Dilla University

College of Social Sciences and Humanities

Department of Social Anthropology

Course Title: Migration, Transnationalism, and Globalization

Course No: SoAn2073

Credit Hours: 3

Course Instructor: Solomon Debebe

Course Description

This course offers students an opportunity to explore and understand the global nature of contemporary social, economic, cultural and political change.

An exploration of similarities and differences in refugee/Diaspora communities is given particular emphasis. Issues include relationships between place and identity, memory and identity, notions of home and homeland, gender and class, assimilation versus resistance, social and cultural changes induced by migration and the impact of Transnationalism.

The course is divided into three parts to closely examine migration, Transnationalism, and globalization. Specifically, the first part will introduce students to the general feature of international migration. The second part deals with the concepts of Transnationalism, Diaspora, and refugees. The last part will briefly present the global/local issues.

C o u r s e Objectives

At the end of the course, students will be able to

- Understand the major social, economic, cultural, and political changes induced by globalization.
- Know the general pattern of migration.
- Identify the relationship between migration, Transnationalism, and globalization.
- Develop knowledge base on the local and the global issues.
- Be familiar with the concepts of Transnationalism, Diaspora, and refugee

Chapter One

Migration: People on the move

1. Introduction

1.1 Meaning and concepts f migration

A variety of definitions of migration have given by different scholars in different ways. To a large extent, the variations in the definitions are due to the differences in the nature, scope or purpose of the study. In the West, where industrialisation has taken deep roots, there are big Industrial centers which attract a permanent class of industrial workers, completely divorced from land. In these countries the workers have not ties with the villages. But in India most of the factory workers come from the villages and continue to keep contacts with their villages homes. Thus, they migrate from rural areas to urban areas for employment. The migratory character of Indian labour, thus can be defined as "the absecure of any permanent industrial population claiming industrial towns.

Migration is thought to be the consequence of unequal development wherein people from 'backward' regions move to 'developed' regions. Migration is also viewed as the concomitant result of industrialisation and urbanisation and relates to special differences in employment opportunities. Migration is also defined as an inflow or outflow of population from a region to another region for a permanent or semi-permanent settlement of habitation (Mishra, 1981, p.227). Dictionaries generally refer to migration as a change of residence from one place to another. According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of current English, to migrate means to "move from one place to another (to live there)". According to the Webster's New World Dictionary, migration means "to move from one place to another especially to another country" or "to move from place to place to harvest seasonal crops". Everett Lee defines migration" broadly as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. No restriction is placed upon the distance of the move or upon the voluntary and un-voluntary nature of the act, and distinction is made between external and internal migration". In the words of Weinberg, "human migration is the changing of the place of abode permanently or, when temporarily, for an appreciable duration as e.g., in the case of seasonal workers. It is used symbolically is the transition from one surrounding to another in the course of human life".

1.2 Concept of Migration

According to Eisenstadt, "migration is the physical transition of an individual or a group from one society to another. This transition usually involves abandoning one social setting and entering another and different one". In the words of Mangalam, "migration is a relatively permanent moving away of a collectivity, called migrants, from one geographical location to another preceded by decision-making on the part of the migrants on the basis of hierarchically ordered set of values or value ends and resulting in changes in the international system of the migrants". Caplov states that, "migration is a change of residence and need not necessarily involve any change of occupation, but it is closely associated with occupational shifts of one kind or another". Thus, migration is a significant factor in influencing the size and structure of population of a given region. While presenting the "Laws of Migration".Ravenstein has pointed out that the tendency of the migrants is to move from the areas of low opportunity to areas of high opportunity. (Ravenstein,1985, p16). It is generally believed that migration often takes place form rural areas to urban areas in search of better employment and earnings. Western Development Models (L.F.R. Model) (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1962) argued that the surplus labour from the rural areas will be absorbed in the urban industrial sector as the industrial sector expands.

Concept of Migration 40The migration of labour is not permanent, but it is temporary in nature. Of course, in recent years, a change has been noticed and a trend towards stabilization of industrial labour in urban areas is found. In this connection Royal Commission on Labour has rightly observed, "Over the last 20 years, the trend towards the stabilization of industrial labour has been further strengthened". A worker today is far more urban in taste and outlook than his predecessor. The notion of 'Village Nexus' has receded to the background owing to the positive measures undertaken on the interest of industrial labour. Ever in the more distant plantations, settled labour is more in evidence now". Another trend is that the younger members of the family generally migrate to the city who do not have emotional attachment to the land and fascination to the rural way of life unlike their elders, landless labour, has, thus, acquired the status of industrial labour as these young men have been able to adopt the changing situation and environments obtaining in their place of work.

The meaning of migration is at once publicly engaging and highly contested, internationally important and context specific, deeply embedded in rational policy calculations and the subject of emotive narratives and personal stories. Migration is undoubtedly publicly significant in the

current conjuncture – resolutely afforded a place on media and policy agendas at election times as if this were a matter of 'common sense' and continuously identified as one of the most important public issues in opinion polls (Moore 2015). It is the object of entrenched political positions, and impassioned public debate and yet it remains shifting and open as a concept. The meaning of migration is inherently political. In the present conjuncture in Europe, we see the most dissonant, contrasting media images of migration competing for prominence in public consciousness. Appeals to the public conscience, first in response to the refugee 'crisis' in Syria and then the migrant 'crisis' in the Mediterranean have writ large the human costs of conflict and perilous journeys in search of safety of tens of millions of civilians. According to the UNHCR, in the last 5 years, around 15 conflicts have displaced unprecedented numbers of people with children making up more than half of the world's refugees. Clearly these crises and their enormous costs in human lives and suffering have been conveyed by the mainstream news media, including investigative coverage engaging with complex contextualizing issues and that featuring migrant centered reportage (see for example Downey 2015; O'Brien 2015). However, the imperative voiced by UNHCR and many non-governmental organizations that we need to recognize that 'refugees are people just like you and me' can be seen as a shocking indictment of how dehumanized the discourse surrounding displaced people has generally become (UNCHR 2015). Unfortunately, this is not a new story. Evidence from migration and media research literature strongly demonstrates that historically, in many of the world's wealthier countries, news media (and especially the press) have constructed a negative, stereotyped, and dehumanized image of asylum seeking and other forms of migration. The subject is rarely absent from news headlines, but migrants are rarely afforded a voice in the news, largely featuring passively as the objects rather than subjects of reports, and habitually represented by statistics and/or as a homogenous mass. Migrants and migration are all too frequently described using stigmatising and threatening language, including animalistic, militaristic and disaster metaphors (e.g., as stampedes, invasions, floods, pollution) (see for example, Santa Ana, 1999, Santa Ana, 2012, Bleasdale, 2008, Buchanan et al., 2003, CharterisBlack, 2006, Cisneros, 2008, ICAR, 2004). Moreover, catchy neologisms as 'bogus asylum seekers', 'asylum shopping', and more recently 'benefit tourism' have worked to position asylum seekers and other migrants as super-calculating and unscrupulous individuals, threatening an unnecessarily vulnerable 'soft touch' nation, by ingeniously exploiting opportunities to help themselves (as might be expected of

neoliberal subjects) in a globalised world (Moore 2013). This kind of rhetoric, reinforced by the unremittingly 'tough stance' of mainstream politicians, has promoted the importance of immigration as a public issue and a 'problem' and thereby afforded legitimacy to the anti-migrant outrage of an ontologically insecure citizenry. Today, as perilous northward journeys continue to be undertaken across the Mediterranean and beyond, once again the problem and solution seems to be defined, first and foremost in the dominant public discourse, in terms of security.

1.3 People on Move

1.3.1 Early humans' mobility Historical Approach

Putative migration waves out of Africa and back migrations into the continent, as well as the locations of major ancient human remains and archeological sites (Lópezet al.2015).

Early human migrations are the earliest migrations and expansions of archaic and modern humans across continents and are believed to have begun approximately 2 million years ago with the early expansions of hominins out of Africa of *Homo erectus*. This initial migration was followed by other archaic humans including *H. heidelbergensis*, which lived around 500,000 years ago and was the likely ancestor of both Denisovans and Neanderthals. Early hominids were said to have "crossed land bridges that were eventually covered in water" (History Alive, pub. 2004, TCI).

Within Africa, *Homo sapiens* dispersed around the time of its speciation, roughly 300,000 years ago. The recent African origin paradigm suggests that the anatomically modern humans outside of Africa descend from a population of *Homo sapiens* migrating from East Africa roughly 70–50,000 years ago and spreading along the southern coast of Asia and to Oceania by about 50,000 years ago. Modern humans spread across Europe about 40,000 years ago.

Early Eurasian Homo sapiens fossils have been found in Israel and Greece, dated to 194,000–177,000 and 210,000 years old respectively. These fossils seem to represent failed dispersal attempts by early Homo sapiens, who were likely replaced by local Neanderthal populations.

The migrating modern human populations are known to have interbred with local varieties of archaic humans, so that contemporary human populations are descended in small part (below 10% contribution) from regional varieties of archaic humans.

After the Last Glacial Maximum, North Eurasian populations migrated to the Americas about 20,000 years ago. Northern Eurasia was peopled after 12,000 years ago, in the beginning Holocene. Arctic Canada and Greenland were reached by the Paleo-Eskimo expansion around 4,000 years ago. Finally, Polynesia was peopled within the past 2,000 years in the last wave of the Austronesian expansion.

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1.3.2 **Before Homo sapiens**

The earliest humans developed out of australopithecine ancestors after about 3 million years ago, most likely in Eastern Africa, most likely in the area of the Kenyan Rift Valley, where the oldest known stone tools were found. Stone tools recently discovered at the Shangchen site in China and dated to 2.12 million years ago are claimed to be the earliest known evidence of hominins outside Africa, surpassing Dmanisi in Georgia by 300,000 years.[11]

Homo erectus

Between 3 and 2 million years ago, *Homo* spread throughout East Africa and to Southern Africa (*Telanthropuscapensis*), but not yet to West Africa. Around 1.9 million years ago, *Homo erectus*migrated out of Africa via the Levantine corridor and Horn of Africa to Eurasia. This migration has been proposed as being related to the operation of the Saharan pump, around 1.9 million years ago. *Homo erectus* dispersed throughout most of the Old World, reaching as far as Southeast Asia. Its distribution is traced by the Oldowan lithic industry, by 1.3 million years ago extending as far north as the 40th parallel (Xiaochangliang).

Key sites for this early migration out of Africa are Riwat in Pakistan (~2 Ma?), Ubeidiya in the Levant (1.5 Ma) and Dmanisi in the Caucasus (1.81 ± 0.03 Ma, p=0.05[13]).

China was populated as early as 1.66 Mya based on stone artifacts found in the Nihewan Basin. The archaeological site of Xihoudu in Shanxi Province is the earliest recorded use of fire by *Homo erectus*, which is dated 1.27 million years ago.[15]

Southeast Asia (Java) was reached about 1.7 million years ago (Meganthropus). Western Europe was first populated around 1.2 million years ago (Atapuerca).

Robert G. Bednarik has suggested that *Homo erectus* may have built rafts and sailed oceans, a theory that has raised some controversy.

After *H. erectus*

Spread of Denisovans and Neanderthals after 500,000 years ago
Known Neanderthal range with separate populations in Europe and the Caucasus (blue), the Near East (orange), Uzbekistan (green), and the Altai region (purple)
One million years after its dispersal, *H. erectus* was diverging into new species. *H. erectus* is a chronospecies and was never extinct, so that its "late survival" is a matter of taxonomic convention. Late forms of *H. erectus* are thought to have survived until after about 0.5 million ago to 143,000 years ago at the latest,[note 3] with derived forms classified as *H. antecessor* in Europe around 800,000 years ago and *H. heidelbergensis* in Africa around 600,000 years ago. *H. heidelbergensis* in its turn spread across East Africa (*H. rhodesiensis*) and to Eurasia, where it gave rise to Neanderthals and Denisovans.

H. heidelbergensis, Neanderthals and Denisovans expanded north beyond the 50th parallel (Eartham Pit, Boxgrove 500kya, Swanscombe Heritage Park 400kya, Denisova Cave 50 kya). It has been suggested that late Neanderthals may even have reached the boundary of the Arctic, by c. 32,000 years ago, when they were being displaced from their earlier habitats by *H. sapiens*, based on 2011 excavations at the site of Byzovaya in the Urals (Komi Republic, 65.02°N 57.42°E).

Other archaic human species are assumed to have spread throughout Africa by this time, although the fossil record is sparse. Their presence is assumed based on traces of admixture with modern humans found in the genome of African populations.[10][20][21][22]*Homo naledi*, discovered

in South Africa in 2013 and tentatively dated to about 300,000 years ago, may represent fossil evidence of such an archaic human species.

Neanderthals spread across the Near East and Europe, while Denisovans appear to have spread across Central and East Asia and to Southeast Asia and Oceania. There is evidence that Denisovans interbred with Neanderthals in Central Asia where their habitats overlapped.

