AFRICA
AND GLOBALIZATION

Challenges of Governance and Creativity

Edited by
Toyin Falola and Kenneth Kalu

African Histories and Modernities

This book series serves as a scholarly forum on African contributions to and negotiations of diverse modernities over time and space, with a particular emphasis on historical developments. Specifically, it aims to refute the hegemonic conception of a singular modernity, Western in origin, spreading out to encompass the globe over the last several decades. Indeed, rather than reinforcing conceptual boundaries or parameters, the series instead looks to receive and respond to changing perspectives on an important but inherently nebulous idea, deliberately creating a space in which multiple modernities can interact, overlap, and conflict. While privileging works that emphasize historical change over time, the series will also feature scholarship that blurs the lines between the historical and the contemporary, recognizing the ways in which our changing understandings of modernity in the present have the capacity to affect the way we think about African and global histories.

More information about this series at
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14758

Toyin Falola • Kenneth Kalu
Editors

Africa and Globalization

Challenges of Governance and Creativity

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Toyin Falola
Department of History
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX, USA

Kenneth Kalu
Global Management
Ted Rogers School of Management
Ryerson University
Toronto, ON, Canada

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Bosede Funke Afolayan PhD is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. Her papers are published in local and international journals, and her areas of specialization include comparative drama, African literature, women's studies, British drama and Nollywood studies.

Ernest Toochi Aniche holds BSc, MSc and PhD degrees of the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with a bias towards international relations. His areas of research interest include African integration, comparative regionalism, international environmental politics, oil politics, energy politics, theories of international relations and international political economy. He has written three books, cowritten two books and contributed chapters to books and articles to scholarly journals. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. He is also the Acting Head, Department of Political Science, Hezekiah University, Umudi, Imo State, Nigeria.

Harriet Omokiniovo Efanodor PhD is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Edo University Iyamho, Edo State, Nigeria. She is a fellow of the Next Generation Social Science in Africa Program of the Social Science Research Council, Brooklyn, New York, USA. She is also an associate member of the Society for Peace Studies and Practice. She was a junior research member of the International Development Research Centre funded research team for Amnesties for

Peace in the Niger Delta (University of Benin and Centre for Population and Development). Her research interest focuses on gender studies, politics, international relations and development studies.

Chigozie Enwere PhD is Pioneer Head of Department of the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nile University, Abuja, Nigeria. He was also a Visiting Lecturer in Turkey. His research interest is in the areas of African politics, international conflicts and strategy. He has published various national and international articles.

Dorcas Ettang is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. She holds a doctorate in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies from UKZN and degrees from Bishops University and University of Windsor in Canada. She has published on various themes including peace education, ethno-religious violence and migration.

Toyin Falola is the Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair Professor in the Humanities and a Distinguished Teaching Professor at The University of Texas at Austin, USA. A celebrated scholar of global stature, Prof. Falola has published numerous books and essays in diverse areas. He has received various awards and honors, including the Jean Holloway Award for Teaching Excellence, the Texas Exes Teaching Award and seven honorary doctorates. He is the Series Editor of "Carolina Studies on Africa and the Black World," among several others.

Ramon A. Fonkoué is Associate Professor of French and Cultural Studies in the Department of Humanities at Michigan Technological University, USA where he teaches world literature, postcolonial theory and globalization. His research examines subjectivity, individual and collective rapport with memory in French and African literature and film, and nation-building in the French Caribbean and Africa. His monograph *History, Memory and Nation Building in Postcolonial Cameroon* is forthcoming from Cambria Press.

Enoch Olujide Gbadegesin received his PhD in Religion at Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA, in 2014. He teaches in the department of religious studies, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. He specializes in the anthropology of religion, philosophy of religion and comparative study. His research foci are on the theories methods in the study of religion, gift and reciprocity, inter-religious dialogue, religion and ecology, migration studies, gender violence and Pentecostal spirituality.

He has published articles in both local and international journals and made contributions to edited books.

Mussa Idris is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Elon University, Elon, NC, USA. Dr. Idris received his Bachelor of Arts in Sociology and Anthropology from the University of Asmara, Eritrea. He then went on to study a Master of Arts in Anthropology at the University of Florida and a PhD at the University of Florida. His research areas include entrepreneurship, micro-enterprise, gender and development, transnationalism, African diaspora, migration, and refugees' and asylum-seekers' resettlement experiences from East and Central Africa in Greensboro, NC and Washington, DC. In 2015, Dr. Idris received the Dr. Gerald Francis Outstanding Faculty Member of the Year award, given by Elon's Student Government Association.

Kenneth Kalu is an Assistant Professor of Global Management at Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada. He received his PhD from Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. His research interests revolve around Africa's political economy. He is particularly interested in examining the nature, evolution and interactions of economic and political institutions, and how these institutions shape the business environment and economic growth in Africa. His essays have appeared in several academic journals and edited volumes.

Fatima Momodu combines a background in Civil Law (Nasarawa State University, Nigeria) with an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies (Hacettepe University, Turkey). Her research focuses on the use of peace education in the promotion of peace as an end to the different forms of violence, violent conflicts and, in particular, violence against women in Nigeria. In addition, she conducts research in international law. She also engages in inter-disciplinary research with scholars from political science and other humanities courses. She currently lectures at the Law Department and the Political Science and International Relations Department of the Nile University of Nigeria.

Charles E. **Nwadigwe** PhD is a Professor of Theatre and Film Technology whose work reflects a blend of scholarship and professional practice on the stage, film and television. He earned his degrees in Theatre and Film Design and Technology from the universities of Jos and Calabar (Nigeria) and has taught in various universities in Nigeria. His drama scripts have gained wide reception and his scholarly articles have been published in

peer-reviewed journals and anthologies around the world. He is a member of many international learned societies and research working groups, and currently leads a comparative research network of sub-Saharan African scholars in the humanities.

Olusola Ogunnubi is a Scarce Skills Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Faculty of Management Sciences, Mangosuthu University of Technology (MUT), South Africa. He received his PhD from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and his knowledge areas include comparative foreign policy, corruption in Africa, African regional power politics and soft power diplomacy.

Funmilola Olorunfemi earned a Bachelor's degree in Political Science at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. She is a Graduate Assistant at Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Nigeria; and currently researching in development studies, and the political economy of Sino-Africa relations, with particular emphasis on Nigeria.

N. Oluwafemi Mimiko MNI is a Professor of Political Science at Obafemi Awolowo University and member of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Nigeria. He was SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Visiting Scholar, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, RI; Korean Foundation Visiting Fellow, The Academy of Korean Studies, Seoul; and Senior Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor, United States Military Academy (USMA), West Point, NY. He is a recipient of *USMA Army Commander's Public Service Award*, 2004; and author of *Globalization: The Politics of Global Economic Relations and International Business* (2012). His most recent publications are *Getting Our Universities Back on Track: Reflections and Governance Paradigms from My Vice-Chancellorship* (2017); and *Democradura: Essays on Nigeria's Limited Democracy* (2017). Mimiko was Vice Chancellor, Adekunle Ajasin University, Nigeria, 2010 to 2015; and African and African-American Studies Associate at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA, from January 2016 to January 2017.

Melike Yilmaz holds an MA and a BA in English Language and Literature from Fatih University in Istanbul, Turkey. She also gained her PhD in Comparative Literature from Fatih University. She has taught Postcolonial and African Literature at universities in Turkey, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Ghana. Her research interests include comparative literature, postcolonial African literature, Soviet literature, colonial and postcolonial literature and

politics, African diaspora, transatlantic slave trade and narratives, and gender in Africa. Currently, Dr. Yilmaz is the Director of the Institute of Languages and African Studies at Regent University College of Science and Technology in Accra, Ghana.

Mesut Yilmaz obtained a BA (Economics) and MA (international Economics) at the Universities of İstanbul and Marmara and studied for his PhD in International Economics at the Marmara University, Turkey. He is currently a Professor of International Economics at Regent University in Ghana, Accra. Previously he worked at the institutions/universities of SDU (Kazakhstan), INCEIF (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), University of Birmingham (UK), NILE University of Nigeria, Gediz University (Turkey). Yilmaz is an economist who works at the intersection of international economics, contemporary Africa and environmental economics. He has a particular interest in regional economic integration. His main research interest is in the areas of globalization, international trade and economic development. He has published several articles in a number of academic journals.

Introduction: Africa in a Globalized World

Kenneth Kalu and Toyin Falola

Emerging from several decades of colonial exploitation, most African states struggled to develop modern state institutions and economic systems throughout the twentieth century. Because European colonial administrations failed to set up efficient and development-oriented governance institutions in the African colonies, postcolonial African states began their journey of statehood on very weak foundations, which were characterized by the preponderance of institutions designed to promote exploitation and predation.[1] This means that most African states have been plagued by weak political and economic systems, with crisis, poverty and underdevelopment becoming almost permanent narratives on the continent. Perhaps one of the greatest mistakes of Africa's postcolonial leaders was their failure to effectively dismantle the colonial institutions that thrived on exploitation and treated Africans as subjects instead of citizens. The wholesale retention of these colonial structures meant that political independence was more symbolism than substance. The threads of

K. Kalu (✉)
Global Management, Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada

T. Falola
Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

1

exploitation, with disdain for the average African citizen by political leaders and formal government structures, as well as the imposition of European education, languages and aspects of European culture, meant that the change in government from European colonial masters to the African elite did not lead to a change in paradigm.

It is pertinent to acknowledge at the outset that Africa is not a single country, but a conglomeration of fifty-four different countries with remarkable differences in language, history, culture, colonial heritage and governance systems. However, these countries share a lot, largely based on several centuries of systemic exploitation from the era of the Atlantic slave trade to the period of colonial rule. In effect, despite the unique characteristics of each country, Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, can indeed be subjected to uniform analysis in terms of governance arrangements and broad economic systems. While it may be wrong to make sweeping generalizations about the entire continent, it is also important to acknowledge, as did Crawford Young, that Africa "lends itself to a broadly comparative approach, owing to similarities among the countries on numerous fronts."[2]

In most cases, African economies have not moved away from dependence on primary produce, which was a principal characteristic of the colonial economy. From Nigeria to Angola, and from Cameroon to Côte d'Ivoire, the extraction and export of primary produce remains the dominant economic activity for most of the continent, alongside the supply of cheap labor. There is nothing wrong with this, but the major problem it creates is a lack of economic diversification. Most of Africa's natural resource-exporting countries have no other viable sectors, and many countries add little or no value to the natural resources before export. This means there is virtually little or no industrial processing of the primary commodities before export. This economic model has exacerbated Africa's vulnerability to external shocks, as the demand for these primary commodities is derived from their use as raw materials for the production of consumer goods in other countries. In effect, cocoa, copper, cobalt, crude oil and practically all of Africa's commodities are demanded not for their sake, but for the sake of the final products that such commodities help to produce.

In the economic sphere, Africa has performed badly when compared with the rest of the world. The World Bank reports that for the first time in world history Africa is now home to the largest number of poor people in the world.[3] With the remarkable economic growth and development, and the burgeoning structural transformation which began since the late

1990's, many countries in Southeast Asia have been able to move a good proportion of their citizens out of poverty. On the other hand, economic growth has been minimal in Africa, and there has been very little structural transformation to expand the continent's economic base and improve its social systems.

An analysis of Africa's share of exports of global merchandise shows that the continent controls an insignificant percentage of world trade. It stood at a disappointing 1.2% in 2014, while Asia's share was 33.3% during the same period.[4] This picture is more disconcerting when it is considered that Africa is home to 16.3% of the world population, yet it controls a depressing 1.2% of world export. Africa's performance in the global creative sector is even worse, as the continent controls less than 1% of export of creative goods and services. A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report shows that no African country featured in the top twenty exporters of global creative goods in 2015.[5] In recent years, the creative sector has been driven largely by technology—an area that cannot be considered one of Africa's strengths. Consequently, the continent lags behind in most measures of economic performance, and there is no sign that indicates African countries are on track towards a better economic performance.

GLOBALIZATION

There has been a significant increase in global trade since the beginning of the 21st century. Countries that are able to produce for the global market have taken advantage of this, and have consequently achieved better economic performance. Like every other region of the world, Africa has been part of the global system, albeit on a different scale and for different reasons. Prior to the current trend of an increasing flow of goods and services, Africa was integrated into the global economy through the Atlantic slave trade. The exploitation of Africa and Africa's labor at this time and the continent's subsequent encounters with European powers during the era of colonialism provided the initial platforms for Africa's interactions with the rest of the world. These encounters—from the Atlantic slave trade to colonialism—defined the mode and nature of Africa's integration into the global economic system. Consequently, the continent has not been an equal partner with the rest of the world in appropriating the benefits accruable from globalization. Indeed, given its mode of integration

into the global system, it can only derive disproportionately low benefits from globalization, if it receives any net benefits at all.[6]

While the slave trade and forced migration have been abolished, the economic system of extraction set up during colonial rule remains in place. As Africa remains at the base of the value chain with its stock of primary produce, much of the surplus from world trade goes to the industrialized nations. This is because they acquire Africa's raw materials at low prices and in return export finished goods back to the continent at considerably higher prices.

The literature contains several possible explanations for Africa's inability to diversify its economy and to play more a more active and profitable role in global commerce. Whether it is the legacy of the institutional conditions of extraction and exploitation foisted on the continent by colonial powers,[7] or the rapacity and poor choices of postcolonial African leaders,[8] or the recent intense and often unfair competition from the industrialized nations, the overall result is that globalization has been more for the benefit of industrialized countries than the rest of the developing world.[9] It is pertinent to note, though, that globalization has produced some benefits to every country irrespective of its place in the global economic equation—advances in science and technology, the spread of higher education, ready availability of life-saving drugs and other essential commodities, irrespective of the place of manufacture. These have certainly improved lives, including those of Africans. Given that globalization has had an impact in every country, and continues to define the trajectory of the global economic order, Martin Wolf has argued that although some countries derive higher benefits from globalization than others, any nation that chooses to disconnect from the global economy can only experience increased suffering.[10]

The point, therefore, is not whether Africa should disconnect from globalization or not, as such disconnection does not look like a feasible option given the current state of the global political economy. Rather, the concern for Africa's policymakers and scholars alike should be to critically interrogate the nature of Africa's engagements with the rest of world. What factors have constrained African states to fulfill the role of weak suppliers of primary produce, while Southeast Asia has made a tremendous leap into manufacturing during the past three decades? Are there trade agreements or other institutional impediments that have made it difficult or impossible for Africa to play a more active and profitable role in the global economy? What reforms, within Africa and across the global

economic systems, would help to modulate the negative impacts of globalization on Africa's developing countries and distribute its benefits more equitably? This volume is an attempt to examine the challenges of globalization, governance and creativity in contemporary Africa. Each chapter approaches the question of governance and creativity from a different perspective. A number of them address the challenges of globalization, including the difficulty of preserving cultural and indigenous systems in this era of heightened global integration.

In the recent past, geographical boundaries have become increasingly irrelevant with respect to the movement of goods and services.[11] Technological advancement has also improved global communication to a level that perhaps could not have been anticipated in the 1970s. These advances in technology and enhancements in the volume of international trade have necessitated the emergence of many international economic governance institutions and mechanisms, to supervise the high volume of international trade and to mediate between nations when the need arises. Institutions such as the World Trade Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization and mechanisms such as the agreements on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, as well as a number of bilateral and multilateral economic partnerships and agreements have all arisen to facilitate the flow of global commerce. Although it has been argued that these and similar institutions have systematically favored the industrialized nations and exacerbated the domination and exploitation of the developing countries,[12] these institutions have defined the modes of trans-national engagements, and they continue to play mediating roles when the need arises. Despite its shortcomings in the distribution of benefits across different countries, globalization has created enormous new opportunities, expanded world markets and facilitated the emergence of new players in the global economy.

During the past two decades, globalization has facilitated the rise in economic importance of some previously less developed countries such as China, Singapore and South Korea, among others. These countries have benefited from the opportunities in the global market to enhance production and export, transform their economies and, in the process, lift many of their citizens out of poverty. Why, for example, did the path of adaptation to globalization and subsequent economic transformation in Nigeria diverge significantly from that of Indonesia, although the two countries have been shown to possess largely similar characteristics in terms of endowments and initial conditions?[13] Drawing contrasts between the two

countries, Peter Lewis points to the nature of political leadership and institutional characteristics, which can give two otherwise similar countries widely divergent economic outcomes.[14] Although Indonesia and Nigeria have almost equally distorted political systems, with all-pervading military dictatorships from the 1960s to the 1990s, and although corruption and rent-seeking were major features of both political cultures, Lewis argues that the choices made by "Nigeria's contentious, divided elites," weak institutions and the predatory political culture produced remarkably different results from the "well-organized corruption and stable macroeconomic conditions" in Indonesia.[15]

The manner in which some countries in Southeast Asia have domesticated globalization, and in the process appropriated impressive benefits from the boom in global trade, shows that globalization can indeed produce net benefits for developing countries. In effect, the gains of globalization are not restricted to countries of the global North but can be appropriated by any party with the right mix of economic and political choices. The question that one may ask is this: should African states look more inwards than outwards in the search for explanations as to why globalization has not produced, or is not producing, enough gains for African states? Or is Africa's precarious position in the global system a result of deliberate design by the industrialized countries, with the aim of consigning the continent to the periphery? How have the legacies of Africa's unique historical path of exploitation shaped, and how do they continue to shape, the continent's economic performance and its place in the global political economy? What has been the role of Africa's postcolonial leadership in charting the economic development trajectories of their respective countries?

Besides its economic significance, globalization has also led to the spread of what one may describe as dominant cultures. It is now commonplace to see young Africans or Asians aspiring to adopt the lifestyles of Americans or Europeans. The ready availability of smartphones, iPads, the Internet and social media has made the dissemination of information and knowledge faster than was possible in the first half of the twentieth century. Perhaps it is important to investigate how African states are using these unprecedented resources in information technology to improve the conditions of their citizens. Has social media helped to improve political accountability? Has information technology strengthened the activities of civil society groups and/or has it improved the business environment? Are new media only a source of entertainment and leisure? Despite the benefits

of the unhindered flow of information and the spread of social media, one major area of concern is the fear that Western culture—examples being the mode of dressing, ideas about marriage and social relations generally—is increasingly replacing Africa's indigenous systems. The implication is that the continent may be facing a double jeopardy with the spread of globalization—economic decline owing to African countries' inability to compete in the global market and increasing erosion of African culture and heritage.

As African states struggle to reform their governance and economic systems, the industrialized nations and other middle-income countries continue to advance their economies and technologies at a faster pace. Globalization has transformed societies, opening up hitherto unreached markets and creating opportunities for the emergence of mega-global corporations. These changes entail more intense competition between nations, with the result that many developing countries are unable to effectively compete in the global market. Consequently, globalization has created new challenges, making it more difficult for weak and struggling states to grow at their own pace and to develop their own indigenous systems. By opening up local markets to competition from more technologically advanced and often more subsidized firms, globalization has effectively shut down many small enterprises in developing African countries. This is because many firms in the developing countries do not have the capacity to compete with more advanced firms from developed countries.

Developing countries that devise means to protect local businesses from harsh and often destructive competition from foreign firms are usually criticized for protectionism and are labeled as pursuing policies that are anti-free trade. Ho Chang argues that the attitude of developed countries of the West in discouraging developing countries from protecting their domestic industries against harsh competition with firms in advanced economies can be likened to "kicking away the ladder."[16] He notes that the now industrialized countries used various forms of protections and granted subsidies to domestic firms and industries during the early stages of industrialization.[17] It is therefore hypocritical, he argues, for these same countries that developed on the back of government protectionism to discourage less developed countries from essentially taking their economic futures into their own hands.

It is interesting to note that globalization and capitalism have been promoted as universal norms that every society must adopt in order to

conform to acceptable "global standards." But as Toyin Falola noted, globalization represents nothing other than the aspirations of a few countries in the global North.[18] Falola argued that however the world may present globalization, it cannot produce equal benefits for industrialized countries and Africa, because of their greatly different starting points. Consequently, he admonished the humanities in Africa to critically engage with globalization and with the erroneous assumption of universalism in order to chart a new course for the continent, and eventually begin to systematically dismantle the structures of exploitation and suppression that have been the defining features of Africa for most of its history.[19]

Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Africa

There has been a rise in the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Africa and other developing countries during the past several years.[20] These flows have been shown to promote economic growth by creating employment and generally enhancing the level of economic activity in the receiving countries.[21] With this increase, it is easy to assume that globalization is producing net benefits to Africa. This connection is usually made on the assumption that FDI is a credible channel to transfer technology from an investing country to a receiving country. However, a number of studies have shown that the ability of a country to transform FDI into economic and social benefit is dependent on a number of factors, including the availability of the appropriate human capital, as well as the presence of the right mix of political and economic institutions to effectively convert foreign capital flows to sources of growth.[22] Given the need for the presence of some critical structures in order for developing countries that are receiving FDI flows to convert this capital, the question is whether African countries have this capacity.

FDI flows into Africa have mainly been in the resource sector—and more recently in the financial sector—where investors are often very likely to want quick returns, without necessarily considering investment in projects that would have transformational benefits to host countries.[23] It is possible that the majority of the investors, especially those in the financial sector, have largely been profiteers with little or no interest in the economic development and structural transformation of the receiving countries. In the natural resource sector, foreign multinationals that have invested in Africa's oil and gas sector have not been the greatest development partners in the region. In countries such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo

and Nigeria, there have been countless cases of irresponsibility on the part of multinational oil majors with respect to oil spills and environmental degradation. They often get away with these unwholesome practices owing to weak regulatory regimes in their host communities.[24] In effect, the oil companies apply different operational standards for countries that are at different levels of development.

While FDI flows have increased economic activities, most of the benefits of such investments have obviously accrued to the investors. Given investors' profit maximization objective, scholars, policymakers and analysts in general need to look beyond the nominal volume of FDI as a reflection of, or proxy for, the benefits of globalization. While FDI flows can help create jobs and enhance the level of economic activity in a country, they can also be an easy way to transfer surplus from the host country to the source (investor) country.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),[25] total FDI flows into Africa reached a high of $56 billion in 2012, followed by $54 billion in both 2013 and 2014. The relatively huge FDI flows since the 2000s may be due to perceived opportunities, improvement in institutional factors, political stability, sound macroeconomic management or any combination of these factors in the destination countries. They could also be due to a harsh economic environment in the origin countries and decreasing returns on investment in most of the advanced economies. While it is interesting to note that investors are looking towards Africa for investment opportunities, what the FDI report does not show is the volume of profit or returns these investors have made from investment in Africa, especially relative to the level of returns for similar investments in their home countries.

There is no doubt that the past few years have witnessed relatively high FDI flows into Africa. However, the rate of FDI flows into the continent pales into insignificance when compared with inflows into Asia. The UNCTAD report shows that these have maintained a steady increase, from $401 billion in 2012 to $428 billion in 2013 and $465 billion in 2014. When compared with the total of flows into Africa, it is clear again that Africa lags behind Asia very significantly.[26] Irrespective of the perspective from which one may view globalization and its impacts on various economies, it is often clear that Africa is at a disadvantage. The challenge, then, for scholars, policymakers and Africa's development partners is to explore the causes of the continent's dismal performance in the global economy and to work out strategies that help to bridge the glaring gap between Africa and the rest of the world.

Layout of the Book

The chapters in this volume examine how African states are adapting to the challenges of globalization. The authors have also attempted to answer the nagging question about how African states can appropriate more benefits from globalization in order to enhance their economies and improve the welfare of their citizens. In an effort to examine this, a number of chapters focus on various aspects of governance, from political leadership to the challenge of security in an increasingly volatile and crisis-prone region. Some explore the creative sector as a route through which Africa could play a more active role and enhance its share of global trade. The book is divided into two broad sections.

The first section of this book, "Africa's Adaptation to Globalization," contains six chapters that focus principally on the dynamics of the continent's engagements and challenges in this area. In Chap. 2, Melike Yilmaz and Fatima Momodu observe that European explorers and colonizers described Africa with demeaning labels in order to justify the continent's exploitation. As a way to counter the negative labels that have shaped Africa's narratives, the authors undertake a journey to rediscover Africa. Their chapter notes with dismay that the narrative of Africa as perceived by the rest of the world is still filled with negative labels, including underdevelopment, poverty, hunger, crisis and dictatorship; as the authors argue, the positive features of the continent are never highlighted. It is these negative stereotypes that define the industrialized world's perception of Africa and determine its relationship with the rest of the world. The authors acknowledge some of the governance challenges that have constrained the ability of the majority of African states to make appreciable progress in the march towards economic development and structural transformation. However, they note that African countries can also boast of a number of positive achievements; these need to be promoted, instead of the single story of poverty and underdevelopment that dominates discourse about Africa. Consequently, the authors challenge Africanists and scholars to essentially revisit history and "rediscover" Africa by bringing to the fore the continent's positive aspects, which unfortunately are rarely heard about, or are undermined by the actions of the industrialized nations.

In Chap. 3, Oluwafemi Mimiko and Funmilola Olorunfemi examine Africa's creative space in the face of globalization. Noting that globalization has permeated all aspects of economics, as well as social and

cultural life, Mimiko and Olorunfemi argue that it could threaten the development of the creative industries in African states. This fear, widely held by a number of African scholars, is strengthened by the belief that part of the mission of globalization has been to transform and, as Mimiko and Olorunfemi argue, "to recompose, wittingly or otherwise, the totality of the culture of the weaker segments of the global system, Africa inclusive." Viewed from this perspective, the forces of globalization are more likely to undermine the ability of African countries to develop the creative sectors, rather than enhancing the sector to provide economic and cultural benefits for Africans.

While acknowledging that globalization has positive impacts in all countries, including African states, Mimiko and Olorunfemi argue that it "has tended to undermine creativity on the part of African peoples and thereby constrained their ability at generating social currents of the kind the continent requires. At best, what you have on the part of Africans is but a systemic pandering to, and regurgitation of, the Western worldview, preferences and dictations." In order to mitigate this unsavory impact of globalization on Africa's creative sectors, the authors propose a number of measures that should help African states to develop their creative industries for the dual purpose of cultural preservation and enhanced economic benefits. These proposals include, among others, creating new platforms for developing the creative sector, investing in the instruments that will enhance this, and reforming Africa's precarious governance structures in ways that will emphasize greater inclusiveness.

Chapter 4 focuses on Africa's development trajectories during the postcolonial period. In this chapter, Mesut Yilmaz and Chigozie Enwere engage with what could be seen as a clash of ideas between on the one hand the neoliberal economic orthodoxy imposed on African states by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and creditor nations, and on the other the statist ideology which according to the authors was the development ideology supported by the majority of Africa's intellectuals. Yilmaz and Enwere argue that the imposition of neoliberal economic ideas on African states, especially those encapsulated in the largely disastrous Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), served the dual purpose of hemorrhaging money from the continent and effectively handing Africa and its resources over to the industrialized nations. The authors emphasize that development cannot come to the continent if African states continue to depend on the modernization

ideas of the West. They argue that these ideas are fundamentally designed to produce greater benefits for the industrialized nations, with more impoverishment the result for African states. The way forward, the authors write, is for African states to domesticate Western-imposed trade liberalization and other modernization ideas. One specific step would be to encourage enhanced trade and other forms of relationship with other countries in the global South, especially Brazil, Russia, India and China, members of the so-called BRICS group of nations.

In Chap. 5, Enoch Gbadegesin calls Africa to return to its traditional values of communalism and group solidarity as a response and an alternative to the global trend of neoliberalism and the elevation of market forces to the status of a global norm. Noting modernism's predilection for individualism as against communalism as the basis for social and economic relationships, the author argues that the fascination with individualism and rational choice has ironically been the biggest source for the crisis in modernity. Individualism, he argues, runs against traditional African values, which emphasize community, bonding and group solidarity. Gbadegesin argues that a focus on these values provide the right levers for balancing society's needs and promoting peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, individualism creates tensions, leads to excessive and often unfair competition, exacerbates inequality and in the process leads to more social problems. One of the effects of globalization has been the spread of the idea of individualism into African societies, with the result that traditional values of communalism continue to be eroded. Gbadegesin says that "returning to the interactive and integrative practice of communalism, in Africa in general and the Nigerian society in particular, could achieve better progress and stem the tide of corruption, oppression and marginalization that modernity with the rise of a capitalist ethos and values engenders."

In Chap. 6, Mussa Idris takes a look at two different business models generally adopted by Ethiopians and Eritreans in the Washington, DC area of the USA. The first business model is the culture-centered business, which typically deals in Ethiopian foods and other traditional items; while the other is what he describes as non-traditional businesses, including transportation services, gas stations and similar trades both owned and managed by these immigrants. Idris uses the two business models to show how immigrants are trying to maintain aspects of their culture and social lives, and at the same time adapt to life in their adopted country.

In Chap. 7, Richard Ogunnubi and Dorcas Ettang examine South Africa's foreign policy since the country emerged from the dark period of apartheid. The chapter explores the ways in which South Africa's soft power can be created, maintained and expanded given the country's central role in the African continent. The authors highlight some of the important instruments through which the country is extending its influence in the region and globally. As a regional powerhouse, it has a critical role to play in advancing the region's interests and helping the continent to take its rightful place in the global political economy. However, South Africa's influence and its ability to play a leadership role effectively depend on its foreign policies and the ways in which it operationalizes these policies. Ogunnubi and Ettang contend that "South Africa can indeed play the part of Africa's regional power/hegemon in a credible and decisive manner, by relying on the moral authority that emanates from the impressive record of its soft power resources." The authors call for an expanded conceptualization of soft power, and argue for the inclusion of state and non-state actors, as well as due consideration of public opinion, in the design and implementation of foreign policy. South Africa's interactions and collaborations with the rest of the continent need to be holistic and diplomatic, and without a trace of anti-African or xenophobic posture. The country needs to formulate its foreign policy in a way that consolidates its role as a responsible regional leader, thereby allowing it to help reposition the continent so Africa can play a greater role in the global political economy.

The second section of the book, "Governance and Creativity," begins with Chap. 8, in which Harriet Efanodor engages with one of the impacts of globalization on local communities in Nigeria. Using recent development trajectories in the rural areas of Kano and Delta states, Efanodor examines how privatization and the consequent activities of large multinational corporations have impacted negatively on the economic opportunities of rural women. Specifically, they are unable to compete with established firms in the liberalized system of land acquisition. The author calls for culture-sensitive development strategies that take note of societies' unique cultural characteristics when they are formulated and implemented.

Chapter 9 is a critical exposition of the challenges of nation-building. Ramon A. Fonkoué examines the seemingly impossible task of creating a viable and progressive nation-state in Africa, and the continent's concomitant failure to take up a respectable position in the global political economy. Using Cameroon as a case study, Fonkoué points accusing fingers at

colonialism as the original foundation of Africa's failed and failing states. As the legacies of colonialism linger, the typical African state continues to fail to deliver basic necessities to its citizens, such as the protection of life and property. Although it has been over fifty years since most African countries gained political independence, these countries remain at the beginning of nation-building. The author laments the predatory state–society relationship that is an almost permanent feature of the average African state. Since the early years of independence, African countries have been largely divorced from their citizens. Unlike the school of thought which blames globalization and neoliberal economic ideas for Africa's lingering predicament, Fonkoué suggests that the alternative approach of statism—the dominant development paradigm of the immediate postcolonial era—might not have produced materially different development outcomes for African citizens. According to the author, "No matter the rhetoric that was put forward to legitimize 'developmentalism' across the continent, it is impossible to argue that the turn that most independent African regimes took was sustainable, and that if it weren't for the major changes that sent African politics into turmoil in the late twentieth century, this path would have led to real development." Consequently, he argues that the African state is by design not amenable to real development, as it is systematically divorced from its citizens.

In Chap. 10, Charles Nwaigwe discusses another dimension of governance—governance in the creative sector. Using Nigeria as a case study, Nwaigwe discusses the challenges facing the creative and cultural sector in that country. He notes with dismay the seeming inability of the sector to define a unique path for itself, rather than continuously trying to copy the film industries of more advanced societies. Despite the modest successes so far recorded by Nigeria's film industry, so-called Nollywood, it has been difficult for the industry to create a unique name and style of its own. The author identifies piracy as one of the biggest challenges undermining the proper development of the industry. While calling on the relevant agencies to articulate policies and enforcement measures that will protect the intellectual property rights of players in Nollywood, Nwaigwe notes that the hydra-headed problem of piracy has permeated all aspects of the business. Consequently, he concludes that "until the theft of intellectual property is treated in Nigeria as a financial crime and copyright infringement treated as a human rights violation, the menace of piracy will continue to pillage the industry."

In Chap. 11, Toochi Aniche examines another aspect of governance and a topical issue—policing in Nigeria. Extolling the benefits of community policing in the traditional Igbo society in Southeast Nigeria, Aniche argues that as practiced by the Igbos in pre-colonial days this relied heavily on the traditional African values of communalism, group solidarity and being one another's keeper. The author notes with dismay the wholesale condemnation of traditional governance systems that worked well for the communities, and the imposition of new governance arrangements by European colonial masters. According to Aniche, the observed increase in crime rate in recent times can be linked to the contemporary ideas of policing, where members of the police force are effectively detached from the community that they are supposed to protect: in Nigeria, as in other African states, crime fighting and detection are more difficult because the community is systematically excluded from crime prevention duties. Arguing for a return to the traditional system of community policing, Aniche highlights the colonial origins of the police force, which was basically an instrument of oppression imposed by European colonial masters. The adversarial relationship between police and communities, which began during the colonial era, continues to pose challenges for crime prevention and effective policing.

Highlighting the failure of state formation and predatory governance arrangements emphasized in Chap. 9, Bosede Funke Afolayan delves into one of the most difficult threats to good governance in Nigeria—corruption amongst state officials and elected representatives. Chap. 12 is based on the works of two authors—Ola Rotimi and Emeke Nwabueze—who used different characters and scenes to depict pervasive corruption and the personalization of public office in Nigeria, a system that Richard Joseph described as prebendalism.[27] The narratives further highlight how prebendalism has been institutionalized to the effect that citizens now find it more worthwhile to trust individuals who hold public offices instead of state institutions.[28] Like Fonkoué in Chap. 9, Afolayan notes that the only way forward that involves real development is for nations to overhaul their politics and economics in ways that will curb corruption, promote political accountability, and bring about broad-based and equitable growth and development.

Conclusion

Africa has been integrated into the global economy since the era of the Atlantic slave trade. From being the source of slaves whose labors were exploited by slave masters, to the era of colonialism when Africa's commodities were taken out of the continent to feed the industrial needs of Europe, Africa's integration into the global economy has been defined by exploitation and predation. Today, globalization and the spread of neoliberal ideas seem to have become the world's sole economic model. But African states' starting positions put them at a significant disadvantage. The foundations of underdevelopment, exploitation and poverty have meant that African states do not have the capacity to play in the global economy as equals with industrialized countries, or with other developing countries from other regions.

Despite its perceived benefits, globalization would not provide equal benefits for every country. Indeed, globalization and its economic ideas regarding a free market have been described as nothing other than the national aspirations of a few powerful nations.[29] While African states are unable to compete effectively with the rest of the industrialized world, it appears the global economy is so integrated that no country can delink itself. Therefore, the most appropriate approach for African states would be to explore ways in which globalization can be domesticated, so that true benefits are produced for Africans, the economic development and structural transformation of societies is facilitated and the living standards of the citizens are improved.

The starting point for Africa's meaningful engagement with the rest of the world is for African states to look inward, examine their politics and economics, and restructure the political and economic institutions that have fostered poverty and underdevelopment. African states must begin by reforming the extant political culture across the continent in ways that will promote inclusiveness, check corruption and bring about stability. The pervasive governance failures, characterized by corruption, prebendalism, inequity and crisis, can only have one outcome—and that involves poverty and underdevelopment. The chapters in this volume engage with Africa's governance challenges from different perspectives and take a hard look at the continent's potential paths for appropriating the benefits of globalization. Africanists, researchers and scholars from Africa and the African diaspora, as well as government agencies and Africa's development partners, will find this book very useful.

Notes

1. See, for example, Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1972); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: an empirical investigation," *The American Economic Review*, 91 no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401; and Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

2. Crawford Young, *The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010*, (Maddison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012): 5.

3. See World Bank's poverty data, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povDuplicateWB.aspx. Accessed, March 12, 2017.

4. World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2015. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf. Accessed March 13, 2017.

5. UNCTAD, International Trade in Creative Goods, 2015. Available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx.

6. Toyin Falola, "Africana at the Margins," in *Africa, Empire and Globalization: Essays in Honor of A. G. Hopkins*, ed. Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2011), 611–622.

7. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: an empirical investigation," *The American Economic Review*, 91 no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401; and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, "Why is Africa Poor?" *Economic History of Developing Regions*, 25 no.1, (2010): 21–50.

8. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford & Bloomington: James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1999).

9. Toyin Falola, *The Humanities in Africa* (Austin, TX: Pan-African University Press, 2016).

10. Martin Wolf, *Why Globalization Works* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).

11. One must note that although movement of goods and services have progressed at a faster rate, a number of restrictions persist with respect to movement of individuals across national boundaries.

12. Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, *Information Feudalism*, (London: Earthscan Publication, 2002).

13. See Peter M. Lewis, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2007).

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid, Chap. 1.
16. Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*. (London: Anthem Press, 2003).
17. Ibid.
18. Toyin Falola, *Humanities in Africa*.
19. Ibid.
20. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report, 2015* (Geneva and New York, NY: UNCTAD, 2016).
21. Marta Bengoa and Blanca Sanches-Robles, "Foreign direct investment, economic freedom and growth: new evidence from Latin America", *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 19 (2003), 529–45.
22. Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead and falling behind". *The Journal of Economic History* 46, (1986), 385–406; and Jess Benhabib and Mark Spiegel, "The role of human capital in economic development: evidence for cross-country data". *Journal of Monetary Economics* 34, (1994), 143–173.
23. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report*.
24. Gabriel Eweje, "Environmental Costs and Responsibilities Resulting from Oil Exploitation in Developing Countries: The Case of the Niger Delta of Nigeria," *Journal of Business Ethics,* 69, (2006), 27–56.
25. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report*.
26. Ibid.
27. Richard A. Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
28. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford & Bloomington: James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1999).
29. Falola, *Humanities in Africa*.

Africa's Adaptation to Globalization

The Rediscovery of Africa

Melike Yilmaz and Fatima Momodu

The mode of Africa's interactions with the rest of the world has had a unique feature. From the era of the Atlantic slave trade, when Africans were taken forcibly as slaves to serve slaveholders in Europe and the Americas, to the era when Europe forcefully partitioned the continent in ways that served the colonial masters' interests, Africa's interactions and subsequent "incorporation" into the global community have been defined by the cruelest forms of exploitation. In order to facilitate the exploitation of Africa's resources, the Western world has had to create labels that would justify, and attempt to legitimize, these acts. European explorers had to "discover" the dark continent populated by natives whose living conditions made them not so different from savages. These labels often led to the treatment of Africa and its people in the most demeaning ways, and this has unfortunately continued to shape Africa's place in the global system. Political independence in the middle of the twentieth century did not change these labels and narratives as defined by Africa's exploiters.

M. Yilmaz (✉)
Institute of Languages and African Studies, Regent University College of Science and Technology, Accra, Ghana

F. Momodu
Faculty of Law, Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria

Unfortunately, the economic and political crises that ensued in postcolonial Africa did not create the needed change, but somehow emboldened the predators and exploiters who defined Africa through unkind labels. But Africa needs to rediscover itself in order to redefine its position in the global political economy. It is only through such redefinition and rediscovery that the continent would begin a new era in its engagement with the rest of the world.

Africa is the second largest continent in the world, making up more than 20% of the world's land area, but it is still referred to, in most parts of the world, as a single country. The African continent occupies about 30 million square km, has a population of about a billion people and is home to fifty-four countries. Africa also hosts important political and economic organizations such as the Africa Union, Monetary Union of West Africa, Economic Community of West African States, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Economic Community of Central African States. Despite the size of this continent, its population, its wealth in natural resources, its rich geographic heritage, its rich history, emerging economies, diversity, contributions to arts, literature and intellectualism as a whole, it is a pity that it does not occupy its rightful position of importance in world discourse.

In the global political economy, Africa occupies a diminished role owing to its relative economic backwardness and the negative stereotype defined by the global North. Nigerian professor Chimalum Nwankwo puts this view into perspective with his interesting narrative that explores the problem from a personal perspective. According to him, "Africa is not a city or country. It is a continent. I remain mindful of circumstance in which you meet people from the Western world who excite this familiar drama. 'Where are you from?' Answer: Nigeria. 'Do you know Dr. Njuguna. He is from Nairobi or Gabon or something like that!'"[1] The problem is highlighted clearly here, with Nwankwo showing that Africa is often regarded not as a continent but as like a mere small city or town where everybody is expected to know everybody else. Nairobi and Gabon are located at two extremes of the continent and they have very little in common except the fact that they are both located on the vast African continent. Nwankwo's experience is similar to the experiences of the majority of Africans who have visited countries outside Africa. As Toyin Falola said in his 2002 publication *Key Events in African History*: "And even today, there are many Americans who cannot locate many African countries on a map."[2] In fact, this does not only apply to Americans but

also to others. For example, Turks, who have had close social and cultural relations with Africa over time, are equally ignorant. Mohamed Bakari, who is of Kenyan origin and a lecturer in Turkey, said: "Turks know very little about Africa, and the little they know is mediated through Western media that often portrays Africa in its desperate moments of famine, hunger and natural catastrophes. On the Turkish side, there have been recent attempts to focus somewhat on Africa."[3]

The reason behind the minimalization of Africa's status from that of a continent to a mere country and in some instances (as seen in Nwankwo's description) to even a small city could be linked to centuries during which the continent has been viewed from a particular perspective, one that is defined by underdevelopment, disease and poverty. When Africa is mentioned the first things that come to mind are poverty, hunger, political and economic insecurity, political instability, terror, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. These negative images can be directly linked to the mainstream media's coverage of the news emanating from the continent. An example is the media coverage of Nigeria. Despite the country's relative economic advancements, the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015 categorization of Nigeria as a developing country,[4] its rich cultural heritage, its various kingdoms and civilizations, we are expected to understand it only through the lens of Boko Haram. The mainstream media's prejudiced coverage of Africa is the reason behind this. Unfortunately, the portrayal of Africa in this light has only been compounded by the notorious cases of corruption by government and public officials, nepotism and abuse of power found in some African countries.

The word "dark" used to describe Africa by the West connotes negativity, hopelessness and bleakness. In the *Thesaurus*, synonyms for "dark" are lack of light, black, darkened, dim, dingy, drab, gloomy, murky, and somber.[5] In the Cambridge Online Dictionaries, dark as an adjective is defined as evil or threatening.[6] Dark has a negative connotation. This is also seen in literary works such as Henry Stanley's *Through the Dark Continent* (1878) and *In Darkest Africa* (1890). Joseph Conrad in *Heart of Darkness* claims to provide an insight into Africa's depth and human knowledge. However, he claims that at the heart of Africa resides darkness, that is, negativity. He tries to explain the issue using the concept of contrasts: darkness for enlightenment, black for white, civilization for primitiveness, naked black Africans for dressed white colonial masters and so on. In the words of his character Marlow: "We whites, from the point of development we had arrived at, 'must necessarily appear to them [savages] in the

nature of supernatural beings—we approach them with the might of a deity … By the simple exercise of our will we can exert a power for good practically unbounded'."[7] Jack London, in his 1911 *A Son of the Sun*, describes the black man as follows: "On deck, for'ard, a dozen blacks pottered clumsily at scraping the teak rail. They were as inexpert at their work as so many monkeys. In fact, they looked very much like monkeys of some enlarged and prehistoric type."[8] Frantz Fanon explains the use of the word dark by the Europeans as referring to something evil. In his 1986 publication *Black Skin, White Masks,* he expresses his personal experience with the black—dark discriminatory qualification. "Will this statement be susceptible of understanding? In Europe, the black man is the symbol of Evil."[9]

The general perception of Africa in literature used to be that of the land of the uncivilized, a primitive, barbaric land of savagery, the dark continent, the home of cannibals and other such derogatory misinformation. This negative perception was not limited to literature; it extended to philosophy, art and intellectualism as a whole. G. W. F. Hegel states in his book *Geographical Basis of World History* (1820): "Africa proper, is the characteristic part of the whole continent as such … It has no historical interest of its own, for we find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery in a land which has not furnished them with any integral ingredient of culture. From the earliest historical times, Africa has remained cut off from all contacts with the rest of the world."[10] Moreover, the philosopher and historian David Hume has the same ideas as Hegel: "I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no science."[11] Immanuel Kant's perception of Africa is no different from that of Hume, as seen in his 1775 work *Of the Different Human Races*, where he emphasized the superiority of the white race over the black race. These scholars' ideas summarize the general view of Europeans' understanding of African art, literature and intellectualism.

This early modern time up to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by a lacuna in publications about Africa by Africans and from the African perspective. Immanuel Kant's basic philosophy explains that courage is needed in the use of an individual's intellect: "Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!'—that is the motto of the age of enlightenment."[12] The age of enlightenment is characterized by people who were reluctant to use their intellect to critique information that was passed to them, but rather accepted it unquestioned. The tradition of

accepting what the "philosophers" of the era had to say resulted in wide-spread internalization of the racist and negative remarks that were directed at Africans. Toyin Falola observes that a century ago there was no history book about Africa written from an African perspective. According to him, the possibility of such a work at the time did not exist:

> The contents of this book [*Key Events in African History*] reveal the richness of African history. As recently as a century ago, a book like this was not possible. There were those who still believed that Africans had no history worth writing about. Indeed, the world knew little of African history at the beginning of the last century and Africans were treated as inferior beings who could not have contributed to civilization.[13]

Correcting the consistent misrepresentation of facts about Africa over several centuries was a herculean task and continues even today. The European depiction of Africa as a dark continent has been passed on from generation to generation. Toyin Falola addresses this issue: "A century later, Africa was still regarded as a 'dark continent.'"[14] Frantz Fanon in his 1986 work *Black Skins, White Masks* portrays the problem thus:

> In the same issue of Presence Africaine, Emile Dermenghem, who cannot be accused of Negrophobia, said: "One of my childhood memories is of a visit to the World's Fair of 1900, during which my chief enthusiasm was to see a Negro. My imagination had naturally been stimulated by my reading: Capitaine de quinze ans (A Captainat Fifteen), Les Aventures de Robert (Robert's Adventures), Les Voyages de Livingstone (Livingstone's Travels)." Dermenghem tells us that this was the manifestation of his taste for the exotic. I should be annoyed with myself if I were simply picking up old subjects that had been worked dry for fifty years. To write about the chances for Negro friendship is an unselfish undertaking, but unfortunately the Negrophobes and the other princes consort are impregnable to unselfishness. When we read, "The Negro is a savage, and to lead savages there is only one method: a kick in the butt," we sit at our desks and we like to think that "all such idiocies will have to die out." But everyone is in agreement on that.[15]

However, in ancient African societies there were developed civilizations and kingdoms. In fact, recent studies have shown that the oldest civilizations in the world were on the continent. According to Falola, "civilization had emerged in the ancient period."[16] Prior to European empires, Africa had both small and large kingdoms, and within these existed art,

literature, trade and farming. One of these was the Kingdom of Axum (fourth century AD). This was in what is now Ethiopia. It was a powerful trading center and it attracted people from all over the ancient world. Axum had a huge impact on the ancient Mediterranean world, and it also influenced one of the important powers of the time, the Roman Empire. Roman ships came to Axum's city of Adulis weekly to trade with merchants there.[17]

Another important kingdom was the Kingdom of Kush. This was Africa's center of culture, and its golden age was between 500 BC and AD 150. By 5 BC it had iron mines and was famous in the iron trade: owing to this it was an economically advanced kingdom, and important cities such as Meroe (the new capital) and Sobo emerged. Meroe's merchants used their wealth to construct fine houses that were built around a central courtyard and public baths modeled after those they had seen in Rome.[18] The Greek historian Herodotus visited Egypt, Meroe and Ethiopia, and recorded the following: "I found a magnificent city with gold in great abundance. I found iron workers capable of creating tools of wonderful strength."[19]

The kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, Songhai and Oyom, and the Bantu kingdoms, are just a few that reflect the advancement of trade, prosperity, housing and urban development in ancient Africa. Benin's Ashanti and Mossi kingdoms had outstandingly beautiful palaces. At Tassili in the Sahara Desert and also in the Kalahari were located works of stone art and paintings. On Zimbabwe's east coast remains of urbanization have been discovered, as well as artifacts that show the existence of a civilization. The Nok people of Nigeria are another important example. They were the first West African people to smelt iron, and this was the most significant technological advancement of the era. "The culture's social system is thought to have been highly advanced. The Nok culture was considered to be the earliest sub-Saharan producer of life-sized Terracotta."[20] The iron tools they used for farming and hunting would make for mechanized agriculture, efficient hunting and successful warfare in 1000 BC–AD 500. Owing to the existence of these technologies during this period, there were other important kingdoms in the same region, such as Dahomey, Benin and Yoruba.[21]

The Nok, Yoruba and West African ancient civilizations play a significant role in the development of African art. In fact, they influenced the art of later civilizations in the region. No serious work on the emergence of early civilizations can be concluded without mention of the Nok civilization, but it was not even discovered until the twentieth century. "The Nok culture was discovered in 1928 on the Jos Plateau during tin mining. In

1932, a group of 11 statues in perfect condition were discovered near the city of Sokoto."[22] Discoveries of this nature should erase some of the prejudice and negative narratives about Africa, and should produce new insights into Africa's history. As Toyin Falola states, "Africa is an ancient continent, with a long history. Archaeologists have concluded that it is the original home of humankind."[23]

Therefore, it is necessary that new archeological research is conducted, with the aim of documenting new discoveries relating to Africa's history and civilizations. An example is the work of UNESCO's researcher David Aremu, whose studies were published under the title "Iron Roads in Africa: A Contribution from Nigeria": "A great deal of research work remains to be done if the contribution of different Nigerian societies to the iron rods in Africa is to be appreciated fully. Such research should be properly planned, programmed and funded, besides covering archaeology, ethnography and other related disciplines."[24] Perhaps such discoveries may help to diminish the negative labels applied to Africa and its people. One of the hindering factors in the study of African art, literature and history is a scarcity of written materials. There is a need for more light to be shed on the first-hand accounts of early African voyagers and explorers, and this should be done without limiting resources just to European explorers; Middle Eastern explorers are also important. For example, Al-Bakri, who lived during the eleventh century, wrote about the Kingdom of Ghana. He describes the contemporary king of Ghana as follows:

> When the king gives audience to his people, to listen to their complaints and to set them to rights, he sits in a pavilion around which stand ten pages holding shields and gold-mounted swords. On his right hand are the sons of the princes of his empire, splendidly clad and with gold plaited in their hair. The governor of the city is seated on the ground in front of the king, and all around him are his counsellors in the same position. The gate of the chamber is guarded by dogs of an excellent breed. These dogs never leave their place of duty. They wear collars of gold and silver, ornamented with metals. The beginning of a royal meeting is announced by the beating of a kind of drum they call deba. This drum is made of a long piece of hollowed wood. The people gather when they hear its sound.[25]

Basil Davidson explains the importance of travelers such as Al-Bakri and other Arab writers for the West African region in *The Growth of African Civilization, A History of West Africa 1000–1800*: "If we look carefully

behind the travellers' information collected and written down by Al-Bakri and other Arab writers, and behind the stories that were afterwards told in countless homes for many years, we can trace several developments in ways of life. These were of great importance to West Africa. They must be clearly understood."[26]

Ibni Battuta, a fourteenth-century explorer, dictated the stories of his travels to a scholar, and these narrations of his travels were translated and published under the title *Rihla—My Travels*. It is clear that the European explorers of Africa at that time knew very little about the continent in comparison with him. He recorded meetings with important personalities during his voyages, and he recorded their lifestyles in detail, recording misunderstandings, intrigues and conflicts. Ibni Battuta also provided graphic descriptions of his experiences when he visited the East African coastal city of Kulwa. In his narrative he provided details such as the nature of the buildings, the sounds in the streets and descriptions of the inhabitants. "Kulwa is a very fine and substantially built town, and all its buildings are of wood. Its inhabitants are constantly engaged in military expeditions for their country is contiguous to the heathen, Zanj. The sultan at the time of my visit was Abu'l-Muzaffar Hasan, who was noted for his gifts and generosity."[27] This account from 800 years ago is very important, as it shows there was already justice, abundant resources and respect among the people coexisting in the area now known as Somalia and Ethiopia.

