Islam in der Gesellschaft

Mario Peucker
Rauf Ceylan *Editors*

Muslim Community Organizations in the West

History, Developments and Future Perspectives

Springer VS

Islam in der Gesellschaft

Herausgegeben von
R. Ceylan, Osnabrück, Deutschland
N. Foroutan, Berlin, Deutschland
A. Zick, Bielefeld, Deutschland

Die neue Reihe *Islam in der Gesellschaft* publiziert theoretische wie empirische Forschungsarbeiten zu einem international wie national aktuellem Gegenstand. Der Islam als heterogene und vielfältige Religion, wie aber auch kulturelle und soziale Organisationsform, ist ein bedeutsamer Bestandteil von modernen Gesellschaften. Er beeinflusst Gesellschaft, wird zum prägenden Moment und erzeugt Konflikte. Zugleich reagieren Gesellschaften auf den Islam und Menschen, die im angehören bzw. auf das, was sie unter dem Islam und Muslimen verstehen. Der Islam prägt Gesellschaft und Gesellschaft prägt Islam, weil und wenn er in Gesellschaft ist. Die damit verbundenen gesellschaftlichen Phänomene und Prozesse der Veränderungen sind nicht nur ein zentraler Aspekt der Integrations- und Migrationsforschung. Viele Studien und wissenschaftliche Diskurse versuchen, den Islam in der Gesellschaft zu verorten und zu beschreiben. Diese Forschung soll in der Reihe *Islam in der Gesellschaft* zu Wort und Schrift kommen, sei es in Herausgeberbänden oder Monografien, in Konferenzbänden oder herausragenden Qualifikationsarbeiten.

Die Beiträge richten sich an unterschiedliche Disziplinen, die zu einer inter- wie transdisziplinären Perspektive beitragen können:

- Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie
- Islamwissenschaft
- Integration- und Migrationsforschung
- Bildungswissenschaft
- Sozialpsychologie
- Kulturwissenschaften
- Geschichtswissenschaft und
- weitere Wissenschaften, die Forschungsbeiträge zum Thema aufweisen.

Weitere Bände in dieser Reihe http://www.springer.com/series/14772

Mario Peucker · Rauf Ceylan
(Eds.)

Muslim Community Organizations in the West

History, Developments and Future Perspectives

Springer VS

Editors
Mario Peucker
Melbourne, Australia

Rauf Ceylan
Osnabrück, Germany

Islam in der Gesellschaft
ISBN 978-3-658-13888-2 ISBN 978-3-658-13889-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017938805

Springer VS

Lektorat: Cori A. Mackrodt

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer VS imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH
The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Foreword

The current book on Muslim community organisations in the West: History, Developments and Future Perspectives, which is edited by Mario Peucker and Rauf Ceylan, is the second issue of the new series on Muslims in society. The first edited book by Peter Antes and Rauf Ceylan focused on Muslims in Germany (Muslime in Deutschland: Historische Bestandsaufnahme, aktuelle Entwicklungen und zukünftige Forschungsfragen). We are very thankful that the editors and authors of the current book on Muslim communities contributed to this new book series, and especially we are very happy to open the series for the international scientific community.

The authors excellently offer new perspectives on the position and situation of Muslim communities. In chapter one Mario Peucker opens the gate to the book by stressing that Islam and Muslims are phenomena which attracted significantly multiple scientific studies, but still several questions remain unanswered. The most prominent question is about the living conditions or everyday life and practices of Muslims in Western societies. Therefore the book opens the focus on Muslim life in Canada, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. The five countries in three continents differ historically and socially, but the framing question also documents similarities in a globalized world. Eleven authors from different disciplines contributed to this outstanding approach to shed a specific and comparative perspective on Islam in diaspora (part 1), the history and development of Muslim communities (part 2), recent debates in Britain, Canada and Australia (part 3) as well future challenges (part 4).

The book perfectly represents our new book series. We want to reinforcedisciplinary and interdisciplinary research, studies, theoretical debates and discourses on the status, position and perspectives of Muslims in different societies. The book series wants to give space and opportunity for scientific questions on the living conditions of Muslims and the status of Islam in society, since many researchers

demanded several challenging questions. Whichposition and status has Islam in modern societies? Which perspectives do Muslims have in Western societies, which perspectives are still undetected or not given? Which societal conditions and processes cause a change of modern Islam and Muslim communities? How do the interpretations of Islam by Muslim differ from non-Muslim interpretations? What is recognized and/or disrespected to be 'Muslim' or 'Islam' in society and why do Muslim still suffer from stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination? These questions link different disciplines and open the analyses beyond religious discourses.

We understand Islam as a heterogeneous and diverse religion with specific cultural and social patterns of organization. The book series embeds Islam and Muslim communities, groups and individuals within society, and it tries to bridge disciplines like social science, sociology, Islam science, integration and migration research, educational science, psychology, history and cultural science.

We hope that scientists from these various disciplines read the current book. If we read it carefully many more questions appear. Readers are welcome to suggest more books in this new book series on Muslims in society. Thanks to Mario Peucker and Rauf Ceylan, who is also editor of this book series, we are sure that the series is a good place for a new debate on Muslims in society.

Andreas Zick and Naika Foroutan

Contents

Notes on contributors

Nora Amath (PhD) is a sociologist whose research focuses on religion and inter-community relations. She is the author of *The Phenomenology of Community Activism: Muslim Civil Society Organisations in Australia,* and has published several book chapters and peer-reviewed journal articles. Highly active in the Australian Muslim community, Nora is also a consultant for various Australian government departments and agencies on Islamic and Muslim issues.

Leyla Arslan is an Arabist and holds a PhD in political science (Sciences Po, Paris). She has conducted and published several qualitative studies on low income neighbourhoods and on immigration and Islam in France. Her publications include *Enfants d'Islam et de Marianne: des banlieues à l'Université* (Presses Universitaires de France, 2010), and, together with Mohammed Ali Adraoui, *L'islam en France pour les nuls* (First Editions, 2013). She is now associated with the French *Conseil économique, social et environnemental*.

Katherine Bullock (PhD) is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto at Mississauga. Her teaching focus is political Islam and her research focuses on Muslims in Canada, debates on the veil, and media representations of Islam and Muslims.

Rauf Ceylan is Professor at the University of Osnabrück (Germany) and Deputy Director of the university's Institute for Islamic Theology. In 2006, he received his doctorate in Sociology from the Ruhr University in Bochum, and in 2014, he received his doctorate in Religious Education from the University of Vechta. His teaching and research activities focus on Contemporary Islamic Studies.

Sadek Hamid (PhD) was recently a British Academy Postdoctoral Research Fellow based at Liverpool Hope University in the United Kingdom. He is the author of

Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism (I. B. Tauris, 2016), editor of *Young British Muslims: Between Rhetoric and Realities* (Routledge, 2016) and co-editor of *Youth Work and Islam: A Leap of Faith for Young People* (Sense, 2011).

Abdolmohammad Kazemipur is Professor of sociology and the Chair of Ethnic Studies at the University of Calgary, Canada. His research is in two distinct areas: the socio-economic experiences of immigrants in Canada; and the socio-cultural developments in the Middle East. He is the author of *The Muslim Question in Canada: A Story of Segmented Integration* (2014, University of British Columbia Press), which received the John Porter Tradition of Excellence Award by Canadian Sociological Association in 2015.

Nasar Meer is Professor of Comparative Citizenship and Social Policy at the University of Strathclyde and a Royal Society of Edinburgh Research Fellow. His publications include: *Citizenship, identity and the politics of multiculturalism: The rise of Muslim consciousness* (Palgrave, 2015, 2nd edition); *Interculturalism and multiculturalism: Debating the dividing lines* (co-edited, EUP, 2016), *Racialization and religion* (edited, Routledge, 2014), *Race and ethnicity* (Sage, 2014) and *European multiculturalism(s): Religious, cultural and ethnic challenges* (co-edited, EUP, 2012). He is an elected member of the UK Social Policy Association Executive and the British Sociological Association board of trustees, and in 2014 he was elected to the Royal Society of Edinburgh's Young Academy of Scotland.

Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy and the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol. He was awarded a MBE for services to social sciences and ethnic relations in 2001 and was elected a member of the Academy of Social Sciences (UK) in 2004. His latest books include *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea* (2nd ed.; 2013); and as co-editor *Multiculturalism Rethought* (2015) and *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines* (2016).

Mario Peucker (PhD) is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing, Victoria University (Melbourne), Australia. His main research interest is active citizenship and community activism among ethno-religious minorities and inclusion-exclusion dynamics in the West. His is the author of *Muslim Active Citizenship in the West* (2014, Routledge; together with Shahram Akbarzadeh) and *Muslim Citizenship in Liberal Democracies. Civic and Political Participation in the West* (2016, Palgrave).

Hadi Sohrabi (PhD) is a Lecturer in Sociology at the Department of Education and Social Sciences at Swinburne University of Technology, Australia. His research interests include sociology of Islam and sociology of the internet.

Ricarda Stegmann holds a PhD in Religious Studies and works at the Department of Social Sciences/University of Fribourg (CH). Her research areas are Islam in France, transformations and discourses on Sharia Law in Europe and North Africa as well as Postcolonial and Discourse Theory. She is about to publish her book on the *Grand Mosque between Algeria and France: Entangled Markers of Identity*.

Acknowledgements

The idea for an edited volume on Muslim community organisations in different western socities emerged in late 2015. We both agreed that the enormous efforts and achievements of these ethno-religious community institutions have not been given sufficient attention – not in the public debate and also not in academia. So we decided to bring together scholars from various western countries and ask them to choose what they consider to be a particularly underexplored and relevant angle to discuss the role and evolution of Muslim community organisations in their respective country. Our biggest gratitude goes to the contributing authors from Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia. This book would not have been possible without their expertise, dedication and commitment. We would also like to acknowledge the constructive feedback from all peer reviewers and the editorial support provided during the final steps of preparing this volume. A big thank you to everyone involved in the long process that led to this book.

Mario Peucker and *Rauf Ceylan*

Muslim community organisations – crucial but underexplored facets of Muslim lives in the West

1

Mario Peucker

There is hardly a topic in the scholarly field of interethnic relations and minority studies that has seen a more exponential growth in interest and attention during the first two decades of the 21st century than questions around Islam and Muslims in Western countries. This applies to North America, Western Europe, including and particularly the United Kingdom, as well as Australia. An abundance of books and journal articles have been published in the social sciences and humanities over the past two decades that deal with various facets of Muslims' lives and their faith in Western non-Muslim majority countries.

What Bryan S. Turner (2013) recently wrote about modern sociology of Islam accurately explains this shift of scholarly attention more broadly: This new academic focus is 'in part a response to the growth of a global Muslim diaspora in the West, but it is also regrettably a reaction to the West's investment in security after 9/11 and bombings in London, Madrid and Bali' (Turner 2013: 14). Against this backdrop, two main research themes, which also dominate the public and political debates around Muslims and Islam, have been particularly prevalent. First, a large proportion of academic literature, both empirical and theoretical, deals with Muslims as the deviant and dangerous Other (Poynting et al. 2004) and the subject of governance strategies of domestication and securitisation (Humphrey 2009). This includes an array of work on Islamist fundamentalism and what has – controversially – been tagged 'radicalisation' (Bartlett and Miller, 2012). Second, there is an enormous bredth of literature that revolves around Islamophobia in various shapes and manifestations (e.g. media misrepresentation, socioeconomic exclusion), which often tends to perpetuate the image of Muslims as the faceless and voiceless victims of interpersonal and systemic racism.

Beyond these two large interconnected – and undeniably important – thematic blocks, the scholarship on Islam in the West has remained underdeveloped, having largely failed to delve into the complexities and multitude of issues that affect the

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_1

lives of 'ordinary' Muslim citizens in Western societies. I therefore agree with Turner's (2013: 15) call for a fundamental research shift towards questions 'about how Muslims live their everyday lives through practices and institutions'. There have been positive signs of change most recently as researchers around the (Western) world have started to explore other aspects of Muslims' lives, such as their manifold engagement in civil society and in civic and political processes (e.g. Peace 2015; Nielsen 2013; Peucker 2016; O'Loughlin and Gillespie 2012; Ayers and Hofstetter 2008; Read 2015; McAndrew and Sobolewska 2015; Johns, Mansouri and Lobo 2015).

Many studies within this emerging research stream emphasise Muslims' individual agency and their personal negotiation of belonging and religiosity. This reverberates within the prevalent contemporary prism, in academia and beyond, of individualisation, informalisation and personal empowerment. However, some of the recent work on Muslims and Islam in the West reminds us also of the continuous relevance of *collective* agency and representation, that is, Muslim community organisations – most importantly, mosques, but also less traditional community groups. Curiously, these institutional dimensions of Muslim life within and outside their immediate ethno-religious community have received only little research attention. This is somewhat surprising given that structural-organisational issues have been a major pillar of sociological theory and research since the beginning of the discipline, from Émile Durkheim to Talcott Parsons and Robert Putnam. This sociological interest in structures and organisations used to dominant within the specific field of minority and interethnic studies as well, emerging in the United States of the 1920s with the prolific work of Robert Park, Ernest Burgess and other scholars from the Chicago School of Sociology (see Bulmer 1984; Alba and Nee 1997). However, it has been largely absent in research on Muslim lives in the West. The thematic coverage of the four-volume collection *Muslim Diasporas in the West*, edited by Tahir Abbas (2017), which brings together over 60 major works in this area, is illustrative and telling: the empirical focus on the roles and importance of Muslim community organisations is only marginal within this 'state of the art on the research and scholarship on Muslim diasporas in the West carried out over the last four decades', as the publisher appropriately describes Abbas's collection.

Despite the underdeveloped research in this thematic field, there is little doubt about the manifold functions that Muslim community organisations have served since Muslims have started to immigrate to and settle in substantial numbers in the second half of the 20th century across many western countries (or rather in their cities). They have offered support, and continue to do so, for new arrivals as well as already more settled members of the community who seek 'refuge, respectability and resources', as Hirschman (2004: 1228) observed about religious migrant organisations in general – and an obvious fourth 'r' needs to be added: religious services.

In the US, the supportive and integrative role of religious organisations for migrants and their communities have been generally well researched and is broadly recognised, while in Europe, religion and religious organisations have more commonly been framed as a 'barrier to inclusion' (Foner and Alba 2008). However, religiously based organisations of the growing Muslim communities have been under the scholarly radar in North America and, even more so, in Europe for many years. This may have been due to the fact that in research and political debates little attention was initially paid to the religious baggage that new immigrants and refugees from Turkey or North Africa, the Middle East, South (East) Asia or other parts of the Muslim world brought with them. Depending on the specific national context, these new population groups were rather treated as temporary workers ('guest-workers') and sojourners or perceived through the ethnic lens as cultural, racial or ethnic minority communities. The religious blind-spot started to diminish in the 1990s (the Rushdie affair was an important trigger), leading to the proliferation of research on Muslims and Islam in particular since the turn of the century; Muslim collective agency and community organisations, however, have remained rather marginal in these expanding research areas.

This volume seeks to address this gap. It brings together academics from Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Germany and Australia to share their empirical and theoretical insights into various facets of Muslim community organisations and the ways they operate in a given national context – from when Muslims first started to settle in the West to the challenges they face in the 21st century and, probably, in the years to come. Its international approach offers new perspectives on the many similarities as well as divergences in the organisational evolutions of Muslim communities in different national settings.

What applies to many Western countries is that, with the continuous arrival of Muslim immigrants and the consolidation and growth of their communities, manifold traditional community organisations, often connected to mosques, have been established, seeking to cater to the various religious, cultural and social needs of their community members. While these traditional services have retained their importance within increasingly settled but, due to ongoing immigration, also continuously growing communities, the landscape of Muslim community organisations has become much more diverse and vibrant over the years in all Western societies. In addition to the many mosques, which have been, and commonly still are, serving as the centre of the local or a specific ethno-cultural (Muslim) community, Muslims have formed new groups and set up other, increasingly multi-ethnic Islamic associations. These organisations, which typically include political advocacy groups, Muslim students, youth and women's groups, to name but a few, have operated independently from mosques, while pursuing a range of religious, civil

or political agendas, representing and often targeting a Muslim constituency and driven by an Islamic ethos. These developments have unfolded in many Western countries with a substantial Muslim population, and they can be understood as the coming-of-age of Muslim communities as civil society stakeholders with a profile as diverse as those of other religious or non-religious communities in a culturally and religiously pluralistic civil society. This ordinariness of Muslim community organisations reverberates with Muslims' desire to be regarded and recognised as 'normal' citizens, just like anyone else, as several contributors in this volume have observed.

This is, however, starkly contrasted by simultaneous tendencies of misrecognition and essentialisation of Muslims and their communities. While the normalisation of Muslim communities has unfolded across Western countries in different ways and in response to country-specific opportunity structures and circumstances (Fetzer and Soper 2005), they have occurred under quite exceptional and anything but ordinary circumstances. Growing suspicion, anti-Muslim rhetoric and Islamophobia have fuelled an unprecedented and ongoing backlash against Muslims and their community representations since the 9/11 terror attacks. Here, the ordinariness and the exceptional of Muslim community lives clash – with contradictory ramifications. Islamophobia has contributed to fuelling a divisive them-vs-us rhetoric, which has been strategically used by anti-egalitarian movements at the far-right end of the political spectrum as well as by radical Islamist minority groups at the fringes of the Muslim communities to promote their aggressively exclusivist, divisive agendas. But paradoxically, at the same time, the anti-Muslim discourse, suspicion and marginalisation have also further accelerated processes of civic normalisation, functioning as a catalyst for many Muslim communities to overcome the hitherto rather inward-looking nature of their community work and seeking to actively struggle for recognition as civil society stakeholders.

These processes of diversification and normalisation of Muslim communities, partially reinforced by exceptional events and experiences of exclusion, confirm the general diagnosis of scholars who have for decades rejected the forecast that ethno-religious identities and organisational structures of minority communities would diminish over the generations in secular societies. Many have argued against such an assimilation perspective, stressing that as long as ethno-religious differences and pertinent group-specific interests and demands persist within diverse societies – and especially as long as these differences remain the basis for unequal treatment and systemic inequity – minorities 'may continue to mobilise around identities of cultural difference' (Modood 2012, p. 46).

There is also a socioeconomic dimension. It has been a classic argument in sociology and political science that those who have limited individual resources

tend to rely more on collective resources provided by voluntary associations and (community) organisations in their claim-making and, more specifically, their struggle for equal citizenship. The political scientists Verba, Nie and Kim (1978: 14), for example, conclude in *Participation and Political Equality* that lower status groups 'need a self-conscious ideology as motivation and [they] need organization as a resource' if they want to catch up with higher status groups in their political activism; 'organization – and we might add ideology – is the weapon of the weak'. Does this also apply to Muslims in the West, who continue to occupy an, on average disadvantaged socioeconomic position in most Western countries, especially in the UK, continental Europe and Australia (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014)? Does this pinpoint the importance of Muslim community organisations as collective agents for Muslims' claims of recognition and against second-class citizenship? Overall, recent research from across Western countries seems to confirm the relevance of community organisation. There is mounting evidence that underscores the crucial role of mosques and other Muslim community organisations in mobilising and facilitating Muslims' civic and political participation (Jamal 2005; Ayers and Hofstetter 2008; Read 2015; McAndrew and Sobolewska 2015; Peucker 2016).

Other scholars have also linked arguments around identity, individual resources and ethno-religious minority organisations in an attempt to explore the specifics of minorities' claim-making and their civic and political integration, arguing, in contrast to Verba, Nie and Kim, that increasing individual resources may not make organisation-based activism less relevant, but rather more powerful. Irene Bloemraad (2007, p. 328), for example, maintains, in reference to Parenti's sociological elaborations from the late 1960s, that 'ethnic politics persists because of real interests and is facilitated by socioeconomic mobility'. This is because 'economic mobility provides greater resources to sustain ethnic organizations, greater confidence in the group's ability to organize, and concrete grievance when economically mobile individuals face continued prejudice because of their ethnicity' (ibid.). Widespread and increasingly blatantly expressed and enacted Islamophobic sentiments and anti-Muslim rhetoric in segments of the public debate seem to make Muslim communities particularly prone to using collective agencies for effectively channelling their claims as citizens. Has this been further facilitated by the generally growing level of socioeconomic resources available to Muslims as many of them have experienced personal and generational upward mobility in most countries in the years and decades after their settlement?

This volume on *Muslim community organisations in the West: History, Developments and Future Perspectives* examines selected facets and challenges of Muslim community organisations in five countries – Canada, UK, France, Germany and Australia – and how their diverse roles and agendas have shifted over time. The

individual chapters cover a broad range of themes and apply different methodological approaches, many of them offering fresh empirical data. Leading scholars of different disciplinary backgrounds have been invited to choose a specific thematic lens through which to explore what in their expert views are particularly crucial issues for Muslim community organisations in their respective national setting. Against the backdrop of the scholarly neglect of these organisational aspects of Muslim communities, this book seeks to make a humble yet important contribution to narrowing the knowledge gap in the abundant research landscape on Muslims and Islam in the West. Our goal is not to offer all the answers but rather to reignite academic debates on the complex meaning, roles and challenges of Muslim community organisations and their interplay with Muslims' lives and their religiosity. The chapters in this book offer many stimulating points of departure for such debates and further research.

The book is divided in three parts and encompasses altogether 12 chapters, including this introduction. The first part gives a general overview on some cross-cutting and cross-national themes in relation to Islam and diaspora, which frame many of the subsequent contributions. Abdolmohammad Kazemipur's chapter (Chapter 2), *Reckoning with the Minority Status: On Fiqh al-aqalliyat al-Muslema*, highlights and discusses the emergence of a new school of thoughts within Islamic jurisprudence, *Fiqh al-aqalliyat al-Muslema*, built on the premise that previous jurisprudential approaches in Islam are inept to offer meaningful answers to the questions of Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries of the West. One key component of the recently emerging Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities is that Muslims have a moral obligation towards not only other Muslims but also towards their non-Muslim fellow citizens in liberal democracies. Kazemipur explores the implications for the lives of Muslims in Western countries, with a particular focus on Canada.

The second chapter in the first part offers a cross-national overview on *Muslim community organisations as civil society agents of social inclusion, cohesion and active citizenship* (Chapter 3). Mario Peucker offers empirical evidence from various countries that challenge the widespread perceptions of Muslim minority organisations as being socially isolated and self-isolating. The data presented here demonstrate that, by and large, Muslim community organisations have become active stakeholders in diverse civil societies and political communities whose civic potentials of promoting social cohesion have often remained unrecognised, underestimated and untapped.

The second part of the volume explores the emergence and consolidation of Muslim communities and their institutions in selected Western countries, applying a country-specific historical perspective. Many of the chapters in this section discuss the complex diversity and multitude of voices within the often fragmented

organisational landscape of Muslim communities in the respective countries. Sadek Hamid's chapter on the *Emergence and Establishment of British Muslim organisations* (Chapter 4) offers an overview of the various stages Muslim organisational development in Britain over the last fifty years. He delineates the main religious trends that have shaped Muslim institution building, identity formation and external relations with the state and wider British society, highlighting some of the most active community organisations. His chapter concludes with a sketch of current and future trends among different types of Muslim organisations in the UK today.

Rauf Ceylan's chapter *From Guest Workers to Muslim Immigrants* outlines the historical development of the Muslim organisations in Germany (Chapter 5). He describes how the profile of major Muslim community organisations shifted from focussing on members' countries of origin to the belated emergence of an increasingly prominent "diaspora Islam", where these organisations play a confident role in the political and public sphere.

In Chapter 6, Nora Amath discusses *Muslim Community Building in Australia*, offering a comprehensive historical account of the Muslim presence in the country that predates the arrival of the First Fleet. Her chapter follows the evolution of Muslim communities over the centuries until today, offering fresh empirical data on the contemporary key agendas of what she calls Muslim civil society organisations in Australia.

Ricarda Stegmann's chapter *Between Orient and Occident? The Colonial Legacy at the Grand Mosque of Paris* (Chapter 7) offers a comprehensive overview of the history and contemporary role of one of the most famous mosques in Europe. It argues that, while the Grand Mosque in Paris continues to be an important voice in the public debate on Islam in France, mainly due to the symbolic power French politicians attribute to it, Muslims do not usually see the mosque as their representative community organisation nor as a bastion of 'moderate Islam'. Stegmann critically concludes that the Grand Mosque perpetuates the colonial discourse around Islam as the oriental Other that may be accepted in France but will never be an inherent part of the French society.

The third part of the volume brings together articles that discuss selected contemporary issues that are currently of high priority within Muslims community organisations in Western countries; some also attempt to look into the future of Muslim communities. The chapters all focus on a specific national context and many of them draw on fresh primary data. The Chapter *Misrecognition and Political Agency* (Chapter 8) by Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood explores how several Muslim civil society organisations in the UK position themselves and respond to experiences of 'misrecognition' in the context of the 2010 British General Election. The three authors draw on a set of qualitative interviews to discuss

how these organisations respond to perceived pressure, make claims and project identities in the face of widespread refusal among Britons to accept their desire to practice civic identities and a commitment to the 'common good'.

The chapter *To Make a Difference: Oral Histories of Two Canadian Muslim Women and their Organisational Lives* (Chapter 9) by Katherine Bullock presents the life stories of two Muslim women who have been very actively engaged as volunteers in several Muslim community organisations in Canada. Bullock argues that their narratives of "traditionalism-feminism" and their views on racism and sexism provide an alternative way of understanding Muslim women in *hijab* who are often dismissed as subordinated in an allegedly patriarchal, oppressive religion. The chapter offers an alternative view – beyond stereotypes and simplistic descriptions – on Muslim women and their civic engagement in Islamic organisations in Canada.

Hadi Sohrabi's chapter *Islam and Community Organisation in Australia* (Chapter 10) explores to what extent religion has facilitated the formation of pan-ethnic Muslim organisations in the face of rising anti-Muslim sentiments in Australia. Drawing from interviews with Muslim community leaders, Sohrabi concludes that Australian Muslim communities have remained deeply divided and fractious. However, he argues, driven by extrinsic social and political forces, some 'moderate' Muslim leaders have partially succeeded in building intra- and cross-community communication channels and creating a number of homologous administrative and religious bodies.

In chapter 11, *Future of Islam in France*, Leyla Arslan outlines several stages in the evolution of Muslim identity and community activism in France, from initial invisibility and the subsequent secularised *Beur* movement to Islamic revivals, the 'born-again' Muslim activism and the rising humanitarian and anti-Islamophobia agenda. Arslan argues that, beyond secularisation or salience of religious identities, the negative essentialisation of Muslims in the public discourse contributes to transforming Islam into a kind of symbolic ethnicity. The future of Muslims in France will be marked by tensions between this symbolic ethnicity and Islamophobia, between Muslims' conformity to the mainstream society and a halal way of life.

Rauf Ceylan's chapter, the final one of the volume, *Future Prospects for Islam in Germany* (Chapter 12) discusses Muslim organisations' progress in the structural integration of Islam in Germany, increasing manifestations of anti-Muslim racism and the challenges that arise from the tension between secularisation and a new religious consciousness. Ceylan paints an ambiguous – or even contradictory – picture of increasing normalisation of Islam and Muslim communities as being 'at home' in Germany contrasted by blatant expression of anti-Muslim sentiments and movements.

References

Abbas, T. 2017. *Muslim Diasporas in the West: Critical Readings in Sociology* (four volumes). London: Routledge.

Alba, R. and Nee, V. 1997. 'Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration', *International Migration Review* 31(4): 826–874.

Ayers, J. W. and Hofstetter, C.R. 2008. 'American Muslim Political Participation, Following 9/11: Religious Beliefs, Political resources, Social Structures, and Political Awareness', *Politics and Religion* 1(1): 3–26.

Bartlett J. and Miller C. 2012. 'The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24: 1–21.

Bloemraad, I. 2007. 'Unity in diversity. Bridging models of multiculturalism and immigrant integration', *Du Bois Review, 4*(2), 317–336.

Bulmer, M. 1984. *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fetzer, J. S. and Soper, J. C. 2005. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany.* Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Foner, N. and Alba, R. 2008. 'Immigrant religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or barrier to inclusion?' *International Migration Review, 42*(2): 360–392.

Hirschmann, C. 2004. 'The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States', *International Migration Review* 38(3): 1206–1233.

Humphrey, M. 2009. 'Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam: Turkish immigrants in Germany and Australia', *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 11(2): 136–154.

Jamal, A. 2005. 'The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness, *American Politics Research* 33 (4): 521–544.

Johns, A., Mansouri, F., & Lobo, M. 2015. 'Religiosity, citizenship and belonging: The everyday experiences of young Australian Muslims', *Journal for Muslim Minority Affairs, 35*, 171–190.

McAndrew, S. and Sobolewska, M. 2015. 'Mosques and political engagement in Britain. Participation or segregation?' In *Muslims and Political Participation in Britain*, edited by T. Peace, 53–81. London: Routledge.

Modood, T. 2012. *Post-immigration 'difference' and integration. The case of Muslims in Western Europe*. London: The British Academy.

Nielsen, J. S. (ed.) 2013. *Muslim political participation in Europe*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

O'Loughlin, B. and Gillespie, M. 2012. 'Dissenting citizenship? Young people and political participation in the media-security nexus', *Parliamentary Affairs, 65*(1), 115–137.

Peace, T. 2015. *European social movements and Muslim activism. Another world but with whom?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Peucker, M. 2016. *Muslim Citizenship in Liberal Democracies. Civic and Political Participation in the West*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Poynting, S., Noble, G., Tabar, P. and Collins, J. 2004. *Bin Laden in the suburbs: Criminalising the Arab other.* Sydney: Sydney Institute of Criminology.

Read, J. G. 2015. 'Gender, religious identity, and civic engagement among Arab Muslims in the United States', *Sociology of Religion, 76*(1), 30–48.

Turner, B. 2013. 'Sociology of Islam: the Desiderata', *Sociology of Islam* 1(1-2): 14–16.
Verba, S., Nie, N.W. and Kim, J. 1978. *Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Part 1
Islam and Diaspora

Reckoning with the Minority Status: On Fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-Muslema (Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities)[1]

2

Abdolmohammad Kazemipur

1 Introduction

The terrorist and/or violent events that swept across Western Europe, North America, and Australia in the past one and a half decades have triggered heavy debates on the integration of Muslims in those countries. A visibly present element in such debates is a perception that the integration of Muslim immigrants in western liberal democracies is particularly problematic and in most cases unlikely. The reasoning behind such a perception finds its most articulate form in the European debates, and is expressed in the form of four axiomatic statements: (1) Muslim immigrants tend not to integrate into host societies; (2) this lack of integration is the product of a conscious decision; (3) this decision is made because the goal of Muslim immigrants is to dominate, rather than to blend into, Western societies; and (4) there are no variations within Muslims, no extremist-moderate and no conservative-liberal distinctions (for an elaborate discussion of these views, see Saunders, 2012). While the most explicit, and sometimes superficial, version of the above line of reasoning is found in political circles, some subtle and more sophisticated variations of it could also be found among academics (see Bernard Lewis's works, among others).

Missing in this line of reasoning and the resultant body of scholarship is an incredible host of identity debates that is happening within and among Muslims who are living in the West. At the heart of these debates is a quest for possible religious and theological grounds that would facilitate a peaceful coexistence with non-Muslim majority populations in immigrant-receiving countries. Implicit in these efforts is the belief that, for such coexistence to materialize, there is a need

1 This is a modified and expanded version of the following article: Kazemipur, A. (2016). "Bringing the Social Back In: On the Integration of Muslim Immigrants and the Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities", *Canadian Review of Sociology*, 53(4):437-456.

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_2

for Muslims to revisit and revise some of the fundamentals of their beliefs, or at least the beliefs that have been considered fundamental till now.

A very important and interesting development among these theorization efforts is a new jurisprudential approach, known as *fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-Muslema* (the *jurisprudence of Muslim minorities*). This title refers to a growing body of Islamic juristical rulings and conceptualizations that emerged in the latter half of the 1990s, thanks to the contributions of Muslim scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the late Taha Jabir al-Alwani, and aimed at addressing the particular challenges faced by Muslims who were living in non-Muslim countries. The basic premise of this new school of thought is that the realities of the lives of the Muslims living in non-Muslim countries are so fundamentally different from those of the Muslim-majority nations that the traditional Islamic jurisprudence cannot offer meaningful solutions to their problems. There is, therefore, a need to establish an entirely different jurisprudential approach as the basis for the solutions to the problems faced by Muslim minorities.

In the following pages, I will outline the main tenets of this jurisprudential approach and its implications for the integration of Muslim minorities in the West. I will also offer an argument, based on Canadian data, that the discussions on *fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-Muslema* could benefit from and be furthered by incorporating the implications of the social-psychological body of research known as the contact theory.

2 The Context

As a social phenomenon, the presence of Muslims in non-Muslim lands is not new. There are at least two well-known cases that date back to the time of Prophet Muhammad himself: a group of Muslims who migrated to the Christian Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and resided there permanently; and, another group who stayed behind in the non-Muslim Mecca after the Prophet and the rest of his followers migrated to the nearby city of Medina to establish an Islamic state. Also, during the era of the expansion of the Islamic Caliphate, there were large numbers of Arab Muslims who were sent to the newly conquered frontier territories for the purpose of setting up colonies and changing the demographic composition of those lands.

In all of these cases, the particularity of the situation of those Muslim minorities was readily acknowledged, and the need for special instructions for them and about them was warranted. For example, with regards to the responsibility of the newly established Islamic state in Medina towards their fellow Muslims who chose to stay behind and live as a minority in Mecca, the Quran provided – in Anfal (8):72 – a

three-part set of instructions: a) no initial responsibility; b) a recommended (not required) responsibility to help them if they ask for it in order to retain their faith; c) but even that responsibility is void, if you have signed a peace treaty with the non-Muslim rulers of that land (for a discussion of this, see Mohammed 2013). Interestingly, even in these Quranic verses, a clear preference is expressed for this group of Muslims not to remain in their minority situation. An exception to the above rule, however, was the case of the Muslim colonies in the frontiers of the Islamic Caliphate. Having had the mission of carrying the message of Islam and expanding the territories of the Caliphate, the early Muslims were encouraged to migrate to the far lands and establish themselves there. Unlike the first group of Muslim minorities, this latter group was viewed as the extension of the Islamic society and as its ambassadors and warriors. While they, too, had special instructions as to how to conduct themselves away from the centre of the Muslim power, they were mostly the author of their new rules.

Despite all these historical precedents, however, the 20th century gave the presence of Muslims in non-Muslim lands an entirely new facelift: larger numbers, immigrating voluntarily, mostly in search of economic opportunities, coming from many different origins, going to a variety of destinations. In the last quarter of that century all those trends intensified significantly, and that at a time that the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims became a very sensitive issue. There was another fundamental difference between the old and the recent Muslim minorities: while the former groups were minority only in a demographic and not in a power sense, the latter ones were minorities in terms of both. The distinct nature of the experiences of new, immigrant, Muslim minorities brought about distinct challenges and new questions.

The initial juristic responses to these new challenges were relatively superficial ones. As a default, the Muslim presence in non-Muslim countries was largely viewed by the Muslim jurists as undesirable and temporary, requiring only some correspondingly temporary measures and minor adjustments. The underlying goal was to come up with solutions that would temporarily ease off the pressures on Muslim minorities until they go back to the Muslim land. Towards that goal, such Muslim minorities were expected to maintain their distinct identities – and their distance – from the non-Muslim majority residents, in order to remain loyal to their religious beliefs and principles. Never in this perspective was there room for the notion of long-term residence in a non-Muslim country, nor was there a trace of any kind of responsibility or moral obligation towards the non-Muslim populations among which the Muslim minorities were living.

With the significant increases in the number of Muslim immigrants, their prolonged stays in non-Muslim countries and, particularly, with the emergence of

2nd and 3rd generation Muslims, this initial response started losing its relevance to the lives of Muslim immigrant minorities. The challenges faced by this new wave of Muslim immigrants generated an increasingly long list of requests for religious expert views on many issues, ranging from mundane daily problems related to food and drink to much larger problems related to the country's politics and role in international conflicts.

The inadequacy of the traditionally-informed responses by traditional religious scholars created a sense of dissatisfaction among ordinary Muslims towards their religious leaders (see, for instance, Karim, 2008; Laurence and Vaisse, 2006). Al-Qaradawi (2005, p. 29) illustrates this inadequacy by saying that: "Some of our scholars are very knowledgeable, but lack an understanding of the conditions of those Muslim minorities; it is not enough that the scholars give those Muslims instructions merely on the basis of what is in the religious references, without enough knowledge of their situations and adequate research on their needs and necessities." The traditional approach of such scholars, according to al-Qaradawi, has led some of them to simply "discourage Muslims from living in non-Muslim countries" (p. 33) as opposed to engaging with the realities of their lives there. A change, therefore, was in order; and some Muslim scholars found the solution in the development of a new jurisprudential branch, known as *fiqh al-aqalliyyat*.

There are many qualities that distinguish the contents of this new jurisprudential branch from the past rulings related to Muslims living in non-Muslim lands. First, it took the presence of Muslims in such environments as a relatively permanent settlement that cannot, and in some cases even should not, be undone. Second, the scope of the rulings generated within the framework of this new branch covered is much wider than that of previous rulings, which were more concerned with providing Muslim immigrants with some practical advice on how to conduct their personal lives and daily routines, such as the issues like proper meat, hijab, banking, etc.; the new rulings incorporated much larger and institutional issues, such as participation in political processes, serving in the army, responsibilities toward the non-Muslims, etc. The latter point has been so strongly present in these rulings that March (2009, p. 34) has considered the main goal of this framework to be providing "an Islamic foundation for a relatively thick and rich relationship of moral obligation and solidarity with non-Muslims". Third, the point of departure for this new framework was not an effort to extend the existing rulings and apply them to a new case/situation but a revision in the guiding concepts and principles. What makes the last endeavor even more incredible is that, according to March (2009), it is taken on by not necessarily the most reform-minded Muslim scholars but by some of the most conservative and traditionally-oriented ones.

Despite the unprecedented nature of many defining elements of fiqh al-aqalliyyat, the overall project is merely another example of the long history of the dynamic relationship between Text and Context. Many of the current debates on Muslims – whether on local or international issues – have an implicit or sometimes explicit assumption that Muslims' conduct is a direct product of their religious beliefs and the teachings of Islam. In doing so, such arguments overlook two important dynamics. First, they ignore the influences on Muslims' conduct that are coming from other, non-textual sources, such as economy, politics, class, gender, race, ethnicity, education, etc. Second, they remain oblivious to the possible yet crucial influence of Context on Text. The emergence of fiqh al-aqalliyyat is indeed a classic example of the latter, in that a change in the demographic, socio-economic, political, and institutional environments under which Muslim minorities live has resulted in a change in the ways in which the Text is understood and interpreted.

Considering the potential influence of Context on Text as a real possibility, one can find many examples of this throughout history. Besides the example given earlier on the different codes of conduct for Muslims living in Medina under the Islamic state and those living in the non-Muslim environment in Mecca, one can think of the following additional examples:

1. The Shia/Sunni jurisprudential schools: The Shia/Sunni split in the early Islam assigned Shias to almost permanent minority status – with some sporadic yet notable exceptions in Iran, Iraq, and North Africa, and Arabia. This minority status, which had important implications for their relationships with states, greatly influenced the theological orientation adopted by their theological leaders, so much so that the Shia theology served as an opposition ideology throughout most of the history of the Muslim world.
2. Muslims in India/Pakistan: The change in the status of Muslims who remained in India after its independence and lived as a minority, versus those who decided to leave the country and form the independent Muslim-majority Pakistan resulted in the formation of very different schools of thought among these two groups of Muslims, illustrated by the differences between Abul Kalam Azad and Abul Ala Maududi.
3. Shia theology in post-revolutionary Iran: The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran brought the Shia clergy to state machinery and shifted the status of the country's Shia population from being a demographic majority but a power minority into being a majority in both domains. This resulted in major changes in the theological approaches of the Iranian Shia establishment.
4. Shia theology in Iraq: The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 allowed Iraq to follow a path somewhat similar to that of post-revolutionary Iran. While the relative

recency of this development and security challenges in the country make it too early for a deeper theological change to come about, even within the 1.5 decades since the fall of Saddam Hussein some drastic changes can be observed in the ways in which the high-ranking Shia clergy (such as Ayat. Sistani) is operating with regard to socio-political issues.

5. Shia minority in Lebanon: The Shia population in Lebanon provides a very unique situation in which they constitute a demographically sizable minority whose political power and influence is much greater than their share of the population. This unique combination has resulted in implications for the general features of the theological approaches among the high-ranking Shia clergy in that country (e.g., late Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah).
6. *Mudejar* Muslims in Spain: This refers to the Muslims who remained on the Iberian Peninsula after the region was taken back by Spaniards through the *reconquista*. Having had experienced the unique combination of being a part of a Muslim majority – both in demographic and political power terms – and then becoming a minority on both fronts, the Mudejars developed an orientation towards the relationships with non-Muslims – mostly Christians at the time – that is unique to them. The Maliki school of jurisprudence, which has the most strict approach in terms of the permissibility of contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims, remained the most influential school of thought among the Mudejars.
7. Jewish theology after the formation of the state of Israel: A similar dynamic has also been reported for the Jewish theology as a result of the formation of the State of Israel as a Jewish state, which allowed the Jews to shift their statuses from being a minority in other countries to being a part of the Jewish majority in Israel.

The dynamic connection between Text and Context in the case of *fiqh al-aqqalliyyat* could be best observed in the scope of the issues and problems that its promoters and key leaders are trying to address. This will be discussed in the next section.

2.1 The Scope of *fiqh al-aqalliyyat*

There are many web sites created by the various Fiqhi councils in Europe and North America that could be consulted with in order to develop a sense of the issues of concerns for the theologians and muftis associated with *fiqh al-aqqalliyyat*. The most articulate roster of these issues, however, could be found in a book (in Arabic) by Yusuf al-Qaradawi (2005), an Egyptian Muslim scholar who is now living in Qatar. Some of the questions that he addresses in this book are as follows:

- Questions related to the larger issue of living in non-Muslim countries and what it might require: "Is the presence of Muslims in western countries religiously justifiable or not? Is it allowed for Muslims to live in the non-Muslim countries, or not? If yes, how could this be reconciled with the religious teachings that imply otherwise? What is the religious verdict for such Muslims, who are concerned with the integrity of their faith, or that of their children, due to living in non-Muslim or non-moral environments? How about adopting the citizenship of those countries? [if that is allowed] Would it be against Islam to take the citizenship oath, in which Muslims have to declare their respect for the law and the system of the host countries? What is the religious instruction on compulsory military service in the armies of those countries, especially when they declare war against a Muslim country - should such Muslims disobey the state, or fight against their own Muslim brothers?" (al-Qaradawi 2005, 25)
- Questions related to the practical challenges of everyday lives, such as: "[Given the required Islamic slaughtering method,] what is the religious instruction on the meat that Muslims purchase in the market, or those served in restaurants? Should a Muslim inquire about them actively, or should they consider those kinds of meat to be fine and usable without asking? (al-Qaradawi 2005, 25-26)
- Questions related to working in places in which pork and alcohol are served, or opening a business that would have to sell those products, or accepting invitations to attend parties in which pork and alcohol are consumed. (al-Qaradawi 2005, 26-27)
- Questions related to civic matters such as marriage and divorce. For example, should they be conducted through the legal system of the host societies or through Islamic organizations? What is to be done in situations in which there is a conflict between the civic law and Sharia law, as is the case with polygamy or heredity? Is it permitted for Muslims to marry non-Muslims? (al-Qaradawi 2005, 27)
- Questions related to working with banking systems that charge and give interest, such as: Is it permitted to have saving accounts with them or use their mortgages? (al-Qaradawi 2005, 27-28)
- And, finally, questions related to participating in the political life of host countries, such as: Is it permissible to become members of the political parties and/or to support them? Or to form political parties and/or simply nominate people and/or vote for them? (al-Qaradawi 2005, 28)

The answers given to the above, and many more questions of similar nature, by the mufti promoters of *fiqh al-aqalliyyat* have not come about as a series of ad-hoc decisions. Rather, such muftis have started their thinking processes by re-visiting some of the fundamental assumptions and concepts of Islamic jurisprudence, and

have proceeded with creating a new structure on that foundation. Many of these concepts are not new, but they have been re-interpreted in radically different ways.

3 The Fundamental Concepts

Two key jurists that have initiated this new line of thinking since the late 1990s are: the late Taha Jaber al-Awlani, an Iraqi-born jurist who was living in the United States until he passed away in March of 2016; and Egyptian-born Yusuf al-Qaradawi who is now living in Qatar. Trying to give the outline of his approach, Taha Jabir Alalwani argues that, to be able to offer advice for Muslim minorities, a jurist "must not only have a strong background in Islamic sciences, but must be well versed in sociology, economics, politics, and international relations (Jabir-al-Alwani, 2012)." The first step to be taken by a jurist in his dealing with a question raised by Muslims in minority statuses is to "redefine the question to deal with the core issue involved (Jabir-al-Alwani, 2012)." Secondly, a jurist should not merely rely on the prior rulings by early scholars. This is partly because those scholars had been giving instructions for an entirely different set of living circumstances; for example, "Muslims were not under conditions such that they had to escape to non-Islamic countries seeking lost rights or escaping from persecution (Jabir-al-Alwani, 2012)." It is also because the bases for many of the early rulings are not adequately known, as many of the early scholars "did not thoroughly document how they arrived at rulings (Jabir-al-Alwani, 2012)."

In order to introduce a well-integrated system of *fiqh al-aqalliyyat,* al-Qaradawi suggests that Muslim scholars concerned with the issues of Muslim minorities should base their work on the following principles: (1) engage in creative thinking (*Ijtihad*), as opposed to simply following the instructions of previous religious scholars; (2) pay attention to the actual living conditions of Muslim minorities; (3) focus on the needs of Muslim communities, as opposed to thinking merely about individual Muslims; (4) try to find solutions that would make life easier, rather than more complicated, for Muslims; (5) reduce the religious requirements and expectations of Muslims who might live in "unfavourable conditions"; (6) realize an Islamic lifestyle "gradually" rather than all at once; (7) attend to human needs and reduce religious requirements accordingly. According to al-Qaradawi, relying on these principles will allow for adequate flexibility and an increased level of pragmatism in the lives of Muslim minorities.

Given the above approach, the jurists of Muslim minorities utilize a wide range of concepts, some newly created, others are existing concepts that are re-interpreted. The main conceptual building blocks used by the promoters of fiqh al-aqalliyyat

seem to be the following: *tayseer* (leniency/facilitation), *tabshir* (gradual pleasant treatment), *maslaha* (expediency, or a pragmatically-defined common good), *tawala* (loyalty)/*tabarra* (disavowment), *dar ul-Islam* (abode of Islam)/*dar-ul-harb* (abode of war). Below, each of these concepts are introduced and briefly discussed.

3.1 *tayseer* (leniency/facilitation), *tabshir* (gradual pleasant treatment)

According to Shavit (2015:29), al-Qaradawi's ideas were based on two concepts: "*taysir*, or facilitation, and *tabshir*, or the spread of Islam through pleasant and gradualist means… *al-taysir fi al-fatwa wal-tabshir fi al-da'wa*", where "[taysir] is a religious duty because Islam is fundamentally a religion that makes things easier rather than harder, one that spreads through pleasant and gradual means (*tabshir*) rather than by generating animosity and rejection (*tanfir*) (quoted in Shavit 2015:30)." This, according to Qaradawi is not only the responsibility of religious scholars but also that of ordinary Muslims: "…to spread Islam is the duty of all Muslims, not only religious scholars. One can fulfill this duty by writing books and by giving lectures and sermons, and also by saying a good word, being a good friend, setting an example, or donating money to proselytizing activities (Shavit 2015:32)."

One thing obvious in the above statements by Qaradawi is his effort to frame the two concepts of *tayseer* and *tabshir* in the context of proselytizing non-Muslims. We will come back to this later in the paper, but here it is important to highlight another aspect of his position, that is, the understanding that proselytizing non-Muslims can happen indirectly and through showing good conduct and setting good examples. Indeed, this has happened many times in history, which serves as the basis for the relevance of such an approach among the jurists of Muslim minorities. One historical example of this could be found in the encounters between Muslims and non-Muslims in the 16th century Europe, during which many Christians converted to Islam after being impressed by what they considered to be good qualities among Muslim Turks who were conquering their lands. Discussing the context for Martin Luther's ideas, Francisco (2007:88-90) documents this phenomenon in the following:

> "Luther thought that there were many reasons one might convert to Islam. In spite of some contemporaneous reports, for the most part, he did not think that the Turks forced Christians to become Muslims. Instead, he favoured other explanations. He believed that Christianity had for so long been led astray by papal innovations that Christians were duped into thinking external appearances (rites, piety, customs, etc.) were the marks of true religious. So when a Christian accustomed to the papal religious encountered Islam whether as a prisoner, slave, or free person they became

> mesmorised by the great display of religiosity. … He also remarked that the underlying theology of Islam appealed to men and women since its doctrines, unlike the Christian teaching on the incarnation and Trinity, presented no offence to reason. Other explanations were also given… many Christians … see that they are unlucky, but that the Turks are very prosperous. And yet another reason was that those from the 'wild crowd' were attracted to what he perceived as permissive sexual promiscuity." (Francisco 2007: 88-90).

3.2 *maslaha* (expediency, or a pragmatically-defined common good)

The history of jurisprudential thought shows that there has always been a tension between a strict attachment to the principle as defined within the framework of religious thought and a more lenient approach in allowing some socially- and politically-defined considerations to serve as the guiding principle. While the first approach has led to a stronger orthodoxy and literalism, the latter has given room for flexibility and pragmatism. This is the product of the fact that incorporating *maslaha* in jurisprudential reasoning "provides jurists with vast discretion in accommodating religious laws. It extends the purposes of the law to almost any aspect of human activity, grants that not only cases of necessity should affect fatwas, and demands that jurists engage in constant evaluations of the repercussions of applying specific religious laws (Shavit 2015:39)."

In the context of *fiqh al-aqalliyyat*, an incredible theoretical development is the introduction of proselytizing as a new *maslaha*. This, according to Shavit (2015:115) is "[t]he most innovative and audacious contribution of … *fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-Muslima*", which "justifies the suspension of the prohibited (Shavit 2015:115)." Once the allowance is given to include *maslaha*, and to give it some kind of veto power over the conventional and customary Islamic teachings, a great degree of flexibility is introduced in the thinking and reasoning about the possible rulings, as in new circumstances new *maslahas* can be introduced.

3.3 *tawalla* (loyalty)/*tabarra* (disavowment)

These two terms – and their specific content – inform the nature of the relationships that Muslims could or should have with non-Muslims. While the traditional understanding of these two terms was that of loyalty to Islam and to Muslims, and disavowal of other religions and non-Muslims, the words have found new interpretations in the hands of jurists of Muslim minorities. Instead of prohibit-

ing the friendship with non-Muslims, the Muslims are expected to "interact with non-Muslims in a tolerant, just and kind manner (Shavit 2015:48)."

While acknowledging the existence of some Quranic verses that directly suggest that Muslims should avoid non-Muslims, al-Qaradawi argues "that these verses should not be understood as applying to all non-Muslims… [and] should be interpreted as applying exclusively to those who are hostile to Islam and who fight against Muslims. Those enemies, as opposed to infidels in general, are not to be assisted or taken as confidants (Shavit 2015:49)."

3.4 *dar ul-Islam* (abode of Islam)/*dar-ul-harb* (abode of war)

This is an area that has probably witnessed the most visible proliferation of conceptual innovations. While the conventional understanding of the two terms of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* provided a very simply and binary structure, consisting of the Muslim land and that of their enemies, the new suggestions under fiqh al-aqalliyyat have provided a much more crowded scene, with a large number of possible abodes in between the two initial ones (e.g., *dar al-solh*, *dar al-ahd*, *dar al-da'awa*, *dar al-mowallat*, etc.) and new interpretations offered for the initial ones.

According to al-Alwani, for instance, "any land in which a Muslim can practice his religion becomes *dar al-Islam* (Shavit 2015:107)." He also argued that "much has changed in international relations between the past and present; today, minorities' rights are protected by international law, the relations between states are not governed by force, and the world has been transformed, almost in its entirety, into a global village. The culture of conflict, which was the context in which the works of the past jurists like Ibn Taymiyya were written, no longer exists (Shavit 2015:107)."

Along the same lines, Mohammed (2013) argues that the different territories (abodes) should be defined not merely on the basis of the populations' beliefs but also on the basis of the nature of their relationships with Muslims. Using this as his point of departure, he suggests the following diagram that combines the two dimensions and creates four different possibilities. Two of these combinations are particularly interesting: the dar al-Islam in which Sharia is not applied; and *dar al-sulh*, defined as "any state in which Muslims are free to practice the tenets of their faith and law and are in a position to invite others to Islam". He then concludes that, on this basis, "Western countries are *dar al-sulh*" *(Mohammed 2013:147).*



Fig. 1 Relationship between the Political-legal Jurisdiction

Along the same lines, Jabir al-Alwani takes this style of reasoning one step further by arguing that Muslims should drop the old concepts and, instead, "consider all land to be for God (Jabir-al-Alwani, 2012)." By doing so, indeed, he removes the minority status of Muslim immigrants as a special feature requiring a special treatment; rather, such status becomes just one of many 'special' sets of circumstances that are present as the context for any question or challenge faced by Muslims. Viewed this way, it seems that al-Alwani is trying to reintegrate the *fiqh al-aqallliyyat* back into the mainstream of the traditional *fiqh* and, through that, into the mainstream of the global Muslim population.

4 From Text back to the Context

It should be clear from the above review of the main themes of the fiqh al-aqalliyyat that one obvious function of this line of jurisprudential reasoning is that it allows – and sometimes even encourages – the settlement of Muslim immigrants in non-Muslim countries, it promotes a pleasant treatment of the non-Muslim populations by Muslim minorities, and it facilitates the integration of Muslims in the host societies. Also, as mentioned earlier, the presence of vast numbers of Muslims in non-Muslim societies served as a force that triggered this school of thought.

However, it should be noted that the mere presence of Muslims in non-Muslim countries does not automatically result in a similar theoretical development. As March has argued, there are many countries in the world with sizable Muslim minority populations but with no strong sign of the presence of fiqh al-aqalliyyat (e.g., in China, Russia, India, etc.). In addition to the demographic factor, it seems that another necessary element is the presence of a desire among Muslim minor-

ities to remain in their new countries and to integrate into it. Indeed, the genesis of *fiqh al-aqalliyyat* could be traced back to new needs, questions, and demands among ordinary Muslims in such countries, which then led to the emergence of new responses and innovative religious rulings on the part of their religious leaders:

> It [*fiqh al-aqalliyyat*] was constructed by Muslims in the West no less than it was constructed for them. [Masud et al.] observed that is Islamic law, the *mustafti*, or the person who presents a query, largely determines the field of response by the formulation of the question… The initial interest of jurists based in the Arab world … developed in direct response to queries presented by individuals and communities in the West. Muslims who migrated to the West were not motivated by religious ambitions, and it is unlikely that lack of juristic legitimization would have terminated their stay. The legitimization offered by jurists for their continued stay…was thus a retroactive rationalization of a reality which jurists realized they could not reverse. The quantity of queries by individual Muslim *mustaftis* on specific issues, the levels of distress conveyed in them, and the *maslahas* they pointed to, focused jurists' efforts and established the main polemics of the discourse. *Mustaftis* often masked their queries in concerns for the welfare of the Muslim nation or Muslim communities in order to encourage the application of *maslaha*, but their requests originated, quite naturally, in experiences of personal hardships (Shavit 2015:80-81)."

In other words, the process for the formation of a fiqh al-aqalliyyat style of thinking looks something like this: first, a sizable number of Muslim immigrants arrive in a non-Muslim country; second, these Muslims do not face a major hurdle on their way of integrating into their new countries; third, the inclusiveness of the receiving environment allows these Muslims to develop a positive attitude towards the host population and the institutional environment in the host country; fourth, in their effort to engage with the new society, they may encounter some conflicts between the traditional religious rulings and the demands of life in their new environment; fifth, they approach their religious leaders with questions and queries to receive advice on how to resolve those conflicts in such a way that is both compatible with the principles of their Islamic faith and practical given the necessities of life in a non-Muslim land; sixth, in response to these new needs and demands, some religious leaders feel the need to come up with innovative responses and rulings along with the line with what the jurisprudence of aqalliyyat is offering.

It should be noted that the above development occurs not as a mechanical process at a superficial level but more as an organic one at a deeper epistemological level. This is a process that is at work in any cognitive field – whether it is *fiqh*, physics, or sociology – along the lines with what Thomas Kuhn (2012[1962]) suggested in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The process starts with the accumulation of questions for which satisfactory answers are not found within an existing

paradigm; hence, the scientists start looking for new paradigms. This scheme is perfectly applicable to the *fiqhi* developments described above – with *fiqh al-aqalliyyat* being a new paradigm, the questions being the queries of the *mustaftis*, the *fatwas* being the answers given to those questions, and the satisfactory answers being those that are practical within the parameters of a Muslim immigrant life. Not every Muslim immigrant and every religious leader, however, goes through such a development. In this process, there are two potential 'casualties': 1) the religious leaders who insist on operating within the older paradigm(s), in which case they lose much of their relevance; and, 2) the Muslim immigrants who find even the new rulings unsatisfactory and impractical and, hence, leave the faith or subscribe to a minimalist version of the faith; in this case, religion still remains relevant and influential, but only in a shrunk scope of life. Both of these two groups fall outside the discussion about *fiqh al-aqalliyyat*.

If the above-mentioned conjecture is valid, an important component in this process is the treatment of Muslims by, and their attitudes towards, the host countries and their populations. This will bring us to a discussion about a body of social-psychological research known as the 'contact theory', to which we will turn to in the next section.

5 Contact Theory and *fiqh al-aqalliyyat*

The recent debates about multiculturalism (MC) have strengthened the position of those who opposed the adoption of it as a policy since its inception. The main argument of this group is that, by acknowledging and legitimizing the cultural differences, such a policy does indeed push cultural groups towards their own distinct and exclusivist identities and make them feel no need for adoption of, or exposure to, other cultures. Viewed this way, MC does not only fail to contribute to the formation of more inclusive identities, but it actually discourages such a development. The solution, so the argument goes, is to abandon MC; and, many countries have already started doing so.

The above proposition, however, is based on an incomplete understanding of the identity formation dynamics. Here, the implications of the social-psychological body of research known as the 'contact theory' are particularly helpful. The main argument of the studies in this field of research is that increased contacts between people of different backgrounds would generally result in the shattering of the negative stereotypes that they hold towards one another. While the bulk of these studies is American and focused on people of different racial origins, it has also

been shown that a similar dynamics can easily be found in other contexts, including the relationships among immigrants and native-born citizens, or among Muslims and non-Muslims, etc., with the end result being the blurring of the lines between in- and out-groups (see Allport 1979 [1954]; DeYoung et al. 2005; Dixon 2006; Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002; Marschall and Stolle 2004; McLaren 2003; Moody 2001; Pettigrew 1998; Powers and Ellison 1995; Sacerdote and Marmaros 2005; Sigelman et al. 1996; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000; Verkuyten 2005, 2007; Verkuyten and Kinket 2000; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2006; Verkuyten and Thijs 2002; Yancey 1999).

Such identity transformations occur through four possible mechanisms: (1) learning about the out-group and the correcting of misperceptions; (2) changing behaviours among the members of the groups involved, which, in turn, can modify their previous attitudes; (3) development of emotional and affective ties; and (4) weakening of ethnocentric views (Pettigrew 1998). Initial studies emphasized that such processes materialize only in situations marked by four key conditions: equal group status within the situation; common goals; inter-group cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom.

The significant positive impact that social contacts can have on the creation of bonds between people of diverse backgrounds is clear in Putnam and Campbell's (2010) study of religion in the United States. Trying to explain how American society has solved what they called "the puzzle of religious pluralism – the coexistence of religious diversity and devotion" (550), Putnam and Campbell arrive at two interesting findings. First, the co-existence of religious diversity is attained through a high degree of "bridging" – that is, through including people of different faiths in one's social network. They believe that this kind of network leads to "a more positive assessment of other religious groups, even those that were not added to the friendship network" (532). They refer to this as the 'spillover effect': "perhaps upon realizing that you can be friends with ... a member of a religious group you once viewed with suspicion, you come to reevaluate your perception of other religious groups too" (ibid.).

Second, Putnam and Campbell (2010) found that their respondents, in the process of shattering stereotypes concerning 'others' as a result of increasing their level of contact with them, not only ignored scriptural teaching but also displayed a wide gap between their beliefs and the beliefs of their clergy – the guardians of the official interpretation of scripture. This is an extremely important finding, and it shows that the theological contents of a faith are not the only determinant of the behaviours of that faith's followers; rather, such contents could undergo transformation as a result of the development of social relationships with 'others'. For this reason, an attempt to fix the relationship between two faith communities cannot start with

a call for a reinterpretation of their respective holy scripts; rather, it should start with changing the nature of the social relations that could inspire a believer to feel the need for such a reinterpretation. Trying to overcome this problem of cognitive dissonance, people may find it necessary not only to reinterpret parts of their faith but also to question and/or ignore certain elements of their scriptural teachings, all in favour of more moderate and inclusive teachings.

Figures 1 through 4 provide a partial illustration for the above argument. Figure 1 shows that, with an increase in the frequency of contact, native-born Canadians' impression of Islam becomes increasingly positive. The strength of this correlation is so high that, between those Canadians with no contact and those with frequent contact, there is an almost 40 percent difference in the percentages reported.



Fig. 2 Proportion of non-Muslim Canadians who have a positive impression of Islam, by their level of contacts with Muslims

Source: Environics Institute, Survey of Canadian Muslims, 2006

Figure 2 illustrates another aspect of this process, by reporting that, with the increase in the level of contact with Muslims, there is an increase in the proportion of native-born Canadians who hold a favorable attitude towards Arabs. The strength of the trend is quite noteworthy as, with every increase in the level of contact with Muslims, there is a corresponding increase of about 10 percent for those who report favorable opinions towards Arabs.



Fig. 3 Proportion of non-Muslim Canadians who have a "somewhat/very favorable" opinion of Arabs, by their level of contacts with Muslims

Source: Environics Institute, Survey of Canadian Muslims, 2006

There is an even more interesting aspect at work here, which is illustrated in Figure 3; that is, an increased exposure of Muslims to other Muslims results in a more positive attitude towards non-Muslims among them. Reporting the relationship between Muslims' participation in religious services and their beliefs about Canadians' impression of Islam, this graph shows that, with an increase in the level of participation, a higher proportion of Muslims seem to develop a feeling that native-born Canadians view Islam in a generally positive light.



Fig. 4 Proportion of Canadian Muslims who believe that non-Muslim Canadians have a positive impression of Islam, by frequency of their religious attendance

Source: Environics Institute, Survey of Canadian Muslims, 2006

A similar, but perhaps more convincing, piece of evidence may be found in the trends in Muslims' levels of trust towards the general population. As is highlighted in the social capital literature, the presence of a general trust in unknown others serves to lubricate the social and economic machinery, making cooperation and collaboration possible. It is therefore important to examine the extent to which such trusting views prevail among Muslims. Figure 4 reports the percentage of Muslims with a high trust in the general population according to their level of participation in religious services. The data show that a higher degree of attendance in religious functions generally leads to a higher level of trust. This is a finding that, again, is contrary to social capital research, which suggests that an increase in bonding tends to weaken bridging.



Fig. 5 Proportion of Canadian Muslims who "totally agree" that most people could be trusted, by frequency of religious attendance

Source: Environics Institute, Survey of Canadian Muslims, 2006

Taken together, the above figures show that the existence, frequency, and nature of social contacts among people of different backgrounds – religious, ethnic, racial, etc. – have unmistakable implications for their views towards each other and towards the broader population. A higher level of pleasant interaction result in the shattering of the initial stereotypes and the creation of more optimistic outlooks towards the society one lives in. In the case of Muslim immigrants, such optimistic outlooks could add to the pressures on Muslim leaders to come up with the kind of interpretations of religious texts that would facilitate the integration of Muslims living as minorities in other countries.

6 Summary

Uninformed about the incredible intellectual vitality among Muslim minorities, the popular debates on the place of such minorities in Western liberal democracies that operate under simplistic – if not false – assumptions: a) that Muslim minorities tend not to integrate into their new homes; and, b) that the main reason for this is the particular teachings of Islam that prohibit or discourage such an integration. Putting the obvious essentialism and reductionism involved in such arguments

aside, this study focused on a recent and very important intellectual development within the Muslim communities, that is, a new school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence known as *fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-Muslema* (the jurisprudence of Muslim minorities).

The basic premise of this new school of thought is that the realities of the lives of those Muslims who are living in non-Muslim countries are so fundamentally different from those of the Muslim-majority nations that the traditional Islamic jurisprudence cannot offer meaningful solutions for their problems; there is, therefore, a need to establish an entirely different jurisprudential approach centered around the lives of the Muslim minorities. The purpose of the bulk of jurisprudential theorization efforts in this line of reasoning is to facilitate the lives of Muslim minorities among non-Muslim populations and in non-Muslim countries; as well, they aim to create a foundation for the moral obligations of Muslims towards non-Muslims in such environments.

