

MALAISE IN REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay

Edited by

**Alfredo Joignant,
Mauricio Morales, and
Claudio Fuentes**



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in Latin American Countries

Alfredo Joignant • Mauricio Morales • Claudio Fuentes
Editors

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Editors

Alfredo Joignant
Universidad Diego Portales
Santiago, Chile

Claudio Fuentes
Universidad Diego Portales
Santiago, Chile

Mauricio Morales
Universidad Diego Portales
Santiago, Chile

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FOREWORD

There can be no doubt that something important and profound occurred in Chile in 2011. The student movement that erupted so dramatically that year, and has since persisted, was initially about the country's educational model but soon also began to question the political order established by the 1980 constitution. Not so long afterwards, just before the start of the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil, a number of cities there saw surprising outbursts of popular indignation, initially about the tournament's high economic cost but soon also about the political class and its growing signs of corruption. In this same period (2010–2013), the Arab Spring was blossoming into democratic regimes in countries like Tunisia and Libya where they would previously have been unimaginable. And then, again not so long afterwards, an original social movement erupted in Turkey, starting in the Taksim Gezi Park and escalating into protest against the Erdogan government's censure policy.

It was in this turbulent political context, mostly in middle-income countries, that Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) approached the editors of this book with a view to analyzing the problems of disaffection and malaise with democracy in the southern cone of Latin America. That is where Chile came in. Given that it had for years been held up as a model of transition to democracy and its peaceful consolidation, it would be interesting to look at what had been happening there since 2011 and compare it with two other middle-income countries in the same sub-region (Argentina and Uruguay) in a bid to identify particular trends and, possibly, common patterns.

To this end, we developed a research strategy that implied carrying out public opinion surveys in Argentina (N=1200), Chile (N=1200), and Uruguay (N=1202) and surveys of an important sample of members of both houses of these countries' Congresses and their executives, using a common questionnaire that was only slightly modified in order to accommodate country-specific language usages (Argentina, N=140; Chile, N=164; Uruguay, N=121). The design of the population samples (probabilistic) was identical and the questionnaires sought to capture the ways in which political activity is perceived.¹

The project that gave rise to this book began with a seminar in Montevideo in July 2013, attended by most of the authors, and concluded with a seminar in Santiago in July 2015 at which all the work published here was presented and debated. As you will see, the authors are political scientists and sociologists, which is in line with the decision of the editors and the IDRC to analyze the same topic from a multidisciplinary perspective. Beyond the challenges that such a multidisciplinary approach implies, the exercise proved an extremely gratifying experience, not least because it is unusual (at least in Latin America) for political scientists and sociologists to analyze and discuss the same topic and to do so as part of the same research project. It is our sincere belief that the future of the social sciences will be multidisciplinary, putting behind them the petty disputes between schools and scholars that can hamper scientific progress.

We are aware that the notion of malaise, although slightly more familiar to sociologists, is a difficult one to use in political science. If we opted to do so, it is because we firmly believe that the problems of distrust and disaffection are a far cry from the imprecise diagnosis of a "crisis of representation" or even worse a "crisis of democracy". But the notion of malaise, whose conceptualization is developed in the Introduction to this book, is also attractive because it is widely used in ordinary everyday language and it was well worth adopting this word as a category of analysis.

We would like to thank the Diego Portales University for the constant support it has provided throughout the three years of this project. We are also indebted to the Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES, CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009) and Fondecyt Project 1150790 for their support in 2015, the last and crucial year of writing the manuscript. Our special recognition goes to Florencio Ceballos, the IDRC program official who accompanied and constantly encouraged us

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Although some chapters of this book were written directly in English, we would like to thank Ruth Bradley for her extraordinary editing and translating skills. For at least one of the editors (Alfredo Joignant), she is an essential part of his intellectual work and, at this stage, a friend.

NOTE

1. This material is available on request.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Manuel Alcántara is a professor at Universidad de Salamanca, Spain, and Director of FLACSO-Spain. He has been General Secretary of Asociación Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política (ALACIP) (2002–2009). His research focuses on parliamentary elites, political parties, elections, and legislatures in Latin America. He is the author of several books, notably *El Oficio de Político* (Tecnos, 2012) as well as editor of *Politicians and Politics in Latin America* (2008).

Germán Bidegain's academic interests are democratic theory, comparative politics, and social movements theory, especially in Latin American politics. His research has been published by *Latin American Politics and Society*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, and *Pléyade*.

Daniel Buquet is a full professor at Social Science Faculty, Universidad de la República, Uruguay. His research focuses on political parties and electoral systems in Uruguay and Latin America. His research has been published by *Journal of Democracy*, *Electoral Studies*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, *Revista Debates*, *América Latina Hoy*, *Política*, *Revista Sistema*, and *Perfiles Latinoamericanos*.

Daniel Chasquetti is a full professor at Social Science Faculty, Universidad de la República, Uruguay. His research focuses on legislative behavior, political careers, and Uruguayan politics and has been published by *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, *América Latina Hoy*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, and *The Journal of Legislative Studies*.

Claudio Fuentes is Director of School of Political Science, Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. His recent books include *La Solución Constitucional* (co-edited with Alfredo Joignant, Catalonia, 2015), *El Fraude* (Hueders, 2013), *El Pacto* (UDP, 2012), and *Contesting the Iron Fist* (2005). He is the winner of the Best Dissertation Award 2003 (Human Rights Section) of American Political Science Association (APSA).

Mariana Heredia is an assistant professor at Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales (IDAES), Argentina. Her research has been published by *Estudios Sociológicos*, *Russian Review of Social Research*, *Social Sciences Information*, and *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*. Her latest book is *Cuando los Economistas Alcanzaron el Poder* (Siglo XXI, 2015).

Alfredo Joignant is Professor of Political Science, Universidad Diego Portales, Chile, and Principal Researcher of Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social (COES), Chile. His latest books are *La Solución Constitucional* (co-edited with Claudio Fuentes, Catalonia, 2015) and *The Politics of Memory in Chile* (co-edited with Cath Collins and Katherine Hite, 2013). His work has been published in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, *Genèses*, *Politix*, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *Democratization*, *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, *Política y Gobierno*, and *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*.

Jorge Lanzaro is a professor at Instituto de Ciencia Política, Universidad de la República, Uruguay. His latest books are *Social Democracias “Tardías” en Europa Meridional y América Latina* (CEPC, 2014), *Parlamentarismo y Presidencialismo* (CEPC, 2012), and *Political Parties and Democracy* (co-edited with Kay Lawson, 2010).

Federico Lorenc Valcarce is Assistant Professor of Political Sociology, Universidad de Buenos Aires, and Researcher of Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) at Instituto Gino Germani, Argentina. His research has been published by *Sociétés Contemporaines*, *POSTData*, and *Estudios del Trabajo*. His latest book is *Seguridad Privada* (Miño y Dávila, 2014).

Noam Lupu is Associate Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University and Associate Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). His research has been published in *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Journal of Politics*, and *World Politics*.

Mauricio Morales is an associate professor at Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. His research has been published by *Democratization*, *Latin American Politics & Society*, *Latin American Research Review*, *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, *Política y Gobierno*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Estudios Públicos*, and *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*. He co-edited with Patricio Navia *El Genoma Electoral Chileno* (UDP, 2009) and *El Sismo Electoral de 2009* (UDP, 2010).

Patricio Navia is Master Teacher of Global Studies in Liberal Studies, New York University, and full-time professor at Universidad Diego Portales, Chile, and associate researcher at COES. His research has been published by *Latin American Research Review*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Estudios Públicos*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, *Política y Gobierno*, and *Democratization*. He co-edited with Alfredo Joignant *Ecos mundiales del golpe de Estado* (UDP, 2013).

Sebastián Pereyra is an assistant professor at Universidad Nacional de San Martín, Argentina. His research has been published in *Revista de Desarrollo Económico*, *Revue Tiers Monde*, and *Revista Trayectorias*. His latest book is *Política y Transparencia. La Corrupción como Problema Público* (Siglo XXI, 2013).

Rafael Piñeiro is an assistant professor at Universidad Católica del Uruguay. His research has been published in *Latin American Politics and Society*, *Latin American Research Review*, *Journal of Democracy*, *Política y Gobierno*, and *Revista de Ciencia Política*.

Timothy Power is Director of the Brazilian Studies Programme and Associate Professor of Brazilian Studies at University of Oxford. His research concerns democratization and political institutions (parties, legislatures, and elections) in Latin America, especially Brazil. His work has been published by *Democratization*, *Dados*, *Latin American Research Review*, *Latin American Politics & Society*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *International Social Science Journal*, *Latin American Research Review*, and *International Political Science Review*.

Carolina Segovia is an associate professor at Universidad Diego Portales, Chile, and Director of Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales (ICSO), Universidad Diego Portales. Her research has been published by *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, and *Papel Político*.

Lucía Selios is an assistant professor at Universidad de la República, Uruguay. Her research focuses on public opinion, elites, and representation in Latin America and has been published by *América Latina Hoy*, *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, *Studies of Changing Societies*, and *POSTData*.

Peter Siavelis is a professor at the Department of Politics and International Affairs, Wake Forest University. His research focuses on Latin American electoral and legislative politics and has been published by *Latin American Politics & Society*, *Comparative Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Electoral Studies*, *Democratization*, *Party Politics*, and *Journal of Politics in Latin America*. He co-edited with Scott Morgenstern *Pathways to Power* (2008).

Nicolás M. Somma is Associate Professor of Sociology at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and associate researcher at COES, Chile. His research focuses on political sociology, social movements, and comparative sociology in Chile and the Americas in general. His work has been published by *Comparative Politics*, *Party Politics*, *Sociological Perspectives*, *The Sociological Quarterly*, *Política y Gobierno*, *Social Science History*, and *Acta Sociologica*.

Víctor Tricot is Academic Director of School for International Training (SIT), Washington, DC. His work focuses on social movements, political participation, party systems, and political cleavages.

Gabriel Vommaro is an assistant professor at Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, Argentina, and researcher of CONICET, Argentina. His research focuses on culture and politics in post-transitional democracy and has been published by *Politix*, *Cahiers des Amériques Latines*, *Apuntes de Investigación*, *Desacatos*, and *Revista SAAP*. He has recently co-authored with S. Morresi and A. Bellotti *Mundo PRO* (Planeta, 2015) and with Héléne Combes *Sociologie du Clientélisme* (La Découverte, 2015).

Zach Warner is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His work has been published in *Political Analysis*.

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Malaise in Representation: Attitudes, Beliefs, Behaviors, and Causalities

Alfredo Joignant, Mauricio Morales, and Claudio Fuentes

INTRODUCTION

What is malaise in representation? It is a diffuse and sometimes confused feeling that ordinary citizens can have about the way they are represented and governed. Rather than using malaise *with* representation (which would imply significant awareness of and reflection about the experience), we prefer to talk about malaise *in* representation in order to convey the idea of a certain discomfort with the practical experience of feeling represented (or not). This is the subject of this book and it calls for answers to a series of questions. How different is this malaise in representation from a crisis of representation? What causes it? Is it really determined by countries' level of development or does it simply reflect citizens' perceptions of inequality or injustice? Is it a feeling of anger with the democratic system in general or more specifically with parties and governments? What concrete expressions of malaise can be measured through opinion surveys and in terms of social mobilization?

We would like to thank Kevin Díaz for his valuable help in organizing the graphics used in this chapter.

A. Joignant (✉) • M. Morales • C. Fuentes
Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile

In the literature of the social sciences and, particularly, political science, it has become almost a cliché to talk about a “crisis of representation” without the terms of this diagnosis necessarily being clear. In studies of the crisis of representation in Latin America, the tendency has been to focus on countries where the party system has collapsed and, therefore, to view a crisis of representation as a necessary and logically prior condition for its collapse. Less attention has been paid to those countries whose party system has not collapsed but where there are nonetheless clear symptoms that “something is not right with democracy”. How should we interpret criticism of democracy in apparently stable societies? How can we explain malaise in countries without the economic and institutional conditions that typically precede a crisis of representation or a crisis of the regime?

What we see in these Latin American countries is probably similar to what we saw in Greece and some East European countries in 2015. In other words, they are democracies which are gradually achieving consolidation but where there remains a feeling of malaise with the way the regime operates. It would, therefore, not be surprising to find cases of democracy that are prototypical for comparative politics but toward which citizens feel disaffected and, in some situations, resort to protests and social mobilization.

It is far more common for crises of representation to go hand in hand with economic crises and to be found in states incapable of providing basic public goods and services. But what happens in democracies where stable party systems coexist with negative citizen perceptions of institutions and, even, citizens who are distanced from the political parties? Can stable electoral competition (low volatility) coexist with citizens who feel little allegiance to the parties? Can we talk about a “crisis of representation” when a democracy’s “objective” signals point to the regime’s stability?

Some Latin American states are capable of providing basic public goods and services and have low electoral volatility. In other words, they have long-standing parties that have been able to survive even severe economic crises and the breakdown of democracy and we also find a high level of programmatic congruence between parties and voters. In such cases, can we talk about a crisis of representation? In our opinion, we cannot. What we see in these countries is a prior stage that does not necessarily lead to what could culminate (under certain conditions that would need to be specified) in a crisis of representation. In these cases, we are talking about malaise with democracy, reflected in citizens’ perceptions of the political regime but not necessarily in objective indicators of party competition. In

these countries, there may, in other words, be a high level of distrust of institutions and disapproval of the government and the parties may lack deep social roots but this does not necessarily imply a crisis of representation. Or, at least, there is no objective evidence this is the case.

This book examines malaise with democracy in three middle-income Latin American countries—Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay—seeking to take a step back and study citizens’ perceptions of some aspects of democracy that suggest malaise but not necessarily a crisis of representation. We believe that some of our findings could well be applicable to European countries with similar levels of per capita income.

THEORY OF MALAISE AND CASE STUDIES

In the mid-1970s, the report of Crozier et al. (1975) for the Trilateral Commission already warned that mounting pressure for participation and demands posed a threat to governability in Western democracies. Despite early rebuttal of the report’s conclusions, the idea of a crisis of representation has always been present in the literature (e.g., in the book of Mainwaring et al. 2006), albeit based on more sophisticated arguments. This crisis, if it existed, would be reflected in different types of misalignment between supply and demand for political goods, between the function of governments and Congresses of providing well-being and their citizens’ subjective experience of satisfaction, between public policies and their results, between governments’ provision of a safety net and people’s feeling of protection, and between problems and solutions. But that is not the whole story. If a crisis of representation as such existed, without adjectives, the implicit assumption is that it would have been preceded by a certain state of equilibrium. And that state of equilibrium could well coexist with perceptions and predispositions that are unfavorable toward democracy or, at least, critical of its representatives.

It is this ambiguous and, in some authors, catastrophic view that this book examines, seeking to combine conceptual precision with empirical analysis strategies. This is the purpose for which this joint book was conceived and why a decision was taken to focus on three countries which are comparable as regards development and well-being. The result was that we worked with three middle-income countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay¹) or, in other words, three societies whose political development (particularly in the case of Chile) the comparative literature considers exceptional within Latin America and even models to be imitated.

Argentina, with its early industrialization and history of political instability, serves as a case that, albeit comparable in terms of well-being, departs somewhat from the logic of an exception that is associated with Chile and Uruguay.

There can be little doubt about the distinctive nature of these three democratic regimes. They are comparatively (along with Costa Rica) Latin America's most successful cases of "social policy regimes" (Huber and Stephens 2010).² Chile's and Uruguay's party systems have the highest levels of ideological cohesion (Hawkins and Morgenstern 2010, p. 154; Morales 2014b) and both are "high-quality democracies" (Payne et al. 2003; Levine and Molina 2011; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, p. 242). Moreover, all three countries have high indices of political tolerance and support for democracy. However, despite the similarities between Uruguay and Chile, their levels of malaise are, as we will show below, practically the inverse of each other. Chile is at the top of the ranking and Uruguay at the lower end while Argentina, with much more evident social and economic problems, is in an intermediate position.

Based on this information, it is difficult to view Chile as one of the "Swiss" democracies of the South.³ Since the end of the past decade, identification with political parties has declined in Chile and distrust of institutions has increased (Morales 2008, 2014b). When measuring trust in institutions, for example, Chile consistently appears in last place. While, in Uruguay, trust in parties reaches almost 15 percent and, in Argentina, 13 percent, it drops to scarcely 5 percent in Chile (Fig. 1.1). In other words, its citizens' perceptions are at odds with the top places Chile takes in rankings of transparency and quality of democracy. What we find is a gap between the objective evidence of aggregate data in international rankings and the subjective data produced by opinion polls (Morales 2014a).

The decline in identification with political parties (except Uruguay: Fig. 1.2), the relatively low indices of internal efficacy (particularly in Argentina: Fig. 1.3), and the explosion of street demonstrations in Chile in 2011 (Figs. 1.4 and 1.5) paint a picture of contrasts and complexities as regards the way these three democracies and their societies function. There are, however, also common denominators: presidential regimes with institutionalized party systems (albeit to a lesser extent in Argentina) and a majority preference for democracy over other forms of government (although with marked contrasts: Fig. 1.6).




Fig. 1.1 Trust in political institutions in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay (*Source*: UDP-IDRC Survey 2013)

There are, therefore, certain inconsistencies between what is understood “objectively” as democracy and perceptions and predispositions as regards some dimensions of this political regime. The idea that high levels of abstention and disinterest in politics can coexist with stable democracies is, it seems, not preposterous after all. In the short term, democracy can, in other words, survive and reproduce itself without the need to show programmatically deep-rooted preferences. Caution is, however, called for in the case of the medium and long term. The gaps and trends we identify in the three case studies could be mere snapshots or representations of reality at a specific point in time, although we believe the data is telling us about the medium-term dynamics. In Chile, for example, there has been a gradual but sustained decline in citizens’ trust in institutions since the restoration of democracy, a process that, in other words, dates back at least 15 years. In Uruguay, on the other hand, perceptions of democracy have not been so ostensibly damaged as in Chile, despite the severe economic crises it has faced. Similarly, Argentina has experienced very important political and social crises (1989 and 2001) but these have not substantially affected citizens’ perceptions of democracy.

How then can we plausibly explain a certain passion for democracy (as reflected in answers to survey questions about support for the




Fig. 1.2 Sympathy for political parties (*Source*: LAPOP 2012)

democratic regime, liberal or contractualist principles,⁴ democratic ideals, or the choice between different political regimes) and expressions of lack of trust in the institutions that are at the root of this passion (from Congresses to parties)? If there can be no doubt about these three countries' option for democracy, how can we explain expressions of an apathy which the literature refers to as "disaffection" and which can take the form of abstention in elections, disinterest in conventional politics, or what Castel would call a "disappointed relationship with the citizenry" (Castel 2007, p. 59)? Norris is certainly right in drawing attention to the importance of "establishing what people understand when they express support for democracy" (Norris 2011, p. 142; Doorenspleet 2010; Zeichmeister 2010, p. 97)⁵ particularly when very different cul-




Fig. 1.3 Internal efficacy in the countries of the Americas (“Internal efficacy” is conventionally understood as individuals’ own perception of their capacities as regards political matters in terms of giving them some understanding of politics and permitting their participation. This definition is operationalized in public opinion surveys through questions such as “You feel you have a good understanding of the country’s most important political issues. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”) (*Source*: LAPOP 2012)

tures and histories are involved. Assuming that the dilemma underlying the question has been resolved, it is not clear that we can assert without a theoretical basis or conceptual clarification that, despite the difficulties, “surveys usually prove more successful” when they address “attitudes and values instead of real behavior” (Norris et al. 2006, p. 281) because their




Fig. 1.4 Number of street demonstrations in Chile, 2009–2011 (*Source:* Planning and Development Division, Carabineros de Chile, cited in *Desarrollo humano en Chile*, 2012, p. 41)




Fig. 1.5 Number of people participating in marches in Chile, 2009–2012 (*Source:* Interior Ministry, in Sazo and Navia (publication pending))




Fig. 1.6 Support for democracy in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Percentage indicating that “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government” (*Source*: UDP-IDRC Survey 2013)

reliability is greater than the difficulties of interpreting behavior (particularly when this is of a routine nature of the type “How often do you talk about politics?”). Beyond the statistical confidence and certainties offered by what Goody (1977) terms “graphic reason” and the intellection effects this produces (Desrosières 2000), how can we explain the frequent discrepancies between the attitudes recorded by surveys—whatever their causal direction with respect to the functioning of such or such a democratic regime—and observed behavior that is not always in accordance with the subjective equipment that supposedly underpins and provokes it? How can we account for the legitimacy of the political regimes, institutions, and agents of these three middle-income countries in the knowledge that this legitimacy is not necessarily or principally the result of evaluation of the regime’s performance?

It is no accident that Weber (1995, p. 36) argues that “agents are often motivated by opposing trends that fight against each other, that ‘we understand’ them all” but, at the same time, “we are not in a position to appreciate, even approximately” the relative force of each one in the “conflict of motives” of which individuals are captive. In other words, although individuals can express the reasons that “move” them (which is what surveys record), social circumstances and political contexts can and often do blur the motives that are at the root of individual actions. We can,

as a result, never be sure of our interpretation of what “moves” agents.⁶ Although it seems an exaggeration to argue that “in short, actions speak louder than words” (Grafstein 1981, p. 463), it does not, therefore, seem reasonable to put the full weight of explanation on attitudes and what critical sociology refers to as subjective “leanings”.

For Dalton, for example, phenomena such as the dealignment of voters with parties or of parties with the cleavages in which they had their origin, the decline in election turnout in industrialized countries, and generalized distrust of parliaments but also and very counter-intuitively the increase of interest in politics in developed countries, where citizens are more educated and autonomous with respect to party brands, can all be seen as indications of new channels “in the continuous history of the development of democracy” (Dalton 2014, p. 275) and, in no case, represent a “winter of democracy” (Papadopoulos 2013, p. 214). In this sense, it is precisely because we do not observe mass attitudes of detachment from democracy nor behavior that is contrary or hostile to it that we should take serious note of the assertion of Norris that “the ideas of a democratic crisis should be rejected as an over-simplification of more complex developments” (Norris 2011, p. 110).

As a preliminary conclusion, the apparent differences between subjective perceptions and “objective” indicators of the behavior of the institutions of the democratic regimes of the countries studied here suggest that (a) discrepancies between perceptions and indicators are not necessarily a sign of a regime’s eventual collapse; (b) agents may have contradictory perceptions—for example, rejection of parties accompanied by the perception of their importance for democracy—that need to be taken into account; and (c) we need to refine our measurement instruments since we are perhaps not adequately capturing the dilemmas and contradictions present in a society at a specific moment.

SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND MALAISE

Although the countries we study have a middle level of income and well-being, they also suffer from important inequalities which could well be a factor in malaise in representation. Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay—in that order—rank in the United Nations Human Development Index as the three top Latin American countries (with 0.82, 0.80, and 0.79 points, respectively). Their GDP per capita is also very similar (Table 1.1). There are, however, important differences as regards total government social

Table 1.1 Indicators of average well-being and development in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay

	<i>GDP per capita (2013)</i> US\$	<i>Government social spending as % of GDP</i>	<i>Poverty rate (2011)</i> %	<i>Gini (Richest quintile)</i>	<i>Gini (Difference 2002–2012 Richest quintile)</i>
Argentina ^a	15,352	27.8 (2012)	5.7	43.6 (2012)	–11.4
Chile	15,784	15.6 (2010)	11.7	52.5 (2011)	–2.6
Uruguay	16,554	23.3 (2009)	6.7	34.8 (2012)	–7.0

Source: For GDP, ECLAC, national economic profile. For poverty rate and Gini index, Social Panorama of Latin America 2013, ECLAC

^a For Argentina, only urban poverty rate

spending as a percentage of GDP (with Chile in third place, well below the other two countries) and their poverty rates (where Chile is again in third place, with double the rates of Argentina and Uruguay). These statistics must, of course, be treated with caution given the questions often raised about the conceptualization and measurement of social indicators. However, they do illustrate the efforts made by the state and the levels of inequality found in these three countries.

In the case of income distribution, we see that the richest quintile accounts for 34.8 percent of national income in Uruguay, 43.6 percent in Argentina, and 52.5 percent in Chile. On comparing these figures diachronically, we find that the most important reduction in inequality between 2002 and 2012 was in Argentina, followed by Uruguay and Chile. Chile has the most unequal income distribution of the three and the fifth most unequal in Latin America while Uruguay has the least unequal in the region.

Some authors have asserted that inequality (measured in terms of income) is the most important variable in triggering malaise. The frustration that can be caused by lack of access to well-being and consumer goods would, under this view, generate the conditions for this malaise in representation, which is diffuse in its target. This leads us to the argument put forward over 50 years ago by T.H. Marshall under which inequality could only acquire legitimacy through the expansion of universal social rights and of citizenship. In this sense, an unequal society that does not expand rights could generate conditions of “social malaise” (Marshall

1950) and, eventually, malaise with democratic representation. However, the data presented here is at odds with this argument. In Chile, income inequality has been a constant since at least the mid-1980s and yet high indices of malaise appeared only 20 years later. Is this merely the result of a lag between cause and effect? In Argentina, a rise in poverty—but not inequality—has not resulted in the collapse of citizens' loyalty to the democratic regime while, in Uruguay, there appears to be greater consistency between indicators of social spending, inequality, and GDP per capita and social perceptions of democracy.

Philip Oxhorn (2003) offers an interesting analytical framework for attempting to understand this contradictory evidence. What we should observe, he argues, is not only the allegiance of a specific regime to certain formal standards of rights (civil, social, and/or political) but also, more crucially, the social construction of those rights thanks to the existence of a civil society with the strength to demand them. He asserts that Latin America has not experienced the accumulation of resources of power by the working class that was so important in Europe and, consequently, the process of building strong civil society players (unions, organized social groups that are independent of the state, etc.) took different forms (Oxhorn 2003, pp. 36–37). The question then is not only about lags between perceptions and macro indicators of well-being but also about the conditions in which a society's players are able to “politicize” a certain social dissatisfaction and transform it into a clear demand that makes sense at a specific point in time. We will address this problem later by increasing the complexity of the models of analysis related to citizen–representative ties and by highlighting the need to consider the “gray” areas of these ties.

The literature on social movements and protest has insisted that the region's unequal social structure leads to important differences in the distribution of power, wealth, and prestige and that this, in turn, means that different groups and hierarchies have disparate interests. As Eckstein says, when the most dispossessed rebel, “it is not because they are particularly conflictive. They rebel because they have limited means or mechanisms through which to make known their demands and press for change” (Eckstein 2001, p. 3). At the same time, however, he argues that, although important, economic conditions alone are not capable of explaining processes of malaise and social protest. On this matter, the theory of the mobilization of resources (McAdam et al. 1999) has suggested that social protest is contingent on resources, organizational capacity, and the seizure of opportunities for action. Other authors have drawn attention to the his-

torical repertoires of social organizations and the institutional conditions of the state in the neoliberal era (Roberts and Portes 2006). In all these cases, structural social conditions (inequality, poverty, a lack of state) act as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the activation of social protest.

FROM SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY TO LEGITIMACY

Montero et al. (1997, p. 131) argued that “questions about alternative political regimes are highly abstract and unreal”. Although such questions are frequently included in opinion surveys, the risks of over-interpretation are indeed considerable. What can we conclude from the high levels of support for democracy⁷ in culturally different countries (e.g., China, India, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile) or, less spectacularly, in groups of countries with less marked cultural differences (like the Southern Cone countries) where they coexist with expressions of distrust of political institutions and disaffection with parties? Certainly, such questions are most useful at the level of a single country where support can be compared over time or when a country is compared synchronously with other countries. The relevant question, however, is whether high levels of support for democracy are unequivocal evidence of its “legitimacy”. We argue that this category which was popularized in the social sciences by Weber refers to dimensions of reality that it is difficult to capture only through survey questions⁸ and much more so with a single question. This implies that survey questions merely skim the issue of the legitimacy of political power.

It is no accident that the social sciences and, particularly, political science use various categories to refer to political representation and its social acceptance. From trust in institutions through evaluation of the regime’s performance to expressions of disaffection, dissatisfaction, and discontent (Torcal and Montero 2006, p. 9), all these categories tell us something about political power and its legitimacy but none of them tell us the whole story.⁹ How should we understand the legitimacy of representative democracies? As a political act and socially acceptable delegation of power to representatives through what Bourdieu (1981) calls a *fides implicita*. For a long time, the delegation of power was not questioned because of the powerful initial energy of universal suffrage with its legitimizing magic as seen in both Europe (Rosanvallon 1992; Offerlé 1993; Garrigou 2002) and Latin America (Posada-Carbó 2000; on Chile, Valenzuela 1985; Joignant 2001, 2002). There is, however, abundant historiographic evidence that this legitimizing energy has weakened for reasons that range from the

expression of the people's will through channels other than the ballot box to its periodic measurement through surveys, hallowed by the eruption of "public opinion" on a daily basis in democratic politics (Zaller 1992; Blondiaux 1998; Lehingue 2007; Champagne 1990). Far from adjusting to the logic of *fides implicita*, as Bourdieu reasonably expected just over three decades ago, under which the act of delegation is similar to a *carte blanche* conferred on the elected representatives, what we see today are conditional mandates, not because universal suffrage has ceased to make sense but simply because it has lost some of its energy. The spread of direct and semi-direct mechanisms of democracy, the institutional imagination by which they are accompanied (Blondiaux 2008; Altman 2011), and the "participative revolution" being experienced by advanced industrial democracies (Dalton et al. 2003b, p. 8) are merely the formal expression of deeper changes. Opinion surveys have been sensitive to this conditionality, operating both as doxometric instruments for recording the attitudes that condition the relation of representation and, at the same time, as devices that provoke conditionality by publishing their results and serving as an opportunity for criticism through analysis and discussion of their results. It is this strange circularity that warrants the attention of researchers.

Surveys ask questions about trust in political institutions, their representatives, and the way governments work or acceptance of democracy. However, can we be sure that the answers in practice represent a record of the views of people (and respondents) and, above all, that they are mirrored in behavior? One step toward capturing the complexity of this conditional legitimacy can be found in Norris's idea of "permissive consensus" (Norris 1997, p. 276), an elegant way of authorizing without expressly consenting which is not so different from Tilly's "contingent consent" which implies "unwillingness to offer rulers, however well elected, blank checks" (Tilly 2007, p. 94). What are the mechanisms of this conditional legitimacy under which elections fulfill the dual function of selecting representatives and giving legitimacy to their power, creating in those by whom they were elected "a feeling of obligation and commitment to those they appointed" (Manin 1995, p. 116)?

When there is a negative evaluation of a president's or a government's performance, a feeling of dissatisfaction becomes apparent. It may be with the government's economic performance, a particular policy, or a set of policies or may even not be about anything specific (about which Easton (1965) was thinking when he talked about "diffuse" legitimacy). However, does this expression of dissatisfaction picked up by surveys

constitute evidence of a decline in the legitimacy of a president or government or does it refer to another dimension of the situation? Montero et al. (1997, p. 130) are certainly right when they say that “efficacy and legitimacy are not only conceptually different but also empirically different”. Indeed, stocks or reserves of legitimacy or, in other words, the systems of beliefs that underpin the principles and ideals of democracy are vigorous enough to withstand the legal continuity (or discontinuity) of governments without posing a threat to the regime’s continuity. But is there a point at which these reserves become exhausted? How can we explain the transition from discontent to “delegitimacy” or, in other words, “acts of generalized public opposition to a regime” (Beetham 2001, p. 111)? Certainly, by emphasizing the political elite’s greater propensity to polarization (which is well documented in the literature) through, for example, the notion of “radical political preferences” in Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013 (see also Kitschelt 2010; Dalton et al. 2011a, p. 151 and, for Chile, Joignant and Navia 2013; Landsberger and McDaniel 1976; Prothro and Chaparro 1974). But, like Janus, the explanation also has a second face which, in this case, involves what ordinary citizens do or stop doing, either relativizing the routines of universal suffrage whose results are not always conclusive or channeling their interests and discontent into forms of collective action that may become violent and end up undermining democratic coexistence (Bermeo 2003).

BIAS IN REPRESENTATION

Are citizens’ preferences being represented or, more precisely, are the preferences of all citizens being represented when interest in and understanding of politics are characterized by their very unequal distribution across social groups? It is in this sense that we should understand the classic demonstration of Gaxie (1979) about contemporary political segregation or the distinction between “equality of access and equality of use” of the vote put forward by Dalton et al. (2003a, p. 259).

The best known, most studied, and most measured source of political distortion is the electoral system. By giving priority to the ideal of governability through an institutional design that fosters the existence of two main parties, first-past-the-post systems with only one round (e.g., the US or British system) leave relatively large segments of the electorate, who vote for small- or mid-sized parties, without parliamentary representation.¹⁰ The same can also be said about institutional mechanisms and

rules such as laws on political parties or election financing which have the effect of excluding some segments of the electorate. All these institutional designs play a role in *ex ante* bias in representation and its *ex post* distortion but, however important such institutional factors are, there are also other sources of distortion in representation.

Certainly, “today, more people are interested in more issues” and this leads to “changes [in] the nature of political representation and decision making” (Dalton 2014, p. 127). But can these changes be attributed only to the morphology of peoples and the size of the electorate, citizens’ level of education and cultural capital, the diversity of issues in which they may be interested, and the numerous causes in which they may be involved? The answer is no, since all these social factors interact with institutional designs and the terms of the interaction are not always rigorously defined. This must be borne in mind when interpreting measurements and the results of empirical research. What is often forgotten is that changes in political representation and the feeling of malaise they involve are also explained by the historical transformations of representative democracies, their dynamics, and the logic of their operation, which generate deep distortions of representation.

In an interesting and well-documented book, Papadopoulos (2013) analyzes the problems of legitimacy and democratic representation while thinking at the same time about supply and demand of political goods (or what he terms the front-stage as opposed to the back-stage of politics). There is, in other words, an important blind spot between the politics that can actually be observed through the actions of its representatives (thanks partly to the mediatization of politics and its transformation into the political spectacle: Edelman 1988) and the back office of policymaking. According to Papadopoulos, party politics and the politics of candidates occupy the first sphere and, it could be added, generate the belief that this is where what is essential takes place. However, we know that, in many aspects of policymaking, politicians often play a role subordinate to that of other agents, ranging from technocrats to advocacy groups and including an endless number of experts. There are, therefore, many agents who play a role in policymaking and in the satisfaction of voters’ preferences that is as invisible as it is important. To this, we must also add the specific role of social movements which, at critical times, can influence the political process, setting agendas, expanding the terms of reference, and eventually blocking political decisions.

We know little about this more invisible sphere¹¹ which raises the question of what surveys tell us about political representation and its agents. If people vote for such or such candidate or party who promised such or such goods, an electoral tie is created between the candidate, the party or its representatives, and the people they represent. If agents other than the parties, candidates, and voters also intervene, can we really be sure that the original representation, with its popularly conferred mandate, is being satisfied? These are important questions because it is reasonable to think that, in the sphere Papadopoulos refers to as the political back-stage, many things happen and many decisions are taken that do not depend on the elected representative or the people by whom he was elected, thereby producing distortions in the relationship of representation.

If the above is true, then we need to ask what is being recorded in opinion polls and the congruence analysis based on them. There appears to be no doubt that what is recorded by surveys belongs to the sphere that Papadopoulos calls front-stage. In this case, doxometric instruments are recording only the perceptive appropriations and attitudinal configurations of the most visible aspect of the political sphere. This gives some weight to the argument that, when using surveys to record the attitudes and opinions of both the political elites and their electorates and, particularly, when detecting high, medium, or low levels of congruence (despite having taken all the methodological precautions), we are ignoring the back-stage sphere whose capacity to distort representation can be considerable (the reason why Papadopoulos talks about a “gap” between the two spheres). It could, of course, be argued that there are no grounds for asserting that what happens in the back-stage contradicts and distorts the front-stage which, at first sight, may seem reasonable. Why, indeed, should we assume that technocrats and expert agents deploy deliberate strategies to distort campaign promises once the winners take office? Looking more closely at the literature on the back-stage, however, it is impossible not to become convinced of the great autonomy that bureaucracies, expert and technocratic agents, and advocacy groups acquire and the dispossession suffered by the people’s elected representatives who may rhetorically claim knowledge of essential issues while lacking the skills to discuss them with specialized agents. It is, therefore, neither necessary nor realistic to assume the existence of conspiracies between expert agents to impose their decisions on elected representatives (even when they may exist but without being central to the argument).

Papadopoulos (2013, p. 113) rightly argues that “through the electoral mechanism”, citizens “*ex ante* authorize incumbents” to take “collectively binding decisions”, a circular relationship that generates a feeling of congruence between policymakers and policy takers. It is this feeling that is analyzed by researchers who specialize in congruence and not a more substantive relationship of representation such as that which arises from the notion of “latent public opinion” of Zaller (1992). This is why it is important to note what could be a true misunderstanding arising from the divergence between the political sphere and the policymaking sphere: “in electoral competition, the parties act as if” this decoupling between the two spheres does not exist (Papadopoulos 2013, p. 218) and this, in turn, would be reflected in dissatisfaction with what this author terms “the principle of reality” (Papadopoulos 2013, p. 239).

For a long time, the literature spontaneously adhered to a conception of representation with, at its base, local preferences formed privately by citizens and, at the top, public policies that seek to satisfy these preferences. Diagram 1.1, taken from Perrin and McFarland (2008), reflects this bottom-up conception. As seen in the diagram, the assumption is that preferences are formed locally by citizens and are adopted by political representatives and policymakers for their subsequent transformation into public policies. However banal the image of the “democratic ladder” may appear, is it so different from the conception that prevails in the literature which seeks congruences between governments and the governed or between representatives and those they represent? Is there not in this apparently undisputable conception a philosophy of representation where what is represented is the functional equivalent of a reflection in a mirror, rhetorically consecrating the principle of popular sovereignty?

This conception is, of course, too simple and reductionist and Perrin and McFarland (2008) reformulated the image of the “democratic ladder” in a way such that the bottom and the top interact. Here, “citizens’ preferences influence public policies” and, at the same time, “public policies also influence citizens’ political ideas”. More important, however, is the idea of a gray area between the bottom and top of the ladder because this is where a key source of distortion and bias in representation is found. Politicians, policymakers, technocrats, experts, bureaucracies, and advocacy groups act and compete here for the preferential right to shape and satisfy citizens’ interests and preferences. This is the area we should focus on and is precisely the area that eludes surveys because it is in areas of this type that they meet the social limits of their usefulness. Although this sec-




Diagram 1.1 The classic idea of political representation according to Perrin and McFarland (*Source*: Perrin and McFarland 2008)

ond conception suggested by Perrin and McFarland is much more pessimistic than that which accompanies the realistic promise of representation, it is extremely important to take it into account when interpreting survey results and the general and optimistic findings to which it is possible to arrive by other means.

Malaise in representation has its origin precisely in the growing impact that this set of gray areas and blind knots, so typical of the way in which contemporary representative democracies function, has on citizens' lives. In these areas, whole aspects of personal and collective well-being are addressed and processed by experts, technocrats, and all types of groups that seek to influence the interests in play without claiming anything that resembles democratic legitimacy. It is this distortion of the relationship of representation of which we must be aware when carrying out empirical analyses, resisting the temptation to believe that what happens in the policymaking back office does not affect the

public and visible sphere of the representation of interests by elected representatives.

THE THREE “D”S OF MALAISE WITH DEMOCRACY

Malaise in representation is a combination of “disaffection”, “disapproval”, and “distrust”. These are three distinct and measurable dimensions of attitudes. Of course, we are not the first to propose this exercise in conceptual classification.

Torcal and Montero (2006, p. 6), for example, defined “political disaffection” as a “subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime”. Disaffection would not in itself represent a risk for democracy. It does, however, imply a distancing between citizens and parties that, if sustained over time, could contribute to produce a crisis of representation.

“Disapproval”, on the other hand, consists in the evaluation of governments. Theoretically, it depends on the economic cycle and how satisfied people are with their economic situation and the performance of their country’s economy. At the same time, this perception of political and economic performance influences citizens’ electoral predispositions. It is common to make a distinction between personal economic situation (pocketbook voting) and the country’s economic situation (sociotropic voting). When disapproval (e.g., of the government) is the result of a negative evaluation of the country’s economic situation (intuitively, the more usual situation), this implies that “policy results” rather than self-interest are the “driving force” (Dalton 2014, p. 221), posing a threat to the government and its parties but not to the democratic regime.

The third dimension is “distrust” of the basic institutions of democracy such as parties or parliaments. Underlying this attitude, there is a gap between the life of institutions and the life of people that implies some type of threat for their representatives. If they “do not perform in accordance with citizens’ expressed collective will”, the latter will not only remove them from their posts but will also, more seriously, “withdraw their compliance” (Tilly 2007, p. 94), albeit under circumstances that empirical analysis has to typify.¹² According to Norris (2011, p. 88), it is of little importance if “levels of institutional trust” are “markedly similar” in old and new democracies. The fact is that, although the comparison serves to show important variations between countries with similar levels

of development (such as the three countries studied here), the idea of threat suggested by Tilly continues to hold true, particularly for societies whose citizens are at the same time educated and disaffected, disapprove of their government, and distrust the institutions of democracy (or what Norris (1999) termed “critical citizens”).

It is a variable combination of these three “D”s (disaffection, disapproval, and distrust), accompanied in countries like Argentina (for many years now) and Chile (more recently) by large-scale social movements (particularly student movements¹³), that we refer to as “malaise in representation”. This is a category rarely used in political science (one exception is Cheng 2003) and criticized by Norris (2011, p. 172 and following) when she refers to the lack of evidence to support the thesis of “videomalaise” (in connection with the possibly corrosive role of highly mediatized scandals in consolidated democracies). However, it is used much more frequently in other disciplines, particularly sociology, and was popularized by Freud (1961) through his work on malaise in culture and civilization published in the 1930s and reappropriated on numerous occasions by sociologists, including in Southern Cone countries (e.g., in Chile by Brunner 1998 and Tironi 1999).

Malaise in representation serves to describe an experience with its roots in a feeling of statutory incompetence (Bourdieu 1979, 1980; Gaxie 2007; Joignant 2004, 2007) and social and psychological distance from the political sphere of representation on the part of numerous individuals (Sullivan and Transue 1999), which could in turn constitute a subjective background for protest behavior and, eventually, exit from the regime. Although the comparative evidence shows that people who protest are often those individuals who can do so (because they have skills, resources, and time or, in other words, socially scarce assets), this statutory incompetence does not necessarily have its origin in poor and culturally disadvantaged individuals but rather in their opposite, that is, students or adults who identify themselves as middle-class are endowed with a relatively high level of cultural capital, and can participate in non-conventional forms of collective action precisely because they have the resources to do so. Although some forms of malaise may exist in socially more disadvantaged groups, it is possible to hypothesize that this low-class or popular malaise will rarely transcend its specific local conditions and is unlikely to show what the pragmatic sociology of Boltanski and Thévenot (1991; Boltanski 1990; Thévenot 2006) refers to as an escalation in generality (*montée en généralité*).

Historical research also tells us that behavior representing an exit from the democratic regime is far from a monopoly of the poorest groups. Instead, it tends to originate in the elites (as clearly seen in the three countries studied here in the 1970s when their democracies collapsed) and, first of all, in the political elites. These elites experienced processes of polarization and hypermobilization (Sartori 1976; Linz and Stepan 1978; Bermeo 2003; on Chile: Valenzuela 1978; Landsberger and McDaniel 1976; Prothro and Chaparro 1974; on Argentina: O'Donnell 1988; on Uruguay: Gillespie 1991; Caetano and Rilla 1994). All these possible combinations between disaffection, disapproval, and distrust as well as the consequences they may have call for empirical analysis which it is impossible to undertake without first having precisely defined and circumscribed these same three “D”s.

How is malaise expressed? Three chapters of this book are devoted to the study of social movements understood as expressions of malaise. This malaise has its origins in specific policies (a tax increase, a policy on migration, etc.), a set of policies that affect an entire sector (e.g., health care or educational reform), a combination of both, the slow or rapid accumulation of reforms that modify a “model” of society, or failed policies and, in all these cases, is reflected in protest behavior. In this sense, these expressions do not constitute isolated or episodic behavior but rather take the form of collective action (demonstrations, petitions, etc.) that keeps an issue on the public stage, reproducing and communicating the malaise over time and culminating by having repercussions in the representation of groups and interests. It is for this reason that malaise in representation often becomes apparent in the heat of social movements which test the party system and its ability to process interests and demands. While protests and collective action are episodic (usually being cyclical and concentrated at specific times or in specific situations), the malaise that gives rise to them persists and accumulates over time until it becomes visible in these expressions of protest.

OPERATIONALIZATION

How can we measure and explain the three “D”s, their variations between and within countries, and their causes and effects? How can we address the “expressions” of malaise in representation? Diagram 1.2 shows the




Diagram 1.2 Malaise in representation: attitudes and behavior (*Source:* Authors)

attitudinal and behavioral dimensions that comprise malaise in representation or, in other words, disaffection, disapproval, and distrust measured using the surveys in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile whose results are systematically explored in this book. In addition, it shows the behavioral expressions of malaise for which we used questions about participation in marches, the signing of petitions to the authorities, and the presentation of complaints to some institution. In each country, other expressions of malaise may also exist but, at the comparative level, we work with these minimum criteria. In a particular country, the composition of expressions may, of course, vary but will probably maintain the trend of the results obtained with the minimum criteria.

Table 1.2 shows the operationalization of malaise with democracy in the three attitudinal dimensions defined above. Since surveys use different

Table 1.2 Attitudinal measurement of malaise in representation

	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Measurement (%)</i>
Distrust	Percentage of distrust in institutions according to the following question: <i>How much trust do you have in the following people and institutions?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government • Parties • Congress • Municipality/Department 	0–100
Disapproval	Percentage of disapproval of the government according to the following question: <i>Do you approve or disapprove of the way in which (name of President) has performed as President of the Republic?</i>	0–100
Disaffection	Percentage of disaffection with parties according to the following question: <i>Which of the following political parties best represents your interests, beliefs, and values?</i>	0–100
Aggregation	Average of 3 dimensions	0–100

Source: Authors

scales to measure each dimension, the results have to be normalized from 0 to 100 percent in order to calculate a final average. In the case of distrust, surveys tend to use a scale of 1–4 where “1” indicates no trust and “4” a lot of trust but, for disapproval and disaffection with parties, tend to measure in different ways. A code is, therefore, used for those who approve of the government’s performance, another code for those who disapprove, and another for those who don’t know or don’t answer. In the case of disaffection with parties, the question permits identification with any of the existing parties, leaving another code for those who do not identify with any party, and another for those who don’t know or don’t answer.

Table 1.3 provides a summary of measurements of these behavioral expressions while Table 1.4 shows the process of normalization of the scales for each variable. The index of malaise ranges from 0 to 100 percent as does the index of “expressions” of malaise. Although theoretically there is a linear relationship between these variables, we assume that the presence of some level of malaise is a necessary condition for the generation of a stronger feeling of malaise in representation. In other words, any protest behavior assumes the presence of malaise but the subjective presence of malaise does not always imply public and objective expressions of this malaise.

In the case of the causes of malaise, the literature distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous explanations. The former insist on the causal impact of sociodemographic factors, ranging from gender, age, and social class or what Dalton (2014, p. 184) more complexly terms the “funnel of causality” to the impact of countries’ social capital on the virtuosity of their peoples (Putnam 1993, 2000). Endogenous explanations, on the other hand, focus on what institutions produce (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; for a radical position, see the brilliant and little-known study of Przeworski (2004) who argues that “the only driver of history is endogeneity” (p. 168) and concludes that “if institutions reproduce themselves ... then they can only change as a result of a ‘rupture’, only when conditions change” (p. 181)).

To what extent can disaffection be explained by social factors that are external to politics or attributed to its institutions and performance (precisely what endogenous explanations emphasize)? Is it true that, as citizens’ educational level rises, their relationship with politics becomes looser and more precarious? And, moreover, how important for the “quality” of democracy are high levels of congruence between citizens’ interests and the preferences of their representatives? If they are high, is this proof of the legitimacy of the political order and representative democracy? Is a high level of congruence a guarantee of both political and democratic stability? Or can it precede profoundly different results? The cases we examine here serve as a warning about the complexity of these questions, with Uruguay as synonymous with high congruence and high levels of identification with parties and coalitions while Argentina is almost the perfect opposite and Chile is a strange case of high congruence between the parliamentary elites and voters, extremely low identification with parties (the recent Democracy Audit (UNDP 2014a; Morales 2014b) confirms that Chile has the region’s lowest level of identification with parties), and the emergence of large-scale social movements.

One way of addressing these questions is to confine the terms of the problem as shown in Diagram 1.3 where representation is essentially a tie built on the basis of parties and the political elites, with the “part” corresponding to the different players depending on a country’s history and experiences. In this case, the tie will be the more institutionalized the greater the nationalization of the parties and the durability of brands, the less electoral volatility there is in the long term, and the more structured the programmatic content offered by parties, resulting in a party system

Table 1.3 Behavioral measurement of malaise in representation

	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Measurement (%)</i>
Expressions	Percentage of people who attended a street demonstration	0–100
	Percentage of people who signed a petition to the authorities	0–100
	Percentage of people who presented a complaint or comment to some institution	0–100
	The question used is: <i>In the last 12 months, have you participated in any of the following activities?</i>	

Source: Authors

Table 1.4 Normalization of scales

	<i>Original measurement</i>	<i>Value on normalized scale</i>
Attitudinal dimensions of malaise		
Distrust	1 = A lot of trust	100 %
	2 = Quite a lot of trust	2 = 33 %
	3 = Little trust	3 = 66 %
	4 = No trust	4 = 100 %
Disapproval	9 = DNK/DNA	9 = Lost values
	1 = Disapproves	1 = 100 %
	0 = Approves	0 = 0 %
Disaffection	0 = DNK/DNA	
	1 = Disapproves	1 = 100 %
	0 = Approves	0 = 0 %
	0 = DNK/DNA	
	Behavioral expressions of malaise	
	Demonstrations	1=Has participated
0=Has not participated		0=0 %
0=DNK/DNA		
Signing petition	1=Has participated	1=100 %
	0=Has not participated	0=0 %
	0=DNK/DNA	
Presenting complaint	1=Has participated	1=100 %
	0=Has not participated	0=0 %
	0=DNK/DNA	

Source: Authors

and elite preferences characterized by their stability. In other words, the more stable and lasting this type of tie, the greater will be the subordination of the elites to the parties to which they belong, even when differences may be observed between countries depending on their electoral system and the nature of their presidential regime.¹⁴ All countries may, of course, experience critical situations (for whatever reason) in which these ties will be liable to weaken, with a risk of the emergence of populist leaders that, in the past, triggered the collapse of the party systems of two of the three countries studied here (Argentina with Perón and Chile with Ibáñez in the mid-twentieth century), albeit without posing a lasting threat to the formal harmony indicated in the diagram.

Diagram 1.3 is, of course, a simplification of reality since, as well as parties and elites, other collective agents such as social movements and what the literature terms “organizations geared to causes” (NGOs, advocacy groups, etc.) also intervene in representation. Diagram 1.4 seeks precisely to show a more complex vision of the relationship of representation, including these collective agents and the effects they may have on the party system. The appearance in contemporary politics of cause-oriented organizations (Norris 2007) as well as the eruption of social movements,




Diagram 1.3 Simple locations of malaise in representation (*Source:* Authors)




Diagram 1.4 Complex locations of malaise in representation (*Source*: Authors)

which are characterized by unique agendas and discontinuous dynamics but can be politically relevant both at their peak and during their decline (in this case, by leaving “associative residues” (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p. 443) that may serve to activate other future social movements), have an effect on the agenda of problems of society and politics. Organizations geared to causes and social movements may indeed put new issues on a country’s political agenda, often showing a divorce from the established political parties which seek to control the agenda through strategies to recover possession of disputed issues and to frame what is in play (McAdam et al. 1999; Neveu 1996). In concrete terms, these collective agents can, precisely because they are organized around specific issues, cause issue dispersion, prompting the parties to take an interest in issues that would not otherwise have attracted their attention in order to stabilize the political agenda on new terms.

WHY ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND URUGUAY? CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS AND ITS LIMITS

As a general rule, the literature assumes that high levels of congruence between the preferences of voters and their representatives, particularly on important issues, indicate a sound democracy. According to the 2013 UDP-IDRC survey (as well as all the different LAPOP measurements and the study *Brechas de la representación* (ICSO-UDP 2010) based on data from the UDP survey), Chile shows a high level of congruence on important issues and an increase in non-conventional political participation (see Figs. 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5) while, in Uruguay, we find a high level of congruence and low non-conventional political participation and, in Argentina, low congruence and continuous protest activity. How can we explain these three different patterns and to what extent are the quality, depth, and legitimacy of democracy at stake in them?¹⁵ It is impossible not to conclude that they reflect something not being captured by surveys, not because of methodological defects (surveys with good sample design are not vulnerable to technical criticism and the batteries of questions have been sufficiently tested so as to permit comparison, albeit not to discuss the assumptions they contain), but because of conceptual problems that prevent them from yielding the grounds for plausible explanations.

Of course, this does not mean that research on programmatic congruence between voters and their representatives has to be discarded but simply that it is important to be aware of what it is possible to conclude on the basis of high, medium, and low levels of congruence, after having taken all the relevant methodological precautions. Luna and Zeichmeister (2010, p. 137) are right in warning about deductions based on averages without distinguishing the most important issues from others that are less important. Too much information is lost in such broad and aggregate analysis when population groups may reach as many as 1000 respondents and their answers are compared with those of much smaller groups. Without the necessary precautions, we may hastily conclude that high levels of congruence automatically imply high-quality democracies. Using data for 1998 (PELA and Latinobarómetro), Luna and Zeichmeister find that, in Latin America, “the countries with the highest levels of representation are Chile and Uruguay, followed by Argentina” (Luna and Zeichmeister 2010, p. 135). But how are we to understand and plausibly explain these high

levels of congruence in Chile and Uruguay, with their very different levels of disaffection, trust in institutions, and approval of the government?

Even accepting the 1998 data for Chile, which is confirmed by the survey carried out by the Diego Portales University in 2009 and the data we obtained in 2013, how can we reconcile this finding with the explosion of demonstrations seen in 2011? Is there not something counter-intuitive and even contradictory in the congruence recorded (controlling for the issues' importance) and the increase in protest activity in Chile?¹⁶ How can we explain the relative quality of democratic representation in Argentina in a context of extremely high perceptions of corruption (Pereyra 2013, and Fig. 1.7) and the always latent resurgence of the popular “all go home”




Fig. 1.7 Perceptions of corruption (Source: LAPOP 2012)

call? These inconsistencies cannot be addressed using methodological strategies alone. In this context, we cannot simply accept the assertion of Dalton (2014, p. 243) that “even if one cannot determine the direction of causal flow, the similarity of opinions between party voters and party elites is a meaningful measure of the democratic representation”.¹⁷ How can we account for these inconsistencies and identify the mechanisms (or set of mechanisms) that mediate between attitudes and behavior or, in other words, the logic of the agency involved?

In the answer we propose, we argue that, in congruence analyses, a superficial conception of representation prevails and that it is important to make this explicit. Why? Because, in many of these studies, we find a mechanical conception of representation in the sense that what is understood by representation is not very different from the logic of the mirror and what is reflected in it. Two examples serve to illustrate this.

In formal terms, the controversy lies in the way in which the notion of representation is operationalized. For Luna and Zeichmeister (2005, p. 396), it is “the extent to which political parties and their constituents have clear and consistent preferences over a set of relevant policy dimensions” (or what is termed mandate or issue representation). As these two authors correctly indicate, this type of representation captures “the degree of a party’s correspondence to the preferences of its constituency” (Luna and Zeichmeister 2005, p. 396). But what can we robustly conclude from high or low levels of congruence between Uruguay’s White Party, Argentina’s Justicialist Party (PJ) or Chile’s Christian Democrat Party (PDC) and their respective electorates? Does a high level of congruence allow us to assert that the representativity of these parties (a lateral concept that conveys the result of the relationship of representation or, in other words, its quality and scope) is substantial, stable and, possibly, optimum? Would it not also be necessary to ask how these parties’ voters experience congruence (or lack of congruence) in practice? Even when there is congruence between parties’ parliamentary representatives and their voters on relevant dimensions of policy and, assuming that all the methodological precautions about averages, average policymakers, average parliamentary seats, and average voters have been taken, are parties and their voters really talking about the same thing? In analysis of representation that is operational-

ized in this way, how can we introduce the possible weakening of ties between parties and their voters due to demographic changes in the electorate and in the social, generational, and political composition of parties' parliamentary representatives?

In the second example, we see that Dalton et al. (2011b, p. 23) argue that “studies of voter-party congruence and citizen-government congruence have found high levels of agreement – evidence that democracy works” but is this really so? Does this emphatic opinion not contain a tacit conception of representation as the reflection of voters' preferences by their representatives which can rapidly give rise to economic conceptions of representation, in this case as a state of market equilibrium between political supply and demand? These authors are right when they refer to the existence of “a dynamic relation between governments and voters” (Dalton et al. 2011b, p. 34) but are we really sure that congruence analyses capture the essential aspects of what happens in the heads and lives of citizens and of their representatives? Is there not an agency problem and a methodological ignorance of the mechanisms that permit the establishment of correspondence between what the different players think and do? Is it so clear that what governments and representatives represent are preferences to which they can respond fully as if satisfaction of citizens' interests depends on what the political elites do? As we will see in other chapters of this book, it is precisely these questions that permit enquiry about the existence of bias and distortions in the relationship of representation.

However, we also need to enquire about the distortions that occur between beliefs and practices, and, particularly, the factors that could cause such discrepancies. For example, returning to one of our case studies, we find high levels of programmatic congruence in Chile and yet distortions related to the balance of power in Congress could explain the apparently discordant behavior of the elites in relation to their voters. There is already abundant information in the literature about the complex intra-elite negotiation processes that have inhibited reformist authorities from progressing in the implementation of public policies that are in tune with their voters' preferences (Siavelis 2000).

CONCLUSIONS

This book proposes a two-stage analysis of malaise in representation, examining first its composition and then its expressions. As regards the composition of malaise, we have defined the three “D”s—disaffection,

distrust, and disapproval—while, in the case of its expressions, we have included participation in demonstrations, the signing of petitions to the authorities, and the presentation of complaints to some institution. Measurements are carried out using public opinion surveys in each of the three countries. The set of independent variables is inevitably very large. Malaise can be determined by people's age, their education, and their income but the effect of these variables will certainly have different coefficients in different countries as will also occur with other variables such as a respondent's place of residence (urban/rural), religion, or sex.

This analysis will allow us to identify the possible determinants of malaise in representation in three middle-income countries, without losing sight of the objective evidence in the form of macroeconomic indicators and the number of days of protest, political crises, or high-profile corruption cases. The idea, then, is not only to advance in identifying the factors that explain malaise but also their possible effects. In addition, we analyze elite–citizen congruence, applying identical questions to citizens and an important part of the parliamentary elite of each country, in order to examine the relationship between levels of congruence and the degree of malaise in and with democratic representation.

Of course, a complete explanation implies opening black boxes and interpreting the empirical findings in the light of a relationship of representation that it is not easy to understand. That is why we include a theoretical and conceptual discussion that deliberately seeks to increase the complexity of the explanation. Indeed, good practice of the social sciences, in any of their disciplines, is that which harmonizes and charts a course between the theoretical construction, the conceptual vocabulary, and the language of the data.

