country was abolished and republican rule was established. Thus the balance between secular and spiritual authority (between royal power and Buddhism) was upset and the traditional symbolic power framework broke down. Subsequently, Lon Nol, who proclaimed the republic (1970–1975), admitted repeatedly that his principal mistake had been his abolition of the monarchy. Despite the destruction of the monarchical institution, the monarchical principle itself would not vanish from the machinery of government or from the mass consciousness, and it gradually penetrated the postmonarchical regimes.

In 1993, the monarchy was restored and the triad of nation-throne-religion was included in the constitution as the main ideological tenet. In the process, the procedure for restoring the monarchy was presented as a classic variant of the enthronement of a Buddhist king. Norodom Sihanouk was elected to the realm. The ruling elite addressed him with a request to be crowned. Underlying that address was the genuine agreement of all the political parties and the population to recognize the unquestionable preeminence of the personal charisma of the prince. He was seen as the only possible guarantor of a successful realization of the policy of national reconciliation.

At present, the monarchy has drawn close to the traditional type of legitimation and to its traditional place in the political system—it is precisely the symbolic role formalized by legislative procedure that is reserved for the monarch. The monarchy is viewed solely as a stabilizing force, the protector and patron of the sangha, the safeguard of traditions and culture. The monarch does not intervene in politics and the economy, because such “intervention is only capable of damaging the authority of the throne.”³⁷ For the monarchical institution to work it must preserve the purity of values and symbolic purity. An association of the monarchy with the dominant value system, with the symbols of spiritual continuity and national consensus, imbues it with the major functions of legitimation and stabilization of the political process in the country, and helps Cambodians to conceptualize modern political reality in line with their political and cultural traditions.

³⁷ *Rosmey Kampuchea Daily* (in the Khmer language), 28 January 1997.

A SHADOW OF KLEPTOCRACY OVER AFRICA
(A THEORY OF NEGATIVE FORMS OF
POWER ORGANIZATION)

Leonid V. Geveling

A logical model of kleptocracy consists of two nodal components. The first embodies a distinct social community and the second a specific way of governance. In mundane thinking, the social and political aspects of this category, becoming blurred, tend to be associated with a governing regime set up by “corrupt bureaucrats.”

Elements of kleptocracy are present in public life of most countries of the modern world. However, this concept owes its emergence and primary development to studies on African countries, or, to be exact, from data on the First Republic in Nigeria that were analyzed by S. Andreski back in the 1960s.¹ Later, a number of African countries saw “hothouse conditions” developed for the growth of economic and political corruption, and the formation of many species of kleptocracy, including its “classic” forms which sometimes served as a reference point even for corrupt bureaucrats of non-African descent.

The sociology of African kleptocracy unquestionably reflects a universal propensity of any “governing group” *to be a social community*, and also *to take a direct part* in the processes affecting the pattern, functions, and algorithm of societal development. However, still at the intuitive level of analysis of this category it may be presumed that kleptocracy belongs to a distinct class of social entities whose being is marked by countless paradoxes.

The fundamental contradictions in the social existence of the stratum under study have to be sought partly in the particulars of the genesis of *proto-kleptocratic groups* whose formation must have begun in the preclass and prestate (or early state) periods in the development of some African societies. On the socio-organizational plane, this

¹ S. Andreski, *The African Predicament. A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation* (London, 1968).

tendency was premised on greater sophistication and individualization of administrative labour, as well as on increased influence, prestige and wealth of a group of persons which gradually monopolized the ruling functions. In the power-related and organizational dimension, the ascendancy of groups marked by a number of kleptocratic features must have been conditioned by the curtailment of non-political (that is, primeval, "tribal") democracy on the one hand, and of harsh forms of autocracy on the other. One may assume that in the socio-political structure formed by that time the moral and "legal" norms favoured or at least accepted the presence of something like "corruption" and a group of its agents in society. The long historical route traversed by kleptocracy hypothetically suggests that the social time of the formation of this category was flowing much more slowly than that of many other groups of African society.

In its present shape, the African kleptocracy, needless to say, is not only a fragment of a status-role group of ancient social structures, but is also an element of the modern cryptosocial structure. What members of the kleptocracy have in common as a social group are the relations of social parasitism and "collective individualism"; these are distinguished by deliberate disorganization of the economic and political life of society, the use of power-related and administrative functions of state and public institutions for personal or narrow corporate ends, the swift accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, a high education level and social status. The similarity of the agents of kleptocratic relations is shaped by quite comparable living standards and a common subculture encompassing the features of both traditional and modern social behaviour.

The structural profile of kleptocracy in a number of tropical African countries is a network of factions of high-ranking corrupt bureaucrats loosely integrated in socio-economic terms. As regards particular factions of kleptocracy, they band together in horizontally aligned groups, small in number, though greatly consolidated. In the broad sense of the term, the concept in question may with certain reservations comprise vertically oriented strata of the kleptocrats' immediate clients as well. Underlying the horizontal and vertical integration of individual agents of kleptocratic relations into factions is usually the corresponding ethnic, regional, confessional, clan—and rarely—party or professional affiliation of individuals.

It should be stressed that the weight of kleptocracy as a social group is limited, its social autonomy relative. This is so, firstly, because

this category epitomizes not so much the product of development of economic and socio-economic relations as it does connections with the powers that be and paradigms of governance. On the strength of this circumstance alone, one may reasonably suppose that kleptocracy may at best pretend to belong to the class of “secondary” social entities. Secondly, it should be noted that although broad social strata of African countries may be tolerant towards kleptocracy (and sometimes admire it), the social essence of this category is always *opposed to the system and the public interest*. It is not by chance that kleptocracy acts as an alien, extraneous element in society and is rejected by nearly all social groups. Kleptocracy’s confrontational existential style characterizes its relations even with the “closest neighbours” in the shadow governing networks. To be included among these, above all, is *lootocracy*, that is, leaders of the negative economy and organized sordid crime, as well as plutocracy which traditionally serves as a reference group for most kleptocrats.

A distinctive code of kleptocracy’s functioning and development makes its social identification difficult, as the entity fits neither the elitist patterns of social arrangement, nor the class models of society entirely. True, this “defect” of kleptocracy is abundantly compensated for by its faculty of *social mimicry*, a remarkable capacity to disguise its parts as elements of quite respectable groups of society. It may be assumed that the role of a destructive faction of the elite or a special stratum of the bourgeoisie, the new middle classes or the politically ruling and economically dominant groups is reserved for kleptocracy for precisely this reason—“by default” (M. A. Cheshkov). The ease with which kleptocracy cloaks itself, for instance, behind the “elite” cover, may perhaps be explained by the fact that a group of high-ranking corrupt officials possesses certain traits of this category, although in reality it may only perform the role of a *quasi-elite*. In this capacity, kleptocracy tends to gravitate towards the model of a “unified”, or “ruling”, elite; the model of “pluralistic elites” accords with its nature to a much lesser extent.

Modern kleptocracy is a political function of corruption. Epitomizing the destructive element of social domination and administration, African kleptocracy has developed in accordance with the imperatives of economic and political corruption. Kleptocracy is a secondary form of organization of power exercised by a group of high-ranking corrupt officials and objectively tending towards subversion of the basic (or primary—democracy, autocracy) and parallel (or secondary—

technocracy, meritocracy, theocracy, partyocracy, and so forth) resources of governing the social processes.

Since the early 1950s, when representative government institutions gradually began to take root in Nigeria's political life, the Nigerians, B. Dudley notes, had begun to feel a morbid fascination for corruption.² In the first half of the 1960s, as pointed out by R. Wraith and Ed Simpkins, corruption gripped the higher echelons of political leadership (federal and regional government levels), while a "conspiracy" against the Nigerian public was in fact brewing in the local government bodies infested with bribery and nepotism.³ In the later periods of Nigerian history (with the exception of brief spells), this tendency was definitely transformed into a process which, as recognized by many of the country's leaders,⁴ was in the ascendant.

The material foundation of Nigerian kleptocracy both as a form of power organization and as a social group was built according to the rules worked out inside the economic corruption (ECORR) network. The category of economic corruption, which occupies a special and very important place in the analytical apparatus of kleptocracy, is in many ways associated with the concepts of negative (shadow) economy and political corruption.

The ECORR's proximity to the negative economy (NEC) is determined by a certain similarity between corporate economic goals chosen by kleptocracy and lootocracy (self-enrichment, illicit seizure of property, etc.), as well as the means and forms of attaining those goals, the comparable scale of damage done to society, and the continued cooperation between the social agents of both systems of relations. In a certain sense, economic corruption serves as an extension of a number of NEC embranchments (large-scale fraud, smuggling, illegal extraction and sale of minerals, and so on), but in this case it reaches from the domain of the economic underground into the field of external interaction of the shadow economy with various types of "controlling" bureaucracy. In other words, a major part of NEC manifestations may be regarded as ECORR (and even trans-

² B. J. Dudley, *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), 103.

³ R. Wraith and E. Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964).

⁴ *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), 31.07.1980, 1.

forming itself completely into the latter) if the development of negative economic activity begins to obey the will of the holders of public, political, and state authority, i.e., first of all, those officials who make the decisions in tackling economic problems and/or have the power to dispose of the property belonging to others.

The difference between ECORR and NEC is no less substantial than the similarity between them. Firstly, the objects of these networks' activity are to a certain extent at variance. This means that economic corruption has forms of existence which are not directly connected with the negative economy; the same holds true of NEC. Thus the forms of ECORR (for example, a bribe given to the employer for career development) are sometimes generated within the framework of a "club", "international," military and other types of leadership, including business administration at enterprises catering to the positive economy. Secondly, the categories of ECORR and NEC are in fact different methodological aspects of analysis even when sections of their objects overlap. Using the category of the negative economy helps reveal both the genetic (specific features of the developmental process) and the structural functional properties of an object, whereas employing the concept of economic corruption is oriented primarily towards the analysis of the object's functional characteristics. Thirdly, as distinct from NEC, the notion of economic corruption calls attention to the tendency towards criminalization of a group of persons invested with power functions, a substantial number of members of society that have contact with them, as well as the political system as a whole. Fourthly, in conclusion, it should be emphasized that as a subsystem of a broader and more abstract object—"corruption in general"—economic corruption, as a matter of fact, inseparably interacts with another subsystem—"political corruption." Somewhat simplifying the root of the matter, it may be pointed out that by means of economic corruption kleptocracy copes with the problem of augmenting its property, while kleptocracy also uses political corruption to shore up its power positions. This suggests that the concept of ECORR pertains mainly to the systems of economic-power and organizational-administrative categories, whereas NEC only joins them at the meeting point.

From the standpoint of kleptocracy theory, the broad practice whereby "public-sector" officials make use of their official functions and information for personal or corporate enrichment (material and non-material forms of wealth) and/or raising their social status may

be regarded as a *general case of economic corruption*. As a rule, specific acts of economic corruption are profitable for both direct donors and recipients. "Influence-peddling" by administrative personnel of private business and other non-state organizations, and also the various manifestations of low-level, "routine" ECORR may be regarded as *particular cases of economic corruption* which do not directly foster the entrenchment of kleptocracy, although they create a propitious environment for its development. The firmly established *system of economic corruption* comprising both its general and particular cases inevitably leads to the destruction of the political system and economic structure of society, as well as to its moral degradation.

Figuratively speaking, economic corruption is a "philosophers' stone" of a political process undergoing criminalization. The essence of the external and partly internal forms of ECORR lies in the fact that many officials, afflicted, as it were, by the *Midas syndrome*, strive to emulate the powers of that semilegendary Phrygian king—to turn whatever they touch into gold (in this case by abusing their duty). The "undeclared earnings" of corrupt officials and other members of the bureaucracy emerge as a result of hidden exploitation of perhaps each and every socio-economic structure and expropriation (sometimes using methods intrinsic in the voluntaristic economy) of wealth that had been accumulated in the framework of various forms of ownership.

Of crucial importance for the accelerated formation of kleptocracy is the monopoly entitlement of the highest bureaucracy to work out, adopt and control the fulfillment of decisions that actualize the strategy and tactics of the state intervention in economic life. (In keeping with Nigeria's political practice, the state was compelled to delegate a part of its economic function to the parties and some other institutions of the political structure ruling at the federal and regional levels.) This said, whereas for an individual kleptocrat the involvement in the state regulation of economic processes mostly implies only a chance of quick enrichment, for kleptocracy as a whole this is a way towards the expansion and consolidation of its positions in the economic and political structures of power.

Being a political and social *embodiment of the seamy side of statism*, the Nigerian kleptocracy more or less successfully brings under its control the components of both the internal (reorganization of the economic production structure, etc.) and the external (protection from foreign competition) economic function of the state. The result is the

emergence of a *quasi-state system of regulating* the market and market-oriented segments of the economy. The development of this system is but a very distorted reflection of the transformation of the Nigerian and global economy, and also of the changes in the ideology of the socially meaningful role of the state in the process of extended reproduction of national productive forces. Thus there is a potential danger that genuine state regulation may be substituted by “economic corruption games” and the strategy of ensuring the country’s economic security supplanted by the goals of ensuring the survival of local kleptocracy or even only one of its factions.

To be sure, it would be an unjustified exaggeration to assert that in post-colonial Nigeria the kleptocratic elements have already elaborated and started to put into practice their own ideology of economic evolution. At the same time, their interests often served as a factor that checked the processes of reforming the economy, for example, in the field of changing its functioning regime (liberalization, democratization or enhanced centralization), determining the main direction of the transformations (industrialization, the farm economy, the development of petroleum sector, etc.), and applying the concept of a wide reorganization of the national economy (the structural adaptation programme—SAP).⁵

Along with economic corruption, kleptocracy’s existence is built on political corruption (POLCORR), which largely rests on the principles and institutions of ECORR and NEC. However, as distinct from NEC and ECORR, actions in which political corruption manifests itself are not always made with the intention of attaining illicit material gain.

The main objects of POLCORR’s influence are the sphere of political behaviour and the domain of political culture.⁶ Due to the POLCORR phenomenon, a notable change is under way, first, in the notions and sociocultural images prevalent in society; second, in the systems of political values cementing orientations and preferences; and, at last, in the historically formed corpus of political, legal, moral, and other norms. POLCORR’s developmental dynamics and the

⁵ Adedotun O. Phillips and Eddy C. Ndekwe (ed.), *Structural Adjustment Programme in a Developing Economy. The Case of Nigeria* (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1987).

⁶ *Sotsiologiya* (Sociology) (Moscow: Mysl’), 79–80, 90–91.

change of its forms in Nigeria were to a large extent determined by the intrinsic features of colonialism, the sovereign rule of civil and military regimes, internecine war and *coups d'état*.

POLCORR's functioning and development gradually resulted in the formation of a peculiar culture of political corruption engendered by practical interests, as well as by intellectual, moral, and aesthetic requirements of kleptocracy and related social groups, along with the psychological and subjective dimensions of its politics.

By the degree of its negative influence on the political system and on the sum total of orientational and behavioural elements of politics, it is possible to classify POLCORR manifestations into two complexes. The first is aimed at a more or less serious distortion of the principles of the prevailing form of power organization, at a readjustment of the officially recognized hierarchy of norms of political behaviour, and at a partial reassessment of cultural values. In the process, POLCORR, needless to say, destabilizes the political structure of society but does not aspire to complete destruction of its basic institutions and communication systems. This POLCORR complex is distinguished by a rather low incidence of violence along with a rather high level of material and "political career" interest displayed by the persons involved in corruption processes.

The most widespread manifestations of the first POLCORR complex in Nigeria are the various kinds of overt and covert slander, especially that containing deliberately false accusations directed toward political and public figures (item 373-376 of the Nigerian criminal code); a public insult to a representative of the authority and political opponent; a deliberately false denunciation of an official and a provocation of a bribe. A distinct segment of this complex is presented by numerous kinds of infringements of citizens' rights. First of all, these infringements occur in the course of election campaigns and elections proper to the federal, state and local government bodies. Here we note that citizens are prevented from exercising their right of suffrage, that pressure is exerted on the national, regional, district and other electoral commissions on the part of the government and various interest groups, and that there is an imposition of baseless bans and restrictions of meetings, rallies and other pre-election events; there is also forgery, destruction, and concealment of ballot-papers and the falsification at the poll. Second, we must also mention explicit or veiled forms of violation of privacy, the infringement of secrecy of correspondence, the far-ranging restrictions on

granting information to journalists and public organizations. With only a small degree of hesitation, one may assume that the first POLCORR complex meets the aspirations of moderate kleptocracy and radical plutocracy.

In the orientation and behaviour of the second POLCORR complex, the element of will implicitly prevails over the material interests of its social agents and is embodied in a special “zone of violence” extending to the border between *gross infringement and destruction* of the officially recognized political relations, values, and rules. It may be assumed that the second complex is objectively aimed not so much at distorting the prevalent political arrangements and subverting the functioning of the regime of the public authority as it is at eliminating the entire system of control mechanisms (the rules, norms, instructions, plans, prescriptions) that ensures the regulation of human social behaviour and that prevents a complete disorganization of the political space. These extreme forms of political corruption lead to the breakup of the political system, the collapse of the state, the proliferation of the most primitive forms of NEC, and the *anomie* of society, while transforming lack of principle (as a generally acknowledged concept) into the main political “principle.”

However, what seems to present the greatest danger is the effect of the “negative-creative” function of the second complex, which is potentially linked to the reconstruction of a certain protoculture of corruption (the information on it is certainly still stored in the social memory) and the possibility that the principles and institutions of a non-political authority peculiar to chiefdoms or early states will be used in modern conditions. POLCORR encourages a tendency towards inversion and restoration (admittedly, in a transformed state) of what had long seemed to be extinct traditions. Models of preferable behaviour, their value systems, and other elements of a system of socio-political relations are lost. Moreover, corruption—just as NEC—begins to be transformed from a deviation or rejection of the norm into the norm itself.

The political life of postcolonial Nigeria is, unfortunately, replete with tendencies towards this corruption complex (see heads 6–10 of the Nigerian criminal code). Among them are hooliganism and vandalism with a hidden political motive (deliberate damage or destruction of property during election campaigns, and so forth); hostage-taking and organization of mass riots by “order” of particular political forces; individual political terrorism; creation of underground

terrorist organizations as defined under the Nigerian criminal code (chapter nine) under the heading of “illegal societies”, whose purposes, structure, and functions only partially coincide with the category of “secret societies” widely known in ethnology. These manifestations also include propagation of religious, ethnic, and “regional” exclusiveness, and also the fomenting of the corresponding forms of strife and enmity (see, for example, article 88 b); encroachment on the life of high-ranking officials, political leaders, big businessmen and public figures; public calls for mass refusal to perform civic duties or for a violent change of the constitutional system. Sabotage, the organization of armed revolts and the practice of military coups, so relevant for a number of the countries of tropical Africa—violent power takeovers, although these are frequently carried out under the guise of combat against corruption within the ruling regime—should be ascribed to the same complex of corruption.

These elements of radical kleptocracy and lootocracy are the predominant social exponents of the ideas and behaviour of the second POLCORR complex.

The formation of the Nigerian POLCORR system was subjected to its own *universal laws*, each of which governed the realization of a particular combination of principles and institutions (in a jurisprudential rather than political science or sociological sense) of the POLCORR system and the functioning of the corresponding groups of its elements. The system of POLCORR’s mutually intertwined imperatives is an asymmetrical structure, not devoid of harmony and internal logic, which makes possible the existence of kleptocracy, the criminalizing strata of plutocracy, and the existence of (in part) lootocracy.

The members of the Nigerian kleptocracy are characterized by a certain community of psychological features, but the feeling of belonging to the “national elite” is not fully their own. It is even more difficult to assume that the category of high-ranking corrupt officials has already developed a system of ideas about solidary interests and uniform goals of kleptocracy as a self-sustaining, sociopsychological community. The level of kleptocracy’s psychological integrity and the features of self-identification of its members are presently determined by factional affiliation and social differentiation (basically according to the “natural” criteria of stratification) of this group. The complex social composition of the category under consideration, after being refracted through the prism of political corruption, engenders in the

framework of kleptocracy an effect of narrow group egocentrism, which serves as one of the decisive imperatives of its existence both on the emotional and the rational plane.

The egocentrism of the highest corrupt bureaucracy in many ways corresponds to the tendency towards the formation of the political consciousness of kleptocratic microgroups that usually assume the form of political clans or cliques. It is these microgroups, not the entire kleptocracy, that determine the social roles of their members, and develop their systems of needs and social expectations. These microgroups also determine the value orientations corresponding to the group, and more or less successfully formulate their own interests and pave the way for their realization. The whole spectrum of political orientations of contemporary Nigerian kleptocracy, encompassing the opinions, feelings, and assessments of its members concerning nearly all social problems, is formed within the microgroups of POLCORR's social agents as steady and recurrent informal relations develop at the interpersonal level. The political behaviour of each kleptocratic faction in question is also programmed simultaneously.

POLCORR's factional structure has not only a horizontal (the "divide and rule" principle) but also vertical (the "benefits for one's own people only" principle) framework. Here it is pertinent to recollect that Le Vine imagined the "hierarchy of trust" of a corrupt Ghanaian (in a descending line) as follows: (1) Members of his small and (or) extended family. (2) Close friends coming from his ethnic community ("countrymen"). (3) Business contractors. (4) Classmates, fellow students. (5) Clients/assistants. (6) Work or professional colleagues. (7) Persons occupying a superior or inferior position in an organization where the given POLCORR agent works. (8) Fellow citizens (representing the government or its individual institutions).⁷

Taking into account the unlawful essence of political corruption and the generally negative public attitude towards it, various factions of Nigerian kleptocracy strive to envelop their *modus operandi*, and sometimes their *modus vivendi* as well, in deep *mystery*. This dissimulation goes far beyond both the natural right of man and citizen to non-interference in his personal life and the limits of normal practice of non-disclosure of business (official) information.

⁷ V. T. Le Vine, *Political Corruption. The Ghana Case* (Stanford, 1975), 47.

The side of kleptocracy's life and activity that is hidden or obscure for the uninitiated embraces different levels of political governance and the institutions of the political structure. The most carefully guarded and socially dangerous among kleptocracy's secrets are undoubtedly those associated with the functioning of the state and government, with repressive bodies, and with the ruling or major opposition party. From the standpoint of POLCORR theory, mystery represents one of the prime conditions of the functioning of the informal machinery of political power. Besides, mystery is an important means of ensuring kleptocracy's social and economic security; suffice it to mention how widely it implants the clandestine and anonymous forms of wealth accumulated in illegal ways.

The latent side of kleptocracy's political and other aspects is primarily conditioned by the fact that kleptocracy itself—as well as lootocracy⁸—is a cryptosocial community and, consequently, a genetic carrier of the mystery imperative. Certain features of the way of life typical of the criminal strata of the informal sector implicitly influence (mainly through the group of leaders of the criminal world) the formation of a secret behavioural pattern of corrupt bureaucrats. Still less is it influenced by the way of living of kleptocracy's social antipodes—lumpens, paupers, a section of marginal elements and other “semicatacomb” strata of society basically representing the culture of poverty of the urban lower classes. (Let us note in passing that the “unknown” forms of existence of the social underground in Nigeria are conditioned not so much by the reticence of its exponents as by the fact that the culture of poverty itself is being ignored by the more lucky members of society).

When cryptologically analysing the POLCORR, one must bear in mind that a significant part of high-ranking corrupt officials are closely connected with the (neo)traditional institutions and, in particular, with secret societies.⁹ Some of the most influential secret alliances even nowadays are claiming—hierarchically and adminis-

⁸ L. V. Geveling, “Negativnaya ekonomika v Afrike. Stanovleniye kriptosotsial'nykh obshchnostei” (Negative economy in Africa. The formation of cryptosocial communities), in *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta* (Journal of the Moscow University), Series 13, Vostokovedenie (Oriental studies), No. 2 (1992): 20–30.

⁹ N. B. Kochakova, *Traditsionnye instituty upravleniya i vlasti (po materialam Nigerii i Zapadnoi Afriki)* (The traditional institutions of management and power [a case study of Nigeria and West Africa]) (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 142–149.

tratively—the role of parallel (if not alternative) regional and local power structures, and making unlawful use of latent ritual practice to enrich their members. The development of the quasiarchaic-type POLCORR in postcolonial Nigeria is also facilitated by the influence of other components of the “mystery culture.” What we have in mind is, first, the presence of various secret cults and clandestine (sometimes “totalitarian”) religious sects, and, which is the main thing, of the still popular ideas of supernatural faculties of power and mystical character of governance, which must be exercised only in an atmosphere of secrecy and with various restrictions (N. B. Kochakova). A second aspect of the “mystery culture” is the “esoteric knowledge,” highly valued in various sections of society, including that intended only for those initiated to the doctrine, types of secret mini-ideologies of a religious and religious-cum-political character.

It is customary to consider—though it is not always justified—special services, repressive bodies, and power-related agencies in general as a serious institutional support for kleptocracy. As to kleptocracy’s ruling centres and POLCORR’s leading force, their roles are played by “invisible supergovernments”, and also by some other elements of the non-constitutional system of political leadership. In the academic literature and in political journalism, such offscreen power centres are usually called a “government within the government” or a “parallel government”, an “inner” or “kitchen” cabinet. Administratively and organizationally, it is the leading body of a ruling party, but more often it is the presidential office or other top echelons of the state machinery that underpin the political puppeteers. In the case when the secret government coalesces around a figure of some “*eminence grise*” (as was, for example, the case with Brigadier Idiagbon in the government of Nigeria under the Buhari administration), it can function beyond the formal framework of ministries and departments in general.

The secret bodies of state leadership, as a rule, directly obey the president, leader of a military regime, or prime minister and stand above representative institutions.¹⁰ Their functions in many respects

¹⁰ V. E. Guliev, *Demokratiya i sovremenniy imperializm. Ocherki teorii kapitalisticheskogo gosudarstva i politicheskoi organizatsii burzhuznogo obshchestva* (Democracy and contemporary imperialism. Essays in the theory of the capitalist state and political organization of the bourgeois society) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1970),

are determined by the discretion of the head of state or the competence of the government and cover questions of national defence, security, civil service, and economic construction.¹¹

As an example of secret government, one may cite an “inner cabinet” that governed the state policy of Ghana in the period of H. Limann’s rule. Not all its members held government offices, but by virtue of their personal connections with the head of state they wielded greater influence than ministers. Limann’s special trust in the members of the “inner cabinet” was attested by the fact that it was they who received key posts in the ruling party.¹² A similar practice, which is very common in African countries, corresponds more to American, than to European ideas of *cabinet governance*. The cabinet of ministers (even official, let alone “inner”) is considered as an “official family of the president” and as a body that has an “intimate character.”¹³

T. Lardner¹⁴ and some other researchers wrote about the existence of an influential “mini-cabinet” in Nigeria in the early 1980s. The takeover of state power by the National party at the federal and regional levels was accompanied by the detachment from the circle of its sponsors and managers of a small group (approximately ten people) of especially close supporters of the president. They constituted a “kitchen cabinet” of Shehu Shagari and played a leading role in appointing members of the administration. They helped in the advancement of some officials, retarded the upward mobility of others, and formed the political canons of the Second Republic. The president’s “kitchen cabinet” was, in essence, outside the control of not only the legislative bodies, but even the the highest ranks of the National Party of Nigeria, the NPN. It was buttressed by Shagari’s political clients who received approximately 500 key state posts—those of ministers, advisers, presidential assistants, chairmen of boards, of directors of the major state-owned companies, etc.¹⁵

213; *Politicheskie sistemy sovremennosti (očerki)* (The political systems of modern times (essays) (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 169.

¹¹ *Gosudarstvo v stranakh kapitalisticheskoi orientatsii* (The state in the countries of capitalist orientation) (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 178.

¹² Yu. A. Rodionov, *Politichskoye razvitiye sovremennoi Gany* (The political development of modern Ghana) (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 110.

¹³ Guliev, op. cit., 192.

¹⁴ *This Week* (Lagos), Vol. 4, 27.6.1988, 17.

¹⁵ *Weekly Star* (Enugu), 12.06.1983.

Openness in political and state decision-making must probably serve as a binary opposite of kleptocracy's "secret governments" and obscure *modus operandi*. However, in Nigeria's political practice openness is frequently replaced by its ersatz substitute—*defamation*, which usually means the publication of genuine or fictitious facts of a compromising character. The discrediting of the target is, as a rule, achieved by the publication of the appropriate materials in the printed and electronic mass media, although "open discussions", skillfully spread rumours and other forms and ways of conveying information and misinformation may play an appreciable role in this respect.

Defamation as one of the imperatives of the Nigerian POLCORR is closely connected to more normal prescribed standards which form the basis of the self-regulation and self-realization of *Homo politicus*. These standards define the borders of the permissible in public life and eventually define what is taboo in many fields of political behaviour.¹⁶ The sense of defamation consists in the emotionally oriented correction of the appropriate *fixed values* of the socialized individual (at times, of the whole electoral corps), whose political consciousness embodies negative appraisals of particular elements of the polity and regime, of certain state and public figures (whose images are being "demonized"), and also of the rules of the political game.

The basic practical task of defamation consists in orchestrating a campaign against the political contender by divulging evidence exposing his political immoralism.¹⁷ For this reason defamation often forms the basis for the development of the type of *electoral technologies* that are usually applied by unprincipled politicians and unscrupulous image-makers. The other task of the corruption process under examination boils down to an attempt by the supplier of information to distract the public attention from the underside of his own activity.

Defamation is characterized by a selective, differentiated "muck-raking" approach to the targets of criticism, and by a broad use of double standards when analysing corruption practices. Corruption in the highest places, wrote O. Arikpo back in the first half of the 1960s, had been "completely" documented by one commission of

¹⁶ F. M. Burlatsky and A. A. Galkin, *Sovremennyi Leviatan. Ocherki politicheskoi sotsiologii kapitalizma* (The modern Leviathan. Studies on political sociology of capitalism) (Moscow: Mysl', 1985), 263; *Sotsiologiya* (Sociology), op. cit., 81, 89.

¹⁷ *Politicheskie sistemy* (Political systems), op. cit., 174.

regional governments after the other. However, in Nigeria it is easy to express righteous indignation only with respect to those who occupy subordinate positions. It is far from easy to do so in the case of colleagues who may insist on the principle of “cabinet solidarity.” And it is extremely difficult to bring accusations against higher-ranking persons. A newspaper editor may easily “bash” corruption in the top echelons of power, but he usually demonstrates restraint when it is his political patron that “swindles” the public.¹⁸

Cyclic (i.e., predominantly private and local) defamation serves as a constant concomitant of the processes of realignment of political forces, especially in those countries where the mass media have sufficient freedom, while political secrets—both public and individual—are considered as an object of bargaining. This kind of defamation can assume an outward form of insult (at times bordering on the verge of the obscene) or public outrage of honour and dignity of an official. A sociopolitical precondition of this phenomenon is usually a high degree of a manipulation of the electorate, the predictability of its reaction to stimuli, and also the low cognitive level of the politically active part of the population, whose representatives, for example, pay attention not so much to programmes of parties as to scandalous press reports on their leaders.

It is necessary to emphasize that cyclic defamation is more or less successfully used by plutocracy. As to the Nigerian kleptocracy, it prefers to depend on *structural* defamation, which is characterized by a regime of general mistrust and suspicion of corruptness, and by a “race” for compromising information that partially reflects the actually committed “transgression” (infringement of generally accepted norms and taboos; criminalization of the targeted person)¹⁹ in its modern political forms. The principle “Live and let others live,” which had made itself felt even in the colonial period, provides a certain counterbalance to structural defamation. As testified by H. Bretton, many members of the Nigerian and Ghanaian elites (including their oppositional components) used this “rule” for the for-

¹⁸ O. Arikpo, *The Development of Modern Nigeria* (London: Penguin Books, 1967), 116, 117.

¹⁹ N. B. Kochakova, “Ranneye gosudarstvo i Afrika” (The early state and Africa), in *Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk, trudy Instituta Afriki* (The Russian Academy of Sciences, transactions of the Institute of Africa) (Moscow, 1999), 23, 24.

mation of various coalitions representing partnerships that were created for the sake of plundering public resources.²⁰

Structural defamation in Nigeria was becoming *total* in the periods that preceded major political changes. It is generally known and indisputable, O. Arikpo stressed, that by the moment when the First Nigerian Republic fell, all the parties, the government, and the councils had become deeply mired in abuses.²¹ At the close of the Second Republic, before the general election of 1983, the situation had worsened to such an extent that various public figures in the country even tried to prove that uncorrupted politicians simply do not exist in nature and consequently it is absurd to prosecute officials for bribery and other offences. This idea was rather frankly supported by one of the senators of the Nigerian parliament, who asserted that all segments of Nigerian society were shamefully corrupt and that nowhere were there such cases of *open corruption* as in House of Representatives of the National Assembly. To this senator belongs a simple and terse phrase which might become the motto of total defamation: "All of us are corrupt, including me."²²

The synthetic blending of total defamation and political latency (kleptocracy's parochial corporate secrets) engenders a curious social and information phenomenon, which ought to be named an "upturned iceberg" effect. What we have in mind is the surrealistic situation in which the public can in the smallest details be informed of events that never happened, while knowing absolutely nothing about the facts of corruption that took place in real life. Methodologically, such myth-making (mostly typical of the fully constituted POLCORR, whose internal connections are largely formalized and depersonalized) risks casting doubt on the value of such categories as "fact", "proof", "testimony", as certain materials on the corruptness or, on the contrary, the incorruptibility of Nigerian politicians in fact appear to be "turned upside down" and represent complete misinformation. This tendency seems especially dangerous when a "*law*" of *inflating corruption cases* (original or imaginary) operates. Here it is again fitting to recall O. Arikpo, who wrote that starting from the first half of

²⁰ H. L. Bretton, *Power and Politics in Africa* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1973), 328.

²¹ Arikpo, *op. cit.*, 117.

²² *New Times* (Lagos), April–May 1983, 34.

the 1960s corruption cases were frequently overpublicized, becoming overgrown with nonexistent details and additions. As a result, an explosive mix of truth and fiction was becoming an evermore frequent part of Nigeria's political reality as "corruption was devouring itself."²³

The Nigerian variant of defamation is distinguished by a sufficiently complex structure, and also by a multitude of arrangements and means of realization. The forms and methods of spreading corruption-related defamation are determined by the content and character of the compromising material; by the planned scale of discreditation; by the degree of truthfulness of the information; by the accuser's social and political position; by his financial means; and by the degree of public and legal protection accorded to the target of criticism.

Among the instruments of defamation used one can cite oral and printed speculation, negative advertising of political organizations and their leaders in the mass media, overt slander and various falsifications, obviously false denunciations, testimony of witnesses, "conclusions" of experts, the unjustified entry of the targeted person on "black" (prohibitive or restrictive) lists. To this it is necessary to add the practice of casting aspersions (which Takuma termed the policy of vindictiveness and hunting for victims),²⁴ as well as blackmail (for example, that of a party leader by members of his party announcing his intention to join an opposition faction or a rival political organization if he is not given a chance for career advancement in their party.)²⁵ Among the manifestations of defamation, one may also cite public ultimatums,²⁶ accusatory statements under oath,²⁷ certain show trials, deliberate leaks of genuine information or the publication of "erroneous" information,²⁸ or the publication of allegations discrediting an official in the form of a "supposition" or "version."²⁹

The defamation intrinsic to the Nigerian POLCORR also has an international dimension, one of whose facets is exemplified by

²³ Arikpo, op. cit., 117.

²⁴ *The Nationalist* (Lagos), 13.05.1979.

²⁵ Bretton, op. cit., 126-127.

²⁶ *Sunday New Nigerian* (Kaduna), 1.1.1984, IV.

²⁷ F. Igwebueze, A. Oguntayo, "Propaganda: Figures Behind the Mask", in *African Concord* (Lagos), Vol. 4, No. 20, 11.9.1989, 12.

²⁸ *The Democrat Weekly* (Kaduna), 22.1.1984, 18.3.1984, 6.

²⁹ *The Punch* (Lagos), 27.7.1983, 12; 4 and 26.11.1983.

disparaging commentary in the foreign mass media. Suffice it to recall the material in the British *Sunday Telegraph* newspaper reporting that Nigeria lost five billion Nairas in hard currency due to counterfeit export documents.³⁰ Later this information was recognized to have been a deliberately disseminated lie.³¹ Another plane of international defamation is the massive attacks in the foreign mass media against Nigeria and of their Nigerian counterparts against a particular foreign state. Such actions may be exemplified by the campaign initiated by the Nigerian political emigrés in the British press against General Buhari and its closest entourage who were ostensibly corrupt millionnaires.³² The reaction of the Nigerian government to the attacks of the British mass media was embodied in a broad campaign against the British authorities who had granted asylum to a group of “corrupt leaders” of the Second Republic led by U. Dikko (the administration of M. Buhari intended to have him abducted from London to be paraded through the streets of Lagos in manacles).

In sovereign Nigeria there were at work inconsistent, and quite often mutually exclusive tendencies towards the stereotyping of ideas about the corruption of politicians and officials, whose sociocultural images could cause both negative and neutral, and at times even moderately positive public reaction. The disagreement in assessments of the “degree” to which the highest bureaucrats were in fact kleptocratic (and plutocratic) is explained by pathological changes in the consciousness and behaviour of the electorate, whose political mindset was controlled by the well-known characteristics and rules of manipulating the crowd.³³ By the beginning of the 1980s, “political engineering” was a goal that had nearly been accomplished by analytical and image-making services of the largest parties. The prime task of “political engineering” was the development of a positive attitude on the part of the individual towards the state and the political system (the personality level of realization of political culture). In postcolonial Nigeria this was equivalent to demolition of the old and the emergence of a new political tradition.

As was to be expected, that task was not accomplished. In the first place, this was due to the extremely limited period of influence

³⁰ *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 28.8.1983.

³¹ *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), 24.9.1983.

³² *National Concord* (Lagos), 20.1.1984.

³³ Burlatskii and Galkin, op. cit., 266–267.

on the electoral corps. The second reason was the inner resistance of the “national character”, whose psychological codes had for many decades been patterned on a negative assessment of the Westernized authority that seemed *a priori* corrupt and alien even for the major part of the politically active population. In the realm of corruption, wrote V. Le Vine, it is very difficult for an honourable man to come close to the throne and even more difficult to become a king; the fate of a pariah or serious trials of a social and economic character usually await the one who refuses to be corrupted.³⁴

Yet nevertheless, the Nigerian kleptocracy has extracted a certain gain from the massive attacks on the public opinion of the rank-and-file citizens. In particular, the highest ranks of corrupt bureaucracy have managed to ensure the entrenchment of one of the decisive imperatives of its development—the *tolerance* of the politically active strata of the population. The reasons and consequences of “tolerance to corruption” in its West African variety are hard to distinguish, especially from the standpoint of practical politics. Besides the realization of political technologies, the existence of this phenomenon may be explained by the following circumstances. First, corruption, as emphasized by O. Obasanjo, does not generate visible victims with their complaints.³⁵ Second, the Africans, according to O. Arikpo’s conclusions, are inclined to hold up to shame a particular individual for abusing authority, but are ready to wink at group crimes committed by the officials.³⁶ Third, the Nigerians (as well as the Ghanaians) agree to put up with corruption, but only up to certain limits, limits that are known by the powers that be.

“Tolerance to corruption” in its Nigerian version testifies not to society’s silent consent with the system of corruption in high places, but only to its traditional obedience to the authorities, political “weariness” and indifference, as well as to the overabundance of defamatory information. By the end of the 1990s, tolerance had by and large swept all the patterns of mass political consciousness. To a

³⁴ V. T. Le Vine, *Political Corruption and the Informal Polity* (Legon: University of Ghana Press, 1971); V. T. Le Vine, *Political Corruption. The Ghana Case* (Stanford, 1975).

³⁵ O. Obasanjo, “Welcome Address”, in *Africa Leadership Forum. Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in East and Central Africa. Entebbe, Republic of Uganda, 12–14, December 1994* (Ibadan), 58.

³⁶ O. Arikpo, *op. cit.*, 116.

large degree it was spread at the level of expectations and appraisals by public representatives to enhance their chances of influencing the political system. The POLCORR imperative under consideration had a smaller influence on sociopolitical values and even less so on opinions (the appraisals of public figures, parties, the administration's course, etc.).

Kleptocracy as a method of running the state represents a system of governance in many ways similar to *government by viceroy*, whose principles and institutions had developed as early as the ancient era. The factor of viceroy government in its classical forms corresponded to the geopolitical dichotomy of "mother country—province (colony)." It was in the mother country that the future viceroy (governor, or governor-general, etc.) received his post and its corresponding powers, and it was to the mother country's government that he was answerable. It was there that he took the spoils that finally came back himself. For many viceroys the province played the role of a training ground where the corrupt and at times also the negative economic ways of enrichment were successfully tested.

In the postcolonial period (in the African countries) the concepts of "mother country" and "province", as well as the category of "viceroys" began to assume new meanings. So, the peripheral independent countries (which continued to serve as objects of outright or veiled corruption and plunder) became "provinces", while kleptocrats from the ranks of heads of states and governments, and also lower-ranking officials became "viceroys." The mother countries, having lost the sovereign right to supervise the public life of the former colonies, certainly lost also the formal power to nominate viceroys. The "mother country" (this concept should be politically and geographically expanded, to include in it the majority of the Western countries, and also some other states enjoying liberal legislation and stable internal-policy conditions) reserved two basic functions. First, it was the keeper of legal and illegal assets of a number of leaders of sovereign African countries. This circumstance actually transformed the *pseudo-mother country* into a second homeland. Second, it offered to function as a source of "logistical support" for a high-ranking corrupt official *whose life after political death* frequently proceeded in a quiet and comfortable foreign haven. To outward appearances, the kleptocrat's physical moving to the "mother country" could look like an emigration for political motives, semi-enforced exile, "honourable banishment", etc. The experience of the last quarter of the twentieth

century testifies that it has become more and more difficult for the most odious corrupt officials from the African countries to find permanent refuge in Western countries, even in the case where they have large investments and fixed assets there.

Individual African kleptocrats were unwilling to part with their financial booty. Thus M. Nguema, the leader of Equatorial Guinea who ruled in a dictatorial fashion till 1979, had twelve suitcases filled with banknotes ready at hand, stored in a wooden hut in his native village. A fire is believed to have consumed a sum equivalent to sixty million dollars.³⁷ A similar example was noted in July 1998, when the widow of the Nigerian dictator S. Abacha, Mariam, was reportedly apprehended while attempting to take thirty-eight suitcases (!) with foreign currency in cash out of the country. However, many African officials and politicians, as P. Buyoya rightly remarked, prefer to keep their personal holdings in banks located in a zone characterized as a one tax paradise. Some of the sums are often larger than their countries' public debt.³⁸ The desire to keep the greater part of their assets abroad distinguishes a significant part of the entrepreneurial elite as well.³⁹ By the beginning of the 1980s, according to some calculations, at least 200 million Nairas were annually siphoned out from Nigeria alone along the channels of the Central Bank and commercial banks.⁴⁰ At the beginning of the 1990s, the Nigerians' deposits in foreign banks amounted to 25 billion dollars by "optimistic" appraisals and 33 billion by "pessimistic" ones;⁴¹ an IBRD study estimated that in the 1980s alone, the outflow of capital reached 50 billion dollars.⁴²

Switzerland ranks high among the new "mother countries" of African kleptocrats. By the middle of the 1990s, stressed O. Obasanjo, referring to a Swiss banks' report, accounts on behalf of African

³⁷ *Africa* (London), No. 98, October 1979, 50–51.

³⁸ P. Buyoya, "Effect of Corruption on Development", in: *Africa Leadership Forum. Corruption. Democracy and Human Rights in East and Central Africa. Entebbe, Republic of Uganda, 12–14 December 1994* (Ibadan), 84.

³⁹ P. A. Samuelson, *Economics*, seventh edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 750; H. L. Bretton, op. cit., 324.

⁴⁰ *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), 08.11.1980, 1.

⁴¹ *National Concord* (Lagos), 16.08.1990.

⁴² "A Survey of Nigeria," *The Economist*, Vol. 328, No. 7825, (London, 21–27 Aug. 1993), 10.

leaders had been opened to the tune of 20 billion US dollars in this European country alone.⁴³

It is necessary to emphasize that it was because of the practice of “viceroy government” and it was the necessity of combatting it that provides one of the crucial arguments of the apologists of various tendencies of Afropessimism. These apologists are ideologists of the revival of classic forms of colonialism in Africa and also the supporters of the idea that the countries of the continent must return to precolonial ways of regulating social processes.

The African version of government by viceroy predominantly embodies the function of *supreme supervision* (in its most parasitic and antisocial forms) and has practically nothing in common with the objectively necessary function of political and economic management. Kleptocracy’s state, administrative, and legal activity is marked by a multitude of paradoxes. Worthy of note among them is, first of all, the necessity to adopt anticorruption laws which kleptocracy, by virtue of its social nature, will inevitably transgress upon. Taking into account kleptocracy’s intimate and mutually advantageous links with the leaders of the economic underground, it is possible to consider both the offensive against negative-economic activity and the stepped-up criminal prosecution of lootocracy (i.e., in fact, the “expropriation of expropriators by the expropriators”) as the double standard of viceroy government. This circumstance, even if it does not contradict the concepts of the so-called *criminal state*, does not accord too well with them.

As is known, “the state is often held responsible for criminal actions—either by authorizing them at the top level, or through actions of law-enforcement bodies or government officials.”⁴⁴ However, the criminal state, as a new type of power and administration, from R. V. Ryvkina’s point of view, occurs due to the merging of business and politics. In the process, the state, as an apparatus of power

⁴³ O. Obasanjo, op. cit., 58.

⁴⁴ *Trevogi mira. Sotsial’nye posledstviya globalizatsii mirovykh protsessov. Doklad UNRISD, podgotovlennyy dlya vseimnoi vstrechi na vysshem urovne v interesakh sotsial’nogo razvitiya. 1995.* (International alarms. Social repercussions of the globalization of the world processes. A UNRISD Report drafted for the world summit in the interests of social development. 1995. A Russian-language edition prepared at the RAS Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in 1997) (Moscow, 1997), 73.

and governance directed against criminality, self-destructs.⁴⁵ According to K. Maidanik, the decomposition of statist structures in the middle of the twentieth century conditioned the process of criminalization and development of corruption in all spheres and at all levels of society, which brought forth ideas on kleptocracy as the “last phase of dominant statism,” or as a “natural foundation of the relations of the basis and superstructure” formed within the framework of transitional (“poststatist”) processes or in the new system of structures.⁴⁶

In a different treatment, a certain semblance of a criminal state emerges in the course of the joining of the drug business and crime, which allows drug traffickers to use billions of dollars for subversion and even destruction of institutions and people who stand in their way. As a result, systemic violence spreads along with the excrescence of a certain kind of antistate functioning outside the legal framework and government control.⁴⁷

In the mirror of the social antisystem one may discern the contours of some cultures of the underground (poverty, negative economy, corruption, etc.) and even a dim silhouette of the *political antisystem* itself, whose social base must apparently include kleptocracy and lootocracy. As a matter of fact, the power system of corrupt bureaucrats has presently two basic vectors of development—a gradual transformation into one version of plutocracy or other, or the entrenchment of kleptocracy at an antisystemic level. The first way is longer, but preferable for kleptocracy, as it assumes its legitimization and entrenchment into the existing political system. The second way is shorter, but its use is equivalent to a constant conflict with society (until the antisystem turns into a new system) and it carries with it the necessity to form distinct political institutions. The network of the latter should constitute a political antisystem of society, with the hypothetical “antistate,” as its probable nucleus. The shadow of such an antisystem is already looming over some states of Africa.

⁴⁵ R. V. Ryvkina, “Sotsial’nye korni kriminalizatsii rossiiskogo obshchestva” (Social Roots of Criminalization of Russian Society) in *SOCis*, No. 4, (1997), 81.

⁴⁶ K. Maidanik, “Korruptsiya, kriminalizatsiya, kleptokratiya . . . ‘Perekhodnaya faza’? Tupikovaya vetv’? Osnovopolagayushchiye struktury?” (Corruption, Criminalization, Kleptocracy . . . ‘A transitional stage’? A dead-end branch? Fundamental structures?), in *Svobodnaya mysl’* (Free thought), No. 1 (1997), 77.

⁴⁷ *Trevogi mira*, op. cit., 82.

The crisis of the “state idea” probably arose partly as a result of the gradual transformation of the “national-state form of the universe”, partly in consequence of the creeping destatization that swept extensive zones of the modern world riven by permanent armed conflicts, inefficient state power, and the neoarchaic structure of society.⁴⁸ That said, the possible collapse of the state, which swiftly began to lose its historical role, was expressed, perhaps, more clearly in tropical Africa than in other regions of the developing world. The symptoms of political catastrophe had begun to be discerned in a number of African countries by the first years of the postcolonial period. Its scope also became evident after some time. The *new despotic regimes* growing on the ruins of colonial empires, and also the young quasidemocratic states (for example, in Ethiopia, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Benin, and Mali) became examples of the crisis. True, from the beginning of the 1990s an opinion prevailed in the political and academic circles that the time of rigid dictatorships in Africa, many of which fell, had passed, and that in the foreseeable future progressive democratization in the political field lay in store for the countries of the continent. However, most of the analysts linked the effect of tendencies toward the spread of (Western-type) political pluralism and liberalization of socio-economic life not with the processes of state construction but with the broadening of the circle of *non-governmental organizations* and even the creation of *parallel administrations* by the international bodies.⁴⁹

In Nigeria and many other countries of West Africa, the state authority was not able to definitely settle the ethnic, religious, and regional relations, nor could it ensure the stable development of the political and party systems. It did not become possible to overcome the conflicting character of ties between the African countries, which time and again engendered situations fraught with local wars, arms race, and the falling prestige of the continent's states in the world arena. The 1980s–1990s saw periodically intensified tendencies towards destatization in the economic field, tendencies which were expressed in widespread privatization and reprivatization, curtailing of state

⁴⁸ A. I. Neklessa, *Otvet Rossii na vyzov vremeni: strategiya tekhnologicheskoi konversii* (Russia's response to the challenge of time: a strategy of technological conversion) (Moscow, Institut Afriki RAN, 1997), 20, 32.

⁴⁹ *Trevogi mira*, op. cit., 17, 128.

regulation or deviation from its basic principles, and discrediting of even well thought-out economic undertakings. National governments demonstrated their inability to find a way out of food, ecological, power and other crises or to ensure even minimal conditions for the functioning of the *economy of survival*.

At the level of ordinary consciousness, this situation was usually seen as a condition of “uselessness” of the state that fell short of the hopes that had been pinned on it by the population of the African countries in the first years of independence. As noted by A. Klein and some other authors, the Nigerians were frequently inclined to consider the state as an immoral and harsh entity, one far removed from their expectations, and one which the rich men use for exploitation and “dehumanization” of broad sections of the needy population.⁵⁰

The substance of the antistate (lack of social freedom), for example, consists in the realization of the interests of an oligarchy or even of one ruler at the expense of narrowing the scope of development of intrinsic forces, potencies and abilities of individuals. This, in turn, means that the objective condition of the entire society, its social groups and individuals, is marked by their inability to control the necessary conditions for its functioning and development. Needless to say, a sufficiently high level of satisfaction of the needs and interests inherent in the social subject is not provided either.

It is not accidental that a number of terrorist, African regimes by many parameters reminds one of ancient, Oriental despotic regimes and similar, already defunct, forms of power organization. In passing we shall note that attempts to reproduce former state entities—in Africa, usually precolonial ones—frequently bear a purposeful, quite deliberate character and are made either by neotraditional political forces or by modern political demagogues of various hues. The realization of such attempts may mean only one thing: the destruction of the state and the triumph of the antistate, for the principles and institutions of despotic regimes, just as the very factor of political violence, must be judged in a frame of reference adequate for a particular historical period.

The antistate, pure and simple, did not take shape in any African country; the development of its standard, theoretical model may but

⁵⁰ J. Ihonvbere, *Nigeria: the Politics of Adjustment and Democracy* (New Brunswick, 1993), 18; A. Klein, “Trapped in the Traffic: Growing Problem of Drugs Consumption in Lagos”, in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32, 4 (1994), 664.

throw some light on the contours of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, already now there are grounds to conclude that the antistate represents an apogee of alienation from society and, moreover, of the alienation of practically all strata connected with state ownership, including the bulk of the state apparatus, from the real public authority.

In conditions of the antistate, the power of the kleptocratic quasi-elite enjoys not simply an extremely high degree of self-sufficiency. It opposes itself to all other kinds of political and non-political power. Such power should be considered as a distinct version of social power based on class, instead of being a truly “state” power.

As a genuine antithesis of social progress, the antistate, as it were, grows out of the vices of the state. Going beyond the limits of modern civilization and being transformed into an “institution of neo-barbarism” (M. Cheshkov), the state reveals its built-in negative features, which had been successfully analyzed by theorists of anarchism and Marxism.⁵¹ As distinct from the state, even the embryo of the antistate no longer bears the seal of a truly systematizing element. If the leaders of the “new despotism” are bringing about a centralization of political leadership, this tends to be reduced to an absurdity and turns into its opposite. The process of centralization is often substituted for by the elimination of all alternative sources of power. In this case, kleptocracy as a function of the political anti-system and/or the new despot seek to cement society artificially, basing their power primarily and largely not on economic incentives (even with regard to their own social allies), nor on ideological impact, but on coercion, the monopoly on which they use in full measure, or, to be more exact, beyond any measure. As a result, economic coercion develops into total enslavement, and violence enters the phase of “ethnic cleansing”, social genocide and other openly repressive measures.

Hypertrophied violence is the essence of the antistate both as a distinct organization and as an actual activity for the implementation of its goals. The formal mechanism of power in the context of the antistate is frequently similar to its state counterpart, while the

⁵¹ See, for example, P. Kropotkin, *Gosudarstvo, ego rol' v istorii* (The State, its place in history), no place, no date, 47, 105; V. I. Lenin, *Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya* (The state and revolution), fourth edition, Vol. 25, 428–430; V. I. Lenin, *Uderzhat li bolsheviki gosudarstvennyu vlast'* (Will the Bolsheviks manage to keep state power), the fourth edition, Vol. 26, 92.

actual mechanism embodies almost every facet of total terror. In the process, a high degree of brutality—in the political meaning of the term—is nothing but the reverse side of central power that can control the situation on the spot only by means of brute force. In multiethnic and regionally fragmented countries, political violence in combination with its other varieties (engendered by the negative economy, and also by the culture of terror peculiar to certain secret alliances),⁵² may be one of the reasons for the process of *dissipation*, that is, of the breakup of the “empire” whose flagging centre is unable to keep the provinces under its rule.⁵³

Political violence reproduced by the antistate in an extended fashion is transformed into a system of social terror, which in literature is not quite correctly called “state terrorism.” Terrorism elevated to the rank of policy implies a purposeful use of violence or threat of violence by criminals vested with state power in order to achieve definite political goals. The important dimensions of massive political terror are the creation of an atmosphere of fear and the spread of a feeling of constant anxiety in human behaviour (J. Polst).

In the concept of the African variety of state terror developed by Arthur Nwankwo, this phenomenon is defined as the deployment of the state apparatus by the ruling minority in an exploitative social system to effect a violent crackdown. This results in a dehumanization of this system itself as well as the overwhelming majority of citizens who are turned into a passive object of historical process. State terrorism is interpreted as a regime of violence, a highly organized and coordinated system of aggression serving the interests of a privileged and restricted circle of kleptocrats—the “ruling criminal brokers.”

The “tyrannical regime of naked power” uses a wide arsenal of institutionalized and structured violence. According to Nwankwo, this regime is largely a by-product of the European culture of violence (which had given rise to the secret police, apartheid, colonialism and similar phenomena) and more and more often uses the most up-to-date foreign means of surveillance and infringement of citizens’ privacy. The regime of terror of the criminal state is characterized by

⁵² *Traditsionnye i sinkreticheskie religii Afriki* (The traditional and syncretic religions of Africa) (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 154.

⁵³ *Literatumaya gazeta* (Literary gazette) (Moscow), No. 30, 25.07.1990, 3.

a concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny group of people (by and large this very kleptocracy), as well as by the spread of not only social, but also physical, poverty of the population.⁵⁴ To this one should add that, as attested by the events in Somalia at the beginning of the 1990s, by preventing the delivery of foreign humanitarian aid or plundering it, terrorist regimes may actually doom their own people to extinction.

The state may evolve towards the antistate (and vice versa) at a slow rate. But this process more often bears a saltatory, explosive character manifested in various forms of political violence—internecine wars, revolutions, collisions on ethnic, religious or regional grounds, but first and foremost in *coups d'état*. The transformation of the state into its opposite is accompanied by tendencies towards the “destatization of the individual” and the negative elimination of the crisis of the statist consciousness.

By their sociopolitical nature, the greater part of the coups in the African countries are related to the realm of state, not antistate, development. Caused, as a rule, by internal reasons, they contribute to the elimination of one or several crises in the state at once. Thus the coups often dull the acuteness of economic crisis and pave the way for a change in the state economic policy. For a certain time, successful coups hamper the development of political and economic corruption, allowing for revision of the principles of the formation of the political system and especially of its party subsystem. This social phenomenon is one of the few ways of changing the government and eliminating the crisis in the context of the interaction of political lines at narrow group and even individual levels.

Contemporary African countries are familiar with various kinds and types of revolutions. Among them are military and civil, palace and “mass-based,” conservative and radical (“revolutions by *coups d'état*”). In the last third of the twentieth century, Africa saw the formation of a group of coup-prone countries; Nigeria unquestionably belonged to the states most explosive in this respect. Generally, the West African region demonstrated an increased propensity to coups, which occurred there at least twice as often as in Central Africa.

⁵⁴ A. Nwankwo, *African Dictators. The Logic of Tyranny and Lessons from History* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1990), 14, 15, 22–26.

The probability of coups was also roughly that much higher in the central part of the continent in comparison with the eastern region.

One cannot help linking the formation of the antistate with the autocratization of political life. This tendency is realized partly through the reception of the principles of European-type autocracy (a high degree of ideological motivation, tough individualism or pseudocollectivism, etc.), and partly due to conscious (planned) or spontaneous archaization of state administration and further entrenchment of irrationalism in political mentality. Outwardly this is expressed in the widely circulating ideas about the supernatural potencies of power, the sacredness of some of its holders, in the important political role of various ordinances, magic actions, various rites, and also in the quite serious attitude of a significant part of society to obviously fantastic stories from political life.

The enhancement of the autocratic tendency (even in conditions of the fusion of the basic forms of power organization, peculiar to tropical Africa), which corresponds to the formation of the antistate, leads to the loss by government authority of its social value and to further alienation of the state from society and the triumph of extreme totalitarianism—autocratic despotism. The recent history of Africa, writes A. Nwankwo, is in a certain sense a history of the rise and fall of dictators, tyrants and state terrorists, both civil and military. This situation became so counterproductive that the Third World in general and Africa in particular cannot help making at least some significant steps towards civilization.⁵⁵

The political toolkit of the antistate undoubtedly includes tyranny, which in its classical treatment (for instance, in Ch. L. Montesquieu) is understood as a arbitrary intervention of the government in the natural rights of the individuals (relating to personality and property) and characterized by actions without reliance on the laws drafted by the democratically elected representatives of the population. The antistate as a tyrannical regime (and therefore the antipode of democracy)⁵⁶ implies unlimited powers of the “lawfully elected” or self-appointed national leader—actually the “viceroy”—and his complete control (sometimes with an introduction of a certain personality cult) over every domain of society’s life. The tyrannical regimes in the

⁵⁵ A. Nwankwo, *ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁶ V. E. Guliev, *op. cit.*, 5.

African countries can lean both on “soft and benign” and on “absolute” dictatorships, but in any case arbitrariness as well as “refined” or frankly punitive violence remain their characteristic features. It is in these conditions, in Nwankwo’s view, that the institutionalization of *plutocracy* and the almost official recognition of *kleptocracy’s* right to exist take place.⁵⁷

In the system of political relations in modern Africa, and in many other regions of the world as well, elements of the antistate may be considered as a certain kind of *social pathology*. Let us recall the words of Berdyaev: “He alone can govern who governs himself. The loss of personal and national self-control, the unbinding of chaos . . . is always a road to despotism.”⁵⁸ The pathological basis of antistatism can have a standard, literal meaning and can arise where the sovereign’s lust for money develops into socially dangerous forms of “political kleptomania.” Thus, in Ancient Rome emperors Caligula and Valens II,⁵⁹ in particular, used their position extensively to plunder their own people while relying on state authority. Among similarly inclined ex-rulers in Africa it is quite fair to mention Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seco or Nigeria’s Sani Abacha.

The postcolonial history of the African countries offers many such examples when the state authority was for a long time under more or less rigid control of mentally defective people practising cannibalism, black magic, and summary executions. A. Nwankwo has fairly, though too emotionally, remarked that in the African countries there is a real chance for a power takeover by “psychopaths and political villains—neurasthenics with bloody international connections,” and also by “civil political buffoons and military masochists playing the roles of dictators.”⁶⁰ These circumstances partly explain the reason for legitimization, still in embryonic conditions of the anti-state, of an emerging culture of the underworld.

Even the development of individual elements of antistatism in Africa has shown that its precondition and simultaneous consequence

⁵⁷ A. Nwankwo, *Civilianized Soldiers. Army-Civilian Government for Nigeria* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1984), 34, 60.

⁵⁸ N. Berdyaev, *Sud’ba Rossii. Opyty po psikhologii voyny i natsional’nosti* (The fate of Russia. Essays in the psychology of war and nationality) (Moscow, 1918), 231.

⁵⁹ Ye. V. Fyodorov, *Imperatorskii Rim v litsakh* (Profiles of Imperial Rome) (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1979), 93.

⁶⁰ A. Nwankwo, *African Dictators*, op. cit., 15.

is the atomization of society (certainly, in the negative meaning of this word), which results in the appearance of “economic wastelands”, the destruction of political systems, and at times grows into *bellum omnium contra omnes*. These tendencies are accompanied by progressing *anomie* in its destructive (R. Merton), or destructive cum creative (E. Durkheim) treatments. In the POLCORR context, kleptocracy and especially the antistate theories, the *anomie* also may probably be considered as a process of “collective unconscious” reconstruction of some power structures of the chiefdom or early state period.

The subsequent formation of kleptocracy, along with the internal developmental logic of its patterns, was probably determined also by the influence of the environment, and above all by the local political system. The latter’s serious transformation was caused by the gradual transition towards civil institutions of quasidemocratic leadership at the end of the twentieth century, by the partial change of the ruling elites, and by the rearrangement of the mechanism of political decision-making. The Nigerian kleptocracy, enriched by the experience of the First and Second Republics, crossed in 1999 the threshold of the Third Republic, in which the structure of a political leadership was designed on a multifaceted, pluralist basis, with an emphasis put on the legal consolidation and some relaxation of the voluntarist elements of power, the maintenance of power legitimacy, as well as on the broad delegation of political powers along the vertical and horizontal axes.

The new stage of democratization of the formal and partly real mechanisms of political leadership in Nigeria will probably expand kleptocracy’s opportunities for social manoeuvring and for the use of the, by now, traditional contradictions between familiar opposing bodies: the military and the civil elites; the legislative and the executive authorities; the federal centre, the states and the local government bodies; the competing parties and other sociopolitical organizations; the ethnoconfessional interest centres; and the social and class forces asserting alternative political lines.

The future kleptocracy in many ways depends on the realization of state strategic and tactical programmes directed at combatting these phenomena, and also on the position of leading non-governmental organizations and the Nigerian public. In the short and intermediate term, the social agents of corruption and the negative economy will hardly disappear from the power domain, but their impact on the politics and economy of Nigeria may be limited. Thus the posi-

tions of kleptocracy will apparently become weakened if the governments of the Third Republic (or other entity of constitutional law) considerably constricts the area of application of the basic tools of economic corruption and universal laws of political corruption and also reduce to the minimum the political function of money. The improvement of criminal and economic legislation, systemic and more resolute actions of the law-enforcement bodies, and the formation of an anticriminal reference-point in the evolution of public consciousness will also obviously promote the gradual elimination of the traditional varieties of kleptocracy. Finally, the war against corruption and against the negative economy and the forms of power organization specific to them may bring positive results only if this process is based on the international institutions of a corresponding profile and the law-enforcement bodies of a number of foreign countries, and also only if this process is constantly verified.

The second echelon of the forces of external environment influencing the Nigerian kleptocracy is constituted by the international political system and reflects—adjusted for the country's specificity—many changes occurring in the world models of these forms of power organization. The international dimension of kleptocracy reveals not so much the processes of its transnationalization and progressing insertion in the international neocriminal community (as is the case with plutocracy), as the deep mark impressed on this form of power organization by the global civilizational crisis and by the asocial section of political management.

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PART TWO

HISTORY

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ISLAMIC FRONTIERS IN THE CAUCASUS DURING THE 'ABBASID PERIOD

Alikber Alikberov

The era of Arab domination in the Caucasus has not been studied completely enough, due, first and foremost, to the extremely fragmented nature of documentary evidence as we have it today. The question of the functioning of the boundary system of the Caliphate in the Northeast Caucasus has till now remained altogether beyond the Arabists' scope of attention, although similar research has been successfully carried out with reference to other regions.¹

When referring to northern nomads that harassed the Caliphate in the course of all its history, researchers have usually confined themselves to emphasizing particularly the major part played by Bāb al-abwāb as a Muslim military and strategic area in the region. The powerful fortress walls of the city, erected as far back as the Sassanids, had indeed played the role of a durable shield for the Arab state from the attacks of the nomads, mostly Khazars and Alans. However, the city used to guard only the narrow Derbent Pass, that part of the coastal land where the mountains closely approached the sea and which provided the most convenient access for penetrating through the borders of the Caliphate. Besides the Derbent Pass, there was also a bypass along the foothills adjoining Bāb al-abwāb at the level of 300–500 metres above the sea level, and it would also have been possible to pass through it to the south, although with certain difficulty. Therefore, Bāb al-abwāb, important as it was and strong as its walls were, could not guard the whole northern borderline alone. A study of a unique manuscript of a hitherto little-known Sufi work dating to the turn of the twelfth century and belonging to Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Darbandī, entitled *Raiḥān al-ḥaḩā'ik wa bustān al-daḩā'ik*,² shows that Bāb al-abwāb was only one of the components

¹ C. E. Bosworth, "Islamic Frontiers in Africa and Asia" in *The Legacy of Islam*. 2nd ed., ed. J. Schacht with C. E. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 116–130.

² For a more detailed treatment of this work and its author, see A. K. Alikberov,

of a much more complex defence network known under the name of Dārbūsh (Pers. *dar push*, “a plug”) at the time.

The Bāb al-abwāb is the Arab name of Derbent (Pers. *Darband* “Iron Gate”) and its possessions; the name was in use from the middle of the seventh up to the middle of the thirteenth century, when it formed part of the Arab Caliphate. Meaning “Main Gate” (literally: “the Gate of Gates”, al-Bāb “Gate” for short) in translation, this name fully mirrored the geographical and political position of the city, which was a major strategic point of the Caliphate at its northern frontiers. The historic records of that period most often called it “borderland” (*al-thagh̃r*) and its population, accordingly, “inhabitants of the borderland” (*ahl al-thugh̃ūr*), referring not only to Derbent’s frontier position, but also to the fact that it was one of the major Caspian commercial harbours.

At the turn of the ninth century, the so-called “Islamic centres” (*al-marākiz al-islāmiya*) began to appear on the political map in close proximity to Bāb al-abwāb; the activity of the ghāzīs who raided (*ghazawāt*, sing. *ghazwa*) their non-Muslim neighbours was intimately connected with these centres. V. F. Minorsky interpreted *al-marākiz al-islāmiya* as fortifications made by Arab settlers near Bāb al-abwāb, meaning above all Bāb-Wāk (Pers. Dārwāk), al-Ḥumaidiya and Kamāḥ (or Ḳamh). These colonies ostensibly served as outposts for the defence of Bāb al-abwāb.³ Yāḳūt noted that special “centres” protected one of the local nationalities (al-Lakz, Ṭabasārān, Lāizān and others) in the defence network of Bāb al-abwāb.⁴ In V. F. Minorsky’s opinion, by these “centres” Yāḳūt meant “a support zone, part of the general front.”⁵

Here we are dealing with fortress cities, or frontier *ribāṭs* (*rubūṭ*; sing. *rabāṭ*; *ribāṭ* in the Caucasus and Central Asia), which were built by the viceroy, Yazīd al-Sulamī, on orders of the second “Abbasid

“Epokha klassicheskogo islama na Kavkaze. Abu Bakr ad-Darbandi i yego sufiiskaya entsiklopediya (rubezh XI–XII vv.)” (The era of classical Islam in the Caucasus. Abu Bakr al-Darbandi and his Sufi encyclopedia) (Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, forthcoming).

³ V. F. Minorsky, *Istoriya Shirvana i Derbenda X–XI vekov* (The history of Shirvan and Derbend in the tenth–eleventh centuries) (Moscow, 1963), 124.

⁴ *Yacut’s geographisches Wörterbuch aus den Handschriften zu Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, London und Oxford* (Leipzig: Hrsg. von F. Wüstenfeld, 1866–1873).

⁵ Minorsky, 124.

Caliph, al-Mansūr. *Darband-nāmā* gives the following account of its history: “The *Amīr* gave an order, and cities were built: the first was Dū’ara, the second was Ṣighna, the third in the *banū* Hashīm valley, whence non-believers (*al-kuffār*) had gone; [there] a strong fortress was built. Miṭā’i and Kamāḥ were built after them. The *Amīr* gave an order, and three hundred men from Ṭabasarān were settled in Miṭā’i; besides, he appointed his brother to be the ruler of Ṭabasarān. After that he built Dārvāḳ, Madīna, and al-Ḥumaidiya, and also Ardjīl al-Kabīr and Ardjīl al-Saghīr. He completed the construction of these cities in six months. He resettled the people of Ḥimṣ to al-Ḥumaidiya and the people of Dimashḳ to the city of Dārvāḳ. Dārvāḳ was a large city. He resettled the people of Mawṣil to the city of Darpūsh. All these cities were called Darpūsh. He ordered [the inhabitants] of all these cities to guard the ravines and roads by turns. . . . After these, he built Mukātīr and Muḥraḳa.”⁶ Actually, as testified to by archeological materials, the activity centered not only on building new fortresses but also on reinforcing the already existing ones, constructed as far back as the Sassanids.