The mechanics of how such outcomes result seem to follow a process like this: first, a sizable number of Muslim immigrants arrive in a non-Muslim country; second, these Muslims do not face a major hurdle in their way of integrating into their new countries; third, the inclusiveness of the receiving environment allows these Muslims to develop a positive attitude towards the host population and the institutional environment in the host country; fourth, in their effort to engage with the new society, they may encounter some conflicts between the traditional religious rulings and the demands of life in their new environment; fifth, they approach their religious leaders with questions and queries to receive advice on how to resolve those conflicts in such a way that is both compatible with the principles of their Islamic faith and practical given the necessities of life in a non-Muslim land; sixth, in response to these new needs and demands, some religious leaders feel the need to come up with innovative responses and rulings in line with what the jurisprudence of *aqalliyyat* is offering.

A key stage in the above process is the interface between the Muslim communities and their religious leaders. The pressure from below forces those at the top to change their mode of thinking and style of reasoning. What is crucial in such dynamics is the eagerness of Muslim minorities to live in their new homes and side-by-side with their non-Muslim fellow citizens. The empirical information about Canadian Muslims presented above shows the significance of social contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims in the creation of more accepting attitudes and a more peaceful coexistence of the members of the two sub-populations. This social component is also what is missing in the existing conceptualizations of multiculturalism. Rather than a mere focus on the recognition of cultural differences, multiculturalism should also promote inter-group contacts and relationships. Such contacts have

the potential to give various groups an impetus for revising their initial images, stereotypes, and even religious beliefs, all in favor of a more inclusive social environment and a more responsible notion of citizenship.

References

al-Qaradawi , Y. 2005. *On Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities: Lives of Muslims in Non-Muslim Societies* [Fi fiqh al-aqallliyyat: Hayat el-Moslemin vasat al-mojtama'at al-okhra]. Cairo: Dar-al-shorough.

Allport, G. 1979 [1954]. *The Nature of Prejudice*. 25th Anniversary Edition, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Cessari, J. 2005. "Islam, Secularisim and Multicutluralism after 9/11: A Transatlantic Comparison." In J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin, eds., *European Muslims and the Secular State,* 39–54. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

DeYoung, C.P., M.O. Emerson, G. Yancey, and K.C. Kim. 2005. "All Churches Should be Multiracial: The Biblical Case." *Christianity Today,* 32–35.

Dixon, J.C. 2006. "The Ties That Bind and Those That Don't: Toward Reconciling Group Threat and Contact Theories of Prejudice." *Social Forces* 84(4): 2179–204.

Emerson, M.O., R.T. Kimbro, and G. Yancey. 2002. "Contact Theory Extended: The Effects of Prior Racial Contact on Current Social Ties." *Social Science Quarterly* 83(3): 745–61.

Francisco, A. S. (2007). *Martin Luther and Islam: A Study in Sixteenth-Century Polemics and Apologetic*. Leiden-Boston, Brill.

Jabir al-Alwani, Taha. 2012. "Fiqh of the Muslim Minorities", website: Message of Islam, http://islamicstudies.islammessage.com/Article.aspx?aid=579 Viewed March 23, 2015.

Kalin, I. 2011. "Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism." In J.L. Esposito and I. Kalin, eds., *Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century,* 3–20. New York: Oxford University Press.

Karim, K.H. 2008. "Islamic Authority: Changing Expectations among Canadian Muslims." In N. Bakht, ed., *Belonging and Banishment: Being Muslim in Canada,* 85–98. Toronto: TSAR Publications.

Khun, T. 2012 [1962], *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

Kymlicka, W. 2005. "The Uncertain Futures of Multiculturalism." *Canadian Diversity*, 4(1): 82–85.

Laurence, J. and J. Vaisse (2006). *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Washington, Brookings Institution Press.

McLaren, L.M. 2003. "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social Forces* 81(3): 909–36.

March, Andrew F. 2009. "Sources of Moral Obligation to non-Muslims in the 'Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities' (Fiqh al-aqalliyyat) Discourse", Islamic Law and Society, vol. 16: 34–94.

Marschall, M.J., and D. Stolle. 2004. "Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the Development of Generalized Trust." *Political Behavior* 26(2): 125–53.

Mohammed, Amjad. 2013. Muslims in Non-Muslim Lands: A Legal Study with Applications. Cambridge, UK, The Islamic Texts Society.
Modood, T. 2007. *Multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Moody, J. 2001. "Race, School Integration, and Friendship Segregation in America." *American Journal of Sociology* 107(3): 679–716.
Pettigrew, T.F. 1998. "Intergroup Contact Theory." *Annual Review of Psychology* 49(1): 65–85.
Powers, D.A., and C.G. Ellison. 1995. "Interracial Contact and Black Racial Attitudes: The Contact Hypothesis and Selectivity Bias." *Social Forces* 74(1): 205–26.
Putnam, R.D., D.E. Campbell. 2010. *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Ramadan, T. 2004. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sacerdote, B., and D. Marmaros. 2005. *How Do Friendships Form?* NBER Working Paper No. 11530 Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11530.pdf?new_window=1.
Saunders, D. 2012a. *The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants Threaten the West?* New York: Vintage.
Shavit, U. (2015). *Shari'a and Muslim Minorities: The wasati and salafi approach to fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-Muslima*. Oxford, Oxford Islamic Legal Studies.
Sigelman, L., T. Bledsoe, S. Welch, and M.W. Combs. 1996. "Making Contact? Black-White Social Interaction in an Urban Setting." *American Journal of Sociology* 101(5): 1306–32.
Sigelman, L., and S. Welch. 1993. "The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes." *Social Forces* 71(3): 781–95.
Stein, R., S.S. Post, and A.L. Rinden. 2000. "Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes." *Political Research Quarterly* 53(2): 10.
Verkuyten, M. 2005. "Immigration Discourses and Their Impact on Multiculturalism: A Discursive and Experimental Study." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 44(2): 223–40.
Verkuyten, M. 2007. "Religious Group Identification and Inter-Religious Relations: A Study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims." *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 10(3): 341–57.
Verkuyten, M., and B. Kinket. 2000. "Social Distances in a Multi Ethnic Society: The Ethnic Hierarchy among Dutch Preadolescents." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 63(1): 75–85.
Verkuyten, M., and B. Martinovic. 2006. "Understanding Multicultural Attitudes: The Role of Group Status, Identification, Friendships, and Justifying Ideologies." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 30: 1–18.
Verkuyten, M., and J. Thijs. 2002. "Multiculturalism among Minority and Majority Adolescents in the Netherlands." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 26: 91–108.
Yancey, G. 1999. "An Examination of the Effects of Residential and Church Integration on Racial Attitudes of Whites." *Sociological Perspectives* 42(2): 279–304.

Muslim community organisations as agents of social inclusion, cohesion and active citizenship?

A cross-national overview

3

Mario Peucker

Many of the Western countries covered in this book look back on a long history of Muslim presence, which in some cases even pre-dates the formal foundation of the nation-state in their current territorial and political shape. Despite this fact, and notwithstanding some major country-specific differences, today's Muslim communities in most Western societies are predominantly a result of post-World War II immigration and settlement processes, which have led to the establishment of very diverse and continuously growing Muslim communities.

For many years, these developments of religious diversification and community consolidation went largely unnoticed by policymakers and the wider public, and little attention was paid to the religious baggage these immigrants brought with them. When Islam did surface in public debates during most of the 20th century, it was almost exclusively as a topic of international affairs or an otherwise non-domestic issue. An Australian media analysis by Howard Brasted (2001), covering the years 1950 to 2000, comes to a conclusion that resonates with Edward Said's (1979) seminal work on Orientalism, and echoes the findings of pertinent media studies in other Western countries: The prevalent image of Islam – and, by extension, of Muslims – shifted from a 'picture postcard portrayal of a fabled, but not yet feared, Orient' (Brasted 2001: 212) in the 1950s and 60s to 'a politicised, fundamentalist religion associated with violence, fanaticism and oppression of women' (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014: 79) in the 1990s and beyond.

Over the years, the domestic situation of Muslims received increasing attention, complementing the crisis and violence coloured lens of international affairs. This shift gained unprecedented momentum in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks and after the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, which led to hitherto unknown levels of 'moral panic' around the Muslim Other and the perceived threat of so-called home-grown terrorism (Humphrey 2007; Morgan and Poynting 2012). Linked to

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_3

this scenario of fear is the almost omnipresent backlash against multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), driven by insinuations of Muslim community organisations' undermining social cohesion by fostering social and cultural segregation and self-isolation. 'Islam is perceived as a source of cultural threat', as Siobhan McAndrew and Maria Sobolewska (2015: 53) assert, 'and mosques in particular are perceived as sites where difference is fostered'. Their assessment of the British situation, which applies to many western societies with substantial Muslim populations, reverberates with what Steven Vertovec concluded five years earlier: 'Policy-makers feared that such seeming separateness might provide a breeding ground for extremism; and the fact that the 2005 London bombers were home grown terrorists, born and raised in the UK, seemed to exemplify this' (2010: 85-86).

The two Belgium scholars Barbara Herman and Dirk Jacobs (2015: 117) identified continuous and widespread misperceptions of minority community organisations in general – which can also be applied especially to Muslim groups and their institutions – as being 'isolated islands, located at a dangerous distance from the mainland', and that minorities actively involved in these organisations may easily get '"trapped" in their own world, cut off from the rest of society'.

The increase in the public and political attention paid to the Islamic faith since the 1990s and early 2000s has coincided with, and has been partially linked to, the growing visibility of the Muslim presence in the urban landscape in the West (e.g. representative mosques) and increasing numbers of Muslim community organisations claiming accommodation of religious needs and recognition of Muslims as equal citizens (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). This civic and spatial visibility has met with suspicion and at times hostility within segments of the wider society (UNSA 2015, Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014; Dunn et al. 2015; Bayrakli and Hafez 2016) – and these negative attitudes often find their target in the institutional representation of Muslim communities. Regularly erupting conflicts and tensions over the building of new mosques and the relatively widespread scepticism towards such places of worship are typical examples in various Western countries. According to a recent Australian representative survey, for example, almost one quarter of the respondents stated they 'would support any policy that will stop the building of a new mosque'; additional 18 per cent were undecided, which indicates that only a small majority seem to have no problem with new mosques (UNSA 2015). A 2010 PEW survey in the US found that 25 per cent of the respondents think that local communities should be able to effectively block the 'construction of mosques if they do not want them' (PEW 2010: 1). In Western Germany a staggeringly low 30 per cent are in favour of building mosques, according to a representative survey by the University of Muenster (2010).

These negative attitudes relate directly to some of the 'big' sociological themes in minority and integration research revolving around social cohesion, healthy democracies and ethno-religious diversity. This chapter seeks to explore one of the key questions in this contested terrain: Are mosques and other Muslim community organisations overall – notwithstanding its enormous internal diversity and fragmentation – rather inward-looking spaces that tend to hamper positive intergroup contact, social integration and civic engagement of its community members? Or are they more often than not agents of social inclusion, cohesion and active citizenship – and if so, to what extent and in what way? Needless to say, this question cannot be ultimately answered for all Muslim community organisations in a given national context or even across the West. There is little doubt that a small number of Islamic organisations at the fringes of Muslim communities do openly and actively promote exclusivist views and separateness, reject the basic principles of liberal democracies and fundamentally question the legitimacy of the political system. But where do the vast majority of mainstream Islamic organisations position themselves in the ethnically and religiously diverse civil societies of Western liberal democracies?

In this chapter I will present a snapshot overview on empirical evidence that challenges the widespread perceptions of Muslim minority organisations as being socially isolated and self-isolating. It will demonstrate that many of these ethno-religious community organisations, including mosques, have become active stakeholders in vibrant diverse civil societies and political communities, although their civic potentials and contributions to promoting social cohesion have often remained unrecognised, underestimated and untapped.

1 Social cohesion

Social cohesion has been a very popular term in academia, among policymakers and in public debates since the late 1990s (notwithstanding its much longer sociological history), and it is the central concept for this chapter – despite its conceptual weaknesses and unresolved 'definitional confusions' (Friedkin, 2004: 410). Various scholars have stressed that social cohesion remains a slippery, ambiguous term, which has been problematically used as the underlying rationale or 'code' (Rutter 2015: 78) for a range of policy agendas (Husband and Alam 2011). Nevertheless, it serves as a useful proxy capturing many of the facets that shape a healthy political community and civil society. The probably most advanced conceptualisation of social cohesion has been put forward by the Canadian scholars Jenson, Bernard and Beauvais. But even Beauvais and Jenson refer to the term as a 'quasi-concept'

that has not ultimately been defined unanimously, arguing that it remains unclear as to 'whether social cohesion is a cause or a consequence of other aspects of social, economic and political life' (2002: 5).

Jenson (1998: 15) proposes a multi-dimensional definition of social cohesion encompassing five components:

- Belonging (as opposed to isolation): shared values, collective identities, community belonging
- Inclusion (as opposed to exclusion): equal opportunities and access to labour market and other key institution
- Participation (as opposed to non-involvement): involvement and civic/political engagement
- Recognition (as opposed to rejection): acceptance and recognition of diversity
- Legitimacy (as opposed to illegitimacy): legitimacy of institutions that mediate conflicts in a pluralistic society

This conceptualisation has become influential in social research and policymaking not only in Canada but also in Australia (Markus 2015; Dandy and Pe-Pua 2013). It differs from what could be described the British model of 'community cohesion' (UK Home Office 2001; Cantle 2012), which is more closely linked to Putnam's understanding of social capital and draws more on Forrest and Kearns' (2001) conceptualisation of social cohesion in a neighbourhood context. Forrest and Kearns identify five domains of social cohesion (2001: 2129):

- 'Common values and civic culture', including common codes of behaviour and support for political institutions and participation in politics
- 'Social order and social control', including absence of incivility and of threats to the existing order; tolerance and respect for difference; intergroup co-operation
- 'Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities', including redistribution of public finances and opportunities and equal access to services and welfare benefits
- 'Social networks and social capital', including high degree of interaction within communities and families, civic engagement and associational activity
- 'Place attachment and identity', including strong attachment to place and intertwining of personal and place identity

One of the key differences between the Canadian-Australian and the British model is the strong emphasis in the latter on intergroup, i.e. cross-cultural, interaction and relationships. Allegedly increasing segregation ('parallel lives') and diminishing opportunities for majority and minority groups to mingle and engage with each

other have been identified as a key concern in the public and political debate around community cohesion in the UK since the 2001 riots in several northern English cities (Worley 2005). As a consequence, the discourse on community cohesion in the UK has focussed much more on this intergroup contact dimension.

These two, otherwise strongly overlapping, models of social cohesions (or, in the UK context, community cohesion) have dominated recent scholarly as well as political and public debates around various concerns in an ethnically, racially and religiously diverse societal context. There is a broad agreement that social cohesion is not merely a status, but rather a 'continuous and never-ending process of achieving social harmony' (Markus and Kirpitchenko 2007: 25). Overall, this dynamic concept generally acknowledges that, in order to promote social cohesion, members of society and the political community need to have equal access to socio-economic opportunities and resources; appreciate, respect or at least tolerate diversity; accept the fundamental principles and legitimacy of the political system; and develop some sense of collective identification and belonging – '*shared vision*', as Markus and Kirpitchenko (2007: 25 emphasis in original) described it. Moreover, both models encompass active citizenship components pinpointing the positive implications of civic engagement and political participation for promoting social cohesion.

The probably most contested domain of social cohesion revolves around the specific boundaries (and who has the power to draw them) of shared values, norms and a common identity. In the public and political debate this is often, implicitly or explicitly, defined in reference to a proclaimed and at best blurrily sketched national identity (Vasta 2013), illustratively captured by discourses, for instance, around 'our liberal British values', a German '*Leitkultur*' or the 'Team Australia' (Abbott) rhetoric. In contrast to these narrow and often rather assimilationist top-down interpretations of shared values and common identity (Kundnani, 2012; Vasta 2013), the Council of Europe proposed a much broad understanding, emphasising that 'Social cohesion comprises a sense of belonging: to a family, social group, neighbourhood, a workplace, a country or, why not, to Europe … this sense of belonging must not be exclusive; instead, multiple identity and belonging must be encouraged' (quoted in Beauvais and Jenson, 2002: 4). This resonates with Tariq Modood's (2012) elaborations on national identity as being 'distinctly plural and hospitable to the minority identities … not obscuring difference but weaving it into a common identity in which all can see themselves, and that gives everyone a sense of belonging to each other'.

In many Western countries, the rapid rise of the social cohesion discourse during the 2000s coincided with the intensifying backlash against multiculturalism and a shift towards civic integrationist agendas (Joppke 2004). As mentioned above, these developments were inherently tied to changes in discourse around Muslim commu-

nities being ushered into the centre of political attention as 'suspect communities' in the context of growing concerns around self-isolation, violent extremism and fears of home-grown terrorism (Vermeulen 2014; Spalek 2011). This has had implications both on the individual as well as on the community level. The acceptance of the Muslim subject as equal citizens has become contingent on their willingness to fully subscribe to liberal values, such as freedom of speech, gender equality, equal rights for sexual minorities, albeit the liberal project remains work-in-progress across the entire society. This widespread 'liberal intolerance' agenda (Lindekilde 2014) has been described as 'a liberal form of anti-Muslim racism which, paradoxically, takes liberalism into an illiberal embrace of conservative themes' (Kundnani 2012: 155). On the community level, mosques and other Islamic organisations have come under heightened scrutiny and suspicion. Their recognition as stakeholders in a diverse and multi-faith civil society has been – unlike the status of other religious community groups – challenged unless they can demonstrate that they contribute to social integration and social cohesion 'as integration facilitators, as 24-hour contact partners for politics and media, and as counter-terrorism activists' (Rosenow-Williams 2014: 759). Can Islamic community organisations, whose prime purpose and activity focus is *not* on fostering social cohesion but rather on delivering religious and other community services, live up to these external expectations and act as agents of social cohesion, while struggling against their labelling as potentially exclusivist 'suspect communities'?

2 Activity profile of Islamic community organisations

Most mosques and other Islamic community centres in Western non-Muslim majority societies are more than just places of worship where Muslims go to perform their ritual prayers. They typically pursue a much broader agenda encompassing cultural, social, civic or even political advocacy activities. This is not only in response to the contemporary needs arising from Muslims' diasporic situation, but it is also rooted in the Islamic tradition of mosques being multi-purpose sites and centres of the community (Karim 2014). Asim (2011: 15-16) reminds us that the first mosque Prophet Mohammad built after migrating to Medina, known as Al-Masjid an-Nabawi, was not just a place to pray but also used as a place for teaching and learning, social gathering and interfaith dialogues, shelter for the homeless, and a platform for civic and political engagement. This multi-purpose nature may have temporarily weakened in early settlement in the diaspora, but has remained, in principle, a key feature of mosques, as Asim (2011: 16-17) asserts: 'Mosques have

always provided a variety of interconnected spiritual and civic services.' Thus, these historical and contemporary activity profiles of mosques blur the general differentiation between *religious* organisations, whose purpose is predominantly religious, and *faith-based* organisations, which are influenced by religion but primarily provide services beyond religion (Torry 2005: 117-122). Mosques have traditionally been places of worship *as well as* social community hubs serving different purposes and catering for diverse needs of the community – and this multiple purpose is gaining prominence as Muslim communities consolidate and become more established in non-Muslim majority countries.

Mosques may have been the first Islamic organisations to be set up when Muslim settlements started to emerge in Western countries, but they are far from being the only Muslim community organisations today. In the course of substantial immigration in recent decades, large – and continuously growing – numbers of other Muslim faith-based organisations have been established, contributing to the diversification of Western civil societies. While usually not holding ritual community prayers, many of these community organisations offer, similar to many established mosque associations, a range of services. These diverse activity profiles have remained under-researched, but empirical evidence has started to emerge in recent years that allows first insights and preliminary conclusions.

Acknowledging the enormous complexity and diversity of Muslim communities and their institutionalised representations in different national contexts, the following paragraphs constitute a tentative attempt to highlight some key areas in which many Muslim community organisations in the West have become increasingly active in. Neither is this outline exhaustive nor does it claim to cover the entire spectrum of Muslim community organisations. Instead it seeks to paint a preliminary picture of the diversifying activity profile of those mosques and Muslim community groups across many Western countries that fundamentally accept the legitimacy of the political system and consider themselves to be part of a pluralistic society and political community. Three major areas of activities can be identified: (1) providing welfare and settlement services; (2) engaging in interfaith dialogue or other outreach initiatives; and (3) advocacy activities.

2.1 Welfare and settlement support

Promoting the welfare of local Muslim community members, including providing settlement support for new arrivals (e.g. immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers), has been a core function of many mosques and various Muslim community organisations. While this was initially undertaken in a rather informal manner, it

has broadened and to some extent professionalised as these communities have grown larger. Göçmen (2013), for example, found in her comparative analysis that in the United Kingdom, Muslim faith-based organisations 'and mosques gained importance as providers of social welfare. They cater to Muslim communities in different localities providing services such as education, employment, counselling advice, and asylum advice' (2013: 502). Similarly, in the German context, mosque associations affiliated with several major Muslim umbrella organisations, 'provide social, cultural, educational, and religious services' and 'play important roles in helping the integration of their community into German society' (2013: 507).

In some national settings, especially those with a proactive multicultural policy framework, cultural and ethno-religious minority organisations have received 'funding, technical assistance and normative encouragement' (Bloemraad 2005: 867) from governments to provide welfare and settlement services. In Australia, for example, migrant and ethno-religious minority community organisations (including mosques) benefitted from a paradigm shift of the country's welfare system in the early 1970s. Instead of funding mainstream community organisations (e.g. Neighbourhood Council), the government decided to fund migrant and minority community groups directly for providing culturally and religiously appropriate welfare services to their respective community members. Although Muslim communities had not been directly involved in the lobbying for these changes (that was mainly done by Greek, Jewish and other already more established minority communities), this grants-in-aid system financially enabled mosques and other Islamic organisations to establish welfare, education and settlement services for their own community (Humphrey 1988; Jakubowicz 1989). This had far-reaching ramifications, as these community organisations not only became social welfare providers, but the government also expected them to act as intermediaries representing their community vis-à-vis the government. This positioned them as 'ordinary' stakeholders in a diverse civil society, comprising various religious, ethnic and cultural communities, and 'raised the public profile of Muslim communities' (Peucker & Akbarzadeh 2014: 148-149).

A large-scale survey among more than 1,100 Islamic community organisations (mostly mosques) in Germany generated empirical evidence on the wide range of welfare, settlement and integration services for both Muslim youth and adults (Halm and Sauer 2012). This includes, among others, parental, educational and social welfare related counselling, German language courses, civic orientation programs, and tutoring for high school students (Table 1).

Tab. 1 Welfare, settlement and integration-related services: Mosques in Germany

	For youth	For adults
Civics courses	66.5	48.2
Tutoring (high school students)	57.3	n/a
German language course	31.0	23.5
Computer/IT	27.7	15.2
Education-related/parental counselling	n/a	43.0
Social welfare counselling	n/a	43.2

Based on Halm and Sauer 2012: 77

Similarly, another study, recently carried out in the state of Victoria in Australia, found that around three quarters of all surveyed Muslim community organisations[1] run a range of 'settlement support, community welfare and counselling services for their community' (Peucker 2017: 36); these services include, among other things, youth work, parent/family and marriage counselling, financial and career-related counselling and settleemtn assistance.

2.2 Outreach and dialogue activities

In many western countries, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have turned out to be a watershed moment for Muslim communities in two oddly intertwined ways. On the one hand, it led to an unprecedented rise of anti-Muslim sentiments and suspicion, on the other, it urged Muslim community groups to increase their efforts to actively respond to these processes of exclusionary Othering (Eck 2005; Allen and Nielsen 2002; Bouma et al. 2007), 'initiating multifaith and educational activities to dispel negative stereotypes and attitudes propagated by the media and political figures' (Halafoff 2012: 115). In Australia, the then president of the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV), Ramzi Elsayed, described this double effect during an interview in 2012. He stated that September 11 was a 'wake-up call, it slapped us in the face' as the Muslim community suddenly realised that they 'have to outreach' and address the anti-Muslim discourse: '…everyone realised we all have to be part of the solution' (quoted in Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014: 162).

While there had been interfaith and cross-community dialogue initiatives well before the tragic 9/11 events (Jonker 2005), their numbers have skyrocketed since

1 This questionnaire-based survey was completed by approximately two thirds (N=68) of all Muslim community organisations active in Victoria.

then in many Western societies. There are now countless local – and a number of more prominent regional or state-wide – dialogue activities, bringing together representatives from all three Abrahamic faiths. This involves mosques as well as other Islamic faith-based organisations. Mosques in many non-Muslim majority countries have been increasingly eager to open their doors, for example, and to invite non-Muslim fellow citizens to come and ask questions about Islam. These Mosque Open Door initiatives have attracted more and more attention both among participating mosques and among members of the wider community who use these opportunities to learn about Islam and enter into a dialogue (Allen and Nielsen 2002). Beyond these mosque activities, civically committed Muslims have set up a range of new Muslim community organisations, many of them affiliated with the global *Hizmet* (or *Gülen*) movement, particularly concerned with promoting education and dialogue with the mainstream community (Yükleyen and Yurdakul 2011).

Several surveys among mosques and oter Islamic community organisations, conducted in Germany (Halm and Sauer 2012), the the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) (Underabi 2015) and Victoria (Peucker 2017), offer empirical evidence demonstrating that such cross-community and interfaith dialogue initiatives have become important elements of many mosques' activity profiles. The German survey of over 1,100 mosques, for example, found that more than 60 per cent of the examined mosques are actively involved in interfaith dialogue initiatives. The NSW study among 50 mosques in and around Sydney revealed that 58 per cent of surveyed mosques run interfaith programs and 56 per cent hold Mosque Open Door events; more over 54 per cent of them stated that they are involved in mainstream 'community service activities' such as Breast Cancer Awareness Month (Underabi 2015: 35). According to the Victiorian study findings, over 85 per cent of surveyed Muslim community organisations run cross-community outreach activities, such as Open Door events, interfaith dialogue initiatives and engaging in mainstream public events (e.g. Clean Up Australia Day), and most of them regularly cooperate with varipus non-Muslim groups and insititutions (Peucker 2017: 34).

2.3 Advocacy, media and political consultation

The active role in providing welfare and settlement support and engaging in cross-community dialogue initiatives indicates that many Muslim community organisations have become 'ordinary' stakeholders and actors within diverse civil societies. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that they, like many other civil society groups, have also taken on advocacy tasks, representing and lobbying for their community vis-à-vis the media and policymakers (Amath 2015). Similar to

interfaith activities and settlement service provision, this is not an entirely new component of Muslim community organisations' activity profile, but it has become increasingly prominent since the early 2000s.

As mentioned above, in Australia, for example, Muslim community organisations who received government grants-in-aid support for their welfare service provision have also been expected 'to act as intermediaries who could speak on behalf of their community' (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014: 148). Moreover, in many countries, Muslim community organisation have been dragged into the public arena as they engaged and negotiated with local government, for example, in the context of mosque building applications and the establishment of Islamic schools (Humphrey 2001: 41; see also Nielsen 2004). Notwithstanding these early forms of advocacy work, Muslim organisations have ramped up their efforts to make their voices heard in the public and political sphere as the public discourse shifted more and more towards securitisation and domestication (Humphrey 2009) and the 'media-security nexus' aggravating the stigmatisation and marginalisation of Muslim communities (O'Loughlin and Gillespie 2012). Simultaneously, national governments have come to the realisation that they would not be able to effectively achieve their political goals around 'integrating Islam' unless they entered into direct negotiations and cooperation with representatives of Muslim communities. This has created new advocacy and lobbying opportunities for certain, often government hand-picked, Muslim community organisations, but it also put them at risk of being used in a rubber stamp exercise for governments, giving legitimacy to a political agenda that fundamentally differs from their own (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014).

The range of advocacy work performed by Muslim community organisations in the West is vast; it includes their active involvement in public demonstrations, participating in government-led consultations or sitting on advisory boards of various institutions, and engaging in media and public relations work. Various Muslim community organisations have (co-)organised public protests to express the political views and frustration within segments of the Muslim community, rallying, to name just a few examples, for a humane refugee policy, against racism or anti-Muslim bigotry, or calling for foreign policy changes or an alternative to globalisation (Peace 2015). One of most outstanding examples world-wide was the British Stop the War protests against the US-led war in Afghanistan (2001) and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014: 132-133). These mass anti-war protests – the largest protests in British history – were co-organised by the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), and they were highly significant, for they created 'new moral communities that transcended ethnic and religious differences' and contributed to 'transforming ideas of citizenship' (Geaves 2005: 73) among Muslims in the UK.

Active media engagement and intervention (Dreher 2003, 2010) has also become a key activity pursued in one way or another by a growing number of Muslim community organisations. While in many countries mosques seem to be lagging behind in this realm, many other Muslim community groups have been leading the way (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). Tanja Dreher (2010) identified a series of media intervention strategies, in particular aimed at tackling Islamophobia and public misconceptions of Muslims. These strategies include rather passive PR work (e.g. publishing media releases) as well as active contributions to the media (e.g. media commentaries, interviews, letters to editor), media training for other community members, and liaising and cooperating with journalists.

While it remains difficult to accurately assess or quantify the extent to which Muslim community organisations are involved in any of these forms of advocacy, lobbying and public engagement activities, there is strong evidence that these activities have received increasing attention within many Muslim community organisations – despite often lacking resources. This is also supported by the recent emergence of a 'new generation' of Muslim community groups whose prime focus is not on traditional community service but more on advocacy work, such as Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR) and Muslim Advocates in the US or the Muslim Legal Network (MLN) in Australia. [2]

This brief snapshot of the broad and diversifying activity range suggests that many Muslim community organisations have embarked – and made overall good progress – on their path to becoming 'ordinary' civil society stakeholders in religiously pluralistic Western societies. But how can these services, most of which aimed at supporting Muslim community members, contribute to the collective goal of promoting social cohesion and active citizenship?

3 Muslim community organisations as agents of social cohesion?

In order to empirically explore this question, we need to look at how certain services and provisions affect key dimensions of social cohesion as outlined above – a

2 The above mentioned Australian survey among Muslim community organisations in the state of Victoria comes to the conclusion that political lobbying and advocacy work is much less common within these organsiations than other types of religious, social or outreach services. Just over one quarter of surveyed organisations are engaged in this kind of political advocacy work (Peucker 2017: 38).

question that has received only little scholarly attention up until a few years ago. Recently emerging empirical research draws attention to mainly three dimensions of social cohesion that may be positively influenced by Muslim community work: (1) fostering socioeconomic opportunities; (2) building and strengthening cross-community relationships and social networks of trust (social capital); and (3) encouraging and facilitating civic and political participation (active citizenship).

3.1 Socioeconomic opportunities

The settlement and welfare services provided by many mosques and other Muslim community groups are one example for how these organisations contribute to strengthening social cohesion. Language courses improving (new) immigrants' proficiency in the language of the host country (e.g. English, German etc.), for example, generate cultural capital that is necessary for accessing the mainstream labour market and other key institutions, resources and services (e.g. education, health care, housing). This helps improve Muslims' economic opportunities and inclusion and decrease socioeconomic marginalisation and, on a macro-societal level, wealth disparities – which is an essential component of cohesive societies. In addition, as outlined above, many Muslim community organisations across western countries run a range of educational programs (e.g. IT programs, job interview training) and capacity building and leadership training that are at least partially aimed at empowering participants and strengthen their employability.

Based on in-depth interviews with representatives of various 'Muslim civil society organisations' in Australia, Nora Amath (2015: 16) found that many of these Muslim community groups pursue the explicit aim of 'supporting the participation [of Muslims or, more specifically, Muslim women] in education and training', and 'facilitating participation in employment and in voluntary work'. One of Amath's interview partners, leader of a Muslim women's organisation in Sydney, for example, stated: 'We educate, we train, skill them up and now they (clients) are working at various government and non-government organisations at a local, state and national level' (quoted in Amath 2015: 17). Amath concludes that these organisations have successfully assisted Muslim community members in getting 'the necessary education, training and skills to ensure that they are able to readily enter other areas of the work force' (2015: 20).

These positive effects apply in different ways to both those who participate in the organisations' educational programs (the 'clients') as well to those who take an active role within these organisations as volunteers coordinating or running these and other services. The latter relates to the empirically well-documented fact that

volunteering within the non-governmental sector – and this includes religious organisations – commonly results in the acquisition of civic skills and knowledge (Verba et al. 1995, Foner and Alba 2008), which are often transferable to other situations and thus may increase their employability and job market opportunities (Walsh and Black 2015: 20-21). Verba, Schlozman and Brady's Civic Voluntarism Model (1995) argues – and this was empirically confirmed in their US-study Voice and Equality – that religious and non-religious voluntary associations serve as a 'training ground', where those actively involved gain organisational and communication ('civic') skills (Verba et al. 1995: 369; see also Putnam 2000). Similarly, Cesari (2013: 73) describes religious organisations as 'incubator for civic skills'. While there is nothing that suggests this would not also be applicable for Islamic faith-based organisations, a recent qualitative study on active citizenship of Muslims in Australia and Germany found evidence that these capacity building and learning effects also hold true for Muslims volunteering within Muslim community organisations (Peucker 2016).

3.2 Intergroup interaction and social networks of trust

The British model of community cohesion particularly emphasises the importance of social networks and, more specifically, cross-community interactions and 'intergroup co-operation', as a fundamental component of cohesive societies (Kearns and Forrest 2001: 2129). Does participating in Muslim community organisations tend to hamper such intergroup contacts? This question goes to the heart of some of the widespread assumptions around the allegedly socially isolating and self-segregating effect of mosque attendance and Muslim community involvement. Empirical data rather support the opposite. For example, McAndrew and Sobolewska recently found in their analysis of a large British data set, the Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010, that Muslims who attend mosques are 'more likely to have friends outside their ethnic or religious group' (2015: 69).

The above outlined profile of mosques in Germany (Halm and Sauer 2012) and NSW in Australia (Underabi 2015) also cast doubt on these self-segregation allegations, given how many mosques have been involved in interfaith and intercultural engagement and dialogue programs. Within these initiatives Muslim community members have established lines of communication and exchange with members of other community groups, which has not only resulted in reducing mutual misconceptions but also in building positive interpersonal relationships (Amath 2013: 117) – *bridging* social capital, in Robert Putnam's terminology (2000: 22).

A recent explorative study on civic and political participation of Muslims in Australia and Germany (Peucker 2016) confirms these positive cross-community

relationship building effects. Based on in-depth interviews with 30 civically active Muslims, many of them engaged primarily in a Muslim community context, the research concluded that almost all interview partners have expanded their social networks across community boundaries as a result of their civic engagement. This applied not only to those who participated in explicit interfaith dialogue or outreach initiatives. In many cases, it was the Muslim community organisation's general institutional connectedness (linking social capital, Woolcock 2001), for example, with policymakers, civil society organisations, or the media, that brought Muslim volunteers into contact with a range of non-Muslims stakeholders and resulted in increasing interpersonal relationships of trust, generating bridging social capital.

Another important facet in this context is how Muslims' active involvement in mosques or other Muslim community organisations has facilitated and encouraged civic engagement in other non-Muslim organisations, where cross-community interaction is a common feature. Jen'nan Ghazal Read's (2015) quantitative study among Arab Muslims in the US demonstrates that Muslim men who attend mosques weekly and those who are very involved in mosque activities were significantly more likely to be civically engaged in non-Muslim organisations, such as neighbourhood groups, arts or cultural organisations, trade unions or organisations that help, for example, the poor and homeless. A few years earlier, the US-researcher Amaney Jamal also found in her local study among Muslims in New York that 'mosque participation among Arabs and South Asian [Muslims] is highly associated with involvement in civic groups' (2005: 531), such as neighbourhood or community group or any other organisation that provides help to 'the poor, sick, elderly, or homeless'.

These US-findings resonate with the result from my own study on Muslims' active citizenship in Australia and Germany (Peucker 2016), which detected the following civic pathway pattern: Many interviewed Muslims started their civic engagement within a Muslim community organisation, not least due to the fact that it seems more accessible to many of them. In the course of their community volunteering experiences they would increase their cross-community contacts and cooperation, and many of them also got invited to participate in various multicultural or mainstream advisory boards and committees, which would subsequently also increase their cross-community networks.

While there is strong empirical evidence that Muslims' engagement in mosques and Muslim community organisations often foster cross-community interpersonal interaction, the question remains as to whether these intercultural contacts also lead to higher levels of mutual trust. This is a key feature of enhanced and deepened social capital, defined by Putnam as social networks of 'reciprocity and trustworthiness' (2000: 19). My qualitative study on active citizenship confirmed this, especially in the Australian sample and to a lesser extent among interviewed

Muslims in Germany. Australian Muslims often emphasised how, through their active community engagement, they have developed friendships and sustainable networks of trust with many non-Muslims.

On a more general level and with regards to trust in politics, Fleischmann et al.'s (2015) quantitative analysis of the effects of mosque attendance among Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands generate important empirical insights. They found statistically significant positive correlations between mosque attendance and participation in ethno-religious minority organisations, which then had positive implications on their trust in politics, in government and in police and the justice system. They conclude that 'there is some indication that the more Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands attend the mosque, the more trust they have in politics, and this is primarily because they participate more in co-ethnic organizations' (2015: 11).

3.3 Promoting civic and political participation

'Democracy depends on all of us: the price of liberty is not just "eternal vigilance", as Abraham Lincoln said, but eternal activity' (Crick 2008: 18). Sir Bernard Crick is one of many political scientists and philosophers who have stressed the importance of civic and political participation for a healthy and vibrant political community – and both the Canadian-Australian and the British social cohesion models also explicitly pinpoint the key role of participation and civic engagement for building a cohesive and inclusive society (Markus 2015; Jenson 1998; see also Putnam 2000).

The widely recognised Civic Voluntarism Model underscores the empowering and facilitating effect of non-political voluntary associations, including religious organisations on political participation. Verba et al. (1995) have argued, based on their empirical findings, that these organisations tend to directly and indirectly increase their members' inclination and capacity to become politically active in three ways. First, as mentioned above, these civil society organisations, including religious associations, foster civic skills among their members, which are important also for political participation. Second, they may directly encourage their members to become politically active (e.g. by calling upon them to vote). And third, these organisations may indirectly encourage political participation through 'political stimuli', like discussion about politics, which then increases people's interest and propensity to become active (Verba et al. 1995: 369).

Verba and his colleagues did not examine mosques in particular, but there is nothing to suggest their elaborations would not also apply to Islamic (religious or faith-based) community organisations. A large study of mosques across the US,

including 524 interviews with mosque representatives, for example, underscored not only the social inclusivist attitude among mosques, with 98 per cent of the interviewed mosque leaders agreeing that Muslims should be involved in American institutions. But 91 per cent of them also agreed (71 per cent agreed strongly) that 'Muslims should participate in the American political process' (Bagby 2012: 20).[3] Similar, though slightly lower, approval rates were recorded among mosque leaders in Australia, more specifically in NSW, where 92 per cent agreed that 'Muslims should be involved in Australian civic institutions' and 72 per cent stated that 'Muslims should participate in the Australian political process' (Underabi 2015: 44).

Several empirical research studies have found evidence for the political mobilisation effect of mosques and mosque attendance or involvement. Jamal was among the first scholars who could empirically demonstrate, based on a survey of 335 Muslim Americans in the New York area, that 'levels of mosque participation are directly associated with higher levels of political activity' (2005: 527), which was defined as non-electoral political participation (e.g. contacting media or politician, signing petition, attended political rally, volunteered for political candidate, active member of political party). On closer inspection, this association only applies to Arab Muslims, but not to African American or Asian Muslims. A few years later, Ayers and Hofstetter (2008), came to similar conclusions; their statistical analysis of a large survey among 1,846 American Muslims revealed that Muslims' religious commitment, operationalised as mosque attendance, prayer and (religious) volunteering, is significantly positively associated with their political participation (2008: 17). Similarly, in the British context, McAndrew and Sobolewska conclude that those Muslims who frequently attend mosques are 'overall more likely to engage in mainstream British politics given rates for engagement among British Muslims which are already high' (2015: 69).

Fleischmann and colleagues (2015) conducted a methodologically robust study on the effects of mosque attendance on participation in both ethnic, or ethno-religious, and mainstream organisations and on electoral participation (voting intention). The survey sample encompassed more than 2,000 people of Turkish as well as Moroccan background – and the results for both groups differ substantially. The researcher found that for Turkish (Muslim) participants mosque attendance correlated significantly positively with civic participation in mainstream organisation and even more so in 'co-ethnic' organisations, and that 'both forms of organizational participation were positively related to voting intentions' (Fleischmann et al. 2015: 12). Give that these two forms of civic participation (mainstream and co-ethnic) do not seem to

3 Only among the overall very small number of Salafi mosques there was widespread opposition to Muslims' political participation in the US (Bagby 2012: 22).

be linked, the authors conclude that 'co-ethnic and mainstream organizations fulfil the same mobilizing role within the Turkish community when it comes to intentions to vote' (2015: 12), not reinforcing each other but independently. Such effects of service attendance on voting intentions were not found for Moroccan Muslims; although mosque attendance for them was also positively related with higher rates of civic participation in both co-ethnic and mainstream organisations – which had no statistical effect on their intention to vote (although it does increase significantly their political trust, which in turn does lead to higher levels of voting intentions).

My own research on active citizenship of Muslims in Australia and Germany pursued a methodologically different approach. While it did not generate any statistically significant or representative insights into Muslims' civic and political participation, the in-depth interviews with 30 civically active Muslims was able to empirically explore how Muslims who begin their civic engagement within a Muslim community organisation eventually move into more political participation. This pathway from civic Muslim community-based engagement to political activism, which was particularly prominent in the Australian sample, usually followed one typical pattern: Active Muslims interviewed for this study have worked tirelessly – often as volunteers – within mosques or faith-based grassroots organisations which would continuously increase their public profile as community activists and representatives; many of them moved into leadership positions within the Muslim community organisations. This enhanced public profile and recognition tends to transcend community boundaries, and these Muslim figures find themselves – often unwittingly – in the arena of political participation as they get asked by government representatives to act as intermediaries, to provide policy feedback or sit on advisory boards, committees or other institutional platforms of political decision-making (Peucker 2016; Peucker and Ceylan 2016).

Overall, the empirical evidence presented here leaves little doubt that Muslims' active engagement within their religious community organisations have civically empowering effects that spill over into political participation.

4 Concluding remarks

Considering the empirical evidence, which is relatively consistent across various national contexts and both qualitative and quantitative studies, the general claims and widespread concerns that mosques and other Muslim organisations are generally 'isolated islands, located at a dangerous distance from the mainland' (Herman and Jacobs 2015: 117) appear unfounded. While some mosques and other Islamic

groups at the fringes of the community may continue to advocate segregation and uncompromisingly exclusivist views of claimed superiority, most Muslims do not seem to get 'trapped' and 'cut off from the rest of society' (ibid.) as a result of being involved in Muslim community organisations, as many people across Western societies presume. Mosques are usually sites where the Muslim community comes together – for prayers, but also to learn, volunteer, socialise, celebrate festivals, and share and discuss their personal, community and political concerns. They are becoming more and more what they used to be in Muslim majority countries: multi-purpose community hubs.

In this sense they may not *primarily* pursue an agenda of social inclusion, cohesion and citizenship, but their usually diverse activity profiles underscore that they are ordinary communities, actors and stakeholders in religiously and otherwise diverse civil society. As such, they foster Muslims' socio-economic opportunities and provide opportunities for civic engagement – with positive implications for Muslims' active citizenship and their social networks with both Muslims and non-Muslims. These are key contributions to a socially cohesive diverse society that is not defined on the basis of an exclusionary (mis)understanding of common values and narrowly defined norms, but is rather built on mutual recognition, respect and the ability to negotiate differences and conflicts in a way 'to make our belonging to different communities of values, language, culture and others compatible with our common belonging to a political community' (Mouffe 1995: 34). Many mosques and other Muslim community organisations may focus their efforts and (often limited) resources on supporting fellow Muslims and advancing their wellbeing, but, in doing so, many of them have become – unwittingly or deliberately – agents of social cohesion and citizenship in diverse societies where Muslims are 'ordinary' citizens, despite widespread misperceptions and prejudices.

References

Allen, C. and Nielsen J. 2002. *Summary report on islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001*. Vienna: EUMC.

Amath, N. 2013. The impact of 9/11 on Australian Muslim civil society organisations, *Communication, Politics & Culture* 46: 116–135.

Amath, N. 2015. Australian Muslim civil society organisations: Pathways to social inclusion, *Journal for Social Inclusion* 6(1): 6–34.

Asim, Q. M. 2011. *Mosques and Youth Engagement. Guidelines and Toolkit*. London: MINAB.

Ayers, J. W. and Hofstetter, C. R. 2008. American Muslim Political Participation, Following 9/11: Religious Beliefs, Political resources, Social Structures, and Political Awareness, *Politics and Religion* 1(1): 3–26.

Bagby, I. 2012. *The American Mosque 2011. Basic Characteristics of the American Mosque. Attitudes of Mosque Leaders*. Washington, DC: Council on American Islamic Relations.

Bayrakli, E. and Hafez, F. (eds) 2016. *European Islamophobia Report 2015*. Ankara: SETA.

Beauvais C and Jenson J. 2002. *Social Cohesion: Updating the State of the Research Discussion Paper No. F/22.* Ottawa: Canada Policy Research Networks.

Bloemraad, I. 2005. The Limits of de Tocqueville: How Government Facilitates Organisational Capacity in Newcomer Communities, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31(5): 865 – 887.

Bouma, G., Pickering, S., Halafoff, A. and Dellal, H. 2007. *Managing the Impact of Global Crisis Events on Community Relations in Multicultural Australia*. East City, Qld/Melbourne: Multicultural Affairs Queensland/Department for Victorian Communities.

Brasted, H. 2001. Contested Representation in Historical Perspective: Images of Islam and the Australian Press 1950–2000. In *Muslim Communities in Australia*, ed. A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh, 206–227. Sydney: UNSW Press.

Cantle T. 2012. *Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity.* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cesari, J. 2013. *Why the West Fears Islam. An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Crick, B. (2008) Democracy, in J. Arthur, I. Davis and C. Hahn (eds) *SAGE Handbook of Education for Citizenship and Democracy*. London: SAGE. 13–19.

Dandy J and Pe-Pua R. 2013. *Research into the Current and Emerging Drivers for Social Cohesion, Social Division and Conflict in Multicultural Australia*. Canberra: Commonwealth Government

Dreher, T. 2003. Speaking up and talking back: News media interventions in Sydney's 'othered' communities, *Media International Australia incorporating Culture & Policy*, 109: 121–137.

Dreher, T. 2010. Community media intervention. In *Islam and the Australian News Media*, ed. H. Rane, J. Ewart and M. Abdalla, 185–205. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.

Dunn K., Atie, R., Mapedzahama, V. Ozalp, M. and Aydogan, A. 2015. *The resilience and ordinariness of Australian Muslims*. Sydney: ISRA/Charles Sturt University.

Eck, D. 2005. Dialogue and the Echo Boom of Terror: Religious Women's Voices after 9/11. In *After Terror: Promoting Dialogue Among Civilizations*, ed. A. Ahmed and B. Forst, 21–28. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Fleischmann, F., Martinovic, B. and Böhm, M. 2015. Mobilising mosques? The role of service attendance for political participation of Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39(5): 746–763.

Foner, N. and Alba, R. 2008. Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?, *International Migration Review*, 42(2): 360–392.

Forrest, R. and Kearns, A. 2001. Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the Neighbourhood, *Urban Studies*, 38(12), 2125–2143.

Friedkin NE. 2004. Social Cohesion. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 409–425.

Geaves, R. 2005. Negotiating British Citizenship and Muslim Identity. In *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure*, ed. T. Abbas, 66–77. London: Zed Books.

Göçmen, İ. 2013. The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Social Welfare Systems: A comparison of France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom', *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 42(3): 495–516.
Halafoff, A. 2012. Muslim participation in Multifaith initiatives in Victoria, *La Trobe Journal* 89: 115–123.
Halm, D. and Sauer, M. 2012. Angebote und Strukturen der islamischen Organisationen in Deutschland. In *Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland*, ed. D. Halm, M. Sauer, J. Schmidt and A. Stichs, 21–156. Nuremberg/Essen: BAMF/ZfTI.
Herman, B. and Jacobs, D. 2015. Ethnic Social Capital and Political Participation of Immigrants. In *Migrant Capital: Networks, Identities and Strategies*, ed. L. Ryan, U. Erel and A. D'Angelo, 117–132. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Humphrey, M. 1988. Community, Mosque and Ethnic Politics, *ANZ Journal of Sociology*, 23(2): 233–245.
Humphrey, M. 2001. An Australian Islam? Religion in the Multicultural City. In *Muslim Communities in Australia*, ed. A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh, 33–52. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Humphrey, M. 2007. Culturalising the Abject: Islam, Law and Moral Panic in the West, *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 42(1): 9–25.
Humphrey, M.2009. Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam: Turkish immigrants in Germany and Australia, *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 11(2): 136–154.
Husband C and Alam Y. 2011. *Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction?* Bristol, UK: Policy Press.
Jakubowicz, A. 1989. The state and the welfare of immigrants in Australia, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 12(1): 1–35.
Jamal, A. 2005. The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness, *American Politics Research* 33(4): 521–544.
Jenson J. 1998. *Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research. Working Paper No. F/03.* Ottawa: Canada Policy Research Networks.
Jonker, G. 2005. From 'Foreign Workers' to 'Sleepers': The Church, the State and Germany's Discovery of its Muslim Population. In *European Muslims and the Secular State*, ed. J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin, 113–126. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Joppke, C. 2004. The retreat of multiculturalism in liberal states: theory and policy, *The British Journal of Sociology* 55(2): 237–257.
Karim, K. 2014. Muslim Civil Society in Eastern and Western Contexts. In *Engaging the Other. Public Policy and Western-Muslim Intersections*, ed. K. Karim and M. Eid, 89–101. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kundnani A. 2012. Multiculturalism and its discontents: Left, Right and liberal. *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15: 155–166.
Lindekilde L. 2014. The Mainstreaming of Far-Right Discourse in Denmark. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 12: 363–382.
Markus A. 2015. *Mapping Social Cohesion: The Scanlon Foundation surveys 2015*. Melbourne: The Scanlon Foundation.
Markus A and Kirpitchenko. 2007. Conceptualising social cohesion. In *Social Cohesion in Australia,* ed. J. Jupp, J. Nieuwenhuyse and E. Dawson, 21–32. Leiden: Cambridge University Press.

McAndrew, S. and Sobolewska, M. 2015. Mosques and political engagement in Britain. Participation or segregation? In *Muslims and Political Participation in Britain*, ed. T. Peace, 53–81. London: Routledge.

Modood, T. 2012. *Post-immigration 'difference' and integration. The case of Muslims in Western Europe*. London: The British Academy.

Morgan, G. and Poynting, S. (eds) 2012. *Global Islamophobia. Muslims and Moral Panic in the West*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Mouffe, C. 1995. Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity. In *The Identity in Question*, ed. J. Rajchman, 33–45. London: Routledge.

O'Loughlin, B. and Gillespie, M. 2012. Dissenting Citizenship? Young People and Political Participation in the Media-security Nexus, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 65 (1): 115–137.

Peace, T. 2015. *European Social Movements and Muslim Activism. Another World but with Whom?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Peucker, M. 2016. *Muslim Citizenship in Liberal Democracies. Civic and Political Participation of Muslim in the West*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Peucker, M. 2017. *The civic potential of Muslim community organisations for promoting social cohesion in Victoria*. Melbourne: Victoria University

Peucker, M. and Akbarzadeh, S. 2014. *Muslim Active Citizenship in the West*. London: Routledge.

Peucker, M. and Ceylan, R. 2016. Muslim community organizations – sites of active citizenship or self-segregation?, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2016.1247975

Pew Research Center 2010. *Public Remains Conflicted Over Islam*. Washington, DC: PEW.

Putnam, R. D 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Read, J.G. 2015. Gender, Religious Identity, and Civic Engagement among Arab Muslims in the United States, *Sociology of Religion* 76(1): 30–48.

Rosenow-Williams, K. 2014. Organising Muslims and Integration Islam: Applying Organisational Sociology to the Study of Islamic Organisations, in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(5): 759–777.

Rutter J. 2015. *Moving Up And Getting On: Migration, integration and social cohesion in the UK*. Bristol, UK: Policy Press.

Said, E. 1979. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.

Spalek B. 2011. 'New Terrorism' and Crime Prevention Initiatives Involving Muslim Young People in the UK: Research and Policy Contexts. *Religion, State & Society* 39: 191–207.

Torry, M. 2005. *Managing God's Business: Religious and Faith-Based Organizations and their Management*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

UK Home Office. 2001. *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*. London: Home Office.

Underabi, H. 2015. *Mosques of Sydney and New South Wales. Research report 2014*. Sydney: ISRA/UWS.

University of Muenster. 2010. *Germans are much less tolerant of Muslims* (press release 2 December 2010). Online: https://www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/religion_und_politik/aktuelles/2010/12_2010/pm_en_zur_pressekonferenz_02.12.2010.pdf

University of South Australia (UNSA). 2015. *Islamophobia, social distance and fear of terrorism in Australia. A preliminary report*. Adelaide: International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding (UNSA).

Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L. and Brady, H. 1995. *Voice and Equality. Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Vermeulen F. 2014. Suspect Communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26: 286–306.
Vertovec, S. 2010. Towards Post-Multiculturalism? Changing Communities, Conditions and Contexts of Diversity, *International Social Science Journal* 61 (199): 83–95.
Vertovec, S. and Wessendorf, S. 2009. *Assessing the Backlash against Multi-Culturalism in Europe*. Göttingen: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity.
Woolcock, M. M. 2001. The place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes, *Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research* 2(1): 11–17.
Worley, C. 2005. 'It's not about race. It's about the community': New Labour and 'community cohesion', *Critical Social Policy* 25(4): 483–496.
Yükleyen, A. and Yurdakul, G. 2011. Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integration: Turkish Religious Organizations in Germany, *Immigrants and Minorities* 29(1): 217–231.

Part II
Historical perspectives

The Emergence and Establishment of British Muslim Organisations

4

Sadek Hamid

1 Introduction

The symbolic presence of Muslims in Britain became visible in the early 1970s and 1980s as communities grew in size and developed religious infrastructures to cater for the public observance of Islam and the transmission of faith to children born in Britain. Islam has now the largest number of adherents in Britain after Christianity, and Muslims are increasingly visible as vocal political actors and frequent subjects of public controversy (Ahmad and Sardar, 2012). The last census of 2011 recorded 2.7 million Muslims living in the United Kingdom, and this number is likely to have risen to now over 3 million out of the total population of 65 million. The majority of Muslims live in the urban conurbations of Greater London, West Midlands, the North West, Yorkshire, and there also significant communities in Scotland and Northern Ireland. London has the greatest population density, followed by Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester (Ali et al., 2015). Some 70 per cent are from Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian ancestry alongside those from Arab, African, Persian and South East Asian heritage, with nearly 50 per cent being the children or grandchildren of the immigration settler generation of the 1960s and 1970s.

This chapter provides a narrative account of the emergence of communal organisations within this highly profiled population and it delineates the main religious trends that have shaped institution building and external relations with state and wider society. It begins by contextualising the types of faith-based institution building that emerged with the increasing population of Muslim communities during the 1970s and 1980s. This is followed by a discussion of the significance of internal Muslim diversity and different theological trends, which have shaped identity formation and religious infrastructure development. It goes on to highlight some of the most active community organisations and describes their main

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_4

features, the interaction between 'mosque and state' and concludes with a sketch of current and future trends among different types of Muslim organisations today.

2 Organising Muslims

Jørgen Nielsen (2004:121) has suggested that Muslim minorities in Europe have developed three main types of organisational infrastructure:

1. groups set up as extensions of organisations or movements from their country of origin:
2. groups set up by governments, or government-related agencies to engage with them and national civil society;
3. groups which arose from local communities in terms of service provision and anti-discrimination

The first types were theological and ideological trends that wanted to establish themselves in the West and then developed mosques and centres. The second were institutions, funded by foreign governments, that catered for their communities in their new countries – but also represented their interests in European states in what became dubbed 'Embassy Islam' (Laurence, 2012). The third resulted from the maturation of communities that organised to represent Muslim concerns to government and wider society. The institutionalisation of Islam in the British landscape has occurred through the establishment of mosques, organisations and Islamic centres across the UK. These institutions have acted as sources of community mobilisation and interlocutors with local and central government to accommodate religious needs of Muslims in the public sphere. Establishing places of worship affirmed an Islamic presence in not only local communities, but also in secular spaces such as universities, airports, prisons and shopping centres.

The first mosque in Britain is said to have been founded in Cardiff (Wales) in 1860, the next two were in Liverpool and Woking; the latter became the first purpose-built place of worship and both were established in 1889 (Gilham, 2014). Mosques became noticeable only after post-war migration in the early 1960s and 1970s to accommodate the religious needs primarily of single male migrant labourers, operating as 'safe houses' or 'places of refuge' (McLoughlin, 2010). As spouses arrived and families grew the mosques became sites of socialisation and religious transmission to a British-born generation. These mosques were nearly always 'housemosques,' that were domestic residences internally modified to accommodate

congregational prayers (Birt and Gilliat-Ray, 2010). This was followed later by the development of 'converted mosques' – large premises, such as churches, synagogues factories, or warehouses, purchased by Muslims as their communities grew in size and economic power. Today, there are approximately 2,000 mosques and Islamic centres across the UK, which are a mix of different ethnic 'house,' 'converted' and purpose built buildings that reflect the internal diversity of Muslims in Britain. The majority are attended only by men and are restricted to prayer and after-school religious instruction to children. Others are more welcoming of women and offer recreational activities for young people, counselling services and are open to local non-Muslim communities. Mosques reflect the various ethnic, linguistic and theological differences of their founding communities that originate and often import divergent, transnational, historical diversities.

Prior to the 1980s Muslims in Britain were overwhelmingly identified in terms of their ethnic origin and not primarily as members of a religious minority (Hussain, 2008). For most first-generation Muslims, Islam was an aspect of their ethnic identity and faith adherence was more to do with participating in communal life and less about personal religiosity. However, the international repercussions over the protests held against the publication of the novel *The Satanic Verses* between 1988-89 functioned as a wake-up call for many second-generation young people coming to terms with their position within British society. The aftermath of what became known as the 'Rushdie Affair' saw people from the communities organising and identifying collectively on their basis of their religion (Weller, 2009). Those at the forefront of these public campaigns where a network of activists, who had established organisations and institutions that foregrounded religion as their core identity.

The creation of physical structures helped to consolidate and perpetuate religious identity formation. At the same, Muslims from different backgrounds were reproducing intellectual orientations from their countries of origin. Islam, like most faiths, has a variety of theological perspectives and tendencies that are rooted in history, culture and geography. As communities matured, these differences sometimes caused internal friction and shaped intra-community dynamics with other Muslims of different ethnicities, nationalities and political allegiances, producing mosques that were largely ethnically or linguistically mono-cultural. Muslim collective identities in Britain – like Christian and Jewish and group identities – are differentiated and layered on the basis of internal theological diversity, ethnicity, geography and politics. This influences how they choose to identify and organise themselves and makes it difficult to talk about a 'single Muslim community' and also implies that there are multiple understandings of what constitutes as 'Islamic.' Most South Asian British Muslims are from South Asian Sunni theological back-

grounds that consist of a range of sectarian traditions, which bear a resemblance to the denominational differences found within Christianity or with various strands of Judaism. Among these four major religious traditions predominate; (1) the devotionalist Barelwi Sufi tradition, (2) the scripturally-oriented reform of the Deobandis, (3) the Islamist Jamaati-e-Islami inspired institutions, and (4) the Ahl al-Hadith (people of Prophetic narrations) mosque network.

Barelwis derive their inspiration from nineteenth century Indian Sufi reformer Ahmed Riza Khan (1856–1921) and perhaps constitute the largest number of Asian British Muslims. They can be distinguished by their particular understanding of the nature of the Prophet Muhammad and popular devotional practices which tend to focus on the spiritual dimensions of faith and practice. The Deobandis are known for their strict adherence in following one particular school of jurisprudence and focus on Islamic education. The Jamaati-e-Islami was founded in India in 1941 as an anti-colonial, religious revivalist movement and later became a major political movement in Pakistan. The Ahl al-Hadith is another reformist movement also founded in nineteenth century India (if you are referring to the same century as the Jamaati-e-Islami was founded, then please replace "nineteenth" with "twentieth"-no I am not) and is recognised for its strict textual literalism and is often thought of as 'Salafi' in its approach to religion (Hamid, 2016).

These transnational currents confined their particular readings of Islam to their own mosque going constituencies and generally focused upon maintaining religious identity and expanding their institutional infrastructures. Public engagement work and advocacy was done by separate organisations that had connections or were influenced by these trends. In the 1960s and 1970s these theological differences were not as pronounced as they later became as the communal priorities of securing halal meat, places of worship and ensuring the transmission of religious values to their children were more pressing than sectarian loyalties.

3 Religion and Public Activism

Community concerns transitioned in the early 1990s as Muslim identities asserted themselves in the public sphere. Prior to the creation of the national level organisations, localised Muslim organisations petitioned the local government for accommodation of religious needs, for example, seeking planning permission for mosque construction or requesting to withdraw their children from Christian-based assemblies, sex education classes, or mixed-gender physical education in school. Such demands became sources of national debate and resistance that later developed

into active country-wide co-ordinated campaigns influenced by Jamaati-e-Islami inspired organisations such as the Muslim Educational Trust (MET) and United Kingdom Islamic Mission (UKIM). These organisations questioned aspects of the national curriculum and how they impacted the faith identity of Muslim children. The UKIM was established in 1962 by people who were sympathetic to the Islamist ideology of the Jamaati-e-Islami. The UKIM manages around 38 mosques and 22 cultural centres across the UK (Laurence, 2012) and in 1973, it established the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, which later developed into the Markfield centre of research, education and publishing. By the late 1970s, other Jamaati-e-Islami inspired organisation close to the UKIM created the Dawat-ul-Islam, which catered for Bangladeshis. This group later split to what became the London-based Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE), which manages the London Muslim Centre, the largest mosque complex in Europe. Another organisation of note during this period, the Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO), was established in 1970 and attempted to act as a national interlocutor for Muslim political and civic concerns to central government and local government.

The national and international repercussions of the Rushdie Affair changed how Muslim organisations articulated their interests and how they related to the state. It also increased transnational political consciousness among Muslim young people that became more pronounced after further crises that involved Muslims over the next decade such as the first Gulf War (1991), genocide in Bosnia (1993), Chechnya (1994) and unresolved conflicts in Palestine and Kashmir. These incidents were used by religious revivalist groups to raise 'Muslim Consciousness' (Meer, 2010) by acting as recruiting issues for groups like Young Muslims UK (YM), which was a youth wing of the UKIM, the radical political movement Hizb ut-Tahrir and Salafi, JIMAS [Jamiyyah Ihya'Minhaj as Sunnah] organisation (Hamid, 2016). These dominant religious currents instrumentalised the idea of supporting oppressed Muslims in need by appealing to the notion of *Ummah* – or global religious fraternity as part of their efforts at youth (re)Islamisation. These trends can be understood in three broad types: 'Conservative Isolationist,' trends such as JIMAS that focused on maintaining religious identity, creating institutions that continue to transmit their values and tended to engage wider society pragmatically only when necessary. The 'Integrationists,' like, for example, YM, were keen to participate in civic matters. A third approach is typified by HT and its extremist splinter group Muhajiroun, who were both isolationist and confrontational, and rationalised its presence in Britain by arguing that it is raising religio-political literacy.

Whilst this activism was taking place among young people, Muslims' engagement with public institutions at the local and national level was being conducted by organisations that were also linked to or influenced by UKIM and other Islamist

organisations. In the early 1990s the short-lived Muslim Parliament of Great Britain became known for the confrontational rhetoric of its founder and leader Kalim Siddiqui, but it faded into insignificance after his death in 1996. In the early 1990s the creation of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was the first functioning attempt at co-ordinating national efforts to lobby for the protection from religious discrimination against Muslims within the legal system. The UKACIA also argued that Britain's blasphemy laws only protected Christians and that they should be reformed and extended to defend Muslims and other faiths.

The latter led to the formation of the National Interim Committee for Muslim Unity in 1994, and a consultation within British Muslim communities to establish whether there was a need for a national umbrella body. Additional impetus was given by the Conservative Home Secretary to create a platform that would function in some way like the Jewish Board of Deputies; this process eventually led to the formation of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997. The MCB called for the public recognition of Muslims as 'Muslims' (McLoughlin, 2010) and became the accepted interlocutor to the New Labour government. In its early years it was able to successfully lobby for a range of issues and was able to secure the inclusion of a question on religious identity in the 2001 census. It became the largest representative body of Muslims in the UK with about 500 mosques, schools and associations of various theological trends and ethnicities affiliated to it. Despite this, much of the MCB executive committee and leadership over its history were either members or sympathisers of the Islamist organisations such as the UKIM, IFE and Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). The later organisation was also founded in 1997 by Muslims of Arab decent with strong links to the Muslim Brotherhood Movement. The MAB was defined by its political activism and campaigning for changes in British foreign policy in the MENA region and the Palestine-Israel conflict in particular. The public profile of the MAB peaked in 2002 when it became a central partner in the 'Stop the War Coalition', which tried to prevent UK involvement Iraq war, and participated in the creation of a Muslim-Leftist alliance, which manifested the RESPECT party (Peace, 2013). It is also worth noting that Welsh Muslims created the Muslim Council of Wales in 2003, which is an affiliate of the MCB. Similarly, Scottish Muslims formed their own Muslim Council of Scotland in 2007, and in Northern Ireland, the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC) is the main Muslim organisation was established in 1978.