NOTES

1. According to the International Monetary Fund, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay had a PPP per capita income of US\$14,540, US\$14,363, and US\$12,642, respectively, in 2010, the highest in Latin America.
2. This is also concordant with the fact that these three countries head the list of countries in the Americas that view recipients of public assistance as lazy, a result that is suggestive and difficult to interpret but makes some sense in the light of the social policy

- regimes involved: Argentina (63.7 percent), Uruguay (57.5 percent), and Chile (54.5 percent) (Source: LAPOP, 2012, p. 35).
3. Chile and Uruguay, again along with Costa Rica, were considered the “Swiss” or “English” of Latin America until the 1970s (Fitzgibbon 1967; Johnson 1976) when relativization of these two adjectives began in the traumatic context of the Southern Cone’s bloody coups.
 4. In this context, Latin America’s political science agenda could emulate and adapt to a different cultural situation, the strategy tested for years by an author such as Johnston Conover in the United States, analyzing levels of acceptance of liberal as opposed to communitarist principles. For example, Johnston Conover and Searing (1994).
 5. This explains why the more ethnographic work of Gamson (1992) or Eliasoph (1998) is interesting. Powell (2004, p. 281) asks the same question about what could really be meant by a “party” for “voters in different districts within a country”.
 6. Classical sociology has always pondered this difficulty which is often forgotten due to contemporary positivist confidence in surveys and the act of asking questions: “this capacity to experience (*éprouver*) feelings I don’t really feel, this reconstitution of subjective states that is only possible in subjectivity and which, however, appear to this subjectivity as objective are the enigma of historical knowledge” (Simmel 1984, p. 89).
 7. Measured through the question “Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?” (LAPOP 2012) or that asked for years by Latinobarómetro (“With which of the following statements do you most agree? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; For people like me, it doesn’t matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime”).
 8. In order to be convinced of this, it suffices to consult any social sciences manual and see the absence of doxometric criteria for defining “legitimacy” that are common to more than one discipline. Then, if legitimacy consists in “rules, justifications based on societal beliefs and actions expressive of recognition or consent”

(Beetham 2001, p. 110), are these aspects understood in the same way across disciplines? How can we distinguish and explain what is “illegitimacy”, “legitimacy deficit”, or “delegitimacy” (Beetham 2001, p. 111) by recording attitudes without observing behavior when sociologists and political scientists do not have the same understanding of the concept?

9. Despite the existence of many analytical categories and abundant empirical literature, Offe takes the view that several lack theoretical precision, particularly that of “political disaffection” which he considers still “largely under-conceptualized” (Offe 2006, p. 25).
10. In this sense, the micro-mega rule of Colomer (2006, p. 223) under which “few large parties tend to prefer small assemblies, small constituencies and rules for assigning seats based on small quotas of votes” remains relevant with all it implies in terms of under-representation of important minorities and over-representation of relative majorities. (Similarly, see Colomer 2004, pp. 25–26.)
11. There is, in fact, literature about this back-stage in different fields (from social and gender policies to reforms of the judicial system and all types of sectorial transformations). The difficulty lies in the fact that this work is rarely incorporated systematically into the study of political representation and malaise in representation, revealing theoretical constructions that are only weakly or not at all unified.
12. For example, by relating trust in institutions with interpersonal trust which has its origins in societies’ stock of social capital (Putnam 1993, 2000) about which there is somewhat contradictory evidence or by analyzing the critical nature of the situations faced by countries (Dobry 1986).
13. For some authors, these new social movements differ from the “new” social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, with their originality lying in the qualitative nature of their demands which, in contrast to a certain rigidity seen in their 1960s equivalents, permits negotiations that contribute to their powerful capacity to bring about transformations in the political field and the political agendas of governments (Hamel and Maheu 2004).
14. In this sense, Chile’s reinforced presidential system and the much more “parliamentarized” presidentialism of Uruguay, both in unitary states, are not the same as Argentina’s presidentialism in a

federal state headed in the recent past by strong leaders such as Menem and Kirchner (Bernadou 2007) who personalized the institution of the presidency to the extent of destabilizing the meaning that history had slowly deposited in it (see Lacroix and Lagroye (1992, p. 11)). These authors remind us that the institution of the presidency is a result of “the sedimentation of prescriptions, practices, knowledge and beliefs” and that “each new contribution, far from simply adding to its predecessors, also modifies its structure and weight, cracks the ordering of its adjustment, partially calls into question [its] definitions”.

15. This question about different patterns in comparable countries is important, lacks a clear answer, and, in fact, goes far beyond the scope of congruence analysis. In a recent study, Rothstein (2009, p. 327, note 3) shows how two similar research projects in two almost identical countries (Denmark and Norway) produce very different results that are not explained only by differences in their recent history.
16. According to LAPOP 2012, 11.1 percent of Chileans had participated in protests during the previous 12 months as compared to 8.1 percent of Argentines and 7.6 percent of Uruguayans.
17. In another book, Dalton et al. (2011a, p. 155) were far more cautious, admitting that “congruence between voters and parties” may have changed and confessing that they were not sure about this since “party elites now know more about their potential voters and preferred policies” thanks to surveys as a result of which congruence could, in fact, be achieved through strategies of doxometric adjustment of what is offered to preferences, assuming that the latter have their origin in genuine convictions and beliefs on the part of representatives and in a certain authenticity of voters’ convictions and beliefs.

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PART I

Chile, a Chronic Malaise with
and Among Elites

Discontent, Collective Protest, and Social Movements in Chile

Nicolás M. Somma

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores relations between discontent, social movements, and collective protest in Chile. I define discontent broadly as a feeling of discomfort with some aspect of the world, a definition that encompasses dissatisfaction with one's personal economic situation or distrust in political authorities through to the perception of abuse by a powerful actor. By collective protest, I refer to any action between two or more people in a public setting that seeks to affect the social world, either by changing or preserving some aspect of it, through “non-institutional” tactics that may

Nicolás M. Somma is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and associate researcher at the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES, Chile). The author thanks the editors of this book and participants in the workshops in Montevideo (August 2013) and Santiago (May 2015) for their criticisms and suggestions. He also acknowledges the support of CONICYT Chile through COES (CONICYT-FONDAP 15130009) and the project “The diffusion of collective protest in Chile (2000–2012)” (CONICYT-FONDECYT Iniciación a la Investigación/11121147).

Nicolás M. Somma

Instituto de Sociología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile

range from signing a petition to marching in the street, blocking roads, or occupying private or public buildings (Meyer 2007; Taylor and Van Dyke 2007). Finally, social movements are networks of people that use protest tactics in a bid to change or preserve some aspect of society.

Relations between discontent, social movements, and protest are an old topic in the literature. During the past century and at least until the 1970s, scholars assumed that social mobilization was mainly shaped by generalized discontent arising from “social strains” or “social breakdown” (including a wide array of macrosocial phenomena such as industrialization, war, migration, economic crisis, and ethnic competition; for reviews, see McAdam 2010; Buechler 2000; Useem 1998). Absolute and relative deprivation theories, which can be respectively traced at least to Marx and Tocqueville, were very influential at that time. They stated that people protest when they feel dissatisfied with their social status or material conditions, either in absolute terms or relative to other groups (Gurney and Tierney 1982). In the 1970s, resource mobilization theorists made the point that social discontent was less important than assumed and that resources and opportunities were the key explanatory factors of collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). Then, in the 1980s, framing theorists brought grievances and discontent back in. Yet they noted that, for being consequential for social mobilization, grievances had to be interpreted in specific ways: through collective action frames that reinterpret individual ills as collective problems, attribute blame to an identifiable actor, and propose collective solutions (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000 for a review). In the 1990s, scholars such as Jaspers (1998, 2011) and Goodwin et al. (2000) complemented this perspective by bringing emotions to the fore and noting how they were direct triggers of action.

This chapter borrows much from the revisionist accounts of the role of discontent in collective protest developed by framing and emotions scholars. It also borrows from political economy and political science debates about how markets and political institutions create discontent. Specifically, the chapter presents three main claims. First, much collective protest and social movement activity in Chile is fueled by a specific kind of discontent that stems from the combination of a population aggrieved by the market society, political elites unable to reduce such grievances, and political institutions too rigid to incorporate groups willing to reform market structures. Second, although social movements and collective protest require some level of discontent if they are to thrive, there are many types

of discontent in Chile, not all of which are relevant in triggering protest. Third, over the last decade and a half, Chile has seen the emergence of a new “social movement sector” (McCarthy and Zald 1977) that plays a key role in transforming diffuse, inconsequential discontent into one that motivates people to engage in collective protest.

The chapter first describes how Chile’s market society creates grievances across different segments of the population and how these grievances cannot be effectively tempered by political elites due to their political orientations and existing institutional arrangements. It then goes on to argue that a recently reinvigorated social movement sector has been key for transforming diffuse discontent with markets and political elites into more finely tuned emotions and cognitions that can be effective triggers of collective action, a process in which the construction of collective action frames and their diffusion in micromobilization contexts and through the mass media played a crucial role. The last section uses survey data representative of most of Chile’s adult population to explore the implications of the previous sections at the individual level. It suggests that only those kinds of discontent that imply blame attribution to a specific actor or stem from abusive power relationships trigger protest behavior. Diffuse political and economic discontent do not do the trick.

HOW MARKETS GENERATE SOCIAL DISCONTENT

Much of the discontent that fuels collective action in contemporary Chile is related to the functioning of markets. Chile had a “state-centric” (Cavarozzi 1991) matrix until the 1970s when Pinochet created a market society that, in some respects, has since changed little. He implemented reforms in education, health, social security, telecommunications, water, gas, electricity, the labor market, foreign trade, mining, and land ownership (Castiglioni 2001; Silva 2009; Wormald and Brieba 2010). These reforms transferred attributions in the provision of welfare for the population from the state to private domestic or foreign firms. Unlike other cases in Latin America in which democratic restoration and market reforms occurred simultaneously, Chile’s market society was built during authoritarian times, making its potential social costs less of a concern for the political authorities.

If a market society is one where most people have to pay out of their own pockets for the goods and services required to satisfy most of their needs, then Chile—like many other Western countries—certainly qualifies

as such. For obtaining food, clothing, and electrical appliances as well as travel, leisure, and other services, Chileans can use a dense and increasing supply of private retail stores, supermarkets, restaurants, bars, travel agencies, and shopping malls. Similarly, although there is a network of free state schools, more and more families send their children to private schools for which they have to pay—either private schools partially subsidized by the state or more expensive non-subsidized schools. The fees charged by universities, whether private or public, are high and only a very few students obtain full scholarships. In the case of transportation, buses and (in Santiago) metro trains charge affordable prices, with subsidies for students and senior citizens. For retirement pensions, Chileans rely on private companies (AFPs) which retain and administer part of their wages. In the case of communications, Chileans purchase phone, internet, and TV cable plans from private companies and, of course, they have to pay for utilities—water, electricity, and gas—also supplied by private companies. The situation as regards health care is somewhat different since most people use the public system and, in the case of housing, the state provides subsidies to the middle classes as well as the poor. In other words, Chileans depend almost exclusively on markets for fulfilling many of their daily needs. They are surrounded by markets and routinely interact with them all day long.

As in any other capitalist country, Chilean markets often create discontent, doing so in at least four ways. The first three affect only those who directly interact with markets—such as consumers or workers who sell their labor for a wage—but the last one extends beyond these groups. In the description and examples below of how markets can create discontent, it is important to bear in mind that this does not imply that only markets and market societies create discontent. State provision of goods and services can also be very problematic and create discontent as shown extensively by former Soviet countries.

Firstly, markets create discontent when the goods or services they provide are too expensive. The most visible expression of collective action driven by expensive markets in Chile relates to education and student protests. Relative to people's incomes, Chile has one of the world's most expensive higher education systems. Many Chilean students and their families take out loans from the state and (until recently) private banks. Educational fees and interest rates are high and families that fall behind with payments face serious financial problems. Students may have to drop out but are still left burdened with the debt, with the risk of appearing in the registry of

defaulters and, therefore, being unable to obtain new loans. All this creates discomfort and uncertainty which, although it may not make people ready for collective action, provides a potentially fertile ground for it. Health care is another example of how high costs create discontent. Since 2005, the so-called Universal Access Plan of Explicit Guarantees (AUGE) plan has achieved significant advances in coverage of many medical conditions but is far from being a solution to all health needs and the cost of treatment for some chronic illnesses can ruin families. It was not until 2015 that the government presented a bill to create a public fund for expensive illnesses, spurred partly by a new movement of sick people and their relatives which has staged two marches in recent years.

Second, markets can also create discontent when they provide low-quality goods and services. Education again serves as an example. Although much of student protest stems from high fees, students also complain that many institutions provide low-quality education. Poor education, provided by institutions with dubious credentials, makes for uncertain hiring prospects, creating a segment of “educated unemployed” who often show up in the streets. In the telecommunications market, citizens often complain (albeit individually, not collectively) about the low quality of wireless signals or distorted TV images.¹ In the nutrition supplements markets, defective products may have tragic consequences. In 2012, many families sued a company that sold a nutritional supplement lacking an ingredient it was labeled as containing. Six individuals died, possibly because of this negligence,² and anger only increased when it was revealed that the company was aware of the missing ingredient but failed to withdraw the product from the market.

Third, markets create discontent when company managers and owners engage in practices perceived as unethical or illegal (or both). Much of the fuel for the student movement that erupted in 2011 came from the revelation that universities were not only charging high fees but also making a profit (which is illegal in Chile). In 2011, Chileans also learned that the La Polar department store chain had been renegotiating clients’ debts without their consent. In the last few years, cases of collusion have also been discovered among pharmacy chains (2008), poultry producers (2011), and tissue paper manufacturers (2015).

This situation is aggravated by the fact that much of Chileans’ increased consumption is credit-financed. A wide array of retail stores, banks, and state institutions provide credits and loans for consumption, housing, and education and, although easy credit provides immediate

gratification, the financial difficulties that may subsequently arise create uncertainty and anxiety.

Most of the examples presented above refer to consumer markets but the labor market may also be an important source of discontent. Real wages have increased since democratic restoration³ but many full-time workers still earn miserably low wages. Moreover, as revealed by the famous case of the trapped miners in 2010, working conditions can be deficient, especially in the manufacturing and construction sectors as well as mining, with companies often investing little in worker safety and well-being. This is aggravated by the weakness of the labor movement—only about 13 % of the labor force is unionized⁴—and by a labor code approved during the dictatorship, which allows firms to replace striking workers and does not allow negotiations between workers and companies beyond the company level.

In fourth place, markets can make people unhappy not only as consumers or workers but also as bystanders not explicitly engaged in market relations. Specifically, markets may hurt people by damaging their social and natural environments. The convenient conditions offered under Chile's regulatory framework have attracted firms (many of them foreign) that have made millionaire investments in exploiting the country's forests, rivers, mineral reserves, and fish stocks. As a result, many Chileans—from southern Mapuche communities to northern mining communities—have seen their air, water sources, and natural environments altered or destroyed. Companies have, moreover, often tried to divide communities that oppose their projects by offering cash or other material benefits, which creates even more discontent.

GOVERNMENTS DO NOT TEMPER MARKET DAMAGES

Chileans may feel aggrieved by market damages but this does not necessarily translate into protest since the political authorities can prevent protest by enacting policies that compensate for such damage and reduce discontent. However, Chilean authorities since 1990 have fallen short in this field (Borzutzky 2010). It would be unfair and incorrect to assert that democratic governments since 1990 have done nothing to reduce market damage. The AUGE health plan, social programs such as *Chile Solidario* for combating poverty, the pension system reform of 2008, and the maternity leave extension of 2011 represent important attempts to reduce commodification and provide well-being and security through state

policies (Pribble and Huber 2011). However, in many areas, Chileans' welfare has continued to depend decisively on the functioning of markets.

What has prevented the political elites from undertaking major reforms? Besides the specificities of each policy arena, I suggest two general reasons: either they lacked sufficient legislative support to tame markets, or they did not consider the market model was doing so badly.

Chile's current constitution, introduced during the authoritarian period (in 1980), requires high legislative thresholds for reforming many policy areas such as labor, education, and mining which, as seen above, are intimately linked to market damages. Moreover, once democracy was restored, the binominal electoral system allowed center-right parties to control about half of the Congress and, as their legislators tend to have pro-market attitudes, it was extremely difficult to reach the required thresholds. Only the 2013 elections, in which the center and leftist forces fared better than ever since 1990, created a unique opportunity for reforms which, at this time (November 2015), are facing significant hurdles.

In addition, post-transitional governments have not been very eager to reform some aspects of market society. After all, under this model, poverty diminished sharply, consumption boomed, inflation was contained, and real wages increased, all of which improved Chile's international image and, until the mid-2000s, provided social stability. This was accompanied by a moderation of the leftist attitudes of the elites of the center-left Concertación coalition. This is reflected in the (PELA) survey, which shows that the legislators of the (formerly very leftist) Socialist Party and those of the Party for Democracy became more favorable to privatization from 1993 onwards (Bargsted and Somma 2015: 9).

INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR ADDRESSING DISCONTENT

Markets may create discontent and governments may be unable to address it through substantial reforms, but this does not automatically lead to collective protest and social movement activity. Modern democracies often allow dissatisfied citizens to redress their grievances through institutional channels such as the creation of new parties that promote excluded demands or direct democracy mechanisms (DDM). In Chile, however, there are constraints on such channels.

The Chilean political system is not very good at incorporating new forces and demands. The binominal system—recently reformed but in force until the next 2017 elections—allows only two representatives in each electoral district (for deputies) or constituency (for senators). This makes it unlikely that parties outside the two main coalitions will obtain parliamentary representation. Indeed, it was not until 2005, 15 years after the restoration of democracy, that the first candidate from outside the two coalitions—Senator Carlos Bianchi, an independent—was returned to Congress. Although a few more independent candidates were elected in 2013, this implies that groups demanding structural reforms have few incentives to compete in elections.

Moreover, the Chilean constitution does not offer the citizenry a realistic possibility of resorting to DDM in order to address at the national level those demands not represented in Congress.⁵ Under the 1980 constitution, only the president of the Republic can call a national plebiscite and only under very specific circumstances—namely, when there is a disagreement between Congress and the executive on a constitutional reform proposal and two-thirds of representatives oppose the executive's position (Gonnet 2008: 8). This makes Chile one of the Latin American countries where implementation of DDM at the national level is most difficult (Altman et al. 2014; Barczak 2001; Altman 2005). It is no wonder then that no national plebiscite has taken place since democratic restoration in 1990 (Bronfman Vargas 2007: 244). Other DDM such as referendums are, moreover, not envisaged in the constitution. This prevents the citizenry from launching direct electoral initiatives without congressional support. Since 2000, the *Movimiento por la Consulta y los Derechos Ciudadanos* (Movement for Consultation and Citizen Rights) has called national plebiscites on issues such as education, taxes, and privatizations (Gonnet 2008: 10) but results were not binding. Between 1990 and 2012, the number of *local* plebiscites grew steadily (Altman et al. 2014; Bronfman Vargas 2007) but, by definition, could not address national-level demands.

Institutional obstacles to processing excluded demands help to explain why Chileans have become increasingly detached from political institutions and elites. Since democratic restoration, electoral turnout, institutional trust, and party identification have decreased systematically (Somma and Bargsted 2015; Bargsted and Maldonado 2015; Joignant 2012). Institutional ways for channeling discontent are quite rigid. This is where social movements enter the stage.

HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS TRANSLATE DIFFUSE DISCONTENT INTO COLLECTIVE ACTION

For Chile, the 1990s was a quiescent decade in terms of social movements and collective action. The Concertación governments of Presidents Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle gave high priority to avoiding an authoritarian reversal. Believing that heightened social mobilization would endanger the new democracy, they severed links between the government and organized civil society (Hipsher 1996; Garretón and Garretón 2010). However, discontent with damaging markets and unresponsive political elites soon provided fertile ground for collective action. From the end of the 1990s onwards, social movements started to become increasingly central actors in Chile. Key landmarks are the revitalization of Mapuche protests in 1997, the secondary student *pinguino* (penguin) movement of 2006, and the university student movement of 2011–2012. New organizations emerged and old ones were reshuffled. In a context of increasing prosperity and better educational levels, activists managed to mobilize resources not only from aggrieved communities but also from disparate bystanding populations.

This new “social movement sector” (McCarthy and Zald 1977) performed a central task for our purposes. It turned diffuse discontent with markets and political elites into specific grievances that could directly fuel protest. To this end, activists constructed powerful collective action frames that resonated across the population (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000 for a review of this concept). These frames emphasized how markets damaged the population and how political elites were falling short in preventing it. They revealed the silent suffering of many people, presented telling diagnostics about the seriousness of collective problems, and defined guidelines for action.

Let us briefly consider some examples. The student movement was important in revealing that higher education in Chile was among the most expensive in the world, that educational entrepreneurs were profiting at the expense of family budgets, and that national governments were unwilling to undertake structural reforms. Environmental organizations, both at the grassroots level and linked to international networks, presented scientific and testimonial evidence pointing to the health and environmental costs of the activities of forestry, energy, and mining companies. They also denounced the deficiencies of existing environmental institutions as not permitting the adequate participation of local communities in

the design of projects that affected them. Mapuche organizations became more conscious of how developmental projects were affecting their environment and lifestyles and denounced the organizations' criminalization and repression by police agents. People affected by chronic illnesses and their relatives became aware that the state was falling short in helping them to pay for expensive medicines and treatments, demanding the creation of a national fund to share these costs. Retired people realized that their pension savings accounts were much thinner than promised when the system was introduced and they blamed pension fund companies for profiting with their savings. Mortgage borrowers, organized in *ANDHA Chile* (National Association of Mortgage Debtors), protested against high interest rates and evictions. Of course, not all protest in Chile was fueled by market damages—for example, in the case of homosexual, pro- and anti-abortion, and regionalist organizations—but often accommodated these other demands within broader frames that criticized markets and political elites.

Activists spread collective action frames throughout multiple “micro-mobilization contexts” (Snow et al. 1980). These ranged from factories, schools, and universities, to mining communities in the north and Mapuche communities in the south; from citizen advocacy groups in large cities to neighborhood associations in small villages affected by developmental projects; from environmental festivals to informal homosexual networks and semi-clandestine anarchist communities. Yet it is important to note that much of the action took place outside formal organizations. Affiliation to voluntary organizations in Chile is very low and has systematically decreased since 1990 (Somma 2015). This has opened a space for the mass media and new communications technologies such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter, and cell phone messages (Millaleo and Velasco 2012; Valenzuela et al. 2012). These new technologies emancipated protest from face-to-face interactions, playing a central role in disseminating the evidence, arguments, images, and stories that made people think of their personal problems as collective problems needing collective solutions. Additionally, in part as a reaction to a political system seen as hierarchical, ossified, and undemocratic, movements turned to organizational styles that attempted to be more open, horizontal, and participative. Open assemblies and conversation tables emerged throughout the movement sector. Rotating spokespersons replaced long-standing leaders.

This energized social movement sector was quite successful in moving discontent on to the streets. As Somma and Medel (2017) show, from

the mid-2000s onwards, both the number of protest events in Chile and the estimated number of participants increased steeply for a wide array of demands linked to the education, the environment, indigenous peoples, and particular regions and localities.

Recent structural changes in Chilean society contributed indirectly to the successful dissemination of collective action frames and protest. For instance, the material prosperity of Chileans has increased dramatically in recent decades. Although income inequality did not recede, per capita gross domestic product has increased fivefold in the last 25 years and poverty rates have dropped to about one-third of their previous level,⁶ allowing more resources to be devoted to non-essential activities like collective action. Additionally, the number of higher education students in Chile increased fourfold between 1990 and 2010 and, today, about 1.2 million 18–24 year olds are enrolled in higher education (OECD 2012: 20). With flexible schedules and disposable time for mobilization activities, students meet regularly, establish informal ties, and create communication networks (McAdam 1986). In Chile, they swell the ranks not only of the student movement but also of environmental, animal rights, homosexual, and other movements. More education also means better cognitive capabilities for assimilating information about the social world, making articulated diagnostics, and attributing blame, all essential components of collective action frames. Market society contributed to protest not only via grievances but also via the provision of tangible and intangible mobilization resources.

And yet, as shown below, out of the 17 million Chileans, only a minority has engaged in collective action. Why do some people protest while others do not? If the argument presented here is correct, we should find protest to be more common among those who seem to have incorporated social movement frames to a greater extent than the rest. The next section addresses this issue.

SOCIAL DISCONTENT AND PROTEST ACTIVITIES: SURVEY DATA

This section further explores relations between discontent and social mobilization using data from a survey carried out in Chile in 2013 within the framework of this broader comparative project.⁷ The discussion above suggests that discontent with markets and political elites fuels collective action but that not all kinds of discontent are equally relevant. People

with merely diffuse discontent with markets and politics may not have internalized the collective action frames constructed and disseminated by social movements or other organized groups. They may not interpret their suffering as an unfair and afflictive situation or blame specific social actors. They may have difficulty in understanding their private problems as collective problems requiring collective solutions. Ultimately, they may not be ready to join collective action. Thus, I expect strong and positive statistical relationships between discontent and protest but only for those kinds of discontent that seem to reflect collective action frames. I expect positive but weaker (perhaps insignificant) relationships between generalized discontent and protest.

The survey provides an excellent opportunity for exploring these issues because it contains several questions about recent participation in protest activities as well as a wide array of questions about discontent. Regarding protest participation, it asks whether the respondent has engaged in the following three activities during the previous 12 months: participating in public demonstrations, signing a petition to authorities, or making a complaint or comment to some institution. As discussed in the Introduction to this book, these are the three behavioral expressions of “malaise in representation” according to the guiding framework of this broader comparative project.

The survey also provides measures of different kinds of discontent. First, in order to assess feelings of absolute deprivation in different life domains, I include measures of respondents’ satisfaction with their health, family, economic situation, and life in general, all on a scale of 0 (totally dissatisfied) to 10 (totally satisfied). According to absolute deprivation theory, less satisfied people should protest more because they may see collective action as a way of improving their life conditions. In Chile, part of this dissatisfaction may stem from problems with markets and political elites that spill over into areas such as family, health, economic situation, and overall satisfaction. Second, in order to measure relative economic deprivation, I use the question: “If you compare your family income with that of other Chilean families, how many families do you believe would have higher incomes than yours?” I use a dummy variable in which 1 = “less than half or a few families” and 0 = “half or more than half of families”. Based on relative deprivation theory, those who see themselves as below half or more families should protest more than those who feel better off.

Following the framework of this project, I include three attitudinal measures of malaise in representation that refer directly to political dis-

content: distrust in political institutions, disapproval of the president, and disaffection from political coalitions. If discontent with institutional politics fuels protest, then those who trust institutions less, disapprove of the president's performance, and do not feel attached to political coalitions should protest more (in any of its three manifestations) than those who trust, approve, and feel attached. To measure trust in political institutions, I use the question "How much do you trust the following institutions?", considering trust in the government, political parties, the upper chamber, the lower chamber, and the municipal government on a scale from 5 (minimum trust) to 20 (maximum trust; Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.80$). For presidential disapproval, I use the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Sebastián Piñera is performing as president of the Republic?", with "approves", "disapproves", and "don't know/no answer" as the possible answers. In regression models, I include "approves" and "don't know/no answer", with "disapproves" as the reference category. Finally, for measuring disaffection with political parties, I use the question "Which of the following political coalitions best represents your interests, beliefs, or values?" The possible answers are "Coalición por el Cambio (Alianza por Chile)", "Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia", "none", and "don't know/no answer". I include identification with each of the two coalitions as dummy variables. The reference category includes both "none" and "DK/NA".

Finally, since discontent in Chile often arises from the abuse of vulnerable people by powerful political or economic actors, I consider two dummy variables to capture such experiences. The first differentiates those who report having been a victim of "power abuses" during the previous year (value 1) from those who did not (0) while the second distinguishes between those who know somebody who has been a victim of such abuses (1) from those who do not (0). I expect that those who have been abused or know some victim of abuse will be more likely to protest than others. In the Chilean context, "power abuses" often mean having been damaged, humiliated, or exploited by the authorities, companies, or other powerful entities or persons. Social movements often frame their messages in terms of abuses and this discontent should boost protest. Note that a person who recognizes an abuse is generally able to identify the perpetrator. Moreover, almost by definition, abuses have a component of unfairness or injustice and feelings of unfairness or injustice are assumed to be powerful triggers of protest (e.g., Jasper 1998, 2011). Power abuses produce a discontent that is more specific and self-conscious and, therefore, more

likely to prompt collective action than diffuse discontent. I also include additional individual attributes that, according to past research in other contexts, are important predictors of protest participation (Schussman and Soule 2005): gender, age, education, political engagement, and organizational membership.

Since the three dependent variables are dummy variables, I use binary logistic regression (Long 1997), running ten models in which I include one discontent variable at a time plus all the control variables. There were no collinearity problems in any of the models. Table 2.1 summarizes the results (full results are available upon request), showing the three dependent variables in the columns and each independent discontent variable in the rows. The corresponding model (from 1 to 10) is shown in the far left column. In the cells, “n/s” means that the association was non-significant at the 0.05 level. For significant associations, the cells report the sign (positive or negative) and the significance level (with conventional significance asterisks). It goes without saying that these models cannot reveal a causal relationship pointing from discontent to protest but they do permit analysis at the individual level of the empirical implications of the macro-level arguments presented above.

The first global finding that readily emerges from Table 2.1 is that, after controlling for several predictors of protest participation, the associations between discontent and protest tend to be non-significant. Out of the 36 associations (12 discontent measures \times 3 protest measures), only 7 are significant. This is broadly consistent with a sizable international literature on protest and social movements which suggests that grievances and discontent do not play a major role in this respect and that other attributes (considered in the control variables) are more important (e.g., McAdam 1986; Schussman and Soule 2005; Snow et al. 1980). Similarly, none of the 15 associations involving absolute or relative deprivation measures are significant. At odds with absolute deprivation theory, people who are less satisfied with their economic situation, health, family, and life in general do not protest more and, at odds with relative deprivation theory, those feeling economically deprived compared to other Chilean families do not protest more. People are not moved into action by dissatisfaction with their personal situation alone.

Another important finding relates to the lack of statistical significance of most of the explicitly political measures of discontent. People who trust political institutions less do not protest more and those who do not feel represented by the two large political coalitions (the Concertación and the Alianza) are not more likely to protest than those who do feel represented

Table 2.1 Sign and significance level of associations between discontent and protest (binary logistic regression models)

<i>Model #</i>	<i>Dimension of discontent</i>	<i>Indicator of discontent (introduced as independent variable)</i>	<i>Dependent variables</i>		
			<i>Petitioned</i>	<i>Demonstrated</i>	<i>Complained to institutions</i>
1	Absolute deprivation	Satisfaction with life (global)	n/s	n/s	n/s
2		Satisfaction with health	n/s	n/s	n/s
3		Satisfaction with family	n/s	n/s	n/s
4		Satisfaction with economic situation	n/s	n/s	n/s
5	Relative deprivation	Economic perceptions: upper half of Chilean families	n/s	n/s	n/s
6	Political distrust	Trust in political institutions	n/s	n/s	n/s
7	Party disaffection	Identifies with Alianza (vs. none)	n/s	n/s	n/s
7		Identifies with Concertación (vs. none)	n/s	n/s	n/s
8	Presidential disapproval	Approves Piñera's govt (vs. disapproves)	n/s	-**	n/s
8		DK/NA (vs. disapproves Piñera's govt)	n/s	-**	n/s
9	Power abuses	Victim of power abuse	n/s	+***	+***
10		Knows others who were abused	+	+	+***

Notes: All models control for age, gender, education, political engagement, and organizational membership. Independent variables were introduced one by one. The number of valid observations ranges across models between $N = 1039$ and $N = 1176$

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

by them. Political distrust and detachment do not seem to move people to action. Disapproval of President Piñera's performance does, however, make a difference: those who disapprove of it are more likely to participate in street demonstrations than those who approve or those who do not

have or do not report an opinion. There is, however, no difference for signing a petition or complaining to institutions.

Why would presidential disapproval make a difference for demonstrating while distrust and detachment do not? People who disapprove of the president have a clear target that can be blamed for the country's problems, especially in Chile where the president has very extensive powers. Not all demonstrations are directed at the president or even the national government but a majority are (Medel and Somma 2016). By contrast, distrust in political institutions or detachment from political coalitions do not provide such a neat focus of protest since they are abstract entities, making it more difficult to send them messages through protest or to make them accountable for social evils. Diffuse political discontent, by itself, does not move to action.

The lack of significance of most variables reviewed so far is in sharp contrast to the results for the two measures of power abuse. As Table 2.1 shows, those who reported having been victims of power abuse in the previous year are significantly more likely to have demonstrated in the streets or have presented complaints to institutions than those who did not feel abused. Likewise, those who reported knowing others who had been abused by more powerful persons or entities are significantly more likely than others to have engaged in the three protest behaviors. Recall that these results hold after controlling for other powerful predictors such as education and political engagement (discussed below).

These last results resonate with the sources of discontent in Chile discussed above. People became aggrieved and enraged when they feel that powerful companies and politicians take advantage of their weakness. Companies abuse people in their role as consumers through expensive and defective services, in their role as workers through inadequate wages and uncertain working conditions, and in their role as bystanders not explicitly engaged in market relations as, for example, in the case of the residents of a community that is polluted by a nearby plant owned by a big company. Additionally, people often see politicians as unable or incapable of protecting them from market damages. Even worse, politicians often appear as illegally profiting from market dynamics as suggested by the scandals relating to illegal financing of political campaigns that shocked Chile during 2015. The negative emotions derived from feeling oneself the victim of an abuse or seeing others being abused prompt people to demonstrate, sign petitions, and present complaints on varied issues.

Social movements play a key role in the construction of such emotions. They provide the collective action frames that facilitate the interpretation of such situations not only as personal problems but also as collective problems requiring collective action. The media also play a role (yet to be explored) by reporting activists' claims and discourses and by presenting shocking images that move to action (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). It is not simple economic dissatisfaction or diffuse political discontent that move people to action but a more complex process of feeling abused, blaming a president, a politician, or a company, realizing that other people share the same grievances, and believing that collective action may provide a solution.

It is also important to consider the results regarding the control variables. Political engagement and organizational membership are the two most potent and robust predictors of protest, with positive and significant associations for the three protest behaviors considered. Younger people also demonstrate more and present more complaints than older people and people with more education present more complaints than less educated people. Interestingly, the models suggest that the effect of education is mediated through political engagement which seems a more proximate trigger of protest. There are no significant differences between men and women.

CONCLUSIONS

Discontent has always been a prime candidate for explaining social mobilization but decades of research have shown that the relationship is not a simple one. In Chile, the functioning of markets and the incapacity or unwillingness of the political elites to temper market damages create discontent but this translates into mobilization only if people can interpret their suffering or discomfort in specific ways. Social movements are crucial in that respect because they craft and spread collective action frames that blame identifiable human actors, reveal the structural roots of private or personal problems, and create a sense of efficacy that motivates collective action. The robust statistical associations between, on the one hand, having experienced or perceived power abuses and, on the other, different protest behaviors lend support to this interpretation. Social movements, with the help of the media, emphasize the abusive practices of those holding power positions in the economic and political system and encourage people to act collectively. Thus, movements not only react to discontent

but also reshape it. Diffuse dissatisfaction with political elites and institutions, as well as with one's personal situation in several life domains, is too indeterminate in that respect. It seems that only a very tiny fraction of the discontent experienced by Chileans is expressed in protest actions.

I have emphasized the role of markets because, in a very commodified society like contemporary Chile, mobilization can often be traced to market damages. However, this is not the case for all movements. Regionalist protests often react to the concentration of political and administrative power in the central government, a situation that long predates the market reforms of the 1970s and can be traced back to the origins of Chile as an independent republic. Homosexual movements react to cultural conservatism and obsolete legislation, not to market damages. Although much Mapuche mobilization has to do with market damages, its roots go back to colonial times. It is impossible to disentangle how much "fuel" comes from markets and how much comes from other sources. And, of course, Chilean markets were not an invention of Pinochet.

Although this chapter has focused on discontent, it is important to note that markets contribute to mobilization not only via market grievances. They also do so via the creation of a critical mass of citizens who regularly interact with them and who obtain from them the resources and skills needed to protest. Thus, educational expansion means more students who can eventually coalesce in powerful movements—a critical mass—and the cognitive abilities and self-confidence they obtain after years of study end up contributing to the protest that blames the educational institutions from which they obtained these very skills. This "circularity" of protest in market societies merits more exploration. It is analogous to Pierson's (1995) notion that the welfare state creates the political constituencies that shape its future development. The same could also be said about political actors and institutions. Although political authorities are commonly blamed for not reducing market damages and even for aggravating them, democratic political institutions also provide the civil freedoms and associational spaces that facilitate mobilization (Silva 2009; Tarrow 1994).

Finally, it goes without saying that Chile is not peculiar in that many of its citizens depend heavily on markets for fulfilling many of their needs. This is also the case in the rest of the region (and much of the world). However, Chile is different in some respects from Argentina and Uruguay, the two other cases studied in this book (in Chaps. 10 and 6 by Pereyra, and Bidegain and Tricot, respectively). As noted above, market reforms took place earlier in Chile and under an authoritarian regime and market

failures seem to play a greater role in motivating collective action. Finally, while the labor movement is a major actor in staging collective action in Argentina and Uruguay, in Chile the student movement as well as environmental and indigenous organizations seem particularly relevant. A systematic comparison of the social movement sectors of the three countries is the next step for advancing our knowledge in this field.

NOTES

1. See for instance <http://www.sernac.cl/sernac-y-subtel-dan-a-conocer-ranking-de-reclamos-en-el-mercado-de-las-telecomunicaciones/>.
2. See for instance http://www.rpp.com.pe/2012-07-01-chile-condenas-por-suplemento-alimenticio-que-mato-a-6-personas-noticia_497386.html.
3. See <http://www.elmostradormercados.cl/grafico/la-real-evolucion-del-salario-minimo-en-parte-de-la-historia-chilena/>.
4. See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN.
5. Altman et al. (2014) define DDM as political institutions through which citizens can decide about specific issues through voting processes that are not part of the regular election of authorities.
6. Statistics are available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/chile>.
7. With a probabilistic sample and a sample size of 1200, the survey represents 85 % of the urban population and 74 % of the national population aged 18 or over.

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Malaise and Democracy in Chile

Carolina Segovia

INTRODUCTION

How much malaise is there in Chile today? Some recent data suggests that a great deal. In 2011, for example, 240 marches were authorized in Santiago alone, representing the highest level of citizen mobilization seen since the early 1990s (Segovia and Gamboa 2012). The number of people estimated to have participated in protest activities in 2011 was, indeed, close to the sum of all those who did so in 2009–2010 and 2012–2013 (UNDP 2014: 257). In the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2013, only 49.35 percent of those eligible to vote did so and, in the second round of the presidential election, this dropped to 41.98 percent (www.servel.cl). There has also been a clear decline in trust in the country's principal institutions. This is seen, for example, in the opinion survey carried out in April 2015 by the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), a Santiago-based think tank, which found that a mere 3 percent of Chileans reported having “a lot” or “quite a lot” of trust in the political parties (www.cepchile.cl).

Carolina Segovia is Associate Professor of Political Science at Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. I would like to thank the participants in the seminar “Making Democracy Count: A Southern Perspective”, which took place in the Universidad Diego Portales on July 1–2, 2015, for their comments on previous versions of this chapter. I would also like to acknowledge the support of Iniciativa Científica Milenio (ICM) through grant Nucleo Milenio Desafíos a la Representación (NS 130008).

C. Segovia (✉)
Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile

However, as will be shown below, indicators like distrust of the political system have long been a feature of Chile and, rather than indicating a sudden crisis, reflect the sustained change in Chileans' attitudes that has taken place over the past 20 years.

This combination of increased participation in political protests and a drop in election turnout, together with the levels of trust reported by Chileans, has triggered important public debate about what is happening, the causes of this malaise and where these processes could lead. In this chapter, we address these questions, seeking firstly to provide an evidence-based diagnosis of how much malaise actually exists in Chilean society and the ways in which it is being expressed. Secondly, the chapter seeks to analyze the determinants that, at the level of individuals, are behind these indicators in order, thirdly, to look at the possible consequences for Chilean democracy.

As seen in other chapters of this book, these questions can be addressed using different theoretical and methodological approaches. Here, we will evaluate the levels of malaise, its causes, and consequences from the standpoint of attitudes and behaviors as reported by citizens. To this end, we use the opinion survey carried out in the first half of 2013 as part of the project financed by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) as well as other freely available sources of information about public opinion.

The first section of this chapter discusses different theories and hypotheses about the determinants of malaise and political protest activities; doing so only briefly since an important part of the theoretical discussion is covered in Chap. 1 by Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes. The second section goes on to describe the study's methodological characteristics and the third to present and discuss the results obtained. Finally, in the last section, we present our conclusions.

DETERMINANTS OF MALAISE

The chapter by Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes contains an extensive theoretical discussion of the concept of malaise in representation, the ways in which this may be expressed, and how it can be measured. Based on this conceptual framework, we review the main theories and hypotheses that have been developed to explain malaise, paying particular attention to the individual factors that lead to the expression of different levels of support, trust, and participation on the part of citizens.

According to Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes (Chap. 1), malaise should be understood as comprising two dimensions: one that is attitudinal and




Fig. 3.1 The dimensions of malaise (*Source:* Own preparation based on Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes)

is seen in distrust, disaffection, and disapproval and one that is behavioral and is measured as citizen participation in protest activities such as attending demonstrations, signing petitions, or complaining to the authorities. Since they both represent malaise, these two dimensions should be positively related, although they may differ in magnitude. As indicated by the authors of Chap. 1, “any protest behavior assumes the presence of malaise but the subjective presence of malaise does not always imply public and objective expressions of this malaise” (p. 27). This can be illustrated graphically as shown in Fig. 3.1.

This conceptualization of malaise—and the corresponding method of measuring it—assumes, therefore, that attitudes like distrust or disaffection will lead certain people to express it by participating in public demonstrations or signing petitions. This has, however, been strongly questioned in the literature (e.g., Barnes et al. 1979; Dalton and Shin 2014) and is, therefore, empirically tested below. For the time being, we take it as a working hypothesis that must be analyzed in the light of the evidence available for the case of Chile.

The Causes of Malaise: Explaining Distrust, Disaffection, and Disapproval

In general terms, we can distinguish between theories that focus on the effects of political culture, perceptions of the economy, people’s level of politicization, and the perceived levels of corruption.

The impact of the political culture on levels of support for democracy and its institutions has been examined by two lines of research. On the one hand, there is that based on theories of modernization which argues that these processes—which are reflected in economic and political changes—lead to cultural changes among citizens whose values shift from ones that are predominantly materialist—centering on matters of physical and social safety—to ones that are postmaterialist and center on expression and quality of life. According to Inglehart (1997, 1999), the appearance and development of postmaterialist citizens will result in a drop in trust in public institutions since these citizens are more skeptical about traditional forms of authority and more prone to reject them. According to this theory, we should expect less malaise in representation among those who prioritize materialist values—related to order and physical and economic security—than those who prioritize postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1997, 1999; Dalton 1999, 2000).

A second line of research on the effects of political culture has focused on the relationship between social capital—interpersonal trust and participation in secondary organizations—and political trust (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993, 1995). In particular, this research suggests that there is a relationship between interpersonal and political trust or, in other words, that political trust will be greater among those who show a higher level of interpersonal trust (Della Porta 2000; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Levi 1998). The evidence is less clear in the case of participation in secondary organizations, although the expectation is that greater participation would generate higher levels of political trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Putnam 2000; Hall 2002).

A second set of theories argues that malaise is related to the characteristics of a country's institutional design due to its influence on political actors' behavior, making this more predictable. The rules and norms that are at the basis of the institutional design would, in other words, increase citizens' trust in them (North and Weingast 1989; Levi 1998; Jackman and Miller 1996). This research has not offered clear answers to the question of what institutions would generate greater trust (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999, 2011; Anderson 1998; Weil 1989), but it can be expected that it will depend on the way these institutions determine who are the winners and the losers in the political system and how fair the procedures used in these processes are perceived to be (Anderson et al. 2005). In this same line of argument, we also find those hypotheses that suggest that malaise may increase with corruption or with citizens'

perceptions of corruption (Seligson 2002; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pharr 2000; Mishler and Rose 2001).

A third set of theories asserts that malaise is a function of governments' economic performance. Since this is something on which voters generally evaluate a government, they will trust institutions and approve of governments to the extent that the economy is working well (Alesina and Wacziarg 2000; Clarke et al. 1993; Cusack 1999). In particular, the research that has focused on the impact of perceptions of the economic situation on malaise is consistent in showing a relationship that is significant in terms of the magnitude of the effect (Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Levi 1998; Holmberg 1999; Espinal et al. 2006). Malaise would, in other words, be higher among those with a negative perception of the country's economic situation.

Finally, there are hypotheses about the impact on the different forms of malaise of the level of engagement with the political system (Burns et al. 1997). This can be measured in terms of the frequency with which citizens talk about politics, their interest in news in the media and their level of political knowledge (Mondak et al. 2007; Converse 1964, 2000; Galston 2001). It has been observed that malaise is, in general, greater among those with less commitment to the political system.

Determinants of Participation in Political Protest

On the reasons why citizens participate in protest activities (Jakobsen and Listhaug 2014), there are two important sources or bases for discussion: those developed in the work of Verba and his colleagues (Verba et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 2012) and the work of Barnes et al. (1979), who argue that participation in protests is just one more form of political participation and, therefore, has the same determinants as more conventional forms of participation such as voting in elections.

Participation in protest activities would, therefore, be explained by the resources that citizens have at their disposal (principally, their educational level and income), with a higher level of education and income implying greater participation. Secondly, participation would be related to people's general attitudes toward the political system, measured principally as interest in and knowledge of politics (Brady 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Klesner 2007; Segovia 2011), with participation increasing with interest and knowledge.

In the particular case of protest activities, it has also been suggested that they are favored by younger people, who have a higher rate of participation in them than older people. In addition, a greater prevalence of values related to freedom—as opposed to order—and a greater importance given by people to citizen involvement in decision-making would lead to greater participation in protest activities (Jacobsen and Listhaug 2014).

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

In order to measure and evaluate malaise in representation in Chile, we use data from the survey carried out as part of the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile and, Uruguay”, financed by the IDRC. The survey was conducted between March 4 and April 3, 2013, and interviewed a random probability sample of 1200 people aged 18 or over living in urban areas of the country. In addition to this data, we use data from the surveys carried out by the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) (www.encuestaudp.cl) and the World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

As discussed in Chap. 1, malaise in representation is examined here from a two-fold perspective, measuring both attitudes such as distrust, disaffection, and disapproval and participation in protest activities (attending a demonstration, signing a petition, and complaining to the authorities).

Malaise in representation at the attitudinal level is measured as distrust of the country’s principal institutions (government, Senate, Chamber of Representatives, political parties, and municipal governments), disapproval of the work of the president, and the disaffection expressed toward political parties (measured as not identifying with any of them). At the behavioral level, it is measured as participation in the following activities during the previous year: attending a demonstration, signing a petition, and presenting a complaint to some institution. Details of the construction of these scales can be found in Chap. 1.

For the analysis of the consequences of malaise, we also construct an index that measures support for democracy and satisfaction with its functioning. This allows us to establish a typology, widely used in the literature, which distinguishes between satisfied and dissatisfied democrats and autocrats. In this way, we are able to identify the types of citizens among whom attitudinal malaise and participation in protests are greater, which will, in turn, enable us to advance in discussion of the consequences of malaise.

In the case of the independent variables used in analyzing the determinants of malaise, we distinguish between the following types of factors related to the principal hypotheses put forward by the literature in these fields of research: evaluation of the economic situation, perceptions of corruption, level of engagement with politics (politicization, knowledge, and interest), social capital, and general values as regards the role of governments. In addition, we include variables that measure the principal demographic characteristics of the people surveyed.

Details of the construction of each of these indices and the variables used in the analysis described in this chapter can be found in the Appendix (Tables 3.4 and 3.5).

RESULTS

In our analysis of the results obtained about the characteristics of malaise in Chile, its causes, and the possible consequences for democracy, we begin by reviewing both trends in malaise over time and comparative data for other countries. Using data for 2013, we then evaluate for the Chilean case the relationship between the attitudinal dimension of malaise and participation in protest activities, before going on to analyze the causes or determinants of malaise and participation and, finally, to analyze the relationship between malaise and support for democracy.

Trends in Malaise

Although recent data on malaise in Chile show high levels of distrust of institutions and disaffection with political parties, accompanied by high levels of disapproval of the president (CEP Survey, April 2015), it is important to look at how these indicators have evolved over time.

Figure 3.2 shows the indicators of distrust, disaffection, and disapproval as well as the average indicator of malaise from 2005 to 2014, obtained from analysis of the results of the UDP National Surveys (www.encuestaudp.cl). Two elements stand out here: except for disapproval of the president, malaise was high throughout this period, and it is in disapproval of the president that we see the widest year-to-year fluctuations, while, in all the other indicators, the changes are less dramatic.

Indeed, both distrust of institutions and disaffection with political parties remained relatively high throughout the period. Nonetheless, they show a clear, albeit only gradual, upward trend. In 2005, distrust of insti-




Fig. 3.2 Malaise in Chile, 2005–2014 (*Source:* UDP National Surveys, 2005–2014. Available at www.encuestaudp.cl)

tutions was running at 67 percent but, in 2014, reached 74 percent, an increase of seven percentage points. Similarly, the percentage of people who do not identify with any political party (disaffection) rose from 53 percent in 2005 to 78 percent in 2014.

In addition, we find large fluctuations in disapproval of the president from one year to the next. Given that this survey question, unlike others, captures short-term effects related to the president’s performance, this was only to be expected. In Michelle Bachelet’s first government, for example, disapproval ranges from a low of 11 percent in 2009 to a peak of 50 percent in 2007, while, in the case of the government of Sebastián Piñera, it ranges from 34 percent in 2010 to 63 percent in 2011.

In summary, the evolution of attitudinal indicators of malaise in Chile shows that this has increased, albeit gradually, during the period studied. As will be seen below, this may be important in that it appears to be a central characteristic of the Chilean process; it is not a problem that occurs and “blows up” from one moment to another but a process of a gradual accumulation of malaise.

In addition, we compare Chile to other countries in order to address the important questions of how “serious” malaise in Chile relative to other countries and how similar or different the trends are. For this purpose, we use data from the World Values Survey for 1990 through to 2014

for distrust since the indicator of distrust used there is constructed in the same way as that used in this book and includes trust or distrust of political parties, Congress, and the government (but not municipal or local governments).

Table 3.1 shows the average distrust index in those countries for which it could be calculated between 1990–1994 or 1995–1998 (the starting point) and 2010–2014. In total, we have data for distrust of institutions for 32 countries.

As seen in the table, levels of distrust of institutions are mostly high. Indeed, it could be concluded that, since 1990, the norm has been that citizens distrust institutions across countries with different, economic, and cultural traditions.

In 21 of these 32 countries, there was, moreover, a significant change in levels of distrust between the 1990s and 2010–2014 and, in 15 of these countries, including Chile, this took the form of an increase. In the specific case of Chile, the data show that distrust was low at the beginning of the 1990s which is in line with other data for a time when expectations and trust in the restoration of democracy were running at high levels. By 2010, distrust had, however, reached a high level (67 percent) and was above the average for all the countries included in this measurement.

In other words, the data reveal an increase in distrust in Chile such that it moves to among the top places in the table. But Chile was not alone; a statistically significant increase in distrust was also seen in another 14 countries.

Relationship Between Attitudinal and Behavioral Dimensions of Malaise

As indicated above, the study takes the hypothesis, put forward by Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes (Chap. 1), that malaise has two forms of expression: an attitudinal form, which comprises attitudes such as distrust of institutions, disaffection with political parties, and disapproval of the president's performance, and a behavioral form that is seen in the participation of individuals in different types of political protest activities such as attending demonstrations, signing petitions, or complaining to the authorities. Given that, according to the authors, these attitudes and behaviors are different dimensions of the same concept, we can expect to find, firstly, a relationship among the different indicators used in each dimension and, secondly, a positive relationship between the two dimensions (Fig. 3.1).

Table 3.1 Distrust of political institutions, 1990–2014

	1990–1994	1995–1998	1999–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014	Variation ^a
Poland	32.3	62.2		72.3	72.3	39.9*
Chile	42.0	59.4	58.2	65.2	67.3	25.3*
Slovenia		64.0		68.5	78.7	14.7*
South Africa	40.8	41.2	44.8	42.9	54.6	13.9*
Taiwan		48.9		71.0	60.2	11.4*
Peru		67.8	69.3	77.4	76.4	8.7*
Ukraine		62.1		68.5	70.0	7.9*
Russian Federation	53.6	68.9		63.7	60.3	6.6*
Spain	60.0	63.7	55.9	55.2	66.4	6.3*
Azerbaijan		35.7			41.6	6.0*
Romania		70.0		71.1	75.1	5.1*
Georgia		59.3		66.0	64.3	5.0*
Japan	59.4	62.7	65.1	64.6	63.9	4.5*
Nigeria	55.4	65.8	52.0		59.0	3.6*
United States		60.7	58.2	61.6	64.2	3.5*
Mexico	64.4	58.6	66.4	64.6	67.0	2.6
Turkey	47.2	56.8	60.7	48.2	49.2	2.1
Australia		63.2		60.2	63.9	0.7
India	47.6	48.1	51.8	46.9	48.3	0.6
Philippines		46.7	47.8		46.7	-0.1
Brazil	73.0			66.4	72.7	-0.2
South Korea	60.0	59.0	69.6	61.7	59.5	-0.5
Armenia		66.7			66.1	-0.6
China	26.8		23.9	25.0	25.7	-1.1
Estonia		58.4			57.3	-1.1
Colombia		71.6		64.1	69.0	-2.7
Uruguay		59.1		53.9	55.5	-3.6*
Argentina	72.5	73.0	75.7	70.7	66.8	-5.6*
Sweden		55.9		53.3	48.8	-7.1*
Belarus	63.3	62.0			52.4	-10.9*
Germany		66.8		68.6	55.9	-10.9*
New Zealand		71.4		59.6	56.7	-14.7*
Average	53.2	60.3	57.1	61.2	60.5	3.4

Source: World Values Survey Association (2015).

Figures for countries are averages. The index ranges from 0 (total trust in political parties, Congress, and government) to 100 (total distrust)

^aVariation in percentage points between the latest measurement (2010–2014) and the first one (depending on the data available for each country). Positive numbers indicate an increase in distrust and negative numbers a decrease

* $p < 0.050$

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics: malaise in Chile, 2013

	<i>Average</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>N</i>
Distrust	73.88	17.86	0	100	1186
Disaffection	70.26	45.73	0	100	1200
Disapproval	49.28	50.02	0	100	1200
<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>64.39</i>	<i>24.37</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1200</i>
Demonstrations	8.46	27.85	0	100	1200
Petitions	6.11	23.96	0	100	1200
Complaints	6.98	25.49	0	100	1200
<i>Participation</i>	<i>7.18</i>	<i>19.53</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1200</i>

Source: UDP-IDRC (2013).

We evaluate these hypotheses using the 2013 survey for Chile. Table 3.2 shows the values obtained for each of the different measures proposed in order to assess malaise in Chile. In the case of attitudinal malaise, we find that this is most strongly expressed in distrust of institutions and disaffection with political parties. On a scale where 0 represents no malaise and 100 represents a great deal of malaise, the averages observed (73.88 for distrust and 70.26 for disaffection) are high and well above that for disapproval of the president (49.28).

On the other hand, we find that Chileans have a low level of participation in protest activities. This result is in line with those of other studies which, in general, confirm that Chileans do not participate actively in society. It is also important to note that the level of participation is quite similar for all three types of protest, indicating that there is not one particular form of expression or political participation that Chileans prefer above others.

This first analysis, therefore, provides evidence that attitudinal malaise and its expression in behavior are not equivalent in Chile in terms of the scale on which they are seen. Malaise appears to be expressed primarily through attitudes, rather than actions.

We have until now assumed that attitudes and actions are, in fact, both reflections of the same phenomenon: malaise. This is, however, a hypothesis that needs to be evaluated. To this end, we analyze the correlations that exist, on the one hand, among the different attitudinal and behavioral indicators of malaise and, on the other, between the global indicators of its attitudinal and behavioral dimensions (Fig. 3.3).

As can be seen, the results are not encouraging. Firstly, the correlations among the three indicators of attitudes show mixed results. Distrust




Fig. 3.3 Correlations between dimensions of malaise in Chile. ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (Source: Own preparation based on Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes)

is positively and significantly correlated with disaffection ($r = 0.088$; $p = 0.002$) and with disapproval ($r = 0.253$; $p = 0.000$). However, that between disaffection and disapproval is small, negative, and not statistically significant ($r = -0.042$; $p = 0.145$). Secondly, the correlations among the three indicators of behavior are positive and significant, ensuring that they can be converted into a single indicator of participation.

Thirdly, the hypothesis of a relationship between attitudes and behaviors is not supported by the evidence obtained for Chile ($r = -0.021$; $p = 0.461$). Indeed, as seen in Fig. 3.3, the correlation between them is not statistically significant. This suggests that these attitudes and behaviors are not measuring the same phenomenon—malaise—but different phenomena. In order to test the robustness of this result, we carry out further analysis by calculating the average index of protest behavior for the different quintiles of attitudinal malaise. As shown in Fig. 3.4, the average number of protest activities undertaken by people does not vary according to their level of attitudinal malaise.

Determinants of Malaise and of Political Participation

What factors are related to or determine the malaise that is expressed in citizens' attitudes? In Chile, what factors are related to participation in protest activities? As discussed above, the political sciences have mooted different explanations. Here, we include variables that allow us to measure the impact of economic factors, perceptions of corruption, values related




Fig. 3.4 Level of malaise and protest activities (*Source*: UDP-IDRC (2013)).

to what is considered a good government, general satisfaction with life, participation in secondary organizations, depoliticization, and knowledge about politics. In addition, we incorporate control variables that measure the sociodemographic characteristics of the people surveyed (gender, age, and educational and socioeconomic level). The procedures used to construct these variables as well as their descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendix to this chapter, while the results of the regressions are shown in Table 3.3.

Two variables were used in the models to measure the impact of perceptions of the economic situation on attitudinal malaise and participation in protest activities: how positively or negatively the country's present economic situation is viewed and perceptions of its future economic outlook. As can be seen, these factors have a strong impact on attitudes, but not a statistically significant effect on participation. Attitudinal malaise is significantly higher among those with a negative perception of the present economic situation and those who consider it will worsen in the future and the largest effect, controlling for other factors, is produced by perceptions of the present economic situation. In the case of protest activities, however, perceptions of neither the present nor future economic situation have statistically significant effects.

Similar results are observed for the effect of perceptions of corruption on attitudinal malaise and protest activities. In the case of attitudes, the effect is statistically significant and in the expected direction, with greater malaise found among those who consider that corruption has increased and less among those who perceive it as having diminished. Perceptions of corruption do not, however, have statistically significant effects on Chileans' participation in protest activities.

Table 3.3 Determinants of malaise in Chile: OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis

	<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>Behavior</i>
Constant	62.965*** (6.187)	16814** (5020)
Present economic situation	22.201*** (3.628)	1239 (2943)
Future economic situation	6.673** (2.335)	2874 (1895)
Corruption has increased	3.907** (1.477)	1047 (1199)
Corruption has diminished	-7.549** (2.270)	0624 (1842)
Participation in organizations	-6.474*** (1.528)	7311*** (1240)
Prefers government that guarantees order	-5.647*** (1.402)	-2475* (1138)
Prefers government that solves problems quickly	2.916* (1.388)	-1499 (1126)
Depoliticization	14.398*** (2.910)	-18126*** (2362)
Satisfaction with life	-6.595 (3.948)	0712 (3204)
Knowledge	-1.391 (3.235)	5352* (2625)
Gender	0.635 (1.366)	0582 (1109)
Age	-15.722*** (4.381)	-10285** (3555)
Educational level	-7.833 (4.149)	6795* (3366)
Socioeconomic level	-4.338 (2.223)	-0348 (1804)
Adj. R^2	0.150	0151
N	1124	1124

* $p < 0.050$; ** $p < 0.010$; *** $p < 0.001$

We find that, controlling for other factors, membership of and participation in secondary organizations have a statistically significant effect in reducing attitudinal malaise and increasing participation in protest activities. This is one more sign of the absence of a relationship between what we have termed the two dimension of malaise and suggests that participation in demonstrations, signing petitions, and complaining to the authorities

are not an expression of malaise toward representation but alternative ways of making preferences and demands known to rulers. Similarly, in the case of depoliticization, we find that people who do not talk about politics or pay attention to them in the media show greater distrust, disaffection, and disapproval but participate less in protest activities. In other words, not being interested in politics increases attitudinal malaise but, as would be expected, reduces the probability of participation.