1.3.2 Homo sapiens

Dispersal throughout Africa

Homo sapiens are believed to have emerged in Africa about 300,000 years ago, based in part on thermoluminescence dating of artefacts and remains from Jebel Irhoud, Morocco, published in 2017.[note 4][26] The Florisbad Skull from Florisbad, South Africa, dated to about 259,000 years ago, has also been classified as early *Homo sapiens*.

Previously, the Omo remains, excavated between 1967 and 1974 in Omo National Park, Ethiopia, and dated to 200,000 years ago, were long held to be the oldest known fossils of *homo sapiens*.

In September 2019, scientists reported the computerized determination, based on 260 CT scans, of a virtual skull shape of the last common human ancestor to modern humans/*H. sapiens*, representative of the earliest modern humans, and suggested that modern humans arose between 260,000 and 350,000 years ago through a merging of populations in East and South Africa.

In July 2019, anthropologists reported the discovery of 210,000 year old remains of a*H. sapiens* and 170,000 year old remains of a *H. neanderthalensis* in Apidima Cave in southern Greece, more than 150,000 years older than previous *H. sapiens* finds in Europe.

Early modern humans expanded to Western Eurasia and Central, Western and Southern Africa from the time of their emergence. While early expansions to Eurasia appear not to have persisted, expansions to Southern and Central Africa resulted in the deepest temporal divergence in living human populations. Early modern human expansion in sub-Saharan Africa appears to have contributed to the end of late Acheulean (Fauresmith) industries at about 130,000 years ago,

although very late coexistence of archaic and early modern humans, until as late as 12,000 years ago, has been argued for West Africa in particular.

The ancestors of the modern Khoi-San expanded to Southern Africa before 150,000 years ago, possibly as early as before 260,000 years ago,[note 5] so that by the beginning of the MIS 5 "megadrought", 130,000 years ago, there were two ancestral population clusters in Africa, bearers of mt-DNA haplogroup L0 in southern Africa, ancestral to the Khoi-San, and bearers of haplogroup L1-6 in central/eastern Africa, ancestral to everyone else. There was a significant back-migration of bearers of L0 towards eastern Africa between 120 and 75 kya.

Expansion to Central Africa by the ancestors of the Central African forager populations (African Pygmies) most likely took place before 130,000 years ago, and certainly before 60,000 years ago.

The situation in West Africa is difficult to interpret due to a sparsity of fossil evidence. *Homo sapiens* seems to have reached the western Sahelian zone by 130 kya, while tropical West African sites associated with *H. sapiens* are known only from after 130 kya. Unlike elsewhere in Africa, archaic MSA sites appear to persist until very late, down to the Holocene boundary (12 kya), pointing to the possibility of late survival of archaic humans, and late hybridization with *H. sapiens* in West Africa.

Early northern Africa dispersal

Populations of *H. sapiens* migrated to the Levant and to Europe between 130,000 and 115,000 years ago, and possibly in earlier waves as early as 185,000 years ago.[note 8] These early migrations do not appear to have led to lasting colonisation and receded by about 80,000 years ago. There is a possibility that this first wave of expansion may have reached China (or even North America[as early as 125,000 years ago, but would have died out without leaving a trace in the genome of contemporary humans.

There is some evidence that modern humans left Africa at least 125,000 years ago using two different routes: through the Nile Valley heading to the Middle East, at least into modern Israel (Qafzeh: 120,000–100,000 years ago); and a second route through the present-day Bab-el-

Mandeb Strait on the Red Sea (at that time, with a much lower sea level and narrower extension), crossing to the Arabian Peninsula and settling in places like the present-day United Arab Emirates (125,000 years ago) and Oman (106,000 years ago), and possibly reaching the Indian Subcontinent (Jwalapuram: 75,000 years ago). Although no human remains have yet been found in these three places, the apparent similarities between the stone tools found at Jebel Faya, those from Jwalapuram and some from Africa suggest that their creators were all modern humans.[45] These findings might give some support to the claim that modern humans from Africa arrived at southern China about 100,000 years ago (Zhiren Cave, Zhirendong, Chongzuo City: 100,000 years ago; and the Liujiang hominid (Liujiang County): controversially dated at 139,000–111,000 years ago. Dating results of the Lunadong (Bubing Basin, Guangxi, southern China) teeth, which include a right upper second molar and a left lower second molar, indicate that the molars may be as old as 126,000 years. Since these previous exits from Africa did not leave traces in the results of genetic analyses based on the Y chromosome and on MtDNA (which represent only a small part of the human genetic material), it seems that those modern humans did not survive in large numbers and were assimilated by our major antecessors. An explanation for their extinction (or small genetic imprint) may be the Toba eruption (74,000 years ago), though some argue it scarcely impacted human population.

An Asia center of origin and dispersal for the mtDNAhaplogroup L3 has also been hypothesized based on the fossil record, the similar coalescence dates of L3 and its Eurasian-distributed M and N derivative clades (~71 kya), the distant location in Southeast Asia of the oldest subclades of M and N, and the comparable age of the paternal haplogroupDE. After an initial Out-of-Africa migration of early anatomically modern humans around 125 kya, fully modern human L3-carrying females are thus proposed to have back-migrated from the maternal haplogroup's place of origin in Eurasia around 70 kya along with males bearing the paternal haplogroupE, which is also proposed to have originated in Eurasia. These new Eurasian lineages are then suggested to have largely replaced the old autochthonous male and female African lineages.

Other research suggests that earlier waves of modern human migration out of Africa predating 70kya mostly became extinct (contributing about 2% to the ancestry only of some Oceanian peoples such as Papuans) and that instead modern Eurasians descend from a single Out-of-Africa

migration occurring approximately 50,000-70,000 years ago associated with the origin and expansion of maternal haplogroup L3 from Eastern Africa.

Coastal migration

The so-called "recent dispersal" of modern humans has taken place after beginning about 70–50,000 years ago. It is this migration wave that led to the lasting spread of modern humans throughout the world.

A small group from a population in East Africa, bearing mitochondrial haplogroup L3 and numbering possibly fewer than 1,000 individuals, crossed the Red Sea strait at Bab el Mandib, to what is now Yemen, after around 75,000 years ago. A recent review has also shown support for the northern route through Sinai/Israel/Syria (Levant).[24] Their descendants spread along the coastal route around Arabia and Persia to the Indian subcontinent before 55,000 years ago. Other research supports a migration out of Africa between about 65,000 and 50,000 years ago. The coastal migration between roughly 70,000 and 50,000 years ago is associated with mitochondrial haplogroupsM and N, both derivative of L3.

A fragment of a jawbone with eight teeth found at Misliya Cave, Israel, has been dated to around 185,000 years ago. Layers dating from between 250,000 and 140,000 years ago in the same cave contained tools of the Levallois type which could put the date of the first migration even earlier if the tools can be associated with the modern human jawbone finds.

Along the way *H. sapiens* interbred with Neanderthals and Denisovans, with Denisovan DNA making 0.2% of mainland Asian and Native American DNA.

Near Oceania

Migrations continued along the Asian coast to Southeast Asia and Oceania, colonisingAustralia by around 50,000 years ago. By reaching Australia, *H. sapiens* for the first time expanded its habitat beyond that of *H. erectus*. Denisovan ancestry is shared by Melanesians, Australian Aborigines, and smaller scattered groups of people in Southeast Asia, such as the Mamanwa, a Negrito people in the Philippines, suggesting the interbreeding took place in Eastern Asia where

the Denisovans lived. Denisovans may have crossed the Wallace Line, with Wallacea serving as their last refugium. Homo erectus had crossed the Lombok gap reaching as far as Flores, but never made it to Australia. During this time sea level was much lower and most of Maritime Southeast Asia formed one land mass known as Sunda. Migration continued Southeast on the coastal route to the straits between Sunda and Sahul, the continental land mass of present-day Australia and New Guinea. The gaps on the Weber Line are up to 90 km wide, so the migration to Australia and New Guinea would have required seafaring skills. Migration also continued along the coast eventually turning northeast to China and finally reaching Japan before turning inland. This is evidenced by the pattern of mitochondrial haplogroups descended from haplogroup M, and in Y-chromosome

Sequencing of one Aboriginal genome from an old hair sample in Western Australia, revealed that the individual was descended from people who migrated into East Asia between 62,000 and 75,000 years ago. This supports the theory of a single migration into Australia and New Guinea before the arrival of Modern Asians (between 25,000 and 38,000 years ago) and their later migration into North America. This migration is believed to have happened around 50,000 years ago, before Australia and New Guinea were separated by rising sea levels approximately 8,000 years ago. This is supported by a date of 50,000–60,000 years ago for the oldest evidence of settlement in Australia, around 40,000 years ago for the oldest human remains, the earliest humans artifacts which are at least 65,000 years old and the extinction of the Australian megafauna by humans between 46,000 and 15,000 years ago argued by Tim Flannery, which is similar to what happened in the Americas. The continued use of stone age tools in Australia has been much debated.

Dispersal throughout Eurasia

Further information: Upper Paleolithic, Mammoth steppe, Archaic human admixture with modern humans, and Mousterian

The population brought to South Asia by coastal migration appears to have remained there for some time, during roughly 60,000 to 50,000 years ago, before spreading further throughout Eurasia. This dispersal of early humans, at the beginning of the Upper Paleolithic, gave rise to

the major population groups of the Old World and the Americas. Towards the West, Upper Paleolithic populations associated with mitochondrial haplogroupR and its derivatives, spread throughout Asia and Europe, with a back-migration of M1 to North Africa and the Horn of Africa several millennia ago. Presence in Europe is certain after 40,000 years ago, possibly as early as 43,000 years ago,rapidly replacing the Neanderthal population. Contemporary Europeans have Neanderthal ancestry, but it seems likely that substantial interbreeding with Neanderthals ceased before 47,000 years ago, i.e. took place before modern humans entered Europe.

There is evidence from mitochondrial DNA that modern humans have passed through at least one genetic bottleneck, in which genome diversity was drastically reduced. Henry Harpending has proposed that humans spread from a geographically restricted area about 100,000 years ago, the passage through the geographic bottleneck and then with a dramatic growth amongst geographically dispersed populations about 50,000 years ago, beginning first in Africa and thence spreading elsewhere.[89] Climatological and geological evidence suggests evidence for the bottleneck. The explosion of Toba, the largest volcanic eruption of the Quaternary, may have created a 1,000 year cold period, potentially reducing human populations to a few tropical refugia. It has been estimated that as few as 15,000 humans survived. In such circumstances genetic drift and founder effects may have been maximised. The greater diversity amongst African genomes may be reflect the extent of African refugia during the Toba incident. However, a recent review highlights that the single-source hypothesis of non-African populations is less consistent with ancient DNA analysis than multiple sources with genetic mixing across Eurasia.

Europe

The recent expansion of anatomically modern humans reached Europe around 40,000 years ago from Central Asia and the Middle East, as a result of cultural adaption to big game hunting of sub-glacial steppe fauna.[91]Neanderthals were present both in the Middle East and in Europe, and the arriving populations of anatomically modern humans (also known as "Cro-Magnon" or European early modern humans) interbred with Neanderthal populations to a limited degree. Populations of modern humans and Neanderthal overlapped in various regions such as the Iberian peninsula and the Middle East. Interbreeding may have contributed Neanderthal genes to

palaeolithic and ultimately modern Eurasians and Oceanians. An important difference between Europe and other parts of the inhabited world was the northern latitude. Archaeological evidence suggests humans, whether Neanderthal or Cro-Magnon, reached sites in Arctic Russia by 40,000 years ago.

Cro-Magnon are considered the first anatomically modern humans in Europe. They entered Eurasia by the Zagros Mountains (near present-day Iran and eastern Turkey) around 50,000 years ago, with one group rapidly settling coastal areas around the Indian Ocean and another migrating north to the steppes of Central Asia. Modern human remains dating to 43–45,000 years ago have been discovered in Italy and Britain, as well as in the European Russian Arctic from 40,000 years ago.Humans colonised the environment west of the Urals, hunting reindeer especially, but were faced with adaptive challenges; winter temperatures averaged from with fuel and shelter scarce. They travelled on foot and relied on hunting highly mobile herds for food. These challenges were overcome through technological innovations: tailored clothing from the pelts of fur-bearing animals; construction of shelters with hearths using bones as fuel; and digging "ice cellars" into the permafrost to store meat and bones.A mitochondrial DNA sequence of two Cro-Magnons from the Paglicci Cave in Italy, dated to 23,000 and 24,000 years old (Paglicci 52 and 12), identified the mtDNA as Haplogroup N, typical of the latter group.

The expansion of modern human population is thought to have begun 45,000 years ago, and it may have taken 15,000–20,000 years for Europe to be colonized.

