

Dilla University

College of Social Sciences and Humanities

Department of Social Anthropology

Course Title: Political Anthropology

Course No: SoAn3101

Credit Hours: 3

Course Instructor: Solomon Debebe.

Course Description

This course focuses on how political institutions and processes have been understood from an anthropological perspective. It introduces key issues and concepts in political anthropology; the forerunners of the Sub-discipline and their critics, ways in which anthropologists defined the field of political anthropology as separate domain classifications, typologies and evolution of political systems in different kinds of societies; the bases for power, leadership, coercion and legitimacy, political fields and processes, power allocation and relationships in local, regional, national and international relations, dispute and conflict resolution. It concludes by considering relations between politics and other aspects of social organization.

Course Goal/Objectives:

- Recognize political institutions and processes from an anthropological perspective
- Understood the key issues and concepts in political anthropology
- Reason theoretically: Analyze, question and internalize the forerunners of the Sub-discipline and their critics, ways in which anthropologists defined the field of political anthropology as separate domain classifications
- Recognize classification of political systems and typologies of political systems and evolution of political systems in different kinds of societies
- Internalize political anthropology and political science Theory
- Reason methodologically: Apply scientific theory to through verbal and written assessment. Communicate and collaborate with other members of the class in a professional and task-oriented manner
- To learn about political anthropology and critical thinking, not only from the readings and lecture, but also through interactions with peers.
- Analyze the bases for power, leadership, coercion and legitimacy, political fields and processes, power allocation and relationships in local, regional, national and international relations, dispute and conflict resolution

Chapter One

1. Introduction

Political anthropology is a sub-specialization within cultural anthropology. Like political sociology, it is a study of how political power is used within a larger social and cultural context. **Political anthropology** concerns the structure of political systems, looked at from the basis of the structure of societies. Political anthropologists include Pierre Clusters, E.E.Evans-Pritchard, Meyer Fortes, Georges Balandier, F.G. Bailey, Jeremy Boissevain, Marc Abélès, Jocelyne Streiff-Fenart, Ted C.Lewellen, Robert L. Carneiro, John Borneman and Joan Vincent. Political anthropology adds a cross-cultural comparison to understand how widely different cultures have generally dissimilar political cultures and political institutions. The major thesis of political anthropology is that politics cannot be isolated from other subsystems of a society. Political anthropology has an interest in how power is used in a social and cultural environment. Areas in social life where political struggles take place (known as 'sites of power') are not just limited to the actions of those in government, or violent armed struggles between revolutionary groups, but instead politics is a wide category existing at both a macro and micro level. Sites of power in contemporary life can be anything from power in interpersonal communication, gender relations in a family, the ability of a professional group to have their 'professional' status recognized in law, up to and including the actions in the House of Commons of those elected to run the country. (Kidd et al., 1998b: 529) Power is defined as political influence to accomplish certain aims. The ability to make and enforce decisions is the basis of power, and power is what political anthropologists study. Political anthropology investigates the everyday experiences of people as they are shaped by their economic position in a particular society, and the world economy that molds most political issues.

1.2 Development of Political Anthropology

Political anthropology has its roots in the 19thC. At that time, thinkers such as [Lewis H. Morgan](#) and [Sir Henry Maine](#) tried to trace the evolution of human society from 'primitive' or 'savage' societies to more 'advanced' ones. These early approaches were ethnocentric, speculative, and often racist. Nevertheless, they laid the basis for political anthropology by undertaking a modern study inspired by modern science, and in particular Darwin. In a move that would be influential for future anthropology, they focused on Kinship as the key to

understanding political organization, and emphasized the role of the 'gens' or lineage as an object of study.

Contemporary political anthropology can be traced back to the 1940 publication *African Political Systems*, edited by Meyer Fortes and E.E. Evans Pritchard. They rejected the speculative historical reconstruction of earlier authors and argued that "a scientific study of political institutions must be inductive and comparative and aim solely at establishing and explaining the uniformities found among them and their interdependencies with other features of social organization". Their goal was taxonomy: to classify societies into a small number of discrete categories, and then compare them in order to make generalizations about them.

The contributors of this book were influenced by Radcliffe-Brown **and structural functionalism**. As a result, they assumed that **all societies were well-defined entities which sought to maintain their equilibrium and social order**.

Although the authors recognized that "Most of these societies have been conquered or have submitted to European rule from fear of invasion. They would not go along with it if the threat of force were withdrawn; and this fact determines the part now played in their political life by European administration."

The authors in the volume tended in practice to examine African political systems in terms of their own internal structures, and ignored the broader historical and political context of colonialism.

Several authors reacted to this early work. In his work *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (1954) **Edmund Leach** argued that it was necessary to understand how societies changed through time rather than remaining static and in equilibrium.

A special version of conflict oriented political anthropology was developed in the so-called 'Manchester school', started by Max Gluckman. Gluckman focused on social process and an analysis of structures and systems based on their relative stability. In his view, conflict maintained the stability of political systems through the establishment and re-establishment of crosscutting ties among social actors. Gluckman even suggested that a certain degree of conflict was necessary to uphold society, and that conflict was constitutive of social and political order. By the 1960s this transition work developed into a full-fledged sub discipline

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By the late 1960s, political anthropology was a flourishing subfield: in 1969 there were two hundred anthropologists listing the sub-discipline as one of their areas of interests, and a quarter of all British anthropologists listed politics as a topic that they studied. Several authors reacted to this early work. In his work *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (1954) **Edmund Leach** argued that it was necessary to understand how societies changed through time rather than remaining static and in equilibrium.

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Political anthropology developed in a very different way in the United States. There, authors such as [Morton Fried](#), [Elman Service](#), and [Eleanor Leacock](#) took a Marxist approach and sought to understand the origins and development of inequality in human society.

Marx and Engels had drawn on the ethnographic work of **Morgan**, and these authors now extended that tradition. In particular, they were interested in the evolution of social systems over time. Interest in anthropology grew in the 1970s. A session/conference/ on anthropology was organized at the Ninth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in 1973, the proceedings of which were eventually published in 1979

as *Political Anthropology: The State of the Art*. A newsletter was created shortly thereafter, which developed over time into the journal "Political and Legal Anthropology".

CHAPTER TWO

2. TYPES OF PRE-INDUSTRIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

British anthropologist Edmund Leach (1961) once relegated virtually all attempts at anthropological classification to the lowly status of butterfly collecting, on the grounds that the resulting typologies made no more sense than, say, grouping together all blue butterflies.

Contemporary postmodern theory has been even more inimical to classification; viewing it as the imposition of the rationalist Enlightenment compulsion to scientifically pigeon hole everything. A large antidevelopment literature has rejected classification on the grounds that it is a means by which a hegemonic West asserts power over the designated groups. In addition, current trends in globalization theory are not any more sympathetic to traditional typologies; the emphasis is on fluidity, hybridity, and change rather than the static structures designated by systems of classification. This said, classification has been a major focus of research since the beginnings of political anthropology; indeed, the foundational book, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's *African Political Systems* (1940), begins with a typology. Most introductory textbooks in cultural anthropology continue to employ the classical band-tribe-chiefdom-state designations

2.1 UNCENTRALIZED SYSTEMS

Many of the groups traditionally studied by anthropologists possess little that could be called government, at least not in the sense of a permanent political elite. In most nonstate systems, power is fragmentary and temporary, dispersed among families, bands, lineages, and various associations. Wider political groups may be formed temporarily to counter some threat, such as warring neighbors, but these groups will break apart when the problem has been overcome. Thus these social systems can best be viewed not as permanent, centrally organized societies, but rather as fluid groups that, over short or long periods of time, sometimes seasonally and sometimes almost randomly, coalesce into larger tribal units that then disintegrate into smaller units, which may themselves be divisible. Although politics is constant in such societies as individuals seek support for leadership positions, public decisions are made, and territory is defended, it is not manifested in either a monopoly of coercive force nor in any form of centralized economic system based on taxes or tribute. There may be great differences in individual status, but there is little in the way of class stratification. Thus, these systems, although only egalitarian in any real sense at their lowest level (that of hunters-gatherers), appear more democratic in decision making and access to leadership than do more centralized groups.

2.1.1 Bands

A major conclusion deriving from a 1965 Conference on Band Organization was that the term band, although still useful, was regularly applied to groups as diverse as those with an average size of 25, as well as those with 300 to 400 members, rendering the term virtually meaningless. It was also argued that the usual defining qualities of bands— seasonal scheduling, lack of

centralized authority structures, and hunting-gathering economy—were not sufficiently restrictive to make these units automatically comparable (Damas 1968). However, in those few societies lacking agriculture, domesticated food animals, or dependable year-round fishing, there would seem to be only a limited number of cultural options available. Similarities in the social and political structures of such widely separated groups as the Canadian Eskimo and Australian Aborigines suggest that dependence on wild foods, the consequent nomadism, and seasonal redistributions of population fix the adaptive possibilities within relatively narrow limits. For this reason, the band may have been a normal mode of social organization in Paleolithic times. The band form is extremely rare today; therefore, this classification is more historical than contemporary. Bands are typically small, with perhaps 25 to 150 individuals, grouped in nuclear families. Although there is a division of labor along age and sex lines, there is virtually no specialization of skills, with the result being that the unity of the wider group is, in Emile Durkheim's term, "mechanical"—that is, based on custom, tradition, and common values and symbols, rather than on an interdependence of specialized roles. A strict rule of band exogamy forces marriage alliances with other bands, and this wider group is typically also united by bilateral kinship (traced equally through both parents). Lineages, in the sense of corporate descent groups holding territorial rights, would not be sufficiently flexible for the constant fluctuations of hunting-gathering societies. Morton Fried (1967) categorizes such groups as egalitarian in terms of economy, social organization, and political structure. Distribution of food and other needed goods is at the simplest level of sharing; bonds are established within the band and between bands on the basis of ongoing reciprocal relations. Political organization is also egalitarian to the extent that decision making is usually a group enterprise, and access to leadership positions is equally open to all males within a certain age range. Leadership, which is temporary and shifts according to the situation, is based on the personal attributes of the individual and lacks any coercive power. A headman or leader in a hunt cannot really tell anyone what to do, but must act as arbiter for the group, and perhaps as expert advisor in particular situations. This least complex of political structures may be further subdivided into patrilocal, composite, and anomalous bands. The patrilocal type is based on band exogamy and a marriage rule that the woman lives with her husband's group. This type was so widespread that Elman Service (1962: 97) regarded it as "almost an inevitable kind of organization." Indeed, it has the advantage of band stability, because each group is constantly replenished over time by new members coming in from outside; but it also is capable of forming wide-ranging alliances

through marriage and possesses considerable flexibility. The composite band was viewed by Service as the result of the collapse of originally patrilocal structures that were rapidly depopulated from disease and war after having come in contact with civilization. It is a group that lacks both band exogamy and a marriage residence rule and, therefore, is “more of an expedient agglomeration than a structured society.” In the anomalous category are the traditional Basin Shoshone and the Eskimo, both of which had social structures so fragmented that they have been characterized as typifying the family level of sociocultural integration.

2.1.2 The !Kung Bushmen

The Nyae Nyae region of the Kalahari Desert in southwest Africa covers about 10,000 square miles, in which there are a number of small waterholes but no rivers or streams or other surface water except for some shallow ponds during a brief rainy season. Within this area, about 1,000 !Kung Bushmen (the ! represents a “click” in their pronunciation) lived in 36 or 37 bands. Although at the lowest level of technological development, relying on digging sticks and poison-tipped spears and carrying all of their meager possessions with them during their constant treks in search of food and water, they had adapted well to the extremely hostile environment. About 80 percent of the food was supplied by the women, who daily collected nuts, fruits, tubers, roots, and various other field foods. The remainder of the !Kung subsistence was supplied through hunting, which was exclusively a male occupation. Various species of large antelope provided most of the meat, although occasionally a buffalo or a giraffe was also killed. About 15 to 18 such large animals were killed by a single band in a year, and the meat was shared by the entire group. Although there was no separate political sphere among the !Kung, a number of political problems had to be dealt with, such as the defense of territories, the protection and allocation of water, and public goals with regard to band movements and collective hunts. Each band claimed a territory that had to have a permanent source of water at a reasonable distance from sufficient vegetable foods for day-to-day consumption. Within such a territory would be sporadic fertile areas, such as groves of mangetti nut trees, clumps of berries, and special places where tubers grew in particular abundance; these were considered “owned” by a band and were jealously guarded. Incursions into another band’s territory occasionally occurred, especially during hunting expeditions, in which case violence might be threatened; but true wars were unknown.

Headmanship was passed on from father to son. The existence of hereditary political positions seemingly defies the principle that all adult males in a band have equal access to leadership.

However, the headman's authority was largely limited to control of field food and water; he planned the utilization of these various resources and had charge of the group's movements from one area to another within the territory. Most of this was firmly established by custom, and important decisions were arrived at by group consensus, so that the headman position was, to some extent, symbolic. Visitors had to ask his permission to partake of food or water within the band's territory, but custom dictated that all reasonable requests be granted. Headmanship brought responsibility without reward, and because it was the !Kung ideal that no individual should stand above another, such positions were seldom actively sought. The hereditary headman might or might not be the actual leader of the band. If he was too young or lacked leadership abilities, this role might fall to someone with more of the personal qualities of leadership, so that the position became nominal. Also, effective leadership shifted according to the situation; a person might be an exceptional hunt leader but have little authority over public decisions, such as when and where to move camp (Marshall 1967).

2.1.3 The Eskimo

Despite the vast territory inhabited by the traditional Eskimo—from Siberia to Greenland—they have been described as remarkably alike in their political and social organization. Environmental determinist arguments are especially tempting, for the Eskimo lived in possibly the most hostile humanly habitable regions on Earth. Their food resources—mainly fish, caribou, and seal—were seasonal and widely scattered, which would logically lead to low population densities, nomadism, and extremely fluid social organization based on small subsistence groups. The basic unit was the extended family, which could take advantage of bilateral kinship relations to join with other families in temporary bands or even villages as food supplies waxed and waned during the year. A household might comprise a family of 12, which subsisted alone part of the year but joined groups of up to 270 at other times. Leadership outside the household was elementary; even villages sometimes lacked a headman, and what minimal influence might be possessed by an individual rested with the local shaman, whose authority was neither coercive nor uniting. Along the coast, the owner of a whaling boat had unrestricted authority over his crew during a voyage, and might, by the prestige of his wealth, maintain a loose chieftainship over a community; but even in this case, group unity was maintained not by government, but by conventionalized reciprocal obligations among kin. As with the !Kung, maintenance of order derived from the power of custom and public opinion (Weyer 1959). Although this textbook

view of the Eskimo was probably reasonably accurate for a majority of groups, there also existed a much greater diversity of social and political forms. Bilateral kinship was in some places replaced by corporate patrilineages; men's associations sometimes overrode kinship relations as decision-making bodies; there were large permanent settlements in some areas; and there were wide differences in types of leadership, from virtual chiefdoms to an absence of authority beyond the head of the family. Some of this variation was undoubtedly secondary, deriving from long contact with agents of Western civilization, such as explorers, whaling crews, traders, and missionaries. However, such diversity does suggest that the hunting-gathering adaptation permits a broader range of sociopolitical variation than is accounted for in conventional typologies (Damas 1968).