Other significant organisations exist that either cater for specific Muslim ethnic groups or theological tendencies. For British Shia Muslims – the Al-Khoei Foundation is perhaps the main group to represent their interests and manages two educational establishments that offer education at primary and secondary level. There is also a strong convert community in Norwich, which follows the teachings

of Scottish Sufi Shaykh Abdal Qadir al-Murabit and several other Sufi communities that give allegiance to their Shaykh or *Tariqa* (Sufi orders). Among South Asians the historical Qadri and Chisti orders are popular with older Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Muslims. Another prominent Sufi organisation is the Minhaj-ul-Quran (MUQ), which has branches in London, Manchester, Oldham and other cities with significant Pakistani Muslim communities. One of the most successful transnational Sufi orders operating in Britain is the Haqqani Naqshbandis, named after its leader Shaykh Muhammad Nazim al-Haqqani (1922–2014). There are also organisations such as the Dialogue Society, inspired by the Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen, and a variety of African and South East Asian Islamic associations that are active at the local level.

Despite all of these faith-based institutions and groups, British Muslim religiousity can range from those who display devout adherence to those who have only nominal affiliation and may describe themselves as cultural, 'non-practicing' Muslims. This can be understood in terms of a spectrum that includes those that have strong attachment to their faith and may be religious activists, those that are observant but privatize their beliefs, those that occasionally practice their religion as well as those who are entirely non-religious or may even identify themselves as atheists. In fact, most British Muslims would not be considered as devout as surveys carried out among Muslim young people for instance, suggest that very few observe their faith on the basis of indicators such as daily performance of prayers, fasting in the month of Ramadan and other religious obligations (Field, 2011). This can in part be explained by secularization, the limited religious teaching offered in mosques and by the fact that many mosques still employ imams that have little fluency in the English language, which has the effect of disconnecting them from young people and makes them unable to understand their life experiences.

4 The Politics of Representation

The multiculturalist policies pursued by successive British governments since the 1970s have generally been hospitable to racial and religious differences (Modood, 2005). This is demonstrated in the incremental pieces of legislation that made it illegal to discriminate against minorities on the basis of race and the recognition that Muslims can face ethnic and faith penalties in areas such as employment (Modood & Khattab, 2015). As faith minorities grew in size –the state began to identify the importance of recognising formal relationships that provided some degree of governmental oversight and addressed the challenge of how to integrate

faith-based representative bodies in wider frameworks of governance. This is evidenced by, for example, the creation of the Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC) in 1992, which was the first national level forum for multi-faith consultation and representation, followed by state encouragement to develop the MCB. The election of the New Labour government in 1997 resulted in a more public engagement with faith communities and creation of the Faith Communities Consultative Council, successor to ICRC housed within the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Between 1997 and 2003, the MCB served as the main representative group for British Muslims towards the government, before it fell from grace due to its positions on UK foreign policy, reluctance to attend Holocaust Memorial Day, the Islamist heritage of many of its leadership and its reluctance to comply with government counter-radicalisation strategies. It was further undermined by several media exposés and reached a turning point in 2009 when the government suspended formal relations with it because one of the MCB Deputy Secretaries was accused of anti-Semitism.

The beginning of the millennium t witnessed a number of problems for British Muslims starting with the riots in Northern towns in early 2001, '9/11' terror attacks, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and '7/7' London bombings. These crises reconfigured relationships between communities and the state. The dominance of the MCB eventually caused other Muslims from different theological and backgrounds to question its legitimacy and triggered a competition to "speak for British Muslims". Following the events of '7/7,' relations with British Muslims came to be conducted almost entirely through the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda, which was resisted by the MCB. The government demoted the MCB and searched for more compliant community organisations to engage with. This was exploited by the devotionalist Barelwi Sufi tradition, which had largely been invisible to the state, eventually, they formed the British Muslim Forum (BMF) in 2005 to provide a national representational structure and because they thought the MCB did not represent them.

In the years after the London bombings, other organisational actors also attempted to fill the representational vacuum left by the MCB's estrangement from government. A set of younger Barelwi individuals with links to the BMF set up the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC) in 2006. It attempted to cast itself as the voice of moderate Sufi Islam in the UK and argued that organisations like the MCB had politicised Islam and that it did not represent the "silent majority" of Britain's Muslims. The SMC became noted for its aggressive denunciation of the MCB and enthusiastic endorsement of governmental claims that Muslim organisations have not done enough to counter violent radicalisation in their communities (Stjernholm, 2011). Ironically, the SMC eventually faded into obscurity after failing to gain any support

outside of Barelwi circles and as a result of the withdrawal of government funding. The state's attempts to engineer a "moderate Islam" against vocal Islamist inspired organisations were most clearly visible by its support for the Quilliam Foundation (QF) in 2007. Set up by three former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the QF styled itself as "the world's first counter-extremism think-tank" and developed a highly controversial reputation. It was almost universally rejected by British Muslims for its criticism towards mainstream Muslim institutions, government backing and for its proximity to neo-conservative funders in the US (Ahmed, 2015). The public sparring between organisations over compliance with government's PVE policy continues to be the single most visible political difference within British Muslim communities today.

5 New developments and mobilisations

The 2000s have been a transitional decade in which generational change took place within Muslim organisations. Today institutions that self-identify as 'Muslim' are either faith-based activist groups, overtly focused on religious revival, or more like NGOs which work within civil society and advocacy groups that campaign on specific issues. They are often youth-led and involve Muslims who have acquired the educational and social capital to both gradually replace the older management structures of existing mosques as well as creating new institutions and initiatives. The new British Muslim organisational landscape is a rich, complex mixture of older, established mosques, institutions and religious revival movements coexisting alongside new cultural trends, public engagement forums, social enterprises, online-based activists and service-based organisations. These younger Muslim organisational activists prefer to express their particular religious values on advocacy platforms and in network hubs rather than as formal, hierarchical socio-political movements. They have a web presence synchronized with multiple social media feeds on Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp, which enable them to make cross-ideological alliances that are strategic in their approach and make interventions in mainstream media. These new organisations range from religious education projects, charities, campaigning organisation to those that promote civil society and social entrepreneurship and have a strong female presence. For instance, pioneering voluntary organisations such as the London based An-Nisa Society have worked to empower of Muslim women, and many other initiatives, such as Birmingham-based Muslim Women's Network and the Muslim Women's Council in Bradford, are also led by female Muslims.

Service-based organisations now work nationally, like, for example, the Muslim Youth Helpline (MYH), groundbreaking charities, such as the National Zakat Foundation (NZF), and a plethora of social enterprises and religiously-themed social events organisations, such as the Emerald Network, and faith-sensitive training consultancies, like Faith Associates. Civic and political engagement is occurring through campaigning advocacy groups, such as MEND and organisations, like TELL MAMA who monitor anti-Muslim hate crime. Other instances of youth-led organisations include the environmentalist group 'MADE in Europe' and the Al-Mizan Trust, which is a British charity supporting homeless young people. Young Muslims are playing significant roles in their local communities through charity work such as the young people who raised £38,000 to purchase new life-saving equipment for the Royal Preston Hospital and the volunteers from the Greengate Trust and the Drive4Justice Team from Blackburn who raised thousands of pounds to help refugees in Calais (Asian Image, 2015).

6 Concluding remarks

This chapter has offered an overview of the various stages Muslim organisational development in Britain over the last fifty years. It has outlined some of the dynamics that characterise early institution building and the types of religious diversity and politics that continue to shape intra-Muslim dynamics. The first attempts at organising community structures were based upon the need to meet communal faith requirements and centred on mosque building. As communities established themselves educational and revivalist institutions attempted to preserve and transmit religious values among the offspring of the immigrant settler generation and students who had come to Britain for higher education. As those children grew older, various revivalist organisations were developed to promote faith-based identity – some were outward looking and integrationist in their approach, while others were conservative and isolationist. Activist orientated organisations also began mobilising communities to demand the recognition of their religious identity in the public sphere and eventually led to various collective attempts to represent Muslim concerns at a national level.

The state has initiated various levels of engagement with British Muslims communities since the mid-1990s and made interventions that shaped how they represented themselves. The riots in the north English towns in early 2001, terrorist attacks in America later that year and the London Bombings of 2005 have created an unprecedented level of political and media scrutiny of British Muslims. This led to

a 'two-fold approach to "managing" Muslims – with a focus on securitization and migration control at the borders, and, internally, on issues of integration, cohesion and citizenship' (Alexander, et al., 2013:3). These dynamics continue to impinge on their everyday lives, which has been further complicated by rising levels of racism and Islamophobia in recent years. This context shapes the current climate in which British Muslims organise themselves and engage with the state and wider society. As a result, Muslim organisational responses vary from revivalist trends that prioritise the maintenance of religious identity, to campaigning organisations that defend Muslim concerns, service-based organisations and representational bodies.

The Muslim presence in Britain will continue to grow in the next few decades and cities like Bradford and Birmingham in the future may even become Muslim-majority in their demographic make-up. This represents both challenges and opportunities that require holistic long-term polices that consider the histories and realities facing Muslim communities. Rather than enforcing heavy–handed policies, governments would be wiser to address socio-economic inequalities and discrimination that alienates young people and in worse cases can contribute to violent radicalization. This radicalised minority is largely underground but is manifested in the rhetoric of groups that encourage young Muslims to migrate to Syria. These factors, in addition to acts of terrorism, have energised xenophobic groups in a vicious cycle that results in increased anti-Muslim hate crimes. The mainstreaming of Islamophobia within media and political discourses also needs to be challenged as feelings of social marginalization are exploited by religious extremists to recruit young people looking for acceptance, hope and sometimes revenge.

Though British Muslims are breaking down barriers through organised activism, much more needs to be done to address sensitive issues such as religious radicalisation. While there is a genuine problem around violent extremism, its scale has been grossly overstated (Kundnani, 2014). The vast majority of Muslim youth are more likely to be pre-occupied with the everyday challenges of adolescence. Despite having grievances against British foreign policies, they are more concerned about domestic social problems such as rise in far-right racism, inequality and being unable to express dissent for fear of being accused of being "un-British." Young people who experience 'born again' religiosity tend to become committed to religion by their contact with peaceful activist organisations. Other transnational movements, like the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir, the proselytizing Tablighi Jama'at and puritanical trends such as the Salafis, have created youth organisations that function as environments where Muslim young people learn about their faith, socialise, express their religious identities and mobilise on religious and political issues through attendance in weekly study classes, public lectures, annual conferences, camps and online forums. Contrary to stereotypes, increased religiosity

does not produce radicalisation — though Salafis and Tablighi Jama'at are known for their highly conservative social attitudes and are generally isolationist in their approach to non-Muslim culture. The future will likely see a continuation of all of these various trends and organisations.

References

Ahmad, I.U. Ahmad and Sardar, Z. (eds) (2012). Muslims in Britain: Making Social and Political Space. Routledge. London.

Ahmed, Nafeez, 'How Violent Extremists Hijacked London-Based "Counter Extremism" Think Tank', AlterNet, 28April 2015, http://www. alternet.org/world/how-violent-extremists-hijacked-london-based-counterextremism-think-tank

Ahmed, Serena (2008). Muslims on the Map: A National Survey of Social Trends in Britain. I.B. Tauris. London.

Alexander, Claire Alexander, Victoria Redclift and Ajmal Hussain Introduction: The New Muslims. The New Muslims in Alexander, C. (2013). The Muslim Question(s): Reflections from a Race and Ethnic Studies Perspective .The New Muslims. Runnymede Trust. London.

Ali, Sundas, and et al., (2015) British Muslims in Numbers: A Demographic, Socio-economic and Health Profile of Muslims in Britain Drawing on the 2011 Census. The Muslim Council of Britain. London.

Asian Image. '35 great things British Muslims did in 2015'. Wednesday 30th December 2015. http://www.asianimage.co.uk/news/14173869.IN_PICTURES__35_great_things_British_Muslims_did_in_2015/

Birt, Jonathan and Gilliat-Ray Sophie. 'A Mosque Too Far: Islam and the Limits of British Multiculturalism,' in Stefano Allievi (ed.) *Mosques in Europe: Why a solution has become a problem* (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2010), 135–152.

Field, Clive. D. 'Young British Muslims since 9/11: A composite attitudinal profile', Religion, State and Society 39/2–3(2011), pp. 247–6

Gilham, J. (2014) Loyal Enemies: British Converts to Islam, 1850–1950. C Hurst and Co Publishers Ltd. London.

Hamid, S. (2016) Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism. I. B Tauris. London.

Kundnani, Arun (2014). The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror. Verso. London.

Laurence, Jonathan, (2012).The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The States Role IN minority Integration. Princeton University Press. New York.

McLoughlin. Seán (2010). 'From Race to Faith Relations, the Local to the National Level: The State and Muslim Organisations in Britain' in A. Kreienbrink and M. Bodenstein (eds.) Muslim Organisations and the State - European Perspectives, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge: Nürnberg, pp. 123–149.

Meer, Nasar, (2010). Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness. Palgrave -Macmillan. London.

Meer, Nasar (2013) Engaged Muslim Citizenship in Europe, in Alexander, C, Redclift, V and Hussain, A (eds). Runnymeade Perspectives The New Muslims. Runneymede Trust. London.

Modood, T.(2005). Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain Edinburgh University Press.

Modood, Tariq & Khattab, Nabil, 2015, 'Explaining ethnic differences: can ethnic minority strategies reduce the effects of ethnic penalties?' Sociology.

Nielsen, J. S. (2004) Muslims in Western Europe. (3rd Edition).Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Stjernholm, Simon, (2011). Lovers of Muhammad: A Study of Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufis in the Twenty-First Century. PhD Thesis. Lund: Centre for Religion and Theology, Lund University. Sweden.

Weller, P. (2009). A Mirror For Our Times: 'The Rushdie Affair' And The Future Of Multiculturalism. Continuum. London.

From guest workers to Muslim immigrants: The history of Muslims and their organizations in Germany

5

Rauf Ceylan

1 Introduction

In the last 50 years, the approximately 4 million Muslims in Germany have established around 2,500 congregations – from backyard mosques to imposing places of worship with domes and minarets. The legal status of these institutions is the registered association (*eingetragener Verein*) according to the German law governing associations. Most Muslim congregations still have a strong ethnic character, with nearly 70% of these religious institutions being Turkish in origin. A large proportion of these communities are organized in different Muslim associations, which joined forces to form an umbrella organization in 2007. Up to and into the 1990s, the activities of these organizations were focused on the members' own home countries, but that decade saw the emergence of an increasingly prominent "diaspora Islam". Today the Muslim organizations play a confident role in the political and public sphere, and want to be accorded the same legal status as the Christian faith communities. In the last two decades, the Muslim organizations have passed major milestones on their path to structural integration. The guest worker structures have developed into immigrant organizations. At the same time, these structural successes coincide with the social rejection of Islam, which has also increased in the last two decades, and has acquired a new dimension as a result of the current refugee issue. It could even be said that the successes are inversely proportional to the social rejection. This Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism can now be found in most Western countries with a Muslim minority. Against this background, the present article will outline the historical development of the Muslim organizations in Germany, which has always taken place in correlation with German integration policies. Because:

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_5

> The more opportunities for assimilative action are available to the migrant in the reception system; the lower the barriers to assimilative action in the reception system are; and the fewer opportunities for alternative action of a non-assimilative nature are available, the more likely the migrant is – all else being equal – to carry out assimilative actions (Esser 1980, p. 211; *author's translation*).

For many years, public policy denied Muslim migrants such opportunities for assimilative action. It was only after these opportunities had been created that a transformation process gradually took place.

2 The persistence of the guest worker status in integration policy, and its effects on the Muslim community in Germany

If one examines publications on the history of Muslims in Germany, there are many indications that people of this religion lived here as early as the 18th century. These traces of Muslims on German soil are particularly emphasized by contemporary Muslims with German roots, in order to establish a certain continuity between past and present. Such observations are usually coupled with a political and cultural message addressed to mainstream German society, aiming to increase acceptance of Muslims as a component of this society. These references are therefore historically interesting, but have to be read in a political light. Against this background, for example, the first Islamic congregation is dated back to the year 1731, when the Prussian king Frederick William I had a prayer room set up for the Turkish soldiers under his command (Leggewie et al. 2002, p. 26). In the second half of the 18th century, the "Red Mosque" in the palace park in Schwetzingen was erected on the orders of Elector Charles Theodore of the Palatinate, between 1780 and 1785 (Kraft 2002, p. 55), which was, however, never used as a house of prayer, but was built rather as "a symbolic reification of the Enlightenment principles of tolerance towards all religions and cultures" (Peucker & Akbarzadeh 2014: 17).

While these two examples are cited as representative of Muslim life in Germany, and are meant to demonstrate the acceptance of Islam by the political leadership of the time, the main focus is on the beginning of the 20th century. Until the outbreak of the Second World War, Berlin in particular had become home to a small but lively Muslim community. For example, Emperor William II ordered the construction of the famous Wünsdorf Mosque in a camp for Muslim prisoners of war from the First World War. This was, however, demolished just a few years later due to dilapidation and the danger of collapse. Today's Moscheestraße (Mosque Street) and a few soldiers'

graves bear witness to this period (Abdullah 1987, p. 27; Tworuschka/Tworuschka 2002, p. 108). Berlin would retain its importance for Muslims and particularly for Muslim academics until the National Socialists took power. The first two Islamic congregations to be recorded in the German register of associations were founded in the capital (Beinhauer-Köhler/Leggewie 2009, pp. 20ff.). Well-known personalities such as Muhammad Asad, alias Leopold Weiß, lived and worked in the capital of the Weimar Republic. Günter Windhager's meticulous analysis of sources on the scholar Asad not only gives an insight into his private life in Berlin, but also sheds light on the congregational life of the Islamische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V., founded in 1922, with Abdul Jabbar Kheiri as its imam. Asad's name is found on the membership list of the Akademisch-Islamische-Vereinigung, which was also integrated into the Berlin congregation (2003, pp. 177ff.). In his autobiographical publication *Road to Mecca*, Asad tells of his conversion to Islam in Berlin (Asad 1982, pp. 359f.). Today a plaque on the house Asad lived in serves as a memorial to his time in Berlin (Aktives Museum 2016). The second congregation to become a registered association was founded in 1924 by the Ahmadiyya community. It built the famous Wilmersdorf Mosque – the oldest intact mosque to have retained its basic structure to the present day. At the time of Adolf Hitler's seizure of power, there were around 1,000 Muslims living in Germany, united in various associations (Beinhauer-Köhler/Leggewie 2009, pp. 22ff.). But these stirrings of Islamic life in Germany were quickly stifled by the Nazi dictatorship and the Second World War (Lemmen 2000, p. 90).

One could provide further historical examples of Muslims on German soil, but all the sources would only reveal the following fact: in quantitative terms, Islam was a marginal phenomenon. It was only with the labour migration that began in 1961, during the reconstruction of Germany after the Second World War, that Muslims entered the country in quantitatively relevant dimensions. The so-called "economic miracle" meant that many sectors of the economy needed young, healthy, low-skilled workers, mainly for the jobs that Germans did not want to do. The first recruitment agreement was made with Italy in 1955, and agreements with other European countries followed. Since this was not enough to supply all the required labour, bilateral agreements were made with the first Islamic country, Turkey (Meier-Braun 2012, pp. 31ff.). While England and France had had some contact with Islam through their colonies, Islam was utterly foreign to German society. Karl May wrote a series of novels set in Islamic countries, the Orient Cycle. True, many in Germany had grown up with the works of Karl May and their image of Islam tended to be based on the pictures of the Orient in these novels (Bach 2010, pp. 21ff.). Among the educated classes there was also some literary knowledge, or a historical awareness that the Turks were "brothers in arms" against the Allies in

the First World War – though this was emphasized more in the Turkish education system than in Germany (Kappert 2002, p. 332). This, however, was the extent of Germans' knowledge about Islam.

Although further countries such as Morocco followed, this first agreement with Turkey has shaped the Islamic structure of Germany to this day, as the majority (around 65%) of the four million Muslims here have Turkish roots (Haug/Müssig 2009, pp. 57ff.). As well as this strong Turkish influence, labour migration has led to other distinctive features of Islam in Germany, which will be elaborated in the following section: "guest worker" status, lack of religious support in the first phase of migration, and educational disadvantage.

The first phase, the "guest worker" status of the Muslim migrants, encouraged politicians and society to believe that Islam was only a religion of foreigners and did not belong in Germany. The term "guest worker" (*Gastarbeiter*) only appeared in German political language in the 1950s, and was used deliberately for labour migration. To counteract social resistance within the German population – which had already experienced the mass migration of ethnic Germans from the occupied eastern territories after the Second World War – politicians and the media used the word "guest" before the recruitment of Italian and Spanish workers to emphasize the temporary status of this migrant group (Dünzelmann 2005, p. 17). This meant that the Muslims were also just "guests" and not immigrants, and that the German population did not have to fear any social and cultural consequences from their migration. This guest worker status would have far-reaching consequences, however, for the German state and for the migrants themselves – especially when it came to denying what had already become a reality. This status did have some short-term effects; among other things, it was able to publicly emphasize the usefulness of foreign workers as a "flexibility reserve". Yet it would result in long-term problems for the country (Herbert 2003, pp. 232ff.).

The first guest workers came without their families, and lived in barracks or factory accommodation supplied by the firms employing them. The economic goal of the migrants was to earn enough money within a few years to establish a modest livelihood in their home country. The migrants were therefore under two kinds of pressure: their financial expectations of themselves, and the social expectations of relatives in their country of origin, who hoped for economic support (Merz-Benz 2015, p. 104). Due to Germany's need for low-skilled workers and the migrants' own unfulfilled economic aims, however, their stay was initially extended into the 1970s. In 1973, following economic recessions, the decision was made to stop the recruitment of further migrants from non-European countries. After this, family reunification was encouraged. Monika Mattes writes:

> It is well known that the recruitment stop had consequences that were not intended. At first the number of foreign workers did decline substantially, in line with official predictions. However, the number of foreign residents did not decrease, but increased until the mid-1970s. In actual fact, the recruitment stop had forced migrants to decide whether to return to their home country for good, or to have their families join them (2005, pp. 59f. *author's translation*).

This is just an example of how supposedly rational political decisions based on official forecasts can have undesired outcomes. For, as the above quote shows, the so-called "guest workers" now faced a choice: to return home, with the risk of not being allowed back into Germany, or to extend their stay and send for their families. And this was why the migrants brought their families to Germany, leading to new social realities and therefore new challenges. For the first time, debates about integration policy and educational policy were triggered, mainly because of the high numbers of children and young people. The historian Ulrich Herbert quotes an assessment by the Ministry of Labour in 1976 that:

> [T]he hope that the federal government could solve the problem of integration by reducing the employment of foreigners [was] not fulfilled. On the contrary, further undesirable developments occurred. The problem areas of current policy on foreigners include […] family reunion, the development of birth rates, ghettoization, the sociological restructuring of the urban population, problems at school and in the workplace, and legal and status-related insecurity (2003, p. 234; *author's translation*).

Whether or not the migrants themselves lived with "illusions of return" – and these illusions would last until the 1990s in the first generation –, the acute challenges meant that the state had to provide new services: language courses, housing policy, kindergarten places and schooling. Furthermore, regardless of the urgent need for action, it was already becoming clear to German policymakers in the 1970s that Germany had – purely in terms of numbers – developed into a country of immigration. Yet this reality was never officially admitted. Despite a small number of visionary politicians such as the first commissioner for foreigners, Heinz Kühn, who presented a comprehensive integration plan with short-term, medium-term and long-term goals, the general political and social consciousness was not ready for this (Farsi 2014, pp. 38f.). The refusal to see Germany as a country of immigration was maintained for the next thirty years. Indeed the debate reached its climax in 1998, in the context of the national parliamentary elections, where rhetoric from the 1970s ("Germany is not a country of immigration") was revived in some quarters (Hell 2005, pp. 79ff.).

For the migrants themselves, this denial of the reality of immigration on a political level meant that only a partial integration could take place in all areas of

society, as it was not possible to make long-term plans. Once reunited with their families, the migrants who had previously lived alone moved into regular apartments, mostly in segregated and poorly situated residential areas. Their dominant urge was to save, not to consume, so comfort was often sacrificed. German policymakers, on the other hand, instigated virtually no integration measures, and continued to hope that the migrants would return home. Until the 1980s, the resolution of the migration issue was left to "developments over time": it was assumed that the problem would eventually resolve itself automatically, because the migrants would be intrinsically motivated to return home. When migrant numbers reached a new record at the beginning of the 1980s, the German state was forced to intervene in "developments over time" after all, and to use financial incentives, paying large sums to encourage migrants – the measure was aimed at Turkish migrants in particular – to go back home. As a result, a few hundred thousand migrants took up this "deal". Once again, however, this political measure was to have the opposite effect to that intended (Hunn 2005, pp. 482f.).

The reason was that this, for the migrants, was the second big "dress rehearsal", another "point of no return". Once they had taken the money and gone back, they would never again be able to set foot on German soil. This explains why the number of migrants began to increase again in the second half of the 1980s (Herbert 2003, pp. 255f.). Despite clear indications that there was an urgent need for immigration policies, the German state still refused to put forward any comprehensive integration plans. This lack of integration measures related not only to language, schooling, rights of residence and work, but also religion. Instead, according to Ulrich Herbert, German politicians took a hard line on integration policy, even though immigration had long since become a reality:

> In order to avoid losing the approval of the German population and electorate, the basic lines of policy on foreigners were not changed. Instead, the politicians continued to assert that Germany was not a country of immigration, that the foreigners were only there to take up temporary work, and that the majority of them would return to their countries of origin sooner or later. [...] But thanks to this propagation of a tough policy of confrontation, particularly by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, this increasingly explosive issue had become ideologically charged, and had acquired a certain political rigidity. What had been a short-term reaction to an unfamiliar, apparently threatening development thus became, in the space of a few years, an ideologeme with long-term effects (2003, p. 262; *author's translation*).

Due to the lack of prospects of integration, no "German Islam" was able to develop from the 1960s to the 1990s; for three decades, the "guest worker" status meant that Islam remained a "foreigners' religion". This misguided policy was reflected in all issues relating to Muslims, Islam, and Islamic structures in these "lost decades":

there was no legal recognition, and little political acceptance. In any case, the topic of Islam played only a subordinate role in discussions on guest workers; instead debate focused on ethnic issues. In the long term, the ideologeme mentioned in Herbert's quote even meant that rejection of the guest workers was transferred to Islam, thus preparing the ground for Islamophobia. In this political climate, any planning related to Muslim structures and social participation was based on the assumption that the migration was intended to be temporary. Thus Muslims did not build any imposing mosques, and only founded the unattractive "backyard mosques", which provided just enough rooms for everyday religious rituals. A further effect of this misguided integration policy was that, for many years, Muslims continued to focus on their home countries and thus took very little interest in the politics and media of their host country, Germany. The counterproductive aspect of this focus on their origins was that, over time, the political conflicts from their home countries were fought out among the Muslims in Germany (Ceylan 2006, pp. 192ff.).

The second crucial element, after the political conditions outlined above, is the lack of religious support for Muslims. When the recruitment agreements were concluded with Turkey, no provisions were made for the religious and cultural support of Muslims. Thus the Muslim "guest workers" came to Germany with their religious needs, but there were absolutely no structures available to meet these needs. This led to numerous everyday challenges such as Islamic dietary rules, a lack of pastoral care, a lack of mosques for worship, etc. – even though Turkey, for example, could have provided these religious services through its Directorate of Religious Affairs, founded in 1924. But the "guest workers", from uneducated families – many were illiterate and came from rural areas with a strong oral tradition of religious teaching – were left to their own devices. A vacuum existed with regard to Islamic organizations and congregations. Individuals therefore took their own initiative, converting certain rooms in the workers' barracks for worship. In the absence of any qualified theological authorities, the more religiously competent migrants often assumed the role of imam (Ceylan 2006, pp. 130ff.). This means, then, that these people lived in Germany for many years with, on the one hand, an uncertain residency status, and, on the other hand, no access to religious welfare services, pastoral care, or theological support.

The final characteristic feature is that the migration from Turkey to Germany was not a migration of Muslim elites. As mentioned above, the Muslims came from families with low levels of education, and in Germany their educational disadvantage was passed down to the second and in some cases third generation over decades – despite increasing progress (Bouras-Ostmann 2014, pp. 49f.). The consolidation of this educational disadvantage is partly related to integration policies, which made virtually no investment in educational measures. Not only that, Muslim children

and adolescents were treated as problematic per se, and declared to be a special pedagogical case. This even led to the development of a "pedagogy for foreigners" (*Ausländerpädagogik*), which sought to resolve the supposed problems on the basis of this deficit-oriented approach. The primary goal of these pedagogical measures was, according to Arnd-Michael Nohl, the assimilation of the children and adolescents. In line with this attitude, the foreign children and adolescents were separated and placed in so-called "foreigner classes and national classes", so that this special education could be implemented (2010, pp. 21ff.). Thus many children and adolescents of the second generation had very little opportunity to develop their potential at the beginning of their migration history in Germany, because the "educational measures" contained a built-in disadvantage. This educational disadvantage as a result of separation would continue to have effects into the third generation. This can be attributed to the general problem of Germany's selective, three-part school system. Historically, the idea of selection goes back to the 19th century, when a large part of the population still worked on the land, and a kind of class system (farmers, lords, etc.) still dominated. With the gradual introduction of compulsory schooling, this social segregation was maintained with different forms of school. It was expected that children from well-to-do families would go to university and eventually occupy high positions, so different types of school were designed for them. Children from poorer families, on the other hand, were merely expected to learn to read and write, to be trained to be loyal to the state, and thus to continue the status of their parents. As the vocational education system expanded and the industrial revolution progressed, the focus shifted to preparing these children for the labour market. Despite educational reforms, this multi-part school system is still intact to this day, and discriminates against children from socially weak families, as pupils are distributed across the different types of school after primary school, thus sealing their fate (Ackeren/Klemm 2011, pp. 20ff.). It is often claimed that this post-primary distribution is based on merit, but studies show that social and ethnic background are just as critical. Despite the same cognitive abilities, it is clear that children from socially weak families are sent to lower school forms, thus preventing an academic career from the start (Bos et al. 2007). Hence the educational career of the Muslim children and adolescents who entered Germany from the 1970s onwards had to take place within this selection-based education system, with the result being that school did not compensate for the educational deficits in the families, but reinforced them. Male Muslims in particular are still disadvantaged in the education system today (Buchen 2013, p. 138). For many years, the "working-class Catholic girl from the country" was the profile associated with educational disadvantage, but this has now been replaced by another group: "working-class Muslim boys from the city".

3 The development of Islamic structures: rivalries and consolidation

Overall, then, the three elements discussed here prevented the emergence of professional Islamic organizations and structures, with appropriate, well-qualified personnel. The tension between "the myth of return" and the actual situation resulting from family reunification ensured that the only Islamic structures to emerge were temporary. These were led by the first generation of guest workers, and were not able to adequately articulate Muslim interests in the public sphere. With family reunification in the 1970s, however, Muslim guest workers not only rented flats, but also established prayer rooms in backyards and in other unattractive, ghettoized locations. Not just for themselves, but mainly for their children, because the fear of assimilation and the interest in conserving the norms and values of their society of origin played a central role. Hence ethnic and religious tradition often went hand in hand because Islam was Turkish, and being Turkish meant Islam. Another interesting fact is that many members of the first generation were believers, but non-practising; it was only when their families joined them that they began to practise their religion more intensively. They did so in the early mosque communities, which began as citizens' initiatives and were independent, i.e. they did not belong to any Islamic umbrella organization (Ceylan 2006, pp. 133ff.).

But since a vacuum had formed in religious support in Germany, and – in contrast to the strictly Kemalist and secularist policy in Turkey – religious freedom was protected in Germany, many proscribed and persecuted religious movements saw new opportunities to organize themselves, expand their financial and human resources, and influence developments in their country of origin. As a result, the new Islamic organizations not only took over the independent mosque communities, but founded new congregations at the same time. They were also able to tap into new financial and human resources, thus increasing their influence not just in Germany, but in their countries of origin. This phase in the 1970s was characterized by rivalries, although the Turkish example shows that religious differences between the organizations could not function as a marker of segregation. To this day, the dominant influence in all these organizations is Turkish, Sunni and Hanafi. Nonetheless, there are many nuances, such as political or mystical orientation, which define the lines of demarcation between the organizations (Ceylan 2006, pp. 139ff.). Numerous Turkish congregations formed in the course of these developments, as well as a number of Arab communities. Mosques were also established by Balkan Muslims.

In 1984, the most influential actor entered the religious field, the *Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion (DITIB)* (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious

Affairs), which is closely linked with the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, DIYANET, in Turkey. After the third military coup in Turkey in 1980, the military government at the time saw the developments among Muslims of Turkish origin in Germany as worrying, and decided to intervene. The main concern was that these congregations could influence domestic politics in Turkey. This fear can be explained by the fact that the congregations that had formed among all the ethnic groups also served to preserve the culture and heritage of their countries of origin, and that an interest in the economic, political and social developments in these countries played an important role (Yasar 2012, 28ff.; 61ff.). This focus on the country of origin in the first phase of Muslim congregations is also a product of German integration policy, which, as we have seen, had no interest in the legal and social integration of Muslims in Germany. Hence from the 1970s to the 1980s, Islamic umbrella organizations were founded whose member organizations had their roots in the different countries of origin, such as Turkey, the Balkans, or other Arab countries.

The Turkish-Islamic *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ)* (Association of Islamic Cultural Centres) was founded in 1973 and is the oldest among the Muslim organizations. In Turkey, this group, founded by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959), was politically suppressed as a result of anti-religious policies based on Kemalist secularism. Due to this hostility towards religion and the state's monopoly on religion, the opportunities for religious development were very limited, and the organization had to operate underground. It was the diaspora that offered this community new opportunities for development (Jonker 2002, pp. 81ff.). This association offered the first comprehensive programme of mosque catechesis for the religious education and training of the first generation, and of the families who joined them in the 1970s. Hasan Alacacioglu explains:

> The *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren* was the first Islamic organization to take on the religious support of Turkish Muslims in Germany during the labour migration. During this period, the Turkish guest workers were left to fend for themselves in a foreign country, and received no support from their own state, either in moral or in financial terms. The only institution that looked after these guest workers was the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren, which became widely known through its activities, e.g. the organization of Koran courses, the funding of mosques, religious and moral support for the guest workers and their families, and the preservation of the Islamic identity, especially among the younger generation and adolescents. It was obvious that the organization's reputation would find fertile ground among the guest workers (1999, p. 110; *author's translation*).

Besides the usual religious services, there is a particular focus on educational work with children and adolescents, as attested by the numerous school boarding houses

run by the VIKZ (VIKZ 2016). Around 300 mosque communities belong to the association (DIK 2016).

The *Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V. (IRD)* (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany) was founded in 1986. This is an alliance of around 30 organizations, representing about 400 mosque communities and roughly 60,000 members. The organization is ethnically diverse, as it includes African and Bosnian Muslims, but like the others, it is predominantly Turkish: it includes the Milli Görüs organization, which represents over 300 mosque communities (Islamrat 2006). The intellectual and political leader of Milli Görüs was the Turkish politician Necmettin Erbakan, who fought against the Kemalist and secularist position with Islamist policies in Turkey. The Milli Görüs organization in Germany was therefore long regarded as Islamist, and was kept under observation by Germany's domestic security agency, the Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). Over the decades, however, the organization has undergone major changes, and is now in a "post-Islamist phase" in which it is aiming for normalization (Schiffauer 2010). In Germany Milli Görüs is now a point of contact for policymakers, and is represented, through the Islamrat, in the Deutsche Islamkonferenz (German Islam Conference), which was established by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The organization's self-presentation therefore reflects the idea of a "German Islam":

> The Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland feels an obligation to the history of Islam in Germany, and regards itself as a bridge between Germany and the Islamic world. The foundations of the Islamrat are Islamic teaching and tradition, and the regulations contained in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and the constitutions of the federal states. The Islamrat is fully committed to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the principles of liberal democracy and the social state under the rule of law. The Islamrat is an autonomous Islamic faith community in the Federal Republic of Germany in the terms of the constitution (Basic Law) and the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Islamrat understands itself as an Islamic community within a secular and pluralistically structured state. The Islamrat seeks to have Islam in Germany recognized as a corporation under public law, with the same status as the two major Christian churches and the Greek Orthodox church (Islamrat 2016; *author's translation*).

The largest organization is undoubtedly the *Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion (DITIB*) (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), founded in 1984. With around 900 congregations and over 100,000 members, it offers the widest range of religious and socio-cultural services. The imams in these congregations are provided by the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, and are sent for four to five years on a rotation basis (Yasar 2012, pp. 56ff.). The German political

sphere has a very ambivalent attitude towards the DITIB. On the one hand, it is seen as a disruption of the integration process of Turkish Muslims when non-German-speaking imams, controlled by the Turkish religious directorate, work in the congregations. On the other hand, the official secularist tendency of the Turkish religious directorate meets with approval, so the DITIB, despite all criticisms, is an important point of contact for political matters.

As mentioned above, the numerous mosque communities that belong to these three big organizations engaged in major competitive struggles from the beginning of the 1970s into the 1990s, even though there was virtually no dissent in terms of theology or orthopraxy in their religious practices. Instead, each organization sought to strengthen the influence of its own community in order to channel this strength into the countries of origin. The relatively late entry of the DITIB into the religious field in the 1980s exacerbated these rivalries, since many Muslim congregations saw the DITIB as representing anti-religious Kemalism. A propaganda war was therefore waged, and the worship in the DITIB congregations with the "puppet imams" sent by the secular Turkish government was declared to be invalid. In reaction to this, fundamentalist movements developed, seeking to actively combat secularism in Turkey with their congregations in Germany (Schiffauer 1997, pp. 190ff.).

4 Diaspora Islam and the founding of the joint umbrella organization KRM

From the late 1990s, two developments have increasingly led to the emergence of a diaspora Islam: firstly the growing social and cultural alienation from the country of origin, especially among the younger generation of Muslims socialized in Germany, and secondly the paradigm shift in German integration policy, which, especially since 2000, has focused more on integrating migrants into society. The Muslims of the first generation, who always retained the illusion that they would return to their home countries, are confronted with increasing challenges facing their children in matters of nationality, education and language, vocational integration, segregation of social spaces, discrimination etc., and so the mosque communities are developing from purely religious institutions into multifunctional ones (Ceylan 2006, pp. 145ff.). This function can currently also be observed in impressive new buildings such as those in Duisburg or Cologne. Large mosque complexes are being built, housing numerous non-religious spaces such as bookshops, seminar and conference rooms, drop-in centres and social clubs, senior citizens' rooms, teahouses etc. This

function is not found in the Islamic countries of origin such as Turkey or Morocco, but is a product of the diaspora.

Further evidence of the emergence of a diaspora Islam is the *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD)* (Central Council of Muslims in Germany), founded in 1994, which has many German converts among its ranks, as proven by the oldest association, the Deutsche Muslim Liga (German Muslim League), established in 1952. The Zentralrat comprises 300 mosque communities with over 20,000 members, recruited from 24 different organizations. These organizations are both ethnically and religiously (Sunnis, Shiites) diverse (DIK 2016). In 2002, the Zentralrat der Muslime was the first organization to produce a charter, in which it not only explains its Islamic theological orientation, but at the same time pledges loyalty to Germany as its home country (ZMD 2016). This Islamic charter has been subjected to criticism, but all in all, by establishing a programme for Germany, it has created a document that can serve as a basis for further critical discussions.

Another milestone in the development of a diaspora Islam is the rapprochement between the large organizations. This process of communication has mainly been in response to the requirement of the German government to find a central point of contact for questions about Islam, and to create the necessary structures for this. The Muslims were expected to organize themselves along the same lines as the Catholic and Protestant churches, which, as historically evolved religious communities, do have the relevant structures. This process has been intensified by the Deutsche Islamkonferenz, launched by the German government in 2006, to deal with the key concerns of Muslims in Germany on the highest political level – the first time this has been attempted (Ceylan 2013, pp. 204ff.). Against this background, the four big Islamic associations founded a joint umbrella organization, the *Koordinierungsrat der Muslime (KRM)* (Coordinating Council of Muslims) in 2007; since then this council has served as a point of contact for policymakers (KRM 2015). With this platform, the KRM represents nearly 2,000 mosque communities. A study by the Centre for Turkish Studies and Integration Research and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, entitled *Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland* (Islamic Community Life in Germany), found 2,342 Islamic congregations offering opportunities for prayer. If we take this number as a reference point, this means that the KRM represents around 81% of all Islamic congregations (Halm et al. 2012, p. 7). On the basis of this high number of mosque communities, the KRM claims in its preamble that it represents Muslims in Germany:

> I. Preamble
> With the intention of creating a unified structure for the representation of the Muslims in the Federal Republic of Germany, the major umbrella organizations DITIB, VIKZ, Islamrat and ZMD have adopted the following rules of procedure for decision-making within the Koordinationsrat.
>
> II. Purpose of the association
> § 1 Basic principles
> (1) The Koordinationsrat, founded with the intention of promoting a unified structure of representation for the Muslims in the Federal Republic of Germany in the long term, is open to all tendencies within Islam.
> (2) The founding members have agreed on an ongoing partnership and collaboration in the areas relating to their joint interests and the unified representation of the interests of Muslims throughout Germany.
> (3) The members also pursue the aim of founding an independent religious community.
> (4) The Koordinationsrat is committed to the liberal and democratic order of the Federal Republic of Germany.
> (5) The Koran and Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed constitute the foundations of the Koordinationsrat. This principle must not be abandoned or modified through alterations to these rules of procedure.
> § 2 Aim and purpose of the Koordinationsrat
> The Koordinationsrat organizes the representation of the Muslims in the Federal Republic, and is the point of contact for policymakers and society. It works to create a unified structure of representation at federal level, and works with the existing Muslim structures at state level, and the existing local structures, to create the legal and organizational prerequisites for the recognition of Islam in Germany in the framework of agreements with the state (islam.de 2015; *author's translation*).

Like all questions about Islam, the issue of the KRM's representation is heavily politicized, and there are different opinions and figures on how broadly it represents Muslims in Germany. The study *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland* (Muslim Life in Germany), for example, concludes that only around 20% of the over four million Muslims are organized in a religious association. The same study also shows that the KRM's Islamic umbrella organizations are not as widely known as expected (Haug et al. 2009, pp. 17f. and 343). On the other hand, there is no denying that with 2,000 mosque communities, the KRM reaches a high number of practising Muslims. Furthermore, membership lists in the congregations do not register whole families, but only one family member. So the membership numbers in the congregations should actually be multiplied to take into account family members as well. Hence further empirical surveys are needed in order to establish the true scope of the KRM and thus put a stop to unnecessary ideological and political controversies. This empirical foundation is also important because the issue of representation is linked with financial resources which the German government wishes

to make available for religious and social services. These financial perspectives will intensify the competition in the religious arena when new Muslim congregations are formed. Another controversial issue in the religious field is the authority to interpret Islam. The pluralization of the Muslim community in Germany means that this controversy will continue to be part of debates within Islam.

5 Conclusion: Overcoming the structures of migrant self-organization to become a recognized faith community

As shown in the historical analysis of Islam and Islamic organizations in Germany, development has taken place in three phases. The lack of religious and cultural structures in the first phase of "guest work" led to independent citizens' initiatives, which sought to meet religious needs by establishing prayer rooms, initially in the factory living quarters and then, after family reunification, in the so-called backyard mosques. Islamic organizations from the countries of origin utilized this power vacuum in the religious field to gain access to new financial and human resources. This led to phase two, rivalries within the Muslim community, and the simultaneous emergence of new mosque communities. A key feature of this phase was that the work of these communities – alongside everyday religious practice – was mainly focused on the countries of origin. Since the congregations also functioned as autonomous migrant organizations, their structures and membership were characterized by ethnic homogeneity. German integration policy, which encouraged the return of the Muslim migrants rather than their integration into German society, contributed to this focus on the countries of origin. This error in integration policy prevented the early development of a "German Islam", engaging with the challenges facing Muslims in Germany. The third and final phase has been marked by the beginnings of diaspora Islam. The characteristics of this phase include the abandonment of the backyard mosques, the construction of large and imposing new buildings, and greater engagement of Islamic congregations with the political, social and cultural challenges in Germany. This shows, amongst other things, that social and cultural alienation from the country of origin is increasing. As a result, the rivalries between the communities have decreased, and the different organizations have joined forces in the large umbrella organization KRM. Since then, they have functioned as points of contact for policymakers. If we evaluate the whole process since the 1960s, then, we can observe that the Muslim "guest workers" have become immigrants, and that a "German Islam" has increasingly developed. This new phase, however, is

characterized by new challenges. New rivalries are emerging between organized and non-organized Islam with regard to the authority to interpret religion in the public sphere. At the same time, the prospect of financial support from the German government further exacerbates existing rivalries. This is because the creation of church-like structures would, according to the German law on state-church relations, mean entitlement to funding for religious and social services. Finally, the effort to "catch up" on integration raises further questions, such as the introduction of Islamic religious education in state schools, or the establishment of a Muslim social welfare service. Inevitably, these integration goals will bring many conflicts, but this can be viewed as a "normal" part of the integration of Islam. One positive development is that Islam is being recognized on the meta-communicative level – in politics, the media etc. – at all. On the negative side, however, the above-mentioned ideology from the political debates on migration in the 1970s led to destructive judgements about immigration. Migrants were "guests", and their "culture" was therefore just a temporary phenomenon, which these people could go back to after their return to their home countries. The current anti-Muslim agitation continues this long-standing debate by declaring Islam to be a "foreigners' religion". Thus the future development of Islam and of the Muslim organizations will take place in the area of tension between structural integration and social rejection.

References

Abdullah, Muhammad Salim. 1987. *UND GAB IHNEN SEIN KÖNIGSWORT: BERLIN-PREUSSEN-BUNDESREPUBLIK. Ein Abriß der Geschichte der islamischen Minderheit in Deutschland*, Altenberge: Selbstverleger.

Ackeren, Isabell van/Klemm, Klaus. 2011. *Entstehung, Struktur und Steuerung des deutschen Schulsystems. Eine Einführung.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Aktives Museum. 2016. Muhammad Asad (Leopold Weiss), URL: http://www.gedenktafeln-in-berlin.de/nc/gedenktafeln/gedenktafel-anzeige/tid/muhammad-asad-leopo/ (last accessed: 18 March 2016).

Alacacioglu, Hasan. 1999. *Außerschulischer Religionsunterricht für muslimische Kinder und Jugendliche türkischer Nationalität in NRW. Eine empirische Studie zu Koranschulen in türkisch-islamischen Gemeinden*. Münster: Lit-Verlag.

Asad, Muhammad.1982. *Der Weg nach Mekka*, Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus.

Bach, Svenja. 2010. *Karl Mays Islambild und sein Einfluss auf seine Leser.* Sonderheft der Karl-May-Gesellschaft Nr. 142/2010, Radebeul: Karl-May-Gesellschaft.

Beinhauer-Köhler, Bärbel/Leggewie, Claus. 2009. *Moscheen in Deutschland. Religiöse Heimat und gesellschaftliche Herausforderung*, Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck.

Bouras-Ostmann, Khatima. 2014. Marokkaner in Deutschland – ein Überblick, in: Pott, Andreas/Bouras-Ostmann, Khatima/Hajji, Rahim/Moket, Soraya (eds.), *Jenseits von Rif und Ruhr. 50 Jahre marokkanische Migration nach Deutschland*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 33–64.

Bos, Wilfried/Hornberg, Sabine/Arnold, Karl-Heinz et al. 2007. *IGLU 2006. Lesekompetenzen von Grundschulkindern in Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich*. Münster: Waxmann.

Buchen, Sylvia. 2013. Übergangsprobleme benachteiligter Jugendlicher von der Schule ins Berufsleben unter Genderperspektive, in: Maier, Maja S./Vogel, Thomas (eds.), Übergänge in eine neue Arbeitswelt? Blinde Flecke der Debatte zum Übergangssystem Schule-Beruf, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 131–147.

Ceylan, Rauf. 2006. *Ethnische Kolonien. Entstehung, Funktion und Wandel am Beispiel türkischer Moscheen und Cafés*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Ceylan, Rauf. 2013. Islamkonferenz, in: Meier-Braun, Karl-Heinz/Weber, Reinhold (eds.), *Deutschland Einwanderungsland. Begriffe – Fakten – Kontroversen*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, pp. 204–207.

Dünzelmann, Anne E. 2005. *Aneignung und Selbstbehauptung. Zum Prozess der Integration und Akkulturation von „GastarbeiterInnen". Bremen*, Göttingen: V&R Unipress.

Esser, Hartmut. 1980. *Aspekte der Wanderungssoziologie. Assimilation und Integration von Wanderern, ethnischen Gruppen und Minderheiten. Eine handlungstheoretische Analyse*. Darmstadt/Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag.

Farsi, Armand. 2014. *Migranten auf dem Weg zur Elite? Zum Berufserfolg von Akademikern mit Migationshintergrund*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Haug, Sonja/Müssig, Stephanie/Stichs, Anja. 2009. *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland – im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz.* Forschungsbericht 6. Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

Halm, Dirk/Sauer, Martina/Schmidt, Jana/Stichs, Anja. 2012. *Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland – im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz.* Forschungsbericht 13. Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

Hell, Matthias. 2005. *Einwanderungsland Deutschland? Die Zuwanderungsdiskussion 1998–2002*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Herbert, Ulrich. 2003. *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Hunn, Karin. 2005. *„Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück ...". Die Geschichte der türkischen „Gastarbeiter" in der Bundesrepublik*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.

Islamrat, Selbstdarstellung, URL http://islamrat.de/selbstdarstellung/ (last accessed: 18 March 2016).

Kappert, Petra. 2002. Epilog, in: Böer, Ingeborg/Haerkötter, Ruth/Kappert, Petra (eds.), *Türken in Berlin 1871–1945. Eine Metropole in den Erinnerungen osmanischer und türkischer Zeitungen*. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, pp. 327–334.

Kraft, Sabine. 2002. *Islamische Sakralarchitektur in Deutschland. Eine Untersuchung ausgewählter Moschee-Neubauten*. Münster/Hamburg/London: Lit Verlag.

Leggewie, Claus/Joast, Angela/Rech, Stefan. 2002. *Der Weg zur Moschee – eine Handreichung für die Praxis. Ein Projekt der Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung.* Bad Homburg v.d. Höhe: Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung.

Lemmen, Thomas. 2000. *Islam*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus.

Mattes, Monika. 2005. *„Gastarbeiterinnen" in der Bundesrepublik. Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.

Meier-Braun, Karl-Heinz. 2012. Ramadanfeier im Kölner Dom – 50 Jahre Anwerbeabkommen mit der Türkei, in: Ceylan, Rauf (ed.), *Islam und Diaspora. Analysen zum muslimischen Leben in Deutschland aus historischer, rechtlicher sowie migrations- und religionssoziologischer Perspektive*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, pp. 31–58.

Merz-Benz, Peter-Ulrich. 2015. Paul Siu's „Gastarbeiter". Ein Leben zwischen „symbiotischer Segregation" und „sozialer Isolaton", in: Reuter, Julia/Mecheril, Paul (eds.), *Schlüsselwerke der Migrationsforschung. Pionierstudien und Referenztheorien*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 97–112.

Nohl, Arnd-Michael. 2010. *Konzepte interkultureller Pädagogik. Eine systematische Einführung*. Bad Heilbrunn: Verlag Julius Klinkhardt.

Peucker, Mario / Akbarzadeh, Shahram. 2014. Muslim Active Citizenship in the West. London/New York: Routledge.

Schiffauer, Werner. 1997. *Fremde in der Stadt. Zehn Essays über Kultur und Differenz*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Schiffauer, Werner. 2010. *Nach dem Islamismus. Eine Ethnographie der Islamischen Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Tworuschka, Monika/Tworuschka, Udo. 2002. *Islam Lexikon*, Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag.

Yasar, Aysun. 2012. *Die DITIB zwischen der Türkei und Deutschland. Untersuchungen zu Türkisch-Islamischen Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V.* Würzburg: Ergon Verlag.

VIKZ. 2016. URL: http://www.vikz.de/index.php/ueber-uns.html (last accessed: 18 March 2016).

Windhager, Günther. 2003. *Leopold Weiss alias Muhammad Asad. Von Gallizien nach Arabien. 1900–1927.* Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau Verlag.

"We're serving the community, in whichever form it may be"

6

Muslim Community Building in Australia

Nora Amath

1 Introduction

We hear a great deal about Islam today but we know relatively little about how it has integrated itself into the societies and cultures of 1.7 billion people on six continents, including Australia. We tend to think of Islam and Muslims in monolithic terms and fail to appreciate the diversity in terms of its manifestations in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Western world. Moreover, literature pertaining to Muslims and Islam largely focus on political issues and actors related to fundamentalism, radicalisation, militancy and terrorism. There is a noticeable lack of scholarly research on the other political actors, particularly Muslims involved in civil society as vibrant contributors to the Western public sphere. This chapter aims to comprehensively present the community-building experiences of Australian Muslim civil society actors and the organisations they represent.

It begins by outlining the history of Muslims in Australia, from the presence of Macassan fisherman and traders, the major contributions of the Afghan cameleers, the arrivals of Muslim immigrants from Albania, Turkey and Lebanon to more recent immigrants from war-torn countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It will describe the process of Muslim community building, including the formation of religious institutions and societies, community organisations and educational institutions. This chapter will also present an overview of the current Muslim civil society organisations (MCSOs) operating in Australia, *who* they are, *where* and *when* they work, *why* they work and *how* they work.

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_6

2 The longstanding Muslim presence in Australia

2.1 Early 17th century: Macassan Fishermen and Traders

Contrary to popular belief, the presence of Muslims in Australia is not a recent phenomenon but predates European settlement. Citing evidence from Aboriginal cave drawings, artefacts, oral traditions and dreamtime stories[1], anthropologists and historians believe that Muslims had contact with Australia with the arrival of the Macassan visitors already in the 16th and 17th century. Although it is difficult to offer a precise date for this initial contact, Macknight (1976) contends that based on documentation, he locates it most likely between 1751 and 1754.[2] Ganter (2008) disputes this and argues that the voyages started much earlier around 1640, based on notes made by a Sulawesi historian and echoed by John Darling's (1994) ABC documentary *Below the Wind*. Further, relying on archaeological, ethnographic and linguistic evidence, Ganter agrees with Berndt and Berndt's (1947) earlier observation that for substantial influence to impact on culture, a 'long history' view of contact was needed; thus, she concludes, the Macassan-Aboriginal relationship "must predate the British arrival by at least 200 years, and a 400-year history is often cited as a 'more or less' reliable estimate" (Ganter 2008, p. 3).

Aboriginal oral traditions from Arnhem Land revealed that the Macassan practised their Islamic rituals during their three to four month stay (Isaacs 1980). These fishermen and traders from the Macassar region of Indonesia arrived on the northern coasts of Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory and made contact and engaged with the local indigenous people. Cahill et al. (2004) and Stephenson (2009) remark that this engagement may have been the first interfaith contact in Australia. By 1907, with an increasing European settlement in Australia, the annual Macassan visits for sea slugs (*trepan*) and trading came to an end. Cleland cites "oppressive imposition of the customs dues […], growing

1 Also, Peta Stephenson (2011) notes that the mortuary ceremonies in the communities of Galiwinku refer to Dreaming figure WaliItha' walitha, adapted from the Arabic phrase- Allah wa Ta'ala (God, the exalted). In "The Conversation: Long History with Islam Gives Indigenous Australians Pride" from http://theconversation.edu.au/long-history-with-islam-gives-indigenous-australians-pride-3521

2 Ethnographers Berndt and Berndt (1947) suggest that there had been contacts between the Maregeans (people of the northern shores of Arnhem land), the Macassans, and the Aborigines from the early 16th century, based on evidence of "the depth of influence" (cited in Cleland 2002, p. 6). Macknight, however, rejects this and asserts that this is not conclusive evidence; instead, he asserts that letters from 1751-1754 provide the most reliable evidence to substantiate the contact.

racism in Australia after the introduction of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act and jealousy over Macassan success" (2002, p. 7) as reasons for the discontinued Macassan expeditions.

Many scholars observe that the relationship between indigenous communities and the Macassan traders and fishermen was a good one, built on mutual respect and trust; in fact, the Arnhem Land Aborigines still refer to that period in history as the Golden Age (Cleland 2002; Worsley 1955).[3] This amicable relationship contrasts with that of the indigenous peoples' relationship with European settlers. Worsley (1955) explains "the contrast is plainly between the generosity and democracy of the Macassan and the parsimony and colour bar of the Whites" (p. 8). These observations led many scholars to conclude that many years later there still remains a positive feeling regarding those contacts between the Macassan and the indigenous population. Accordingly, in 1997 for the anniversary of the City of Gowa (in Sulawesi, Indonesia) the Arnhem Land Aborigines performed an opera showcasing the historical and harmonious connection between the Yolngu and Macassan peoples (Cleland 2002).

2.2 Late 18th century: The First Fleet and Settlement

Historians also found record of Muslim sailors and prisoners aboard the convict ships bound for Australia. The Muslim sailors were classified as Lascars –Indians and Ceylonese (Cleland 2002). Hanifa Deen, researcher for the Uncommon Lives National Australia Archives project, documents that "a group of stranded Muslim seaman were forced to make new lives on Norfolk Island" (2014, para. 4) in 1795-1800. The stranded sailors were not provided with a passage home and, thus, had to make Australia their home. In 1807, British officials closed Norfolk Island and transferred everyone to Hobart. A number of Muslims were part of the transfer, including Antonio Bucknall (Bukhari), Bastian Suez, Muhammad Abdilla, Muhammad Coosoms, Said (Jacob) Sultan, Ram John Conn (Khan) and John Hassan (Parkar). However, with only few references to their names, not much is known

3 There are scholars, like Ganter (2008), however, who state that the meetings were not always peaceful. She states: "I'm a historian and I know that the Macassans, when they came to Arnhem Land, they had cannons, they were armed, there were violent incidents." Rogers (2014) elaborates that "when she (Ganter) mentioned the Macassans' cannons to one elder in the tribe, he dismissed it." Ganter elaborates, "He really wanted to tell this story as a story of successful cultural contact, which is so different to people coming and taking your land and taking your women and establishing themselves as superior" (cited in Rogers 2014, para. 14).

about these sailors and prisoners as they left no known Muslim families nor did they build any mosque or Islamic institutions.[4] Cleland (2002) observes that life as both Muslims and lowly subjects would have been difficult for them; the intolerance, perhaps, forced them to assimilate as much as possible into the mainstream Christian community.

2.3 Mid-19th century: Afghan Cameleers

Muslim presence in Australia in the early 17th century was minimal, fleeting and transitory. It was only in the 1860s that the first real settlement of Muslims began, with the arrival of 'Afghan'[5] cameleers, who were described by Cahill, Bouma, Dellal and Leahy (2004, p. 38) as "the real founders of Islam in Australia". In order to open up the harsh interior of Australia, 124 camels were initially brought over from India and 31 Afghan drivers and handlers[6] were recruited. Every expedition across the vast interior was accompanied by Afghan Muslims drivers, although "they were scarcely recognised for their contribution" (Cleland 2001, p. 16). The estimated 2,000 cameleers also contributed to the development of the rail link between Port Augusta and Alice Springs, later known as *The Ghan*. Moreover, Afghan Muslims participated in the construction of the Overland Telegraph Line in 1870-72, including the surveying, constructing and carrying of materials into the harsh interior. By the 1920s, with the introduction of the T-Ford utility truck and the railway, the cameleering industry came to a halt (Cleland 2001).

With little prospect of further employment and no prospect of gaining citizenship in Australia, the majority of the cameleers returned to their homelands

4 Bilal Cleland (2002) in his *The History of Muslims in Australia* chronicles the life of Said Sultan, a Muslim, came to Australia on the Lady Nelson. He initially resided on eleven and half acres on Norfolk Island, but in 1809 he set sail for Tasmania with his wife. The records indicate that he changed his name to Jacob and by 1819, he owned 28 acres of pasture and another 2 acres of wheat.

5 The label 'Afghans' refers to people from "Beluchistan, the Punjab, Kashmir and the Sindh province, areas that now straddle north India, Pakistan and Afghanistan" (Ganter 2008, p. 9).

6 Doast Mahomet and Esan Khan were the two first cameleers to arrive in Australia. Other well-known Afghan cameleers were Abdul Wade, Faiz, the Taj Brothers, Alam Khan and Basher Gool.

to reunite with their families.[7] However, despite the xenophobic legislation[8] and attitudes in Australia, a small number of Afghans settled permanently in Australia; of those, many married local Aboriginal women and laid roots along the camel routes, known as 'Ghan' towns. These included Marree, Broken Hill, Alice Springs, Farina, Cloncurry and Oodnatta. As a result of these intercultural marriages, there are Aboriginal families still today with the surnames of Khan, Akbar, Mahomed and Sultan (Stephenson 2011). The relationships also resulted in artefacts such as boomerangs carved with turbaned cameleers and indigenous ceremonial items with attached camel hair.

Like the Maccassan fishermen and traders, many Afghan cameleers attempted to maintain their Islamic practice in their new non-Muslim homeland. They erected mud mosques with tin roofs, prayed, fasted, gave their compulsory charity, read the *Qur'an*, and refrained from pork, alcohol and other non-permissible food (Deen 2010, p. 31). However, many scholars note that the Afghan camelmen found it very difficult to maintain not only the Islamic practice, but their Islamic identity as well in the majority white Anglo-Celtic, Christian society. Consequently, Johns and Saeed (2002) state that many of the Afghan camelmen lost their Islamic faith. It is also a result of these early Muslim historical experiences in Australia that Australian Muslim civil society actors have deemed it imperative to establish community organisations and institutions for the preservation of identity in order to avoid such losses.

2.4 Late 19th century: Malay Pearl Divers

In the late 19th century, after securing a contract with the Dutch, Australia recruited 'Malays'[9] from Southeast Asia to work as indentured labourers in the pearling industry in areas of and surrounding Darwin, Broome, Christmas Island as well as along the Queensland coast. Although it was a very dangerous job with a high death toll, the pearling industry remained the main source of employment for Malays in Australia until the 1960s. Eventually some were lured to work in the South Australian mines or on the cane fields and sugar estates in Queensland. Like other

7 Australian authorities did not allow them to bring their wives over from their homelands.

8 Legislation included the Imported Labour Registry Act of 1897 which stated that "coloured aliens" were not allowed to import other workers and the *Immigration Act of 1901* (commonly referred to as the *White Australia Policy*).

9 Malays is placed in inverted commas as, like other historical cultural and ethnic phenomena in Australia, the label was used for all, including Malays, Timorese and Javanese.

Muslims who had arrived in Australia previously, many of these Malay workers returned home after their services were no longer needed in Australia. Moreover, like the Afghan cameleers, those Malays who remained stayed and married the local women.[10] Today, there are 30 families, about 100 people, in Broome and the surrounding areas with ancestry linked to the Malay pearl divers.

With the settlement of the Malays and Afghans, the small Australian Muslim community began establishing more permanent places of worship around Australia. Evidence suggests that the first permanent Muslim settlement and mosque was established in the Flinders Ranges in the Betlana Station[11] (Stevens 1989). The first mosque was built in Marree in northern South Australia in 1861 with the first large mosque built in Adelaide in 1888.[12] Another mosque was built in Broken Hill (New South Wales) in 1891. Muslims in Western Australia completed their first mosque, known as the Perth Mosque, in 1905. The first mosque in Queensland in Holland Park was built in 1908. It is worth noting that while some of these earlier communities, such as the ones in Marree and Broken Hill, did not themselves endure, their role in establishing mosques served as an important foundation for the establishment of the more permanent Muslim communities that succeeded them.

2.5 Post-World War I: Albanian Migrants

The implementation of the *Immigration Restriction Act* in 1901 created difficulties not only for Muslims already residing in Australia, but for further Muslim migration to Australia. It was at this time that Albanian Muslims started to consider Australia[13] as a place to achieve economic success. As Albanians were European, they were not excluded from coming to Australia under the *Immigration Restriction Act* or otherwise known as the 'White Australia Policy'. However, as their numbers increased,

10 Stephenson (2011) remarks that a significant number of the Muslim Malay men married the local Indigenous women; their Aboriginal-Malay descendants can be found in the top end of Australia.

11 Nothing remains of the settlement or the mosque, except six Afghan graves.

12 Some records indicate it was 1890, but the majority, including the State Library of South Australia, puts the original completion at 1888, with the minarets added in 1903.

13 Before that Albanians were migrating to the US; however, the US started limiting their immigration intake from Southern Europe (see Uncommon Lives: Muslim Journeys. National Archives of Australia (NAA). Retrieved from http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/muslim-journeys/arrivals/albanians.aspx)

legislation was sought in 1924[14] to limit the number of visas granted to them; as a result, in 1929, only 24 visas per month were granted to Albanians.[15] There were fears that Albanians (as well as Greeks and Yugoslavs) would bring economic strain by competing with Australians for jobs as well as upset the Anglo-Celtic character of the society by not being able to integrate successfully into society.