During this time, the Neanderthals were slowly being displaced. Because it took so long for Europe to be occupied, it appears that humans and Neanderthals may have been constantly competing for territory. The Neanderthals had larger brains, and were larger overall, with a more robust or heavily built frame, which suggests that they were physically stronger than modern *Homo sapiens*. Having lived in Europe for 200,000 years, they would have been better adapted to the cold weather. The anatomically modern humans known as the Cro-Magnons, with widespread trade networks, superior technology and bodies likely better suited to running, would eventually completely displace the Neanderthals, whose last refuge was in the Iberian peninsula. After about 25,000 years ago the fossil record of the Neanderthals ends, indicating extinction. The last known population lived around a cave system on the remote south-facing coast of

Gibraltar from 30,000 to 24,000 years ago. From the extent of linkage disequilibrium, it was estimated that the last Neanderthal gene flow into early ancestors of Europeans occurred 47,000–65,000 years BP. In conjunction with archaeological and fossil evidence, interbreeding is thought to have occurred somewhere in Western Eurasia, possibly the Middle East. Studies show a higher Neanderthal admixture in East Asians than in Europeans. North African groups share a similar excess of derived alleles with Neanderthals as non-African populations, whereas Sub-Saharan African groups are the only modern human populations with no substantial Neanderthal admixture. The Neanderthal-linked haplotype B006 of the dystrophin gene has also been found among nomad pastoralist groups in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, who are associated with northern populations. Consequently, the presence of this B006 haplotype on the northern and northeastern perimeter of Sub-Saharan Africa is attributed to gene flow from a non-African point of origin.

East and North Asia

"Tianyuan Man", an individual who lived in China c. 40,000 years ago, showed substantial Neanderthal admixture. A 2017 study of the ancient DNA of Tianyuan Man found that the individual is related to modern Asian and Native American populations.A 2013 study found Neanderthal introgression of 18 genes within the chromosome region (HYAL region) of East Asians. The introgressive haplotypes were positively selected in only East Asian populations, rising steadily from 45,000 years ago until a sudden increase of growth rate around 5,000 to 3,500 years ago. They occur at very high frequencies among East Asian populations in contrast to other Eurasian populations (e.g. European and South Asian populations). The findings also suggests that this Neanderthal introgression occurred within the ancestral population shared by East Asians and Native Americans.

A 2016 study presented an analysis of the population genetics of the Ainu people of northern Japan as key to the reconstruction of the early peopling of East Asia. The Ainu were found to represent a more basal branch than the modern farming populations of East Asia, suggesting an ancient (pre-Neolithic) connection with northeast Siberians. A 2013 study associated several phenotypical traits associated with Mongoloids with a single mutation of the EDAR gene, dated to c. 35,000 years ago.

Mitochondrial haplogroupsA, B and G originated about 50,000 years ago, and bearers subsequently colonized Siberia, Korea and Japan, by about 35,000 years ago. Parts of these populations migrated to North America during the Last Glacial Maximum.

Last Glacial Maximum

Eurasia

Schematic illustration of the Beringia migration based on matrilineal genetics: Arrival of Central Asian populations to the BeringianMammoth steppe c. 25,000 years ago, followed by a "swift peoplling of the Americas.

Around 20,000 years ago, approximately 5,000 years after the Neanderthal extinction, the Last Glacial Maximum forced northern hemisphere inhabitants to migrate to several shelters (refugia) until the end of this period. The resulting populations are presumed to have resided in such refuges during the LGM to ultimately reoccupy Europe, where archaic historical populations are considered their descendants. The composition of European populations was later altered by further migrations, notably the Neolithic expansion from the Middle East, and still later the Chalcolithic population movements associated with Indo-European expansion. A Paleolithic site on the Yana River, Siberia, at 71°N, lies well above the Arctic Circle and dates to 27,000 radiocarbon years before present, during glacial times. This site shows that people adapted to this harsh, high-latitude, Late Pleistocene environment much earlier than previously though

Americas

Paleo-Indians originated from Central Asia, crossing the Beringia land bridge between eastern Siberia and present-day Alaska Humans lived throughout the Americas by the end of the last glacial period, or more specifically what is known as the late glacial maximum, no earlier than 23,000 years before present. Details of Paleo-Indian migration to and throughout the American continent, including the dates and the routes traveled, are subject to ongoing research and discussion. The routes of migration are also debated. The traditional theory is that these early migrants moved when sea levels were significantly lowered due to the Quaternary glaciation, following herds of now-extinct pleistocenemegafauna along *ice-free corridors* that stretched

between the Laurentide and Cordilleran ice sheets. Another route proposed is that, either on foot or using primitive boats, they migrated down the Pacific coast to South America as far as Chile. Any archaeological evidence of coastal occupation during the last Ice Age would now have been covered by the sea level rise, up to a hundred metres since then. The recent finding of indigenous Australasian genetic markers in Amazonia supports the coastal route hypothesis.

Holocene migrations

Further information: Pre-modern human migration, Mesolithic, and Urheimat

Prehistoric migration routes for Y-chromosome Haplogroup N lineage following the retreat of ice sheets after the Last Glacial Maximum (22–18 kya)The Holocene is taken to begin 12,000 years ago, after the end of the Last Glacial Maximum. During the Holocene climatic optimum, beginning about 9,000 years ago, human populations which had been geographically confined to refugia began to migrate. By this time, most parts of the globe had been settled by *H. sapiens*; however, large areas that had been covered by glaciers were now re-populated. This period sees the transition from the Mesolithic to the Neolithic stage throughout the temperate zone. The Neolithic subsequently gives way to the Bronze Age in Old World cultures and the gradual emergence of the historical record in the Near East and China beginning around 4,000 years ago. Large-scale migrations of the Mesolithic to Neolithic era are thought to have given rise to the pre-modern distribution of the world's major language families such as the Niger-Congo, Nilo-Saharan, Afro-Asiatic, Uralic, Sino-Tibetan or Indo-European phyla. The speculative Nostratic theory postulates the derivation of the major language families of Eurasia (excluding Sino-Tibetan) from a single proto-languages spoken at the beginning of the Holocene period.

Eurasia

Further information: Neolithic Revolution, Indo-European expansion, and Proto-Uralic homeland hypotheses

Evidence published in 2014 from genome analysis of ancient human remains suggests that the modern native populations of Europe largely descend from three distinct lineages: "Western Hunter-Gatherers", derivative of the Cro-Magnon population of Europe, Early European Farmers

introduced to Europe from the Near East during the Neolithic Revolution and Ancient North Eurasians which expanded to Europe in the context of the Indo-European expansion.

Sub-Saharan Africa

The Nilotic peoples are thought to be derived from an earlier undifferentiated Eastern Sudanic unity by the 3rd millennium BCE. The development of the Proto-Nilotes as a group may have been connected with their domestication of livestock. The Eastern Sudanic unity must have been considerably earlier still, perhaps around the 5th millennium BCE (while the proposed Nilo-Saharan unity would date to the Upper Paleolithic about 15kya). The original locus of the early Nilotic speakers was presumably east of the Nile in what is now South Sudan. The Proto-Nilotes of the 3rd millennium BCE were pastoralists, while their neighbors, the Proto-Central Sudanic peoples, were mostly agriculturalists. The Niger-Congo phylum is thought to have emerged around 6,000 years ago in West or Central Africa. Its expansion may have been associated with the expansion of Sahel agriculture in the African Neolithic period, following the desiccation of the Sahara in c. 3900 BCE.[127] The Bantu expansion has spread the Bantu languages to Central, Eastern and Southern Africa, partly replacing the indigenous populations of these regions. Beginning about 3,000 years ago, it reached South Africa about 1,700 years ago. Some evidence (including a 2016 study by Busby et al.) suggests admixture from ancient amd recent migrations from Eurasia into parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Another study (Ramsay et al. 2018) also shows evidence that ancient Eurasians migrated into Africa and that Eurasian admixture in modern Sub-Saharan Africans ranges from 0% to 50%, varying by region and generally higher in the Horn of Africa and parts of the Sahel zone, and found to a lesser degree in certain parts of Western Africa, and Southern Africa (excluding recent immigrants).

Indo-Pacific

The first seaborne human migrations were by the Austronesian peoples originating from Taiwan known as the "Austronesian expansion".[131] Using advanced sailing technologies like catamarans, outrigger boats, and crab claw sails, they built the first sea-going ships and rapidly colonized Island Southeast Asia at around 3000 to 1500 BCE. From the Philippines and Eastern Indonesia they colonized Micronesia by 2200 to 1000 BCE. A branch of the Austronesians

reached Island Melanesia between 1600 to 1000 BCE, establishing the Lapita culture (named after the archaeological site in Lapita, New Caledonia, where their characteristic pottery was first discovered). They are the direct ancestors of the modern Polynesians. They ventured into Remote Oceania reaching Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and Fiji by 1200 BCE, and Samoa and Tonga by around 900 to 800 BCE. This was the furthest extent of the Lapita culture expansion. During a period of around 1,500 years, they gradually lost the technology for pottery (likely due to the lack of clay deposits in the islands), replacing it with carved wooden and bamboo containers. Back-migrations from the Lapita culture also merged back Island Southeast Asia in 1500 BCE, and into Micronesia at around 200 BCE. It was not until 700 CE when they started voyaging further into the Pacific Ocean, when they colonized the Cook Islands, the Society Islands, and the Marquesas. From there, they further colonized Hawaii by 900 CE, Rapa Nui by 1000 CE, and New Zealand by 1200 CE.In the Indian Ocean, Austronesians from Borneo also colonized Madagascar and the Comoros Islands by around 500 CE. Austronesians remain the dominant ethnolinguistic group of the islands of the Indo-Pacific, and were the first to establish a maritime trade network reaching as far west as East Africa and the Arabian peninsula. They assimilated earlier Pleistocene to early Holocene human overland migrations through Sundaland like the Papuans and the Negritos in Island Southeast Asia. The Austronesian expansion was the last and the most far-reaching Neolithic human migration event.

Caribbean

The Caribbean was one of the last places in the Americas that were settled by humans. The oldest remains are known from the Greater Antilles (Cuba and Hispaniola) dating between 4000–3500 BCE, and comparisons between tool-technologies suggest that these peoples moved across the Yucatán Channel from Central America. All evidence suggests that later migrants from 2000 BCE and onwards originated from South America, via the Orinoco region. The descendants of these migrants include the ancestors of the Taíno and Kalinago (Island Carib) peoples.

Arctic

The earliest inhabitants of North America's central and eastern Arctic are referred to as the Arctic small tool tradition (AST) and existed c. 2500 BCE. AST consisted of several Paleo-Eskimo

cultures, including the Independence cultures and Pre-Dorset cultureThe Inuit are the descendants of the Thule culture, which emerged from western Alaska around AD 1000 and gradually displaced the Dorset culture

1.4 Causes and Consequences of migration

According to Alden Speare, "in the strictest sense migration can be considered to be involuntary only when a person is physically transported from a country and has no opportunity to escape from those transporting him." Movement under threat, even the immediate threat to life, contains a voluntary element, as long as there is an option to escape to another part of the country, go into hiding or to remain and hope to avoid persecution." However this thought has been questioned, especially by Marxians, who argue that in most cases migrants have little or no choice.[6]

Causes for forced migration can include:

- Natural disaster: Occurrence of a disaster – such as floods, tsunamis, landslides, earthquakes or volcanoes – leads to temporary or permanent displacement of population from that area. In such a scenario, migration becomes more of a survival strategy, as natural disasters often cause the loss of money, homes, and jobs. For example, Hurricane Katrina resulted in displacement of almost the entire population of New Orleans, leaving the community and government with several economic and social challenges.

- Environmental problems: The term environmental refugee has been in use recently representing people who are forced to leave their traditional habitat because of environmental factors which negatively impact their livelihood, or even environmental disruption i.e. biological, physical or chemical change in ecosystem. Migration can also occur as a result of slow-onset climate change, such asdesertification or sea-level rise, of deforestation or land degradation.

- Man-made disasters: Examples are industrial accidents and especially accidents that involve chemicals or radioactivity, such as inChernobyl, Bhopal or Fukushima.

- War, civil war, political repression or religious conflicts: Some migrants are impelled to cross national borders by war or persecution, due to political, social, ethnic, religious reasons. These immigrants may be considered refugees if they apply for asylum in the receiving country.

- Development-induced displacement: Such displacement or population transfer is the forcing of communities and individuals out of their homes, often also their homelands, for the purposes of economic development. It has been historically associated with the construction of dams for hydroelectric power and irrigation purposes but also appears due to many other activities, such as mining and transport (roads, ports, airports). The best-known recent example of such development-induced displacement may be that resulting from the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China. This type of forced migration disproportionately affects low income earners and ethnic minorities. According to estimates, between 90 and 100 million people were forced to leave their homes due to development projects in the 1990s.
- Human trafficking and human smuggling: Migrants displaced through deception or coercion with purpose of their exploitation fall under this category. The data on such forced migration are limited since the activities involved are clandestine in nature. While migration of this nature is well covered for male migrants (working in agriculture, construction etc.), same cannot be said for their female counterparts as the market situation for them might be unscrupulous (sex work or domestic service). The International Labour Organization considers trafficking an offence against labor protection and denies them the opportunity of utilizing their resources for their country. ILO's Multilateral Framework includes principle no. 11 that recommends, "Governments should formulate and implement, in consultation with the social partners, measures to prevent abusive practices, migrant smuggling and people trafficking; they should also work towards preventing irregular labor migration.
- Slavery: History's greatest forced migration was the Middle Passage of the Atlantic slave trade during the 15th through the 19th centuries. Of the 20 million Africans captured for the trade, half died in their forced march to the African coast, and another ten to twenty percent died on slave ships carrying them from Africa to the Americas.[10]
- Ethnic cleansing: The systematic forced removal of ethnic or religious groups from a given territory by a more powerful ethnic group, with the intent of making it ethnically homogeneous. For example, during counter-Reformation the Catholics removed of Protestants during the 16th through 19th centuries in Europe (e.g. Salzburg Protestants).