In the last edition of the Russian translation of the text of *Darband-nāmā*, a hypothesis is put forward that Darpūsh (Darbūsh in some scrolls) is a name of one or a complex of three cities: Darpūsh, Dārvāḳ, and al-Ḥumaidiya.⁷ However, no source speaks of Darpūsh as an inhabited locality. This is a Persian word (whose Arab equivalent is Darbūsh, its Arab semantic equivalent being *dirbās*—“a bar”), which means in translation “a latch,” “a plug,” “a bolt,” with other senses of the word being “the Gate of Glory” or “the Gate of Might.” Darpešh is translated as “Forward (or Frontal) Gate,” or “Main Gate.” Darbešh has the same meaning—“Great Gate”, “Greater Gate (compared to those of Derbent?)” (cf. the meaning of Bāb al-abwāb). All of these meanings in one way or the other denote a unified line of defence running along the northern frontier of the Caliphate, deeply echeloned (in two rows) and resting on the strength

⁶ “Derbent-name (Rumyantsevskii spisok). Vvedenie, per., komment. G. M.-R. Oraziava” (Derbent-name [the Rumyantsev scroll]. Preface, translation, comments by G. M.-R. Oraziava) in *A. R. Shikhsaidov, T. M. Aitberov, G. M.-R. Oraziav, Dagestanskie istoricheskie sochineniya* (Daghestani historical writings) (Moscow, 1993), 38. See also: Mirza A. Kazem-Beg, *Derbend-nāmeḥ, or the History of Derbend* (St. Petersburg, no publisher, 1851).

⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

of the new fortresses. "The support zone" of Darpūsh consisted of two boundaries: the front and the rear ones. The front boundary stretched from the northern walls of Darband through Sighna (possibly contemp. Sabnova), Kamāḥ (which has not survived but its locus is known), al-Ḥumaidiya (initially Muḥammadiya, contemp. Gimeidi) and Ḳal'a-Ḳuraish ("Fortress of the Quraishites", contemp. Kala-Koreish; the settlement had been abandoned and is presently under exploration) towards Ur-Karakḥ and Zarīkarān (contemp. Kubachi). These centres were reinforced by Muslim garrisons. The second boundary also started from al-Bāb and included the following settlements: fortress Djalghan (contemp. Dzhalgan)—Rukāl (contemp. Rukel)—Mitā'ī (contemp. Mitagi)—Mukātīr (contemp. Mugarty)—al-Muḥraḳa (contemp. Maraga)—Arđjīl al-Kabīr and Arđjīl al-Saghīr (contemp. Pendzhi and Kheli, or Khelipendzhik)—Taṭīl (contemp. Tatil). From Taṭīl towards the Khaidāk Mountains, the line of defence had several ramifications: through Irsī (contemp. Yersi) and Bāb-Wāk (contemp. Darvag) to the north in the direction of Bilḥadī (contemp. Bilgadi); towards Ṭawīḳ (Ṭuwaik; contemp. Dyuvek) in the northwest; to the southwest towards the contemporary Khuchni, Afna, Dzhuli and Furdag, and to the south in the direction of Dzanak and Tinīt. Yakrākḥ (contemp. Yakrakh) and Hanāk (contemp. Khanag) also formed part of the second defence boundary.

The next line of defence ran through cities mentioned in the sources as Madīna or Madīnat al-'arab (possibly the same as 'Arablar—the self-designation of this settlement is a Turkic plural form of *al-'arab*) and Baldj (contemp. Belidzhi). Further on it continued westward across the area of Stal—Tsmur—Arkhit—Khiv—Tpig—Richa—Chirag as far as Khosrek, and subsequently onward towards Ḳumūkh. And, finally, the fourth, deeply echeloned line of defence went from Baldj to the al-Lakz mountains through Khorel—Kabir—Karakyure—Mikrakh—Miskindzha—Akhty—Zrykh—Rutul—Kala—Shinaz—Amsar—Luchek, and further bifurcated along the heads of the River Samur: Mikhrek—Ikhrek and Gelmets—Tsahur—Mishlesh. Thus the circuit of populated areas was completed from the sea to the Greater Caucasus Range, and a natural barrier formed by the River Samur was additionally reinforced.

Apart from the numerous historical and folkloric data, there is a lot of material evidence in favour of this version. To begin with, Kufic inscriptions in the Arabic language dating from the tenth through the thirteenth centuries have been found in all the popu-

lated areas in question, while in other settlements located in proximity to them but equidistant from the routes indicated, such inscriptions have not been discovered. These texts are usually lapidary and dedicated to the eulogy of God; they do not contain dating, as a result of which researchers, for the sake of greater reliability, dated them within broad chronological limits. Refinements in the chronology of records, which had earlier been dated on paleographic evidence, were made on the basis of *Raiḥān al-ḥakāik* by Abū Bakr al-Darbandī. Such improvements in chronology now show that many records, including epitaphs, appear older than their paleographic dating almost by a whole century, and sometimes by even more (see personalia). The Khosrek inscription, paleographically dated as being within the confines of the eleventh-to-the-twelfth centuries and known as the most ancient epigraphic record in the Lak territory and in the whole Sulak-Koisu river basin,⁸ may also date to the tenth century. Many texts of the “Islamic centres” in the vicinity of Darband, dated as belonging to the tenth-to-the-thirteenth centuries, may refer to an earlier period, at least to the ninth-to-tenth centuries. It is known that earlier Muslim inscriptions had almost never been dated. This circumstance largely explains the absence of dated texts in the northeast Caucasus in the period of active affirmation of Arab authority there—a fact raising great doubts, if one is to take into account the evidence of the sources on the active religious and spiritual life of the “Islamic centres.” The tradition of dating records and, first of all, making inscriptions and epitaphs, stems from the tenth and particularly eleventh century, when borderline *ribāṭs* had undergone considerable evolution, having been transformed from soldiers’ settlements into centres of Muslim education.

All the fortifications that constituted lines of defence are connected with each other by transport arteries, which, as a rule, pass along the river valleys: the first boundary—along the valley of the River Ulluchai, the second along that of Rubas, the third along the Gulgerychai, and the fourth along that of the Samur. Surrounded by mountains difficult of access, the valleys of these rivers represent the only possible routes for movement in this terrain, a fact still

⁸ L. I. Lavrov, *Epigraficheskie pamyatniki Severnogo Kavkaza na arabskom, persidskom i turetskom yazykakh* (Epigraphical records of the North Caucasus in the Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages), Part I (Moscow: Nauka, 1966).

relevant to this day. The road running north of Darband coincides with the headmost defence boundary. The second boundary was the main one. It was additionally reinforced by a mighty wall stretching for forty-five kilometres. This wall, called Caucasian or *Dagh-barā* (Turk. *Dagh-bary* “Mountain Wall”), extended from the fortress walls of Darband to the interior in a westward direction as far as the *Khaidāḡ* Mountains. Its ruins have been preserved up to now in Darvag, Gimeidi, Bilgadi, Khanag and other populated areas of the region, and in some of them even with Kufic inscriptions. According to A. V. Komarov, who recorded many of these inscriptions, texts composed in the Persian language can also be found among them.⁹

The setting of *Dagh-barā* is absolutely identical with the walls of the Darband defensive complex.¹⁰ An attentive explorer will discover the ruins of the walls of forts and other defensive installations of exactly the same type of setting in the abandoned settlements. A. S. Bashkirov and M. I. Isakov discovered the site of the ancient settlement of the Kafirski Post with demolished remnants of walls and foundations close to the village of Sabnova.¹¹ E. I. Kozubsky and M. I. Isakov wrote about the remaining earthwork of Iran-kharab two kilometres from Bilgadi.¹²

Whereas *Bāb al-abwāb* was guarding the narrow Derbent Pass, *Dagh-barā* was doing the same with relation to the whole plateau adjoining the city, the highest point of which was the Dzhalgan Mountain (708 metres). Where the mountain wall broke off, barely accessible mountains began, with each line of defence starting from the sea and ending at the foot of one of the mountain ranges.

Expeditionary research has ascertained the earlier existence of a common system of signal fires for the main boundary of the defensive line, intended to be lit in case of enemy approach. V. V. Barthold attributed the appearance of that system to the time when the Darband citadel had not yet been established, that is, to the tenth century at least.¹³ Functionally, it continued to operate well into the era of the struggle against Nadīr *Shah Afshār* (1160/1747).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 192–193.

¹¹ A. I. Abakarov, O. M. Davudov, *Arkheologicheskaya karta Dagestana* (An archeological map of Daghestan) (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 224.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ V. V. Barthold, “K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii Derbend-name” (On the ori-

In addition, L. I. Lavrov drew attention to the uniform style of headstones of the eleventh and twelfth centuries from the localities of this line of defence—they were hollow (trough-shaped) and semi-cylindrical in form.¹⁴ The same headstones were discovered in Tabassarani, Yakрах, and Khelipendzik located along that line, in Dargwa-populated Kala-Koreish and Urkarakh—the “Islamic centres” that had extended the line of defence to the area of Khaidāk, in the Djalghan fortress at the approaches to Darband, as well as in at least three other Lezghin-populated areas at the border between the possessions of al-Bāb and al-Lakz: Belidzhi of the Derbent district, Kug of the Khiv district, and Khorel of the Magaramkent district of Daghestan.¹⁵

Our conclusions are also confirmed by medieval records and ethnographic material. In particular, *Darband-nāmā* contains information about Persian and Arab settlers to Darband and Ṭabasarān. *Taʾrīkh al-Bāb*, especially, distinguishes some “Muslim centres” that were located in the “borderland” (*thaghr*) of Bāb al-abwāb but formed an administrative part thereof. Al-Masʿūdī wrote in the tenth century: “The area between Khaidāk and al-Bāb is populated by Muslim Arabs who speak no language but Arabic. They live in forests, thickets, valleys, and along large rivers in the settlements they had put up at a time when these places were conquered by those who had come here from the Arabian deserts. They live on the boundary with the kingdom of Khaidāk but are protected therefrom by thickets and rivers. It is one *farsakh* [ca. six kilometres—A. A.] between them and the city of al-Bāb, and the inhabitants of al-Bāb come to their aid.”¹⁶ This is also confirmed by Ibn al-Azraq (see below).

Traces of the presence of the early Iranian and Arab settlers are revealed by the Pehlevi, modern Persian and Arab texts discovered in Darband and other areas. Rukel, Mitagi, and Gimeidi are still populated by the Tats—an ethnic group, Iranian by descent, resettled there as far back as the Sassanid era. Gimeidi was considerably Turkicized and is now almost deserted; the Tats who had been

gins of *Derbend-name*), in *Sochineniya*, Vol. VIII (Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1973), 423–424.

¹⁴ Lavrov, 196, 179.

¹⁵ Lavrov, 196, 179; A. R. Shikhsaidov, *Epigrafičeskie pamyatniki Dagestana X–XVII vv. kak istoričeskii istočnik* (Epigraphical records of Daghestan of the tenth-seventeenth centuries as a historical source) (Moscow, 1984), 128.

¹⁶ *Murudj al-dhahab wa maʿadin al-djawhar li . . . al-Masʿūdī* (Misr, 1303), 154, 203.

dwelling in Rukel were also Turkicized and no longer speak their own language. Present in the Daghestani (Tabassarani) environment and considering themselves ethnic Tabasaranis, the inhabitants of settlements in this locality speak a particular dialect of the Turkic (Azerbaijani) language.¹⁷ The same is true of the administrative centre of the Tabassaran district, Khuchni. The villages of Dzhalgan, Darvag, Bilgadi et al., properly speaking, were settled by the Azeris. As is known, the numerous Arab and Persian communities of Darband and its vicinity were also completely Turkicized with the passing of time.

Records of the Arab and Persian presence in the Caucasus have been discovered not only in the Derbent area, although there their concentration was the greatest, but also at the last Arab defensive boundary in the territory of contemporary Daghestan—at the approaches to the Greater Caucasus Range. In the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries, mosques appeared in the Samur Valley, the largest of which was the shrine complex in Karakyure built by the Arabs as a counter to the “*amīrs* of Tats,” the stronghold of Christianity in South Daghestan—Gapsah. L. I. Lavrov claims that the mosque built in Ihek in the beginning of the eleventh century was not the first one.¹⁸ We have detected an Arab-Persian inscription of the eleventh or twelfth century in the village of Kala, Rutul district, in the territory of the historical al-Lakz.¹⁹ Similar texts have also been discovered in the other settlements of this locality.²⁰ Ethnographers note that Iranian customs and traditions have been preserved to this day in the village of Miskindzha of the neighbouring Akhty district; moreover, the inhabitants of this populated area are the only ones in the vicinity to profess Shi‘a.²¹

¹⁷ The Tabassarani language belongs to the Lezghian group of the Vainakh-Daghestani branch of the Ibero-Caucasian language family.

¹⁸ Lavrov, 174.

¹⁹ A. K. Alikberov, “O nekotorykh stroitel’nykh nadpisyakh Yuzhnogo Dagestana XI–XIII vv.” (On some building inscriptions in South Daghestan in the eleventh-thirteenth centuries), in *Arkhitektura drevnego i srednevekovogo Dagestana* (The architecture of ancient and medieval Daghestan) (Makhachkala, 1989), 174–175.

²⁰ Thus a building inscription dating back to the eleventh-twelfth centuries, discovered in Mishlesh, is also bilingual: its Koranic portion is written in Arabic and the substantive portion in Persian (Lavrov, 67–68).

²¹ All the remaining Lezghins, the inhabitants of the village of Miskindzha among them, are Shafītes, i.e. Sunnites.

It is quite clear that the “Islamic centres” referred to above were nothing but *ribāṭs*—border fortresses of the Arabs who were usually assigned there by the Caliphs—to protect the country against invasions, in this case from the Khazars. The fortresses were often at the distant borderlands of the Caliphate in close proximity to areas populated by non-Muslims. However, what was the relationship between them and the *ghāzīs* and, moreover, the Sufis? It is common knowledge that the garrisons of the *ribāṭs* consisted of military settlers and their families dwelling in fortified outposts within a unified defence network. However, the connection that existed between them was very clear-cut. As noted by J. S. Trimmingham, “*ribāṭs* were founded in frontier regions as Muslim cells in a non-Muslim environment. They were watch stations and frontier posts, whose guards were often effective propagandists of Islam.”²²

Such a state of affairs is confirmed by other examples as well. The military and political significance of al-Bāb was similar to that of Djurdjan. The frontier of Djurdjan was contiguous with the desert adjoining Khorezm, whence, as indicated by Ibn Ḥaukal, “The Turks come to us. Mountains and unassailable fortresses dominate the regions of Djurdjan.”²³ Further on, Ibn Ḥaukal reports that in the Buid era the inhabitants of Djurdjan “had their own *ribāṭ* called Ribāṭ Dihistān, [this] was a city, there was a mosque in it and it was a border fortress against the Ghūz Turks.”²⁴ The *ghāzīs*’ activity was intimately connected with this *ribāṭ*, and after the Saldjūk conquest it became one of the centres of Sufi practice.

With the passage of time, the military settlers in the Caucasus had indeed acquired the status of *ghāzīs* and religious martyrs (*shuhadā*; sing. *shahid*). This was a kind of religious army that sacrificed itself for the faith in the war against the “infidels.” Epitaphs from Derbent tell of many martyrs “slain in the path of Allah” (*al-maktūl fī sabīl Allāh*): Maḥmūd b. Abī-l-Ḥasan (killed in 469/1076–7), Sulṭān Yusūf

²² Trimmingham, J. S., *Sufiiskie ordeny v islame* (The Sufi orders in Islam) (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 238.

²³ “Iz vlecheniya iz “Kitāb al-mesalik wa al-memalik” Ibn Haukalya/Perevod S. Volina” (Excerpts from *Kitāb al-mesalik wa al-memalik* by Ibn Ḥaukal/Translation by S. Volin) in *Materialy po istorii turkmen i Turkmenii* (Materials on the history of the Turkmen and Turkmenistan), Vol. I (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1939), 181.

²⁴ Ibid.

(killed in 479/1086–87) et al.²⁵ The *ghāzī* communities turned into half-secret military and religious organisations that supported themselves by the spoils of war and incomes from the *wakf* property (with the *wakfs* being normally constituted by gardens, plots of arable land, mills and caravanserais). If initially their upkeep proceeded in centralised order (at least they were allocated a share of the incomes from the Bākūya oil sources and the salt mines of *Shirwān*), as central power weakened, various revenues progressively diminished. This compelled the uncared-for military bands to subsist by raiding the neighbouring “infidel countries” that they proclaimed to be a “zone of holy war” (*dār al-ḥarb*) or a “zone of *djihad*.” The amīr of Bāb al-abwāb himself at the head of his retinue and city-folk volunteers not infrequently used to take part in such “campaigns in defence of faith.” Ideologically, such campaigns were justified by invoking a thesis that taking part in *djihad* was pleasing to God; as is known, this was proclaimed to be a religious duty of a Muslim to do so. However, it was a process that went both ways.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the *ghāzīs* from the “Islamic centres” started to be enlisted by the local Muslim rulers as a military force. An example of this practice was provided by the Turkic *amīrs* who were the first to appreciate all the benefits of using the *ghāzīs* for campaigns of conquest. They used them for their own purposes, disguising their appetite for conquest with the slogans of struggle against the foes of Islam, just as in their own time the Saldjūks had won over the Caliphate from the Buīds under the pretext of defending Sunni Islam from the encroachments of Shi‘ite rulers.²⁶

In the appanage domains of the “frontier area,” the *ghāzīs*, among whom were the veterans of wars and border skirmishes with the

²⁵ Lavrov, 61–62; Shikhsaidov, 16.

²⁶ Subsequently, the idea of the *ghazawāt* played a determining role in the formation of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, who had originated from the Oguz clan of *kayig*, were standing at the head of tribes that had come to Asia Minor in the Saldjūk conquest era and found themselves at the forefront of the struggle against the Byzantines, with whom they had to wage incessant wars to gain living space. According to C. E. Bosworth, the ranks of their army were constantly swelled by the Turkmen arriving from the East, who were anxious to become *ghāzīs*, fighters for the faith. It is from these *ghāzīs* that the martial spirit of the Ottoman dynasty takes its origin, thanks to which the Ottomans expanded their domains, achieved prosperity and finally engulfed all the other, more inert Turkic emirates. See C. E. Bosworth, *Musul'manskie dinastii. Spravochnik po khronologii i genealogii* (Muslim dynasties. A reference guide to chronology and genealogy) (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 186–187.

“infidels,” the readers of the *Ḳurʿān*, the *muhaddīthūn*, and other categories of Muslims practising *djihad*, were a major factor in Islamization. In those cases where Muslim enclaves managed to entrench themselves in the centres of rural communities, they created a support base for further Islamization. This helps to explain not only the status of the *ghāzīs* but also the second meaning of *al-marāḳiz*: some of the centres of minor ethnic zones in the area remote from Darband, mostly located in the mountain and foothill regions, were perceived as a sort of supporting base for the spread of Islam, since they contained *ribāṭs*. At any rate, in Karakyure, Kala-Koreish, and Kochkhyur, physical traces of large Islamic shrines have remained, dated as belonging to ca. the tenth century according to epigraphic texts cut in stone thereupon,²⁷ whereas *Ḳumūkh* had acquired an enduring reputation as a stronghold of “fighters for the faith.”²⁸

Due to the relative stabilization of the Caliphate’s internal situation after the “Abbasids” accession to power, sociopolitical conditions began to change at the periphery of the Arab state. This circumstance eventually affected the frontier *ribāṭs*, which turned into frontier Muḥammadan monasteries. According to J. S. Trimmingham, under the new conditions they changed their character from being centres of defence and proselytism to Sufi centres of devotion and learning.²⁹ Al-Darbandī’s *Raiḥān al-ḥakāʾik* related that Sufi *shaiḫh* Aḥmad al-Fuḳāʿī visited the “Islamic centres” and had a multitude of followers there. Abū Bakr al-Darbandī himself learned in those centres from various *shaiḫhs*. In that era, the population of military camps still retained its language and customs. This was also implicitly confirmed by Ibn al-Azraḳ who visited two such “centres” near Bāb al-abwāb in 549/1154.³⁰

With the spread of Islam abroad, the hostile environment of the *ribāṭs* disappeared. Time was calling for new heroes, and the word became a more effective weapon for the *ghāzī*. Medieval epigraphy tells us about the construction of a *khānaḳā* in Ruṭūl, one of the “Islamic centres” in South Daghestan, in the month of *muḥarram*

²⁷ Shikhsaidov, 8, 96–114, 138–145.

²⁸ Initially, *Ḳumūkh* bore exactly that name: *Ghāzī-Ḳumūkh*. In due course, this name transformed itself into Kazikumukh (*Ḳāḍī-Ḳumūkh*).

²⁹ Trimmingham, 239.

³⁰ He says, in particular, that, to his surprise, he discovered Arab populations in those “centres.” See Minorsky, Supplement V, 1963, 223.

545/May 1150.³¹ This fact prompts us to suggest the enhancement of the Saldjuks' ideological influence in certain southern areas of Daghestan, at least in a portion of the territory of al-Lakz under Sulṭān Sandjar (490–552/1090–1157); it also makes the process of the ever-increasing penetration of the Turkic ethnic element in the Darband area more explainable.

In the course of the whole twelfth century, the significance of the *ribāṭs* as the centres of Sufi learning increased greatly. Having formerly constituted a ramified defence network in the Caucasus, they were now found to be redundant in terms of the form and purposes for which they had been created in the first place. And the fact that in all the peripheral areas of the Caliphate where the *ribāṭs* were numerous—in Mawarannahr, Transcaucasia, the North Caucasus, and in the many African borderlands of *dār al-islām*—Islam was propagated in a distinct, Sufi form³² largely depended on the *ghāzīs*, people directly involved in the process. Already in the eleventh century, their communities were beginning to take on many characteristic traits of religious communities or brotherhoods (*tawā'if*, sing. *ṭā'ifa*). Caliph an-Nasir only logically consummated this process by reorganizing the *ghāzī* communities on the basis of his *futuwwa*, a code of rules of pious life, in keeping with the principles of Muslim mysticism. Subsequently, the *ghāzī* communities continued to function as one of the forms of the organized network of Sufism, until eventually they were definitely dissolved in the changed historical conditions after losing their social role and, correspondingly, their specific functions and features.³³

The changes in the character and structure of the defensive system in the Caucasus that occurred in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries could not but affect its efficiency. When a grave threat in the person of the Mongols emerged in the region, all the defence frontiers turned out to be ineffectual. The *khānaḳā* in Ruṭūl was destroyed by the Mongols in 636/1239 but soon restored, as testified

³¹ Lavrov, 63–64; Shikhsaidov, 24–28. Paleographically, this inscription is akin to the Akhty inscription on the wall of the mosque of the “health resort quarter,” which contains a call: “Come to prayer and do not be one of the negligent! Muhammad.” (Lavrov, 69, 267, 269; illustrations 16 and 34).

³² Cf. Trimmingham, 1989.

³³ I. Melikoff, “*Ghāzī*” in *EI NE*, II, 1043–1045.

by a building inscription dated 644/1246–47, discovered by us in the same quarter of the village.³⁴

A minaret in Tsahur was restored (*sāba*) in the same year of 636/1239, as attested by a building inscription in the same village. L. I. Lavrov (1966, 185), noting the coincidence of the time of construction with the date of the Mongol campaign, cited that inscription as evidence that the Mongols did not reach the upper course of the River Samur that year, since “Tsahur is located far from the main roads, in the mountains difficult of access; secondly, it is little likely that the inhabitants who had suffered from the invasion could restore the minaret in the same year . . .”³⁵ But Mishlesh is located even farther into the mountains than Tsahur; however, the mosque was reestablished there in 644/1247 as well.

We have also identified and published an inscription on the reconstruction of the minaret in the village of Khiv, which is likewise associated with the Mongol invasion of 636/1239.³⁶ An inscription from the village of Richa, situated along the same line of defence as Khiv (Ruṭūl, Tsahur, and Mishlesh were along another line) says: “In the name of Allah the Merciful and the Compassionate. Allah! Allah! Allah! A host of Tatars came—let Allah incapacitate them—to Bāb al-Ḳīst Riḍjā, when ten days still remained before the month of *rabiʿ al-awwal*. Then the inhabitants of Riḍjā fought with them until the middle of *rabiʿ al-akhīr* of the year 637. Then Sabād̲j̲ b. Sulaimān ordered this fortress to be constructed in the month of *zu-l-khid̲j̲ja* 638.”³⁷ This means that the Mongols systematically demolished the whole complex of lines of defence set up under the Arabs, thereby consolidating their positions everywhere. A fresh effort to fortify Darband and reestablish all the lines of defence on the territory of Daghestan now belonged to the Hulagid Ghazan Khan, the descendant of Genghis Khan.

³⁴ Alikberov, 1989, 176–177.

³⁵ Lavrov, 82–83.

³⁶ Alikberov, 1989, 173–175.

³⁷ Lavrov, 81.

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THE RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION
OF MONARCHICAL POWER AS AN OBJECT OF
SYSTEMATIC DESCRIPTION (CONCERNING THE STUDY
OF NUSANTARA MONARCHIES, THE SEVENTH TO
FIFTEENTH CENTURY A.D.)

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The history of the states of Nusantara, that is to say, the island portion of Southeast Asia and the Malay Peninsula—before the period of Islamization and the start of the early colonial European expansion—is a treasure trove from the standpoint of understanding cultural realia pertaining to the ideology of power. However, given the relatively long and rich experience of studying the culture of ancient and medieval states of Java and Sumatra, particularly in Dutch historiography, and the growing interest in the political and ideological foundations of these states, the monarchical ideology of the pre-Muslim period has not been fully elucidated as yet.

One of the reasons for this, in our opinion, is that the theoretical and systemic descriptive base for approaching this highly complex subject and the sources of information thereon have not been worked out (and their necessity has not been sufficiently realized). The task is not only to develop the necessary general-concept language but also to make a fuller use of the diverse Nusantara sources—epigraphy, literature, data on temple architecture, and iconography. These are indispensable in order to reconstruct and make a concrete historical description of what we call the conception of monarchical power (CMP), the monarchical conception.

In a most generally summarized formulation, the CMP is the sum total of religious and mythological images of power and person of the monarch, which are cultivated and employed as an ideological substantiation of the state order and as such constitute a definite system.

It is beyond question that the CMP is by definition a highly complex thing, one difficult to visualize in contemporary eyes. On the one hand, it belongs to the domain of ideas, figurative and mental patterns, sometimes basically difficult to reconstruct, and conjecturally

interpreted. On the other, as we approach the monarchical conception in a concrete historical manner, for instance, while studying the Southeast Asian region in the period in question, we become certain that the CMP is part of the meta-language of the traditional culture and appears to be polymorphous and multilevel. Evidence of all kinds of archaeological, written, and ethnographic sources attests that the idea and image of monarchical power has exhibited a varied degree of orderliness, integrity, a different salience, and greater or smaller detail, depending on the character of the source. And in this sense it would be wrong to understand the monarchical conception only as a certain pattern, stringently codified once and for all, which we have to pinpoint and record. At the same time, we are dealing with a system of mental constructs, since the conception of monarchical power functions in a state and some innovations in its content and structure are often interrelated with political factors and their dynamics.

But in any case, the conceptual perception and representation of the monarch's power is what largely determined the language of culture and politics, the motivation of political actions, and every other thing that is indispensable for an adequate and somewhat comprehensive understanding of history and the workings of these societies in ancient and medieval states.

From the times of early statehood (the fifth to seventh century) of Nusantara up to the era of its flowering in the thirteenth to fourteenth century, the idea and image of monarchical power were undergoing quite definite changes. This was caused by many reasons. First of all, one should single out such interrelated factors as the extent of personification of the etatist principles, the ethnoconfessional leanings of the subject of supreme power, the relationship between elite (predominantly Hindu and Buddhist) and popular (predominantly autochthonous) traditions (related to ancestor worship in the latter case), the development of an imperial model of a "universal state," and the degree of its correlation with the political reality.

But no less significant is that the traditional stability of the most important elements in the system of concepts of supreme power were preserved—mythologemes, descriptive and figurative canons, stereotyped constructions of the monarch's image, and modes of expressing the latter. This is what makes it possible to approach the ideology of the monarch's power and its religious foundations as a relatively integral object of study.

For the sake of initial examination of the monarchical conception as an object of description, we proceeded from one theoretical premise which is, in our view, important and obvious: the CMP is a sort of cultural text which has to be identified, restored in its main structural components (the lacunae are here inevitable), and read as coherently as possible. In this case we used the well-known cultural studies and semiotic characteristics of text.¹ The monarchical conception is shaped and “pronounced” having a definite pattern of expression. The image of supreme power is given to us through its mutually intertwining manifestations in the evolving context of cultural history. The monarchical conception finds its expression in the character and disposition of political and worship centres, in iconography, regalia of power, titles, notions and characteristics related to the apotheosis of the personality and power of the monarch, in rituals and other actions. We call all these the CMP phenomena and their sum total the CMP phenomenology. The latter, judging from the surviving artifacts and written texts, expresses the monarchical conception at three levels: objective, speculative, and dynamic (that is, through action). As far as the content is concerned, this is an image of supreme power presented to us through its phenomenology. This is, as it were, a semantic field formed by all sorts of relations between the monarch (as the holder and focus of power) and the religious and political cum ideological aspects of the expression of that power.

All this we endeavoured to reflect in the diagram “Phenomenology of the conception of monarchical power (CMP) and sections of its systematic description.” The material adduced on Nusantara history (of the medieval states of Java and Sumatra) made it possible to identify certain constants, i.e., recurring signs of a common religious and ideological pattern of perceptions of the monarch. On this basis, an attempt was made to plot a diagram that would be adequate for the purposes of the study of monarchical ideology in a regional (Southeast Asian) perspective and (upon extended revision) in an extraregional perspective. In this diagram, the structured CMP

¹ See, for example, V. S. Bibler, “Ideya kul'tury v rabotakh Bakhtina” (The idea of culture in Bakhtin's works), in *Odisei. Chelovek v istorii* (Odysseus. Man in history) (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 30–32; G. A. Antipov, O. A. Donskikh, I. Yu. Markovina and A. Sorokin, *Tekst kak yavlenie kul'tury* (Text as a phenomenon of culture) (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1989), 35–36; Yu. S. Stepanov, *Semiotika* (Semiotics) (Moscow: Raduga, 1971), 13–14.

expression pattern (phenomenology) is linked to the content pattern (sections of description).

Before going into detailed explanation of the diagram, one should make a few preliminary remarks of a very general nature, and give a brief exposition of the principles underlying the plotting of the diagram.


First of all, this is not a diagrammatic plan reflecting any order of relative positioning of certain objects in real space. The geometrical centre of squares (or, to be more exact, of a double square consisting of two squares, external and internal) contains the designation of the focus of power—the monarch (M) and the group holder of monarchical power (GHMP), namely, the monarchical clan or dynasty. The remaining points are linked with the corresponding abbreviations and designations in letters—these signs are symbols of notions and mental constructs referring to the phenomenology of the monarchical conception. It is in the process of undertaking concrete historical studies that a definite descriptive structure is built. At the diagram this is shown in the form of five sections corresponding to different aspects of the monarchical conception. Each section is predominantly related to one of the groups of phenomena placed at the peaks of the squares.

Now we may pass on to the content and makeup of the diagram.

Let us point out that the initial assumption in identifying and determining elements of the diagram bears an empirical, not speculative character: it is based on real observations derived from the sources. These sources are represented by epigraphy (more than one hundred monarchical inscriptions—edicts of the fifth to fifteenth century), literature, a prominent place among which is held by chronicles, quasi-official and normative-type writings (Pararaton, Deśawarjana, Sutasoma, Navanatya, all dating to the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries), and also by monuments of architecture and religious plastic art of the seventh to fifteenth century. This is the main corpus of sources for the history of Indonesia in antiquity and the Middle Ages, except for external sources.

It has been noted that in the framework of the whole “lifetime parabola” of Indonesian (mostly Malay and Javanese) medieval civilization, from its beginnings in the fifth to seventh century until its decline as a coherent cultural and ideological system in the fifteenth century, the religious self-expression of monarchical power as well as its conception in a regular (and in a number of cases quantita-

*Phenomenology of the conception of monarchical power (CMP)
and sections of its systematic description*



Signs and Symbols:

M/GHMP – monarch; group holder of monarchical power

TC – throne centres

CRW – centres of religious worship

AMP – attributes of monarchical power

ARW – attributes of religious worship

SMP – space of monarchical power

SRW – space of religious worship

FEMP – form expression of monarchical power

FRW – forms of religious worship

a¹ – sociopolitical actions

a² – religious actions

a³ – political cum religious actions

a⁴ – religious cum political actions

① – mythogenetical foundations of the CMP (the myth of power)

② – status of power-holder, legitimizing factors, forms of investiture

③ – religious sanction of rule. Divine analogues of the royal person

④ – spatial and cosmological aspects of the CMP

⑤ – religious and cosmological aspects of the CMP. The ruler as the sacral principle of the world

tively measurable) form have come down to us in a limited number of phenomena, which nonetheless constitute a universal basis for expressing the monarchical conception.

There exist several groups and types of such phenomena, all of them related to the holder of power—the monarch, monarchical clan or dynasty (the centre of the square designated as M/GHMP)—and all of them represented in three varieties or, as we have already noted, at three levels.

I. The first (objective) level is the sum total of individual artifacts, constructions, and verbal definitions which may be reduced to the notions of centres and attributes of power. These are the phenomena denoted in the diagram by the peaks of the internal square.

The first group of phenomena of the first (objective) level is composed of the attributes and insignia of monarchical status and various images, characteristics and definitions of the power and person of the monarch, that is to say, designations and depictions of the monarch and monarchical power in signs and images, things and texts. These may conditionally be called the attributes of power. Their foundation is constituted by things that legitimize the status and sacral distinction of kingship. In the epigraphy of the fifth century, for instance, these are the determinant titles: *rāja*, *indra*, *rājā-dhīrāja*; the Sanscrit throne names; Viṣṇuite symbols, and so forth. In the statuary plastic arts of the fifth to seventh century, this is the Viṣṇu image associated with the early monarchical idea.

In the seventh to tenth century (the epoch of the flowering of the early medieval monarchies of Śrīvijaya and Mataram), these are the Sanscrit and autochthonous (Malay and Javanese) titles: *aḷi*, *mahārāja*, *mahārāja raka*, *ratu*, *datu* in epigraphical records; images of Śiva and other Hindu and Buddhist, Tantric divine analogues to kingship, the king's symbolic names and epithets in inscriptions and literary sources. It goes without saying that among all kinds of religious and mythological definitions, names and determinants, there exist certain criteria allowing to identify—with relative assurance and greater authenticity,—those which may be classed in the category of quasi-official, although it seems impossible to arrive at a fully authentic picture.²

² On the model of the MDS (monarch designation system), we analyzed in detail

During the thirteenth through the fourteenth centuries (when the centralized state of the Javanese and the Java-based Nusantara association was being formed), the system of designation and depiction had become rather complex. An identification of the monarchical family with individual images of gods of the Buddhist and Hindu pantheons was presupposed, and the extremely rich repository of Vajrayāna mythology was used for these purposes in syncretic combination with the incarnations of the Shaiwa set of personages and for establishing the cult of dynastic ancestors. At that time the dynastic regalia and dynastic names found sanction in texts of the chronicles and particular works performing a mythological apologia and legitimation of the sacral status of the dynasty that has come to the necessity of creating a semblance of the island empire.³

The system of depiction and the system of designation of the monarch, which were growing more complex and detailed in the course in the period under review (from the seventh to the fourteenth century) were built upon a two-type attribution. These were the *attributes of monarchical power* as such (AMP), that is, what may be called the determinants and regalia of power, and the *attributes of religious worship* (ARW), giving a religious and mythological sanction of monarchical power, namely, depictions of gods and their names.

The second group of phenomena of the first (objective) level is related not to the attributes of power, but to its centres, the localization of power, the points of its concentration, and the focus of political and spiritual resources. In this respect, the following elements are normally related to monarchical power: the nation's capital, the monarch's residence, and the religious architectural and sculptural complexes of various types. All these, according to our

and with massive evidence, the evolution of monarchical determinants in connection with the ideology of power. See G. G. Bandilenko, "Tipologiya oboznachenii monarkha i yeyo razvitiye v srednevekovom yavanskom obshchestve" (The typology of designations of the monarch and its evolution in medieval Javanese society), in *Tipologiya osnovnykh elementov traditsionnoi kul'tury* (Typology of the basic elements of traditional culture) (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).

³ This is quite clearly traced in Deśawarnana (Nāgarakṛtāgama) which may conditionally be defined as a chronicle poem. Th. Pigeaud, *Java in the Fourteenth Century. A Study in Cultural History. The Nāgara-Kertāgama by Rakawi Prapañca of Majapahit, 1365 A.D.*, Vol. I: *Javanese Texts in Transcription*; Vol. III: *Translations* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). See also: *Deśawarnana (Nāgarakṛtāgama) by Mpu Prapañca*; transl. [from the Javanese] by Stuart Robson (Leiden: Koninklijke Instituut voor taal, land- en volkenkunde Press [hereafter KITLV Press—*translator's note*], 1995).

classification and in the defined cultural and historical context, are power centres. But as in the case of attributes, in reality the centres are represented by two varieties of phenomena. These are the power centres as such (we conditionally call them “throne centres”—TC) and the centres of religious worship (CRW). The latter may include temple ensembles, detached complexes, and religious settlements.

The political and ideological content of the history of the Nusantara states under examination (Mataram and Śrīvijaya in the tenth to twelfth century, Singhasāri and Majapahit in the thirteenth to fifteenth) is largely manifested in the relationship between the throne centres and the centres of religious worship, the capital and the temples, the political and administrative core and the major religious monuments. In Javanese and Malay history this finds expression in the relationship between the two elements and two personages of political and ideological life: *kraton* (the ruler’s residence) and the *candi* temple (the basis of religious complexes). One may identify two phases of Javanese statehood when the two elements just mentioned approached each other to the maximum extent: these were, first, the early medieval phase of Buddhist and Hindu ensembles in the area of the capital (the Borobudur and Prambanan phase), and, second, the quasi-imperial phase of Majapahit and its main sanctuary Panataran, when the idea of spiritual and political centralization was modelled in the arrangement of the capital city centre itself (the prevailing idea in the character of religious ensemble was that of state ancestors and religious syncretism as a form of deification of the monarch’s power).

Thus, at the first level we empirically subdivided the objective content of the CMP phenomena into four composite objects—AMP (attributes of monarchical power) and ARW (attributes of religious worship), TC (throne centres), and CRW (centres of religious worship). But one has to make it clear at once that this division of attributes and centres into monarchical proper and those dealing with religious worship may not at all be understood as unconditional, unequivocal and represented in the historical forms of culture in a “pure form.” As these are phenomena of the monarchical conception that are related to its “servicing,” they form intricate combinations. For instance, the system of designating the monarch (the combinations of “big” and “small” names and determinant titles) and the system of his depiction (iconography and descriptive characteristics) contain religiously “neutral” status-related significates of power (*prabhu*, *rāja*, *datu*, etc.), sacral titles correlated with the designation

of gods (*bhaṭāra*, *devata*, *īśvara*), and attributes and elements of names from the treasure trove of definite religious mythologies. The nature of combination in the syncretism of these elements, just as with similar combinations in the figurative sequence, generally reflect not only the “confessional” line of the ideology of power, but also the extent to which the religious traditions and dogma of different origin come closer together on that basis. We are dealing not with the interrelation of the state and the clergy, the secular and the religious aspects of politics, but with different historical manifestations of a conceptual (basically religious and mythological) substantiation of monarchical order.

One may presume that the monarchical conception is always and everywhere premised on: 1) the personification of power as embodied in the monarch; 2) the concentration of power in its centres; and 3) attribution of power. But in the centre of the phenomenological diagram of the CMP in any version of its content-related (historical) treatment stands a personal or group holder of power—M (monarch or group holder of monarchical power). Therefore, at the start of a historical narrative of the monarchical conception, it is appropriate to present as the first aspect of its content the section “Mythogenetical foundations of the CMP (the myth of power)” (① at the diagram). The “myth of power” and its components, together with the conceptual genealogy of the power holder (dynastic myth), may be likened to a grain, from which grows the ramified pattern of concepts that feed the ideology of power within certain ethno-cultural and historical limits.

For the Singhasāri-Majapahit (Javanese thirteenth-through-the-fourteenth century) tradition, the motives of the origin of the founder of the dynasty—Angrok-Rājasa turn out to be the most essential for the mythogenetical foundations of the monarchical conception: the “divine seed,” protection by gods on his way to power, and the dualism of personal nature, exhibited by the future Javanese king in a combination of divine (uranian) and demonic (chthonian) characteristics. Son of Brahmā, the incarnation of Viṣṇu and adopted son of Śiva—Angrok-Rājasa, as it were, mythologically presages and produces archetypes of the qualities of a whole multitude of gods in the essence of the succeeding kings of the House of Rājasa and of the presence of a sacral substance, the Śakti (Sakti) power, in the nature of their authority. The Austronesian (regionally autochthonous) mythologemes on ancestor spirits, tricksters, and the mighty personages

of the local folklore, beyond any doubt exerted an influence on the structure of the myth of Angrok.⁴ Possibly linked with the determinant motives of the Singhasāri and Majapahit dynasty myth is also the image of the female ancestor—progenitress of two reigning lines—Ken Dḍḍēs, from whom were taken the origin of the descendants of Rājasa and the Singhasāri ruler Tunggul Amētung. It was the mythological memory about the common female (sacral) root that probably united these two lines to form the Majapahit dynasty in the second half of the thirteenth century; Kṛtarājasa became the first ruler of that dynasty.

II. The second level of expression of the conception of monarchical power is notional. It comprises figurative patterns and notional constructions reducible to the categories of space and form (form expressions). These are the phenomena of the external square of the diagram, in a certain (inductive) sense derivative from the phenomena of the internal square. For instance, whereas at the first level the centres of religious worship are represented by individual temples of the *candi* constructive type or groups thereof (Candi Mendut, Candi Loro Jonggrang, et al.) or by *stūpa*-like structures (Borobudur, Jabung), at the second level, in regard to the space of the CMP, the centre of religious worship may be an architectural cosmological image of the (sanctuary) Mountain Temple, which unites them. At the same level, some *candi* ensembles may be viewed as a model of the centred microcosm. By their internal structure and in combination with centres of religious worship and between themselves, the throne centres may be associated with sacral space—*maṇḍala*. As far as the form (form expression) is concerned, in this case, too, the notional phenomena are logically linked to the objective level. If there is a certain sum total of titles and iconographic signs—attributes in the system of designation and depiction of concrete monarchs (*bhaṭāraprabhu*, *ratu* of Nusantara; the crown and the flame-shaped halo; the definition “*prabhu* of the divine kin,” and so forth), these may be the

⁴ See J. L. Brandes, *Pararaton (Ken Arok), of het Boek der koningen van Tumapel en van Majapahit*, 2 druk, bewerkt door N. J. Krom met medewerking von J. Jonker, H. Kramer en R. Poerbatjaraka, [’s] (Gravenhage, Batavia: Nijhoff, 1920); F. D. Bosch, “De mythische achtergrond de Ken Angrok-legende” in *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe reeks*, Deel XXVII, No. 8 (1964).

elements of a notional model of a deified dynastic ancestor or a king-god. Different combinations of elements of cosmological content changing at the first level may stand behind such notions, since the “filling” of these notions at the second level has not remained constant over time.

Thus behind the designations at the peaks of the square at the diagram stand collective phenomena *sui generis*, at the basis of which lie combinations of each of the four above-named elements of the diagram in the internal square (AMP, ARW, TC, and CRW). In the external square, these are, respectively, the form expression of monarchical power (FEMP), the forms of religious worship (FRW), the space of monarchical power (SMP), and the space of religious worship (SRW).

This explanation of the second-level phenomena presupposes the researcher’s exterior position with respect to the phenomenology of power. Meanwhile, we are dealing with a product of medieval, archaic thinking, in which the sacral goes back to mythologized archetypes. And this, naturally, refers to the phenomena of space and form. From this position (a view “from the inside”), the archetypes of the SMP and the FEMP are found between the centre of the phenomenological square and the phenomena of the “notional” level (the centres and attributes). Space is relatively broadly represented in academic literature as an archetypal category in the most general and universally human sense. A. Ya. Gurevich ascribed it to the “root structures of the medieval mentality,” considering space along with time as “great values of the collective unconscious,” whose images are aspects of a single matrix superimposed by the mind upon the perceived world and by which the world is organized.⁵ It may be supposed that space, as just such an archetype, coupled with the image of power was generating a mythology of the centre, which in its “corporeal” embodiment was brought to life after the fashion of and as a replica of the mythological, heavenly centre. A very characteristic example in this sense is the Bugis tradition (Sulawesi Island) whereby not only the first rulers (*tomanurungs*) but the very power-centres palaces descended from heavens as mythological prototypes

⁵ A. Ya. Gurevich, *Srednevekovyi mir: kul'tura bezmolstvuyushchego bol'shinstva* (Medieval world: the culture of the silent majority) (Moscow: Iskustvo, 1990), 116.

of throne centres (the *manurung* palace). However, among the Bugis this concept also refers to sacral regalia of royal power.⁶

Thus the very phenomena of the centre and forms of monarchical power are established under the impact of the heavenly archetype. As Mircea Eliade put it, the worldly space is abolished by the symbolism of the Centre, and all the symbols of absolute reality are to be found in the Centre. The Centre transforms the worldly space as the transcended space, all by itself.⁷ It is quite clear that it is on such a basis the phenomenology of space in the conception of the monarchical power is built: the concepts of mountains as temples, of the ensembles as microcosms, of the state as *maṇḍala* (the sacred “circle” of lands), etc., were reflected in complicated territorial and spatial designs and combinations of various artifacts.

Now let us examine the makeup of the phenomena of the external square of the diagram, one after the other, along with the sections of description of the monarchical conception related to them.

1. The form expression of monarchical power (FEMP) is directed at the attributes of monarchical power (AMP) and through them at the holder of power (see the right upper angle of the external square of the diagram). The FEMP is defined above all by the presence of monarchical attributes and is an integral notion in the sense that it reflects a definite aspect of the monarchical conception—in this case the status (or the distinct position) of the holder of power and its legitimacy. This may be the fact of membership in a definite circle within the royal family on condition that this membership is phenomenologically emphasized, for instance, through the use of the *prabhu* title. A definition of the founder (“root”) of the dynasty (the royal family) with the attributive characteristics attendant upon this form of expression, as well as the above-mentioned phenomena of the king-god and the deified ancestor and others, belongs to the same level in phenomenology as the form expression of power. In principle, no monarchical idea can exist without forms which per-

⁶ For recent works dealing with the traditional foundations of the Bugis statehood, see: A. Schrauwers, “Houses, Hierarchy, Headhunting and Exchange. Rethinking Political Relations in the Southeast Asian Realm of Luwu,” in *Bijdragen tot de taal, land- en volkenkunde*, Deel 153, 3-e afl. (Leiden, 1997), 357–380.

⁷ M. Eliade, *Kosmos i istoriya. Izbrannyye raboty* (Universe and history. Selected works) (Moscow: Progress, 1987), 42–43, 44, 54.

sonify and legitimize it. In its “objective foundation,” it is an organized spectrum of architectonic, plastic, and verbal means of conveying the idea of monarchical power and its status and legitimacy. Therefore, given the fact that the form expression of monarchical power is based on attribution, it also includes individual elements of the latter phenomena of the internal square (the TC, the CRW, the ARW), conceptualized as attributes of a figurative and symbolic expression of personified power and its status and legitimacy. For example, evidence of the links between some *candi* temples and particular persons among the deceased members of the monarchical clan may serve as an indication of those persons having assumed the status of spirits among the dynasty’s ancestors; there are specific features of the statuary images of gods with attributes of Hindu personages, which are interpreted as a sign of the iconography of the kings’ ancestor worship, and so on.

The form expression of monarchical power is linked first and foremost with the second (after the “mythogenetical foundations”) section of the description of the monarchical conception (see ② at the diagram). The section “Status of power-holder, legitimizing factors, forms of investiture” shows the concrete historical content of notions referring to the form expression of the monarch’s power—the way they had been changing by the time of the Majapahit statehood and the way they reflected the aims and results of the political and ideological aims of the Javanese monarchy in the fourteenth century. Besides, it is this part of the systematic description that contains an account of regalia and ritualized actions which serve as symbolic participants of the political history of Singhasāri, Majapahit, and other states, such as the sacred *kris* dagger, the elements of dynastic and state heraldry (*vilva* fruit and others), or cockfighting (a custom that accompanied the scenes of political clashes and confrontations).

2. The forms of religious worship (FRW) are the second phenomenon viewed at the “notional” level of the monarchical conception (see diagram—left lower angle of the external square). The FRW is directed at attributes of religious worship, with the latter phenomena of the “objective” level involved to the extent that they are also associated with ritual formalization of monarchical power. For instance, the sum total of phenomena related to the definition of Śaiwa forms of monarchical conception and to the Śaiwa form of deification of the monarch (in the shape of the status of Śiva Mahādeva, Ardhanari,

and the corresponding verbal media) is not exhaustive by attributes as such. The statuary plastic art itself in its monumental version is part of the architectural and sculptural complexes (which form the basis of centres of religious worship), to cite an example of the pan-Majapahit sanctuary of Palah. A properly religious form of authority is here read from the symbolic structure of this centre just as it is read even more clearly from the “text” of the Buddhist centres. It is precisely by invoking not only the texts *per se* but the cosmography of the cult and throne centres that makes it possible to identify and represent the syncretized form of the deification of authority, which denotes the peculiarity of Austronesian traditions at that stage in the evolution of Javanese statehood.

The analysis of forms of religious worship serves as a prerequisite to a systematic description of the monarchical conception in the form formulated in the third section—“Religious sanction of rule. Divine analogues of the royal person” (see ③ at the diagram).

Addressing ourselves to the evidence related to the ideas of the form of religious worship of power (to the cult iconography above all), we may assert that the various images of gods (that is to say, the aspects of Śiva, the iconography of the Bodhisattvas, etc.) become the language media of monarchical ideology, the forms of religious worship of the CMP, if they are inserted in the context of that ideology through their correlation with the monarch or with the group power-holder. In this connection, we have to point out that, in the early period (before the era of the state of Kaḍiri, until the twelfth century), this correlation is rather faintly traced and faintly personified. Still, we can hardly deny it, as it is attested to by the particular features of the correlation between the iconography and the power centres as much as by the courtly literature or by certain formulas in the charter inscriptions. Nonetheless, we may single out an early phase of the FRW compared to the developed phase. In the latter case, the cult attributes in the form of temple figures in the Singhasāri-Majapahit period bear signs which point to a possible inclusion in the common monarchical, dynastic, or even individual image, which conjures an idea of a dynastic and “portrait” sculpture of the monarch-god.⁸ In any case, nothing of the kind is observed in Mataram in

⁸ In recent times, the old discussion of this topic has been revived. See M. J. Klokke, “The Iconography of the So-Called Portrait Statues in Late East Javanese Art,” in *Ancient Indonesian Sculpture* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), 178–202.

the eighth-eleventh centuries. At that time the local (Austronesian) cultural soil had not yet developed, under the impact of the Indian civilizational influence, such forms of symbiosis and mutual complementarity of the autochthonous and borrowed elements that would have manifested themselves in a special “genre” of the quasi-official cult art, in the set of its attributes. Neither were there enough political prerequisites for this, as the process of centralization had not yet led to the creation of a common Javanese state in the centre and the east of the island.

Along the historic path of Javanese statehood from the early medieval princedoms to the inter-island unification in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, normative character becomes more complicated and pronounced in those attributes which belonged to the means of expressing the legitimacy of the monarchical status. In line with this, the system of canonical attributes, built in a certain fashion and joined together in forms of religious worship, was subordinated to the purposes of the apotheoses of members of Majapahit royal family in their lifetime and, afterwards, to their posthumous deification. Such deifications was accomplished mostly through the attributes of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Tantric pantheons and syncretic philosophy.

That said, we also have to take into account that forms of religious worship (just as the space of religious worship, of which later) in any case do not entirely coincide with the traditional confessional tendencies prevalent in society. We are also as yet unable to determine to what extent the elite ideology was synonymous with mass religious sentiment, since remoteness in time makes it hard for us to transpose ethnographic data on popular religion and beliefs to medieval states, and particularly of the pre-Islamic epoch. Therefore, one may only assert that the forms revealed reflect a certain religious background, a “nativist” and durable enough source of religious and mythological images and notions, partly employed in the monarchical conception. All this considered, we deemed it appropriate to provide a descriptive section under the symbol ③ (“Religious sanction of rule. Divine analogues of the royal person”), consisting of two subsections:

1) *The monarch as the protagonist of cults and religious denominations*

There is a certain set of confessional and cult signs which distinguished the policies of both individual monarchs and dynastic groups.

This was sometimes called a “state religion” or “state ideology,” which is, needless to say, a rather arbitrary designation. In the early medieval Malay states of Sumatra (Malayu, Śrīvijaya in the seventh to tenth century), the presence of the greater part of the surviving monumental stone buildings and the small number of written testimonies, as well as the cult sculpture in the Sumatran and Malayan (peninsular) territories, speak of an outstanding role of Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhism. This is supported by the information of Chinese pilgrims on the existence in Sumatra and the northern part of Malaya of very significant centres of Buddhist learning, like those in the areas of Palembang and Jambi in the southeast of Sumatra (I-Tsing’s notes, the seventh century).⁹ One may say that the geographical scale of distribution of the Vajrayāna *candis* erected by Malay *mahārājas* corresponded with the scope of expansionist aspirations of the ancient Malay state of Śrīvijaya. Although the mystic Buddhism of Vajrayāna connected with the “Greater Vehicle” (Mahāyāna) school was not the only religion practised in Śrīvijaya (both Śaiwa and Viṣṇuite monuments are known), still the policy of Śrīvijaya kings was apparently oriented mostly to Vajrayāna and the cult of Avalokitēśvara and other Bodhisattvas of Mahayāna Buddhism.

The religious orientation of the policy of the Javanese *raka*-kings in Mataram and in other princedoms east of Sunda Strait was more ambivalent. It is surprising that the Vajrayāna cult ensembles, the largest in the region, such as Borobudur and others which so far surpassed their Sumatran-Malay counterparts in scale, were erected here long before the formation of the centralized Javanese state. However, one may suppose that the Buddhist preferences of a number of kings of Central Java, who had been included in Mountain Rulers’ (Śailendras’) family, derive their origin from the Malay ruling elite. At the same time, the Buddhist complex of kingship-inspired Prambanan sometimes compared well in magnitude with the Buddhist ones. By now it has become clear that the adherence of individual ruling groups to the Śiva cult or Vajrayāna school could hardly conceal sharp contradictions and conflicts, confessional rivalry, and endless struggle between two prospective dynasties, Śailendra and Sañjai.

⁹ See J. Takakusu (transl.), *I-Tsing. A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 67–695)* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1896), XXXIV, 160–166.

It is quite probable that it was in fact one dynasty, within which a change in confessional affiliation was under way.¹⁰ And still in the power ideology of that era, as distinct from the Singhasāri-Majapahit period, the Hindu and Buddhist “ways of faith” coexisted independently as alternatives, albeit in the context of a symbiosis of these two traditions and even mutual influence owing to Tantrism and the local autochthonous cults, and to ancestor worship above all.

In the era of late medieval Mataram and Kaḍiri (Javanese states of the end of the tenth to the first quarter of the thirteenth century), the Javanese kings patronized various religious communities (sources bear witness to the peaceful coexistence of Śaiwa adepts, Buddhists, and *ṛṣi* ascetics). However, from the surviving monuments of temple construction and iconography, as well as from court literature, it follows that it was largely the Viṣṇu cult (owing to the particular link between the image of god-protector Viṣṇu and the idea of kingship), and the traditions of mystic, secret rituals of Tantrism that provided the background for the religious conception of power. In late Śrīvijaya and Malayu the ruling establishment continued to rely mostly on Buddhism with a strong admixture of the latter-day version of mystic Buddhist Tantrism—Kālacakra.

The Javanese “holy empire,” which endeavoured to expand into territories outside the realm under the aegis of Singhasāri and Majapahit, inherited and accumulated in the utmost degree those religious traditions which were employed by the monarchs of the past as the “divine sanction” of their power. One gets the impression that generally nothing was rejected and everything was picked up in accordance with the principle of complementarity. In the historical context under study, this comprised ancestor worship, the cults of Śiva-Bhairawa and the Tantric deities, the Buddhas of “contemplation” (*tathāgatas*), a number of Bodhisattvas (first of all the popular Avalokiteśvara; Akṣobhya, Amoghapāśa), as well as the rituals of yogic character within the framework of the Kālacakra secret doctrine. There was an order of its own in that complex conglomerate of religious preferences, in which the exoteric and esoteric rituals and ideas were prominent. A very important feature of that time was the intensified tendency towards dual syncretic treatment of the

¹⁰ See R. E. Jordaan, “Imagine Buddha in Prambanan. Reconsidering the Buddhist Background of the Loro Jonggrang Temple Complex,” in *Semai* 7 (Leiden, 1993).

correlation between the Śaiwa and the Buddhist principles as the two stages in the path of faith and the two sides of a single theology. It is in the religious treatises of the Majapahit period that we find a thesis which was appropriated for the national coat of arms by the Indonesian politicians of the twentieth century as a motto and principle of political and ideological integrity of the state and the nation: “*Bhineka tunggal ika*” (“Different but united”). Thus the largest Muslim country of the world derives its state motto from the dogmas that uphold the meaning of the symbiosis of Śiva and Buddha.¹¹

2) *Deity as an image of monarchical power and of the ideal monarch. Forms of religious worship in the depiction system*

What had been accumulated by the Javanese tradition since the times of Mataram and Kaḍiri (the ninth through the twelfth century) was largely conceptualized in the apotheosis of deified royal power in Majapahit in its heyday. Great theomorphous (throne) names, borne while the monarch was still living, and posthumous names (*devānamabhiṣeka*) as well, were regularly employed together with the determinants of divine status in the official designation of persons of the monarchical clan. Figurative stereotypes accompanying names and titles and the iconographic sculptural canon of the dynastic temple complexes form a particular combination of forms of religious worship. This may be called the polytheomorphism of the power of the king and his family. All the *prabhus* of this group acquire the status of *bhaṭāra* (“divine”) and as such are vested with the title of “protector” of the major regions of the Javanese core of the state, in keeping with the strict internal hierarchy. The king himself as a *mahārāja* and *prabhu devanmūrti* (*prabhu*-deity) embodies an image of the master of the world (*bhūmipālaka*, *ratu ning bhuvana*) and joins the nature of Buddhist and Śaiwa gods, old and new, in his own nature from that time on. This indicates a definite purpose of the monarchical ideology—a desire to hold an all-embracing “monopoly” on the sacral forms of incarnation of power in life and after death.

¹¹ Santoso Soewito, *Sutasoma. A Study in Javanese Vajrayana* (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1975), 576–588.

3. The third phenomenon of monarchical power at the “notional” level we are dealing with is the space of monarchical power (see left upper angle of the external square at the diagram).

The SMP is directed at throne centres and through them at the focus of power—the monarch or the group power-holder. However, the SMP is defined not only by the presence of throne centres but also by those centres of religious worship, as well as monarchical and religious-worship attributes which express the idea of the spatial power of the centre.

The space of monarchical power is a conceptual space; it cannot be confined to the notion of the limits of economic and administrative rule of the state; this is not a territorial/state reality but one of the conceptual realia. The SMP has a horizontal plane (as the principal one), expressing geographical vectors, a vertical plane expressing authority in the social space, as well as the temporal plane (the time depth of space), that is, the ruler’s line of descent from the ancestor and dynastic continuity. The monarchical idea of sacred power cannot by definition be one without the idea of all-pervasive domination over the Universe in its spatial and temporal incarnations—over the cosmos of men, the cosmos of things, and the cosmos of nature in their interrelation. In a certain sense, the Universe of power comprises these objects of domination.

This space is mythological and cosmological; it correlates with a state of mind which could not in this case handle an abstract space, a space only as a “place of action,” or as something Martin Heidegger defined as “dissociation equivalent in all directions . . . not perceived sensually.”¹² Like the space of art, it is not identical to abstract, “empty” space; it is heterogeneous and sensually perceived. Just like the space of art, it is mastered, not filled. Like mythological space, it is filled by means of image and symbol. The quality of being imbued with myth, cosmos, and imagery of space in the monarchical conception induces one to recall the judgement made by Ivan Ilyin who assessed the monarchical mind as artistic and creative.¹³

¹² M. Heidegger, *Vremya i bytie. Statyi i vystupleniya* (Time and being. Articles and presentations) (Moscow: Respublika, 1993), 313. The German original was published as *Die Kunst und der Raum* (St. Gallen, 1969), 26.

¹³ I. A. Ilyin, “O monarkhii i respublike” (On the monarchy and the republic), in *Voprosy filosofii* (Questions of philosophy), No. 5 (1991): 100, 108.

In the descriptive diagram of the monarchical conception, the section “Spatial and cosmological aspects of the CMP” (see ④ at the diagram) is based on the analysis of the phenomenon of space of monarchical power.

In the study of the monarchical conception in the Nusantara states, the subject of space of power is intimately linked with those ideas of the ideological mastery of space, which sanctioned territorial unions under the aegis of such states as Śrīvijaya, Singhasāri, and Majapahit. Their history presents a religious and ideological model that mediates the relationship between the monarch, the power centres, and space. This is an image of the sacred circle of lands magically imbued with monarchical power. The directions and zones of this space are hallowed by the presence of gods-protectors and ancestor spirits: ritual contact with the latter generates and sustains the ruler’s sacral might. Such a functional semantics of space was developing and becoming more complex in the real history of the states of Sumatra and Java.

The idea of an orderly and centred microcosm as a model of the state is related to the perception and adaptation of a sacral diagram of universal space—*maṇḍala* via Buddhism and Hinduism. From the ancient period, *maṇḍala* was known in Nusantara as an iconographic and architectonic pattern; it determined the symbolism and imagery of candi temples and cult ensembles in extremely varied versions. The conception of *maṇḍala* was then projected to various types of territorial and political units, from early Śrīvijaya to Majapahit. The Śrīvijaya version was linked with the archaic character of relations, when the main *maṇḍala* of the South Sumatran centre (*kadatuan*) in the person of the main *datu* (ruler) with the title of *aji* controlled the sum total of other *maṇḍalas* with their own *kadatuan* centres.¹⁴ The

¹⁴ H. Kulke, “‘Kadatuan Srivijaya’—Empire or Kraton of Srivijaya? A Reassessment of the Epigraphical Evidence”, in: *Bulletin d’École Française d’Extrême-Orient*, T. 80, No. 1 (1986), 166–176; see also: G. G. Bandilenko, “Tsentra vlasti i vlast’ tsentra (k problemam izucheniya monarkhicheskoi kontseptsii i stolichnykh obrazovaniy v rannikh gosudarstvakh Nusantary)” (The centre of power and the power of the centre [on the problems of the study of monarchical conception and capital city formations in the early states of Nusantara]), in *Goroda-giganty Nusantary i problemy ikh razvitiya (Malaisko-indonezijskie issledovaniya, IV)* (The giant states of Nusantara and the problems of their development [Malay-Indonesian studies, IV]) (Moscow: obshchestvo “Nusantara”, 1995), 27–30.

ritual magical “sovereignty” of the supreme *datu* was combined with naval supremacy and elements of trade monopoly along the pathways of international transit of rare commodities.

In the period of the Javanese expansion of Singhasāri and Majapahit, i.e., at the end of the thirteenth through the middle of the fourteenth century, the monarchical conception relied on the concept of an enormous “circle” of sacral power of the *mahārāja*, which included the “*maṇḍala* of the Javanese land” (*yavabhūmimaṇḍala*) as a centre, but also extended to external territories (*nuṣantara*). That was a structured space that depended on the role attributed to those lands in relation to Java, many of which had their own traditional statehood but geopolitically and conceptually formed part of the Nusantara quasi-empire. That “circle” comprised the administrative territories in eastern and central Java, in Madura, at times in Bali; the vassals and satellites in Sumatra and in part at the Malaccan Peninsula; the subdued territories in Kalimantan and in eastern Indonesia and the littoral settlements, economically dependent via foreign trade; part of the lands within Java’s sphere of interest north of the Kra Isthmus at the Indochina Peninsula, as well as “friends” beyond the limits of properly Austronesian ethnic regions. The space of Majapahit’s monarchical power was a kind of *supermaṇḍala*, underpinned by the idea of spiritual and political integration of various island territories, but the vectors of this “holy empire” extended even further.

In the part of our description dealing with the monarchical conception corresponding to the phenomenon of the space of power, the greatest attention is drawn exactly to the space-hierarchical model of power of the centre (the section termed “Spatial and cosmological aspects of the CMP”; see ④ at the diagram). This is not only a principle of the *maṇḍala*-type sacralized space, but it is also the principle of sacred numerology in the structural organization of space (sacral numbers in the lists of lands outside Java: 16, 28, 96, etc.—numbers divisible by four).

4. The fourth phenomenon of the monarchical conception at the level of “notions”—the space of religious worship, SRW (see right lower angle of the external square of the diagram)—is most intimately linked with the idea of the space of power.

The centres of religious worship form the basis of the SRW with the involvement of the remaining phenomena of the internal square, since they are conceptualized as an expression of common religious

ideas and the monarch's image as an object of cult. The main "dimension" of the CRW is vertical and axial, since in the mythological sense this space is the domain of action of specific deities and spirits. The section of description of the monarchical conception, designated at the diagram under the symbol ⑤, is related to this phenomenon *par excellence*. The section is entitled "Religious and cosmological aspects of the CMP. The ruler as the sacral principle of the world." There are two subsections in this description.

1) The monarch as the carrier of sacral energy. This constituent embraced the ancient ideas on the magical impact of the ruler (priest-chief) on nature, which dates from prehistoric times. It includes faith in a special strength bestowed from on high, which had developed under the influence of Śaiwa and Tantric elements (one of its designations being Śakti). The possession of that strength and its accumulation were a pledge of successful rule and, *sui generis*, a sign of legitimacy of the reign. However, this "strength of rule" was linked to the inheritance (acquisition) of sacred regalia, on the one hand, and the ritual contact with the spirits of dynastic ancestors, on the other.

2) The monarch as an object of deification. The data on temple construction, on iconography, and on titulature, and the granting of a set of titles, names and qualities (besides poetical metaphors and comparisons) to the monarchical status and the living members of the dynasty themselves—all of this indicates these events are linked (above all?) to the "preparation" for their posthumous apotheosis into the image of the deity. The corresponding attributes appended to the *prabhus* (members of the monarchical clan, not only to the reigning monarchs) are the attributes of such gods as the King of the Mountain, Śiva Mahādeva, Viṣṇu, Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, Jina-Buddha, Batara Guru and others. By joining with the abode of the deity, whose nature was symbolized by his power and personality in worldly deeds, the *prabhu* became an object of worship, this time as a god and as an ancestor spirit. Characteristically, one and the same ruler in Singhasāri and Majapahit might be honoured with a posthumous cult in the form of various deities in different temples. The polytheomorphism and syncretism of religious images in the Javanese monarchical conception were transposed to the cult of the deified ancestor monarch.

III. Besides the “objective” and “notional” levels of the conception of monarchical power, our diagram marks a third level in its phenomenology. These represent all kinds of actions (see crossings of diagonals tying the peaks of the external and the internal squares: symbols a^1 , a^2 , $a^{3(4)}$, $a^{4(3)}$). One may say that many deeds and actions are a dynamic apotheosis of power. The Old Malay epigraphy bears witness to the use of ritual magical devices and corresponding rituals for the territorial expansion of early Śrīvijaya simultaneously with the spatial spread of Buddhist sanctuaries. In the era of Singhasāri and Majapahit, a rich arsenal of ritual court policies existed. These included pilgrimages to temple centres, ceremonies of worship of dynastic ancestors (i.e., śrāddha), the implantation of dynastic iconography in external territories, ceremonial tours of major lands, and many other things. As a matter of principle, the monarchical conception could find reflection in the military, diplomatic, and economic actions of state-wide importance, while the economic undertakings were highly ritualized.

Depending on how prevalent particular tasks were, one may conventionally identify several varieties of these phenomena, calling all of them “actions.” These are religious actions (a^2), for instance, the consecration of water, exorcist rituals, temple festivals; religious cum political actions (a^4) with an emphasis on the political aspect, e.g., inauguration acts; political cum religious actions (a^3) with an emphasis on the religious aspect, e. g., rituals of dynastic ancestor worship; and sociopolitical actions (a^1). Needless to say, this initial typology is very approximate. The numerical symbols encoding the particular species of actions are presented as variants at the diagram (in parentheses). The place held by the signs that symbolize actions at the diagram is explained by the fact that centres, attributes, forms, and spaces of a definite variety function in actions of various types. That is why the different combinations of the phenomena of the internal and the external squares are linked with the typology of actions. However, this explanation requires careful elaboration and is not examined within the limits of the task set in this article. The third, dynamic level of the phenomenology of monarchical conception must become the subject of discussion of a separate article.

Thus we believe that it is only possible to approach an adequate perception of the religious and ideological conception of monarchical power through its phenomenology, since the image of supreme power is present to us through its manifestations in the changing

cultural and historical context. Such an approach presupposes a systematized analysis, because the monarchical conception is not picked out from the context arbitrarily but with the use of a certain descriptive pattern, the main sections of which are adapted to the study of objective, notional, and dynamic phenomena of the monarchical conception. And this, in our opinion, logically conditions a relatively full understanding of these exceptionally complex and manifold cultural phenomena.