In the case of people's values and their effect on attitudes and behavior, we find that those who prefer order as the government's guiding principle show less distrust, disaffection, and disapproval with an effect that, although not very large, is statistically significant. Similarly, those who attach greater importance to order are, controlling for other factors, also those who participate less in protest activities.

Finally, people's age also has an important impact. As seen in other contexts, attitudinal malaise is higher among young people who also participate more in protest activities. For other demographic variables, statistically significant effects are not seen on either the attitudes or protest activities measured.

Consequences of Malaise

As suggested above, the consequences of malaise for democracy depend on the type of citizens among whom it is strongest. If malaise and participation in protests are greater among people with a lower level of support for democracy, populist or authoritarian forms of government could be sought as an attractive alternative. If, on the other hand, malaise is greatest among those with a strong commitment to democracy, this would imply the development of a type of citizenry that differs from the classic model of Almond and Verba (1963) and is closer to that suggested by Dalton and others, under which the model of a citizen congruent with a democratic system would shift from one that is allegiant (with high levels of trust and low political participation) to one that is assertive (with low levels of trust and high political participation) (Dalton and Welzel 2014).

We, therefore, develop a typology of citizens that combines support for democracy and satisfaction with the way it is functioning in the country. This typology, illustrated in Fig. 3.5, is based on the work of Dalton and Shin (2014), Klingemann (2014), and others.

In answer to the question "With which of these statements do you most agree?", 54.9 percent of those surveyed chose "democracy is prefer-

Satisfaction with democracy	Support for democracy	
	Democracy is preferable to any other form of government	Indifferent to democracy or prefer authoritarian government
Very + Quite	<i>Satisfied democrat (1)</i> 33.6%	<i>Satisfied autocrat (3)</i> 20.5%
Not very + Not at all	<i>Dissatisfied democrat (2)</i> 24.1%	<i>Dissatisfied autocrat (4)</i> 21.8%

Fig. 3.5 Typology of citizens according to results of survey for Chile (*Source: UDP-IDRC (2013)*).

able to any other form of government”, while 22.7 percent indicated that “in some circumstances, an authoritarian government is preferable” and, for 14.7 percent, the type of government was a matter of indifference. There is, in other words, majority support for democracy as the form of government.

In the case of the question about satisfaction with the way democracy works in Chile, 48.2 percent indicated that they were very or quite satisfied and 40.8 percent that they were not very or not at all satisfied.

The results obtained when combining these two variables of support for and satisfaction with democracy can be seen in Fig. 3.5 which shows that a third of Chileans can be classified as satisfied democrats or, in other words, people who support democracy as the form of government and believe that, in Chile, it works well. A quarter can be classified as dissatisfied democrats or, in other words, as preferring democracy but not being satisfied with the way it works in Chile. Finally, around 42 percent do not support democracy, divided almost equally into those who are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way it works in the country.

Now, as can be seen in Fig. 3.6, malaise in Chile is positively correlated with the type of citizen ($r = 0.100$; $p = 0.001$). Attitudinal malaise is lower among satisfied democrats (59.6 percent) than among the other three types of citizens. It is important to remember that this is also the largest group, accounting for a third of those surveyed.

At the same time, however, there is a negative correlation between political participation and the type of citizen ($r = -0.126$; $p = 0.000$).




Fig. 3.6 Malaise and participation by type of citizen (*Source:* UDP-IDRC (2013)).

Participation is, in other words, significantly lower among those who do not indicate support for democracy and higher among those who support democracy as a form of government.

This is an important result which complements the arguments presented above. Attitudinal malaise in Chile is not correlated with its expression in behavior or the level of participation in protests. This is seen not only in the direct relationship between these two dimensions of malaise (Fig. 3.3) but also in the way they are related to support for democracy (Fig. 3.6).

Attitudinal malaise is widespread throughout the population and, albeit lower among satisfied democrats than other groups, it is still seen in over half of this group. Distrust, disaffection, and disapproval with respect to the different components of the political system can be seen in the vast majority of Chileans, regardless to some extent of their level of support for democracy.

At the same time, it is the democrats who most frequently report attending demonstrations, signing petitions, and complaining to the authorities. This is a clear indication that these types of participation have come to form part of the normal repertoire of a democratic citizen just like, for

example, voting in elections and are not related to mechanisms of destabilization or the breakdown of democracy. Protest activities are, in other words, a sign of the strength, rather than weakness, of democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

The results presented in this chapter about malaise and participation in protest activities in Chile indicate a situation that it is important to bear in mind, particularly in the context of the other cases discussed in the book.

Levels of malaise among citizens as expressed in distrust of political institutions, disapproval of presidents, and disaffection with political parties are high. Indeed, Chileans take an important distance from their principal institutions. This malaise has, moreover, been apparent for a long time and distrust and disaffection, rather than a passing phenomenon, date back 20 years and have shown a gradual but constant increase. In this sense, we can assert that, in the case of Chilean citizens, the country's political and economic ups and downs during this period have not permeated distrust. It has increased constantly even, for example, during economic booms.

At the same time, however, most Chileans support democracy as their form of government and, despite the low standing of political parties and institutions, it is considered the best alternative. Malaise does not, therefore, appear to be related to a preference for authoritarian government or to undermine the legitimacy of the government regime. This is also borne out by analysis of participation in protest activities since this is highest, albeit still limited, precisely among those who most value democracy.

Participation in protest activities, therefore, appears to be an expression of commitment to democracy rather than of malaise with the country's principal institutions. In Chile, in other words, activities of this type do not constitute a way of undermining the system's legitimacy (as could have been the case of protests during the dictatorship) but are rather just one more element in the repertoire that citizens have to communicate their opinions and preferences to their rulers.

A question that remains for future research is how long Chile's political system can withstand these levels of malaise. They have so far coexisted with relatively strong support for democracy but could, if they persist in the long term and deepen, generate or help to generate processes of delegitimization of the political system. This raises the question of what the country's institutions and authorities can do to increase trust and credibility as a pending task that must be addressed.

APPENDIX

Table 3.4 Measurement of variables used

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Codification</i>
Present economic situation	How would you describe the country's present economic situation? Would you say that it is... ?	0 = Very good ... 1 = Very bad SYSMIS = DNK/DNA
Future economic situation	And, in the future, do you think the country's economic situation will be better, the same, or worse than it is now?	0 = Better 0.5 = Same 1 = Worse SYSMIS = DNK/DNA
Corruption	As regards corruption in the country recently, would you say it has increased, stayed the same, or diminished?	Two dummy variables were constructed: (a) Corruption has increased. (b) Corruption has diminished.
Participation in organizations	Do you participate in any of the following institutions? Political party Trade union Professional association Neighborhood association Church Sports club Charity Other	0 = No 1 = Yes In order to calculate the index of participation, the answers to these questions were added together, giving a variable ranging from 0 to 8 organizations. Subsequently, this variable was recodified as follows: 0 = Does not participate in any organization. 1 = Participates in 1 or more organizations.
Prefers a government that guarantees order	If you were able to choose the type of government, would you prefer one that guarantees order in the country or one that guarantees individual liberties?	0 = I prefer a government that guarantees individual liberties. 1 = I prefer a government that guarantees order in the country.
Prefers a government that solves problems quickly	Which do you prefer? A government that solves problems quickly without asking people their opinion or one that takes longer to solve problems but asks people their opinion?	0 = A government that takes longer to solve problems but asks people their opinion. 1 = A government that solves problems quickly without asking people their opinion.

(continued)

Table 3.4 (continued)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Codification</i>
Depoliticization	How often do you undertake the following activities? Talk about politics with family members or friends Read about politics in newspapers or magazines Watch the news or programs about politics on the television Listen to the news or programs about politics on the radio Read about politics on internet	0 = Daily or every day ... 1 = Never The index of depoliticization was calculated taking an average of the answers given to these five questions.
General satisfaction with life	And, in general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life?	0 = Totally dissatisfied ... 1 = Totally satisfied
Political knowledge	Please answer the following questions about political institutions. How many seats does your constituency have in the Chamber of Representatives? How many senators does your constituency have? How many years does the president's term of office last? How often do municipal elections take place? How many seats are there in the Chamber of Deputies? How many seats are there in the Senate?	0 = Incorrect answer 1 = Correct answer To calculate the index of political knowledge, answers to these six questions were added together and then transformed into the following scale: 0 = 0 correct answers 1 = 6 correct answers
Gender	Note gender of interviewee	0 = Male 1 = Female
Age	What age did you reach at your last birthday?	
Educational level	What is your educational level?	0 = No schooling ... 1 = Postgraduate
Socioeconomic level	Interviewee's socioeconomic level	0 = medium high 0.5 = medium 1 = low

Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>P10</i>	<i>P90</i>
Malaise	1200	64.39	24.368	0	100	24.27	97.73
Distrust	1186	73.88	17.859	0	100	52.80	100.00
Disapproval	1200	49.28	50.016	0	100	0.00	100.00
Disaffection	1200	70.26	45.729	0	100	0.00	100.00
Expression in behavior	1200	7.18	19.533	0	100	0.00	33.33
Demonstrations	1200	8.46	27.847	0	100	0.00	0.00
Petitions	1200	6.11	23.960	0	100	0.00	0.00
Complaints	1200	6.98	25.488	0	100	0.00	0.00
Present economic situation	1192	0.44	0.200	0	1	0.25	0.75
Future economic situation	1138	0.38	0.299	0	1	0.00	0.50
Corruption has increased	1200	0.35	0.478	0	1	0.00	1.00
Corruption has diminished	1200	0.11	0.312	0	1	0.00	1.00
Political knowledge	1200	0.33	0.231	0	1	0.00	0.67
Participation in organizations	1200	0.29	0.453	0	1	0.00	1.00
Prefers government that guarantees order	1200	0.57	0.495	0	1	0.00	1.00
Prefers government that solves problems quickly	1200	0.48	0.500	0	1	0.00	1.00
Depoliticization	1197	0.71	0.260	0	1	0.30	1.00
Satisfaction with life	1196	0.76	0.181	0	1	0.50	1.00
Gender	1200	0.48	0.500	0	1	0.00	1.00
Age	1200	0.43	0.171	0.18	0.92	0.22	0.68
Educational level	1197	0.49	0.239	0	1	0.22	0.89
Socioeconomic level	1200	0.60	0.408	0	1	0.00	1.00

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Elite–Mass Congruence in Chile

Peter M. Siavelis

INTRODUCTION

Chile is often lauded for its successful democratic transition and high-quality democracy. Nonetheless, increasingly the country's traditional image as Latin America's democratic poster child is being replaced by one of protest, conflict and corruption, suggesting for some that the country is experiencing a crisis of democracy. Student protests that began in 2006 have become a permanent fixture. Chile, long assumed to be among the cleanest countries in Latin America, now makes headlines with the emergence of scandal after scandal. There are increasing levels of citizen dissatisfaction with the functioning and quality of democracy in the country. Only 48.2 % of Chileans are *bastante* or *muy satisfecho* with democracy. Further, after more than two and a half decades of democracy, only 54 % think in all cases democracy is the best regime, and the number who think so has actually decreased since peaking after the return of democracy (UDP-IDRC 2014). Indeed, 22.7 % contended that in some circumstances an authoritarian regime is preferable and 14.7 % said it really did not matter. Though Chile is lauded by academics and analysts as a high-quality democracy, on several key indicators of mass public opinion other Latin

P.M. Siavelis

Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA

American countries rank significantly higher, and some of Chile's indicators are disturbing. For example, long known for high level of citizen identification with parties, Chile now ranks 25th out of 26 countries in levels of party identification, trailed only by Guatemala (LAPOP 2012; UDP-IDRC 2014).

However, as the introductory chapter sets out, Chile presents some striking realities and contradictions among the three countries considered in this volume. Objectively, and superficially one would think that Chileans should be among the most satisfied with their political system, given relatively higher levels of development and a long-standing reputation (until recently challenged) of clean politics and political institutions with a high degree of probity. This chapter seeks to place the political conditions of Chile within the framework of *malestar en la representación* as set out in the introductory framework chapter of this volume. It also however, seeks to understand the contradictions suggested by the Chilean case with respect to how outsiders feel Chileans “should” feel about their democracy and political institutions and how they actually feel. Many previous studies of citizen satisfaction were limited by a lack of comparable data for citizens and elites. However, the Universidad Diego Portales-International Development Research Centre (UDP-IDRC) data on which this book is based, for perhaps the first time, provides broadly similar questions for citizens and elites during the same time period, allowing for a more comprehensive view of the parallels between party elites and the public. In essence, this chapter finds that there is indeed *malestar en la representación* for the Chilean case as defined by high levels of what the editors call “the three Ds”: *desafección*, *desconfianza* and *desaprobación*. However, it argues that the three Ds have not necessarily emerged in Chile as a result of lack of congruence between elites and the public—though there are areas of disagreement, there are also striking parallels between elites and the masses. Rather it suggests that the roots of *malestar* are complex and multivariate.

Where do we stand on the question of elite–mass congruence in Chile, and what do the data suggest with respect to the narrowness or breadth of the difference of opinion between elites and the public and its significance for the “three Ds”? The answer is quite complex and necessarily impressionistic. No definitive conclusions can be drawn from the results, but they are suggestive of certain patterns, some of which are counterintuitive, contradictory and perhaps unexpected: (1) There is broad consensus on the desirability of democracy as a system, though more confidence at the

elite level and very similar patterns of ideological self-placement between elites and the public. (2) It is widely held that the military regime transformed notions of the role state and individual responsibility. The data suggests that attitudes toward work and inequality among the public are profoundly tied to notions of individual responsibility rather than structural dimensions, though the latter are more of a concern for elites. (3) The data also suggests that elites and masses are deeply concerned with inequality, however, ironically, elites are more so. (4) There is some agreement regarding the most important issues facing the country in terms of rankings. Nonetheless, despite seemingly unending student protests, citizens place crime rather than education as the most important issue facing the country while elites place education first as the most significant issue facing the country. (5) There are some significant disagreements between elites and the public on the role and function of the state. Despite the Chilean public's belief that poverty and inequality are tied to individual characteristics, they ironically want much more involvement of the state in institutions of social provision. (6) Finally, the data suggests that political institutions and parties are held in low esteem by the Chilean public, supporting the widely held notion that this constitutes disgust with politics. However, the data presented here suggests that this is an incomplete view. By wide margins, Chileans favor a larger role for the state in the social provision institutions privatized during the dictatorships, and there is lingering confidence in local institutions. This last point challenges the widely held notion that there is a complete *agotamiento* of Chile's public institutions and there is probably more potential to deal with some of Chile's political challenges than some might contend, given continuing confidence in the state and some local institutions.

However, simply measuring where Chileans and their leaders stand on a series of issues and whether there are broad parallels between them is less than satisfying without asking about the potential source of congruence or lack thereof. In this sense, this chapter asks a bigger question, which it will only attempt to answer in a very limited way. This chapter makes the necessarily tentative assertion, building on other work, that the interaction of a political elite resistant to fundamental reforms, the electoral system and the structure of post-authoritarian competition has forced an elitist form of politics that has led to widespread dissatisfaction and disaffection from institutions, something which contemporary scandals have only reinforced. For very good reason, elites continue to act within a political model that guaranteed a successful political transition. However, it is also

a model which, in terms of longer term government performance, limits accountability, undermines legitimacy, prevents party alternation and has severely constrained the scope and audacity of political, economic and social policy reforms (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2014). It is in these areas that we can perhaps find the origins of *malestar* and hopefully its solution.

ELITE–MASS CONGRUENCE IN CHILE

Representative democracy is defined by the existence of mechanisms to channel public will into policy by way of a smaller number of elected representatives. This concept of democracy, though not uncontested, suggests that policy preferences of legislators ideally should reflect those of the electorate.¹ Still, contrary to first appearances, the highest quality democracy (depending on which dimensions are privileged in a particular democracy) is not necessarily be the one where there was minimal distance between the policy preferences of electors and politicians. Indeed, Pitkin's (1967) classic work establishes the multidimensionality of representation. An argument can even be made that depending on the particular goals of the differing models of democracy, it might be preferable that there is a wide gap between the preferences of the governed and the governing. Though an elitist conception, if one seeks governability over "pure representation" a less "representative" democracy may indeed be one where politicians avoid tapping into populist tendencies in voters to promote policies that are damaging to democracy for the longer term, or advocate harmful policies that respond to the will of a fleeting majority caught up in the passions of the political moment.

Still, there is reason to believe that a model of "mandate representation" (where congruence exists between the policy preferences of the population and politicians) is more likely to facilitate the positive functioning of democracy (Kitschelt 1999). "Mandate representation" may contribute to other dimensions of democracy like responsiveness and accountability by creating the citizen–politician links that allow these processes to take place. What is more, such congruent relationships may better ensure the ability of marginalized citizens to pursue their interests and achieve distributive outcomes that are beneficial to them and that reinforce democracy (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). With respect to new democracies, "[t] here is strong reason to believe that the level of representation affects citizens' support for a system and therefore contributes to its durability" (Luna and Zechmeister 2005: 392). For all of these reasons, elite–mass

congruence is significant to democracy. However, as this chapter will ultimately demonstrate, “mandate representation” guarantees neither the quality of democracy nor a high level of satisfaction with it.²

How does Chile fit into these debates, and what is the status of elite-mass congruence in the country? It has now become passé and simplistic to refer to Chile as a “model” country. However, for many years, it was considered as such, despite academic work dedicated to asking this question in a more serious way (Drake and Jaksic 1999). Still, Chile’s status as an iconic model for democratic transition and economic development for so many years makes it a useful case to comparatively analyze *malestar*. The reasons are the apparent contradictions that emerge from the three cases that are analyzed in this volume which make Chile in many ways the most enigmatic. Almost any observer would contend that objective economic and political conditions have been better in Chile than in Argentina over the last two decades. Nonetheless, among the cases, and as noted in the introduction to this volume, on many counts Chile has the most indications of *malestar* as conceptualized in this project. An additional contradiction arises when looking at levels of internal efficiency. At face value, Chileans demonstrate a high level of *malestar*, yet when it comes to their evaluation of “internal efficiency” as set out in the introductory chapter, they rank their own country as highly as Uruguay.

In this sense, Chile’s enigmatic status in many ways makes it an interesting case for understanding the development of *malestar*. It is not simply objective economic conditions or the quality of the political model, but *malestar* somehow has deeper origins that might also be related to the very process of democratic transition that made Chile stand out for so many years. The challenge, for this chapter—and more generally—is to find the clues among the survey data and elite opinion surveys we now have available.

Elite-mass congruence has been little analyzed in Chile. There are a smattering of cross-national studies, and one that deals with Chile in particular. Luna and Zechmeister (2005) provide an excellent study of elite-mass congruence in Latin America by combining indicators from elite and mass surveys to measure the extent to which such a parallel between electors and the elected exists. They offer a quantified measure of the extent to which political parties represent the preferences of voters based on 11 questions that are broadly parallel and asked of elites and voters in nine Latin American countries. It is no surprise to those accustomed to Chile’s portrayal as the poster child for democracy in Latin America

that the country ranks the highest as the most representative democracy among cases covered in the study. Again, this raises the question of what happened, why it happened so quickly and, ultimately, “What’s the matter with Chile in recent years?”

Further, Luna and Zechmeister find high correlations between party institutionalization and representation. They propose that this is the case because, “[i]n systems in which parties have had time to develop clear and consistent track records, citizens and elites are more likely to link to each other on the bases of programmatic criteria” (2005: 409). While Luna and Zechmeister’s findings are interesting, as they acknowledge, their measures provide a snap-shot of elite–mass congruence, not accounting for change over time. Second, though their study measures elite–mass congruence in 11 areas, the measure is necessarily based on a narrow set of questions. So it is possible that the extent of elite–mass congruence could be muted or elevated based on the questions selected.

Siavelis (2009) has also analyzed the issue, but notes that his conclusions are necessarily tentative, and as this chapter shows, outdated. He asks whether the dissatisfaction with democracy and political parties that was already emerging in the early 2000s was due to a lack of congruence between elites and masses with respect to their ideological orientations and policy positions on concrete political and economic issues. He argues that for the period from 1994 to 2006, there was growing consensus between elites and the mass public with respect to the most important issues. Rather than a lack of congruence between elites and masses, he argued that the more likely source of citizen dissatisfaction was an emerging *partidocracia* (or a polity characterized by political party domination) which hampered the full functioning of democracy in terms of legitimacy, accountability and alternation of power. In essence, despite broad agreement on the content of politics between elites and the mass public, there was dissatisfaction with democratic processes and outcomes. In this sense, and parallel to the arguments of this chapter, he contended that the quality of democracy was about much more than “representation” conceived as congruence between elites and citizens. He goes on to argue that this domination was a product of the interaction of an entrenched legislative election system and model of post-authoritarian partisan politics. This chapter takes up and further elaborates many strands of that argument.

Why so little work on elite/mass congruence in Chile? In essence, up until now, it has been difficult to find uniform political opinion survey data that questions a broad range of the citizenry and elites asking the

same range of questions in the same way over an extended period of time. Happily, the UDP-IDRC project provides us with just the type of data we need to undertake such an analysis. It is also enlightening to interpret this new data in light of the few past studies of elite–mass congruence in Chile.

DATA AND METHODS

In order to uncover the extent of agreement between citizens and politicians, this chapter will employ the surveys from UDP-IDRC Project. While the project’s dependent variable is *malestar*, broadly considered, it is broken down into three major dimensions: disaffection with political parties, distrust of institutions and people and disapproval of governments. However, simply presenting and describing data related to parties, people and institutions might show *malestar*; it fails to grasp the more interesting “why” question. It is important to note that it is not only shared or unshared perceptions that can lead to this type of *malestar*. Indeed, it is the contention of this chapter that some part of the deepening seriousness of the “three Ds” in Chile are tied to broader political phenomena and institutions and not just the extent of agreement or disagreement between elites and masses.

This reality has consequences for the methods employed in this chapter. As noted by Buquet and Selios and Lupu and Warner (this volume), there are numerous ways to measure elite–mass congruence and some controversy concerning the most appropriate way to do so. The most basic and straightforward is based on broad political congruence between the mass citizenry and political elites with respect to issues and orientations (Otero and Rodriguez-Zepeda 2010). Dyadic congruence, on the other hand, measures programmatic parallels between voters and their parties’ legislators (Dalton et al. 2011; Kitschelt 1999). Both usually rely on comparison of mean or median preferences, and often standard deviations. In their chapter in this volume, Lupu and Warner choose to employ a measure based on probability density functions, which allows computation of differences between entire distributions of preferences. While both the other chapters on congruence rely on more sophisticated measures of elite–mass congruence than employed here, this chapter has opted to employ the broadest stroke and most basic ones based on political congruence and the comparison of means. This methodological choice was made in line with available data and what this chapter is seeking to accomplish, which is a bit different than that which the other chapters on congruence seek to

do. First, because as noted citizen identification with parties is currently so low in Chile, it is difficult to measure patterns of dyadic congruence. Second, and more importantly, this chapter is seeking to advance a tentative hypothesis on the causes of *malestar* based on the links between attitudes regarding education, the state, institutions and the causes of poverty as they relate to subsequent attitudes toward concrete public policy options (and what this all means for *malestar* in the country). In this sense, this more intuitive approach to measurement makes more sense for what this chapter is attempting to accomplish at this stage of theorizing and hypothesis generation for Chile.

Support for Democracy

An essential element underwriting the governability and success of a government is support for democracy as a regime. The violence and severity of the military regime and its toll for Chilean society would lead one to expect widespread rejection of authoritarian politics. In addition, given the country's iconic status as a model democracy in the region and frequent allusions to the quality of Chilean democracy, one might think that support for a democratic regime would be high at the popular and elite level. On the other hand, studies of posttransitional Chilean politics find that the democratic/authoritarian cleavage was a defining one which differentiated the right and the left. So it is possible that this might persist with more limited support for democracy as a regime (especially for parties of the right) (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003).

At the elite level, historical data from the Salamanca survey of parliamentary elites shows that the percentage of deputies who agreed with the statement that an authoritarian regime may be preferable in "situations of political and economic crisis" grew across the three legislative sessions from 1.0 % to 6.7 %, to 9.0 % (1994–1998, 1998–2002, 2002–2006). However, it was only among parties of the right that there was such an increase. Contemporary data from the IDRC-UDP survey of elites contrasts sharply to these findings, with 98.7 % of deputies agreeing with the statement that "democracy is preferable to any other form of government." Interestingly, and contrary to the findings of the Salamanca elite surveys, current support for democracy was actually higher for deputies on the right at 100 %! Granted, a minuscule 1.7 % of Concertación/Nueva Mayoría deputies surveyed agreed with the statement that "in some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable." Yet, still it

is remarkable that among parties of the right, support for this statement approached 10 % in 2006 and today it has completely evaporated. This suggests at the elite level support for democracy is firmly entrenched.

It is less so at the level of the mass public, where data suggests that solid support for democracy as the only acceptable regime has decreased, with support going in the opposite direction from elites. From 2006 to 2008, the percentage of Chileans who agreed with the statement that an authoritarian regime “might be preferable to a democratic regime in certain circumstances” increased from 12.6 to 18 % from 2006 to 2008.³ The more contemporary and complete UDP-IDRC data shows 22.7 % support for this statement. On the flip side, among the citizenry, 54.9 % of the population agree that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, yet a total of 37.4 % do believe that authoritarianism is sometimes justified (22.7 %) or that it really does not matter whether a government is authoritarian or democratic (14.7 %). Between 2006 and 2008, solid support for democracy as regime varied between 46 and 56 %—thus it continues to hold at that rate. At the most basic level of the governing regime, there is consensus and general congruence, with generalized acceptance of democracy. Nonetheless, there is a stark difference between elites and the masses regarding the acceptability of a military regime.

Social Order⁴

A focus on values and value change has been central to work on party politics (Flanagan 1982; Inglehart 1977, 1997). While a complete analysis of Chilean values and orientations is beyond the scope of this chapter, survey data suggests that there are differences between elites and the masses with respect to the importance of order and stability. For example, from the most basic perspective, 57.4 % of Chileans prefer a government that guarantees order in the country over one that guarantees civil liberties (37.6 %). While it would be interesting to cross tabulate this data to determine whether this corresponds to particular patterns of partisan identification, as will be noted the level of identification with parties is so low, it is difficult to determine any precise pattern. While there is little variation based on region, what is clear is that older Chileans (61 and older) opt more for order (65.4 %) and there is a direct inverse correlation based on age. Women also tended to opt more for order (59.7 %) than men (54.7 %). Though less stark a divide, a plurality of Chileans (47.9 %) prefer a government that “rapidly solves problems without asking people”




Fig. 4.1 Preferences for regime type among party elites by coalition (*Source: UDP-IDRC 2014*)

over one that “takes longer to solve problems but asks people their opinions” (47.2 %).

The attitudes of political elites are quite (and surprisingly different). As Fig 4.1 shows, a full 75.6 % of elites prefer a government that guarantees individual liberties over order. The breakdown by party is somewhat counterintuitive, as it is actually the parties of the right which have the lowest preference for a government that keeps order. This is probably due to a libertarian strain among parties of the right, and the use of the term *libertades individuales* in the question’s wording. Indeed, Concertación/Nueva Mayoría deputies had a higher preference for order than any other group. The effect of the wording is confirmed by the related question of whether deputies prefer a government that “rapidly solves problems” or one “that takes longer but asks peoples’ opinions.” Here the response to the question falls along the lines one might normally expect with a total (78 %) opting for consultation (with 55 % of the right and 94.2 % of the center-left opting for consultation). Still across both sets of questions, the Chilean public is obviously much more in favor of a more traditional values orientation when it comes to order and the solving of problems.

Ideological Self-Position

Historically, Chile was regularly cited as one of the most polarized countries in the world by analysts and this polarization is often cited as one of

the drivers of democratic breakdown (Sartori 1976; Valenzuela 1978). Nonetheless, these analyses were often not satisfying because of the failure to differentiate between the citizenry and the masses when measuring polarization or the use of survey data that simply asked citizens whether they identified with the center, right or left. Indeed, even Valenzuela (Valenzuela 1978), one of the most important analysts of party system polarization in Chile, noted that though the elite was polarized, voting behavior at the local level was more motivated by clientelism, and indeed, that these local–national clientelistic connections actually helped moderate party system polarization.

The general consensus among contemporary scholars is that there is a much lower degree of polarization of the party system and electorate when compared to the pre-authoritarian period (Munck and Bosworth 1998; Scully and Valenzuela 1997). The IDRC-UDP data backs up this contention, though there are slight differences between ideological self-positioning at the elite and voter level with different levels of dispersion and positioning. Figure 4.2 shows this data. First, it is striking that Chile has become overwhelmingly a centrist country at the level of voters. A full 23.2 % of Chileans place themselves firmly in the center at five. This is roughly consistent with the status of self-identification during most of the




Fig. 4.2 Ideological self-placement of deputies and the electorate in Chile (Source: UDP-IDRC 2014)

post-authoritarian period. Data cited in Siavelis (2009) finds that in polls conducted in 2008, 30 % of those surveyed placed themselves exactly at the center at “five,” with none of the other deciles on the ten-point scale exceeding 7 %.

This only tells part of the story. What Fig. 4.2 does not show is that a full 38.1 % (or almost four out of ten!) claimed to not know or chose not to respond. This is a dramatic change since the return of democracy. Indeed, in 1990, only 13.1 % claimed not to identify with any ideological tendency (a figure that went to 38.4 % in 2009) (Centro de Estudios Públicos 1990, 2007, 2011). What is more remarkable is that the IDRC-UDP survey actually seems to under-measure this tendency. Indeed in the most recent Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) survey, 57 % said that they identified with no ideological tendency (Centro de Estudios Públicos 2015). This is fairly consistent with other surveys.

The data for parliamentary elites parallels that of the citizenry, of course without the high level of non-identifiers. As the figure shows, while there is a pretty standard distribution of the ideological self-identification of members of parliament, there are two key and important differences. First, the elite survey places the average member of parliament farther to the left than the average Chilean, with the modal score being a four instead of a five. The distribution is also different, and wider than the self-positioning of the electorate. Chilean elites disburse themselves more widely across the scale, as evinced by a standard deviation of 7.7 for elites and 4.65 for the surveys of the electorate. In this sense, both parliamentary elites and the citizenry are broadly centrist, though elites are slightly to the left and more widely dispersed across the ideological spectrum. Buquet and Selios, this volume, find a similar relationship between elites and masses in Uruguay.

*Chile's Most Important Problems: The Link Between Education,
Inequality and Poverty*

What do Chileans and elites most care about and what are the principal problems they perceive the country to have? Chile has been repeatedly in the news regarding its extraordinarily high levels of inequality, which has also been the subject of a good deal of scholarly analysis (Borzutzky et al. 2014). Comparative Gini coefficients from around the world repeatedly place Chile among the countries with the highest level of inequality.

Indeed Chile ranks 20th out of 175 countries in its level of inequality worldwide, with the highest level of inequality in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) club of which it just became a member, and only slightly beat by Brazil and Colombia in South America (World Bank). According to the UDP-IDRC data, Chilean elites are keenly aware of these realities.

What is more, though Latin America is “the” region of inequality, in Chile high levels of inequality have been tied to the Pinochet governments neo-liberal economic and social policies (Borzutzky 2002; Pribble and Huber 2013) and the lack of audacity of subsequent Concertación governments in significantly challenging the bases of neo-liberal market economics (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2014). In addition, much of the other data presented in this chapter and, indeed, the protests spilling out on the streets in recent years suggest that inequality is the most pressing problem in Chile. However, what is intriguing as Fig. 4.3 shows is that Chileans do not rate inequality as Chile’s most pressing problem, nor do they cite education (which one could argue—with some complicating realities—is




Fig. 4.3 Most important issues facing the country for Chilean deputies and the electorate (*Source:* UDP-IDRC 2014)

proxy for inequality). Rather, by wide margins the Chilean public feels that *delincuencia* (31.6 %) is the most serious issue facing the country. Indeed, three times as many people mention *delincuencia* as mention *desigualdad* (10.7 %) as the most pressing problem facing the country. On the one hand, this is a curious finding given the irony that the country has a relatively lower level of violent crime than most of the rest of Latin America. On the other hand, it is perhaps not so curious because *delincuencia* likely emerges from the set of problems associated with such glaring levels of inequality. Elites also perceive crime as a problem, but place it a distant third (11.7 %) after education (37.9 %) and inequality (36.6 %). This is not unusual, as Siavelis (2009) pointed to a similar disconnect regarding crime in his earlier study of elites and masses in Chile.

Members of parliament, however, are profoundly concerned about inequality, placing it a very close second to education as the first most mentioned problem. Again considering that many of the issues facing Chilean education also have much to do with issues of equality of access and quality, it is clear that equality and inequality are very much on the minds of Chilean elites, even though they are unlikely to play a role in their daily personal lives.

Again, there is something of a schizophrenic attitude regarding the sources, consequences and impact of inequality. Both elites (95 %) and citizens (72.6 %) tie the sources of social and student protests to inequality with more Chileans (72.6 %) pointing to *descontento social frente a las desigualdades* more than any other factor in explaining the protests (though it is interesting that elites find inequality much more significant). Therefore, the citizenry seems to understand that inequality a divisive issue threatening Chile's social peace.

Though poverty and inequality are separate issues, they are inextricably linked in the minds of elites and the public. Obviously, given a certain level of economic development, where inequality is minimized poverty will be reduced. Still, elites and the public have deeply different explanations for the sources of poverty in the country. This difference is not clear at first blush, but becomes starkly clear digging deeper into the data. In particular, both elites and the citizenry resoundingly agree that "lack of education" is the most important source of poverty. Indeed, there is not a whole lot in the survey data on which elites and the public agree more. Lack of education was the first mention of 156 out of 164 elites in terms of explaining poverty (constituting 95.7 % of




Fig. 4.4 Factors the influence poverty for Chilean deputies and the electorate (*Source: UDP-IDRC 2014*)

first mentions!). The citizenry also overwhelmingly agrees that education is the key to understanding and explaining poverty (though a not as resounding, a solid majority of 77.4 % of the population mentions education as most important).

However, most of the data cited in the IDRC-UDP report only summarizes “first mentions” of the causes of poverty. An analysis of second and third “mentions” shows an interesting divergence between elites and masses, and one that suggests some potential changes to Chileans’ perceptions structural versus personal views of the sources of poverty. In particular, once education is set aside, Chileans are much more likely to blame themselves for being poor than they are to blame the state or structural conditions, while members of parliament are more likely to focus on the latter rather than the former. As Fig. 4.4, which summarizes the top three reasons cited for a person being poor, shows, after education, the Chilean public finds that “personal laziness” (16.36 %) and “alcohol/drug addiction” (16.19 %) rank second and third. On the other hand, and again in a striking testament to the perhaps schizophrenic view of poverty and

inequality, though public discourse repeatedly refers to social class, *apellido* and deep inequalities in education (all determined by where and to whom you are born), only 4.94 % of the first three mentions of the citizenry of the sources of poverty were “coming from a poor family.” On the other hand, elites recognized the generational sources of poverty, placing it as the third most important explanation (15.04 %). It is equally interesting that the second and fourth reasons were structural or related to the state: “lack of jobs” at 18.29 % and “economic policies of the government” at 10.57 %. The Chilean public neither expects help from the state nor thinks much of the notion that state policies impact poverty. Again a dearth of data from the pre-authoritarian period structured in the same ways prevents definitive conclusions concerning the potential transformation of Chileans into stubborn individualist. Still, the data are suggestive of an important divide between elites and the public, one mirrored later when each are asked about the role the state should play in social welfare institutions (analyzed below).

Confidence in and Perceptions of Institutions

Chileans are decidedly sullen and dissatisfied when it comes to institutions in their country. It has been well known and well analyzed for years that Chileans do not like political parties (a common cross-national phenomenon). However, given their traditional role in Chilean society, they will be discussed individually in detail below.

Table 4.1 summarizes Chileans’ evaluations of social institutions. The results of the table are impactful, but again, there are some complexities in the data’s take away messages. First, it is clear that there is a general lack of support for any institution in society. Even the top-rated institutions (like the generic “church” and the particular “church parish”) only rate at the top end of *bastante* and do not really approach *mucho*. Second, while political parties are at the bottom of the barrel when it comes to the evaluation of institutions, other *national level* institutions are equally poorly rated. Chileans are dissatisfied with their legislative chambers, their courts and their ministers. Indeed, even businesspeople—who are relatively highly rated in some industrial democracies like the USA—rank right down with the chambers of congress and ministers in Chile.

Should one conclude then that democracy by way of formal institutions in Chile is in its death throes with no prospects for resurrection?

Table 4.1 Mean confidence in institutions

	<i>Confidence (rated 1–5)</i> <i>(1 = nada, 2 = poco,</i> <i>3 = bastante, 4 = mucho)</i>
Partidos Politicos	1.74
El Senado	1.85
Los Tribunales de Justicia	1.86
La Cámara de Diputados	1.87
Los Ministros	1.97
Los Empresarios	1.98
Su Senador	1.98
Su Diputado	1.99
El Gobierno	2.09
Los Periodistas	2.13
Presidente de la República	2.18
Medios de Comunicación	2.22
Los Sindicatos	2.28
La Municipalidad	2.28
Iglesia Católica	2.29
Su Alcade	2.30
Carabineros	2.40
Fuerzas Armadas	2.45
Su Iglesia	2.66
El Párroco de su Iglesia	2.74

That would be a premature conclusion for a number of reasons. First, as noted, declining support for formal institutions is a widespread phenomenon around the world, though the extent and speed of loss of confidence in formal institutions in Chile has been remarkable. However, despite an overall suspicion of institutions, the armed forces and the police actually do quite well in comparative perspective, actually outscoring the Catholic Church. The other hopeful with respect to demonstrating that there is not a complete loss of faith in institutions is the relative positions of *local level* Municipalities and local mayors actually do quite well in comparative perspective. This is supported by additional questions that ask citizenry the best way to solve an urgent problem in the neighborhood. The top three were “meet with the mayor” (41.9 %), “meet with the *junta de vecinos*” (18.2 %) and “contact the press” (7.1 %). This far outstripped the option of “meeting with a deputy/senator” (3.3 %), or “meeting with the governor/*intendente*” (2.4 %).

Political Parties

Parties have been central actors in Chilean political life. The country was notorious historically for its wide ideological spectrum, high levels of party fractionalization and high levels of party identification (Garretón 1989; Valenzuela 1978). Survey data from the post-authoritarian period demonstrate deep and fundamental changes to this pattern. Perhaps most remarkable, while Chile was often noted as the most politicized country in Latin America (and data supported this contention), recent data from the Latinobarómetro ranked Chile as the least politicized among the 18 countries surveyed based on a question regarding the ideological self-identification. While there has been declining support for and identification with political parties cross-nationally, the speed and degree of decline in Chile are what makes it stand out as truly remarkable. This has led some to assume that Chileans are through with parties and that they will be less relevant to future channels of citizen representation. The answer is more complex. Data presented here suggests that elites have a much more positive view of parties than the citizenry, but also that citizens understand the difficulty of structuring representation without some form of party organization. Thus, the dire crisis of party politics in Chile may be overstated.

What does contemporary data suggest? When surveys began immediately following the return of democracy in 1990, 62.5 % of the Chilean public identified with a political party. By 1992, the number of Chileans self-identifying with political parties increased to 87 %. From there this percentage has registered gradual declines, to the point that in 2008 only 43 % identified with a political party, and none of the parties registered a level of adherence above 10 % (Centro de Estudios Públicos, various years). By 2013, this rate had dropped to 28 % (PNUD 2014). The IDRC data presented in this volume parallels this trend and finds remarkably that when asked “*Cuál de los siguientes partidos políticos representa mejor sus intereses, creencias y valores?*” 70.3 % said that “none” did. Unsurprisingly, elites hold quite a different view of parties. When asked if there can be democracy without parties, 84.5 % of elites said they were not at all in agreement (ranging from 89.5 % win the Alianza to the not surprising 50 % among those with no party affiliation, and 85.2 % in the Concertación/Nueva Mayoría). On the other hand, only 16.9 % of the population surveyed were “not at all in agreement.” Also, the IDRC data shows that while 56.4 % of Chileans believe that political parties were behind recent student protests, only 15.4 % of parliamentary elites believe this to be the case.

In addition, among institutions in which Chileans participate, only 1.4 % said they participated in political parties, placing them dead last. Still, it should also be stressed that in Chile, there is nowhere near the Putnam-ian style engagement in associative institutions often noted in the USA. The highest level of participation in institutions for Chileans was the church and that was cited by only 13.2 % of those surveyed. This was followed by *juntas de vecinos* (9.2 %) and *clubes deportivos* (8.2 %) rounding out the top three.

Still, as is the case with many issues analyzed here, citizen views of political parties are not cut and dried. Despite disgust with parties, not all is negative—although what follows is perhaps scant hope for parties—or at least for some form of citizen participation. First, citizens recognize that parties are necessary to run a democracy. Despite the apparent anti-party attitude, when asked by the UDP-IDRC survey, only 23.7 % were “*bastante de acuerdo*” and 9.2 % “*muy de acuerdo*” with the statement that “*puede haber democracia sin partidos políticos.*” Thus, Chileans begrudgingly acknowledge that political parties are necessary. In addition, when presented with the statement “*es mejor tener un presidente independiente, que uno que milita en algún partido político,*” only 32.4 % of Chileans ranked this as between 7 and 10, where 0 was “*muy en desacuerdo*” and 10 was “*muy de acuerdo.*” So, despite overwhelming negativity regarding the role of political parties, this outcome suggests that Chileans would be reluctant to support the kind of free-wheeling independent populist president that have emerged in other countries.

Second, while engagement in civic organizations is not widespread in Chile, these statistics raise a potentially hopeful reality for political participation. As noted above, the institutions with relatively higher levels of citizen support are local ones, suggesting that political engagement at the local level is a potential avenue for representation in a political system widely regarded as in crisis.

Role of the State

Another essential question concerns the role of the state. Chile is notorious for its early adoption of a neo-liberal model, and is lauded as a successful model of capitalist development. While the actual extent of the free market model is subject to dispute and beyond the scope of this analysis, many have argued that there is a consensus among the elites and public regarding Chile’s market model. Did the Pinochet government strip

Chileans of their historical attachment to the state? The answer is clearly, no, and like the answers to so many questions analyzed in this chapter, there are complexities and contradictions.

From the most basic perspective when we consider the variables that affect economic success or failure, Chileans and those who govern them disagree on the role of structural factors in poverty. A total of 38 % of parliamentary elites trace the sources of poverty to having a poor family, only 0.1 % of the population find this to be the case! Indeed, the population deemed personal laziness as more important (2.8 %). As already discussed in great detail above, the Chilean public puts much of the responsibility for personal economic success on the individual rather than on the state. This is quite a transformation considering the size, scope and reach of the Chilean state before the dictatorship.

However, elite and mass views of the state are not that simple, and despite many years of dictatorship and market economics, Chileans—even though they tie success to individual variables—remain remarkably statist, and dare we say, communitarian. Also, the Chilean public and the parliamentary elites differ widely on their perception of the role of the state in some key areas. Figure 4.5 demonstrates the many contradictions that Chileans and elites have in their ideas regarding the state, suggesting that the mass public is considerably more statist than parliamentary elites. Remarkably, and despite decades of neo-liberal economics, over 75 % of Chileans agree that there should be state pharmacies, state banks and a state Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP). Well over 50 % of Chileans want to transfer responsibility for public transport and for education to the state or state entities. Also, mirroring questions concerning who should control aspects of the economy and social provision, most Chileans do not want to see Instituciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPRES) or AFPs remain in private hands. In all other areas, the mass public is substantially more statist. Indeed, the most dramatic difference of opinions between the two groups concerns education. The mass public is dramatically more inclined to support a role for the state in the provision of education. There are only two areas where elites are more statist than Chileans: Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO) and the provision of public services. Fewer elites want to see CODELCO privatized and fewer elites believe that the state should not be in the business of providing public services.

We should neither conclude that Chilean elites are now the market champions and that the public are closet statist. When asked whether




Fig. 4.5 Views of the role of the state in institutions for Chilean deputies and the electorate (*Source*: UDP-IDRC 2014)

they would prefer to choose a society “where all have the same rights guaranteed” or one that “awarded individual effort,” 66.4 % of members of parliament chose the former, while only 31.5 % chose the latter. As one might expect, there is a partisan divide on this question, with 61.3 % of those who identify in the Alianza opting for individual effort and 89.5 % in the Concertación opting for guaranteed equality of rights.

So, as in all areas, the data talks in many different ways and pulls in many directions regarding the role of the state. Despite mountains of data demonstrating a complete lack of trust in many state institutions, and a perception that much of the explanation for wealth or poverty is tied to personal variables in peoples’ mind, Chileans have not completely lost faith in the state. This is significant. Even in the USA (a country whose democracy is deemed vigorous by much of the world—and as a “model democracy” for parliamentarians asked in the IDRC questionnaire (20.1 %) (rightly or wrongly)), it is difficult to find people who trust the state to do much of anything (again, rightly or wrongly!).

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Studies of elite–mass congruence are prefaced on the long-held notion that where the preferences of elites are parallel to those of the citizenry that democracy will be efficacious and valued by the public. This chapter and others in the volume show that this relationship is much more complex. This complexity has deep consequences for the future of Chilean democracy. This chapter has uncovered some surprising divides between the mass and the public and some intriguing contradictions and realities that say a lot about the quality of democracy in Chile, citizen satisfaction with it, and some potential solutions to the “three Ds” plaguing the country.

First, while there is a good deal of congruence between the public and parliamentarians regarding a general acceptance of democracy, ideological placement and the importance of inequality and education, there are some intriguing differences regarding the causes of inequality, the role of the state and the potential solutions to some of the dissatisfaction registered repeatedly by the Chilean public.

It is also clear that Chileans are done with a number of things: done with politics, done with political parties and done with institutions (at least national ones). However, the data are revealing in many ways. Chileans do not seem to trust their government and institutions, but they trust their state more than members of parliament do. They want the state involved in things. Perhaps most intriguing is the differences in interpreting and explaining inequality and in the proper role of the state. At first glance, it is puzzling that Chileans tie the sources of poverty to individual variables, but want the state more involved in addressing inequalities generated by a largely private structure of social provision. In addition, local institutions are nowhere nearly as negatively rated as national ones.

These divergent views as well as disgust with national institutions certainly are related. It is telling that national level institutions are the target of most of the ire of the Chilean population. Democracy is about process and content. In terms of process, at the national level, Chile’s transitional years were characterized by a politics of elite domination with little citizen input, and an ideology of stability. While this pattern provided remarkable stability, it undermined other equally important aspects of democracy like representation, accountability and legitimacy (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2014). Chileans are reacting against this form of politics and the institutions and parties which promoted it.

With respect to content, while there were reforms to some aspects of the system of educational and social provision, the broad outlines of the Pinochet structure remained. Again, these were systems left over from the previous regime which were deemed untouchable by subsequent governments. In this sense, perhaps Chileans are not as statist as they seem from the data presented here, they are just disgusted with what the market-oriented system has wrought, and are casting about for reform. The obvious candidate to fix policies if they are to be wrested from the market is the state.

What does this all mean for the future of democratic politics in Chile? While reform of the binomial system had the potential to at least partially alter the transitional model of exclusive politics, it comes too late and in the wrong form. Had it come earlier when Chile's parties enjoyed high levels of citizen approval and deep connections to the populace, the type of moderate proportional representation (PR) adopted may have functioned better, with more engaged voters and more responsive parties. In addition, aspects of the new system like open lists will only cultivate personalist politics when Chile really needs better institutionalized parties. Earlier adoption and better design would have been optimal for Chile's sorely needed electoral reform. In the end, and ironically, even the strongest proponents of electoral reform may realize it matters less than they suspected. Chile's elitist and disconnected parties will likely continue the pattern of policy-making by elite pact-making and horse trading that characterizes the country today.

This analysis of the binomial system parallels another broader potential difficulty with the current state of Chilean democracy. The country is currently undergoing a deep debate concerning its political future and the fate of the Pinochet-era constitution that this analysis suggest may be partly to blame for *malestar* Chile is experiencing. However, unfortunately, it may be too late to put the genie back in the bottle, and even with the most optimal form of institutional design, it will be difficult to establish a democracy that balances stability, representation, legitimacy and accountability.

As noted, there are signs of hope. There remains some confidence in the state and local institutions which could provide the building blocks for an improving quality of democracy and a more legitimate and equitable set of social policies. Nonetheless, the reach of local institutions and state bureaucracy is limited without the restoration of some degree of confidence in national level institutions that can better address the very visible "three Ds" plaguing Chilean society.

NOTES

1. The purpose of this chapter is not to enter into a debate concerning the distinction between mandate and trustee models of democracy. Rather its focus is primarily on the tradition of representative democracy which posits that the will of the elected should generally parallel the will of the electors.
2. This section draws from (P. Siavelis, 2009). See Powell (Powell, 2004) for a review of the literature on political representation.
3. Latin American Public Opinion Project <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/> and Centro de Estudios Públicos, et al. “Estudio nacional sobre partidos políticos y sistema electoral,” March–April 2008. Accessible at http://www.cepchile.cl/bannerscep/encuestascep/encuestas_cep.html
4. This section draws on (P. M. Siavelis, 2006).

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Malaise in Representation in Chile: An 18-Year-Old Debate in Search of Evidence

Patricio Navia

The debate about the malaise with representation—or with democracy in general—that allegedly exists in Chile has been a permanent feature of scholarly work on Chile and that of Chilean social scientists since shortly after democracy was restored in 1990. Claims that there is something wrong with Chilean democracy or that people are discontented with the way it has evolved have abounded over the past 20 years. In fact, however, the evidence is inconclusive.

This chapter first reviews the emergence and historical evolution of the argument of malaise in representation in Chile before going on to show that the data which should provide grounds for the persistence of this argument fails to conclusively demonstrate such malaise. I conclude by arguing that persistence of the view that something is wrong (or potentially wrong) with Chilean democracy responds to normative claims rather than empirical evidence. While making democracy work is unquestionably a challenge for most contemporary societies, there is nothing particular to Chile to justify the strength of its ongoing debate about malaise in representation which is about to turn 18 years old.

P. Navia
New York University, New York, NY, USA

THE START OF THE DEBATE

After an admittedly unusual transition to democracy in 1990, Chile consolidated a democratic system under the ever-present shadow of the Pinochet authoritarian regime (1973–1990). Given that the end of the dictatorship began with a plebiscite called in 1988 by the dictatorship itself on a further eight-year presidential term for General Augusto Pinochet, the conditions under which democracy emerged were severely constrained by the military. Indeed, the transition took place under the institutional structure established by the authoritarian government. The 1980 constitution, custom-made for Pinochet, stipulated that if Chileans voted “No” in the 1988 plebiscite, democratic elections would take place a year later but, conveniently, included a number of authoritarian enclaves that would restrict the powers and attributions of the new democratically elected authorities.

When Chileans did, in fact, vote “No” by 56–44 percent in the plebiscite of October 1988, the transition to democracy began. In 1989, under strong pressure from the democratic opposition—united in the *Concertación for the No Vote*, a center-left multiparty coalition—the military agreed to eliminate some of the constitution’s authoritarian provisions ahead of the December 1989 presidential and legislative elections. The opposition acquiesced to these changes, but vowed to replace the authoritarian constitution with a new democratically produced text (Heiss and Navia 2007). The Concertación easily won the 1989 elections, but the authoritarian enclaves prevented its electoral majority from translating into a legislative majority. The presence of unelected senators and a malapportioned electoral system (Navia and Rojas 2005) that distorted seat assignments in favor of right-wing parties (Siavelis 1997) gave the right-wing Alianza coalition a majority in the Senate—the coalition has changed its name several times, but has always been formed by the conservative Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and the more moderate National Renewal (RN).

Although there has been ample debate about the limitations of Chilean democracy when it was restored in 1990 (Portales 2000; Garretón 1995; Huneus 2014), there was no question that the country had abandoned authoritarian rule and that, albeit constrained, a new democratic system had been put in place. In the early 1990s, lively debate quickly ensued about when the transition to democracy would end (Menéndez-Carrión and Joignant 1999). Some claimed that it ended in 1990 and was the result of a tacit pact between the outgoing regime and the incoming democratic government (Godoy Arcaya 1999). A number of intellectuals and political

actors, however, analyzed the first few years under democratic rule as if the country were still undergoing a transition to democracy (Elizondo and Maira 2000; Escalona 1999; Briones 1999; Maira 1999; Huneeus 1998; Zaldívar Larraín 1995; Moulian 1994; Foxley 1993).

The center-left Concertación won four consecutive presidential elections, ruling the country from 1990 to 2010. In that period, its governments embraced the basic tenets of the market-friendly economic model put in place by the Pinochet regime. The Concertación, claiming that it would give neoliberalism a human face, began to talk about a social market economy, with social policies tempering the brutally unregulated market-friendly model implemented by Pinochet. A significant increase in social spending and targeted economic subsidies helped bring poverty down from close to 40 percent in 1990 to around 15 percent by 2005. Stronger regulatory powers also increased the state's capacity to foster market competition and combat oligopolies. By all indicators, the pragmatic approach of Concertación governments to adapting the economic model inherited from Pinochet was successful. As Fig. 5.1 shows, Chile's




Fig. 5.1 Chile and Latin America GDP per capita, 1990–2014 (Source: Author)




Fig. 5.2 Tertiary educational enrollment and 18–24-year-old population in Chile, 1983–2011 (Source: Navia and Pirinoli 2015)

level of development in 1990 was similar to the average for Latin America but, by 2014, was almost 40 percent higher. In fact, by 2014, Chile was already the most developed country in the region.

Other indicators of social progress also showed impressive results. As seen in Fig. 5.2, enrollment in tertiary education began to grow rapidly in the years after democracy was restored. As education is seen as—and, in fact, constitutes—a tool for upward mobility, rising enrollment numbers reflected Chileans' growing acceptance of the prevalent economic model and their mounting demand to be a part of the success that, according to macroeconomic indicators, the country was experiencing.

Chile's high level of development and the rapid decline in poverty did, however, hide a darker element in the otherwise rosy picture. Its historically high levels of inequality persisted. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators, the Gini indicator (with a scale of 0–100) was, at 57.25 in 1990, one of the highest in the world. By 2000, it had dropped only to 55.2 and, although it reached 50.8 in 2011, the lowest on record, was still higher than in most countries with a similar level of development to Chile at that time. Thus, the country was in a paradoxical position in the late 1990s. On the one hand, democracy was flourishing,

the economy was growing, and poverty was declining rapidly, but inequality remained stubbornly high.

In the context of debate about a possible unfinished or incomplete transition, rapid economic growth, and high levels of inequality, several intellectuals began to raise the issue of the alleged growing discontent in Chilean society with the institutional, social, and economic model that had emerged in the first decade of democracy. An influential book written in 1997 by academic and public intellectual Tomás Moulián—*El Chile Actual. Anatomía de un Mito* (Moulián 1997)—became a best-seller and a symbol of discontent, at least in left-wing intellectual circles, with the shape that Chilean democracy and society were taking. Though Moulián's book was principally a criticism of the economic and political model put in place as a result of Chile's uniquely constrained transition to democracy, it was swiftly embraced by those who believed that behind the good economic numbers, a darker shadow of discontent was brewing among Chileans.

Many of those doubters saw the 1997 legislative election as confirming that things were going the wrong way. Turnout dropped sharply to 59.6 percent of the voting age population (VAP), down from 75.8 percent in 1993. Jumping to the conclusion that Chileans were increasingly dissatisfied with democracy, few seemed to notice the difference that, in 1993, the legislative election had been held concurrently with a presidential election, whereas, in 1997, there was no presidential election. Analysis of turnout trends since before the 1973 democratic breakdown would have suggested that the high turnout observed in the 1988 plebiscite and 1989 elections were an exception, rather than the norm for Chilean democracy. As Table 5.1 shows, turnout before 1973, like that in 1997, was in the 50–60 percent range. Rather than a crisis, the decline in turnout in 1997 should have been read as a normalization of the political process. True, turnout continued to decline after 1997, reaching a low of 39.2 percent of the VAP in the 2012 municipal elections. Although declining turnout has repeatedly been associated with a sense of discontent with democracy or at least with political parties, the evidence points to a more nuanced set of reasons behind this phenomenon in Chile (Contreras, Joignant, and Morales 2015; Contreras and Navia 2013).

The brewing perception that something was wrong with the way Chilean democracy was consolidating and Chilean society was evolving was most effectively reflected in the 1998 Human Development Report by the Chilean office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Table 5.1 Voter turnout in Chile, 1964–2012

<i>Election year</i>	<i>Voting age population (VAP)</i>	<i>Registered voters</i>	<i>Votes cast</i>	<i>Valid votes</i>	<i>Null, blanks, abstentions</i>	<i>Valid votes/registered (percent)</i>	<i>Valid votes/VAP (percent)</i>
1964	4088	2915	2530	2512	1576	86.8	61.6
1970	5202	3540	2955	2923	2279	83.5	56.2
1973	5238	4510	3687	3620	1620	81.8	69.1
1988	8062	7436	7251	7187	889	96.6	89.1
1989	8243	7558	7159	6980	1344	92.3	84.6
1992	8775	7841	7044	6411	2345	81.9	73.2
1993	8951	8085	7377	6969	1848	84.3	75.8
1996	9464	8073	7079	6301	3085	76.6	65.3
1997	9627	8078	7046	5796	3746	71.1	59.6
1999	9945	8084	7272	7055	2890	90.0	70.1
2000	10,100	8089	7019	6452	3648	86.8	63.9
2001	10,500	8075	6992	6107	4393	86.6	58.2
2004	10,700	8013	6874	6123	4577	85.8	57.2
2005	10,800	8221	7207	6942	3758	87.7	64.3
2008	12,066	8110	6959	6362	5704	85.8	52.7
2009	12,226	8285	7186	6938	5284	83.7	56.7
2012	13,388	13,388	5496	5261	8127	39.2	39.2

Source: Contreras and Navia (2013)

A team led by German sociologist—and longtime resident of Chile—Norbert Lechner issued a report entitled *The Paradox of Modernization* (UNDP 1998).¹ It was very critical of Chile’s modernization process:

Nevertheless, along with these important advances, there continue to exist significant levels of mistrust in inter-personal relationships as well as in relationships between the individual and the health, social security, education and work systems. This persistent social malaise suggests that the elements of security reaped from the current “pattern of modernization” are insufficient. The phenomena presented in the different chapters of this Report lead to the conclusion that although the country has progressed, Human Security in Chile has not reached satisfactory levels nor achieved an equitable distribution. (UNDP 1998)²

The document introduced the concept of “malaise” to refer to the apparent discontent that UNDP researchers identified in their study of Chilean society. The report went on to warn that social malaise represented a potential threat to the stability of Chilean democracy:

The aforementioned social malaise is neither a conscious sense of insecurity nor a collective complaint. Instead, it is a diffuse malaise (and perhaps more puzzling for the very fact that it is not spurred by a clear cause). Nevertheless, its diffuse character does not mean that it should be easily dismissed as an innate, inevitable human sense of dissatisfaction; in fact, *today's social malaise could produce an estrangement between citizens that would ultimately undermine the social order*. In any case, the registered social malaise suggests that Human Security in Chile is less laudable than what the macro-social indicators express. (UNDP 1998) (Author's italics)

Unfortunately, the report lacked sufficient data to demonstrate that levels of “mistrust in inter-personal relationships” were any higher in 1998 than in previous years or ever before. Without enough evidence to back up a causal link, the report concluded that the low levels of trust seen in Chile were somewhat associated—in fact, caused by—the development path that it had taken since adopting the market-friendly model and since the restoration of democracy. Thus, while identifying a problem, the report established an unjustified causal link since levels of trust could have been on the decline compared to the historical average or the increase could have been similar to that seen in countries experiencing similar rapid economic growth. Moreover, there was no justification for concluding that high levels of mistrust could pose a threat to the social order. Whether unfounded fear or wishful thinking (if those writing the report disliked the social order), the report's conclusions of a potential threat to the democratic order were not justified by the evidence.