Forced migration has caused millions of people around the world to be uprooted, including refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants. 20 people are forced to leave their home every minute and the global total of forcibly displaced people currently stands at over 65 million. 10 million of them stateless and 22 million are refugees in a foreign land.*

While we often associate civil conflict with forced migration, these aren't the only reasons that people around the world leave their homes (often with nothing but the clothes on their back) in order to have a better life.

1. **Drought**

A single drought can mean disaster for communities whose lives and livelihoods rely on regular, successful harvests. In a number of African countries where Concern works, including Somalia, Kenya, Malawi, and Ethiopia, droughts have become increasingly severe, leaving millions of citizens without the ability to grow the food that feeds them and their livestock.

Drought also leaves families without access to clean water, often leading to them turning to dirty water as their only alternative for bathing, drinking, and growing crops. For families, this can mean going up to three days without food and resorting to contaminated water which could potentially bring disease — an especially precarious situation for the elderly, children, and pregnant and lactating women.

What people in these regions don't consume from their own harvests is sold to cover vital costs, and so without any other alternatives, families are often separated by forced migration, with one parent (usually the father) seeking work in a city to cover costs. Other families leave as a unit to begin their life in a new country.

2. **Hurricanes and Flooding**

A lack of water isn't the only natural disaster that can force communities to uproot: Countries that are vulnerable to heavy rains or and high winds are also at risk for cases of forced migration. After Hurricane Matthew made landfall in Haiti in 2016, the storm's lethal winds and rain left 200,000 homes in its wake of destruction. An estimated 1.5 million citizens — or more than 10% of the country — were left in need of humanitarian aid and damages clocked in at $1.9 billion.

(A hurricane is a storm that occurs in the Atlantic Ocean and northeastern Pacific Ocean, a typhoon occurs in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, and a cyclone occurs in the south Pacific or Indian Ocean.)

In addition to losing houses and communities and being at risk for waterborne diseases, areas affected by heavy rains, such as those seen in Somalia last September, can also demolish crops and kill livestock. Almost 60,000 Haitians currently live and work in the United States, many driven from their homes due to the devastating effects of two major hurricanes and one earthquake in recent years.

According to a report published in 2017 by Cornell University, climate change could account for up to 1.4 billion forced migrations by the year 2060. By 2100, they estimate that number would surpass 2 billion.

3. Earth Quake

In 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake hit Haiti's capital city of Port-au-Prince as well as the surrounding area, leaving 1.5 million Haitians homeless. No natural disaster had ever affected a capital city in such a way, creating a ripple effect that paralyzed even certain areas well outside the disaster zone.

Five years later, 2015 saw devastating earthquakes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (7.5-magnitude) and two separate earthquakes in Nepal (7.8-magnitude and 7.3-magnitude, respectively).

4. Disease

Contagious disease and outbreaks often follow in the wake of issues brought up by drought, flooding, and earthquakes. When crops are threatened and water supplies are either limited or contaminated, the risk for infection increases.

For migrants, even if disease isn't a contributing factor for forced migration, it may still become a risk during migration. In a 2015 article for the peer-reviewed journal Virulence titled "Climate change-related migration and infectious disease," Dr. Celia McMichael of the University of Melbourne notes the reciprocal cycle between forced migration and disease, particularly in the

wake of natural occurrences as noted above. Populations relocating (both internally and internationally) are at a higher risk for contracting disease because they're exposed to infection possibilities in new locations either once they've resettled or in the midst of travel. They're also at a high risk for spreading diseases that they may unknowingly bring from their homeland.

5. War and conflict

Conflict is the most common factor for forced migration around the world and throughout history. Most recently, the world's focus has been on the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, with over half a million of the country's Muslim population fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh in the wake of violence and ethnic cleansing. Though the Rohingya originally migrated to Myanmar during British rule of Bangladesh and have lived in the country for generations, Myanmar (a majority Buddhist nation) refuses to acknowledge them as citizens, rendering them a stateless people. In 2017, amid the escalation of ongoing tension and violence, the United Nations deemed the plight of the Rohingya the "fastest-growing refugee emergency" in the world.

Ongoing, too, is Syria's deadly civil war, which to date has left nearly 6.3 million Syrians displaced within the country and over 5 million Syrian citizens seeking safety in neighboring countries including Lebanon and Turkey. The Democratic Republic of Congo has the highest number of displaced people on the continent of Africa, with nearly 6 million people forced from their homes by various conflicts, and South Sudan has been continuously plagued by war-induced migration during its short existence.

1.5 Benefits of Migration

1.5.1 Economic Benefits

According to Immigration is one of the most important issues in the contemporary global economy.1Itis estimated that over 110 million people now reside outside the country of their birth (United Nations, 2002).This clearly has major economic and political implications for boththe sending and receiving countries.Coppel et al.(2001) identify four major consequencesof international population movements.Firstly, there is the effect that immigration hason the host country's labour market.Although the possible adverse effects that immi-gration can have on the wage and employment levels of natives are typically examined,immigration may also have a role to play in reducing skill shortages in certain key sectorsof the economy.Secondly, immigration is

likely to influence the budgetary position of thereceiving country since the amount recent arrivals receive through health, education andwelfare systems is unlikely to exactly balance the increased tax revenues from new workers.

Thirdly, it is argued that immigration may be a solution to the ageing population prob-lem that faces many OECD countries.

Hence,immigration can have a major economicimpact on the source country.These effects can either be negative, in terms of braindrain (though a brain drain can be beneficial if it creates incentives for human capitalinvestment in the source country), or positive since migrants' remittances are thought tobe an important economic development tool for many labour exporting countries

The effect of migration and remittances on non-migrating family members has long attracted attention. Migration and remittances can increase investment in human and physical capital (Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003, Hildebrand and McKenzie, 2003, Mesnard, 2004), reduce poverty and alter inequality in the home country (Adams, 1992; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996). It can also induce chain migration (Dimova and Wolff, 2009). Remittances have long been viewed as a means to combat poverty, to improve consumption, to raise standard of living. Remittances, however, can also enable investment in human capital resources (especially education) of the next generation. Haberfeld, Semyonov and Xing (2010) examines the impact of remittances sent by labor migrants from India on the standard of living (as a proxy of consumption) and on the education of young children (as a proxy of investment in human capital) on non-migrating family members. Also in recent research links migration, transfers and child labor, showing in the aftermath of migration and the transfers sent by emigrating parents may enable the children and other family members to stop working (Epstein and Kahana, 2008).

In addition as to a reflection by OECD Development Centre 2018, Immigrants indeed play a diverse set of roles and exert a variety of influences on the economy of the host country:

As workers, immigrants are part of, but also have an impact on, the labour market; they also alter the country's income distribution and influence domestic investment priorities.

As students, immigrants – or their children – contribute to increasing the stock of human capital and diffusing knowledge.

As entrepreneurs and investors, they create job opportunities and promote innovation and technological change.

As consumers, they contribute to increasing the demand for domestic – and foreign – goods and services, thus affecting the price and production levels, as well as the trade balance.

As savers, they not only send remittances to their countries of origin but also contribute indirectly, through the bank system, to fostering investment in their host countries.

As tax payers, they contribute to the public budget and benefit from public services.Through these different roles, immigrants can help stimulate economic growth in their countries of destination and thus promote development. Immigrants also contribute to the social and cultural diversity of the communities in which they live.

1.5.2 Diversity and Development

Stakeholders dispute whether cultural diversity creates economic costs or benefits. On one hand, a richer pool of expertise and experiences can create organisational synergies, leading to better outcomes for all. At a macro level, diverse societal norms, customs, and ethics can nurture technological innovation, the diffusion of new ideas, and so the production of a greater variety of goods and services (Ager and Brückner 2013, Ottaviano and Peri 2006)

The literature on immigration emphasises that immigrants represent human resources, particularly appropriate for innovation and technological progress (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2013). So, as with the effect of education, the level of heterogeneity in their composition should enhance human capital formation and favour the adoption of new technologies (Nelson and Phelps 1966). Rich countries are closer to the technological frontier, thus the strength of the catch-up effect becomes smaller the more developed the host country is. This implies that developing economies would benefit the most from diversityimmigration-fuelled diversity is good for economic growth. We recommend more openness to immigration so as to reap the large unrealised benefits from an increased range of skills and ideas in the destination country. Cultural diversity is a phenomenon that is continually changing, and difficult to define. Individuals have many observable characteristics – race, language, religion, nationality, wealth,

education – but only some categories have economic salience. Because we don't yet know which markers of identity are economically important, this subject will be a fertile area of study for the foreseeable future.

Chapter two

2. Transnationalism: living across borders

2.1 From Assimilation to transnationalism

Assimilation or Transnationalism? Conceptual Models of the Immigrant Experience in America

Americans are immigrants—people whose origins are various but whose destinies made them American. Immigration—voluntary or involuntary—is what created all multiracial and multicultural nations. The United States is a prime example. Sometimes the migrants moved freely from the area of origin to the area of destination. Such was the experience of the European immigrants. Sometimes their movement was coerced and resulted from processes not of their own making. This was the experience of enslaved Africans as well as of Mexicans, Native Americans, and Puerto Ricans, whose history began with conquest and annexation. Sometimes their movement was semi-coerced and semi-free— the experience of indentured servants (whether Japanese, Chinese, Irish, or Germans) in the nineteenth century and of refugees, such as Jews at the turn of the twentieth century and Cubans, Cambodians, Guatemalans, Salvadorans in the latter part of the twentieth century.

The major questions in immigration research can be summarized briefly as follows: What led people to make the decision to move—what "push" and "pull" factors impelled them to displace and uproot themselves (see Lee, 1966)? What is the nature of the crossing—not only literally but also, more abstractly, the policies of two governments that can, in societies that have developed long histories of emigration and immigration, result in their developing systems of economic and political migration (see Burawoy, 1976; Pedraza-Bailey, 1985)? And, what can they attain afterwards? A recurrent question in studies of immigration is: How do we best describe that process—as assimilation, adaptation, integration, incorporation, or transnationalism and diasporic citizenship? This paper traces the development of these concepts overtime as social scientists struggled to explain these important social processes.

ASSIMILATION

The study of immigrants was closely wedded with the beginnings of social science in America at the turn of the 20th century (Portes 1978). Immigrants and their plight were the focus of vivid studies from the early days of "the Chicago school," the first major department of Sociology in the U.S. Their work on immigration, ethnic, and urban studies laid the very foundations of American sociology (e.g., Park and Burgess, 1921; Park, 1928, 1950; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927). Despite varying emphases, they shared the expectation that the outcome to the process of integrating those who arrived at its shores would be a process of assimilation. Yet from the outset there was an ambiguity in the idea that Park himself (1950 [1913]) underscored. "Assimilation" meant to become alike—but like whom? And in what way? That ambiguity remained until Milton Gordon (1964) distinguished among types of assimilation: cultural vs. structural. But the fundamental characteristic of assimilation theory was already evident: assimilation was expected to be a one-way process that would also be natural and evolutionary, process that as time passed would yield the inevitable outcome of the adaptation of minority ethnic groups to the mainstream culture. A very different concept—transculturation—arose in Cuba, the peopling of which through conquest and immigration resembled that of the United States. Fernando Ortiz (1983 [1963]), one of Cuba's leading social scientists, proposed the notion of transculturation to signify how one culture comes to express itself in another, as was the case of Santería, the popular religious expression in Cuba that blended West African beliefs with Spanish Catholicism. Even in the United States, another important text of the time, Nathan

Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's (1963) Beyond the Melting Pot examined the incorporation of Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish in New York City and found substantial ethnic malleability and persistence. But the leading influence was that of the assimilation school, a major exponent of which was Glazer (1971), who argued that while Blacks did not seem to be assimilating to the mainstream, due to the Southern experience of slavery and "Jim Crow," in the North their experience more closely resembled that of other immigrants, and, in due time, they would also achieve it.

As Gordon defined it, cultural assimilation entailed a process of acculturation on the part of the immigrants, of becoming "alike" in cultural patterns, such as language, behavior, and values; while structural assimilation resulted only when the immigrants had been "taken up and incorporated" and entailed the full integration of the immigrants and their descendants into the major institutions of the society (educational, occupational, political) and into the social cliques, clubs, and institutions of the core society that lead to intimate primary relationships, including intermarriage. This distinction aimed to provide a more exact conceptual tool, a yardstick to measure the extent of the assimilation of immigrants and racial minorities in America.