2.1.2 Tribes

“If I had to select one word in the vocabulary of anthropology as the single most egregious case of meaninglessness,” wrote Morton Fried (1967: 154), “I would have to pass over ‘tribe’ in favor of ‘race.’” The comparison is apt; like race, the concept of tribe is used to refer to a vast range of entities that have almost nothing in common with each other. There are three basic objections to the concept of tribe: (1) it does not encompass a discrete group of societies that share common qualities; (2) it is not sufficiently different from other types, such as bands and chiefdoms; (3) it suggests a degree of social integration, or at least boundedness, that is often nonexistent (Helm 1968). Why, then, is the term in use at all? There are both logical and empirical reasons. First, the term is a recognition that in sociopolitical complexity and evolutionary development, there must be a form that bridges the gap between hunting-gathering bands and centralized systems. Second, cross-cultural studies do reveal features in common to at least many of these groups. Tribes are uncentralized egalitarian systems in which authority is distributed among a number of small groups; unity of the larger society is established from a web of individual and group relations. Because these groups rely on domesticated food sources, they are more densely populated and usually more sedentary than are hunting-gathering bands. As with bands, there is little political or economic specialization, except for a division of labor along age and sex lines, and there is no religious professionalization. However, according to Elman Service (1962), the defining quality of the tribe—that which separates it from the band—is the existence of pan-tribal sodalities that unite the various self-sufficient communities into wider social groups. A sodality is simply a formal or informal association, such as a family group, a college fraternity,

or the Boy Scouts. In tribal societies there are two types of sodalities: those that are derived from kinship, and those that are not. Kinship sodalities include lineages—groups tracing descent through either the male line (patrilineage) or the female line (matrilineage)—and clans, which are groups of lineages tracing common descent to an often-mythical ancestor. Nonkin sodalities include a host of voluntary and involuntary associations. If tribes are viewed in terms of the types of sodalities that unite them, or in terms of who makes the decisions for the group, a number of subtypes immediately emerge. Even in cases in which other forms of sodalities are evident, kinship will almost invariably be an important element of social integration. One form of political organization based on kinship is the segmentary lineage—especially common in Africa—in which a number of autonomous village groups can join together in everlarger units for ritual purposes or to counter some threat. Many tribal societies are integrated by associations, which cross-cut kinship divisions. In age-set systems, the group initiated together at puberty will form a continuing sodality that takes on different functions as it passes through certain age levels—for example, if the group is male, they will form a warrior society as young men, and will become the governing body of the community as elders. In other tribes, such as the American Plains Indians, voluntary societies of warriors, clowns, or police may serve important integrating and decision-making functions. Although tribal societies do not have hierarchies of full-time religious professionals, religion may be extremely important, especially if it is tied to some sort of ancestor veneration, as is often the case in unilineal groups. In these societies, ritual stratification may be a key element of integration, as those responsible for major rituals assume decision-making leadership even in secular matters. In some tribes, village councils of elders will make public decisions, usually through a process of discussion leading to consensus. Finally, throughout Melanesia certain big men attain significant political authority through wealth, generosity, and courage in war. Although these leaders may exercise chieftainlike authority, their position is inherently unstable, because it is dependent on their ability to buy followers through gift giving and loans. A bad crop, an inability to gather sufficient pigs for a lavish feast, or failure in battle can quickly shift authority to a contender with better luck or skill. It is tempting to think of such a breakdown of subtypes as fairly covering the range of possibilities, but there are tribes that include elements from more than one subtype, and others that do not fit any of these forms. Why this endless profusion of subtypes? Perhaps the basic problem is in attempting to define tribe in political terms at all. Unlike band, chieftdom, and state, the concept of tribe really does not—and cannot—refer to a particular type of political organization, because there seem to be

few structural, or systemic, limits on the variety of forms. Ronald Cohen's characterization of this midrange group of societies as noncentralized "polities based on domesticated plants and animals" may be the best we can do and still allow for the range of variation, and even then, we are faced with certain rather glaring anomalies. The American Plains Indians, some of whom lacked domesticated plants or food animals (their subsistence was almost entirely based on the buffalo), certainly had more complex integrating institutions than did those found in hunting-gathering bands.

The Kpelle

Just how complex all this can get is illustrated by the Kpelle of West Africa. Their larger cultural group was fragmented into a number of self-sufficient communities, each with a hereditary "owner of the land," but also with a council of elders that made decisions by consensus. Complementing the political power of these groups was the men's secret society—secret in the sense that its symbols and rituals were not to be revealed to outsiders. This society, the Poro, held a supernatural political power that cut across lineage and small chiefdom boundaries and could thus unite the Kpelle into larger groups. Actually, the Poro extended far beyond the Kpelle, including a host of cultures in Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Portuguese Guinea. It arbitrated in local wars and even united entire countries for common action in times of emergency. Thus, we find the centralization and hierarchy we expect from chiefdoms, the segmentary organization and pantribal sodalities common to tribes, and at least three of the subtypes—associational, village council, and ritually stratified—combined in the Kpelle (Fulton 1972; Little 1965).

The Yanomamo

The Yanomamo are a horticultural group living in scattered villages in Venezuela and northern Brazil. As described and analyzed by Napoleon Chagnon (1968), these people were traditionally extremely aggressive and warlike, which derived partially from a shortage of marriageable women. Polygamy was mainly reserved for the older and wealthier men, and there was a marriage rule that gave older brothers first right for brides. In addition, a broad definition of incest restricted a male's sexual access to a very small proportion of the women in the village. The result was that within villages, brothers were pitted against brothers, adultery and accusations of adultery were common, and hostility levels were high. The maintenance of order in such a situation would seem to demand a strong headman, but, as with bands, the headman

had no coercive authority. Within the village, the men were kept from killing each other by a system of conventionalized violence: taking turns hitting each other with the fist on the side or chest, or striking each other on the head with long poles. The political leader's function in these battles was to maintain the level of violence within the rules— that is, just this side of lethal. Because young men had to go to war to capture wives, and every killing of a member of one's own group had to be avenged, raiding other villages was routine. In a situation of constant war, intervillage politics was a matter of survival. Unlike many horticultural tribes that participate in warfare almost as a game, the Yanomamo were deadly serious; it was not unknown for entire villages to be overrun, with all the men killed or dispersed and all the women taken captive. In order to maintain a balance of power, a village sometimes needed to form alliances with former enemies. This took place in three stages: first, ritual exchange of goods; second, mutual feasting; and finally, exchange of women as wives. Such alliances were tenuous, and might be broken with impunity, especially in the early stages. In many ways, the Yanomamo would appear to be a typical tribe: their social organization was certainly more complex than that of nomadic hunter-gatherers; their villages were permanent and relatively stable (they tended to fission after reaching a certain size), there was no centralized coercive leadership, and there was equal access to headmanship positions among the men of the village. However, these obviously tribal people seemed to lack the one thing Service held to be the defining quality of tribes, namely, pantribal sodalities. It was true that lineages extended beyond village boundaries, but they did not unite villages. In fact, because of the hostilities created within lineages through competition over women, bonds of marriage were often stronger than were patrilineal bonds. There were no pantribal associations, and military alliances united only two or a few villages. Certainly no political structure integrated the entire Yanomamo group or even a large proportion of it.

The Nuer

The Nuer of southern Sudan, described by E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940a, 1940b), provide a classic example of the segmentary lineage solution to the problem of tribal unity. About 200,000 Nuer lived in villages, cultivating maize and millet during the rainy season, herding cattle in almost constant nomadism during the dry season. Their social system was fluid in the extreme, and individually they had a reputation for being fiercely independent. Although they lacked centralized authority, or any formal authority at all beyond the village level, they were able to join together in large groups to counter an external threat. EvansPritchard characterized the Nuer

as “an acephalous state, lacking legislative, judicial, and executive organs. Nevertheless, it is far from chaotic. It has a persistent and coherent form which might be called ‘ordered anarchy.’ ” The smallest corporate economic unit was the household, comprised of several patrilineally related men and their families. A group of these households might be clustered as a hamlet within a village. As one of these hamlets grew through the processes of birth, adoption, and immigration, it would inevitably fission, creating another group that might form a hamlet in a nearby village. These hamlets comprised a minor lineage, and several of them, spread between many villages, made up larger and larger units: major lineage; maximal lineage; and, finally, clan. A clan might include thousands of people and be spread throughout all Nuerland, creating a network of social ties that these highly mobile people could call upon as needed. Because clans were exogamous, marriage alliances established hundreds of small bonds with other clans. Parallel to the segmentary lineage system, but not identical with it, was a territorial system. Each clan “owned” a certain territory that was, however, open to members of other clans; in fact, the owner clan did not form an aristocracy and might actually populate only a small portion of its territory. However, those moving into a village attempted to establish relations with an owner lineage through being adopted into it or through marriage. War and feuding were almost constant. By means of a process of complementary opposition, increasingly larger territorial groups could be united for such purposes. For example, two sections might be fighting with each other, but they would become allies if another group attacked either or both. To counter an even larger threat, all three former antagonists would join together. The political unity of the Nuer had to be defined situationally as increasingly larger units were assembled according to need, and then dismantled when the threat was gone. The complementary opposition solution to the problem of tribal integration, shown in Figure 2.2, was especially adaptive for a tribe that intruded into an already occupied territory. This was the case with the Nuer, who had within historical times expanded into the land of the Dinka. Such a system, extremely flexible yet capable of forming a powerful united force, channeled expansion outward and released internal pressures in warfare against other peoples (Sahlins 1961).

CENTRALIZED SYSTEMS

As noted previously, a valid typology should designate systems, so that within any single category the determination of one or a few variables will predict others. The category of centralized political systems encompasses societies in which power and authority inhered in one

person or a small group. This is true by definition. By extension, however, it is possible to predict that these societies will tend to be more densely populated than are bands and tribes, will be stratified by rank or class, will have specialized social and occupational roles, will utilize more productive technology, will have economies based on centralized redistribution, and will be more stable in terms of ongoing sociopolitical groupings. Morton Fried emphasizes the basic inequalities of these systems relative to uncentralized systems: recruitment into political positions is no longer equal but may be based on membership in a certain class or in an elite lineage. Although unilineal descent groups may exist and even hold a great deal of local power, politics is no longer manifested mainly through kinship; political specialization appears with full-time politicians and an attendant bureaucracy.

Chieftoms

With respect to social integration, the chieftom level transcends the tribal level in two major ways: (1) it has a higher population density made possible by more efficient productivity; and (2) it is more complex, with some form of centralized authority. Unlike segmentary systems in which political units coalesce and dissolve according to the situation, chieftoms have relatively permanent central agencies of government, typically based on collection and redistribution of an economic surplus (often including a labor surplus). The position of chief, unlike that of headman of a band or lineage, is a position of at least minimal power—that is, the chief has access to a certain amount of coercion. The chief may be the final authority in the distribution of land, and may be able to recruit an army. Economically, he is the center and coordinator of the redistribution system: he can collect taxes on food or goods, some of which will be returned to the populace, creating a new level of group solidarity in which a number of specialized parts depend on the smooth functioning of the whole. Even if the chief's position is not directly hereditary, it will only be available to certain families or lineages. Although actual class stratification is absent, every individual is ranked according to membership in a descent group; those closer to the chief's lineage will be higher on the scale and receive the deference of all those below. Indeed, according to Service (1971: 145), "the most distinctive characteristic of chieftoms, as compared to tribes and bands, is . . . the pervasive inequality of persons and groups in the society." However, the chief by no means possesses absolute power. The aristocratic ethos does not carry with it any formal, legal apparatus of forceful repression, and what obedience the chief can command may derive less from fear of physical sanctions than from his direct control

of the economic redistributive system. The chief's lineage may itself become exceptionally wealthy, but ultimately loyalty is purchased by constant bestowal of goods and benefits. Although there may be the approximation of a bureaucracy, offices beneath that of chief are not clearly differentiated, and when pressures build up, these lower bureaucrats can break away from the parent body and set up an opposition government. Thus, a chief walks a narrow tightrope between conflicting interest groups and maintains his position through a precarious balancing act. Although definitions of tribe have often been accused of being so general as to be meaningless, the above description of the chieftain level of political integration, derived largely from Elman Service (1971), has been accused of being too specific. According to Herbert Lewis (1968), Service has logically deduced this model according to what should exist between the tribal and state levels, then joined it with the specific model of Polynesian political structure, and proposed this hybrid as a general evolutionary type. Lewis points out that many groups that appear to have chieftainships are not stable at all; they oscillate back and forth from centralized leadership to egalitarianism as strong leaders come and go.

Such looseness in categories, however, should be assumed without another long disclaimer.

Pre-colonial Hawaii

The eight islands of aboriginal Hawaii were under the domination of a number of rigidly stratified hereditary chieftaindoms. The paramount chiefs were believed to be descendants of the gods and were so charged with mana—supernatural power—that even the ground they walked on could not be touched by lesser mortals. The chiefly personage was thus surrounded by an elaborate set of taboos, the breaking of which could mean a sentence of death. The chiefs were supreme economic, military, and ritual leaders, although most of these functions were delegated to a group of noble administrators and war leaders who formed the upper strata of society. There were two other levels below these administrators: lesser nobles and commoners. Each individual belonged to one of these strata, and the nobles were also ranked according to the order of their birth and their nearness to the high chief. The higher nobles, or lesser chiefs, were accorded a great deal of deference; for example, commoners had to throw themselves face down on the ground as they passed. In order to keep the chiefly line pure, the heir to the position of high chief was supposed to be the firstborn son of the chief and his firstborn sister (a form of incestuous endogamy that is also found in ancient Egypt and Inca Peru). Lesser chiefs controlled allocations of land and water—the latter exceedingly important, because much of the productive land was

irrigated. They also, de facto, controlled the communal labor of commoners. Tribute was paid to the high chief by the upper-level nobles, who collected from the lower nobles, and so on, down the line to the commoners. This tribute—or some of it—would be used in public works, mainly irrigation canals and warfare. Nobles also subsidized a group of professional craftsmen from the tribute till. What kept these polities from attaining the status of states was partially the lack of differentiation of the political sphere; these were hereditary theocracies in which authority was still relatively undifferentiated from religion and kinship. Also, although a chief might hold life and death power over his subjects in some regards, the central governing unit by no means held a monopoly on this power, which was distributed among a number of lesser chiefs; nor was there any legal structure to administer such force. Finally, these governments were far from stable. Warfare was constant, and chiefdoms were regularly overthrown, in which case the entire noble class would be replaced by the conquering group (Davenport 1967; Seaton 1978; Service 1975).

The Kwakiutl

Indian societies of the Northwest Coast of North America are usually categorized as chiefdoms, although these groups do not fit the ideal pattern as neatly as do the Hawaiians. The Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island were never studied in their aboriginal state; by the time Franz Boas began his fieldwork among them in 1885, they had already had almost a century of contact with white traders, missionaries, sailors, and Indian agents, and had been decimated by disease. At that time, their plane of living, based on hunting and fishing and virtually devoid of domesticated food supplies, was among the highest in North America as measured by material possessions—houses, canoes, utensils, tools, and art objects such as carved masks and totem poles. The Kwakiutl were divided into about 25 villages, each of which was comprised of two to seven numayma, or tightly cohesive units made up of one to several extended families. Numayma were stratified in terms of prestige within the village, and each individual was ranked within his numayma. Ranks, which were obtained mainly through heredity or marriage, were intricately elaborated by titles, crests, and ceremonial privileges. Such prestige positions were by no means rare; out of a population of about 1,500 individuals, there were 650 named positions, some of which were held by more than one person at the same time. These social positions were maintained through the medium of the potlatch—an elaborate feast in which an enormous amount of goods was distributed to all present. One could also insult a rival by destroying goods

in his presence, but these rivalry potlatches, although dramatic, were not as common as is often believed. The Kwakiutl obviously suggest many elements of the classical chiefdom: a strong system of ranking, specialized leadership roles based on heredity, permanent agencies of government, and redistribution. However, the fit is far from perfect. First, there was no integration beyond the village, and precious little within it, because most political integration was focused in the numayma. The highest-ranking chief in the village would supposedly have some extra authority, but in practice, the numayma was the day-to-day political entity, which means that politics was manifested through kinship, as in tribal society. Also, it is debatable that the potlatch really represented a system of redistribution. No one in Kwakiutl society was sufficiently wealthy to give a potlatch without both calling in debts and borrowing. The potlatch was the center of a complex economic system based on an intricate web of loaner-debtor relationships. Although an invited numayma might not be directly involved in such debts, it was expected to reciprocate the potlatch, preferably with greater abundance. Also, the main article distributed at a potlatch was the Hudson Bay blanket, which could hardly be eaten and so was most valuable as a sort of currency used for further loaning and borrowing. Thus, the potlatch suggests a system of reciprocity (common to bands and tribes) and not the centralized redistribution that is supposedly a defining quality of chiefdoms. In other words, the Kwakiutl, and perhaps all the cultures of the Northwest Coast, would seem to represent a blending of elements of both tribes and chiefdoms (Codere 1950, 1957; Drucker and Heizer 1967).

