Philip Jan Schäfer

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Preface

'Security' has been a contested term, concept, and issue in international politics and in their academic analysis as international relations. In the twentieth century the 'security concept' has been widely used since its inclusion in the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) and in the Charter of the United Nations (1945) that described as its purpose in Article 1.1 "to maintain international peace and security" by taking collective measures "for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression or other breaches of the peace".

In contrast, the 'national security' concept emerged during World War II in the United States "to explain America's relationship to the rest of the world" (Yergin 1977: 193). It was widely used by the first US Defence Minister Forrestal to legitimize a strong military establishment and this is reflected in the National Security Act (1947) that created its legal and institutional basis (Czempiel 1966; Brauch 1977). It was criticized by Wolfers (1952, 1962) and Herz (1959: 236f).

The 'security concept' has gradually widened since the 1980s, as have the objects and means of security policy in the framework of three security systems in the UN Charter, and within the UN framework several sector-specific security concepts have emerged. For the constructivists, security is *intersubjective* (Wendt 1992, 1999). It depends on a normative core that cannot simply be taken for granted. Its political constructions have real-world effects by guiding action of policy makers and exerting constitutive effects on political order.

At least three major developments have triggered a major 'reconceptualization of security' (Brauch et al. 2008, 2009, 2011) in many parts of the world: (a) the end of the Cold War with its bipolar international order in 1989; (b) the process of globalization with the emergence of new non-state actors and processes as objective security dangers and subjective security concerns for both the world of 'nation states' and the 'people'; and (c) a fundamental shift in the understanding of the Earth's history since the industrial revolution from the Holocene to the 'Anthropocene' (Crutzen 2002).

These three major global contextual changes have resulted in three processes of a 'widening' of the prevailing narrow political and military national and international security concepts by adding at least three additional dimensions of economic, societal, and environmental or ecological security.

The second process of a 'deepening' of security by shifting the referent from the 'state' to the 'people', by moving from the notion of a 'state-centred' to a 'people-centred world' where the referent object are the individual, the family, the community, the tribe, the religious group and humankind' as a species. This shift is reflected in the 'human security' concept that was introduced by Mabhuq ul Haq in the Human Development Report (UNDP 1994) and was developed further conceptually by the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadago Ogata and Amartya Sen (CHS 2003). The 'human security concept' and its three classical pillars of 'freedom from want' (referring to the human development agenda), 'freedom from fear' (pointing to the humanitarian law and disarmament agenda), and 'freedom to live in dignity' (stressing the human rights agenda, rule of law and good governance) were promoted further in the Report *On Larger Freedom* by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (UN 2005). To this Bogardi and Brauch (2005) added a fourth pillar as 'freedom from hazard impact' by bringing issues of the environment and related to global environmental and climate change into the human security discourse. Based on a mandate by the Summit of September 2005 (UN 2005), the General Assembly has discussed the human security concept since May 2007 and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon assessed the conceptual debate in two reports on Human Security in 2010 and 2012 (UN 2010; Brauch and Scheffran 2012).

A third process has emerged since the 1970s, the use of the security concept by several specialized organizations within the UN system, such as 'food security' by the UN FAO (Oswald Spring 2009) and 'health security' by WHO (Rodier and Kindhauser 2009). The concept of 'energy security' has been widely used by the IEA since its foundation in 1974 in response to the 'oil shocks', and later the 'water security' concept was adopted at the second ministerial meeting of the World Water Forum (in 2000, The Hague) and the concept of 'soil security' was suggested in a study for UNCCD (Oswald Spring and Brauch 2009; Brauch and Oswald Spring 2009).

This is the conceptual and political background of this study by Philip Jan Schäfer on *Human and Water Security in Israel and Jordan* that emerged from a diploma thesis in political science he submitted in February 2011 to the Otto-Suhr-Institute on Political Science of the Free University of Berlin of which this author was the thesis adviser and first evaluator. After obtaining his degree the diploma thesis was anonymously reviewed by a prominent hydrologist and political scientist from Israel and the Arab world. Their critical and constructive comments and useful recommendations resulted in a fundamental transformation from an academic thesis to this author's first book.

From a constructivist perspective Schäfer analyses, assesses and compares the scientific and the political discourse on national, human, and water security in both Israel and Jordan. His study was influenced by the theory of 'securitization' of the Copenhagen School (Wæver 1995, 2007; Buzan and Wæver and de Wilde 1998) to which he added the categories of 'violization' and 'opportunization' (Neuman 1998; Warner 2000). With the tools of discourse analysis he compared the discourse on human security among scientists with that among high level policy makers in both Jordan and Israel. He also compared the 'hegemonic' national security

discourse in Israel with the 'instrumental' human security discourse of Jordanian government officials. He then focused on the securitization of water in Jordan and Israel prior and after the bilateral peace treaty of 1994. On the background of the bilateral tensions over the allocation of water in 1999 Schäfer observed a 'de-securitization' and 'economization' of water in both countries that downgraded 'water' as an issue of national security and of political conflict.

Thus, Schäfer's careful analysis offers insights that are not only of pure theoretical and academic interest, they also matter politically. This study is a good illustration of Wæver's 'securitization theory' that aims at a progressive de-securitization of political issues by taking them out of the realm of security policy, where issues of utmost importance for the survival of a state and its people require 'extraordinary measures'.

It remains a challenge to achieve human and water security in the Middle East during the Anthropocene era of the Earth history, where the demand for blue (drinking) and green (soil water for agriculture) will increase, due to the projected trends of population growth, and the supply of water is projected to decline, due to the physical effects of climate change (increase in temperature and sea-level, precipitation change and more intensive extreme weather events, especially droughts). This requires cooperative strategies, policies, and measures by jointly addressing the new security dangers of water, soil, food, health, and livelihood insecurity.

Whether a process of de-securitization of soil, water, food, health, and livelihood issues will enhance the human security prospects for the people and will also contribute to a sustainable peace with sustainable development in the Middle East spring will remain a challenge in the aftermath of the political transformation triggered by the Arab for the years to come.

Mosbach, 1 May 2012   Hans Günter Brauch

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Contents

Abbreviations

AKUF	Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung
AMFA	Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ATF	Arab Thought Forum
AUAJRC	Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center
BESA	Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics Israel
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DO	Dissolved oxygen
DPS	Department of Preventive Security in Jordan
DSB	Defence Science Board
E. coli	*Escherichia coli*
ESS	European Security Strategy
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FWSI	Falkenmark water stress indicator
HSN	Human Security Network
IAF	Islamic action front
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IWS	Index of water scarcity
JCPA	Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
JCSS	Center for Strategic Studies
JRSP	Jordan Red Sea Project Description
KAC	King Abdullah Canal
MFAI	Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Israel
MOEI	Ministry of the Environment in Israel
MoEJ	Ministry of Education in Jordan
MOFI	Ministry of Finance in Israel
MOI	Ministry of the Interior in Jordan
MoPD	Ministry of Political Development in Jordan
MoSD	Ministry of Social Development in Jordan
NWC	National Water Carrier (of Israel)

PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCP	Peres Center for Peace
PSD	Public Security Directorate in Jordan
RAE	Royal Academy of Engineering
RHSC	Jordan Regional Human Security Center
SSSC	Strategic and Security Studies Center in Jordan
SVIVA	Ministry of Environmental Protection in Israel
UJCR	Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
UNU	United Nations University
UNU-IHDP	International Human Dimension Programme on Global Environmental Change
US-DHS	United States Department of Homeland Security
WAI	Water availability index
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WEF	World Economic Forum

Chapter 1
Introduction

> *Long after oil runs out, water is likely to cause wars,*
> *cement peace, and make and break empires and*
> *alliances in the region, as it has for thousands of years*
> *(Cooley 1982: 3).*

The growing world population and the depletion of natural resources raise the
question of the impact of resource scarcity on social relations. In the Middle East
the natural resource of water in particular is a major issue, and economic, political,
and religious issues are linked to this frequently discussed and important topic. The
ambiguity of this issue was illustrated when King Hussein I of Jordan said that the
only reason ever to go to war with Israel again would be water (Lonergan 2003).
Despite this, a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel was signed which
regulated the allocation of water between the states. How fragile such an agree-
ment could be was shown during the drought of 1999, when Jordan announced an
"appropriate response" if Israel were to break the treaty and withhold the Jordanian
share of water as determined in the treaty (Al Sharq Al Aswat 1999).

   The aims of this book are to contribute to the growing research on the impact of
resource scarcity on social relations and to embrace constructivist ideas of how the
perception of a matter influences crucial decisions being made that shape people's
realities. It comes at a moment when vital information on emergent issues in the
Middle Eastern region is needed so that the challenges ahead can be understood
and properly handled. The democratic revolutions of the *Arab Spring* opened a

window of opportunity for far-reaching political and societal change, though they brought uncertainties with them and raised a number of significant questions. Widespread shortcomings in water supply, triggered by prolonged drought and a growing number of consumers, must be addressed in terms of their impact on the security considerations of relevant actors. Not least to understand the potentially conflict-laden nature of natural resource scarcity, such research is crucial.

In this study we shall argue that resource scarcity can be addressed in its empirical impact (water scarcity, desertification, air pollution), followed by observations on subsequent actions, such as technical solutions, cooperation, competition, or even conflict. Hence the need to define a particular scarcity as a security issue. The empirically measurable impact of resource scarcity becomes the independent variable and influences decisions about how to react.

Another possibility is to explicitly address the perception of an issue. How a matter is perceived has a decisive impact on decisions about how the matter is acted upon in a different way from other issues. The perception and not the empirical impact decisively influences relevant decisions. Necessarily material circumstances heighten awareness. But how far an actor chooses to act depends on how their own perception makes certain steps appear necessary.

With these considerations in mind the main question of this study is: how do security perspectives influence the perception of water scarcity and what is the impact on bilateral relations between Jordan and Israel in terms of security?

As a starting point a similar conceptualization of security—in the form of national security—is assumed for Israel and Jordan. Therefore the state will be regarded as the referent object of security from which another perspective might have developed. We need this especially for a human security perspective (with the individual as the referent), as we shall argue that between the two poles of the state and the individual a wide range of possible perspectives can be identified.

We shall argue that the knowledge an actor can draw upon determines the actor's perspective on security. Subsequently we shall examine the process of knowledge creation. As in this study knowledge is regarded as being created in a discursive context, we shall use the method of discourse analysis. Since we are seeking a human security perspective—with the concept still being fairly new and the relevant discourses having taken place over an accordingly short time-span—we are necessarily limited to a selective discourse analysis, focusing on the last decade. The discourses taken into account are the scientific security discourses and the security discourses of state executives. We shall argue that if these discourses differ to a great extent, certain influences have to cause these differences, these most likely being a set of specific interests. Therefore the question that will be answered with the help of discourse analysis—the question that helps to delineate the Israeli and Jordanian security perspective that influences decisions on how to act upon water-related issues will be: has a human security perspective developed in the Jordanian and/or the Israeli scientific or state executives' security discourse?

Finally we shall use the perspectives identified to estimate the impact of the perception of water on bilateral relations between Jordan and Israel. To do this, we shall apply the theory of securitization. Securitization describes how a matter

comes to be defined as a security threat. For this reason, the state executives' security discourse becomes more important, as the state executives are regarded as being mostly congruent with the securitizing elites in their respective countries. Here the key question is: how do the perspectives on security in Israel and Jordan—the presence of a human security perspective in each case—influence the dynamics involved in the securitization of water?

In order to answer these questions, we shall proceed as follows: first, we shall address definitional and theoretical questions with the conceptualization of security in general as human and national security, along with the several ways in which security can be perceived, and then we shall examine the goals of security (part 2). Subsequently we shall investigate the link between water and security, using the concept of water security (part 3). Then we shall introduce the theory of securitization and the concept of discourse, and then discuss discourse analysis and the operationalization of human security (part 4).

We shall determine whether a human security perspective has been adopted in Jordan and Israel and if the Jordanian and Israeli populations experience shortcomings in the provision of human security that they are willing to act upon. In order to provide a point of reference for securitization dynamics in Israel and Jordan, the critical incident of 1999 when tensions arose between the two countries concerning the allocation of water will be examined, along with the relevant state executives' security discourse at that time.

We shall examine the scientific discourse in Jordan and Israel, as well as the state executives' security discourse in Jordan and Israel, from a human security perspective. Subsequently the results of the relevant discourses in Jordan, in Israel, and in both countries will be presented and compared. We shall discuss how far water has been securitized. To do this, we shall provide a historical overview of measures aimed at securing the supply of water in Jordan and Israel, before finally analysing the impact of the respective security perspectives on the dynamics of securitizing water in the bilateral relations between Israel and Jordan.

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Chapter 2
The Concept of Security

2.1 Conceptualization and Re-Conceptualization of Security

Security is of vital importance. The term is frequently used to help raise consciousness of the importance of particular issues, which are then so labelled in the minds of the population at large (Buzan 1991, p. 370). However, security is an 'essentially contested concept' (Gallie 1956, p. 184; Buzan 1983, p. 6); a concept on which no consensus exists. This conceptual vagueness makes it difficult to find a common ground for discussion. A feature shared by most definitions is some form of threat to cherished values (Williams 2008, p. 5), especially those threats that endanger a particular referent object's survival in the near future. Accordingly, concern for survival entails a preoccupation with security (Art 1993, p. 821).

Security is not an independent concept. It is always related to individual or societal value systems (Brauch 2003, p. 52). Every actor talking about security assigns different meanings to the term. Based on the assumptions of the realist theory of international relations—that security is the dominant concern for states, that force is the major instrument, that governments preserve their unity as they interact with one another—security is achieved once threats to security can be prevented or at least managed (Nye 1988, pp. 6–8). Contrary to realist theory, social constructivism perceives security as resulting from the interactions of various actors, with social values and identities shaping these relations. Security is accordingly intersubjective; constituted by a process of interaction and negotiation. Once the perception of security has changed, and the fear of one another is overcome, security is achieved (Ulusoy 2003, p. 161). Especially noteworthy in this context is the distinction between security in an 'objective sense' (absence of threats) and in a 'subjective sense' (absence of fear)[1] (Wolfers 1962, p. 149). Security is achieved once both components exist.

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[1] "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Wolfers 1962, p. 149).

Security cannot be achieved at the expense of others. Actors deprived of security are possible threats. Security can only be achieved by combined efforts (Booth 1999, p. 41). In this view, security means that a certain degree of trust between actors—originating from a certain level of predictability—needs to be achieved by sharing commitments. The 'common security'[2] approach reflects this view: "International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutual destruction" (Palme 1982, p. ix).

There have been various interpretations of security. In general, security has been understood to be synonymous with the accumulation of power. It has been regarded as a commodity, and power[3] as the means of achieving it (Van Buuren 2010, p. 4). Most strikingly, the interpretation of security has changed with the end of the systemic antagonism between the Soviet Union (SU) and the United States (US). The traditional goal was to defend national sovereignty in terms of territory, people, and the system of government. Two principal assumptions supported this view: the state was seen to be relatively absolute, and the conflict between capitalism and communism was unresolvable (Allenby 2000, pp. 10–13).

Within the organizational framework of the UN the focus has shifted away from a state-centred to a more human-centred approach. The concept of human security was included in the agendas of UN component organizations (UNDP 1994; FAO 2003), and incorporated into the studies of the academic security community (Brauch 2005, p. 18). Despite a widening of the concept of security, a large number of states still adhere to a state-centred, militarized approach (Møller 2003, p. 279). Since the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the 'war on terror', however, it has been possible to observe a shrinking of the concept of security. Military security, concentrating on state actors, has gained importance once more (Liotta 2002, p. 173).

This study will be based on a definition of security as 'survival-plus'. Since those threats in particular that endanger a particular referent object's survival in the near future are of vital importance, concern for survival entails a preoccupation with security (Art 1993, p. 821). Yet, the terms security and survival are often used in a similar way and present a confusing ambiguity. Defining security as 'survival-plus' removes this flaw. Here survival is understood as an existential condition, while security additionally comprises the ability to pursue cherished political and social ambitions; the ability to make "life-choices" (Booth 2007, p. 106).

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[2] In 1982 the Palme Commission led by Olof Palme issued the report on *Common Security*. It argued that both sides in the Cold War have legitimate security needs. Unilateral security for one block based on superior military resources is seen to be impossible (Palme 1982).

[3] 'Power' is understood in a Weberian sense as: "the chance of a man, or a number of men to realize their own will in communal action, even against the resistance of others" (Weber 2005, p. 28).

2.2 Human and National Security

As it was impossible to predict the end of the Cold War, the realist assumptions of security studies faced a severe crisis (Fierke 2007, p. 22). This stimulated reflection within the academic community about the meaning of security. The major shortcomings of the state-centred security paradigm were highlighted, especially that it did not provide an explanation for states threatening their own citizens or for state collapse (Mack 2004, p. 48). As a result, the need for a human-centred perspective was identified (UNDP 1994, p. 22).[4]

2.2.1 Human Security

Human security moves the focus away from states and towards individuals. It emphasizes human rights, safety from violence, and sustainable development (Paris 2001, p. 88). Although the term was coined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 *Human Development Report* (UNDP 1994), it emerged from the fusing of a number of different concepts (Hampson et al. 2001, p. 152):

- The first concept is human development. The first UNDP report of 1990 called for a people-centred approach to all forms of development. Accordingly, there was a demand that the development of national production and its impact on human development must be further investigated (MacFarlane et al. 2006, p. 143; UNDP 1990, p. iii).
- A second concept underlying human security is sustainable development. The *Brundtland Commission's* report of 1987 argued that protecting the environment is a prerequisite for the survival of humankind. Sustainable development was accordingly identified as a necessary long-term development strategy (WCED 1987).
- The third important emergent point for human security is the *responsibility to protect*. This thematizes tensions between the claim for universal human rights and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If a state is unable to fulfil its obligation to protect its citizens, or if the state itself becomes a danger, the *responsibility to protect* is transferred from the sovereign state to the international community (Tajbakhsh et al. 2007, p. 27).

Especially interesting is the connection between human security and development. In order to better distinguish between the concepts, human security has been

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[4] "The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy […]. It has been related more to nation-states than to people […] For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards" (UNDP 1994, p. 22).

defined as "a necessary but not sufficient precondition" for human development, with a suggestion that "If human security could cover the most urgent threats, development would then address societal well-being" (Owen 2004, p. 381). Seven dimensions of human security are distinguished by the UNDP:

- *Economic security*—assuring every individual a minimum requisite income.
- *Food security*—the guarantee of physical and economic access to basic foodstuffs.
- *Health security*—the guarantee of minimum protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles.
- *Environmental security*—protecting people from the short- and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment.
- *Personal security*—protecting people from physical violence.
- *Community security*—protecting people from loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.
- *Political security*—ensuring that people live in a society that honours their basic human rights (UNDP 1994, pp. 24–33).

By conceptualizing human security in the political context of the United Nations, three pillars of human security have been identified:

- *Freedom from fear*—protecting the physical integrity of human beings.
- *Freedom from want*—providing access to the goods and services needed to satisfy material and non-material needs.
- *Freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment*[5]—environmental protection (Annan 2000a, pp. 1; Owen 2004, pp. 384).

In addition, the need for a fourth pillar has been identified and it has subsequently been conceptualized: *freedom from hazard impact*.[6] This implies that people are able to mobilize their resources and concentrate on sustainable development goals instead of not being able to escape the 'survival dilemma' (Brauch 2008).[7] Currently three different forms of conceptualizing human security can be identified.

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[5] "Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment—these are the interrelated building blocks of human—and therefore—national security" (Annan 2000a, p. 1).

[6] 'Hazard' is defined as: "A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon and/or human activity, which may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation" (UN/ISDR 2002). Hazard is not related to the persons or objects that could be affected. It describes only the threat emanating from an event. Hazards can be single, sequential, or combined in their origin and effects (UN/ISDR 2002).

[7] At this point we shall introduce the definition of 'crises'. Crises are defined as "specific, unexpected, and non-routine events or series of events that [create] high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to high priority goals" (Seeger et al. 1998, p. 254). The defining characteristics of crises are: they are unexpected, create uncertainty, and are seen as a threat to important goals (Seeger et al. 1998, p. 254).

- Firstly, it can be conceptualized as a level of analysis where the referent object is the individual affected by hazards, migration, crises, or conflicts (Brauch 2005, p. 22).
- Human security can also be understood using a mainly normative orientation and from a political perspective where human security is conceptualized in close relation to human rights. The two concepts still do not converge, as they employ separate ideas and separate functions. While the literature on human security acknowledges the importance of human rights, there has been little evidence that human rights theory has responded accordingly (Brauch 2005, p. 22; Boyle et al. 2004, p. 3).
- The third way to conceptualize human security is to understand it as an encompassing concept, including all five dimensions of the widened concept of security: economic, societal, environmental, political, and military security (Brauch 2005, p. 22; UNDP 1994).

The large number of possible definitions has often led to criticism and doubts about the usefulness of the concept of human security. About the referent object of human security there can be little debate. The focus is the individual human being or humankind, even if the referent object is conceptualized in a social context. Accordingly 'community security'—as part of human security—refers to individuals finding shelter in a community (Krause and Williams 1997, p. 47).

As for possible threats, conceptions differ greatly. Depending on which dimension is accentuated, the main threats to human security range from economical to environmental and societal security threats. In order to separate a danger to human security more accurately from other dangers, a distinction between *threats to human security*—hunger or disease—and *specific threats*—single actions that have an immediate effect on the safety or welfare of victims and demand immediate remedy—has been introduced (Thomas et al. 2002, pp. 183–185).

Human security's definitional flexibility makes it appealing for decision-makers, as various interests and goals can be projected on to human security (Chourou 2005, p. 12). Accordingly, policymakers in several countries have embraced the concept as the foundation of their foreign policy. Thirteen states have founded the *Human Security Network* (HSN), organized at ministerial level, in order to promote a human security perspective. Their individual ideas still differ to a great extent. In the Canadian context, human security is based on *freedom from fear* and humanitarian interventions are seen as a strong measure for its promotion. In Japan, *freedom from want* is stressed and much effort is put into economic development (Sato 2007, pp. 83–84).

As the concept grew in importance, Kofi Annan established a *Commission on Human Security* whose final report led to the establishment of the permanent *UN Advisory Board on Human Security* (CHS 2003). Human security received further international attention when the *Barcelona Report* of the *Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities* called for a *Human Security Response Force* (Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2004).

2.2.2 Convergence of Human and National Security?

It has been argued that human security has an increasing impact on national security (Thomas and Tow 2002, p. 179). Often a blurring of issues involving national and human security can be detected (Liotta 2002, p. 173), or it is even stated that ultimately, one concept—national security or human security—would gain a dominant position (Henk 2005, p. 101).

National security and human security are interlinked. For example, outwardly aggressive and inwardly repressive regimes can be a major source of human insecurity (Lodgaard 2004, p. 4). Underdevelopment in particular has been identified as a link between human and national security Mack 2004, p. 2).[8] Over the years a convergence of national and human security perspectives can be observed. The main reason stated for promoting a human security perspective is that of an "enlightened self-interest" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 7). In order for a state to survive, it has to respect the security of its citizens, and the security of citizens of other states. This demonstrates one possible connection between human security—especially aspects of livelihood security[9]—and how these interact with national security issues. For example, predicted climate stresses on livelihood systems may lead to upheavals for those already vulnerable and incapable of adapting. This food and livelihood pressure might motivate populist or military coups (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 18).

2.3 Threat, Challenge, Vulnerability and Risk

One of the main tasks for security analysts is to investigate how some threats come to have priority over others and become the focus of security. More broadly speaking, this is a question of how specific objects come to be constituted as one type or another. The scope of relevant categories is large: probably the prevalent category is that of *threats*. Other possible categories are, for example, those of *crises* (Weldes 1996, p. 276), and *risks* (Beck 1986, 1992, 1999). The main idea behind distinguishing between different categories is to be able to estimate the process by which, under certain circumstances, objects are given meaning as threatening, while in a different environment they are understood to be non-threatening. An attempt to grasp this categorization that conceptualizes *threats*, *challenges*, *vulnerabilities* and *risks* as the categories for judging a new situation is presented in Brauch (2005, 2011).

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[8] "It is impossible to explore causal relationships between violence, on the one hand, and indicators of underdevelopment, on the other, if all are subsumed under the rubric of human insecurity" (Mack 2004, p. 2).

[9] "… The adequate and sustainable access to income and other resources to enable households to meet basic needs. This includes adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, and time for community participation and social integration". (Frankenberger 1996, p. 3).

2.3.1   Threat

An early definition of *threat* is: "capability coupled with intent" (Singer 1958, p. 94). Clearly applied to the possibility of a nuclear war between the Soviet Union (SU) and the United States (US), this definition mainly focuses on military capabilities. The assumed intentions of the Soviet Union were built into models of massive retaliation, deterrence, and mutually assured destruction. Basically, intentions appeared to be less important, as it seemed obvious that the SU would seek confrontation once the capabilities were in place (Flynt 2000, p. 32). While the systems of antagonism between the SU and the US continued, threats were conceptualized in a dual way, as a threat to state institutions by force (capabilities), and by ideas (ideology) (Buzan 1983, p. 57). The referent object of security remained the state, and accordingly threats were defined in close connection to the security of states.

Obviously military threats can pose major threats to the state and affect all its components, as the use of force is involved. Political threats also present a constant concern for a state. They can manifest themselves as competition amongst ideologies, or as an attack on the nation itself (Stone 2009, p. 5). In this respect it is important to distinguish between international political threats and those arising internally from the impact of alternative ideas about the form of government or about the legitimacy of state leaders (Buzan 1983, p. 120).