The Chicago school in the early part of the century also emphasized the "natural history" of ethnic relations, as best expressed in Park's race relations cycle. Park evolved his theory of the race relations cycle as stages of interaction through which immigrant or racial groups progressed irreversibly: contact, competition, and accommodation, culminating in eventual assimilation (1950:138–58). Because at the root of his thinking was the ecological emphasis on race relations as spatial relations that defined the Chicago school of urban sociology, Park expected that the notion of assimilation and the stages of the race relations cycle could be extended to immigrants and racial minorities alike. From his point of view, both European immigrants and American Blacks came from rural, peasant backgrounds and, upon migration to the urban ghetto, confronted a similar clash of cultures. Thus immigration and race and ethnic relations could both be viewed within the same frame of reference.

This perspective was clearly apparent in another of the classics of the Chicago school: W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1927). Drawing

from the work of Thomas, Park also was responsible for articulating the theory of the "marginal man." In 1928, Park stressed that marginal human beings—those who, as a result of migration, ended up by living simultaneously in two separate worlds—were not only marginal, never fully belonging to the one or the other, but also enormously creative and intelligent, as experiencing more than one social world had sharpened their vision and sensibilities. Park extended the concept of the marginal man from its origins in the notion of the human being caught between two cultures—the immigrant, the mixed-blood person (Eurasian, mestizo, or mulatto), the outcast and stranger (the Jew)—to encompass the experience of American Blacks who shared the same national culture but lived at the margins of society in social, rather than cultural or ethnic, marginality. Thus, it was left to E. Franklin Frazier (1957), student of the Chicago school and Black sociologist in the 1950s, to demarcate the difference between race relations and ethnic relations. He underscored that American Blacks had experienced successive forms of economic subordination (slavery, the plantation society, "Jim Crow") with the outcome of extensive cultural assimilation but, rather than final structural assimilation, complete social and institutional segregation. Sociologists, then, in the early part of the 20th century were concerned with what the experience of immigration had done to the immigrants' lives themselves and with the outcomes to the process of integrating those who arrived at its shores, outcomes that were usually conceptualized as acculturation and assimilation—becoming like the dominant population, which at the turn of the century clearly meant conformity to Anglo-Saxon ways (Gordon, 1964).

Research on immigrants and the eventual outcomes of the processes of immigration, therefore, was at the very foundations of American sociology. But that emphasis began to wane until, in the 1960s, it all but disappeared. Several different trends promoted its disappearance. First, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1924 cut the massive waves of European immigration to the United States. Second, under the pressures of Anglo-conformity, the children of those European immigrants went on to assimilate in American society at a time when the price of success was often one's ethnicity and identity. Like Paul Cowan (1982), writer for The Village Voice whose real name should have been Saul Cohen, many successful Americans became orphans in history, having lost their ethnic legacies. This could be seen in how often the old immigrants had to change their names, to Anglicize them. Looking at the first generation of Hollywood movie stars,

for example, Kirk Douglas (father of our Michael Douglas today) was really the Eastern European Jewish IssurAnielovitch; Rita Hayworth, the love goddess, was really Spanish— Margarita Carmen Cansino. Third, as Portes (1978) stressed, the research focus on immigrants and immigration was also lost as a result of the arrival of the racial demands and militancy of the Civil Rights Movement so that the analytical focus shifted to that of racial and ethnic relations. And in the process what is really distinctive about immigrants was lost. What is distinctive about immigrants? At the micro level, that they have experienced another whole life in another country and culture, which they bring with them and decisively continues to influence them; and, at the macro level, that the state in two societies permits the immigrants to exit and enter. As gatekeeper, the state regulates and directs migration through a body of law.

From the theoretical vantage point, immigrants are also distinct in that they bring with them a whole host of social resources (their social class, education, occupation, culture, values) from another society and their outcomes in American society will be partly a function of those initial resources, partly a function of the nature of their migration (whether they are political or economic immigrants, victims of genocide, settlers, or sojourners), and partly a function of the social context that greeted them, of the amount of opportunity available to them in their new society (in the particular cities and industries where they became concentrated, in the nature of the discrimination or exclusion they afterwards faced).

INTERNAL COLONIALISM

In sociology the major challenge to assimilation theory came from the proponents of the internal colonialism model, the theoretical effort to delineate in what ways the experiences of the racial minorities (Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Native Americans—some of its oldest immigrants and most indigenous native sons and daughters) differed significantly from the experiences and eventual assimilation of the White European immigrants at the turn of the century. The internal colonialism model underscored that the experience of these groups was different in that they had suffered a process of internal colonization due to their place and role in the system of production, place and role they came to occupy because of their color, their race (Blauner, 1969; Barrera,

1979). Proponents of the internal colonialism model underscored that the European migration had been voluntary, the result of decisions the immigrants themselves had taken, while the migration of the racial minorities had been involuntary, the result of slavery, annexation, conquest—processes that involved substantial violence. Moreover, they stressed, the European immigrants had changed their cultural patterns at will, gradually over the course of generations, while cultural change had been imposed on the racial minorities. Even more, the ghetto had been only a one or two generation phenomena for the European immigrants and their descendants, while for the racial minorities it had become a nearly permanent condition. Last, they stressed, the European immigrants had substantial control of their own communities, through teachers, policemen, small business owners, social workers, while the racial minorities' communities had been manned and controlled by outsiders. Hence, the racial minorities had suffered from a process of colonization, unlike anything experienced by the European immigrants.

An important corrective to the assimilation model, the internal colonialism model itself suffered from stretching the colonial analogy overly far, not recognizing the essential differences between the domestic situation of race relations in the United States and what happened in Africa and Asia. Thereafter, Joe Feagin (1978) sought to transcend the shortcomings of both the assimilation and internal colonialism models by focusing on the varying ways in which different ethnic groups were incorporated, became a part of the society, by paying attention to the initial and continuing placement and access of various groups within the economic, political, and educational institutions of the society.

Still, as a central concept that guided research, incorporation, like its predecessor, assimilation, assumed a one-way process, failing to take into account that immigrants not only become incorporated into a new society, they also transform it. Immigrants did not just become incorporated into American society, they made and remade America and are fashioning her still.

Despite the challenges the concept of assimilation and acculturation received from other concepts, such as internal colonialism, incorporation, and more recently transnationalism, and diasporic citizenship, Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003) argued in Remaking the American Mainstream that it is still a necessary concept. In their view, assimilation is a grand narrative that

served to describe well the experience of the Southern and Eastern European immigrants, as well as the Asian immigrants who arrived at the turn of the 20th century and, over the course of several generations, went on to join the mainstream of American life in terms of their levels of educational attainment, patterns of suburbanization, and intermarriage. As Alba and Nee emphasized, the process by which they achieved parity in terms of their life chances was partly historically contingent— dependent on two World Wars, the GI Bill, and the like. It was also racialized—that is, exclusive to those who had become "White" in the process. Banks, other credit lenders, and real estate developers kept Blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans from joining the mainstream of life in suburbia due to their race. Still, even for those formerly excluded groups, there has been progress. Reynolds Farley and Richard Alba, in "The New Second Generation in the U.S." (2002) examined the pattern of occupational distribution for older immigrants and for the new second generation in the United States in 1998–2000. They showed that even for those groups dominated by low-wage labor immigrants in the first generation (such as Mexicans, Central Americans, and Afro-Caribbeans), there has been considerable improvement in the average occupational position in the second generation, though not to the point of parity with native-born whites, as is the case for Asians and South Americans, immigrants who arrived with high levels of human capital. Hence, it would seem that for all the challenges to the concepts of assimilation and acculturation over time, the concepts are still useful in exactly the way Gordon intended them to be: as a conceptual yardstick with which to measure the extent to which various groups have joined the American mainstream over the course of time.

TRANSNATIONALISM

As a result of the fourth wave of American immigration that we are still living through, sociology refocused its research on immigrants as a social category distinct from racial and ethnic minorities and on immigration as an international process that reshuffles persons and cultures across nations, until we now find ourselves amidst a veritable explosion of immigration research as well as a search for new concepts such as those of transnationalism and diasporic citizenship with which to describe the new realities.

The concept of transnationalism arose when social scientists noticed that under the impact of changes in the nature of modern communications at this century's end, many immigrants fail to shed their old identities and totally assimilate. Instead, they developed new bicultural identities and live their lives and are quite involved in more than one nation, more than one world—in effect making the home and adopted countries both one lived social world. In his study of Mexican working class immigrants living in Redwood City, California, Roger Rouse found that "while they lived in Redwood City, they were also living deep in western Mexico" (1992:45) and were obliged to balance two quite different ways of life, which resulted in "cultural bifocality," as he expressed it.

Linda Basch and colleagues (1994:7) formalized the definition of transnationalism now in use: the process by which immigrants "forge and sustain multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement." Thus, they underscored, immigrants "take actions, make decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more nations" (Basch et al. 1994:7). Like all social processes, it has economic, political, and social dimensions, both in its causes and consequences. However, soon thereafter the cry arose that transnationalism is not new, though much of the literature sounds as if it is (Foner 1997; Moya 2004; Waldinger 2004). Comparing immigrants at the turn of the century with contemporary immigrants to New York—the quintessential immigrant city—Foner (1997) showed that many transnational patterns actually have a long history. At the turn of the last century, many immigrants were involved in what is now called transnationalism. For example, Italian and Russian immigrants also kept ties of sentiment and family alive with those back home by living in what today are called "transnational households" with members scattered across households; by sending remittances back home; and by making political contributions for particular causes, such as the Irish support for the nationalist cause back home. Moreover, with the exception of Russian Jews who fled from political and religious persecution, the return rates for many immigrant groups, like the Italians, were extremely high, around one-third, even higher than today's.

While these critiques are valid, I argue that, nonetheless, at the turn of this 21st century, much is distinctive about our current transnationalism. In today's global economy, changes in the

technologies of transportation and communication (jet air travel, faxes, electronic mail, the internet, videos) have changed the qualitative experience of immigration. These modern communications (or are they post-modern?) have enabled immigrants to maintain more frequent and closer contact with their home country and to participate regularly—both actually and vicariously —in the life they once left behind. Based on substantial participant observation, in various immigrant communities, as well as observing the changes over time in my own transnational relationship to my country of origin, I argue that while immigrants in the past also led transnational lives, there is a qualitative difference in the transnational experiences immigrants live today. Because the new technologies allow immediate communication, immigrants can experience the world they left behind as if they were still there. For example, today Costa Ricans can easily and rapidly travel between "home" and "host" societies, rather than spending many months at sea, the voyage that it took Italians to return to Italy in the 19th century; likewise, cable television has brought Greece, with its colorful festivals and Olympics, right into the living room of Greek immigrants. Moreover, while in the past communication was not reliable and was painfully slow, today it is nearly certain and fast. For example, the "overseas Chinese" that lived scattered throughout the South East Asian nations in the early part of the 20th century often paid a "letter writer" to write the letter they could not, so as to send their messages back to their families in China. However, the letter often did not reach those in the rural areas, or it took a month or two to reach them, so that the news had grown old, while today a fax sent to a temple or a benevolent association will penetrate deep in China, and arrive immediately. Even Cuban- Americans, whose travel is so restricted by the perennial conflicts between the U.S. and Cuban governments, now communicate regularly with relatives and friends back in the island through electronic mail, since a friend that works for a state corporation that has access to e-mail can invariably be found; and while Irish immigrants in the early part of the 19th century heard that a new baby had been baptized in Ireland long after the event, today Mexican immigrants can quickly see the baptism that took place back in their village on video. Rather than being substantially cut off from the past, today's immigrants live—existentially speaking—both in the past and the present at once. A strong emotional thread now ties the two realities, as never before.

Immigrants today are there not just in their memories and imaginations, but vicariously, in that very moment; they are able to participate—economically, politically, socially, emotionally—in a regular, constant way, often creating two "homes" that rest on the pillar of an identity (or identities) that incorporate two or more nations, social worlds, at the same time. This is true even when, as Waldinger (2004) points out, dual loyalties can be conflicting. My point is not to emphasize a past/present divergence, as Waldinger put it, but to emphasize that we do now live in a brave new world that is both vastly more impersonal and personal at once. We know the ways in which our new world is more impersonal— e.g., telephone menus now answer most of our questions automatically, without our hearing a human voice; clothing is bought and sold online via the computer without our ever touching the cloth in our hands for its feel. But our new world is also far more personal across very great distances than it once was, as the new technology allows us immediate intellectual and emotional communication with those we love that remained behind. Those sustained affective, emotional linkages also constitute a form of transnationalism, as Elizabeth Aranda and Elena Sabogal (2004) have argued. They give evidence of the social networks across various nations that immigrants are embedded in, even though they do not entail sustained cross-border exchanges, as Portes et al. (1999) insisted upon. For many immigrants in their new "home," this communication with their families and friends back in their old "home" represent the foundation of their emotional and economic well-being. As Waldinger (2004) concluded, "History involves change, which is why any particular historical constellation is distinct from other like developments encountered before." Thus, we do want to know how and why "now" differs from "then." However, as both David Hollinger (1995) and Jose Moya (2004) stress, the major differences are not necessarily between "then" and "now," but between groups who show remarkable variation in the development of diasporic identities and political and social involvement.