THE STATE

For Elman Service (1971: 163), the distinguishing quality of the state, that which separates it from the chiefdom, “is the presence of that special form of control, the consistent threat of force by a body of persons legitimately constituted to use it.” Morton Fried (1967), on the other hand, emphasizes stratification: the state has special institutions, both formal and informal, to maintain a hierarchy with differential access to resources. This stratification goes beyond the individual and lineage ranking found in less complex societies; it involves the establishment of true classes. For Ronald Cohen (1978a, 1978b), the key diagnostic feature of the state is its permanence. Unlike lower order forms of political organization, the state does not regularly fission (i.e., break up into a number of smaller groups) as part of its normal process of political activity. States are generally large, complex societies, encompassing a variety of classes, associations, and occupational groups. Occupational specialization, including a full-time political bureaucracy,

unites the entire group in a web of interrelated dependencies. Because of the vast range of individual and class interests within a state, pressures and conflicts unknown in less complex societies necessitate some sort of rule of impersonal law, backed by physical sanctions, for the ongoing maintenance of the system.

The Precolonial Zulu

The Nguni family of Bantu-speaking peoples included about 100,000 pastoralists and shifting cultivators living in about 80,000 square miles of southeastern Africa. The basic residence unit was the patrilineally extended family. The largest permanent political unit was the clan, although several clans might temporarily form a tribe. Actually, these were classic chiefdoms, as described above. During the early years of the nineteenth century, most of these independent chiefdoms were united through conquest into the powerful and highly militaristic Zulu state. To a great extent, this relatively undeveloped state owed its continuing unity to the threat of the Boers and British who were pushing at the edges of its territory (the British conquered the Zulu in 1887). Regiments of conscripted soldiers, belonging to the king alone, were stationed in barracks concentrated in the capital. The king not only had the power to command military and labor service, but also collected “gifts” from his subjects, which made him the wealthiest man in the kingdom. In turn, he was expected to be generous in providing food and other goods for his people. He had a council of advisors whose recommendations, ideally, were followed. He was also the ultimate appeals court for cases referred from the lower chiefs’ courts, and he reserved to himself the right of passing death sentences (although the chiefs did not always respect this reservation). Individuals and clans were stratified according to their genealogical closeness to the king. Thus, although inchoate and short lived, the Zulu state displayed many of the attributes of more complex states: it united a large number of disparate groups under a central authority; it claimed, at least in theory, a monopoly on the use of force; its power was allocated through a complex bureaucracy; and it maintained government by objective law. However, much of the old chiefdom stage remained—so much so that the people themselves seemed to think of the state as a glorified chiefdom. The state was essentially a collection of clans that were still relatively independent. Loyalties were inevitably divided between chief and king, with the people often siding with the local group. Chiefs retained day-to-day rules, including the right to use force to put down rebellions as long as the king was informed. The idea persisted that a bad king could be overthrown, just as could a bad chief, as long as the individual and not the system was changed;

in fact, kingly succession was largely a matter of assassination or rebellion. Also, although there was definite social stratification, it was much the same as that of the Hawaiians (individuals and clans ranked according to their genealogical closeness to the king). In addition, occupational specialization was not much more developed than in the prestate period. In short, although definitely a state with regard to unification of a number of formerly autonomous groups under centralized government, the precolonial Zulu encompassed many of the aspects of the chiefdoms upon which it was based (Gluckman 1940; Service 1975).

The Inca

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, a powerful chiefdom in the Cuzco Valley of Peru began the military expansion that would create the largest of the pre-Columbian New World states. At its climax, the Inca empire extended 2,700 miles from Central Chile to the present-day border of Ecuador and Colombia, an area that was united without the use of animal transportation (although llamas and alpacas were used as cargo carriers). Contemporary characterizations of the Inca as a communist, socialist, or welfare state do little justice to this unique adaptation to the ecological, social, and historical conditions of the Andes. The Inca empire was integrated as much by a system of economic redistributions as it was by military force or political centralization. Food production was greatly expanded, not through technological innovation, but through the increasingly efficient organization of labor—for agricultural terracing, for example, or in the construction of extensive irrigation systems—and through transferring entire communities to formerly underutilized areas. Throughout the empire, land was divided into thirds to provide for the common people, the state religion, and the secular bureaucracy. After 1475, there was increasing state ownership, especially of lands newly developed for cultivation or pasture. Three bureaucracies were supported by this economy. At the top was the central bureaucracy, comprised of ethnic Inca nobles and others who had attained the status of Inca through their contribution to the state. This Cuzco-based bureaucracy consisted of a Royal Court (made up of 11 minor lineages, each with its own palace); a royal advisory council; and more or less specialized agencies to administer the judiciary, the military, education, transportation, and communications. A parallel, and to some degree separate, religious bureaucracy administered a state religion that was fairly open in the sense that it was quite capable of incorporating the gods, idols, and rituals of the conquered tribes. As much as one-third of the Inca's entire gross national product was devoted to religious ceremony. Finally, a provincial bureaucracy encompassed

about 80 regional groups through a hierarchy of local chiefs called curacas. The existence of such sophisticated bureaucratic structures might give the impression that the Inca state had completely overridden and replaced earlier forms of social organization; yet over millennia, and through the risings and fallings of civilizations, the basic unit of Andean social structure remained the ayllu, a lineage-based community in which land was held in common and redistributed according to need. The ayllu was highly self-sufficient, unified by common territory and by complex interrelationships of social and economic reciprocity. Each ayllu had its own leader, who lacked coercive authority. The ayllu cared for its own infirm and aged and achieved public building and maintenance goals through cooperative labor. Many ayllus were united into larger tribes and confederacies for trade and defense. Conquest by the Inca left this fundamental social structure intact, and many state governmental forms and practices were based on those of the ayllu. For example, the system of conscripted labor by which the Inca built their phenomenal roads (one road was almost two-thousand miles long), public buildings, and agricultural terraces was a direct extension of traditional ayllu collective labor patterns. Even at the highest levels of government, the ayllu form was the model: each new Inca emperor began a new royal ayllu consisting of all his male descendants. According to John Murra (1958), the widespread belief that the Inca polity was divided into groups based on a decimal system is but a literal reading of a census taker's shorthand (records were kept on knotted ropes); the actual division of the empire was the traditional one of ayllu, tribe, and confederacy. Thus, despite its complexity, the Inca state does not represent a quantum leap in social organization, except in sheer magnitude; rather, it was a drawing together of a number of intact traditional units (Mason 1957; Murra 1958; Shaedel 1978)

CHAPTER THREE

3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE

About 5,500 years ago, on the fertile floodplains of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in what is today Iraq, there developed a type of society unique to its time. After millennia in which humans have gradually turned from migratory foraging toward seasonal settlements based on a few domesticated plants and animals, and then toward year-round farming villages, there came into being the world's first true cities, and with them a novel form of political organization. Previously, society had been structured according to kinship networks; now there appeared a permanent administrative bureaucracy that demanded loyalties transcending lineage and clan. Local chiefs relinquished much of their authority to a ruling class who had the power to gather the agricultural surpluses and call forth the labor necessary to create large-scale irrigation projects and monumental architecture. Fortified cities, such as Uruk and Ur, boasted populations of upward of 40,000 "citizens." A full-time caste of priests presided over a complex temple religion. Craft specialists manufactured the obsidian knives and gold and silver figurines that would tie vast areas together through webs of trade. The state had been born. Today, when national populations are counted in the hundreds of millions and power is so concentrated that the word of a president can send huge armies scurrying to any part of the globe, it may be difficult to realize the significance of the 13 or so small city-states collectively known as Sumeria. Just as it is legitimate to speak of an agriculture revolution or an industrial revolution to suggest quantum changes in human social complexity, so too can one speak of a state revolution. Various authorities might argue the defining characteristics of the early state, but none would demean its importance; for it was a new kind of society—a seed bearing the genetic code for the giant nation-states of the modern world. The Mesopotamian state developed through a long series of adjustments to a particular environment and a specific set of social problems. In retrospect, however, the process seems almost inevitable, for similar adaptations are found leading to similar sociopolitical structures in Egypt, the Indus River Valley of India and the

Yellow River Valley of northern China, Mesoamerica, and Peru. These “primary” states are illustrated in Figure 3.1. Although these six states appeared hundreds or even thousands of years apart (see Figure 3.2), and there was minimal commerce between a few of them (such as India and Mesopotamia), each seems to have originated independently of the others. This poses a problem: if the state evolved autonomously not once but six times, can fundamental processes be discovered that were common to all? Although far removed from the state, the rudiments of human social evolution can be found in human’s closest animal relatives. Among higher primates characterized by marked sexual dimorphism (differences in size and musculature between sexes)—such as baboons and gorillas, is found strong male dominance, specialization for defense, and various patterns of ongoing family organization. Some primate species reveal extremely complex elaborations of social structure. *Cynocephalus* baboons, for example, live in stable groups of 40 to 80 individuals, and these bands exhibit clear hierarchies of status and considerable specialization of function among both males and females. *Hamadryas* baboons forage in small one-male groups, but join together in troops of several hundred for sleeping. Some primates pass on significant learned skills from generation to generation and reveal remarkable cooperation in rearing the young, collective defense, grooming, and sexual behavior. However, only the genus *Homo* has extended such basic primate adaptations by cultural means. The most significant of these are symbolism, through which humans communicate and embellish both individual and group ideas, and sharing (reciprocity), which underlies the division of labor, creates the potential for increasingly elaborate social organization, and ties kinship groups together. More than 99 percent of human’s two- to three- million-year sojourn on Earth has been spent in small bands—flexible, egalitarian, nomadic groups comprised of several extended families. Because contemporary hunting-gathering peoples occupy only the most marginal environments, care should be taken with regard to generalizing their social organization to remote ancestors who lived in more hospitable places and climes. Yet archeological evidence from Paleolithic times suggests little elaboration on the basic band form. One reason that this structure may have persisted for so long is that it was an evolutionary dead end. The hunting-foraging adaptation requires an almost perfect ecological balance, in which populations must be maintained below the food supply; thus, there would have been little selective pressure for change. What requires explanation is not why such an excellent adaptation should have lasted so long, but rather why a few groups of people—very few, at first—abandoned it for more complex forms of subsistence and society. Radically new types of social structure appeared only with the

sedentary lifestyles and greater population densities brought about by the domestication of plants and animals. It should not be supposed, however, that this revolution was sudden, or that it immediately led to the formation of the state. Agriculture and animal husbandry apparently developed independently in a number of areas throughout the world, but only a few of these went on to evolve states. In the Tehuaca'n Valley of Mexico, the period of development from hunting-gathering bands to agriculturally based states was more than 7,000 years (Flannery 1968). In other areas of primary-state development, too, centralization of government was long preceded by sedentary agriculture, permanent villages, and even extensive irrigation works. American and Dutch anthropologists have tackled the problem of the origin of the state with enthusiasm (the British and French tend to ignore evolutionary questions). Until recently, such theorists carefully distinguished the six primary states from secondary states (those that developed out of or through contact with already existing states). Because virtually all theories focused on the former, evidence was exclusively archeological. Today, some researchers have abandoned the primarysecondary distinction for a typology that allows for the inclusion of recent states, such as the Ankole of Uganda, as long as they remained pristine. We will examine some of this important research later, but first we must look at the classical theories of state origins.

INTERNAL CONFLICT THEORIES

The doctrine that the state evolved through class struggle is implicit in many of the writings of Karl Marx. However, these ideas were not fully worked out until Frederick Engels' major work, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* ([1891] 1972), which was published after his mentor's death. According to Engels, who borrowed heavily from American evolutionary anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan, the earliest form of social organization was communistic: resources were shared equally by all and there was no strong concept of personal possession. Technological innovation gives rise to surplus, which allows for a class of non-producers to develop. Private ownership is simply a concomitant of commodity production. Once established, private property stimulates an inexorable chain of cause and effect that leads to an entrepreneurial class—owners of the means of production and buyers and sellers of human labor. This, in turn, results in differential access to resources, and thus to vast discrepancies in individual wealth. In order to protect its interests against the masses of active producers, who understandably want to share in their own production, the elite must erect a structure of permanent centralized force to protect its class interests. Given its time, this analysis is

sophisticated and subtle. In it is found the perception that the primary means of economic exchange in band and tribal society is reciprocity, and that more complex systems involve concentrations of wealth and redistribution through a central agency, be it chief, king, or bureaucracy. Engels artfully applies Marxian materialism to long-term social evolution; the basic causes of change are held to be technological and economic, not ideational. There is also a clear recognition that social stratification is one of the defining qualities of the state. Unfortunately, as Elman Service (1975: 283) has observed, “there is absolutely no evidence in the early archaic civilizations themselves, nor in archeologically- or historically-known chiefdoms and primitive states, of any important private dealings—e.g., evidence of capitalism.” Indeed, the very concepts of communism and capitalism seem absurd when projected onto band and chiefdom societies, so different from modern industrial states. Morton Fried (1967), who bases his evolutionary typology of political systems on the degree of individual access to resources and positions of prestige, offers a variation on the class-conflict model. Once true stratification exists, Fried notes, the state is already implicit because the maintenance of a class system requires that power be concentrated in the hands of an elite. By its very nature, this creates conflict within the society. Differential access to resources and the exploitation of human labor create pressures that are quite unknown in less complex societies. Conflict arising out of social stratification should not be thought of as the cause of state formation; rather, such conflict is merely a prior condition for the development of the state. Incipient social stratification is so unstable that a society that finds itself at such a stage must either disintegrate to a lower level of organization or continue its process of centralizing political power. In other words, once classes begin to separate themselves from hierarchies based on individual or kinship status, power must be fairly rapidly assumed by the privileged elite if the true state is to come into existence.