The drastically increased number of violent domestic wars after the end of the Cold War (Gantzel 2000, p. 305), an increase in asymmetric forms of warfare, as well as the important role of non-state actors—such as terrorist networks—have stimulated a change in the conception of threats (Stepanova 2008, p. 3). This conception now requires an element that is not controllable and raises the possibility of destroying an actor's key value or commodity. Since the early 1990s, a threat has also been defined as referring to the dangers due to the manifold destructive potential of the environment and its global consequences (Brauch 2005, p. 26). The United Nations has acknowledged the widening of the concept of security by identifying new security threats, such as poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation, and war and violence within states (United Nations Department of Public Information 2004, p. 11).[10]

2.3.2   Challenge

Despite its regular use, the term *challenge* has rarely been defined. Challenge may basically be seen as similar to threat, except that an actor has a slightly firmer grip on a challenge and may be able to handle it in the future (Brauch 2003, p. 76). A security challenge may also refer to security issues that are not acutely

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[10] "[…] we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; […] the threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security" (United Nations Department of Public Information 2004, p. 11).

time-critical or are non-violent. These challenges are primarily issues of the internal security agenda (Brauch 2005, p. 29). To address a security challenge the referent object has to be clearly defined, as a human security perspective will identify totally different security challenges from a national security perspective. As the range of security threats has shifted away from primarily military threats, so has the range of security challenges. As a human security perspective becomes more and more integrated into the agenda of the European Union, 'soft' security challenges, such as poverty, collapse of the environment and underdevelopment are being increasingly addressed (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 6).

2.3.3 Vulnerability

To affect security a threat to a cherished object has to be identified and the referent object must be vulnerable to this threat.[11] Accordingly the concept of *vulnerability* has achieved a high degree of recognition in different fields, such as disaster management and development studies. Vulnerability can be defined as "a weakness that makes targets susceptible to physical or emotional injury or an attack" (Gregory 2009, p. 406).

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) distinguishes vulnerability from sensitivity[12] and adaptive capacity,[13] and defines it in the context of global climate change as "the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable cope with, adverse effects of climate change including climate variability and extremes" (Smit et al. 1999, p. 885; IPCC 2001). The concept of vulnerability was widened so that it received a dual focus; susceptibility to a certain threat, and unusual difficulties in coping and recovering (Bohle 2009, p. 521). Two basic features of vulnerability can be distinguished. These are 'exposure'[14] and 'insufficient capacities'.[15]

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[11] "Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities, and the two cannot meaningfully be separated. […] national security policy can either focus inward, seeking to reduce the vulnerabilities of the state itself, or outward, seeking to reduce external threat by addressing its sources" (Buzan 1991, p. 112).

[12] Sensitivity is the "Degree to which a system is affected by or responsive to climate stimuli" (IPCC 2001).

[13] Adaptive capacity is the "potential or capability of a system to adapt to climatic stimuli or their effects or impacts" (IPCC 2001).

[14] 'Physical exposure' is the presence and density of the people, habitat, networks, and goods and services in risk zones, defining potential losses or damages, both human and non-human (stakes). Physical exposure also is the socio-ecological: human-induced ecosystemic perturbations aggravating the natural hazard.

[15] 'Insufficient capacities' to prevent, prepare for, face and cope with hazards and disasters can be separated into: physical weakness, legal vulnerability, organisational vulnerability, technical vulnerability, political vulnerability, socio-economical vulnerability, psychological vulnerability, and cultural vulnerability (Nathan 2009).

Vulnerability to a hazard is to a large extent created by the relevant social order. The division of labour, cultural values and legal rights strongly influence the vulnerability of a referent object to security threats. Vulnerability can be understood as an estimate of the potential scale of destruction and is therefore a function of a society's ability to adjust to a new set of circumstances (Barnett 2001, pp. 132–133). Often vulnerabilities are cumulative, causing disasters which in turn further aggravate those vulnerabilities. Vulnerability is both hazard-related and subject-related. The level of analysis (individual, group, society) has to be made clear, as the vulnerabilities at one level are totally different from the vulnerabilities at another level. Furthermore, different subjects—even those at the same level—have different vulnerabilities (Nathan 2009).

The factors influencing vulnerability can be divided into external and internal. The internal factors are those of coping with and anticipating a threat, while the external factors are those involving an exposure to risk and shock (Bohle 2009, p. 521). Often vulnerability is described as the "internal side of risk" (Birkmann 2006, p. 16). This highlights vulnerability's dependence on certain characteristics, for example of an individual, an environmental system, or a social structure (Birkmann 2006, p. 16; Wisner et al. 2004, p. 12).

2.3.4 Risk

Risk is described as the leitmotif of contemporary society. It is the combination of the likelihood of a future event and its possible impact. As a concept, risk represents our "desire to control the future" (Giddens 1998, p. 101). Risk presupposes some form of uncertainty that cannot be removed, but with a possibility of managing this uncertainty. By framing future events in the form of risk, these can be either measured or prioritized (Gibson 2005, p. 23). Risk has a dual nature. This means its perception may not necessarily be equal to its empirically measurable impact (Slovic 2000, p. 17). Duality presents a dilemma for managing risk, as the task is that of managing the risk itself as well as managing the fear of that risk.

Before the beginning of modernity and the industrial age, risks were perceived to be induced by non-human forces; so-called 'external risks'. Modern societies are exposed to a number of man-made risks that are a product of modernization itself: "manufactured risks" (Giddens 1998, p. 99). As the nature of risk shifts away from external to manufactured risks it is possible to assess the level of risk being produced. By reflecting on the way a risk is manufactured, the method of manufacturing this risk can be changed as well (Beck 1992, p. 23). With the notion of manufactured risks and human impact on the environment, a number of environmental risks have gained attention. These include possible disputes arising from human-induced local environmental degradation or scarcity-induced conflict over resources such as water (Kasperson et al. 2001, p. 45).

2.4 Security Goals

There are various categories into which the perception of security can be classi-
fied, but the envisioned goals of security must be taken into account as the per-
ceived end to which security efforts should lead. Based on the 'sectoralization of
security' (Brauch 2009), the goals of security can be conceptualized as the guiding
rationale of the actors involved in each sector. Each sector has its own primary
concern—which closely mirrors the guiding rationale—and until it has been sat-
isfied, the security of the sector is at peril. Security goals are closely related to
the capacities an actor can rely on to achieve these goals. Strong actors can be
expected to employ various methods to try and reach their goals. Moderately
strong actors may be assumed to constantly try and improve their position, while
weak actors can be expected never to reach their prime concern and to struggle
for survival from day to day. The various prime concerns and particular capaci-
ties lead to a complexity concerning security goals. Accounting for this complex-
ity and in order to reduce it to a level at which it can be handled more easily, three
security goals have been distinguished (Zeitoun 2006, pp. 2–5):

- First-order goals are the bare primary concerns. Their main characteristic is a
  notion of base values or bottom lines which might trigger defence mechanisms.
  Actors who have not been able to achieve first-order goals are forced to deal
  with threats to their survival. Behaviour concerning first-order goals is guided
  by a perceived need for protection. Actors who have achieved a first-order
  goal, particularly those who have struggled to do so, tend to take a conservative
  approach in order to maintain their achievement.
- Second-order goals are more beneficial, higher-risk achievements. A certain
  amount of risk is required to achieve these goals. Hence the goals can be con-
  sidered as risk ceilings. The dominant characteristic governing behaviour at
  this level is accumulation, or the acquisition of resources, allies etc., enabling
  improvement or consolidation of the actor's position.
- Third-order goals may be considered irrational maxima. The overriding charac-
  teristic governing behaviour is supremacy, where the goal of preservation of a
  position is seen to justify the means used against and suffering endured by com-
  peting actors (Warner 2006, pp. 17–20).

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Chapter 3
Water Security

Fundamentally speaking, either too much water (e.g. floods) or a lack of water (e.g. drought) can become an issue of security. In this study, water security is limited to the study of a lack of water, as this is assumed to be the main problem connected with water in Israel and Jordan. The questions that then arise are, how much water is necessary to ensure a *water secure* life? and at what level of quality should water be provided?

The World Economic Forum (WEF) has categorized the concept of water security as "the gossamer that links together the web of food, energy, climate, economic growth and human security challenges that the world economy faces over the next two decades" (WEF 2009, p. 5). The connections between water and security are many and concern the dimensions of environmental, societal, economic, health, livelihood and food security (Oswald and Brauch 2009, pp. 175–176). There is still no generally agreed definition of water security. Definitions of water security mostly focus on a single dimension of water use:

- The availability of clean drinking water, important in the engineering and municipal infrastructure (RAE 2010, p. 5).
- Reliable basic water services, vital for any plans for development (UNESCAP 2008, p. 2).
- Measures to ensure the security of drinking water infrastructure against potential terrorist attacks, as promoted by the US *Department of Homeland Security* (US-DHS 2010).
- As a dimension of environmental security, and in order to manage conflict, reduction of the potential for conflict, especially with regard to concerns of national security (Pachova et al. 2008, p. 6).

The 'Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Water Forum' was an attempt to define the components of water security.[1] It announced that in order to achieve water security, the main challenges were: "Meeting basic needs, securing the food supply, protecting ecosystems, sharing water resources, managing risks, valuing water, governing water wisely" (WWC 2000; Saeed and Lauren 2004, p. 19).[2]

In order to isolate the impact of water as an object of securitization, we shall reduce the definition of water security to the components perceived to be most severe by the securitizing actors in Israel and Jordan. With recurrent droughts and severe shortages of water during the summer months, we shall consider the supply of water in sufficient quantity and quality for agricultural use and industrial use and as drinking water. We shall therefore define water security as "a sufficient supply of water in quantity and quality in order to conduct operations perceived to be essential for survival, daily life, or development plans".[3]

3.1 Quantity of Water Supply

The first question that arises concerning water security is, is the quantity of water sufficient? The most commonly used indicator for estimating the adequacy of water supply is the *Falkenmark Water Stress Indicator* (FWSI). Water availability of more than 1,700 m³/capita/year is defined as the threshold. Below this level, water scarcity increases at different levels of severity. Below 1,700 m³/capita/year water stress appears regularly, below 1,000 m³/capita/year water scarcity is a limitation to economic development and human health and well-being, and below 500 m³/capita/year water availability is a major constraint on life (Falkenmark 1989, p. 350). Despite being commonly used to estimate the adequacy of water supply, the FWSI has been subject to various criticisms. One is that only the renewable surface and groundwater flows in a country are taken into account. Water availability is calculated as an average with regard to both the temporal and the spatial scale and water shortages in dry seasons or in certain regions are ignored. Moreover, water quality is not taken into account, and no information about a country's ability to use its resources is used. Even if a country has

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[1] *"This [Water Security] means ensuring that freshwater, coastal and related ecosystems are protected and improved; that sustainable development and political stability are promoted, that every person has access to enough safe water at an affordable cost to lead a healthy and productive life and that the vulnerable are protected from the risks of water-related hazards"* (WWC 2000; Saeed and Lauren 2004, p. 19).

[2] A comprehensive definition of water security was created by a group of researchers at the University of Guelph (Canada), who defined it as: "A multi-dimensional concept that recognizes that sufficient good quality water is needed for social, economic and cultural uses while, at the same time, adequate water is required to sustain and enhance important ecosystem functions" (de Loë et al. 2007, p. 2).

[3] This is a working definition used in this work and does not claim to cover all aspects of water security.

sufficient water according to the FWSI, these water resources possibly cannot be used because of pollution or insufficient access (WaterStrategyMan 2010, p. 87).

Another index for assessing the sufficiency of water supply is the *Water Availability Index* (WAI). The WAI takes surface water as well as groundwater resources into account. The total resources are compared with the demands of all sectors—domestic, industrial and agricultural. The month with the maximum deficit (or minimum surplus) is decisive. The index is normalized to the range -1 to $+1$. When the index is zero, availability and demand are equal (Meigh et al. 1999, pp. 87–88).

Combining the data concerning water abstraction and water availability, the *Index of Water Scarcity* (IWS) measures overall sufficiency of water. It is defined by the intensity at which resources are used.[4] In addition, desalinated water is included into the calculations. The IWS has been criticized for neglecting temporal and spatial variations as well as water quality data (Heap et al. 1998, p. 161).

3.2 Quality of Water Supply

Another factor influencing water security is that of water quality. There are several key water quality indicators:

- The test for 'Dissolved Oxygen' (DO) measures the amount of oxygen dissolved in water. The decomposition of sewage decreases DO readings. DO is measured in milligrams per litre (mg/L) (Grossman and Krueger 1995, p. 354).
- The temperature of water affects many other parameters, including DO readings and the susceptibility of organisms to parasites, pollution and disease. Causes of temperature changes in the water include weather conditions, shade, and discharges into the water from urban sources or groundwater inflows (Puls and Powell 1992, p. 167).
- A pH-test measures the alkalinity or acidity concentration in water. A pH of 7 is neutral, below 7 is acidic, and above 7 is alkaline. Acid rain, for example from coal-fired power plants, causes a drop in the pH of water. Pollution from accidental spills, agricultural run-off, and sewer overflows can also change the pH (Puls and Powell 1992, pp. 169–170).
- 'Escherichia coli' (E. coli) is a type of faecal bacteria that comes from human and animal waste. Disease-causing bacteria and viruses may be present in water that has elevated levels of E. coli. Levels of E. coli can increase during flooding. E. coli is measured by the number of colony-forming units. The water quality standard for E. coli bacteria is 394 colony-forming units per 100 mL (Shafik 1994, p. 758).
- The 'Specific Conductance Test' measures the ability of water to pass an electrical current. Conductivity in water is affected by the presence of inorganic dissolved solids such as chlorides, sulphates, sodium, calcium and others. Conductivity in streams and rivers is affected by the geology of the area, but

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[4] Freshwater abstractions as percentage of the total renewable water resources respectively as percentage of internal water resources (Heap et al. 1998, p. 161).

also by industrial pollution or urban run-off. Because an organic compound such as oil does not conduct electrical current, an oil spill tends to lower the conductivity of the water. Temperature also affects conductivity, as warm water has a higher conductivity. Specific conductance is measured in microsiemens per centimetre (μs/cm) (Kelly 1977, pp. 420–424).

- The amount of nitrogen is tested in the form of nitrate (NO3-N). In excess amounts, nitrates in water cause an increase in algae growth. Algae can decrease the level of DO and eventually kill aquatic life. Sources of nitrates may include human and animal waste. Under certain conditions high levels of nitrates (10 mg/L or more) in drinking water can be toxic to humans. High levels of nitrates in drinking water have often been linked to serious illness and even to infant deaths. Nitrates are measured in milligrams per litre (mg/L; ARR 2001, p. 68).

3.3 Blue and Green Water Versus Soil and Ground Water

It is important to mention a few distinctions concerning the management of water resources. Firstly there is a distinction between *green water* and *blue water*. *Green water* can be described as mainly of fixed use and not used for a large variety of purposes, as it is the water that is caught up in plants. *Blue water* on the other hand is the water that is accessible in form of streams and lakes. This is the form of water of most interest for industrial use and agricultural production (Rost et al. 2008, pp. 3–5).

A second important distinction is that between *soil water* and *groundwater*. Overlapping in many ways with that between *green* and *blue water*, it focuses on the source of water. While *soil water* is caught up in topsoil, and mainly becomes available through precipitation, *groundwater* is available in form of aquifers, streams and lakes. *Soil water* is thus harder to plan for, as precipitation patterns are hard to predict, while the flow of rivers is more constant. Conflicts are most likely to arise over *ground-* or *blue water*, as this is the form of water whose supply is reliable up to a certain point (Allan 2009, p. 576, de Silva 2004, p. 2).

In general, we shall regard water as a flow resource (ground—or blue water), which is difficult to manage at the level of fixed jurisdictions. Three difficulties have to be faced concerning the management and supply of water:

- competition between the users of water resources;
- coordination between the different levels at which water is used and managed; and
- the mismatch between geopolitical and administrative boundaries and hydrological boundaries (Norman et al. 2010, p. 15).

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Chapter 4
Securitization and Discourse

Classical or realist security studies failed to foresee the end of the Cold War and to address new challenges. In the aftermath of the Cold War there was a widening of the narrow meta-theoretical assumptions of traditional security studies. The wide range of approaches in this field is often subsumed under *Critical Security Studies* (Booth 2005). This field of study stresses the claim that threats are a product of the politics of representation. Only through the actions of security agencies is a potential threat transformed into a matter of security. By reifying the initially constructed security threat, it is understood as a given fact and seen to exist externally of the agencies that produced it (Balzacq and Burgess 2010, p. 43). *Critical Security Studies* tries to dismantle the implicit assumptions by which threats to security are defined.

4.1 Theory of Securitization

Despite having distinguished itself from *Critical Security Studies,* the work of the *Copenhagen School* figures prominently in *Critical Security Studies* literature. The *Copenhagen School* stresses the need to avoid an endless broadening of the security concept and focuses on how security is used, regarding it as a field of practice (Wæver 1995, p. 55). It has developed an approach that formalizes the act of constructing an issue as a matter of security. This is the "securitization" approach (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan 1997, 2004; Wæver 1995, 2000, 2006; Wæver et al. 2007). Securitization deals with integrating a perceived reality into a security framework, and likewise socially constructing reality in terms of security. For that purpose Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde conceptualize security as a 'speech act', implying that to say something is the same as to do something (Austin 2005, p. 40). In a securitizing speech act an actor designates a threat to a specified reference object and declares an existential threat to it (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 25; Wæver 2000, p. 251). Once an issue is securitized it is separated from the negotiation processes of normal politics, and receives a higher priority than other issues (Williams

and Michael 2003, p. 5). Securitization is successful once the construction of an 'existential threat' is socially accepted, and under the conditions of an existential threat survival becomes crucial (Ciuta 2004; Hintermeier 2005). Securitization of an issue guarantees it heightened priority, while also accrediting a particular legitimacy to those handling the policies in question (Hansen and Lene 2006, p. 35). Some analysts argue that when the state of emergency becomes the norm, securitization can also function as a technique of governance (Shapiro and Michael 2005, p. 21). Furthermore, in order to legitimize certain policies under a state of emergency, securitization bestows on those accountable responsibility for the issue. In order to cast off this responsibility the issue has to be "de-securitized" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 209).

4.2 Levels of Securitization

Now that we have described the act of securitization, we need to describe the level of securitization. This refers to an actor's securitizing efforts. This actor can be located at any level from the individual to the level of all humankind. Nevertheless, a topic will most probably be securitized at state level, as the means of expression are best available at this level, and it is easiest to address a relevant audience.[1] The *Copenhagen School* lays emphasis on constructed security threats becoming relatively stable practices (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 35). Therefore—as a concept strongly rooted in history—the traditional understanding of security is still predominant. While changing the conception of security is possible in principle, the basis of security remains the state and its defence.

4.3 Violization and Opportunization

Securitization refers to the act of designating a security threat, but not to any further steps taken in order to achieve security. In an attempt to categorize securitization with reference to possible outcomes, the categories of violization and opportunization have been developed.

At the point when violence is used to fend off a designated security threat, politics become violated and the issue itself becomes violized (Neumann 1998, p. 2). *Confrontational action* is a possible category to define violization. *Action* means

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[1] Interestingly "macro-securitization" is also possible. This means that a relevant audience can be united by the feature of a commonly perceived security threat. "Macro-securitization" is most likely at a civilizational level (Buzan et al. 2009, p. 254).

violent conflict—not necessarily including death –, or some form of humiliation, provoking a reaction from the target of the action (Zeitoun and Mark 2006, p. 5). A *violation logic* may be invoked for decision-making (Warner and Jeroen 2000). Decisions made under this *violation logic* can be expected to follow distinctly different rationalities. For example, where violence was regarded as the only means or the last resort, feelings of revenge and humiliation could guide an actor according to the logic of violation.

The dynamics involved in defending security or in capitalizing on opportunities show strong similarities. If there is an opportunity for an actor to achieve a higher-order goal, an *opportunity logic* may be invoked by the actor presented with the opportunity. The issue might be handled in the same way a security issue would (Warner and Jeroen 2000). The category of opportunization tries to encompass this. 'Opportunized' can thus be considered the flip side of 'securitized'. Instead of a threat-defence mechanism, an opportunity-offence mechanism would be at work. A corresponding *opportunity logic* would be invoked for decision-making.

4.4 Identity

In constructivist approaches such as the theory of securitization, the concept of identity acquires importance in the realm of security. From a constructivist perspective, identity only exists in and is produced by social relationships and interaction. Accordingly the concept of identity not only refers to the self-identification and allocation of meaning by an actor to the self, but is also related to definitions of self assigned to and produced by others (Jenkins and Richard 2008, p. 22). Concepts and categorizations are consequently intersubjective, the product of a process of definition of social groups with certain identities, and therefore supraindividual (Stryker et al. 2000, p. 23). Identity can be thought of as existing in four dimensions:

- Identity existing in and being produced by social interactions is reflected in the concept of *alterity*. Here the identity of the self is defined by a dichotomous distinction between the self and the other. Identity in the dimension of *alterity* is based on dichotomies leading to oppositions that exclude one another.[2] Understanding identities in the dimension of *alterity* lays emphasis on the power constellations present in the construction of knowledge based on difference.

[2] The idea of identity solely based on difference has been doubted. Ole Wæver points to modern-day Europe and the European Union as an example demonstrating the opposite (Wæver and Ole 1996, p. 122).

- *Fluidity* refers to the flexibility of identities, seeing them as highly dynamic and constantly changing and evolving, and rejecting a given, fixed, homogeneous and bounded identity.
- *Constructedness* describes identities as the products of social interactions.
- *Multiplicity* indicates the possibility of multiple identities, between which actors can shift back and forth (Baki and Aminuddin 2009, p. 4; Goff et al. 2004).

Identity and security policies are closely interlinked. For example, national security draws upon the distinction between the inside and the outside of a state. The inside is presented as the desirable state of being, while promising prosperity, welfare etc. On the other hand, the outside world is presented as threatening and the state as the agent providing security from it. Domestic and international systems are therefore constructed as opposites. The construction of the national self as form of identity has led the state to take measures to ensure security from the threatening outside world. In this view security is not only a necessity, but defines the very identity of a state as the protector from external threats (Hansen and Lene 2006, p. 34).

4.5 Discourse Analysis

A securitizing actor identifying a security threat relies on a set of knowledge[3] on which particular decisions are based. From a constructivist perspective this knowledge can be regarded as being constructed in a discursive context,[4] with the relevant discursive groups linked together by some form of identity. With the changing of a discourse the meaning of the object also changes—its identity has changed.

For social constructivism "ideas and discourse matter", identities and interests are seen to be socially constructed (Wendt and Alexander 1992, p. 393). Discourse refers to any form of communication—speeches, conversation etc.—that are instrumental, communicative, or constitutive (Gee and James Paul 2005, pp. 2–5). The norms, values and identities created in a discourse influence political life to a great extent and may serve as focal points for themselves and others (Lapid et al. 1996, pp. 210−212). Accordingly, a discourse establishes a template for judging the surrounding circumstances.

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[3] 'Knowledge' is defined as: "all sorts of meanings, with the help of which humans allocate meaning to their surrounding environment and constantly reshape their environment" (Jäger and Siegfried 2006, p. 84).

[4] In this work discourse is understood in a Foucauldian way, as: "an entity of sequences of signs in that they are enouncements" (Foucault and Michel 2002, p. 141). An enouncement is an abstract matter that enables signs to assign specific repeatable relations to objects, subjects, and other enouncements (Foucault and Michel 2002, p. 140).

In discourse analysis language is significant. Only by constructing objects in the form of language can meaning be attributed to them. Language is understood as a *"system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference"* (Hansen and Lene 2006, p. 18).

Identity is constructed in close relation to difference, as it is argued that it is a positive process of linking certain characteristics in combination with a negative process of differentiation that creates identity. Often it is stated that creating an identity makes the existence of an *other* mandatory (Miller and David 1989, pp. 67−68).[5] Yet the process of differentiation does not equate with a presupposed external *other*. An adversarial exclusion of identities is regarded as a historical contingency, originating in the paradigm of state sovereignty and a 'Westphalian State System', since, under the current interstate system, collective identities constitute themselves in contrast to an external other (Abizadeh and Arash 2005, p. 45). The main concern in constructivism remains explaining how states, social groups etc., come to acquire their identities, and therefore it needs to allow the possibility that state identities need not be adversarial (Wendt and Alexander 1992, p. 395). With their individual knowledge sets, humans allocate meaning to their environment. Their perception of their surroundings is dependent on the knowledge they can draw upon. Identity may be defined as the *"repetition of common patterns of thought and action"* (Fuchs and Peter 2004, p. 78). These repetitions are bound to a dimension of meaning by which they are confirmed (Brown and Spencer 1969, p. 81). Being created simultaneously in a positive linking and negative differentiating way, identity is attributed to a subject or group by the *self* or by an outside actor. This allocation of identity and therefore of meaning is dependent on knowledge, which in turn is a product of the relevant discourses.