Although many of the Albanian migrants were single, strong and adventurous young men, they found it very difficult to get jobs due to their lack of English language proficiency. Gradually, they moved away from the cities and into rural areas of Queensland, Western Australia and Victoria where they eventually found back-breaking jobs clearing land and cutting the canes. However, according to Cleland (2002), during the Great Depression of the 1930s even these jobs were "subjected to racial tests […] (the) British Preference Leagues demanded that all sugar industry employees should be Anglo-Celtic Australians" (p. 59).

Upon hearing the distressed plight of their countrymen in Australia, the Albanian government provided discounted fares back home.[16] Some Albanians accepted the offer, but many decided to stay and make a fresh start elsewhere in Australia. Consequently, a number of the men left the cane fields and settled in Western Australia where they became wheat or sheep farmers in the areas of York and Northam. Many others finally settled in areas around Shepparton, in countryside Victoria, where they became prosperous orchardists and market-gardeners.

Even during some of those prosperous economic times, life was difficult for many Albanians, particularly during World War II. In 1943, when Albania came under Italian occupation, 1,086 Albanian Australians were considered 'alien enemies'.[17] As a result, their names and other personal details were registered and their movements monitored and recorded by the Australian Government. Although they did not pose a direct threat to Australia's national interest, at a time of heightened fear

14 "Influx of Southern Europeans to Australia", letter from the Secretary, Home and Territories Department, to the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 31 December 1924. NAA. Retrieved from http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/muslim-journeys/enlargement/european-migration-1920s.aspx

15 Instructions issued by the Passports Control Office at the British Foreign Office, 30 January 1929. NAA. Retrieved from http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/muslim-journeys/enlargement/british-foreign-office-1929.aspx

16 Press release, issued 24 December 1931. NAA. Retrieved from http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/muslim-journeys/enlargement/press-release-issued-24-december-1931.aspx

17 Interim report of the Aliens Classification and Advisory Committee, March 1943. NAA Retrieved from http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/muslim-journeys/enlargement/aliens-classification-1943.aspx

of invasion in 1942, 84 Albanians were sent to internment camps in Enoggera and Cowra, Queensland.[18] They were eventually released seven to eight months later.

Because of their treatment during the war as well as earlier years of social and economic hardships, some Albanians left Australia and returned home after the war. The vast majority, however, stayed, settled permanently (most sent for their fiancés or wives they left behind in Albania), had families and established vibrant communities. In 1956, the Albanian Mosque in Shepparton was the first mosque to be erected in Victoria. Similar to the experiences of Australian Muslims in the other major cities, mosque building for the Albanian community in Shepparton was central for the community's activities but also fundamental to the preservation of the religious identity of the community.

2.6 Post-World War II: Increase in Muslim Population in Australia

With the official end of the *Immigration Restriction Act* in 1958 (*Migration Act*), the population of Muslims in Australia rose dramatically from 2,704 in 1947 to 22,313 in 1971 (see Table 2).

In particular, Muslim from Turkey (including the Turkish part of Cyprus) and Yugoslavia took advantage of Australia's increasing employment needs, and in 1967 Turkey was the first non-Western European country to sign the *Assisted Passage Agreement*. As a result, the Turkish community grew significantly from 1,544 in 1966 to 11,589 in 1971 (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2012). Turkish migrants were the first large group of Muslims to migrate to Australia as well as the largest group of 'non-Whites' since 1901. As the Turkish migrants often lacked educational and professional qualifications, many of them could only find work as unskilled labourers and process workers.[19] In the early 1980s, there was a decline in labour migration from Turkey to Australia, and in recent times, Turkish nationals have migrated to Australia under the general skilled migration scheme or have been reunited with their families. Over 75 percent of Turkish migrants arrived in

18 Memorandum concerning the status of Albanian nationals from the Director of the Security Service to the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Army Headquarters, 7 July 1941. NAA Retrieved from http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/muslim-journeys/enlargement/status-of-albanian-nationals.aspx

19 The migration intake had aimed for a 30% skilled and 70% unskilled Turkish migrant population; however, the intake the first year of the program resulted mainly in unskilled migrants.

Australia before 1996, with half of Turkish-born Australians residing in Victoria (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2012).

Tab. 1 Number of Muslims in Australia from 1911-2011

Year	Number	Percentage of the Population
1911	3908	0.09
1933	1,877	0.03
1947	2,704	0.04
1961	N/A	N/A
1971	22,311	0.17
1976	45,205	0.33
1981	76,792	0.53
1986	109,523	0.70
1991	147,507	0.88
1996	200,885	1.13
2001	281,578	1.5
2006	340,387	1.71
2011	476,291	2.2

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011

Migrants from Lebanon have been in Australia since the 1880s, but it was only in the post-World War II era that the numbers increased significantly. In 1947, there were 1,886 migrants from Lebanon, many of whom were Christians of Maronite, Antioch Orthodox or Melkite denominations, and in 1971 there were 24,218 Lebanese-born Australians (Humphrey 2004). A significant shift following the civil war in Lebanon in 1975, saw some 20,000 Lebanese arriving in Australia seeking shelter. The latest census figures indicate that there are now 76,450 Lebanese-born residing in Australia, with the majority of them living in Sydney, New South Wales.

The dramatic increase in Lebanese refugees migrating after 1975 greatly altered the social and religious landscape of the Lebanese community in Australia (Humphrey 2004) as many of these refugees were extremely poor and over half of them were Muslim. Consequently, by 1996, 38.6 percent of the Lebanese population in Australia were Muslim (Convy and Mansour 2008), and amidst the sectarian war occurring back in Lebanon, the mostly communal Christian Lebanese community had to now cope with new Muslim Lebanese migrants (Humphrey 2004). Scholars such as Saeed and Akbarzadeh (2001) and Bouma, Daw and Munawar (2001) contend that Australia's multiculturalism can unify disparate groups; however,

Humphrey (2004) believes that in this case, Australia's multiculturalism polarised the Lebanese Australian community. He writes:

> Externally the new communities introduced the concerns of the war and internally competition between sect communities was intensified in the context of the new politics of multiculturalism. The social expression of this new identity politics was the proliferation of Lebanese community associations to the peak of around 250 largely based on village community associations. The provision of welfare services and government grants became the focus of intra-Lebanese ethnic competition. Multiculturalism opened up a new arena for party politics and petty patronage which the Lebanese were quick to learn and exploit. (p. 47)

Moreover, Ata (1987) adds that some of the main Lebanese community organisations and media did not assist in moderating tensions; rather, they promoted segregation and conflict between the various Lebanese religious groups. Lebanese Muslims unlike Lebanese Christians continue to face social disadvantage in Australia (Tabar, Noble and Poynting 2010) and one of the initial reasons for this may be that, unlike the Lebanese Christian refugees in the post-1975 migration wave, the Muslims "lacked the pre-existing ethnic institutions of church and community networks that had been established by earlier waves of Christians" (Betts and Healy 2006 p. 25). Recently, reasons may also include a sense of disconnect, alienation, marginalisation and even victimhood (Akbarzadeh 2006; Betts and Healy 2006; Wakim 2006). Overall, recent Muslim immigration has largely been a result of professional and skilled migration as well as the intake of those seeking asylum on refugee or humanitarian grounds, fleeing from war torn countries in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Europe.

With the growth of the Australian Muslim community, Muslims began forming Muslim civil society organisations (MCSOs),[20] including mosques, to serve the needs of the growing community. Initially this was not an easy task due to a lack of resources and societal backlashes. As Johns and Saeed (2002, p. 202) remark, "the effort to establish themselves, and define their own identity, often had to be carried out in the face of open hostility on the part of other Australians". The experience is similar for Muslim migrants in Western Europe who established what Pedersen (1999) refers to as 'new Islamic movements'.

Concentrating on the internal needs of the community, Australian Muslims began establishing mosques, extending beyond the "Ghan" structures built by the

20 In this article, civil society organisations include non-government organisations, non-profit and professional associations, trade unions and communities, neighbourhood groups, registered charities, men's and women's groups, educational and religious organisations.

cameleers in the interior of Australia and moving to the coastal cities. For many Muslims, the building of a mosque establishes their permanency in a land. In his important work *Mosques and Muslim Settlement in Australia,* Bouma (1994) similarly concludes that for Muslim migrants to be able to "settle religiously" (p. 98), the establishment of a mosque was necessary. He further argues:

> Far from retarding settlement or participation in Australian society, this study concludes that the practice of Islam in Australia can facilitate settling into a new life here…With the establishment of Islamic societies, mosques and other community infrastructures has come a greater commitment to Australia and greater satisfaction with life here. (p. 100)

Moreover, mosques have served as vehicles to preserve the community's religious identity, to help build and empower the community as well as develop outreach programs to serve the wider community. Bouma (1994) contends that the establishment of mosques allows for a two-way communication between Australian Muslims and the Australian government bodies and agencies. He observes that 'mosques and Islamic societies have helped to interpret Australian events and policies to Australian Muslims and to interpret Islamic events and policies occurring both here and overseas to departments and agencies of Australian governments' (1994, p. 90).

In 1994, when Bouma surveyed mosque establishment, he identified 57 mosques across Australia. In 2002, John and Saeed estimated that there were 80 mosques. In 2013, Amath found that there were 150 mosques in Australia as indicated by Table 3.

Tab. 2 Current distribution of mosques in Australia

States	Number	Percentage (%)
ACT	2	1
New South Wales	49	33
Northern Territory	3	2
Queensland	23	15
South Australia	8	6
Tasmania	2	1
Victoria	45	30
Western Australia	18	12

She found that the majority of mosques were in New South Wales (49), followed by Victoria with 45 mosques. There were 23 and 18 mosques in Queensland and Western Australia respectively. South Australia had eight mosques constructed,

Northern Territory had three and both Tasmania and the ACT each have two mosques (Amath 2013). The 2014 Islamic Sciences and Research Academy Australia (ISRA) report indicated that there are 82 mosques in Sydney and New South Wales, as it included not only permanent mosque structures, but any space which offered the compulsory Friday prayers and the five daily prayers (Underabi, 2014). There are a few more mosque applications pending in various councils around Australia with a number of mosques waiting to be constructed to meet the growing needs of the Australian Muslim community (Underabi 2014).

With the establishment of the mosques and centres, a peak Islamic body, the Australian Federation of Islamic Societies (AFIS), emerged in 1964. In 1975 it changed its name to the Australian Federation of Islamic Council (AFIC) and in 2010, it formally became 'Muslims Australian' (although it is still commonly referred to as AFIC). In its early years, AFIC was mainly concerned with halal meat certification (Humphrey 2001; Kabir 2005); the coordination of mosque societies at the local and state levels occurred in later years of its establishment. Now AFIC's main role, as stated on its website, is to advocate on behalf of all Australian Muslims on issues and concerns which affect the community's "settlement and integration within Australian society" (AFIC 2012).

Currently, AFIC has over 94 member societies, including peak state organisations such as the Islamic Council of Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Islamic Council of New South Wales (NSW), Islamic Council of Queensland (ICQ), Federation of Australian Muslim Students and Youth (FAMSY), Islamic Council of Tasmania, Islamic Council of Victoria, Islamic Council of South Australia and the Islamic Council of Western Australia. Other state and national peak organisations include the Muslim Women's National Network Australia (MWNNA), Muslim Council of NSW and the Supreme Islamic Council of NSW.

Over the years, the establishment of other MCSOs, aside from mosques, Islamic societies and peak Islamic Councils[21], became easier due to the shift in policy from assimilationism to integration and, in the mid-1970s, to multiculturalism; financial support from overseas; as well as funding from all three levels of the Australian Government (Johns and Saeed 2002), among other things. Humphrey (2001) explains:

> It is pluralising through the migration process that has generated local, ethnic community-based Islamic religious institutions which, in turn, helped decentre and localise the religious authority of tradition. It is homogenising through a multicultural

21 Islamic societies consist of a board of trustees/directors which administer the mosque's operation. Each state has an Islamic Council which individual Islamic societies may choose to be a member of and these state councils may join the national peak organisation, AFIC.

> politics of 're-traditionalisation' – the essentialisation of culture as a defensive, as well as representational, strategy that tends to place ethnic culture in compartmentalised social space. (p. 35)

The historical development of Australian Muslim community building is similar to the American experience, described by Muqtedar Khan (2003) as a transition from internal to external focus. In other words, Muslims first concentrated on their internal needs to maintain religious practice in a non-Muslim environment by building an internal community with the establishment of ethnic-based organisations, mosques, Islamic centres and religious educational programs. Humphrey (2001) refers to the ethnic-based organisations as "village associations" which served the religious and communal needs. When the Muslim population increased in any one area, the "community houses" were redeveloped into a public mosque, so as to continually meet the religious as well as the social and communal needs (Humphrey 2001, p. 38).

3 The Present Context

According to the 2011 Census figures, there are 476,291 Muslims in Australia, accounting for 2.2% of the population, making Muslims the fourth largest religious group in Australia.[22] Many observers, including Bedar and El Matrah (2005) state that these numbers may be inaccurate as some Muslims may not indicate their religion on the Census form due to "fear of persecution, a lack of understanding of the Australian Bureau of Statistics data collection procedure or because they do not identify with mainstream Islam" (p. 43).[23]

Australian Muslims are one of the most diverse groups in terms of their cultural, ethnic, linguistic and ideological background, yet they are commonly viewed as one homogeneous group, which is largely due to their simplistic (mis)representation in the mass media. The majority of Muslims in Australia (294,824/62 %) were born overseas and 38% were born in Australia. The four places of birth after Australia for Australian Muslims are Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey, which are the countries from which the early Muslim immigrants migrated from the 1800s;

22 The largest religious group is Christianity (61.1%) followed by no religion (22.3%) and then Buddhism (2.5%).

23 See also report on the Australian Broadcast Corporation (ABC). 'Guarded Muslims "halve census figures' 18 July 2011. Visited 14 August 2012 on http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-18/muslim-population-census-fears/2798462

this will be discussed in the subsequent sections. About 24,000 Muslims (5%) did not indicate their place of birth and 1,145 Aborigines identified themselves as Muslim in the 2011 Census.

Tab. 3 Birthplace of Australian Muslims

Birthplace	Percentage
Australia	37.6
Lebanon	7.1
Pakistan	5.6
Afghanistan	5.5
Turkey	5.3
Bangladesh	5.0
Iraq	3.3
Iran	2.7
Indonesia	2.6
India	2.1
Other	23.2

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011

The majority of Australian Muslims live in New South Wales (46.5 %) and Victoria (32.1 %). This is followed by Western Australia (8.2 %), Queensland (7.1%), South Australia (4.1 %) and the ACT (1.9 %). The least percentage of Muslims live in Tasmania (0.4%), followed by the Northern Territory (0.1 %).

4 Methodology

To gain a general overview of the MCOs operating in Australia, the first stage of the research framework involved empirical research and includes two steps. The first process comprised of identifying and mapping all possible MCSOs in Australia in a database from these sources: internet searches, contacts in all states and territory, Muslim newspapers, newsletters and other media outlets, including social media. This was useful as it not only identified and located all MCSOs in Australia, but it also provided a reference point to locate the participants for the purposeful sampling.

The second step required the distribution of all the recorded Australian MCSOs among these categories below:[24]

a. Religious institutions (includes mosques and mosque societies)
b. Social welfare organisations
c. Cultural/Ethnic associations
d. Advocacy organisations (human rights, civil rights, environmental rights and so forth)
e. Women's organisations
f. Youth associations
g. Professional associations
h. Research centres/think tanks
i. Education institutions
j. Sports and Recreational associations
k. Charities
l. Interfaith understanding[25]

The second stage of the research design involved in-depth phenomenological interviews with the Australian MCSOs. At the core of phenomenology lies the attempt to explore and understand the nature and meaning of the phenomena. Unlike the positivist research paradigm which "reduces the study of the human world to something that can be measured" and thus, "precludes researchers from focusing on the complexity and ambiguity of the world of human beings" (Gibson and Hanes 2003, pp. 183-4), phenomenology is a research approach which aims to

24 Lukka and Locke (2003) only identify 4 categories of volunteering activities of faith-based organisations: 1) routine activities (e.g. preparing food for *gudwara,* washing body for Islamic burial rites, visiting the sick, informal assistance and care for the aged and invalid, formal religious instruction, etc.); 2) welfare services (as part of the faith or separately such as youth groups, refugee services, etc.); 3) festivals (organising, preparations, etc); and 4) disasters and causes. I felt this list was too narrow and did not account for other activities and services faith-based civil society organisations participate in and deliver. Hence, I preferred to use the organisations as per the civil society definition. See also Augur's European Commission Report on "The Role and Structure of Civil Society Organizations in National and Global Governance Evolution and Outlook" http://www.augurproject.eu/IMG/pdf/cso_note_provisional_draft5_june_2012.pdf

25 This category is not included in the definition of civil society organisations, but I felt it was important to include it as quite a number of organisations, such as Affinity, the Australian Intercultural Society, Bluestar Intercultural Centre, Queensland Intercultural Society and so forth are founded by Muslims on the Islamic principle of building better relations.

explore and gain in-depth understanding of the complexities of human experience. This is an important characteristic as research approaches to the study of civil society organisations and their actors need to be able to respond to the rapid and complex changes occurring in the field. Gibson and Hanes (2003, p.183) argue that because the phenomenological approach "has complexity as one of its foundational attributes […] it is not constrained by limitations of traditional methods that tend to ignore the complex, evolutionary and systemic attributes of organisational context".

Unlike quantitative or experimental research where hypotheses are being tested or situations controlled, applied descriptive phenomenological research involves obtaining deep, reflective lived experiences from the participants and uncovering the 'essences', that is, the thematic patterns, of those experiences. Because the research approaches are quite different, selecting participants to sample had to be approached differently. While it was necessary for this research to select participants whose experience "would not be easily dismissed as idiosyncratic to them and irrelevant to a larger population" (Seidman, 2006, p. 51), it could not employ random sampling or stratified random-sampling. These sampling techniques involve a very large number of participants which is prohibitive and a near impossibility with research employing in-depth interviews. Moreover, as Seidman (2006) rightly points out, potential participants must agree to participate; thus, this element of "self-selection and randomness are not compatible" (p. 51).

In order to overcome these sampling considerations, qualitative researchers reason that potential participants need to be purposefully sampled. It is especially important for a phenomenological approach that potential participants were selected from those who have experienced the phenomena under investigation and whose qualities and experiences were relevant to the project. In other words, it is essential to ask: '*Has the potential participant experienced the phenomenon I am interested in investigating?*' After ascertaining this, it is worthwhile to consider several different approaches as suggested by Patton (1989), which are typical case, extreme or deviant case, critical case, sensitive case, convenience, and maximum variation. Because this research aims to discover patterns in the lived experiences of MCSOs, thereby generalising the essences, it was important that the purposeful sampling technique allowed for as much generalisation and connection to the population as possible. Thus, the maximum variation sampling technique was employed to locate potential participants for this study.

After identifying and mapping all possible MCSOs in Australia, I then established clear criteria to assist in locating the research participants who would best serve the aims and objectives of the research. As there are 12 different categories in which Australian MCSOs fall under, the first criteria for the purposeful sampling involved determining which categories were most relevant to the aims and objectives

of this study. After informal conversations with a number of Australian MCSOs actors about the research I was conducting, I found that the MCSOs involved in grass-roots community development would be most relevant to achieving the study's purpose. Consequently, I excluded MCSOs which fell under the categories of religious institutions (such as mosques or mosque associations); professional organisations (such as business or commerce organisations, medical professional groups and so forth); education institutions (such as Islamic schools or *madaris)*; and cultural and ethnic organisations (such as the Sri Lankan Muslim Association, or the Bosnian Association and so forth).

Secondly, for practical exigencies, I limited my study geographically to the three cities on the east coast of Australia: Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney. Thirdly, I then determined the number of Australian MCSOs I needed to establish a sufficient sample and reach saturation. Phenomenological researchers suggest different preferred numbers of individuals to interviews. Some, like Englander (2012) and Giorgi (2009), argue that it should be at least three; however, most concur with Polkinghorne's (1989) recommendation of 5-25 interviewees. I chose to interview 15 participants, with each participant being interviewed twice, over a two to three week period. There were three participants from Brisbane, six from Melbourne, and another six from Sydney. In total, I conducted 30 face-to-face, in-depth interviews across the three cities. Out of the 486 MCSOs in Australia, fifteen organisations from Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane were purposively selected to be investigated for this study using the descriptive phenomenological research approach.

The fifteen MCSOs participants include:

1. United Muslim Women Association (MWA),
2. Benevolence Australia,
3. Mission of Hope (MoH),
4. Muslim Women's National Network of Australia (MWNNA),
5. Crescents of Brisbane (CoB),
6. Australian MADE,
7. Al-Nisa Youth Group,
8. Islamic Foundation for Education and Welfare (IFEW)
9. Australian Islamic Social Association (AISA) Youth,
10. Forum on Australia's Islamic Relations (FAIR),
11. Australian Intercultural Society (AIS),
12. Islamic Women's Association of Queensland (IWAQ),
13. Sareera,
14. Australian Muslim Women's Centre for Human Rights [AMWCH] and
15. Islamic Society of UNSW (ISOC).

An overview of the organisations, their background and context, their vision and the key services they provide are outlined in Appendix A. This important step allowed me to gauge the diversity of services provided by all possible MCSOs in Australia. It also provided a quantifiable aspect to this research, namely the category of MCSOs most frequently established by Australian Muslims.

5 Findings

5.1 Overview of Australian Muslim civil society organisations

The mapping exercise indicates that there are currently 486 MCSOs in Australia with new organisations being established regularly. Although there are a number of older organisations (mostly mosque or mosque-based institutions), the majority are fairly new, established particularly after September 2001.

As Table 4 shows, the majority of established MCSOs are in New South Wales with 183 organisations, while Victoria comes in second with nearly 140 organisations. Although Queensland has a similar population of Muslims to Western Australia, interestingly it has established 60% more MCSOs than WA. South Australia is placed fourth with 22 organisations, followed by the ACT with nine, Northern Territory with four and Tasmania with two.

Tab. 4 Distribution of Australian MCSOs among states

States	Number	Percentage (%)
ACT	9	2
New South Wales	183	37
Northern Territory	4	1
Queensland	78	16
South Australia	22	5
Tasmania	2	0.4
Victoria	138	28
Western Australia	47	10
Total	486	100

Tab. 5 Distribution of Australian MCSOs among categories

Category	Number	Percentage (%)
Religious	265	55
Education	59	12
Cultural	43	9
Youth	22	5
Women	21	4
Student	17	3
Charity	14	3
Umbrella	12	2
Advocacy	11	2
Miscellaneous	10	2
Social/recreational	8	2
Interfaith	4	1
Total	486	100

The 486 Australian MCSOs across all states and territories represent the diversity of Muslim communities' engagement in the public sphere. Moreover, these organisations have made contributions in almost every area of civil society. They have formed religious institutions (includes mosques and mosque societies), social welfare organisations, cultural associations, advocacy organisations (human rights, women's rights, civil rights, environmental rights, etc.), youth associations, professional associations, research centres/think tanks, educational institutions, sports and recreational associations, charities, and interfaith understanding associations[26].

This study has found that the majority of MCSOs are mosque-based, with 265 religious organisations (including mosque administrations), followed by 59 education institutions. Forty-three MCSOs are cultural/ethnic associations. The Muslim youth and women's associations make up the fourth and fifth group with 22 and 21 respectively. Miscellaneous organisations such as professional, funeral, convert support services as well as support for the aged make up the fifth largest group of Australian MCSOs.

26 This is not Muslim per se as the membership is obviously open to all; however, many are founded by Muslims on the Islamic principle of building better relations.

Key themes in Community Building

The phenomenological interviews revealed that the Australian MCSO actors were keen to discuss the theme of establishing community as part of their lived experiences. They spoke about the history of community building, the establishment of mosque and mosque societies and the establishment of their own organisation. In particular, they highlighted a number of key themes as part of these community-building processes, first, filling a void and, second, assisting the community to access essential services. A third emerging theme related to the establishment of community was that the organisations were keen to operate separately from mosque establishments. The next sections will provide an exhaustive description and analysis of this theme as presented by the participants.

Theme 1 '*there is a great need…which had never been addressed*': Filling a Void

One of the main themes raised by MCSO actors related to their desire to fill a void within the community landscape or provided certain much-needed services. Mustafa Ally from Crescents of Brisbane articulated clearly: '*there was a gap and […] there was a need for something like this*.' Similarly, the manager of the Islamic Women's Association Queensland (IWAQ), Galila Abdel-Salam, stated that '*there was a great need in the Logan area which had never been addressed […] for Muslim women as there was nothing there*'. She continued to discuss that '*the vision was to provide services for the community, [provide the] first home and community care.*' Abdel-Salam said that before that time, there was no organisation to holistically cater for the needs of Muslim women and their families. Specifically, IWAQ set about ensuring that Muslim women's needs were met.

Hanan Dover from Mission of Hope (MoH) echoed Abdel-Salam's sentiments and stressed that while mainstream organisations do great work,

> *They don't have programs on the ground that are really important for the Muslim community; yes, we are helping our own because of the gaps. There is no point going mainstream when you have difficulties. We understand our problems, so we are trying to close those gaps first.*

Tasneem Chopra, chairperson of AMWCH, stated that they '*felt this compelling need to do something to help the community.*' She also articulated that '*it was a bit valiant at the time, but it was from a good place.*' In particular, Chopra said that the organisation was established to fill a void in the Muslim community: '*it started off*

as a group of women wanting to collaborate on how to assist women in need through domestic violence.' Chopra continued

> *The early days I guess the analysis and the thinking about supporting women was quite important and it was get them out of the house, get them somewhere safe, and getting them to a safe place, with provisions and for a while that was adequate.*'

According to Chopra, unfortunately this vital need was not being met by other organisations, mainstream or other Muslim-based ones. When asked as to why the needs could not be met by other mainstream women's organisations dealing with domestic violence, Chopra articulated:

> *I think obviously the core difference is we have Muslim staff of different ethnicities so our client base by definition is attracted to coming to us because they feel we are going to get where they are coming from, and when I say get I mean, it's beyond just having the linguistic comfort zone, it could be the cultural comfort zone.*

In the same vein, Maha Abdo from the United Muslim Women's Association (MWA) asserted that there were no organisations in Sydney which catered specifically for Muslim women and their families. According to Abdo, MWA's vision was to '*create opportunities for the woman*.' She further explained that the organisation is constantly staying in touch with its members and the community so that it is aware of their needs. She discussed:

> *Now the organisation is actually evolving with the needs and aspirations of Muslim women that it comes in contact with… so the organisation today, while the vision exists in principle the application evolves according to the needs of the community.*

Like other Australian MCSO actors, Salam El-Merebi from the Al-Nisa Youth Group also discussed the need to provide culturally-sensitive programs for Muslims, especially young females. She elaborated that '*it was more like a way where we could get the young Muslim girls out of their houses and getting them into something that is active and becoming more […] part of the community.*' Kurander Seyit said that FAIR also wanted to engage with Muslim youth. In particular, the organisation saw a need for Muslim young people to contribute outside of the Muslim community. Seyit expounded,

> *So based on that report*[27] *we saw that Muslim youth had a tendency to only volunteer in Muslim organisations and there was a high rate of Muslims girls volunteering; boys tended to focus on their studies. The aim was to introduce them to organisations they may not have heard of before or they may have heard of but had no idea what it was, so RSPCA, Red Cross, SES they were all very successful presentations. People were amazed by what they heard, Vision Australia, Amnesty International, Oxfam. It all culminated in a massive symposium of 30 volunteer organisations and about 500 kids; it was brilliant.*

In Melbourne, Buday from ASIA Youth stated that one of the main reasons for the establishment of their organisation was to connect with young Muslim males and provide for their needs. He explained, *'I remember one of our mottos back in the day ASIA Youth an end to disillusionment, because what we noticed is that a lot of the youth today are really disillusioned; they don't know their place in society.'*

Saara Sabbagh, founder of Benevolence Australia, also spoke about the vital need to connect with those most disillusioned within the Muslim community. She explained how their organisation catered especially for these people and how that dictated their philosophy as well as their programs. She discussed at great length:

> *I wasn't interested in law, right and wrong. I just constantly saw a yearning in people's condition to connect with the Creator and I saw and I responded to that throughout my years working with the community and every group and organisation I worked with […] didn't fulfil that gap for me because I still saw people falling aside.*

Sabbagh spoke specifically about the people who were '*falling aside*' who they wanted to reach out to and connect with through Benevolence Australia. She further explained:

> *They did not fit into that community ethos, or that community because once you establish a 'religious group' of any kind, there are rules that come with that. And the majority of the people in the community, and I say the majority,*

27 The 2007 report, entitled *Supporting Volunteering Activities in Australian Muslim Communities, Particularly Youth* was commissioned by the Australian Multicultural Foundation (AMF) and Volunteering Australia and was funded by the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. It can be retrieved here: http://www.volunteeringaustralia.org/wp-content/files_mf/1377045799VASupportingVolunteeringActivitiesinAustralianMuslimCommunitiesParticularlyYouth.pdf

> *of them didn't fit into that. Benevolence in a nutshell is trying to create a safe space, both physically and metaphorically for both born Muslims who want to reconnect as well as converts that they can come and find a place where they are not judged and accepted for who they are. The organisation that we work with and respect highly in the United States is called Ta'leef; they have a motto which we can't use because they just won't allow us to: it's come as you are- that's it, that's beautiful. That's a philosophy that we would abide by, come as you are, we will take steps side by side.*

Sabbagh stated numerous times that their organisation is there to serve the needs of the community, to fill that void because, as she reflected, '*at the end of the day that's what we are doing, we're serving the community. In whichever form it may be.*'

Saba Hakim from Australian MADE acknowledged that there were so many great organisations out there providing vital community services; however, she discussed how their organisation wanted to especially reached those communities which were more difficult to access. She explained that *'the idea was to access new and emerging communities, so the Iraqi and Afghani communities and within areas that haven't been accessed by other organisations.'*

Related to this discussion, which emerged from the interviews, was that the participating Australian MCSOs in this study were established to cater for the social needs of the community, a void many felt were not adequately met by other organisations. For example, after her research and consultation, Abdel-Salam came to the conclusion that Muslim women in Queensland felt '*isolated*'. Hence, one of IWAQ's main activities has been intended to be '*very socialising; this is where a group of women meet together; women bring in food, in a non-confronting way, sitting together chatting together, having lunch, sharing lunch.*' Buday noted a similar reason for establishing ASIA Youth and stated that the organisation allowed people to '*really work together to prevent isolation of communities.'* El-Merebi reflected that activities of Al-Nisa Youth Group were '[…] *like a social gathering; people from every single community come, including non-Muslims, which was really great*.'

Dover outlined some of the social activities they provided for the community. She elaborated: '*we have social events like trivia nights […] and we love hosting co-medians; the community needs to laugh at themselves*.' Similarly, Sertel elaborated that Sareera organise social events for young Muslim girls: '*We have sleepovers with the girls; we contribute to Clean-Up Australia Day, Earth Hour, a tree planting day, (and) bike riding in the city.'*

Theme 2 '*…this is your right*':
Assisting the Community to Access Vital Services

A second theme related to the establishment of community as articulated by the Australian MCSO actors was to assist the community in accessing essential services. For instance, Abdel-Salam stated that one of the main functions of the Islamic Women's Association of Queensland (IWAQ) is to inform the community of their rights to access certain services. To elucidate, she discussed how their organisation conducted field research into areas of need in the community: '*the search highlighted that people are not aware of what service is available to them […] So after much research we conceived of the first aged care service.*'

Moreover, Abdel-Salam stated that IWAQ wanted to '*encourage people to get that this is (their) your right; what is available for Muslim women*'. The representatives of the organisation feel it is their responsibility to advise the community '*so that the Muslim women can be informed about it.*' Abdel-Salam also advised that IWAQ had initial difficulties informing their members and their families about the services. She noted that she had to tell them: '*this is a service which the government is giving you as a taxpayer*'. She remembered that they had to use '*different strategies and approaches*' to get the community to access and make use of these services.

Abdo also observed a similar occurrence with their clients and felt that the issue may have arisen due to the fact that they are working with vulnerable communities.

El-Merebi also spoke about working with vulnerable communities and needing to ensure that they understood existing services and support available to them. She discussed:

> *There are a lot of refugees coming in with sensitive backgrounds and a lot of child safety officers being called to remove these children. It's a big, big thing and child safety is getting involved with the family and the reason for that is because they come from a culture that is extremely different from Australian culture and two, they do have a traumatic background. They became refugees not just within their own countries, but they became refugees moving from one country to another to end up in Australia.*

As a result of the knowledge, El-Merebi stated that they delivered sessions to assist the communities in dealing with these issues and where they can to go for assistance.

The Australian MCSO actors explained that many times one of their most important roles was to assist the community in being aware of these pertinent issues and vital services they can access. As Abdel-Salam highlighted: '*it's like when you are sending someone to school, it is funded from the government. When you go to*

the hospital you know it's funded from government. So this is an opportunity to use these services, other people use it so what's wrong with that?'

Theme 3 '*we leave the mosque for the worship and prayer*': Separate from Mosque Establishment

A final theme related to community establishment revolved around the fact that many Australian MCSOs in this study position their organisation to be separate from the mosque societies. In Queensland, for example, Abdel-Salam, manager of IWAQ, explained that '*[they] we leave the mosque for the worship and prayer […] imams cannot do everything and cannot have all the information; some of the imams don't know what is available for Australian citizen here.*' El-Merebi, founder of Al-Nisa, also spoke about the problems associated with operating within mosque establishments. She expounded,

> *If we were part of a mosque, we would have been dictated by the mosque what to do and we didn't want that. We wanted to work solely from an Islamic perspective, an Islamic philosophy […] not be dictated by some figure of authority, such as an Imam.'*

She further commented that besides not wanting to be dictated by mosques, Al-Nisa Youth Group has also sought to avoid any restrictions in terms of their membership as they '*wanted to cater for everyone, [we] don't want to cater for one specific mosque.*'

In particular, El-Merebi spoke about the organisation intending to cater for hard to reach Muslim girls. She said, '*I know these girls and I know that they swore to never attend the mosque ever again. And they don't; they never access it'*. She further explained that this is one of the reasons why it was important for Al-Nisa Youth Group to establish itself separate from the mosque. She elucidated:

> *I guess that's why we wanted girls that we know [who] aren't accessing the mosque because the girls that do access the mosque, they are in safe hands. They are in a mosque. People know them, but the girls who are not in a mosque you never know where they are, or what they are doing. And we really wanted to keep an eye on them and not in the sense of the big brother, but in the sense of you're still part of our community; you're part of this community.*

In Melbourne, Sabbagh articulated similar sentiments. She noted:

> *I saw those people that were on the side who would just look at us from afar and say I wish I could connect but you are just too beyond me, too religious that I cannot connect with you, but they are the people I wanted to connect with. So Benevolence really evolved out of me separating from organised religion. We're really broad here […] separating from organised religion.*

She further elaborated on those people her organisation wants to reach out to and serve, those who want to belong, but feel they could not for various reasons. Specifically, she discussed how a number of Australian Muslim women felt about their place in a mosque. Sabbagh observed:

> *They are predominantly women who don't fit into the mosque community; they are unwelcomed in the mosque community. They are made to feel that they are second class, they have to go through an alleyway, down the stairs, up the gutter, whatever it might be, to find their little place to pray in the darkness, those women who have become almost disenfranchised with Islam as a whole.*

Discussing the same theme, Dover contended, '*We build too many mosques not enough social services in our community, that's the problem.*' She further commented:

> *A lot of people are turning away from Imams because they are too basic for us now, because we are too educated and when they are too basic you can't gain from them. We are going to independent organisations to learn our Islam, because we love our religion and we love our Islam but we also want to be free.*

Dover provided an example where it was important that certain Australian Muslim organisations provided services independent of mosque establishment. She elucidated:

> *There is no domestic violence allowed in Islam… and any Sheikh that says otherwise is incorrect. We are quite an educated group […] we also train service providers, educating them, informing them that Sheikhs may have views of that nature, but it clearly is not acceptable in Islam and we give them examples. You're not allowed to harm a child, a plant or an animal so it doesn't make sense that you are allowed to harm your wife, or your family. You can't break a tree branch so how does that make it permissible to strike your wife. We use a very rational, common sense theological, spiritual approach to it. The Prophet never struck a woman and he is the best of our examples. So as Muslims that makes sense.*

6 Conclusion: Muslim Community Building in Australia

While Muslim presence in Australia can be traced back to the Maccassan fisherman and traders in the 16th-17th centuries along with some mosque establishments with the Afghan cameleers in the mid-19th century, it was only in the 1970s that the Muslim communities began establishing civil society organisations to serve the social, recreational, welfare, educational as well as religious needs of their communities. Similar to other minority groups in the West, the Australian Muslim community-building experience began with an internal focus concentrating on preserving the Muslim identity.

The initial priority was mosque-building, followed by educational programs, established through mosque societies or informal family settings. This confirms Schumann's (2007) discussion where he notes that it was considered important for Muslims to build mosques in order to preserve the Muslim identity, which was perceived to be threatened in a hostile, Western environment. Thus, community building in this regard was one of "inward looking and identity-concerned orientation" (Schumann 2007, p. 16). As the Muslim community grew in Australia from the 1970s, however, Muslims leaders recognised a dire need to meet not just the religious needs of the community, but also the social, recreational, cultural, economic, intellectual and health needs of the community.

This shift of focus is important because it enabled the establishment of firm and permanent roots in their new country and allowed them to go from simply being Muslims in Australia to being Australian Muslims. They began establishing schools and community institutions to accommodate the increasing Muslim population as well as contribute to the wider community. Moreover, many of the Australian MCSO actors interviewed for this study engaged in a needs analysis of their community. These actors and the organisations they represent recognised that the growing Muslim communities in Australia needed more than religious guidance; they needed assistance with issues related to settlement, domestic violence, mental health, child safety, social welfare, social ills and advocacy. Hence, based on consultations with the communities and various stakeholders (such as social workers, police officers and community developers) and based on their own experiences and expertise, these Australian MCSO actors realised that there was a dire need to fill those voids, which they felt could not be met by other mainstream organisations.

Williams' (2011) study on American Muslims and the necessary establishment of community organisations notes similar observations. He contends that "the crux of this organisational form is the basic reality of […] religious institutions as locally organised and ultimately responsive to local members" (p. 132). Williams further explains that by building, incorporating, administering and financing their own

civil society institutions, Muslims "were in control of their own religious lives" (p. 132). Additionally, establishing these organisations allows them to assist Muslims in accessing important services and resources. This is a common observation of many scholars studying Muslim community building in Western countries (see Bouma 1997; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000; Kurien 2007).

The intentional establishment of their organisation separate from the local mosques also emerged as a strong theme of Muslim community building. This allows for control of the vision, goals, programs and initiatives of their own organisation. There is no clergy within Islam[28] and, while scholarly opinions from learned *ulama* (religious scholars) may hold weight with many Muslims, the ultimate reverence belongs to God alone. Thus, establishing separate institutions from the mosque is not considered sacrilegious. In a similar vein, Williams (2011) concludes that Islam is very much "a lay-driven religion" (p. 132) and can, accordingly, organise itself into other organisations to meet the needs of the Muslim community.

It is noteworthy that all but one of the Muslim women's and young women's organisations interviewed in the three states strongly articulated this theme. As indicated by the MCSO actors, the intention to establish an organisation separate from the mosque allows for not only freedom from mosque authority, but also provides Muslim women key leadership roles within an organisation as well as representation within their community. Scholars note that this is a common occurrence for other migrant religious congregations (Abushurafa 1998; George 1998; Hurh and Kim 1990; Warner and Wittner 1998). Due to a sense of cultural loss and deprivation as a result of the migration experience, these places of worship may be the only spaces which allow men to reclaim their sense of self-worth, pride and honour. In doing so, they have excluded women from occupying the space and leadership roles. Accordingly, Australian Muslim women, in particular, have responded by seeking spaces which provide them with autonomy and leadership through the establishment of their own MCSOs separate from mosque institutions.

With the shift in focus from internal to external, Australian Muslims established nearly 500 diverse MCSOs, with more being established regularly, to serve not only the Muslim communities' varied needs but also provide services to the wider community. As the mapping exercise revealed, these organisations have made contributions in almost every area of civil society endeavour with the establishment of religious institutions (includes mosques and mosque societies), social welfare organisations, cultural associations, advocacy organisations (human rights, women's rights, civil rights, environmental rights, and so forth), youth associations,

28 There is a religious hierarchy system in Shiite Islam with the Ayatollahs, but it is not as pronounced as other religious traditions such as Catholicism.

professional associations, research centres/think tanks, educational institutions, sports and recreational associations, charities, and interfaith understanding and dialogue associations.

Alongside the response to these needs, there was also an urgent sense to engage more with the Australian society (Peucker, Roose and Azbarzadeh 2014). These MCSOs and their leaders urged Australian Muslims to not have a separatist mentality in relation to the Australian society but rather to participate and contribute fully to the wider society. They also discussed the process of community building as a sense of empowerment, a strong sense of identity and an emphasis of a "new universalism" (Schumann 2007, pp. 22-23). In particular, the interviews with the actors reveal that the establishment of these Australian MCSOs has helped Muslims participate, contribute and be a visible part of the diverse social, cultural, economic and political mosaic of Australian society.

Finally, it is worth noting that external events have brought Australian MCSOs full circle in their building of community. When they first began establishing permanent communities throughout Australia, the emphasis was particularly inward-looking; thus, they solely concentrated on the internal needs of their communities. With the rise of multiculturalism and with more sizeable Australian Muslim communities due to increased migration in the 1980s and 1990s, their concentration soon shifted to an external focus. However, the impact of the events of 9/11 meant that so much focus and resources were spent on the external needs that the Australian MCSOs found themselves neglecting the internal needs of the communities in which they were established to serve originally (Amath 2013; Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014).

A number of recent issues related to troubled Australian Muslim youth have confirmed the need for MCSOs in Australia to re-shift its focus, concentrating particularly on youth capacity building and youth identity negotiation issues (Amath 2015; Peucker et al 2014). After reifying the community-building needs of the Muslim communities, the Australian MCSOs are now focusing on harnessing social capital and facilitating pathways for Muslims who feel marginalised and socially excluded from mainstream Australian society. The actors argued that the inward focus will allow them to create a more harmonious relationship externally.

References

Abusharaf, R.M. 1998. Structural adaptations in an immigrant Muslim congregation in New York. In *Gatherings in diaspora: Religious communities and the new immigration,* eds. S. Warner & J. Wittner, 235–261. Philadelphia, MA: Temple University Press.

Akbarzadeh, S. 2006, February 7. Freedom is not a right to abuse. *The Australian*, 12.

Amath, N. 2013. The impact of 9/11 on Australian Muslim civil society organisations. *Communication, Politics & Culture* 46(1): 116–135.

Amath, N. 2015. Australian Muslim Civil Society Organisations in Australia: Pathways to Social Inclusion. *Journal of Social Inclusion* 6(1): 6–25.

Andrews, D. 1996. *Building a better world*. Sutherland, NSW: Albatross Book.

Andrews, D. 2007. *Living community: An Introductory course in community work*. West End, Australia: Tafina Press.

Andrews, D. 2008. Vocation, profession and community development. In *Development Studies*, eds. R. Ghosh, K.R. Gupta, and P. Maiti, 28–52. New Delhi, India: Atlantic Publishers.

Ata, A. 1987. *Arab-Lebanese religious affiliates and their attitudinal discrepancies in Australia*. North Fitzroy, Australia: CIRC Reprints

Australian Broadcast Corporation (ABC) (2012, July 18). Guarded Muslims halve census figures. *Australian Broadcast Corporation (ABC).* Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-18/muslim-population-census-fears/2798462

Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2006. *Religious affiliation (No. 1301.0.)* Retrieved 6 April 2016, from AusStats database http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/46d1bc47ac9d-0c7bca256c470025ff87/BFDDA1CA506D6CFACA2570DE0014496E?opendocument

Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2011. *2011 census of housing and population*. Canberra, Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Bedar, A. and El Matrah, J. 2005. *Media guide: Islam and Muslims in Australia*. Melbourne, Australia: Islamic Women's Welfare Council of Victoria.

Betts, K. and Healey, E. 2006. Lebanese Muslims in Australia and social disadvantage. *People and Place* 14(1): 24–42.

Bouma, G. D. 1994. *Mosques and Muslim settlement in Australia*. Canberra, Australia: Bureau of Immigration, Population and Multicultural Studies.

Bouma, G. D. 1997. The settlement of Islam in Australia. *Social Compass* 44(1): 71–82.

Cahill, D., Bouma, G.D., Dellal, H., and Leahy, M. 2004. *Religion, cultural diversity and safeguarding Australia*. Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.

Cleland, B. 2001. The history of Muslims in Australia. In *Muslim communities in Australia,* eds. A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh,12–32. Sydney, Australia: UNSW Press.

Cleland, B. 2002. *The Muslims in Australia: A brief history*. Melbourne, Australia: Islamic Council of Victoria.

Convy, P. and Monsour, A. 2008. *Lebanese settlement in New South Wales: A thematic history*. NSW, Australia: The Migration Heritage Centre. Retrieved from www.migrationheritage.nsw.gov.au/mhcreports/ThematicHistoryOfLebaneseNSW.pdf

Deen, H. n.d. *Uncommon lives: Muslim journeys*. National Archives of Australia: DIAC. Retrieved from http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/muslim-journeys/index.aspx

Deen, H. 2003, *Caravanserai*. Fremantle, Australia: Fremantle Arts Council Press.

Department of Communities and Local Government, UK (2011). *Citizenship survey April 2010 – March 2011*. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications

Ebaugh, H. and Chafetz, J. 2000. *Religion and the new immigrants: Continuities and adaptations in immigrant congregations*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.

Elbayar, K. 2005. NGO laws in selected Arab states. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 17(4): 3–27.

Ganter, R. 2006. *Mixed relations: Asian-Aboriginal contact in North Australia*. Crawley, Australia: University of Western Australia Press.

Ganter, R. 2008. Muslim Australians: The deep histories of contact. *Journal of Australian Studies* 32(4): 481–492.

George, S. 1998. *Caroling with the Keralites: The negotiation of gendered space in an Indian immigrant church*. In *Gatherings in diaspora: Religious communities and the new immigration*, eds. S. Warner & J. Wittner, 265–294. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Gray, A. 2013. Withholding government funding: A breach of freedom of political communication. *Alternative Law Journal* 38(4): 214–218.

Humphrey, M. 2001. An Australian Islam? Religion in the multicultural city. In *Muslim communities in Australia,* eds. A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh, 33–52. Sydney, Australia: UNSW Press.

Humphrey, M. 2004. Lebanese identities: Between cities, nations and trans-nations. Arabs Studies Quarterly 26(1): 31–50.

Hurh, W. M. and Kim, K. C. 1990. Religious participation of Korean immigrants in the United States. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29(1): 19–34.

Isaacs, J. 1980. Australian *dreaming*: 40,000 Years of Aboriginal history. Sydney, Australia: Lansdowne Press.

Johns, A., & Saeed, A. 2002. Muslims in Australia: The building of a community. In Muslim minorities in the West, eds. Y.Y Haddad and J.I. Smith, 195–216. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.

Johnson, A. 1994. Linking professionalism and community organisation. *Journal of Community Practice* 1(2): 65–86,

Kabir N. 2005. *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, race relations and cultural history*. London, England: Kegan Paul.

Khan, M. A. M. 2002. *American Muslims: Bridging faith and freedom*. Beltsville, MD: Amanah Publications.

Kurien, P. 2007. *A Place at the multicultural table: The development of American Hinduism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Macknight, C. 1976. *The voyage to Marege: Macassan trepangers in Northern Australia*. Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press.

McKnight, J. (1978). Professionalised services and disabling help. In *Disabling Professions,* eds. I. Illich, I. Zola, J. McKnight, J. Kaplan, & H. Saiken, 69–92. London, England: Marion Boyars.

Ozdalaga, E., & Persson, S. 1997. *Civil society, democracy and the Muslim World*. Istanbul, Turkey: Swedish Research Institute Pedersen, L. 1999. *New Islamic movements in Western Europe*. Sydney, Australia: Ashgate, Aldershot and Brookfield.

Padgett, D. 2002. Institutionalizing activism. *Journal of Community Practice* 10(4): 67–83.

Peucker, M. and Akbarzadeh, S. 2014. *Active Muslim citizenship in the West*. London: Routledge.

Peucker, M., Roose, J.M., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2014): Muslim active citizenship in Australia: Socioeconomic challenges and the emergence of a Muslim elite. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 282–289.

Rogers, J. 2014, June 24. When Islam came to Australia. *The BBC news magazine*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27260027

Saeed, A. and Akbarzadeh, S. 2001. *Muslim communities in Australia*. Sydney, Australia: University of NSW Press.

Schumann, C. 2007. A Muslim 'diaspora' in the United States? *The Muslim World* 97(1): 11–32.

Singerman, D. 2004. The networked world of Islamist social movements. In.), *Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach,* ed. Q. Wiktorowicz, 143–163. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.

Sparre, S., & Petersen, M. 2007. *Report on Islam and civil society: Case studies from Jordan and Egypt*. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=45293

Stephenson, P. 2009. Typologies of security: Indigenous and Muslim Australians in the post-9/11 imaginary. *Journal of Australian Studies* 33(4): 473–488.

Stephenson, P. 2011. Long history with Islam gives Indigenous Australians pride. In *The Conversation*. Retrieved from http://theconversation.edu.au/long-history-with-islam-gives-indigenous-australians-pride-3521

Stevens, C. 1989. *Tin mosques and Ghantowns: A history of Afghan camel drivers in Australia*. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press

Tabar, P., Noble, G., and Poynting, S. 2010. *On being Lebanese in Australia: Identity, racism and the ethnic field*. Institute for Migration Studies. Beirut, Lebanon: Lebanese American University Press.

Underabi, H. 2014. *Mosques of Sydney and New South Wales: Research Report 2014.* Auburn, NSW: ISRA, UWS & CSU.

Warner, S. and Wittner, J. 1998. *Gatherings in diaspora: Religious communities and the new immigration*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Wakim, J. 2006, February 1. A police disservice to paint race relations with broad-brush labels. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15.

Westoby, P. and Dowling, G. 2009. *Dialogical community development with depth, solidarity and hospitality.* West End, Australia: Tafina Press.

Wiktorowicz, Q. 2004. *Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach*. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.

Williams, R. H. 2011. Creating an American Islam: Thoughts on religion, identity, and place. *Sociology of Religion* 72(2): 127–153.

Worsley, P. 1955. Early Asian contacts with Australia. *Past and Present* 7(1): 1–11.

Between Orient and Occident? The Colonial Legacy at the Grand Mosque of Paris

7

Ricarda Stegmann

1 Introduction

This article examines the history, political importance, and contemporary self-staging of the Grand Mosque of Paris. It argues that colonial discourse has played and continues to play a crucial role in the representation of Islam in France. This leads to the thesis that the colonial legacy of the Grand Mosque of Paris has not been critically deconstructed, but on the contrary, continues to be maintained in the present day. Both French political leaders and the Mosque's Rector, Dalil Boubakeur, maintain the representation of Islam as an oriental "other" that may be accepted in France, but is not part of it. One can conclude from this that non-integrationist stances are incorporated into the political discourse on Islam in France, as well as into the self-presentation of one of its most symbolic institutions.

Inaugurated in 1926 in the elite *Quartier Latin,* the Grand Mosque of Paris is the second oldest in France. Several analyses have focused on how deeply the institution is embedded in colonial discourse and the power struggles of the time (e.g. Bayoumi 2000, Sbaï 2006, Atouf 2006, Sellam 2006, Davidson 2007, 2012, Telhine 2010). Naomi Davidson in particular has argued in her above-mentioned works that the conceptualization of the Mosque colluded in the French state's creation of an *islam français* that served the political interests of the colonial Empire.

In the 1980s, the Grand Mosque of Paris gradually came under the control of the Algerian state, which still administers it today. However, the institution also continued to play an important role in the French political organization of Islam, and thus has been and is still torn between Algerian expectations and French political interests. While some of the scholarship has addressed the political role of the Grand Mosque with regard to the institutionalization of Islam in France (e.g. Krosigk 2000; Godard/Taussig 2007, 2009; Sellam 2006; Telhine 2010), little atten-

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_7

tion has been paid to the impact of colonial history on the Mosque's contemporary self-representation or on the political discourses *about* the Mosque.[1]

To elucidate this issue, this paper first provides an overview of the colonial rhetoric regarding the Mosque project in the 1920s, and then provides a brief history of the institution. In the second part, it focuses on political discourse, showing how French politicians in the 1990s maintained, and then in the 2000s downplayed the importance of the Grand Mosque of Paris with regard to the representation and organization of Islamic issues in France. At the same time, this part of the paper demonstrates that politicians uncritically reproduce a colonial vision of the Mosque and the Islam it represents. In the third part, the paper elucidates on the self-staging of the Grand Mosque of Paris towards a non-Muslim public. It particularly analyzes the discourse of the Mosque's current Rector, Dalil Boubakeur, arguing that he too employs a political perspective and a concept of Islam deeply rooted in colonial history in order to defend his institution's importance for Islam in France today.

2 The History of the Grand Mosque of Paris

2.1 A colonial monument – The foundation phase of the 1920s

In 1920, the French National Assembly and the Senate decided to award subsidies to the *Société des Habous et des Lieux Saints de l'Islam*[2] for the construction of a Mosque in Paris (cf. Telhine 2010, p. 158).[3] Soon after, the City of Paris made available a property valued at FF 1,620,000 for the building of the Mosque in the famous and intellectual *Quartier Latin* (idem), opposite the *Jardin des Plantes*. Between 1922

1 An exception is Vincent Geisser and Aziz Zemouri who make several allusions to colonial politics that, they argue, are being reproduced in contemporary French political decision-taking and are often linked to the Grand Mosque of Paris (Geisser/Zemouri 2007). However, Geisser rather discusses concrete political decisions and situates them historically. He does not focus on the rhetoric of the politician's speeches about the Mosque or on the Mosque leader's concept of Islam.

2 The Socitété des Habous et des lieux saints de l'Islam is an association founded in Algiers in 1917 and originally designed to facilitate the pilgrimage of North and West African Muslims to Mecca and Medina (cf. Sellam 2006, p. 177); it was then made responsible for the Grand Mosque of Paris.

3 The missing sums were collected with the collaboration of the colonial administrations in North and West Africa (cf. Davidson 2007, p. 64-67).

and 1926, the Grand Mosque of Paris was built according to blueprints designed by French architects of the *Service des Beaux Arts, des Antiquités et des Monuments historiques* in Morocco, which were deeply inspired by the fourteenth-century Abou Inan Mosque in Fez (Davidson 2007, p. 77). The building complex of around 7,500m^2 comprised extensive gardens, conference rooms, a library, a hammam, a restaurant, an oriental souk, and a hospital room (idem, p. 81-86). It was inaugurated on July 15th 1926, in the presence of the French State President, Gaston Doumergue, many other local politicians, and delegations from North Africa (cf. Weiss 1927, p. 5-12).

As to the official political discourse, the Grand Mosque of Paris was said to have been constructed as a gesture of thanks to the Muslim soldiers who lost their lives fighting in the French army during the First World War. According to official statistics, approximately 36,000 soldiers of Muslim origin from the Maghreb and around 30,000 from French West Africa were recorded as missing or dead during the First World War (Recham 2006, p. 746). It is, however, questionable that the French state would really invest in a huge Mosque building project just to thank Muslim soldiers. Given the internal and global political constellations of the time, this seems rather unlikely. To name only two reasons: The French government had introduced a law in 1905 for the separation of church and state, prohibiting the state's financial support for any religious community or institution. By the 1920s, the state was still embroiled in huge disputes with the Catholic Church, which had harshly criticized this law (cf. Baubérot 1990, p.80-83) and might have escalated its protests if the state were to assign funds for the building of a Muslim mosque. Furthermore, only a few weeks before the Mosque's inauguration ceremony, France had entered into the North-Moroccan Rif War, deploying chemical weapons, like poisonous gas, that caused far more casualties, including civilians, compared to the number of Muslim soldiers who died for France during the First World War (cf. Sasse 2006, p. 51-54). Against this background, to thank dead Muslim soldiers for their commitment in the World War and to present oneself as a tolerant and grateful colonial power borders on the grotesque. Indeed, looking more closely at the discussions taking place within the French administration of the time, one quickly comes across powerful political reasons that explain the construction of the Mosque.

The French colonial power faced many challenges in the international political scene both during and after the First World War. First of all, the other major powers were wrestling for the loyalty of Muslims on the international level. For example, the military camp leaders in Zossen near Berlin tried to convince North African prisoners of war to follow the Ottoman call for jihad against non-Muslim France during the First World War, carefully demonstrating their commitment to Islamic needs by serving halal food, celebrating Islamic holidays and constructing a mosque

in the camp (cf. Telhine 2010, p. 124f.; Sellam 2006, p. 177). Furthermore, Great Britain, whose ambitions increasingly challenged the French spheres of influence in the Middle East, had erected a mosque in Woking in 1889 (Sellam 2006, p. 177) and planned the inauguration of another in London in 1926, thereby presenting itself as the most important colonial power and the most tolerant towards Muslim culture (cf. Davidson 2007, p. 49; Tibawi 1981, p. 195).

It should be noted, moreover, that the colonial power had increasingly become the subject of severe criticism after the First World War. The French state increasingly feared the emerging nationalist movements in North Africa that had also spread to Paris and were cautiously developing calls for independence (cf. Sellam 2006: 67-72; Telhine 2010, p. 153f.). Even the French population was either becoming disinterested or beginning to question the colonial project, doubting the benefits and the necessity of the French Empire (cf. Deroo 2005, p. 70-72).

Thus, the construction of the Grand Mosque of Paris has to be seen in the wider context of colonial propaganda strategies. Its aim was both to strengthen the loyalties of Muslim elites around the world and to render more visible the French colonial empire for the Parisian population. This becomes apparent in the way the Mosque was designed and exhibited in the years following its inauguration. As mentioned above, the Grand Mosque of Paris was not only conceived as a place for prayer. The connected souks, hammam, oriental restaurant, sickroom, library, conference rooms, and gardens were supposed to offer all the facilities of an "oriental city", but condensed into a very small space, as Robert Raynaud, General Secretary of the Mosque, has stated (Weiss 1927: 78).

During the inauguration ceremonies, the French authorities emphasized many times that the Mosque complex should reproduce a living oriental world and meet the physical, spiritual and intellectual needs of Muslims:

> They [the Muslims] will have, in addition to the Mosque, their *hammam*, their hostel and their infirmary for the needy; but the facilities would be incomplete if they did not ensure the enjoyment of intellect and participation in the arts and sciences. This, together with the organization of conferences, will be the aim of the library where we will collect the most precious books of Islam. (Ben Ghabrit, first Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, in Weiss 1927, p. 61)[4]

4 [all French quotes translated by the author, French original]: «Ils [Muslims] auront, à côté de la Mosquée, leur hammam, leur hôtellerie & leur dispensaire pour les indigents; mais l'oeuvre serait incomplète si elle n'aßurait les joies de l'intelligence & le concours de l'art & de la science. Ce sera, avec l'organisation des conférences, le but de la bibliothèque où nous réunirons les livres les plus précieux de l'islam.»

It should also protect them from getting lost in the modernity of the capital, providing them with the colors, sounds and tastes of their homelands:

> It is thus in this peaceful quarter and in the enormity of our city of Paris that a home will be erected for gatherings and for rest. Far from the turbulence of new and worrying sensations, a Muslim can find himself here, at any time, and reconnect with his holy traditions, maintain a personality that he cares about (Autrand, Prefect of the Seine in ibid., p. 44).[5]

> ... that Muslims find here the forms that delighted their eyes in their homelands, the images of their thousand-year-old civilisation, full of splendour and mystery, both passionate and serious, glistening and composed, and which appears to us as a precious fruit in the distance, as one of the most beautiful jewels in the world (Autrand, Prefect of the Seine, in ibid., p. 45.).[6]

These and other statements given during the inauguration ceremonies show that the Grand Mosque of Paris was meant to illustrate the fundamental otherness of Muslims, who could not get along with the modern, secular French capital, and therefore needed a very different, religious, and "sensual" environment to live in. This conception and portrayal of the "Muslim Orient" was carefully orchestrated in the following years. As Davidson has shown, French media presented the Mosque as a tourist attraction where non-Muslims could experience "the Orient" in a realistic and interactive-way, through its colors and sounds, its art and rituals. This is all reminiscent of the *Expositions Coloniales,* which sought to demonstrate the exotic otherness of the colonized life-worlds for the French population after the First World War (Davidson 2007, p. 87-89).

This staging of Islam and Muslims at the Grand Mosque of Paris was of course anything but innocent. It detracted, for instance, from the complex constellations in Algeria where a young French-speaking elite were increasingly claiming civil rights in return for their engagement in the French Army (cf. Mérad 1999, p. 45-48). It also detracted from the various other political movements already mentioned that had begun to protest the legally and socially discriminatory practices against Muslim North Africans in the colonies and protectorates. Instead of civil rights, the

---

5 «C'est donc en ce quartier paisible que s'élèvera, dans l'immensité de notre Paris, un foyer de recueillement & de repos. Loin du tourbillon des impreßions nouvelles & troublantes, le Musulman pourra, à toute heure, se retrouver lui-même, reßaisir les liens de ses traditions sacrées, maintenir une personnalité qui lui est chère»

6 «… que les Musulmans retrouvent ici les formes qui, dans leur pays natal, ont enchanté leurs yeux, les images de leur civilisation millénaire, pleine d'éclat & de mystère, ardente & grave, brillante & recueillie, & qui nous apparaît à distance comme un fruit précieux, comme un des plus beaux joyaux du monde.»

French government gave them a mosque. This mosque would not only consolidate the French's idea of North Africans being first and foremost religious Muslims; it would also convey Islam as being omnipresent in a Muslim's life – in contrast to modern, secular visions of the world – and would paint Muslims as both apolitical and in need of protection – a protection which the colonial power would provide.

In its initial phase, therefore, the Grand Mosque of Paris can be understood as a product of the French desire to consolidate and stabilize its presence in the African colonies and protectorates.

2.2 Between Algeria and France – The Mosque's History up to the 1990s

Until his death in 1954, the Algerian Abdelkader Ben Ghabrit, first leader of the Grand Mosque of Paris, ensured the institution's loyalty to the French state. His successor, Ahmad Ben Ghabrit (Rector from 1954-1956), allowed Algerian and Moroccan activists to spread anti-colonial propaganda within the walls of the Mosque. Nevertheless, the institution remained an important strategic center for the French Ministry of the Exterior from whence to influence the political situation both in North Africa and France, especially during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) (cf. Davidson 2007, p. 237-241). Thus, to ensure the Mosque's loyalty, the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet removed Ahmad Ben Ghabrit from power in 1957 and, in accordance with advice from the Ministries of the Interior and Exterior, as well as the colonial administrations, replaced him with Hamza Boubakeur (Rector from 1957-1982) (idem., p. 241). The new Rector was politically committed to French rule in Algeria (cf. Telhine 2010, p. 206f.). However, political tensions and judicial uncertainties soon emerged as the Algerian government did not accept the new Francophile leader. They founded a new association in Algiers to administer the Mosque of Paris, and declared the end of Hamza Boubakeur's tenure at the Mosque. At the same time, the *Conseil d'Etat*, the highest administrative court in France, declared the French state's appointment of Hamza Boubakeur as illegal, according to the 1905 law separating church from state. However, with no legal way to appoint a new leader of the Grand Mosque, Boubakeur stayed in post, positioning himself as spokesman for Muslims in France (Boyer 1992, p. 37-42; Telhine 2010, p. 208f.). From the end of the 1970s on, he engaged in negotiations with the Algerian state and tried to bring the Grand Mosque of Paris under Algerian control. These attempts were legally invalid, but when Boubakeur departed in 1982, the Algerian government took over the Mosque's administration (Boyer 1992, 43, Sellam 2006, p. 269, Telhine 2010, p. 212). Since then, Algeria has successfully

maintained its right to possess and administer the Grand Mosque of Paris. Thus, it was Algeria that decided on the appointment of the next two rectors, Abbas Bencheikh el Hocine (1982-1989) and Tedjini Haddam (1989-1992), who were both adherents of the Algerian ruling party, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), before electing Dalil Boubakeur (1992-present), son of Hamza Boubakeur – which was still with the agreement of the French Ministry of Interior (Godard/Taussig 2007, p. 167). The FLN, former enemy of the French-controlled Grand Mosque of Paris, now considered the institution an appropriate place to represent Islam in France and from which to influence the political attitudes of Algerian immigrants inside the Hexagon (Sellam 2006, p. 270f.). In light of the political developments in the 1980s – namely Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979, the rising importance of Algerian Islamism, which stoked fears that anti-French ideologies might spread among Muslim communities in France, and the Rushdie Affair of 1989 – Rector Abbas became acceptable to the French government as well, since his was a discourse of a moderate, tolerant and apolitical Islam (cf. Telhine 2010, p. 219f.). So the Grand Mosque of Paris once again came to stand for a state loyalist, non-violent, non-political Islam, but this time for both France *and* Algeria.