EXTERNAL CONFLICT THEORIES

In the Biblical version of social evolution, the development of cities is a direct result of Cain’s primordial murder of his brother Abel. This idea, that states are born in blood and war, was given scientific respectability with the emergence of Social Darwinism in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Herbert Spencer, chief spokesman for the more violent interpretations of evolutionary theory, applied the idea of survival of the fittest mainly to individuals, but it took little imagination to extend this concept to societies. The stronger, more militaristic organizations would inevitably prevail over weaker groups, uniting them under a powerful centralized

government with a monopoly on the use of force. Militarism alone, even without warfare, would be sufficient; merely the existence of an external threat that required a large standing army could push a loosely structured society in the direction of strong centralized leadership. Implicit or explicit in such theories, of which Spencer's was one of many, is the idea that state government is modeled on military organization in terms of its hierarchical structure and centralized control of physical force. A nineteenth-century tendency to oversimplify and overgeneralize is evident in these theories, which are based on a gross misunderstanding of physical evolution. Darwin's rather prosaic idea that the mechanism of evolution is differential reproduction (parents with the most surviving offspring pass on more traits) was transliterated into the law of tooth and fang, with imagery of big tigers devouring little tigers with much sound and fury. When applied to society, such a theory could—and did—provide the philosophical justification (“Law of Nature, you know!”) for colonialism, imperialism, monopoly capitalism, and every other form of exploitation. As we shall see, cross-cultural research does support the hypothesis that war and conquest are important factors in the development of some states, but there are two important objections to the theory that war is the primary cause: (1) a society can marshal forces only according to available levels of population and organization and, thus, warfare might be better viewed as a function rather than a cause of a given level of social integration; and (2) warfare among tribes and chiefdoms is more likely to prevent state formation than to cause it, because groups will simply disperse when threatened by a power greater than themselves (Price 1979; Service 1971). This latter point is a salient consideration in Robert Carneiro's (1967, 1970, 1978) theory of environmental circumscription. Because warfare is virtually universal and usually has the effect of dispersing people rather than uniting them, conflict could only lead to centralization in particular situations. After examining primary-state development in both the Old and New Worlds, Carneiro notes that a common denominator is that they are all areas of circumscribed agricultural land; that is, they are bounded by mountains, sea, or desert. When there is no such circumscription, population pressures on the environment can be expanded outward, and losers in a war can resettle in a new area. This is not possible in cases in which the only arable land is surrounded by unproductive land. Population pressure must then be resolved by unification and by increases in productive capacity (both characteristics of the state), and losers in a war—lacking means of escape—must submit to their conquerors. Amazonian Indians waged frequent wars for revenge, the taking of women, personal prestige, and the like; but these wars never resulted in widespread conquest by a central power because new areas of forest could always be

found in which to start a new village. However, the riverine valleys of coastal Peru—surrounded by sea, desert, and mountains—offer no such options. As the small, dispersed villages of the Neolithic grew and fissioned, the narrow valleys became increasingly crowded. Intensification of agriculture, through terracing, for example, would only solve the problem temporarily. Revenge warfare would turn to warfare over land, with one group trying to increase its productive capacity at the expense of others. However, for the weaker in these conflicts, there would be no place to escape that could provide even minimal subsistence; submission to a dominant force was the only viable survival strategy. In this way, a number of independent chiefdoms would be brought under a single hierarchical military government. Circumscription need not be strictly physical; it can also be social. The Yanomamo of the Venezuelan jungle are not physically circumscribed, but village fission and expansion into virgin territory is easier for those at the periphery of the tribal group than for those near the center. According to Carniero's theory, we would expect that central villages, surrounded by other warring villages, would tend to be larger and have more powerful headmen than do peripheral villages, and this is indeed the case. Although the Yanomamo are far from the state level of cultural integration, the socially circumscribed villages do exhibit greater tendencies toward centralization. Carniero subsumes these processes under the principle of competitive exclusion, derived from evolutionary biology. This principle states that two species occupying and exploiting the same portion of the habitat cannot coexist indefinitely; one must ultimately eliminate the other. In applying this idea to societies, Carniero observes that throughout history, chiefdoms have been united into states and states have gone to war to create larger states, with competition and selection increasingly moving toward larger and larger units. In plotting the decreasing number of autonomous political units in the world from 1000 B.C., Carniero predicts the political unification of the entire planet by about the year 2300. (However, the breakup of the Soviet empire and the tendency for the world community to intervene to halt interstate wars suggests that there may be countercurrents working against sheer hugeness.)

HYDRAULIC CIVILIZATION

From about 23000 B.C. until 2000 A.D., world population has grown from an estimated 3.5 million to over 6 billion and from a density of 0.1 persons per square mile to 124 per square mile (Campbell 1979: 462–63). The correlation between this increase in population and the rise of the state has been noted by virtually all evolutionary cultural anthropologists. Robert Carniero

(1967) plotted the relation between population density and social complexity in 46 societies and found a significant statistical correspondence between the two variables. Although the correspondence held, at least loosely, for arithmetic density (i.e., the average number of people per square mile over an entire territory), a much stronger relationship is found when economic density alone is considered. Economic density is the relation between population and sources of production. For example, in Egypt, the vast majority of people are concentrated in a narrow strip of arable land on either side of the Nile. According to the early nineteenth-century economist Thomas Malthus, population is negatively checked by disease, famine, and war as it threatens to outgrow the food supply. However, if this were the only principle operating, population growth would have stabilized at a much lower level than today's. Certainly, one possible response to population pressure on food supply is exactly the opposite of the Malthusian checks; the food supply itself may be increased through some sort of intensification of production, often involving the development of a new technology or the refinement of an existing one. Irrigation, terracing, fertilization, using animal labor, cultivating more types of crops, and exploiting previously unused lands can significantly increase the carrying capacity of a given territory. The resulting increases in population density require more complex forms of social and political organization. This correspondence between population and social evolution was most extensively elaborated by Ester Boserup (1965). In a slight variation on the theory, Michael Harner (1970) argues that population pressure is not only directly responsible for some form of intensification of food production, but also leads to unequal access to resources and subsequently to increasing social stratification. The importance of irrigation to state formation was recognized as early as the writings of Marx and Engels, who noted that a major difference between small-scale agricultural communities and state societies was that the latter required the support of extensive irrigation systems. More recently, Julian Steward (1955) has emphasized irrigation as the fundamental mechanism of state development, because water control permitted sufficient agricultural intensification to create large population densities, and the construction of massive hydraulic systems required new levels of social organization, power, and coordination of labor. It was Karl Wittfogel (1957) who elaborated the hydraulic theory in such detail that his name is now associated with it. Neolithic farmers in the areas of primary-state development, such as Egypt or the riverine valleys of Peru, were dependent on flood irrigation; their fields were watered once a year and new soil was deposited by the annual flood. Flood irrigation is quite variable, however, and even in the best of times it provides only one crop per year. Slowly, farmers began to

exercise control of the floods with dikes and reservoirs, preserving and taming the precious water that could then be released as needed through a network of canals. Early irrigation systems were small and primitive, involving only the labor of a few neighboring farms, but as the productive capacity of the land increased and the human population burgeoned, irrigation works grew in size and complexity. A group of specialists emerged to plan and coordinate the construction of these systems, and later to control the flow of water. This group, whose hands now quite literally held the very life of the community, developed into an administrative elite that governed despotic, centralized states. This model has fared surprisingly well. Irrigation seems to have been important in all of the primary states. The lowland Maya of the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico were believed to be an exception until recent aerial photographs revealed that this civilization, too, was reliant on elaborate irrigation systems. However, the hydraulic theory should not be interpreted in too rigid a cause-and-effect manner: in some areas, complex irrigation systems long preceded state development, whereas in others (such as Mesopotamia) large-scale water control systems only developed well after state development. Furthermore, in the American southwest and other areas, large hydraulic systems existed for centuries without political centralization. Finally, the theory has only the most tenuous application to secondary states, many of which possessed the most rudimentary irrigation. These objections may be beside the point. Marvin Harris (1977) has noted that Wittfogel's theory is not really about the origin of the state per se, but rather about the development of certain types of managerial systems. To postulate centralization of despotic power around the management of water supplies is not to deny the importance of population density, trade, warfare, environmental circumscription, and other factors that have had key roles in the increasing integration of society. Harris, in *Cannibals and Kings* (1977), incorporates population pressure, hydraulics, and environmental circumscription into a complex argument in which social organization and ideology are viewed as the results of a society's technological adaptation to its physical environment. Harris begins by noting the main objection to population pressure theories; namely, that populations usually tend to stabilize comfortably below the carrying capacity of the land. Indeed, all societies have cultural means of supplementing Malthusian checks on population. Hunting gathering groups maintained relative population equilibrium for tens of thousands of years, and the few such societies that survive today depend on balancing population to food supply. In all preindustrial societies, such practices as female infanticide, two- or three-year long taboos on sexual intercourse with a woman after she has borne a child and prolonged nursing (which delays

ovulation) serve to keep population in balance with food production. It is only in modern times that population has been allowed to grow unchecked. If population equilibrium was the norm in most pre modern societies, then why would population increase to the point where it would force more complex forms of social organization? Harris's explanation to this question is that during the Pleistocene Era, which lasted until about 10,000 to 15,000 years ago, hunting bands had come to rely on an abundance of large game, and populations had stabilized at levels made possible by such resources. At the end of the Pleistocene Era hundreds of big game species became extinct, for reasons still not entirely understood, with the result that people had to rely increasingly on alternative sources of food. Wild plants susceptible to domestication had always been available but had been rejected for cost-benefit reasons: without population pressure, hunting and foraging was more expedient for expending a minimum of calories. Now, plant domestication raised the carrying capacity of the land, allowing populations to increase. Population would tend ultimately to stabilize, but over time—perhaps hundreds of years—a gradual and inevitable decrease in productivity occurs as agricultural land loses nutrients and game is overhunted to supply animal protein. In other words, pressure is created not only by population growth, which might be quite slow, but also by a natural decline in the productivity of the land. In tribal societies, populations are often controlled through a “male supremacist complex” that develops out of constant warfare. A premium on masculine fierceness diminishes the value of women, so that female infanticide—certainly one of the most effective means of population control—becomes virtually normative (some societies have institutionalized the killing of the firstborn, if it is a female). Agriculturalists have another option: instead of reducing population, they can increase their workload or add a new technology to augment production. This leads to agricultural surpluses, which are collected and redistributed by “big men” who use their role to gain and maintain status and power. These redistributive chiefs—often war chiefs as well—take on the role of a centralized coercive force. At this point, Harris brings in both Carniero's circumscription theory and Wittfogel's hydraulic theory to show the conditions under which centralization will continue until the state is formed. To Harris the initial kick for this whole process is population; but, in a reverse on the Boserup theory, he sees a relatively stable population adapting to a diminution of food supplies. A major element of the theory—one not too auspicious for the future of civilization—is that any form of productivity will gradually lead to depletions of primary resources, with the result that all societies must sooner or later face the alternative of collapsing or moving to a new level of intensification. Once the domestication of

plants and animals becomes the basis for subsistence, there can be no long-term stabilization. Harris's argument, although appealing, is open to challenge. State development occurred so long after the end of the Pleistocene Era—thousands of years—that the relationship is tenuous at best. Population pressure on resources cannot, in every area that became politically centralized, be related to declines in productivity. Also, Boserup may be more correct in placing her emphasis on population growth rather than resource depletion. Even relatively minor changes in nutrition can radically alter the size of a population. Food supplies are quite elastic and can easily be affected either by a redefinition of usable food resources or by slight changes in technology. As Harris and others have pointed out, population growth may indeed need explaining, but not very much explaining.

Chapter Five

5. THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY: ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

As described by Abner Cohen in his classic *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa* (1969a), the Hausa of Nigeria were renowned traders, who had developed a widespread reputation as shrewd businessmen, exploiters, troublemakers, and geniuses at their profession. There was a certain truth in at least the latter accusation, although their genius resided more in their trading network than in individual brilliance. The Hausa were neither pastoralists nor farmers, and therefore had to make up in efficiency for what they lacked in control over the production of the cattle and kola nuts they traded. The forest zone people of the south could not raise their own meat because the tsetse fly killed off cattle within two weeks. The savanna people of the north put a high value on the kola nut but could not grow this food themselves. Trading between these two ecological zones was a tricky business; because cattle died so quickly in the forest and the kola nut was highly perishable, one could not just transfer these goods from one area to another and wait around for the best price. Information on supply and demand had to be obtained before goods were moved. Nor could one depend on either traders or customers having money on hand when the actual transfer was made. The Hausa trading network solved both these technical problems: information on market conditions moved rapidly through the system, and the Hausa had established a virtual monopoly on credit and trust in these business transactions. There was nothing “primitive” or small in such trading: millions of dollars worth of goods were involved, and the wealth and income of the vast majority of the Hausa were directly or indirectly derived from the dual trading of kola nuts and cattle. However, despite their sophisticated knowledge of banking, insurance, and legal documents, the Hausa quite rationally preferred traditional arrangements based on partnerships of trust and reciprocity. Cohen’s study focused on the “retribalization” of the Hausa quarter of Sabo in the city of Ibadan. Only a few decades earlier, Sabo had been little more than a Hausa sector of a largely Yoruba village; but as Ibadan grew into a major city, Hausa influence was reduced. With independence after World War II, the central government of the newly liberated nation simultaneously emphasized party politics and condemned tribalism in an attempt to unify the country. These pressures combined to weaken the effectiveness of the traditional Hausa chiefs, and both outmarriage and the revolt of the young against tribal ways threatened to detribalize the Hausa altogether. The Hausa were neither particularly self-conscious nor defensive about their tribal heritage, but they became increasingly aware that their trading network, and therefore their livelihood, depended on their ethnic cohesiveness. The Hausa answer to this political and economic challenge was to reemphasize the tribal unit. The major tool in this process was the development of a Moslem religious brotherhood called Tijaniya. The majority of Hausa had previously, like the Yoruba, been rather casual about their religion. The Tijaniya practiced a highly puritanical mode of religion, which involved an intense form of community ritual that clearly set them off from the morally inferior non-Hausa. In addition, the Tijaniya established a religious hierarchy that provided strong ritual leaders to fill the power vacuum left by the declining authority of the traditional chiefs. Through retribalization, Hausa ethnicity was politicized and used as a weapon in the struggle to maintain their monopoly on trade. The forces of modernization thus drove the Hausa to a degree of

exclusiveness more radical than at any time in the past. Abner Cohen's analysis has become a classic of instrumentalism, a cost-benefit theory that holds that the primary motivating force of ethnic identity is the establishment and maintenance of privileged economic and political niches. At the time this book was written, it was widely believed that the processes of modernization would lead to cultural homogenization. Cohen was one of the first to thoroughly document what has now become a truism, namely that modernization regularly leads away from assimilation. It turns out that "retribalization," which would today be termed ethnogenesis or the solidifying of ethnic identity, is a very common process.