ON THE ORIGINS OF CATHERINE II'S MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

Irina M. Smilyanskaya

There exists a tradition in Russian science to regard the subjects touched upon in this article as part of the Eastern Question. But Catherine II's policy in the Mediterranean was not limited to the problems of historical fate of the Ottoman Empire, Greek statehood, and the straits regime. The empress and her entourage also had distinct political, economic, cultural and historical interests in the Mediterranean region. There, Russia was also pursuing particular objectives differing from the solutions of the Eastern Question; in addition, Catherine's Mediterranean policy was evolving according to its own logic and was being implemented by particular personnel. All this affords ground for distinguishing, among others, a Mediterranean dimension in Russia's foreign policy in the second half of the eighteenth century, while nonetheless admitting its subordinate character in relation to the main tasks in the solution of the Eastern Question.

By the eighteenth century, the Mediterranean had long lost its significance as the centre of the civilized *oikoumenē* as it had been in antiquity and, in part, in the Middle Ages. Now that the bitter clashes over colonial domains shifted overseas as European political struggles began to focus primarily on Central Europe, the Mediterranean assumed the significance of a political periphery. Its role as a spatial barrier in the opposition between Christianity and Islam also diminished.

Nevertheless, the Mediterranean retained its significance as the central crossroads of communications between Europe, Asia, and Africa. It was an object of commercial interests of almost all the European states, with the Eastern Mediterranean, the Levant, playing an important role in the eastern trade of France and England. For the Christian world, the Mediterranean still remained a religious and cultural centre.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, processes were under way and conflicts were maturing in the Mediterranean that would

partly be resolved in the nineteenth century. These issues concerned the internal policy crisis of the Ottoman Empire, expressed in the emergence of national movements in Greece and the Balkans and in the appearance of ethno-regional separatism in the Arab-Ottoman world, with both phenomena paving the way for the break-up of the empire. That crisis had already captured the rapt attention of European powers who were essentially preparing themselves for colonial conquest in the region.

The political acumen of Catherine II suggested to her the importance of ensuring Russia's political presence in the Mediterranean in the newly formed context, and of creating premises for the development of Russian trade in that region. The dispatch of a Russian squadron to the Mediterranean in 1769, in the period of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774, was the first real step towards accomplishing that intention of Catherine II.

And no sooner had the squadron of Admiral G. A. Spiridov, heavily battered by the long passage, reached the Island of Minorca than the empress addressed a letter to A. G. Orlov, the political manager of that expedition, in which she pointed to the importance of “securing a port on an island or on firm ground . . . which,” she wrote, “we shall seek to retain under the peace agreement. By way of commerce [as we see, politically the empress was thinking in quite a pragmatic fashion—I. S.], it will always have communication with the nations we need in peacetime, and thereby our force will certainly not diminish in that land”.¹ Catherine II's wish to obtain one or two islands in the Archipelago under a peace treaty pointed to the same intentions—to get a firm foothold in the Mediterranean. At the same time, a broad scale of work performed by the expedition in mapping shores and littoral areas of nearly all the eastern and southern territories of the Mediterranean, probably made by instruction of Catherine II, testified to the wish to master navigation in the Mediterranean.² (That work resulted in the appearance

¹ *Materialy dlya istorii russkogo flota* (Materials for the history of the Russian navy), Part XI (St. Petersburg: tipografiya Morskogo ministerstva, 1886), 529.

² Catherine II's interest in the maps of the region and its cartography is attested by her correspondence with I. G. Chernyshev, I. G. and A. G. Orlovs. See *Russkii arkhiv* (The Russian archive) (1871), 1319 and 1329; “Bumagi imp. Yekateriny II, khranyashchiesya v gosudarstvennom arkhive MID” (Papers of Empress Catherine II kept in the Foreign Ministry State Archive), in: *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshch-*

of a remarkable specimen of hydrography and cartography—the *Atlas Arkhipelagskikh ostrovov* (Atlas of Archipelago Islands) kept in the Russian Military Historical Archive).³

By the end of 1760s the empress achieved a great deal in having Russia's influence on Europe's political affairs accepted. In the opinion of N. I. Panin, who directed Russia's foreign policy in the first two decades of Catherine II's rule, "the world saw in surprise that the court of this country has begun to play a role in general matters equal to that of great powers, while in the North this role has become the primary one".⁴ Russia's presence in the Mediterranean would provide Catherine II with new important instruments of political influence on European affairs. By the way, she had already begun using those instruments in the course of the first Russo-Turkish war: it is well-known that Catherine II, acting through the medium of I. G. Chernyshev and A. G. Orlov, made far from disinterested offers to the British officials⁵ to acquire one of the islands of the Archipelago, to say nothing of how unceremoniously the empress disposed of the territories of the Mediterranean in her "Greek project".⁶ Still, she acted in the spirit of international politics of that time: Britain, too, offered Russia the Island of Minorca in return for Russia's renunciation from armed neutrality.⁷

estva [SRIO] (A collection of the Russian Historical Society [MRHS]), Vol. X (St. Petersburg, 1872), 387; *Materialy dlya istorii* . . . , Part XII (St. Petersburg, 1888), 11.

³ The compilers of the atlas noted in the preface with pride that no nation had until then "dared to freely extend to that sea the hand of hydrographic art, in keeping with all its rules, as the Russian seafarers did." See Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv [RGVIA] (The Russian State Military Historical Archive [RSMHA]), f. 434, op. 1, d. 58, ll. 1–44.

⁴ See N. D. Chechulin, *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii v nachale tsarstvovaniya Yekateriny II. 1762–1774* (Russia's foreign policy in the early reign of Catherine II. 1762–1774) (St. Petersburg, 1896), 46.

⁵ S. M. Solovyev, "Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremen" (Russia's history since earliest times), in *Sochineniya* (Works), Book XIV (Moscow: Golos, 1994), 339, 513.

⁶ The "Greek project" drafted by A. A. Bezborodko and G. A. Potyomkin was reflected in the correspondence between Catherine II and Emperor Joseph II in the autumn of 1782. It envisaged the elimination of Turkish authority from European territories, the creation of the Greek state headed by a dynasty from the Russian reigning house and the partition of the remaining territories between Russia, Austria and the Venetian Republic.

⁷ *Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma. Rossiya vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v.* (Outline history of the USSR. The period of feudalism. Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century) (Moscow, 1956), 365. The doctrine of armed neutrality was proclaimed by Catherine II in the declaration of 28 February 1780; it set out the rights of

The appearance of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean definitely affirmed the status of a sea power for Russia. In subsequent years, Catherine and Paul I took care to ensure a constant presence of Russian naval and merchant vessels in the waters of the Mediterranean, while the Russian consuls were instructed to seek ways for Russia to acquire naval bases there.⁸

The Ministry of Commerce (*kommerz-kollegiya*), for its part, was exerting great efforts to develop Russia's direct trade with the countries of the region in question.⁹ However, progress in that field was not great. Russia's political interests in the Mediterranean prevailed over economic ones up to the end of the XIX century.

Italy was far from the last on the list of priorities of Catherine II's Mediterranean policy. The elite of Russian society was then keen on "antiques"; Russia's science, literature, and art were feeling the influence of antique traditions thanks to the acquaintance with models of the Italian classical heritage, while the culture of classicism that had emerged on its basis fostered the development of the imperial cult of the reigning house and the formation of civic sentiments in society, which were then in many ways associated with that cult.

Catherine II's policy in the Mediterranean did not become a sum of disparate and accidental steps; it followed a definite logic, which is clearly discernible as we study its evolution. Analysis in the present chapter is, however, focused on the empress's first undertakings that preceded the dispatch of the Archipelago expedition to the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean policy of Catherine II and her entourage was not born in a vacuum. The first foundations of that policy were laid by Peter I. It is common knowledge that Peter cherished the idea of creating a firm military and political alliance of Russia, Austria,

maritime shipping of neutral states in time of war, specified the concepts of military smuggling, blockade, and so forth. The principles of armed neutrality were recognized by a number of European states and the USA, but evoked British opposition.

⁸ See Memorandum by K. Tonus, a Russian consul-general in Alexandria, on the means of decreasing the expenses for the maintenance of Russia's standing squadrons in the Mediterranean. AVPRI, f. *Snoshenie Rossii s Turtsiei* (Russia's relations with Turkey), 89/8, yed. khr. 966, l. 1.

⁹ V. Ulyanitsky, *Dardanelly, Bosfor i Chernoye more v XVIII veke* (The Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the Black Sea in the eighteenth century) (Moscow, 1883), 93, 94ff.

the Venetian republic, and the Maltese Order against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ For that reason the tsar pursued primarily military and political objectives. In the Balkans, however, Peter I championed a religious and political idea. Along with that, Peter I exerted efforts to establish relations with Genoa and Piedmont. In addition, he dispatched the first Russian vessel, the *Armont*, to the Mediterranean for reconnaissance purposes.¹¹ All that seemed to testify that the tsar had a deeper interest toward the Mediterranean than that of creating an anti-Turkish coalition alone.

Continuing the policy of Peter I, his successors somewhat expanded contacts with the Balkan Slavs and Greeks, whose representatives not only joined the Russian service, but also resettled to Russia. However, they did not show any pronounced interest in Mediterranean affairs.

The accession of Catherine II to the throne coincided with a worsening of Russo-Turkish relations: the Porte protested against the building of the fortress of St. Dmitry at the Don River, it began to meddle in Russian policy in Poland, with France standing behind it.¹² It was apparent that a war with Turkey could not be avoided. Given the active character of the empress's policy and her great foreign policy plans and ambitions, Russia was facing an offensive war, designed to resolve the fundamental issues of Russo-Turkish relationships—to uphold the freedom of navigation of Russian ships along the Black Sea and to establish Russian ports and fortresses on the Black Sea shore.

The empress was not prone to underestimate the amount of danger posed to Russia by her adversary, whom she considered to be “the only state that can be frightful to us”.¹³ Therefore, to wage war successfully against the Ottoman Empire, amid hostile relations with France and markedly cool ones with Austria to boot, Russia had to secure friendly ties with the states of Northern Europe and

¹⁰ See, e.g., G. Berti, *Rossiya i italyanskije gosudarstva v period Risorgimento* (Russia and the Italian states during the Risorgimento period) (Moscow, 1959), 58, 59.

¹¹ N. D. Kallistov, “Arkipelazhskaya ekspeditsiya” (The Archipelago expedition), in: *Istoriya russkoi armii i flota* (A history of the Russian army and navy), Vol. 8 (Moscow, 1912), 53.

¹² See P. P. Cherkasov, “Frantsiya i rusko-turetskaya voina. 1768–1774 gg.” (France and the Russo-Turkish war. 1768–1774), in: *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, No. 1, (1996).

¹³ See S. M. Solovyev, “Istoriya Rossii . . .”, *Sochineniya*, Book XIV, 513.

neutralize hostile actions on the part of Sweden and Poland. This purpose was to be served by the so-called system of the Northern Alliance carefully elaborated by N. I. Panin.

Ensuring the country's security in the North, increasing its international weight, and also penetrating into the Mediterranean region in the future required from Russia the strengthening of its navy. The very first year of Catherine's reign saw the adoption of a decision to expand the naval forces, to invite naval officers and ship-builders from abroad, as well as to send probationers to do practical work in foreign navies.

In a few years the Russian navy had grown in numbers and enlisted excellent naval officers, among them the Scotsman S. K. Graig (in the Russian service since 1764), later famous as a hero of Chesma and a distinguished Russian naval commander. The selection of Russian officers for service abroad was rather strict.¹⁴ The greater part of the officers sent for probation in 1762 and 1763 later served with success in the Archipelago expedition, among them captains Yefim Lupandin, Ivan Borisov, and Mikhailo Kozhukhov, whose maritime detachment took the city of Beirut by storm (after besieging it jointly with some Arab rulers who had refused allegiance to the Porte).

During the first years, the probationers were sent to Britain, who readily responded to the appeal of the Russian Naval Ministry (*Admiralteiskaya kollegiya*) for help in rebuilding the navy. Britain did not perceive Russia as a rival on the main and, in addition, expected to use the Russian ground forces in a future war with France as allies and mercenaries.¹⁵ The king of Britain, like other crowned sovereigns of the European reigning dynasties, had not yet been "accustomed" to the thought that the Russian empress had made a decision—which she unswervingly followed—to pursue an indepen-

¹⁴ Among the first twelve seamen sent to Britain in 1762 was the midshipman Mikhailo Kozhukhov, a veteran of the Seven Years' War, who distinguished himself by outstanding courage—as an officer on duty it was he who prevented the landing at Kronstadt harbour of Peter III who had just been deposed from the throne. See V. Shigin, "Vsemi zabytyi kapitan Kozhukhov" (The all-forgotten Captain Kozhukhov), in: *Vek XVIII. Pod andreevskim flagom* (The eighteenth century. Under St. Andrew's flag) (Moscow, 1994).

¹⁵ An attempt to conclude a treaty with Russia on such hiring of soldiers took place in 1755, for example. See *Istoriya diplomatii* (The history of diplomacy), Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1959), 332.

dent foreign policy without permitting Russia to be used in alien interests. Still greater was Catherine II's indignation at the persistent British demand to include in the treaty of alliance a clause on Russia's obligation to send troops to North America in support of the British, although Britain itself did not agree to render assistance to Russia in the Mediterranean.

Characteristically, besides the British, Russia invited shipwrights and naval officers from Venice and the Maltese Order to join the Russian service. Since the middle of 1760s, six Russian officers had been on probation in the Maltese fleet. According to C. Ch. Rulhière, a French diplomat and publicist of the second half of the eighteenth century, their presence in Malta was officially explained by the need to improve their knowledge in shipbuilding and navigation for subsequent application of that knowledge in the Baltic. In fact, as Rulhière supposed—and apparently he was not mistaken about this—their presence there was for getting acquainted with the conditions of navigation in the Mediterranean.¹⁶ Some of these officers had managed to finish their probation period in Britain as well. The officers were recalled in the summer of 1768, when a secret preparation for the dispatch of the squadron got under way.¹⁷

The naval officers who had been sent for training to foreign navies were to collect data on sea lanes, the condition of harbors and cities they visited, and on their population.¹⁸ The knowledge obtained by the naval officer Matvei Kokovtsov in the course of service in the Maltese fleet and then in the Archipelago expedition facilitated the compilation of books describing the Archipelago and the “Barbary Shore” (the coastlines of Tunisia and Algeria).¹⁹ The Maltese practice

¹⁶ AVPRI, f. 6/6, *Snosheniya Rossii s Maltoi 1746–1801* (Russia's relations with Malta, 1746–1801), yed. khr. 5, ll. 1–3; Rulhière, “Histoire de l'anarchie de Pologne”, *Œuvres*, Vol. III (Paris, 1819), 292; P. Perminov, *Pod senyu vos'mikonechnogo kresta (Mal'tiiskii orden i ego svyazi s Rossiei)* (In the shadow of the eight-point cross [The Maltese Order and its links with Russia]) (Moscow, 1991), 76.

¹⁷ AVPRI, f. 2/6, *Vnutrennie kollezhskie dela* (Internal ministerial matters), d. 7177, ll. 64–66. T. Kozlyaninov (Kozleninov) had been on the list of those naval officers sent to Britain from Kronstadt on 12 December 1762. See *Materialy dlya istorii . . .*, Part XI (St. Petersburg, 1886), 11.

¹⁸ Those dispatched to Britain had been instructed to learn the English language and collect the above data. *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁹ *Opisanie Arkhipelaga i Varvariskogo berega, iz'yavlyashchee polozhenie ostrovov, gorodov, krepostei, pristanei, podvodnykh kamnei i mele, chislo zhitelei, veru, obryady i nrawy ikh s prisovokupleniem drevnei istorii i s tremya chertzhami* (A description of the Archipelago and

and the experience of service in the Archipelago expedition were utilized by the Russian seamen in carrying out missions in the Mediterranean after the war as well. T. G. Kozleninov, who attracted attention from the tsar's family, would in the 1770s command a small squadron serving in the waters of the Mediterranean, and would play a definite role in Russia's relations with the Moroccan sultan. In other words, in sending its officers for practice to the Maltese fleet, the Admiralty was looking far ahead in its plans.

The sending of the Russian officers for a mission to the Maltese fleet was preceded by reconnaissance of the situation in the Mediterranean that was undertaken by Catherine II. A frigate with a symbolic name—the *Nadezhda Blagopoluchiya* (Promise of Wellbeing)—specially designed for sailing to the Mediterranean (Rus. *Mediterrenskoye more*), was laid down at Russian wharves in 1763.²⁰ In the documents of the period and in literature it is known as the Vladimirov frigate (Rus. *Volodimirov fregat*), as it had been chartered for sailing to Italy by a company of Tula merchants headed by Ivan Vladimirov.²¹

The empress's ardent wish to send a frigate to the Mediterranean from Petersburg under the guise of a commercial undertaking emboldened the Tula merchants to ask for major concessions from the Treasury. They were asking to be provided "initially" with a frigate armed with cannons; at the same time the merchants were refusing to pay the expenses for the ship, and promising to pay only for the freight. Catherine gave an instruction that for the first year "the

the Barbary Shore, depicting the position of islands, towns, fortresses, quays, reefs and shallows, the number of the population, their beliefs, rites and folkways, with an addition of ancient history and three drawings) (St. Petersburg, 1786); *Dostovernnye izvestiya ob Al'zhire, o nrvakh i obychayakh tamoshnego naroda, o sostoyanii pravitel'stva i oblastnykh dokhodov; o polozenii Varvariiskikh beregov, o proizrastanii i prochem, s vemyim chertezhom* (True facts on Algeria, on the folkways and customs of the people there, on the state of the government and regional revenues; on the condition of the Barbary shores, on the crops, etc., with a true drawing) (St. Petersburg, 1787).

²⁰ *Materialy po istorii . . .*, Part XI, 117.

²¹ S. M. Solovyev, "Istoriya Rossii . . .", *Sochineniya*, Book XIII, 316; Ye. M. Druzhinina, *Kyuchuk-Kainardzhiskii mir* (The Peace of Kuchuk-Kainarji) (Moscow, 1955), 63. Rulhière and V. A. Plugin after him wrote about two ships and asserted that the commercial operation had been prepared by the empress and G. G. Orlov. See V. Plugin, *Alekhan, ili chelovek so shramom. Zhizneopisanie grafa Alexeya Orlova-Chesmenskogo. Dokumental'naya povest' s nekotoroj dolei vymysla* (Alekhan, or a man with a scar. A life of Count Alexei Orlov of Chesma. A documentary, if somewhat fictional narrative) (Moscow, 1996), 189. The document I am relying upon speaks of the participation of Teplov, not Orlov.

frigate shall be supported at our expense with all its crew and company".²²

The success of the whole undertaking was furthered by its diplomatic preparation: via the Russian Minister in Vienna, Prince D. M. Golitsyn, the Foreign Ministry got in touch with the governments of Italian states, requesting them to render assistance to the Tula merchants and their frigate. In reply, the Neapolitan minister in Vienna reported that his king would be willing to conclude a commercial treaty with Russia, while the Tuscan government expressed a desire to have a Russian consul in Leghorn.²³ However, the Foreign Ministry was not yet ready to take advantage of these proposals, in the same way it did not do so with the periodically expressed readiness of the Venetian Republic to return to the question of concluding the commercial treaty. Catherine II apparently decided to limit herself at this time to reconnaissance felicitously combined with commercial purposes and camouflaged by them.

If Catherine left the arrangements related to the voyage of the *Promise of Wellbeing* under her own supervision (by the way, the empress, just as G. N. Teplov, who acted as her trustee, had purchased some shares of the Tula merchants' company), it was G. G. Orlov who probed the political sentiments of the Orthodox populations of Morea and the Balkans during the same years. Of course, Count Grigorii Grigoryevich, according to S. M. Solovyev, did nothing without prior consultation with the sovereign; nonetheless, the plans for joining the efforts of Russia and the Orthodox population of the Balkans and Morea for struggle with the Turks had been worked out by the Orlov brothers in the 1760s in their own interpretation. (An opinion was expressed in the historical literature that during the first Russo-Turkish war the Orlovs even had ambitious plans to capture Constantinople, whereas the more sober empress, in a letter to Mrs. Boelke dated 4 October 1769, jokingly remarked that conquering Constantinople was just "a little easier than catching the moon with one's teeth").²⁴ The Orlovs' designs, if one is to

²² "Proshenie russkikh kuptsov o torgovle v Sredizemnom more s otmetkami Ekateriny II" (Russian merchants' petition to trade in the Mediterranean with remarks made by Catherine II), in: *Russkii arkhiv* (1870), 541-545.

²³ Ulyanitsky, *Dardanelly* . . . , 97.

²⁴ "Sobstvennoruchnoye pis'mo Ekateriny II k g-zhe Boelke o pobedakh nad

believe Rulhière, from their very inception drew resolute opposition on the part of N. I. Panin.

The year when the frigate *Nadezhda Blagopoluchiya* (Promise of Well-Being) was laid down for sailing to the Mediterranean, G. G. Orlov sent his two Greek emissaries to the Balkans and Greece—Georgi Papazoli (or Papazuli) and Manuil (Manolis) Saro. The first of them, an artillery poruchik (first lieutenant) in those years, was serving in the artillery regiment under G. Orlov's command. According to C. Ch. Rulhière, it was the Thessalian-born Papazoli (or, according to the data of the contemporary Romanian researcher A. Camariano-Cioran, a native of Macedon), who had suffered persecution in his homeland and had been forced to leave it, who suggested to Grigori Grigoryevich the idea of pooling the efforts of the Russian armed forces and the Greeks in the future war; the latter were allegedly just waiting for a chance to shake off Turkish oppression. Meanwhile, G. Papazoli was not alone in expressing this idea: the Russian residents in Constantinople had more than once reported to Petersburg on the readiness of the Porte's Orthodox subjects to support Russia in the war against the Ottoman Empire.²⁵

M. Saro, a man of an exotic occupation—he had been supplying wild beasts from Africa to Russia—settled in Petersburg, having accumulated a small capital by his trade (five thousand rubles), living off the interest and “enjoying complete tranquility and health”. According to him, he felt great attachment toward the faith of his compatriots. This enthusiasm, coupled with courage indispensable for his occupation, may have attracted the attention of the empress's favourite. As Saro wrote in his petition, “in 1763 I was summoned to His Highness, Prince Grigori Grigoryevich Orlov [G. Orlov was then still a count.—I. S.] who proposed to me to go secretly to Morea and other Greek localities in order to find out how the local inhabitants were disposed towards this court, and to prepare them for the future Turkish war beforehand”. Orlov's initiative was private, and he promised Saro a great reward only upon his return. M. Saro

turkami ot 4 oktyabrya 1769 goda” (Catherine II's letter from 4 October 1769, written by her own hand to Mrs Boelke on victories over the Turks), in: “Bumagi imp. Ekateriny II . . .”. See *SRIO*, Vol. X (St. Petersburg, 1872), 388.

²⁵ Rulhière, “Histoire de l'anarchie de Pologne”, in *Œuvres*, Vol. III, 290–293; A. Camariano-Cioran, “La guerre russo-turque de 1768–1774 et les grecs”, in *Revue des études sud-est européennes* (Bukarest, 1965), Vol. III, Nos. 3–4.

took his capital and embarked on his journey together with Poruchik G. Papazoli. Both suffered a lot of misfortunes along the way: Saro was captured by the corsairs of Tripoli, maimed and ransomed by a Greek acquaintance; G. Papazoli was taken prisoner by the pirates of the littoral Balkan town of Ulcin and was freed by the Austrian consul.

G. Papazoli dispatched to Morea two of his emissaries for secret meetings with Greek "elders" (kojabashi). At the Peloponnese M. Saro found himself together with Ivan Palatino, apparently an emissary of Papazoli. "I spent with him [Palatino] more than two years," wrote M. Saro, "travelling around various Greek islands and cities, proclaiming to the inhabitants all I had been instructed to by Prince Grigori Grigoryevich, dissuading them from obedience to the Ottoman Porte and teaching them to resort to the almighty protection of the Great Catherine, their defender and champion of their faith. Encouraging the depressed spirit with such and similar suggestions, I induced the elders of the leading families of that land to take a proper oath to Your Imperial Majesty, which they confirmed in a multitude of letters later addressed here to Prince Grigori Grigoryevich".²⁶

On his return to Petersburg, M. Saro submitted to G. G. Orlov a very cogent report in which the idea of sending a Russian squadron into the Mediterranean in support of a Greek uprising was expressed for the first time. He wrote that on his arrival in Morea the Greek elders, particularly active among whom was P. Benaki, called a great meeting at which they stated that they were ready to fight the Turks. Generally, Saro formed an impression that the Greek population of Morea did not obey the Turks and did not fear them, whereas the Greeks living amongst a number of Balkan peoples, whom Saro visited jointly with Papazoli, shared the intention of their Morea compatriots regarding the uprising. Thus the whole picture was painted in rosy colours and the report ended as follows: "From the bottom of my heart I dare advance a plea that ten Russian men-of-war be dispatched to the Mediterranean against the Turks and that a sufficient number of cannons be loaded on them: on seeing them the Greeks would rush to join hands with the Russians; the Greeks have their

²⁶ RGADA (The Russian State Archive for Ancient Acts), f. 10, *Kabinet Ekateriny II* (Catherine II's study), op. 1. yed. khr. 645, ll. 94–95.

own numerous ships but they have to be supplied with cannons; for the Greeks themselves are a brave and courageous people".²⁷ That report may have produced a great impression both on Catherine II and on the Orlovs; at least this refers to the ideas of sending ships (by accident, in G. A. Spiridov's first squadron there were precisely ten big ships) and the need to supply them with additional guns and weapons for the Greeks.

Despite the fact that Count G. G. Orlov regarded highly Saro's mission ("[he] accomplished the mission he was entrusted to perform in good faith"), N. I. Panin, as a sign of his disagreement with the Orlovs' designs refused to reward their emissary, although the latter "kept ceaselessly coming to him" for a long time. In other words, N. I. Panin nourished no illusions regarding the possibility of using Greeks, unorganized in a civic sense, as a military force; meanwhile, they were excited with hopes, unrealistic at the time, and fed by religious sentiment.

In 1765 N. I. Panin remained an opponent of the Orlovs' designs. Still, G. G. Orlov kept the ball rolling; in 1766 G. Papazoli set out for Morea, this time not to probe the Greek community spirit and call on them to revolt against the Porte, but to inform them of an allegedly speedy arrival of Russian ships with soldiers to the shores of Greece.

Other agents of Russia also visited Morea: a Venetian Greek, Ivan Petushin, who may have brought G. G. Orlov the letters mentioned by M. Saro; V. S. Tamara, a translator, and a Russian minister to Constantinople between 1798 and 1802: he met G. Papazoli on the way under the pretext of archeological explorations; and a certain Haji Murat, a Moldavian who had a good command of Turkish. G. Papazoli settled in Trieste where, keeping up a correspondence with G. Orlov, he organized a secret centre for recruiting participants in the future uprising. A version of the history exists according to which the idea to launch operations in Greece in concert with the Maynotes²⁸ belongs to him. The Russian activity in Greece caught

²⁷ S. M. Solovyev, "Istoriya Rossii . . .", *Sochineniya*, Book XIV, 272.

²⁸ A. Camariano-Cioran, "La guerre russo-turque . . .", 519, 520; "Pervaya mysl' o Moreiskoi ekspeditzii grafa A. G. Orlova, s predisloviem L. N. Maikova" (The "first idea" of Count A. G. Orlov's Morea expedition, with preface by L. N. Maikov), in *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov i dokumentov, otnosyashchikhysya k novoi russkoi istorii XVIII*

the eye of the Turkish authorities: as a preventive measure, they carried out a number of reprisals, having the metropolitan of Lacedaemonia executed and persons of consequence subjected to persecution. Immediately after the declaration of the war, arms were confiscated from the Greeks.

And still the measures undertaken by Russia in the Mediterranean between 1763 and 1766 were but feelers.

Meanwhile, foreign policy developments were taking a menacing turn. The Russian resident in Constantinople, Alexei Mikhailovich Obrezkov, following the admonitions of N. I. Panin, who believed that "it was not the time for a break with the Porte,"²⁹ had great difficulty fending off accusations against the Russian court by the Ottoman government that charged it with non-observance of the clause of the Russo-Turkish treaty on mutual non-interference in the Polish affairs. At great financial cost, Obrezkov still managed to neutralize the intrigues of the French ambassador aimed at causing a rupture in the Russo-Turkish relations and a declaration of war on Russia by Turkey. However, the Russian court already felt the looming military danger. This required purposeful actions from Catherine in her Mediterranean policy. It was these that the empress embarked upon after the end of 1767.

Properly speaking, we are dealing with three seemingly unrelated measures that were carried out by Catherine II and played an important role in the subsequent organization of the Archipelago expedition—on the enlistment to Russian service of Marquess P. Maruzzi, on the appointment of Count I. G. Chernyshev, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to London, and on the dispatch to Italy of counts Alexei and Fyodor Orlov, allegedly for treatment but in fact to find out the degree of Greeks' readiness for an uprising.

In 1767 the Russian court was staying in Moscow. There the empress was constantly surrounded by the Orlov brothers. Two more future participants in the diplomatic preparation of the Archipelago expedition were also staying in Moscow: Count I. G. Chernyshev, Catherine II's permanent assistant in naval matters, and the Venetian

i XIX vekov (A collection of historical materials and documents pertaining to modern Russian history (St. Petersburg, 1873), 140. The Maynotes (Maniates) were the mountaineers of the southern extremity of the Peloponnese.

²⁹ S. M. Solovyev, "Istoriya Rossii . . .", *Sochineniya*, Book XIV, 217.

aristocrat and banker, Marquess Pano Maruzzi, who originated from a family coming from Epirus. Catherine repeatedly amused herself by falconry with Ivan Chernyshev in the vicinity of Moscow. Someone, possibly G. G. Orlov, who pressed for conferring a decoration on the Marquess, introduced Marquess Maruzzi to the empress. The sovereign had one or several rather confidential conversations with him and managed to appraise his political dexterity and Mediterranean ties. She formed a favourable impression of him, as can be judged from the delicate assignments she entrusted to Maruzzi, and also from the right to address her directly in writing that was accorded to him.³⁰ Count N. I. Panin, the virtual head of the Foreign Ministry, was also well disposed towards the Marquess and initially attributed to him in Italy the honor held by the Swedish Baron Schemelman, “a man devoted to Russia”, as S. M. Solovyev described him, who rendered that country great services in Denmark.³¹

The wealthy Maruzzi family, of Greek descent, owned not only huge financial resources but also real estate (it is well known that Marquess Maruzzi petitioned for the return to him of his domains in Janina, confiscated by the Turks). The transfer to the Russian service and the acquisition of substantial Russian patronage were so attractive for Pano Maruzzi that he agreed to execute the assignments of the Russian court free of charge. Still, as it turns out, the marquess assumed the duty of crediting the Italian bills of the Archipelago expedition and therefore did not end up without material gain. In essence, the interest was mutual, and N. I. Panin explained his plea for awarding the marquess with the order of St. Anne even before he started to perform his duties in Italy by the importance of “inducing favour for the interests of our court of such a wealthy house as that of Maruzzi’s, and that in a land where he may with time be far from useless to us.”³²

Thus Maruzzi agreed to perform certain assignments and was awarded with the order of St. Anne in advance or for some advice in the field of Mediterranean policy. He was assigned a certain mission in the “land where he may with time be far from useless to

³⁰ AVPRI, f 41/3, *Snosheniya Rossiï s Venetsiei*, yed. khr. 13, 14, 35, et al.

³¹ *Ibid.*, yed. khr. 13, l. 1 ob.; S. M. Solovyev, “Istoriya Rossiï . . .”, *Sochineniya*, Book XIV, 246.

³² AVPRI, f 41/3, *Snosheniya Rossiï s Venetsiei*, yed. khr. 13, 1.

us", but so nobody at court or in the diplomatic corps could suspect or guess the substance of his mission, Marquess Maruzzi was obligated to make his decoration public beyond Russia's borders alone. As we see, the Mediterranean policy of Catherine the Great was from the very outset shrouded in mystery, for, as Catherine tutored A. Orlov, "a secret is the heart of all affairs".

N. I. Panin made a plea for the Marquess Maruzzi to be decorated with the order on 27 January 1768, whereas the official appointment of Maruzzi as a Russian chargé d'affaires in the Venetian Republic and "other commercial cities of Italy" came on 10 March, that is, a month and a half later. During that time Catherine may have ventured upon a breach of certain rules of exchange of diplomatic representatives in the name of her secret Mediterranean plans. This attests that the empress's preoccupation regarding the Mediterranean was working relentlessly.

The fact is that back in October 1766 D. M. Golitsyn reported that the Venetian ambassador to Vienna informed him that his government then did not renounce from sending its diplomatic representative in a ministerial rank to St. Petersburg and suggested "preliminary points," on the basis of which it was prepared to conclude a commercial treaty with the Russian Empire. In addition, the Venetian government wished for trade with Russia to be carried on not only through the Baltic but also through the Black Sea.³³

In August 1767 the empress noted with satisfaction that Venice finally made a step towards exchanging diplomatic representatives. But on 10 March 1768, without waiting for the agreement on the clauses of the treaty and on the terms of the arrival of the Venetian minister, she suddenly ordered Golitsyn to inform the Venetian ambassador in Vienna of her approval of the decisions of the Venetian government and of her wish to see the Venetian minister at her court. As a token of the "sincerity of her intention" (by a unilateral act, without waiting for the appointment of the Venetian minister, on which she earlier insisted), Catherine II designated Marquess Maruzzi as her chargé d'affaires in the Venetian Republic.³⁴ According to Catherine's designs, the matter apparently brooked no further delay. It was exactly at that time that the farce was played out

³³ Ibid., yed. khr. 14, ll. 14–14 ob.

³⁴ Ibid., yed. khr. 34, ll. 32–33.

concerning the resignation of Podpolkovnik (Lieutenant Colonel) Aleksei Grigoryevich Orlov, a second-ranking officer in the Preobrazhensky regiment, for the sake of a journey to Italy “for treatment”, and it was necessary to organize diplomatic and financial support for A. G. Orlov’s secret mission in Italy.

The scope of Maruzzi’s hidden duties that were not formally designated were not limited to the instruction to render services to A. G. Orlov;³⁵ judging by the content of his reports, he was to inform the Russian court on the state of affairs in Montenegro where an impostor under the name of Peter III was found, and on the progress of revolt against France on the island of Corsica. Marquess Maruzzi was charged with establishing secret contact with the rebel leader Pasqual (Pascal) Paoli, informing him of the empress’s support for the Corsican people fighting for its freedom, which was to serve as a pretext for secret talks on the use of the ports of Corsica by Russian ships.

However, the official instruction issued by the Foreign Ministry to the chargé d’affaires in the Venetian Republic obliged him to press for the sending of the Venetian minister to St. Petersburg to discuss and conclude the commercial treaty, for which purpose he was to “enlist the support of senators” and other officials. He was to take care of his accreditation in other commercial cities of Italy as well. The penultimate point of the instruction given to Maruzzi was formulated as follows: if people of Greek confession express the wish to resettle to Russia, “in that case you have the permission to encourage them with the highest mercy and protection of HIM [Her Imperial Majesty] and, after receiving information about their fortune and trade, you are to make a detailed report [to the Ministry] without promising them anything more for your part, but expecting a resolution from here”.³⁶

Despite the concern of the Russian court, Marquess Maruzzi was well received in Venice. However, the Russo-Turkish war that started soon after his arrival in Italy “prevented” him from “being more useful to the service to HIM,” as the Venetian government refrained from taking any step capable of arousing suspicion on the part of

³⁵ Ibid., yed. khr. 35, l. 12, ob.

³⁶ Ibid., yed. khr. 14, l. 20.

the Ottoman Porte;³⁷ and all negotiations on sending the Venetian minister to Petersburg were stopped. Nevertheless, the chargé d'affaires continued to stay in Venice and serve the Russian court in the Mediterranean policy with great success.

Count Ivan Grigoryevich Chernyshev, who also contributed to the Mediterranean policy of Catherine II, was close to the empress. The notes of S. A. Poroshin, the tutor of the future Tsar Pavel Petrovich, testified that Ivan Grigoryevich constantly circulated between the "larger" and "smaller" courts.³⁸ He enjoyed the affection of the young heir, whom he instructed in naval matters, for Chernyshev was a member of the Naval Ministry and a chief of galley squadrons and the port. He also enjoyed great trust on the part of Catherine II. It was he, I. G. Chernyshev, whom Catherine II appointed as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to London in the critical period of the Russo-Turkish relations, while transferring Count A. Musin-Pushkin, the Russian minister plenipotentiary, from Britain to the Netherlands.

S. M. Solovyev's viewpoint that the corresponding diplomatic transfers were made in Petersburg in response to Britain's decision to appoint an ambassador to Russia instead of a minister of a second class, as had hitherto been the case, so as to speed up the Anglo-Russian talks on a treaty on alliance, has not been challenged in the literature. Besides, the transfer of Musin-Pushkin to the Hague, according to S. M. Solovyev, was viewed favorably by N. I. Panin, since Musin-Pushkin was considered an incompetent diplomat in Petersburg.³⁹ Indeed, instead of the British minister Lord MacCartney (recalled by the British king in April 1768), it was Lord Catcart who was expected in Petersburg in July but who arrived a month later, whereas the "letter of credence on the Ambassador Count Chernyshev" directed to London "for greater promotion of good concord and close friendship" was dated 24 July.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ibid., yed. khr. 34, l. 54.

³⁸ *Semena Poroshina Zapiski, sluzhashchie k istorii Ego Imperatorskogo Vysochestva . . . Pavla Petrovicha, naslednika prestolu rossiiskogo* (Notes by Semyon Poroshin dealing with the history of His Imperial Highness . . . Pavel Petrovich, the heir to the Russian throne) (St. Petersburg, 1844).

³⁹ S. M. Solovyev, "Istoriya Rossii . . .", *Sochineniya*, Book XIV, 247.

⁴⁰ AVPRI, f. 2/6, *Vnutrennie kollezhskie dela*, yed. khr. 7232, Nos. 36, 58, 66.

However, S. M. Solovyev overlooked another document issued from the Foreign Ministry half a year earlier. It was an imperial edict fixing the salary, travel expenses, etc., of General-Poruchik [Lieutenant-General] Count Ivan Chernyshev, who was being sent to the British court as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in view of "our particularly important business with the London court today".⁴¹ The edict was dated 10 January 1768, that is to say, two weeks earlier than the day on which N. I. Panin requested that an order be awarded to Marquess Maruzzi, who hastened to Venice allegedly on his own business. All this attests to the fact that the political situation formed as a result of the Turkish threat by the beginning of 1768 compelled Catherine to speed up the preparation of her Mediterranean action; under these conditions, securing Britain's benign attitude towards that action became a "particularly important" matter; this was the apparent reason for the willingness to send Chernyshev to Britain (although the appointment itself must have been made even earlier). Meanwhile, the political situation became temporarily defused, Maruzzi's departure to Italy was postponed until summer, and a possibility arose to link Chernyshev's appointment with changes in the diplomatic representation of the court of Great Britain and thereby eliminate the excessive curiosity and concern of the European reigning courts and the diplomatic corps in Petersburg.

I. G. Chernyshev arrived in London just before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war. Besides his secret mission, he was entrusted with a number of other assignments. In particular, he brought with him Catherine II's consent to exclude the item on British assistance to Russia in the war with Turkey from the treaty under discussion, possibly in return for Britain's support for the Archipelago expedition. There was still lack of agreement on the clause in a treaty between Britain and Sweden whereby Britain would pay Sweden a subsidy, a treaty designed to weaken the French influence in that country and preclude the possibility of its campaign against Russia. However, the British government responded negatively, arguing its refusal by saying that "Britain found it extremely difficult to betray its principle—not to pay subsidies in peacetime".⁴² As a result, the

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, yed. khr. 7175, l. 228.

⁴² S. M. Solovyev, "Istoriya Rossii . . .", *Sochineniya*, Book XIV, 250

talks on the conclusion of the treaty of alliance were suspended, albeit this did not spoil relations with the British court; the talks were resumed only in the autumn of 1770, and it was the “incompetent” Count A. Musin-Pushkin who pursued them in London.⁴³

The fact is that the year after the appointment of Count Ivan Grigoryevich as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to London he received a promotion in his career, being appointed Vice-President of the Naval Ministry. On 19 August 1769, the empress sent an instruction to London, recalling Count Ivan Chernyshev from Britain at his request “due to impaired health from the alien climate of that country” and in view of the need in his presence in Russia “particularly in our present circumstances”.⁴⁴ However, Ivan Grigoryevich stayed in London at least for another year until the third squadron of the Archipelago expedition commanded by Rear Admiral Arf safely reached the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the diplomatic functions were assumed by Count Musin-Pushkin, who had returned from the Hague. From Catherine’s letter it becomes clear that Chernyshev’s presence along the shores of Albion was necessary to speed up the passage of the Arf squadron: “I am surprised,” wrote the empress to Chernyshev to London on 18 May 1770, “that Mr. Arf is moving too slowly; perhaps you and I will make him spry; we are accustomed to handle and wake up sleepy youths.”⁴⁵ By “sleepy youths” Catherine probably meant the commanders of the two first squadrons, G. A. Spiridov and J. Elfinston.

Indeed, I. G. Chernyshev’s main concern in Britain was the diplomatic and material provision of the Archipelago expedition. He laid the ground for a benign attitude within the British court and government towards that Mediterranean undertaking of Catherine II. The British government closed its eyes to the enlistment of volunteer officers for the Russian fleet in their country (I. Yu. Rodzinskaya reports that during the Russo-Turkish war up to 35 British officers were serving in the Russian navy;⁴⁶ the British government replied

⁴³ I. Yu. Rodzinskaya, “Angliya i russko-turetskaya voina: 1768–1774” (England and the Russo-Turkish war: 1768–1774), in *Trudy MGIAI* (Proceedings of the Moscow State Historical Archive Institute), Vol. 23 (Moscow, 1967).

⁴⁴ AVPRI, f. 2/6, *Vnutrennie kollezhskie dela*, yed. khr. 7233, No. 58, l. 14.

⁴⁵ “Pis’mo imp. Yekateriny II k grafu Ivanu Grigoryevichu Chernyshevu (1764–1773)” (Catherine II’s letters to Count Ivan Grigoryevich Chernyshev (1764–1773), in: *Russkii arkhiv* (1871), 1336–1337.

⁴⁶ Rodzinskaya, “Angliya i russko-turetskaya voina . . .”, 180.

to the protests of the Turkish reis-effendi—Foreign Minister—that young people always liked to fight and there was no power to keep them from doing so).⁴⁷ As a neutral power, Britain refused to supply the Russian navy with arms from its arsenals, but it did not impose a ban on their purchase through the medium of the British merchants, just as it did not ban the purchase of British transport vessels by Russia, and so forth. Not only did the British government allow the Russian fleet to call at its ports and make the necessary purchases and repairs there but it also put pressure on France when the latter posed the question of not allowing the Russian fleet into the Mediterranean, and gave a promise to protect the interest of Russian ships from encroachment by France and Spain. It also prohibited the sending of French ships into the Baltic Sea, thereby preventing Sweden from entering the war against Russia.⁴⁸

Ye. V. Tarle had good reason to write that Britain's position was secured by the "Russian diplomacy without the slightest sacrifices, concessions, or promises in favour of the British. Catherine merely made the right assessment of the whole alignment of forces on the diplomatic chessboard and drew the proper conclusions. The British could not allow a victory for two Bourbon courts in the Mediterranean, because after the destruction of the Russian squadrons the extensive trade in the Levant on that sea would come under the firm control of France, Spain and the Turks, France's allies".⁴⁹ Ye. V. Tarle, however, forgot to mention that it was I. G. Chernyshev who was making the moves on the diplomatic chessboard on orders of the empress, and that it was for that purpose that he had been sent to London on the eve of the war, as the historian was convinced that the idea of sending the fleet to the Mediterranean was suggested by one of the Orlov brothers after the outbreak of the war. And therefore the Chernyshev mission could not possibly be decided upon long before the war started.

It was not until 31 August, when G. A. Spiridov's squadron took to the North Sea, that Chernyshev made an official representation

⁴⁷ AVPRI, f. 89/8, *Snosheniya Rossii s Turtsiei*, yed. khr. 1893.

⁴⁸ See more detailed treatment in the above articles by I. Yu. Rodzinskaya and P. P. Cherkasov.

⁴⁹ Ye. V. Tarle, "Chesmenskii boi i pervaya russkaya ekspeditsiya v Arkhipelag (1769–1774)" (The Chesma battle and the first Russian expedition to the Archipelago (1769–1774), in *Sochineniya*, Vol. X (Moscow, 1959), 89–90.

to the head of Britain's northern department Lord Rochefort. A favourable answer came the same day; the lords of the Admiralty were instructed to assist the Russian ships by supplying them with masts, gear, and pilots; instructions were forwarded to Gibraltar and Port Mahon on helping the fleet with necessary materials.⁵⁰ This kind of British promptitude can only be explained by a solid preliminary understanding.

Judging by a document stored in the Archive for the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) in the fund *Russia's relations with Turkey*, such an understanding was reached at the end of 1768 and the beginning of 1769, and this is natural: Catherine II would hardly risk undertaking such a dangerous and costly operation without a prior sounding of Britain's attitude to it. We are dealing with the Abstract of Rescript Issued to Instruct Admiral Spiridov on his Departure which is the preliminary variant of an instruction handed to the admiral in July 1769. However, the texts of the rescript and the instruction are in many ways fundamentally different; the reason for these differences may easily be explained if we turn attention to the date of the rescript, 19 January 1769. It is known that in the first months of 1769 the fleet's preparation for the departure, which may have initially been scheduled for April, had already been proceeding full speed. In February Ivan Hannibal, the brother of Osip Abramovich Hannibal (A. S. Pushkin's grandfather) was posted to naval ordnance; on 20 March came the official appointment of G. A. Spiridov as squadron commander. The ships were supplied with food for a campaign of many months; their route was kept strictly confidential, and the administrative documentation was also being worked out.⁵¹ A document from 19 January 1769 refers to the same period. The following passage from it is of interest for us: "While preparing our expedition to the Mediterranean, we frankly informed the British king through our ambassador about it and received assurance that our men-of-war would be accepted in the harbours of his domains as friendly vessels and as such would be supplied with any assistance required by circumstances".⁵²

⁵⁰ Rodzinskaya, "Angliya i russko-turetskaya voyna . . .", 170.

⁵¹ *Materialy dlya istorii russkogo flota*, Part XI, 360–361.

⁵² AVPRI, f. 89/8, *Snoshenie Rossii s Turtsiei*, yed. khr. 1878, l. 29.

It only remains to appreciate the uncommon talent of a conspirator natural to a person such as the empress: in her letters to Chernyshev she did not breathe a word about the mission entrusted to him. The hints they contained, one should believe, apparently had a special mission—to keep Ivan Grigoryevich in touch of events as they unfolded. Without doubt, the empress knew that Chernyshev would understand why she had come to need the maps of the Mediterranean and the island of Corsica and which sense her following remark had: “Today I pray each morning: God save the Corsican and do not let him fall into the hands of the unholy Frenchmen”.⁵³ Indeed, Catherine was expecting to obtain the consent of the Corsican General Paoli for the use of Corsican harbours by the Russian fleet in return for special services! It remains to be added that counts I. G. Chernyshev, A. G. Orlov, Admiral G. A. Spiridov, and Marquess Maruzzi as persons directly responsible for the fate of the Archipelago expedition shared a common secret code in their correspondence during the war.⁵⁴

Back in the beginning of 1768, Catherine II, jointly with Count Alexei Orlov, one of the initiators of the Archipelago expedition, worked out a secret scenario for the dispatch of Alexei Grigoryevich to Italy in the guise of treatment, so as to conceal the genuine purpose of the visit. To this day, the greater part of historians, like S. M. Solovyev, believe in Orlov’s illness, as that contention has a documentary basis: in the fifth fund of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts there is a letter—a petition from Alexei Grigoryevich Orlov, dated March 1768, whose broken-hearted tone does not seemingly allow one to doubt its sincerity. Alexei Orlov writes: “The all-merciful sovereign! With an extreme regret and a broken heart I find myself compelled to petition Your Imperial Majesty to relieve me of military and civil service; the reason for this, as Your Imperial Majesty knows yourself, is the severity of my longstanding illness, which has reduced me to a state of incapacity for the continuation of my humble service to Your Imperial Majesty”.⁵⁵

Whether Alexei Grigoryevich was sick or not is difficult to say, but the duration of his illness may be disputed, for on 28 December

⁵³ “Pis'ma imp. Ekateriny II k grafu Ivanu Grigoryevichu Chernyshevu”, in *Russkii arkhiv* (1871), 1318.

⁵⁴ *Materialy dlya istorii russkogo flota*, Part XI, 375.

⁵⁵ RGADA, f. 5, op. Gosarkhiv, yed. khr. 84, l. 17.

1767 he gave a ball in Moscow in honour of the empress, at which Catherine II made merry until two a. m. But three months later came Orlov's petition for resignation on account of illness, of which the empress "knew" so well. Could this scenario have been conceived while still in Moscow? The empress responded to Orlov's request with the following words: "Count Alexei Grigoryevich! At your insistent request I hereby relieve you of each service until your illness is cured, allowing you to live inside and outside the country where you think fit, which no one should or may prevent you from doing upon showing this letter; as far as your service is concerned, your zeal, loyalty and love towards us and the fatherland are well known not only to us but to the whole nation. A passport for exit from Russia is hereby enclosed so that you will have no constant need of showing this letter". After that, an order was sent to Preobrazhensky regiment to dismiss Orlov from its ranks "with salary for the duration known to us".⁵⁶

Thus in spring 1768 Catherine hastened to consign the main participants in the Mediterranean operation to the places of their destination. A. G. Orlov received his passport with the assurance that the empress had not forgotten Alexei Grigoryevich's services rendered to her and the fatherland. However, he did not leave for treatment but, just as I. G. Chernyshev and Marquess Maruzzi, he stayed back in Petersburg until summer. In summer in Peterhof he argued for the expediency of taking advantage of the Greek uprising in the forthcoming Mediterranean operation with N. I. Panin. Incidentally, at the same time, according to the March edict of the empress, Russian men-of-war were to proceed from Archangel to the Baltic ports—two battleships, a frigate and two pinks,⁵⁷ in other words, a whole small squadron: a concentration of the fleet at the point of squadron's departure must have been made in advance. That summer the Russian officers who had been undergoing training in Malta were recalled to Russia.

That very summer of 1768, all three executors of the empress's secret mission left Russia. On 21 June, Vice-Chancellor A. M. Golitsyn issued a special circular sent out to Russia's representatives at foreign courts, which, one should think, leaves no doubt that the version

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, l. 8.

⁵⁷ AVPRI, f. 2/6, *Vnutrennie kollezhskie dela*, d. 7232, l. 71.

concerning A. Orlov's illness was designed to conceal the secret character of his genuine mission. The circular claimed, in particular, that Count A. G. Orlov "was embarking on a journey to foreign lands, to mineral waters, to restore his health and by medical advice", and that he was accompanied by his brother Fyodor Grigoryevich; this was followed by rather strange explanations: "In order not to give rise to useless speculation as to their journey, they are setting forth thereon under the name of Messrs Ostrovovs. Mr Lieutenant Colonel Hersdorf and horse-guardsman Mr. Buchgolz are in their retinue." The Russian diplomatic missions were proposed to inform [Petersburg] of the route taken by their Excellencies, "so as to know constantly where to send letters to them, which may follow."⁵⁸ The assumed names, the military retinue (in a few months Hersdorf would find himself in Montenegro performing special duties), the constant postal communication with Petersburg, and besides (as reported by V. A. Plugin on the basis of his acquaintance with the Almanac of the Privileged Shooters' Society in Karlsbad)—the purchase of a consignment of small arms⁵⁹—all that proves incontrovertibly that A. G. Orlov, having been dismissed from every service, was performing a secret state assignment.

Thus by the very beginning of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774, Catherine managed to place on the political scene the *dramatis personae* of the military and political play conceived by her, pursuing a strategic object of affirming Russia's political presence in the Mediterranean and spreading its political influence upon the Orthodox population of the Balkans and Greece.

⁵⁸ A. M. Golitsyn, "Tsirkulyar vitse-kantslera Golitsyna k nashim predstavityeliam pri inostrannykh dvorakh. Peterhof 21 June 1768" (A circular letter from Vice-Chancellor Golitsyn to our envoys at foreign courts. Peterhof, 21 June 1768), in *Russkii arkhiv* (1876), Nos. 7, 270.

⁵⁹ Plugin, *Alekhon* . . . , 175. V. A. Plugin belongs to that group of historians who believed that A. G. Orlov's illness was of a "partly political character."

PART THREE

ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY

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THE CHINESE MIGRATION TO SIBERIA AND THE BEGINNING OF THE FORMATION OF A NEW DIASPORA

Vladimir I. Dyatlov

The last decade of the twentieth century saw mass migration to Russia of citizens of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Thus started the process of the formation of a new Chinese diaspora. This is a novel element in the contemporary ethnocultural and socio-economic structure of Russian society, since the old, pre-revolutionary diaspora had almost completely disappeared under the Soviet regime. After many years' of absence of the Chinese, there began to appear a surge of the *chelnoki* (literally: "shuttles", small-time retail traders whose numbers oscillate in pendular fashion with the vagaries of the market), of guest workers (contracted agricultural and construction workers), and of students to the the Far East, to Siberia, and from there to the country's western areas. Within a space of a few years, they have managed to create a ramified and effectively functioning infrastructure of retail markets, joint ventures, hotels and hostels, travel agencies, and a network of intermediaries and advisers.

The "pendular migrants" pave the way for long-term settlement and the creation of permanent communities. Thousands of Chinese set up permanent businesses in Russia, receive education here, marry, and achieve the status of a permanent resident. It is a classical labour migration, and its pioneers have already managed to achieve their main task: they have taken root in Russia, finding their own niche in its economy and attaining opportunities inaccessible in their native land. It may be safely predicted that this is a long-term, if not permanent, phenomenon. An event unique for our time is in progress—under our eyes and with our participation, a diaspora is taking place. This presents an opportunity to study not the consummated phenomenon but the process of its formation.

Forecasts have already appeared predicting that by the middle of the twenty-first century Russia will be home to several millions and even tens of millions of Chinese, and that they will become the

country's largest national minority.¹ It is certainly possible to view such forecasts skeptically, but their emergence suggests that such forecasts are taken seriously by many.

Whereas the author of one of those predictions the historian Yu. Kobishchanov, regards the prospect he outlined rather positively than otherwise, and while G. Vitkovskaya and Zh. Zayonchkovskaya approach that prospect neutrally, as a fact, one may confidently assume that they hardly express the commonly held view, rather the other way around. The massive and swift penetration of the Chinese has caused a guarded or even openly hostile attitude on the part of the host society. Paradoxically, this attitude was not formed when relations between the USSR and the PRC were hostile but at a time of the officially proclaimed Russian policy of strategic partnership with China in the twenty-first century. Ill feeling grows with direct intercourse, as the number of migrants and the degree of their "rootedness" into the socioeconomic fabric of the host society grow. We observe a spontaneous revival of the "Yellow Peril" thesis common at the turn of the twentieth century.

The massive spread of a guardedly fearful and even hostile attitude to the Chinese migrants, and this in most strata of Russian society, testifies that the formation of the new element of ethnocultural and socioeconomic structure of Russia's society is accompanied by a profusion of problems, conflicts, and antagonisms. These problems may suggest that the Chinese migration and the attitudes to it have become a challenge to the country's national security. A challenge is not yet a threat. It is a problem forcing one to make decisions. Shrinking away from making a decision is one of the variants of meeting the challenge. To make meaningful decisions it is necessary first of all to understand the essence of the challenge, its content, and the spectrum of questions which require an answer.

The process of Chinese penetration into Russia and the existence of a new Chinese diaspora has already some history behind it. Certain tendencies and stages have become visible, and a historiographical

¹ G. Vitkovskaya and Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, "Novaya stolypinskaya politika na Dal'nem Vostoke Rossii: nadezhdy i realii" (The new Stolypin policy in Russia's Far East: hopes and realities) in *Perspektivy Dal'nevostochnogo regiona: mezhsranovye vzaimodeistviya* (Outlook for the Far Eastern region: cross-country interactions) (Moscow: Gendalf, 1999), 87; *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Moscow), 02.07.1996.

tradition, even if not a very rich one, has appeared. This tradition obliges one to study the problem in a differentiated light, distinguishing separate plots, themes, and problems in it—interconnected, intertwined but still autonomous.

Some avenues of research have been clearly discerned: the migration situation proper (the dynamics of number, structure and territorial distribution of migrants, the legal and illegal migration, the relationship between occasional visitors, periodic migrants, and those who intend to settle permanently), the legal regulation of migratory flows and its efficiency, the migrants' economic specialization and their role in the socioeconomic structure of the host society, their contribution to the criminal situation, their relationships with the host society and the authorities, and the geopolitical context of the problem.

Thus, it is necessary to take into account that we are involved with a dynamic, swiftly developing process that is affected in a very complex way both by powerful long-term factors as well as by changing factors generated by the sweeping, sometimes catastrophic developments in Russia and in China. Therefore, the problem can only be studied in a dynamic form—certainly if we want to acquire an adequate understanding of it.

Already now—just a few years after the start of the process—one may see that along with general traits, this diaspora has a significant regional specificity, that its scope, forms, and prospects look differently from Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, or Irkutsk, from the Foreign Ministry and from the Interior Ministry (MVD), from a bank office and from a kiosk of a small-time salesman, and even from next-door studies of regional and municipal administrations. Therefore, it is necessary to study the phenomenon of Chinese penetration both on the macrolevel, on the scale of the entire country, and in separate regions.

It is extremely important to assess the situation in the provinces. The regions that became the subjects of the Federation are compelled and themselves aspire to make decisions on highly complicated and delicate problems, on the basis of their experience. The development of a realistic and effective migration policy is impossible without taking into account this experience, without understanding that the regions and their elites have their own interests and the willingness to assert them.

An analysis of the situation in Irkutsk yields an exceptional amount of information for the understanding of the problem. On the one hand, it is a most typical Russian province. On the other—in the context of the subject under discussion—it is highly individual. It is a city of 600,000, and the former administrative, cultural and economic centre of entire Eastern Siberia. It has managed to preserve many elements of tradition. The Irkutsk region is now the last area of continuous industrial development in the east of Russia. It enjoys a powerful industrial and scientific potential, a well-developed system of vocational training and higher education, an advanced infrastructure, large mineral deposits, and energy resources. All this makes the region attractive for economic migrants, all the more so as the region always suffered from a deficiency of manpower. It is a crossroads of almost all ground and air communications between the east, west and north of Russia. The level of economic and infrastructural integration with the rest of Russia is here perceptibly higher than in areas east of Lake Baikal, which remain an advanced post, a “frontier”, a place of primary development, whose links with the country are mostly conditioned by power-related and sociocultural factors.

Here we find a rather peculiar ethnic situation. On the one hand, Irkutsk is a monoethnic city, with more than 90 percent of its population being Russian. On the other, this is a centre of a settler area which members of diverse nationalities, races and cultures had long since been making their home. This is a region of long-standing and close contact between the settler population and the indigenous, Buryat one. Therefore, the people of Irkutsk have had a long history of experience with coexistence. In this sense they are better prepared to appreciate ethnic variety than the provincial inhabitants of European Russia.

It is only natural that the Irkutsk region has become a centre of gravity or a transit route for several flows of external migration. First of all, there were people originating from the former Soviet republics, who now find themselves citizens but also nearly the equivalent of immigrants from abroad—Moldavians, Ukrainians, inhabitants of Central Asia and the Caucasus. It is not hard to predict that this flow will continue to exist and to grow. Less numerous but stable migrant groups and flows from Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam have also formed.

The rapidly growing flow of PRC citizens has become a factor that considerably alters the migration situation. And although the

Irkutsk region does not border on China, old-time historic ties, economic opportunities, and the state of communications are making it an important point of transit, temporary residence, and settlement for the Chinese. Here again, it is possible to predict a continuing, and possibly an increasing flow, which may take on catastrophically great dimensions in case of any upheavals in China.

Even now many characteristics of the Chinese migration, along with its role in the life of the region, and the problems that underlie the wariness and fears among a significant part of the host society, have become clearly apparent. The problems and fears can be encapsulated by the negative emotions expressed by such words and phrases as “strangers,” “hucksters,” and “tools of Chinese expansion.”

The formation of the Chinese presence in Irkutsk did not begin without a precedent. Insignificant and nearly imperceptible remnants of the old diaspora have remained in place: according to the 1989 census, the region was then home to 489 ethnic Chinese, with 185 in Irkutsk itself. From that year on, PRC citizens began to add to those numbers *en masse*. The question of their quantitative dynamics is complex and unclear. The inflow turned out to be so powerful that the Soviet-era system of all-embracing state control over every person, foreigners in particular, became paralysed. One of the chiefs of the regional FSB, after nostalgically recollecting the former system, noted with concern: “Now foreigners are out of eyeshot of state bodies.”²

The authorities proved unable to cope not only with the regulation, but also with the calculation of the migration flow, a fact which reflected the all-Russian situation. People well-informed *ex officio* frankly stated as much. According to the former Head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), T. Regent, “No state body keeps exact records of illegal immigrants.” The former Director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), S. Stepashin, declared in 1994: “We can only approximately guess how many people we have and who they are.”³

A senior official of the Irkutsk regional administration admitted in the beginning of the 1990s: “Thousands of foreign citizens reside in

² *Sovetskaya molodyozh* (Irkutsk), 11.02.1997.

³ T. Regent, “Migratsiya v Rossii: real’nost’ i politika” (Migration in Russia: reality and politics) in *Migratsionnaya situatsiya v Rossii: sotsial’no-politicheskiye aspekty* (Migration situation in Russia: sociopolitical aspects) (Moscow, 1994), 8; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26.05.1994.

the Irkutsk region without paying any taxes. And no official service has any information even on their number.” Having carried out a mass check of places of residence and economic activity of foreigners, MVD bodies revealed hundreds of infringements. They uncovered “. . . the possibility of checking into hostels and hotels with delayed visas, without documents and living [there] illegally for a long time.” The head of the Migration Service of the region told the author in an interview (1997) that the situation has not radically changed. And in December 1998, Deputy Mayor of Irkutsk Ye. Voitsekhovich, speaking before the deputies of the Municipal Duma, declared: “Nobody will say exactly how many foreigners, citizens of China in particular, now live in Irkutsk.”⁴ The quantitative parameters of the migration flow were as unclear at the turn from the 1980s to the 1990s, as they are now.

The problem of the number of Chinese migrants to Russia was one of most frequently discussed issues in the last decade. Both the real challenge of the problem—a disorderly situation when thousands of foreign citizens are uncontrollably migrating across the country, while the authorities are ignorant even of their numbers and, moreover, publicly admit this—and a host of various phobias, myths and speculations were responsible for this. The discrepancy in estimates that ranged from several hundred thousand to 3–5 million persons also forced one to ponder not only the random method of obtaining them, but also the possibility that the figures were the object of perfectly calculated manipulations.

The discussions currently under way gradually have pointed to a conclusion that this situation has developed as the result of an unidirectional and simultaneous action of two fundamental factors—the crisis of former statehood and the formation of a new migration situation. The state has not simply become weakened but its place in society, its functions and methods of their realization are radically changing. Formerly, the Soviet institutional system, and also the system of laws, instructions, written and unwritten norms, as well as the scale of resources underpinning all these institutions, controlled and regulated not simply the flows of external migrations, but also governed them in a hard and fast way. Every foreigner in the USSR

⁴ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda* (Irkutsk), 07.12.1998.

was under tight control of state services. More or less mass cross-border travel could only be made possible as a result of corresponding political decisions. The reorganization that took place not only destroyed the remnants of the Iron Curtain, but created a new mechanism for migrations.

Now the same Chinese native could come to Russia in search of a job because there developed a demand for his labour, not because corresponding agreements were concluded by government ministries. A multitude of people began to cross borders, propelled by personal interest, not by state decisions. At the turn of the 1990s there arose a tremendous demand for Chinese goods and the services of traders and guest workers in Russia, and their unlimited supply in China. A catastrophic situation on the Russian consumer market, especially painful for the country's eastern regions, and a time lag between the total crash of the Soviet distribution system and the formation of that of a new consumer market, forced the nation to fling wide open the formerly impenetrable eastern border.

Several channels were created for the massive and virtually uncontrollable penetration of the Chinese into Russia. These are above all the regime of frontier trade conducted without the use of visas (1992–1994) and visa-less group tourism as well. Besides, opportunities created by student exchange and labour employment were used.

All of these events resulted in a powerful surge of Chinese migration to Russia. Russian society and the authorities found themselves unprepared for this. The new element of ethnosocial structure emerged too swiftly and unexpectedly, a situation which generated a lot of fears, apprehensions, and discontents. Because of these fears, the really great scale of migration was exaggerated and even raised to an exponentially high degree by officials, journalists, public figures, and average citizens. This was easy to do since exact data were simply absent. It is quite possible that sometimes the estimates were exaggerated consciously, to solve certain departmental, regional or general political problems.

The authorities, now disturbed, undertook a number of steps, both at regional and at federal levels to defuse the problem. The years 1993–1994 saw the closure of the main channels for visa-less trips, the introduction of migration control, new customs duties and excises, and the appearance of documents regulating the use of foreign workforce. Police began to carry out regular “Foreigner” operations—mass checkups of places of residence and economic activity of the

migrants. "Thus," G. Vitkovskaya and Zh. Zayonchkovskaya made clear, "the federal Centre chose the option of rigid control, restrictions on immigration, and limitations of Chinese rights on Russia's territory."⁵

All this resulted in the second half of the 1990s in an appreciable decrease in the number of Chinese migrants, with the flow gradually stabilized and taken under control by the authorities. Besides, the population, too, was gradually getting used to the Chinese, and not reacting to their presence as negatively as earlier. In general, the acuteness of the problem gradually faded away. The recent publications of a number of studies concerning the assessment of this question, in the country as a whole and the Far East in particular, relieve us of the necessity of describing it in greater detail.⁶

In what follows, it is important to trace how these processes proceeded in Irkutsk. In defining the number of migrants we meet the same difficulties as in the country as a whole. The basic problem is the illegal and transit migrants. An immigration control post functions only at the airport, while the greater number of the Chinese arrive and depart by rail. Significant numbers of transit migrants do not register in the city and are consequently not recorded. Many Chinese arrive in Irkutsk illegally (with expired or counterfeit documents), many refrain from departure in the allotted time and also become illegal residents. They naturally tend to avoid any contact with state organizations. Data from the Migration Service of the Irkutsk region may give some idea about the scope of the problem. According to them, 6113 people entered the region by way of collective visa-less tourism and 4920 left it from January till November 1996.

⁵ Vitkovskaya and Zayonchkovskaya, *Perspektivy Dal'nevostochnogo regiona: mezhstranovye vzaimodeistviya*, 103.

⁶ *Perspektivy Dal'nevostochnogo regiona: mezhstranovye vzaimodeistviya; Perspektivy Dal'nevostochnogo regiona: naseleniye, migratsiya, rynki truda* (Outlook for the Far Eastern region: population, migration, labour markets) (Moscow: Gendalf, 1999) (Working materials of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, Issue 2); V. L. Larin, *Kitai i Dal'nii Vostok Rossii v pervoi polovine 90-kh: problemy regional'nogo vzaimodeistviya* (China and Russia's Far East in the first half of the 1990s: problems of regional interaction) (Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 1998), 104–127; V. Portyakov, "Kitaity idut? Migratsionnaya situatsiya na Dal'nem Vostoke Rossii" (The Chinese are coming? Migration situation in Russia's Far East) in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, No. 2 (Moscow, 1996); I. Fedotov and L. Selivanov, "Prizrak 'demograficheskogo imperializma'" (The spectre of "demographic imperialism") in *Migratsiya* (Migration), No. 3 (Moscow, 1997).

As appraised by the Migration Service and the local Department of the Interior Ministry (UVD), such a situation comes about rather simply. Using the services of a certain travel company, a group of Chinese tourists arrives, and then a part of it disappears and does not return home after the expiry of the term of the visa. This process is described in detail in an analytical memorandum submitted to the UVD chief of Irkutsk in 1996. The memorandum is devoted to numerous breaches of the law registered in the International Sputnik Tourist Bureau—an organization that controls a significant part of tourist exchanges with China. The dry lines of the official document are so eloquent that we can hardly help quoting it in detail: “After crossing Russia’s borders, more than half of a tourist group, in contravention of all the regulations, systematically remains for a long time in the town of Chita, waits for their luggage, and then proceeds without registration not along the route of the tourist group but to other cities of Russia. During registration at the Passport and Visa Service . . . a person responsible for the reception and registration of tourist groups . . . cannot always explain where the straggling part of the tourists is to be found. . . . The departure of tourist groups after the end of the tour is not supervised, and there are cases when a part of a tourist group stays behind, purchasing a second tour. . . .” The memorandum concludes by citing data on numerous administrative penalties and fines imposed on the employees and management of Sputnik. Judging by their quantity, they were not particularly onerous for the firm.

This story had a curious continuation at a session of the Club of Young Scientists “Alliance”, which discussed the problem: “Is the Yellow Peril real in Siberia?” (May 1999). A representative of the region’s Migration Service accused some travel companies, and especially Sputnik, of numerous offences. According to her data, during four months in 1999, 589 tourists from the PRC passed immigration controls, of which number 124 (21 percent) had various violations (expired term of stay, discrepancy between the visa and purpose of the trip, etc.). One of the Sputnik leaders categorically denied any responsibility for violations on the part of his organization, stressing the fact that its activity provides the region with major tax receipts and jobs, while it promotes the strengthening of Russo-Chinese relations.