As early as the twelfth century, the area referred to today as Senegal, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad basin, Northern Nigeria and Sudan had established Islamic states. A thirteenth-century Ghanaian emperor conquered Mali, and within a short while was using the upper Niger valley as a trade route. The spread of Islam from Egypt to Andalusia and down to Mali played a key role in the development of that region. One of the strongest emperors of the fourteenth century was Sulan (Mense) Musa (1312–1337). He championed Morocco–Egypt relations in 1325 upon his return from Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj); he brought several scholars and experts back to his country. The architects amongst them constructed five mosques using backed bricks for the first time.[28] Ibni Battuta wrote that Mali enjoyed social and cultural opulence. It was at this time that Islamic knowledge and tradition spread to Timbuktu, situated within Mali's borders. In 1353, Ibni Battuta carried out his first exploration of this area. He was clearly impressed by the peace and order: "One of (the) good features (of the people of Mali) is their lack of oppression. They are the farthest removed of people from it and their king doesn't

permit anyone to practice it. Another is the security throughout the entire country, so that neither traveller there nor dweller there has anything to fear from robbers or men of violence."[29]

An important African explorer after Ibni Battuta was Leo Africanus (Hassan bin Muhammed al-Wazzan). In 1526, he recorded that Timbuktu was a developed city, that it had well-established trade, public welfare was maintained by the state and that the people engaged in social activities such as evening dances:

> Here are great store of doctors, judges, priests and other learned men, that are bountifully maintained at the kings cost and charges … The inhabitants are rich … The rich king of Tombuto hath many plates and scepters of gold, some whereof weigh 1300. Poundes … and he keepes a magnificent and well furnished court. The inhabitants are people of gentle and cheerful disposition and great part of the night in singing and dancing throughall the streets of the city.[30]

Shamil Jeppie's article "Re/discovering Timbuktu" discusses some very important and interesting facts about Africa's history, and this chapter has been inspired by Jeppie's work.[31] Shamil Jeppie discusses not just the developments in trade and the economy in sixteenth-century Timbuktu, but also its well-established education system: "Timbuktu may be hard to get to but it played an essential role as a centre of scholarship under the Songhay state until the invasion by the rulers of Marrakesh in 1591 … Timbuktu was centre of trade and scholarship, a magnet to people from far and wide coming to exchange goods and ideas."[32] Further, "Expert readers and writers, paper and copyists, books—original and copies—were circulated between Timbuktu and its regional counterparts."[33] It was also an important center where scholars in science and social science could exchange knowledge. This played an important role in the development of the people and the community as a whole. Ibn Khaldun stated: "A scholar's education is greatly improved by traveling in quest of knowledge and meeting the authoritative teachers (of his time)."[34]

Even today we can see that in order for a state or country's education sector to fully develop, it needs to do what obtained in sixteenth-century Timbuktu. That is, it has to acquire knowledge through interactions with scholars from other parts of the world. It is important that scholars are not confined to a single area if they are to break through boundaries in their fields. It is safe to say that the application of lessons from sixteenth-century

Timbuktu will serve us well in the twenty-first century: we should consider factors needed for human liberation that are related to family, law, politics, religion and education, amongst other fields. Of these, education remains the most important because it is at the core of each sector: by implication, the progress of every society is shaped by the progress of its education sector. The role of Timbuktu's trade and education centers cannot be overemphasized. The Ahmed Baba Institute was listed on the UNESCO "Memory of the World" register of humankind's most significant documentary heritage.[35] South Africa set up a project related to Timbuktu, and the Department of Arts and Culture began to conduct research in this area in 2001.

It is clear that the Africa that was invaded by Europeans, the Africa that they described as the land of "barbarians, cannibals," that even in our generation is referred to as backward, primitive and barbaric, is in reality quite the contrary. We have seen that it has some of the world's oldest civilizations, and some of the most ancient trade routes. In *Key Events in African History*, Toyin Falola describes the Agricultural Revolution of 3100 BC, ancient Egypt's centralized government in around 1000 BC, the Berber civilization of 730 BC, the Kush rising to power in northeast Africa, the first "Iron Age" kingdom, which developed in 500 BC around the period when ideas about ironworking began to spread in west, central, eastern, and southern Africa, spreading widely by 100 BC.[36]

In AD 320 the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was founded, during the reign of King Ezana (AD 320–356). By the year AD 800 the empire of Ghana in West Africa had become very powerful, and it controlled the gold and salt trades across the Sahara. Sankore University in Timbuktu was founded in 1327. In 1415, Timbuktu and Jenne (Djenné) in West Africa became famous centers of Islamic scholarship. In1434 Benin was a strong empire in West Africa. The Portuguese reached the West African coast in the 1450s, marking the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade.[37]

African ancient civilizations changed between the sixteenth and the twenty-first centuries because of European exploration of the African coasts. In the fifteenth century, the Portuguese/Spanish invasion of Africa marked the beginning of colonization. This period marks some of the most horrific moments in history. Millions of Africans were sold to Europe and the Americas, and this has continued to affect Africa negatively. The slave trade marked the beginning of the decline of African kingdoms and civilizations. Selling prisoners into slavery created friction among different tribes, and in order to avoid this fate people began to migrate from cities into the jungle.

Nineteenth-century colonization and subsequent division is a leading factor in Africa's underdevelopment. This remains one of the most significant points in African history, a time during which the continent witnessed massive decline. The forced migration of Africans to the West because of the slave trade created a decline in Africa's economic, social, and education sectors. Alongside the oppression of the people, the fertile land, rich in natural resources, was also exploited, and its wealth was exported from the continent by the colonists. Europe's industrialization meant that there was an increased thirst for natural resources, and a large portion of those natural resources were sourced in Africa.

Several centuries of the slave trade and the subsequent colonization resulted in Africa's decline on several fronts. The early advances of its civilizations were frittered away. This decline precipitated poverty and industrial and technological underdevelopment and paved the way for neocolonialism in the now independent African countries. In reality, Africa is still not really independent of its colonial masters: although there is some semblance of self-government, a number of African countries continue to depend on their erstwhile colonial rulers for aid and grants. This malady of dependence was systematically designed and planted by the European imperialists, this being achieved largely through the arbitrary division of the continent into unwieldy and unworkable administrative units called countries. In addition, the creation of predatory states and extractive institutions meant that modern economic and political development was difficult, if not impossible. Africa therefore faces a double tragedy: the continent had thriving societies with their own organic trajectories of civilization and development, which were was halted by the European slave traders and colonialists; on the other hand, Africa's natural process of growth and development were interrupted, and Europe foisted weak state structures and extractive institutions on the continent—so that it was almost impossible for Africa to chart its own course back to sustainable development.

Upon their arrival in Africa, European voyagers and explorers began to draw conclusions, based on very limited knowledge and pre-conceived notions, and began to present themselves as experts on the history of the continent. This helps to explain the negativity with which African history is marred. Jonathan Reynolds states:

> In their efforts to place Africa in world history, most Enlightenment historians were deeply influenced by two issues. First, they tended to think of historical evidence only in terms of written documents. Thus, because they

were either unable to translate (as in the case of ancient Egyptian, until the deciphering of the Rosetta Stone in the early nineteenth century) or unaware of written documents of African origin, these scholars decided that Africans were without history. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they were deeply influenced by growing notions of European racial superiority. Born of the achievements of the scientific revolution and the creation of a new plantation economy that demanded a brutal system of slave labor, most European scholars of the time embraced the notion that nonwhite peoples were intrinsically inferior.[38]

South African writer J. M. Coetzee criticizes the Western mentality and negative stereotypes about the natives during the colonial period.[39] These stereotypes shaped what is wrongly known as Africa's history and defined the world's attitude towards Africans, as writers thoughtlessly repeated the observations made in earlier works. As an example of this, he describes the book *Jodocus Hondius* as a work that "seems to wish to emphasize that it is no work of fantasy: everything it records has truly been witnessed."[40] Coetzee also notes:

> In the early records one finds a repertoire of remarkable facts about the Hottentots repeated again and again: their implosives (turkey-gobbling), their eating of unwashed intestines, their use of animal fat to smear their bodies, their habit of wrapping dried entrails around their necks, peculiarities of the pudenda of their woman, their inability to conceive of God, their incorrigible indolence. Though many of these items are merely copied from one book to another … Yet, while there were certainly differences, these items are perceived and conceived within a framework of sameness.[41]

One may observe that Coetzee was influenced by Edward Said's discourse about the attitude of Europeans towards Africans. One of Said's major books was *Orientalism*,[42] which was published ten years before Coetzee's *White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa*. Said's book was about the major European misconceptions and prejudices about the East and Africa. According to Said, these misconceptions existed in the European mind and consciousness, and implied huge differences between the West and the East. These ideas began with colonization, when Europeans arrived in the lesser developed countries, and drew the conclusion that their civilization and culture were more civilized. Europeans used the term "The Other" for the Eastern and African peoples: the world was divided into two parts that were in opposition, the

West being civilized and superior and the East being uncivilized and inferior. From the Western perception of the East, there arose a European identity, which has not changed throughout history. Said comments on the "idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures."[43] He stresses the creation of Orientalism: "The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences … The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture."[44]

According to Said, the reason behind the Western countries' superiority complex towards Africa is an attempt to justify its colonization of the continent. Jean-Paul Sartre describes this:

How can an elite of usurpers, aware of their mediocrity, establish their privileges? By one means only: debasing the colonized to exalt themselves, denying the title of humanity to the natives, and defining them as simply absences of qualities—animals, not humans … The colonizer can only exonerate himself in the systematic pursuit of the "dehumanization" of the colonized by identifying himself a little more each day with the colonialist apparatus.[45]

The notion of "we" versus "them" was also introduced by the West, creating an artificial distinction between the races. This negative view has had devastating effects on the politics, economics, literature, social and living conditions of the people. By implication, the Western and Eastern civilizations are hugely contrasted, as Albert Memmi notes:

Everything in the colonized is deficient, and everything contributes to this deficiency—even his body, which is poorly fed, puny and sick. Many lengthy discussions would be saved if, in the beginning, it was agreed that there is this wretchedness—collective, permanent, immense. Simple and plain biological wretchedness, chronic hunger of an entire people, malnutrition and illness. Of course, from a distance, that remains a bit abstract, and an extraordinary imagination would be required. I remember that day when the "Tunisienne Automobile" taking us south stopped in the midst of a crowd whose mouths were smiling, but whose eyes, almost all eyes, were watery; I looked uneasily for a nondiseased glance on which to rest my own. Tuberculosis and syphilis, and those skeletonlike and naked bodies passing between the chairs of the cafes like living dead, sticky as flies, the flies of our remorse … "Oh, no!" cries our questioner. "'That poverty was there before! We found it there when we arrived!"[46]

As a result of Africa's colonization and the negative light in which the continent has been painted, a huge part of Africa's history remains unknown—both to the wider world and to Africans alike. Any hope for African history, civilizations, culture, and literature has to be with the younger generations. They are the ones who are tasked with the responsibility of rediscovering Africa and bringing the continent into the limelight. Even today, owing to neocolonialism, African education is heavily influenced by a Western mentality. In particular, it is filled with what the Western world expects Africans to know and not necessarily what is required for society. An example is the history curriculum taught in Nigerian schools, which is not compulsory at any stage. The resultant lack of knowledge will result in negative effects: no society can truly exist and have a sense of patriotism and nationality without an awareness of its history. This problem is not only witnessed in Nigeria, but is also seen in other West African states. The recent interest in research into African history and the resulting increase in the number of publications has not translated into new enthusiasm for the subject expressed through education curriculums. Roland Keyanja, the UNESCO's Advisor for Communication and Information has been quoted as saying: "We understand the African history was distorted through colonialism. This means that colonialism brings a lot of negative influence into the African history. On our part, we have tried to publish the history of Africa in nine volumes for our children to know our history in the best format."[47]

History is not just a stack of information from the past. It teaches us the experiences of societies and individuals in all sorts of social, political and daily activities. Lessons derived from the experiences of the past can be used to find solutions to contemporary challenges, such as migration, poverty, indiscipline, political uncertainty, political instability, challenges in the education sector, family problems and racism. By implication, history is studied as an international discipline, and it is also an element of other disciplines, such as political science, international relations, sociology, psychology, literature and philosophy. History and these related disciplines are indispensable to every society's development. One of the most beautiful expressions depicting the importance of history was made by Ibn Khaldun: "The past resembles the future more than one (drop of) water to another."[48] This shows us how the past is the best predictor of the future. Because history is filled with the experiences of humankind, it affects our understanding of factors such as freedom, equality, justice, human rights, economics, education, the structure of government and

domestic affairs. The composer of the Turkish national anthem, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, writes: "They define history as 'repetition'. Would it be repeated if they had learnt their lesson?"[49] In other words, those who do not learn lessons from history are likely to repeat the mistakes of the past.

CONCLUSION

In order to dominate and impose their worldview on Africans, Europeans introduced artificial divisions centered around skin color. This was achieved through the degradation of African using various negative labels, the exploitation of Africa's natural resources, and the colonization and enslavement of the people. The result was the introduction of racism and racial profiling, which continue to be detrimental to the entirety of the black race decades after the end of colonization. Following the formal end of colonialism there was the emergence of neocolonialism. Independent African states have continued to be dependent on their former colonial masters for financial aid and policy support. This negative trend can only be reversed through revisiting history. Because there exists a multiplicity of historical interpretations, students of history should not be limited to just one perspective.[50] We have seen that historians and anthropologists have recorded the fact that Africa developed civilizations and kingdoms far greater than what has been portrayed by the single narrative about the continent that has shaped events of the past century. In order for Africa to regain its past glory, there is a need for African writers to add their voices to the African narrative, and to rewrite it. Several other perspectives exist that show Africa is not merely a land of darkness, deprivation, communicable diseases, crisis and violence; rather, it is a land of beauty, art, literature, colorful cultural heritage, and diverse cultures and people. Africans must play a key role in the rediscovery of Africa.

One of the roles that Africans must play in changing the fortunes of the continent is to work towards transforming the states in ways that will bring an end to the political and economic crises that have ravaged Africa for decades. Given that European colonial exploitation created highly extractive institutions that cannot support real development, postcolonial African leadership should put a concerted effort into dismantling these anti-development institutions and create an environment for peace, development and stability. Events of the past decades should have confirmed to African leaders that real development cannot be imported from overseas. Foreign aid or technical assistance, however well designed, can-

not replace domestic efforts and programs that enhance citizens' living standards. Africans must rise up to tell a different story about their continent, and challenge the negative labels that have defined Africa for centuries. In the same vein, African political leadership must take critical action to change the narrative of the continent, working for inclusive growth and development.

Notes

1. Ernest Emenyonu (ed.), *Teaching African Literature Today* (Ibadan, Nigeria: HEBN Publishers. 2011), 129.
2. Toyin Falola, *Key Events in African History. A Reference Guide* (London, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 3–4.
3. Mohamed Bakari, *Turkish – African Social and Cultural Relations: Reflections*, (International Conference on Turkish-African Relations at the Turkish Asian Centre for Strategic Studies, Istanbul; 23rd November, 2005), 4.
4. *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015*, New York: United Nations, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2015wesp_full_en.pdf. Accessed January 7, 2016.
5. Thesaurus Dictionary, *Dark*. http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/dark?s=t. Accessed January 1, 2016.
6. Cambridge Dictionaries Online, *Dark* http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/dark. Accessed January 1, 2016.
7. Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*. Internet Archive. 82. https://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/cvsp/Documents/reading_selections/204/Spring%202013/CS-204-ReadingSelections-Conrad-HeartDarknestDarkness.pdf accessed November 17, 2015.
8. Jack London, *A Son of the Sun*. (Doubleday, 1912). http://london.sonoma.edu/Writings/SonofSun/sonofsun.html. January 3, 2016.
9. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 188.
10. Jonathan Reynolds, *Introduction: Africa's Role in World History* (Berkshire, 2011), 14. http://berkshirepublishing.com/assets/PDF/AfricaWH_Intro.pdf. Accessed December 2, 2015.
11. David Hume, *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*, Note [M], p. 222. [Mil 208.] http://www.davidhume.org/texts/etss.html accessed January 10, 2016.
12. Immanuel Kant, *What Is Enlightenment?* http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html. Accessed January 10, 2016.
13. Toyin Falola, *Key Events in African History. A Reference Guide* (Westport, CT, London: Greenwood Press, 2002),3–4.

14. Ibid., 3–4.
15. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks* (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 200.
16. Toyin Falola, *Key Events in African History. A Reference Guide* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 12.
17. Roger Beck and Linda Black, *McDougal Littell World History. Patterns of Interaction* (Florida Edition, 2004), 227.
18. Mounir Farah and Andrea Karls, *World History: The Human Experience* (USA: Teacher's Wraparound Edition. Macmillan/McGraw – Hill, 1992), 333.
19. A. James Banks and Jean Craven at all, *The World Past and Present East and West*. (New York: Macmillan/McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1995), 417.
20. *Nok Culture*, http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Nok-Culture.pdf. Accessed November 12, 2015.
21. Emma George Ross, "The Age of Iron in West Africa", in *Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History* (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000), http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/iron/hd_iron.htm
22. *Nok Culture*, http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Nok-Culture.pdf. Accessed November 12, 2015
23. Falola, *Key Events in African History*, 10.
24. Hamady Bocoum (ed.), *The Origins of Iron Metallurgy in Africa. New light on its antiquity: West and Central Africa* (Unesco Publishing. 2004), 164.
25. Basil Davidson, *The Growth of African Civilisation, A History of West Africa 1000 – 1800* (England: Longman, 1977), 38.
26. Ibid., 38.
27. H. A. R. Gibb (trans), *Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa* (New Delhi: Asian Educational Service, 2005), 112.
28. Davut Dursun. *Afrika*. (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi: cilt: 01), 433.
29. Ibn Battuta, *A Donation to Those Interested in Curiosities*, http://college.cengage.com/history/primary_sources/world/donation_to_curiosities.htm. Accessed November 14, 2015.
30. John Pory (trans.), Robert Brown (prepared), Leo Africanus, *The History and Description of Africa: and the notable things* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1896), vol. 3, p. 824–825.
31. Shamil Jeppie, Souleymane Bachir Diagne (eds.). *The Meanings of Timbuktu*, CODESRIA/HSRC, 2008, ISBN: 13,978-07969-2204-5.
32. Ibid., 3.
33. Ibid., 5.
34. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, Franz Rosenthal (trans), p. 731. https://asadullahali.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ibn_khaldun-al_muqaddimah.pdf. Accessed November 15, 2015.

35. Shamil Jeppie, Souleymane Bachir Diagne (eds.). *The Meanings of Timbuktu*, CODESRIA/HSRC, 2008, ISBN 13978-07969-2204-5 p. 10
36. Toyin Falola, *Key Events in African History,* 3–4.
37. Ibid., xv–xvi.
38. Jonathan Reynolds*, Introduction: Africa's Role in World History* (Berkshire, 2011), 12. http://berkshirepublishing.com/assets/PDF/AfricaWH_Intro.pdf. Accessed December 2, 2015.
39. J. M. Coetzee, *White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988).
40. Ibid., 13.
41. Ibid., 13.
42. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 7.
43. Said, *Orientalism* p. 7.
44. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
45. Jean-Paul Sartre*,* "Introduction" in *The Colonizer and The Colonized*, Albert Memmi (Britain: Souvenir Press (Educational & Academic) Ltd., 1974), 22.
46. Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and The Colonized* (Britain: Souvenir Press (Educational & Academic) Ltd., 1974), 161.
47. *UNESCO Wants Nigeria's History In School Curriculum* http://nigerianobservernews.com/05062014/news/latestnews2.html#.VqjJQpqLTIV. Accessed December 13, 2015.
48. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, Translated by Franz Rosenthal, p. 60 https://asadullahali.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ibn_khaldun-al_muqaddimah.pdf. Accessed November 15, 2015.
49. Mehmet Akif Ersoy, *Safahat* (Ankara: ITO, Hece Yayınları, 2008), 477.
50. Kaya Yılmaz, "Postmodernism and its challenge to the discipline of history: Implications for history education." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 42.7 (2010): 779–795.

Globalization and the Creative Space in Africa: Implications for Governance and Development

N. Oluwafemi Mimiko and Funmilola Olorunfemi

THE CONTEXT

State and society in Africa are not insulated from the current of globalization, which became markedly entrenched at the turn of the twenty-first century. They could not have been, given the all-encompassing orientation of the phenomenon and its multiplicity of dimensions. Indeed, it is arguable that globalization has tended to have more of an impact on African countries, with virtually all aspects of their lives being reconfigured in a short period. Globalization has been profound in its impact on the African continent, seeking to recompose, wittingly or otherwise, the totality of the culture of the weaker segments of the global system. Being deeply ideological and cultural, globalization dispenses both positive and

N. O. Mimiko (✉)
Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

F. Olorunfemi
Department of Political Science, Adekunle Ajasin University,
Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria

negative outcomes for the weaker nations and their peoples, who must of necessity take what they have to in the structure of ownership that is presented. A consideration of how this phenomenon has influenced, impacted or shaped the creative milieu on the African continent constitutes the focus of this chapter.

Given that African peoples do not have the capacity to insulate themselves against globalization, assuming it is desirable to do so, and given their very limited influence on the tenor and character of globalization, the continent's secondary status in the globalization schema is virtually complete. What this implies in the arena of creative engagement is the subject of inquiry here. Our central thesis is that while some positive externalities of globalization for Africa cannot be wished away, the phenomenon, in very significant ways, has tended to undermine creativity on the part of African peoples and thereby constrained their ability at generating social currents of the kind the continent requires. At best, there is but a systemic pandering to, and regurgitation of, the Western worldview, preferences and dictations, at times benign but profoundly impactful when it is sustained. This inquiry underscores the need for Africans and their leadership to engage with globalization constructively and in a manner that will reignite their creativity; without this, a valuable basis cannot be created for national and continental rebirth. Against this backdrop there is a discussion of the nature of globalization's character. Then the nexus between globalization and creativity in the African context is established, providing the basis for our conclusion.

The Nature of Globalization

What is described as globalization today is but the current phase of a phenomenon that has always been a part of human society as we know it. In all ages and at different levels, different peoples have always found reasons to move across borders, no matter how tenuous these were at different times in the past, to interact and indeed establish the basis for some degree of integration. The concept of global citizenry, albeit in its rudimentary form, was ingrained in Stoic philosophy in the era between 300 BC and AD 200. Indeed, the concept of the "global village," which defines globalization today, is effectively a reformulation of cosmopolitanism, from the Greek words *cosmos* (world) and *polis* (city). Trans-border relationships have therefore always been a pattern driven by stark realities of livelihood

and the innate instinct in humans to interact. It is a basis as well as a consequence of the social nature of human beings. While globalization may be an expression of this reality, albeit in a more profound manner, there is really not much about it that is novel.

It is this compelling pattern of social engagement that production and exchange processes, now conducted more than ever on a planetary scale, have followed. A compelling example of the economic integrative dimension of globalization is Apple's iPhone: design and software are developed in the USA, the screen is manufactured in Japan, its flash memory is developed in South Korea and its assembly is undertaken in China.[1] Accompanying this is a massive and holistic diffusion of cultural valuesand forms that has not left out any people, nation or region, facilitated largely by advances in communication, transportation and other forms of technology. As great variations exist in the capacity for social formations, as has always been the case for different reasons, those with greater capacity tend also to be better privileged in the emergent patterns of engagement. It is understandable, therefore, if such nations not only try to sustain such patterns, but also work committedly to deepen them. These are some of the more compelling realities that globalization presents.

Criticism of the extant concept of globalization is fairly well articulated in the extensive literature on the subject. It often focuses on the acceleration in the number of interconnections in the global economy over the past few decades, and the attendant rise in international financial markets and global corporations.[2] It suggests a political economy in which the territorial state is less important in global politics and economics than ever before.[3] To fully appreciate the dynamics of globalization, therefore, it is apposite to examine the phenomenon within the context of its various dimensions—economic, social, scientific and technological, among others.[4] Its basic orientation as a neoliberal ideological construct is also fully attended to.[5] That by its very nature it seeks to entrench the old pattern of unequal relationship between the rich and the poor nations of the global economy, albeit in a more benign form, has also been fully interrogated.[6] How it undermines statehood, seeks to further entrench the dominance of the leading aid agencies and their principals, and imposes thinly veiled Western values on non-Western societies have also been explored.[7] Its penchant at undermining the possibilities of autochthonous development in sundry social formations and deepening the process and pattern of incorporation of a comprador elite in the weaker nations have been addressed as well.[8] The feeble attempts by "the 99%" to confront global-

ization and its patrons on both the moral and political planes have also been interrogated, albeit haphazardly. Why it would seem that the "Occupy" initiative has all but failed, especially in the face of fresh threats from global terrorism, continues to be debated. The critical gap that remains to be filled is advancing globalization beyond the more evident economic and political plane towards subtler, if no less profound, meta-economic pressures that it generates and imposes on peoples across the globe. A dimension of this is how it has impacted or shaped the creative world on the African continent.

CREATIVITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION

The concept of creativity speaks to inspired thoughts and actions. It is about the ability to produce ideas that are as fresh as they are profound, original and impactful. A creative mind expresses the unusual and the imaginative. It is about incubating ideas and translating them into creative expressions. Without doubt, it is through the power of such creative thoughts that society is built. In a broader context, creativity equates innovation, which according to the World Economic Forum constitutes one principal basis of global competitiveness.[9]

Scholarship

A major element of globalization is the development in the technology of communication, as represented most profoundly by the Internet. The breadth of this platform has no previous equivalent. The amount of information available on the Internet and the ease with which it can be accessed has facilitated the expansive development of knowledge and its sharing across boundaries. To a significant extent, however, this same invention has constrained the space for creativity in many societies across the world, Africa included. The place of critical thinking in human affairs has been greatly eroded in the African space, as information on virtually all aspects of human existence is already readily available. Without making a deliberate effort at staunching this trend, therefore, what you find is a situation in which whatever you find on the Internet, created by those who are better placed, is regurgitated as the whole truth. This is the way it is for scholarship in many parts of the African continent, wherein even research students seem to have substituted Internet materials for the rigor that is associated with academic research. In the process, rigorous intellectualism

and empiricism are becoming increasingly marginalized. Further entrenching this trend is the associated ease with which ideas may be accessed through the open courseware that has been facilitated by advancements in cyber-technology. It is important that a deliberate effort is made to underscore the disadvantage to creativity if there is virtually complete reliance on information that has been generated by more advantaged. If this is not done, Africa faces the prospect of remaining a victim of a form of cultural imperialism, with all the deleterious implications that this implies for robust national development.

The Arts

The content of creative artistic expressions such as movies, literary works, dress and dance forms, have all been greatly impacted by globalization, such that original ideas are becoming increasingly scarce on the African continent. There are a number of reasons for this. First, there is the allure of societies that are perceived to be more successful, and the attendant tendency to ape the cultural forms prevalent in such societies. Secondly, there is the ease with which articles of cultural expression can be disseminated and distributed across the world by dint of advancement in the technology of distribution and movement of goods and services. Thirdly, industrially advanced societies tend to produce this material, cultural vehicles as it were, more cheaply, given their comparative advantage in manufacturing industrial goods. With the benefits of economies of scale, these industrial nations are therefore more able to offer cultural goods at very competitive prices thereby crowding out similar products from African countries. Consequent upon the foregoing, a degree of uniformity in thoughts and actions that is antithetical to creativity now defines the creative arena.

The virtual collapse of the stage play genre in the face of the intrusion of Nollywood (home videos) in Nigeria is also emblematic of this. While the film industry without doubt possesses its own dynamics and vitality, contributing 1.4% to Nigeria's $510 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013,[10] the loss of creativity inherent in the disappearance of stage plays, scripting and production, which defined the moral fiber of the society and provided a platform for recreation and systemic order in times past, is unquantifiable. All this is now virtually lost in the face of the systematic onslaught of celluloid.

Akin to this is the systematic undermining of the dynamism associated with African languages. Under the sheer weight of globalization, the vital-

ity of several of them has been lost by reason of the widespread and increasing usage of foreign languages. It is axiomatic that language use echoes the pattern of prevailing power relations. The languages of peoples with stronger economic and political capabilities invariably find greater relevance than those of weaker political economies. Further development of African languages and their creative essence is, in the circumstances, greatly circumscribed. Indeed, it is now projected that unless a deliberate intervention is made, several of Africa's languages may be extinct the year 2060. The deleterious implication for the cultural essence of affected societies is unquantifiable.

Governance

Globalization continues to be profoundly impactful in expanding the power of ordinary peoples across the world, including Africans. Both cable television and the Internet have done much to broadcast democratic ideas faster and more extensively than any other vehicle previously developed. The impact of Cable News Network (CNN) on the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and more recently on the Arab Spring, may not have been adequately interrogated; but that mass movements are inspired by an emergent protest culture that is broadcast from other countries is not in doubt. The freedom attendant upon the unhindered usage of social media platforms has enhanced the power of ordinary people to call their leaders to account, and by implication has facilitated good governance.

These trends do not, however, detract from the fact that governance forms are becoming increasingly harmonized across cultures and spatial entities, and in a way that may be dysfunctional. The conception of democracy is thus shifting from its principles—majority rule, minority rights, public accountability and so on—to particular institutional forms that connote the histories and cultures of Western societies. To a large extent such culturally specific connotations account for the crisis of governance confronting African states in their attempts to implant liberal democracy. The contradiction inherent in having statutory parliamentary opposition in a cultural milieu where opposition of any kind equates with enmity is a case in point. Dividing power between a prime minister who is head of government, and a president who is only ceremonial is hardly consistent with the culture of many an African society. When democracy is conceived in these institutionally specific terms, the room for creativity in evolving governance forms that could meet the canons of democracy without being Western in outlook is constricted. This was one major reason for the col-

lapse of the immediate post-independence governance systems across the African continent. It is also a key element in the monumental crises that have attended the push for liberal democracy via the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. The historically authoritarian orientation of the Arab political system guaranteed order, peace and stability in such societies, in spite of their scant regard for the nuances of democracy. Without regard to this reality, the US government under President Barack Obama embarked upon a completely ahistorical nation-building agenda that ended up virtually destroying their fabric, especially in Syria, Libya and Yemen. A more appropriate response would have been to find ways by which the authoritarian political system entrenched in the region for centuries could be moved in the direction of democracy through a gradual and carefully guided process.

Development of Value Chain
Under globalization, the integration of the global economy has attained unprecedented proportions. The pattern of production and exchange that hitherto existed has been further consolidated; and thus the division of the global system into nations of commodity exporters and industrial producers continues to deepen. Commodity exporters rarely add value to their products. Therefore, they fail to develop the requisite value chain, which the processing of commodities would have engendered. This accounts for the enclave status of the crude oil sector in Nigeria, with its minimal integration with the larger economy in which a preponderance of the population is anchored. The deep alienation of such a population is a function of this shortage of creativity in economic administration. Globalization, by implication, facilitates the large-scale importation of consumer goods by African countries, often in a manner that disrupts the nascent productive sector of their economies. The scope for creativity in the production process is thereby undermined. It was a similar mindset that was demonstrated across the continent soon after political independence, when development initiatives were predicated upon access to foreign aid. The large-scale failure of the New Partnership for African Development initiative, more than 50% dependent on external funding, is a function of this display of a shortage of creativity.

In a similar manner, the vast opportunity for migration that globalization has afforded the people of Africa has undermined the commitment of the elite to engendering newer and more advanced societies across the continent, as safe havens continue to exist for them in other regions of the

world. This is one factor in the phenomenon of brain drain that is occurring: according to the United Nations, the continent may have lost a third of its skilled professionals to richer countries. It has been suggested that a key factor in the limited scope of medical facilities in Nigeria, for instance, is the ready availability of opportunities for medical tourism in India for the elite, whose vision for the sector therefore remains mediocre.

Recreation (Sporting) Activities

In sports, the redirection of focus from African soccer to the European Premier League is so profound in its manifestation that it has all but destroyed the vitality this game was previously noted for on the continent. How far creativity can blossom in soccer in the African context with this type of mindset and orientation remains to be seen. The point is that traditional African recreational activities have suffered great reversal in patronage by reason of the easy access to foreign models that is afforded by globalization.

Media

The dominance on the airwaves of international cable networks broadcasting heavily prejudiced and culturally specific messages to all parts of the world round the clock every day, detracts from creativity on the part of those who can only watch and listen but have virtually no opportunity to influence content. It is also debatable whether the quality of programming on African local television stations can improve when cable television has invaded the privacy of virtually all elite homes on the continent. That the technology for delivering this service also tends to be located outside Africa compounds the problem, ensuring the almost complete irrelevance of the continent in the scheme of things.

Conclusion: Sustaining Creativity in the Face of Globalization

Reigniting and sustaining the basis for creativity on the part of Africans in the face of the onslaught represented by globalization remains a major challenge. The first critical step in addressing this is an appreciation of the nature of the pressures represented by globalization, what they mean for the mental state of the African peoples and by implication the organization of their societies. This is to be followed by a deliberate program of accul-

turation to ward off some of the more deleterious of these pressures and create the basis for the revival of creativity on the continent. Accomplishing these requires the African state to be better organized and focused. The prevailing leadership type across the continent needs to be reconfigured for more robust engagement with globalization by African countries. Doing this would require the restructuring of the structures of governance to guarantee greater inclusivity and sub-national development initiatives. An advancement of the creative agenda and the broader issues of social development in the continent can only be enhanced thereby.

Notes

1. The Economist "*The World in 2008,*" London, December, 2009.
2. Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order* (New York, NY: Touchstone Publishers, 1994).
3. Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*: *The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
4. N. Oluwafemi Mimiko, "Globalization and the Nigerian State," lecture delivered to the Senior Executive Course (SEC) 38, 2016, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Nigeria, Feb. 25, 2016.
5. N. Oluwafemi Mimiko "Globalization, (Economic) Crisis and Social Dislocation in Changing Contexts: A Comparative Study of Mexico, South Korea and South Africa," *Korea Observer*, 36 no.4 (2005).
6. Joseph E. Stieglitz, *Making Globalization Work* (New York, NY: WW Norton and Company, Inc., 2006).
7. Dani Rodrix. *Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy* (New York, NY: WW Norton and Company, Inc., 2012).
8. N. Oluwafemi Mimiko, *Globalization: The Politics of Global Economic Relations and International Business* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, African World Series, 2012).
9. World Economic Forum *Global Competitiveness Index Report,* (Stockholm: WEF, Sept. 2015–2016).
10. FGN, *Federal Government of Nigeria 2014 Budget*, (Abuja: Federal Ministry of Finance, 2014).

Postcolonial Africa's Development Trajectories

Mesut Yilmaz and Chigozie Enwere

INTRODUCTION

Nature with its infinite authority positioned Africa as the raw material base of global capitalism. The world's capitalist system depends to a large extent on Africa's raw materials to create, sustain and consolidate its industrial power and base. In the absence of Africa's resources, industries of the developed West and the new industrializing nations of the East would compete more and, in turn, pay more for scarce raw materials. In some ways, Africa has become the bride of international capitalism and the backbone of its industrial expansion and hegemony, yet the continent does not have much in terms of development to show for its abundance of natural resources. This strategic position given to Africa by nature triggered off an interest in developed countries of the North for the discovery of new

M. Yilmaz (✉)
School of Business and Leadership, Regent University College
of Science and Technology, Accra, Ghana

C. Enwere
Department of Political Science and International Relations,
Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria

sources of raw materials and potential large markets for industrial goods. The competition for access to these resources led to the scramble for and partition of Africa, as well as the strategy to destroy Africa's economic systems and drive its industrial growth and development into stagnation. Therefore, control strategies were developed to contain Africa's expansion into the Eurocentric club of capitalists. The first of these was the use of wars and conquests as control mechanisms during the colonial era. Although this strategy was very effective—as Africa was partitioned and shared between various European forces—it was too costly to maintain after the Second World War.

Following the devastation of Europe's economy during the Second World War, as well as intense agitation by African nationalists, colonialism became a very expensive instrument of containment. Consequently, African states gained their political independence from European colonial masters. However, international capital methodically changed its instrument of control and adopted more subtle strategies. These involved the use of neoliberal economic ideas, which provided the institutional mechanism to control Africa's political and economic machineries, as well as its resources. Overtly, these ideas were driven largely by the dogma of free market, and were promoted as instruments that would quicken the transition of Africa from a less developed country to an industrial society. This idea was accepted by most members of Africa's governing elite but opposed by many African scholars, who saw neoliberalism as a continuation of the colonization process. The result was a conflict of ideas between the governing elite and African scholars. This disagreement between political leaders and intellectuals resulted in a crisis of ideas.

Owing to pressures from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, neoliberal economic ideas were institutionalized and consolidated in Africa through economic reforms that were anchored on privatization and liberalization policies. However, economic liberalization did not produce the promised benefits of rapid growth and development. Rather, African states experienced a monumental economic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s following the implementation of the infamous Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)—the umbrella policy for liberalization in African states. With the failure of economic liberalization, it became clear to African leaders that alternative models might indeed hold the key to the continent's development. The rise in economic importance of the BRICS nations (Brazil,

Russia, India, China and South Africa) provided African states with opportunities to enter into new trade partnerships with these emerging economies, especially those of China and India, leading to marginal economic growth. This chapter analyzes the application of modernization ideas in Africa, and the extent to which the South–South economic partnerships have improved the continent's participation in the global economy.

MODERNIZATION IDEAS IN AFRICA

Modernization ideas rooted in Western economic liberal values incorporate the full spectrum of the transition and transformation that a traditional society needs in order to become a modern industrial society.[1] Accordingly, the term modernization as used in this chapter involves policies intended to raise the standard of living of the poor through a process of disseminating knowledge and information about more efficient techniques of production and distribution. Modernization is thus an idea dominated by liberal tradition, which envisions the development of a free market that is similar to what obtains in the global North. In the 1950s, liberal scholars from the North turned the modernization idea into a movement, insisting that developing and underdeveloped countries in the global South would develop only when they traveled along the path of political and economic development that had already been experienced by the developed countries of the North. The applicability of this idea in the global South, particularly in Africa, clearly demonstrates that there are three historical contexts for the systematic implementation of this idea. These are the post-independence era that marked the end of colonialism in Africa, the era of institutionalization of Western liberal economic models in Africa, and the post-Cold War period, which witnessed the collapse of socialist economies in Africa.

POSTCOLONIAL MODERNIZATION ERA

To understand the strategic relevance of modernization in the 1950s, it is necessary to understand the dynamic importance of sub-Saharan Africa as the raw material base or source for European industries. The abundant human, material and mineral resources in sub-Saharan Africa triggered off the quest and struggle for the colonization of the continent, one being a direct product of the other. This struggle over and "sharing" of Africa was

formalized at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, after which European merchants took absolute control over African markets and resources.

Following the Second World War and the associated devastation in Europe, colonialism became so expensive that the European powers began to yield to pressure for the dismantling of colonial rule. In order to remain relevant in a time of international capitalism, the European powers changed their tactics of domination from the overt use of violence and terror to a more covert and cunning strategy. This encouraged the use of ideas to influence and shape Africa's political and economic development models. These were structurally designed as viable development strategies that would move Africa into the realm of sustainable development and rapid industrialization. Therefore, the transition from colonialism to political independence also marked the transition from the use of colonial terrorism to the use of "modernization" ideas as the least expensive instrument to control Africa, its resources and peoples. To ensure a smooth transition, scholars from the global North labeled Africa as a dark continent which needed to be modernized. They portrayed Africa and Africans as the white man's burden, primitive people who lacked ideas of how to manage and develop the huge resources bestowed on them by nature. Africa needed to be directed, and to be taught the best possible ways of exploring and managing these resources for the benefits of its people and humanity as a whole.

Therefore, a number of theorists embarked on a mission to build new development roadmaps, theories and models for Africa, which Africans were expected to use as catalysts to facilitate the changes in technological and ideological values that were necessary for the transition from the traditional society of the past to the modern society of the present and future. For these theorists, Africa represented an intellectual burden and challenge, similar to the challenges faced by European explorers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries during the era of discoveries. Like the earlier explorers who gained fame and fortune through geopolitical discoveries, the European scholars of the 1950s designed an intellectual blueprint for understanding the development of Africa. This blueprint was sold to Africans, and it became a dominant theory for African development. Drawing on the experiences of the industrialized countries of the North, modernization theorists argued that African countries were at the starting point of the development process. Therefore, there was a need for African states to mechanize agriculture and build industries in major urban areas. According to these theorists, the measurement of

Africa's development index should be based on a country's gross national product (GNP), which also constitutes one of the best measurements of the modernization process.[2]

The central goal of modernization theory in Africa in the 1950s was to rationalize and consolidate Western capitalist values and practices. However, the idea was presented in a way that suggested adoption of the modernization blueprint would help bridge the gap between developing countries and developed nations. It was argued that modernization will help introduce modern ideas and facilitate advances in technology, agriculture, trade and industries that would stimulate economic growth and expansion in underdeveloped countries.[3] The conclusion was that Africa and all countries in the global South needed to look at the Western model of modernity and pattern their societies along those lines in order to attain real development. This was what most African countries did during the immediate independence period. The modernization theorists advocated two basic dimensions to Africa's development process. The first of these was the social dimension of modernization, which drew its conclusions from the writings of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons. These theorists argued that for Africa to develop, Africa and its people had to jettison their traditions and ways of life, and embrace a worldview patterned after European culture. Modernization scholars insisted that ethnic divisions in Africa constitute hindrances to development and were partly responsible for Africa's underdevelopment.[4]

The second dimension was political modernization, to bring "primitive" political processes into line with the North. Scholars argued that democratic pluralism was the key to political development in Africa, which offered a framework that would allow Africans to participate actively in the political process. Therefore, growth in political participation would invariably foster good governance: Africa's political leaders and governing elite would respond to the needs of their citizens, as well as to the demands of society. To this end, modernists affirmed that the only road to Africa's development was to create or adopt the political values and culture of modern industrialized democracies. However, the optimism and hope projected by the modernization theorists encouraged Africa to unconditionally adopt the theory as a blueprint for development during the 1950s and 1960s. Owing to differences in institutional characteristics between African and European countries, African societies failed woefully to achieve the promised rapid industrialization and economic growth during that era.

Unlike the African proponents of the liberal tradition who sought to emulate the political and economic systems of the industrialized democracies of the global North, critical scholars from Latin America and Asia sought new theories of development that were more sympathetic to the values of self-reliance and import-substitution industrialization, and did not rely on the European model of modernization. This new body of development literature was driven by the belief that external influences would inhibit economic development in the developing countries. Proponents of this line of reasoning argued that the domination of developing countries by the industrialized powers of Western Europe and North America, was largely responsible for the economic and political challenges of the developing nations.[5] Though this new theory gained acceptance among African scholars, African policymakers and the governing elite were more inclined to the Eurocentric modernization theory, because it offered the ruling elite an easier way of running their economies—through knowledge and technology transfer without personal effort or intuition.

To Africa's governing elite, adopting Western modernization ideas offered access to European loans and aids so that their economies could be run for the benefit of the elite, without making reasonable efforts to initiate Afrocentric models of development. But indigenous African scholars, like their Latin America counterparts, saw modernization theory as too "Western centered" in nature. Such disparity in thinking between members of the African elite and scholars led to a crisis of ideas, resulting in uncertainty, conflict of interests and misapplication of development ideas and programs. One notes that the acceptance of Western liberal economic models by Africa's political leadership and the tacit rejection of these models by most African scholars led to a conflict of interests. This lack of harmony regarding the appropriate development models explains in part why attaining real and sustainable development has remained a challenge for most African states.

THE ERA OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

This period witnessed the institutionalization of Western economic liberal traditions in Africa. Realizing the challenges that Western scholars faced in using publications and conferences to shape the minds of African scholars and policymakers, the apostles of free market and globalization devised a different strategy to force African states into adopting the economic mod-

els predicted on market determinism. Instead of using scholars, these apostles of unhindered free markets coopted the international finance institutions to bring about the stagnation of Africa's industrial development by urging these countries to adopt free market ideas without first setting up the institutions that would ensure the success of the free market. Through various conditionalities attached to loans and aids, the World Bank, the IMF and various creditors forced African states to abandon state-guided economic models. In the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank became the principal vehicles for transmitting the tenets and values of Western economic models into African states. Using conditionalities attached to technical assistance, loans and grants, these institutions systematically transformed African economies into proxy theaters of liberal tradition and exploitation. Economic liberalization was thus promoted as the only route for Africa's development. While there may be nothing inherently wrong with market determinism, the biggest scandal was that African states lacked the appropriate institutional mechanisms to effectively implement the structural transformations that were being suggested by the World Bank and the IMF. Although the international financial institutions suggested that markets would solve all of society's problems, the reality in Africa is that economic liberalization had disastrous consequences.[6]

As African states implemented the economic liberalization policies encapsulated in the SAP, economic crises persisted. Instead of acknowledging that the SAP was not producing its promised benefits, the IMF and the World Bank insisted that Africa's economic challenges were the result of its failure to implement the reforms as designed. It was also alleged that observed economic challenges were taking place because African leaders were inclined towards rent-seeking and leadership failures. According to the IMF and the World Bank, government interventions in the economy bred corruption, stifled private sector innovation and produced stagnation or economic decline. Economic liberalization policies were seen as effective mechanisms to correct for poor policy choices and bloated and inefficient government bureaucracy. The World Bank and IMF became the institutional mechanisms for the promotion, stabilization, imposition and implementation of the principles and propositions of modernization theory in Africa. Through their endorsement, the modernization theory had institutional cover that sought to enhance its theoretical potency and gave it some element of legitimacy and appeal, especially in the developing world. In order to show the problem-solving potentials of the moderniza-

tion theory, the 1981 publication of the World Bank study titled "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action" reveals that misguided decisions of the first generation of African leaders were responsible for the economic crisis of the 1980s.[7]

Therefore, in order to resolve the crisis and to put Africa on a new path of development, the IMF and World Bank tacitly forced African states to accept and implement the SAP, whose intent was to link Africa's economy to future flows of Western capital. It was suggested that this would move Africa from a traditional economy to a modern economy, where industrialization and rapid economic growth would be achieved. The SAP was hence infused with liberal traditions of modernization and given to Africa as a condition for technical assistance, loans and grants from the IMF, the World Bank and other international funding bodies. The World Bank and the IMF used the SAP to prescribe the following conditions, among others:

1. That African states should discontinue the use of subsidies because, according to these institutions, subsidies kept prices artificially low and discouraged production and investment flows from the global North.
2. That African states should devalue their national currencies so as to stimulate exports and promote domestic industrial production.
3. That African states should trim all government bureaucracies and embark on privatization and commercialization of state-owned corporations.
4. That African states should scale down on their social programs, such as subsidies to education and health, and encourage private sector participation in them.

This neoliberal economic model became the keystone of IMF and World Bank conditions to African states, and were held as the only catalyst that would trigger rapid economic growth. Unfortunately, African leaders and policymakers were quick to accept these conditions and began initiating the reforms that were necessary for the implementation of the proposed economic models. As an embodiment of the neoliberal economic model, which promotes less government intervention in the economy, the SAP was designed to transfer and institutionalize Western economic values and culture to Africa by insisting that all forms of government interventions in national economics should be reduced.

The IMF and World Bank noted that Africa's economic successes would depend largely on the pursuit of an export-oriented strategy in a way that allowed for the free rein of the forces of demand and supply, with only limited government interventions in the economy. To achieve its export-oriented goals, Africa needed either short-term stabilization loans from IMF to ensure economic solvency or long-term loans from the World Bank to promote economic development. Either of these options had a series of neoliberal conditions, which according to the IMF and World Bank were designed to restructure Africa's economies to meet international standards, and in the process open up the continent's economies to foreign investments.

Post-Cold War Era

With the introduction and consolidation of Western liberal economic values, involving less interference by the government in the economy, the modernization theorists and strategists began to develop new tactics on how to influence and control African politics and economic system. Perhaps the aim was not to recolonize Africa through territorial conquests but through the colonization of the minds and hearts of Africans using the strategic hegemonic imposition of ideas. This new form of colonization was anchored in the use of knowledge and ideas to control Africans' minds, which would result in the colonization of African territories without the use of arms and ammunition. To achieve this goal, there was a need to project liberal political ideas into Africa, to serve as an ideological superstructure for the transplanting of Western political values.

The power and influence of the World Bank and the IMF, and the seeming global status of neoliberal ideas, became more pronounced with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Prior to this, the USSR was the only world power that provided alternative models of development and offered alternative sources of development assistance outside the Western powers. With the end of the Cold War and the apparent success of the USA and its Western allies, socialism ceased to exist as a model of development, and capitalism became the unipolar determinant model available to Africa and Africans.

In essence, the decline and fragmentation of the Soviet Union strengthened the hegemony of the Western powers that controlled institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. This left African leaders with little or no bargaining leverage when Western offers of foreign assistance and loans

were accompanied by increasingly stringent political demands or eco-
nomic conditions.[8] These stringent demands were aimed at increasing
Africa's politico-economic dependency on the North as well as perpetuat-
ing the exploitation of Africa by the industrialized countries.

As aptly captured in their study "Between Liberalization and Oppression:
The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa," Thandika Mkandawire
and Adebayo Olukoshi insist that the foreign impositions of Western polit-
ical values in what is commonly called "structural adjustment programs"
runs counter to the legitimate needs of socio-political forces and therefore
corrupts true efforts by African states at creating responsive political ideas
to boost and consolidate democracy.[9] With the collapse of single regimes
throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the stage was set for
the dismantling of the few African countries that were leaning to the left,
and the full imposition of neoliberal political and economic models.

In the 1990s, African pro-democracy and modernist activists sparked a
wave of democratic transitions in all regions of the continent in order to
consolidate the tenets of modernization theory in Africa's political econ-
omy. African leaders who were sympathetic to socialist ideas could no lon-
ger successfully align themselves ideologically with the Soviet Union in
exchange for protection against exploitation by and impositions from the
Western nations. The new Russian regime was pre-occupied with domes-
tic economic restructuring, and consequently withdrew from African poli-
tics, leaving Africa at the whims and caprices of the capitalist nations.
These dynamics created ample room for owners of international capital to
begin the process of recolonization of Africa through the instrumentality
of neoliberal ideas. The IMF and the World Bank included this new strat-
egy in the conditions given to African states for loans and grants. Their
conditions included, among others, the liberalization of African political
systems through the acceptance and adoption of Western political institu-
tions and practices. The reason given for these conditions was the belief
that bad leadership and wrong policy choices were responsible for Africa's
economic and social challenges in the past. The adoption of the SAP,
including transitions to democratic political arrangements, became condi-
tions for accessing Western capital and foreign development assistance.
Again, the major concern with the liberalization policies in Africa was not
necessarily the potency of the ideas in themselves. The biggest challenge
was the absence of appropriate mechanisms to ensure that markets in fact
functioned the way they should. For example, in most African countries
there were no coherent competition laws to govern business-to-business

relationships. This challenge was clearly demonstrated in the banking crisis that ensued in Nigeria and in many other African countries following banking sector liberalization. Several banks failed shortly afterwards mainly because there was not adequate regulatory infrastructure to effectively supervise the upsurge in the number of banks.

Modernization and Africa's Development

Through the strong influence of the World Bank and the IMF, Africa was drawn into the pursuit of Western economic and political models. The Bretton Woods institutions assumed that a market will perform in the same manner and produce the same results across all societies, irrespective of history, culture and extant institutions. This erroneous assumption led to a proposal for universal solutions in the form of market liberalization. However, as the subsequent results show, institutions in fact do matter, and the application of silver bullets or universal models have proven disastrous for Africa. The promised economic growth and transformation that were expected to flow from liberalization were a delusion, with disappointment, failures and structural dislocations becoming almost a permanent narrative. The failure of the imposed development models has contributed to the growing gap between developed and developing countries.