However, the political legitimacy of the Grand Mosque of Paris contrasted sharply with its poor acceptance by other Muslim actors in France. Against the background of guest workers and their families becoming more permanently settled in France, the 1980s saw a rise in the number of Islamic associations and mosques.[7] The so-called *mouvement associatif*, a complex new body composed of many immigrant and Harki associations, converts and student groups, dedicated itself to organizing and representing Islam-related issues (cf. Telhine 2010, p. 271-301), thus challenging the authority of the Grand Mosque of Paris to represent Islam in France. This rivalry reached a peak with the foundation of the umbrella association *Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* (FNMF) in 1985. The FNMF explicitly aimed to marginalize the Grand Mosque of Paris and to represent all Muslims of France on both the local and national levels (cf. Telhine 2010, p. 232-234).

7 This was particularly due to a law adopted in 1981 which allowed persons of foreign nationality but residing in France to found religious or cultural associations (e.g. Telhine 2010, p. 272).

3 The Contemporary Role of the Grand Mosque of Paris within French Politics

3.1 The centralization of the Grand Mosque of Paris during the first half of the 1990s

Since its foundation, the Grand Mosque of Paris has been more of a symbolic institution than a living Islamic center with which a majority of Muslims living in France have identified. This did not change with the growing number of Muslims and Muslim demands in France during the 1980s. Thus far, the Grand Mosque of Paris has drawn its legitimacy from its history and from the importance invested in it by politicians, rather than from its capacity to respond actively to Muslims' concerns or to organize Islamic issues in France.

The question still remains, however, as to what role French politicians attribute to the Mosque nowadays? What does a colonial institution like the Grand Mosque of Paris mean after the independence of the French colonies and protectorates? How can a building that was conceived to demonstrate the exotic otherness of the colonies' life-worlds now play a role when it comes to organizing Islam on a national level and to integrating Muslims as citizens of the wider society?

Looking back at the 1990s, it can be seen that French politicians actively presented the Grand Mosque of Paris as a bastion of a non-political, moderate Islam. In the first half of the 1990s, different terrorist attacks against the French population had provoked heated debates and a general fear of radical Islamic movements in France. Various security measures were implemented by the government and discussed in detail in the media. Thomas Deltombe has demonstrated that French ministers at that time needed a strategic counter-image to combat the media's version of radical Islam: the counter-image of a moderate, non-political Islam, which rejected violence and terrorism (Deltombe 2007, p. 217). Hence, the then Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, sought to revitalize the image of the Grand Mosque of Paris as the main representative of this moderate Islam, as he had done previously from 1986 to 1988, and tried again to promote it publicly as the privileged interlocutor of the French state (cf. Krosigk 2000, p. 229-233). Unlike his predecessor Pierre Joxe (Minister of the Interior from 1989-1991), Pasqua tried rhetorically and politically to marginalize the two other main Muslim organizations, the FNMF and the UOIF. Pasqua also gave the Mosque of Paris a financial edge by issuing a decree that authorized it alone to control the certification of halal meat and to charge a

fee for each kilo of slaughtered meat (Krosigk 2000, p. 233-235)[8] – a right which the umbrella organizations of UOIF and FNMF had claimed in vain.

French members of the Ministry of the Interior have furthermore called for a theological institute at the Grand Mosque of Paris to train French-speaking, well-integrated imams. They have simultaneously tried to hinder the success of the Islamic institute run by the UOIF and partly funded by the Gulf through the denial of visas for students, or by hindering it from becoming an établissement d'enseignement supérieur privé, which would have come with enormous financial advantages. By contrast, the *Institut Musulman de la Grande Mosquée de Paris* opened in October 1993 with grandiose festivities in the presence of Charles Pasqua and Jacques Toubon, the then Culture Minister (ibid., p. 217-221). Letter exchanges from the following years show that members of the Ministry of the Interior persisted in trying to convince the Mosque's leadership on the question of founding and running the theological institute (*AN Institut de Théologie*; *AN Situation de la Mosquée*). However, Rector Dalil Boubakeur and his staff made no attempts to set up the institute (cf. *AN Situation de la Mosquée*; GL Mazurek 2006, p. 30), thereby allowing other Islamic organizations to monopolize the field of Islamic education, which was clearly in demand by many Muslims in France.

These examples point to the huge discrepancy between the French political wish to organize Islam in France and the Mosque's actual engagement with the centralized organization of Islam. Aside from the Mosque's dependence on the Algerian state, this might account for the lack of recognition for the Mosque by other Muslim actors, which became especially visible when Dalil Boubakeur officially presented a *Charte du Culte Musulman* to the Minister of the Interior in 1995. This charter, previously requested by Charles Pasqua, defines the general positions of a "moderate Islam" and describes a conflict-free relationship between this Islam on the one hand and the French Republic and its values on the other; however, it also clearly positions the Grand Mosque of Paris as the centralized head of Islam in France. With a very few exceptions, all Islamic federations in France decided not to sign the charter, thereby rejecting this role attributed to Dalil Boubakeur and the Grand Mosque of Paris (cf. Krosigk 2000, 236-239; Godard 2007, p. 168; Sellam 2006, p. 291).

8 Krosigk assumes a yearly sum of 500,000 FF (75,000 Euros) (Krosigk 2000, p. 235). However , Jean-Louis Debré, Minister of the Interior from 1995-1997, extended the mentioned licences to two other mosques in 1996: the Grand Mosque of Lyon and the Mosque of Evry (ibid., p. 251).

3.2 The creation of the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* in the 2000s

Ten years later, debates about the place of Islam in France reached a new apex. Discussions about the new global character of Islamic terrorism emerged in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in the USA and were soon linked to national debates like the wearing of headscarves in public schools and, more generally, the compatibility of Islam and French republican values, especially *laïcité* (cf. Deltombe 2007, p. 273-315). Once again, agitated debates about the threatening character of (radical) Islam were accompanied by political attempts to better organize a moderate and apolitical Islam of France. However, this time, even if the Grand Mosque of Paris was able to remain an important actor in the organization of Islam in France, it would irreversibly lose its status as the only interlocutor of the state. Instead, first Jean-Pierre Chevènement and later Nicolas Sarkozy dedicated themselves to the foundation of a representative body, gathering all the influential Muslim umbrella organizations, plus various experts (cf. Godard 2007, p. 169-187). To the surprise of many, French political leaders negotiated every association's concrete role and powers within the new body, including representatives of different states like Morocco, Algeria or Turkey. In 2003, the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM, 2003) was created and the presidency awarded to the Grand Mosque of Paris' Rector, Dalil Boubakeur (cf. Boyer 2005). Negotiations conducted by different state representatives thus once again guaranteed the Mosque's pivotal symbolic function for the organization of Islam in France. Likewise, internal reports by members of the Ministry of the Interior document the revival of the French aim to open and successfully run an institute at the Grand Mosque of Paris that would provide an education for imams in France (*AN Structuration du Culte*). Additionally, a renewed contract between France and Algeria officially charged the Grand Mosque of Paris with administering the arrival of up to 100 imams that the Algerian state would send to France for a maximum stay of four years (cf. GL Mazurek 2006, 8f.). Thus active French political engagement once more tried to centralize and maintain the importance of the Grand Mosque of Paris.

However, the institution was subject to a new political strategy. Nicolas Sarkozy revealed a plan for so-called "moderate Islamists", in particular those represented by the UOIF, to be included in the process of organizing Islamic issues in France, for two reasons: they should thereby feel more accepted and consequently develop more moderate stances; and they should at the same time become allies in the fight against more radical movements, such as some branches of Salafism (cf. Sarkozy 2004; p. 84; Geisser/Zemouri 2007, p. 115-118). Thus, for Nicolas Sarkozy and for other political leaders, the Grand Mosque of Paris remained the "republican pole"

within the representation of Islam in France. It continued to stand for a more moderate version of Islam (cf. Sarkozy 2004, 72), but this time was forced to share its representative role with moderate "Islamist versions" of Islam, without these terms being clearly defined. Another important issue, however, consisted of the appropriate involvement of different ethnic communities in the CFCM: while the *Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France* (CCMTF) represented Turkish Muslims, the *Fédération Française des Associations Islamiques d'Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles* (FFAIACA) those from Western African countries, the Comoros and the Antilles, and the *Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* (FNMF) those from Morocco, a representative body of Islam in France cannot possibly be organized without the Grand Mosque of Paris, which primarily represents Muslims of Algerian origin in France.

Already in the preceding decades, the Grand Mosque of Paris had become an Algerian-led institution, where mainly Algerian Muslims gathered. However, if the institution had remained representative in public discourse of "all moderate Muslims in France", there was now a discursive shift concurrent with the creation of the CFCM. This was related to the Grand Mosque's self-representation during that time: the complex electoral system which determined the composition of some of the council's bodies consistently exposed the marginality of the Mosque among Muslim actors in France. After the devastating election results of 2003 and again in 2005 (cf. Godard/Taussig 2007, p. 175f., 185), the Grand Mosque of Paris prepared for the forthcoming election periods by mobilizing the *Amicales Algériennes*, former FLN-led networks whose aim was to ensure the loyalty of Algerians in France to the Algerian state (idem., p. 184). The Mosque of Paris thus played the "Algerian card", convincing Algerians to vote for them because they were Algerians – and not because they would sustain a politically created "moderate Islam." The newspapers reflected this situation and increasingly described the Grand Mosque of Paris as "close to Algeria" (*proche de l'Algérie*), "linked to Algeria" (*lié à l'Algérie*), and financed by Algeria ("*finance par l'Algérie*").[9]

9 Cf. e.g. Larminat, Astrid de. 30.04.2002. Sous la pression de la Grande Mosquée de Paris. L'élection du Conseil des Musulmans de France ajournée. Le Figaro ; Maréchal, Elie. 07.10.2002. Islam de France: Sarkozy pour une représentation équilibrée. Le Figaro ; Ludovic, Thomas. 04.04.2003. L'islam organisé ou encadré ? L'Humanité ; Portes, Thierry.14.10.2003. Le Conseil francais du culte musulman pris au piège du voile islamique, Le Figaro ; Rousseau, Yann. 4./5.04.2003. Pour la première fois, l'islam de France désigne ses représentants. Les Echos ; Deloire, Christophe/ Corderlier, Jérôme.30.09.2004. Zizanie chez les musulmans français. Le Point ; Lemieu, Emmanuel/Perdreau, Stéphanie.13.07.2006. Enquête – pouvoirs spirituels (5/5). Le Nouvel Economiste ; Gabizon, Cécilia.16./17.10.2004. L'islam de France cherche à sortir de la crise. Le Figaro ;Gabizon,

By reorganizing the institutionalization of Islam in France from the early 2000s onward, the French government thus contributed to a redefinition of the role of the Grand Mosque, which has not changed considerably since then.

However, the role attributed to the Grand Mosque of Paris remains complex. Whereas the institution has become one among many that legitimately participate in the official organization of Islam in France, and whereas this institution is often associated with Algeria or even "Algerian Islam" in public discourse today, the Mosque nevertheless remains a place where colonial history and colonial argumentative patterns are maintained – by French politicians as well as by the Mosque's leadership. This will all be demonstrated and analyzed below.

3.3 French political leaders and colonial rhetoric at the Grand Mosque of Paris

French presidents, prime ministers, ministers of the interior and local political leaders keep gravitating towards the Grand Mosque of Paris, for example to participate in fast breaking during Ramadan or to officially address "the Muslim community of France" on other occasions such as anniversaries of the end of the World Wars or the foundation of the Mosque of Paris. The Mosque thus continues to constitute a symbolic place where the relationships between French politicians and Muslims in France are officially defined and made audible for a broader audience. However, the speeches delivered by French politicians at the Grand Mosque of Paris are hardly free from a political agenda. For instance, in the 1990s, Charles Pasqua and Jacques Chirac both maintained a version of history deeply embedded in the above-mentioned colonial power discourses.

On May 2nd, 1995, during a speech given at the Mosque of Paris on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, Charles Pasqua reminded his audience that Muslim soldiers had demonstrated great commitment to France and thus contributed to the victory (*AN Mosquée de Paris/Allocution Pasqua*, p. 2). Moreover, he referred to the Grand Mosque of Paris as a symbolic place, citing colonial leaders of the 1920s who, he claimed, wanted to build the Mosque to commemorate and thank Muslim soldiers who heroically demonstrated their commitment to France during World War I (idem., p. 2f.). Similarly, in a speech at the Grand Mosque on December 7th, 1992, the 70th anniversary of its inauguration, President Jacques

Cécilia. 21.03.2005. Mosquées et formation des imams: le pari de la transparence. Le Figaro ; Portes, Thierry. 18.06.2005. Les musulmans de France élisent leurs représentants dans la discorde. Le Figaro.

Chirac called it a place of both prayer and remembrance. He then emphasized that Muslims became a part of French history when fighting for France during the World Wars and that this dedication to the fatherland should teach the French population to respect them:

> The request of its [the Grand Mosque's] founders was that it should become at the same time a place for prayer and memory, in remembrance of the Muslim soldiers, Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, Senegalese, who died for France during the Great War and who, by their sacrifice, acquired for their coreligionists the means to practice their religious in the heart of Paris. I am thinking above all of these soldiers, whose memory the Grand Mosque of Paris preserves […]. In these difficult moments that the Muslim community in France is currently experiencing, just some days after the abhorrent profanation of Mulhouse, it seems important to me to recall what our country owes them and the role they have played in our history (AN Mosquée de Paris/Discours Chirac).[10]

This explicit causality between the postulated readiness of Muslim soldiers to die for France on the one hand, and the respect the population owes them on the other, is clearly incompatible with commonly accepted ideas about the French Nation and Republic: the latter usually start from the basic principle that each citizen belongs to and participates in the Nation independently and without any prior payment or service.

Chirac also added that the Grand Mosque represents a tolerant and moderate Islam, far from any type of religious fanaticism (ibid., 6). However, this demonstrated "acceptance of a moderate Islam" which has "earned its place in France", does not equate to its recognition as a full part of France. The *communauté musulmane de la France*, addressed in the citation above, rather reiterates the idea of a clearly distinguishable group, to whom France owes respect while staying apart from it.

The same can be seen with regard to much more recent political declarations. For example, on November 11th, 2010, which marked the First World War Armistice, Hervé Morin, the then Minister of Defense, unveiled a stela at the Grand Mosque of Paris and dedicated it to the Muslim Soldiers who lost their lives for France

10 «Le souhait de ses fondateurs [of the Grand Mosque of Paris] était qu'elle fût à la fois un lieu de prière et de mémoire, en hommage aux soldats musulmans, Marocains, Algériens, Tunisiens, Sénégalais, morts pour la France au cours de la Grande Guerre et qui, par leur sacrifice, avaient acquis, pour les leurs, au cœur de Paris, les moyens de leur pratique religieuse. C'est à tous ces soldats, dont la Grande Mosquée de Paris conserve le souvenir, que je pense d'abord […].Dans ces moments difficiles que connaît actuellement la communauté musulmane de la France, quelques jours seulement après l'odieuse profanation de Mulhouse, il me paraît important de rappeler ce que leur doit notre pays, et la part prise à son histoire».

during the two World Wars. He referred to Gaston Doumergue, who in the 1920s had pointed to the history of Muslim-French friendship, and then explained that the Nation does not forget any of their children lost in the War. Despite the promise of equal respect and recognition, the idea of different groups is still perpetuated:

> In this place of worship where President Gaston Doumergue recalled the French-Muslim friendship and reaffirmed that the Republic protects all faiths, we want to say to them that the Nation does not forget any of its children who died in battle. To all of them, whether French in origin, French at heart, or French by the shedding of blood, it expresses the same respect, the same recognition [...] (www Allocution Hervé Morin).[11]

Thus, Morin refers both to the French and to those who first needed to shed their blood to become French. The latter are described in an alluring oriental image, further strengthening their otherness:

> In the middle of two cruel and murderous conflicts, they left the land of their fathers to answer the call of the Republic and its universal values. They took up their weapons to defend this France that they loved [...].
> During each assault, during each combat, disciplined to fire as to manoeuvers, ardent in the attack, tenacious in defense, they proved themselves worthy of General Maunoury's praise and distinguished by their military quality.
> They will never again see the snow of the mountains, the barren beauty of the great sand dunes, and the sweetness of the oasis. Never again will the call of the muezzin ring in their ears (ibid.).[12]

In summary, the conceptualization of the Grand Mosque of Paris as a place of remembrance for the Muslim war victims is still topical. But instead of a critical perspective on the colonial discourse of the 1920s, the latter is cited and reproduced in spite of its highly problematic construction of history, as has been explained

---

11 «Dans ce lieu de culte où le président Gaston Doumergue rappela l'amitié franco-musulmane et réaffirma que la République protège toutes les croyances, nous voulons leur dire que la Nation n'oublie aucun de ses enfants tombés au champ d'honneur. A tous, Français d'origine, Français de cœur et Français par le sang versé, elle exprime le même respect, la même reconnaissance [...].»

12 «Au cœur de deux conflits cruels et meurtriers, ils avaient quitté la terre de leurs pères pour répondre à l'appel de la République et de ses valeurs universelles. Ils avaient pris les armes pour défendre cette France qu'ils aimaient.» «Dans chaque assaut, dans chaque combat, disciplinés au feu comme à la manœuvre, ardents dans l'attaque, tenaces dans la défense», ils s'étaient montrés dignes de cet éloge du général Maunoury et distingués par leur valeur militaire». «Jamais plus ils ne reverraient les neiges du djebel, l'austère beauté du grand erg et la douceur des oasis. Jamais plus l'appel du muezzin ne résonnerait à leurs oreilles.» (ibid.).

above. France's top politicians reproduce the vision of a generous France that realizes the contribution of Muslims and kindly shows its gratitude, this time by the dedication of war memorials and ceremonies of remembrance. They thereby maintain alluring descriptions of the life-worlds of Muslims and therefore also, albeit implicitly, the vision of their otherness.

But how has the Mosque represented itself since the 1990s? How does the institution's public policy align itself with politicians' expectations and at the same time cope with Algerian demands?

4 The Grand Mosque of Paris and its self-representation towards non-Muslims

4.1 Activities at the Grand Mosque of Paris

The Grand Mosque of Paris is involved in the organization and representation of various Islam-related issues in France, even though its impact can be considered rather low, as already mentioned. Beside the above-mentioned administration of up to 100 imams sent from Algeria, it also runs its own halal label (cf. Godard 2015, p. 25-27), contributes to the dominical airtime on French public TV (an honor accorded to the main religious communities in France), and its members participate in various think tanks for the CFCM, including those on the organization and education of imams and Muslim pastoral workers in hospitals, prisons and the military, control and supply of halal products, and the annual pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca (cf. Godard/Taussig 2007, p. 173). In addition to this engagement with Islamic issues on a national and structural level, the Mosque complex itself offers various religious and cultural activities, attracting different audiences. The use of the 7,500m^2 building space differs only slightly from its original purpose.

Thus, the tourist center, consisting of a *hammam*, a restaurant serving North African dishes, a tea room famous for its mint tea and Algerian pastries, and a small souk selling North African handicrafts, books and religious items, are frequented primarily by the non-Muslim Parisian public and international tourists. Adjacent and accessible through another entrance is the *Institut Al-Ghazali*; re-inaugurated in 2003 and operative since approximately 2006-7, it provides education for imams in terms of four or five years and for Muslim pastoral workers over terms of two

years.[13] The Algerian embassy provides Arabic language courses for children and adults, which also take place inside the institute. Beyond its walls, various other lessons are organized, such as religious education classes for children, lessons for converts, and women's circles for memorizing the Koran. Finally, the Mosque of Paris comprises a very large prayer room, which accommodates up to 600 Muslims every Friday and, with the use of an adjacent atrium, even more on Muslim holidays. Bordering the atrium are the following: wash rooms; another small library; a large conference room; a number of offices; cultural and religious service rooms where one can, for example, sign up for Arabic lessons, convert to Islam, register for Islamic marriage ceremonies, or ask for advice on Islamic legal and behavioral questions; and finally a small shop where tourists can buy copies of the Koran, francophone books on the Mosque's history, and entrance tickets to visit the Mosque's little library, atrium, gardens, and prayer room. Last but not least, the large building complex comprises the living area, where one can find the private apartments and guest rooms of the Mosque's Rector Dalil Boubakeur and his family.

The number of employees required to run the different sections of the Grand Mosque of Paris is extremely high. The list includes various imams and muezzins, members of a theological board that issues Fatwas as required, religious and language teachers, public speakers, press spokesmen, lawyers, secretaries and other administrative staff, guards, cooks, salesmen and tourist guides. Lastly, the Mosque Rector Dalil Boubakeur is assisted by a multi-headed management team, appointed by the Algerian state, who take important decisions in conjunction with Algerian state members.

4.2 A short biography of Dalil Boubakeur (Rector of the Mosque since 1992)

Dalil Boubakeur, born in the north-east Algerian coastal town Skikda in 1940, underwent his education in elite French schools in Algeria and later in France.[14] A qualified doctor since the 1980s, he was also introduced to the affairs of the Grand Mosque of Paris by his father Hamza Boubakeur, the then Rector (Boyer 1992: 50). Unlike some of his predecessors, Boubakeur had no classical Islamic education and, among Muslim intellectuals, is not recognized as a Muslim scholar. He derives

13 This and the subsequent information is drawn from data collected during my field work at the Grand Mosque of Paris in 2008-9.

14 Boubakeur visited the French-speaking Lycée Bugeaud in Alger and the Louis-le-Grand in Paris (Godard/Taussig 2007, p. 258).

his authority and political influence partly from his descent from the *Sidi Ouled Cheikh*, a powerful brotherhood-tribe-confederation of South Algeria that played an ambiguous role in the Algerian War of Independence and has been re-evaluated by the Algerian state in the last few decades (cf. Telhine 2010, p. 206, Noyer 1901). Nevertheless, Dalil Boubakeur, with mastery of both French language and French intellectual history, is an ideal candidate to reassure the French public of the Mosque's moderate and Francophile orientation. During his time as Rector, Boubakeur has developed extensive activities in publishing and public relations, through which he regularly reaffirms his vision of a moderate and Republic-compatible Islam for a French audience. Boubakeur often makes public appearances when intense debates on Islam in France surface, and then reaffirms the need for an enlightened Islam that is apolitical and accepts the values of the French Republic.[15]

Boubakeur shows no sign of being anchored in a specific Islamic tradition or Muslim scholarly discourse. His rhetoric is entirely independent of the traditions taught at the Mosque and particularly at the *Institut Al-Ghazali* where teachers are more embedded in the classic positions of the Sunni-Maliki school of law and its reformist reinterpretations.[16] Nevertheless, Boubakeur significantly defines the public image of the Grand Mosque of Paris for the non-Muslims of France. His argumentation is thus an important voice within the public debates on Islam's role in France and will therefore be presented critically below.

15 For example, in the case of the above-mentioned debates on Islamism of the mid-1990s, he published the *Charte du Culte Musulman* (Boubakeur 1995), and during the foundation of the CFCM and the agitated debates on the compatibility of Islam with the French *laïcité*, he provided the population with a series of books on the situation of Islam in France: *Les défis de l'Islam* (Boubakeur 2002), *Non! L'Islam n'est pas une politique* (Boubakeur 2003a), *L'appel au dialogue. Juifs et musulmans de France* (Boubakeur 2003b), *L'Islam de France sera liberal* (Boubakeur 2004). Again, in 2014, amid the escalating debates on French jihadists leaving for Syria, he published *La Grande Mosquée de Paris. Un message et une histoire* (Boubakeur 2014). Similarly, following the deadly attacks on the staff of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and the Jewish supermarket Hyper Cacher on January7th, 2015, he issued *Dalil Boubakeur et Philippe Duley. Lettre ouverte aux Français. L'appel du recteur de la Mosquée de Paris* (Boubakeur/Duley 2015).

16 The positions and teachings of the *Institut Al-Ghazali* differ from teacher to teacher. Hence, in what concerns Islamic law, one can find more traditional versions of Maliki Law, but also interpretations in light of Algerian Reformism (as represented by Ibn Badis), or more recent interpretations, as for example presented by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and others. With regard to Islamic belief (*ʿaqīda*), there is a range of references reaching from classic Sunni interpretations like *Al-ʾAšʿarī* to *ʾIbn Ṭaymīyya*; some of which reject, while others approve of Sufi stances.

4.3 Dalil Boubakeur's political rhetoric in the 1990s and the 2000s

Boubakeur's statements in the 1990s read like a perfect response to the demands of the Minister of the Interior of the time, Charles Pasqua, and could be seen as indicative of the absolute harmony and unanimity between French political concerns and representatives of moderate Islam in France. However, on closer analysis one soon discovers the political benefit for Boubakeur in his adoption of the rhetoric of the contemporary political discourse. For example, in internal letters addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, the Rector points to the growing influence of global Islamic fundamentalism in France and warns against its destabilizing effect on the Muslim community in France:

> The situation, without being critical, is nevertheless serious. International fundamentalists and extremists are making combined efforts in FRANCE to destabilize a community that is for the most part moderate as long as it is administered by the Imams of the GMP (AN Etat de l'islam en France).[17]

> The critical political situation in Algeria is in danger of severely affecting our country at any moment (ibid.).[18]

Boubakeur then presents the Grand Mosque of Paris as the only institution capable of averting that danger, because it ensures the moderate nature of the Muslim community in France.[19]

In the 2000s, Dalil Boubakeur maintained the same discourse. In 2003 and 2005, he tried to boycott the elections of the newly created CFCM, threatening not to stand as a candidate (cf. Godard/Taussig 2007, p. 176f.; Telhine p. 330). In 2008, the Grand Mosque of Paris effectively decided to withdraw its candidacy and the position of President went to the Moroccon Mohammed Moussaoui before it was given back

17 «La situation, sans être critique, est néanmoins grave. Les menées internationales fondamentalistes, intégristes et extremists conjuguent leurs efforts en FRANCE, pour déstabiliser une communauté majoritairement modérée lorsqu'elle est encadrée par les Imams de la GMP»(*AN Etat de l'islam en France*).

18 «La situation politique critique de l'Algérie risque à tout moment d'avoir des effets très graves dans notre pays» (ibid.).

19 It is of note that the blamed fundamentalist movements are not defined in any detail, but they are nevertheless associated in one place with a Wahhabi reading of Islam (AN Boubakeur/Etat de l'Islam en France) and indirectly though not explicitly related to the Grand Mosque's two big competitors, the UOIF and the FNMF.

to Dalil Boubakeur in 2011.[20] In his rhetoric, Boubakeur consistently refers to the politically generated distinction between a moderate and a radical Islam, claiming that he, sole representative of a moderate Islam, would certainly be crushed by the Islamist dominance within the council (Peter/Arigita 2006, p.11; Deltombe 2007, p. 325.). He accuses the other Islamic federations participating in the council, and especially the UOIF, of representing a fundamentalist Islam (cf. Boyer 2005, p. 17; Peter/Arigita 2006, p. 11). When Boubakeur decided to stay within the council in 2003, he finally declared that he did not want to abandon the council to its fate but wanted to continue the fight against Islamic fundamentalism (Gabizon, 17.06.2003; Ternisien 17.06.2003; Gabizon 28./29./06.2003).

Alongside various press statements, Boubakeur published two collections of interviews: *Non! L'islam n'est pas une politique* (2003) and *L'Islam de France sera liberal* (2004) where he again criticized the structure of the CFCM, pointed to the war taking place between radical and moderate Islam in France, and repeated that the Grand Mosque of Paris is the most effective institution in the fight against radical Islam.

> Since about ten years, it seems as if the watchword of the decision-makers, the media, and diplomacy has been to weaken the Mosque of Paris, and this has defined their actions and their thinking […] Thereby, artificially and falsely mesmerized by this institution, one central fact was forgotten: the silent progress of the radical threat which benefits from the stir that is continuously caused around the Mosque. If today we can recognize that it is the surest institutional safeguard against the aberrations of Islamism […] then the commitment to the Mosque of Paris, loyal and unalterable in its mission, is of national interest (Boubakeur 2003a, p.103).[21]

---

20 It is not completely clear how the decisions on the participation of the Grand Mosque of Paris were taken. However, various sources indicate that the political leaders in France and especially in Algeria had a decisive impact on Boubakeurs's final decision. Geisser/Zemouri show that, since 2003, Algerian consulates have been trying to convince the French government to abolish the elections of the CFCM and to appoint the representatives of Islam in France unilaterally (Geisser/Zemouri 2007, p. 66). However, internal reports of the French Ministry of Interior show that French politicians tried to convince the Algerian government to cooperate with them with regards to the CFCM (AN Structuration du Culte). They further show that at least in 2001, the Algerian government gave Boubakeur the instructions to not delay the foundation process of the CFCM (ibid.).

21 «Depuis une dizaine d'années, tout se passait comme si un mot d'ordre d'affaiblir la Mosquée de Paris avait caractérisé l'action et la réflexion des décideurs, des medias, de la diplomatie… Par là meme, en s'hypnotisant de manière artificielle et fausse sur cette institution, on en a oublié un fait essential: le progrès silencieux de la menace radicaliste qui profite des clameurs entretenues bêtement autour de la Mosquée. Alors qu'aujourd'hui on peut constater qu'elle est le plus sûr garant institutionnel contre les

It can therefore be said that Boubakeur manifestly exploits the security concerns of political leaders and the population as a whole to justify the urgent re-centralization of the Mosque of Paris. Most interestingly, Boubakeur argues that the French state should administer and intervene in the administration of Islam in France (Boubakeur 2003a, p. 106f.), justifying this state control as follows:

> I detect here, by the way, the great virtues of the state and the visions of the French, experts in Islam: from Marshal Lyautey to Charles Pasqua, Jacques Chirac and of course Nicolas Sarkozy. I state that, due to these latter men, the legacy of General de Gaulle continues to raise France in the esteem of those who are hopeful for her, especially Muslims (Boubakeur 2003a, p. 107).[22]

This quote pays tribute to the policy of Maréchal Lyautey, an important agent in the pacification of Morocco, who also participated in the Grand Mosque's inauguration ceremonies. Lyautey made strong contributions to the exoticization of Muslim (and especially Moroccan) civilization (cf. Théliol 2009) and to colonial propagandist activities aiming to expose the life-worlds of colonized peoples to the French public (cf. Bancel/Blanchard/Vergès 2003, p. 111). In the above, Dalil Boubakeur puts this colonial agent on par with contemporary French politicians: they all are presented as experts on Islam and as being held in esteem by Muslims in France; they thus appear as legitimate administrators of Islamic issues.

Interestingly, it is, in the 2000s, not representatives of the French state but rather a Muslim leader himself who maintains the link with colonial politics in order to argue for the importance of the Grand Mosque of Paris.

The question remains, however, as to whether it is this rhetoric alone – concerned with French politics and inspired by the need to strengthen the Mosque's place within Islam in France – that is permeated by colonial arguments? To answer this question, let us now consider some selected points concerning the more general concept of Islam that Boubakeur defends.

---

derives de l'islamisme […]… ce recours à la Mosque de Paris, fidèle et immuable en sa mission, est d'intérêt national» (Boubakeur 2003a, p.103).

22 «Je retrouve bien là, par ailleurs, les grandes vertus de l'Etat et les visions de Français, connaisseurs de l'Islam: depuis le maréchal Lyautey jusqu'à Charles Pasqua, Jacques Chirac et naturellement Nicolas Sarkozy. Je remarque que, par ces derniers hommes, l'héritage du général de Gaulle continue de porter la France dans l'estime de tous ceux qui espèrent en elle, notamment les musulmans» (Boubakeur 2003a, p. 107).

4.4 Dalil Boubakeur's notion of Islam

Boubakeur claims in his publications that Islam is a *religion* and should not be extended to worldly and political affairs (Boubakeur 2003a, p. 17, 104). Elsewhere, he defines religion as an initiation into spiritual values (*une voie d'initiation aux valeurs spirituelles*; Boubakeur 2003a, p. 177), as a path to the understanding of one's self (*une connaissance de soi-même*, ibid.), as a source of meaning for one's life (*donne sens à la vie*, ibid.), as experience (*expérience*, ibid.; p. 178), and above all as a spiritual attitude (*une attitude spirituelle*, Boubakeur 2004, p. 27) or an "inner life" (*une vie intérieure*, ibid.). Boubakeur blames those Muslims who extend the meaning of religion to worldly issues and use "Islam", for example, to establish social justice in regions of economic crisis (Boubakeur 2003a, 24f.), stating that one can deduce general moral values from the Koran, but not types of government (ibid., 45). Boubakeur explicitly demands a definition of Islam that parallels and remains within the borders of the French Republic's notion of religion, especially as defined against the core value of "*laïcité*" (Boubakeur 2003a, p. 104). Without explaining more concretely how he understands this notion of religion defined by *laïcité* (which in itself is highly contested and subject to many and varied interpretations), by this declaration, Boubakeur positions himself as a defender of the French Republic's values, assuring the French public that the feared political versions of Islam are at odds with the nature of Islam, or, to put it another way, that authentic Islam is perfectly compatible with the French Republic.

In other parts of his publications, however, Boubakeur suggests a different conceptualization of Islam that adds another dimension to the discussion around the compatibility of Islam and the French Republic. He stresses that Islam is *not* only a religion, but a dogma, a law, an attitude to life and a civilization that has produced its own art, culture, philosophy and science (e.g., Boubakeur 2002, p. 12; Boubakeur 2004, p. 99). Islam, in this perspective, does not distinguish between earthly and celestial issues:

> I would like to say that I do not draw any difference between Islam, Muslims, history, civilization, religion, etc. They are all part of a whole, just as Islam does not greatly differentiate between worldly, celestial, communal and civilizing elements (2004b, p. 95-96).[23]

23 «Je tiens à dire que je ne fais aucune différence entre l'islam, les musulmans, l'Histoire, la civilisation, la religion, etc. Il s'agit de tout un ensemble puisque l'islam ne fait pas de grandes différences entre l'élément mondain, céleste, communautaire et civilisateur».

Moreover, Boubakeur attributes the idea of Islam as a religion to a Judeo-Christian perspective and claims that Muslims should abandon this perspective in order to return to an understanding that has developed within Islam itself (Boubakeur 2002, 12f.). This understanding is detailed as containing both a dogmatic-religious approach and a secular approach (*une approche séculière*, ibid., p. 13): "It has its origins in moral and political thinking, indeed, but also in the scientific, medical, mathematical… " (ibid.).[24]

Boubakeur's book *Les défis de l'Islam*, published in 2002, tries to give an overview of this secular approach to Islam as a "civilization." Islamic civilization is defined in essence by core values such as tolerance, humanism, openness towards people of different faiths, openness to foreign cultures (e.g., Greek and Persian elements and sciences), as well as by the high position it accords to reason, reason's compatibility with faith, rationalism, logical thinking, and finally the promotion of philosophy, the sciences and arts. This last, he argues, has always entailed the rejection of determinism, political absolutism, religious dogmatism, and prioritizing the past, but above all it has meant a refusal to interpret the world only through the lenses of theology (cf. Boubakeur 2002, p. 12f., 24, 29, 57, 61-65, 67, 83, 91-94, 100, 111-113, 158f., 169). According to Boubakeur, this civilization traces its origins to the values defined by the Prophet Mohammed and the community of Medina (ibid. p. 24f.), and culminated in the Abbasid Empire (ibid., p. 57, 76) with a later offshoot in Muslim Andalusia (ibid., p. 81f.); it was then also revived by reformist thinkers such as Mohammed Iqbal, Jalal al-Din Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh from the Nineteenth Century onward (ibid., p. 151f., 157, 160).

In the context of these explanations, Boubakeur does not distinguish between the religious institutions that define religious values and the non-religious components of society. Rather, Mohammed as the founder of the Islamic faith appears as the founder of Islamic civilization as well. According to Boubakeur therefore, the "religious-dogmatic" and the "secular approach", as delineated according to Eurocentric notions, appear to be intrinsically *one* from an Islamic perspective.

With regard to Islam in France, Boubakeur requires the Muslims living in France to adopt this same civilization. He ends *Les défis de l'Islam* with an invitation to Muslims in France to rehabilitate an "*Islam des Lumières*" and to revive the core values of this Islamic civilization:

> This long cavalcade through centuries of Islamic flourishing would be in vain if it did not aim at inviting Muslims today to ascend the peaks of intellect where their fathers

24 «celle-ci relève d'une pensée morale et politique, certes, mais aussi scientifique, médicale, mathématique...».

> respired. (…). Look at what our ancestors accomplished; do you want to make liars of them? Then, together, let us roll up our sleeves and get down to business. There is so much to do to inspire Islamic civilization again with the energy, the ambition, the force to welcome that it seems to lack so cruelly (ibid., p. 165).[25]

There is a very questionable genealogical connection postulated here between the bearers of Muslim civilization on the Arabian Peninsula and the Abbasid Empire on the one hand and the – mostly North African – Muslims living in France today on the other. Moreover, this civilization is referred to as an *Arabic*-Muslim civilization (ibid., p. 65-67, 76), thus subsuming all Muslims living in France under a supposed Arab identity. Through the lens of history, these attributions can rapidly be deconstructed: the arts and sciences flourishing under the rule of the Abbasids can barely be characterized as "Arabic" and Muslims in France are not all Arab in origin. Even when speaking about Muslims of North African origin, their designation as Arab excludes the many Berbers living in France. Algerian politicians have tried to define the Algerian national identity as an Arabic identity that includes all Berbers, but this political line has been very much contested by the Berbers themselves in the last decades (Mengedoht 1997, p. 92).

Boubakeur's concept of an Islamic-Arabic civilization, however, is highly political in another sense: Even though the suggested essence of Arabic civilization is declared as being perfectly compatible with the values of so-called "French civilization" (cf. (Boubakeur 2004a, p. 46f.), both constitute distinguishable entities. The Islamic-Arabic civilization as described by Boubakeur is characterized by a tolerance and openness that entails a positive attitude towards French civilization, with which it shares many core values. While this may mean that Muslims in France do not cause problems, the differences between the two civilizations mean that they do not identify with the idea of France, French civilization or its values. Boubakeur upholds the image of a civilization whose values and traits continue to affect its adherents deeply. Against the background of the terrorist attacks in January 2015, Boubakeur explains that Muslims in France really want to re-connect with the authenticity of their civilization and sees the solution for the contemporary problems in the revitalizing of this big civilization's values:

---

25 «Cette longue chevauchée à travers des siècles d'efflorescence de l'Islam serait vaine si elle n'avait pour but d'inviter les Musulmans d'aujourd'hui à se hisser à leur tour vers les sommets de l'intellect où respirèrent leurs Pères. (...). Voyez ce qu'ont accompli nos ancêtres; voulez-vous les faire mentir? Alors, ensemble, retroussons nos manches et mettons-nous au travail. Il y a tant à faire pour insuffler de nouveau à la civilisation islamique l'énergie, l'ambition, la force d'accueil qui me paraissent lui faire si cruellement défaut».

> They ask for it [civil participation]. They simply want to get back to authenticity, to the tradition of wisdom and philosophy, to the historical richness of their civilization, their past and their prestige. And it is urgent. Back then, there was an Islam that conveyed universal values, of science and peace, that he has often described as an "enlightened Islam", according to an expression by Jacques Berque. This was the Islam that reconnected with its tradition of knowledge, wisdom, philosophy and human sciences. Will the clouds dispel? In any case, many desire the return of this vision of an Islam that lights up the world and illuminates thinking (Boubakeur 2015, p. 21f.).[26]

The tension between "difference" on the one hand, and complete compatibility on the other is rooted in the colonial discourse of the 1920s. Since the inauguration of the Grand Mosque of Paris, both Muslim and non-Muslim representatives have frequently referred to Muslim and French civilizations as being fundamentally different in their traditions and their attitudes to life; but the two civilizations have at the same time been presented as being fundamentally the same with regard to their core values (cf. Davidson 2007, p. 71f.). Hence, such French politicians as the State President Gaston Doumergue have clearly attempted to stress Islam's compatibility with equality, liberty and tolerance (ibid., p. 72). There has also been the wish to show that compatibility with French values does not mean abandoning Islam (ibid., 74). Furthermore, the Grand Mosque of Paris itself was conceived as the place to represent the Islamic-Arabic civilization in its authenticity and at the same time make it possible for these two big civilizations to meet and learn from each other. The Grand Mosque of Paris, as Davidson has exposed, has thus been a place where compatibility and sameness have been stressed at the same time as the above-mentioned fundamental otherness, which is rooted in a created image of Moroccan-Oriental aesthetics and reinforces the impossibility of completely integrating Muslims into French society (ibid., 59).

Alongside the postulated compatibility of an Islamic and a French civilization, Boubakeur also stresses the mental and aesthetic differences that both civilizations produce, arguing that they could learn from, and in this way complement each other:

> What is important is that one and the other, Algeria and France, France and Algeria, complete each other wonderfully. They respectively embody the most loveable Ori-

26 «Ils la demandent [the civil participation]. Ils veulent simplement revenir à l'authenticité, à la tradition de sagesse et de philosophie, à la richesse historique de leur civilization, de leur passé et de leur prestige. Et il y a urgence. Autrefois, il existait un islam porteur de valeurs universelles, de science et de paix, qu'on a souvent qualifié d'islam des Lumières, selon l'expression de Jacques Berque. C'était l'islam qui renouait avec sa tradition de connaissances, de sagesse, de philosophie et de sciences humaines. Est-ce qu'une éclaircie va arriver? Beaucoup souhaitent en tout cas le retour de cette vision d'un islam éclairant le monde, éclairant la reflexion».

> ent and the less brutal Occident. That is way I remain persuaded that this alliance of the two shores of the Mediterranean could finally, and almost entirely, seal this encounter between Orient and Occident that so many wise people have been calling for for centuries (Boubakeur 2002, p173-4.).[27]

Algeria is thus subsumed under the category of "Orient" as opposed to the "Occident" to which France belongs. Boubakeur repeats the idea of a world divided into two parts, and then adds typical stereotypes concerning the character of the Orient and Occident. For example, he describes the French cultural attitude as one of rational thinking, as being cold, and rigorously demanding that people fulfill their obligations (2003a: 143f.). He then contrasts it with the aesthetics of North Algeria and the rough south Algerian Sahara, suggesting nostalgia, magic, bright colors and infinite space (ibid.). Just like some French intellectuals in the beginning of the Twentieth Century (even though their stances did not influence the dominant political discourse of the time), Boubakeur points especially to the spiritual, human and cultural enrichment that Islamic civilization could bring to France (cf. Boubakeur 2004a, p. 106f.), thereby suggesting that Islam could contribute to saving the West from the dangers of materialism and rationalism:

> With the advent of the reign of quantity, the world has turned upside down; it is now up to Islam, as it seems to me, to provide relief. And it is in the confluences of an "Orient of Wisdom" and an "Occident of Impatience" that we have to find the means to save man from the dangers imposed on him by materialism and rationalism, which are pictured as the ultimate goal (Boubakeur 2002, p. 160f.).[28]

In this way, Boubakeur not only argues for solving the problems arising from the presence of Muslims in France; he moreover attributes an important role to Islam, claiming it could be indispensable for contemporary French society. In doing so, Boubakeur lends his voice to the long-standing critique of materialism and the lack of spirituality in the Occident.

---

27 «L'important, c'est que l'une et l'autre, Algérie et France, France et Algérie, se complètent à merveille. Elles incarnent respectivement l'Orient le plus aimable et l'Occident le moins brutal. Aussi demeuré-je persuadé que cette alliance des deux rives de la Méditérranée pourrait, à peu de chose près, sceller enfin cette rencontre entre l'Orient et l'Occident que tant de sages, depuis tant de siècles, auront appelée de leurs vœux».

28 «Avec l'avènement du règne de la quantité, le monde s'est mis à marcher sur la tête; or c'est à l'Islam, me semble-t-il, qu'il appartient d'y porter remède aujourd'hui. Et c'est dans les confluences entre «un Orient de sagesse et un Occident d'impatience» qu'il nous appartient tous de chercher les moyens de sauver l'homme des dangers que font peser sur lui le materialisme et le rationalisme envisagés comme fins ultimes».

One can summarize, therefore, by saying that Boubakeur fails to develop a critical approach to deconstruct colonial narratives or pluralize concepts like French and Muslim identity, which could in turn have paved the way for a dissolution of "Islam" and "France" as different and opposing markers of identity. Instead, his solution lies in the perpetuation of an orientalist perspective, idolizing the separation of the world into a fascinating, colorful and sensual Orient on the one hand, and a rational, productive Occident on the other, while pointing to their harmonious coexistence and even fusion in contemporary France.

This idea is not only visible through the publications of Dalil Boubakeur. If one moves to the Grand Mosque of Paris, there are also traces of this staging of the Orient, above all in the parts that are frequented by a non-Muslim public. The Grand Mosque of Paris, for instance, still runs the tourist center that sells North African folklore and consumer goods related to "the Orient" adapted to the European taste. There you can eat in rooms decorated with heavy wooden furniture featuring engravings of camels or praying Bedouins, with thick red curtains in front of the windows and the work of famous nineteenth-century painters hanging on the walls. The souq-like gift store sells paintings, posters and cards of Orientalist paintings, along with recipes for North African cuisine, spices and long pink, red and blue robes.

Another example is the ceremony of November 22nd, 2008, where diplomas of the *Institut Al-Ghazali* were awarded at the Grand Mosque of Paris.[29] This ceremony takes place every year and is always attended by French politicians and journalists. The ceremony is always accompanied by the staging of Oriental imagery: a reciter of the Koran opens the ceremony with some verses, while women, who are mostly black West Africans, dressed in pink, turquoise or yellow robes and wearing big colorful turban-like scarves on their heads serve North African pastries and mint tea in small gold-plated glasses. Another employee walks around with little bottles to sprinkle the hall with the scent of orange incense. Oriental aesthetics are deliberately deployed to represent the Grand Mosque of Paris. This concept of Oriental aesthetics distinguishes itself from elements that are very often associated with Islamic extremism in the public discourse. For example, Boubakeur does not staff a long beard, and the women who serve the tea and pastries during public events do not wear hijabs or black head scarves, but rather colorful African fabrics that are not feared and are considered exotic and beautiful in France. In essence, Boubakeur is trying to deliver to the West an Islamic folklore with positive connotations, combined with Oriental wisdom and spirituality, an approach which is

29 The ceremony was observed during the field work conducted at the Grand Mosque of Paris in 2008-9.

reminiscent of Zen Buddhism, Thai culture and Yoga. Boubakeur conceptualizes the Islamic Orient as contributing positively to Western living in the same way as Zen Buddhist meditation.

It could perhaps be argued that in suggesting everyone should learn from other cultures and adopt their ways of thinking and living, Boubakeur overcomes those colonialist ideas in which Oriental Muslims were so fundamentally different that it was impossible for them to integrate into French society. Instead, both Muslims *and* the French are understood as subjects able to choose and combine the different elements they need for the perfection and realization of their selves.

5 Conclusion

This article provides an overview of the history and contemporary role of the Grand Mosque of Paris in the official organization of Islam in France. It demonstrates firstly that the constellations of political power after the First World War led directly to the decision to build the Grand Mosque in the middle of Paris – far away from the immigrant quarters to the north of the city where most Muslims were living at the time. It also shows that the concrete reality of the Grand Mosque of Paris allowed the government to present France as a Muslim-friendly empire and, in this way, to assert its power in the colonies and protectorates. Moreover, the Grand Mosque was meant to demonstrate the peaceful and traditional character of Muslim life-worlds, the exotic otherness which was carefully integrated into the building and orchestrated during the inauguration ceremonies. Half a century later, with the independence of the North and West African protectorates and colonies and the rise of Islam as a national issue to be addressed within the borders of the Hexagon, French politicians have since maintained the symbolic character of the Grand Mosque of Paris as the center of Islamic organization in France.

In the early 1990s, Charles Pasqua took concrete steps to centralize the Mosque of Paris and re-present it as the place that embodies an Islam compatible with France's interests; within the new political context, which included the spread of political Islamism in Iran, Algeria and other countries, it was meant to illustrate a "moderate Islam" that could stand as a bastion against these feared political movements. Since the new millennium, French politics has reorganized the official representation of Islam in France, this time including umbrella organizations whose members had formerly been decried as fundamentalists. From then on, the Grand Mosque has been reduced in status to being one actor among many, even though French politicians have still guaranteed it a pivotal role within the Muslim Council

CFCM. However, French politicians still turn to the Mosque of Paris when there is a need to officially address the Muslim community of France and, as this paper argues, the speeches delivered there, far from being "decolonized", actually serve to uncritically reproduce official colonial historiography, reiterating that the Mosque of Paris was built to thank Muslim soldiers for their service to France during the First World War. Moreover, exoticized elements and the binary idea of Muslims and Non-Muslim French as different categories of identity are maintained. Even if other sections of official political discourse differ from the speeches held at the Mosque, it can nevertheless be said that part of it is still shaped by a logic and a rhetoric rooted in colonial times. The third part of this thesis shows that Dalil Boubakeur, current Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, reproduces the politically constructed dichotomy between moderate and political Islam and represents the Mosque of Paris as the moderate center in France that can effectively reduce the influence of radical Islam, so long as it is sustained by French politics. Boubakeur explicitly asks the French government to intervene in the organization of Islamic actors in France, claiming that if Muslims are left alone with this task, one risks the victory of radical over moderate Islam in France. This attitude frequently references French attempts to control Islamic infrastructure in colonial times, but is also in line with Algerian politics, where one can similarly discern attempts to control Islamic branches that are radical in their eyes through institutions like the Grand Mosque of Paris. The paper finally demonstrates that Boubakeur's notion of Islam itself is deeply rooted in colonial discourse, as represented in the Grand Mosque of Paris in the 1920s. Boubakeur maintains the idea of an Islamic civilization that imbues its adherents with core values such as humanism, rationality, tolerance and openness to other civilizations, all of which overlap with the core values of French civilization. At the same time, Boubakeur reproduces the idea of an Arabic-Islamic civilization that embodies a mentality and way of life fundamentally different from that of the Occident but that can positively contribute to the French life-worlds, especially in providing it with aesthetic and spiritual sensibilities. One can critically argue that this speech contributes to the maintaining of a colonial rhetoric which considers Muslims as "other" and prevents them from being considered an integral part of France, whilst also preventing them from identifying with France. However, the claim that Islam is merely a religion intermingles with another that claims Islam is a civilization. Boubakeur states several times that Muslims should primarily engage with Islam as a religion defined by *laïcité,* but also urges them to rediscover its cultural dimensions. Boubakeur thus responds to recent debates on the compatibility of Islam and *laïcité*, arguing that Islam fits comfortably into the notions of religion accepted by *laïcité*. At the same time, however, one could argue that in maintaining a discourse that stresses the differences in civilizations

(despite the possibility that modern subjects are able to choose and combine elements of their own and other cultures), Boubakeur not only perpetuates colonial arguments, but also mirrors contemporary Algerian politics, which often encourages anti-integrationist stances, urging Muslims of Algerian descent in France to protect their Arabo-Islamic identity, as being clearly distinct from the French one. In this way, Boubakeur intelligently adapts his discourse to French and Algerian aspirations at the same time.

One could go so far as to posit that Boubakeur's reproduction of the French colonial image of Islamic civilization proves how deeply embedded he is and how well adapted to French traditions. If French colonial history and discourse can be considered part of France, and are, moreover, reproduced by French politicians, it could be said that Boubakeur, in reproducing these positions, is himself deeply immersed in this history– even though from a non-integrationist perspective.

In summary, we have seen that the Grand Mosque of Paris does not have any considerable impact on the organization of Muslim issues in France today and Muslims in France do not usually consider it representative of moderate Islam. Its continued status as an important voice within public discussions are due to the role politicians have reserved for it within the CFCM and to the symbolic value politicians continue to attribute to it. The Grand Mosque of Paris still serves as a place where colonial historical perspectives on the presence of Muslims in France are reproduced. It will surely uphold this symbolic role so long as French politicians maintain it. Moreover, the importance of the Grand Mosque of Paris in public debates might also depend on whether the future rectors will be able to continue to produce rhetoric that is as convincing and reassuring for the French population as Boubakeur's is today.

References

Atouf, Elkbir. 2006. La Mosquée et l'Institut musulman de Paris. Origines, enjeux, Controversies. *La gestion locale de l'islam* 62 (3): 209–222.

Bancel, Nicolas/Blanchard, Pascal/ Vergès, Françoise. 2003. *La république colonial. Essai sur une utopie*. Albin Michel: Paris.

Baubérot, Jean. 1990. *La laïcité, quel héritage? De 1789 à nos jours*, Labor et Fides : Genf.

Bayoumi, Moustafa. 2000. Shadows and Light. Colonial modernity and the Grand Mosquée of Paris. *The Yale Journal of Criticism* 13 (2): 267–292.

Boubakeur, Dalil. 1995. *Charte du culte musulman en France*, Editions du Rocher: Paris.

Boubakeur, Dalil. 2002. *Les défis de l'Islam. Recteur Dalil Boubakeur*, Flammarion: Paris.

Boubakeur, Dalil. 2003a. *Non! L'islam n'est pas une politique. Entretiens avec Virginie Malabard*, Desclée de Brouwer: Paris.
Boubakeur, Dalil/Kanovitch, Bernard. 2003b. *L'appel au dialogue. Juifs et musulmans de France*, Editions 1: Paris.
Bouakeur, Dalil. 2004a. *L'Islam de France sera libéral. Entretiens-Nathalie Dollé*, Alias: Paris.
Boubakeur, Dalil. 2004b. *L'islam à la croisée des chemins*. In *Le choc des religions*, ed. François Celier. Paris: Presses de la renaissance, p. 95–133.
Boubakeur, Dalil. 2014. *La Grande Mosquée de Paris. Un message et une histoire*, kero: Paris.
Boubakeur, Dalil/Duley, Philippe. 2015. *Dalil Boubakeur et Philippe Duley. Lettre ouverte aux Français. L'appel du recteur de la Mosquée de Paris*, kero: Paris.
Boyer, Alain. 2005. La représentation du culte musulman en France. *French Politics, Culture & Society* 23 (1): 8–20.
Davidson, Naomi. 2007. *Becoming Secular? Making Islam French, 1916–1982*. Online Publication.
Davidson, Naomi. 2012. *Only Muslim. Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France*, New York: UP.
Deltombe, Thomas. 2007. *L'islam imaginaire. La construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en France, 1975–2005*, Paris: La Découverte.
Deroo, Éric. 2005. *L'illusion coloniale*, Paris: Tallandier.
Geisser, Vincent /Zemouri, Aziz. 2007. *Marianne et Allah. Les politiques français face à la „question musulmane"*, Paris: La Découverte.
Godard, Bernard/Taussig, Sylvie. 2007. *Les musulmans en France. Courants, institutions, communautés: un état des lieux*, Robert Laffont: Paris.
Godard, Bernard. 2015. *La question musulmane en France. Un Etat des lieux sans concessions*, Paris: Fayard.
Krosigk, Constanze von. 2000. *Der Islam in Frankreich. Laizistische Religionspolitik von 1974*, Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač.
Mengedoht, Ulrike. 1997. *La politique d'arabisation de l'Algérie et ses conséquences sur l'islamisme*, In *Algérie. France. Islam*, ed. Jurt, Joseph (Hg.): Paris/Montréal: l'Harmattan: 77–96.
Mérad, Ali. 1999. *Le reformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940. Essai d'histoire religieuse et sociale*, Paris u.a.: Mouton.
Noyer, Albert. 1901. *Questions coloniales. Les Ouled-Sidi-Cheikh et Bou-Amama. Le gouvernement doit-il accepter la soumission du dernier chef insurgé d'Algérie*, Evreux: Imprimerie de G. Lamaury.
Peter, Frank/Arigita, Elena. 2006. Authorizing Islam in Europe. *Muslim World* 96 (4): 537–737.
Peter, Frank. 2010. *Die Union des Organisations Islamiques de France und die Tradition der Muslimbrüder im Zeitalter der Integrationspolitik*, In: *Islam in Europa. Religiöses Leben heute*, ed. Dietrich Reetz Münster u.a.: Waxmann: 145–170.
Recham, Belkacem. 2006. *Les musulmans dans l'armée française, 1900–1945*. In *Histoire de l'islam et des musulmans en France du Moyen Âge à nos jours,* ed. Mohammed Arkoun, Paris: Albin Michel: 742–761.
Renard, Michel. 2006. Les débuts de la présence musulmane en France et son encadrement. In *Histoire de l'islam et des musulmans en France du Moyen Âge à nos jours,* ed. Mohammed, Arkoun, Paris: Albin Michel: 712–740.
Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2004. *La République, les religions, l'espérance. Entretiens avec Thibaud Collin et Philippe Verdin*, Paris: Editions du Cerf.

Sasse, Dirk. 2006. *Franzosen, Deutsche und Briten im Rifkrieg 1921–1926. Spekulanten und Sympathisanten, Deserteure und Hasardeure im Dienste Abdelkrims*, München: Oldenbourg.
Sbaï, Jalila (2006): La République et la Mosquée: genèse et institution(s) de l'Islam en France. In *Le choc colonial et l'islam. Les politiques religieuses des puissances colonials en terres d'islam*. ed. Pierre-Jean Luizard, Paris: La Découverte: 223–236.
Sellam, Sadek. 2006. *La France et ses musulmans. Un siècle de politique musulmane. 1895-2005*. Paris: Fayard.
Telhine, Mohammed. 2010. *L'islam et les musulmans en France. Une histoire de mosques*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
Theliol, Mylène. 2011. Le Service des beaux-arts, antiquités et monuments historiques, clef de voûte de la politique patrimoniale française au Maroc sous la résidence de Lyautey (1912–1925). *Outre-Mers. Revue d'histoire* 370/371: 185–193.
Tibawi, Abdul Latif .1981. History of the London Central Mosque and the Islamic Cultural Centre. 1910–1980. *Die Welt des Islams* 21 (1-4): 193–208.
Weiss, René. 1927: *Réception à l'hôtel de ville de sa majesté Moulay Youssef, sultan du Maroc. Inauguration de l'Institut musulman et de la Mosquée*, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.

Newspaper Articles

Gabizon, Cécilia, 17.06.2003. Les succès intégristes inquiètent l'islam de France. *Le Figaro*.
Gabizon, Cécilia. 28./29./06.2003. Islam de France: la vraie fausse démission de Dalil Boubakeur. *Le Figaro*.
Ternisien, Xavier. 17.06.2003. L'UOIF domine les instances régionales du culte musulman. *Le Monde*.
Ternisien, Xavier. 29./30.06.2003. Confusion autour de la fausse démission du recteur de l mosquée de Paris. *Le Monde*.

Documents from the French National Archives

AN = Archives Nationales, short title, numeration of the National Archives
AN Etat de l'Islam en France, AN-19970154, Art. 5, l.1.
AN Institut de Théologie, AN-19970154, Art. 5,1.1.
AN Mosquée de Paris/Allocution Pasqua, AN-19970154, Art. 5,1.1.
AN Mosquée de Paris/Discours Chirac, AN-19970154, Art. 5,1.1.
AN Situation de la Mosquée, AN-19979154, Art. 5,1.1.
AN Structuration du Culte, AN-20050132, Art. 1.

Web Pages

www.Allocution Hervé Morin, Morin, Hervé, "Allocution de Monsieur Hervé Morin, Ministre de la Défense, A la Grande Mosquée de Paris, Paris – 11 novembre 2010, Ministère de la défense ; http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/97900/947645/version/1/file/2010.11.11+H.Morin+Hommage+aux+soldats+musulmans+morts+pour+la+France.pdf. (last access: 12.8.2016)

Grey Literature (unpublished)

Mazurek, Domitille. 2006 (unpublished), *Formation des imams. Politiques publiques et initiatives privées (1989–2006),* (result report of a study at the French Ministry for the Interior (Bureau Central des Cultes).

Part III
Contemporary discussions

Misrecognition and political agency

8

The case of British Muslim organizations at a General Election[1]

Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood

1 Introduction

It is a common complaint among Muslim civil society organizations and activists that their presence in British politics is misconceived. For example, and notwithstanding a broader commitment to pluralism in British politics, activists who mobilize on the basis of Muslim religious identities often encounter the charge that they foster sectarian divisions.[2] Hence, following his victory in the Bradford West by-election, the salient charge was that George Galloway's success was the outcome of a homogeneous Muslim voting block. What was less immediately noted was the role of young voters and disenchantment with Labour's alleged exploitation of kinship networks (*biraderi*), factors largely passed over by commentators generally supportive of Muslim identity politics (e.g., Hasan 2012). Right-wing commentators meanwhile converged on the view that Galloway's success showed 'that sectarian politics are now alive and well in Britain' (Murray 2012) and that British Muslims eagerly responded when they were addressed 'not as primarily British citizens but solely as Muslims' (Pollard 2012). As an example for the 'ugly alliance between the far left and Islamists', Abhijit Pandya (2012) pointed to 'groups like Operation

1 This chapter is a slightly expanded version of work that has been published in *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2015, 17 (2): 189-206.

2 Iris Young distinguishes between 'identity politics', understood as "solidarity-producing cultural politics", (2000, 103) and the 'politics of difference', in which claims for "fairness, opportunity, and political inclusion" (2000, 107) emphasize, but are not reducible to, specific cultural markers. It is not the point here to argue this type of nuance in political rhetoric, yet it is clear that the popular critique of 'identity politics' is often simplistic and confused.

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_8

Black Vote and the Muslim Public Affairs Committee [that] are busy encouraging such communities to vote along racial and religious lines.'

There is of course a prevailing political context here. Organizations that attempt to mobilize minority citizens by appealing, in one way or another, to collective concerns, interests and identities, find themselves in situations where they have to respond to representations that they believe do not adequately characterize their objectives, subjectivities and the reality of Muslim participation in British politics more generally. In response, an increasing number of advocacy groups are concerned to repudiate what they perceive to be misperceptions of Muslim agency as exceptional and impossible to accommodate. Frequently, these organizations and initiatives desire to project and practice civic identities, to demonstrate their normality and a commitment to the 'common good'.

This chapter focuses on such efforts in the context of the general election 2010. It draws on qualitative research into campaigns of the most active mobilizing actors: the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), ENGAGE, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC), the Youelect initiative, and, as a non-Muslim group, the aforementioned Operation Black Vote (OBV). It explores how organizations positioned themselves in response to experiences of 'misrecognition'.[3] This conceptual focus allows us to explore one of the most pertinent characteristics of Muslim political agency in Britain today: how actors respond to perceived pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to alleged misperceptions or the refusal to acknowledge their desired self-descriptions. We employ the concept of misrecognition to help theorise these processes.

More precisely, this chapter draws on a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the organizations listed above that were conducted in early 2012; it supplements the accounts of these activists with a study of campaign materials published by these organizations in the run-up to the general election. It begins by locating the concept of misrecognition within normative and political theory (2). It then outlines five 'modes' that are characteristic for how Muslim political actors conceive of misrecognition (3). In the following section, the chapter works through three significantly contested issues that are highlighted by and require a response from all organisations under investigation: minority representation (4), the character of 'the Muslim Vote' (5) and political neutrality (6). It concludes by

3 The article focuses on political agency in response to the experience of misrecognition. It deliberately chooses not to review in significant detail the socio-political and demographic context of British Muslim electoral politics (see, however, the recent Ethnic Minority Election Survey; e.g., Sobolewska et al., 2011). It equally does not address the reality of anti-Muslim bias, such as in the British press (see Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008; McEnery, Baker and Gabriealatos, forthcoming 2013).

suggesting that misrecognition represents a meaningful perspective on Muslim politics that needs to be expanded in order to conceive of creative and productive, not just reactive, modes of political agency.

2 The Concept of Misrecognition

Beginning with our theoretical concern, misrecognition is a term that is obviously relational to recognition, and the two most prominent proponents of the latter concept began their dialogues with the same source. Charles Taylor's essay on 'The Politics of Recognition' (1994) and Axel Honneth's book *Kampf um Anerkennung* (1994) engage with – both appropriating and departing from – Hegel's philosophical system. For example, shadowing Hegel's account of the three *arenas* of recognition (family, civil society and the state), Honneth argues that there are three *modes* of recognition, which he refers to as love, respect and esteem. Love is the mode of recognition which, all being well, we receive from our small circle of significant others. Respect is that mode which we experience when our fellow citizens regard us as rights-bearing individuals. Esteem is the sort of recognition we enjoy when we are valued for our distinct contributions to society's collective goals. Taylor, meanwhile, offers a philosophical and historical account of how recognition reflects 'a vital human need' (1994, p. 26), one crucial to our ability to become full human agents. This claim stems from the Hegelian premise of the fundamentally dialogical character of human identity which Taylor elaborated on in *Sources of the Self* (1989). That is, one can become a self, capable of self-understanding and achieving 'self-definition', only in relation to other conversation partners, within 'webs of interlocution' (1989, p. 32, 36).

The two leading authors on recognition spend relatively little time elaborating on the circumstances of misrecognition (cf. Martineau, Meer and Thompson 2012; Meer, Martineau and Thompson 2012). For Taylor, the concept is a relatively taken-for-granted inversion of recognition. To those affected, he argues, misrecognition inflicts 'real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves' (Taylor 1994, p. 25). Honneth offers a marginally more sustained elaboration of misrecognition, regarding it as 'the withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and disrespect' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 134). Yet in both cases the specifically political conditions for this harm to occur, or how those that are misrecognized act in response, is left largely unexplored. Taking issue with, among other things, the lack of concern for political agency in such theorizations

of recognition, Saba Mahmood (2005, p. 18, emphasis in original) highlights the 'capacity for action that specific relations of *subordination* create and enable'. Misrecognition, following her, is an unhelpful device if it is (solely) concerned with the assertion of pre-existing and stable identities that are articulated against social stigma. Instead, we should explore the subjectivities that emerge within social environments of subordination and misrecognition.