Like all social forms, transnationalism can have both positive and negative impacts—economically, politically, and socially. Transnationalism is not only salutary for the mental health of immigrants, but is also salutary for the economic health of the underdeveloped nations they came from. For example, in many Latin American countries today immigrant remittances represent millions, even billions of dollars a year—the second or third largest source of foreign exchange, quite critical to the survival of those societies (Lora 2003). And this is true not only

with respect to Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, but also Cuba. Despite the insistence of a very vocal part of the Cuban American exile community, whose political task is to insist that no dollars be sent back to Cuba because that props up Fidel Castro's regime, another sizable part of the Cuban American exile community insists on putting their families back in Cuba first—and quietly sends dollars back to their family left behind, who need it. This is a moral task in which women are centrally involved (cf. Pedraza 1991).

Not only does migration result in remittances, but remittances also result in migration. In her study of the cumulative causation of migration from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Puerto Rico to the U.S., Elizabeth Fussell (2004) found that in all communities in these countries, except Puerto Rico, larger amounts of remittances sent to households in a given year were associated with higher migration prevalence ratios the following year, especially in places with older migration streams, such as Mexico and the Dominican Republic. As Fussell underlined, immigrants who send back remittances demonstrate the rewards to migration, thus enticing more members of the sending community to go to the United States. Puerto Rico was an exception because, as U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans migrate freely to and fro. So much so that Jorge Duany (2000) has investigated how a "nation on the move" constructs its identity in Puerto Rico (where 61 percent of Puerto Ricans live) and the diaspora (where 39 percent of Puerto Ricans now live). While language (Spanish) and culture (Latin America) used to be the cultural markers of the Puerto Rican identity, such a large diaspora, many of whom do not speak Spanish and are rather American, challenges the very markers of that identity.

Moreover, while overall the impact of immigrant remittances is positive for buoying the sinking economies back home, it can also create certain imbalances. Sarah Blue's (2004) survey of Cuban families in Havana who received remittances from their relatives abroad showed that the remittances were relinking the family that both the Cuban government and the exile community had torn asunder, and that they certainly provided some measure of material comfort for those left behind, improving their lives; however, they also served to exacerbate racial inequality. Since the first two waves of the Cuban exodus (from 1959 to 1974) were predominantly White (cf. Pedraza 1996a), Black and Mulatto Cubans in the island have fewer immigrant networks

abroad they can relay on to send remittances to improve their household consumption or to sponsor their emigration.

Transnationalism has class as well as racial dimensions. Harriett Romo's (2004) study of the transnational lives of the Mexican elite in San Antonio, Texas, described the major influence they had on the cultural and artistic life in the city of San Antonio itself, as well as the role of "broker" they played between the Mexican community, on the one hand, and the Anglo elite, on the other, on behalf of the Mexican community.

DIASPORIC CITIZENSHIP

It is also important to recognize that yesterday as well as today, the immigrants' return migration and their involvement with life in the countries they left was due not only to their bonds of love and loyalty for the family and nation left behind, but was also due to their lack of acceptance in America. Michel Laguerre used the broader concept of diasporic citizenship— "a set of practices that a person is engaged in, and a set of rights acquired or appropriated, that cross nation- state boundaries and that indicate membership in at least two nation states" (1998:190). Laguerre underlined that thereby Haitian immigrants in the U.S. today "escape complete minoritization since the link with the homeland allows one to enjoy the majority status one cannot exercise in the adopted country" (1998:192). Thus Laguerre underscored the difference that race—being Black and immigrant— makes.

Moreover, as a social practice, diasporic citizenship is ahead of its legal expression. Laguerre argues that a new conception of dual citizenship is developing that is dual in two senses: first, in the sense it has always been for many immigrants—that while they are in the home country (Italy, Haiti) they are its citizens, while when they are in the U.S. they are Americans; second, also in the new sense that the diaspora— those who are, as the etymology of the word indicates, scattered asunder like seeds—can now participate fully in the social and political life of both countries, exerting quite an influence on the course of the political life in the home country. Foner provides a telling example. In the last Dominican presidential election, many Dominicans residing in New York quickly flew to the island to vote. In the next elections, the trip will be unnecessary since, due to electoral reforms, it will be possible to vote while remaining in New

York. This gives the diaspora (whether Haitian, Dominican, now Mexican also) a role in homeland politics that is much larger than ever before. Moreover, as Laguerre underscores, it removes the future of citizenship from its modern-day location in the nation state. With Haiti's long history of political repression, the diaspora may well be playing the role of the missing political center—between the army and the government, siding with the people, thus helping the development of civil society and democracy in Haiti. Incidentally, that is precisely the role that the Cuban diaspora has never been able to play with respect to Cuba, at least in part because both the American and Cuban governments have drastically curtailed its involvement with life in Cuba, its transnationalism, much less its diasporic citizenship. As David Hollinger underscored, the new immigration, like the old, "displays a variety of degrees of engagement with the United States and with prior homelands, and it yields some strong assimilationist impulses along vivid expressions of diasporic consciousness" (1995:153).

Governments will try to restrict the flows of communication involved in transnationalism. As of the Summer of 2004, President George W. Bush drastically curtailed the involvement of Cuban-Americans with their family and friends in the island by restricting their travel (only once very three years now) and the amount of money they may send back as remittances through formal channels, such as Western Union, as well as the goods they may send to the island. These restrictions will only temporarily reduce the flow of people, goods, and money, however. Cuban immigrants, like all other immigrants, will find ways to get around the government's restrictions. Try as governments try to stop the immigrants transnationalism, however, they will not be able to do so because transnationalism is a fact of the modern (or post-modern) world in which we live, it is a result of the spread of the new forms of communication.

Laguerre underscored that transnational Haitian Americans developed loyalty to their new country as well as to their homeland, loyalties that give rise "to a fragmented bi-polar identity that transcends national boundaries and is central to the social construction of the transnational citizen" (1998:173). He also sees such an identity as the result of transnationalism. Here I disagree with Laguerre, for to me such an identity (preferably called a bicultural identity) is not only fragmented but also sharper in its sensibility— not unlike that of Park's "marginal man" at the beginning of the 20th century. It is also both cause and consequence of transnational

practices. To my mind, a bicultural identity is not only the result of transnationalism but is that on which transnationalism first depends and ultimately (over the course of time and further investments) cements. Precisely because transnationalism depends on such a bicultural identity, it is unclear at present whether the second generation, the children of immigrants, can or will participate in such a transnational social field. While that is the subject of future research, I believe that they can or will do so only to a rather delimited extent. However, it is possible for even a small group of the second and third generations to play an influential role, as they can transfer ideas and resources that can have important impacts in both places.

Last, participation in transnational practices and the exercise of a diasporic citizenship has consequences for the extent to which immigrants can engage in ethnic politics in American life. Like any other social form, transnationalism has both positive and negative consequences. The positive consequence is that transnationalism gives us a new emotional health—a present that is tied to one's past. But the negative consequence is that this may well come at the price of domestic political engagement, of creating institutions and lobbies that can improve the immigrant's lives as immigrants, workers, ethnics. Transnationalism has consequences for the extent to which immigrants can assimilate—both culturally and structurally—in America. In the end, it may still be up to the second and future generations to play the ethnic politics game. Such, indeed, was the role the descendants of the old immigrants played in the past, when city-level political "machines" built on the support of various ethnic groups traded votes for city jobs and contracts. Hence, it is quite likely that the shift in concepts—from assimilation to transnationalism—will only be useful to describe the lived experience of the immigrant generation. That, however, is a necessity at a time like now when America is not only "a nation of immigrants"— whose history was written by immigrants—but is also an immigrant nation— whose present relies on immigration. Perhaps in the brave new world of this 21st century most nations will also become immigrant nations

Chapter Four

4. Displacement

Forced displacement or **forced immigration** is the coerced movement of a person or people away from their home or homeregion and it often connotes violent coercion. Someone who has experienced forced displacement is a **"forced immigrant"**, a **"displaced person" (DP)**, rarely also a **"displacee"**, or if it is within the same country, an internally displaced person (IDP). In some cases the forced immigrant can also become a refugee, as that term has a specific legal definition. A specific form of forced displacement is population transfer, which is a coherent policy to move unwanted groups, for example, as an attempt at ethnic cleansing. Another form is deportation.

Forced displacement has accompanied persecution, as well as war, throughout human history but has only become a topic of serious study and discussion relatively recently. This increased attention is the result of greater ease of travel, allowing displaced people to flee to nations far removed from their homes, the creation of an international legal structure of human rights, and the realizations that the destabilizing effects of forced immigration, especially in parts of Africa, the Middle East, south and central Asia, ripple out well beyond the immediate region.

Definition

The concept of forced displacement envelopes demographic movements like flight, evacuation, displacement, and resettlement.TheInternational Organization for Migration defines a forced migrant as any person who migrates to "escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made disasters, ecological degradation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom or livelihood".[3][4]

The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) defines it as "the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects."[5]

Types of displacement

"Primary" or "direct" displacement occurs when people are moved from their traditional lands to make way for a development project or when people move towards a project to meet a new labor demand. Primary displacement is usually predictable and can therefore be mitigated through planning.[5]

"Secondary" or "indirect" displacement is a result of environmental, geographical and socio-political consequences of the development project that take place over time and distance from the initial project. This type of displacement is less predictable and difficult to control.[5] One example of secondary displacement is if a community is forced to move because of pollution of their water supply by a mining project.

Some examples of development-induced displacement are:

- Three Gorges Dam in China – A hydroelectric dam on China's Yangtze River constructed between 1994 and 2006, which displaced over 1.4 million people through primary and secondary displacement.[6]
- SardarSarovar Dam in India – The largest dam in the Narmada Valley Project, which displaced over 40,000 people. The dam was the subject of protest by environment groups and tribal groups during the 1980s and 1990s.[7]

- Ahafo Mine in Ghana – An open-pit mine which displaced approximately 10,000 people in 2005 and 2006. Most of the displaced were subsistence farmers, but the mining company, Newmont, denied them compensation for loss of land.[8]
- Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary in India – Between 1999 and 2003, 24 villages were displaced to reintroduce the Asiatic Lion to the area. Resettlement and enforcement of forest boundaries disrupted social and economic ties between the displaced and the host community.[9]

Consequences

It has been estimated that fifteen million people each year are forced to leave their homes as a result of public and private development projects and that number continues to increase as countries move from developing to developed nations.[10][11]

Compensation and rehabilitation policies designed to mitigate effects of displacement are often unsuccessful. This is largely due to corruption of street level bureaucrats, underestimation of the value of resources, failure of planners to recognize the intricacies of the existing social and economic systems of the displaced and lack of involvement of displaced persons in the planning process.[12] Communities and individuals are most often only compensated monetarily, without proper mechanisms for addressing their grievances or political support to improve their livelihoods. When land is used as compensation, it is often inadequate in terms of size, location and natural resources.[13] Land tenure laws may also prevent resettlement policy from being effective.[14] Poor and indigenous people are mostly affected by displacement as they have few political and monetary resources.

Michael Cernea's impoverishment and reconstruction model (IRR) sets forth eight potential risks of displacement:

1. Landlessness
2. Joblessness
3. Homelessness
4. Marginalization
5. Food insecurity
6. Increased morbidity and mortality
7. Loss of access to common property

8. Social Disarticulation

The consensus among researchers is that impoverishment due to loss of capacity to generate income is the most apparent effect of DIDR. Additionally, displacement severs social ties which are often crucial for survival in indigenous communities. Loss of connection to historical, religious, symbolic or spatial locations resulting from forced migration diminishes cultural identity. Development-induced displaced persons, like refugees and internally displaced persons, experience psychological stress as well as feelings of helplessness and distrust towards their government and humanitarian groups. While the state is charged with protecting them as equal citizens, they are considered "others" and left to bear the cost for those who will benefit.

Women are disproportionately affected by DIDR as the loss of land used by women to generate economic worth further marginalizes their socio-economic standing as they become more dependent on their husbands.

Chapter Five

Refugee

A **refugee**, generally speaking, is a displaced person who has been forced to cross national boundaries and who cannot return home safely (for more detail see legal definition). Such a person may be called an asylum seeker until granted refugee status by the contracting state or the UNHCR[2] if they formally make a claim for asylum.[3] The lead international agency coordinating refugee protection is the United Nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The United Nations have a second Office for refugees, the UNRWA, which is solely responsible for supporting the large majority of Palestinian refugees.[4]

Etymology and usage

Although similar terms in other languages have described an event marking large scale migration of a specific population from a place of origin, such as the biblical account of Israelites fleeing from Assyrian conquest), in English, the term *refugee* derives from the root word *refuge*, from Old French *refuge*, meaning "hiding place". It refers to "shelter or protection

from danger or distress", from Latin *fugere*, "to flee", and *refugium*, "a taking [of] refuge, place to flee back to". In Western history, the term was first applied to French Huguenots, after the Edict of Fontainebleau (1540), who again migrated from France after the Edict of Nantes revocation (1685).[5] The word meant "one seeking asylum", until around 1914, when it evolved to mean "one fleeing home", applied in this instance to civilians in Flanders heading west to escape fighting in World War I.[6]

Legal definitions

Darfur refugee camp in Chad, 2005

The first modern definition of international refugee status came about under the League of Nations in 1921 from the Commission for Refugees. Following World War II, and in response to the large numbers of people fleeing Eastern Europe, the UN 1951 Refugee Conventionadopted (in Article 1.A.2) the following definition of "refugee" to apply to any person who:[2]

"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."[2]

In 1967, this legal concept was expanded by the UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa expanded the 1951 definition, which the Organization of African Unity adopted in 1969:

"Every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality."[7]

The 1984 regional, non-binding Latin-American Cartagena Declaration on Refugees includes:

"persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."[8]

As of 2011, the UNHCR itself, in addition to the 1951 definition, recognizes persons as refugees:

"who are outside their country of nationality or habitual residence and unable to return there owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order."[9]

The term "refugee" sometime applies to people who might fit the definition outlined by the 1951 Convention, were it applied retroactively. There are many candidates. For example, after the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685 outlawed Protestantism in France, hundreds of thousands of Huguenots fled to England, the Netherlands, Switzerland, South Africa, Germany and Prussia. The repeated waves of pogroms that swept Eastern Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries prompted mass Jewish emigration (more than 2 million Russian Jews emigrated in the period 1881–1920). Beginning in the 19th century, Muslim people emigrated to Turkey from Europe.[10] The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 caused 800,000 people to leave their homes.[11] Various groups of people were officially designated refugees beginning in World War I.