5.1 IDENTITY AND POWER

Although identity politics undoubtedly has a long history, its importance has grown over the last few decades as ethnicity and nationalism have emerged as forms of resistance against the forces of globalization and, at the same time, as a means of taking advantage of those forces. On the one hand, sodalities of identity are created to defend themselves against the threat of marginalization within an unequal global hegemony; on the other hand, cheap travel and new media technologies have been employed to unify distant people and to lay claim to universalized values such as human rights and indigenous sovereignty. These identities take many specific forms:

- Amazonian Indians reinforce Brazilian stereotypes of narrow tribal identity by attending televised meetings in traditional garb, while at the same time forming modern pan-Amazonian organizations that emphasize a broad Indian unity. Politically sophisticated Indian leaders regularly attend international conferences in Europe and routinely tape-record or videotape meetings with government officials so that every promise is documented. (Ramos 1998)
- As an independent country, Tibet possessed no unified ethnic or national identity. In 1959, after 10 years of brutal Chinese communist occupation, 80,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama into exile. Today, over 120,000 expatriate Tibetans, living in numerous diaspora communities throughout the world, have formed a self-consciously unified democratic nation in exile and have become a respected voice for human rights in the United Nations and other global institutions. (Mountcastle 1997)
- Thousands of years of African migration, especially the forced transport of slaves to the Americas, the Middle East, and South Asia, left the descendants spread throughout the world with little sense of their African roots. Over the last decades, an increasing intellectual and popular African consciousness has emerged, along with the concept of a black Atlantic composed of multiple cultures united by a common history of subjection, suffering, resistance, and cultural innovation. (Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990)
- When Indonesia became independent, it consisted of a multitude of different tribal groups speaking different languages. However, Islamic religion, the existence of Malay as a lingua franca, and a common history of struggle against Dutch colonialism served to unite the people in a rough, and largely situational, Indonesian nationalism. (Watson 1996: 110)

Such variety suggests some of the difficulties in finding general terms and theories that are universally, or even widely, applicable to political identity groups. Through the 1960s, identity was not a focus of interest of political anthropologists. According to the theoretical perspectives of the time, politics took place within stable bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Individuals assumed their identities from membership in such groups: one was Nuer, Quechua, Dobu, or Norwegian. Each group possessed a particular social organization and sense of values, including notions of political legitimacy, which have been passed on from generation to generation. Thus, in many ways, identity was coterminous with “culture.” However, today the very concept of culture—which has always been subject to numerous and contested definitions—is rapidly losing its authority to designate a bounded, politically cohesive group. From the point of critical theory in anthropology, culture was always more a heuristic ascription of the anthropological imagination than anything that might objectively inhere within some collective. The reification of culture as something objective and measurable is giving way to more fluid conceptions of culture as shared meanings that partially bridge the fragmentation and heterogeneity that has resulted from globalization. Neither culture nor individual self-identity may, any longer, be presupposed to be cohesive, but can be compartmentalized, situational, and deterritorialized (Appadurai 1991). Culture, political and otherwise, has been replaced as the primary foci of anthropological studies of power by two overlapping but distinct concepts: ethnicity and nationalism. Another increasingly common anthropological concept of identity is compressed in the term “hybrid.” In the very real sense that no society has been entirely immobile or historically isolated, all cultures and identities are hybrids, intermixtures of multiple confrontations between unequal societies in complex interaction with the demands and constraints of particular ecosystems. Unfortunately, the biological hybridity of plant geneticists provides, at best, an imperfect metaphor for human identity; in the biological sphere, hybridity usually denotes only two parents, often with sterile offspring, whereas the human variation is much more complex. However, hybridity is the term of the day and has assumed a generally agreed-on meaning that encompasses the changeable, multisourced, and constructed nature of identity today. The book that popularized the term, Néstor García Canclini’s *Cultural Hybridity* (1995) focuses on only two of its many aspects: traditionalism and modernism. Because this dichotomy has been associated with long-repudiated modernization theory (see chapter 11), it would seem an odd revival; however, García Canclini finds it useful in the analysis of Mexico, where modern and traditional clash and blend in unexpected configurations in everything from politics to the arts. In the past, the traditional was the province of the anthropologist, whereas sociologists studied the modern; hybridity demands that such disciplinary distinctions be put aside. In one sense, cultural traditionalism represents embeddedness within relatively tight structures of family, kin, and community, such as the religious cargo systems found throughout Central America, whereas modernity represents individualism and social fragmentation. Jonathan Friedman (1994: 91–92) also sees modernism “as a continuous process of accumulation of self, in the form of wealth, knowledge, experience.” There is no longer any clear linear trajectory that runs from tradition to modern; the movement can go both ways. Neotraditionalism can be a reaction against the atomization and anomie that modernism implies. Hybridity is more commonly employed in the wider sense of a syncretism or compartmentalization of different

culture traits. Often the emphasis may be on language, such as Creole, or on relative power, such as Chicanos within the dominant Anglo society of the United States, rather than on a tradition/modern tension. In many cases, hybridity is not simply the result of acculturation or assimilation but may be actively sought, as when African Americans assume Islamic identities based on North African models. The range of possibilities for such hybrid intermixtures is virtually infinite. Despite the historically hybrid nature of ethnic and nationalist groups, self-identity is often, if not usually, legitimized by some form of primordialism. This is the idea that identity is based on race or on an essential culture or religion that reaches deep into the far recesses of history or even prehistory. Identity is thus replete with affective meaning, bound up in blood, martyrdom, soil, and perhaps an emotionalized sense of language. One is born into the identity, although it may have been forgotten or repressed and needs to be rediscovered by the new generation, as exemplified, at opposite poles, by the Nazi claims to an Aryan heritage and by the negritude ideology of Leopold Senghor. In the former Soviet Union, a state-sponsored primordialist “ethnos theory” attempted to integrate the numerous non-Russian people into the nation-state through a convoluted Marxist evolutionism (Banks 1996). Almost all anthropologists today reject primordialist notions, viewing group identity in constructivist terms. From this point of view, ethnicity and nationalism are created situationally and constantly changing. There are multiple ways in which this occurs. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) and Eric Wolf (1982) have shown, all cultures have been substantially changed since the sixteenth century by the spread of colonialism and capitalism. The continued survival of indigenous tribal peoples and peasantries have required constant adaptation. Some of these adaptations may be forced, as when, under colonial domination, subsistence agriculturalists or pastoralists were brought into a tributary mode of production where they were required to transfer much of their labor to export goods for the colonial or imperialist conquerors. Identity may be constructed or reinforced when a group emphasizes in-group unity in order to maintain control of an economic niche. Groups artificially created by foreign powers may assume the classification of the oppressor in order to gain political power; as, for example, in postcolonial times, when the American Indian Movement in the United States assumed a pan-Indian identity that had no roots in indigenous culture. Constructivism, however, can be easily overstated. Speaking specifically of ethnicity, Milton Esman (1994: 14) observes that such identity, is “seldom...invented or constructed from whole cloth: a cultural and experiential core must validate identity and make solidarity credible to potential constituents.” Political Adjustment in a Reservation Context: The Mapuche

For perhaps the majority of indigenous peoples, the postcolonial era resulted less in integration than in increased marginality. This was especially true in the United States, Canada, Chile, and to some extent Brazil, which handled their “Indian problems” through the establishment of reservations. In a few cases, such as some Pueblo tribes in the American Southwest, reservations provided the means for maintaining crucial elements of a traditional culture up to the present day. In most cases, however, cultural continuity has been rendered impossible by the destruction of subsistence patterns, resettlement on land too barren to be desired by whites, crude attempts at forced assimilation such as sending children to off-reservation schools for long periods, and state administrative control of the reservation system. The parameters of the politics of marginality

can be very narrow, and reservation populations must constantly adjust to the whims of the dominant power. However, such change may be imaginatively adapted to the needs of the people and to traditional versions of political legitimacy. L. C. Faron's (1967) ethnohistoric account of the Mapuche of Chile reveals tribal politics as a constant process of change in response to the varying policies of the Chilean government.

Traditionally, the Mapuche lacked any centralized political authority. The functioning social unit was the kin group, under the limited leadership of an elder called the lonko. During more than 300 years of resistance to European invaders, a powerful military organization with strong war chiefs developed. By the mid-1800s, after a period of relatively peaceful defiance, the Mapuche grew increasingly restive as lands maintained through force of arms were eroded by fraudulent legal claims. Taking advantage of Chile's preoccupation with the War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia (1879–1883), the Mapuche staged their last major uprising. They were soundly defeated, most of their lands were confiscated, and they were placed on relatively small reservations. The Chilean government preferred to deal with each reservation through a single chief. This centralization of political authority was alien to the Mapuche, but there was sufficient precedent in the institution of strong military chiefs for a military-like power to be transferred to a peacetime office. Of course, this meant drawing power away from both the lonkos and the lesser military leaders. The federal government reinforced this centralization of reservation power by directly providing the chief with three times as much land as anyone else, at a time when land was a scarce and valuable commodity. Moreover, the chief was given limited legal control of all reservation land, and so many government restrictions were funneled through him that he ended up controlling, directly or indirectly, all of the wealth of the community. Anyone wishing to set up a household within the reservation had to seek permission of the chief. This made it extremely difficult to settle disputes, as of old, by moving to another area. There was no choice but to submit to the chief. In addition, the chiefs were given responsibility for mediating Chilean law for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and for enforcing the customary law of the Mapuche. Such a concept of centralized power depended entirely on the reservation system and on the intrusion of the federal government into native politics. By the 1950s, the reservation chief's kingly position had become an increasing irritation to the very national government that had created it in the first place. An extremely powerful chief was in a position not only to exploit his people, but also to defend them from outside exploitation. In a deliberate attempt to break the power of these chiefs, the government began to bypass them and deal individually with the Mapuche as Chilean citizens. The predictable result was that the power of the chiefs declined almost as rapidly as it had arisen. Some of the chief's powers reverted to the lonkos, whose authority nevertheless continued to be localized and traditional. With increasing interaction between the Mapuche and their wider social environment, however, and with increasing threats against their land, mediation was as necessary as ever. Although the chief continued to represent the reservation, a new mechanism of culture brokerage developed: the political pressure group. The Corporación Araucana formed to fight for maintenance of the reservations and for increased government assistance to the Indians. A smaller opposition group, the Unión Araucana, was conceived by the Capuchin missionaries to promote absorption of the Mapuche into Chilean society. In sum, the Mapuche continuously remade themselves in a reactive and adaptive

process, beginning with authority vested in the elders of local kin groups, followed by the rise of war chiefs, the decline of the power of such chiefs, the emergence of strong reservation chiefs, and finally by the shift of authority into the hands of political action groups.

5.2 ETHNICITY

Ethnicity is a relatively new concept for anthropology. Prior to the 1950s, general classifications were mainly race, tribe, and peasant. Race got a bad name from the deadly genetic nonsense of the Nazis, and the gap between common parlance “race” and anthropological conceptions became so wide that the two seemed to have nothing to do with each other. The term “tribe,” although still commonly used among North American Indians, assumed pejorative connotations of primitivism and colonial subordination, especially in relation to Africa (Zenner 1996: 393). The term “peasant” also has its problems, as more and more people so designated take on multiple jobs, from transnational migratory workers to shopkeepers, in the process losing the attachment to land and much of the folk culture that once defined them (Kearney 1996). The unfortunate result has been that “ethnic” emerged as the all-in-one term for a number of once-separate categories. The term ethnicity, as now employed, is so broad as to be almost meaningless, because no matter how one defines the term, multiple anomalous examples can be found. Early definitions tended to equate ethnicity with culture—thus replacing one highly problematical term with one equally nebulous—but the fit was tenuous at best. As early as 1969, Frederick Barth argued that among the Pathans of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Northern India, a traditional culture was retained relatively intact when an individual moved from one area or country to another, but ethnicity—the way in which the group was both socially and self-classified—changed radically. Also, ethnicity only exists in relationship to other groups; isolated people would certainly have culture, but would not have ethnicity. Often, as is the case with Palestinians, ethnicity designates a subgroup of a broader culture (in this case Arab). Another problem with the term ethnicity is that it does not make the modern/traditional distinction that many anthropologists find crucial; the term would apply equally to the Yanomami in Brazil and English expatriates in Argentina. In reality, different levels of modernity create very different kinds of ethnicity. Among the *dalits* of India, formerly known as the untouchable caste, ethnicity is ascribed and whatever unity is claimed is defensive. In contrast, in the United States, a certain shallow ethnicity is purely voluntary as highly educated third- or fourth-generation Italians celebrate their heritage in parades and by serving Italian cuisine (it should be noted that the first generation of migrants did not identify themselves as Italian, but as Sicilian, Neopolitan, or Calabrian) (Pieterse 1996: 31–42). Thus, ethnicity would seem to lend itself either to endless subcategories or to an I-knows-it-when-I-sees-it specificity. Given the range of possibilities, perhaps Stanley Tambiah’s (1996: 168) definition is as good as any: ethnicity is “a self-conscious and vocalized identity that substantializes and naturalizes one or more attributes—the usual ones being skin color, language, religion, and territory— and attaches them to collectivities as their innate possession and myth-historical legacy.” The crucial components are ideas of inheritance, ancestry and descent, a territory or place of origin, and at least some shared sense of kinship. This definition assumes an emic point of view—that is, the point of view of the people within the group. However, a clear distinction must be kept between the outsiders’ perception of a given

ethnic group and that of those who make claim to it. Ethnicity usually refers to distinctions that are recognized by both the in-group and outsiders, but these by no means always coincide. For Anglos, African Americans or Indians may be considered ethnic groups based on skin color or on simple cultural misunderstanding, whereas those so designated may define themselves entirely differently. Thus, much ascribed ethnicity may be more in the mind of the beholder than in the minds of those so designated. Even if only the perspective of the in-group is assumed, ethnicity depends to a great deal on what might be called feelingtone, that is the individual's emotional sense of belonging to the group, which can range from virtually nil to violently intense. In addition, there is a wide range of emphasis on shared history or on territory. Ethnicities may overlap or be situational; Chinese in Malaysia would be "Asian" in the United States.

For political anthropology, the real issue with ethnicity is its relation to politics and power. Edwin Wilmsen (1996: 3) defines "the essence of ethnic existence" as "the differential access to means of production and rights to shares in production returns." Such a definition would not apply very well to the faddish ethnicity of the thoroughly assimilated American Italian, nor would it accord with the numerous viewpoints that find the essence of ethnicity in symbolic meanings (e.g., Appadurai 1991; Friedman 1994). However, such a perspective is valuable in focusing on the very real power differentials among ethnic groups and the importance of ethnicity in making claims to power. Ethnicity, according to this view, not only exists in a field with other such groups, but is also relational in a power sense; the form and content of a particular ethnicity will be determined by its positions of power relative to other contenders and to the dominant power. From Wilmsen's perspective, because ethnicity arises out of power differentials, ethnic politics are, by definition, the politics of marginality; dominant groups are never themselves ethnic. The dominant group, which need not be in the majority, will consider itself the universal or essential group and thus above the categorization of ethnicity. There is, for example, no English ethnicity in Britain nor any White Tribe in the United States (although the question "Is 'Anglo' an ethnicity from the perspective of a Chicano?" must be asked). If one assumes, as Wilmsen does, that ethnicity is always subordinate to a dominant group, then within the state, ethnicity is marginal by definition. Nevertheless, it is obvious that ethnicity can become an important form of cultural capital; belonging to a certain group bestows advantages that can be utilized in political struggle (Alonso 1994: 382–405). In high minority areas of Southern California, for example, being Chicano or African American can be an important, perhaps even essential, asset in local elections.

Unity and Fragmentation in Israel

Ethnicity and nationalism are often conflated, and can be conjoined in ethnonationalism. However, these two concepts can also be quite distinct, as is illustrated in the case of Israel. As analyzed by Herbert Lewis (1993), Israel started with a relatively high degree of ethnic homogenization, at least in its ideology, and subsequently fractured into multiple ethnicities within an overarching nationalism. Zionist immigrants began to settle in Palestine in the 1880s, and until about 1950 the large majority was Ashkenazi, from eastern and central Europe. They

brought with them Western Enlightenment values of rationality, secular government, democracy, education, and a firm belief in progress. The Jewish Labor Party, which would lead the way to the founding of the state of Israel and remain the dominant political force through the 1960s, was dedicated to such goals, as were multiple other unions, cultural organizations, sports federations, paramilitary groups, and universities. The founding leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, Yitshak Ben-Svi, and Golda Meir, saw themselves not as reproducing some ideal Jewish nation of the past, but rather as repudiating the past. In the 1950s, similar progressive ideas were solidified and articulated throughout much of the world through the modernization theory of development, which held that traditional culture would gradually be absorbed by a forward-looking industrial sector. Ethnicity was not a part of the discourse of the time, but there was a strong belief that as modernization proceeded, tribalisms, nationalisms, peasant folk cultures, and the like would be integrated into a culturally homogenous nation-state. By vote of the United Nations, the state of Israel came into formal existence on May 14, 1948. Of the estimated fifteen million Jews scattered throughout the world in 1939, most lived in Europe. However, these European populations were severely decimated in the Nazi death camps, and many of those who survived were trapped in refugee camps. Many who desired to come to Israel were not from Europe but from North Africa and Asia—countries such as Iran, Yemen, Morocco, and India. The Law of Return that came into effect in 1950 opened Israel's borders to all of these. This was to be an "ingathering of exiles," an invitation to Jews everywhere to join in the founding of the new nation. The underlying vision was that a new, unified people would emerge out of the cauldron of war, destitution, and struggle from which Israel was born. This new people would leave old cultures behind. As expressed by the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, "Within the state the differences between various kinds of Jews will be obliterated in the course of time, the communities and tribes will sooner or later fuse into one national and cultural identity" (Ben-Gurion, as cited in Lewis 1993: 209). It did not happen. Through the centuries of the Diaspora, Jewish people had taken on the cultures of the countries in which they settled. Although they lived in separate communities from their Muslim and Christian neighbors, they could not help but to assume many of the culture traits of those around them. The European and American Jews who had established the goals of Israel found themselves confronted by 50 different languages, and by people who had no knowledge of electricity or plumbing, and who practiced polygyny and child marriage.