Therefore, in estimating the number of Chinese migrants in Irkutsk and the Irkutsk region one is compelled to use the obviously incomplete

data of the passport and visa service, the equally obviously incomplete data of immigration controls, and also the various estimates of the state services, obtained by techniques that we may only guess about. Each year of the period from 1993–1995, four to five thousand persons were registered in passport registry offices of Irkutsk police. MVD bodies themselves estimated the number of Chinese in 1994 as 40 thousand legal and approximately an equal number of illegals. The divergence by order of magnitude is probably caused by the fact that man-days were meant in the latter case. The estimate given by the borderguard service (in a newspaper publication on the occasion of a professional holiday)—400 thousand persons per year—is difficult to explain other than by a misprint.⁷ In 1997 the police registered 6500 Chinese staying in the region, in 1998–7702 foreigners from the “far abroad.” With all the scantiness and ambiguity of all these figures it is possible all the same to assert that after the upsurge at the beginning of the 1990s the number of Chinese in Irkutsk has stabilized, and most likely it has considerably decreased.

By virtue of its geographical position, the region has become a transshipment base for legal and illegal migration of the Chinese to European Russia and abroad. It is also attractive for settling for a long term or for permanent residence. The army of migrants whose numbers shift according to economic conditions (“pendular immigrants”) is already paving the way for the formation of a permanent settled community. The methods of achieving permanency are quite diverse: marriages, reunification of families, study, guest-working, registered business, rent or purchase of real estate.

As early as the beginning of the 1990s, the Irkutsk newspapers began to publish announcements like: “a 36-year-old Chinese woman wants to marry a Russian,” “a well-to-do Chinese student is looking for a girl for help in the study of Russian,” “a young man from China (32 years old) will get acquainted with a pleasant girl up to 25 years of age, speaking English or Chinese,” “a young man of Chinese nationality (pleasant appearance, trades on the market) will get acquainted with a Russian girl for serious relations. A departure

⁷ *Sovetskaya molodyozh*, 05.11.1994; 06.10.1994; *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 07.03.1996; 28.05.1996.

for residence to Australia is possible.”⁸ Such were the forms (along with other ones) which a completely inevitable process of intercultural interaction was taking.

One of the consequences was the contracting for marriages—and the analysis of archives of Irkutsk registry offices shows a literally classical picture of them as tools for settlement, acquisition of status, and adaptation. In the course of 1989–1995, there were 101 marriages with the participation of the Chinese, including 71 mixed ones. In nine out of thirty purely Chinese marriages, one of the spouses was a native of the USSR. Out of 105 natives of the PRC, eighty-nine settled permanently in Irkutsk, with three more in other Russian cities. More than thirty received a permanent residence permit or Russian citizenship. And whereas absolute figures look rather modest, the dynamics of the process is impressive: four to seven marriages in each year from 1989 to 1992, thirteen in 1993, twenty-nine in 1994, and thirty-seven in 1995. After that peak the downturn began: ten marriages in 1996, nine in 1997, and eight in 1998. At the same session of the Club of Young Scientists “Alliance,” the director of the Wedding Palace spoke of the results of a random inspection of mixed families. It was found out that the majority of the Russian wives do not remember even the names of their “husbands”. It was rumoured that the price for fictitious marriages reached up to two thousand dollars (in Moscow up to three thousand).⁹

Besides the fact that marriage statistics are interesting in themselves, they enable us once again to talk about the formative mechanism of certain myths connected with the Chinese migration. An article by V. Portyakov—a trustworthy, informed scientist, one of the greatest experts on the economy of modern China—contains the following statement: “There is some evidence that the Chinese make up about half of the men contracting marriage in the Irkutsk and Chita regions.”¹⁰ Indeed, “The Chinese are coming!”—as, not without

⁸ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 15.01.1992; *Sovetskaya molodyozh*, 04.08.1994; *SM-Nomer Odin* (Irkutsk), 22.07.1998; 12.10.1998.

⁹ Ye. V. Dyatlova, “Chislennost’ i struktura brachnykh svyazei kitaitsev sovremennogo Irkutsk (1989–1995)” (The number and structure of conjugal ties of the Chinese of contemporary Irkutsk [1989–1995]) in *Vostok i Rossiya: vzglyad iz Sibiri* (The East and Russia: a view from Siberia) (Irkutsk, 1996), 340–342; *Itoги* (Moscow), 04.06.1995, 7.

¹⁰ Portyakov, *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 2:82.

rightful irony, the author named his article. It is understandable that the author regards this “evidence” with suspicion, but all the same his failure to comment on it lends support to its introduction into scientific usage, and then into propaganda practice. The real figures show that this is at best a conscientious fallacy—and, in any case, it has nothing in common with the real state of affairs. The propaganda effect, for its part, can be enormous.

In 1994, 774 students were studying at colleges or attending courses of Russian in Irkutsk, in 1998 more than 1500. Learning accords a relatively long-term status and thus requires an equally long-term habitation, if acculturation and integration into Russian society is successful. Estimates made by teachers and experts or contained in materials of educational documentation reveal that the ratio of those who study to those who engage in trading alone is approximately, in percentages, 50:50. Out of those who study, 20 percent wish to receive education (but they, too, engage in some traffic to earn their living and pay for their studies), while others study the language for business. About ten percent make it to the diploma, and it is they who persistently master the Russian language, are interested Russia’s history, culture, and realities, and many of them do not disguise their desire to remain in Russia.¹¹ It is they who will become, and are already becoming, the elite of the communities in the making.

For Irkutsk, the offering of educational services to foreigners is a traditional business. Back in Soviet times, two strong preparatory faculties worked successfully; there was an appropriate material base and teams of qualified teachers. After perestroika, hard times set in for them—as for the entire system of higher education, though. The paid instruction of Chinese nationals became a vital means of support.

In addition, the private enterprises especially created for this purpose began to venture into the newly formed market. Sometimes their services were of a high quality, sometimes not. Accordingly, the rates varied. A competition arose—and people obviously unfit

¹¹ Ye. V. Palyutina, “Studenty v kitaiskoi diaspore Irkutska: nekotorye kharakteristiki gruppy i situatsii” (Students in the Chinese diaspora of Irkutsk: certain characteristics of the group and the situation) in *Irkutsk. Khronika sobytii. Dokumenty. Sotsial’nye tekhnologii* (Irkutsk. Chronicle of events. Documents. Social technologies) 1 (1999), 46–54.

for higher education (on grounds of age, educational level, and so forth) were quite often accepted for tuition. This was expressly noted in the “Information on visa work and the work of the consular department of the embassy of Russian Federation in the PRC in the first half of 1995.” Among the examples cited there was one about an Irkutsk higher school which invited for study twenty-three peasants of Korean nationality from the PRC, who were of “non-student age.”

There are data that some firms were created specially to cater to such a category of “pupils”. The firm charges a payment from them, has them register as students, sometimes provides a hostel for them—and with this their contacts come to an end until graduation from “school.” Everyone is pleased, as the host party saves on payments for the educational process, premises, and so on, whereas for its clients “payment for tuition” is a quite acceptable price for a long-term legal status.

Joint Russo-Chinese ventures furnish rather handsome opportunities for long-term residence in Irkutsk. In 1997, according to the data of the regional administration, sixty-six of them were registered, including ten with a 100-percent Chinese capital. Their total authorized capital was 4.5 million US dollars. Only twenty-one of them were really working, and they were mostly engaged in trade and intermediary activity. According to the data of the Migration Service of the Irkutsk region for that year, 112 PRC citizens were engaged in them (in 1998 their number came to 146).

Already now from the ranks of “shuttles”—petty pendular traders—there came full-time subpurchasers, middlemen, and sellers on the market. Legally or illegally, they permanently live in Irkutsk and intend to continue to do so. By 1994, 346 Chinese immigrants had a residence permit, and at the present time this number has not substantially changed. In the opinion of competent sources, this is a result of both rotation (some owners of permanent residence permits would leave, while others would obtain it) and the conscious, purposeful policy of the regional authorities, aimed at restricting this category of PRC citizens in every way possible. By the way, this was also the reason for a flagging interest in fictitious marriages, since, as distinct from the early 1990s, marriages were no longer an automatic guarantee of the new spouse receiving the permit.

The scale of illegal settlement is evidenced by the fact that out of six thousand people who entered the region in 1996, fewer than five

thousand left, that is to say, more than a thousand became illegals or moved to another area. If we add to them an even greater number of those who entered the country through the Far Eastern borders, then the estimate of the head of the region's Migration Service that up to five or six thousand persons a year settle here illegally looks convincing.¹² The former vice governor of the region, V. K. Yakovenko, said in 1996 that an estimated one thousand persons do so each year, which is also a large number. For nine months of 1996 alone, 1820 foreigners, mostly Chinese, were subjected to penalties under administrative law for violation of the visa regime, and forty-one persons were expelled from the country.

Thus the migration process itself entails a lot of problems. Representatives of the authorities, especially of law-enforcement agencies, are especially disturbed by loss of control over the situation and by illegal migration. Illegal penetration is a violation of Russian laws, which undermines the foundations of statehood. It is a nutrient medium for crime, both Russian and imported. Corruption is part and parcel of illegal residence. Municipal authorities are worried about the problems of congestion and unsanitary conditions in Chinese hotels and hostels, the migrants' mass dodging of taxes and duties, the additional and uncompensated pressure on municipal services, the maintenance of law and order at Chinese markets, and so forth.

All state structures fear the emergence of massive Chinese criminality, the "mafia"—and the rare criminal offences of Chinese nationals are regarded in this vein. The reaction of the Irkutsk mass-media to a robbery of a Chinese trader by his compatriots is a case in point: "The opinion about the Chinese mafia operating on the territory of Irkutsk seems to have been confirmed."¹³ This was the first such crime of that kind, it bore an interpersonal character, and subsequently crimes against persons among the Chinese nationals were literally solitary instances.

The state and especially the prospects of Chinese crime are monitored and analyzed by both regional and municipal authorities thoroughly and with deep concern. The data on criminal statistics,

¹² *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 04.03.1995; 09.04.1998.

¹³ *SM-Nomer Odin*, 29.03.1996; comment of the Irkutsk TV programme "Seichas" (Now) from 26.03.1996.

however, do not arouse much fear for the time being.¹⁴ In 1997, in particular, Chinese nationals committed eighty-six crimes; in addition, ten crimes committed earlier were uncovered, 105 persons were made answerable for criminal activity, and fifty-six fell prey to crimes. A memorandum of the regional UVD pointed out that the greater part of crimes involves the manufacturing, forgery, or sale of documents, stamps, and seals.

Organized crime is a separate, large, and very grave question. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, the Irkutsk press began to write anxiously about the Chinese “triads,” and to guess when they would appear in the city. According to competent experts, the organized Chinese criminals came in the wake of the traders and began to engage in racketeering. In 1997 two such groupings were uncovered and destroyed in Irkutsk. According to some evidence, Chinese organized criminal groups are engaged in racketeering among traders—their compatriots—even now. Racketeers usually contact local groups and demand part of their incomes.

In examining this problem it is necessary to take into account a very high level of reticence, when we are dealing with crimes of Chinese nationals against their compatriots. Practically all experts, Russian and Chinese alike, note that migrants do not trust the Russian police and avoid any contacts with them in every way possible. The reasons for this exist on both sides. Many Chinese are breaking the laws governing residence in Irkutsk, dodging taxes, and are therefore not at all anxious to communicate with the police, even if they need protection. On the other hand, they really understand that chances of receiving such protection are minimal. Besides, the majority have had unpleasant experiences in contact with the police during, for example, checks of passports, operations “Foreigner”, of meetings in the streets, and so forth. It is considered a good outcome if such contact is confined simply to payment of “fines without receipt.” A representative of International Sputnik Tourist Bureau at a meeting of the Club of Young Scientists discussed some patently flagrant instances. Thus, during one massive checkup, the inhabitants of

¹⁴ D. G. Lyustritsky, “Uroven’ prestupnosti sredi grazhdan KNR v Irkutskoi oblasti v 1997” (Crime level among PRC citizens in the Irkutsk region in 1997) in *Rossiya i Vostok: vzglyad iz Sibiri* (Russia and the East: a view from Siberia) 1 (Irkutsk, 1998), 193–195.

a hostel were cooped up in a police van and held there all day without outer clothing in a 30-degree frost. Then the police checked their papers and released almost all of them.

To assess the role of Chinese nationals in the economy of the region is even more difficult than to estimate their numbers. There are very few data, and those that are available are scattered, inconsistent, and often doubtful. The greater part of the migrants are small-time retail traders, "shuttles" engaged in informal business, whose activity often goes simply unrecorded by customs and fiscal authorities due to its insignificant volume or illicit character. So far only qualitative appraisals seem to be possible. A memorandum by the region's State Tax Inspectorate for 1995 noted that foreigners often evade registration, but nonetheless accounted for 2274 out of 12,401 registered entrepreneurs. It is a very high proportion.

The first Chinese "shuttles" depended on the old diaspora, i.e., earlier migrants, for housing, storage facilities, consultations, and mediatory services. However, they amazingly quickly developed their own structures to absorb the incoming traders. They rented hostels and private apartments and transformed them into something midway between hotels and warehouses. The term "dosshouse" is most applicable here. They function with violations of all sanitary, fire-prevention and immigration norms. In 1995 the police kept tabs on 1090 such establishments.

A center of economic, and social life of Chinese migrants in Irkutsk is the Chinese market, known in the city as "Shanghai". Before it was built in 1993, the Chinese would sell their wares in some of the central streets with the resulting awful crush and unhygienic conditions. There was no question about any kind of licensing or collection of taxes. Conflicts were frequent. Therefore the authorities set aside a place downtown for the Chinese tradesmen, where an entrance fee and a payment for a trading space were introduced. The salesmen were offered counters and room for storing goods, with a permanent police post to keep law and order. By the summer of 1993, 500–600 salesmen gathered there daily and their monthly proceeds, by an estimate of the Regional Statistical Bureau, was equal to the monthly sales turnover of all the registered trading enterprises of the central, commercial district of the city. By the beginning of 1998, the area occupied by "Shanghai" had already grown three times—and is now overcrowded. From being a simple trading-ground it turned into a peculiar social organism with a rather rigid structure,

norms, rules, and customs. There are permanent traders, hierarchically organized national groups (not only Chinamen trade there), with complex relations formed between them, as well as with the administration, police, and rackets.¹⁵

In their time Chinese traders literally saved the city from goods shortages, “shoeing and dressing” its inhabitants, to use the expression of many experts. Now that the consumer market has become saturated and varied, “Shanghai” continues to play an important and irreplaceable role as a market for the poor. However, its inexpensive goods are largely due to the extremely poor quality of the products. This is a breeding ground for unsanitary conditions, and petty and serious offences (larceny, racketeering, corruption). Chinese traders dodge taxes and duties *en masse*. According to the data of the municipal finance administration, for 11 months of 1997 only, receipts from “Shanghai” for the right to engage in commerce alone were two billion rubles less than they should have been. The number of foreigners voluntarily paying taxes to the tune of 330 million rubles that year was 1376. However, in addition, regular tax police raids brought more than 4 billion rubles.¹⁶ Most likely, this is only the tip of the iceberg. The Chinese have not set up any permanent enterprises in Irkutsk—shops, restaurants, factories, craft workshops, hospitals, etc. Several dozen Chinese enterprises and joint ventures possess scanty capital and their role in the region’s economy is negligible. There are no major investment projects as yet.

At the beginning, the Chinese “shuttles” imported Russian-made finished products, using the proceeds received from the sale of consumer goods. As the system of state-set prices disappeared, this practice came to an end. The greater part of the sales proceeds began to be converted into dollars and legally or illegally imported to China. Up until the crisis of August 1998, smugglers were detained almost daily at the city’s international airport. According to official figures, in 1995–96 the Irkutsk customs house confiscated \$150,000. The sums vary—from a thousand dollars “tucked behind the bra” up to \$114,000 seized from a courier, a passenger of the “Moscow-Peking” train. In the opinion of experts, Chinese citizens were among the main buyers of hard currency from Irkutsk banks.

¹⁵ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 07.07.1993; 09.04.1998; *SM-Nomer Odin*, 16.03.1998.

¹⁶ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 09.04.1998.

It was a few years ago that the customs services of the region suggested that an underground “bank” had been founded and was actively functioning—traders handed over rubles and dollars there, receiving yuans in China in exchange for them. In 1997 this was confirmed by one of the FSB chiefs of the region. As he reported, two criminal cases were instituted to neutralize the “Chinese underground banks” which used the money resources they obtained for illegal operations in Russia.¹⁷ Let us note that there are no branches of Chinese banks in the region and the yuan is absent on the country’s financial market.

Guestworking is the second most important sphere of economic activity of Chinese nationals. The first agricultural workers from the PRC appeared in the region in 1989 and construction workers in 1991. The quantitative dynamics look as follows: there were only 300 foreign workers in 1988, but 3000 Chinese workers alone in 1993, 1514 in 1995, 1173 in 1996, 807 in 1997, and 801 in 1998. The import of Chinese labour was a spontaneous process at the beginning: usually a Chinese national came and proposed to the director of a state farm a tenancy agreement. However, already in the autumn of 1989 representatives of agricultural enterprises went to China and concluded contracts there. From that time on, a practice was established, effective till now, whereby labour is imported through Chinese intermediary firms. They recruit personnel themselves, conclude contracts, receive the money earned and pay salaries to the workers. The barter of labour in exchange for fertilizers and timber was common at the beginning. Experts dealing with guestworkers note that their labour is inexpensive, they are unpretentious, highly disciplined, and sober. They are more or less satisfied with their qualifications and have the highest opinion of the agricultural workers and tenants. In his already quoted statement, former vice-governor V. K. Yakovenko cited an example of a suburban hot-house complex. There the Chinese had three hothouses, from which they received a profit of 500 million rubles; for their part, the hosts had twenty-one hothouses working at a loss of 500 million rubles.

For some time the process of recruitment and employment of the Chinese workforce was spontaneous and almost outside legal regulation and control of the authorities. The situation changed only with

¹⁷ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 18.03.1997; *Zemlya-Novyi porjadok*, 6 (Irkutsk, 1996).

the adoption of the presidential Decree "On the recruitment and use of foreign workforce in the Russian Federation" (16.12.1993). In effect before that (from May 1993) was only a "Provisional regulation on licensing the recruitment of foreign workforce to the Russian Federation" issued by the FMS. The new decree included principles that are still effective. An organization wishing to use foreign labour has to receive a one-year license from the FMS. For this purpose it is necessary to submit a number of documents confirming guarantees of observance of workers' rights, and also the findings of executive government bodies on the necessity and feasibility of this project.

This system impedes the processes of purchase and sale on the labour market by sometimes subordinating them to extra-economic but related factors and slow bureaucratic procedures. Nevertheless, the system regularises migration processes and may prevent the "dumping" of goods and the infringement of rights of employed personnel. Mass violations may undermine its efficiency. This was shown, among other things, by an inspection carried out by MVD agencies at the end of 1994. In 1999, one of the documents of the region's Migration Service ended with the following conclusion: "At present, there is a problem of uncontrollable labour migration, when the recruitment of foreign labour is illegally pursued by employers at the expense of foreign citizens who enter the country by way of tourism, through the organization of all kinds of educational courses, private invitations, and also at the expense of students who do not leave after the end of their studies."

The fifty percent decrease of the number of Chinese guest workers for 1995–98 may probably be explained both by administrative restrictions, and, in the first place, by the reduction of demand for their services. This resulted from the state of crisis of the Russian economy as a whole and in the Irkutsk region in particular. The developments of the August 1998 crisis were an especially stark demonstration of this. For the first four months of 1999, FMS sanctioned the arrival of 679 persons, of whom 151 (22 percent of the requested number) really did arrive in the region. Representatives of the Migration Service explain it by the deterioration of the economic situation in the Russian market, the instability of the exchange rate of the ruble, due to which Chinese companies incurred heavy losses.

The August crisis was likewise a shock for Chinese traders, resulting in a temporary paralysis of their activity. "Shanghai" became visibly empty, prices rose, and demand fell. However, the shock did

not turn into a landslide. In a few weeks trade at “Shanghai” began to revive—although even now it has not reached the pre-August scale in terms of turnover, range of commodities, number of traders and buyers. The reason is simple—despite the price rise and the fall in the purchasing power of the people of Irkutsk, “Shanghai” remains a “market for the poor,” a source of the cheapest goods in daily demand.

Experts believe that the economic activity of Chinese traders continues despite falling profits for the following reasons: the difficult economic situation in China, especially Northeast China, serves as a strong factor encouraging migration. To enter the markets of other countries is very difficult and costly. Besides, there is a firm hope for prospects in Russia, but in order to realize them it is necessary to retain the positions already won. There are examples of businessmen who had switched their activities to the USA, Japan and Korea returning to resume their operations in Siberia.

On the eve of the crisis, there were plans to carry out some projects with Chinese capital, but now they are still frozen. One project, in particular, was the plan of constructing a Chinese Centre (a set of hotels and a market). The project was discussed at the level of the mayors of Irkutsk and Shenyang. It is possible that in case of improvement in the economic situation in Russia an interest in this and other projects will revive.

An accelerated monopolisation of trade at “Shanghai” has become an important result of the crisis. An independent “shuttle” bringing and selling small consignments of goods at his own risk is becoming a figure of yesterday. Now the market is controlled by two or three families, with the greater number of the salesmen working for them (either for hire or taking goods for sale). Clans have been formed that are based on clientele dependence. Despite the fall of turnover and sales proceeds, there is no lack of salesmen. Many of those working under these conditions have expired documents, running a constant risk of administrative punishment or (which is more probable) feeling the necessity of giving constant bribes (by some unofficial evidence, they amount to 50–100 rubles). These are probably worth the payoff, and therefore a simple logic says that even in present conditions trade at “Shanghai” is profitable.

The crisis, having decreased the profitability of export to and sale of consumer goods in Russia, has sharply raised the earnings from

the import of some traditional goods from Russia. At the present these are timber, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Besides the fall in the rate of the ruble, the increase of demand on these goods was strengthened by the recent huge floods in China and reconstruction work. Therefore there were notable changes in the pattern of commodity-money flows. Whereas earlier a significant part of sales proceeds was converted into dollars and then taken to China (often illegally), now they are concentrated in the hands of big businessmen and channeled towards buying up and exporting timber and metals.

The pattern of such concentration was worked out in previous years. Its vehicle is the "underground banks" already referred to. FSB representatives for the region officially announced two years ago that two of them were under investigation. From the information available it is clear that these are certainly not banks in the full sense of the word. The pattern of their functioning is extremely simple and therefore effective. The traders, wishing to avoid large overhead charges involved in double conversion and export of the proceeds, hand their proceeds over to the owner of the "bank" in exchange for the obligation of payment of this sum in China in yuans. According to certain data, sometimes this transaction is not drawn up even in the form of receipts. A "word of honour" and, possibly, other non-economic forms of security serve as a guarantee. The "bank" owner receives a virtually interest-free credit, which he uses for buying up and exporting timber and metals.

It is quite clear that such operations are accessible only to the big dealers who, besides having considerable capital, possess reliable connections in the business and administrative circles of the host society, as well as affiliates in China. According to press data and expert estimates, the earnings from export operations increase through the buying up of round timber instead of saw-timber, and also through the broad circulation of a number of not-so-legal, or completely illegal operations. Timber is often bought up from the manufacturers for dumping prices and "black cash" [payments hidden from taxation—*translator's note.*] The heads of timber industry enterprises resort to this practice in an effort to rescue the enterprises in the throes of the deepest crisis, and also, most likely, for reasons of personal gain. Frequent press reports of robberies of Chinese buyers are reliable evidence that large sums of cash rubles and dollars are

involved.¹⁸ The region, as well as the entire country, was literally gripped by an epidemic of robberies of products made of metals, especially non-ferrous ones. The greater part of them was siphoned off to China.

Barter operations are used for export of wood and metals—and here again there are a huge number of “schemes” facilitating evasion of taxes, duties, and illegal export of the capital. One of the most simple and effective is the following. A private enterprise is created on behalf of a Russian citizen. What is required from a strawman for a rather small payoff is only to lend his passport for a few hours. In the city there are firms that can register the enterprise within such a short time (this certainly costs money). Then it carries out some barter operations with its Chinese contractors, during which the cost of the goods exported does not return either in money, or in the form of a commodity. The firm exists as long as the tax bodies do not get interested in its operations.

The scale and forms of similar operations began to disturb the local government bodies seriously. The deputy head of the Irkutsk customs house cited examples where the cost of the goods that failed to arrive in Russia in certain barter deals reached 500–600 thousand dollars.¹⁹ He noted the decrease in the amounts and volumes of hard currency seized during attempts to smuggle it out. Whereas earlier the customs apprehended hundreds of thousands of dollars, now “a catch of 20 thousand is considered a large sum.” There existed a completely new phenomenon—the import of hard currency into Russia, illegal import included. Data on it appeared after a robbery of a large sum from one of Chinese nationals.

One should particularly note the swift propagation of the institution of strawmen. This is a classical phenomenon; it was and is widely used everywhere by members of “trading minorities” in the countries of the East. It is an effective way to circumvent a multitude of restrictions existing for non-citizens or members of discriminated-against minorities, a means of tax evasion. With the passage

¹⁸ “Ubity kitaiskiye lesotorgovtsy” (Chinese timber merchants killed) in *SM-Nomer Odin*, 24.03.1999; “Lesotorgovtsev dobivali vystrelami v golovu” (Timber merchants killed off by being shot in their heads) in *Moskovski komsomolets v Irkutske*, 6.11–03.12.1998; “Ograbil sobstvennyi sotrudnik” (A firm robbed by member of its own staff) in *SM-Nomer Odin*, 16.12.1998.

¹⁹ *SM-Nomer Odin*, 21.10.1998.

of time, this institution becomes a mechanism for business integration with the influential circles of the host society. Therefore, in practice strawmen can have very different shapes—starting from a “heavy drinking” social outcast who gives away his passport for a day for a couple of hundred of rubles, down to a respectable member of the elite whose duties as president of a certain company are confined to receiving a rather handsome remuneration. The emergence and development of the system of strawmen in this case is no surprise—it is the tempo and scale that are amazing.

It is quite possible to interpret the phenomenon noted above both as a parameter of embedding or integration of the Chinese business in the social fabric of Russian society. It is quite understandable that bargaining of this type is impossible without the closest business contact with the representatives of the local business and administrative elite. One may also build more or less convincing hypotheses about the means by which such cooperation is developed and strengthened.

The August crisis most likely spurred the process of consolidation of the Irkutsk Chinese community. Even during the first stages of their presence here they were not a conglomerate of scattered singletons. It is impossible to survive like that and achieve success in an alien world. There existed family and clan connections, on the framework of which business relationships were built. Earlier we spoke of the existence of a nucleus of Russian Chinese, small as it is, who live in a closely knit fashion in one of the suburbs of the city. It was to them that the entrants were drawn.

The type and pattern of the migrants has changed appreciably throughout these years. The scenes at “Shanghai” when tradesmen and buyers bargained, writing down and crossing out figures on a piece of paper, have become a thing of the past. Now the bulk of the tradesmen have a good, and some of them excellent, command of Russian. The earlier predominating type of stranger of an obviously country type, unsure of himself and badly dressed, is gradually disappearing. Now it is a modern-dressed, vigorous and jaunty dealer who knows perfectly all the “ways of the world,” including those in the corridors of power. At least, it is such people that set the tone in the community.

The key element of intracommunal consolidation is “Shanghai.” It is there that the greater part of a migrant’s life passes. Already at the beginning of its existence it became clear that migrants trading there are welded together by an extremely intricate system of

connections and relationships. Indirect data on institutions of mutual aid and mutual control have come to light. Blatant swindlers were instantly expelled from the market, and persistent suggestions may have been made to some “shuttles” to sell their goods wholesale and leave. The leaders, people who did not engage in trade but issued commands, were visible. There was a layer of professional middlemen, who for payment would help their compatriots solve their numerous and difficult problems in a foreign country.

A process of gradual monopolisation has been in progress, with small independent “shuttles” either superseded or subordinated to big dealers. It has already been noted that several Chinese families have gained control over the market. But “Shanghai” is not only an economic but also a social institution and a very complex organism. Alongside the official Irkutsk administration there exists, to all appearances, an informal but very influential Chinese one. According to some data, there also exists an organization of Chinese racketeers who pursue their operations with the sanction of its Irkutsk colleagues and as their younger partner (the corresponding emoluments are also provided for in the process).

The processes of consolidation sometimes take rather tough forms. In the city of Ussolye-Siberskoye three Chinese trade groups were unable to share trading territories peacefully. The conflict resulted in a knife-fight, during which one businessman received serious wounds.²⁰

The processes of communal consolidation do not exclude property and social differentiation. Sometimes it coincides with ethnic differences. In the opinion of many experts, China’s Koreans made up a significant part of the “shuttles” of the first wave, who paved the way for the rest. There are many of them, as well as Mongols from Inner Mongolia, who are among the lowest stratum of the traders.

As for the official registration of communal structures, there have been no serious moves in this direction so far. True, there are symptoms of possible changes. Notably, the “Irkutsk municipal public organization for expansion of international ties,” “The Chinese Community” was registered in September 1998. According to the Charter, “the Organization is created for the purposes of promoting

²⁰ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 04.02.1998; *SM-Nomer Odin*, 04.02.1998.

the expansion of international ties, strengthening of peace and friendship between the peoples, improving interethnic relations in a harmonious combination of social and national interests in all spheres of public life, comprehensive study of socioeconomic, national and cultural problems, contributing to the preservation and development of national and cultural traditions of persons of Chinese origin, as well as other nationalities who are members of the Irkutsk municipal public organization, 'The Chinese Community,' assistance to their timely solution in cooperation with other public organizations." Characteristically, in accordance with the Charter, "The Chinese Community" has the right to pursue entrepreneurial activity.

Thus, the Chinese migrants have found a "niche" in the economy of the host society, becoming a necessary part of it. Already now the termination of their activity would deal a heavy blow to the consumer market. It would result in a rise in prices and in decreased competition. The mass strata of the poor population would suffer most. There would be a decline in the production of vegetables, a number of construction projects would be discontinued. Many citizens of Irkutsk are involved in servicing the migrants' basic needs (the provision of housing, warehouse premises, transport and intermediary services, work for hire). With a departure of the Chinese, the workers would join the ranks of the unemployed. The municipal authorities would lose significant sums in taxes and duties. The growth of social discontent would be inevitable.

However, their stay generates a host of mind-boggling problems. Illegal migration undermines the foundations of statehood, corrupts the state apparatus, becomes a fertile ground for Russian and Chinese crime. Chinese traders are a favourite object of larceny and robberies. Increased criminal activity gives additional work and "headaches" to the police.

Chinese traders dodge taxes *en masse*. Their goods are notorious for their extremely low quality, and sometimes their foodstuffs are simply so unsanitary they can be life-threatening. The Chinese market—important as its social role is—is a breeding-ground for unsanitary conditions and serious hygienic offences. The most serious economic problem is the outflow of capital. Directly or indirectly, the Chinese goods are paid for at the expense of export of raw resources. Such a structure of trade impedes the movement of Russian industry into the Chinese markets. The import of cheap consumer goods undermines the already weak light industry of the region. The

rent and buying up of real estate are what the authorities and the public fear most—and are the least informed about. But these fears are an important factor of tension and disruption of stability. Chinese capital is not invested in the region's economy as yet. The Chinese labour is poorly involved in local production of goods and services.

The problem of competition in the commodity and labour market is potentially acute. Thus far, the Chinese migrants have reduced this problem to a minimum. They practically do not trade outside “Shanghai,” invite local intermediaries and sellers to cooperate, and find common language with the authorities. At the beginning there were tensions with Caucasian traders, but they were quickly relaxed. The Chinese almost never encroach upon the local businessmen's sphere of interests.

The importation of Chinese labour has not destabilised the labour market yet—due to its relatively small scale and its specialization in the sector of dirty and underpaid work, extremely unattractive for local workers. But all this may quickly change. “Shanghai” is becoming too narrow for Chinese dealers. As soon as they overstep its limits, starting to trade goods other than just Chinese, they will “stand in the way” of the Russian and Caucasian dealers with easily foreseeable consequences. The murder of the director of “Shanghai” at the end of 1996 may have become their “first sign.” The recurrence of a situation that arose at one of the Kuzbass mines may lead to a new level of conflict. There, a director declared to the striking miners: “If you make trouble, I shall sack all of you and hire Chinese.”²¹ The directors of several large building organizations have made statements in the press concerning the importation of Chinese construction workers and are putting pressure on the authorities (jointly with the employment service) to sharply cut down on the quota of imported labour.

The processes of the migrants' social and cultural integration lag behind the corresponding economic processes. The estrangement from the local population can under certain conditions become dangerous for them, serving as an incitement for upsetting social stability, fragile as it is.

Nevertheless, one may safely assume that the first, most difficult stage in the formation of the Chinese diaspora in Russia was passed

²¹ *Izvestia* (Moscow), 11.07.1996.

rather swiftly and successfully. Within a few years a “Great Clothes Road” was beaten, along which came to Russia not only goods and services it needs, but also Chinese migrants—representatives of a next-door power, but an incredibly distant culture and civilization. What we are seeing is the making of a diaspora that enriches and complicates the life of the host society. One may and must draw the balance of losses and gains—and form one’s attitude in accordance with it. One thing is beyond doubt—the existence of this new element of economic, social, and ethnic structure of the region should now be taken into account in the analysis of all current and future development processes and in making administrative decisions.

A major factor that determines the tempo and scale of migration and diaspora formation is the attitude of the host society towards it. On the whole, it is ambiguous and rather changeable. It combines a clear understanding of the usefulness of Chinese visitants with a major set of fears and apprehensions towards them.

The appearance of a multitude of Chinese in the city proved too sudden and breathtaking. Their foreignness has not had time to become habitual, recognized, and legitimized in public opinion. This foreignness breeds irrational fears, phobias in confronting the new, and an almost instinctive abhorrence of the alien and the novel. The role of this factor increases amid crisis of values and orientations. On the whole, the attitude to the Chinese may be characterized as indifferent-cum-condescending and reserved-cum-unwelcoming. They are “aliens”—and therefore there is nothing to love them for. But they have a low status, they do not aspire to equal rights and do not try to attain it by force or money. Next to them one may feel—and, if one wishes, also to demonstrate—one’s superiority. This feeling is expressed, in particular, by the fact that a characteristic description of “dirty” prevails in all the polls in relation to them. They are useful, complaisant, and obliging; when one is near them, there is no feeling of danger. But they are self-contained, secretive, sly, insincere, and haughty. A complex combination of a disparaging, yet fearful attitude is gradually formed towards them. “The yellow race is a dangerous race. Many world scholars warned of its creeping aggressiveness as a quality inherent in it,” writes the author of an article in the national-patriotic journal *Russki Vostok*.²²

²² *Russki Vostok* (Irkutsk) 13 (1994).

Economic specialization of the migrants is a powerful irritant for public opinion. Society, which had for many years been built on antimarket principles and is convinced of the justice, necessity, and possibility of universal material equality, still views trade negatively, regarding it as a “mercenary” activity, “jobbery”, a low and “mean” employment, an unmeaningful way of spending time, rather than work, a life at the expense of others. It is not only the employment but also the lifestyle, the type of behaviour and a system of values connected with it that is rejected as socially valueless. A poll conducted by sociologists of the municipal administration revealed that from 1992 to 1994 the number of citizens of Irkutsk who feel irritated by trade decreased from 49 to 21 percent. However, 61 percent out of 2000 persons polled by them in 1995 flatly ruled out for themselves the possibility of engaging in trade, while 42 percent believed that the “shuttles” activity hinders local manufacture without solving the problems of supply.²³ In such an environment, the most typical stereotype with respect to “commercial people”²⁴ is formed—that of a roguish, crafty idler who deceives a local inhabitant—a hardworking, honourable but unsophisticated and simple-minded man. The aversion towards the entrepreneurial values and lifestyle of the Chinese is partly compensated for by recognition of their usefulness. But a competitive situation may swiftly crowd out this motive.

The most powerful menacing factor for many, a circumstance increasing their phobias and discontent exponentially on account of migrants’ presence, is the feeling that the Chinese are too many, that every migrant is a part, a “tentacle,” a tool of the billion-strong and primordially expansionist China. Consciously or unconsciously, very many people regard the Chinese migration is a factor threatening at the minimum to destroy the ethnopolitical balance in the region (“Irkutsk will become a Chinatown.”) Many are ready to reconcile themselves to the “shuttles”—temporary visitors, “birds of

²³ *Delo* (Irkutsk) 5 (1995). The author would like to thank A. Vasilyev, who conducted the poll, for having kindly provided him with some unpublished materials.

²⁴ V. I. Dyatlov, “Predprinimatel’skiye men’shinstva: torgashi, chuzhaki ili poslannye Bogom? Simbioz, konflikt, integratsiya v stranakh Arabskogo Vostoka i Tropicheckoi Afriki” (Entrepreneurial minorities: hucksters, aliens or delegated by God? Symbiosis, conflict and integration in the countries of the Arab East and Tropical Africa) (Moscow, 1996).

passage”, but are flatly against their settlement. This is the origin of fears concerning the purchase of real estate, or mixed marriages. One would think that the main problems here lie ahead—when an appreciable enough Chinese community will be formed, all the more so a Chinatown, with a life unfathomable to strangers.

The Chinese are not feared singly, for personal qualities. Fear and aversion arise towards them as a mass, a group. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the political journalist of *Sovremennik* periodical, A. Verezhnikov composed a weird picture of the “Chinese mob” as an unending, homogeneous swarm of locusts, devouring everything in its way, “equally indifferent to famine, cold and death,” which “is secretively silent and sprawling around, breeding and multiplying,” sweeping through the Russian borders.²⁵

Many analysts, experts, politicians, and people in the street are afraid that the formation of a numerous Chinese diaspora in the region will become the first step towards its loss by Russia. Migration is considered a form of China’s “peaceful expansion.” On a visit to Irkutsk, V. V. Zhirinovskiy formulated this with utmost clarity: “One fine day they will cross the border as tourists, traders, and teachers to visit their relatives and will occupy Siberia and the Far East without a single shot being fired.”²⁶

Serious analysts argue in favour of the possibility of such a course of events by invoking the following factors:

- the millennial tradition of frontier policy of the Celestial Empire;
- the monstrous overpopulation of China along with an extreme scarcity of resources;
- the traditional PRC policy of using the Chinese diasporas as an instrument of influencing neighbours;
- China’s rapid economic growth, the prospect of its transformation into a global superpower. Then Russia’s eastern regions can be drawn into the sphere of economic and political gravitation of the giant;
- the crisis of Russia’s statehood with a prospect of separatism. The eastern regions, escaping from under the sway of Moscow, will inevitably get into Peking’s orbit of influence;

²⁵ A. Verezhnikov, “Kitaiskaya tolpa” (The Chinese mob) in *Sovremennik* (St. Petersburg) 4 (1911): 124–134.

²⁶ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 27.08.1994.

- the economic crisis in Russia tending in the same direction, and the orientation of market reforms. The disintegration of old economic links and an attempt to form new ones on a market basis are destroying the economy of the Far Eastern regions, which had from the outset been created as an advanced-post, frontier economy, which therefore required constant state support;
- the infrastructural crisis, excessive transport tariffs destroying the economic and social links of the eastern regions with European Russia;
- the sparse population of Siberia and, especially, the Far East, which lacks roots and has failed to develop organic links with the area and to become an integral part of it.

One may continue this line even further by adding to it much less serious or totally unserious reasonings about various plots for the partition of Russia, the “primordial expansionism of the yellow race,” and so on. But there is probably no particular sense in doing so. Each of the points just mentioned is serious enough and calls for a separate thoughtful analysis without hysteria, which falls outside the scope and possibilities of this work.

Even if the fears concerning the disintegration of the country, peaceful Chinese expansion, and the formation of the Chinese diaspora are irrational and totally unfounded (and they are clearly not), their very existence and mass propagation is a source of instability. A threat to security is inevitably generated by public hysteria, alarmism, a search for enemies and scapegoats, political manipulations, xenophobia and, even more predictably, excesses.

This said, the reaction of the host society—the ordinary man, the persons and structures that shape public opinion, the public and political movements, and the authorities—is multifarious, dynamic and changeable. It was already noted that the xenophobic element in the public atmosphere of Irkutsk is weaker than in European Russia and that the variety of races and cultures has long since become a norm, a habit, a thing of everyday life. The generally warm memories about the old diaspora, with its positive but condescending image of *khodya* [an old Russian nickname for a migrant Chinaman—*translator’s note*]—a benevolent, obliging man, a hard-working, cheap worker—have also been preserved. And the famous phrase “a Russian and a Chinaman are brothers forever” [derived from a Stalin-era song on Soviet-Chinese friendship—*translator’s note*]

reflected more than one in a series of zigzags of interstate relations. The negative attitude towards the Chinese as a people did not arise even in the 1960s–1970s, when the PRC was perceived as a hostile state. The deterioration of attitudes came about in the process of direct intercourse, as the number of migrants and the degree of their insertion in the host society increased.

The findings of the poll conducted among students of six faculties of four Irkutsk higher schools (125 questionnaires) are characteristic. The students were selected as a stratum generating the whole spectrum of public opinion, as a potential elite, and also by virtue of their large number. Their attitude characterizes a set of qualities that are, in the opinion of the respondents and by their free choice, typical of the Chinese of Irkutsk. One has to emphasize the latter circumstance, since many questionnaires (more than 20) note that “what we have here is not their best representatives.” Here then are the main characteristics in decreasing order: [the Chinese migrants are] dirty, untidy (26), hucksters (15), hardworking (13), numerous, representatives of an ancient civilization, patriarchal, artful, crafty, modest, cowed, impudent (7–9 answers for each quality), uncultured, uneducated, corporate (4–5 each). The majority of the respondents visited “Shanghai” (103), and they note the Chinese migrants’ merit in saturating the market, but the majority expresses fear of their presence and concern over the fact that the authorities do not regulate the process of their entrance and sojourn. As one student wrote, “We are being bought, and we are selling ourselves in silence”. Seventy-four persons stated that too many Chinese live in Irkutsk, ninety-two thought that it is necessary to limit their presence, and eighty-six would like to restrict their economic activity. But only three wrote in favour of expelling them. In general, here again appears an image of a “second-class” person, useful, but potentially dangerous.

Worthy of note are the dynamics of change in the tone of the Irkutsk press coverage of the Chinese problem. In the city there is a rich and rather full spectrum of sociopolitical, business, commercial-entertaining, and advertising publications, and several local television channels. Only a regular Communist newspaper is lacking. So, almost all editions reacted to the early stages of the Chinese penetration either indifferently, or with benevolent curiosity. After a long interruption, the great neighbour was being opened up, relations with the country which earlier was a source of danger were abruptly improved. Benevolent-cum-enthusiastic tourist impressions

of the Chinese therefore prevailed, as were materials about culture, history, and successful economic reforms (the latter was especially characteristic of national-patriotic and Communist editions). The arrival of the first Chinese nationals in Irkutsk was positively commented upon, and their role in saturating the market, the industry, cheapness, and unpretentiousness of the workers was highly appreciated. Great attention was paid to cultural exchange. Soon, however, there began to appear information on the Chinese mafia, on border incidents, on violations of laws on the part of PRC citizens, on the monstrously low quality of the goods they brought, on drug smuggling, and so forth; then such information began to predominate. Notes of a haughtily disparaging attitude could be discerned more often. When migrants became numerous and visible, the subject of Yellow Peril surfaced.

A series of interviews with experts, conducted in the framework of a research project of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, "The Chinese migration in the Russian Far East and Siberia" (early 1997), yielded a great deal for the understanding of the problem. A detailed poll of twenty-four high-ranking officials of the municipal and regional administration, as well as those of certain federal services, well-known politicians, journalists, businessmen, directors of state enterprises, scholars and university lecturers (historians, ethnologists, economists and geographers)—people who are highly educated, well-informed and competent in their fields—affords a practically full spectrum of opinions that exist in society and its elite. Most of them are natives of Irkutsk or have been living here for such a long time that they may be considered, as they used to say before the revolution, "Siberianized." Unexpectedly, many were found to be personally connected with the problem—they have Chinese or Korean ancestors, relatives, children who received education in China, and so forth. They are people of varied professional and life experience, and political views. Some called themselves liberals and some nationalists.

Their attitude to the Chinese presence ranges from restrained approbation to the sharply negative. But generally a combination of perception of their utility with wary apprehension (in different proportions) prevails. The fears are caused not by the fact of the foreigners' presence or the racial motive but by the sensation that behind their back stands a monstrously overpopulated China. The majority examines the problem in terms of the Yellow Peril (real or potential). Highly characteristic is the set of positive and negative qualities, as

formulated by experts. What strikes the eye is their strongly marked consumer character: what in them is good or bad *for us*, and not by itself. What is emphasized is, on the one hand, industry, plain tastes, unpretentiousness, a high farming culture (all of which is useful for us), and, on the other, cunning, insincerity, latent arrogance (which is bad). The sociocultural assessments ("they are dirty and uncivilized") are called upon to assign them to a low rank in the hierarchy, much lower than oneself. Some experts emphasized that having visited China they changed their attitude to the Chinese from neutral or positive to negative. The reason is a shock they experienced there from undisguised arrogance, a superiority complex. Practically all experts view Chinese nationals above all through the prism of "Shanghai," and, more broadly, of their economic role. Even those who view the immigrants' presence very negatively, recognize their positive contribution to the saturation and differentiation of the consumer market. The general opinion is to let them trade, it is useful—but under strict control and effective state regulation. Almost everyone singles out the problem of outflow of capital as a serious one, but the majority does so in a somewhat abstract way, possibly only because one is asked about it and because everyone knows that the outflow of capital is a bad thing. Only a businessman-financier (a political scientist by his first occupation) and a high-ranking official of the regional administration (an economist) are more specific. The former believes that the Chinese are among the main buyers of currency in the city, and the latter that it is the Chinese' overanxious feelings that created the panic demand for dollars and the temporary leap of its exchange rate at the end of 1996. The same experts differed as to the assessment of the problem that worries many. One considers that the capture by the Chinese of the strategically important enterprises and branches of the region is not excluded (it is not for nothing that they had actively bought up privatisation vouchers). Another regards this with undisguised scepticism, believing that the property is already divided and that the Chinese have no financial resources for this purpose. Anyway, many think that here, too, tight state control is necessary.

On the whole, the majority of experts appraise the Chinese economic presence positively now, but differ in their assessment of prospects. Some consider that the economic enslavement of Siberia is not to be ruled out; therefore, it is necessary to strictly ban the import of labour, to forbid rent and purchase of land and real estate,

to prohibit or restrict the foundation of Chinese enterprises, to allow no Chinese businessmen at financial markets. There is also the opposite point of view: the economic development of the region is impossible without a massive application of Chinese labour, capital, and entrepreneurial energy. This will not threaten national security if the scale and forms of the process are under reasonable control. Therefore, with rigid regulation and control it is worth allowing migration to continue (using a system of quotas, selection of migrants with capital, education and necessary trades), it is possible to permit trade, to set up enterprises, and to rent land (some even propose to allow its sale).

Representatives of the Migration Service and law-enforcement bodies are disturbed not so much by economic problems as by illegal migration and the prospect of the appearance of Chinese crime. Some experts from the circles of humanitarian intelligentsia consider the cultural separation of the migrants, their unwillingness or inability to be integrated in the city's social life to be potentially dangerous.

Attitudes towards the prospect of the formation of a permanent Chinese community, a "Chinatown" of sorts, and to the problem of communal self-organisation are rather varied. Perhaps no one, including the agencies involved, has any exact data on the existence of communal structures. But the probability of it, from their point of view, is great. However, high-ranking municipal and regional officials point out that representatives of communal structures (if they do exist) do not make contact with them, nor do they not create legal structures. Some consider that the existence of a friendly Chinese association or cultural society would be very useful to authorities—as an instrument of control and management.

Some consider the emergence of a Chinatown to be improbable; others are sure that its nucleus has already been formed. The majority is convinced that this is an event that will come about in the very near future. Some approve of it with restraint (referring to world experience), others assess it sharply negatively (as a "fifth column"). If one is to summarize their opinions, Chinatown may bring the city:

- the emergence of Eastern traits in some aspects, which is not bad and which also may promote tourism;
- the development of trade, crafts, and the services sector, and the penetration of elements of Chinese culture,
- crime, mafias, drug traffic, prostitution—and, as this takes place,

this criminal world will be absolutely off-bounds to law-enforcement agencies;

– sociocultural isolation, separation, unadaptability which are fraught with conflicts with the host society.

Just as in the assessment of other aspects of the problem, the keynote idea shared by almost all experts is this: whatever the attitude towards Chinese migration (positive, negative or neutral), it is vitally necessary to control it, and it is the state that has to do it. If the situation gets out of control, this is fraught with the direst consequences.

While disagreeing on whether Chinese entry and residence should be restricted or liberalised, all without exception consider that what is necessary is a working and universal normative base and a clear-cut order in its realization. The state bodies are obliged not simply to know, but to determine how many and what kind of migrants will be allowed to come and for what purpose. Extremely interesting is the variety of answers to the question of whether it is justifiable and necessary to hold roundups of those who violate the migration legislation (such as the regular operations “Foreigner”): they range from absolute denial (“this is a pogrom and a violation of human rights”) to complete approval (“this is lawful and necessary like a general housecleaning in spring”). The prevailing attitude is “Certainly, it is bad and the word ‘roundup’ is bad, but. . . .” The majority considers it an ineffective and morally dubious, but at this time inevitable business. To abolish it is impossible; one may only gradually get rid of it by introducing a system of regular control.

While according so much space here to the analysis of answers of a relatively small number of arbitrarily selected experts, the author realizes that the sample is insufficiently representative and the analysis may elicit reproaches on this score. But we did not set ourselves the task of giving quantitative estimates of the positions of the Irkutsk elite. It was important to reveal the spectrum of opinions and approaches of people competent and influential in their circles, and even on a region-wide scale. It is important that the experts not only reflect elite opinions, but also form public sentiment and directly or indirectly participate in administrative decision-making.

This is especially important because anti-Chinese and generally anti-immigrant sentiment gradually is becoming a component and constantly growing part of political struggle in the city. The various groupings of national-patriotic forces were the first to make it their

tool of political mobilization and struggle for power. The most mass-based force here is the Cossacks. In 1995, the Atamans' [Cossack chieftains'—*translator's note*] Council of the Cossack Union of the Asian part of Russia has spoken of the "necessity to resolutely combat the partition of Russia, to stop settling Siberia and Far East with Chinese and Koreans."²⁷ V. V. Zhirinovskiy declared in Irkutsk: "If they do not have jobs in their native land, let them come, work—and go home. Without families, without the right to purchase real estate. Only work. Sixteen hours a day, without days off, without walks around the city. And to live in barracks somewhere, feeding on skilly. Let the inhabitants of the Irkutsk region be engaged in other work—creative pursuits."²⁸ The reaction of one of his supporters is characteristic: "Let him come to power sooner—at least we shall shoot down all the Chinese then. For we are already fed up with it: you go here—you run into a Chinaman, you go there—you bump into another. It's impossible to live like this. All these slit-eyed guys should be driven from Russian territory! Let them vanish from here without trace!"

Until the middle of 1997, the newspaper *Russki Vostok* was the organ of national-patriotic forces. Its attitude to the immigrants generally may be characterized by the title of a thematic column—"Russia under the yoke of the Caucasian horde." In an article, "Caucasian gangsters rape Russia" the task is posed: "To carry out the cleansing of Russian land from Caucasian tramps and establish such an order that would make the appearance of a Caucasian no less surprising than the appearance of a Papuan." So far the main object of attacks is the Caucasians and, traditionally, Jews. But the Chinese are also gradually moving into this circle. In 1994 the paper featured an article devoted to the "Chinese expansion" and "lawlessness."²⁹

At the local elections of 1996, some candidates who actively played on anti-immigrant sentiment won seats in the regional legislative assembly and Municipal Duma. But it is also true that in 1997, when a deputy of the Municipal Duma, S. Batishchev, tried to become a mayor, promising to create for the foreigners a special

²⁷ *Zemlya* (Irkutsk) 6 (1995).

²⁸ *Sovetskaya molodyozh*, 30.07.1994; *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 27.08.1994.

²⁹ *Russki Vostok* 13 (1994).

reservation, he suffered a crushing defeat.³⁰ Still, it was not due to his views on the national question that he lost—there were behind him simply no real forces.

It is much more significant that similar motives, certainly not in such odious forms, began to be used by politicians of a different type who wielded greater power. At the gubernatorial election of 1997, anti-immigrant motifs sounded in the statements and programmes of the main three leaders, including appeals towards struggle with “the Chinese expansion” made by the deputy of State Duma, V. Mashinsky.

The municipal and regional authorities cannot ignore both the problem and public reaction to it. They have to take into account, in particular, such actions as the special session of the Municipal Duma and the hearings that followed, which voiced demands on the executive powers to take drastic measures against “foreign dominance.”

The first reaction of the authorities to the massive Chinese presence was benevolent indifference. The problem was simply disregarded, nor was it realized as a challenge. As one of the leading Irkutsk politicians and officials said some years ago to the author of this article, “The Chinese do not disturb us. They are harmless, they do not break the laws, and they supply the population with goods. There is a wealth of more pressing problems.” The turning point came in 1993 and was initiated by the law-enforcement agencies. They were extremely concerned by a situation where thousands of foreign citizens were chaotically migrating across the region without any control, thus breaking the Russian law on a massive scale.

The essence of the new course was formulated by Governor Yu. I. Nozhikov: “As to the foreigners . . . we shall pursue a policy of restriction of their entrance into our region.”³¹ Regional administration officials worked out some drafts of corresponding enactments, and when it became clear that they contradicted the all-Russian legislation, an appeal was sent to Foreign Minister A. V. Kozyrev, demanding resolute measures at the federal government level. Without waiting for immediate reaction, the governor issued an order, “On the presence of foreign citizens on the territory of the region”

³⁰ *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 11.11.1997.

³¹ *Moskovskie novosti* (Moscow) 23 (1993).

(06.12.1994), which provided for measures of strict control over the residence and economic activity of foreigners, and a system of responsibility of the officials.³²

This stimulated a burst of activity on the part of law-enforcement bodies. Following the example of Irkutsk's Far Eastern neighbours, the operations "Foreigner" with a massive checkup of places of Chinese residence and economic activity have regularly been carried out since 1994. Dozens, sometimes hundreds, of infringers have been detained. They are fined (the sums of the penalties being ridiculously small), and sometimes deported—with difficulty, since there are no funds for this. The efficiency of these measures is insignificant— infringers have learned to evade the checkups, with fresh migrants immediately taking the place of the unfortunates who are caught. This may have possibly softened the hard line taken earlier.

But it is the economic reasons that may have had a decisive influence. The necessity of the presence of the Chinese "shuttles" was obvious, as well as the pressing need to regularise their activity. Therefore, vigorous measures were undertaken to create and expand "Shanghai", as well as to equip it with modern amenities.

It was also necessary to take into account that the PRC became the region's leading foreign trade partner, the buyer of raw materials, and the supplier of consumer goods. The implementation of large-scale projects for the sale of electric energy and natural gas to the PRC has entered its practical stage. In the long term, China is a huge market for the advanced industry of the region, including the military. This predetermines the course towards an all-around development of relations and a policy of restraint towards the migrants. The legislation concerning the Irkutsk region, "On the presence of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship on the territory of the region" (1995), adopted after long discussions and backdoor struggles, incorporates not the prohibitive principle any more, but rather the registrational and supervisory principle.

Sometimes the Chinese problem is used as a tool for tackling important, but extraneous problems. Thus, at the end of 1994, the governor sent a letter to Prime Minister V. S. Chernomyrdin, in which he stressed that the Chinese are penetrating into the region *en masse*, that they have showered the market with bad-quality and

³² *Vostochno-Sibirskaya pravda*, 25.10.1995.

cheap goods, with the result of some destruction of "honest industry." He insisted on the necessity of protectionist measures and, which is the main thing, on the realization of a major programme to channel the flow of refugees and forced migrants to Siberia, a programme to be financed from the federal budget. The "Chinese threat" was obviously used to pressure the federal authorities for the purpose of redistribution of resources.

Thus, the policy of the authorities is now an outcome resulting from the interests of various departments, on the one hand, and a set of discontents and fears concerning migrants coupled with an interest in their economic activity, on the other. The rise and fall of interest in the problem, the zigzags and unexpected turns in taking and implementing administrative decisions are therefore inevitable. This corresponds to the state of public opinion, where, depending on the general situation in the country and the region, it is both possible that the xenophobic tendency will intensify and that the public will show readiness to accept the Chinese immigrants as a not-much-loved but recognized and legitimate element of social life.

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AGRICULTURAL GROWTH IN INDIA.
SOME BURNING ISSUES TOWARDS THE END
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY*

Victor G. Rastyannikov

This paper briefly examines a spectrum of demographic, economic and social processes which, I believe, have greatly influenced contemporary economic growth in India's agricultural sector. Our time frame spans the second half of the twentieth century—beginning with India's independence in 1947. At that time, India was officially described as having a “completely stagnant economy”¹ grounded in a decaying form of production.²

We will focus on the *deforming components* of the growth model that forms its organic, “trade-mark” features. India belongs to a group of countries characterized by “land-saving” technological pattern of production. Here, the determining parameters of the farm economy were originally formed, not with an eye toward saving labour (which was plentiful), but rather toward saving land (which was scarce). I shall argue that the pressure of a surplus labour force on productive resources is capable of deforming an economy and the *natural basis of agricultural growth* intrinsic to it, down to its root structures.

I will argue that it is in this very centre of the agricultural sector that a “built-in depressor,” to use a pithy concept suggested by the late Daniel Thorner,³ has emerged and gripped the mechanisms of agricultural growth in a way that is increasingly painful, and this anti-growth factor is gathering momentum.

I shall assert further that the normative model of the state regulation policy in the agrarian economy may have a socialist effect.

¹ *Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, 1976. Part XV. Agrarian Reforms* (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Agriculture, n.d.), 50.

² During the first half of the twentieth century India's rate of agricultural growth was less than a half per cent per annum [*Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, 50*], while the yield of the major crop, rice, decreased annually by 0.55 per cent from 1900–1950.

³ Daniel Thorner, *The Agrarian Prospect in India* (Delhi: University Press, 1956), 12.

That is, it may lead to the formation of a high-cost, fiscally irresponsible economy, predatory in resource consumption, with production costs that defy rational estimates. I shall also discuss the challenge posed by the processes of globalization to the competitiveness of this type of Indian farming.

This study poses more questions than it answers. Among these is the following: *What will be the social costs of modernization, which is so badly needed, for the agricultural sector, which is historically the most important field of human economic activity?*

*The Changing Structural Dimensions of the Farm Economy:
The “Demographic Siphon-Based Land Complex” (DLC) Phenomenon*

Economic growth in India’s agricultural sector in the second half of the twentieth century was marked by dramatic increases in the imbalance of two determinant factors of agricultural growth there: labour force and the natural resources used in production.

The years of plentiful land allowing for extensive cultivation in India were largely over by the mid-1970s. The area of arable land was 146.9 million hectares in 1950–1951, 158.4 million in 1964–1965, 163.1 million in 1974–1975, 165.8 million in 1984–1985, and 166.0 million in 1993–1994.⁴ Meanwhile, the demographic explosion that started at the turn of the second half of the twentieth century caused a sharp growth in labour resources in India. The increase in workers for a period of four decades (1950–1951 to 1990–1991) amounted to 115 million persons (from 973 million to 212.3).⁵ Thus the number of workers engaged in agriculture more than doubled during the period.

As a result of the imbalance which emerged within the traditional system of productive forces, the area of arable land per agricultural worker fell roughly by half, broken down by decades as follows (in ha):

⁴ *Agricultural Situation in India* (Delhi), 46 (12) (1992), 961; *The Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 16 November 1994.

⁵ *Agricultural Statistics at a Glance* (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Agriculture, 1988), 1; *Indian Agriculture in Brief*, 21st ed. (Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture, 1987), 198; *Indian Economic Survey 1996–97* (Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, 1997), S-111, S-112; *The Hindustan Times*, 16 November 1994.

1950–1951	1960–1961	1970–1971	1980–1981	1990–1991
1.51	1.19	1.27	1.11	0.78

The massive transition from a traditional agriculture to an intensive market-oriented system began the second half of the 1960s. India was confronted with not only extremely aggravated macroeconomic challenges (such as the problem of food safety) but also the detrimental consequences of the gap between the two determinant productive elements of the farm economy: the labour force and the available land.

One factor that cushioned the negative after effects of this imbalance was the extension of irrigated agriculture. Indeed, the large-scale construction of irrigation works in India, launched since the first years of independence, has not only improved the fertility of large tracts of cultivated land, but has also enlarged substantially the area under cultivation (through increasing the area sown more than once). Minor irrigation played a notable role in this process. From 1950–1951 until 1995–1996, the specific weight of the irrigated area under cultivation increased from 17.1 per cent to 37.6 per cent, while the cropping intensity grew from 112 points in 1950–1951 to 128 points in 1988–1989 to 1993–1994.

A powerful cushioning factor was performed by the new cereal cultivation technologies whose application in areas of irrigated agriculture began in the mid-1960s for wheat, and the first half of the 1970s for rice. As a result of the “green revolution” (the name given to the process of assimilating and proliferating of new technologies), the yield of cereal crops, particularly wheat, has risen sharply—anywhere from twofold or threefold—within a relatively short time. Changes in the yield of cereals for the last three decades are as follows (in 100 kg/ha):⁶

⁶ *Agricultural Statistics* (1988) 9, 11, 13; *Indian Economic Survey 1996–97*, 151, S-14, S-16.

	<i>Wheat</i>	<i>Rice</i>	<i>All cereals</i>
1962–1963 to 1966–1967	8.3	9.5	7.4
1992–1993 to 1995–1996	24.4	18.5	17.1

As far as the labour force is concerned, the intensification of agriculture has greatly enhanced the potential of the farm economy to absorb more workers. As of March 1992, India's sector of agriculture, forestry and fisheries employed 63.4 per cent of India's workers; nevertheless it provided a 47.9 per cent of the increase in all-India employment that had taken place from 1992 to 1995.⁷

Still, demographic pressure, although showing signs of slowing,⁸ is eating away at the gains in the rural potential of productive employment. It is aggravating the imbalance between the two determinant factors of the production system.⁹ In post-reform India, despite all the state's efforts, the labor force concentration in the agricultural sector has never been diverted into non-agricultural fields of economic activity, which would adequately compensate for the above imbalance. As a result, India's farm economy remains the main source of productive activity for the gainfully employed population (see below), and also the largest reservoir of redundant labour. "Pressure on land" (to use a concept widespread in Indian economic literature until recent years), that is, pressure on the sources of livelihood in the agricultural sector, far from diminishing during the last five decades of economic development, has probably increased.

Agricultural census data provides rather graphic testimony concerning the surprising metamorphoses of land holdings by economic groups in post-reform India (see Table 1). We see that for two decades

⁷ *Draft Mid-Term Appraisal of the Eighth Five Year Plan 1992–97* (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Planning Commission, 1996), 66.

⁸ The average annual rate of India's population increase by decades was as follows (by percentage):*

1950–1951	1960–1961	1970–1971	1980–1981	1990–1991	1996–1997
1.25	1.96	2.20	2.22	2.14	1.9

* *Indian Economic Survey 1996–97*, 155; "Social Indicators of Development for India-1 (EPW Research Foundation)," in *Economic and Political Weekly* 29 (20) (1994), 1231.

⁹ See more in V. V. Krylov, *Teoriya formatsii* (Formation Theory) (Moscow: Nauka, 1997), 8–21.

(1970–1971 to 1990–1991) the number of operational holdings rose substantially (by 50 per cent), while the operated land area did not (the increase is equal to 1.5 per cent). One can justifiably make the assumption that the deficit of land for agricultural farming has started to make itself much more felt in rural India during the last two decades.

Let us look at how this shift affected the distribution of farming households (taking the first census year of 1970–1971 as the year of reference). The group that shrank the most was those farms with large holdings, which decreased by two-fifths, while its share within the total number of holdings dwindled twice and a half over two decades. The operated land area of this group also decreased substantially (shrinking by half both in absolute value and in the groups' share of the total land area operated). The group of medium farms remained fairly stable by these measures (the number of holdings, the operated land area), although their share of holdings notably decreased (by a third) (see Table 1).

Table 1. *Changes in operational holdings and land area operated, by economic group*, 1970–1971 to 1990–1991*

Group ⁽¹⁾	Area per holding, ha	Specific weight of the group in total number of operational holdings and total operated land area, per cent				
		1970–1971	1976–1977	1980–1981	1985–1986	1990–1991 ⁽²⁾
Marginal:	less than 1.0					
I		50.6	54.6	56.4	58.1	59.7
II		9.6	10.7	12.1	13.2	14.6
Small:	1.0–2.0					
I		19.0	18.1	18.1	18.3	18.2
II		11.9	12.8	14.1	15.6	16.8
Semi-medium:	2.0–4.0					
I		15.2	14.3	14.0	13.5	13.2
II		18.5	19.9	21.2	22.3	23.6
Medium:	4.0–10.0					
I		11.3	10.0	9.1	8.1	7.4
II		29.7	30.4	29.6	28.7	28.3
Large:	10.0 and more					
I		3.9	3.0	2.4	2.0	1.5
II		30.9	26.2	23.0	20.2	16.8

Table 1. (cont.)

Group ⁽¹⁾	Area per holding, ha	Specific weight of the group in total number of operational holdings and total operated land area, per cent				
Total						
Real value ⁽³⁾						
I		70.5	81.6	88.9	97.7	106.6
II		162.1	163.3	163.8	163.9	164.5

* Compiled from: *All India Report on Agricultural Census 1970-71* (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Agriculture, 1975), 26; *All India Report on Agricultural Census 1980-81* (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Agriculture, 1987), 17; "Agricultural Census—XVII. [All India]. Number and Area of Operational Holdings 1985-86," in *Agricultural Situation in India* 45 (3) (1990); N. J. Kurian, "Employment Potential in Rural India," in *Economic and Political Weekly* 25 (52) (1990), A-179.

⁽¹⁾ (I)—holdings; (II)—operated land area.

⁽²⁾ The figure was calculated by N. J. Kurian on the basis of the trend for the previous fifteen years (see: Kurian, "Employment Potential.").

⁽³⁾ (I)—Number of holdings in millions; (II)—operated land area in millions of hectares.

On the other hand, the sector of the smallest (marginal) and small farms increased greatly. For two decades, the smallest farms increased in number by 80%. Their operated land area grew by 60 per cent, and so did their share in the total operated land area. The potential of the group of small farms expanded by 40 per cent by both indicators.¹⁰ The weight of "semi-medium farms," which tended toward the small farms group, grew appreciably (a 32-per cent increase in the number of holdings, 29 per cent in operated land area).

¹⁰ In assessing changes in land area operated in agriculture for over two decades, we use as a finishing point not the physical values (i.e. those established by the agricultural censuses) but rather the analytically developed counterparts thereof (by N. J. Kurian). That they reflect realistically both the tendencies and the scope of change is suggested by data (alas, incomplete) at our disposal provided by another all-India government body: the National Sample Survey Organization. According to agricultural censuses, in the period 1970-1971 to 1980-1981 the total number of operational land holdings increased by 26.1 per cent (and by 51.2 per cent according to data based on calculations referring to 1990-1991) and by 24.5 per cent in rural India according to data of the National Sample Survey Organization (and by 62.7 per cent in 1991-92). According to the latter, changes in the specific weights of the marginal and small holdings were as follows (by percentage):*

Thus for two decades the structure of land holdings by economic group of land users in India underwent dramatic changes. One may identify, first and foremost, two lines of change. First, *a decrease of land area per production unit (farm) took place in virtually all groups of holdings*, but the large-holding group was most strongly affected. Even if one makes allowance for the fact that large landowners succeeded in distributing their land ownership among relatives and other men of straw, this circumstance cannot undo the fact that as an *object of economic activity*—not ownership—the land holdings per family used for productive purposes became continually *smaller* in the group of large land users. Second, the economic space occupied by the *smallest and small land users* increased substantially. The aggregate share of the latter had grown: from 70 per cent to 78 per cent by the number of holdings (from 68 per cent to 81 per cent according to the National Sample Survey Organization [NSSO]), and from 21 per cent to 31 per cent by operated land area (from 24 per cent to 34 per cent according to the NSSO). In other words, for the two decades in question, the least efficient farms (at least regarding labour productivity; see below) in India advanced towards the point where they would become *major economic agents of the farm economy*.

It is precisely in the deepening deformations of the interaction between agricultural land and labor that the processes of *massive marginalization of production units of the farm economy in postreform India* received their point of reference. The National Sample Survey Organization noted these processes in citing the following series of indicators:¹¹

	1960–1961	1970–1971	1981–1982	1991–1992
Average operated land area per farm, ha	2.63	2.20	1.67	1.34

	1960–1961	1970–1971	1981–1982	1991–1992
Marginal holdings	39.1	45.8	56.0	62.8
Small holdings	22.6	22.4	19.3	17.8

* See: *Sarvekshana, Journal of the National Sample Survey Organization* (Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Planning) 12 (1) (1988), 33, 34, 42; 20 (3) (1997), 17, 20.

¹¹ *Sarvekshana*, 20 (3) (1997), 17.

For three decades, the average land area operated in India contracted by half, like the magic skin of Balzac's dreamworld.

These processes were a graphic manifestation of the deeper crisis within the system of organization of agricultural productive forces, caused by the land-saving technological pattern of production. This crisis struck the former colonial periphery with particular violence in the post-war period because of the demographic explosion.

Non-agricultural economic realms in India have been unable to absorb the labour surplus produced by changes in the farm economy. This is evident from the high incidence of poverty among so many Indians—the rural areas account for from 75–80 per cent of the total number of India's poor. The specific weight of persons living below the poverty line in India's total population has changed as follows since the beginning of the 1970s (by per cent):¹²

<i>Year</i>	<i>Rural areas</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>India as a whole</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Rural areas</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>India as a whole</i>
1973–1974	54.6	53.1	1989–1990	37.6	38.0
1978–1979	51.2	50.1	1991–1992	40.0	39.4
1984–1985	43.8	43.3	1992–1993	41.7	40.7
1987–1988	39.1	39.3	1994–1995	40.7	39.6

⁽¹⁾ *Classed in this category were persons earning an income lower than the level at which it is possible to ensure a per capita diet of not less than 2,400 kcal per day in rural areas (not less than 2,100 kcal in urban areas).*

Thus, as concluded by the Expert Group of India's Planning Commission, which made the above estimates, the greatest progress in reducing poverty for the two decades under review largely took place during the first half of the period. Moreover, since the end of the 1980s the poverty zone in India appears to have entered a phase of stabilization, with roughly 40 per cent of the country's population classified as poor.¹³

¹² *Draft Mid-Term Appraisal 1992–97*, 60; "Social Indicators of Development for India," 1233.