A discourse is the "flow of knowledge through time that determines individual and collective actions and therefore exercises power" (Jäger and Siegfried 2006, p. 84). As a discourse functions in this way, it establishes the circumstances for the constitution of a subject and the structuring of society as a whole. Power is being exercised, as a discourse determines the way a certain issue is perceived, as well as the scope of reactions regarded as necessary. In addition, a discourse excludes a number of other statements and therefore stops them from being connected to consecutive actions (Fairclough and Holes 1999, p. 82). Here the distinction between *hegemonic discourse* and *instrumental discourse* gains importance. While a 'hegemonic discourse' has a dynamic of its own which cannot be influenced by particular interests, an 'instrumental discourse' can be influenced and used to bolster a claim and to pursue one's own interests. Instrumentalization can occur when an agenda is enforced—positive form—or when certain issues are purposely

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[5] "The view that community might embrace all of humankind neglects the fact […] that communities just are particularistic. In seeing myself as a member of a community, I see myself as participating in a particular way of life marked off from other communities by its distinctive characteristics" (Miller and David 1989, pp. 67–68).

excluded from the discourse—negative form (Wodak et al. 2009, p. 159). The empirical footprints of a discourse are the so-called dispositives.[6]

In every group a number of discourses exist side by side and their structure is highly dependent on the identity of the relevant group. A collective form of symbolism[7] functions as connection between the different discourses (Jäger et al. 2009, p. 36). Establishing symbolism can be the function of a collective understanding of the past.[8] A collective understanding of the past constitutes a view of the present and establishes a shared identity by providing a shared understanding of the self and the environment. The media that create a collective understanding of the past are oral history, written texts, or even physical monuments that help a collective to communicate constantly about its own history and therefore about its own identity (Assmann and Jan 1995, p. 126).

This can be seen in the different historical narratives concerning the establishment of the state of Israel. In the Arab states and especially for the Palestinians the events of 1948 are known as the *Naqba* (catastrophe). According to the constructed knowledge about these events, the present is perceived in this case as ongoing oppression from Jewish immigrants (Sa'Di et al. 2007). When *Yom Ha`atzmaut* (Independence Day) is celebrated in Israel, the same day is known as *Naqba-day* in the Arab world. In Israel the notion of history is strongly intertwined with religion, namely Judaism. Jewish history is characterized by the constant experience of persecution, which is passed on in the form of myths. The Shoa is constantly taught in schools and is omnipresent in daily life. In the modern history of the state of Israel the ongoing enmity of the surrounding Arab states and the recurrent wars shape views on the world and on history. The experiences of the Shoa have led to the new leitmotif of the *New Jew*, who is independent, strong, and will never be a victim again. The successful founding of the Israeli state and

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[6] A possible connection between discourse and dispositive is described by the 'activity theory' of Alexei Leontjew. In activity theory the active subject is the connection between discourse and empirical reality. With the help of this theory, the actions of a community ('activities') or of a group or an individual ('actions'), and the routine works of an individual ('operations') can be explained. A motive is derived from a particular need and as a consequence a particular aim is seen to be relevant, and to reach this goal actions and operations are the material to achieve it (Wodak and Meyer 2005, p. 25). Actors engage and interact with their environment, and through this tools are produced which are external forms of mental processes; these do not have to be material but may also include techniques. Leontjew points out that individuals engage in 'actions' that do not necessarily satisfy a need, but contribute towards the eventual satisfaction of this need in the future. These 'actions' make sense only in a social context. In 'activity theory' three levels are distinguished: 'operations' (routine works by an individual), upon which 'actions' are based (conducted by a group or by an individual actor), and 'activities' (conducted by communities), which draw upon 'actions'. Corresponding to 'operations', 'actions', and 'activities' are 'motives', 'aims', and 'instrumental conditions' (Blunden and Andy 2010, pp. 226–230; Leontjew 1978).

[7] Cultural stereotypes which are collectively passed from generation to generation (Jäger et al. 2009, p 36).

[8] A collective understanding of the future is also possible, as can be seen in messianic movements and their discourses.

the several wars that have been fought have reinforced this leitmotif (Katz and Steven 1993).

4.6 Operationalizing Human Security

Knowledge and identity are created in discourses and help to attribute meaning to the surrounding conditions and social relations. Discourses can draw upon and reinforce the identity on which they are based. So the perception of one's natural and social environment and the subsequent actions based on these perceptions are a product of discourses. In order to address the question of the securitization of water security in Israel and Jordan a discourse analysis has to be conducted.

Different materials are used. For the analysis of the public discourse, the popular media such as television and newspapers should be used. Analysing the scientific discourse requires scholarly literature, and for the analysis of the political discourse the conversations of policy professionals and policy advocates should be taken into account. The challenge for discourse analysis as a research tool is that all material can be regarded as discursively mediated. Security issues are not handled afresh as their solution is negotiated on a discursive terrain which is already partially structured through previously articulated identities. This puts the question of useful distinctions at the centre. In this study a division is made between the discourse of state executives and the scientific discourse. This is regarded as helpful as the institutions securitizing relevant topics are mostly congruent with the state executives on whom the responsibility of security has been placed.[9]

We argue in this book that the scientific discourse is not as restrained as the discourse of state executives. Different conditions influencing the securitizing discourse can be identified. We hypothesize that if a certain perspective has developed at the scientific level, but not at the level of state executives, a set of restrictions applies to the discourse of state executives. This form of analysis helps us to understand certain standpoints by reproducing the relevant perspectives and the attribution of meaning to topics concerning the security of water.

In this study the elucidation of the relevant perspectives will be carried out in close relation to the appropriate referent object. This seems appropriate as possible threats are different depending on the level of securitization, either at the individual level of human security or at the wider level of national security. As we argue that the concept of security has historically been conceptualized in close relation to national security and has evolved since, the question of the security level on which relevant perspectives are based can also be asked if a human security

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[9] Military generals as members of the securitizing elites are not included in this work. This flaw is due to the difficulty of access to reliable sources. As this work aims at the possibilities of expression and not at the exact reproduction of a discourse, this flaw is seen as not having a major influence on the general findings.

perspective has developed. This question presupposes a national security perspective, but it will be elaborated in more detail. It also helps to identify a shift in the perception of possible security threats, and therefore comprehends the overall perspective which guides the perception of security issues at large.

In order to respond to the question about a human security perspective, the first step is to operationalize human security and make it accessible for analysis. This procedure must reflect the variability of conception in different contexts where uniform principles are applied. To do this, we introduce a threshold-based definition of human security which allows us to differentiate between human security threats in different contexts while still ensuring a level of intellectual rigour: "Human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats." Furthermore it is "an orientation to future risks and a focus on risks falling below some critical threshold of deprivation" (Owen and Taylor 2004, p. 383). Accordingly, a possible threat to human security imperils a domain of well-being that is essential insofar as it has been "important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives and property at great risk" (King et al. 2002, p. 592). Such a threshold-based definition helps us to investigate the connections between the wider public, decision-makers, and scientists. As certain topics have to be regarded as important enough to fight over, these topics are most likely an object of the scientific and political discourse. If integration into the relevant discourses has not occurred, despite the willingness to fight a certain discourse-dynamic—a 'hegemonic discourse'—has to be in place, or certain issues are purposely excluded—e.g. the negative form of an 'instrumental discourse'.

Based on this definition four components of human security[10] can be derived:

- protecting the physical integrity of human beings (*freedom from fear*);
- providing access to the goods and services needed to satisfy material and non-material needs (*freedom from want*);
- enabling individuals to cope with contingencies and emergencies that threaten survival (*freedom from hazard impact*); and
- ensuring *participation in processes used to delineate, revise, achieve and advance individual and collective welfare* (Owen and Taylor 2004, p. 384).

The component *protecting physical integrity* includes threats to life emanating from a variety of sources. Various forms of violence—torture, arbitrary arrest, invasion of privacy, harassment, and surveillance, as well as burglary, trafficking,

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[10] The human security pillar of "freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment" (Annan and Kofi 2000a, p. 1) is not integrated into this work. After all, "states approach security as aggregate security, not as five different fields" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 170). In that regard the integration of a specific environmental component confuses the results concerning the securitization of water between the two states of Jordan and Israel. Accentuating the environmental component leads to an under-representation of the other dimensions (economic, societal, military, and political), which are all linked by the mediatory medium water.

extortion, and bribery—are considered as threats to the physical integrity of an individual and therefore to human security (Chourou and Bechir 2005, p. 16). Physical integrity may also be imperilled because of lack of food, medical care, or other goods and services without which life cannot be sustained. Besides the access to material goods an individual's moral participation in society and in all aspects of a decent life—such as human dignity and self-fulfilment—has to be ensured to guarantee freedom from want (UNDP 2002, p. 15). To enable people to mobilize their resources in case of emergencies and a concentration on sustainable development goals in order to escape the 'survival dilemma' are constituents of the human security component of *freedom from hazard impact* (Brauch 2006). The component of "ensuring participation in processes of collective welfare" (Owen and Taylor 2004, p. 384) is strongly interlinked with notions of democratization. This is because in many cases the state itself is the main source of threat to its citizens. It can be argued that 'participation' weakens the tendency of states to imperil the security of their own citizens by involving them in some form of decision-making process. Ensuring 'participation' can be seen as a means to advance human security.

Whether these four components of human security are addressed in the security discourse of state executives and in the scientific security discourses is a question that will be examined once the willingness of people in Jordan and Israel to 'fight over or to put their lives and property at great risk' for one of the four components has been identified. Incidents such as riots over the four components of human security will be discussed, based on public media in Israel and Jordan. Once we have identified how far people are motivated to act on human security grievances, we shall investigate the integration of a human security perspective into the agenda of state institutions.

For the analysis of the scientific discourse several publications from research institutions were selected.[11] The research institutions were chosen to cover a wide range of possible positions. In Jordan the *Arab Thought Forum* (ATF) represents a more *Arab* position, while the *Center for Strategic Studies* (JCSS) is regarded as connected to the Hashemite monarchy, and the *Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center* (AUAJRC) is considered to be more 'Palestinian-friendly'.[12]

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[11] A number of publications in Arabic were used for research, while no Hebrew sources were used. Because of the large number of Israeli scientists publishing in English, this flaw can be regarded as having a minor impact on the results.

[12] The term 'Palestinian-friendly' is important as 50.56 per cent of the Jordanian population considers itself Palestinian (PCBS (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) 2009). This high ratio has often led to tensions in the past and resulted in violent conflicts between militant Palestinian organizations and the Hashemite monarchy. September 1970 is known as Black September. Former King Hussein of Jordan destroyed militant Palestinian organizations and restored the monarchy's rule over the country. The armed conflict lasted until July 1971 and resulted in the expulsion of the PLO and of thousands of Palestinian fighters to Lebanon (Shlaim and Avi 2007, pp. 301–302).

In Jordan the first distinction that has to be made is that between the *East Bankers*—Jordanians of Bedouin origin, living in Jordan before 1948—and Palestinians, who came to the country after the establishment of the Israeli state. The interests of the *East Bankers* are closely connected to the well-being of the Hashemite monarchy, as a large proportion of them occupy positions in the apparatus of the state. The JCSS has therefore been chosen to represent the *East Bankers,* while the AUAJRC represents the Palestinians in Jordan. Another distinction can be made between a particularistic view, dealing with the interests of one group (e.g. the East Bankers—JCSS, or Palestinians—AUAJRC), and a wider *Arab* focus. The ATF has therefore been included in this study, as it represents a wider Arab view on security issues.[13]

The research institutions taken into account in Israel are the *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies* (BESA), the *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* (JCPA), and the *Peres Center for Peace* (PCP). The goal of this study is to cover a wide range of positions on security issues and of interests possibly influencing the work of the research institutions. In Israel a distinction can be made between those advocating *land for peace* (the *doves*) and those campaigning for *peace for peace* (the *hawks*). Here the BESA represents the 'hawkish' position, while the PCP represents the 'dovish' position, and the JCPA takes the middle ground. The BESA is considered as representing a more conservative approach towards security studies, especially as the BESA is connected to the conservative *Bar-Ilan University*. The JCPA has a more pragmatist reputation, while the PCP stands for the more 'dovish' positions of the Israeli peace camp.

We shall examine how far a human security perspective has been integrated into the security discourse of state executives using the public statements of state executives and non-classified, freely accessible government documents.[14] A wide range of possible positions, taking the target audience into account, will be covered. The goal is to identify a general perspective. Therefore, we shall use for this investigation the websites of the appropriate ministries, newspapers representing different opinions, and speeches given on different occasions. In Jordan, newspaper sources are for example the government-friendly *Jordan Times*, the independent newspaper *Al-Rai*, and the Palestinian-friendly *As Sabeel*. In Israel the conservative *Jerusalem Post* and the more liberal *Ha`aretz* represent the two poles of the media spectrum used in this study. We shall argue that the wish to present one's own person or policies in the best possible light offers much information on the appropriate perspectives.

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[13] The distinction between Islamist and moderate Muslims has not been integrated into this work, as it is argued that no research institution covers Islamist views in Jordan and therefore no investigation can be conducted.

[14] Only using freely accessible documents is a flaw which cannot be circumvented. Nevertheless, the research aims at "fields of possible articulation" and it is argued that these fields also become visible in publicly accessible documents.

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Chapter 5
The Human Security Discourse in Jordan

5.1 A Threshold for Human Security in Jordan

Constraints on human security in Jordan are many. Demographic trends and an urbanization rate of 79 % (CIA 2012a) makes cities such as Amman especially hard to manage. Inhabitants are confronted with insufficient and substandard housing, growing criminality, and pollution. In the face of the growing population and a 12.7 % unemployment rate (CIA 2012a), Jordan's national income is not growing quickly enough to prevent a deterioration of living standards. We shall investigate whether the lack of human security has motivated Jordanians to 'fight over or to put their lives and property at great risk'.

The motivation to act on the failure to provide physical integrity—*freedom from fear*—seems obvious. Accordingly, several violent outbreaks could be observed.[1] Violent clashes between security forces and protesters in the Amman neighbourhood of *Umm Summaq* were sparked by the death of a neighbourhood resident, killed by police forces during a drug bust (Daoud 2010). From this incident it becomes obvious that *freedom from fear* is an issue Jordanians are willing to act on.

A shortcoming in 'providing access to goods and services' by the Jordanian government has variously motivated Jordanians to take action. Riots and violent outbursts in Amman and Karak have been indications of discontent over the provision of human security. When the government suspended subsidies for wheat and bread prices instantly doubled, the protests calling for a reintroduction of subsidies quickly deteriorated into two days of riots. Military occupation of the town and a strict curfew ended the upheaval in Karak. Aware of the delicate situation, the government dropped nearly all charges against those arrested during the riots (Andoni and Schwedler 1996, pp. 40–42; Curtis 1998, p. 54). On issues of *freedom from want*, the motivation to act on particular shortcomings and even to put

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[1] A single action is distinguished from a threat to human security (Thomas and Tow 2002, pp. 183–185). Here the goal is to identify a general willingness in the population to act upon failures in the provision of human security. Therefore, the threat is generalized and seen as the potential for performing single actions from which the individual will be protected.

one's own life at risk became obvious during the protests in the wake the *Arab Spring*. The calls for political reform were a main reason for people to occupy the streets, but the demand for at least a drop in food prices also motivated the protesters (McDevitt 2011).

In 2007 access to clean water was disrupted in Sakeb. Hundreds of citizens were hospitalized with fever and diarrhoea. While officials insisted that food poisoning caused this epidemic, the government was widely blamed for the outbreak. When Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit visited the Sakeb hospital, discontent with the situation deteriorated into riots, with ten people being injured. There was harsh criticism that the government had failed to prepare for such a situation. The riots have since become known as the "diarrhoea riots".[2] A human security component touched on by this incident is *freedom from want*, as access to the basic commodity of clean water could not be provided for. Yet the main accusation brought forward by the protesters was that the government had failed to prepare the inhabitants for such an incident. The notion of *freedom from hazard impact* demonstrates a human security perspective, and creates pressure to integrate such a perspective into the Jordanian security discourse.

Before the uprisings of the *Arab Spring*, motivation to act on the provision of human security in the dimension of 'participation' was only moderately developed. Yet several incidents showed that Jordanian citizens consolidated their position regarding participation in society. Post-election violence after the 2010 elections illustrates the motivation to act on a lack of 'participation'. Calling for democratization and claiming the election results had been manipulated, students took to the streets. In the city of Ajloun riots took place. Despite both parties claiming a competitive disadvantage in the elections, the violence was mostly due to tribalism and the rivalries between two tribes who had candidates in the same electoral district (Omari 2010). The call for participation is especially strong in Jordan's Palestinian population. Yet it is often stated that the call for more participation and the dismissal of the former government did not aim to end the Hashemite monarchy (Kadri and Bronner 2011). Since the upheavals during the *Arab Spring*, the call for a democratization of Jordan has rapidly gained strength. The protesters mainly demanded change from within the system but still their motivation to take to the streets and to call for democracy was strong, as can be seen by the recurrent protests, especially on Fridays after prayer (Luck 2011).

We may conclude that human security is contingently at peril in Jordan and that Jordanians are willing to fight over shortcomings in its provision. Public pressure is present and could have served as a stimulus for the development of a human security perspective in the scientific and state executives' security discourse. If a human security perspective can be traced in the Jordanian security discourse, then there is the possibility of an instrumental discourse. With pressure from the population a human security perspective could be adopted so as to provide the motivation for addressing a shortcoming in the provision of human security.

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[2] "Jordan: Ten injured in diarrhoea riots", in: *IRIN News* (31 October 2007); at: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report. aspx?ReportId= 75072> (12 November 2011).

5.2 The Scientific Security Discourse in Jordan

Dr. Hammam Ghassib, the secretary-general of the Arab Thought Forum (ATF), and Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Ghamdi,[3] the president of the Naif Arab University for Security Sciences in Saudi Arabia, stated that the topic of human security will have special priority for the work of the Forum in the coming years. Ghassib stressed that the Forum's goal was to create awareness of human security among Arab decision-makers.[4]

The most prominent Jordanian associated with human security is HRH Prince Hassan Bin Talal. Until January 1999, he served as the King's closest political advisor and as Regent in the King's absence. Having strongly influenced the discourse on security, HRH Prince Hassan Bin Talal has been the most prominent advocate of a human security perspective at the societal and scientific level, while he has also strongly influenced the state executives' discourse for over thirty years. His definition of human security is wide, and includes a national security[5] dimension (Bin Talal 2003; RHSC Amman 2010). Having initiated the founding of influential scientific institutions such as the ATF, the Prince's perspective is reflected in published papers. At a conference on the impacts of globalization, he called for the humanizing of globalization. He advocated a change in perspective so that the needs of the people would be regarded as the main focus of political and economic interests, and he said that a state of security cannot be achieved if more than a billion people suffer from hunger and are deprived of their right to food (Karishan 2010).

As an explicit advocate of human security, it is not surprising that Hassan Bin Talal has referred to access to goods and services as well as to the physical integrity of human beings, as he talks about access to food and the prevention of suffering. Furthermore, the Prince has called for a security policy with a double focus, based on the idea of comprehensive security—including an individual perspective and a state-based perspective (Bin Talal 2003).

The *Regional Human Security Center* (RHSC), created in 2000, is the main institution promoting human security in Jordan. Being under the patronage of

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[3] In the academic discourse a number of stimuli must be considered. Therefore, the nationality of contributors to the scientific discourse in Jordan will not be taken into account, but only the forum they are using for the distribution of their ideas. For example, Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Ghamdi is included despite his Saudi nationality.

[4] وزير الداخلية: الامن الشامل مطلب اساسي لتحقيق الحرية والكرامة. ("Minister of the Interior: Overall security is a key demand for freedom and dignity"), in: *As Sawsana*, 13 July 2010; at: <http://www.assawsana.com/portal/newsshow.aspx?id = 33503> (29 November 2011).

[5] "[…] I would like to depart from the familiar dichotomy between security as the defense of states and security as a personal right, and offer a different perspective, viewing this question through a wider lens, a lens which captures the full gamut of inter-personal, community-oriented, and culturally-founded relationships which take place between the levels of individual and state" (Bin Talal 2003; RHSC Amman 2010).

Prince Hassan Bin Talal, the RHSC seeks to advance the cause and concept of human security through research, training, and the facilitation of dialogue on policy recommendations (RHSC Amman 2010). As the RHSC explicitly wishes to promote human security it has not been integrated into this research, as it may be judged that in the case of the RHSC a human security perspective has developed.

Whether and how far a human security perspective has developed in the Jordanian scientific security discourse will now be examined using publications by the most influential institutions for the research of security, namely the *Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center* (AUAJRC) (representing a more 'Palestinian-friendly' position), the *Arab Thought Forum* (ATF) (representing an *Arab* focus, encompassing positions and opinions from all over the Arab World), and the *Center for Strategic Studies* (CSS), closely connected to the interests of the Hashemite monarchy.

5.2.1 Arab Thought Forum

In an article published in the *Arab Thought Forum Magazine*, Khadija Arafah[6] explicitly deals with the topic of human security and how the concept is applied.[7] Arafah regards transformations in the international environment and the interests of powerful international actors as the driving forces in advancing the concept. She reasons that human security could be simply camouflage for interference into states' internal affairs and a threat to their sovereignty. Arafah argues that human security has been and should be a response to the suffering of individuals, but that the concept is mainly advanced by the dominant international forces. These rather try to achieve political objectives and marginalize the United Nations. This has led to massive violations of individual rights under the pretext of humanitarianism. She points to the concept's implementation by the European Union, and claims that the Union's goal is to achieve human security by international intervention through the deployment of troops. She refers to the European Union's strategy, which makes 'absolute necessity' the prerequisite for any humanitarian intervention, and argues that absolute necessity was also believed to exist in the case of the

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[6] Although Arafah's work focuses on developments in Egypt, her work can be regarded as a stimulus for the Jordanian discourse, as it is influential and, not insignificantly, published in a Jordan-based magazine. Kaddijah Arafah is the director of the Working Group at the Information and Decision Support Center chaired by the Council of Ministers of Egypt.

[7] Arafah defines human security as: "essence of the individual; it means eliminating all political, economic and social threats to the security of individuals, by focusing on institutional reform, the reform of security institutions, and the establishment of institutions at the local, regional and global level. Achieving the security of individuals, can not be achieved in isolation from the security of nations" [translated from Arabic: أمن الأفراد؛ إذ يُعنى بالتخلص من كافة ما يهدد أمن الأفراد جوهره الفرد؛ السياسي والاقتصادي والاجتماعي، من خلال التركيز على الإصلاح المؤسسي، وذلك بإصلاح المؤسسات الأمنية القائمة، وإنشاء مؤسسات أمنية جديدة على المستويات المحلية والإقليمية والعالمية، وهو ما لا يمكن تحقيقه بمعزل عن أمن الدول.] (Arafah 2008).

Israeli bombardment of Qana,[8] illustrating the highly emotional nature of the topic. Arafah reasons that making popular approval a prerequisite of any intervention is not helpful, as exactly the same interests would be pursued, but now approved by a wider public. She concludes that Arab states should reject the concept of human security, since it is used to implement certain interests aimed at controlling other nations. Nevertheless, Arafah contends that the concept could be used internally by the Arab states. She regards national security as a prerequisite for human security, and emphasizes the need to reconcile both concepts by a reform of security institutions to enable them to face new challenges.[9] She argues that the achievement of human security requires more attention to human development, and that this requires a reduction in military spending and a focus on health and educational issues, as well as the empowerment of individuals (Arafah 2008). Arafah is explicitly writing about human security, and so the concept of human security clearly influences the work of the *Arab Thought Forum*. Yet her specific interpretation of human security is highly interesting. Arafah regards human security as a Western concept. She acknowledges its potential for Arab countries, should they implement the concept, but regards human security as an instrument for enforcing Western values and interests.

In "Education and Development", an article written by Muhammad Al-Rumaihi[10] and published in the *Arab Thought Forum Magazine,* Al-Rumaihi argues that the problems of economic, social, political, cultural, and health and environmental security are mainly educational issues. He states that the link between social and economic development and education has become universally accepted and underlines its importance by citing King Abdallah II of Jordan, who describes education as a pillar of development in Islamic countries. Al-Rumaihi notes that the multitude of failures connected with the educational system in Arab countries strongly correlates with the Arab decision-makers' ignoring criticism and only pursuing their particular interests. He emphasizes that restrictions on co-education in particular have led to the impoverishment of social and intellectual skills. He complains that research on certain social and political issues is prohibited by Arab traditions and customs. Al-Rumaihi criticizes Arab countries for failing to provide job opportunities for young professionals. It is not surprising to him that half of those educated in Western countries do not return. He concludes that

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[8] The bombardment of Qana, a village in Southern Lebanon, took place on 18 April 1996, when Israeli artillery began bombarding a United Nations compound. Of the 800 Lebanese who had taken refuge in the compound, 106 were killed and about 116 were injured (Volk 2010, p. 225).

[9] Here the notion of 'comprehensive power' is interesting. As it is argued by various Arab academics, hard and soft security issues are fully interlinked, with hard security being a necessary prerequisite for soft security. Here the notion of power in relations with outside actors gains importance (Selim, M. 2011, p. 327).

[10] Although the author is professor at the University of Kuwait his contributions to the scientific discourse in Jordan can be regarded as important, since the Arab Thought Forum is based in Amman and the selection of articles for the Arab Thought Forum Magazine can be said to reflect supporters of the forum, such as HRH Prince Hassan Bin Talal.

education will constantly fail to provide for economic, social, political, cultural, and health and environmental security as long as society continues to put up regulatory barriers to education and to scientific research. Finally, Al-Rumaihi demands that education should aim at preventing wars and violent conflict, especially between different clans (Al-Rumaihi 2008). Education as a tool to enable the individual to make life choices and as a non-material good to which access should be guaranteed has strong connections with the concept of human security. Al-Rumaihi acknowledges this link especially when he points out the importance of education in preventing violent conflict. The notion of education contributing to *freedom from want* and also *freedom from fear* by aiming at the prevention of violent conflict is present in Al-Rumaihi's words and influences the scientific security discourse in Jordan.

In an article about the nature of loyalty in the Arab World Yusuf Abdallah Mahmoud places personal security in close relation to an incorrect understanding of loyalty. Using examples from Arab literature, he concludes that loyalty was too often understood as support for the rulers and their policies. Loyalty to the 'homeland'[11] and to one's own people is considered to have suffered. He argues that the security of a country and its citizens can only be achieved by changing the concept of loyalty from a focus on the person of the ruler to a perspective that includes the well-being of every individual and the well-being of the 'homeland' (Mahmoud 2009). Here we can trace the idea of 'participation'. Mahmoud argues for a shift of focus and points out that every individual should contribute to the well-being of the 'homeland'. The referent object of security remains the 'homeland', but he acknowledges that every person should participate and not blindly follow those in charge. Once every person participates in the 'homeland's' well-being, decision-makers cannot endanger the security of the individual.