The report was greeted with enthusiasm by those less sympathetic to the neoliberal economic model and those critical of the political institutional setup, with its many ongoing authoritarian enclaves. Concurrently with the report, and probably somewhat influenced by it, a debate emerged within the ruling Concertación coalition, with two documents produced by leaders of different member parties suggesting that a new cleavage was emerging within the coalition. Unlike the traditional division that separated its centrist parties (mostly the Christian Democrat Party, PDC) from its leftist partners (the Socialist Party, PS; Party for Democracy, PPD; and Radical Social Democratic Party, PRSD), the new cleavage cut across party lines, dividing the coalition into two groups that the press dubbed *autoflagelante* (self-flagellating) and *autocomplaciente* (self-complacent). The former shared the critical views of the UNDP report and argued that the Concertación had abandoned its foundational ideals and accepted the constitutional order and economic model inherited from the

military regime. The latter were more optimistic about the direction the country was taking and the democratizing and socially oriented economic reforms implemented by Concertación governments. Both groups issued documents outlining their views. This division subsequently reappeared from time to time, particularly during electoral campaigns, with the self-flagellating always urging a change in direction and the self-complacent always advocating faster and deeper progress along the same roadmap that the Concertación had embraced since the transition to democracy.

The UNDP Report also elicited some formal responses. One of the leading figures of the self-complacent camp, sociologist José Joaquín Brunner, wrote a long essay for *Estudios Públicos*, a quarterly journal published by the Centro de Estudios Públicos, a Santiago-based right-of-center think tank formed by business leaders eager to promote the market-friendly model and separate it from the human rights atrocities of the Pinochet dictatorship. During the dictatorship, Brunner had made a career as an intellectual at FLACSO, a center-left think tank that advocated the restoration of democracy and served as one of the havens for moderate opposition voices during this period. In *La Cultura Autoritaria en Chile* (Brunner 1981), he had argued that the dictatorship attempted to put in place an institutional setup based on authoritarian values. For him, the main challenge for the opposition to the dictatorship was to fight it in the cultural sphere so as to help a democratic culture to prevail. The fact that Brunner came out in the late 1990s to strongly criticize the UNDP report represented a significant break within the intellectual elite that had united to oppose the dictatorship.

In his response to the UNDP report, making a reference to the “*Chile, la alegría ya viene*” (Chile, happiness is on its way) slogan used by the democratic opposition in the 1988 plebiscite, Brunner summarized the perception of malaise that was already prevalent in 1998:

In intellectual and political circles in the Concertación, there is the image that Chilean society is not happy, that happiness has not returned. On the contrary, the belief is that a large majority of the population lives in displeasure, expresses insecurity, does not perceive real progress, is trapped in fear and malaise, and experiences mute uneasiness about their present situation and intense uncertainty about the future. In sum, as has recently been said ‘a diffuse malaise is at large in Chile’. (Brunner 1998: 174)

In the document, Brunner, who had also served as a minister in the second Concertación government’s cabinet (1994–2000), questioned the UNDP

report's conclusions and defended the achievements of the Concertación governments. Using survey data, he showed that Chileans reported high levels of satisfaction with their lives and high expectations for the future. Albeit acknowledging declining voter turnout, he argued that this was a phenomenon common to many well-functioning democracies. Reflecting on the report's argument that Chileans were feeling fear and insecurity, he wrote that "one wonders if societies were ever different, if fear and insecurity are not present—in different forms—in all eras" (Brunner 1998: 174).

To complement Brunner's argument about fear and insecurity, I return to the 1998 UNDP report. Part of the malaise, according to the report, reflected the growing perception of uncertainty prevalent in Chilean society. In fact:

One of the main reasons for insecurity reflected in the Report's studies is the uncertainty of access to existent opportunities and their persistent uneven distribution across diverse sectors of society. Especially notorious are the spheres of education and health-care where equal access to services for all beneficiaries is still not a reality despite advances made in recent years; in fact, more often than not, the socioeconomic level of the individual still determines his options. (UNDP 1998)

The report seems to assume that certainty is always better than uncertainty. However, it is demonstrable that the reverse may well also be true. For a person in the lowest income bracket, the certainty that living conditions will not change provides no relief. On the contrary, for that person, certainty is condemnation while uncertainty is synonymous of hope. The UNDP report incomprehensibly fails to make that point and simply treats insecurity and uncertainty as negative concepts. It correctly notes that unequal access to opportunities was the norm in Chile in 1998—and, in many regards, remains so—but fails to understand that when social programs are first implemented and opportunities begin to expand, the uncertainty that these new opportunities create is a far better status quo for the marginalized and excluded than the certainty that they will never be included. It is true that, as inclusionary policies help create opportunities for some, others will become increasingly anxious to benefit from the expanding opportunities. However, to conclude that this anxiety—or uncertainty—is the reason behind the alleged malaise is to miss the point by a wide margin. Only those who have never been the victims of the certainty of permanent exclusion will fail to realize that the uncertainty caused by limited and insufficient inclusion is far better than the certainty of permanent exclusion.

Despite its conceptual and analytical shortcomings, the UNDP report put alleged malaise with Chilean society and, perhaps, democracy (it did, after all, refer to a diffuse malaise) at the center of debate. Today, 18 years later, we are still discussing the alleged malaise with democracy—or, in this case, malaise in representation—that exists in Chile. Below, I will discuss some of the evidence, from 1990 to 2015, that calls into question the claim that Chileans are experiencing a particular malaise in representation.

MALAISE IN REPRESENTATION IN CHILE TODAY

The argument that there is malaise in representation can be based partly on the paradox that, while Chileans are increasingly supportive of democracy as being preferable to any other form of government, trust in political parties has been declining. As Fig. 5.3 shows, support for democracy is now greater than when it was first restored, but mistrust of political parties has increased constantly since Latinobarómetro first began to ask the relevant question in its 1995 survey. Thus, as democracy has consolidated in Chile, trust in political parties has declined.




Fig. 5.3 Levels of trust in political parties and support for democracy in Chile, 1995–2014

The reasons behind this decline of trust in parties can be associated to malaise in representation, but can also be the result of a normalization of politics. The parties played a very important role in the restoration of democracy, defending human rights and individual liberties during the dictatorship, and leading a social movement that culminated in the 1988 plebiscite and paved the way for democratic restoration. Once democracy was reestablished, however, they lost the moral high ground they had occupied during the final years of the dictatorship. Since the art of politics requires parties to bargain and negotiate to form governments and pass legislation, people might have begun to perceive parties as what they are—groups of politicians interested in promoting certain policies but also in acquiring power and distributing the perks of office to their members. Especially in democracies governed by multiparty coalitions, bargaining, and horse trading are essential components of successful politics. In countries where parties are unwilling to bargain and the defense of principles hampers political compromise, the political process ends in stalemate. In fact, the success of the Chilean party system after the transition to democracy in 1990 has been related to an institutional setup that induces parties to compromise and build the long-term agreements that are possible because they have long-term horizons (Stein et al. 2006).

The negative externality of a successful party system—with parties that are more pragmatic than ideological and with governments that build multiparty coalition support—might be that voters end up distrusting parties that campaign on a certain policy position but then bargain their way into the government coalition by modifying their positions or strategically choosing which policy positions they will defend and which they will renounce in the bargaining process.

Since we do not know for sure why people no longer trust political parties—but we do know that, in general, levels of trust have gone down in Chile across institutions—we can also speculate that declining trust is a result of Chile's development rather than evidence of a particular crisis in the party system or any of the other institutions that have also experienced declining trust.

Higher levels of education among Chileans probably imply more awareness of the negotiations and deals that take place between parties. A more informed population will also be more aware of corruption scandals affecting political parties. This does not mean that there is not a problem. There might be, but assessing and correcting it in the context of more transparency, more access to information, and a more educated public is a difficult challenge.




Fig. 5.4 Perceptions on the importance of political parties and support for democracy in Chile, 1995–2014

Surprisingly, lower trust in political parties has not led Chileans to discard parties as essential components of democracy. As Fig. 5.4 shows, the percentage of Chileans who believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government moves almost in tandem with those who believe that democracy cannot exist without parties. Between 1995 and 2013, there was a drop of 10 percentage points in those who believe parties are essential for democracy but this view continues to be held by a majority of Chileans. Moreover, the belief that democracy can exist without parties actually declined from a high of slightly more than 40 percent in 2001 to less than 30 percent in 2013. Thus, the concept of malaise in representation might be a result of the tension that exists in a society where people believe in the importance of parties but, at the same time, increasingly distrust them.

Are Chileans Satisfied?

Though Chileans seem to be increasingly discontented with their political parties, they hold more positive views about the direction in which the country is headed. The highly respected and widely cited twice-yearly




Fig. 5.5 Is Chile making progress? 1900–2015 (*Source:* Author with data from CEP polls)

polls carried out by the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) have tracked Chileans’ perception of the country’s progress. As the CEP has conducted national probabilistic sample polls since the late 1980s, we can assess the evolution of Chileans’ perceptions of different issues.

Figure 5.5 shows the evolution of the perception of progress. CEP polls ask respondents to say if they think the country is making progress, is stagnant, or is going backwards. Though the middle category is somewhat biased toward a negative meaning—it would be better to offer the option “the same” rather than “stagnant” to avoid the suggestion that no change is negative—the fact that the CEP poll has tracked responses since 1990 permits some useful comparison in order to assess the validity of the alleged perception of malaise in representation (the objective of this volume) or with the way society in general has evolved (the ongoing debate on malaise in Chile that started in the late 1990s).

Figure 5.5 shows a sharp decline in 1998 in the percentage of those who thought the country was moving in the right direction. At the end of that year, an economic crisis in emerging markets, especially in Asia, hit Chile hard and provoked an economic recession in 1999, the first since




Fig. 5.6 Perception about present and future economic situation, 1990–2015 (*Source:* Author with data from CEP polls)

democracy was restored. Better economic conditions in the next few years helped Chileans become more positive about the country's direction. In early 2007, slightly ahead of the meltdown of the world economy, they again turned pessimistic. Since then, the mood has been less stable. In 2015, for the first time ever, those who think the country is moving backwards outnumbered those who think it is moving forward. Still, for most of the 25 years since democracy was restored, the views of Chileans about the future have been rather optimistic. If there is malaise in representation, that malaise is not expressed in the perception Chileans have about where the country is going.

The moderately positive views people have about the country's direction is consistent with Chileans' assessments of their own present economic situation and their expectations about their economic situation in 12 months' time. Figure 5.6 shows the time series for these two questions. Not surprisingly, the percentage of those with a negative assessment of their present situation increased sharply in late 1997—coincidentally, that was the moment when the UNDP conducted the national poll used as evidence for the diffused malaise identified in its 1998 report. When the economy began to recover after 2000, the percentage of those with a

pessimistic assessment of their present economic situation declined rapidly. The 2008 crisis also induced an increase in pessimists. Most recently, pessimism has again increased since early 2015, coinciding with a time of sluggish economic growth.

Interestingly, the expectations people have about the future have always been better than their perceptions of the present. In Fig. 5.6, the percentage with a negative future assessment is consistently lower than that with a negative assessment of the present. In fact, negative future assessment has varied less than negative present assessment, indicating that even when people were experiencing a difficult period, as in 1998, 2008, or 2015, far fewer had a negative assessment of the future. Since 2014, however, negative assessment of the future has grown as fast as negative assessment of the present. In other words, for the first time since the restoration of democracy, Chileans are becoming increasingly concerned about their future economic prospects.

The Debate About Malaise and Discontent Today

UNDP Human Development Reports have continued to assume diffuse societal discontent (UNDP 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2015). In its latest report in 2015, the UNDP Human Development team found a more politicized society (though the timing of the national poll used in the study, just a matter of weeks before the 2013 presidential election, would explain a higher level of politicization). Other intellectuals have joined ranks with contributions highlighting the alleged tensions that exist in society and constitute a threat to the stability of the economic model. In a 2012 bestseller, sociologist Alberto Mayol announced *El Derrumbe del Modelo* (The Collapse of the Model), claiming that Chileans' discontent with the model had reached an intolerable level (Mayol 2012). Others have also suggested that the neoliberal model is about to be replaced, but have been less clear as to when this would happen (Atria et al. 2013).

The dominant paradigm among public intellectuals in Chile, and among many social scientists, is that Chilean democracy is facing difficult hurdles. In an op-ed, published on June 30, 2015, in Spain's *El País* newspaper, sociologist Cristóbal Rovira warned the Chilean elite that "broken links of trust cannot be restored. The irruption of populism is around the corner" (Rovira 2015). Others have joined the chorus of apocalyptic predictions about the future of Chilean democracy. Citing the high levels of social protests—particularly among Chilean students—and basing their

conclusions on low approval of the political elite, those who insist on seeing signs of malaise will even deny the evidence indicating otherwise in order to continue to claim that “*esto no da para más*” (“this is about to explode”). In a column commenting the results of the last CEP poll in October 2015—which confirmed a more optimistic society—philosopher and university professor Max Colodro reflected that “when people are forced to look at themselves and evaluate their own situation, the country of malaise seems far away and disconnected from the very personal reality of its inhabitants” (Colodro 2015). However, rather than taking a clue from what people report in polls and updating his own reading of society, Colodro went on to insist there is a problem, arguing that “either Chileans simply lie when they talk about their lives or we are facing a phenomenon where connections between private and public are more complex and *diffuse*”. Using the favorite code word from the UNDP report, the paradox between a society that seems to be adapting to the new realities that Chile faces and an elite that insists on the presence of malaise is often explained away by the adjective “diffuse”.

CONCLUSION

All democracies face challenges. Dahl warned that democracy would always be an unattainable ideal (Dahl 1971). Thus, he argued we should accept living in polyarchies. To a large extent, the notion of malaise in representation simply reflects the shortcomings of the democracies that actually exist today. Undoubtedly, technological developments and the structural difficulties of making representative democracy work (Przeworski 2010) are also present in Chile. However, rather than concluding that Chilean democracy is at risk or that there is a dominant malaise in (or with) representation, “we should be aware of the limits [of democracy] because otherwise we become prey to demagogical appeals, which more often than not mask a quest for political power by promises that cannot be fulfilled by anyone anywhere” (Przeworski 2010: 171).

NOTES

1. An English summary of the report can be found at <http://desarrollohumano.cl/idh/informes/1998-las-paradojas-de-la-modernizacion/>.
2. All quotes are from the English summary (no page numbers provided).

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PART II

Uruguay, the Antonym of Malaise

Political Opportunity Structure, Social Movements, and Malaise in Representation in Uruguay, 1985–2014

Germán Bidegain and Víctor Tricot

INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL PROTEST AND MALAISE IN REPRESENTATION

Uruguay is a special case within Latin America. As revealed by the data presented in Chap. 1 of this book and Chap. 7 written by Daniel Chasquetti, it shows an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, the values found for the attitudinal dimensions of malaise in representation are low compared

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G. Bidegain, PhD (✉)

Associate Researcher of the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (SNI), Uruguay

V. Tricot, PhD

Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain

to Chile and Argentina and, in this sense, malaise in representation is weak. On the other hand, however, the behavioral dimensions of malaise have high values compared to these other two countries (Table 6.1). How can this paradox be explained?

In this chapter, we argue that, in order to understand this particularity, it is important to invert the causal relationship discussed in Chap. 1. In Uruguay, protests, complaints to the authorities, and the signing of petitions are not manifestations of malaise in representation. On the contrary, these non-conventional forms of political participation are the reason why high levels of malaise do not exist. We assert that, between 1985 and 2014, some of the particularities of the Uruguayan political system and its institutional framework operated virtuously, channeling social demands institutionally. This resulted in a system of representation in which social protests acted as a way of integrating citizens into the political system, rather being a symptom of problems of representation.

The case of Uruguay has important implications for the conceptualization of malaise in democracy. As we argue in this chapter, it is important to differentiate social protest from malaise in representation. In some cases, protest can, as discussed in Chap. 1, be a manifestation of malaise. In other cases such as Uruguay, however, social protest serves as a form of non-conventional political participation that corrects problems of representation when the will of the citizenry is at odds with that of the government. When protests serve as an effective vehicle for channeling social demands into the political system, they can, in fact, improve citizens' feelings about "the way in which they are being represented and governed".¹

Study of the period between 1985 and 2014 also reveals another particularity that sets Uruguay apart from the rest of the region. Since the restoration of democracy, there have been no cycles of protests that have questioned the country's political-institutional order (as occurred in the

Table 6.1 Attitudinal dimension of malaise in representation (% of the population participating in at least one of these activities in 2012)

	<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>Uruguay</i>
Presenting a complaint or comment to an institution	8.3	7	23.7
Signing a petition to the authorities	7.7	6.1	17.7
Demonstrating in the street	7.9	8.5	10.7

Source: Own calculations based on 2013 UDP-IDRC Survey

Argentine protests of 2001 or the 2011–2014 cycle of protests in Chile). In this chapter, we argue that the low levels of malaise in representation and the social and institutional stability seen in Uruguay during this period are related to the successful social and political articulation favored by the particularities of the country's political system. Social mobilization existed throughout the period analyzed but did not question or pose a threat to the democratic system. We argue that this successful articulation is explained, at least in part, by certain aspects of the country's political opportunity structure (POS), an institutional framework that is open to demands from society and means that social organizations always have the possibility of access to political allies within the institutional system. In other words, the political system has been capable of adapting to social protests, successfully taking on board their demands and preventing the emergence of a significant citizen perception of a problem of representation of interests (the three "Ds" discussed in Chap. 1).

In order to develop this argument, the chapter is divided into four main parts. In the first, we discuss the POS concept and its most important aspects as regards the Uruguayan case, arguing that some of its characteristics (the existence of mechanisms of direct democracy and an alliance between the Frente Amplio Party and social organizations) are crucial for understanding the particular articulation between political and social actors that has characterized Uruguay since 1985. Secondly, we present empirical evidence of the country's low level of malaise in representation before, in the third section, going on to divide the period studied into sub-periods, taking into account the ups and downs seen in social mobilization and its impact on the political and social sphere. This section will clearly show that, although social mobilization has existed in Uruguay, it has not been the result of a high level of malaise in representation but is rather a factor that explains its low level. Finally, in the fourth section, we discuss a movement of particular importance—the trade union movement—that illustrates the dynamics of Uruguayan social movements. This shows how articulation between political and social actors in the framework of an open POS successfully channels social demands, reducing malaise. The chapter concludes with some final remarks about this case and the outlook for the future of social mobilization in Uruguay. The empirical evidence used in our research comes from review of the literature and the analysis of the databases of surveys of the population and the country's political elite (some of which were conducted especially for this project).

THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE IN URUGUAY: MECHANISMS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND PARTY SYSTEM

The POS is one of the most important concepts developed by the literature on social movements. In his groundbreaking work on the determinants of the uprisings that occurred in North American cities in 1968, Peter Eisinger defined it as “a function of the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (1973, 25). This definition marked the school of research into social movements that has become known as political process theory (Campbell 2005, 44; Alonso 2009, 54) and, for some authors, this is the predominant school in this field of research (Lichbach 1998; Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 3). Given its success, this concept has been the object of some stretching and it is, therefore, important to define it precisely. Here, we understand the POS as the “set of dimensions or factors of the political fabric that provide incentives or conditions that facilitate the development of a collective action of contestation seeking to influence public policy processes and results” (Ibarra et al. 2002, 14).

We believe that two aspects of Uruguay’s POS are key for understanding articulation of the political-institutional sphere and social movements in this country: its mechanisms of direct democracy (MDD) and close contact between political and social actors. MDD are institutional tools that allow direct citizen participation through the ballot to express their opinion on a particular matter (i.e. referendums, plebiscites, recall, etc.). They can be binding, as the Uruguayan case, or not.

Mechanisms of Direct Democracy in Uruguay

The existence and constant use of MDD, particularly since 1989, make Uruguay exceptional (Altman 2011). Through these mechanisms, citizens can promote constitutional changes and propose or revoke laws approved by Congress. As binding mechanisms, they are an important complement to representative institutions, offering the possibility of important legal and constitutional changes from outside the representative system. Since 1989, 14 popular consultations have taken place as well as campaigns for other consultations that failed to meet the requirements established in the Constitution.² The issues addressed in the different consultations varied and included, for example, the amnesty law preventing human rights trials, the right of Uruguayans living abroad to vote, the privatization of state

enterprises, and the amount of retirement pensions. The real possibility of exercising direct influence on important public policies is, therefore, a powerful incentive for civil society to organize and seek to use MDD, rather than confronting the political system from the street.

There are various ways of calling a direct popular consultation in Uruguay. In the case of constitutional reforms proposed by the political system, this occurs automatically, and the reform must be ratified by the electorate in a plebiscite. Under Article 331 of the Constitution, the citizenry is also empowered to propose constitutional reform directly, providing this has the backing of at least 10 percent of the electorate. In this case, a bill containing the proposed reform must be presented to the president of the General Assembly, together with the signatures of 10 percent of the electorate and, providing the Electoral Court validates these signatures, the initiative must be put to the country in the next general election. In Uruguay, all popular consultations on constitutional matters are known as plebiscites.

In addition, Uruguayan citizens can decide directly on matters of ordinary law. In this case, the consultation is known as a referendum, and the only restrictions are that it may not refer to taxation or other matters on which only the executive branch may present a bill. Referendums may be of one of two types, either to propose or to revoke a measure. In the case of the former, Article 79 of the Constitution stipulates that 25 percent of the electorate can propose a legislative initiative, and this must be put to the country while, in the latter case, 25 percent of the electorate can request a referendum on a law enacted by the executive branch, providing this occurs within a year of the law coming into force.

Political-Social Alliances and Changes of Power

Uruguay has one of Latin America's most solid party systems, and two of its important characteristics are its strong institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) and its programmatic structure (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Through to 2005, the possibility of a victory of the left-wing party, the Frente Amplio (FA), also offered opposition sectors of society the option of a change in the country's direction. In addition, the FA has been a traditional ally of Uruguayan social movements since 1985, joining forces with them on a number of occasions to promote and campaign for use of MDD against the policies of right-wing governments (Moreira 2004; Monestier 2010).

Between 1985 and 2005, power was in the hands of the country's two traditional parties, the Colorado Party and the National Party, and, during this period, a number of popular consultations took place, some of which were successful and forced the government to rectify its line of action. These consultations were called for by civil society groups and supported by the FA for which the MDD were part of its strategy of opposition and a way of building its own strength (Moreira 2004).

The FA's electoral support grew constantly between 1985 and 2004 when it won the general election, becoming the first left-wing party ever to take the presidency. Until then, there was, therefore, the real possibility of an important change in the country's political direction through traditional electoral mechanisms. This served as a reserve for the party system and all the political system. To a large extent, social movements channeled their actions through their historic alliance with the FA, viewing an election victory by it as a promising outlook.

In other words, Uruguay's POS meant that, between 1985 and 2004, the incentives for collective social action were for the promotion of a left-wing victory in the general elections or, if the objective was more rapid change, for directly promoting popular consultations that would force the government to change direction. During this period, Uruguay, therefore, had a POS that internalized and channeled possible social overflows of politics. With the FA's victory, however, the situation changed and social organizations had to rethink their approach to the political party system. In any case, it can be argued that, between 2005 and 2014, tensions between the FA and social movements were not sufficient to cause delegitimization of the political system or for it to be questioned by civil society.

MALaise WITH DEMOCRACY?

The consolidation of the political regime that took place once democracy had been restored built on the institutional and social basis that had existed prior to the military coup (Figueira 1985). The three decades that have since elapsed brought important challenges for this consolidation, including civic-military relations during the transition and the serious economic crisis of 2002. It can, nonetheless, be asserted—as by the authors of Chap. 1 of this book and Daniel Chasqueti in his chapter—that Uruguayan citizens have continued to show high levels of support for the functioning of their democracy and low levels of malaise. In this section, we present empirical evidence of the strength of the Uruguayan political system.³




Fig. 6.1 Support for democracy (*Source:* Own preparation based on 2013 UDP-IDRC Survey)

Figure 6.1 shows the high level of legitimacy of Uruguayan democracy. The vast majority of the population considers democracy preferable to any other form of government. This is also the case in Chile and Argentina but, in Uruguay, the figures are higher than in either of these two countries.

In a phenomenon directly linked to the above, Uruguayans also have a high level of trust in their political parties. This is important because, if citizens trust their representatives, there is less incentive for direct action. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of Uruguayans, Chileans, and Argentines who, between 1995 and 2013, reported trusting the political parties (“a lot of trust” and “some trust”). Across the variations seen during the period, Uruguayans consistently indicate higher trust in their political parties. In 2010, for example, 45.8 percent of Uruguayans reported a lot or some trust, over double the figure for Chile and Argentina. The large drop seen in 2002–2003 was a direct result of the country’s economic crisis but was temporary, with levels of trust showing a rapid recovery in the following years.⁴

Figure 6.3 shows that 72.7 percent of Uruguayans are quite or very satisfied with democracy, well above the levels seen in Argentina (48.2 percent) and Chile (24.7 percent). This reinforces the idea that Uruguayans trust democracy to resolve the country’s problems. It is important to note




Fig. 6.2 Percentage of citizens who trust political parties, 1995–2013 (Source: Own preparation based on data from Corporación Latinobarómetro)




Fig. 6.3 Satisfaction with democracy, 2013 (Source: Own preparation based on 2013 UDP-IDRC Survey)

that this is not just a matter of trust in representative institutions. The MDD are an integral part of Uruguayan democracy and, as we will show in the following sections, were used regularly during the period studied. It should, therefore, be borne in mind that satisfaction with democracy probably includes the “adjustments” made through the MDD in the case of differences between the popular will and that of the political actors.

Far from suggesting a crisis of legitimacy of democracy, the data presented indicates a population that trusts its country’s institutions and is, in general terms, satisfied with the functioning of democracy.

At this point, it may be useful to underscore the idea put forward above to the effect that the absence of significant malaise with democracy does not imply an absence of social mobilization. During the period studied, there were no cycles of large-scale protest that directly questioned or challenged the political system, but a number of social organizations did nevertheless mobilize around different issues and, in some cases, achieved notable victories. They included the human rights, trade union, and mutual-help housing cooperative movements as well as those around issues such as sexual diversity, feminism, pensioners’ rights, and the rights of Afro-Uruguayans and, more recently, the legalization of marihuana and protection of the environment. The repertoire of actions undertaken by these movements was influenced by the country’s POS. The next section examines the principal characteristics of social mobilization in Uruguay.

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN URUGUAY, 1985–2014

The most striking feature of relations between the social and political worlds in Uruguay since the restoration of democracy has been the use of MDD. Following Monestier (2010), it is possible to identify four distinct periods.⁵

1985–1998: Inauguration and Successful Use of MDD from Below

During this period, Uruguayans voted directly on political decisions on seven occasions. These included two plebiscites convened automatically on constitutional reforms proposed by Congress, the first of which took place in 1994 and failed while the second, in 1996, was successful. Since they were the result of the actions of the country’s political representa-

tives, these plebiscites can be considered popular consultations promoted “from above”. The other five consultations were, on the other hand, promoted “from below” in that they were the result of the collection of signatures by citizens in a bid to oblige Congress to vote on some law or obtain some constitutional change.

The first referendum to take place sought to revoke the Law on the Expiration of the Punitive Claims of the State (Law No. 15.848) or Amnesty Law and was initially promoted by human rights groups. It took place in 1989 and its defeat meant that the amnesty law on human rights violations remained in force. The next popular vote was the plebiscite, also in 1989, promoted by pensioners on the automatic adjustment of pensions implemented a few months earlier, which was approved with impressive citizen backing. These were the two cases of use of direct democracy under the first post-dictatorship government and marked the start of use of mechanisms of this type.

The third case of direct democracy “from below” was the 1992 referendum which revoked part of the Law on Privatization of State Enterprises (Law No. 16.211). This initiative, promoted by the union of the state telephone company and the Inter-Union Workers’ Federation-National Workers’ Convention (PIT-CNT), Uruguay’s only trade union federation, was very successful, obtaining overwhelming approval.

Two further plebiscites, promoted by citizens, took place together with the 1994 general elections. One of these, promoted by pensioners, was successful and protected the benefits received by this sector from possible reductions under fiscal balance laws. The other one, promoted by teachers’ unions in a bid to enshrine in the Constitution the allocation of 27 percent of the fiscal budget to education, failed. In summary, five popular consultations called by different social organizations (two referendums and three plebiscites) took place in this period of which three were successful and two failed.

1998–2001: Cycle of Failed MDD Initiatives from Below

According to Monestier (2010, 58), this period saw a possible “crisis of wear and tear” in use of MDD “from below”. Five successive consultations promoted “from below” failed, with three not even obtaining the support necessary for their implementation. In addition, one consultation “from above” took place and also failed to obtain approval.⁶

The first case “from below” was the failed attempt to call a referendum against the Energy Regulation Framework Law (Law No. 16.832) while the second

to fail was the referendum promoted against Article 29 of the Investment Law (Law No. 16.906). In neither case did the referendum's promoters obtain the required 25 percent of signatures. A third initiative "from below" that failed was the bid by the Association of Social Security Public Employees to obtain a constitutional reform revoking the law that had reformed social security (Law No. 16.713). In this case, an important percentage of the signatures collected were declared invalid by the Electoral Court, and the initiative did not obtain the 10 percent required to call a plebiscite.

A fourth initiative did obtain sufficient signatures but the result was, nonetheless, negative for its organizers. This was an MDD promoted by the Union of Judicial Employees which obtained the three-fifths support in the General Assembly required under Article 331B of the Constitution to directly call a plebiscite on constitutional reform. This institutional mechanism operates "from above" but, in this case, was triggered by the union's actions and can, therefore, be considered "from below". It sought to give the judiciary budget autonomy. The popular consultation took place together with the 1999 elections but, with 43 percent support, was rejected.

Finally, the fifth initiative corresponded to a referendum promoted by the PIT-CNT against some articles of the "Emergency Law" (Law No. 17.253) approved by the Batlle administration. This law included a number of reforms to the administration that prompted the unions to seek a referendum through the fast track⁷ but without obtaining the necessary 25 percent.

Beyond the failure of all these initiatives, their constant promotion of use of MDD implied important levels of mobilization and public and media presence. Although failing in their objective, they did serve to ensure public debate about the issues raised.

2002–2005: Economic Crisis, Successful Use of MDD from Below, and Historic FA Victory

This period opens with the 2002 economic crisis and culminates with the FA's election victory. The economic crisis was the worst in the country's recent history while the FA's election victory in late 2004 marked the end of the two-party system that had historically characterized the country since its independence. In this period, we can talk about a "successful cycle" of initiatives "from below" (Monestier 2010, 72). Indeed, three initiatives successfully impeded government action and were perceived as demonstrating the strength of the FA allied with social organizations in the use of MDD.

The economic crisis also triggered a series of social mobilizations. Firstly, the PIT-CNT (driven by the workers of the national telephone company) reacted against the 2000 budget law which, in its view, posed a threat to the company. The FA supported the PIT-CNT in the campaign to collect signatures, and this was so successful that the government opted to annul the questioned articles of the budget law, rendering the referendum unnecessary. The second initiative “from below” was about the possibility of partnerships between the National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol, and Portland (ANCAP), the state fuel company, and private companies (Law No. 17.448). The situation in this case was particularly complex since some FA legislators had actively participated, along with government legislators, in drawing up the law. However, once the law had been passed, the ANCAP union began to collect signatures for its repeal. Despite the internal divisions this caused, the FA finally supported the MDD which was successful, obtaining 63.7 percent support.

Finally, there was the case known as the “water plebiscite” through which the union of the State Water Company sought to introduce articles into the Constitution to ensure the state’s monopoly over water and render some concessions granted to private companies illegal. Although the Federation of State Water Company Employees initially led the process, it generated widespread support among social organizations which formed the Commission for the Defense of Water and Life.⁸ The plebiscite took place together with the 2004 general elections and was successful, obtaining 64 percent support.

The deterioration in the economic situation also prompted some social and business actors to form the so-called Concertation for Growth whose objective was the country’s economic reactivation. The PIT-CNT played a key role in this initiative in which some rural and small- and mid-sized business organizations also participated. Although short-lived, the initiative was responsible for a memorable mass demonstration at the Montevideo obelisk in April 2002 which, according to its organizers, was attended by over 100,000 people.⁹

Another important demonstration was the march in January 2002 to the exclusive Punta del Este beach resort, a new form of mobilization through which the PIT-CNT sought to impact public and government opinion. The FA supported the march while the government of Jorge Batlle forbade its entry into Punta del Este (the march reached its outskirts). According to some press reports, 25,000 people participated in this march.¹⁰ In January 2003, the housing cooperative movement also

organized a similar march.¹¹ The period between 2002 and 2005 was, in other words, characterized by social mobilizations related to the MDD as well as by classic mass mobilizations, designed to express generalized discontent in the framework of the economic crisis.

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The fourth period begins when Tabaré Vázquez took office and extends through to the end of the period studied here. It brought with it an important change in relations between the political and social worlds since the FA, the traditional ally of social movements, was more pervious to their demands than previous governments. This is reflected in important progress as regards social demands as seen, for example, in government policies that included the law on Wage Councils (union movement), the renegotiation and restructuring of the debt of the mutual-help housing cooperative movement and increased lending to it (housing cooperative movement), progress on cases of violations of human rights under the dictatorship (human rights movement), increased government spending on education (student movement), recovery and improvement of pensions (pensioners' movement), decriminalization of abortion (feminist movement), same-sex marriage (sexual diversity movement), decriminalization of marihuana (pro-cannabis legalization movement), and the positive discrimination law (Afro-descendants' movement).

Another important event was the creation in 2005 of the Ministry of Social Development. This new institution sought to address the “social emergency” caused by the economic crisis, working directly with numerous social organizations. One example of its work was the creation within the ministry’s structure of the National Women’s Institute which incorporated members of Uruguay’s feminist movement. Another area in which a more open POS was apparent was recognition of sexual diversity. Between 2005 and 2014, an important agenda in this field, promoted by civil society and supported by FA legislators, made rapid progress, with its high point in 2013 when the law on same-sex marriage was approved.

The absence between 2005 and 2013 of MDD “from below” against the government reflects the similarity of positions between civil society organizations and the government. Through to the beginning of 2013, the only initiative “from below” was the calling of the plebiscite, which

took place together with the 2009 general elections, on repeal of the Law on the Expiration of the Punitive Claims of the State (Amnesty Law).

It failed, obtaining only just over 47 percent support, but showed that social organizations continued to pursue strategies outside the political system's representative channels. In any case, during the government of President José Mujica, the traditional parties began to make direct use of MDD "from below" as a form of political opposition. In 2012, the Electoral Court validated the signatures collected by the Colorado Party for a plebiscite on lowering the age of criminal responsibility while the National Party successfully used the "fast track" to call a pre-referendum consultation on the law legalizing abortion that came into force in 2012. When this took place, however, it failed, obtaining less than 10 percent citizen support.

To some extent, the right appears to have appropriated an opposition strategy that, as seen above, had served the FA well. There was, however, an important difference between the right's and the FA's use of MDD. In the MDD "from below" supported by the FA, the process was always initiated by important social organizations while those promoted by the right did not have the backing of significant social organizations. This implied a change in dynamics under which signatures were collected almost exclusively by parties, helped by only minor social organizations.

Although MDD have played a fundamental role in social mobilization in Uruguay, other forms of collective mobilization have also been used. In order to illustrate the dynamics of mobilization in this period and its diversity, the next section looks in more detail at one of the movements that was most important during these years: the trade union movement. Through this case, we will show how, through protests, social organizations brought their demands to the attention of the political system and, in this way, successfully overcame the most important points of disagreement between the country's rulers and civil society.

POLITICAL-SOCIAL ARTICULATION: THE CASE OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

When democracy had been restored, the country's only trade union federation, the PIT-CNT, returned to the traditions of the National Workers' Convention, the union federation that had existed before the 1973 coup. Although the PIT-CNT remained one of the country's most important social organizations, union membership began to decline steadily,

reaching a low in 2003 (Porrini 2008). However, with the election of the FA, the POS changed significantly, and the movement once again strengthened, with an explosive increase in membership rates. Some normative changes introduced by the left, particularly the reestablishment of the Wage Councils, had an important impact in revitalizing unions and, after the FA took office, union membership began to show a constant increase, reaching 330,000 in 2011,¹² equivalent to approximately 21 percent of the labor force.¹³

The PIT-CNT brings together unions from both the public and private sectors and a total of 37 unions and federations have a seat on its representative board.¹⁴ In 1989, the Cuesta Duarte Institute, a civil association, was also created on the initiative of the PIT-CNT to which it provides technical support through research and training. One of the PIT-CNT's important characteristics is the independence from political parties which is enshrined in its statutes and, although historically close to the FA, it has always jealously guarded its formal independence from this party and its factions. Internationally, it has also remained independent, maintaining good relations with different international workers' federations but not joining them. In this way, it seeks to prevent their political positions from impairing the internal equilibrium between its own different currents. It has, in other words, given priority to the internal unity of the Uruguayan trade union movement over its membership of external organizations.¹⁵

As seen in section "[Social Mobilization in Uruguay, 1985–2014](#)", the union movement has played a key role in different MDD initiatives promoted by social civil society. This was in addition to the classic forms of collective union mobilization, such as partial and general strikes, also seen during the period studied here. Given the existence of a single trade union federation, general strikes are an important means of pressure in Uruguay since, if approved by the PIT-CNT, they bring the entire country to a halt. The May 1 event, attended by thousands of workers in Montevideo, is also of central importance and, each year, has a significant media impact. As seen in section "[Social Mobilization in Uruguay, 1985–2014](#)", some very important specific initiatives also occurred in the context of the 2002 crisis (such as the Concertation for Growth and the march to the Punta del Este beach resort at the height of summer season).

The dynamics of social mobilization changed with the election of the FA. The PIT-CNT's traditional independence from political parties did not prevent it from having a special relationship with the FA. This was reflected in reforms that created a new model of labor relations in which

Méndez et al. (2009) identify two main elements. Firstly, they sought to foster collective bargaining and tripartism, reestablishing the Wage Councils¹⁶ and, secondly, to establish a new balance in relations between negotiators, employers, and unions. In 2009, the FA passed the Collective Bargaining Law whose terms included elimination of the government's monopoly on convening the Wage Councils,¹⁷ empowering any of the three parties to do so. In addition to this important law, it also presented a number of labor bills, marking a difference from previous governments. Moreover, real wages increased uninterruptedly between 2005 and 2013 while unemployment dropped to its lowest levels in the country's recent history (Bidegain Ponte 2013). The legal changes introduced in labor policy seem, therefore, to have had a bearing on many of the classic demands of the Uruguayan trade union movement.

In its central role in social mobilization in Uruguay, the trade union movement has regularly been present in the country's most important cycles of protests. Article 2, Clause C of the PIT-CNT's statutes states that "It will join together in a common front with all popular and student movements and organizations, but always within its principles, programs and statutes. To this end, the Federation of University Students of Uruguay will have the right to a voice on the Representative Board of the CNT".¹⁸ This reflects the federation's willingness to coordinate with other social organizations and the close alliance that has existed since 1966 between the worker and student movements. Similarly, a document issued by the PIT-CNT in 2011 demonstrates the persistence of this approach to mobilization. It indicated that: "Our union movement forms, together with social, student, housing cooperative, and pensioners' organizations, the social and political block for change which, in order to advance in democracy, confronts the block of power formed by the dominant classes in the quest to overcome the stage's principal contradiction which is an economy with social justice or greater dependence".¹⁹ This document refers to three emblematic movements of the period between 1985 and 2013: the student, cooperative, and pensioners' movements. The union movement has, in addition, collaborated and worked with other movements such as the feminist and sexual diversity movements and the movement for the legalization of cannabis.

Under the first two FA governments (2005–2015), its historic relationship with the PIT-CNT maintained its general characteristics, despite some disagreements that were logical given the change of political context.

Good relations were also favored by the fact that internal currents within the union movement close to the FA continued to dominate the PIT-CNT. However, as noted by Méndez and Senatore,²⁰ some more critical currents have gained strength, albeit still without becoming dominant. The fact that public-sector unions were the most critical of the Mujica administration indicates that, for left-wing governments, the cultivation of good relations with their traditional ally is a key challenge.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has pinpointed two factors that are particularly important for understanding social mobilization in Uruguay and its relation to the country's low level of malaise with democracy. Firstly, Uruguay has an institutional framework which, through MDD, allows social demands to be heard politically and, even, for binding decisions to be taken through these mechanisms. Secondly, there is the fact that, until 2005, the FA was in the opposition. During the first 20 years of the transition, it represented the political system's option of a change of power and, while in opposition, tightened its ties with social organizations, playing an important role in MDD campaigns that posed a threat to some government policies. The possibility of an FA election victory was viewed as a promising prospect by most social organizations, thereby serving as a reserve of legitimacy of the political system. Once in power, the FA implemented a series of political reforms that addressed a significant part of social demands. The use of MDD under right-wing governments and the policies implemented by the FA once in power, therefore, prevented the alienation of social actors from the political system. These are key factors for understanding the low level of malaise with democracy seen in Uruguay.

The absence of malaise and, indeed, of a crisis of legitimacy does not, however, imply an absence of social mobilization. On the contrary, between 1985 and 2005, social movements and the FA formed a front of opposition to the period's Blanco and Colorado administrations. Through the MDD, they proposed referendums on the laws of different governments and plebiscites on constitutional reforms. The campaigns to collect signatures and demonstrations in support of social demands were periods of intense mobilization during which social organizations worked together, occupying space and prompting public debate. The distinctive feature of these cycles of mobilization is that they occurred within an open POS which channeled social protest institutionally through the

MDD. Given that social demands could make themselves heard politically, levels of malaise with democracy remained low. It is important to emphasize that, in addition to these mechanisms of direct democracy, Uruguayan social movements also employed traditional forms of mobilization. Each of the movements discussed mobilized around its own agenda. However, throughout the period studied, no cycle of protests challenged the country's political institutions.

The FA's election victory in 2004 and its installation in government in 2005 implied a qualitative change for the different movements. Despite some more or less intense criticism of the speed of change, these governments addressed a significant number of the historic demands of different organizations. The FA also maintained fluid ties with social organizations, in most cases incorporating activists into the state institutional framework or working together with them on the design and implementation of public policies. This implied a POS that was even more open to social actors and the political system, in other words, demonstrated its capacity to adapt to social demands, with the option of a change of power also serving to contain malaise.

In the case of the period which began in 2005, a further important conclusion has to do with the growth of non-traditional movements. These social expressions are not studied in any detail in this chapter but, as from the FA's victory, there was an important development of movements in support of, for example, sexual diversity, the legalization of marihuana, and protection of the environment. In any case, the more traditional movements, such as the student, trade union, and cooperative movements, retained their historically central role in social mobilization. Perhaps the most interesting point to which to draw attention is the capacity shown by different organizations to generate platforms for coordinating support for specific common causes as in the case of the Uruguayan Coordinator for Same-Sex Marriage which brought together trade unionists and members of the cooperative movement with other movements that included the sexual diversity, Afro-descendants', pensioners', and student movements.

During the second FA government (2010–2015), the right-wing parties sought to appropriate the MDD which had traditionally been linked to the FA. The Colorado Party successfully collected the signatures required to call a plebiscite on lowering the age of criminal respon-

sibility which took place in 2014, but failed in its objective. Similarly, the National Party called a pre-referendum consultation against the Law on Voluntary Pregnancy Termination that came into force in 2012. Although it failed and a referendum did not take place, the campaign served to maintain the issue in public debate after the law came into force. These two initiatives appear to follow the road taken earlier by the FA—use of the MDD available under the Constitution—but there was one crucial difference: in the cases in which the FA supported initiatives of this type, it was social organizations that led the process while, in the case of the right-wing parties, there was no social organization or movement of weight behind them. The failure of the two initiatives led by the right-wing parties raises the question of whether, in the absence of an effective political-social alliance, it is feasible to use the MDD successfully in Uruguay.

NOTES

1. Malaise in representation is defined in Chapter 1 of this book as “a diffuse and sometimes confused feeling in ordinary citizens about the way they are represented and governed”.
2. But implied widespread social mobilization to collect signatures of support.
3. We will take a comparative approach, including Argentina and Chile, the other two countries examined in this book.
4. All the data from Corporación Latinobarómetro used here are available on its website from which it was downloaded (<http://www.latinobarometro.org>). We use data from the Latinobarómetro surveys corresponding to 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013.
5. The first three periods correspond to right-wing governments: the Colorado governments of Julio María Sanguinetti (1985–1990 and 1995–2000), the Blanco government of Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990–1995), and the Colorado government of Jorge Batlle (2000–2005) while the fourth period corresponds to the Frente Amplio governments of Tabaré Vázquez (2005–2010) and José Mujica (2010–2014).

6. This initiative, led by the Nuevo Espacio Party and supported by the Frente Amplio, sought to prevent directors of autonomous state bodies from immediately going on to stand in general elections in order to guard against them using public resources for their own positioning. The plebiscite took place together with the 1997 general elections and obtained 38 percent support.
7. Under the “fast track”, once citizens present signatures equivalent to 0.5 percent of the electorate, the Electoral Court calls two voluntary votes after which, if 25 percent support is obtained, the obligatory referendum is formally called. If neither of the pre-referendum votes achieves 25 percent, the initiative is considered to have failed.
8. A detailed account of this process can be found in Santos et al. (2006).
9. See <http://www.paginal2.com.ar/diario/elmundo/4-8603-2002-08-07.html> [visited on 01/06/2013].
10. See <http://www.lr21.com.uy/politica/69740-el-pit-cnt-resolvio-denunciar-ante-la-oit-prohibicion-sobre-la-marcha> [visited on 01/06/2013].
11. See http://historico.elpais.com.uy/03/01/20/pnacio_26765.asp [visited on 01/06/2013].
12. See interview with union leader Fernando Pereira: <http://www.espectador.com/noticias/210598/pit-cnt-preocupa-desacatos-de-sindicatos-de-empresas> [visited on 02/06/2013].
13. According to the World Bank, the country had a labor force of 1,600,000 in 2013. Data obtained from <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/jobs/country/uruguay> [visited on 25/08/2015].
14. See PIT-CNT website: <http://www.pitcnt.org.uy/front/base.vm#/mesa> [visited on 02/06/2013].
15. Interview with union leader Marcelo Abdala (13/06/2013).
16. Not convened since 1991.
17. Law available at <http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18566&Anchor=> [visited on 03/06/2013].
18. Statutes available on the federation’s website: <http://www.pitcnt.uy/index.php/el-pit-cnt/acerca-de/estatutos> [visited on 15/06/2013].
19. Document cited in Notaro (2011, 82).
20. See <http://www.vadenuuevo.com.uy/index.php/the-news/2543-38vadenuuevo02> [visited on 12/06/2013].

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Weak Malaise with Democracy in Uruguay

Daniel Chasquetti

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, Uruguay completed 30 years of uninterrupted democracy, a period during which elections regularly took place and the three main political parties had a turn in government in a context of total respect for liberties and political rights. This is reflected in international rankings which identify Uruguay as one of the region's most solid democracies.¹ This privileged situation is, however, not a recent or casual phenomenon but, rather, the product of an institutional and cultural process that began in the early twentieth century and has continued through to the present day with only two interruptions of democracy.²

Studying malaise with democracy in Uruguay may, therefore, seem a useless exercise lacking in practical interest. However, as indicated in the Introduction to this book, even the most successful democracies sometimes have problems and a better understanding of democracy's strengths and weaknesses can help to correct mistakes (Przeworski 2010).

This chapter seeks to answer several questions: how much malaise exists in Uruguay?, among whom does it exist?, what factors play a role in this phenomenon?, is there a relationship between malaise and support for

D. Chasquetti (✉)

Professor of Political Science, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay

democracy, social protest, or election abstention? The first section briefly describes Uruguay's institutional, economic, and social characteristics before going on, in the second section, to answer some of these questions by operationalizing the concept of malaise and empirically analyzing the segment of the population apparently affected by it. The third section examines the factors that influence citizens' attitude toward democracy while the fourth analyzes the relationship between malaise and democracy, focusing on the problem of social protest and abstention. Finally, the fifth section summarizes the findings.

DEMOCRACY IN URUGUAY

Democracy in Uruguay rests on two sets of institutions: the rules of the game which define how the different branches of government relate to each other and the electoral laws which largely determine the number of agents in the decision-making process.

Uruguay has a presidential system under which the head of government has important constitutional prerogatives as regards control of the agenda and legislative outcomes. As well as having total and partial veto powers, which serve as an efficient tool for controlling legislative outcomes, the president is also constitutionally the only player who can propose legislation in certain strategic areas (including the budget, taxation, pensions, and public sector employment). These constitutional features limit the proactivity of legislators, positioning the executive as the central actor of the policy-making process (Chasquetti and Moraes 2001).

Presidents are elected for a five-year term without the possibility of reelection. Until the constitutional reform of 1996, they were elected by simple majority and simultaneous double vote where political parties presented multiple lists of candidates for parliament.³ Since this reform, however, presidents have been elected by a two-round system, with simultaneous primaries held by all the political parties four months before the election. As the parliamentary election coincides with the first round of presidential election, legislative support for the president's party can be significantly lower than that achieved by the president in the run-off. Consequently, the rules of the game guarantee the election of presidents with great legitimacy of origin but not *per se* with strong legislative backing.

Uruguay's parliament has two chambers and its senators and deputies are elected through a system of proportional representation with closed lists for a term of five years. The Senate has 30 members elected for a

single national constituency, plus the vice-president of the Republic who acts as president of the Senate and of the General Assembly (joining of both chambers). The Chamber of Representatives is formed by 99 deputies elected for 19 constituencies of differing size.⁴

Finally, Uruguay's institutional system includes mechanisms of direct democracy. These take two forms: referendums against laws approved by parliament, providing they do not correspond to those areas where only the executive can present bills, in which 25 percent of citizens (through the collection of signatures or a call to the polls) can present a request for the law's repeal and, secondly, the constitutional plebiscites which require collection of the signatures of 10 percent of citizens on the Electoral Register. Both mechanisms have been used frequently over the past 30 years in order to (i) block reforms promoted by governments or (ii) include constitutional amendments to confer advantages on some group of society (Altman 2010).⁵

Uruguay's Political Parties

The principal comparative studies indicate that Uruguay has one of Latin America's most institutionalized party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Jones 2005). Its solidity, legitimacy, and key role in the decision-making process rest not only on the liberal and representative vocation historically shown by parties but also on the set of institutional rules that govern the functioning of the political system. The Colorado Party and the Nacional Party are among the oldest in the world. For almost a century and a half, they exercised a solid bipartisan predominance over the political scene, forging powerful identities, setting democratic institutions, and channeling the demands of the most diverse sectors of the population. The appearance of the Frente Amplio in 1971 marked the start of a new stage in the history of the party system and, after the restoration of democracy in 1985, resulted in a moderate multi-party format, with three main actors and two smaller ones.

The key characteristics of Uruguayan political parties include their factionalized structure and decentralization. Within each party, there are institutionalized factions which take decisions with a significant degree of autonomy. There is agreement among scholars that, given their influence over their party's positions and their capacity to discipline legislators and regulate careers, the factions are important actors in the political system. In addition, they have their own grassroots organizations which compete

for parliamentary seats and local executive and legislative positions.⁶ All the factions are, moreover, represented in the parties' leadership at the national level. Party conventions and congresses are important events in the life of a party but the most important body is its executive leadership. However, none of these structures has sufficient power to discipline the party as a whole.⁷ In the decision-making process, factions establish positions *ex ante* and reserve the power to disagree with the party when they deem it convenient, forcing *ad hoc* negotiations as, for example, at a party's caucus or in conclaves of party leaders in order to reach a common position.

Faction leaders tend to hold Senate seats although some, for different reasons, prefer to remain outside parliament. Their political power has a variety of roots but include the country's electoral rules which give them the power to present candidates and, therefore, to punish those legislators who do not behave in a disciplined manner. Some internal rules of the parliament on membership of committees and appointment to positions of authority also have a similar effect.

Over these 30 years of democracy, the institutions of Uruguay's political system have worked efficiently, with only rare episodes of locking between branches of government. The balance achieved has served to guarantee full functioning of democracy and this has, in turn, permitted the expression of very diverse points of view without affecting governability. The parties have had the authority and legitimacy to propose new avenues to the citizenry. Polls show that Uruguay has Latin America's most deeply rooted party system, with six in ten citizens feeling close to them or sympathy toward them.⁸

Uruguayan Society

Uruguayan society includes a strong trade union movement, a diversity of business associations organized by sector, and social organizations, either of a student or special-interest nature, that compete and/or cooperate with the parties to influence the democratic agenda.

Since the mid-1960s, the trade union movement has been grouped into a single federation, the Inter-Union Workers' Federation-National Workers' Convention (PIT-CNT), whose leaders have mostly been left-wing. As Yaffé (2005) has shown, this situation has permitted a "guiding interconnection" between unions and the left-wing parties (especially the Frente Amplio), which converge on policy matters and act as allies.

Collective bargaining at the level of all the economy and by sector, promoted by Frente Amplio governments since 2005, as well as legislation to foster and protect union activity have helped to strengthen the movement's structures.⁹ Wage Councils, which bring together employer, worker, and government representatives, have favored an increase in real wages and the formalization of large segments of the labor market. As a result, membership of the PIT-CNT has quadrupled over the past decade and it has emerged as one of the region's most powerful union movements.¹⁰

Unlike those of other Latin American countries, Uruguay's business associations are not grouped into a federation. They do, however, collaborate closely to exercise pressure, promote policies, and block government measures.¹¹ Their influence over the political process is not insignificant (they can often veto government or parliamentary decisions), but their capacity to capture parties and the political class is limited (Zurbriggen 2006).

The weight of the state university in the country's higher education system means that the student movement is grouped around the University Student Federation of Uruguay (FEUU). Its leaders have positions close to those of the left-wing currents of the Frente Amplio and the movement has an important capacity for mobilization. In addition, a number of vigorous organizations have been formed in recent years to promote specific issues such as sexual diversity, protection of the environment, the struggle against gender-related violence, and the defense of animals or children's rights. In many cases, their appearance has coincided with parliamentary discussion of related legislation or the emergence of problems in the public arena that were not previously perceived as such. They, of course, have less influence than the other organizations mentioned above, but their capacity for mobilization and for putting forward new demands has made for a more plural society.

In general, society and its organizations and the political parties relate to each other quite smoothly, thanks to the important ability shown by the parties to permeate these organizations and co-opt part of their leadership (Real de Azúa 1985). Tensions, conflicts, and contradictions, related to the public agenda and competition do, however, arise between party and social actors.

Problems, Difficulties, and Dilemmas

Despite the normal functioning of Uruguayan democracy, certain unresolved problems or dilemmas exist. Chasqueti and Garcé (2010) pointed out that, although the political system is stable, some institutional difficulties

persist such as the parliament's limited ability to exercise proper supervision of the executive, the ongoing inefficiency of the state bureaucracy, and the marked institutional weakness of the judiciary with, moreover, a budget that is not commensurate with the challenges it has to address.

Queirolo and Boidi (2013) pointed out that, since 2007, levels of civic participation in Uruguay have been very low compared to other countries in the region.¹² They take the view that this cannot be attributed to significant inequalities related to gender, race, age, or educational level and that the causes must, therefore, be sought in other factors of a political, economic, or institutional nature. Their study also showed that there is an important level of gender discrimination in Uruguay, particularly as regards job opportunities for women and their market wages.

Some analysts also increasingly suspect that there has been a slow process of citizen disaffection which is, at present, expressed timidly as and when institutional conditions permit. The results of parties' primary elections, in particular, have been studied as an indication of the level of citizen adherence to the democratic regime. Unlike all other elections, voting in these primaries is not compulsory and turnout has gradually dropped from 53 percent of those eligible to vote in 1999 to 46 percent in 2004, 45 percent in 2009 and, in 2014, 37 percent. In a newspaper interview, Rosario Queirolo played down the problem's importance, indicating that "low turnout is a normal phenomenon in non-compulsory primaries because people learn to use the rules of the game. On finding out that voting is voluntary, many citizens decide not to participate".¹³ However, another political scholar, Adolfo Garcé, was more pessimistic, interpreting the drop in turnout in these elections as a symptom of citizen apathy. Using the analytical prism of Przeworski (2010), Garcé asserted that Uruguayan democracy is beginning not to deliver on some of its substantive promises: "Voter participation is not very effective and its capacity to control the ruler is limited. Political equality exists alongside economic inequality and individual freedom comes up against demand for order. Democracy works better in protecting the status quo than in transforming it. Democracy frustrates, Przeworski maintains, most particularly in the case of those who pin their hopes of perceptible and visible change on the parties. I suspect that something along these lines is happening in Uruguay and it became apparent on Sunday, 1 June 2014" (Garcé 2014).¹⁴

In other words, not everything is rosy in Uruguayan democracy and it may have institutional and/or political problems that need to be examined in depth. In the next section, we will attempt to determine how much

frustration exists in Uruguayan democracy in order to assess whether a process of disaffection is occurring and whether it reflects a systemic pattern of behavior.

BUILDING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Torcal and Montero (2006) asserted that political disaffection is a “subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism, and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians, and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime”. This subjective feeling is reflected in a set of negative opinions about the government, institutions, and/or the parties that affect the capacity for representation and the legitimacy of the typical actors of democracy. As argued in the Introduction of this book, malaise is a combination of disaffection, disapproval, and distrust that can to some extent be measured through public opinion studies.

Disaffection refers to the distance that citizens feel from the parties that are the usual channels of political representation in modern democracies. In contrast to Torcal and Montero (2006), we adopt a unidimensional approach to disaffection, taking into account basically the distance between citizens and political parties.¹⁵ Disapproval, on the other hand, is related to citizens’ evaluation of the government’s performance. As argued in the Introduction to this book, their opinions depend on the economic cycle and how satisfied individuals are with their personal situation. These opinions may influence their predisposition to vote in elections and to support the political regime whenever asked to do so. Finally, distrust in democratic institutions (the powers of state, political parties, etc.) refers to the type of relationship established between the ordinary citizen and these institutions. When a citizen feels taken into account, trust will increase and vice versa.

The level of malaise with democracy is, therefore, assessed here on the basis of the combination of these three specific attitudes: disaffection, disapproval, and distrust. In order to measure disaffection, we use the question “Which of the following political parties best represents your interests, beliefs, and values?” (Question 32), applied in the public opinion survey carried out in February 2014 for the project, *A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay*, considering as disaffected all those who answer “None”. In order to measure disapproval, we use the question “Do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Mujica has performed as President of the Republic?”




Diagram 7.1 Citizens' attitudes toward democracy

(Question 34). Finally, in order to measure distrust, we use the question “How much trust do you have in the government?” (Question 21.5), taking into account all those who answer “Little trust” or “No trust”.