¹³ For instance, the 'poverty zone' comprised 355 million persons in 1992, with 269 million of them living in rural areas [S. P. Gupta, "Economic Reform and Its Impact on Poor," in *Economic and Political Weekly* 30 (22) (1995), 1298], Moreover,

Thus the tangle of contradictions which I will conditionally call the *demographic siphon-based land complex* (DLC) was formed in India's agricultural sector. Its formation has been a dynamic process encompassing an ever-greater economic space of the farm economy. Under the conditions of the DLC, a high birth rate, although observed in many social groups of the rural population (including the well-to-do) has particularly painful effects among marginal and poor families. The latter have traditionally strived for a safety net. The high birth rate stimulates a further marginalization of small-scale farming and, correspondingly, of the area of cultivated lands, thus aggravating the problems of land hunger for large sectors of the rural population. The DLC is paralyzing government social policy.

It is no coincidence that in recent decades the function of land reform emphasized in India has been to relieve the demographic pressure on economic resources. And in this capacity, land reform is called upon to play the role of an effective instrument for the "population stabilization strategy".¹⁴

It has been empirically proved that in India (and in other countries) "rural fertility is closely linked to land ownership," and, although "this fertility-depressing effect of land ownership is limited to households with small farms",¹⁵ the latter form the vast majority of India's rural population. It is therefore obvious that the decrease in fertility

much data points to a worsening quality of life within the poverty zone since the second half of the 1980s. We must assess the decline in the per capita food supply in India since 1984-1985, shown by the following annual indices of per capita caloric and protein intake per day:*

	1965-196	1973-197	1978-197	1980-198	1984-1985	1989-1990	1991-1992
Calorie intake,	2111	2296	2366	2404	2481	2283	2139
Protein, g	n.a.	63.6	62.3	62.8	n.a.	61.8	54.1

* Social Indicators of Development for India, 1234.

As follows from these data, during this quarter century the per capita diet in India in terms of energy supply had, after having experienced a phase of growth, come full circle by the 1990s. It is now characterized by the same (and, by protein content, even worse) parameters as found in India's agricultural sector on the eve of its transition toward modern economic growth. This is especially disappointing since overcoming these has been and remains a central focus of state economic and social policy.

¹⁴ Sonalde Desai and Soumya Alva, "Land Redistribution. A Popular Stabilization Strategy?" in *Economic and Political Weekly* 33 (10) (Bombay, 1998), 533,

¹⁵ Desai and Alva. "Land Redistribution," 536.

is closely connected with the strict execution of the almost forgotten *land ceiling laws* (especially if we take into account that a number of them are aimed at realizing the principle that land belongs to the person who cultivates it), and with the subsequent redistribution of 'surplus' land among the small and marginal peasantry.¹⁶ The land ceiling laws, long consigned to political oblivion, could acquire a second life in the contemporary setting.

The DLC forms a mighty depressor, lowering the potential of India's agricultural sector to effect a transition toward a new type of agricultural production. Indeed, the farming pattern of India's agricultural sector in the technological realm is generally marked by a generally very inefficient use of natural resources.

The output per unit of cultivated area (as one of the factors exerting a decisive importance on the volume of the value added), despite all the achievements in agricultural intensification (sometimes substantial, if judged by the standards of India's agrarian economy), remains one of the lowest in the world in a great majority of sectors (see Table 2).

Table 2. *Production and productivity of selected crops in India during 1993–1995* by world rank*

<i>Crop</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Yield, kg/ha</i>	<i>Rank in the World</i>	
			Production	Yield
Rice (paddy)	China	5900	1	7
	India	2880	2	51
Wheat	China	3495	1	27
	India	2394	2	43
Maize	USA	7380	1	16
	India	1583	8	98
Pulses	India	588	1	126
Sugar cane	Brasil	65,607	1	39
	India	66,683	2	35

¹⁶ The small peasant landowner quite clearly imagines what the critical lower limit of the land holding area is, which may serve as a basis for the survival of his family. The further fragmentation of a land holding of such size may only mean that the peasant family falls below the poverty line. That is why the realization of the land ceiling laws, which might provide an impulse for the formation of a relatively large group of small owners (agricultural producers), is regarded as a factor depressing "surplus" fertility [see: Desai and Alva. "Land Redistribution," 536].

Table 2. (*cont.*)

<i>Crop</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Yield, kg/ha</i>	<i>Rank in the World</i>	
			Production	Yield
Groundnut	China	2579	1	14
	India	919	2	70
Cotton (lint)	China	805	1	17
	India	257	3	62
Tobacco	China	1581	1	45
	India	1413	3	56
Onion	China	17,272	1	48
	India	10,811	2	56

* Compiled from: Ramesh Chand, *Import Liberalization and Indian Agriculture. The Challenge and Strategy* (New Delhi: NCAP Publication Committee, 1997), 35–40. Data from the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, are used.

What is remarkable is that the lowest ranks in the world hierarchy of indices of productivity fall to those (grain-producing) branches which experienced a boom of technological transformation during the green revolution, which ushered in a fundamentally new type of agricultural farming in India (particularly in wheat farming).

Such a striking lag of India's agricultural productivity must be assessed against the background of the equally impressive fact that India has become firmly one of the world's largest agricultural producers, when measured by the amount of output (see Table 2). In other words, if one compares according to the parameters of agricultural productivity, India's agricultural sector in the 1990s is producing crop yields per unit of cultivated area typical of the low-productivity farming systems found in the "labour-saving technologies" zone in the era before the technological revolution, or in some cases in its earlier period. This is as opposed to modern farming systems (irrespective of the type of technologies used), where a systemic transition toward a science-intensive stage of growth is under way. Moreover, backward farming technologies with inherently low crop yields continue to dominate several major sectors of Indian agriculture.

With relatively low agricultural productivity (if viewed by international standards), enormous areas of land under cultivation, including, what is particularly important, those in marginal-type farms, are used for "low-income" crops. This, incidentally, is a reflection of residual forms of traditional intraeconomic division of labour in

agricultural farming. This automatically leaves many of the smallest farms below the poverty line. This problem has long been a problem for the Indian bureaucracy running agricultural policy. For that reason, the expected use of high-income crops is believed, in academic as well as government circles,¹⁷ as crucial to developing a new agricultural strategy.¹⁸

But the most depressing factor of agricultural growth in India is that for more than half a century of post-war development both the state and agricultural producers have proved incapable of *transforming the technological and economic conditions to ensure an increase in labour efficiency* (with very modest exceptions).

The slow progress in improving crop productivity, with its discreet character (in time) and enclaved nature (in space), has not been countered by a commensurate (let alone greater) progress in *labour-saving in the agricultural sector*. This is so whether one looks at production of specific crops or at specific areas of their cultivation. Such counter-forces were historically important before the scientific and technological revolution started in the countries of the labour-saving technological mode of production (TMP) zone.

Moreover, as noted above, the constant reinforcement of the rural reservoir of manpower with fresh resources is accompanied by the growth of land cramming in India, which intensifies the marginalization of the farm economy. This factor places a *powerful limit on the growth of agricultural labour-saving*.

Indeed, labour productivity, if measured in terms of agricultural output per unit of labour time expended, had by the mid-1990s

¹⁷ See, for instance, V. S. Vyas, "Agricultural Policies for the Nineties. Issues and Approaches," in *National Bank News Review* 10 (3) (Bombay, 1994), 2, 3, 8.

¹⁸ Note the following important fact: India, a country of the "land-saving" technological mode of production (TMP) zone, could never effectively realize the tendencies of land-saving through traditional methods inherent in that TMP (which presupposes, among other things, a transition to broad cultivation of relatively high-yielding, intensive crops) *by the initial stage of modern economic growth*. In this sense India continues to reap the 'benefits' of the colonial yoke, under which the colonialists succeeded in arresting the onward march of agricultural development of the vast country within the framework of the "land-saving" TMP. They did this by imposing on Indian farmers, besides a heavy tax burden, specific crop patterns subjected to the needs of the imperial mother country and the world market. By contrast, Japan, which had no experience of colonial dependence, managed to make good use of the factors of traditional land-saving on the eve of the massive intrusion of the industrial system into her agriculture.

remained almost unchanged (see Table 3) over the overwhelming portion of India's cultivated land area. It had basically retained the characteristics of a traditional economy.¹⁹ Particularly impressive is more than half a century of stagnating labour productivity in the main sector of cereal farming, that of rice production.

Table 3. *Labour productivity in India's agriculture*

I. *Crop output per hour by states, 1983-84 to 1995-96, in kg*

<i>Wheat</i>			<i>Rice (paddy)</i>			<i>Raw cotton</i>		
State	1983-1984	1995-1996	State	1983-1984	1995-1996	State	1983-1984	1995-1996
Haryana	6.5	11.8	Punjab	9.9	9.5	Haryana	-	1.8
Punjab	7.1	10.8	Madhya Pradesh	-	3.1	Punjab	0.7	1.7
Rajasthan	3.2	5.9 ⁽¹⁾	Andhra Pradesh	2.6	-	Karnataka	1.6	-
Madhya Pradesh	3.5	5.2	Uttar Pradesh	2.6	-	Tamil Nadu	-	0.9
Uttar Pradesh	3.6	4.9 ⁽¹⁾	West Bengal	2.4	2.9 ⁽²⁾	Gujarat	0.9	-
Bihar	2.5	-				Maharashtra	0.7	0.8

II. *Rice producing states. Rice output per hour (in cleaned rice equivalent) by year, in kg*

1933-1936 ⁽³⁾	1954-1955-1956-1957 ⁽³⁾	1957-1958-1959-1960 ⁽⁴⁾	1968-1969 ⁽⁴⁾	1970-1971 ⁽⁵⁾	1972-1973 ⁽³⁾	1984-1985 ⁽³⁾	1994-1995 ⁽⁶⁾
1.3	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.8

¹⁹ Moreover, as identified by the Indian researcher Sumit Guha, in certain regions of Western India an *increase in labour time expenditure on the production of every unit of grain output* was noted when comparing the period from the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, with standards disclosed by statistical surveys from the 1880s! A *recoil in labour productivity* must have occurred during the period immediately preceding the green revolution [see: Sumit Guha, "Labour Intensity in Indian Agriculture, 1880-1970," in *Economic and Political Weekly* 25 (52) (1990), A-191, A-192].

III. *The State of Punjab. Wheat output per hour by year, in kg*

Period ⁽⁷⁾ (year)	Value	Period ⁽⁷⁾ (year)	Value	Period ⁽⁷⁾ (year)	Value
1929–1930	1.8	1960–1961	1.9	1976–1979	5.3
1935–1936	1.5	1963–1964	1.8	1980–1983	7.1
1939–1940	2.1	1969–1970	4.4	1984–1987	7.5
1950–1951	1.9	1972–1975	4.8	1995–1996	10.8

* Compiled and calculated from: publication series “Farm Management Studies” by the Agro-Economic Research Centres, states of West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Punjab for the 1950s to the 1970s. Publications by the Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab (Lahore, Chandigarh, Ludhiana) were used for the 1930s to the 1960s. Also used: N. J. Kurian, “Employment Potential in Rural India,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 25 (52) (1990), 182; Sumit Guha, “Labour Intensity in Indian Agriculture, 1880–1970,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 25 (52) (1990), A-189, A-190; D. S. Sidhu and Derek Byerlee, “Technical Change and Wheat Productivity in Post-Green Revolution Punjab,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 26 (52) (1991), A-160; *Report of the Commission for Agricultural Cost and Prices for Crops Sown in 1997–98 Season* (New Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture, 1998), 173, 176, 277; Madhusudan Ghosh, “Technological Change and Employment Generation in a Rice-Based Agriculture,” in *Agricultural Situation in India* (Delhi), 42 (10) (1988), 881–888.

⁽¹⁾ The State of Rajasthan, 1994–1995; the State of Uttar Pradesh, 1990–1991.

⁽²⁾ The State of Assam.

⁽³⁾ The Province of Bengal (1954–1955 and later, the State of West Bengal).

⁽⁴⁾ The State of Andhra Pradesh.

⁽⁵⁾ The State of Tamil Nadu.

⁽⁶⁾ The State of Orissa.

⁽⁷⁾ The Province of Punjab (1929–1930); East Punjab (1935–1936, 1939–1940); the State of Punjab in present boundaries (1950–1951 and later).

Since the start of the green revolution (the latter half of the 1960s), positive changes in labour productivity have been observed only in certain enclaves, regions with the most developed agricultural farming such as the states of Punjab (3 per cent of the country’s cultivated area) and Haryana (2.5 per cent) (see Table 3). It was not until the turn of the 1990s that labour-saving developments in Indian agriculture seemed to gain some additional impetus, although this again took place within a limited area. This was connected with the consolidation of the stratum of middle (capitalist) farmers (as it is customary to call them in Indian economic studies).²⁰

The trends towards stagnation of labour productivity, which had established themselves in Indian agriculture, predetermined the progressive lagging of this major sector of the national economy. In the

²⁰ Whereas in 1985–86 only 3.4 tractors were employed in India per 100 hectares of cropped area, in 1995–96 the figure had jumped to 7.5 tractors.

years after independence, the relative macroefficiency of labour exhibited by agriculture has decreased. This is clear in the following data:²¹

	1950– 1951	1960– 1961	1970– 1971	1980– 1981	1990– 1991	1996– 1997
Specific weight of those employed in agriculture and related sectors, ⁽¹⁾ per cent	72.3 ⁽²⁾	69.5	69.7	60.5	66.9	64.0
Specific weight of agricultural product in the gross domestic product, per cent	51.2 ⁽²⁾	48.5	45.8	39.6	32.9	29.4

⁽¹⁾ Forestry and fishing.

⁽²⁾ Share of agricultural population alone accounted for 69.8 per cent and share of net agricultural product 50.0 per cent.

As can be seen from the data cited, the speed of decline of agriculture's share of the national product has far exceeded the decrease in the nationwide share of the labour force taking part in the creation of this portion of the product. Whereas at the turn of the 1950s it took the labour of 1.4 agricultural workers to create a unit of national product, in the mid-1990s this had grown to 2.18 workers. Put differently, the labour of each worker engaged in agriculture was becoming relatively less and less productive as the economy grew. (This, incidentally, was a characteristic feature of all the developing countries in the era of their industrial growth.)

²¹ Compiled from: *Census of India 1991, State Profile 1991* (Delhi, Govt. of India, Controller of Publications, 1998), 136; *Estimates of National Income 1964–65* (Delhi, Govt. of India, 1966), 2; *Indian Agriculture in Brief*, 21st ed. (Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture, 1987), 3; *Indian Agriculture in Brief*, 12th ed. (Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture, 1973), 224, 225; *Indian Agriculture in Brief*, 4th ed. (Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture, 1958), 9, 14; *Indian Economic Survey 1996–97*, 155.

From this it follows that during a half century of economic growth an *economic pattern with excessively high production costs* was formed and reproduced in India's farm economy. Its pivotal constructions were (and remain) the processes of marginalization (or, perhaps, to be more exact, general disaggregation) of agricultural farms. Moreover, these processes took place against the background of the already existing mass of non-viable production units on the one hand, and stagnation of agricultural labour efficiency, frozen at an exceedingly low level, on the other.

Such a model of the agricultural economy presupposed, even at an extremely low wage level (see below), a high cost of the Indians' staple food, grain, and, respectively, of the labour fund (the fund for compensating the cost of labour force) of the nation's working population. The fact of the matter is that with marginal labour efficiency in the grain-producing sectors, *the market (i.e. natural) price of cereal crops would be fixed so high that a large part of the population, first and foremost the groups living below the poverty line (and these, as we have seen, comprise two-fifths of the whole Indian population), given the naturally forming (market) prices of grain, would, find themselves unable to acquire it in quantities that ensure, to use Karl Marx's phrase, "a physical minimum of means of subsistence."* This is even more true since the poverty zone has been more afflicted with underemployment and unemployment, and the ensuing scarcity of income sources.

Indeed, throughout the 1980s, the internal market prices of wheat, the basic grain accumulated by the state for the public distribution system, were year on year 10.7 per cent higher than world prices.²² During the 1990s, this margin increased still more: in March 1998, the internal market price of wheat exceeded the world price of wheat (i.e. the price of Chicago Board of Trade) by 50 per cent (by 23 per cent with respect to lower-quality wheat varieties), while in September, 1999, the latter was more than 20 per cent lower than the state purchasing price for wheat in the Punjab, the Indian granary.²³

To sustain the population living in the poverty zone the state was forced to realize wheat out of its grain resources (through the Food

²² Calculated from: Deepak Nayyar and Abhijit Sen, "International Trade and Agricultural Sector in India," in *Economic and Political Weekly* 29 (20) (1994), 1201.

²³ Calculated from: *The Economic Times* (Mumbai), 16 March 1998 and 13 September 1999; *Finansovye izvestia* (Financial News in "Izvestia") (Moscow), 19 March 1998 and 16 September 1999.

Corporation of India—FCI) for rationed consumption among the poor, at a price constituting, according to data for 1998, only 32 per cent of its so-called “economic cost” (this cost comprises the FCI expenditure on market purchases, cost of storage and transportation, and overhead charges). Even rice, whose 1980s internal market price was 36.6 per cent lower than the world price, was realized through the public distribution system at a price which in 1998, for instance, reached only 38.4 per cent of its economic cost.²⁴ Overall, in the 1990s (1991–92 to 1997–98), the state-accumulated grain was sold through all the regulated distribution channels at 64.4 per cent (wheat) to 76.2 per cent (rice) of its economic cost on yearly average. The balance was covered by state food subsidies.²⁵

The extremely low labour efficiency in the farm economy has maintained the excessive relatively high cost of the labour fund, having multiple negative influences upon economic growth. This has been and continues to be one of the worst effects of the increasingly enhanced DLC in India.

Marginal labour efficiency in the agricultural sector also adversely affects the overall competitiveness of the Indian economy. The high cost excesses could only normally be compensated by the fact that the economy could tap the resources of the remaining “relative advantages,” in the form of the cheapest standards of agricultural labour. (The grain equivalent of the wage of male agricultural labourers amounted to three to four and a half kilos of grain [in terms of cleaned rice-per day in the rice producing states of India from the 1980s to the beginning of 1990s. This equalled the amount paid for a day’s work to a French agricultural labourer in the period from the eve of the Great Revolution of the eighteenth century until the 1840s.])²⁶ It was the cheap standards of labour that determined, in particular, the competitiveness of India’s agriculture in individual

²⁴ *Economic Survey 1997–98* (Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, 1998), 72, 74.

²⁵ *Economic Survey 1997–98*, 74.

²⁶ *Zarubezhnyi Vostok i sovremennost’* (The Outer East and Modernity), Ed. by G. F. Kim, Vol. 2, Eds. V. G. Rastyannikov, M. S. Lazarev, (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 16; P. Prudhvikar Reddy, “Trends in Agricultural Wages. An Inter-Regional Analysis in Andhra Pradesh,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 33 (13) (1998), A-17; Kailas Sarap, “Changing Contractual Arrangement in Agricultural Labour Market. Evidence from Orissa,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 26 (52) (1991), 172, 173.

market commodities (when this came into being). But that factor gradually begins to lose significance as the economic process develops.²⁷

The man-made deformations in government economic policies in the farm economy, which have profoundly transformed the whole cost formation process in agriculture, have left a sinister imprint on the already existing standard of high costs inherent in the type of the economy under review.

State regulation and production costs in agriculture: The Indian pattern

Throughout the post-war period, the Indian farm economy was geared toward maximizing the physical volume of agricultural output, especially its food component. In the process, the problem of cutting farming production costs was neglected in state economic policies. The development of natural factors of production, from which all their productive potential was squeezed, was given unquestioned priority. The policy was aimed at ensuring the growth of agricultural product at any price. As pointed out by V. S. Vyas, "The emphasis has mainly been placed on increasing yield per hectare rather than improving the productivity of other factors of production, i.e., labour or animal power".²⁸ We can add, too, such factors as the conservation of the environment, particularly the natural resource basis of economic growth.

Active processes of degradation of the latter were caused by the use of heavy (intensive) technologies of the green revolution that fostered the solution of the most important macroeconomic task—the provision of the country's food resources (particularly grain). The green revolution "has led to numerous environmental problems which became conspicuous by the early 1980s." These were primarily in

²⁷ See especially *The Economic Times*, 10 August 1998; for the progressive loss of competitiveness by a number of sectors of the Indian economy, see: *The Economic Times*, 2 May 1998; *The Economic Times*, 9 October 1998.

²⁸ Vyas, "Agricultural Policies," 7. Another major Indian scholar, Prof. M. L. Dantwala, referring to the problems of production efficiency in agriculture, comes to the following conclusion: "We are worried more about the quantum of investment than about the efficiency of the use of invested resources" [*The Economic Times*, 9 September 1997]. When we recall the case of the USSR and Russia we notice a congeniality of problems!

areas of irrigated cultivation.²⁹ “The natural resources of soil and water are used in a manner that the sustainability of agricultural growth could be easily questioned.” By the existing estimates, “by now [1994], nearly half the agricultural land [!] is affected more or less severely by soil erosion, waterlogging, salinity, formation of gullies and ravines”.³⁰

Moreover, in practice, the functioning of the mechanism of “growth at any price” implied, as it did everywhere in the world, an *escalation of costs*, particularly since the 1980s. By the early 1990s the Indian agricultural sector, laced under an umbrella of state protectionism, developed, to use a surrogate notion of the socialist political economy, a monster of a “hang-the-expense economy” with which the road had been paved few decades earlier by Soviet-style socialism.

Indeed, the farm economy was becoming increasingly inefficient: in the period from 1970–1971 to 1984–1985, “with an increase in the expenditure to the tune of 69 per cent, the incremental output was only 33 per cent”.³¹ “As a result, Indian agriculture is becoming progressively a high-cost agriculture”.³² And this in spite of enormous subsidies provided by the state for the costs of productive inputs, and to cover the cost of preferential crediting (see below). That is to say, not only was the Indian agriculture failing to be transformed into a competitive economic sector, but, on the contrary, it was losing even its previous resource of competitiveness, that of cheap labour factor.

An outstanding role in fostering the high-cost economy in India’s agricultural sector was played by the *collateral (secondary) effects of the subsidies policy*, whose generous benefits were largely reaped by individual agricultural regions (“poles of intensive growth”), and within them the well-to-do farms. It is this policy, so indispensable at the initial stage of modern economic growth, to which the mechanism of escalating costs in agriculture owes its origin.

²⁹ V. Ratna Reddy, “Environment and Sustainable Agricultural Development,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 30 (12) (1995), A-22.

³⁰ Vyas, “Agricultural Policies,” 4. Let us also add to that list heavy ecological damage caused to the natural base of agricultural growth, such as the depletion and degradation of water resources from massive poisoning by chemicals and mineralization.

³¹ Vyas, “Agricultural Policies,” 3; this is the exposition by V. S. Vyas of the main result of a study by M. V. Nadkarn.

³² Vyas, “Agricultural Policies,” 4.

One can identify a few key negative impacts that subsidies policy have had on agricultural growth. The policy of production subsidies is realized in the form of gratuitous shift into agriculture of a portion of the national product produced outside the farming sector. It is this policy that leads to skyrocketing costs of production in the agricultural sector of the national economy.

Moreover, it significantly distorts the proportions of exchange that are determined and normally regulated by the market. This generates home-grown terms of trade, which damage the national economy within the world market as globalisation process spreads. So far as the Indian agrarian sector is concerned, by the 1990s, by common agreement of a number of India's economists, these losses had been found to be incommensurate with the largely obsolete benefits and advantages the policy ensured before, actuating and sustaining the mechanism of modern economic growth in agriculture. The price exchange proportions in a number of agriculture-related sectors were also deformed.³³

What is especially dramatic in the Indian market economy, as under any centrally planned economy, is that not only do subsidies distort the *actual* costs,³⁴ but they also foster the erection of barriers that *destroy the system of producer feedback—from market to production—as a source of incentives to cut the costs and, correspondingly, to increase the economic efficiency of economic activity.*

The agricultural subsidies policies in India extends to the area of consumption by the farm (peasant, entrepreneurial) economy of the fruit of the production infrastructure that is by and large created and owned by the state.

Great amounts of the social product in the form of nonrepayable subsidies are expended on the exploitation of water resources which are distributed through large and medium irrigation systems owned

³³ In India, for instance, the producers of fertilizers have been placed in warm-house conditions: these appropriate half of the entire volume of fertilizer subsidies allocated by the state. It can be easily understood that in such conditions these high-cost enterprises no longer pay any attention to cutting costs [see: *The Economic Times*, 28 April 1997].

³⁴ In some cases, the subsidies policy breeds paradoxes like those mentioned by the Indian researcher, Dr. R. P. S. Malik: "The way the prices of inputs and outputs are currently set in India sends the wrong signal to the farmers that conserving social and water resources is inefficient and depleting them is efficient" [*The Hindustan Times*, 22 November 1993].

by the public sector. In the process, the state pursues a policy of maximum preferential rates in agricultural water use. In some states (for instance, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal) it offers water to agricultural producers free of charge, generating a mentality among water consumers that is destructive for the national economy.³⁵ Hence the result: state-run irrigation requires ever greater costs, reimbursed at the expense of subsidies. These have snowballed from the late 1970s.³⁶ Needless to say, under such conditions nonreimbursed irrigation costs (in the class of “large and medium irrigation”) are soaring. This greatly increases agricultural production costs.³⁷

The same phenomena can be observed in agrarian-sector consumption of another important resource of economic growth: electric energy. This is provided to agricultural producers (mostly for tubewell irrigation) at extremely favourable, state-subsidized rates.³⁸ Free electric energy is being misappropriated on an unprecedented scale: even at the preferential rates, only one-third to two-fifths of electric energy consumed in agriculture is currently paid for.³⁹

³⁵ One of the motives invoked by the states’ governments to defend the validity of the policy of low rates of irrigation charges is curious: “Water rates are looked upon, by most farmers and even some experts, as a *tax* paid by the farmers. Hence they need have no relation to the cost incurred in providing irrigation water. It is the total contribution of the farmer to the national exchequer . . . , which should be taken into account” [Ashok Gulati, et al. “Major and Medium Irrigation Schemes Toward Better Financial Performance,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 29 (26) (1994), A-76, emphasis added]. This reflects the mindset of economic agents of the “high-cost economy.”

³⁶ Over the period from 1977–1978 till 1986–1987, the sum of invisible subsidies paid for large and medium irrigation works rose from being roughly 30 per cent of the annual investment in the construction of such works to 70 per cent, “. . . and is almost certainly much higher today” [i.e., by 1996] [*Draft Mid-Term Appraisal 1992–97*, 218].

³⁷ India’s Planning Commission reports on the dynamics of unrecovered costs of major and medium irrigation works over the period from 1977–1978 to 1986–1987: these increased fivefold, reaching 15.25 billion rupees; and, in 1977–1978, they accounted for 36.1 per cent of the aggregate sum of public investment in irrigation and melioration, and jumped to 47.3 per cent in 1986–1987 [*Draft Mid-Term Appraisal 1992–97*, 218; *Indian Economic Survey 1996–97*, S-41].

³⁸ Electricity rates for rural regions account for a third of those in the country as a whole. In some states (in Tamil Nadu since the 1980s, in Punjab since the 1990s) electricity is supplied to farmers free of charge (for utilization in tubewell irrigation) [Gupta, “Economic Reform,” 1298; *The Economic Times*, 12 March 1997].

³⁹ The patterns of energy loss are multiform—they include not only excessive consumption of electric energy due to the Indian farmers’ lack of incentive to save production resources offered free of charge, but also the massive theft of electric

Moreover, the energy network created for the farm economy is extremely inefficient, and that electric energy supplied to rural consumers free of charge boomerangs against the economic efficiency of energy consumption: farmers are deprived of incentives to renew minor irrigation equipment owned by them.⁴⁰ As a result, the energy complex of India's farm economy is making an increasing contribution to the surplus production costs of agriculture.

Certainly, farmers demand and receive their "pound of flesh" (large subsidies from the "budget granaries") for mineral fertilizer consumption, the most important means, along with water, of intensifying production. This too contributes toward inflation of agricultural costs and degradation of the natural resources used in production.⁴¹

A mighty flow of credit resources into the agricultural sector,⁴² largely state-financed (at reduced rates of interest) and state-distributed through a network of state-supported credit institutions (primary agricultural credit societies, regional rural banks) and commercial banks, has been accompanied by a mounting wave of overdues.⁴³ How much this resembles the situation in contemporary Russia!

power, which is taking on the character of national disaster [*The Economic Times*, 21 December 1996].

⁴⁰ According to field experiments, allowing for transmission and distribution losses, losses in the exploitation of irrigation equipment (pumping sets, generating plants) and those incurred for other reasons, only eight per cent of the total amount of energy supplied to agricultural consumers from thermal power stations is actually being consumed in the production process. "That is the magnitude of the inefficiency built into the present system" [of energy consumption in agriculture] [S. N. Roy, "Debating Power Saving Possibilities in Agriculture," in *The Economic Times*, 19 January 1996].

⁴¹ Lavish government spending on water use has already led to overexploitation of surface and ground water resources. This raises "concern about the long-term sustainability of agricultural production" [S. Mahendra Dev, "Farm Subsidy: More Pain, Less Gain," in *The Economic Times*, 12 March 1997]. Another researcher pointed out that "when inputs are cheaply available, they are wastefully used." He concluded that "subsidies are environmentally undesirable." For instance, due to cheap electric power, "pumps are not well maintained, water is wastefully used and fields get waterlogged" [Kirit Parikh, "How to Phase out Fertilizer Subsidy," in *The Economic Times*, 28 April 1997].

⁴² From the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s the amount of credit annually supplied to agricultural producers via formal credit institutions, according to my calculations, accounted for roughly eight to nine per cent of agriculture's share of the GNP.

⁴³ In commercial banks active in rural areas, overdues began to decrease only with the start of the economic reform of the 1990s (see below); while in 1992 overdues made up 46 per cent of the amount of extended credit, in 1996 that figure was just 38 per cent [see: *Economic Survey 1997-98*, 120].

Outstanding liabilities were organically built into costs, inflating them still more. Furthermore, as concluded by India's Ministry of Finance, "There is a serious problem of overdues which has not only been inhibiting credit expansion [in the farm economy], but also economic viability of lending institutions, especially the cooperatives and the RRB's" [regional rural banks].⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the state pulled the knot of that serious problem tighter by adopting at the turn of the 1990s the practice (assimilated back in the era of socialist construction in the USSR) of "a large-scale write-off of bank loans to farmers . . . which . . . has dealt a heavy blow to the agricultural credit system of the country".⁴⁵ The general assessment of its condition by the Ministry of Finance, made in the mid-1990s, is full of pessimism: "The present system of agricultural credit suffers from poor recovery of loans, high costs of intermediation by cooperatives and banks and the legacy of debt write-offs which has contributed to a culture of non-recovery".⁴⁶

The *expansion of overcharges* made by the bureaucracy to deal with the turnover of agricultural products, so familiar to us from socialist economies, has grown to major proportions in India's farm economy. According to Ramesh Chand, multiple evidence testifies to the "low operational efficiency of the state sector" in India's agriculture, "which has been increasing over the years." Thus by the mid-1980s (1985–1986), ". . . the economic cost of wheat handled by the FCI was 22 per cent higher than the procurement price in early 1970s, which increased to 30 per cent by 1977–1978 and further escalated to 54 per cent by 1985–1986 . . . without any commensurate increase in the services added to the produce".⁴⁷ Such escalations of state expenditures naturally contributed greatly to a rise in agricultural costs.

We can add to this that twenty-five years of efforts by India's succeeding cabinets to introduce an income tax relative to incomes generated in agriculture have been a complete failure. With the beginning of the "new economic policy" in the agricultural sector in the early

⁴⁴ *Indian Economic Survey 1996–97*, 150.

⁴⁵ B. M. Bhatia, "Time to Reform," in *The Hindustan Times*, 3 January 1992.

⁴⁶ *The Hindustan Times*, 25 February 1994.

⁴⁷ Ramesh Chand, *Import Liberalization and Indian Agriculture. The Challenge and Strategy* (New Delhi: NCAP Publication Committee, 1997), 29.

1990s, its creator (India's Agriculture Minister) announced that agriculturists will not be subjected to the "regulatory and tax collection machinery of the government" at all.⁴⁸ Thus, one can hardly doubt the validity of the following main conclusion of the World Bank on the nature of agricultural growth in India: "Even moderate growth in the sector has come at a high cost, *both to the budget and the economy*" (emphasis added).⁴⁹

A policy based on non-repayable infusions into agriculture, increasing amounts of material and financial (not to speak of natural) resources belonging to the nation, has come, over time, to resemble the mythical Kronos who devoured his children—aimed at stimulating economic growth in agriculture, it acts as a powerful factor *undermining the very basis of such growth*.

India's experience in the 1980s and 1990s has convincingly proven the truth—repeated many times over in history—that *with limited resources of growth, priority in their distribution is frequently given to policies that bring small but immediate returns, as distinct from policies calculated to resolve fundamental strategic tasks, with much greater and steady return but in a more distant future*. The free and, correspondingly, predatory consumption of resources of growth ensured through the mechanism of state distribution (i.e. subsidies policies) has become a favourite of economic policy-makers in Indian agriculture. As a result, potential investments which might be channeled into agriculture to form the basis of long-term economic growth, is increasingly diverted to current productive expenditure. A consequence is that *the worst parameters of production costs* are being formed (here one may recall the persistent distortion of costs whose proportions do not conform to those determined by the market).

In the early 1980s the vigorous drain of the investment potential from the farm economy began reaching a negative peak by the end of that decade (see Table 4, Section I). In only fifteen years (by 1994) India succeeded in recovering the per hectare capital formation level of the late-1970s, and by the middle of the 1990s, already in the midst of economic reform (see below), a certain increment of the above-mentioned indicator became apparent (see Table 4).

⁴⁸ Bal Ram Jakhar, "New Agricultural Policy," in *Yojna* (Delhi), 15 August 1993.

⁴⁹ Quoted from: Bhatia, "Time to Reform."

Particularly impressive is that “the increasing subsidies have been ‘crowding out’ public investment in agriculture”.⁵⁰ Over the fifteen years under review, the latter decreased both absolutely (1.4–1.8 times), and relatively (by nearly 40 per cent) (see Table 4, Section II). Moreover, agricultural investments of the public sector were losing their place in the nationwide investment process. In the words of the former Indian Minister of Agriculture, “from 15.3 per cent in 1980–1981, the share of capital formation in agriculture in the public sector declined to barely 5.6 per cent in 1990–1991” with a decline in total gross capital formation in agriculture from 18.6 per cent of the all-India gross capital formation in 1978–1979 to 9.5 per cent in 1990–1991.⁵¹

Meanwhile, the problem of nonrepayable state expenditures (subsidies) on current productive consumption is increasing without restraint.⁵² According to one “conservative estimate,” the input subsidies allocated for agriculture rose from 51 per cent of the total planned expenditure on agriculture (central and state together), in the early 1980s, to about 142 per cent in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, the productivity enhancing expenditure declined from 60 per cent of the total agricultural expenditure in 1981–1982 to 38 per cent in 1994–1995.⁵³

Table 4. *Gross capital formation in Indian agriculture, 1965–1966 to 1996–1997**

I. *Index of changes in gross investment per hectare of net cropped area*⁽¹⁾ (constant prices, 1980–1981; cf. 1979–1980 to 1981–1982 = 100%)

Year	Index	Year	Index	Year	Index	Year	Index
1965–1966	50.8	1981–1982	93.9	1986–1987	86.4	1991–1992	100.9
1970–1971	61.9	1982–1983	89.6	1987–1988	85.6	1992–1993	104.1
1975–1976	76.9	1983–1984	90.2	1988–1989	88.0	1993–1994	114.6
1978–1979	103.3	1984–1985	88.3	1989–1990	90.1	1994–1995	124.7
1979–1980	106.3	1985–1986	88.4	1990–1991	93.8	1995–1996	137.7

⁵⁰ Dev, “Farm Subsidy.”

⁵¹ According to the findings of India’s Minister for Agriculture, “Obviously, the investible resources have been diverted from agriculture to other sectors. This has to be stopped. This is the central theme of the New Agricultural Policy” [Jakhar, “New Agricultural Policy”].

⁵² For the period from 1980–1981 to 1992–1993 alone, such expenditures jumped more than nine times, from 15 billion rupees to 141 billion [Dev, “Farm Subsidy”].

⁵³ Dev, “Farm Subsidy.”

II. *Dynamics of gross public investment: specific weight in aggregate gross agricultural investment and index of absolute values* (constant prices, 1980–1981; 1980–1981 = 100)

Year	Specific weight, %	Index	Year	Specific weight, %	Index
1970–1971	28.6	43.9	1992–1993	19.7	59.1
1980–1981	38.7	100.0	1993–1994	22.9	64.2
1989–1990	26.6	64.4	1994–1995	21.0	73.3
1990–1991	25.1	64.3	1995–1996	18.2	70.6
1991–1992	21.2	55.8	1996–1997	16.2	63.0

* Compiled and calculated from: *Indian Economic Survey 1996–97* (Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, 1997), 151, S-14, S-18; *Draft Mid-Term Appraisal of the Eighth Five Year Plan 1992–97* (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Planning Commission, 1996), 193; *Economic Survey 1997–98* (Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, 1998), 117; “Agriculture in the National Accounts of India,” in *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 47 (2) (1992), 294–303; *Agricultural Situation in India* (Delhi), 46 (12) (1992), 961.

⁽¹⁾ The index has been calculated on the basis of triennial sliding average values of gross investment per hectare of net cropped area.

The facts cited enable one to draw the following, at least preliminary, conclusion: as far as *modern* economic growth of India’s agricultural economy is concerned, for one and a half decades—from the turn of 1980s—the country developed a *pattern of a farm economy with attenuating impulses towards self-propelled growth*. This pattern’s realisation would also mean *eating away, without recompense, an ever-growing amount of national productive resources*. Any step along the path of economic progress would be paid for *at an ever higher rate*. Such was found to be the cost of government regulation which set in motion the *mechanism of high-cost economy*, rejecting market determinants.

The disastrous consequences of such an economic pattern were clearly perceived by state authorities. A diagnosis by the Indian Finance Ministry of the influence of the subsidial disease on the economic dynamics in the agricultural sector, made in its annual report of 1994 to Parliament rings like a *cri de coeur*: “The rate of investment in agriculture has stagnated or even declined in recent years; in many areas existing public capital assets are deteriorating for want of adequate funds for operation and maintenance. Reversal of this trend will require a shift in the balance of public expenditure for the agricultural sector from large input subsidies to creation and maintenance of public economic structure. . . . But the resources for this are likely to be available only if the massive subsidies provided for water, electricity and fertilisers are scaled down. It has to be appreciated that if the charges for water and electricity are not raised

to appropriate levels, then the delivery of these critical inputs is likely to worsen over time and *undermine agricultural development*” (emphasis added).⁵⁴

During the 1980s and the 1990s the challenges to the Indian economy’s growth became increasingly acute. That was, *inter alia*, a reflection of intensifying worldwide globalisation. The imperatives of the latter compelled the authorities to open safety valves wider to spread the influence of market determinants throughout the farm economy. This stimulated processes which would save labour and, correspondingly, establish normal competitiveness, namely, those formed by economic methods as distinct from those ensured by the fading “comparative advantages”, i.e. advantages granted by Nature, or embodied in cheap labour. Meanwhile, despite the economic reform under way since the 1990s, which fostered a fuller integration of the Indian economy into the world market system,⁵⁵ the scale of price distortions of production costs in agriculture have barely decreased. Enormous amounts continue to be spent on subsidies, price support policy et al., though it is becoming increasingly difficult for the state to sustain such wasteful patterns of agricultural growth, which do not dovetail with market requirements.

Let us draw some brief conclusions. The foundation of the pattern of *modern* economic growth in Indian agriculture was laid at the turn of the 1970s when the nation’s agrarian economy entered, to use here a concept of the American economist W. Rostow, a “take-off stage” of development.⁵⁶ Discoveries in the field of biology generated by the scientific and technological revolution were applied with

⁵⁴ Quoted from: *The Hindustan Times*, 25 February 1994.

⁵⁵ Among the greatest results achieved by the reform one may point to the growth of gross capital formation in agriculture (see Table 4), which started at the time of the reform. What is especially important is that this growth took place almost exclusively at the expense of greater increases in private per cent shares of investment than public. Changes in the correlation between them are evident in the following data (by percentage):*

Investment	1970–1971	1980–1981	1990–1991	1995–1996	1996–1997
Public	28.6	38.7	25.1	18.2	16.2
Private	71.4	61.3	74.9	81.8	83.8

* *Economic Survey 1997–98*, 117.

⁵⁶ Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

particular vigour to the resource potential of the agricultural sector (irrigated lands above all), accumulated during the era of the domination of the traditional economy. The attenuation of this pattern of growth fell on the 1980s (as far as investment is concerned) and the 1990s (in case of productivity).

The processes of shaping a new (modern) technological type of production, in which the above transition finds its expression, have involved only a small part of the economic space of the agricultural sector—the irrigated farming areas. To put it differently, the pattern of economic growth which was becoming entrenched in India's agriculture spawned *uneven development of economic potential of both individual agricultural areas and individual groups of farms* (the Punjab phenomenon clearly demonstrates this).

In contrast to Japan, India did not succeed in overcoming the negative impact of the demographic explosion on its agrarian economy; pressure on production resources mounted swiftly. As a result, in the second half of this century there developed a DLC, which, to use the term of the American agrarian scholar D. Thorner, turned into a *“built-in depressor” of the entire agricultural growth pattern*. Under the influence of the DLC, the operated land area of production units was contracting; as time went on, this undermined the economic foundation of rational (at least “economic, cost-reimbursable”) farm management of an increasing number of farming households. The processes of marginalization of operational units have embraced an ever-greater scope of the farm economy in recent decades. They have increasingly generated powerful impulses towards worse structural characteristics of agricultural growth patterns.

The farm economy was also changing under the influence of state protectionist policies. In virtually every place reached by the mighty hand of protectionism in its specific, subsidial form, productive consumption along the patterns of the high-cost economy was becoming an inherent constituent of agricultural growth, a trade mark of the protected farm economy. With the progress of economic development in India, the rapacious use of production resources, bestowed by Nature or created by human labour alike, and the production costs in agriculture have escalated tremendously. By the 1990s India's farm economy had crossed the line beyond which the economic damage produced by escalating production costs started to outweigh the benefits of subsidial protectionism. Paradoxical as it seems, protectionism in its developed form, even as it strengthened the farm econ-

omy, was increasingly moving it away from the market. The formation of a large (by Indian standards), modern farm economy (that is, one based on the use of nonfarm, industrial inputs) did not and does not mean that an *economically efficient farming is being formed*.

In this context one may assess the meaning of the economic reform that started in the early 1990s but has never been fully accomplished, as far as it bears upon the agricultural economy.⁵⁷ Under conditions of the ongoing globalization of market mechanisms, this reform was intended to forestall the accelerating slide of India's farm economy into the class of noncompetitive, crippled economic systems, and therefore its being deprived of the potential of modern economic growth. The significance of this not partially accomplished reform is that it heralded the start of a normal market era in the development of India's agriculture.

Against the background of the entire spectrum of processes that determine economic growth in the agricultural sector, it is necessary to assess the direction of changes in the *character of Indian agriculture as a multiform-structure economy*.⁵⁸ It is evident that for the past five decades the *economic potential of subsistence-based agricultural farming has noticeably increased*, even if many of its constituent units have already shed the cloak of traditional economy relations. An engine of this process was the massive marginalization of the farm economy whose "lower sections," as we have seen, were inflated beyond measure by the inflow of fresh masses of producers who were becoming smaller. The expansion of subsistence-based tendencies in India's agrarian economy was simply a different expression of DLC dynamics.

However, the market-oriented economy sector has considerably strengthened itself during the period under review. The main feature of that process was that the means of production generated by modern industry were drawn into the market (or, to be more exact, conditionally market-oriented) turnover. And it was the green revolution that turned the mechanism of agricultural growth onto a new avenue.

⁵⁷ For more details see: Ashok Gulati and Shashanka Bhide, "What Do the Reformers Have for Agriculture?," in *Economic and Political Weekly* 30 (18-19) (1995).

⁵⁸ For more detail see: Victor G. Rastyannikov, *Agrarian Evolution in a Multi-form Structure Society. Experience of Independent India*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).

Against the background of the developed market-oriented economy, one may discern a type of economic agent which in India is characterized as a “*middle farmer*” *expressing the tendencies of modern enterprise and capitalism by his economic activity*. It is they who become leaders of the capitalist-type farmers, including the diminishing groups of larger landowners (including those from the reforming quarters of the traditional economy *par excellence*). And it is he who epitomizes technological progress in the farm economy to the greatest degree and who represents the best type of farm management (and, in isolated cases, even displays a tendency toward saving labour, as we have found in Punjab and Haryana).

The salient feature of the present stage of development of the private-enterprise sector is that it is experiencing a process of a peculiar fragmentation: on one side of it is a chunk of high-cost, economically rapacious farming, whose reproduction is supported by lavish infusions of free resources belonging to society. It appropriates incomes, using in its interests the battering ram of state protectionism;⁵⁹ On the other side is a farm economy already prepared to accept the rules of the game of the invisible hand of the free market; as one of the designers of the new agricultural policy has put it, its “thrust is on freeing the farm sector from the artificial support systems to make agriculture profitable. . . .” Moreover, “. . . this sector should generate incomes comparable to other sectors, so that the farmers continue to retain interest in farming.” In the process, state intervention in the agrarian economy must be limited to regulating prices of the final product. “The government will continue to discharge its responsibility for ensuring remunerative prices to the farming community.”⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Moreover, independent farm management is already becoming impossible without subsidial supports. G. Parthasarathy forecasts a “reverse motion” in the socio-economic process: the “. . . removal of input subsidies for the rich could result in a shift from entrepreneurial agriculture to rentier agriculture as the large farmers and the rich peasants lease out lands because of reduced profitability” [of farming] [T. Haque, G. Parthasarathy, “Land Reform and Rural Development,” in *Economic and Political Weekly* 27 (8) (1992), 397].

⁶⁰ Jakhar, “New Agricultural Policy.” For this kind of entrepreneur, see an overview of a meeting between agriculturists and the Indian Finance Minister in 1992 [*The Hindustan Times*, 24 January 1992].

PART FOUR
LANGUAGE

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ON THE HISTORY OF TRADITIONAL
ANTHROPOMETRIC TERMS: *QARI* AND OTHER
CENTRAL ASIAN LINEAR MEASURES

Anna V. Dybo

The history of traditional anthropometric systems of measurement falls within the scope of two sciences. One is historical metrology—an auxiliary historical discipline setting the largely metric values of particular measures in particular eras. It does not deal with the anthropometric aspect of these values proper (which is frequently stated in the designations of measures). The other science is historical lexicology, dealing with the names of traditional measures. Most studies in this field limit themselves solely to determining the anthropometric origin of the designation of a measure within the framework of a specific language or group of related languages. What is left out is that the systems of measures are actively used in commercial exchange, and being purely anthropometric (prior to state codification), may be influenced by similar systems of other nations. However, a term with an identical “intentional”—“elbow” for example—may have different “extensionals” in various cultures, that is to say, it may imply different ways of measurement. For example, “elbow” may refer to a measure “the distance from the elbow to the fingertips” or it might mean “the distance from the elbow to the first phalanx of the fingers.” Influences do not necessarily entail lexical borrowings. They may take the form of changes in the metric value of measures. Upon the introduction of state codification of measures, metrological systems began to interact at two levels: the level of initial anthropometric systems stated in the designations of measures, and the level of conversion from one codified system to another. As long as the metrological term exists, entire “metrological” cultural areas are formed and redistributed. Accordingly, such terms should be examined in their synchronic and diachronic aspects against the broader background of their linguistic and environments.

Before proceeding further, the reader must be aware that when analyzing the development and interaction of metrological “sign

systems,” one must identify the following aspects of the “anthropometric sign”:

- (1) Its signifier;
- (2) Its internal form (a derivation from the name of a certain part of the body is possible but not obligatory);
- (3) Its value in the system (equals “*valeur*”: a place in the particular anthropometric system of measures, conventionally correlated with a certain part of the body);
- (4) Its value in the sense of an agreed form of measurement (“distance from . . . to . . .”);
- (5) How relative value is defined (in developed metrological systems, relative value is size converted to basic units—for example, an “elbow” equals 24 “fingers”);
- (6) How metric value is defined (In codified systems, metric value equals the length of a reference ruler, which researchers measure in metric measures—for example a “cloth elbow” is 82.9 cm).

Let us note that aspects (4) and (5) of the measure may continue to function in codified systems. That is, it is known that the “cloth elbow” consists of 40 “fingers,” and in certain cases it is important that this is the nominal distance from the shoulder to the fingertips. The specific metric values of anthropometric measures in uncoded systems, certainly, do not constitute a “side of the sign”; rather, these are the usual values. By “intentional,” I mean aspects (2) and (3), as linking the measure with the anatomical concept, and by “extensional,” is meant aspects (4) (5) and (6), specifying its dimensions.

The Turkic word *qari* originally meant the shoulder (upper) part of the arm¹ but it has become the name of the forearm (from the elbow to the wrist) in most of the Turkic languages. It was also used as a name of a linear measure. In Central Asia, metric values of the *qari* vary widely—from 45 cm to 3 m. Apparently, all these numerical values form a system based on certain anthropometric units, either directly or implicitly.

The equivalents of *qari* in the Persian- and Arabic-speaking designation systems of Central Asia measures² exhibit the same spec-

¹ See *Etimologicheskii Slovar' tyurkskikh yazykov* (Etymological dictionary of Turkic languages) 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 1974–), 5, s.v. *ĠARĪ*.

² Data on metric values of the measures of the Muslim tradition were derived

trum of values: accordingly, *gaz* (see etymology below) and *dar*, *dirā* (literally: “elbow, forearm”).

Two anthropometric systems were probably used in Central Asia: The first was an absolute system based on the mean sizes of the respective parts of the body. The metric values for each of the measures were rather diluted. For Central Asia, the data we have concerning the basin of the River Khingou is that an elbow (the length of the forearm plus the hand, from the ulnar fold to the fingertips) was 45–50 cm;³ a half-fathom (a distance from the middle of the breast to the fingertips with the arm outstretched) was 84–88 cm.⁴ On the basis of these figures and the normal proportions of the human body, it is possible to interpret the measure of? 71 cm as an arm’s length, with the elbow equaling 45 cm and the half-fathom 84 cm. These are the Central Asian *alcin*, some of the *gaz* measures, and the Russian *aršin* which has come from Central Asia).

The history of the name of the *aršin* measure presents a distinct problem.⁵ In the Iranian languages, the following forms exist, dating to pre-Iran. **arašīn-* (equivalent to Sanskr. *aratniḥ* (m.) “Ellenbogen,

here from summary works: Ye. A. Davidovitch, *Materialy po metrologii srednevekovoi Srednei Azii* (Materials on the metrology of medieval Central Asia) (Moscow: Nauka, 1970) and W. Hinz, “Musul’manskie mery vesa s perevodom v metriceskuyu sistemu” (The Muslim measures of weight) in Davidovitch, *Materialy po metrologii srednevekovoi Srednei Azii*.

³ Davidovitch, *Materialy po metrologii srednevekovoi Srednei Azii*, 109.

⁴ Hinz, “Musul’manskie mery vesa s perevodom v metriceskuyu sistemu” in Davidovitch, *Materialy po metrologii srednevekovoi Srednei Azii*, 115–116.

⁵ For the following linguistic data, see V. I. Abayev, *Istoriko-etimologicheskii slovar’ osetinskogo yazyka* (A Historical Etymological Dictionary of the Ossetian Language), I (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, Leningradskoye otdeleniye, 1958), 129; R. Abramyan, *Pekhleviŋsko-persidsko-armyano-russko-angliiskii slovar’* (A Pehlevi-Persian-Armenian-Russian Dictionary) (Yerevan: Akademiya nauk Armyanskoi SSR, Sektor vostokovedeniya, 1965), 44; M. S. Andreyev and E. M. Peshchereva, *Yagnobskie teksty* (Yagnob Texts) (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1957), 229; H. W. Bailey, *Dictionary of Khotan Saka* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 8 [6]; Ch. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch* (Strassburg: K. G. Trübner, 1904), 196, 1021; A. A. Gaffarov, *Persidsko-russkii slovar’* (A Persian-Russian Dictionary), 2 (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniya, 1927), 21, 22; A. L. Grünberg and I. M. Steblin-Kamensky, *Yazyki Vostochnogo Gindukusha: Vakhanskii yazyk* (Languages of the Eastern Hindukush: the Wakhi Language) (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoye otdeleniye, 1976), 298, [5. II. 45, 400–401], *Farkhangii zaboni tojiki (az asri X to ibtidoi asri XX)* (A Dictionary of the Tajik Language from the Tenth to Early Twentieth Century), 1–2 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1969), 920, 922; P. Horn, *Grundriss der neupersischen Etymologie* (Strassburg: K. G. Trübner, 1893), 5; R. G. Kent, *Old Persian* (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1950), 170; G. Morgenstierne,

Elle”:⁶ 1) **araĪna-* (m.): Avest. *arəĪna-* (m.) “Ellenbogen”; 2) **araĪni-* (m.): a) Avest. *fraraĪnay-* (m.) “elbow—a linear measure” (a form with a prefix *fra-* is characteristic of the designations of arm-related measures in the Avestian language); from Avest. comes Pehl. *frārāst*, *frāč̄*; b) ancient Pers. *arašni* “cubit.”;⁷ Middle Pers. (Man. *𐭥𐭮𐭩* (Budd. *lśn*), Pers. *ārāš*, Taj. *aras* “elbow, forearm; linear measure” (could *arəĪ* in the Middle Pers. translation of the Avesta be a New Persian term?). Some other forms in this category are listed in Table 1.

Table 1

Language	Form	Meaning
Baluchi	<i>hariš</i> , <i>harš</i> , <i>harša</i>	“elbow, forearm length”
Sak.	* <i>arina-</i> (< * <i>araĪni-</i>)	“elbow”
Osset. D.	<i>-ārīna</i>	measure; in compounds
Osset. I.	<i>-ārin</i>	<i>idem</i>
Pamir. Shugni	<i>wi-xc-em</i>	
Oroshor., Rushan., Bartang. Yazg.	<i>xic-īrn</i> <i>səm-arn</i> (n.) (< * <i>huška-arina</i>)	
Sarykol.	<i>yom</i>	“elbow”
Wakhi	<i>arət</i> , <i>harət</i> (< * <i>araĪni</i>)	“elbow” (linear measure)

c) **araĪnika-* (dimin.): Sogd., Budd. *𐰽𐰺𐰽𐰺*, Chr. *ʾrync*, borrowed in Pehlevi *aranj* “joint, elbow,” Taj. *orinj*, Old Taj. *orinj*, *oranj*, Pers. *aranž* “elbow, forearm; linear measure,” whence were borrowed, in their turn, Yagnob. *ori:nž*, *oʻ rúnž* “elbow”; Ormuri, Parachi *arunž*, Shugn. *arenž*, Sangl., Ishkash. *arinž*, Wakhi *orinj* “elbow.”

Etymological vocabulary of the Shugni group (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1974), 94; G. Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, I: “Parachi and Ormuri”, 235, 388; G. Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, II: “Iranian Pamir Languages (Yidgha-Munji, Sanglechi-Ishkashimi and Wakhi)” (Oslo: H. Aschehoug, 1938), 381, 468, 514; G. Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, III (Index). 20. Bailey attributes here also the Yidgha *razən*, *razin*, Munj. *rāzən* (m.) “elbow”, which is little likely phonetically (*razən*, *razən* might rather be expected—see: Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, II, 244; Grünberg and Steblin-Kamensky, *Тазыки Востоchnого Гиндукша: Vakhanskii yazyk* (Languages of the Eastern Hindukush: the Wakhi Language), 350.

⁶ M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefaßtes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1963), 47.

⁷ Kent’s opinion that the ancient Persian forms represent an *n-* basis seems based on an erroneous conviction that the word is a formation with the suffix *-tan*. See Kent, *Old Persian*.

Such forms as Old Taj. *orang*, Pers. *arang* “elbow, forearm” should perhaps be explained as borrowings from the undetected Sogd. **arang* < **arank*.⁸ The Pers. *aran* most likely falls into the same category. Bartholomae’s suggestion that *aran* < *arhn* is highly questionable.⁹

Horn¹⁰ attributes Baluchi *harəš*, Pers. *araš* to Avest. *arštya*—in the combination *arštyo-barəzan-* “fathom-high.” This comparison is incorrect, since this combination literally means “high as a spear.” Compare this with the Old Pers. *aršti* “spear”.¹¹

Of all the Iranian forms considered, only Middle Pers. **arišn* may, perhaps, be viewed as a source of the name of the *aršin* measure. Borrowed into the Turkic languages, it has been recorded in the form of *aršin* since the twelfth century and *aršin* since the thirteenth century.¹² In the Russian system of measurements, the *aršin* measure appears at the end of the fifteenth century.¹³ Apparently, it was borrowed from the Turkic languages, not from Pehlevi or Persian where such a term was not observed, and certainly not from Ancient Iranian into Common Slavic, as Kent suggests.¹⁴

The second anthropometric system probably used in Central Asia was a relative system based on a conventional ratio of the lengths of parts of the arm to the basic, conventionally fixed unit—the width of the finger. This type of ratio comes from the ancient Oriental systems—Egyptian and Akkadian-Sumerian—and was repeatedly rebuilt. Naturally, the relative system became largely autonomous, operating and changing on an independent basis, and its units were connected with “absolute” anthropometric units in a rather oblique fashion. Falling on new soil, the relative systems are probably often

⁸ *Osnovy iranskogoazykoznanija: sredneiranskijeazyki* (Fundamentals of Iranian linguistics: Middle Iranian languages) (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), see p. 394 < **araĭnaka?*.

⁹ Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*.

¹⁰ Horn, *Grundriss der neupersischen Etymologie*, 18.

¹¹ Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, 338; Kent, *Old Persian*, 172.

¹² On the Central Asian Tafsīr, see: A. K. Borovkov, *Leksika sredneaziatskogo tefsira XII–XIII vv.* (The Vocabulary of the Central Asian Tafsīr) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1963), 60; on further adaptation—Chagat. *alĭn*, Alt. *arĭn*, see: V. V. Radlov, *Opyt slovarja tyurkskikh nareĭii* (An Essay in a Dictionary of Turkic Dialects), I (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Imperatorskoĭ Akademii nauk, 1893), 323, 426.

¹³ G. Ya. Romanova, *Naimenovaniya mer dliny v russkom yazyke* (Designations of linear measures in the Russian language) (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), 72–73.

¹⁴ Kent, *Old Persian*.

used for reinterpreting the local, traditional “absolute” measures.¹⁵ For Central Asia, evidence suggests the following most commonly used “relative” *arshins*: those consisting of 24, 28, 40 and 49 fingers. This said, the measures consisting of 24 and 28 fingers date to the ancient Middle Eastern measures of “elbow” and “the royal elbow.” The name “royal *arshin*” referred to *arshins* of 40 and 49 fingers (40 fingers was *dira²-i padīšahi* in the State of the Great Moguls; 49 fingers, “the shah’s *gaz*,” in Bukhara; and “the khan’s *gaz*” in Samarkand). This implies a certain parallelism between these two measures.

A system which included “simple” and “royal” elbows had arisen in ancient Egypt, its metric values being ≈ 46 and 52.5 cm respectively. The “royal” elbow was a measure employed in construction and geodesy. One can put forward the following hypothesis concerning why the two elbows emerged: The Egyptian “royal” elbow of 52.5 cm was actually equal to the Akkadian elbow of 52.5 cm, which was considered to be equivalent to 30 (Akkadian) “fingers,” that is, six “palms,” five “fingers” in each palm. A simple Egyptian elbow was said to contain 24 (Egyptian) “fingers,” that is, six “palms” four “fingers” in each. The Akkadian elbow may have been borrowed by the Egyptians and reinterpreted within the framework of the Egyptian system. However, the Egyptians found it unacceptable to count in terms of 30 fingers, since in their system there were only four “fingers” in a “palm” (*dbf*). The thumb was not named a “finger,” (and was not treated as such) but had a special designation (*n.t.*), possibly different from that of the Sumerians and the Akkadians. In Sumerian, only one name for a finger—*dubbin*—is known, which is translated into Akkadian as *šupru* “claws, bird’s claws, nails,” *šumbu* “finger” and *ubānu*. The latter can be traced back to the pre-Semitic designation of “thumb”: compare Hebr. *bāhōn*, *bohēn*, Arab, *abham*, *biham*, *bahim*, Harsusi *habēn* “thumb” vs. Hebr. *ešbā^c*; Arab, *uṣbū^c*, Ugar. *uṣb^c*, Geez *aṣbā^cət*, South Arab, *ṣb^c*, Sir. *ṣabb^aa*, Akkad. *šumbu* “finger” (related to Egypt, *dbf*). It is also used to denote

¹⁵ Relative systems probably do not emerge *per se* in any particular place. The two types of relative systems of linear measures we have investigated by now are definitely associated with the two centres of ancient civilization. One, the “duodecimal,” is associated with the Middle Eastern region (Egypt and Mesopotamia, see Hinz, “Musul'manskīe mery vesa s perevodom v metriceskuyu sistemu” in Davidovitch, *Materialy po metrologii srednevekovoi Srednei Azii*), and the other, the decimal (basic unit: “inch,” ten “inches” which equals one “foot,” ten “feet,” etc., is associated with China.

the finger: compare *ina ú-ba-ni-Ḳu ṣi-qir-ti* “upon his little finger” (*ṣi-qir-ti* “little”). It is further a designation of measure. Having borrowed a 30-finger elbow, the Egyptians were compelled to interpret it as consisting of seven “palms,” that is, 28 “fingers.” Subsequently, this elbow became a general-purpose measure and started to be divided into 24 “fingers.” This was precisely the simple elbow of the Muslim world, and a new, 28-finger elbow started to be used alongside it.¹⁶

Thus it is possible to reduce the relative system to two varieties: The first is one with the most generally-employed *arshins* of 24 and 40 fingers (which, with the value of a finger width set at 2.1–2.3 cm,¹⁷ roughly corresponds to the “absolute” elbow’s length of 50 cm and to the corresponding “absolute” arm’s length). The second variety is that of the most generally-employed *arshins* of 28 and 49 fingers. By analogy with the first variety, they may conventionally correspond to elbow’s and arm’s lengths (metrically 59–64 cm and 102–113 cm). The half-fathom is anthropometrically equated to two elbows (cf., f. i., Arab, *baʿ* “fathom” equals 4 elbows), and, accordingly, its lengths in these systems must equal 100–116 and 118–128 cm.

The actual values of Central Asian *arshins* are distributed by anthropometric measure values as follows, divided into the first and second varieties just discussed, (a) and (b) respectively.

“Elbow”

a) The canonical *gaz* (the same as *Iarʿ*, *Iiraʿ*) (24 “fingers”), the *qari* under Babur (six fists four fingers each), Azer. dial. (Gazakh, Balaken) *gari* “linear measure approx. 50 cm,” the Ferghana *gaz* equal to three *syam* (palms, measuring the distance between the tips of the thumb

¹⁶ A. Erman and H. Grapow, *Wörterbuch der Aegyptischen Sprache*, VI (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950), 34, 52; W. Gesenius, *Hebraisches und aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament* (Berlin u. a.: Springer, 1954), 67, 92, 93; Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1928), 628; A. Dillmann, *Lexicon linguae aethiopiae cum indice latino* (Lipsiae, 1865/New York: Ungar, 1955), 1283; J. Aistleitner, *Wörterbuch der Ugaritischen Sprache* (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1965), 33; F. Delitzsch, *Assyrisches Handwörterbuch* (Leipzig: Hinrichs – Baltimore: Hopkins Press – London: Luzac, 1894–1896), 8; F. Delitzsch, *Sumerisches Glossar* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914), 145 (quoted from: F. Hultsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1882, 395–415).

¹⁷ Hinz, “Musulʿmanskie mery vesa s perevodom v metriceskuyu sistemu” in Davidovitch, *Materialy po metrologii srednevekovoi Srednei Azii*, 109.

and the index finger) ≈ 54 cm (apparently designed on the basis of the Arab “black elbow” of 54.04 cm, which was counted as 24 fingers of 2.252 cm each (see: [3, p. 62]).

b) The Khorezm *gaz* for cloth measurement (28 “fingers” or 61.04 cm).

Kalte-kary, the Ferghana unit for the measurement of coarse calico of 57.79 cm (which may have been designed as the Egyptian “cloth *Ira*” of 58.187 cm, 28 “fingers”).

Of the same design (with greater finger width) were the “cloth *Ira*” of Damascus (63.036 cm), Tripoli (64 cm) and the Bilali *Ira* (“a small Hashimi elbow” is 60.045 cm; see: [3]); the Kokand *gaz* (62.195 cm).

The “Shari’a *gaz*” was evidently a derivative from the elbow of 28 fingers within the framework of the relative system. It equaled 28 fingers plus the length of the thumb (equated to three fingers), that is, seven fists of four fingers each, with the last fist having the thumb stretched out. This equaled 31 fingers, from 68.58 to 70.68 cm.

The Central Asian *alcin* ≈ 70 cm¹⁸ should also be classed in this category. As may be seen from the metric values of this measure, it was designed for reinterpreting the “absolute” arm’s length within the framework of the system.

“Arm’s Length”

(a) The “royal elbow” of the Great Mogul state of 40 fingers is 81.28 cm; *Iar*’*i-isyfaḥan* is 79.8 cm.

The Bukhara architectural *gaz* of 78.74 cm (possibly derived from the “Kashkanadi architectural elbow” of 77.5 or 79 cm).

¹⁸ This should not be directly equated with the Arab “royal elbow” which equals “the great Hashimi elbow” of 32 fingers, equal to 66.5 cm (and, possibly, the similarly built Aleppo “cloth elbow” of 66.5 cm, the Persian “shortened *gaz*” of 68 cm for measuring expensive drapery, the Istanbul “cloth elbow” of 68 cm, and the “caliph Umar’s elbow” of 72.5 cm). This measure descends from the Roman provincial two-foot elbow. This measure was introduced in Egypt in order to reinterpret the local system—which had been built upon the correlation of arm-related measures—in terms of the Roman model, that is, as a system with the basic unit of “foot length.” However, the Roman “two-footer” itself may have been based on a semantically dual Roman measure of *ulna* “elbow,” or “arm’s length.” See F. Hulstsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie*, 77–78, 617–619.

Here also belongs the “cloth elbow” of Baghdad and Basra in the sixteenth century, of 82.9 cm and, possibly, the *qari* under Babur of 36 fingers, and 75–80 cm length. It may possibly be a conversion of a certain measure into “larger” fingers.

The *aršin* under Sheikh Suleiman—three large palms (measuring the distance between the tips of the thumb and the little finger) twelve fingers each, equaling 36 fingers—is obviously the same measure.¹⁹

The Central Asian “bazaar *gaz*” of 39 fingers is 88.9 cm, with greater finger width (2.28 cm). The Surat “cloth elbow,” which 91 cm;

(b) The “land *gaz*” of Khorezm equals the “shah’s *gaz*” of Samarkand, which is the same as the cloth measurement *gaz* of Samarkand, at 106.68 cm.²⁰

“Half-fathom”

(a) Turkm. *ğari*, Kir., Kkal. *qari* “distance from the middle of the chest to the fingertips of the outstretched arm.”

The Persian *gaz* is 104 cm, the same as Khalaj. *qari*; Khotan *qari* “linear measure,” Turkm. dial. (Emreli) *gary* ≈ “five big palms” (anthropometrically ≈ “half-fathom”).

(b) Not recorded.

“Fathom”

(a) This includes only the duplicated “arm’s length,” the “bazaar *qari*” (two “bazaar *gazes*” of 39 fingers each ≈ 178 cm), equal to the Andizhan *qari*.

¹⁹ E. N. Najip, *Istoriko-sravnitel’nyi slovar’ tyurkskikh yazikov XIV v.: Na materiale “Khosrau i Shirin” Kutba* (A Historical Comparative Dictionary of the Turkic Languages of the Fourteenth Century: Based on the Material of *Khosrau ve Shirin* by Qutb), Book I (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1979), 170.

²⁰ Since the “arm’s length” under system (b) (49 fingers) is close to the “half-fathom” under the system (a) (duplicated elbow equals 48 fingers), it is difficult to make a distinction between these measures. The measure itself is derived from the 28-finger elbow. That is, it consists of seven fists of four fingers in each, with every fist having the thumb stretched out (equals three fingers). Note that the metric “half-fathom” (see below) is less than the 49-finger “arm” by 2.68 cm, and rather close to “finger width.”

The Ferghana *qulač* (literally “arm’s-reach fathom”) (two “architectural *gazes*” of 167.5 cm); the Ferghana *qulač-qari* or *uzun-qari* is 164.45 cm.

(b) This means only the duplicated “arm’s length,” and includes the “khan’s *qari*” (two “khan’s *gazes*” of 49 fingers each equal 213.36 cm (three Russian *arshins*).

(c) The duplicated *arshin* of 31 fingers, that is, duplicated arm’s length. The Khiva *qari* \approx 142 cm (two Russian *arshins*).

The Bukhara *qulač* for cloth measurement, 142.24 cm; Uzb. *qari* 140–145 cm.

The Khorezm *qari* of 148.94 cm. Compare this with the “weight elbow” of 145.608 cm, equal to two “caliph ‘Umar’s elbows.” This was introduced by the ‘Abbasid Al-Mamūn (before 833) and was used for canal measurement.