5.2.2 Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Center

In a publication for the UN's *Global Compact*[12] Hani Hourani[13] and May Al-Taher placed the implementation of labour rights for Jordanian employees in close relation to individual security. They argue that a large proportion of employees are not covered by law, as the informal sector—domestic workers, family-owned businesses,

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[11] Translated from Arabic: الوطن (Al'Watan), meaning 'homeland'. This has different implications from 'country' البلد (Al'Beled), or 'the state' الدولة (Al'Dualia) and is often used in Palestinian rhetoric to refer to Palestine—Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories.

[12] The United Nations Global Compact is a United Nations initiative to encourage companies to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies and to report regularly on their implementation. The Global Compact establishes a principle-based framework, stating ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment, and anti-corruption (UNGC 2010).

[13] Notably the AUAJ's head, Hani Hourani, was active in anti-government politics during the 1960 s as a member of the Marxist wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

and agricultural workers—is excluded from it. Hourani and Al-Taher state that these
workers cannot legally exercise their fundamental rights and cannot protect them-
selves against exploitative methods. Access to goods and services is regarded as
particularly insufficient. For example, only fifteen per cent of the current work-
force and three per cent of retired workers are included in the health insurance sys-
tem. Retirement pensions are too low to secure a minimum standard of living for a
retired person. Health expenses in particular cannot be sufficiently covered. The
AUAJRC researchers demand that special articles should be added to the labour
law in order to create mechanisms for protecting the unemployed. Additionally, all
workers and employees should be allowed to join unions without discrimination
based on citizenship. Improvements regarding the situation of women and children
are especially demanded. Hourani and Al-Taher argue that health services and
childcare centres for female workers should be established. The wages of female
workers during maternity leave should be sustained. Combating child labour by
compensating families through granting cash allowances equivalent to the income
given up for raising the children and paying for expenses like schooling, uniforms
and stationery is seen as the most important step in guaranteeing the security of
children. They argue for campaigns to boycott products that involve child labour at
any stage of their production (Hourani and Al-Taher 2007). This indicates a human
security perspective since they are demanding access to goods and services. Their
criticism also hints at parts of the Jordanian population's not being able to cope
with contingencies and emergencies since they are excluded from social welfare.
A human security perspective based on the component *freedom from want* exists.
The call to enable individuals to provide for their own welfare and therefore for its
own security suggests the presence of such a perspective.

5.2.3   Center for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan

A JCSS report on the implementation of the *Jordan-EU Action Plan* implicitly
provides information as to how far a human security perspective—according to the
EU's idea of human security—has developed. As the *Jordan-EU Action Plan* calls
for the development of an independent judiciary and the promotion of human
rights, it can be argued that according to the definition of human security in the
Barcelona Report[14] the development plan is a means of achieving human security.

The JCSS states that Jordan was not fully aware of its obligations when signing
the agreement. This implies that a common understanding of human security and
development was not present. But as the report constantly points out achievements
and commitment to reform, it can be argued that an understanding of human secu-
rity similar to that of the EU is emerging. In addition, the progress of the Action
Plan's implementation is constantly described as a positive development, while

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[14] "Human security refers to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross
human rights violations" (Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2004, p. 5).

Table 5.1   Scientific discourse in Jordan

Scientific security discourse in Jordan	Human security perspective present in all four components
	Human security is regarded as a 'Western' concept
	Authorities are seen as a barrier to achieving human security
	National security remains the dominant perspective

Source Compiled by the author

shortcomings are described in negative terms. Regarding the Action Plan's points about cooperation on conflict prevention and crisis management, the JCSS report refers to fighting organized crime, migration, and the reform of the penal sector as issues of security policies. This points to a variety of possible threats to security, which can only be identified as threats if a human security perspective exists. Regarding migration, the Iraqi refugees are discussed in detail and it is argued that refugees receive the same goods and services as Jordanian citizens. These are, for example, schooling for the refugees' children and health care at the same price as that charged for Jordanian citizens. With regard to the reform of the penal system, there is a strong focus on human rights. The improvement of the conditions in Jordanian prisons is seen as a highly positive development. However, the fact that the penal system remains in the hands of the Public Security Directorate is seen as negative (Nabulsi 2009).

5.2.4 Conclusion: Scientific Security Discourse in Jordan

It can be concluded that a human security perspective has developed in the Jordanian scientific discourse. All four components of human security can be traced in the various studies, regardless of the particular institute's position. One feature of the scientific human security discourse is human security's being regarded as a Western concept which can only be of limited use in Jordan. The possibility of Western countries using the concept to interfere with the domestic affairs of another state is identified as a problem. Another aspect of the human security discourse in Jordan is criticism of the authorities for having failed to provide for human security (Table 5.1).

5.3 Security Discourse of State Executives in Jordan

In the search for a better understanding of the securitizing dynamics concerning the issue of water, we shall now examine a particular time period in 1999 when a dispute over the allocation of water resources caused a severe crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations. We shall review the security discourse of state executives around the year 1999 in order to develop a reference point for the current security discourse.

5.3.1 Security Discourse of State Executives in Jordan around 1999

The King's contributions to the security discourse are of the utmost importance for assessing whether a human security perspective has developed in Jordan. On 7 February 1999, King Abdallah II inherited the Hashemite throne from his father Hussein. Most observers had taken it for granted that HRH Prince Hassan Bin Talal would succeed his brother Hussein. But as the succession was changed only a few days earlier and HRH Prince Hassan Bin Talal did not inherit the throne from his brother, uncertainties emerged as to whether the new king would be able to deal with the difficult situation of a deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process, recurrent American and British attacks on neighbouring Iraq, and an economic recession accelerated by the decline in oil prices. In this light the statements made in 1999, when a crisis over the water supply involving shared water resources with Israel, can be expected to reflect those uncertainties.

The protection of the individual, as *freedom from fear*, is not regarded to be as important compared with the protection of the national interest. If the protection of the individual is mentioned, this is done without referring to a defined threat, and the protection of the individual is mostly referred to as being guaranteed by the armed forces (Abdallah II 1999a). In statements made by King Abdallah around 1999 a notion of *freedom from want* appears. Here the main focus—economic development in Jordan, aiming at keeping up with the country's population growth—shows through. He stresses that poverty and unemployment have to be tackled as major issues and that the fight against corruption and nepotism is crucial in achieving *comprehensive security* (Ciriaci 1999). He additionally addresses the supply of water for Jordanian citizens as a matter of national security, stressing the need to overcome distribution problems and arguing that the water issue might ignite violent conflicts in the future (Wardam 1999). Furthermore, a notion of democratization is present when he formulates the goal of including more societal groups into Jordanian politics and of ensuring their participation in society. Yet the idea of participation being closely linked to the goal of achieving economic success is demonstrated when he states that democratization is a means of achieving economic development. In addition, he refers to Jordan's dependency on outside resources being an obstacle for security efforts, and states that Jordan should be self-reliant and self-sustaining for the sake of its citizens (Abdallah II 1999a).

A notion of *freedom from hazard impact* is demonstrated when King Abdallah II stresses the importance of further cooperation between armed forces, government, and the private sector when dealing with natural disasters.[15] Despite several hints pointing towards a human security perspective, the understanding of security is almost exclusively based on national security considerations, and mainly concerns relations with Israel, the Palestinian question, and the situation in neighbouring

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[15] "King meets with CDD officials to discuss natural disaster, emergency readiness", in: *Jordan Times*, 29 November 1999.

Iraq (Abdallah II 1999c). Accordingly, therefore, King Abdallah states that the main precondition for stability, security, and development is peace with the state of Israel (Ciriaci 1999).

In 1999 a critical incident occurred when tensions rose to the point that Jordan announced "appropriate reactions" if its water supply should be disrupted. With this background, we shall assess the relevant security perspectives of influential state executives in the governments of Prime Ministers Fayez Al-Tarawneh and Abdelraouf Al-Rawabdeh with regard to references to a human security perspective.

Jordan's 83rd government under Prime Minister Al-Tarawneh was a cabinet of technocrats whose main challenge was financial and economic stagnation in Jordan (Ciriaci 1998). When Abdelraouf Al-Rawabdeh became Prime Minister on 4 March 1999, his government was considered as a step backwards in terms of democratization (Ciriaci 1999). Unlike previous governments, the Al-Rawabdeh cabinet did not contain any of the negotiators of the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. In addition, two outspoken Islamists became ministers, Hosni Abu Gheida as Minister of Public Works, and Ishaq Maraqa as Health Minister. This indicated an interest in calming tensions involving the Islamist opposition.

References to *freedom from fear* were included in several statements by Prime Minister Fayez Al-Tarawneh during 1998 and 1999 when he pointed out the need to adjust the penal code to include *crimes of honour* in order to ensure the security of Jordanian citizens.[16] Notions of human security as *freedom from want* can be traced in several statements made by government officials of the 83rd and 84th Jordanian governments. Nevertheless, the notion of security remains closely tied to a national security perspective. When Al-Tarawneh stressed the need for economic and social security in order to achieve 'comprehensive security' and to guarantee the people's security in the Middle East, he did it with the reservation that security guarantees for Israel and also for the Palestinians had to be made.[17] The same idea is present in the statements by Interior Minister Nayef Qadi, who stressed that security efforts must include social and economic matters as the precondition for a stable political environment.[18] A notion of *freedom from hazard impact* can also be traced in the relevant statements, when Qadi mentions the need for better cooperation between the responsible authorities aiming at achieving better capacities for dealing with natural disasters and emergencies and guaranteeing people's security.[19]

Foreign Minister Abdelelah Al-Khatib demonstrated a rather traditional understanding of security, making relations with Israel and the Palestinian question the

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[16] Queen Noor says 'honour crime' is inconsistent with Islam, Constitution", in: *Jordan Times*, 12 January 1999.

[17] "King closely following progress of Wye talks", in: *Jordan Times*, 17 October 1998.

[18] "Prince Hamzah conveys Easter greetings to clergy, meets with interior minister", in: *Jordan Times*, 13 April 1999.

[19] "King meets with CDD officials to discuss natural disaster, emergency readiness", in: *Jordan Times*, 29 November 1999.

main issue of security in the region (Issa 2001). Yet in his statements the shift in Jordanian foreign policy away from former allies such as Iraq towards the US and Israel can be observed. This was shown in his harsher tone towards Hamas, which was described as a *front for illegal political activity* (Trounson 1999). A notion of *freedom from fear* can be seen in the idea of improving the peace process through economic cooperation and the achievement of comprehensive security, including economic and social dimensions.[20]

Minister of Water and Irrigation Hani Mulki referred to notions of *freedom from want* and *participation*, when he stressed the importance of developing human resources in order to achieve a better level of security and social standards for the people. He argued that national security cannot solely be attained through economic progress, but should be accompanied by social achievements and be reflected in better standards for the people (Abu-Ghazaleh and Ben Hussein 1998).

The idea of *freedom from want* also showed in the statements by Minister of Finance Michel Marto, who saw unemployment and poverty as a major obstacle to achieving security and regarded measures aimed at job creation as of the utmost importance.[21] Concerning *freedom from fear* for Jordanian citizens, some comments by decision-makers of the 83rd Jordanian government indicated the priority of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for the then security considerations in Jordan. When the Palestinian population was regarded as a potential rival and when Palestinian organizations such as Hamas were still operating from Jordanian territory, the protection of the Jordanian individual was not extensively addressed.

Designating Al-Rawabdeh as the new prime minister was interpreted as an effort by King Abdallah II to put his own stamp on the government and to emancipate himself from his father's heritage and the legacy of his uncle HRH Prince Hassan Bin Talal. Concerning the development of a human security perspective in the security discourse of Jordanian state executives, the similarities to the former government can be observed. On the whole the security discourse was instigated by national security issues, and primarily by relations with Israel and the Palestinian question. Here the Prime Minister Abdelraouf Al-Rawabdeh indicated discontent with ongoing relations with Israel, and advocated a reorientation towards Arab states. Despite a change in style, the hierarchy of security issues remained unchanged, with Israel and the Palestinian question having first priority. However, a notion of *freedom from want* emerged when Al-Rawabdeh made the economy the first priority for Jordan, stressing the need for the reform of the educational system in order to enable Jordanians to participate in society and so increase the level of 'comprehensive security' (Henderson 1999).

In a statement by Hosni Abu Gheida, the then Minister of Public Works, a reference to *freedom from want* indicated that growing urbanization and the threat of a loss of quality of life could be the biggest security problem for the Jordanian population. He therefore announced measures to combat this problem. Yet this was

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[20] "Jordan hopes Israel will lift trade barriers", in: *Jordan Times*, 28 October 1998.

[21] "Jordan wins $220 million in IMF loans to fund reforms", in: *Jordan Times*, 18 April 1999.

Table 5.2 Security discourse of state executives in Jordan in 1999

Security discourse of state executives in Jordan (1999)	Economic development as a major goal
	Dominant national security perspective
	Aimed at directing international funds to Jordan
	Instrumental discourse; reaction to public pressure

Source Compiled by the author

overshadowed by the Israeli question, as he stated that development in the area faced complete collapse because of the war faced by the Palestinian people and the continuing violence (UN General Assembly Plenary 2001).

In the security discourse of Jordanian state executives around the year 1999, several discursive fragments point to the gradual development of a human security perspective, especially with regard to *freedom from want*. Here human security is closely linked to the economic development of the Jordanian state. Combating unemployment and poverty and creating sustainable economic growth are seen as matters of the utmost importance. Even so, a strong national security perspective is evident in relations with Israel and in the deadlocked peace process. On the whole a slightly developed human security perspective illustrates the characteristics of an instrumental discourse, aimed at calming down inner tensions by achieving economic well-being, with a national security perspective and threats to national security being the dominant concern (Table 5.2).

5.3.2 Security Discourse of State Executives of the Rifai Government

Since the democratic revolutions in the Arab world, the Jordanian political system has experienced a crisis. Convictions for reform, steps towards it, and a change in security perspective can best be observed in periods of relative stability. In his letter of designation to the Jordanian Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, King Abdallah II stressed that the focus of the Jordanian development process is the human being. He emphasized that a prosperous future is only possible by investing in the Jordanian citizen, who is described as the true wealth of the Jordanian nation (Abdallah II 2009). A developmental focus was evident when King Abdallah II mentioned the special commitment to global economic opportunity, with a focus on the world's youth. Furthermore, he pointed to the utmost importance of resources such as water and clean air. Thus he referenced the category of *freedom from want*. When he mentioned the importance of a flourishing civil society of pluralism and democracy for Jordan and the Arab world, he referenced the category of *participation* and by referring to the removal of mines and the training of Iraqi civil defence forces the category of *freedom from fear*. A special category of threats to human security identified by Abdallah II is those threats that endanger the national unity of Jordan. When possible threats to human security in

Jordan and the Arab world were mentioned he indicated the threat of favouritism and patronage conflicting with Islamic values and Arab heritage (Abdallah II 2010).

The connection between national unity and economic development can be traced in the statements by King Abdallah II as he describes economic development as an urgent need for Jordan and for the whole Middle Eastern region, especially with reference to the need for job opportunities for youth in order to give them an orientation in life and to discourage fundamentalist movements. King Abdallah II indicated the importance of women's participation in public life and the importance of democratic reform. Here he clearly touched on the human security category of *participation*. He emphasized the need to empower human security and also pointed to the achievements that had already been made (Abdallah II 2004).[22]

Abdallah II strongly advised the international community to invest in countries such as Jordan—not one of the poorest countries, but in the midst of a process of modernization and development. He emphasized that threats such as terrorism and growing fundamentalist tendencies could undermine the achievements that had already been made. Abdallah II advocated a new development paradigm, as well as investments and developmental aid from the international community (Abdallah II 2007). He especially pointed out achievements in the security sector which strongly encouraged economic reform. The biggest threat to this development has been the slow peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. He argued that if the international community did not put an end to the suffering of the Palestinians, new conflicts would arise and destabilize the whole region. Here a strong instrumental tendency of human security in Jordan was evident. The main focus was on the developmental process, but military and classical security threats strongly influenced the achievement of human security goals in Jordan. A human security perspective has therefore developed in the shadow of a strong national security perspective which still predominates as a precondition for any efforts to achieve human security (Abdallah II 2006).

The appointment of Samir Rifai as prime minister indicated a declining interest in military security and reflected the priorities in the Kingdom. The new Prime Minister Rifai was a CEO at *Jordan Dubai Capital* and this demonstrated the government's focus on economic development (Terrill 2010, p. 30). A human security perspective referring to *freedom from want* can be traced in several statements by Prime Minister Rifai. He emphasized the need to use human resources more efficiently by improving education and to enable Jordanian citizens to receive their own share of Jordan's economic development. At an international conference on *food security and climate change in dry areas*, Rifai stated that food security, water security, and agricultural development should be given first priority in the Jordanian development process. He pointed to climate change and its impact on food security as the most important problems facing humankind in the future (Karishan 2010). The idea of *freedom from fear* shows in the announcement of the

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[22] Elections, measures to entrench basic political and human rights such as freedom of assembly and the press, and initiatives to empower women and youth (Abdallah II 2004).

creation of a ministerial committee to investigate communal violence and to address the reasons behind it and the underlying problems. Rifai referred to *freedom from fear* when he described the Jordanian efforts to fight terrorism as protecting the Kingdom of Jordan, its principles, and above all Jordanian citizens (Al-Du'ma 2010). In particular, the sustainability of the development process is emphasized when the need for preventive action against crime aimed at the creation of a safe environment is announced.[23] Rifai describes the motivation for decentralizing the Jordanian administrative apparatus as developmental and political. The political aspect aims at expanding the base of participation and giving the provinces the right to set their own priorities (Al-Du'ma 2010).

Education is an important means of promoting or suppressing a human security perspective. For this reason the statements of the then Jordanian Minister of Education, Khaled Karaki, gain importance. He pointed out that a country like Jordan is highly dependent on its human resources and that only a development process based on global standards and distinct social values can guarantee Jordan's position in the global knowledge economy (MoEJ 2010a). The official curriculum for secondary education in Jordan includes several aspects which could be attributed to a human security perspective, e.g. the goal of enabling the students to adapt to environmental, natural, demographic, and social and cultural changes. In this case the human security component of *freedom from hazard impact* could be detected. The connection between human rights and human security is present in secondary education's goal of enhancing Jordanian students' self-confidence and appreciation of human rights in order to achieve security and stability. This can be regarded as the human security component of *participation* (MoEJ 2010b).

New perspectives are often adopted to begin a political development process. The statements of the Jordanian Minister of Political Development are therefore relevant. At a conference before the parliamentary election of 9 November 2010, May'ateh argued that long-term stability and economic growth cannot be maintained without political reform. In a publication on *Political development and National Security*, Musa May'ateh stated that the notion of security in connection with state borders, stability, and the nation is not enough, but that in Jordan security must be conceptualized in a broader sense of the word. This includes security in terms of politics, culture, social relations, the economy, and the environment and food (MoPD 2010b). This pointed to a shift away from a state-centred security paradigm and although not explicitly addressed this constitutes a perspective of human security. May'ateh furthermore indicated that it was the duty of the educational, political, and economic and cultural sectors to create awareness of the development of society, which influences overall national security. These efforts aim at accurately translating the concept of citizenship, social values, and behavioural patterns into an all-encompassing concept of security. He points out

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[23] رئيس الوزراء يزور مديرية الامن العام وامانة عمان [Prime Minister visits the Directorate of Public Security], in: *Al Rai*, 12 January 2010; at. <http:/; manbaralrai.com/?q=node/59121/print> (7 October 2010).

that especially after the structural changes that have occurred in Jordanian communities, and as a result of permeable borders induced by improved communications, questions about the absoluteness of sovereignty arise. This would require the development of alternatives to state-based security and proactive solutions for clashes that may result from these fundamental changes. These approaches should be based on a right to development and should provide conditions that guarantee a change of perspective. May'ateh furthermore referred to the participation of every citizen in decision-making, in order to eradicate marginalization and the short-comings of social justice, which he described as the most prominent motive for extremism (MoPD 2010b).

To a great extent the protection of the individual and his or her access to the goods of daily life is an issue for the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, the statements of the then Jordanian Minister of the Interior, Nayef Qadi, have increased in importance. At a conference on security in the Arab world and the role played by civil society, he stressed that while the security sector in the Arab region was one of the topics that were previously the preserve of official agencies, the growing concern for development and democratic transformations has shown the need to change the stereotypical image of security in order to bring it closer to the needs of citizens. While Qadi stressed the importance of changing the traditional conceptualization of security, he also pointed to the primacy of traditional security in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. He identified a common denominator in all conceptualizations of security, namely the two dimensions of psychological and moral security, and material and physical security. The state has to provide for both categories in order to ensure the security of its citizens. Qadi stated that the security and safety of the homeland and the citizen are the most important national priorities. He stressed the importance of non-governmental organizations and civil society, as well as the importance of implementing security policies that take into account human rights. Qadi emphasized that the security sector is important on the path to reform, and noted resolutions adopted to ensure that women enjoy all the rights guaranteed by the constitution. Nayef Qadi said that national security is a holistic concept which attempts to achieve freedom and the provision of human dignity and a better life. He also stressed that security depends on all political, economic, and social achievements.[24]

Water links a variety of security sectors, such as food security, energy security and economic security, which all require a sufficient supply of water in order to be guaranteed. Therefore statements by the former Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation, Mohammad Najjar, are also discussed here. During a meeting with a group of farmers in the Jordan Valley he said that all measures to alleviate the suffering of the agricultural sector will be undertaken in order to ensure Jordanian national security and the security of its citizens. He stressed that the obstacles

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[24] وزير الداخلية: الأمن الشامل مطلب اساسي لتحقيق الحرية والكرامة [Minister of the Interior: Overall security is a key demand for freedom and dignity], in: *As Sawsana*, 13 July 2010; at: <http://www.assaw-sana.com/portal/newsshow.aspx?id=33503> (29 November 2011).

facing agricultural work receive attention in national policies and strategies.[25] Here the human security dimension of *freedom from want* is being referred to, as Najjar implicitly touches on the dimension of food security by linking the well-being of all Jordanian citizens closely to the well-being of the farmers.

Social development can take advantage of new perspectives, so we also need to consider statements by the Jordanian Minister of Social Development, Hala Lattouf. In a press conference on social assistance in Jordan, she highlighted the upcoming *National Strategy to Combat Poverty*. She stressed the improvements in social protection and social security, capacity building, employment, infrastructure, housing, and the financing of income-generating projects (Hazaimeh 2010). Here the component of *freedom from want* as well as the human security component of *participation* are highlighted. Lattouf especially pointed out the importance of protecting women and children. She repeatedly stressed that in the Arab world, Jordan was the first country to adopt such a strategy, and she emphasized the achievements of the law on protection from domestic violence.[26]

For the question of whether an outwardly-directed human security perspective has developed in Jordan, the statements of the then Foreign Minister, Nasser Judeh, are important. When he was asked about the most urgent threat to security in the Middle East, Judeh pointed to the unresolved conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. He stated that in order to achieve security for the whole region the conflict has to be tackled first. He thus indicated a predominantly national security perspective, as he regarded the national security of Israel and a future Palestinian entity as the precondition for peace and security in the whole region (Macropolis 2010). A concern for human security contributed to Judeh's perception of security, as he stated that in order to achieve peace, Palestinians as well as Israelis have to be liberated from daily fear over their basic rights and their need for security. With the individual as the reference object, a partially developed human security perspective can be seen in Judeh's statements.

When he was asked about human rights violations in Jordan, Judeh pointed out the achievements that had already been made and indicated the difficulties in the implementation of human rights, especially under the socio-cultural conditions pertaining in Jordan. Here there is an indication that human security could be an instrumental discourse. Judeh stressed that Jordan's constitution safeguarded human rights and democracy. He emphasized that Jordan is committed to human rights and freedoms, and stressed that other reports are politically motivated with the aim of harming Jordan's image in the international community (Macropolis 2010). Certain preconditions for achieving individual security in Jordan and in the whole Middle

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[25] "وزيرالمياه والري يلتقي مجموعة من مزارعي وادي الاردن" [Minister of Water and Irrigation meets group of farmers in the Jordan Valley], in: *Al Madenah News*, 17 October 2010; at: <http://www.almadenahnews.com/newss/news.php?id=59084> (10 January 2012).

[26] "وزيرة التنمية الاجتماعية الاردنية: التعامل مع الفقر يتطلب تطوير شبكة حماية" اجتماعية [The Jordanian Minister of Social Development: Dealing with poverty requires the development of a social protection network], in: *Insanonline*, 4 May 2010; at: <http://www.insanonline.net/print_news.php?id=7796> (19 November 2011).

Eastern region are mentioned. But as the topic of ongoing human rights abuses in Jordan and a certain delay in implementing measures against human rights abuses is explained by socio-cultural conditions, this indicates an instrumental perspective (Garriggio 2009). Emphasis on achieving *freedom from want* emerged when Judeh stated that one of the main goals of Jordan's policies must be to open up markets and attract investors, as well as to establish Special Economic Zones, where regional industries can produce and sell free of customs, duties, tariffs, and quotas. Judeh sees this as a guarantee of a secure life in Jordan (US Department of State 2010).