Regardless of the philosophical implications of Mahmood's position, this would require us to be contextually specific about the types of self-understandings that emerge in the case of minority politics, and so not to prejudge modalities of agency on the basis of uniform or detached conceptions of 'the' minority experience. It also means paying attention to how political identities and claims are adapted in conjunction with, rather than just asserted against, social biases. Yet it is still the case that a significant number of political actors that engage with such biases do conceive of their social contexts as characterized by misrecognition and of themselves as misrecognized. Our discussion of their experience serves as a starting point for contextual inquiries into the struggle for recognition.

More recently, there has been a political turn in understanding misrecognition, as a means to understand and contextualize political mobilizations that span different categories of political recognition: from seeking statehood (Seymour 2012; Staples 2012) to pursing participation in the public sphere as co-citizens (Lægaard 2012; Martineau 2012; Meer 2012). Indeed, we suggest that this is what makes it helpful to our interest in strands and processes that make up Muslim political mobilizations. Rather than being a 'master concept' to conceive of justice and human self-realization, it can be an empirically sensitive instrument in analyzing debates about formal participation and representation. As Honneth (1994, p. 274) himself suggests, it can deliver a 'critical, interpretive framework' to identify social conditions and discourses employed by actors that participate in concrete social struggles.

As such, misrecognition can provide for an empirically sensitive perspective. What actors, or groups of actors, do in response to the experience of misrecognition will depend on the type of bias they encounter and the discursive and material opportunities that are available to them. Unless they acquiesce or resign, misrecognized actors will seek redress and propose alternative truths that they wish to see socially acknowledged. Significantly, this might entail a challenge not only to individual biases or misperceptions, but to social rules and conventions. Thus, James Tully (2000, p. 479) suggests that when

> a group puts forward a demand for recognition they seek to disclose the misrecognition or non-recognition in the existing rule of mutual recognition of themselves and others, to persuade others it is unjust and intolerable, and to display a preferred alternative.

Tully points to acts of 'disclosure' in which actors seek to defeat misrecognition not just by articulating alternative narratives but by embodying alternative selves. Such alternatives may then be registered (or not) by majority actors that revise their understanding of the minority in question. Ideally, it may lead to the revision of social conventions and established perceptual frameworks of misrecognition, such as those that account for the sensationalizing coverage in parts of the British press. Yet, even when the desired form of recognition is not forthcoming, the proposition of alternatives might be empowering in its own right, and there are numerous examples for how the assertion of oppositional identities, such as that of *Black Power* beginning in the 1960s, against the social mainstream has been experienced as profoundly positive by minority groups in question.

Drawing on these suggestions about reciprocal relationships in the struggle for recognition, there are three moments that we wish to highlight and that are open to contextually sensitive inquiry: (*i*) initial experiences of misrecognition motivate (*ii*) the disclosure of alternative truths or the embodiment of alternative identities that are then (*iii*) socially acknowledged, or not. In the following, we focus on the first two of these moments. We wish to specifically address dilemmas of political agency and civic positioning in a difficult environment and thus examine how Muslim civic organizations respond to, are bound by and seek to transcend socio-political misrecognition.

3 Misrecognizing Muslim Agency

Here, we discuss some of the constraints that characterize negative responses to the Muslim presence in British politics and outline five 'modalities' of misrecognition (see *Table 1* below) on that basis. In a first step, these modalities are loosely delineated, drawing on previous cases and discursive possibilities. We will then, in the following sections, apply and develop these modalities in a discussion of three contested cases.

As a general proposition, an equitable place for ethnic minority populations in British politics is relatively undisputed. However, progressives as well as conservatives frequently disavow political expressions that emphasize specific minority markers or that prioritize minority requests (at the expense of, for example, overarching ideas or ideologies that are said to 'cover' or 'subsume' such requests). As already suggested, it is the critique of 'identity politics' in particular around which left- and right-wing commentators coalesce. For example, Douglas Murray (2010), the former

director of the neo-conservative *Centre for Social Cohesion*, chastised the Tories in particular for appealing to Muslim voters and remarked that all

> three of the major parties continue to think that the identity-group era of politics is still alive and well; that as part of the multiculti [sic] mindset it is inevitable that you say different things to different 'communities'; and that therefore you can say anything at all to get the alleged 'Muslim community' to vote for you.

On the Left, critics of 'identity politics' see disempowering effects of the political appeal to ethnic or religious identities for the communities in question and to how this emphasis reinforces hierarchies and strengthens conservative forces. In a manifesto, the *New Generation Network* (2006), for example, argued that in 'a throwback to the colonial era, our politicians have chosen to appoint and work with a select band of representatives and by doing so treat minority groups as monolithic blocks, only interested in race or faith based issues rather than issues that concern us all'. This critique, and the request to 'end communal politics', is particularly directed towards political operations that mobilize kinship ties, *biraderi* in the case of Pakistani communities (see Werbner 1990; Anwar 1995; Purdam 2001), which have recently been identified as one reason for the wide-spread disenchantment leading to George Galloway's victory in Bradford West (Akthar 2012).

While specific features of minority mobilizations, for example on the basis of informal relationships between community leaders and the Labour Party, are perhaps particularly deserving of critique, the attack on identity politics has an unfortunate tendency to conflate different phenomena and stigmatize minority participation altogether. Race- or faith-based mobilizations that happen to be bottom-up do not perpetuate communal hierarchies and aren't manipulated by vested interests, at least not more than *any other type of political assertiveness* on the basis of shared concerns, are seen as an anomaly or ruled out as impossible. Identity politics tends to be identified with 'monolithic' groups, and there is, hence, a risk that this line of critique is selectively used to marginalize and silence some groups, especially new entrants. In fact, a type of misrecognition (M1a) that is identified by some of our respondents in this research is characterized by *the rejection, often selectively, of group- or identity-based mobilizations in the case of Muslim political actors.*

Tab. 1 Five modes of misrecognition

M1	Misrecognizing Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics
M2	Misrecognizing the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns
M3	Misrecognizing Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based or 'pariah politics'
M4	Misrecognizing Muslim concerns as 'sectarian', not compatible with an orientation towards the common good
M5	Misrecognizing Muslim political actors as 'toxic' and refusing political association

Such imbalances in the rejection of ethnic minority claims apply to debates about formal representation, too. Commentators criticize the concern with heightening ethnic minority representation for its single-minded pursuit of superficial similarity. Yet the meaning of political representation, and the balance between in particular, is largely open (see Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1995; Young 2000). As Hannah Pitkin (1967, p. 210) suggests, the act of representation can be conceived in an abstract and disconnected way, akin to the Burkean 'representation of unattached interests', or as a particular and intimate connection where close ties between representatives and represented are necessary because 'interest, wants, and the like [are] definable only by the person who feels or has them'. It is not the case that in British parliamentary democracy, or more generally, the role of elected representatives is clearly conceived to follow either of these models; different expectations exist and claims can be modelled according to divergent understandings of what representatives are for and what representation is about. The suggestion that a Muslim 'politics of presence' or any other concern to increase the formal representation of specific minority groups is either exceptional or exceptionally problematic constitutes a related type of the same kind of misrecognition (M1b). The conditions for the civic self-constitution of post-immigration groups are usually fragile and the request that they, sometimes even above all others, approximate idealized understandings of citizenship and democratic agency can be, and historically has been, an exclusionary device.

British Muslims are clearly beyond exclusion in some way, and in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair distinct patterns of their political agency became more widely acknowledged (Modood 1990). Yet it has been suggested that the experience of stigmatization, in the aftermath of the *Satanic Verses* and exacerbated after 9/11, has led to political orientations that are primarily reactive and articulate grievances. There is a risk of reductionism in such accounts. British Muslim politics

is characterized by diversity and, although the concern to defeat stigmas may be widely shared, political objectives differ in line with different religious, strategic and ideological commitments and follow distinct grammars of political agency (see O'Toole and Gale 2010). While ideological or religious commitments are clearly significant, they are not the only predictors of political activism among British Muslims. Some organizations, such as the MCB, liaise with decision makers and lobby behind the scenes. Others seek to effect political change through public engagement and awareness-raising (e.g., ENGAGE). Others, again, operate and mobilize predominantly locally, on the ground and through social networking sites (MPAC). The diversity of approaches, political sensibilities and the different ways in which religious identities are emphasized or merely play a background role reflects heterogeneity. The reluctance to acknowledge this diversity and the dynamism of political agency among British Muslims constitutes a second type of misrecognition (M2).

In a similar manner, the emphasis on grievances means that the proliferation of alternative sites of Muslim civil society – in terms of media production and consumption, community and religious activism, and arenas for Muslim dissent – risks being ignored. This proliferation is considered as evidence of withdrawal rather than political pluralization of the public sphere. Accounts that treat Muslim agency as purely reactive face a related objection. It is hardly the case that outside pressures always *determine* the political agency of marginalized groups; at least they usually do not give a good account of motivations and purposes that exist beyond the concern to overcome pressures. 'Excluded groups', Modood (2005, 159, emphasis in original) suggests, 'seek respect for themselves as they are or aspire to be, not simply a solidarity on the basis of a recognition of themselves as victims; they resist being defined by their *mode of oppression* and seek space and dignity for their *mode of being*.'

As such we have to be sensitive to the emergence of Muslim identities that are adopted and deployed in various permutations by many Muslims themselves. A key issue is how this 'Muslim-consciousness' connects to the sorts of 'civic status' that Muslims are seeking. The types of civic status being referred to here include those that have prevailed for other minorities under the terms of a peculiarly British multiculturalism, and which has sought to promote equality of access and opportunity, and has led to some significant recognition of particular minority 'differences'. In this domain and in arenas of political participation more generally, the concern to project political identities is as evident as the desire to overcome pressures. Its portrayal as driven by and reducible to grievances, purely reactive to outside pressures and devoid of positive political objectives, indicates a third type of misrecognition (M3).

There has been a tendency, moreover, to reject mobilization on the basis of minority identities for its alleged incompatibility with a political orientation towards the 'common good' (M4). A historical account of this position within the Labour Party has been vividly brought out by Les Back and John Solomos (1992). In Birmingham Small Heath, the contender for the 1992 Labour candidacy – current incumbent Roger Godsiff – was challenged at selection meetings by minority candidates. Godsiff enjoyed support from trade unions and the national party; his eventual selection, however, was marred by allegations of vote-rigging. Godsiff defended his position and suggested that the

> trouble with people trying to become MPs now, they're trying to become MPs because they're members of an ethnic community, they're not trying to become MPs because they concern the whole of the community and they represent a philosophy. They don't understand that, they need to stop to think about it. I have to tell my councillors, some of whom aspire to become MPs, that their job is to represent all the constituents they've got, and often they're not very successful at it. And that's sad, so they still are not fully integrated into the Labour party, never mind the community. (Interview with Roger Godsiff MP, quoted in Back and Solomos 1992, p. 11)

The suggestion appears to be that in order to *be representative* – to embody, for example, the 'Labour philosophy' – minority concerns have to be abandoned. It is moreover the responsibility of minority politicians to prove their ability to represent: a burden that does not usually apply to white politicians, not even in constituencies with significant post-immigrant populations, such as Small Heath (43% in 1992). The suspicion, and a related type of misrecognition (M4), is that Muslim agency reflects 'sectarian' interests – a suspicion that can only be appeased through continuous demonstrations of a commitment to the 'common good'.

A final obstacle, frequently encountered by Muslim political actors, is the difficulty to forge alliances as a result of the perceived toxicity of Muslim concerns. It is clear that different organizations deal differently with such difficulties. The MCB, for example, has sought to establish collaborative relationships across the party-political spectrum. MPAC, on the other hand, adopts a more combative posture: while it endorses candidates, it maintains distance since the association could potentially be damaging to its endorsees. Considerations about the due proximity and distance, as well as neutrality and partisanship, are widely evident in the strategic thinking of the mobilizing actors that we have interviewed. The toxicity of the Muslim association constitutes a final experience of misrecognition that we investigate in the following (M5).

4 The politics of Muslim representation

It is worth registering at the outset that Muslim activists, particularly those operating with a view to the national level, often seem strongly attuned to their political environment and thus show considerable reflexivity about dilemmas of formal representation. For example, a respondent for *The Cordoba Foundation* who was involved in the *Youelect* initiative to mobilize Muslim voters highlighted in fairly stark terms one of the problems entailed in a mere focus on increasing the parliamentary minority presence:

> We have one or two Muslim MPs that are absolutely dreadful. They happen to be Muslims but actually, they're dreadful, and most of their positions, you know, vis-à-vis the Muslim community, are totally negative. It doesn't really matter that they're Muslim. (Interview, 9 January 2012)

The ability to judge candidates on the basis of their policy record rather than their faith, this respondent suggested, proved that 'the Muslim community is issue-based, and not religion-based' (Interview, 9 January 2012). Indeed, in the debate about political representation activists frequently appear to disavow the concern to heighten the Muslim presence in public institutions and highlight sophisticated, issue-based deliberations that they either see at work or want to promote among Muslim citizens. It is likely that frequent portrayals of Muslim political agency as 'tribal' or 'sectarian', and thus pre-modern and unenlightened, account for the vehemence with which this sophistication among Muslim voters is highlighted.

This is particularly evident in the reference to Muslim mobilizations against Muslim candidates, which were positively highlighted for how 'ideas' trumped 'religion': MPAC, for example, lobbied against Khalid Mahmood's re-election in Birmingham's Perry Bar constituency and claimed that, while Mahmood had 'relied on the Muslim vote to keep him in power', we 'are asking what did he do to stop the illegal wars abroad against Muslims and what did he do to stop the demonization of Muslims in the UK' (MPAC 2010). A similar line of attack was adopted in the Bradford West by-election where MPAC endorsed Galloway and campaigned against Labour's Imran Hussein: 'to sweep aside the tired old pattern of voting in lack lustre candidates, just because they wear a red rosette' (MPAC 2012). Non-Muslims were favored over Muslim candidates, and this was noticed and indeed highlighted as a rejection of the unthinking support for Labour and co-religionists that was seen to have plagued a previous era of Muslim politics.

Elaborating on this type of strategic thinking, a respondent for MPAC suggested that 'we're not just saying: more Muslim MPs. What we're saying is that

non-Muslims MPs also need to address the concerns of their Muslim constituents, which we feel in a large extent are being ignored' (Interview, 28 January 2012). For the MCB, a respondent agreed that certain types of community politics, which he labelled as the 'politics of representation', were detrimental to Muslim interests: 'unity is dissipating where you have vested interests competing for that patronage for government access'. This, he suggested, was 'damaging to the community itself and damaging especially to the younger people' (Interview, 12 January 2012).

There is some concern, moreover, that an increased Muslim or minority presence in institutions might not further the cause of equality but serve to conceal the lack of serious, issue-based commitment to racial or religious justice. Commenting on the policy record of the current government, a respondent suggested that 'we have a party that's beginning to look like the people it serves and yet […] race equality [is] going further and further away. Multiculturalism [is] being trashed' (OBV, Interview, 2 February 2012). The concern is that a 'politics of presence' (Phillips 1995) achieves little if it is not accompanied by a critical concern with policy-making *after* elections. While the representative for *OBV* highlighted the value of increased ethnic minority representation, it is striking that Muslim mobilizing organizations often appear to accord only secondary, if any, significance to this objective.

A representative of *Youelect* highlighted a different set of problems. He pointed to persistent doubts about the Britishness of British Muslim, reflecting a situation where Muslim political agency was considered sectarian by default and thus incompatible with the 'common good': 'at the moment, unfortunately, any Muslim, either public figure or otherwise, is first a Muslim, then British and therefore his views are first pinned down to his Islamic identity rather than the British identity' (Interview, 25 January 2012). This leads to a situation where British Muslims 'are asked to make choices that no other groups are asked to make – their identity of being Muslim or British first'. A different respondent pointed to his own political activism, which included a candidacy for *Respect*, as an example for a similar experience of misrecognition: 'One of the most common questions that came my way was, you know, 'If you decided to do this, why don't you go and establish a Muslim party?'" (Interview, 9 January 2012). His response would be that 'we don't need a Muslim party, we're calling for Muslims to be part of society, I don't want them to stand on one side'.

Among those involved in the 2010 mobilization there was thus a measure of concern about dilemmas of representation and, in particular, about the way Muslim political actors were forced to abjure their Muslimness in order to claim a more encompassing political identity. At the same time, the notion that increased representation would provide a remedy to inequality that could be achieved without serious and issue-based commitments was widely denounced. Arguably, one of

the background conditions for this rejection of the 'politics of presence' was the concern to counter simplistic, but pervasive, representations of Muslim politics as pre-modern. There clearly is a strong concern to dispute accounts that equate Muslim agency with sectarianism and patronage politics and to emphasize and embody an alternative ideal of political sophistication and maturity.

5 Conceiving of the 'Muslim Vote'

The 'Muslim Vote', and how actors of the mobilization conceive of its significance and coherence, points in a different direction for our concern with the type of political positioning that emerges in contexts of misrecognition. As with formal representation, there are ambiguities to consider that are, to some extent, the reflection of a difficult environment. The aspiration to 'normalize' the participation of British Muslim – to emphasize that a 'bloc vote' does not exist or to argue that bloc-like voting instincts need to be overcome – is an evident concern among all the respondents in our research. To some extent, this position implies a disavowal of 'groupness' and leads to strategic contradictions, such as when an emphasis on group coherence – such as on the potential for Muslim constituents to 'swing' elections – is considered strategically advantageous.

Highlighting diversity within the 'Muslim Vote', organizations involved in the 2010 mobilization are also identifying features of the political environment that tend to negatively affect all British Muslims. An MPAC respondent, for example, suggested that although 'there's a great deal of diversity amongst Muslim communities, always in the plural rather than singular [...] we can potentially be all victims of anti-terror legislation, stop and search, lengthy detention without charge, these sorts of cases' (Interview, 28 January 2012). MPAC, however, appears to be an outlier among organizations that operate on a national level as it tends to frame its activism with reference to the global community of Muslims, the *ummah*. Other organizations, as indicated by a respondent from the British Muslim Initiative, appear more cautious in highlighting their encompassing concerns: 'oppression, we don't accept it whether it is against Muslims or against any human being' (Interview, 11 January 2012). Whether injustices that were seen to be impacting o British Muslims in particular or Muslims globally should be addressed as Muslim-specific, maybe even Muslim-exclusive, is thus somewhat contested. The reference to universal concerns, as it is evident in the MCB's public commitment to 'working towards the common good' appears to contrasts with MPAC's emphasis. Since a broad commitment to justice can be inferred from Islamic scripture and is evidently shared

among the organizations in question, these different emphases are not necessarily the result of theological disagreement but of differences about how to address target audiences, such as in relation to sensitive foreign policy issues, .and how to access mainstream political channels.

Asked about the extent to which it was possible to speak of a 'Muslim vote', a representative for *Youelect* suggested that this was difficult to pinpoint 'whether the Muslim identity itself can determine which way they're going to vote or their personal factors, like any economic profession and country of origin' (Interview, 25 January 2012). Equally, the Muslim Council of Britain's mobilizations reflect this uncertainty: 'the needs and aspirations of Britain's Muslim community are no different from those of our fellow citizens – whatever their beliefs or backgrounds' (MCB 2005, p. 3). In 2010, the MCB suggested that 'the Muslim voter, like any other Briton, may well make discerning choices of which their "Muslim identity", if ever there was one, is only a part of a menu of considerations' (MCB 2010). Highlighting the issue of apathy among young voters, an MCB representative emphasized the importance of social trends: **'**We cannot just use Muslim factors when asking ourselves why there are low numbers' (Interview, 12 January 2012). In order to explain patterns of political behavior amongst Muslim voters, the suggestion is that religious identities are one aspect, and not necessarily the most important one, that needs to be considered.

Other activists carefully distinguished between the problematic nature of the 'Muslim vote' and the legitimate concern to mobilize on the basis of shared Muslim interests. A representative of *ENGAGE*, for example, indicated her uneasiness about the idea of a 'Muslim Vote' 'because it kind of condenses and generalizes and homogenizes something that I think is a much more complex phenomenon' (Interview, 3 February 2012). At the same time, the respondent indicated that the rejection of this concept placed disproportional on Muslims that, too, collectively 'have the freedom to associate, and by virtue of association [to] create organizations' (Interview, 3 February 2012). Doubts about the coherence of the Muslim Vote and necessary awareness into the complexity of British Muslim populations should not be used to discredit the mobilization on the basis of shared interests and identities, in particular not where similar associational freedoms are selectively withheld while being unproblematically granted in the case of non-Muslim social identity groups.

With regard to the basis on which Muslims should mobilize, another respondent argued along similar lines: 'I'm not someone who favors religious politics, but I believe that there is a call for religious politics at a time when a particular religion is being targeted' (*The Cordoba Foundation*, Interview, 9 January 2012). The experience of stigmatization, he suggested, had forged a politically salient identity.

Yet the respondent equally argued that this political salience should be embraced for its positive potentials, rather than being rejected as abnormal or exceptional.

> If religion becomes a catalyst towards people taking part in a democratic process, I'm happy with that. If football becomes the catalyst for people to take part in something that is, you know, a democratic process, I'm happy for that. […] We have, you know, communities or groups with interests, you know, whether based on ethnicity, race, religion, colour, creed, hobbies, leisure, entertainment, we have that. But we're talking about it as sort of an issue or a problem even simply because of the type, of the context, because we're operating within a context that is defined by 9/11, it's defined by 7/7, it's defined by terrorism, it's defined by extremism, it's defined by wars, it's defined by, you know, all these issues. (Interview, 9 January 2012)

The stigmatization of Muslim identity in the public sphere, however, meant that some organizations treaded more carefully in the framing of their political messages. *Youelect*, for example, chose not to prominently highlight Muslim-specific issues or even identify Muslims as its target group on its website. The concern, as the person in charge of the initiative suggested, was that anything with 'the pre-fix of Islam or Muslim has a negative connotation immediately and I think there's a counterproductive element there' (Interview, 25 January 2012). In contrast to such concerns about the risk of being dismissed or negatively perceived, other organizations appeared to see a certain strategic benefit in highlighting a Muslim agenda: an 'acknowledgement that this is a constituency that they [politicians] cannot ignore' (Interview, 2 February 2012). Despite difficulties in identifying a 'Muslim Vote', the appeal to this concept could help to increase the public visibility of important issues that would elicit a response from campaigning politicians.

Yet the concern remains an emphasis on the 'Muslim Vote' might encourage a certain intellectual laziness that was characteristic for how ethnic minority groups had been engaged in the past. The benefit of rejecting simplistic categories and of highlighting the multiplicity within groups would be, a respondent for *ENGAGE* argued, that

> you're able to populate that space and give voice to all the different perspectives that exist in the Muslim community, and it to me can only be a very good thing. Because it means that when politicians are looking around for a Muslim voice, they're all automatically confronted with Muslim voices, and they have to get over this idea that, you know, a Muslim voice will suffice, because they're confronted with a cacophony of voices and you have to deal with that cacophony. And annoying as it is, you have to deal with it, because that's the reality of the British Muslim community. (Interview, 3 February 2012)

The diversity among representative organizations would thus reflect the complexity of Muslims as a social group and make it more difficult, it is hoped, to apply simplistic categories when accounting for British Muslim politics. At the same time, this emphasis on multiplicity might constitute a constraint if it hampers associational freedoms, the articulation of shared concern and the use of Muslim electoral significance as a bargaining chip. In this case, a context of misrecognition appears to account for a choice between unsatisfactory alternatives.

6 Limits of neutrality and partisanship

As in debates about conceptions of the 'Muslim Vote' and representation, Muslim activists have discussed the issue of neutrality in a way that reflects difficult choices. In particular, the 2008 election for London Mayor appears to constitute a crucial case. Widely considered sympathetic to their concerns, Labour's Ken Livingstone benefited from Muslim support, such as a number of well-known activists within the *Muslims4Ken* initiative. Yet Livingstone lost the election and there were some concerns that Boris Johnson had been portrayed in a way that would make it more difficult for Muslims to engage in London politics. During the campaign, MPAC had urged its supporters to 'help save us from a Zionist Islamophobe becoming Mayor of London' (MPAC, 2008). Responding to controversial statements by Boris Johnson, *Muslims4Ken* portrayed the Conservative candidate as an 'Islamophobe who has insulted and condemned Islam and Muslims' (cited in Siddiqui, 2008).[4]

In the *Guardian*, Asim Siddiqui attributed Livingstone's defeat to the backlash that these allegedly inapt efforts had particularly triggered the capital's predominantly right-wing press. Siddiqui pointed to the 'kiss of death' that the association with *Muslims4Ken* had meant for Livingstone and to 'the radioactive affect [sic] of reactionary Islam in a post-7/7 London. [...] If the very candidate you are endorsing is being damaged by your endorsement, then surely it's time for a rethink' (Siddiqui 2008). Disputing this account, Anas Altikriti took particular issue with the assumption that led Siddiqui to the conclusion that it was time to stop 'mobiliz[ing] the "Muslim vote"' (Siddiqui 2008). Altikriti argued that '[t]o suggest that while Muslims can come under collective attack, suspicion and scrutiny as a result of crimes committed by a few, but can only defend themselves and fight for their

4 This condemnation was later rephrased in somewhat less drastic terms, suggesting that "Boris Johnson […] has insulted women, blacks, Muslims and many other groups." (http://muslimsforken.blogspot.com/).

rights as individuals, is nothing short of absurd - discriminatory, even' (Altikriti 2008). Siddiqui's call for caution, Altikriti argued, merely reflected the stigmatization of British Muslims as a 'special case' and mainstream attempts to discredit any collective articulation of Muslim political concerns.

Strategic considerations about how to mobilize voters in the run-up to the general election, two years after Livingstone's first defeat, seemed to take account of this experience. The MCB, for example, which had not endorsed Livingstone, felt encouraged in its position of neutrality. An MCB respondent pointed to the significance of the mayoral campaign and argued that 'it wasn't for MCB to endorse', but rather just to 'do everything in terms of [..] raising issues, but stop short of saying who to put in their ballot box. It's more of service facilitation. You make your own mind up' (Interview, 12 January 2012). The same MCB respondent suggested that the fact that a political campaign had used the notion of a 'Muslim Vote' in support of a specific candidate constituted an anomaly, similar to Siddiqui (2008) who observed that there had been no 'JewsforBoris' or 'GaysforBrian' campaigns: 'You don't have a chief rabbi supporting a campaign for Boris' (MCB, Interview, 12 January 2012). As a representative umbrella body, the MCB saw it necessary to maintain neutrality - despite clear affinities with Ken Livingstone and the Labour party – in order to be able to engage with elected representatives regardless of their party background.

In the campaigns to mobilize Muslim voters in 2010, there were related differences of strategic positioning. *Youelect*, similar to the MCB's objective, primarily intended to familiarize Muslim voters with issues and candidates' policy record. Just before the election, however, it published links to two lists of recommended candidates.[5] A respondent introduced the rationale for this departure from a more neutral position as follows:

> up until, I think it was the final week or the final two weeks, we didn't favour one over the other. We just said this is the information, these are the priorities, here's how it works, you go and decide, and you go and decide by meeting in your mosques and your community centres, in your homes, by talking, by discussing, by holding people accountable, asking them questions. […] it was only towards, I think, the last week or 10 days of the elections that we started to come up with the idea of the lists, that, okay, fine […] we feel that now is the time when we should say well, listen, there are some really very bad candidates and regardless of where they stand on the playing fields, they are really, really bad candidates. (Interview, 9 January 2012)

5 One by the British Muslim Initiative, an organization closely connected to Youelect, the other by Salaam.co.uk.

Another respondent similarly suggested that 'people appreciated the fact that we [*Youelect*] weren't spoon-feeding them or we're not dictating on what they should be doing, we were simply directing them' and that 'people did feel empowered through *Youelect* but making sure we didn't encroach on their personal political space' (Interview, 25 January 2012). Accordingly, the reason why the initiative eventually offered voting recommendations was in response to 'a lot of push coming from the community itself'.

By contrast, *ENGAGE* provided background information without offering recommendations and it was suggested that it 'would never advocate that you vote for this particular candidate, because it would be irresponsible, to be fair, but also because it's the local communities that determine which candidates they want to elect' (Interview, 3 February 2012). MPAC, on the other hand, directly targeted those candidates that were rejected, for example, for their support of the war on Iraq and alleged anti-Muslim positions. Without aiming for neutrality in its local interventions, MPAC nonetheless did not endorse any party. It was suggested for MPAC that

> we have to be careful about how we position ourselves. So when we campaign, we campaign as an independent group, we are not in the pockets of anyone that we are trying to promote because what happens is, that can be used against them. So we're backing a candidate, for example from a party, his opposition will simply try to portray us as extremists and that this candidate is in the pocket of that group. So deliberately what we do is we keep distance from any candidate that we endorse. We're not asking for *their* endorsement. We're endorsing *them*. (Interview, 28 January 2012)

For MPAC, the portrayal as 'extremist' was a malign, but given the political climate perhaps unavoidable, aspect of their political work: 'accusing people who are pro-democracy of having some kind of violent, extremist agenda. It's nonsense' (MPAC, Interview, 28 January 2012). Accordingly, while being opinionated and often less moderate in their messaging than other campaigning actors, MPAC sought to tread carefully in its relationship with the politicians that it endorsed and thus to avoid the 'radioactive effects' that had (allegedly) damaged Ken Livingstone.

7 Muslim Organizational Politics

The discussion of Muslim electoral politics as a case for the study of misrecognition raises relevant issues in the context of this volume's wider concerns. In circumstances of competitive politics, which entails the negotiation of collective interests,

the concept of misrecognition may not easily apply. Arguably, misrecognition is the norm, not an exception, as disputes over the framing of collective identities forms part of the maneuvering that constitutes political normality. As discussed, the links of equivalence that any organization puts forward publicly in support of its claim to represent complex sections in society will be open to dispute.

It is therefore unsurprising that the understanding of a 'Muslim vote', proposed by groups that we have considered in this chapter, are also contested. Arguably, exempting Muslim organizations from contestation of their collective claims cements a special status, rather than making space for them in a pluralized domain of interest- and identity-based politics.

From this perspective, the meaning of misrecognition as it pertains to Muslim organizations would seem to be an open question. But our discussion in this chapter also points towards a response. It is not claims by particular organizations, such as the MCB, about Muslim-specific issues that are at stake, but the general response to group-based articulations of any Muslim concern. The maneuvering in response to misrecognition that we have discussed in this chapter is different from contestations about particular claims and identity positions: the legitimacy of the Muslim position itself is in doubt. The similarity of pressures that organizations experience despite distinct agendas and concerns underscores this observation: where Muslim identity is expressed collectively, in a way that is not reducible to individual faith commitments, it encounters a significant pushback. To be sure (as we argue in the conclusion), such pressures on collective expressions are not merely constraining, but also constitutive of positions: they enable a type of politics that proves itself by showcasing maturity and a commitment towards 'the common good'. But the interview material that we have presented here also shows that the weight of a particular Muslim burden is widely registered among our respondents and leads to disenchantment among them.

Much before Muslims and Islam became *the* questions in European debates about citizenship and integration, Soysal (1997, p. 509) registered the normality of how Muslim organizations were acting like other interest groups. In her terms, Muslim organizations 'claimed for their members not only religious, but also political, social, and economic rights. Like their secular counterparts, they take stands on such issues as racism, discrimination and integration'. In the intervening period, the 'special status' of Muslim organizational politics has been reinforced and cemented. Even in country cases, such as Britain, that are often considered hospitable to group-based expression of identity, there is little evidence of normality.

There is a wider question to address in how to envisage a plural political environment where religious minority groups, in this case Muslims, can have a standing on par with other collective actors. This is not the place to consider this challenge

and, instead, we draw attention to a number of more recent developments in British politics that highlight challenges of Muslim organizational life.

The General Election 2010 returned a hung parliament and a Coalition government between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Sherif et al. (2015, p 43) suggest that a 'general feeling within the Muslim community towards the end of 2009 was that such an outcome was one worth striving for' as it could be expected to bolster the significance of minority constituencies. Retrospectively, such hopes would seem to have been frustrated. Beyond short-lived moments of electoral outreach in 2010 and 2015, UK governments have not sought to establish a more collaborative relationship with Muslim interest groups or shown interest in amplifying a Muslim voice (O'Toole et al. 2013). Despite rhetorical commitments to civil society empowerment, envisaging a 'return to small units' and a place for faith groups in society, the election of a Conservative majority government in 2015 means that this course is likely to stay.

Where Muslim collective actors have been registered, and invited a response, this has been predominantly negative. A much-delayed report into British affiliations of the Muslim Brotherhood adopted a harsh tone towards the movement, which it linked to some of the most prominent Muslim organizations in Britain (House of Commons 2015, para. 23), concluding that its impact was 'contrary to our values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national security' (para. 39).[6] In the context of the so-called Trojan Horse Affair, where Muslim educationalists have been accused of 'infiltrating' state schools in Birmingham, collective attempts to enhance Muslim representation in the running of schools have received a similar treatment. There is also continuing evidence where prominent Muslims, even where their religious identity is not the most prominent feature of their public appearance, are tarnished as extremists. The election of Sadiq Khan as Mayor of London presents itself as a case study for a political campaign waged by his opponent that relied nearly exclusively on the fact that Khan was Muslim and therefore unfit to serve in office.

6 The report received considerable criticism as its commissioning appeared to be a concession to pressure from autocratic Gulf regimes.

8 Conclusion

Traversing debates about the Muslim presence in British electoral politics, the chapter has examined ways in which Muslim organizations respond to, are bound by, and transcend the experience of misrecognition. Through empirical studies of activist organizations, we draw attention to the different ways in which these organizations speak about Muslim identities and seek to address Muslim concerns. This occurs within, and so is not immune to, a wider political landscape in which questions of minority agency are unsettled. The speech acts and positions investigated in this chapter reflect the attempt to respond to features of this landscape and to challenge experiences of misrecognition.

Although misrecognition is not an untroubled concept (insofar as it subscribes to a unitary conception of the 'authentic self', etc.), it corresponds to how activists that we have interviewed perceive features of the mainstream response to their political presence. We have highlighted the need to be contextually sensitive in examining their civic and political claims; these are not merely asserted against, but modulated and defined in relation to the experience of misrecognition. We contend that this accounts for specific dilemmas, for example, in relation to the recurrent emphasis on maturity and sophistication, which is perhaps the most widely shared point of reference in the rhetoric of the various initiatives that we have explored. Although this emphasis appears to offer a strong challenge to portrayals of Muslim agency as 'sectarian' and 'exceptional' – along the modalities of misrecognition outlined above – it also reflects some ambiguities. While the definition of the 'Muslim Vote' as the sum of mature, discerning and ideas-based choices may hold strategic benefit, it may also limit the room for political maneuver, cement a special status and thus impede a normalization of the Muslim presence in British political life. The need to counter misrecognition through constant reiterations of political maturity constitutes an additional burden for Muslim political agency.

Yet, although misrecognition has been our focus, we do not suggest that it provides a complete account. Indeed, experiences of misrecognition are not adequately understood if they are seen to be *merely* oppressive, limiting spaces for agency and being met by coping strategies and a posture of defensiveness. The political positioning that is evident among the organizations examined in this chapter shows that constraints are often creatively negotiated and that perceived pressures invite a significant degree of reflexivity and strategic awareness. Although these are challenging times for confident expressions of Muslim identities in British politics, there are some indications that political actors succeed in projecting political subjectivities that are not simply determined by the experience of misrecognition. The diversity of attempts to delineate such identities, as is evident among the mobilizations ex-

amined in this chapter, might indeed make it more difficult for Muslim political claims to be stigmatized as 'exceptional' or brushed off and rejected.

References

Akthar, Parveen. 2012. British Muslims have given David Cameron an object lesson in democracy, *The Guardian*, 13 April. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/13/british-muslims-david-cameron-democracy

Altikriti, Anas. 2008. We got out the vote, *The Guardian*, 4 May. Available online at www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/04/wegotoutthevote

Anwar, Muhammed. 1995. Social Networks of Pakistanis in the UK: A Re-evaluation. In *The urban context: ethnicity, social networks and situational analysis*, ed. Alisdair Rogers and Steven Vertovec, 237–257. Oxford: Berg.

Back, Les and Solomos, John. 1992. *Who represents us? Racialised politics and candidate selection*, Birkbeck College, University of London: Research Papers No 3 May 1992.

Fraser, Nancy and Honneth, Axel. 2003. *Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange*. London: Verso.

Hasan, Mehdi. 2012. British Muslims must step outside this anti-war comfort zone, *The Guardian*, 2 April. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/02/muslims-step-outside-antiwar-comfort-zone

Honneth, Alex. 1994. *Kampf um Anerkennung: zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

House of Commons. 2015. Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. *House of Commons*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/muslim-brotherhood-review-main-findings

Lægaard, Sune. 2012. Unequal recognition, misrecognition and injustice: The case of religious minorities in Denmark. *Ethnicities* 12 (2): 197–214.

Mahmood, Saba. 2005. *Politics of piety: the Islamic revival and the feminist subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Martineau, Wendy. 2012. Misrecognition and cross-cultural understanding: Shaping the space for a "fusion of horizons". *Ethnicities* 12 (2): 161–177.

Martineau, Wendy, Meer, Nasar and Thompson, Simon. 2012. Theory and Practice in the Politics of Recognition and Misrecognition. *Res Publica* 18 (1): 1–9.

MCB. 2005. Electing to deliver, *Muslim Council of Britain*. Available at: www.mcb.org.uk/vote2005/ELECTINGTODELIVER.pdf

MCB. 2010. The "Muslim Vote" - Does it exist?, *Muslim Council of Britain*. Available at: www.muslimvote.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=97&Itemid=159.

McEnery, Tony, Baker, Paul and Gabriealatos, Costas. 2013. *Discourse analysis and media attitudes: The representation of Islam in the British press*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Meer, Nasar. 2012. Misrecognising Muslim Consciousness in Europe. *Ethnicities* 12 (2): 178–196.

Meer, Nasar, Martineau, Wendy and Thompson, Simon. 2012. Misrecognition and ethno-religious diversity. *Ethnicities* 12 (2): 131–141.
Modood, Tariq. 1990. British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair. *The Poltical Quarterly* 61 (2): 143–160.
Modood, Tariq. 2005. *Multicultural politics: racism, ethnicity and Muslims in Britain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Moore, Kerry, Mason, Paul and Lewis, Justin. 2008. Images of Islam in the UK. The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000–2008. *Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies*. Available at: http://www.channel4.com/news/media/pdfs/Cardiff%20Final%20Report.pdf
MPAC. 2008. How YOU can help save us from a Zionist Mayor. *Muslim Public Affairs Committee*. Available online at www.mpacuk.org/content/view/4572
MPAC. 2010. MPACUK take on Muslim MP Khalid Mahmood. *Muslim Public Affairs Committee*. Available at: www.mpacuk.org/story/080410/press-release-mpacuk-take-muslim-mp-khalid-mahmood.html
MPAC. 2012. Will Labour Steal The Bradford West By-Election? *Muslim Public Affairs Committee*. Available at: http://www.mpacuk.org/story/270312/will-labour-steal-bradford-west-election.html
Murray, Douglas 2010. 'When will the Tories stop trawling for the "Muslim" vote?', *The Telegraph*, 3 May.
New Generation Network. 2006. Race and faith: a new agenda. *The Guardian*, 20 November. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/nov/20/whyweneedanewdiscourseon
O'Toole, Therese and Gale, Richard. 2010. Contemporary grammars of political action among ethnic minority young activists. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (1): 126–143.
O'Toole, Therese, DeHanas, Daniel, Modood, Tariq, Meer, Nasar and Jones, Stephen. 2013. Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. University of Bristol
Pandya, Abhijit. 2012. Galloway's victory is the last thing Britain needs. *The Daily Mail*, 30 March. Available at: http://pandyablog.dailymail.co.uk/2012/03/galloways-victory-is-the-last-thing-british-muslims-need.html
Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The politics of presence*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pitkin, Hannah Fenichel. 1967. *The concept of representation*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Pollard, Stephen. 2012. Galloway victory is a disaster for British democracy. *Daily Express,* 31 March. Available at: www.express.co.uk/posts/view/311608/Galloway-victory-is-a-disaster-for-British-democracy
Purdam, Kingsley. 2001. Democracy in practice: Muslims and the Labour Party at the local level. *Politics* 21 (3): 147–157.
Seymour, Michel. 2012. Peoples, political liberalism and religious diversity. *Ethnicities* 12 (2): 142–160.
Sharif, Jamil, Patel, Ismail and Altikriti, Anas. 2015. Muslim electoral participation in British general elections. In: *Muslims and Political Participation in Britain*, ed. Timothy Peace, 32–52. Abingdon: Routledge.
Siddiqui, Asim 2008. The kiss of death? *The Guardian*, 3 May. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/03/thekissofdeath

Sobolewska, Maria, Heath, Anthony, Sanders, David and Fisher, Stephen. 2011. *Religion and minority political participation: evidence from Great Britain*. Available at: http://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/5d20b96a-9898–4f91-ac2c-e177750c0bb7.pdf

Soysal, Y. 1997 Changing parameters of citizenship and claims-making: Organised Islam in European public spheres. *Theory and Society* 26 (4): 509–527

Staples, Kelly. 2012. Statelessness and the Politics of Misrecognition. *Res Publica* 18 (1): 1–14.

Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Charles. 1994. The politics of recognition. In *Multiculturalism and 'The politics of recognition': an essay*, ed Amy Gutmann, 25–73. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tully, James. 2000. Struggles over recognition and distribution, *Constellations* 7 (4): 469–482.

Werbner, Pnina 1990. Manchester Pakistanis: division and unity. In: *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*, ed. Colin Clarke, Ceri Peach and Stephen Vertovec, 322–338. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, Iris Marion. 2000. *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To Make a Difference: Oral Histories of Two Canadian Muslim Women and their Organisational Lives

9

Katherine Bullock

"Why is it important for women to be involved in business and politics?" asked Mississauga Mayor, Bonnie Crombie, at a female-only International Women's Day luncheon organised by *ICNA Sisters* (*Islamic Circle of North America*) in 2016. "This is the interactive part of my speech," she quipped, as she encouraged audience members to share. A common theme from the audience, reiterated and built upon by the Mayor, was women having different perspectives to bring to the table, different issues, and different networking and working styles from men. The nod to a concept of male/female difference seemed to be unconsciously articulated by the Mayor. Moreover, it would be negated, I suspect, if she were pressed for philosophical definitions and consistency, given the regnant discourse of liberal feminism in Canada, which usually denies any notion of male/female difference. The event was a celebration of women's rights and contributions to Canadian society. Law professor Audrey Macklin delivered the keynote address, speaking of her involvement in the legal team that assisted Zunera Ishaq (who was present) challenge successfully the previous Conservative government's attempt to deny women in *niqab* from swearing the citizenship oath in a ceremony unless they removed their face veil (Siddiqui 2015, p. 81). A Muslim woman school board trustee and two Muslim women members of Provincial and Federal Parliament also spoke. The room was full of Muslim and non-Muslim women who are leaders or volunteers in a plethora of organisations.

The context of the event and the range of women who were present speak to the complex and intersecting issues related to understanding Muslim women's identities and roles in twenty-first century liberal-democracies such as Canada: agency; oppression; participation; exclusion; patriarchy; feminism; Islamophobia and racism. *ICNA Sisters* is a department of the North-American wide *Islamic Circle of North America* (ICNA). Founded in 1981, by people mostly with a South Asian background, to the best of my knowledge, the ICNA maintains an all-male board, with women's activism devolved to the "Sisters Wing." A good many of the

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_9

ICNA sisters wear *niqab*, identified by the former Prime Minister Steven Harper as clothing "rooted in a culture that is anti-woman (quoted in Siddiqui 2015, p. 79)."

And yet, at the *ICNA Sisters'* event, we celebrated Muslim women's accession to the highest levels of government power (none of whom wore headscarves, would they have been elected had they?); we celebrated Zunera Ishaq's victory at the Federal Court of Appeal in being allowed to swear her citizenship oath in her *niqab*; and we celebrated *ICNA Sisters'* projects over the last year which have included outreach events (Canada Day celebrations, Get to Know Your Muslim Neighbour Mosque Tours); Social Services (women's prison visits, food bank drives, neighbourhood clean-ups); and Education (weekly Qur'an classes, annual women's conference) (see www.icnasisters.ca). Shabana Waheed read poetry. We were women leaders and activists, mostly Muslim, though not all, in an all-female space in which men were officially not allowed to be present. We were in an arena that exuded women's agency, intellect, drive, ambition, energy, talent, compassion, and self-sacrifice. On the other hand, based on my interactions with *ICNA Sisters*, many of the women hold to traditional gender interpretations of the Qur'an, including segregation (men were not present at the event), the father as head of household and women as primary caregivers, automatically seen by many feminists as discourses and sites of patriarchy and women's oppression, not to mention the emphasis on *hijab* and encouraging the *niqab*. *ICNA Sisters* would be considered by many as a "fundamentalist," hence anti-woman, organisation, even though it celebrated Zunera's agency expressed through her victory over the anti-Muslim prejudice of a government that tried to deny her religious right to wear *niqab* at the moment of becoming a citizen. This is why many feminists think of multiculturalism as misguidedly allowing women's oppression (Okin 1997). Yet my research in the Canadian Muslim community over the last twenty years, coupled with my own volunteering, has shown me a much more nuanced understanding of women's equality, agency and empowerment.

In this chapter, to examine the aforementioned issues in more depth, I focus on Muslim women and Islamic organisations in Canada. I echo Mayor Crombie's stress on the need for women to be involved in business, politics, and organisations; I believe that the Qur'an also underlines the necessity for it, but I do not want the measuring stick of Muslim women's involvement in the community to be based on the life cycle of men. Thus, while we can observe that "the collective voice expressed [of Islamic associations in Canada is] a predominantly male one (Scholes 2002, p. 413-4)," as I have maintained elsewhere (Bullock 2012b), while this is largely true at the board level, we should not discount the pivotal role, and important contributions women have made, and are making, in other capacities to community life.

There are seven dominant archetypes of how Muslim women's identity developed in varying socio-political and cultural contexts: (1) the oldest, medieval, and now

defunct, image of the Muslim woman as a termagant (Kahf 1999); (2) the exotic supine woman of the orientalist (Kahf 1999); (3) the oppressed woman needing rescue of the secular feminist (Zine 2002); (4) the dangerous-to-western-civilisation "fundamentalist" woman of mainstream media (Bullock, 2002); and (5) the native exposé, "this-is-what-is-wrong-with-Islam," of the ex-Muslim (Capasso 2015). Muslim feminists have attempted to draw a (6) "gender egalitarian" figurine, in contradistinction to the (7) "patriarchal" woman of political Islam (Badran 2006).

The *ICNA Sisters*, and other Muslim women like them, present a puzzle for the aforementioned archetypes: is she oppressed; a fundamentalist threat; a duped supporter of patriarchy; a willing supporter of patriarchy; or perhaps some combination of all archetypes? What can we make of their discourse of "choice" or of a *niqabi* woman like Zunera Ishaq going so far as to take the Canadian government to the Federal Court in order to be allowed to wear her *niqab* at a citizenship ceremony? Why did she not embrace Canada's freedoms and take it off?

There are attempts by Muslim women, myself included, to draw a different archetype: what I call the "traditionalist-feminist." The traditionalist-feminist sounds like an oxymoron. She charts a difficult course for Muslim women's everyday living and religious observance that comprises a seemingly contradictory configuration of being a traditional Muslim woman who embraces some, but not all, aspects of traditional Islam, and some, but not all, feminist stances. Many Muslim women reject patriarchy, yet embrace teachings about women's primary role as caregivers; eschew the label feminist, yet embrace feminist aspirations of women's equality (however understood), empowerment and dignity for women (Bullock 2012a, pp.268-269; Contractor 2015). My chapter looks at the lives of two such women who have dedicated most of their adult lives to volunteering in Islamic (and non-Muslim) organisations in Canada.

1 Methodology

In previous work investigating Muslim women and political engagement in Canada, I argued for a broad interpretation of political engagement, encompassing the "public (including the economic), private, formal, and informal sectors [as] all arenas in which Canadian Muslims engage politically (Bullock 2012b, p. 97)." I maintained that "anyone who seeks to challenge, resist, combat or change the negative stereotype of Islam or Muslims [is] politically engaged." I pointed out, however, that "activism," as understood by the social movement literature, even when defined broadly, following Wiktorowicz (2004), to include "propagation movements, ter-

rorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts (p. 2)" is a misleading concept when applied to political engagement in liberal-democracies such as Canada. In investigating Muslim women's roles in Islamic organisations in Canada, I argue similarly.

Social movement theory investigates collective action around an issue of contention. Toth (2013) provides a good definition: "social movements are defined as coordinated, collective efforts aimed at purposely implementing or resisting social change, often in challenge to, or defiance of, constituted authority (p. 7)." Now, Muslims in Canada may join or form social movements (feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, human rights), they may be local or international, they may also be Islamist (Mandaville 2007; Wiktorowicz 2005), but not all "activism" is social movement activism. Social movement activism is collective action around contention, whereas community organisation activism is collective action around community service. I do not think it useful to broaden the scope of social movement Islamic activism to include all collective action, because that does a disservice to those volunteering (activists) not around an issue of contention: it casts the Muslim volunteer differently from a church volunteer, perpetually in the role of agitator or disruptor, too close to an idea of Muslims seeking to threaten the peace of liberal-democracies. Therefore, to investigate Muslim women and Islamic organisations in Canada, I believe the most appropriate field of study is that of civic engagement in the form of volunteerism.

In the Canadian context, volunteering is a common activity. Using data from the 2010 *Canada Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating* (CSGVP), Vézina and Crompton (2012) learned that Canadians are overwhelmingly a people who volunteer their time, skills, and assistance to those outside their homes, either informally to a relative, friend or neighbour, or formally with a charity or non-profit association (pp. 54-55). They found that 83% of Canadians volunteer informally, and nearly half (47%) volunteer formally. Almost all (93%) volunteers said that making a contribution to the community was a key motivating factor in their decision (p. 47). In line with sociological research exploring the reasons people volunteer, Vézina and Crompton established that higher education and income levels lead to higher volunteerism, as do higher levels of religiosity: "It is a basic axiom of research in the non-profit sector that more religious people exhibit higher rates of giving, participating and volunteering; studies also show there are significant relationships between religiosity, personality type and volunteerism (Vézina and Crompton 2012, p. 44)."

This Canadian cultural existence of high volunteerism, of wanting to make a positive contribution to the community, and of a spiritual connection, provides an enabling factor (political opportunity structure) for Canadian Muslims' civic engagement. Yet quantitative data such as the above rarely explicitly explore Canadian Muslims' volunteerism. Studies looking at the link between religiosity and volunteerism either focus overwhelming on Christians (Cnaan and Curtis 2013; Uslaner 2002; Wang and Handy 2014), or subsume Muslims under a wider category of "eastern" (Berger 2006). Two exceptions, Lam's now dated study (2002, based on 1996 survey data), included Jews and Muslims, and the 2016 Environics' survey of Muslim youth included questions about volunteering. It is my professional observation, as well as personal experience, that Canadian Muslims fit neatly into the general patterns described above by Vézina and Crompton (Bullock 2005, 2012b). Quantitative research, while giving insight into broad trends, cannot tell us enough about the motivations and significance of volunteering on an individual level. Therefore, this chapter aims to give substance to the story of Canadian Muslim civic engagement by looking specifically at the lives of two Muslim women.

Muslims have a recorded presence in Canada for over 180 years (Hamdani 2002). Little is known of the life and activities of the early settlers, but we do know that, just as today, early Muslim families would be part of informal volunteering by assisting each other in settlement, social activities and job hunting (Bullock 2013a). As soon as it was financially possible, Muslims banded together to rent or build mosques that would accommodate the growing community. Thus, informal volunteering was always quickly augmented by formal volunteering for the mosque or community association that was to be founded. Both kinds of volunteering continue into the present. The first such formal community effort was to raise the funds to build Canada's first mosque in Edmonton, Alberta in 1938. Women played an important role in this fundraising, organising teas and dinners in their own homes (McDonough and Alvi 2002, p.82).

In spite of the longevity of Islamic organisational life in Canada, it has not been the focus of much dedicated academic study. What exist are usually brief surveys (frequently not much more than one or two paragraphs) of specific organisations, their history, aims, and activities (Haddad and Smith 1994; Lovell 1992; Metcalf 1996; Nimer 2002; Rashid 1985; Waugh, Abu-Laban and Qureshi 1983). Likewise, Muslim women's role in Islamic organisations has not received much consideration (Atasoy 2003). The *Canadian Council of Muslim Women* (CCMW), the first national Muslim women's organisation(founded 1982), has received some academic notice (Jafri 2006; McDonough and Alvi 2002; Scholes 2002). According to my research, the *ICNA Sisters* (a national organisation founded 1997) or regional Muslim women's organisations, such as the *Muslim Women in Dawah* (2003) in British Columbia; the

Canadian Muslim Women's Institute (2004) in Winnipeg; *The Coalition of Muslim Women of Kitchener-Waterloo* (2010); the *Federation of Muslim Women* (1998) in the Greater Toronto area, the *Ottawa Muslim Women's Association* (2001), and *La Fédération des Femmes Musulmanes du Québec* (2013) have not received any academic attention (Nimer 2002 mentions very briefly CCMW and FMW). As far as I can tell, the aforementioned women's groups are closer to the "traditionalist-feminist" archetype described above than is the CCMW, and I speculate that CCMW has received the most academic attention (not to detract from its significant accomplishments) because of its orientation as a "liberal or modernist" association (Scholes 2002, p.414); embracing Canada's liberal-feminist approaches, "advocating for a pro woman, moderate and progressive vision of Islam" (McDonough and Alvi 2002, p. 92), its women mostly not covered (Scholes 2002, p.419); the organisation sits more easily with secular academics than an organisation like *ICNA Sisters* or the others with their multiple women wearing *hijab* or *niqab*.

In spite of such a lack of academic work on such women's groups, I decided for this chapter that, rather than focusing on a single woman's organization, I would focus on the stories of individual women themselves for two reasons: in my experience, people who are actively volunteering for organisations tend to have been active most of their lives and have cycled through multiple organisations, often simultaneously, rather than working only with one (Bullock 2005; SOMMS 2015); and two, since we have very few narratives from Muslim women activists about their life stories, especially from those who would fit the traditionalist-feminist archetype described above, I wanted to put their volunteerism and their contributions on record before they passed. I looked for women currently serving on the boards of more traditionalist national Muslim organisations. Following Badran (2006), I took oral histories focusing on the volunteerism from two such women: Khadija Saidi and Shahina Siddiqui.[1] After a brief biographical sketch, I will share

1 See Bullock 2005 for the narratives of other women activists, including Khadija Haffajee, the first woman to serve on the *Islamic Society of North America* board. Shahina Siddiqui's story is also included in the book. Wahida Valiante's story, the first woman to be President of a national umbrella organisation (the *Canadian Islamic Congress*) is captured in the SOMMS documentary. She was to be interviewed for this chapter but had to go overseas for a family funeral. I reached out to women in the *Muslim Association of Canada* and the *ICNA Sisters*, but was not able to secure interviews in time for this chapter. Full disclosure: I am the fourth woman to serve on the ISNA Canada board (after Seema Khan, 3rd); Khadija Saidi (who was the 2nd after Haffajee, and I am currently serving a three year term until 2018). I am deeply grateful to Khadija and Shahina for the time they spent talking to me and their candidness with my questions. Obviously without them there would be no chapter.

their stories through thematic relationships between their narratives and the issues related to Muslim women's identity mentioned above.

2 Introducing my Interviewees

Khadija Saidi was born in 1952 as Doris to a Nigerian Christian family. Her father had died when she was only three months old, so she was raised by her Mum, brothers and sisters. She remembers her older brother in particular as a father figure. He paid for her to go to the United Kingdom to study nursing, graduating in 1976. While on the plane home she met other students returning for the holidays, including some who were studying air traffic control in Scotland. They encouraged her to switch from nursing tempting her with the thought that she could become Nigeria's first woman air traffic controller, so she went home and persuaded her brother to allow her to go back to Scotland for the air traffic control programme. At that programme she met a man from Tanzania, whom she married a year later. Prior to the marriage she converted to Islam, a change she found easy, since "if anyone is serving God, God is one." While he completed his studies they lived between Tanzania and the UK, Khadija working as a nurse, planning to finish her air traffic control studies later. Three children arrived, changing those study plans. They settled in Tanzania for ten years, moving to Canada in 1989 after he fell in love with Vancouver while attending a meeting for a pilot association. Khadija had run a very successful high-class women's clothing boutique in Tanzania, and tried unsuccessfully to open a similar shop after moving to Vancouver. Her husband was not able to find work as a pilot in Canada, so worked as a salesman. To help with the family finances, she decided to go back to nursing, accepting a job at St Paul's hospital in 1992, where she is still working as a nurse. She became active in the *British Columbia Muslim Association* (BCMA) almost immediately upon arrival. The BCMA has a segregated governance structure with an all-male executive board, and a parallel women's committee, who sit together with the men in an executive council. Soon she was invited to join the board of the women's committee (1989), a position she held for a decade, serving sometimes as secretary, and as editor of the BCMA women's magazine. Ten years later she formed her own women's organisation, *Muslim Women in Dawah*, and has been twice elected (2003-2005; 2015 – 2018) as a representative of British Columbia to the board of the *Islamic Society of North America – Canada* (ISNA Canada), a non-segregated organisation with men and women serving on the board together.

Shahina Siddiqui was born in 1955 and lived in Pakistan until she was nineteen, moving briefly to the United States before settling in Canada in 1976 with her husband and first son. They had been to visit her sister in Manitoba, falling in love with Winnipeg, "a beautiful, green, city" with a "soul." A second son was born soon after. She has lived more than forty years in Canada, and laughs that she has grown up here. Her first child was terminally ill with a rare condition, passing away when he was only ten years old. Shahina devoted her time to taking care of him. That experience taught her a lot about the local Muslim community's needs, so that after he passed away she moved quickly into a dizzying volunteer life. She volunteered at the local *Manitoba Islamic Association*, and also ISNA. In the late 1990's she joined the board of the then *Canadian Association of American Islamic Relations-Canada* (CAIR-CAN), renamed *National Council of Canadian Muslims* (NCCM) in 2013, now being the senior most board member; in 1999 she co-founded and served as volunteer Executive Director of the *Islamic Social Services Association* (ISSA), which until 2003 was a North America wide association, now split into two sister organisations, where she remains the volunteer ED of the Canadian association; in 2004 she help founded the *Canadian Muslim Women's Institute*; 2010 the *Canadian Muslim Leadership Institute*; in 2013 she became the Chair of *Islamic History Month Canada* and joined the RCMP Commissioner's National Advisory Committee on Diversity as well as the RCMP Commanding Officers' Diversity Committee, D-Division in Manitoba; in 2014 she founded the *Federation of Canadian Muslim Social Services*. She has also volunteered in local Manitoba hospitals, senior's centres and libraries. Shahina has authored many brochures and handbooks relevant to the Muslim Community in Canada. In 2013 she was awarded the Queen Elizabeth Diamond Jubilee Medal for her contributions to Canada.

2.1 Activism and Volunteerism

I learned during the research for my book on Muslim women activists that most women who volunteer, either formally or informally, are leery of calling themselves activists. In spite of the word being common parlance in academia, many outside academia consider an activist to be someone who is committed to a cause to such an extent that they will participate in violent demonstrations or blockades. Khadija prefers the term "volunteer," saying she has been "very well-known volunteer all her life, at work and in everything" that she does. Her preference for the term volunteer, though, is not an indication that she takes her causes less seriously than an activist: volunteerism is something she takes very seriously, as if it were paid

employment. She simply sees an activist as willing to go as far as attending lots of demonstrations and committing violence, which she does not:

> *[Activist] is a bit strong, but I see myself as somebody who believes in human rights seriously speaking…an activist is somebody, well depending on what type of, first of all you need to know why you are being activist, and for what cause. So for me, I did it for the cause of religion, I did it because of people suffering, I did it because I believe that certain things we need to speak out, so for me…an activist is being, if you do it in the right way, of doing an honest activist so that people can see your point of view so that either the government or community can make a change, which you as a person could not really make alone.*

Shahina has come to a different understanding, explaining that being called an activist is a "title she has been given" but that she went through a process before really accepting it as a self-designation: "An activist is not always in a positive way, as trouble making or rocking the boat or whatever…[but] when I fully came the understand the *hadith* [saying of Prophet Muhammad] when you see an injustice then stop it, if not then at least speak up against it, and the weakest form is that you at least consider it wrong, and if this is not activism, what is?" It was her involvement in the social justice, peace and labour movements after 9/11 that brought this into consciousness for her. In the first 48 hours after 9/11, she had done "72 media interviews, locally, nationally, internationally. I was doing three/four presentations and consultations in every sector in the community and in the years following there was no denying I was out there, speaking out, that, yes, I was an activist, but a social justice activist."

In my book on Muslim women activists I defined activism as "doing something concrete for the sake of a social good (2005: p.xv)." Nevertheless, we should not emphasise too much on the differences between the terms activist and volunteer, because people can come to their own definitions of either, the former being more controversial than the latter. The discussion, however, does yield some insight into the women's motivation for being civically engaged. It also speaks to the methodological questions I raised above, about seeing participation in Islamic associations through the lens of volunteerism rather than contention.

3 Passions and Areas of Volunteerism

Khadija's volunteerism began while she was in college back in Nigeria, and has continued her whole life. She used to help clean up after dinner in the dining room, help old people with weeding or cutting the grass, and so on. So it was a natural step for her, upon arrival in Canada, to become involved in the Muslim community. She began attending the mosque regularly, and started assisting at their events, for instance helping clean up after community dinners. She says that her experience newly arrived in Canada made her take her previously largely informal volunteerism "to a new level," to the point of joining organisations at the board rank. When she and her husband first arrived, she was without work and he was in a low paying job that could not cover all the family's financial needs, so she found herself at the welfare office, quite a shock to some-one from a "high-class" life back in Tanzania. She determined that should she ever have an opportunity to give, she would give: a motivation that remains strong these twenty-four years later. Her two passions are providing food security and women's issues. Both of which played a part in her leaving the BCMA board (while staying on as a member) to form her own group *Muslim Women in Dawah*. Feeling that her projects aimed at helping people on welfare were being sidelined by men in the organisation, she decided (based upon a quip from her husband) to form her own group. She explains that:

> *I don't see where it says [in the Qur'an] that men are supposed to do more good deeds than women. I did not see where it says dawah[2] work is for men only, that the women should not do it. I never saw those things there […] one thing that triggers me all the time when I know that the day of judgement, your husband will not be there for you, neither will you be there for him, everybody's for themselves [….] with that in mind it is my responsibility to look after me. The world I believe in, to do as much as I want to do for my hereafter and also for this world [….] people look at it as an activist, but for me it's my right, that I'm trying to protect, and I'm saying that it is my right to do this, and somebody tells me, no you need to take permission for that, you need to take permission for this, so there were too many permissions to do, so I felt that my time, my willingness to do good, is being […] refused.*

Shahina echoes Khadija's religiously-inflected motivations and passions for being a volunteer. Looking back, she realises that although she was not formally an activ-

2 She understands this word to mean giving, sharing, helping others, and also inviting people to Islam.

ist, she was being trained by her family's lifestyle. Her father was part of Maulana Mawdudi's religious organisation. She now thinks of her grandmother and mother also as activists. They were strong women and raised her and her sister to be strong women "to know [their] place, know that no man can tell you what to do." Her grandmother, in spite of having no schooling, nevertheless became a magnet in the community for mediating, spiritual counselling, solving disputes and children's mental health issues. Shahina used to be present, always watching. Artists, poets, scholars, and writers used to visit her family home weekly, and she and her sister would sneak in to listen to the conversations which often included social justice themes. Being a social justice activist was always "in my blood," she says, "I just didn't recognise it until I entered into it." Nevertheless, the term "activist" was not something she grew up with, "because it was just natural, Muslims stand up for justice, right. That's a requirement of our faith. I didn't see it as something that was not required of me, that I could do a concerted, conscious effort. I just grew into it." She became an expert on human rights, gender, and racism and discrimination issues.

While her first son was ill, she used to assist in the background, helping in whatever way she could from home, for example assisting her husband while he held various positions in the *Manitoba Islamic Association*, including Treasurer and President. Above I quoted Schole's conclusion that in Canada, until the CCMW was formed, Islamic associations were the collective voice of men, rather than women. This statement, while largely true, overlooks the important volunteer work being done by women such as Shahina. ISNA, for instance, has had a long history of women's contributions, even while the men were predominant at the board level (Ali, 2003; Bullock 2013b). This is what I meant previously by saying to consider only the male voice at the board level when reflecting on women's contributions to community organisations is to overlook their crucial role.