As the developed nations work under the pretext of helping Africa's developing countries to overcome the multitude of development challenges, the continent's economy is a shambles, with pervasive poverty and destitution. This is in part because the current global economic order, which emphasizes the free flow of goods and services, has made it almost impossible for African states to begin the process of industrialization. It is now cheaper to import manufactured goods from Asia instead of developing local industries. The consequence of this economic arrangement is that Africa has remained a supplier of raw materials for the use of industries in other continents. Across most African countries, the exploitation and export of natural resources remain the dominant economic activity. This heavy dependence on natural resources is the same model that was forced on Africa during the period of colonial rule. In effect, although Africa has gained political independence from its erstwhile European colonial masters, the colonial economic systems of dependence on natural resources persist.

In order to understand the problems and the dynamic rationalization of modernization, it is pertinent to review the history and politics of the concept of "underdevelopment," which has triggered off an ideological race for the control of Africa's economy and natural resources through the instrumentality of ideas and theories. This scramble for Africa has led to the postulation of several theories of development intended to coerce the continent into the Eurocentric international capitalist system, using the subtle tools of ideas, concepts and theories. Since the 1960s, the word "underdevelopment" seems to have become the label that the West has reserved for Africa. Poverty and underdevelopment have become the cornerstone of the literature. Measuring Africa by the standards of the global North, the continent has been given all the negative labels—with diseases, poverty and underdevelopment as the most common descriptors. The label of underdevelopment has led to the division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries; North and South; core and periphery.

The modernization theory forced on Africa by the World Bank and the IMF draws on the theoretical postulations of economists such as Walt W. Rostow. In his book *The Stages of Economic Growth: Non-Communist Manifesto*, Rostow argues that all countries evolve through the same stages of growth as leaders seek to transform backward agricultural societies into modern industrial societies.[10] Rostow outlines an optimistic scenario for potential African states willing to follow the most accessible model for swift transition from a backward society to the expected industrial society. He identifies five stages for economic development. They are as follows:

1. *Primitive society:* characterized by subsistence farming and trade by barter.
2. *Preparation for take-off:* characterized by specialization, production of surplus goods and trade. Transport infrastructure is developed to support trade, and savings and investment are encouraged at this stage.
3. *Take-off:* signifies a process where industrialization increases and the economy switches from agriculture to manufacturing.
4. *Drive to maturity:*, there is less reliance on imports as there is an increased need to diversify the economy into new areas.
5. *Period of mass consumption:* the diversified economy stimulates mass production, with the service sector becoming increasingly dominant.

With this scheme, the Rostow modernity theory posits that development is a multidimensional process that requires nations to achieve industrial development at different paces depending on their capacity to adapt the necessary development values that move a nation to the next level of advancement. Along this line, it was argued that sub-Saharan Africa's development lagged behind because of its failure to adapt Western economic ideas in its economy. But in the words of Walter Rodney, the belief that adopting the Western-designed modernization theories will produce long-term benefits for Africa is not only malicious and misdirected, but clearly demonstrates the misrepresentation and misinterpretation of the African history of economic development.[11] In the views of the modernists, Africa has no history of economic development; therefore, the continent must imbibe the development ideas developed by the West. But Rodney argues that Africa has a recorded history of economic development and does not require Rostow's modernization ideas.[12] According to him, the empires of Mali, Songhay and Zulu and the Kingdom of Dahomey had well-developed economic systems prior to European colonial conquest. Samir accepts Rodney's assertion and goes further, arguing that pre-colonial African economies had advanced technology and techniques.[13] According to him, Africa had already found its true path to development well before the first encounter with Europeans. However, the arrival of Europeans distorted Africa's development trajectories and forcibly imposed a new development model, one that conflicts with Africa's technology, methods, history and economy. Through the strategic but very destructive instrument of colonialism, Europe derailed and undermined Africa's development patterns and replaced them with modernization ideas that are based on the disingenuous belief that Africa is the white man's burden. Therefore, Africa was classified as a dark continent, which needed to be enlightened through a modernization process that would transform the continent from being a burden to becoming self-reliant. Evidence of pervasive economic and political challenges across Africa has only proved that the mission of Europe and its allies to "develop" Africa has been a monumental failure.

In order to unlock Africa's economies from the shackles of underdevelopment, scholars from Latin America developed a new theoretical course of action to expose the flaws in the writings of Western theorists such as Walter Rostow, W. A. Lewis, Talcott Parsons and Daniel Lerner, whose theories partly influenced African states to look at the Western model of modernity and patterns as the appropriate development model for the transit from a

traditional society to a modern society. The criticisms of the Latin American scholars are generally anchored on the dependency theory. Simply put, this argues that the underdevelopment of Africa is externally induced because the core nations exploited the raw materials of the periphery nations to create and sustain global economic imbalance. Some of the proponents of the dependency theory are Raul Prebish, Theotonio dos Santos, Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Cardoso, Walter Rodney and Samir Amin. They base their theory on the premise that the core would like to make Africa a perpetual supplier of raw materials. While the industrialized nations make large profits from the manufactured goods produced from raw materials, African states make very low profits on commodity exports.[14] Dependency theory suggests that the actions of the industrialized countries are designed to keep Africa in perpetual dependence on the West, which is a source of ideas and charity upon which the future of Africa rests. Along these lines, the modernization ideas and processes were designed on the principles of parasitic relationship, which provide the framework for the conscription of African states into an exploitative international system; this principally serves the needs of the developed nations.

The contradictions experienced by Africa in the world capitalist system are at variance with the persuasive arguments of modernization theory, which posited that the relationship between African states and the Western nations would culminate in mutual benefits and shared prosperity across every nation. Contrary to this assumption, the neoliberal reforms have, according to Greig, Hulme and Turner, led to the underdevelopment of Africa and Latin America.[15] In effect, the core–periphery relationship in the world capitalist system has had negative repercussions on the periphery, and has produced monumental gains for the core.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SOUTH–SOUTH ECONOMIC COOPERATION

In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the volume of trade between African countries and other developing nations. The increase in South–South economic cooperation has had positive effects on African economies. Since the mid-1990s, sub-Saharan Africa has demonstrated an impressive increase in economic activity, which has resulted in more investment flows into the region. Through this, most African states have achieved some measure of economic growth. Despite

the 2008 global finance crisis and the subsequent recession in most Western countries, sub-Saharan Africa posted robust economic growth from 2007 to 2014, before the decline in global commodity prices began to adversely affect growth.

The rise of economic activities and trade in the global South has boosted the participation of sub-Saharan Africa in global trade. For sub-Saharan African countries, trade with the better performing developing countries, especially the BRICS nations, offers opportunities for specialization, efficiency gains, export market diversification and investment flows. South–South trade and economic cooperation offer a vehicle for promoting trade-led development in the weaker economies of sub-Saharan Africa, and in recent years the BRICS nations have provided improved market access to sub-Saharan African countries. Currently, there are thirty-eight sub-Saharan African countries whose major trading partners are countries of the global South. Over 50% of these countries' export and import are with countries of the global South. There are five countries that are clearly increasing their share of South–South trade: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ghana and Mozambique.

The rise of South–South economic cooperation has been driven in large part by the phenomenal growth in the BRICS nations, whose trade accounts for over 65% of all trade involving the developing countries. With a combined GDP of US$15.8 billion in 2013, the BRICS countries contributed 21% of world GDP and 18% of global exports. With the rise of BRICS nations as major actors in global trade, sub-Saharan Africa's exports to traditional developed countries decreased, while exports to the BRICS countries have increased significantly during the past decade.[16] Sub-Saharan African countries have continued to increase their trade with the BRICS nations perhaps because of more favorable terms of trade and partnerships when compared with the situation regarding countries of the global North.

With the rise of the BRICS nations, significant changes have taken place in terms of sub-Saharan Africa's export destinations. Between 2000 and 2012, the percentage of sub-Saharan Africa's export to developed countries declined from 65% to 46%, while exports to China dramatically rose from 5% to 19%. From a very small trade volume of less than US$10 billion in 2000, China has now become sub-Saharan Africa's largest single trading partner, with US$160 billion worth of goods traded in 2013.[17] While the sub-Saharan African region is a major source of raw materials, the BRICS nations predominantly supply manufactured goods. In 2012, the BRICS nations accounted for 33% of all imports of manufactured

goods in sub-Saharan Africa. The items of import range from labor intensive products to capital intensive goods such as machinery, vehicles and pharmaceutical products. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the BRICS share in foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa has also increased significantly during the past two decades. Chinese FDI is heavily concentrated in oil, infrastructure construction and mining, with South Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola and Zambia being important beneficiaries. FDI from India has been largely concentrated in Senegal, Sudan, Mauritius and in East African countries. Russia's investment is focused towards securing raw materials and local markets for its manufactured goods. Brazilian FDI is mostly in the areas of ethanol industries in Angola, Ghana and Mozambique, as well as securing access to local services market in housing projects in Angola and Mozambique.[18] Another significant trend in South–South cooperation is the rise in the volume of aid from the BRICS nations to sub-Saharan African countries. In recent years, China has become active in giving aid to African nations. Top recipients include Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia. In the same vein, India has provided aid to Nigeria and Sudan, as well as to some other West African countries. Aid from China and India are more of concessional loans, rather than grants. The grants and loans have been devoted primarily to infrastructure development and the expansion of the primary sector in the receiving countries.

The triumphant entry of the South into the global capitalist economy dominated by the North has produced renewed hope and optimism for the developing world at large. What is emerging is a relative decline in economic importance of the global North and the emergence of new actors in global economic calculations. With the emergence of China, India and South Korea as global players, South–South economic partnerships have gained momentum, and emerging trends, including relative political stability in most of Africa, show that Africa's rise in economic importance has only just begun. The new South–South trade flows are what UNCTAD has described as a "hub and spoke" trade network, where Asia plays the role of the hub, being both the largest exporter and importer, while Africa plays the peripheral role of the spoke.[19]

To structurally induce South–South trade, trade liberalization was adopted to lower the price of intermediate imports and place the South in a strategic position in the international market.[20] Liberalization and the concomitant growth in South–South trade has a greater potential of

enhancing the welfare of African developing countries compared with the liberalization of North–South trade that exploitatively stagnates economic growth in the South. The liberalization of South–South trade necessarily reduces global imbalances and the exploitation of developing countries as it provides alternative sources of demand with less reliance on the industrialized nations of the global North. This in turn will not only promote South–South trade, but will also help to move developing countries from resource-based exports to manufacturing and sustainable industrialization. The manufacturing capabilities of the South provide better and cheaper goods to consumers of the North, and also encourage backward–forward linkages among industries in the South.

To facilitate the liberalization process and enhance economic relationships, the South initiated and encouraged bilateral, regional and inter-regional preferential trade agreements among developing countries. In the Asia Pacific region, 137 trade agreements were initiated and ratified, out of which seventy-nine were entered into between developing countries.[21] In addition, developing countries in different regions also established schemes for regional economic integration: these include the Association of South East Nations Free Trade Area, the South Asia Free Trade Area and the Asia–Pacific Trade Agreement. To integrate developing countries in Africa into the liberalization process of the global South, inter-regional preferential trade agreements have been introduced. This led to the creation of the India–Brazil–South Africa free trade agreement and the Asia–Africa Sub-Regional Organization Conference. These inter-regional partnerships have a global perspective and are open to all countries of the global South. They provide options and mechanisms for enhancing South–South trade and investment flows with mutual benefits and payoffs.

In recent years, tariff restructuring in South–South economic partnerships has increased the participation of the so-called least developed countries (LDCs) in the competitive international market. LDCs such as Afghanistan, Maldives, Myanmar and Nepal have increased their exports to the South during the past two decades. Similarly, Bangladesh and Cambodia have also increased their exports not only to the global South, but also to the European Union and the USA. It is worth mentioning that despite their main export market being developed countries, both countries still depend on the global South to meet their import needs. In the global South, regional trade agreements are reciprocal in nature, with each participating country making commitments towards tariff liberalization by

providing special and differential treatments to LDCs. These latter make it possible for LDCs to gain market access into other developing economies.[22]

However, the South–South reciprocal trade concessions provided the mutual catalyst that pushed the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide duty-free quota access to LDCs. The decision was taken during the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005, and required that all developed and developing country members of WTO should provide duty-free and quota-free market access to all products originating from all LDCs. These requirements were done in a manner that would ensure stability, security and predictability of trade and enhance economic growth in the LDCs. For this reason, China commenced the implementation of preferential scheme for LDCs. China provides these concessions only to imports from African LDCs who are members of WTO, primarily to support sub-Saharan Africa towards rapid economic growth and sustainability. In addition, India complemented the efforts of China by providing a duty-free tariff preference scheme in August 2008 to LDCs in Africa, which is intended to boost South–South trade and economic partnerships. Pursuant to this scheme, duties on the majority of items will be gradually eliminated over the course of several years. These duty-free items from LDCs include cocoa, aluminum, cotton, copper ores, sugar cane and ready-made garments. Through this preferential tariff scheme, India and China provide technical assistance to LDCs to encourage manufacturing and mutual implementation of the scheme. Therefore, many of the benefits recorded in increased South–South trade are the result of regional preferential trade agreements. South–South trade has become a credible alternative to North–South trade, particularly for sub-Saharan African countries in the areas of manufacture and services.

In the quest for an expanded economic base, developing countries in the global South are shifting towards value-added exports, as hundreds of companies from these countries have joined international value chains for the production of components and the assembly of completed products. In 2001, exports of manufactures from developing countries to other developing countries stood at 65%.[23] This is as a result of intra-South reductions in tariffs and the rapid delivery of imported components, which has become an ordering principle for developing countries' exporters and their governments. This was evident in the 2004 South–South trade, where exporters from the fifty LDCs became active actors in global economies. This phenomenon has not been restricted to trade flows and invest-

ment, but extends to the area of services. These account for a larger share of developing countries' output, reaching 60% of GDP.[24] In addition to manufacturing, trade in services is also expanding tremendously, especially in the areas of tourism, transportation, information, education, medical services, telecommunication and financial services.

Major economies in sub-Saharan Africa, such as those of Nigeria and South Africa, have experienced spectacular trade booms through the framework of South–South trade and service expansion. Rapid trade and service expansion has been stimulated by inter-regional trade and service exchanges, as well as high levels of investment from developing giants such as China, India and Brazil. This strategic expansion has benefited Africa greatly. Given the unprecedented rise in South–South economic partnerships in recent years, and the spectacular economic growth in most of the developing world during the past few years, one can conclude that the expansion in South–South trade and economic cooperation has produced much greater benefits to the developing nations than has trade with the industrialized nations.

Conclusion

The imposition Eurocentric development ideas on African states was part of the tacit scramble for Africa. As Africa's quest for decolonization intensified in the 1950s, international capitalism introduced the modernization ideas and structural reforms as strategies to influence the universal authoritative allocation of Africa's resources to determine who got what, when and how. The modern strategy for appropriating Africa's resources did not follow the colonial means of war and conquest, but a more complex strategy of control through the use of ideas to influence the thinking of the governing elite. This created a crisis of ideas in Africa and this resulted in a crisis of strategies and policies, making Africa the perpetual producer and exporter of primary products. The industrialization process stagnated, and the desired transition from primitive or traditional society to modern industrial society became more of a development mirage than reality. Unlike the BRICS nations that jettisoned or restructured the modernization theory to reflect each country's peculiar circumstances, Africa's elite rejected the development paradigm that was more in line with Africa's culture of self-reliance and communalism. Consequently, Africa has depended largely on the benevolence of the North for grants, loans and FDI.

It is not likely that any industrialized nation will transfer its technology to Africa and create another economic actor that will intensify the global competition for labor and raw materials. The strategies of the developed countries have always been aimed at balancing global economic growth, competition and access in favor of the developed nations, so as to sustain their hegemony over the rest of the world. The content of this balancing strategy was institutionalized in Africa in the form of "international standards," which Africa is asked to adopt in order to achieve industrialization and the Western-designed model of "growth." Therefore, Africa is caught in the web of economic crisis and underdevelopment. This chapter concludes that Africa's underdevelopment is largely a product of the failure of Africa's governing elite to initiate and implement home-grown development ideas anchored on Africa's unique culture and systems. In order to achieve sustainable growth and development, and in order to take on a respectable position in the global political economy, African states must take their destinies into their own hands by designing home-grown and effective development models that are in consonance with Africa's culture, history and extant institutions.

Notes

1. Athar Hussain and Keith Tribe, *Marxism and the Agrarian Question: German Social Democracy and the Peasantry 1890–1907*, (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), 23.
2. Peter Schraeder, *African Politics and Society* (Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2004), 302–304.
3. Nancy Bonvillain, *Women and Men: Cultural Constructs of Gender* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 2001).
4. Peter Schraeder, *African Politics and Society* (Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2004), 303.
5. Ibid., 323.
6. Howard Stein, Olu Ajakaiye and Peter Lewis, eds. *Deregulation and Banking Crisis in Nigeria: A Comparative Study* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002); and Julius Ihonbvere, "Economic Crisis, Structure Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria," *World Development* 21, no. 1 (1993): 141–53.
7. Ibid., 324.
8. Ibid., 334–336.
9. Thandika Mkandawire, and Olukoshi, Adebayo, *Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa* (Darkar: CODESRIA, 1995).

10. Schraeder, *African Politics,* 302–305.
11. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), 176.
12. Ibid., 176.
13. Amin Samir, D. Chitala, and Mandaza. I., *SADCC Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa: Studies in Africa Political Economy,* (United Nations University, London, ZED Books Ltd., 1987), 56.
14. Linda Sorensen, "Modernization and the Third World", *Global Studies 410*, Global Studies Capstone Portfolio Project, (2001): 2–3.
15. Hulme Gereig and Mark Turner, *Challenging Global Inequality*, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 75.
16. Razzaque, *Trading with the Rising South*, 4–5.
17. Razzaque, *Trading with the Rising South*, 5.
18. Oliver Morrissey, Evious Zgovu, *The Impact of China and Idea on Sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunities, Challenges and Policies* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2011): 45.
19. Marco Fugazza, and David Vanzetti. *A South-South Survival Strategy: The Potential for Trade among Developing Countries* (Geneva: UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/34, 2006).
20. Ibid.
21. Rajan Sudesh Ratna, "Promoting South-South Trade: Recent Development and Options," *ARTNeT Policy Brief*, United Nations ESCAP, No. 17, (2009): 2.
22. Ibid., 4–6.
23. *Global Economic Prospect*, 2004. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf
24. *World Trade Report*, 2003. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report_2003_e.pdf

Collective Social Action: Enlightenment Ethic and the Rise of Modern Individualism

Enoch Olujide Gbadegesin

INTRODUCTION

One of the major consequences of globalization and the rise of neoliberal ideas has been the erosion of cultures and value systems that promoted communal friendship and good neighborliness, with the result that the world order is now defined primarily by the so-called market forces of demand and supply. In this chapter, I argue that the crisis of modernity or modern culture began with the rise of the Enlightenment ethic, which endorsed individualism at the expense of community. The Enlightenment ethic is characterized by, among other things, viewing the world as a privatized and consumerist "everything for sale" culture; an attitude that is completely different from the traditional view. In an age dominated by consumerism, the belief of the majority is that self-interest is the dominant motive in society. It is a culture in which the past is not regarded as belonging to the present; it is interpreted as an anachronistic mode of perceiving, cognizing and acting. As Gustavo Benavides observed, "modernity is an

E. O. Gbadegesin (✉)
Department of Religious Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University,
Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria

act of self-conscious distancing from a past or a situation regarded as naive—break different in the domain of knowledge than in morality, aesthetics, and religion."[1] He goes as far as saying that "this self-extrication, is in principle an endless task, for just as the term naïve may be applied, for example, to an organic conception of the social order that is rejected in favor of one built around mechanistic metaphors."[2] Enlightenment celebrates libertarianism, with the maxim that all human interactions should be voluntary and consensual.

The Enlightenment began with the rise of modern science and is only inadvertently characterized by the rise of modern individualism. It has been rightly observed that "in the Western world, individualism first began in the Middle Ages and found its full expression with the dawn of modern era."[3] In the modern era, individualism became a way of adapting to the new social, economic and political conditions in Europe. From that point, it evolved into social, economic, political and philosophical doctrines expressive of an individual's independence, self-reliance, self-determination and, hence, individuality.[4] In general, individualism gives primacy to the individual over what opposes her/his individuality, be it a social institution or the state.

In thinking about how the Enlightenment contributed to the rise of individualism, one must go back to the time of Immanuel Kant. He describes it as "the liberation of man from his 'self-imposed immaturity', adding that this immaturity lies 'not in lack of understanding', but in a lack of determination and courage to use it without the assistance of another."[5] For Kant, individual autonomy is central in making ethical decisions. In essence, Enlightenment is the process of undertaking to think for oneself, to employ and rely on one's own intellectual capacities in determining what to believe and how to act. From the French Revolution until the present, the authority that has been most recognizable has been the autonomous individual. With respect to the modern world, Richard Stivers asserts that "Modern individualism exists to permit a non-political totalitarianism to flourish. Consumerism creates a radical individualism."[6]

Another important figure whose philosophical thinking helped perpetuate the culture of modernity and its relationship to individualistic ethos is René Descartes. One could go so far as arguing that in philosophy, and consequently in the academic study of religion, modernity actually began with Descartes's search for method. He thought that by formulating proper method for rational reflection, one can overcome the doubt that is characteristic of modern experience.[7] According to Descartes, a rational

individual thinker lives an isolated, individualist and egoistic life, having nothing to do with other individual egos. Descartes's knowledge is privatized: "I think therefore I am." But the Yoruba have a saying that relates to such an individual: *Ani kan gbero ti mba ìyá sun* [an isolated thinker runs the risk of sleeping with his mother].

This chapter proposes that, by returning to the interactive and integrative practice of communalism, Africa in general and Nigerian society in particular could achieve better progress and stem the tide of corruption, oppression and marginalization that modernity, with the rise of a capitalist ethos and values, engenders. The ancient African paradigm of communalism directs this discourse. However, the communalism that is advocated here is not restricted to the African practice of it; it was notable in Greece in the medieval period. The Greek city-state functioned as a civilizing force by collectively creating social conditions that were necessary to the development of good life for its citizens. It has been pointed out that "The Greek sense of community is also exhibited in their intellectual activities. For the Athenians, the pursuit of philosophical truths was no private, individual affair; truth was not something that could be attained individually and monologically, but something that could be achieved collectively and dialogically."[8] Perhaps ancient Greece would be appalled to see the Western practice of atomic individualism, which has already permeated into almost all other nations' cultural fabric, including modern Nigeria's.

There is no doubt that communalism and communitarianism have their own disadvantages, such as the encouragement of laziness and free-riding among group members—which leads to sub-optimal results for everyone. As a matter of fact, if one considers the theory of John Stuart Mill, one is confronted with an argument that is clearly against communitarianism. Mill's individualism was a criticism of John Locke's individualism insofar as majoritarianism had taken root in England, this resulting in the "Tyranny of the Majority."[9] Mill therefore gave high value to the sanctity of the individual, even when he or she disagreed with the overwhelming majority.[10] Yet there is another counter-argument against Mill's theory of individualism, which is pre-eminently provided by John Dewey. Dewey's theory of individualism posited that independent agents are always socially situated and composed largely of social intelligence. Further, he believed that an individual was inseparable from his or her role as a citizen.[11] In fact, Dewey's theory of individualism was largely said to be a criticism of widespread poverty and the abuse of political power in America during the Great Depression. Laissez-faire economics, combined with cut-throat

competitiveness and atomistic individualism had resulted in pervasive injustice, and Dewey recommended the recognition of our inter-connectedness and continuity rather than our separateness.[12] One can see a similar trend in Nigerian socio-political life.

I believe that part of the messiness of the current world situation is as a result of the enthronement of modern individualistic ethos and values. With respect to Africa, the situation seems to be more problematic because individualistic morality separate from that of the society did not come into the picture. In the African past, morality could generally be interpreted as resonating with a Durkheimean perspective of collective social action. In his *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim views religious life as preeminently a social collectivity. He says that the springs of religion and ritual lie in kinship and social organization, and was of the opinion that "religious beliefs and practices reinforce and consecrate those things that sustain communal life and expel or purify those things that endanger group life."[13] He conceived religion as a community affair, one that no doubt has an infinitely positive effect on politics, economics and social life in general.

Definition of Individualism and Collectivism[14]

Individualism is the idea that an individual's life belongs to him or her and that he or she has an inalienable right to live as he or she sees fit, to act on his or her own judgment, to keep and use the product of his or her effort, and to pursue the values of his or her choosing. It is the idea that the individual is sovereign, an end in him- or herself and the fundamental unit of moral concern. On the other hand, collectivism is the idea that an individual's life belongs not to him or her but to the group or society of which he or she is merely a part; that he or she has no rights; and that he or she must sacrifice his or her values and goals for the group's "greater good." According to collectivism, the group or society is the basic unit of moral concern, and the individual is of value only insofar as he or she serves the group. As A. Maurice Low puts it, "Man has no rights except those which society permits him to enjoy. From the day of his birth until the day of his death society allows him to enjoy certain so-called rights and deprives him of others; not … because society desires especially to favor or oppress the individual, but because its own preservation, welfare, and happiness are the prime considerations."[15] A close observation of these two definitions will show that each of them has its own merits and demerits, but one of

them seems to me to be more salient than the other. If one is thinking about a good society, one might want to advocate for the communitarian life rather than egoistic, individualistic life. Social life makes more meaningful sense than a privatized and exclusive life, in that social life is dialogical whereas privatized life is monological. A private life, though it might emphasize reason and turn morality into a means for individual success or happiness, is nevertheless a fragmented life.

Modernity and Its Crisis

The modern world is a consumer-driven society, where individual taste seems to dictate moral standards. In fact, according to Kierkegaard:

> The aesthetical and the ethical are dimensions of culture and ways of existing. Both are necessary to the life of the individual and society. The aesthetical is concerned with immediate experience. Aesthetic existence is principally about enjoyment, to lose oneself in the pleasure of the moment. A purely aesthetical approach to life, Kierkegaard observes, is ethically indifferent to others. When one is not ethically bound to others, one is free to relate to them as best fits one's needs and desires.[16]

No doubt, Kierkegaard is right in thinking this way; in the modern era individuals are estranged from one another. In this society social bonds are fragmented; personal interest is placed over and above the collective. In their brilliant essay "Creating the Good Society", Claire Andre and Manuel Velasquez contend that "A ruthless individualism, expressed primarily through a market mentality, has invaded every sphere of our lives, undermining those institutions, such as the family or the university, that have traditionally functioned as foci of collective purposes, history, and culture."[17] In another sense, we might agree with Ernst Troeltsch, who conceives of modernity or the modern world in terms of the conception of modern civilization as developed in Europe and America, in which Protestantism plays a very significant role.[18] Protestantism, he argues, gives rise to a world in which "modern individualism is of much more deeply and strongly rooted metaphysical constitution."[19]

The crisis of modernity was first noticed in America by Robert Bella and his coauthors in their book *The Good Society*. They write that American society is faced with growing homelessness, rising unemployment, crumbling highways, and impending ecological disaster. In spite

of these appalling situations, they note, the response is one of apathy, frustration, cynicism, and Americans cope by retreating into their private worlds. American institutions have failed, yet the Americans refuse to take charge. They fail to do so because of "our long and abiding allegiance to 'individualism'—the belief that 'the good society' is one in which individuals are left free to pursue their private satisfactions independently of others, a pattern of thinking that emphasizes individual achievement and self-fulfillment."[20] Alexis de Tocqueville notices a similar crisis in France and defined individualism as "the apathetic withdrawal of individuals from public life into a private sphere and their isolation from one another, with a consequent and dangerous weakening of social bonds."[21] Coming back to Africa in general and Nigeria in particular, we have a big problem, owing largely to the ways in which we run our social and political lives. Ours is a system characterized by social atomization, anarchy and exploitation of the poor masses under a profligate democratic regime. We are living as strangers in the land of strangers.

If American institutions have failed because of the country's allegiance to individualism, then we could not expect anything better in a Nigerian society, where the untamed acquisition of individual wealth is the order of the day. If this wealth were acquired legitimately, the argument would no doubt be different, but here is a situation where a few individuals who have corrupted themselves through the embezzlement of public funds have continued to bully the rest of the citizens. Appearing to lack a good sense of judgment, the Nigerian government continues to indiscriminately embrace a Western idea of industrial capitalism, creating a sense of isolation, joblessness and homelessness for the greater mass of individuals. As aptly observed by Toyin Falola, the humanities are also complicit in perpetuating this Western modernization or modernity, with all its negative consequences: "the branches of the humanities that have devoted all their energies and time to the promotion of Western modernization have been frustrated time without number to the extent that the use of 'crisis' has become part of a permanent vocabulary."[22] The reason is simple; Falola argues that "the reality of the stubborn survival of past traditions has called into question the reality of the stubborn quest for Western modernity."[23] My suspicion is that Falola's reference to past tradition also has something to do with the communitarian ideal and value system.

CRISES OF MODERN AFRICAN STATE

Unfortunately, because Africans lack collective (moral) will, they have been enculturated into believing the lie that is being sold to them by Western modernization and the rise of industrial capitalism. Either Africans have not been informed that industrial capitalism leads to fragmented society or they do not feel threatened by it, so they have adopted this practice wholesale to their own peril. Modernity has brought about a liberalized market economy in which only a few people continue to control and dictate market prices. The problem is that since Africans have given up the need for a communitarian ethic of commonwealth, they seem to have lost what it takes to build a just and good society. In Nigeria today, the naira continues to slide downwards and the whole economy is in a mess. The majority of Nigerians are wallowing in abject poverty.[24] Falola, who foresaw this problem long ago, even thinks that what the African nations were told they would obtain from their encounters with Westernization and modernization turned out to be fake, to the extent that their unreflective adoption of the classical economics of free trade, which promised benefits to poor and rich nations alike, is a failure.[25] Modernity, which ushers in neoliberalism as we can see, has contributed to too many African nations' huge debts, leading to impoverishment and systemic decay; and there seems to be no solution to this in sight. A neoliberal economy that supports free trade eventually leads to exploitative capitalism, which has given a huge number of Third World countries, including Africa, a huge economic problem.

Modernity, which has led to the rise of modern individuals, produces feelings of release, freedom and power. According to Stivers, "individualism is characterized by certain ideologies namely: No one can tell me what to do, for we are equal. At the same time, however, we cannot rely on others for assistance; they are not morally bound to us in a reciprocal relationship."[26] Moreover, our relationships to others become more competitive and more dangerous, leading to what Tocqueville calls "psychological weakness."[27] As Louis Dumont observes, modern ideology turns morality and virtue into personal values that individuals are free to accept or reject.[28] Because our modern world extols individualism, we have ended up becoming fragmented, isolated and privatized in our separate modes of thought. Because the modern world continues to value and pride itself on its "technologized" and mediated mass culture, communal bonding continues to get weaker and weaker. The new generation of children and youth in Nigeria, and perhaps all over Africa, now collect information from strangers

via the Internet: WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook and so on. Perhaps Stivers is right in thinking that "for increasing numbers of people, the images of the media furnish the context within which words take their meaning."[29] This is correct; native storytellers are even now failing to pass on time-tested stories that teach morality to the young(er) generations, who are constantly being enculturated into strange ideas and customs via print and electronic media.

Many examples of the consequences of modernity can be given in this regard. We can easily see that modern Nigerian culture, which arguably is giving rise to individualism, is now characterized by the use of earphones by youths and some adults who successfully cut themselves off from the reality of their immediate environment. Some of our youths find their husbands and wives on Facebook, or Twoo, or Twitter, leading to disturbing consequences—failed marriages and the burden of single parenting. Something radical needs to be done to salvage African society in general and Nigeria in particular from the perils of modernity. I propose a return to a communitarian or communal morality and to values that promote social solidarity and a collective emotional experience. What our technologized world has successfully done to us is to make us anonymous and less responsible to others. There is an urgent need to return to reciprocal relationships that work to create trust. Our society must change from aesthetic love, which is based upon individual attraction and pleasure, and on that which is interesting and immediately fulfilling, to ethical love, which is based upon a sense of obligation to and even sacrifice of one's interests for the other. We could remember Moremi Àjàsorò in this regard. She was said to have sacrificed herself and her only son for the general welfare of the whole Ife people of Southwestern Nigeria. She did this because she was more concerned about communal welfare than her personal welfare; or one could say that she promoted community interests over and above her own self-interest.[30]

Modern Nigerian society should return from a state of anomie, as Emile Durkheim calls it, to a traditional morality of care and concern for one another. We must rescue ourselves from the dominating effect of information technology (IT), which individualizes us, and global capitalism, which continues to bring us under its dominion. With respect to the evil effect of global capitalism, money and what money can buy have occupied the minds of the majority of Africans, who blindly continue to copy Western ideas and practices so that money continues to condition how relationships are conceived. Recently, some students at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State were asked whether or not they would consider stopping their studies if

someone gave them N50, 000000.00. Over 75% claimed that they would gladly do so. One of them put it this way: "money answers all things."[31] This is a terrible situation. The individualistic ethic of acquiring wealth through whatever means has led quite a number of young folk (known as yahoo yahoo boys and girls) to swindle people's money from their overseas accounts. In many Pentecostal churches today, favor and God's grace are measured by how much money or material wealth a person has at his or her disposal, regardless of how or where the money has been obtained.

Even the increasing ugly practice of kidnapping and abducting people in order to collect a huge amount of money from the relatives and friends of the victims has become the order of the day in Nigeria. Situations like this indicate that things are really changing for the worse. Rightly, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) predicted the collapse of traditional values, which, he warned, would lead to a crisis of unparalleled magnitude, what he coined "nihilism": "What does nihilism mean for Nietzsche? That the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking; [the question] 'why?' finds no answer."[32] It is baffling that this nihilistic tendency has also found its way into religious institutions, especially Christianity or, to be more specific, Pentecostal Christianity. This is being rapidly and negatively influenced by the individualistic ethos of the untamed acquisition of wealth.

If one observes the African socio-political realm, it may be seen that the situation is getting worse and worse by the day. Individualism has begun to riddle the social fabric of many African nations, and Nigeria seems to be badly hit. A few cabals are stashing money that belongs to the whole community into private accounts overseas. They do this with impunity, thinking that nobody can or will challenge them for doing so. Revelations about people who have stolen government money for their private use show that Nigeria still has a long way to go in curbing corruption. It is appalling to hear that Nigeria's current Senate President claimed he was richer than Kwara State before he became the governor of that state. The majority of the people in Kwara State are still languishing in abject poverty. This is a good example of the individualistic ethos.[33]

Perhaps what we are witnessing in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general could be likened to Thomas Hobbes's state of nature, in which everyone acts entirely for himself or herself, and in which chaos prevails in the absence of effective authority to supervise interactions among society's members. Hobbes's state of nature is a state without a common

political authority in the form of a government. It is not a historical state; rather it is a device to illustrate what we can expect in a situation where egoistic human beings interact without a common authority. What we can expect, according to Hobbes, is a state of war where everyone will have to fight for his or her survival—a war of everyone against everyone.[34] This is a mark of individualism, which seeks its own good without giving consideration to others.

Using this insight, we can proceed to make the assumption that for the majority of Africans, as in the West and as clearly observed by Stivers, individualistic morality that takes no cognizance of the community is conceived and understood as the only survival instinct through which wealth can be accumulated or acquired. It is not surprising then that many people in Africa in general, and Nigeria in particular, no matter their status or class, try to outwit or outsmart their fellow humans to get more than they deserve or steal money that does not belong to them. The majority of people, including the religious ones, have the notion that the only way by which we can judge success, progress and prosperity is by the amount of wealth a person accumulates, and if such wealth cannot be acquired through honest work and industry, it can be acquired through corrupt practices. Because we undermine sound morality, a structural imbalance exists. Returning to our political situation in Nigeria, the story of the Senate President who claimed that his wealth was more than that of the state he governed for eight years, and who left that state in a worse situation than when he arrived, leaves much to be desired. A person who put his worth as at September 2003 at over N4 billion (which is $22 million, £12 million or 2.6 million euros) in cash, movable and landed assets could not be said to be a lover of the people he governed, as he left thousands of the less-privileged people languishing in abject poverty.[35] He and a host of people in his category could be said to be ethically insensitive. Wealthy individuals who amass wealth for self-gratification and personal aggrandizement are egotistical and are unconcerned about people's welfare in general. There is nothing bad in people making money and increasing their wealth through legitimate means, but they need to show compassion to the less privileged in society.

The other area of concern, in Africa generally and in Nigeria in particular, has already been mentioned. It is the unfortunate introduction of the concept of neoliberal economic policies, including structural adjustments

and the post-socialist market transitions demanded by the World Bank, as this continues to contribute to the widening gap between the haves and the have nots: a few rich are getting richer and the majority poor are getting poorer. The problem the modern world is facing is the lack of a capacity for mutual respect for others. Regaining this is only possible through a concerted effort to return to the communitarian ideal. In what follows I propose how this could occur.

A Return to the African Ethic of Communitarianism

There is a need for African nations generally and Nigeria in particular to return to the compassionate and communitarian ideal. I believe that a truly compassionate individual is avidly oriented towards helping others. Such an individual is available for others and is willing to sacrifice self for the good of the wider community. It is clear that our political leaders have a lot to learn about a life of compassion: the capitalist economy is highly competitive and individualistic. The Buddha's crucial insight was that to live morally was to live for others; it is not enough simply to enjoy a religious experience. After enlightenment, he said, a person must return to the marketplace and there practice compassion to all, doing anything he or she can to alleviate the misery of other people.[36] Karen Armstrong puts it this way: "The clan would survive only if members subordinated their personal desires to the requirements of the group and were ready to lay down their lives for the sake of the whole community. It was necessary for humans to become a positive presence in the minds of others, even when they were absent."[37]

In political life, Confucius explained, if we seek to establish ourselves, we should seek also to establish others; if we wish status and success for ourselves, we should make sure that others have it too; if we wish to turn our merits to account, we should make sure that others have the same opportunity.[38] Coming home to Africa, according to the Ubuntu principle human beings are inextricably connected to one another in concrete, rather than abstract, ways, such that the humanity of one is defined by the humanity of the other and by membership of a community. According to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, "A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed."[39]

There is a need for African leaders generally and Nigerian leaders in particular to revise their current economic and social policies, which continue to have inimical effects on the majority of the people. This is possible if they adopt the principle of the welfare state.[40] According to Encyclopedia Britannica online, this is a concept of government in which the state or a well-established network of social institutions plays a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of citizens. It is based on the principles of the equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth and public responsibility for those who are unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life.[41] Government policies and programs that work against poverty and provide social insurance, affordable housing, and education and health welfare schemes could be said to be welfarist in outlook. African nations should rescue their cities, which have fallen into the hands of totalitarian bureaucrats and the corporate elite, who are dictating the pace of the economy and making policies for the government, especially if they alone are favored. The result is the continued alienation and marginalization of the common people through harsh public policies that have constantly served to oppress them. African nations should be aware that the political, economic and social problems that are facing the advanced countries are getting increasingly severe. Blindly copying their policies, which have directly led to this situation, in the name of globalization, will lead to the further collapse and fragmentation of the communitarian ideal that ancient Africans stood for.

There is a need for Nigeria as a nation to return to mediating structures, such as family, clan, religious organizations and village, where systems of meaning are taught to and imbibed—without romanticizing the ugly practices of the past, such as genital mutilation, suppression of women and child labor. The modern experiences of alienation, rootlessness, loss of strong bonds and common values, hedonism and disenchantment with the world must be challenged and discouraged. Aafke E. Komter agrees with Christopher Lasch, who says that the modern experience of the individualized person has "resulted in a growing narcissism and an increased vulnerability to infractions on immediate impulse satisfaction."[42] Given this reality, Nigerian society needs to return to the communitarian ethic of communal feeling and social solidarity. This is based on affective ties and shared norms and values, and is often associated with the small-scale communities of traditional society.[43] Solidarity has inbuilt feelings of mutual connectedness. A lack of solidarity engenders violence, murder and poverty;

these are conditions in which deprivation and suffering may be so unbearable that belief, even in one's own humanity, may shrivel and die.[44]

There is a need for Nigerian society to return to communal ritual action, which is more social and interactive. There is a need to return from the organic solidarity that characterizes modern industrial life and return to the mechanical solidarity that encourages collective rites. Emile Durkheim foresaw this trend, noting that modernism was causing a massive shift in society's bonds.[45] The development of the division of labor led to the decline of the collective consciousness. Individuals began to deal with tasks separately, suggesting a sense of individualism. The industrial revolution changed our very social makeup. This is what Durkheim called "Organic solidarity." In traditional rural life, the values and culture that a people share were responsible for communal living. This is what Durkheim called "Mechnical solidarity." When there was a mass movement of people from rural to urban areas, the social forces that bring us together to form a society were redefined, because people shared in the same struggles and joys. This commonality was the basis for community.[46]

Not all African traditional rites are evil, as modern and "rational" minds want us to believe. We have to purposively reenact those that are intended to cleanse individuals and the collective from impurities, especially those caused by divisiveness and ill-feelings that have accrued during the year. Ritual is one of the principal vehicles that bind people together in a community of shared interest and tradition, and should be encouraged. This lessens the catastrophic effect of modern disaggregated, fragmented and isolated life. Schmidt says that "the poetry of the liturgy and the colorations of the ritual context set the heart dancing or, conversely, make the participant feel uncomfortable and out of place."[47] Perhaps Morris Adler is also correct when he says that "ritual renews and fortifies our sense of linkage with a tradition and our continuity with a community spanning centuries … Woven into the daily texture of his/*her* life, ritual is a reminder to man/*woman* of who he/*she* is, and what his/*her* supreme goals and duties are."[48]

For a person such as myself, who has developed an interest in gift theory and practice and how it has an infinite capacity to unite people and bring cohesiveness to a community, it is good to show that Nigeria could become great if the culture of gift and reciprocity is imbibed. Here I am thinking especially of the very rich and wealthy, who should give back to their community or society what God or Nature has endowed or bestowed

upon them. A good example is Aliko Dangote, who is lessening the harsh economic plight of the poor masses by making most of his manufactured goods available and accessible to them; this is highly encouraging and commendable.[49] There is no doubt that some people will argue against this, it having been observed that "Dangote is a reflection of a deeper political and economic dysfunction in Nigeria. This foundational dysfunction makes it possible for oligarchic wealth accumulation to occur, creates a fait accompli of indispensable, monopolistic oligarchs…"[50] This observation only holds good, however, if many of the Nigerian businessmen and women who have the same access to the Federal Government are doing what Dangote is doing, I want to believe the economy can fare better in Nigeria than it is now.

Many other wealthy persons could imbibe this culture and give more than currently. There is a need to restructure the ways in which our institutions are being managed or run. Universities, hospitals, prisons and so on all seem to have been put in place so that the most powerful in society can continue to manipulate and humiliate the less privileged. This degrading condition was part of what Michel Foucault challenged. William R. Lafleur remarks:

> With unconventional tools and insights, Foucault tore away at the assumption of a self-confident, rational modernity. His analyses of the historical development of institutions—especially the clinic, the hospital, the prison, and the asylum for the insane—were intended to show that, although such institutions had been established with rhetoric about their being "modern," "humane," and "enlightened," they usually were, in fact, arenas in which powerful persons manipulated, constrained, maimed, and sometimes even destroyed the bodies of the powerless.[51]

There is no doubt that this is what is happening in Nigeria today. In virtually all of our hospitals, psychiatric clinics, prisons and university hostels there are found patients, mentally challenged individuals, prisoners and students living in appalling conditions.

This situation is also noticeable in America. According to Bellah:

> What the relentless effort of Americans to think of human beings as autonomous interest maximizers who also occasionally want to feel good ignores is a truth that most human societies, including our own not so long ago, were quite aware of: namely, that human beings are not autonomous atoms, that human beings exist in and through relationships and institutions or they

don't exist at all. It is simply absurd to expect a young person growing up amidst violence and poverty, hopelessness and lovelessness, to "just say 'no'" to crack cocaine, without any role model or any institution to support such a personal decision.[52]

This ought not to be the case, and should not continue.

In thinking about social solidarity, a lot could be learned from Marcel Mauss; his book *The Gift* has influenced a host of sociologists and anthropologists. In Mauss's conception of social relationships, which he calls "total social fact," he believes that "the gift" works to build not just wealth and alliances but also social solidarity. Since he feels that "the gift" pervades all aspects of society, politics, economics, religion, law, morality and aesthetics, it is his considered opinion that "nothing is more urgent or more fruitful than the study of total social fact."[53] This will make "individuals within particular groups, even those with strong characteristics, to be less sad, less serious, less miserly, and less personal."[54] But beyond this, friendship and contracts will be enhanced; in turn this will ensure "peace" within markets and towns.

Mauss believes that peace was guaranteed "when groups paid visits to one another at *tribal festivals and at ceremonies* where clans confronted one another and families allied themselves or began 'initiations' with one another."[55] He even goes as far as saying that "generosity is an obligation, because Nemesis avenges the poor and the gods for the superabundance of happiness and wealth of certain people who should rid themselves of it. This is the ancient morality of the gift which has become a principle of justice."[56] This seems to resonate with John Rawls's statement that "inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone and in particular for the least advantaged members of society."[57] Mauss says that especially among the groups he considers "To refuse to give or receive is tantamount to declaring war, rejecting a bond of alliance and commonality."[58] He was interested in the gifts that are socially necessary for producing and reproducing social relationships, namely kinship relations and ritual relations, the very conditions for social existence.[59] What was important to Mauss and must be important to us is the social standing created through gift exchange. This practice will have, I hope, an infinite capacity to build a just and moral society, where every member of the community will have equal access to the basic necessities of life.

In an era of inequality, oppression, poverty and lack of opportunity, which is widespread in Africa generally and in Nigeria in particular, there

is a need to reevaluate how we have been doing things that have not been working for us. There is a need to ask pertinent questions about where our leaders are heading. I think there is an urgent task before Nigerian and indeed African leaders at large to bridge the widening gap of inequality between rich and poor. There is a need to reduce the rate of poverty, in Nigeria especially. According to Vanguard News, "The World Bank 2010 World Development Report revealed that Nigeria's per capita income stands at $2,748, falling behind that of Ghana and Cameroun with $10,748 and $10,758 respectively."[60] And this is in spite of its rich oil wealth. Ironically, in this same Nigeria are found those who could provide for the needs of millions of people who are currently wallowing in abject poverty. In a situation where the communitarian ethic of care and concern for others is enshrined, this inequality gap is bound to shrink.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have argued that the Enlightenment or modernizing ethic has weakened traditional societies with their communal values to the extent that practices that were based on affection, kinship, common good and historical attachment have rapidly lost their value. I have looked at how industrial capitalism, oppressive regimes, lack of communal solidarity, corruption and lack of compassion have contributed to the state of affairs throughout Africa. In Nigeria in particular, successive leaders have had no real clue about how to deal with the problems that bedevil the nation— and corruption continues to change into violence, and vice versa. As has been rightly observed, "In Nigeria as in Congo, although there is a clear understanding that the resources extracted or the violence perpetrated in the name of the state actually benefit private individuals and pursuits, the right of these state agents to tax or use force is not questioned."[61] My supposition is that in any society where principles of group solidarity are in place, things might work better and a communal life of care and concern will lessen the suspicion, intrigue and violence that we continue to witness. It has been suggested that "Communitarian insights about civil society as the sites for moral education can help to remedy the Confucian focus on the family as the only (or main) springboard for moral learning" and that "Confucians can look to communitarianism (as well as contemporary debates about deliberative democracy) for insights about values and practices that allow ordinary citizens to make meaningful contributions to the political process, even in political contexts (such as China) without

democratic elections to choose top leaders."[62] It is not the case that intrigues, suspicion and violence have never been part of human society, but they, I argue, were not as rampant as they are today.

I conclude this chapter by referring to those theorists who view solidarity as a condition that makes people feel committed to each other, because they experience mutual attraction and want to identify with others and act loyally towards them.[63] Komter quotes Mayhew, who considers four "systems of solidarity." The first is the primary ties of affection between people, or attraction. When a group member not only feels attracted to the group, but also cares for the unity of the group and the group's ends, *loyalty* is involved. The next two forms of solidarity are not so much based on direct emotional attachment to others but rather on a feeling of belonging to a group, or *identification*. According to Mayhew, identification with a group often surpasses attraction or loyalty. For instance, people may identify with homosexuals, blacks or people with higher education as a group. The fourth form of solidarity is *association*; this transcends established group identities and distinctions.[64] With growing individual autonomy and freedom, there has been a widespread individualization process, which must be challenged and corrected. There are clear reasons to agree with Zygmunt Bauman, who said that "the other side of individualization seems to be the corrosion and slow disintegration of citizenship."[65]

NOTES

1. Gustavo Benavides, "Modernity" in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies,* Mark C. Taylor (ed.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp.186–204, see p. 187 in particular.
2. Benavides, "Modernity," 188.
3. https://philosophy.wordpress.com/2010/04/05/individualism/.
4. A Brief Exploration of History of Western Individualism https://philossophy.wordpress.com/2010/04/05/individualism/.
5. Immanuel Kant, 'An answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?",' in *Political Writings*, tr. H.B. Nisbet, ed., Hans Reiss, 2nd edn., Cambridge, 1991.
6. Richard Stivers "Ethical Individualism and Moral Collectivism in America" in *Humanitas,* Volume XVI, No. 1, 2003, 56–73. See page 65 in particular.
7. Rene Descartes, *Descartes Selection*s, edited by Ralph M. Eaton (New York: Scribner, 1955), 38.
8. https://philossophy.wordpress.com/2010/04/05/individualism/.

9. Here J.S. Mill was reacting to John Locke's conception of individuals in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Ed. Alexander Campbell Frasier, (New York: Branes and Nobles Publishing, 2004), according to which "Because governments are a necessary evil, individuals sacrifice the absolute freedom of the state of nature in return for the security of government."

10. See J.S. Mill, *Utilitarianism,* (New York.: Bantum Classics, 1993), 201–2.

11. Quoted in Philip Schuyler Bishop, "Three Theories of Individualism" A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of the Arts Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida, April 15, 2007, 7.

12. Bishop, "Three Theories of Individualism", 4.

13. Roger Schmidt. *Exploring Religion* (Belmont, California: Wardsworth Inc. 1980), 249–250.

14. Collectivism is used as an alternative to communalism or communitarianism, or one can say that all three terms are used interchangeably in this chapter.

15. A. Maurice Low, "What is Socialism? III: An Explanation of 'The Rights' Men Enjoy in a State of Civilized Society," *The North American Review*, vol. 197, no. 688 (March 1913), p. 406 gotten online from https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2012-spring/individualism-collectivism/ 26/2/2016, 11.14 am.

16. see Stivers, Ethical Individualism and Moral Collectivism in America, p.63; Stivers is here quoting Soren Kierkegaard from *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

17. These authors speak with respect to the American culture of individualism, which according to them has continued to affect American social life. See their article on https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/creating-the-good-society/.

18. Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress: The Significance of Protestantism for the Rise of the Modern World*. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986 edn.), 20.

19. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress,* 30.

20. Quoted in Claire Andre and Manuel Velasquez's essay "Creating the Good Society" in https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/creating-the-good-society/

21. Alexis. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 98.

22. Toyin Falola, "Nationalizing Africa, Culturalizing the West, and Reformulating the Humanities in Africa", in Sola Akinrinade, Dipo Fasina,

David O. Ogungbile and J.O. Famakinwa (eds.), *Rethinking the Humanities in Africa*. Faculty of Arts of Obafemi Awolowo University's publication, 2007, 25–44 see page 36 in particular.

23. Ibid., 36.
24. At the time of writing, the Nigeria naira to a dollar is N414.00 on the parallel market (aka black market). See many of the daily newspapers in order to get the sense of the exchange rates of foreign currencies vis-à-vis naira.
25. Falola, "Nationalizing Africa", 37.
26. Stivers, "Individualism and Moral Collectivism," 59.
27. See Stivers, "Individualism and Moral Collectivism," 59.
28. Louis Dumont, "On Value, Modern and Nonmodern," in *Essays on Individualism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 234–68.
29. Stivers, "Ethical Individualism and Moral Collectivism," 62.
30. Moremi Àjàsorò was a princess from Offa in the present Kwara State, but was married to the then king of Ile-Ife, and was to become the queen. She was said to be a very beautiful and brave woman who tried to alleviate the plight of the people of Ile-Ife who were constantly being enslaved by the Igbo warriors who usually appeared dressed in raffia palm. Her heroic attempt to do something about it ended in her capture during a subsequent raid of the Igbo warriors/marauders. When she got to Igbo kingdom she was able to discover the secret of the warriors through their king, who had taken her to be a wife because of her beauty. See Oyeronke Olajugbu, *Women in the Yoruba Religious Sphere* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 29.
31. This occasion was one of the Students Associations' special programs in Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, specifically on February 13, 2016 in front of the Student Union building.
32. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power,* trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, edited by Walter Kaufmann. (NY: Vintage Books, 1968), 11.
33. See the front page of Sun News online titled: I was richer than Kwara before becoming Gov. http://sunnewsonline.com/i-was-richer-than-kwara-before-becoming-gov-saraki/, downloaded May 11, 2016.
34. My interpretation of Hobbes's state of nature as an individualistic mode of behavior is open to debate; I find it difficult to give this kind of individual competing with each other any other interpretation than individualistic or selfish behavior. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, London, 1651.
35. See Sun Online of May 11, 2016 with the headline that reads: I was Richer than Kwara before becoming Gov-Saraki. http://sunnewsonline.com/i-was-richer-than-kwara-before-becoming-gov-saraki/ downloaded May 11, 2016.