As the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Judeh also represented the outwardly-directed view of human security. Judeh stressed Jordan's expanding participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, pointing to Jordan's growing importance in the UN. This indicated Jordan's willingness to play a bigger role on the international stage, and that human security could well be an instrument for achieving such a role. By indicating that Jordan, despite its limited capabilities, is willing to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions, he acknowledges the importance of the human security concept for the dimension of *freedom from fear* as well as the important role Jordan is willing to play in the promotion of the concept. Combined with Judeh's statements that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be solved first, this statement pointed to the importance attributed to the concept of human security in helping Jordan to channel resources previously allocated to the security sector to the economic development process, thus helping to achieve internal stability. Great success has been achieved in securing major international government-to-government financial support, military support, and development funding to aid Jordan's economy. From 1996 to 2008, US aid totalled more than US$4 billion. In 2008 especially—due to the war in Iraq—Jordan was playing an important role. The United States committed financial, military, and development aid of roughly US$660 million (Sharp 2010, p. 9). Therefore human security can also be described as an instrument for Jordan, which lacked the economic and military capabilities to bolster its role on the international stage, to achieve the advantages accruing from the goodwill of internationally strong states such as the US.[27]

5.3.3 Security Discourse of State Executives in Jordan since the Arab Spring

In the course of the Arab Spring protests the Jordanian government has changed twice. Until 17 October 2011 Marouf Al-Bakhit was Prime Minister and he was succeeded by Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh. After a phase of relative stability the pressure on the Hashemite monarchy to conduct democratic reforms has intensified. Demanding political change, lower food prices and more jobs in Jordan, the

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[27] Nasser Judeh, Jordan Minister of Foreign Affairs: UN General Assembly Address; at: <http://www.maximsnews.com/news20091011JordanforeignministerUNGA10910110102.htm>(28 November 2011).

street demonstrations have been largely peaceful. The monarchy was not openly challenged, as people called for changes from within the system. Below we shall examine the discursive fragments of the Al-Bakhit government as well as the Al-Khasawneh government, in the context of their relevant security perspectives and their influence on the dynamics of securitizing water in Israeli-Jordanian relations. These refer to the nature of the reactions of state executives to ongoing protests and thus point to the nature of the human security discourse as being either hegemonic or instrumental.

On 1 February 2011 Al-Bakhit was appointed as Prime Minister. The ongoing protests had resulted in the dismissal of former Prime Minister Samir Rifai who was blamed for the rise in food prices and poor political reforms. Marouf Al-Bakhit is a former army general and intelligence official and the head of a state committee that oversaw the implementation of the peace treaty. He is described as being a moderate politician, despite his distrust for democratic rule.[28] The idea of *freedom from want* is present in several of his statements. He stressed the necessity for economic cooperation with Jordan's Arab neighbours in order to overcome the dire economic situation and to provide the Jordanian population with basic needs such as water and energy. Furthermore, he stressed that new government expenditure should not be financed by raising taxes, and that for their own safety Jordanians should not face a reduction in income through tax increases. Here the notion of *democratization* emerges in connection with the people's security, as he stressed the importance of political reform and changes in Jordan's political scene in order to achieve stability.[29] When he was accused of corruption linked to a secret deal to build a casino at the Dead Sea, Al-Bakhit was replaced by Awn Al-Khasawneh (Seumas 2011).

Since 2000 Al-Khasawneh had served on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), including three years as its vice-president. For many Jordanians he represents the best choice for achieving meaningful reform (Satkowski 2011). A human security perspective can also be traced in his harsh stance on corruption where he argues that in order to achieve security for Jordan nobody should be above the law.[30]

Despite the change of government, Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh remained in office. With respect to the crisis in Syria, Judeh followed King Abdallah II, who advised Bashar Al-Assad to step down from office.[31] In the statements by Judeh a clear concern for *freedom from fear* for the Syrian population is evident, when he

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[28] "Emerging Leaders: Marouf Suleiman al-Bakhit, Prime Minister, Jordan"; at: <http://www.thomaswhite.com/explore-the-world/emerging-leaders/al-bakhit.aspx> (6 January 2012).

[29] "Lawmakers to look into constitutional changes in new extraordinary session", in: *Jordan Times*, 8 July 2011.

[30] *"*Jordan PM wins comfortable confidence vote"; at: <http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/news/jordan-pm-wins-comfortable-confidence-vote_3251> (9 January 2012).

[31] "New fighting reported in Syria; Jordan's king on Syria's president: 'I would step down'", at: <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-14/middleeast/world_meast_syria-unrest_1_president-bashar-al-assad-sanamein-syrian-president?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST> (10 January 2012).

argues that Jordan will pursue every possible means to protect civilians in Syria and to end the violence and the aggression of the authorities against their own people. This notion also appeared when he announced support for the Syrian people and directly mentioned their security as a priority for the Jordanian state (AlWatan 2011).[32]

Minister of the Interior Mohammad Al-Raoud stressed the government's support for freedom of expression. Freedom of expression as a means of participation in society is seen as important in Jordan. Yet he argued that freedom of expression and democracy are not in any way related to Jordanian Islamic traditions and values, and that freedom of expression has to be suspended when vandalism is involved. Al-Raoud explicitly referred to the protests calling for reform and the reference to *participation* may have been a mere rhetorical instrument to calm the situation. Thus, if human security with the dimension of *participation* has evolved, it is still at the stage of an instrumental discourse. The idea of *freedom from want* is present in a developmental focus. Al-Raoud claimed that the government realizes the significance of Jordanians' demands for reform, employment, and development, and is working to meet them.[33] Al-Raoud's predecessor Saad Hayel Srour also stressed the importance of freedom of expression and, referring to the protests, called for new arrangements for public protest and free expression.[34]

With regard to supplying water to the Jordanian population (*freedom from want*), the Jordanian water ministers were highly aware of the security implications that water might have. Mousa Jamani—Minister of Water and Irrigation—argued that Jordan's water crisis is the most severe worldwide, and he gave top priority to supplying fresh water to the Jordanian people.[35] He also stressed the right of every Jordanian to receive a sufficient supply of water and pointed to technical possibilities such as desalination and new wells to achieve this goal.[36] He also indicated the importance of water supply for national development and for agriculture when he announced a change in the law that allowed farmers to drill

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[32] نطلب أردني بالسماح بمرور شاحناته إلى تركيا عبر العراق...ناصر جودة: عمان تؤيد حل" الوضع في سورية في إطار البيت العربي m [Jordanian request to allow the passage of trucks from Iraq to Turkey… Nasser Judeh: Oman supports "to resolve the situation in Syria in the framework of the 'Arab House'"], in: *Al Watan*, 7 December 2011; at: <http://alwatan.sy/dindex.php?idn=113365> (9 January 2012).

[33] "Interior minister warns against vandalism in Maan visit", in: *Jordan Times*, 22 November 2011.

[34] الفايز : الملك وضع النقاط على الحروف وأضاء لنا الطريق [Al Fayez: The King points out the letters and showed us the way]; at: <http://jobs.addustour.com/scripts/bcc_search_box?bcc_codename= addustour&lang=ar>(8 January 2012).

[35] الأردن الأول عالميا في الفقر المائي. [Jordan occupies first spot in global water poverty]; at: <http://www.ain.jo/node/198441> (8 January 2012).

[36] وزير المياه: ايصال الخدمات للمنازل المقامة على اراض معتدى عليها في وادي الاردن. [Minister of Water: Delivery of services to homes built on victims' land in the Jordan Valley]; at: <http://www.addustour.com/PrintTopic.aspx?ac=\LocalAndGover\2011\12\LocalAndGover_issue1517_day13_id375905.htm> (6 January 2012).

additional wells for their water supply.[37] He stressed the importance of securing water of sufficient quality and of combating its pollution.[38] His predecessor Mohammad Najjar made similar statements that indicated the consequences of global climate change for water resources and linked it to the security of Jordanians and Palestinians in the occupied territories whose security will be endangered if a sufficient water supply cannot be ensured.[39] He emphasized the connection between water security and food security, and he mentioned the importance of major projects—such as the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit—for securing Jordan's water supply.[40]

The nexus between water and providing basic goods is stressed in statements by the Minister of Agriculture. The former Minister Samir Habashneh argued that in summer the water supply to rural communities must be guaranteed to achieve security for agricultural production and the livelihood security of farmers.[41] Concerning the provision of basic agricultural goods, the focus has shifted from solely increasing domestic agricultural production to food imports. Agricultural Minister Ahmed Al-Khattab emphasized the importance of outsourcing food production to other countries with better natural resources and thus ensuring the food security of Jordanian citizens.[42]

Concerning the security of migrant workers, a clear dimension of guaranteeing *freedom from fear* is evident when former Minister for Labour Mahmoud Al-Kafaween stated that their personal security and their overall situation should be improved. Here the priority of national economic growth is made clear when he puts the better protection of migrant workers in direct relation to the need for their workforce for the economic development of Jordan.[43]

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[37] [Minister of Water: وزير المياه : تخفيض أسعار الوحدات السكنية للاعتداءات القائمة لإيصال الخدمات". Reducing the prices of residential units to attack the existing service delivery], in: *Al Rai*, 13 December 2011; at: <http://alrai.com/article/8965.html> (8 January 2012).

[38] [Al-Jamani's instructions call for the protection of water resources in 2011]. الجمعاني يطلق تعليمات حماية المصادر المائية للعام 2011; at: < http://alghad.com/index.php/article/514143.html> (9 January 2012).

[39] [Minister of Irrigation وزراء الرى العرب يجتمعون الشهر المقبل لإقرار إستراتيجية الأمن المائى العربى. and Arabs meet next month to approve the strategy of Arab water security]; at: <http://www.elgh ad.com/Read.asp?News_Id=2010100017890> (6 January 2012).

[40] [Najjar: Delayed completion النجار : تأخر إنجاز « ناقل البحرين » يشكل خطورة على الأمن الغذائي والزراعي. of « Bahrain Carrier » constitutes a threat to food- and agricultural security]; at: <http://www.addustour.com/ViewTopic.aspx?ac=\LocalAndGover\2011\10\LocalAndGover_issue1452_day06_ id360544.htm#.TwwoEPnNmDQ> (6 January 2012).

[41] [Ministry of Agriculture agrees to وزارة الزراعة توافت على استصلاح الابار الرومانية والابار القديمة. reclaim Romanian and old wells]; at: <http://www.sarayanews.com/object-article/view/id/93791> (7 January 2012).

[42] [Looking for agricultural land in the world to زراعة" تبحث عن أراض في العالم لزراعتها بالقمح والشعير grow wheat and barley], in: *AsSabeel* (12 December 2011).

[43] [Jordanian Minister of وزير العمل الأردني يؤكد ضرورة تصويب أوضاع العمالة الوافدة المخالفة — محيط Labour confirms the need to improve the conditions of migrant workers]; at: <http://www.saray-anews.info/ وزير-العمل-الأردني-يؤكد-ضرورة-تصويب-أو/2011/09/15/ htm > (15 December 2011).

The statements of the Jordanian Minister for the Environment concerning the provision of basic goods and services show that Jordan's economic development is increasingly perceived as an environmental matter. The Minister for the Environment, Yassin Khayyat, stated that new environmentally friendly ways of producing energy would be a major stimulus for the Jordanian economy and that they would guarantee the security of Jordanian citizens, as Jordan would be able to produce its energy within its own borders; the new technology would boost economic growth and social security in Jordan.[44] Khayyat acknowledged the negative impact of environmental pollution on the quality of life. In respect of agricultural production and its projected decline due to pollution, he also referred to the livelihood security of Jordanian farmers[45] (AlArab AlYawn 2011). Khayyat's predecessor Taher Shakhshir stated that the impact of emissions on the health of Jordanians and on their security is grave and that therefore a campaign to tackle this problem will be launched. Here a reference to *freedom from hazard impact* can be detected (PSD 2011).

Salwa Damen, the Minister of Social Development in Jordan, stressed the importance of social security for the poor and to protect the weakest members of society as a means of achieving comprehensive security including its social dimension. She therefore highlighted *freedom from want* for each member of society.[46] She also stressed the importance of protecting women and integrating them into Jordanian society in order to guarantee their social security and to enhance Jordan's economic production (MoSD 2011).

5.3.4 Conclusion: Security Discourse of State Executives in Jordan

A human security perspective is present in the security discourse of state executives in Jordan. While national security is regarded as a precondition for human security, the importance ascribed to the concept of human security can be observed and its four components have been stressed in many statements. But the discourse mainly focused on *freedom from want*, in close connection with the economic development process. The material well-being of the population is regarded as an essential

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[44] المملكة استوردت عام 2009 نحو 96 % من حاجتها للطاقة. [In 2009 the Kingdom imports about 96 % of its energy requirements]; at: <http://www.albawaba.com/ar/ÇáãããáßÉ-ÇÓÊæÑÏÊ-ÚÇã-2009-äÍæ-96-ãä-ÍÇÌÊåÇÇ-ááØÇÞÉ.htm> (6 January 2012).

[45] (ملامح أولية لخارطة طريق (إعادة تأهيل سبيل الزرقاء). [Features of the initial road map (Rehabilitation of Zarqa)]; at: <http://www.alarabalyawm.net/pages.php?news_id=340882> (7 January 2012).

[46] لضامن تلتقي بعثة البنك الدولي المعنية بمشروع تعزيز الحماية الاجتماعية. [Al Dhamen meets the World Bank mission on a project to enhance social protection]; at: <http://www.petra.gov.jo/Public_News/ Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?lang=1&site_id=2&NewsID=35131&Type=P>(6 January 2012).

Table 5.3 Security discourse of state executives in Jordan

Security discourse of state executives in Jordan	• Human security perspective to bolster inner stability
	• Economic development as a major goal
	• Attracting international funds to Jordan
	• Instrumental discourse; reaction to public pressure

Source Compiled by the author

component of Jordan's internal stability. The external human security perspective is used to raise consciousness among international decision-makers of the need to channel resources to Jordan. There references to ensuring broader *participation* are seen as a means of minimizing the appeal of fundamentalist movements in Jordan and of ensuring the monarchy's legitimacy. In response to the protests connected with the Arab Spring, the call for *democratization* has been emphasized in the rhetoric of state executives. In the face of a political crisis and given the rapid inclusion of *democratization* in their statements, the human security discourse in its aspect of *participation* was most likely instrumental in nature Table 5.3.

5.4 A Human Security Perspective in Jordan?

It remains debatable whether a human security perspective is present in the Jordanian security discourse. But the human security approach has become a part of the discourse of the political elite. However, it is far from being integrated into Jordan's overall security strategy (Selim 2003, P. 336). Between the discourses of scientists and state executives tensions could be noted. The scientific discourse has been critical of human security and the concept has been seen as a Western concept and as a possible instrument for interfering in Jordan's domestic affairs. However, when it was internally implemented by the government, human security was seen as a helpful concept. Yet Arab governments have repeatedly been described as barriers to achieving human security for their citizens. On the other hand, the security discourse of state executives has shown a tendency to be used as a way of attracting foreign aid and therefore this did not indicate that human security was seen as a Western concept. This tendency was prevalent in the papers of the JCSS that described—from a government-friendly position—human security as a helpful concept when advocating cooperation between Jordan and Western states in its implementation.

An explanation for this discrepancy in both discourses is that Jordanian academia is predominantly Palestinian. While the Hashemite monarchy made peace with Israel, this step is seen by the Palestinian-dominated academia as serving Western interests (Reiter 2002, p. 145). The discourse of state executives pursues certain goals, while most contributors to the scientific discourse are critical of a Western concept and an 'Israel-friendly' government.

This study argues that the human security discourse in Jordan has been of an instrumental nature and has been used to pursue certain goals—internal stability

and economic development—and that it has lacked the material effects of a hegemonic discourse by restricting what can and cannot be imagined.

One reason for suggesting that human security is not ideologically hegemonic is that the concept is too new and often seems too vague to strongly influence long-standing policies. Within Jordan reports on human security have been regularly directed in ways that serve bureaucratic objectives, suggesting that human security can be understood as an instrumental part of Jordanian policy. Human security's popularity, together with its vagueness that enables Jordanian officials to interpret the concept in ways that fit their own interests, have made the discourse a useful tool for pointing out its contributions to economic and social development as a way of realizing certain political interests. This becomes especially obvious as the public demands and protests for democratization in Jordan have led to a rapid adoption of the democratic rhetoric by Jordanian state executives.

US support for Israel, the war in Iraq, and the militarization of the US's relations with Arab states connected with its 'war on terror' have turned public opinion in Arab states against the US (Harders 2008, p. 38). Thus in several Arab countries the broad population, considered to be friendly to the US, has rather been alienated from its rulers, and radical fundamentalism has been strengthened (DSB 2004, p. 35).

Dissatisfaction with authoritarian rule is said to be mostly the result of economic hardship, poverty being an ideal breeding ground for extremism (Chourou 2005). When Jordan's rents from direct state-to-state transfers—particularly from Arab oil countries—declined in the 1980s, this led to a severe budgetary crisis (Harders 2005, p. 290). Subsequently IMF-inspired structural adjustment plans were introduced. These were designed to reduce budget deficits by cutting subsidies and social expenditure. Combined with the prevailing 'rentier mentality' in Jordan,[47] these reforms led to sharp price increases in basic commodities, and reforms were implemented to stabilize the country. As the government had to rely on tax revenues instead of on external rents, the public had to be included more in decision-making, and this was interpreted as *defensive democratization* (Robinson 1998, p. 389). This refers to a process of pre-emptive measures designed to maintain elite privileges while limiting the appeal of fundamentalists in the form of citizens' movements such as the *Muslim Brotherhood* and the *Islamic Action Front* (IAF). The four pillars of power in Jordan—the monarchy, the army and security services, business elites, and tribal leaders of the East Bank—needed to be protected (Robinson 1998, pp. 389–393). The dynamic of *defensive democratization* pointed to the need for the Jordanian government to integrate the expectations of its citizens into the overall agenda. While the Hashemite monarchy could for a long time rely on the 'rentier mentality' of its citizens, the material basis for legitimizing the monarchy by reallocating resources to its citizens faded.

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[47] 'Rentier-mentality' implies that the state's rulers provide for the material needs of the citizens and conversely the citizens do not get involved in politics. A rentier economy is an economy where income is derived not from productive activities but from the rents yielded by assets. When the state itself is a rentier, it does not need to levy taxes and therefore does not feel accountable to its citizens (Schwarz 2004, p. 2).

Table 5.4 Security discourse in Jordan

	Jordanian security discourse
Scientific security discourse in Jordan	• Human security perspective present in all four components
	• Human security is regarded as a 'Western' concept
	• Authorities are seen as a barrier to achieving human security
	• National security remains the dominant perspective
Security discourse of state executives in Jordan	• Human security perspective to bolster inner stability
	• Economic development as a major goal
	• Aimed at directing international funds to Jordan
	• Instrumental discourse
Conclusion	• Divergent security discourses of scientists and state executives
	• Instrumental human security discourse of state executives

Source Compiled by the author

A new social contract had to be implemented, by which more and more political freedoms were granted to Jordanian citizens by simultaneously emphasizing the need for an economic development process and enforcing democratic reforms. To address those needs, a human security concept has been instrumentalized. To maintain its legitimacy the government has had to point to certain achievements, especially concerning *freedom from want*, since access to material goods was formerly used as a means of implicitly ensuring the loyalty of Jordanian citizens. By explicitly addressing the needs of the individual, the aim was to consolidate loyalty to the monarchy and to the cohesion of the Jordanian state in the face of strong tribal tendencies. Tribalism raises the problem of divided or conflicting loyalties (Chourou 2005, pp. 49–52). In general, individuals perceive their strongest ties as with the smallest and most proximate groups, while national cohesion is significantly weaker. This has been the case since in daily life, to achieve the identification of the *self*, dichotomies must be constructed which consistently subdivide a larger group. Weaker ties in particular dissolve when individuals consider themselves deprived of the material necessities of life, particularly from a level of personal safety (Fiske 1993, pp. 17–21). Mobilization most likely takes place around groups offering the strongest ties and addressing the forms of deprivation that are feared the most. Therefore, the concept of human security points to the needs of individuals and to the achievements of the government and so may contribute to the legitimization of a government that is facing fundamentalist movements and where the cohesion of Jordan needs to be guaranteed in the face of tribalism Table 5.4.

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Chapter 6
The Human Security Discourse in Israel

6.1 A Threshold for Human Security in Israel

Various international observers perceive the Israeli state as a danger to Palestinians[1] and Israeli Arabs, and criticize this situation (Yakobson and Rubinstein 2008, p. 105). Within Israel are seen violent protests that are effectively criticizing a failure to provide *freedom from fear*. When an Israeli security guard shot and killed a Palestinian in the East Jerusalem district of Silwan, violent clashes took place between residents and the police. The riots may also have been motivated by Jewish settlers who had set up a private armed militia suspected of maltreating the local population (Kyzer and Hasson 2010). Here a motivation to act on a failure to provide human security as *freedom from fear* can be traced. Once the threshold had been crossed of fighting over a failure to provide human security, the question is raised of the responsiveness of the security discourse of Israeli state officials.

When the water supply to 4,000 Bedouins was cut off as a result of an argument about the payment of water bills, the city counsellor responsible was harshly criticized. Yet the situation remained calm, as the supply was only cut for 24 h (Yagna 2010). Regarding the provision of *freedom from want*, discriminatory treatment of various groups in Israel has been criticized. A failure in the provision of water to Palestinian villages is said to have been one of the reasons for the Intifada (Anderson et al. 1993). In the case of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, a failure in the provision of *freedom from want* attributed to the occupying Israeli forces resulted in a number of clashes. In a Palestinian village near Jerusalem demonstrations and riots took place weekly, as a result of Jewish settlers claiming a water well for their own use (Katz and Lazaroff 2010).

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[1] With Israel occupying the West Bank and therefore being partly responsible for the concerns of the Palestinian population, these concerns have to be incorporated into the Israeli discourse in some way. For that reason the occupied Palestinian territories are included in this study in order to investigate whether the threshold of willingness to fight exists if the provision of human security has failed.

Often the politics of the *Joint Water Committee* (JWC) have led to disputes. During the drought of 1999 in particular, tensions arose concerning the allocation of water. This could be seen at its most drastic in the protests of Palestinians who were demanding an improved system for the allocation of water (Sosland 2008, p. 171).

When it comes to protests and riots in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, a large number are religiously motivated or directed against building activities on the West Bank. For example, violent clashes between police and Haredic Jews took place in Jaffa when the Haredim took to the streets of the Muslim neighbourhood of Ajami in order to protest against a construction project said to be disturbing Jewish remains (Hartman 2010). Riots are regularly reported in Jerusalem around the Temple Mount and on other holy sites during religious holidays (Kyzer 2010).

Human security issues have motivated various segments of the Israeli and Palestinian population to protest and fight over failure to provide for *freedom from want* and *freedom from fear*. Yet the main focus of public discontent is on religious topics, and on the issue of territorial influence manifested through Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Public pressure is likely to have led to an integration of human security issues into the security discourse of Israeli state executives, and yet they are not likely to be allocated the highest priority.

6.2 The Scientific Security Discourse in Israel

6.2.1 The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

The *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies* (BESA) is an independent research institution aiming to promote peace and security in the Middle East. It is located within the *Bar-Ilan University* and represents a more conservative national and military understanding of security.

Chuck Freilich (2010) identified the global economic crisis and unemployment rates as an ideal breeding ground for all forms of fundamentalism. He expressed concern about Arab governments that were not willing to permit political reform, leaving only extremist and fundamentalist ways of expressing political grievances. Here the concern for *participation* by Arab citizens in political processes emerges, together with a concern for their being deprived of access to a number of goods through unemployment. With regard to *freedom from want* and the component *participation*, a partly developed, outwardly directed human security perspective can be traced. However, the main referent of security remains the state. Fundamentalism originating in deprivation of basic goods is said to result in violent actions aimed at the state of Israel. Freilich identified the main threat for Israel as a nuclear wave in the Middle East resulting from civil nuclear programmes turning into military programmes. He identified Israel's strength as the main reason preventing the Iranian regime from conducting a nuclear attack (Freilich 2010, pp. 1–15).

An article by Kenneth Bialkin (2010) stressed that it is only Israel that has made unilateral concessions, and demanded that the Arab states—including a potential Palestinian state—should recognize Israel's legitimacy and sovereignty, explicitly and openly. Hence he identified the state as the referent of security. He addressed failures by Arab governments to provide for the basic needs of their populations, and identified this failure as empowering fundamentalists. This indicated an outwardly directed human security perspective based on *freedom from want*. Bialkin argued that the Israeli state provides for the material needs of its population, and that despite the continuing threat of war Israel has managed to attain robust levels of economic growth, progress in education, human rights, social services and quality of life (Bialkin 2010, pp. 2–5). He argued that the Israeli state offered desirable conditions within an unpleasant external environment. Therefore in his understanding of national security he identified Arab states and their populations as threatening Israel and its good quality of life.

Samson (2010) argued that the occupation of Gaza and the restrictions on Palestinian public life have been used to justify attacks against Israel. Samson stated that the quality of life in Gaza has suffered during Israel's occupation, and thus acknowledged a threat to the individual's conduct of life. After the withdrawal from Gaza this had finished and so the attacks against Israel lacked justification and Israel's acts of self-defence gained legitimacy. Here an outwardly directed human security perspective can be traced, constructing Gazan inhabitants as the referent of *freedom from want*, with their conduct of life being disrupted by the Israeli military. Nevertheless, the Israeli state remained the main referent of security as she identified threats from Gaza as directed against Israel as a whole, and she re-emphasized the Israeli right to self-defence (Samson 2010, pp. 4–9). Elsewhere Samson has described international law as a potential tool for aggression against Israel. By making the individual the centre of international law, tactics such as using human shields, guaranteed safety for terrorists attacking Israel, and actions by the *Israeli Defence Forces* (IDF) caused a lawsuit that curtailed Israel's means of self-defence. She called this *lawfare*. A concept such as human security is regarded as a threat, as it could be used to de-legitimize Israeli military actions, endangering Israel's national security (Samson 2009, pp. 2–13). Despite several hints at a human security perspective, directed outwardly and concentrating on *freedom from want*, a national security perspective nevertheless predominates.