In citizens' opinions in these three dimensions, there are four possible combinations. Citizens whose opinions about the system are all positive (closeness to a party, approval of the president's performance, and trust in institutions) are “satisfied citizens”. When there is one negative answer (whatever it is), these are “annoyed citizens” while, in the case of two negative answers, we have “angry citizens” and, in the case of three negative answers (disaffection, disapproval, and distrust), “defiant citizens”. This is illustrated in Diagram 7.1.

From a substantive standpoint, satisfied and annoyed citizens should be treated as the same and as integrated into the political system since it is very likely that the difference between them lies simply in disapproval of the president. Annoyed citizens are very common in modern democracies and their attitude reflects their evaluation of the government's




Fig. 7.1 Attitudes toward democracy in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile (*Source:* Own calculations based on Questions 21.3, 32, and 34 of the survey carried out in three countries for the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay” (February 2014))

performance. The problematic citizens are, therefore, those who are angry or defiant. The former may have ceased to trust institutions or perhaps do not consider themselves represented because they feel distant from the party system, while defiant citizens are those who are furthest removed from the system of representation because they distrust, disapprove, and feel disaffected.

Malaise with Democracy in Uruguay

Measuring malaise with democracy in this way, we find that 45 percent of Uruguayan citizens are satisfied, 29 percent express some annoyance, and 21 percent are angry, while only 5 percent have a defiant attitude toward democracy.

If we apply the same procedure for the other countries included in this project, we find that Uruguay has the lowest level of malaise with democracy. While, in Uruguay, satisfied and annoyed citizens total 74 percent, the equivalent figures for Argentina and Chile are 42 percent and 27 percent, respectively. Similarly, only 26 percent of Uruguayan citizens are defiant or angry as compared to 58 percent in Argentina and 73 percent in Chile (Fig. 7.1).

The sociostructural attributes of Uruguayan citizens do not appear to make a significant difference when examined according to the four classic categories. Men and women are distributed in very similar proportions and the same also occurs with educational level, age, and a household’s socioeconomic level. This would indicate that the distribution of malaise is not related to sociostructural factors. Neither distributive conflict nor discrimination




Fig. 7.2 Attitudes toward democracy and sociostructural factors (Source: Own calculations based on Questions 21.3, 32, 34, 54, 55, 63A, and 63C of the survey carried out in three countries for the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay” (February 2014))

against certain segments of the population appears to explain different attitudes and preferences as regards the democratic regime (Fig. 7.2).

If malaise with democracy is lower in Uruguay than in other countries of the region and if preferences are not related to structural factors, the question that should be asked is what factors do fuel it.

EXPLAINING MALAISE WITH DEMOCRACY

Our dependent variable comprises three dimensions that are negative for democracy. The specialized literature maintains that disaffection is related to the capacity of political parties to represent citizen preferences

correctly, disapproval of the president to the country's economic situation, and distrust in institutions to a feeling of not being taken into account by governments (as discussed in the Introduction). Based on these assertions, we present below an analysis that controls for some of these relationships.

Dependent Variable

Attitude Toward Democracy We have so far treated this attitude as an ordinal variable whose variance depends on the sum of answers to three different questions about disaffection, distrust, and disapproval. In the light of the arguments put forward in the previous section, we decided to transform it into a dichotomous variable. Satisfied and annoyed citizens are grouped together, taking the value 0 and are referred to as "integrated into system" while angry and defiant citizens take the value 1 and are referred to as "dissatisfied with the system".

Independent Variables

Reaction to Political Scandals The stronger citizens' reactions to political scandals, the greater malaise with democracy should be. Citizens who are indignant can react by complaining, protesting, or becoming disaffected. The strength of the reaction was controlled using Question 25, "Did political scandals motivate you to take any of the following decisions? Change your vote, abstain, turn in a blank or spoiled vote, protest in some way, or not motivate you to do anything". As this question was put only to those interviewees who mentioned some political scandal (Question 24), the results were recodified as follows: 0 = does not mention problems or opts for the alternative "Did not motivate me to do anything"; 1 = "Change my vote" or "Protest in some way"; 2 = "Turn in a blank or spoiled vote"; and 3 = "Abstain". The assumption underlying this reasoning is that, the greater the indignation, the stronger the reaction will be. Changing the way a person votes or protesting is a systemic reaction (characteristic of the democratic system) while handing in a blank or spoiled a vote is an intermediate reaction and abstaining is to opt out of the system.

Interest in Politics The lower the level of interest in politics, the greater malaise with democracy may be. Disinterest was measured using Question 20, "How interested are you in politics?" Citizens who are not interested

in politics feel remote from the political system and consequently may feel annoyed or angry with it. There were four alternative answers to this question: very interested, quite interested, not very interested, and not at all interested.

Country's Economic Situation The worse a country's economic situation is perceived to be, the greater the malaise with democracy we would expect to find. Perceptions of the economic situation were measured through Question 10 of the survey, "How would you evaluate the country's current economic situation?" to which the possible answers were: very good, good, about average, bad, and very bad.

Personal Economic Situation The worse a person's evaluation of his or her own economic situation, the greater malaise with democracy should be. To measure this variable, we used Question 1.4, "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your personal economic situation?" with answers ranging from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied).

Being Included by the Government The lower the perception that government takes people into account, the greater malaise with democracy will be. This variable was measured using Question 47, "Which do you prefer, a government that solves problems rapidly without asking people their opinion or a government that takes longer to solve problems but asks people their opinion?" Answers to this question were binary, with 0 = prefers exclusion for the sake of government speed and 1 = prefers inclusion at the price of government slowness.

Satisfaction with Life The more dissatisfied a people are with their lives, the greater the probability of malaise with democracy. This hypothesis of a psychological nature suggests that a citizen who is happy (for reasons not studied here) will be more disposed to value democracy than a person who is unhappy. This variable appears in Question 2, "In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life?" with answers ranging from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). These six variables and the way they were measured are summarized in Table 7.1, with the sign of the expected relationship in brackets.

We also included a second model in the study through which we sought to control the classic sociostructural variables of age, educational

Table 7.1 Summary of variables

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Measurement</i>
Disaffection	DV. Attitude toward democracy (+)	Dummy: 0 (integrated); 1 (dissatisfied)
	Q25. Reaction to public scandals (+)	Ordinal: insensitive, changes vote, Spoils vote, abstains
	Q20. Interest in politics (+)	Ordinal: very, quite, not very, not at all interested
Disapproval	Q10. Evaluation of country's economic situation (-)	Ordinal: very good, good, about average, bad, very bad
	Q1.4. Evaluation of personal economic situation (-)	Continuous: 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
Distrust	Q47. Inclusion by the government (+)	Dummy: 0 (exclusion); 1 (inclusion)
	Q2. Satisfaction with life (-)	Ordinal: very, quite, not very, not at all satisfied

and socioeconomic level, and gender, using the binary logistic regression method. The results are shown in Table 7.2.

Model 1 has goodness of fit since the significance of its chi-squared is less than 0.05. It is able to classify 79.6 percent of cases (95.5 percent for integrated citizens and 29.4 percent for dissatisfied citizens). Except in the case of the variable personal economic situation, regression coefficients have the expected sign. There will, in other words, be greater malaise with democracy the more intense the reaction to scandals, the lower the interest in politics, the stronger the feeling of not being taken into account, the worse the evaluation of the country's economic situation, and the more dissatisfaction with life there is. Regression coefficients are statistically significant for the first four variables: reaction to scandals, interest in politics, being included by the government, and evaluation of the country's economic situation. In the case of personal economic situation and satisfaction with life, the level of significance is more than 0.05.

Model 2 includes the four variables that are statistically significant and adds four sociostructural variables. It also has goodness of fit and is able to classify 79.5 percent of cases. As expected, given the evidence presented in the figures of the previous section, the coefficients of these variables are not significant.

Table 7.2 Logistic regression: factors related with attitudes toward democracy

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>			<i>Model 2</i>		
	<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Reaction to scandals	0.282	0.079	0.000	0.277	0.076	0.000
Interest in politics	-0.217	0.097	0.025	-0.175	0.095	0.064
Being included by the government	0.790	0.330	0.017	0.865	0.306	0.005
Country's economic situation	-1.125	0.107	0.000	1.132	0.104	0.000
Personal economic situation	0.022	0.025	0.375			
Satisfaction with life	-0.086	0.050	0.085			
Socioeconomic level				0.094	0.052	0.071
Age				0.003	0.004	0.496
Educational level				-0.092	0.168	0.586
Gender (man)				0.023	0.155	0.864
Constant	-4.961	0.612	0.000	-5.024	0.546	0.000
Chi-squared	10.188 (Sig. 0.252)			9.016 (Sig. 0.341)		
-2 log likelihood	997.362 ^a			1.070.715 ^a		
Cox and Snell R ²	0.156			0.148		
Nagelkerke R ²	0.234			0.222		

Dependent variable: Attitude toward democracy (0 = integrated into system, sum of those satisfied and annoyed; 1 = dissatisfied, sum of those angry and defiant)

Observations included in the analysis: 1055 (87.8%). Lost cases: 147 (12.2%)

This statistical analysis, therefore, confirms some of the principal findings of the specialized literature. Evaluation of the economy (Levi 1998; Holmberg 1999) and the feeling of not being taken into account by institutions (Galston 2001) strongly affect attitudes toward democracy. In addition, it shows that interest in politics is related to a defiant attitude, ruling out the opposite idea that citizens become defiant as a result of excess interest and subsequent disappointment.




Fig. 7.3 Attitudes toward democracy and reaction to scandals (*Source:* Own calculations based on Questions 21.3, 32, 34, and 24 of the survey carried out in three countries for the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay” (February 2014))

Finally, the variable reaction to scandals has robust coefficients of correlation with malaise. The box plot below helps to understand the direction of the relationship. In Uruguay, the case most often cited in the survey (Question 24) was the closure of the PLUNA airline (29.5 percent of mentions). As can be seen, the median for each group of citizens (the thick black line in each box which represents 50 percent of the cases corresponding to the category indicated on the horizontal axis) coincides with “changes vote” on the vertical axis. The most likely reaction of citizens indignant about public scandals will, therefore, be to switch party. Satisfied citizens tend to be less sensitive or more passive in the face of scandals because some of them opt “to do nothing”. Annoyed citizens may also be insensitive or spoil their vote, or vote in blank. Defiant citizens are the only ones who may change their vote, remain insensitive, vote in blank, or even opt out of the system by abstaining (Fig. 7.3).

MALAISE WITH AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

At the beginning of this chapter, we raised the question of how the different attitudes toward democracy affect support for it. It seems reasonable to think that the greater malaise with politics, the lower support for the democratic regime will be.

We selected two classic questions of studies of democratic culture to serve as indicators of support for and satisfaction with democracy (Rose and Mishler 1996). The first asks citizens their opinion on the Churchillian definition of democracy, “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government” (Question 41.1) while the other refers to satisfaction, “How satisfied are you with the working of democracy in Uruguay?” (Question 44). In order to see whether attitudes toward democracy are affected by the role of the parties, we also included the question, “Some people say that democracy can exist without parties. How much do you agree with this statement?” (Question 42).

Table 7.3 combines these three questions with each of the four attitudes toward democracy. As can be seen, support for democracy, and satisfaction with it, and agreement with the idea that democracy cannot exist without parties are most prevalent among satisfied citizens. They are followed, in order, by annoyed, angry, and defiant citizens. As the categories relating to attitudes do not show inconsistencies, we can affirm that, as malaise with politics increases, support for democracy, satisfaction with it, and the view that democracy requires political parties tend to drop.

Table 7.3 Malaise with and support for democracy

<i>Question</i>	<i>Attitude toward democracy</i>				
	<i>Satisfied (%)</i>	<i>Annoyed (%)</i>	<i>Angry (%)</i>	<i>Defiant (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Supports democracy	84	74	67	65	77
Satisfied with democracy	92	79	63	49	80
Democracy cannot exist without parties	84	85	79	68	82

Source: Own calculations based on Questions 21.3, 32, 34, 41, 42, and 43 of the survey carried out in three countries for the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay” (February 2014)

Table 7.4 Attitude toward democracy and support, satisfaction, and opinion about the parties' role (Pearson correlation coefficients)

		<i>Attitude toward democracy</i>
Support for democracy	Coeff.	-0.142**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1175
Satisfaction with democracy	Coeff.	-0.236**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1154
Democracy cannot exist without parties	Coeff.	0.080**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.008
	N	1091

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 7.4 correlates support for democracy, satisfaction with it, and the questions about parties and politicians with attitudes. The correlation coefficients are statistically significant in all three cases. This robust relation tends to confirm the existence of a relationship between malaise and support for democracy.

Malaise with Democracy and Social Protest

In the previous section, we saw that citizens are not very sensitive to scandals and, when they do react, do so within the democratic rules of the game. This leads to the question of the relationship between malaise and social protest. In order to analyze this, we used the question, "In the past 12 months, have you participated in any of the following activities? Demonstrating in the street, signing a petition to the authorities, presenting a complaint or suggestion to some institution, expressing your opinion in social networks" (Question 7).

Figure 7.4 sets out the results for these four forms of social protest ordered by attitude toward democracy. Levels of protest are moderate in all four groups and the most frequent form of protest is the expression of opinions in social networks, with a maximum of 28 percent among satisfied citizens and a minimum of 18 percent among defiant citizens. Demonstrating in the street is most common among satisfied citizens (15 percent), illustrating the weakness of the relationship between protest and




Fig. 7.4 Malaise with democracy and social protest (*Source:* Own calculations based on Questions 21.3, 32, 34, 7.1, 7.2, 7.5, and 7.10 of the survey carried out in three countries for the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay” (February 2014))

malaise, while, among defiant and angry citizens, it drops to 9 percent and 3 percent, respectively. Signing a petition is used as a form of protest almost equally by three of the four groups (19 percent, 17 percent, and 18 percent) while presenting a complaint or suggestion to some institution is used uniformly across all four groups (21 percent, 23 percent, 19 percent, and 18 percent).

If social protest is not explained by malaise, the question that then has to be asked is what factors do explain it. Out of all the variables tested, we found that (i) interest in politics; (ii) evaluation of the country’s economic situation; (iii) a person’s age; and (iv) support for democracy all have some type of direct relationship with social protest. Table 7.5 shows four logistic regressions whose dependent variables are interviewees’ answers to the questions about social protest (where 1 means a positive answer and 0 a negative answer).

Table 7.5 Determinants of social protest, logistic regression coefficients (*Coefficient of significance in brackets*)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Street demonstrations</i>	<i>Petition</i>	<i>Complaint</i>	<i>Social networks</i>
Interest in politics	0.400 (0.004)	0.228 (0.030)	0.288 (0.056)	0.108 (0.522)
Country's economic situation	-0.429 (0.000)	-0.555 (0.000)	-1.008 (0.000)	-0.533 (0.000)
Age	0.035 (0.000)	0.012 (0.013)	0.004 (0.592)	-0.002 (0.758)
Support for democracy	-0.809 (0.007)	-0.454 (0.035)	-0.426 (0.195)	-0.598 (0.123)
Constant	1.208 0.041	1.939 0.000	4.192 0.000	4.295 0.000
-2 log likelihood	689.573	987.768	560.953	468.458
Included in analysis	1111	1111	1112	1113
Missing cases	91	91	90	89

As shown in the Table 7.5, evaluation of the economic situation is a robust explanatory variable of all four types of protest, with their probability of use increasing as perceptions of the economy become more negative. Interest in politics, age, and support for democracy are decisive for demonstrating in the street and also, albeit to a lesser extent, for signing a petition (of which the likelihood increases as age and interest in politics increase and support for democracy diminishes).

Malaise with Democracy and Election Abstention

We have left until last the much debated matter of abstention in the primary elections of the political parties. As indicated above, the decline in turnout when voting is not compulsory has prompted studies about the apparent development of a process of citizen apathy. Unfortunately, our source of information is a survey that took place four months before primaries so the data about likely turnout in them need to be treated with extreme caution. Queirolo and Boidi (2009) studied the difficulties experienced by public opinion surveys in forecasting turnout for primaries, finding that certain normative beliefs about democracy lead interviewees to answer insincerely. In a country with a strong democratic tradition where the memory of an 11-year dictatorship (1973–1985) remains fresh in people's minds, admitting that one plans to abstain can be difficult.

Table 7.6 Will you vote in the primaries in June?

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Certainly	505	42.0
Probably	207	17.2
Probably not	113	9.4
Certainly not	315	26.2
Doesn't know	63	5.2
Total	1202	100.0

Source: Own calculations based on Question 53 of the survey carried out in three countries for the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay” (February 2014)

We have, nonetheless, attempted to analyze the existence of a relationship between malaise with democracy and turnout at these elections. The question was phrased as follows, “In June 2014, all the political parties will hold primaries to define their presidential candidate and voting will not be compulsory. Do you think you will vote?” (Question 53). There were four alternative answers: certainly, probably, probably not, and certainly not. The results are shown in Table 7.6.

Results for “certainly” are comparable to actual turnout (42 percent as compared to 37 percent)¹⁶ and were, therefore, used as a positive value in the new binary variable we created and termed “turnout”. Figure 7.5 sets out the results for participation by attitude toward democracy, showing that satisfied citizens were more disposed than any other group to vote in the June 2014 primaries (25 percent). This is also the only group where those disposed to vote exceeded those who indicated they would not vote. In the other groups, disposition to vote decreases as malaise increases, dropping from 11 percent among annoyed citizens to 6 percent for angry citizens and 0.4 percent for defiant citizens.

This data confirm the existence of a relationship between participation in elections and attitude toward democracy. It does not, however, confirm the hypotheses about the phenomenon of apathy that are based on evidence from party primaries. If they were correct, all those citizens who were annoyed or angry should have said they would not vote in the June 2014 primaries but this was not the case. Similarly, satisfied citizens should have been disposed to turn out in large numbers, rather than being divided into practically equal parts. It seems reasonable to think that the probability of voting drops when malaise is greater but it is not altogether clear that malaise induces abstention and that well-being encourages participation. In this




Fig. 7.5 Participation in primaries by attitude toward democracy (*Source:* Own calculations based on Questions 21.3, 32, 34, and 54 of the survey carried out in three countries for the project “A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay” (February 2014))

case, turnout is evidently being influenced by other factors such as familiarity with the rules of the game, the characteristics of the contest in each party (some primaries are only to select the party’s presidential candidate while others also define parliamentary candidates and future nominations for departmental elections), and the degree of internal competition (in some, a number of candidates stand and in others, only one).

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have examined malaise with democracy in Uruguay. In line with the methodological framework presented in the Introduction to this book, we built a dependent variable based on three proxy questions

for disaffection, disapproval, and distrust. The variable attitudes toward democracy had four possible values: satisfied citizens, annoyed citizens, angry citizens, and defiant citizens. Application of this procedure showed that Uruguay is a country with a moderate level of malaise. Only a quarter (26 percent) of citizens are defiant or angry as compared to well over half (58 percent) in Argentina and almost three-quarters (73 percent) in Chile.

Attitudes toward democracy are not related to sociostructural factors. The weight of different socioeconomic segments, age ranges, educational levels, or gender does not explain the distribution of citizens as regards attitudes. The variables that do have a significant relationship with attitude toward democracy are evaluation of the economy, the desire to be taken into account, interest in politics, and strength of reaction to scandals. This latter variable is important because, when analyzed separately, it showed that the strongest reactions are found among defiant citizens who, in the face of a scandal, are inclined not to vote. Annoyed and angry citizens may turn in a blank or spoilt vote but will not, in general, abstain. For satisfied citizens, on the other hand, the only alternative is to switch to another party.

This chapter has also shown that there is a strong relationship between attitudes toward politics and support for democracy, satisfaction with it, and the role parties play in it. We can assert that, as malaise increases, support for democracy, satisfaction with it, and the view that it cannot exist without parties all diminish.

Analysis of the relationship between attitudes toward democracy and social protest shows that, in Uruguay, citizens are not very prone to protest. Contrary to what might have been expected, it is satisfied citizens who have proportionally demonstrated most in the streets, indicating that mobilization is related not so much to annoyance as to political and/or organizational factors. However, protest most frequently takes the form of expressing an opinion in social networks which gives us an idea not only of the increasing importance of internet but also of the citizenry's passiveness. The principal conclusion as regards this aspect of the study is that malaise with democracy does not explain protest and that the most important factor for its development is citizens' evaluation of the country's economic situation. This is followed, albeit with much less weight, by interest in politics, people's age, and support for democracy.

Finally, taking advantage of the fact that our survey took place four months before party primaries, the study also analyzed the problem of low turnout in these elections. This showed that satisfied citizens are the most inclined to vote and that disposition to vote drops as malaise increases. However, this does not appear to be the sufficient evidence to support the

idea that Uruguay is incubating a process of citizen apathy and, instead, seems to indicate that other factors such as familiarity with the rules of the game and the characteristics of the intra-party contest are at work.

NOTES

1. Rankings published by Freedom House are available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>, those of Polity Project at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/index.html>, the data of Corporación Latinobarómetro at <http://www.latinobarometro.org/>, and the World Bank's Governance Indicators at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2010/>
2. The first interruption occurred in 1933 with the self-coup of President Terra who sought rapid reinstitutionalization through constitutional and legal reforms. The lack of legitimacy of the two governments elected under this institutional format (1934 and 1938) meant that effective redemocratization did not occur until 1942 when a new constitutional reform was implemented. The second interruption was the 1973 coup which led to a military dictatorship similar to those seen in other Latin American countries during this decade. This 11-year dictatorship was the only period of the twentieth century in which Uruguayan governments were not elected and the political parties were out of power (Chasqueti and Buquet 2004).
3. In this way, voters chose in a single act, a party (slogan), a faction (sub-slogan), and a list of candidates. Under these conditions, the president had the effective support of only part of his party, affecting the way he governed from the beginning of his term.
4. Seats are allocated taking into account firstly the parties' vote in the country as a whole. They are then distributed based on the quotients of the parties' votes in each constituency. Since constituencies for both chambers are large, the parties' representation in parliament tends to be extremely proportional.
5. The evidence indicates that these undertakings have been successful when sponsored by an alliance between opposition parties and factions and social organizations of different political tendencies (Altman 2002).
6. There are 19 departments, each with a governor, and a 31-member Departmental Junta. The third level of government comprises 116 municipal governments led by a Council with five members and chaired by the mayor.
7. The evidence of the past decade indicates that a party's leadership can, in general, align it behind its political positions but sometimes has to have recourse to internal party rules such as declaring an issue a political matter or, in other words, real enforcement of discipline.
8. Another indicator of their strong roots has to do with the electoral system and, in particular, with the presentation of candidates. Since voters must choose between lists put forward by the party's factions and these lists

- include as many candidates as positions up for election, plus three substitutes for each candidate, there are over 10,000 candidates for parliamentary seats. Given that Uruguay has a small electorate, with only just over 2 million voters, this implies one candidate per 200 voters.
9. A number of laws approved since 2005 have favored the development of an organized union movement. They include the Trade Union Immunity law, the Collective Bargaining Law, and the Law on Homogenization of Benefits for Union Leaders.
 10. In 2005, the PIT-CNT had 100,000 members and, ten years later, over 400,000. See <http://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/pit-cnt-supero-afiliados-preparan.html>
 11. The 25 main business associations represent some 260,000 employers from sectors that include agriculture, construction, banking, commerce, the media, tourism, manufacturing, software development, and cold storage and freezing plants as well as small- and mid-sized businesses. See <http://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/bloque-camaras-empresariales-se-declararon.html>
 12. On community participation, for example, Uruguay ranks last out of 26 countries (Queirolo and Boidi 2013: 56).
 13. See <http://www.larepublica.com.uy/lo-que-dejaron-las-internas/461031/>
 14. Garcé states that “despite the promises of the Frente Amplio and its efforts in government, social inequality persists; party programs have lost variety as a result of centripetal competition; political leaders act with an important level of autonomy with respect to their own voters; there are not sufficiently robust answers to demands for order and security”.
 15. For these authors, the concept of political disaffection has two dimensions. The first is institutional and is related to levels of institutional trust and evaluation of the regime’s response capacity while the second is the absence of political commitment and is related to the level of interest in politics and the internal effectiveness of democracy.
 16. In these elections, 2,668,775 citizens were eligible to vote and 989,696 (37.08%) did so.

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Political Congruence in Uruguay, 2014

Daniel Buquet and Lucía Selios

INTRODUCTION

In a bid to contribute to debate about mounting citizen malaise with democracy, this study analyzes political congruence in Uruguay in 2014. Research into congruence seeks to identify and explain the levels of representation produced by democracy in the understanding that its performance depends on the citizenry being adequately represented by the political system. If malaise in representation implies a certain discomfort with the experience of feeling represented (as the introduction to this book asserts), which implies that it has to do with a subjective dimension of representation, then congruence or, rather, its absence could be the objective root of this situation. Or, expressed positively, the existence of high levels of congruence could explain low levels of malaise.

Different approaches have been used to analyze political representation such as the study of the composition and actions of the elites, the analysis of citizens' perceptions of the quality of representation, and the approach that focuses on linkages between elites and citizens or, in other words, political congruence (Otero and Rodríguez-Zepeda 2010). All

D. Buquet (✉) • L. Selios
Universidad de la República, Uruguay

these issues are related to the quality of democracy and the problems of growing citizen discontent with politics.

Work on democratic representation by North American and European scholars, in particular, has tended to focus on political congruence, a concept that seeks to gauge the extent to which the political preferences of citizens and their representatives coincide. If applied to the political system as a whole, it serves as a measure of the quality of representation (collective congruence) or, when applied to specific political parties and their voters, as an indication of the programmatic linkage of representation (dyadic congruence) (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Dalton et al. 2011).

Despite the concept's relevance, little and only incipient work on congruence has so far been undertaken in Latin America. The few comparative studies that exist can be divided into those that focus on linkages between parties and voters and those that look more generally at the congruence between the representative and the represented. Although most of these studies use surveys to compare the opinions of legislators and citizens, few measure the concept of congruence in the same way, leading to often contradictory results and an even more limited understanding of the phenomenon. In this context, case studies are crucial in order to learn more about how political representation works and the consequences it may have in the future. This is particularly so because, as asserted in the introduction to this book, historic transformations and the very dynamics of politics have significant effects on representation that can only be captured through in-depth studies.

For the first time, this study looks in detail at political congruence in Uruguay as regards democratic values, preferences, and policy evaluation, examining both the congruence between voters and their parties' legislators (dyadic) and between the citizenry as a whole and the legislature in general (collective). In addition, it employs an approach which is relatively new in methodological terms and offers alternative ways of comparing legislators' and citizens' opinion distributions (Powell 2009; Golder and Stramski 2010; Andeweg 2011).

The first section looks at the relevance of congruence as an indicator of political representation and how it relates to citizen malaise and proposes the concept's operationalization as it refers to both the use of sources of information and the way in which congruence is measured. In the next section, we present the case of Uruguay, focusing on its democratic tradition and the evolution of its party system. Finally, in the third section, we analyze the results of surveys of the political elites and public opinion and the levels of congruence they reveal.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, CONGRUENCE, AND CITIZEN MALAISE

In contemporary democracies, representatives must obtain their authority from the people and, to this end, be accountable to citizens and periodically receive authorization from them in order to ensure democratic responsiveness (Manin 1998; Pitkin 1985; Przeworski et al. 1999; Perrin and McFarland 2008) or, in other words, to ensure that government decisions are in synch with the people's preferences, interests, and expectations in a dynamic process of representation through accountability.

To illustrate how these expectations are transformed into public policies, an idea often used is that of the "chain of responsiveness" (Powell 2004; Przeworski et al. 1999: 9) through which inputs or social demands are fed into the political system and representatives translate them into public policies or outputs. Public policies are, however, not necessarily the result of the representatives' preferences since other factors that develop in the backstage of politics (Papadopoulos 2013) or distort representation through the institutions of the democratic ladder (Perrin and McFarland 2008) can play a decisive role (for example, technocracy or corporate interests). However, beyond the way in which public policies are generated and how responsiveness should be achieved in a democracy, it is important to bear in mind that, if legislators are not capable of channeling citizens' demands, problems of systemic response to their needs and demands are likely to occur. A lack of response "overheats" the system and can often result in discontent, malaise, and even political disaffection, seriously affecting participation levels and citizens' engagement with public affairs (Torcal and Montero 2006).

When analyzing how representation works, it is, therefore, crucial to look in detail at the political congruence between the preferences of citizens and their representatives (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Siavelis 2009; Luna and Zechmeister 2005). This is particularly so in the case of Uruguay where congruence between citizens and their representatives has not been studied in depth. The literature has, nonetheless, indicated that it is a country with a system of parties that is stable, consistent, differentiated, and ideologically and programmatically connected with voters under a proportional electoral system, conditions that suggest high congruence between parties and voters. Indeed, comparative studies have found a level of congruence that is quite high for Latin America, although similar to that seen in Chile (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, 2010) or Peru and El Salvador (Otero and Rodríguez-Zepeda 2010). The apparently somewhat

contradictory results of these studies can be interpreted as questioning the theories of congruence based on the design of institutions but, above all, serve as a reminder that different analytical strategies produce different conclusions¹ and that much remains to be learned about responsiveness and representation in each country.

Analysis of congruence provides an insight into the level of agreement between the preferences of the representative and the represented. As Dalton asserts, it “is a meaningful test because it determines whether political decision makers enter the policy process with the same policy preferences as the public. This is the basic goal of representative government” (1985: 275). Its measurement, however, represents a number of challenges in the empirical approach that are not always addressed as problems. They include the scope and substance of representation as well as the sources of information and the adequacy of the measurements.

In terms of scope, this study combines both the collective vision of representation and the dyadic one which aims to gauge the capacity of political actors to reflect their own electorate’s preferences and opinions. It is important to bear in mind that these visions refer to different relations of representation. Collective congruence is systemic in nature and reflects the capacity to be responsive to the citizenry shown by representatives as a group. When it is absent, the result may be discontent among the population. Dyadic congruence, on the other hand, measures parties’ capacity to reflect their voters’ opinions and the latter’s level of identification with them. Absence of congruence of this type may foster party dealignment, leading to a loss of electoral support for some parties and increased citizen dissatisfaction.

In order to measure congruence, we have opted to use coordinated surveys of the elite and public opinion that were carried out at the same time. This was chosen as the best strategy because it is based on positions as reported by representatives themselves, thereby avoiding the problems of subjectivity that arise when using the opinions of experts as well as the problems of endogeneity that occur when using only opinion polls. In this way, a problem of representation is said to exist when the preferences of representatives do not coincide with those of their publics.

In addition, we employ a many-to-many strategy since this best reflects the concept of representation understood as the relation between two groups of individuals (Golder and Stramski 2010; Andeweg 2011). This implies that comparison of distributions serves as a more conceptually appropriate criterion for capturing congruence as a collective phenomenon and between each party and its electorate.

Specifically, we work with density functions and use their common area to measure congruence (Andeweg 2011).² The resulting indicator of the concept of congruence is simple and intuitive since it can be represented as the overlap between the two distributions, with the index varying from 0 to 1 where 0 represents a total absence of congruence and 1 perfect congruence.³

THE URUGUAYAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Within Latin America, Uruguay has been highlighted for its greater long-term stability. The comparative literature on the region has attributed its party system with a high level of institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Jones 1995; Payne et al. 2006), which implies that its political parties have strong roots in society. The strength and persistence over time of linkages between Uruguayans and their parties have also been highlighted and documented by the specialized literature on the subject (Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Otero and Rodríguez-Zepeda 2010).

The notion of institutionalization of party systems, which could now be considered classic, is closely associated with the idea of stability, particularly in the electoral field. Uruguay's party system has, however, undergone very significant transformations in recent decades. Until the 1960s, it was a two-party system dominated by old traditional parties—the Colorado Party (PC) and the Nacional Party (PN)—but has since become a multi-party system under which a new left-wing party—the Frente Amplio (FA), created in 1971—has displaced the traditional parties from government.

The change that has occurred in this period consists in an electoral realignment that is reflected in a systematic decline in the vote of the traditional parties and the resulting electoral growth of the left-wing opposition, culminating in its election victory in 2004 (Fig. 8.1). The increase in the vote of the “challenging” parties has its roots in a long-standing lack of conformity on the part of Uruguayan public opinion that may have had its origins in the mid-1950s with the start of the crisis of the import-substitution development model. From that time onwards, the idea of a country in crisis and suffering constant deterioration became an idiosyncratic feature of Uruguayan culture that Luna (2002) termed “structural pessimism”.

This change is related to the ability of nontraditional parties and, particularly, the Frente Amplio to capitalize electorally on this chronic lack of conformity on the part of Uruguayans. The most important aspect of the




Fig. 8.1 Election results in Uruguay, 1942–2014 (*Source:* Own calculations based on data from the Politics and International Relations Area of the Data Bank of the Social Sciences Faculty of the Universidad de la República)

realignment that occurred over the course of several decades was the configuration of two ideologically differentiated blocks. According to voting intention polls, voters' ideological self-placement is the factor that shows a decisive correlation with their electoral preferences. The position in which they place themselves on the left-right scale appears to be the principal cognitive reference that guides Uruguayans' voting behavior. This is absolutely clear in the second rounds of presidential elections where the candidates are reduced to one from each block. In 1999, positions on the left of the scale were directly correlated with voting for Vázquez and those on the right with voting for Batlle (Canzani 2000). In 2009, something similar also occurred with Mujica and Lacalle (Canzani 2010). In other words, Uruguayans' electoral behavior can be said to be completely ideologized.

The importance of ideological differentiation in electoral competition is related to the structural crisis that had its roots in the 1950s and the reaction of the political parties. Views favorable to the market and reduction of the size of the state increasingly gained ground in the traditional parties, leaving defense of the state, public-sector jobs, the state's role in the economy, and its social welfare regime even more in the hands of the left. However, at the same time as the traditional parties shifted to the right of the ideological spectrum, the Frente Amplio moderated its discourse, shifting progressively toward the center in a process that has been universally recognized by experts in the field (Garcé and Yaffé 2006; Yaffé 2005).

Since public opinion polls became available, they indicate that the Uruguayan electorate is ideologically distributed in a normal curve and that self-placement on the ideological scale and voting intention are strongly correlated. Those on the left vote almost exclusively for the Frente Amplio, while those on the right vote for one of the traditional parties, and those in the center are divided between the two blocks. The political elites also show a clear ideological differentiation that is consistent with citizen perceptions. In other words, Uruguay's political system is one of the most ideologically polarized in Latin America (Alcántara and Luna 2004). However, this polarization does not imply high levels of conflict but instead that voting decisions are taken on programmatic, rather than clientelistic or personalistic, grounds.

The process of realignment eventually led to the consolidation of two blocks as such and they appear to have stabilized, each occupying around half of the political spectrum. The last two elections (2009 and 2014) have the characteristics of elections that take place during a period of stability in the configuration of the party system and not of those that take place during a period of transformations. Analysis of this process confirms the idea that, in the past decade, Uruguay's party system has reached a new competitive equilibrium (Buquet and Piñeiro 2014). In this context, it is particularly relevant to study congruence between the political elites and citizens on the basis of data collected in 2014 since, rather than providing a snapshot of a single moment in time, it serves to characterize a stable configuration that will surely persist for a good length of time and where left-right ideology plays a key role in electoral alignment.

ANALYSIS

Although the levels of congruence between the political elites and the citizenry in Uruguay are relatively high compared to other Latin American countries, a closer look at concrete aspects reveals that the situation is heterogeneous. In this study, we analyze three dimensions of congruence: (i) ideology and issues; (ii) democratic values; and (iii) policy evaluation, identifying areas of marked congruence between the political elites and public opinion in general as well as within the different political blocks and areas where the elites' opinions differ significantly from those prevailing among citizens. Dyadic congruence is analyzed by blocks and not parties. This is for two reasons. First, the weight of the Colorado Party is insufficient to permit differentiated analysis and, secondly, as indicated above and further discussed below, the profiles of the Nacional and Colorado parties are ideologically very similar.

Congruence on Ideology and Public Issues

Self-placement on the ideological scale is an excellent starting point for analyzing congruence in Uruguay. It not only serves to summarize issues, evaluations, and values but, over the past 50 years, has proved important in structuring political competition and voting patterns in the country. There are various ways of observing ideological congruence, but here we apply an analysis based on the models of representation proposed by Kitschelt et al. (1999) and then present the results in terms of the overlap discussed above.

Comparison of ideological means for the case of Uruguay indicates a situation of “moderate representation”⁴ both in general and for each of the party blocks (Fig. 8.2). Both blocks’ legislators are clearly to the left of citizens who follow the same order but more toward the right of the scale. The difference within the traditional block is significantly larger than in the Frente Amplio.

However, when the position where citizens place the political parties is used, instead of the positions of the legislators themselves, the model of representation becomes almost perfect, with the mean position attributed to the parties being practically identical to that of the citizens (Fig. 8.3). This congruence supports the notion that the left and right are a form of heuristic shorthand and play an important role in electoral behavior in Uruguay since, from citizens’ standpoint, the parties they vote for have, on average, their same positions. Similarly, comparison of the two alternatives shows that using only public opinion polls to measure congruence,




Fig. 8.2 Ideological positions of citizens and legislators in Uruguay, 2014 (Source: Calculated on basis of means for each group. The *dotted line* in the middle indicates collective positions while the *green line* corresponds to the legislators and voters of the FA and the *red line* to those of the traditional parties)




Fig. 8.3 Ideological positions of citizens and those attributed to parties (*Source:* Calculated on basis of means for citizens. Means for parties are calculated using the position that each citizen attributes to his or her party. The *dotted line* in the middle indicates collective positions while the *green line* corresponds to the legislators and voters of the FA and the *red line* to those of the traditional parties)

although a widespread practice (Dalton 1985; Golder and Stramski 2010), tends to exaggerate congruence while surveys of legislators eliminate citizen subjectivity and increase the accuracy of results.

If we accept that the most appropriate source of information is that which includes surveys of both legislators and citizens, then we can conclude that representation in Uruguay coincides with the model of moderate representation (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Despite a certain level of ideological incongruence, the party blocks are, therefore, ideologically consistent in that they are able to capture the electorate located in their same ideological space.

Figure 8.4 shows the normalized distributions of citizens' and legislators' ideological self-placement by political party. Frente Amplio voters are distributed toward the center-left of the scale while those of the Colorado and Nacional parties share the same ideological space between the center and right of the scale. There is, however, an important overlap in the center between voters of the traditional parties and the Frente Amplio. Similarly, in the case of legislators, the left is monopolized by members of the Frente Amplio while legislators of the Nacional and Colorado parties are located slightly more to the right.

Legislators and citizens are similar in terms of the ideological distribution of the political blocks, albeit with the former located further to the left. Frente Amplio voters and elites monopolize the left of the scale while, in the case of the traditional parties, both voters and legislators share similar spaces on the center-right.




Fig. 8.4 Ideological distribution of citizens and legislators by party (*Source*: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out)

When congruence is calculated as the overlap between legislators' and citizens' distributions as a whole, the marked shifted to the left in the former's ideological distribution means a somewhat lower result. Collective congruence, which compares the ideological distribution of all the citizenry with that of all legislators, reaches only 55.4 points out of 100 and is shown as the shaded overlap in Fig. 8.5. In this graph, it is apparent that the preference distribution of citizens is more heterogeneous than that of legislators where center-left positions predominate.

This medium level of congruence reflects, in turn, a higher level in the Frente Amplio block and a lower level in the traditional block. Dyadic ideological congruence reaches 64.62 points between Frente Amplio voters and legislators and 44.08 points in the traditional block (See Table 8.1). In other words, the overlap between the distributions of Frente Amplio voters and legislators is greater than between those for voters and legislators of the traditional block.

Although the model corresponds to that of moderate representation, ideological congruence is not very high. This is because ideological preferences among the elites range less widely and are more to the left than among citizens. This is particularly marked in the traditional block where voters tend to position themselves on the right of the scale and legislators in the center.

The left-right distinction is widely recognized as a heuristic shortcut (Downs 1957) which simplifies the arenas of conflict related to preferences




Fig. 8.5 Ideological distribution of citizens and legislators (*Source:* Calculated on basis of surveys carried out)

over issues and citizen values. It is, therefore, useful to complement the analysis of ideological congruence with citizens' and legislators' congruence as regards policy priorities.

As shown in Fig. 8.6, legislators and citizens collectively do not share exactly the same priorities as regards the country's problems. For 40.4 percent of citizens, crime is the principal problem while, for 47.9 percent of legislators, it is education. Although education is also identified as the principal problem by almost 30 percent of citizens, crime is the principal problem for only 11.6 percent of legislators. Similarly, while a fifth of legislators put inequality in first place, it is mentioned by only 2.3 percent of citizens. Moreover, issues such as infrastructure and discrimination are important for some legislators but not for the population in general while, inversely, issues such as employment, inflation, and health care are mentioned by citizens but not by legislators.




Fig. 8.6 Country's principal problem according to legislators and citizens (*Source*: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out)

Analysis of identification of the country's top principal problems by political block (Fig. 8.7) reveals that there is practically no difference between citizens' answers regardless of whether they support the Frente Amplio or one of the traditional parties. In both cases, they mention crime, education, and inequality in very similar percentages. There are, on the other hand, very clear differences among legislators. Among those of the Frente Amplio, almost a third cites education and another third inequality while crime is mentioned only by 6.3 percent. Among the legislators of the traditional parties, on the other hand, 70 percent identify education as the principal problem, 22.5 percent mention crime, and the remaining 7 percent is divided equally between infrastructure, inequality, and discrimination. In other words, since crime and, in second place, education are identified by citizens as the principal problem, the answers of the traditional parties' elites are more congruent with their voters and citizens in general than those of the Frente Amplio elites.

Although it is true we do not know what happens in the case of other political preferences that could be related to the ideological distinction, we see that, despite the ideological congruence that exists, citizens' perceptions of the country's principal problems differ from those of their representatives. The most marked difference is between the voters and




Fig. 8.7 Country's top principal problems according to citizens and legislators by block (Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out)

legislators of the government party. Ideological congruence is highest in the Frente Amplio but its legislators and voters do not agree on the country's principal problems while the reverse situation exists in the traditional parties where there is greater congruence between voters and legislators on issues and less on ideological positions.

Congruence on Democratic Values and Policy Evaluation

As seen in the case of ideology, reasonable levels of collective congruence can conceal situations that are revealed to be very different when subject to dyadic analysis by political group, with one block showing a high level of congruence while, in another, it may be quite low. It is, therefore, interesting to look descriptively at the values and evaluations in which these different situations are reflected.

Table 8.1 shows the value of the index of congruence measured as the overlap for the different variables at both the collective and dyadic level. A key feature of the results is the broad consensus that exists as regards satisfaction with democracy. The vast majority of both citizens and the elites indicate satisfaction with the way democracy works in Uruguay. Collective congruence is high, reaching 75.2 points.

Table 8.1 Summary of collective and dyadic indices of congruence

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Collective congruence</i>	<i>FA block</i>	<i>Traditional party block</i>
Ideology and ISSUES	Ideological self-placement	55.4	64.6	44.1
	Country's principal problem	Low	Low	Medium
Democracy	Satisfaction with democracy	75.2	86.0	75.5
	Support for democratic system	73.4	80.3	65.1
	Government effectiveness vs. consultation	79.8	75.4	91.6
	Government order vs. freedom	33.1	43.6	25.5
	Parties and democracy	68.1	75.2	67.5
	Politicians and democracy	73.1	86.4	60.7
Policy evaluation	Evaluation of present economic situation	45.6	53.3	46.9
	Perception of evolution of poverty	54.1	56.6	69.9
	Perception of economic inequality	55.3	46.4	82.2
	Future economic situation	83.9	85.6	64.7

Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out
A graphic representation of these variables can be found in the Appendix

As shown in Table 8.2, almost three in four interviewees report being very or quite satisfied with the way democracy works and only one in 30 is not at all satisfied. Satisfaction is even more widespread among the political elite where over nine of ten indicate that they are quite or very satisfied, no one reports not being satisfied at all, and an absolute majority is very satisfied. This attitude is, moreover, common to both political blocks, although congruence is slightly lower in the traditional block (75.5 points as compared to 86 points for Frente Amplio legislators and voters).

Levels of congruence on satisfaction with democracy are practically identical to those on support for the democratic system seen in Table 8.1. Collective congruence for the latter reaches 73.4 points, while dyadic

Table 8.2 Satisfaction with democracy, citizens and legislators (%)

	Citizens	Legislators
Very satisfied	27.3	51.2
Quite satisfied	45.8	41.3
Not very satisfied	18.6	6.6
Not at all satisfied	3.3	–
DNK/DNA	4.9	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out

Table 8.3 Preferences as regards government action, citizens and legislators (%)

	<i>Collective</i>		<i>Frente Amplio</i>		<i>Traditional parties</i>	
	<i>Citizens</i>	<i>Legislators</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Legislators</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Legislators</i>
Solves problems rapidly without asking people their opinion	30.5	15.7	28.0	6.3	36.8	35
Takes longer to solve problems but asks people their opinion	64.1	78.5	69.1	88.6	56.6	60
DNK/DNA	5.4	5.8	2.9	5.1	6.6	5
Total	100.0	100.0	100	100	100	100

Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out

congruence is higher between Frente Amplio voters and legislators than between those of the traditional parties where the values of the elites are slightly more democratic than those of their electorate.

The support for and satisfaction with democracy shown by Uruguayans is also expressed in a quite widespread preference for a government that consults people rather than solving problems rapidly. In this case, collective congruence reaches almost 80 points since both the elites and the citizenry appear to prefer a fluid relationship between the government and citizens rather than the government effectiveness that could be considered comparable to the notion of delegative democracy (O'Donnell 2007).

Table 8.3 shows that almost two-thirds of citizens prefer consultation as compared to less than a third who prefer a government that solves

Table 8.4 Government as guaranteeing order/freedom, citizens and legislators (%)

	<i>Citizens</i>	<i>Legislators</i>
Prefers a government that guarantees order in the country	67.1	5.0
Prefers a government that guarantees individual liberties	28.1	89.3
DNK/DNA	4.8	5.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out

problems quickly. Again, this profile is more marked among the elite where almost four in five prefer consultation and only 15 percent opt for effectiveness. There is, however, a difference between Frente Amplio legislators where a preference for consultation is more marked and those of the traditional parties where, as among citizens, opinions are more divided. In this case, congruence is higher between the voters and legislators of the traditional parties than between those of the Frente Amplio whose elites favor consultation more than their voters.

In the context of this level of correspondence between the preferences of elites and citizens, it is particularly striking to observe the very significant discrepancy that is seen between the two groups when the question asked is about order and freedom (Table 8.4). In this case, there is a high level of incongruence between citizens and their representatives, with the collective congruence index dropping to only 33.1 points (Table 8.1).

On the one hand, a preference for a government that guarantees order rather than liberties clearly predominates among citizens, with two in three opting for this alternative. Among the elites, on the other hand, an overwhelming majority of nine out of ten puts individual liberties before order (Table 8.4). It could be said that the citizenry values participative democracy but with an authoritarian component while the elite also values participation but from a clearly liberal position. This applies to both collective and dyadic congruence, although congruence is much lower in the traditional block (25.5 points) than the Frente Amplio (43.6 points (Table 8.1)).

In this sense, the surveys carried out show that there are some matters on which congruence is high at the collective level but reflects situations that are clearly different within the party blocks. One such case occurs with one of the most important issues included in this study: the need for

Table 8.5 Agreement with statement “there can be democracy without parties”, voters and legislators by political block (%)

	<i>Frente Amplio</i>		<i>Traditional parties</i>	
	Voters	Legislators	Voters	Legislators
Strongly in agreement	4.2	2.5	4.6	0.0
Fairly in agreement	10.2	8.9	10.5	2.5
Not very much in agreement	26.0	22.8	28.3	7.5
Not at all in agreement	52.2	65.8	50.7	90.0
DNK/DNA	7.3	0.0	5.9	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out

parties in a democracy (Table 8.5). On this question, there is a reasonably high level of congruence, although somewhat lower than for the question of the need for politicians in democracy. However, on this latter question, congruence is very high between Frente Amplio voters and legislators (86.4), but significantly lower in the traditional block (60.5) (Table 8.1).

Although both the elite and citizens mostly disagree with the idea that democracy can exist without political parties, there is a marked difference on this point between the Frente Amplio elite and the traditional elite. The distribution of answers for the former is much closer to public opinion than that for the traditional elite and, in particular, “not at all in agreement”, the answer given by a majority in all segments, receives less than two-thirds support from the Frente Amplio elite as compared to nine in ten of the traditional elite (Table 8.5). Here, the Frente Amplio elite is more congruent with its electorate, better representing a certain level of distrust of political parties on the part of citizens while this feeling is hardly represented at all by the traditional elite.

A similar, but inverse, situation is seen in the case of the evaluative dimension. When the question asked is about the evolution of poverty in Uruguay, congruence is not very high (55.3 points, see Table 8.1) with the discrepancy explained by the elite’s greater level of information about how poverty has dropped in recent years as compared to the general population which has yet to assimilate this information and, therefore, has a different perception (Table 8.6).

Incongruence on this point is particularly apparent between Frente Amplio legislators and citizens. While the former almost unanimously consider that poverty has dropped, barely over half of the party’s voters

Table 8.6 Evaluation of poverty in past five years, voters and legislators by political block (%)

	<i>Frente Amplio</i>		<i>Traditional parties</i>	
	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Legislators</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Legislators</i>
Has increased	17.1	1.3	34.9	15.0
Has shown no change	28.9	3.8	41.8	37.5
Has dropped	51.6	94.9	17.4	45.0
DNK/DNA	2.4	0	5.9	2.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out

Table 8.7 Perception of country's future economic situation, voters and legislators by political block (%)

	<i>Frente Amplio</i>		<i>Traditional parties</i>	
	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Legislators</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Legislators</i>
Will improve	43.6	53.2	19.1	0.0
Will not change	38.2	41.8	33.2	32.5
Will worsen	9.8	3.8	32.2	67.5

Source: Calculated on basis of surveys carried out

take this view. By contrast, the perception of the traditional elite is much closer to that of its voters and very close to the distribution of opinions among the population in general.

This situation is seen across the dimension of evaluations. As shown in Table 8.1 above, collective congruence is not very high in evaluation of the country's present economic situation. And, even though congruence is slightly higher regarding poverty and inequality, it is much lower in the Frente Amplio block than in that of the traditional parties. On the question about the future economic situation, however, there is a change in the pattern of congruence. Both the elites and citizens show great optimism, although this is more marked between government party legislators and voters than between those of the opposition. As can be seen in Table 8.7, the elites of the traditional block are far more pessimistic about the country's future economic situation than their voters.

CONCLUSIONS

In line with previous research, this study confirms the existence of two clearly differentiated ideological spaces in the Uruguayan political system. Each of the two political blocks occupies almost half of the ideological spectrum but share an important segment of center voters. Based on the empirical data analyzed, it can reasonably be concluded that the moderate levels of congruence found are related to the consolidation of a new equilibrium in political competition in Uruguay (Buquet and Piñeiro 2014). Ideology has, however, been losing weight in voting intention since 2005 (Canzani 2010; Selios and Vairo 2012) while retrospective evaluations have gained in importance. This phenomenon is reflected in the fact that the preferences of Frente Amplio voters are more moderate than those of their representatives while, in the traditional block, the reverse is true.

The weakening of the ideological connection between voters and their representatives is related to a heterogeneous situation as regards congruence on issues evaluative aspects and even attitudes toward the parties and the democratic system. In the case of perceptions of the country's principal problems, the opposition parties offer greater congruence than the government party and a similar situation is also seen in evaluation and retrospective perception of the policies implemented over the past five years.

In the case of democratic values, the study shows a high level of congruence on positive attitudes toward the democratic system and the way it works as well as on the importance of the existence of parties and, particularly, politicians for the functioning of democracy. Congruence on democratic values is high between Frente Amplio voters and legislators and slightly lower between those of the traditional parties where the values of the elites are somewhat more democratic than the mean for their voters.

Finally, as regards the way in which a government should behave, there is congruence on **how** it should represent citizens, with agreement on consultation in preference to effectiveness. There is, however, an important level of incongruence on the **substance** of this representation since, while the elites prefer the government to guarantee individual liberties, the citizenry tends to prefer it to guarantee order. This is certainly related to the low level of congruence that exists as to the country's principal problem where crime or public safety is a significantly greater concern for citizens than for the elites.

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that, in Uruguay, there is congruence between legislators and citizens on democratic, evaluative, and ideological values. However, the problems identified by government legislators are different from those identified by citizens and the former have a better evaluation of what has been achieved on inequality and of the country's economic performance. In this sense, there can be said to be a lack of responsiveness that could in future give rise to malaise.

Moreover, some of the traditional parties' voters express positions that are very different from those of their representatives, particularly as regards satisfaction with democracy and the importance of politicians. Although they represent only a small segment, their discontent may grow if they fail to find a political reference closer to their opinions. There is, in other words, a political space on the right, related to discontent with policies and to values that are less democratic and clearly anti-party, that, albeit small, is far from being represented by today's political parties. One indication of the electoral potential of this space is the important support obtained by an outsider candidate in Montevideo in the country's recent departmental elections.

Levels of congruence in Uruguay's political system are, nonetheless, reasonably high, which is consistent with the traditional view that its party system is strongly institutionalized. Over the past decade, the system, moreover, appears to have been in equilibrium, implying that changes should not be expected in the short term and that, if they do occur at some point, they will be gradual like those that led to the present situation.

NOTES

1. The first study uses party-voter linkages on different issues and policy preferences to measure congruence, while the second uses the ideological linkage between parties and voters. They also differ in the measurements and sources of information they use.
2. Defined as the sum of the minimum proportion of congruence of both density functions for each value on the ideological self-placement scale: $\sum_{c=1}^n \min(j_c; l_c)$, where j_c and l_c are the frequency of answers of the elite and citizens, respectively, for each category of the ideological scale. The value of congruence is obtained by adding the minimum values for each category of the ideological scale, j_c and l_c .
3. In order to measure ideological congruence, a recoded scale with five categories was used to avoid the problem of considering small differences as representing incongruence.

4. The model of moderate representation proposed by Kitschelt et al. (1999) occurs when there are differences between the position of parties and voters but the relative position is maintained, generating a system in which the parties are steered by voter preferences (segments inclined in the same direction).

APPENDIX: GRAPHS OF INDICATORS AND QUESTIONS

Graphs of overlaps. Blue: elite; red: public opinion; purple: overlap (indicates congruence).

By order:

* Not shown in graphs since they are two-category discrete variables.

Table 8.8 Variables used in public opinion survey by dimension, indicator and question number

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Question number public opinion Uruguay</i>
Ideology and ISSUES	Ideological self-placement	31
	Country's principal problem	(19) No
	Satisfaction with democracy	44
	Support for democracy	(41) No
	Government effectiveness vs. consultation	46
Democracy	Government order vs. freedom	47
	Parties and democracy	42
	Politicians and democracy	43
Policy evaluation	Evaluation of present economic situation	10
	Perception of poverty	14
	Perception of economic inequality	15
	Future economic situation	11



Fig. 8.8 Collective



Fig. 8.9 Frente Amplio




Fig. 8.10 Traditional block

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Uruguay: A Counterexample of Malaise in Representation: A Propitious Transformation of the Old Party Democracy

Jorge Lanzaro and Rafael Piñeiro

INTRODUCTION

In this comparative study, Uruguay serves as a contrasting case and could, in fact, be considered a counterexample of malaise. In this context and, indeed, a broader comparative horizon, the interest of Uruguay, with its distinctive features, lies precisely in the absence of significant signs in citizen attitudes and behaviors of political disenchantment or malaise in representation. This absence or, inversely, the causes of significant political satisfaction are what call for explanation. As Chasquetti points out in his chapter of this book (Chap. 7), some citizens in Uruguay, as in other contemporary democracies, do express a certain malaise but this is a limited phenomenon and within the parameters of the normal functioning of a democratic regime.

This chapter seeks to explain citizen satisfaction with political representation in Uruguay, drawing on the findings presented in the other three

J. Lanzaro (✉)

Instituto de Ciencia Política, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay

R. Piñeiro

Departamento de Ciencias Sociales y Políticas, Universidad Católica,
Montevideo, Uruguay

chapters of this book on the Uruguayan case: on congruence between parties and voters (Buquet and Selios, Chap. 8); the levels of disaffection, distrust, and disapproval expressed by citizens (Chasquetti, Chap. 7); and the relationship between social movements and the party system (Bidegain and Tricot, Chap. 6).

In line with the Introduction to this book (Joignant et al., Chap. 1), we take the view that there is not a linear relationship between satisfaction and the existence of an institutionalized and competitive party system, high congruence between the preferences of rulers and citizens, governments' economic and political performance, or certain institutional characteristics. Political satisfaction does not arise from these factors individually nor even a simple aggregation of them, but from a particular combination that characterizes the process of transformation of the party system in critical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991).¹ This is what has occurred in Uruguay in two crucial and related historical periods: (a) in the late 1960s through to the start of the dictatorship in 1973 and (b) after the democratic transition when the liberal transition takes place with its wave of pro-market reforms.

As described by Roberts (2014) and Lanzaro (2007, 2010), the way in which the party system began to change at the time of the crisis of the traditional two-party system in the late 1960s and, furthermore, the way this change continued and reached consolidation as from the 1990s, with the cycle of neoliberal reforms, resulted in a new programmatic structure, important levels of congruence, and a significant capacity to channel social demands. Our analysis, therefore, refers to a relatively long historical process during which the two-party system that had prevailed in Uruguay since the nineteenth century was gradually transformed into a multiparty system that, after several decades, acquired a bipolar configuration, with a center-right and a center-left block.

This transformation, which implied a lasting political realignment, was the result of the strategies adopted by the old traditional parties of their own account and in the face of competition from the Frente Amplio (FA), a party of the left that deployed its own strategies of opposition and achieved sustained development (Lanzaro 2007, 2010). Along with this process, the parties' place in the system changed and the FA became the predominant party (Lanzaro 2015).

Like the other chapters of this book on Uruguay, we focus on the relationship between the parties' political offer and representation, taking into account the extent to which, at critical times of change, the party system was able to incorporate the citizenry and social movements into its

framework while, at the same time, managing its own transformation in what is, in fact, a “transition within transition” (Lanzaro 2007). As Mair (1997) suggests, what is required is to verify the extent to which the party system, faced with important processes of change, displays its potential and, through vigorous competition and refashioned political platforms, is able to exercise a certain control over the citizenry and social movements.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AS CAPACITY FOR ADAPTATION

The concept of institutionalization as coined by Huntington (1968) differs from the way it has sometimes been used in comparative politics since the 1990s (especially Mainwaring and Scully 1995), and was not originally related to the notion of stability, but rather to the capacity of political systems to adapt to external challenges.

More clearly, Mair (1997) considers that political systems subsist not necessarily in supposedly static situations (as in the controversial freezing hypothesis of Lipset and Rokkan 1967), but rather in a combination of continuity and change. Uruguay is a good example of this assertion. Quite unusually for Latin America, it has historically had a party democracy (Lanzaro 2010, 2012). Dating back to the early twentieth century, with two authoritarian interruptions and a succession of significant changes, it is one of the oldest party democracies in the region and, indeed, the world.

It has its basis in a long-standing, plural, and competitive party system that has achieved a high level of institutionalization. Born in the first half of the nineteenth century, soon after the country’s independence, it is also among the oldest in the world (Sotelo 1999). It was initially a two-party system formed by the Colorado Party (Colorados) and Nacional Party (Blancos) which dominated the political arena from the civil wars of the nineteenth century through to the late twentieth century.²

In the shadow of these two parties, “parties of ideas” were founded as from 1910 (the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Civic Union which, by the early 1960s, became the Christian Democrat Party). For many decades, they were parties of an ideological nature with little electoral support and acted as testimonial nuclei and “prodding” parties *vis-à-vis* traditional sectors. Consecutive participation in the corporatist representation segment (wage councils and social security administration) gave them subordinate but significant sources of power that were captured principally by the Communists and Socialists, thanks to their bases in the trade unions.