36. See Karen Armstrong, *Twelve Steps to a Compassionate Life,* (Canada: Borzoi Books, 2010), 40.
37. Ibid., 30.
38. Ibid., 72.
39. Tutu Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness, incomplete citation.
40. See Britannica Encyclopedia online titled: Welfare State. http://www.britannica.com/...welfare state, accessed on 4/9/2016.
41. Britannica Encyclopedia, Welfare State, http://www.britannica.com/...welfare state, accessed on 4/9/2016.
42. Aafke E. Komter, *Social Solidarity and the Gift,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 175.
43. Komter, *Social Solidarity,* 118.
44. Roger Schmidt, *Exploring Religion* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, Inc. 1980), 343.
45. Durkheim Emile. *The Division of Labour in Society* (New York, The Free Press, 1933), 337.
46. Ibid., 103.
47. Schmidt, *Exploring Religion*, 163.
48. Aliko Dangote is from Kano state and he is regarded as one of Africa's richest men. He is into manufacturing and production of cement, flour, sugar, rice and so on. He was born in the year 1957. His wealth is estimated at $14 billion. He is a degree holder. His grandfather Alhaji Sanusi Dantata was regarded as the man behind Dangote's success in business because he had already set Dangote on the path of business before he died. See https://www.forbes.com/profile/aliko-dangote/
49. See Morris Adler, *Likrat Shabbat*, 85, quoted in Roger Schmidt, *Exploring Religion*, 164, additional emphasis mine.
50. See Moses E. Ochonu's article of Mar 25, 2016 titled: "The Dangote Paradox," which criticized Dangote for manipulating Nigerian political leaders to his own advantage in order to continue to cause more devastation to the Nigerian economy. http://saharareporters.com/2016/03/25/dangote-paradox-moses-e-ochonu. In yet another school of thought, there is an argument that Dangote is a major part of the cronyism that has selfishly cornered society's wealth for personal use, and occasionally sends a pittance to ameliorate the poverty and misery which elite actions and inactions have unleashed on the people.
51. William R. Lafleur, "Body" in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies* edited by Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 36–54. See page 45 in particular for this quotation.
52. Robert N. Bellah. "Understanding Care in Contemporary America" Originally published in Susan S. Phillips and Patricia Benner, eds., *The Crisis of Care: Affirming and Restoring Caring Practices in the Helping*

Professions. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994, 21–35. See also http://www.press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/crisis-care.

53. Marcel Mauss, Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: The form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, translated by W.D. Halls, With Foreword by Mary Douglas, New York: W.W. Norton, 1990, 80.

54. Mauss, The Gift, 81.

55. Mauss, *The Gift*, 81 (emphasis added).

56. Mauss, *The Gift,* 18.

57. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 14–15.

58. Mauss, *The Gift,* 13.

59. Maurice Godelier, "Some Things You Give, Some Things You Sell, but Some Things You must Keep for Yourselves: What Mauss Did not Say about Sacred Objects" in Edith Wyschogrod, Jean-Joseph Goux and Eric Boynton (edited), *The Enigma of Gift and Sacrifice.* (NY: Fordham University Press, 2002), 19–35. See p. 24 in particular.

60. Read more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/02/nigerias-per-capita-income-drops-now-2748/ accessed today 16/1/2017, 10.07 pm.

61. Pierre Englebert, *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 45.

62. *See Daniel Bell, Communitarianism, First published Thu Oct 4, 2001; substantive revision Mon Mar 21, 2016. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism, downloaded 16/1/2017 10.36 pm.*

63. Komter, *Social Solidarity and the Gift,* 115 italics in the original.

64. Komter, *Social Solidarity and the Gift,* 115.

65. Zygmunt Bauman, *Individualized Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 49.

Same Migrants, Two Business Models: Culture-Centered and Non-Traditional Businesses Established by Ethiopians and Eritreans in Washington DC

Mussa Idris

INTRODUCTION

The US capital (Washington DC and its surrounding areas) is where you find the largest number of Ethiopians living abroad organized as a "trans-national migrant" community.[1] Migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia's neighboring country, also live in large numbers in DC. As trans-national migrants, Ethiopians and Eritreans try to adapt to their host country; simultaneously, they also establish social networks with other Ethiopians and Eritreans through kinship and family ties, ethnic associations, sports organizations (especially the football soccer federation), churches and mosques, informal gatherings in restaurants, cafés and bars, and community centers, which assist them with employment, education, social services and legal support.[2]

M. Idris (✉)
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Elon University, Elon, NC, USA

93

The Ethiopian and Eritrean communities in DC also have visibility through the entrepreneurial initiatives they undertake in the city. Most visible are the culture-centered small businesses that sell ethnic food in restaurants, cafés, grocery stores and convenience stores. These small businesses recreate the feeling of "home" for the migrants through their food and decoration, and they share these Ethiopian and Eritrean identities with Washingtonians and tourists as well. Less visible, but also migrant led, are medium-sized enterprises and non-traditional businesses. These are scattered all over the district and offer a range of services, such as transportation, parking, real estate services, lodging, and more.

This chapter compares and contrasts the characteristics of these two types of businesses that have been developed by Ethiopians and Eritreans in Washington DC: (1) the culture-centered businesses and (2) the non-traditional businesses. The objective is to highlight the differences between these businesses, including the strengths and weaknesses of each and the different purposes they serve for the migrants who establish them and their customers.

Literature Review

Trans-national migration is conceptualized as a complex process that involves economic, social, cultural, political and historical dimensions.[3] This chapter defines Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants in DC as trans-national migrants because their home connections are a central part of their migration experience in Washington DC. Trans-national migration research primarily focuses on family, economic, socio-cultural and political ties in both host countries and homelands,[4] and this chapter follows this theoretical approach.

There is a vast literature about the experiences of trans-national migrants in the USA, such as Italians, Indians, Koreans, Latin Americans and Cubans in Miami, all of whom have established ethnic enclaves in various metropolitan areas, which include many entrepreneurial efforts.[5] However, less is known about the specific entrepreneurial initiatives and experiences of the "new" African trans-national migrants to the USA after 1965.[6]

The establishment of "new" African trans-national migrant businesses in the USA is a relatively new phenomenon. Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants have lived in various cities of the USA, as short- or long-term residents, as individuals, families and communities since the 1970s. Ethiopian and

Eritrean migrant-owned businesses began to become visible in the Washington DC area in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There are already numerous academic studies and publications that deal with the broader picture of the new African migrants to the USA, and these indicate that while compared with migrants from elsewhere the new African migrants make up a small share of the US immigrant population, their numbers have been growing faster since the 1970s.[7] According to a Pew Research Center analysis of US Census data, there were 1.8 million African immigrants living in the USA in 2013.[8] However, this is a drastic increase since 1970, when sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 80,000 foreign-born Africans. This means that sub-Saharan Africa accounted for a meager 0.8% of total immigration to the USA in 1970, and this drastically increased to 4.4% of the immigrant population in 2013. The same study also shows that the number of African immigrants increased by 41% between 2000 and 2013. Five countries, namely Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana and Kenya, accounted for nearly half of the foreign-born African population in the USA.[9]

However, studies that concentrate not on the general picture but on specific topics, such as the entrepreneurial experiences and behaviors of these communities, thereby providing cultural and ethnographic contexts, are a useful addition, and help to provide a comprehensive understanding of specific aspects of the new African trans-national migrants.[10] In particular, it is helpful to investigate how different or similar they are in their business experiences.

The gap in the literature on the entrepreneurship of recent African trans-nationals is partly explained by the fact that they are recent arrivals. A 2006 study,[11] and the Pew Research Center report of 2015,[12] showed that in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the number of African migrants from Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea to the USA began to increase, owing to various human and natural factors that are glossed as "push and pull factors." This process added to the ethnic diversity of US societies and economies.

The study referenced in this chapter helps to fill the gap in the literature by undertaking ethnographic research that uses both trans-national migration theory,[13] and entrepreneurship theory,[14] as its theoretical frameworks. The theoretical approach adopted by this study is useful for interdisciplinary studies, as it combines the study of supply-side views or microlevel factors (entrepreneur migration experiences and business development) and the demand-side views or macrolevel factors (economic, social, cultural and political structures), and develops a comprehensive understanding of the

experiences of trans-national migrant entrepreneurs.[15] This research there-
fore views entrepreneurs and businesses as results of continuous dynamics
of both microlevel and macrolevel processes, rather than just individual
acts.[16]

The present study tries to respond to the following research
questions:

1. What types of businesses have Ethiopians and Eritreans developed in
   Washington DC and its surrounding areas?
2. Can these businesses be placed in categories or clusters? If so, what
   are these categories?
3. What are the similarities between the categories or clusters? What
   are the differences?

METHODOLOGY

Primary data and supplementary secondary data were collected and ana-
lyzed over a two-year period. The primary data collection was conducted
from September 2009 to December 2009 and from June 2011 to August
2011. A sample that comprised twenty cases of entrepreneurs and busi-
nesses from both the Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants in DC was obtained
using the snowball sampling technique.[17] This is a method of sampling
whereby initial contacts were made by the ethnographer in various busi-
nesses, including restaurants, cafés, grocery shops, 7-Eleven convenience
stores, taxicabs, parking lot businesses, gas stations, migrant social centers
and so forth. Various entry points were used to increase the diversity of the
sample by gender, nationality and business type (including both culture-
centered and non-traditional businesses).

The initial contacts helped to recruit other participants. Passive snow-
ball sampling was effective, although a slow process, given that it allowed
the researcher to gain acceptance, obtain informed consent and establish
trust with the interviewees. Establishing trust is a very important process
with any group of participants, but even more so with communities that
have encountered political insecurity in their home countries in the past.

Primary data collection was mainly achieved through participant obser-
vation and semi-structured in-depth interviews with twenty successful
Ethiopian and Eritrean migrant entrepreneurs who provided information
to build the business cases.[18] Data from unsuccessful business experiences
were also collected, and the main reasons why these businesses failed were

also analyzed. However, the focus of the study is on the successful entrepreneurs and businesses, in order to understand how the participants developed their businesses, and what made them successful.

Interviews lasted between two and five hours over several sessions, depending on the availability of the participants. Many of these interviews were recorded. Other conversations were captured by taking very detailed written notes during their course. The author's linguistic competence and the fact that he belongs to these ethnic groups helped with data collection process. Participant observation was also conducted, with increased competence over time.

The field notes and secondary sources were analyzed, and the interviews were transcribed and systematically coded. A thematic analysis was conducted to identify main themes, consistent patterns and peculiarities in the data.[19]

Findings

The twenty entrepreneurs studied and their businesses can be categorized in three groups: (A) culture-centered entrepreneurships (restaurants, cafés, grocery shops and convenience stores), (B) mixed entrepreneurships (entertainment, advertisement and clothing services), and (C) non-traditional entrepreneurships (transportation services, franchises, gas stations, real estate businesses and hotels). Because group B is a combination of groups A and C, this study focuses on the similarities and differences between group A (culture-centered) and group C (non-traditional) entrepreneurial initiatives and excludes group B. For a summary of the characteristics of these twenty cases see Table 6.1.

Culture-Centered Businesses: Restaurants, Cafes and Small Stores

As detailed in Idris,[20] the culture-centered businesses are primarily food-centered entrepreneurial activities, mainly ethnic restaurants, cafés and small stores (grocery shops and convenience stores). These businesses not only rely on cultural products such as cultural and ethnic foods and spices, but they are, for the most part, clustered in specific areas of Washington DC, such as Adams Morgan, the U Street Corridor, the 9th Street city block of Northwest DC and 18th Street. These businesses started in the

Table 6.1 Demographic characteristics of the entrepreneurs

Variable	Number out of 20	Percentage
Gender	10 family	50
	7 M	35
	2 F	10
	1 group (2 F and 2 M)	5
Age	4 (20–30s)	20
	5 (40s)	25
	5 (50s)	25
	6 (60s)	30
Education	1 elementary	5
	4 high school	20
	10 college diploma	50
	3 undergraduate (B.A.)	15
	2 graduate (M.A.)	10
Ownership	10 family	50
	9 individual	45
	1 group	5
Country	9 Ethiopia	45
	9 Eritrea	45
	1 (mixed family Ethiopian/Eritrean)	5
	1 group	5
Ethnicity	8 Tigrinya	40
	6 Amhara	30
	1 mixed (Amhara/Tigrinya)	5
	2 Oromo	10
	1 Gurage	5
	1 Bilen	5
	1 group (3Amhara and 1 Tigrinya)	5
Time of migration to the U.S.	7 before 1980	35
	5 1981–1990	25
	8 after 1991	40
Reason for migration to U.S.	6 higher studies	30
	5 D. V.	25
	3 asylum seekers	15
	2 refugee	10
	2 tourist visa	10
	2 undocumented	10
	1 family reunion	5
Family background in business	6 yes	30
	14 no, developed by experience	70

(*continued*)

Table 6.1 (continued)

Variable	Number out of 20	Percentage
Location	5 U Street Corridor	25
	3 Adams Morgan	15
	4 D.C	20
	6 Virginia	30
	2 Maryland	10
Business scale	12 micro	60
	7 small/medium	35
	1 large	5
Main customers	3 migrants	15
	8 mainstream	40
	9 both	45
Sources of capital	16 saving and social capital	80
	2 saving and loan	10
	2 saving and partnership	10
Types of businesses	8 traditional (3 restaurant, 2 breakfast, 2 grocery, 1 take-out)	40
	5 combination (1 film, 1 advertisement, 2 entertainment, 1 clothing)	25
	7 non-traditional (1 taxicab, 2 parking, 3 gas station, 1 hotel, 1 7-Eleven and real estate)	35

1980s and began to flourish in the 1990s. At the time, these areas of DC had real estate and rentals that were relatively cheaper than other neighborhoods, and, as such, immigrants were attracted to these zones.[21]

In these areas (Adams Morgan, U Street, 9th Street NW, 18th Street), it is impossible to walk without seeing the businesses, smelling the spices, enjoying the aromas of Ethiopian coffee and listening to people conversing in Amharic, Tigrinya and Oromo, among other languages. All these are important for the re-creation and enjoyment of a sense of community and keeping their identities alive in their new home environment. Young men in particular gather in bars and cafés to discuss politics, the economy and the state of society in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in the USA. The conversations are primarily about current and past political and economic developments in their homelands. The author of this study remembers these topics as being heavily debated, sometimes for a few minutes but often for several hours. Sitting together and debating about life for an extended period, just as they used to do in their home countries, is what happens when these Ethiopian and Eritrean trans-national migrants meet,

particularly after working hours and during the weekends. Migrant-run Internet sites, radio and TV programs, and newspapers—local and international—such as the *Washington Post*, CNN and the BBC, provide them with context and inspiration for discussion. Conversations take place in several languages, including English, Amharic, Oromo and Tigrinya.

Families also attend restaurants to enjoy *injera* (the traditional flat bread) with all sorts of meats and vegetables, cooked with traditional butters and *berbere* (a very characteristic combination of spices that create a delicious and very specific flavor). These food-centered and culture-centered businesses allow Ethiopians and Eritreans to enjoy community life and feel at home, even if they reside in a host country. Tourists also visit these culture-oriented businesses because it allows them to experience different ways of sharing a meal, to eat with their fingers instead of cutlery, to taste food that has stronger and bolder flavors than they are used to eat, to enjoy traditional Ethiopian and Eritrean music and decorations, and to feel that they have been transported to East Africa, even in the middle of the US capital.[22]

Even though these ethnic businesses are frequent in Adams Morgan, U Street, 9th Street NW and 18th Street (an area known unofficially as Little Ethiopia), which have more than two dozen Ethiopian- and Eritrean-owned restaurants and shops, I argue that these areas are not "ethnic enclaves" such as Little Italy in New York or Little Havana in Miami, but "ethnic entrepreneurial niches."[23] "Ethnic enclaves" primarily do business with the business owners' own diaspora groups. They tend to have a very high concentration of ethnic businesses in the same area, and the business owners tend to live in the same areas in which they work, in many cases above their businesses.[24]

The Eritrean and Ethiopian concentration of ethnic businesses in a few specific geographic areas in DC could be understood as a move towards the ethnic enclave model. However, this requires a higher number of ethnic businesses, as well as more coethnic, business-supportive institutions in the area, something that is lacking in the Ethiopian and Eritrean migrant business experience. Ethnic enclaves would also require a wider variety of business activities and well-established, ethnically identified neighborhoods with a residential concentration of immigrant groups from Ethiopia and Eritrea around the businesses.[25]

It is argued here that the Ethiopian and Eritrean culture-centered businesses clustered in specific zones of Washington DC are not ethnic enclaves but ethnic entrepreneurial niches, in that although the trans-national migrant entrepreneurs are clustered in certain geographical areas and

around particular types of businesses they have the purpose of serving their own migrant groups and Washingtonians alike. They try to offer experiences that recreate certain ethnic identities and "home" feelings for the migrants; nonetheless, they target not only their own migrant communities but also any customer willing to pay for the goods or services offered. Besides, these business owners do not live, for the most part, in the neighborhoods where their businesses are located.

One advantage that culture-centered businesses have in DC is that they tend to scare away the competition. As these businesses are culture-based and identity-based, other immigrant groups or US citizens in the area have a hard time establishing this type of business because there are cultural and social barriers to entry. The Ethiopian and Eritrean entrepreneurs make use of their cultural knowledge and social capital, and they take advantage of the trans-national social networking skills they have developed with other Ethiopians and Eritreans, both in DC and at home. For this reason, it is not easy for non-Ethiopians or non-Eritreans to open businesses in these areas.

On the other hand, these culture-centered businesses are all concentrated in the same areas, and they offer relatively similar services (the same type of menu and products, with small variations). The one weakness is that there is a lot of competition among the businesses, especially when trying to attract customers from within their migrant communities.

Non-Traditional Businesses

Transportation services, gas stations, 7-Eleven franchises, hotels and real estate businesses, which are some of the entrepreneurial initiatives developed by Eritreans and Ethiopians in Washington DC, can be described as non-traditional businesses. These are small or mid-size businesses engaged in different economic activities, in different geographical locations and for different target audiences. Large-scale businesses were not included in this study, as they tend to follow a corporate business model; this was not the focus of this research project.

Unlike the food-centered and culture-centered businesses described in the previous section, these non-traditional businesses do not rely on identity or culture to survive and thrive. They are not clustered in specific zones, but scattered all around the city. Further, they rely on all potential customers in DC requiring the service the business provides (migrants, Washingtonians and tourists alike).

What these entrepreneurs seem to have in common is their desire to be successful as business owners, their passion to become financially successful, their "eye" or ability to recognize good business opportunities and, perhaps, some personality traits. They appear not to be afraid of taking calculated business risks, they feel relatively at ease with uncertainty and, in many cases, they have certain levels of support from family members, both in their home countries and in the USA, that allow them to risk some resources in business ventures in which they have no previous experience. In other words, these entrepreneurs tend to have some support from their cultural knowledge and social capitals, including family members or ethnic institutions that make risk-taking more feasible. Besides, some of these entrepreneurs have had some sort of additional support (financial and informal business training, for example) from their social and business networks in their home and host environments. Those entrepreneurs who venture outside their comfort zone (those whose businesses are not linked to their culture or food) pursue different opportunities with all their energy, depending on the learning of new ideas that are related to multinational corporation business models.

Given that these non-traditional businesses tend to be relatively larger in scale than the culture-centered ones; it is more expensive to establish a transportation service, a parking lot business, a 7-Eleven franchise or a hotel than it is to open a small grocery store. One common trend among these non-traditional entrepreneurs is that they need to attract coinvestors and business partners who share a similar vision for their business. A disadvantage these entrepreneurs have is that they tend to have poor access to formal sources of capital. In many cases, they do not qualify for loans through US banks, given that they have limited collateral and limited credit histories. For this reason, one threat to these businesses is the competition they face from other more established and better funded businesses, whether owned by individual investors or by corporations.

Most of the non-traditional entrepreneurs who participated in this study built their businesses from the bottom up over time, and they are very aware of the importance of being flexible to adapt to new opportunities, to evolve and to adjust to changing business circumstances. They also believe in the power of good customer service. If successful, these businesses are highly profitable, with ample room for potential growth, but they are not easy to establish.

On the other hand, non-traditional businesses start with limited capital and business experience. Such drawbacks affect their ability to grow fast in their respective areas. Pressures to generate more revenue for future busi-

ness growth push some of these entrepreneurs to seek additional investment opportunities. This puts them in a vulnerable situation regarding their personal safety, because they often invest in neighborhoods that have high crime rates, and it often leaves them with little time for their families or for other social life. Their limited capital also puts them in a vulnerable situation as they compete for markets and bid against larger companies.

With regard to opportunities, these businesses share the potential for a high level of growth in their investments in various cities in the USA and in their home countries. They have the potential to create business associations and business partnerships among themselves and in conjunction with other capital investors. When such businesses do well, they can gain high levels of revenue and can generate networking opportunities that help to create deals with larger companies.

With regard to threats, these non-traditional businesses are affected by competition from larger corporations. Their franchises, sub-contract licenses and business well-being are affected by how well they are doing alongside the larger corporations they partner with. They are also affected by how well the larger corporations are doing in local, national and global markets. Their ability to invest in trans-national businesses, which includes business creation in their host and home countries, depends on how conducive the macroeconomic policies, infrastructure and business environment are to business creation and growth.

Discussion

This research shows that Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants in the Washington DC metropolitan area are living increasingly complex lives and are maintaining social, financial, cultural and political connections in the host environment and trans-nationally with either their home country or with multiple countries. The successful entrepreneurs among them are able to survive and thrive in this globally interconnected world. Entrepreneurs and businesses strive to find opportunity amidst crisis and, in the process, end up creating jobs and alternative, sustainable local and global solutions.

The study shows that there are various types of businesses (culture-centered businesses, a combination of culture-centered and non-traditional businesses, and non-traditional businesses) that are undertaken by Ethiopian-American and Eritrean-American entrepreneurs in Washington DC. The entrepreneurs who lead these businesses have learned to value doing busi-

ness as a culturally legitimate way of employment creation and social mobility in the USA, even though entrepreneurship is not strongly valued at home, where formal education and jobs (for instance with the government) or subsistence agriculture are preferred culturally to doing business.

Included in this study are micro-, small-scale and medium-scale businesses; they are mostly owned by individuals or families. The culture-centered ones are primarily micro- or small-scale businesses based on social and cultural capital. Initially, most of these migrants came to the USA for reasons other than for conducting business. However, given the favorable business opportunities they found in their host country a few of them who were entrepreneurial, industrious and able to save money created businesses that were inspired by their cultural knowledge. In the process, as migrant communities, they collectively managed to create what are defined here as ethnic entrepreneurship niches.

The migrants informally refer to these niches as Little Ethiopia. This gives them the strategic advantage of gaining visibility and recognition as they do business with other migrants, with Washingtonians and with tourists and visitors. It is very common to find Ethiopian and Eritrean restaurants and grocery stores located in close proximity to each other in these areas. Moreover, since the largest population of Ethiopians in the USA live in the metropolitan area, their entrepreneurial presence is bigger there than in any other city. Newcomers from Ethiopia and Eritrea to the USA often find support from their relatives, friends and compatriots and many men start out working in the service sector or as cab drivers, thereby adjusting to Washington DC culture, and with some finally opening their own businesses. In the process, they contribute to the transformation of these neighborhoods into prosperous business centers. This entrepreneurship also allows the migrants to feel that they have played an important role in transforming Adams Morgan and U Street from neighborhoods in disrepair to thriving business areas.

The non-traditional businesses led by Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants offer a range of services not based on migrant identity. These businesses are linked to diverse corporations that have a wider base of customers, including first- and second-generation migrants, Washingtonians, tourists and other business establishments. They are highly dependent on the passion, creativity and unique skills of the entrepreneurs. They take a longer time to establish owing to their limited financial capital, but they can be highly profitable.

The non-traditional types of businesses that are run by the Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants are mostly transportation services, gas stations,

7-Eleven convenience stores, hotels and real estate businesses. However, the diversity and scope of these businesses is wide. Regarding the non-traditional cases that are included in this research, it is relevant to point out that they do not fit into either the ethnic enclave or the ethnic entrepreneurial niche model. They are businesses scattered throughout various locations in Washington DC, without the geographic concentration of the culture-centered businesses mentioned above. The non-traditional types of businesses involve relatively higher risks and high competition from large entities, but they can be highly profitable when they work well, with greater opportunities for potential growth in both the host and the sending countries.

In general, Ethiopian and Eritrean societies have a culture of interdependence among family, kin, ethnic groups and friends, and they support each other in various daily activities at home, including growing crops, tending livestock, caring for children and building houses. These types of support systems and networks are also useful among the successful migrant entrepreneurs. Most importantly, they have several key characteristics that help to create and maintain businesses. The interdependence, the informality of the social structure, the reliability of the members of the network and the sustainability of the support system are some advantages that transfer to the host environment.

Limitations and Further Research

The Ethiopian and Eritrean entrepreneurs who are organized in a large business association in Washington DC are relatively few and were not accessible to this ethnographer, despite the attempts that were made to include them in the study. Analyzing this elite business group could be an interesting topic for future research. This research is also the beginning of a larger anthropological research endeavor in which an attempt will be made to situate the Ethiopian-American and Eritrean-American migrant entrepreneurs and businesses in Washington in a much broader context, through comparative studies with other African migrant communities in the USA and elsewhere. This could lead to a more thorough ethnography and could generate comparative studies of Ethiopian and Eritrean migrant entrepreneurial experiences in a globalized era.

Notes

1. Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994); Laura Bigman, "Contemporary migration from Africa to the USA," *Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, ed. R Cohen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 260–62; Elizabeth Chacko, "Africans in Washington, D.C.: Ethiopian Ethnic Institutions and Immigrant Adjustment," in *The African Diaspora in the United States and Canada at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, ed. J.W. Frazier, J. T. Darden, and N. F. Henry (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing, 2009), 243–256; Solomon Getahoun, "The History of Ethiopian Immigrants and Refugees in America, 1900–2000: Patterns of Migration, Survival, and Adjustment," in *The New Americans: Recent Immigration and American Society*, ed. Steven J. Gold and Ruben G. Rumbaut (El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2007); and Mussa Idris, *Entrepreneurship among the Ethiopian and Eritrean Migrants: Ethnographic Case Studies in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area* (PhD diss., University of Florida, Gainesville, 2013).

2. Mussa Idris, "The multidimensional roles of food and culture-centered entrepreneurship among Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants: Ethnographic case studies in Washington, DC." *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal*, *8* no.1 (2015): 55–70.

3. Arjun Appadurai, "Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queries for a Transnational Anthropology," in *Recapturing Anthropology*, ed. Richard G. Fox (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1991), 191–210; Basch et al., *Nations Unbound;* Nancy Foner, "Anthropology and the Study of Immigration." *American Behavioral Scientist 42* no. 9 (1999): 1268–1270. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/00027649921955038; Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places* (London: Routledge, 1996); Jon Holtzman, *Nuer Journeys, Nuer Lives: Sudanese Refugees in Minnesota* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000); Peggy Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Abdoulaye Kane and Todd H. Leedy, *Africa Migration. Patterns and Perspectives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

4. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton, "Transnationalism: A new analytic framework for understanding migration," in *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered.* (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992); Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton, "From Migrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration."

Anthropological Quarterly 68 no.1 (1995): 48–63. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/3317464

5. Mark Abrahamson, "Urban Enclaves: Identity and Place in America." Review by David M. Hummon. "Contemporary Sociology." *American Sociological Association* 25 no. 6 (1996): 781–782; Ivan Light and Steven Gold, *Ethnic Economies* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2000); Alejandro Portes and Robert D. Manning, "The immigrant enclave: Theory and empirical examples." *Competitive ethnic relations* (1986): 47–68.

6. Jacqueline Copeland-Carson, *Creating Africa in America: Translocal Identity in an Emerging World City* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Mamadou Diouf, "The Senegalese Murid Trade Diaspora and the Making of a Vernacular Cosmopolitanism." *Public Culture 12* no. 3 (2000): 679–702; Mamadou Diouf, "The Senegalese Murid Trade Diaspora and the Making of a Vernacular Cosmopolitanism." *Public Culture 12* no. 3 (2000): 679–702; Paul Stoller, *Money Has No Smell: The Africanization of New York City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

7. John Arthur, Invisible Sojourners: African Immigrant Diaspora in the United States (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000); Klaus Benesch and Genevieve Fabbre, Africa Diasporas in the New and Old Worlds: Consciousness and Imagination (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004); Copeland-Carson, Creating Africa in America; Kwano Konadu-Agyemang, Baffour K. Takyi, and John Arthur, The New African Diaspora in North America. Trends, Community Building, and Adaptation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); Khalid Koser, "New African Diasporas: An introduction," in New African Diasporas, ed. Khalid Koser (New York: Routledge, 2003): 1–16.

8. Monica Anderson, "African Immigrant Population in U.S. Steadily Climbs." Pew Research Center website (November 2, 2015). Accessed on March 20, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/02/african-immigrant-population-in-u-s steadily-climbs/

9. Ibid.

10. Copeland-Carson, *Creating Africa in America*; Diouf, "The Senegalese Murid Trade; and Stoller", *Money Has no Smell.*

11. Konadu-Agyemang, Takyi and Arthur, *The New African Diaspora.*

12. Anderson, "African Immigrant Population."

13. Glick Schiller. Basch and Szanton. "Transnationalism."; and Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton. "From Migrant to Transmigrant."

14. Kathleen R. Allen, Launching New Ventures: An Entrepreneurial Approach. 5th ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2009); W.B. Gartner, "What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Entrepreneurship?" *Journal of Business Venturing,* Vol. 5 (1990): 15–28;

Patricia H. Thornton, The Sociology of Entrepreneurship. Annual Review of Sociology 25 no. 1 (1999): 19–46.

15. Allen, *Launching New Ventures*; Light and Gold, *Ethnic Economies;* Karl Polanyi, "The economy as instituted process," in *Economic Anthropology*, eds. E LeClair and H. Schneider (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1934); Thornton, *The Sociology of Entrepreneurship.*

16. Idris, *Entrepreneurship among the Ethiopian and the Eritrean.*

17. H. Russell Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* 5th ed. (Lanham, MD: Altamira Press, 2011); and John Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007).

18. Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods.* 4th ed. (London: Sage, 2008).

19. Bernard. *Research Methods in Anthropology.*

20. Idris, *Entrepreneurship among the Ethiopian and the Eritrean.*

21. Celestino Zapata and Josh Gibson, *Adams Morgan. Now & Then.* (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 2006).

22. Sydney Mintz and Christine Du Bois, "The Anthropology of Food and Eating," *Annual Review of Anthropology* (2002): 99–119.

23. Idris, "The Multidimensional Role."

24. Abrahamson, *Urban Enclaves*; Light and Gold, *Ethnic Economies;* Portes and Manning, "The immigrant enclave."

25. Ibid.

Making Sense of South Africa's Soft Power: Projections, Prospects and Possibilities

Olusola Ogunnubi and Dorcas Ettang

INTRODUCTION

South Africa occupies a principal position in the African continent because of the size of its economy and its relative political stability compared to other African countries. Given its position as a regional leader, post-apartheid South Africa has an important role to play in galvanizing the African continent for more meaningful engagements with the rest of the world. For Africa to take its rightful position on the global sphere, regional leaders such as South Africa need to take steps towards designing

O. Ogunnubi (✉)
Management Sciences, Mangosuthu University of Technology,
Umlazi, Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

D. Ettang
International and Public Affairs, University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

and championing coherent strategies for Africa's engagement with the rest of the world. How South Africa performs this role, whether through fostering stronger regional integration, designing the right foreign policies or any combination of steps is its prerogative. However, if Africa must begin to appropriate some of the benefits of globalization, African states must strengthen national institutions and redefine the mode of Africa's relationship with the rest of the world. This chapter examines South Africa's soft power, and analyzes its prospects and possibilities for fostering regional leadership in the African continent and stepping up as an important force in global affairs.

Naidoo identifies the three building blocks of South Africa's foreign policy literature as *estimative/prescriptive*,[1] *new dispensation*,[2] and *ambiguity*.[3] A distinct body of literature is emerging, however, within a fourth thread of *strategic engagement* that focuses on the ideational value of soft power for Pretoria's foreign policy.[4] This nascent brand of literature, which clearly falls outside the remit of Naidoo's classification, seeks to capture the nexus between the utility of soft power and Pretoria's foreign policy projections. Nonetheless, there has been limited analysis of the behavioral settings and adaptation of soft power in the South African context. This study is thus motivated by two factors: (1) the desire to gain deeper insights into the settings through which South Africa's soft power can be created, maintained and extended; and (2) (perhaps more importantly) the need for a nuanced assessment of the complex processes that enable the manipulation of South Africa's soft power with its foreign policy trajectories in a way that appreciates the connections between the different actors and structures beyond mere un(official) rhetoric.

Indeed, there is a growing body of literature on South Africa's soft power as a foreign policy tool;[5] its ideational value for (re)shaping South Africa's international image;[6] the facilitative role of its higher education as a knowledge diplomatic tool;[7] and the contradiction role that xenophobia plays.[8] Scholars have also considered the implications of soft power for South Africa's regional hegemonic status;[9] its potential to promote the country's international relations;[10] and the effect of South Africa's rising soft power on its middle and regional power status.[11] Ogunnubi also attempts a useful categorizing of South Africa's soft power literature in three realms: the *prescriptive*, *utilitarian* and *comparative*.[12] However, there has been very little scholarly effort to understand the contextual settings in which soft power operates, especially within the ambit of this country's foreign relations. Consequently, there is a paucity of research on

the three important realms of soft power in the South African context: the *agents* directly implicated in wielding it; the *instruments* and *sources* necessary for cultivating it; and the perceptions of the foreign publics who are the direct *recipients* and *targets* of the extension thereof. Understanding the complexity of the three realms involved in the communication and utilization of soft power is crucial for gauging the value and utility of this subtle means of influencing states' behavior.

According to Van Wyk, the three outstanding dimensions of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy are its *inter-subjectivity*, *context* and *power*.[13] Firstly, South African "foreign policy agents' *intersubjective* understandings of cooperation, partnership and reform of international institutions, for example, constructed the country's identity, interests, role and meanings and vice versa, resulting in the mutual constitution of agents and structures."[14] Secondly, the country's post-apartheid foreign policy is *contextually* linked to its "transformed domestic policies (social context), and its perception of itself as an African, developing and a country from the South."[15] Thirdly, the focus has shifted from one of poor human rights policies, an isolated state and a material base of power during the apartheid era to the construction of *soft power* owing to the change in its interests since 1994. This has transformed international perceptions of the country, giving it "significant normative power" as a middle power state.[16] Drawing on these three ontological foreign policy markers, this chapter examines critically the value and utility of South Africa's soft power engagement, especially in framing the country's post-apartheid foreign policy identity.

The chapter intervenes in the debate regarding the prescriptive and utilitarian substance of South Africa's soft power resources by examining the multiple contexts in which it operates. Two critical questions are posed. What are the agents, instruments and subjects of South Africa's soft power? What linkages exist between these communicative contexts of soft power? These questions are important, given the official emphasis on the growing role of soft power in South Africa's foreign policy ambitions.[17] The chapter seeks to address these critical issues by creating a triangulated model of the different players, structures, sources and recipients involved in the conception, implementation and communication of South Africa's soft power, which is considered important in linking soft power resources to outcomes. To begin, our understanding of soft power within the constructivist notion of power is explored. Thereafter, the nexus between soft power and foreign policy in relation to South Africa is discussed. The following sections highlight a link between the communicative contexts of soft power before drawing a conclusion.

Soft Power and Constructivism

Contrary to neorealism and neoliberalism, constructivism posits that international relations are a result of interaction and engagement in the social space. Leading constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt points out that for constructivism "the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature."[18] Within the field of international relations, constructivism prescribes the view that global relations are linked strongly to historical and social factors rather than human nature. This is in contrast to classical realism where "egoism and power politics" are attributed to human nature.[19] While neorealism presents the assumption that one's identity is shared across all units within the global political arena, these units being self-interested states, constructivism on the other hand focuses on understanding and theorizing identity within a historical context.[20] Thus in an anarchic system, while competitive power politics might exist between states, there is also a possibility that they might not occur as different identities and interests emerge at different times. Hopf acknowledges that the meaning of anarchy is inter-subjective as it has multiple meanings to different actors based on their community's understanding and practices.[21]

The international system is an anarchic one, and "anarchy is what states make of it."[22] States therefore react based on what is given to them now. Wendt goes on to state that "people act towards objects, including other actors; on the basis of meanings objects have for them."[23] The interests, perspectives and identities of states thus change over time: states thus start to cooperate as war is no longer the only option. States are increasingly cooperative as they unite and work together under institutions such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and European Union (EU). In essence, while the international arena is inherently anarchic, constructivist theorists argue that states are not solely focused on competition, self-help or survival, but are able to cooperate and refrain from using force at all times. Indeed, the anarchy in the system creates an arena for diplomacy and economic cooperation as avenues for global interaction.

A possible constructivist approach to determine whether states will cooperate entails an investigation of how they understand and map their interests on a particular issue and what their identities and interests are. Identities and interests matter in inter-state relations, and how states react

is subjective and determined by various factors beyond the anarchic structure in which they exist. In essence, "the identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions."[24] Furthermore, "state interests are part of the process of identity construction."[25] For constructivists, power is subjective and is seen through the lens of cultures, norms and identities, in contrast with neorealists who see it as objective and determined by material factors such as military strength, resources, population, geographical size, wealth and technological advances.[26]

In contrast to these neorealist assertions, identities and interests drive and shape actions in world politics.[27] These identities and interests are "transformed under anarchy by the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities."[28] Interests can be partly explained and concatenated by the merging of knowledge and power.[29] Power is defined not only as "the resources required to impose one's view on others, but also the authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer, or deny access to goods; and benefits."[30] Knowledge on the other hand, is "rarely value-neutral but frequently enters into the creation and reproduction of a particular social order that benefits some at the expense of others."[31] Following from these notions of power and knowledge, Alder notes that national interests are not made up of the interests of the collective, or of a single dominant individual—rather, they are "intersubjective understandings of what it takes to advance power, influence, and wealth that survive the political process, given the distribution of power and knowledge in a society."[32]

Clearly, it is on the basis of the constructivist notions of power that the logic of Nye's prescriptions on soft power rests. Hayden already points out that soft power rests on the "recognition that traditional metrics of 'power' in international affairs should be inclusive of ideational factors: what people believe can shape or constrain the agency of a political actor and their ability to effect change."[33] Citing Kissinger, Lynch notes that constructivism promotes the idea that identity strongly shapes the foreign policies of states.[34] In line with the constructivist view and central to South Africa's foreign policy is the recognition that states are "independent and promote cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation."[35] As the case of South Africa shows, the interests of the various actors including a variety of state and non-state actors help to shape identity in the global sphere. In the same vein, sources through which power is extended

transcend the traditional conceptions as often perceived by realist theorists. In other words, culture, political values and foreign policy which highlight the beauty, brilliance and benignity of a state can indeed become communicative instruments to exert influence in a subtle manner, particularly when reinforced by collective interests and identities.[36]

Outcomes (of power) are also determined not only by how material power is distributed or by how authority is structured; it is determined by the inter-subjectivity found in culture, procedures, rules, norms and social practices that characterize both actors and structures.[37] These arguments raised by the constructivist notion of power not only underscore the importance of soft power as significant determinants of states' influence but also serve as a useful framework to gain insight into the connections between the multiple forces that drive the cultivation and utilization of soft power within a broad social space.

These aforementioned views bring attention to the criticisms of constructivist theory and its relevance to the arguments and views in this chapter. The emergence of constructivist theory after the Cold War was met with a lot of criticism and, according to Nugroho, it was deemed by some as a not insignificant theory when referring to world politics; it was identified as useful for international political economy and could be beneficial when used with other theories from sociology, social psychology and comparative politics.[38] Neorealism is at the forefront in the critique against constructivist theory as neorealists are wary of the notion by constructivists that international norms play a significant role in the relationship between states.[39] For neorealists these agreed-upon norms become insignificant or discarded if they are not in the interest of member states. States therefore are willing to disregard the interests of other states and global norms of engagement if and when it does not benefit their interests. The idea by neorealists that the world would remain bipolar and that international organizations did not influence whether war would occur or not was dismantled by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War saw a reduction in the strength of neorealism as one of the theories of international relations.[40] Citing Jackson,[41] Hofferberth and Weber isolate norms as independent variables and relegate individual actors, most often states, to the status of mere "throughputs" for pressures which are located in the cultural structure of the international system.[42] In doing so, they add that it has failed to give significant attention to the "interpretive performances of human actors."[43] Checkel writes that owing to its lack of focus on agency as a critical element of international relations, it

"overemphasizes the role of social structures and norms at the expense of the agents who help create and change them in the first place."[44]

Authors such as Wendt, Katzenstein and Klotz have presented and applied constructivist theory to matters of global politics and national security.[45] Constructivism is a significant theory of international relations as it provides considerable insight into the "sociology of moral community in world politics."[46] While voicing criticism that constructivism lacks a "theory of agency," Checkel also asserts that constructivists have been able to show the empirical relevance and utility in the theory on issues of world politics.[47] The complexity of world politics, the agents that interact and engage in it, as well as the domestic characteristics all point to the necessity and strength of constructivist theory in understanding these layers and complexities. The fact that constructivism underscores the significance of both discursive power (knowledge, ideas, culture, language and ideology) and material power, unlike neorealism's sole focus on material power (military and economic) and neoliberal institutionalism's focus on "a relatively weak influence of non-material power," shows the value it brings to our understanding of the world order.[48]

Hofferbeth and Weber's reconstruction of constructivist norm research concludes that norm research has become one of the most significant elements of constructivism in international relations.[49] As a theory it does not focus on power, inter-dependence or preferences such as realism, institutionalist theories and neoliberal theories do respectively, but it brings to the forefront the norms that interpret and explain the behavior of actors in international relations.[50] Wendt argues that constructivist social theory is guided by the principle that "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them." Using this view, Hurd writes that sovereignty as a "social institution" has transformed over time as "the autonomy of some rulers (that is, rights violators) is reduced while that of others (potential interveners) is increased."[51] He writes then that sovereignty in itself has changed, has become a significant mobilizing force in global politics and is based on the common and shared ideas and practices of people.[52]

Examples of the empirical application of constructivist theory abound, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Price and Reus-Smit note that with the end of the Cold War came a "substantial systemic change" largely from changes in domestic political systems rather than the distribution of power.[53] Galariottis writes that norms as a central element of constructivist methodology are significant in unpacking and examining the identity, role

and behavior of actors in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy,[54] "a social construction which has emerged and continues to be emerged from the social interaction among diplomats, politicians, the citizens of EU member states, the EU member states themselves, as well as other actors or structures which influence EU foreign policy agenda."[55] Because of the discursive power of constructivism, Nugroho notes that the USA is able to identify and understand the reasons for Pakistan and North Korea's nuclear weapons, as the former is not an enemy and the latter is an enemy—this is not because of how military and economic power is divided, but because of factors such as knowledge, culture, ideas, language and ideology.[56] Checkel writes that constructivists argue that while nuclear weapons are the most important example of material resources that countries have, the USA is not concerned about the large quantity that the British have, but more worried about North Korea's possession of such a weapon.[57] This is in line with Wendt's statement that "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons."[58] Wendt's statement, according to Hurd, distinguishes constructivism from other approaches because of its "critique of materialism, its emphasis on the social construction of interests, its relationship between structures and agents, and its multiple logics of anarchy."[59]

The relevance of constructivism for this study is based on the fact that it "focuses on the social and relational construction of what states are and what they want," in the words of Hurd.[60] South Africa's foreign policy and use of soft power is largely determined by both social and relational factors. Based on the empirical discussions above and the discussions below, it can be deduced that South Africa's foreign policy and its use of soft power is largely shaped by endogenous factors such as the actors that shape and decide on policy, its citizens (very minimally) and other bodies such as civil society and the media. Legro thus argues for the constructivist view that "new foreign policy ideas are shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events."[61] Thus South Africa's foreign policy and use of soft power is shaped from its history and experiences as an apartheid state and the post-1994 democratic process, all social factors that have shaped the identities, then interests, of key actors and groups. Borrowing then from Hurd, the "social constitution of interests encompasses all the ways that actors' interests and identities might be influenced by their interactions with others and with their social environment."[62] These ways include socialization and internationalization processes, desire

for social appreciation and status,[63] the results and impact of social norms on interests and behavior (which includes the desire to create norms that give legitimacy to one's behavior) and the presence or lack of a sense of community.

The constructivist notions have put forward the importance of shared values rather than material factors and that the identities and interests of key actors are driven by these values. It also acknowledges the increasing need for states to cooperate and find avenues and ways to achieve this, through diplomacy, economic cooperation and collaboration on political, economic and social matters such as education, human rights, health and education.

Based on the constructivist approach, then, it is difficult to conclude that South Africa's foreign policy is grounded on realist perceptions of material power, and largely driven by power politics and extending its power on the African continent. For the most part, cooperation rather than conflict has shaped its interaction in Africa. It could be argued that this materialistic approach to power (purported by realism and neoliberalism) is not beneficial to South Africa as a result of its lack of material resources (bombs, large army, oil, huge markets for its resources and businesses) among other factors. The lack of these resources and its dependence on the rest of the continent limits its ability to influence or control the actions of other countries in the continent.

Communicative Contexts of South Africa's Soft Power

Soft power as a concept is based on behavioural notions of power focusing on an agent's attraction to the subject. Communication is a key element for making sources of soft power work (e.g. through the media and those actions by which a country sends its message to promote its culture and values and explains its foreign policy).[64]

The point Fijałkowski seems to make is that soft power rests on the agent's ability to effectively communicate its intention to an audience (the foreign publics) in a way that positively changes the target's attitude while also facilitating a moral conviction towards the agent.[65] In other words, as Nye puts it, the "parenthetical conditions" under which soft power works "are the key to determining whether potential soft power resources translate into the behavior of attraction that can influence others towards favourable outcomes."[66]

It is against this background that the chapter examines South Africa's soft power profile from the analytical standpoint of three main communicative themes of *Agents*, *Instruments* and *Recipients*. The crux is to establish the complex inter-relationship between these three essential components and to draw attention to how their synergy and functionality can possibly advance the cultivation and extension of (South Africa's) soft power, both regionally and globally. Fijałkowski claims that, "power defined in behavioural terms is about the relationship, and soft power depends not only upon the agent, but also upon the subject's role in that relationship."[67] This means that for soft power to be effective there must be the strategic calibration between the agents and instruments of soft power, mobilized to achieve soft power outcomes. Throughout the analysis, we stress the argument that the deepening of South Africa's soft power capability in the long term would depend largely on the extent of strategic calibration between these communicative contexts of actors, sources and the direct target audiences of soft power. On the other hand, we also interrogate the implication that the contradictory positions of these three soft power remits have for Pretoria's moral authority, international acceptance and legitimacy.

Agents

Smith argues that South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy has been underlined by an emphasis on its national soft power virtues.[68] Accordingly, the country's post-1994 foreign policy processes have existed within the purview of the activities of a variety of both state and non-state actors with varied degrees of influence. Similarly, Fijałkowski, while acknowledging the difficulty of incorporating soft power into strategy, observes that "in some governments the resources that can produce soft power are often dispersed among different departments and agencies and thus dissipated."[69] For South Africa, one important reality is its dwindling economic fortune as well as its unwillingness to resort to military might as an instrument of foreign policy, given the historical experiences under apartheid and more recently the humiliation in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. As a result, in promoting its international agenda, very few concrete alternatives remain outside the ideational credentials of its soft power.[70] Hence, the historical context of South Africa's relations with the rest of the continent and southern Africa in particular impose enormous restraints on the use of its traditional power competences. As

Alden and Schoeman note, South Africa is still generally considered a worthy leader by the international community "despite its declining material base and uneven record … while among African governments its credentials are viewed with concern and even at times suspicion."[71] The authors argue that South Africa's *symbolic representivity* as Africa's regional hegemon places significant constraint on its ability to lead, and this has "induced a number of strategies by the government aimed at off-setting these limitations."[72]

This suggests partial recognition of the limitations of South Africa's material assets in achieving specific foreign policy targets. By wielding soft power resources, South Africa is likely to be in a better position to effectively manage the tension that often arise from its symbolic hegemonic intent in the region.[73] Therefore, soft power instruments of culture and public diplomacy can be recognized as a form of power in South African foreign policy agenda settings. This requires that the traditional repertoire of recognizable official agents, as well as informal sources that are able to promote South Africa's soft power influence globally, be expanded. The task is therefore to find ways in which existing bureaucratic and non-state institutions can be integrated into mainstreaming foreign policy processes, to achieve long- and short-term objectives around geopolitical relevance.

Nye reminds us that in the arena of soft power state actors remain the primary object of analysis.[74] Masters concedes that "as international relations become increasingly complex and diffuse, the number of actors with a stake in foreign policy decision-making has increased accordingly" (with varying degrees of participation) within this "black box" of foreign policy decision-making.[75] This reinforces the need to incorporate other relevant state agencies in the process of deepening South Africa's soft power. Locally, traditional government agencies closely involved in the foreign policy process include the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Defence (DoD) and to some degree, Parliament. Traditionally, the Minister of DIRCO is responsible for developing, promoting and implementing the country's foreign policy; and in consultations with the president, the minister is tasked with handling all aspects of South African foreign policy.[76] The minister and his department shape foreign policy through various ways, including developing foreign policy alternatives, advising on legal international matters and providing early warning information to key political actors.[77]

Aside from these traditional agencies, the National Development Plan (NDP) affirms that "in areas such as *science*, *culture*, *higher education*, *sport* and *environmental protection*, there is a need to showcase South Africa and promote its presence and leadership on strategic issues as part of its soft power in international relations" (emphasis added).[78] Correctly, the NDP envisages that the current formalized foreign policy structures are insufficient to meet the demands of South Africa's international relations and its quest for global prominence. In other words, for this country to play a prominent role in international affairs, an expansion of the corridors of diplomatic interactions is required that will include alternative forms of agency (e.g. cultural, knowledge, nuclear, economic, development, sports and public diplomacy as well as celebrity advocacy and diplomacy).

Nevertheless, beyond the NDP statement, there is little to show that soft power instruments are taken seriously by policy practitioners.[79] Ogunnubi and Isike (forthcoming) identify seven critical state agencies/departments which are able to open up the foreign policy "black box" and invariably play important roles in cultivating South Africa's soft power resources (and consequently its international profile): Tourism, Communications, Arts and Culture, Sport and Recreation, Home Affairs, Science and Technology, and Higher Education & Training.[80] These departments can be integrated into the foreign policy processes, allowing the state to channel its beauty, brilliance and benignity to the rest of the world.[81] Ogunnubi and Isike (forthcoming) accept that while these agencies have not traditionally been involved in the foreign policy process, they are becoming increasingly relevant in defining South Africa's soft power status and consequently international perceptions.[82] Elsewhere, Ogunnubi and Shawa highlight the prospects and value of South Africa's higher education sector as an important component of its soft power resources in helping to positively shape international perception of Pretoria through the retinue of its knowledge diplomacy.[83] Although this may not have been intentional, there is strong evidence of the sophistication and increasing preference for South Africa's higher education institutions; for example, the presence of a significant number of international students and staff—a remarkable sign of the global recognition South Africa enjoys.[84] Admittedly, the 2015–2016 fees protest at most South African universities have effectively dented its reputation.