6.2.2 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

The *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* (JCPA) focuses on research into international law and the connections between local and global terrorism. The JCPA was created to promote analysis, transparency and accountability in the face of an international campaign against Israel that labels it as an *apartheid state* (NGO Monitor 2005). A more pragmatic understanding of security is attributed to the JCPA. The reader will recall (Sect. 4.6) that the goal of this study is to cover a

wide range of positions on security issues and of interests possibly influencing the work of the research institutions, and that in Israel a distinction can be made between those advocating *land for peace* (the *doves*) and those campaigning for *peace for peace* (the *hawks*). The BESA (Sect. 6.2.1) represented the 'hawkish' position, while the PCP (Sect. 6.2.3, below) represents the 'dovish' position; the JCPA takes the middle-ground.

Giora Eiland (2010) argued from a strong national security perspective, firmly rooted in territorial considerations. He stated that Israel cannot be defended without the Golan Heights. Only with an agreement including specific security arrangements, the relocation of Syrian army divisions further east, and the stationing of Israeli divisions on the banks of the Jordan could the Golan Heights safely be returned. Eiland acknowledged the changing nature of threats to Israel, but he was only referring to military threats. He especially labelled as emergent threats to Israeli security rockets and missiles potentially positioned on the West Bank, anti-aircraft missiles aimed at large passenger aircraft flying into Ben-Gurion Airport, and anti-tank missiles. Eiland stressed the state's responsibility for the protection of its citizens from terrorist attacks and thus indicated the idea of *freedom from fear*. Nevertheless, the idea of national security in military terms based on the utmost importance of territory is uppermost. This became obvious when Eiland referred to tactical aspects such as the line of visibility, a minimum range for anti-missile systems, and the minimum distance needed to deploy Israeli aircraft. As such a minimum distance is not available in Israel's 9-mile-wide *waistline* along the 1949 cease-fire zone, a return to the pre-1967 borders is deemed impossible (Eiland 2010).

Elliot Abrams (2010) stated that Israeli security depends on developments in Palestinian society. With regard to the positive development of the Palestinian economy, the assumption that the cost of terrorism or a future war would be too high is mentioned. This refers to the concept of *economic peace* and is closely related to the dimension of *freedom from want*, constructing outward actors—the Palestinians—as the referent of human security. A national security perspective remains predominant. The precondition for Israeli security is identified in the US's willingness to grant further military aid to Israel and in Israel's reluctance to return to the pre-1967 borders. Here a strong territorial notion of security is present (Abrams 2010). The territorial dimension of security was also stressed by Richard Kemp (2010), who stated that the technological possibilities of monitoring hostile activities outside a state's borders can always fail. He therefore advocated a buffer zone between Israel and its neighbours to guarantee Israel's security.

6.2.3 Peres Center for Peace

The *Peres Center for Peace* (PCP) in Tel Aviv-Jaffa is a non-governmental organization founded in 1996 by the current President of Israel Shimon Peres. The goal of the PCP is to encourage people of the Middle East region to work together to build peace through socio-economic cooperation and development (PCP 2012).

The head of the PCP, Ron Pundak, has strongly supported the concept of *economic peace* and has emphasized that economic benefits must accrue to all parts of society. Here there is a human security perspective stressing the dimension of *freedom from want*. The focus is clearly directed outward, as the Palestinans are constructed as the referent, struggling for their livelihoods. On civil society's role for peace, Pundak (2007) argued that Israeli initiatives aimed at improving the Palestinians' economic situation are partly understood as a change of strategy away from military dominance towards the goal of controlling the Arab world through social, cultural and economic means. Here the fear is emerging that a concept such as human security could be used against Israel, especially against its own efforts to ensure a state of *freedom from want* (Pundak 2007).

After the Second Intifada, the question was raised of whether the idea of an *economic peace* could still be sustained. With the Palestinian economy having grown strongly before 2000 the Second Intifada came as a shock for the advocates of *economic peace* (PCP 2009, 2008). Researchers at the PCP tried to explain the shortcomings of the *economic peace* paradigm and so modified it. It was argued that the model is not specific to individuals and cannot provide certain insights. This statement indicated a perceived necessity to shift the focus away from groups and towards individual human beings. It was stated that the deep frustration within Palestinian society caused by the stagnation of the Oslo Process, the continued building of settlements, and the daily encounters with the IDF had to be incorporated into an overall model. By integrating these aspects the modified *economic peace* paradigm increasingly becomes similar to the human security concept. By highlighting the daily encounters with the IDF a notion of *freedom from fear* was integrated, not only for Israelis (protection from terrorist attacks) but also for Palestinians (protection from occupying forces). Furthermore the necessity of improving the economic situation for all parts of Palestinian society was also emphasized. It was argued that there was a feeling of not being integrated and that only a few Palestinians were generating profits from a peace agreement with Israel. This statement pointed to the perceived necessity for the *participation* of all Palestinians (Ashkenazi et al. 2008).

6.2.4 Conclusion: Scientific Security Discourse in Israel

An outwardly directed human security perspective can be traced in the scientific Israeli security discourse. This perspective is mainly based on the ideas of *freedom from want* and *participation*. This could be observed especially in the idea of an *economic peace*. Human security that focuses inwardly is restricted to *freedom from fear*, the protection of Israeli citizens from terrorism. *Freedom from want, freedom from hazard impact,* and *participation* cannot be detected. The perspective is one of national security and the security of the Israeli state is seen as a prerequisite for the security of the individual. An outwardly directed human security perspective is focused on the dimension of *freedom from want*. This is expressed

Table 6.1   Scientific security discourse in Israel

Scientific security discourse in Israel	• Inwardly directed human security perspective solely based on *freedom from fear*
	• Outwardly directed human security perspective, based on *freedom from fear* and *participation*, e.g. economic peace
	• Predominant national security discourse
	• Strong historical and territorial understanding of national security

Source Compiled by the author

by the idea of *economic peace*. Some developments towards a broader human security perspective can also be detected. This has been stimulated by the shortcomings of the *economic peace* paradigm, as shown by the outbreak of the Second Intifada Table 6.1.

6.3 Security Discourse of State Executives in Israel

6.3.1 Security Discourse of State Executives Around the Year 1999

Tensions over the allocation of water and the related security discourse of relevant state executives in 1999 provide a point of reference for the influence of a possible human security perspective on the dynamics of securitizing water in Israel. In May 1999 the elections of the Israeli Parliament and Prime Minister were monitored by international observers. When Ehud Barak became Prime Minister and formed the 28th Israeli government, there were great expectations of a change in Israeli politics. This is the background for an analysis of whether elements of a human security perspective were present in discursive fragments among selected decision-makers[2] and how this influenced the securitization of water in 1999.

In statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanjahu (1996–1999), the notion of providing *freedom from fear* was clearly present. While Israel was a target of terrorist attacks, addressing the level of personal security seemed to follow. Netanjahu saw a clear connection with Israel's national security. He interpreted this as a precondition for individual security, which in his opinion was being endangered without anything being provided in exchange (Netanjahu 1998). He argued that if national security and a balanced foreign policy were provided, the security of

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[2] In 1999 the Israeli Security Cabinet, which functions as a point of reference for determining a 'securitizing-elite' in Israel in the analysis below, was not yet established. The Security Cabinet was to create an objective professional advisory body for the Cabinet. The members would evaluate different situations, offer alternatives, determine positions, and have oversight of the Cabinet and the armed forces (Peri 2006).

Israel's citizens would follow. He further claimed that once security was achieved, peace in the region would follow; this indicates the predominance of national security issues, with peace seen as in close relation to national security. He extended the notion of security to Israel's Jewish character and placed Israel's national security in close relationship to its ties with the United States. He linked Israel's security to control of territory and objected to giving into any demands (Netanjahu 1999). He made Israel's Arab neighbours, especially the Palestinians, responsible for the prolonged conflict and for the issues facing Israel's national security. He drew historical comparisons with the Shoa and made a clear reference to Israel's security being the precondition for Jews worldwide to live in safety. Under the precondition of guarantees for Israel's national security a notion of *freedom from want* emerged, closely connected with the notion of economic peace, when Netanjahu addressed the profits of peace that would enable Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese, and Israelis to reach a standard of living and quality of life that was previously considered unimaginable. Therefore he argued that efforts at the level of national security, such as arms control, as well as measures to conserve water resources and protect the environment, should be undertaken and that these would establish the "building blocks of peace" (Netanjahu 1998).

As Netanjahu's successor, Prime Minister Ehud Barak took a more moderate stance and was willing to negotiate on a number of sensitive issues. However, his general understanding of security was similar to that of his predecessor. When asked about the chances for peace in the region, Barak indicated the asymmetry between Israel and its neighbours in terms of geographic and demographic issues. He stressed that Israel has never threatened the sovereign existence of any neighbour, whereas Israel's Arab neighbours have several times threatened the very existence of Israel. A national security perspective was clearly dominant when he pointed to land and population as strategic assets and to an asymmetric threat with Israel as the only potential victim. Hence he stressed the necessity of preserving Israel's advantages in military technology and also of enhancing the army's long-range capabilities (Diamond 1999). Furthermore, he emphasized the need to prevent a splintering of Israeli society into groups and communities that define themselves by their enmity towards one another (Keinon 2000). These statements did not refer to the human security dimension of *participation*, but rather emphasized the need to remain focused on the strategic asset of population strength.

A reference to *freedom from want* could be found in discursive fragments of statements by the Minister of Agriculture Rafael Eitan, who referred to the need for environmental protection in order to guarantee the supply of basic goods for Israeli citizens, particularly the need to preserve water resources and fertile land and to deal with the issue of solid waste disposal. He argued that growing urbanization and the need for new desalination capacities had been neglected for years because pressing security needs had taken priority, and that an environmental disaster would have worse consequences than a war (Collins 1999). Here a human security perspective in the dimension of *freedom from want* was present. In particular, the link between environmental protection and the provision of basic goods is present. Yet, as Eitan stated himself, national security needs will always have the highest priority. Eitan's

Table 6.2 1999 discourse of state executives in Israel in 1999

Security discourse of State executives in Israel (1999)	• Several traces of a human security perspective, with national security considerations superimposed
	• Human security perspective solely based on *freedom from fear*; protection from terrorist attack
	• Human security perspective, based on *freedom from want*, as peace through economic cooperation

Source Compiled by the author

successor, Haim Oron, also showed a tendency to develop a human security perspective. He questioned the concern for land as a strategic value by referring to the expulsion of Palestinians by the IDF (B'tselem 2000). Here it was obvious that the dimension of *freedom from fear*, the fear of being dis-placed from one's own territory and losing one's own livelihood, also exists in Israel. But all these state-ments were made within an overall and strong national security discourse, where individual issues such as the expulsion only represented separate parts of a human security discourse.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs in the governments of Netanjahu and Barak, several statements by David Levy referred to *freedom from want*. He stressed the potential for economic benefits once security in Israel was achieved. These would directly translate into a higher level of security for the population in all countries of the region. Once the infrastructure was developed, greater cooperation would be facilitated, and new resources would be at hand to tackle the region's social and economic problems (Levy 1996). He also discussed the provision of water to the Israeli population, but framed this in close relation to the Golan and the Kinneret, which Levy described as crucial security assets (Haram and Landau 1999). These references to elements of human security were all part of the discourse on national security.

In the statements of Levy's successor as Israeli foreign minister, Ariel Sharon, the notion of *freedom from fear* was employed when he made the security of every Israeli citizen the precondition for an agreement with the Palestinians. Again a clear predominance of national security matters is present. He stressed the importance of land as a security asset and the necessity of settlements to ensure the security of Israel (Foundation for Middle East Peace 2000).

In the discursive fragments of Israeli state executives around the year 1999 the national security discourse remained dominant. A notion of human security emerged in the dimension of *freedom from fear*, referring to the protection of Israeli citizens from terrorist attacks, as well as a notion of *freedom from want* in the idea of intra-regional economic cooperation and its potential for a lasting peace. However, when issues of water supply were addressed, they were always considered in connection with territorial considerations such as the need to control the Golan. By referring to single events such as the expulsion of farmers from their land, traces of an idea of human security could be found, but it was obvious that these were replaced by national security considerations Table 6.2.

6.3.2 Security Discourse of State Executives of the Netanjahu Government in Israel

To obtain comparable results statements by government officials in Israel and Jordan will be analysed for the same time period. Owing to the changes in government linked to the Arab Spring the Jordanian side was reviewed for selected decision-makers from three different governments, while the Israeli side was only analysed using statements by members of Netanjahu's government. The Israeli decision-makers are roughly based on members of the Israeli Security Cabinet, as they are considered as major 'securitizing actors', e.g. in the issue of water. Therefore the utterances of politicians such as those who represent the Arab minority within Israel are not included. According to the theory of 'securitization', only a small circle of decision-makers has the power to securitize an issue. This selection of a few key decision-makers takes into account the multi-ethnic character of the Israeli state.

Israeli president Shimon Peres is the most renowned figure in Israeli politics. He has shaped the security discourse in Israel for decades and still influences it. During the Second Intifada and in the face of the incidents at Jenin[3] and Bethlehem[4]—when he was Israel's foreign minister—Peres stated that in order to achieve a better situation for both sides and to end the terror attacks, the goal should be to improve the economic situation of the Palestinians (MFAI 2002). With this demand Peres touched on the dimension of *freedom from want*. Once the Palestinians living in the occupied territories were able to access goods more easily they would be expected to refrain from violence. Following this chain of thought, Peres referred to the idea of economic peace[5] on various occasions. Asked about Israeli settlements, Peres advised the Palestinians to react by building settlements themselves[6] (The Wall Street Journal 2010).

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[3] From 2–11 April 2002, Jenin, a Palestinian refugee camp, was under siege and fighting occurred. During the IDF's operations in the camp, Palestinian sources announced that a massacre of hundreds of people had taken place. The United Nations issued a report that found no evidence of 100 of deaths, and criticized both sides for placing Palestinian civilians at risk. "Fifty-two Palestinian deaths had been confirmed by the hospital in Jenin by the end of May 2002. A senior Palestinian Authority official alleged in mid-April that some 500 were killed, a figure that has not been substantiated in light of the evidence that has emerged." (UN Secretary-General 2002).

[4] From 2 April to 10 May 2002 Palestinian militants had taken hostages in the Church of the Nativity. IDF soldiers surrounded the Church. The stand-off was resolved with the deportation of thirteen Palestinian militants (Rees et al. 2002).

[5] The idea of 'economic peace' states that Israeli economic success will spread throughout the Middle East and lead to a mutual exchange of benevolence between Israel and its neighbours.

[6] "Transcript: Shimon Peres", in: *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 May 2010.

Despite several hints of an outwardly directed human security perspective based on *freedom from want* the referent object of security remained the Israeli state. Peres clearly defined an in-group which has to be protected from terror attacks, and argued that the question of permanent borders is the hardest to agree upon (The Wall Street Journal 2010). It was obvious that the security of the Israeli state had first priority and giving up sovereignty or territorial integrity was much harder to negotiate on than to ensure a state of *freedom from want* for the Palestinians.

The main threats identified were Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. Additionally the necessity of being self-reliant and the feeling of standing alone in a hostile environment was present. When Peres compared Iran to Nazi Germany,[7] this comparison referenced the perception of being constantly threatened by outside powers; a feeling that is deeply rooted in historical experiences of persecution and living in a hostile environment[8] (Mozgovaya 2009; MFAI 2007). Shortly after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Peres was asked about Rabin's impact on Israel. He pointed out that peace[9] is a moral choice, and cannot be achieved from a position of weakness. His answer showed that the concept of Israeli strength as the guarantee for its security was present (MFAI 1995).

With regard to the severe fires of 2010 in northern Israel, threatening the city of Haifa, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that, "[…] the threat of climate change is no less menacing than the security threats that we face. I intend to act determinedly in this field. In a country that suffers from a severe water shortage, this is an existential struggle" (Netanjahu 2010; MFAI 2010b). Identifying climate change and water shortage with an existential struggle pointed at a widened understanding of possible threats. But when Netanjahu talked about climate change, he distinguished it from "security threats that we face", and indicated that climate change was not regarded as a 'real' threat. In the case of the peace process with the Palestinians it becomes clear that Israel's expressed main concern is security[10] (Mozgovaya; Ravid Ravid et al. 2011). Netanjahu specifically talked about 'our security', referring to the Jewish population of Israel. Probably the threat to security perceived as most urgent is the possibility of the Iranian regime's arming itself with nuclear weapons (Starthmann and Mc Carthy 2010). Concerning the Gaza

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[7] "The world has no choice but to compare the threat posed by Iran now to that of Nazi Germany before the Second World War […]. As Jews, after being subjected to the Holocaust, we cannot close our eyes in light of the grave danger emerging from Iran." (Peres 2009 cf. Mozgovaya 2009).

[8] The notion of national security is difficult in Israel, as the Israeli state understands itself as the homeland for all Jews worldwide. Accordingly, the historical experiences of Judaism worldwide are incorporated into the national narrative and influence the perception of security.

[9] He placed peace in close connection to security, since in the case of the peace resulting from the 'Oslo accords' peace is primarily a 'negative form' of peace, namely absence from attacks. Therefore, understanding Israel's national security as threatened by constant attacks, peace and security are conceptualized in close relationship.

[10] "Israel stands ready to make the compromises necessary for peace. […] But one thing I will never compromise is our security" (Netanjahu 2010, p. 166).

strip and the smuggling tunnels, Netanjahu indicated that he regarded the constant undermining of Israeli sovereignty over its own territory as a severe threat to security. As he demanded an Israeli presence, we may detect that in his opinion a possible solution was to be implemented by military means (Netanjahu 2010, p. 166; Ravid and Khoury 2011).

Speaking about Israeli security in general, Netanjahu drew upon history when he pointed to the Shoa as illustrating the Israeli right to defence (Netanjahu 2010, p. 167). His historical comparisons showed that the Israeli idea of security is strongly interlinked with the idea of being self-reliant. Due to the experiences of the Shoa, Jews worldwide and especially in Israel should never be victims again. In addition, they should be able to defend themselves. Israel as the Jewish state is not only seen to serve as a shelter from worldwide anti-Semitism, but to be threatened by anti-Semites, of whom the most threatening are seen in the form of militant Islamism. The means that Netanjahu saw the best means of fighting militant Islamism as military means (Netanjahu 2010, p. 166). He pointed out that it was only because anti-Semites worldwide, and especially the enemies of Israel, lacked the means to fight Israel that Israeli security was not seriously imperilled (MFAI 2010b). However, when he saw the security of the Israeli state at stake through violence committed by ultra-Orthodox Jews, whom he described as *Jewish Terrorists*, it became obvious that he gave the security of the Israeli state higher priority than the cohesion of the Jewish in-group.[11] The Israeli understanding of Israeli military actions was apparent when Netanjahu referred to Israel's right for defence. In this understanding any aggression in the past was a simple response by the Israeli state, and Israel has never been the aggressor (Couric 2010).

In Ehud Barak's statements—made during the war in Gaza—we can trace that primarily he judges the ongoing war and enmity towards the Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbours as the main threat to Israel's security. He claims that in the long run these threats cannot be met by military means. Barak's focus nevertheless remains the national security of the Israeli entity. He refers to "our borders" (Morris 2009), a reference to the perspective of enhancing the sovereignty of Israel by extending it to cover the Gaza strip that borders on Israel. Barak explicitly refers to protecting the physical integrity of Palestinians when he indicates the duty to protect the lives of innocent inhabitants (Morris 2009). Here it can be argued that a human security perspective is present. Barak stresses that the Israeli army has taken steps to ensure that human rights violations are not perpetrated by Israeli soldiers. Barak furthermore points to a growing demand for a perspective that will integrate a guarantee of the physical integrity of the individual (Amanpour 2010). Barak's fear that a concept such as human security could be used to delegitimize the acts of the Israeli military is indicated when he refers to the accusations made in the Goldstone Report[12] (Morris 2009). Barak regards

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[11] "PM calls urgent meeting on settler attack on IDF base", in: *The Jerusalem Post*, 13 December 2011.

[12] That Israel did not respect the Geneva Conventions on warfare and knowingly violated human rights.

Israel′s security as dependent on its defensive capabilities (Amanpour 2010). Furthermore, he talks of a conflict being imposed on Israel, a reference to a non-offensive understanding of security (Katz 2011). A focus on national security predominates when Barak states during the 2006 Lebanon war with Hezbollah that the Lebanese government will be held responsible. Hezbollah posed a threat, but it was said to originate in the lack of sovereignty of the Lebanese government over its own territory (Shavit 2010). Furthermore, Barak states that (national) security has to be prioritized over economic growth because the Israeli economy has only been able to flourish in recent years because of the calm that Israel has experienced. For this reason he argued as Minister of Defence for a halt to cutting the budget for national defence.[13]

Avigdor Lieberman has been the most polarizing politician within Israeli politics. As the current Foreign Minister Liebermann has strongly influenced the security discourse in Israel. He acknowledges new challenges—such as terrorism—yet he regards the state as remaining the main referent and agent of security (MFAI 2009a). This position predominates when he states that he will never be ready to compromise Israel's national security for the sake of a peace agreement with the Palestinians (MFAI 2010c). When asked about the settlements, he pointed out their importance for Israel's national security. This indicates that Lieberman's idea of security is strongly linked to the idea of territory, since he regards the settlements as a second fence protecting the Israeli mainland[14] (Doerry and Schult 2010; Lazaroff 2011). Lieberman hinted that Israeli military strength and its victories were the main cause of Jordan and Egypt's willingness to sign peace treaties, and he argued that despite the settlements several peace agreements have been signed (MFAI 2010c). The highest priority is assigned to the Iranian threat, which comes before the Palestinian question or territorial questions such as the Golan (Shavit 2009). When Lieberman stressed that Iran is preparing global public opinion for "the possibility of doing without Israel" (Liebermann 2010 cf. Shavit 2009) he is stressing that the very survival of the Israeli state is in danger. When he compares Iran to National Socialist Germany he is pointing to the possibility of a second Shoa; or in other words he proclaims a state of emergency and so securitizes the Iranian issue (Shavit 2009). Lieberman regards Israeli security as being primarily threatened by outside forces. Yet he also identifies threats within Israel (Shavit 2009). He clearly identifies an in-group in favour of Israel as a Jewish state, and an out-group which is opposed to this idea. For Israelis who do not acknowledge the Jewish character of the state, he suggested that the state should have the right to expel them (Shavit 2009). Lieberman refers to Israel as the state for the Jewish people (Hoffmann 2010). National security is identified with the security of the Jewish population in Israel.

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[13] "Barak: Cutting defense budget will hurt security", in: *The Jerusalem Post*, 12 May 2011.

[14] "The settlements also serve our security […] the settlements are like a fence for us […] the settlements are like a second security line, we need them." (Liebermann 2010; Doerry and Schult 2010).

Another prominent figure in Israeli politics is current Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Shalom. As an active politician for many years, Shalom has shaped and is still influencing the Israeli security discourse. We can trace an outwardly directed perspective of human security in terms of guaranteeing the inhabitants of the occupied territories a certain degree of *freedom from want* (Keinon and Horovitz 2010). He has indicated that by improving the economic situation of the Palestinians, their access to goods and services would be made easier, and he has emphasized the goal of protecting the Israeli citizen from terrorist attacks. Despite international protests about its being used to establish Israeli borders, a major motivation for building the 'Israeli Security Fence' that separates large parts of the West Bank from the Israeli mainland was surely to protect Israeli citizens from terrorist attacks (Farnsworth 2004). While Shalom sees the individual as the referent object in the case of terrorism and thus addresses *freedom from fear*, he regards the state as the agent of security, which he characterizes as the *responsibility to protect* (Farnsworth 2004). Despite his claim to be protecting the individual Israeli citizen, Shalom referred to "our security" (Farnsworth 2004). By this he indicated that he regarded the security of the individual as the security of the in-group, and national security as a prerequisite for the security of the individual. During the Lebanon War, Shalom insisted that the Lebanese state was responsible for the actions of Hezbollah. He advocated only condemning those in charge, but stressed that a state which does not have full sovereignty over its territory must be held responsible for that failure (Federal News Service 2006). This perspective of national security is closely linked to the idea of sovereignty. If a state cannot control its territory or is not willing to do so, it will be held responsible for the consequences. Shalom identified the most urgent threat as Iran (MFAI 2003b). His security perspective is influenced by the feeling of standing alone in a hostile environment and mostly alone on the international stage, since he regards the majority of the member states of the United Nations as biased against Israel (MFAI 2003b). Yet he himself identifies preoccupation with national security as a problem. He stated that the country's security needs should not consume all its capacity and called for a focus on civil society and social and economic resilience (Mualem 2010).

As Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy, Dan Meridor has been an important figure influencing the discourse about security in Israel. Meridor has stated that the 'two-state solution' is the only possible way of ensuring the Jewish character of Israel. He assigns the highest priority to the Jewish character of the Israeli state. This notion of security is connected to societal security, where identity is the core value (Ravid 2010). It shows that Meridor sees Israeli security interests as best promoted if Israel can make compromises from a position of strength, and he has proposed Israeli initiatives to promote a 'two-state-solution'.[15]

The environment's being the "essential support system" (Buzan 1991, p. 19) is an important variable that influences access to the goods of daily life. For this

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[15] "No freeze vote until written proposal", in: *The Jerusalem Post*, 16 November 2010.

reason the statements by Israeli Minister for Environmental Protection, Gilad Erdan, are of special importance in the Israeli security discourse. When Erdan announced the Israeli government's plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, he acknowledged the impact of the environment on the lives of Israeli citizens. When he talked about a response to global warming it was evident that present in this statement was a mechanism to enable individuals to cope with emergencies which could threaten survival (MFAI 2010d). Furthermore, Erdan has openly criticized the military for being the main source of pollution in Israel. He has suggested that military officials should create an initiative to provide the necessary means of combating environmental pollution (Wokoeck 2009).