1933 (rise of Nazism) to 1944

The rise of Nazism led to such a very large increase in the number of refugees from Germany that in 1933 the League created a high commission for refugees coming from Germany. Besides other measures by the Nazis which created fear and flight, Jews were stripped of German citizenship [B] by the *Reich Citizenship Law* of 1935.[18] On 4 July 1936 an agreement was signed under League auspices that defined a refugee coming from Germany as "any person who was settled in that country, who does not possess any nationality other than German nationality, and in respect of whom it is established that in law or in fact he or she does not enjoy the protection of the Government of the Reich" (article 1).[C]

The conflict and political instability during World War II led to massive numbers of refugees (see World War II evacuation and expulsion). In 1943, the Allies created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to provide aid to areas liberated from Axis

powers, including parts of Europe and China. By the end of the War, Europe had more than 40 million refugees.[23] UNRRA was involved in returning over seven million refugees, then commonly referred to as displaced persons or DPs, to their country of origin and setting up displaced persons camps for one million refugees who refused to be repatriated. Even two years after the end of War, some 850,000 people still lived in DP camps across Western Europe. DP Camps in Europe Intro, from: *DPs Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945–1951* by Mark Wyman After the establishment of Israel in 1948, Israel accepted more than 650,000 refugees by 1950. By 1953, over 250,000 refugees were still in Europe, most of them old, infirm, crippled, or otherwise disabled.

Acute and temporary protection

Refugee camp

A refugee camp is a place built by governments or NGOs (such as the Red Cross) to receive refugees, internally displaced persons or sometimes also other migrants. It is usually designed to offer acute and temporary accommodation and services and any more permanent facilities and structures often banned. People may stay in these camps for many years, receiving emergency food, education and medical aid until it is safe enough to return to their country of origin. There, refugees are at risk of disease, child soldier and terrorist recruitment, and physical and sexual violence. There are estimated to be 700 refugee camp locations worldwide.[47]

Urban refugee

Not all refugees who are supported by the UNHCR live in refugee camps. A significant number, actually more than half, live in urban settings, such as the ~60,000 Iraqi refugees in Damascus (Syria), and the ~30,000 Sudanese refugees in Cairo (Egypt).

Durable solutions

The residency status in the host country whilst under temporary UNHCR protection is very uncertain as refugees are only granted temporary visas that have to be regularly renewed. Rather than only safeguarding the rights and basic well-being of refugees in the camps or in urban settings on a temporary basis the UNHCR's ultimate goal is to find one of the three durable solutions for refugees: integration, repatriation, resettlement.[51]

Integration and naturalization

Local integration is aiming at providing the refugee with the permanent right to stay in the country of asylum, including, in some situations, as a naturalized citizen. It follows the formal granting of refugee status by the country of asylum. It is difficult to quantify the number of refugees who settled and integrated in their first country of asylum and only the number of naturalisations can give an indication.[citation needed] In 2014 Tanzania granted citizenship to 162,000 refugees from Burundi and in 1982 to 32,000 Rwandan refugees.[52] Mexico naturalised 6,200 Guatemalan refugees in 2001.[53]

Voluntary return

Voluntary return of refugees into their country of origin, in safety and dignity, is based on their free will and their informed decision. In the last couple of years parts of or even whole refugee populations were able to return to their home countries: e.g. 120,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the DRC,[54] 30,000 Angolans returned home from the DRC[54] and Botswana, Ivorian refugees returned from Liberia, Afghans from Pakistan, and Iraqis from Syria. In 2013, the governments of Kenya and Somalia also signed a tripartite agreement facilitating the repatriation of refugees from Somalia.[55] The UNHCR and the IOM offer assistance to refugees who want to return voluntarily to their home countries. Many developed countries also have Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes for asylum seekers who want to go back or were refused asylum.

Third country resettlement

Third country resettlement involves the assisted transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought asylum to a safe third country that has agreed to admit them as refugees. This can be for permanent settlement or limited to a certain number of years. It is the third durable solution and it can only be considered once the two other solutions have proved impossible. The UNHCR has traditionally seen resettlement as the least preferable of the "durable solutions" to refugee situations.[58] However, in April 2000 the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, stated "Resettlement can no longer be seen as the least-preferred urable solution; in many cases it is the *only* solution for refugees."[58]

Internally displaced person

UNHCR's mandate has gradually been expanded to include protecting and providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and people in IDP-like situations. These are civilians who have been forced to flee their homes, but who have not reached a neighboring country. IDPs do not fit the legal definition of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967 Protocol and the 1969 Organization for African Unity Convention, because they have not left their country. As the nature of war has changed in the last few decades, with more and more internal conflicts replacing interstate wars, the number of IDPs has increased significantly.

The term refugee is often used in different contexts: in everyday usage it refers to a forcibly displaced person who has fled their country of origin; in a more specific context it refers to such a person who was, on top of that, granted refugee status in the country the person fled to. Even more exclusive is the Convention refugee status which is given only to persons who fall within the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

To receive refugee status, a person must have applied for asylum, making them—while waiting for a decision—an asylum seeker. However, a displaced person otherwise legally entitled to refugee status may never apply for asylum, or may not be allowed to apply in the country they fled to and thus may not have official asylum seeker status.

Once a displaced person is granted refugee status they enjoy certain rights as agreed in the 1951 Refugee convention. Not all countries have signed and ratified this convention and some countries do not have a legal procedure for dealing with asylum seekers.

Seeking asylum

An asylum seeker is a displaced person or immigrant who has formally sought the protection of the state they fled to as well as the right to remain in this country and who is waiting for a decision on this formal application. An asylum seeker may have applied for Convention refugee status or for complementary forms of protection. Asylum is thus a category that includes different forms of protection. Which form of protection is offered depends on the legal definition that best describes the asylum seeker's reasons to flee. Once the decision was made the asylum seeker receives either Convention refugee status or a complementary form of protection, and can stay in the country—or is refused asylum, and then often has to leave. Only after the state, territory or the UNHCR—wherever the application was made—recognises the protection

needs does the asylum seeker *officially* receive refugee status. This carries certain rights and obligations, according to the legislation of the receiving country.

Quota refugees do not need to apply for asylum on arrival in the third countries as they already went through the UNHCR refugee status determination process whilst being in the first country of asylum and this is usually accepted by the third countries.

Refugee status determination

For over 30 years, several tens of thousands of Sahrawi refugees have been living in the region of Tindouf, Algeria, in the heart of the desert.

To receive refugee status, a displaced person must go through a Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process, which is conducted by the government of the country of asylum or the UNHCR, and is based on international, regional or national law.[60] RSD can be done on a case by case basis as well as for whole groups of people. Which of the two processes is used often depends on the size of the influx of displaced persons.

There is no specific method mandated for RSD (apart from the commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention) and it is subject to the overall efficacy of the country's internal administrative and judicial system as well as the characteristics of the refugee flow to which the country responds. This lack of a procedural direction could create a situation where political and strategic interests override humanitarian considerations in the RSD process.[61] There are also no fixed interpretations of the elements in the 1951 Refugee Convention and countries may interpret them differently (see also refugee roulette).

However, in 2013, the UNHCR conducted them in more than 50 countries and co-conducted them parallel to or jointly with governments in another 20 countries, which made it the second largest RSD body in the world. The UNHCR follows a set of guidelines described in the *Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status* to determine which individuals are eligible for refugee status.

Refugee rights

Refugee rights encompass both customary law, peremptory norms, and international legal instruments. They include the following rights and obligations for refugees:

Right of return

Even in a supposedly "post-conflict" environment, it is not a simple process for refugees to return home.[63] The UN Pinheiro Principles are guided by the idea that people not only have the right to return home, but also the right to the same property.[63] It seeks to return to the pre-conflict status quo and ensure that no one profits from violence. Yet this is a very complex issue and every situation is different; conflict is a highly transformative force and the pre-war status-quo can never be reestablished completely, even if that were desirable (it may have caused the conflict in the first place).[63] Therefore, the following are of particular importance to the right to return:[63]

- May never have had property (e.g., in Afghanistan)
- Cannot access what property they have (Colombia, Guatemala, South Africa and Sudan)
- Ownership is unclear as families have expanded or split and division of the land becomes an issue
- Death of owner may leave dependents without clear claim to the land
- People settled on the land know it is not theirs but have nowhere else to go (as in Colombia, Rwanda and Timor-Leste)
- Have competing claims with others, including the state and its foreign or local business partners (as in Aceh, Angola, Colombia, Liberia and Sudan).

Refugees who were resettled to a third country will likely lose the indefinite leave to remain in this country if they return to their country of origin or the country of first asylum.

Right to non-refoulement

Non-refoulement is the right not to be returned to a place of persecution and is the foundation for international refugee law, as outlined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.[64] The right to non-refoulement is distinct from the right to asylum. To respect the right to asylum, states must not deport genuine refugees. In contrast, the right to non-refoulement allows states to transfer genuine refugees to third party countries with respectable human rights records. The portable procedural model, proposed by political philosopher Andy Lamey, emphasizes the right to non-refoulement by guaranteeing refugees three procedural rights (to a verbal hearing, to legal counsel, and to judicial review of detention decisions) and ensuring those

rights in the constitution.[65] This proposal attempts to strike a balance between the interest of national governments and the interests of refugees.

Right to family reunification

Family reunification (which can also be a form of resettlement) is a recognized reason for immigration in many countries. Divided families have the right to be reunited if a family member with permanent right of residency applies for the reunification and can prove the people on the application were a family unit before arrival and wish to live as a family unit since separation. If application is successful this enables the rest of the family to immigrate to that country as well.

Right to travel

Those states that signed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees are obliged to issue travel documents (i.e. "Convention Travel Document") to refugees lawfully residing in their territory.[D] It is a valid travel document in place of a passport, however, it cannot be used to travel to the country of origin, i.e. from where the refugee fled.

Restriction of onward movement

Medical problems

Refugees typically report poorer levels of health, compared to other immigrants and the non-immigrant population.

PTSD

Apart from physical wounds or starvation, a large percentage of refugees develop symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or depression. These long-term mental problems can severely impede the functionality of the person in everyday situations; it makes matters even worse for displaced persons who are confronted with a new environment and challenging situations. They are also at high risk for suicide.[71]

Among other symptoms, post-traumatic stress disorder involves anxiety, over-alertness, sleeplessness, chronic fatigue syndrome, motor difficulties, failing short term memory, amnesia, nightmares and sleep-paralysis. Flashbacks are characteristic to the disorder: the patient experiences the traumatic event, or pieces of it, again and again. Depression is also characteristic for PTSD-patients and may also occur without accompanying PTSD.

PTSD was diagnosed in 34.1% of Palestinian children, most of whom were refugees, males, and working. The participants were 1,000 children aged 12 to 16 years from governmental, private, and United Nations Relief Work Agency UNRWA schools in East Jerusalem and various governorates in the West Bank.[72]

Another study showed that 28.3% of Bosnian refugee women had symptoms of PTSD three or four years after their arrival in Sweden. These women also had significantly higher risks of symptoms of depression, anxiety, and psychological distress than Swedish-born women. For depression the odds ratio was 9.50 among Bosnian women.[73]

A study by the Department of Pediatrics and Emergency Medicine at the Boston University School of Medicine demonstrated that twenty percent of Sudanese refugee minors living in the United States had a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. They were also more likely to have worse scores on all the Child Health Questionnaire subscales.[74]

In a study for the United Kingdom, refugees were found to be 4 percentage points more likely to report a mental health problem compared to the non-immigrant population. This contrasts with the results for other immigrant groups, which were less likely to report a mental health problem compared to the non-immigrant population.[70]

Many more studies illustrate the problem. One meta-study was conducted by the psychiatry department of Oxford University at Warneford Hospital in the United Kingdom. Twenty surveys were analyzed, providing results for 6,743 adult refugees from seven countries. In the larger studies, 9% were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and 5% with major depression, with evidence of much psychiatric co-morbidity. Five surveys of 260 refugee children from three countries yielded a prevalence of 11% for post-traumatic stress disorder. According to this study, refugees resettled in Western countries could be about ten times more likely to have PTSD than age-matched general populations in those countries. Worldwide, tens of thousands of refugees and former refugees resettled in Western countries probably have post-traumatic stress disorder.[75]

Malaria

Refugees are often more susceptible to illness for several reasons, including a lack of immunity to local strains of malaria and other diseases. Displacement of a people can create favorable

conditions for disease transmission. Refugee camps are typically heavily populated with poor sanitary conditions. The removal of vegetation for space, building materials or firewood also deprives mosquitoes of their natural habitats, leading them to more closely interact with humans.[76] In the 1970s, Afghani refugees that were relocated to Pakistan were going from a country with an effective malaria control strategy, to a country with a less effective system.