North Africans and Asians, who by the 1980s made up more than half of the population, were lumped together in the single category of Oriental Jews, although differences among them were vast. European Orthodox Jews were viewed as an equal problem by the more secular founders of the Jewish state. Toward the goal of cultural assimilation, an official government Absorption Department was established, but failed to accomplish much absorbing. Villages and neighborhoods took on distinctly ethnic dispositions: Yemenite, Iraqi, and Kurd. Many continued to speak their own language at home and in their own communities; although they also learned Hebrew, it was often with a characteristically ethnic pronunciation. Synagogues, traditional dance groups, cultural organizations, and even political parties were formed around such differences. This was not just a matter of cultural variety, but also of class and status. Basically, there emerged two Israels, a dominant Euro-American and a subordinate Afro-Asian. The latter

often justly complained that they were discriminated against in terms of jobs, land, and political influence. The Western Jews argued that their dominance emerged not from prejudice but from a more active entrepreneurialism, goal orientation, technical expertise, and high valuation of education. Periodically, especially during elections, conflict would grow heated. By the 1970s, the total failure of the policy of absorption was blatantly evident. At about the same time, new intellectual currents were sweeping the West; modernization theory's goal of cultural homogeneity was giving way to the acceptance of multicultural heterogeneity. The state simply dropped its absorption policy—without a lot of to-do and not much opposition—and adopted a policy of multiculturalism. From now on, Israel would celebrate difference, not try to do away with it. The government has tended to support its many ethnicities through cultural exhibitions, dance groups, lectures, conferences, and publications. Lewis emphasizes that despite the continuing “two Israels,” the ongoing discrimination, ethnic separation of neighborhoods and villages, and periodic conflict, there are also overarching forces of unity. Above all is the consensus on the oneness of the Jewish people and the legitimacy of the state of Israel. Hebrew is a national language that almost all Jews speak no matter what language they might use at home (Arabic is also an official language, but mainly used by the Arab population). Although ethnic endogamy is common, so is intermarriage; almost all citizens agree, at least when polled, that any Jew should be able to marry any other. Finally, there has emerged a sort of pan-Israeli culture for public places—the job, government, the market—that assumes a degree of conformity to a common set of behaviors. Thus, we find a continuing fragmentation of Jewish ethnicities existing within a strong unifying Israeli nationalism

5.3 NATIONALISM

In the twentieth century, millions of people lost their lives violently either in the support of existing nations or in the attempt to establish new ones, and it appears already that the twenty-first century may follow a similar pattern. When nationalism is involved, dying for The Cause can assume the level of moral imperative, the grandeur of martyrdom. This emotional intensity is one factor that may distinguish nationalism from ethnicity, or turn mere ethnicity into ethnonationalism. Since World War II, every successful revolution, from Cuba to Vietnam, has defined itself in national terms (Anderson 1983: 2). In many cases, however, the uniting factor was not ethnicity but the establishment of a state or the maintenance of a state against a perceived enemy. Nationalism, like ethnicity, is notoriously difficult to define. However, it is possible to delineate two relatively distinct forms, although both share many attributes. In state nationalism the territorially bounded state assumes a loyalty that transcends that of family, kinship, culture group, or ethnicity. The nation-state was conceived in Europe in the eighteenth century; it was closely linked to the rise of industrial capitalism and founded on the ideals of the French Revolution (Tambiah 1996: 124– 27). Such Enlightenment values as secularization of government, citizenship, equality, and jurisdiction over a clearly defined territory were part of the original ideology of nationalism. Although made up of many sectors, the nation-state would encourage the creation of a single dominant language and a supraordinate national culture that would supercede the claims of classes and subcultures. Nationalism today has evolved far from such Enlightenment roots. Many nationalisms are authoritarian and even genocidal against their

enemies. Native India was intensely nationalistic during its opposition to British rule, but today contains neither a common language nor a national culture. Whereas in the past, violent ethnonationalisms were tightly focused on a particular territory and were directed at the nation-state that encompassed that territory, the weapon of terrorism seems to be increasingly employed by deterritorialized nationalisms. The second form, ethnonationalism, is often in conflict with the nation-state. All nationalisms share certain characteristics with ethnicity, such as the very selective and perhaps creative construction of history, some emotive sense of group communion and cohesion, and some overarching sense of unity. However, ethnicity is not nationalism, nor is nationalism ethnicity. What brings the two together is the claims of an ethnic group to its own state or, at the minimum, to sovereignty within a state. In Africa, where imposed colonial boundaries grouped together people with radically different languages and cultures, such ethnic claims may be based on real differences as well as demands for ancient territory. In other cases, the ethnic groups may be linguistically, culturally, and physically identical, defined primarily by religion and selective histories, as is found with the Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia and the Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. It would appear that in many cases in which the actual ethnic differences are the least, the feeling-tone of nationalism is at its most intense. In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson (1983) traces nationalism from its roots in eighteenth-century European “print capitalism.” Prior to this time, there was little sense of national unity beyond a generalized allegiance to the crown. With the emergence of wide-scale printing in the vernacular and of mass literacy, driven by publishers’ search for profits through ever-expanding markets, the common people were for the first time able to identify themselves with others they had never seen and would never meet. These groupings were reinforced by the rapid spread of ideologies that divided people according to their languages, cultures, and legitimizing histories—complete with valiant self-sacrificing heroes—and attached them to specific territories. On a world scale, nationalism seems to go through periods of peaks and valleys. From the late 1700s through the first decades of the following century, American nationalism succeeded in breaking the bonds of European rule. The “official nationalism” that dominated Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century was challenged by multiple reactionary ethnonationalisms. In the first half of the twentieth century, state nationalism was powerfully combined with absolutist ideologies such as communism and fascism. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a peak of new-state nationalisms accompanied the process of decolonization. A common pattern emerged. The achievement of decolonization was followed by a period of fervent nation building, with coalition governments steadfastly focused on establishing national sovereignty, integrating the new country, and creating a national culture. When the initial promises did not materialize, regional and subregional resistances emerged. Over a generation or two, these resistances would take the form of ethnonationalisms, demanding formal recognition through sovereignty, state homelands, or special rights (Tambiah 1996: 127–31). Today, globalization seems to be creating a new spate of intense nationalisms. There are many reasons for this. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union provided massive military aid to dictators who would support one side or the other; the termination of such aid ended the unity established by pure force, leading to pent-up fragmentation. The collapse of the Soviet Union released not only a multitude of independent

nations within its previous borders, but also opened the way for long-simmering ethnic rivalries in the former Eastern European allies. The relinquishment of economic functions once monopolized by the state to global institutions, such as multinational corporations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, helped to reduce the power of the state to maintain conformity. A multitude of grassroots organization, sometimes supported by or aligned with global nongovernmental organizations, emerged to fill in power vacuums at the local level. Modern communications and cheap long-distance travel have made it possible for deterritorialized diasporas to make and maintain contact. The Internet may become the contemporary equivalent of Anderson's "print capitalism" in its ability to unite people in many different countries. For example, the numerous Web sites on the Armenian genocide of 1915, complete with histories, survivor accounts, and horrific photographs, provide a new sense of outraged national consciousness (Kojjian 2002). Arjun Appadurai (1996: 158–77) foresees the emergence of a period of postnationalism as the nation-state becomes obsolete and other forms of allegiance and identity arise to take its place. Dominant state cultures will be increasingly diluted by the influx of transnational communities with the ability to maintain their cultures of separateness and their connections to a real or putative homeland. De facto multiculturalism will overwhelm the artificial unity of the nation-state. Although Appadurai may exaggerate the demise of the state, there can be little doubt that new forms of transnational nationalism are already arising to challenge old notions of the nation as a territorially bounded entity.

From Arab to Palestinian

The circuitous route by which a relatively small group of Arabs came to construct themselves as a Palestinian nation reveals many of the theory-defying complexities of the politics of identity in the twentieth century. The Palestinian experience is almost the opposite of the Israeli example above, in which an original national unity fragmented into a multiplicity of ethnic groups. In the Palestinian case, a unified nation emerged gradually out of a broad regional ethnic group (the Arabs). Emile Sahliyeh (1993) argues that this process passed through three stages, and it was not until the Intifada (popular uprising) of 1987 that a true sense of ethnic nationhood was firmly established. In the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, the muchconquered area of the Eastern Mediterranean was part of the Ottoman Empire. It was occupied mostly by rural Muslim peasants, but in urban areas there were also sizable groups of Arab Christians and Jews. Under the Ottomans, the basis of unity was Islamic, not Arab. During World War I, the British convinced many Arabs to join them in overthrowing the Ottoman Turks, but Palestinians were not supportive; Britain actively backed Zionism—and Palestinians viewed the Ottomans as a bulwark against the settlement of Jews in the region and the establishment of a Zionist state. Thus, until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war, Palestinians tended to align themselves against Arab nationalism. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British endorsed a national homeland in Palestine for Jews, and the League of Nations mandate for British administration in 1922 (which had actually begun two years earlier) signaled the end of the old order. Two distinct trends developed in Palestine, neither of them devoted to the goal of the Palestinian state that the British had promised during the war (and later denied promising). First, the more prominent families of the region, many of whom had business and political

dealings with the British, wanted a degree of sovereignty within the British mandate. This group tended to be conservative, assuming a low profile toward the British. The second group was younger, more radical, and had few ties to the occupying administration. They demanded unification with Syria—at that time, under Prince Faisal. Syria was seen as protection against further inroads of Zionism. The collapse of the Faisal government in 1920 left Palestinian Arabs bereft of their major supporter and protector. They found themselves powerless either to stop the Zionists or to gain self-determination. The second phase in the emergence of Palestinian identity began in 1948 when the United Nations formally created the state of Israel. The establishment of Israeli borders and the resulting war dispersed Palestinian Arabs in different directions: those inside Israel, those on the West Bank and in the Gaza strip, those in refugee camps in surrounding Arab states, and those who had taken up residence in many non-Arab nations. Such dispersal disrupted whatever Palestinian nationalism was emerging prior to 1948, and Palestinian Arabs had little choice but to identify themselves not particularly as Palestinian but as Arab, and to take their place within the broad Arab nationalism that was sweeping the Middle East and that, in the 1950s, found its visionary spokesman in Gamal Abdal Nasser of Egypt. Palestinian interests were subordinated to those of Arab unity, and many Palestinians joined pan-Arab political organizations such as the Ba'ath Party, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the Moslem Brotherhood. The dream that the Arabs would unite to defeat Israel and reclaim the region was short lived. The collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961 followed by the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war with Israel threw the Palestinians back on themselves. They would have to go it alone. The turn to Palestinian self-definition as a group separate from the Arabs and the growth of Palestinian nationalism took many forms. The inability or refusal of the Arab states to assimilate Palestinian refugees was one more form of isolation, but one that had its value in reinforcing Palestinian identity. Many took advantage of the geographical dispersal to gain education, establish businesses, and bring modernization back home. The mass media, mainly radio and television, provided means for creating a national identity with common goals. Organization now tended to be particularly Palestinian: for example, the General Union of Palestine Students and the General Union of Palestine Women. Militant groups were tightly focused, undiluted by pan-Arabism. Fatah, under Yasir Arafat, began fighting even before the 1976 war. Afterward, both the Popular and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine were quickly established. The Palestinian Liberation Organization originated as a support group in the refugee camps, turning to active militancy when it was taken over by Arafat's Fatah commandos in 1969. Throughout the 1970s, there was a determined consolidation of Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza, culminating in the first Intifada. Sahliyeh argues that his analysis refutes two general theoretical perspectives on ethnicity and nationalism. One perspective views ethnicity as deriving from race, distinct national origins, religious beliefs, and above all a common culture. However, this definition does not apply because Palestinians are culturally, racially, and religiously identical to other Arabs. The other point of view holds that, relative to available alternatives, a united sense of peoplehood serves the practical function of providing security, status, power, and economic benefits. In reality, many Palestinians have refused economic assimilation even when it was possible and clearly to their benefit, and have chosen the more difficult course of economic instability and armed struggle. What this brief

history also reveals is that identity is something that is constantly in progress, constantly negotiated against external opportunities and constraints. Above all, identity in this case is distinct from culture. Indeed, what seems to set the Palestinians apart from other Arabs is not culture, religion, or language, but a sense of territory and a shared history of crisis.

What's in a Word? The Threat of an Indian "Nation" in Brazil

Identity politics can be so divisive that words themselves are potentially explosive. For example, Loring Danforth (1995) scrutinizes the volatile term "Macedonian" in the southern Balkans and Greece. The term has three different meanings. In general discourse, it refers simply to people who claim a Macedonian identity, in contrast to, say Serbian or Greek. Within Greece, it has a regional meaning, referring to Greeks from Macedonia. Finally, in northern Greece it takes on a more specifically ethnonationalist meaning referring to an indigenous people of Macedonia. These apparently subtle differences have enormous political ramifications. Greece has an ideology of homogeneity and thus refuses to officially recognize the existence of Macedonians within its border and has virulently opposed the independent Republic of Macedonia that was established on Greece's northern border in the 1990s. Both sides in the conflict have developed elaborate histories dating back to Alexander the Great to support their positions. In Brazil, it is the term "nation," especially when applied to the Indian population, that threatens the state. Unlike in some parts of Latin America, both the terms and concepts "Indian" and "indigenous" are legitimate and accepted (although they tend to go in and out of fashion). Indians have, in fact, captured the imagination of the Brazilian people far out of proportion to their relatively small numbers, rendering them a fascinating exoticism. The indigenous population numbers an estimated 236,000 to 300,000 and is comprised of over two hundred separate groups and 170 languages. Altogether they account for no more than 0.2 percent of Brazil's 160 million people. Alcida Rita Ramos's (1998: 168–94) analysis of the attempts by indigenous people to move from a relatively benign ethnicity to a politically charged nationalism reveals the power that a single word can assume. It is only recently that the multitude of Indian tribal groups have sought a common voice. In 1972, a militant branch of the Brazilian National Conference of Bishops created the Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI), based on the democratic and empowering principles of the theology of liberation. This was already well into the period of repressive, often brutal military rule that extended from 1964 until 1988. The Church, and especially the left-leaning theology-of-liberation faction within it, was already distrusted by the extreme right-wing dictatorship. The conservative national daily newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* ran a weeklong series viciously attacking CIMI. The series was based on a document supposedly from The World Council of Christian Churches (no relation to the World Council of Churches) that revealed an insidious foreigner's plot to challenge Brazil's sovereignty over Indian lands, divide Brazil along ethnic lines, and turn the exploitation of the country's mineral wealth over to an indigenous population manipulated by foreign interests. It turned out that the document was forged and that no World Council of Christian Churches exists, but the articles succeeded in bringing the issue of national sovereignty out into the open while avoiding the political incorrectness of seeming baldly anti-Indian. Two years after its founding, the CIMI began organized a series of "indigenous assemblies," which funded transport, food, and lodging to

representatives of many linguistic and tribal groups. Although quite different culturally, the Indians recognized commonalities in their interactions with the Brazilian “Whiteman”: destruction of forests; diminishing land bases; polluted rivers; intrusive roads; settlers; and, all too often, brutality and killing. The holistic composition of the organization was sufficiently unwieldy that ultimately more than a hundred groups broke off from it, ranging from regional and interest-oriented pan-Indian groups to very local organizations. Just as the Church had been the impetus for CIMI, many of these larger groupings were influenced by outsiders, such as missionaries, journalists, and especially anthropologists, and tended toward vertical and hierarchical structures. Smaller, more focused groups were often the indigenous reaction to outsider influence, and reflected more accurately the many different cultures. Although CIMI routinely referred to its component groups as indigenous “nations,” it was only in 1980, with the founding of the Union of Indian Nations, that the term took on a more incendiary tone. Why not simply stick with the term “ethnic”? Ramos (1998: 184–85) answers:

Because, I dare say, the concept of ethnic group has neither the political strength nor the ideological wallop that nations does. Ethnic groups are regarded as social excrescences that history forced upon the country and that must be leveled out and diluted into mainstream nationality. . . . As a politically insipid term, ethnic has been relegated to the realm of culture. And as a rule culture is regarded as politically innocuous.