Duplicated “Fathom”

The Central Asian *qari* of the year 1876 (equal to two Russian “fathoms” of \approx 178 cm, or two bazaar *qaris*).

The weaving *gaz* in the basin of the River Khingou (the duplicated *qulač*).

The Bukhara *qari* for cloth measurement (320.04 cm; the duplicated fathom on the basis of the elbow of 40 fingers \approx 80 cm).

The Khuf *gilim-gaz*, of 268–275 cm, the duplicated fathom on the basis of the *arshin* of 31 fingers(?), may belong to this type.

Data cited above make for a rough reconstruction of a system of anthropometric models underlying the diversity of Central Asian measures. The system has emerged from the repeated borrowings and reinterpretations of several systems of measures and individual linear measures. We can only reconstruct these basic systems and their development by analyzing the history of each specific measure.

They do, however, share certain features in common. First, there is the unified principle of designing a system through “duplication,” starting from the “elbow,” with the latter, while increasing without limit, retaining its designation [besides *dira*” and *qari*, this is the Pers. *arash* and Turk. *aršin* (from Pehlevi)]. Secondly, the fathom in this “duplicating” system is designed in a rather peculiar way—not as a duplicated half-fathom or a fourfold elbow, but rather as a duplicated arm’s length.

How might we explain these two characteristics? First of all, the duplication of the “elbow” without a corresponding change in the name of the measure occurs frequently (cf. Fr. *aune* ≈ 120 cm < Frank. **alina* “forearm” equals Germ. *Elle*). It is based on the existence of the so-called “circular elbow,” a measure of strings and narrow strips of cloth which were passed round the forearm when measuring (cf. Chuvash *xur* < **qar* “two elbows, a measurement made by wrapping the rope around the elbow.”). But it is impossible to construct measures larger than a half-fathom in this way. In the Central Asian system of measures, the Turkic- and Arabic-language designations of the “elbow” were equated to the Persian-language *gaz*. This word is attributed to Iran. **gaza*.²¹ It may have been borrowed from the Persian Kurd. (Kurmanji) *gəz*, -e (f.) (tamarisk; a feminine form typical of borrowings),²² such as Kurd. (Sorani) *gez* “tamarisk,” Sangl. *gāz*, *gazek* “tamarisk.” The attribution of Pashto *yōza* “brushwood” to the same etymology is doubtful (it could originate from **gā:zā* or **gauzā(:)/ī*²³ but not from **gāzā*). The Pamiri forms: Shugn. *žīz* (m.), Sarykol. *žez*, Rush., Khuf. *žoz*, Ishkashim (Sanglechi) *yōz*, *yūz*, *yuz*, *yū* “fuel, firewood” (Sangl., possibly from Wakh.);²⁴ Wakh. *ūz* “brushwood, fuel” (which may originate from **gāzā*)²⁵ may represent

²¹ Compare Khotan-Sak. *gaysa-* (reed) (also in a derivative form: *gaysakya*, “flute”); Oset. Digor. *qāza*, iron. *qāz*, “reed, cane,” Yagnob. *yazak* “cane” (> Taj. dial. (Matcha) *yazak* id.), Baluchi *gaz* “reed”; Pers. *gāz* “tamarisk,” which equals Taj. *gaz* id.; Pashto *gaz* (m.) “tamarisk”.

²² “A bush with a fragrant reddish cortex (used for manufacturing mouthpieces for smoking), a prickly, tarry small-sized bush (used as fuel)”. See K. K. Kurdoyev, *Kurdsko-russkii slovar’* (A Kurdish-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye izdatel’stvo inostrannykh i natsional’nykh slovarei, 1960), 524.

²³ On the distribution of the *au* reflexes in Pashto subject to the place of accent, compare Pashto *cváb* “passion”; Sanscr. *kópas* “excitement, anger”; Pashto *kváb*, *kūb* “hump”; Slav. **kūpъ*, Pashto *rwaz* “ear”; Sanscr. *ghóṣas* “hearing,”; Pashto *švāla* “intestinal colics”; Sanscr. *ksoda-* “Stoß, harter Anschlag,”; Pashto *kwáli*: “is learning, is reading”; Sanscr. *bódhati* “is keeping vigilant, is cognizing”; compare Pashto *zōšā*, *zoxa*, *zoxá*: “a variety of syrup”; Sanscr. Ind. *jóṣas* (m.) “pleasure”; Pashto *tómá* “seed”; *tó:knan* “seed.” The material on the distribution belongs to V. A. Dybo. On the etymology of Pashto terms, see G. Morgenstierne, *An etymological vocabulary of Pashto* (Oslo: Akademi i Oslo, 1927), 18, 41, 49, 74, 78, 103, 242).

²⁴ Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, II: “Iranian Pamir Languages (Yidgha-Munji, Sanglechi-Ishkashimi and Wakhi)”, 302, § 27.

²⁵ V. S. Sokolova, *Geneticheskie otnosheniya yazgulyamskogo yazyka i shugnanskoi yazykovoi gruppy* (Genetic relationships between the Yazgulyam language and the Shugni language group) (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoye otdeleniye, 1967), 25.

a local evolution of the same meaning.²⁶ Apparently, the initial meaning of the word was “reed, cane.” It has been retained in all the North Iranian languages.

The Pers. *gaz* “linear measure”²⁷ stands somewhat apart. It is unlikely that “tamarisk” ⇒ “linear measure” was a semantic evolution that occurred solely in Persia. One might presume a case of Parthianism; the corresponding Parthian word might be a translation of Aramaic *qaniâ* “reed,” or “linear measure” (with different values). As a measure, the Aramaic *qaniâ* is itself descended from Akkad. *qânu* “reed, a reedy measuring ruler of six elbows.” This measure was generally accepted throughout the ancient Middle East²⁸ [14; 9].

²⁶ See: Bailey, *Dictionary of Khotan Saka*, 80; Abayev, *Istoriko-etimologicheskii slovar' osetinskogo yazyka*, II, 302; I. M. Steblin-Kamensky, *Ocherki po istorii leksiki pamirskikh yazykov: Nazvaniya kul'turnykh rastenii* (An Outline History of the Vocabulary of the Pamiri Languages. Designations of Domestic Plants) (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 90; Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, II: “Iranian Pamir Languages (Yidgha-Munji, Sanglechi-Ishkashimi and Wakhi)”, 424; Morgenstierne, *Etymological vocabulary of the Shugni group*, 111; V. S. Sokolova, *Rushanskii i khufskii teksty i slovar'* (The Rushan and Khuf Texts and Dictionary) (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, Leningradskoye otdeleniye, 1959), 304; I. I. Zarubin, *Shugnanskiy teksty i slovar'* (The Shugni Texts and a Dictionary) (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, Leningradskoye otdeleniye, 1960), 288; T. N. Pakhalina, *Sarykol'sko-russkii slovar'* (A Sarykol-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 230; M. G. Aslanov, *Afgansko-russkii slovar'* (A Pashto-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1966), 607; Ch. Kh. Bakayev, *Kurdsko-russkii slovar'* (A Kurdish-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo inostrannykh i natsional'nykh slovarei, 1957), 95; K. K. Kurdoev and Z. A. Yusupova, *Kurdsko-russkii slovar' (sorani)* (A Sorani Kurdish-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Russkii yazyk, 1983), 569.

²⁷ The Pers. *gaz* was borrowed into other Iranian languages: Kurd. (Kurmanji) *gaz* (f.), (Sorani) *gez*, Talysh. *gəz*, Parachi *gaz*, Pashto *gaz* (m.), Yidgha *gaz*, Munj. *gaz*, Rush., Khuf. *gaz*, *gaz*, Saryk. *goz*, Yazg. *guz*, Sangl. *gaz*, Wakhi *gaz*. See Bakayev, *Kurdsko-russkii slovar'*, 92; Kurdoev, *Kurdsko-russkii slovar'*, 270, 276; Kurdoev and Z. A. Yusupova, *Kurdsko-russkii slovar' (sorani)*, 569; L. A. Pireiko, *Talyshsko-russkii slovar'* (A Talysh-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Russkii yazyk, 1976), 51; G. Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, I: “Parachi and Ormuri” (Oslo: H. Aschehoug, 1929), I, 25; G. Morgenstierne, *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, II: “Iranian Pamir Languages (Yidgha-Munji, Sanglechi-Ishkashimi and Wakhi)” (Oslo: H. Aschehoug, 1938), 211, 394; Aslanov, *Afgansko-russkii slovar'*, 730; Zudin. 432; Lebedev. 437; Grunberg. 299; V. S. Sokolova, *Rushanskii i khufskii teksty i slovar'*, 179; T. N. Pakhalina, *Sarykol'sko-russkii slovar'* (A Sarykol-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 65; J. I. Edelman, *Yazgulyamsko-russkii slovar'* (A Yazgulyam-Russian Dictionary) (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 98; Grünberg-Stebelin-Kamensky, *Yazyki Vostochnogo Gindukusha: Vakhanskii yazyk*, 347.

²⁸ The Greek κῶνός “a measure of six elbows” (dating from the Byzantine period) was borrowed from the Semitic languages; see: Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 1–2 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1960), 780.

This said, *qaniâ* as a term descending from the common Semitic designation of the reed (Akkad. *qânu* “reed, a measure of six elbows,” Arab, *qana*, *qanat* “reed, a spear made of reed,” Ugarit. *qn* “reed, a tubular arm bone”; Hebr. *qaneḥ* “reed; figuratively, a tubular arm bone, a neck of the lamp, a measure of six elbows”),²⁹ has evolved in its meaning in the case of Aramaic: “reed” ⇒ “pipe” ⇒ “tubular bone” ⇒ “forearm, wing bones” ⇒ “forearm” ⇒ “elbow (measure)”.³⁰ Thus the word *qaniâ* had two metrological values represented in Aramaic: “elbow” and “six elbows” (1.5 fathoms). Moreover, in a text on Roman law translated from the Greek, *qaniâ* was used as an equivalent of the Greek ἄκείνα “a measure of eight elbows” (two fathoms) (included was a remark that that it was the *qaniâ* of eight elbows).³¹ Naturally, the Parthian translation had to preserve the polysemy of the Aramaic measure. A superposition of this polysemy on the “duplication” of the elbow into a half-fathom might have resulted in a development of the Central Asian type. This is all the more likely because it was the eight-elbow (two-fathom) measure—which had emerged under the influence of the Roman-Greek tradition—that the Arab Muslim tradition adopted from the Middle Eastern “reed” measures (*qaṣaba*, literally “reed”). Thus a system was formed in which measures of one, two, four and eight elbows could be used, and there was a common denomination for them all. A conversion mechanism leading to an identification of the half-fathom and the “arm’s length” was bound to be worked out later in that system. Such a possibility could be provided by the presence of the Iranian designation of the fathom as a form of dual number of the name of the arm: Avest. The Junior Avesta, *bazu*, preserved itself in Pers. *baz*, Baluchi *gwaz* id., Pashto *wazə* (f.) id.³² As the form with the meaning of a measure is identified both in the eastern and western groups of the Iranian languages, this use may be considered common Iranian. The initial value of the form of the dual number may

²⁹ See Aistleitner, *Wörterbuch der Ugaritischen Sprache*, 268; Delitzsch, *Assyrisches Handwörterbuch*, 588; Gesenius, *Hebräisches und aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*, 735).

³⁰ Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum*, 677.

³¹ Hultsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie*, 582–583.

³² See Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, 956; *Dictionary of Khotan Saka*, 277; Morgenstierne, *An etymological vocabulary of Pashto*, 94; *Istoriko-etimologičeskii slovar’ osetinskogoazyka*, 1, 242.

be interpreted as a “pair of arms,” which implies the meaning of a “distance between the fingertips with the arms outstretched,” that is, a “fathom,” but further on, once the “duplicating” system developed, such a name for the fathom could be interpreted as “two arms” ⇒ “two arms” lengths.

Thus the aforementioned features of the Central Asian system of linear measures can be explained by the passing of the old Middle Eastern system through the Middle Iranian language environment. In this connection, it is possible to make two remarks concerning the traditional Russian linear measures. First, the three-*arshin sazhen*’ (“fathom”), introduced in the seventeenth century as the basic state measure, apparently equals the Central Asian “khan’s *qari*.” Therefore, its name *gosudareva sazhen*’ (“the sovereign’s [royal *sazhen*’”) may have replicated the name of that Central Asian measure. Second, if the designation of the East Slavic measure *kosaya/kosovaya sazhen*’ (“the oblique *sazhen*’”) in fact descends from the Arab *qaşaba*,³³ one should suppose that that measure had come to the Russians and Ukrainians through the Central Asian mediation. Indeed, the Arab *qaşaba*—a twofold arm’s reach—is equal to eight elbows or 399 cm. The Russian “oblique *sazhen*’” has the length of 288 cm, that is, the twofold “*sazhen*’” of 144 cm was the duplicated Central Asian fathom built upon the “*arshin*” of 72 cm (31 fingers, the arm’s length; see above).

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³³ See Romanova, *Naimenovaniya mer dliny v russkom yazyke*, 59.

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THE CULTURAL VOCABULARY IN THE COMMON NORTH CAUCASIAN LEXICAL STOCK

S. A. Starostin

A well-known study by Trubetzkoy [48] cited about one hundred lexical points in common between the Nakh-Daghestani and the Abkhazian-Adyghe languages. With such limited material, and considering the complexity of the phonetics of the languages in question, it was difficult to establish a reliable system of phonetic similarities and thereby show the kinship of these two families. Now it seems possible to increase substantially the number of the lexical comparisons—to ca. 700; the quite regular phonetic parallels are also established (an independent phonetic reconstruction of the common Nakh-Daghestani and the common Abkhazian-Adyghe languages is, certainly, a preliminary condition for such an enterprise). A detailed examination of the historical phonetics and lexical analogies of the North Caucasian languages is, naturally, impossible in this study (an etymological dictionary of the North Caucasian languages is now in print). In this article we shall be interested only in that part of the common North Caucasian lexical stock that may characterize the material and cultural level of the speakers of the common North Caucasian proto-language.¹ This involves the terms related to cattle-breeding, farming, the names of metals, production tools, and processes.

¹ In our opinion, the existence of the Common North Caucasian proto-language is presently beyond doubt. Glottochronological calculations show ca. twenty percent of coincidences between the present-day Nakh-Daghestani and the Abkhazian-Adyghe languages in Swadesh's one-hundred-word list, which corresponds to the date of divergence around the middle of the sixth to the beginning of the fifth millennium B. C. The glottochronological dating is certainly very rough; however, the high percentage of lexical coincidences in any case directly testifies in favour of genetic kinship of languages (let us note that the percentage of lexical coincidences between both the Nakh-Daghestani and the Abkhazian-Adyghe languages on the one hand and the Kartvelian languages on the other does not exceed four or five per cent, a figure that lies on the threshold of coincidence).

Before starting to examine the material, it is necessary to make some phonetic comments. The Proto-Nakh-Daghestani phonological system is generally more archaic in comparison with Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe (with the exception of certain particular changes like the lateralization of strong velar $*gg$, $*ggw > *g\check{g}$, $*g\check{g}w$; in Abkhazian-Adyghe, where these heminate were transformed into $*y$, $*yw$, their velar character persists). In Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe, the following cardinal changes took place, which modified the structure of the root and present one of the major obstacles in the way of comparison of the Nakh-Daghestani and the Abkhazian-Adyghe languages:

(1) All the laryngal consonants (which are rather numerous in the Nakh-Daghestani languages) were lost in Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe; thus all the roots of the $*HVCV$ or $*CVHV$ structure are reflected in the Abkhazian-Adyghe as $*CV$ (less frequently $*VCV$);

(2) In a great number of cases, the original sonants in Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe have been lost. Their loss is obligatory in combinations of the $-RC-$ type (i.e., the structure $*CVRC > *CVCV$, while the structure $*HVRCV > *CV$); in other cases, the sonants j , r , l , l , n , w may either be lost or retained (the latter occurs less frequently and the conditions causing the loss or retention of sonants have not been clarified yet); the most obvious is the situation concerning the sonant $*m$: it is necessarily retained in nominal roots (with the exception of the earlier mentioned obligatory loss in $-mC-$ combinations), but is also lost in verbal roots (in which only the resonant r is altogether acceptable in Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe).

(3) The initially rich system of vocalism in Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe was destroyed, which resulted in the formation of a "linear" system of two vowels: a , ə . In the process, the timbre signs of the vowels were transferred to the preceding consonants (in the form of palatalization, labialization, or a combination of these two signs).

(4) The Abkhazian-Adyghe roots often include the prefix element of $*b-$ (or $*p-$) absent in the corresponding Nakh-Daghestani roots; this is perhaps not a phonetic but a morphological phenomenon whose character has not been definitely clarified yet.

Unfortunately, we cannot dwell in greater detail on the description of phonetic similarities between Proto-Nakh-Daghestani and Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe; however, the aforementioned rules are sufficient to evaluate the lexical comparisons examined below.

The following abbreviations of the names of the proto-languages are used in this study (see abbreviated names of the North Caucasian languages and dialects at the end of the article):

- PNC — Proto-North Caucasian (the author's reconstruction jointly with S. L. Nikolaev);
- PND — Proto-Nakh-Daghestani (the author's reconstruction jointly with S. L. Nikolaev);
- PAA — Proto-Abkhazian-Adyghe (the author's reconstruction [46]);
- PN — Proto-Nakh (S. L. Nikolaev's reconstruction);
- PL — Proto-Lezghian (the author's reconstruction [4]);
- PA — Proto-Andi (T. E. Gudava's reconstruction of consonantism [19]; S. L. Nikolaev's reconstruction of vocalism);
- PTS — Proto-Tsezian (S. L. Nikolaev's reconstruction [39]) with sub-groups: PTSKH—Proto-Tsezian-Khvarshi, PGB—Proto-Gunzib-Bezhta;
- PAT — Proto-Abkhazian-Tapant (= Proto-Abkhazian-Abaza) (the author's reconstruction);
- PAK — Proto-Adyghe-Kabardian (= Proto-Adyghe) (A. Kuipers's reconstruction [32; 31]).

For all the North Caucasian languages, the transcription adopted at the Moscow State University's Department of Structural and Applied Linguistics is used with minor modifications.

The language material is given below.

Cattlebreeding

1. PNC **rVxwA* "cattle" : PND **rVxwV* > Av. *rexed* "herd", PN **dāXune* > Chech. *dāXni*, Btsb. *daXn* "cattle"; PAA **raxwə* > Abkh. *a-raXw*, Bz. *a-raxw*, Abaza *raXwə* "cattle". R. Stackelberg [45, p. 83] and W. Miller [37, p. 10] held that the Abkhazian *a-raxw* was borrowed into Ossetian (*rāRaw* "herd"), but we agree with V. I. Abaev [1, Vol. 2, p. 370] and are rather inclined to see an accidental coincidence here (at any rate, the possibility of borrowing from the Ossetian is absolutely ruled out).

2. PNC **jāmcō* "bull" : PND **jāmcō* > Av. *oc*, PA **umco* > And. *unso*, Akhv. *uča*, Tind. *musa* et al., PTS **os^a* > Khvar. *is*, Gunz. *os* et al., Lak. *nic*, Darg. *unc*, PL **jāmc* > Arch. *ans*, Lezg. *jac* et al., PN **jēt* > Chech., Ing., Btsb. *jett* "cow"; PAA **cwə* > PAK **cwə* > Ad. *cwə*, Kab. *və*, PAT *cwə* > Abkh. *a-c_v*, Abaza *č_wə*; Ub. *c_wə*. This comparison has already been established [47, p. 364; 48, p. 84; 48, p. 240; 5, p. 174; 42, Vol. 1, p. 107]; let us remind ourselves, however, that what researchers usually cite as an example from the Nakh material is not **jēt* "cow" but **pst'u* "bull" (Chech. *stu*, Ing. *ust*, Btsb.

pst'u), which, in our opinion is not relevant here. A comparison with the Kartvelian **wac* ₁ “ram” [21, p. 82] is not convincing for semantic reasons.

3. PNC **c(w)ämV* “cow” : PND **c(w)ämV* > PA **zín'V* (Andi *zúwu*, Tind. *zini* et al.), PTS > PTSKH **zihV* (Tsez. *zija*, Khvar. *zih* et al.); PL **cär* (Rut. *zär*, Kryz. *zar* et al.); PAA **zwo* / **zwo* (Ub. *mə-zw-Rə* “heifer”), PAT **z_wə* (Abkh. *a-z_w*, Bz. *a-z_w*, Abaza *ž_wə*). Cf. also Kab. *məz*—an affectionate address to a cow. The initial syllable *mə*—possibly has a prefix character in the Ub. and Kab. form.

4. PNC **qgoIrc'ü* / **č'oIrcqü* “calf, bull-calf” : PND **qgoIrc'V* > PA **Radač'a* “bull-calf” (with the infix *-da-*, also represented in other names of calves) > And. *Rajč'a* “calf”, God. *Radač'a* “bull-calf” et al., Lak. dial. (Arak.) *quič'u* “heifer”, PL **qIarc'* “heifer (about two years old)” (Arch. *Xlorč'i* et al.); PAA > PAK **čk'a* “calf” (Ad. *šč'a*, Kab. *šč'a* / *šk'a*). PAK **čk'a* may suggest a PAA form of the **čwəqI'a* type. A metathesis in roots consisting of more than one stop consonant is a rather frequent phenomenon in the North Caucasian languages; therefore, it cannot serve as an obstacle for the comparison of PND and PAK forms (cf. Nos. 7, 15, 33, 64, 68, 71 below).

5. PNC **ccimHV* “she-goat” : PND **ccimHV* > Av. *čm* “yearling kid”, PA > And. (*rebxo-*)*č* “he-goat”, PL > Arch. *čama* “she-goat, one to three years of age”; PAA **p-čVmV* “she-goat about two years of age” > PAK **pčanə* > Ad. *pčan*, Kab. *bžan*, PAT **žəma* > Abkh. *a-žma*, Abaza *žma*. In the Adyghe forms one observes *-n-* instead of the expected *-m-*; however, this irregularity may hardly give occasion to denying this Abkhazian-Adyghe comparison (a parallel between PAT **žəma* “she-goat” and PAK **čamə* “cow” [42, Vol. 1, pp. 85, 192] seems much less reliable semantically). Alternative parallels between the Abkhazian-Adyghe root and other Nakh-Daghestani material [7, pp. 97–98] are not well-grounded phonetically.

6. PNC **Hējzū* “she-goat, he-goat” : PND **HējžV* > Darg. *ŕeža* (Tsud. *ŕečā*) “she-goat”, PN **āwst* “she-goat up to one year of age” (Chech. *awst*, Ing. *əsta*); PAA > PAK **ača* “sire goat” (Ad. *āča*, Kab. *ažā*). A comparison of the Adyghe and the Dargwa roots is provided by A. K. Shagirov [42, Vol. 1, p. 58]. Due to reliable Nakh-Daghestani parallels, one may hardly regard the Adyghe root as an Indo-European borrowing [14, p. 17]. Rather, it has to be perceived as one of the ancient Indo-European North Caucasian cultural isoglotic lines [cf. Nos 7, 8, 13, 17, 46, 56, 63, 70, 72 below], cf. Ind.-Eur. **ag-* / **aig-*.

7. PNC **c'c'īkV/ *kīc'c'V* “kid” : PND **c'c'īkV* > PA **c'ik'V-* (And. *c'ek'ir*, Kar. *c'ik'er* et al.); PTS > PTSKH **cik'e* (Tsez. *cek'i*, Gin. *cek'e*), Lak. *c'uku* “she-goat”; PAA > PAK **kVc'ə* (Ad. *čac'ə*, Kab. *čəc'*). Just as in the preceding case, worthy of note are the Indo-European parallels: Ind.-Eur. **kago-* (*-kogo-*) “she-goat”, “kid” > O. Slav. *koza* (“she-goat”), Ang.-Sax. *hēcen* “kid”, possibly also Anc. Ind. *chāga* “he-goat” < **khāgo-*? [50, Vol. 1, p. 336].

8. PNC **pāHäk'wE* “small horned cattle”: PND **pāHäk'wV* > Av. *burut'* (< **bik'-ur*) “kid”, PTS **bilk'u* “sheep” (Tsez. *belk'* “flock of sheep”, *belk'-Ru* “sheep”, Gunz. *bik'* “sheep” et al.), PL > Arch. *balk'* “ram”, PN **bʁoc'* “he-goat” (Chech. *bož*, Btsb. *bʁok'*); PAA > PAK **-bǵa* in **Xwə-bǵa* “flock of sheep”, “cattle” (Ad. *Xwə-bya*, Kab. *Xwə-bǵa*). In the first part of the Adyghe compound PAK **Xwə* means “sheep” (see No. 9). PAK *bǵa* presupposes a PAA form of **bǵwa*, and this root seems to have an Indo-European parallel [cf. Ind.-Eur. **peku* “cattle”].

9. PNC **rəXU* “sheep”: PND **rəXV* > PA **riXa* (Botl., Tind. *riXa* et al.), PTS > PGB **Xor* “ram” (Gunz., Bezhta *Xor*); PAA > PAK **Xwə* in compounds **Xwə-rə- s_wa* “sheepskin”, (Ad. *Xwə-rəsw*, Kab. *Xwə-rəfa* literally, “ramskin”), *Xwə-bǵa* “flock of sheep” (on the second part of the compound see No. 8). The similarity with the verbal root *Xwə* “breed”, “graze” (see No. 23), is, most likely, accidental.²

10. PNC **näwsE* “sheep about two years of age” : PND **näws'wV* > Lak. *nuwša* “ram older than two years of age”, PL **nušaj* “ram, sheep about two years of age” (Rut. *nūšej*, Tsakh. *nušej*); PN **šinara* “heifer two years of age” (Chech., Ing. *šinara*); PAA **nəčə* “ram which is slaughtered for a guest” (> PAK **nəčə* (Ad. *nəčə*, Kab. *nəš*), Ub. *nəčə*). The Ubykh. form may have been borrowed from the Adyghe, although formally nothing is at variance with the genetic kinship of the Ubykh and the Adyghe forms). If one is to consider the fact that “until the middle of the nineteenth century the Adyghes used to slaughter mostly a two year old colt for a guest” [13, Vol. 1, p. 288], as well as the meaning of the root in Nakh (“a two-year-old heifer”), one may conclude that in the PNC this root did not necessarily mean a two-year-old sheep but a two-year-old domestic animal in general.

² A. K. Shagirov [42, Vol. 2, p. 114] takes another view.

11. PNC *[*tw*]anHV “ram” : PND **twanHV* > PA > And. *dan* “ram”, “sheep”, Lak. *ta* “sheep”, PN **ta-bu* “ram (older than one year)” (Chech. *tō*, Ing. *tq*, Btsb. *tawbu* [-*bu* was originally a suffix of plural]); PAA **tə*/**t’ə* “ram” > PAK **t’ə* (Ad., Kab. *t’ə*), PAT **tə* (Abkh. *a-tə*, Abaza *tə*), Ub. *t’ə*. The reasons for vacillations in glotalization in PAA are unclear. The comparison belongs to Trubetzkoy [48, p. 84; see also 5, p. 176; 42, Vol. 2, p. 87] and is probably true, despite certain phonetic difficulties.

12. PNC **swämŃV* “lamb” : PND **swämŃV* > Lak. *si* “yearling sheep”, PL **säm* “lamb (after six months)” (Tab. *sumag*, Ag. *sem*, Kryz. *säm* “sheep (which lambed once)”, “she-goat (which kidded once)”; PAA **swə* > PAK **sə-na* (Adyg., Kab. *səna*), PAT **sə* (Abkh. *a-sə-s*, pl. *a-sa-ra*, Bz. *a-ə-*, *a-a-ra*, Abaza *sə-s*, *sa-ra*). Parallels between the Adyghe root and other Nakh-Daghestani material (Chech. *žij* “sheep” [23, p. 110]; Av. *k’eŃer* “lamb” [2] or Kartv. (Sv. *žinaR* “lamb” [23, p. 110] are unacceptable for phonetic reasons.

13. PNC **hī(n)čwE* “horse” : PND **hī(n)čwV* > Av. *čū*, PA **ič_wa* (Tind. *ič_wa* “horse”, Akhv. *ič_wa* “mare” et al.), PTS > Tsez. (*gulu-čī* “stallion,” Lak. *č_wu*, Darg. *určī*, Hin. *psī*, PL **hīš_w* (Arch. *noIš*, Lezg. *šiw*); PAA **čwə* > PAK **čə* (Ad., Kab. *šə*), PAT **čə* (Abkh. *a-čə*, Abaza *čə*), Ub. *čə*. This is one of the most reliable North Caucasian parallels [32, pp. 48–49; 48, p. 84; 7, p. 97; 42, Vol. 2, p. 141]. It is very interesting to compare PNC **hī(n)čwE* “horse” with Indo-European **ekwo-* (Anc. Ind. *açva-*, Lat. *equus* et al.).

14. PNC **farnē* “horse”, “mare” : PND **farnē* > Av. *x_wani* “horses” (Av. > And., Akhv. *x_wani* et al.), PL **X_war* “mare” (Tab., Ag., Lezg., Rut. *X_war*); PAA > PAK **x_wara* “thoroughbred” (Ad. *fāra*, Kab. *x_wāra*).

15. PNC **kwāccE*/**ccākwE* “mare”; “donkey” : PND **kwāccV*/**ccwākwV* “mare” > Darg. *gaza*, Lak. *kwaca*, PTS **sig_wə* (Gin. *šeg_wə*, Gunz. *šugu* et al.); PAA **kwəčə*/**čəkwə* (~*gw*) “donkey”, “mule” (Ub. *čəg_wə*/*čəg_w* “donkey”, Abkh. *a-g_wəž* “mule”).

16. PNC **HVqIwA* “pig” : PND > PN **hāqa* (Chech., Ing. *hāqa*, Btsb. *qa*); PAA **qIwa* > PAK **q_wa* (Ad. *q_wa*, Kab. *q_wa*), PAT **h_wa* (Abkh. *a-h_wa*, Abaza *h_wa*), Ub. *XI_wa*. The comparison belongs to Trubetzkoy [48, p. 84]. Comparisons with Kartvelian material (Kartv. **Ror-* “pig” or Sv. *Xām* “pig” [11, p. 54; 35, p. 378; 9, p. 294; 29, p. 71; 23, pp. 110–111, 116] are unacceptable for phonetic reasons.

17. PNC **wāIrk’k’ə* “pig”, “piglet”: PND **wāIrk’k’əwə* “pig” > PTS **bukIwⁿ* (Tsez. **beIko*, Gunz. *buku* et al.), Lak. *burk’*, PL **walk’_w* (Arch. *boIk*, Ag. *wak*, Lezg. *wak* et al.), PN > Btsb. *buruk’* “piglet” (Georgian

bur(w)ak'- “piglet” [19, pp. 224–225]; PAA > PAK *yawə* “pig”, “piglet” (Ad., Kab. *yaw*). In the Adyghe form a metathesis is observed (*yawə* < **wayə*; for the rest, the parallels are quite regular. PNC **wāIrk'k'ə* “pig”, “piglet” may be compared with Ind.-Eur. **porko-* “piglet” (for the latter, contrary to Benveniste’s opinion [8, p. 90], the ancient meaning “variegated” is very unlikely).

18. PNC **[X]weje* “dog” : PND **XIweje* > Av. *hoj*, PA **X_wo’i* (And. *X_woj*, Akhv. *X_waji* et al.), PTS **RI_waj* (Tsez. *RI_waj*, Gunz. *wə* et al.), Darg. *XIa* (Kait. *XI_wa*), Hin. *pXra*, PL **Xwəja* (Tab. *Xuj*, Ag. *Ruj*, Tsakh. *X_wajä* et al.), PN **pħu* “male dog” (Chech., Ing., Btsb. *pħu*); PAA **ħa* (Ad., Kab. *ħa*), PAT **la* (Abkh. *a-la*, Abaza *la*), Ub. *wla*. The comparison belongs to Trubetzkoy [48, p. 85]. The character of the initial consonant in PNC (a uvular pharyngealized consonant is present in PND and a lateral in PAA) is not quite clear, but since exactly the same correspondence is observed in some other cases as well (see below No. 41 “to grind” and No. 42 “millstone”), we still believe this comparison to be true.

19. PNC **k'wātV* “hen” : PND **k'wātV* > PTS > PGB **gudə* (Gunz. *gudo*, Bezht. *güdä*), PL **k'at'a* (Tsakh. **k'at'e*, Rut. *k'at'*), PN **kōtam*, (Chech. *kōtam*, Ing., Btsb. *kotam*);³ PAA **k'wVt'ə/ *k(w)Vtə* (< ***k'wVtə*) > PAK **katə* (Ad. *čatə*, Kab. *žad*), PAT **k'wət'ə* (Abkh. *a-k'wt'ə*, Abaza *k_wt'u*).⁴ The root structure with two obstruents possessing different laryngeal features (the first glottalized, the second non-glottalized and unaspirated) has conditioned various (regular) assimilations in descendant languages.

20. PNC **q'urutV* “brood hen” : PND **q'ur(u)t'V* > PL **q'urt'-* (Lezg. *q'ürt'ü* “brooding”, Rut. *k'urt'* [with secondary *k'*] et al.), PN **q'urt'-ik'* > Chech. *q'ürdig*, PAA **q'wVrtə* > PAK **q'_wrtə*), (Ad., Kab. *q'_wrt*), PAT **q'_warətə* (Abkh. *a-q'_wart*, Abaza *q'_wart*), Ub. *q'_wart*. From North Caucasian languages the word penetrated into some neighbouring languages, cf. Osset. (Iron.) *k'_wrtt* “brooding” or Balk. *gurt*

³ Kartv. **katam-* “hen” [30, pp. 195–196]. The Kartvelian form is phonetically the closest to the Nakh one, but it is not clear whether the Kartv. **katam-* may be considered a Nakh borrowing (the etymology of the Nakh form < PND **k'wātV* seemingly testifies in favour of this) or, on the contrary, the Chech., Ing., Btsb. *kotam* may be considered a Kartvelianism (the remaining North Caucasian forms are definitely not borrowed from Kartvelian).

⁴ For the correlations between the Nakh-Daghestani and the Adyghe forms (with Kartvelian material also utilized), see works by I. A. Javakhishvili [24, pp. 613–617], G. A. Klimov [30, pp. 195–196], and A. K. Shagirov [42, Vol. 1, p. 159].

tawuq “brood hen” [42, Vol. 1, p. 236]. The original onomatopoeic character of the root is not excluded.

21. PNC **-Vq'Er* “to feed (cattle)” : PND **-Vq'Vr*, derivative **-Vq'Vr-* “fodder” > Ur. *-iq'-is* (Kait. *-iq'ar-a* “to feed”, Av. *rafi* “fodder”, PA **riq'ir* “cattle feed”, “fodder prepared in advance” (Akhv. *req'i*, Kar. *refir* et al.), PN **dāq'ur* “fodder” (Chech. *dōq'ar*, Ing. *dōq'ar*); PAA **p-qʔə* “to feed” > Ub. *p'q'ə-*, PAK **p'ʔə-* “to breed, to rear” (Ad. *p'wə-n*, Kab. *p'ə-n*, Hak. *p'q'wə-n*). The original meaning “to feed cattle” is well preserved in the Nakh-Daghestani languages.

22. PNC **hō(r)ǰ ǰAl* “to filter”, “to milk” : PND **hō(r)ǰ ǰVl* “to filter”, “to drink” > Av. *-eč'-ize* “to filter”, PA > Tind. *čal-ixa* “to filter”, Darg. *už-es* “to drink”, Lak. *ħac'a-n* “to drink”; PAA **ǰV* “to filter” > PAK **zə-* (Ad., Kab. *zə-n*), PAT, **za-/ǰa-* “to filter”; “to cream” (Abkh. *a-za-ra*, Bz. *a-za-ra* “to cream”, “to become filtered”, Kauz. Abkh. *a-ra-za-ra*, Bz. *a-ra-za-ra*, Abaza *ra-za-ra* “to filter”), Ub. *za-* “to filter”. Trubetzkoy’s comparison of the Abkhazian-Adyghe (Adyghe) form with other Nakh-Daghestani material (Arch. *-ac-as* “to milk” et al.) [48, pp. 88–89] faces difficulties of a phonetic order (the correlation “Bz. hissing-hushing consonant : Ub.-Ad. hissing consonant” indicates the PAA non-palatalized consonant, whereas Arch. *-ac-as* and other forms cited by Trubetzkoy go back to PND **-VnǰV* with a hissing consonant). The comparison cited here appears to be more reliable. A link between the above-mentioned forms and the Kartvelian **(s)ǰe* “milk” [30, pp. 172–173] is questionable both for phonetic reasons and in view of the absence of the deriving stem **ǰe* “to milk” in Kartvelian.

23. PNC **-ōXlwA* “to graze”: PND **-ōXlwV* > PTS > Gunz. *-oha* “to feed”, “to graze”, PL **oXlw-* “to graze”, “to guard” (Tab. *u-b-Xl-uz*, Ag. *uX-as* et al.); PAA **Xlwə* “to pasture”, “to graze” > PAK **Xwə-* (Ad., Kab. *Xwə-n*), PAT **ħwə-* (Abkh. *a-ħw-ra*, Abaza *ħw-ra*), Ub. *Xlə-*.

24. PNC **rak(w)A* “milk”: PND **rakwV* > Av. *rax* “milk”, PTS **rex^a* “butter” (Tsez. *rix*, Gunz. *rex* et al.), Darg. *daki* “fat”, PL **jixw-al* “butter” (Ag. *ifal*, Rut. *jixwal*); PAA **kə* “milk” > PAK **ča* (Ad. *ša*, Kab. *šə*), PAT *xə* (in compounds: Abkh. *a-Xa-z*, Bz. *a-xə-z*, Abaza *X-zə* “serum”, Abkh. *a-X-š*, Abaza *X-šə* “milk”, literally “white milk”, cf. also Bz. *a-x-raǰaga* “milk filter”, Abaza *Xə-rč'wə* “sour milk”).⁵ The

⁵ The seemingly obvious affinity of PAK **ča* and Ub. *ča* “milk”, in fact, prob-

development of the meaning “milk” > “butter” in most Daghestani languages should be considered secondary (in this sense, Avar is an important archaism), related to the displacement of this root by the root **neIk'k'V* “milk” (the latter is absent from PAA, while in PND it may have originally meant some kind of a milk product, cf. its meaning in Chech.—*nalXa* “butter” and in Khin.—*eng* “cheese”). Trubetzkoy [48, p. 85] compared the Adyghe root with other Nakh-Daghestani material (Chech. *šura*, And. *šiwu*; it should be noted that these forms have no etymological connection with each other). However, this comparison has to be dismissed due to the reliable reconstruction of the lateral in PAA (on the basis of the correlation “PAK *č : PAT *x”).

25. PNC **renXwa* “butter” : PND **renXwV* > Av. *naX*, Lak. *nah*, Chir. *nerX* (Kub. *nēX*), PL **jimX* (Arh. *inX* “butter”, Kryz. *juX* “milk”;⁶ PAA **/r/əXwə* > PAK **tXwə* (Ad., Kab. *tXwə*), Ub. *tXwə*. The absence of an Abkhazian form (contrary to Shagirov [42, Vol. 2, p. 78], Abkh. *a-Xwə* “butter” cannot be correlated with the Adyghe and Ubykh forms due to lack of correspondence “PAK, Ub. *Xw* : Abkh. *Xw*”) makes it impossible to establish with certainty the character of the initial consonant in PAA (a reconstruction **rəXwə* or **təXwə* is possible). A correlation is possible in case of PAA reconstruction as **rəXwə*.

26. PNC **'eruk'k'E* “yoke” : PND **'eruk'k'wV* > Av. *ruk'*, PA **ruk'V* (Akhv. *ruk'e*, Kar. *ruk'e* et al.), PTS **ruk' u'* (Tsez. *rek'u*, Gunz. *ruk'u* et al.), Hin. *ing*, PL **'ärk_w* (Arch. *ok'*, Tab. *jurk-aR*, Ag. *jark_w-aX*, Lezg. *wik* et al.), PN **dug'* (Chech., Ing., Btsb. *duq'*); PAA > PAK **b-žə* (Ad. *bžə*, Kab. *bzə*). PAK **bžə* unambiguously suggests a PAA form of **b-yə*. The correlation “PND lateral : PAA velar fricative” is quite regular and suggests a PNC velar affricate; therefore, the comparison may be considered fully reliable. Phonetic considerations do not allow one to link the Nakh-Daghestani root with

ably has a somewhat more complex character. A regular Ubykh reflex PAA **kə* would have been *šə* (cf. Ub. *ša* “bullet” with PAK **ča*, PAT **xə* “arrow”); therefore, Ub. *ča* most certainly corresponds not to this root but to PAT **čə* “udder” (Abkh. *a-č-γə-gw*, Abaza *čə*). It is obvious that the meaning of the Ubykh *ča* had been subjected to Adyghe influence.

⁶ The question of whether Akhv. *iX_wa* “melted butter” and PTS **RIej* “milk” (Tsez. *RIāj*, Gunz. *hi* et al.) belong to this root is more complex. Gigineishvili [17, pp. 72, 121] refers to the Akhv. form; he also refers to Gunz. *aX* “food” and Tab. *XaX*, which seems incorrect.

Kartvelian **uRel-* “yoke, oxbow” [18, p. 581; 30, p. 186]. As correctly remarked by V. M. Illich-Svitych [20], polemizing with Deeters [12], there is no reason to trace Caucasian forms back to Ind.-Eur. **iug-*/**ieug-* “yoke”.

27. PNC **ṛxwṛV* “bridle”: PND **ṛxwṛV* > Lak. *xwri*, Darg. *urhur* (Chir. *urxur*), PA > Cham. *rāxir* “halter”, PL **ṛxw-Vn*/**xw-ir-Vn* (Arch. *duxur*, Tab. *furun*, Rut. *rīxnā*), PN **urX* “reins” (Chech., Ing. *urX*);⁷ PAA > PAK **č-xwa* (Ad., Kab. *š-xwa*). The first part of the PAK compound presents the root **čə* “horse” (see No. 13). The Georgian *aRwiri* “bridle” (whence, in its turn, comes Abkh. *a-Rwra*) is a borrowing from North Caucasian.

Farming

28. PNC **binči* “millet (standing, not yet cut down)” : PND **binčwi* “millet” > Av. *muč*, PA **binčwa* (Akhv. *miča*, And. *beča*, Tind. *boča* et al.), Darg. *muči* (Kait. *miči*); PAA **mVčV* “millet (standing)”, PAK **mačə* (Ad. *mašə*, Kab. *maš*), PAT **ča* “bread”, “eat” (Abkh. *a-ča* “bread”, Abkh. *a-ča-ra*, Abaza *ča-ra* “to eat”).⁸ The root has acquired verbal semantics in PAT, resulting in the loss of the initial **m-* (impossible in verbal roots). The old meaning of cereal is additionally revealed in the Abkhazian compound word *a-ča-ra-ʒ/a-ča-ra-ʒ* “wheat”, “wheat grain”. The development of the meaning “millet” > “cereal in general” is also noted in the Adyghe dialects [51, pp. 261, 277; 42, Vol. 1, p. 267]. The comparison belongs to Balkarov [7, p. 99].

29. PNC **xwīwV* “millet (mown)” : PND **xwīwV* “bread”, “hard food” > PL **xwīw* “bread” (Lezg. *fū*, Akht. *fī*, Rut. *xīw* et al.), PN **fo* “hard food” (Chech. *ho*, Ing. *fu*); PAA **xwə* > PAK **xwaə* (Kab. *xwaə* “millet (in grain)”, Ad. *fə-* in compounds: *fə-gw* = Kab. *xwaə-gw* “millet”, literally “ground millet” [8, Vol. 2, p. 108], *fə-Rwa* “millet”, literally “yellow millet”, PAT **šə* (Abkh. *a-šə*, Abaza *šə-r-ʒa*), Ub. *sə-*

⁷ Osset. *roX* “reins, bridle” is undoubtedly a Caucasian borrowing, contrary to Abaev [1, Vol. 2, p. 422], who links this word to the Baltic and Slavonic name for a hand. Due to the presence of North Caucasian evidence, this is very unlikely.

⁸ For the correlation between the Adyghe and the Abkhazian forms, see the paper by G. V. Rogava [40, p. 34]. Shagirov prefers to compare PAK **mačə* with PAT **məxə* “cornfield” [42, Vol. 1, p. 268]. It may be better to compare the latter with PND **malxwə* “pasture”, “farmstead” (Arch. *maxi*, Av. *maxi* et al.).

in compounds $s_{w\partial}$ - bIa “bread”, $s_{w\partial}$ - $p\partial$ “flour”.⁹ The old opposition of PNC $*xw\acute{r}wV$ “mown millet”, “millet (in grain)” and PNC $*bin\acute{c}\acute{i}$ “millet (standing)” is traced most distinctly in Abkhazian-Adyghe (Adyghe) forms; in PND the secondary development of the meaning is “millet in grain” > “hard food”.¹⁰

30. PNC $*\acute{a}mqqIwE$ “barley” : PND $*\acute{a}mqq(I)wV$ > South. Av. oq , PA > Akhv. uqa “a kind of barley”, PTS > PGB $*\acute{o}X$ (Gunz. oh , Bezht. oX); PAA $*qIwV$ > PAK $*\acute{h}a$ (Ad., Kab. $*\acute{h}a$), Ub. X_wa , PAT $*q_{w\partial}$ - $\acute{z}\partial$ “wheat” (Abkh. $a-X_w\acute{z}$, Bz. $a-X_w\partial$, Ab. $q_{w\partial}$).¹¹ Kakhadze [39, pp. 192–193] and Balkarov [6, p. 30] correlate the Abkhazian-Adyghe (Adyghe) root with different Nakh-Daghestani material (PND $*m\acute{o}qV$ “filmy barley” or PND $*nurqIwa$ “oats”), which is less likely for phonetic and semantic reasons. Kartv. $*maXa$ ($\sim maqa$) “species of wheat” [16, p. 130] can only be compared with PND $*m\acute{o}qV$ (with the direction of the borrowing unclear), but not with the Abkhazian-Adyghe and Nakh-Daghestani forms cited above (it has to be remarked that PND roots $*m\acute{o}qV$ and $*\acute{a}mqq(I)wV$ often fail to be distinguished in the literature [26, p. 62]).

31. PNC $*qqIwa\acute{c}V$ “wheat”: PND $*qqIwa\acute{c}wV$ “bread”, “bread cereal” > PTS > PTSKH $qI\acute{e}\acute{c}\acute{e}$ “cereal”, “corn” (Tsez. $qI\acute{u}\acute{c}\acute{i}$, Inkh. $qe\acute{c}\acute{e}$); Chir. $qIu\acute{c}$ “bread”; PAA > PAK $k_wa\acute{c}\partial$ “wheat” (Ad. $k_wa\acute{c}\partial$, Kab. $g_wa\acute{z}$). PAK $k_wa\acute{c}\partial$ may be traced back to PAA $*k_wa\acute{c}\partial$ (the assimilative transition of a uvular consonant into a velar one is rather frequently observed in presence of front consonants; cf., e.g., No. 4). The Sv. k^wecen “wheat” [40, p. 130] was borrowed from Adyghe.

32. PNC $*neqqw\acute{e}$ “hay”, “straw” : PND $*neqqw\acute{e}$ “hay”, “chaff”, Av. $naku$ “chaff”, PA $*nik_wV$ (Akhv. $nixo$ “hay”, “chaff”, Kar. $niku$

⁹ For phonetic reasons, other parallels between the above-mentioned roots inside Abkhazian-Adyghe are unacceptable (the parallel between PAK $*x_{w\partial}$ with Ub. X_wa “millet”, “grain” in Mészáros [36, p. 386], between PAT $*\acute{s}$ and PAK $*ma\acute{c}\partial$ in Shakryl [43, pp. 53, 98], and between PAK $*x_{w\partial}$ and PAT $*q_{w\partial}$ - $\acute{z}\partial$ “millet” in Rogava [40, p. 121]). Osset. (Dig.) $f\acute{a}g\acute{a}$ “millet” [42, Vol. 2, p. 108] goes back to Adyghe $f\acute{a}g_w$ “millet.”

¹⁰ The existence of two terms for millet (“millet standing, not cut yet” and “millet in grain”, see Nos 28 and 29) is somewhat surprising, since millet was not very common in the Near East and in the Caucasus in the period under review (still, millet did occur, if rarely [34, p. 61 ff.] in the early agricultural complexes of the Caucasus). It is therefore possible that the original meaning of the root $*xw\acute{r}wV$ was not “millet in grain”, but “grain in general, hard food” (in such a case, the Nakh-Daghestani meaning of this root should be considered archaic).

¹¹ PAT has a compound with the root $*\acute{z}V$ “grain” (cf. the same component in Abkh. $a-\acute{c}a-ra-3$, Bz. $a-\acute{c}a-ra-\acute{z}$ “wheat”; Abaza $\acute{s}\partial-r-3a$ “millet”).

“straw” et al.), PTS **nɔXu* “chaff”, “small straw” (Tsez. *noXu*, Gunz. *naXu* et al.), Lak. *nax* “chaff”, Darg. *neg* “chaff” (Chir. *nek_w* “chaff”, “straw”), Hin. *nuk* “straw”, PL **näq_w* (Arch. *naX_w* “chaff”, Tab. *niq_w* “chaff”, Rut. *naX_w* “hay” et al.); PAA > PAK **maq_{wə}* “hay” (Ad. *maq_{wə}*, Kab. *maq_w*). In PAK there is apparently an assimilation of *maq_w* < *naq_w*. For phonetic reasons, the Adyghe form cannot be correlated with the Kartvelian one (Georg. dial. *magoli* “stack”, Sv. *mekw* “stack”) and Osset. *mäk_wl* “stack” forms.¹² All these forms, which do not have uvular but velar root consonants instead, most likely have no relation to the root under examination.

33. PNC **qIwē(r)ɸV* “stack”, “pile of sheaves” : PND **qIwe(r)ɸwV* > PA **R_wiba* “stack” (Akhv. *Ruba*, Tind. *Roba* et al.), PTS > Gunz. *Rob* “stack”, Darg. *ɣeba* “stack” (Kait. *Repi*, Chir. with a metathesis *baRIa* “stack”, Kharb. *ɣeɸa* “sheaf”), PL > Ag. *RIab* “stack”, “haystack” (the Ag. form may also be a Dargwa borrowing), PN (with a metathesis) > Ing. *ɸarq* “pile of hay”; PAA > Ub. *qIabla* “pile of sheaves”.

34. PNC **č̣inVk'wV* “scythe” : PND **č̣'inVk'wV* > And., South. Av. *č̣'ini_k'*, PTS > PGB **č̣'ini_k'* (Gunz. *č̣'ini_k'*, Bezht. *c'ini_k'*), Lak. *č̣'ini_k'*, Chir. *č̣'inak'*, PL *č̣'inak_w* (Arch. *č̣'ini_{k_w}*, Rut. *č̣'inak'*); PAA **č̣VmVgV* / **č̣wVmVgV* > PAK **č̣amagə* (Ad. *šamaž*, Kab. *šamaž*), PAT *č̣əbəgV* (Abkh. *a-č̣əbəga*, Abaza *č̣əbəg*), Ub. *č̣amag*. In PAA assimilation occurred of *n* > *m* in front of the following labialized consonant (cf. No. 32). Owing to reliable Nakh-Daghestani parallels, the Abkhazian-Adyghe forms cannot be considered to have been borrowed from the Osset. *cäväg* “scythe” [1, Vol. 1, p. 306]. On the contrary, the Ossetian form has to be recognized as the borrowed one (its primary source being the form of the Abkh. *a-č̣əbəga* type), and correspondence with the verbal stem *cäv-* “to beat” as secondary. However, the Andi forms God. *č̣ogi*, Cham. *č̣agi*, “scythe”, which are sharply distinguished by their irregularity against the background of the rest of Nakh-Daghestani forms, may have been borrowed from Ossetian.

35. PNC **HVrəccU* “wooden plough” : PND **HVrəccV* > PA **rici* “wooden plough”, “plough” (Cham., God. *reci*), Darg. *durac* (Ur. *duraž*, Chir. *darac*) “wooden plough”,¹³ PAA **c_wa* “wooden plough” > PAK **c_wa-* in the compound **c_wa-bʒa* “ploughshare” (Ad. *c_wābʒa*,

¹² As V. I. Abaev is doing [1, Vol. 2, p. 85].

¹³ PL **turVč̣' / *rurVč̣-* “wooden plow” (Tab., Ag. *duruc*, Lezg. *türez*, Gelm. *vijaca* et al.) must be considered as a borrowing from the Proto-Dargwa **durac*.

Kab. *vābʒa*), Ub. *c_wā-* in the compound *c_wā-bʒa* “ploughshare” (about the second part of PAK and Ub. compounds see below, No. 36), PAT **c_wa/ *c_wə* “wooden plough” (Abkh. *a-c_v-mat_wa* “wooden plough”, literally “wooden plough + thing”, *a-c_v-əjXa* “ploughshare”, literally “wooden plough iron”, *a-c_v-mā* “handle of wooden plough” [cf. *a-mā* “handle”], *a-c_v-R_wa-ra* “to till”, literally “to drag the wooden plough”, Abaza *č_wa-R_wa-ra* “to till”). Ub. *c_wa-bʒa* should be regarded not as an Adyghe borrowing but as an original correlation to PAK **c_wa-bʒa*¹⁴ (all the more so as the hypothesis on the borrowing cannot explain the hissing-hushing *ʒ* in the Ub. form).

36. PNC **bVruccE* “wooden plough”, “ploughshare”. PND **bVruccV* “wooden plough” > Av. *puruc*, PA **birVcV* (Kar. *berce*, Cham. *bijaca* et al.), PTS **bərus* (Tsez. *birus*, Gunz. **bərus* et al.), PL > Ud. *penec*; PAA **b(ə)ʒa* “ploughshare” in the compound **c_wa-b(ə)ʒa* > PAK **c_wa-bʒa*, Ub. *c_wā-bʒa* (see No. 35 above). For phonetic reasons, PAK **bʒa* can be compared neither with PAK **bʒə* “to cut” [42, Vol. 1, p. 104], nor with PAK **pə* “chisel”. Judging by the meaning of the root in PAA, it had originally meant a ploughshare, but in the Daghestani languages listed above it had come to mean a wooden plough, superseding its old name (see No. 35): the roots **HVrəccV* and **bVruccV* do not occur together in any Daghestani language. An interesting case is the Chamalal language where the Gakvari and Gadyri dialects have the reflex of **bVruccV*, cf. L. Gakv., U. Gakv. *bijaca*, Gad. *beuc* while the Gigatli dialect has the reflex of **HVrəccV*—Gig. *reci*.

37. PNC **GGwəbV* “detail of a wooden plough (ploughshare?)” : PND **GGwəbV* “ploughshare” > PA **q_wibV* “ploughshare” (Akhv. *q'obe*, Cham. *q'ubu* et al.), PTS **qIwe* (Tsez. *qIu* “ploughshare”, Gin. *qu* “ploughshare”, Gunz. *qe* “ploughshare” et al.),¹⁵ Darg. *Rab* (Chir. *R_wab*) “ploughshare”; PAA > Abaza *q'aba* “ploughshare”. The root may have meant some kind of ploughshare; at present, it is hard to establish the precise original meaning.

¹⁴ Contrary to the opinion of Shagirov [42, Vol. 1, pp. 104–105], who rightly remarks that in the first part of the compounds examined above one can by no means reflect PAA **c_wə* “bull”.

¹⁵ The PTS form **qIwe* is an obvious result of the reanalysis of the stem (in consequence of perception of *-bV* as a formant of the plural); cf. plural forms: Gunz. *qebur*, Tsez. *qIurbi*. In Gunzib there is also an indirect singular stem *qebo-*.

38. PNC **(ü)nzU* “to till” : PND **(ü)nzV* “to till”, “to sow” (the meaning “to sow” is secondary in this root) > PTS **-iž-* “to sow” (Khvar. *-ižā*, Gunz. *-ižā* et al.), Lak. *zu-n* “to work”, Darg. *-alc-es* “to till”, PL **āca* (Arch. *aca-s* “to sow”, Tsakh. *ez-as* “to sow”, “to till”, Kryz. *-iz-äž* “to till”, Ud. *ez* “tillage” et al.); PAA **zwa* “to till” > PAK **z_wa* (Kab. *va-n*, Ad. *z_wa-n*), Ub. *z_wa-*, PAT > Abaza *ž_wž_wa-ra* “to harrow”. This root can have no relation to the root **cwə* “bull” [42, Vol. 1, p. 106].

39. PNC **?Vlc’Er* “to weed” : PND **?Vlc’Vr* “to weed”, deriv. **?alc’VrV* “weed” > Av. *č’ara-ze* “to weed”, *č’ar* “weed”, PA **hanč’Vr-* “weed” (Akhv. *ač’are*, Kar. *hanč’ar* et al., cf. also Kar. *hanč’a-xa* “to weed”), PTS **<üč’urV* “weed” (Tsez. *eč’uri*, Gunz. *ič’ur* et al.), Lak. *-u-r-č’i* “to weed”, *č’alū*, Darg. *-irc’-es* “to weed”, *arc’i* “weed”, PL **?ač’a(r)* “to weed” (> Lezg. *eč’e-z*), **?ač’al* “weed” (Lezg. *eč’el*, Tab. *ač’al*, Ud. *il* et al.), PN **āsor* “weed”, “to weed”, Chech. **āsar*, Ing. *Ōsar* “weed”, Chech. *āsar dan*, Ing. *qsar de* “to weed”); PAA > PAK **pč’a* “to weed” (Ad. *pč’a-n*, Kab. *pč’a-n*). For phonetic reasons, the Adyghe root cannot be correlated with Ub. *pča-* [36, p. 217], Abkh. *a-š_wa-ra* “to weed” [49, p. 49], or Abkh. *a-bc’a-ra* “to reap (the harvest)” [27, p. 299].¹⁶ The correlation of the Adyghe form with Nakh-Daghestani material is credited to Balkarov [7, p. 100].

40. PNC **jirxA* “to reap” : PND **jirxV* > Av. (with reduplication) *xix-ize*, PA > Kar. *rexī-hedu*, PL **jixV* (Ag. *ix-es*, Kryz. *jix-äž*, Ud. *eX* “harvest time” et al.), Darg. *irš-es* (Chir. *-irx-*); PAA **xə* “to reap”, “to mow” > PAK **xə* (Ad., Kab. *xə-n*), PAT **xə* (Abkh. *a-X-ra*, Bz. *a-x-ra*, Abaza *X-ra*), Ub. *šə-*. Balkarov’s correlation [7, p. 99] of the Abkhazian-Adyghe root with other Nakh-Daghestani material is unacceptable for phonetic reasons (Av. *qwe-ze* “to slaughter”—Balkarov lists this erroneously as “to mow”—and PA **Xan-* “to mow”; it should be noted that the Av. and Andi forms are not linked to each other etymologically).

41. PNC **-em[XIw]V* “to grind” : PND **-emXIwV* > Av. *Xene-ze*, PA > Tind. *X_wan-ixa*, PL *r-eXI_wa* (Arch. *deXIas*, Tab. *raRIus*, Rut. *ruXI_was* et al.), PN **aḥ-* (Chech., Ing. *aḥ-a*); PAA **ḡ_wa-ga* (the meaning of the *-ga* component is not quite clear) > PAK **ḥāžā* (Ad.

¹⁶ A comparison between PAK **pč’a* and Abkh. *a-bc’a-ra* is impossible, as the Bzyb dialect has the form *a-bc’a-ra* with a hissing-hushing *c’* (the correspondence “PAK *č’* : PAT *c’*” does not exist).

ħāžā-n, Kab. *ħaža-n*), PAT **la-ga* (Abkh. *a-lagara*, Abaza *laga-ra*). The correlation of consonants is the same as in the root “dog” (see No. 18); therefore, the parallel seems quite reliable.

42. PNC **[Xlɥ]ɥwū* “mill”, “millstone”: PND **Xlɥwū* > Av. *hobo*, PA **X_wobV* (Akhv. *X_waba*, And. *iXob*, Tind. *X_wabu* et al.), PTS **R_wobV(r)* (Inkh. *Robol*, Gunz. *habur* et al.), PL **Xlɥw* (Kryz. *ħuw*, Bud. *ɥw*); PAA > PAT **ləwə* “millstone” (Abkh. *a-ləw*, Abaza *lu*). The Ub. *məwa* “mill” may belong to the same root (with dissimilation *məwa* < **wəwa*; the correlation “Ub. *w* : Abkh. *l*” indicates PAA **ğw*). Here again we observe the same correlation of consonants between PND and PAA as in the roots “dog” (No. 18) and “to grind” (No. 41). It is not ruled out that PNC **[Xlɥ]ɥwū* “mill” is derived from **-em[Xlɥ]V* “to grind”, although the word-building model is unclear.¹⁷

43. PNC **ħižVn* “to knead (dough)”: PND **ħižVn-* > Darg. *-alš-es*, PL **Pišän* (Arch. *šulm-mus*, Ag. *t’išan-as* et al.), PN > Chech. *ħaš-a* “to press down”, “to trample down”; PAA > PAK **p-šV-* “to knead (dough)” (Ad. *pša-n*, Bzhed. *pša-n*, Kab. *psə-n*). A correlation with other Nakh-Daghestani material (Av. *-us-* “to knead” et al.) [42, Vol. 2, p. 36] is unacceptable for phonetic reasons.

Metallurgy

44. PNC **t’iš(w)V* “lead” : PND **t’išwV* > Av. *t’oxi*, PA **t’iš_wV* (Akhv. *t’oša*, And. *t’uši*, Kar. *t’oše* et al.), PN **daš* (Chech., Ing. *daš*; in PN *d-* instead of *t’-* was formed under the influence of other names for metals, cf. PN **dašiw* “gold”, **datiw* “silver”); PAA > PAT **t’əsa* ~ **t’əsa* (Abkh. *a-t’sa*, Abaza *t’sa*, Ashkh. *t’asa*). The PAT form may be traced back to PAA **t’əša* or **t’əsa* (the absence of the Bzyb form does not allow us to achieve a more precise reconstruction).¹⁸

45. PNC **rVwswi* “gold”: PND **rVwswi* “gold”, “red copper”, > Lak. *duwsi*, Darg. *dubsi* (Kait. *diws*) “red copper”, PL > Tab *jiš_wur* “gold”, PN **dašiw* “gold” (Chech. *deši*, Ing. *došuw*); PAA > PAK **dəsa* “gold” (Ad. *dəs*, Kab. *dəsa*). Contrary to Shagirov’s opinion [42,

¹⁷ Another derivative from **-emXlɥV* is widespread in the PND: PND **emXlɥVrV* “mill” (Tsez. *aR_wir* “mill”, “millstone”, PN *ħarV* “mill”, Lak. *hara-qalu* et al.).

¹⁸ Abkh. *a-t’sa* cannot be associated with PAK **pca-c’_wV (c’a)* “lead” due to phonetic considerations, contrary to the suggestion made by Balkarov [6, p. 49]. The Bzyb form *a-psta* may apparently be correlated with the latter.

Vol. 1, p. 158], the Adyghe form cannot be related to PAT **xə* “gold” due both to the presence of the *də*- syllable in Adyghe and to the absence of the correspondence “PAK **s* : PAT **x*”. The meaning “red copper” in Lak and Dargwa may be secondary (related to the presence therein of reflexes of another PND root, **mVselV* “gold”, which has no Abkhazian-Adyghe parallels—contrary to Rogava’s viewpoint [40, p. 158]. The correlation of Adyghe and Nakh material is credited to Trubetzkoy [48, p. 84].

46. PNC **IerVcwE* “silver”: PND **IerVc(w)V* > Av. *ḡarac*, PA **’orci* (Akhv. *ačī*, And. *orsi*, Bagv. *ars* et al.), PTS > PTSKH **os* (Khvar., Inkh. *os*), Lak. *arcu*, Darg. *arc*, PL **’ars* (Arch. *arsi*, Tab., Ag. *ars*; the PL reflex **’ars* points to the presence of labialization in PND—in the absence of labialization in PL one would expect the retention of inlaut *c*); PAA **rVwV-nV/’rVswV-nV* > PAT **ražəna* (Abkh. *a-ražna*, Bz. *a-rəžna*, Abaza *rəžna*), Ub. *daš_wana*, PAK **təžəna* (with an irregular *ž*; one would expect PAK *z*) > Ad. **təžəna*, Kab. *dəžən*. The comparison between the Nakh-Daghestani and the Abkhazian-Adyghe forms belongs to Charaya [11, p. 11], who also makes reference to similar Kartvelian forms (**wer_qXl-* “silver” [30, p. 83]). There is also an obvious link to the Indo-European **argnto-* “silver” [46. 90–95], although the question of the direction of borrowing is very complicated (the Ind.-Eur. underived stem **arəg* “shining”, cf. Greek *ἀργός* “white”, Anc. Ind. *arj-una* “bright” et al. [50, Vol. 1, p. 82] is more comparable phonetically with the North Caucasian forms; could it have originally meant “silver” in itself?

47. PNC **rik(w)E* “copper” : PND **rikwV* > Lak. *duk-ni* “yellow copper”, “brass”, PL **jix_wa* “copper” (Tab. *jif*, Ag. *if*, Tsakh. *juxa*); PAA > PAT **xə* “gold” (Abkh. *a-Xə*, Abaza *Xa-pš*). The PAT form suggests PAA **k* or **x*. This root superseded the original name for gold in PAT [see No. 45]. In the Abkhazian-Adyghe languages there is another root denoting “copper” (PAA **RIwV*), which has no valid external parallels and which may have originally meant “metal in general” (cf. its usage in compounds **RIwə-k’wV* “iron”, **RIwə-k’V* “blacksmith”). The Osset. *ärx_wy* “copper” may be an old North Caucasian borrowing (it has no Iranian or Indo-European etymology) [1, Vol. 1, p. 186].

48. PNC **locV* “kind of light-coloured metal”: PND **locV* > Av. *rez* “yellow copper”, PA > Akhv. *lezi* “bronze”, PL **lac-* “white”; “iron” (Arch. *lacut* “iron”, Lezg. *lacu* “white”, Kryz. *läzi* “white”

et al.); PAA > PAK *ca- in the compound *ca-x_wə “tin”, “zinc” (Ad. *cafə*, Kab. *zax_w*/*-x_wə “white”).¹⁹

49. PNC *Hōk k'wA “iron (?)” : PND *Hōk k'wV “iron”; “horseshoe” > PTS *heku “horseshoe” (Tsez. *hiku*, Gunz. *hek* et al.), PL > Rut. *äg* “horseshoe”, PN *fiā(h)k’ “iron” (Btsb. *ƒajhk*; Chech. *ēčig*, Ing. *äšk* < PN contracted *fiā(h)k²-ik²*); PAA *k'wV in the compound *RIwə-k'wV “iron” (PAK *R_wə-č'ə > Ad. *R_wəč'ə*, Kab. *R_wəš'*; Ub. *wə-c'wə*; PAK *č' : Ub. *c'w* < PAA *k'w). The first part of the compound is PAA *RIwə “metal”, “copper” (for this root see No. 47 above). The development of the meaning “iron” > “iron product” (in particular, “horseshoe”) is common (cf. numerous cases, for example English *iron* “flatiron”, and also Chech. *ēčig* “iron”, “ironware”, Ing. *äšk* “iron”, “flatiron”) et al.; therefore, the fact that the Daghestani forms with the meaning of “horseshoe” (see above) belong to this root is not in doubt. It is somewhat difficult to determine the original meaning of the root, as it is questionable that the speakers of Proto-Caucasian had been acquainted with iron mining: the working of iron in the Caucasus, just as in the Near East generally, had hardly started earlier than the third millennium B.C. at the earliest. It is not excluded that the root *Hōk k'wA denoted meteorite iron, with which people might have been acquainted even earlier.

In the light of new data on the genetic links of the Khatti language with Abkhazian-Adyghe (Vyacheslav V. Ivanov), it seems rather tempting to compare PAA *RIwək'wV “iron” with Khatt. *ħap/walki* “iron”. Khatt. *ħaw-* may convey a labialized uvular fricative (= PAA *RIw*) and the graphic combination *-lk-* a lateral affricate (= PAA *k'), although a phonetic development *k' > lk in the Khatti language is not excluded either. The suggestion of morphological complexity of the Khatti word and its link with different Nakh-Daghestani names for iron (Bezht. *kil* et al.) [15, pp. 25–38] apparently lacks foundation. The Khatti form penetrated into Hurrian (Hurr. *ħabalgi* [15, pp. 25–38], as well as into the Indo-European languages (Greek

¹⁹ The problem of linking the Adyghe component *ca- in *ca-x_wə with *pca- in *pca-c'wV (c'a) “lead”, which is established by Balkarov [6, p. 49] is a complicated one. If that link is acknowledged to be accurate, one has to reconstruct the variants *ca-/pca- in PAK (Bzyb. *a-psta* “lead” is, possibly, a dissimulative development of a PAT form like *pca-c'wə, corresponding to PAK *pca-c'wV).

χαλκός “copper”, Slav. **zēlezo* < **g(h)elēg(h)-*), and the languages of Southeast Asia (Thai **hleḱ*, which may be the source for Tib. *lcags* and Old Chin. **lhēt* < **lhēk* “iron”). In a roundabout way and apparently significantly later (no earlier than the middle of the first millennium B. C.), this root again found its way to the North Caucasus; cf., for example, PL **hilak* “iron” (Rut. *hilag*, Kryz. *iläng* et al.).

50. PAK **-ak’V* “to forge” : PND **-ak’V* > PTS > Tsez. *ak’a* “to forge”, PL > Arch. *ak’a-s* “to demolish”; PAA **k’ə* ~ **k’ə* “to forge” > Ub. *k’ə*- “to forge”, PAK **k’ə/k’a* in the compounds **R_{wə}-k’a* (Ad., Kab. *R_{wə}č’a*) “smith” (= Ub. *wək’ə*), **k’ə-šə* (Ad. *č’əš*, Kab. *č’əs* “smithy” et al.