As the Minister of Agriculture—agriculture being ideologically loaded due to its role during the founding years of the Israeli state—Shalom Shimhon has also influenced the Israeli discourse on security. On the economic blockade of the Gaza strip, Shimhon has stated that exports to Gaza constitute a large part of Israeli farmers' livelihoods (Goldman 2008). The concept of livelihood security is closely linked to human security and a component of *freedom from want* can be detected.

Moshe "Bogey" Ya'alon shaped the military strategy that went hand in hand with the building of the security fence and is said to have decisively contributed to a military victory over terrorism (Shavit 2005). Moshe Ya'alon stressed that the military is capable of dealing with the issue of terror by switching strategy (Shavit 2005). Ya'alon acknowledged the limited capacities of the security fence, but pointed to a military solution which included the seizure of complete areas and the removal of any form of terrorist infrastructure: "to get the terrorist in bed" (Ya'alon 2006; Shavit 2005). By emphasizing this point, Ya'alon reintroduced the issue of terrorism into the framework of national and military security. The Israeli army has succeeded in ending the Intifada by military means, even under conditions of fundamental asymmetry (finding its expression in suicide bombings), by shifting to the concept of *low intensity warfare* (Yoram 2007). Yet he did not regard a military strategy as a final solution. Ya'alon demanded educational, political, and economic reforms. The human security component of *participation* can be seen in the demand for political reform. Furthermore, the call for educational reform hints at the human security component of *freedom from want*, as education is regarded as a non-material good, essential for creating livelihoods (Yoram 2007). Here an outwardly directed (towards the Palestinians) human security perspective can be detected. Ya'alon has seen Israel trapped in the continued struggle for independence which started in 1948. He has seen the conflict as essentially about Israel's existence, rather than about territorial questions (Yoram 2007). He stated that in a *self-help system* it is only Israel's power that guarantees its survival (Shavit 2005).

The statements by Ya'alon show that he views Israel and Jews worldwide as the victims of ongoing aggression. Security therefore means the existence of a Jewish homeland, a refuge from aggression, and a precondition for individual survival (Ya'alon 2006). The historical dimension of security in Israel is clearly present since the Israeli state is seen as the precondition for the individual survival of Jews, so that they never experience a second Shoa (MFAI 2009b). What becomes obvious in this statement is the perceived obligation to never be the victim of

aggression again and the obligation to refrain from aggression against others. But he also fears that the protection of individual lives can be abused if the aim is the destruction of the Jewish state (Ya'alon 2006).

As chairman of the Shas Party, Eli Yishai represents a large proportion of the Sephardic Jews.[16] As the Minister of Internal Affairs Yishai has regularly addressed the issue of organized crime and the implications of ongoing immigration to Israel. By doing so he has addressed the human security component of *freedom from fear*, which is closely connected to the fight against organized crime. In recent years Sudanese immigrants who cross the southern Israeli border over the Sinai have caused a number of problems including rising crime rates, especially in the southern areas of Tel Aviv. Yishai saw the migrants as an issue of security when he labelled the majority of them as an existential threat. He saw those who are not refugees as in competition with Israeli citizens on the labour market, and he saw many of them as linked to organized crime (Weiler-Polak 2010). As a solution to the issue of migrants, Yishai suggested framing the topic in the military realm by engaging IDF troops along the border (Weiler-Polak 2010). Yishai acknowledged that issues of human security such as *freedom from fear* originated in organized crime, but he wanted to tackle the issue by military means, and this indicated a military security perspective.

Yuval Steinitz is a former chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee and of the Defence Committee. As a member of the Israeli Security Cabinet, Steinitz strongly influences the security discourse in Israel. Steinitz's perspective on security points to several components of a human security perspective. He referred to the protection of Israeli citizens from terrorist attacks and therefore addressed *freedom from fear*. Yet his concept of security was strongly focused on military means. He identified the main threats to Israeli security as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, concentrating on their respective military capabilities. Steinitz addressed the link between Hezbollah and Iran and described Hezbollah and its activities as an existential threat (Steinitz and Yuval 2007). As for Iran and the possibility of the Iranian regime developing nuclear capabilities, Steinitz stated that the only way to avoid an Iran with nuclear weapons is a military ultimatum with a clear date (Ratzlav-Katz and Nissan 2009). Here the predominance of military means is obvious, as he described the military option as the only way and made no reference to economic sanctions or other alternatives.

Yitzhak Aharonovich has influenced the Israeli security discourse as Minister of Internal Security. During riots around the Temple Mount, Aharonovich saw the outburst of violence as a matter of the security of Israeli citizens (Weiss 2010), and attributed responsibility for the riots to Hamas and to the Islamic Movement's northern branch. He said that the Islamist movement led by Sheikh Salah was the biggest threat to the existence of Israel (Weiss 2010). As Aharonovich saw the Islamist movement as the main threat to security, this indicates that the state of Israel and its Jewish character remain the referent object of security.

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[16] Sephardic Jews have their roots in north Africa and Arab countries, rather than the Ashkenazim who originate from eastern and central Europe.

Table 6.3   Security discourse of state executives in Israel

• Discourse of state executives in Israel	• Inwardly directed human security perspective solely based on *freedom from fear*
	• Outwardly directed human security perspective based on *freedom from fear* and *participation*, e.g. economic peace
	• Similar perspective despite different political affiliations
	• Predominant, hegemonic, national security discourse
	• Strong historical and territorial understanding of national security

Source Compiled by the author

6.3.3 Conclusion: Security Discourse of State Executives in Israel

In the security discourse of state executives in Israel a human security perspective can only be traced in part, namely as the protection of Israeli citizens from terrorist attacks and as the need to guarantee a certain degree of *freedom from want* and *participation* for the Palestinians and other external actors. The national security perspective remains predominant and demonstrates various features of a hegemonic discourse. While some human security aspects emerge, a national security perspective has consistently been dominant. A strong historical dimension that conceptualizes Israel as the Jewish homeland and as a refuge from outside aggression exists and limits the possibilities of expression. Therefore, the national security discourse has the characteristics of a hegemonic discourse. This is also evident in the fear that a concept such as human security could be used to de-legitimize the means of Israeli self-defence.

What becomes obvious from the statements of state executives is that the component of *freedom from fear* is closely linked to the idea of the state. Israel regarded as the refuge from aggression for Jews worldwide is seen as the precondition for the security of individual Jews Table 6.3.

6.4 A Human Security Perspective in Israel?

The 'hegemonic' nature of the national security discourse in Israel can be seen in the discourse of both scientists and state executives; these are generally similar in nature. This means that a set of ideas that limits the means of expression must be in place. All that has happened is that a re-conceptualization of security beyond the realm of the military has taken place. We can only trace a human security perspective in part since security has been put on a level with existential threats to the state, and retains a narrow and highly militarily focused interpretation.

Table 6.4   Security discourse in Israel

Israeli security discourse	
Scientific security discourse in Israel	• Inwardly human security perspective solely based on *freedom from fear*
	• Outwardly directed human security perspective based on *freedom from fear* and *participation*, e.g. economic peace
	• Predominant national security discourse
	• Strong historical and territorial understanding of national security
State executives' discourse in Israel	• Generally similar to scientific discourse
	• Similar perspective despite different political affiliations
Conclusion	• Similar discourses point to the hegemonic nature of the national security discourse
	• Outwardly directed human security perspective has developed, as the hegemonic national security discourse does not cover this issue

Source Compiled by the author

There are several hints that a human security discourse, present in part, is outwardly directed. It is conceptualized in a way that constructs people in developing countries and the occupied Palestinian territories as the object of human security, and mainly addresses the dimension of *freedom from want*—in the form of Israeli humanitarian aid or the idea of *economic peace*—, but also addresses the dimension of *participation*. A human security element that constructs the Israeli citizen as the referent of security can be seen in the form of *freedom from fear*, observed in numerous efforts to protect Israeli citizens from terrorist attacks.

The Israeli security discourse is closely tied to the perceived existential threat facing the state from Israel's Arab neighbours, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The Israeli security discourse addresses these outer threats. With a feeling of being under constant attack, it is only possible for a human security perspective to partially develop. The need to maintain a dominant military position and the desire to maintain control over territories that promise a strategic advantage mean that territory is perceived as an essential element of security.

In Israel the notion of demography is to a great extent perceived as a matter of security. Political claims to territory and sovereignty are closely linked to the population ratios between Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians. In order to retain demographic superiority, policies that encourage growth amongst the Jewish population and Jewish immigration into Israel have been implemented. The necessity of a two-state solution perceived by several political parties illustrates the high priority ascribed to the issue of demographic security of the Jewish population.

In Israel we can trace the idea of being oppressed rather than being the oppressor. Jewish history in particular is used in political rhetoric to attribute urgency and importance to certain issues that endanger national security, e.g. the issue of Iran Table 6.4.

Table 6.5 Security discourses in Israel and Jordan

	Jordan	Israel
Scientific discourse	• Human security perspective present in all four components	• Inwardly human security perspective solely based on *freedom from fear*
	• Human security is regarded as a 'Western' concept.	• Outwardly directed human security perspective, based on *freedom from fear* and *participation*, e.g. economic peace
	• Authorities are seen as a barrier to achieve human security	• Predominant national security discourse
	• National security remains the dominant perspective	• Strong historical and territorial understanding of national security
State executives discourse	• Human security perspective to bolster inner stability	• Generally similar to scientific discourse
	• Economic development as a major goal	• Similar perspective despite different political affiliations
	• Aimed at directing international funds to Jordan	
	• Instrumental discourse	
Conclusion	• Divergent scientific and state executives' security discourses	• Similar discourses point at hegemonic nature of national security discourse
	• Instrumental human security discourse of state executives	• Outwardly directed human security perspective has developed, as the hegemonic national security discourse does not cover this issue

Source Compiled by the author

6.5 Comparison: Human Security Discourse in Israel and Jordan

It has been established that a human security perspective has developed in Jordan, but has not developed beyond a fledgling stage in Israel.

Human security has been integrated into the discourse of state executives in Jordan, but is still not fully incorporated into Jordan's general security strategy. Human security is adopted in a way that serves the interests of the Hashemite monarchy, making human security an instrumental part of Jordanian policy. The main source of threat is seen to be within the Jordanian state. In Jordan it is the legitimization of the monarchy and the inner cohesion of the state that are the main concerns of the securitizing elites. In the face of religious fundamentalist movements and in an attempt to compensate for this lack of legitimization at an output level, that is, through the means of development, state executives have

integrated a human security perspective into their security discourse. Human security in Jordan has a strong economic and developmental focus, by which the individual and the community become the referent object of security. The concept's vagueness helps it to be interpreted in a way that serves to ensure inner cohesion, the stability of the state, and the legitimization of the Hashemite monarchy.

In Israel a hegemonic national security discourse limits the chances of a human security per-spective developing. A human security perspective can only be traced in part. The perceived need to conserve the IDF's dominant position and the perception of territorial control as closely connected with the survival of the state shapes Israeli understanding of security. While Israeli survival is constructed as constantly imperilled and security focuses on existential threats to the state, so that a military interpretation of security is conserved, an outwardly directed human security perspective that focuses on *freedom from want* has developed. It is possible for such a security perspective to develop since the hegemonic national security discourse lacks an outwardly directed perspective. The population of developing countries and the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories are the referent object of this form of human security. *Freedom from want* is the main component addressed and can be observed in the Israeli efforts in the field of humanitarian aid, leading to the idea of *economic peace.*

We shall investigate below how these distinctively different perspectives on security influence the securitization of water in the bilateral affairs of Jordan and Israel. The first step will be to examine water supply in Jordan and Israel Table 6.5

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Chapter 7
Securitization of Water in Jordan and Israel

Water as a trigger for violent conflict or as a stimulus for cooperation has been discussed in numerous publications (Gleick 1995; Allan 2002; Giordano et al. 2002; Wolf 1999). It is widely agreed that water has not been the sole cause of conflict. Controversy starts when the extent to which water has had an impact is discussed, for example in the case of the outbreak of the Six Day War.

This study argues that the securitization approach taken by the Copenhagen School is a helpful tool for estimating the impact of an issue such as water on a government's policy decisions and therefore on the coexistence of certain actors. Furthermore we argue that the perspective on security—shaped by the relevant discourses—determines how far a certain issue is being securitized and therefore how far an actor is likely to be induced to take emergency measures.

A key question is: how do the perspectives on security in Israel and Jordan—the presence or absence of a human security perspective—influence the dynamics involved in the securitization of water? For this purpose we shall divide the securitization approach into a sequence of possible levels of securitization, employing the concepts of *violization* (Neumann 1998, p. 2) and *opportunization* (Warner 2000). Accordingly we shall apply a continuum: *non-politicized*[1]—*politicized*[2]—*securitized; opportunized—violized* (Zeitoun 2006, p. 3–4). Various insights into how a particular issue such as water is dealt with can be derived from this continuum:

- It is possible that actors who are strictly located on one side of the conflict take different positions concerning the issue of water, based on the particular securitizing dynamics.
- Governments may opportunize water issues to promote other political interests. This may especially be relevant in the case of an instrumentalized security discourse.

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[1] A non-politicized issue is one such that the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision (Zeitoun 2006, p. 5).

[2] Politicized means that the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decisions and resource allocation (Zeitoun 2006, p. 5).

- Water can take in different positions along the continuum according to time and circumstances. The potential for conflict or cooperation varies accordingly.
- Power asymmetries and their effect become obvious, since for the *violization* or *opportunization* of an issue certain capabilities have to be given (Zeitoun 2006, p. 3–4).

Once a topic has been securitized and emergency measures have been legitimized it is assumed that the chances for cooperation on the issue fade. Being isolated from the realm of normal politics the logic of emergency is in place and the social environment is strongly divided into competitors, enemies, or supporters. Here the connection between securitization and the construction of social identity becomes obvious. Accordingly cooperation is most likely if the topic remains in the political realm. We shall discuss how far water is securitized in Jordan and Israel using the perspectives on security identified earlier.

7.1 Historical Overview: Measures to Secure Water Supply

To secure their supply of water, Jordan and Israel have taken several measures in the past.

7.1.1 The Johnston Plan

In 1951, Jordan announced the *Bunger Plan* to divert part of the Yarmouk River to irrigate the East Ghor area of the Jordan Valley (Haddadin 2006, p. 239). Subsequently Israel began the construction of its National Water Carrier (NWC) in 1953. Syria complained to the UN, and the UN ruled in favour of Syria. Israel ignored the order to abandon construction work. When the US threatened to withhold funds the original plan was modified and the NWC's intake was moved. With regard to the rhetoric of the then Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion,[3] the construction work and the refusal to refrain from construction can be seen as securitizing moves. This is particularly true since the original purpose had been to extend Israeli borders in order to ensure a sufficient supply of water (Maier et al. 1983, p. 319). The survival of Israel was presented as constantly at risk; this legitimized extraordinary measures and left no alternative but to build for Israel's survival.

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[3] David Ben-Gurion constantly stressed the importance of expanding Israel's borders based on access to water: "It is necessary that the water sources upon which the future of the Land depends should not be outside the borders of the future Jewish homeland. For this reason we have always demanded that the Land of Israel include the southern banks of the Litani River, the headwaters of the Jordan and the Hauran Region from the El Auja spring south of Damascus". (Ben-Gurion 1973 cf. Maier, Waxman and Cahnman 1983, p. 319).

This demonstrates the importance of water for national security in the early days of the Israeli state.

The Jordanian and Syrian perspective is indicated in a statement by the then US ambassador Eric Johnston.[4] A national security perspective strongly influenced the Jordanian and Syrian position. Israel was constructed as a threat and as a competitor for water resources (Haddadin and Shamir 2003, p. 24). Describing Israel as 'the enemy' demonstrates that Israel was constructed as an existential threat to survival which had to be contained.

The construction works led to military skirmishes between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Each side perceived a threat to its access to a sufficient supply of water (Allan 2001, p. 21). In order to ease the tensions the US-moderated Johnston Plan (1955) called for the allocation of 55 % of the available water in the Jordan River basin to Jordan, 36 % to Israel, and 9 % each to the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. The plan was not ratified but served as a guideline for appropriations in the Jordan basin (Kliot 1994, p. 202).

7.1.2 The Six Day War

When the NWC opened in 1964 large amounts of water started to be diverted from the Jordan River Valley. This was immediately discussed as an issue of major importance at the Arab Summit of 1964. At the summit a plan was adopted with the goal of diverting the Jordan's headwaters away from Israel to the Syrian Arab Republic and to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Allan 2001, p. 25).

From 1965 to 1967 construction works in Syria aiming to divert the waters of the Jordan were attacked by Israel. To employ violence inevitably changes the perceived nature of an issue. The logic of 'violization' differs from that of 'securitization'. Categories of identity gain importance, as violence needs to be attributed to an outside aggressor. Definitions of the self and of the social environment in the realm of security rely greatly on the creation and establishment of dichotomies. Actions perceived as hostile are attributed to the outside, as the inside of a (national-) security entity is presented as the desirable state of being. By identifying the source of a threat this object or social entity is perceived as a form of enemy and an appropriate identity is attributed to it.

Once violence is applied, the idea of security is closely tied to survival and an opponent's efforts—with a construction of the opponent's identity as enemy being attributed to it—to ensure its state of existence are now regarded as a threat to the self's existence.

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[4] Johnston spoke about the position of the Arab League, showing solidarity with Jordan and Syria and saying that it: "utterly refuses consideration of any joint project to utilize the waters of this river (the Jordan) with the enemy Israel" (Johnston 1953 cf. Haddadin and Shamir 2003, p. 24).

When violization logic is invoked, mutual provocations are inevitable. This made the situation escalate more and more in combination with a number of other issues[5] it is estimated that these tensions escalated into the Six Day War of 1967. In the war Israel completely destroyed the Syrian diversion project and occupied the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The occupation provided Israel with control over the Jordan's headwaters, as well as significant groundwater resources under the West Bank (Pearce 2007, p. 78). This control is crucial for the Israeli perception of security, as the constant fear of being deprived of water supply is a deeply worrying threat in Israel (Twite 2009, p. 866). From being securitized the issue of water security changed its nature and was opportunized, as Israel used its military power to secure its supply of water by occupying the Golan.

Here a logic different from that of violization is invoked. The possibilities for opportunizing the situation existed. Each side saw itself as well as the other side as possessing the minimum necessary capabilities for military success, and was aware that, if this had not been the case, it might itself have been destroyed. For this reason each side attempted to secure the capabilities to help it survive in this dangerous situation. A shortfall in those capacities was now perceived as an existential threat in the face of this decisive and violent situation.

We can assume a strong national security focus on both sides where the issue of water is seen as vital to sovereignty and territorial integrity. The issue of water is perceived as directly relevant to Israel's survival as a state in as much as its borders would be impossible to be sustained within their previous confines after the war if the water supply from the Golan were not brought under Israeli control. Accordingly, by losing control over the Golan Israel would lose control over the strategic asset of water, and the state of Israel would suffer a severe constraint to its sovereignty. In Jordan the construction works were regarded as a serious threat to its own survival, since loss of control over the Jordan's inflow was seen as resulting in a loss of the state's sovereignty and hence there was an existential threat to national security.

In the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1969, Israel attacked Jordan's East Ghor Canal. Jordan was suspected of extracting excessive amounts of water from the Yarmouk. Later, under the terms of the Johnston Plan, Israel and Jordan agreed on the amount of water each would extract from the waters of the Jordan basin (Pearce 2007, p. 78).

7.1.3   The Peace Accords

In 1994, the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty—which included specific articles on the allocation of water—was signed. Under this treaty Jordan was entitled to store 20 million m^3 of the Upper Jordan winter flow on Israeli territory—in

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[5] E.g. the blockage of the Tiran Straits.

Lake Tiberias—and to receive it during the summer months. Ten million m^3 of desalinated water from saline Israeli springs near the town of Tiberias were allocated to Jordan and until the desalination plant was erected, Jordan would receive this quantity from the lake in summer. Jordan was permitted to build a regulation/storage dam on the Yarmouk downstream of the point where the Yarmouk's waters were diverted to the King Abdullah Canal (KAC). Jordan was furthermore permitted to build a dam of 20 million m^3 capacity on the Jordan, as well as on its reach south of Lake Tiberias, on the border between Jordan and Israel. Later an agreement was reached that included the provision of 50 million m^3 of desalinated water from the Israeli saline springs south of Lake Tiberias to Jordan (Walker 1999). A regulating dam on the Yarmouk was built and the water conveyor to transport water from Lake Tiberias in Israel to the KAC in Jordan was constructed just after the signing of the Peace Treaty (Haddadin 2002, p. 331).

Here it becomes obvious that the perception of water—regarded beforehand as indivisible between the potential competitors Israel and Jordan—has changed. In Israel a relatively comfortable position has been achieved based on military supremacy. Israel was willing to make concessions out of a position of power (peace as a moral choice). Water as a potential security issue was on the way to being de-securitized and placed within the political realm. From out of this perspective the issue of water gradually changed its nature and became a second-order goal, a necessity for economic success.

The de-securitization of the issue of water supply has to be differentiated from a mere change in the hierarchy of potential security issues. While certain topics might lose importance at some point in time, they might reappear on a later occasion, exhibiting similar securitizing dynamics to when the issue had first been securitized. This implies that for an issue to be finally de-securitized it has to be completely removed from the realm of security and not solely be attributed a lower priority or forgotten. De-securitization therefore is processual in nature. Accordingly the presence of a security perspective different from the one that obtained when the issue was first securitized might lead to a totally different perception of the matter and might permanently de-securitize it. Therefore, the presence of a human security perspective could lead to a durable de-securitization of an issue such as water.

Having supported Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War, Jordan was internationally isolated. While its economic base declined and the 'rentier mentality' of the Jordanian population started to fade, the survival of the Jordanian monarchy was seriously imperilled, threatened by a collapse of the state and by competition between various groups. In order to ensure economic well-being, new international funds had to be directed towards Jordan and the Jordanian economy had to be developed. In pursuing those goals the concept of human security was introduced in Jordan. This also shows how the human security discourse in Jordan was identified as instrumental in nature. To improve its international standing and to be able to materially bolster the monarchy's legitimacy, the peace treaty with Israel was signed. Political rents such as development and military aid substituted for the oil

Table 7.1 Securitization of Water in Jordan (1953-1994)

Securitization	Violization	Violization/ Humiliation	Politicization
1953–1955	1965–1967	1969–1994	1994
Israeli construction works are presented as a threat	Violization logic	Aftermath of 1967 war	International isolation for supporting Saddam Hussein
	Escalating violence	Deep humiliation	Peace treaty containing water annexe

Source Compiled by the author

rents that were formerly directed towards Jordan from oil-rich countries[6] (Pawelka 2002, p. 442–443; Harders and Bank 2008, p. 413). While water had been seen as indivisible, and Israel constructed as the enemy and as a major threat to Jordan, the perception of threats—now focusing on threats to inner stability—changed. Israel was no longer regarded as an arch-enemy, and the issue of water has been gradually de-securitized, and put on the level of a second-order goal, in close connection to the economic development process.

A human security perspective only developed after the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. With a predominantly national security perspective in place, water was integrated into the categories of territorial integrity and sovereignty. While a disruption of the water supply was seen in Jordan as a threat to national security, closely linked to the enemy Israel, the treaty created a level of reliability for both parties and repositioned the issue of water supply, placing it lower in the hierarchy of potential security threats. This is a different approach from for example that discussed in various works on the water regime and its potential for enhancing cooperation and decreasing the potential for conflict (Fischhendler et al. 2011; Jägerskög 2003). While the treaty can be regarded as the decisive de-securitizing step from which a new base for cooperation has been achieved, in the scheme of *non-politicized—politicized—securitized; opportunized—violized* it is a step towards further de-securitization—repositioning it in the political realm, but not fully de-securitizing it—while still constantly being dependent on the relevant security perspective. While cooperation between Jordan and Israel over the issue of water supply has a long history (see Sect. 7.1.1), Jordan signed the peace treaty from a position of weakness with regard to the capabilities necessary to achieve national security. Of course a treaty will increase the cost of future conflict and thus make a violent outbreak more unlikely, yet a final de-securitization will not have been achieved as long as the issue is still perceived as located within the realm of security and as making the issue a question of national survival. It changes the hierarchy of threats to national security, but it does not finally de-securitize the matter (Tables 7.1 and 7.2).

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[6] Including the remittances of the large Jordanian diaspora—especially from Palestinians working in the Gulf states.