If the term “nation” in the title of a major pan-Indian organization was especially potent, it was because it butted against the dominant philosophy upon which Brazil had been founded, a philosophy of homogenization and unity. From its independence from Portugal in 1822, the country had been founded on the “liberal”—in the nineteenth-century sense—ideal of the vertical state in which there was no room for subgroups. “From this perspective social diversity was not regarded as an enemy to be physically wiped out (as in Argentina), but rather as an immaturity to be outgrown” (Ramos 1998: 181). The ideal state was a “collective individual,” a single mind and body—a far cry from the United States idea of a “collection of individuals.” The Indian claim to nationhood, rather than mere ethnicity, was perceived as a barb aimed at the very heart of the nation-state. Ramos agrees that the use of “nation” is inflammatory without really designating a definable group. Lacking any real indigenous unity of culture, history, or language, nationalism becomes a divisive political rhetoric that is ultimately impotent.

Pulled from its historical and multivocal context, the term Indian nation loses the implication both of state organization and of nationalism, for it is a concept that does not refer to nation-state, patriotism, national pride, or imagined communities. . . . Inshort, it is a nation without a nation. (p. 190)

Chapter six

6. Modernization, Globalization and Political Anthropology.

Since the 1970s onwards, Political Anthropologists began to refer to related developments because the societies that Anthropologists Studied were within the so called developing countries.

6.1 Modernization Theory

Fundamentally, modernization theory studies the process of social evolution and the development of societies. Given the complexity that arises from tracing the multidimensional development of social processes, the goal of discovering a single definitive social theory of evolution is perhaps the most ambitious research goal in all of social science. It is therefore unsurprising that, with the benefit of hindsight that is advantaged by cumulative research, we find classical modernization theory unsatisfactory due to its Western bias, capitalist ideological underpinnings, and an overall social Darwinism in its logic. Most troubling, though, is that it displays a poor understanding of the socioeconomic development process, especially when it comes to issues such as economic sustainability, political freedoms, and social emancipation. Empirically, too, the logic of classical modernization theory has been shown to be unsophisticated at best and expressly erroneous at worst. So there is a strong case to be made for arguing that, in fact, modernization theory is extinct and hardly deserves an essay devoted to it in this compendium.

However, this essay looks ahead and suggests a considered methodical resuscitation of social evolution theory – a new modernization theory that attempts at providing a socialscientific metastructure within which the constituent development processes relevant to sociologists, political theorists, and economists all form contributory substructures. As such, it suggests salvaging not the message, but rather the spirit of classical modernization theory, which attempted a single conjoint explanation for social development processes, democratization, and economic growth.

This essay consequently requires the reader to be ready for a distinct change of gears from the survey it presents of modernization theory in its classical form to the basis for a research program it proposes for continuing research into a modernization theory for the future. The suggested approach is based on social choice theory and more recent insights gained from

political and economic development theory. It is meant to be accessible to any social scientist with an interest in this area. It is presented as one possible and exciting way forward and as a call for addressing key weaknesses in classical modernization theory by using a tractable formal structure that remains true to the eclectic social scientific research that classical modernization theory spawned, and not to introduce needless overformalization.

Classical Modernization Theory Contributions to classical modernization theory can usefully be studied as belonging to two levels of analysis. At a finer level are the microcosmic evaluations of modernization that focus on the componential elements of social modernization such as urbanization, gender and income inequality, skills acquisition and education, the role of political communication and the media, bureaucratic corruption, and so on. At a broader level are the macrocosmic studies of modernization focused on the empirical trajectories and manifest processes of the modernization of nations and their societies, economies, and polities. While this characterization is not absolute, and indeed both levels of analysis are actually linked in that theoretical constructs from one hold logical implications for the other, such a categorization perhaps makes it easier to understand the emphasis and primary focus of a given modernization theorist.

Why the timing of the birth of classical modernization theory spans the late 1950s to the 1970s is in itself an interesting question worth addressing. Arguably key contributions at both the micro and macro levels came around the time the behavioral revolution was sweeping across the social sciences, albeit at different rates in economics, sociology, and political science. It essentially espoused the merits of methodical analysis and treating social science as a science of social processes, and naturally the study of development took center stage in this ambition. The benefit of the behavioral revolution to the study of modernization was in social scientists recognizing that it deserved a treatment that prevented variegated and ethnocentric interpretations for the definition of “modernity” from overwhelming its practical usefulness. In a review published in 1976, Portes noted this fundamental difference between the more contemporary studies on social development and those that came earlier, and interestingly attributed the drive for the methodical study of development to discovering systematic sociological differences between the Western developed European societies and the underdeveloped societies around the world (Portes 1976).

At the level of the microcosm of modernization, emphasis was therefore focused more squarely on characterizing the modern social entity, be it an individual, a family, or even a firm.

Sociologists with an interest in sociometry devised surveys to study the effects of industrialization, urbanization, and the acquisition of skills on the development of a modern social being that shared certain similarities across nations (Smith and Inkeles 1966; Inkeles 1969) and generally discovered emergent social values that evolved from the process (Feldman and Hurn 1966). Pinning down changes in social values resulting from the idea that an increasingly specialized modernizing society can effect is understandably an arduous task owing to the complex dimensionality of social change. However, this complexity is also interesting in that it reinforces the humanistic reality of modernization that macro studies simply cannot address. For instance, in an interesting study, Delacroix and Ragin (1978) conducted a panel regression analysis on the effects of schooling and the cinema on the development process in third world countries. They reaffirmed the observation made by classical theorists that schooling helps modernization but attributed this to schools being generally secular institutions; in contrast, they suggested how cinemas may hinder growth by promoting Western social values that are not compatible locally.

With respect to the macrocosmic studies of classical modernization, it is hardly a surprise that its primary contributors came from a time (unsurprisingly, prior to the formal publication of Godel's theorem, which denied that such an enterprise was at all possible) when theories of everything were all the rage. Therefore, Rostow (1990) was not trying to explain sectoral transitions of economies; he was creating an all-encompassing theory of development that inexorably led to a modernization of the polity and society. Likewise, Lipset (1959) was not constructing a socioeconomic development model; he was instead positing an endogenous transition theory that explained the sociopolitical development of nations. And Kuznets, who is often forgotten for his contribution to modernization theory due to his dissenting views, was, while disclaiming the existence of a climacteric change that signified modernization (see, for instance, Rostow 1963), himself interested in characterizing the overarching dynamic of the socioeconomic development process (Kuznets 1955). Still, Lerner's study on modernization as a process of three distinct phases was remarkable in that it was rooted primarily in micro-social processes yet attempted to explain societal evolution as a single macro-social process that transformed traditional societies into modern ones (Lerner 1958). It began with urbanization that led to a growing need for education and technology, which in turn created the demand for mass communication and a more efficacious media sector. His phase theory culminated in one of the earliest characterizations of

modernity based on an institutional explanation because for him a modern society was one that eventually had modern institutions that facilitated political participation.

In contrast to these macro-level grand theories, it is fair to say that contemporary eclectic social scientific study of the modernization of societies has sputtered to a halt, and there are two chief reasons for this. First, the study of each of the constituent social dimensions of modernization theory has advanced independently and created significant barriers to entry for anyone who wishes to retain the social-scientific perspective to modernization rather than select and commit to a component area and concentrate his or her efforts from the perspective of either a social development theorist, a democratization scholar, or a researcher on economic development or economic growth theory.

Second, the foundations of modernization theory are now considered questionable, a charge based more significantly on its inadequate empirical validity rather than its underlying logic. Most political scientists would consider the most important contribution in this regard as being that of Przeworski and Limongi (1997). However, it is equally illuminating to realize the significance of the emergence of the endogenous growth literature in economics (beginning with Romer in 1986), which started suggesting the relevance of government policy and even social behavior in creating an environment for households and firms in which to determine their savings, investments, acquisition of skills, size of their family, and so on. With the multifactoral endogeneity across the numerous variables spread over the various social sciences that classical modernization theory necessarily implied, it is very easily shown to be lacking in any exercise that takes empirical validity as a benchmark for success.

As a result of these developments, the status quo for classical modernization theory is that it is discounted as being overly deterministic in its logic. Ironically, the endogeneity that made modernization theory in its classical form an interesting unifying theory in the first place appears now to be its principal failing because that makes it too deterministic in the eyes of any empiricist worth his or her salt. Additionally, it is also critiqued as simply being unable or at least wanting in its ability to be reconciled with the various empirical truisms that have been established through specialist study of the political, social, and economic strands since its advent.

How, after all, can a political scientist make peace with a theory that is unable to explain the process of probabilistic regime transition negotiated by key political actors in one instance and by exogenous forces in another?

6.2 Dependency Theory

Dependency Theory is the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system".

The theory arose as a reaction to modernization theory, an earlier theory of development which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development, that today's underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed areas at some time in the past, and that, therefore, the task of helping the underdeveloped areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the world market. Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that underdeveloped countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but have unique features and structures of their own; and importantly, are in the situation of being the weaker members in a world market economy.

Dependency theory no longer has many proponents as an overall theory⁴ though some writers have argued for its continuing relevance as a conceptual orientation to the global division of wealth.

The importance of multinational corporations and state promotion of technology were emphasised by the Latin American Structuralists.

Fajnzylber has made a distinction between systemic or authentic competitiveness, which is the ability to compete based on higher productivity, and spurious competitiveness, which is based on low wages.

The third-world debt crisis of the 1980s and continued stagnation in Africa and Latin America in the 1990s caused some doubt as to the feasibility or desirability of "dependent development".

The *sine qua non* of the dependency relationship is not the difference in technological sophistication, as traditional dependency theorists believe, but rather the difference in financial strength between core and peripheral countries—particularly the inability of peripheral countries to borrow in their own currency. He believes that the hegemonic position of the United States is very strong because of the importance of its financial markets and because it controls the international reserve currency – the US dollar. He believes that the end of the Bretton Woods

international financial agreements in the early 1970s considerably strengthened the United States' position because it removed some constraints on their financial actions.

"Standard" dependency theory differs from Marxism, in arguing against internationalism and any hope of progress in less developed nations towards industrialization and a liberating revolution. Theotonio dos Santos described a "new dependency", which focused on both the internal and external relations of less-developed countries of the periphery, derived from a Marxian analysis. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (in office 1995–2002) wrote extensively on dependency theory while in political exile during the 1960s, arguing that it was an approach to studying the economic disparities between the centre and periphery. Cardoso summarized his version of dependency theory as follows:

- there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery;
- this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers;
- this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery;
- this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations;
- these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance.

The analysis of development patterns in the 1990s and beyond is complicated by the fact that capitalism develops not smoothly, but with very strong and self-repeating ups and downs, called cycles. Relevant results are given in studies by Joshua Goldstein, Volker Bornschier, and Luigi Scandella.

With the economic growth of India and some East Asian economies, dependency theory has lost some of its former influence. It still influences some NGO campaigns, such as Make Poverty History and the fair trade movement.

Other theorists and related theories

Two other early writers relevant to dependency theory were François Perroux and Kurt Rothschild. Other leading dependency theorists include Herb Addo, Walden Bello, Ruy Mauro Marini, Enzo Faletto, Armando Cordova, Ernest Feder, Pablo González Casanova, Keith

Griffin, Kunibert Raffer, Paul Israel Singer, and Osvaldo Sunkel. Many of these authors focused their attention on Latin America; the leading dependency theorist in the Islamic world is the Egyptian economist Samir Amin.^[12]

Tausch,^[12] based on works of Amin from 1973 to 1997, lists the following main characteristics of periphery capitalism:

1. Regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism
2. Unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export-oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987)
3. These structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system
4. Chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, and deficient business cycles at the periphery that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings
5. Structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 'compradore' element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class

The American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein refined the Marxist aspect of the theory and expanded on it, to form world-systems theory. This postulates a third category of countries, the *semi-periphery*, intermediate between the core and periphery. Wallerstein believed in a tri-modal rather than a bi-modal system because he viewed the world-systems as more complicated than a simplistic classification as either core or periphery nations. To Wallerstein, many nations do not fit into one of these two categories, so he proposed the idea of a semi-periphery as an in between state within his model.^[13] In this model, the semi-periphery is industrialized, but with less sophistication of technology than in the core; and it does not control finances. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal exchange tends to remain stable. Tausch traces the

beginnings of world-systems theory to the writings of the Austro-Hungarian socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War, but its present form is usually associated with the work of Wallerstein.

Dependency theory has also been associated with Johan Galtung's structural theory of imperialism.

Dependency theorists hold that short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth in the periphery will be imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances.^[12] Cyclical fluctuations also have a profound effect on cross-national comparisons of economic growth and societal development in the medium and long run. What seemed like spectacular long-run growth may in the end turn out to be just a short run cyclical spurt after a long recession. Cycle time plays an important role. Giovanni Arrighi believed that the logic of accumulation on a world scale shifts over time, and that the 1980s and beyond once more showed a deregulated phase of world capitalism with a logic, characterized - in contrast to earlier regulatory cycles - by the dominance of financial capital.

It is argued that, at this stage, the role of unequal exchange in the entire relationship of dependency cannot be underestimated. Unequal exchange is given if double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 1.0 (Raffer, 1987, Amin, 1975).

The former ideological head of the Blekingegade Gang and political activist Torkil Lauesen argues in his book *The Global Perspective* that political theory and practice stemming from dependency theory are more relevant than ever. He postulates that the conflict between countries in the core and countries in the periphery has been ever-intensifying and that the world is at the onset of a resolution of the core-periphery contradiction – that humanity is "in for an economic and political rollercoaster ride".

Criticism

Economic policies based on dependency theory has been criticized by free-market economists such as Peter Bauer and Martin Wolf and others:^[16]

- Lack of competition: by subsidizing in-country industries and preventing outside imports, these companies may have less incentive to improve their products, to try to become more efficient in their processes, to please customers, or to research new innovations.