The large parties survived several cycles of crises and were the main protagonists of successive phases of change in an historical sequence over the course of which both the parties and the system as a whole had a number of different configurations. However, the traditional two-party system did not emerge unscathed from the last crisis. Indeed, during the 1960s, the old parties of ideas, in coalition with sectors that split off from the Colorado and Blanco Parties, formed the Frente Amplio (1971) which brought together the left and reached almost 20 percent of votes, opening its own space in the party system.

After the democratic transition, which began in 1980, the party system underwent a second push for change that included the cycle of liberal pro-market reforms and led to a formidable transformation through which the traditional parties lost ground while the FA consolidated its position as the third force, achieved sustained growth, and eventually emerged as the predominant party (Lanzaro 2015).

FROM THE CRISIS OF THE 1960s TO THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE 1990s

In Uruguay, the 1960s were marked by the crisis of the economic and political models that had emerged in the 1940s during the so-called second democracy that followed the 1933–1942 dictatorship. An important role in this crisis was played by the exhaustion of the import substitution model and the difficulties of implementing a program of change, with the consequent stagnation of the economy. This was partly the result of an intensification of inter- and intra-party competition—with a low propensity to cooperate and centrifugal tendencies—and a leadership gap that was not resolved until the late 1960s. In this context, political and social disaggregation increased, with different types of activism on the part of several sectors (the rural sector, the middle and upper classes, workers, students, intellectuals, cultural actors, the armed forces, etc.) which was, in turn, reflected in electoral mobility and the corporativization of politics, accompanied by social agitation and guerilla actions.

Although the Colorados and Blancos failed to establish a new development model and often became trapped in competition between themselves and their own infighting, they alternated in power, promoted strategic changes in the thrust of economic policy, and collaborated to approve important institutional reforms—particularly, the 1966 constitution—designed to impose a new rationality on the management of

government: replacement of the nine-member collegiate presidency introduced in 1952 with a single figure, concentration of powers in the head of the executive branch, centralized regulation of wages and social security, and a number of institutions of the “developmentalist” generation such as the Central Bank and the Budget and Planning Office. Although losing centrality and showing important flanks of weakness, the traditional parties managed to retain the support of a majority of voters by reinforcing their right wings—most markedly in the case of the Colorados—and thanks to the emergence of a centrist progressivism in the Blanco Party.

In contrast to these measures, the trade unions unified around an alternative political platform and founded a single federation, the National Workers’ Convention (CNT) (1964–1966). In a reaction closely linked to the new trade union movement, the old parties of ideas—the Socialists, Communists, and Christian Democrats—in alliance with splinter groups from the traditional parties sought ideological renewal and launched new political strategies. From 1962 onward, they embarked, through different coalitions, on an unprecedented effort to pursue the electoral road, eventually joining forces to found the FA which, in the 1971 elections, vastly increased the left-wing vote (taking 18 percent nationally and 30 percent in Montevideo). These two strands—the trade union movement and party constructions—came together to forge the new configuration of the institutional left which achieved greater potential and emerged as a challenging force.

However, competition became increasingly adversarial, aggravated by the harmful effects of social mobilization, radical ventures, and armed action on the part of small groups from both the right and the left. In these conditions, the party system and the political government were unable to prevent the undermining of their centrality and capacity for aggregation. Polarization finally had a catastrophic outcome, opening the way to a costly dictatorship that began with the 1973 military coup and lasted until 1985.

As from the democratic transition that began in 1980, the party system recovered its consistency and centrality, undergoing a second cycle of changes that resulted in the formidable transformation in which the traditional parties lost ground while the FA achieved sustained growth and consolidated its position as the third actor.

In this way, a gradual but lasting and far-reaching realignment was consolidated. The left achieved a majority position and, in 2014, the FA became the predominant party while the block of traditional parties saw

Table 9.1 Electoral support by blocks, 1971–2014 (% of valid votes)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Colorados+Blancos</i>	<i>FA</i>
1971	81	18
1984	76	21
1989	69	21
1994	63	30
1999	55	40
2004	46	52
2009	46	48
2014	44	48

Source: FCS database (<http://www.edu.uy/pri>)

a gradual decline in their vote (Table 9.1).³ In the 1984 elections, which marked the return of democracy, the Blancos and the Colorados together still took 76 percent of the vote. In 2004, however, they reached only 46 percent, a figure they maintained in 2009 but which dropped to 44 percent in 2014. In other words, the party system has persisted in terms of continuity and change. All its members remain in the race although a structural transformation means that their place and function in the system is no longer the same.

The change that appeared in the 1971 election was repeated almost exactly in 1984, after the interruption of the dictatorship, and culminated in 2004 when the FA made its debut in office with an absolute parliamentary majority. The elections of 2009 mark an inflection point in this cycle in that the FA ceased to grow and saw a 2.5-point drop in its vote while the traditional parties ceased to lose votes, although they did again drop two points in 2014.

By winning three consecutive elections with an absolute parliamentary majority, the FA became the predominant party as defined by Duverger (1960) and Sartori (1980) (Lanzaro 2015). The FA's predominant position in the institutions of government is reinforced by the network of powers and ideological weight of the left in several spheres of civil society, including its brotherhood with the unions, the student movement, and other social organizations. In addition, the left has important influence among intellectuals and journalists and in cultural milieux as well as the key strategic vector of control of state education. These linkages—which date back to the 1960s and increased in strength as from the democratic transition—are crucial in explaining the unions' and social movements' attitudes toward political representation.

The left's embedment in civil society evokes Gramsci's writings on hegemony (Gramsci 1971). However, they serve here only as a

reference. This is not only because they were conceived in terms of class struggle but also because the notion of hegemony, although implying a democratic advance in Marxism, does not sit easily with plural societies where the activities of parties and other political and social actors mean that ideological currents, even if achieving certain predominance, are still exposed to unceasing competition and the dynamism of civil society.

The FA's predominance in political institutions and civil society does not imply that it was by way of a single or monopolistic party but refers to its position in the effective competition that underpinned the two stages in which the transformation of the Uruguayan system occurred.

In order to explain this realignment, we analyze the strategies deployed by the parties in the new democratic stage and the parameters of competition that emerge in the face of a polarization which, in contrast to that of the 1960s, was moderate, rather than radical. The new democratic cycle puts to the test the system's consistency and capacity to adapt.

MARKET REFORMS AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

In the democratic transition—which is resolved in a process of reordering of the political system and recomposition of its main actors—the parties played an ever more active role, underscoring their identities (muted, albeit still alive, during the dictatorship) and gradually recovering their centrality. Once democracy had been reestablished, it was the parties that spearheaded the “second” transition and it is competition between them that shapes the phase of liberal reforms (Lanzaro 2000).

In this cycle, the Colorado and Blanco Parties proposed reforms that, in contrast to other countries, were not triggered by a situation of crisis. This process was the result of active competition between and within the parties in the presence of factors that tend to favor major political transformations: an important ideological renovation in the context of a *changement d'époque*; the resulting accentuation of its programmatic character at the expense of clientelistic ties that also underwent a change; and a triad of powerful leaderships. Motivated by this competition, the Colorados and Blancos, together with some organic intellectuals, promoted the neoliberal agenda—some politicians with radical profiles, others from a more centrist and, therefore, also more successful position—advocating reform of the state, the economy, and the market in election campaigns and from

government through public policy initiatives and an ideological offensive with the effects of a “cultural revolution”.

Competition in the traditional block was also impacted by the existence of the left as a third actor and the intense opposition it exercised. There were also some instances of citizen participation in the form of constitutional plebiscites and referendums seeking to block privatizations in the public sector. However, in contrast to other Latin American countries, these examples of plebiscitary democracy were not populist ventures nor a result of the weakness of the party system, but rather of the parties’ tactics and, in particular, the veto mobilizations undertaken or espoused by the FA in alliance with the unions.

This political competition, with *ex post* brakes and *ex ante* adjustments, meant that reforms were gradual and moderate, with a profile that limited liberalization and privatizations and preserved the state’s functions to a much greater extent than in other Latin American countries (Lanzaro 2000; Forteza et al. 2007; Lora 2012). However, the critical situation of the liberal transition had palpable political consequences and produced a sort of “transition within transition”, with effects that were particularly important as regards the government, the party system, and the structures of competition (Lanzaro 2000, 2007).

Political Innovation and Constitutional Reform

As the FA grew as the challenger party, convergence between the Colorados and Blancos increased and they began to act as a block. They alternated in the presidency, gradually increasing their cooperation through political compromises and by joining the “coalition presidentialism” seen in a number of Latin American countries at the height of liberal reformism and in multiparty contexts (Lanzaro 2001).

Through these coalitions, they were able to form parliamentary majorities, implement liberal policies, and promote reforms that, in Uruguay, were in any case incremental and moderate, reflecting competition between the coalitions’ own partners and the counterpoint with the left-wing opposition.

In 1996, in order to delay the arrival of the FA to government and make it require greater political support, the traditional parties proposed a constitutional reform that dismantled the electoral regime introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century. In typological terms, this was a defensive reform by a “waning” coalition (Buquet 2007) that operated as

a two-against-one alliance typical of three-party settings (Caplow 1974). However, thanks to the balances produced by inter- and intra-party competition and the political will of their main leaders, this strategy sought to regulate political conflict, taking into account not only the partners in the reformist coalition but also the adversary, thereby increasing consensus and limiting dissent.

The 1996 reform, therefore, occurred in the framework of party democracy under a plural competitive system and is very different from the “refoundational” constitutional reforms of an adversarial nature, introduced without effective opposition in democracies without parties and, indeed, with anti-party rhetoric, that have proliferated in recent decades in some Latin American countries (notably Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela).

Political competition also resulted in innovations in presidential government and substantial changes in the electoral regime.⁴ These changes, in turn, had important political consequences for both the FA and the traditional parties which, as often happens, ended up prisoners of their own initiatives.

The new regime did not halt the trends that had prompted the reform. Realignment of the electorate continued and consolidation of the historic transformation brought changes in the general structure of the party system. This process occurred gradually across several crucial elections with only moderate volatility over the course of a quarter of a century, producing a new plural and always competitive structure in which political allegiances and electoral contest were organized around the left-right cleavage. The FA’s development helped to make this cleavage more explicit than when competition was predominantly between the Colorados and Blancos and served as an axis of identification and recognition for both party elites and voters (cf. www.latinobarometro.org). Moreover, with its eyes on government, the FA preferred competitive integration to rupture and acted as a political “safety valve”, doing its bit to maintain the party system’s capacity for aggregation in a critical context.

Electoral realignment was driven by political competition and this is the key to understanding it. After the democratic transition and during the liberal transition, the traditional parties performed reasonably well, basically in three important aspects of party government: their programmatic platform and reform agenda; innovation in modes of governing and propensity to negotiate; and renewal of their leadership and party machines. Paradoxically, their success in these fields had a high price in that they systematically lost electoral support.

Liberalization, reform of the state, and privatizations became the strategic axis of party competition, decisively influencing political realignment. The “reformist revolution” was supported by part of the electorate but opposed and rejected by other voters with positions in line with the statist tradition that had historically prevailed in Uruguay. The Uruguayan electorate has a strong preference for statism which was, in this phase, among the most marked in Latin America (www.latinobarometro.org). The nature of political competition since the 1990s, fuelled by the FA and the unions in their antagonism to the Colorados and Blancos, moreover, accentuated the state-market cleavage. This was so much the case that, once the FA took office, this antagonism weakened and the statism of Uruguayan public opinion, although remaining high, became less marked.

The liberal reforms and economic transformations affected the character of “state parties” that the traditional parties had always had, reducing their resources of power, particularly as regards objects, forms, scope, and margins of discretion in the political allocation of public goods. Their own reforms and the resulting changes modified the nature of “Keynesian” parties which they had acquired during the twentieth century and especially after the 1930s through political regulation of the economy and the systematic delivery of public goods and state services (Lanzaro 1994). This also changed their sources of legitimacy and system of linkages (Kitschelt 2000) with citizens, economic agents, and collective organizations, affecting particularly their networks of patronage.

To this were added the effects of the new forms of competition and cooperation practiced by the traditional parties, which were reinforced by the electoral regime established under the 1996 reform. From 1990 onward, as the FA grew, the Blancos and Colorados gradually converged, forming coalitions and becoming ever less differentiated. It was not that a new two-party system emerged but that, in the face of a third challenger, the old historic rivals came to form a political pole and, even, a “family circle”.⁵ Ideological overlap and political association made it ever more difficult for the two parties to maintain their traditions, conserve their identity, and sustain political offers appropriate for triangular competition between themselves and the FA.

The FA’s opposition to the reforms of the governments of the Blancos (1990–1995) and the Colorados (1995–2005) strengthened its position on the left of the ideological spectrum while, at the same time, pushing the traditional parties and, even, their center segments toward center-right positions.⁶

As indicated by Roberts (2014), what makes Uruguay stand out from other cases in Latin America is the programmatic alignment of its party system with market reforms. This reflected the presence of an institutionalized left-wing party that consistently opposed the reform agenda of the traditional parties.

This process also brought a moderation of the FA driven, once again, by effective leadership and fostered by its development as a catch-all party striving to achieve social and political expansion of its electorate (Lanzaro 2004; Yaffé 2005). Lanzaro (2010) describes this stance as a two-pronged strategy that combined firm opposition with progressive moderation, avoiding both radicalization and convergence *vis-à-vis* the traditional parties. In this way, the FA contributed to the system's structuring in terms of programmatic competition and safeguarded its institutionalization.

The current ideological configuration of the Uruguayan party system corresponds to the format foreshadowed in the 1990s. In their chapter of this book, Buquet and Selios (Chap. 8) show that FA voters are distributed toward the center-left of the spectrum and those of the traditional parties toward the center-right. There is also an important contingent of center voters who choose either the traditional parties or the FA and constitute the territory in dispute between the two blocks. The distribution of all parties' legislators is similar but more to the left than that of both the electorate as a whole and their own voters. In other words, there is a rather high level of party-voter ideological congruence. However, in the case of issues, democratic values, and policy evaluation, congruence is significantly lower, confirming the system's strong structuring in ideological terms as compared to other possible axes of competition.

From the 1990s onward, after the democratic transition and, particularly, during the liberal transition, the system showed a moderate level of polarization, without the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s.⁷ Together with the effective leadership seen in both the left and the traditional block, this is a necessary and desirable ingredient for democracy and the quality of political competition, with beneficial effects for the reproduction of parties and the party system, citizen conduct, and the party leanings of the electorate (Lupu 2014; Dalton 2008).⁸ It is "a logic of political and ideological differentiation with positive consequences, given that it favors the vitality of democratic politics and party competition while contributing to create stability in electoral alignments and institutionalization of the party system" (Lanzaro 2015: 14).

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

In Uruguay, contentious activity by social movements has been limited and has targeted governments rather than the political system as a whole. In their chapter of this book, Bidegain and Tricot (Chap. 6) indicate that, although mobilization existed, it “did not question or pose a threat to the democratic system”. They attribute this to the political opportunities offered by the institutional rules that permit the calling of plebiscites and referendums against political initiatives or to promote them.

The unions, the student movement, human rights organizations, and environmental groups needed the FA to reinforce their actions and, above all, to make their plebiscitary initiatives viable. In turn, the FA took advantage of these instances to garner support and for its election campaigns. All the plebiscites and referendums that were successful or obtained a significant level of support were interpreted as a sign of the FA’s electoral potential, fanning its expectations of forming a government.

According to Lanzaro (2011), there was a change in the pattern of mobilization by the unions which preferred the “plebiscite of the ballot box” to the “plebiscite of the streets” or other traditional forms of class struggle. This was frequently the case during the low, experienced by the unions, amid the wave of liberal reforms. As they were weak in labor demands and collective bargaining, they opted to take refuge in political unionism, general demands, and opposition to liberalism. This alternative, which contributed to bring the left together, was also useful as a “survival strategy” through which the unions, particularly in the public sector, could attempt to maintain their membership and some level of centralization, marking a difference with the vicissitudes suffered by their counterparts in other countries.

The FA did not have to take distance from the trade union movement and social movements in order to position itself as a moderate party. On the contrary, this relationship facilitated its election victory. Through the two-pronged strategy it implemented for several years, the FA was able to moderate its platform in order to attract center voters while, at the same time, providing selective support for the opposition of social movements and, particularly, the unions to pro-market reforms.

In another side of this same coin, there was some “capture” of social movements by the political left, including the absorption of their demands into the FA’s platforms and the recruitment of union members and social leaders for election campaigns and government tasks.

This relationship which, for the unions, is organic and historic meant that social movements, albeit guided by the particular logic of their respective founding principles and acting with certain autonomy, also served as a recruiting ground and a vehicle for training, socialization, and ideological proselytism as well as arenas of competition between the different currents of the left.

This relationship changed when the FA took office. However, the Uruguayan left formed a government which belongs to the generation of “late” social democracies that opened a way for themselves in the wake of liberal reforms and in peripheral areas, a far cry from the golden years of the Keynesian era of the classic social democracies (Lanzaro 2014, 2011). FA governments did not, therefore, generate significant discrepancies with social organizations. On the contrary, for reasons of both ideological affinity and political decision and helped by the commodity price boom, they implemented policies that were favorable to social movements and, above all, the unions. This was apparent not only in economic policy, higher employment and real wages, social policies, and the combat of poverty but also in reforms of labor legislation, trade union immunity, and the institutional regime for collective wage and labor relations bargaining. It was also evident in human rights policy and the promotion of other aspects of the democratic rights agenda (decriminalization of abortion, regulation of the growing of cannabis for personal use and its sale, sex-change registration, and same-sex marriage).

Again, now in government as when in opposition, the FA did not need to distance itself from the demands of social organizations or to domesticate them. Indeed, it operated as an “amphibious” party, with one foot firmly in the government and the state but the other still to some extent in its grassroots.

The FA’s capacity to represent the demands of different sectors while in opposition and to manage them when in government helps to explain the low levels of discontent or malaise with representation seen in Uruguay.

COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPACITY FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In 2014, the third consecutive FA government was elected, with an absolute parliamentary majority. This implied the emergence of a predominant party system (Duverger 1960; Sartori 1980). However, according to Lanzaro (2015), this does not mean that the system has ceased to be

competitive since the “margin of victory” between government and opposition is relatively small and expectations of alternation in government persist due to uncertainty as to which party will win an election. Buquet and Piñeiro (2014) argue that the new equilibrium of the party system, based on the electorate’s division into halves, means that minimum changes in the sum of each block’s votes can eventually lead to the election of the traditional parties.

Competitiveness and polarization go hand in hand. As a strategy for obtaining election and for governing, the FA did not seek to mimic the traditional parties but maintained a certain differentiation. It is no accident that levels of polarization are comparatively high in Uruguay (Luna and Alcántara 2004; Lupu 2014). As argued by Buquet and Selios in their chapter of this book (Chap. 8), “this polarization does not imply high levels of conflict but instead that voting decisions are taken on programmatic, rather than clientelistic or personalistic grounds”. Indeed, within Latin America, Uruguay is noted as having a system with a programmatic structure of political competition, not only since the appearance of the FA as a challenger party but also during the long era of its traditional two-party system (Kitschelt et al. 2010).

The available studies (Colomer and Escatel 2005; Selios and Vairo 2012) confirm that Uruguay is one of the Latin American countries in which the left-right cleavage is a strong factor in explaining party alignments and voting behavior, constituting a dimension recognized as relevant in the identification and self-identification of both the political elites and citizens.⁹ It is also the Latin American country with the largest proportion of citizens who combine ideological self-identification with preference for a party.

Competitiveness and polarization, intermediated by the relevant leaders and organizations, help to maintain the control that the party system as a whole exercises over platforms, electoral options, and the citizenry’s alignments under a system of compulsory voting with very low abstention—a system, indeed, in which the signs of democratic malaise and a crisis of representation, seen today in some Latin American and European countries, are not apparent.

Competitiveness is associated with relative parity in citizens’ electoral preferences and an institutional design that permits expression of this parity. Historically, Uruguay’s simultaneous double vote for presidential elections and simultaneous triple vote for parliamentary elections served to boost levels of competition. Until the 1996 electoral reform, the parties

could present more than one presidential candidate and different lists for senators and deputies who, at the same time, formed sub-groups in a bid to increase their vote. The parties competed with each other but there was also internal competition between the different candidates and factions. In this way, internal competition, instead of being a disadvantage, served as a strategy for increasing the vote obtained. At the same time, this system opened the way for challengers who did not obtain a place on the official party lists. This increased the competitiveness of elections and the uncertainty of their results.

The 1996 reform abolished this system, introducing compulsory primary elections through which each party selects a single presidential nominee. This limits internal party competition in national elections but permits prior internal competition in the selection of candidates through the primaries which all parties must hold simultaneously.

In this way, the Uruguayan system ensures a high level of competition at all levels, both between and within parties. Elections have historically represented and continue to represent a real challenge for the parties and a real opportunity for voters, fuelling the expectations of those who do not feel represented by governments. Politics and, in particular, the parties are recognized by citizens as tools for change. Election victories or defeats are perceived as transitory and both contestants and voters have sufficient expectations for them to accept the system's rules and wait for the next election.

As discussed above, since the 1996 reform, the president has been elected by an absolute majority rule in a two-round system, rather than by simple majority. This change was promoted by the traditional parties in a quest for a system that would permit the existence of more than two parties unlike what tended to happen under the previous simple-majority system.¹⁰ As Buquet and Piñero (2014) have emphasized, the system was once again able to adapt, changing its rules in line with the new three-party equilibrium and reinforcing it. The new rules and, particularly, the two rounds permit competition between parties and between the center-left and center-right poles, facilitating coordination among each block's voters.

CONCLUSIONS

The capacity of Uruguay's old party democracy to prevent citizen discontent and contain malaise with representation is explained by the forms taken by the transformation of the party system which began in the 1960s and gained speed as from 1989.

The first stage of this long process occurred in the 1960s with the crisis of the second democracy established in the 1940s after the end of the previous dictatorship (1933–1942). Deficits in the party system and radical polarization, accompanied by political disaggregation and guerrilla adventures, meant that this crisis resulted in a new dictatorship established in 1973, 40 years after the first one.

However, this critical juncture left lasting legacies. Despite losing their centrality and failing to establish an alternative development model, the traditional parties retained the support of a majority of voters, thanks to new leaderships on the back of which they reinforced their right wings and adopted some centrist positions while also introducing enduring institutional, political, and economic innovations. At the same time, the left emerged as a challenger party, with a viable opposition profile that was not merely testimonial. Despite its weaknesses and inability to prevent the dictatorship, the system retained its competitive vigor and appeal to citizens and even incorporated a new institutional left-wing option for those who rejected the traditional parties' long-standing predominance.

The second stage of the process—that of the system's great transformation—occurred gradually during the democratic transition that began in 1980, the liberal transition of the 1990s, and the shift to the left seen as from 2004. These episodes were led by the parties, which also introduced their own changes, each under consistent leadership and with renewed competition between them. Through this competition, the system, political platforms, and the ideological structure were redesigned, generating electoral realignment and ensuring that the citizenry was firmly included within the framework of the parties.

With new momentum, the traditional parties worked as programmatic parties—in an ideological offensive—and, based on liberal precepts, introduced market reforms that, due to differences between the Blancos and Colorados and opposition from the left and the unions, were moderate and implemented gradually. They also innovated in government practices and passed a major reform of the electoral system in line with the changing nature of the party system and in a bid to hinder the rise of the FA, which in fact favored the consolidation of the new multiparty system. Due to their own effects and competition from the left, these measures—which boosted the neoliberal cultural revolution and implied advances in a number of areas of reform—affected the nature of the traditional parties, their resources of power, and linkages with the citizenry, resulting in a significant loss of votes. However, these parties have stayed in the race and, as a block, continue to attract about half the electorate.

The FA, for its part, accentuated its nature as an electoral-professional catch-all party and grew into the predominant party. It achieved this through a two-pronged strategy, using moderation as a tool for successful competition for center votes while differentiating itself ideologically through both systematic opposition to the reforms of the traditional parties and, in its three consecutive terms of office, a social democratic type of government. Through its ideology and organization, the FA preserved its programmatic character and is an amphibious creature, inserted into government with cartel-party practices but maintaining power networks and ideological influence in civil society and the educational apparatus in brotherhood with the unions and social movements.

In other Latin American countries, the implementation of liberal reforms and the subsequent shift to the left occurred without parties or caused the system's deinstitutionalization and even its collapse, with authoritarian regimes or low-quality democracy. In Uruguay, by contrast, both stages occurred within the framework of the ancestral party democracy which recovered its vigor. The party system recreated competitiveness and tested its institutionalization by introducing a major reform that opened the way to a new plurality, initially with triangular dynamics and, subsequently, a bipolar shape.

Despite the predominant position achieved by the FA, election results continue to be uncertain since the two blocks are evenly matched under an electoral regime that permits both plurality and coordination between like-minded parties and voters. Elections are, therefore, recognized by the parties themselves and citizens as offering choice and the possibility of a change of government.

There is, at the same time, a moderate level of polarization, with competition between the two blocks ordered around the left-right cleavage. This ideological structure was consolidated during the liberal transition through contrast between the traditional parties and the FA and maintained its vigor once the latter took office. Although competition is principally for center votes, differentiation between the two blocks is significant and there are relatively high levels of ideological congruence between the parties and voters.

As we have argued, this combination of characteristics of the party system is a result of the ways in which it changed during a succession of critical junctures. This is the great transformation of recent decades which harks back to the opening that occurred in the 1960s and consecrates the replacement of the old two-party setting with a bipolar multiparty system. The specific nature of competition in this transition—which recreated the format of the old party democracy, rebuilding relations with the citizenry and social

movements—explains the relatively high levels of satisfaction with representation seen in Uruguay and its place as a counterexample of malaise.

NOTES

1. Or, rather, a “critical era” in the sense of Aldrich (1995) in an approach that refers to electoral realignments and changes in institutions and parties.
2. The Colorado Party and the Nacional Party are traditionally referred to in Uruguay as the Colorados (Reds) and Blancos (Whites), respectively, due to the color of their flags during the nineteenth century civil wars.
3. See Fig 8.1 in the chapter by Buquet and Selios (Chap. 8).
4. The new design represented a break with the core principles of the *ancien régime* since it eliminated the simultaneous double-vote system introduced in 1910, replacing it with a majority two-round presidential election, with a “pure” *ballottage* and single candidates nominated through simultaneous and compulsory primaries for all parties. It retained proportional representation for the parliamentary elections held simultaneously and definitively together with the first round of the presidential election.
5. In 1984, overlap between the Colorados and Blancos covered around 77 percent on the electorate but, by 1999, had risen to 90 percent. In the same period, the ideological distance between the two parties narrowed from 12 percent to 3 percent, creating a “family circle” (Lanzaro 2000).
6. This process is similar to that which occurred in Brazil. Although the Brazilian Social Democrat Party (PSDB) has social democrat leanings, the struggle with the center-left Workers Party (PT), which opposed particularly the Cardoso government’s privatization policies, resulted in PSDB shift to the center-right in the identification of citizens and at the level of its own party elites.
7. According to Moraes and Lujan (2014), who apply Dalton’s Polarization Index for the period 1995–2009, Uruguay’s parliamentary elites showed an intermediate but significant level of polarization with tangible, albeit relatively moderate, ideological distances. See also Altman et al. 2009.
8. “When parties agree on policies, they become irrelevant to citizens. But when they disagree, partisan conflict becomes more heated and parties seem more important” (Lupu 2014: 4).

9. According to Latinobarómetro for 1995–2010, the percentage of Uruguayans who do not identify with this axis, at around 10 percent, is relatively low and below the average for the region (www.latinobarometro.org).
10. According to the “laws” of Duverger (1951), formalized by Cox (1997), two-round systems permit a multiplicity of candidates and parties unlike simple-majority systems which tend to reduce their number.

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PART III

Argentina, the Malaise as Routine

Protest, Social Movements, and Malaise in Political Representation in Argentina

Sebastián Pereyra

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the relationship between social protest and malaise in political representation in present-day Argentina. To this end, it looks at the role that social movements and protest activities play as expressions of a particular type of malaise in representation (Joignant, Morales, and Fuentes in Chapter 1).

The recent history of Argentina shows that malaise in representation is a persistent characteristic of the functioning of a democratic regime.¹ Similarly, social mobilization and, in particular, protests and street demonstrations are a habitual feature of the country's political landscape. How are these two phenomena related? In order to address this question, we examine a particular aspect of malaise in representation—disaffection with political parties—and its relationship with the dynamics of mobilization and protest in the country's current political situation.

S. Pereyra (✉)

CONICET - IDAES/Universidad Nacional de San Martín, Argentina

The organization and mobilization of protest groups have become a normal everyday occurrence since the second half of the 1980s. In one sign of this, the number of reports of protest actions in the Argentine press reached an average of more than one per day between 1984 and 2007.² The persistence of this phenomenon indicates a growing legitimization of protest as a way of making social demands heard.

In the 2013 Universidad Diego Portales-International Development Research Centre (UDP-IDRC) survey for Argentina, 14.1 percent indicated that they had participated in a protest action during the previous year.³ This data is also in line with the results of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey in 2010 which showed that, in this respect, Argentina doubled the regional average (Lodola 2011: 178).

Although protest—which implies some form of confrontation with the state and the elites—is a legitimate form of participation, data from the UDP-IDRC survey also shows important differences between different types of protest. For example, 41 percent of those surveyed indicated that *cacerolazos* (banging saucepans) are justified as a way of protesting, while 37.3 percent considered strikes justified but, in the case of blocking roads, the figure dropped to 18.4 percent.⁴

Some studies have pointed out that street protests and the emergence of social movements have, in recent decades, become ever more habitual features of the political life of our societies (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Indeed, in recent years, the idea that social movements are a normal part of the functioning of democracies has generated broad consensus (Goldstone 2003; Johnston 2011). This transformation of protest into a more habitual—and probably less disruptive—feature of the functioning of democracy implies that, in order to address our principal question, we must put it in the perspective of the evolution over time of the relationship between disaffection and protest and, at the same time, explore the different types of protest seen in present-day mobilization and its relationship with party politics.

This chapter is divided into two broad sections. In the first, we examine the dynamics of social mobilization in Argentina from the restoration of democracy in 1983 through to the start of the Kirchnerist governments in the early 2000s. In the section, we analyze the emergence between the 1980s and the crisis of 2001 of the important social movements which became important collective actors in national politics and marked a gradual process of citizen disaffection with the traditional political parties that occurred throughout the new democratic period.

The second section focuses on the current situation, characterized by a proliferation of collective groups and demands reflected in social protest

that, in recent years, have not led to the formation of new social movements. Here, we explore the principal types of demands seen in recent protests and analyze some of the key protests related to them. Data about protest actions is complemented with that obtained from the UDP-IDRC survey on individuals' political attitudes. Together, this will allow us to build a profile of those who protest as compared to those who do not in order to reach some conclusions about protest and the relationship between its actors and political activity and, in particular, the parties and their leaders.


In the conclusions, we return to the principal questions about disaffection as an attitude of malaise in representation in order to analyze its impact on the characteristics and scope of social protest in Argentina today.

MOVEMENTS AND PROTEST SINCE THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

In recent decades, the emergence of important countrywide social movements and recurrent episodes of protest—ranging from the human rights movement in the transition to democracy to the movements of the unemployed and present-day demands related to socioenvironmental struggles—have been a key feature of Argentine society.⁵ This has, moreover, occurred in the framework of significant levels of trade union protest throughout the period in addition to critical moments of economic and political instability, with their proliferation of the most diverse processes of mobilization (Pérez and Pereyra 2013).

The transition to democracy brought with it a marked increase in party and trade union activity. The two principal parties' end-of-campaign rallies in 1983 were attended by close to three million people and, at that time, levels of voter affiliation were very high. Similarly, trade union unrest in the face of the deterioration in living standards under the first democratic government reflected the weight of this other important actor in national politics (Suriano and Alvarez 2013).

Subsequent years brought some important transformations that led to a gradual decline of political parties and unions as spheres of participation in politics. Firstly, while the human rights movement acquired a central position as an axis of the revalorization of the rule of law, civil guarantees, and political rights, the main political parties gradually began to bear the brunt of disappointment when some of the expectations created by the change of political regime were not fulfilled. Secondly, neoliberal policies contributed

Table 10.1 Social movements in Argentina since the transition to democracy

Source: Own preparation

to a very important change in conditions of organization and mobilization for popular sectors, resulting in what some authors have termed their “territorialization” (Merklen 2005). After the first year of party effervescence during the transition to democracy, participation tended to shift to non-institutional political actors in the form of social organizations with different scopes and levels of organization (Table 10.1).

The range of experiences of social organization and mobilization seen in Argentina since the transition is broad but some stand out. This is the case, for example, of the human rights movement which arose during the last military dictatorship and, through its denunciations about the fate of the disappeared and the illegal forms of repressive violence employed by the state, laid the foundations for the transition to democracy and the agreements on which it was based. During these 30 years, this movement served as a vehicle for expressing certain values that became associated with Argentine democracy such as guarantees and civil and political rights as well as the condemnation of all forms of political violence (Acuña and Smulovitz 1995; Jelin 2005).

Something similar also occurred with the movements of the unemployed that emerged in the second half of the 1990s. The *piqueteros* movements, which appeared in national politics between 1996 and 2000, installed a series of demands related to the problem of social exclusion and the consequences of the neoliberal economic policies that were applied with greater force in this period. The mobilization of unemployed people throughout the country, the creation of organizations, and the policy of

blocking roads gave shape to a set of demands that reflected the direct relationship between unemployment and exclusion (Svampa and Pereyra 2003). Demands for genuine employment as well as negotiations for assistentialist workfare policies set both a horizon and a floor in the demands of the unemployed. This cycle of mobilization marked another milestone in these 30 years of democracy in Argentina, positioning unemployment as a central problem of the public agenda and underscoring the link between material conditions of social integration and the exercise of citizenship. In addition, it represented a very significant criticism of the neoliberal policies and their social consequences.

The genesis of both movements was characterized by the establishment of transversal ties of solidarity, fundamentally in terms of the plurality of party loyalties seen among their participants, which meant a clear differentiation from party politics. This feature of the movements' origin also remained relatively unchanged and has played an important role in the dynamics of democratic politics in recent decades. The proliferation of movements and protest groups of very different sizes and weights occurred mainly outside and in confrontation to party politics.⁶

This remoteness from party politics and forms of confrontation help to understand the characteristics and scale of the crisis of 2001. Although the crisis did not produce any movements that lasted for any length of time or bring about significant transformations in political practices or mechanisms of representation, one of its key features was criticism of professional political activity and its effect continued to be felt in subsequent years.

This first outline of events should, however, not lead us to conclude that the delegitimization of party politics and the dynamics of social movements are directly linked and are a one-way process. When considering the movements discussed so far, it is important to note that their dynamics followed a process of "institutionalization".⁷ In this sense, the demands of the historic human rights organizations as well as the problem of unemployment were pillars of the country's political recomposition after the crisis of 2001. Indeed, Kirchnerism, starting from its position of relative weakness, looked to these movements for support in its bid to acquire political legitimacy. In this sense, this process of institutionalization is apparent not only in the movements' political reorientation but also in their articulation with the state apparatus.

These two movements have contributed to the legitimization of the authorities and the strengthening of different state agencies, supplying people to occupy key posts while also transforming their demands into

public policies. This process could be characterized as fragile institution-ization, with the movements' participation in the government coalition guaranteeing mutual support and cooperation.

SOCIAL PROTESTS AND MALAISE IN REPRESENTATION

Protests and Demands Since the Crisis of 2001

Since the crisis of 2001 and, particularly, since the arrival of Kirchnerism to power, social movements have entered a period of demobilization. Until 2005, there continued to be intense mobilizations, especially among movements of the unemployed⁸ but the alliance of majority groups with the national government as from 2002–2003 and the progressive isolation of more contestatory groups resulted in a process of fragmentation and demobilization.

During the past decade, new countrywide contestatory groups have not been formed. However, protest activity has been a constant feature of the last few years, related to groups with a more limited scope or life.

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, participation in protests is comparatively high in Argentina. This becomes even more interesting if we consider that protest has, to some extent, become less dependent on the presence of important collective players in national politics.

Although protesting continues to be viewed as a legitimate way of expressing social demands in Argentina today, it has become ever more difficult to pin down the physiognomy and principal features of the actors in social mobilization. In this context, it is useful to look at the form taken by the structure of social demands related to protest actions. Based on the study of social protests by Schuster et al., we can analyze the principal demands voiced in recent years (Schuster et al. 2006; Pereyra et al. 2015).

When focusing on the demands of protests between 1984 and 2007, we observe that labor demands predominated. However, by the end of this period, they had lost relative importance due to an increase in the range of other demands. As from the end of the 1990s, these other types of demands were reflected in protests and, among the most important, included welfare (education, pensions, and health care), assistentialist policies, human rights and justice, and those referring to the economic model and the functioning of representative institutions.

When comparing different years within this period, some interesting changes in the structure of demands become apparent (Table 10.2). Although demands directly related to the dynamics of employment in

Table 10.2 Distribution of types of demands in social protests, 1984–2007

<i>Demand</i>	<i>1984</i> (%)	<i>1990</i> (%)	<i>1996</i> (%)	<i>2002</i> (%)	<i>2007</i> (%)
Labor (wages and working conditions)	68	53	17	13	30
Economic policy	6	11	15	28	4
Administration of justice	6	8	12	9	10
Welfare (education-health care-pensions)	4	8	14	6	6
Political regime	2	4	7	12	9
Unemployment and assistentialist policies	0	2	2	14	2
Housing and infrastructure	3	2	8	1	8
Human rights	3	2	12	3	2
Environment	0	0	1	2	15
Public safety	1	3	1	2	3
Consumption	1	3	3	2	2
Discrimination and diversity	0	0	0	0	1
Others	4	1	5	5	5
Without information	3	3	2	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Own preparation based on data from Grupo de Estudios sobre Protesta Social y Acción Colectiva (IIGG-UBA) and PIP-Conicet Project 0393 (IDAES-UNSAM)

particular and labor issues in general predominated throughout the period, their relative weight varied strikingly. The deepening of the change of economic model transformed labor demands with a shift toward demand for jobs and assistentialist policies.⁹ Economic recovery after the crisis of 2001, however, then reduced demands of this type and, as we will see below, created the conditions for a reactivation of demands related to wages and working conditions which, however, had much less weight than in the 1980s.

Table 10.3 summarizes the types of demands that predominated in 2007 (latest available data) and represent a universe of demands that has been fundamental in Argentine political life since then. Taking these main types of demands as an indicator, we now go on to analyze some protests as a basis from which to address the question of malaise in representation.

Types of Demands, Protest, and Links to Politics in Argentina Today

Protest activity related to labor issues is central in present-day Argentina. Although trade union conflict has declined since the early 1980s, it continues to play a fundamental role and even regained strength with

Table 10.3 Types of demands and principal conflicts, 2007

<p>(I) Labor issues Protest at national level as function of the political position of trade union federations Grassroots conflicts related to working conditions in precarious sectors</p>	<p>(III) Justice Victims and victims' relatives Two different meanings of politicization Central importance of judicial issue</p>
<p>(II) Socioenvironmental demands Citizen assemblies as from 2002 (autonomy) Large-scale mining, agrochemicals, and urban pollution New framework for collective action</p>	<p>(IV) Political representation 2012–2013 cycle of protests (polarization since 2008)/non-party and non-political Demands related to agenda issues (public safety, corruption, etc.) Criticism of presidentialism</p>

Source: Own preparation

the economic recovery that followed the 2001 crisis. In addition to trade unions' participation in the institutions that regulate labor relations—at least in the formal market—there has, in recent years, been an increase in protest activity and confrontation related to their role in negotiation of wages and working conditions.

The dynamics of this reappearance of trade union conflict have been of a segmented nature. While most formal employment is governed by the logic of country-level organizations (unions and federations) and their political positions, there has also been an increase in conflict related to the role of grassroots leaders—particularly in less protected economic sectors—that falls outside or is in direct confrontation to the positions and decisions adopted by national leaders (Etchemendy and Collier 2008; Armelino 2011; Trajtember et al. 2012).

In recent years, conflicts have taken institutional channels, particularly while the most important unions remained grouped together in a single federation and aligned with the national government's position.¹⁰ After 2011, the breakdown of the alliance between most of the trade union sector and the government—which resulted in a split in the General Federation of Labor (CGT)—opened the way to the reappearance of important measures of force at the national level related, in particular, to price increases and the levy of income taxes but also reflecting political conflict between the two sectors.

Intra-union confrontation tends to reflect the segmentation of the labor market. Important conflicts have arisen in recent years related to the precarious working conditions and exploitation still found in some

little controlled sectors or where national union leaders take more flexible stances as, for example, in the case of supermarkets, call centers, the cosmetics industry, and subways (Abal Medina and Diana Menéndez 2011). Precarious working conditions and lack of protection have been a matter of public debate and a cause of conflict particularly in recent years, thanks to the revelation of different situations considered “slave labor”. Such reports and complaints have tended to appear with increasing frequency in the textile and rural sectors and reflect the activities of social organizations, rather than unions.

Secondly, during the past decade, demands related to the environment have appeared. A transformation in how natural resources are exploited, related to changes in the country’s regulatory framework, have served as the context for a proliferation of conflicts of this type which, in some cases, had very important repercussions in national politics. The mobilization of grassroots community actors, principally multi-sector groups representing the interests of communities in the provinces, resulted in cases of organization and confrontation with the state and economic actors.

The scope of these conflicts has, in general, been only local. A number of emblematic cases received wide coverage and had a great impact but did not result in the problem’s escalation to the national level or the appearance of actors with a real capacity to intervene in national politics. Two key elements must be borne in mind here. Firstly, the environmental problem differs from region to region depending on their economic activities and the local and provincial coalitions that arise in opposition to these activities. Secondly, the assemblies that have been formed and have led the processes of political confrontation against these activities have, from the beginning, had a strongly community rhetoric (Delamata 2009).

The first such experience was the case of the citizen assembly of the Esquel community where, in 2002–2003, an important movement arose against a mining project with Esquel in its area of influence. As a result of direct action and the forcing of a popular consultation, the project was finally halted. This success in terms of the creation of a truly multi-sector coalition that crystallized in the organization of the citizen assembly¹¹ and was able to fight an economic project through mobilization and protest was such that its impact came to be referred to as the “Esquel effect” (Svampa and Antonelli 2009) and, over the past decade, has inspired an important series of other challenges to projects, mobilized under the slogan “No to the mine”.

Environmental demands have gradually come to form a new framework for collective action whose growth is reflected principally in the

rejection of mining projects by new self-convened citizen assemblies in the Catamarca and La Rioja Provinces (Svampa and Antonelli 2009). These demands gained further strength when the inhabitants of the city of Gualaguaychú began to organize and mobilize against the installation of two paper companies on the banks of the River Uruguay, which marks the border between Argentina and Uruguay (the country where the plants were located). The conflict had enormous repercussions at the national level because Gualaguaychú's inhabitants blocked the cross-border bridge between this city and Fray Bentos (Uruguay), escalating the conflict to the point of causing an international diplomatic conflict.

As pointed out by G. Merlinsky (2014), daily expressions of environmental conflicts have become ever more frequent, with consequences in areas that include open-pit mining, the application of agrochemicals and advances in soya cultivation, waste management, river pollution, and the impact of large-scale real estate projects. The diversity of these complaints and of the collective actors by whom they are voiced is such that it is very difficult to talk about a movement or even a set of relatively coordinated movements.

Thirdly, in current protests, a high percentage of demands refer to the functioning of the judicial system. Demands for justice are by no means new and have, in fact, been growing significantly since the 1990s. There has been a close relationship between demands of this type and the proliferation of protest groups formed by the victims of different types of situations and their families (Jelin 2008). Most cases relate to police and institutional violence but the list is long and has also come to include other types of cases (public safety, accidents, catastrophes, addictions, etc.). In general, such cases involve deaths after which, for different reasons, the resulting investigation encounter obstacles. They are mostly known by the victim's name—although in collective cases such as the Cromañon fire tragedy or the so-called Once massacre, a railway accident, the name of the incident can also be used—and the main spokespeople are the victims' relatives.

These forms of mobilization by victims' families have been linked to two broad frameworks for the interpreting collective action that have also appeared within the past 20 years: those of impunity and insecurity (Schillagi 2010). The former is related principally to the way in which some complaints against police and institutional violence were structured as from the end of the 1980s. A series of high-profile cases (the Budge massacre in 1987 and the Bulacio case in 1991) and the interest and

activity of some lawyers and human rights organizations in these matters appear to be the key to understanding the emergence of these forms of mobilization (Jelin 1996; Pita 2010).

As from the mid-1990s, the other broad framework for collective action has also increasingly been adopted by victims' families who, under the umbrella of "insecurity", have mobilized in demand for the prevention and investigation of common crimes (Kessler 2009). It was the impact on national politics of the so-called Blumberg case in 2004 that consolidated "insecurity" as the second great interpretative framework for collective action (Annunziata et al. 2006).

One of the first actions taken by victims' families is precisely to establish equivalences or, in other words, identify patterns that allow them to position their case in a series of others. This is part of the task of "politicizing" the event. At the same time, they systematically strive to show that the mobilization does not have political intentions and does not form part of the political party struggle. Mobilizations by victims' families, in other words, take place at a distance from and, to a large extent, against institutional politics (Zenobi 2014).

Fourthly and finally, one of the most important types of demands in recent years has to do with the political regime.¹² A key example is the last cycle of mass protests against the national government which took place in 2012 and 2013.¹³ These protests brought the reappearance of a type of confrontation characteristic of the crisis of 2001—*cacerolazos*—as well as important criticism of political activity, albeit centering this time on the president and her style of political leadership.

The 2012–2013 protests must be viewed in the broader context of the polarization produced by the conflict that, in 2008, pitted the national government against farmers' organizations. Although this episode is not examined in detail here, it is important to note that the conflict awoke passionate support for those who fought the government's application of a tax on agricultural exports. It produced a binary situation of loyalty to or criticism of the national government, generating the cleavage between "Kirchnerism" and "anti-Kirchnerism" that was a striking feature of subsequent years.

This is important in explaining the response to successive calls to demonstrate against the government in 2012 and 2013. These were of a strictly non-party nature and the reference to self-convening, the absence of party insignia and flags and the lack of spokespeople were a core feature of all of them (Gold 2015: 10).

This makes it very difficult to talk about the participants as a whole or their interests and motives. These protests were the expression of a strong rejection of the national government's policies and, in particular, of the president. At the same time, however, their manner of organization highlighted the participants' reluctance to be represented in a precise manner. This suggests indignant people in search of mechanisms of expression and forms of recognition, rather than a movement seeking to define strategies and aims of political intervention. In this case, far more than in other protest actions, the difficulty of identifying a collective actor was, therefore, particularly evident.

From data gathered at one of the demonstrations—which is not, nor pretends to be, representative—some of the characteristics and attributes of participants in protests of this type can be tentatively identified.¹⁴ Two-thirds of those who answered a survey, carried out during one of the protests, indicated that they had found out about it on internet and 99 percent that were there on their own account, not with an organization, and mostly with friends or relatives. Their educational level was markedly high and the number of unemployed people quite low. All those surveyed had an extremely negative evaluation of the country's situation at the time and were highly dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. Only 4 percent reported having voted for the current government in the 2011 presidential election.

Finally, based on observation and information published in the press, it can be argued that the demonstrators seemed not to master the key elements of the traditional repertoire of demonstrations. They did not form columns nor have a pre-established route. Depending on the particular demonstration, there were loudspeakers or screens with slogans but all three consisted principally in people gathering at the Obelisk in Buenos Aires and then wandering around the nearby area.

The protests focused on agenda issues (such as lack of public safety, corruption, inflation, and savings in dollars) and on drawing a clear dividing line between the citizenry and the political class. Although there was unanimous criticism of the government, the type of criticism and the insistence of marches on defining themselves as non-party and apolitical point to some interesting aspects of these protests. Firstly, although the demands expressed coincided with the positions of the political opposition, participants were reluctant to be represented in any clear way. As a result, the demands were fragmented and tended to come down to a register of the personal opinion of each of the participants, all feeling entitled to express

their motives, reasons, and demands without anyone being able to claim the right to a collective voice. Secondly, the complaints tended to underscore a lack of recognition in government policy of citizens' interests as expressed there, albeit in disaggregated form. In other words, these mass demonstrations appear to have a privileged position in an area of growing malaise in representation among part of the citizenry that, as we have seen, expresses itself through the politics of indignation.

Protest, Disaffection, and Attitudes Toward Politics

As already seen, social protest in Argentina is certainly heterogeneous. Participation in protest actions is, of course, not distributed homogeneously across the population but neither does it seem to be confined to a particular social group. Using data from the UDP-IDRC survey, it is possible to identify some differences between the profiles of those who protest and those who do not (data for 2013). According to this, the former live predominantly in large urban centers, mostly come from the middle of the socioeconomic scale, and are more than averagely likely to engage in other forms of participation (such as in political parties, trade unions, and NGOs). They also show a greater interest in political life and consume more specific information than the average citizen.¹⁵

Tables 10.4 and 10.5 show the answers of those who indicated having participated in a protest during the previous 12 months as compared to those who had not done so. Two conclusions stand out. The first is that participation and interest in politics are quite low in Argentina, which could be interpreted as an important indicator of disaffection. At the same time, however, both tend to be higher among those who participated in a protest

Table 10.4 Political participation by participation in protests

<i>Variable</i>		<i>Protested</i> (<i>n</i> = 170)	<i>Did not protest</i> (<i>n</i> = 1030)
Participates regularly in a political party	Yes	18.2	2.2
	No	81.8	97.6
Participates regularly in a trade union	Yes	12.5	1.6
	No	87.5	98.4
Participates regularly in a neighborhood assembly	Yes	24.1	6.7
	No	75.9	93.3

Source: Own preparation based on data from UDP-IDRC survey

Table 10.5 Interest in politics by participation in protests

<i>Variable</i>		<i>Protested</i> (<i>n</i> = 170)	<i>Did not protest</i> (<i>n</i> = 1030)
Do you talk about politics with family members and friends?	Every day	27.8	7.9
	Never	9.4	27
Do you read about politics in newspapers and magazines?	Every day	19.8	8.4
	Never	14.7	38.2
Do you watch the news or political programs on television?	Every day	39.5	24.4
	Never	8.8	18.9
Do you listen to the news or political programs on the radio?	Every day	25.6	11
	Never	19.8	42.5
Do you read about politics on internet?	Every day	18.8	7
	Never	35.3	64.6

Source: Own preparation based on data from UDP-IDRC survey

action during the previous 12 months. As indicated by Nicolás Somma in his Chap. 2, political commitment and membership of an organization are directly related to protest activity. Membership of a political party reaches only 2.2 percent among those who did not protest in the previous year but, among those who did so, reaches 18.2 percent (Table 10.4).

A similar result is also seen in the case of interest in politics. This is clearly higher among those who protest, indicating a citizen who is more than averagely well informed, albeit within the framework of a quite generalized lack of interest in political matters.¹⁶ In what sense then can disaffection be considered as linked to protest? Here, it is useful to introduce two additional elements. The first has to do with controlling an initial indicator of disaffection (participation and interest in politics) with others related to forms of ideological self-identification and position *vis-à-vis* political cleavages as well as the relationship between identification and parties' election platforms.

As can be seen in Table 10.5, people who protest are more likely to take a position on the left-right and Peronist-anti-Peronist scales while, among those who do not protest, a significantly larger percentage does not identify with these criteria of ideological differentiation. As indicated above, this may be a result of the heterogeneity of the collective groups and protest movements that exist in Argentina today. The cleavage between support for and rejection of the government expressed in approval or disapproval of the president is, for example, distributed quite homogeneously between those who protest and those who do not.

Table 10.6 Ideology by participation in protests

<i>Variable</i>		<i>Protested</i> (<i>n</i> = 170)	<i>Did not protest</i> (<i>n</i> = 1030)
Are you on the left or right?	Left	30	10
	Center	34	41
	Right	24	15
	None	17	35
Are you Peronist or anti-Peronist?	Very Peronist	10	7
	Very anti-Peronist	8	7
	Neither	19	35
Democracy is preferable to any other form of government		71	72
Do you approve or disapprove of the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK)?	Approves	50	44
	Disapproves	47	50
Does any politician seem better to you than another one?	Yes	37	27
	No	61	70
Do you identify with any political party?	Yes	70	49
	No	26	47
	DNK/DNA	4	3

Source: Own preparation based on data from UDP-IDRC survey

Finally, Table 10.6 shows an interesting distinction in what can be considered dimensions of disaffection. When the question is about the political class, disaffection as an attitude of malaise clearly predominates (between 61 percent and 70 percent of interviewees indicate that they view no politician as better than any other). However, between 49 percent and 70 percent identify with some political party. Disaffection appears, in other words, to focus on the political class and its remoteness from citizens and not specifically on the programs currently represented by political parties.

CONCLUSIONS: DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL DISAFFECTION AND LEGITIMACY OF SOCIAL PROTEST

We return here to our original question of whether protest activity is an expression of a certain type of malaise in representation. If the question refers to the relationship between disaffection with political parties and protest, the obvious answer, based on the dynamics of the traditional

political parties and social movements since the transition to democracy, is that it is, indeed, an expression of such malaise. Compared to the vitality of the transition, the role of Argentina's traditional parties has dulled significantly in recent decades (Torre 2003). The culmination of this process was the crisis of 2001 and the citizenry's strong rejection of political party leaders as a whole.

At the same time, the situation after the 2001 crisis shows that this process has changed significantly for a number of important reasons. The new cleavage that gradually developed as a result of the election of the first Kirchnerist government in 2003 meant a readjustment of political loyalties in both parties and social movements. In this context, what we have termed here the institutionalization of part of the human rights movement and the *piqueteros* movements after 2003 implied a new relationship between these collective actors and party politics. In this period, it was not only those who identified themselves as opposition to the national government who engaged in protest activities. Pro-government sectors also protested in conflicts with the private sector or against provincial or local governments of a different political color.

As seen above, protest since 2001 has also been a more direct expression of malaise in representation as reflected in the *cacerolazos* of recent years against the national government. Here, disapproval of the president appears to be central and related to a particular type of disaffection with parties and lack of identification with what the opposition offers. These *cacerolazos*—with their echo of the 2001 crisis—highlight the relationship between malaise and protest. However, like the great demonstrations of the crisis, they are principally an expression of the politics of indignation, rather than an effort to structure demands and define collective frames and forms of organization that give continuity to these demands. Their scope also tends to be limited to large urban centers and to citizens who have a clear position of opposition to the national government.

Disaffection as a general process is, therefore, reflected in distance from traditional parties and a decline in membership of them. It is, however, less clear that this is also the case with respect to the new political cleavage that has emerged in the past decade and, therefore, also the new electoral options that have emerged in recent years.¹⁷ Our data shows that identification with a party is high among both those who protested and those who did not. Disaffection is perhaps expressed in a more structural manner in citizens' feeling of distance from political activity. Party membership is low in Argentina. The data also reveals a quite widespread

view among citizens that there are few differences between the different political leaders, also marking a dividing line between the citizenry and the political class. Citizens tend not to identify with or feel represented by their leaders.

These factors together could explain the persistence of protest as a legitimate mechanism for expressing demands, outside and at a distance from political party channels, but without causing institutional crises or serious questioning of the functioning of the democratic system.

NOTES

1. On this point, see the Chap. 11 of this book by Federico Lorenc and Mariana Heredia.
2. This data is the result of a number of research projects undertaken through the Grupo de Estudios sobre Protesta Social y Acción Colectiva (IIGG-UBA and IDAES-UNSAM). Thanks to these projects, a database of social protests in 1984–2007 was compiled with the Argentine press as its source. As its unit of analysis, this work used the notion of social protest understood as a public event of a contentious nature produced by a social actor and entailing an effort to mobilize resources. The database comprises a total of 10,679 protest actions that were characterized according to three multiple variables: type of organization, type of demand, and format of the protest. See Schuster et al. (2006) and Pereyra et al. (2015).
3. For construction of this dichotomous variable, answers to questions 6.1, 6.3, 6.10, and 6.13 were used.
4. In the 2010 LAPOP survey (Lodola 2011), road blocking was considered a legitimate form of protest by 35 percent.
5. For the purposes of the present analysis, we use a quite restrictive definition of social movement in order to emphasize the specific nature of phenomena of this type within the broader context of processes of social mobilization. In this sense, social movements are “temporary processes of emergence of collective, solidary, conflictive, and questioning actions that, in their development, can result in the formation of new collective actors with their own identity, a certain persistence over time and the potential to transform the situation of social action through their presence and practices” (Jelin 1987: 14). For a general discussion of the concept of social mobilization, see, among others, Tarrow (1994).

6. Except for the left-wing Trotskyite parties that shown a strong presence in protest activity and a limited weight in electoral and institutional politics.
7. Relations between the human rights movement and Kirchnerism since the latter came to power have been the subject of much debate. Some consider that they consist primarily in the movements' cooptation by the government while others maintain that they take diverse forms that range from forms of exchange to the appearance of new political loyalties (party, programmatic, or charismatic).
8. It is interesting to note that, despite the marked cleavage produced by Kirchnerism among organizations of the unemployed, it did not directly result in demobilization during the first few years. Organizations that both supported and opposed the government took to the streets during the years immediately following the crisis. There were, for example, marches of support for the government in conflicts with private companies. These dynamics persisted in subsequent years, albeit with less intensity, and also saw the inclusion of pro-government trade union sectors.
9. It is important to remember that the rise in unemployment during the 1990s was addressed principally through conditional cash transfers and assistentialist policies. See Svampa and Pereyra (2003).
10. Since the 1940s, Argentine trade unionism has been structured around its majority allegiance to Peronism. Centralized bargained by sector also gave national unions a monopoly on worker representation. This tended to favor the unity of the workers' movement and, at the same time, the focus of union leaders on their positioning in national politics. Most wage negotiations take place through institutional channels—collective bargaining—led by those unions with the greatest weight at the national level.
11. The citizen assembly of local residents comprised principally teachers, professionals, and university students but was also supported by different social sectors of the Esquel community and even local political leaders.
12. This category is certainly quite wide. In 1984–2007, it includes, among the most important demands, matters as diverse as greater participation, political representation, decision-making (increased transparency of decisions, freedom of expression, political reform,

a participative budget, challenging of election results, obstruction of republican procedures, and abuse of decrees of necessity and urgency), “all go home” demands, requests for popular consultations, the performance of public-sector employees and requests for their resignation, and special pensions (Schuster et al. 2006: 23).

13. We refer here to the cycle of protests that took place between September 2012 and August 2013 and included three large mobilizations known as “13-S” (13/9/2012), “8-N” (8/11/2012), and “18-A” (18/4/2013). The recent mobilization of February 18, 2015, in response to the death of public prosecutor A. Nisman could also be included.
14. This data was gathered in a survey of demonstrators at the protest which took place in the city of Buenos Aires on November 8, 2012. It was carried out by sociology and social anthropology undergraduates at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín. A total of 220 people were interviewed at different points in the demonstration.
15. The LAPOP survey (2010) concludes that participation in protests in Argentina is biased toward young people, the inhabitants of large urban centers, and those with some form of participation in community organizations or political parties (Lodola 2011: 246).
16. It should perhaps be considered here that asking specifically about politics may induce a negative answer from interviewees who do follow general news about the country (including matters of political debate) but are not interested in the life of parties, leaders, or public-sector officials.
17. In the past ten years, new political parties have been created that do not fit the traditional distinction between the Peronists (PJ) and the Radicals (UCR). The Frente para la Victoria, for example, emerged as a party structure designed to reflect the project of political transversality implemented by N. Kirchner in 2005, precisely at the time when Kirchnerism broke with its principal allies within the PJ. A similar case today is the PRO, the main opposition party at the national level, whose main leaders do not come from any of the traditional parties but which has, however, used agreements with them to strengthen its party structures at the national level.