Instruments and Manufacturing Processes

51. PNC **k_wirt’ā* “hammer”, “axe” : PND **k_wirt’ā* > Av. *k_wart’a* “hammer”, PA **k_wirt’a* (Akhv. *kort’a* “hammer”, God. *kurt’a* “axe” et al.), PTS > PTSKH **k_wid-* “sledge-hammer” (Tsez. *k_wed* et al.), PL **k’urt’aj* “hammer” (Arch. *k’urt’a*, Lezg. *k’uta* et al.); PAA **kət’_wV* ~ **gət’_wV* > Ub. *gət’_w* “lance”, PAK > Kab. *žəda* “axe” (Old. Kab. *gəda*). The velar anlaut of Abkhazian-Adyghe forms rules out the possibility of borrowing from the Turkic languages (cf. Turk. *žida* “dart” et al. [42, Vol. 1, p. 162]). The Osset. *gidä* “axe for hewing” was borrowed from Kab. [1, p. 518].

52. PNC **k_wemXU* “scraper”; “pitchfork” : PND **k_wemXV* “scraper” > Av. *k_warXi*, PA **k_wAnXi* (Akhv. *k_waXi*, Kar. *k_wanXe* et al.), Meus. *k_waXi* “scoop”, “scraper”, PL > Lezg. *kiXel* “scraper”; PAA > PAK **k_waX_wa* “pitchfork” (Ad. *k_wāX_wa*, Kab. *g_wāX_wa*). The change of “scraper, rake” ↔ “pitchfork” is easily explainable. A comparison with Mong. *goXo* “boat-hook, hook” [42, Vol. 1, p. 109] is hardly acceptable.

53. PNC **cVnV* “sickle”, “knife”: PND **cinV/nicV* “sickle” > PA **nūco* (Akhv. *niča*, And. *nūco* et al.), PTS > PTSKH **nišu* (Tsez. *nešu*, Inkh. *nišu* et al.), PL **čín* (Kryz., Bud., Tsakh. *čín*); PAA > Ub. *canə* “sword”. The Ub. form may be traced back to PAA **čVnV* (the collation of *ca-* in Ub. *canə* with Ad. *sa*, Abkh. *a-sa* “sword”, “knife” [13, p. 148] is inadmissible for phonetic reasons: the Ub. *c* cannot correspond to the Abkh. *s*).

54. PNC **wənsE* “sickle”, “knife” : PND **wənsV* > Av. *nus*, PA **bisun* (And. *besun*, Tind. *besun* et al.), Khin. *vaz* “knife”, PN **mārs* “sickle” (Chech., Ing. *mars*); PAA **sa* “knife”, “sword” > PAK **sa* (Ad. *sa*

“sword”, Kab. *sa* “knife”), PAT **sa* “sword”, “sabre” (Abkh. *a-sa*, Bz. *a-sa*).

55. PNC **acV* “chisel” : PND **acV* > PA **azal* (Akhv. *ažalo*, Kar. *azal* et al.), PN **asto* (Chech. *sto*, Ing. *osta*); PAA > PAK **p-ca* (Ad. *pcə*, Kab. *bzə*). In the light of external data, the correlation of PAK **pcə* “chisel” with the root **ca* “tooth” [36, pp. 156–157, 274, 293] should be considered unreliable.

56. PNC **tirungV* “spindle” : PND **tirungV* > Darg. *durug*, PL **tinug* (Arch. *tung* “spindle axis”, Kryz. *tinüg* “spindle stem” et al.); PAA > PAT **darəð* (Abkh. *a-dardə*, Bz. *a-dərdə* “spindle” et al.). In PAT assimilation apparently took place: **darəð* < **darəgə* (< PAA **dVrVgV* or **tVrVgV*). Worth noting is the similarity with the Ind.-Eur. **tork-*/**terk-* “spindle”, “to spin” (Anc. Ind. *tarku-* “spindle” et al.) [50, Vol. 1, p. 735].

57. PNC **swänq’q’i* “resin”, “Indian ink”: PND **swänq’q’i* > Av. *sanq* “gum resin” (which is added to Indian ink for lustre), Lak. *šiq’i* “ink”,²⁰ Darg. *šinq’Ia* “ink”, PL (with reduplication) **šVq’aq’* ~ *š-* “resin” (Lezg., Tab. *šq’aq’*); PAA **šwəqIa* “letter”, “something written” > Ub. *šwəq’a* “book”, “letter”, PAT **šwəʔV* “letter”, “document” > “book” (Abkh. *a-švq’ə*, Bz. *a-švq’ə*, Abaza *šwəʔa*). Evidently, at first it was the name of some dye used for making an ornament (in Abkhazian-Adyghe “ornament” later acquired a secondary meaning—“something written, a letter”, The ancient North Caucasian character of the root is beyond doubt (the correspondences are quite regular; borrowing—either from Nakh-Daghestani into the Abkhazian-Adyghe languages or vice versa, or else from some third source—being impossible for phonetic and semantic reasons). Besides the North Caucasian languages, this root is found in the Semitic ones (Ar. *summāq* —Rhus coriaria L.—the name of a plant used for dyeing black),²¹ and also

²⁰ Av. *šaq’i* “ink” may have been borrowed from an Old Lak form *šaq’i*. The Avar form, in its turn, was borrowed into the Nakh languages (Chech. *šəq’a*, Ing. *šəq’a*) and penetrated into Kabardian (*šəqa* “ink”) through Nakh. Abdulaev’s explanation [42, Vol. 2, p. 136] of the Dargwa form *šinq’Ia* “ink” as *šin* “water” + *qIa* “roasted grain” should, in the light of external parallels, be regarded as a folk etymology.

²¹ From the Arab. *summāq* the word entered Persian (*summāk*) and, through the Turkish mediation (Tat. *sumax* et al.) into Osset. (*s(y)mäg* “green vitriol”); later it passed from Ossetian into Georgian (dial. *smagai* “green vitriol”). The Semitic word also became widespread in European languages (Rus. *sumakh*, Eng. *sumac* et al.). See the analysis in Abaev [1, Vol. 3. pp. 198–199].

in the Sino-Tibetan languages (cf. Tibetan *snag*, Old Chin. *māk* < *(s)māk “ink”; due to the obvious Near Eastern parallels, the similarity of this root and Tib. *nag* “black” et al. must be considered secondary). The primary source of this root is at present hard to establish, but even if it had penetrated into the North Caucasian languages, this had taken place still at the PNC level.

58. PNC **irisA* “to cut”, “to cut out” : PND **irisV* > Av. *su-ze* “to cut up”, Darg. *-irses* (Chir. *-irs-*) “to cut out”, Lak. *tisi-n* “to cut out” et al.; PAA **b-sV* “to cut”, “to cut out” > PAK **bzə* (Ad., Kab. *bzə-n*), PAT **sa* (Abkh. *a-sa-ra*, Bz. *a-sa-ra*, Abaza *sa-ra*), Ub. *bzə-*. The Abkh. *a-sa-ra* “to cut out” cannot, contrary to Shagirov [42, Vol. 2, p. 58], be associated with *a-sa* “sword”, “sabre” (see No. 54 above): in the Bzyb dialect we have *a-sa-ra* “to cut out”, but *a-sa* “sword”. The parallel between PAT **sa* and PAK, Ub. *bzə-* is therefore fully justified [3, p. 43].

59. PNC **Vwc’U* “to hew,” “to plane” : PND **Vwc’V* > Av. *-uc’-ize*, PTS > Tsez. (with reduplication) *c’ec’a*, Lak. (with reduplication) *c’uc’i-n*, Kub. *-ūc’-es*, PL **äwc’a* (Arch. *babč’a-s*, Tab. *u-r-č’_v-uz*, Ag. *ic’_wa-s* et al.); PAA > PAT **c_wə* (which suggests PAA **c_wə* “to hew,” “to plane”) (Abkh. *a-c_w-ra*, Abaza *č_w-ra*).

60. PNC **VrVcE* “to spin”; “to make a warp for weaving” : PND **VrVcV* > Av. *reč-ize* “to make a warp for weaving”, PL > Lezg. *ruč-a-z*—the same, PN **-ūc-* “to weave” (Chech., Ing. *-ūc-a*); PAA > Ub. *čə* “to spin yarn”.

61. PNC **imXwVr* “to knit” : PND **imXwVr* > PA **iXVn* “to tie up” (Tind. *-iXi-xa*, Cham. *iXn-a*), Darg. *-umX-es* “to weave”, PL **iX_war* “to knit”, “to weave” (North Tab. *u-v-R-us*, Rut. *-XurX-as*, Tsakh. *ho-’oXar-as* et al.); PAA > PAT **h_wa* “to knit” (Abkh. *aj-laħ_wa-ra* “to loose”, *a-č’a-ħ_wa-ra* “to knit”, “to tie up”, Abaza *č’a-ħ_wa-ra* et al.). PAT **h_wa* presupposes a PAA form **Xwa*.

62. PNC **VqAr* “to weave (yarn)” : PND **VqVr* > Hin. *qi*, PL **iXar* (North Tab. *u-v-X-us*, Lezg. *Xra-z*, Rut. *-XřrX-as*, Tsakh. *q-eX-as*, Kr. *XiXr-iž* et al.); cf. also derivatives: Lak. *qa*, PL **ruX* (Lezg., Kryz. *ruX*) “carpet”, “woven woolen carpet (palas)” et al.; PAA **Xa* “to weave”, “to knit” > PAK **Xa* (Ad., Kab. *Xa-n*) “to knit”, PAT > Abkh. *a-ħa-ra* “to weave”, “to spin”, Ub. *Xa-* “to spin”.

63. PNC **Ii(r)pE* “to sew” : PND **Ii(r)pV* > Darg. *ib-es* (Ur. *-irb-*), PL > Ud. *eIb* “sewn”, “tailored”, PN **ab-* (Btsb. *ab-ar* “to sew” et al.),²²

²² Derivatives from this verbal root are extremely frequent in the Nakh-Daghestani

PAA **bV* ~ **dwV* “to sew” > PAK **da* (Ad., Kab. *da-n*), Ub. *d_wə-*, PAT **ž_{a-x-}* (Abkh. *a-ž_{a-X-ra}*, Abaza *ž_{a-X-ra}*, Bz. *a-ž_{a-x-ra}*). In PAT, *b* reflecting PAA **b* would have rather been expected; **b* and **dw* reflexes (very close to each other in terms of articulation) could apparently vary (it is not excluded that the oppositions *b-dw*, *p-tw*, *p'-t'w* in PAA must not be reconstructed at all: in Ubykh and Adyghe, reflexes in these pairs coincide, while the difference between labial and hissing-hushing reflexes in PAT may be secondary).²³ External parallels clearly testify in favour of the reconstruction of **b* into PAA.

Articles of Production

64. PNC **c'c'äq'wA* “wooden scoop”, “ladle” : PND **c'c'äq'wV(lV)* > Av. (dial.) *č'ik'aro* “spoon”, Lak. (with metathesis) *k'ič'ala* “soup ladle”, Darg. (with metathesis) *k'ac'ul* “spoon”, PL **č'äq'w* (Arch. *č'äq'w* “spoon”, Dyub. *č'äq'a* “wooden jug for sour milk and other products”); PAA **č(w)äq'wV* > Ub. *čäq'w* “pan”, Abkh. *a-čäq'wA* (Bz. *a-čäq'wə*) “small wooden scoop with a handle”.

65. PNC *k̄ōrV* “kind of wooden vessel”: PND **k̄ōrV* > PA > Tind. (with reduplication) *gigar* “mug”, PL **kor* “pan”, “cup” (Lezg. *kur*, Rut. *gīr*); PAA > PAT **gara* “cradle”.

66. PNC **t'āqA* “kind of vessel”: PND **t'āqV* > Darg. *t'äq'a* “beehive”, PN **t'āqe* “tub” (Chech. *t'ēqa*, Ing. *t'äqa*) (it is not quite clear whether PL **t'ak* > Ag. *t'ak* “beehive” et al.) may belong here; PAA > Ub. *(n)daq'a* “vessel”, “jug”, “vase”. Ub. *(n)daq'a* suggests PAA **taq'a* (< *t'äqa* with metathesis of glottalization).

67. PNC **qqwāp'wa* “kind of vessel” : PND **qqwāp'wa* > Av. *qaba* “pot”, “jug”, “ewer”, PA > Bagv. *qapa* “pot”, PTS > Inkh. *XuIpa* “ladle”, Darg. *qaba* “vase”, “vessel” (probably < Av.), PL **X_wap* ~ **X_wap* “sack”, “bag” (Rut. *X_wab*, Kryz. *Xāb* et al.), PN **qāp'a* “earthen

languages: PND **wurepV* “needle” (PL **wurepa* > Tsakh. *Gelm. v—jäba* et al., Darg. *bureba*, Kharb. *burepa* et al.); PND **Iöröpu* “awl” [Av. *šebu*, Darg. *durub* (Chir. *durup*)], PL **rāp* (Tab. *rīb*, Arch. *dab*, Kryz. *reb* et al.), PN **jub* (Chech. *jū*, Btsb. *jub*). Cf. also Lak. *pa* “awl”, PN **ab* > Chech. *ow* “spit.” Cf. also Indo-European parallel: **ereb-* “awl,” “to make holes with the use of an awl,” [50, Vol. 1, p. 146] (the root contains the phoneme **b* untypical of Ind.-Eur. and may therefore have been borrowed).

²³ See more on the correspondences in our work “Rekonstruktsiya praabkhazodygskoi sistemy soglasnykh” [46].

pot” (Chech., Ing. *qāba*); PAA *Gāba* “boat” > Ub. *Rāba*, PAT **yāba*, Abaza *Rba*). The semantic development “vessel” > “boat” is customary. A similar name for a vessel is widespread in the languages of Eurasia (cf. Nostr. **k’ap’V* ~ **q’ap’V* “vessel” [21, p. 366]; cf. also Old Chin *khāp* “wooden cup”, “vessel” et al.).

68. PNC **c’c’irqā* “loomwork or wattled fabric” : PND **c’c’irqā* > Av. *c’aXa* “kind of palas”, Lak. *c’iqā* “mat”, PL > Lezg. *c’irX* “patch”; PAA > PAT **qəza* (Abkh. *a-Xəza*, Abaza *qəza*), “blanket” (with metathesis < **qirc’c’ā* < **c’c’irqā*). Apparently borrowed from Abkhazian-Adyghe is Osset. *qāzūl* “blanket” [1, Vol. 2, p. 286].²⁴

69. PNC **k’ōwčU* “variety of clothes”: PND **k’ōwčV* > Av. *k’āč* “sheepskin coat”, PA **k’AčV* (Akhv. *k’āčī*, Kar. *k’āča* “fur coat” et al.), PTS > PTSKH **k’ala-k’āč* “sheepskin coat”; (Gin. *k’al-k’āč*, Inkh. *k’alak’āč*; the meaning of the component *k’ala-* is not clear), PN **kōč* “shirt” (Chech., Ing. *koč*); PAA **k’āč’wə* > PAK **k’āč’ə* (Ad. *č’āč’ə* “ancient female costume made of velvet or black close silk”, Kab. *č’as* “quilted jacket”, “padded jacket”), PAT > Abkh. *a-k’āč’* “shirt”, “blouse”. A formal coincidence with PAA **k’āč’wə* “short” is most likely accidental due to the availability of reliable Nakh-Daghestani parallels. Abkh. *a-k’āč’*, contrary to Shagirov [42, Vol. 2, p. 134], cannot be regarded as borrowed from Adyghe (otherwise, Abkh. *a-k’āč’* with soft *č’* might have been expected).

70. PNC **pwatV* “variety of clothes” : PND **pwatV* > PA *bata* “trousers” (Akhv., Tind. *bata* et al.), Lak. *pata* “rags”, “old clothes” (Arak. *pata* “trousers”), Darg. *pada* “(trouser) fly”, PL **pa(t)V-* “trousers” (Arch. *paItəla*, Rut. *badu*, Tsakh. *bada*), PN > Chech. *bedar* “clothes”; PAA > PAK **padə* in **xa-padə* “stocking”, “sock” (**xa* “leg”) > Ad., Kab. *xa-pad*. Borrowed from Adyghe are Ub., Abaza *xapad*, Abkh. *a-klapad* “stocking”, “sock”. The suggestion of a compound nature of PAK **padə* in Adyghe²⁵ is unacceptable first and foremost due to reliable Nakh-Daghestani correspondences. A link with the Ind.-Eur. **baiwā* “variety of clothes”, “cloak” [50, Vol. 2, p. 104] is not ruled out, although a comparison is hindered by certain semantic problems (in the North Caucasian languages these terms designate primarily leg clothing, cf. the meanings of “trousers”, “fly”, “stockings”).

²⁴ Abaev’s *Historical Etymological Dictionary of the Ossetian Language* provides no reliable etymology [1, Vol. 2, p. 286].

²⁵ **pa* “fore-part” + **da* “to sew” [42, Vol. 1, p. 251].

71. PNC **q'q'IapE/ *paq'q'IE* “cap” : PND **q'q'IapV* > PA **q'wapa* (Tind., Kar. **q'wapa* et al.), Lak. *q'aIpa*, Darg. *q'apa* (with an unclear loss of pharyngealization), PL **qI'apaj* (Lezg. *q'ep̄e*, Tsakh. *qI'apa*); PAA **pIVqI'V/ *bI-* > PAK **pVʔ(w)a* (Ad. *pāʔ_wa*, Hak. *pāq'_wa*, Kab. *pəʔa*), Ub. *bIaqIə*. With the exception of the metathesis, all the correspondences are regular (including the presence of pharyngealization in PND and PAA). Borrowed from Adyghe is Sv. *paq'w* “cap” [40, p.129] and Balk. *bokka* “children’s cap” [42, Vol. 2, p. 41].²⁶ Similar forms are common in many languages of Eurasia, cf. Kor. *penkel*, Alyut. *pankal* “cap”, Shugn. *paköl* “flat, low cap”, cited by Bouda [10, p. 202]; cf. also the disparate European forms: late Lat. *cap̄pa* (whence come Pol. *kapa* and Rus. *капа*), Slav. **čepьсь*, Lit. *kepure* “cap” [16, Vol. 2, p. 183, Vol. 4, p. 333]. In spite of this, one can hardly doubt the ancient character of the PNC root (pharyngealization does not allow it to be considered as a recent borrowing, to say nothing of the fact that the direct source of such borrowing is absent; and the metathesis in PAA does not permit one to regard the PAA form as one borrowed from PND or vice versa). Just as in the case of PNC **swānq'q'i* (see No. 57), if this root did penetrate into the North Caucasian languages, this had taken place still at the PNC level.

72. PNC **halkwV* “cart” : PND **halkwV* > Av. *hoko* “bullock-cart”, “horse-cart”, PA > And. *ink_wa* “bullock-cart”, Darg. *urkura* “bullock-cart”; PAA > PAK *k_wə* “bullock-cart”, “horse-cart” (Ad. *k_wə*, Kab. *g_wə*). The collation is credited to Balkarov [7, p. 98], who, on the basis of Nakh-Daghestani material, makes reference to Cham. *hok_w*, which is a borrowing from Avar (just as the other Andi terms: Bagv. *hoko*, Tind. *hoka*, Kar. *hoko* et al.). In PND the correlation of Darg. *-r-* : Av. *ə* : And. *-n-* in front of a velar consonant points to *-l-* inside the cluster (cf. also Hitt. *hulukanni* < Hurr.). However, one may indicate a more ancient Indo-European parallel: Ind.-Eur. **Huerk-* “wheel” (Hitt. *hurki-*, Tokh. A *wärkänt-* [22, p. 146], which stands in one class with other North Caucasian and Indo-European cultural isoglosses. This root bears no relation to the Ind.-Eur. **uogho-* “cart”, contrary to Shagirov’s viewpoint [42, Vol. 1, p. 113]).

²⁶ Contrary to Abaev [1, Vol. 2, p. 237], the North Caucasian root scarcely has a sound-symbolic character and, at any rate, bears no relation to Osset. *pak'_wV* “plumage”, “feathers”, “fuzz” or *paka* “branchy”, “broad.”

The lexical correlations cited above enable us to draw a number of important conclusions.

1. The speakers of the Proto-North Caucasian language had reached a rather high level of development by the time of its split. Lexical analysis makes it possible to ascertain the existence of cattle breeding²⁷ (cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, horses), agriculture (with cultivation of millet, barley, and wheat) as well as at least the initial stage of development of metallurgy. This means that the PNC period may be dated to the end of the late Stone Age or to the beginning of the Bronze Age. Such dating is probably confirmed by certain linguistic evidence (the presence in PNC of a number of roots associated with house building; of a number of roots designating fruit plants; and of the entire system of numerals from one to one hundred).

2. Among the roots analysed, several obvious North-Caucasian-Indo-European parallels are worth noting:²⁸

PNC	Ind.-Eur.
*Hējžü	: *a(i)g- “goat” (No. 6)
*kic’c’V	: *kogo “goat”, “kid” (No. 7)
*päHäk’wE	: *peku- “cattle” (No. 8)
*hī(n)čwE	: *ekuo- “horse” (No. 13)
*wāIrk’a	: *porko- “pig”, “piglet” (No. 17)
*IerVcwE	: *arəg- “silver” (No. 46)
*tirungV	: *tork- “spindle” (No. 56)
*Iöröpu	: *ereb- “awl” (No. 63, see note 22)
*pwatV	: *baitā- “variety of clothes” (No. 70)
*halkwV	: *Huerk- “wheel”, “cart” (No. 72)

The number of such correlations may be substantially enlarged if one draws material from other thematic groups (e.g., the names of wild animals and plants). These facts undoubtedly attest that the

²⁷ The presence of poultry farming (see Nos. 19, 20) in the Proto-North Caucasian period raises certain doubts. It is not ruled out that the roots *k’wātV and *q’urutV signified some species of wild fowl, although the uniform meanings of “hen” and “brood hen” in all the North Caucasian languages testify against this. Interlingual borrowings at a later period are not excluded with respect to the root *q’urutV “brood hen”; for the root *k’wātV “hen”, however, this is unlikely.

²⁸ Attention should be drawn to a characteristic feature of these parallels: the regular correspondence of PNC front and lateral affricates to the Indo-European palatal consonants.

speakers of the Proto-North Caucasian and the Proto- Indo-European language did have contact with each other.

3. Archeological data attest that the agricultural and cattle-breeding complex had hardly arisen in the North Caucasus earlier than the third millenium B.C. [38; 41, p. 50; 44, p. 71]. Thus a culture which would possess a set of characteristics described above did not exist on the territory of North Caucasus in the period of our interest (ca. fifth–fourth millenium B.C.). This is apparently a sufficient reason to look elsewhere for the proto-homeland of the contemporary North Caucasian languages. In the light of new studies which argue that the North Caucasian family included such languages of the ancient Near East as Khatti (Vyacheslav V. Ivanov) and Hurro-Urartian [13], it seems realistic to put forward a hypothesis that the proto-homeland of the North Caucasian languages had been situated farther to the south (in the South Caucasus or the Near East). The fact that the Khatti language manifests specific kinship to the Abkhazian-Adyghe and the Hurro-Urartian to the Nakh-Daghestani languages may bear witness to the fact that the division of the Common North Caucasian had taken place back in the South, while the contemporary North Caucasian languages penetrated to the North Caucasus later by two distinct routes.

Abbreviations of language names

Ab.	—	Abaza
Abkh.	—	Abkhaz
Ad.	—	Adyghe
Ag.	—	Agul
Akht.	—	Akhty dialect of the Lezghin language
Akhv.	—	Akhvakh
Alyut.	—	Alyutor
Anc. Ind.	—	Ancient Indian
And.	—	Andi
Ang.-Sax.	—	Anglo-Saxon
Ar.	—	Arabic
Arak.	—	Arakul dialect of the Lak language
Arch.	—	Archi
Ashkh.	—	Ashkhar dialect of the Abaza language
Av.	—	Avar

Av. Chadak.	—	Chadakolob dialect of the Avar language
Bagw.	—	Bagwali
Balk.	—	Balkar
Bezht.	—	Bezhta
Bezht. Kh.-Kh.	—	Khoshar-Khota dialect of the Bezhta language
Botl.	—	Botlikh
Btsb.	—	Batsbi
Bud.	—	Budukh
Bz.	—	Bzyb dialect of the Abkhaz language
Bzhed.	—	Bzhedug dialect of the Adyghe language
Cham.	—	Chamalal
Chech.	—	Chechen
Chir.	—	Chirag dialect of the Dargwa language
Darg.	—	Dargwa
Dig.	—	Digor dialect of the Ossetian language
Dyub.	—	Dyubek dialect of the Tabasaran language
Eng.	—	English
Gad.	—	Gadyri dialect of the Chamalal language
Gelm.	—	Gelmets dialect of the Tsakhur language
Georg.	—	Georgian
Gig.	—	Gigantli dialect of the Chamalal language
Gin.	—	Ginukh
God.	—	Godoberi
Gr.	—	Greek
Gunz.	—	Gunzib
Hit.	—	Hittite
Hurr.	—	Hurrian
Ind.-Eur.	—	Indo-European
Ing.	—	Ingush
Inkh.	—	Inkhokwari
Kab.	—	Kabardian
Kait.	—	Kaitag dialect of the Dargwa language
Kar.	—	Karata
Kartv.	—	Kartvelian (Proto-Kartvelian)
Khak.	—	Khakuchi dialect of the Adyghe language
Kharb.	—	Kharbuk dialect of the Dargwa language
Khatt.	—	Khatti
Khvar.	—	Khvarshi
Khin.	—	Khinalug

Kor.	—	Koryak
Kr.	—	Kryz
Kub.	—	Kubachi dialect of the Dargwa language
Lak	—	Lak
Lezg.	—	Lezghin
L. Gakw.	—	Lower Gakwari dialect of the Chamalal language
Lat.	—	Latin
Lit.	—	Lithuanian
Meus.	—	Meusishi dialect of the Dargwa language
Mong.	—	Mongol
Nostr.	—	Nostratic (Proto- Nostratic)
O. Slav.	—	Old Slavonic
O. Kab.	—	Old Kabardian
Old Chin.	—	Old Chinese
Osset.	—	Ossetian
Pol.	—	Polish
Rus.	—	Russian
Rut.	—	Rutul
Shugn.	—	Shugni
Slav.	—	Slavonic (Proto-Slavonic)
Sv.	—	Svan
Tab.	—	Tabassaran
Tat.	—	Tatar
Tib.	—	Tibetan (Ancient Tibetan)
Tind.	—	Tindi
Tokh.	—	Tokhar
Tsakh.	—	Tsakhur
Tsez.	—	Tsezian
Tsud.	—	Tsudakhar dialect of the Dargwa language
Turk.	—	Turkish
Ub.	—	Ubykh
Ud.	—	Udin
U. Gakw.	—	Upper Gakwari dialect of the Chamalal language
Ur.	—	Urakhi dialect of the Dargwa language

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PART FIVE
PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE

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ON KALĀM ATOMISM AND ITS ROLE IN ISLAMIC CULTURE

Tawfik Ibrahim

This article examines some interpretations of Kalām atomism, its main characteristics and, most importantly, its place in Kalām theology and in classical Islamic culture more generally.

Culturological and Theological Interpretations

There is a stereotyped notion that the atomism of the Mutakallims is the ontological basis of their theological system with its theistic creationism (viz. the doctrine of God's continuous recreation of the world) and indeterministic voluntarism (viz. the affirmation of God's omnipotence and the negation of natural causality in the universe).¹ Very often Kalām atomism is understood as an expression of the "spirit" of Islamic culture and the "mentality" of the peoples that created it. From this doctrine was deduced the "specific" peculiarities of science, art and of other branches of Islamic culture.² With

¹ For example, the articles: M. Fakhry, "Occasionalism," R. Frank "Ash'ariyah," and J. van Ess, "Mu'tazilah," in Mircea Eliade, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1987); and L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction a la theologie musulmane*. 3 éd. (Paris: Vrin, 1981), 63-64, 285; H. A. R. Gibb, *Islam*. 2 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 80. In European (Western) literature the notion of Mutakallims' atomistic occasionalism has grown up mostly under the influence of the work of the eminent critic of Kalām, Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) in "Dalālat al-Ḥā'irīn" which was translated into Hebrew under the name of "More Nevochim." In the first quarter of the thirteenth century there appeared from this Hebrew translation a Latin version, "Doctor perplexorum". Maimonides' picture of Kalām, which astounds the imagination of readers with its voluntaristic creationism and indeterminism, passed from one historico-philosophical work into another. It generated a stable stereotype which was consolidated by the authorities of Saint Thomas, Leibnitz and especially by Hegel, who characterized Mutakallims' view as "a whirl of all things." See *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 3 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 32; F. Niewohner, "Die Diskussion um den Kalām die Mutakallimun in der europäischen Philosophiegeschichte." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, Bd. 18, H.I (1974).

² L. Massignon "Les methodes de realisation artistique des peuples de l'Islam,"

this atomistic worldview they explain the “stagnation” of Muslim society after the tenth century³ and, moreover, the political disintegration of contemporary Arab countries.⁴

From our point of view these culturological and socio-historical generalizations are mere speculations, mostly tendentious by character and devoid of factual foundation.⁵ The preponderant interest paid to algebra (relative to geometry) by classical Muslim scholars cannot be explained by a so-called “atomistic” spirit supposedly innate to the Arabs (as opposed to a Greek “continualistic” mentality). Rather, it reflects the fact that, up to the times of Islam, geometry was already flourishing among the Greeks, while algebra was still waiting to be founded among the Arabs. Even less correct is another claim that the idea of cosmos harmony was unknown to Muslim theologians and, consequently, that they preferred not the aesthetic proof of God’s existence, typical for ancient Greek philosophy, but instead the proof based on the tangibility of everything that is not God.⁶ This ignores that in Mutakallims’ treatises the notion of the world’s harmony serves as the traditional premise of the proof for the existence of God’s wisdom. The same subjectivity and inco-

in L. Massignon, *Opera Minora*, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dar al-Maaref, 1963), 9–24; N. Bammate “The status of science and technique in Islamic civilization,” in Ch.A. Moore ed., *Philosophy and Culture: East and West* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), 14; D. Sourdel, *L’Islam* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 99; S. H. Nasr, *Islamic Life and Thought* (Albany: State University of New York, 1981), 61; W. M. Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 301–302.

³ B. Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (London: Hutchinson, 1964), 141.

⁴ G. Ben-Tor, “Political Culture Approach to Middle-East Politics”, *International Journal of Middle-East Studies* 8(1) (1977): 220–234.

⁵ We find critics of such stereotypes in the field of aesthetics in an article by A. Sagadeev. A. V. Sagadeev, “Ochelovechennyi mir v iskusstve musul'manskogo srednevekoviya” (“Humanized world in medieval Muslim art,” *Estetika i zhizn'* (Moscow) 3 (1974), 453–488 (in Russian). The lack of factual grounding in such culturological conceptions of Kalāms’ natural philosophy is something I tried to show in my dissertations (both in Russian): *Atomostika kalama I yeyo mesyo v srednevekovi arabo-musul'manskoi filosofii* (Kalām atomism and its place in the Arabo-Islamic medieval philosophy) (Moscow: Moscow State University, 1978); and *Filosofiya kalama* (The philosophy of Kalām) (Moscow: Institute of Philosophy, 1984). Regarding the subjectivist and tendentious interpretation of Kalām by Maimonides, see the article Ibn-Maymūn wa ‘ilm al-kalām al-islāmī, *At-Tarīk* (Beirut) 2 (1985) (in Arabic). A positive exposition of Kalām’s atomism can be found in chapter 4 of the book by T. Ibrahim and A. Sagadeev, *Classical Islamic Philosophy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990).

⁶ Massignon, “Les methodes,” 13.

herence are highlighted in arguments usually elaborated by the adherents of the thesis of “atomicity,” or “discreteness” of the Arab-Muslim “spirit.”

It should be also noted that ash‘arism (and Kalām in general) cannot pretend to represent “orthodox” Islam and Arabo-Muslim “mentality.” However widespread this trend was, it would have been no more than a “sect.” Mostly it is true in regard of its atomistic doctrine. Suffice it to say that the adherents of another, no less representative school of Kalām—the school of Ḥanafītes-Māturīdītes—did not share this doctrine. On the other hand, atomism was rejected by theologians, who would better claim the status of “orthodox,” namely Ṣāhirites (in particular, Ibn-Ḥazm) and Ḥanbalītes (in particular, Ibn Taymiyyah).

Finally, the thesis that atomism is an ontological basis of Kalām theology is also flimsy.⁷ Supporters of this thesis say that atomism correlates with the Kalām doctrine of accidents, the fundamental basis of the eminent Kalām proof for the existence of God: *argumentum e novitate mundi*. However, a more attentive examination of this argument in its different versions reveals that this atomistic thesis is far from ubiquitous. Moreover, in those versions where the word “atom” is present, it can be easily changed to “body.” Therefore the presence of atomism in the aforementioned proof is not merely accidental.⁸ Sometimes it is thought that atomism seemed to Mutakallims to be an ideal “natural philosophy,” fully corresponding to the thesis of the indeterminism in the world and, subsequently, of the omnipotence of God. This hypothesis lacks solid foundation. For example, H. A. Wolfson, elaborating such an explanation, does

⁷ Even L. Mabilieu (*“Histoire de la philosophie atomistique”* (Paris: Alcan, 1895), 353) has noted that despite Maimonides’ thesis about the atomistic basis of Kalām theology, the Mutakallims (as he himself expresses their views in “Doctor perplexorum”) draw no theoretical conclusion from the atomistic hypothesis. Nevertheless, the Maimonides’ interpretation of Kalām atomism is still accepted by some contemporary scholars (for example, M. Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958); H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1976).

⁸ Noteworthy is a remark made in one of the recent works on the theme of the proofs for God’s existence in Islam: “The Kalām doctrine of accidents is integral to the proof for the creation of the world. Yet atomism, which is commonly thought to be a correlate of the Kalām doctrine of accidents, is curiously absent” (H. A. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 136).

not notice the following contradiction: Mu‘ammar, acknowledged by the author himself as a military adherent of causality and determinism in nature, was one of the first atomists.⁹

In this context, it is incorrect to refer to al-‘Allāf, the pioneer of Muslim atomism, as using atomism as corollary of God’s omnipotence.¹⁰ Al-‘Allāf’s statement that God can stop the body’s division at the level of particles that are not further divisible (atoms) is merely a dialectical and polemical argument in favor of finitism. Ibn-Ḥazm, one of the opponents of the Kalām atomistic doctrine, rightly notes that, quite to the contrary, the existence of a limit to the divisibility of the body presupposed the impossibility of its further division, which threw doubt on divine omnipotence.¹¹ Indeed, al-‘Allāf was famous for his scandalous views on the finite nature of the objects of divine omnipotence (*maḳdurāt*), which he extrapolated to include eschatological realities.

Also weak is an explanation according to which the Mutakallims accepted atomism in order to substantiate the doctrine of God’s continuous recreation of the world. Such doctrine was developed in its most consistent form precisely in the bed of the anti-atomist current—by an-Nazzām and his followers. Despite some hypotheses, Mutakallims did not strive for a fragmentation of matter into tiny, isolated particles, in opposition to which there arose the continual empire of God: the finitism of Kalām did not presuppose the discreteness of bodies, the existence of an empty space or void between atoms.

In general, this ignoring of the polemical and dialectical context of Mutakallims’ discourse presupposes a theological intention of the Kalām atomistic doctrine. Certainly, al-‘Allāf, following other Mutakallims-atomists (especially Ash‘arites) appealed to the Koran in argumentation. For example, they quoted the verses about God’s knowledge that *comprehendeth all things* (6:80; 2:29), about *God who doth encompass all things* (41:54), and *takes account of every thing* (72:28). On the basis of such verses they conclude the impossibility of a body’s divisibility ad infinitum, because only the finite could be taken account of

⁹ Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 467–471, 559ff.

¹⁰ Gardet and Anawati, *Introduction*, 63.

¹¹ Ibn-Ḥazm, *Al-Fiṣal*, ed. M. I. Nasr and A. ‘Umayra (Beirut: Dār al-Jil, n.d.) vol. 5, 228.

and be encompassed. In such references it became clear not that *philosophia* is *ancilla theologiae*, but rather vice versa.

Mutakallims' discussions on atoms and continuum mostly were limited to the context of natural philosophy, of physics. Following al-'Allāf (d. 840), some Mu'tazilites defended finitism, or the existence of a limit to the body's divisibility. An-Nazzām (d. 835) and other Mu'tazilites taught that the body could be divided *ad infinitum*. There were thinkers, such as Abū-l-usayn al-Baṣrī (d. 1044–5), the head of the Baghdad Mu'tazilites' school, who occupied a neutral position. Thus it is difficult to suppose any inner link between atomistic problematic and theological conceptions common to Mu'tazilism. Neither can we assume such a connection in the doctrine of Ash'arites. They inherited the Mu'tazilites' atomistic doctrine, but developed their own theological system which has generally been regarded as opposite to that of the Mu'tazilites. Moreover, there was a serious split among Ash'arites themselves regarding atoms. While al-Ash'arī (d. 935) and al-Bāḳillānī (d. 1013) held atomistic views, al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) and Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 1210) refrained from joining either the finitists or their opponents. This latter stance became characteristic for Kalām after the twelfth century. According to Maimonides' testimony, most of the late Mutakallims supposed that their predecessors had tried in vain to prove the existence of the atom.¹²

Scholars elaborating upon theologico-occasionalistic interpretations of Kalām atomism and teaching about its ancient Greek roots, come up against the following paradox: how could the doctors of Kalām adopt the ontological principles of one of the most materialist and atheistic systems of antiquity—that of Democritus and Epicurus—and use them as the basis upon which to build an exclusively theistic doctrine? Very often, the answer to this question presupposes that Mutakallims did not know the authentic doctrine of Greek atomists, that their doctrine came down to them in distorted mystical and alchemist forms.¹³ According to Wolfson, when Muslims began to be acquainted with atomism, that is in the ninth century, they knew

¹² Ibn-Maymūn, *Dalālat al-Ḥā'irīn*, éd. Ḥ. Atāy (Ankara: Ankara University, 1974), 217.

¹³ Mabillean, *Histoire*, 309; S. N. Grigoryan, *Srednevekovaya filosofiya narodov Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Medieval philosophy of Near and Middle East peoples)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 97.

that those who denied atoms admitted causality, and vice versa.¹⁴ A. O. Makovelsky writes, "If Muslim theologians had known, with their leader al-Ash'arī, the authentic doctrine of Democritus, they would have turned away from it in horror."¹⁵

But in fact Mutakallims must have possessed quite rich and exact information about Greek atomism, particularly since pseudo-Plutarch's *De Plaitis Philosophorum* and Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, had already been translated into Arabic in the early ninth century. Muslim thinkers were also familiar with an atheistic trend of the philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus—denial of a creator, of the hereafter and so on.¹⁶

Finitism Rather than Atomism

The theological interpretations of Mutakallims' views on the limit of divisibility derive partly from an inaccurate notion of the genesis of the atomistic problem in Kalām. It is commonly thought that the majority of the Mu'tazilites had held to finitism and that only an-Nazzām and some of his followers had objected to it. There appears to be a need to discover an inner link tying together the atomistic theologico-metaphysical conceptions of its adherents. This connection is typically declared in a purely speculative manner. In fact it was not the atomistic doctrine of Mu'tazilites, which was refuted by an-Nazzām. Rather, an-Nazzām himself, and before him the Shī'ite Mutakallim Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam (eighth century), upheld the teachings about divisibility *ad infinitum*, an idea they probably inherited from the Stoics. Disproving Hishām and an-Nazzām, the first atomists among the Mu'tazilites formulated the doctrine that the body's divisibility was limited.¹⁷

The atomist Mutakallims' denial of the endless divisibility of bodies was due above all to the epistemological difficulties connected

¹⁴ Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 468.

¹⁵ A. O. Makovelsky, "Atomistika na Blizhnem Vostoke" (Atomism in the Near East), *Voprosy filosofii* 3 (1957), 113 (in Russian).

¹⁶ For example, ash-Shahrastānī, *Al-Milal wa-n-nihal*, ed. A. M. al-Wakīl, vol. II (Cairo: Al-Ḥalabī, 1968), 158, 162; A. S. an-Nashshār, *Nash' at al-fikr al-falsafi fi al-islām*, 7 ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'arif, 1977), 160–162.

¹⁷ Al-Baghdādī, *Al-Farq bayn al-firaq*, éd. M. M. 'Abd-al-Ḥamīd (Cairo: Ṣubayḥ, 1948), 132; al-Balkhī. *Faql al-I'tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazilah* (Tunis: Ad-Dār at-Tūnisīyah, 1974), 263.

with accepting infinitude, especially actual infinitude. For ancient and medieval thinkers infinity was a “dark” when “all cats are gray.” Indeed, the categories “how much,” “equal” and “not equal” were inapplicable to infinity because all infinities were equal. Furthermore, the infinite sum of very small or infinitesimal quantities, or of quantities that were steadily being lost in a definite ratio (2:1, for example), was always infinitely great. Finally, it seemed impossible to pass infinity.

The Mutakallims and other philosophers of the Islamic Middle Ages were acquainted with the aporia that arose with both affirmation and denial of the infinite divisibility of the body. In particular they knew Aristotle’s famous discussion about divisibility in the treatise “*De Generatione et Corruptione*.” Aristotle showed that endless division transforms a body and subsequently the whole universe into illusory dust, into a haze and consequently a mirage. From that it followed that the division must stop at some point. The particles so obtained could not be bodies since it is impossible that there would have been indivisible bodies and magnitudes. On the other hand, they could not be points since it is absurd that a magnitude should be composed of things which are not magnitudes.¹⁸

In denying infinite divisibility, the atomist Mutakallims would have had to allow for such difficulties, and also for the criticism of antique atomism, with its two main schools, the Pythagorean-Platonic and the Democritean-Epicurean. But these were not focused on building the universe on an atomistic foundation; they did not intend to explain the properties of bodies by the characteristics of the atoms composing them. They were occupied with arguments concerning the existence of a limit of divisibility. Conclusively, then, their doctrine can be qualified as a finitism rather than an atomism.

The atomist Mutakallims practically distinguished between physical and mathematical divisibility, between physical and mathematical minimum, although they did not operate on such terms explicitly. They stopped the process of division at the “smallest bodies” (*aḳall al-aḳsām*) corresponding to the “primary bodies” or atoms of Democritus and Epicurus, and to an even greater extent to the “minimal lines”

¹⁸ De Gen. et Corr., 1, 2, 316.

of Pythagoreans and Platonists.¹⁹ The first Mutakallims typically designated the limit of divisibility (the atom) by two terms: “indivisible particle” (*al-juzʿ alladhī la-yatajazzaʿ*) and “indivisible single substance” (*al-jawhar al-fard alladhī la-yankasim*). Sometimes the terms “particle,” “single substance” or simply “substance” were used as shorthand terms. The Mutakallims’ use of the terms “substance” in the sense of “atom” is usually what disorients scholars who portray the atomistic views of Kalām as a total and complex system. The word “substance” designates a body in many testimonies of doxographers as well as in the treaties of the Mutakallims themselves, but it is wrongly interpreted as “atom.”

According to Mutakallims, an atom in itself had no independent reality. It did not exist separately.²⁰ However, certain atomists assumed the isolated existence of single atoms, but they implied that to mean a mental hypothetical existence, not a real one. In that respect, the Mutakallims’ “particles” were similar not to Democritus’ atoms, but rather to Epicurus’ ameres (mentally distinguishable in atoms but not separable from them), and to the monads/points of the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition.

Some doxographers describe Mutakallims’ atoms as absolutely lacking magnitude (*kamm*),²¹ as lacking a body,²² length, breadth and depth.²³ Based on such opinions, many modern scholars understand Mutakallims’ atoms as geometrical (mathematical) points,²⁴ and sometimes even as spiritual, mental monads.²⁵

In fact, atomists of Kalām, like the classical atomists, attribute to the minimum/atom a specific extension that is intermediate between corporeality and absolute in-extension. The anti-atomists pointed out that atoms are either bodies, and then they must be divisible, or

¹⁹ J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 109; P. P. Gaidenko, *Evolutsiya ponyatiya nauki* (Evolution of the notion of science (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 56 (in Russian).

²⁰ Al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt al-islamiyyin*, ed. H. Ritter, 3 ed. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1980), 316–317.

²¹ Ibn-Maymūn, *Dalālat*, 200.

²² Ibn-Ḥazm, *Al-Fiṣal*, vol. 5, 223.

²³ Al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, 304, 307, 311, 315.

²⁴ H. A. Wolfson dedicates an entire paragraph (*Philosophy*, 472–486) to the explanation of how—as a result of faulty transmission—the Democritus’ atoms could be understood by the Muslims as pure geometrical points!

²⁵ Makovelsky, “Atomism”, 114.

points from which it was impossible to form a body, a continuum. Epicurus, acknowledging such criticism, put forward a third possibility: ameres occupied an intermediate position between “primary bodies” or atoms, and points, “measuring magnitude in their own way.”²⁶ Earlier, the Pythagoreans and Plato had arrived at a similar solution. From Plato’s point of view, writes Aristotle, “extension is different from the magnitude: it is what is contained and defined by the form, as by a bounding plane.”²⁷ The distinction between “magnitude” and “extension” fully corresponds to the Greek philosophical tradition, which does not include the principle of things in their number. In particular, the Greeks did not consider unity a number since it was the principle of counting.

Mutakallims followed this tradition, attributing to the “indivisible” a kind of extension. In their opinion, the atom lacked corporeality, but occupied space (*hayyiz*) which is distinguished from the place (*makān*) that body occupies, and has some surface area (*masāha*), etc. Ash‘arites emphasized that the atom in itself also had a magnitude (*mikdār*) and volume (*hajm*).²⁸

This tendency was shared among the Mu‘tazilites of the Basra school who considered it necessary for each atom to have a certain area.²⁹ As for the Baghdad Mu‘tazilites, they were inclined to stress the difference between microscopic and macroscopic extension. That is why they refused to characterize the atom in itself as occupying a space or having an area; such qualifications could only be attributed to it when it was joined to other atoms that were the composition of a body.³⁰ According to several Baghdad Mu‘tazilites, writes al-Ash‘arī, “when an atom was joined to another atom, each of them would be a body. . . . But when they are separated neither of them would be a body.”³¹ As an-Nisābūrī himself noted, the difference of

²⁶ Epicurus, *Epistola ad Herodotum*, § 58. See also: J. Mau, *Zum Problem des Infinitesimalen bei den antiken Atomisten*, 2 ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 36; V. P. Zubov, *Infinitesimalen bei den antiken Atomisten*, 2 ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 36; V. P. Zubov, *Razvitiie atomisticheskikh predstavleniie do nachala XIX veka* (The development of atomistic notions before the beginning of nineteenth century (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 17.

²⁷ Aristotle, *Physics*, VI, 2, 209.

²⁸ Al-Juwaynī, *Ash-Shāmīl*, vol. 1 (Cairo: Dār al-‘Arab, 1960), 60–62; ash-Shahraṣṭānī, *Nihāyat al-ikdām*, ed. A. Guillaume (Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthanna, n.d.), 507–508.

²⁹ An-Nisābūrī, *Al-Masā‘il fī al-khilāf bayn al-baṣriyyin wa al-baghdādīyyin*, ed. M. Ziyadah and R. As-Saiyyd (Beirut: Ma‘had al-Inma’ al-‘Arabī, 1979), 58.

³⁰ An-Nisābūrī, *Al-Masā‘il*, 58, 61.

³¹ Al-Ash‘arī, *Maḳālāt*, 302.

opinions between the two schools on the atom's extension consists only in one of the modes of expression and terminology, because "there was no disagreement among our masters that an atom could exist without occupying a definite space."³²

So, the atom lacks corporeality, it "does not have length, breadth and depth," but rather extends in its own way. This extension is the principle of extension in general, the unit of corporeality. In this sense an-Nīsābūrī testifies, "When we say that an atom occupies a space (*mutahayy*z), we mean the [origin], thanks to that atom's increase in size (*tata'azam*) when joined with another."³³ Founding this timistic approach, the Mutakallims addressed the question of the minimum number of atoms needed to form a composite body. At the Mu'tazilite stage of the Kalām development atomists gave various answers, but as a rule they built corporeality in a manner that appeared geometrical. According to al-'Allāf, six atoms are sufficient to construct a body (a "smallest body")—two atoms in each dimension. Mu'ammār and al-Jubbā'ī taught about constructions of eight atoms: two for length, two for breadth, and another four piled on them to form depth. Al-Ka'bī built the body from four atoms: three forming a triangular base of a pyramid, and the fourth constituting the apex. Some atomists described a construction of seven atoms: one in the center, and the other six contiguous with it on the six sides. Al-Iskāfī and several Baghdadis regard the smallest body as composed of two atoms akin to the Pythagorean conception of "minimal line" which prevailed at the Ash'arite stage in the history of Kalām."³⁴

This resembles the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition, which often constructed bodies from planes, planes from lines, and lines from points. But the atomists of Kalām, like the Pythagoreans and Plato, imply not merely geometrical points, lines and planes, but almost physical entities, intermediate between geometrical, numerico-ideal and spatial-sensible entities. The pseudo-Aristotle's treatise "De lineis

³² An-Nīsābūrī, *Al-Masā'il*, 61.

³³ An-Nīsābūrī, *Al-Masā'il*, 61.

³⁴ Al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, 301–304; at-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maḳāšid*, vol. I (Istanbul: Al-Maḳba'ah al-'Uthmaniyyah, 1898), 289. The extreme views can be taken as those of as-Ṣālihī, on one hand, who identified atom and body, and, on the other, those of atomists who refused to name a specific number of atoms needed to form a body, stating only that the number is finite.

insectabilitibus” was built upon a fusion of these two perspectives, and supplied arguments for anti-atomists of Antiquity and the Middle Ages.

The Kalām finitists came across the aporia, arising from the question of the atoms’ contiguity. As is generally known, the anti-atomists (in particular Aristotle) note that atoms (“indivisibles,” “points”) exclude a continuum: they could not completely coincide with one another or they would merge, and they could not come into contact even partially since they had no parts. The atomists spoke of a third possibility. For instance, Epicurus represented the atoms as preserving continuity but not merging and contacting.³⁵ The Pythagoreans comprehended the “minimal line” as a composite of two points “in contact” in some way.³⁶

The Mutakallims developed these ideas in a clearer manner, being inclined to distinguish between physical and mathematical divisibility. They attributed to the atom six sides (*jihāt*), which correspond to the Democritus’ “positions” or “turns”: top and bottom, right and left, front and back. According to the Basra Mu‘tazilites, these sides pertain to the atom itself. Some Baghdad Mu‘tazilites also held this view, and others, including al-Jubbā’ī and al-Ka‘bī, considered the sides to be “accidents” (*arād*) of the atom.³⁷ The Ash‘arites also recognize the sides or edges (*atrāf*) as accidents or in-extended parts of the atom.³⁸ In this latter meaning the atom is indivisible although its sides could be mentally distinguished. By coming into contact on their sides, which represented accidents or in-extended parts, atoms could constitute a continuum.³⁹

The problem of an atom’s extension is closely related to that of its form. The Mutakallims knew about Democritus’ atoms, and that

³⁵ Epicurus, *Epistola*, § 58.

³⁶ Raven, Pythagoreans, 109; Gaidenko, *Evolution*, 94.

³⁷ An-Nīsābūrī, *Al-Masā’il*, 59–60; al-Ash‘arī, *Maḳālāt*, 316–317.

³⁸ Al-Ijī/al-Jurjānī, *Al-Mawāḳif*, vol. 7 (Cairo: Matba‘at as-Sa‘ādah, 1907), 21; ash-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, 511–512.

³⁹ An atom with six sides could come into contact with six atoms. Those atomists who denied the existence of different sides to an atom considered it capable of making contact with no more than one other atom. Such was the view of Abū-Bishr Ṣāliḥ ibn Abū-Ṣāliḥ and Ṣāliḥ Ḳubbah (IX c.), who claimed that one of the contacting atoms would completely occupy the other, and that if it were assumed that an atom could make contact with more than one other atom, the whole universe could fit into the first. Al-Ash‘arī, *Maḳālāt*, 303.

they were distinguished from one another by shape, necessary to explain the differences in bodies' sensible qualities.⁴⁰ But the question of atom's form did not attract much attention in Kalām. This is particularly evident in the absence of mention of it in al-Ash'ari's *Maḳālāt* since the dispute around the characteristics of atoms occupies considerable space in that work. This omission was due to the fact that—in contrast to the atomism of Democritus and his followers—the atom's form played no role in Mutakallims' constructions, or in their explanations of differences between the sensible qualities of the bodies. As a rule, the Mutakallims assumed that, in itself, the atom had no figure or shape (*shak*), although they admitted likening it to certain figures. Some likened it to a sphere or a triangle, but the majority taught that it resembled a cube. The superiority of a square shape was explained by squares being able to fit together so that there are no cracks or fissures between them.⁴¹ This preference for the square form expressed a significant peculiarity of Mutakallims' atomism: the denial of void, which played such a fundamental role in the atomistic doctrine of Democritus. Against Maimonides' affirmation,⁴² the Mutakallims had no need of a void (empty space) to explain the atoms' motion, its uniting or separation. In their opinion, a singular atom could exist only in a composite of a body, and that is why, in itself, it does not move.⁴³ Al-Ka'bī and other Mu'tazilites of the Baghdad school rejected the void even as an imaginary or hypothetical assumption.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Sharh al-Ishārāt*, printed on the margin of Ibn-Sina's *Al-Ishārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, vol. 2 (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1957), 155; Ibn-Sina, *Ash-Shifā': Aṭ-Ṭabī'iyāt*, ed. M. Ḳasim (Cairo: Dār al-Kātib al-'Arabī, 1969), 83–84. Democritus taught about an infinite number of forms, and Epicurus about a finite one. However, some medieval Muslim doxographies attribute to them opinions about exclusively one form, namely spherical (for example: ar-Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal* (Cairo: Al-Maṭba'ah al-Husayniyyah, 1905), 84. These ideas may have been borrowed from Aristotle's *De Anima* (I, 4, 409), and Themistius' commentary on it.

⁴¹ An-Nisābūrī, *Al-Masā'il*, 98; al-Juwayni, *Ash-Shamil*, 62; at-Taftazani, *Sharh*, vol. I, 310–311.

⁴² Ibn-Maymūn, *Dalālat*, 201.

⁴³ Ibn-Ḥazm, *Al-Fiṣal*, vol. 5, 196; al-Ijī/al-Jurjānī, *Al-Mawāḳif*, vol. 7, 23 (as-Syālkūti's commentary). Certain Mu'tazilites (among them al-Futū and 'Abbād ibn Sulaymān) categorically denied any possibility (even imaginary or hypothetical) of the separate existence of an atom. See: al-Ash'ari, *Maḳālāt*, 303.

⁴⁴ An-Nisaburi, *Al-Masā'il*, 47.

Other Mutakallims recognized the existence of a void between bodies but not—as incorrectly supposed by some scholars—between atoms.⁴⁵ Contrary to the Democritean quantitative atomism, the Kalām’s finitism developed a qualitative approach to the “indivisible.” The Ash‘arites endowed the atom with all the qualities of accidents (except, of course, the composite nature) of bodies. That was also the opinion of certain Mu‘tazilites. It is true that other atomist Mu‘tazilites, particularly al-‘Allāf, considered that a solitary atom could not bear (be substratum to) certain qualities (for example, color, taste or smell) if it is not contained in the composition of a body.⁴⁶ However, it would be incorrect to interpret such statements⁴⁷ in the spirit of Democritus’ atomistic doctrine, that is, in the sense that the accidents of a body arose from the union of atoms and disappeared when they were separated. We must assume that it means only that the joining of atoms is a necessary precondition (but not the cause) for the “installation (*ḥulūl*)” of qualities in the composite whole.

From this it follows that the Mutakallims were close to finitism, resembling Pythagorean-Platonic, geometrical (mathematical) atomism rather than the Democritean, physical atomism. They focused their attentions on the question of the existence of a limit to the body’s divisibility. Toward the substantiation of the finitistic thesis, the Kalām atomists discussed various characteristics of “indivisible,” viz. its extension, sides, form, or qualities. The Mutakallims did not distinguish atoms by such traits as their magnitude, position or figure, because, unlike those in the Democritean tradition, they did not explain the sensible properties of bodies by means of the characteristics of atoms, and they did not construct “secondary” qualities from “primary” ones.

⁴⁵ H. A. Wolfson (*Philosophy*, 490), incorrectly attributing to Mutakallims a notion of atoms’ motion, thinks that the Kalām atomists rejected Epicurus’ principle of spontaneous inclination of atoms due to their doctrine that God was a single factor of atoms’ composition in a body.

⁴⁶ Al-Ash‘ari, *Maqalat*, 303–317; al-Juwayni, *Ash-Shamil*, 56, 67.

⁴⁷ As does, for example, A. Nadea in his *Le système philosophique des Mu‘tazila* (Beirut: Les Lettres Orientales, 1956), 152 et sq.

Discontinualist Approaches to Motion and Time

Atomist or finitist conceptions of bodies led logically to the principle of *isotachia*, that is, of equal velocities:⁴⁸ when a body passes one atom of distance, another body must pass an equal distance, since advance by less than one atom implies divisibility of the atom. Although the existence of different velocities of motions had been proposed by Peripatetics since the time of Aristotle as a counter-argument against the doctrine of “indivisibles” (because, from their standpoint, the existence of motion with different velocities was an obvious fact), the atomists did not abandon the principle of isotachia. Al-Ash‘arī, for instance, did not admit the existence of faster or slower motions.⁴⁹

As is generally known, Epicurus, who accepted that isotachia in the microworld (at the level of atoms), explained differences in velocities in the macroworld (at the level of bodies) by the distribution of “kynems” (the atoms of motion) among atoms composing complex bodies.⁵⁰ Alongside this conception existed another theory that explained differences in velocity by larger or fewer numbers of intermediate pauses, or interruptions of motion. The Muslim thinkers were acquainted with this theory, in particular, from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *Questiones naturales*, in which it is attributed to several adherents of atomism.⁵¹ In the Muslim East it was known as a doctrine characteristic of atomists as a whole.⁵²

This conception of pauses (*wakāfāt* or *sakanāt*) was shared by several atomists among Mu‘tazilites (in particular, by al-‘Allāf), and in Ash‘arism it came to predominate. However, the later Mutakallims were inclined to believe that its opponents were more convincing than its supporters.⁵³ It should be noted that the conception of pauses is not logically connected to the atomistic thesis. In the teaching of certain Mutakallims (especially the Mu‘tazilites) as well as of several

⁴⁸ For example, Aristotle, *Physics*, VI, 2. 233.

⁴⁹ Ibn-Fūrak, *Mujarrad maḳālāt ash-shaykh Abī-l-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī*, ed. D. Gimaret (Beirut: Dar al-Mashrik, 1987), 206.

⁵⁰ Epicurus, *Epistola*, §§ 61–62; Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* X, 154, *Pyrrhoneae hypotyposes* III, 77.

⁵¹ Quest. Natur. II, 1.

⁵² For example, Ibn-Sina, *An-Najāt* (Cairo: Maṭba‘at as-Sa‘ādah, 1938), 110–111.

⁵³ Al-Ash‘arī, *Maḳālāt*, 322; *An-Nīsābūrī*, *Al-Masā‘il*, 200–201; at-Taftāzānī, *Sharh*, vol. I, 275–276; al-Ījī/al-Jurjānī, *Al-Mawāḳif*, vol. 7, 25.

nonatomist thinkers,⁵⁴ the concept occurs as an independent doctrine explaining differences in velocities.

The Kalām thinkers elaborated another discrete conception of motion, which emerged in anti-atomist thought: the theory of leaps (*tafrah*), usually associated with an-Nazzām.⁵⁵ According to him, a body can be in one place, and then in a third, without passing through an intermediate place. An-Nazzām advanced this idea in response to the question of al-‘Allāf (and before him, of Zeno): how can an infinite number of things pass during a finite time. In particular, how can an ant crawl from one edge of a rock to another edge. In an-Nazzām’s view the ant covers part of the rock by crawling, and part by a leap.

Commenting on An-Nazzām’s answer, al-Jurjānī puzzled over why he had not replied that the interval of time had been divided to infinity, that is, that it consisted of an infinite number of parts so that a segment of time corresponded to a segment of distance.⁵⁶ In fact, in An-Nazzām’s epoch the Mutakallims did not yet teach about a structural correspondence between matter (body), space (distance) and time. The appeal to the concept of a leap, which seemed strange and unconvincing even to An-Nazzām’s followers (including al-Jāhīz), was evidence that the first atomists of Kalām had not developed a discrete theory of time.

However, according to Maimonides, the Mutakallims extended their finitism not only to bodies and distance but also to time and motion. Because, he said, “they undoubtedly knew Aristotle’s proofs, in which he showed that distance, time and spatial motion were three things that corresponded to each other in their being—there were mutual links between them, so that when one of them was divided, the other was divided in the same way.”⁵⁷

Aristotle had demonstrated in his *Physics* that the atomistic (or anti-atomistic) conceptions of space, time and motion were logically connected: when one was affirmed it was necessary to affirm the second

⁵⁴ For instance, in Galens’s *De diagnoscendis pulsibus canonicis*.

⁵⁵ In antiquity, Damascius Successor shared this theory. In his *Dubitaciones et solutiones de primis principis* he asserted that motion proceeds through intervals and not points, by leaps as it were.

⁵⁶ Al-Ījī/al-Jurjānī, *Al-Mawākif*, vol. 7, 10.

⁵⁷ Ibn-Maymūn, *Dalālat*, 201–202.

and the third.⁵⁸ But such theoretical consistency was rarely observed either before the Stagirite or after him, especially among atomists. Most notably, the question of Democritus' recognition of an atomistic structure of space, and especially of time, remained in dispute.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Strato, who tried to combine the Aristotelian teaching with certain Democritean doctrines, assumed the atomic character of time, and also considered bodies and space divisible to infinity.⁶⁰ In the Muslim East, the philosopher Abū Bakr Ar-Rāzī, for instance, affirmed the atomistic structure of matter, but not of space and time.

This inconsistency is also found in early Kalām. The atomist Mutakallims of course were predisposed to deny the endless divisibility not only of a body but of anything finite. Al-Ash'arī, for example, declared: "An analogue of our doctrine of the indivisible particle, of there being nothing smaller than it, was the doctrine of minimum pleasure and benefit, of the ending of the process of division [of pleasure and benefit] in an indivisible part; anything smaller could not be imagined."⁶¹ In the spirit of that orientation, the Mutakallims should have affirmed the existence of a minimal interval of space and time. But we possess no unambiguous knowledge about the atomism of time and motion among early Mutakallims. Sometimes, it is true, they spoke about "the least time" (*aḳall al-awḳāt*), and they often argued about the renovation of the body's accidents in each "moment" (*wak̄t, zamān*) or "now" (*'ān*). But we do not have enough information to identify these "moments" and "nows" with atoms of time. Such expressions were employed as nontechnical terms by both atomists and continualists (including Peripatetics). In any case, the Mutakallims did not assume any discreteness of time: the units of time are not isolated one from another, but continually pass one into another.⁶²

⁵⁸ *Phys.* VII, 1, 231; IV, 11, 219.

⁵⁹ S. Ya. Luryie, *Ocherki po istorii antichnoi nauki* (Essay on the history of antique science) (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiya nauk SSSR, 1947), 181 (in Russian); Zubov, *Razvītie*, 90.

⁶⁰ Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos*, X, 90.

⁶¹ Ibn-Fūrak, *Mujarrad*, 127.

⁶² In this spirit Ibn-ʿArabī, who developed Kalām atomism and dynamism (in extending the conception of permanent renovation to substance), emphasized that the moment a thing disappears is the moment of the appearance of its like. See

Usually, in affirming Maimonides' testimony about the atomicity of motion, space and time in the Mutakallims' view, we find cited an opinion of al-'Allāf. According to this "the motion of a body is divided in correspondence with the number of its parts, so that a movement that occurs in one part differs from a motion that occurs in another part, and that motion is also divided by time so that a movement that took place in one time differs from a movement that took place in another."⁶³ But this allusion is not quite correct. Immediately after the quoted opinion it is said that al-Jubbā'ī and other finitists rejected this view of al-'Allāf. That is why these variants of motion's divisibility have no inner, necessary link with a body's atomicity. Furthermore, if al-'Allāf had claimed a structural correspondence between time, motion and distance he could not have posed to an-Nazzām the question, cited above (not solvable from his point of view), concerning the crossing of an infinitely divisible distance during a finite time interval.

It is true that the later Mutakallims, including Maimonides' contemporaries, were more consistent in their views on structural symmetry between matter, space, time and motion. But in their works the notion of the finity of motion and time were developed, as a rule, within the context of discussions on a body's divisibility, in which this finity was cited as an initial premise of certain proofs for the atomicity of a body.⁶⁴ But here, we must emphasize again, Mutakallims' conception of time is far from a discrete one. We are dealing here, as in general, with finitism, rather than with atomism.

his *Fuṣūs al-ḥikam*, ed. A. 'Afīfī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1980), 155–156; *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabiyyah al-Kubra, 1911), vol. I, 292; vol. III, 275.

⁶³ Al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, 319; Such is the interpretation of Wolfson (*Philosophy*, 494).

⁶⁴ About these proofs see Ibrahim and Sagadeev, *Classical*, 94–100.

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THE NOTION OF STONE IN THE BOOK OF GENESIS¹

Dmitry V. Frolov

1. The term “stone” is often mentioned in the Bible but practically never as part of a landscape. Stone is often a symbolic concept and refers to the link between God and Man; it is elevated to the rank of the chosen substance in parallel with the concept of the chosen people. The oral Torah tradition and the classical commentaries do not neglect the symbolic significance of the stone theme in the Bible. On the contrary, they even emphasize it. Here are two examples.

The famous midrash *Bereshit Raba* enumerates things that existed before the creation:

*shishah d'barim qadmu li-briyat ha-olam, yesh me-hem she-nibre'u we-yesh me-hem she-alu ba-mahshaba lehibarot: ha-torah we-kise ha-qabod nibra'u . . . Ha-abot we-yisrael u-beyt ha-miqdash u-shmo shel mashiah alu ba-mahshaba lehibarot . . .*²

“Six things preceded the creation of the world, some of them were created and some were planned to be created. The Torah and the Seat of Honour were created and Patriarchs, Israel, the Temple and the Name of Mashiah were intended to be created later. . . .”

It can be seen that five of the six things enumerated are directly related to the motif of stone. The exception is the Patriarchs, if we do not count Jacob among them.³

¹ I discussed three topics in my oral presentation at the 12th World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem, 1997), namely: 1) the motif of stone (*eben*) per se; 2) the motif of precious stone (*eben toba* or *yaqara*); 3) the motif of stoning (*ragam* and *saqal*). In this paper I have concentrated on the first one, the logical starting point in the treatment of the subject. The complete text of my study with all the references and statistical tables will be published as part of the book devoted to the comparative study of the notion of stone in the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament and the Qur'an.

² See *Bereshit Raba* (Tel-Aviv: Yavneh, 1986), Vol. 1, 5–6.

³ Rashi gives another version of the list that includes seven things: 1) Torah; 2) Tshuvah; 3) Gan Eden; 4) Gehinom; 5) Kise ha-qabod; 6) beyt ha-miqdash; 7) shmo shel mashiah. In his list, at least five items (1, 3, 5–7) are definitely related to the motif of stone. See Rabbi Moshe Weissman. The Midrash says. Translated

One of classical commentaries included in the Vilna edition of the Torah, “*Kli yaqar*” or “Precious Vessel”, comments on Deut. 9:9, “When I was gone up into the mount to receive the tables of stone, . . . the tables of the covenant . . .” by giving several reasons for the choice of stone as the matter for *luhot*. The reasons given are the following:

- 1) most of the capital punishments mentioned in the Torah are examples of stoning (*sqilat abanim*);
- 2) it is a homage to Jacob of whom is said *ro'eh eben Israel* (Gen. 49:24);
- 3) it is a homage to the Temple with the reference to Isa. 28:16: “Therefore thus saith the Lord God, Behold, I lay in Zion for a foundation a stone, a tried stone . . .;”
- 4) it is a homage to the Mashiah with the reference to the Book of Daniel.

2. All of the three “stone” motifs (stone, precious stone, stoning) originated, as could be predicted, in the Pentateuch. Each motif appears to be related from the start to one of the three persons who are of the utmost importance for the history of the Jewish people—stone per se to Jacob,⁴ precious stone to Joseph,⁵ and stoning to Moses.⁶ It follows that the genesis of the stone theme is placed in the context of the genesis of the people of Israel, its exodus, the receiving of the Torah and settlement in the promised land.

3. The word *eben*, attested in most of the Semitic languages and reconstructed for the Proto-Semitic, was interpreted in the tradition as semantically related to *ben* “son” and *banah* (*livnot*) “to build.” In other words, it was placed in the semantic field whose configuration is shaped up by the twin ideas of birth and building. Modern scholars here, as in many other cases, repeat what has already been known to medieval Jewish commentators.

4. It is noteworthy that eleven of the thirteen stone contexts in *Bereshit* are part of the story of Jacob/Israel. The stone theme appears

into Russian. *Bereshit.*, Vol. 1, 19. This note needs standard bibliographical format, i.e., title in italics, etc.

⁴ The first relevant context is Gen. 28:11–22.

⁵ The first relevant context is Gen. 2:11, where one of the two precious stones mentioned in relation to Gan Eden, the stone of onyx (*eben ha-shoham*) is the stone of Joseph, as can be seen from the list of the twelve precious stones used for decoration of the breastplate (*khoshen*) of the High Priest. The stones are arranged according to the dates of birth of the sons of Israel, see Ex. 28:9–12 and Ex. 39:6–7.

⁶ The first relevant context is Ex. 8:26.

in the crucial moments of Jacob's life: during the vision of the ladder (Gen. 28:11–22), during the first meeting with Rachel at the well (Gen. 29:1–11), during the parting with Laban (Gen. 31:45–46), during the revelation about the change of the name (Gen. 35:14), within his blessings (*brachot*) at his death-bed (Gen. 49:24).