Evidently, the role of official state agencies is integral to understanding how South Africa's focus on soft power has emerged in its foreign policy.

Mandela and Mbeki played significant but varied roles in shaping the country's (soft power) influence, especially through a robust human rights-centered and Afrocentric foreign policy posture, and more recently through bold economic diplomatic projects since 1994.[85] Although the evidences shows that these processes are much more complex and are, in fact, characterized by the linkages between a wide range of state and non-state actors, the iconic characters of Mandela and Mbeki perhaps remain the main embodiment of South Africa's soft power.[86] The presidency during the Mandela and Mbeki years remained a focal agent for the extension of the country's soft power, given the former's emphasis on human rights and his reconciliatory spirit as well as the latter's forceful involvement in the African Renaissance project through his commitment towards the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),[87] and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Consequently, under the leadership of Mandela and Mbeki, South Africa has been able to significantly transform its international image from an erstwhile pariah to an apostle of idealism, which its constitution seems to represent.

There is, however, the dilemma of ensuring that the soft power outcomes of specific institutions are not dampened or contradicted by the inconsistent actions of other agencies—pivotal issues that require careful examination if South Africa is to fully maximize the strength of its soft power.[88] As affirmed by Fijałkowski, "soft power depends upon credibility, which can be easily destroyed by governmental action."[89] A number of examples reveal that, in many cases, soft power dividends can be sometimes be dissipated by the thoughtless actions of state agencies. For instance, Van der Westhuizen notes that key events raised questions whether the country has been robbed of its soft power at the international level, arguing that this "robbing process" was already in motion.[90] South Africa's soft power has been weakened by significant actions around its foreign policy, including its refusal to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama in 2009, as his presence "would distract attention from the 2010 World Cup Festivities."[91] This incident, according to Van der Westhuizen, resurrected debate about the country's commitment to international human rights.

In addition, South Africa was known to protect Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, rather than give priority to upholding human rights in that country—an action that has been ruinous for both states.[92] The government's failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (accused of committing gross genocide) and allowing him to fly out of South Africa

despite an international warrant for his arrest also raised questions about this country's commitment to human rights. According to Abiodun Williams, former adviser to the UN Secretary General and President of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, this was not in line with Mandela's standards and ideals.[93] Mandela's ideals were clear in his view that South Africa, as a result of its history, would make human rights a key component of its foreign policy and that its respect for international law would be evident in its interactions with other countries.[94] Beyond this, South Africa's soft power decline is a result of the disaster in the CAR, where fourteen South African troops were killed in an exchange of fire with rebels advancing on the capital Bangui. This resulted in the immediate withdrawal of South African National Defense Force soldiers from the country in an act which many termed embarrassing.[95] David Hornsby, Senior Lecturer at Wits University, argues that the South African government should be ashamed of its actions in the CAR, which greatly undermined its standing on the continent.[96] As the AmaBhungane Reporters note, the ANC was actively involved in the CAR owing to the benefits derived from arms deals and diamonds.[97] In addition to an extensive overview of the links between the ANC and the CAR on mining and arms, the article also reported that key individuals in the ANC (former chief spy Billy Masetha and Paul Langa, security expert and fundraiser) have maintained solid business ties with David Pereira, originally from Congo-Brazzaville and a special adviser to toppled President Francois Bozize.[98]

Perhaps more damning to its soft power profile has been the South African government's failure to effectively manage incessant xenophobic attacks in the country which have damaged its reputation on the continent and weakened its soft power. In 2015, such attacks locally were met with poor government response. The attacks were characterized by the murder of a Mozambican, Manuel Jossias, in Alexandra Township in Gauteng. Attacks in Durban led to the death of seven people (including four foreigners), wide-scale looting and damage to foreign-owned shops, the displacement of thousands of foreigners and the creation of makeshift refugee camps in key locations (to ensure their protection and meet their basic needs). A statement made by President Jacob Zuma that foreigners who wanted to go home were free to do so after the cessation of violence were deemed unsympathetic to the plight of foreigners.[99]

The country's soft power stance was further weakened as a prominent political actor, Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, was accused of fuelling xenophobia by commenting that foreigners should return to

their countries,[100] even though he claims these utterances were distorted by the media.[101] South Africa's reputation was attacked as countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique announced plans to vacate their citizens.[102] These events also led to the recall of Nigeria's High Commissioner, Martin Cobham, and Deputy High Commissioner, Uche Ajulu-Okeke, in protest against the race-based violence.

While South African government has repeatedly shown its commitment to addressing the 2015 spate of xenophobic violence in parts of the country, many deemed its strategic joint military-police operation, tagged "Operation Fiela," another xenophobic backlash targeted at poor African migrants, with over 5000 individuals being illegally deported.[103] Ogunnubi and Isike emphasize that

> the South African government needs to ensure that the diverse state agencies directly and/or indirectly affiliated with its foreign policy goals play their part in accordance with a single national script tailored along the lines of a unified framework and do not contradict one another.[104]

Clearly, the instruments of soft power are beyond the full control of governments and, within the ambits of South Africa's foreign policy, a wide variety of non-state actors are increasingly playing important roles as agents of soft power.[105] Hence, while government has the final say on foreign policy matters in South Africa, the avenues through which domestic non-state actors sometimes percolate the international realm, are widening. Businesses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic institutions, research bodies and the media with no known state affiliation and their own "perspectives, interests and capacities, engage through policy workshops, putting pressure on governments, and bringing together the governments and international actors to collaborate on key areas."[106] While they may not influence foreign policy directly, they are often involved in various projects on the continent and within the South African Development Community, through conflict resolution, mediation, policy formulation and engaging with stakeholders.[107] As with the example of the charitable Gift of the Givers Foundation, non-state institutions can admittedly play complementary roles in shoring up South Africa's international reputation. Many such endeavors, carried out in the name of South Africa, have deepened the moral authority and international reputation of brand South Africa over the years.

What is important is for the state to find ways to unlock the pathways through which the vast array of non-state actors and institutions can be carefully integrated within the foreign policy spectrum of South Africa. This is to ensure that its soft power currencies are extended through these platforms. Both official and informal agencies of state greatly impact foreign policy and more specifically South Africa's use of soft power. An important consideration therefore is how they impact South African soft power. In understanding how these agents impact South Africa's soft power, Marthoz describes its foreign policy as one that "appears contradictory, torn between ethics and interests, between liberal internationalist and human rights values, on the one hand, and the attachment to a doctrine of national sovereignty that tolerates authoritarian regimes" on the other.[108] To a large extent, the strategic wielding of soft power (resources) can detract from the ambivalences that arise from South Africa's foreign policy obligations. The country therefore needs to do more to locate the specific soft power resources to mobilize in order to attend to different foreign policy requirements. We stress that although the state and its agents have remained the official custodians of South Africa's soft power, other unofficial agents equally exist that sometimes have a greater impact on South Africa international relations further afield. There is also an imperative for South African foreign policy practitioners, the ANC ruling political party as well as scholars in this field to begin to think carefully about the remit of South Africa's soft power in a way that reflects the peculiarities and dynamics of the country's privileged resources and competitive advantages.

The fundamental questions in this regard are through what instruments or models can the main sources of South Africa's soft power be communicated, and how can the country stimulate the positive reception (cultivation) of its soft power resources.

Soft Power Instruments

As noted earlier, Nye differentiates between soft power and the instruments mobilized to produce soft power. It is thus important to locate the instruments of South Africa's soft power (economic diplomacy, higher education, the hosting of mega-sporting events, MSEs, its ideational foreign policy) as part of its resources. One tool of soft power is economic diplomacy. The *International Relations Discussion Policy Document* notes the "critical need to build connections between our international relations

and domestic interests through economic diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy."[109] Economic diplomacy would:

> expand trade and investment in Africa and advance regional integration in Southern and Eastern Africa; consolidate relations with traditional trade and investment partners in the North; to strengthen relations with the emerging economies of the South, and to recalibrate global trade regimes in favour of developing countries through the WTO Doha Round negotiations.[110]

South Africa's soft power instruments emanate from its role in bridging the north–south divide; the status and influence of Mandela; its strong constitution and emphasis on the bill of rights; its hosting of various international MSEs and multilateral conferences; the fact that it supports other African countries with resources; the popularity of its African soap operas and actors; and its role in the AU, NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), among others.[111]

Another instrument of South Africa's soft power is its ideational leadership on the continent, which has earned it the status of global norm entrepreneur.[112] South Africa provides such leadership by creating norms, intellectual leadership through the promotion of democracy and thinking on the African renaissance, and through implementation leadership, for example by ratifying all key global human rights instruments and being one of the first to submit its review to the APRM.[113] Van Wyk remarks: "Since 1990, South Africa has conducted its nuclear diplomacy by constructing certain norms and its identity in a particular way to serve its national and international interests, and in the process—as a norm entrepreneur—aligning itself with internationally settled norms and advancing new and/or nascent nuclear norms."[114] She adds that South Africa's commitment to the three pillars of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty—non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—has yielded a strong soft power base for the country. South Africa's nuclear diplomacy is effectively manifested in its contribution to establishing nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes, the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) as well as hosting and leading the African Commission on Nuclear Energy which is the treaty's main compliance instrument.[115] The dismantling of South Africa's nuclear warheads in the build-up to independence signaled the initial display of the country's soft power and created many favorable international perceptions of it as being the first and only country to dismantle its nuclear warheads.

Accordingly, South Africa's contribution towards ensuring the strict compliance to the fundamental pillars of the treaty can be perceived as a clear indication of a strong soft power profile. Yet this was an initiative whose purpose has long been clouded by a fundamental ambiguity.

Negotiated settlements, conflict resolution and mediation are some of the tools South Africa has used to promote its foreign policy as an instrument of soft power. At the base of South Africa's instruments of soft power are the shared values of negotiation, mediation and peacemaking. A key aspect of South Africa's foreign policy since the 1990s is the assumption of the role of "peacemaker and negotiator in Africa, and a champion of Africa's interests abroad."[116] Under Mbeki, the foreign policy focus was on development, peace and security, democratic governance and economic growth. Good neighborliness and non-hegemonic relations with fellow African states were at the core of the African Agenda Under the banner of the "African Agenda," "good neighbourliness and non-hegemonic relations with fellow African states" was at the core.[117] Its policy on regional integration and development was based on "the principles of equity and mutual benefit."[118]

More specifically, in the area of peace and security South Africa has increased its international standing through its mediation and facilitation roles in countries such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe, and has supported peace efforts in Angola and Zaire, negotiations and conflict resolution in Libya and negotiations to end civil war in Liberia.[119] Similarly, South Africa has been involved in postconflict reconstruction and development by supporting the strengthening of democracy and improving the effectiveness of civil services, providing electoral support through bilateral engagements between electoral commissions and developing the capacities of military personnel and military centers in the DRC.[120] It has worked with the Youth and Human Rights Commissions and in improving the capacity of state organs and democratic institutions in Burundi, and has facilitated information exchange initiatives with anti-corruption efforts in South Sudan.[121] In peacekeeping, South Africa has contributed civilian and military personnel to resolve conflicts (in the CAR, the DRC, Sudan, Nepal and Burundi) arising through shifts away from nationalist struggles for independence, and wars fought for decolonization, or intra-state conflicts between governments and non-state actors such as armed rebels, identity groups and opposition groups.[122] As of 2011, more than 1000 South African soldiers have participated in both AU and UN peacekeeping missions.[123] This shows that

the country has been able to reasonably convert its military and economic strengths as soft power instruments to gain international appeal and credibility through peacebuilding initiatives.

South Africa is also involved in promoting democracy through the APRM, having been instrumental in setting it up, and has arguably been the most active promoter of NEPAD. Landsberg notes that South Africa is one of the largest contributors to the AU's budget, having paid as much as R30 million to Nepad and APRM.[124] Gelb argues that South Africa's leadership is needed in NEPAD although it lacks knowledge on how to exercise its influence and power on the continent, and is limited by severe capacity constraints in the public sector.[125] South Africa's commitment to the success of Nepad and development on the continent is down to its view that both development and good governance will bring positive benefits for all in Africa.[126]

Soft Power Recipients (Foreign Publics)

Nye affirms that because "attraction and persuasion are socially constructed … with soft power, what the target thinks is particularly important, and the targets matter as much as the agents."[127] Hence, the effectiveness of soft power "depend[s] heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences."[128] It is thus important to evaluate international perceptions and the reception of South Africa as a global player through the lens of its soft power resources, and through the benefits which the extension of soft power might yield for its international attraction and moral authority. More specifically, the foreign public's perception of South Africa soft power remits is examined within the purview of the four concentric circles of South Africa's foreign policy: southern Africa, Africa, the Global South and the international system in general. The focus is on the importance of understanding the international perceptions that shape views of South Africa and its foreign policy. Because South Africa's foreign policy is largely idea driven and premised on the use of its soft power resources,[129] an understanding of its impact, particularly on continental matters, is key to gauging two factors: (1) the extent to which soft power has remained "soft" and (2) ways in which the country "could work more effectively with partners in the region (and abroad) on bringing peace and stability to Africa."[130]

In the post-apartheid era, there were high expectations that South Africa would engage in conflict resolution efforts on the continent, something it could not do during the apartheid years.[131] By the late 1990s,

there was a realization that South Africa's prosperity and growth were not independent but were highly reliant on Africa's economic development, and this heralded its increased continental focus.[132] Economically, South Africa remains a powerhouse on the continent despite losing its status as Africa's largest economy to Nigeria in 2014. This is because of a number of factors: South Africa remains one of the largest foreign investors (outside the mining and energy sectors) on the African continent; it is engaged in economic activities in various fields (aviation, culture, science, taxation, technology, tourism and trade); and its multinationals (Woolworths, Game and Shoprite) have a large presence across the continent.[133] All of these have contributed to favorable perceptions of South Africa as a model African country. According to Louw-Vaudran, however, some argue that the success of South African businesses in Africa cannot be attributed to the government's diplomatic approach.[134] Notwithstanding the country's dwindling economy, it is still generally regarded as the most advanced and developed African state and scores high in the many global competitive indexes.

South Africa was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007–2008 and 2011–2012. During its first tenure, it opposed "the condemnation of human rights abuses in Myanmar and Zimbabwe; the furthering of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme; and the inclusion of climate change on the Council's agenda."[135] During its second term, its agenda entailed pushing the African focus and drawing more attention to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention in the Security Council, amongst other issues.[136]

Regaining the confidence of Africa would require strategic and continuous communication of South Africa's foreign policy mandates to the foreign publics, by wielding its soft power resources more carefully. This can create an attractive image for South Africa and improve its prospects of obtaining desired outcomes that contemporaneously reflect many of its national interests. Effective soft power diplomacy thus demands that the country pay attention to trends within international perceptions. If it hopes to wield its soft power resources more effectively, by getting more international actors to want the same outcomes that it desires, it will require South Africa to understand and respond appropriately to the feedback it receives from international engagements. Some analysts argue that because of South Africa's naivety in international diplomacy (owing to its apartheid-era isolation), it needs to do more to understand its (African) target audience. By funding international perception surveys such as that conducted

by Hengari, South Africa is in a position to gain greater insight into the reception and acceptance of its policies regionally, if not globally.[137]

Hengari's qualitative survey conducted with experts from Pretoria and Ethiopia in 2012–2013 on external actors' perceptions of South Africa's foreign policy classified the country into categories: leader, achiever, Africa-focused, negotiator, lone wolf and reactive. Other perceptions included a face in the crowd, rival, enigma and fading star.[138] It was noted that South Africa's African Agenda was "largely unknown in Ethiopia and was confused with AU's Africa Agenda 2063" (ibid.). The survey also highlights that South Africa is perceived as a big bad wolf, as it seeks leadership within Africa as a significant step in seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. As the survey shows, much of the enthusiasm that accompanied South Africa's emergence post-1994 has become the subject of debate. Particularly in terms of the recurring xenophobic violence in the country, there is very little conviction among African countries that South Africa is truly committed to its African Agenda. In the aftermath of xenophobic incidents in 2015, generally favorable perceptions of South Africa appear to have waned.

Hengari's report highlights the importance for South Africa to navigate negative perceptions of its foreign policy by paying careful attention to its soft power instruments and resources, as well as the contradictory effect this may have on its African relations.[139] One can infer that the long-term reception of South Africa's soft power is predicated on the consistency of its agencies, instruments and resources, as championed by the government, being able to promote the benefits of its moral authority, credibility and international acceptance. South Africa's "symbolic representivity" as Africa's hegemon will continue to hinge on the sophistication of its soft power reservoir.[140] Therefore, for Pretoria to continue to play the part of a decisive and benevolent regional hegemon, it must bring to bear ways to convert the compassion (benignity), competence (brilliance) and charisma (beauty) of its soft power into practical power outcomes.[141] Without doubt, South Africa needs to consistently display these qualities for its soft power impact to be positively received by the intended targets.

Nye points out that "when an actor or action is perceived as malign, manipulative, incompetent, or ugly, it is likely to produce revulsion."[142] In this regard, South Africa granting $10 million towards the development of an African diaspora legacy program in the CONCACAF (Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football) region for football development—albeit with good inten-

tions—was deemed a repulsive action, amidst allegations of bribery to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It is therefore possible to argue that the decision of South Africa's Tokyo Sexwale to contest for the FIFA presidency is intended to redeem the country's tainted image. Some question why such financial reward was not extended to its African neighbors. While this action might have produced attraction for South Africa in the short term, it has resulted in revulsion in the long term, particularly in the eyes of the international community.

This change in global perceptions of South Africa can be partly attributed to changes in its leadership personality and style, as well as in the political environment and the situation in the country. Mandela's reputation automatically gave the country a clean reputation and resulted in strong diplomatic ties which other countries could not access.[143] Furthermore, its attempts at reconciliation established the world's view of it as a relationship builder and conflict mediator across the globe (East Timor, the Middle East, Northern Ireland).[144] Mandela mediated talks between Mobutu and his rival Laurent Kabila in 1997, and while both failed to sign a peace agreement the parties were successfully brought together owing to Mandela's confidence and the soft power that earned him respect.

Mbeki, on the other hand, lost credibility on the global stage for his failure and "unwillingness" to push Mugabe into concession,[145] yet he did, for the most part, enjoy significant political goodwill and support internationally and on the continent.[146] Internationally, Jacob Zuma has garnered a unique reputation: according to Louw-Vaudran his terms in office have seen South Africa act in a more bullish manner on the continent—a notion which is noted in South Africa's National Development Plan.[147] Under his government, South Africa has struggled to communicate effectively its soft power in a manner that yields the anticipated influence, and the country is sometimes seen as acting in a way that is sub-imperial in nature, serving its own interests alone. According to Louw-Vaudran, while Mbeki was regarded as an Africanist, Jacob Zuma is not considered to be one.[148] The view is that South Africa will fail to regain its leadership on the continent under the current regime. Unlike Mandela and Mbeki, the Zuma era has weakened South Africa's stature as a leader on the continent: for instance, its failed efforts in Libya showed clearly that South Africa does not have enough influence or the soft power it had during the preceding regimes.[149]

South Africa's reputation has further dwindled owing to domestic events in the country which, according to Louw-Vaudran,[150] other Africans are aware of: the corruption allegations related to Zuma's Nkandla residence; ongoing violent service delivery protests; the massacre of miners in Marikana in August 2012; strikes across the mining and manufacturing sectors; the 2015 student fees protests; clashes in parliament; and Zuma's abrupt firing of former Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene, which weakened the currency; the weak governance of government officials and numerous tenderpreneurism scandals. From 2013, Zuma's alleged involvement and suspiciously close relationship with the Indian–South African Gupta family, who have a vast business empire in the country, has allowed the Guptas to exert great influence on the country's economic, political and social landscape, including their ability to offer government promotions to individuals such as Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas. Their use of government facilities for personal activities was seen as an abuse of power by not only the opposition Democratic Alliance, but also by factions within the ruling ANC. According to the BBC, the Gupta family has been accused of trying to capture the South African state, to push forward its own interests and agendas.[151]

In maintaining its soft power, then, Van der Westhuizen argues that South Africa must take risks as a nation and hold positions that may not be popularly accepted at the regional and global levels.[152] It is important that it address its significant domestic problems, before it aspires to lead the continent. Louw-Vaudran concludes that South Africa must not take its superpower status on the continent for granted, but must work actively to regain its soft power.[153] To do so, it must communicate a positive image of the country abroad and equally project the image of a country willing to collaborate to ensure the growth of the continent.

In an assessment of the above, it shows the focus of South Africa on soft power. This is evident through South Africa's focus on economic relations, negotiated settlements and efforts to collaborate with the G20, the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), the reform of the UN and push for AU and regional economic community engagement in global economic discourse. On the other hand, the perceptions of South Africa from experts in Ethiopia, particularly as the seat of the AU, are quite negative. With perceptions that it does not see itself as African, does not collaborate or reflect the true interests of other African countries, it is not truly promoting the African interest within BRICS, and its failure to follow through on the promises made within the continent does not bode well for its relationships on the continent.

Conclusion

Although South African foreign policymakers seemingly subscribe to Ozkan's prediction that regional powers/hegemons are increasingly becoming the new centers of power within an ever-changing international system, if the country is to play a prominent role in global affairs there must be concerted and strategic policy efforts to launch it into the realm of sustained relevance.[154] This chapter has examined the extent to which Pretoria's soft power resources present such opportunities. The argument was made that South Africa can indeed play the part of Africa's regional power/hegemon in a credible and decisive manner, by relying on the moral authority that emanates from the impressive record of its soft power resources. This will only be possible if there is a strong link between the communicative contexts involved in extending South Africa's soft power, particularly in ways that do not detract from potential gains.

However, the country needs to do more to locate the specific soft power resources required to meet different foreign policy obligations. Although the state and its agents have remained the official custodians of South Africa's foreign policy, other unofficial agents exist that sometimes have a greater impact on the country's relations further afield. It is also imperative that South African foreign policy practitioners, the ruling party as well as scholars in this field, begin to think carefully about the remit of the country's soft power as it reflects on the peculiarities and dynamics of its abundant resources and competitive advantage.

As Naím wants us to believe, "in the 21st century, power is easier to get, harder to use – and easier to lose."[155] In utilizing its soft power and remaining a relevant power broker on the continent, South Africa must include relevant state institutions and non-state/unofficial groups such as civil society organizations, academia, NGOs and, most importantly, public opinion. This will ensure that its interactions on the continent are inclusive, diplomatic and holistic. Moving forward, soft power will likely remain at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy. However, care should be taken not to portray the country as anti-African or xenophobic in its actions, policies or even at the grassroots. This will require a reengineering of South African society, so as to understand the need to engage more diplomatically with the foreigners within its borders and Africans in the rest of the continent.

Notes

1. For example, see Peter Vale (Starting Over: Some Early Questions on a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: 1990, Points of Re-entry: Prospects for a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: 1992), Geldenhuys (Towards a New South Africa: The Foreign Policy Dimension: 1991), Davies (Integration or Cooperation in a Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Some Reflections on an Emerging Debate: 1992), Du Pisani (Post-Settlement South Africa and the Future of Southern Africa: 1993); McGowan (The 'New' South Africa: Ascent or Descent in the World System?: 1993), Koos van Wyk (Foreign policy options for a new South Africa: 1993).

2. Mills (From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990–1994: 1994), Bischoff (Democratic South Africa One Year After: Towards a New Foreign Policy: 1995), Davies (South African Foreign Policy Options in a Changing Global Context: 1995), Carlsnaes and Muller (Change and South African External Relations: 1997), Landsberg (Selling South Africa: New Foreign Policy and Strategic Ambiguity or Ambitious Strategy?, Foreign Policy Since the 1994 Election: 1995), Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (Mission Imperfect: Redirecting South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1995), Evans (South Africa in Remission: The Foreign Policy of an Altered State: 1996) and Spence (The Debate over South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1996), and Van der Westhuizen (Can the giant be Gentle? Peacemaking as South African foreign policy: 1995).

3. Ryall (Caught Between Two Worlds: Understanding South Africa's Foreign Policy Options: 1997); Solomon (In Search of a South African Foreign Policy: 1997); Le Pere, Lambrechts and Van Nieuwkerk (The Burden of the Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy Challenges in the New Millennium: 1999); Vale and Taylor (South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Five Years on – From Pariah State to 'Just Another Country'?: 1999); Sidiropoulos (Ed) (Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1994–2004; 2004); and Adebajo et al. (Eds.) (South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era; 2007); Vanusha Naidoo, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: South Africa's foreign policy dilemma in southern Africa" (PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2010).

4. Olusola Ogunnubi, "Hegemonic order and regional stability in sub-Saharan Africa: A comparative study of Nigeria and South Africa" (PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 2014).

5. Karen Smith, "Soft power: The essence of South Africa's foreign policy," in *South African foreign policy review, vol. 1*, ed. Chris Landsberg and

Jo-Ansie van Wyk (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa and the Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012), 68–83.

6. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa: The idea-driven foreign policy of a regional power," in *Regional leadership in the global system*, ed. Daniel Flemes (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 151–167.

7. Olusola Ogunnubi and Lester Shawa, "Analysing South Africa's soft power in Africa through the knowledge diplomacy of higher education." Manuscript submitted for publication.

8. Oluwaseun Tella and Olusola Ogunnubi, "Hegemony or survival: South Africa's regional pursuit of soft power and the challenges of xenophobia," *Africa Insight* 44, no. 3 (2014): 145–163.

9. Olusola Ogunnubi, and Christopher Isike, "Regional hegemonic contention and the asymmetry of soft power: A comparative analysis of South Africa and Nigeria," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 37, no. 1 (2015): 152–177.

10. Olusola Ogunnubi and Nwabufo Okeke-Uzodike, "South Africa's foreign policy and the strategy of soft power," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 1 (2015): 23–41.

11. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, "South Africa's emerging soft power," *Current History* 113, no. 763 (2014): 197–202.

12. Olusola Ogunnubi, "South Africa's soft power: A comparative content analysis," *Politeia* 34, no. 2 (2015): 39–56.

13. Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, "Reflections on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy and preliminary comments on future foreign policy," in *South African foreign policy review, vol. 1*, ed. Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa and the Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012), 274–290.

14. Van Wyk, *Reflections on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy*, 286.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. National Planning Commission, *National Development Plan 2030* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 2012).

18. Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

19. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it," *International Organisations* 46, (1992): 391–425.

20. Ted Hopf, 1998. "The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, (1998): 171–200.

21. Ibid.

22. Wendt, *Anarchy is what states make of it*, 391.

23. Ibid., 396.

24. Wendt 1999, *Social theory*, 175.

25. Ibid., 181.
26. Marc Lynch, "Kissinger the Constructivist," *The Washington Post*, October 21, 2014. Accessed: March 27, 2015. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/21/kissinger-the-constructivist/?utm_term=.b3eaca54cea9
27. Dale, C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 187–212.
28. Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it, 395.
29. Emmanuel Adler, "Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, (1997): 319–363.
30. Adler, *Seizing the middle ground,* 336.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 336.
33. Craig Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).
34. Lynch, *Kissinger the Constructivist.*
35. White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, *Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu* DIRCO. Final Draft, 13 May 2011.
36. Alexander L. Vuving, "How soft power works" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto, September 3, 2009).
37. Hopf, *The promise of constructivism*, 173.
38. Ganjar Nugroho, "Constructivism and international relations theories," *Global & Strategies Th* 2, no. 1 (2008): 85–98.
39. Georg Sørensen and Robert Jackson, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
40. Nugroho, *Constructivism,* 85–86.
41. Patrick, T. Jackson, "Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO," *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11, no. 3 (2003): 223–252.
42. Matthias Hofferberth and Christian Weber, "Lost in Translation: A Critique of Constructivist Norm Research," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 18, no. 1 (2015): 75–103.
43. Ibid., 81.
44. Jeffrey Checkel, "Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–328.
45. Wendt, *Anarchy is what states make of it*; Peter Katzenstein, ed. *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014); Audie, J. Klotz, *Norms in international rela-*

tions: The struggle against apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

46. Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998): 259–294.

47. Checkel, *The Constructivist Turn*, 338.

48. Hopf, *The promise of constructivism*, 1777.

49. Hofferbeth and Weber, *Lost in Translation*.

50. Ibid.

51. Ian Hurd, "Constructivism," in *The Oxford handbook of international relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

52. Hurd, *Constructivism*, 300.

53. Price and Reus-Smit, *Dangerous Liaisons?* 265.

54. Ioannis, J. Galariotis, "The theoretical and empirical application of social constructivism in the EU's foreign and security policy," *Cyprus Center of European and International Affairs* 04, January (2008): 1–53.

55. Ibid., *The theoretical and empirical application of social constructivism*, 23–24.

56. Nugroho *Constructivism,* 92.

57. Checkel, *The Constructivist Turn*, 326.

58. Alexander Wendt, "Constructing international politics," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71–81.

59. Hurd, *Constructivism*, 298.

60. Ibid., 299.

61. Jeffrey Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

62. Hurd, *Constructivism*, 303.

63. Wendt, *Social theory.*

64. Łukasz Fijałkowski, "China's 'soft power' in Africa?," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 2 (2011): 223–232.

65. Ibid.

66. Nye*, The future of power,* 84.

67. Fijałkowski, China's 'soft power', 225.

68. Smith, *Soft power.*

69. Fijałkowski, China's 'soft power', 225.

70. Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, "South Africa's symbolic hegemony in Africa," *International Politics* 52, (2015): 239–254; Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, "South Africa: Development, international cooperation and soft power," in *Development cooperation and emerging powers: New partners or old patterns?,* ed. Sachin Chaturvedi, Tom Fues and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (London and New York: Zed Books, 2012), 216–242.

71. Alden and Schoeman *South Africa's symbolic hegemony*, 241.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Nye, *The future of power*.
75. Lesley Masters, "Opening the 'black box': South African foreign policy-making," in *South African foreign policy review, vol. 1*, ed. Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa and the Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012), 20–41.
76. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), *White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy. Building a better world: The diplomacy of ubuntu. Final draft*, May 13, 2011.
77. Ibid.
78. NPC, *National Development Plan 2030*.
79. Smith, *Soft Power*.
80. Olusola Ogunnubi and Christopher Isike, "South Africa's foreign policy aspirations and the National Development Plan (NDP): The role of soft power," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, (forthcoming).
81. Vying, *How soft power works*.
82. Ogunnubi and Isike, *The role of soft power*.
83. Olusola Ogunnubi and Lester Shawa, "Analysing South Africa's soft power in Africa through the knowledge diplomacy of higher education," Manuscript submitted for publication; Jenny Lee and Chika Sehoole, "Regional, continental and global mobility to an emerging economy: The case of South Africa," *Higher Education* 70, no. 5 (2015): 827–843.
84. Ogunnubi and Shawa, *Analysing South Africa's soft power*.
85. Masters, *Opening the 'black box'*.
86. Sidiropoulos, *South Africa's emerging soft power*.
87. Mbeki's African Renaissance project was a pan-Africanist and 'progressive' African agenda for the total liberation of African states and the institution of values that would replace corruption and incompetence as an approach to solving Africa's problems (see Landsberg 2007). NEPAD was essentially an economic blueprint for the development of the African continent.
88. Ogunnubi and Uzodike *South Africa's foreign policy*.
89. Fijałkowski, *China's 'soft power'*, 225.
90. Janis Van der Westhuizen, "Has South Africa lost its soft power?," *Foreign Policy*, April 10, 2009. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/10/has-south-africa-lost-its-soft-power (accessed July 12, 2016).
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.

93. Joe, J. Clarke, South Africa's failure to arrest Omar Al-Bashir is betrayal of Mandela's ideals. *The Guardian*, June 24, 2015. https://www.the-guardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2015/jun/24/south-africas-failure-arrest-al-bashir-not-in-keeping-mandelas-ideals (accessed July 12, 2016).
94. Clarke, *South Africa's failure to arrest Omar Al-Bashir.*
95. Simon Allison, "South Africa in the CAR: Was pulling the troops a catastrophic mistake?" *Daily Maverick*, January 21, 2014. http://www.daily-maverick.co.za/article/2014-01-21-south-africa-inthe-car-was-pulling-the-troops-a-catastrophic-mistake/#.V4Xnz_l97IV   (accessed July 12, 2016).
96. Allison, *South Africa in the CAR.*
97. AmaBhungane Reporters, "Central African Republic: Is this what our soldiers died for?" *Mail & Guardian,* March 28, 2013. http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-28-00-central-african-republic-isthis-what-our-soldiers-died-for (accessed July 12, 2016).
98. Ibid.
99. "South Africa's Zuma vows to end attacks on migrants," *BBC*, April 18, 2015.   http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32365157   (accessed July 12, 2016).
100. Ibid.
101. The views by President Zuma's son Edward Zuma, for an end to the "unnecessary accommodation of foreign national" further fanned previous statements made by King Zwelithini (See "'Several dead' in South Africa xenophobic attacks, as Zuma son renews anti-foreigner sentiments," *Mail & Guardian Africa*, April 14, 2015. http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-04-14-severaldead-in-south-africa-attacks-on-foreigners-swell-as-zuma-son-makes-anti-foreignersentiments-again (accessed July 12, 2016)).
102. BBC, *South Africa's Zuma vows.*
103. eNCA News, "News Night [television broadcast]," May 18, 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa.
104. Ogunnubi and Isike, *The role of soft power.*
105. Nye, *The future of power.*
106. Masters, *Opening the 'black box',* 33–35.
107. Ibid.
108. Jean-Paul Marthoz, *The Challenges and Ambiguities of South Africa's Foreign Policy,* (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource, 2012).
109. African National Congress (ANC), *International relations discussion policy document* (Pretoria: ANC, 2012). http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/internationalb.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016).
110. Van Wyk, *Reflections on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy,* 284.

111. Smith, *Soft Power*.
112. Geldenhuys, *The idea-driven foreign policy of a regional power*.
113. Smith, *Soft Power* 2012.
114. Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, "South Africa's nuclear diplomacy since the termination of its nuclear weapons programme," *South African Journal of Military Studies* 42, no. 1 (2014): 80–101.
115. Ibid.
116. Chris Landsberg and Kwandi Kondlo, "South African and the 'African Agenda'," *Policy Issues and Actors* 20, no. 13 (2007): 1–10.
117. ibid., 1–2.
118. Ibid.
119. Landsberg, C. n.d. "South Africa's 'African Agenda': Challenges of policy and implementation," Paper prepared for the Presidency Fifteen Year Review Project.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
122. Emmanuel Nibishaka, "*South Africa's peacekeeping role in Africa: Motives and challenges of peacekeeping. South Africa*," (Johannesburg, Southern Africa: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2011).
123. Ibid.
124. Chris Landsberg, "South Africa and the making of the African Union and Nepad: Mbeki's 'Progressive African Agenda'," in *South Africa in Africa: Post-apartheid era*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Landsberg (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007) 195–212.
125. Stephen Gelb, *South Africa's Role and Importance in Africa and for the Development of the African Agenda* (Braamfontein: The EDGE Institute, 2001).
126. Ibid.
127. Nye, *The future of power*, 84.
128. Joseph Nye, *Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
129. Geldenhuys, *The idea-driven foreign policy of a regional power*; Smith, *soft power*.
130. Aditi Lalbahadur, *Moving beyond 'trophy diplomacy': How to consolidate South Africa's position in the world* (Pretoria: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2014).
131. Sidiropoulos 2012.
132. Nibishaka, *South Africa's peacekeeping role in Africa*.
133. Landsberg, *South Africa's 'African Agenda'*.
134. Liesl Louw-Vaudran, *South Africa in Africa: Super power or neocolonialist?* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2016).

135. Olivier Serräo, *South Africa in the UN Security Council 2011–2012* (Johannesburg: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011).

136. Ibid.

137. Tjiurimo Hengari, "Expert perceptions of South Africa's foreign policy: Views from Pretoria and Addis Ababa" (Paper presented at the BRICS Policy Centre, Brazil, for South African Institute of International Affairs, March 14, 2014).

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Alden and Schoeman *South Africa's symbolic hegemony.*

141. Nye, *The future of power*, 92; Vuving, *How soft power works.*

142. Nye, *The future of power*, 92.

143. Van der Westhuizen, *Has South Africa lost its soft power?*

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Louw-Vaudran, *South Africa in Africa.*

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. "The Guptas and their links to South Africa's Jacob Zuma," *BBC,* March 17, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410 (accessed July 12, 2016).

152. Van der Westhuizen, *Has South Africa lost its soft power?*

153. Louw-Vaudran *South Africa in Africa.*

154. Mehmet Ozkan, Does 'rising power' mean 'rising donor'? Turkey's development aid in Africa. Africa Review 5, (2013): 139–147.

155. Moisés Naím, *The end of power: From boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states: Why being in charge isn't what it used to be* (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

Governance and Creativity

Developmental Strategies and Cultural Dynamics in Rural Nigeria

Harriet Omokiniovo Efanodor

Introduction

In several ways, globalization and the spread of neoliberal ideas have shaped and continue to shape the economic and social systems of every region, including Africa. Increasing internationalization, the growing influence of multinational corporations and other holders of private capital, and the roles of international financial institutions, most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have exerted enormous influence on domestic policies in many African countries. Sometimes the need to conform to the new universal norms of privatization and free markets have led policymakers to overlook national characteristics and culture in domestic policy choices. The race towards policy convergence sometimes leads to disruptions and dislocations within local communities, with the result that the poor become bigger losers in the overall scheme of globalization. As this chapter demonstrates, in the efforts to embrace globalization and in the race towards economic policy

H. O. Efanodor (✉)
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Edo University
Iyamho, Edo State, Nigeria

143

convergence, domestic policymakers should take due consideration of people's lives and extant culture, so as to ameliorate the potentially harmful effects of new policies.

The conditions of rural women in Nigeria have been associated with numerous challenges, largely occasioned by the prevailing politico-economic and socio-cultural situations in the country. Women bear enormous burdens because of poverty, lack of political power, environmental degradation and some cultural practices that impose formidable constraints on their effective participation in the economy and rural development. Since the 1980s, the most prevalent developmental paradigm adopted by Africa's developing nations has been based on the economic development models suggested or imposed on the continent by the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the trade liberalization agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Consequently, developmental strategies that emphasize privatization, liberalization and deregulation have been the predominant national economic model, and have equally become the adopted model for rural development in most African countries. The logic of liberalization with regard to society's welfare is anchored on the assumption that benefits derived from a private sector-led economy would lead to wealth creation, reduce poverty and improve the living standards of every citizen, including those in rural communities. These development strategies, as they apply to the rural economy, are reflected in the privatization of resources and services, commercialization of agriculture and agro-industries, deregulation of labor, liberalization of international trade for agricultural products, and the intensification of international and internal labor migration.

The rural sector constitutes a significant component of the Nigerian economy, with approximately 70% of Nigeria's population engaging in agriculture, which contributes about 45% to Nigeria's gross domestic product (GDP).[1] Rural women participate in development processes in diverse ways, and they constitute a high percentage of Nigeria's rural population, where they provide 60–79% of the nation's rural labor force.[2] Unfortunately, developmental theories and programs targeting the rural economy are often designed with little or no consideration for the socio-cultural environment. Hence, owing to a male dominated culture that places women in an inferior position, rural women's lived realities, needs and contributions to the economy continue to be inadequately recognized and greatly undervalued in the implementation of developmental strategies in Nigeria.

Culturally, Nigeria is a predominantly patrilineal and patriarchal society; patriarchy is largely reflected in household structure, gender relations and access to productive resources. Culture in its widest sense includes the values, attitudes, beliefs and customs of the people. Paramount to culture are religious beliefs, ethnic symbols and traditions. Cultural norms determine the social order of a society. In Nigerian society, socio-cultural norms promote and maintain men's dominance over productive resources, while inheritance is also mostly through the male line.[3] Therefore, implementing gender neutral developmental strategies with no consideration for socio-cultural norms will affect men and women in varying degrees.

In practice, it should be noted that the degree to which cultural norms affect women in urban centers and rural areas are different. In urban centers, socio-cultural norms are in constant change as a result of modernization and urbanization, which is accelerating urban transformation through changes in lifestyles, and decision-making patterns, thereby diffusing cultural norms which have bearing on gender relations and household structure. Women in urban centers undergo a greater degree of exposure to education and westernization, and they also have a higher degree of human rights awareness. These factors help to shape and reinforce the independence of urban women in decision-making and influence gender relations in the household, compared with rural areas where traditional practices continue to limit the choices of women.

Despite marginal changes in social relations, rural women remain at a relative disadvantage, because they cannot successfully challenge the established gender relations and prevailing customs in the family. Rural communities are seen as the custodian of customary and traditional laws. A respect for cultural norms is central to every rural society in Nigeria. Consequently, socio-cultural norms have a greater influence on women in rural communities than in the urban centers. These norms therefore determine the extent to which women are affected by new opportunities offered by rural developmental strategies.

Most studies regarding the effects on women of the developmental strategies of liberalization, privatization and deregulation have been limited to the experiences of women in various regions of the world, but these studies have often neglected the cultural dimensions of such experiences.[4] There is also a lack of explanation about how the socio-cultural environment can help to shape and contribute to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of such developmental strategies. This neglect could be ascribed to a lack of recognition among researchers that the socio-cultural

environment is fundamental in examining the impacts and achievements of developmental objectives in various countries, especially in heterogeneous societies such as Nigeria, where the preservation of culture and religion continues to be invoked to justify female subordination. While other empirical studies have focused on individual societies and rural communities, there has been little effort to draw comparisons between different socio-cultural contexts in order to highlight the impacts of different cultural practices on particular segments of society.[5]

Consequently, the objective of this chapter is to highlight, in comparative terms, the impacts of cultural differences on the effectiveness of developmental strategies regarding the privatization of land as they concern women in rural communities of the Delta and Kano states of Nigeria from 1999 to 2014. This research is also an attempt to draw the attention of policymakers to the importance and recognition of culture and custom in formulating developmental policies/strategies. The work is significant because understanding the socio-cultural environment and its effects on developmental strategies is crucial for engaging in relevant processes of social-cultural, political and economic change in the country's rural communities. The chapter uses theoretical and empirical analyses, which involve a documentary review of the implementation of developmental strategies in rural communities in Nigeria, with a special focus on the socio-cultural context of the rural communities of Delta and Kano states, using two case studies based on these areas. The empirical analyses focus on the impacts of culture on developmental strategies based on socio-economic activities of women in rural communities.

Study Areas and Research Methods

The study is based on an exploratory analysis of developmental strategies around the privatization of land adopted by the Nigerian government, and their outcomes for women in a particular socio-cultural context. Therefore, the exploratory analyses of two case studies from two Nigerian regions in Nigeria, Delta State in the south and Kano State in the north, provide evidence of women's experiences, grounded in the complex socio-cultural context of Nigerian society. Delta state lays approximately between longitude 5°, 00′ and 6° 45′ east and latitude 5° and 6° 30′ north, with 80% of its population living in rural areas.[6] Its peoples are predominantly Christian, with a handful practicing traditional religions. It has the following language groups: Isoko, Urhobo, Ijaw, Itsekiri,

Ukwuani and Delta Igbo. These groups have identical customs, beliefs and culture: their cultural identity is manifested in unique systems of administration, custom and religion.[7] Kano State is one of the original seven Hausa kingdoms and lays approximately on 12° 37′ north, 9° 29′ east, 9° 33′ south and 7° 43′ west. It is predominantly a Muslim state with 70% of its population living in rural areas, and it is largely inhabited by the Hausa ethnic group, although there are other smaller ethnic groups, such as the Fulani, as well as internal immigrants from Southern Nigeria. The Hausa ethnic group is diverse but culturally homogeneous, as the Hausa culture is strongly linked to Islamic laws.[8] Delta and Kano states have been impacted by an intensification in the large-scale acquisition of land in rural areas for the establishment of Staple Crop Processing Zones (SCPZ), Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones (EPZ) to promote export-oriented trade, establishment of large scale commercial farms and acquisition of farm land for oil related activities.

The study is based on data that were collected between January 2014 and March 2015. Using the multistage cluster sampling procedure, the study identified twelve purposively selected rural communities (six from each of the two states) where significant privatization of land had occurred. The study is mainly qualitative, so it employs various qualitative data collection procedures. Regina Scheyvens acknowledges that qualitative data are used to explore the meaning of people's worlds.[9] Interviews and focus group discussion (FGD) were used to elicit information from 120 women purposively selected based on their experience. Given the nature of the study, interviews were optimal for collecting data on individuals' personal histories, perspectives and experiences particularly when a sensitive topic was being explored. Similarly, Reinharz[10] and Boesveld[11] maintain that interviewing techniques are particularly useful, and are suitable and efficient, when collecting data or researching women's needs or interests. In addition, FGDs were conducted in order to get more information and to cross-check information from personal interviews. This was effective in eliciting information from a group and in generating a broad overview of the issues of concern to the group. The snowball purposive procedure was used to select respondents for the interview and for the FGDs. Six FGDs were carried out (three from each study state), comprising ten persons per group, bringing the total to sixty focus group discussants. Five respondents were interviewed from each selected community, bringing the total to sixty participants. Documentary reviews of various literature and historical data from secondary sources were also

completed in order to gain further understanding of the subject matter. Analysis of secondary sources was done using the hermeneutic method, while qualitative data was analyzed through a thematic descriptive analysis, which focused on the content of the data derived through interview and FGDs. Cross-checking of data from primary and secondary sources was done using the triangulation method.

DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES AND RURAL COMMUNITIES IN NIGERIA: A THEORETICAL DISCOURSE

With the return to democratic rule in 1999, the guiding principles of Nigeria's economic policy aimed to reposition the economy in line with the rapidly globalizing world. Thus, in line with the policies promulgated by the IMF/World Bank and the WTO, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was formulated in 2003 to foster Nigeria's integration into the world economy through privatization, deregulation and liberalization programs. The development of NEEDS at the federal level was complemented at state level by State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (SEEDS), which prioritized agriculture, small and medium enterprises, infrastructure, finance and social sector reforms.[12]

With regard to the rural economy, major efforts were devoted to address a land tenure system that inhibits the acquisition of land and other natural resources. The NEEDS and SEEDS provided the right policy environment, target incentives for private investment and implemented new agricultural and rural development policies. To achieve this, the following strategies were employed:

1. Privatization of land
2. Commercialization of agriculture
3. Vigorous implementation of presidential initiatives on cassava, rice, vegetable oil, sugar, livestock, tree crops and cereals
4. Taking advantage of the various concessional arrangements provided by the WTO, the European Unions, Africa, Caribbean and Pacific state agreement, the United States African Growth and Opportunity Act, and the National Partnership for African Development, as well as the huge West Africa market
5. Promoting joint venture, private sector-managed, multicommodity development and marketing companies to provide alternative markets for farm produce through a buyer of last resort mechanism.[13]

Following on from the above, the implementation of developmental strategies in rural areas was carried out through the privatization of land and resources, leading to a liberalization of the land market and tenure system,[14] commercialization of agriculture, rural industrialization, deregulation of the labor market and liberalization of the agricultural market with the development of an agricultural value chain. The implementation of the above reinforced the agrarian nature of the rural communities and resulted in a land grab through the acquisition of a large amount of land via the Land Use Act of 1978.[15]

Socio-Cultural Environment of Rural Communities of Delta and Kano States, Nigeria

The socio-cultural environment of rural communities in Nigeria is complex owing to the multiplicity and diversity of cultural practices. Consequently, the traditional systems in Delta and Kano states have different procedures and established systems that govern rural communities' rights and obligations. The predominance of either customary laws over religious law or the practice of both customary and religious laws accounts for this diversity in cultural practice. For instance, the socio-cultural environment of rural communities of Kano State is shaped and linked to both customary and religious laws, while that of Delta State is basically shaped and linked to customary laws. However, rural communities in both states are patriarchal in nature. Household and community authority revolves around the male household head, and the application of customary and religious laws reinforces the social order in society by determining the rights, responsibilities and obligations of men, women and children, including inheritance rights and each group's entitlement to resources.[16]

Although there are diverse systems of customary laws as there are diverse ethnic groups in rural communities, there exist some common characteristics.[17] For instance, the basic unit of land holdings is the family or community. Ownership is based on the assumption that the family has property rights over land, while economic activities are based on the practice of participatory economy that is predicated on the household as a unit headed by the male. The family economic arrangement requires the full participation of everyone in the household.[18] Similarly, marriages are conducted under customary laws, and a woman is placed under the authority of her husband. Upon marriage, a woman (wife) is under a customary

duty to care for the home and assist her husband in his economic ventures, without specific or formal reward in the form of wages or salaries. Under the customary law, male children have the exclusive rights to inheritance, while the wives and unmarried daughters are expected to be "maintained" by the male figure. In a number of communities, a married daughter has no right in her father's property and a widow's maintenance right is withdrawn if she does not remarry a relative of the deceased husband or returns to her home.[19]

Religious laws embody adherence to a set of obligations and rules that are defined and interpreted according to religious scriptures. In Kano State, there is the coexistence of customary and Islamic laws. The interpretation of Islamic law as it relates to the role of women in society is explicit. Under this, the practice of seclusion is important and is widely practiced, though it has been argued that the practice of seclusion is strongly influenced by Hausa cultural values.[20] However, this practice varies widely from family to family, and largely depends on factors such as the level of wealth and family background. Most rich families keep women strictly in seclusion, while most rural women see seclusion as a social status to attain; a step up the social ladder and a sign of family wealth. Following on from this, customary and religious norms embedded in cultural practices influence access to productive resources, gender relations, household structure and decision-making in rural communities. Consequently, the status of women's rights in rural communities are dependent on the cultural environment.

DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS

In rural communities, privatization has accelerated the liberalization of land markets through titling, registration and other institutional reforms designed to guarantee tenure and title security. The privatization process has resulted in the intensification of large-scale land acquisition by the state using the statutory Land Use Act of 1978. Typically, land deals are initiated through a process of consultation and negotiation, which eventually leads to a contract. This usually comes with promises for rural development through compensation for land. The Land Use Act of 1978 vests the ownership of land rights in the state to ensure equal access to the allocation and distribution of land, irrespective of gender. The Land Use Act is operationalized through investment in proprietary rights, the use of administrative systems and the granting of user rights in land to individuals and corporations.[21]

However, despite the revolutionary nature of the Act, sections 6 and 36 grant local government authorities customary rights of occupancy in respect to rural lands. These customary rights are also expected to be administered in line with existing customs and native laws.[22] Similarly, under section 29 of the Act, compensation can be paid to individuals or community leaders whose lands are acquired by the state. This is expected to be used for the benefit of the family/community and in accordance with the applicable customary laws and customs.[23] This suggests that customary landlords continue to control and manage land and resources in the rural areas. Therefore, in terms of the promised benefit of changing land tenure system, evidence from Delta and Kano states indicates that the tenure system is still administered in line with customary land laws. It was expected that the liberalization of the land tenure system would increase women's access to land, but this was not the case, because privatization of land via the statutory Land Use Act is still based on the patriarchal system and administered in line with existing customary and native laws. Under the customary system, men hold land rights and women can access land through relations to males, either as wife, mother or daughter. The privatization process in rural communities is hence still mediated through existing power relations, and does not take women into consideration. As such privatization does not alter land ownership dynamics, and does not shift the concentration of land ownership from men to women, it has reinforced the culture of male-dominated land tenure arrangements.

In terms of consultations and negotiations, the situation of women in the rural communities of Delta and Kano states differs slightly. The practices of seclusion and the non-application of Islamic law as regards land tenure rights in the rural communities of Kano made women invisible in the consultation and negotiation processes. Rural women in Kano assert that they have stronger rights under Islamic law, as widows with children receive one-eighth of the late husband's property or one quarter if childless; daughters receive half the amount that sons receive. However, the implementations of these rights are often limited, as the customary law is often applied.

Evidence from Delta State indicates that in most communities where land deals occurred rural women were excluded from the negotiating team or process when their communities were consulted. However, in a few cases women were invited as observers. Moreover, in most cases women were not included in the compensation schemes. Field reports confirm that where compensation is paid to the family or community

head, such compensations were based on ownership rights of farmland and not on land use rights, ownership rights of crops destroyed or time and labor invested in cultivation. As such, most rural women in Delta State did not receive individual compensation for destroyed farm crops, neither were they compensated for labor expended on acquired farmland. Field reports revealed that in relation to family and community compensation payments were made to family heads or community heads, who are always male. In cases where money was paid for crops destroyed, the compensation was usually included alongside ownership rights to land. It was also found that the men in most cases did not compensate their wives when they received compensation payments.