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Malaise in Political Representation: Citizen Attitudes and Sociocultural Tensions in Argentine Democracy

Mariana Heredia and Federico Lorenc Valcarce

INTRODUCTION

When analyzing democracy, the social sciences look at recognition and acceptance of the institutions, actors, and actions considered as being political (Dalton, 2004 and 2014; Norris, 1999; Torcal and Montero, 2006). This relates to the representative dimension that, in different senses, democracy seeks to enshrine. To what extent does politics represent the interests and opinions of the social groups under its sway? What differentiated stances do citizens take toward different political objects? What factors play a role in determining preferences for and levels of satisfaction with the actors and institutions of democratic politics? Many studies

M. Heredia (✉)

Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales, Universidad de San Martín, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina

F. Lorenc Valcarce

Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Departamento de Sociología, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina

have drawn attention to the lack of legitimacy of politics in contemporary democracies but, paradoxically, have also found that marked malaise with parties, politicians, and governments is accompanied by strong support for democracy as a form of government.

Argentina is a particularly interesting case for analysis of malaise in representation. Between 1930 and 1983, it alternated between civil and military governments that found it equally difficult to complete their term. Argentina's recent history is plagued with extreme experiences: severe and recurrent economic crises, early handovers of power by the elected authorities, systematic deterioration of social equality, and protests of different types and singular intensity. Many authors have credited its political leaders with the capacity to resolve the difficulties posed by these critical situations within constitutional parameters, neutralizing and managing civic malaise and social belligerence. To what extent is this reflected in the relations of citizens to politics and its professionals? After more than a decade of Kirchnerist hegemony, what remains of the "all go home" of 2001?

In a bid to answer these questions, we first analyze the three dimensions of malaise in representation: disaffection, disapproval, and distrust. We then go on to examine the relationship between this phenomenon and a set of social, cultural, and political factors that influence its structure before, finally, looking at the relationship between malaise in representation and the democratic regime.

Our analysis is based on an original survey of attitudes, opinions, and practices in Argentina, using a representative sample of over-18-year-olds throughout the country. A total of 1200 face-to-face interviews took place in people's homes and the sample has a margin of error of less than 3 percent and a level of confidence of 95 percent. The interviews took place between November 20 and December 12, 2013.

DEFINING MALAISE

In recent decades, malaise in representation in Latin American democracies has become a topic of discussion. The notion of malaise in representation encompasses a multitude of different political phenomena: citizen criticism of governments and parties, the weakness of political identification, electoral abstention, questioning of state intervention, lack of interest in public debate, the emergence of new extra-party leaders, citizen disaffiliation, and the proliferation of social movements and protest actions.

These processes can all be traced back and attributed to the same frustration with government institutions and their principal protagonists but

are, nonetheless, diverse and very different in the way they relate to political institutions. Some express disdain while others are combative; some reflect the naturalization of the established order while others entail a significant risk of rupture; some make demands on the authorities while others indicate apathetic resignation in the face of the authorities' conduct.

In line with the overall purpose of this book, we look at attitudes of malaise in representation and, after defining these dimensions and characterizing them for the case of Argentina, proceed to examine their determinants.

The First Dimension of Malaise: Disaffection

In studying contemporary democracies, scholars tend to highlight the gulf between citizens and political parties, the lack of interest in politics seen among a majority of citizens, and their scarce knowledge of and familiarity with political objects. At the end of this analysis, we consider as an indicator of disaffection the question of whether some political parties represent the interests and values of those surveyed better than others.

When attempting to identify the relationship between ordinary citizens and political parties, the question often asked is “At present, do you sympathize with a particular political party?” In a recent study in Argentina, 27 percent of interviewees replied positively (Lodola and Seligson 2013: 197–9). However, this question is phrased in absolute terms and makes a negative answer a very easy alternative. In contrast to other studies, the question we ask is “Which of the following political parties best represents your interests, beliefs, and values?” This forces the interviewee to distinguish among the different parties while still permitting the option of rejecting them all.

We do not seek to establish “identity” or even “identification” with a party but simply a relative preference in a specific context. This can be considered a threshold for asserting that people who indicate a preference are not “disaffected” with the parties.

Over half of our interviewees (52.3 percent) recognized that certain parties represent their interests and beliefs better than others, with almost 35 percent of total replies corresponding to a branch of Peronism (Table 11.1). This would indicate that, at least for part of the population, the different alternatives are not a matter of indifference.

Our data shows that parties—understood not as organizations but as identity references and points of allegiance—have some degree of embedment in society. This is, in turn, in line with the relative capacity to monopolize political-electoral representation that the political actors

Table 11.1 Party preferences, Argentina, 2013

<i>Party</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Peronism (Kirchnerism)	25.1
Peronism (anti-Kirchnerism)	9.8
Radicals (UCR)	5.4
Macrism (PRO)	4.7
Trotskyism (PO, PTS, PO, etc.)	2.2
Socialism (PS)	1.9
ARI	1.0
Proyecto Sur	1.0
Communism (PC)	0.7
Others	0.3
None	44.3
DNA	3.5

Source: IDRC Project “A crisis of legitimacy”. Argentina survey ($N = 1200$).

related to these parties—albeit under different electoral labels—have shown since 1983.

Different studies have demonstrated that the Peronist and Radical identities persisted during the years of praetorianism of the masses, a phenomenon that was revitalized by the restoration of democracy. Even when, between 1930 and 1983, the armed forces were recurring and legitimate participants in national political life (Rouquié 1978), many Argentines continued to identify themselves as Peronist or Radical (James 1993; Acuña 1984). More recently, when both parties have given rise to common fronts and different split organizations, this and other data show that their identities continue to exist in the preferences of Argentines.

It is difficult to assert unequivocally that Argentines have distanced themselves from political parties, that they do not identify with them, or that there is a misalignment with voters. The preferences indicated by interviewees tend not only to coincide with their parents’ preferences but also to follow certain socioeconomic patterns. In this sense, party identities have survived over time and maintained preferential ties with certain socioeconomic groups.

In other words, although absolute disaffection is high, it does not affect a majority of the population and is not reflected in a corresponding loss of allegiance to party traditions and organizations. In summary, we find, in Argentina, an index of disaffection of 0.47.

The Second Dimension of Malaise: Disapproval

Approval of a government's performance on the part of those subject to its authority is a crucial aspect of political legitimacy and, in particular, of the support it can elicit. Our data indicates that, in late 2013, almost 45 percent of Argentines approved of the performance of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner while almost 50 percent disapproved and 5 percent did not express an opinion. The index of disapproval, at 0.49, was only slightly higher.

This very volatile data is conditioned by the wear and tear of an administration in the latter part of its term and the specific context in which the survey took place but nonetheless indicates a high level of polarization in Argentines' opinions about their government. Can this be interpreted as an expression of malaise in representation or its effectiveness? In one sense, the government could be held responsible for its tendency to arouse and fan malaise among its opponents. In regimes like that in Argentina, with a dominant party and fragmented opposition parties, polarization can be interpreted as caused by the government party and the electoral opposition's incapacity to effectively capitalize on discontent. In another sense, however, it can be viewed as reflecting the authorities' capacity to implement a set of decisions that express the will of a part (initially, the majority) of the electorate and, in this sense, as representing certain beliefs and values above others.

Throughout the twentieth century, the role of presidents in Argentine politics was central and this is even more so today. The development of new communications technologies (which tend to personalize electoral options), the breaking up of political parties (due to splits in Peronism and the Radicals), and the relative disorganization of the parties (which rarely function as bodies governed by explicit impersonal mechanisms) have accentuated the presidentialist nature of Argentina's political dynamics.

Scholars have frequently noted both the hopes that Argentines have pinned on great leaders and the unsuccessful attempts of anti-Peronist parties to forge charismatic figures of the stature of Perón or Kirchner. The attention focused on the presidency appears to have been fostered by what de Ípola and de Riz (1982) termed the "Argentine ideology". According to these authors, this ideology has its roots in two great myths ascribed to by the principal protagonists of the country's political life: that it is a land unusually rich in natural resources and blessed by divine

providence and that is a community which can be “decided for” politically and organized from above by a will sufficiently lucid and audacious to do so. The repeated delegation of public and political power in strong leaders renewed, time and time again, the hope that the process of decadence often attributed to the country would be definitively resolved in a single stroke.

In other words, although this dimension of malaise in representation appears to be the simplest, its interpretation is far from obvious when such polarized opinions are expressed. Should this polarization be viewed as an expression of malaise in representation or of the conflict that exists in any democratic society?

The Third Dimension of Malaise: Distrust

In representative democracies, citizens are almost always spectators who—in their ordinary conversations, in answers to surveys, or when voting—merely *express a judgment* on political actors and institutions (Gaxie, 1978; Sniderman, P. and Highton, B. [ed.] 2011). In this book, malaise includes a dimension that is the (dis)trust shown by individuals in the basic institutions of democracy: the government, the parties, Congress, and municipal governments.

Relative trust in these political institutions and actors is best evaluated by comparing it to that in other institutions and actors which are not directly and specifically political in nature (Table 11.2).

When asked about actors and institutions, interviewees tend to report low levels of trust. Indeed, only a minority of the population trust the representatives of the three powers of state (executive, legislature, and judiciary). Trust in the representatives of economic sectors (businesspeople and trade unions) is even lower. The only institutions trusted by a majority of the population are the church and universities. Political parties are at the very bottom of the scale.¹

In the case of political actors, only those with the strongest personal identity—the president and the local mayor—elicit a relatively high level of trust. As in disaffection, the use of a question about abstract political objects, which induces a generalizing reply, may tend to prompt negative opinions that become more nuanced when the question is more specific.

As regards our index, distrust in the government reaches 36.25 while that in the parties, the Chamber of Deputies, and the municipal government reaches 25.15, 28.56, and 34.82, respectively, giving an average of 31.19.

Table 11.2 Trust in actors and institutions, Argentina, 2013 (“A lot” plus “Quite a lot”)

<i>Institution</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Universities	77.5
Church	52.3
President of the Republic	35.8
Journalists	29.1
Armed forces	28.6
Mayor	28.0
Supreme Court	26.6
Government ministers	18.7
Businesspeople	17.0
Senators	16.5
Trade unions	15.9
Members of Chamber of Deputies	15.5
Political parties	13.0
Total average distrust	28.81

Source: IDRC project “A crisis of legitimacy”, Argentina survey ($N = 1200$)

SEEKING EXPLANATIONS FOR MALAISE

Once the content and scope of malaise in representation have been identified, the question then arises of the social and political factors that determine this specific configuration of citizens’ relations with politics. Firstly, we establish the correlation between each of the dependent variables and the other variables included in our questionnaire. For this purpose, we compare the distributions of the conditional relative frequencies and determine each correlation coefficient. From those variables with the highest coefficients, we then select a series of endogenous and exogenous variables in order to look at how malaise in representation is anchored in a broader sociopolitical context.

In analyzing malaise in representation, we seek to identify the way in which citizens relate to politics. Underlying this specific question, there is, however, a more general interest in the way in which politics forms part of individuals’ experiences and how social factors such as class, profession, educational level, age, and gender affect the practical and symbolic relationship they establish with the differentiated sphere of political objects. It is also interesting to analyze how the relationship is affected by broader social experiences such as religious socialization and social participation as well as personal ties with political organizations and practices (such as

coming from a politicized family or belonging to a party). Finally, there are other broader types of ties with collective and public life that also have an impact on political attitudes and behavior.

Determinants of Disaffection

The position in which people place themselves on the Peronist-anti-Peronist scale (0.430) and the left-right scale (0.374) are the two factors most directly related with political disaffection. It also shows a very close correlation with their level of interest in politics (0.283) and with coming from a family with a politicized father (0.275). Indeed, sympathizing with a political party appears to form part of a manner of relating to politics in which ideological and political-cultural cleavages have certain weight.

The principal difference between those who do or do not sympathize with a political party is that around 80 percent of the former can place themselves on the left-right scale while 50 percent of the latter cannot or do not wish to do so. At the same time, the Peronist-anti-Peronist cleavage remains very strong in Argentine society but is more evident among those who identify with a political party than among disaffected citizens.

Allegiance to a party is closely associated with having been brought up in a family with clear political preferences. Two-thirds of those whose father identified with some party also express political sympathies and, in most cases, allegiance to a specific party.

Levels of disaffection are correlated with people's social characteristics. In Argentina, the distance of young people from political parties is greater than among older people. Women have a slightly higher level of disaffection than men and it is also higher in working and middle-class segments of the population than among the upper and upper-middle classes. In addition, people with a higher level of participation in social, religious, or neighborhood organizations are more likely to express a preference for a political party.

A binary logistic regression was used to assess each variable's specific contribution to explaining political disaffection (Table 11.3). The model correctly classifies 72.7 percent of cases and explains some 30 percent of the dependent variable's variance. All the factors included in the model contribute to explaining disaffection, led by being under 30 years of age, considering crime to be the country's principal problem, and perceiving that corruption has increased in recent years. Evaluation of the country's economic situation and ideological cleavages also contribute but their weight drops slightly.

Determinants of Disapproval

The factor that most contributes to explaining approval of the president's performance is allegiance to a party (0.521). This is, in fact, a two-way effect, with support for Kirchnerism positively affecting approval of the president's performance and approval of the president's performance making support for Kirchnerism more likely. In other words, the government and the party appear to unite in structuring reality.

In line with the literature, leaving aside the strictly political variables, evaluation of the country's economic situation predicts approval or disapproval of the president's performance better than any other single variable (0.439). Approval is also accompanied by positive perceptions of the present and future situation, greater acceptance of the political order, and lesser cynicism about the actions of the country's rulers and social organization.

Opposition sympathizers are more sensitive to the problem of corruption and believe it has increased. Those who disapprove of the president's performance are more likely to believe that politicians steal tax revenues (0.297) and that these are not used to provide public services (0.299). They more often take the view that a job and housing are not universal rights and that the market has legitimacy. In terms of the ideological scale, approval of the government is slightly higher among those who place themselves left of center and lower among those who place themselves right of center. This is in line with how the government itself describes its position on this scale.

There is no correlation between the different indicators of social participation and approval of the president's performance, although those who approve have participated more than others in demonstrations, protest marches, and petitions and those who disapprove have participated more in *cacerolazos* (saucepan-banging protests).

Disapproval of the government does not vary with gender or age. It does, however, do so slightly with educational level. In what appears to be a combination of the more typical popular current of Peronism with one that is more progressive and socially privileged, those at the lowest and very highest ends of the educational scale are more likely to approve of the president's performance.

These distributions are almost all borne out by multivariate analysis (Table 11.4). The model correctly classifies 73 percent of cases and explains over 30 percent of the dependent variable's variance. The perception that corruption has increased in recent years, reading about

politics in newspapers and magazines, and believing that politicians steal tax revenues and elections are not clean and transparent are all factors that contribute strongly to disapproval of the government. Reproaches of lack of transparency are a decisive factor in disapproval of the president, which is higher among more educated sectors of the population (which is the second most important factor after the perception that corruption has increased).

Determinants of Distrust

There is a strong correlation between trust in the government and trust in the president (0.721), the presidency (0.753), and ministers (0.709). All these survey questions are similar in that they tend to measure trust in the executive and its occupants. There is also a correlation with approval of the president's performance (0.387) and, to a lesser extent, identification with the parties (0.263). This dimension of distrust is, therefore, correlated with other dimensions of distrust and overlaps with what we have termed disaffection and disapproval.

Trust in actors and political institutions shows some correlation with political identities but less so with variations in party identification or self-placement on the ideological scales. Above all, it is those who have no preference for a party and decline to place themselves on the left-right and Peronist-anti-Peronist scales who express most distrust. Distrust is correlated with rejection of even the official categories of symbolic organization of politics.

Those who trust the government tend to take a positive view of the country's economic situation (0.330) and not to think that corruption has increased (0.312). Similarly, they do not think that politicians steal taxes (0.245) and accept that the state plays a beneficial role (0.235). They are also particularly sensitive to inequality and discrimination, identify more with parties, and declare a greater interest in politics. Over-45-year-olds tend to trust the government more but this trust decreases as educational and socioeconomic level increases.

The configuration of the determinants of distrust of the parties is similar to that of distrust of the government but the correlations are weaker. Those who distrust the parties are more concerned about lack of public safety and corruption whereas those who show more trust in the parties tend to give more importance to the problems of housing, unemployment, and discrimination.

Using multivariate analysis, it is possible to estimate the contribution of each specific factor to the variance of the different aspects of distrust. For this purpose, we constructed a dichotomous dependent variable, grouping positive answers—a lot or quite a lot of trust in the institution—and negative answers—little or no trust—each into a single category, and then carried out a binary logistic regression with the same variables as in the other analyses.

In the case of trust in the government (Table 11.5), the model correctly classifies 77.7 percent of cases and explains over 30 percent of the dependent variable's variance. The factors that affect trust in the government are very much the same as for approval of the president's performance, with the perception that corruption has increased generating distrust of the government which is further reinforced by the idea that politicians steal. Distrust of the government is also higher among those with a higher level of education.

In the case of trust in the parties (Table 11.6), the model correctly classifies 87.3 percent of cases but explains less than 20 percent of the dependent variable's variance. Those who trust the parties less are more egalitarian while those who trust them more are more meritocratic. Distrust of the parties goes hand in hand with the idea that elections are neither clean nor transparent.

For trust in the Chamber of Deputies (Table 11.7), the model correctly classifies 83.8 percent of cases but explains less than 20 percent of the dependent variable's variance. The tension between egalitarianism and meritocracy and the perception that politicians steal and that elections are not clean are the main factors behind distrust of the legislature.

For trust in the municipal government (Table 11.8), the model correctly classifies 73.6 percent of cases but only explains some 10 percent of the dependent variable's variance. Distrust of the municipal government is correlated with the perception that politicians steal and that elections are not clean. In this case, distrust increases with educational level and knowledge of politics.

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF MALAISE

Concern about the social foundations of democracy and political representation of social interests has been a key feature of classic studies of democracy (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Barrington Moore 1973). As indicated in the introduction to this book, a society may "have a high level of distrust of institutions and disapproval of the government. The parties

may also lack deep social roots but this does not necessarily imply a crisis of representation". This defines the problem of establishing whether malaise, with the sociocultural and political roots shown above, has direct and systematic effects on the force of democracy as a political regime.

Here, we look at the way in which support for democracy and satisfaction with it vary as a function of the same independent variables considered in the previous sections. However, we also add the attitudes and behaviors related to malaise in a bid to identify the possible effects of these phenomena.

In our survey, 72 percent of interviewees said that democracy is better than any other form of government and 60 percent reported being quite or very satisfied with it. In line with the prevailing ideas in this field, over two-thirds indicated that democracy cannot exist without parties or politicians. However, this clear expression of approval of democracy conceals more complex and nuanced views.

Support for democracy shows no correlation with signing a petition or protesting but there is a slight correlation with attitudes of malaise in representation. Those who disapprove of the government tend to express malaise with democracy but, rather than malaise with the regime, this appears to be malaise with representation in terms of "those who govern do not represent me", "no-one represents me" or "those who represent me don't get into government". Like many of the factors analyzed here, disapproval forms part of the government-opposition cleavage that has emerged so strongly over the past decade. Acceptance of democracy as a form of government is distributed relatively homogeneously across citizens with more or less trust in political institutions.

The strongest correlations are, however, with other factors. Those who identify corruption as the country's principal problem are more likely not to view democracy as the best political regime while those for whom education is the principal problem are more favorably disposed toward it. Similarly, those who prefer a government that ensures order to one that guarantees liberties are less well disposed toward democracy. There is also a correlation between satisfaction with democracy and support for it as a form of government.

Men are slightly more likely to prefer democracy to any other form of government. This preference also increases with educational and socioeconomic level but is lower among young people than among older people. Answers to this question may, however, depend on the interviewee's level

of political knowledge or, at least, awareness of the expected and legitimate or “politically correct” answer and the lower level of support for democracy seen among young people and women and in popular sectors may, therefore, reflect more limited political knowledge, rather than real and concrete malaise.

The logistic regression specifies the factors that explain support for democracy (Table 11.9). The model explains just under 20 percent of the dependent variable’s variance and properly classifies 75.6 percent of cases. Support for democracy is highest among those who are more concerned about education and more satisfied with their lives, those who advocate more egalitarian values, and those who are more politically knowledgeable.

In the case of *satisfaction with democracy*, we find that this shows a relatively strong negative correlation with disaffection and disapproval. Those who most distrust political institutions also tend to be less satisfied with democracy. In other words, malaise in representation does not affect support for democracy but does reduce satisfaction with it.

Those with a negative evaluation of the country’s economic situation are more dissatisfied with democracy. Similarly, albeit less markedly, those who are dissatisfied with their own personal economic situation and their life in general also tend not to be very satisfied with democracy. Those dissatisfied with democracy tend to believe that politicians steal the money from taxes and that these are not used to provide public services. They also disapprove of the government’s performance and are more likely to believe that corruption has increased and elections are not clean and transparent. By contrast, those who are satisfied with democracy are slightly more statist and more interested in and better informed about politics. They also have greater trust in the government, the parties, and political institutions. To sum up, malaise with the current situation and a low level of satisfaction with the performance of the country’s rulers imply less satisfaction with democracy, but not a lack of support for it as a form of government.

Multivariate analysis shows that the variables we have included in malaise are not those that best explain satisfaction with democracy, although some of them do play a role in the model (Table 11.10). The model explains over 20 percent of the variance of satisfaction with democracy and correctly classifies 70 percent of cases. Again, satisfaction with life as well as being resident in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area make for satisfaction with democracy. These factors are followed by political knowledge and a certain progressivism as regards the role of the state, equality, and freedom.

CONCLUSIONS

Through our analysis, we have determined the levels and forms of malaise in representation understood, above all, as a set of attitudes in relation to politics. We have also identified the factors that determine malaise and its relationship with democracy.

The different attitudes of malaise are correlated with each other but are not identical. Despite a certain correlation between disaffection and disapproval, they do not coincide. The relationship between distrust, particularly in the government, and disapproval is the stronger. However, each of these attitudes is correlated with different factors.

Disaffection with political parties is a function principally of evaluation of the country's economic situation, the perceived cleanliness of elections, and views on what is the country's principal problem. Those who take a negative view of the economy's performance and of the cleanliness of elections and who identify crime as the country's principal problem express malaise in representation in this dimension. Almost superimposing the dependent variable, factors such as party preferences and the position in which people place themselves on the left-right scale and with respect to Peronism show a close and, in this case, negative correlation with disaffection.

Disapproval of the president's performance is also partly a function of some of these same factors. Party preferences, ideological position, relationship to Peronism, evaluation of the country's economic situation, and the perceived cleanliness of elections, for example, affect approval of the president, with those who are not Peronist, who place themselves right of center on the ideological scale, and who take a negative view of the economic situation and the cleanliness of elections expressing malaise in representation in this dimension. However, other factors such as the perception that corruption has increased and that money from taxes is stolen by politicians, rather than being used for their proper purpose, also play a role.

Distrust of political institutions is a function of some, but not all, of these factors. Party preferences, evaluation of the country's economic situation, and views on corruption and the use of public funds have an impact. Those who do not identify with a party, take a negative view of the economic situation, and believe there is corruption and misuse of public resources express greater malaise in representation in this dimension.

The relationship with democracy has its own specific configuration. Support for democracy is relatively homogeneous and only factors

related to politicization have a differentiated impact, with those who decline to place themselves on the left-right scale being less likely to view democracy as the best possible form of government. Citizens' satisfaction with democracy varies markedly as a function of the factors considered in this study. Firstly, distrust of political institutions and disapproval of the government go hand-in-hand with dissatisfaction with democracy which also shows a correlation with the idea that elections are not clean, that tax revenues are not spent properly, and that corruption has increased. A person's distance from Peronism also has an impact and the anti-Peronist pole is the region most dissatisfied with democracy. This is further reinforced by the fact that those who do not identify with Peronism and, above all, those who identify with no political party are more discontented with democracy. Finally, both evaluation of the country's economic situation and the metropolitan region-provinces cleavage also have a small impact on this malaise.

To sum up, factors such as a negative evaluation of the economic situation, a perceived increase in corruption, the idea that tax revenues are not put to good use and are stolen by politicians, skepticism about the cleanliness of elections, and anti-Peronism directly contribute to disapproval and distrust as well as having a direct and indirect impact on dissatisfaction with democracy. Disaffection with political parties, however, appears to go together with a rather apolitical stance that does not necessarily view democracy as the best system.

How should we interpret these phenomena? Articles in the press, essays about the current situation, and the work of some social scientists paint a bleak picture of an apathetic society with an almost total absence of mobilization on collective matters, formed by an indifferent mass of citizens not interested in current political and social issues and a set of isolated individuals disaffected with politics, if not indignant with those who claim to represent them.

Our results are far more nuanced. As indicated by Torre (2003), malaise in representation does not affect all equally and appears to be concentrated among non-Peronist citizens. Moreover, malaise can arise in different situations. In a crisis, it reflects a certain inability of political institutions and government agencies to process social conflicts but, in situations of relative calm, is a sign of a configuration of relations between politics and citizens, characterized by a certain distance, skepticism, and some degree of rejection but without being more than a mere feature of the political culture.

The crisis of 2001 was interpreted as a crisis of political representation and even as an “organic crisis” in the Gramscianist sense.² However, many of the elements of malaise that erupted in December 2001 had been present for years as scholars had insistently pointed out (Lorenc Valcarce, 1998). The question then is why this malaise had not erupted before and whether it was, in fact, the political-cultural elements related to malaise that unleashed the crises that led to forced changes of government and even made the political regime itself tremble.

A certain level of malaise and even high levels of rejection of politicians and indifference toward politics can be “normal” in a stable democratic system. This does not mean that a crisis may not occur but malaise does not appear to be what triggers it or even its key aspect.

This diagnosis is open to the charge of fatalistic acceptance of the current configuration of relations between the citizenry and politics. Interestingly, however, it may imply that, beneath the radical criticism and the appearance of permanent crisis, democracy and party identities have a sociocultural vigor which probably explains why the political system has survived the different crises that have occurred since 1983, without major mishaps and with a certain continuity in the country’s political leadership and a change of generation that would probably have taken place even without the intervention of traumatic situations.

In this sense, although social belligerence and the great porosity of political parties have facilitated the entry of new citizens into politics, they have not implied the appearance of politicians with a different type of profile or lasting questioning of the party system.

Over a decade after the crisis of 2001 and the calls of “all go home”, our study offers two interesting insights. Firstly, while a majority of those surveyed has a poor image of politicians and political parties, a majority also believes that the state should solve society’s problems. As seen in other surveys, a majority of interviewees, over and above party and ideological cleavages, is in favor of the advance of state intervention in the economy and the democratization of welfare. Secondly, while there remains a belief that politicians and parties are as a whole bad, there is also a nuanced view of the political system, with some parties seen as better than others and some politicians as having positive qualities lacked by others. In other words, malaise in representation not only has nuances and variations but also appears to result in dissatisfaction with democracy, rather than its rejection as a form of government.

NOTES

1. Comparison of the replies shown in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 raises an interesting problem of interpretation about which of the two questions best captures citizens' relations with political parties. In answer to the question in Table 11.2 about parties in general, people tend to express rejection but, when parties are mentioned individually as in Table 11.1, some elicit allegiance.
2. The most alarmist interpretations, drawing on Gramsci's work, even argued that the very foundations of political and social domination were at stake or, in other words, that both the authority of political leaders over public institutions and the prerogatives of businesspeople over the coordination of production processes could be eroded by the virulence of social demonstrations and citizen protests.

APPENDIX I. BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS
FOR THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF MALAISE

We separated the set of variables considered relevant for explaining malaise in representation and then ran a logistic regression for each of the three dimensions of malaise, using the forward selection method based on the Wald coefficient. In each case, we obtained a model including all the variables that have a significant relation to the dependent variable and fulfill the chi-squared test of significance.

Table 11.3 Logistic regression: D1 disaffection

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>gl</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Country's economic situation	-.648	.183	12.584	1	.000	.523
Taxes used for health care and education	-.457	.138	10.904	1	.001	.633
Crime is country's principal problem	.484	.145	11.207	1	.001	1.623
Participation in religious group	-.348	.170	4.198	1	.040	.706
Participation in sports club	-1.117	.210	28.405	1	.000	.327
Political knowledge 2—senators	-.439	.189	5.363	1	.021	.645
Political knowledge 5—minister	-.475	.163	8.521	1	.004	.622
Talks about politics	-.318	.139	5.227	1	.022	.728
Peronism-anti-Peronism	-1.521	.170	80.199	1	.000	.219
Left-right	-.993	.207	23.024	1	.000	.370
Corruption has increased	.357	.150	5.619	1	.018	1.429
Age	.705	.154	20.914	1	.000	2.024
Constant	.696	.191	13.218	1	.000	2.005
Chi-squared	336.695	gl 12	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	1321.875					
Cox-Snell R ²	.245					
Nagelkerke R ²	.327					

Table 11.4 Logistic regression: D2 disapproval

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gl</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Country's economic situation	-1.705	.212	64.511	1	.000	.182
Taxes stolen by politicians	.411	.147	7.776	1	.005	1.508
Taxes used for health care and education	-.719	.143	25.264	1	.000	.487
Egalitarianism	-.574	.200	8.219	1	.004	.563
Statism 3—Aerolíneas Argentinas	-.337	.153	4.851	1	.028	.714
Statism 4—Taxes on agricultural exports	-.356	.145	6.061	1	.014	.700

Table 11.4 (continued)

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gl</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Participation in religious group	-.516	.172	9.026	1	.003	.597
Reads about politics in newspapers and magazines	.400	.146	7.494	1	.006	1.492
Peronism-anti-Peronism	-.560	.161	12.124	1	.000	.571
Corruption has increased	.981	.154	40.610	1	.000	2.668
Cleanliness of elections	.438	.148	8.718	1	.003	1.550
Educational level	.405	.144	7.892	1	.005	1.500
Constant	.277	.263	1.112	1	.292	1.319
Chi-squared	383.425	gl 12	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	1277.794					
Cox-Snell R ²	.274					
Nagelkerke R ²	.365					

Table 11.5 Logistic regression: D3a distrust of government

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gl</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Country's economic situation	-1.117	.175	40.619	1	.000	.327
Taxes stolen by politicians	.536	.156	11.791	1	.001	1.709
Taxes used for health care and education	-.790	.151	27.314	1	.000	.454
Statism 4—Taxes on agricultural exports	-.385	.152	6.434	1	.011	.681
Education is country's principal problem	.516	.233	4.876	1	.027	1.675
Talks about politics	-.490	.157	9.700	1	.002	.612
Peronism-anti-Peronism	-.706	.160	19.428	1	.000	.494
Corruption has increased	1.180	.153	59.217	1	.000	3.254
Educational level	.342	.158	4.668	1	.031	1.408
Constant	.950	.216	19.346	1	.000	2.587
Chi-squared	334.719	gl 9	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	1130.428					
Cox-Snell R ²	.244					
Nagelkerke R ²	.345					

Table 11.6 Logistic regression: D3b distrust of parties

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gf</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Country's economic situation	-.797	.202	15.599	1	.000	.451
Taxes used for health care and education	-.431	.192	5.038	1	.025	.650
Egalitarianism	.760	.237	10.231	1	.001	2.137
Interest in politics	-.623	.207	9.052	1	.003	.536
Participation in sports club	-.727	.229	10.073	1	.002	.483
Talks about politics	-.675	.213	10.072	1	.002	.509
Peronism-anti-Peronism	-.765	.192	15.829	1	.000	.465
Cleanliness of elections	.513	.224	5.231	1	.022	1.670
Constant	2.583	.275	88.376	1	.000	13.232
Chi-squared	126.353	gl 8	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	797.613					
Cox-Snell R ²	.100					
Nagelkerke R ²	.186					

Table 11.7 Logistic regression: D3c distrust of chamber of deputies

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gf</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Country's economic situation	-.732	.187	15.359	1	.000	.481
Taxes stolen by politicians	.355	.180	3.874	1	.049	1.426
Taxes used for health care and education	-.673	.177	14.514	1	.000	.510
Egalitarianism	.575	.220	6.822	1	.009	1.778
Interest in politics	-.496	.190	6.784	1	.009	.609
Participation in sports club	-.463	.218	4.520	1	.033	.630
Talks about politics	-.511	.184	7.688	1	.006	.600
Peronism-anti-Peronism	-.754	.173	19.080	1	.000	.470
Cleanliness of elections	.447	.198	5.076	1	.024	1.563
Constant	2.101	.268	61.238	1	.000	8.174
Chi-squared	151.004	gl 9	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	953.028					
Cox-Snell R ²	.118					
Nagelkerke R ²	.197					

Table 11.8 Logistic regression: D3d distrust of municipal government

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gf</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Taxes stolen by politicians	.574	.136	17.849	1	.000	1.775
Participation in religious group	-.366	.162	5.109	1	.024	.694
Political knowledge 1—constitution	-.527	.178	8.802	1	.003	.590
Political knowledge 2—senators	.391	.170	5.316	1	.021	1.479
Reads about politics in newspapers and magazines	-.461	.144	10.192	1	.001	.631
Peronism-anti-Peronism	-.320	.147	4.737	1	.030	.726
Cleanliness of elections	.837	.161	27.078	1	.000	2.310
Educational level	.291	.145	4.031	1	.045	1.338
Constant	.659	.146	20.308	1	.000	1.932
Chi-squared	94.46	gl 8	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	1330.379					
Cox-Snell R ²	.076					
Nagelkerke R ²	.109					

Table 11.9 Logistic regression: E1 democracy is best regime

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gf</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Satisfaction with life	.564	.240	5.503	1	.019	1.757
Egalitarianism	.901	.181	24.699	1	.000	2.462
Crime is country's principal problem	.481	.154	9.826	1	.002	1.618
Education is country's principal problem	1.161	.266	19.072	1	.000	3.193
Participation in church	-.674	.165	16.698	1	.000	.510
Political knowledge 1—constitution	.916	.224	16.730	1	.000	2.499
Political knowledge 2—senators	.580	.188	9.530	1	.002	1.787
Reads about politics in newspapers and magazines	.355	.149	5.674	1	.017	1.426

(continued)


Table 11.9 (continued)

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gl</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Order-freedom	-.292	.145	4.077	1	.043	.747
Cleanliness of elections	-.561	.148	14.367	1	.000	.571
Disapproval	-.558	.162	11.827	1	.001	.572
Distrust of national government	.487	.185	6.895	1	.009	1.627
Distrust of chamber of deputies	-.450	.218	4.268	1	.039	.638
Constant	-.180	.366	.244	1	.621	.835
Chi-squared	177.934	gl 13	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	1243.073					
Cox-Snell R ²	.138					
Nagelkerke R ²	.199					

Table 11.10 Logistic regression: E2 satisfaction with democracy

<i>Variables included in model</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>E. E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Gl</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>
Satisfaction with life	.610	.248	6.064	1	.014	1.840
Taxes used for health care and education	.432	.141	9.413	1	.002	1.540
Egalitarianism	.375	.179	4.375	1	.036	1.455
Political knowledge 2—senators	.522	.191	7.467	1	.006	1.685
Political knowledge 5—minister	.479	.158	9.190	1	.002	1.615
Order-freedom	-.321	.136	5.607	1	.018	.725
Cleanliness of elections	-.511	.141	13.110	1	.000	.600
Region	.558	.149	14.089	1	.000	1.747
Disapproval	-.677	.148	21.051	1	.000	.508
Distrust of national government	-.939	.180	27.245	1	.000	.391
Distrust of municipal government	-.555	.160	12.049	1	.001	.574
Petition	-.569	.258	4.868	1	.027	.566
Constant	.853	.341	6.277	1	.012	2.347
Chi-squared	255.080	gl 12	sig. .000			
-2 log likelihood	1355.778					
Cox-Snell R ²	.192					
Nagelkerke R ²	.259					

APPENDIX 2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FACTORS THAT DETERMINE MALAISE, DIMENSIONS OF MALAISE AND DEMOCRACY



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Mass–Elite Congruence and Representation in Argentina

Noam Lupu and Zach Warner

In representative democracies, policymakers should reflect the policy preferences of citizens (Manin 1997; Pitkin 1967). Scholars have long assumed that citizens elect representatives whose platforms are closest to their own preferences (e.g., Downs 1957). And models of accountability assume that elites have incentives not to stray too far from the preferences of sanctioning voters (e.g., Ferejohn 1986). But how close are politicians' preferences to those of their constituents? Do they indeed reflect an aggregation of citizens' preferences, or do they prioritize some citizens over others?

These questions are not merely empirical curiosities. If policymakers and policies do not reflect the preferences of citizens, a democratic system

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N. Lupu
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA

Z. Warner
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA

ought to hold them to account. In a properly functioning representative democracy, these should be off-equilibrium instances. Voters should quickly replace elites who are not representing their preferences with others who will. If, for some reason, they cannot do so, they may become disillusioned with democratic institutions, disaffected from politics, and disapproving of the political elite.

A growing body of studies has examined the congruence between citizens' preferences on the one hand and policymakers' views or policy outcomes on the other.¹ At the most basic level, these studies have shown that mass–elite congruence varies across space and time—that is, that some governments more closely reflect the preferences of the citizenry than others (Dalton 1985; Miller and Stokes 1963). One possible reason for this cross-national variation is that some political institutions make for more congruent governments than others. In particular, an “ideological congruence controversy” (Powell 2009) has emerged regarding the role of electoral systems in promoting mass–elite congruence. The scholarly debate is between those who find that electoral systems of proportional representation generate more mass–elite ideological congruence than majoritarian electoral systems (Ezrow 2007; Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2006, 2009, 2013) and those who find no difference across electoral systems (Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Lloyd 2014; Golder and Stramski 2010).

Another set of congruence debates has emerged with specific focus on the United States. A recent wave of studies there point to a wide—and perhaps widening—gap between voter preferences and the policymaking choices of elected officials (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005, 2011, 2012). Instead of treating all citizens'—or even all voters'—preferences equally, the democratic process in the United States appears to privilege the preferences of the very affluent voters over all others. Still, other studies maintain that US elites are not more responsive to the preferences of the affluent (Bhatti and Erikson 2011; Wleziem and Soroka 2011).

Both sets of debates focus exclusively on advanced democracies. Only very few scholars have studied mass–elite congruence in developing democracies, and their findings do not speak directly to these broader debates. In Eastern Europe and Latin America, these studies find considerable mass–elite congruence in the stated preferences of citizens and elites (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 2010; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Miller et al. 1995, 1997, 1998; Saiegh 2015; Siavelis 2009). But they also find considerable heterogeneity: Luna and Zechmeister (2005), for instance,

find higher levels of mass–elite congruence in more consolidated party systems and among parties of the left.

Even these studies, however—like the studies of advanced democracies that are part of the ideological congruence controversy—focus entirely on left–right ideological positions. As a result, they rely on citizens’ self-placements on a left–right ideological continuum, even though we know that these survey items generate high levels of (non-random) non-response and that ideological labels can mean different things in different contexts (Zechmeister 2006; Zechmeister and Corral 2013).² As Golder and Stramski (2010) note, many of these studies often also simply compare the mean responses of citizens and elites, paying no attention to the distribution of responses. This can be misleading: the mean response may in fact reflect the preference of very few voters.³ And these studies also fail to distinguish among different types of voters or different types of issue areas in ways that might speak to the debate over unequal representation.

In this chapter, we extend the study of mass–elite congruence by focusing on a developing democracy, employing more sophisticated methods of measuring congruence, and disaggregating congruence along different issue dimensions and different subgroups of citizens and elites. We focus on the case of Argentina and use a unique survey of both elites and citizens conducted in 2014. And we compare the entire distribution of responses between elites and the public rather than just mean responses.

We find that mass–elite congruence in Argentina is fairly high, although there is considerable variation across issue areas. We also find that on most issues, Argentine elites’ preferences more closely resemble those of citizens residing in Greater Buenos Aires, those who identify with the ruling political parties, and the most affluent. In other words, we find a distinct elite bias toward the capital, government supporters, and the wealthy. We also find that elites in the executive branch are more congruent with mass preferences than those in the legislature, perhaps because of their more national voter base.

DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND ESTIMATION

Our empirical strategy extends the study of mass–elite congruence in three ways. First, while previous research has mostly focused on self-placement on a left–right ideological scale—which we replicate here—we also study congruence on specific questions of normative and policy importance. Second, while previous research on congruence has often relied on

comparing survey responses against observed policy outcomes, we avoid the problems implicit in this approach by directly examining preferences of both citizens and elites. Finally, we use a unique survey that makes such straightforward comparisons feasible.

Our data consist of 140 Argentine elites and 1,200 citizens surveyed in April 2014. Among the elite respondents, 94 held legislative office and 46 held executive office, including mayors, ministers, and governors.⁴ Both samples were asked some 80 identically worded questions, from which we selected a subset that represent important electoral issues and demonstrate the range of variation in congruence.

Of course, by comparing responses in mass and elite surveys, we are limiting our analysis to mass–elite congruence in terms of stated preferences. In the absence of reliable cross-national measures of policy output from developing contexts, prior studies of congruence in the developing world have done the same. The Europe- and US-focused debates have instead compared mass preferences to aggregate measures of policy outcomes or legislative behavior. Our reliance on surveys means that we cannot know whether congruent survey responses between citizens and elites actually translate into policies. This is a limitation that can only be addressed with further scholarly efforts to code policy outputs in developing democracies like Argentina. One might also be concerned that elites responded to the survey strategically, offering not their personal preferences but what they think their constituents want to hear. But if this were the case, then we would see little variation in congruence across issues and we would not find systematic differences in elites' congruence with particular subgroups of citizens. The fact that we do suggests that many elites did respond sincerely to the survey.

Our analysis focuses first on a set of four issue dimensions that are typically salient in developing democracies. Following the debate over ideological congruence, we begin by comparing citizens' and elites' self-placement on a left-right ideological scale.⁵ But we are also interested in measuring congruence using preferences over more specific sets of issues. In developing democracies, and particularly in Latin America, the issue of democratic regime support is always prominent. We therefore compare citizens' and elites' support for democracy.⁶ In crisis-prone economies like Argentina's, economic policy issues also loom large. To measure economic preferences with minimal measurement error, we combine multiple survey items on salient economic policies into a factored index.⁷ We also use a unique item that asked respondents about their ideal society and the role

of the state in providing a social safety net.⁸ Finally, populist tendencies are common in developing democracies and especially in Latin America (Conniff 1982; Doyle 2011; Hawkins 2010). The concept is difficult to capture in a single survey item, so we again develop a factored index that combines multiple items similar to the standard measures used by other scholars (Akkerman et al. 2014; Seligson 2007).⁹

Another set of issues is somewhat more specific to the Argentine context. Given rising crime rates in recent years, the perceived trade-off between security and civil liberties has become a salient issue.¹⁰ Bargaining between the federal government and the governments of individual provinces is also a perennial issue in Argentina, where revenue-sharing arrangements have to be negotiated at regular intervals (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). We therefore examine a question that asks respondents their views on the relative distribution of power between the central and provincial governments.¹¹ Finally, we study the policy priorities of citizens and elites by comparing their responses to a standard question about the most important problem facing the country.¹²

Scholars have proposed a variety of methods for calculating congruence between citizens and elites using data like ours. Early research focused on measures such as ideological distance between each district's representative and citizens represented—what Golder and Stramski (2010) call *many-to-one* congruence. As Achen (1978) argues, however, mean proximity is a poor measure of congruence: legislators in more sharply divided districts will appear further from their average constituent no matter what policy position they take. More generally, such measures do not fully capture the conceptual definition of representation. Proximity will be greatest where representatives are closest to the preferences of the majority *within* each district, but in aggregating *across* districts, substantial minorities may not get represented, particularly in single-member district electoral systems. This result contrasts sharply with classical theories of representative government, in which minority groups' voices are a key component (Mill 1859; Pitkin 1967).

These concerns have prompted scholars to instead study *many-to-many* congruence, or comparisons across *distributions* of responses. Miller and Stokes (1963), for instance, correlate the distributions of citizen and elite responses to survey questions. But Achen (1977) notes that these measures too are uninformative, because they reflect the variance of each response distribution, not correlations across them. More recently, Golder and Stramski (2010) propose measuring the difference between cumulative distribution

functions (CDFs), a quantity which they argue most directly captures the outcome of interest for many normative theories of representation.

We begin this chapter by analyzing mass–elite congruence in Argentina with a measure of many-to-many congruence that is similar to Golder and Stramski’s. Rather than relying on the CDFs of mass and elite positions, we follow Andeweg (2011) in calculating instead the overlap in probability density functions (PDFs). This approach allows us to compute differences between entire distributions of preferences, which better captures congruence as a concept than does comparing mean or median preferences (Buquet and Selios (Chap. 8), this volume; Golder and Stramski 2010). Additionally, studying PDFs instead of CDFs allows for a more natural interpretation of our results. At no overlap, the dependent variable equals zero; since each PDF sums to unity, complete overlap takes on the value one. This measure of congruence is constrained to the unit interval, and thus predicted effects directly capture changes in percentage points (Andeweg 2011), with positive values indicating more congruence.¹³ Figure 12.1 illustrates how these distributions and overlap look visually for our first dependent variable, self-placement on a 0–10 ideological scale.¹⁴

Our analysis allows us to measure the degree of mass–elite congruence in Argentina on the issues outlined above, and to compare congruence across different issues. We also examine whether our measure of congruence is higher for more affluent citizens than the poor, and whether citizens have more congruence with the executive branch than with the legislature.

This analysis, however, is largely impressionistic. We cannot say with any certainty whether our estimates of mass–elite congruence differ in statistically significant ways among different groups of citizens or elites. To do that, we turn to a different technique that allows us to relate individual mass respondents to individual elites (see also Boas and Smith 2014). With dyadic analysis, we can model all possible one-to-one comparisons and better explain variation in the quality of representation for individual Argentines. Dyadic analysis is very common in studies of international relations and conflict, where each state is related to every other state in the international system (see Erikson et al. 2014). For each issue dimension, our analysis measures the distance between each mass respondent and each elite respondent,¹⁵ then regresses these distances on mass and elite individual characteristics.¹⁶




Fig. 12.1 Example of congruence calculation (*Notes:* Plot compares the densities of self-placements by Argentine citizens and elites on the left-right ideological scale (0–10). The *dark gray* region represents the overlap between the two densities. Our measure of congruence reports the proportion of the total density that this overlap region represents)

We focus our analysis on a particular set of citizen and elite characteristics that may condition mass–elite congruence. We expect that elites’ policy preferences are closer to those of Argentines who live in Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), a common complaint of citizens who live in the country’s interior. We also expect that the preferences of elites from the ruling Frente Para la Victoria (FPV) faction of the Peronist Party are more similar to citizens’, given their electoral success and their dominance of the executive branch. Following the debate over unequal representation in the United States, we examine whether elite preferences are closer to those of citizens in a particular social class group. We measure class using the census-based classification of households into socioeconomic status (SES) groups.¹⁷ Finally, we expect that elites who hold executive positions, and therefore a national constituency, have preferences closer to citizens than do legislative elites, who have more particularistic constituencies. Our models therefore include indicator variables for citizens’ GBA residency, partisanship, and social class, as well as elites’ branch of government and partisanship. All of our models also include controls for citizen age and gender.

DISCUSSION

We begin by estimating mass–elite congruence along the issue dimensions we identified. The second column of Table 12.1 reports our congruence measure for each of the issues. In general, the overlap in the distributions

Table 12.1 Mass–elite congruence in Argentina

<i>Issue</i>	<i>All respondents</i>	<i>High SES respondents</i>	<i>Low SES respondents</i>	<i>Executive elites</i>	<i>Legislative elites</i>
Ideology	0.70	0.64	0.69	0.69	0.69
Democracy	0.79	0.86	0.77	0.85	0.75
Economic policy	0.71	0.78	0.68	0.70	0.71
Ideal society	0.89	0.90	0.91	0.85	0.90
Populism	0.60	0.69	0.54	0.74	0.53
Order versus liberty	0.56	0.83	0.51	0.57	0.55
Decentralization	0.85	0.78	0.83	0.82	0.85
Most important problem	0.59	0.60	0.56	0.56	0.56

Notes: Values represent calculations of many-to-many congruence in mass and elite responses to particular survey questions

of mass and elite responses is fairly high, consistent with prior work on the region (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Saiegh 2015). But the estimates in Table 12.1 also reveal substantial differences across issues. Citizens and elites seem to agree a lot on their preferences about an ideal society and decentralization, but substantially less on the trade-off between order and civil liberties and the country's most important problem.¹⁸

We also find remarkable differences in the congruence between elite preferences and those of citizens from different social classes. The third and fourth columns in Table 12.1 report elite congruence with high and low SES respondents, respectively. In some cases—like left-right ideology, preferences about an ideal society, and the most important problem—there is little difference between elites' congruence with high and low SES citizens. But on other issues—like economic policy, populism, and especially the trade-off between order and civil liberties—congruence diverges substantially by citizen social class.¹⁹ In every case where this occurs, it favors high SES citizens. In other words, elites seem either to share the preferences of all citizens or to hold preferences much more in line with those of affluent citizens.

On the elite side, we find little difference in elites' congruence with citizens between the legislative and executive branches of government. The fifth and sixth columns of Table 12.1 report the congruence measure for each subgroup of elites and show little substantial difference between them. The exception is the case of populism, in which the executive branch seems much more congruent with citizens' preferences than the legislature. But this is unsurprising: these questions ask respondents whether policymaking should be centralized in the executive, with little or no check from other branches of government. Although many citizens may support such populist political tendencies, it is unsurprising that legislators would think differently about their own political agency.

Still, the results in Table 12.1 only provide a coarse understanding of the differences in congruence among different subgroups of citizens and elites. To more rigorously estimate the size and significance of these differences, we turn to our dyadic analysis, reported in Fig. 12.2. In the interest of tractability, we present the analysis for only the five most important issue areas and note that the others look very similar. In addition to more rigorously testing social class differences, the dyadic analysis allows us to also study regional and partisan effects.

Figure 12.2 shows that in Argentina, elites' preferences are systematically more congruent with some citizens than with others.²⁰ First, some




Fig. 12.2 Mass–elite congruence in Argentina, by subgroup (*Notes:* Values are differences in mass–elite congruence between each type of respondent and the baseline type, based on estimates from dyadic regression analysis. *Horizontal lines* represent 95% confidence intervals; estimates failing to achieve statistical significance at 95% confidence are plotted with *white dots*. All models also control for citizen age and gender, and include citizen and elite random effects. Regression estimates are reported in the online appendix. Note that the democracy and order versus liberty dependent variables are binary, so the scale of their *x* axes differs from that of the other (continuous) dependent variables)

elite preferences seem to mirror more closely the preferences of citizens living in or near the capital. This is particularly the case with economic policy and populism; even with regard to ideology and support for democracy, our estimates suggest some bias toward capital residents, though they are not statistically significant. This may reflect the socialization of political elites who live and form social networks within the capital. The one issue on which elite preferences are biased toward Argentines in the country's interior is the trade-off between order and civil liberties. This is perhaps unsurprising given that crime is a far more pressing issue for citizens living in GBA than elsewhere in the country.

Partisanship also seems to be a source of bias in mass–elite congruence. Citizens who identify with parties in the opposition express preferences that are systematically less well-reflected in the preference distribution of the ruling elite. This would be unsurprising in the context of strong and stable parties, where parties may have incentives to be responsive to their base rather than to the broader electorate (Ezrow et al. 2011). But the Argentine party system has become far more fluid in the last two decades, with the collapse of the Radical Party and the intense factionalization of the Peronist Party (Lupu 2014, 2016). This makes it far more surprising that the ruling party is substantially more congruent with its partisan base than with the rest of the electorate. The one issue on which elites do not favor FPV partisans is populism. In general, mass–elite congruence on this issue is relatively low (Table 12.1), but elite opinion seems to better reflect the preferences of opposition supporters. This may be because legislative elites are simply less likely to hold populist preferences, since these imply granting more political authority and legitimacy to the president. Mass opposition supporters may also be less likely to hold these views since they do not support the president, and this may explain their apparent congruence with elites.

Elite preferences also seem to skew toward the opinions of the more affluent in Argentina. Like studies that find unequal representation in the United States, we find that on certain issues, mass–elite congruence is higher with affluent citizens (SES level 1) than with the poor (SES level 4). This is particularly surprising given that the majority of the elites in our sample belong to the ruling (Kirchnerist) faction of the Peronist Party, which has for a long time attracted a disproportionate share of its support from working-class Argentines (Lupu and Stokes 2009; Tagina 2012). The fact that its members seem to more closely reflect the preferences of affluent Argentines makes it puzzling that they nevertheless continue to win over poor voters.²¹

This class bias appears on almost every issue, although it only reaches statistical significance with respect to populism and the trade-off between order and civil liberties. Looking only at Fig. 12.2, there could be two explanations for why we fail to find a similar bias on the other issues. One reassuring possibility is that on these issues—ideology, support for democracy, and economic policy—elite preferences better reflect those of citizens. But another, more sobering possibility, is that citizens from different social classes largely agree on these issues. Figure 12.3 examines




Fig. 12.3 Differences in mass preferences, by social class (*Notes:* Values represent the average difference between mass respondents with high and low SES in responses to survey question on each area. Lines represent the 95% confidence interval around the estimated difference. *White dots* represent those estimates that are not statistically significant at the 95% level. Regression estimates are reported in the online appendix)

the latter possibility. As it turns out, across social classes, Argentines seem to basically agree when it comes to ideology, support for democracy, and economic policy. As a result, elite preferences correspond as much to the views of the affluent as they do with the preferences of the poor. But when the poor and rich disagree—on populism and the trade-off between order and civil liberties—political elites seem to side with the most affluent.²²

These results are also substantively important. Elite preferences on economic policy are associated with a 5.2 percentage point increase in congruence for a Buenos Aires resident over an otherwise identical non-resident. Since predicted congruence for non-residents on this issue is 0.65, this translates into preferences that are 8% closer to citizens living in the capital, all else equal. The effect of partisanship is even larger: for dissident Peronists, elites are 5% less congruent on ideology, 7% on democracy, and 16% on economic policy. Finally, the largest substantive effect is that of class bias. On the populism issue dimension, members of the lowest SES have preferences 13% less congruent than those of the highest SES. And on the question of order versus liberty—which is a binary dependent variable—the predicted probability of holding preferences congruent with those of the elite increases from 38% among the poorest to 66% among the richest. In other words, elites are 175% more likely to answer the order-security trade-off in the manner favored by the highest-SES voters.²³

Why might this be? Why do Argentine politicians hold views that disproportionately represent the rich? One explanation is that campaign contributions tend to come from affluent citizens, making politicians more responsive to the preferences of the rich (Gilens 2012). Another is that the vast majority of Argentine politicians come from affluent backgrounds that skew their preferences toward this social group (Carnes and Lupu 2015).²⁴ This suggests that class background contributes to pro-rich bias. Whatever the reason, the preferences of Argentine politicians seem to better reflect those of affluent Argentines. It appears that US elites are not alone in catering to the preferences of the rich.

MASS-ELITE CONGRUENCE IN ARGENTINA AND THE MALAISE OF REPRESENTATION

Argentine citizens and elites appear to share many of the same preferences when it comes to major issue areas. By our estimation, mass-elite congruence is fairly high in Argentina and comparable to levels seen in Chile and Uruguay (see Buquet and Selios (Chap. 8), this volume; Siavelis (Chap. 4), this volume). But levels of congruence in Argentina vary across issues; in particular, elites seem to reflect public preferences worst when it comes

to issues related to crime and security, a major preoccupation of citizens in Argentina and across Latin America (Pérez 2015). Moreover, elite preferences seem to correspond much more closely with those of some citizens than with others. Elites seem to skew toward citizens who live in or around the capital, government supporters, and the affluent. Even in a fluid party system, elite preferences seem to skew toward the views of their partisan followers. And even amidst a government disproportionately supported by poor voters, elites' views appear closer to those of the affluent.

Studies of congruence and representation have so far focused primarily on left-right ideology within the advanced democracies. This chapter suggests that many of the same theories can and should be extended to the developing world. Consistent with prior studies, our analysis reveals fairly high levels of congruence in Argentina, which uses proportional representation. But our analysis of issue areas beyond left-right ideology demonstrates that our conclusions about congruence can vary substantially. Our findings also suggest that the class biases in representation that US scholars have recently uncovered may exist elsewhere in the world. This is surely a topic that comparative scholars ought to study further.

To what extent does mass–elite congruence help to explain Argentines' disaffection with democracy? This question is difficult to answer in the absence of data on how individuals perceive their congruence with their elected representatives. But our results do bear indirectly on the question. If a lack of congruence delegitimizes democratic institutions and causes disaffection, then our findings suggest that it should be Argentina's poor, opposition supporters, and interior residents who feel least represented. Heredia and Lorenc (Chap. 11, this volume) report that opposition supporters indeed seem to feel most disaffected, but they find no social class effects (their analysis does not include a variable for GBA residence). Argentines may be politically disaffected because their preferences are poorly represented among the political elite—or others' are disproportionately better represented—but this does not seem to be the major reason.

This does not mean that the patterns of mass–elite congruence are irrelevant. To the contrary, our findings in this chapter show that a fundamental premise of representative democracy seems to be failing specific subgroups of citizens. And it seems to be failing all Argentines on certain issues, especially when it comes to rising crime levels. The fact that very similar representational biases seem to be present in the United States suggests that this is not a fluke specific to Argentina, to this particular time period, or to our particular dataset. Instead, there seems to be something about representative democracy that systematically privileges some citizens over others.

NOTES

1. For a review of this literature, see Canes-Wrone (2015).
2. Saiegh (2015) addresses some of the problems in comparing ideological spaces across citizens and elites.
3. For instance, in a polarized society in which the distribution of preferences is bimodal, the mean response will be in the center even if no voters actually hold a centrist view. We elaborate on these measurement issues below.
4. The survey initially went into the field in late 2013, but an election in November and the December–March legislative recess delayed data collection. Thus, 14 respondents in our sample were *former* legislators and executive office-holders by the time they took the survey. Note also that while the sample of national legislators is representative, the executive branch sample is not. We include a dummy variable for executive elites in our models, which should reduce bias arising from this non-representativeness. Further, limiting our analysis to just the representative sample of legislators does not change any of our substantive results (see online appendix).
5. The question asked, “On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means furthest left and 10 means furthest right, where would you place yourself?” Saiegh (2015) suggests rescaling to account for measurement problems with such questions. This process relies on respondents also placing well-known politicians on the same ideological continuum, which our survey did not include. We therefore cannot rule out measurement problems from variations in how individuals perceive the ideological scales. Still, we are reassured by the question’s concrete endpoint labels (“furthest left” and “furthest right”), which are known to help reduce bias (King et al. 2004). Additionally, we can rule out two other types of measurement error that rescaling eliminates—cross-national comparisons and disjoint choices—since they are not relevant to our data.
6. A version of the standard democracy question, the item asked, “With which of the following statements do you agree most strongly? (1) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; (2) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; or (3) For people like me, a democratic regime means the same thing as an authoritarian one.”