Table 7.2   Securitization of water in Israel (1953–1994)

Securitization	Violization; Opportunization	Non-politicized	Politicization
1953–1955	1965–1967	1969–1994	1994
Jordanian/Syrian construction works are presented as a threat	Violization logic Escalating violence	Aftermath of 1967 war Supply of water from the occupied territories	Peace treaty containing water annexe
	Opportunizing on military supremacy	Other threats to national security are attributed higher priority	

7.2   Tensions Over the Allocation of Water in 1999

Due to a severe drought Israel decided in 1999 to reduce the quantity of water piped to Jordan by 60 %, and this led to a sharp response from Jordan. With only 2 % of the average annual rainfall in 1999, Jordan was forced to declare a state of drought, and both Israel and Jordan expected aggravated water scarcity during the summer. In order to prevent a severe water shortage Israel presented a plan to reduce the amount of water that had been promised to Jordan in the 1994 peace accords by 40 % (Khatib 1999). To legitimize such a step Israel's then Water Commissioner, Meir Ben Meir, stated that the peace accords did not take drought into consideration, and that shortage of water also forced Israel to severely reduce its water consumption. Jordan vociferously demanded its full share of water, claiming that a severe crisis was about to occur if Israel should withhold water from Jordan (Harman 1999; Sosland 2008, p. 180). In Jordan a number of measures—such as taking control of 1,650 privately-owned wells, rationing water consumption, and limiting agricultural production to less water-intensive crops—were undertaken. The amount of water pumped to the Southern Ghor region for agricultural use was reduced by 50 %, to the Northern Ghor by 20 %, and to the Central Ghor by 10 %. Severe economic damage was expected if Jordan did not receive the full amount of water from Israel as granted in the peace treaty.[7]

After one week of negotiations Jordan categorically refused to reduce its share. Furthermore, Jordan announced that if the water were withheld from Jordan 'appropriate actions' would be taken against Israel. The dispute was not settled until five weeks later. By allowing for some flexibility in the delivery timetable of the water, Israel agreed to provide Jordan with its full share of water as specified by their peace treaty (Khatib 1999).

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[7] "Delegation Head says Amman Cannot Renegotiate Water Shares with Israel", in: *Shihan News*, 19 March 1999.

As was agued above for the 1999 security discourse, in both states a national security perspective predominated, with a hegemonic national security discourse in Israel and a slowly developing, instrumental human security discourse in Jordan. Therefore, the tensions of 1999 offer insights into the dynamics of the securitization of water in Israel and Jordan. The severe drought of 1998–1999 had forced Jordan to announce 'appropriate measures', implying a willingness for open confrontation despite the dominant military position of Israel. This indicates that water was integrated into the frame of national security and 'appropriate measures' were directed towards a potential competitor, namely the state of Israel. As the tense situation was perceived within a national security context, it was presented as a situation where confrontation was inevitable. Yet the drought was affecting the whole region, reducing the available amount of water for all actors. From a national security perspective there was no alternative to initial confrontation. But efforts to resolve the tensions succeeded. Water was a security goal of a lower priority than the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a radical Iranian regime etc. Of course the drop in position in the hierarchy is a step towards de-securitizing a matter, but the issue remained closely linked to the categories of territorial integrity and sovereignty. The situation would have looked different if Israel's military dominance had not been as obvious. The question was not why Jordan did not take any further steps, but why it threatened to do so despite Israel's military dominance. Possibly from a national security perspective no alternative was considered as the situation was presented as a matter of national survival.

7.3 Securitization of Water and Security Perspectives in Israel and Jordan

If the 1999 tensions between Israel and Jordan over the allocation of water are classified within the previously introduced continuum of *non-politicized, politicized, securitized* and *opportunized, violized* a possible conclusion could be that in Jordan the water supply was not fully de-securitized. As the categories of *violized* and *opportunized* (Zeitoun 2006, p. 2–5) were integrated into this analysis, the findings of this study differ from those of the Copenhagen School's original approach of securitization.

The water that was withheld by Israel was presented as a matter of survival for Jordan (Khatib 1999). Yet several measures, such as reducing the amount of water pumped to southern Jordan, had previously been taken. While several steps to de-securitize water were taken, the severe drought of 1998–1999 led to a reappearance of the dynamics which could be observed in earlier incidents. The connection between water supply and the survival of the state in the categories of territorial integrity and sovereignty was still strong, owing to a predominantly national security perspective. In Jordan the issue had been *violized* before but in the short time since the peace treaty of 1994 this *violization* could not significantly change owing to the logic of securitization. While all countries in the region were affected by

the drought, the water shortage was attributed to Israel, which was presented as putting Jordan's survival at stake. The reaction to security threats in the realm of national security implies the definition of a threat to a state's territorial integrity and sovereignty, which is attributed to an outside entity—e.g. the state of Israel.

In Israel the dominance of its military had led to a de-securitization of the supply of water, and the announcement that it was not willing to provide the full amount of water was seen as a logical step since the peace treaty did not cover a severe drought. As water was de-securitized and did not affect the categories of territorial integrity or sovereignty, this prevented relevant decision-makers from seeing a strong connection between water and national security in Jordan. Therefore, a confrontational logic was invoked which left no alternative but a clash of interests. But an open conflict did not arise.

One explanation of why an open conflict was avoided is the power asymmetry between Israel and Jordan. While the IDF was the strongest military force in the Middle East, the Jordanian military had no chance of prevailing in a military dispute. Another explanation was 'learning' within the water regime. Both states had cooperated on water issues in the framework of the Johnston Plan before the peace treaty of 1994. The water regime offered them a platform for developing trust and achieving more favourable solutions.

Both explanations focus on the state as the main referent and thus the potential security threats were addressed by policies for conflict resolution from a national security perspective. The situation in 1999 was only able to be resolved within five weeks by allowing more flexibility in the delivery timetable because of the dominance of the Israeli military and previous 'learning'. But these explanations could not answer the question of why the tensions arose. The logic of a national security perspective may have resulted in confrontation due to the link with a threat to national security by another state, where one's territorial integrity and sovereignty was at stake.

7.4 De-Securitization of Water

Since 2008 the most severe drought period since the 1920s has been seen in both Israel and Jordan. Due to population growth in both countries—1.58 % in Israel (CIA 2012b) and 0.98 % in Jordan (CIA 2012a)—this confronts both governments with a severe challenge to maintaining a sufficient supply of water.

Jordan faces the most severe water crisis worldwide.[8] Total natural renewable water resources account for 1,622 km^3/year, while the actual total renewable water resources amount to 937 km^3/year (Aquastat 2012a).[9] With a population of

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[8] الأردن الأول عالميا في الفقر المائي. [Jordan occupies first spot in global water poverty]; at: <http://www.ain.jo/node], 198441 (8 January 2012).

[9] The actual total renewable water sources refer to the total natural renewable water resources that are not referred to in treaties and may therefore be freely allocated (Aquastat 2012c).

6,508,271 (CIA 2012a), each inhabitant has a share of 144 m^3/capita/year. According to the FWSI the lack of water supply in Jordan is a main constraint on life (Falkenmark 1989, p. 350–351). Even if the total natural resources were taken into account, only 251 m^3/capita/person would be available. With a dependency ratio of 27.21 %, Jordan is highly dependent on its neighbours, mainly on Syria and Israel.[10] Even with all the water that is potentially available—by depriving the neighbours of it—water scarcity in Jordan could not be overcome. In 2006, the total use of water in Jordan was 165 m^3/capita/year (Khaleq 2008). This discrepancy (WAI of—0.11) indicates a massive overuse of Jordan's water resources and demonstrates the importance of mining non-renewable groundwater resources, such as the Disi Aquifer. In terms of water supply it seems legitimate to speak about a crisis of water security in Jordan. To improve the health of the Jordanian population during the past three decades sewage networks have been constructed in cities and towns. For this reason the quality of drinking water in Jordan has steadily improved (Nimri 1993, p. 2707). But the quality of rivers and groundwater sources has decreased. The Yarmouk contains sewage which contributes high ammonium loads to the river. Nitrate concentrations have increased from near zero to 10–15 mg/L. With a mixture of saline spring water diverted from the Sea of Galilee and urban sewage affluent, the quality of the water of the Jordan has degraded during the last few years. As a result the Lower Jordan has become brackish (Salameh 1996, p. 13). Over-exploitation of groundwater resources has degraded water quality and reduced future quantities available for exploitation. This has resulted in the abandonment of several municipal wells and water wells for irrigation (Aquastat 2008a). Water scarcity is accompanied by degradation in quality. Water security in Jordan is severely endangered, even more so than could be observed in 1999.

Israel is also facing severe water scarcity. Total internal renewable water resources are estimated at 750 million m^3/year. The total renewable water resources are thus 1,780 million m^3/year, of which 1,638 million m^3/year are considered to be exploitable (Aquastat 2008b). With a population of 7,473,052 (CIA 2012b), each inhabitant has a share of 219 m^3/capita/year. The FWSI identifies the lack of water supply in Israel as a main constraint on life (Falkenmark 1989, p. 350–351). The total rate of withdrawal is 302 m^3/capita/year (CIA 2012b), which is higher than the available 219 m^3/capita/year. This discrepancy (WAI of—0.27) is mainly due to the intensive use of the Mountain Aquifer which lies under Palestinian territory and the unrestricted influx of water from the occupied Golan. The dependency ratio of 57.87 % points to Israel's high dependency on the unrestricted use of freshwater inflows. In terms of quality, in Israel water security is highly fragile. While 97.9 % of the Ministry of Environmental Protection's tests of drinking water met the quality standards, in terms of salinity water quality in Israel is at stake. Salinity varies greatly from very low concentrations in the

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[10] That part of the total renewable water resources originating outside the country (Aquastat 2012c).

Upper Jordan, with 10 mg/l of chlorides, to more than 1500 mg/l from groundwater sources in the south (SVIVA 2003). Currently the Mountain Aquifer has the best water quality. Yet 60 million m^3 of untreated sewage from Palestinian villages, cities, and Israeli settlements are endangering the Mountain Aquifer's water quality (Tagar, Keinan and Bromberg 2004). In particular, the lack of services for the treatment of solid waste has led to a situation where 25 % of the West Bank's population has no access to solid waste collection or management programmes. This results in a steady inflow of pollutants from insufficiently treated waste into the Mountain Aquifer (Dajani Daoudi 2009, p. 876–877). The Coastal Aquifer is being over-pumped, leading to its salinization in large parts, while the level of salinity of the Sea of Galilee has declined as a result of the pumping of the saline springs at the bottom of the lake and discharge of the water to the southern Jordan (Keinan et al. 2005; Issar 2007, p. 382–383). Thus, water scarcity in Israel is serious and presents a major obstacle to the achievement of water security.

Despite the most severe water crisis in history no open water dispute has occurred between Israel and Jordan. Why has this strained situation not resulted in confrontation? We shall argue that the dynamics of securitization have changed, placing water in the political realm and treating it as an economic issue instead of one of national survival.

For the analysis of a human security approach in Israel and Jordan the overall security perspective was assessed. While in Jordan an 'instrumental' human security perspective was integrated into its security discourse, in Israel a 'hegemonic' national security discourse prevailed. The human security perspective in Jordan was attributed to a concern for inner stability and economic development. Given the constant threat of losing control over the state, the Jordanian government had to adopt measures to reduce the potential for internal conflict. The hegemonic nature of the national security discourse in Israel was explained by the idea of Israel being a Jewish homeland—a shelter from the continuing oppression of Jews—and by the dichotomy between the Jewish in-group and the rest of the world. External threats unite Jewish Israelis. In Jordan water was regarded as a medium that cannot easily be shared. The security focus changed, and internal threats were perceived as being more important than external ones. The development process was central and water was regarded as a means for sustainable economic growth, so its strategic importance was not regarded as being as important as before, when military motivations predominated.

With the shift towards a human security perspective, the needs of individuals received higher priority. This resulted in a change to the perceived possible threats. National security refers to sovereignty and territorial integrity. When a human security perspective evolved in the discourse of state executives, the needs of the individual were conceptualized so as to affect these categories. The perception of water scarcity in terms of the allocation of water between Jordan and Israel shifted from a threat to vulnerability. In Jordan water scarcity was seen as a function of the country's own lack of capabilities and so water scarcity was addressed from a domestic perspective. Water security was now perceived as a means of granting individual security and thus internal stability. Once a human security perspective

had developed, water security was treated as a vulnerability and disruption to the water supply as a risk.

While the available amount of water was seen as being fixed, the technical possibilities of improving the water supply changed the perception of the total amount of available water. The perception of water itself changed from an external to a manufactured risk, and human-made risks can be solved by technical solutions. Given the know-how and the financial means, the risk of a disruption to the water supply can be managed.[11] Even with all the water available in Israel and Jordan, water scarcity—as defined by the FWSI—could not be overcome. Both in Israel, with its highly developed economy, and in Jordan's developing economy the means exist to purchase water-intensive goods from abroad. Importing grain, cattle, or industrial goods, or 'virtual water',[12] could in each case reduce dependence on the country's own water resources. 'Virtual water' already relieves large parts of the Middle East's population from threats to water security, and it accounts for most food consumed in the Middle East[13] (Allan 2002, 2007, p. 33–40, 2009).

The Israeli dynamic of integrating water into the security framework differs from that of Jordan, but the results are similar. According to Israel's 'hegemonic' national security discourse, an issue can only be handled as a security issue if it is integrated into the categories of sovereignty and territorial integrity. While in the past the issue was presented as a matter of Israel's bare survival, this perception has changed. With the peace treaty competition for water has declined and the fixed amounts of water allocated in the treaty have led to its gradual politicization. As the threat of a Jordanian attack has faded, other threats, such as those from Iran and Hezbollah, have gained importance. The issue of sharing water with Jordan is no longer integrated into the wider frame of national security, since Jordan itself is no longer seen as a threat. Technical solutions for water scarcity were noted based on desalinization and sewage treatment.

In both states the issue of water is now presented as an economic issue. The prevailing opinion is that it is easier to manufacture water than to have to negotiate about it. Several steps towards technical solutions have been made, which can also be described as de-securitizing steps. Various projects, including desalination, sewage water treatment, importation of water from Turkey, or the building of a Red Sea-Dead Sea canal with additional desalination capacities, have been

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[11] The dynamic if a natural shortage cannot be overcome by technical solutions is described by Homer-Dixon as an "ingenuity gap" (Homer-Dixon 2001).

[12] Water use worldwide is greatly affected by food production. The distinction between 'soil water', fresh water and groundwater gains importance in relation to 'virtual water'. As 'soil water' is freely available, but less reliable than groundwater, geographical features greatly influence the availability and especially the price of products containing soil water, which are mainly agricultural products. Groundwater on the other hand can be extracted in reliable amounts and is therefore much more interesting to industrial and high intensity (industrialized) agriculture.

[13] Yet the impact of importing water-intensive goods remains "economically invisible and politically silent" (Allan 2009, p. 33), so that despite shifting perceptions of water possibly being handled by technical solutions, importing water-intensive goods is not perceived as a possible means of reducing water scarcity.

discussed (Newman 2004, 2009, p. 864; Hayek 2009, p. 619). With these projects, water has been removed from the security agenda.

Probably the most spectacular step in placing the water issue into the political realm is the proposed Red Sea-Dead Sea conduit. In 2005 the three parties of Jordan (represented by the then Water Minister Raed Abu Soud), Israel (represented by the then Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer), and the Palestinian Authority (represented by the then Planning Minister Ghassan Al-Khatib) achieved an agreement for the carrying out of a feasibility study on the conduit. Four years later, in June 2009, the Israeli Minister for Regional Development, Silvan Shalom, announced the building of a 180 km-long pipeline from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea as a pilot project for the proposed conduit. Two hundred million m³ of water would be pumped annually from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, with half of that amount being desalinated for Jordanian consumption (Lazarof and Waldoks 2009). Before the feasibility study had been completed, the Jordanian government announced in October 2009 that it would unilaterally begin its own project as the first phase of the proposed common project (Spencer 2009). If the project reaches its final phase, the Red Sea Project would provide 930 million m^3 of fresh water per year for Jordan, and 180 MW of energy through hydropower, but would also require 995 MW of electric power generating capacity. This demand would have to be met by additional power projects, whose costs were not included in the project calculations (JRSP 2011). In February 2011 the Red Sea-Dead Sea feasibility study, sponsored by the World Bank, was completed, but several substudies had still to be conducted to evaluate the findings (Namrouqa 2011).

Another example of the removal of water from the realm of (national) security can be seen in Israeli efforts to enhance its own desalinating capacities. A desalination facility in Palmachim has been proposed which will supply 16 per cent of Israel's drinking water (Rinat 2010). Water is presented as an economic issue, and the prevailing reasoning is that no dispute over the allocation of water will resolve the problems at hand since the available amount of water is too small to cover the needs of even only one actor. The *Blue Peace Report* published by the Strategic Foresight Group (2011) illustrated the change of perception with the statement "War does not make additional water but regional cooperation can" (Bin Talal 2009). The prevailing opinion is that it is easier to manufacture water than to have to negotiate about it. Several technical solutions have been suggested which can be described as de-securitizing steps.

Different perspectives have resulted in similar conceptualizations of water as an economic issue.[14] These different perspectives agree that an open conflict can be prevented and that enhanced cooperation has resulted from the strained situation of a prolonged drought. While water was previously seen as affecting the very survival of Jordan and Israel, and this led to skirmishes in the past, this perception has changed. Jordan is no longer regarded as an enemy that might pose a severe military threat, while in Jordan the focus has shifted internally towards the goal of stability and economic prosperity.

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[14] In Israel an ideological preference for farming can be observed in the disproportionate political power of the agricultural sector (Jägerskög 2009, p. 636).

A hegemonic national security discourse determines the security perspective in Israel. Water security must affect sovereignty and territorial integrity to be perceived as a security matter. The military capability to seize and control the occupied territories and therefore to control a large part of the water supply have led to a situation where the very survival of the Israeli state is not linked to water supply. Water has changed from a first- to a second-order goal. Israeli security thinking and the zero-sum logic of water security have changed and have possibly been overtaken by technological innovations (Selby 2009, p. 627). National security defines the very identity of Israel as the protector from external threats. The idea of Israel as a shelter from continuing aggression against Jews incorporates *freedom from fear* into the Israeli national security discourse. While national security is regarded as a precondition for protecting the in-group, the area inside the borders of one's own state is presented as the desirable environment to live in (Hansen 2006, p. 34). Therefore, the dimensions of *freedom from want* and *participation* for one's own in-group are not addressed since the area inside the borders of one's own state already represents the proposed living environment. In Israel the presentation of the outside world and the construction of dichotomies have changed. While Arab states per se were before regarded as an enemy, now it is radical fundamentalist movements that are so perceived. As a consequence, water is not integrated into a national security perspective since it cannot be linked to an enemy.

In Jordan an 'instrumental' human security discourse could be observed. While the focus of security was on the state as the referent and on military means of ensuring national security, this perspective has also changed. Before the peace treaty of 1994 the issue of water supply was securitized in a way that saw competition with Israel over water as an existential threat. This has gradually changed. Previously, water was seen as being connected to Israel and therefore as a threat to national security, and water was securitized.

With the acknowledgement of the Palestinian's right to their own state in the territory of the West Bank in 1988, the water resources of the West Bank were removed from the Jordanian agenda. Due to the peace agreement of 1994 with Israel the water issue gradually shifted into the political realm. A first step in the process of de-securitization was thus made. With the decline of Jordan's 'rentier economy', internal cohesion became a primary goal. Subsequently a different set of security threats were identified. Water was not connected to a clearly identified enemy,[15] but became an issue of the economic development process.

Finally, in the Jordanian case a gradually developing human security perspective offers another possible explanation of the fierce reaction to the Israeli proposal of 1999 to reduce the amount of water. The economic development process

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[15] In this study only certain levels of the discourse have been analysed. The conclusions refer to the findings from the scientific and the state executive's discourses. Large parts of the population on each side still regard their counterparts as enemies. In Jordan, opposition to a peace agreement with Israel was seen as the most severe threat to the Hashemite monarchy (Robinson 1998, p. 393), while for many Israelis 'the Arabs are still regarded as enemies per se (Bar-Tal; Teichman 2005, p. 155).

became a matter of security. When this process seemed to be in danger, this led to a strong political reaction.

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Chapter 8
Conclusion

This study has addressed the question of how security perspectives influence the perception of water scarcity, and what their impact has been on bilateral relations between Jordan and Israel in terms of security. We saw that different security perspectives result in different perceptions of water scarcity. In order to define the limits of the relevant security perspectives, we raised the question of whether a human security perspective emerged in the Israeli and Jordanian security discourse of scientists and government officials, and to do this we carried out a discourse analysis. We argued that the knowledge on which an actor bases relevant decisions is created in a discursive context, and so the security discourse determines the security perspective; for this reason, a discourse analysis was considered as an appropriate instrument. An important distinction was made between the discourse among scientists and the discourse among state executives. Our goal was to identify the nature of a human security discourse, if we found one was present: was it *hegemonic* or *instrumental*?

In Jordan we saw that the concept of human security—with its four components of *freedom from fear*, *freedom from want*, *freedom from hazard impact*, and *participation*—was present in both discourses, but that there were major differences between the two. In Jordan's scientific discourse, human security was conceptualized as a 'Western' concept and as a possible tool for interfering in domestic issues and thus circumventing the sovereignty of the state. The Arab elites were also seen as a barrier to human security. The security discourse of Jordanian state executives is different in nature. Here the focus shifted from external threats to domestic threats such as groups in society who were challenging the dominant position of the Hashemite monarchy. The elites of the state actively promoted and instrumentalized human security to achieve internal stability, so that it became an instrument for governing the Kingdom of Jordan.

In the discourse analysis of Israeli scientists and state executives, a national security discourse was identified with a hegemonic position that has shaped the Israeli security perspective, hence only minor differences could be traced between the scientific and the state executives' security discourses. In Israel a focus on

national security has predominated, firmly rooted in military considerations. Israeli understanding of security is deeply rooted in Jewish history and shaped by tragic events and continuing oppression. The experiences of the Shoa in particular have led to an understanding of security that is strongly connected to the idea of a shelter from anti-Semitic aggression for Jews worldwide. The notion of shelter finds its expression in turn in an understanding of security that is linked to territorial considerations.

The security perspectives of the securitizing elites and the security discourses of the state executives in both Israel and Jordan have strongly influenced the perception of water security. We saw that the empirically measurable water scarcity is an urgent issue for both states. The threshold of 500 m^3/capita/year cannot be met, and according to the Falkenmark Water Stress Indicator (FWSI) water scarcity is a major constraint on life. Both states have perceived water and the sustainability of its supply as an urgent issue. The great importance attributed to water security can be seen in the various measures that both sides have taken to secure their share of water. Examples of such measures are in Israel the drainage of the *Hulah Swamps* and the construction of the National Water Carrier (NWC), and in Jordan the *Bunger Plan* aimed at diverting the headwaters of the Jordan away from Israel in order to serve the development of the Jordanian (and Syrian) economy. Steps to secure the supply of water have led to confrontations in the past, such as skirmishes in the early 1950s linked to the implementation of large-scale development plans for the water infrastructure and the subsequent construction works. These tensions that originated in the early 1950s are often referred to as a major trigger for the 1967 war.

A major result that we found in this study is that since the 1990s the issue of water has been gradually de-securitized. In Jordan, the perspective of the securitizing elite shifted from outside threats such as the state of Israel towards threats to inner cohesion and to the development of the national economy. In Israel a national and military security perspective has prevailed and the dominant position of the IDF in the Middle East has put Israel in a comfortable position. A dominant position was interpreted as a prerequisite for Israel's willingness to make concessions towards its Arab neighbours, making peace a *moral choice* (Peres 1995 cf. MFAI 1995). Despite their different perspectives on security, Jordan and Israel have achieved compatible ways of dealing with the issue of water. We investigated the securitization of water—within the continuum of *non-politicized, politicized, securitized; opportunized, violized*—and found that the issue of water has been gradually de-securitized, despite severe water scarcity and signs of confrontation in the year 1999. Here the confrontational logic connected with the tensions of 1999 was ascribed to the prevailing national security perspective that made water an issue to be handled within the categories of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. De-securitizing steps were, for example, the signing of the peace treaty of 1994 and the acknowledgement of the Palestinians' right to their own state within the territory of the West Bank. These steps have shifted the focus and gradually put the issue of water in the political realm. In Jordan, concerns for inner stability and the opportunity of directing international funds towards Jordan

have led to a conceptualization of security goals similar to that in Israel. Here the military dominance of the IDF and the 1967 war—when Israel opportunized the situation and secured the inflow of water from the Golan and the occupied West Bank—made Israel's water supply much more stable and so a lower priority was attributed to this issue.

The tensions of 1999 have shown that perspectives might change but that those changes require longer time spans. In Jordan an 'instrumental' human security perspective has developed out of concern for the country's internal stability. Subsequently the economic development process is perceived as a major factor influencing Jordan's cohesion. If in the future water security issues are perceived as a threat to inner stability, these might also be securitized and subsequent emergency measures may follow.

The outcomes of the *Arab Spring* cannot be predicted. Yet the Hashemite monarchy has not been challenged and recurrent protests have mostly remained peaceful. What became obvious is that human security in Arab countries has been at stake for a long time now, and that people are willing to act on shortcomings in its provision. Rising prices for basic commodities (*freedom from want*), the often unlawful behaviour of police forces and government authorities (*freedom from fear*), the lack of preparation of the population for emergencies such as the disruption of basic services (*freedom from hazard impact*), and depriving young people of their chances in life (*participation*) may all have had a strong influence on the outbreak of the protests and revolutions in many Arab countries. In Jordan the focus on threats to the internal cohesion of the state has led to the integration of an instrumental human security perspective into the securitizing elite's security discourse. Whether fundamental changes may occur in Jordan remains speculative. But the potential for a revolution may be lower than in other Arab countries, because threats to human security have been addressed and partly ameliorated during recent years.

Water will remain an important issue in the bilateral relations between Jordan and Israel. We cannot predict whether perspectives on security may change again and water be regarded as a threat to national security, leading to confrontations between the two actors. The issue of water and the need to secure its supply will shape the relations between current actors and those to come.

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Biography

Philip Schäfer is a political scientist specializing on security policy and the region of the Near- and Middle East. He graduated with a diploma degree from the Otto-Suhr-Institute of Political Science of the Free University of Berlin and he travelled extensively in the Middle East, lived in Damascus and Cairo studying and improving his knowledge of Arabic. He currently works on Saudi Arabian foreign policy and temporarily lives in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.