The refugee camps were built near rivers or irrigation sites had higher malaria prevalence than refugee camps built on dry lands.[77] The location of the camps lent themselves to better breeding grounds for mosquitoes, and thus a higher likelihood of malaria transmission. Children aged 1–15 were the most susceptible to malaria infection, which is a significant cause of mortality in children younger than 5.[78] Malaria was the cause of 16% of the deaths in refugee children younger than 5 years of age.[79] Malaria is one of the most commonly reported causes of death in refugees and displaced persons. Since 2014, reports of malaria cases in Germany had doubled compared to previous years, with the majority of cases found in refugees from Eritrea.[80]

The World Health Organization recommends that all people in areas that are endemic for malaria use long-lasting insecticide nets.[81] A cohort study found that within refugee camps in Pakistan, insecticide treated bed nets were very useful in reducing malaria cases. A single treatment of the nets with the insecticide permethrin remained protective throughout the 6 month transmission season.[82]

Access to healthcare services

Access to services depends on many factors, including whether a refugee has received official status, is situated within a refugee camp, or is in the process of third country resettlement. The UNHCR recommends integrating access to primary care and emergency health services with the host country in as equitable a manner as possible.[83] Prioritized services include areas of maternal and child health, immunizations, tuberculosis screening and treatment, and HIV/AIDS-related services.[83] Despite inclusive stated policies for refugee access to health care on the international levels, potential barriers to that access include language, cultural preferences, high financial costs, administrative hurdles, and physical distance.[83] Specific barriers and policies related to health service access also emerge based on the host country context. For example, primaquine, an often recommended malaria treatment is not currently licensed for use in Germany and must be ordered from outside the country.[84]

In Canada, barriers to healthcare access include the lack of adequately trained physicians, complex medical conditions of some refugees and the bureaucracy of medical coverage.[85] There are also individual barriers to access such as language and transportation barriers, institutional barriers such as bureaucratic burdens and lack of entitlement knowledge, and systems level barriers such as conflicting policies, racism and physician workforce shortage.[85]

In the US, all officially designated Iraqi refugees had health insurance coverage compared to a little more than half of non-Iraqi immigrants in a Dearborn, Michigan, study.[86]However, greater barriers existed around transportation, language and successful stress coping mechanisms for refugees versus other immigrants,[86] in addition, refugees noted greater medical conditions.[86] The study also found that refugees had higher healthcare utilization rate (92.1%) as compared to the US overall population (84.8%) and immigrants (58.6%) in the study population.[86]

Within Australia, officially designated refugees who qualify for temporary protection and offshore humanitarian refugees are eligible for health assessments, interventions and access to health insurance schemes and trauma-related counseling services.[87] Despite being eligible to access services, barriers include economic constraints around perceived and actual costs carried by refugees.[88] In addition, refugees must cope with a healthcare workforce unaware of the unique health needs of refugee populations.[87][88] Perceived legal barriers such as fear that disclosing medical conditions prohibiting reunification of family members and current policies which reduce assistance programs may also limit access to health care services.[87]

Providing access to healthcare for refugees through integration into the current health systems of host countries may also be difficult when operating in a resource limited setting. In this context, barriers to healthcare access may include political aversion in the host country and already strained capacity of the existing health system.[89] Political aversion to refugee access into the existing health system may stem from the wider issue of refugee resettlement.[89][90] One approach to limiting such barriers is to move from a parallel administrative system in which UNHCR refugees may receive better healthcare than host nationals but is unsustainable financially and politically to that of an integrated care where refugee and host nationals receive equal and more improved care all around.[89] In the 1980s, Pakistan attempted to address Afghan refugee healthcare access through the creation of Basic Health Units inside the

camps.[91] Funding cuts closed many of these programs, forcing refugees to seek healthcare from the local government.[91] In response to a protracted refugee situation in the West Nile district, Ugandan officials with UNHCR created an integrative healthcare model for the mostly Sudanese refugee population and Ugandan citizens. Local nationals now access health care in facilities initially created for refugees.

One potential argument for limiting refugee access to healthcare is associated with costs with states desire to decrease health expenditure burdens. However, Germany found that restricting refugee access led to an increase actual expenditures relative to refugees which had full access to healthcare services.[93] The legal restrictions on access to health care and the administrative barriers in Germany have been criticized since the 1990s for leading to delayed care, for increasing direct costs and administrative costs of health care, and for shifting the responsibility for care from the less expensive primary care sector to costly treatments for acute conditions in the secondary and tertiary sector.

Exploitation

Refugee populations consist of people who are terrified and are away from familiar surroundings. There can be instances of exploitation at the hands of enforcement officials, citizens of the host country, and even United Nations peacekeepers. Instances of human rights violations, child labor, mental and physical trauma/torture, violence-related trauma, and sexual exploitation, especially of children, have been documented. In many refugee camps in three war-torn West African countries, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, young girls were found to be exchanging sex for money, a handful of fruit, or even a bar of soap. Most of these girls were between 13 and 18 years of age. In most cases, if the girls had been forced to stay, they would have been forced into marriage. They became pregnant around the age of 15 on average. This happened as recently as in 2001. Parents tended to turn a blind eye because sexual exploitation had become a "mechanism of survival" in these camps.

Security threats

Very rarely, refugees have been used and recruited as refugee militants or terrorists,[96] and the humanitarian aid directed at refugee relief has very rarely been utilized to fund the acquisition of arms.[97] Support from a refugee-receiving state has rarely been used to enable refugees to mobilize militarily, enabling conflict to spread across borders.[98]

Historically, refugee populations have often been portrayed as a security threat. In the U.S and Europe, there has been much focus on the narrative that terrorists maintain networks amongst transnational, refugee, and migrant populations. This fear has been exaggerated into a modern-day Islamist terrorism Trojan horse in which terrorists hide among refugees and penetrate host countries. 'Muslim-refugee-as-an-enemy-within' rhetoric is relatively new, but the underlying scapegoating of out-groups for domestic societal problems, fears and ethno-nationalist sentiment is not new.[100] In the 1890s, the influx of Eastern European Jewish refugees to London coupled with the rise of anarchism in the city led to a confluence of threat-perception and fear of the refugee out-group.[101] Populist rhetoric then too propelled debate over migration control and protecting national security.

In Europe, fear of immigration, Islamification and job and welfare benefits competition has fueled an increase in violence.[108] Immigrants are perceived as a threat to ethno-nationalist identity and increase concerns over criminality and insecurity.

In the PEW survey previously referenced, 50% of respondents believe that refugees are a burden due to job and social benefit competition.[105] When Sweden received over 160,000 asylum seekers in 2015, it was accompanied by 50 attacks against asylum-seekers, which was more than four times the number of attacks that occurred in the previous four years.[99] At the incident level, the 2011 Utøya Norway terror attack by Breivik demonstrates the impact of this threat perception on a country's risk from domestic terrorism, in particular ethno-nationalist extremism. Breivik portrayed himself as a protector of Norwegian ethnic identity and national security fighting against immigrant criminality, competition and welfare abuse and an Islamic takeover.[109]

According to a 2018 study in the *Journal of Peace Research*, states often resort to anti-refugee violence in response to terrorist attacks or security crises. The study notes that there is evidence to suggest that "the repression of refugees is more consistent with a scapegoating mechanism than the actual ties and involvement of refugees in terrorism."

Education

Refugee children come from many different backgrounds, and their reasons for resettlement are even more diverse. The number of refugee children has continued to increase as conflicts interrupt communities at a global scale. In 2014 alone, there were approximately 32 armed

conflicts in 26 countries around the world, and this period saw the highest number of refugees ever recorded[111] Refugee children experience traumatic events in their lives that can affect their learning capabilities, even after they have resettled in first or second settlement countries. Educators such as teachers, counselors, and school staff, along with the school environment, are key in facilitating socialization and acculturation of recently arrived refugee and immigrant children in their new schools.

Obstacles

The experiences children go through during times of armed conflict can impede their ability to learn in an educational setting. Schools experience drop-outs of refugee and immigrantstudents from an array of factors such as: rejection by peers, low self-esteem, antisocial behavior, negative perceptions of their academic ability, and lack of support from school staff and parents.[112] Because refugees come from various regions globally with their own cultural, religious, linguistic, and home practices, the new school culture can conflict with the home culture, causing tension between the student and their family.

Aside from students, teachers and school staff also face their own obstacles in working with refugee students. They have concerns about their ability to meet the mental, physical, emotional, and educational needs of students. One study of newly arrived Bantu students from Somalia in a Chicago school questioned whether schools were equipped to provide them with a quality education that met the needs of the pupils. The students were not aware of how to use pencils, which caused them to break the tips requiring frequent sharpening. Teachers may even see refugee students as different from other immigrant groups, as was the case with the Bantu pupils.[113] Teachers may sometimes feel that their work is made harder because of the pressures to meet state requirements for testing. With refugee children falling behind or struggling to catch up, it can overwhelm teachers and administrators.

Not all students adjust the same way to their new setting. One student may take only three months, while others may take four years. One study found that even in their fourth year of schooling, Lao and Vietnamese refugee students in the US were still in a transitional status. Refugee students continue to encounter difficulties throughout their years in schools that can hinder their ability to learn. Furthermore, to provide proper support, educators must consider the experiences of students before they settled the US.

In their first settlement countries, refugee students may encounter negative experiences with education that they can carry with them post settlement. For example:[111]

- Frequent disruption in their education as they move from place to place
- Limited access to schooling
- Language barriers
- Little resources to support language development and learning, and more

Statistics found that in places such as Uganda and Kenya, there were gaps in refugee students attending schools. It found that 80% of refugees in Uganda were attending schools, whereas only 46% of students were attending schools in Kenya.[111] Furthermore, for secondary levels, the numbers were much lower. There was only 1.4% of refugee students attending schools in Malaysia. This trend is evident across several first settlement countries and carry negative impacts on students once they arrive to their permanent settlement homes, such as the US, and have to navigate a new education system. Unfortunately, some refugees do not have a chance to attend schools in their first settlement countries because they are considered undocumented immigrants in places like Malaysia for Rohingya refugees.[111] In other cases, such as Burundians in Tanzania, refugees can get more access to education while in displacement than in their home countries.[115]

Overcoming obstacles

All students need some form of support to help them overcome obstacles and challenges they may face in their lives, especially refugee children who may experience frequent disruptions. There are a few ways in which schools can help refugee students overcome obstacles to attain success in their new homes.

- Respect the cultural differences amongst refugees and the new home culture
- Individual efforts to welcome refugees to prevent feelings of isolation
- Educator support
- Student centered pedagogy as opposed to teacher centered
- Building relationships with the students
- Offering praise and providing affirmations

- Providing extensive support and designing curriculum for students to read, write, and speak in their native languages.

One school in NYC has found a method that works for them to help refugee students succeed. This school creates support for language and literacies, which promotes students using English and their native languages to complete projects. Furthermore, they have a learning centered pedagogy, which promotes the idea that there are multiple entry points to engage the students in learning.[116] Both strategies have helped refugee students succeed during their transition into US schools.

Various websites contain resources that can help school staff better learn to work with refugee students such as Bridging Refugee Youth and Children's Services. With the support of educators and the school community, education can help rebuild the academic, social, and emotional well being of refugee students who have suffered from past and present trauma, marginalization, and social alienation.

Cultural differences

It is important to understand the cultural differences amongst newly arrived refugees and school culture, such as that of the U.S. This can be seen as problematic because of the frequent disruptions that it can create in a classroom setting.

In addition, because of the differences in language and culture, students are often placed in lower classes due to their lack of English proficiency.[111] Students can also be made to repeat classes because of their lack of English proficiency, even if they have mastered the content of the class. When schools have the resources and are able to provide separate classes for refugee students to develop their English skills, it can take the average refugee students only three months to catch up with their peers. This was the case with Somali refugees at some primary schools in Nairobi.

The histories of refugee students are often hidden from educators, resulting in cultural misunderstandings. However, when teachers, school staff, and peers help refugee students develop a positive cultural identity, it can help buffer the negative effects refugees' experiences have on them, such as poor academic performance, isolation, and discrimination.

Refugee crisis can refer to movements of large groups of displaced persons, who could be either internally displaced persons, refugees or other migrants. It can also refer to incidents in the

country of origin or departure, to large problems whilst on the move or even after arrival in a safe country that involve large groups of displaced persons.

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