Rashi's commentary adds to this list one more stone allusion, taken from the Oral Torah tradition, and it has to do with Jacob's birth. Commenting upon the verse Gen. 25:26, "And after this came his brother out, and his hand took hold on Essau's heel . . .," Rashi says, "I have heard some who interpreted the verse in the following manner: Jacob had the right to do so as he was conceived first and Essau second. Compare it with a thin tube into which you put two stones. That which you have put first comes out second and that which you have put second comes out first."⁷

Thus stone becomes the matter that accompanies Jacob from birth to death. This fact is all the more visible as no stone appears in the stories of other patriarchs who lived before Jacob.

5. The above words of Rashi directly relate stone to the process of birth. Thus the concept of dead matter—and nothing deserves the name of dead matter more than stone—is tied up with the concept of life. See, for example, Ex. 1:16 where the Pharaoh speaks to the Hebrews' midwives: "When ye do the office of a midwife to the Hebrew women and see them upon the stools (in the original—*abnay_m*) . . .".

The tendency to relate the stone motif to the genesis of the Jewish people can be traced in the commentaries to most of the above contexts.

Commenting upon Gen. 28:11, when the Lord promises Jacob that his seed "shall be as the dust of the earth" . . . and that in his seed "shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (Gen. 28:14), Rashi recites the well-known Haggadah story that Jacob took for his pillows several stones of the place (other sources mention the exact number of these stones, twelve). The stones began quarrelling about the honour to be the pillow for the head of Jacob, and the Lord made them one stone. This story was understood as a symbolic equation between the twelve stones and the twelve tribes of Israel.

⁷ Most of the commentaries, except *Kli yaqar*, are cited from the edition: *Torah Hayim* (Jerusalem, 1986), Vols. 1–7.

Commenting upon Gen. 29:10, which is part of the story of the first meeting between Jacob and Rachel, Maxaram (Pab Meir bar Baruch from Rothenburg) says that at the moment when Jacob saw Rachel *ruah ha-qodesh* descended on him and Jacob managed to roll the stone away from the well's mouth. This context establishes a symbolic opposition which is very important throughout the Bible, that of water and stone, life and death, which often are intertwined in the Biblical narrative.

Rashi's commentary on Gen. 49:24, and more specifically on the phrase, *ro'eh eben Israel* "the shepherd of the stone of Israel," by which Jacob addressed Joseph, says that the notarikon of the word *eben* from *eben Israel* is *ab wa-ben* "father and son," or Jacob and his sons.⁸

The same symbolic relation between *eben* and *ben* is asserted by Ibn Ezra who cites in his long commentary an authority who said that aleph in *abanim* is added to the model (*gizrat*) of *banim*.⁹

In his commentary on the same text, Radaq stresses that the whole of Israel is likened *'al derech mashal*, to the stone, because Israel is "the foundation of the building of the world" (*'iqar binyan ha-'olam*).

Let us remember in this context that Adam *ha-rishon* was made of *afar min ha-adamah*, "dust of the ground," or clay, see Gen. 2:7. It follows that the rest of mankind is formed of clay or dust, while the origin of the Jewish people is likened to stone, not clay. The use of the "stone" simile or metaphor is never applied to anybody else except the Jewish people throughout the Bible.

6. The opposition of stone and clay generates another opposition that is related not to birth but to building, that of stone (*eben*) and brick (*labanah*)—see below. This observation brings us close to another theme incorporated into the story of Jacob, that of stone as the chosen matter for building a monument, an altar, the Temple or the House of the Lord, etc.

As we remember, three of the four stones in the story of Jacob (chapters 28, 31 and 35) became monuments devoted to God or manifesting the role of God, as, for example, the *brit* between Jacob and Laban.

7. It is significant that classical commentaries tend to place most of these stones at the same place, the mountain of Moriah. The old

⁸ Later commentators more often use the phrase *ab wa-mishpahah*, "father and his family."

⁹ Needless to say, this statement has to do with exegesis, not linguistics.

tradition, supported by Josephus Flavius, places the sacrifice of Isaac at this mountain. It is identified with the mountain in Jerusalem, where David later put the altar and Solomon built the Temple. Ibn Ezra, Radaq, and Sforno especially assert that the stone after the second revelation (chapter 35) was placed exactly at the same place as the first one (chapter 28). In this way, the theme of many stones as the equivalent of one stone, begun by the oral tradition in relation to stone as a symbol of birth, is continued in relation to stone as a symbol of building. Only this time we do not have a collection of stones gathered in one place at the same time, but a succession of stones in time which becomes, it may be said, one everlasting moment.

The motif of the changing number of stones also occurs in relation to stone as symbol of building. See, e.g., Gen. 31:45–46, where a heap (*gal*) of stones is functionally interchangeable with a single stone as a monument. Ramban particularly mentions and discusses in detail the status of the first stone (chapter 28), which was, as he says, something between a monument, that is, a single stone, and an altar, which is made of many stones.

In other words, we see from the very beginning the formation of the motif that many stones joined together are like one stone (the Temple), exactly as all the *shbatim* joined together make one people. This motif adds one more dimension to the idea of unity omnipresent in the Bible, unity of God, unity of cult, unity of place, unity of chosen people, unity of chosen matter, etc. For instance, Radaq in his commentary on Gen. 49:24 stresses the fact that *kol israel* is likened to a single stone that is “a strong substance and one body” (*etzem hazaq wa-guf ehad*). Rashi mentions that this *eben* (or the people of Israel) is the *eben ha-roshah* “corner-stone”, referring to Zech. 4:7. The suggestion is repeated by Ramban, who states that this stone is put in place by the Lord himself. He also adds that *eben Israel* is equivalent in meaning to the phrase “kneset Israel” in the Rabbinical usage and that stone is a metaphor for the structure (*binyan*) of the whole building. Sforno adds to this image one more dimension. He identifies *eben Israel* with the stone which “was cut out without hands” and “which smote the image upon his feet that were of iron and clay” (Dan. 2:34), emphasizing the endurance of this stone.

8. We see that the ideas of birth and building are, indeed, as linguistic analysis suggests, intertwined in the first book of the Pentateuch, with the image of stone serving as a common metaphor symbolising

both. All the motifs are centred around the idea of the chosen people and their relation with the Lord. The same theme is continued in other books of the Pentateuch, only there, compared with the book of Genesis, we can see the shift of emphasis from the idea of birth to the idea of building, which ultimately culminates in the Tables and the Temple.

We can conclude the discussion with three closing extended examples that make use of the symbolic meaning of “stone.” The first looks backwards in time to the time of Jacob, the second looks forward after Jacob’s time, to the time of the national catastrophe, exile and diaspora, and the third is oriented both ways.

First, the close relationship and identification of stone with Jacob and the people of Israel explains why one of the two pre-Jacob episodes involving stone from the Bereshit (Gen. 11:3) gives, so to speak, a negative variant of the motif. That variant is the story of *midgal Babel*, which was built of bricks instead of stones. Rashi and later commentators stress the fact that people of the *dor ha-plaga*, “the generation of the division,” the builders of the tower, did not have stones in their land (called desert-*midbar*) and therefore all of their houses were made of clay bricks (Radaq). This absence of stones seems to have a two-fold symbolic meaning. The Tower Enterprise was a failure because, among other things, it was built of the wrong material and because the builders were the wrong people. In both senses the stone was absent from the project because the time had not yet been ripe for the right Temple.

Second, the special place given to stone as the chosen matter helps to explain its occurrence in the book of Deuteronomy and later books in a totally different context, that of idolatry: see Deut. 4:28; 28:36; 29:16; 2 Kings 19:18. Let us cite only one example: “And there ye shall serve gods, the work of men’s hands, wood and stone which neither see, nor eat, nor smell” (Deut. 4:28). The stone here is different from the stone we have been speaking about before in two respects. First, the dead matter of stone can become alive only in the sense of the dwelling-place of the Lord Himself (the Temple) and the transmitter of His word (the Tables) and only at the Lord’s will, who chooses the matter as He chooses the people or the prophet. As soon as this link with the Creator is severed, stone turns into what it was originally and becomes dead matter and nothing more. Second, the chosen matter cannot be made equal to other matter,

exactly as the chosen people cannot be the equal of other peoples and the Creator is not like gods of other nations.

Obedience to God's will or the violation of it is the dividing line between what otherwise could have been identical phenomena. Thus, the stones for the altar had to be uncut (see Ex. 20:25), while stones for the Temple were hewed (see 1 Kings 5:18). The equation of stone and wood is an embodiment of idolatry, see above, while the combination of stone and wood in the construction of the Temple is not (see 1 Kings, chapters 5 and 6). Third, the motif of the water coming out of the stone as a symbol of life and procreation miraculously generated by the dead matter (Gen. 29:1–11) is developed further in the miracle of water coming out of the stone rock in the desert when Moses struck it with his rod (Ex. 17:5–6). At the same time, the Midrash tradition extends this motif backwards to the time of Creation as it interprets the famous *bohu* from the second verse of the Bible as the great stone rocks in the depth producing water. The reference is to Isaiah 34:11 where *abney bohu* are mentioned within the picture of the Lord's revenge.

This is the complex of images that lays down the foundation for the further usage of the symbol of stone in other books of the Bible.

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INDRA THE ANT: A COMPARATIVE COMMENTARY ON A MOTIVE OF ANCIENT INDIAN MYTHOLOGY

Vladimir N. Toporov

In this article the author examines two problems related to the mythopoieic image of the ant: firstly, its mythoritualistic and symbolic meaning in various cultural traditions, and secondly, the central “formic” myth that forms part of the so-called “basic myth” as one of its versions. The basic myth deals with the subjects of crime and punishment, damage/deficit and compensation, crisis and settlement. In connection with these latter subjects, worthy of note is the mythologeme on the transformation of God the Thunderer (Indra, Zeus, and others) or his fairy-tale counterparts (Prince Ivan, Vol’ga, and so forth) into an ant, of the strongest and the largest into the weakest and the smallest (a minimal calculable unit, a sort of quantum). This smallness and weakness, however, is compensated by the ant’s ability to transform its seeming deficiency into an advantage that makes it possible to attain what is impossible for the largest and the strongest to achieve. In the mythopoieic thought, the magic transformation of the Thunderer into an ant capable of penetrating through the smallest crevice into the fortress of an adversary gives rise to a motive of human beings (e.g. the tribe of Myrmidons) “transformed” into ants. It also gives rise to ideas about such qualities of ants as collectivity, diligence, industry, a businesslike style of living, modesty, plain tastes, foresight, frugality, thrift, resourcefulness, rationality, and cunning, but also a fiercely warlike spirit that makes ants similar to men. The motive of humans “transformed” into ants gives grounds to reconstruct the motive of precisely such method of punishment of the Thunderer’s adversary in the “basic myth”—the fragmentation of his body into tiniest particles. This vision was facilitated by the fact that an ant heap is the maximum biomass in a humanly visible world. But this formic smallness and extremely cohesive plurality begets richness, progeny and fertility—signs of a new life, reborn and intensified. Such ideas, incidentally, underpin a number of rituals like the Russian custom of “sowing” of live ants to achieve a plentiful harvest and particularly cattle young, which again refers us

to one of the motives of the “basic myth”. A similar connection may be seen in the profanized rites of burning and/or flooding an ant heap, understandable in the context of actions undertaken in the myth by the Thunderer in order to destroy his adversary—burning to ashes and flooding with water (rain, storm). The connection between ants and Maundy Thursday, the day of the Thunderer (compare with the Russian proverb *posle doždika v četverg*—“after the rain on Thursday”), and signs according to which heavy rain or storm can be forecasted from ant behaviour (the “swarming” of ants = the “swarming” of rain-drops) also refer to the “basic myth”, just as the rite of an apotropaic character—the cooking of the so-called “ant porridge” turning away witches and evil spirits. The following work uses materials drawn from many ancient and later ethnolinguistic and cultural-historical mythopoieic traditions.

This motive of which I write may be best understood if viewed within the limits of that whole of which it forms a part, or, to be more exact, of which it forms one of many reflections. It is advisable to see this whole in the so-called basic myth.¹ Its reconstruction, like those of other studies in that field, makes it possible to establish the pattern and basic transformations of the myth in individual Indo-European traditions. It also allows us to interpret some important fragments of Indo-European mythology which have until now been regarded as isolated particularities, a species of *membra disjecta*. If the basic myth casts light on these particularities as one component of a general pattern, they may allow us to better specify the structure of the basic myth within the aggregate of its constituent versions. In order to control the pattern of the basic myth with the help of particular (and partial) variants, it should be remembered that it is a myth of transformation.

The myth may be summarized as follows: the Thunderer punishes his wife and/or children for some offence by expelling them from heaven and transforming them into creatures. These creatures are of a chthonic type, usually zoomorphic, such as snakes, frogs, mice, worms, insects, or monsters of a “composite” type. Sometimes,

¹ Cf. V. V. Ivanov and V. N. Toporov, *Issledovaniya v oblasti slavyanskikh drevnostei* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); V. V. Ivanov and V. N. Toporov, “Indoyevropeiskaya mifologiya,” in *Mijy narodov mira*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1980), and other works.

by a struggle with a demon. During the duel, the opponents choose opposing tactics. Whereas the demon grows in volume, Indra, on the contrary, dwindles in size to an ant and, having outwitted the demon, penetrates invisibly through the mound of his fortress. There may still be another place in the Rig-Veda where traces of the motive of Indra's turning into an ant can be discerned—refer to RV X, 99, 5 (from another hymn to Indra):

sá rudrēbhīr āsastavāra ṛbhvā hitvī gāyam āréavadya āgāt /
vamrāsya manye mithunā vīvavrī ānnam abhītyarodayan muṣāyān
“Together with the Rudras came the master, having left the house
With a wish that was not commendable [but] sinless./
I am thinking about a naked twin body of an ant.
Having darted towards food, he caused tears [as he]
robbed”./

Usually *vamrāsya . . . mithunā vīvavrī* is construed to be an indication of Indra's wicked deed in relation to the ant. To assume the shape of the ant (compare with RV I, 51, 9) Indra had to appropriate it. Indra managed to do this by divesting the ant (properly speaking, it might be a she-ant) of its aspect, that is, by robbing it (hence the motive of the nakedness of the ant who lost its aspect, form and clothes).² In the hymn (verse 12), the ant theme again comes to the fore in connection with Indra:

evā mahó asura vakṣāthāya vamrakāḥ paḍbhīr úpa sarpad
indram/
sá iyāṇāḥ karati svastīm asmā iṣam úrjaṃ suksītīm vísvam ābhāḥ//

“Thus, Oh Asura, the little ant crawled on [its] feet
To Indra, to reinforce the great [Indra]./
Let the one to whom the request was addressed establish his well-
being. The nourishing force, reinforcement, good lodging—all that
he brought [to him]”./

² See the full text of Rig-Veda translated into German and commented upon by K. F. Geldner: *Der Rig-Veda aus dem Sanskrit ins Deutsche übersetzt und mit laufenden Kommentar versehen von K. F. Geldner*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press – London: Geoffrey Cumberlege – Oxford University Press – Leipzig: Otto Harrasowits, 1951), 64. Sāyaṇa understands this passage quite differently: for him, *vamrāsya* is the name of the ṛṣi, the supposed author of that hymn, while *mithunā* stands for his parents. This is extremely unlikely, despite the presence in the same hymn of a very plausible play on words, in which *vamrakāḥ* may be understood both as the name of Rṣi Vamraka and as a designation of the ant (properly speaking, “little ant”).

Finally, Indra's implicit connection with the ants is revealed in RV IV, 19, 9 (in the hymn to Indra), on the basis of which one can reconstruct Indra's motive for leading the son of a girl, eaten away by the ants, out of the shelter where he had been hiding (see *vam ībhīḥ putrām agrīvo adānām nivēsanād dhariva ājabhartha* for famous rescues and cures of unnamed personages).³ Ants eating away the youth (divesting him of his corporeal integument, a type of denudation) refer to an "opposite" motive: that of the "denudation" of the ant by Indra (RV I, 51, 9). Compare this with the motive of the testing of the ascetic Cyavana in the Mahābhārata.

Although there is a scarcity of examples, the conclusions that may be drawn from those we do have are highly significant. Out of the six mentions of the ant (or the ṛṣi with the "ant's name) in the Rig-Veda, four are associated precisely with Indra the Thunderer, and it is these examples that are especially informative in the mythological plane. The most important motive is the transformation of Indra into an ant (great → small, in parallel, but with an inversion relative to the "transformed" forms of Indra and the demon in the duel motive: small → great). Also important is the motive of wealth, well-being, aid, support. They possess a property of reflexiveness: on the one hand, the little ant reinforces the great Indra. On the other, Indra (designated as *sá iyānāḥ*) must create for the little ant (designated as *asmai*) well-being, nourishing force, reinforcement and good lodgings (RV X, 99, 12). But another important motive for the purposes of inner reconstruction of the mythologeme about Indra and the ant has been overlooked by researchers: that of offence and damage caused to the ant by Indra (RV X, 99, 5),⁴ divesting the ant of

³ The motive of Indra's perforation of river-beds in the same hymn (RV IV, 19, 2) is comparable to the way he pounced on the mound after having assumed the shape of an ant. Apart from these excerpts, the ant theme in the Rig-Veda appears twice more. Once is in RV I, 112, 15, in the hymn to the Aśvins, where mention is made of Vamra, the creator of the hymn RV X, 99 (according to a native commentary—Vamra Vaikhānasa. The other is in RV VIII, 102, 21, in the hymn to Agni: *yād āty upajīhvika yād vamró atisārpati sāvam tād astu te ghr̥tām* ("What the termite picks, what the ant crawls over, let all that be fat for you!"). For *ati-sarpati* see I.-Eur. **serp-* in the designations of the snake. See *upa sarpad* RV I, 51, 12, also about the ant. With regard to the ant in snake motif see RV X, 16, 6, the hymn to the burial fire).

⁴ Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda*, vol. 3 (1951), 311. A distant trace of the motive of ants stricken by Indra may be found in the description of the storm scene in "The Little Clay Cart" by Śūdraka, in which Indra is repeatedly mentioned. Compare this with:

its aspect. This motive is relevant in two respects: first, it is a motivation of the theme of Indra's transformation into an ant; Indra was able to turn into an ant precisely because before that he had robbed the ant by taking possession of its aspect. Second, this motive is easily transformed into another:—Indra damages the ant. This in turn may with some probability be deduced from an earlier motive pattern, namely Indra causing someone harm by transforming him into an ant. My postulating an initial motive in this form should not be too surprising, since one of the most characteristic features of the basic myth, as emphasized above, is a continual exchange of attributes between the main protagonist of the myth, the Thunderer, and his opponent, proceeding against the background of a series of transformations of both. It is interesting that the two traditional ways of combating ants—burning anthills by fire and inundating them with water—correspond to the two elements that serve as tools of the Thunderer: fire and water.

In order to understand the appearance of the ant image at this point in the pattern of the basic myth, one must bear in mind the mythological significance of ants in other traditions. Why this is so becomes clear if one considers the biological features that have assured this species of insects its special position among the invertebrates. We have their smallness, making them, as it were, a minimal calculable unit (“a quantum”).⁵ We have their multiplicity (a maximum

“These clouds are dark—/ They have ravished the sun from the sky./ The anthills/ Have settled, washed away by the shower,—/ Thus elephants settle,/ Stricken to death with spears” (act five).

⁵ Regarding the motive of extreme smallness of ants, cf.: “And she (a woman) thought: “How can he marry me after he had begotten me out of himself? Why, I shall hide.” She became a cow, he a bull, and married her; then cows were born. She became a mare, he a stallion . . . And thus all that exists in pairs, he brought all these to life, including ants.” See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, Section Madhu, I, 4, 4; cf. *ibid.*: “it [deity] is equal to a white ant, equal to a midget, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this Universe . . .” (I, 3, 22). Regarding the motive of the ant and the elephant (the extremely small and the extremely big). See also in *Tiruvacagam* (IV, 11, ff): “From the elephant to the ant into blameless births, [. . .] into birth as a man, into mother's womb [. . .]” (on the conception). The same idea of smallness embodied in the image of ants is frequently opposed to images of bigness. An example is a well-known Vietnamese tale, in which ants defeat an elephant (elephants have avoided meeting ants since then). Another is the “Bulbul-name” (A book on the nightingale) by Farid Ad Din 'Attar, in which ants wishing to see the *Qa'ba* in Mecca perch under the flapping wing of a falcon. See Ye. Ye. Bertels, *Sufizm i sufiskaya literatura. Izbrannye trudy* (Sufism and Sufi literature) (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 345. An excerpt from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-*

density of the population and a maximum biomass per territory), and their high mobility (momentum). We have their collectivity, as revealed not only in the joint forms of existence (ants never live alone), but also in their organized purposeful activity presupposing a certain differentiation and social hierarchy. There is their frugality, high adaptability to the environment and capacity for its active reclamation and transformation (with resulting wealth and prosperity).⁶ They also have special building and military talents and the

Upaniṣad, cited above, in essence represents a cumulative (“chain”) type of pattern, in which the image of the ants is an extreme element of the chain. The property of the ant in mythopoic concepts, “to be the smallest,” explains why its image is featured in cumulative or quasi-cumulative tales. For a comparative example see the Pamiri tale of an ant (who prompts the ensuing action in the narrative), which ends in the following conclusion: “Our sworn brother the ant has fallen into milk, the fly has smeared its face with soot, the jackdaw has put out its eye, the goat has broken its horn, the tree has shed its leaves, the water has become turbid, millet has lowered its panicles, the peasant has set his beard against the spade and I overturned sour milk upon my head. The old woman grew surprised, made the frying pan burning hot, sat on it with her backside and was burned to death!” See *Skazki narodov Pamira* (Tales of the peoples of the Pamir) (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 508–509. Another cumulative tale in which an ant introduces the action by falling into the water, and also concludes it, forms part of the Ossetian folklore. Compare: “A pot for brewing the *kvas* gave some *kvas* to the mower. The mower gave some hay to the cow. The cow gave some milk to the cat. The cat stopped catching mice. The mouse stopped making holes in the *kurtu*. The *kurtu* gave some grains to the hen. The hen gave a chicken for the raven. The raven stopped fouling the tree. The tree gave them a branch. The mouse and the flea threw a branch to the ant, their companion, and saved it from death.” See *Osetinskiye narodnye skazki* (Ossetian folk tales) (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 36–37. A similar type is represented by a Persian tale “The flea has fallen into the tanur, bringing misfortune to the ant.” See *Persidskiye skazki* (Persian tales) (Moscow: Nauka, 1959), 456–458. The chain is built somewhat differently (the link between elements is not always motivated) in the Baigi tale (Taliyapani, Central India) about an ant and a small piece of coal. See V. Elwin, *Folktales of Mahakoshal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944) (XXIV, 2, type AT 2030); cf. *Skazki Tsentral’noi Indii* (Tales of Central India) (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 339–341. Especially interesting is the Ilokano (Philippines) cumulative tale “A disobedient little ant”, because it presents the same mythologeme of water and fire, which is usually associated with the Thunderer: the fire saves the ant by boiling the water (the action begins when the ant gets into a drop of water). Being afraid of the water, the fire hides itself, but the ant finds it again (in the matches, in a dry tree, in the stones). See *Skazki i mify narodov Filippin* (Tales and myths of the peoples of the Philippines) (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), 206–210. For the link between the ants and the water, see below.

⁶ The idea of wealth (and, more generally, good husbandry and thrift) constantly occurs in connection with ants in very different toposoi. A specific motive of ant gold prospectors in India occurs in Arrian in his work “India”: “Megasthene [. . .] relates as something absolutely true that these ants are digging up gold not for its

highest speed of learning in the animal world. These traits also explain the symbolic meanings attached to ants in various mythopoieic

own sake, but because they are digging the earth in line with their nature, to make burrows for themselves—just as our little ants are also turning up the earth. The Indian ants, who have the stature of a fox, are digging the earth in proportion to their size. The earth is, however, gold-bearing [this would of course be impossible in India], so the Indians are extracting gold from the earth. However, Megasthene recounts what he knows by hearsay, and I have nothing more veracious that could be added to that, therefore I would have gladly omitted the tale of the ants” (Ind. I, 9). Another variant of the association of ants with wealth is found in Greek mythology. When the Phrygian King Midas, subsequently famous for his wealth, and punishment by Apollo, was still a child, the ants were putting grain seeds into his mouth, which portended his future wealth. In the Russian ritual tradition we find the so-called “sowing” of live ants, aimed at ensuring the well-being of cattle and a plentiful harvest (see the motive of an ant picking all the grains from a stack overnight in Afanasyev, no. 222). The theme of fertility associated with ants is prominent in the Altaic tradition. One can sometimes see the seething of silvery foam at the surface of an anthill (cf. a combination of these two motives in Mandelstam, below). Rubbing this foam into one’s body ensures many children and wealth to a man and fertility to cattle. See L. Ye. Karunovskaya, “Iz altaiskikh verovanii i obryadov, svyazannykh rebyonkom” (From the Altaic beliefs and rites related to the child) in *Sbornik Muzeya antropologii i etnografii* (Miscellany of the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography) (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk, 1927), issue IV, 20. Another researcher reports similar ideas about the formic *erdine*, a substance resembling *kaimak* [sort of sour cream—*translator’s note*], among the Telengits. See N. A. Alekseyev. *Rannie formy religii tyurkoyazychnykh narodov Sibiri* (Early forms of religion of the Turcophone peoples of Siberia) (Novosibirsk: Nauka, Sibirskoye otdeleniye, 1980), 48–49. On Maundy Thursday (a day associated with the Thunderer and the rain, cf.: German *Donnerstag* or Russian *posle dozhdicha v chetverg* [“after the rain on Thursday”—a Russian proverb signifying something that will never happen—*translator’s note*]) people come to the woods before dawn in search of an anthill. They bring it into a sheep-cote so that the sheep could “breed better.” On the role of ants in the “Maundy Thursday” rites of the Letts, see Ye. Volter, “Materialy dlya etnografii lатыškogo plemeni Vitebskoj gubernii” (Materials for the ethnography of the Lettish population of the Vitebsk province) in *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva po Otdeleniyu etnografii* (Transcripts of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society, Department of Ethnography), XV, issue 1 (St. Petersburg, 1890), 3–4, 13, 307, 342; P. Šmits. *Latviešu tautas ticējumi* (Riga [no publisher cited], 1940), nos. 27905–27953; 1683–1686 (*Pērķons-skudres*). For the association of ants with the rain, whose appearance they portend, see *Jaskudres parādās istabā, tad visadā ziņā būs lietus* (no. 27908), and *Ja spārnotās skudres skraida un ķēbas ap cilvēku, tad būs drīzi pērķons* (no. 27909). Considering that Pērķons is the god of storms, the thunderer, a passage from *Cloud the Herald* by Kālidāsa is worthy of note: You will meet a marvelous mix of rubies and emeralds: This is the rainbow, an arch over an anthill from the bow of Indra. Indra’s bow rests against the anthill; the rainbow is seen only when Indra starts on a journey to perform his feats. Indra, who sends rain to earth, is correlated with an anthill—a multitude of ants that appear as an image, a metaphor of rain, a multitude of the water-drops within it. Cf.: And outpours of shower—spears/Seem to be flying from the rainbow—from the bow of Indra/ While heavens cry with rolls of thunder (Śūdraka, “The Little Clay Cart.”) It may be remembered that above that fragment there is an address to a well-known descen-

traditions.⁷ Especially significant in connection with this topic is the presence in the ants of a number of human qualities (particularly those attributed to the ideal man).⁸ It is this circumstance which explains the widespread ideas of ants as transformed people or that

dant of the famous clouds of Puškara, the favourite of Indra. Another theme that emerges is that of thunder, implicitly referring to the link between it and the appearance of mushrooms—"Having heard the thunder, your voice, sweet for the hearing, that will/Cover all the earth like an umbrella made of mushrooms [. . .]." For that motive, see R. G. Wasson, "Lightning-bolt and Mushrooms" in *For Roman Jakobson* (The Hague: de Ridder, 1956); R. G. Wasson, *Soma: Divine Mushroom of Immortality* (The Hague: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968); V. N. Toporov, "Semantika mifologicheskikh predstavlenii o gribakh" (The semantics of mythological conceptions about mushrooms) in *Balkanski Sbornik* (The Balkan miscellany) (Moscow, 1978); V. N. Toporov, "On the Semiotics of Mythological Conceptions about Mushrooms," in *Semiotica*, 53-4 (1985), 295-357 and other works. Turning back to the theme of wealth and fertility, the reader should recall a custom of taking ants from an anthill and sowing them to cows, pigs and hens, so that they could procreate. For the festival of Ivan Kupala which involved fire and water [with bonfires lit and girls setting wreaths afloat in rivers—*translator's note*], an ant *kasha* was cooked, to bring protection from witches. The link between the theme of wealth and ants figures prominently in Goethe's *Faust*, in the parts of vultures and ants (cf. the association of ants with the falcon, and the ant and the eagle as different aspects of the Thunderer, above): *Greife*. Gold in Blättchen, Gold in Flittern/Durch die Ritzen seh' ich zittern./Laßt euch solchen Schatz nicht rauben,/Imsen, auf es auszuklauben.—*Chor der Ameisen*. Wie ihn die Riesigen/Emporgeschoben,/Ihr Zappelfüßigen,/Geschwind nach oben!/Behendest aus und ein!/In solchen Ritzen/Ist jedes Bröselein/Wert, zu besitzen./Das allermindeste/Müßt ihr entdecken/Auf das geschwindeste/In allen Ecken./Allemsig müßt ihr sein,/Ihr Wimmelscharen;/Nur mit dem Gold herein!/Den Berg laßt fahren.—*Greife*. Herein! Herein! Nur Gold zuhauf! . . . (*Faust*, Zweiter Teil. Zweiter Akt).

The role of ants as keepers of riches was ascertained by as early an author as Philostrates. He wrote about Ethiopian ants and Indian griffins keeping watch over gold veins (*Vita Apollonii*, VI, 1). The same theme of wealth and chthonism appears in the verses of an anonymous Latin poet, entitled "Ant": An ant is carrying welcome seeds from the bovine breeds,/The little black tribe is carrying grains into its caves./Small as the ant is, what a great amount of grains does the skillful creature/Collect for the hard winter for his benefit!/It behooves to call ants the servants of the black Orc:/Their colour and actions are similar to such a potentate. On the motive of the ant's propensity for making stores, cf. fable "The Dragon-Fly and the Ant" see *Pozdni'aya latinskaya poeziya* (Late Latin poetry) (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1982), 519.

⁷ For example, collectivity, diligence, industry, efficiency, modesty, moderation, frugality, foresight, propensity for making stores, thrift, exactitude, order, resourcefulness, rationality, wisdom, artfulness (that comes to the aid of smallness), and rugged militancy. For details see the author's work on ants in the edition *Mify narodov mira*, 2 (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1982), 181-182.

⁸ "Come to the ant, the lazy one, look at his actions and be wise" (*Parables of Solomon*, W, 6). See also the motive of ants teaching King Solomon wisdom and humility in the Hebrew and corresponding Muslim legends.

people had hitherto been ants (cf. a similar belief among the Hopi Indians).⁹

Especially significant here are close parallels to the Vedic motive dealt with above, when similar transformations are linked to the Thunderer and through him to the entire basic myth. Worthy of attention here is an ancient Greek etiological legend, known in a number of versions, about the Myrmidons. They were an Achean tribe from Thessaly which later colonized the island of Egina. According to one version, Zeus, at the request of the king of Egina, transformed ants into humans after the island's population had died from the plague. In another version, the Myrmidons, that is, "ant people" (cf. Gr. μύρμηξ "ant"), trace their lineage from Myrmidon, the son of Zeus the Thunderer and Eurimedusa, to whom Zeus presented himself in the shape of an ant. This version contains two key elements that mutually reinforce each other and also the whole theme of ant metamorphoses. One is the transformation of Zeus into an ant (a complete analogy with the corresponding transformation of Indra, although in this case the motivation was romance). The second element, especially important, is that Zeus the Thunderer had an "ant" son Myrmidon, that is, a son-ant, whose progeny were "ant people," or Myrmidons (Lucian reports about the Hippomirmeks, a

⁹ Thus the Apaches call Navajo Indians "the ant people." In some traditions it is believed that women who have formed a connection with white people turn into red ants. The comparison of people with ants is widespread. In "Prometheus Bound", Aeschylus speaks of miserable human creatures who, like "agile ants," inhabit "the depths of sunless caves" (on the combination of ant and cave themes, see Elian, *Hist. anim.* XI, 16). In many riddles questions are asked about people, but ants are the key to the riddle. There are Russian riddles of related interest: *Below blacksmiths are hammering, in the middle people live a rich life, above candles are glimmering. Or, At the roots of trees sits military force.* There are riddles about anthills, such as: *A hundred muziks are putting up a peasant hut without angles; the carpenters were going without axes [and] put up a hut without angles.* (See V. V. Mitrofanova (éd.), *Žagadki* (Riddles) 35, no. 708–725 (Leningrad: Nauka, 1968). See also the Armenian riddle: *In the house there lives a thousand people, but there is no room in it even for a haystack.* The image of cattle is also employed: *A flock of sheep is grazing on the mountain, the wolf does not eat them and is afraid to come to the cote.* See *Armysanski folklor* (Armenian folklore) (Moscow: Nauka, 1967, 89). In the African Akamba riddles, ants (Nduti and Iziggi) and cattle are connected by a motive of a projected campaign of black ants, with a view toward stealing cattle from the Galla country (see "Skazanie o Liongo Fumo" (A tale of Liongo Fumo) in *Skazki narodov Afriki* (Tales of the peoples of Africa) (Moscow: Nauka, 1962), 229–230. However, in the riddles the ants are encoded through images of a non-man, non-beast, non-cattle (compare with a Russian tale "A little creature, not a green money-box, not a beast, not a bird, not water, not a stone").

fabulous tribe who rode ants like horses, cf. ἵππο-μύρμηξ/κεξ/. A particular species of large ants—*Formica herculeana*—is designated by this term). The Myrmidons were humans and lived on earth, while Zeus (the ultimate ancestor, grandfather) lived in heaven in keeping with a reconstruction confirmed by the etymology of his name (Ζεύς— I.-Eur. **deiuos* as a designation of the shining sky). In this way an important motive coinciding with a similar element of the basic myth is implied, namely, the transformation of the children (descendants) of the Thunderer into ants, and their expulsion from heaven to earth, where they multiplied. Later, under the command of Achilles, the Myrmidons fought stubbornly and zealously under the gates of Troy. Their “ant-like” qualities explain the allegorical understanding of the ethnonym as the image of subordinates who strictly follow orders. This said, one should remember the veneration of ants by the Myrmidons, and the use of totemic “formic” names in archaic traditions (for example, among many African tribes). The “Myrmidon” theme may also be found in South Russia, particularly the Crimea.¹⁰

¹⁰ “The Life of Stephan of Surož”, which has come down to us in a Russian fifteenth-century paraphrase, in *Torzhestvennik*, describes a miracle associated with the conversion of Bravlin soon after that saint’s death ca. 787. Bravlin was regarded as a leader of a Gothic armed force, and some scholars traced his name to the Gothic language. See V. G. Vasilyevsky, “Xoždeniye apostola Andreyā” (The progress of the Apostle Andrew) in *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniya* (Journal of the Ministry of Education) (1877), 176ff. O. N. Trubachev has recently offered to explain that name on the basis of the language of the old “Indian” population of those places. Reacting to Vasilyevsky’s hypothesis regarding Bravlin’s name, still another explanation was offered. See A. N. Veselovsky, “Russkie i viltiny v sage o Tidreke Bernskom (Veronskom)” (Russians and Viltins in the saga on Tidrek of Bern (Verona) in *Izvestiya Otdeleniya russkogo yazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoĭ Akademii nauk* (Transcripts of the Department of the Russian language and literature of the Imperial Academy of Sciences), XI, 3 (1906), 42–45. As is known, Byzantine sources referred to various tribes in the south of Russia as the Myrmidons. Veselovsky hypothesized that the southern localization of the Achilles legend, alone, could not explain this. He said there would have to be supportive evidence of the existence of local Μύρμηκιων (cf. *Myrmidon*, *Myrmidona* in “Virtutes Andreae,” Mermedonia in an Anglo-Saxon poem) or, possibly, ethnic designations of that type, one of which could be understood as Μύρμηδόνες (in which case the name Μύρμηδών would have been an eponym of a “formic” ethnicity). If we consider the Russian rendering of the traditional etymology (μύρμηξ—Mravlin, from *Mravii*), the name Bravlin could be explained as a distortion of the anlaut consonant. Veselovsky proposed that Bravlin-Mravlin was a Russian prince who undertook a campaign against Surož, just as, in the poem on Ortnit, Ilya the Russian had taken part in a campaign against the heathens, perhaps, against the Jewish-Khazar element, as may be judged by the name of their prince, *Nacharel: Nachor* and similar names. The Myrmidon-

There is another, more specific parallel to the episode of the transformation of Indra into an ant during a duel with the adversary, the demon. This parallel is more exact from the perspective of the motive, and is found in the Russian tale “Crystal Mountain” (Afanasyev, No. 162). It is structurally close to type 554 (according to the Andreyev classification): grateful animals help the protagonist to rescue the princess. It is also close to snake-combating types—300 A (Victor over the serpent) and 302 (Koščei’s death in an egg). Moreover, this tale displays unquestionable affinities to the tales of type 301 (accord-

Mravlin is correlated in this case with the ethnic meaning of Merminka of Modern Greek songs. In a jocular Cretan ditty from the Yannaraki collection, an ant (ὁ Μέρμινκας) acts as a protagonist: “I came across an ant (*Merminka*),/The son of a Serb, the son of a Serbian woman.” He was dressed in European fashion, armed in the Turkish manner, “and was an ant in addition.” He goes to war in Syria where he meets the Saracens and Moors (in a Trebizond song Mermica is a peasant woman fighting the Saracens). Veselovsky places Mravlin-Bravlin and Merminka in a wider context. Incidentally, he correlates the name Myrmidons “as a designation of the Scythians and their descendants in the Black Sea area” with the name of the region of *Mauringa* in the centre of Europe, as related by Paul the Deacon. The population of that country, the Maurungs, was correlated with *myrgingas* from “Vidsif.” Müllenhof compared the designation *Mauring* or *Maurung*, sometimes deduced from the Germanic *môr* “mire,” with the Norse and Swedish *maur* “ant”. He also compared these with the Ancient High German *marawi* or *muruwi* and perceived in the country’s name an emphasis on its large population, it resembling an anthill. Khalansky (“K istorii poetičeskix skazanii ob Olege Veščem,” *Žhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosvescheniya* (Journal of the Ministry of Education) (1902, August-November, 46ff.) approached the Mravlin problem in a different direction. He surmised that a Russian translator might render the hypothetical Greek reading ὁ ἄρχωντων ῥως with the words *murmanin* (i.e., Norman, Varangian), *muravlenin*, *morovlenin* or *morovlin*, whereas a scribe from the school of Metropolitan Cyprian might rewrite them as Mravlenin or Mravlin. It follows, according to Khalansky, that Bravlin is a Norman identified, on the one hand, with Oleg the Wise (a reference to him is also found in Ilya Muromets, cf. *Oleg* [*Eł’gB], *Vol’ga*) and on the other with *Muromets* (Ilya)—*murmanets*, that is to say, with a Varangian. It also becomes possible to correlate *Murovskii Šl’iyax* [The Murov Road], instead of *Murmanskii*, with both the “murav’yinyi” šl’iyax [Ant Road], and with a designation of the old Varangian [*murmanski*] Road. For a consideration of the Germanic **mouro-* (: **neuro-*) ascertained, in particular, in the Crimean Gothic *miera* (a reference to the “Crimean” theme), as well as of the Ancient Icelandic *maurr*, Danish *myre*, Swedish *myra*, Middle Lower German *mīre*, German *Miere*, English *mire*, and Anglo-Saxon *myre*, see Pokorny I, 749; W. P. Lehmann, *A Gothic Etymological Dictionary* (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 253–254; E. Schwarz, *Goten, Nordgermanen, Angelsachsen* (Bern: Francke – Munich: Lehnen, 1951), 166 and other works. Another Germanic name for “ant” may be found in the German *Ameise*, Old English *āmette*, cf. *maze*. This is a Gothic borrowing (Puy-de-Dôme, the Kingdom of Toulouse), from the West Gothic **amaitja*: Gothic **maitan* κόπτω “to cut.” The ant is “the cutting one” or “the pricking one,” that is, the stinging one. See Lehmann, *A Gothic Etymological Dictionary*, 241–242 and other works.

ing to Aarne), where the protagonist (like the protagonists of all the snake-combating tales) is clearly a transformation of the fairy-tale counterpart of the Thunderer image from the myth. The Russian fairy-tale Prince Ivan, having been deprived of his princess, is shepherding a herd of cows near the crystal mountain. The serpent comes and takes away three cows (then six). Turning into a falcon, Prince Ivan cuts off three heads of the serpent (then six) and brings the herd home. "Late in the night Prince Ivan turned into an ant and crawled through a small crevice into the crystal mountain" where he found the princess. Having killed the twelve-headed serpent (and cut its body),¹¹ he sets the princess free,¹² melts the crystal mountain with a seed set afire and marries the princess. Significantly, the hero receives the gift of transformation from a falcon for a fair division of the body of a fallen horse, according to which he gave the head to ants (with its bones given to beasts, its meat to birds, and its skin to reptiles).¹³ A similar motive is known in the Russian epics (*bylinas*) about Vol'ga, where the protagonist, possessing a gift of being a werewolf, turns now into a falcon, now into an ant penetrating through a gateway out of a fish tooth. The *bylina* about Volx learning arts and wise tricks [e.g., on the ants' wisdom] and turning into various animals says: *A i tol'ko v vyrezu murašu proiti* [An ant has just to pass through a crevice]. Ivan Bykovich of the Afanasyev tale also turns into a *muraš* (ant). Since the thunderers Zeus and Indra both possess the same gift of being able to transform into royal birds

¹¹ Indra does the same to his adversary: he rips open the bodies of Vṛtra or Vala and disperses their limbs to many places (*punutrā*). This is stressed repeatedly. Regarding the motive of turning into an ant with the aim of penetrating an enclosed space through the thinnest crevice or a narrow opening, one should attribute to this pattern a motive noted in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. That is, when Daidalos is given an assignment to run a thread into a shell, he ties it to an ant, and the latter drags the thread into the narrow opening.

¹² Compare this with a motive in German folklore of ants bringing silk threads into jail for laying a rope, which a prisoner uses to escape.

¹³ These two motives (the ant and the horse, and the ant as dismemberer) produce two association patterns. The first motive refers to the aforementioned "Hippomirmeks" (horse-ants). The second motive refers to Indra the "ant" beating the "jointlessness" with a *vajra* (RV IV, 19, 3), the "splinterer of the cannon-bone" (19, 9, compare with a motive of knitting joints). The "formic" Ivan the Prince and Indra seem to play the role of priests dismembering a horse (cf. *asvamedha*). On Indra stealing the sacrificial horse, see Mhbh. III. 105. 18–24 (also compare with the motive of horses secreted in the underground kingdom). Legends have it that ants bear a special relation to cattle fertility.

(eagles) and ants, the images of the Russian fairy-tale hero Prince Ivan and the epic hero Vol'ga take an additional meaning in the reconstruction of the basic myth.¹⁴ The existence of two aspects of the "transformed" Thunderer—the eagle (falcon) and the ant—is meaningful: it refers to the opposition of heaven and the underground kingdom (the nether world). The Thunderer is linked to the former, his adversary with the latter. It is precisely the eagle (falcon) and the ant who act as zoomorphic classifiers of these two opposed cosmic zones. Moreover, both zones may be linked through the ant image alone. Recall the rather general idea of an "ant" road running from the earth to the sky or found solely on earth (Muravyinyi shlyakh [Ant Road]) or in the sky. The Ant Road motive also correlates with the theme of transformation of ants into people; cf. also Strana Muraviya (Ant Country). When it is found in the sky alone, the Ant Road is sometimes exemplified by the Milky Way.¹⁵ This mediating function also explains the role of ants in a number of West African traditions (for example, in Dahomey) as messengers of a god-snake, or the motive of ants being a link with the world

¹⁴ In that context, an image of king of ants, which occurs in a number of traditions, comes as no surprise. "Ant, ant, do not bite me, I shall crush you, all your kith and kin and your king," says a Russian charm. See Kh. N. Maikov, *Velikorusskiye zaklinaniya* (Russian incantations) (St. Petersburg [no publisher cited], 1869), 526, no. 16. Compare in Maikov: "Brother ant, tell your brother ant not to sting my body or emit its poison. My body is the earth and my blood is black . . ." D. K. Zelenin, *Kul't ongonov v Sibiri* (The Ongon cult in Siberia) (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk, 1937) alludes to the king of ants in Buryat mythological concepts. Some interesting details about the king of ants are reported in one of the Russian charms "na dobrye dela" ("for good deeds") described by A. A. Blok. These charms are made in order to become invisible: "If you find a large anthill, from which twelve roads branch off, dig through it and pour water on it, and you will find a hole in the ground. Dig deeper, and you will see the king of ants on a purple or blue stone. Pour boiling water on him, and he will fall down from the stone, but you must dig again and envelop the stone with a kerchief. He will ask, "Have you found?" You must keep silent and hold the stone in your mouth, and wipe yourself with the kerchief. "You, father heaven, you, mother earth, you, root [and] light, bless to take yourself for good deeds, for the good". See A. A. Blok, "Poeziya zagoovorov i zaklinanii" in *Sobranie sochinenii*, 5 (Moscow-Leningrad: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1962), 41–42.

¹⁵ The motive of the link between the earth (or the underground kingdom) and the sky is common in mythologemes, sometimes highly transformed ones. For example, there is a myth of Kariri (Chaco) Indians about red ants who gnawed at a tree along which the first people had climbed to the sky. There is also a Shan (Indochina) cosmogonic myth about the creation of the earth by a white ant who had carried it from a pristine abyss.

of the dead. Some New Guinea people believe that after a person's death a second death may ensue, at which point the soul turns into an ant. A custom of feeding ants on the days relating to commemoration of the dead is known among Hindus and Jains. The ants are linked to the earth or even to the nether world,¹⁶ and simultaneously with prosperity and wealth. Sometimes they are associated with the main cultivated plant of the given area, one that gives both food and intoxication. These variations are reflected in many traditions. This brings us again back to the corresponding theme found in the stories of Indra and the ants.¹⁷

¹⁶ The Altaic hero and shaman Er Töštük meets an ant as he embarks on a journey to the underground kingdom. The ant makes him a gift as a token of their alliance. See J.-P. Roux, *Faune et flore sacrées dans les sociétés altaïques* (Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris: Maisonneuve, 1966), 143; *Er-Töštük, épopée kirghiz du cycle de Manas, traduite du kirghiz avec une introduction et des notes par P.N. Boratov et L. Bazin* (Paris, 1966), chap. XXXVIII and other works. Eight-footed spirits with the head of an ant are known in the Turkic epos. See I. Melikoff, *Abū Muslim, le "porte-hache" de Khorasan dans la tradition épique turco-iranienne* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1962), 37; Roux, *Faune et flore sacrées dans les sociétés altaïques*, 249. The chapter "News on the houses venerated by the Slavs" of a work by the Arab author of the tenth century, Al Masudi, mentions a Slavic temple built by a king on the Black Mountain among the curative waters. In that temple was a giant idol of Zuchal (= Saturn) in the shape of an old man with a stick, with which he stirred the bones of the dead. There were ants under his right foot, and rooks, other birds, "Ethiopians" and "negroes" under his left foot. See A. P. Kovalevsky, "Al-Masudi o slavyanskix yazyčeskix xramax," (Al-Masudi on the Slavic heathen temples) in *Voprosy istoriografii i istočnikovovedeniya slavyano-germanskikh otnoshenii* (Questions of historiography and source study of Slavic-Germanic relations) (Moscow: Nauka, 1973). Reconstruction makes it possible to correlate ants with Triglav, a deity of the Baltic Slavs, also associated with Saturn (Otto of Bamberg). An admirable Coptic drawing of Anubis on a cloth, accompanying a youth on his way to the underground world (in the State Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow) contains the motive of ants at the feet of a deceased man (cf. R. B. Bandinelli, *Roma la fine dell'arte antica* (Roma: Rizzoli, 1976), 283, no. 259).

¹⁷ The Aztecs believed that black and red ants had shown Quetzalcoatl the place where maize was grown. In the ancient Mexican story of the founding of maize Quetzalcoatl is transformed into a black ant and convinces the red ant living "beyond the mountain of our subsistence" to give him the maize seed; mesoamerican stories of this genre also include other significant motives such as Quetzalcoatl descending into the underworld to meet the god of the dead. We also find strokes of lightning and the four gods of the wind. See *Märchen der Azteken und Inkaperuaner, Maya und Muisca. Übersetzt und erläutert von W. Krickeberg* (Jena, 1928), S. 10f. (no. 4a); M. Leon-Portilla, "Mifologiya drevnei Meksiki" (The mythology of ancient Mexico) in *Mifologiya drevnego mira* (The mythology of the ancient world) (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), pp. 439–440 (translated from: Max S. Shapiro (ed.), *Mythologies of the Ancient World: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961). See also the folkloric motive no. 249 (according to Aarne) concerning an ant and a grasshopper (cricket, dragonfly). The ant motive is also found in a fable by Aesop (cf. fable by

We have discovered several motives: the Ant-Thunderer, the transformation of people into ants,¹⁸ and the link between ants and heaven and earth or the nether world, or with prosperity, wealth and death. These support the reconstruction, suggested above on the basis of Vedic material, of a fragment of the basic myth describing the transformation of the Thunderer into an ant. One may go further and do the same for the Thunderer's transformation of his children (sons) into ants. This reconstruction can be supported by a number of other arguments as well. First, the Indo-European names for ants reveal reduplications and metatheses that are characteristic of the name of the Thunderer and personages linked to him, particularly his children. For example, I-Eur. **Per(k)-*, **Pe(r)-per-* in names for ants such as Gr. μύρμηξ or the Slavic **morv-* (Rus. *morovii*), Ind. *vamrá-*, *vamrī́*, the "transformed" Indo-European form (cf. I.-Eur. **mor-y-*: the tabooed **mor-m-*, **mor-m-*, etc.; these may have a link with the I.-Eur. **mor-m-*, "fear". See the Gr. μορμῶ/v/ "scarecrow," "fright," μορμύνω, "frighten," μορμος φοβος. Also see Hes., Lat. *formīdō*, "be afraid," "fear," "sacred awe." Regarding semantics, see. *muraš*, *muravei* [ant]—*muraški* ["creeps", "jitters out of fear"] and Lat. *formīca* [ant]—*formico* "feel jitters [creeps]").

Phaedrus; "The Ant and the Fly," IV. 24 on true glory—as transformation of Aesop's fable). It is widespread in the Eurasian area, from where it spread to a number of Indian traditions of North America (motive group 711–711.3: the timely provision of stores. We find "The ants are not a strong people, but they store their food in summer" in the Parables of Solomon (XXX, 15). This motive is well-known in other traditions as well. There is a Ukrainian tale about an ant and a lazy cricket or dragonfly (see *Sravnitel'nyi ukazatel' syuzhetov. Vostochnoslavjanskaya skazka* (A comparative index of plots. The East Slavic fairy tale) (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoye otdeleniye, 1979), 97, no. 280A. The same study contains other motives: a contest of ants with a raven or a crow (no. 280) and the mutual rescue of an ant [bee] and a dove [goose] from disaster (no. 239). There is also a contemporary Assyrian tale "The Ant and the Grasshopper" (see *Istrebitel'kolyuchek. Skazki, legendy i pritchi sovremennykh assiriitsev*) (The thorn destroyer. Tales, legends and parables of contemporary Assyrians) (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 37. A Maori tale "The Ant and the Cicada" about the ant Papakorua may be found in A. W. Reed, *Mify i legendy strany maori* (Myths and legends of Maori land) (Moscow: Nauka, 1960), 89–90. The theme of the propensity of ants for making stores and of their foresight has one more aspect: ancient Mayas used to eat live ants who had been storing honey in their stomachs as a delicacy. See R. V. Kinzhalov, *Kul'tura drevnikh maya* (The culture of ancient Mayas) (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoye otdeleniye, 1971), 99. The theme of the ant and the bee is also well-known in folkloric texts.

¹⁸ Sometimes other animals are transformed into ants, such as monkeys in the Chinese folklore.

We can make some substantive arguments in reference to the sphere of ritual. In the Amerindian mythopoieic tradition there exists an idea that ants know when the rain will come, and forecasts are made on this basis.¹⁹ Theophrastus (fragm. 6, 1, 22) indicates that rain is to be expected when ants start carrying ova from an anthill to a higher place.²⁰

Of even greater relevance are data on the Polesye rites for conjuring rain. They exhibit parallels with the south Slavic tradition, and also a number of non-Slavic ones. Thus there is a custom of children destroying an anthill with a stick,²¹ imitating its dangling in a well (here the ants are correlated with splashes of water according to the principle: “as many ants as there are drops [of water, rain]”);²² ripples on the water are akin to ants. A local tradition prescribes as follows: “If the weather stays sunny, take an anthill and scatter it with a stick, saying: just as these ants are flowing, let the rain flow.” Anthills are also scattered to bring sunny weather. The anthill itself symbolizes fertility, abundance and good crops. It is no coincidence that on the eve of St. George’s day people bury eggs and salt, and lamb’s bones in anthills, so that “sheep could multiply

¹⁹ Incidentally, in various traditions there is a widespread opinion that the abundance of ants in summer points to adverse, cold winter.

²⁰ For the role of ants (and bees) in forecasts, see reference in Cicero, “De divinatione”, 1, 36. The Buryats believed that finding an anthill in a tree marked out for construction work was a good omen, (see Zelenin, *Kul't ongonov v Sibiri* and other works).

²¹ A stick (*kü*) is the instrument of the Thunderer, wherewith he strikes his adversary and dismembers him, as if releasing productive, fertile power, giving it an external outlet. A most ancient example of the theme of crushing the ant is presented in an invented situation: in the Hittite mythological song about Ullikummi, a rendering from the Hurrian language, the father of the protagonist Kumarbi (Ullikummi’s mother was the Rock, while he himself was called Kunkunuzzi, “stony killer”) forecasts to his son: ^D*U-an-ma-ya ualḫdu/ . . . lalakyesan-mayar-an-[-kan mān] X-it anda pasiḫaiddu* [21–22]. That is: “For he (= Ullikummi) will smite the God of the Storm . . . He will crush him with his heel like an ant” (*lalakyeša* “ant”, a form with a characteristic reduplication). See H. G. Güterbock, “The Song of Ullikummi. Revised Text of the Hittite Version of a Hurrian Myth”, *Journal of Cuneiform Studies*, 5 (1951), 153.

²² Cf. the poetic image of rain in Osip Mandelstam:

I v temnote rastet kīpenye—
 Čainok legkaya vozn’a,—
 Kak by vozdušnyi muraveinik
 Piruet v t’omnyx zelen’ax . . .
 (“Moskovskii dozhdik”, 1922)

like ants.”²³ The ultimately salutary function of ants, particularly their curative function, may be correlated with their special role in the mythopoieic theme of heaven and earth, life and death.²⁴

Data from ancient India reveal an obvious connection between the ant theme and the motives of the nether world, water and conjuring up water, and therefore fertility. Recently F. B. J. Kuiper reminded us that Varuṇa’s underground abode (*varuṇālaya*) representing the nether world is, in essence, identical to the habitation of snakes (*nāgaloka*):²⁵ both have similar entrances. A good illustration of this is a correlation between two fragments of the well-known episode of *Uttanka* from the Mahābhārata: one of them speaks about a wide (“evolved”) hole leading to *nāgaloka*, the world of the Nāgas—

(“And in the darkness a seething grows—/ A light bustle of tea-drops,—/ As if a mid-air anthill/Feasts in dark green shoots of winter crops . . .”). (A Little Moscow Rain, 1922).

²³ See S. M. Gribić, “Srpski narodni običaji iz Sreza Boljevačkog,” in *Srpski etnografski zbornik*, XIV (Belgrade, 1909), 334; S. Miloslavlević, “Srpski narodni običaji iz Sreza Xomolskog,” in *Srpski etnografski zbornik*, XIX (1913), 393; N. I. and S. M. Tolstoy, “Zametki po slavyanskomu yazychestvu. 2. Vyzvyvaniye dozhdya v Polesye” (Notes on Slavic heathenism. Conjuring rain in Polesye) in *Slavyanskii i balkanski folklor* (The Slavic and Balkan folklore) (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).

²⁴ Ants are widely found in folk medicine. Ants as a medication are repeatedly mentioned in the Atharva-Veda. In Morocco, ants are given to patients to prevent lethargic sleep (an image of death). American Indians drink tea steeped in ants in order to cure themselves from whooping-cough (here is an interesting parallel with thunder: thunder is sometimes spoken about as “Thunderer’s coughing”). The Indians of Guyana use ants to clear the lungs and the bronchi at pneumonia and bronchitis.

²⁵ See F. B. J. Kuiper, *Varuṇa and Vidyūṣaka. On the Origin of the Sanskrit Drama* (Amsterdam – Oxford – New York: North-Holland Publishing Company), 1979, 82–83. It is said in the fragment I, 19, 3 from the Mahābhārata: “Then they saw there an ocean (*samudram*), the receptacle of water (*nidhim ambhasām*), the source of all valuables and Varuṇa’s abode (*ālayam varuṇasya*), the favourite dwelling of the Nāgas-snakes (*nāgānām ālayam ramyam*), the supreme lord of rivers (*uttamam saritāṇ patim*), the habitation of the fire of Patala and the repository of Asuras (*asurānām ca bandhaman*) . . .” (Cf. *varuṇēṇa ’bhyanuñjātau nāgalokaṃ viceratuḥ*,—Mbh. V, 96, 8). The third book of the Mahābhārata, which deals with the search for the vanished sacrificial horse by the sons of Sagara (it had been stolen by Indra) (III, 105, 18–24), describes how having found a hole at the bottom of the dried-up sea, they began digging deeper until they reached Patala, the dwelling of Varuṇa. The Asuras, snakes (*uragā*), Rakṣasas and other creatures then emitted cries of despair, and were smitten by the sons of Sagara (. . . [19] *athā ’paśyanta te vīrah ’pṛthivīm avadāritām, samāsādyā bilam tac ca kṣanantiḥ sāgarāptmajāḥ hṛṣukais caiva samudram akhanams tadā* [20] *sa khanyamāṇaḥ sahitaiḥ sāgarair Varuṇālayaḥ, agacchat paramām ārtiṃ dāryamāṇaḥ samantataḥ* [21] *asuroragarakṣāmsi sattvāni vividhāni ca, ārtanā dam akurvanta vadhyamāṇāni sāgaraiḥ* . . .). Here again the dwelling of Varuṇa, lord of the nether world, virtually coincides with the place inhabited by the Asuras, snakes, Rakṣasas, etc. Compare also with the ants and the cave, the abode of the serpent in Elian.

vivṛtaṃ mahābīlam.²⁶ The other fragment speaks of the disappearance of a snake into an anthill which serves as an entrance into the nether world.²⁷

In this context, *vivṛtaṃ mahābīlam* (Mhbh. I, 3, 137) is identical to the entrance into the nether world—*asuravivara-*, which is a widespread concept in classical literature. Kuiper emphasized that, for the anthill from the Uttānka episode, we encounter the old motive of the link between the Asuras and the ants (compare the larger context: Indra turns into an ant, the Thunderer's adversary is transformed into ants. The Devas vanquish the Asuras. The Asuras dwell in the nether world). In particular, we are dealing here with the she-ant *upajīkā*, the daughter of the Asuras and the sister of the Devas. Thus *ásurāṇām duhitā 'si śá devānām asi svāsā, divás pṛthivyāḥ sambhūtā śá cakarthā 'rasam viśám* (Atharva-Veda VI, 100, 3)—“Thou art daughter of the Asuras, thou, the same, ant sister of the gods; arisen from the sky, from the earth, thou hast made the poison sapless”²⁸ [that is to say, harmless]. Staying underground, the Asuras perform the role of “diggers” (cf. *nīcaih kḥananty ásurāḥ*—AV II, 3, 3, cf. VI, 109, 3) who keep valuables underground; cf. AV V, 31, 8, particularly VI, 109, 3, Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa III, 5, 4, 3. Note that in various traditions ants perform the role of keepers of wealth hidden underground. Within late Indian beliefs, he who digs a pond may reach the kingdom of Varuṇa, the nether world, where the Asuras dwell. Ants as “diggers” are also linked to the nether world of the water Varuṇa. They therefore possess the faculty of producing water (cf. Kauśika-Sūtra, 25). This may be correlated with two different motives: ants bringing water, rain and moisture, ants digging a hole in the

²⁶ Cf. [137] *sa [śramaṇah] tad rūpam vihāya takṣakar ūpaṃ kṛtvā sahasā dharanyām vivṛtam mahābīlam viveśa [138] pṛaviśya ca nāgalokaṃ svabhavanam agacchat. tam uttānko 'nāviveśa tenaiva bilena* in Mhbh. I, 3, 137–138, vj. 158: *tābhīr nāgaloko dhūpitaḥ*.

²⁷ Cf. Mhbh. XIV. 57: [21] *apaśyad bhujagaḥ kaścit te tatra maṇikuṇḍale [22] airā-vatakuloṭpannah śighro bhūtvā tadā sa vai, vidadāyā 'syena valmīkam viveśa 'tha sa kuṇḍale . . . [26] tataḥ kḥanata evātha vipraser dharāṇītalam, nāgalokasya panthānaṃ kartukāmasya niścayāt . . .* The word *valmīka-* “anthill” (cf. Nom. propr. *Valmīka, Vālmīka-, Vālmīki-*) is etymologically tied to *vamrā-, vamri* “ant” (cf. *vamri-kūṭa*). See M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefaßtes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1963), svv. *vamrāḥ, valmīkaḥ*.

²⁸ C. Lenman (ed.), *Atharva-Veda Samhitā*. Transl. with a Critical and Exegetical Commentary by William Dwight Whitney. First Half (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1905), 354.

bottom of the sea and discharging water underground into the nether world (see the myth of the Papatava tribe, described below). A charm associated with spring waters (AV II. 3.4—the charm for relief from flux—*āsāvā*) says that ants—*upājīkāh*—bring up the remedy from out the ocean (*ūd bharanti samudrād ādhi*) where it is stored by the Asuras dwelling far below. This link of ants with waters, with the underworld of Varuṇa (and death), and therefore with Varuṇa himself, represents a second dominant theme, balancing the first (the ants' link with Indra, i.e., with the Thunderer) in the context of the basic myth.²⁹

The ability of ants to sting, and its relatively mild quality, also receives mythopoieic motivation in context close to the basic myth. There is a Tagalog mythological tale of an ant which, envying a snake which had received a sting from God, asked to be given one for himself. But the ant never used it and wandered about the earth at random, thereby angering God, who stripped the ant's sting of its integral force.³⁰ Nonetheless, ant bites can have a role in rituals. In South America (for instance, among the Apalai tribe) the bites of black ants are deemed the best means of expelling from a settlement the evil spirits brought by strangers. On reaching puberty, girls in Guyana subject themselves to ant bites for purification, or for training to endure the rigours of maternity. Youths from the Brazilian Mauhe tribe acquire the right to marry only after they have thrust

²⁹ This is the consequence of three elements: first, the Thunderer is linked to ants. Second, ants are linked to cattle, an asset over which the Thunderer and his adversary (of the Russian Volos-Veles type) are fighting. Third, ants are correlated with water, wealth and death. The result is a pattern of opposition between Indra and Varuṇa, each of which is in one way or the other linked with ants. This is also found in the ancient Indian tradition. The Russian ritual custom of "sowing" ants "for the procreation of cattle" allows one to reconstruct the place that ants might occupy in the pattern Perun-Volos" (not improbably as "transformed" cattle).

³⁰ Ants figure among the "pests" (*xrafstra*) which were created by Agro Manyu and served him. The ants' harmfulness obviously follows from charms against ants described above. See in this regard Pushkin's imitation of Dante's tercets describing Hell:

Togda ya demonov uvidel černyi roi,
Podobnyi izdali vatage murav'noi . . .

(A. S. Pushkin, "Podrazhaniye Dantu", 1832)

("Then I saw a black swarm of demons/Which seemed from afar akin to a horde of ants . . .").

(A. S. Pushkin, Imitation of Dante, 1832)

their hands into sleeves filled with fierce ants.³¹ Moreover, a similar motive is well-known in the ancient Indian tradition: the ascetic Cyavana submits himself to a trial, sitting in an anthill so that only his eyes are visible.³²

There are other mythological ideas associated with anthills. A rite of sacrifice to wood spirits (Maahiset), performed upon anthills, is known to a number of Finno-Ugrian peoples. In West Africa, anthills are portrayed as the dwellings of demons. Some African tribes have a custom of burying people in anthills. In Mysore, India, anthills are believed to be the residence of the Nāga snake or cobra. Generally, anthills play in India a distinctive role in the snake cult and they are frequently treated as a symbol of fertility.³³ Sometimes the idea of fertility in connection with ants and anthills is embodied, not in quantitative characteristics (a numerable multitude motivating an identity of the type) “as many ants as there are grains” but rather as an indication of sources of fertility. In Central India, myths are known in which Mahadeo (Śiva) creates the first human pair—man and woman—from the clay soil of an anthill. Among the Central Indian Dhangar tribe there exists an idea that the first sheep and ram originated from an anthill. Then in order to stop them damaging crops, Śiva created the Dhangars. The part played by ants (especially by pairs of ants) in creating the first people or animals

³¹ See M. Leach (ed.), *Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and Legend*, Part 1 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1950), 63–66; G. Jobes. *Dictionary of Mythology, Folklore and Symbols*, Part 1 (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1962), 101 passim.

³² In a detailed and colourful description of the mortification of the flesh by the ascetic, an initial stage of his torment is depicted: “Look,/Yonder stands the austere hermit,/He is in a huge hill of ants [. . .] (Kālidāsa, Śakuntalā, Act 7, Mātali’s part). This torment is voluntary, and is undergone by hermits marked with saintliness. But the ordinary man also suffers from antbites. In the Atharva-Veda (VII, 56, 7) in a charm against the poison of snakes and insects, it says “Let ants eat you”.

³³ There is a rather popular folkloric motive of “the ant and a pile of grain.” For example, there is a variant underlying the following fable from Leonardo da Vinci: a grain of millet is asking for indulgence from an ant, promising to return to him a hundredfold. Another version is ants helping a man: they are carrying a pile of grain one grain at a time, picking them from a stack, counting them, etc. (Compare this to the tale of Vasilisa the Beautiful in the Afanasyev version, no. 222. There is also a modern Greek tale of a king’s godson, one of whose protagonists is also the king of the ants helping the godson (through the transfer of a magic object) with the sorting of grain. See G. A. Megaw (ed.), *Folktales of Greece*, Chicago – London, 1970, 83–92.

refers to two mythological motives. In the first, ants are associated with the idea of doubles, of the first twin pair of something. In the second, ants possess demiurgic faculties. The clearest example is perhaps the myth of the creation of the earth that was found among the Papatava tribe (on the island of New Britain, in present-day Papua-New Guinea). Two demiurgic brothers, To Kabinana and To Purgo (sometimes they personify the moon and the sun) call for a black ant which digs a hole in the earth and discharges the sea underground, removing water from the earth. The ant thereby effectively becomes a demiurge.³⁴

The mythical images of ants and anthills were used in later schemes—for instance in relation to the organization of human society—with analogies that reveal both negative and positive assessments of the insects. Some important motives sometimes emerge in modified forms in highly demythologized animal tales which include ants, and in fables, apologues, allegories, proverbs, in heraldic images, and in symbolism. Ants in China can symbolize justice, righteousness, virtue, and patriotism, but also egoism. In Buddhism the white ant is a symbol of humility and self-denial, while in some other traditions it stands for destruction. Black ants are sacred in India. In

³⁴ See P. A. Kleintitschen, *Mythen und Erzählungen eines Melanesierstammes aus Papatava, Neupommern, Südsee* (Mödling – Wien, 1924); *Skazki i mify Okeanii* (Tales and myths of Oceania) (Moscow: Nauka, 1970, 97–98, 612). Certain etiological myths about ants imply that they played an important role in the creation of the world. In one story told among the Nabaloi (Northern Luzon, the Philippines) a young woman marries a youth who, having turned into a tom-cat, starts to pursue her. Kabunian drops her a rope from the sky and saves her. When the cat tries to climb the rope, it breaks, the cat falls and breaks into pieces. Those pieces that fall to the earth turn into black ants, while those that fall into the water become firebugs. (C. R. Moss, *Nabaloi Tales*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1924, 277–279, no. 42; *Skazki i mify narodov Filippin*, 49–50, no. 17.) Ants as an image of ineluctable fate of the clan in line with the prediction that the last in the clan will be eaten by ants figure in the final of the novel *One Hundred Years of Solitude* by Gabriel Garcia Marquez; the novel abounds in mythopoieic symbols and archetypal patterns. Concerning the ant-ancestor image, one may cite the image of the progenitor and thunderer Kalunga (Karunga) who generates the first human pair by striking against a termitory or an anthill. See H. Baumann, *Schöpfung und Urzeit der Menschen der afrikanischen Völker* (Berlin: Reimer, 1936). The Dogons believe that at the beginning of time God Amma created an anthill (the womb of Mother Earth), while a she-ant was the mother of the first great twins Nommo. An ant was present during the initial exchange, while the exchange itself took place on an anthill (the equality of the twins signified the fairness of the exchange). See M. Griaule, *Dieu d'eau: entretiens avec Ogotemmeli* (Paris: Editions du Chêne, 1948), 25ff., 238ff.

the Muslim tradition ants are one of the ten heavenly animals. Ants are involved in divination, and in curing. Pueblo Indians believe that ruining an anthill causes illness, which can only be cured by a special ant doctor or an ant community (cf. the role of such communities among the Zuñi, and its ritual function in the performance of dances). As a whole these mythopoieic concepts of ants form the general context, against the background of which the “ant” version of the fragments of the basic myth stands in particularly bold relief.

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