7. The economic policy index was composed of four questions: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1) It was better when pensions were managed by the AFJP [Administrators of Retirement and Pension Funds, private companies that managed government retirement plans]; (2) It is bad that the state subsidizes electricity, gas, and water—everyone should pay for whatever they consume; (3) Aerolíneas Argentinas should continue being run by the state; and (4) It is good that the state charges taxes on soy exports.” The eigenvalue is 1.42 and the factor loadings are -0.33 , -0.23 , 0.77 , and 0.82 , respectively.
8. The question asked, “If you could choose the society in which you would want to live, which would you choose? (1) A society in which individual effort (merit) is rewarded; (2) A society in which the rights of all are equally guaranteed; or (3) A society in which the majority win and some lose.”
9. The populism index was also composed of four questions: “On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly disagree and 10 means you strongly agree, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1) When Congress rejects the president’s proposals, the president should govern without Congress; (2) On important decisions, the president should consult with the citizenry; (3) The president should have the power to annul a decision of the judiciary; (4) The Supreme Court can limit the decisions of the president.” The eigenvalue is 1.47 and the factor loadings are 0.84 , -0.13 , 0.83 , and -0.24 , respectively.
10. The question asked, “If you had the option to choose the government, would you prefer one that guarantees order or individual liberties? (1) A government that solves problems quickly without asking the people their opinion; or (2) A government that takes longer to solve problems but asks the people their opinion.”
11. The question asked, “On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly disagree and 10 means you strongly agree, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the provinces should have more authority to manage their own affairs.”
12. The question was worded, “Which of the following items do you believe is the country’s most important problem? (1) Education; (2) Crime; (3) Health; (4) Pensions; (5) Housing; (6) Other public works such as roads, ports, bridges, etc.; (7) Deterioration of

- the environment; (8) Public transport; (9) Justice; (10) Unemployment; (11) Inflation; (12) Politics; (13) Corruption; (14) Inequality; or (15) Discrimination.”
13. The CDF approach also forces scholars to make ad hoc adjustments to the dependent variable. For instance, overlap can range from 0 to 1 for each point at which question responses are evaluated. This means that if all respondents choose the minimum value, overlap will be 11 for a question with a 0–10 scale, but only 2 for a 0–1 scale, despite identical responses in each case. This forces us to rescale the dependent variable by question. Moreover, for survey responses that cannot be meaningfully ordered (e.g., “which of these...”), we cannot compute CDFs.
 14. Formally, we compute congruence as

$$y_{c,e,q} = \int_w^w \min \{ f_{c,e,q}^c(w) f_{c,e,q}^e(w) \},$$

where f^c and f^e are empirical PDFs for citizens and elites, respectively, w indexes the possible responses to question q , c and e index citizen and elite subsets of the sample, and there are $c \times e \times q = N$ comparisons.

15. We rescale these distances so that they are constrained to the unit interval, which allows us to directly compare estimated coefficients across issues.
16. Since dyads are non-independent, conventional OLS estimation will produce overly confident standard errors (Erikson et al. 2014). To account for this complication, we conservatively estimate models with random effects for each citizen and each elite. Aronow et al. (2015) provide a cluster-robust variance estimator that relies on weaker assumptions than does a random effects model. However, their approach is not implementable here, since their method assumes dyads are components of a single sample, while ours are drawn from two samples (citizens and elites). We are reassured by the fact that the authors’ simulations suggest that random effects models perform well in the absence of misspecification. Each model is specified as

$$y_{ij} = \beta X_{ij} + \alpha_i + \alpha_j + \epsilon_{ij},$$

where y_{ij} is a dependent variable in Table 12.1, \mathbf{X}_{ij} is the vector of covariates outlined below, the random effects for citizens and elites are $\alpha_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\alpha_i}^2)$ and $\alpha_j \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\alpha_j}^2)$, respectively, and $\varepsilon_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ is idiosyncratic error. These models are computationally intense, and hypothesis testing is non-trivial. We therefore also estimated equivalent models in a fully Bayesian framework, using weakly informative priors (following Gelman et al. 2008). These results are very similar and can be found in the online appendix.

17. Socioeconomic status indexes can be fairly opaque and are therefore not our ideal measure (Lupu 2010). Our ideal would have been a classification of respondent occupation, but that information was not asked in these surveys.
18. As in Uruguay and Chile (see Buquet and Selios (Chap. 8), this volume; Siavelis (Chap. 4), this volume), citizens appear to be much more concerned about crime and security than elites: 35% of citizens reported crime as the country's primary problem, compared to only 8% of elites. The most common responses to this question among elites were inequality (34%) and education (19%).
19. Regarding the trade-off between order and civil liberties, elites and affluent citizens were much more concerned about civil liberties than poorer citizens: 76% of elites and 63% of highest-SES citizens preferred liberties, compared to only 41% of those of SES level 2, 43% of SES level 3, and 34% of SES level 4.
20. On the elite side, we find no systematic differences in mass-elite congruence on the basis of elites' partisan affiliation or branch of government.
21. Of course, poor Argentines may not base their ballot choices on policy preferences alone (see Carlin et al. 2015). They may instead choose candidates or parties on the basis of performance evaluations (Lupu 2016; Stokes 2001) or clientelist goods (Stokes et al. 2013).
22. Gilens (2012) demonstrates a similar dynamic in the United States: overall policy responsiveness seems not to have a particular class bias, but on issues on which the poor and the affluent disagree, policy skews significantly toward the preferences of the rich.
23. These computations hold all other covariates not of interest at their central tendency.

24. Reestimating the dyadic models with elites' parents' and grandparents' education levels (see online appendix), we find that elites from affluent backgrounds express preferences less congruent with those of the public, but only on economic policy.

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Political Representation and Malaise in Representation in Present-Day Argentina

Gabriel Vommaro

LEGACIES OF A LONG CYCLE

Argentina is currently experiencing the longest democratic cycle of its modern history or, in other words, since the formation of the two large parties—the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the Justicialist (Peronist) Party (PJ)—that have structured the national political space, its cleavages, and hierarchies. In this cycle, which began in 1983, the institutions of democracy have functioned uninterrupted and political terms and the allocation of positions have been determined through regular elections. Democratic political representation—by the parties, leaders, and rulers—has become an object of academic interest and public debate, with its vitality and problems putting the political elites at the center of intellectual analysis and political criticism. During some moments of crisis, new actors have sometimes challenged the majority parties, presenting themselves as a way to strengthen representation. Professional civil society activists also appeared during this period, focusing in their work on the institutional dimension of democracy. Citizen mobilization in the streets has expressed both political loyalties and discontent while also raising problems not on the “normal” political

G. Vommaro

Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento/CONICET, Buenos Aires,
Argentina

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agenda. However, recurrent social and economic crises and even condemnation of political leaders did not result in rejection of democracy as a form of government. The way the country's authoritarian past was processed put the so-called *procesista* positions—support for a return of the military to political life—beyond the pale of public debate and social consensus.¹

In order to understand the tensions in political representation in present-day Argentina, this chapter examines two dimensions of citizen-politician relations associated with elections, the institutional process, and social mobilization. In the first section, it analyzes the evolution of parties' and governments' linkages with citizens, identifying some significant nuclei that politically determine the distance between them. In addition, it refers to the way in which governments used different types of frames² to build political ties with society, ties which, in most cases, tended to weaken during their terms of office due to difficulties in resolving demands related to an institutional agenda or structural socioeconomic problems. The second section looks at the forms of participation, which have emerged during the current democratic cycle, that are at odds with party and government intermediation and have served to define both the frameworks of political discontent and the channels of expression of demands not represented by institutional politics.

PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS: REPRESENTATION UNDER SCRUTINY

If, based on the three components of malaise in representation defined in the Introduction to this book, we look at how parties, governments, and political institutions have related to citizens in the current democratic cycle, we find that: (1) the parties have weakened as cultural entities that produce permanent identifications but have maintained their role of organizing institutions and the frames of political competition. Disaffection with parties is more marked in the non-Peronist than the Peronist side of the political spectrum; (2) governments elicited broad consensus in their origins but, once in power, either faced important poles of opposition or had to leave office without completing their term. An increase in disapproval of governments toward the end of their terms has been a constant but has not always been of the same intensity. In this sense, the political cycle which culminated in 2015 stands out for its duration and vitality but did not escape the phenomenon of culminating with unmet demands that cause disapproval and rejection of the government and are taken up

by opposition forces and social mobilization; (3) distrust in political institutions is certainly important and, due to its relationship with the other two dimensions of malaise, is unequally distributed, being lower among those who feel close to the government and the figure of the president and higher among those who do not identify with any political force. In other words, representative political linkage with a party or government creates “successful” intermediation with the institutions of democracy.³ However, high distrust of these institutions does not spill over into an equally high level of distrust of democracy as a system of government. As indicated in the 2013 Latinobarómetro report, “institutions may function poorly in Argentina but its citizens will continue to support democracy” (UNPD 2013: 12). In contrast to other Latin American countries, it appears that, in Argentina, democracy has become a collective and consensual good.

Parties and Political Competition in the Current Democratic Cycle

In the early years of the so-called transition to democracy, the parties played a key role in mobilization. The mass party membership campaign of 1983 and the large demonstrations of those years showed that, as the country emerged from dictatorship, the parties provided citizens with frameworks of political meaning that identified the problems of the time and their diagnosis. A revitalized Radical Party and, subsequently, Peronism as it sought to adjust to the new democratic times attracted mass support, guiding society’s political preferences and positions. This was accompanied by a transformation of the principles of perception and evaluation of the political game as well as the way in which institutionalized political activity took place. This first became apparent in 1983 when Peronism suffered the first election defeat of its history and was accentuated by the strengthening of other forms of intermediation between the citizenry and political activity (Vommaro 2008): forms of association independent of the state such as the incipient professionalized NGOs and human rights movements (Pereyra 2008); expert actors who took it upon themselves to define the problems of the time and their solutions (Morresi and Vommaro 2011; Heredia 2015); and the media which increasingly became where political events took place (Landi 1988). The parties and their actors had to share representative activity with these other actors, at least as regards the construction of frameworks of the meaning of social life and the definition

of the current situation and its problems. Activists, experts, and actors from the media came to form part of this political communication space in which political representation was at stake (Vommaro 2008). The parties, as cultural entities that provide identification and frames, would weaken or, at least, their social roots would do so (Sawicki 2001).

Although losing some of their capacity to create lasting ties with a good part of the citizenry (Catterberg 1989), the parties did not cease to play a central role in the organization of political competition. Even in the 1990s, when the country was widely perceived to be suffering a crisis of representation and the parties were considered among the main culprits (Novaro 1994), there is empirical evidence of majority social recognition of their role in democracy and of the importance of party identification in explaining election results (Adrogué and Armesto 2001). It is not, therefore, surprising that the surveys carried out for the project that gave rise to this book indicate a weakening of the parties' influence as cultural reference points and poles of permanent identification (in the survey for Argentina, 27 percent indicated identification with a party) but nonetheless the maintenance of their capacity as organizers of political competition and the frames around which it is structured (when asked if they preferred one party above others, 52.3 percent chose one of the parties listed).

Tension between the parties' institutional and organizational role, on the one hand, and, on the other, their weakness of cultural entities is reflected in the constitutional reform of 1994. With its origins in a surprising and secretly negotiated pact between the PJ and the UCR, the new constitution recognized the parties as central to political competition and provided them with funding. Similarly, after the crisis of 2001 and 2002 which called into question the parties' capacity for representation, the political reform of 2009 gave a new boost to their role in the organization of political competition by increasing their state funding. However, this new law also obliged the parties to open up their internal life by introducing compulsory primaries in which all voters could participate.

Successive elections and the stability of democratic institutions fostered the emergence of a class of professional politicians, mostly from the majority parties, who governed Argentina throughout this period. The individuals who formed this elite changed—at the sub-national level, for example, the fortunes of legislative careers varied significantly (Lodola 2009)—but, as a group, they showed some permanence over time (Canelo 2011). This, in turn, reflects stabilization of politics as a profession and of professional

politicians as actors who are relatively autonomous from other social spaces and specialize in competing for elected and non-elected positions and to represent and mobilize voters. The incorporation of a new type of politician, outsiders from the world of entertainment or sports, economists, or experts from other fields occurred within the parties, either the traditional parties or new ones, often created around such figures.

In order to understand transformations in party-citizen linkages, we examine the stability of electoral loyalties and the intelligibility of parties' differentiation from their competitors. In the case of the first of these dimensions, the literature indicates that parties have differed in their ability to elicit stable identification. In historical terms, the Peronist-non-Peronist cleavage has proved important for understanding politics in Argentina where the principal parties differ little programmatically (Altman et al. 2009). Pierre Ostiguy (2009) described the sociocultural roots of this cleavage—habits, values, and ways of speaking and behaving in public—in terms of a distinction between “the high” and “the low” in politics. The former encompasses values that could be associated with elitism and good education or, in other words, the characteristics now associated in Argentina with republican values such as transparency and respect for the division of powers. The low, on the other hand, is related to plebian views of the world and behaviors, physical force, and the defense of a certain type of populism understood as the exaltation of the “low part” of society in the face of different forms of “privilege” (Laclau 2005). In terms of political linkages, the low electorate has historically been close to Peronism and the high electorate to non-Peronist options. The programmatic pillars of the positions of the elites and the preferences of citizens become intelligible, therefore, when the classic left-right coordinates are combined with these low-high coordinates whose functioning in the Argentine political space has been studied by Alessandro (2009) and Morresi and Vommaro (2014).

According to the literature, the Peronist pole has been the most stable throughout the democratic cycle, even when its elites have changed and, with them, its programmatic orientation. Its electorate is stable in quantitative, social, and territorial terms (Calvo 2013). For Calvo and Murillo (2013), this is because its voters perceive Peronism as having three electoral advantages: “(i) a vast political network, (ii) a greater perceived capacity to implement public policy, and (iii) preferential access to fiscal resources” (Calvo 2013: p. 437). These three dimensions of the party “label” give its elites comparative advantages over all competitors,

explaining the intensity of internal conflict over control of such strategic resources. (Levitsky, 2003), on the other hand, highlights the organizational variable as explaining the stability of Peronism-citizen linkages. He identifies the local and territorial autonomy with which the party's networks maintained political linkages across changes in the government's general policies and programmatic orientation at the party leadership level as explaining its stability over time.⁴ This stability has certainly existed and to some extent still survives since, according to data presented by Mariana Heredia and Federico Lorenc (Chap. 11) in their chapter of this book, 35 percent of those surveyed identified with one of the recent currents of Peronism.

By contrast, the quadrants of the political space identified with non-Peronist options have shown greater instability since the crisis of Radicalism in the 1990s. This led Juan Carlos Torre (2003) to assert that the notion of a "crisis of representation" applies particularly to this part of the political space, a segment of the population "orphan" of stable political loyalties. Disaffection with the parties is, in other words, not homogeneously distributed. In the survey indicated above, 5.4 percent identified with the UCR, 4.7 percent with the center-right Republican Proposal Party (PRO), and 2.2 percent with different forms of Trotskyism while, in the case of the other left-wing parties, Socialism, and other non-Peronist forces, the figure dropped below 2 percent. In other words, the non-Peronist space not only has less capacity to create political identification but is also less stable.

Particularly in the case of the non-Peronist space, the swings in political party representation are related to the important changes seen in recent decades in the parties associated with this pole. One of these changes was the crisis of Radicalism after President Raúl Alfonsín's early handover of power in July 1989 in a context of hyperinflation and social instability, a crisis that deepened when, in December 2001, President Fernando de la Rúa, beset by great social mobilization, pillaging, and a financial and monetary crisis, also failed to complete his term. As Javier Zelaznik asserts, the present democratic cycle has seen the "disintegration" of the electoral base of Radicalism (2013: p. 423). This implied both the rupture of identification with the party and the appearance of a gap in political and electoral representation. In institutional and systemic terms, it put supporters of non-Peronist options, identified with the top quadrants of Argentina's political-cultural cleavage, in a recurrent situation of instability and orphanhood that accentuated their political-representative malaise.

Or, in other words, “the impossibility of building electoral coalitions to compete for the presidency reinforces the sub-competitive character of Radicalism and the rest of the non-Peronist parties and, consequently, weakens their image as a government alternative in the eyes of the electorate” (Zelaznik 2013: p. 430). The presidential elections of 2015 appear to have modified this situation but it is not clear that the change in electoral support they revealed will persist over time.

The second change, also related to the crisis of Radicalism, was the appearance of third forces which threatened the power of the majority parties and tended to compete particularly for the non-Peronist space. Unlike the third forces of the 1980s—the Intransigent Party and then the Democratic Center Union—these new parties, which appeared in the 1990s, sought to be electorally competitive, rather than to hold the balance of power. Some, such as the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) in the early 1990s or the ARI Civic Coalition a decade later, were splinters of the traditional parties. FREPASO, although founded by a group of former Peronist leaders, increasingly tended to compete for the UCR vote and, in 1997, established an alliance with it that won the 1999 presidential election. The ARI, on the other hand, which was Radical in origin, formed different alliances depending on the strategy of its leader, Elisa Carrió, who refused to institutionalize it as a party and it degenerated into micro-spaces with different policy orientations. Other political groups, such as the PRO in the city of Buenos Aires, were founded by outsiders with the capacity to harness existing political networks. Again, as in the 1990s, their bid to attract Radical voters led them to establish an electoral alliance, which Carrió’s group joined, that won the 2015 presidential election. In other words, the non-Peronist space proved to be unstable, rather than uncompetitive, and, depending on the circumstances, has had to form alliances that have had a very short life.

In addition to these new forces, splinter Peronist groups have regularly appeared, competing for the official label in general elections. The dispute in the 1980s between orthodox sectors and those advocating renewal, the new forces that split off on the right and left from the Menemism-dominated PJ of the 1990s, only in many cases to subsequently return to the party, or the splits caused by internal opposition to Kirchnerism’s shift to the left also disrupted political party loyalties. This is reflected in the data presented by Heredia and Lorenc where 10 percent of those surveyed identify with non-Kirchnerist Peronism. It is too early to say whether this fissure will persist over time but it does indicate some erosion

of identification with Peronism as a force united under the same election program. In both poles of the political spectrum, therefore, transformations in the parties meant some fluidity in loyalties and political identities, although with a different intensity in each case.

Finally, the weakening and fragmentation of national parties means that, in a federal system like that of Argentina, provincial and regional dynamics have gained importance in recent years. National party leaders have had difficulty in marshaling regional leaders spread out around the country who have become more autonomous in creating local or provincial political cleavages that are not always related to the frames established by the party at the national level.⁵ Some authors have interpreted this as denationalization of the party system (Leiras 2007) with the resulting impact on representation in terms of weaker unique identifications and different loyalties at each level.

What remains to be examined in order to understand the strength of parties' representative linkages is their capacity for differentiation. In a recent study, Noam Lupu (2012) concluded that the more a party's program is differentiated from that of its rivals, the greater the likelihood that citizens will identify clearly with it. Indeed, one of the most widespread interpretations of the crisis of representation of the 1990s, which culminated in massive rejection of parties' platforms in the 2001 legislative elections and the popular mobilizations of 2001 and 2002, is that one of its causes was a lack of differentiation between the platforms of the majority parties (Pousadela 2006). The neoliberal consensus was identified as having eliminated all possibility of political differentiation and, consequently, of construction of political linkages. However, according to the data presented by Heredia and Lorenc, the intensification of the cleavage between Peronism and non-Peronism—probably due to the Kirchner governments' logic of political construction (discussed below)—means that a lack of differentiation is no longer perceived to exist. Indeed, 52.3 percent of those surveyed indicated that some party represented their interests, beliefs, or values better than any other, revealing that political cleavages—in the two senses described above on the basis of Ostiguy (2009)—are relatively well defined. For those who do not express a party preference, on the other hand, they are more diffuse, which appears to confirm that parties also act as agents that mobilize ordinary citizens politically (Offerlé 1987).

It would seem that, at present, the political space has a more or less intense programmatic intelligibility. After a period of uninterrupted democracy, this would be consistent with the fact that a more institutionalized

political system implies more structured programs (Luna and Zechmeister 2005). However, the 44.3 percent of survey respondents who indicated no preference for any political party suggests that an important part of the citizenry lacks reference points with respect to the parties. Heredia and Lorenc show that self-placement on the left-right and Peronist-non-Peronist scales is much lower among this group while the positive correlation between possession of these reference points and educational level indicates a strong social bias in disaffection with the parties.

Similarly, in their chapter of this book, Lupu and Zach Warner (Chap. 12) show that congruence between the opinions of the political elites and citizens reproduces this social bias since it is higher for three groups: citizens of Greater Buenos Aires or, in other words, those who live geographically closer to the political center; those who identify with the government party or, in other words, accept the principles of division of the political space proposed by Kirchnerist Peronism; and higher social classes as measured using educational level as a proxy. Therefore, although studies of elections between 2003 and 2015 indicate that the working classes predominate among the government party's supporters while the middle classes are among those who most often participate in protest activities, there is not, according to Lupu and Warner, greater congruence of ideas between the elites and the working classes. The pattern of congruence in Argentina seems to be similar to that in other countries, such as the United States, with the ideas of the elite resembling most closely those of the citizens to whom they are socially and culturally most similar or, in other words, the middle or upper-middle classes. The data, therefore, prevents us from viewing representation as a reflection in a mirror.

Representative Governments? Approval and Disapproval in the Recent Political Cycle

A party's ability to build political-representative linkages is closely related to its participation in government (its access to power and performance once there). Given Argentina's presidential system, governments are both central to the formulation of political promises and the object of citizen demands.

Throughout the current democratic cycle, rupture with the past (Aboy Carlés 2001)—dictatorship, hyperinflation, and corruption—means that governments have generally begun with strong legitimacy of origin but ended with very low presidential popularity ratings and majority

disapproval. The early handover of power by Raúl Alfonsín in 1989 and the resignation of Fernando de la Rúa in 2001 are testimony to governments' difficulties in fulfilling their political promises and, particularly, in combining a political-institutional agenda with an economic-social agenda of welfare. The fall of these two governments was, indeed, followed by periods marked by a weakening of the legitimacy of politics and the parties. Each time, the promise to build an institutionalized pluralist democracy came up against the difficulties of defining an economic and social policy that guaranteed a minimum threshold of welfare for citizens. President Carlos Menem, who held office for two terms, ended his government with a weakening economy and a much deteriorated social situation and became one of the principal targets of citizen criticism of politicians and politics. In his case, disapproval mostly reflected rejection of the corruption associated with his government and his lack of respect for the republican institutional framework as seen, for example, in his instrumentalization of the Supreme Court and attempts to stand for a third term. Like political conflict in the first Peronist period (1945–1955), the institutional agenda in the present democratic cycle has been driven by the non-Peronist pole, helping to explain disapproval of the governments of President Néstor Kirchner and, particularly, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

This Kirchnerist cycle, however, marked a change with respect to previous presidencies. The low level of presidential legitimacy with which it began—after Kirchner obtained a first-round vote of 22 percent and, because of the resignation of his rival, did not face a run-off ballot—forced it to seek to build majority support when already in power. Moreover, also in contrast to previous presidents, both Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner ended their terms with relatively high popularity. This reflects the fact that, after the crisis and mobilizations of 2001 and 2002, Kirchner's election created a new political-representative pole that rebuilt the state's authority and established a new point of political identification that attracted the support of ever more citizens—approval of the president reached 76 percent at the end of 2003⁶—while also restoring a measure of trust in political institutions.

However, the logic of political construction, similar to that described by Ernesto Laclau in his latest work on populism (2005), made for a polarization of the political space that gradually accentuated the cleavage between supporters and opponents of the government and its political movement. Although Kirchner continued to have a positive image throughout his period, this had dropped to 55 percent by 2007 while

his negative image showed a slight but sustained increase (from 4 percent in 2003 to 14 percent in 2007). The key event for understanding the Kirchnerist populist political construction—marked by the accentuation of political tensions—was the conflict between the government and farmers of 2008 in which the administration sought to position itself as a “government-that-represents-the-people’s-interests-against-corporations-that-defend-their-own-interests”. This new political polarization had a twofold effect. On the one hand, it consolidated political-representative identification *from above* around the Kirchnerist pole and, on the other, solidified a non-Kirchnerist pole without permanent institutional representation and characterized by sporadic mobilization. This polarization had long-term political implications, creating malaise in representation related to citizens’ position with respect to these two poles that pit the government against its detractors. Moreover, in contrast to the majority recognition of political activity and the action of the state—as regards both its sphere of influence and effectiveness—seen in the early years of Kirchnerism, both began to be seen as problems in public debate.

The polarized presidential image described by Heredia and Lorenc may, therefore, reflect both malaise in representation and with its effectiveness in terms of the construction of a strong linkage between the government and its supporters. In 2013, after Fernández de Kirchner had been in power for six years—or ten years if all the Kirchnerist cycle is included—approval of her performance reached 45 percent while 50 percent disapproved and 5 percent did not express an opinion. As argued in the previous section, the problem for the government’s opponents was, therefore, that they lacked a durable political option. Malaise in representation appears to be concentrated in these sectors and, at the same time, suggests that Argentine society is deeply divided about its governments. What we still do not know is whether these divisions are only a result of the type of political construction employed by Kirchnerism or reflect deep differences inherited from the past and destined to last.

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND MALAISE IN REPRESENTATION IN ARGENTINA: BETWEEN REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

The sinuous construction of representative linkages in the present democratic cycle is related to the way in which parties and governments have established more or less stable and open (or not) channels of

communication with the so-called civil society and its forms of participation. In addition, it is related to civil society's characteristics during this cycle, which are discussed below.

Who are the mobilized citizens? As seen in the chapters of this book by Sebastián Pereyra (Chap. 10) and Heredia and Lorenc (Chap. 11), the people who are most active in terms of participation and direct social mobilization are not only those who are most interested in politics and most assiduously follow political events in the media but also those who have ties to representative organizations (parties, trade unions, etc.). This implies that social mobilization and malaise in representation are not necessarily correlated, at least in the case of the dimension of disaffection. At the same time, the forms of mobilization most frequently employed by citizens have to do with their relation to the government. As shown by Heredia and Lorenc, demonstrating, marching, and signing petitions were most common among those who approved of the performance of Fernández de Kirchner while *cacerolazos* (saucepan banging protests) were most common among those who disapproved of her performance. This suggests that there are two types of politicization: one that is articulated together with representative institutions or, to be more precise, related to support for a government that, moreover, made mobilization of its supporters one of the principal ways of reflecting its social support and, secondly, one not intermediated by institutions or organized groups that is reflected in the *cacerolazos* used in different situations during recent years to express rejection of politicians and governments. Under Kirchnerism, these *cacerolazos* expressed indignation with the government that reflected disapproval of it among a good part of the non-Peronist electorate.

In the next section, we examine two key dimensions of social mobilization in relation to representation: the activities of NGOs and foundations that made institutional politics a target of their criticism and, secondly, the political language and views about the state and representation that have dominated social mobilization in recent years.

Professionalized Civil Society and Frames of Distrust of Politics and Institutions

Since the 1980s, a new form of professionalized social activism has emerged that monitors politics and its institutions (Thompson 1994). Although with ties to political and political-state life, it is relatively autonomous of party logic (Jelin 1985; Pereyra 2008). Inserted into international net-

works of expertise, it forms part of a global agenda of public problems and obtains funding from international agencies that helps it to maintain a flow of activity, finance its organizations, and produce information about the issues in which it intervenes (Morresi and Vommaro 2011). The principal institutions it has created and through which it works include *Poder Ciudadano* (Citizen Power) and the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies for Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), founded in the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively. These have since been followed by other organizations such as the Civil Association for Equality and Justice (ACIJ). Although lacking social movements' ability to occupy the streets, they intervene in public debate and help to define the space of political communication. By working together with the investigative journalism that gained professional and public prestige in the 1990s through its revelations of the Menem government's corruption, they are also able to raise problems related to the functioning of political institutions (Pereyra 2013). Moreover, this professionalized civil society does not merely participate in the public-media space that serves as the "sound box" for society's problems but also influences governments and their policies and its members obtain government posts from which they innovate institutionally and legislatively. Following its growth in the 1990s and subsequent consolidation, its activists-experts have emerged as central actors in the definition of public problems in general and, in particular, in monitoring and criticizing political institutions and their functioning. Their work in diagnosing the deficits of Argentine democracy provides public debate and, especially, the political communication space with important frames for defining the coordinates of complaints about representation. In this way, they play a key role in determining the institutional agenda.

The transparency of institutions has been the key focus of the work of these groups (Pereyra 2013). In the 1990s, civil society experts consolidated their efforts to control the functioning of the state and politicians' activities, seeking to combat the corruption that became a key to explaining poor government performances, the low quality of public policies, and problems in management of the state. The perception of politics as an activity associated with corruption is, as indicated above, closely related to the work of an alliance between expert and media actors, with politics criticized in moral terms and expert activity becoming inextricably the activism of denunciation.

These frameworks were appropriated by protests and mass social mobilizations, particularly those with a low level of organization. Rejection of

politics as a spurious activity was at the root of some of the mobilizations of 2001 and 2002. In some cases, they represented a condemnation of politicians as an inefficient class and a bid to replace them (Morresi and Vommaro 2014) while other critical discourses attributed this inefficiency to politicians' subordination to other factic powers (companies or multi-lateral organizations like the IMF). The political class could also be perceived as a set of actors with a basic solidarity among themselves that cut across party differences or, in other words, as a corporation.⁷

In the first decade of this century when, after the social crisis, mass social policies were introduced, the issue of transparency shifted to the monitoring of the provision of public goods to poorer segments of the population. In this context, clientelism became the focus of expert denunciations of politics and governments (Vommaro 2012). They questioned politicians' spurious use of social benefits as a means of electoral manipulation. More recently, questions have also been raised about the transparency of the electoral process as a whole and expert activism has, in alliance with political and media actors, developed mechanisms for detecting election irregularities related, for example, to manipulation of voters and of election rules. In recent election campaigns, such possible irregularities became a matter of debate that dominated much of the press opposed to the Fernández de Kirchner government and were even a factor in mass mobilizations as in the Tucumán Province in 2015 when the cleanliness of the election was suspect.

A large part of disapproval of the president and disaffection with the parties, therefore, appears to find expression in mass mobilizations that use the language of denunciation of how political institutions operate. But what type of relation with political institutions are they calling for? It is not clear that the program of expert activism is taken literally by the *cacerolazos* and other inorganic forms of protest. Nor is it clear if these forms of protest find stable party representation. In any case, the diagnosis of the centrality of distrust as the predominant way citizens relate to the institutions of democracy seems to apply to these sectors which we could term "orphans of the political parties" (Torre 2003). Indeed, if trust creates a moral tie with these institutions and their actors (Rosanvallon 2007: p. 23), mistrust is expressed as moral indignation with what are considered intolerable dys-functionalities, particularly as regards a lack of public transparency. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that, as Heredia and Lorenc show, the perception of an increase in corruption is related to suspicion that elections are not clean and a belief that taxes are "stolen by politicians" or that all these perceptions are related to disapproval of the government.

*Social Mobilization, State, and Rights: Tensions
of the Representative Logic*

In his chapter of this book, Pereyra (Chap. 10) asserts that social movements are a normal part of the functioning of our democracies. The data, indeed, indicates that the evolution of Argentine democracy has been accompanied by the activities of these movements. They are, therefore, not necessarily a sign of democratic deficits but of the vitality of democracy as a form of government and of its openness to society, including its critics. The interpretation of distrust must, therefore, take into account the centrality that a type of language which served as a vehicle and frame for different demands—the language of rights—has acquired in social participation in Argentina. Since the 1980s, the language of protest and mobilization by social movements of all types has tended to be formulated in these terms (Delamata 2013; Pereyra 2008). This language is in permanent tension with the state which, in some cases, it treats as an adversary, albeit seeking its recognition, while, in others, it attempts to form alliances with the state as a way of guaranteeing certain rights. Mobilization of the working classes as well as most social movements related to gender issues and human rights are phrased in these terms. It is, therefore, not surprising that, as seen in the data presented by Heredia and Lorenc, we find a quite widespread statist consensus that overlays consensus about democracy.

This consensus does not, however, imply absence of criticism of the state as a threat to certain rights (particularly as regards institutional violence) and on the grounds of the poor quality of services (for example, transport) which is, in turn, behind questioning of the legitimacy of the state's extraction of social resources (for example, through an excessive tax burden). The fact that criticism of the state—taxes are the “booty” of politicians—tended to go hand in hand with criticism of the Fernández de Kirchner government reflects this greater distrust of state institutions among those who feel more distant from the government. It is not clear whether this is a feature of the non-Peronist segment of the citizenry, of the way in which Kirchnerism built its political program on the back of an intensification of redistribution by the state, or a “positional” effect of those who feel that the incumbent government does not represent them. It is, in any case, likely that criticism of the state reflects three points of view: (1) demand for a greater state presence; (2) demand for greater state efficiency; and (3) demand for a reduction of the state's presence.

Ambiguity about the state is also apparent in another issue that, in recent years, has acquired prominence in social mobilization—that of the safety of people and property and, particularly, what has been termed the “feeling of insecurity” (Kessler 2009). In line with trends in the other countries studied in this book, Lupu and Warner find that, in Argentina, citizen-elite congruence is lowest on public safety and crime. Citizens consider these a priority issue but the elites identify inequality and education as their principal concerns. One of the cores of malaise in and with representation is probably related to this lack of congruence which is reflected in practice in the difficulties of democratic institutions in addressing this problem.

Finally, cycles of mobilization are related to the important political and economic commotions that have been a feature of these years. Critical situations such as the hyperinflation of 1989 and the crisis of 2001 and 2002 reflect the difficulties of repairing the damage to social integration caused by the economic and social transformations that began under the dictatorship. The impoverishment and informalization of vast sectors of the population as well as the increase in inequality rocked Argentina’s democratic institutions. The result is a democracy that, in the terms of Robert Castel (1997), failed to resolve the enigma of its cohesion. In such situations, demands on the state include not only goods and services but also the restoration of order which is seen as being in danger. This is accompanied by an ambiguous citizen attitude toward social protest which, in Argentina, meets with greater tolerance than in other Latin American countries. Although, as Heredia and Lorenc assert, there is certain consensus as to the legitimacy of the expression of interests and opinions by active citizens, this is not homogeneous as regards the different forms of protest. While *cacerolazos* and strikes are quite widely accepted (by 41 percent and 37 percent, respectively), picketing and blocking roads are considered justifiable only by 18 percent. While the former are the expression of indignation and distrust or institutionalized sectoral protest, the latter conjure up those critical social experiences in which there was tension between demand for material goods and for social order. The challenge of governments and democratic institutions since the 1980s has been to reconcile both dimensions.

CONCLUSION

As indicated in the Introduction to this book, studying political representation implies taking into account the positions that question its effectiveness and argue that it is in crisis. That is because political representation

is a matter not only of how the political elites and, particularly, those who hold institutional positions in the legislative and executive branches relate to citizens but also of how citizens and their different associations perceive these elites. The way these perceptions are structured depends largely on how the political processes of the construction of social problems are framed. The state of political representation cannot, therefore, be separated from (critical) views about representation. Disaffection with political parties, disapproval of governments' performance, and distrust of institutions are, in this sense, inextricably entwined with the way in which parties, government performance, and institutions are presented on the media stages that define a large part of these critical frames.

This public dimension, played out in the political communication space, is connected to citizens' experience of linkage with political institutions, governments, and democracy. The experience of citizens, from both the working classes and different sectors of the middle classes, has often been perceived as being disconnected from the frameworks of meaning proposed by the elites and governments. During the current democratic cycle, although elections established the horizon of the political struggle while their timing regulated much of the conflict, important forms of social organization and protest nonetheless existed outside party politics and there were periods of crisis that decoupled the tempo of elections from those of social and economic events.⁸

Argentine society and its forms of representation have yet to define a set of basic institutional and social goods through which to consolidate a lasting democratic experience.

NOTES

1. The term "procesista" alludes to Argentina's last military dictatorship, which called itself *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (Process of National Reorganization).
2. Our use of the Goffmanian concept of frame is inspired by the way it was used by Snow and Benford (1992) for the study of social movements. For these authors, frames are interpretative schemes that simplify and condense a certain vision of the world since they "selectively punctuate and encode objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present and past environment" (1992: p. 137).
3. We follow the characterization of political linkages by Herbert Kitschelt (2000). We do not, on the contrary, consider that the

different types of linkage are mutually exclusive both because parties and governments segment their ties with citizens based on the type of demands they have and the living conditions associated with them and because the analytical distinction between programmatic and non-programmatic goods is not clear in practice (Combes and Vommaro 2015).

4. An analogous argument could be used to explain the support of Peronism for the programmatic change of tack under Kirchnerist Peronism as from 2003.
5. Many political parties in Argentina have arisen as a result of the articulation of provincial political leaders and groups that were not always completely aligned with the party's national program. For example, in their analysis of the genesis of peripheral Peronism, Darío Macor and César Tcach question interpretations based principally on analysis of the Buenos Aires Region, the role of the working class, and the effects of industrialization (Macor and Tcach 2003). However, in the cases of Peronism and Radicalism, the national cleavages prevailed throughout much of the twentieth century.
6. See “*El subibaja de la imagen de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner*”, *La Nación*, 24 May 2013. The data on presidential image below is also from this source.
7. In the case of Chile, Siavelis (2009) has referred to this phenomenon of homogenization of the elites in relation to procedures rather than the content of policies in terms of “partidocracia”.
8. This is apparent in the 2001 legislative elections when the institutional political game and party actors failed to respond adequately to the economic and social crisis that was then occurring. The different forms of rejection expressed through blank or spoiled votes reflected this disconnection between institutional politics and the conflicts then marking society. Shortly afterwards, the mass protests that led to the fall of Fernando de la Rúa's government erupted.

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Malaise as a Symptom of Conflict: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay in Comparative Perspective

Manuel Alcántara and Timothy J. Power

INTRODUCTION

Scholars of advanced industrial democracies first began to speak of “malaise”—then defined much more loosely than the editors of this volume have done—in the early 1970s. In the United States, Vietnam and Watergate revealed the problem of rapidly declining trust in government and a broad withdrawal of citizens from representative institutions. Comparative research found similar trends unfolding in other advanced democracies. The publication of the controversial study by Crozier, Huntington, and Watanake, *The Crisis of Democracy* (1975) set the tone for the joyless 1970s. Among political analysts, crisis theories abounded; their ideas even found their way into the discourse of political practitioners, as in Jimmy Carter’s famous “malaise” speech of July 1979. Fittingly, the decade closed with the publication of Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture Revisited* (1980), in which several of the contributors dramatically recanted Almond

M. Alcántara (✉)
University of Salamanca, Santiago, Chile

T.J. Power
Oxford University, Santiago, Chile

and Verba's earlier (1963) hypotheses about the supposedly enduring cultural bases of robust political support in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States.

More recently, the main analytical challenge facing political scientists has been to determine whether the erosion of political trust is part of a "worldwide trend" of disengagement from politics due to "common structural and secular factors," or whether trends may be cyclical and/or attributable to "country-specific factors" such as "specific historical traditions, the performance of governments, or the working of particular political systems" (Norris 1999: 8). The present volume generally takes the latter path, seeking to identify causal sources of malaise in twenty-first-century Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.

In broad terms, these three Southern Cone countries have now experienced some three decades of political stability, a period that has permitted consolidation of the legacy of their transition to democracy in the 1980s. In the case of Chile and Uruguay, this represented a return to the stability and continuity seen in their political systems prior to the breakdown of their democracies in 1973. In the case of Argentina, the democratic experiment that began in 1983 has been of unprecedented length when compared to the fateful half-century that preceded it: a period characterized by coups, military governments, and political proscriptions.

The fact that these three countries are currently enjoying a modicum of democratic sustainability provides an opportunity to study them using an approach that takes into account not only features of their emerging regimes, but also other factors intrinsic to the context of each particular country. In addition, it seems opportune to compare them with the rest of the region as regards both research agenda issues and case-specific trends.

Politics is a domain of humanly devised institutions intended to address the *conflicts* that inevitably emerge between different social groups. Competition for scarce resources and disagreements about how individuals should approach a wide range of decisions, stretching from basic survival to collective welfare, underlie these conflicts at all times. Addressing these conflicts has historically produced malaise not only among the losers but also the winners who sometimes do not achieve their goals satisfactorily. In other words, two key terms that are central to this chapter—*conflict* and *malaise*—unequivocally share common roots in the political sphere.

This chapter addresses elements that help to understand the relationship that, in these three countries, exists between political *conflict*—which can be understood as a political process involving contestation among

actors—and the resultant *malaise* engendered among different social groups. To this end, we propose four areas that can be analyzed as generating tension between politics and malaise: each country's specific political context, the way in which political expectations are created, the determinants of the economic cycle and, finally, the role of political elites. The chapter concludes by relating these topics to the quality of democracy, emphasizing the complex particularities of the concept of malaise.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

The political contexts of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay differ as regards not only their recent past but also the dimension of political representation. Here we review both of these aspects, bearing in mind their effects in generating citizen malaise.

Effects of the Legacy of the Past

The past bears on the present in many different ways. There are, however, three which are particularly important for understanding the present and have been characteristic of many Latin American countries over the past half-century: the persistence or creation of new more or less solid cleavages that define the structure of political competition, the existence of the politics of memory, and forward-looking "promises" as a basis for plausible political changes. This occurred in the specific framework of these countries which suffered a breakdown of democracy in fairly rapid succession, whose authoritarian regimes maintained close ties of understanding and collaboration (except for the fraught moment of the Beagle conflict between Argentina and Chile in 1978) and whose respective processes of transition to democracy took place within a short span of barely five years.

In Argentina, the tumultuous events of the early postwar period divided the country into Peronists and anti-Peronists. This cleavage indisputably persists today. In Uruguay, the most important cleavage, dating back to the first half of the nineteenth century, was an intra-elite split between the Blancos and the Colorados. The emergence of a new left in the 1960s added a new dimension, which consolidated after the transition to democracy in 1984 as a cleavage between the traditional parties and the Frente Amplio. In Chile, on the other hand, the cleavages that existed prior to the 1973 military coup tended to erode toward the end of the dictatorship, giving way to a single overriding cleavage between supporters and

opponents of Augusto Pinochet. This points to a marked level of polarization over the past quarter century that defines the type of democracy found in each country, impeding the construction of “consensus democracies” (Lijphart 2012) with the capacity to generate inclusive agreements.

The logic of bipolar competition has a majoritarian component, one that is intrinsic to presidentialism (Linz 1994). This is a conception of democracy that emphasizes procedures designed to award power to representatives of the majority, excluding the losers. If this happens repeatedly, it helps to foster a mood of generalized dejection among members of the losing group and this, in turn, leads to malaise among an important part of the population. Cross-national research by Christopher Anderson and colleagues finds that support for democracy tends to be lower among electoral losers, and that this effect is much stronger in new democracies than in older ones (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Anderson et al. 2005); the applicability of this thesis to Latin America is confirmed by Vairo (2012). In sum, “losers’ fatigue” can be an important source of malaise, especially when elections have small margins of victory (Nadeau and Blais 1993; Whitehead 2007).

The three countries’ transitions to democracy differed significantly in the way they dealt with the past. In Argentina, the defeat of the armed forces in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict made it easier for the democratic government to launch court investigations of human rights violations—although these were subsequently halted due to military saber-rattling—while, in Uruguay, the Naval Club Pact, which ensured impunity, was endorsed by a plebiscite in 1989. In Chile, the outcome of the 1988 plebiscite thwarted Pinochet’s bid to remain as president until 1997, but did not stop him from staying on as commander-in-chief of the armed forces until 1998 and then taking up a Senate seat until his arrest in London later that same year. The persistence of authoritarian enclaves in Chile fomented social frustration that only began to abate at the start of the present century, thanks to policies of reparation, truth, and justice. Even then, the feeling of an open wound persisted. Policies of transitional justice began to be widely implemented with the election of Ricardo Lagos in 2000, Néstor Kirchner in 2003 and Tabaré Vázquez in 2004 (Lessa and Payne 2012).

The restoration of democracy in the 1980s occurred at a time when the Latin American economy was entering what proved to be a decade-long recession. Of the three countries studied here, Argentina was the worst hit, suffering a process of hyperinflation that severely damaged its

economy and also had a very negative spillover effect on Uruguay. Despite the structural reforms it had previously implemented, Chile did not entirely escape the effects, although they were milder. The dramatic economic downturn brought with it social protests and growing skepticism about the claim of Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989) that “democracy means food on the table.” Indeed, in Argentina, mounting disaffection with democracy led to a shift within the Peronist movement toward a neoliberal model, away from the now collapsing developmentalist state. The fact that this occurred under the institutional umbrella of presidentialism and the hyper-centralized leadership of Carlos Menem facilitated the emergence of de-institutionalized forms of political action.

This new form of politics in Argentina was famously theorized by O’Donnell (1994) as “delegative democracy,” which he also identified in Collor’s Brazil and Fujimori’s Peru as well. In this model, economic crisis attracts presidential candidates who portray themselves as the savior of the nation. Claiming that only executive empowerment can “solve” the crisis, savior-presidents trample democratic institutions and undermine horizontal accountability. Their inevitable failures generate another wave of contenders with populist promises and magical cures. Each repetition of this vicious cycle takes its toll on the collective reputation of the political class. O’Donnell intended “delegative democracy” as a grand theory of the unaccountable form of democracy that was emerging in Latin America in the early 1990s, yet the foundations of his model rest largely upon macroeconomic performance—that is, the repercussions of the stagnation of the 1980s. Of the three countries studied here, only Argentina fell victim to delegative democracy, with Chile and Uruguay resisting the regional trend due to their stronger political parties (providing vertical accountability) and parliaments (generating horizontal accountability).

Political Representation

As regards political representation, the only common features of the three countries’ institutional design are presidentialism and bicameralism. Although their presidents are elected through two-round majority systems, this is tempered in Argentina by the possibility of a first-round victory if a candidate wins 45 percent of the valid vote, or alternatively obtains 40 percent of the vote and is ten percentage points ahead of the runner-up. The “winner-take-all” nature of unipersonal elections tends to foster malaise among the losers, who end up empty-handed.

For legislative elections, proportional representation with closed, blocked lists predominates. In Chile, however, the introduction of two-seat constituencies altered the proportional nature of elections, resulting in the over-representation of some sectors and leaving some 10 percent of voters, including those of the historic Communist Party, without political representation until the 2013 elections. This phenomenon is also seen, albeit to a lesser extent, in Argentina. In Argentina, electoral constituencies correspond to the provinces, but these are of very different sizes. Moreover, although Argentina and Uruguay have introduced primary elections, these have so far had only a limited impact on the production of candidate lists with a truly democratic composition. This helps to perpetuate the distance between representatives and their constituents that is a key element of what the editors of this volume refer to as malaise *in* representation.

Finally, another aspect of political representation that needs to be borne in mind has to do with the existence of multilevel formats. While Argentina is a federal state with a longstanding tradition of decentralized provincial politics in which governors play a critical role, Chile's centralism restricts representation of the regions. The urban primacy of Santiago is at times perceived as a further cause of political frustration.

GENERATION OF POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS

In a democracy, political expectations are not based simply on the presentation of platforms by parties and candidates. Expectations are also linked to the ways in which these proposals are presented to the general public and in which their implementation is monitored and evaluated across time. Scholars have studied politicians' failure to comply with the mandate received from voters in accordance with their election platform and the imposition of unpopular policies in Latin America (Stokes 2001). Yet here we wish to highlight a factor which, in our view, has not received sufficient attention: the process of intermediation in the generation of popular expectations.

Political events are monitored primarily by the media and, in second place, by think tanks, lobbies, and interest groups. The media answer to the companies by which they are financed, whether these be of a public-state or private-business nature. The political agenda of think tanks and interest groups, which tend to prioritize the interests of organized business, can either topple presidents (as in the case of Brazil's President

Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992) or “build” and nationalize preferred candidates (such as Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico, elected in 2012). These processes have been painfully visible over the past five years in the intense struggle between Argentina’s presidency and *Clarín*, the country’s most powerful media group, as well as the compulsory broadcasting (on almost a weekly basis) of official presidential events or presidential addresses to the nation. Civic fatigue induced by this struggle serves to increase social polarization and contributes to malaise among the intended audience.

The media agenda has, moreover, acquired ever more influence over the public agenda, playing a crucial role in the way in which expectations are generated and “framed.” Modern framing theories have developed a social construction of the social phenomena that influence how citizens perceive reality. The schemata of interpretation that is established has a great impact on how individuals appraise the political situation, predisposing them to view it and the relevant actor(s) favorably or negatively (Lakoff 2004). When seeking to explain a situation of citizen malaise caused by politics, it is important to ask how much of the explanation lies in strictly political factors and how much in the intermediation of an astutely designed political message through a particular vehicle.

New communications technologies have boosted the use of mechanisms through which individuals can share information, form opinions and even advocate collective action in real time. Through these mechanisms, virtual communities are created that constitute a “digital hive” (Han 2014a), with a capacity to intermediate and, ultimately, create or destroy political expectations that is new in terms of the immediacy of its impact and the scope of its reach. The effectiveness of these communities is currently a subject of research that has so far arrived at only tentative conclusions. We do know that Latin Americans who discuss politics via social media tend to be younger, wealthier, more educated, and more likely to reside in large cities (Brunelle 2013), but this in itself is unsurprising: such citizens were already more likely to discuss politics even before the advent of the Internet. It does, however, seem that the immediacy and ease of digital mobilization could have an impact on classic institutional representation, threatening to render old representative mechanisms obsolete.

A further issue relates to “psychopower,” whose effectiveness is based on a model of seductive consumption. Individuals, as happy consumers, are manipulated to the extent that they surrender personal data and information about their habits and preferences that they might never have provided if requested to do so directly. The rise of Big Data (Mayer-Schönberger

and Cukier 2013) —that is, analysis using the collection, organization, and processing of huge quantities of data by computers—serves as a more efficient alternative to any opinion survey “permitting forecasts of the behavior of persons and their conditioning at a pre-reflexive level. Free expression and hypercommunication through the web become total control and vigilance, leading to an authentic crisis of freedom” (Han 2014b). In this way, citizen malaise can not only be understood but also predicted.

EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC CYCLE

The economic cycle that began in Latin America soon after the turn of the twenty-first century represented a “gained decade” for the region, driven by the increase in demand for raw materials (minerals and agricultural products) and their prices (especially oil). The commodities boom gave rise to fiscal surpluses that allowed governments to raise public spending with a particular emphasis on social policies. In addition, it allowed tens of millions of Latin Americans to join the swelling ranks of the middle classes. Thanks to the timely structural reforms they had implemented and a financial sector that had been put on a healthy footing, Latin American countries were also able to ride out the great international financial crisis, suffering only a limited impact in 2009. The heyday of the commodities boom was from approximately 2003–2004 to 2011–2012, when the world’s fastest-growing economy, China, began to show signs of an impending deceleration.

In these market societies, the commodities-driven windfall generated a marked increase in people’s expectations which, in turn, boosted demands for improved policies and services. Student protests in Chile were the most palpable sign of a climate of malaise caused by a longstanding failure to address social demands, in this particular case in the field of education. Public spending increased very significantly, particularly in the case of conditional cash transfers and welfare programs that generated pro-government electoral loyalties. One sign of this was the expansion of the electoral reach of the Frente Amplio from Montevideo to the interior of Uruguay.

More recently, however, a drop in commodity prices, a weakening of Chinese demand, and appreciation of the dollar have created a far more adverse external scenario for Latin America. This has been reflected in an important increase in inflation in Argentina and a risk of job losses, resulting in the gradual installation of a certain social climate of generalized

dejection, which is the stepping-stone to malaise. The end of the economic expansion has also been aggravated by the cases of corruption seen regularly in Argentina and, particularly as from 2013, in Chile, a country normally ranked as the most transparent in Latin America according to international surveys. These scandals have heavily damaged the political class, helping to provide grounds for a negative evaluation in a context of expensive and poor-quality public services, low wages and collateral social and ecological damage.

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ELITES

The post-transition political elites of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have in common that they were recruited from traditional political parties, marking a clear difference with other cases in Latin America, for example, the Andean countries. To the extent that they came from different political sectors in terms of their position on the left-right scale, they are also a reflection of the existence of ideological pluralism and the functioning of mechanisms for alternation in power.

However, Chilean governments have also notably included “technopols” (Joignant 2011), suggesting a somewhat different pattern. Technocrat-politicians, despite claiming to practice a new form of politics, have a unique profile: they have taken the risk of entering the political arena despite their relative inexperience with the rhetorical or persuasive aspects of day-to-day politics. This special case is significant from the standpoint of the pedagogical influence that all elites habitually have (and exercise consciously or unconsciously) over society. In certain circumstances, due to the technical nature of their decisions, “technopols” serve to guarantee the impartial efficiency of public policies, thus earning popular esteem. Yet at times of crisis, their cold calculation and the asepsis of their movements leave much to be desired: they seem incapable of displaying a warmer approach characterized by (populist) empathy on the part of rulers.

In these cases, it is important to take into account the style of presidential leadership as a vector for channeling the aspirations of people who may desire a savior at times of crisis (Carlos S. Menem and Néstor Kirchner), a leader able to manage the risks of processes of change (Raúl Alfonsín, Patricio Aylwin, Ricardo Lagos, and Julio María Sanguinetti), or a man of the people (José Mujica), rather than a person overwhelmed by events (Fernando de la Rúa), consumed by reelection ambitions (Carlos S. Menem—in his second term—and Cristina Fernández), or lackluster

presidents incapable of inspiring the masses (Eduardo Frei and Jorge Batlle). Style of leadership matters not only to defusing malaise, but can also be the causal factor behind it. Michelle Bachelet currently faces a situation in which she has become the central figure, with the decline in her popularity contaminating not only her own circle but also all the Chilean political system.

In a parallel to the end of the economic cycle discussed in the previous section, it is also possible to talk about the end of the generational cycle of the group of people who have been leading the political life of the three countries studied here. This cycle will very probably reach its end when these countries' current presidents finish their respective terms. Due to both constitutional limits and their age, representatives of the transition generation are poised to abandon politics together with members of their circle who are of a similar age. Although the return of Ricardo Lagos and Cristina Fernández cannot be ruled out, the cycle of popularity of their political platforms appears to be approaching its end, suggesting a natural alternation in power. Voters' fatigue with familiar faces and repetitive policies and a desire for change may play a role in the existing climate of political malaise, at least in part of these societies. In this case, the economic cycle itself, biological factors, and others of an institutional nature may be contributing factors.

QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY AND MALAISE

One of the considerations that need to be borne in mind is the fact that the concept of malaise has a markedly cultural component. The political sciences are somewhat reticent to include issues of a cultural nature as independent variables to explain political phenomena. After the behaviorist revolution, analyses focusing on political culture have certainly figured prominently in political analysis but it is important to remember that they have tended to refer to issues related to subjective dimensions such as values, beliefs, and attitudes, rather than ones that can strictly be considered cultural. The cultural dimension has a broader connotation in that it is related to the meaning of life. When using the term malaise, we should recall that it is sometime analogous to other concepts that have been addressed in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, or anthropology. These include anxiety in its basic sense, or unease (a mild form of anxiety) or agony (the most extreme form). Social groups pass through stages in which these forms have collective manifestations due to numerous

different factors, shaping their trajectory and evolution. When this occurs in a political unit, it has an undoubted impact which may, however, escape the notice of scholars.

These observations are congruent with elements of value change theory as espoused by Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators. The core of the “postmaterialist” thesis builds on the observation that in traditional societies, individuals are generally preoccupied with fundamental needs such as that of economic and physical safety, housing and food. Yet as sustained economic development leads to more prosperous societies in which basic needs are more easily met, individuals begin to accord priority to newer, nonmaterial values (Inglehart 1977, 1990). These values include personal emancipation, aesthetic satisfaction and a wide range of issues connected to the quality of life. Postmaterialists give high importance to equal rights, personal freedoms, environmental sustainability, and female empowerment. They are responsible for many of the “green” and “new politics” movements that have transcended the traditional left-right cleavage in recent decades. Suspicious of bureaucratic authority and technocratic governance, postmaterialists tend to prefer grassroots, participatory forms of democracy. Their political skill levels bias them toward criticism of state performance, leading to the emergence of “critical citizens” who strongly support democracy but are very skeptical of its outputs (Norris 1999). It is worth noting that both Inglehart’s postmaterialists and Norris’ critical citizens are predicted to appear first among privileged individuals within societies at higher levels of socioeconomic modernization; this means that in the Latin American context, Argentines, Chileans, and Uruguayans—particular urban ones—should be among the very first to display these new forms of (skeptical) political culture.

Globalization and the predominance of the neoliberal model mean that there is currently a very particular cultural climate, reflecting very important changes in different spheres of daily life which affect citizens’ response to eminently political issues such as participation. The changes that have occurred in consumption patterns and the labor market, the exacerbation of individualism, and the way in which new social networks are established, conditioning classic patterns of both identity and solidarity, have been profoundly affected by the new information and communications technologies that are today available in abundance to most people.

This particular context lends itself well to analysis from within the emerging research program on the “quality of democracy.” Over the past two decades, an important body of work has been built up in this field

(including Beetham 1994; O'Donnell et al. 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Munck 2009; Levine and Molina 2011; Morlino 2011, 2013; Coppedge et al. 2012). Its common denominator has been to establish the dimensions of the procedural nature of democracy and the relationship to results. Although some attempt has been made to introduce matters that have a certain relational character such as sovereignty, these approaches avoid considering the cultural fabric in the terms discussed in the preceding paragraphs. They do not, therefore, answer the questions—which are not raised because they are not the matter in hand—of how widespread sociocultural malaise affects politics, of whether there can be a type of political malaise distinct from sociocultural malaise, and of whether politics is a source of sociocultural malaise. All these questions raise the possibility of political configurations that could (hypothetically) either permit the coexistence of a political matrix with disastrous results in a “happy” society, or conversely, societies with perfectly functional political institutions encumbered by severe malaise. Are such alignments possible?

Research on the quality of democracy has made a Herculean effort to build up a great quantity of detailed and rigorously collected data. The analytical framework has been designed and now it is a matter of asking new questions or introducing fresh data. In this sense, work on the lines of studies of happiness may point in an interesting direction. Thanks to work ranging from the exercise based on 33 indicators grouped into nine categories seen in Bhutan's Gross National Happiness Index (<http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/>) to the work of Layard (2005) and the proposal of Kahneman (2011) of the day reconstruction method, there is beginning to be sufficient evidence to attempt this. If, as indicated above, the options related to big data have ceased to be a mere dream, we may be at a point when the opening of new avenues completely changes the practice of politics and the way it is studied as we have known them until now.

CONCLUSIONS

In this brief synthetic essay, we have drawn attention to the relationship to four ways in which conflict is causally linked to malaise in representation in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay: via the historical context, via the generation of political expectations, via the effect of the economic cycle, and via the critical role played by professional politicians.

Of these four dimensions, two can be seen as exogenous to the events and processes analyzed in this volume. The *historical context* lies beyond

the control of today's actors, and several of the key variables driving *economic performance*—global demand and international finance—are external to Latin America. Yet two dimensions of the relationship between conflict and malaise are endogenous to human action. The *political elites* in question are Argentines, Chileans, and Uruguayans who seek governing authority and who are awarded this power by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. Once in office, they have significant influence over how *political expectations* are shaped and created.

Although we have argued that conflict is inevitable, we also contend that it is the responsibility of elites to generate expectations that are congruent with the really existing capacities of state bureaucracies and political institutions. When they do so responsibly, the inherent conflicts of democracy can be processed in ways that do not aggravate the march toward political skepticism that seems inexorable in the twenty-first century. Yet when elites raise expectations beyond the capacity of the state and representative institutions to respond, conflicts are likely to spill out into the open, producing unmediated tensions that democracy is hard pressed to resolve. In the end, the ways in which citizens evaluate the performance of Argentine, Chilean, and Uruguayan democracy are impossible to understand without first assessing the complex interplay between historical legacies and modern popular expectations.

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