A developmental strategy applied in the intensification of production in rural communities was a contract farming system with local producers. This contract farming system is also known as the out-growers' scheme, and is an alternative to the direct purchase of land for the establishment of large-scale commercial farms. Under the contract farming system, the farmer cultivates an agreed crop on his farm and agrees to provide a given quantity within a given time frame in exchange for direct purchase of the harvest at a set price by the investor. In most cases the investor provides seeds, fertilizer and agricultural inputs while the farmer retains control over and benefits from his land and labor.

Culturally, economic activities in rural communities of Delta and Kano states are based on the practice of participatory economy. This is predicated on the household as a unit, and it requires the full participation of everyone in the household: it is basically a survival strategy for individual family or community groups. Since the family is structured with patriarchal authority, the male as the household head is expected to provide the livelihood, while it is the traditional obligation of the wife to participate and support through complementary economic activities, providing labor services and the marketing of farm produce.

Evidence from field reports indicates that as a result of the dominant cultural practices, investors collaborating with local farmers usually adopt a contract model based on the unified household system, which is usually predicated on existing power relations in the household. Contract farming arrangements are therefore based primarily on who owns the land, which is a determinant of who in the household receives the compensation for contracted production. In communities where seclusion is practiced, investors cannot enter into contracts with women, because women are not allowed to relate to men outside their immediate environment. However,

where seclusion is less practiced, women contribute a substantial amount of labor but are not recognized by the contract model or in terms of compensation for production. The male contract holder receives the money on behalf of the family or owners of the land. Furthermore, as a result of male dominance in ownership of land, contract farmers for many crops are predominantly men. From the FGD, women in communities which serve as catchment areas for the SCPZ posit that crops such as tomatoes were traditionally associated with women: they plant them in the portion of land allocated to them by their husbands. However, with the establishment of the SCPZ, men in contract farming have taken over women's traditional crops because they consider them more profitable, especially since the establishment of tomato processing factories.

Evidence from Delta State is slightly different from that of Kano. On the one hand, investors base contract farming on the household, which primarily engages men as a result of the culture of participatory economy and the male dominance of the land. On the other hand, investors deliberately target more females than males. Cultural-religious norms do not exclude women from full participation in economic activities. Women in rural communities are industrious and more involved in agriculture than men. Hence, they tend to benefit more from contract farming than women in Kano State, but are constrained owing to a lack of access to land. Another strategy for rural development was a move to transform small-scale farmers in rural areas into large-scale farming entrepreneurs. This included the creation of an enabling environment to stimulate foreign investment flows into commercial agriculture. Along these lines, land deals were accompanied by large-scale investment and mechanization of agriculture, with the aim of achieving rural industrialization. The related successes include the establishment of large-scale commercial farms by investors and the creation of employment opportunities in the host communities.

Household structures in the rural community present a clear distinction between the status of men and women, with respect to rights, obligations, ownership, access and management of productive resources. Rights and obligations are largely determined by religious norms, traditional customs and family circumstances. These factors in turn dictate the division of labor within the household and the community. The traditional division of labor allots primary responsibility to women for domestic chores and childcare. As a result, investors often prefer to work with men rather than women in rural communities.

The adoption of a commercial farming system requires the acquisition of large amounts of land. A field report based on FGDs from Delta and Kano states revealed that customary land tenure does not grant women the land rights that will enable them to acquire land on a large scale, and most women do not have the financial capacity to rent a large amount of land. Similarly, rural women do not receive the enabling political and financial support from the state or federal government. In terms of opportunities for small-scale commercial farming through the allocation of smallholder plots to smaller farmers, investors usually consult with community leaders, who in turn select those who will benefit from such opportunities. Women are not given these opportunities, but allocations are based on the model of a unified household controlled by a male head.

Evidence from Kano indicates that, as a result of religious and cultural practices that are prevalent in rural communities of the state, most investors preferred men to women in terms of employment opportunities. The survey revealed that in some rural areas in Kano State the need for women's labor in farm and off-farm activities results in a more relaxed practice of seclusion. Women who are not expected to conform to the strict seclusion rules have greater mobility and social interactions with those outside the nuclear family network. In spite of this, where women are employed in wage labor in commercial farms or rural industries, the investors prefer unmarried women and older women who have passed child-bearing age. The field report revealed that due to the practices of seclusion, a handful of women in seclusion often worked for food processing industries under sub-contracting terms negotiated through the male household head. These sub-contracting jobs are usually home-based, with the women carrying out their assignments according to the factory specification. Furthermore, where the employment opportunity entails migration to another town or community, women are not allowed to migrate because this decision is seen as a man's prerogative as provider for the family.

For women in Delta State, where religious laws do not restrict them, investors naturally target women. As such, women are engaged in smallholder commercial farms through contract farming. Where women gain wage employment in commercial farms, when it is compatible with existing norms, most investors tend towards the gendering of task. Women are given tasks that are less strenuous, such as spraying, pruning and weeding, thereby excluding them from better paying functions. However, most land deals in Delta State, especially in the rural communities of Utorogu,

Ogidigben, Okpai and Koko, were for a massive expansion of pipeline projects and development of the EPZ. These projects needed skilled workers whose expertise was in this area, and these were men. Given the nature of the project, rural women were not visible beneficiaries of opportunities that it created.[24] Furthermore, where employment opportunities entail migration outside the community, women are allowed to migrate because most women in rural communities in this area assume responsibility for the upkeep of their household members and are not forbidden from taking up opportunities elsewhere.

Another rural development strategy resulting from commercialization of agriculture is the formalization of the agricultural value chain. This has become a tool for the integration of rural markets into the global market. It is thus expected that the value chain will be optimized to link women in rural areas into formal markets. Evidence from both Delta and Kano states indicates that this formalization still reflects gender roles in agricultural production and processing. As a result of these, certain crops along the value chain are considered men's or women's crops. For instance, as a result of seclusion, women in Kano State dominate in processing and packaging, while women in Delta State dominate in the post-harvest stages of crop production and in fish processing.

The extent to which women can benefit in the value chain is determined by their access to productive resources, capital, input and technology. Women in Kano State do not participate in the open market because culturally all marketing functions are undertaken by men. This is not the case with women in Delta State, who dominate in marketing functions. However, women's roles along the value chain are still informal, labor-intensive and largely non-mechanized. With increasing formalization of the value chain, the middlemen, who are also predominantly men and have access to resources, now dominate the link between the rural market and the formal market.

From an empirical analysis of the impact of developmental strategies on women in the rural communities of Delta and Kano states, it is clear that culture must be a central component of a developmental paradigm in a heterogeneous society that has diverse cultural norms. From the case studies, it is clear that insensitivity to the dominant cultural and social norms of rural communities has evoked a fundamental and obscurantist response, which is inimical to rural development.

Conclusion

The assumption that the challenges confronting women in rural communities would be resolved by resorting to free market activities has not been a fair one.[25] There is no doubt that new economic opportunities for women living in rural areas may have arisen from the privatization of land, the setting up of the special economic zones and the movement towards large-scale farming; but the extent to which rural women can benefit from privatization is determined, at least in part, by cultural norms.

The argument made in this chapter is that social questions and socio-cultural relations are as important as economic considerations in a development process. Development patterns and priorities vary among and within countries according to resource endowments and other peculiarities, including religion and cultural norms.[26] Culture is a vital pillar of social, economic and political transformation. Therefore, in a heterogeneous society such as Nigeria, the effectiveness or otherwise of development strategies will depend on their consonance with the society's culture. Lack of freedom for individuals within a cultural setting, gender norms and religious beliefs are some of the factors that may impose significant constraints on the ability of women to participate.[27] Therefore, the socio-cultural environment is relevant to the notion of development, and must be taken into account in formulating and implementing economic development policies.

This chapter concludes that the socio-cultural environment in many ways contributes to the effectiveness or otherwise of developmental strategies in rural communities, especially as it concerns women. Therefore, the strategies for rural development in Nigeria should show understanding and appreciation of the cultural environment. In order to be effective, policies need to be consistent with the extant culture of the people, and such policies need to satisfy the demands of social equity, integration and development. Consequently, in order to involve women as active participants in formulating and implementing developmental strategies, socio-cultural constraints facing women should be considered. Only then can the creative potential of women be mobilized for sustainable development. National government should adopt clear policies and priorities to foster cultural development so as to cope with existing and emerging issues, and to foster the advancement of the rights of women who are culturally marginalized.

Notes

1. John Oyeleye, "Settlement Geography," 2001 cited in Abel Abotutu, "Rural Settlement types in Delta State". In *Delta State in Maps*. eds. Odemerho, Awaritefe, Atubi Augustine, Ugbomeh and Efe (Asaba: Proverbsplus International, 2007), 144.

2. Gender in Nigeria Report, *Improving the Lives of Girls and Women in Nigeria: Issues, Policies and Action*. (2nd Edition UKAID, British Council Nigeria, 2012), iv, 9.

3. Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation (CTA), *The Economic Role of Women in Agricultural and Rural Development: Promoting Income Generating Activities*. (London: Ebenezer Baylis & Son Ltd., 1999), 23.

4. See for example, Julia Berhman, Ruth Meinzien-Dick, and Agnes Quisumbing, "The Gender Implications of Large Scale Land Deals," *Journal of Peasant Studies 2012*. 39(1): 49–79; and Fiona Tsikata Dzodzi and Pamela Golah, eds., *Land Tenure, Gender and Globalisation: research analysis from Africa, Asia and Latin America*, (New Delhi: Raj Press, 2010).

5. See, for example, some empirical studies, including: T. Kachika, *Land Grabbing in Africa: A Review of the Impact of Possible Policy Responses*. Retrieved from www.oxfamblogs.org/eastafrica/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Landgrabbinginafrica-kachika.pdf. on 05/03/2013; Omokoniovo Harriet Efanodor, "Liberalisation of Oil Exploration: Land Grab and the Travail of Women in Rural Communities of Delta State, Nigeria" In *Oil Theft, Environmental Degradation and the Reciprocal Responsibilities of Host Communities and the Government in Nigeria: A Book of Readings* ed. Christian Ewhrudjakpor, Augustine Atubi and Etemike (Abraka, Delta State: Grace Communication International, 2015), 57–67; Patience Mutopo, "Women's Struggles to Access and Control Land and Livelihoods after Fast Track Land Reform in Mwensi District, Zimbabwe," *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38 no.5 (2011), 1021–104; Esekumemu Victor Clark and Omokiniovo Harriet Efanodor, "Land Grab as Developmental Strategy: Privatisation of Land and

Women in Rural Communities of Kwara State, Nigeria". *Journal of Social and Management Science*, 10 no. 1 (2015), 138–149.

6. Delta State Government, Fact File of Delta 2012. Retrieved on 12/03/2015 from www.deltastate.com.ng/delta/fact/file.html

7. Ben Okpervra, "Historical development of Delta State: Precolonial and Colonial," in *Delta State in Maps,* eds. Awaritefe Odemerho, Ugbomeh Atubi and Efe (Delta state: Proverb Plus International, 2007), 60.

8. Lowenberg-DeBoer and Germaine, *A Study of the Cowpea Value Chain in Kano State, Nigeria, from Pro poor and gender perspective.* (Nigeria: USAID, 2008), 9.

9. Regina Scheyvens, ed., *Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide* (London: SAGE, 2003).

10. Shulamit Reinharz, *Feminist Methods in Social Science Research* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 19.

11. M. Boesveld, *Towards Autonomy for Women: Research and Action to Support a Development Process* (Hague: RAWOO, 1986), 20.

12. National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) *Policy Document.* Abuja, (Nigeria: National Planning Commission, 2004); Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, and Osafo-Kwaako, *Nigeria's Economic Reforms: Progress and Challenges* 2007 p. 7, retrieved from www.ancien/inter-resource. org/IMG/pdf-Nigeria-Economic-Reform-Okonjo-2007 on 7/1/13.

13. NEEDS, *Policy Document,* 70.

14. Liberalization of land tenure system has to do with the making of land tenure system market-oriented, with harmonized system of regulated access to right to use, control and transfer land. See, Shahra Razavi, "Liberalisation and the Debates on Women's Access to Land," *Third World Quarterly*, 28 no 8 (2007):1486.

15. Laz Etemike and Omokiniovo Harriet Efanodor, "Contemporary Globalisation and the Rural Economy in Nigeria," *America International Journal of Social Science*, 4 Nos 3 (2015):14–27; Center for Promoting Ideas, U.S.A. www.aijssnet.com Index in DRJI (Directory of Research Journal Indexing).

16. CTA, *The Economic Role of Women in Agricultural and Rural Development,* 23.

17. Bioje Tajudeen Aluko and Abdul-Rasheed Amidu, "Women and Land Rights in Nigeria" (A paper presented at 5th FIG Regional Conference Accra, Ghana March 2006), 3.

18. Dieyi Dan Olisa. *The Realities and Values of Anioma Identity* (Lagos: Danfejim International Com, 2001).

19. CTA, *Economic Role of Women in Agricultural and Rural Development,* 26.

20. Lowenberg-DeBoer and Germaine, *A Study of the Cowpea Value Chain in Kano State,* 9.

21. Aluko and Amidu, "Women and Land Rights in Nigeria," 13.
22. Nnadi Chikairu and Ihenacho Egwuonwu, "Mobilising Women for Food Security, Poverty Reduction and Rural Development in Nigeria: The Role of Land Tenure Rights," *Greener Journal of Agricultural Science* 2no.3 (2012), 98–101. Retrieved on 61/8/2013 from www.gjournal.org/GIA/GIA%20PDF/2012/June/Nnadi.pdf
23. Aluko and Amidu, "Women and Land Rights in Nigeria," 14.
24. Harriet Efanodor, "Large Scale Land Deals and Women in Rural Communities in Nigeria: Paradox of a Developmental Paradigm," *Research in Social Change*, 8 no.11 (2016), 33.
25. CTA, *Economic Role of Women in Agricultural and Rural Development.*
26. Harriet Efanodor, "Liberalisation of Oil Exploration", 58.
27. Report of the South-South Commission, *The challenges to the South* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1996).

CHAPTER 9

The Impossible Craft of Nation-Building in Postcolonial Cameroon

Ramon A. Fonkoué

Introduction

Every year African countries commemorate in pomp their accession to independence in the middle of the twentieth century. At the same time, Africa has never appeared as irrelevant on the international stage as it is today.[1] Moreover, it has never been as economically marginalized. Despite the phenomenal increase in global trade, and the recent growth miracles and transformations in parts of Southeast Asia, African states remain largely characterized by the same old narratives of weak institutions, underdevelopment, poverty and misery. One of the consequences of Africa's development failures has been the continent's inability to effectively appropriate some of the benefits of globalization through increased production and export. Instead of expanding industrial production and creating jobs for its citizens, Africa is increasingly becoming a dumping ground for goods manufactured elsewhere. As developing countries in other regions of the world embark on aggressive programs of economic

R. A. Fonkoué (✉)
Department of Humanities, Michigan Technological University,
Houghton, MI, USA

growth and development, most of Africa remains mired in governance challenges, with the result that little real progress has been made since the end of colonial rule.

Questions about the meaning of the recent commemorations of political independence are therefore worth asking, especially when nowhere on the continent did the fiftieth anniversary of independence appear to provide an opportunity to reflect on the road traveled since. Not one African country engaged in a serious reflection on the "state of the nation" and/or the effectiveness of the national institutions that have framed and guided nation-building over the past decades. This chapter investigates the dead end of nation-building in Africa more than half a century after independence. In counterpoint to the pompous commemorations across the continent, I argue that on close examination not much has changed between the colonial state and its postcolonial heir.

In general, debates about current conditions on the African continent are polarized, pitching those who favor external factors against those for whom the sources of the continent's failures are to be found solely within Africa herself. As William Moseley noted, "Scholars and policymakers seeking to understand the synergy of global and local forces that imbue most African issues often privilege one set of causes *over another*. This privileging of more global or local causes is often described in terms of externalist versus internalist explanations."[2] This polarization continues to plague discussions about the situation in Africa in our own time. For example, are African governments' continuous failures to build a prosperous society and deliver the protection, services and benefits that the citizenry rightly expects from a modern state a consequence of Western powers and trans-national corporations continual meddling in African affairs, or are they a reflection of sole endogenous factors? To what extent is Africa still trapped in its colonial past? What does it take for a subject who, as Albert Memmi suggested, has been defined only in negative traits and removed from history to become, owing to independence, an agent of his/her own destiny?[3] Can we ignore that privileging one set of factors over the other has significant implications, both methodological and epistemological?

The question of how the past continues to influence the present in Africa is most often skewed, making it easy to brush aside. Therefore, many studies of postcolonial Africa acknowledge in passing the influence of the past without making any effort to trace the roots of the current ills

to the colonial era. As Michael Mahadeo and Joe McKinney rightly observed, even when there is some acknowledgment of the weight of past experiences such as colonization or the Cold War, it is "with the connotation of 'it is the past' and it is time to move on, as if political habits, structures and cultures, once entrenched, can be changed so quickly."[4] But can euphemisms such as "kleptocratic regime," "poor governance" and "patrimonial state," all found in scholarship on Africa today, mask the fact that the colonial state was in essence a patrimonial state? This status was epitomized in the Belgian Congo, which was the personal property of King Leopold II for a quarter of a century.

A scrutiny of the structures and cultures of postcolonial institutions that Mahadeo and McKinney refer to would certainly provide further evidence of this too often overlooked legacy. For instance, to rule over the "Congo Free State" over twenty-four years, King Leopold II had created the "Force Publique," a private militia whose atrocities are well known. When the Belgian government wrested the colony from the monarch in 1908 (renaming it Belgian Congo), it was the same "Force Publique" that assumed security under Belgian colonial rule until the territory gained independence in 1960. President Mobutu, who overthrew Patrice Lumumba—the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Congo—came out of the ranks of the "Force Publique." Yet for decades Mobutu was hailed by the West for his ability to keep the Congo "stable." As Achille Mbembe has rightly argued, scholars cannot reasonably investigate violence in the postcolonial African state without tracing its roots back to the violence that was foundational in the colonial state.[5] It is therefore regrettable and detrimental to rigorous research on Africa when the authoritarian rule that characterized nascent states in postcolonial Africa is uncritically presented as a choice, as we often see in scholarship on Africa. The Congo not only provides a vivid picture of what Mbembe calls "the authoritarian imaginary" inherited from the colonial state, but it also exemplifies the limits of the security state that many African postcolonial elites built with the help of departing colonizers.[6] Unfortunately, African leaders today still resort to rhetoric about the preservation of public order, either to silent opponents or to suppress civil society.

History thus retains its importance when it comes to understanding what is happening in and to Africa, and it is at its own peril that any reflection on the African state as a driving force for development and about nation-building can overlook the question of the filiation of the postcolonial state. In *The Intention of Africa*, Valentin Mudimbe describes Africa

as essentially characterized by its marginality, as "an intermediary space [that] could be viewed as the major signifier of underdevelopment."[7] He criticizes the modernization theories that have pervaded African studies since independence, noting that "This presupposed jump from one extremity (underdevelopment) to the other (development) is in fact misleading. Between the two extremes, there is an intermediate, a diffused space in which social and economic events define the extent of marginality."[8] Mudimbe points out the contradictions inherent in postcolonial African societies, and concludes that development theories are inappropriate when confronted with these societies:

> In general, troubled by such confusion, social scientists prefer to plead for a reassessment of programs of modernization. No doubt many theories are still to be proposed and plans to be made. Yet one may already understand that this marginal space has been a great problem since the beginning of the colonial experience; rather than being a step in the imagined "evolutionary process," it has been the locus of paradoxes that call into questions the modalities and implications of modernization in Africa.[9]

This chapter finds its impetus in Mudimbe's suspicion of modernization and development theories that are applied to Africa, and attempts to shed some light on what remains, by all fair accounts, a dismal situation that offers somber perspectives on the continent. I am specifically interested in renewing the ways in which the past can help understand the chronic inability of the African state to modernize and turn into a driving force for development. While emphasizing the historical factor, I wish, however, to guard against the danger of historicism; that is, the risk of seeing in the current conditions in Africa a result of events past, at the risk of exonerating African actors from any responsibility.[10] I also take my cues from Achille Mbembe, who has repeatedly stressed the limitations of classical approaches to Africa in social sciences, and called for innovative ways to investigate current conditions on the continent. Mbembe is interested in new avenues for scholarship on Africa, acknowledging the specificity of African societies and resisting the insertion of them into a totalizing historicity, but also escaping the center–periphery dichotomy of a structuralist approach and avoiding the pitfalls of dependence and marginalization theories. This chapter is concerned with contributing to an understanding of the failure of the state in Africa as an agent of development that departs from widely circulated theses about stability, ethnicity, fluctuations in

gross domestic product (GDP) and other macroeconomic measurements that are customarily used to measure state success.

I contend that the development fiasco in most of Africa has to do with the fact that from its origin the African state, for the most part, has been fundamentally ill equipped to be an agent of development, despite the official rhetoric in the years following independence, which itself was fueled by short-lived tailwinds in the international economy. Drawing principally from Mbembe's reflections on the state in contemporary Africa, from political philosophy and inspired by recent developments in institutional theory, I argue that the state in Africa seems bound to become an end in itself. In talking about the "impossible craft" of nation-building in postcolonial Africa, I posit the state as originally responsible for forging the nation in the aftermath of colonization. I view nation-building as an organic project in which building institutions, developing a sound economy and fostering a sense of community are intrinsically linked. I suggest that, in the face of the chronic inability of the postcolonial state to liquidate that which it inherited from its colonial ancestor, the logical conclusion one arrives at is that the national community the state had the mission to forge seems doomed. I start out by framing the context in which the postcolonial state came into being, viewing this moment as critical for the trajectory the African state was to follow. Next, I examine nation-building in light of the rhetoric of modernization and development. Finally, taking Cameroon as a case in point, I foreground my suggestion of an autistic postcolonial African state, which remains dreadful to its confused citizens and yet boasts to be a modern state.

THE POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN STATE: THE LURKING COLONIAL IMAGINARY

From its inception, the African state, from the standpoint of international institutions and in the views of its first leaders, had to be a strong state. This was considered as a pre-condition for the possibility of any development in the territories that were emerging from colonial rule. As Arnold Rivkin noted just a few years after the bulk of African countries achieved independence,

> For the most part African states have chosen centralized, unitary state structures *with* authoritarian political structures and systems. The growth of authoritarian institutions has been almost a natural concomitant—a reflex

action—to the highly centralized constitutional structures and the ascendancy or domination of the apparatus or machinery of their *de jure* or *de facto* single parties over them.[11]

Today, many critics of the state in Africa start with the assumption that the state is either simply weak, corrupt or dysfunctional or else not modern enough, but argue it can be fixed to function as a modern state. While there is a consensus among scholars that the autocratic turn many states took in the early years of their sovereignty was detrimental to their nation-building agenda, what has not been sufficiently investigated is whether the postcolonial state was, by its nature, apt to engage in a real revolution and able to make a clean break from what Mudimbe has called the "colonial organization." The anti-colonial struggle, as theorized by the likes of Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral, carried a revolutionary ambition that was spurred by an acute awareness of the nature of the colonial state. Let us recall Cabral's response to a question on the nature of the state that the nationalists who fought Angolan colonization in Guinea and Cape Verde sought to build after colonization:

> We aren't interested in the preservation of any of the structures of the colonial state. It is our opinion that it is necessary to totally destroy, to break, to reduce to ash all aspects of the colonial state in our country in order to make every-thing possible for our people. The masses realize that this is true, in order to convince everyone we are really finished with colonial domination in our country [...] The nature of the state we have to create in our country is a very good question for it is a fundamental one.[12]

Making the nature of the state central to an investigation of the state and nation-building in Africa appears to be a crucial task in African studies. Sanctioned and institutionalized knowledge has played into the hands of those in power by looking for fixes instead of investigating the crux of the question of state failure. Theories of decolonization have not sufficiently infused social sciences in African studies, which, as Mudimbe warns, have for the most part remained steeped in development and modernization theories. For a very long time these theories have obscured analysis of the state's inability to deliver on the promises of development to the citizenry. This realization calls for an archeology of the postcolonial state, which would shed light on what Michel Foucault calls the "power-effect" of dominant discourses on Africa, and underscore the collusion between the

logics of neocolonialism and the rhetoric of modernization in the postcolonial state. In Michel Foucault's words, "Archaeology is the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them."[13] Raising the question of the nature of the postcolonial state is a reasoning that proceeds along the lines of archeological thinking. This approach requires taking a step back in history to consider the "colonial organization" and to scrutinize the filiation between the colonial and the postcolonial state. Achille Mbembe persuasively demonstrates the umbilical cord that led from the former to the latter. As noted by the historian, in the colony "Power was reduced to the right to demand, to force, to ban, to compel, to authorize, to punish, to reward, to be obeyed—in short to enjoin and to direct. The key characteristic of colonial rule was thus to issue orders and have them carried out."[14] Has the postcolonial state deviated from this original model? It does not take much effort to realize that generally speaking, in Africa, subjection has remained the privileged mode of mediating the relation between the state and the holders of power on the one hand and the citizens on the other.

As Fanon suggests in his description of colonial sovereignty, too often in postcolonial Africa the policeman and the soldier have remained the intermediary of choice between the state and individuals. The experience of powerlessness that was the essence of the colonized condition has too often continued to be the lot of the peoples in Africa over the last half-century. In *Africa, I Will Fleece You*, the Cameroonian film maker Jean-Marie Teno explores the postcolonial condition against the backdrop of the memory of colonization, and the history of anti-colonial struggles.[15] In a scene that is emblematic of the condition of the subject in the postcolonial state, the screen abruptly switches from a perky young boy going down the street while dancing to the rhythm of an upbeat song to the screeching sound of a police truck's tires on asphalt, and images of police brutality against the population in what looks like a city in independent Africa. These images are immediately followed by a shocking silence. The continuity of space (the postcolonial space) is undercut by the juxtaposition of clashing shots, and the result is an arresting picture of the disenchantment that followed independence. The sequence of images, which included celebrations of Congo's independence in a very festive night atmosphere in Kinshasa, suggests that right after exulting for their independence Africans found themselves under a leaden shroud. Mbembe's

characterization of the postcolonial state is therefore an accurate representation of the trajectory of the postcolonial state: "Although the trajectories of the 'indigenization' of the state varied from country to country, the actual crystallization of the state as a technology of domination and of the imaginary that sustained it were everywhere carried out in an authoritarian manner that denied individuals any rights as citizens."[16] The authoritarian drift that increasingly spread across the continent was therefore inscribed in the postcolonial state's genes.

One only needs to revisit Fanon's portrayal of the postcolonial elites to measure the odds that the nascent African nation stood against.[17] It is Cabral who in this warning put in more prosaic terms the nature of postcolonial power:

> You have to realize that it is very difficult for the people to make a distinction between one Portuguese, or white, administrator and one white administrator. For the people, it is the administrator that is fundamental. And the principle—if this administrator, a black one is living in the same house, with the same gestures, with the same car, or sometimes a better one, what is the difference?[18]

The inner contradictions of the postcolonial state made it inadequate from the start. In a very perceptive analysis of the colonial origins of postcolonial state policies, David Abernethy points out the colonial inspiration of remuneration policies in the postcolonial African state. Abernethy traces—in independent Africa—the roots of the income gap between the public and the private sector, the urban population and the peasantry, this accounting for the massive urban migration that followed independence, and the ballooning of a bureaucratic yet unproductive administration that was attracted by the prestige and the perks that came with a civil servant position. Says Abernethy: "Ironically, the demands of African nationalism for equality—defined as equality with Europeans—carried over to the postcolonial period the highly inegalitarian remunerations patterns Europeans had developed during the colonial period."[19] Building on the foundations of the colonial state, the postcolonial state also inherited its illegitimacy. This could be seen in the gradual discarding of the nationalist rhetoric and its ideals of dignity and equality for all.

The epic failures of the postcolonial state in Africa all point to its inability to liquidate that which it inherited from the colonial state. As a way of envisioning power, the "colonial imaginary" proves especially useful in

analyzing this colonial legacy. On the one hand, it gives access to the psyche of the colonized who, as Fanon has underlined, dreaded but were also seduced and fascinated by the power wielded by them. On the other hand, it sheds light on the contradictions that could exist in the colonial state. The colonial administrative machinery is certainly the embodiment of these contradictions. As Aaron Gana suggests, "The colonial state can only be adequately understood if its role in the political economy of colonialism is considered. Originating as a bureaucratic apparatus of control, it further developed primarily as a bureaucratic apparatus of economic management. Colonial states are thus among the most striking modern examples of bureaucratic states."[20] In a colonial economy engineered to remain an appendage to the metropolitan economy, these contradictions were naturally contained since the colonial apparatus did not have any obligations towards the colonized, and thus felt no social pressure of the kind exerted by citizens on the state. But that the postcolonial state had to liquidate this "imaginary" if it was to be an engine for development is beyond question. This bureaucratic apparatus is today the most visible symbol of the "colonial imaginary," and can be viewed as a poisoned gift from the colonial state. As the masses grew disillusioned and nationalist fervor waned, the state morphed into an authoritarian power that was characterized by a rapid rise in power of the discourse of security reminiscent of the colonial state's rhetoric of peace and order; at the same time "developmentalism" as a conceptual framework for nation-building was on the upswing.[21]

Nation Building and the Rhetoric of Modernization

Following independence, the postcolonial state engaged in a race against the clock. Nation-building, as a societal project and as a political concept, had a peculiar meaning, insofar as the nations that preceded colonization were largely dismembered when the political map of the continent was redrawn according to Western powers' interests. Félix Houphouët-Boigny is thus right to have noted that "Independence has only bequeathed statehood to us; it remains for us to create nations transcending the tribal level, which is what I believe we are doing in the Ivory Coast."[22] As Arnold Rivkin observes, the statehood achieved at independence was only a nominal entity, the state being an empty shell with no substance. Therefore, state building had to be carried out concomitantly with forging a national community. Rivkin's observation that "For the most part, state and

nation-building remains for African countries five and ten years after independence the unfinished task it was at the moment of independence" is still pertinent more than half a century later.[23]

Yet the rhetoric, the tremendous amount of resources and the institutional arsenal that the state deployed in the name of development over decades are quite notable, especially when compared with the results attained. With the assistance of a legion of development specialists mostly comprising foreign advisors, the postcolonial elites elaborated a centralized and hegemonic discourse on development, which quickly became an organic project that left no part of national life untouched. Rivkin aptly captures this despotic conception of development, which turned into what some scholars have called "developmentalism," when he notes that

> This forced-draft pace, this compulsion to telescope a century of nation-building into a decade, has frequently become the justification for African leaders and political parties having recourse to authoritarian and coercive courses of political action. Everything has to be sacrificed—the rationale goes—to speed, any means to an end. And so for many African countries, independence has not necessarily meant freedom for the individual. It has frequently meant authoritarian one-party government as the preferred means of building a strong, integrated, cohesive nation-state, and as a concomitant, a dominant state sector and comprehensive government control as a preferred means of building a modern economy, which is, in this view, indispensable for, an integral part of, and inseparable from, building a modern nation-state.[24]

What Rivkin said almost fifty years ago remains true today, since nation-building has essentially meant strengthening the grip of state power over national life and bringing all institutions—universities, courts, civil services, parliaments, private groups and so on—under the control of the state. Indeed, the evisceration of institutions, to which I will return, has become the trademark of the postcolonial state. It is in this light that we must examine its claims of development and modernization, and assess fifty years of nation-building on the continent.

Aaron T. Gana notes that:

> Because contemporary African states were creatures of Western imperialism, it is imperative for any serious analysis to take as its point of departure the process of Africa's incorporation into the capitalist world-economy (CWE) characterized by a single world division of labor, production for profit, capital accumulation for expanded reproduction as a key mode of maximizing profit.[25]

Any attempt to make sense of the predicament of the state in today's Africa ought to heed this warning. Gana further argues that the postcolonial state that took over following independence did not fundamentally alter the order put in place during colonization. In studying the state in Africa as a driving force for development and modernization, it is thus imperative to assess the implications of the detrimental dynamics that existed between Africa and the outside world, and to discern the repercussions this has had, not only on the postcolonial nation-building project, but also on the production of dominant discourses on African societies. To take the example of the economic realm, desubjugating knowledge—in Foucauldian terms—on African societies means developing new tools and a new approach that breaks the monopoly of classical economic discourse, whose data, macro-economic measurements and precepts have proved to be unable to stop the vicious cycle in which African economies have been since independence. Put in a more prosaic way, how would an economy that brings about development and sustainable progress to African societies function? How would it measure economic performance in a way that not only makes sense to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and trans-national companies, but also to the African populations, from the peasant who has been repeatedly exploited and scorned to the college graduates who, generation after generation, nervously contemplate an uncertain future? What is the use of studies that analyze a rentier state as if it has the levers of an economy that is geared toward development? Nigeria's recent descent into economic recession barely a year after being hailed for the highest GDP in Africa offers a vivid illustration of the inadequacy to which I am alluding.

Ignoring this imperative, many studies of the state and state institutions in Africa tend to take the state as a given, and therefore project a certain vocation onto the object being considered. For instance, in an otherwise well-researched study on state failure in recent African history, Robert Bates concludes his analysis of the factors leading to state collapse on the continent by stating that:

In the late twentieth century, the political foundations of Africa were hit with shocks, both economic and political, and subject to forces that eroded political order. Posed dispassionately, Africa was subject to an experiment, as these forces pushed the value of key variables into ranges in which the possibility of political order became vanishingly small. It was the misfortune of Africa's people to be caught in a perfect storm—one in which political fundamentals were so altered that the foundations of the state lay nakedly revealed: a sight that was both horrible and destructive.[26]

In a book whose title echoes one of the most emblematic texts in African literature,[27] the author suggests that it is the major historical events that took place at the turn of the century (world economic crisis followed by structural adjustment programs in Africa, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War with its ripple effects in African politics) that shook the foundations of the African state. If political order is central in Bates's reflection, he never fully dissects it, and in his view order and stability in Africa hinge exclusively on economic productivity and the ability of the political elites to keep a limited clientele content and protect the citizens' wealth. For instance, Bates suggests that "There is political order when citizens choose to turn away from military activity and to devote their energies to productive labor and when those who govern—specialists in violence—choose to employ their power to protect rather than to prey upon the wealth that their citizens create. Political order becomes a state when these choices persist as an equilibrium."[28] Whereas resource control seems to be the paradigm that determines public order and state viability, Bates makes no mention of the question of legitimacy, which is central in institutional theory. Conversely, he is silent on the issue of leadership and the mechanisms of its constitution and devolution in Africa. Even though at the end he advocates for a multiparty system as a remedy to state failure in Africa, empirical evidence does not support such a claim. The recent history of the African continent has proved that a multiparty system is not a panacea to the problems facing the crisis-prone continent.

By attributing the misfortune of Africa to the upheavals in world economy, history and politics at the end of the last century, Bates fails to acknowledge what has become a truism in African studies, namely that the official end of colonization did not set African countries on the right course as they were integrated into the community of independent nations. As we know, the nations emerging from colonial rule were subjected to the geopolitical calculations of dominant powers and drawn willingly or unwillingly into their orbit. For instance, as Toyin Falola has noted:

> Between the Second World War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, US–Africa relations were structured by strategic calculations of the Cold-War: East–West rivalries over the marketing of economic ideologies of capitalism and socialism, intervention in African politics, support for authoritarian leaders […] and the elimination of radical leaders […] Today, terrorism has replaced the politics of the Cold War in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States.[29]

Falola's comments on the relations between the USA and Africa provide useful information about the mold in which the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world has been shaped from the beginning. It is therefore misleading to study the African state without bringing the history of the incorporation and marginalization of the continent into the community of world nations to bear on one's analysis. It is costly to ignore, as Mudimbe suggested, that the Africa we see today is originally a product of the "colonial organization," which rested on three pillars: "the domination of physical space, the reformation of *natives*' minds, and the integration of local economies into the Western perspective."[30]

The legacy of the colonial state thus raises, for the African state today, the question of its ability to metamorphose into the modern state it is often assumed to be. Giorgio Agamben has defined the state as a "community instituted for the sake of the living and the wellbeing of men in it."[31] In a continent where for over half a century political discourse has revolved around the rhetoric of modernization, to what extent has the state, defined as a set of institutions, been true to this original vocation? As has been argued by some scholars, the postcolonial state has largely functioned as a state of exception.[32] In the continued absence of a contractual relation between those who are in power and the citizen, considering the pervasiveness of an authoritarian conception of power hinging on an obsessive requirement for peace and order, the swiftness with which the police forces move to crush the citizen in contemporary Africa is instead reminiscent of the classical state as defined by Michel Foucault. If in Foucault's theory the advent of the modern state in Western civilization coincides with the moment when the "sovereign" relinquished its power of life and death over its subjects,[33] it should be noted that in Africa, for the most part, the sovereign remains jealous of this privilege, and its power is easily asserted through lethal force.

As Achille Mbembe has suggested, in the face of a power that relates to the masses only through subjection, the African citizen finds himself deprived of any legal status. The normalization of violence, the routine with which tragedies strikes and the ease with which death is inflicted by those in power make the postcolonial state a space of "sovereign power." In Agamben's political theory, "The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere."[34] Agamben's "*homo sacer*," a life made sacred because it stands bare in front

of a crushing power, fittingly describes the postcolonial condition. Given the limitlessness of state power and the impunity that is rampant in state institutions on the continent, the legal status of the postcolonial subject looks identical to that of Agamben's "*homo sacer*" who, once deprived of the protection that the modern state extends to its citizens, can be subjected to unlimited abuse and the most extreme forms of violence. In view of the persistent seemingly unbridgeable gap between the state and the populace, one ought to ask what is left of the modernization project of the postcolonial state.

The Autistic Postcolonial State

From the outset, the balance of power in postcolonial Africa was tipped in favor of the state, which Agamben calls the "constituted power." But in the Italian philosopher's theory, the *raison d'être* of the modern state and its institution is the well-being of the citizens. As a result of the deepening alienation of the people from the state, it can be said that over time the African state has become an end in itself. Indeed, when we examine the history of independent Africa, what we see is the quasi-absence of a "constituting power,"[35] and the "passivization" and orchestrated exclusion of the masses from meaningful political participation. Therefore, in reaction to the recent commemorations of independence across the continent, we can well say that the state in Africa will have spent half a century in self-consolidation. As a consequence, not surprisingly, the state security apparatus has become the top priority of the African state since independence. It is this narcissistic turn that accounts for the fact that as the African continent commemorated its independence the only palpable achievements that its leaders could show were state institutions, and almost exclusively the armed forces and the police, in contrast to the nation and the social fabric, which remain in a precarious state.

How, then, do we analyze the state in a continent where institutional analysis has no place in the political culture, where government performance remains measured through its GDP and its monopoly of violence, where the only public institution whose performances are measured and incentivized is the Ministry of Finance, and precisely its customs and tax divisions? It is also in light of the trajectory of the African state described above that we can make sense of the dull political life on the continent, where political debate essentially revolves around the question of the need of new institutions, while the powers that be celebrate with much publicity

the ones they choose to put in place, only after carefully eviscerating them.[36] The trend of the creation of a higher chamber in African parliaments, where the president appoints up to 30% of senators, is a telling example in this regard.

With its institutional armada, Cameroon certainly exemplifies the African state I have endeavored to describe in the preceding paragraphs. It must be said that institutional development in the country over the last decades reflects the patterns of institution-building in the continent. Prima facie, the Cameroonian state presents the institutional structure of any modern state, with a wide array of public institutions and a constitution consecrating the existence of three separate branches of government: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. While "modernization" has been the mantra of state-building here as well as on the continent at large, this has mostly meant piling up institutions without following a logic aligning needs, means and ends. In the absence of any investigation of the usefulness and the performance of institutions in most African countries, this pattern of modernization that has been mostly understood as buttressing the state raises from a historical point of view the question of a purely mimetic move that could be explained by the "myth of the modern state." In fact, the Cameroonian president never fails, in his end of year address, to mention any new institution that was created—as evidence of the continued modernization of the state.

David Abernethy has warned that:

> The crisis of government performance is particularly alarming because central government are the only institutional means Africans have to cope with many of the problems within their different countries, as well as with the powerful intrusive institutions from the international environment. If the capacity to cope with multiple crisis is seriously reduced by the ineffective or counterproductive actions of governments, then the harmful effects of other social crises are magnified.[37]

The perversion of the state has certainly made it a drag to the nation-building and the modernization project in Africa. The fight against corruption, for which Cameroon has been notoriously ranked very high year after year on the list of the most corrupt countries in the world, further illustrates the heedless ballooning of state institutions. The institutional framework that the state has put in place has a plethora of institutions devoted to fighting corruption. Beside the classic administrative and judi-

cial mechanism that had been in place for years, the government now has a Ministry of Higher Control of the State, a Ministry of Public Contracts, a National Anticorruption Committee (with representations in all branches of the administration), an Inter-Ministerial Anticorruption Unit and a Special Criminal Court to prosecute economic crimes. While, the combined action of these institutions over the last two decades is yet to yield tangible results, the government has not deemed it necessary to implement other key provisions added in the constitution in 1996, these being the Court of Financial Auditors, the Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice, and the entry into force of Article 66 of the constitution which requires all high-ranking officials to disclose their wealth upon their appointment to office. These provisions dating twenty years ago are yet to be operationalized. The first senatorial elections took place only three years ago, even though the Senate was instituted in the same 1996 constitution. In 2008, the country's constitution was amended for the thirteenth time since independence in 1960, removing the two-term limit for presidency that was added in 1996.

The exciting original project of nation-building in postcolonial Africa, which was an organic project combining the state and the national community, was gradually shrunk to state-building, which meant consolidating state power to the detriment of the people. Mindful of this dangerous perversion of the state and its deleterious effect on the nation, the Cameroonian writer and activist Mongo Beti once cautioned:

> The Cameroonian state exists, but in my humble opinion, it is an empty shell. The state is a set of institutions: an army, the Presidency, customs, educational system … Apparently, all these are found in our country. But what counts is the soul that gives life to these institutions. If the soul does not exist, the state is a corpse. Yet, what constitutes the soul? It is the nation. Is there a Cameroonian nation? This is the big question.[38]

Ironically, it is in the travesty of modernization that the African "sovereign" has displayed its creativity. Examples of this "craftsmanship" abound, from Bokassa's imperial adventure to Mobutu's illusion of immortality, from Robert Mugabe's autocratic drift, as illustrated by the peremptory assertion "Zimbabwe is mine,"[39] to the more recent trend of "royal presidencies" made possible by modifications at will of the constitution.[40]

Conclusion

In a study of the early years of independence in Cameroon, Richard Bjornson suggests that:

> There was considerable sympathy in Cameroon for the idealistic goals of nation building, but there was also a good deal of discontent with the authoritarianism that accompanied Ahidjo's centralization of power. Because possibilities for expressing this discontent became increasingly circumscribed during the 1960s and the 1970s, Cameroonians were largely prevented from participating in an honest dialogue about the nature of their collective existence as citizens of the same nation.[41]

The divorce between the state and the people, which lies at the foundation of the state in Africa—from the colonial to the postcolonial era—is key to our ability to understand the current situation in Africa. Over time, the state has become what Mongo Beti called "a corpse without a soul," namely a spectral state. This original alienation matters not only because it challenges the claims about Africans' lack of agency, which is rampant in some quarters of African studies, but also because it points to the urgency to rethink the state on the continent. If the various schools in theory of institutions all have a point of convergence, it is certainly that institutions are primarily concerned with social legitimacy and survival. The African state was not born out of a social contract, and from its inception, in many cases, it suffered from a deficit of legitimacy. Even where the state started with a veneer or legitimacy, the odds were stacked against the ideals of the anti-colonial struggle. Forced to choose, the state chose survival over legitimacy. As a result, the politics of "developmentalism" had the pernicious effect of giving primacy to public institutions over the individual and the nation, such that it is safe to say that the postcolonial African state was built at the expense of the nation.

We must therefore view the stability of today in many countries, or the peace of days gone by that commentators often lament, for what they really are: a Pax Romana that stifled life and today celebrates—in commemoration of independence—empty shells in place of legitimate institutions. This fetishization of institutions displaces political debates on a terrain where modernization no longer means pursuing the well-being of the community but completing the state institutional infrastructure.

Mindful of this original flaw, some analysts have coined the notion of an "overdeveloped state" to characterize the postcolonial African state.[42]

No matter the rhetoric that was put forward to legitimize "developmentalism" across the continent, it is impossible to argue that the turn that most independent African regimes took was sustainable, and that if it weren't for the major changes that sent African politics into turmoil in the late twentieth century this path would have led to real development. Faced with the pattern of state failure and the upheavals that tore the continent apart, it is very tempting to lament the peace and stability of the olden days. This nostalgic gaze at the past would be forgetting at what cost "public order" was achieved and maintained in the young postcolonial states. It would be ignoring the fact that more often than not, the state was built while negating the individual, whose legitimate right to participate in public life was rescinded. In this respect, it is especially revealing that in the wake of the debacle of the multiparty political system in Africa, the fight that is being fought by the people across the continent today is for an open and accessible public sphere and for the building of civil society. The recent resurgence of the civil society may therefore be read as a response to the depoliticization of the masses that was characteristic of the authoritarian rule of the postcolonial state.[43]

Analyzing the discourse of such organizations, it appears that this revival is driven by the realization that it is the state in its foundation that must be questioned. Theories developed by sociologists in new institutionalism prove very useful in diagnosing the failure of the postcolonial African state. Proponents of a sociological understanding of institutions suggest that the patterns of institutional development observed in modern organizations are not always followed because they are the most efficient means to tackle the tasks at hand. They also contend that institutions do not necessarily operate according to the logic of rational choice theory. This point is well illustrated in the large-scale prestige projects characteristic of the early years of independence but also, more recently, in the way constitutions are changed at will and new institutions such as the senate discussed earlier are forced through without proper deliberations about their usefulness. As Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor suggest, such patterns "should be seen as culturally specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally."[44] Arnold Rivkin has labeled the patterns of nation-

building that I have attempted to describe in this chapter as "pure patrimonialism," which is, in his view, "the establishment or continuation of new political and administrative central framework, which have a tendency to maintain external contents of traditional or of modern symbols without simultaneously maintaining any strong commitment to them."[45] It is precisely this culture inherited from the colonial state, one that makes the citizens at best passive agents of their fate that the aforementioned struggles seek to change. It remains to be seen if the burgeoning civil society may succeed where party-based politics has failed, and rehabilitate politics by forcing the state to agree to a social contract.

Notes

1. The most vivid illustration of this irrelevance is NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011, and the subsequent overthrow and assassination of its leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi, in violation of the UN mandate that only sought to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster. The AU (African Union) stood completely voiceless.
2. William Moseley, "Understanding African Issues in Context: Global and Local forces," in *Taking Sides. Clashing Views on African Issues,* ed. William Moseley (Dubuque, Ia.: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007), xvii–xxv.
3. Albert Memmi, *The colonizer and the colonized.* Introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre; afterword by Susan Gilson Miller; trans. Howard Greenfeld (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991). See especially the chapter "Portrait of the Colonized."
4. Michael Mahadeo and Joe McKinney, "Media representations of Africa: Still the same old story?" *Policy & Practice: A Development Education Review* Vol. 4 (2007): 14–20, http://www.developmenteducationreview.com/issue4-focus2
5. On this point see, for example, the chapter "Of Commandment" in Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001).
6. Ibid., 43.
7. V.H. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa. Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988); 5.
8. Ibid., 4.
9. Ibid., 5.
10. See Dwight E. Lee, and Robert N. Beck, "The Meaning of "Historicism"." *The American Historical Review* 59, no. 3 (1954): 568–77, doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/1844717, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1844717

11. Arnold Rivkin, ed., *Nations by Design* (New York: Anchor Books, 1968); 19.

12. Amilcar Cabral, "Connecting the Struggles: an informal talk with Black Africans," in *Return to the Sources: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 83.

13. Michel Foucault, "*Society Must be Defended*" in *Lectures at the College de France 1975–1976*, trans David Macey (Paris: Éditions de Seuil/Gallimard, 1997, 2003); 8–9.

14. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, 32.

15. *Afrique, je te plumerai / Africa, I Will Fleece You*, directed by Jean-Marie Teno (1992; San Francisco: California Newsreel), DVD.

16. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, 42.

17. See the chapter "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness," in Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963).

18. Cabral, *Return to the Sources*, 83.

19. David B. Abernethy, "European Colonialism and Postcolonial Crises in Africa," in *The Crises and Challenges of African Development*, ed. Harvey Glickman (New York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1988); 10.

20. Aaron T. Gana, "The State in Africa: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique* 6, no. 1 (1985): 115–32, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1600974

21. See Thandika Mkandawire, ed. *African Intellectuals: rethinking politics, language, gender, and development* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2005).

22. *Cahiers de l'Afrique Occidentale et de l'Afrique Équatoriale* 337 (Paris: 1967), 15 quoted in Arnold Rivkin, *Nations by Design*, 8.

23. Arnold Rivkin, *Nations by Design*, 23.

24. Arnold Rivkin, *Nation-Building in Africa. Problems and Prospects* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969); 8–9.

25. Gana, "The State in Africa", 115.

26. Robert H. Bates, *When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late Century-Africa* (Cambridge: University Press, 2008); 138.

27. Bates's title purposefully echoes Chinua Achebe's acclaimed novel *Things Fall Apart*.

28. Bates, *When Things Fell Apart*, 130.

29. Toyin Falola, *The African Diaspora. Slavery, Modernity and Globalization* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2013); 344.

30. Mudimbe. *The Invention of Africa*, 2.

31. Giorgio Agamben, *Means without Ends. Notes on Politics*, trans. Vincenzo Bineti and Cesare Cesarino (Minneapolis, London: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000); 3–4.

32. On this point, see, for instance, Achille Mbembe's *On the Postcolony* already referenced above, and Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, *La démocratie de transit au Cameroun* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997); 167–171.

33. Michel Foucault, "Right of Death and Power over Life," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinov (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984); 259.

34. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign power and bare life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); 83.

35. Agamben suggests that the modern state is born out of a contract between the constituting power on the one hand (the people, who are the actual source of power) and the constituted power on the other hand (the state). This contract is also the foundation of the democratic state. The philosopher considers that in our era, in the wake of the rise to power of technocrats and finance capital, democracy is in peril and the gains of the original social contract are jeopardized.

36. An illustration of the claim I make here can be seen in Burkina Faso. In the summer of 2013, this land-locked West-African country was shaken by protests over the creation of a senate, which transformed the parliament into a bicameral house. In a context of rampant inflation, the population of this very poor country did not see the justification for this new institution, and the political unrest that ensued led to the fall of the president. In neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, the current president recently forced the creation of the senate through without a broad consensus, an initiative that has left his country profoundly divided.

37. Abernethy, "European Colonialism", 5.

38. Mongo Beti & Kom, Ambroise, *Mongo Beti parle* (Bayreuth: Eckhart Breitinger, 2002); 139.

39. "Mugabe insists "Zimbabwe is mine"," *BBC News*, December 19, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7791574.stm

40. On this topic, refer, for example, to V. Adefemi Izumonah, "Imperial Presidency and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria," *Africa Today* 59, no. 1(2012): 43–68.

41. Richard Bjornson, *The African Quest for Freedom and Identify: Cameroonian Writing and the National Experience* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991); 140–141.

42. See Gana, "The State in Africa", 123.

43. For illustrative purpose, I would mention Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Senegal, The Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa, where the revival of civil society organizations is noticeable.

44. Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," in *Political Studies* 44, issue 5 (1996): 936–957.

45. Arnold Rivkin, *Nations by Design*, 61.

Creativity and New Technologies: Piracy, Politics and the Business of Cultural Production in Nigeria

Charles E. Nwadigwe

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian film industry, Nollywood, is contributing in shaping Nigeria's identity abroad. The success of Nollywood films overseas has shown that Nigeria has another product it can sell to the world besides crude oil. If properly harnessed, Nollywood can be a significant tool for Nigeria's productive engagement with the rest of the world. However, like other sectors of the Nigerian economy, the film industry is struggling to assert its own identity within the global film industry. Several factors continue to impede the development and growth of the industry. Weak regulation, piracy, poor government support, inadequate infrastructure and shortage of appropriate skills are some of the factors that have been identified.