All male boards transitioning to include women over the last decade of the twentieth century is not something unique to Islamic organisations. It is a common experience of women all over North America, although the glass ceiling is still present in many boards and corporations. Remembering how she slowly moved from behind the scenes to take positions on boards, Shahina laughs that "at that time unlike you young girls, women were delegated to kitchens, to make food for conferences and you know, do all that hosting stuff." Rather than resenting this, Shahina tried to see the good in it, "sure, if that's what you want, but then I soon realised that's where the power laid, because no conference could go without a schedule for food." She slowly worked her way into the conferences programme committee for both ISNA, and the local *Manitoba Islamic Association*, where she volunteered for about ten years. She was motivated to do this believing that there was a need for more women to be involved at the board level, because "the boards

were all men […] and women were having a hard time getting through to all male boards to talk about family issues […] [social justice issues] were not being talked about and discussed." She was the only woman on the programme committee for a few years, and used her position to introduce family issues as conference topics. Early on, she pushed for a panel discussion on domestic violence.

> *I remember going to Chicago convention [and they'd given the panel of scholars and psychologists] the smallest room you can get…there were so many people […] sitting on window ledges, they had to open the doors to expand out to bring speakers in so we could hear outside that little room. They soon realised that […] this was something that was impacting the community, and it has since become a staple of that.*

She also wrote brochures on these topics for social service providers under the banner of the CAIR-CAN.

4 Juggling Work, Volunteerism and Family Life

One of my favourite sayings hangs on a wall plaque in a friend's kitchen: "I wanted to change the world, but I couldn't find a babysitter." It is a challenge for a man or a woman with a full-time job to find extra time to volunteer. It is even more daunting for married people, and those with children. Khadija has always consulted her husband and children, once they reached the age of reason, about her juggle between family, work and volunteering. She says they have always given their "unwavering support." When the children were younger, she worked night shift and was with the children during the day, and vice versa with her husband while she worked at night. She would have the dinner ready when the children came home from school, and her husband took care of putting them to bed. Volunteer work then was on the weekends and she took her children with her to the mosque for the events and meetings, taking activities for them to do on the side while she was in the meeting. I marvelled at her ability to do so, since not everyone has children who will sit still while a parent is busy in a meeting. She laughs, "my children were very disciplined, yes." Later on, when she was experiencing burnout, and the children were older, they had a family meeting and agreed to split the household chores.

Shahina has never worked in paid employment, devoting the early years to her ill son and other child, and later to volunteerism, "My payment is with Allah," but her life is obviously extremely busy juggling so many different positons and roles

with various organisations, so she developed her own household management style to cope with the home/work juggle. Since "my husband and I like gourmet dinners every night" she laughs, she cooks all the meals on the weekend, her son, husband or herself preparing the rice or bread needed on a particular night. She gives "all credit" to her husband, as she could not have been active in so many associations without his support. He used to look after the children while she travelled and did her community work. "Some of these traditional roles," she observes "have to be challenged […] how many brothers look at [their wives activist talents as a gift], that their wife has a talent that benefits the community, that they would support her and through that get the *hasanat* [Allah's blessings] as well?" She practised *shura* [consultation], like Khadija, and says she always put her family first. They would take short family holidays during the year and made a good time of it, and she and her husband would leave the kids with her sister or parents to have romantic nights out. "We worked on our marriage while we were working on the community as well. It's not about either/or."

5 Hijab, Veiling and Women's Subordination

The only academic piece I could find that was an extended analysis of an Islamic organisation other than CCMW is one by Atasoy (2003), which compares the CCMW's and ISNA's ideology of veiling. This piece sets up a dichotomy of CCMW as a "liberal" organisation promoting women's empowerment through a discourse of veiling as a personal choice, and ISNA as one which believes in and practices women's subordination to men through a discourse of veiling. Since Khadija sits on the board of ISNA and Shahina has volunteered for many years for ISNA, and they both wear the hijab, I was curious to see what they would make of Atasoy's conclusions, so I read them the following statements, asking for their reflections on them:

> […] Muslim men use the veil to constitute a particular gender ideology for women (p.147) […] women are auxiliary partners in ISNA (p.149) […] Men who hold positions of power in [ISNA] draw the moral boundaries for women's conduct (p.149) […] women's responsibility is limited to reinforcing Muslim cultural difference [from the West. ISNA has an anti-West attitude] through veiling (p.149) […] [a theme of ISNA publications is that] a good woman must wear the veil and take family as her primary responsibility (p.151) […] men's sphere of activity is to be in public realm of paid work, providing for the family. Women's primary sphere of activity is the home and family (p.151) […] ISNA views men as possessing superior mental ability and emotional stability. The veil therefore, becomes a symbol of women's acceptance of men's superiority in society and in personal relationships (p.151).

Shahina laughed when I read her the quotations, becoming slightly speechless. Her response is worth quoting in some length:

> *Yeah. OK. So. I have worked for the longest time for ISNA, including being on the constitution committee […] I know it inside out [pause] I'm sorry! [laughs] you know, when I hear these things I'm saying this is one person's experience, because yes I had experiences with guys I just wanted to bang my head on the wall, but my greatest supporters through this whole journey of mine have been brothers.*[3] *People that I have found to be the real downers have been women, okay, so, sometimes, and I always like to ask people to be self-aware, as to where their biases are coming from, if we have made assumptions based on our own personal experience with brother X, Y or Z and juxtaposed it on a while entire body of men. Are we being fair?*

Khadija's initial response to Atasoy's quotations also was amazement, "completely not my understanding." To explain, we have to unpack her response through her own understanding of ISNA, sexism, hijab, and women's position in Islam. First of all, she noted, that ISNA like all organisations evolve over time, and since this article is now over ten years old, she speculates that Atasoy's observations may have once been true but are no longer. Her next response is to argue that sexism is something that women will encounter anywhere "in every organisation you are going to get some form of power play from men against women, even at work. So, I wouldn't single out the name of ISNA in doing that. It's quite a wrong way to classify the actions of some few men who are assuming the authority of oppression [and put them over the whole organisation]. She does not view hijab as "a symbol of women's acceptance of men's superiority in society and in personal relationships," nor of men at ISNA "possessing superior mental ability and emotional stability." She herself was invited to join ISNA and put her name forward for election either by a male board director or Dr Muhammad Ashraf, the secretary-general of ISNA at the time. She has always experienced ISNA as an open, welcoming organisation, and one of her testimonials was seeing men and women sit side by side at conventions, and talk to each other, "how wonderful was that?" Now, such segregation is usually pointed to as an example of women's subordination, but for Khadija, who had experiences in mosques in British Columbia "where you dare not go through the front door," these experiences as ISNA seemed inspiring. In fact, even though in Atasoy's article, ISNA is posited as anti-liberal, amongst many communities across

3 Not biological brothers, rather, name given to fellow male Muslims, as the women are called 'sisters' by the men.

Canada, ISNA has a reputation for being too liberal for the way they treat women. (Sheikh Abdalla Idris Ali, the current Executive Director for ISNA Canada, told me about the opposition ISNA-USA received when Dr Ingrid Mattson became the first woman president in 2006). Khadija recalls some negative reactions to her being elected to the ISNA board, as someone representing, along with another man, both the men and women of British Columbia. One judgment about Khadija's response might be to say, well she was really repressed, which is why she saw ISNA as less repressing, though, in reality, it is still repressive. In many ways, such judgment is the nub of the problem: the feminist assessments of Islam as subordinating women, as evidenced in Atasoy's conclusions versus the self-understanding of women who are actively involved in it. This becomes clearer when we look at the discourse over hijab and women's relationship to family life.

Both Khadija and Shahina started wearing hijab a few years after arriving in Canada. Khadija believes it is mandated in the Qur'an, and when she joined the BCMA board she felt that she should not be in such a position and not wear a hijab out of lack of courage. She believes it should never be forced on someone and was not wearing it during her time at ISNA, believing it is a sign of *eman* (faith) that should come from the heart. Being from a fashion background, she thinks of hijab as a kind of promotion or marketing tool for Islam and tries to wear beautiful and coordinating scarfs so that if "people are admiring it, it will encourage other women to follow the same suit."

When she was young, Shahina's mother had taken off her hijab after her father had asked her to when he took a job with an American firm in Pakistan, so they were all quite shocked when Shahina started to wear it a few years after arriving in Canada. She says she had been thinking about if for a couple of years and something "clicked" for her one Ramadan, when she woke up and then decided to wear it seemingly out of the blue. Shahina is not convinced hijab is *fard* (obligatory), on the same level as prayer or testimony of faith, but considers it to be a "recommendation" from Allah, as something that is best for her. She is disappointed by a lot of the discourse in the Muslim community that focuses on *hijab*, while ignoring other more important spiritual issues. Hijab is just "the icing on the cake" she says, but you have to make the cake first with the right ingredients otherwise the cake falls flat. She also does not believe it should be forced. It is something that a woman needs to be convinced about in her "heart and mind," otherwise it is just a "Halloween costume."

5.1 Family Life and Subordination

Did they feel, as Atasoy proposed, that ISNA's suggestion that women's primary sphere of activity is the home and family was evidence of a discourse of women's subordination (p.151)? Neither Khadija nor Shahina did. So, whereas Atasoy meant to demonstrate something negative by this statement, Khadija and Shahina affirmed it, meaning something positive. Khadija says she prefers the word "duty" rather than role. A woman has many roles, as a wife, mother, volunteer, worker, role for herself, but she believes wholeheartedly in the concept of the husband as head of household, and a woman's primary duty to care for children and husband. Khadija does not take from this what Atasoy does, namely evidence of women's subordination, in fact she said she is "puzzled" why people would question it, and advance it as evidence of suppression. Her dad was a Christian, and he provided for the family, all Nigerian men provided for the family, in most societies it is like that, and women's primary duties are to care for the children.

Shahina says "absolutely" a woman's primary role is in the family:

> *If my family is not cherished and looked after and happy and is suffering because I'm out there saving the world, what have I gained? Allah (swt) will first and foremost ask me as a mother did I fulfil my responsibility to him, to the Creator first and to my family second. What answer will I have? 'Oh you know, Allah, I was on CBC doing this when my son was sick?' So, if women are to be the builders of community, we are bringing up the next generation of citizens, how well we are bringing them up is going to be a question.*

For women adamant on taking paid work and/or volunteer positions in Islamic organisations, this idea is more sophisticated than it seems. For one thing, Khadija stresses that a woman's role in society is more than just "changing diapers and cooking,' so while saying a primary duty is to look after children, home and husband, it is just one part of a woman's duties in this life, there are many others, including volunteering to help others live a better life. Second, she understands the husband-wife relationship as a partnership, the husband as head of household idea does not diminish that. Third, she expresses gratitude for having been born and raised in Nigeria, where men and women are equal. Fourth, part of her motivation in volunteering on a board like ISNA is to show to the world what women are capable of and that Islam does not oppress women. She argues that in the future Islamic organisations should give more positions to women. "By the way,' she added, "I don't stand for oppression. No-one can oppress me because I don't give room to it […] if somebody is behaving bad, what is stopping you from reminding the person

that their position doesn't give them the authority to talk to you, or demean you for any reason." Shahina expresses a similar viewpoint:

> *The problem with people is when they say it's either/or. It's about time management, right, that's the issue. Also, having a spouse that is supportive. If you have the traditional spousal relationship where all he will do is provide and all you do is this […] but if you look at the Sunnah of the Prophet, they did mutually supported [sic] each other. His wives worked, right. His wives were social workers and political advisors and business woman. That all didn't stop, right, because he didn't ask them to cook the food and mend the clothes.*

Atasoy notes that her research "does not focus on how […] women personally experience such dilemmas" and says that "women's own responses to organizationally sanctioned gender division of moral order should be examined in more research (p.152)". Khadija and Shahina's responses to these statements show that they do not experience dilemmas posited in the way Atasoy does, nor do they see their involvement in ISNA as part of an organisationally sanctioned gender division of moral order, or at least, to the extent that they do, they do not see anything negative in that.

6 Liberal Islam versus Patriarchal Islam

Atasoy's article pitting the CCMW's liberal/progressive Muslim feminist views on women against ISNA's "patriarchal" views replicates a dichotomy prevalent in the academic literature about Muslim women that is relevant to this chapter exploring Muslim women and Islamic organisations in Canada. Badran neatly expresses this dichotomy:

> the implementation of the Qur'anic message of gender equality and social justice that Islamic feminism supports is challenged by political Islam, which promotes a patriarchal gender system upholding the hegemony of men over women that is anchored in male dominance in the family and extends into society (pp. 192-3).

Through Khadija and Shahina's stories, I am trying to argue that this binary of progressive/regressive is much more complicated than such conclusions make it appear, and I am pointing to the efforts of women activists who accept Islamic teachings on hijab and husband as head of household, while not seeing this as evidence of male 'dominance' either in the family nor in society, in fact resisting such interpretations and the negative consequences for women's empowerment that

can flow from them as not truly reflecting the example of the Prophet. Khadija and Shahina both do not see their view of Islam as being patriarchal. Shahina laughed when asked this question and told me:

> *You know what, I was speaking at a Church the other day and somebody was asking me is this hijab a badge of patriarchy. I told them, no it's from the Qur'an, and they looked at me. I said, Allah is neither male nor female. So, in Islam there is no patriarchy. In Islam. The Qur'an is not patriarchal and the Creator commands me, and recommends to me that I be dressed in this way and Allah has recommendations for men as well. So, that is off the plate. And they were just, like, ok, whatever [laughs].*

Shahina rejects the concept of Islamic patriarchy, but says there is definite "internal anti-woman" behaviour. And like Khadija, she says that you will always encounter "jerks" in an organisation, but when a man opposes her points of view or projects, if she cannot find out why through a reasonable discussion, she tells him: "you have nothing to stand on except that fact that you just don't want to hear it from a woman." I also do not believe their viewpoints demonstrate their lack of exposure to feminism, as I have been told by a female academic about women who wear hijab – it is not possible to live in Canada for forty years, be actively involved in wider society, and not know typical feminist criticisms of Islam.

The only way to understand these responses is to understand their viewpoints through the lens of religiosity. If you are a believer in God's existence, and in the Qur'an as the word of God, the verses referred to about *hijab*, or the interpretations of the husband as head of household, or women's duty to the family, are not seen as having been penned by a *man*, rather by the "Creator, who knows what is best for me," as Shahina says. Khadija stresses "your service is to Allah, nobody else… Your own personal role to yourself, what do you want, that overrides everything else except Allah's service."

Thus, in contradistinction to Atasoy, Badran, CCMW, and others who see a binary of egalitarian-feminism Islam versus patriarchal-Islam through the discourses on hijab, women's role in the family, and organisational segregation, as demonstrating ISNA's subordination of women, Khadija and Shahina's perspectives are an alternative formulation. They reject the concept of the male as superior and women as childlike; they reject patriarchy and sexism as inherent to Islam, locating "internal anti-woman behaviour" to different instances than the ones often pointed to. (For example, both campaigned against the barriers that are being erected in mosques all over Canada. Shahina threatened to take a hammer to one that some people tried to put up in her local mosque). Their ideas about the

relationships between women, men, family, and community life are complex; they are obviously not standard liberal feminist understandings of women's equality. Jamal Badawi (1995) has proposed a concept of "equity" rather than "equality" to capture this viewpoint. My archetype of the "traditionalist-feminist" is also meant to encapsulate this point of view.

Islamophobia and Patriarchy

A second dichotomy often posed in the academic literature is the idea of Muslim women who seek empowerment, equality and dignity as being stuck in an unenviable "third space" between Islamophobia and Islamic patriarchy (Khan 2000; Zine 2009). Again, this binary is ultimately a limitation to understanding women's complex identities and their relationship to activism around promoting women's rights. Do they feel surrounded by Islamophobia on the one hand and Islamic patriarchy on the other? We have seen their answer to the latter. For the former, in a nutshell, both Khadija and Shahina see, experience, and work against racism and Islamophobia. Shahina says "I face three hurdles when I step out: 1) is that I'm a woman whether in the Muslim community or outside, it's a hurdle; 2) that I'm a woman of colour; and 3) that I'm Muslim. So, there are three layers that I have to peel…" Khadija says that she is black and wears hijab, "two counts against me in the eyes of many," but neither of them seems to allow such interactions to impact their self-perceptions, nor to inhibit their work or volunteer goals. Khadija says that racism and discrimination is always going to be there but over eighty/ninety percent of people are not like that and that she can "deal with" the ten percent who are. She uses a medical analogy to explain – in the hospital they use a scale of one to ten to evaluate pain, if it is under a scale of one, which she judges racism and sexism in Canadian society to be, "it's nothing to me," I will speak about it," or confront the person.

Shahina speaks similarly, says she has fostered throughout her life "allies" and relationships with diverse groups in Canadian society. Islamophobia exists; she works to diminish it, but finds there are "numerous overwhelming number of Canadians who stand with me when I stand against Islamophobia, so it is not just me. I have allies and I'm constantly educating." Through her *Canadian Muslim Leadership Institute,* she seeks to impart these lessons to youth and so they have brought together groups from racialized communities, including the Muslim, indigenous, Japanese-Canadian, African/Caribbean-Canadian and Mennonites, to help connect them and give them a way to make allies as a bulwark against the alienating and corrosive effects of Islamophobia. Shahina argues Muslim organisations in Canada need to become more "truly Canadian" by having non-Muslims involved and on their boards, as she has done with all her organisations, as a way

to reach out and serve not only Muslims, but all Canadians. She believes that the compassion and mercy inherent in Islam will be better known this way. Overall then, the inhibiting feeling of being squeezed into a third space between Islamophobia and Islamic patriarchy does not seem to be part of their self-perceptions or *modus vivendi* as activists.

7 Conclusion

I have presented the life stories of two remarkable women, Khadija Saidi and Shahina Siddiqui, who have made a positive impact on the Muslim community and the wider Canadian society since they immigrated here from Nigeria and Pakistan, respectively. I have used their stories to learn what has motivated them to such extraordinary volunteerism over the last thirty to forty years. I have argued that their narratives of "traditionalism-feminism" and their views on racism and sexism provide an alternative way of understanding Muslim women in *hijab* who are often dismissed as subordinated in a patriarchal, oppressive religion. I aimed to demonstrate through their convictions, strength, passion, and energy an alternate archetype through which to understand Muslim women's roles in Islamic organisations in Canada.

References

Ali, S. 2003. Building a women's movement. *Islamic Horizons* May – June, pp.16–24.

Atasoy, Yildiz. 2003. Muslim Organizations in Canada: Gender Ideology and Women's Veiling. *Sociological Focus* 36 (2): 143 – 158.

Badawi, Jamal. 1995. *Gender Equity in Islam: Basic* Principles. Plainfield: American Trust Publications.

Badran, Margot. 2006. Feminism and Conversion: Comparing British, Dutch, and South African Life Stories. In *Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West*, ed. Karin van Nieuwkerk. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Berger, Ida E. 2006. The Influence of Religion on Philanthropy in Canada. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*. 17(2): 110–127.

Bullock, Katherine. 2002. *Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil: Challenging Historical and Modern Stereotypes*, Herndon, Va: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.

------- (ed) 2005. *Muslim Women Activists in North America: Speaking For Ourselves*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

--------. 2012a. "The Muslims Have Ruined Our Party:" A Case Study of Ontario Media Portrayals of Supporters of Faith-Based Arbitration. In *Debating Shariah: Islam, Gender Politics and Family Law Arbitration in Ontario*, eds. Jennifer Selby and Anna Korteweg. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

--------- 2012b. Toward A Framework For Investigating Muslim Women And Political Engagement In Canada. In *Islam in the Hinterlands: A Canadian Muslim Studies Anthology*, ed. Jasmin Zine. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

------- 2013a. Canada. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Women*, ed. Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

------ 2013b. The Islamic Society of North America. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Women*, ed. Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Oxford University Press.

Cnaan, Ram A and Daniel W Curtis. 2013. Religious Congregations as Voluntary Associations: An Overview. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 42 (1): 7 – 33.

Capasso, M. 2015.

Contractor, Sariya. 2012. *Muslim Women in Britain: De-Mystifying the Muslimah*. London, UK: Routledge.

Environics. 2016. Canadian Muslim Opinion.

Hamdani, Daood. 2002. A Century of Islam in Canada. *Islamic Horizons*. May/June: 18- 21.

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck and Jane Idleman Smith (eds). 1994. *Muslim Communities in North America*. Albany: State University of New York.

Kahf, Mohja. 1999. *Western Representations of the Muslim Woman: From Termagant to Odalisque*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Khan, Shahnaz. 2000. *Muslim Women: Crafting a North American Identity*. Florida: University Press of Florida.

Jafri, Nuzhat. 2006. The Canadian Council of Muslim Women: Engaging Muslim Women in Civic and Social Change. *Canadian Woman Studies*. 25 (3/4): 97–99.

Lam, Pui–Yan. 2002. As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41 (3): 405–422.

Lovell, Emily Kalled. 1992. A Survey of Arab-Muslims in the United States and Canada. In *Islam in North America: A Sourcebook*, eds. Michael A Köszegi and J Gordon Melton. New York and London: Garland Publishing. (A reprint of an article from *The Muslim World* (63) 1973.

McDonough, Sheila and Sajida Alvi. 2002. The Canadian Council of Muslim Women: A Chapter in the History of Muslim Women in Canada. *The Muslim World* 92 (1/2): 79–97.

Mandaville, Peter. 2007 (1st ed). *Global Political Islam*. New York: Routledge.

Metcalf, Barbara Daly. 1996. New Medinas: The Tablighi Jama'at in North America and Europ. In *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe*, ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Nimer, Mohamed. 2002. *The North America Muslim Resource Guide: Muslim Community Life in the United States and Canada*. New York: Routledge.

Okin, Susan. 1997. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? *Boston Review*, Wed Oct 1. https://bostonreview.net/forum/multiculuralism-bad-women/katha-pollitt-whose-culture

Rashid, A. 1985. *The Muslims of Canada: A Profile*. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.

Scholes, Laurie Lamoureux. 2002. The Canadian Council of Muslim Women/Le Conseil Canadien des Femmes Musulmanes: A Profile of the First 18 Years. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*. 22 (2): 413–425.

Siddiqui, Haroon. 2015. Anti-Muslim Bigotry Goes Official- Canada's Newest Dark Chapter. In *The relevance of Islamic identity in Canada: Culture, Poltics, and Self*, ed. Nurjehan Aziz, 44–96. Toronto: Mawenzi House Publishers.

SOMMS. 2015. Serving Others: Memoirs of Muslim Seniors. http://tessellateinstitute.com/projects/memoirs-of-muslim-seniors/

Toth, James. 2013. *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Uslaner, Eric M. 2002. Religion and Civic Engagement in Canada and the United States. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41 (2): 239–254.

Vézina, Mireille and Susan Crompton. 2012. Volunteering in Canada. Component of Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11–008-X Canadian Social Trends, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-008-x/2012001/article/11638-eng.htm

Wang, Lili and Handy, Femida. 2014. Religious and Secular Voluntary Participation by Immigrants in Canada: How Trust and Social Networks Affect Decision to Participate. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 25 (6): 1559 – 1582.

Waugh, Earle H., Baha Abu-Laban, Regula B. Qureshi (eds). 1983. The Muslim Community in North America. Edmonton: The University of Alberta.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2004. Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory. In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory* Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

-------. 2005. *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Zine, Jasmin. 2002. Muslim Women and the Politics of Representation. *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* (19) 4: 1–22.

Zine, Jasmin. 2009. Unsettling the Nation: Gender, Race and Muslim Cultural Politics in Canada. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* (9) 1: pp.146–163.

Islam and Community Organisation in Australia

10

Hadi Sohrabi

1 Introcution

'The religion of Islam must reform'. Calling for a 'religious revolution' in Islam, former Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, noted: 'We can't remain in denial about the massive problem within Islam' (Colangelo, 2015). This viewpoint is held and promoted by many western commentators, journalists, scholars and politicians—the idea that the religion of Islam motivates, fertilises and energises intolerance, violence, and terrorism. To them, Islam plays a crucial role in shaping individual identities and the collective lives of Muslims. Assuming Islam is pre-modern, stagnant, and intolerant, they arrive at the conclusion that the 'Muslim problem' will remain unresolved unless a theological reform takes place in their religion.

Inherent in the above argument is culturalism, a theoretical perspective that gives analytical precedence to culture in explaining social, economic and political phenomena. One well-known example of this perspective is Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis, which was put forward in the 1990s to envision and explain the international politics in the post-Cold War era. While political scientists such as Fukuyama argued for the triumph of liberal democracy and the 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992), Huntington promulgated the idea that culture-based alliances and conflicts will shape global politics in the coming decades. In his view, religion is the essence of world civilisations (Huntington, 1998). The September 11 attacks and the rise of global Jihadism were seen as the manifestations of civilisational clashes in the twenty-first century, which provided support and legitimacy to Huntington's thesis. In contemporary western societies, domestic issues such as home-grown terrorism and lack of Muslim integration are at least partially explained with reference to conflicting values systems. As a corollary, the solution lay in asserting western liberal values, promoting Australian values and suchlike.

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_10

This chapter is a critique of culturalism. I will explore the organisational capacities of Islam in the context of Australian Muslim communities. The guiding question is whether, or to what extent, religion has facilitated the formation of pan-ethnic Muslim organisations in the face of pervasive anti-Muslim sentiments. In the post 9/11 era, Muslim strategists, activists and leaders have increasingly felt the debilitating effects of ethnic fissures and fragmentations (Sohrabi & Farquharson, 2016). They have realised that an effective response to external threats includes joining forces, bridging ethnic divisions, and overcoming intra-community conflicts and competitions. This *ad hoc* necessity is supported by the Islamic notion of Islamic Unity or *Ummah*, a cherished idea in Islamic thought and history that Muslims constitute a one-faith community, no matter where they live.

The overarching argument in this chapter is that, despite ideological and external forces, Australian Muslim communities have remained deeply divided and fractious. Having said that, 'moderate' Muslim leaders of various ethnic backgrounds have partially succeeded in developing synergy, building intra- and cross-community communication channels, and creating a number of homologous administrative and religious bodies. These efforts, however, have been driven by extrinsic social and political forces, and not by an endogenous urge for the creation of *Ummah*. If there has been partial success in organisational agglomeration, concerted actions, and the smoothing out of differences, it has often been prompted, assisted by, and incentivised by the Australian government.

The argument is substantiated by data collected through a study of Australian Muslim leaders in 2010 and 2011. The study involved interviewing Muslim leaders and public figures in Melbourne and Sydney, exploring their understanding and interpretation of, and their strategies and approaches towards social integration. The chapter also draws upon media sources to further illustrate the points.

2 Historicak Background: Australian Muslims, Settlement and Institution Building

Muslim presence in Australia pre-dates white settlement. In the eighteenth century, Macassan fishermen from Indonesia frequently visited the northern and western coasts of Australia to trade with Aboriginals. Later on, in the nineteenth century, Afghan cameleers were brought to Australia from British colonies, and they played a significant role in the exploration of central Australia. They also contributed to the establishment of telegraph technology, and worked in the mining industry. Only a small number of Muslims entered Australia prior to the 1960s, but in the late

1960s, Turkish immigrants arrived under a bilateral labour agreement between the Australian and Turkish governments. By 1971, the Turkish population in Australia had risen to 11,589 (DIAC, 2014). Fleeing the civil war, Lebanese refugees started arriving in the 1970s, and by 1976, their population had risen to 33,424 (DSS, 2014). In subsequent years, Muslims have immigrated to Australia from over 60 countries. According to the 2011 census, Muslims comprise 2.21 per cent of the population in Australia, and over one third of Muslims (37.5%) were born in Australia (ABS, 2012).

Soon after arrival, Muslims began building mosques, forming associations, and establishing religious and ethnic organisations. Given their varied ethnic, national, sectarian, and theological backgrounds, the institutions developed largely within the confines of ethnic groups, and in isolation from each other. Even within a single ethnic group, there were multiple lines of divisions and fragmentations. For instance, Christian, Sunni and Shiite Lebanese had their own community organisations. Christian Lebanese became organised more easily, largely due to their hierarchical and centralised Church structure. By contrast, Sunni Lebanese were scattered and clustered around numerous hometown villages, regions, and towns.

Humphrey (1988) argued that the Australian government played an important role in the unification of Sunni Lebanese community leadership in the early years of settlement, and this was the result of government welfare and funding programs. Given the divided and scattered organisation of Lebanese immigrants, leaders from various groups and associations were competing with each other to attract funding. To make more efficient use of resources, the government supported those organisations and leaders that had a broader social base and represented larger numbers of people. This policy led Lebanese groups to merge and create broader structures. Humphrey claims that the Sunni Lebanese community leadership eventually came to coalesce around mosques and religious leadership.

Muslim immigrants of different countries had varying associational patterns depending on their ethnic, culture, demographic characteristics of immigrants, relationship with the homeland government and so on. For instance, the Turkish government purports to maintain its influence over the diaspora by dispatching Imams, usually for a period of four years (Bouma 1994). The project is managed by the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs (Dyanet), which also funds building mosques; the Gallipoli Mosque in Auburn, Sydney is one example. These ethnic differences created disparate and disconnected Muslim organisations and leadership groups that were concerned only with their constituencies' needs. The emerging organisational structure—which persists to this day—looked like numerous intersecting magnetic fields.

One of the early attempts at creating a national pan-ethnic organisation was the establishment of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) in

1976, with the support of the Saudi government. The Saudi delegates proposed to build state-level Islamic councils, who then would elect the AFIC board. The plan aimed at the 'gradual elimination of Islamic societies based on ethnic, national language, racial and sectarian grounds' (Cleland 2002, p.78). To strengthen the financial position of the AFIC, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States recognised the AFIC as the sole Australian authority for issuing Halal certificates. Saudi Arabia also offered 1.2 million dollars to the AFIC, to be spent on building mosques and Islamic schools (Cleland 2002). The role of the AFIC was limited to administrative affairs such as issuing Halal certificates, and building schools and mosques; they haven't had much religious or political authority.

Since their arrival, Muslim immigrants have been seen by the host society as culturally different. Very soon they entered the forefront of the national stage through political debates and commentaries. In the 1990s, after the outbreak of the Gulf War, Australian Muslims were embroiled in events they had not expected. Racism against them significantly increased; mosques and Islamic schools were attacked, burnt and firebombed; Islamic centres were ransacked; and they received bomb threats. The AFIC warned Muslims 'to keep a low profile', and suggested that Muslim women only go out when absolutely necessary (Cleland 2002, p. 93). Another event that put Muslims in the spotlight was the series of gang rapes in Sydney in 2000, in which a group of Lebanese young people raped Australian women. These rapes were reported to be racially motivated. This kept the Lebanese and Muslim immigrants at the forefront of public controversies for a long time (Poynting, 2004).

The 9/11 attacks in 2001 gave full force to anti-Muslim discourses, and accorded them a permanent position in political discussions about integration and multiculturalism. In a relatively short period of time since arrival, Muslim immigrants played an integral role in public conversations about Australian national identity and minority rights. But Muslims were not prepared to function on such a scale. They were by and large socio-economically disadvantaged, and lacked the political and financial resources and capacities necessary for effective political functioning at the national level. The following comparison might help illuminate the significance of political resources and skills. The Australian Jewish community planned their strategies for protection and progress around what Jakubowicz (1994, p. 25) refers to as 'elite politics'. They were successful in carrying out their plans 'because of the social class of many Jewish people (and their growing economic resources in Australia)'. Muslim immigrants had very different conditions.

The post-9/11 political climate created challenges and opportunities, competitions and conflicts, and alliances and divisions in Muslim communities. In this era, the political and religious leadership of Muslim communities gradually overshadowed or complicated ethnic leadership. On the one hand, Muslims have had to defend

their religion and faith against anti-Islam discourses, and on the other hand, it has been necessary for them to protect themselves against widespread racism and discrimination. These factors have compelled Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds to attempt to bridge divisions and create pan-ethnic structures. In the following sections, I will focus on the two fields of religious and political leadership in the post-9/11 era. The discussions revolve around the capacity of Islam to facilitate convergence, unification and the agglomeration of Muslim community leadership.

3 Religious Leadership in the Post 9/11-Era

Religious authority in Islam is not as organised as it is in Catholicism. The prophet Muhammad did not establish priesthood. In the centuries following his death, roles and personalities emerged whose functions were to recite the Koran and Hadith, and to guide Muslims by narrating the prophet's deeds and words. Jurists with the role of systematising Islamic rules also appeared, as did theologians in defending the faith against heresy. As their number, status and power increased, they came to be recognised by the Abbasid Dynasty (749-1258). They were known as *Ulama:* scholars and jurists with expertise in Islamic law and history. They occupied positions in courts, educational institutions, state apparatuses and charities, and more often than not would ally with the state to maintain social order and peace (Keddie, 1972). In most contemporary Muslim societies, clerical institutions exist, though their functions and structures vary to a great extent. The clerics may occupy several roles and titles, but the majority of those active in western Muslim communities are referred to as *Imam* or *Sheikh*, who lead prayers in mosques and disseminate Islamic teachings.

In western societies such as Australia, Imams encounter realities and complexities that are very different from countries where Muslims form the majority. They do not have the state support that their counterparts enjoy, and therefore have to rely largely on their personal communication and leadership skills to influence Muslim life in Australia. Also, unlike traditional Muslim communities where the population shares a similar culture and language, and where Imams are part of the state bureaucracy, Muslims in Australia of various linguistic, national, sectarian and theological backgrounds coexist side by side. This latter reality should not create a problem given that Australia upholds the principle of freedom of religion, and numerous religions, sects and churches live peacefully side by side. However, the rise of Islamic radicalism and subsequent state interventions have complicated the issue of religious authority in Muslim communities.

Global developments have impelled western states to devise initiatives, policies and programs for the governance of Islamic institutions and management of their religious affairs (Humphrey, 2010). The state's desire for control and management has partially required the centralisation of religious leadership. This has proved to be very difficult, because there is little internal imperative on the part of Muslims to syncretise their religious leadership. Like other religions, Islamic schools of thought are by and large exclusive and self-contained in their worldview, and there is no religious incentive to engage with other Islamic schools or sects. It is easier for Muslims to conduct inter-faith dialogues with Christians and Jews than with their Muslim counterparts of other Islamic sects and ideologies. They are more open to inter-faith dialogue than intra-faith dialogue. However, the wider political climate, in which terrorism is often explained in religious terms, has created the necessity for intra-faith dialogue.

Politicians, scholars, public commentators and journalists vary in their explanations of Jihadism and terrorism. Nonetheless, it is fair to argue that the 'clash of civilisations' thesis is a common explanatory framework in public discourses. In these political and media discourses, terrorism is said to be motivated, fuelled, and scaffolded by fundamentalist interpretations of religion. In such accounts, the role of socio-economic factors and western foreign policies in the Muslim world are either overlooked or underestimated. As Mamdani (2004) aptly put it, the term 'Islamic terrorism' is used as both description and explanation; that is, Muslims are the perpetrators and Islam the motivator. Given that the way a problem is defined will determine the possible solution, western governments have come to emphasise Australian values, cultural integration, and the promotion of moderation to combat radicalisation in their countries.

As a corollary, state counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation policies incorporate elements of religious governmentality in order to gain control over the production and dissemination of radical ideas and ideologies in Muslim communities. Although liberal and secular states, by definition, should remain impartial to cultural and religious worldviews and the internal dynamics of religious institutions, western governments actively attempt to promote moderate interpretations of Islam, supporting and funding moderate voices and leaders in order to marginalise fundamentalist and radical voices. Moderate organisations and leaders are assisted financially, politically and discursively.

The above-mentioned amalgamation of religion and politics has created new divisions and confusions among Muslim leaders. Underlying these policies is the idea that political moderation correlates with religious moderation, which means the more religiosity, the higher the likelihood of radicalism. This assumption has led some Muslim leaders to distance themselves from identifiers such as 'moder-

ate'. For example, Hass Dellal, Executive Director of the Australian Multicultural Foundation, expressed his misgivings as follows:

> What does that mean? Am I a moderate Muslim or I'm not? Or is that really a code for those that bomb and those that don't? Is that a code for radicals and extremists, and those that are secular? […] The level of my religiosity is different, the way I practice it, but you can't say whether I am moderate or not, so what is a moderate Muslim? One may pray but also drink? What is moderate Muslim? In whose eyes?

In a similar fashion, Aly (2007, p.68), a well-known Muslim public figure and academic in Australia, referred to the notion of moderate Muslim as 'contemptible' and 'meaningless':

> I cringe every time the 'moderate' label is applied to me. I understand it is probably meant to be a compliment, but the truth is that it is offensive in the way it would be to be called a 'moderate intellect'. It carries the connotation that one's faith is somehow diluted. It implies, condescendingly, that it is socially acceptable to be a Muslim, as long as you are not too Muslim.

Unlike other theological and sectarian divisions that are rooted in Muslim history, the terms moderate and radical have been created and imposed by non-Muslims. The moderate-radical nexus, as Hall (1993, p. 284) argued more generally, has cognitive, evaluative, expressive, explanatory, predictive and consolatory power; it represents the moderates as rational, normal and natural. It also aims to 'build a coalition between the moderates and the agencies of control'. It is in this light that radical Muslim groups, such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia*, reject the terminology altogether:

> Thus we must reject the West's idea of extremism and moderation. We must reject the West's interference in the affairs of our deen [religion]. That is why this discussion did not proceed from a Shar'ee [Islamic law] standpoint from the very beginning. Rather it is a political stance, used to entrench a direction in the *Ummah* [Islamic community] suitable for the West. It is [a] discussion that relates to the continuation of the colonisation of people's minds (*Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia* 2009, p.3).

The Australian government's principal initiative to boost moderate religious leaders took effect in 2005 in a plan called the National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security (NAP). The plan was a response to rising concerns over 'home-grown' terrorism in the aftermath of the London Bombing. John Howard, then Prime Minister, invited a select group of Muslim leaders to discuss the threat of Muslim youth radicalisation in Australia. The meeting led to the launching of the NAP, and its leaders were called the Muslim Reference Group. Andrews (2007, p.55), ex-Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, pointed out

that the key objectives of the NAP were 'improving understanding of extremism, building leadership capacity in Australian Muslim communities, promoting non-violent interpretations of Islam in Australia, encouraging mutual respect, and actively engaging with Australian Muslim communities'. The plan was a step towards creating pan-ethnic religious structures, motivated by the state's security concerns.

The Muslim Reference Group facilitated the establishment of the Australian National Imams Council (ANIC) by bringing together over 100 Imams from around the country in 2005. After its first conference, the group encouraged all Imams in Australia to deliver their sermons in English. It also supported Howard's controversial initiation of the Citizenship Test (Poynting & Mason 2007, p.238). The moderate tendency of the ANIC is evident in its goals; it aims to 'utilise the skills, qualifications and expertise of Imams and Islamic scholars to promote and contribute to the betterment of the Australian Islamic community and the wider Australian society at large'. It also seeks to be 'working towards promoting better relations and understanding between Muslims and other faith groups as well as wider Australian society by spearheading religious understanding, universal and Australian values of morality, fairness, equity, justice, among the Muslims and the wider Australian society' (ANIC, 2016). These statements carry a clear undertone that can be described as being reflective of their positioning as 'moderate' imams: emphasis on building relationship with wider society, interfaith dialogue and promoting Australian values.

The ANIC has not been very active since its establishment. Nor has it been very successful in bridging divisions and ethnic boundaries. Occasionally, it has attempted to exert influence over religious affairs in Muslim communities (see for example O'Brien (2011) and Zwartz (2012)).

The ANIC does not hold religious authority over all Imams, and its legitimacy is easily contested by non-moderate Imams. To make up for this lack of power, it welcomes the establishment of administrative and bureaucratic bodies such as a national registry of qualified Imams. Raising his concerns regarding unqualified Imams, the ANIC President Sheikh Abdul Azim said: 'People who assumed the title of Sheikh, who do not have appropriate training, are a problem'. But establishing such a body through intra-community negotiations is almost impossible given the wide-ranging disagreements among Muslim leaders. In response to the call for a national registry of Imams, Kuranda Seyit, spokesperson of the Islamic Council of Victoria, said: 'The Muslim community in Australia is quite fractured. There are some very disparate groups, different schools of thought and ideologies. To get everybody to work together on this initiative would be very difficult unless it's lead by the government' (Roberts 2015).

The ANIC also appoints the Grand Mufti of Australia, whose position denotes the highest religious authority in Australia. However, he is not recognised by Turkish communities, which constitute the second-largest Muslim group in Australia. Acknowledging his contested role, Grand Mufti Dr Ibrahim Abu Mohammed said in an interview: 'If I speak to the Turkish community they may not know or trust me, but if I speak through their own leaders they will understand me and may accept what I am saying' (Barney Zwartz, 2011). The Egyptian-born Mufti is not even popular among the Lebanese, the largest Muslim ethnic group in Australia. Needless to say, he has no influence over Shiite and other non-Sunni Muslims.

Despite moderate leaders' efforts to overcome fissures and fragmentations, bridge divisions and build pan-ethnic structures, the Muslim religious leadership remains as disunited, segmented and fractious as before (Morton, 2015). Religious commonalities and shared values have not helped much in creating homologous organisations and structures. The pluralist nature of religious authority in Islam has hampered syncretism. Calling for the creation of a 'charter of values and unity', Ahmed Kilani, founder of the Muslim Village website, maintained: 'The goal of this should be to unify theologically the Australian Muslim community internally, and externally reach out to the greater community to reinforce the common values we all share'. This urge for 'theological unification' does not spring from religious teachings, but from external conditions. So far, some moderate leaders have been brought together by the government to establish broader structures; nonetheless, their authority over ordinary Muslims remains in question.

4 Political Leadership of Muslim Communities

Generally speaking, ethnic leadership is concerned with how to represent the minority group in the host society, how to draw in more resources, and how to raise the relative status of the group. In his seminal book *An American Dilemma*, Gunnar Myrdal (1944) classified African-American leaders as accommodation and protest leaders. Accommodationist leaders, instead of undermining the dominant norms and prevalent discourses in the host society, work through them to achieve their goals. In our contemporary language, they are referred to as moderate leaders. By contrast, protest leaders do not succumb to the dominant definitions of normality, and take on a critical approach and strategy to raise the socio-economic, cultural and symbolic status of their group. Whether ethnic leaders adopt an accommodation or protest leadership style depends partly on the relationship between the government of the host society and that of their origin country. It also depends

on the status of the ethnic group in the host society (Higham, 1978). Myrdal's categorisation has been applied to various other ethnic groups, and is relevant to Muslims in the West, including Australia.

Muslims were not considered to be the most threatening 'other' in Australia until recently. Due to Australia's geographic location, Asians used to be seen as the menace. However, with the turn of the century and the rise of global terrorism, Asians were replaced with Muslims as a threat (to national security). Former president of the AFIC, Ikebal Patel, recounted a conversation he had with a Vietnamese community leader in which he said: 'Thank God for you Muslims! thanks God for you Muslims! because after September 11, as Vietnamese and Chinese, we are at least safe now; the focus has gone from us to you Muslims as criminal, terrorists or whatever!'. Although Australian Muslims had experienced the repercussions of global events such as the Gulf war in the 1990s, the September 11 attacks, the Bali and 7/7 London bombings created alarming rates of anti-Muslim sentiment, racism and discrimination (HREOC, 2004). Unlike the foreign-induced 9/11 attacks, the London Bombing in 2005 turned attention to domestic minorities and 'home-grown' terrorism. The past discourses about the threat of Lebanese gangs were now turned to national security concerns over young radicalised Jihadists.

One factor that has complicated the relationship between Australian Muslims and their government is the active participation of Australia in the War on Terror, and in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (and more recently in the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). These involvements have increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks in Australia; consequently, there is more surveillance and policing of mosques and Muslim communities. Over the past few years, anti-Muslim rallies in Australia by right-wing nationalist movements, such as Reclaim Australia, have multiplied. In 2015, a new anti-Muslim party, The Australian Liberty Allegiance, was launched by controversial Dutch MP Geert Wilders. The party campaigns for the banning of the burqa, placing a 10-year moratorium on immigrants from Muslim countries, and withdrawing from the UN Refugee Convention (ABC, 2015). They are not likely to have astonishing success in attracting voters, but could further normalise anti-Muslim discourses in the Australian political scene. In the face of such external threats, and the looming possibility of terrorist attacks in Australia, which could encourage greater public hostility towards them, Muslims are sensing the urgency to build an effective political leadership more than ever before.

This antagonistic political climate has impelled accommodationist Muslim leaders of various ethnic backgrounds to enhance intra-community communication and create a level of synergy across their organisations. With governmental support, they have attempted to mitigate public antagonism, and to facilitate Muslim integration into Australian society. This political climate has also generated unprecedented

opportunities for upward political mobility for moderate leaders, particularly aspiring second-generation Muslim youth. In order to counter radicalisation, to promote moderate Islam, and to build role models for Muslim youth, moderate Muslim leaders are given a voice on national TV and radio, in newspapers, and on public panels. These opportunities have enabled them to fast-track to the national stage and to accumulate political capital, which in normal conditions would be inconceivable. However, these opportunities could undermine their legitimacy and political currency. Moderate leaders have had to tread a fine line. On the one hand, they have to maintain their critical position towards western interventions in the Islamic world, and on the other hand, they must support social integration, engage in interfaith dialogues, and condemn terrorism and acts of violence. Despite doing all of these things, they are still criticised by non-moderate Muslim activists, organisations and leaders.

Criticising the moderate leaders' motivations, Yassir Morsi, former President of Victoria's Muslim Student Associations, said: 'They are very well integrated, highly educated, articulate, intelligent, well to do Muslims' who 'try to create a space for themselves by saying, "Look! We are not like Osama Bin Laden! We are not like Taliban!"'. In his view, moderate leaders 'try to reaffirm some normality: "We are not terrorists! We work at banks, and we are high school teachers, I like footie!". As if! I hate that! […] They want to integrate well because they are higher up in the class level"'. In a similar fashion, Sheikh Abu Ayman, founder of the *Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Association of Australia*, an ultra-conservative Salafi group, said: 'They don't communicate with people; they are sitting in the office; they don't know what is happening with the community, how the community feels about it, because they are not in the community". To these critics, the political atmosphere, though causing suffering to many ordinary Muslims, has brought about unprecedented opportunities for moderate leaders to move up the political ladder. Such critiques are prevalent in other ethnic and religious minority groups. For example, describing moderate Jewish leaders in America, social psychologist Kurt Lewin asserted: 'They are usually eager to accept the leading role in the minority, partly as a substitute for gaining status in the majority, partly because such leadership makes it possible for them to have and maintain additional contact with the majority' (Lewin, 1948, p. 196).

Groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia view moderate leaders as being co-opted by western governments. In their view, moderate leaders, consciously or unconsciously, serve to generate division in *Ummah* by placing local priorities over global affairs. Recognising genuine and honest intentions of many Australian moderate leaders, Uthman Badar, spokesperson of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia, described them as the 'agent class', a 'western developed and educated elite class' who 'push

western ideas'. He added that discourses such as 'Australian Islam' and 'American Islam' are aimed at undermining the unity of Muslims living in the world.

By contrast, moderate leaders portray radical leaders as a tiny minority that does not represent mainstream Muslim communities. To them, radical leaders feed and fertilise anti-Muslim media reports, increase tensions and conflicts, and add to the problems of ordinary Muslims who are living in western societies. Moderate leaders argue that the majority of Muslims are happy with the liberal, democratic and multicultural norms. For example, Kuranda Seyit said:

> There are a lot of [radical] organisations out there. They are talking about no voting, and no this and no that—they are just being more aggressive. This causes more friction in society, so they have to employ more Hikmah [wisdom] in getting their message across. I know they are concerned about Muslims overseas and want to be more religious and all that, but they need to do it in such a way that it doesn't undermine the system that already is in place, which everybody is happy with. Most people are happy with the system in Australia—they like it; it is a free, democratic, open society.

Evidently, religion cannot resolve the above disagreements. Each side of the debate is able to draw on Islamic teachings to support their stance. Moderate leaders put emphasis on those Islamic teachings that encourage Muslims to obey the laws of the land, show compassion and wisdom, contribute to society, and offer help to those in need, while radical Muslims focus on the more combative elements of Islamic texts, highlight unjust western foreign policies in the Muslim world, and lay stress on in-group solidarity and identity (Sohrabi, 2016; Sohrabi & Farquharson, 2015). The broad scope of Islamic teachings allows Muslims of different ideologies to form alliances consistent with their material and political preferences, taking into account resources, power dynamics, and personal ambitions.

5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, it was shown that despite the existence of ideational sources such as *Ummah* in Islam, Muslim communities have remained as divided as ever. Shared beliefs have not smoothed out political and ideological conflicts. The major thrust for organisational syncretism and agglomeration has been exogenous; that is, the state's national security concerns. The post-9/11 political climate has created new divisions, competitions and conflicts in Muslim communities and among Muslim leaders. In particular, the competition between moderate and radical leaders was

highlighted to illustrate the role of politics in influencing and shaping Muslim community politics in Australia.

The chapter's goal was to investigate the relationship between religion on the one hand, and community organisation on the other. Although religions create shared symbolic universes, collective feelings and meanings, and sources for personal identities, their organisational power is complicated by societal power dynamics and the availability of economic resources, among other things. In principle, Abrahamic religions intend to create a symbolic universe in which this-worldly life finds meaning in relation to a larger invisible other-world — a cosmology that endows mundane daily affairs with spiritual meaning. Their moral systems find logic in the context of their cosmology, and function to cement the communal relationships of faithful followers. Religious authority and organisations — Priest, Rabbi and Imam—have historically emerged to control the production and distribution of religious ideas, innovations and symbols. Over time, their role has become almost integral to religions.

Nonetheless, the organisational capacities of religions diminish the further one moves away from the centre of spiritual life, rituals and morality. The further one moves to the realm of the secular, the greater the organisational thrust by material and political forces. This is what we observe in Muslim majority countries in which religion is only one forcethat along with other secular forces shape their political system and social organisation. And this is what we observe in the community life of Muslim minorities in Australia. If this is true, then a theological reform within Islam—advocated by Tony Abbott and others—would not necessarily solve the issues unless political, economic and social factors are taken into account.

References

ABC. (2015). Geert Wilders launches a controversial anti-Islamic party in Australia Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2015/s4336410.htm

ABS. (2012). *2011 Census of population and housing* Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, data produced by ABS tablebluilder.

Andrews, K. (2007). Australian government initiatives for social cohesion In J. Jupp, J. Nieuwenhuysen, & E. Dawson (Eds.), *Social cohesion in Australia* (pp. 45–58). New York: Cambridge University press

ANIC. (2016). Australian National Imams Council. Retrieved from http://www.anic.org.au/

Colangelo, A. (2015). Islam must change, says Tony Abbott. Retrieved from http://thenewdaily.com.au/news/2015/12/09/abbott-islam-must-change-west/

DIAC. (2014). Community information summary, Turkey-born. Retrieved from https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/02_2014/turkey.pdf
DSS. (2014). The Lebanon-born Community. Retrieved from https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-affairs/programs-policy/a-multicultural-australia/programs-and-publications/community-information-summaries/the-lebanon-born-community
Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man* New York: The Free press.
Higham, J. (Ed.) (1978). *Ethnic leadership in America*. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
HREOC. (2004). Isma-Listen: National Consultations on eliminating prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians. *Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission* Sydney.
Humphrey, M. (1988). Community, mosque and ethnic politics. In A. Ata (Ed.), *Religion and ethnic identity: an Australian study* (pp. 255–269). Victoria, Australia Spectrum Publications
Humphrey, M. (2010). Securitisation, social inclusion and Muslims in Australia In S. Yasmeen (Ed.), *Muslims in Australia: the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion* (pp. 56–78). VIC, Australia: Melbourne University Press
Huntington, S. P. (1998). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Jakubowicz, A. (1994). Ethnic leadership, ethno-nationalist politics and the making of multicultural Australia. *People and Place, 2*(2), 20–28.
Keddie, N. R. (1972). Introduction. In N. R. Keddie (Ed.), *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis; Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500* (pp. 1–14). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lewin, K. (1948). *Resolving Social Conflicts*. New York: Harpers and Brothers Publishers.
Morton, R. (2015, 30/05/2015). In Muslim Australia, there's divide and no respected rule. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/in-muslim-australia-theres-divide-and-no-respected-rule/news-story/45cbf8eff9457eacf608518a0ec62018
Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American dilemma, the negro problem and modern democracy*. New York: Harpers and Brothers Publishers.
O'Brien, N. (2011). Australian Muslims call for 'radical' 2MFM radio station to be shut down. Retrieved from http://muslimvillage.com/2011/01/09/8251/muslims-call-for-radical-2mfm-radio-station-to-be-shut-down/
Poynting, S., Noble, G., Tabar, P. & Collins, J.H. (2004). *'Bin Laden in the suburbs: criminalising the Arab other*. Sydney: The Federation Press.
Sohrabi, H. (2016). Identity and Muslim leadership: the case of Australian Muslim leaders. *Contemporary Islam, 10*(1), 1–16.
Sohrabi, H., & Farquharson, K. (2015). Australian Muslim leaders and normalisation discourses. *Ethnicities, 15*(5), 633–651.
Sohrabi, H., & Farquharson, K. (2016). Social integration of Australian Muslims: a dramaturgical perspective. *Journal of Sociology, 52*(2), 387–402.
Zwartz, B. (2011, 20 Oct 2011). The man and the Mufti. *The Sydney Morning Herald*. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/national/the-man-and-the-mufti-20111019-1m7zs.html
Zwartz, B. (2012). Local Muslim leaders condemn violence. Retrieved from http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/local-muslim-leaders-condemn-violence-20120917-262l5.html

Futures of Islam in France

11

Leyla Arslan

Muslims living in France have been facing multiple shifts and evolutions since the end of the 1970s. This chapter will discuss various facets of these developments, including what can be described as the rise of French Muslim citizens, the upward social mobility based on access to higher education, the weakening of their previous social identity as "blue collar workers", the essentialisation of their identity as "Muslim" and finally their stigmatization in a context of growing Islamophobia. Muslims in France have had to cope with mistrust for decades, and this suspicion has become worse for several reasons: first, the strengthening of the extreme right party, the National Front, and second, the global fear of increasing communitarianism within Muslim communities, particularly after the violent Islamist terrorist attacks abroad and in France since the 1990s and, most recently, in January and November 2015, within France.

This political situation has consequences for the way Muslims feel about themselves as Muslims and practice their Islam faith. Against the backdrop of these current developments, how can we imagine the future perspectives of Muslims in France between salience of religious identity and secularization, especially for the descendants of migrants? And what will the future of the Islamic organizations look like? The future perspectives of Islam cannot only be analyzed through the lens of secularization; we also have to understand how people use religious symbols in the cultural, economic and political fields. Contemporary Islam in France tends to oscillate between a *halal* way of life and a "symbolic ethnicity" (Gans 1979). This new balance appears in the attitude and behaviors of French Muslims and, consequently, affects in the organizations they create.

Understanding the past helps us understand the present and anticipate what the future might bring. Historically, in France, after years of an invisible presence for Muslim migrants, a new Muslim generation has entered the stage since the 1980s. These second-generation Muslims have become French citizens and, after

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_11

the failure of the secularized "Beur" movement (see below), have been identified and have identified themselves as Muslim in both the public and private spheres, especially since the end of the 1980s when the figure of the 'Muslim activist' appeared (section I). However, this Islamic new visibility did not mean the end of secularization. Religious transmission is mainly based on the transmission inside families, but this passing on of traditional religious and cultural norms and values inside family has been transformed as a result of the rise of interracial marriages and the upward mobility for many French Muslims (section II). But beyond secularization or salience of a religious identity, the negative essentialisation of Muslims in the public discourse contributes to transforming Islam into a kind of ethnicity. This ethnicity, more and more individual and individualistic, assigned or claimed, will be more or less appeased in function of the social trajectories of individuals. The future of Muslims in France will be drawn between symbolic ethnicity and Islamophobia, between conformity to the mainstream society with regard to the intensity of Islamic practices and a *halal* way of life. *Halal* industry, Islamic humanitarian organizations, autonomous local mosques led by French born Muslims rejecting the Islamic institutionalized organizations dominated by the countries of origins – this will be the future of Islam in France (section III).

1 The Rise of a Visible Muslim Religious Revival

1.1 Invisible Islam of the parents in the Dar al Harb

The Muslim community in France has grown with the several waves of immigration, predominantly from North African areas of the former colonial French empire in the 1960s, and subsequently also from many other parts of the world (e.g. Turkey, Mali, Senegal) (Viet, 2004). Most often, the first Muslim migrants, poor, of rural origins, few of them educated, brought with them an Islam that can be described as considered "traditional" or "moderate". Their main community organizations were not in charge of Islam: established in the 1970s, they were mainly characterized by blue collar working class culture and the cultural-ethnic markers of the members' countries of origin (Wihtol de Wenden, 2001). Some places of worship were created in big factories (such as Renault) or in the hostels where immigrants were accommodated, with the benevolence of the public authorities and the business community. For them, Islam could be used as a social tool to steer immigrant workers away from participating in strikes and social movements more broadly.

Given the lack of places of worship and organizations, Muslim immigrants practiced their faith with discretion. This could be justified as, first, most of them intended to return to their country of origin and, second, France was not a considered Muslim country; therefore the classical Islamic orthodoxy allowed them to reduce the extent of their religious practices as the theologist Qarâdawi, thinking about Muslim minorities living outside the Dar of Islam, explained in a fiqh al aqaliyyat (law of the minority, see Kazemipur's chapter in this volume) (Arslan, 2005).

However, while religious practices were performed hidden from the eyes of the wider society, this did not mean that Muslim migrants were completely secularized or that Islam was without importance for them. For many Muslim migrants, Islam was not only a religion, a cult, a set of rituals or source of spirituality, it was part of their cultural and national identity. It was often used as a shelter identity enabling them to cope in French society and to gain recognition as a community in a country where Islam was not the religion of the majority (Babès, 1997, 2000). This trend was reinforced by the general living conditions of many Muslims in France, characterized by poor housing and precarious employment, no political representation, racism, very few appropriate places of worship or community organizations, except the Grand Mosque of Paris (see Ricarda Stegmann's chapter in this volume), built after World War I, which had been the main Muslim community interlocutors for public authorities for many decades (Minces, 1997).

1.2 The secularized «Beurs»

In the beginning of the 1980s, after decades of Muslim communities remaining largely invisible, living at the fringes of society, without asking for social, political or religious claims, the descendants of North African immigrants became adults and French citizens. In 1983, the March for Equality and Against Racism, also known as the *marche des beurs*, signaled the rise of a new sociological and politically active movement within the Muslim community (Bouamama, 1994; Hajjat, 2013). At that time, descendants of Muslim immigrants were commonly called "Beur", a slang word coming from the word "Arab". The movement was not religious and the "Beurs" appeared to be a very secularized generation. This social movement did not use religious speech or religious activists and it did not make or support religious claims. As this new generation of Muslims considered France to be their home country, they rather expressed claims of equal social and political rights. However, mass media reports portrayed this social movement, which was more concerned with unemployment and tensions between young people and police

in the *banlieues*, as an ethnic movement claiming multiculturalism (Bouamama, 1994; Hajjat, 2013).

However, these demands of more equality fell on deaf ears within political parties and the government (Jazouli, 1986; 1992, Bouamama, 1994). At this time, after the president François Mitterrand had authorized the immigrants to create associations in 1981 without prior authorization of Minister of Interior, associations of a new kind have been created, inspired by the "Beur" movement, promoting civil activism. After they failed to achieve their goals, this was followed by a rise of grassroots organizations that focused their attention mainly on social activities fighting discriminations and exclusion on the local level of the neighborhood. These associations were not interested in religious action nor were they driven by an Islamic identity (Wihtol de Wenden, 2001).

1.3 The rise of Muslim activists and 'Born-again' Muslims

1.3.1 A Muslim identity preferred to being «Beur»

After a decade of tireless political mobilization for promoting equality between all French people, regardless of immigrant roots, many young people were disappointed. The previous social movement claiming social justice for those living in the *banlieues* and the descendants of immigrants failed because of internal divisions, fatigue of its activists and the misrepresentation of their claims in the mass media as support for multiculturalism (Bouamama, 1994). Many of these Muslim activists lost hope and faith in such a movement and left it, preferring to become active in small grassroots organizations, secular (promoting culture, sport or the fight against social exclusion) or religious, in their own local neighborhood. Another development: rather than presenting themselves as "Beur", they define themselves as Muslim. For them, the Muslim identity has bypassed "Beur" identity, which was experienced as a stigma. Thus, the former "Beurs" overcame their hybrid (half-French, half-Arabic) identity, replacing it by a single, comprehensive identity based on several centuries of civilization and history: Islam. Consequently, since the 1990s, the number of mosques has greatly increased : in 1970, there were 100 mosques, 500 in 1985, 1,279 in 1992, 1,545 in 2003, 1,600 in 2004 (Godard, 2007, p102), 2,368 in 2010 (Ministry of the Interior's data)[1].

This new generation of French Muslims usually had little knowledge about their country of origins and often didn't speak their mother tongue very well. Moreover, when travelling to the country of origins during holidays, they have been viewed as

1 http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-86924QE.htm

French, and not as Arabs. Thus, they have chosen being faithful to their origins by referring more to Islam than to the culture of their parents. With these widespread identity shifts among young Muslims, Islam has become a positive pole of identity after having appeared, until the failure of the "Beur"movement, as something archaic (Arslan, 2010). The re-discovery of his Islamic faith by Toumi Djaidja, one of the first leaders of the March for Equality and Against Racism in the 1990s symbolized this new Islamic visibility which is also linked to the heated public debates around the Muslim veil, which started to unfold in 1989. According to a poll carried out in 1994 by the Institut français d'opinion publique (IFOP) among 535 Muslims living in France interviewed in person and 1,000 French people representative of the mainstream society, the self-identification as Muslim and religious practices are more important for the 16-24 year olds than for the 25-34 year olds, the former "Beur" generation. This poll showed that those aged 16-24 practiced more than their elder counterparts: only 24% (versus 38%) do not fast during the holy month of Ramadan, 64% (versus 50%) do not drink alcohol, and 65% (versus 50%) want to make their holy pilgrim to Mecca (Le Monde Le supplément, 16 October 1994, polls IFOP :"France and Islam: the claims of the 16-24 year olds).

Beyond the failure of the "Beur" movement, this identity change can partially be explained by the emergence of new Muslim thinkers and activists promoting a renewed vision of Islam in Europe. Since the 1980s, the myth of returning to the country of origins has disappeared and the Muslims have come to consider the West their home. Time for religious discretion was ultimately over. They insisted on equal rights, including religious rights, and they wanted to fully express and practice their faith without any restrictions that may result from living in the *Dâr al Harb*. This required new ways of thinking about the religious text (ijtihad) in order to create an Islamic Western culture, offering a more coherent framework for *fatwas* stated in a very scattered way to fix the fate of the Muslim minority. Leaving the binary and classical opposition between the *Dâr al islam* and the *Dâr al Harb* is increasingly considered a necessity. Other concepts emerged such as *Dâr al Da'wa*, area of the preaching, as proposed by the Lebanese Fayçal Mawlawi, spiritual chief of the Union of the French Islamic organizations (UOIF), an organization close to the Muslims Brothers (Mawlawi, 1987), or the *Dâr al 'Ahd*, area for the contract (1981), by Al Qarâdawi, or *Dâr al Shahada*, area of testimony, by Tariq Ramadan (1994) (Ramadan, 1994, Césari, 2003). In the 1990s, in books, on audio cassettes and on tours through the immigrant and poor neighborhoods, Ramadan promoted a discourse about the possibility of being French, European and Muslim at the same time, without hierarchy (Ramadan, 1994, 1999, 2002):

> We are in the West and we stay there and even more, in the West, we are at home […] For the Muslims, they have to keep fidelity to their values and to be in tune with their environment. We don't have to be less Muslim to be more Western or European. We can be a Muslim churchgoer and a European citizen in the same time. (Ramadan, 2002, p7)

In the 1990s, this discourse was completely new, especially for the Algerians. Over the years, becoming French by adopting the nationality of the former colonizer was considered by many of them as an act of apostasy. All these interconnected developments have led to the creation of numerous Muslim associations and to the rise of a new kind of Muslim. According to the National Federation of Muslims in France, 632 Muslim associations and centers were created between 1969 and 1985 (Kepel, 1991, p 228). Many of them have organized worship and at same time promoted integration and worked towards strengthening Islam voices in the public debate. The foundation of some of the major national federations, such as the Union of the Islamic organizations in France (1983) or the National Federation of the French Muslims (1985), fall in this period of the 1980s:

1.3.2 The rise of the 'born-again' Muslims

A new kind of Muslim appeared at the end of the 1980s, with the increasing number of veils, beards and djellabas in some neighborhoods embodying this development. They have conceived their religiosity as a self-fulfillment and a quest for meaning based on the return to the funding principles of the Islamic Revelation, which differs from the religiosity of their migrant parents. While many of them may have previously been Muslim 'activists', this new Muslim way of life extended to a public far beyond. These Muslims act and behave similar to new converts to Islam, although most of them grew up in a Muslim family. This is why they can be tagged as 'born-again' Muslims, although this label is not being used for self-identification. Characterized by an orthodox practice (Amghar, 2006), they seek to suppress all cultural elements of the Islam practiced by migrants to "purify" it and make it more orthodox and, as they tend to claim, authentic. They affirm to promote a seemingly pure Islam, not corrupted by cultural influences. Their religiosity differs strongly from the traditional, rural, sometimes magical Islam practiced by their parents, and especially their mothers who have sometimes mixed Islam with magical practices (*sohr*) or a practiced cult of saints from the country of origins in the *zawiyya* (for the North Africans) (Babès 2000).