- Sustainability: industries reliant on government support may not be sustainable for very long, particularly in poorer countries and countries which largely depend on foreign aid from more developed countries.
- Domestic opportunity costs: subsidies on domestic industries come out of state coffers and therefore represent money not spent in other ways, like development of domestic infrastructure, seed capital or need-based social welfare programs.^l At the same time, the higher prices caused by tariffs and restrictions on imports require the people either to forgo these goods altogether or buy them at higher prices, forgoing other goods.^[citation needed]

Market economists cite a number of examples in their arguments against dependency theory. The improvement of India's economy after it moved from state-controlled business to open trade is one of the most often cited (*see also* economy of India, *The Commanding Heights*). India's example seems to contradict dependency theorists' claims concerning comparative advantage and mobility, as much as its economic growth originated from movements such as outsourcing – one of the most mobile forms of capital transfer. South Korea and North Korea provide another example of trade-based development vs. autocratic self-sufficiency. Following the Korean War, North Korea pursued a policy of import substitution industrialization as suggested by dependency theory, while South Korea pursued a policy of export-oriented industrialization as suggested by comparative advantage theory. In 2013, South Korea's per capita GDP was 18 times that of North Korea. In Africa, states which have emphasized import-substitution development, such as Zimbabwe, have typically been among the worst performers, while the continent's most successful non-oil based economies, such as Egypt, South Africa, and Tunisia, have pursued trade-based development.

According to economic historian Robert C. Allen, dependency theory's claims are "debatable" and that the protectionism that was implemented in Latin America as a solution ended up failing.^[19] The countries incurred too much debt and Latin America went into a recession. One of the problems was that the Latin American countries simply had too small national markets to be able to efficiently produce complex industrialized goods, such as automobiles.

6.3 World-systems theory

World-systems theory (also known as **world-systems analysis** or **the world-systems perspective**) is a multidisciplinary, macro-scale approach to world history and social

change which emphasizes the world-system (and not nation states) as the primary (but not exclusive) unit of social analysis.

"World-system" refers to the inter-regional and transnational division of labor, which divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries, and the periphery countries.^[2] Core countries focus on higher skill, capital-intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labor-intensive production and extraction of raw materials.^[3] This constantly reinforces the dominance of the core countries.^[3] Nonetheless, the system has dynamic characteristics, in part as a result of revolutions in transport technology, and individual states can gain or lose their core (semi-periphery, periphery) status over time.^[3] This structure is unified by the division of labour. It is a world-economy rooted in a capitalist economy.^[4] For a time, certain countries become the world hegemon; during the last few centuries, as the world-system has extended geographically and intensified economically, this status has passed from the Netherlands, to the United Kingdom and (most recently) to the United States.^[3]

A world map of countries by trading status, late 20th century, using the world system differentiation into core countries (blue), semi-periphery countries (purple) and periphery countries (red). Based on the list in Dunn, Kawana, Brewer (2000).

Background

Immanuel Wallerstein has developed the best-known version of world-systems analysis, beginning in the 1970s. Wallerstein traces the rise of the capitalist world-economy from the "long" 16th century (c. 1450–1640). The rise of capitalism, in his view, was an accidental outcome of the protracted crisis of feudalism (c. 1290–1450). Europe (the West) used its advantages and gained control over most of the world economy and presided over the development and spread of industrialization and capitalist economy, indirectly resulting in unequal development.

Though other commentators refer to Wallerstein's project as world-systems "theory", he consistently rejects that term.^[8] For Wallerstein, world-systems analysis is a mode of analysis that aims to transcend the structures of knowledge inherited from the 19th century, especially the definition of capitalism, the divisions within the social sciences, and those between the social sciences and history.^[9] For Wallerstein, then, world-systems analysis is a "knowledge movement"^[10] that seeks to discern the "totality of what has been paraded under the labels of the... human sciences and indeed well beyond".^[11] "We must invent a new language,"

Wallerstein insists, to transcend the illusions of the "three supposedly distinctive arenas" of society, economy and politics.^[12] The trinitarian structure of knowledge is grounded in another, even grander, modernist architecture, the distinction of biophysical worlds (including those within bodies) from social ones: "One question, therefore, is whether we will be able to justify something called social science in the twenty-first century as a separate sphere of knowledge."^{[13][14]} Many other scholars have contributed significant work in this "knowledge movement".

Origins

Influences and major thinkers

World-systems theory traces emerged in the 1970s.^[1] Its roots can be found in sociology, but it has developed into a highly interdisciplinary field.^[2] World-systems theory was aiming to replace modernization theory, which Wallerstein criticised for three reasons:^[2]

1. its focus on the nation state as the only unit of analysis
2. its assumption that there is only a single path of evolutionary development for all countries
3. its disregard of transnational structures that constrain local and national development.

There are three major predecessors of world-systems theory: the Annales school, the Marxist tradition, and the dependence theory. The **Annales School** tradition (represented most notably by Fernand Braudel) influenced Wallerstein to focusing on long-term processes and geo-ecological regions as unit of analysis. **Marxism** added a stress on social conflict, a focus on the capital accumulation process and competitive class struggles, a focus on a relevant totality, the transitory nature of social forms and a dialectical sense of motion through conflict and contradiction.

World-systems theory was also significantly influenced by **dependency theory**, a neo-Marxist explanation of development processes.

Other influences on the world-systems theory come from scholars such as Karl Polanyi, Nikolai Kondratiev and Joseph Schumpeter (particularly their research on business cycles and the concepts of three basic modes of economic organization: reciprocal, redistributive, and market modes, which Wallerstein reframed into a discussion of mini systems, world empires, and world economies).

Wallerstein sees the development of the capitalist world economy as detrimental to a large proportion of the world's population. Wallerstein views the period since the 1970s as an "age of transition" that will give way to a future world system (or world systems) whose configuration cannot be determined in advance.

World-systems thinkers include Oliver Cox, Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, with major contributions by Christopher Chase-Dunn, Beverly Silver, Volker Borschier, Janet Abu Lughod, Thomas D. Hall, Kunibert Raffer, Theotonio dos Santos, Dale Tomich, Jason W. Moore and others. In sociology, a primary alternative perspective is World Polity Theory, as formulated by John W. Meyer

Current research

Wallerstein's theories are widely recognized throughout the world. In the United States, one of the hubs of world-systems research is at the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations, at Binghamton University.^[2] Among the most important related periodicals are the *Journal of World-Systems Research*, published by the American Sociological Association's Section on the Political Economy of the World System (PEWS), and the *Review*, published the Braudel Center.^[2]

Edythe E. Weeks asserts the proposition that it may be possible to consider, and apply critical insights, to prevent future patterns from emerging in ways to repeat outcomes harmful to humanity. (See *Outer Space Development, Space Law and International Relations: A Method for Elucidating Seeds* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012)). Her current research, as a Fulbright Specialist, further suggests that new territories such as the Antarctic Peninsula, Antarctica, the Arctic and various regions of outer space, including low Earth orbit, the geostationary orbit, Near Earth orbit are currently in the process of colonization. By applying lessons learned from our past, we can change the future towards a direction less likely to be widely criticized.

6.4 Globalization

Globalization or **globalisation** is the process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments worldwide. As a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, globalization is considered by some as a form of capitalist expansion which entails the integration of local and national economies into a global, unregulated market economy.^[1] Globalization has grown due to advances

in transportation and communication technology. With the increased global interactions comes the growth of international trade, ideas, and culture. Globalization is primarily an economic process of interaction and integration that's associated with social and cultural aspects. However, conflicts and diplomacy are also large parts of the history of globalization, and modern globalization.

Economically, globalization involves goods, services, the economic resources of capital, technology, and data.^{[2][3]} Also, the expansions of global markets liberalize the economic activities of the exchange of goods and funds. Removal of Cross-Border Trades barriers has made formation of Global Markets more feasible.^[4] The steam locomotive, steamship, jet engine, and container ships are some of the advances in the means of transport while the rise of the telegraph and its modern offspring, the Internet and mobile phones show development in telecommunications infrastructure. All of these improvements have been major factors in globalization and have generated further interdependence of economic and cultural activities around the globe.

Though many scholars place the origins of globalization in modern times, others trace its history long before the European Age of Discovery and voyages to the New World, some even to the third millennium BC.^{[8][9]} Large-scale globalization began in the 1820s.^[10] In the late 19th century and early 20th century, the connectivity of the world's economies and cultures grew very quickly. The term *globalization* is recent, only establishing its current meaning in the 1970s.^[11]

In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified four basic aspects of globalization: trade and transactions, capital and investment movements, migration and movement of people, and the dissemination of knowledge.^[12] Further, environmental challenges such as global warming, cross-boundary water, air pollution, and over-fishing of the ocean are linked with globalization.^[13] Globalizing processes affect and are affected by business and work organization, economics, socio-cultural resources, and the natural environment. Academic literature commonly subdivides globalization into three major areas: economic globalization, cultural globalization, and political globalization.

The term *globalization* derives from the word *globalize*, which refers to the emergence of an international network of economic systems.^[15] One of the earliest known usages of the term as a noun was in a 1930 publication entitled *Towards New Education*, where it denoted a holistic view of human experience in education.^[16] The term 'globalization' had been used in its

economic sense at least as early as 1981, and in other senses since at least as early as 1944.^[17] Theodore Levitt is credited with popularizing the term and bringing it into the mainstream business audience in the later half of the 1980s. Since its inception, the concept of globalization has inspired competing definitions and interpretations. Its antecedents date back to the great movements of trade and empire across Asia and the Indian Ocean from the 15th century onward.^{[18][19]} Due to the complexity of the concept, various research projects, articles, and discussions often stay focused on a single aspect of globalization.^[20]

Sociologists Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King define globalization as "all those processes by which the people of the world are incorporated into a single world society."^[21] In *The Consequences of Modernity*, Anthony Giddens writes: "Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa."^[21] In 1992, Roland Robertson, professor of sociology at the University of Aberdeen and an early writer in the field, described globalization as "the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole."^[22]

In *Global Transformations*, David Held and his co-writers state:

Although in its simplistic sense globalization refers to the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnection, such a definition begs further elaboration. ... Globalization can be on a continuum with the local, national and regional. At one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are organized on a local and/or national basis; at the other end lie social and economic relations and networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global interactions. Globalization can refer to those spatial-temporal processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents. Without reference to such expansive spatial connections, there can be no clear or coherent formulation of this term. ... A satisfactory definition of globalization must capture each of these elements: extensity (stretching), intensity, velocity and impact.^[23]

Held and his co-writers' definition of globalization in that same book as "transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows" was called "probably the most widely-cited definition" in the 2014 DHL Global Connectiveness Index.^[24]

Swedish journalist Thomas Larsson, in his book *The Race to the Top: The Real Story of Globalization*, states that globalization:

is the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving closer. It pertains to the increasing ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on the other side of the world.^[25]

Paul James defines globalization with a more direct and historically contextualized emphasis:

Globalization is the extension of social relations across world-space, defining that world-space in terms of the historically variable ways that it has been practiced and socially understood through changing world-time.^[26]

Manfred Steger, professor of global studies and research leader in the Global Cities Institute at RMIT University, identifies four main empirical dimensions of globalization: economic, political, cultural, and ecological. A fifth dimension—the ideological—cutting across the other four. The ideological dimension, according to Steger, is filled with a range of norms, claims, beliefs, and narratives about the phenomenon itself.^[27]

James and Steger stated that the concept of globalization "emerged from the intersection of four interrelated sets of 'communities of practice' (Wenger, 1998): academics, journalists, publishers/editors, and librarians."^{[11]:424} They note the term was used "in education to describe the global life of the mind"; in international relations to describe the extension of the European Common Market; and in journalism to describe how the "American Negro and his problem are taking on a global significance".^[11] They have also argued that four different forms of globalization can be distinguished that complement and cut across the solely empirical dimensions.^{[26][28]} According to James, the oldest dominant form of globalization is embodied globalization, the movement of people. A second form is agency-extended globalization, the circulation of agents of different institutions, organizations, and polities, including imperial agents. Object-extended globalization, a third form, is the movement of commodities and other objects of exchange. He calls the transmission of ideas, images, knowledge, and information across world-space disembodied globalization, maintaining that it is currently the dominant form of globalization. James holds that this series of distinctions allows for an understanding of how, today, the most embodied forms of globalization such as the movement of refugees and migrants are increasingly restricted, while the most disembodied forms such as the circulation of financial instruments and codes are the most deregulated.^[29]

The journalist Thomas L. Friedman popularized the term "flat world", arguing that globalized trade, outsourcing, supply-chaining, and political forces had permanently changed the world, for better and worse. He asserted that the pace of globalization was quickening and that its impact on business organization and practice would continue to grow.^[30]

Economist Takis Fotopoulos defined "economic globalization" as the opening and deregulation of commodity, capital, and labor markets that led toward present neoliberal globalization. He used "political globalization" to refer to the emergence of a transnational élite and a phasing out of the nation-state. Meanwhile, he used "cultural globalization" to reference the worldwide homogenization of culture. Other of his usages included "ideological globalization", "technological globalization", and "social globalization".^[31]

Lechner and Boli (2012) define globalization as more people across large distances becoming connected in more and different ways.^[32]

"Globophobia" is used to refer to the fear of globalization, though it can also mean the fear of balloons.^{[33][34][35]}

There are both distal and proximate causes which can be traced in the historical factors affecting globalization. Large-scale globalization began in the 19th century.^[36]

Archaic

Archaic globalization conventionally refers to a phase in the history of globalization including globalizing events and developments from the time of the earliest civilizations until roughly the 1600s. This term is used to describe the relationships between communities and states and how they were created by the geographical spread of ideas and social norms at both local and regional levels.^[37]

In this schema, three main prerequisites are posited for globalization to occur. The first is the idea of Eastern Origins, which shows how Western states have adapted and implemented learned principles from the East.^[37] Without the spread of traditional ideas from the East, Western globalization would not have emerged the way it did. The second is distance. The interactions of states were not on a global scale and most often were confined to Asia, North Africa, the Middle East, and certain parts of Europe.^[37] With early globalization, it was difficult for states to interact with others that were not within a close proximity. Eventually, technological advances allowed states to learn of others' existence and thus another phase of globalization can occur. The third

has to do with inter-dependency, stability, and regularity. If a state is not dependent on another, then there is no way for either state to be mutually affected by the other. This is one of the driving forces behind global connections and trade; without either, globalization would not have emerged the way it did and states would still be dependent on their own production and resources to work. This is one of the arguments surrounding the idea of early globalization. It is argued that archaic globalization did not function in a similar manner to modern globalization because states were not as interdependent on others as they are today.^[37]

Also posited is a "multi-polar" nature to archaic globalization, which involved the active participation of non-Europeans. Because it predated the Great Divergence in the nineteenth century, where Western Europe pulled ahead of the rest of the world in terms of industrial production and economic output, archaic globalization was a phenomenon that was driven not only by Europe but also by other economically developed Old World centers such as Gujarat, Bengal, coastal China, and Japan.^[38]

The German historical economist and sociologist Andre Gunder Frank argues that a form of globalization began with the rise of trade links between Sumer and the Indus Valley Civilization in the third millennium BCE. This archaic globalization existed during the Hellenistic Age, when commercialized urban centers enveloped the axis of Greek culture that reached from India to Spain, including Alexandria and the other Alexandrine cities. Early on, the geographic position of Greece and the necessity of importing wheat forced the Greeks to engage in maritime trade. Trade in ancient Greece was largely unrestricted: the state controlled only the supply of grain.

Native New World crops exchanged globally: Maize, tomato, potato, vanilla, rubber, cacao, tobacco

Trade on the Silk Road was a significant factor in the development of civilizations from China, Indian subcontinent, Persia, Europe, and Arabia, opening long-distance political and economic interactions between them.^[39] Though silk was certainly the major trade item from China, common goods such as salt and sugar were traded as well; and religions, syncretic philosophies, and various technologies, as well as diseases, also traveled along the Silk Routes. In addition to economic trade, the Silk Road served as a means of carrying out cultural trade among the civilizations along its network.^[40] The movement of people, such as

refugees, artists, craftsmen, missionaries, robbers, and envoys, resulted in the exchange of religions, art, languages, and new technologies.^[41]