Recent studies on arts and cultural production have continued to highlight the huge potentials of the creative industry across the globe. Apart

C. E. Nwadigwe (✉)
Department of Theatre and Film Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University,
Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria

from the values of cultural preservation and promotion, cultural productions are considered a significant economic resource for both the public and private sectors. For instance, David Throsby observes that "the internationalization of world economy provides the context within which much cultural production, distribution and consumption takes place."[1] Similarly, repeated human development indices released by various international agencies continue to emphasize the significant contributions of the creative industries to local economies and livelihood particularly in developing countries. In Nigeria, Nollywood alone is rated the third largest producer of films in the world, with a considerable contribution to the national gross domestic product (GDP).[2] Hence, "Nollywood, the Nigerian video film industry, has become the most visible form of cultural machine on the African continent."[3]

However, the immense potential of this creative industry pales into insignificance when compared with the actual economic status and living conditions of a majority of the practitioners in Nigeria. Owing to the high incidence of piracy, the volume and popularity of productions released into the market have not translated into commensurate economic success for producers and service providers in the industry. Indeed, piracy, "the reproduction, for the purpose of seeking a profit, of the property of a copyright owner without permission," has been a threat to creative artists since the earliest times in human civilization.[4] But the phenomenon became a complex global challenge after the Industrial Revolution marked by technological advancements, new designs and inventions. Therefore, copyright was instituted to encourage creativity by protecting intellectual property. Copyright matters are thus at the foundations of the culture and creative industry. Sola Williams argues that good copyright administration will support the creative industries and promote national culture, inventiveness and creativity.[5] Whether it is designed to protect the name or economic interest of either a creative artist or folk community, the ultimate essence of copyright is to promote culture and creativity.[6] Owing to technological developments, intellectual property has become "a vital part of modern society's infrastructure" because of "the centrality of the copyright system in the communication and dissemination of information," as evident through films and broadcast media.[7]

In view of the global recognition of the importance of copyright in the promotion of culture and creative arts, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was held in 1886 and thereafter administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

The basic principles of this Convention are hinged on the fact that creative works originating in one member state must be given commensurate protection in another state. Such copyright, as WIPO declares, should confer both economic and moral rights to the owner. The economic right enables the artist to make financial gains while the moral right helps him to control the use, adaptation, recreation or distortion of his works. Since the Berne Convention, several treaties have been signed to update global copyright and Neighboring Rights protection for artistic works in line with contemporary realities. Nigeria therefore domesticated these treaties as a base for her copyright laws, which were statutory promulgations under the Copyright Acts of 1970, 1988 and 1999 as amended. Currently, the Copyright Act, Cap 68, *Laws of the Federation of Nigeria*, 1990 as amended by Decree 98 of 1992 and Decree 42 of 1999 is the subsisting law regulating copyright matters in the Nigerian creative industries.

Essentially, artistic works which range from films to folklore are products of human intellect and creative imagination, and constitute veritable channels for propagating a nation's heritage while providing livelihood to several people. Moses Ekpo therefore argues that:

> With the hazards of filmmaking, the energy to be expended and the economic outlay which normally goes into film production, it is only imperative that the right of the owners of the works should be respected and protected through the discouragement of any nefarious or illegal acts which include unauthorized copying, dubbing and piracy.[8]

But while film producers consciously guard against the infringement of their copyrights, the rights assigned to indigenous folklore are often neglected and abused by many film producers. Yet folklore constitutes a rich cultural receptacle, the traditional wellspring of knowledge, an identity marker and a source of raw material for creative artists. Toyin Falola affirms that "great political and cultural ideas are embedded in oral poetry" and that these are frequently seen "in performance, and in Nollywood productions."[9]

Folklore belongs to the body of indigenous knowledge and creative resources, communally owned and passed orally from generation to generation. These legends are shaped by the culture and traditions of a people through which they express their identity, worldview, aspirations and knowledge systems. These oral traditions, as expressed in fables, poetry, songs, visual arts, drama, dance and rituals, are often taken out, adapted

into films, commercialized and distributed without permission or compensation to the community. In many cases, the community of its provenance is not even acknowledged by the scriptwriters and producers. Apart from infringing on the property rights of the community, the film producers sometimes distort and misrepresent the people's history, cultural values, heritage and identity, and still claim copyright on the production. This trend reflects the complexity of the copyright problems that characterize the Nollywood industry. The situation appears aggravated by the liberalization and flexibility introduced into filmmaking by technological advancement.

The Problem in Context

The effect of technological change remains a significant factor in the evolution of the Nigerian video-film industry. As a popular art of mediated storytelling, the use of simple video technology which marked its humble beginnings made this cultural product more accessible and affordable. But the industry has continued to experience technical upgrades with paradoxical outcomes. Indeed:

> Recent development in the (Nigerian) motion picture industry has been basically influenced by advancement in technology. From the reel to reel celluloid, the industry moved to the era of magnetic tapes and digital discs. Of no less impact has been the introduction of the video technology which has completely improved the dissemination of the product in the industry. Conversely, these developments have also posed serious challenges to the practitioners in the industry.[10]

Apparently, one of such "serious challenges" is the incidence of piracy. Globalization has had an extensive impact on the culture industries, especially in developing countries. As creative artists grapple with new technologies of production and communication, they also try to adapt to global demands, trends and expectations in both content and distribution systems. Responses to the impact of globalization on local culture and the creative industries have led to the emergence of a hybrid culture known as *glocalization*. From its practical perspective, glocalization reflects how globalization and localization processes are providing new platforms for cultural expression. Glocalization therefore represents the tangible and intangible consequences of globalization.

Indeed, the *glocal* platform remains a lopsided pedestal reflecting "the intersection of political, economic and socio-cultural concerns with its emphasis on the local and community impacts of global structures and processes."[11] Similarly, George Ritzer considers glocalization as "the interpretation of the global and the local resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas."[12] Hence, "although globalization has broadened knowledge through the dissemination of and exposure to a variety of hybrid cultural forms from different parts of the world, such dissemination has hardly been in equal measure for all cultures."[13] In the same vein, Nigerian filmmakers responding to global pulls in the industry produce and disseminate their local cultural products through globalized channels of which they have little control. They use imported technology to create their productions and rely on global distribution networks to market their products. Furthermore, the practitioners in the Nigerian creative industry in response to diaspora and international market and audience demands often attune and package their works to suit foreign or Westernized tastes. Yet they lack the capacity to control how the products are marketed, consumed and interpreted. For instance, the Internet, digital cable television, electronic video-sharing devices and international business mobility have made Nigerian cultural products easily available abroad, and these channels of distribution and exhibition have also become handy tools for pirates.

In fact, related studies have acknowledged the "transnational dimension of Nollywood," and this trend is attributed to "satellite television, the Internet, and piracy," which paradoxically became "Nollywood's boon and bane" and thereby "facilitate the spread of its films across linguistic, cultural, and national boundaries."[14] Similarly, Alessandro Jedlowski affirms that "the Nigerian video film industry has long had a transnational dimension" driven by piracy owing to "the informality of Nollywood's distribution networks," which allowed pirated copies of Nigerian videos to be "circulated throughout the world since the mid-1990s."[15]

The quest to move Nigerian cultural products from local to global platforms has invariably facilitated the phenomenon of copyright infringement. Creative artists are often place-bound in their local environments of operation, whereas pirates are highly mobile, connecting and moving pirated products across continental boundaries beyond the reach of the copyright owners. Hence, glocalization—the interface between the global and the local—is essentially "a restratification of society based on the free mobility of some and the place-bound existence of others."[16]

There is an interconnection between globalization, culture and technology. Owing to the effects of globalization on the culture industries, glocalization is conceptually meant to promote "respect for the autonomy and creativity of individuals and groups," hence it is conceived as "a positive interpretation of the local impacts of globalisation" thereby helping "communities represent and assert their unique cultures globally, often through new media."[17] But this is not always the case, as the Nigerian experience illustrates. The new media technologies have indeed liberalized access to local cultural products (such as video-films), and even made them popular. Nevertheless, most cultures in the Global South are mere consumers of modern technology, and these technologies of the new media are not even available to a greater section of the population. The skill or technical knowhow as well as the infrastructure (such as energy, equipment, resource and institutional frameworks) are still undeveloped or beyond their reach. Consequently, the application of new technologies in creating and protecting their intellectual property and cultural products is still limited, whereas pirate networks are already deploying the technology. Obviously, the new media are progressively configured for digital operations and this makes copyright protection a global challenge. Indeed, as Kgomotso Moahi observes, "there is an inherent contradiction that seemingly renders the concept of copyright in the digital era untenable. This is an issue that has not been resolved as some people believe that downloading is legal and others believe that it is not."[18]

Having studied the technology of production and distribution trends in the Nollywood industry, Jonathan Haynes and Onookome Okome conclude that piracy is a major setback to the development of the Nigerian video-film industry.[19] Pirates frequently flood the country with cheap, foreign-pirated works that stifle local creativity by capturing the market. In addition, piracy can give a negative image to a country as a safe haven for intellectual property thieves. This discourages investors from coming into the industry and robs creative artists and other ancillary service providers of their livelihoods.

Nevertheless, despite the huge contribution of the creative industries to every nation's GDP, copyright laws in Africa remain obsolete, weak and at variance with contemporary technological realities. Mould-Iddrisu found that many African nations are still using their colonial copyright regulations which were "designed specifically to protect the rights of the colonizing nationals and their businesses and firms."[20] In Nigeria, such weak laws engendered an ineffective copyright administration system that has

helped pirates to maintain a stranglehold on the video-film industry. In an earlier study, Charles Nwadigwe observed that:

> The Nigerian home video industry is proliferated by pirates masquerading as "marketers". The bitter experiences of genuine producers in the hands of these men have reserved video film production to a clique of shylock businessmen who now control the market, producing the films and reaping the profits alone. Film is capital intensive but its Nigerian market remains unstable. Thus, producers have shrunk capital investment into the industry and rendered many artists jobless.[21]

It is pertinent to emphasize that the conditions have not sufficiently improved after several years of copyright enforcement. Instead, what has changed is the methodology of infringement and the resolve of creative artists to enforce their rights.

One confusion about copyright regulation is that copyright infringement involves both the civil and criminal aspects of law. The award of punitive damages against offenders will bring in an element of criminal law, which is punishment. Conversely, civil law is anchored on compensation and not punishment. Yet it is quite difficult to truly ascertain how much the copyright owner has lost and how much the pirate has gained; hence the law relies on the amount of copies physically found in possession of the accused. This technical snag often results in the imposition of an insignificant fine, which cannot deter future offenders. Such legal loopholes in the Nigerian Copyright Act have become aggravated in the present digital era. There is apparent complexity and lack of clarity on copyright issues in the digital environment. Therefore, "the digitization of information and the proliferation of networks" are challenging the fundamental concept of copyright. Consequently, "the very essence of copyright (copying/downloading)" is currently "at the heart of using the technology that many people in the world now have access to."[22]

The digital platform is further making the protection of indigenous cultural heritage, such as folklore, more complex. Experience has shown that "communities have been unable to control their rights once their knowledge (or heritage) has been codified or digitized; they have been powerless to prevent their knowledge from being commercialized and used in derogatory ways."[23]

When folklore is shot into a video-film, as is common in Nigeria, the heritage becomes digitized automatically, thereby complicating copyright

assignment and protection on the work. The film producer usually claims the copyright whereas the original material may have been illegally obtained, which amounts to an infringement on other people's communal intellectual property. From all indications, the weakness in the legal provisions, the technological gaps, the relative inexperience of the police on copyright technicalities and the sheer lack of diligence in arresting and prosecuting offenders have rendered copyright enforcement ineffective in Nigeria.

Technology and Piracy in the Creative Industry

As production technologies advance in the creative industry, the mechanisms of piracy also become sophisticated. WIPO recognizes the fact that continuous technological change will have an implication on copyright infringement and protection. Therefore, WIPO regularly revises its treaties such as the Berne Convention (of 1886) "in relation to the impact that technology has on copyright laws and the protection that could be accorded to the authors and creators as a result."[24] The transformation and revolutions in the culture industries have been linked to globalization, and this trend has "arguably increased in intensity in the wake of new media, technology, communications and transport developments."[25] The advancement of various devices for copying, sharing and exhibition of data in audio and visual formats is a critical factor in the negotiation of access to content and viability of the creative industry. Consequently, the Internet has various implications for creators and users of cultural productions. For instance, "the easy distribution and availability of materials on the Internet meant that the economic returns (i.e. from sales) of the works would be severely curtailed because once the material is available digitally, distribution becomes easy."[26] Despite the laws on licensing of digital designs, programs and creative works, it is still hard to track their use and unauthorized copying across the globe.

New technologies obviously increased the volume of cultural productions and widened the distribution and exhibition of the products, "yet the musicians, artists, producers and others involved in the legitimate production in the industry as a whole—had never been poorer due to the impact of these new recording technologies and their encouragement of piracy."[27] From observable indicators, it is certain that information and communications technology companies (ICTs) are challenging and even

changing intellectual property rights in contemporary global society. These realities point to the fact that the theft of creative works is much greater and easier in the digital world. The technology facilitates the making of identical copies to the extent that it is often difficult to recognize a replica from an original version. In response to the dynamics in the industry, it is expected that as technology of piracy advances, that of detection and prosecution should also advance. But this is often not the case, especially in developing economies. Obatosin Ogunkeye, using the Nigerian experience for illustration, observes that copyright infringement is a "highly technical offence", and as a result "the police prosecutors are unable to handle prosecutions of this nature." This explains "the primary cause of lack of conviction" in most copyright cases.[28]

Piracy in the Nigerian creative industries has been heightened by the advancement of digital technology, which has made the works easier to copy and sell while making detection and enforcement more difficult, owing to "the free accessibility of this technology" to all classes of people.[29] The technology has made the copying or dubbing devices smaller and more portable and created virtual platforms for distribution. The infringing act can therefore be executed in relatively small spaces at homes, markets, offices and even when in transit. In fact, in the Nigerian video-film industry:

> The problem is compounded by the emergence of video clubs and rentals, which flagrantly abuse the warning on copyright by (copying and) letting out home video films for rental, lease, hire or loan. The overall effect on the national socio-cultural environment has become obvious over the years.[30]

Furthermore, Krings and Okome affirm that piracy has been an integral feature of Nollywood from the onset owing to its simple technology and low production infrastructure, as the films are "shot on video, edited on personal computers, and copied onto cassette and discs."[31] Similarly, Jedlowski maintains that technology and piracy were fundamental issues in "the production crisis that hit the English-Igbo section of the video industry" as the Nigerian operators tried to "switch from VHS to VCD technology" and cope with "the emergence of new distribution outlets," such as "satellite television channels and Internet platforms."[32] The unfavorable copyright situations in the industry apparently persist because Nollywood still operates largely in the informal sector of the economy.

Cultural Politics and Nollywood Business

One recurrent view expressed by many stakeholders in the Nigerian video-film industry is that government and regulatory authorities lack the political will to fight piracy and rescue the industry from continuous dwindling of investments and prevalent investor apathy. In the Nollywood industry, according to Amaka Igwe:

> The practitioner has to operate in an environment where copyright violation is tacitly overlooked, even condoned. It has come to be that making and selling video films in Nigeria presents the same difficulty as carrying water in a basket full of holes! Everyone loses.[33]

Indeed, the rampant and unresolved cases of copyright infringement in the Nollywood industry appear to confirm the position that it is "tacitly overlooked" if not "condoned." A study by Charles Nwadigwe found that "the perpetrators of this illegal act are often well-educated" and aware of the implications. Despite the existence of copyright laws, "virtually every roadside store in Nigeria is involved in dubbing and rental of films and musical recording for commercial purposes." Hence, creative artists continue to lose "substantial revenue in terms of royalties" because "even accredited marketers are involved in various sorts of sharp practices."[34]

The apparent official neglect of the industry is anchored on the fact that most politicians see video-film, indeed the cultural sector, as mere entertainment rather than an industry. They rarely invest in Nollywood or promote cultural productions, hence the lack of interest in protecting the sector through adequate legislation and diligent oversight of the relevant agencies. Consequently, the Copyright Act remains virtually obsolete and out of tune with current technological realities. Similarly, the enforcement machinery remains weak, understaffed and underfunded in the nation's annual budgets. Olusegun Ojewuyi affirms that the politicization of funding and management of the culture sector in Nigeria has become a bureaucratic routine whereby the culture sector is "the least funded" in terms of "annual capital allocation." Again, the legal instruments that set up and regulate the culture industries (Constitution, Cultural Policy, Mission Statements) "project the same short-sighted or confused thinking" and this also "shows government's analytical laziness, when confronting the complexity of culture."[35]

The *Mass Communication Policy* (1987) and the *Cultural Policy for Nigeria* (1988) respectively emphasize the establishment of a functional and viable film industry as one of their key objectives.[36] But, as Olalere Oladitan stressed, there is a world of difference "between policy and legislation" because "a policy is a statement of intention, it is a statement of objectives which may or may not be carried out," whereas law is concerned primarily with "the issue of justiceability."[37] Over the years, the experience in Nigeria reveals that the policies are rarely implemented and the laws regulating the culture and creative industries are often bogged down by legal technicalities, contradictory clauses and unrealistic penalties that cannot deter violators in the present age of globalization, urbanization and technological advancement.

A common maxim in law holds that "equity protects the vigilant." Therefore, copyright owners are expected to monitor their works and enforce their rights whenever the need arises. The stakeholders are also required to identify weaknesses, inconsistencies and contradictions between policy and law regulating the creative industries and diligently pursue their amendments. However, from the Nigerian legal perspective, it has been observed that:

> Making a case for an amendment of law is one thing, actually working for the amendment is another. It is the duty of the party interested to ensure that appropriate research is carried out, that the proper bill is drafted and processed to the final stages, up to becoming a law.[38]

In reality, sponsoring bills in Nigeria is an expensive business fraught with frustration. Huge amounts of money are needed for legal research, drafting of the bills, processing and production of adequate copies, sponsoring the bill, lobby of the lawmakers to support the bill and sometimes "settlement" of the legislative committee members who will actually do the groundwork and recommend positively to the general house. The process has become over politicized and monetized to the extent that creative artists cannot cope. This reality is a major snag militating against the quest for review and update of the Nigerian copyright law and its administration.

Therefore, operators in the culture and creative industries continue to suffer financial losses owing to rampant piracy. The governments and the political class do not seem interested in the problems facing the culture industries. Hence, the banks and corporate investors shun the culture

industry because it is not regulated and any investment in the sector is considered risky. The business of cultural production has become even more risky as the industry embraces digital technology. This is because "digitized data can be easily manipulated and modified," and this facilitates piracy. Indeed, it is "extremely difficult in the digitized, electronic media" to actually "determine what was fair use of materials."[39]

Nevertheless, the Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC) as well as producers and creative artists in the culture industries have made several independent and joint efforts over the years to combat piracy and safeguard the business of cultural productions. Some of these anti-piracy initiatives include:

1. Hologram (Bandrole) system: The hologram regulation requires producers and marketers to affix the hologram device sticker on all audio and video tapes offered for sale. Any copy without the device was deemed to be fake and consequently seized and destroyed.

2. Cinematographic survey: The NCC also embarked on a national survey to document and register all credible cinematographic productions in Nigeria. This was meant to regulate indiscriminate exhibition of Nigerian films and videos abroad and check piracy.

3. STRAP: The Strategic Action Against Piracy was an anti-piracy initiative promoted in the industry by the NCC. It was designed to create a conducive environment for copyright protection through mass enlightenment, enforcement and administration of rights

4. Optical Disc Regulation. This regulation was targeted at replicating plants at the production level to ensure that the business of dubbing and replication of creative works is done within the law and not used by pirates to violate copyrights.

5. Filmmakers Multipurpose Cooperative (FMC): The FMC was formed by concerned producers to create a common market for direct distribution of films and musical videos. The FMC was meant to cut off the independent marketers and middlemen who were frequently accused of engaging in illicit deals, producing and marketing pirated copies of original works entrusted in their care.

6. Tamper-proof packaging: This was a device that uses a security seal to protect original works. The producers usually advertise the tamper-proof seal, warning retailers and buyers that any copy with-

out the seal is pirated. They also introduced rewards and bonuses for consumers who purchase the original copies with the tamper-proof seal.

7. Pre-release screening: Under this initiative, producers chose to screen their productions for paying audiences using halls and the few cinema houses around the country. This was meant to promote the film before it gets to the open market. The strategy was also meant to promote a film-going culture among Nigerians and generate reasonable revenue before the film was officially released into the market, where it will likely be grabbed by pirates.

8. Bidding and outright sale: Having lost the battle against pirates and dubious marketers, film producers decided to engage in bidding and outright sale of distribution rights to interested marketers. The film, prior to release, is screened for invited marketers as a kind of preview. At the end, the marketers are requested to either openly or secretly bid to buy off the master tape and marketing rights. Contract papers are thereafter drawn and signed with the highest bidder who then pays off the producer.

9. Off-shore release: To get away from the piracy-ridden Nigerian market, many producers devised a method whereby the films are first released and sold abroad mainly in African countries and thereafter to other continents, targeting Nigerians and Africans in the diaspora. The idea was aimed at generating valuable income in foreign exchange before films are released in the Nigerian market.

10. Special rental copies: In a tacit admission of its inability to stop the illegal rental or lease of Nigeria video-films, the NCC advised producers to package special rental copies of their works. These are distributed to video rental clubs that then pay token amounts per production every year in the form of royalties to the copyright owners.

11. Hunger strikes and protests: Nigerian artists have embarked on hunger strikes and public demonstrations to raise awareness and protest against the rampant piracy in the country as well as the government's inaction to check the menace. They also periodically protest against the debts owed to artists by broadcast stations as unpaid royalties.

12. Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON): Some artists even formed a trade union, and sought to take over the administration of copyright matters. Their main objective was to register creative works

and productions, collect royalties on behalf of artists and press for the prosecution of copyright violators.

13. New Film Distribution Framework (NDF): The Nigerian Film and Video Censors Board also introduced the NDF to regulate the activities of marketers by registering them. This was aimed at creating a database of marketers, their business outlets and productions in their stables to check piracy and monitor the payment of entitlements to copyright owners.

It is pertinent to note that all these initiatives failed to yield the desired results. Some of them have since been abandoned while others merely exist on paper. The pirates are still in business and are progressively moving into new frontiers, especially the digital cinema technology format.

DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Despite the availability of relevant technologies, Nigerian regulatory bodies have been unable to deploy them in the fight against piracy. With the advent of digital cinema, copyright protection and enforcement has become a tougher challenge. The Copyright Commission could not actually combat piracy during the analogue era of video-film production. It is therefore difficult to foresee how it can cope in this era of digital cinema, smart technologies and virtual online platforms of distribution and marketing.

The initiatives created to curb piracy in Nigeria failed because the fundamental structure, the institutional framework to support the anti-piracy programs, is weak. The Copyright Act is virtually obsolete; the Nigerian Copyright Commission is understaffed and underfunded; the Nigerian Police Force has been ineffective in copyright matters because of corruption, inadequate manpower and a lack of specialized training to understand the nature and dynamics of copyright infringement; and finally, the Police are even incapacitated by some clauses in the Copyright Act, which prevent them from handling copyright issues like any other crime.

The peculiar copyright situation in Nigeria persists because of the political, economic and social problems that undermine most laudable programs in the country. The Hologram or Bandrole initiative was quite effective in Portugal and it also worked well in Ghana, but collapsed in Nigeria after a few months owing to internal problems. The cinematographic survey, Strategic Action Against Piracy, special rental

copies and tamper-proof packaging initiatives all failed because Nigeria is a vast and complex country and the video-film producers and distributors operate largely in the informal sector. They are not registered and do not need any license to operate. They shun every program aimed at documenting and controlling their business in order to avoid paying taxes and fees to the government. The majority of their audiences and consumers are people in the lower classes of society who are either not enlightened or are simply uninterested in government matters. They often prefer the cheapest means of access to films—renting instead of buying, or even watching on satellite television.

Indeed, a popular view among some video-film operators is that the industry was established and nurtured by individual efforts and private capital. They argue that since the government has not provided any input in terms of capital investment, infrastructure and human resources, it should not interfere in their business. This sentiment fuels the sabotage of various regulatory programs in the industry. The hunger strikes, public demonstrations, media campaigns and the NDF were all sabotaged. The marketers quickly rented their own crowds, holding counter-rallies and addressing press conferences that castigate the protesting creative artists. The marketers have formed a powerful cartel and even went on strike to scuttle the NDF plan.

Having discouraged other investors from entering the industry through piracy, the dubious marketers have now metamorphosed into producers. They buy or steal scripts, producing and marketing films themselves. To protect their monopoly, they have set up exclusive trade unions and use various techniques of undercutting, arm-twisting and unfair competition to ward off new entrants. The marketers even attempt to cut and regulate artiste fees and ban top actors and actresses who refuse to do their bidding. They currently sponsor renegade artistes so that they can join the executive committees of creative artists' guilds, to keep them divided and ineffective. Internal wrangling and leadership factions are two of the reasons why COSON, FMC, Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria (PMAN), Actors Guild of Nigeria (AGN) and Performing Musicians Employers Association of Nigeria (PMEAN) cannot collect royalties or enforce their copyrights.[40] The marketers have become so powerful in the industry that they often mobilize and resist any raid from government agencies, or go behind closed doors to "settle" problems with them.

Although some marketers in the video-film industry claim to be genuine and free from copyright infringement, many independent producers

are not convinced. They link the failure of the bidding and outright sale and pre-release screening approaches to the fact that the same marketers are connected to the piracy network. The selected bidders watch the new films and offer ridiculous amounts to purchase the marketing rights. If rejected, they hurriedly reproduce the same storyline in another film, changing the title and names of characters, then flood the market with the copies before the original version begins to circulate in various parts of the country and abroad. The same scenario obtained in the pre-release screening, thereby forcing producers to abandon the idea.

Pirates have spread their network to the diaspora, using modern technology to monitor, copy and distribute video-films abroad without permission. The off-shore release of films has therefore become a risky venture. In this era of digital cinema, pirates engage in the streaming of entire films or audiovisual clips of films and comic shows, as well as online posting of clips of dramatic scenes from stage productions. These are circulated to subscribers on the Internet through websites, blogs, YouTube, WhatsApp and other social media. The appropriation of Nigerian films in foreign countries by Nigerians and their diaspora associates has become a recognized genre and a "transnational dimension" of Nollywood, but "the mushrooming growth of Internet sites offering free streaming of Nigerian videos eroded the economic potential of the diasporic market."[41] The complex situation presented by diaspora piracy in this era of digital cinema indicates that "Nigerian producers and distributors rarely controlled the economy generated by this huge interest from the diasporic bloc." Whether distributed through satellite television, online platforms or transnational trade networks, Nollywood films "traveled largely under the regime of piracy."[42] Studies conducted by Matthias Krings reveal the same trend, and he submits that early distribution of Nollywood videos abroad "relied solely on pirated material, and this has not changed much."[43]

As a developing country, Nigeria will continue to suffer economic losses, retardation of creativity and the deprivation of livelihoods of creative artists in the culture industries unless the problem of piracy is effectively addressed. Adequate copyright protection will contribute to development through "stimulation of creativity and inventiveness," providing the "infrastructure necessary for the growth of production" as well as the "creation of an environment" that will be conducive for "domestic and foreign private sector investment." It will also protect, "in view of emerging technologies—the expressions of folklore and live

performances."[44] An effective copyright enforcement machinery is supposed to turn the emerging technologies into an advantage by deploying them to track, detect and deter violators. In the early years of video-film production, pirates used replicating plants in Asia to copy and distribute other people's works. In the current dispensation, portable replicating machines have been imported into the country and installed in private homes and unmarked warehouses across the country. The pirates appear more dynamic than the regulatory authorities.

Conclusion

The Nollywood industry is contributing in shaping Nigeria's identity abroad. But the industry itself is struggling to assert its own identity within the global film industry. In his discourse on the identity question within the humanities and culture sector, Falola has argued for a conscious return to "pluriversalism" whereby African cultural practices, humanities and academic orientation will "create their own distinctive methodologies and epistemologies," so that "even when they combine localism with globalism" it will still produce "a distinguishable autonomous hybrid that is African in its imprimatur."[45] When the "pluriversalist model" is applied to the Nollywood industry, Falola opines that it will give birth to a "Nollywood epistemology" whose identity label will be autonomous and globally recognizable, rather than being "Otherized" and consistently "anchored in a relational frame" of Hollywood or Bollywood.[46]

However, with the incidence of piracy, the identity challenge of Nollywood becomes more complex particularly in this era of digital film technology. Digital cinema is considered a boost to the creative industry because it facilitates production and reduces the risks, delays and other bottlenecks in the distribution chain. This is quite apparent in countries with well-developed film industries, cinema houses and a theater-going culture: the digital technology format can reduce the problem of moving films directly to theaters across the country and cut out the middlemen, thereby putting a check on pirates within the film distribution process. With the use of satellite or cable technology, films can be sent to several theaters at the same time and at no extra cost. In fact, as

against traditional cinema delivery, digital cinema offers the most effective ability to curb piracy, a menace that has afflicted the industry for years. This is because digital cinema takes away any physical handling of the film or

print … in this case, using Digital Cinema, celluloid prints are first trans-
ferred to a digital medium, which is then beamed via satellite or cable to all
the theatres at once. Furthermore, the movie transmitted is encrypted data,
and decryption occurs at the projection system itself and is therefore
protected.[47]

However, the Nigerian case is different because the industry still oper-
ates at an informal level. Again, cinema houses are few and most of the
audiences gain access to video-films from local video shops and satellite
television broadcast. Most of the films are not shot on celluloid formats
but on digital video. Physical distribution of films is still common, hence
the high incidence of piracy which threatens the business of cultural
production.

Indeed, copyright infringement is still a challenge to global society, but
each country makes an effort to combat the menace and protect the viabil-
ity of the creative industry. However, piracy appears to thrive in Africa and
other less developed economies because the social and technical infra-
structure for instituting and sustaining a functional copyright administra-
tion system are either undeveloped or so far unavailable. To develop a
strong and effective copyright system in Nigeria and Africa, governments
must pass strong and updated copyright laws, adhere to international con-
ventions on piracy, create effective monitoring and enforcement machin-
ery, establish functional administrative mechanisms to collect royalties and
remit the same regularly to copyright owners and finally enter into a net-
work of societies with reciprocal protection agreements. To do these effec-
tively, there is a need to deploy new technologies for production,
distribution, marketing, copyright administration and enforcement.

Because of the peculiar nature of the Nigerian video-film industry, it
will be difficult to release the stranglehold of pirates on the industry. This
is because some of them have been integrated into the system as accredited
marketers, producers and "stakeholders." A specialized body is therefore
required to fight piracy in the culture and creative industry. This body
should be properly funded, staffed and given adequate powers under the
law to investigate, detect, arrest and prosecute copyright violators similar
to such agencies as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) or the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).[48]
Indeed, until the theft of intellectual property is treated in Nigeria as a
financial crime and copyright infringement treated as a human rights viola-
tion, the menace of piracy will continue to pillage the industry. The big

question is whether the authorities, with their penchant for the neglect of the culture sector, will have the political will to make this happen. To facilitate this ideal, practitioners in the creative industry should unite, avoid bickering and continue advocacy and pressure on governments and civil society to enforce their rights and salvage the industry.

NOTES

1. David Throsby, *The Economics of Cultural Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Publishers, 2010), 157.
2. Jyoti Mistry and Jordache Ellapen, "Nollywood's Transportability: The Politics and Economics of Video Films as Cultural Products," in *Global Nollywood: The Transnational Dimensions of an African Video Film Industry*, eds. Matthias Krings and Onookome Okome (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 46–69.
3. Matthias Krings and Onookome Okome, "Nollywood and its Diaspora: An Introduction," in *Global Nollywood: The Transnational Dimensions of an African Video Film Industry*, eds. Matthias Krings and Onookome Okome (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 1–22.
4. Denis Freitas, "Piracy of Intellectual Property and the Measures Needed to Counter it," in *Copyright Bulletin*, eds. E. Guerassimov and N. Paudras (Paris: UNESCO, 1992), 7–18
5. Sola Williams, "Copywrighting the Cine Film," in *Making the Transition from Video to Celluloid*, eds. Hyginus Ekwuazi, Mercy Sokomba and Onyero Mgbejume (Jos: Nigerian Film Institute, 2001), 285–293.
6. C. O. Ojiji, "The Development of Intellectual Property and Book Piracy," in *Essays on Copyright Law and Administration in Nigeria*, ed. E. Uvieghara (Ibadan: Y-Books, 1992), 179–195.
7. Betty Mould-Iddrisu, "A Developing Country's Perspective," in *Introduction to Intellectual Property Rights*, ed. Kathleen Hug (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1999), 15–19.
8. Moses Ekpo, "The Implications of the Nigerian Copyright Law for a Virile Film Policy in Nigeria," in *Operative Principles of the Film Industry: Towards a Film Policy for Nigeria,* eds. Hyginus Ekwuazi and Yakubu Nasidi (Jos: Nigerian Film Corporation, 1992), 37–45.
9. Toyin Falola, *The Humanities in Africa: Knowledge Production, Universities, and the Transformation of Society* (Austin, TX: Pan-African Universities Press, 2016), 230.
10. Williams, "Copywrighting," 285.
11. Melanie Smith, *Issues in Cultural Tourism Studies* (London: Routledge, 2009), 63.
12. George Ritzer, *The Globalization of Nothing* (London: Sage, 2004), 73.

13. Femi Osofisan, *The Muse of Anomy: Essays on Literature and the Humanities in Nigeria* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2016), 232.
14. Krings and Okome, "Nollywood," 1.
15. Alessandro Jedlowski, "From Nollywood to Nollyworld: Processes of Transnationalization in the Nigerian Video Film Industry," in *Global Nollywood: The Transnational Dimensions of an African Video Film Industry*, eds. Matthias Krings and Onookome Okome (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 25–45.
16. Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 16.
17. Smith, *Issues*, 64.
18. Kgomotso Moahi, "Copyright in the Digital Era and Some Implications for Indigenous Knowledge," in *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Perspectives from Southern Africa*, eds. Isaac Mazonde and Pradip Thomas (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa, 2007), 66–77.
19. Jonathan Haynes and Onookome Okome, "Evolving Popular Media: Nigerian Video Films", in *Nigerian Video Films*, ed. Jonathan Haynes (Jos: Nigerian Film Corporation, 1997), 21–44.
20. Mould-Iddrisu, "A Developing," 15.
21. Charles Nwadigwe, "The Nigerian Copyright Law," *Nigeria Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies.* 15, (2005): 5.
22. Moahi, "Copyright," 76.
23. Ibid., 75.
24. Ibid., 67.
25. Smith, *Issues*, 57.
26. Moahi, "Copyright," 70.
27. Mould-Iddrisu, "A Developing," 17.
28. Obatosin Ogunkeye, "Legal Remedies for Infringement of Copyright", in *Essays on Copyright Law and Administration in Nigeria*, ed. E. Uvieghara (Ibadan: Y-Books, 1992), 101–119.
29. Ekpo, "The Implications," 42.
30. Ibid.
31. Krings and Okome, "Nollywood," 1.
32. Jedlowski, "From Nollywood," 26.
33. Amaka Igwe, "Copyright and the Movie Industry", in *A Decade of Copyright Law in Nigeria*, eds. J. Asien and E, Nwauche (Abuja: Nigerian Copyright Commission, 2002), 36–39.
34. Charles Nwadigwe, "Theatre Practice and the Nigerian Copyright Law: A Critical Discourse," *Current Jos Law Journal* 6, no. 6 (2003): 220.
35. Olusegun Ojewuyi, *Katanfuru: The Illogic of Culture-Nomics in Nigerian Cultural Administration*, (Abuja: National Institute for Cultural Orientation, 2011), 9.

36. For instance, Article 8.5 of the *Cultural Policy for Nigeria* (1988) provides among other things as follows:

    8.5.1. The State shall recognise cinema as an important means of entertainment and a vehicle for promoting the social, political, economic and cultural objectives of the nation.

    8.5.2. The State shall promote a virile film industry in Nigeria by:
    - *(a)* establishing institutions and agencies for film development;
    - *(b)* promoting the indigenisation of film distribution and exhibition, and establishing standards in exhibition facilities compatible with accepted theatre usage,
    - *(c)* promoting an effective film censorship policy that reflects Nigerian values and national interest, and
    - *(d)* providing incentive to productivity by funding and financing of private sector film production.

37. Olalere Oladitan, "Beyond Policy Perfectioningv: Towards a Dynamic Legal Environment for the Film in Nigeria," in *Operative Principles of the Film Industry: Towards a Film Policy for* Nigeria, eds. Hyginus Ekwuazi and Yakubu Nasidi (Jos: Nigerian Film Corporation, 1992), 12–36.

38. Ibid. 34.

39. Moahi, "Copyright," 71.

40. A multiplicity of trade guilds currently operates in the Nigerian culture and creative industry. Some of these include:

    a. Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON), which seeks to protect the works of creative artists and collect royalties on their behalf.

    b. Filmmakers' Multipurpose Cooperative (FMC) was formed to enable artists to market their works instead of relying on independent marketers who are constantly accused of engaging in piracy. The FMC proposed to create a reliable market for producers of creative works and cut off the pirate marketers.

    c. Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria (PMAN) is a pioneer body set up by musicians to promote their professional interests and the welfare of members, and to protect the works of registered musicians.

    d. When leadership crises began to tear PMAN apart, a faction broke away from the association and formed the Performing Musicians Employers Association of Nigeria (PMEAN). This was mainly made up of band owners, producers and owners of recording labels, who claim to be the "real" employers of performing musicians.

    e. Actors Guild of Nigeria (AGN) was formed in the wake of the video-film industry's meteoric rise in Nigeria. It is an association of actors that claims to operate exclusively in the movie industry. Although many of their leaders and members do not have the professional training or

academic qualification to operate in the industry, they often discriminate against trained and qualified actors who work on the live stage (theater) and who are mainly members of the National Association of Nigerian Theatre Arts Practitioners (NANTAP), the country's pioneer body for all artists in the performing arts.

There are many other guilds that cater for the specific interests of dancers, directors, scriptwriters, producers, marketers and designers, but some of these are not even officially registered with the regulatory agencies in Nigeria. The guilds are also riddled with leadership crises, personality clashes and persistent internal squabbling. Some of them appear to be working at cross purposes, duplicating functions, and enacting exclusive and discriminatory regulations to give them monopolistic control of certain aspects of the industry. Currently, there is no law or recognized umbrella professional body in Nigeria to regulate the registration, membership and professional practice of creative artists. Different groups spring up from time to time and claim legitimacy. This is a reflection of the disorder that currently subsists in the industry, as operators come from various backgrounds often without formal training or professional qualification. Consequently, the industry remains weakened as creative artists are largely divided and unable to speak with one voice or fight for their collective interests.

41. Jedlowski, "From Nollywood," 29.
42. Ibid., 31.
43. Matthias Krings, *African Appropriations: Cultural Difference, Mimesis, and Media*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 151.
44. Mould-Iddrisu, "A Developing," 16.
45. Falola, *The Humanities*, 365.
46. Ibid., 268.
47. Aleogho Dokpesi, "Digital Cinema and Intellectual Property Issues" (lecture: 4th Zuma Film Festival, Abuja, Nigeria, May 8, 2008).
48. The EFCC was set up by the Nigerian Federal Government to tackle financial crimes, such as the Advance Fee Fraud (popularly known as 419), embezzlement and other corrupt practices. Similarly, the NDLEA was established to check the production, distribution and consumption of narcotics and other illicit drugs. These agencies were set up when the criminal activities they were meant to check were becoming rampant, with both domestic and international connections. The agencies were given extensive powers to investigate, arrest, detain and prosecute offenders. This has helped to make the agencies relatively effective. Such powers have been canvassed for the NCC to check piracy, but the government is yet to be convinced that this is a necessity.

Igbo Community Policing and Its Relevance for Contemporary Nigeria

Ernest Toochi Aniche

Introduction

One of the defining characteristics of colonialism was the abandonment of several indigenous governance systems and institutions, and the imposition of alien systems. Because the colonial exploiters considered the new systems as "modern" and capable of helping the so-called "dark continent" to embrace civilization and converge with global norms, many indigenous systems, including those that had effectively served communities for centuries, were given uncomplimentary labels and eventually discarded. One of the areas in which this abandonment and imposition took place was community policing—a system that had effectively served the traditional Igbo communities in the southeast of Nigeria before colonial incursion.

The core elements of community policing were integrated into traditional African societies before the arrival of European colonists. The precolonial Igbo society, for example, did not distinguish between policing

E. T. Aniche (✉)
Department of Political Science, Federal University Otuoke,
Otuoke, Bayelsa State, Nigeria

205

and the role of every member of the society to ensure the safety and orderliness of the community. Consequently, policing was diffused, in that there were no specialized institutions with the specific role of fighting crime. It was the role of the entire society, which explains the saying that "elders do not allow a goat to be strangulated by the forest."[1] The age grade and masquerade societies were prominent in the role of policing and fighting crime amongst other roles or functions. In the traditional Igbo society, all adult male citizens belonged to both of these societies.

Before the coming of European colonialists to Africa, the traditional Igbo society of what is now Southeastern Nigeria had devised means for policing its communities and curbing crime, using primarily the age grade system and the masquerade secret society. This approach was very effective in pre-colonial society, not just for fighting crime, but also for preventing it. Given the current enormous security challenges in contemporary Nigeria, there is a need to revisit this model of community policing for the purpose of preventing and curbing such crimes as terrorism, insurgency, armed robbery, commercial hostage-taking (kidnapping), militancy, crude oil pipeline vandalization and oil theft.

This chapter notes that recognizing the "acephalous," decentralized, egalitarian, communalistic, "gerontocratic," villagized, largely republican and directly democratic character of traditional Igbo society is necessary for adapting its mechanism of community policing into the more complex, less decentralized, republican, federal, capitalist and indirect democracy of modern Nigeria. To do this, the chapter is divided into five main sections: introduction, conceptualizing community policing, community policing in traditional Igbo society, application of traditional Igbo society's model of community policing in contemporary Nigeria, and conclusion.

Conceptualizing Community Policing

Community policing or neighborhood policing or proximity policing has been variously defined, but all the definitions are basically different ways of saying the same thing. For example, Ikuteyijo and Rotimi note that community policing entails community partnership in creating a safe and secure environment for all, in which people take active part in their own affairs.[2] In the same vein, Stipak avers that community policing is a management strategy that promotes the joint responsibility of citizens and the police for community safety, through working partnerships and interpersonal contacts.[3] Similarly, van Rooyen conceives community policing as

a philosophy and strategy which is based on a partnership between the community and the police that aims to find creative solutions for contemporary community problems, crime and other related matters.[4]

Community policing is a philosophy that guides police community partnerships and a problem-solving approach that is responsive to the needs of the community.[5] Community policing means making the police more cooperative with those who are not police.[6] Adams opines that community policing refers to a shift from a military-inspired approach to fighting crime to one that relies on forming a partnership with constituents.[7] Consequently, community policing has become a term used by both professionals and scholars alike to replace other terms such as foot patrol, crime prevention, problem-oriented policing, community-oriented policing and police–community relations. Therefore, it is a policing strategy or philosophy based on the notion that community interactions and support can help control crime and reduce fear, with community members helping to identify suspects, detain vandals and bring problems to the attention of the formal police.[8]

In other words, community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques. These proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime. Perhaps the inference that can be distilled from these definitions is that community policing, unlike the authoritarian, autocratic and top-down traditional policing, is democratic, participatory and consultative, and bottom-top in approach; this is why it is referred to as democracy in action.[9] It represents a paradigm shift away from traditional policing. The central theme here is collaboration between the police and residents in combating crime and the fear of crime. Community policing does not imply that the formal police are no longer in authority or that the primary duty of preserving law and order is subordinated, rather that there is a community partnership aimed at creating a safe and secure environment for all.[10]

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the basic elements of community policing include community partnerships, organizational transformation and problem-solving. Community partnerships are collaborative if there are mutually beneficial links between the law enforcement agencies and the individuals and communities that the agencies serve. They involve confidence-building measures and capacity-building, in which partnerships are forged in conjunction with all relevant stakeholders, these including community members and groups, human and social service providers,

private businesses and the media. They may involve the establishment of ad hoc community liaison, where community police officers go into the community and try to find responsive people who are on the side of the police to serve as their informants.[11]

Through community partnerships, community policing seeks to reconceptualize policing; that is to say, community policing involves efforts to enhance the relationship between the police and the community.[12] In this regard, Bayley notes that some forces require community police officers to handle calls for the police.[13] Almost all community police officers are responsible for community crime prevention one way or another. Some patrol on foot, while others do not. Some are given responsibility for diagnosing the needs of communities and coming up with solutions, utilizing police and non-police resources, while others are simply responsible for delivering traditional police services, but are enjoined to do so in a more responsive and community-oriented way.

Greene states that community policing has increased police responsibilities to include issues such as public safety, crime prevention, fear of crime and community quality of life.[14] Communities are thus seen as participants in shaping police objectives and interventions as well as evaluating them. Capacity-building in community policing or community–police partnerships is focused on crime prevention and victim assistance. The police strengthen citizens' capacity and resolve to resist crime and recover from it. Therefore, effective community policing depends on optimizing positive contacts between patrol officers and community members. Police departments may supplement automobile patrols with foot, bicycle, scooter and horseback patrols, as well as adding "mini-stations" to bring the police closer to the community. Regular community meetings give the police and community members opportunities to express concerns or views and to find ways to address such issues. Officers working long-term assignments on the same shift and beat will become aware of the day-to-day workings of the community. There is a need to increase police presence in the community in order to reduce the fear of crime, and thereby creating a sense of neighborhood security. Fear must be reduced if community members are to participate actively in policing, because people will not help if they feel that their actions will jeopardize their safety.[15]

More importantly, citizens will not partner with the police if they suspect that the police will reveal their identity to criminal gangs. The police should recognize the need for cooperation with the community in order to earn support when encouraging community members to come forth

with relevant information; trust enables them to gain greater access to valuable information, and this could lead to the solution and prevention of crime, engender support for needed crime-control measures and provide opportunities for police officers to establish a cordial working relationship with the community.

Another key element of community policing is organizational transformation, which involves fundamentally changing the culture, leadership and management structure, labor relations, strategic planning processes, performance evaluation techniques, operational transparency or modus operandi, the geographic assignment of officers, the allotment of fiscal resources, recruitment and hiring practices, training, and information-gathering systems. Such a transformation should create an organization infrastructure that can best support pro-active operations intended to prevent crime. In line with this, Bayley posits that in some forces community policing is a new command often based at the headquarters or a new unit of specialization, or in other cases a function that is integrated into the existing command structure, though this is rarer than the former.[16] Therefore, in terms of personnel, that is recruitment and training, the major choice is whether community policing is carried out by new specialists or by the traditional police force. Community policing personnel may be located at headquarters, in police stations or in disbursed offices often created with material or financial contributions from communities. In the case of volunteers, the question is whether community policing is strictly performed by the police themselves, or whether the community is to be enlisted, especially in the form of volunteers, to work with the police.

Another core component of community policing is engaging in the pro-active and systematic examination of identified problems to develop and rigorously evaluate effective responses. This requires police to become proficient in what is known as the SARA model of problem-solving: scanning, analysis, response and assessment. Scanning involves identifying and prioritizing problems. Analysis involves researching what is known about the problem or subjecting the identified problem to a thorough investigation. Response entails developing solutions to bring about a lasting reduction in the number and extent of problems. Assessment, lastly, involves evaluating or appraising the success of the responses. Whilst traditional law enforcement is reactive and emphasizes measures such as response times and arrest rates, community policing encourages the police to pro-actively solve community problems and address the factors that contribute to crime rather than focus on how they respond to crime.[17]

Problem-solving in community policing is problem-specific and focused. The main thrust is to make the police more thoughtful about the problems they address and their methods of intervention, and to make them more analytic. Problem-solving is based on the assumption that crime and disorder can be reduced by carefully studying the characteristics of the problems in a given area, and then applying appropriate resources to solve them. Community participation in identifying and setting priorities contributes to effective problem-solving efforts by the community and the police. Cooperative problem-solving also reinforces trust, facilitates the exchange of information and leads to the identification of other areas that could benefit from the mutual attention of the police and the community.[18] Ferreira identifies three major models of community policing: crime prevention and peace preservation policing, communications policing and community-building policing. The crime prevention and peace preservation model entails securing the active cooperation and participation of the community in order to prevent crime and preserve peace. In other words, it secures the active cooperation, support and participation of the community. This model also includes the involvement of the community in monitoring and controlling police activities. Communications policing sees the police as agents of consensus; communities are cooperative and bear a sense of tradition. A vertical or two-way flow of information allows community members to provide for their own security and take necessary precautions. This model is best described as ensuring information flow that relates to risk, safety and security. It is all about establishing channels of communication between the police and the community.[19]

Community-building policing emphasizes capacity-building initiatives, in which the police help to build communities and take more of a social role, as opposed to legal actions. To do this, the police need to penetrate all spheres of the community and develop personal relationships in order to engender trust and solidarity. They must view their role in neighborhoods as a means of reestablishing the neighborhood relationships and strengthening the institutions that make a community competent to deal with its own problems.[20] It is in this regard that we distinguish between community policing and policing the community. Community policing is a bottom-up approach to crime prevention, detection and fighting. The police force involves the community in curbing crime, and encourages community participation in securing neighborhoods. The police cooperate with the community in law enforcement and in maintaining law and order. This is a form of police–community partnership, in which the police

partner with the community to prevent, detect and fight crime. The overall goal is not just to fight crime but to prevent it through confidence-building, capacity-building and mutual trust between the police and the community. In this approach, the community is willing to collaborate with the police to combat crime. On the other hand, policing the community is a top-down or top-bottom approach to crime fighting. It is traditional policing where the police see the community as made up of criminals who must be crushed, while the community views the police as corrupt officials who abet rather than curb crime: there is mutual distrust. The police become alienated or distanced from the people, and thereby disconnect themselves from the community. Where there is this form of disconnect, criminals become the sole beneficiaries and society is the worse for it.

COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE TRADITIONAL IGBO SOCIETY

Before embarking upon a description of community policing in the pre-colonial Igbo society, it is necessary to briefly trace the historical origin of the Igbos, as well as discuss the traditional Igbo political system and institutions. The Igbo age grade system and masquerade secret societies sufficiently capture the workings of community policing in the traditional Igbo society, and the roles of these institutions in community policing will be discussed here. Therefore, this section is subdivided into four parts: a pre-colonial history of the Igbos; the traditional Igbo political systems and institutions; the role of age grade in community policing in the traditional societies; and the role of masquerade secret societies.

PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE IGBOS

The historical origin of the Igbos is a subject of controversy, and has been an issue of serious scholarly debate. There are numerous suggestions about the origin of Igbo people, including the Middle East, the Nri, the Awka, the Orlu, the Idah, the Benin, the Jewish and the Aro versions.[21] Perhaps it is safe to say that the Igbo people migrated from different places depending on their geographical zones, sub-cultures and sub-groups. However, the Nri, Aro, Benin and Jewish versions remain dominant in the literature.[22] For example, the western banks of the River Niger, including Onitsha and Ogbalu (on the eastern banks), trace their origin to Benin because they share a similar religion, cultural and political systems.[23] This is the reason why Onitsha and Ogbalu, unlike most Eastern Igbo

communities, were non-republican. In fact, these societies were monarchical and were referred to as kingdoms because they had powerful kings long before the coming of Europeans.[24]

The Northern Igbo identify with the mythical Nri version, in which the ancestor of the Nri people, the patriarchal king figure Eri, is believed to have descended from the sky and settled at the northwest region between the banks of the River Niger and the Anambra River, from where his descendants spread to other parts.[25] Eri's origin is unclear, but he is believed to have descended from the sky.[26] The southeastern Igbo people, constituted by the Arochukwu, Bende, Ohafia, Abam, Ngwa, Okigwe, Afikpo and the Umuahia axis, who share a similar dialect and culture, also associate themselves with the Aro version.[27] Beyond this region, other mainland Igbo people from the central, northwestern and northeastern regions trace their origin to Arochukwu.[28] Generally, many Igbo people link their origin to the Jews, believing the Igbos came from Israel.[29] This version is based on cultural similarities between the Igbo and the ancient Hebrews. Even some Igbo scholars consider themselves as offshoots of the lost tribes of the Hebrews who migrated southwards.[30]

The Igbo Traditional Political Systems and Institutions

The Igbo traditional political system has been described as acephalous, stateless, segmentary, fragmented, decentralized, villagized, egalitarian, communalistic, gerontocratic, predominantly republican and directly democratic.[31] The Igbo have no centralized political system. However, Onuoha and Omenma identify four basic levels of Igbo pre-colonial political systems: the family, the kindred, the village and the town.[32] For them, the town was the highest political unit, being made up of villages which were collections of kindred. The basic political unit in traditional Igbo society was therefore the kindred or extended family, based on the kinship relationship known as "Umunna" and headed by the oldest man, who was known as "Okpara." The kindred or the compound ("ezi") comprised a group of nuclear families with common ancestry.[33] The functions of government were carried out by a Council of Elders, which shared powers with other groups such as age grades, titled men ("ozo"), secret societies, oracular/ritual priests and women's organizations.[34]

Prior to the British colonial rule, therefore, there was no centralized system of government.[35] The Igbo people had fragmented and politically autonomous or independent communities, with no strong identity as a single people.[36] The village was regarded as the centre of political, economic and social life,[37] and village government consisted of the oldest male members of each family.[38] This is the reason why the Igbo traditional political system is sometimes described as a gerontocracy ("Okpara," "Ndi Ichie," "Ndi Okenye" or "Ndi Ikenye").[39]

The Igbo pre-colonial political system is also characterized as egalitarian, relatively classless and communalistic, in that people were equal when it came to apportioning the land and sharing its proceeds. The land, which was the major means of production, was communally and collectively owned, being referred to as communal land or ancestral land.[40] However, the sequence of selection was based on seniority of age. In other cases, the land was apportioned equally to families to cultivate during the planting season.[41] But like the Athenian democracy, the Igbo traditional political systems guaranteed its citizens (the free-born) equality, but denied this right of equality to women, slaves ("Ohu") and outcasts ("Osu"). There were also lineage heads, titled men and secret societies that had a status and honor that bestowed on them certain advantages, leverage or an edge over others. As a result, not a few scholars argue that the Igbo pre-colonial political system was anything but egalitarian.[42]

Furthermore, the system is described as largely republican, or village republic. The common aphorism "Igbo enwe eze" (meaning Igbo has no king) describes this village republicanism.[43] There were very few centralized chiefdoms/kingdoms, hereditary aristocracies or kingship customs among the Nri, Arochukwu, Onitsha, Oguta, Ogbalu and Igbo people on the west bank of the River Niger.[44] In other words, the traditional Igbo political system was not generally monarchical.[45] With a few notable exceptions, such as Onitsha which had kings called Obi, and Nri and Arochukwu which had priests as kings, most Igbo communities were ruled solely by a republican consultative assembly of the common people, usually known as the Council of Elders.[46]

Finally, the Igbo pre-colonial political system was characterized as directly democratic, often referred to as "village democracy." This is because it usually involved all adult males, who converged or assembled at the village or market square, where issues affecting the village were deliberated upon and decisions were based on majority or consensus. This village assembly ("Oha na Eze") was presided over by titled elders, who

announced the final decisions. The traditional Igbo political system is also described as "indirectly democratic," representative democracy or representative government. Uchendu describes it as an exercise in direct democracy on the village level with a representative assembly at the level of community or town, this latter being made up of several village groups.[47] In other words, the system was a hybrid or a blend of direct and indirect democracy, which operated at different levels of government.

Despite the fact that the Igbos never had a centralized government in the form of a king or emperor with a consolidated power, they were law-abiding people long before the advent of European colonialism. They had well-established norms of conduct and political institutions for enforcing and implementing laws, maintaining law and order, and ensuring peace and harmony. The infringement of laws was dealt with by the entire society (the "oha") under the direction of the elders.[48]

The prominent traditional Igbo political institutions included the Council of Elders, the "Ozo" title holders, the chief priest of the oracle, the age grades, the masquerade secret societies and female organizations ("Umuada"). Their roles were diffused in that they performed overlapping but complementary, supportive and related functions. For example, the executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in the village assembly ("Oha na Eze"), the council of elders, the age grades, the "Umuada," the secret societies and the titled men, among others. All these political institutions were collectively used as social control mechanisms, and were useful for crime prevention and crime fighting.[49] The two primary institutions responsible for policing the communities were the age grade and masquerade secret societies.

The Age Grade and Community Policing in the Traditional Igbo Societies

The age grade system ("ogbo") began as a peer group. This was usually made up of people who were born within a specified period (usually within one to four years). Ndukwe defines age grade as "an association of people of equal or about the same age, operating within a given a territory or area with the aim of individual, collective and societal transformation/development." He adds that it is "a form of social organization based on age, within a series of such categories through which individuals pass over the course of their lives," and further explains that it refers to "people of the

same age who were born same year (grade) or within a two or three-year period who identify themselves by coming together to form an organization."[50] Okeke defines age grade as "the organization of people of different generations in a given village into stratified age group or sets in a way that produces a social hierarchy based strictly on age differences."[51] For Igwe, age grade system is "among the Igbo fundamental institutions of government and principle of traditional political organization which variedly developed in the cultures of some other African nationalities."[52] He further notes that the age grade system is a manifestation or reflection of the republican way of life of the Igbos, as well as their system of direct village democracy.[53]

The Igbo age grade system is a mechanism or scheme that involves a number of adults of different age ranges constituted by various communities for the purpose of performing assigned functions, in economic, political, social, military, security, religious, cultural and developmental spheres. The Igbo age grade system pre-dated European colonialism and even survived it. Each age grade was usually organized under a leader and had its own name. Membership was obligatory and not voluntary. The system varied from one community to another. For example, the age interval varied from three to five years. In some communities, membership was restricted to men while others allowed female membership. Even the latter could differ: in some, wives of male members belonged to the same age grade as their husbands irrespective of their actual age, while others only allowed membership of daughters. The minimum age for formation of age grades also varied, from eighteen to twenty-five years. In most Igbo communities, membership of an age grade required initiation, called "ito ogbo" or "ima akwa," which signified reaching manhood.[54]

The age grade system was a vital instrument or mechanism for fostering unity, solidarity, brotherhood, good human relations, peace, progress and development.[55] It was one of the two institutions primarily charged with the responsibility of policing communities. Like other Igbo traditional political institutions, it was multifunctional. Apart from policing, the age grade also performed ceremonial or entertainment functions during festivals, ceremonies and burial rites (dancing, singing, etc.); security functions (defending villages against external enemies); socialization and social control functions; and developmental functions (sanitation, clearing paths, sweeping markets, maintaining streams, mutual help, etc.).[56]

The younger age grades, those between the ages of eighteen and forty, were usually charged with the responsibility of law enforcement and

maintaining law and order.[57] Traditional Igbo communities mandated the use of vigilantism to prevent crimes, and the identification, apprehension and prosecution of those suspected of committing crimes.[58] Igbo and Ugwuoke rightly argue that prior to the advent of colonial rule there was rudimentary formal and informal policing.[59] In pre-colonial times, various Igbo communities organized younger age grades into night-watch parties, with the aim of securing and protecting communities from thieves and other criminal elements.[60] Age grade vigilantes were able-bodied men who participated effectively in the fight against the internal and external breach or breakdown of law and order, such as rape, murder, head-hunting, cannibalism, kidnapping for rituals or slavery, and vandalism.[61] The age grades were also involved in the collection of dues and fines, and the punishment of criminals as directed by the Council of Elders and the village assembly.[62]

THE MASQUERADE SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY POLICING IN TRADITIONAL IGBO COMMUNITIES

Just like the age grade system, the masquerade ("mmanwu") secret society preceded and survived European colonialism. A masquerade secret society is a secret and voluntary association of male indigenes that operates under cover on the basis of restricted membership, rituals, oath-taking and secrecy. Although membership of a masquerade society was and remains voluntary, it was inconceivable for anyone to decline membership during the pre-colonial era. Admission took the form of initiation. The minimum age varied from one community to the other, but ranged between twelve and eighteen years. It was the duty of fathers to present their children as candidates for initiation, which usually signified a transition from boyhood to manhood. Initiated members were usually under oath not to disclose the secrets of the masquerade to non-members or to the uninitiated. In most Igbo communities, women and non-indigenes were excluded from membership of the masquerade society.[63]

Just like the age grade system, the masquerade secret society performed a number of functions that overlapped with other traditional political institutions. These included religious and cultural functions (entertainment, dancing, singing, contests, etc.); social functions (socialization and social control); economic functions; and political functions (including law enforcement and community policing, as directed by the Council of Elders

and titled societies). The masquerade society was therefore a vital instrument of governance. As an institution of government, it enforced laws and community policing, as well as disciplining deviants or criminals. Anyone visited by the masquerade would quickly comply with imposed sanctions to avoid repercussions. In this way, the society was involved both in preventing and in actually fighting crime.[64]

The masquerade cult as an agent of social control helped to ensure obedience to the sanctions that were applied by the town to a culprit. The masquerade could enter the home of the culprit and seize all his/her belongings until he/she paid the stipulated fine for his/her crime. Usually, defaulters were made to pay an additional fine before being able to reclaim any property seized by the society. The masquerade cult also maintained surveillance over village streams during the dry season to ensure that they were not misused. As part of its duties, the masquerade society was involved in the collection of levies for the community.[65]

Community Policing in Contemporary Nigeria

The current system of policing in Nigeria, as in other African countries, is essentially a colonial creation. The colonial police force was an instrument of exploitation and intimidation, and not an agency that promoted peace and order for the benefit of the citizens. In effect, the foundations of the current policing arrangement were anti-people. At independence, the new African leaders continued with the exploitative institutions that had been set up under colonial rule. The Nigerian Police Force continued to operate in postcolonial Nigeria without the necessary reorientation that was necessary to build trust with citizens and engender community partnerships.

The recurrence or reemergence of vigilantes in modern Nigeria was as a result of ineffectiveness of the police force in performing its primary role of maintenance of law and order and fighting crime in the communities. The dissatisfaction of the people with the police resulted in an increased demand for alternative internal security, now known as the vigilante security apparatus. Okafo notes that the unsatisfactory system of official security maintenance, crime prevention and law enforcement in a modern African community leads to an increase in demand for alternative, unofficial, sometimes extra-legal security and law enforcement systems and organizations, which are aimed at addressing the citizens' desire for effective protection of life and property.[66]

It is on these grounds that this chapter recommends traditional Igbo community policing as a model for crime prevention and fighting in Nigeria. Given the increasing crime and insecurity in the country today, it is imperative to integrate and incorporate the age grade system and masquerade secret societies, so that the police and communities can cooperate and synergize in their onerous tasks. The communities are familiar with their local terrain and can take the lead in tracking and pursuing criminals. Moreover, the communities know the history of all their members, as well as their residences and their hide-outs. These institutions can therefore easily detect culprits whenever there is a breakdown in law and order.

The point being made here is that cooperation between the police and the community in crime prevention and crime fighting is a desideratum for community policing in Nigeria. There is a need to shift from the present system to community policing. This will endear the police to the people, instead of continuing the present mutual suspicion and distrust. It will improve community relations, as well as enhancing information-sharing, intelligence, crime detection and prevention. There is a need for confidence-building to create the trust that is necessary for citizens to be willing to work with the police.[67]

Since the Police Force is under the Exclusive List of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the role of the state and local governments should be to encourage community-based vigilantes in terms of remuneration, training, equipment, arms and ammunition. This will also create employment opportunities, and in the process reduce crime and other social ills associated with youth unemployment. Already some states in Nigeria, such as Anambra, have adopted this model to some extent. No doubt the more complex, less decentralized, republican, federal, capitalist and indirect democracy of the modern Nigeria may pose some serious challenges to this model of community policing, but the challenges are not insurmountable.

The role of the contemporary age grade vigilante will be to watch over the neighborhoods at night, to apprehend criminals and to hand them over to the police. The relationship between the vigilante and the police should be to (1) operate under the strict supervision of the police, (2) be answerable to the police, (3) gather and share information with the police, (4) always report to the police and (5) dismiss the erring members of the vigilante and inform the police accordingly. They must abide by the rules of engagement and desist from extra-judicial killings except in self-defense. The role of the police should be to detain, inves-

tigate and ensure that suspects are duly prosecuted in the court of law. Other complementary and supportive roles should be to (1) train members of the vigilante groups, (2) maintain constant communication with the groups, (3) share information, (4) supervise their activities, (5) jointly execute operations, (6) check their excesses and (7) discipline, prosecute and dismiss anyone who does not abide by the law. The age grade system and masquerade secret societies are common in most parts of Nigeria (especially in the south), so it is worth other states studying the progress made in Anambra State, where developments regarding this model have reduced crime tremendously and improved security enormously. The state and local governments cosponsor and coordinate the community vigilante security apparatus through the various community-based organizations (CBOs), particularly the development unions. The various community vigilantes are under the command and strict supervision of divisional police officers (DPOs).

CONCLUSION

Community policing is not new to Africa. Long before European colonialism, the traditional Igbo society already had this model in place, with the age grade and masquerade societies performing the role of law enforcement and the maintenance of law and order, among other functions. Every adult male citizen was a member of an age grade and masquerade society, suggesting that policing was a societal duty. The Igbo had well-established norms of conduct and political institutions for the maintenance of law and order, ensuring peace and harmony. However, European colonialism supplanted this model with colonial police, who alienated the people.

This chapter has noted that mutual cooperation between the police and the community both in crime prevention and crime fighting is a desideratum for community policing in Nigeria. There is a need to shift from the current policing of the community to community policing by the Nigeria Police Force. This will endear the police to the people, instead of the present mutual suspicion and distrust, which alienate people from the police. In other words, it will improve community relations and enhance mutual trust, as well as increase information-sharing, intelligence-gathering and crime prevention.

This chapter therefore recommends the traditional Igbo community policing as a model for crime prevention and crime fighting in Nigeria.

Given the increasing crime and insecurity in the country today, it is imperative for variants of community policing to be explored, to see which would be most effective in curbing crime. The police and various communities can cooperate and synergize in the tasks of crime prevention and crime fighting.

Notes

1. Jude Okafor and Ernest Aniche. "Policing the Community or Community Policing: Implications for Community Development in Nigeria," *Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Working Paper Series* (2015).
2. Lanre Ikuteyijo and Kemi Rotimi. "Community Partnership in Policing: The Nigerian Experience," http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/copp. Accessed on 01/01/2012.
3. Brian Stipak, "Are you really doing Community Policing?" *The Police Chief* 61, no. 10 (1994): 115–23.
4. N. Van Rooyen, *Community Policing* (Pretoria: Promedia S.J., 2001).
5. F.J. Reyneke, "Creating a Culture of Entrepreneurship in the South African Police Service," *Praector* 8, no. 5 (1997).
6. Stephen Mastrofski, Robert Worden and Jeffrey Snipes. "Law Enforcement in a Time of Community Policing," *Criminology Year* 33, no. 4 (1995): 539–63.
7. Charles Adams, "Fighting Crime by Building Moral Community," *Christian Century Year* 111, no. 27 (1994): 894–6.
8. Robert Friedmann, *Community Policing: Comparative Perspectives and Prospects* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996).
9. Okafor and Aniche, "Policing the Community".
10. Ikuteyijo and Rotimi. "Community Partnership in Policing".
11. Jack Greene, "Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure and Function of the Police," *Criminal Justice* 3 (2000): 299–370.
12. David Bayley, "The State of the Art in Community Policing: An International Perspective," http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications. Accessed on 01/01/2012.
13. Bayley, "Community Policing".
14. Greene, "Community Policing in America".
15. Okafor and Aniche, "Policing the Community".
16. Bayley, "Community Policing".
17. Reyneke, "South African Police Service".
18. Greene, "Community Policing in America".

19. Bertus Ferreira, "The Use and Effectiveness of Community Policing in Democracy," in *Policing in Central and Eastern Europe* (Ljubljana: College of Police and Security Studies, 1996).

20. Ferreira, "Community Policing in Democracy".

21. Victor Uchendu, *The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria* (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).

22. Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of the Igbo People* (London: Macmillan, 1976).

23. Chieka Ifemesia, *Traditional Humane Living among the Igbo: A Historical Perspective* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1979).

24. Michael Onwuejeogwu, "Evolutionary Trends in the History of the Development of the Igbo Civilization in the Culture Theatre of Igboland in Southern Nigerian," in *Ahiajoku Lecture* (Owerri: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1987).

25. Elizabeth Isichei, *Igbo Worlds* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

26. Adiele Afigbo, *Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo History and Culture* (Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press, 1981).

27. Kenneth Dike and Felicia Ekejiuba. *The Aro of South-eastern Nigeria, 1650–1980* (Ibadan: University Press, 1990).

28. Basil Nwankwo, *Authority in Government* (Lagos: African Fep, 2004).

29. George Basden, *Among the Ibos of Nigeria* (Gloucestershire: Nonsuch Publishing, 2006).

30. Tony Nwaezeigwe, *The Igbo and their Nri Neighbours. A Study in the Politics of Igbo Culture and Origins* (Enugu: Snaap Press, 2007).

31. Daryll Forde and Gwilliam Jones. *The Igbo and Ibibio Speaking Peoples of Eastern Nigeria* (London: International African Institute, 1950).

32. Jonah Onuoha and Tochukwu Omenma. "The Seniority Ideology and Governance in Igbo Culture," *Ikenga International Journal of African Studies* 9, nos. 1&2 (2007): 145–53.

33. Ikpechukwuka Ibenekwu, "Igbo Traditional Political System and the Crisis of Governance in Nigeria," *Ikoro: Journal of the Institute of African Studies* 9, nos. 1&2 (2010).

34. Patrick Chikendu, *Nigerian Politics and Government* (Enugu: Academic Publishing, 2003).

35. Emmanuel Onyeozili and Obi Ebbe. "Social Control in Precolonial Igboland of Nigeria," *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies* 6, nos. 1&2 (2012): 29–43.

36. Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of African Societies to 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

37. Chinyere Ndukwe, "Changes and Continuity in Age Grade Practices in Nigeria: A Study of the Igbo Traditional and Modern Administrative System," *Journal of Policy and Development Studies* 9, no. 3 (2015): 176–84.

38. Adiele Afigbo, "The Indigenous Political Systems of the Igbo," *Tarkh* 4, no. 2 (1973): 13–20.
39. Emmanuel Igbo and Cyril Ugwuoke. "Crime and Crime Control in Traditional Igbo Society of Nigeria," *Developing Country Studies* 3, no. 13 (2013): 160–7.
40. Obasi Igwe, *Politics and Globe Dictionary* (Enugu: Jamoe Enterprise, 2002).
41. Ernest Aniche, *A Modern Introduction to Political Science* (Onitsha: Desvic Publishers, 2009).
42. Femi Adegbulu, "From Warrant Chiefs to Ezeship: A Distortion of Traditional Institutions in Igboland?" *Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences* 2, no. 2 (2011): 1–25.
43. Adiele Afigbo, *The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891–1929* (London: Longman, 1972).
44. Ikenna Nzimiro, *Studies in Igbo Political System. Chieftaincy and Politics in Four Niger State* (London: Frank Cass, 1972).
45. Okoro Ijoma, "Kingship in Three West Niger Igbo Chiefdoms," *African Notes* 2 (1983): 33–41.
46. Lambert Ejiofor, *Igbo Kingdoms* (Onitsha: Africana Publishers, 1982).
47. Uchendu, *The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria*.
48. Obi Ebbe, "Crime Prevention in Nigeria: Pre-colonial and Post-colonial Dimensions," in *International Perspectives on Community Policing and Crime Prevention,* eds. Lab and Das pp. 140–50 (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003).
49. Onyeozili and Ebbe. "Social Control in Precolonial Igboland of Nigeria".
50. Ndukwe, "Changes and Continuity in Age Grade Practices in Nigeria".
51. Tochukwu Okeke, "West African Societies since the Pre-colonial Era: Studies in the Socio-Political Structures of the Agulu," *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences* 3, no. 2 (2013): 127–35.
52. Igwe, *Politics and Globe Dictionary*.
53. Ibid.
54. Ndukwe, "Changes and Continuity in Age Grade Practices in Nigeria".
55. Ifeyinwa Ezenwaji, *Traditional Administrative System in Nigeria: A Study of Selected Nigerian Societies* (Enugu: Institute for Development Studies, 2002).
56. Aliu Fafunwa, *Learning among Peers* (Akure: Satellite Publications, 2004).
57. Michael Olisa, "Igbo Traditional Socio-Political System," in *A Survey of the Igbo Nation,* ed. G.E.K. Ofomata (Onitsha: Africana First Publishers, 2002).
58. Nonso Okoreaf-Ezeke, "Traditional Social Control in an Ethnic Society: Law Enforcement in a Nigerian Community," *Police Practice & Research: An International Journal* 4, no. 1 (2003): 21–33.

59. Igbo and Ugwuoke. "Crime and Crime Control in Traditional Igbo Society".
60. Chukwudifu Oputa, "Crime and Nigerian Society," in *African Indigenous Laws,* eds. T.O. Elias, S.N. Nwabara and C.O. Akpamgbo (Nsukka: Institute of African Studies, 1975).
61. J.A. Iyamagba, "Policing and Democracy," in *Police, Law and Order in Nigeria,* eds. E. Amucheazi and D.O. Saunomi (Abuja: National Orientation Agency, 1998).
62. Emmanuel Igbo, *Introduction to Criminology* (Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press, 2007).
63. Alex Okpoko, "The Igbo State System," in *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: The Pre-colonial Antecedents,* eds. J.I. Elaigwu and O.E. Erim (Abuja: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996).
64. Humphery Nwosu, "Politics and Administration in the Igbo Traditional Society," in *A Survey of the Igbo Nation,* ed. G.E.K. Ofomata (Onitsha: Africana First Publishers, 2002).
65. Nonso Okafo, "Law Enforcement in Postcolonial Africa: Interfacing Indigenous and English Policing in Nigeria," *International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) Working Paper* no 7, May (2007).
66. Okafor, "Law Enforcement in Postcolonial Africa".
67. Okafor and Aniche, "Policing the Community".

"Come and Chop": Representations of the Parliamentarian in Ola Rotimi's *If* and Emeka Nwabueze's *A Parliament of Vultures*

Bosede Funke Afolayan

INTRODUCTION

In terms of the size of its population and economy, Nigeria has the potential to play more meaningful and impactful roles in the African region than it is currently. The country's abundant mineral resources and youthful population place it at a strategic position in the vanguard of the African renaissance. However, in order to realize its potential and assume its leadership role on the African continent, Nigeria must first put its house in order by institutionalizing accountable government that will work for the development and structural transformation of the country. It is only a stable Nigeria, characterized by good government and inclusive institutions, that could hold its head high and lead the African continent into a respectable position in global affairs. Unfortunately, persisting

B. F. Afolayan (✉)
Department of English, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria

225

evidence shows Nigeria as a sleeping giant unable to realize its potential, and failing in its natural leadership responsibilities. Characterized by decadent institutions, government failures and prebendalism,[1] Nigeria has a long way to go in order to achieve the stability and level of development that would put the country in the right place for more effective leadership on the African continent and more productive engagement with the rest of the world.

This chapter examines the character of the parliamentarian in the Nigerian democratic dispensation, as portrayed in two plays—Ola Rotimi's *If* and Emeka Nwabueze's *A Parliament of Vultures*. Since the 1990s, Nigerian political history shows parliamentarians as inept, wasteful, insensitive, corrupt and rancorous. From the days of Sidi Alli who took a toy gun to the House of Representatives (Nigeria's lower house of parliament), to Patricia Ette's corrupt appropriation of government money and the renovation of a house for twice the cost of building it, to the scandal involving members of parliament with fake academic credentials, the Nigerian parliament reeks of corruption. These realities and their consequences on the development of the country are ready materials for playwrights, who are the conscience of society and who creatively depict these atrocities in graphic detail in their various works of art.

Significantly, African writers such as Wole Soyinka, Femi Osofisan, Tess Onwueme and Ahmed Yerima are known to be committed to their societies. This commitment has led many of them to write works that graphically expose the ills and foibles of society. They see themselves as critics and the repositories of the culture of their people, ready to correct and set society on the right course. It was the late Chinua Achebe writing on the importance of these burning national issues who proverbially stated that writers who ignore the pressing national malaise could be likened to a house owner pursuing rats when his house is ablaze. In effect, it is a gross irresponsibility for writers to ignore important national issues that have direct consequence on the welfare of citizens. Ngugi wa Thiong'o equally believes in the fact that writers should write about the society because "Literature does not exist in vacuum; it is given impetus, shape, direction and even area of concern by social, political and economic forces in a particular society."[2] This utilitarian view has propelled many African writers to concentrate on using art as an instrument of social reordering. They believe that drama should not just be pleasing but also useful to the society that breeds it. In his little book entitled *The Trouble with Nigeria*, Achebe submits that:

The trouble with Nigeria is simple and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else ... Nigeria has been less fortunate in its leadership.[3]

Dramatists in Nigeria have therefore focused their criticism largely on exposing the leadership defects in Nigerian politics. Ola Rotimi dramatizes the insensitive and megalomaniac role of Lejoka Brown in satirical mode in *Our Husband Has Gone Mad Again*.[4] In the same vein, Olu Obafemi lays bare the politicians' ridiculous acts of flagrant embezzlement in Awadanu in *Naira has No Gender*.[5] This chapter focuses on parliamentarians—the men and women occupying or trying to occupy the upper and lower houses of parliament in Nigeria. Recently, the legislative arm of government has come under great criticism in the print and social media and in literary drama. This chapter seeks to examine how the dramatists have creatively represented the legislators' deficiencies, corrupt practices and excesses.

Ola Rotimi was a Professor of Drama at the University of Ife and later at the University of Port Harcourt. As a playwright, he belonged to what Yemi Ogunbiyi classified as the first-generation dramatists.[6] He studied at the Yale School of Drama and his directorial abilities on stage were legendary. In fact, his plays were performed more by university theaters than Wole Soyinka's. This is thanks to the accessibility of his images and the simplicity of his dialogue. Some of his plays are *Our Husband Has Gone Mad Again*, *Kunrunmi*, *Ovonramwen Nogbaisi*, *Holding Talks*, *Hopes of the Living Dead* and *If: The Tragedy of the Ruled*. Emeka Nwabueze on the other hand is a third-generation Nigerian dramatist. He is also a Professor of Drama and Theatre at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Some of his plays are *When Arrows Rebound* (a dramatized version of Chinua Achebe's novel *Arrow of God*), *Spokesman of the Oracle*, *The Dragon's Funeral*, *Fate of a Maiden* and *A Parliament of Vultures*. Having been exposed to Nigerian culture and political systems as well as to the cultures and politics of other climes, these writers are able to see what is wrong in their home culture and politics. They are also able to offer constructive criticism, with the hope that such criticism will help to bring about change in the mentality and actions of those concerned, with the ultimate goal of producing a better and more egalitarian society.

In Ola Rotimi's *If* the focus is on the condition of the ruled—the fate of the common man. In fact, the play is subtitled "*The Tragedy of the*

Ruled." Thus, the society is divided in political terms into the ruled and the ruler—what the Marxists would describe as the proletariat and the bourgeois. The tenants are the "wretched of the earth" (see Frantz Fannon), as they are oppressed by the rich landlord.[7] The ruler in this case is represented by the rich landlord, who is incidentally standing for election as a parliamentarian, while the masses are the tenants in his house. As in most of Rotimi's works, the tenants are people from almost all parts of Nigeria: each tribe is represented in the tenement house. In fact, the building symbolically stands for the nation itself. Thus, Rotimi gives a national view of the sufferings of the poor masses, meaning that the suffering is not localized in a particular tribe. In effect, he nationalizes the face of tragedy as it pertains to the masses. Whether it is Garuba or Akpan, or Betty or Chinwe or Papa and Mama, or Dr. Hamidu or Banji or Adiagha, they are all united by the fact that they are ruled by the likes of the greedy landlord; by their poverty and by that common house that they share. The house with many occupants and shared facilities stands as an image of the poor condition of infrastructure, which is characteristic of present-day Nigeria. It stands for the Nigerian state, which has been roundly exploited by successive political leaders.

In spite of the poor state of the building, the landlord increases the rent astronomically. He does not apply this rent increase to all occupants, but to a select group. This shows his corrupt ways. Who gets an increase in rent is not based on any objective criteria, but is driven by acts of discrimination: he gives the hike to those he considers to be troublemakers. All the occupants are workers except Papa, who is retired. The landlord exploits all the tenants although he is richer than them.

The landlord passes the notice of rent increase to the others through one of the tenants who happens to be a single lady, Betty. Betty is known to be in an amorous relationship with the landlord. Although the reader is not told of his marital status, one cannot but imagine that this relationship is adulterous. It is also exploitative as he exploits Betty's youthfulness and helplessness. This is a man who is standing for the office of senator: he wants to be a leader when his credentials are faulty. As portrayed in the play, the landlord does not have the moral credentials necessary to be a parliamentarian and political leader. If he becomes the senator as he wishes, his excesses will be unlimited.

At Mama's party, the landlord shows his lack of love for others and good neighborliness as he rudely interrupts the party with his unwanted presence and expensive gift. He barges into the celebration without invita-

tion, forcing his gift on Mama. Garuba intercepts him and lets him know he is not wanted. For this affront, the landlord invites thugs and the police to manhandle Garuba, to the consternation of Betty. Eventually, both Garuba and Betty are taken away by the police. At the party, which was not a political event, the landlord converts the assembly into a forum for political campaign as he begins to canvass for votes, making promises he cannot keep to the same people he has served quit notice to. The landlord is pictured as ridiculous when he says this:

> Mama, I hear today is your birthday. So, I've brought this token gift. Eh … I'm sorry I'm a bit late, but I'm sure you all know how busy I've been – the political campaigns and then the voting which began this morning, and all that. Which reminds me—it's not late yet for those of you who haven't gone to the polls. Voting ends at 6—which gives you—what? 25 more minutes. And remember, it is: The Patriotic People's Party. PPP. Your Party; *my* Party. The only Party to save the nation, indeed to rescue the blackman from perpetual misery, perpetual backwardness.
>
> All I'm saying is: when you see a monkey, you see its hands. We are for progress. And we mean business this time. As you know, I'm to be your *servant* from this Constituency at Senate. All I'm saying is: I am ready to serve you; will be *honoured* to serve you. True, between us there have been a few problems.[8]

The landlord claims to be a servant in order to win votes, but the tenants are aware that if he wins the election and becomes a senator, he will exploit the people all the more. Ola Rotimi creates the landlord as an example of bad leadership in Nigeria. His character has shown that leadership in Nigeria is not for service. Most politicians in Nigeria do not aspire for political post to serve the people. Rather, as revealed since the 1990s people get to positions of authority to enrich themselves illegally. Thus, leadership in Nigeria is for selfish concerns. Politicians as depicted by the landlord are not servants of the people, rather they are profiteers and exploiters whose pre-occupation is to convert public office to personal estate. They get into office to "chop." This is a "broken" English word for "eat" that is sometimes used in Nigeria; "eat" as used here means embezzlement. It refers to the illegal conversion of government and public funds for private and personal use. In Nigeria, it is commonplace for people to go into politics and become rich overnight. These politicians promise heaven on earth for the electorates, but when they get

into office they literally focus on selfish and rapacious accumulation of wealth to the detriment of expanding public goods for the masses.

It is in the fracas that ensues between the police and the two tenants—Betty and Garuba—that Betty forgets to give Onyeama his asthma drugs. It is also this shock that eventually leads to Onyeama's death. The young boy has shown a lot of promise, having come first in the whole nation in the common entrance examination, but unfortunately he suffers from acute asthma. Chinwe, his aunt, has done what is in her power to care for him since he lost his parents, but she cannot do much because of her poor condition. Dr. Hamidu gives drugs to help the boy while warning Chinwe of the conditions that can trigger asthma attacks. Onyeama is seen clearing the chairs left over from the party and sweeping up the dust. He leaves his shirt hanging on the water tap, and it is there when he is discovered dead.

The tenants are aware of the landlord's atrocities, especially his exploitative tendencies and his lack of compassion for fellow human beings. Therefore, they decide to work against him by not voting for him. Hear Papa:

> But we must bide our time. Everything really depends on our votes. Which brings me back to the dustbin picture. I said the dustbin presents the most sincere reflection of the values of a people. The same goes for the Judiciary in a nation. A forthright judiciary is a reflection of the confidence it derives from the ethics of the people. The people then are the last hope for safeguarding that ethics through the kinds of persons they put in power. That is the language you must speak tomorrow. With your votes. You know the candidates. They are rice; our votes, the water. Rice is rice. It is when you pour it in water that the empty husks float … Anything short of this language, any vote cast for a politician tomorrow on the basis of sheer fatherhood by birth; or of brotherhood by clan; or sisterhood by religion, is your doom and my doom. Our last hope then, is in a sound Government that will inspire a forthright judiciary before which we'll present our case. That's all. Meanwhile, we bid our time. We'll write to the landlord and tell him—one: we regard his letter discriminatory and vindictive.[9]

From this quote, it is clear that the populace knows the right thing to do. They know that their vote is their right and their power. They are ready to defend it at the polls to the disgrace and shame of the landlord, who does not have their interests at heart. Unfortunately, when the votes are counted on the radio, the unpopular party which many people did not vote for wins with a wide margin. This victory can be explained in Papa's words to the children in the neighborhood who cannot correctly memo-

rize their lessons: "This is Nigeria, young man. Anything goes. Say anything, do anything. What matters is the fact that you're saying something, or doing something. Good, bad, it doesn't matter."[10] In other words, the true wishes of the electorates do not really count, as there is widespread manipulation of the electoral process and outcomes.

The faulty electoral process vindicates the landlord when people such as Papa who are selfless are doomed to a one-room apartment in the landlord's dilapidated tenement house. This view is aptly voiced by Hamidu in this way: "Kai! To think that people like that, with selfless concern for the community remain doomed to a hovel like this … Sharing one room, while grabbers strut the nation, scooping wealth without sweat! Makes me sick! Plain sick!"[11] Ola Rotimi creates Papa as a foil to the character of the landlord. While the landlord has no feeling for his fellow human being, Papa shows concern for the people. While the landlord rules his building with divide and rule tactics, Papa brings everyone together to deliberate on what concerns all of them, even the erring Betty. The roles Papa plays in the story are sharply contrasted against those of the landlord, which are lacking in compassion and human feelings. The landlord does not have the heart of a servant-leader. The people cannot trust him because his purpose in government is to oppress them, and not to help them. He is depicted in the play as someone without redeeming qualities.

In Emeka Nwabueze's *A Parliament of Vultures* the parliamentarian is depicted in all his excesses. He is corrupt and wasteful in his use of government resources. The playwright employs satire in exposing to ridicule the actions of the lawmakers who are in government for personal enrichment. The House of Parliament is composed of social misfits who lack intellectual and moral power, and who find themselves in that position because of an electoral system that is riddled with rigging, ballot snatching and corruption.

The title of the play is an imaginative expression and an apt description of the corruption of the lawmakers. The use of the word vultures is inventive. The English language has some anthropomorphic collective nouns—there is a flock of birds and a school of fish, just as there is a congress of doves and a parliament of baboons. This explains semantically what goes on in the Nigerian Senate and the House of Representatives. Rather than call them baboons, the author prefers to call the parliamentarians vultures, which also incriminates the people and seems to accuse them of complacency. Equally, the use of the word vultures reflects the extent of the lawmakers' depletion of the nation's economy. Vultures are ravenous by

nature. Such an image is not positive but negative, as it connotes their scavenging attitude. This image in essence sees the people the vultures feed on as dead and lifeless. In other words, society at large is not exempted from the author's caustic abuse. This attitude can be seen in the character of all the people in the play. Hear Habamero when he places two bottles of champagne before Madam Omeaku and her daughter, Nkechi:

> This is just to kick start the day, we shall move from here to Hilton. My special assistant has already made reservation for us. We shall eat and drink until we are saturated. Then we shall check into the presidential suite to cool off before returning to our homes.[12]

These are people who are supposed to be making laws, but they neglect and abandon their duties in order to engage in wanton pleasures. Even with this Madam Omeaku is not satisfied. She wants more allowances, in the form of an inconvenience allowance for sleeping and eating out. There and then Habamero, in what turns out to be ridicule of him and his post, states: "By the power invested on me as the Speaker of the House and Chairman of the assembly, I approve a sum of two million naira for each member as inconvenience allowance."[13] All the members need to do is ask for any amount of money, whether such money has been budgeted or not, and they will get it. This money is not accounted for, and is routinely spent on frivolities and according to the whims and caprices of the politicians. As an instance of this wasteful spending of national resources is Madam Omeaku's insistence that the Chairman should buy her daughter a new car. This is bought from the national coffers, and not from the Chairman's personal purse.

The playwright imaginatively exaggerates this wasteful spending in order to drive home his point that the lawmakers are wasteful and irresponsible. The excesses of the Nigerian lawmakers are ready material for a dramatic work like this. To organize a thanksgiving service, a member suggests a total of 10 million naira to fund the party, and this is in a country where the minimum wage is 18,000 naira per month and a very large percentage of the population is unemployed. Madam Omeaku is angry at what she calls peanuts and asks if the money was meant for teachers. There and then, the amount budgeted for the party is increased to 10 billion naira. This excessive display and siphoning of national assets is not limited to expenses in Nigeria, as many of the lawmakers try to acquire houses and property abroad. It appears that owning buildings and other property in foreign countries is a priority for parliamentarians, at the expense of their constitutional role as lawmakers.

Members of the House as shown in Nwabueze's play are also incompetent. They lack intellectual power and show unabashed disdain for reason and intellect. To Madam Omeaku, those with PhDs are not to be reckoned with because they are so poor they cannot afford a car in spite of their high level of education.[14] Therefore, the man who could have brought sanity to the house is sidelined. The slogan of the house is that "the minority should be heard but the majority must prevail." In Brown's account, Dr. Parker is cajoled that he was needed to come and serve his fatherland. However, the ulterior motive is to use him to transfer stolen money into foreign bank accounts. Apart from Dr. Parker and Otobo, all the other parliamentarians are illiterates.

Nwabueze creatively exposes the moral decadence of the lawmakers by creating an extended metaphor about the vultures in a speech that is made by Mr. Omeaku. The man feels much disgust as the nation's resources are squandered by the irresponsible men and women in the House. He says: "this is my nation's parliament at work. Do you know what you people are? You are vultures, eating my nation to death, leaving nothing for the masses to quench their thirst."[15] This metaphor is repeated to reiterate the author's point that the parliamentarians are contributing to the nation's woes. Barine Ngage avers that this image shows the rapacious nature of the lawmakers. He says:

> Traditionally, a rapacious person is regarded as a vulture. Vulturism accordingly refers to predators, voracious persons, the avaricious and the greedy. Vultures give birth to underdevelopment, corruption, promotion of diseases, mortality rates and environmental degradation.[16]

In this interesting image, Nwabueze finds a parallel for the lawmakers. It is an image that smacks of death; the death of a nation caused by avarice and embezzlement. In the political reality of Nigeria, one can find similar vultures in the lawmakers who allocate to themselves so much money as allowances of different kinds, including sitting allowance, furniture allowance and newspaper allowance.

The playwright exposes the evils of the actions of the lawmakers through the acts of Chief Habamero, Madam Omeaku, Reverend Jossy and Brown. Nwabueze creates the character of Reverend Jossy as an indictment of religion. Through him, the author reveals the religious hypocrisy in the land: religious men work hand in hand with political thieves to rid the nation of its wealth. Politicians are known to donate a huge amount of

money to the church without the religious leaders asking questions. Habamero is seen donating 1 million naira to Jossy. While they show interest in church affairs openly, these politicians also engage in fetish practices. At the inauguration of the parliament, members of the House are made to swear oaths at the shrine of Ogburabani. By this act, the men are not only shown as fetishist but also as hypocritical. They are seen to be serving two masters.

Again, the character of Madam Omeaku leaves much to be desired. She is shown as wasteful and uninformed. It must be stated that Madam Omeaku is a food seller turned politician. She has no training in the art of law-making and her excesses, therefore should not be seen as typical of women. In creating her personal and social traits, Nwabueze shows her as an illiterate and very destructive person. Orabueze states that:

> It is quite clear that Nwabueze uses Madam Omeaku, the food seller turned politician to make an important statement that women's abdication of their natural roles as mothers for politics can only lead to annihilation of family values.[17]

While this might be true for Madam Omeaku, it is not true of all women. Women are known to be adept at multitasking. In other words, they are capable of doing many things at the same time without losing focus on any of the chores. Madam Omeaku's fault is her lack of education. With education, many successful women have learned to delegate, while having time for other important tasks. They have been seen planning their time and juggling home and career effectively. That Madam Omeake fails in her duties should not be a yardstick for all women or warrant the sexist generalization made by Orabueze.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to show the creative ways by which Ola Rotimi and Emeka Nwabueze portray the character of the parliamentarian in their plays. The depictions are realistic and reflect the true situation of events in Nigeria. Through their artistic depictions, the plays have shown the true picture of parliamentarians in that country as insensitive to the plight of the masses they claim to represent. The parliamentarians go on spending sprees, allocating huge sums of money for their personal use and to satisfy selfish interests. The parliamentarians are also hypocritical as they serve

both the Christian God and the native god, all in a bid to secure their positions. It may seem that the playwrights employ exaggerations in order to paint these lawmakers as evil and wasteful, but the reality gleaned from newspapers and television shows that sometimes life can be stranger than fiction. Nigerian parliamentarians in general live ostentatious lifestyles and are overtly corrupt in their ways. In their works, these playwrights have employed irony, satire and humor creatively to depict political corruption and moral decadence on the part of parliamentarians in contemporary Nigeria. This level of corruption unfortunately weakens the fabric of the country and makes it difficult for Nigeria to achieve meaningful growth and development. Consequently, the country continues to depend almost exclusively on the export of natural resources, and has failed to develop a capacity for industrial production.

Notes

1. Richard A. Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
2. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Homecoming* (London: Heinemann, 1972), xv.
3. Chinua Achebe, *The Trouble with Nigeria* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1983), 1.
4. Ola Rotimi, *If- the tragedy of the Ruled* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Limited, 1990).
5. Olu Obafemi, *Naira has No Gender* (Ibadan: Kraft Books, 1983).
6. Yemi Ogunbiyi, *Drama and Theatre in Nigeria* (Lagos: Nigeria Magazine, 1981), 36.
7. Frantz Fanon (English translation by Richard Philcox), *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2004).
8. Rotimi, *If- the Tragedy of the Ruled,* 63.
9. Ibid., 14–15.
10. Ibid., 30.
11. Ibid., 36.
12. Nwabueze, *A Parliament of Vultures*, 15.
13. Ibid., 15.
14. Ibid., 36.
15. Ibid., 18.
16. Barine Ngage, "Vultures in Politics: Emeka Nwabueze's *A Parliament of Vultures,*" *CAJOLIS,* 1 No 1, (2002), 5.
17. F. Orabueze, "The Devil's Alternative: The Portrait of the Politician in Emeka Nwabueze's *A Parliament of Vultures,*" *CALEL*, 3 no. 1 (2005), 128.

CHAPTER 13

Conclusion

Kenneth Kalu and Toyin Falola

Since the 1960s, African states have experimented with different development ideas and several economic models. From state-anchored development planning to economic liberalization, they have moved from one model to another without hitting the right note. Consequently, the continent's economic challenges have persisted, and poverty and destitution remain pervasive across many African countries. While Africa's development failure is definitely a cause for concern, perhaps the most puzzling aspect of this failure has been the phenomenal growth and transformation in several other developing countries that were in a similar, or even worse, situation than Africa was in the 1970s. The question that arises, therefore, is why Africa has failed to take advantage of globalization to improve its economic performance and enhance the living standards of its people.

Globalization has led to a greater integration of the global economy. It has opened up new markets, created new opportunities and of course led to increased competition. Countries that are able to bring value to the

K. Kalu (✉)
Global Management, Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada

T. Falola
Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

global market have benefited from globalization, as they now have access to wider markets and are less constrained by the size of their domestic economy. The recent success of countries in Southeast Asia has been achieved largely on the back of increased opportunities in the global market. China, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and many other countries in Asia have achieved tremendous success and phenomenal growth following their productive engagement with an expanded global market. They have been able to bring value to the market by producing what the market needs, and by offering the right environment for domestic and foreign capital. Needless to say, the rapid economic growth in Southeast Asia has led to real development and structural transformation in most of the region, with the result that the poverty rate has declined during the past two decades.

It is safe to state that as globalization has produced winners, so it has also produced losers. Countries that are unable to develop a competitive advantage in any sector are forced to act as perpetual receivers and consumers of goods manufactured in other countries. Unfortunately, most of Africa has fallen into this category. With poor infrastructure exemplified by bad roads, poor railway services, unreliable electricity and weak regulatory standards, African countries have been unable to compete in the global marketplace. Firms in these countries face daunting challenges in the production process, as they have to privately provide infrastructure that are public utilities in other societies: they sometimes have to build their own roads, provide water supplies or generate their own electricity. This leads to high costs, creates inefficiencies and makes the African firms uncompetitive.

Africa's poor performance in the economic sphere despite opportunities in the global market has generated much debate, as one would expect. This volume reflects in part some of the differences in opinion about Africa's unenviable place in the global economy. While a number of chapters point to globalization and the free market as destabilizing forces that have exacerbated Africa's economic challenges, others argue that Africa has failed to take advantage of opportunities in the global market owing to the failure of political leadership. This difference in views reflects the literature about the political economy of development. In discussing Africa's development challenges, a number of authors focus on Europe's exploitation of the continent during colonial rule as the foundation of Africa's underdevelopment. It is argued that the institutions set up by imperial Europe in their African colonies, which were retained by African postcolo-

nial leadership, are incapable of generating real development.[1] At the other extreme are those who blame Africa's development challenges on the actions and inactions of Africa's postcolonial leaders, who have made parochial and welfare-diminishing choices, leading to corruption, crisis and poverty.[2]

The consensus of opinions across all the chapters is that Africa has not done well on the economic and political fronts, and has failed to domesticate globalization for the benefits of Africans. However, as in the broader literature, authors in this volume differ in their assessment of the causes of Africa's unimpressive performance. For example, Mesut and Enwere in Chap. 4 suggest that Africa's economic challenges are the result of the application of neoliberal ideas that have been imposed on the continent by the global North. Consequently, the authors contend that African states would have made better progress if they had ignored the advice and policy prescriptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which, the authors believe, were mere agents of the industrialized world and seeking to keep Africa perpetually at the periphery. Arguing from a different perspective, Fonkoué (Chap. 9) contends that statism and development planning would not have produced better results for the continent. In effect, his chapter argues that whether African states ignored the dictates of economic liberalization or not, their lot would not have been much different. Fonkoué notes that this reality is essentially due to the nature of the postcolonial African state—a colonial structure built essentially as an instrument of exploitation. The argument here is that the typical African state cannot work for true development or for the benefit of its citizens. Because the colonial African state and its institutions were instruments of exploitation and predation, the succeeding postcolonial state is incapable of generating the currents that are necessary for real and inclusive growth and development. Perhaps it is the perverse nature of the African state and its institutions that has led to the serial failure of every development model so far experimented in most African countries. Although practiced over a relatively short period, between the 1960s and early 1980s, national planning with state interventions failed to produce real development. In the same vein, economic liberalization has not produced noteworthy results, despite unprecedented opportunities in the global market.

Perhaps it is apt to describe the apparent differences in opinion expressed in this volume as different ways of stating the same fact: Africa has failed to take full advantage of opportunities in the global market

because states and the political elites alike have largely failed their citizens. Whether working in the frame of state interventionism or inspired by market determinism, the state is central to the economic development and social stability of any nation. The economic successes of the newly industrializing nations of Asia were secured on the back of development-oriented states driven by sound national policies that produced impressive economic growth and structural transformation. In the same vein, market-based economic models can only be successful where there are efficient state institutions to provide enabling environments in which markets can thrive. In effect, every country that wants to achieve real development must first deal with the structure of the state. Markets function well and are likely to enhance society's welfare if the right institutions exist to correct for market failures. It is principally the state's responsibility to provide such institutions.

Perhaps the different explanations for Africa's failure to take advantage of globalization reinforce the need to reexamine the structure of the African state. In predatory states, where political leaders focus primarily on extracting state resources for the enjoyment of a privileged few, it is near impossible to achieve inclusive growth and development. This is because a predatory state acts as an inhibitor instead of a facilitator of development. When state actions are antithetical to growth and development, for example, where the state consistently channels national resources to satisfy personal greed, every economic development model will produce the same result of failure. The disposition of the typical African state to embrace parochial and welfare-diminishing choices has led to uncharitable descriptions of Africa's political culture. Dictatorship, clientelism, prebendalism, patronage politics and rentier state have all been used to describe a perverse political culture where political leaders treat state resources as personal assets. We are of the view that the biggest obstacle to Africa's effective utilization of opportunities in the global market is not necessarily the choice of economic model. State interventionism during the immediate post-independence period did not produce spectacular results. In the same vein, experimentation with neoliberal economic models has not significantly altered the development trajectories of African states since the 1990s. The African state needs to rethink its true mission, restructure key public institutions and alter the nature of state–society relations in ways that engender synergy and mutuality between the state and its citizens.

What has been constant in either a market-based or state-anchored development model is the state itself. In every economic model the state performs a critical role in ordering the flow of economic activities. Because there is so far no institutional alternative to the state, a predatory state stands as the biggest obstacle to growth. Although economic liberalization may have had some destructive impacts, other subsisting indexes do not suggest that African leaders have done a great job in leading postcolonial Africa along the path of growth and development. A political system defined by a perverse patron–client network that feeds on corruption and saps that state of its resources is anti-development. Africa's utterly extractive economic and political institutions that exclude the majority of citizens from playing active roles in the polity can only produce sub-optimal results, irrespective of the economic model on paper and irrespective of the opportunities in the global market.

The chapters in this volume have examined Africa's place in a globalized world from diverse perspectives. While the verdict on the continent's capacity to profitably utilize the opportunities offered by globalization is almost unanimous in reporting gross incapacity and failure, recommendations about how to enhance Africa's position in the global economic order are quite varied. These have been influenced by what each author sees as the cause of Africa's failure to derive optimal benefits from globalization. Those who blame neoliberal ideas and what are sometimes seen as the imposition of market-based policies on African states argue that abandoning the prescriptions of the World Bank and the IMF, and following Africa's "home-grown" models, would produce better results. In addition, some have recommended a number of concrete policies for specific industries, such as the creative sector, as ways to increase the economic benefits of such sectors. A number of chapters directly or indirectly emphasize the weakness of the African state, as exemplified either by high levels of corruption and prebendalism or by clear leadership failures on several fronts.

Although most of Africa has achieved a relative political stability devoid of wars and military coups during the past decade, transparent and accountable political leadership has remained a challenge in a number of countries. Where the head of state has remained in power for decades, the focus of governance has changed from formulating policies and taking actions that would improve the welfare of the general population to the pursuit of agendas of self-perpetuation. Wrong choices have made it difficult for many countries to diversify their economies away from primary

commodities, and in these mono-product economies natural resource rents have not been effectively utilized to develop industrial capacity or to advance the welfare of the citizens. The signs and causes of economic failure include the inability to develop functional physical infrastructure in a number of countries; yet to succeed in the global market countries must develop the industrial capacity necessary to produce what the market needs. In the case of African countries that have lagged behind other countries during the past two decades, the challenge of playing catch-up is enormous. They first have to address the decay in their domestic systems, and then develop the capacity to compete against firms from other countries that have already started producing for the global market. While this challenge is enormous, there is still ample space for Africa to play more productive roles in the global economy. However, it is our considered view that the first steps to claiming its rightful place in the global economic system is for Africa to take a hard look at the structure of the state. The erroneous assumption that markets alone will solve all of society's problems should have been consigned to where it belongs—the dustbin. After all, the recent growth miracles and economic transformations in Southeast Asia have been achieved through the state's conscious efforts to drive development for the benefit of the citizens.

NOTES

1. Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: an empirical investigation," *The American Economic Review* 91 no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401; and Crawford Young, *The Postcolonial State in Africa*, (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).
2. This view is eminently represented by: Robert Calderisi, *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn't Working* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

Index[1]

[1] Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.