How do Muslims who follow this emerging understanding of Islam practice their religion? They develop a new religious sociability, for example, through the internet but also, more traditionally, through religious associations, promoting

an abstract Islam beyond ethnicity and culture of origins, claiming a universal, orthodox and non-territorial Islam (Roy, 2004). The Islamic sciences are important for the group; studying them is valued even though few of them have undergone theological training. Their religiosity is a do-it-yourself path, changing according the way the individual defines religious orthodoxy. Several movements, such as Islamic Salafi or Tablighi movement or Muslim Brotherhood, have succeeded in attracting permanent or temporary supporters. The use of mass media and the internet is vital for the development of their religious sociability. TV broadcasters, like Iqraa or Al Jazeera, have begun to play a role in the religious socialization in the 2000s, especially for Arabic-speaking immigrants and their descendants (Talon, 2005). The transnational Arab mass media with broadcasting of, for example, Al Chari'a wal Hayat, presented by Qarâdawi on al Jazeera, or Kalam min al Qalb by Amr Khaled on Iqraa, have spread an Islam from the Arabian Peninsula, not only across the Muslim world but also in France. The internet has become increasingly important for the youth, especially with the development of French websites. The number of Salafist websites, for example, has grown substantially, building a virtual and non-territorial global *Ummah*. They produce an Islam ready-to-consume and ready-to-apply without contextualization. On these websites, French Muslims can find advice in French language, for example, by chatting in forums. This building of a virtual *Ummah* is reflected by the names of these websites: muslimonline, cybermuslim, islamcity, ummah.net. The internet started to partially replace the traditional Islamic society, especially in countries where Islam is a minority religion. It is a new way of linking Muslims in a recreated religious community, offering the opportunity to buy Islamic books and other religious items or even offering virtual places of worship.

For 'born-again' Muslim girls and women, Islam is used as a resource to improve their status inside their family. In the name of 'authentic Islam', they can contest and break with the way of life of their migrant parents, claiming a different position within the family system, including re-allocated shares in the household duties and the possibility to choose their spouse (Khosrokhavar, 1997, p 57). Without referring to Islam, these acts of contestations would have been considered an unthinkable violation of basic family principles.

Notwithstanding the enormous heterogeneity within Muslim communities, numerous studies tend to link these phenomena of Islamic revival to Muslims' prevalent feeling of discrimination and alienation, especially among the youth living in the socioeconomically deprived *banlieues*. The shifts to more intense religious self-designation and practice may be founded on young Muslims' quests for self-respect or self-assertion. Religion becomes a redemption tool and a way to find new dignity. It is a way to find a community of peers, a "néo-communauté"

sharing the same values. It offers guidance and a sense of direction in a seemingly rather hostile world that is difficult to understand. Many young Muslims consider Islam as a way of protecting them from getting dragged into, for example violence or drug abuse. This new vision of Islam as identity refuge applies in particular to the most disadvantaged (Khosrokavar 1997, Kakpo 2007, Arslan, 2010, Kepel-Arslan 2012). It is strengthened by their sense of social exclusion and anti-Muslim racism, which gained momentum after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But this kind of new religiosity has not only emerged among descendants of migrants but also among a significant number of 'ethnically' French, who convert to Islam after having fasted out of solidarity with their Muslim friends, having accompanied them to the mosque, and spent time in religious gatherings. The stigmatization of both Islam as a faith and of those deprived neighborhoods where Muslims predominantly live has led them to conversion.

The visible and intensive religiosity of the 'born-again' Muslims are not well understood by the secularized mainstream society and sometimes not even by more secular Muslims, who tend to regard this religiosity as exaggerated and possibly a threat to *laïcité*, the separation between state and church.

2 Continuation of the Secularization and Rise of an Indivualized Islam

The numerous debates on the lack of integration of Muslims in French society and the increased visibility of the 'born-again' Muslims seem to hide one fact: the logics of secularization are not over. Although asking about people's religion in the census is forbidden in France - the last census asking about the religious belonging was held in 1872 -, some figures and qualitative survey data do exist. Based on a sociological survey[2] conducted in 2005, the sociologists Brouard and Tiberj state:

> […] what differentiates French people of African and Turkish origins from the rest of society is the over-representation of those youth who define themselves as Muslims,

2 For this questionnaire survey called Rapport au politique des Français issus de l'immigration, a representative sample of 1,003 French of African (including North African) and Turkish decent were interviewed, among them naturalized immigrants, those born to migrant parents, and French people with (at least) one migrant grandparent. A representative sample of the mainstream population was also interviewed as a mirror sample.

> while the same age group is underrepresented in terms of Catholic affiliation throughout the French population (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005, p. 27, author's own translation).

Self-identifying as Muslim does not say much, however, about the level of practicing Islam. The visit to a prayer facility is a more suitable indicator to measure the intensity of practiced religiosity. Comparing Muslims and other non-Muslim French, the aforementioned survey shows that Muslims attend places of worship as regularly as the rest of the population. Although Muslims and non-Muslims do not substantially differ in terms of their attendance at their places of worship (e.g. church, mosque), Muslims still seem to be more religious than the rest of society. Although Muslims of migration background practice their faith only slightly more than the wider population, their Islamic faith still seems to play a more central role: For half of the total French population, religion is only of minor importance, while this applies only to less than 10% of French of migration background; 44% of them state that it is very important and for 28% it is extremely important (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005, pp 27-28).

As Islam is not the mainstream religion in France, practicing becomes more of a deliberate individual decision; there is no Islamic 'obviousness' in France due to the weakness of Islamic institutions and its status as a minority religion. Therefore, the way of practicing and the choice of presenting oneself as Muslim depend heavily on various dimensions of religious socialization, including families, media and Islamic organizations, the evolution of the latter will be analyzed in the third part.

2.1 Transformations of the peer group and religious transmission

2.1.1 Traditional religious transmission transformed by the rise of interracial marriages

The way in which Islam is practiced and lived is mainly built and passed on by peer Muslims (e.g. family, neighborhood, friends). In most Muslim families, young people are introduced to certain dietary restrictions (e.g. pork, alcohol) and religious celebrations (e.g. Ramadan, Eid). In the case where parents are migrants, most of them have a low level of religious education and knowledge in a theological sense: they have taught religious rituals without being able to explain their deeper meaning to their children, who thus learn Islam by 'mimicry' (Babès, 2000, p126.).

Moreover, parents commonly experience difficulties explaining to their children the religious discrepancy between their home and the rest of society. However, beyond their seeming homogeneity, Muslim immigrants who were educated in

their Muslim country of origin have formed not one, but many different Muslim communities. Various national and ethnic belongings, urban or rural origins, age, political opinions, and *madhab* belongings, that is different Islamic sects or schools of thought (e.g. mainly Malikism for North Africans, Hanafism for Turks and Pakistanis) result in a variety of ways of being a Muslim in France. For instance, in North Africa, Islamic religiosity developed differently in urban and rural spaces: in the major towns, discourses of orthodoxy were more prevalent, whereas in the rural parts, people were more influenced by an Islam mixed with magical practices, beliefs in *djinns*[3] and in other forces of the nature. One of the first quantitative surveys among migrants in France, for example, found that Algerians attended mosques less frequently than all other Muslims, and that Kabylian (Berber) from Algeria's north practiced their faith less than Arab Muslims from Algeria (Tribalat, 1995, p. 94). Moreover, the survey findings showed that the degree of religiosity was lower among those with higher levels of education (Tribalat, 1995, p. 106). These different religious legacies are poorly and inconsistently transmitted by the parents. The Islam with strong magical components, common among North African Muslims, especially the mothers, for example, is hardly being passed on to their children, especially to their daughters (Arslan, 2010). Instead, due to the emergence of French Islamic associations , the proselytism of the Tabligh in France, the rise of orthodoxy in North Africa and the increasing access to religious broadcasting from the Arabian Peninsula, religious practices of immigrants tend to become increasingly orthodox, also among mothers: *Sohr* (a kind of black magic, condemned by the Quran) and *roqyya* (a kind of divination or white magic, sometimes using religious verses) are being used less and less by mothers, as these practices are not considered orthodox.

The aforementioned survey among immigrants and their descendants, conducted by Brouard and Tiberj (2005), shows that respondents' religious self-identification is associated with their integration in French society. The part of Muslims is more important for the immigrants and the first generation born in France, however the second generation is twice less Muslim: 35% among them are without religion. It is the case for 22% in the first generation and 14% for the immigrants (Brouard, Tiberj, 2005, p.23). The most important evolution is the increase of the interethnic marriages: more than ¾ of the second-generation respondents were born in an interethnic family setting. For the descents of North Africans, 28% of those born in an interethnic family see themselves as Muslims, while this applies to 78% for those born in ethnically non-mixed families. It can be concluded from the survey

3 The Islamic texts refer to supernatural and invisible creatures: angels (*malaika*) and *djinns*. The first being entities of light, the second are entities of fire.

findings that, overall, interethnic family environments seem to weaken the Muslim identity. Vice versa, or coming from a non-mixed family shows particularly strong effects on young respondents of North African origins: 90% of them declare themselves as Muslims. (Brouard, Tiberj, 2005, p. 23). This observation of the weakening of the self-designation as Muslims according to the interracial marriage was also illustrated in the more recent survey Trajectoires et origines (INSEE, INED, 2010), as the following table illustrates.

Tab. 1 Religious self-designation in function of the link to migration

	Migrants	Descendants of two migrant parents	Descendants from one parent migrant	Mainstream (non-immigrant) population
Without religion	19	23	48	49
Catholics	26	27	39	47
Orthodoxs	3	1	0	0
Protestants	4	1	1	1.5
Muslims	43	45	8	1
Jews	0.5	1	2	0.5
Buddhists	2.5	1	0.5	0.5
Other	2	1	1	0.5
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Survey: Trajectoires et origines, INED-INSEE, 2008, p 124, https://www.ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/19558/dt168_teo.fr.pdf

Population: 18-50 years of age

Reading: 19% of migrants assert not having a religion, 26% identify themselves as Catholics

2.1.2 Upward mobility for French Muslims

The descendants of migrants that come from the Islamic world are currently experiencing what can be described as an 'invisible revolution'. While for decades the vast majority of them had been poorly educated, stuck in low-prestige and badly paid occupational positions, Muslim communities in France have entered into a new phase of deep transformation, as a part of second and third generation migrants are increasingly becoming middle class (INSEE-INED, 2010; Tribalat, 1995, pp 19-37).

The social status of descendants of immigrants has improved as a result of their incorporation into civil society associations and political parties during the 1980s and the 1990s (de Wenden, 2001), among other factors. Two decades later, however, the upward mobility appears more due to improved access to university

education.[4] They have benefited from the expansion of higher education at the end of the 1980s and the mid-1990s. As a result of this, individuals have discovered new social spaces very different from the working-class immigrant neighborhood they had previously known. This leads them to perceive their 'differences' with more flexibility because they become more aware of the plurality of their various layers of identity. Spatial and social mobilities have helped these individuals come to grips with more complex understandings of who they are themselves and what society they live in. They increasingly manage to overcome their hitherto dominant binary thinking in terms of a clash between races and communities, like Blacks vs Whites, Muslims vs non-Muslims (Arslan, 2010).

These socioeconomic developments have strong implications also for the self-designation of ethno-religious minorities and the intensity of their religious practices. Brouard and Tiberj (2005) found in their survey data analysis that the higher the monthly income, the lower the proportion of Muslims and the higher the proportion of those 'without any religion.' Moreover, their analysis revealed that the level of belonging to Islam doesn't correlate with the level of schooling or education attainment. The proportion of those respondents holding high school or a university degree who identify as Muslims is as high as among those without formal educational qualifications, which suggests that Islam in France goes beyond the educational boundaries and plays an important role in the identity formation of the highly educated as well as those with low levels of education (Tiberj, Brouard, 2005, p. 26).

2.2 Beyond the 'Born-again' Muslim, other kinds of sociological Muslims

Those defining themselves as Muslims in France fall broadly into one of the following two categories: The 'born-again' Muslims we presented previously and those defining Islam as a mix between moral, religion, culture and tradition. Beyond these two groups, few individuals born into Muslim family refrain from defining themselves as Muslim.

4 The French educational system is said to be meritocratic, although the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) survey carried out by the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) consistently pinpoint its exclusionary effects, especially on socioeconomically deprived groups (Arslan, 2010).

2.2.1 People coming from a Muslim family abandoning Islam

Not many people who have turned their back on Islam publicly assert they are no longer Muslims. While not much is known about them, it can be assumed that at least some of them consider themselves now atheists or agnostics. Others may have converted to another religion, for instance, Christianity. Abandoning Islam often means breaking with the family's religious culture. This choice can be very painful when the individuals keep having good relations with their parents. Some people, especially among those of Algerian origin, gave up being Muslim in the wake of the Algerian civil war during the 1990s because they considered Islam a terrorist and archaic religion after having been shocked by some terrorist attacks (Arslan, 2010).

2.2.2 People conceiving Islam as a culture and a moral

Another group defines their Islam in accordance with the views and practices of their migrant parents. For Muslims in this category, Islam is a mix of religion, moral and culture. In contrast to the 'born-again' Muslims, they insist they can be Muslim without regularly attending the mosque and fervently practicing every religious ritual. For them Islam is rather a marker of cultural belonging and a moral framework. The Islam of the parents is not rejected as being shallow or mistaken. Religious celebrations such as Ramadan are the most important moment of their religious life, practiced and followed as a way of connecting with the community. They commonly share the intention to re-build, in a novel synthesis, a religious family legacy, not dissimilar to the path followers of other religions have previously taken in France. The individualization of their Muslim faith is an important factor in their understanding of religiosity. Religious issues and practices, including the choice of how and whether to practice at all, are increasingly regarded as belonging to the private sphere of each individual. North African, Turkish or African Islam, characterized also by certain regional specifics as inherited from the parents, is not rejected. According to these Muslims, Islam is conceived as part of the Arabic Muslim identity. It is both a cultural legacy maintained in the family traditions and behaviors, and a faith requiring its adherents to apply a moral code which needs to somehow be adapted to the specific circumstances. There is no real dissociation between the Arabic or Turkish or African layers of their identity and their Muslim identity - again in contrast to the 'born-again' Muslims (Arslan, 2010).

Muslims in this category tend to find individual autonomy in religious matters. They are Muslims at the occasion of the most important rites of passage, such as circumcision or marriage. Their Muslim belonging is claimed in a very soft, non-aggressive way. Sometimes, it serves more like a religious label without deep spiritual content. Therefore, here Islam is a "thread running through generations

coming from migration, it is working as a link reuniting the 'here' and the 'over there'" (Arslan, 2010). Under these conditions, claiming to be Muslim enables them to maintain a link to their cultural origins without deepening their relation to God.

3 Beyond Religiosity: Islam as Ethnicity

The future perspectives of Islam cannot only be understood through the rise of a religious visibility or a stronger secularity: we also have to understand how people use religious symbols in the cultural, economic and political fields. The analysis of attitude and behaviors of French Muslims show us that Muslims in France tend to oscillate between the development of a *halal* way of life and a symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979), which, consequently, has an effect on the organizations they create.

3.1 Between essentialization and stigmatization as "Muslim"

3.1.1 Islamophobia and essentialization of the Muslim identity

Until the end of the 1970s, Islam had been perceived as a tool to promote social peace, as prayer rooms were set up in factories or in migrant workers' hostels, and TV broadcasting stations catering for religious needs for Muslims were created. These general attitudes and approaches, however, changed fundamentally between 1979 and 1986, when in the wake of the Islamic revolution in Iran the political and public debate in France shifted towards increased fears and concerns about Islam with many French politicians, speaking about Islam as a dangerous and alien religion. Furthermore, migrants had to face the politicization of questions around migration in the 1980s, while the openly xenophobic party, The National Front, managed to increase its socio-political influence and celebrated unprecedented electoral successes (Dreux 1983).

At this stage, with the weakening of their blue-collar worker identity, many migrants were considered less, along the lines of social class, as "workers" or, along ethnic lines, "Arabs" or "Africans", and more as "Muslims". Public authorities, mass media and community leaders started to massively use the label "Muslim" to comment on societal developments on the pretext that Muslims, residing in the same socioeconomically deprived areas, would all share major cultural and social barriers. This kind of analysis, regularly expressed by intellectuals and politicians from the veil affair of 1989 up until now have caused increasing concerns about the

development of growing communitarianism among Muslim communities, which was seen as a threat to the republican order. The reference to Islam for explaining certain political and social behaviors has since become commonplace. For instance, in 2005, the riots in the deprived areas were primarily farmed and tagged as Muslim riots. Some columnists and politicians explained them by referring to polygamy or the so-called role of Islamic/Islamist associations. The descendants of migrants of Muslim background tend to be defined as Muslim, regardless of whether they feel and identify themselves as Muslims, regardless of whether they practice Islam in one way or another or not.

From the end of the 1970s to now, these developments unfolded against the backdrop of increasing concerns – or even fear – of immigration and the implications of the economic crisis (OPEC, strikes) and the Iranian revolution. The trend towards the negative essentialization of Muslims in the public discourses and the increase of Islamophobia have not stopped growing since. This new negative (mis) representation of Islam was further fueled by the Rushdie affair in the UK and the Islamic headscarf controversy in France, both occurring around the same time in 1989-90. Subsequently, the essentializing and prejudice-driven public portrayal of Islam was aggravated in the aftermaths of the various terrorist attacks around the world, especially those of the September 11th, 2001 in the US and, most recently, those of January and November, 2015 in Paris, and in reaction to increasing conflicts resulting from the clash between French traditional stance on *laïcité* and Islamic religiosity and practices. These clashes are becoming more common today, not only due to the development of a strict *laïcité* identity promoted by the extreme right, but also as a result of an increasingly restrictive definition of *laïcité*, which tends to confuse *laïcité* and secularism.

What is the difference between these two concepts? *Laïcité* is a legal obligation of neutrality for the state and the public servants, whereas secularism describes a process in which religion is continuously losing relevance for the individual person, both in the private and public sphere. The state-church regime *laïcité* is based on case law, laws and constitution: this last one asserts indeed that France is a *laïque* republic. The most famous law about *laïcité* is the law passed in 1905 which promotes the separation between church and state. If religious pluralism is acknowledged by the French Constitution, the law of 1905 promotes the separation between church and state, leading to state neutrality and the equality between cults. But the 1905 law is not applicable in the entire French territory: Concordat is applied at the East, in Alsace Moselle, which was German territory when the law was passed. Due to this regime created by Napoleon in 1801, public money finances the wages of the clerics or the building of worship (Baubérot, 2007).

Since the end of the 16th century, the separation between church and state, coupled with the rise of a more secularised society, has provoked strong tensions which tend to calm down concerning religions other than Islam, even if the defence of faith-based private schools or of the traditional family can resurrect them as the massive Catholic demonstrations against the gay marriage in 2013 illustrate. Today, the debate about *laïcité* is more and more a debate about Islam. Islam has been increasingly perceived as a threatening social fact, suspected to not respect equality between men and women and the fundamental rights in liberal democracies, such as freedom of expression, which allegedly threatens French society through the promotion of conservatism, radicalism and Islamism (Gastaut 2000). This trend is strengthened by the fact that the extreme right wing has developed an identity *laïcité* over the past few years: if they criticize the few Muslim prayers in the street, they don't do the same when some Catholic fundamentalists do it, for instance during the debate about gay marriage. But this new way to consider the *laïcité* has an effect on the whole political French chessboard. This hotchpotch between the lack of *laïcité* and Islam is due to the more recent arrival of this religion in France and its new visibility inboth the public and private spheres.

Today, Muslim belonging has tended to become a new form of ethnicity, socially very costly due to prevalent stigmatization of Islam. Muslims are assigned their Muslim identity by the public discourse and thus get stuck in a religious identity that they do not necessarily choose themselves or wish to be associated with publicly. This trend creates the misconception that Muslims constitute one homogenous community, seemingly sharing the same characteristics and interests, that ask for special treatment by the public authorities. This stands in contrast to the above outlined fact that the Islamic revival among the youth did not mean the same thing to all of them. This external homogenization has had implications for the way Muslims are perceived by the wider community. The findings of a recent study by the French human rights organization la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme (CNCDH, 2012) highlight that Muslims are increasingly seen as a group that lives outside the French mainstream society. The 2012 CNCDH report shows that 51% of all respondents think "Muslims" constitute a group outside of French society ("un groupe à part dans la société"); this proportion decreases to 40% for "North Africans" and 38% for "Asians" (CNCDH, 2012).

While since 2005 there was a trend of returning prejudices, since 2010, a deep switch has been visible, which is explained by the economic crisis producing a racism of protection and the rise of the extreme-right party. These anti-Muslim prejudices against Muslims seem to also affect Muslims' socioeconomic opportunities. In 2010, French and American academics David Laitin, Claire Adida and Marie-Anne Valfort (2010) found empirical evidence that Muslims may face higher levels of

discrimination than other groups when applying for a job. Through a systematic discrimination study using a correspondence test in the French labor market and a matching strategy that compares the relative success of two identical candidates who differ only in their religious affiliation, the three researchers identify significant discrimination against Muslim job applicants. Its key result is that when all other personal characteristics (e.g. relevant qualification, experiences) are identical, a Muslim job candidate is 2.5 times less likely to be invited to a job interview than is his or her Christian counterpart. The study showed that a job applicant named "Marie Diouf" who alluded in her application to her Christian background by mentioning her involvement in a Catholic humanitarian organization, received 100 responses from the employers, while another, equally qualified job applicant named "Khadija Diouf", who mentioned her active engagement with an Islamic humanitarian organization, received only 38 answers (Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2010).

In a more recent study investigating the labor market discrimination against the minority religions, Marie Anne Valfort (2015) again found strong empirical evidence that Muslims face discrimination when trying to get a job. For this large-scale study, 6,231 CVs were submitted throughout mainland France between September 2013 and September 2014. In order to analyze how the applicant's religion influences the callback decisions of the employers, all applicants were French citizens of Lebanese origins, born in 1988; they all arrived in France after getting a junior high school degree and completed their secondary education in France with the same degree and professional experience. The findings show that strong discrimination against Muslims prevails.

> The probability that practicing Catholics will get a callback from a recruiter to invite them to a hiring interview is 30% higher than that for practicing Jews. And it is twice as high as the callback rate for practicing Muslims. But this last result conceals a strong disparity based on sex. Whereas the callback rate for practicing female Catholic applicants is "only" 40% higher than that for practicing Muslim women, the callback rate for practicing Catholic men is close to four times higher than that of practicing Muslim men (Valfort 2015, p. 14).

3.1.2 Fighting against Islamophobia and Islamic humanitarianism, the new it-issues

Against the backdrop of rising Islamophobia, those organizations that have made it one of their priorities to combat Islamophobia have gained strength; they have become the new centers of Islamic activism, while more traditional Muslim community organizations, both at the local and national levels, continue to operate as a site for ethnic gatherings for immigrants, offering a soothing discourse about what

Islam and being Muslim mean in France. Although these Islamic organizations have become better structured since the 1990s, they are still mainly organized along lines of ethnic and national belonging: Algerian Islam (dominant, for example, in the Mosque of Paris), Moroccan Islam, Turkish Islam. Only the Tabligh, the Muslim brotherhood and the various Salafist groups are ethnically very mixed and not linked directly to a certain nationality.

Generally speaking, Islamic associations in France have not succeeded to produce French leaders in charge of Islamic worship. At the end of the 1990s, the Union of Islamic French organizations (UOIF) was the one major Muslim organization that was most open to the establishment of a 'home-grown' French Muslim leadership for its youth organizations; however, one of the most well-known young leaders of the Islamic Youth of France, the youth organization of the UOIF, Farid Abdelkrim, left the UOIF and its youth organization in the 2000s with feelings of deep disappointment and anger, which he expressed publicly in a book about his experience (Abdelkrim, 2015). Sometimes, French born Muslims develop autonomous mosques, beyond the main Islamic federations, which, in some cases, have gained influence in their neighborhood, but not in the national governance of Islam in France (Kepel and Arslan, 2011).

Due to these developments and in spite of the creation of a French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman; CFCM) in 2003, composed of all major Muslim organizations, the institutionalized Islam is not recognized by its grassroots communities as something of value, having influence on the religious practices and understanding of their faith. While the main Muslim leaders have expressed their concerns about Islamophobia, which is a very mobilizing issue for the youth, they have failed to set up effective actions or groups to fight against it, with the exception, perhaps, of the UOIF, which heavily mobilized around the veil issue. Due to their weak involvement, others Muslim organizations, unrelated to issues revolving around the governance of the Islamic worship, were created. Amongst them, the "Union des Jeunes Musulmans de France" (1987), the "Jeunes Musulmans de France", the "Collectif des Musulmans de France" have become very active public voices against the suspension of veiled teenagers at public schools. In contrast to the activity profile of traditional worship organizations (e.g. mosques), this new Muslim activism was inspired by trade union activism, by young Muslims' involvement in local associations, which had positive effects on their skills and knowledge as well as their sense of citizenship, among other things.

Today, combatting Islamophobia is perhaps the only thematic context where we can find Muslim activists involved as a Muslim group at the political level. It is not a coincidence that Mohamed Latrèche, founder of the "Parti des Musulmans de France" was a harsh opponent to the law prohibiting religious symbols at the public school

in 2004. After 2003, a new wave of activists has risen with organizations such as the "coordination contre le racisme et l'islamophobie" (CCIF). While the first activists of these kinds of organizations were 'born-again' Muslims, more and more people conceiving Islam as a mix between culture and moral have begun to sympathize or even to get actively involved in these new types of Muslim organizations in the face of rising Islamophobia. Regardless of their specific approaches to Islam, these young activists were born in France and tend to be well educated. Some of them are professional activists, but many others are involved in this activism as volunteers in their free time outside their jobs at firms or as public servants. They tend to try to expand their civic agenda to also include other forms of racism and exclusion to underline their global and universal approach. They often try to find allies within non-Islamic associations (feminist groups, other minority groups) and join forces with other minority groups. The CCIF, for example, has become actively engaged in redressing prejudices and discrimination against the ethnic Roma population and in the fight against racism and Islamophobia at the European level. Rather than arguing along religious lines, their agenda is primarily based on the preamble of the French constitution, the "Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen". Despite this reference to the (republican) French constitutional principles, they are often regarded by parts of the most well-known anti-racism organizations to be pursuing rather communitarian goals.

Parallel to the emergence of these Muslim community organizations, humanitarian Islamic organizations have become increasingly important actors within the institutional landscape over the last few years, especially for young Muslims who often share their messages on Facebook, give money or time as volunteers. The *Islamic crescent* or *une chorba pour tous* come to mind, which provides food to Muslims and for the non-Muslims in need. More recently, *Baraka city*, created in 2010 and very active on the Internet seeks to develop humanitarian actions, delivering food in deprived neighborhoods in France and abroad in Asia, Africa or Middle East, especially for Muslims. This kind of activism gives the opportunity to promote a positive Islamic identity.

3.2 Beyond religion, the rising of a *halal* way of life and an Islamic ethnicity

3.2.1 Post-Islamism and halal way of life

While young Muslims do not seem to be involved or even interested in the governance of worship at the local or national level, they often prefer to promote an individualized Muslim identity through new ways of mobilization (e.g. fighting

Islamophobia, pursuing humanitarian issues) and new ways of consumption, be it media, food, fashion, or music. The desire to disconnect Islam and culture leads to post-Islamism, which initially only applied to 'born-again' Muslims, but subsequently has become a way of life for more and more young Muslims: - a *halal* way of life.

This post-Islamism, characterized by liberal values in economy, valuing the economy rather than focusing on politics has been tagged as 'Market Islam' (Haenni 2005). This manifestation of lived Islam promises new future directions to Muslims, mixing various factors: a new individualized religiousness with new interactions between religion and economy, a kind of new business ethics based on religion. The growing rise of *halal* illustrates this new trend. While this kind of consumption has been well developed among 'born-again' Muslims, it also seems to be becoming increasingly popular with the other young Muslims. For many of them, their newly discovered religious way of *halal* consumption, vastly void of any spiritual and religious meaning, has become only an identity label. Beyond the hijab, jellabah, qamis and traditional Islamic clothes worn by the 'born-again' Muslims, a new offer is appearing for them and other Muslim youth, through small brands in food or in fashion, such as dawah wear, created in 2004 in the US and sold at the Muslim congress organized by the UOIF, or Unicitewear, founded in 2007. The rap singer Médine, who has written rap songs about Islamophobia or the situation of Muslims in the Middle East and Europe, which are promoted by his own label la boussole, has launched his own design label le savoir est une arme (knowledge is a weapon, which is inspired by one of his songs). His T-shirts show slogans like "I'm Muslim, don't panic , "Everyday, I'm Muslim", "Jihad, the biggest fight is against oneself", others are printed with the names and figures of Malcolm X, Massoud, Che Guevara. This latest Islamic street-wear shows how Islam is becoming more of an ethnicity rather than a spirituality or worship. According to Patrick Haenni,

> whereas the Islamic fashion is based on an accommodation of a symbolic universe (background) and religious rules (Islamic), the street-wear fashion rises from the religious rules. It doesn't want to be in contradiction with them, it has no interest for them. Whatever the inspiration of the clothes, tradition, street-wear or modest fashion, the Islamism is reduced to a symbolic catalogue in which the brands choose their icons and pictograms. (Haenni, 2005, pp 32-33)

For a few years, brands like Uniqlo or even luxury brands like Dolce & Gabana have become aware of these new markets and business opportunity, as they develop some 'modest' fashion items targeting the Muslim and Western worlds, including observant Muslims, Christians and Jews. A similar development can be identified in the food industry. While the *halal* industry was mainly concerned with the meat industry until the 2000s, now it is possible to eat Tex-Mex, Chinese, Indian,

Italian *halal* food or drink *halal* drinks like Mecca Cola. *Halal* food can be found in mainstream supermarkets, and some branches of fast-food restaurant chains like Burgerking or Quick restaurants (that served *halal* meat) have opened. According to the marketing office Solis, the *halal* industry amounted to 5.5 billion euros in 2010. (« Le marché du halal suscite des convoitises en France », Le Figaro, 31/03/2010) – not without also causing numerous controversies in the public debate in France.

3.2.2 Islam as a symbolic ethnicity?

Beyond the question of secularity or salience of a religious identity, and beyond the nature of the relation between God and the religious individual, Islam in France tends to become an ethnicity. But how can we define it? As a 'symbolic ethnicity' similar to the concept that Herbert Gans developed in the 1970s? Or as an instrumentalist one? Is it a chosen or rather an imposed identity? Is it a rather individualistic or a more collective one? The social transformations in the country of origins and the distance due to the migration cause a process of *désaffiliation* which contributes to the emergence of more individualized behaviors leading people to continuously re-shape their understanding of their religion, resembling a new form of ethnicity. This new ethnicity becomes more affective or symbolic than the one of their parents, brought up abroad where this cultural and religious alterity was the norm.

However, the majority of French Muslim citizens prefer to relegate their "differences", especially religious ones, to the private sphere, for consumption, for free time. They want to appear as "normal" as anyone else in French society (Arslan, 2010). This quest for "normality" and "sameness" can be illustrated by their doubts about the changing public policy to deal with ethnic, cultural and religious differences: "integration" since the end of the 1980s, and "struggle against discriminations", "positive action" and "diversity" since the end of the 1990s. Several *entrepreneurs identitaires*, that is, organization that are involved in generating political discourse shaping different kinds of identity, have emerged over the last few years, proposing strengthening collective identities defined in ethnic, religious or post-colonial terms. However, there is a deep gap between their discourse and people's predominant practice and experiences which are more turned towards universal collective action: fighting for better education as a young person, being interested in accessible housing as a member of the working and middle classes.

For instance, a Muslim party, the *Parti des Musulmans de France*, was created in 1997 in the east of France, but this party has remained so small und un-recognized that the majority of Muslims have never heard about it. So, the expression of ethnic or religious references is more or less appeased and more affective. Very few people use them in collective and political actions. As the majority seeks to appear 'normal' in the public sphere, the various offers of the *entrepreneurs identitaires* encounter

major difficulties in trying to build a large base, the religious reference seeming to be the most efficient tool: the religious organizations are the most well-known among the groups that base their discourse on cultural or religious references. So far away from a citizenship inspired by the polyethnic rights of Will Kymlicka (1996), French Muslim citizens are more focused on reminding the public authorities to live up to the promises of equality and freedom at the heart of the republican model than creating an Islamic political order. They are more concerned with their own socioeconomic mobility than with maintaining close ties with their ethnic or religious group. They mostly adopt individualized approaches (Arslan, 2010). Mobilizing as Arabs or as Muslims in the public and especially in the political sphere seems inefficient, even counterproductive for their chances to improve their socioeconomic mobility in a context of public hostility towards Islam. Therefore, French Muslim citizens tend to use means at their disposal (including the educational system) by getting degrees and finding good jobs, for instance. Finally, establishing a collective movement referring to Islam or their ethnicity, stigmatization and discrimination lead to the opposite situation: Most Muslims in France prefer to remain invisible, 'hidden' among the mass of the other citizens, claiming recognition as 'ordinary' equal citizens. They want to be the only ones who define themselves, refusing to accept an identity defined by others that refer to religion or ethnicity, which keeps to particularizing and essentializing them.

4 Conclusion

In a republican, *laic* country, like France, where the public expression of minority belongings is poorly recognized, the future of Islam is complex and complicated. Until now; the Islamic (religious) community organizations seem to have trouble building a strong basis, as their leaders claim to represent a community they do not speak for. Their position of leaders is mainly based on their acknowledgement by the public authorities as an interlocutor. However, the traditional institutions focusing on the governance of Islamic religious practice are currently experiencing a deep crisis, which can partly be explained by the lack of homegrown community leaders. This lack of leadership is due to blocking behavior inside the main Islamic organizations, but it is also due to the lack of the youth's appetence of worship governance. The sociological transformations of the Muslim group (interracial marriages and the access to the middle class) enable the continuation of the logics of secularity in a background where a part of the youth is experiencing an Islamic revival. But beyond salience of a religious identity or secularity, the Islamic reference can be

understood as the visibility of a new ethnicity which can't be a symbolic one due to the strength of Islamophobia. This new ethnicity, more or less appeased, more or less claimed or assigned, more or less individualistic, is leading many Muslims to explore and express new ways of consumptions and activism.

References

Abdelkrim, Farid, 2015. Pourquoi j'ai cessé d'être islamiste. Paris : Les points sur les i.
Adida, Claire ; Laitin, David ; Valfort, Marie-Anne, Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays ? Une étude expérimentale sur le marché du travail, 2010 :http://equality.frenchamerican.org/sites/default/files/laitin_discriminationmusulmans_report_fr.pdf
Adraoui, Mohamed-Ali. 2013. Du Golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé. Paris : PUF.
Amghar, Samir. 2006. Le salafisme en Europe. La mouvance polymorphe d'une radicalisation. Politique étrangère, Printemps (1) : 67–78.
Arslan, Leyla. 2005. Au miroir du bled : l'islam des Français d'origine maghrébine, Paris : Master II memory, Sciences Po (unpublished).
Arslan, Leyla. 2010. Enfants d'Islam et de Marianne : des banlieues à l'Université, Paris : PUF.
Babes, Leïla. 1997. L'islam positif, la religion des jeunes musulmans de France. Paris : L'Atelier.
Babes, Leïla. 2000. L'islam intérieur, passion et désenchantement. Paris : El Bouraq.
Bauberot, Jean. 2007, Histoire de la laïcité, Paris, PUF.
Bouama, Saïd. 1994. Dix ans de marche des beurs : Chronique d'un mouvement avorté. Paris : Desclée De Brouwer, Collection Epi-Habiter.
Bouzar, Dounia. 2001. L'islam des banlieues, les prédicateurs musulmans, nouveaux travailleurs sociaux ? Paris : Syros.
Brouard, Sylvain ; Tiberj, Sylvain. 2005. Français comme les autres ? Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque, Paris. Presses de Sciences Po.
Castel, Robert. 1999. Les Métamorphoses de la question sociale. Une chronique du salariat, Paris : Gallimard.
Cesari, Jocelyne, 2003. L'islam à l'épreuve de l'Occident, Paris, La Découverte
CNCDH, 2012, Rapport annuel sur la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie, http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/cncdh_racisme_02_basse_def.pdf
Deltombe, Thomas. 2005. L'islam imaginaire : la construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en France (1975–2005), Paris : La Découverte.
Gastaut, Yvan. 2000. L'immigration et l'opinion en France sous la Vème République, Paris : Seuil.
Geisser, Vincent. 2003. La nouvelle islamophobie, Paris : La Découverte.
Godard, Bernard, TAUSSIG, Sylvie. 2007. Les musulmans en France, courants, institutions, communautés, un état des lieux, Paris : Hachettes Littératures.
Godard, Bernard. 2015. La question musulmane en France. Un état des lieux sans concessions. Paris : Fayard.
Hajjat, Abdellali. 2013. La marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme. Amsterdam, 2013

Hajjat, Abdellali ; Mohammed, Marwan, Islamophobie : comment les élites françaises fabriquent le « problème musulman », La Découverte, Paris, 2016
Haenni, Patrick. 2005. L'islam de marché, l'autre révolution conservatrice. Paris : Seuil.
INSEE - INED, 2010. Trajectories and Origins Survey, Document de travail n° 168, http://teo_english.site.ined.fr/
INSEE, 2012. Fiches thématiques, Population immigrée, www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/ref/IMMFRA12_g_Flot1_pop.pdf
Jazouli, Adil. 1986. L'action collective des jeunes Maghrébins en France, Paris : L'Harmattan CIEMI.
Jazouli, Adil. 1992. Les années banlieue, Paris : Seuil.
Kakpo, Nathalie. 2007. L'islam, un recours pour les jeunes, Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, Société en mouvement.
Kepel, Gilles. 1991. Les banlieues de l'islam, naissance d'une religion en France. Paris : Seuil.
Kepel, Gilles (avec Leyla Arslan et Sarah Zouheir). 2012. Banlieue de la République, Paris : Gallimard.
Khoskhoravar, Farhad. 1995. Le Foulard et la république, Paris : La Découverte.
Khoskhoravar, Farhad. 1998. L'islam des jeunes, Paris: Flammarion.
Kymlicka, Will, 1996, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority rights, London : Clarendon Press
Laurence, Jonathan ; VAISSE, Justin. 2007. Intégrer l'islam. La France et ses musulmans: enjeux et réussites, Paris : Odile Jacob.
Laurence, Jonathan. 2012. The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims : the State's Role in Minority Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Lorcierie, Françoise. 2005. La politisation du voile en France, en Europe et dans le monde arabe, Paris : L'Harmattan.
Mawlawi, Fayçal, Al Ussus al char'ia lil'aqalat bayna al muslimin wa ghar al muslimin, (the Legal Foundations of Relations between Muslims and non Muslims), Beyrouth, Dar al Rashad al Islamiya, 1987
Mesure, Sylvie ; Renaut, Alain. 1999. Alter Ego, les paradoxes de l'identité démocratique, Paris : Flammarion.
Minces, Juliette. 1997 : La génération suivante, Paris : Ed de l'Aube.
Ramadan, Tariq. 2002. Musulmans d'Occident, construire et contribuer. Paris : Tahwid.
Ramadan, Tariq, 1994, Les Musulmans dans la laïcité, Lyon, Tahwid
Ramadan, Tariq, 1999, Etre musulman européen, étude des sources islamiques à la lumière du contexte européen, Lyon, Tahwid
Roy, Olivier. 2004. L'Islam mondialisé. Paris : Seuil
Stora, Benjamin. 1992. Ils venaient d'Algérie, l'immigration algérienne en France, 1912 1992. Paris : Fayard.
Talon, Claire, 2005, Les Chaînes satellitaires arabes et les jeunes Français issus de l'immigration. Chronique d'un malentendu, Paris, Mémoire de DEA, Sciences P.
The Pew Forum on religion and public life, The Future of the Global Muslim Population, projections 2010–2030, 2011, http://www.pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx
Tribalat, Michèle. 1995. Faire France, une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants, Paris : la Découverte.
Tribalat, Michèle ; Kaltenbach, Jeanne-Hélène. 2002. La République et l'islam : entre crainte et aveuglement. Paris : Gallimard.

Valfort, Marie-Anne, Discriminations religieuses : une réalité, 2015, Paris, Institut Montaigne, http://www.institutmontaigne.org/fr/publications/discriminations-religieuses-lembauche-une-realite
Venel, Nancy. 1999. Des pratiquantes voilées à l'université. Paris : l'Harmattan.
Venel, Nancy. 2004. Musulmans et citoyens. Paris : Le Monde-PUF.
Viet, Vincent. 2004. Histoire des Français venus d'ailleurs, de 1850 à nos jours. Paris : Ed Perrin.

Future prospects for Islam in Germany: Between secularization, anti-Muslim racism and a new religious consciousness

12

Rauf Ceylan

The establishment of a "diaspora Islam" in Germany has paved the way for the legal recognition of Muslims. Since this development, German policymakers have been trying to "catch up" on integration, working with Muslim partners to find pathways and solutions for legal recognition. At the same time, this legal issue is linked to many services inside and outside schools, which are to be established along the same lines as Jewish and Christian structures. The "process of normalization", however, is accompanied by new social challenges. On the one hand, the social rejection of Islam in German society is increasing in parallel to the efforts to gain legal recognition. On the other hand, there is evidence of processes of pluralization and individualization within the Muslim community, which suggest that similar phenomena of secularization to those in non-Muslim mainstream society may eventually occur. The aim of this article is to explore the phenomena of recognition and simultaneous social rejection, and the transformation processes within the Muslim congregations, and to discuss prospects for the future.

1 Muslim organizations in the process of "catch-up integration"

The paradigm shift in 2000, and specifically the introduction of the new citizenship law, marked the beginning of a new phase in integration policy. Adopting the principle from traditional countries of immigration, such as the US, the new legislation introduced a provision that children born in Germany could be naturalized provided their parents fulfilled certain residency requirements (Brabandt 2004, pp. 114-115). At the same time, numerous new projects for the integration of Islam were launched in the 2000s, such as the founding of Institutes for Islamic

M. Peucker und R. Ceylan (Hrsg.), *Muslim Community Organizations in the West*, Islam in der Gesellschaft,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-13889-9_12

Theology, making Germany a model for other Western societies with regard to Islamic issues. The legal recognition of Islamic organizations—represented by the Koordinierungsrat der Muslime (Coordinating Council of Muslims)—is closely linked with the new projects, as many programmes could not legally be initiated by the state without the involvement of the Muslim community. Here the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference), founded in 2006 by the then-Federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, has proved to be an important platform. It was Schäuble who broke new political ground with the following historical words, acknowledging Islam as an integral part of German society:

> Most of them came to this country decades ago, with their traditions and customs, their religion and their culture. Many of them 'forgot to return', as the film director Fatih Akin has described it. Islam is a part of Germany and a part of Europe, it is part of our present and it is part of our future. Muslims are welcome in Germany. Let them develop their talents, and let them help to bring our country forward (BMI 2016, *author's translation*).

On the basis of this general political principle, a plenary and several working groups were set up to discuss central issues such as consensus on values, religious issues in the German understanding of the constitution, the economy, Islamic religious instruction and so on. On the one hand, this conference had symbolic value. On the other hand, it produced important policy documents, which were then implemented in society. The participants in this conference included representatives of both organized Islam and non-organized Islam, in the form of public figures. The conference has continued to be held to the present day, with each session focusing on new topics. Its findings have gradually been put into political practice (Ceylan 2013). A few important examples are discussed in the following.

The first element to be mentioned in this context is Islamic religious education in state schools, which has increasingly been introduced in various federal states on the basis of German's Constitution (Basic Law, *Grundgesetz*). For Christian religious communities in Germany, this has a long legal and educational tradition. As the state is only allowed to introduce these classes in cooperation with Muslim faith communities, Islamic organizations have been included in the development of the curricula and the appointment of the teachers. The debate about Islamic instruction in schools actually started long before the *Deutsche Islamkonferenz*, but after 2006, this subject was introduced more extensively (Kiefer 2005; Kiefer 2009, 21f.).

A further milestone is the establishment of institutes of Islamic theology at universities. Since 2012, academic centers with numerous professors have been set up in Münster, Osnabrück, Frankfurt, Erlangen-Nuremberg and Tübingen. This

development should also be viewed in the context of a more effective integration and policy coherence

The founding of these institutes was preceded by critical discussions about the influence of Islamic organizations from abroad on the German-Muslim community. A central area of criticism was the so-called "import imams", who were seen as an obstacle to the integration of German Muslims. Again, organized Muslims—i.e. the organizations that have gathered under the umbrella of the *Koordinierungsrat der Muslime*—were involved in this process. This is because German law on the church-state relationship dictates that theology can only be taught in cooperation with the churches. As there were no Islamic structures analogous to the churches, theological advisory boards were set up, which had a say in both the development of curricula and the appointment of professors. This representation in the academic world is a further milestone in the structural integration of organized Muslims (Hessischer Landtag 2014, p. 170).

At present, there is also discussion about the introduction of a Muslim social welfare service. Again, it was the *Deutsche Islamkonferenz* that raised this important issue, as the Jewish, Protestant and Catholic welfare organizations have limited capacity to accommodate, in a the culturally sensitive way, the specific needs of Muslims. The establishment of a Muslim social welfare organization is expected to result in greater interfaith and intercultural openness in many areas, such as hospitals, child and youth facilities, and social services. (Ceylan/Kiefer 2016).

Finally, important steps have been taken in individual federal states with regard to the perennial issue of the legal recognition of a central Islamic organization as a point of contact for policymakers. Due to the federal system in Germany, negotiations about options for legal recognition are conducted between the regional branches of the Islamic organizations belonging to the *Koordinierungsrat der Muslime* and the governments of the individual federal states. These negotiations have already led to certain successes, as several agreements between Islamic organizations and the state have been made or are at the point of being made, e.g. in the federal states of Hamburg and Lower Saxony. The question that remains unresolved is the inclusion of non-organized, moderate Muslims (Muckel 2012, pp. 61ff.; Beyme 2015, pp. 179ff.). In this context, critical voices point out that even in Christianity, only the organized believers, in the form of the two major churches, are taken into account politically. There are many people who leave the church and still call themselves Christians, but they have no political representation. The positive voices, on the other hand, continue to emphasize the involvement of non-organized Muslims, and encourage them to form congregations as a counterweight to the KRM.

2 Anti-Muslim racism in the form of popular movements

Paradoxically, however, the structural integration of Islam and its political recognition are taking place in a social climate of rejection. While policymakers have been pushing an accelerated program of "catch-up integration" for the last fifteen years or so, there has been a simultaneous increase in the anti-Muslim sentiments within certain segments of the population, and in the resonance of right-wing populist parties. This is not a purely German phenomenon, but can be found in all Western societies with a Muslim minority. Here Muslim minorities are the victims of a dangerous confluence of developments: global conflicts (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), the increase in extremist groups such as IS, the emergence of neo-Salafist groups whose appeal extends to converts in Western countries, demographic developments in the West (low birth rates, ageing societies), the EU crisis, fears of downward mobility in mainstream society (especially among the middle classes), and the current movement of refugees to Europe. Fears related to these developments are projected onto the Muslim minority, and as a result the only evocations of Islam in the public sphere are in the context of negative coverage (Cakir 2014; Schneiders 2014). An international study from 2013 shows that even well-educated people have these fears of and prejudices against Islam (Kassis et al. 2014).

At the same time, this skewed and biased thematization of Islam creates a discourse of justification, because Muslim organizations are constantly forced to express opinions on the negative events, leading to a kind of rhetorical mobility trap. The Islamic organizations are not able to set their own positive agendas, but are merely the pawn in this discourse of justification. Based on the principle of association, a vicious circle develops: by repeatedly responding to these accusations (extremism, incompatibility with democracy, Islamic macho culture, etc.), the Muslim organizations contribute to the association of Islam with negative themes. The successes of the right-wing populist party AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*) in the latest elections to the state parliaments in Saxony-Anhalt, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate showed that the Muslim associations will have trouble escaping this discourse. For the AfD, the election result is a confirmation of their anti-Islamist course, and will encourage them to explicitly instrumentalize the fears of parts of the population in the future—even more than they have so far. The AfD wants to establish itself as an ordinary mainstream party, not only in further regional elections, but also in national elections. Its recently released manifesto calls for far-reaching restrictions on the rights of Muslims. An extract from the manifesto makes this clear:

> For freedom of religious belief—against cultural relativism. The AfD is committed to our Christian-humanist culture and the value system of our Basic Law, which is founded on this culture. It refuses to relativize or relinquish this in favour of a misconceived tolerance towards other religions. Islam does not belong to Germany. However, people of Islamic faith do belong to Germany's reality, and we accept them as long as they are integrated and live peacefully among us. Manifestations of a parallel society, such as the application of Islamic laws, conflict resolution that bypasses the German courts, the exclusion of girls from physical education, the refusal to allow Muslim students to take part in class trips, and many other issues, cannot be justified with reference to "religious freedom", and can no longer be accepted (AfD 2016a; *author's translation*).

Here, then, we find an explicit reference to the guest worker discourse of the 1960s and 1970s in Germany, used to stigmatize Islam as a phenomenon related to foreigners, and thus to deny its social legitimacy. It is particularly worrying when this anti-Muslim attitude is expressed in relation to other topics in the manifesto, such as integration or justice, and it is implied to the reader that Islam is an "insidious danger" in all areas of society. This suggests a kind of "Islamic parallel society" right in the heart of Germany.

> Associations that turn against the Basic Law and therefore the principles of liberal democracy—e.g. by preaching hate or disseminating values contrary to criminal law—or that oppose the peaceful coexistence of peoples, must be prohibited by the relevant authorities and consistently prosecuted under criminal law" (AfD 2016a, p.10).

> "In our country, there are Islamic justices of the peace who seek to resolve conflicts according to Sharia law. So far there has been no sign of an effective counter-strategy on the part of politicians and security agencies" (AfD 2016a, p. 13; *author's translation*).

> "This includes the wearing of the Islamic headscarf. This is a religious-political symbol of repressive tendencies within Islam, and stands for the unequal treatment of women. The AfD advocates a prohibition of the headscarf in the public service and in schools, and a general prohibition of the burka" (AfD 2016a, p. 24; *author's translation*).

At the same time, the manifesto states that the structural integration of Islam, e.g. through religious instruction, pastoral care or agreements between Islamic organizations and the state, needs to be thwarted (AfD 2016b). The perfidious strategy of this anti-Muslim party, and other right-wing populist parties, is that they include topics such as animal protection, environmental protection, poverty and social justice in their manifestos in order to be accepted as a popular movement—but that they clearly gain their electoral potential from their exclusion of the "foreign" (Häusler 2009).

The established mainstream parties have taken a far too passive role in public debates to make a valuable contribution to understanding the Integration policy, especially in the refugee crisis, and have reinforced the image that they are not only helpless and unprepared in the face of migration processes, but that the ruling parties, the CDU and SPD—and especially the Chancellor, Angela Merkel—have actually lured migrants to Germany with their "naïve" altruism and Culture of Welcome. On this point, communication between politicians and society was not used as effectively as possible to bring this policy closer to its citizens, and the main beneficiaries of this have been these right-wing groups, who have deliberately linked the refugee issue with the established Muslim minority in Germany. Thus, as the right-wing groups grow stronger, the process of integration described above has deliberately been disrupted, and the already strong prejudices against Islam have been further intensified. In the next few years, anti-Muslim racism will be one of the greatest challenges facing the Muslim minority in Germany.

3 Cultural time lag—Muslims between secularization and a new religious consciousness

Besides the Islamophobia outlined above, Muslims are facing further challenges, which in some ways, however, apply to the whole society more broadly: the secularization and pluralization of lifestyles. German society man society in particular are c hoechstbrisant und sendet die Botschaft, die die AfD sehr freune wird. ngebuergert.has experienced profound social transformations since the end of the Second World War: German war refugees in the post-war period, economic reforms, labor migration, secularization and individualization resulting in a movement away from the churches and from tradition, then the German reunification, and most recently, demographic losses and the current floods of refugees. The list goes on, but these processes are enough to show that German society has changed enormously in the last seventy years. The movement away from the church, with huge numbers of people leaving the churches, is especially prominent (Pickel/Hidalgo 2013).

Similar consequences and challenges of secularization and individualization increasingly confronted the Muslims in Germany. Signs of this development can already be observed in the mosque communities. At present, however, the pluralization of lifestyles which has led people to leave the churches does not seem to be having the same effect on mosque communities. One explanation for this phenomenon appears to be the public construction of Islam as a "foreigners' religion", and the related anti-Islamic agitation. In this discourse, Muslims of dif-

ferent types (secular, practicing, cultural Muslims etc.) are lumped together and presented as one monolithic religious group (cf. Ceylan 2014, pp. 251ff.). The effect of the "Muslimization" of Muslims seems to be that the external attributions are adopted. Recent studies on religiosity, such as the *Religionsmonitor 2015*, show that Muslims in Germany rate their own religiosity as very high (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015, pp. 5f.). Moreover, some key findings of this study reveal further insights which correspond to the developments discussed here:

> "1. Muslims in Germany are closely connected to the state and society—regardless of the intensity of their Muslim faith.
>
> 2. Life as a religious minority shapes the religious orientations and values of Muslims in Germany. Muslims in Germany think about questions of faith more often and are generally more liberal than Muslims in Turkey.
>
> 3. The open attitude of many Muslims in Germany is contrasted, however, with an increasingly negative attitude among the majority of the population. The 4 million Muslims living in Germany suffer from a negative image, which is probably shaped by the small minority of radical Islamists (fewer than 1% of all Muslims).
>
> 4. Hostility towards Islam is not a marginal phenomenon, but can be found in the heart of society. As a socially accepted trend, Islamophobia can be used to legitimate discriminatory and exclusionary behaviour towards a minority.
>
> 5. Regular personal contact helps to reduce prejudices against Muslims. Often, however, there are no opportunities for this" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015, p. 3; *author's translation*).

These findings confirm the tensions described above between increasing integration of Muslims and massive social discrimination. In addition, the observation that Muslims in Germany are more liberal than those in the Islamic countries of origin points indirectly to the pluralization of lifestyles.

Studies on hybrid identities also show that Muslim lifestyles are becoming increasingly pluralized. Hybrid identity, according to Naika Foroutan and Isabel Schäfer, refers to the fact that a person feels an affiliation with "two or more cultural spaces" (2009, p. 11). In the context of Muslims in Germany, this means that they do not have to perceive Islamic and Western identities as a contradiction. The social discourse about the compatibility of Islamic and Western identity is conducted in the terms of a binary logic, but this can lead to identity problems. According to Foroutan and Schäfer (2009), it can result in tendencies of disintegration, especially in the socio-structural, institutional and personal dimensions, with far-reaching consequences:

> The consequences can be disintegration, radicalization, Islamism, anti-Western discourses. The development of "counter-identities" in reaction to the failure of modern societies to integrate immigrants threatens the systemic structure of Germany and other Western European countries of immigration. Collectives often create inner connectedness and identity by defining themselves against outsiders. This natural mechanism becomes problematic if it assumes pathological dimensions, and if this self-definition or demarcation entails the demonization of the other. In this way, the blame for the group's own experience of disintegration is shifted to a particular group of "ethnic others"—in this case mainstream German society. This collective attribution of blame allows the radicalized individuals to maintain a positive self-image, even if this is sometimes described with negative terms such as "Kanake" [pejorative term for foreigners from Southern Europe/Turkey/the Middle East] or "Gangster". The main thing is not to be a "victim" ("Opfer"). It would be particularly dangerous if the second and third generation of Muslim migrants were to drift towards Islamic fundamentalism, which seems to combine modernity and tradition. Some of these disoriented young people seek, in the potent radical slogans of the Islamists, a way to redefine their own identity. They sense that by associating with radical political groups they will gain strength and self-confidence, will create an aura of fear, and will earn greater respect (Foroutan/Schäfer 2009, pp.13; *author's translation*).

As long as the anti-Islamic discourse predominates, and the tendencies to disintegration in the above-mentioned dimensions continue, there is no short-term prospect of normalization. The Muslim organizations, however, face a dilemma: on the one hand, they have to advocate normalization, but on the other hand, this normalization would mean the end of "Muslimization". This would accelerate the already incipient pluralization of lifestyles, and the mosque communities, like the churches, would presumably face a decline in congregation numbers. At present, however, it cannot be assumed that this will happen (Ceylan 2014, p. 433).

4 Conclusion: future prospects for Islam in Germany

Islam in Germany finds itself caught up in ambivalent processes. On the one hand, there has clearly been progress in the structural integration of Islam through legal processes of recognition, the establishment of institutes of Islamic theology, the introduction of Islamic religious instruction, etc. On the other hand, there has been a dramatic increase in social rejection and anti-Muslim resentment, made socially acceptable by the new right-wing populist parties such as the abovementioned AfD. This complex intermeshing of progress and rejection is taking place in equally complex conditions, resulting from processes of secularization and pluralization. Muslims are not immune to these social transformation processes, and the mosque

communities will therefore have to go through similar processes of secularization to those experienced by the churches. This process is hampered, however, by the current political climate, in which people from a Muslim background are reduced to their religion or religious identity. Although Islam and Muslims are becoming more "at home" in Germany, then, the anti-Muslim discourse attempts to construe Islam as a "foreigners' religion". This has far-reaching consequences for the way Muslims assess their own religiosity or their individual Muslim identity, as empirical studies clearly show that religious identity is very important to Muslims—regardless of tendencies towards secularization and pluralization. Thus, there is a relationship of interdependency between the articulation of this identity and the anti-Muslim discourse. Despite this complex interrelationship, however, we can expect in the medium- and long-term that a weakening of the anti-Muslim discourse—especially once the refugee issue has become less topical—will bring normalization, in that it will unblock the path to the pluralization of Muslim lifestyles. All in all, structural integration and the tendencies to pluralization within the Muslim community will lead to many transformation processes in the future. Against this background, these are some of the important medium-term and long-term prospects that can be expected in the context of the future development of Islam:

- Muslim educational elite: unlike Muslim immigrants in the USA, Muslims came to Germany as low-skilled workers in the 1960s. Although their educational poverty was passed on to the second generation, the numbers of university-educated Muslims are increasing. This is a crucial development for the articulation of Muslim interests in the public sphere.
- The academization of Islamic theology should also be viewed in the context of an educational elite. Up until now, non-German-speaking imams have held sway in the congregations, and representatives of the Islamic organizations have participated in the public debates on Islam, even though they have no theological knowledge. The establishment of a core of theological expertise will rectify this problem. At present, nearly 2,000 students are studying at the different institutes of Islamic theology.
- An additional source of religious knowledge will be provided by qualified Muslim teachers of religious education in the German education system who are currently being appointed in schools. To meet the needs of the roughly 1 million Muslim pupils in the German education system, over 2,500 teachers are needed. These are already working in schools or are currently being trained in the above-mentioned institutes. As these teachers will not only provide lessons in Islam, but also regular lessons in subjects such as German, maths, English, etc., they will also have contact with non-Muslim students. They hence assume an

important function as role models and intermediaries. They also often function as advisors on questions of Islam for the non-Muslim teachers. This can help to nip prejudice in the bud, and can pave the way for constructive interfaith dialogue in schools.

- The feminization of Islam is another aspect. Today, more and more women are appearing in public as experts on Islam, and studying Islamic theology. With this more prominent role, they will change the image of women in Islam and will be contributory partners in the normalization of Muslims and Islam in Germany.
- The legal recognition of Islamic organizations is progressing, and it is only a matter of time before a legal form acceptable to all sides is found. Legal recognition will give access to new sources of finance from government subsidies, which will bring a professionalization of the mosque communities. The mosque communities will then be able to employ professional staff, whereas now they only work with volunteers.
- The establishment of a Muslim social welfare service will lead to greater intercultural and interfaith openness in all areas of social, cultural and medical support and care.
- The historically evolved Muslim organizations which currently work together in the KRM will be enriched by new Muslim congregations. At present, there are already new congregations, most of which have separated from the established mosques. Not all of them manifest the typical features of mosque communities, but believers with similar interests come together in small groups. This is mainly a process of "brain drain" from the large mosque communities, where these young, well-educated people see little scope for participation.
- The networking of European Muslims will intensify on an organizational and academic level. The Islamic associations in the European context have always maintained good relations, but this communication will be raised to a new level. What is new is the academic networking of Muslim scholars, who can use metacommunicative methods to study the concerns of Muslims and participate in discourses.

These are just a few important aspects which will change the image of Islam in Germany. There will always be conflicts along the way because Muslims are becoming more and more present in the public sphere. The difference between the current situation and the guest worker phase, or the backyard mosque phase, is that Muslims were simply not visible in the past. They did exist, but their social position was reduced to marginal areas. The more Islam acquires status and therefore visibility, and the more its areas of public participation increase, the more the

conflicts will emerge. At the same time, this participation will contribute to the normalization of Islam.

References

AfD. 2016a. *Landtagswahlprogramm 2016 der AfD Baden-Würtemmberg*, URL: http://www.alternativefuer-bw.de/wp-content/uploads/Landtagswahlprogramm_AfD_2016.pdf (last accessed: 18 March 2016).

AfD. 2016b. Paul Hampel: Weils Islamvertrag – mit Volldampf in den Schariastaat! http://www.afd-niedersachsen.de/index.php/medienspiegel/afd-presse-und-medien/afd-pressemitteilungen-nds/1917-19-02-2016-paul-hampel-weils-islamvertrag-mit-volldampf-in-den-schariastaat (last accessed: 18 March 2016).

Bertelsmann-Stiftung. 2015. *Religionsmonitor – verstehen was verbindet. Sonderauswertung Islam 2015. Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse im Überblick*. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Beyme, Klaus von. 2015. *Religionsgemeinschaften, Zivilgesellschaft und Staat. Zum Verhältnis von Politik und Religion in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

BMI. 2016. Deutsche Islam Konferenz – Perspektiven für eine gemeinsame Zukunft, URL: http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/2006/09/bm_bt_regierungserklaerung_zur_islamkonferenz.html (last accessed: 18 March 2016).

Brabandt, Heike. 2004. Frauen und Asyl. Geschlechtsspezifische Fluchtgründe im deutschen Asyl- und Ausländerrecht, in: Roß, Bettina (ed.), *Migration, Geschlecht und Staatsbürgerschaft. Perspektiven für eine anti-rassistische und feministische Politik und Politikwissenschaft*, Wiesbaden 2004, pp. 103–126.

Cakir, Naime. 2014. *Islamfeindlichkeit. Anatomie eines Feindbildes in Deutschland*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

Ceylan, Rauf. 2013. Islamkonferenz, in: Meier-Braun, Karl-Heinz/Weber, Reinhold (eds.), *Deutschland Einwanderungsland. Begriffe – Fakten – Kontroversen*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, pp. 204–207.

Ceylan, Rauf. 2014. *Cultural Time Lag. Moscheekatechese und islamischer Religionsunterricht im Kontext von Säkularisierung*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Ceylan, Rauf/Kiefer, Michael. 2016. *Muslimische Wohlfahrtspflege in Deutschland. Eine historische und systematische Einführung*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Foroutan, Naika/Schäfer, Isabel. 2009. Hybride Identitäten muslimischer Migranten, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Lebenswelten von Migrantinnen und Migranten*. 5/2009, pp. 11–18.

Häusler, Alexander. 2009. Antiislamischer Rechtspopulimus in der extremen Rechte – die „Pro"-Bewegung als neue Kraft?, in: Braun, Stephan/Geisler, Alexander/Gerster, Martin (eds.), *Strategien der extremen Rechten. Hintergründe – Analysen – Antworten*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 131–147.

Hessicher Landtag. 2014. *Abschlussbericht der Enquetekommission Migration und Integration des Hessischen Landtags*, Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.

Kassis, Wassilis / Schalliè, Charlotte / Strube, Sonja / von der Heyde, Judith. 2014. Preduction of Anti-Muslim Sentiment on Campus: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Prejudices in Two University Populations, in: HIKMA – Journal of Islamic Theology and Religious Education 5(9), pp. 141–165.

Kiefer, Michael. 2005. *Islamkunde in deutscher Sprache in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Kontext, Geschichte, Verlauf und Akzeptanz eines Schulversuchs*. Münster: Lit-Verlag.

Kiefer, Michael. 2009. Islamische Religionspädagogik und -didaktik – Offene Fragen zu den Gegenständen einer neuen wissenschaftlichen Richtung, in: Mohr, Irka-Christin/ Kiefer, Michael (eds.), *Islamunterricht – Islamischer Religionsunterricht – Islamkunde. Viele Titel, ein Fach?*, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, pp. 19–33.

Muckel, Stefan. 2012. Antworten des staatlichen Religionsrechts auf Herausforderungen durch den Islam, in: Häberle, Lothar/Hattler, Johannes (eds.), *Islam – Säkularismus – Religionsrecht: Aspekte und Gefährdungen der Religionsfreiheit*, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer VS, pp. 61–78.

Pickel, Gert/Hidalgo, Oliver (eds.). 2013. *Religion und Politik im vereinigten Deutschland. Was bleibt von der Rückkehr des Religiösen?* Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Schneiders, Thorsten Gerald. 2014. *Wegbereiter der modernen Islamfeindlichkeit. Eine Analyse der sogenannten Islamkritiker.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS.