THE TURNING POINT IN US-JAPAN RELATIONS

Hanihara's Cherry Blossom Diplomacy in 1920–1930



MISUZU HANIHARA CHOW
KIYOFUKU CHUMA

The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations

Misuzu Hanihara Chow • Kiyofuku Chuma

The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations

Hanihara's Cherry Blossom Diplomacy in 1920-1930

palgrave
macmillan

Misuzu Hanihara Chow
Macquarie University
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia

Kiyofuku Chuma
The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo
The Shinano Mainichi Shimbun, Nagano
Japan

ISBN 978-1-349-58153-5 ISBN 978-1-349-58154-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016941238

Cover illustration: © OJO Images Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Nature America Inc. New York

To

Dr. Michael Chow,
Dr. Clara Chow, Dr. Carina Chow,
Dr. Venu Chalasani, and Dr. Ben Green

Also to

Mihika, Kira, Ken, and Kailani
The youngest generation to carry on the Hanihara legacy

Preface

The 1920s is a strangely forgotten decade in the history of modern Japan. Even historians seldom explore this period. When the Japan of the "interwar period" is discussed, the focus seems always to be on the 1930s. The country inevitably is characterized by its military aggression, total disregard to the prevailing international order, and headlong plunge into fascism.

The 1920s was, however, a totally different era. With the end of World War I, the Japanese military saw its influence decidedly wane. In its place, the intellectual movement, later known as the *Taisho Democracy*, flourished. More progressive leaders emerged to dominate party politics. With strong support from the country's intellectuals, the new leaders with a liberal outlook tried to steer the nation on a more moderate course based on international cooperation.

Meiji's pioneering spirit was still vibrant and intellectual minds were open to international visions, instead of being confined to the narrow view of national self-interest. As a newly emerging power on the world stage, Japan, above all, desired to be accepted in the international community. She was eager to play a part in cooperation with other leading nations in the search for lasting world peace.

Those two decades, the 1920s and 1930s, mark a stark contrast. Yet, history would seldom allow a total break from one decade to another during such a short period. Various torrents of undercurrents, some barely visible, must have been at work only to surface in later years.

This book is an attempt to explore some of those barely recognized undercurrents and to discover how a country, which had so successfully

modernized and was seemingly led by well-educated, intellectual minds, slid so suddenly and completely into the hands of ultranationalists, until it was transformed into an international pariah during the 1930s.

Two international incidents in the 1920s shocked Japan and changed the way in which the country looked at the West. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Japan proposed that a declaration of racial equality (i.e., the Racial Equality Bill) be included in the forthcoming League of Nations Covenant. Japan's proposal was defeated despite support from a majority of member nations. Five years later, the US Immigration Act of 1924 was passed; it specifically excluded Japanese from immigrating to the United States. Those two incidents had a significant impact on minds of the Japanese people, and henceforth influenced the way in which the country would view and judge the West. The two incidents are the focus of this book.

This is also the story of Hanihara Masanao, the diplomat who became closely involved in both of the incidents. He was Japan's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately after the Paris Peace Conference, and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Washington at the crucial period around the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act. Against tremendous odds, he made unstinting efforts to keep Japan–US relations on even keel. His efforts to prevent damages to the relationship between the two countries came at the cost of his diplomatic career. His motivation and the ideology behind his diplomacy, however, in many ways represents the same pioneering Meiji spirit that modernized Japan, and the liberal ideas that epitomized the *Taisho Democracy*.

Acknowledgments

The seeds of this project were planted nearly thirty years ago. It occurred in the beautifully wood-paneled lobby of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto. Known as Nichibunken, the center is now a well-established hub for Japanese Studies, frequently visited by international scholars throughout the year. At that time, however, it was the newest important national center in Japan. The building had just been completed on spacious grounds, which were hemmed in by bamboo forests, in the outskirts of Japan's ancient city.

The author was having a conversation with Hanihara Kazuro, Professor Emeritus of Tokyo University, an anthropologist who was well known for his theory of the dual structure model for the formation of the Japanese population. He had also been one of the key figures in bringing about the establishment of Nichibunken.

Hanihara Kazuro and this author both are related to Hanihara Masanao. He and his wife Mitsuko had no children. Therefore, to ensure continuation of the long family lineage, the children of Masanao's younger brother, Hanihara Yumijiro, who was then vice president of the Furukawa Mining Industry, were raised as heirs to the family name. The eldest son, Giro, was this author's father and Kazuro was Giro's younger brother, uncle to the author. On that spring day in Kyoto, the uncle and his niece chatted throughout the afternoon. We discussed Hanihara Masanao and what he stood for during his lifetime. In addition, we discussed the strange neglect of the decade of 1920s in studies about Japanese history. Professor Hanihara Kazuro concluded that it was about time that someone undertake serious investigation into both subjects.

At the time, this author had just established the Department of Japanese Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney. For the next twenty years, responsibilities as the head of the department, as well as the director of the Macquarie Japanese Studies Centre, left little time to take up the project. In the meantime, in 2004, Professor Hanihara Kazuro passed away. With my own retirement from the university in 2007, I finally found myself in a position to earnestly launch into the project.

Search for archival documents and other original source materials extended over several continents—the United States, Australia, and Europe, as well as Japan. I owe a great deal to two dedicated women, Kotani Kikue and Beverley Shea; both had once been my graduate students. Dr. Kotani searched for and located materials in Japan, and Beverley Shea did a wide-ranging search for materials in English in Australia, the United States, and Europe. Their painstaking searches yielded many valuable resources, a significant number of which had never been seen in English publications.

As for Hanihara Masanao's personal history and his legacy, including "the true story" behind the so-called "grave consequence" incident, this author was initially guided by what she heard growing up in the Hanihara family. For the project, however, clear evidence had to be found for each turn of events. Documents and letters left by Hanihara Masanao had been scattered, partly due to the fact that his Tokyo residence had been burned to ashes in an air-raid during World War II. To locate the scarce materials, I relied on the valuable assistance of my cousins, Professor Hanihara Tsunehiko of Kitazato Medical University and his sister Hanihara Yumio—the son and daughter of Hanihara Kazuro.

Two friends from this author's Waseda University days have given considerable assistance with this project. Mr. Mori Jiro, formerly an *Asahi Shimbun* journalist and later a lecturer at Waseda University, made tireless efforts and located a tremendous amount of source material in Japan, including original government documents and articles that appeared in various Japanese newspapers—all nearly 100 years old. Mr. Nakayama Tsunenori, formerly the head of the *Asahi Shimbun* Photography Division, helped locate a number of images of Hanihara and articles on related historical subjects.

The author is also indebted for the valuable assistance given by the expert librarians at the Japanese Foreign Affairs Archives (Gaikoo Shiryoo Kan) in Tokyo. Living in Sydney, Australia, the author's visits to Tokyo were always severely restricted by time. Understanding that, Mr. Kanno

Haruhiko, in particular, often searched the materials that I might need before I got there. He took care to be sure that I would have access to the necessary materials in a minimum amount of time.

This project would never have been completed without the participation of Mr. Chuma Kiyofuku. The quality of his investigations into and analysis of Japanese politics, both then current and in more recent history, is well known and respected in Japan. It was extremely fortunate that he had expressed interest in the project since the beginning and ultimately agreed to participate in it. His knowledge and insight into the political situation in Japan during the 1920s and his in-depth analysis of what went on behind the scenes during that particular period have been the most valuable contribution to the project. The author was extremely saddened that Mr. Chuma passed away in late 2014, unexpectedly after a short illness, without seeing the publication of this work.

Despite his highly recognized status in Japan, with positions including Editor-in-Chief of the *Asahi Shimbun*, then vice president of the same company and Editor-in-Chief of the *Shinano Mainichi Shimbun*, Mr. Chuma never lost sight of what it was to be a true investigative journalist. He maintained his integrity and firm commitment to uphold the canon of journalism—to "tell the truth." As an outspoken journalist and the author of numerous books, he stood firm as the "conscience of Japan." throughout the many political changes that occurred in Japan during his time.

The original version of this book was published in Japan in 2011 by Fujiwara Shoten in Tokyo, with the title *Hainichi Iminhoo to Tatakatta Gaikookan*. Mr. Fujiwara Yoshio, the president, and Kariya Taku, the editor, continued to give assistance while I was preparing this English publication. I am most grateful for their generous support.

For this publication in English, the content has been extensively revised and new materials added. For the English edition, the author owes much to Dr. Craig Freedman, formerly Director of the Centre for Japanese Economic Studies at Macquarie University, and the author of numerous academic and nonacademic books and journal articles. In addition to giving this author valuable advice and encouragement throughout the process, Dr. Freedman took on the laborious task of going through the entire manuscript, clarifying and polishing the prose.

The 1920s in Japanese history is still largely an unexplored period. Much more investigation would be needed if we are to fully understand what actually happened during the inter-war period. For this reason, my profound gratitude goes to Dr. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, Publisher at the

Global Outreach Program of Palgrave Macmillan, for determining that this subject matter was worth publishing and for making every effort to make it a reality. Finally, I thank most sincerely the staff members of Palgrave Macmillan; they have made my work much easier by always being helpful and efficient.

Sydney, Australia *Misuzu Hanihara Chow, PhD*

Contents

List of Figures

CHAPTER 1

Entering on to the World Stage: The Advent of a New International Order

A Visitor from Australia

The time was 1919. That eventful year was finally coming to a close. On December 25, a high-ranking Australian diplomat came to visit the Gaimusho[1] in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo. Exactly a year had passed since the World War I armistice. The Paris Peace Conference had concluded a further half year ago with the signing of the Versailles Treaty.

Edmund L. Piesse,[2] with his coat all buttoned up against the unfamiliar chill of Japan's winter, entered the gray-faced building. A gentleman of quiet demeanor with round glasses, Piesse was the Head of the Pacific Branch, a newly created unit within Australia's Prime Minister's Department.[3]

Japan and Australia had been allies during World War I, Great Britain being the connecting link. With her navy fully occupied in the defense of European waters, Britain decided to rely on the existing Anglo-Japan alliance by requesting Japanese assistance in defending the British territories scattered throughout the Pacific.

Japan had responded by forming a special task force consisting of more than thirty war ships. Japan's naval force, during the war, had protected the coasts of Australia and New Zealand as well as the Indian Ocean.[4] The Japanese battle cruiser *Ibuki* was part of the Anglo-Australian fleet that had escorted the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) to Alexandria in Egypt.[5] The ANZACs would later gain fame in the battle of Gallipoli. The fleet had encountered the German light

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2_1

cruiser *Emden,* which had been causing havoc for the Allied ships in the Indian Ocean. In the ensuing battle, the *Ibuki* had supported the Australian ship *Sydney* in the defeat and ultimate sinking of the *Emden*.[6] A massive painting of this now famous Australian sea battle can be seen at the War Memorial in Canberra. In it, it is possible to spot the imposing sight of the *Ibuki* engaged in battle.

This close cooperation between Australia and Japan during the war, however, remained only a matter of convenience for the Australians, reflecting no deeper or long-lasting values. Japanese war efforts did little to alleviate the more ingrained fear and suspicion that had marked Australia's reaction to the Japanese ever since Japan's startling victory over the Russians in 1905.

Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War marked a first in modern history, an occasion when a clearly "non-white" nation convincingly defeated a white nation. This remarkable feat was achieved by a tiny island nation in the East to the astonishment of the rest of the world. Such an outcome had a particularly severe impact on Australia's national psychology. A British territory isolated in the Pacific, Australia began to fear the rise of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Australians became suspicious of every move that Japan made or was assumed to be making. Without exaggerating this preoccupation, it is safe to say that Australia formulated much of its defense strategies and diplomatic policies based on this perceived Japanese threat: "The central issue for Australian diplomacy and defense during 1901–39 was the threat of Japan and the search for security in the Pacific."[7]

Australia had become a federation at the turn of the twentieth century. By uniting separate British colonies that co-existed on the continent, a new Commonwealth of Australia was proclaimed in 1901. National identity, however, remained largely British rather than that of the people of a new and independent country. Australians felt as though they were relegated to the very farthest outpost of the British Empire, alone and isolated in the vast Pacific.

When territorial security was considered, the threat emanating from Japan always loomed large in the people's minds. The perceived threat was nurtured by a specific set of assumptions concerning Japan's imperialistic ambitions in China, and its intention to further advance into the southern parts of the European colonial empire. For a small population of essentially white settlers, Japan became the veritable essence of what would be characterized as the "Yellow Peril"—the fear of being overrun by an alien race.

The object of Piesse's Christmas Day visit to the Gaimusho was to meet Hanihara Masanao,[8] the then Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the meeting with Hanihara, Piesse frankly admitted Australia's less than friendly attitudes toward Japan and explained the background for them. Piesse began by first clarifying that he was voicing not an official position but only his own opinion. He described the history of Australia–Japan relations, emphasizing the sense in which Australians feared Japan and the reasons behind this almost visceral aversion.

Piesse also explained Australia's attitudes toward immigration and the so-called "White Australia" policy then in effect. Hanihara was profoundly impressed by Piesse's candidness. He appreciated Piesse's plain-spoken honesty, despite the high-ranking office he held. Hanihara considered this openness as representing an agreeable, natural trait that characterized Australians.

As the last item on his agenda, Piesse referred to the Paris Peace Conference, which had concluded earlier in the year. He explained how the Japanese proposal for "racial equality" was perceived as a threat by Australia, particularly in relation to its immigration policy. He asked Hanihara for Japan's true intentions; that is, the real motivation behind this proposal. Piesse's unusual frankness had provided Hanihara with an opportunity to respond with equal frankness. According to the diplomatic protocol of the day, however, Hanihara avoided an immediate verbal response but promised to respond later in writing. Early in the New Year, on January 20, Piesse received Hanihara's reply in Manila where he had stopped on his way home.

The letter opened with Hanihara sincerely expressing his gratitude for Piesse's visit. Hanihara stated that he particularly valued Piesse's personal and unofficial statements because they were given in "all candour and unreserve."[9] After responding to the other points raised during the meeting, Hanihara attempted to clarify the reasons that motivated Japan to propose the "Racial Equality Bill" at the Paris Peace Conference.

> *. . . [T]he utterances of Japanese delegates and steps taken by them at the Conference, demonstrate that Japan's object was not "the removal of restrictions on immigration", but the elimination of racial discrimination—a discrimination which, for no reason but of the colour of skin deprives men of equal opportunity in life and often subjects them to an unbearable humiliation.*[10]

All men are created equal. This unequivocal proposal was based soundly on a universally accepted principle. What Japan wanted was to have racial

equality explicitly acknowledged as a fundamental principle by the representatives at the Paris Peace Conference and to have it written into the Preamble of the forthcoming Charter of the League of Nations—the first such international body in human history. However, a further quarter century would have to pass before that principle was finally accepted and articulated by an international organization.

> *Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. . . .*[11]

Thus reads the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. More than sixty-five years later, we still cannot say that men and women have achieved this goal. Few would, however, publicly express doubts about the truth of this universal principle today. Thirty years prior to the action by the United Nations, this humane ideal had been brought to the attention of a world gathering for the first time in history. It was the Japanese who found the courage then to stand up for human dignity. Very few today remember that story.

Japan's proposal was made at the Paris Peace Conference held after the end of World War I. The destruction and slaughter, which defined that particularly lethal war, was still very vivid in the minds of the delegates from all the participating nations. Championed by US President Woodrow Wilson, the creation of a League of Nations was offered as a strategic framework that could bring permanent peace to the world. Japan participated in the conference as one of the victorious nations planning a post-war reality. As the only non-white nation among the five principal participants, it was perhaps not surprising that Japan put forward a proposal that would add a racial equality clause to the Preamble of the League of Nations Covenant.

Japan insisted that the equality principle was imperative if countries were to avoid future conflicts and pave the way for world peace. The proposal, however, was rejected by the ruling world powers. The Japanese delegates were extremely disheartened by this crushing defeat. All their earnest and tireless efforts had gone for naught. Some historians suggest that the rejection of the racial equality clause was an important factor "in turning Japan away from co-operation with the

West and towards more aggressively nationalistic policies"[12] during the inter-war years.

High Hopes, Valiant Struggles, and Bitter Disappointments

On December 10, 1918, Yokohama Harbor was filled with excitement hitherto unseen in Japan. On that day, the Japanese delegation, some twenty members led by Makino Nobuaki,[13] boarded the *Tenyo Maru*; their destination was the Paris Peace Conference. It had been exactly sixty years since the Meiji Restoration, during which Japan was coaxed out from its isolationism, opening the country to the world. Victorious in two wars, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese conflicts, Japan had emerged from World War I on the winning side.

Standing alongside the most powerful nations of the day, the Japanese appeared on the world stage for the first time in history. This was cause for a national celebration. To mark the importance of the occasion, the National Railway organized special railway trucks to transport the delegation and its well-wishers from Tokyo Station directly to the Yokohama piers. Outside of a rare event, such as visits by foreign royalty, that kind of logistical operation had never been undertaken.[14]

On the morning of the day of their departure, Makino, the Deputy leader,[15] and the delegation received a grand send-off at Tokyo Station. Prime Minister Hara Takashi,[16] cabinet ministers, Admiral Togo, and Army and Navy generals were among the 3,000 well-wishers gathered at the station. The specially fitted train left Tokyo amidst a thundering cry of "Banzai!" On arrival at the Yokohama Pier, the delegation was met by some 10,000 ordinary Japanese who were there to see them off and wish them well.

Threading through this sea of waving flags, the delegates finally boarded the *Tenyo Maru,* where yet another grand celebration awaited them. Despite the broad daylight, multi-colored lights brilliantly illuminated *Tenyo Maru*'s banquet hall. It is said that more than 1,000 glasses of champagne were poured for the occasion. Another thunderous cry of "Banzai" went up when the ship left the pier.

At sea, four naval destroyers, including the *Yuugure* and the *Yuudachi*, stood ready to escort the *Tenyo Maru* across Tokyo Bay. Yet another ship with an entire military band on board provided musical accompaniment. Bidding a final farewell, four Japanese Air Force planes flew overhead as

the ship left the Bay. "The grandeur of the sight was incomparable to anything we know," reported a newspaper the next day.[17]

Five years after the Meiji Restoration, while visiting Germany to meet Kaiser Wilhelm I, Ito Hirobumi[18] had written to his young friend Inoue Takeshi: "We, as a tiny island nation in the East, are now ready to stand face to face with the mighty nations of the West."[19] Nearly half a century had passed since then. Now Japan was finally ready to take her first step into the center stage of international diplomacy. She would stand side by side with the mighty powers of the world. The expectations the Japanese people placed on that delegation were enormous. The *Asahi Newspaper* editorial of the time read:

> *From Yokohama today, Baron Makino and the members of the special envoy embark on this voyage. Their journey precisely symbolizes our nation's journey towards permanent peace in the world. It also signifies our efforts towards the reconstruction of a world order, which will ensure lasting peace after the Great War. There is no doubt that our nation's future is greatly intertwined with their mission.*[20]

The list of representatives that each nation sent to the Paris Peace Conference was impressive. President Wilson headed the US delegation with Prime Minister Lloyd George representing Great Britain. France, the host nation, had Prime Minister Clemenceau at its head, while Italy was led by Prime Minister Orlando. Each of the British Dominion states, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had sent their prime ministers.

Saionji Kinmochi,[21] a revered elder statesman, was head of the Japanese delegation, with Makino Nobuaki as his deputy. Japanese Ambassador to France Matsui Keishiro,[22] Ambassador to England Chinda Sutemi, and Ambassador to Italy Ijuuin Hikokichi joined them in Paris as plenipotentiaries. Each of these diplomats had outstanding credentials, being thoroughly experienced in diplomatic dealings with European nations and the United States. Matsui had been the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to his posting in Paris. In this capacity, he played an active role in Japan's preparations for the conference.

Due to his ill health, Saionji's arrival was delayed until the following March. Consequently, Makino conducted most of the negotiations at the conference. To assist the delegation, members of Japanese embassies in London, Paris, Rome, and Amsterdam joined the initial twenty members

arriving from Yokohama. The Japanese delegation in Paris totaled more than sixty.

A photo of the Japanese delegation was taken in front of the Hotel Bristol in June 1919. With Saionji sitting in the center of the front row, almost the entire delegation was neatly lined up in four rows for this official photo. They were all in three-piece suits, except for several in military regalia. On both sides of Saionji were seated two of the plenipotentiaries, Makino and Matsui. Makino had been Foreign Minister and Matsui would become Foreign Minister four years later. In fact, the photo contains nine former and future Foreign Ministers, including Matsuoka Yoosuke[23] and Shigemitsu Mamoru.[24]

The younger delegates included three future Prime Ministers of Japan, Konoe Fumimaro,[25] Yoshida Shigeru,[26] and Ashida Hitoshi.[27] Among the other representatives, the young faces of Saito Hiroshi and Sawada Renzo can be seen. Saito would become Ambassador to the United States during the 1930s. When he died in office, his body was returned to Japan on a US Navy ship as a mark of courtesy and respect from the then President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Sawada would become the first Ambassador to the United Nations for post-war Japan. The photo is in effect a lineup of the brilliant talents that would shape the future of Japan and its diplomatic efforts. These men were the elite among the elites that Japan had carefully chosen to send to the world stage.

The Japanese delegation occupied all of the Hotel Bristol at Place Vendôme in Paris. One section of the hotel was apportioned as offices, with the rest serving as living quarters for the members of the delegation. Sawada Renzo, one of the youngest members, described the daily scene this way:

> *Under the watchful gaze of Napoleon Bonaparte, thirty some automobiles, each proudly fluttering the flag of Japan, lined up neatly in front of the offices of the Japanese delegation. It was a sight to be taken note of by Parisians.*[28]

The Japanese delegation went to Paris bearing with them the honor and pride of a nation, as well as her hopes and aspirations. Japanese intellectuals, in particular, noted the significance of the occasion. Ever since the island nation was forced to open its doors to the world during the last half of the nineteenth century, the country's intellectuals had hungrily absorbed Western knowledge. As understanding of the West's *realpolitik* grew, they had come to recognize the importance of international diplomacy.

Participating in the Paris Peace Conference, therefore, provided Japan with a long-awaited opportunity. Their country would be joining an elite club within an emerging international community. Japan would now be able to stand beside the world's leading nations. This would not only raise Japan's standing, but more significantly, enable the Japanese to play a significant role in international diplomacy.

"Japan has now become a fully-fledged member of the world," wrote Yoshino Sakuzo[29] in the 1919 New Year's edition of the *Chuuoo Kooron,* as the Paris Peace Conference was about to open. "The progress of the world will prompt the advancement of Japan. The development of Japan will contribute to the evolution of the world. Japan has to be a positive force for the world to go forward."[30] In today's terminology Yoshino would be called a global thinker.

Moreover, he was not alone among Japan's intellectual elite of that time. The Taisho era was characterized by a flourishing of intellectual ideas that would become known as the "*Taisho Democracy*." Freely expressing his thoughts on an ideal future for the world, Yoshino warned the country's leaders that "Japan can no longer be led by policies that ignore the tide of the world."[31] He feared that the Japanese government was not yet ready for the challenge.

A great transformation was occurring in the way the world conducted its diplomacy. Rather than relying solely on bilateral negotiations between nations, international conferences involving multiple nations became the prevailing norm. The world had entered a new era of international diplomacy.

Among the political leaders of Japan, there were those who immediately grasped the direction in which the world was trending. They advocated Japan's active participation in this emerging international community. This group can be labeled as being the "internationalists" in outlook. Makino Nobuaki, who displayed remarkable talent at the Paris Peace Conference, was a prominent member of these more cosmopolitan types. However, a conservative force of nationalists still greatly influenced policy decisions in Japanese politics.

Ito Miyoji,[32] a member of the Gaiko Choosakai, and Army Minister Tanaka Giichi[33] were notable figures among this disparate group. They viewed every intention of Western nations with suspicion. Their ruling objective was to protect what they deemed to be Japan's national interests. The government swayed between the two forces—the internationalists and the nationalists.[34]

Adding to the contested domestic situation was the government's insufficient grasp of the central issues that would dominate debate in Paris. The lack of information also placed Japan at a distinct disadvantage in making preparations for the conference. Superficially, Japan was to play a role equal to the Big Four victorious nations—the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. In reality, however, Japan had not been invited to take part in any of the crucial preliminary talks prior to the actual conference. Essentially, the early meetings set the subsequent direction of the more formal proceedings. The aims and agenda of the conference had already been discussed and predetermined among the four Western nations.

Certainly historical factors and sheer geographical distance would have contributed to Japan's exclusion in any case. It is doubtful, however, that the Western nations at any time seriously intended to treat Japan as an equal. For instance, discussions about the future League of Nations were conducted without anyone from Japan present. Hardly any reference materials, including the draft Covenants, reached the Japanese delegation in time for them to give the content of the proposal any serious consideration.[35]

The Paris Peace Conference marked Japan's first attendance at a grand-scale multilateral conference. In Paris, Japan was pitted against powerful Western nations with centuries of experience in conducting diplomatic negotiations with one another. Furthermore, the concept of white supremacy was still a widely held principle. Japan, thus, not only had to face its newcomer status but also the fact that she was breaking into the elite group of world powers as the only non-white, non-Christian nation. The situation demanded Japan to perform an intricate task of somehow finding the best way to protect her interests while simultaneously forging an effective role for herself in the emerging international balance of power.

Japan was far from ready. Reflecting the two conflicting political ideologies back home, the Japanese had proven incapable of setting a clear direction for their foreign policies. Subsequent preparations for the conference, therefore, were not much more than an unfocused "fumbling in the dark." The territorial issue seemed the only point on which political leaders could form something resembling a consensus. Japan negotiated doggedly to secure a mandate over former German territories, both in China's Shandong Province, including Qingdao, and in the Pacific islands north of the Equator. Regarding other international issues, however, opinions were divided among Japanese key political leaders. As a result, government directives remained unclear. Support for the proposed creation of

a League of Nations, in particular, left many politicians hesitant and with serious misgivings.

Less than one month before the delegation's departure, Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya's[36] statement to the Gaiko Choosakai remained vague: "Besides the issues directly concerning Japan, we will go along with the general consensus of the participating nations. As for the issue of the League of Nations, we will delay that decision as long as possible."[37]

The Paris Peace Conference was the grandest international conference that the world had ever seen. Involving diplomats from more than thirty nations, the conference went on for six months from its January opening until the signing of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919. The principal purpose of the conference was to forge a peace settlement following the armistice of 1918. The conference set out the peace terms and decided on the financial penalties for the defeated nations. Looking beyond these fundamentals, the victorious powers sought to create a new world order that would ensure permanent world peace. The focus of achieving this objective became centered on Wilson's Fourteen Points. His proposal included arms reduction, the removal of economic barriers, and freedom within the seas. Wilson's doctrine especially championed the need to work together earnestly to create a League of Nations.

Prior to the conference, the Japanese government was skeptical about such an organization and clearly was hesitant to become involved in its proposed activities. As soon as the conference opened, however, it became clear to the delegates from Japan that the creation of the League of Nations would inevitably be supported by a majority of Paris Peace Conference's members. By the time the League of Nations Commission was established at the end of January 1919, Japan had decided to participate in earnest.

Japan made three proposed additions to the League's draft Covenant; they concerned racial equality, the nature of territorial mandates, and international labor regulations. The first reflected broad sentiments shared by a wide range of the Japanese public. This proposal, later known as the Racial Equality Bill, requested that a clause declaring the abolition of racial inequality be added to the draft Covenant. Its eventual defeat would have a lasting impact on Japan's perception of the world, casting dark shadows on most subsequent relations with Western nations.

The priority that the Japanese government initially placed on the Racial Equality Bill, compared with the other two additions to the draft they put forward, remains unclear. Japanese people, however, enthusiastically supported the bill. Intellectuals, in particular, firmly believed in the

importance of the Racial Equality Bill. In their view, it would provide a significant moral ground on which international diplomacy could henceforth be conducted.

> *For us Japanese, what remains as a significant issue is racial equality. If the inequality in trade is considered an injustice, racial inequality is an even greater injustice. Allowing racially discriminatory regulations to remain in international intercourse would be a grave violation of human justice. It will damage the fundamental principle from which good relations are forged between nations.*[38]

Hayashi's[39] comments reflected the thoughts of contemporary Japanese intellectuals. Discourse focused inevitably on the country's future. Japan had grown sufficiently to participate fully in international diplomacy. If the country was to play an effective role in that community, the principle of racial equality had to be its cornerstone.

Japanese migrants in countries, such as the United States or in the British Dominion states of Canada and Australia, were direct victims of racial discrimination. The sufferings of these immigrants were felt keenly in Japan. Such sympathetic feelings particularly dominated the Wakayama Prefecture, southwest of Tokyo, from the shores of which many migrants had departed. Shortly before leaving Yokohama, Makino received a letter, written by the representatives of the Wakayama branch of Seiyuu Kai, reflecting these concerns. The letter described their serious trepidations over the discriminatory treatments facing migrants to the US and British territories. The writers expressed their hope that the delegation would succeed in carrying out this moral objective.

> *To His Excellency Baron Makino: . . . Taking this opportunity of your representing the country (at the Paris Peace Conference), we strongly entreat that you would proclaim the just rights of our people and persuade the international community to remove all unreasonable discriminatory regulations so that our people be accorded equal rights. We believe that this act will strengthen the foundation from which our nationals develop further.*[40]

Japanese residents overseas also made direct appeals to the delegation. Fujioka, representing 40,000 Japanese residents of southern California, conveyed the resolution adopted at their convention, that "the abolition of discrimination based on racial differences is vital to the establishment of permanent world peace," and they pleaded for the delegation to "take

appropriate action upon this matter."[41] The Japanese residents' association in Seattle also held a convention. As the result of that meeting, the residents there decided to send a copy of their declaration to the delegation. This included a plea that urged the delegates to exert all efforts toward resolving this "most vital question."[42] The declaration concluded:

> *Whereas the establishment of the League of Nations may tend to prevent wars among the nations, yet it offers little hope of a perfect lasting peace unless the existing racial discriminations and prejudices are abolished.*[43]

It is noteworthy that the Japanese diplomatic corps overseas also actively supported the proposal. A letter was sent from the members of the Japanese Consulate in New York to Matsui Keishiro, one of the plenipotentiaries in Paris. These diplomats pressed the Paris delegation to go even further than the existing Japanese proposal. They insisted that a racial equality clause should be included in the Charter of the new League of Nations. Their proposed wording read:

> *All nations without regard to race, colour or creed have, and are assured of, equal rights. Our chief reason for this request is that in our opinion the solemn declaration of this undisputed fact will prevent future troubles which is the main purpose of the League of Nations.*[44]

The letter was signed by Consul General Yano and fourteen members of the Consulate; it was sent to Paris on February 5, immediately after the Paris Peace Conference opened. Japan's insistence on racial equality is significant when one realizes the close similarity of its wording to that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations thirty years later.

Younger members of the Japanese delegation took the Racial Equality Bill very seriously. They believed that this significant proposal would create an equal footing from which their nation could enter world politics. At the same time, the delegation was increasingly frustrated with their government's inability to see the dynamics of international diplomacy that was emerging. The Japanese government seemed to be concentrating only on a short-term strategy, such as gaining a mandate over Shandong, that would bring the country immediate benefits. Other important issues, such as the creation of a League of Nations, were sidelined. In this sense, Japan was failing to see the larger picture. These young and aspiring diplomats felt that the situation was becoming truly alarming.

With Saito Hiroshi, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Arita Hachiro, and Horie Kensuke, all Second Secretaries in the delegation that made up its core, some fifteen young diplomats decided to act. They composed a document pointing out the weakness of the present Gaimusho. These secretaries proposed administrative reform with promises that they would make further efforts to train themselves for the coming new age of diplomacy. The young diplomats signed this document with blood, to express their seriousness, and presented it to the Gaimusho in September 1919.[45] The young diplomats' attempts to create fundamental reforms at the Gaimusho had commenced. The coming decade would reflect this movement's subtle, but significant, set of effects.[46]

Impenetrable Resistance from the British and the United States

Makino, as acting head of the delegation, officially presented Japan's Racial Equality Bill to the League of Nations Commission on February 13. His initial proposal was that the additional clause be included under Article 21, the one detailing the principle of religious freedom. Makino stated, as he presented the bill:

> *It is not necessary to dwell on the fact that racial and religious animosities have constituted a fruitful source of trouble and warfare among different peoples throughout history, often leading to deplorable excesses.*[47]

The full text of the clause presented by Makino reads:

> *The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States that are members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.*[48]

Neither the Gaimusho nor the Japanese delegation in Paris expected an easy passage of their proposal. Therefore immediately after the conference opened in January, the Japanese delegation, with Makino and Chinda as the central movers, cornered delegates from the other nations, lobbying for the Racial Equality Bill with each one. Their tireless efforts continued for three months until April 11, the very day of the final vote.

As predicted, the Japanese delegates encountered tremendous resistance from the outset, with the main opposition coming from Great Britain and the United States. France and Italy, the other principal participants at the conference, were supportive of the Japanese proposal. The United States and Britain perceived, however, that the suggested article was something of a Trojan horse. From their viewpoint, the motivation of the proposal was an unspoken demand for increased Japanese immigration. The touted principle of racial equality provided nothing more than a smokescreen. British plenipotentiary, Foreign Minister Balfour, warned his US counterpart, Colonel House, that the Japanese proposal was simply "a first step to outlawing restrictions on Japanese immigration."[49]

Japanese delegates had anticipated this possible cynical interpretation of its proposal and the consequent strategy that would follow. Prior to the opening of the conference, an editorial in *The Asahi,* a leading Japanese paper, read:

> *It is not our intention to force Japanese immigration on those countries where Japanese are not wanted, be it the United States, British territories or any other. Our demand is that those Japanese nationals already in the country and engaged in honest work be treated equally as any other people of the country and that they not be subjected to harassment or persecution. We also demand that Japanese travelers and merchants, while visiting another country, be accorded treatment equal to white nationals. We expect nothing more than that the [preceding] two conditions be observed.*[50]

The Japanese people were agitated by the numerous examples of discrimination that their nationals faced in the United States and British Dominion countries, in particular Canada and Australia. The main concern, therefore, was not about the number of emigrants the country would send out, but the plight their countrymen suffered overseas. These discriminatory practices were riling the Japanese domestically.

The progressive leaders and intellectuals in Japan clearly were aware that the Japanese were not alone in being subjected to racial discrimination. They anticipated that this treatment of "colored" people was bound to spread dangerous seeds of discontent throughout many parts of the world. The Japanese proposal, therefore, was based clearly on their belief that racial equality constituted an essential ingredient in building international peace. The *Asahi* editorial continued:

> *Our proposal is not about increasing immigration. It is to avoid creating causes for international disputes stemming from immigrant problems. Removal of these causes will necessarily contribute towards permanent world peace, to which*

> *all nations so anxiously aspire. We are asking all nations to maintain a full understanding of the issue.*[51]

Despite such protestations, however, the overriding fear driving both the United States and Britain was that passage of the Japanese proposal would immediately motivate other Asian nations to demand that their immigration restrictions likewise be eased. Such a result undoubtedly would cause grave domestic political problems for each of the countries. To clarify the issue Makino and Chinda, in particular, made every effort to discuss these misunderstandings face to face with the relevant plenipotentiaries.

In addition to a number of meetings with Colonel House of the United States and British Foreign Minister Balfour, they especially sought meetings with Canadian Prime Minister Borden and Australian Prime Minister William Hughes (popularly known as "Billy"). They hoped to clarify the genuine intentions behind Japan's proposal. The Japanese delegates insisted that the bill was not intended to interfere with the immigration restrictions of any country. In fact, they insisted that Japan considered immigration restrictions to be entirely an internal matter for each country.

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, Ishii Kikujiroo,[52] the Japanese ambassador in Washington, DC, supported his colleagues' efforts in Paris by delivering an address to a gathering of the Japan Society. They met at the Hotel Astor in New York on March 14. Japan, he declared, harbored no hidden agenda of employing the proposed Racial Equality Bill as a means of forcing a consequent relaxation of the US immigration restrictions. Kikujiroo assured that any such article in the Charter of the League of Nations would not cause Japan to abandon her policy of restricting emigration to the United States.[53] He further asserted:

> *Nothing will be further from Japan's thought than hastily to force the issue of labor question in the event that the League covenant is modified in accordance with Japan's desire. That is, upon a new article being inserted in the covenant against racial discrimination.*[54]

Ishii then spoke of the spirit that underlaid Japan's proposal:

> *Race prejudice . . . promises to be an increasingly disturbing element for the peace of the future unless a proper remedy be brought about at this opportune moment. If the foremost object[ive] of the great conference now sitting in Paris is to establish a solid and permanent peace on earth, nothing would more effectively contribute to the attainment of this object[ive] than the timely elimination of this cause of international discord.*[55]

The New York Times reported the content of Ishii's address the following day. The reaction throughout the United States came swiftly, not unexpectedly from those Senators representing the US West Coast. Senator Chamberlain of Oregon declared that the Racial Equality Bill described by Ishii would "imperil the peace and safety of the United States."[56] Senator Jones of Washington State and Senator King of Utah both stated unequivocally that "American labor would never submit to the indiscriminate admission of Oriental labor into this country."[57]

In some parts of the United States in fact, Ishii's address appeared to have precipitated effects quite the opposite to those intended by the Ambassador. Some politicians in the western states, where anti-Japanese sentiment was on the rise, turned Ishii's statement to their own advantage. They used it to support and strengthen the anti-Japanese arguments.

Meanwhile in Paris, Makino continued making public appeals, stating that "the issue of racial equality should be considered independently from that of immigration. The latter is fundamentally an economic issue. On the other hand, the former is an emotional issue concerning the sensitivity and pride of a people."[58]

Impassioned pleas from the Japanese delegation, however, had little effect on those in the United States and Great Britain. The next US presidential election was only a year away. The incumbent president, Woodrow Wilson, could not simply ignore the growing anti-Japanese movements on the West Coast. In this regard, Wilson demonstrated certain inconsistencies in his character. Wilson's terms in office have in fact been applauded for promoting a progressive agenda including clearly advocating for women's suffrage.

On the matter of race, however, his unshakable Southern roots seemed to have dominated. He stood for racial exclusion as firmly as the nation's most hardened conservatives such as Henry Cabot Lodge. Wilson believed that assimilation in the US melting pot should never cross color lines.[59]

Britain attended the Paris Peace Conference representing all the states under the British Dominion. Its delegation included representatives from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, all of which faced immigration issues. Of those from these countries, Australia's Billy Hughes was the fiercest in opposing the Japanese proposal. Responding to an earnest request from the Japanese delegation, Robert Cecil, a member of the British delegation and a great advocate of the League of Nations, helped convene a face-to-face discussion between the Japanese and Dominion delegates.

The meeting was held at the end of March and lasted two hours, without producing any encouraging results. Billy Hughes, in particular, remained implacable. After the meeting, he declared that if the Japanese proposal were to pass, Australia would refuse to sign the Covenant of the League of Nations, thereby threatening the Dominion with disunity. Britain could not ignore the demands of its Dominion states. Each of the countries had contributed troops that augmented British forces during the war. In particular, Australia had sacrificed many young lives in that conflict.

Problems with the Dominion states, however, may not have been the only reason causing Britain to reject the Japanese proposal, for the Empire contained a great number of territories. British colonial rule, hardly without exception, took the form of a "white" elite ruling the "colored" masses, who were generally considered inferior. The British living in those colonial states enjoyed great privileges, occasionally causing native resentment to surface. If the principle of racial equality were to be adopted, it might stir up future unrest in the colonies. It is not difficult to see why the Japanese proposal was unpalatable to the British.

Also undeniable is the fact that white supremacy was a generally accepted concept in the West at the time. Even the most educated intellectual seldom doubted that whites were clearly superior to people of color. Delegates from Western nations at the Paris Peace Conference proved to be no exception. In a conversation with Colonel House of the United States, Britain's Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour mentioned that although "all men were created equal, was an interesting concept," he did not believe it. Balfour said: "[Y]ou can scarcely say that a man in Central Africa was equal to a European."[60]

Despite all their efforts, the Japanese found the resistance of the United States and Britain impenetrable. They were, however, able to gain the support of a number of other countries attending the conference, with France and Italy included in that group. Leon Bourgeois of France urged the conference to adopt the Japanese proposal. Rejection would be shameful, since the issue at stake was "an indisputable principle of justice." Orlando of Italy noted: "If this principle was rejected, it would give rise to feelings which were hardly in harmony with the new organization (the League of Nations)." Veniselos of Greece added his support with this:

> *It would be very difficult to reject such a proposal, especially since Baron Makino had carefully pointed out that his proposal did not burden any State with an obligation to pass any measures whatever with respect to immigration.*[61]

On April 11, when the final session of the League of Nations Commission convened to discuss the draft Covenant, Makino formerly presented the Japanese proposal. By that time the content was well known to all the assembled delegates. US President Wilson was in the Chair. The Japanese proposed inserting an article on racial equality into the Preamble of the Covenant. As Makino took the podium, he was calm and his tone determined. He opened his speech by noting that, "The subject is a matter of great moment and concern for a considerable part of mankind." He then continued:

> *This League is intended to be a world instrument for enforcing righteousness and defeating force. It is to be the highest Court of Justice. . . . It is an attempt to regulate the conduct of nations and peoples toward one another according to a higher moral standard than has [been] obtained in the past. . . . These ideas have touched the in[ner]most human soul and have quickened the common feelings of different peoples scattered over the five continents. It has given birth to hopes and aspirations, and strengthened the sense of legitimate claims, which they consider as their due.*[62]

Makino built on his opening statement, as follows:

> *The sentiment of nationality, one of the strongest human feelings, has been aroused by the present worldwide moral renaissance. . . . In close connection with the grievances of the oppressed nationalities, there exist the wrongs of racial discrimination which was, and is, the subject of deep resentment on the part of a large portion of the human race.*[63]

Makino concluded his case with the forceful statement:

> *If this reasonable and just claim is now denied, it will, in the eyes of these peoples with reason to be keenly interested, have the significance of a reflection on their quality and status. Their faith in the justice and righteousness, which are to be the guiding spirit of the Covenant, may be shaken.*[64]

Makino sat down as a hushed silence fell over the audience. A delegate from the United States later recounted that the presentation was admirably done. Impressions of Makino's speech recorded by other delegates included "dignified," "impressive," and "cogent." It looked as if Makino had secured the support of the entire room.[65]

President Wilson, in the Chair, had intended that the proposal not proceed any further. He stated his hope that "national differences and racial

prejudices" would be forced as much as possible into the background at this juncture in history.[66] Makino, however, insisted that a vote be taken as sufficient discussions had already taken place. He prevailed. The subsequent ballot was comprised 16 votes. The resulting tally showed 11 votes in favor of the Japanese proposal with 5 against. Supporters included France with 2 votes, Italy with 2 votes, and Greece and China with 1 vote each. It looked as though the Japanese proposal had been carried.

At this moment, a totally unanticipated turn of events occurred. Wilson, as Chair of the Commission, peremptorily declared the Japanese proposal rejected, claiming that it failed to gain unanimous support. A great deal of agitation then arose in the room. The rule of unanimity had not been applied to any other decision making during the conference. In fact, Wilson's proposal to protect the Monroe Doctrine had been passed by a majority vote shortly before this session. Voices of protest arose from the floor; Wilson, however, was not to be moved. Even the protest from Ferdinand Lanaude, France's most respected international legal expert, failed to overturn Wilson's extraordinary decision.[67]

On April 28, two weeks after the Japanese proposal had met with bitter defeat, Makino took the floor at a Plenary Session of the conference. For the very last time, he spoke with grave disappointment about the Racial Equality Bill. Reiterating the grounds for the proposal as a "desire to see the League established on a sound and firm basis of good will, justice, and reason," he told the audience of the "poignant regret that both the Japanese government and its people feel." Makino further declared that "they will continue to insist on the adoption of this principle by the League in [the] future." Before concluding his speech, he presented the full text of the Japanese proposal so that it would be formally included in the Paris Peace Conference record.[68]

Struggles in Australia: Piesse and Murdoch

We now return to Piesse of Australia with whom this chapter began. It was Prime Minister of Australia Billy Hughes who most fiercely opposed the Racial Equality Bill at the Paris Peace Conference. Hughes's attitude came from his deeply rooted convictions because he conceived that Australia was a lone "White Fortress" surrounded by a "cooee of a thousand millions of coloured people." Hughes believed in a "White Australia" policy as being the terra firma of his nation. He constantly feared his country's vulnerability to an Asian attack. Thus, Hughes

viewed Japan, in particular, with profound suspicion. Furthermore, he saw the former German Pacific islands north of the Equator as walls encompassing Australia like a fortress. Therefore, Hughes was extremely agitated by the Japanese claim to these islands at the Paris Peace Conference.[69]

Back in Australia, however, not everyone supported Hughes's actions, nor did they share the beliefs that motivated him. Piesse stood out as a significant figure among a very small minority of dissenters holding top-level positions in the government. Since the Russo-Japanese War, Piesse, the same as most Australians, had started watching Japan with a good degree of apprehension. He was a pragmatist, however. During World War I, Piesse served as the Director of Military Intelligence, and in that capacity sought accurate intelligence on Japan, untainted by emotions and prejudices. His war experience made Piesse realize that his country was sorely lacking in any reliable source of information.

In 1917, while the country was still at war, the Japanese language training program commenced at the Royal Military College at Duntroon in Canberra. This military initiative was aimed at producing officers skilled in the Japanese language who would be capable of gathering intelligence and assisting military leaders in determining Japan's intentions in the Pacific. James Murdoch, a scholar originally from Scotland, was invited to be its first instructor. Piesse, without losing time, befriended Murdoch and started learning Japanese himself.[70]

Although a military appointment, Murdoch seemed to be a man imbued with a very liberal way of thinking. Being a native of Scotland, he had received an M.A. from Aberdeen University. After graduating in 1879, he traveled extensively around the world, staying in places such as Australia and Paraguay. He spoke a number of languages fluently and his eyes were wide open to what the world had to offer, unusual among the contemporaries of that day.

Murdoch had lived a total of twenty-five years in Japan and was married to a Japanese woman. He lived in various parts of Japan and from 1889 to 1891 taught English and Western history at the First High School in Tokyo. Natsume Sooseki, later a most influential literary figure during the Meiji period, was among his students. According to Sissons, a leading scholar on Murdoch, Murdoch understood Japan with "admiration and affection."[71]

Piesse valued Murdoch's firsthand knowledge of Japan, his intelligent perception, and particularly the fact that he was free from many of the

prejudices held by contemporary Europeans. This was exactly the quality of knowledge that Piesse had been seeking. Together, the two men seemed to have struck a common chord, and a close relationship developed based on mutual respect and trust.

Under Murdoch's tutelage, Piesse made rapid progress learning the language and shortly was able to read Japanese newspapers. As he began to gather firsthand knowledge of Japan, Piesse became more of a moderate and realistic observer; thus, he started to express serious doubts about the alarmist views held by Hughes.

During Australia's summer months, November 1918 to March 1919, Murdoch returned to Japan. This period partially overlapped the Paris Peace Conference. He went there on the pretext of collecting teaching resources. In actual fact, he was entrusted by Piesse to gather further intelligence about "Japan's true intentions" on behalf of the Australian government. In addition to an official report, Piesse wanted Murdoch's more candid observations and an in-depth interpretation of what he saw. Piesse, therefore, created a separate communications channel that would enable Murdoch to correspond freely without detection by the government or the Defense Department.[72]

As soon as he arrived in Japan, Murdoch launched into a flurry of activity. He interviewed a number of Japanese government leaders, including Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Shidehara Kijuro.[73] He then conducted two long sessions with Roland Morris, US Ambassador to Tokyo. Making full use of his wide personal network forged during his previous stay in Japan, he discussed the current Japanese situation with a number of journalists, friends, and acquaintances. His private correspondence with Piesse revealed Murdoch's energetic activities in Tokyo.

At the beginning of his stay in Japan, Murdoch's report to Piesse was imbued with optimism. In a letter dated December 6, he wrote that "things now in Japan are vastly better than they were last year." He remarked on the waning of military influence and suggested that "the setback that militarism has met with in Europe has its effect here." Murdoch also commented that the "Japanese seemed to be fully alive to the danger militarism would bring."[74]

Murdoch was forced, however, to quickly reassess when a new political situation suddenly developed before his eyes. Shortly after the Paris Peace Conference opened, the Japanese delegation proposal of racial equality met with stiff opposition, and the mood in Japan changed drastically. Greatly alarmed, Murdoch sent an urgent dispatch to Piesse on March

14. He reported that "this racial discrimination agitation extends all over Japan" and suspected that the military might be behind it. Consequently, "it may very well become dangerous if not met properly." After meeting with Shidehara Kijuuro and talking with many of his journalist friends, Murdoch alerted Piesse that "this racial discrimination business is the most important thing just now."[75]

From his own reading of Japanese newspapers, Piesse also was aware of these new developments in Japan. Murdoch's reports confirmed his fears. Shortly after receiving Murdoch's communication, on March 24, Piesse sent a memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff. In it he reported that "all Japan is boiling with this cry for racial equality" and alerted the chief to the dangers posed by this sensitive issue. Piesse feared that the issue would be exploited by the factions within Japan's military establishment and allow them to pursue their expansionist purposes.[76]

Piesse was one of the very few Western observers of his time who were aware of the two political factions that divided Japan's leadership. Moderate internationalists formed the alternative to conservative nationalists backed by the military. Piesse understood that the prevailing influence of the moderates at that time was sustained only by maintaining a precarious balance with the conservatives. Any antagonism toward the West, therefore, might be easily manipulated by the combined efforts of the nationalists and the military to advance their political agenda.

In his memorandum, Piesse recommended that Western leaders consider the Japanese proposal of racial equality in a more sympathetic manner. He further suggested that they meet "the reasonable wishes" expressed by Japan's public opinion, in the hope of assisting the democratic forces opposing the militarists and imperialists. Piesse also severely criticized Hughes's opposition to Japan's proposal, stating that the Prime Minister's speeches on this issue "could not fail to be offensive to a high-spirited people."[77]

Piesse's desperate warnings, however, fell on deaf ears. It failed to influence Australia's deep-rooted suspicion of Japan displayed by Billy Hughes. As described earlier, the Japanese proposal met with defeat at the Paris Peace Conference. Disheartened, Piesse wrote to his trusted colleague Lt. Commander J. G. Latham, who was with the Australian delegation in Paris:

> *The whole business in Paris seems to have gone badly for us, from our apparent lack of cordiality towards the United States to the barren victory over racial*

discrimination. How much better it would have been to accept the Japanese amendment in one of its least noxious forms and rely on the opportunities the Covenant of the League gives to protect ourselves from any unfavourable interpretation. As it is we have been perhaps the chief factor in consolidating the whole Japanese nation behind the imperialists—and it needs little imagination to see how serious that may be with Japan's now assured opportunities expanding her power through China's resources.[78]

In May 1919, while the conference in Paris was still underway, the Pacific Branch was established under the Prime Minister's Department in Australia. Reflecting its older traditions as a British colony, even at the end of World War I, Australia still lacked its own foreign affairs department or intelligence-gathering facilities. Instead, the country relied totally on the British to provide any needed intelligence. From his own experiences during World War I, Piesse had become keenly aware of the risks arising from a total dependence on Britain for intelligence, particularly concerning the Pacific region. England remained many thousands of miles distant from the region.

Furthermore, being totally preoccupied with the European war, Great Britain had been scarcely able to spare the effort needed for effective intelligence-gathering in the Pacific. Australia had to have its own intelligence capabilities if it was to ensure the nation's security. Piesse's firm conviction resulted in the creation of the Pacific Branch, a permanent body existing to advise the government on Pacific matters. This was the forerunner of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs.[79]

Appointed as the Foundation Director of the Pacific Branch, Piesse's first undertaking was to conduct his own fact-finding mission throughout the region. For six months he traveled around East Asia and visited a number of countries. Piesse wanted to see the area that was his responsibility with his own eyes. The journey's final destination was Japan. His stay there extended to five weeks, evidence of his significant interest in the country.

In Japan, Piesse consulted with a wide variety of people including diplomats from the United States and Great Britain, as well as people from other European countries. Several months prior to Piesse's visit, Hanihara Masanao had replaced Shidehara as Japan's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. Piesse considered his consultation with Hanihara to be of utmost importance.[80]

A question that persisted in Piesse's mind had been Japan's true motivation behind its intense lobbying effort to adopt a Racial Equality Bill

at the Paris Peace Conference. He posed this question to Hanihara, after first candidly explaining the "White Australia" policy that his country supported. He enunciated the deep-rooted Australian fears that Japan's proposal, if adopted, would seriously jeopardize existing immigration restrictions.[81]

In response, Hanihara assured Piesse that Japan's object was not "the removal of restrictions on immigration" but the elimination of racial discrimination. He further stated: "[I am] . . . not hesitat[ant] to admit the unwarranted nature of any attempt to deprive a state of its right to restrict immigration, and that Japan would never agree to an international agreement of that kind, but Japan [is] . . . strongly opposed to discrimination on the basis of race."[82] With candor matching that of Piesse, Hanihara then spelled out the genuine feelings of the Japanese people:

> *Japan has the misfortune of being a non-Christian and non-white Power, and has in consequence to undergo experiences, which are not even dreamt of by a European or American Power. …… All what she wants is a fair and equal opportunity for her people's legitimate and peaceful activities.*[83]

On his return to Australia, Piesse sent Prime Minister Hughes the full text of Hanihara's response together with his own notes about the meeting. In a cover note to Hughes, he asked him to pay particular attention to the Vice-Minister's remarks concerning "the unwarranted nature of any attempt to deprive a state of its right to restrict immigration."[84] A few days later, he sent the Prime Minister a comprehensive report of his own findings while in Japan. The nine-page report revealed Piesse's analysis to be substantially accurate and realistic and remarkably free of many of the preconceptions and prejudices held by Western nations at that time.

The report included an important observation expressed by Western diplomats and military attachees with whom Piesse met in Japan. All expressed skepticism about Japan's so-called southward policy and dismissed speculation that she had aggressive plans in the immediate future aimed at Australia.[85] In addition, the report explained away all the evidence that had been advanced to justify Australia's fear of Japan.[86]

Piesse's earnest efforts, however, had little effect on the alarmist ideas prevalent among Australia's government leaders. Piesse's timing also was not propitious. At this exact moment, the government was considering the following year's defense appropriations. Piesse's downgraded

assessments of a Japanese threat ran counter to the recommendations made by the British Admiralty.[87] Britain, regardless of the fact that Japan had honored the Anglo-Japan Alliance during the war, harbored deep suspicions about its erstwhile ally, attributing the nurturing of imperialist ambitions to Japan. As a result, the British regarded the Japanese as potential Pacific enemies.

In addition to Piesse's effort, Murdoch took pains to correct what he considered to be Australia's misunderstanding of Japan. He held talks with a number of Australian government leaders, including Prime Minister Hughes, after his return from Paris. However, these meetings merely resulted in the increasing isolation of Piesse and Murdoch within Australian politics.

Two years after the Paris Peace Conference, Murdoch died. His last letter to Hughes was a request for yet another meeting to discuss "the danger of conflicts in the Pacific."[88] Murdoch's tireless efforts had continued, terminated only by his untimely death. In 1923, less than two years after Murdoch died, Piesse resigned from the Pacific Branch. He is reported to have felt increasingly isolated and ineffectual in his post at the helm of the branch.[89]

Piesse and Murdoch stand out in Australian history, among a precious few who made serious efforts to understand the real situation in Japan without being influenced by politics or popular prejudices. Both men firmly believed that accurate knowledge and a clear reading of the situation would be the key to avoiding future conflicts. Their expressed opinions, however, failed to alter government policies. Australian leaders were already entrapped by their fears and suspicions of Japan. The ideas held by the Australian government and its military "reflected earlier strategic perspectives which had hardened into dogma, almost a racially based dogma, and they appealed to the bureaucratic ambitions of the armed forces,"[90] writes Neville Meaney, one of Australia's leading historians.

"A racially based dogma" defining Japan, perhaps, was not exclusive to Australia. Unfortunately, how it manifested there became the most unambiguous at that time. This dubious honor was thanks to Billy Hughes, who persisted in speaking his mind publically, totally oblivious to any attendant diplomatic considerations. If one is willing to peek behind the well-practiced diplomatic curtsy of more polished foreign services, a similar concept undoubtedly dominated the minds of leaders in the United States, Great Britain, and other nations under the British Dominion.

Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 was the first occasion in modern history that an Asian country had defeated a European power. It sent a shock wave throughout all Western nations. The impact was felt particularly in countries that maintained a strong interest in the Asia-Pacific region—namely, the United States, Britain, and those British Dominions, such as Canada and Australia, bordering the Pacific. The rise of Japan, they feared, would change the balance of power in the area this was furthered when Japan emerged as one of the victorious nations after World War I. As a consequence, the Japanese expanded their holdings in China and gained control of the former German islands dotting the Pacific. The United States, Great Britain, and the British Dominion States came to fear the increasing influence that Japan wielded over other Asian nations. Japan's assured access to the limitless resources of China made them uneasy. They further disliked the prospect of heightened commercial competition in the Far East and the Chinese market in particular. Underpinning all these fears was a prevailing notion grounded in white supremacy and, combined with it, the fear of a Yellow Peril.

This was the reality that Japan faced during the 1920s when she entered the world of international diplomacy for the first time. Japan's debut on the international stage was met with distrust and suspicion from the existing world powers—the veteran players in diplomatic dealings. The concept of racial equality, which Japan repeatedly advocated, was deliberately misconstrued every time as being no more than a devious device seeking to gain increased immigration. The corresponding heightened Japanese resentment against those Western attitudes added further difficulties for those diplomats trying to uphold the country's standing on the world stage. As MacMillan noted: "Japan's dilemma, which was to become more acute by the 1930s, was whether to trust the white powers, work with them in strengthening the international order, or assume that it had better look out for itself."[91]

In 1924, five years after Japan's Racial Equality Bill had been defeated at the Paris Peace Conference, a new immigration bill was introduced in the US Congress; it included a specific clause designed to exclude Japanese immigration to the United States. A contradictory fate placed former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hanihara Masanao, the newly appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Washington, DC, at the forefront of Japan's battle to eliminate this offensive clause from the immigration bill.

Notes

1. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Edmund L. Piesse (1880–1947) Director of Military Intelligence (1916–19), Head of the Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department (1919–23), Australia.
3. The forerunner of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs.
4. Miyaji-Lawrence, Tsuneko, *Rose, Wattle and Chrysanthemum*, in Japanese in Australia: 1867–1998, Japan Club of Australia commemorative issue, 1998, pp. 48–50.
5. Further on this, see: Meaney, Neville, *Towards A New Vision: Australia and Japan Across Time,* University of New South Wales Press, 2007.
6. Miyagi-Lawrence, *Rose, Wattle and Chrysanthemum,* op. cit.
7. Meaney, Neville, Fears and Phobias: E. L. Piesse and the Problem of Japan 1909–39, Occasional Papers Series No. 1, 1996, National Library of Australia, Canberra.
8. 埴原正直 (1876–1934), all Japanese names are presented surname first, as customary in Japan.
9. Statement from Mr. Hanihara, Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dec. 25, 1919, Received by E. L. Piesse, 20 February 1920, MS882/5/43-52, The National Archives of Australia, Canberra.
10. Ibid.
11. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2.
12. MacMillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War,* 2002, John Murray (Publishing) Ltd. London, p. 330.

    Lauren, Paul Gordon, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination, 2nd Edition,* 1996, Westview Press.
13. 牧野伸顕 (1861–1949), also known as Makino Shinken. Foreign Minister (1913–1914).
14. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 8 December 1918.
15. The official head of the delegation was Saionji Kinmochi. His departure was delayed until the next year due to his health.
16. 原敬 (1856–1921), also known as Hara Kei. Prime Minister (1918–1921).
17. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 11 December 1918.
18. 伊藤博文 (1841–1909), also known as Ito Hakubun. The first Prime Minister of Japan (1885–1888) after the Meiji Restoration.
19. Shiba Ryootaro, *Meiji to Iu Kokka,* Tokyo Hoosoo Shuppan Kyookai, 1989, p. 290.
20. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 10 December 1918.
21. 西園寺公望 (1849–1940).

22. 松井慶四郎 (1868–1946), Foreign Minister (1924).
23. 松岡洋右 (1880–1946), Foreign Minister(1940–41).
24. 重光葵 (1887–1957), Foreign Minister (1945, 1954–56).
25. 近衛文麿 (1891–1945), Prime Minister (1937–39; 1940–41).
26. 吉田茂 (1878–1967) Prime Minister (1946–47; 1948–54).
27. 芦田均 (1887–1959), Prime Minister (1948).
28. Sawada Renzo, *Gaisenmon Hiroba,* Kadokawa Shoten, 1950, p. 30.
29. 吉野作造 (1878–1933).
30. Yoshino Sakuzo, *Sekai no Daishuchoo to Sono Junoosaku Oyobi Taioosaku,* Chuuoo Kooron, 1919 New Year Edition.
31. Ibid.
32. 伊東巳代治 (1857–1934).
33. 田中義一 (1864–1929), Prime Minister/Foreign Minister (1927–1929).
34. Further discussions on these two forces can be found in Chap. 2.
35. Burkman, Thomas W., *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order: 1914–1938,* University of Hawai'I Press, 2008, p. 44.
36. 内田康哉 (1965–1936), also known as Uchida Koosai, Foreign Minister(1911–12; 1918–23; 1932–33)
37. Gaimusho Hyakunen-Shi Hensan Iinkai, *Gaimusho no Hyaku Nen,* Hara Shobo, 1969. Further on domestic political debate is in Chap. 2.
38. Hayasi Kiroku, *Koowa no Kisomondai 7,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 1918.
39. 林毅陸 (1872–1950), Historian, Educator, President of Keio Gijuku.
40. *Kokusai Renmei Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai (1): Taisho 7 November–Taisho 8 March,* The Gaimusho Archives
41. Fujioka Shiro to All Plenipotentiaries to Paris Peace Conference, 10 February, Taisho 8 (1919), in *Kokusai Renmei Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai (1),* op. cit.
42. *Kokusai Renmei Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai (1),* op. cit.
43. O. Yamaoka to All Plenipotentiaries to Paris Peace Conference, February 7, Taisho 8 (1919), in *Kokusai Renmei Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai (1),* op. cit.
44. Yano, Consulate General in New York, to Matsui, February 5, Taisho 8 (1919), in *Kokusai Renmei Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai (1),* op. cit.
45. Sawada Renzo, *Gaisenmon Hiroba,* Kadokawa Shoten, 1950.
46. Further on this development in Chap. 6.
47. Makino Nobuaki's statement at the League of Nations Commission on 13 Feb. 1919, quoted in Miller, David Hunter, *The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 2,* G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1928, p.323
48. *Kokusai Renmei Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai (1),* op. cit.
49. MacMillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War,* 2002, John Murray (Publishers) Ltd., London, p. 327.

50. *The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 23 December 1918.
51. Ibid.
52. 石井菊次郎(1866–1945), Foreign Minister (1915–16).
53. Ishii Looks to End of Race Prejudice, *The New York Times*, 15 March 1919.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ishii's Plea Stirs Western Senators, *The New York Times,* 16 March 1919.
57. Ibid.
58. Makino Dan (Baron Makin) Seimei: Jinshu to Imin wa Betsumondai, *The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 25 March Taisho 8 (1919).
59. Lauren, Paul Gordon, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination,* 2nd Edition, 1988, Westview Press Inc., p. 62.
60. MacMillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers,* op. cit. p. 326.
61. Miller, David Hunter, *Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2,* op. cit., pp. 390–391.
62. Makino Iin Chinjutsu no Waga Teian Shushi: Pari Koowa Kaigi ni Okeru Jinshu Sabetu Teppai Mondai Ikken, in Nippon Gaiko Bunsho Taisho 8, vol.3, Part 1, Gaimusho, 1971, pp. 500–502.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Lauren, P. G., *Power and Prejudice,* op. cit., p. 98.
66. Ibid. p. 99.
67. Burkman, Thomas W., *Japan and the League of Nations,* op. cit., p. 85.
68. Miller, D. H., *Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2,* op. cit., pp. 703–704.
69. Further on Billy Hughes attitudes, see Neville Meaney, *Towards a New Vision: Australia and Japan across Time,* The University of New South Wales Press, Australia, 1999, pp. 111–119.
70. Hanihara Chow, Misuzu, *The Study of Japan in Australia: A Unique Development over Eighty Years*, International Research Centre for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken), 2003, Kyoto.
71. Sissons, David C., Australia's First Professor of Japanese: James Murdoch, 1985, unpublished, David Sissons Papers, National Library of Australia.
72. The scheme was for Murdoch to send his letters not directly to Piesse, but addressed instead to McRae, the maiden name of Piesse's wife. In subsequent notes, however, letters are identified as 'to Piesse', not McRae.
73. 幣原喜重郎 (1872–1951) Foreign Minister (1924–27, 1929–31), Prime Minister (1945–46).
74. Murdoch to McRae (Piesse), 6 December 1918, National Library of Australia.
75. Murdoch to Piesse, 14 March 1919, National Library of Australia.

76. Piesse to Legge, Memorandum on The Present Movement in Japan against Racial Discrimination, 24 March 1919, cited in Meaney, Neville, *Fears and Phobias,* op. cit.
77. Ibid.
78. Piesse to Latham, 7 May 1919, The National Library of Australia
79. Further on Australia's situation and Piesse, see Meaney, Neville, *Fears and Phobias: E. L. Piesse and the Problem of Japan, 1909–39,* 1996, Occasional Papers Series No. 1, National Library of Australia.
80. Ibid. Meaney, Neville, *Fears and Phobias.*
81. Piesse to Prime Minister Hughes 17 March 1920, Australia and Japan: Note of Statements Made by Major E. L. Piesse in a converstion with Mr. Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. S. Shimidzu, Consul-General for Japan at Sydney. Gaimusho, 25th December 1919, The National Library of Australia.
82. Statement from Mr. Hanihara, Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, 31 December 1919, op. cit.
83. Ibid.
84. Piesse to Prime Minister Hughes, 17 March 1920, op. cit.
85. Piesse to Prime Minister Hughes, 23 March 1920, *Japanese Expansion as It Affect Australian Defence,* The National Library of Australia.
86. Meaney, Neville, *Fears and Phobias,* op. cit.
87. Ibid.
88. To the Australian Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes, from J. Murdoch, 3 March 1921, National Library of Australia.
89. Walker, David and Ingleson, John, *The Impact of Asia,* in Meaney, N. (ed.), *Under New Heavens,* Heinemann Educational Australia, 1989, Victoria, Australia.
90. Meaney, Neville, *Fears and Phobias,* op. cit.
91. MacMillan, Margaret, '*Peacemakers',* op. cit., p. 322.

CHAPTER 2

Domestic Situation

Opposing Factions

In September 1918, when the Great War was about to end in Europe, Japan had a new Prime Minister, Hara Takashi. Taking the helm of the nation, Hara and his selected cabinet were immediately to face a set of imposing challenges. Looming before them were multiple international agendas much larger in scale and more complex than what any of the previous Japanese governments had ever experienced. These included the imminent armistice and post-war settlements that were bound to be bitterly contested, the Paris Peace Conference and Woodrow Wilson's proposed League of Nations, and Japan's planned proposal, the "Racial Equality Bill." Closer to home, the unsettled aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution threatened the very borders of Japan. Ongoing Siberian intervention by Allied forces, including Japan, was bringing home numerous unanticipated problems.

China represented yet another unresolved problem ready to boil over into a troublesome conflagration. The previous Ookuma cabinet had insisted that China meet its Twenty-One Demands. For his part, Hara had always been against Japan engaging in aggressive policies toward China. From the outset, the new Prime Minster had never been in agreement with the Demands. Now at the helm of his new administration, Hara wished to ease the increasingly unstable tensions generated by the Japanese policy toward China. He was concerned about the severe criticisms and the opposition that the Twenty-One Demands were attracting from Western

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2_2

powers. Hara anticipated that rising tensions with the West would ensue unless Japan's policy direction was curtailed to accommodate Western objections. Fall out of this nature would inevitably thwart the direction of his own foreign policy, one designed for cooperation and peaceful resolutions with the Western nations.

Hara was a new type of political leader. Due to his largely liberal outlook, he would be recognized in future history as one of the two political leaders in Japan who represented the ideology of the *Taisho Democracy*. The other was Hamaguchi Osachi,[1] who became Prime Minister ten years later.[2] Hara was unique among the political elites of his day, a class that almost uniformly came from the bosom of Japanese nobility.

Although born to a Samurai family, Hara remained untitled throughout his career. He continued to maintain his "commoner" status by repeatedly declining offers of a title when his political career subsequently soared. Defying another long-held tradition that all Prime Ministers came from the Upper House (House of Lords), Hara was the first one to come from the Lower House. Becoming known as the "Commoner Prime Minister," he enjoyed widespread popular support.

Hara had started as a journalist before being drawn to the diplomatic service. Well-versed in French from a young age, Hara served for three years as a Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Paris. After achieving the position of Director for Commerce and Trade, and ultimately Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hara left the Gaimusho. In 1900, he entered the world of politics firmly backed by Itoh Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru,[3] both revered elders of the Meiji Restoration. Hara was now in his mid-forties.

As Prime Minister, Hara's political goals were characterized not only by his liberal ideology but also by a useful dose of pragmatism. The "Great War" was coming to an end, and the more astute observers sensed that the world would witness major power shifts during the post-war period. To protect Japan's national interests through these uncertain times and expected changes, Hara needed to identify key shifts in international power politics, particularly which country would dominate in the future. He unhesitatingly foresaw that the United States would become the dominant power. Its strength was its freedom from the restrictive mores of the Old World. Hara believed that fundamentally the United States shared his vision of a peaceful world based on cooperative relations. This assessment would shape Hara's diplomatic objectives.

Hara's faith in the United States went back many years to a time before he became Prime Minister. He meticulously kept a diary that revealed

his long-held convictions. In the autumn of 1914, Hara privately visited the residence of Inoue Kaoru. At that time, the unsettled direction Japan continued to exhibit was troubling to the elder statesmen of the Meiji era. The incumbent Ookuma administration was proving incapable of retaining popular support.

At this point, Inoue informed Hara that he was leaning toward an alliance with Russia, France, and Great Britain (i.e., the Triple Entente of the pre-war period). Hara very much disagreed and told Inoue: "In whatever the form it might take, Japan has to avoid touching upon issues sensitive to the United States. Our country should rather work towards forming closer relations with America."[4] Nearly two weeks later, Hara visited Yamagata Aritomo,[5] who also was advocating a Russian alliance. Hara objected saying that if the existing tensions with China were to be resolved, Japan would need to avoid attracting US criticism. As for an alliance with European nations, he remained skeptical:

> *There is talk of a Japanese-Russian alliance, or of Japan joining the alliance between Russia, France, and England. This would only serve to earn Japan a short-term temporary peace. Japan would not be able to depend even on the existing Anglo-Japanese Alliance. If there happens to be strife with the United States in the future, none of these European nations would come to Japan's assistance.*[6]

Once at the helm of the Japanese nation, Hara immediately set a course that sought to promote US cooperation. Better and closer relations with the United States would be the cornerstone of his foreign policy. In gaining these stated objectives, however, he faced formidable domestic opposition from a tightly maintained political alliance between conservative and nationalist forces.

The largest hurdle came in the form of the Rinji Gaiko Choosakai.[7] More commonly known as Gaiko Choosakai', this autonomous committee was established in 1917 by the previous Terauchi government. The committee was placed directly under the Taisho Emperor. Its function was to examine and discuss vital issues concerning Japan's foreign policy. The specifics of any discussion were deemed "top secret," and the members were sworn to secrecy.[8] On the surface, the committee displayed an ostensible bipartisan appearance. The membership, however, included some powerful conservatives such as Itoh Miyoji, one of the three Privy Council members of the committee.

The second iteration of the Gaiko Choosakai met on November 13, 1918, immediately following the armistice. They discussed the coming peace and foreseeable terms of settlement. Central to the discussions was the focus on Wilson's Fourteen Points. The main argument was about how Japan would interpret the Fourteen Points and react to them during subsequent international discussions.

On behalf of the government, Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya presented the content of instructions that he had recently sent to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington and Paris. The major issues that would shape Japan's post-war diplomacy still lacked any distinct governmental consensus. The Foreign Minister's presentation outlining "Japan's fundamental position towards the peace talks" was vague and lacked focus. Instructions given to the Paris delegation included amorphous directions insisting that on "issues in which Japan observes conflicts with other Allied nations, they should try not to get out of step with these other countries."[9]

On Wilson's Fourteen Points, Uchida's instruction to London Ambassador Chinda Sutemi was again unfocused—devoid of any concrete conviction. Referring to an upcoming discussion on arms restriction, the provided instructions counseled: "The position of our Imperial Government is to avoid binding restrictions as much as possible." The same instruction also proclaimed: "The representatives of our Imperial Government should avoid adopting any attitude that could be seen as opposing peace and humanitarian principles."[10] The thrust of this guidance placed the Japanese delegation in the difficult position of not opposing other Allied nations despite potential conflicts of interest.

Among the uncertainties and failures to reach any consensus, there was one notable exception. Support for "racial equality" commanded an unquestioned consensus within the administration. When the parliamentarians considered the proposed establishment of a League of Nations, the prevailing concern, despite various party positions, was its effect on Japan's emerging status in the international community. Japan was entering a new level in world politics, one that was hitherto an exclusive club belonging to the Western powers.

Japan was not only a newcomer to this arena, but also bore the burden of being the first and only non-white and non-Christian nation trying to gain full membership. The Japanese were not so naïve as to believe that the strong and prevailing racism against Asians and other people of color would not pose serious barriers in Japan's diplomatic relations with these

countries. Japanese ministers clearly realized that gaining a decisive role in shaping the post-war world required their country to be placed on an equal footing with the more established powers.

On this point, the fractionalized Japanese government remained united. The policy, which would ignite a concerted effort at the Paris Peace Conference, would be one that pushed for the explicit recognition of racial equality. This strategy was first presented to the Gaiko Choosakai on November 13. These aims were then transmitted to Makino Nobuaki, the designated head of the Japanese delegation. Subsequently, this guidance formed the backbone of Japanese strategy during the long days of negotiation ahead.

> *The establishment of [a] League of Nations would be one of the most important issues (at the Paris Peace Conference). The Imperial Government would endorse the ultimate purpose behind the League of Nations. However, given the present international situation where racial prejudice and discrimination amongst nations are still prevalent and show no sign of improvement, the League of Nations in actual fact may cause our nation a great disadvantage. This will depend upon the methodology by which the aims professed by the League of Nations will be achieved.*[11]

The Japanese government initially sought to

> *. . . delay as much as possible any discussion of the establishment of League of Nations . . . until such time as all nations have had time to consider all its implications. If, however, the establishment of the League of Nations proceeds during the Paris Conference, the Japanese representatives shall be instructed to put forward an effective measure to prevent the prevalent racial prejudice that must inevitably cause detrimental consequences to our nation.*[12]

Thus, the Hara administration clearly perceived that the establishment and subsequent success of the League of Nations would inevitably be inextricably intertwined with the issue of racial equality. Even though not spelled out on this occasion, what troubled Hara were race-based sanctions aimed against Japanese immigrants. Incidents of this were increasing in frequency and virulence on the West Coast of the United States. Hara envisaged that by allowing this situation to develop unchecked it would cause a potentially major rupture preventing "closer and better relations with the United States."

Such a denouement would vitiate the very centerpiece of his foreign policy. Hara, as an intellectual liberal, firmly believed that the most advantageous policy for Japan lay in cooperating with other nations rather than going all-out against them. As a former diplomat, Hara had firsthand knowledge and generally a better understanding of the West than most other Japanese politicians and bureaucrats. However, he had to contend with racially based problems and policies clearly aimed against existing Japanese immigrants in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Ugly incidents had been on the rise over the previous two or three decades. Hara plainly saw that this issue could pose a significant circuit breaker that would derail improved relations with the West. Given this perception, Hara had no other viable choice than to use the Paris Peace Conference to further his agenda. The damaging racial clashes needed to be effectively forestalled and fundamentally resolved.[13]

The Gaiko Choosakai met on November 13 and, as expected, turn into a turbulent session. Conservative members, led by Itoh Miyoji, were determined to stand against the liberal, internationalist ideas put forward by the Hara government. They were extremely skeptical of Wilson's Fourteen Points and particularly critical of the idea behind the League of Nations. Itoh forcefully expressed his opinion that the proposed organization represented a Western plot to continue its subjugation of weaker nations, making it a distinctly reactionary rather than anything resembling a progressive idea. The conservatives' deep suspicion and inherent negativity toward Western proposals persisted in subsequent meetings, hindering any constructive discussion of the issue.

Losing patience, Makino Nobuaki was moved to deliver a lengthy speech during a fourth meeting on December 2, just before he left for Paris. He joined the Gaiko Choosakai in his capacity as a member of the Privy Council. Makino had just been appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary at the head of the Japanese delegation. This is from that speech:

> *Wilson's Fourteen Points is extremely significant. They are very different from what we have ever known. They will doubtless change the face of international diplomacy. On the other hand, we must examine how we currently conduct our diplomacy. Whatever we do invites suspicion from other world powers. Our practices offend the President of the United States and demonstrate insensitivity to the feelings of England and France. We have to realize that the world of diplomacy is moving towards a position of peace that can only be achieved by preventing powerful nations from brutally forcing others into submission.*[14]

To press his point, Makino scathingly attacked conservative opponents, particularly with regard to their old-school position on Japanese-Chinese relations:

> *Superficially everyone advocates "Japan-China friendship." In reality, the government, public and military all nurse different ideas as to how Japan could best achieve this aim. I have now been given the grave responsibility of representing our country. I am tasked with proclaiming to the world that Japan is ready to work in cooperation with other nations. When I look at the present situation in Japan, however, I cannot feel anything other than dismay. How are we going to work with other nations? We have to cease adopting oppressive methods to pressure other nation into submission. Instead, we have to stand for justice and uphold the humane principle of seeking to help weaker nation.*[15]

Makino also discussed the League of Nations:

> *Both the United States and England place a great deal of significance on the proposal and consider the issues surrounding this idea seriously. The same goes for France. Given the positive attitudes towards the proposal by the leaders of the United States and Europe, it is certain that the League will come into being. The League is also very important for our country. In recent years, labor issues are becoming increasingly significant. Certainly racial equality deserves most serious consideration.*[16]

The speech demonstrated Makino's view of the current international situation, including his vision of the future. Makino and Hara held almost identical ideas, both in their reading of the world situation and in charting Japan's future course. They viewed the Paris Peace Conference not as the opportunity to reap maximum benefits from the war's defeated nations, as the conservatives did. They saw that what happened in Paris would present Japan with an opportunity to participate in the construction of a new world order, one that would ensure lasting peace.

In believing this Makino and Hara were clearly at odds with their conservative opponents. The powerful conservative faction of the government had little understanding of the international dynamism that was rapidly developing. As represented by the extremely vocal Itoh Miyoji, the conservatives were consumed by their deep-rooted suspicion of the Western powers. They became fixated on conserving and advancing what they defined to be Japan's narrowly constrained self-interest. For them, the upcoming Peace Conference represented an opportunity to gain at the expense of others, to be a predator rather than the prey.

Liberals led by Hara had become increasingly frustrated by these uncompromising conservatives. Their opponents seemed to ignore, or certainly disregard, the new realities of this post-war period. They were also exasperated by the conservatives' stubborn refusal to see the benefits that would accrue to Japan if the country could only prove able to form cooperative relations with Western powers. For these liberals, the Paris Peace Conference offered a long-awaited opportunity to advance and shape a more modern Japan. Their country finally would be recognized as a member fit to take its place among other great nations. Japanese liberals aspired, more than anything else, for their country to be accepted as an equal by Western world powers. Makino's outburst on the eve of his departure for Paris inevitably stemmed from his, and of the other liberals', exasperation from trying to deal with obstinate and suspicion-ridden conservatives.

Clash of Ideas Over the League of Nations

The fifth meeting of the Gaiko Choosakai on December 8 proved to be even more turbulent than the preceding ones. The divisions between the two contending sides vying for political power were laid starkly bare. Neither side was keen to compromise. Prompted by Hara, who chaired the meeting, Makino reiterated the content of his previous speech. This time, his words were even more uncompromising. He branded the diplomatic policy advanced by the conservatives as being "oppressive, selfish and cunning." Makino cautioned that the country had to be careful not to be seduced into pursuing this line of diplomacy.

On the China issue, Makino was particularly scathing. He described Japanese actions in China as deviating widely from officially sanctioned government policy. This situation, if ignored, could continue to nurture ever-rising suspicions about Japanese aims he said. Western nations might doubt that Japan could be trusted. Itoh matched Makino's aggressive stance. He demanded to see unequivocal evidence that any one of these Western nations regarded Japan as "untrustworthy."

Other conservative members joined Itoh in mounting a relentless attack on Makino and his liberal views. Itoh's allies included Minister for the Army Tanaka Giichi and former Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake.[17] Both Tanaka and Terauchi had their power base firmly rooted in the Imperial Army. Both still commanded considerable influence within the army and tended to reflect those more military viewpoints.

Itoh's strong skepticism of the League of Nations was based on his misgivings about Wilson's Fourteen Points. He interpreted the Points as an attempt to strengthen the status quo of the Anglo-Saxon alliance in order to maintain its dominant position in the world. Particularly, Itoh claimed that items, such as the "freedom of the seas" and "reduction of armaments," could easily be manipulated to reflect the national self-interest of the United States and Great Britain. Itoh went on to say that the objective behind the proposals and their subsequent result would be the impeding of any potential competitor. Other nations would see their future development curtailed and be forced to accept a lasting disadvantage.[18]

In response, Makino repeated his conviction that the League of Nations proposal was virtually unstoppable. He explained once again that the thinking of world leaders was changing. They were clearly seeing the necessity of establishing an international body such as the League of Nations. Hara endorsed Makino's statement and added his own:

> *If the purpose of the League of Nations is to maintain eternal world peace and the League would be bound by the principle of justice and fairness, I would not only support the proposal but also actively advocate the establishment of such an institution.*[19]

In the New Year, the administration announced the final composition of the Paris delegation. Saionji and Makino would head the Japanese contingent with London Ambassador Chinda Sutemi, Paris Ambassador Matsui Keishiro, and Rome Ambassador Ijuuin Hikokichi joining as plenipotentiaries. The composition of the delegation clearly reflected Hara's determination to adopt, on behalf of the Japanese nation, a more liberal and international approach.

The conservatives were not happy. Once the conference opened, they took every opportunity to criticize the delegation's conduct. The ideological differences between the delegation and the growing political reality back home only widened as the conference progressed. The conservatives, still wielding considerable power, employed obstacle after obstacle to thwart Hara from providing outright support for his select delegation. Consequently, the Paris representatives were forced to operate without the full support of the Japanese government.

Besides the ideological differences, which had become increasingly evident, there were other issues that added to Hara's consternation. Ever since the Meiji Restoration, a persistent faction of the leadership had lobbied for

closer relations with Germany and Russia, thus breaking away from Japan's traditional "English anchor." A significant figure in this camp was Yamagata Aritomo whose influence both in politics and the military could not be ignored. This opposing faction worried that the current government had foolishly placed too much weight on its relationships with the United States and Great Britain, at the cost of neglecting Russia in particular. They predicted that after the war, a victorious Russia would gain a decisive degree of leverage; her strengthened position in Europe would encourage expansion of its eastward ambitions.

There were other governmental figures with solid intellectual reputations who were skeptical of Hara's policies. They remained unconvinced of the "wisdom" of placing so much trust in the continuing good intentions of the United States and Great Britain. Instead, the underlying hypocrisy of the US and English position continued to concern them. On one hand, the two nations were the greatest advocates of "democracy" and "human justice"; on the other, their behaviors showed outright racism and at times brutality in their colonial conduct. The "Yellow Peril" myth was very much still alive and exploited domestically for political gain.

Particularly galling was the continuing discriminatory treatment of Japanese immigrants in both the United States and the Dominion countries. The actions of these two countries consistently contradicted a devotion to the democracy and justice that they preached. On the eve of Paris Peace Conference, Konoe Fumimaro published an article titled "Reject the US-British Centered Peace Doctrine."[20] In it, he warned the Japanese not to be dazzled by the seductive ideology advocated by the United States and Britain. "Examine carefully," he urged, "the level of national self-interest lurking beneath the noble language that earnestly promotes unequivocal 'democracy' and 'human justice.'"

Japan was not without its own festering contradictions. The country was eager to promote the notion of racial equality and had committed to championing the idea in a wide range of international arenas. Yet Japan's colonial conduct, even at this early stage of imperialism, was becoming indefensible. Conduct in China and the Korean Peninsula seemed to be increasingly characterized by racially oriented discrimination that hardly aligned with Japan's professed aims. This placed the conservatives, who were pushing aggressive policies in these regions, in an ambiguous position.

On the surface, Itoh Miyoji and allied conservatives demanded that the West explicitly recognize racial equality as unarguably just and correct.

Clearly, that position promoted their own unvarnished nationalistic ideology. At the same time, however, they recognized that by promoting the Racial Equality Bill, the very proposal that they supported could come back to bite them. Passage might well serve to highlight their own less than commendable conduct in China and the Korean Peninsula.

The Racial Equality Bill, once adopted as the lodestone of Japan's policy, would pose a great disadvantage to the ambitions they planned to pursue in Asia. Reflecting their unresolved and ambiguous position, conservatives opted to pursue tactics that not only disrupted a reasoned discussion of the Paris Peace Conference's agenda, but also constantly attacked the performance of the Paris contingent. This type of criticism served as a surrogate attack on the Hara administration, which remained the real target of the strategy. The constant derogatory opposition did limit the Hara administration's ability to fully support the delegation in Paris.[21]

Even today, some Japan scholars continue to explore the true motive behind Japan's proposal of the Racial Equality Bill at the conference. One persistent speculation, made mainly outside of Japan, ascribes a more cynical reason behind Japan's seemingly noble intentions. The proposed bill could have been motivated to serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations to subsume former German territory in China and the South Pacific. Thorough reading of the Gaiko Choosakai record and of Hara's diaries, however, have provided little support for this position. No recorded discussion or speech links the two issues. No evidence has been found that the Racial Equality Bill at the time was ever considered in connection with the issue of annexing the former German territories.

Media Reporting About the Paris Peace Conference

Japan's struggle over the direction of post-war diplomacy was largely played out in the burgeoning press arena of that period. The onset of the Taisho Era[22] provided an unanticipated opportunity for Japanese newspapers. During the first decade of the Taisho period, newspapers rapidly grew and their influence in communities expanded to an extent never seen before. They were thrust into a role that previously had not existed.

Taking the *Asahi*, for example, its circulation grew from 330,095 in 1913 to 839,760 in 1922.[23] The Japanese public seemed to have developed an unquenchable thirst for news. The rapid expansion was underpinned by the parallel spread of literacy among the population. Universal education, a hallmark reform of the early Meiji period, provided the

required groundwork for such a result. Meanwhile, improved printing technology and the introduction of better sales and circulation systems simultaneously reduced publication costs. The ability to produce low-cost editions for a rising pool of subscribers certainly guaranteed success for an increased number of newspaper publishers. Although the *Asahi* maintained its dominant position, other periodicals flourished as well.

Heightened public interest was nurtured during the *Taisho Democracy*. Japanese society opened up, with an increasing social awareness and liberal ideas gained a wider audience. With more open debate playing a crucial role during this period, newspapers recognized new opportunities to widen the scope of their activities. With Japan increasingly participating in international affairs, the Japanese public soon hungered to learn more about the world. This further encouraged newspapers to broaden their traditional coverage. Increased opportunity and better training produced better-qualified journalists. A career as a foreign correspondent, a prospect never thought of by previous generations of journalists, now opened up as leading Japanese newspapers started sending correspondent overseas.

During the previous Meiji period, politically affiliated newspapers were the dominant provider of information, and consequently, commanded greater influence than other newspapers. Under the *Taisho Democracy*, however, their prominence ebbed away. Emerging persistently in their place were the so-called "general papers." Independent of any political party, these publications professed an explicit policy of political neutrality and promised to serve the public with facts and unbiased opinion. Readers were mostly drawn from the ever-expanding middle class. The *Asahi* clearly became a leading representative of this group.

The new breed of papers all claimed to provide straight news reports. In addition, they assumed the function of providing a needed forum for public debate. Newspapers far and wide published opinion pieces by Japanese intellectuals and leading critics. The stated aim was to encourage further discussion among the educated population.

This time period contrasted sharply with the next decade, the 1930s. That decade was notable for a progressive curtailing of any true freedom of speech. Inevitably, newspapers would come under the sway of government bureaucrats who were exerting a rigid policy of military censorship during the 1930s. In the 1920s, however, debate and discussion appeared to flourish in the atmosphere created by the *Taisho Democracy*. Leading papers were able to champion more liberal ideologies that reflected internationalism, world peace, and humanitarian principles. Because of their

outspokenness, these publications were able to garner increasing degrees of trust from the educated public. In fact, in the history of Japanese journalism, the Taisho period represents something of a high-water mark of progressive thought.

The Paris Peace Conference was the first major international meeting that Japan participated in as one of the principles. As seen in Chap. 1, the occasion had given the Japanese a feeling of enormous national pride and boosted the country's confidence. The people's interest in the proceedings of the conference reached an unusual height.

For newspapers, it was a not-to-be-missed opportunity, both in establishing their credentials in international reporting and in expanding circulation. All the major newspapers sent squads of reporters to Paris. Stationed in close proximity to the Hotel Bristol, where the Japanese delegation was lodged, correspondents reported the proceedings of the conference in detail, as well as the delegation's busy activities. Looking through that era's newspapers, almost 100 years later, one is surprised by the vast quantity of information that these journalists sent back home on a daily basis. Perhaps even more impressive is the accuracy of their reports, particularly considering that the majority of them had had no previous overseas experiences.

Along with their Paris correspondents' reports, major newspapers published editorials and analytical commentaries examining every aspect of the conference. They opened their pages to academics and intellectuals. On December 10, the day the Paris Peace Conference delegates left Yokohama, the *Tokyo Asahi* published a lengthy editorial titled "Basic Principles for the Peace Treaty."[24] It opened with severe criticisms of the government for failing to devise a unified Japanese strategy that could be skillfully employed at the conference.

The paper had extended analysis of the League of Nations proposal. The *Asahi* position was not without a few crucial reservations. While approving the US-British advocated principle of treating strong and weak nations on an equal basis, the paper expressed concerns that this principle might get in the way of the further progress of more middle-ranked countries. Basically, its editors questioned the underlying unselfish motivations of such a proposal.

The same editorial had no qualms about supporting a Japanese proposal championing racial equality. In this, the paper reflected the prevailing popular mood in the country. Racial and religious prejudices, which still defined the Western ethic, needed to be explicitly addressed. The paper's

main message was that Asian people should insist, without reservation, on equal treatment throughout the world. The editorial even went so far as to suggest that the passing of a Racial Equality Bill as part of the Paris Treaty be made a precondition for Japan to join the League of Nations.[25]

Continuing to criticize government disunity, the editorial stressed the importance of Japan presenting a consistent and united front; she needed to demonstrate her unqualified commitment to world peace. "The vague attitude of the Japanese government and its constant swing between militarism and all-out support for peace initiatives only invites the suspicion of Western nations," it warned. "Japan might be viewed as harboring an ambition to form a union of 'yellow races' which would pursue such aggressive policies throughout the region."[26]

A few days later, the *Asahi* further advanced its argument in another editorial titled "Peace Settlement and the Divisional Concept."[27] It articulated, as a vital principle, the idea of obliterating any hitherto constructed divisions separating Western from Asian people. All people could then be treated as equal. Subsequently, the peace settlement would rest firmly on the principle of racial equality. The principal concepts championed by the *Asahi* were: "the elimination of racial inequality, a more benevolent treatment of other Asian peoples, and a firm denouncement of militarism." These largely paralleled Makino's convictions, which he had clearly presented at the meeting of the Gaiko Choosakai immediately before his departure for Paris.

Unfortunately, government policy remained indecisive even as late as the New Year. On January 25, the Paris Peace Conference passed a resolution accepting Wilson's League of Nations proposal, although some details were yet to be ironed out. The *Asahi* severely criticized the passive pose of the Japanese delegation during the discussion preceding its adoption. They dismissed the Japanese performance with withering sarcasm: "They were too involved in taking notes and making an accurate record of the proceeding to utter even a word during the session."[28] Included in the same editorial was the comment made by Lloyd George that the proposal for a League of Nations was supported by all members except for one with even that nation expressing its principled support. "It is believed that particular nation was Japan."

The *Asahi* derided the government's vagueness on this crucial issue. The paper mocked instances of Hara's repeated comments that "the issue is under discussion in Paris," and Foreign Minister Uchida's statement that "the details of discussions at the conference cannot be disclosed."

The paper accused the government of lacking transparency: "Is it not the principle of a modern government to tell the people what diplomatic policy they want to pursue and to involve the public in the decision making process?"[29]

Concluding, the editorial attested once again that the paper held firmly to its conviction supporting racial equality: "It is imperative to promote the removal of racial discrimination." The paper insisted that the issue should be clearly separated from the contested terrain of conflicting national interests. The *Asahi* further stated that racial equality was an indisputable universal principle that all human races were obliged to uphold.[30]

In the following two months, the impending defeat of the Japanese proposal on racial equality became increasingly obvious. The *Asahi*'s expressed disappointment extended to criticizing the way that the most powerful nations had controlled the direction of the conference. Even though five nations ostensibly enjoyed equal status, the paper claimed that in practice not all were treated as such. Most outcomes were the result of "private consultations" between the delegates from two, or at most three nations, which took place prior to any formal decision making.

Japan had been pointedly excluded from these consultations. Consequently, her delegation was left with little choice other than to meekly follow the preordained direction. This reality contradicted the professed spirit of the conference. The supposed purpose was to build a future peaceful period based on the principle of fairness. The *Asahi* questioned whether the result of those deliberations at the Paris Peace Conference really furthered this objective.[31]

Since the very opening of the conference, an increasing number of Japanese newspapers selected the Racial Equality Bill as their focal point of reporting. Inevitably they became critical as its passage was repeatedly bogged down and deliberately blocked by the concerted efforts of leading Western powers. On February 19, the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi* severely criticized the proceedings, comparing the idea of a League of Nations to a fragile basket. The spirit and ideology behind this idea were fine, but the basket seems so fragile and too easily broken. It could not withstand the weight of a serious endeavor such as the "racial equality proposal."[32]

The Japanese government grew increasingly uneasy as newspapers and the public incessantly focused their attention on the passage of the Racial Equality Bill. Governmental qualms reached an alarming stage when nationalists opportunistically seized the situation seeking to promote their own agenda. As the public's dissatisfaction spread rapidly across the nation,

militant groups took decisive steps to strategically stir national emotions. Foreign Minister Uchida's telegram, dispatched to the delegation in Paris on February 1, revealed the government's mounting agitation. Uchida informed the delegation, with rising alarm, that Tooyama Mitsuru,[33] the doyen of numerous nationalist movements, had started his move.[34]

Tooyama had formed, under the pretext of "exploring means of constructing peace," a forum appropriately named the "Mission." The founding members included Vice-Admiral Kamiizumi from the navy reserve. The stated objective was the "abolishment of racial discrimination." Events moved quickly on to a plan. On January 5, a large rally was organized under the banner of "A Great Assembly for Abolishment of Racial Discrimination."[35] More than 300 people attended, including members from some thirty-seven civilian groups.

The list of executives represented a stellar lineup of prominent nationalist leaders, including Hashimoto Kazuma, Oshikawa Masayosi, Kuzu Yoshihisa, and Okawa Shuumei. It is noteworthy, however, that those attending the rally went far beyond the narrow confines of traditionally conservative nationalists. The thirty-seven civilian groups participating included the Japan Immigration Association,[36] the All Asia Association,[37] the Japan-China Peoples Association,[38] the Japan-India Association,[39] as well as a Buddhist organization and a number of youth groups.

The speakers for the occasion came from an even broader range of the social spectrum. A spokesman representing a voluntary group from each of the major political parties (i.e., *Seiyuu*, *Kensei*, and *Kokumin*) delivered a speech. So did a "voluntary spokesman" from the House of Lords; other speakers included academics and journalists. Both the army and navy reserves were represented. Tanabe Yasunosuke, author and Asia specialist, spoke on behalf of the organizers:

> *This issue is closest to the hearts of all sixty million people of Japan. This event is unprecedented, as academics, educators and religious leaders have all come together to organize [it]. Our voices will be echoed and its reverberation will be heard by the four hundred million people of China and the three hundred million people of India. Our voices will ultimately move the opinion of the world.*[40]

At the conclusion of the event, a new association was formed and a resolution was adopted: "The people of Japan expect that racial discrimination, as hitherto practiced in international relations, will be abolished at the Paris Peace Conference."[41] A copy of the resolution was immediately

dispatched to French Prime Minister Clemenceau, Host to the Paris Peace Conference, as well as to the Japanese delegation.

The newly created association held an executive meeting on March 14. In the event that Japan's Racial Equality Bill was voted down, an operative strategy needed to be agreed on and put in place. Agreement rested on a two-pronged proposal: (1) denouncement of the incumbent cabinet and bringing down the existing government, and (2) withdrawal from the League of Nations. As each day in March passed, chances increased that Japan's proposal would be rejected. Subsequently, a Second Great Assembly was held in March and resolved that it would "stand against the League of Nations if the proposed international body were to be established without the principle of racial equality."[42] The following day, the Third Great Assembly unanimously agreed that Japan would immediately withdraw from the League of Nations if it failed to recognize the principle of racial equality.[43]

Japan's Fundamental Dilemma

Dissatisfaction with the anticipated rejectiton of the Racial Equality Bill was rapidly spreading among the population. The resulting outcry stemming from the perceived miscarriage of justice was generating dangerous crests of unrest in Japan. Under such circumstances, the question of Japan's own imperialism and her discriminately treatment of the people in China and the Korean Peninsula were buried and largely ignored. Some among the Japanese intellectuals, however, were conscious of their country's fundamental dilemma and of the need to address the issue honestly. The psychology underlying the circumstances behind the issue, nevertheless, was much more complex.

Ever since the Meiji Restoration, when the Japanese intellectuals started traveling overseas, the implacable racial prejudice prevalent in Western nations became a festering thorn for many of that generation. They gained firsthand, although largely unwanted, experience through their visits to Europe and the United States. In particular, they became aware of how myths, such as the Yellow Peril, had been fabricated largely on misconceptions of the East and used for political advantage in Western lands.

Japanese intellectuals during the Meiji and Taisho periods greatly admired Western civilization. They looked to the West as a model and inspiration for Japan's modernization. Faced with the reality, however, they were incapable of reconciling this bedrock respect for the West with

the ineradicable racial prejudice prevalant there. Particularly troubling to them was the notion that warned of a rising Yellow Peril threatening Western values.

Okakura Tenshin,[44] a philosopher, art critic, and author of many books, successfully introduced Japanese traditions, culture, and art to the West. Many of his works were translated into English, including *The Book of Tea*. Reacting to this unthinking Western prejudice, Okakura wrote: "If the West, dismissing the Asians as inferiors, fails to take serious note of Eastern issues, a great disaster will befall mankind. As it is, European imperialism shamelessly cries out 'yellow peril.'"[45]

Mori Oogai[46] was another leading intellectual during the Meiji and Taisho periods. As a medical doctor, he had spent four years in Germany undertaking further training. While there he was exposed to the Yellow Peril concept and was greatly alarmed by it. Mori was particularly appalled by the false premises on which the theory had been constructed. He began his own extensive research into the origin and basis of the myth. His assiduous investigation resulted in the publication of *An Analysis of the Yellow Peril Theory*.[47] In this volume he noted the serious implications that such a theory could have on future relations between the East and the West. Mori went on to become one of the most influential literary figures of that time. In his poetry and novels, he continued to warn the Japanese of the double standard practiced by the West in their international dealings.

Mori Oogai was not exceptional in his analysis. Others of his generation came to think along similar lines. Okuma Shigenobu, a revered elder statesman, had been exposed to the Yellow Peril concept during the Russo-Japanese War earlier in the century. His experience precipitated a life-long involvement with the issue of racial discrimination.[48] This elder statesman stalwartly supported Japan's racial equality proposal. He firmly believed that this bill, once adopted, would serve to eliminate one of the largest causes of conflict between nations. Okuma anxiously watched the proceedings in Paris and was greatly disappointed that they were not taking the path that he had hoped for. At the time of the Third Great Assembly, he sent an open letter declaring that "Japan must not join the League of Nations if the League disregards human justice."[49]

Okuma had been Prime Minister when the Japanese government forced China to yield to its infamous Twenty-One Demands. It would then seem impossible to square Japan's colonial policies, as then endorsed by Okuma, with his principled stand at this crucial juncture of Japanese history. Mamiya Kunio, a noted Okuma scholar, tried to reconstruct his

thoughts some seventy years later. According to Mamiya, Okuma fervently believed that racial equality should represent an ideal goal subscribed to by all of humanity.

Nonetheless, for Okuma, different nations represented various stages of development in civilization, and the differences could not be ignored. Therefore, justice demanded that, in practice, each nation should receive a level of treatment proportional to its level of civilization.[50] Okuma seemed to favor, in this respect, something resembling a crude version of Social Darwinism. Today this rationalization would be widely rejected. Even so, Okuma seemed to increasingly become aware of this fundamental contradiction in his thinking. After he left government service, Okuma battled with the conflicting beliefs. Such psychological struggles were in fact common among many Japanese intellectuals at the time.

Newspapers of this era also had to grapple with exactly the same Japanese dilemma. Japan had hoped to take part in shaping the new world order that would emerge from the Paris Peace Conference. The hope was that the resulting concord would be based on the idea of racial equality. For the newspapers at home, this could have given a singular opportunity to start a debate within Japan on the prevailing human conditions in its own colonies, especially those in China and Korea. Most newspapers, however, avoided or ignored the topic; there were few exceptions.

The *Asahi*, perhaps anticipating political repercussions from the government, avoided commenting directly on this issue. The paper, instead, resorted to publishing opinions by academics and other experts who vociferously warned against the continuation of Japan's colonial aggression and its treatment of the people under its rule. In the 1919 New Year issue, the *Asahi* published an essay by Toda Kai-ichi[51]:

> *If our country is to advocate human justice and denounce racial discrimination practiced by Western nations . . . we should firstly reflect on our own conduct. We should not pursue our own colonial ambitions in such places as China and Siberia, either by military or by economic means.*[52]

A few months later, the *Asahi* devoted significant coverage to anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, events that were largely ignored by Japanese newspapers of that era. It reported that the organized protests, initially formed by students in Peking, were rapidly spreading. Active episodes could be found in various locations in Shantung Province as well as major cities along the Yangtze River, including Amoi and Canton. The

Asahi, however, felt the need to temporize its reporting by toning down the serious nature of the recent developments in China. Its analysis could not avoid putting a certain gloss on events by at least hinting that the current turmoil was due to a temporary misunderstanding that would soon subside once the disagreements were resolved.

Nonetheless, the overall tone of the article was far from dismissive. The *Asahi* did report that the influence of the anti-Japanese movements was spreading to the Chinese students studying in Japan. Consequently, a number of student groups had indicated a desire to return home. After interviewing some of the Chinese students involved, the paper listed their grievances, which included widespread rudeness displayed by Japanese students, discriminatory treatment in regard to housing, as well as ignorance and offensive attitudes endemic among the Japanese police. The paper sufficiently clarified the root causes of resentment felt by Chinese students.

The *Asahi* stated that their grievances substantially arose from Japan's aggressive policy toward their country, especially its occupation of Chinese territories and the overt discriminatory practices endured there by the Chinese on a daily basis. "These Chinese students are the future of China," the paper reminded its readers. The editorial then concluded: "What would be the long-term consequence for Japan if these students return home full of animosity to our country?" Addressing the government directly, the *Asahi* demanded that the so-called "Japan–China friendship policies" be thoroughly clarified. These ostensibly formed the basis for a governmental strategy in that country but were far from transparent.

The newspaper also urged the public to reflect on its discriminatory behavior in the treatment of Chinese residents in Japan, a practice acted out almost automatically. To display a responsible level of understanding did not equate to being unpatriotic by siding with the Chinese. Rather, as a nation unequivocally championing a Racial Equality Bill at the Paris Peace Conference, it was Japan's responsibility and the obligation of every Japanese citizen to be more open-minded.[53]

Unfortunately, the *Asahi*'s attempt to draw public attention to the issue did not go far enough. Reporting about the 1919 student opposition demonstration in Peking on May 4, later known as the "*5/4 Undoo*,"[54] the newspaper's handling proved to be neither even-handed nor comprehensive. The paper seriously underplayed the importance of the spreading unrest. Instead of being a momentary period of unease, as the paper wanted to portray, these movements marked the beginning of wide-scale anti-imperialist movements throughout China. Similarly, the *Asahi* failed

to recognize the significance of the March 1, 1919, start of a Korean independence movement.

Many years later, in the 1950s, prominent historian Oka Yoshitake[55] would severely criticize the performance of Japanese newspapers around the time of the Paris Peace Conference. He wrote that "newspaper editorials, rather than representing the interests of the public, largely reflected the opinions of the leaders of the time, consequently helping those political leaders to control public opinion."[56]

The *Asahi*, after World War II, admitted that its reporting of events in China and Korea at this period had been subjected to strict censorship.[57] Government restrictions on newspapers during the 1920s was not invisible. In the more liberal climate of the *Taisho Democracy*, however, it was still possible for responsible news media to exercise a relative degree of freedom. This freedom would be increasingly curtailed toward the end of the 1920s and would become severely restricted during the 1930s and onward.

Intellectual Viewpoints

A number of intellectual leaders in Japan at the time understood the delicate, and potentially precarious, situation that it had placed itself in at the Paris Peace Conference. Each tried to guide the government toward a more positive direction. Prominent among this group were industrialist Shibusawa Eiichi, educatior Nitobe Inazo, historian Asaga Kan-ichi, social activist Ooyama Ikuo, as well as Hasegawa Nyozekan and Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, both journalists and social critics. The focus here, however, is on the two leading figures: Yoshino Sakuzoo and Ishibashi Tanzan.[58]

Yoshino Sakuzoo, born in 1878, graduated from Tokyo Imperial University with a Doctor of Law. After studying for three years in the United States and Europe, he took a position teaching political science at his alma mater. While there, he published extensively on current political and international issues. A consistent advocate of democracy, Yoshino was considered one of the dominant intellectual figures of the *Taisho Democracy*. His theories and thoughts published in the *Chuu'oo Kooron* between 1914 and 1928 proved to be particularly influential.

With the end of World War I, Yoshino predicted that a new world order would be built on a base of international cooperation. Accordingly, he asserted high hopes for the proposed League of Nations. Consistent

with such beliefs he persistently attempted to raise public awareness of the potential benefits such an organization could offer Japan. His essays published in the *Chu'oo Kooron* included titles such as "Why Hesitate to Join the League of Nations?,"[59] "The Readiness of the Japanese for Peace Talk,"[60] "To the Activists for Abolition of Racial Discrimination,"[61] and "On the Issue of Abolishing Racial Discrimination."[62]

The last two articles focused on the proposed Racial Equality Bill. On one hand, he strongly supported the activists for encouraging a greater voice for the abolition of racial discrimination prevalent in the West. On the other, Yoshino reminded the Japanese of their country's own behaviors in the East. Advocating racial equality only from the victims' point of view, he argued, would not lead to a lasting resolution of such an intractable problem. Taking as his example the case of Japanese traders still willing to sell morphine to China, Yoshino warned that pointing to the sins of Western nations likewise occupied could never excuse the actions of the Japanese countrymen.

Yoshino further denounced the way in which the Japanese conducted themselves in the Korean Peninsula. He emphasized the fact that the way in which Japanese law was applied in that country was based on blatant racial discrimination. Clearly, the attitude that Japan manifested in Asia, and particularly in China, served only to fuel anti-Japanese sentiments abroad. Given Japan's own behavior, Yoshino doubted that grandstanding over a Racial Equality Bill would diminish the prejudice against and suffering of Japanese immigrants residing in such countries as the United States, Canada, and Australia.[63] He instead urged activists, and in fact all Japanese, to become a little more self-reflective. Yoshino's core message tied the Japanese demand for racial equality to universal principles that would bolster equal treatment of all races. Japan could not succeed, according to him, if it championed the proposal purely out of a narrowly selfish motive that sought to improve only the conditions of those compatriots residing in the West.[64]

Ishibashi Tanzan, the other major intellectual figure of this era, was born in 1884, making him several years younger than Yoshino. After graduating from Waseda University, he joined the *Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo* as a journalist. His analysis and critical comments extended to all areas of politics, economics, and diplomacy. Ishibashi's ideas increasingly drew the attention of intellectual elites and more broadly the educated public. Promoting a liberal ideology, his unvarnished commentaries transformed him into a central figure of the *Taisho Democracy*.

In print he consistently campaigned against Japan's imperialist policies. Ishibashi's articles included titles such as: "Tsingtao Should Never Be Taken into (Japan's) Possession,"[65] "Regrettable (Japan's) Foreign Policy,"[66] and "Troops Should Be Withdrawn from Siberia."[67] He unflinchingly advocated a "smaller Japan," a stance that starkly contrasted with the prevailing demand for an ever "greater Japan." His opinions separated him from the majority views of the time. Ishibashi, however, never wavered from his convictions steeped in liberalism and human justice. For this reason, Ishibashi commands considerable respect in Japan even today. After World War II, he entered politics, held a number of ministerial positions, and then briefly became Prime Minister in 1956. Unfortunately, his term was cut short because of illness.

Ishibashi commented extensively during the debate over the Racial Equality Bill. His sharpest editorial was titled, "Before Demanding the Abolition of Racial Discrimination."[68] He enunciated exactly where he stood on the issue of racial discrimination, noting that it was suffered by all colored races in the United States, Canada, Australia, and colonial Africa, not just by the Japanese.

> *[Such practices] not only go against the universal principle of liberty and equality, but would also create causes for future conflicts. As long as these practices by the white races upon the colored continue, even thousands of treaties would be illusory just like castles in the sand. They would never warrant world peace. … For this reason I desire, more than anyone else, the elimination of racial discrimination throughout the world as soon as possible.*[69]

Having stated that, Ishibashi reluctantly declared that he would be unable to support the antidiscrimination activities currently mounting in Japan. To explain his reasons, he listed examples of Japan's own discriminatory treatment of the Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese people. Ishibashi then drew attention to the discriminatory practices, which were generally overlooked or ignored, within Japan against fellow citizens. He pointed out that voting rights were still strictly limited to the privileged few and to male citizens only; this practice meant that more than ten million people were unable to vote.

In the face of these facts, Japan's demand at the Paris Peace Conference carried neither credibility nor legitimacy. Before demanding that the world abolish discrimination, he insisted that Japan had to first do away with her own discriminatory behavior and instead treat all people, including the

Chinese, equally. Ishibashi also said that the Japanese government would have to show itself willing to grant its own citizens universal suffrage.[70]

While denying Japan's right to legitimately propose a Racial Equality Bill, Ishibashi did not dismiss the importance of the issue at stake. He once wrote that he considered "racial discrimination" the most problematic issue that human society faced, as it was rooted in basic human emotion. "War would never solve this fundamental problem," he wrote. "The only way forward is to understand each other and seek a peaceful solution in a broader framework."[71]

Perhaps from this vantage point, Ishibashi was elated with the prospect of a League of Nations. In his editorial, "The Most Important Project of the League of Nations," he discussed at length what the core structure of the League should be. Ishibashi predicted that the three pillars of democratic government (i.e., legislative, administrative, and the judicial system) would be developed to facilitate the functioning of this new international institution. If that happened, Ishibashi was hopeful that "an international court" could deal with issues of racial discrimination, together with any other issues that might threaten world peace.[72]

Notes

1. 濱口雄幸(1870–1931) Also known as "Hamaguchi Yuukou." Prime Minister (1929–1931).
2. Both Hara and Hamaguchi were to fall to the hands of assassins. Hara was stabbed to death in 1921 by a man strongly suspected of his right wing affiliations. Hamaguchi, then prime minister, was shot in 1930 by a member of an ultra-right group. Hamaguchi survived his initial injury but died from complications a year later in 1931. Further on Hamaguchi in Chap. 7.
3. 井上馨 (1836–1915).
4. Hara, Keiichiro, ed., *Hara Takashi Diary,* Vol. 5, Fukumura Shuppan 1981, p. 67.
5. 山縣 有朋(1838–1922), Field Marshal of the Imperial Army of Japan. Prime Minister (1889–91, 1898–1900) He is considered one of the architects of the military and political foundations of early modern Japan.
6. *Hara Takashi Diary, Vol. 5,* op. cit.
7. 臨時外交調査会 Established in 1917 and continued for five years until abolished in 1922 The initial membership included the prime minister, foreign minister, minister for internal affairs、minister of the navy, minister of the army and three members of the Privy Council. Major leaders of political parties were also invited, though some declined.

8. Due to this, no official record was kept. For minutes of meetings, the authors relied on private records, such as diary, letters and incidental writings by those who had been the members of the *Gaikoo Choosakai* during this period.
9. Kobayashi, Tatsuo, ed. *Suiu Soo Nikki: Rinji Gaikoo Choosakai Iinkai Giji Hikki Nado,* Hara Shoboo, 1966, p. 328.
10. Ibid.
11. To Plenipotentiary Makino, *Koowa ni Kansuru Hooshin,* 9 December, Taisho 7 (1918), in Gaimusho ed., Kokusai Renmei•Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai, (1): 11 July Taisho 7–31 March Taisho 8, Gaimusho Archives.
12. Ibid.
13. Shidehara Kijuuro, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of Paris Peace Conference, described the motive behind Japan's proposal for Racial Equality as follows: "Considering the damages caused by the rising mood of 'Japanese exclusion' in the US, Canada and Australia, over the previous 20 to 30 years, (we) wanted to take this opportunity (during the Paris Peace Conference) to solve this problem once and for all."

    Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, ed. *Shidehara Kijuuroo,* Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, pp. 141–142.
14. *Suiu Soo Nikki*, op. cit., pp. 326–328.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. 寺内正毅(1852–1919), Prime Minister (1916–18).
18. *Suiu Soo Nikki,* op. cit. pp. 326–328.
19. Ibid.
20. Konoe, Fumimaro, *Ei-Bei Hon-i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu,* Nippon Oyobi Nippon Jin, 15 December 1918 Issue, pp. 23–26.
21. Some detailed discussions and private dialogues, see *Suiu Soo Nikki,* op. cit. and also *Hara Takashi Diary, Vol. 4 & 5,* op. cit.
22. Taisho Period: July 30, 1912–December 25, 1926.
23. The combined figures of the *Tokyo Asahi* and the *Osaka Asahi.* Asahi Shimbunsha Siryoo, ed., *Hakkoo Busuu no Sui-I,* Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1995, p. 320.
24. *Koowa no Kihon Hooshin,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 10 December 1918.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. *Koowa to Kubetsu Kan-nen,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 15 December 1918.
28. *Kokusai Renmei to Teikoku: Seifu no Himitsu o Ayashimu,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 30 January, 1919.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. *Koowa Kaigi no Gaikoo Buri,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 27 March 1919.

32. *Shasetsu: Kokusai Renmei Kiyaku,* Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 18 February 1919.
33. 頭山 満 (1855–1944) Tooyama Mitsuru was a right-wing nationalist leader in early 20th century Japan and the founder of the *Genyoosha, a* nationalist secret society. Although Tooyama remained a private citizen all his life, he was known as the "Shadow Shogun," "Spymaster," and "The Boss of Bosses," reflecting his tremendous covert influence on the nationalist politics.
34. Uchida to the Delegation in Paris, 1 February Taisho 8 (1919), in Gaimusho ed., Kokusai Renmei Jinnshu Sabetsu Teppai (1) op. cit., pp. 273–274.
35. *Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai Taikai*, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 6 February 1919.
36. Nichibei Imin Kyookai.
37. Zen Ajia Kai.
38. Ni-sshi Kokumin Kyookai.
39. Nichi-In Kyookai.
40. *Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai Taikai*, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 6 February 1919, op. cit.
41. Ibid.
42. *Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai Taikai*, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1919.
43. *Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai Taikai*, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 25 April 1919.
44. 岡倉天心 (1863–1913). Also known as Okakura Kakuzo. His books translated into English include: *The Book of Tea* (1906 New York), *The Ideals of the East-with special reference to the Art of Japan* (1903 John Murray, London), *The Awakening of Japan* (1904 John Murray, London).
45. *Meiji Bungaku Zenshuu Vol. 38: Okakura Tenshin Shuu,* Chikuma Shoboo, 1968, p. 123.
46. 森鴎外 (1862–1922).
47. Mori, Oogai, *Ooka Ron Koogai,* Shunyoodoo, 1904.
48. Mamiya, Kunio, *Ookuma Shigenobu to Jinshu Sabetsu Teppan Mondai,* Waseda Daigaku Shi Kiyoo, Vol. 21, No. 25, Waseda University, 1989, pp. 219–229.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 226.
51. 戸田海市 (1873–1924), Doctor of Law, Scholar in Economics and Social Policy, Professor of Kyoto Imperial University.
52. Toda, Kai-ichi, *Yuushoku Jinshu Imin Haiseki Mondai(1)*, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 1 January 1919.
53. *Shina Hainichi Undoo,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 25 May 1919.
54. 「五四運動」 Students in Peking mounted a sizeable demonstration on the 4th of May 1919, which opposed the Paris decisions accepting Japan's 21 Demands and rejecting China's request that territories, including the Shantung Peninsula, be returned.

55. 岡義武 (1902–1990) Scholar in Japanese political history, Professor Emeritus of the Tokyo University.
56. Oka, Yoshitake, *Pari Heiwa Kaigi ni Okeru Amerika Gaikoo to Waga Kuni Yoron,* in Saito Makoto, ed. Gendai America no Naisei to Gaikoo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1959, p. 278.
57. Asahi Shimbun, ed. *Asahi Shimbun Sha Shi: Taishoo-Shoowa Senzen Hen,* Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1991, p. 23, p. 124.
58. 石橋湛山 (1884–1973).
59. Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Nanzo Kokusai Renmei Kanyuu o Chuucho Suru,* Chuu-oo Kooron, 1919 January issue.
60. Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Koowa Kaigi ni Taisuru Kokumin no Kakugo,* Chuu'oo Kooron, 1919, March issue.
61. Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Jinshu Teki Sabetsu Teppai Undoo Sha ni Atau,* Chuu'oo Kooron, 1919 March Issue.
62. Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Jinshu Teki Sabetsu Teppai Mondai ni Tsuite,* Chuu'oo Kooron, 1919 May Issue.
63. Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Jinshu Teki Sabetsu Teppai Undoo Sha ni Atau,* op. cit.
64. Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Jinshu Teki Sabetsu Teppai Mondai ni Tsuite*, op. cit.
65. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Tsingtao wa Danjite Ryooyuu Subekarazu,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 15 November 1914.
66. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Kakon o Nokosu Gaikoo Seisaku*, Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 5 May 1915.
67. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Siberia Shuppei Hiki Agu Beshi,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 15 September 1918.
68. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Jinshu Teki Sabetu Teppai Yookyuu no Mae ni*, Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 15 February 1919.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Ware ni Imin no Yoo Nasi*, Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 15 May 1913.
72. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Kokusai Renmei no Chuushin Jigyoo*, Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 5 February 1919.

CHAPTER 3

The Making of a Young Diplomat: Thrust into the Caldron of Japan–US Diplomacy

Born a Samurai

Hanihara Masanao was born in the ninth year of Meiji (1876) in the county of Kahi (now the Yamanashi Prefecture) southwest of Tokyo. The Hanihara family is descended from the Samurai class. Its lineage extends back at least several hundred years; numerous ancestral name tablets stand in the family shrine to this day. One of the oldest of them bears an inscription describing the heroic death of a family member in the famous battle of Komaki Nagakute in 1584. The Hanihara ancestors served as Takeda Shingen's generals. The estates in Yamanashi, where Masanao was born, boasted an imposing gate, which was said to have been presented by Lord Takeda. The Hanihara residence, even to the present generation, always displays a collection of magnificent bows, reflecting the clan's prowess in *Kyuu Doo*.[1]

Masanao was the eldest of three children. His sister, Kuwakiyo, later known as Kuwayo, became a leading painter during the Meiji and Taisho periods. She is also known for her significant contribution to the development of Western-style oil paintings in Japan. Masanao's younger brother, Yumijiro, would become Vice-President of Furukawa Industries, a prominent copper producer. Because all three achieved well, this generation of Hanihara became the pride of their Yamanashi hometown. Masanao was small but sturdy and well-trained from his very early years in the art of *Kyuu Doo*. He was able to pull the strongest bow, the thickness of which is about that of a child's fist.

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2_3

According to local history, the Minamoto Village, where Masanao was born, had been under the direct rule of the Tokugawa, who defeated all the rival lords in the country in 1600 and became Shogun. The Tokugawa Shogunate continued to rule Japan until 1868. Under their rule, the Takeda samurai were virtually decimated, leaving only a few remaining clan members from the former Takeda household. Hanihara was one of them. Although they were allowed to carry a sword, the symbol of the samurai, all other privileges were stripped away.

Despite the oppression under Tokugawa rule, former Takeda samurai upheld their pride and throughout the period, which lasted more than two hundred years, secretly plotted their restoration to power. Hanihara Benichiro, Masanao's father, was at the forefront of this scheme. When the initial movement, ultimately leading to the Meiji Ishin,[2] began to stir in the country, Benichiro together with the rest of the Takeda samurai rose in revolt. They gathered at the ruins of the Takeda Castle and resolved to fight against the Tokugawa. They considered themselves as Royalists who were upholding the rights of the Emperor. This Takeda-composed troop of samurai was labeled "*Gokoku-tai*" (protection of the country) by one of the Royalist leaders, Itagaki Taisuke.[3] They fought ferociously throughout the country, becoming renowned for their bravery.[4]

The Meiji Ishin restored sovereign power to the Emperor, with the country united beneath him. Masanao was born ten years after the Meiji Ishin. Growing up in Yamanashi, where the Tokugawa had ruled, during his childhood Masanao was still frequently taunted as the son of the rebel. According to local historians, this environment helped to strengthen Masanao's pride and in turn nurtured a formidable willpower within him.[5]

The following is a description of an episode that reflects Masanao's unyielding resolve. When Masanao was a young student in Tokyo, he was diagnosed with tuberculosis, which at that time was considered to be a terminal illness. The doctor's advice was to return home and rest, so he did retreat to his family home in Yamanashi. Instead of quietly resting, however, he was up at dawn every morning, standing in the fresh cold air of his family's estate, doggedly performing strenuous exercises and eventually regained his health and strength. Being afraid that he might not be allowed to leave home again, he told his family one morning that he was going hunting. Instead of heading toward the mountains, he went straight back to Tokyo to continue with his studies.

While investigating Hanihara Masanao's life one observes, at every turn, evidence of characteristics such as uprightness, honesty, courage, and

perseverance—all the traits of the Samurai strictures. He was a modern, educated man, wise in the ways of the West. As a diplomat, he was a pragmatist and a skilled negotiator. In his heart, however, Hanihara was true to the ways of the samurai. Called on to make extremely difficult decisions, it was the code of *Bushido*[6] that ultimately guided him in upholding the honor of the nation.

The sense of what it meant to belong to the Takeda clan was also important to him. When Hanihara was appointed Ambassador to the United States, he ordered a china service, suitable for twenty-four people, that would be used at the Washington Embassy. When Masanao contemplated the occasions to host representatives of the United States and of many other countries at his Washington residence, his mind must have gone back to his roots, giving him the idea of showing his hospitality with his family honor.

The specially ordered white and gold Noritake China bears a gold insignia on every piece; the full set still remains in the family. A closer look reveals that it is not precisely the Hanihara family insignia, but an inspired combination exhibiting both the Hanihara and the Takeda family crests. The striking insignia was his own creation.

Benichiro, Masanao's father, also lived by the strict samurai code throughout his life. He believed that martial skills marked the highest achievement in his children's education, so gave them strict training in swordsmanship and *Kyuu Doo*. However, academic learning was also essential for a samurai. Masanao learned to read early and entered primary school at the age of four. In high school, even though the youngest and smallest, Masanao was always at the top of his class. He was particularly outstanding in English and creative writing. The acquisition of English was highly prized by Meiji intellectuals.

Masanao extended his interests beyond the English language alone, becoming extremely involved in the study of the United States. He often presented his views at speech contests and in discussion groups. It was a precursor for his future diplomatic career, where he specialized in US–Japanese relations. He also wrote well; whether an official report or a critical essay, his later writings always displayed his literary flair.

Publishing the "Diplomatic Review"

At fourteen, Masanao left home for Tokyo where he lived at the home of one of his relatives. Starting his education at Tokyo English School in Kanda, he was later admitted to Waseda University. He enrolled in the

Faculty of Politics, the forerunner of the current Faculty of Political Science and Economics. His close friend, Tanaka Hozumi, later President of Waseda University, described Masanao during his student years in this way:

> *He held first place in the class. His academic excellence went without saying. He was short, but handsome. In those days, Waseda students were known for their ragged appearance, but Hanihara always dressed simply and neatly. He was bright, cheerful and articulate. If you speak of a model student, Hanihara, perhaps, fits the description.*[7]

As a young student, Hanihara was very interested in foreign affairs, constantly and ravenously studying the overseas situation. With his knowledge and recognized writing skills, he became the chief reporter for the *Waseda Gakuho*, the university journal. He graduated in Meiji 30 (1897) from Waseda with the highest honors. At graduation he gave a speech as the representative of his graduating class, a privilege limited to a single outstanding student.[8]

After graduation, his first job was as a reporter for the *Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo*, a leading financial newspaper. In 1898, while working as a journalist, he assisted Dr. Ariga Nagao with the inauguration of the *Gaiko Jiho*[9] (*Revue Diplomatique*), the first scholarly journal in Japan with a focus on foreign affairs. Hanihara said later that this was "perhaps because I had been the closest to the professor,"[10] so must have been a natural choice for Ariga. Ever since he first joined Ariga's classes as a teenage student, Hanihara had shown exceptional interest in international relations, devoting himself tirelessly to exploring further into the area.

Ariga Nagao[11] was a well-known scholar of international law. He would later be called Japan's founding father of diplomatic history.[12] An outstanding scholar on one hand, he also dedicated himself to the education and training of younger academics. Invited by Takada Sanae,[13] who also would later become a President of Waseda University, Ariga joined the Waseda faculty in 1884 where he taught international law and political history. Hanihara in his second year at Waseda became one of Ariga's students. At that stage, Ariga was already planning to create an academic journal specializing in diplomacy and foreign affairs.

In the first issue of *Gaiko Jiho*, Ariga noted: "This journal intends to contribute toward good diplomatic practice and to extend the knowledge of international law and diplomatic history."[14] It was obvious that, as a leading intellectual of the time, he wanted to educate the Japanese

public beyond the confines of a university. More than anyone else at the time, Ariga was keenly aware of the volatile environment Japan occupied. Therefore, he felt an urgent need to inspire and enlighten Japan's general population, who hitherto had very little interest in foreign affairs. To him, Japan's survival depended on furthering such knowledge; he wrote:

> *The dark ominous clouds of diplomacy are quickly gathering over the Far East. The destiny of our nation will be decided in the next few years. At this juncture of history, it is imperative that we correctly understand the true intentions of the world powers. They have been intensely observing our country, but we know very little of their affairs and intentions.*[15]

This was immediately after Japan's victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. The enormous country of China, perceived as the "Giant Tiger" of Asia, was defeated by a tiny neighboring nation. Japan's victory revealed to the world the unexpected weakness of this "sleeping giant." China's defeat encouraged Western powers to expand their spheres of influence in that country. In doing so, however, they also forced the Japanese to relinquish some of its territorial gains.

Russia took the lease of Port Arthur (Lüshun). Great Britain took possession of Wei-Hai-Wei while expanding its territory in Kowloon. Other European countries clamored for more concessions while the United States, as a latecomer to this Chinese land rush, championed an Open Door Policy that would provide equal access to all ambitious countries. During the same period, the United States was transforming itself into a contending Pacific power by expanding its reach to include Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines.

The rapidly developing situation in the Pacific region surrounding Japan called for extreme caution and skilled diplomatic maneuvers. Was Japan ready? Were the Japanese equipped with a sufficient level of knowledge and ability to face this unpredictable situation? Many years later, Hanihara gave these details:

> *The Japanese of that time totally lacked training in dealing with international affairs. Their knowledge of diplomacy was at an elementary level at best. A real danger existed that the country might commit grave errors in its international dealings. The situation greatly worried Dr. Ariga. As a scholar, he wanted to educate the populace and raise the level of knowledge to meet the urgent need of the country. This was what motivated Dr. Ariga to launch the* Gaiko Jiho.[16]

A sense of mission to educate the Japanese populace in foreign affairs as quickly as possible, while upholding high ideals for the country's future, was a motivator for the journal's publication. The editor also clearly stated that "it will seek no profit in any shape or form, and will have no affiliation with any political party."[17] From the very beginning, the journal positioned itself on high moral ground, championing grand ideals. The actual scale of the enterprise, however, was very small; only three people were involved in its publication. Ariga was editor, Hanihara was publisher, with a clerk to assist with the actual work.

The Gaiko Jiho Co. was located within Waseda University. The publication started with a fund of only ¥2,000 provided by Waseda's accounting department. A little study in Ariga's family home served as its first office. Hanihara went there every other night and helped Ariga by searching through foreign journals and translating articles.[18] The print run of the first edition was only 2,500 copies. To everyone's surprise, however, they quickly sold out. A second run then followed. Later, Hanihara would describe this unexpected outcome in these words:

> *It was true that* Gaiko Jiho *drew some attention because it was the first journal focused on diplomacy in the country. More importantly, perhaps, it provided evidence that the Japanese were already beginning to realize the volatile situation in the Far East. They had been awakened to the need to know more about diplomacy.*[19]

The *Gaiko Jiho* increased its circulation and influence at a remarkable pace. During the 1920s, circulation reached 100,000 copies. By that time, the journal occupied a significant place within Japanese academia and among the intellectual community. "If there were what we would call a diplomatic forum in Japan during the first half of the twentieth century, the *Gaiko Jiho* undoubtedly was at the centre," writes Ito Nobuya, a research specialist for the journal.[20]

During the first fifty years of its publication, starting from its inception and reaching to the end of World War II, the journal remained notable for its impressive roster of contributors. The lineup included not only leading academics but also formidable figures from the fields of politics, the bureaucracy, and business. Academic contributors included such Japanese influential intellectuals of the time as Rooyama Masamichi, Yoshino Sakuzo, Tachi Sakutarou, and Hayashi Kiroku, in addition to its founder Ariga Nagao. Okuma Shigenobu (Prime Minister, 1898, 1914–1916),

Hara Takashi (Prime Minister, 1918–1921), Takahashi Korekiyo (Prime Minister, 1921–1922), Konoe Fumimaro (Prime Minister, 1937–1939, 1940–1941), Yamamoto Jootaro, and Goto Shimpei number among the political leaders who wrote articles.

Contributors from the diplomatic corps included Ishii Kikujiro, Shidehara Kijuuro, and Ashida Hitoshi. The last two would become Prime Ministers in post-war Japan. Just a small sample of notable contributors to the journal stands as proof of its influence in every sector of Japanese society at that time.[21] Even though publication was interrupted for a few years immediately after World War II, the journal was revived and continued until 1998. Its 100 years of history reflects the thoughts and ideals that shaped Japan's diplomacy throughout the twentieth century.

A Popular Young Diplomat in Washington

In the same year as he helped launch the *Gaiko Jiho*, Hanihara passed the Class I diplomatic examination, providing him with entry into Japan's diplomatic corp. The following year, when he started as a young diplomat at the Gaimusho, he had to drop all active participation in the *Gaiko Jiho*. However, his close relationship with the journal would continue throughout his life. Decades later, when he left the Gaimusho and became a commentator and critic of the country's diplomacy, the *Gaiko Jiho* provided him with a major forum for his essays and discussions. His respect and affection for Ariga also remained unchanged throughout his life. Mourning Ariga's death in 1927, Hanihara wrote: ". . . [S]ince my young student days, extending throughout my diplomatic service, I owe much to Professor Ariga. For the privilege of serving the country to the best of my powers, I am most indebted to Dr. Ariga, my great teacher."[22]

Hanihara Masanao was one of the first diplomats to come from Waseda University. The diplomatic corps in the Gaimusho before had consisted exclusively of graduates from elite government universities such as the Tokyo Imperial University. Waseda, a non-governmental, privately established university, would now send its first graduate to the Gaimusho. It was an epoch-making event for the university. In January 1899, as he commenced his diplomatic career, Waseda honored Hanihara with a grand celebration held at the famous Sakura Gawa Roo restaurant in Ueno in Tokyo's ancient district. The invitation to Hanihara was handwritten in beautiful calligraphy by Hatoyama Kazuo, then the President of the Waseda Alumni.[23]

Hatoyama Kazuo[24] was a diplomat in the Gaimusho. He also had taken an active role in the administration of Waseda University. Hatoyama in fact had been appointed as the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in the year when Hanihara passed his diplomatic examination. A celebratory dinner hosted by Hatoyama, therefore, would have provided an enormous degree of encouragement to Hanihara, who was standing at the very threshold of his diplomatic career. From then on, those at Waseda University closely followed his career with pride and anticipation., For his part, Hanihara never forgot his alma mater and maintained close contact with his Waseda friends throughout his life.

The year after Hanihara started his diplomatic career, the world entered the twentieth century. In 1901, he received an appointment to serve at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, DC. This was the beginning of his unique diplomatic service, a career exclusively devoted to Japanese–US relations. In Hanihara's third year in Washington, the Russo-Japanese War broke out. The Japanese Navy, previously little known to the world, defeated the mighty Baltic Fleet of Russia in the battle of the Japan Sea. This success ultimately led to Japan's victory in the war. It was the first time in modern history that an Asian country had defeated a European power. The world was stunned.

US President Theodore Roosevelt initiated and subsequently facilitated a peace conference between Japan and Russia. Held in August 1905 at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in New Hampshire, it would become known as the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Komura Jutaro[25] led the Japanese delegation that included Takahira Kogoro, Sato Aimaro, and Ochiai Kentaro. For Hanihara, it marked the first time he had attended an international conference. As a young twenty-nine-year-old Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, he previously had not been entrusted with any significant role. An enormous painting depicting the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty can be seen still on the wall of the *Meiji Kinenkan* (Meiji Memorial) Hall in Tokyo. A young Hanihara is recognizable, standing at a respectful distance from the principal delegates, watching intently as each delegate signs the treaty.[26]

The press covering the conference besieged Hanihara. He was a young (and therefore assumed to be naïve) delegate who spoke fluent English and seemed by nature to be personable. The conference negotiations were conducted in strict confidence. Any scrap of information leaked might have led to a front-page exclusive. Reporters attempted to seduce Hanihara with "every power of persuasion through an overt display of

good fellowship." He, while remaining friendly, "kept his own counsel like the Scot who treasures a secret not only for the secret's sake, but for the congenial task of keeping it."[27] Eventually, reporters realized that they had to give up on Hanihara.

Venting their frustration, toward the end of conference, the reporters decided to play a practical joke on the young diplomat. Hanihara, having finally freed himself from the press throng, returned to join his delegation at the conference. It was Viscount Komura, Head of the Japanese delegation, who found a piece of paper pinned on the back of the unsuspecting junior diplomat. The note read: "This package is warranted to contain 90 % alcohol." Great merriment ensued among the normally sedate and very sober group of Japanese delegates.[28]

As his stay in Washington, DC, lengthened, Hanihara became a well-known figure in the capital despite his young age. *The New York Times* described the Hanihara of this period this way:

> *. . . [E]veryone from President Roosevelt and President Taft down to the clerks of the Department of State who knew him, called him "Hany." To each and all he was the same congenial, natural person, with a lively sense of humor, but displaying a seriousness of purpose. . . .*[29]

The same article noted that Masanao, Hanihara's first name, means "just and straight" and praised his ability and intimate knowledge of the United States and Americans.

It also related an anecdote, which would become something of a legend in Japanese and US diplomatic circles: ". . . [A]t a public dinner in New York, President Taft lost his escort. Spying Hanihara, he grasped his arm and said: 'Come along, Hany. We are about the same size.'"[30] Hanihara stood a little over five feet, small even among Japanese. The grand entrance of the two side by side, "one physically typify[ing] America and the other Japan" was met with great applause. The episode eloquently speaks to the sense of humor the two men shared, although the incident would be unthinkable in today's security-conscious environment.

The year after the Portsmouth Treaty, Hanihara became Second Secretary at the Washington Embassy. Recommending his promotion, Ambassador Aoki[31] praised his remarkable knowledge of the country, outstanding language skills, and his ease in society: "Hanihara not only knows the country in great depth, but also has many friends at all levels of the society. It is almost beyond belief how Hanihara has forged such close

friendships with so many people."[32] As for his work at the Embassy, the Ambassador wrote:

> *From serious diplomatic tasks, such as the negotiations with the United States Congressmen, down to the day-to-day running of the Embassy, I rely greatly on Hanihara. In other words, being the only one in the Embassy with multifaceted unique skills, Hanihara has been the busiest and most industrious of all the staff.*[33]

Ambassador Aoki seemed to have developed almost a dependency on Hanihara, both for Embassy duties and the type of social interaction that was a necessary part of diplomatic life in Washington. The year after Hanihara's promotion to Second Secretary, a rumor reached the Ambassador that the Gaimusho was considering transferring Hanihara to London. Greatly alarmed, Aoki immediately sent this telegram to the head office in Tokyo: "It is rumored that the transfer of Hanihara to London is quite possible. I hope that no such movement is contemplated, as his services are indispensable here."[34]

A letter in the same year to Foreign Minister Hayashi from Koike, the Consul General of Japan in New York, verified that "a prominent reason that Hanihara cannot leave Washington seems to be that Ambassador Aoki cannot dispense with Hanihara's services."[35] Later that year, when Koike himself was leaving his New York post, he recommended that Hanihara be his successor as the Consul General in New York.[36] Although Hanihara seemed happy with this prospect, it failed to materialize.

Still in Washington, Hanihara was promoted to First Secretary in 1909. In his new role, he represented the Ambassador at many events held throughout the United States. His name started to appear more frequently in society columns of *The New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and others. When the *Times* described his language skills, the paper portrayed him as "speaking without an accent." Hanihara's fluent English, together with his ease when faced with any social gathering, gave him a decided advantage.

In an age when social status was clearly defined and respected, Hanihara demonstrated a natural tendency to treat everyone with an equal degree of friendliness and courtesy. He made friends with people of all social classes, from the President to clerks in the State Department. Arriving at the Embassy every morning, he never failed to call out "Good Morning" to the janitor cleaning the floor. Such an acknowledgment was unusual even

in US society of that time. In the strictly class-denominated Japanese society, it was eye-raising conduct. Hanihara's eccentric attitude could not fail to gain amused attention in diplomatic circles. Hanihara never suppressed his natural inclinations, however, even when he later became Ambassador.

Investigating the Reality of Japanese Immigrants

While Hanihara was in Washington, anti-Japanese movements started to gain ground in a number of the western states. California was at the forefront of this populist tide. Against this background, Hanihara took on the special assignment of investigating the precise situation of Japanese immigrants in the United States.

Japanese immigration, even though very limited, began almost immediately after Japan opened its doors to the world. In 1868, in the year of the Meiji Ishin, some 150 Japanese migrated to Hawaii on board of the *Scioto*. They were bound for American-owned sugar plantations. This was the first recorded history of a group of Japanese immigrants crossing the ocean to reach America. By 1924, approximately 300,000 Japanese had settled in the states of California, Oregon, and Washington, as well as Hawaii.[37]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, as the number of Japanese immigrants increased, anti-Japanese movements arose along the US West Coast. In 1905, the year the Russo-Japanese War ended, San Francisco witnessed the birth of the Asiatic Exclusion League. From this time onward, the anti-Japanese movements became more organized, gaining political power and gradually extending influence, first to local governments and later to federal politics.[38] The following year, the great 1906 San Francisco earthquake struck. Four Japanese scientists from Tokyo Imperial University visited the city to inspect the extent of the destruction. They were subjected to repeated violent assaults in various parts of the city during their stay.[39]

In November of the same year, the San Francisco Board of Education passed a resolution segregating Japanese children, along with Chinese and Korean children, from all others. Although the number of affected children was never more than 100,[40] it greatly angered the Japanese public. In reaction, the Japanese government was forced to take this restriction quite seriously. Ambassador Aoki immediately arranged to see Elihu Root, the Secretary of State at that time. The Ambassador pointed out that, under the treaty of 1894, full protection of the law extended to all Japanese

residents in the United States. A previously localized matter had now developed both national and international implications: "The invocation of treaty rights by the Mikado's representative gives a more serious aspect to the recent anti-Japanese crusade in California and the anti-American outburst in Japan."[41]

Seeing the gravity of the matter, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Root invited the California congressional representatives to meet at the White House for strategic discussions. As a result, the president of the San Francisco Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools were summoned to Washington for further consultations with the President and the Secretary of State.[42] To prevent the situation from deteriorating further, suitable measures needed to be put into place to avoid a rise in Japan of anti-American hostility due to actions on the West Coast. Both the White House and the Japanese Ambassador were in perfect agreement in recognizing the urgency of the matter. Repeated conferences were held at the White House between Roosevelt, Root, and Aoki, with Hanihara in attendance. The so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" was put in place as a result of these discussions.

These anti-Japanese movements mainly targeted unskilled immigrants entering the United States as manual laborers. To mitigate the situation Japan, of its own accord, suggested placing strict limits on the emigration of such laborers. This proposal formed the substance of what was known as the Gentlemen's Agreement. In March 1907, in a related measure, President Roosevelt signed an Immigration Act that called for the end of all Japanese migration coming through Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada.[43]

Once these two measures were in place, no further Japanese unskilled laborers would be able to enter the United States. By this time, however, approximately 60,000 Japanese immigrants were already there, according to Consulate records.[44] Anti-Japanese sentiments in the western states, instead of subsiding after the Gentlemen's Agreement, were further inflamed. The political strength of these agitators could no longer be ignored by federal politicians.

On the other hand, most people in Japan remained ignorant of what was happening to their countrymen in the United States. Some Japanese intellectuals were still encouraging youths to emigrate based on the potential rewards to be gained. They envisioned a grand new world with limitless opportunities. Fukuzawa Yukichi,[45] a leading intellectual with extensive knowledge of the West, was one prominent advocate. Starting in the 1880s, through articles in his own journal, *Jiji Shinpoo*, Fukazawa

encouraged ambitious Japanese youths to cross the Pacific. A number responded to Fukuzawa's call.[46]

In 1887, with Fukuzawa's help, some thirty young Japanese went to California espousing the dream of founding a utopian farming colony.[47] The enterprise did not succeed and most returned to Japan disillusioned and disheartened. Nonetheless, stories of those Japanese who had succeeded filtered back to Japan, stoking the vision of a land of boundless opportunity. Consequently, for very pragmatic reasons, a portion of the general public supported emigration. This strategy appeared to offer a solution to problems of overpopulation, while providing a source of overseas remittance.

Despite the rising hostilities in the United States against Japanese immigrants, no clear response dominated public opinion at this stage in Japan. Concerned, however, about this unstable situation, the Gaimusho instructed thirty-two-year-old Hanihara, then the Second Secretary, to investigate. The intention was to obtain an accurate picture of these immigrants, while clarifying the underlying cause of hostilities. Documented facts would help the Gaimusho to better understand the problem and to estimate the impact the present hostilities might have on Japan–US relations.

Hanihara took the assignment very seriously and immediately set out on a fact-finding mission. For several months, from August to November of 1908, Hanihara visited every conceivable place that played host to a sufficiently large Japanese population. He first traveled throughout the western states of California, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, and Oregon. His journeys also extended into the southern parts of the United States, including areas along the Mexican border, Texas, and the city of New Orleans. Having collected a considerable pile of data, Hanihara compiled a detailed report of his observations.

His painstakingly prepared submission, however, created a great deal of consternation among Japanese officials when it finally reached the Gaimusho's Tokyo office. The report contained graphic depictions of numerous Japanese communities that he had visited. Some of the behaviors typical of these Japanese immigrants were much worse than anyone had imagined. Ministry officials worried over possible consequences should the report be widely released. It would definitely stir up the Japanese public. Even worse, it could end up serving the interests of anti-Japanese activists in the West by making a deteriorating situation more desperate than it already was. These possible results could conceivably have influenced

the minds of the Gaimusho officials when they decided to seal the report. Hanihara's meticulous submission remained secret for many decades.

The "Report on Japanese Immigrants" by Second Secretary Hanihara is now a public document in the Gaimusho archives.[48] Reading it 100 years later, the first impression one gets is that it is very honest. It was written by a young diplomat whose self-imposed mission was to tell the truth. With youthful energy, he had traveled widely to meet with as many people as possible. Hanihara conscientiously crafted his gathered information into a detailed report and understood that it would be used to formulate Japan's immigration policy. Consequently, he felt obliged to assist his senior officials so that they would come to correct decisions based on accurate facts, even if some of the reality was distinctly distasteful.

Remember that Hanihara was already an experienced reporter. As a student, he had been attached to the *Waseda University Journal*. He moved after graduation into a similar position with the *Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo* and had been instrumental in publishing the *Gaikoo Jihoo*. Thus, Hanihara's training and experience almost compelled him to adhere to a journalistic standard of "finding the truth and reporting it as accurately as possible," rather than taking the sort of strategic and cautious approach more often seen in the diplomatic service. The report made little, if any, attempt to veil or suppress painful facts in elegantly ambiguous phrases. He made no use of ingenuous euphemisms. Even today's reader occasionally might feel uneasy when confronted by some of the stark realities described in the report. Given the situation then, it was not entirely unreasonable for the Gaimusho to have this document disappear from public view.

From a present-day vantage point, the report provides a rare and valuable glimpse into how Japanese immigrants actually lived in the United States in the early twentieth century. Many facts contained in it are unknown in Japan even to this day; what is contained in it starkly contradicts commonly held Japanese beliefs concerning the lives of their countrymen in the new world. The report is largely consistent, however, with later research conducted by first- and second-generation Japanese-Americans.

At the beginning of the report, Hanihara wrote that due to the imposed time constraint, he could spend only several hours, or at most overnight, in each community visited, which was insufficient to investigate each in depth. The area he did cover, however, was extensive. In each location, he sought out as many Japanese settlements as possible, from city dwellers to farm workers. The situation of Japanese immigrants in the farming areas gave Hanihara some hope. Those who had managed ownership or

lease of a farm had begun to establish themselves. They were by no means prosperous but had created a stable base from which to plan and build for their future. Compared with those who lived in cities, the ones settled in the agricultural regions had a healthier and securer outlook on life, with brighter prospects.

> *They live close to the land. They seem to have already developed an affinity with the land and take joy in the variety of crops they can grow. . . . They are sincere and hard working. Their family life provides them with peace and respite from toil.*[49]

Hanihara considered these Japanese farmers to be active and interested in local affairs and community development and to enjoy good relationships with other local residents. Hanihara also reported that Japanese immigrants settling in farming communities were on the rise. They were spreading not only throughout California and Colorado but also into Utah and Idaho, into areas that previously had had only a few Japanese immigrants. Such farmers intended to remain in the United States. Hanihara was pleased with what the Japanese were achieving in these areas.[50]

As a proportion of the entire Japanese immigrant population, however, agricultural settlers formed only a tiny minority. In California, they were at most one-fifteenth to one-twelfth of all immigrants; elsewhere they accounted of less than 10 %. The rest of the Japanese immigrants were simply unskilled, itinerant laborers who did not settle in one place, but moved from one job to the next, forever looking for work. They were employed predominantly as laborers, whether in railway construction, mining, seasonal farm work, or domestic service. These immigrants encountered awful living conditions without much hope for the future.

> *The great majority of immigrants are floating laborers. With only a piece of blanket on their backs, they move from one place to another looking for work. . . . In this situation, their behavior tends to be unruly and often unnecessarily creates hostility and antagonism among the local community.*[51]

Yuji Ichioka,[52] a historian as well as a Nisei (i.e., second-generation Japanese-American), is noted for his research into the history of Japanese-Americans. In his award-winning book, *The Issei*, Ichioka portrays the life of those Japanese laborers mentioned in the Hanihara report in detail. The Japanese immigrants already settled in farming communities called those laborers “blanket-carriers.”

> *Twenty to thirty Japanese sleep alongside each other in field sheds at the edge of orchards. These sheds are called camps. There are well-built camps as well as makeshift ones. Most of the latter have no beds. Men sleep on straw spread over dirt floors.*[53]

In his book, Ichioka also referred to the *Shin Sekai* article of 1900 that reported the situation of Japanese farm laborers in Fresno, California:

> *The camps are worse than dog or pig-pens. They are totally unfit for human beings to sleep in. Rain and moisture seep down from the roofs. Winds blow nightly through all four walls. . . . No one, not even dirt-poor peasants, wants to live in such unpleasant and filthy surroundings. These camps are the reason why so many robust workers become ill and die.*[54]

The situations were no better for those working in mining and railroad construction. The conditions in these camps were atrocious. The food supplied by employers was of very poor quality and scarcely adequate. Each worker had to pay the "employment agent" a large portion of his wages. Such circumstances ensured that the Japanese laborers had to endure a rough and harsh life. The only respite was a visit to the "Japan Towns" that had emerged in various areas on the West Coast.

A Japan Town would spring up not only in large cities but also in smaller townships. They were scattered throughout many states, but located close to where Japanese laborers made their temporary living. A Japan Town usually consisted of eating and drinking places, inns, one or two bathhouses, barbershops, laundries, billiard parlors, groceries, and employment agencies. All of these establishments were operated by someone from Japan. Store signs were written in rudimentary Japanese and a few frayed paper lanterns swung in the alleys.

The Japan Town area vaguely resembled a town, but a rather destitute one by any standard. The occupants and visitors rarely had any contact with local citizens; it was a small world all its own, totally isolated from the rest of any surrounding community. Only the employment agencies and laundries needed to maintain some continuing contact with outsiders. The town's patronage was exclusively Japanese, and the majority of them were "floating laborers"—temporary residents dwelling near the town.

For his investigation, Hanihara visited a number of such towns, the first of which was in Denver, Colorado. Here he met Dr. Bennet, who carried the somewhat unusual title of "Asian Health Inspector." Dr. Bennet had lived and studied in Japan on at least two previous occasions and

had a warm affinity for the Japanese. Bennet proved to be an excellent guide. What was revealed to the young diplomat, nevertheless, was simply appalling.

The local Japan Town was situated at the less-affluent fringes of Denver, between China Town and the red light district, where white prostitutes operated. What struck Hanihara, as he followed the lead provided by Dr. Bennet, was the filthy, unhygienic conditions that prevailed.

> *Even if one tries to see it in the most favorable terms, it does not look to be a place fit for any healthy human being to live. . . . When night comes, men in strange, frayed clothes congregate, and wander from billiard parlor to gambling house, all operated by Chinese.*[55]

After the one in Colorado, Hanihara visited many more such towns. The size of the towns varied, but the conditions were all similar. "None appears to be fit for any healthy and civilized population to live in," wrote the very disheartened investigator. On one occasion, being unable to obtain a guide, Hanihara disguised himself in shabby clothing and entered a town at night. In some towns, when night fell, many ordinary shops changed into either gambling dens or brothels. Shop owners kept a vigilant eye out for nighttime police raids conducted randomly throughout each month. As a precaution, they immediately shut their shop doors when they spotted an unfamiliar person. If he was to gain a reliable picture of nighttime activities, it was vital for Hanihara to be cleverly disguised.

Suitably attired, he witnessed sights that he found almost unbearable to watch. Prostitutes and unruly crowds mingled together in filthy narrow alleys, using vulgar, drunken language. The situation was reprehensible, unbelievably worse than what Hanihara had imagined after viewing the same places during the day. The young diplomat was utterly shocked by his fellow countrymen's behavior. "What could have brought them down to this situation? I could only deplore the result, but could offer no answer," wrote a totally distressed Hanihara.

According to Ichioka, Japanese prostitutes first appeared in California during the 1880s. Their number increased in the 1890s, and they soon ventured beyond California. At the turn of the twentieth century, prostitutes were in almost every western state, officially numbering into the hundreds. Ichioka, however, estimates the actual population would have been many times more.[56]

The Inevitable Gentlemen's Agreement

Presented with this unimaginable stark reality, an astonished Gaimusho responded by sealing Hanihara's disturbing report. However, the young Secretary wanted to alert the Gaimusho to the sordid reputation such Japanese had gained in the United States. Honest and hard-working immigrants were the ones who would suffer most from the conduct of the majority.

> [*The conduct of "floating laborers"] will degrade the Japanese as a whole, providing a stronger rationale for anti-Japanese sentiments, and will be ultimately detrimental to the healthy growth of the Japanese immigrants' community within the country.*[57]

In his report, Hanihara pointed out that the core of the problem arose from the intentions of the majority of unskilled Japanese laborers to stay in the United Sates for just a short period. They sought only to amass a suitable level of funds before returning home. These temporary residents were known as *Dekasegi*.[58] Because such immigrants did not plan to stay long, they felt no compulsion to learn the language, did not have any concern for the rules and customs of the land, and made little effort to adapt to a different way of life. They barely mingled with the local US population or with those they worked with, most of whom were immigrants from other parts of the world. Frictions with their employers and quarrels with other immigrant workers occurred constantly. With little contact with the community in which they lived, and without reasonable communication skills, these Japanese quite naturally created misunderstandings and suspicions within the local community.

> *Coming from a totally different culture with dissimilar customs, equipped with no knowledge of the moral codes of the country or of its religion, leading an entirely different manner of life, it is difficult for them to associate with the white population. It is true, on the other hand, that narrow and deep-seated prejudice does exist among the white population. You cannot, however, help but recognize that the conduct of those Dekasegi migrants is a contributing factor [to anti-Japanese feelings].*[59]

Many US employers were convinced that the Japanese were excessively short-tempered, getting angry over trivial matters. They were categorized as disobedient and irresponsible, and that they often refused to honor the

employment contracts they signed. Hanihara grew troubled by the spread of such a negative reputation among potential employers. He attempted to discuss the problem with respected intellectuals who he thought might have some basic knowledge about Japan. Hanihara wanted to discover the underlying elements of the existing situation based on their objective opinions.

Most of those whom Hanihara met claimed to hold views that were sympathetic to the Japanese. Some insisted that "the real cause is their [Japanese immigrants] lack of language skills." They said that the "uneducated laborers had little, if any, understanding of the contracts they signed. In many cases they have been victims of unscrupulous employment agents." Meeting those employers, however, gave Hanihara another shock. He had not anticipated such total ignorance among them about Japan.

Even those intellectuals, seemingly unaffected by common prejudices, had formed their perception of the Japanese from what they saw in the Japan Towns. They openly expressed the opinion that the Japanese way of life was utterly at odds with the rest of America, and that it would be near impossible for them to assimilate into US society. In light of this, they believed that the Japanese had to be excluded from the community, and that the demands being made by the anti-Japanese lobby were not entirely unreasonable. Many of them sincerely warned Hanihara that the appearance of Japan Towns and the general conduct of *Dekasegi* immigrants were further inflaming the common prejudice of Americans. Moreover, in their view, Asians were inherently an inferior race. Surprised by the fact that even the well-educated in the United States held such prejudice, Hanihara wrote in his report:

> *Regardless of whether or not their opinions were correct, our government, as well as Japanese residents in the United States, should pay particular attention to the fact that how Americans view Japanese is worsening.*[60]

Hanihara wrote his report more than 100 years ago; at that time, very few Americans, even the most educated, had seen Japan with their own eyes. Even photos were scarce. Thus, it would have been nearly impossible to become acquainted with the way in which Japanese people really lived. It was, therefore, perhaps natural for those in the United States to see the Japan Towns as representing a mirror image of the real Japan. There was no compelling reason for them not to believe that this was the way in which Japanese lived in their home country.

This reasoning formed the basis for judging the Japanese as a race that could not possibly learn to assimilate into US society. Prejudices often reflect ignorance. This logic applies even today. The prejudice and discrimination experienced by the Japanese in the United States 100 years ago can largely be attributed to yet another tragic consequence of ignorance.

In the course of his investigations, Hanihara also interviewed many Japanese on the West Coast who had lived there for a considerable number of years. Many were extremely concerned about the behavior of *Dekasegi* immigrants. Drawing on the information gathered from those "conscientious Japanese residents," Hanihara concluded:

> *Many long-term Japanese residents frankly admit that the current rise of anti-Japanese sentiment had been caused largely by the conduct of some fellow Japanese, namely the Dekasegi immigrants. They identified the root cause of their irresponsible behaviors as their lack of intention to settle in the country. The honest and conscientious group of Japanese has been trying to remedy the situation. Forced to face the present reality, however, they support the continuation of the emigration ban on unskilled laborers, until such time as their on-going efforts yield an improvement in this situation. For the sake of maintaining good relations between the two countries, they believe that there is no other option.*[61]

Hanihara in his report said: "If good leadership emerges in the Japanese community, and helps educate these laborers, then they will have a better outlook in the future." In fact, eight years later, when he served as Japanese Consul-General in San Francisco, Hanihara would put these conclusions into effect. He spoke frequently to Japanese communities in California and other western states, emphasizing the importance of their participation with US society and the benefits they would draw by assimilating into the community.

For the time being, however, he remained downhearted. In his conclusion, Hanihara wrote that despite great regret, he felt compelled to recommend that the Japanese government continue its present policy. This strategy required the government to strictly observe a ban on any further emigration of unskilled laborers. Such a ban was to remain in effect until further developments might signal some clear signs of improvement. The young diplomat had witnessed a reality that was ugly and stark. The intense sadness and deep disappointment he felt was palpable between the lines.

The Gentlemen's Agreement had come into force a half year earlier. The core of the agreement, as mentioned before, was Japan's voluntary

ban on the emigration of unskilled laborers. By sending Hanihara out to investigate, perhaps the Gaimusho also sought to evaluate the agreement's merits. Ichioka, in his study, divided the history of the Japanese immigrants in the United States into two periods: the first extended from 1885–1907, until the Gentlemen's Agreement came into force; the second lasted from 1908–1924. Ichioka characterizes the first period as dominated by "*Dekasegi* immigrants."[62]

It would be a mistake to characterize the virulent anti-Japanese movements in the western states as representing the views of the rest of the country. Certainly, attitudes varied according to individual experience. On the East Coast, Japanese visitors consisted largely of students, scholars, government officials, and businessmen. Matsumoto Shigeharu, a journalist and leading intellectual who had studied at Yale University in the early 1920s, later wrote that the Japanese were not treated with hostility in the East.[63] Hanihara also reported that even in certain western locations, Japanese were held in high regard by local residents. Ogden in Utah was one such place. Talented Japanese there had been successful in building thriving businesses.

Japanese and other Asian laborers were not the only ones who became the target of hostility, prejudice, and discrimination at that time. Many European immigrants, particularly those from Southern and Eastern Europe, suffered a similar fate. The motivating causes behind this prejudice and discrimination were similar to that affecting Asians. There was, however, one clear difference between immigrants from Europe and those arriving from Asia. Asian immigrants, including all Japanese, were ineligible to become citizens. The US Citizenship Law established in 1790, and then revised in 1870, defined eligibility according to race. Only whites and the descendants of African slaves were eligible for citizenship. Japanese, as well as all other Asians, were disqualified.

Lacking citizenship, the Japanese were barred from voting, so their ability to exercise any political influence was strictly limited. Opportunistic politicians in the western states exploited this situation. They trolled for votes by using the rising anti-Japanese sentiment to their political advantage. Boosted by this contentious political climate, hostility and discrimination directed toward the Japanese intensified in the west. In 1913, California Governor Hiram Johnson signed the Alien Land Law, which prohibited the Japanese from owning land. Political oppression and social harassment gained momentum.

The backlash from this populist agitation started reaching the federal level. The situation came to a head in 1924 when ambitious anti-Japanese politicians managed to insert a "Japanese exclusion" clause into the new immigration act before it came up for a vote in Congress. Hanihara, the newly appointed Ambassador to Washington, battled relentlessly against it and by doing so risked his entire diplomatic career.

Going Home and Getting Married

These especially desperate times, however, lay more than a decade into the future. At this point, Hanihara was still in his position as a young Embassy Secretary. The year after reporting on Japanese immigrants, the thirty-three-year-old Hanihara was promoted to First Secretary. Two years after that, in 1911, the Japanese signed the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the United States. The signing of this treaty was particularly significant for Japan. The Japanese achieved its long-desired revisions to the then existing treaty of 1894, which Japan had long regarded as an unequal treaty. The new treaty largely rectified demands and requirements that had placed Japan in an unfair and disadvantageous position. Most importantly, the new treaty now recognized Japan's right to set its own tariffs.

During the six months prior to the signing of the treaty, the Japanese Embassy in Washington was buzzing with activity. Ambassador Uchida Yasuya, Councilor Matsui Keishiro, and First Secretary Hanihara Masanao were all heavily involved in preparing for the upcoming negotiations. Okabe Nagakage, then a twenty-seven-year-old junior diplomat, recalled how he and Saito Hiroshi, also twenty-seven and later Ambassador to Washington, stayed up many nights deciphering coded telegrams from the Gaimusho.[64]

The signing ceremony was held at the White House on February 21, 1911. It was a simple affair attended by only four people: Ambassador Uchida, accompanied by Hanihara, and Philander Knox, the Secretary of State under President Taft, accompanied by his aide. Despite the simplicity of the occasion, it marked a significant change in Japan's diplomatic history. In the late nineteenth century, when Japan finally emerged from nearly three centuries of isolation, the country immediately came under pressure from foreign powers. A country innocent of modern diplomatic negotiations was compelled to sign unequal treaties with powerful Western nations, including the United States and Great Britain.

With the increased confidence gained from victories in both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, Japan's government attempted to rectify the inequality of trade treaties. The 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation revision was considered the first step toward achieving this objective; it became a milestone in the country's effort to be treated with dignity and as an equal. When Uchida and Hanihara returned from the White House, the entire Embassy staff gathered around them. Champaign corks popped and loud cheers of *Banzai* went up repeatedly in the normally quiet Japanese Embassy.[65] The treaty was to remain in effect for nearly thirty years. In 1939 it was abrogated by the United States without consulting Japan, reflecting the worsening relations between the two countries.

The year before the signing of the 1911 treaty, Hanihara had applied to the Gaimusho for a return to Japan. It had been nearly nine years since the time that he had first arrived in Washington as a young diplomatic novice. He had come to love it there and had made some of his closest friends. However, he was now simply ready to go home. This time the Ambassador understood and supported his application.

> *First Secretary Hanihara has served in Washington since the 34th Year of Meiji (1901). He is already well known in the home office for his consistent hard work and for the invaluable assistance he has given to generations of Ambassadors through his tremendous knowledge of the country. In view of his long and outstanding services here, his request is deemed very reasonable and should be granted.*[66]

Still, the Gaimusho did not grant his request immediately. It was only in 1912, after the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed, that Hanihara was finally allowed to return home. His stay in Washington had extended to eleven years. A diplomatic post in Washington was, at that time and still is today, considered a plum assignment for any diplomat. On the other hand, eleven years in the same Embassy, with two promotions during that time, was most unusual and not in line with standard Gaimusho practice. Furthermore, leaving the United States would turn out to be only temporary for Hanihara. His unique diplomatic career, concentrating singularly on Japanese-American relations had just begun. Half a year later, he was back in the United States.

The Mexican Revolution, beginning in 1910, had overthrown the country's long-lived dictator Porfirio Diaz by 1911. By 1913, however, the struggle had intensified with various revolutionary factions vying for power. Japan's concern for the welfare of approximately 3,000 nationals

living in Mexico led Japan to dispatch the cruiser *Izumo* to Mexican waters. Prior to this, Japanese Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki had conferred with US Ambassador George W. Guthrie about the Mexican situation. The two countries displayed a common accord with regard to Mexican affairs.[67]

The Gaimusho chose Hanihara to travel on board the *Izumo* to assist Adachi Minehiro, the Japanese Minister to Mexico. His mission was two-fold: (1) report on the Mexican situation to the Embassy in Washington and (2) discuss with the US State Department the growing anti-Japanese feeling behind the alien land ownership movement in California.[68] For Hanihara, it also gave a welcome opportunity to meet with old friends in Washington. In Japan, Mexico was an almost unknown quantity at that time. His firsthand knowledge of Mexico was deemed to be valuable. After his return to Tokyo, Hanihara wrote voluminous accounts about Mexico, describing the history of the country as well as the then present situation.[69] He was also invited by Waseda University to lecture on the situation in Mexico.[70]

Two years later, in 1916, Hanihara was appointed to be the next Consul-General in San Francisco. It had been three-and-a-half years since he left his post in Washington. During that time he had been sent to Mexico, and then back to Washington on his return to Japan. In fact, he did not stay home very long. Nonetheless, before he took up his appointment in San Francisco, Hanihara decided to marry.

Iida Mitsuko, his chosen bride, was a daughter of Iida Giichi, an industrialist and a director of Mitsui, one of the leading *Zaibatsu* of Japan. He was known and feared as the invincible power behind the Mitsui Trading Company. Mitsuko's marriage to Hanihara was decided by her father alone, without any consultation with her. All she was told was that she was marrying a government official. "Since I was told that he was with the government, I imagined a quiet and uneventful life ahead," Mitsuko remembered.

Shortly after the wedding, however, she was told by her bridegroom that his next post would be in San Francisco. "I was so stunned that I just sat there and could not get up for a long while." In her old age, Mitsuko would relate this to her granddaughter (this author) with little giggles. "Grandma, you got married and did not know that he was a diplomat?" The author listened to grandmother's recollections totally appalled. Was this the way that a young, upper-class lady was raised in Meiji society? Did all of them remain totally secluded from the real world? If that was the case, there is no mystery behind Mitsuko's astonishment.

Being swept away to San Francisco would not have been psychologically much different than accompanying her husband to the moon! As the notion finally sank in, her first thoughts focused on the high-heeled shoes that she would have to learn to wear. With stern resolution, she began practicing by walking in them around her garden, with a maid supporting her on either side.

The wedding reception was held at the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. Built in 1890, this was the original hotel building, standing adjacent to the famous *Rokumeikan*. In stark contrast to the subsequent modern building, designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, it embodied nineteenth century European elegance. It so happened that when the reception was held, the hotel was in the process of remodeling its garden, so trees sat there waiting to be planted. Someone proposed the original idea of bringing all the trees into the reception hall. The indoor trees at the reception created a serene and elegant atmosphere. This very unusual decorative style instantly became a talking point in polite society.

For Mitsuko, life overseas was something she had never imagined. The two years in San Francisco as a bride, however, seem to have been very happy ones. Half a century later, the Graduate School of the University of California, Berkeley, accepted the author after her graduation from Waseda, Hanihara Masanao's alma mater. Before leaving for California, the author visited Mitsuko, who was already in her eighties and living a peaceful and quiet life at the spacious former Iida estate.

Berkeley is situated across the bay from San Francisco. The sound of "Berkeley" seemed to carry with it a flood of memories for Mitsuko. "Ah, the beautiful San Francisco Bay . . . towards the evening, the mist would drift into the bay . . . [and] passing ships sounded their horns. . . . The sweet sounds of those horns still come back to me." Beautiful sparkles lit her eyes as she spoke, sitting comfortably in her sunny lounge room. She had traveled back in time, seeing the San Francisco Bay spread out below. Her smiling, gentle profile mirrored an inner happiness, allowing the author to share this special warmth.

To: Baron Ishii Kikujiro, Minister of Foreign Affairs
From: Hanihara Masanao, Consul General, San Francisco[71]
This is to request the accompaniment of my wife to my new assignment in San Francisco.

In May of 1916, Hanihara Masanao left Yokohama for San Francisco with his bride at his side. He was thirty-nine years old.

Notes

1. Traditional Japanese archery.
2. The Meiji Restoration in 1868.
3. 板垣退助 (1837–1919).
4. Hoochi Shimbun Sha Tsuushin-bu ed., *Meishi no Shoonenn Jidai – Middle Volume – Hanihara Masanao*, Heibon Sha, Showa 5 (1930).
5. Ibid.
6. The Code of Chivalry that the Samurai class observed.
7. Tanaka, Hozumi, in Waseda Gakuho No. 480, Waseda University, Showa 10 (1935).
8. Waseda Daigaku Hyakunen Shi, Vol. 3, Chap 7, Waseda University, 2008.
9. 外交時報.
10. Hanihara, Masanao, *Gaiko Jihoo no Chichi Ariga Hakase o Omou*, Gaiko Jihoo, No. 539, Gaiko Jihoo Sha, 15 May 1927 Issue.
11. 有賀長雄(1860–1921).
12. Ito, Nobuya, *Gaiko Jiho Soo Mokuji:* February 1898–April 1945, Nihon Tosho Sentaa, 2008.
13. 高田早苗 (1860–1938), President of Waseda University (1923–1931).
14. Ariga Nagao, *Hakkan no Ji*, Gaiko Jihoo No. 1, Gaiko Jiho Sha, 1989.
15. Ibid.
16. Hanihara, Masanao, *Gaiko Jihoo no Chichi Ariga Hakase o Omou*, op. cit.
17. Ariga, Nagao, *Hakkan no Ji*, Gaiko Jihoo, op. cit.
18. Hanihara, Masanao, *Gaiko Jihoo no Chichi Ariga Kakase o Omou*, op. cit.
19. Ibid.
20. Ito, Nobuya, *20 Seiki Zenpan no Nihon Gaiko Rondan to Gaiko Jihoo(1)*, Matsuyama Daigagu Ron Shuu, Vol. 20, No. 1, Matsuyama Daigaku, 2008.
21. Ito, Nobuya, *Gaiko Jiho Soo Mokuji 1898–1945: Shippitsusha Sakuin-Senzen Hen*, op. cit.
22. Hanihara, Masanao, *Gaiko Jihoo no Chichi Ariga Hakase o Omou*, op. cit.
23. Hatoyama Kazuo to Hanihara Masanao, 20 January 1899, Hanihara family papers.
24. 鳩山和夫 (1856–1911), Father of Ichiro Hatoyama (Prime Minister, 1954–1956), and Great- Grand Father of Yukio Hatoyama (Prime Minister, 2009–2010).
25. 小村寿太郎 (1855–1911), Foreign Minister (1901–06, 1908–11).
26. Painting: *Portsmouth Koowa Jooyaku Chooin Hekiga*, Seitoku Kinen Kaigakan, Meiji Jingu, Tokyo.
27. New Japanese Ambassador, *The New York Times*, 21 January, 1923.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.
31. 青木周蔵 (1844–1914), Ambassador to the US (1906–07), Foreign Minister (1889–91, 1898–1900).
32. Aoki to Hayashi Kaoru, Foreign Minister, 13 June, Meiji 39 (1906), Gaimusho Record H192 Hanihara Masanao, The Gaimusho Archives.
33. Ibid.
34. Telegram: Aoki to Gaimusho, 13 April 1907, Gaimusho Record H192 Masanao Hanihara, The Gaimusho Archives.
35. Koike to Hayashi, Foreign Minister, via Ishii, Director of Commerce, No. 211, October 1907, Gaimusho Record H192 Hanihara Masanao, The Gaimusho Archives.
36. Koike to Hayashi, Foreign Minister, via Ishii, Director of Commerce, No. 238, December 1907, Gaimusho Record H192 Hanihara Masanao, The Gaimusho Archives.
37. Niiya, Brian, ed., *Japanese American History*, The Japanese American National Museum, U. S. A., 1993.
38. Hanihara,Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite*, Kokusai Gaiko Zasshi, Vol. 24, No. 9, 1925.
39. Niiya, Brian, ed., *Japanese American History*, 1993, op. cit., p. 37.
40. Ibid. p. 303.
41. Japan's Ambassador Complains to Root: Regards Segregation of School Children as Treaty Violation, *The New York Times*, 26 October 1906.
42. Californians Agree to Treaty with Japan, *The New York Times*, 31 January, 1907.
43. Niiya, Brian, ed., *Japanese American History*, op. cit., p. 145.
44. Hanihara Shokikan, *Nippon Imin Jootai Shisatsu Hookokusho*, 10 November, Meiji 41 (1908), The Gimusho Archives.
    To be called *'Hanihra Report 1908'* henceforth in this chapter.
45. 福沢諭吉 (1835–1901) Author and educator, Founder of Keio Gijuku, predecessor the present Keio Gijuku University.
46. Ichioka, Yuji, *The Issei: The world of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants 1885–1924*, The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1988, New York.
47. Ibid.
    Niiya, Brian, ed. 1993, op. cit.
48. Takahira Kogoroo, Ambassador to the US, to Count Komura, Foreign Minister, *Hanihara Shokikan no Beikoku Kyokuseibu Taiheiyoogan Kakuchi ni Okeru Nippon Imin Genjoo Shisatsu Hookokusho*, 24 November Meiji 41 (1908), The Gaimusho Archives.
49. *Hanihara Report 1908*, op. cit.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.

52. Ichioka, Yuji (1936–2002).
53. Ichioka, Yuji, *The Issei*, op. cit., p. 83.
54. Shin Sekai, Oct. 17, 1900, quoted by Ichioka, Yuji in *The Issei*, op. cit., p. 83.
55. *Hanihara Report 1908.*
56. Ichioka, Yuuji, *The Issei*, op. cit. pp. 28–29.
57. *Hanihara Report 1908.*
58. The terminology literary means 'engage in temporary work away from home.'
59. Hanihara Report 1908.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ichioka, Yuji, *The Issei*, op. cit., p. 3.
63. Matsumoto Shigeharu, Kunihiro Masao, *Shoowa Shi e no Ichi Shoogen*, Tachibana Shuppan, 2001.
64. *Nichibei Tuushoo Jooyaku Teiketsu no Omoide*, Chuugai Shoogyoo Shimpoo, 28 July 1939.
65. *Haiki sareta Nichibei Tsuushoo Kookai Jooyaku*, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 28 July 1939.
66. Uchida, Ambassador to the US, to Juutaroo Komura, Foreign Minister, 11 April Meiji 43 (1910), Gaimusho Record H192 Hanihara Masanao, The Gaimusho Archives.
67. Japan in Accord with US, *The New York Times*, 14 November 1913.
68. Ibid.
69. Hanihara Masanao, *Mekishiko*, Dai Nippon Bunmei Kyookai, Taisho 3 (1914).
70. Waseda Daigaku Hyakunenn Shi, Vol. 5, Chap. 18, Waseda Daigaku, 2008.
71. Hanihara to Ishii, *Tsuma Doohan Negai*, 30 March Taisho 5 (1916), Gaimusho Record H192 Hanihara Masanao, The Gaimusho Archives.

CHAPTER 4

Hanihara at the Peak of His Career: Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the United States

A New Era in Japan-US Diplomacy

In June 1918, Hanihara returned to the Gaimusho's home office in Tokyo. He had served as the Consul-General of Japan in San Francisco for two-and-a-half years. The Prime Minister was Hara Takashi and Uchida Yasuya was Foreign Minister; both were known to be progressive thinkers. Uchida had come from the Gaimusho and had been the Japanese Ambassador in Washington when Hanihara had served as one of the Embassy's young secretaries. Settling in at the Gaimusho in Kasumigaseki, Hanihara went through a series of promotions at lightning speed. Immediately on his return, he was appointed Head of Commerce and Trade, rising to the position of Head of Political Affairs only a few short months later. In 1919, he was the newly appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. At forty-three, Hanihara was remarkably young to be an administrative head of the Gaimusho.

Five months after Hanihara's return, Germany surrendered, marking the end of World War I. Emerging as one of the five major victorious nations, Japan anticipated that it would play a newly earned role on the main stage of international diplomacy. In this new era, the Japanese saw themselves as standing side by side with leading Western nations. The end of World War I had in fact brought a dynamic transformation in diplomacy worldwide. The focus began to shift from more traditional bilateral negotiations to discussions that were multilateral in nature, involving the simultaneous interaction of many countries.

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2_4

The term "World War I" is, of course, an anachronism. Its usage only became accurate after the Second World War that followed. At the time, the conflict was widely known as the "Great War." The war raged the most extensively, though not exclusively, throughout Europe, bringing with it enormous destruction and tragedy on a scale previously unknown in human history. Greatly affected by the miseries just witnessed, concerned nations appeared determined in its aftermath that this Great War would become "the war to end all wars." Preventing future outbreaks by establishing mechanisms to ensure a permanent peace soon became paramount. The Paris Peace Conference, including the creation of a League of Nations, was followed by the Washington Conference to limit armaments. Both the League and the Washington Conference were hopeful attempts that sought to create a new world order capable of maintaining a lasting peace.

As noted earlier, Japan was a newcomer to the world of high-level diplomacy; previously, its experience had been severely limited. Japan now had to construct a role for herself, one that she might play effectively in the increasingly vibrant international diplomacy. More than ever, the country faced a delicate balancing act. Japan somehow had to protect its narrowly defined national interests without abdicating its desire and responsibility to play a more decisive role on the international stage. Japanese leaders and diplomats were confronted with one of the biggest challenges in the nation's history.

It is doubtful that the Japanese leadership as a whole fully comprehended the rapidly changing international environment that they now faced. As pointed out in earlier chapters, Japan still found it difficult to cast off the old and somewhat obsolete notions of diplomacy. Consequently, at the Paris Peace Conference, Japan was largely regarded as a silent partner among the leading nations, a country with views that could safely be disregarded. Japan had learned a bitter lesson in Paris. The experience, however, did help to awaken its leaders to the new international situation.

Determined to emerge from the role of a silent partner to become a more active player in the world, Japan's leaders started stirring. Fortunately for Japan, the Gaimusho at that time already held a number of talented diplomats all of whom had had sufficiently good exposure to Western diplomacy. Their past experience had equipped them with the skills and ability that would allow them to take an active role on the world stage.

With Hara Takashi taking the nation's helm as Prime Minister, Japan's direction was set for international cooperation. The core of this new

approach was based on a significant strengthening of relations, particularly those with the United States and Great Britain. It was therefore no coincidence that Hara, himself a former diplomat and a progressive thinker, nominated Uchida Yasuya, former Ambassador to the United States, to be Foreign Minister; Hanihara Masanao to be Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Shidehara Kijuuroo to serve as Ambassador to the United States. All three belonged to a group that became known as the *Oobei-Ha* of the Gaimusho.[1] The latter two diplomats were still relatively young but both were well-seasoned in their dealings with European nations and the United States. In the Gaimusho, they were widely known to be American specialists.

Perhaps not coincidentally, in April of 1920 *The New York Times* featured an interesting article focusing on the new Japan.[2] The analysis was authored by Theodore Burton, a former US Senator from Ohio. In that article, Burton selected a number of Japan's notable past and present political and intellectual leaders and evaluated each separately; in this way, he evaluated the then current political climate. To conclude Burton drew on his analysis to forecast possible future directions that the Japanese might choose to take. The in-depth article was comprehensive and filled a half page of *The New York Times.*

Burton began his analysis by focusing on Saionji and Ookuma, two elder statesmen who were still very influential at that time. He then moved on to the ruling policymakers and those who would make their mark in the near future. Then current notables included Hara Takashi, the Prime Minister; Makino Nobuaki, a leading diplomat who played a key role at the Paris Peace Conference; and Uchida Yasuya, the Foreign Minister. In terms of up-and-coming figures, Burton singled out two young diplomats, Hanihara and Shidehara, marking them as men to watch in the future. As the article indicated, the rise of the *Oobei-Ha* in Japan did not escape the keen eyes of the small corps of Japan watchers in the United States.

Shidehara Kijuuro was born in 1872 and was senior to Hanihara in the Gaimusho by four years. Both men were well known for their exceptional knowledge of the United States. Hanihara succeeded Shidehara, first as the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and then as the Ambassador to the United States. During the Washington Conference, the two worked together as plenipotentiaries of the Japanese delegation. The conference in Washington, held from November 1921 to February 1922, focused on reducing and thus containing naval power. Historically, it was the first international conference with disarmament as its objective. The meeting

also signaled a clear shift in the world power configuration with the center drifting away from England, moving toward the United States.

The five victorious nations, the United States, England, France, Italy, and Japan, acted as major participants. China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal were also invited to join discussions that centered on the situation in China and the Far East. The negotiations yielded three key agreements:

- The Washington Naval Treaty was considered a cornerstone of naval disarmament because it bound each participating country to observe a set ratio of naval power.
- The Four Power Treaty involving Japan, the United States, Great Britain, and France sought to maintain peace in the Far East by providing a consultative mechanism that would come into force in the event of a crisis.
- The Nine Power Agreement substantiated a US Open Door Policy in China that was meant to respect the territorial integrity of that country.[3]

The conference established a new international order in the Pacific and the Far East, one that would be maintained for more than a decade.

The Japanese delegation initially consisted of three plenipotentiaries: Tokugawa Iesato,[4] Chairman of the House of Lords; Kato Tomosaburo,[5] Minister of the Navy; and Shidehara Kijuuroo, Ambassador to Washington. Kato accepted responsibility for naval affairs, while Shidehara handled most diplomatic issues. Hanihara served as the Secretary General of the delegation. Unfortunately, Shidehara's health unexpectedly deteriorated. He fell ill with a kidney inflammation shortly after the conference opened. His physicians prescribed a regime of absolute bedrest for ten days.[6]

Responding to these circumstances and anticipating very involved and difficult negotiations ahead, the Japanese government elevated Hanihara to the position of fourth plenipotentiary. Consequently, a major portion of all subsequent diplomatic negotiations fell on his shoulders. Specifically, in the meetings of the Pacific and Far Eastern Committee, Hanihara became Japan's chief negotiator. Despite its name, the committee focused exclusively on Chinese issues.

Hanihara embodied a new type of diplomat. He adroitly championed the active role that Japan sought to play within the changing world of international diplomacy and developed a unique style when conducting

negotiations. Unlike most diplomats of that time, Hanihara valued "communication" over stiff and unrelenting protocol. In any discussion, irrespective of the other party's friendliness toward Japan, he remained resolutely open and forthright. Hanihara believed that if you plainly presented your case, a mutually agreeable solution between opposing parties could be achieved.

Hanihara was inevitably affable, maintaining a very relaxed stance in any social exchange. On the other hand, he could never be satisfied with relying solely on carefully crafted, diplomatic responses. He preferred truth whenever possible and sought it. A positive natural disposition, combined with an inherited samurai spirit, motivated Hanihara to pursue his objectives fearlessly, while adhering to his principled beliefs.

China remained one of the most contentious issues throughout the Washington Conference. The façade that had portrayed the country as a "Sleeping Tiger" had by this time fallen away, exposing China's inherent weakness to the rest of the world. China, however, insisted on maintaining its dignity as a great nation. Consequently, dealing effectively with China would require tactful care. Unfortunately, at that time, the standard strategy gave powerful nations the freedom to dominate and dictate terms to weaker ones.

Hanihara, however, was a liberal thinker in the realm of international diplomacy. He maintained that it was essential to understand the extent and range of the problems facing a weaker nation. Only then could astute diplomats effectively represent and devise treaties that would reflect their own country's true interests. He felt that out of such mutual understandings a suitable pragmatic solution could be found. A US journal described Hanihara's style as being fundamentally democratic.[7] Another commentator also singled out the way Hanihara conducted diplomacy during the Washington Conference:

> *[Hanihara was] one of the most active workers in the Japanese group. His excellent work there was diplomacy of the sort which brings advantage to the diplomat's own country without injuring others, co-operation and not competition.*[8]

Japan pushed two major objectives in regard to China. First, she wanted to protect and maintain her own interests in China, ones that they believed had been acquired fairly. She also wanted to mitigate the increasing suspicions against Japan, held by the United States and other Western countries, that had been gaining momentum since the war. The Western

powers grew wary of Japan after its initial victories over China in 1895 and then Russia in 1905. Emerging as one of the victorious Allied nations after the war only caused Western distrust and subsequent vigilance against Japan to further increase. The nations suspected that Japan harbored serious ambitions in China.

Specifically, the concern focused on any additional access to China's unlimited resources that Japan might claim. Such ambitions were deemed a serious threat given Japan's growing military strength. In the United States, suspicions about Japan were amazingly intense, causing the Japanese government grave concern. As a result, her government made sure to counsel its Washington Conference plenipotentiaries about this: "We place particular priority on the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States of America."[9]

Hanihara did not require such instructions. Improving Japan's relations with the United States was already one of his top priorities. He clearly belonged to the *Oobei Ha* in the Gaimusho. Hanihara's remarkable knowledge of the United States and its people was widely recognized within the diplomatic circles of both countries. His life-long personal affinity to America and its people went beyond any official obligations.

Numerous misunderstandings had accumulated between the two nations during the ten years since the Russo-Japanese War. Attending the conference provided Hanihara with the opportunity to address and amend many of them; where possible, he wanted to achieve an effective resolution. By doing so he hoped to create a stronger base from which the two nations could work together on matters of international diplomacy. One member of the US press analyzed Hanihara's appointment as the fourth plenipotentiary to the Washington Conference in this manner:

> *The appointment of Masanao Hanihara, . . . as one of the delegates to the Washington Conference, is interpreted among the Japanese as meaning that Japan, while insistently adhering to what she believes to be her rights, will develop the doctrine that her success and prosperity as a world power is largely contingent upon her continued co-operation with the United States in all spheres of international activity.*[10]

Later in life, Hanihara explained why the improvement of US–Japanese relations was so urgent at that time.[11] Taking a historical overview, he observed that in the fifty years between the 1854 Kanagawa Treaty and the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the two nations enjoyed relatively favorable relations. After the end of that war, however, a rift began to

appear, leading to a rapid dissipation of the mutual trust that hitherto had existed. Hanihara listed a number of possible reasons for this unraveling, including:

- Differences in interpreting the Russo-Japanese conflict
- Clashes at the Paris Peace Conference
- Suspicions generated by Japan's rapid rise in the Far East
- Intensified commercial competition within China
- Opposition to Japan's Chinese and Korean policies, including the US proposal for neutrality of the Manchurian railway
- Distinctly anti-Japanese movements in the western states of America[12]

Every such disagreement succeeded in stirring up further distrust. Nationalism in both countries was nurtured by various incidents. Nonetheless, some Americans and Japanese did try valiantly to patch up the distinct damages and restore basic trust and confidence. Hanihara scrupulously noted that such initiatives came not only from those operating within the government but also from private individuals in both countries. Tangible results emerged from the efforts—for example, the 1908 "Gentlemen's Agreement" on Japanese immigration, the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and various academic exchanges and reciprocal visits by business groups. Unfortunately, all these displays of goodwill failed to stem, let alone reverse, the growing tide of hostility displayed by both countries' citizens. Agitators existed in each country. Some were far from shy in declaring and even promoting the inevitability of war between the two nations.[13]

Hanihara was well aware of this state of affairs as he prepared to attend the Washington Conference. Although the conference was primarily intended to limit naval forces worldwide, Hanihara glimpsed an opportunity to pursue a second and unadvertised agenda. The conference in Washington could be used to defuse the worrisome tide of hostility by employing open and sincere discussions with his US counterparts. Mutual understanding could very well have had the power to resolve even these seemingly intractable differences.[14]

Applying a Unique Style of Diplomacy

Hanihara had by now spent twelve years in the United States, first as a Secretary in the Washington Embassy and later as Consul-General in San Francisco. During these years in the country, he forged a number of

friendships with Americans representing all levels of society. Returning to Washington, he was happy to find that his friendships remained unaltered. While not engaged in official duties as a conference delegate, Hanihara made use of most of his time by reconnecting with them. As many of his friends were persons of influence in the country, he consulted with them extensively and sought their advice.

One old friend that Hanihara eagerly sought out was Elihu Root, an internationally known and respected elder statesman. Originally a lawyer, Root had served as Secretary of State under President Theodore Roosevelt. His personal guidance had steered the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908 to a successful conclusion. As one of the first to recognize the emergence of multilateral diplomacy after World War I, Root fervently advocated cooperation as the basis for international relations. In 1912, his diplomatic contributions earned him a Nobel Peace Prize.

Hanihara respected Root tremendously; he admired this elder statesman as being a model for every good diplomat to emulate. At the time of the Washington Conference, Root was already seventy-seven years of age. However, when entreated by President Harding, he reluctantly joined the US delegation. Outside the official conference activities, Hanihara privately met with Root and sought his advice for dealing with the China issue.

While attending the conference, Hanihara also attempted to mend relations with the US State Department. Whenever possible, he tried to find a way to cooperate and improve lines of communication with its staff.

> *[Hanihara] showed eagerness to co-operate with the State Department in all questions affecting the United States and his own country, while being most scrupulous in his interpretation of his Government's attitude toward purely Far Eastern questions.*[15]

Besides disarmament, the most contentious issue at the Washington Conference was the status of China. This was the one topic for which Hanihara needed to muster all his diplomatic skills. Japan considered that issues connected to China were closely linked with her national interests. Despite intricate and often heated discussions, Hanihara remained conscious of the great national pride that China imparted to such issues. At the same time, however, he recognized the need to exert the utmost care in such negotiations so that Japan's cooperative relations with the United States would not be further impaired.

There is no doubt that his [Hanihara's] ability to interpret America's sentiments and his liberal ideas in international relations were potent factors in bringing about the adjustment of Japan's relations with the United States and China upon the basis of good-will which there is every reason to hope and expect will be maintained.[16]

The desire to improve and strengthen Japan–US relations was doubtless at the foremost in Hanihara's mind at the Washington Conference. He had rightly been concerned about the increasing degradation of this relationship. After the conference, however, the level of anxiety that Hanihara previously had seemed to have abated to some extent. The following year, a US reporter asked Hanihara, now the newly appointed Ambassador to Washington, about his thoughts on the outcome of the conference. He appeared to be in a much more optimistic frame of mind, as he responded:

The Washington Conference brought us two significant benefits. Firstly, negotiations on disarmament resulted in the saving of military expenses in each country. Secondly, Japan reached a better understanding with each nation attending, especially with the United States. It was apparent that, before the conference, suspicions and anxiety, whether they were justified or not, existed between the two countries, marring the relations. After the conference they dissipated as if the storm had been blown over.[17]

Hanihara's diplomacy was characterized by his belief in the importance of communication, both at the official and the private level. He particularly valued friendly exchanges with journalists, the "media" of that day, although diplomats are bound to protect sensitive information. Naturally, they must be extremely careful when screening any information that is given to the media. Unfortunately, some diplomats become overly cautious and some even come to regard the media as a dangerous foe. Any exchanges then tend to be marked by a climate of mutual antagonism. Hanihara, on the contrary, always tried to forge friendly and cordial relations with journalists. His style was considered most unusual in the era when diplomats could simply ignore the press, unlike the environment in which officials have to operate today.

During the Washington Conference, Hanihara acted as the spokesman for the Japanese delegation. In this capacity, he established a routine to meet the press at the end of each day; he briefed the media and answered questions. Freely chatting with reporters, he was always relaxed and pleasant, ready to smile and crack jokes in his fluent English. Hanihara's affable

nature and candid style generally created a favorable impression and allowed him to form comfortable relationships with journalists.

Having thus earned a certain degree of trust from journalists, Hanihara, in his daily briefing, would willingly explain not only the decision that Japan had made but also their motivation, including historical background behind the decision. Given the atmosphere inevitably attached to disarmament talks, where suspicion and distrust dominate, a plain and often cryptic official statement usually generates further skepticism from reporters. In this, Hanihara was at an advantage compared with other diplomats who depended on very formal and highly limited briefings. He was able to clarify each issue, detailing the reasons for positions taken. By doing so, Hanihara's objective was to promote a better understanding of Japan and the stances the Japanese assumed.

The Washington Conference extended over several months with Christmas coming somewhere in the middle of the proceedings. Each delegation attending issued a Christmas greeting to the US people. Kato Tomosaburo sent a message on behalf of the Japanese delegation. In addition to Kato's words, Hanihara decided to issue a special message addressed exclusively to the US press corps. His message began with his personal gratitude to its members for the "courteous, fair and even generous way" in which they had treated his delegation. They had "sought to obtain the news accurately and fully, letting the facts speak for themselves."

Hanihara also noted that "sympathy" was one of the dominant American characteristics that he admired. He recognized that this very characteristic had affected the Japanese profoundly and had tempered any irritation they might have felt when "American views had not been right or the wisest."[18]

"There is just one more idea I want to express," Hanihara continued:

> *But without wishing to criticize, I want to put to you this single question: While you are very generous to less fortunate persons and nations, are you not also unduly critical at times, of those great powers that through self-sacrifice have placed themselves in a position from which to greatly benefit mankind?*[19]

After mentioning the contributions made by "great powers," such as England, France, and Italy, Hanihara spoke, in his characteristic directness, of the most sensitive issue involving his country:

> *I would call your attention to the historic fact that the very object which you so worthily seek, the protection of China, has been served by Japan with the blood of her sons as by no other nation.*[20]

Hanihara hoped he could reach a press generally critical of Japanese policy by explaining the reasons for her interest in China. Note, however, that his remarks were made in the early 1920s. Hanihara, therefore, did not speak in defense of Japan's military aggressions in China, which occurred a decade later. At the time of the Washington Conference, Japan was still earnestly seeking to maintain peace in the Pacific. The nation's progressive leaders, firmly supported by the intellectual community, actively pursued policies that would uphold the peace framework constructed by the conference. This concurrence extended to the Nine-Power Treaty that dealt with outstanding disputes over China.

Japan's military hardliners and her associated conservative nationalists were never happy with these arguments, as history later clearly revealed. Nonetheless, it is crucial to remember that the peace framework stitched together at the conference did manage to prevail in the Far East for a decade. During that time at least, Japan actively supported its terms. Only in 1931, exactly ten years later, did Japan's China policy suddenly veer off course when military strongmen took control of the nation's leadership. The transformation of Japan into an international pariah began at that moment.

Back in the 1920s, however, Hanihara wished to persuade journalists of the validity of Japan's perception of Manchuria. Ever since the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had recognized the potential opportunity available to those who might be interested in developing Manchuria, a sparsely populated and largely barren region. Japan had poured in massive resources. Ultimately, human costs were high. Many Japanese lives were lost in the course of developing the land.

Given this immense sunk investment, Japan was unlikely to simply cede its interests in Manchuria despite Chinese protests.[21] Nor would other imperial nations of the day do otherwise. Throughout the Washington Conference, Hanihara felt compelled to defend Japan's position in Manchuria vigorously. However, ten years later, when Japan's military began a campaign of naked aggression in China, Hanihara became one of the Japanese government's most severe critics. His comments in the early 1930s are discussed in Chap. 7.

The Youngest Ambassador to the United States

In December 1922, only ten months after the Washington Conference, the Japanese government appointed Hanihara Masanao Ambassador to the United States. He succeeded Shidehara Kijuuroo who, due to poor

health, had been forced to return home. At the age of forty-six, Hanihara became Japan's youngest ever Japanese Ambassador to the United States. As mentioned previously, he was a graduate of Waseda University, a private institution that encouraged the spirit of independence.

That background made Hanihara unique among his peers in the Gaimusho, where almost all the posts were held by graduates of elite government universities such as Tokyo Imperial. He was also a commoner during a time when high-ranking diplomatic assignments were usually reserved for titled personages. His predecessor, Shidehara, was a Baron. Neither did Hanihara have any special connections, family ties or otherwise, to the powerful and influential men in government. Given his background, one can conclude that Hanihara's case was indeed a rare example of advancement in the Gaimusho entirely on merit.

The time was right for him. Hanihara was able to advance rapidly because the inter-war period presented him with opportunities that closely matched his skills and objectives. Prime Minister Hara, also known as a "commoner prime minister," believed that Japan's foreign policy could best be advanced by engaging openly with Western nations. Maintaining good relations with the United States necessarily became a priority. Diplomatic circles in both countries recognized Hanihara's knowledge of the United States and his in-depth understanding of her people. His outstanding diplomatic skills were beyond dispute.

Some also site Hanihara's personality as one of the reasons for his speedy advancement. A rarity among the sober countenances of Gaimusho officials, he possessed a notably jovial personality with a tremendous sense of humor. He was also honest and frank, surprisingly so in his profession. Hanihara's simple and straightforward approach gained him the affection and respect of both senior and junior officers in the Gaimusho.[22]

Added to these characteristics was Hanihara's singular career that had focused almost entirely on Japan–US relations. All his major overseas postings had been in the United States. He had, in the process, developed a genuine affinity for the country on the other side of the Pacific and especially for its people. His commitment to forging a good relationship with the United States went beyond his purely diplomatic obligations; it had become a life-long personal commitment. Given this background, Hanihara's appointment as Ambassador to Washington marked the pinnacle of his career and dreams.

Hanihara's diplomatic prowess demonstrated at the Washington Conference seemed to have directly contributed to his ambassadorial

appointment. Years later, Foreign Minister Hirota Kooki wrote this to Hanihara's widow:

> *. . . The 10th year of Taisho (1921) in November, as a plenipotentiary to the Washington Conference, Hanihara worked tirelessly day and night to deal with both overseas representatives and American officials. His contributions to the treaty for disarmament were indeed outstanding. Consequently, in the same year, he was appointed to be the Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the United States.*[23]

The news of Hanihara's appointment, immediately transmitted to the United States by the Associated Press, was received warmly:

> *There will be general satisfaction at the news that Mr. Masanao Hanihara has been appointed Ambassador at Washington. In his long service in the Washington Embassy as Secretary and Counselor, Mr. Hanihara made himself well known and well liked.*[24]

Hanihara was noted as being "the youngest Ambassador ever accredited from Japan to the United States."[25] A Japanese-American described him as being unpretentious with natural compassion, a unique quality among diplomatic officials. Fondly remembering Hanihara as Consul-General in San Francisco several years before, San Francisco Mayor James Rolf sent him a telegram:

> *Highly pleased to learn your appointment as Ambassador to the United States. Heartiest Congratulations. I am sure that no representative of your Government is more pleasing to the people of this city than you.*[26]

In the New Year, on January 26, 1923, Hanihara left Yokohama with his wife Mitsuko. They were accompanied by four personal retainers including one woman, likely a handmaid for Mitsuko. Prior to Hanihara's departure, the Japanese-American Relations Committee celebrated his appointment. It was held at the Tokyo Bankers Club and was attended by dignitaries representing both government and industry, including Nagai Matsuzo, Matsudaira Tsuneo, and Hirota Kooki, among others. Shibusawa Eiichi,[27] Japan's leading industrialist and Chairman of the committee, gave the occasion's speech.[28] Shibusawa had collaborated with Hanihara and would continue to do so in order to strengthen US–Japan relations. His support of Hanihara never faltered even during the difficult year of 1924.

Newly appointed Ambassador Hanihara's departure for the United States coincided with that of Charles Warren who was returning home after completing his term as US Ambassador to Tokyo. The *Shunyoo Maru*, which carried Hanihara and his party, and the *President Cleveland* carrying Charles Warren, his wife, and their son entered Honolulu Harbor on the same day, February 5, 1923. The Washington Conference had only recently concluded. The resulting agreements were intended to create a new framework to guarantee peace throughout the Pacific region.

Reflecting the mood, Japan's new Ambassador and the retiring US Ambassador appeared at a joint press conference. Each expressed an optimistic view of the future to the assembled journalists. Mr. Warren emphasized his belief that "any potential danger in relations between Japan and the United States has disappeared." In his opinion, the prevailing mood ensured that "harmony rules among the nations bordering the Pacific."[29] Mr. Warren expressed his happiness that "Japan is carrying out the terms of the Washington disarmament treaty as well as any other nation. . . . I am certain that Japan intends to live up to the provisions of the pact."[30]

The two Ambassadors and their families were enthusiastically welcomed by the people of Honolulu. While the two ships lay anchored, both families attended an array of welcoming events prepared by local residents. A friendship arose between the two families during this enjoyable Hawaiian interlude. Theirs was an era of elegant and leisurely diplomacy, a far cry from the rushed procedures of today that require diplomats to shuttle back and forth across the Pacific in a fraction of time that it used to take.

After a brief stopover in San Francisco, the new Ambassador finally arrived in Washington. The midwinter weather was severe, but Hanihara's reception was warm. He was no stranger to Washington, nor had he been forgotten in the capital city.

> *When in Washington, as Secretary, Hanihara was a great favorite in society on account of his wit. . . . Then he was universally known by the nickname of "Haney."*[31] *. . . [I]t is a pleasure to Americans who knew him of old that the promotion brings him back to Washington.*[32]

Hanihara was also happy. Addressing the US people via a radio speech given almost immediately after his Washington arrival, he concluded: "In returning to America, I feel almost as if I were coming home to a land filled with my friends."[33]

This was the first time that a foreign Ambassador had spoken on radio to the general public. Radio at that time was still quite a new technology. "A new Ambassador invoked the radio to extend his greetings to the people of the country," noted the press.[34] The *Independent Magazine* and the Japan Society together had arranged for the ambassador's message to be broadcast throughout a large part of the country via the Westinghouse transmission station.

> *It is a great pleasure for me, arriving today in Washington . . . to have this early opportunity to greet so many Americans by means of this most modern of all methods of communication, the radio telephone.*[35]

Hanihara sounded truly pleased by the event. He particularly valued the power of communication as an effective diplomatic tool. Consequently, he must have been impressed with the potential of radio that would place him in direct contact with such a large number and wide variety of people.

Early in March, with Japan celebrating *Hinamatsuri* and Washington beginning to see the thawing of a severe winter, Hanihara visited the White House. He brought with him twelve members of the Japanese Embassy. He arrived to present President Harding with his credentials as the Ambassador Plenipotentiary from Japan. Harding received him warmly:

> *. . . [B]ecause of my understanding of your previous service at Washington in the cultivation of cordial relations between the two countries based upon those high principles of right and justice by which each desires to be governed, I can readily foretell that you will do much in advancing the interests common to both the Government of Japan and that of the United States.*[36]

Promising that, "you may rely upon my hearty co-operation," the President accepted Hanihara's credentials. However, such promises were never to be tested. President Harding died suddenly in August of that same year. Calvin Coolidge, the Vice President, succeeded to the presidency. Thus, throughout his term in Washington as Ambassador, Hanihara dealt exclusively with President Coolidge

Hanihara was now comfortably installed in the Japanese Embassy. It was a homecoming for him, but this time he served in a noticeably more exalted position. The promotion, however, did nothing to change his basic congeniality and approachable nature. In fact, Hanihara's personality effected a change in this Japanese institution up till then known for

its severe formality and austerity. Hanihara brought in a fresh breeze of openness. One US journalist detailed this change to the Japanese press:

> *When I need to find out something of Japan, regardless of its importance, the Ambassador always responds. You would experience no difficult formalities. The person at the end of the telephone is the Ambassador himself. We [in America] constantly talk of an "open diplomacy." Hanihara does not even mention the word. He just does it every day.*[37]

The same journalist wrote that "Hanihara's style reminded him of (Theodore) Roosevelt, a good listener and very inquisitive at the same time. . . . . Hanihara also possesses the ability to instantaneously see through the intention of the other." The reporter went on to emphasize the fact that no other foreign representative attracted so many "real friends" as Hanihara did while in Washington. These people were not simply official friends of the Ambassador but rather intimates of Masanao Hanihara himself.[38] These American friends would become a source of great personal support the following year when he faced the greatest challenge of his diplomatic life, the now infamous Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Law of 1924.

The Great Kanto Earthquake: Organizing US Aid

Hanihara's term as the Ambassador started smoothly. The Four-Power Treaty, an outcome of the Washington Conference, effectively replaced the Anglo-Japan Alliance, which had become increasingly ineffectual. The treaty similarly replaced the Ishii-Lansing Agreement of 1917. A new order across the Pacific was then firmly in place.

In Japan, February 1923 saw the completion of the Marunouchi Building. This imposing structure, known by its nickname "Maru Biru," stood proudly facing Tokyo Station. It soon became a symbol of the rapid development of modern Japan. Similarly, in July of the same year, the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo reopened,[39] distinguished by Frank Lloyd Wright's ultramodern design. The first commercial airline, Japan Airlines, was established that same month. Its first regular flight was between Oosaka and Beppu in Kyuushuu. The future of a newly modernized and industrial Japan looked bright. Then, without warning, on September 1, the Great Kanto Earthquake hit Tokyo.

Hanihara was in New York on business when he first heard news of the earthquake. That report, however, did not come from the Gaimusho

but was relayed by a reporter from the Associated Press. Hanihara was informed that a very large earthquake had occurred and was asked whether he had further information. Astounded, Hanihara immediately put through a long-distance call to the Embassy in Washington from the Plaza Hotel in Manhattan. The Embassy, however, had not received any direct information from Japan. On the other hand, it had been inundated by calls from all over the United States enquiring about the earthquake.

Speaking on the phone to Hanihara, the Embassy staff seemed to be in a state of confusion and at a loss in dealing with the situation. Hanihara immediately cut short his business in New York and took an afternoon train back to Washington. He spoke to reporters a few minutes before his train left Pennsylvania Station, saying: "So far as I have information, this is the most terrible earthquake in the history of Japan. The loss of life must have been appalling."[40] The following is a summary of Hanihara's own account of what happened next.

Arriving in Washington, he headed directly for the State Department. Even though it was Sunday, he found all senior members were already there working. An intense effort was underway to gather as much information as possible about the earthquake in Tokyo. Back at the Embassy, however, Hanihara found no communication from the Gaimusho, or any other official Japanese source. Staff members were trying to contact Tokyo using every means possible including wireless and ocean cables. Anticipating the possibility that Pacific Ocean cables had been affected, they also tried the trans-Atlantic and European cable routes. No response came. While this desperate effort was going on, more and more visitors were arriving at the Embassy to register their sympathy and express their deepest concern. Two days passed with only silence from Japan, creating a totally unsettling situation.[41]

On the morning of the third day, the Embassy still did not have any official communication from Tokyo. On the other hand, astounding reports were rapidly reaching the US government and news media.[42] Hanihara and the members of the Embassy were operating at a loss. They did not know what to make of the situation. In the afternoon, Hanihara received a message from President Coolidge requesting that he come and see him. He immediately went to the White House.

On receiving the Ambassador, Coolidge gave Hanihara the following assurance:

> *According to the State Department, you still have no official information from Japan. Absence of communications can only mean a disaster on a catastrophic*

scale. Reports often become exaggerated in such circumstances. In this instance, however, I feel that things are out of the ordinary. I consider that the situation will require a large-scale aid operation with utmost urgency. The United States is prepared to give as much as possible towards the most effective disaster relief possible.[43]

The President then told Hanihara that he had already initiated as much in the way of relief operations possible within the fundamental constraints on his authority. He then outlined his plan for further action to the Ambassador:

I have sent an order to the US Fleet in Asia and our troops in the Philippines to set out immediately for Japan to conduct rescue operations. I do not think, however, this will be sufficient. On the other hand, as you are aware, the Administration does not have any fund that can be used without the approval of Congress. There is, however, no time to wait for the opening of Congress. Time is the vital factor now. The only way is to appeal to the American public. It has to be a large public campaign. I am, however, quite confident. The Americans at heart extend a warm friendship towards Japan. If I personally appeal to them, they will immediately respond. To do this, however, I have to have your consent.[44]

The President went on to explain the necessity of gaining the Ambassador's consent:

The United States has always taken an active role in assisting any foreign country hit by a natural disaster. However, we have had bitter experiences in the past as our efforts had been at times misunderstood, resulting in unexpected suspicions in the host country. I do not foresee that this will happen in the case of Japan. I do, however, need your opinion on this.[45]

Hanihara expressed his deepest gratitude to the President and said, "The Japanese, without doubt, will accept the American people's sympathy and goodwill in this disaster with as much goodwill as that of your people and with utmost kindness."[46] "You have put my mind at ease," said the President. Coolidge immediately went into action. He already had his message to the nation prepared. The President's message was dispatched to the entire nation at three o'clock the same afternoon; it began:

. . . While no official details of the disaster in Japan have been received, the President and his cabinet advisers entertain no doubt that the world is confronted

with one of the greatest calamities in its history. . . . [I]t will call for herculean relief efforts from this country and the outside world, as well as the Japanese government.[47]

In the message, the President expressed his deepest personal sympathy to the Japanese people, appealed to the goodwill of all Americans, and expressed his confidence that the American people would spare no effort to help the victims. To speed aid along, the President proposed that all resources and cash donations be sent through the American Red Cross, which was well equipped with all the necessary facilities to handle a disaster situation such as this.

The effect of the presidential message was immediate. Anticipating the announcement, the Red Cross had held an emergency executive meeting that very day to consider relief measures for the victims of Japan's earthquake. Their first task was to send a telegram to Red Cross Chapters in the Philippines and China—those closest geographically to Japan. The executive committee requested all available information on the extent of the disaster, instructed an immediate dispatch to Japan of nurses and emergency personnel, and informed them that US destroyers were available to transport them along with the necessary supplies to the stricken areas. On the same afternoon, Red Cross Chapters on the West Coast reported that they were ready to dispatch nurses and trained emergency personnel to Japan on the first available ship.[48]

The Red Cross machinery across the nation went into action within an hour of the executive meeting.[49] As a result of a complete absence of any communication with the Japanese government, the Red Cross faced difficulties in determining exactly what the most urgent supplies were. After a conference between President Coolidge and James L. Fieser, Acting Chairman of the American Red Cross, it was announced that the Red Cross would ask the public for cash donations totaling $5,000,000 by the end of the first week.[50] Every chapter across the country received this request during that initial night's activity.

As the President anticipated, the voluntary response to the Japanese disaster was remarkable. Americans donated immediately and with great generosity. Within a few days of the presidential message, the Red Cross $5,000,000 target had been met. After a week, the total amount had reached nearly $10,000,000. Within two weeks, Americans had contributed the staggering amount of $14,000,000. At this time, such a sum in Japanese currency was nearly ¥3,300,000,000. To draw a simple

comparison, the cost of constructing Frank Lloyd Wright's new Imperial Hotel had come to approximately ¥9,000,000. Widespread rumors at that time claimed that the massive budget overrun for the hotel had caused Hayashi Aisaku, then General Manager, to resign. This amount was trivial when compared to the enormous sum collected by the American Red Cross.

The day after the presidential message, the US Salvation Army also went into action. Heads of all Departments of the Army were summoned for an emergency conference during which they decided to raise $5,000,000 for Japanese relief. As a first step, $5,000 from its general relief fund was cabled to San Francisco to be allocated for immediate relief in the form of food and clothing.[51]

The Red Cross Emergency Executive Committee met frequently. Invited by the committee, Hanihara attended every meeting. He was astounded by the speed and efficiency with which the relief strategy was formulated and then plans put into action. Red Cross board members are usually nominated from the more notable members of the community. They held significant national posts with little time to spare. Yet in this case, each member faithfully attended the multiple meetings with remarkable punctuality. Hanihara was really impressed by their genuine and extremely serious attitude when undertaking the Japanese relief effort.

> *. . . [F]or example, Mr. Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce, despite his extremely demanding schedule, appeared at every committee meeting punctually, not even a minute late. He conducted the proceedings with utmost expediency.*[52]

Six years later, in 1929, Herbert Hoover would be elected the next President of the United States. He was immediately to face the Great Depression and its widespread misery in his own country. At the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake, he had served as Secretary of Commerce in the Coolidge cabinet. The plans for Japan's disaster relief campaign were worked out and all ultimate decisions were decided in meetings attended by Hoover, James L. Fieser of the Red Cross, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Wordsworth, and Ambassador Hanihara.[53]

The Red Cross's nationwide appeal had commenced precisely on the evening of the presidential message. Speaking to the media, a Red Cross official recalled that the Japanese Red Cross had sent $100,000 in relief funds immediately after the San Francisco earthquake of 1907. He stated that as a result, "[i]n performing this work, the American Red Cross feels that it reflected a debt of gratitude."[54]

Response to the presidential announcement and the Red Cross appeal came from all levels of the American community, from large corporations to individual citizens. Remarkable achievements were made by city-by-city initiatives. As one of its strategies, the Red Cross assigned a quota to each major city. For example, the quota attached to the City of New York was a $1,000,000, one fifth of the national target. Dwight W. Morrow of J. P. Morgan chaired the New York City Committee, of which members were representatives of US financial institutions and business leaders of the day: Chairman of the Board of General Electric Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Bankers Trust Seward Prosser, and Chairman of the New York Trust Mortimer N. Buckner, just to name a few.

At the outset, the New York Committee announced that a check for $200,000 had already been received from John D. Rockfeller and the Rockfeller Memorial Funds. Dwight Morrow declared that "the City and the County of New York will do much more than the Red Cross had asked for."[55] He also acknowledged Japan's contribution to the San Francisco Earthquake relief seventeen years before. The fact that Japan had contributed more than 50 % of overseas aid for the disaster in that instance was recognized explicitly. Committee members emphasized that "New York should not stop at the $1,000,000 goal."[56]

The New York Committee met every day, and donations poured in quickly. The Silk Association, which had close connections with Japan, set its own target of $500,000 to be raised among the silk dealers of New York. By noon the same day, contributions of $120,000 were already pledged, with more to come. Among the New York donors were some of the nation's leading financial and commercial establishments: The New York Stock Exchange, The Merchants Association, Westinghouse, Brown Brothers, The American Steamship Owners Association, and hundreds of other contributors.[57]

Other US cities were not far behind New York. The Mayor of Chicago held an emergency conference in his own office. Afterward, he proudly announced that, during the first five minutes of the meeting, $100,000 had been collected. The Red Cross quota for Chicago had been $175,000; Chicago declared that the city would raise twice that amount. Detroit collected $300,000. Mayors of all major cities competed against one another, trying to raise larger and larger amounts. Boston called for a citizens' meeting. During the first three minutes, the Boston quota of $225,000 was fulfilled by those attending. Greatly encouraged, Boston informed Red Cross Headquarters that the city would raise double the amount required.[58]

Donations came flooding in from many individuals in the United States. The list of donors included Elihu Root, a recent Nobel Peace Prize recipient. Many people went to the Japanese Embassy to personally express sympathy. Hanihara wrote to James L. Fieser that every direct donation received by the Embassy would be forwarded to the Red Cross because this would be the most expedient course given the emergency circumstances.

One week after the earthquake, on September 7, Hoover reported that "the relief machinery was working at top speed."[59] The Army transports *Meiggs* and *Merritt*, each carrying a full load of relief supplies, were about to leave Manila for Yokohama. The destroyers *Edwards* and *Whippie* had already left Port Arthur in China, heading directly for Yokohama. On the US mainland, relief supplies and medicines were quickly assembled at Pacific Coast ports. Relief supplies totaling more than 300 tons were being loaded on to the passenger liner *Taft* in San Francisco. In Seattle, medical supplies valued at some $30,000, in addition to food and hospital equipment, were being loaded on the liner *Tundarius.*

The first message from Woods, the US Ambassador in Tokyo, finally reached Washington on September 12, after some ten days' delay due to the communications breakdown. Woods reported that a fleet of five US destroyers had already arrived at Yokohama from Dairen, China. Admiral Anderson, in command of all fleets in the Far East, was expected to arrive on the flagship *Huron* the following day.[60]

The scheduled American Red Cross national convention began its sessions in New York on September 25, less than a month after the Great Kanto Earthquake; President Coolidge opened the convention. Ambassador Hanihara also had been invited to speak. The audience welcomed him with exceptional warmth and cordiality. At the beginning of his speech, Hanihara recalled that, barely two years before, the Washington Conference had been held at the Continental Hall, exactly the same venue where he now stood:

> *And now I find myself here again in different circumstances. It is absolutely impossible for me to express to you, so that you will fully understand, the depth of my feeling in facing you, the active representatives of the Red Cross. For events have transpired that may well prove to be more far-reaching in their importance than even the Washington treaties.*[61]

Hanihara described what Americans had done for the Japanese as "such unmistakable evidence of the great hearted and open-handed sympathy of

America." He spoke with deep emotion, noting: "In the very moment of our sorest need, you did not fail us."

Two years later, in his article that appeared in *International Law and Diplomacy,*[62] Hanihara described in detail the miraculous campaign that Americans had mounted to help relieve the sufferings caused by the Great Kanto Earthquake. He wrote this after the events of 1924, when a new immigration law had passed in the US Congress. This measure included a clause that pointedly barred Japanese from immigrating to the United States. Hanihara's enormous efforts to have this particularly noxious measure removed from the proposed legislation had failed. As a result of his perceived failure, Hanihara had no alternative but to leave his post and return home.

Despite these events, Hanihara's conviction remained unchanged. He continued to believe that maintaining good relations with the United States was of the utmost importance to Japan, then an emerging player on the stage of world diplomacy. He was naturally extremely concerned when anti-American sentiments rapidly spread throughout Japan subsequent to the passage of the Immigration Law of 1924. In his article he attempted to relay to the Japanese public the fact that "not all Americans were hostile to the Japanese." Hanihara recognized the necessity of calming the general population so that they could be gently led to forming a more rational judgment.

> *In the face of the great disaster (of the Kanto Earthquake), the finest nature of Americans, genuine sympathy, spontaneously poured out. Many stories of their acts at the time would bring tears to your eyes. . . . I had always felt that the majority of the Americans did not hold ill feelings towards Japan. Witnessing their actions at that time, I renewed my conviction. I was very happy and grateful that I could witness the evidence at first hand. . . . [Y]es, in a natural disaster befalling any country, Americans are known to extend their sympathy. If, however, the Americans had not always held warm friendship towards the Japanese, their sympathy, I believe, would not have been demonstrated in such an enormous scale and with that incredible level of commitment.*[63]

On a more personal level, the total breakdown of communications following the earthquake meant that Hanihara himself had no way of knowing what was happening to his family. His mother, Mon, lived at the Hanihara estates in Yamanashi outside of the earthquake zone. His siblings and their families also were all outside of the danger zone. His most urgent concerns, therefore, centered on the members of his wife

Mitsuko's family, the Iida. News finally arrived on September 9, more than a week after the earthquake. The Mitsui Trading Company's communication system was one of the first to recover. In the company's first message, the safety of the entire Mitsui Board and their families, including the Iida, was verified. The US media warmly reported the news as though they too were sharing Hanihara's relief.[64]

Mitsuko's Recollection

Hanihara's concern for his family, however, did not end then. Even before the earthquake, Hanihara had been notified of his father-in-law's illness. Iida Giichi's health deteriorated in the New Year. This prompted Hanihara to send his wife home.

Mitsuko's stay in Washington, therefore, had lasted less than a year. Her life there, however, did leave Mitsuko with unforgettable memories, memories that vividly remained with her throughout the rest of her life. "When you were invited to dinner at the White House, you had to wear *Robe Decollete*," she would tell this author, her granddaughter, in her later years. "*Robe Decollete* is normally white, but I decided to have mine made in yellow, because my skin is yellow. How ugly I looked in that!" She chuckled as if she was speaking of someone else.

Mitsuko, as the author remembers her, was a quietly elegant lady of very traditional Japanese appearance. Her white hair was always neatly bundled low. She wore a black *Haori* over a conservatively colored kimono composed of different hues of grey. The author was totally astounded, therefore, when she came across a photo of Mitsuko, many years later, in an old US newspaper. Sporting a big hat fashionably askew and clad in a voluminous mink coat, Mitsuko, wife of the Japanese Ambassador, looked absolutely modern and stylish.

The time when Mitsuko lived in Washington was immediately after the Washington Conference. Most diplomats believed that a new and viable framework for peace had been established. Spirits were high, which encouraged cooperation and friendship between the United States and Japan. High-ranking officers from the Imperial Army and Navy frequently visited Washington and stayed at the Embassy. "The Army men did not know manners at all. They did not even offer me their arms when going to the dinner table," Mitsuko would tell the author.

Those she scorned were no other than the most powerful generals of the pre-war Imperial Army of Japan, trained in the most severe fashion of

masculine dignity. It is utterly impossible even to imagine that they would offer their arms to a lady in *Robe Decollete*, even if the occasion was a formal dinner at the White House. Looking at her grandmother pouting her lips and still complaining about the officers even after half a century, it was the author who could not help chuckling this time. "On the other hand," Mitsuko admitted, "the men of our Navy were magnificent, their manners were perfect, and they looked so smart." It is quite understandable that the Ambassador's wife took pride in the smartly uniformed naval officers from her own country.

One day, she happened to walk into one of the rooms in the Embassy and found a young Navy officer. He was busily mending the button of his uniform. "Oh, I will do that for you," Mitsuko said to him, extending her hand to take the uniform. Surprised, he got up, stood at attention, and spoke, "I could not think of troubling you, Madam." He refused to hand her the uniform. Japanese naval training at that time is said to have included the mending of one's own uniform, since sailors spent most of their time on their ships. That officer would not have been an exception.

"The officer was Mr. Yamamoto Isoroku,"[65] Mitsuko said in a pretended casualness. Astonished, this author looked up at her grandmother, whose eyes were full of merriment as if saying, "Now I surprised you, didn't I!." Yamamoto Isoroku completed his study at Harvard in 1920, three years before this encounter. Later, he would be appointed as the Military Attaché to the Washington Embassy in 1925, a year after Ambassador Hanihara had left. This meeting with Mitsuko, therefore, must have taken place when Yamamoto was on an extended overseas tour between 1923 and 1924. He would have been a thirty-eight-year-old naval officer.

Being an Ambassador's wife, Mitsuko was frequently invited to teas and lunches hosted by society ladies. After such an occasion, it was customary to send a thank you note to the hostess. Not confident in her English, Mitsuko often asked her husband to write one instead. "I have not polished my English for such purposes," Hanihara would say but obliged every time. "I bothered such an important person even for writing a thank you card," Mitsuko's eyes were suddenly downcast. Something like a shadow of regret passed across her face, interrupting her happy reminiscence.

Mitsuko was born a daughter of Iida Giichi, a prominent and powerful figure of the Mitsui Zaibatsu. Gently brought up in the exclusive society of Japan, Mitsuko remained cocooned within her environment. Throughout her youth and married life she was mostly ignorant of world events. World War II came after she was already a widow. The Hanihara

mansion in Azabu Sakurada Choo in Tokyo, where Mitsuko lived, was burned down in an air-raid. She had to struggle through the post-war sufferings by herself.

For the first time in her life, she was motivated to gain knowledge. She read and read, going through books and archives. It was only then that she began to understand the public side of her husband, the heavy responsibilities he had carried for the country and the role he had played in Japan's diplomacy. "Why didn't I know that? I should have known that." That must have been a regret she endured. In her later years, Mitsuko trained herself to write in braille and worked as a volunteer, transcribing books into braille. Her simple desire was to help blind people read books. She completed the transcription of the entire *Les Thibault,* by the French author Roger Martin du Gard, consisting of eight parts in eleven volumes. That became the pride and joy of her later life.

Back in 1924 as the New Year began, having been informed of the deterioration of Iida Giichi's condition, Hanihara sent Mitsuko home to be with her father. Unfortunately, there was not enough time. On her journey home, while stopping in San Francisco, Mitsuko received news of her father's death. The *Tenshin Maru*, with Mitsuko on board, arrived at Yokohama on March 3, 1924. She disembarked, sadly clad in her black mourning kimono. Her arrival marked the date, almost exactly to the year, when Hanihara had presented his credentials to President Harding.

Now on his own in Washington, Hanihara's most difficult year in his diplomatic life was about to begin.

Notes

1. A faction in the Gaimusho known for their pro-European, pro-American profile.
2. Burton, Theodore E., Notable Leaders in Japan and China: The Truth About the Far East, *The New York Times,* 11 April 1920.
3. The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922, Milestones: 1921–1936, Office of the Historian, the United States Department of State.
4. 徳川家達 (1863–1940).
5. 加藤友三郎 (1861–1923).
6. Hanihara is Named Japanese Delegate, *The New York Times,* 24 November 1921.
7. E.L. Conn for The Outlook, *Hanihara Taishi Kaiken Ki,* 2 May 1923, in Gaikoku no Shimbun to Zasshi ni Miru Kaigai Ronchoo, Vol. 1, Nippon 1, No. 59, Kashiwa Shobo, 1997.

8. Ambassador Hanihara, *The New York Times,* 16 December 1922; Ambassador Hanihara, *The Washington Post*, 17 December 1922.
9. Gaimusho ed. *Nippon Gaiko Bunsho, Washinton Kaigi,* Vol. 1, p. 188.
10. Hint of Japan's Policy: Hanihara Appointment is Taken to Mean Co-operation With Us, *The New York Times*, 25 November 1921.
11. Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* Kokusaihoo Gaikoo Zasshi, Vol. 24, No. 9, 1925.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Confirm Hanihara Choice, *The New York Times*, 17 December, 1922.
16. New Japanese Ambassador, *The New York Times*, 21 January, 1923.
17. E.L. Conn, *Hanihara Taishi Kaiken Ki,* op. cit.
18. Arms Delegates Greet Americans: Hanihara Greets the Press, *The New York Times,* 25 December 1921.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Whether expansion into Manchuria was economically advantageous to Japan is an open question. Certainly, a few select Japanese individuals benefited greatly but in other respects Manchuria represented a drag on Japanese finances.
22. Insei to Yoosei, Matsui Gaishoo to Hanihara Taishi, *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 29 May 1924.
23. Hirota Kooki to Hanihara Mitsuko, 21 December Showa 9 (1934), Gaimusho Record H192 Hanihara Masanao, The Gaimusho Archives.
24. Ambassador Hanihara, *The New York Times,* 16 December 1922, op. cit.; Ambassador Hanihara, *The Wasington Post*, 17 December 1922, op. cit.
25. New Japanese Ambassador, *The New York Times*, 21 January 1923, op. cit.
26. James Rolph to Ambassador Hanihara, 20 December 1922, Gaimusho Record HI92 Masanao Hanihara, The Gaimusho Archives.
27. 渋沢栄一 (1840–1931).
28. Shibusawa Sei-en Kinen Zaidan Ryuumon Sha ed. *Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Siryoo,* Vol. 34, Chap. 3, held at Shibusawa Kinenkan.
29. U.S. and Japanese Harmony is Voiced, *The Washington Post*, 6 February 1923.
30. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Hankow in June the previous year had been widely reported in the US. e.g. Japan to Withdraw Troops at Hankow, *The New York Times*, 1 June 1922.
31. Confirm Hanihara Choice, *The New York Times*, 17 December 1922, op. cit.
32. Ambassador Hanihara, *The New York Times*, 16 December 1922, op. cit.
33. New Envoy Greets America by Radio, *The New York Times*, February 19, 1923.

34. Ibid.
35. Hanihara's message quoted in New Envoy Greets America by Radio, *The New York Times*, ibid.
36. The President Harding's words quoted in Hanihara Is Received, *The New York Times*, March 3, 1923; also in Japanese Ambassador Presents Credentials, *The Washington Post*, 3 March 1923.
37. 'Masanao Hanihara': Beikoku Kisha no Inshoo Ki, *The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 23 April Taisho 13 (1924).
38. Ibid.
39. The original building of 1890 had burned down in fire in 1919.
40. Ambassador Seeks News by Wireless, *The New York Times*, 3 September 1923.
41. Hanihara Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* op. cit.
42. Both the Commercial Pacific Cable Company and the Radio Corporation of America reported that they had been unable to have any access to Tokyo and Yokohama. The latter, however, maintained wireless communication with Osaka. Sporadic information was getting through from Osaka, via Nagasaki and Shanghai. Also see: New York Japanese Besieged the Consulate, but Not a word had been received from the earthquake district, *The New York Times*, 4 September 1923.
43. Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* op. cit. The text of the presidential speech is translated into English by the author (M. H. Chow) from the Japanese text written by Hanihara.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Prepared to Rush Relief, *The New York Times,* 3 September 1923.
48. Ibid.
49. Red Cross Asks $5,000,000, *The New York Times*, 5 September 1923.
50. Ibid.
51. $5,000,000 Appeal by Salvation Army, *The New York Times*, 4 September 1923.
52. Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* op. cit.
53. Red Cross Asks $5,000,000, *The New York Times,* op. cit.
54. Prepared to Rush Relief, *The New York Times*, 3 September 1923, op. cit.
55. $200,000 to Open Drive, *The New York Times,* 6 September 1923.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. $5,000,000 Aid Fund Likely by Monday, *The New York Times*, 7 September 1923.
59. Ibid.

60. Japan On Her Feet, Ambassador Cables, *The New York Times*, 13 September 1923.
61. 'Japanese Ambassador Speaks' in Coolidge Glad War Left Us Unattached, *The New York Times*, 25 September 1923.
62. 国際法外交雑誌.
63. Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* op. cit.
64. News Cheers Hanihara, The New York Times, 9 September 1923.
65. 山本五十六 (1884–1943), Admiral of the Imperial Navy, Supreme Commander of the Combined Fleet (1939–1943).

Image 1 Hanihara Masanao, as young Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Washington (Harris & Ewing, photographer. "HANIHARA, MASANAO." Photograph/glass negatives. Washington, D.C.: Harris & Ewing, c. 1905 to 1945. From Library of Congress (LC-H25-17219-F [P&P]): *Harris & Ewing Collection*, gift from Harris & Ewing, Inc. 1955)

Image 2 Ishii Mission to U. S., Ishii Kikujiro, head of the mission, in the centre, Hanihara Masanao, Consul General in San Francisco, 2nd from left, 13 August 1917 (Harris & Ewing, photographer. "Japanese Mission to U.S. Arrived August 13, 1917. Comdr. Ando, Imperial Japanese Navy; Masanao Hanihara, Consul Gen. At San. Fr.: Vice Adm. Takeshita;Viscount Ishii, Head of the Mission; Ambassador Sato; Maj. Gen. Sugano with Medals; Matsuzonag." Photograph/glass negatives. Washington, D.C.: Harris & Ewing, 1917. From Library of Congress (LC-H261- 9332 [P&P]): *Harris & Ewing Collection*, gift from Harris & Ewing, Inc. 1955. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/hec2008006545/ (accessed August 2015))

Image 3 Japanese Delegation to Paris Peace Conference, Saionji Kinmochi in the Centre, Makino Nobuaki on his left, Matsui Keishiro on his right. The photo contains 8 future foreign ministers and 3 future prime ministers of Japan; Paris, June 1919 (Zuroku Nippon Gaiko Taikan [A pictorial view of Japanese diplomacy] (The Asahi Shimbun 1936))

Image 4 Ratification of the Five Power Naval Treaty, at the Washington Conference: Charles Evans Hughes, US Secretary of States seated at the head of the table, and Hanihara Masanao, Japan, at the far right. Washington 1922 (Photo by Topical Press Agency/Courtesy of Getty Images) ("[Five power naval treaty signed. Seated left to right: Signor Augusto Rosso for Italy; Mr. H.G. Chilton for Great Britain; Charles Evans Hughes for the U.S.; Mr. Andre de la Boulaye for France, and Mr. Masanao Hanihara for Japan.]" Photograph. Topical Press Agency, 1922. From Library of Congress (LC-USZ62-62848): Hughes, Charles Evans—Treaties as Secy. of State [item]. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004673296/ (accessed August 2015). (Photo by Topical Press Agency/Courtesy of Getty Images))

Image 5 Hanihara Masanao, with his wife Mitsuko, received by the Emperor as the newly appointed Ambassador to the United States, 1923. (Photograph 1923. From the Hanihara Family Collection.)

Image 6 Hanihara Masanao at the occasion of presenting his credentials to President Harding as Japan's Ambassador Plenipotentiary, the White House, 2 March 1923 ("Aml. Harrihara, 3/2/23." Photograph/ glass negatives. Washington, D.C.: National Photo Company, 1923. From Library of Congress (LC-F8- 22642 [P&P]): *National Photo Company Collection*, gift from Herbert A. French, 1947. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/npc2007007882/ (accessed August 2015).)



Image 7 Meeting to formulate aid activities for the Kanto Earthquake victims, from left Masanao Hanihara, J.L. Feisea of Red Cross, Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, and Wadsworth, Assistant Secretary, 4 September 1923 ("[Harihara, Jos. L. Feisea, Hoover, Wadsworth, 9/4/23.]" Photograph/ glass negatives. Washington, D.C.: National Photo Company, 1923. From Library of Congress (LC-F8-26075 [P&P]): *National Photo Company Collection*, gift from Herbert A. French, 1947. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/npc2007009415/ (accessed August 2015).)

Image 8 Hanihara Masanao, Ambassador to the United States of America (1923–1924) (Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryoo Kan (Diplomatic Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan))

CHAPTER 5

A Tragedy that Eroded Japan–US Relations: The Truth Behind the "Hanihara Note"

"Japanese Exclusion": Background of the Immigration Act of 1924

In 1924, anti-US sentiment exploded throughout Japan. In April of that year, the US Congress passed a new immigration bill, which included a special clause excluding Japanese from immigrating to the United States. The 1924 act became widely known in Japan as the "Japanese Exclusion Immigration Law." The intensity of the reaction was in part prompted by the way in which a few Congressmen managed to ramrod the law through the legislature. Many Japanese considered the methods that were employed to be at least underhanded, if not downright deceitful.

Historians today often treat the incident only as an immigration matter. To the Japanese of that day and even today, however, it was more than just a conflict over the number of their countrymen entering the United States. What angered Japan was not the bar on any further immigration. What enraged the Japanese was the fact that the US Congress, using the pretext of immigration reform, legalized and condoned racial discrimination aimed directly at the Japanese. At the peak of the ensuing national outrage, a young man committed *seppuku* next to the US Embassy in Tokyo. The note by his ravaged body read: "Appealing to the American people."

A year prior to this event, E. L. Conn representing *Outlook* magazine, had interviewed Hanihara Masanao, then the newly appointed Ambassador to the United States. The Washington Conference had concluded a mere

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2_5

year before. The United States and Japan seemed to be enjoying a close and friendly relationship, a diplomatic rebalancing rectifying many decades of decay. Conn, however, ventured to ask Hanihara whether any important issue between the two nations still remained unresolved, to which Hanihara responded:

> *In my opinion at least one issue still remains. It is the treatment of Japanese nationals in the United States. This issue has nothing to do with the question of immigration. Japan no longer intends to send its own nationals as immigrants to the United States. For those Japanese who are already residents of the United States, however, we demand they receive treatment by the Americans equal to that of any other nationals in this country.*[1]

From the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Japanese sentiment had been increasing along the Pacific Coast of the United States. For the first two decades of that century, Japan had repeatedly requested equal and fair treatment for all Japanese residents who had legally entered the country. Hanihara later, in an article in a diplomatic journal summarizing the prevailing situation, said:

> *On this issue, our government maintained a very sympathetic and friendly attitude toward the United States. We understood very well the precarious situation that the US government faced. We tried to convey to the US government that: "We understand very well that if a large number of Japanese laborers went to the United States as immigrants, it would cause problems in the country. We have no intention to force an issue that will bring difficulties to the US government. On the contrary, we are prepared to cooperate with the US government in any way we can to avoid such problems. Japan, however, will not tolerate its nationals being discriminated against on the basis of race. This goes against the universal principle of racial equality."*[2]

Japan's antidiscrimination stance was intractably rooted in the precept of racial equality. It seemed like some US politicians deliberately misrepresented Japanese intentions by claiming that the dispute centered on immigration issues. This approach allowed those politicians to inflame popular opinion. Rhetorically, they insisted: "The Japanese government was pressing for unlimited Japanese immigration to the United States." The politicians seditiously used fear as a lever to increase their political advantage.

Historically, this was not the first time that Japan's demand for racial equality was distorted and skillfully transformed into a more controversial

immigration issue. At the Paris Peace Conference, those representatives who wanted to bar the passage of Japan's proposed "Racial Equality Bill" employed similar tactics.[3] The rejection of the bill at the conference created lasting and deep-rooted distrust among the Japanese toward the Western nations. Given this background, the 1924 Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Act could only further strengthen Japanese suspicion of the United States, and expand the basic wariness with which Japan approached all Western powers.

Discrimination against "Asiatics" in the United States goes back almost to their arrival in the nineteenth century. Significant Chinese immigration had started in the 1850s, beginning with the California Gold Rush. This movement increased after the 1868 Burlingame-Seward Treaty, which formalized friendly relations between the United States and China. In California, the increased presence of Chinese laborers encouraged the formation and subsequent rise of an array of anti-Chinese movements.

This unwanted influx spurred California into demanding a set of federal laws that would prevent Chinese immigration altogether. These demands ran up against the accepted responsibilities contained in the Burlingame-Seward Treaty, in which the United States granted China most-favored nation status. How to ameliorate the growing resentment of native Californians without violating the treaty placed Congress in a quandary. The unrelenting domestic pressure, however, led President Chester A. Arthur to sign the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. The measure effectively terminated Chinese immigration for the next ten years.

At the same time the West Coast, California in particular, continued to expand rapidly. Growing industries, such as railways, farms, and mining concerns, all required an ever-expanding supply of laborers to maintain operations. Under these circumstances, the Japanese started to fill the gap left by the now excluded Chinese immigrants.

Japanese immigrants subsequently became the target of anti-Asiatic activists. The same groups who had actively agitated to bar the Chinese now shifted their focus on the growing immigration from Japan. Initially, Japanese migrants were relatively small in number, thus limiting the impact that the activists could hope to have. When Japanese immigrants increased and numbers approached the previous level of those from China, anti-Japanese movements gained momentum.

In 1905, the Asiatic Exclusion League was formed in San Francisco. Historians usually cite this event as representing the beginning of anti-Japanese movements in the United States. The following year, 1906, the

San Francisco Board of Education passed a resolution segregating the children of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean ancestry from the rest of US school children. The San Francisco strategy, which would be known as "the segregation order of October 11, 1906," led to high-level talks between the governments of Japan and the United States.

Several years later, in 1913, Governor of California Hiram Johnson enacted the "Alien Land Law." The law prohibited "aliens who were ineligible for citizenship" from owning property. The measure effectively barred Japanese, as well as any other Asians, from purchasing and owning land. For Japanese immigrants, who were mostly farmers, it was a fatal blow. The law was later amended and strengthened to prohibit children of Japanese, even those born in the United States and therefore US citizens, from owning land. This blanket prohibition was aimed at undermining the strategy through which Japanese parents could buy land by putting it in their children's names.

One of the key figures of this movement, Hiram Johnson, was a political eminence in the United States and part of Theodore Roosevelt's progressive wing of the Republican Party. Despite these reformist leanings, he relentlessly spearheaded the anti-Japanese movement in California. As initially the Governor of and later a Senator from California, Johnson deliberately used populist anti-Japanese positions to gain political traction. Taking advantage of rising widespread sentiment against Japanese immigrants in California and nearby regions, Johnson continued to encourage this hostility, using it for his own political advantage.

Hiram Johnson would find an ally in the noted exclusionist politician, Congressman Albert Johnson, representing the third district of Seattle, Washington. In 1924, Albert Johnson introduced a new immigration law containing the fateful Japanese exclusion clause. Hiram Johnson became the law's major supporter in the Senate. This marked the culmination of an extended drive to prohibit Japanese from entering the United States and to marginalize those already there.

During World War I, with Japan allied to the United States, anti-Japanese activities momentarily receded into the background. The conclusion of the war, unfortunately, acted as a signal to resume hostilities. By 1920, with another presidential election campaign underway, ambitious politicians from the western states were once again pandering to popular anti-Japanese sentiments. In fact a year earlier, in 1919, California Senator James D. Phelan helped to fuel the anti-Japanese movement with an address before its legislature.

Phelan declared that the Japanese posed not only an economic threat but also a military one. He advocated a more stringent Alien Land Law, together with the total termination of Japanese immigration.[4] Concurrently, the Anti-Asiatic Association of California was formed in Stockton, California, home to a large number of Japanese immigrants. Anti-Japanese movements spread beyond the borders of California, gaining traction in Washington, Oregon, Colorado, and beyond. By 1920 Alien Land Laws, all very similar to the initial Californian version, had passed in the states of Washington, Nebraska, Nevada, and Texas.

Politicians were not alone in reviling the Japanese. Local media, particularly the Hearst newspapers entwined within the fabric of California, carried inflammatory anti-Japanese articles day after day. This obvious and expanding hostility to Japanese immigrants along the West Coast precipitated angry reactions back in Japan, fostering anti-American sentiments throughout the country. Both governments grew increasingly concerned as sensitivities intensified.

In 1906, when the City of San Francisco felt itself to be justified in segregating school children, Elihu Root served the country as Secretary of State. Addressing the American Society of International Law in 1907, Root warned Americans of the serious dangers attached to this issue. He felt that treating Japanese unjustly in the United States would inevitably cause an emotional reaction in Japan and poison relations between the two countries. In newspapers and at public gatherings, innumerable insults and denouncements were being hurled at the Japanese.

How could such a proud and sensitive people on the other side of the Pacific be expected to react? How would Americans react when faced with the justifiable resentment expressed by the Japanese? The ensuing discord between the two countries' people would be the most serious consequence of the whole affair. Root asserted that in democratic societies, it was ultimately the people, not their governments, who decided whether other countries received friendship or hostility, sympathy or discord, peace or war.[5]

Economic and racial factors were the prime catalysts behind the rising hostility facing Japanese immigrants. Those who willingly worked for lower wages were perceived to be a definite threat to the existing workforce. Racial prejudice against Asiatics in general was also prevalent in those western communities. In this regard, anti-Japanese hostilities were awash with the same causes that led to the exclusion of Chinese immigrants a decade before.

Antagonism was mainly directed toward unskilled laborers from Japan. To be fair, the blame for some of the problems was created by a number of the Japanese laborers themselves, particularly by the group largely known as "*dekasegi*."[6] Those workers made little effort to learn the language and remained oblivious of the local customs and lifestyle because they did not plan to stay in the United States. Instead of trying to assimilate into the local community, they created what were called "Japan Towns." Within these segregated outposts they congregated, isolating themselves from the local population.[7]

The attitudes of the *dekasegi* workers bred contempt among local, established communities, adding fuel to already-ingrained racial prejudice. The nature of such prejudice was largely indiscriminate. All Japanese, including the more serious settlers engaged in farming and commercial activities, were equally targeted. The Japanese government was clearly aware of the problems that their *dekasegi* workers were creating and the harm that they were causing other Japanese immigrants. Still, the Japanese government could not approve of such laws. Doing so would provide something of a sanction of racial discrimination, a stance the Japanese found to be inherently unviable.

How did the US government deal with the rising hostilities toward Japanese immigrants? Anti-Japanese activities were, at this early stage, limited largely to the West Coast. Washington, therefore, treated them as localized incidents and tried to avoid any federal government involvement. At the same time, politicians in Washington perceived that Japan's government administration of the day was sufficiently mature to negotiate responsibly. It was felt that the two countries, acting together, could be relied on to find a viable solution through mutual consultation. From a series of high-level meetings, a Japanese proposal emerged.

An acceptable voluntary restriction would be set in place to deter Japanese people from immigrating to the United States. If the restriction were to be the result of Japan's own initiative, rather than bending to a demand emanating from the United States, the risk of arousing Japanese sensitivities would be minimized. This strategy would effectively defuse the possibility of further anti-Japanese movements escalating. Both governments hoped that as cooler heads prevailed, a more comprehensive agreement would eventuate. Both Republicans and Democrats in Washington generally supported such an approach.[8] The "Gentlemen's Agreement"

was thus introduced in 1908. Hanihara later described the considerations that formed the basis of it:

> *Japan cannot accept that the United States would exclude Japanese from immigration by law. On the other hand, Japan does understand that increased Japanese immigration would cause domestic disputes in the United States and create troubles for her government. It is, therefore, imperative to find a solution through cooperation between the two governments. The solution had to be the one that would ease the different predicament in which each country is placed. After painstaking efforts by both governments, what is called "The Gentlemen's Agreement" finally [has] emerged.*[9]

With this agreement in place, the Japanese government stopped issuing passports to Japanese laborers applying to immigrate to the United States. The Gentlemen's Agreement excluded those who wished to return to the United States after a temporary return to Japan and wives traveling to rejoin their husbands. Nonetheless, the agreement stood as an effective measure by the Japanese government to drastically restrict immigration to the United States. Elihu Root, with President Roosevelt's support, was closely involved in the formation of this agreement.

This arrangement, painstakingly formulated by the two governments, failed to satisfy anti-Japanese activists on the West Coast. Hostile outbreaks did not cease. Politicians there continued to bolster their ongoing anti-Japanese crusade. Every single year until the Immigration Act passed in 1924, these men demanded that Congress legislate an end to all Japanese immigration. At an early stage, it was still possible for the federal government to treat the West Coast exclusionists as simply a local pressure group—one that did not warrant serious consideration. As California developed further and its political influence grew, it became increasingly difficult to ignore the issue even at the federal level. The inevitable crisis came in the ill-fated year of 1924.

Ironically, the major target of the Immigration Act of 1924 was not Japanese immigrants. The overwhelming concern at the time was the rapid influx of European immigrants during the post-war period. The new immigration act was aimed mainly at Southern and Eastern European immigrants. The population, and politicians, considered these people to be foreigners who would prove to be difficult to assimilate into US society.

Between 1830 and 1924, more than thirty-five million immigrants arrived, predominantly from Europe. During this "century of immigration,"

the United States maintained a policy that encouraged new immigrants reinforced by both economic and ideological rationales. The immigrants in turn were the key contributors to the country's rapid growth and development. With the coming of the 1920s, however, the nation's attitude toward immigration took a drastic turn. No longer were more immigrants welcome. Instead, they were looked on as a definite problem. Long before the 1920s, political movements, such as the "know-nothings," had demanded tight restrictions on European immigration. They were mostly drowned out by powerful economic voices that benefited from such flows of migrants. Drastic changes in immigration laws largely had been avoided.

World War I brought with it considerable changes. With the Armistice, the European immigrants in the United States, who had gone home to their own country during the war, started to return all at once. Adding to the great number of returnees, hundreds of thousands more Europeans wanted to leave their devastated homeland and build new lives in the United States. Confronted by this potentially explosive situation, in 1921 the US Congress enacted the Emergency Immigration Act, placing some restrictions on European immigration. The act, however, was a temporary measure and was due to expire on June 30, 1924. This deadline placed Congress under unusually urgent pressure to legislate a new immigration law.

For those politicians who had long been recognized as Japanese exclusionists, the prospect of new legislation represented a great opportunity to achieve their long-desired goals. Given the public anxiety in the face of the sudden influx of European migrants, any proposed bill at this time would win overwhelming support from the US people. In all likelihood, it was felt that an attempt to drastically curtail immigration would pass Congress without much resistance.

A clause excluding Japanese, from the country was carefully inserted into a bill that would be approved by Congress as part of the larger proposed law. The added urgency to enact that newly proposed legislation could only strengthen this possibility. For Japanese exclusionists, the situation provided a golden opportunity. The fact that 1924 also was a presidential election year served to heighten the political climate for any decision making. Extraordinary political maneuvers took place, serving the ambitions of many different interest groups.

In California and its neighboring states, Japanese exclusionists redoubled their efforts. Hiram Johnson was expectedly at the forefront. As a Republican Senator from California, he had his own presidential ambitions with which to grapple. In 1920, he had sought the Republican presidential nomination only to lose out to Warren G. Harding, who subsequently

won the presidency. In advance of the 1924 presidential election, Johnson was planning to challenge President Coolidge, vying once again for the Republican nomination. Some believed that the extreme passion Johnson demonstrated in pushing the Japanese exclusion clause was closely related to his rivalry with Coolidge, who stood against that particular measure. Johnson's long-standing animosity toward Charles E. Hughes, Secretary of State under Coolidge, was also well known.

Within this environment, a special clause aimed at excluding the Japanese had been created and inserted into the draft immigration bill before Congress. The nature of the particular clause, however, was totally incongruous with the rest of the bill; in it immigration was to be based on a "quota system." This same principle was in the 1921 law, known as Quota Act. The basic idea that act was to limit the number of immigrants from each European country according to the proportional number of existing immigrants in the United States.

In other words, the intent was to devise a formula that would restrict immigration rather than ban any particular nationality. The specific clause formulated by the anti-Japanese representatives translated into a total ban on a targeted group of people. The actual phrase used was to exclude immigration of those "aliens ineligible for United States citizenship." In effect, the clause labeled an entire nationality as undesirable.

The classification of aliens who were ineligible for citizenship applied to all "colored" races. The existing law restricted naturalization to "white persons and persons of African descent." Under this arrangement, all Asians, including Chinese and Indians, were ineligible for citizenship. Today, such exclusion would be considered as a violation of the universal principle of racial equality. At that time, however, all Asians already had been banned from immigration by US laws enacted at various times in the past. The Japanese, until 1924, were the only exception.

There were reasons why Japan had been exempted from this overall ban, including: (1) Japan was the leading Asian nation with both economic and military strength; and (2) Japan had focused its foreign policy on maintaining cordial relations with the Americans, and the policy was supported by generations of well-trained diplomats. In the face of mounting hostility to Japanese immigrants, the Gentlemen's Agreement had been formulated. It was a last desperate effort to stem any future conflict, by preventing discrimination against the Japanese from becoming law.

The Japanese exclusion clause in the proposed bill eliminated the special status that the Japanese had thus far maintained. Instead, there would now be a total ban on their immigration to the United States. The Japanese

people would be singled out this time and the law would explicitly discriminate against them. For the Japanese government, it posed a grave matter of national honor. For the people, it was regarded as a great insult to their race, and a total betrayal by a nation that they had considered to be a friend.

Looking at the issue from a narrow point of view, immigration policies remained strictly a domestic issue for each sovereign nation. Other countries were advised not to meddle. The Japanese government also was well aware of the prevailing international protocol on this matter. However, Japan took issue with the way in which the new immigration law endorsed a clear intention to promote "racial discrimination" especially in regard to that one specific clause. Once passed, the clause would serve to legitimize discrimination against Japanese residents solely on the basis of race.

Japan took no issue with the right of the United States to control the influx of immigrants on a fair and equal basis. If Washington had applied the same European quota system to the Japanese, no perceived issue would have been raised. The proposed law, however, singled out the Japanese as the target for specific racial discrimination. That approach was reprehensible in the view of the Japanese public and its government.

Analyzing the Immigration Act of 1924, Vija Lehtinen pointed out the way in which the specific clause, aimed exclusively at the Japanese, failed to align with the purpose behind the rest of the law. He concluded that its distinct purpose was to pander to racist-inspired demands aimed at discriminating against Japanese immigrants. Lehtinen said the "guilty" clause reflected the popular perception that Asians, regardless of their achievements or abilities, were unsuitable to be members of US society.

> *In the exclusionist argument … race was paramount, and the achievements of the Japanese were irrelevant to the question of their desirability as immigrants. . . . [Japanese] were described as hard working, thrifty, ambitious, and enterprising. . . . all characteristics that in other contexts were used to describe good American citizens. Yet, the very people portraying the Japanese in this way … cited those very qualities as the reason the Japanese should be kept out.*[10]

Hanihara's Warning: Revisiting the Cassandra Complex

Hanihara had been one of the first to recognize the dangers lurking behind the California exclusionist movements. Under certain adverse circumstances, they might escalate into a far more serious diplomatic problem

between the two countries. During the early 1920s, Washington still tended to dismiss the California anti-Japanese activities as merely a localized phenomenon. In 1920, Hanihara, then the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, issued an official warning to the United States.[11] In his statement, he identified the California problem as not simply a local issue. If "[this] sort of irritation and pin-pricking" were left unchecked, he feared, it would "create an atmosphere which might lead to almost anything." Hanihara pleaded for the matter to be treated with "deadly earnestness. . . . What is needed right now is right feeling, sympathetic understanding and generous treatment of one another on the part of the two peoples as a whole."[12]

Hanihara felt obligated to alert his own government to the danger that the anti-Japanese movements posed. In 1920, he reported to a committee of Japan's House of Peers on the California exclusionist movements. He pointed out the close link between the intensifying movements and the politics surrounding the upcoming presidential election. Hanihara detailed the way in which certain politicians were stirring up popular opinion and using the reactions for their own political advantage. His principal fear was that the problem would not be a temporary aberration caused by political emotions, but that it would instead cause lasting danger to Japan–US relations.[13]

After he took up his appointment as Ambassador, Hanihara immediately involved himself in this thorny issue. On his way to Washington, his ship initially stopped in San Francisco, where he had previously served as Japan's Consul-General. On the evening of his landing, the Japan Society of America and the Consulate General of Japan jointly held a welcome reception for Hanihara. In his speech as the guest of honor, he did not directly mention the exclusionist movements. However, he did state clearly Japan's stance on the issue.

After praising the successful outcome of the Washington Conference, and assuring his audience that "with regard to our particular countries there are no vital interests that [are in] conflict," he brought up:

> *[T]he only question which has been and still is vexing the minds of the American and Japanese peoples: All that we want is to be accorded the same fair treatment you accord to other people: in other words, no unfair discrimination on account of race or nationality. We ask no more, no less.*[14]

With this speech, Hanihara launched a determined campaign to help Americans understand how that core issue was affecting the Japanese.

As Ambassador, he took every opportunity to communicate with the US people, giving talks and responding to the media. His main thrust was to make it clear to that Japan did not want an "increase of Japanese immigrants" into the United States. He emphasized the fact that hardly any new immigrants had been arriving from Japan since the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect.

According to Hanihara, Japan did not object to restrictions on Japanese immigration, but it did reject any unequal treatment of the Japanese in America based on race. The Japanese people were trying to uphold a principle of human dignity and justice. Hanihara tried to reach the conscience and good sense of Americans who, he genuinely believed, proudly upheld the principles of "justice" and "fairness." A few months after his arrival in Washington, Hanihara spoke to the Japan Society in New York:

> *I want you to understand that there is no question of our desire to send in more immigrants. The question is simply one involving an elementary principle in international relations—that is to say, of discrimination or no discrimination based on color or nationality. … It is clear to me that America wants to be just and that she is friendly to Japan. On the other hand, Japan has no desire to send to your country such of her people as you do not desire.*[15]

A year later, little doubt remained that the proposed immigration bill would include a Japanese exclusion clause. Frankly revealing his feeling of dismay, Hanihara wrote to Secretary of State Charles Hughes. It was motifying, he said, for the Japanese government that such a provision was to be introduced in the proposed bill "in apparent disregard of these most friendly and effective endeavors on the part of the Japanese Government to meet the needs and wishes of the American Government and people."[16] He then reiterated his message:

> *It is needless to add that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to question the sovereign right of any country to regulate immigration to its own territories. Nor is it their desire to send their nationals to countries where they are not wanted.*[17]

The situation motivated Hanihara to speak once more, again at the Japan Society's annual dinner:

> *If you choose to restrict immigration, it is your own affair. Another country has no right to complain about it. … With Japan the question is not one of expediency,*

> *of whether Japan should be allowed to send a few hundred more of her emigrants to this country or not, but one of principle: of whether her self-respect as a nation should be given proper and friendly consideration or not.*[18]

"What Japan wishes for is to have her national dignity honored," thus Hanihara continued to address the American public with this message. The forthrightness of his New York speech surprised many Americans.[19] Hanihara's style went beyond the customary reserve that was normally expected from a diplomat, especially a seasoned and skilled diplomat such as Hanihara.

Guiding his diplomacy, though, was his faith that "[i]f you explain, the other party will understand. If the other party truly understands your fundamental argument, then good sense will prevail." Grounded by this conviction, he always relied on communication as a preferred tool in his diplomacy. He was also a gifted speaker. Facing the most difficult task in his diplomatic career, he called on this natural talent. Hanihara was convinced that speaking to US people, whether in public or in private, ultimately would lead them to understand Japan's true intentions.

The exclusionists, however, deliberately refused to understand. Instead, they chose to intensify their efforts. In that presidential election year, campaigns by the exclusionists escalated to outrageous levels. They employed whatever means were at hand, whether scrupulous or not. Hanihara described the then prevailing situation a few years later:

> *Their favorite means [of campaign] were to throw a question at the American public, "If our nation were to allow [an] unlimited number of Japanese immigrants incapable of adjusting to the American society, would you support it or not?" If asked whether or not "unlimited Japanese immigrants" should be allowed into the country, 90 % or more Americans would surely answer "No," no matter what the underlying argument behind might be. …. No country would allow that. If the Japanese were in their place and were asked the same question, they would surely say No. The problem was that the exclusionists' claim was far from the truth of what Japan wanted. The exclusionists, however, persistently repeated to the public their version of "truth."*[20]

On December 5, 1923, the new immigration bill, including Section 12(b),[21] which became known as "the Japanese exclusion clause," was introduced before the US Congress. Albert Johnson presented it to the House and Henry Cabot Lodge to the Senate. Johnson, a Republican from the State of Washington, was at the time presiding over the House

Committee on Immigration and Naturalization as its chairman. The bill would later be known as "the Johnson Bill."

John Raker, a Democrat from California, also helped to formulate Section12(b). Both congressmen had lobbied to exclude Japanese immigrants for years. Seventy-four-year-old Lodge, a Republican Senator from Massachusetts, commanded considerable influence in the Senate. A staunch conservative and isolationist, he was known to have played a key role in preventing the United States from joining the League of Nations at the end of World War I.

As soon as he learned of the bill, Hanihara went to see the Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, who had been appointed to that role under President Harding. After Harding's death, he stayed on in the Coolidge cabinet. Hanihara had worked closely with Hughes during the Washington Conference. The two had become close on a personal level as well. At their initial meeting, Hanihara pointed out to Hughes that the content of the bill just submitted to Congress breached both the 1911 Commerce and Navigation Treaty and the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement. He appealed for Hughes to examine this complex situation with all due care.[22]

In response, Hughes explained that the bill had been submitted without consulting the State Department, which was currently looking into its content. He asked Hanihara for more time. It appears, at that stage, the opinion of the State Department, as well as the Administration at large, was that the bill likely would be rejected by the Senate. In contrast to the House, more members of the Senate took the country's international relations seriously, including those between the United States and Japan. Given this assessment, Hughes did not appear to be overly concerned about the proposed bill.

Japan's politicians, however, had become very agitated. Immediately after New Year's Day in 1924, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ijuuin Hikokichi sent an urgent telegram to Hanihara in Washington. It began:

> *At the time when the current Immigration Act (of 1920) passed, Japan had most strongly protested against the discriminatory nature of the clause restricting "aliens ineligible from citizenship." Our nation would never accept such discrimination given that it violated the basic principles of universal human rights.*

Ijuuin described the current situation in Japan, saying that growing indignation was spreading throughout the Japanese public; even intellectuals

and respected leaders, who would normally be considered moderate, were becoming hostile.

Consequently, the Japanese government was being placed under increasing pressure from the public. Ijuuin's instruction to Hanihara was to meet with the Secretary of State immediately in order to conduct a continuing series of close consultations. The purpose would be to explore a means that might either prompt the removal of the objectionable clause or prevent the bill from passing should the clause be included.[23]

Hanihara immediately contacted Hughes, and they then met frequently to discuss the matter. Hughes was keenly aware of the implications that the Johnson Bill would have on US–Japan relations. It was, however, a presidential election year. The Administration inevitably was forced to display extreme caution when dealing with Congress.

During a January 19 meeting, Hughes had assured Hanihara that he was paying very close attention to the matter. Hughes emphasized that he had already discussed the situation with the President Coolidge and both were making efforts to find a way to have that particular clause removed or amended. He then confided to Hanihara the political difficulties faced by the Administration. The proposed bill was entangled within an array of different issues. Only delicate persuasion and "tact" would be able to convince Congress to make any changes.

The meeting concluded with Hughes reassuring the Ambassador that the Administration fully understood the serious nature of Japan's expressed concerns. Hughes, however, requested continued patience that could be reflected best by a moratorium on any overt Japanese protests. Hughes said that such headline-making actions would only make his own efforts to placate Congress more difficult.[24]

While relying on Hughes's assurances, Hanihara also attempted to meet as many individual congressmen as possible. He intended to explain Japan's actual position and intentions with whatever patience he could muster. Later on Hanihara would be criticized by some Japanese for relying too heavily on the State Department rather than lobbying Congress directly. Even then a representative of a foreign country, however, could only legitimately deal directly with the State Department; a person must not be seen explicitly lobbying Congress. Private and unpublicized contacts had to suffice in attempting to deal directly with politicians and political situations.

After President Coolidge and his cabinet had closely examined the content of the Johnson Bill, on March 8 Hughes sent the Administration's

response to Albert Johnson, Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. The full text of the letter, which set forth the Administration's view of the bill, was made public a few days later. It consisted of a long and detailed statement analyzing the content of the entire Johnson Bill.

On Section 12(b), Hughes pointed out that "the practical effect of this clause is to single out Japanese immigrants for exclusion." He wrote that, "there can be no question that such a statutory exclusion will be deeply resented by the Japanese people." This conclusion led him to question the very necessity of such a clause: Why was it necessary to have this particular section in the bill?

Hughes argued that if Section 12(b) was eliminated, with the quota system applied to Japan instead, there would be a total of only 246 Japanese immigrants entitled to enter the United States in any given year. Furthermore, with the Gentlemen's Agreement still in force, "the Japanese Government would assist in scrutinizing and regulating immigration from Japan to the United States and to the rest of the American territory." Hughes believed that such existing arrangements placed dual controls over the inflow of Japanese. He felt that the two agreements would accomplish more effective regulation of inassimilable and undesirable classes of Japanese immigrants without directly affronting Japan's sensibilities.

Hughes made the additional point that "so far as the clause is concerned, the question presented is one of policy." He asked whether it was worthwhile to affront deliberately "a friendly nation with whom we have established most cordial relations." He failed to see that any gain would accrue from such actions.[25] "In the interest of our international relations," Hughes's letter strongly urged the elimination of the provocative and inflammatory clause, writing:

> *The Japanese are sensitive people and unquestionably would regard such a legislative enactment as fixing a stigma upon them. I regret to be compelled to say that I believe such legislative action would largely undo the work of the Washington Conference, which so greatly improved our relations with Japan. The manifestation of American interest and generosity in providing relief to the sufferers in the recent earthquake disaster in Japan would not avail to diminish the resentment; as such an enactment would be regarded as an insult not to be palliated by any act of charity.*[26]

Hughes's plea to have the Japanese treated in the same way as other immigrants failed to placate the members of the House Committee. They agreed

to a small amendment to avoid breaching the existing US–Japan Commerce and Navigation Treaty because he had pointed out this risk. Unfortunately, the rest of Hughes's arguments were totally ignored or rebuffed.

Raker, who had coauthored Section 12(b) of the Johnson Bill, claimed that if Hughes's proposed policy toward the Japanese were to be carried out, Westerners might as well abandon their property. Placing the Japanese under the quota system was the proverbial thin edge of the wedge (i.e., set a precedent). This seemingly small first step could lead to a veritable future avalanche of immigrants, according to Raker, that would be a virtual catastrophe. Any arrangement that would allow the Japanese to own land eventually would lead to the complete expropriation of all available US land by these foreigners.[27] Inflammatory rhetoric became the fuel propelling the inevitable anti-Japanese campaign.

The Hanihara Note

Faced with those growing difficulties, as noted earlier, Hanihara and Hughes consulted often. Meeting on March 27, Hughes confided to Hanihara that what disturbed him most was the House Committee's report on the Gentlemen's Agreement, which described it as a sort of secret agreement containing terms that had remained undisclosed to protect Japanese interests. The report also maintained, without resort to any evidence, that the agreement had failed in its objectives. Hughes considered addressing these assertions to be vital.

In response to the report, Hughes floated an idea that he took pains to emphasize should not be considered as an official proposal. He suggested that Hanihara write a letter to him detailing the way in which the Gentlemen's Agreement had been reached. The letter would need to explain Japan's interpretation of the agreement, as well as Japan's successes in limiting emigration to the United States by Japanese nationals.[28]

The Gentlemen's Agreement had been reached by direct negotiations between the two governments; it was not part of any legislation by the Congress. Nonetheless, Congress was always well aware of the agreement. During the sixteen years of its existence no objections had been raised. It was true though that the voluminous correspondence leading up to the Gentleman's Agreement had never been released. Hughes thought that the time was opportune for unwrapping the details of the agreement and shedding light on the matter by taking the associated correspondence "out of obscurity and putting the matter in a direct and simple form."[29]

Hughes assumed that he could mitigate the difficulties he was facing by directly addressing the House Committee's accusations surrounding the Gentlemen's Agreement. The controversy, he felt, could be dissipated by disclosing the content and by making clear the effectiveness of the agreement. The rapidly developing situation meant that the Administration had left itself with very few other options. Preventing the addition of the Japanese exclusion clause would not be easy to accomplish.

Hanihara accepted Hughes's idea. Armed with the Gaimusho's consent, he prepared an official communication for Hughes. The letter was delivered to the State Department on April 10. This was the fateful document that was to become known as the "Hanihara Note."[30] Hughes acknowledged in his response to Hanihara that the letter was "directed towards clearing away any possible misapprehension as to the nature and purpose of Gentlemen's Agreement," and that "the essential points constituting the Gentlemen's Agreement stated in the letter corresponded with his own understanding of that arrangement."[31] Hughes then sent copies of Hanihara's letter and his own reply to both Houses of Congress.

Two days later, the Johnson Bill, including Section 12(b), passed the House by an overwhelming majority of 323 to 71. The Hanihara Note and the attached reply from Hughes were not even discussed. The Senate represented Japan's last hope. Six members of the Senate from the three West Coast states had all campaigned diligently for Japanese exclusion. Hiram Johnson, in particular, had become notorious for his ruthless tactics in this regard. On the other hand, compared with the House, there were more Senators willing to weigh foreign, as well as domestic considerations, before voting.

On the day the bill passed the House, Louis Marshall,[32] a well-respected minority rights lawyer, spoke out against it. In an address delivered at the Temple Emanuel, he denounced the Johnson Bill in the strongest terms possible. In a public appeal, Marshall insisted that it was of paramount importance for the Senate to reject the proposal:

> *The Johnson Bill means that, for the first time in the history of America, we are beginning to discriminate between man and man. It is not based upon public policy, but upon prejudice, intolerance and ignorance. It is an insult to the citizens of the United States. . . .*[33]

Marshall further stated that "there is no question as important before the American people today as the subject of immigration." He explained

that the "welfare of the country and of humanity depended on its proper solution." He then urged that every effort be made to defeat this odious bill in the Senate.[34]

The day after Marshall's address, the Japanese exclusion issue took a surprising turn that no one had expected. Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the authors of Section 12(b), stood before the Senate and declared that the Hanihara Note contained a "veiled threat." What Lodge took issue with was two words that appeared in the last paragraph of the Note. Lodge claimed that the two words—"grave consequences"—were diplomatic terminology that could be construed as a posed threat.

"The United States legislations are not subject to a threat. It is the sovereign right of the United States to decide which nationalities are permitted into the country and which nationalities are eligible for citizenship. This fact has to be made known around the world," Lodge thundered ceaselessly.[35] His speech was intended to be, and in fact became, a political bombshell. Sections of his provocative speech were instantly reprinted and sensationalized by parts of the media, especially the "yellow press," which was notorious for its homegrown brand of unrestrained scandal-mongering journalism.

Lodge spoke during a Senate debate on the Gentlemen's Agreement. After he had spoken, Lodge was followed by a number of his fellow exclusionist Senators in a staged attack on the measure. Unsurprisingly, the Senate voted to abrogate the Gentlemen's Agreement. The following day, April 15, the Johnson Bill passed the Senate, with the Japanese exclusion clause intact. This series of events formed the basis for the "veiled threat theory." Supporters of this approach claimed that Hanihara's use of two words—grave consequences—was largely responsible for the passing of the bill.

Proponents of this view assumed that many Senators were undecided about whether to support the bill. Only after the provocation created by the Lodge speech did they feel compelled to vote for it with the exclusion clause remaining unchanged. Strong evidence for this reading of events is sadly lacking however. Historians continue to question the legitimacy of this far too simple account of the proceedings. What cannot be questioned is the reaction in Japan to the sensational treatment of Lodge's rabble-rousing speech by the American media. The Japanese press in turn was stirred up and startled the populace of Japan with its coverage of what was happening.

What then was the Hanihara Note? It was not a voluminous document but a letter addressed to Secretary of State Hughes; it was less than ten pages

written in English. Reading through it objectively nearly a hundred years later, one can immediately see that it was a well-prepared document of substance, with careful attention given to each word used. The main thrust was to respond to the criticism raised in Congress concerning the Gentlemen's Agreement and to the points that Hughes presented to Hanihara at their meeting on March 27. It is worded to be consistent with Hughes's February 8 letter to Albert Johnson . The Note begins by explaining that:

> *The Gentlemen's Agreement is an understanding with the United States Government by which the Japanese Government voluntarily undertook to adopt and enforce certain administrative measures designed to check the emigration to the United States of Japanese laborers.*[36]

This is followed by a declaration: "It is [in] no way intended as a restriction on the sovereign right of the United States to regulate its immigration." As to why the agreement had come about, the letter explains that "discriminatory immigration legislation by the United States would naturally wound the national susceptibilities of the Japanese people."

To avoid that situation, the Gentlemen's Agreement had been reached by way of "thorough but most friendly and frank discussions between the two Governments." The purpose of the agreement was to relieve the United States "from the possible unfortunate necessity of offending the natural pride of a friendly nation."[37]

The letter then described the detailed content of the Gentlemen's Agreement and presented indisputable figures to illustrate the effectiveness of the agreement. The letter even indicates Japan's willingness to make further concessions by stating that "the Japanese Government would not be unwilling to discuss, if the United States considers it would be desirable, to amend or modify some of the terms of the Agreement."[38]

Hanihara took great pains to clarify the message he had tried to convey to the American public since his arrival. He said that Japan had absolutely no intention of questioning the sovereign right of the United States to regulate immigration flows, nor did the Japanese seek to forcefully send their nationals to the United States.

> *To Japan the question is not one of expediency, but of principle. . . . The important question is whether Japan as a nation is or is not entitled to the proper respect and consideration ordinarily given by one nation to another, which after all forms the basis of amicable international intercourse throughout the civilized world.*[39]

In his Note, Hanihara questioned whether it was necessary for the United States to enact Section 12(b)—the Japanese exclusion clause. Clearly, the object of it was to discriminate against Japan as a nation. The result would stigmatize the Japanese as unworthy and undesirable in the eyes of the US people. Yet, the practical consequence would be to exclude less than 150[40] Japanese per year. The clause was also simply redundant as an effective measure since the Gentlemen's Agreement already accomplished all that was sought by means of the proposed exclusion clause.

The only actual difference was the matter of the 150 Japanese immigrants. Hanihara, in his Note, expressed his inability to believe "that it can be the intention of the people of your great country, who always stand for high principles of justice and fair play in the intercourse of nations."[41] Hanihara's closing remarks were addressed directly to Hughes. It is here that the two words, which Henry Cabot Lodge seized on, appear:

> *Relying upon the confidence you have been good enough to show me at all times, I have stated or rather repeated all this to you very candidly and in a most friendly spirit, for I realize, as I believe you do, the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure retaining that particular provision would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries.*[42]

In his Senate speech Lodge deliberately ignored the contents of the Note except for the two seemingly innocuous words. Lodge insisted that the use of "grave consequences" constituted an explicit threat. In the general diplomatic terminology, however, "a threat" involves economic or military action, even extending to a declaration of war. Reading through the entire text of the Hanihara Note, it is difficult to detect any intention of the Japanese to react in an explicit manner.

Lodge consistently failed to articulate the possible nature of this supposed threat. The Note does describe how the Japanese government analyzed the matter using language that is firm and unflinching. Regardless, the letter was carefully worded so that its tone conveyed the clear intention of stating an objection in a friendly and gentlemanly manner.

Immediately after Lodge's speech, while the Senate was still deliberating on the Johnson Bill, *The New York Times* communicated this opinion:

> *Whatever criticism may be made of Ambassador Hanihara's reference to "grave consequences"—a term which was used obviously not as a threat, but merely to describe the effect on Japanese opinion of our proposed policy of complete exclusion—the conclusion to which the Senate unthinkingly jumped,*

> *that Japan was trying to dictate to us on a matter of internal politics, is far from the facts.*[43]

The paper went on to repeat the Ambassador's assurance in the Note that the Japanese government did not question the sovereign right of the United States to regulate its immigration.

The *Times* also pointed out the Ambassador's explicit offer; that is, Japan remained more than willing to discuss a modification of the Gentlemen's Agreement with the United States. The editorial urged the Senate to reconsider its "intemperate action," as "hasty legislative action [that] merely serves to rekindle the deep fires of race hatred and undo the work of a quarter of a century of diplomacy."[44]

The Washington Post also carried a lengthy article by Albert W. Fox on the same day:

> *The significance of such an expression (as "grave consequences") in diplomatic correspondence depends on the context of the document . . . so that the words "grave consequences" may imply a threat of war or may imply no threat at all . . . In the case of the Ambassador's letter, neither the Japanese government nor Mr. Hanihara regard the tenor and substance as justifying any possible interpretation that it implied a veiled threat.*[45]

Fox went on to warn:

> *The attacks on the Japanese Ambassador in the Senate will be interpreted (in Japan) as attacks on the government of Japan. . . . The question of whether it will be possible to deter the Japanese people from now pursuing a course of continued resentment toward the United States is problematical, especially after the exclusion law goes into effect.*[46]

Merlo Pusey,[47] in his Pulitzer Prize biography of Charles Evens Hughes, wrote this thirty years later:

> *His (Ambassador's) plea was merely for "that proper consideration ordinarily given by one nation to the self-respect of another, which after all forms the basis of amicable international intercourse throughout the civilized world." The temperate and persuasive qualities of the letter were lost to sight, however, because of two ill-chosen words.*[48]

Was it really possible that the Senate decision was so significantly influenced by just two words in a Japanese Ambassador's letter? If one closely examines the history of anti-Japanese movements that were mounted and

fueled throughout the US West Coast during the early twentieth century, it is hardly plausible that Japanese exclusion became law in such an apparently accidental manner. That fervent desire to exclude Japanese inevitably flowed from a pool of essentially deep-rooted racial prejudice. The passage of the Johnson Bill was motivated by much more sinister designs. The two words found in the Hanihara Note hardly could have been the catalyst that swayed the Senate. Instead, Lodge and other intractable supporters of Japanese exclusion pounced on the words in order to shift the grounds of debate and by doing so camouflaged their true motivation.

The issue of Japanese exclusion could better be described as a conflict between two unflinching political positions. Japanese exclusionists believed there were potential political gains to be exploited by supporting and inciting popular anti-Japanese sentiment. Such emotions already existed in the western states. The other side chose to stand on higher moral ground by refusing to ignore the importance of America's international relations, especially the one with Japan. Unfortunately, those who had rational arguments found it difficult to weather emotional appeals, especially when employed by ruthless people willing to use any means to achieve their political ends. Historians still debate the underlying reasons for the final passage of the Johnson Bill in April of 1924.

The 68th Congress would become known for the turbulence of its sessions. Besides the Immigration Act, a number of other landmark bills were before it. They included a World War Compensation Act; a Revenue Act; and the Rogers Act, which would decide the future of the US Foreign Services. Each issue involved a complex web of political interests supported by a diverse group of representatives. Sessions often became heated.

In a presidential election year, backroom political bargaining by definition became more involute and difficult to delineate. The Administration confronted uphill battles in regard to a number of bills that it supported. Hiram Johnson was mounting a challenge against the incumbent President Coolidge for the Republican presidential nomination. Coolidge and his Secretary of State Hughes campaigned for the removal of Section 12(b) from the Immigration Act. Johnson stood in clear opposition to the Administration. He was intent on gaining the maximum amount of political mileage from the circumstances surrounding the bill.

On April 14, the Senate convened to debate a proposed amendment to Section 12(b) of the Johnson Bill. The purpose was to exempt from quota restrictions those "aliens who came within the provisions of an existing treaty or special agreement." In practical terms, the amendment aimed to override Section 12(b) by preserving the Gentlemen's Agreement. The

Administration strongly supported the amendment because substituting a ban on all Japanese immigration for the Gentlemen's Agreement would needlessly inflame relations with Japan.[49] The amendment was the last gasp of an Administration that still hoped to mitigate the offensiveness of Section 12(b). The subsequent Senate debate on the amendment would set the stage for Lodge's dramatic speech denouncing the two words in the Hanihara Note as constituting a veiled threat.

Speculation abounds concerning the events and motivations actually driving the exclusion clause during that key period. Republican Senators, including Johnson and Lodge, had held a crucial closed-door meeting prior to the Senate debate. Historians find that meeting intriguing, though what exactly occurred behind those closed doors remains a mystery. Doubtless what went on during those crucial hours greatly influenced subsequent events. There was a sudden shift of mood in the Senate debate immediately following that meeting.[50]

As soon as Lodge made his veiled threat accusation, other exclusionist Senators spoke in turn, almost according to some prearranged cue. They all railed against the same two words used in the Hanihara Note. The grounds of the debate were shifted by making the Japanese government the central target of attack. Senators Lodge, Reed of Pennsylvania, and several others declared that they would vote for Japanese exclusion "as a rebuke to the action which Japan took through the Ambassador's letter."[51] The words "grave consequences" were transformed into an explicit threat intended to curtail the sovereign rights of the United States.

"At no time in the history of the Senate has a government with which the United States was on terms of friendly relations been subjected to more severe criticism," reported *The Washington Post*.[52] Even moderate Senators, who had previously supported the amendment, felt compelled to vote against it "to emphasize their refusal to sanction what they construed as the effort of another nation to influence the United States Congress by an implied suggestion of threat."[53] The amendment was defeated soundly by a vote of 76 to 2.

"Grave Consequences": The Advantage of Distorting a Phrase

The Senate rejection formally abrogated the Gentlemen's Agreement. The defeat marked the end of the Administration's efforts to avoid the consequences stemming from the proposed Japanese exclusion clause. The

agreement had arisen almost immediately after the San Francisco Board of Education had insisted on segregating Japanese children from the rest of the school population. It represented hard work on both sides including the then Secretary of State Elihu Root and even President Theodore Roosevelt. The aim was to fend off any further rise of anti-Japanese sentiments in the western states.

The Gentlemen's Agreement came into effect in 1908 and for more than ten years acted as a barrier that restrained the rising demands made by Japanese exclusionists; it succeeded in keeping the issue on the back burner of policy negotiations. In 1924, Congress decided to unilaterally renege on this important agreement. For the more fervent Japanese exclusionists, it was a long-awaited victory. With the abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement, there was nothing left to stop the exclusionists from achieving their ultimate goal of totally stopping Japanese immigration. The day after the agreement was scuttled, April 15, the Johnson Bill passed the Senate with Section 12(b) included intact. Since an overwhelming majority supported the bill, a roll call was deemed to be unnecessary.

The machinations that contrived to maintain the Japanese exclusion clause remains a mystery. Historians still question the motivations of the major players and the deals struck to ensure success. Even a superficial study, however, raises questions concerning the veiled threat theory. It is difficult to believe that two words in an Ambassador's Note could have become anything resembling a decisive factor in the subsequent Senate vote. Even given the deliberate attempt to distort their meaning, why was the veiled threat theory given such importance?

The main objective of the Johnson Bill (i.e., Immigation Act of 1924) was to restrict the number of European immigrants that were streaming into the United States after World War I. The bill had overwhelming popular support, so Congress had little choice but to pass it. In addition, Congress was under an inflexible time constraint. The existing immigration act was to expire on June 30 of the same year, so a new immigration act had to be legislated in before that. The Japanese exclusionists pounced on this extraordinary circumstance as their best chance. The exclusion clause, inconsistent as it may have been with the rest of the draft, was worked into the Johnson Bill, which was considered certain to pass.

A significant number of representatives, however, stood on higher moral ground and wished to avoid having racial segregation written into law. They were also aware of the importance of the United States maintaining good relations with friendly countries such as Japan. Even they

had to admit, however, the inevitability of the bill becoming law. The Japanese exclusion clause cleverly worked into it posed a dilemma for them. A number of amendments were proposed to reduce the offensiveness of the clause; however, exclusionists successfully blocked every one of them. No easy solutions were forthcoming to help the moderates. The time pressure was on.

Lodge's allegation of a veiled threat perhaps gave them a way out. It was an extraordinary construal of the words "grave consequences" taken out of context. The interpretation, however, gave substance to the ensuing claim that the Ambassador's letter was an attempt to interfere with the decision-making power exercised by Congress. The claim touched the core principle that the US Congress would not be subjected to threats by another country. After this rhetoric was aired, even the most moderate representatives felt justified in rejecting the amendment. Instead, they voted outright for the bill without further arguments on the Japanese exclusion clause. Merlo Pusey in his 1952 biography of Hughes concluded:

> *It is unbelievable that any substantial number of Senators were really concerned about the alleged "threat." Rather, they were determined to adopt the exclusion policy in any event and seized upon the Hanihara letter to salve their consciences.*[54]

One week after the decisive vote in the Senate, Albert Johnson, himself the chief architect of the Japanese exclusion clause, made a public statement. He said that it was a "misunderstanding that the Senate action was occasioned by resentment at the letter of Ambassador Hanihara." He then revealed that, "long before the (Hanihara) letter appeared, the measure was assured of passage in the House, and a poll in the Senate showed at least 54 votes certain for the exclusion feature," and that "the Hanihara letter forced a practically unanimous action on the part of the Senate."[55]

When exploring the underlying factors that facilitated the Johnson Bill's passage, it would be foolish to ignore the inescapable and almost casual racism that pervaded the Western mentality at the time. The great majority of white Americans, as well as Europeans, accepted the idea of "white supremacy" as an established fact. This one unshakeable belief inevitably influenced the way people thought about and evaluated any situation. Even the most conscientious congressmen would not have escaped untainted. They would have been incapable of dissociating the consequences of the proposed clause from the fact that in their eyes, the Japanese were orientals, members of the "yellow" race.

Taking a principled stand against such a prevailing concept by defending the human rights of Asians would pose a political risk. Besides, excluding Japanese immigration was something of a sideshow in the ensuing debate, as the overriding goal was to restrict the influx of Europeans. Given these circumstances, any other outcome would have been surprising. What remains totally puzzling, however, is the attitude displayed by the Gaimusho in Tokyo and its Foreign Minister Matsui Keishiro.

Immediately after Congress passed the bill, the Associated Press interviewed Matsui for his response. Matsui's first comment was to deny the Gaimusho's involvement in the wording found in the Ambassador's Note. He told the reporter that Hanihara had written the April 10 communication without specific instructions from Tokyo. He maintained that the Ambassador had full authority to act on his own discretion.[56] For the next few days, Matsui and his senior staff repeated the same interpretation to the American press, appearing keen to disassociate the Gaimusho from the wording used in the Hanihara Note.[57] "In that case," an American reporter in Tokyo asked a high-ranking Gaimusho official, "is Hanihara's recall being considered?" The official denied that the government had contemplated Hanihara's recall. However, the unnamed official felt compelled to make the following enigmatic statement: "[T]he Ambassador might eventually find it uncomfortable to remain in Washington."[58]

The Hanihara Note represented official correspondence between the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and the US Secretary of State. Subsequently, the actual wording of that document was deliberately distorted by certain members of Congress to further narrow political ends. This distortion resulted in the unilateral abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement; it paved the way for retaining the exclusion provision in the proposed immigration bill. This series of events should have provided clear grounds for the Gaimusho to protest and make its displeasure known. Instead, the Gaimusho adopted an oddly defensive and ill-defined response. Foreign Minister Matsui displayed no displeasure over then recent Washington events.

In contrast, a vocal outcry against the United States was mounting throughout Japan. Intellectuals and other prominent members of society led the charge. The Jiji, a major Japanese news service, published an editorial insisting that "no nation retaining the least trace of self-respect could tolerate the discrimination desired by the Johnson Bill which strikes at the very foundation of American–Japanese friendship."[59] In response to this rising sentiment, Prime Minister Kiyoura and his cabinet met on

April 18, four days after the Johnson Bill passed the Senate. The Japanese cabinet without hesitation endorsed the entire content of the Hanihara Note. They provided unconditional support for the Ambassador by stressing that he would not be recalled.[60] This action proved sufficient to finally induce the Gaimusho to shift its position by lodging a formal protest with the United States.

Nevertheless, the Gaimusho's response, during the crucial few days between the time when Lodge's veiled threat accusation was made and the Japanese cabinet's declaration of support, remains inexplicable. A popular Japanese newspaper described the Gaimusho as an "invertebrate."[61] Even after the cabinet decision, Matsui was still hinting to US journalists about Hanihara's imminent resignation. Matsui's suspicious attitude provided fodder for plausible speculation. The Foreign Minister might have intended to make Hanihara a scapegoat by tarring him with sole responsibility for the passage of the Japanese exclusion clause. This would have successfully diverted attention and blame away from the Gaimusho.

In stark contrast to what Matsui said, Japan's Ambassador to France Ishii Kikujiro, a former Foreign Minister, publically declared:

> … [*N]o argument based on an interpretation of the Hanihara Note as containing a threat towards the American Government can be just or reasonable. . . . I can only hope sincerely that the document, prepared by one of the warmest admirers of the American nation and in a spirit of cordial cooperation with the Government of the United States, will receive an impartial interpretation.*[62]

The Associated Press reported from Japan that "other Japanese Ambassadors are said to have been rallying to the support of the Washington Envoy and will oppose any possible efforts to make Hanihara the scapegoat of the exclusion fiasco."[63]

Ishii Kikujiro was Hanihara's senior in the Gaimusho by nearly ten years. In 1917, Ishii led the Japanese delegation to Washington as Special Envoy to sign the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Hanihara, then Japan's Consul-General in San Francisco, assisted Ishii. Ishii became closely acquainted with Hanihara's personality and with his unwavering commitment to improving Japan–US relations. An elite Gaimusho diplomat, Ishii previously had been Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and from 1915 to 1916 was Minister for Foreign Affairs. That was his second appointment as Ambassador to France. Ishii's breadth this time around extended to acting as the Japanese representative to the League of Nations.

Both in Japan and overseas, Ishii was known for his broad international vision and respected for his outstanding diplomacy. Five years before, during the Paris Peace Conference, he had served as the Ambassador to Washington. In that capacity, Ishii had delivered a powerful speech in New York defending Japan's proposed Racial Equality Bill. His intention was to boost the morale of the struggling Japanese delegation across the Atlantic.[64]

A Fatal Failure of Diplomacy

Lodge's claim that a veiled threat had been made against the United States astounded Hanihara more than anyone else. On the day following this extraordinary claim, Hanihara headed directly to the State Department. Since Hughes was away in New York, he instead had a private meeting with John Van Antwerp MacMurray, Division Chief of Far Eastern Affairs. Hanihara had worked closely with MacMurray on a number of occasions. In fact, during the drafting of the Note, MacMurray had cooperated with Hanihara and his Embassy staff. It can safely be assumed that he was well aware with its content.[65]

MacMurray wrote a descriptive record of the meeting with Hanihara that took place on April 15. Hanihara told MacMurray that he had come "not as the Japanese Ambassador, but simply to talk the matter over frankly and outspokenly as between personal friends." Clasped in his hand was a copy of the Congressional Record; the Ambassador was clearly distressed. Hanihara's superb command of English seemed to fail him. He struggled and had "some difficulty in expressing his disappointment and chagrin at the construction which had been placed upon his note." The Ambassador told MacMurray that "he was altogether unable to understand how the Senators had been able to misconstrue his meaning in that way, and that making a threat was the furthest thing from his mind."[66]

Hanihara's principal concern was the way in which Hughes would evaluate the situation. In an attempt to put Hanihara's mind at ease, MacMurray quoted the substance of the telegram, which the Secretary had just sent to US Ambassador Woods in Tokyo. In it, Hughes explained to Woods:

> *Detaching the phrase "grave consequences" which manifestly conveys only an innocuous expression of the regret that would be felt in the event of any impairment of the happy relations between the two countries, a certain segment of the press immediately reported that these words implied a definite threat.*[67]

Hughes had attached the full text of the last paragraph of Hanihara's Note in which those words appeared so that Woods could see the truth for himself. Once MacMurray conveyed this information, Hanihara appeared to be much relieved. He felt confident that Hughes's analysis of the situation did not differ from his own.

Hanihara told MacMurray that his implied animosity toward the United States was a totally unjustified fabrication. He had not "in any part of his body" any feeling of unfriendliness or of antagonism toward Americans. On the contrary, his experiences and associations with the United States were such that "he felt it was the real mission of his life to contribute what he could to a better understanding between Japan and America."[68]

At the conclusion of this meeting, after apologizing for any possible presumptuousness, MacMurray expressed his hope that the Ambassador would not be forced to bear the responsibility for a misunderstanding in which he remained entirely blameless. Hanihara responded in turn with unexpected warmth. He told MacMurray that his own conscience was clear. Hanihara was aware that opponents in Japan would seize this as an opportunity to launch personal attacks against him. He claimed, however, that this personal side to the matter was largely irrelevant. What remained of paramount importance to him was the effect the incident might have on the relations between the two countries.[69]

The manner in which Hanihara responded to MacMurray was sincere and devoid of diplomatic circumlocutions or personal bravado. It was a display of his belief; Hanihara was a samurai at heart and a samurai's commitment to his mission was total. Hanihara was representing his country, one that had only newly emerged onto the international stage. The country was anxious to play a role there. Like many Japanese intellectuals and progressive leaders of his day, Hanihara firmly believed that Japan had no choice but to work with the United States. If Japan wanted to effectively contribute to achieving peace and stability within its region, cultivating and nurturing friendly cooperation with the United States was essential. This had become Hanihara's diplomatic mission.

Hanihara foresaw the strains that the Japanese exclusion clause would generate between Japan and the United States. He tried desperately to prevent what seemed to be an almost preordained event. At this juncture, he must have felt as if his entire achievements, built on painstaking diplomatic negotiations and personal efforts over many years, were all crumbling around him.

Hughes was also bitterly disappointed. A few days after meeting with Hanihara, he revealed his feelings in a personal letter to Judge Hiscock:

> *It is a sorry business and I am greatly depressed. It has undone the work of the Washington Conference and implanted the seeds of an antagonism which are sure to bear fruit in the future. … Our friends in the Senate have in a few minutes spoiled the work of years and done a lasting injury to our common country.*[70]

In the same letter, Hughes also laments:

> *Japan cannot threaten anybody. She is overwhelmed with her economic difficulties as a result of the earthquake. She had no idea of making threats. That makes the situation all the worse because she feels that we have chosen to affront her at such a time.*[71]

Friendship between the United States and Japan was not simply a matter of attending to mere diplomatic niceties. The relationship generated serious and difficult-to-ignore implications for regional stability. Japan was the most powerful nation in the Far East and held extensive economic interests in China. The United States was, by pursuing its "Open Door Policy," anxious to expand its own interests in China. Inevitably, the competition between the two nations for influence and control in China would come to a head.

The basis for preventing a dangerous situation from erupting lay in strengthening the relationship between the two countries. Cooperation also would ensure regional stability throughout the Pacific and the Far East. Both countries could then enjoy a mutually favorable diplomatic environment, as well as potential economic gains. Hanihara and Hughes shared this vision.

This common objective encouraged cooperation between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State. Mutually consistent goals generated an unusual amount of joint effort during the Washington Conference. The unanticipated hostility that the passage of the 1924 immigration bill created in Japan, consequently, was expected to upset the delicate balance attained throughout East Asia. Hughes could not hide his bitterness when writing to Hiscock: "The question is not one of war but of the substitution of antagonism for cooperation in the Far East."[72]

In his letter to Hughes, Hanihara confirmed their mutual belief that "a hearty cooperation between Japan and the United States is essential to the welfare not only of themselves but of the rest of the world." Hanihara

expressed his fears of the far-reaching effect in the region that "an unhappy atmosphere of ill-feeling and misgiving over the relations between our two countries would create."[73]

As Secretary of State, Hughes had taken charge of foreign policy since the Republicans came to power four years before. The passing of the Johnson Bill represented more than just a mere setback. It was a severe blow to the international order that Hughes had endeavored to create and maintain ever since the Washington Conference. Worse still, the situation had occurred surreptitiously, aided by a deliberate and extreme cunningness. Hughes's disappointment went deep.

Visiting Coolidge at the hospital, where the President was recovering from an illness, Hughes declared that "it was enough to make a man resign." Coolidge quickly responded: "Don't you ever think of leaving your position." He consoled Hughes by saying, "I agree with you in everything that you have done."[74] Twenty years later, the incident was still vivid in Hughes's mind. He had no idea, he recounted to his biographer Pusey in 1946, that Hanihara's words would be so blatantly misinterpreted.[75]

To try to deflate the rising controversy, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsui suggested that Hanihara should publicly explain his true intentions that lay behind the words "grave consequences." Hanihara informally conferred with Hughes and the two agreed that he should create a public record that would clarify the true intention behind the Ambassador's Note.[76] Consequently, a response appeared as an item of official correspondence between Hughes and Hanihara.

In his April 17 letter to Hughes, Hanihara candidly expressed his bewilderment. He could not comprehend "how two words [in his Note], read in their context, could be construed as meaning anything like a threat." He explained that he used the words, "quite ingenuously," in order to emphasize "the most unfortunate and deplorable effect upon our traditional friendship" that might result from the adoption of a particular clause in the bill.

Hanihara described the nature of what he perceived as the good and helpful relationship that had been built up between the two countries over the previous three quarters of a century. The friendship had been considerably strengthened by the Washington Conference, and also by "the most magnanimous sympathy" shown by the Americans during the Great Kanto Earthquake the year before. He also expressed his genuine fear that the Japanese exclusion clause might significantly impair the otherwise promising relationship developing between the two countries.[77]

In his response, Hughes expressed gratitude for Hanihara's frank and friendly willingness to explain the intent of his Note. He assured Hanihara that when "reading the words 'grave consequences' in the light of their context, and knowing the spirit of friendship and understanding you have always manifested in our long association," he had no doubt that "these words were to be taken in the sense you have stated." Hughes concluded by expressing his deep appreciation of the Ambassador's "constant desire to promote the most cordial relations between the peoples of the two countries."[78] Both letters were made public by the State Department a few days later.[79]

When the exclusion clause in the Immigration Bill passed, President Coolidge called it a congressional error.[80] Legislative power, however, lies with Congress. Once the bill had passed, the Administration was left with very few options. The President could veto it, but given the overwhelming support from his own party, this strategy would have been particularly unwise. Instead, Coolidge proposed an amendment that would delay enforcing the controversial exclusion clause by one year. Before the bill went into effect, the President hoped he could negotiate an immigration arrangement with the Japanese government that would soften the sting of US-imposed immigration restrictions. Unfortunately, the House rejected this last-ditch effort. [81]

At this point, the Japanese government's final hope was a presidential veto. Both the government and the people of Japan placed an almost desperate faith in this alternative. In fact, this option presented a nearly impossible political situation. Matsui urgently sent telegrams instructing his Ambassador to call for a veto, suggesting he spare no pains to persuade the President. Hanihara in turn painstakingly attempted to explain to Matsui the realities of the US system of government.

Under the US Constitution, a President does not have a line item veto. Either the entire bill must be rejected or, alternatively, it must be signed. With an upcoming presidential election in sight, vetoing a publicly popular bill that had been passed overwhelmingly by both branches of Congress would have been politically unwise. Given that any veto in this case stood a very good chance of being overridden by Congress, for Coolidge to do so would have been downright foolish and ultimately futile.

Despite these realities, Matsui still had to face mounting Japanese anger. All Hanihara could do was to assure Matsui that both the President and the Secretary of State were well aware of the potential damage to the Japan–US friendship that the exclusion clause would trigger. They were both

doing what they could, but their power in this case was extremely limited. Hanihara tried to explain to Matsui that there was little he could do at this stage because immigration control was essentially a domestic matter. Since any attempt at foreign meddling would be resented, Japan's only sensible option was to await the outcome of the Administration's efforts.[82]

On May 25, 1924, Coolidge signed the Immigration Bill. In a statement made subsequent to its signing, the President publicly expressed his regret that the Japanese exclusion clause could not have been separated from the rest of the law.[83] Two days previously, Hughes had invited Hanihara to his office, where he detailed the efforts that the President and he had made "to secure the elimination or modification of the provision relating to the exclusion clause." Unfortunately, they had been unsuccessful in the face of overwhelming sentiment within Congress to retain the clause.

Hughes then reiterated what both knew. The exclusion provision did not come before the President as a separate matter. If that had been the case, Hughes assured him that "the President would unhesitatingly disapprove it." The Secretary of State explained that the President wished to let the Japanese government know that "his approval of the Bill did not imply any change in his sentiment with regard to this provision or any lack of cordial feeling toward Japan."

The Ambassador's response was equally candid. He could understand the Secretary's position and hoped that the Gaimusho might also appreciate the difficulties the President faced. He was, however, sure that the Japanese people would fail to understand. If the President approved the bill, it would cause intense disappointment throughout Japan. Hanihara feared that there would be violent demonstrations expressing that disappointment. The disheartened Ambassador nonetheless promised that he would do his best to explain the matter to the Japanese people. He could only thank Hughes for being so honest with him.[84]

Both men were deeply downhearted. Ever since the Washington Conference, the two had attempted to build a better and closer relationship between their countries. During the preceding few months, they had again mustered their combined efforts, hoping to prevent the exclusionists from destroying their achievements. Having realized defeat, neither could hide their profound disappointment. Hanihara recalled a few years later:

> *It was obviously clear that Congress would pass the Bill. President Coolidge and his Secretary of State put so much effort into altering the course of events. Their*

effort was neither cursory nor superficial just to appease Japan, but genuine and earnest. Having stood as a witness to their enormous effort day in and day out, I am qualified to vouch for their sincere endeavors more than any other Japanese.[85]

Several months later, when Hanihara was leaving the United States, Hughes said to him: "We will not see each other for a long while. I have dealt with a great number of foreign representatives, but have never met someone [to] whom I could speak as candidly as I did with you."[86] They were like two soldiers who had fought a battle together. Although they were never to meet again, the warmth and trust forged between the two remained unchanged for the rest of their lives.

Hughes was an outstanding diplomat, one with a truly international vision. After World War I, he quickly recognized the drastic changes occurring in the diplomatic world. Serving as Secretary of State for four years, Hughes guided US policy. He managed to carve out a decisive role for his country in a rapidly transforming world. Historians continue to rate his legacy quite highly.

In January, after Coolidge's successful reelection, Hughes resigned. The President's pleading could not change his decision. He resumed his legal career and never returned to the political arena. For eleven years starting in 1930, Hughes served as the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court.

After the passing of the Johnson Bill, Cyrus Woods,[87] Ambassador to Japan, also resigned. The official reason was the failing health of his mother-in-law, who had sustained injuries during the Kanto earthquake. Those close to him, however, pointed out the distress created by congressional action. A year before Woods, shortly after taking up his post, had faced the devastating Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. Setting up his headquarters at the Imperial Hotel, which had escaped destruction, he took full command of the US relief effort. His remarkable performance during the crisis earned him great admiration and respect from the Japanese people. He was a very popular Ambassador.

When the Johnson Bill was submitted to Congress, Woods worked with the State Department to sidetrack the exclusion clause. He shared the same concern as did Hughes and Hanihara that passing the bill would have a lasting and negative effect on the otherwise friendly relationship that existed between the two countries. At the announcement of his resignation, Woods concluded that with the passing of the bill, he could be

of greater service at home than by remaining in Tokyo. Once back in the United States, he could attempt to bring about a better understanding of the Japanese viewpoint.[88]

Public opinion and major newspapers, particularly in the eastern states, were critical of the congressional action on the exclusion clause. The interpretation of the words "grave consequences" was denounced as a distortion to an abnormal degree—lacking in any foundation. *The Washington Post* carried an article from the British press, which warned of the inevitable international implications: "This desire to keep the Japanese out of America can only be interpreted in Japan as an act of injustice quite contrary not only to the spirit of internationalism but to the spirit of the Washington Pact from which the world hopes so much." The paper warned of "the dangers to peace, which lurk in intolerance."[89]

A reader, who had lived in Japan, wrote to *The New York Times* expressing his astonishment that "our representatives in both houses should be capable of inflicting such an undeserved affront upon that sensitive, admirable and truly friendly nation." The writer recommended that "our representatives at Washington could learn many good things from the Japanese, for instance 'politeness.'"[90] The American Merchants Association of Tokyo and the American Association expressed more pragmatic concerns. They sent a joint cable to the State Department warning of possible serious trade consequences.[91]

US intellectual leaders and the major press outlets focused their attention on the impact that the congressional decision would have on international relations. More specifically, they were concerned with damages that might be inflicted on US–Japan relations in the immediate future. Consequences could also ripple out through the entire Far East if this relationship significantly deteriorated, said one newspaper. Only six years had passed since the end of World War I. The importance of safeguarding peace by maintaining international order was on everyone's mind. The Far East situation always held a potential threat to world peace. A good and close working relationship between the United States and Japan was regarded widely as the key to maintaining a sustainable balance in the Far East. That delicately poised balance was now in jeopardy.

Nathaniel Peffer,[92] a Far Eastern specialist, published a lengthy article in *The New York Times* in which he called attention to the recent past. The Washington Conference, he wrote, eased tensions that had existed

between Japan and America. As a consequence, the threatened naval rivalry ceased as soon as it had begun. Peffer also said:

> *Now in the twinkling of an eye and without warning we seem to be back where we were before the conference. . . . [A]ll that had been done to make for better relations between Japan and the United States and therefore for peace in the Far East is being undone. The most substantial accomplishment of this Administration is being wiped out.*[93]

Peffer severely criticized the Senate's action as having nothing to do with immigration, but the result of which would be multifaceted. He warned of the possible danger that action might cause. The exclusion clause would give a new lease on life to Japanese militarism, which had been waning ever since the end of war. Democratic movements in the country would see their momentum start to dissipate. Peffer pointed out that militarism flourishes in any country only when it can work on fear. America's attitude toward Japanese immigration would provide military advocates with grist for their mills. What would be the consequence of ascending Japanese militarism? The Far East would be unable to avoid the resulting serious consequences.[94]

Peffer's predictions were almost identical to those made by two Australians, Piesse and Murdoch, five years earlier when the Paris Peace Conference rejected Japan's Racial Equality Bill.[95] As we now know how history played out, it is poignant to reflect on the repeated predictions made some twenty years before the outbreak of the Pacific war.

Farewell to America

Two days after President Coolidge signed the Johnson Bill, Hanihara's return to Japan for consultations was announced. The Gaimusho was careful to emphasize that it was not a recall. The Gaimusho was simply bowing to the Ambassador's expressed request, the announcement read, because he desired a temporary return to Japan to discuss the then current situation with the Japanese government. Most people in Washington, however, understood that the Ambassador would not return.[96]

Hanihara had used every last bit of his diplomatic skills, experience, and personal contacts in an effort to prevent the Japanese exclusion clause from becoming law. Senate passage represented a severe blow to him. Hanihara's disappointment must have been tremendous. Despite all his

efforts, he had failed to forestall a dangerous piece of legislation. In this, his darkest moment, the greatest support came from his US friends, predominantly East Coast intellectuals. Immediately after the bill passed, Charles Eliot,[97] the president of Harvard University, wrote this to Hanihara:

> *The Japanese exclusion flies in the face of the historical good fellowship between America and Japan and of every American tradition concerning glad hospitality towards other peoples. It is also a policy of selfishness and panic. Use this as you think best.*
>
> *Charles W. Eliot*[98]

Shortly after the Japanese Ambassador's imminent return was made public, Brown University in Rhode Island announced that Hanihara would be awarded an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Law. An Honorary Doctorate from Brown was an internationally recognized honor. When reporting the announcement, the *Boston Transcript* described it as "Brown's Reply to Japan." The same paper wrote in its editorial that the true feelings of Americans toward the Japanese were distinctly demonstrated by Brown University, which represented the best of America.[99]

Hanihara Masanao received his Honorary Doctorate of Law during the graduation ceremonies on June 18. William Faunce,[100] president of Brown, spoke at the ceremony. Faunce listed what he considered to be the barriers that were interferring with friendship between Japan and the United States: language, race, and the US Congress.[101] Despite these hindrances, Faunce declared, the US people ardently desired to maintain friendship and cooperation with the Japanese. Americans wanted to work with them to pursue permanent peace in the world.

"When he spoke these last words, the entire audience applauded, freely expressing their sincere friendship to Japan," wrote Hanihara emotionally to Shidehara, the new Foreign Minister in the Gaimusho.[102]

> *President Faunce, who commands a high respect in the country, openly cited the American Congress as a barrier to better relations between the United States and Japan. His expressed denouncement of Congress can reasonably be interpreted as generally representing the opinions of American intellectuals.*[103]

The previous few months had not been easy for Hanihara. The passing of the Japanese exclusion clause alone would have been a sufficiently severe blow. To add to his consternation, it was his own words that had been

used to push the legislation through. Hanihara had written the letter at Hughes's request to explain the true feelings of the Japanese and to appeal genuinely to the fairness and good sense of the US people. However, two words had been extracted from the Note and deliberately distorted to paint the Japanese in sinister tones. Even for a seasoned diplomat, such a disturbing political maneuver proved overwhelming.

Fortunately, that day in Rhode Island lifted Hanihara's spirits. The audience there numbered some 2,000. In addition to those graduating, the majority attending were Brown alumni, many of whom were prominent figures throughout US society. Facing the audience, which included among it the intellectual elites of the country, Hanihara finally felt relaxed for the first time in many months. Confident that this audience would understand his clear logic and reason, Hanihara's speech flowed as if suddenly released from the chains of intrigue. His opening remarks articulated his genuine feelings marking the occasion: "It is indeed a blessing to feel that one is among trusted friends to whom he may open his heart without fear of being misunderstood. That is the way I feel here today."[104]

Expressing his deep gratitude to Brown, he stated that the university honored not only himself but also the country he represented. Hanihara reminisced about US and Japanese relations over the previous seventy years, his favorite subject of study. He reminded the audience that it was Commodore Mathew Perry, born of Newport, Rhode Island, who in 1853 opened up Japan to the rest of the world after nearly 300 years of seclusion. He noted that one of Brown's distinguished sons, William March, was the Secretary of State during that period. Perry had instructed Townsend Harris, the first US representative in Japan, to successfully negotiate the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (the Harris Treaty) between the two countries. This treaty became the model for all later agreements between Japan and foreign nations.

Hanihara said that he considered Japan to be fortunate that a friendly America took the lead in opening up the "hermit nation." He listed dozens of US engineers, scientists, and teachers who had arrived in Japan to help with the country's modernization process during its critical Meiji period. Those names included James Curtis Hepburn, who compiled a Japanese–English dictionary, and William Smith Clark, who introduced the modern farming methods that helped develop the Hokkaido prefecture.

Trade had been flourishing between the two countries, Hanihara noted. Japan became America's greatest customer in the Pacific and the United

States the greatest market for Japanese goods. "These happy and mutually beneficial relations" continued until after the Russian War, when certain malicious forces began to work against the best interests of the two countries. Fortunately, however, wise people on both sides of the Pacific were quick to realize the effect of this sinister influence and spared no effort to bring about its removal.

Hanihara continued, saying that two years ago at the Washington Conference Charles Evans Hughes, another worthy son of Brown, played a very successful leading role. As a result, the symptoms of internal discord that had threatened US–Japan relations were removed and good relations had been restored. He said: "The relations were made immeasurably closer by the American people's generous act of sympathy at the time of Japan's great calamity less than a year ago." Hanihara then expressed his ardent hope that the friendship might survive present adversities: "Aye! It will survive, if we remain true to our worthy traditions of the past, which is an embodiment of that great human spirit of mutual toleration and esteem."[105]

When the preceding words were spoken, the audience responded with sustained applause. Hanihara had presented his analysis of Japan's role in the Far East, saying that she had acted as "a great bulwark of regional stability, strategically placed, as no other Power, to insure peace in the Far East." Japan continues to be a factor for security, commerce, and progress within the region, he concluded; unfortunately, this crucial role too often has been overlooked by other nations. Speculations concerning rival navies, rival markets, and trade routes tended to dominate diplomatic discussions.

Hanihara said that what "tends to be forgotten are the ability those Powers have to bring stability to the world. A stable environment enables mankind to live more happily and civilization to progress."

> *We Japanese have tried to become a great nation, not only in the attainment of strength sufficient to defend ourselves and to protect our weaker neighbors from dangerous aggressions, but also we have striven to be great because we are anxious to serve the cause of humanity.*[106]

This view of the world reflected not only Hanihara's own beliefs, but also represented the prevailing idealism of Japanese intellectuals. Born and raised in the Meiji era, they were anxious to guide a newly awakened Japan so that it could play an influential and respectable role in the world.

In his address at Brown, Hanihara avoided any specific mention of the Japanese exclusion clause. He did reiterate the principle that formed the basis for his controversial Note:

> *In our dealings with the United States, so far, we have been encouraged in the belief that as between friends there is no question that cannot be adjusted amicably and to the entire satisfaction of the parties concerned, for there is after all not true interest and honor of one party which is incompatible with a due regard for the interest and honor of the other.*[107]

He concluded his address with a question for the American people:

> *Is it the true sentiment of the American people to make light of its friendship with the people of Japan, a friendship which has been built up by the hard conscientious labor of the two peoples extending over nearly three quarters of a century, not only for the good of themselves alone but for the good of the rest of mankind?*[108]

Hanihara's address at Brown was extensively reported on by all major newspapers. Many quoted his hopeful conviction that "US-Japan friendship would survive, if we remain true to our worthy traditions of the past."[109] *The New York Times* carried in full the question posed to all Americans at the conclusion of his address.

While Hanihara was preparing for his imminent departure from the United States with a heavy heart, one bright occasion managed to lift his spirits. Mrs. Frank A. Vanderlip, the wife of a New York financier, decided to hold a garden party at Beechwood, the Vanderlip estate in Scarborough, New York. The gala's aim was to raise funds to help rebuild the Tsuda Juku, Japan's leading college for women. Like many other Tokyo structures, it had been largely destroyed by the Great Kanto Earthquake. Hanihara was to be the guest of honor. Mrs. Vanderlip had come up with the unique idea for having her invitation delivered to the Ambassador in Washington.

Three homing pigeons carrying the invitation raced an airplane piloted by former Army aviator J. Kendrick Noble. The plane carried yet another invitation for Secretary of State Charles Hughes. Judging the race were Cuno H. Rudolph, president of the Board of Commissioners of Washington and Commander Claude Mayo of the US Navy. The race caught the attention of the media. It was also just the right touch to cheer up Hanihara, who was normally jovial and possessed a great sense of humor.[110]

Even by the extravagant standards maintained by the wealthiest Americans, the garden party on June 7 was extraordinary. Miura Tamaki, Japanese-born prima donna of the Metropolitan Opera sang. A Noh play was performed for the first time in the United States. An exhibition tennis match between the Davis Cup teams of Japan and the United States was staged. A part of the estate garden had been transformed into the busy main street of Ginza. The library of the mansion became an authentic Japanese tea house with kimono-clad ladies serving tea in the age-honored fashion.[111] The Vanderlip party gave the departing Hanihara his last happy occasion in his beloved America. Being among so many of his real friends, he basked in the warmth and generosity that the country offered.

On July 11, just as Washingtonians began enjoying bright summer weather, Hanihara left the US capital. The city had been his home many times in the past, ever since he first arrived as a young diplomat at the beginning of the century. *The New York Times* carried this tribute to Hanihara on the day of his departure:

> *[US and Japan] fellowship has been outwardly disturbed by an untoward incident. As a result, the distinguished scholar and diplomat Mr. Hanihara, who has represented Japan to us in its finest qualities, goes away from our side—for a little time only as we hope. … He takes back with him the highest honor that one of our greatest universities can confer, and he will bear innumerable expressions and proofs of the good-will in which he and his people are held by the people of this country. We who pushed open the door of Japan will always keep open our own door for his return. When he comes again, may he bring us word that the people of Japan still trust us and wish to walk at our side in good-fellowship down all the coming years.*[112]

Hanihara had spent sixteen years, a majority of his diplomatic life, in the United Sates. Many of his true and life-long friends still lived here. The country had become his second home. Taking leave on that day in July, however, he was never to return.

Notes

1. E. L. Conn for the *Outlook*, 2 May 1923, Hanihara Taishi Kaiken Ki, in *Gaikoku no Shimbun to Zasshi ni miru Kaigai Ronchoo,* Vol. 1 (Japan 1), Kashiwa Shobo, 1997.
2. Hanihara, Masanao, Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite, *Kokusaihoo Gaiko Zasshi*, Vol. 24, No. 9, 1925.

3. See Chap. 1.
4. Brian Niiya, ed., *Japanese American History,* Japanese American National Museum, 1993, p. 43.
5. Root, Elihu, Address to the American Society of International Law, April 1907, quoted in Hanihara Masanao *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* op. cit.
6. Further on *"Dekasegi,"* see Chap. 3.
7. Description of "Japan Town," See Chap. 3.
8. Hanihara Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* op. cit.
9. Ibid.
10. Lehtienen Vilja, *America Would Lose the Soul: The Immigration Restriction Debate, 1920–1924,* Masters' Thesis, 2002, University of Helsinki.
11. Tokio Warns That Danger Lies in Irritation: Vice Foreign Minister Says "Deadly Earnestness Is Needed Now," *The New York Times*, 21 August 1920.
12. Ibid.
13. Japanese Fear for Projected Treaty, *The New York Times*, 19 October 1920.
14. Says Japan Seeks an Understanding: Expects Fair Treatment, *The New York Times*, 13 February 1923.
15. Hanihara Warns of Japanese Issue, *The Washington Post*, 19 May 1923.
16. Hanihara, M., *The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State Memorandum,* Washington, January 15 1924; Papers relating to the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol. II, Washington, 1939, p. 336.
17. Ibid.
18. Japanese Envoy Asks Cooperation, *The New York Times*, 11 March 1924.
19. Insei to Yoosei: Matsui Gaisho to Hanihara Taishi, *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 29 May 1924.
20. Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite*, op. cit.
21. Some records identify the Japanese exclusion clause as Section 13(c). Section 12(b) is used throughout this book as the identification, as it appeared in the Hanihara Note.
22. Hanihara to Ijuuin, 13 December Taisho 12 (1923), in Beikoku ni Okeru Hainichi Mondai Zooken: 1924 Nen no Iminho ni Taisuru Kooshoo Oyobi Koogi, *Taisho*, 12 December; *Taisho* 13 June, The Gaimusho Archives.
23. Ijuuin to Hanihara, 1 January Taisho 13 in Beikoku ni Okeru Haninichi Mondai Zooken, op. cit.
24. Hanihara to Foreign Minister Matsui Keishiro, 1 January Taisho 13 (1924), Gaimusho ed. *Nippon Gaiko Bunsho: Taisho 13*, Vol. 1, p. 114.

25. Text of Secretary Hughes's Letter to Chairman Johnson, in Hughes Would Put Japan on Equality in Immigration, *The New York Times*, 14 February 1924.
26. Ibid.
27. Balks on Equality for the Japanese: Raker of California Criticizes Hughes's Plea on the Immigration Bill, *The New York Times*, 15 February 1924.
28. Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador Hanihara, March 27, 1924, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol. II, Washington DC Department of State, published in 1939, pp. 337–338.
29. Ibid.
30. The original document is titled as *Memorandum,* dated April 10, 1924. It is commonly known as *Hanihara Note, or Hanihara Shokan* (埴原書簡) *in Japanese.*
    The full text is found in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol. II, pp. 369–373, by Washington DC, Department of State, 1939.
31. The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara), Washington, April 10, 1924, Papers relating to the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol II, Washington, 1939, p. 374.
32. Louis Marshall (1856–1929).
33. Louis Marshall Warns, in Predict Close Vote in Senate Decision on Ban on Japanese, *The New York Times*, 14 April 1924.
    Marshall in his lecture referred to the entire bill, not exclusively to Japanese exclusion clause.
34. Ibid.
35. Gaimusho, ed. Nippon Gaiko Bunsho: Taibei Imin Mondai Keika Gaiyou, *Taisho* Vol. 24, Gaimusho 1972, p. 796.
36. The Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara) to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 10, 1924, Papers Relating to the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol II, pp. 369–373, Identified as Hanihara Note henceforth.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. This figure indicates the number of Japanese immigrants allowed to enter the United States under the Gentlemen's Agreement. The figure 250 quoted by Hughes was the number that would be allowed if the quota system were applied to the Japanese.
41. Hanihara Note, op. cit.
42. Ibid.
43. Thinking It Over, *The New York Times*, 16 April 1924.

44. Ibid.
45. Albert W. Fox, Alien Bill Amended by Senate to Deny Entry to Japanese, *The Washington Post,* 16 April 1924.
46. Ibid.
47. Merlo J. Pusey (1902–1985). Awarded the Bancroft Prize and the Pulitzer Prize for his 1951 biography of Charles Evens Hughes.
48. Pusey, Merlo J., *Charles Evans Hughes,* Vol. 2, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1952, pp. 513–4.
49. Senate, 76 to 2, Scraps Agreement with the Japanese, *The New York Times*, 15 April 1924.
50. Hanihara to Foreign Minister Matsui, Jooin ni Okeru Hainichi Toogi no Keisei Kyuutenn ni Tsuki Kyokutoo Buchoo to Kondan Oyobi Daitooryoo no Hooan Kyohi no Kanoosei ni Kansuru Ken, 16 April Taisho 13(1924), in *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho*, Taisho 13, Vol. 1, Gaimusho, pp. 150–152.
51. Senate Abrogates "Gentlemen's" Pact on Japanese Entry, *The Washington Post*, 15 April 1924.
52. Ibid.
53. Senate, 76 to 2, Scraps Agreement with the Japanese, *The New York Times*, 24 April 1924 op. cit.
54. Pusey, Merlo J. *Charles Evans Hughes,* op. cit. p. 515.
55. Conferees, Meeting Friday, Expect to Speed Alien Bill: Johnson Says Japanese Exclusion Was Decided Before Hanihara Made Protest, *The Washington Post*, 22 April 1924.
56. No New Orders to Hanihara, *The New York Times* (Associated Press, Tokyo 15 April), 16 April 1924.
57. Japan Is Aroused by Exclusion Move, *The New York Times*, 15 April 1924. Senate Surprises Japan, Matsui Issues Statement to Counteract Hanihara's Tone, *The New York Times*, 17 April 1924.
58. Fleisher, Wifrid, Senate Surprises Japan: Matsui Issues Statement to Counteract Hanihara's Tone, *The New York Times*, 17 April 1924.
59. Quoted in *The Ambassador in Japan (Woods) to the Secretary of States,* Tokyo, April 15, 1924, Papers relating to the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol. II, pp. 374–5, Washington, 1939.
60. Hanihara Koogi wa Sekkyokuteki ni Shiji: Hanihara Taishi wa Shookan Senu, *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 19 April 1924.
61. Jingo Tokio Papers Hints at "War," *The New York Times* (Associated Press), 17 April 1924.
62. Ishii Explains Envoy's Note: Asserts Common Sense Shows No Insult Was Intended, *The New York Times* (Paris, 18 April), 19 April 1924.
63. Jingo Tokio Papers Hints at "War," *The New York Times* (Associated Press), 17 April 1924, op. cit.

64. See Chap. 1.
65. Pusey, Merlo J., *Charles Evans Hughes,* op. cit., p. 513.
66. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State (MacMurray) of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara), Washington, April 15, 1924*, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol. II, Washington, Department of State, 1939, p. 379.
67. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Woods), Washington, April 15, 1924, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol. II, Washington, Department of State, 1939, p. 375.
68. Memorandum by MacMurray, April 15, 1924, op. cit., p. 379.
69. Ibid., p.380.
70. 'Hughes letter to Judge Hiscock dated on 24 April 1924,' quoted in Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, op. cit., p. 516.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. The Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara) to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 17, 1924, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, op. cit., p. 381.
74. Beerits' Memorandum, quoted in Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes,* op. cit., p. 516.
75. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes,* op. cit., p. 514.
76. Hanihara to Matsui, "Grave Consequences" Kaishaku Mondai ni Kanshi Hughes Kokumuchookan to Shiteki Kondan wo Togetaru Ken, 19 April, *Taisho* 13 (1924), *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho Taisho* 13, Vol. 1, Gaimusho, pp. 152–153.
77. The Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara) to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 17, 1924, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, op. cit., pp. 381–2.
    A copy of the letter found in: Hanihara to Matsui, "Grave Consequences" Kaishaku Mondai ni kanshi Hughes Kokumuchookan to Shiteki Kondan wo Togetaru Ken, Betsuden, 19 April *Taisho* 13 (1924), *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho Taisho* 13, Vol. 1, Gaimusho, pp.154–156.
78. The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara), Washington, April 18, 1924, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol II, Washington, Department of State, 1939, p. 383.
79. No 'Veiled Threat' Intent in Letter, Hanihara Asserts, *The New York Times*, April 20, 1924.
    No 'Veiled Threat' Intent in Letter, Hanihara Asserts, *The Washington Post*, April 20, 1924.
80. Coolidge Concerned Over Japanese Ban But Veto Is in Doubt, *The New York Times*, 18 April 1924.

81. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Woods), Washington, May 8, 1924, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, op. cit., p. 388.
    Hanihara to Matsui, *Telegram: 382, 385, 386, 388,* 7 May Taisho 13 (1924) *Nippon Gaiko Bunsho Taisho* 13, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 84–86.
82. Hanihara to Matsui, *Telegram 353,* 29 April Taisho 13 (1924), *Nippon Gaiko Bunsho Taisho* 13, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp 166–170.
83. Exclusion Law Is Scored: President Calls That Part of Act "Unnecessary and Deplorable," *The New York Times,* 27 May 1924.
84. Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara), May 23, 1924, 4 pm, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 393–395.
85. Hanihara Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite,* 1925, op. cit.
86. Washington Kaigi o Asshita Hughes no Iki, Hanihara Masanao Shi Kataru, *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 30 August 1930.
87. Cyrus Woods (1861–1938), Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Japan (1923–1924).
88. Woods Resigns Post as Envoy to Japan; Opposes Exclusion, *The New York Times*, May 19, 1924.
89. An Injustice to Japan, London Newspaper Says, *The Daily News*, London, April 16 1924, quoted in *The Washington Post*, April 17, 1924.
90. F. H. Olmsted of Ridgefield, Connecticut, Japanese Exclusion: Bill Attached as Undeserved Affront and Defended as a Necessity, *The New York Times,* April 22, 1924.
91. Japanese Will Seek to Have Exclusion Act Reconsidered, *The Washington Post*, 22 April 1924.
92. Nathaniel Peffer (1890–1964), Far Eastern specialist.
93. Peffer, Nathaniel, The Old Issues with Japan Flame Again, *The New York Times*, April 20, 1924.
94. Ibid.
95. See Chap. 1
96. Tokio Announces Hanihara's Return, *The New York Times*, May 28, 1924.
97. Charles William Eliot (1834–1926), president of Harvard University (1869–1909).
98. Charles W. Eliot to Ambassador Hanihara, in the attachment to the correspondence: Hanihara to Matsui, 23 April Taisho 13 (1924), *Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryoo*, Vol. 34, Sec. 3, Part 1, Chap. 3.
99. *The Boston Transcript* Editorial, Brown's Reply to Japan, June 20, 1924, of which copy was attached to: Hanihara to Foreign Minister Shidehara, *Brown Daigaku Meiyo Hakase,* 23 June Taisho 13 (1924), The Gaimusho Archives.

100. William Herbert Perry Faunce (1859–1930), president of Brown University (1899–1929).
101. Au Revoir to Hanihara, *The New York Times*, July 11, 1924.
102. Hanihara to Shidehara, 23 June Taisho 13 (1924), op. cit.
103. Ibid.
104. Address by Mr. Hanihara, the Japanese Ambassador, at Brown University on June 18, 1924, on the occasion of his receiving the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Law, The Gaimusho Archives.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Friendship to Last, Declares Hanihara, *The New York Times*, June 19, 1924.
Japan A Bulwark of Peace in Orient, Asserts Hanihara, *The Washington Post*, June 19, 1924.
110. Pigeons to Race Plane to Washington with a Party Invitation to Hanihara, *The New York Times,* May 30, 1924.
111. Ibid.
112. Au Revoir to Hanihara, *The New York Times*, July 11, 1924.

CHAPTER 6

The Washington Conference Undone: The Impact of the Japanese Exclusion Clause

The intent of the Washington Conference was to improve cooperation between the United States and Japan. At the conclusion of the conference, both countries expressed a fair degree of satisfaction. At least superficially, a friendly atmosphere now dominated a previously strained relationship. In a few short years, however, the situation changed drastically. The then newly passed US Immigration Act of 1924 singled out Japanese nationals because of the exclusion clause, thus shutting the door to future migration.

The legislation sparked fierce resentment in Japan. Reflecting the anger of a nation, a one-man protest culminated in an act of *seppuku* beside the US Embassy in Tokyo. Throughout the entire country, regard for the United States plummeted dramatically. No longer did friendly optimism reign, but rather expressions of outright distrust and resentment swept the nation. It was a remarkable shift that had occurred in the minds of the Japanese.

From the early 1860s onward, Japanese nationals had started arriving in the United States. In Japan, these years marked the end of the Edo period, and the country was about to embark on a dramatic opening to the outside world. The first Japanese to go to the United States were mostly students and scholars who were eager to understand American democracy. By the end of the 1880s, however, the type of Japanese entering the Unites States had significantly changed.

Increasingly, unskilled workers looking for short-time jobs in the United States were the majority of arrivals. Those immigrants became

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2_6

known as the *dekasegi* laborers. Back in Japan, the Gaimusho was quick to note and assess this change in composition. In their official report written at the time, one can detect a sense of alarm, as well as a distinct edge of rising annoyance:

> *The type of Japanese nationals going to the United States has totally changed. They are no longer students seeking to pursue studies in America. They are going there as Dekasegi laborers. They do not speak the language nor understand the customs of the country. A large number of them are illiterate and not even able to write their own names. Misled by exaggerated accounts coming from so-called "fellow countrymen" already in the United States, they are under [the] illusion that instant wealth can be obtained. They sell everything they own at home to afford the expense of a sea crossing. As soon as they arrive in America, they face abject poverty instead. . . .*[1]

Greatly concerned with the quite predictable ill effects that these immigrants would cause, the Japanese government decided to restrict further migration to the United States. In 1891, the then Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu issued instructions to governors of each prefecture to stop immigration to the United States by contract laborers, people with weak constitutions, and those lacking funds. Unfortunately, this limited government constraint failed to reduce the anti-Japanese movements gaining traction in California, where a majority of Japanese *dekasegi* laborers settled. In May 1900, the Japanese government further tightened immigration by restricting it to 200 persons a month. Three months later in August of that year, the pervious restrictions were replaced by a total ban on immigration, but only for a limited period.

About the same time another, equally serious, problem became evident. In 1898, the United States had taken possession of the Hawaiian Islands. That event allowed a significant number of Japanese, those already residents of Hawaii, to migrate to the Continental United States. During a seven-year period (1900–1907), 37,000 Japanese moved from the Islands to the mainland.

Adding in the numbers migrating from Mexico and Canada brought the total Japanese influx to approximately 50,000 during that time period. Japan's subsequent victory over Russia in 1905 added another dimension to the problem. The Gaimusho summed up the deteriorating situation in their report, noting: "In addition to the existing problems, Japan's victory over Russia and the subsequent rise of a Japanese presence in the world added fuel to the anti-Japanese movements [in California]."[2]

In 1905, the Asiatic Exclusion League (AEL) was formed in San Francisco. Scattered anti-Japanese agitation coalesced into an increasingly organized movement. In the following year (1906), the great San Francisco earthquake struck. In its aftermath, the Japanese people and government expressed their genuine sympathy for the US victims by immediately sending substantial relief aid to those devastated by the quake. This gesture, however, did little to lessen the basic hostility Japanese emigrants faced in California.

Later in the same year, the San Francisco Board of Education passed a "segregation order" prohibiting Japanese, Chinese, and Korean children from sitting in the same classrooms with Caucasian students. The extreme nature of this restriction prompted the two governments to discuss and consider a workable resolution, which resulted in the 1908 Gentlemen's Agreement. As seen in previous chapters, the agreement, painstakingly worked out by both governments, did not stem the tide of an ever-rising anti-Japanese movement. The California Alien Land Law (i.e., the Webb-Haney Act) passed in 1913 and was further strengthened in 1920 by the introduction of its second version.

Despite the extreme constraints, the California situation had not provoked any serious anti-American feelings among the Japanese. The excesses were largely dismissed as atypical incidents that gained ground in only a small number of western states. Japan acknowledged that these racially motivated actions did not reflect Washington policy, but rather perceived, rightly or wrongly, that the federal government remained critical of the movements.

The 1924 exclusion clause in the Immigration Act, however, violently shook the Japanese because of its underlying degree of intolerance. To them the legislation represented a clear case of official "discrimination" by the US government based solely on race. The Japanese quite naturally were insulted. As a leading Asian nation, Japan felt it deserved more than a modicum of respect.

The congressional legislation was perceived only as a challenge to national honor. The resulting injured pride lit the fire of a fierce and potentially dangerous nationalism. The flames quickly spread throughout the Japan. Moderates and intellectuals, such as Ishibashi Tanzan, tried to reason with their fellow Japanese. Their voices were soon drowned out by a rising cacophony of anti-America slogans used by a cohort of increasingly confident ultranationalists.

In hindsight, 1924 represented an unforeseen, and insufficiently recognized, turning point in Japan–US relations. Significant shifts occurred

in the minds of the Japanese people, no matter what their place in society, in the way in which they regarded the United States. In one sense, 1924 became the year the Japanese suffered a rude reawakening to the reality not only in America but also extending to the rest of Western world. All sectors of Japan were subsequently affected and none managed to escape significant changes.

Government Reactions and Domestic Constraints

The 1924 immigration legislation shattered the possibility for any complacency on the part of the Japanese. Flurried correspondence traveled back and forth daily between Ambassador Hanihara and Foreign Minister Matsui Keishiro in the days leading up to the vote on the Japanese exclusion clause. Clearly, the Gaimusho was in crisis mode.

On April 16, Hanihara's urgent telegram told Matsui that the prospect of the exclusion clause as part of the Immigration Act made a sudden turn for the worse for Japan during the Senate meeting on the previous day (i.e., April 15); now with all likelihood the legislation would pass the Senate.[3] True to Hanihara's prediction, the Senate gave the bill a clear stamp of approval on April 16. One of the crucial factors assisting this "sudden turn" of events was described in a previous chapter. Senator Lodge and other anti-Japanese proponents opportunistically posed a "veiled threat" interpretation of the phrase "grave consequences" to reinforce their position.

On the 18th, Hanihara received Matsui's first "top secret" telegram following the senatorial decision. Matsui offered his own analysis on the use of the "grave consequences" words:

> *You used the phrase "grave consequences" not as a threat of war. You used these words since you believed that the enactment of the Exclusion Act [clause] would certainly jeopardize the spirit of friendship and cooperation between our two peoples and carry with it grave consequences for our government, which has always particularly valued relations with the United States. . . . This is my understanding of the reason why you chose these words.*[4]

After clarifying his position, Matsui made the following suggestion: "Publicly explaining the reasons why you employed these words may help persuade the President to exercise his veto, or even help change the mind of the Senate."

This legislation represented a crucial battle lost for Japan. Despite the very serious situation, the first telegram sent to the Ambassador by the Foreign Minister had a strangely vague and lackluster tone. His grasp of the situation seemed confused—difficult to pin down. One cannot find any clear indication of his view, nor the direction that he as Foreign Minister was going to advance. Even more peculiar were the expressions he chose: "This is my understanding of the reason why you chose these words" and "Publicly explaining the reasons why. . . ."

The former statement suggests that Matsui may have intended to establish, as an official fact, that the words "grave consequences" were chosen by Hanihara alone and that Matsui himself, or the Gaimusho for that matter, took no responsibilty. The latter expression was perhaps used to emphasize that the Gaimusho was issuing no instructions to Hanihara. He would be granted discretion and thus be made solely responsible for reacting to the accusation that he had made a "veiled threat."

In response to the growing outcry within the country, the Privy Council met in Tokyo on April 23. They summoned Matsui and requested his explanation of recent events in the United States. Ito Miyoji, a prominent conservative voice, opened the session. He questioned Matsui on whether the Gaimusho had instructed Hanihara to use the words "grave consequences" in the now famous "Hanihara Note." In his subsequent telegram to Hanihara, Matsui told the Ambassador how he had responded to this question, saying that he stated that there had been no specific instructions issued on the wording to be used in the document. It is striking that in Matsui's handwritten draft of the telegram, which still remains in the Gaimusho archive, Matsui had written "the wording was the Ambassador's own choice." Somehow, this sentence was later crossed out with two black strokes.[5]

Whatever Matsui's exact words might have been, it is obvious that he did not defend the Ambassador's conduct in his testimony before the Privy Council.[6] The Foreign Minister chose instead to place the entire responsibility squarely on the shoulders of Hanihara. Dissatisfied with Matsui's answer, Ito pursued his line of inquiry further. He questioned the wisdom of allowing Hanihara to deal with such a dangerous situation by conferring with Hughes directly. Furthermore, Ito declared that it was unnecessary for Hanihara to explain to the US public his intentions by using the words "grave consequences."

The domestic consequences of the 1924 Immigration Act seemed to occupy Matsui's mind at the time rather than any possible international

implications looming on the horizon. Matsui was more concerned with responding to the public outcry, which was fueling the Privy Council's antagonistic behavior. In fact, the conservatives serving on the Council regarded the Japanese exclusion clause as something of a political godsend. The Americans had provided them with some deadly ammunition for their nationalistic agenda. Matsui, forced to defend himself, was above all extremely worried about the survival of the incumbent government and hence his own future. The Kiyoura government had come into power less than six months before in January 1924. Lacking any initial public popularity, it then faced a looming general election. Consequently, the enactment of the US Immigration Act with the exclusion clause seemed destined to bring down the government.

As the controversy threatened to boil over, the *Asahi* newspaper delivered some incisive commentary on the contrasting personalities of Matsui and Hanihara, the two main players in that unfolding drama. Employing the Eastern concept of Yin and Yang, the paper described Matsui, a nervous introvert, as the "Yin" of the struggle. That left Hanihara, an open, upright, and unexpectedly honest diplomat, with the role of "Yang." "In the midst of this grave situation," the article sketched Matsui as a man with, "his face tense and deathly white marked by visible nervous twitches. . . . It is too harsh to call Matsui simply weak," the paper continued, because "his illustrious career had been built by having his superb intelligence focused solely on avoiding any mistakes."[7]

The contrasting personalities of the two protagonists were reflected in their correspondence during that crucial period. Matsui was forced to navigate an often precarious and treacherous domestic political situation. Facing unquenchable public anger, he became desperate to survive the crisis. Hanihara, on the other hand, was looking unwaveringly toward the future. He was intent on trying to keep long-term relations with the United States from deteriorating any further. He also was attempting to get Matsui to recognize, perhaps in vain, the political reality in the United States.

Matsui initially had requested Hanihara to somehow delay congressional action on the Immigration Act. He rejected this idea by explaining to Matsui the attendant risks; that is, Japan would almost certainly be accused of interfering in US domestic policy. Hanihara told Matsui that, given the situation advanced thus far, Japan had no option but to rely on the goodwill of the President and the Secretary of State. Both of the gentlemen were well aware of the international implications attached to the exclusion clause.[8]

In reply, Matsui's subsequent May 8 telegram to Hanihara descended to the very brink of panic:

> *If we do nothing and the worst eventuality [enactment of the exclusion law] becomes a reality, the [Japanese] public will consider us to be incompetent and incapable of exercising any effective means to remedy the situation. We would have no way of explaining ourselves.*[9]

At this juncture, Matsui seemed to be placing his remaining hope on the US President's veto power. Issuing telegram after telegram, Matsui insisted that Hanihara put continuing pressure on President Coolidge to veto the Immigration Act.

> *Our hope lies in a request to the President that he exercise his veto power. Doing so would prompt the American people to review the situation. They would then ask the US government to do everything they can to prevent the enactment of this immigration law.*[10]

After each telegram, Hanihara responded to Matsui at length, patiently explaining the political reality reigning in Washington at that time. He detailed the constitutional limit on the presidential veto power; that is, any veto of the bill would simply be overturned by Congress. To expect the President to veto a piece of popular legislation just a few months before an election would be an exercise in futility.

The correspondence of these two main players during the crisis demonstrates the unbridgeable gulf that existed between these diplomats. They differed in their understanding of the current US political situation as well as clashed on what was primarily at stake. Hanihara tried to draw Matsui's attention to a more fundamental and long-term principle. Focus needed to be placed on the future role the United States would play regarding Japan. Hanihara insisted that Japan needed to develop a strategy that would allow that country to maintain and develop friendly relations with the United States even after the enactment of the exclusion clause. Unfortunately, Matsui could not see beyond the then current crisis. In all his communications with Hanihara he seemed incapable of grasping any broader vision that might have elicited a long-term diplomatic policy.

As Foreign Minister, Matsui never clearly indicated to Hanihara the preferred Japanese position or the strategy that the government was likely to adopt. In the absence of clear directions from the Gaimusho, Hanihara opted to assume a pragmatic position given the political reality

dominating Washington. He was well aware of the efforts being made by Coolidge and Hughes to minimize the harm that the Johnson Bill (i.e., Immigration Act of 1924) would have on the Japanese population's psychology. Congressional approval would be, however, the final word in this instance. At that stage, any concerted Japanese attempt to sway the outcome would not only be futile but also would likely backfire. Such actions might only harm future relations with the United States. Hanihara recognized that the then current situation could not be altered but hoped for better in the future.

In contrast, Matsui was overwhelmed by his more immediate domestic concerns. US decisions on immigration inevitably would endanger the fragile Kiyoura government. Because of the immediacy of this problem, he proved incapable of seeing or even thinking beyond the immediate survival of his government. Notable in Matsui's correspondence was only his increasing irritation with Hanihara who refused to comply with his repeated requests.

On May 26, President Coolidge signed the Immigration Act of 1924 (i.e., the Johnson-Reed Act), which included future exclusion of the Japanese—Section 12(b). Two days later, on May 28, the Kiyoura cabinet held an emergency session to shape a Japanese response to the passage of that act. The meeting concluded by declaring, "Japan would continue its most serious protest against Section 12(b)." The communiqué justified its decision by pointing out that Section 12(b) discriminated against nationals who were ineligible to become US citizens by prohibiting their entry into the country. Moreover, Section 12(b), it also said, had been written for the sole purpose of targeting potential Japanese immigrants.

In response, the Japanese cabinet made its underlying principles quite clear. Discrimination aimed at specific nationalities, regardless of its form or pretext, went against universal principles of justice and fairness. Discrimination based on race could not be tolerated given its deep and long-lasting psychological impact. Such arguments entailed much of the same logic employed a decade earlier by the Japanese when its delegates to the Paris Peace Conference pushed for racial equality. The public resentment that arose at this time simply duplicated, at an even higher pitch, what had characterized the events surrounding the Paris Peace Conference. Anger subsequently swept through the Japanese community, overwhelming any other issues facing the government.

The official document protesting the 1924 US legislation was prepared and subsequently passed from Matsui to Hanihara, who had no choice but

to dutifully hand it over to Hughes on May 31. Hughes's official response on June 17 was published by all the major newspapers, but the issue by that time was yesterday's news. The prevailing press attitude was that the law had been enacted. Therefore, there was no longer any room for argument. Hanihara reported this sad reality to Matsui.[11]

Less than a month later, Hanihara returned to Japan. Oddly enough, no official documentation remains, despite the extensive Gaimusho records of that period, that provides any indication as to why and under whose instructions Hanihara returned. The Kiyoura government had declared publically its full support for Hanihara's conduct. It had insisted that it had no intention of having Japan's Washington Ambassador recalled. Politically, such avowed support makes a subsequent recall almost impossible. Nonetheless, Hanihara left his Washington post after serving less than two years.

The decision must inevitably be linked to the legislation passed. Hanihara chose to remain silent for the rest of his life, refusing to reveal the circumstances of his return. Neither did he ever disclose how Matsui and the Gaimusho dealt with him after his return. He remained loyal to the code of *Bushido*, acting throughout his life as a *samurai* through and through. Hanihara would say nothing that might dishonor that code. The government's integrity had to be protected whatever his personal costs.

Impact on a New Generation of Diplomats

Matsui's handling of the matter aside, it is important to note the impact that the enactment of the Immigration Act with its exclusion clause had on the younger generation of Gaimusho diplomats. Even though not immediately visible, or perhaps even foreseeable, this event was to seriously influence the future direction of Japanese diplomacy.

After the Washington Conference, Japan had set a diplomatic course centered on the United States. Developing a cooperative relationship with the country shaped all Japanese foreign policies. However, the unfortunate enactment of such clearly discriminatory legislation seriously shook Japan's faith in the United States. These events made a particularly lasting impression among the younger generation of diplomats. The congressional decision clearly revealed that the United States had no intention of treating the Japanese as equals. Proud young Japanese diplomats started questioning the validity of the country's US-centric policy. They began to look seriously for alternatives. One such diplomat, Oohashi Tadakazu,

wrote to Hirota Kooki, the Head of the Europe and America Division of the Gaimusho. Oohashi was then thirty-one and currently serving as Consul-General in Seattle. His letter, dated May 1924, reads in part:

> *The enactment of the Japanese Exclusion Act was a grave error on the part of the United States. At the same time, this presents Japan with a great opportunity. This is a godsend not to be missed, if we are to avoid future decimation of our country and of our race. . . . Recently, we have seen progress in our negotiations with Russia. The prospect of signing a treaty is getting closer.*[12] *On the China front, our discussions are progressing on many fronts with both sides coming closer. These instances would seem to indicate the future direction for Japan, one which I am extremely pleased to observe. . . . Taking advantage of this opportunity, we should go forward and thrust aside the policy of subjugating ourselves to Anglo-Saxon initiatives. We should stand upright like men, be conscious of fighting for freedom on behalf of all the Asian races, and uphold the principle of human justice with the utmost integrity and compassion. . . . In order to follow this path, we will have to work together with France and Russia, and even shake hands with Germany.*[13]

The younger members of the Gaimusho were greatly provoked by the action of the US Congress. Those with dynamic minds also questioned the traditional mind-set of the Gaimusho. This led them to mount a reform movement within the Ministry. In 1932, a group of young diplomats established the "*Ryoo Yuu Kai*" Association, aiming to prompt a more modern stance within the Gaimusho. They hoped to update its thinking as well as its somewhat outmoded structure.

In the latter part of the 1930s, as this generation of diplomats achieved influential posts, a power group emerged among them. Going against the traditional Gaimusho practice of deliberately standing apart from the military, this group did not hesitate to cooperate with the rising military faction pushing for closer alignment with Nazi Germany. Oohashi, who became the Consul-General of Harbin in 1931, willingly cooperated with the *Kantogun* and went on to hold a number of high-ranking posts in the then newly created state of Manchuria. In 1940, Oohashi rose to become the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs—the top post at the Gaimusho.

Since the end of World War I, and following the Washington Conference in particular, the ambition of the Japanese military had been largely contained. Their political influence within the country seemed to be waning. Unfortunately, the fury provoked by the Japanese exclusion clause managed to engulf the entire nation. This wave of populist feeling provided the

military with a renewed opportunity to expand its influence. The conservative nationalist faction of the military, in particular, quickly understood the possibilities available. They assiduously manipulated national sentiment and, building on this support, strengthened their power.[14] Barely a decade later, in 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations of which she had been a founding member. Subsequently, the Japanese joined Germany and Italy in forming the Axis powers, and Japan then signed a treaty of mutual neutrality with Russia. Japan's headlong slide into fascism had begun.

The Role Played by the Press

How did the Japanese press react to the passing of the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act? What viewpoints characterized their reporting? After the Paris Peace Conference, when Japan's proposal of racial equality was rejected, some blamed the Japanese press for fanning and promoting rising anger in the nation. Similar accusations were once again raised in late 1924. Was this really the case? Given the inherent ambiguous role adopted by the press, an examination of their performance may be in order here.

Immediately after the exclusion clause passed the Senate in April, and once again in July when the Immigration Act subsequently was enacted, Japanese newspapers were awash in screaming headlines: "Foolhardy Law to Promote Racial Conflicts,"[15] "A Challenge Against All Colored Races,"[16] "Japanese People Betrayed,"[17] and "Reversing the Way to Peace—The US Responsibility."[18] Tokutomi Soho,[19] the founder and publisher of the ultranationalist paper *Kokumin Shimbun,* went a number of steps farther.

"The Day of National Humiliation Is Upon Us," led off Tokutomi's editorial on July 1, the day of the enactment of the 1924 Immigration Act. He called on the Japanese to never forget the day and to prepare for the day of vindication.[20] He encouraged people to persevere under this great humiliation for the larger purpose of defending national honor. Tokutomi saw the action of the US Congress as a long-waited stimulant to harden Japanese people to build further strength.[21] Targeting the moderates of the country, the editorial denounced all those who refused to answer his call, those who instead persisted in supporting a pro-US policy and "foolishly" backed international cooperation. Tokutomi accused them of not having learned anything, even after being kicked and trampled by Americans.[22]

Even moderate publications did not escape the heightening national emotion. Major Japanese newspapers relied on reports relayed by their

correspondents stationed in the United States. Those reporters had been closely following the day-to-day events surrounding the passage of the exclusion clause. They judiciously observed and understood the practical reality of US politics. Some said that the underhanded stage management that slid this particular clause in the legislation through Congress was clearly on display. As Japanese citizens, they should not fail to be affected and even angered by how the events unfolded.

As a result, the feelings of a number of reporters were to some degree reflected in their reports back home. Being in the center of international politics in Washington, they were also keenly aware of the danger that the enactment of the legislation would create for the US–Japan relations. The papers carefully noted the natural concerns expressed by a number of US politicians and diplomats. As a consequence, their views and reporting inevitably were critical. Like the rest of Japan, reporters regarded the congressional action to be an unarguable insult to their national pride. Ever since Japan's two great victories during the Meiji period, the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, national pride had soared among Japanese nationals and journalists were no exception. The 1924 Immigration Act came as a rude awakening to the decline of their hard-won self-esteem.

The Japanese newspapers of that time certainly seized the opportunity to use sensational headlines. Passing judgment on newspapers' performance by headlines alone, however, could be misleading. To understand and evaluate the media's acts requires some basic knowledge of the news market during that period. With the rise of the *Taisho Democracy*, Japanese newspapers fell into one of two categories; no longer were they simply politically affiliated. A new "general paper," independent of any political party, became increasingly common. Those papers attempted to reflect rather than shape public opinion. A leading one within this category was the *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*. Reviewing its specific coverage of events should provide a useful insight into the growing public uproar in Japan over the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act.

On April 17, 1924, two days after the legislation passed the US Senate, the *Asahi* doggedly persisted in maintaining a hopeful tone. Its article on page two, "Enactment Can Still Be Delayed," emphasized the fact that although the act had passed the Senate, it was too early to consider the matter concluded.[23] The writing in it was measured and controlled, obviously aiming to calm readers. On the same page, a full text of the Hanihara Note appeared.

The accompanying article reported Senator Lodge's veiled threat accusation as well as the speeches made by Shortridge, Reed, and other Senators. The paper described the speeches as the "culmination of hatred and animosity" that effectively obliterated the goodwill displayed by Americans at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake.[24] A corresponding article on the same page described the attempts by Secretary of State Hughes to try to avert inevitable Japanese indignation. It also reported that the dubious methods employed by some congressmen surprised even US citizens. A visible effort was made to avoid expressing harsh anti-American feelings by reporting both sides of the story.

The next day the *Asahi* continued its coverage of that ongoing story by carrying an editorial, "An Ill-Considered Act Which Can Only Promote Racial Conflict."[25] The column began with an unambiguous denunciation of the legislation that could only be considered as "an act more violent and selfish than any other that America had committed." The editorial went on to discuss the Hanihara Note in detail.

"The particular words used in the Note and the commotion they caused were in fact minor details," the editorial stated. "The main thrust of the Note was to explain, by presenting precise facts, the reasons why such legislation was no longer necessary." The editorial further continued and insisted:

> *In ordinary circumstances, perhaps there was no need to describe the possible consequences by employing such terminology [as grave consequences]. This time, however, the circumstances had been nothing even close to ordinary. . . . At stake was a sovereign nation's honor and the pride of her people. Facing this situation, Japan's need to issue a warning was totally justified.*

Furthermore, it stated:

> *[T]he Note emphatically reaffirms the undoubted importance that Japan consistently has and still places on Japanese-American friendship. What fault could they find in the Note? The United States, on one hand, demands that other countries open doors and provide equal trade opportunities, but on the other, shuts America's door to so-called 'Asiatics.' It is shocking to witness the discrepancy revealed in that country's sense of justice and fairness. One cannot but conclude that race-based prejudice and discrimination has climbed to new heights in the United States.*[26]

A second editorial appeared the following day, on April 19. That time the *Asahi* questioned whether the United States was truly shouldering

its responsibility to protect and promote world peace. Reaffirming the positive results of the Washington Conference, the paper went on to caution the United States: "Consequences of the Exclusion Law will not be limited to Japanese-American relations. We all have to consider how this Congressional decision might affect the way in which we pursue world peace and ultimately the happiness and well-being of the human race." The paper also quoted the *L'Echo de Paris* article of April 16 that said: "[Alt]hough the US may not want a war, her repeated ill-considered acts might in the end drag her towards this precipice. . . . To speak of war sounds a gross exaggeration," the editorial admitted; "however the notion may not be as far-fetched as it sounds."[27]

The same editorial argued that a powerful nation, such as the United States, is capable of exercising enormous leverage in world affairs. By taking the sort of attitude displayed in this incident, it said, the United Sates could succeed in reversing the international effort toward a peaceful world. "In such a scenario," the editorial warned, "it is not totally unimaginable that the world will be faced with a situation that could lead to war." Reviewing the recent history with a more positive note, the editorial pointed to the efforts made by the League of Nations and the outcomes promoted by the Washington Conference as having helped the world stay on the path to peace after World War I. The paper concluded its editorial by urging the United States to exercise self-restraint:

> *This new cooperative spirit among nations has helped to produce positive results. Unfortunately, acts such as the Exclusion Law can only have negative and unwelcome effects. These actions will only arouse and abet racial conflict which is fundamentally opposed and will ultimately undermine any cooperative spirit between nations.*[28]

As time went on, the *Tokyo Asahi* increasingly held back from directly criticizing the United States. The paper instead attempted to publish an assortment of opinions. On April 20, the *Asahi* started a series titled, "How the World Looks at the US Exclusion Act: Public Opinion from Other Countries."[29] This series highlighted opinions and comments from countries, such as Germany, France, and China, as well as a cross-section of the United States. Most of those reported were quite critical of the congressional action and were noticeably sympathetic to the Japanese position. However, when reporting opinions expressed throughout the US media, the *Asahi* did not avoid comments hostile to Japan such as those that appeared in the Hearst papers.

The *Asahi* also published the full text of an article appearing in a Chinese paper. The report strongly suggested that Japan could benefit through some careful self-reflection of its own conduct in China. It went on to severely criticize the Americans as well however.[30] The Japanese of the day seldom had access to the foreign media. By highlighting opinions from other countries, the intention of the *Tokyo Asahi* seems to have been twofold: (1) to develop the discussion in a wider international context and (2) to make Japanese readers aware of the fact that others saw the injustice committed by the United States. It was a clever ploy, which also helped the paper to appear objective by upholding its journalistic integrity.

The *Asahi* was clearly aware that international opinion was important. On the same day as the series started, the *Tokyo Asahi* and the *Osaka Asahi* simultaneously published an open letter expressing gratitude to three New York-based newspapers, *The New York Times*, the *Herald Tribune*, and the *World*:

> *We Japanese greatly appreciate your fair and broadminded attitude on the anti-Japanese problem expressed in your editorials. We believe your editorials are really representative of the opinion of true Americans who stand for justice, humanity, love of freedom and equality.*[31]

All three US newspapers published the *Asahi*'s letter the following day, one with the comment that "broad-minded" journalism contributes to world peace more than anything else.

On April 21, fifteen Tokyo-based newspapers[32] issued a joint declaration concerning the Japanese exclusion clause of the Immigration Act. The *Asahi* devoted front-page space to present a declaration to its reading public:

> *If the enactment of the law becomes a reality, the resulting damage would not be confined only to the long-standing friendship between the two peoples of Japan and America. Even greater damage is feared as it would pose a significant threat to ongoing cooperative efforts between Japan and the US, which would otherwise represent a glorious joint enterprise promoting peace and the improvement of welfare for the peoples of the world.*[33]

A few days later, on the 26th, the *Asahi* reported the comments made in China by Tagore,[34] the great Indian poet and a Nobel Prize laureate in literature, who was then visiting Beijing. Tagore labeled the exclusion movement against the Japanese as an outrageous act that was both barbaric and

inhumane. He branded the US action as being, in essence, a grave insult to all Asian people.[35]

The *Tokyo Asahi*'s reporting during that period can be generally characterized as evenhanded. The paper made a conscious effort to maintain its objectivity. The criticism that "the press deliberately fanned anti-American sentiment" would not be justified, at least in the case of the *Tokyo Asahi*. The same did not necessarily apply to the case of the *Osaka Asahi*, an equally influential general paper with a circulation base that was then spread throughout the Kansai district.

On April 23, barely a week after the legislation passed the US Senate, a people's forum was held at the Osaka Nakanoshima Public Hall to discuss the then current issues. The organizers were the four largest newspapers in the region, including the *Osaka Asahi*, and the Greater Business Union of Japan.[36] Reporting on the event, the *Osaka Asahi* adopted a more aggressive tone compared to its counterpart in Tokyo. It described the forum's purpose in the following way: "With the weight of public opinion in Japan united in its opposition, we urge the people of the United States to look deep into their hearts and help awaken the conscience of their representatives in Congress to the grave international implications of their conduct." The actual news item bore the headline: "Behold the Spirit of Our People. A Big Stick Falls on the Exclusionists." The article began by feverishly describing the atmosphere at the forum: "Long before the designated time, the hall was already fully packed with a tense and purposeful mass of citizens."[37]

The actual speeches made at the forum, however, were much more moderate. Takahara Misao, editor-in-chief of the *Osaka Asahi*, spoke as the chair of the forum. "The Japanese exclusion clause did not reflect the will of all US citizens," he reminded the audience. "We should not, therefore, counter this act of diplomatic violence with violence in return." Takahara reiterated that the purpose of the forum was to urge the US President to reject that particular piece of legislation.[38] His appeal was symptomatic of the widely held belief within Japan that the US President was seriously considering vetoing the bill.

Various newspapers facilitated community debates on the issue by organizing events throughout the country. The Tokyo nationalist paper, *Kokumin Shimbun Sha,* conducted a public lecture on current diplomatic issues facing the United States and Japan. Six newspapers based in Kyoto and Osaka promoted a similar meeting in Kyoto. Each event was attended by more than 1,000 people.[39]

Community Groups and Christian Leaders

Immediately after the enactment of the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act of 1924, two groups with very different bases in the Japanese community sprang into action. Japanese immigrant support groups, including the Overseas Association[40] and Immigrants Association,[41] quite naturally, reacted against such an obviously directed piece of legislation. On the opposite end of the spectrum were organizations, such as the Committee for Japan–US Relations, seeking to promote American-Japanese friendship.[42]

In addition, Christian organizations felt compelled to respond. Fourteen Christian groups under the umbrella of the Kobe Women's United Association, including the Kobe Women's Association of Christian Youth, joined the effort. They decided to send a telegram of "warning" to the President of the United States. During this time, the Japanese Christian Association,[43] the central body uniting all Christians in Japan, reacted by holding an emergency board meeting. Members unanimously agreed to send an appeal to all Americans in which they asked that all decisions might be based on their own sense of faith and justice. Their appeal was telegraphed directly to Secretary of State Charles Hughes.

The Japanese Association of Labor Unions,[44] representing both those in the public and private sectors, sent a protest to its US counterparts, those at the federal level as well as those at the California state level. The Japanese Printers Union made a resolution at its meeting to mount a "non-purchase movement of Californian products."

The *Suiheisha*[45] chose a slightly different approach in forming its strategy. The organization, founded in 1922, focused on fighting against the prejudice and discrimination still rampant in Japanese society. It campaigned particularly to promote the dignity of the *Burakumin*, who were still a target of prejudice. On April 27, *Suiheisha* held its national conference in Osaka. The organization condemned the Japanese government for adopting "a weak diplomatic stance," almost ignoring the grave insult the United States had inflicted on the Japanese people.

All branches of the *Suiheisha* followed this national initiative. Days before, on the 25th, three of its representatives had visited US Ambassador Woods in Tokyo and handed him a letter protesting the treatment of Japanese nationals in the United States. Woods received the delegation most cordially and responded: "I fully understand what you intend to

convey. As a sincere friend of your country, I promise that I will do my utmost to help the situation."[46]

Although willing, the Ambassador proved unable to alter reality. In the meantime, reaction throughout Japan spread like wildfire. The response was exceptional. In early twentieth-century Japan, international incidents seldom attracted much attention outside major cities. People residing in the rural areas largely remained indifferent to events occurring in other countries. This time, however, it was quite different. The impact of the US exclusion clause in the Immigration Act of 1924 reverberated, affecting those in every corner of the island nation.

The impact was much more personal in the areas that had a direct connection to the issue. For people who had some sort of relationship to migrants who had gone to the United States, this was more than just a matter involving abstract human justice. The Hiroshima prefecture, for example, had sent approximately 57,000 immigrants to the United States out of a total of only 150,000 Japanese immigrants.

In addition, those Japanese had sent back some ¥11,000,000 to their home country. If the funds brought with all of the returning Japanese were added to this total, the amount would have been approximately double. The prefectures of Wakayama, Yamaguchi, and Kumamoto were also the point of departure for a number of immigrants. Support groups in them naturally urged the Japanese government to apply further pressure. Those people had, however, refrained from taking any immediate action for fear that their compatriots in the United States would suffer even more repercussions.[47]

The citizens of the Fukuoka prefecture were the first to actively protest. Fukuoka was the home base of the fourth largest number of Japanese immigrants in the United States. The local newspaper *Fukuoka Nichi Nichi Shimbun* played a leading role in encouraging support for the nascent citizens' movement.[48]

The Business Sector

The exclusion clause of the Immigration Act was a tremendous blow to Japan's business sector. As soon as the legislation passed the Senate on April 16, the Japanese silk market plummeted and the yen weakened dramatically. On April 19, the *Asahi* used detailed data to estimate the immediate damage the legislation had inflicted on trade. The paper went on to forecast "further serious impacts on related industries."[49] The Tokyo

Chamber of Commerce had called an emergency board meeting and a general meeting on the 17th. The Committee for Japan–US Relations also held an emergency meeting on the April 18. Both resulted in the formation of movements to protest the recently passed US legislation.

Apart from the clear financial impacts, the psychological blow was extremely serious for pro-American business leaders such as Shibusawa Eiichi and Fujiyama Raita. Shibusawa, a greatly respected elder of the Japanese business community, revealed his disappointment in an interview. Shibusawa told the reporter:

> *I have undertaken countless enterprises in my life, among them, Japanese-American relations have been one of my most important objectives. I have repeatedly toiled in the hope of achieving success and have spent much of my own resources to achieve positive results. And yet, the current prognosis can only be called dire. I cannot leave the world like this, with so much of what I have done unraveling. . . . Burying his head in both hands, a trickle of tears escaped through the fingers of this aging great man.*[50]

Shibusawa had been consistently at the forefront of Japan's attempt to forge better relations with the United States. He had put in tremendous individual effort, as well as his personal wealth in hopes of building a friendship between the two nations. His endeavors had not been confined to the business field, but extended further to include cultural exchanges and education. Shibusawa's long-term project was to help stabilize the Pacific region. He had gained a great deal of respect in the United States for his diligent efforts, not only among other business leaders but also with many prominent Americans who shared his vision.

As for the offensive Article 12(b) in the Immigration Act, Shibusawa had been closely monitoring the situation since the beginning. He did everything he could in his capacity to prevent the worst-case scenario from becoming a reality. Even after the legislation's enactment, Shibusawa still searched for a pragmatic solution. Interviewed by the *Asahi* on April 17, the day after the Senate decision, he proposed setting up a committee of Japanese and Americans to consider a way toward solving the issue. He, however, was no longer enthusiastic about going to the United States despite rumors then circulating in Japan. Despondent, Shibusawa questioned his previous strategy: "What has become of all my effort and my life-long agenda?"

On April 22, the national convention of all Japanese Chambers of Commerce was held in Kyoto. The resulting declaration, sent to its US counterparts, warned of the impending grave damages to trade relations between the two nations. All the actions undertaken by the Japanese business sector, however, had no tangible result in the United States.

Nationalist Movements and Reaction of the General Public

Surprisingly, the nationalists did not immediately seize the occasion to promote their own specific agenda. Prior to May 31, the day when a lone individual committed *seppuku* to protest the US action, hardly any initiatives originated from the "nationalists." One exception was a group of students who belonged to a Japan Marshall Arts group.[51] They were widely known for their ultranationalistic attitudes. The students demonstrated in front of the Gaimusho, but went no further than to wave a large protest banner.[52]

A protest, taking the form of *seppuku,* however, had its desired effect—shaking the entire nation. As the day dawned on May 31, a maid serving in the household of Viscount Inoue discovered the body lying in the garden. The property was situated adjacent to the US Embassy. The dead man appeared to be approximately forty years of age. He had slit his belly straight across with his short sword as well as severing the artery in his neck. Beside him was a letter addressed to US Ambassador Woods; it was an appeal to the American people via its Ambassador. It also stated the man's intension to arouse the Japanese people. The letter was signed "an anonymous citizen." This drastic protest created a shock wave that rippled throughout the nation. Not only the major national papers, but also all the leading local papers, such as the *Shinano Mainichi* based in Nagano, carried headlines about the event.

Nationalists seized this opportune moment, prompted by this centuries-old sacrificial act that embodied the ultimate form of protest. Prominent nationalist leaders, such as Uchida Ryoohei, Uesugi Shinkichi, and Koizumi Matajiro, met on June 3 to weigh their options. They decided to mount a large-scale "anti-American National Rally" at the *Kokugikan* in Tokyo, a grand hall dedicated to the martial arts. The *Kokuryuukai,*[53] a prominent right-wing organization, became the principal organizer. More than 30,000 people attended the rally on June 5.

Tooyama Mitsuru,[54] the revered sixty-nine-year-old patriarch of nationalist movements and the principal adviser to *Kokuryuukai*, addressed the crowd. When Tooyama stepped onto the stage, the audience responded with deafening applause. "Greatly elated by the enormous size of the crowd, with his face all flashed pink, Tooyama joined the clapping . . .," reported the *Asahi*.[55] The day coincided with the wedding of Crown Prince Hirohito (later the Showa Emperor) to Princess Nagako. "On the day of what would otherwise be a joyful national celebration, a loud cry of grief and anger was raised against the United States," the news article read.[56]

One man's *seppuku* had changed the mood of a nation. Even those general papers that usually took a more objective and restrained stance began shifting, with articles that assumed harsher tones when reporting about the United States. Poignant, however, was the *Asahi's* tribute to Ambassador Woods who was leaving Japan that appeared on the same day as the protest.

The motive for the Ambassador's resignation had already been made public by the US government. Woods had then confirmed it. The health of his mother-in-law, who had sustained injuries during the Great Kanto Earthquake, was rapidly deteriorating and he wanted to return home to Pennsylvania. Although this was the official reason provided, the Japanese government and press understood that the resignation was definitely related to the enactment of the Japanese exclusion clause. Many Japanese were aware of the efforts made by Woods to avert that particular clause from gaining congressional approval.

The *Asahi*, catching the Ambassador late at night while he was already preparing for bed, managed to capture some off-the-cuff remarks. Woods frankly admitted his sadness on leaving Japan: "I have found many of the most trusted and valuable friends of my life in Japan. The Japanese people fully understood me. Having to say farewell to them leaves me most disturbed. This is my saddest night."[57]

Prior to his departure, a farewell party was held at the Imperial Hotel. In his speech, an emotional and teary Woods once again made a personal pledge to continue his utmost to strengthen the Japan–US friendship.[58] On June 6, the day that Ambassador and Mrs. Woods departed, Tokyo Station was inundated by an unanticipated crowd of people. These were ordinary Japanese who came to pay their respects to Woods and say farewell to him in person. Security forces were overwhelmed as they attempted to protect government ministers, foreign diplomats, and other

dignitaries who were also seeing the Ambassador off. Finally, the train carrying the Ambassador and Mrs. Woods left for Yokohama amid a roar of emotional cries of "*banzai*," as the crowd spontaneously displayed its respect and affection.[59]

That day was packed with events: the wedding of the Crown Prince, the nationalists' rally, and the farewell to the US Ambassador. Still there was room for the press to report on another international item that would significantly affect Japan; the International Migration Conference was being held in Rome. Japan decided that its delegation would present a resolution calling for racial equality.

That resolution was a more explicit version of Japan's proposal in support of racial equality first submitted to the Paris Peace Conference some ten years before. Subsequently, Japan had proposed a similar resolution two years earlier to the League of Nations Association in Prague. This time Japan's proposal was accepted. Having an international body approve the principle of racial equality had continued to be part of Japan's unfulfilled agenda. "In view of the newly enacted US Immigration Law, it is the right opportunity for Japan to let the world know once again where she stands on this issue," a press report commented.[60]

Two days after Woods's departure, on June 8, the funeral was held for the "unnamed" man who had committed *seppuku*. Tooyama Mitsuru officiated at the ceremony, calling it "The Citizen's Funeral." The night before, the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo had hosted a grand ball attended by Acting US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Mrs Caffery, and many dignitaries, both foreign and Japanese. Prior to the actual ball, invited guests were seated at a dinner. Halfway through the meal, the assembled diners were taken by surprise when a group of fierce-looking Japanese men, approximately sixty in number, suddenly marched into the room.

The men were all dressed in sword dance costumes, each holding a glittering weapon pointing upward. A boy of about eight years old, also clad in a sword dance kimono, walked at the head of the group. They identified themselves by carrying a red banner that read "*Tai Ko Sha*."[61] Before the stunned guests, they performed the traditional masculine "dance of the sword," made a speech, and distributed pamphlets. A would-be crisis was averted by a quick-thinking Imperial Hotel staff member who promptly had the *Kimigayo*, the national anthem, played in the dining hall. The men suddenly stood at attention, paying homage to the anthem that symbolized their eternal obeisance. As the song ended, they quietly withdrew.[62]

The *Tai Ko Sha* also campaigned to stop US movies from being shown in Japan. Threatening letters started arriving at cinemas in Tokyo whenever such movies were to be shown. On June 8, managers of cinemas throughout Tokyo, including the famous director Kido Shiro of Shochiku Cinema, consulted each other. They agreed that starting in July, all cinemas would no longer purchase, lease, or show US movies.[63]

Hostilities also extended to people from the United States living in Japan. The US Consulate in Yokohama was threatened with violence. Various organizations competed to stage demonstrations; those registering their intense disapproval included the Port Workers Union as well as the Hairdressers Union. Fearing for their personal safety, US citizens residing in Yokohama began sending messages home pleading for enhanced protection, and also firmly suggested the necessity and benefit of repealing the offensive legislation.

The worsening domestic crisis caused the Japanese government increasing concern. As a result, the internal security command channel was upgraded. Responsibility for security became the direct concern of the Vice-Minister of the Naimusho (i.e., the Ministry of Internal Affairs) rather than the responsibility of the Director of Police and Security. On June 18, the Vice-Minister directed department heads of local districts throughout Japan to control anti-American protest movements. Government efforts, however, failed to fully contain the hostile actions, which were now spreading like wildfire.

The Japanese exclusion clause was to become law on July 1. On the eve of the enactment, the *Asahi*'s front-page headline proclaimed: "Protest Movements Become More Severe with the Approaching Enactment." The paper was filled with reports of rallies, lectures, and conferences organized by a great number of groups to protest the unacceptable US conduct. On July 1, the *Asahi*'s lead headline read simply: "With Both Houses [of the US Congress] Supporting the Legislation, the Law Has Been Enacted." On page 2, however, the *Asahi* published its own editorial comments under the heading: "We Deeply Regret the Harmful Effects on Japan–US Relations."[64]

Another headline read: "The Day of National Humiliation Has Arrived Today with the Law's Enactment." The paper also pointed out that some six protest rallies were scheduled for that day. The following day, the paper described the atmosphere of the protests and other meetings. The column heads included: "Cries of Grief. Unforgettable Injury by America," "Over Ten Thousand Gather to Express Their Anguish," "Cries of Anger Under

the Sweltering Summer Heat," and "All Shinto Shrines Combine to Pray to *Kami* to Lead Americans Toward a Just Path." Striking an odd note was the report that the only cinema still showing US movies enjoyed a full house.

Not unlike the media today, the heightened interest in the incident dissipated not long after, as the press chased other news items. But the Japanese people did not forget so easily. In the minds of a great many ordinary Japanese, the resentment toward the United States did not go away. The feeling of injustice committed by the US government grew more intense. The realization that Americans would continue to discriminate against people based solely on their race etched deeply into the minds of the Japanese.

The Intellectual Reaction

Many Japanese intellectuals at that time possessed extensive knowledge of the West and were experienced in dealing with other nations. They constantly kept abreast of international affairs. Faced with that current crisis in Japan–US relations, the attendant populist emotional tide inevitably became a matter for their profound concern. They clearly envisaged the dangerous path this reaction conceivably might encourage in the future.

The pro-American intellectuals were deeply disappointed by the passage of the Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Act of 1924. They admired US democracy and trusted its leadership. This group firmly believed in and advocated for closer ties with the United States. Such an improved relationship would provide a productive base on which Japan could then develop its own foreign policy, some felt. With this unfortunate turn of events, they not only feared for Japan–US relations but also dreaded possible destabilization throughout the wider Pacific region. The consequences might not be successfully contained but instead ultimately threaten world peace.

Many of the intellectual leaders openly voiced their grave concerns. They expressed their opinions and were not reluctant to issue serious warnings. Subsequent discussions extended over a broad range of issues. Their endeavors covered more ground than can be adequately or appropriately covered here. Instead, examining a representative number of the leading figures should provide a compelling portrait of the intellectual reactions during this time.

Those described are: Shidehara Kijuuro, a diplomat who represented a pro-American faction of the Gaimusho; Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, a leading journalist who specialized in US–Japan relations; Nitobe Inazo, an educator who had studied in the United States and was to a great extent an admirer of all things American; Ishibashi Tanzan, a well-known figure in journalism who maintained an objective viewpoint throughout the ordeal; Yoshino Sakuzo, Professor of Tokyo Imperial University, who had studied in the United States and Europe, was widely considered to be a leader of the *Taisho Democracy;* and, finally, Yanagida Kunio, an ethnologist and historian, who was greatly respected as a scholar of Japanese philosophy.

Shidehara Kijuro played a central part in each of Japan's crucial diplomatic events during the 1910s and 1920s: the Paris Peace Conference, the Washington Conference, and the enactment of the Japanese exclusion clause. He was always known as a staunch pro-American diplomat. As fate would have it, the day that Shidehara, as the then newly appointed Foreign Minister, was scheduled to detail the country's foreign policy before the National Diet, coincided with the passage of the exclusion clause in the United States.

Despite his normally pro-American stance, the demands of the situation forced Shidehara to denounce US conduct as he faced the Diet. He declared that Japan would continue to protest until its legitimate demand met with a satisfactory response. Shidehara quickly added, however, that he would not spare any effort to resolve the situation peacefully. His aim was to strengthen and ensure the continuation of long-lasting friendship between the two countries.[65] Shidehara's accumulated experience as a diplomat had taught him that compromise was an essential part of diplomacy. A basic underlying pragmatism also convinced him that, since Japan was unable to match the military might of the United States, it was up to Japan to compromise at this point.

Writing in his autobiography many years later, Shidehara recounted his conversation with James Bryce, the then British Ambassador to the United States. The meeting took place in 1912, more than ten years before the uproar caused by the Japanese exclusion clause. Bryce asked Shidehara, then a young Japanese diplomat stationed in Washington, whether Japan was prepared to wage war against the United States. Bryce would later tell him: "If so, you are making a great mistake. [An Exclusion Law] is not a sufficiently large issue to risk the total demise of the nation. If I were you, I would let it go."[66]

Shidehara was an enthusiastic admirer of US democracy. He clearly recognized the country's military strength and was well aware of the economic importance of the United States to Japan. Balancing idealism with political reality, he chose not to jeopardize relations with the United States whenever possible. Perhaps he might have remembered James Bryce's advice, or simply considered the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act not worth the risk to national security.

As a Foreign Minister, Shidehara would never issue a meaningful protest to the United States, despite his own pledge before the National Diet. A year after the enactment of the exclusion clause, Foreign Minister Shidehara stated before the Diet: "There is no doubt that a sense of justice still runs through America's blood, unchanged from the time of the country's founding. I will bide my time until this American spirit reveals itself."[67] With this pronouncement, he effectively closed the curtain on the exclusion clause issue.

Shidehara's attitudes naturally drew severe domestic criticism, particularly from nationalist factions. Despite his stated position, however, Shidehara managed to somehow escape any serious political harassment. This good fortune largely was due to some key factors that worked in his favor. He was Foreign Minister as the Taisho era was closing and the Showa was just beginning. The *Taisho Democracy* was still at its height. Consequently, liberal ideas continued to dominate, particularly among the country's intellectuals. The political climate also remained hospitable to Shidehara's brand of diplomacy.

Meanwhile, Japan's economic dependence on the United States continued to make it imperative for the Japanese not to rock the boat. Perhaps, most important, was that Shidehara remained extremely well connected to the top echelon of political and economic players in Japan. At this crucial period, he was under the protection of the then Prime Minister Kato Takaaki, his brother-in-law.[68]

Taken together, these conditions allowed Shidehara a fairly free hand in forming diplomatic policies. He was able to evade any potentially damaging public criticism, allowing him to escape unscathed from the usual malicious maneuvers of his political rivals. However, Shidehara's policy did not have the support of all of the Gaimusho. After the enactment of the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act, skepticism arose even among those who hitherto had supported cooperative international diplomacy. Seeds of distrust were sown against the United States among a number of diplomats. This creeping level of doubt would take root

as the 1930s unrolled, with Japanese distrust developing into outright hostility.

Shidehara consistently chose reason above emotion, calm above uncontrolled excitement. Unfortunately, many intellectuals who previously had been recognized as pro-American reacted differently. Japan's *Taisho Democracy* was grounded, in many ways, on an admiration for the US style of democracy. The Japanese exclusion clause, therefore, came as a severe disappointment to this group of intellectuals. This shift was most unfortunate because they had acted as one of the mainstays of the *Taisho Democracy*. These intellectuals included Nitobe Inazo, Uchimura Kanzo, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, and Shibusawa Eiich, just to name a few. The event sent shockwaves reverberating among this group. For some, their previous admiration turned to resentment.

Another important intellectual, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi,[69] was a liberal thinker, leading journalist, and later a critic specializing in Japan–US relations. During his youth, he had spent some years in the United States attending high school and then studying at the University of Washington in Seattle. Despite the many hardships he was forced to experience while living on the West Coast, he continued to actively support close cooperation with the United States. Consequently, the enactment of the Japanese exclusion clause, intensified his criticism of the United States. He pointed out that "this discrimination is purely based on race." After a time, however, Kiyosawa returned to a more moderate stance:

> *When dealing with Eastern issues, Japan and the United States differ little in their ideas. Only the specific policy of immigration created bad feelings between the two peoples. . . . We will continue denouncing the injustice committed by the United States on immigration. At the same time, however, we need to continue our cooperative efforts on broader Eastern issues.*[70]

Nitobe Inazo,[71] the author of *Bushido: The Soul of Japan,* was a leading intellectual and educator in Japan. His activities were internationally recognized. When the League of Nations was established in 1920, Nitobe was appointed as the Deputy Secretary General of it. At the age of twenty-two, he had traveled to the United States and studied at John Hopkins University. He then moved to Europe, continuing his studies at the University of Bonn.

After returning to Japan with his American-born wife, Mary P. Elkinton of Philadelphia, Nitobe took on the self-appointed role of acting as "the

bridge over the Pacific." Among his numerous publications, the 1908 *Bushido* attracted worldwide attention and was translated into many different languages. The book was the basis for his Honorary Doctorate from John Hopkins University.

The impact on Nitobe of the enactment of the exclusion clause was severe. As a friend described its effect, the event descended as if "the sky was falling down on him." Extremely perturbed by what he considered outrageous congressional behavior, Nitobe declared that despite his love for the United States, he would never set a foot on its soil until the legislation was repealed. His anger never subsided. Even seven years later he wrote:

> *Though it is not voiced much now, the Japanese people, deep in their hearts, will never forgive the Exclusion Law. … After a nation sows the seeds of distrust and indignation in the minds of the people of another country, whatever it may subsequently preach on the subject of equality and friendship between nations will sound hollow.*[72]

Not all Japanese supported Nitobe's extreme position. They thought instead that he might make a more positive contribution by visiting the United States in order to appeal directly to the US public. They felt that such a visit would allow him to carefully explain the injustice of the actions taken by the United States. Still others conjectured that Nitobe could be more effective by using his position with the League of Nations to bring the matter before the international organization. Why Nitobe did not choose this option remains an unsolved puzzle. As a possible explanation, Miwa Kimitada attempted to provide a psychological answer to this question.[73]

Miwa suggested that Nitobe felt no need to use the League of Nations option. Instead, he fiercely believed that the United States would not persist in its error. A country founded on justice must inevitably reassert its true moral principles. Doing so would then resolve the situation in a mutually satisfactory fashion. Throughout the ordeal Nitobe held fast to his unshakable faith in Americans.

Moreover, he always regarded the United States as Japan's benefactor for it had been the one that had forced open the doors of a previously closed country. Since then America had assisted with Japanese development. For these reasons, he felt that the Japanese remained in America's debt. Nitobe previously had defended the United States even on occasions

when many other Japanese labeled its conduct as unjustifiable. He considered this support to be a partial repayment of the debt the Japanese owed to the United States. Even for Nitobe, however, there was a limit to his unquestioning support. The exclusion clause of the Immigration Act of 1924 left his faith in the US public fatally shaken. His loyal devotion had been betrayed.

There were also those in Japan, although they were a distinct minority, who kept calm throughout the period. They were neither in favor of, nor hostile to, America but chose to remain objective and rational. Ishibashi Tanzan[74] was a notable leader of this group. He was a journalist and an influential voice during the *Taisho Democracy*. He would enter politics after World War II, hold a number of ministerial posts, and serve briefly as Prime Minister in 1956. Today, some forty years after his death, Ishibashi continues to be respected by the Japanese people. He is remembered for his honest and rational thinking, particularly during the immediate turbulent years in post-World War II Japan.

Ishibashi had made his thoughts clear long before the exclusion clause was introduced. Earlier in that century, with resentment against Japanese immigrants increasing in California, he wrote an editorial in the *Toyo Keizai Shimpoo*. The column, titled "No Need for Immigration," argued that Japanese immigration was not necessary. The issue of migration, however, comprised only one point within Ishibashi's larger vision. Less than a decade later, during the time of the Washington Conference, Ishibashi wrote a series of editorials urging Japan to rein in its expansionist ideas. The titles of these pieces included: "Be Ready to Give Up All: Attitudes that Should Be Taken at the Washington Conference"[75] and "The Illusion Behind the Greater Japan Doctrine."[76]

In his first editorial, Ishibashi described Japan's current strategy as essentially lacking any focus: "What we are doing is without any larger vision. All we are doing is coveting a little more land and resources in Korea, Taiwan, China, Manchuria and Siberia. Once gained we simply try to hold on to our conquests while we figure out a way to manage them." "Give up everything!" Ishibashi insisted, "that is the only way for Japan to go forward." Anticipating that he would be criticized as just another ideological dreamer, he wrote a series of follow-up editorials.

Ishibashi declared that the "Greater Japan Doctrine,"[77] which sought ever-increasing power and influence outside Japan's borders lacked either political or economic merit. Furthermore, he said that it was simply foolish "to send substantial numbers of Japanese overseas as a means of alleviating

Japan's economic and over-population problems." Ishibashi went on to say that pursuing this Greater Japan Doctrine meant expanding military power. Only by giving up this counterproductive strategy would Japan be able to avoid this rather futile path. "If you think that Japan needs to annex Korea and Manchuria to strengthen our defense, then you have totally reversed the priority of the ends and means," he concluded.

Ishibashi's editorials appeared three years before the enactment of the Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Act. He seemed to have anticipated the immigration crisis and the direction in which it would head. In the same series of editorials, Ishibashi presented his own assessment of immigration: "Sending laborers overseas to compete with local labor by offering to work for lower wages would not benefit Japan. Such a policy is shameful, and dishonorable." Instead, Ishibashi argued, "it would be far better to keep the labor force at home, productively employed. Japan could then sell its manufactured output to the United States."

Yoshino Sakuzo was arguably the most influential intellectual leader of the *Taisho Democracy*. His ideal brand of democracy was very close to that of the United States. He considered President Wilson to have been a very outstanding political leader and personally held him in great esteem. Taisho intellectuals who advocated democracy were often identified as admirers of America. In this respect, both Yoshino and Nitobe can be placed in the same category.

Mitani Taichiro,[78] in his 1995 publication, offers the following valuable observation about Yoshino:

> *Yoshino, on one hand states that "If we expect our country to develop in a healthy manner, it is clear that we first have to observe and then to adapt to the dominant trend in the world." On the other hand, Yoshino also cautioned, "While adapting to this trend, we must not forget the mission that is unique to our own nation. . . . Blindly following powerful nations in their pursuit of national interest would be an error, as well as a misinterpretation of the meaning of 'adaptation.'" Yoshino admired Wilson not because of the latter's skills when playing American power politics. Yoshino held Wilson and the Wilson Doctrine in high regard because they existed as a symbolic representation of universal principles, which were capable of rising above party politics.*[79]

Unlike Nitobe, however, Yoshino remained objective when the exclusion clause became law. He considered the issue from a scholar's point of view and concluded that the problem would not be solved quickly. Too many obstacles lay ahead.

A decade before, Yoshino had spent three years in the United States and Europe as a Tokyo University scholar. Shortly after his return in 1914, he published an essay, "Issues Concerning Japanese-US Relations—An Academic Analysis."[80] In it, he analyzed a number of elements imbedded deep within US society that had helped transform the immigration issue into an anti-Japanese movement. Yoshino's approach attracted the attention of both academics and intellectuals in Japan.

In 1924, Yoshino was invited to join the editorial board of the *Tokyo Asahi* as an adviser. His work there, however, was short-lived. During that time, he was forging close relationships with the up-and-coming generation of Chinese and Korean intellectuals. His increasingly critical comments on Japan's aggression in China, and on the assimilation policy imposed on Koreans, did not please Japanese authorities. Seeing that he was becoming a liability to the *Asahi* in the then current political climate, Yoshino resigned from that post after only four months of service.

Yanagida Kunio[81] was appointed as a senior editor of the *Tokyo Asahi* at the same time as Yoshino. Yanagida was a well-known ethnologist and historian. His work as an analytical journalist, however, is surprisingly little known. After serving as the Chief Secretary for the House of Lords in 1920, Yanagida became a guest writer for the *Asahi*. In 1921, he was appointed Japan's representative to the League of Nations Committee for Mandated Territories and moved to Geneva. On his return to Japan, he once again took a position with the *Tokyo Asahi*, only this time as a senior editor. It was 1924, the year of the fateful US immigration initiative. Yanagida was scheduled to write an *Asahi* editorial on July 1, the day the Immigration Act of 1924 was enacted. Titled "July the 1st, the Exclusion Law Is Now Enacted,"[82] Yanagida's editorial attracted considerable attention both then and later on.

The enactment of the Japanese exclusion clause was "the historical incident, which marks a drastic turn in Japanese-US relations," Yanagida asserted. He was dismissive, however, of the proposal to rename July 1 as "Humiliation Day." "Our anger and distress go deep," he wrote and continued:

> *Our consternation is not something easily resolved by a simple slogan. . . . Our objective should be to guide the population to a better future and prepare them for the effort required to achieve it. The idea of naming a day that would mark our humiliation falls considerably short of this objective. Our youth growing up today will not necessarily take lessons from the past. We should be pointing*

them to the future, whether or not they ultimately remember the humiliation we sustained this time.[83]

"Even in the midst of humiliation and disappointment, we learned important lessons, though most of our new knowledge can only sadden us," he wrote. Yanagida then listed what he described as "our new knowledge." He continued: "First, that the humanitarian principle extends only as far as the national border. Second, hidden beneath the beautifully worded diplomatic discourse conducted by 'civilized' nations lay the changeable whims of politicians and the trivial conditions that they demand." Finally, he wrote:

[The] 'international unity of working people' is nothing more than hollow rhetoric. The misfortune suffered by one group of workers does not stir compassion in another group, but rather invites distrust and exclusion. Above all, we have learned exactly how ineffectual are those of our politicians, who cling to outdated ideas.

In conclusion, Yanagida proposed marking July 1 as a day of blessing instead of labeling it Humiliation Day:

The United States is made up of many different races. Given the greatly mixed composition of the population, to single out the Japanese and exclude them based on race is nothing but a deft political maneuver, a pretext for a hidden political agenda. Even a three-year-old should be able to understand this. If we were to accept their justification purely at face value, and consider it as a part of an everlasting racial struggle, we would certainly walk into the rhetorical trap they set. This incident, in fact, has given us a great opportunity to unite with other peoples in Asia. We should recognize the reality that discrimination against us truly does exist. With that understanding, we should learn to be more generous to other Asian races, and pity those who are trapped by a narrow concept of racial prejudice. For these reasons, I now propose to mark the July 1st as our Blessed Day.[84]

Notes

1. Gaimushoo, ed. *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho*: Taibei Imin Mondai Keika Gaiyoo, pp. 1–11.
2. Ibid.
3. Gaimushoo, ed. *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho*: Taisho 13, pp. 150–151.
4. Ibid., p. 152.

5. Matsui to Hanihara, 24 April Taisho 13 (1924), *Beikoku ni Okeru Hainichi Mondai Zooken: Dec. Taisho 12 – June Taisho 13* (Handwritten draft), Gaimushoo Archives.
6. The Privy Council at that time was the highest advisory body to the Emperor.
7. Insei to Yoosei, *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 29 May 1924.
8. Hanihara to Matsui, Telegram 353, 29 April Taisho 13 (1924), Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho: Taisho 13, op. cit., pp. 166–170.
9. Matsui to Hanihara, 8 May Taishoo 13 (1924), *Beikoku ni Okeru Hainichi Mondai Zooken: Dec. Taisho 12 – June Taisho 13,* Gaimushoo Archives, op. cit.
10. Matsui to Hanihara, 16 May Taisho 13 (1924), *Beikoku ni Okeru Hainichi Mondai Zooken: Dec. Taisho 12 – June Taisho 13,* Gaimushoo Archives, op. cit.
11. Gaimusho, ed. *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho*: Taisho 13, op. cit., p. 217.
12. The Japanese–Russian Basic Treaty was signed in January 1925, normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries after the Russian revolution of 1917. The enactment of Japanese Exclusion clause most likely acted as a catalyst in hastening this agreement.
13. Oohashi to Hirota, 28 May 1924, Gaimushoo, ed. *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho*: Taishoo 13, op. cit., pp. 184–185.
14. It is not correct to assume that the entire pre-war military establishment was hostile to America. Taking the Imperial Army as an example, there were those commanding officers who admired the American military during World War I for their "progressive thoughts and bravery." They actively studied the United States. These officers sought to avoid being biased by any specific issue, such as the US immigration policy, or being influenced by rising domestic anti-American propaganda. In their opinion, prejudgments were detrimental to studying the true state of Americans. In the thoughts of these progressive Army officers, the historian Kurosawa Fumitaka detects an undercurrent by which the *Taisho Democracy* responded to the American style of democracy. Further on this, refer to Kurosawa, Fumitaka, *Taisenki no Nippon Rikugun,* Misuzu Shobo, 2000.
15. *Jinshu Atsureki Jochoo no Gusaku,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 18 April 1924.
16. *Yuushoku Jinshu e no Choosen,* Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 April 1924.
17. *Minshuu no Kitai wa Uragirareta,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 29 May 1924.
18. *Heiwateki Keikoo no Gyakutensha – Beikoku no Sekinin,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 19 April 1924.
19. 徳富蘇峰 (1863–1957).
20. *Kutsujoku no Hi 7gatsu 1nichi wa Tsui ni Kitareri,* Kokumin Shimbun, 1 July 1924.
21. *Haji o Shiri, Haji o Shinobi, Haji o Sosogu,* Kokumin Shimbun, 20 May 1924.

Nippon Teikoku no Ichi Dai Yakuseki, Kokumin Shimbun, 27 May 1924.
22. *Aa 7gatsu 1nichi,* Kokumin Shimbun, 2 July 1924.
23. *Ichiru no Nozomi wa Rippoo no Chien,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 17 April 1924.
24. *Hanihara Shi no 2 Go no Ue ni Zoo-o to Teki-i no Uka,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 17 April 1924.
25. *Jinshu Atsureki Jochoo no Gusaku,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 18 April 1924, op. cit.
26. Ibid.
27. *Heiwa Teki Keikoo no Gyakuten Sha—Beikoku no Sekinin,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 19 April 1924.
28. Ibid.
29. *Sekai wa Kore o Nanto Miru: Hainichi-An ni Taisuru Kakukoku no Yoron (1),* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 20, 1924.
30. *Beikoku wa Bera-bo daga Nippon mo Tai-shi Taido o Hansei Seyo,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 6 May 1924.
31. *Japanese Thank The Times: Asahi Newspapers Express a Nation's Appreciation of its Attitude,* The New York Times, 20 April 1924.
32. The list of participants included all major newspapers including, Hoochi Shimbun, Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Kokumin Shimbun and Jiji Shinpo.
33. *Hainichi An ni Taisuru Kyoodoo Sengen,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 21 April 1924.
34. Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941).
35. *Juuteki na Ban-kooi – Zen Asia e no Dai-bujoku,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 26 April 1924.
36. 大日本実業組合連合会.
37. Oosaka Asahi Shimbun, 24 April 1924.
38. Ibid.
39. Kodama, Masaaki, *Amerika 1924nen Iminho no Seiritu ni Taisuru Imin-ken no Dookoo–Fukuoka Ken o Chuushin ni,* in Miwa Kimitada ed. *Nichibei Kiki no Kigen to Hainichi Iminhoo,* Ronsoo Sha, 1997, p. 136.
40. 海外協会.
41. 移民協会.
42. 日米関係委員会.
43. 日本基督教連盟.
44. 官業労働総同盟.
45. 水平社.
46. *Woods Taishi ga Hainichi Koogi ni Kita Suihei Daihyoo to Akushu,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 26 April 1924.
47. *Hainichi An no Tsuuka ni Gekishi, Zai-Beikoku Imin Doohoo no Kekki,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 20 April 1924.

48. For further details, refer to: Kodama Masaaki, *Amerika 1924 nen Iminhoo no Seiritu ni Taisuru Imin-ken no Dookoo – Fukuoka Ken o Chuushin ni,* op. cit., pp. 120–153.
49. *Tokushuu: Hainichiho Jisshi to Nichi-Bei Booeki Eikyoo – Kansetsuteki no Eikyoo Sukoburu Jindai,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 17 April 1924.
50. *Shibusawa-Oo no Namida,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 19 April 1924.
51. 日本力行会.
52. Kodama, Masaaki, *Amerika 1924nen Iminho no Seiritu ni Taisuru Imin-ken no Dookoo – Fukuoka Ken o Chuushin ni*, op. cit.
53. Kokuryuukai (黒龍会) was a right wing nationalist organization founded in 1901. Their activities extended beyond Japan. The group was known overseas as the 'Black Dragon Society', a direct translation of its Japanese name. The group also actively supported Japan's 'Racial Equality' proposal at the time of Paris Conference. The group continued its activities until the GHQ ordered its dissolution in 1946.
54. See Chap. 2.
55. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 6 May 1924.
56. Ibid.
57. *Saraba! Aisuru Nippon Yo, Yo wa Besuto o Tsukusita to Woods Taishi Kataru,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun 20 May 1924.
58. *Kangeki ni Michite Bei Taishi no Chikai,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 2 June 1924.
59. *Banzai no Koe o Ato ni Bei Taishi Kokoku e,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 6 June 1924.
60. *Kokusai Imin Kaigi e Jinshu Byoodoo Teian,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 6 June 1924.
61. 「大行社」 This right wing organization was founded in 1924 under the umbrella provided by *Inagawa Kai*, a prominent *Yakuza* group.
62. *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 8 June 1924.
63. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 9 June 1924.
64. Since the Exclusion Act was first presented before Congress, in Tokyo alone, fifty-five public rallies have been held in protest. Host groups included the People's conference to protest the US (国民対米会), the League of labor unions to protest the United States (対米労働連盟), and the association to support overseas Japanese." (対外同士会). Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 30 June 1924, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun 1 July 1924.
65. Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, ed. *Shidehara Kijuuroo,* Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 1955, p. 265.
66. Shidehara, Kijuuroo, *Gaiko 50nen,* Chuu-oo Kooron Sha, 1987, pp. 50–51.
67. Gaimu Daijin no Enzetsu (Statement by Foreign Minister), 22 January *Taisho 14* (1925), Kizokuin Giji Sokki Roku, No. 2, p. 25, Kokkai Toshokan (The National Diet Library).

68. Both Kato and Shidehara were married to daughters of Iwasaki Yataro, the founder of the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu.
69. 清沢冽 (1890–1945).
70. Kiyosawa, Kiyoshi, *Kuroshio ni Kiku,* Banri Kaku Shoboo, 1928, pp. 276–27.
71. 新渡戸稲造(1862–1933).
72. Nitobe, Inazo, *Japan,* published in London 1931, quoted in Asada Tadao, *Ryoo Taisen Kan no Nichibei Kankei,* Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1993, p. 309.
73. Miwa, Kimitada, ed. *Nichibei Kiki no Kigen to Hainichi Iminhoo,* Ronsoosha, 1997.
74. For Ishibashi's ideas on the Racial Equality Bill, see Chap. 2.
75. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Editorial: Issai o Sutsuru no Kakugo – Taiheiyoo Kaigi ni Taisuru Gawa Taido,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 23 July 1921.
76. Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Editorial Series: Dai Nippon Shugi no Gensoo,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, 30 July, 6 August, and 13 August, 1921.
77. 「大日本主義」 The terminology is Ishibashi's own creation.
78. 三谷太一郎 (1936–).
79. Mitani, Taichiroo, *Shinpan, Taisho Democracy Ron: Yoshino Sakuzo no Jidai,* Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995, p. 81.
80. Yoshino Sakuzo, *Gakujutsu Joo yori Mitaru Nichibei Mondai,* Chuuoo Kooron, 1914 January Issue.
81. 柳田國男 (1985–1962).
82. Yanagida, Kunio, *Editorial: 7gatsu 1nichi kara Iyoiyo Hainichihoo no Jisshi ni Tsuki,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 1 July 1924.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

The Courage of One's Conviction: Braving the Currents of Showa Diplomacy

Japan's Diplomatic Directions

Over the years, historians have gradually reduced the stature of Hanihara Masanao to the somewhat sad and sentimental figure of yet another "tragic diplomat." As a family member, this romantic reduction remains nearly incomprehensible. At the very least, we consider such a characterization to be distinctly at odds with what we know and accept. Hanihara never considered the 1924 incident as his personal tragedy. Nor would those who remained close to the Ambassador think of him in this way. Hanihara's decision to change the trajectory of his career was the only personal consequence that flowed from the Immigration Act of 1924 events.

In 1927, three years after returning from Washington, his role as Ambassador Plenipotentiary concluded. Instead of accepting another diplomatic post, Hanihara resigned from the Gaimusho. He had entered the diplomatic corps at the age of twenty-two. His career spanned more than thirty years, starting as a young Secretary at the Washington Embassy. He was the youngest attaché at the Portsmouth Peace Conference in 1905, when the end of the Russo-Japanese War was negotiated.

The age of thirty-nine found him as Consul-General in San Francisco, where he gained firsthand knowledge of the plight of Japanese immigrants. He later acted as a member of the Ishii Mission to Washington when the Lansing-Ishii agreement was signed in 1917. Back in Japan, he first served as the Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs, and then rose to the position of the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs—the

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2_7

administrative head of the Gaimusho. Hanihara in due course became Japan's Ambassador to Washington in 1922, the youngest man ever appointed to that coveted post. He had devoted his entire career to advancing Japan's diplomatic efforts, particularly in regard to US–Japan relations, which had grown steadily in importance.

While serving as Ambassador, he received a Papal Order of the Grand Cross of St. Sylvester from the Vatican. Before leaving Washington, the Emperor awarded him the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun. International accolades followed him even after he returned home to Japan. The honors included an Order of the Grand Cross Odorodzenia Polski from the Polish government, as well as the Grand Cross of the Peruvian Order of the Sun. His was an indisputably illustrious diplomatic career.

Leaving the Gaimusho, however, did not mean retirement; Hanihara was only fifty-one years old. He was still at the peak of his strength and continued to lead an active life. It was his decision to start a new life. His letter to his mother, Hanihara Mon, still living in Yamanashi, shows a glimpse into his frame of mind at that time. Hanihara wrote that Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi had offered him the Ambassadorship to Belgium, but he had declined. "I have some thoughts of my own on the future of Japan's diplomacy, which I wish to explore in depth," he explained to Mon as the reason for refusing Tanaka's offer.

> *Today, on the 18th [December], at the fulfillment of my term as Ambassador Plenipotentiary, I resigned from the Gaimusho, with a clear mind and in fine spirits. From now on, totally freed from an official position, I will explore the ways in which I can contribute to the nation. I am aware that many difficulties lay ahead. I am quite prepared for them, and I entreat you not to worry. In a man's life, the higher the position you reach in society, the more responsibilities you must accept. It is a natural matter of course. What is required are courage and determination to fulfill one's obligations as a man. One should not be blinded by short-term interests or aspirations for higher social recognition.*[1]

Leaving the confines of officialdom and work so that he could operate as a totally free citizen was Hanihara's decision. Born in the Meiji era from the samurai class, he never doubted that his first obligation was to devote his life to the country he loved and honored. By staying in an official position, however, he would be forced to acquiesce to whatever the government policy of the day might be. This necessity posed an intractable difficulty for Hanihara. Being highly scrupulous, he likely would

have found the evolving direction of the Japanese position difficult, if not impossible, to support.

At this crucial juncture, Japan's diplomacy was taking a sharp turn to the right. Different, nonliberal, ideas were gaining predominance in the shifting battle over Japan's foreign policies. In fact, once unshackled from the Gaimusho, Hanihara immediately went on to criticize Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka's China policy quite severely. Clearly, his decision to abandon the honors accruing to his justly deserved government post reflected a growing disenchantment with Japanese policy. In his letter to Mon, he had emphasized the need "to fulfill one's obligations as a man." Hanihara recognized that if he stayed committed to the present government he would be severely limited in what he could accomplish for his country.

Perhaps, his decision at that time was not entirely surprising, when one considers Hanihara as a young man who had been profoundly influenced by his experience at Waseda University. Waseda was one of the first non-government universities. Commonly known as the "Waseda Spirit," the ideology was proudly nurtured and instilled in generations of Waseda students. Some years later, Ogata Taketora,[2] journalist and one-time leader of the Liberal Party, summarized this ideology in an article titled "What Is the Waseda Spirit?" According to Ogata, "[i]t is the spirit of freedom, in other words, the spirit to proudly stand up to authority."[3]

Graduating from Waseda some ten years after Hanihara, Ogata had held many key government positions, including serving as the Minister of Internal Affairs. However, in a speech given at one of Waseda's graduation ceremonies, Ogata encouraged the new graduates not to aspire to government positions. He reminded them that if they found themselves in government, they would still always have to uphold the Waseda Spirit as free thinkers.[4] The Waseda Spirit was rooted in the belief held by Okuma Shigenobu, the founder of Waseda University. He was twice Prime Minister, as well as the Foreign Minister a number of times.

In addition, Okuma was an outspoken critic of the policies of his day. He left government a number of times in his life, only to be persuaded later to return. During his periods away from the government, he acted as a stern political watchdog. It was while out of power that he made substantial contributions toward building the future of Japan. Okuma created the private university, Waseda, in 1882. His vision for future Japanese leaders stressed individuals who were willing and capable of standing apart from government authorities when necessary. He intended Waseda to

serve that purpose by becoming one of the leading private universities, a position it achieved and still retains today.

Hanihara studied at Waseda when the university was in its youth, only some ten years after it was founded. Okuma's spirit was still very much alive, an unmistakable presence throughout his university years. Hanihara went on to become one of the first Waseda graduates to enter the Gaimusho, breaking into that elite enclave of government university graduates. Throughout his diplomatic career, as well as in the years following his resignation, Hanihara maintained a close relationship with Waseda. In 1922, while attending the Washington Conference, Hanihara received news of Okuma's death. Unable to contain his personal grief, he spoke to journalists attending the conference:

> *I am, as a student of the great Okuma, under many personal obligations to this man who was a great teacher and a wise statesman. He was one of the greatest national figures, if not the greatest, since the Meiji restoration. His services to the empire can scarcely be measured. I am inexpressedly [sic] shocked to hear this news.*[5]

Throughout the Taisho era, Japan's diplomatic efforts remained firmly in the hands of liberals and moderates. Political leaders who had extensive knowledge of the West shaped international policies. These strategies gained widespread support from like-minded intellectuals. Most Foreign Ministers were veterans of the Gaimusho, including Makino Nobuaki, Ishii Kikujiro, Uchida Yasuya, and Shidehara Kijuuro. They were all well informed and maintained a critical understanding of both Europe and the United States. Each and every one of them had profited from firsthand experience in dealing diplomatically with the Western nations.

In 1927, as Japan entered the new Showa era, the conservative nationalists, a totally different political breed, emerged as the dominant faction and took over the reins of Japanese diplomacy. Tanaka Giichi came from a narrower military tradition, having served as a General in the Imperial Army. After entering politics, Tanaka became the Cabinet Army Minister and earned a well-deserved standing as a hardliner in international dealings. Once he became Prime Minister, Tanaka appointed himself to the concurrent position of Foreign Minister. From this vantage point he was able to pursue his own hardline policy quite freely. Tanaka quickly signaled his own compass settings by denouncing the diplomatic initiatives and strategies adopted under the previous Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijuuro, as distinctly "soft and weak."

All of a sudden, Japan's diplomatic initiatives were forcefully taken away from the hands of pro-West diplomatic experts who believed that cooperation would yield major benefits. Tanaka, an avowed army hardliner who now controlled policy, had little sympathy for such views. He regarded all Western nations with deep-seated and irreducible suspicion. Tanaka's lack of any overseas experience, except for some brief study in Russia, served to reinforce his ideological judgments. His knowledge of the United States and European nations was minimal at best and remained so throughout his tenure. Tanaka's stewardship marks a distinct transition that served as a turning point in Japanese diplomacy.

It is hardly by chance that Hanihara's decision to leave the Gaimusho came a mere six months after Tanaka gained power. "I have thoughts of my own for the future of Japan's diplomacy," Hanihara wrote to his mother. He was greatly alarmed with that new diplomatic direction the country was taking. Tanaka's strategy clearly departed from the cooperative relations that Hanihara and his moderate colleagues had meticulously constructed over the years. Above all, he was perturbed by the potential danger inherent in those new, unreflective policies.

While in the United States, Hanihara often was described as an accomplished scholar as well as a diplomat. He never ceased to study, and his mastery of the history of Western diplomacy frequently was said to surpass that of many academics. Hanihara's library, which his wife Mitsuko donated to Waseda after his death, still is a part of the university's library. Approximately 800 of the more than 1,000 titles he owned were published in either Europe or the United States. Most of the works focus on Western history and diplomatic developments.

The more experienced he became in the practice of diplomacy, the more Hanihara tried to define the meaning and purpose of this art. He consistently sought to discover the proper diplomatic focus that could direct the Japanese initiatives toward achieving a peaceful outcome. Hanihara believed this could be accomplished by acting as a major contributing member of the international community. The *Gaiko Jihoo* became his principal lobbying vehicle, allowing him to voice his thoughts. In one published article, he pointed out:

> *It was once considered brilliant diplomacy to cunningly trap another nation or to threaten her brutally, all under the pretext of upholding national honor or protecting your country's interests. Fortunately, we are no longer in that age.*[6]

International diplomacy, after World War I, began to shift increasingly from bilateral to multilateral negotiations. Diplomacy through international conferences emerged. Hanihara was quick to grasp the importance of this changed strategy. He was among the very few in his country who had experienced firsthand the dynamism underlying that new age of multinational diplomacy. Hanihara emphasized this point in an essay:

> *Today, it is hardly possible that an international issue can be resolved by the mere insistence of one nation acting from its own convenience. Most are resolved only after all other nations involved have demonstrated self-discipline, understanding and the willingness to compromise. . . . True international peace will not be achieved based on the fear of one nation for another. It is only achieved if each independent nation recognizes a sense of justice and generosity that will protect its own interests while also respecting the interests of other nations.*[7]

The new political leaders of Japan, however, had very little understanding of the world outside of Japan, let alone the dynamism created by multinational negotiations. It is doubtful that those leaders gave even the briefest thought to how their pursuit of national self-interest would be perceived by others. The then new authorities had little idea that an unconstrained attempt to achieve their narrow objectives might adversely affect their own objectives.

The year Hanihara left the Gaimusho coincided with the beginning of the Showa era. The Taisho era came to an end the year before with the death of the son of the Meiji Emperor. The new era began when the young crown prince came to the throne as the Showa Emperor. The name "Showa" originated from ancient Chinese literature: "All be enlightened, all nations come together." The government explained the intended meaning to be that "Japanese people all unite under the Emperor, and work in harmony with all nations in the world."

With the beginning of the Showa era, however, in practice the nation veered away from that elevated, grand vision embodied in the Showa name. Under Tanaka Giichi's leadership, the Imperial Army required little encouragement to increase its bold strategies in China. Troops were dispatched to Shangdong Province, while the railway in Mukden was bombed. The assassination of the Chinese warlord, Zhang Zuolin, followed closely in the sequence of these events. On the domestic front, Tanaka issued the Security Maintenance Law.[8] As an outgrowth of this legislation, he set up the "*Tokkoo*,"[9] a special police force. In the years leading up to,

and continuing throughout the prolonged Pacific War, the *Tokkoo* gained notoriety as the most brutal and feared of the secret police forces in Japan.

Liberal Japanese thinkers and intellectuals grew increasingly fearful of the direction that the rapidly changing domestic situation was taking under the new regime. Hanihara became a vocal and determined critic. He published a number of articles severely criticizing Tanaka's China policy. At the same time, Hanihara keenly felt that the events needed to be publicized more widely. The Japanese public at that time remained largely ignorant of the world around them.

Thomas Jefferson once said: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."[10] Applying this same idea to a country's diplomacy, the dictum insists that it is not only national leaders, but also the general population that needs to have knowledge and understanding of international affairs. Elihu Root, whom Hanihara greatly admired, also wrote that:

> *. . . .[T]he vast extension of international commerce; the recognition of interdependence of the peoples of different nations engendered by this commerce and this intercourse; their dependence upon each other for the supply of their needs and for the profitable disposal of their products, for the preservation of health, for the promotion of morals and for the increase of knowledge and the advance of thought—all these are creating an international community of knowledge and interest, of thought and feeling.*[11]

A population ignorant of the international situation inevitably would become vulnerable to strategically arranged and politically motivated incitements. By misrepresenting the intentions of other countries, politicians can, at times, easily manipulate their people into supporting dubious policies. Emotional appeals tend to easily mislead the general public, stirring up hostility against other nations without needing to provide valid rationales. Opting for such a defining path in international relations, Japanese leaders of the Showa era dallied with dangerous alternatives, ignoring potential potholes in the road directly ahead.

As the only effective antidote to this course, Hanihara felt that the general public had to be informed and provided with broad-based knowledge about international affairs. While a student at Waseda, Hanihara had helped Ariga Nagao launch the publication *Gaiko Jihoo*.[12] As Japan's pioneering scholar of international law, Ariga's greatest fear was the woeful state of ignorance demonstrated by the Japanese people in regard to international

affairs. This situation, he thought, would permit the country to commit grave diplomatic blunders. To correct this sorry state, Ariga created the *Gaiko Jihoo*, the first Japanese journal specializing in diplomatic issues. The journal aimed to "contribute to the acquisition and development of knowledge amongst the general population." Thirty years later, with the journal still thriving, Hanihara chose it as his primary platform from which to advocate the "responsibilities of the people."

> *In the eras long past, when diplomacy was the monopoly of the royal courts and the limited few of the privileged class, the welfare of the population was often sacrificed to the ambitions of individuals or to misplaced patriotism. . . . Today, however, diplomatic policies are part of government policy, which should be based on the welfare of the population. People who now are able to elect the government have to share responsibility in forming policies.*[13]

Hanihara questioned the present situation in Japan, saying: "The Japanese people often lack sufficient knowledge, and are easily misguided by the irresponsible, but skillful, manipulation by politicians." Hanihara warned that if people were misled under the pretext of "national interest" and elected to follow blindly the policy of self-interest, exclusive of all the other considerations, the country would find itself in a most difficult and dangerous position within the international community.

> *It goes without saying that any international conflict has to be solved peacefully. To achieve this end, it is absolutely essential that the people understand the situation in which others are placed and stay reasonable. You also have to be generous and tolerant. In other words, people have to grasp the facts as accurately as possible, calmly examine the arguments of both sides and make considered judgments concerning each issue, whether these arguments are favorable or unfavorable to one's own nation. It is also important that people be watchful of how their diplomatic representatives deal with each issue and make an equitable assessment of their conduct.*[14]

According to Hanihara, a knowledgeable public would ultimately prevent political leaders from recklessly pursuing extreme policies. Only an informed citizenry could keep a country on the right path, he said. Believing in the ultimate power of a country's people, Hanihara desperately appealed to his fellow Japanese:

> *The essence of modern diplomacy is to earn the trust and friendship of other nations. This is particularly true of a country like ours, which relies heavily on*

other nations in every aspect of its daily needs. We cannot do without the cooperation and friendship of others. What we must avoid at all cost are: narrow minded exclusionism; xenophobia; inflated pride arising from ignorance; and an obstinate pursuit of self-interest.[15]

A country with few natural resources, such as Japan, had to rely on others to supply its essential needs. Japanese diplomacy, therefore, should always be conducted by keeping in mind this basic fact. This was the reality that Japan grappled with in Hanihara's day as well as throughout its modern history. In writing and through public speeches, Hanihara tried hard to rouse public awareness of Japan's predicament.

Japan's China Policy Comes under Attack

In the first decade of the Showa era, the Meiji spirit still acted as a guiding light for many Japanese intellectuals. These men remained outward-looking and quite conscious of all significant international issues. If anything, their vision of the world was expanding. Hoping to enhance the prospects for world peace, they explored possible roles that Japan could play as an effective participant in the international community. In stark contrast to these intellectuals, the vision of Japanese political leaders was contracting at an alarming rate. Disregarding reactions from the rest of the world, their policies were increasingly limited to what the more narrowly focused officials viewed as Japan's national interests.

"Is Japan going to follow the way of the West and pursue only conquest? Or is she going to uphold the Eastern tradition and follow the Righteous Path?" questioned Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen in his lecture titled "Greater Asianism" that was delivered while visiting Japan in 1924.[16] Sun Yat-sen died a year after giving that speech. A mere two years later Giichi Tanaka then served as Prime Minister, providing an answer to the question posed by Sun Yat-sen. He engineered a series of drastic changes to Japan's foreign policy. "Cooperative diplomacy," earnestly pursued by Shidehara Kijuuro as well as previous governments, gave way to hardline diplomacy. The shift clearly reflected Tanaka's grasp of the outside world. As Tanaka's intention to invade China became increasingly clear, anxiety grew among Japan's intellectuals, predominantly comprised of moderate and liberal thinkers.

In response, a few months after leaving the Gaimusho, Hanihara published a paper titled "A View of Our China Policy."[17] Referring to the then recent discussions on China policy between Shidehara and Minister

for Railways Ogawa Heikichi, Hanihara expressed his dissatisfaction and offered his own view on the direction in which policy was heading. "Missing in these discussions," he wrote, "were matters that people wish to know and have to know, but which were somehow left out. As current office holders, perhaps these politicians are unable to say what they wish to say," he observed. "I am now in a position to speak freely. In that capacity, I am going to offer my humble views, hoping to invite responses from them and from others as well."

Hanihara's lengthy article contained a careful analysis of the malaise then distressing China, including any implications it might have had on a broader range of international disputes. Pointedly, the paper focused on issues that governments like to evade, namely "unequal treaties," particularly those that emphasize "extra territorial rights." According to Hanihara, China's problems had their basis in both internal and external causes. They included accumulated domestic mismanagement and frequent clashes with foreign countries that provoked further policy complications. Unfortunately, to remedy the internal causes would depend on China's ability and willingness to undertake sufficient reforms. External issues were different.

In those cases, Japan should take the lead in facilitating negotiations between the affected countries, Hanihara said. Through such a strategy, cooperation would be greatly encouraged. Since the root cause of the Chinese problems were driven by the series of unequal treaties that China had been forced to sign, the agreements were the natural starting place for any instrumental negotiations. Japan was obliged to do so since she had become inextricably involved in the problems when the country chose to closely imitate the United States and other European countries by claiming "extra territorial rights" in 1896. Since then, they had exercised it over the lives of a multitude of Chinese people. By doing so, Japan became the unsurprising focus of Chinese hostility, even more than any other country faced. Such was the case despite Japan's late start in seizing control over parts of the Chinese territory.[18]

For China, Japan had become no different than other world powers that sought to humiliate their country based on a series of unequal treaties signed under pressure. Those imperial powers corroded official Chinese authority, while ignoring the natural rights of its people, including the right to trade. Foreigners extended this humiliation by providing special protection to their Chinese clients; those individuals claimed that they willingly abandoned their traditional faith and belief.

Through such means, outsiders gained significant privileges that far outweighed what any ordinary Chinese citizen could imagine. Outsiders totally ignored the authority of the Chinese government. As a result, the interlopers behaved as wantonly as possible, ignoring the powerless Chinese police. Conduct of this kind could only severely damage any remaining prestige that the Chinese government held. Witnessing the daily oppression of the weak by the powerful only succeeded in stoking the anger of the Chinese people. As a result, resistance was rising daily.[19]

Hanihara concluded his article by putting forward a policy proposal. He called for the immediate abolition of "Extra Territorial Rights" even though those extraordinary privileges had long been made available and advantageous to them. Hanihara's suggested alternative seemed radical for those times, but others had come to similar conclusions. The idea had been suggested by progressive Japanese diplomats for nearly a decade. The strategy even predated the Washington Conference. Makino Nobuaki was one of its advocates. While in government, however, the progressives were constrained from expressing the idea publicly. Hanihara had now freed himself from any official constraints by resigning. He could use his newfound discretion to raise the issue and open it up to public debate.

Hanihara warned of the international consequences if the deteriorating situation in China was left to fester. Unless effective steps were instituted by those countries that were most directly responsible for the situation, unfolding events would be dire. Nothing though could be accomplished without the trust and cooperation of the Chinese. It was up to the leading world powers to take the initiative.

Removing the treaty conditions that the Chinese found most abhorrent was probably the only significant gesture that could move the process forward. Once this step was taken, then perhaps reconciliation could begin. But such a breakthrough was urgent given that China was on the brink of anarchy. Ideally, such negotiations would proceed at a measured pace. In the then current situation, however, time was of the essence. Despite the need for speed, foreign powers were unlikely to completely abandon their advantages in China overnight.

Equally, the required strategies could not be postponed until China could negotiate with a single, strong and united government. A credible Chinese government should provide a sufficient basis for those discussions, which might lead to the removal of the detested extra territorial rights. To make progress, all the countries with Chinese interests needed to stop competing for advantage and instead start loosening their grasp

on the privileges they had hitherto so fiercely guarded. Hanihara urged the Japanese to play a major role in initiating the changes. "Japan is at the most advantageous position to initiate the changes," Hanihara reasoned, "as Japanese citizens comprised some eighty percent of the foreign citizens benefiting from these 'extra territorial rights.'"[20]

To strengthen his argument, Hanihara employed a compelling central theme, one with which he was extremely familiar. Mutual contempt between nations, the subjugation of one group of people by another, or entrenched prejudice that bred discrimination formed a powerful cocktail that could only encourage international conflicts. The colonizers dominating China would inevitably use these as a basis to create unfortunate rationales to provide a justification for their countries' self-interest. The interests of numerous individual citizens of the nations would benefit from the status quo.

From the Chinese standpoint, however, each and every one of those rationalizations involved so many "engines" clawing away their national wealth. Such behavior had only succeeded in destroying Chinese pride and nurturing hate in its place. Continuing a policy based on extra territorial rights constituted not only shortsighted policy but also served to uphold behavior that was fundamentally unjust. In terms of generally agreed-on universal principles, no other system is quite as contradictory as extra territorial rights when placed within the context of international justice.[21]

"Do not slight the feelings of other people," was Hanihara's warning. His message should have sounded familiar to the Japanese. Hanihara recognized that slighting and discriminating against a nation that is too weak to properly defend itself could only destroy any feelings of friendship or trust. When amity between countries dies, Hanihara believed, the inevitable rising tensions breed dangerous flashpoints between them.

When the Immigration Act passed in 1924, US intellectuals had largely recognized the folly demonstrated by Congress of including the Japanese exclusion clause. They were able to put aside national passions and realized that by deliberately insulting the feelings of the Japanese, Congress had flagrantly injured US–Japan relations. Friendships between countries, which are only built slowly and painstakingly, could in this fashion be simply tossed away. Five years previously, when the Japanese proposal of "Racial Equality Bill" was rejected at the Paris Peace Conference, Australia's Piesse issued a similar warning: "Insisting on discriminating against people based on race could only injure the feelings of the Japanese. Such an action would only help strengthen the hands of ultraconservative

politicians and the extreme elements of the military, at the cost of weakening the moderate voices in Japan."[22]

Hanihara himself had fought an equivalent battle only a few years before while serving in the United States. He had persevered to the bitter end in trying to stop the Japanese exclusion clause. The desperate sacrifice of his diplomatic career was motivated by this basic reasoning. By having the United States insert a specific discriminatory clause in an immigration law, it was in effect taking aim at Japan's national pride. At that time, Hanihara believed unshakably that such legislation would inevitably lead to "grave consequences." This action contained within it the power to undermine, quite heedlessly, US–Japan relations.

When analyzing the then current Chinese situation some years later, Hanihara found that Japan's position now paralleled that of the United States. Japan had left its former role of victim only to become a victimizer instead. Learning little from its own experiences, Japan was now intent on injuring the Chinese. For Hanihara, it was basically contradictory that Japan could be greatly offended by intimidation when aimed against itself, but felt justified in using bullying tactics to gain short-term advantages. For Hanihara, the best diplomacy—namely, the policy that would yield long-lasting benefits—had to be firmly grounded in principles reflecting human justice. In more rational times, Hanihara's insights should have resonated with the educated opinion makers in Japan.

In reality, however, the recognition of human justice was largely distinguished by its absence within the Tanaka cabinet. Instead, Tanaka's leadership precipitated a military advance by the Japanese into the Shandong Province of Northern China. Once commenced, this trend could only continue. A mere month after Hanihara's article was published, the Japanese people were rudely awakened from dreams of a lasting peace. A railway explosion in Manchuria killed Zhang Zoulin, the ruling warlord of that region. Prevailing belief attributed the assumed assassination to the *Kantogun*, the ultranationalist wing of the Imperial Army.

Overriding the voices of moderate politicians, and ignoring warnings from the country's leading intellectuals, the Tanaka government increasingly revealed its unmistakable intention to invade China. Japan's foreign policy had fallen into the hands of extreme hardliners. Given such an all-encompassing political climate, any proposals that stressed the possibility of peaceful solutions, such as Hanihara's proposal to abolish extra territorial rights, would only sound like some woolly headed fairy tale to Japan's hardline leaders.

The following year, Hanihara issued a more direct warning to the Tanaka government. In his view, Japan had crossed a crucial limit by clearly going beyond internationally accepted boundaries. Government policy continued to harden. The diplomatic risk that Japan was undertaking should have been obvious, but recognition of it proved to be lacking. Hanihara's reaction to this shift, in his essay, "Warning: The Danger of Factional Politics,"[23] carried a desperate tone of urgency. Hanihara began by pointing out:

> *After the Russo-Japanese War, our nation progressed in the world to play a major part in international negotiations. In the following quarter of a century, Japan has encountered a great many diplomatic difficulties. Never before, however, have we faced a greater danger than the one that the Tanaka government has placed us in.*[24]

Hanihara contended that Manchuria represented the crucial region for Japan's security, incorporating an array of distinctly Japanese interests. Japan at that time owned some 700 miles of arterial railways connecting Asia to Europe. More than 1,000,000 Japanese people were living in the region. Japanese investments totaled in excess of ¥200,000,000. Trade with China was steady expanding, reaching a flow of approximately ¥10,000,000 per year. Through its massive investment, Japan had managed to develop a previously barren and sparsely populated region in China. The Japanese certainly had not forgotten the blood and toil of countless pioneers, some of whom had sacrificed their lives. Given this background, it is only natural that Japan would attempt to protect and maintain its Manchurian assets.

Despite these facts, the Japanese needed to remember that Manchuria was legally neither Japan's territory nor even its protectorate. Hanihara insisted that the Tanaka government should not casually overlook this reality. Previous governments had acknowledged and abided by this central fact. The majority of the Japanese people had supported this stance. Moreover, previous governments had vocally pledged in the international community, on numerous occasions, not to incorporate Manchuria, nor make it into a protectorate.

"Against all these indisputable facts, what was the current government's response?" After raising this controversial issue, Hanihara proceeded to pinpoint the administration's most recent statement on its China policy.[25] In that, the Tanaka government seemed to have taken the position that it had the responsibility to maintain public security in Manchuria, and that the

Imperial Government had the right to initiate any action presumed necessary for this. Hanihara objected unreservedly to this stance.

According to him, the Imperial Government of Japan lacked any such responsibility or assumed right to proceed on this basis. Instead, the Japanese government should realize that it was legally limited to do no more than protect Japan's interests. There existed no legitimate reason that would permit the country to extend its Manchuria sphere of activity to public security matters. Clearly showing his mounting anger, Hanihara concluded: "I sincerely hope no one in the government harbors a misguided notion that the Manchurian region is ours, or ought to be ours in the future. Such fantasy or misunderstanding has no place in our new Showa Era." Here, Hanihara's outrage became palpable. He placed the blame for the current diplomatic muddle squarely on the shoulders of the government:

> *I trust there exists in our nation no one so unreasonable and irresponsible as to subscribe to this position. If anyone does incline in this direction, it becomes the imperative task of a democratic government to resolve such misunderstanding by eradicating this fantasy.*[26]

Hanihara's greatest concern was the international impact that Japan's new recklessness in China might precipitate. To provide a vivid contrast to this foolhardy strategy, Hanihara focused attention on the efforts made by Japan's diplomatic service over two long decades:

> *For a long time, unfortunately, China as well as the acknowledged world powers have viewed Japan with great suspicion. Their assumption of Japan's presumed intention over Manchuria has over the last twenty years created many obstacles hampering Japan's international diplomacy. Our representatives, both within the government and out, therefore, have consistently striven to remove this prevailing international distrust. Generations of past governments repeatedly sought to clarify these issues in order to reassure the international community. As a result, our country finally had begun to gain a fairer consideration of its policies. Just when its decades of efforts has begun to bear fruit, our new government issued its China policy statement, which can only arouse international suspicion once again and bring much harm to Japan. For the sake of our national interest and for our diplomatic dignity, I am extremely saddened to see this happened.*[27]

The Washington Post translated Hanihara's essay and published an extensive portion of it. The newspaper particularly focused on his discussion of the potential international impact of Japan's new diplomatic direction.[28]

The United States, acutely aware of the evolving changes characterizing Japan's China policy, was watching carefully.

Attempting Repairs to the Damaged US–Japan Relations

US–Japan relations continued to prey on Hanihara's mind while he was developing his new role as a freelance critic. This became, in fact, his most compelling undertaking of his post-Gaimusho activities. Hanihara's unsparing attacks on Tanaka's China policy had been motivated predominantly by his grave concerns over the impact it might have on US–Japan relations.

The passing of the Japanese exclusion clause in the US Immigration Act of 1924 represented far more than a personal tragedy for him, as some Japanese perceived. Over and above anyone else, he recognized this event as one of the greatest tragedies imposed heretofore on US–Japan relations. The consequence of that act created an emerging fracture in the existing friendship between the two countries. That gulf inevitably would widen, Hanihara felt, unless conscious efforts were made to repair the damage.

Despite the exclusion clause in the act, Hanihara had tried to be optimistic about the future of US–Japan relations. He returned to Japan in August 1924, only a few months following the enactment of the legislation. On arriving in Japan, Hanihara managed to stand on the Yokohama pier projecting a cheerful and bright exterior. His carefully arranged countenance starkly contrasted with the anxious expressions of those friends and family meeting him there. Hanihara told the throng of reporters eagerly awaiting him that he had not been recalled. He had returned, compelled only by the need to discuss the pressing matter in detail with Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuuro. He advised the reporters that the delicate nature of the issue prohibited any precipitous action, at least for the time being.

"It is only a few months before the presidential election in the United States," he explained. "This was not the appropriate time to pursue further discussions with the US government." Hanihara reassured reporters that US–Japan discussions on the issue had not been terminated. "Before leaving Washington," he revealed, "I had made sure that all preparations at the Embassy stood ready. As a consequence, whoever is posted there next will be able to pick up the thread immediately and continue negotiations unhindered."[29]

Hanihara added that many members of the US Congress had told him that they regretted the manner in which the exclusion clause had been enacted.[30] He remained hopeful. In his optimistic opinion, once the election was over and the new government took office, the political situation would then be stabilized in Washington. At that time, Hanihara said, the opportunity to restart negotiations would arise.

The passage of the Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Act represented an almost unendurable battle for Hanihara. He had fought with every resource available, trying to prevent that discriminatory clause from being included. Hanihara, however, was not blind. He recognized the political realities that constrained diplomacy. Any attempt to conduct serious negotiations immediately before a presidential election clearly would have been futile. Several months before, in March 1924, when the Japanese exclusion clause had been presented to the US Congress, Foreign Minister Matsui became extremely agitated.

The Japanese population fiercely objected to the legislation. Domestically, popular emotions had been on the rise. In an act of desperation, Matsui enlisted Shibusawa Eiichi, a leading industrialist with extensive US business connections, to help ease the situation. Gaining Prime Minister Kiyoura's support, Matsui requested that Shibusawa travel to the United States. Shibusawa was to meet with his business colleagues in New York and Chicago to rally support for the Japanese position.

Shibusawa hesitated, first wanting to hear Hanihara's opinion. Hanihara vetoed the idea. In his response, he wrote that "[s]ending a special envoy at this moment would only create further confusion. We need to remain calm and wait until after the presidential election is over before starting any new initiatives."[31] Prime Minister Kiyoura accepted Hanihara's advice and decided not to send Shibusawa.

To Hanihara's mind, passage of the clause in the act would fail to terminate future negotiations regarding the Japanese's exclusion status. Given sufficient time, methods could be found that might mitigate the situation. That possibly would include amendments to the existing Immigration Act. Inevitably, he said, that trying to gain a quick result before a presidential election would be useless—a simple waste of time. Japan had no alternative but to wait. When the election was over, the situation would calm down in the United States, Hanihara said; it was only then that a sensible discussion could begin.

In fact, when Shidehara Kijuuro replaced Matsui as Foreign Minister, US–Japan relations began to look considerably brighter. Shidehara

immediately commenced direct talks with Secretary of State Hughes. Shidehara had preceded Hanihara as Japan's Ambassador to the United States and had served as one of the principal delegates to the Washington Conference. Throughout those years, Shidehara and Hughes had forged an easy friendship. Both were keenly aware of the damage the exclusion clause had created, and they agreed that the US–Japan relationship required urgent repair if further damages were to be forestalled. Unfortunately, a few short months later, Hughes left the Coolidge administration.

Frank B. Kellogg replaced Hughes as Secretary of State. Kellogg's Far East strategy differed sharply from that of Hughes. Under his guidance, the US Far Eastern policy shifted toward outright championship of China, drifting farther away from Japan.[32] Not surprisingly, the shift raised alarms back in Tokyo. For Japan, the decision to steer US policy deliberately away from the "Hughesian" formula of mutual consultation and cooperation appeared ominous. That noticeable diplomatic change implicitly bolstered within Japan the more extreme voices supporting nationalist policies, weakening at the same time internationalist positions supported by liberals and moderates.

Troubled by the direction in which the US–Japan relations were moving, in 1929 the Japanese government dispatched Uchida Yasuya, a veteran diplomat and former Foreign Minister, to Washington. He intended to tentatively explore whether chances for a more cooperative policy between the United States and Japan could be revived. Sadly, Uchida received a rather cool reception in Washington. Two years later, the emergence of Tanaka Giichi as Prime Minister marked something of a fork in the road for the two countries. The United States and Japan were now drawing irrevocably apart. In his 1952 biography of Charles Evans Hughes, Merlo Pusey concluded that ". . . it is clear that if the Hughes and Shidehara policies could have prevailed there would have been no attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and no war between the United States and Japan."[33]

Nonetheless, such matters at that time still lay in the future. Back in 1924, little time had passed since the enactment of the Japanese exclusion clause. In August of that year, a few months after the passage of the Immigration Act, the Institute of Politics in Massachusetts invited Tsurumi Yuusuke[34] to speak at an international conference organized by the Institute.[35] Tsurumi was at that time a thirty-nine-year-old Japanese academic. He was viewed as a rising star by Japanese liberals who supported his internationalist views. In the first of four lectures delivered at the Institute, Tsurumi predicted

that the impact of the "Japanese exclusion act" would cause a significant shift in Japan's dealings with the United States.

Tsurumi began his speech by referring to the controversial phrase "grave consequences" that had appeared in the Hanihara Note. Tsurumi interpreted the significance of this particular phrase by claiming that:

> *The phrase, "grave consequences," used by Ambassador Hanihara, was the exact truth. It was not a threat. It did not mean that any intelligent person in Japan dreamt of going to war with the United States over the immigration act. But it did mean that the new immigration policy marked an epoch in the development of Japanese diplomacy.*[36]

In Tsurumi's analysis, the "Japanese exclusion act" had already brought and would continue to bring "grave consequences" not only to Japan but to the rest of the world as well. The legislation had tipped the balance in Japan in favor of conservative rather than liberal forces. The conservatives now were able to shape the psychology of the Japanese public. In a wider sense, the ramifications extended to the "unfolding of the drama of international politics, on the Pacific stage in the first instance and finally on the world stage."[37]

Tsurumi unequivocally labeled war as the greatest threat to civilization. The most implacable problem that every country faced was discovering a strategy that would prevent armed conflict. Meeting this challenge would demand more than simply relying on such agencies as the League of Nations and the Washington Conference. Only if the causes of war were rendered inoperative could a dependable peace be achieved. Tsurumi particularly singled out the Pacific as representing a potential flashpoint, given the dangerous nature of its ever-changing dynamics. The United States and Japan "on the opposite shores of a vast ocean, stand now upon the threshold of a new era—the Pacific era."

Cooperation between the two powers provided the only path that might lead away from regional conflicts, according to Tsurumi. Each country must realize its complex interdependence. A pragmatic assessment of this nature should spur both countries to pursue friendship despite the inherent difficulties they will be forced to confront. Given the dire nature of Tsurumi's predictions and the passion of his delivery, major newspapers throughout the United States were moved to provide extensive coverage of his speech.[38]

By 1925, one year after the passage of the Japanese exclusion clause enacted, the anger shown by the Japanese public had not abated. The

implied insult of the legislation was still fresh in the minds of the Japanese people. When Matsudaira Tsuneo left Japan to fill the post of Ambassador, left vacant by Hanihara, he was warned: "Do not return until the Japanese exclusion act is amended!" The act continuously formed a rallying point for the belligerent rhetoric of the Japanese extreme right.

On his part, Hanihara continued his endeavors to calm the population by presenting reasoned arguments. He understood that nothing positive would be accomplished if motivated by anger. For Hanihara, calm and good sense were the two key factors that might lead to a resolution of the volatile issue, saying: "The only chance to bringing about the repeal or modification of the Japanese exclusion act would be to present the American public with facts."[39]

"Americans have neither the time nor interest to study the issue," he observed. Hanihara believed that they lacked an awareness of the crux of the problem. Instead, they largely allowed themselves to be manipulated by anti-Japanese campaigners. They had become convinced that Japan wanted to swamp the United States with vast numbers of immigrants and by doing so colonize the Pacific Coast by stealth. Clearly, that was not the case. The crux of the matter was that the enactment of the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act greatly hurt national pride and humiliated the Japanese.

Furthermore, the Japanese perceived that the clause in the act had been totally unnecessary and therefore unwarranted. To overcome the situation, the Japanese must try to communicate the actual facts of the dispute to the US public, but with utmost calm and patience. Such a goal would not easily be accomplished, Hanihara said. The Japanese "must be determined to see this end accomplished. Rash and heated actions would only harden the minds of the people and lead to no solution."[40] Patience, for Hanihara, continued to be his watchword.

> *In a democratic society, developing a healthy and sensible public opinion is a complex process. Even in a favorable environment, it takes time. If anything detrimental occurs, public opinion could instantaneously go into reverse. This is both the merit and the shortcoming of "Democracy."*[41]

"Not all Americans are anti-Japanese"; that was the unambiguous message Hanihara consistently delivered. The reality for him was that a majority of Americans were sincerely friendly toward Japan, just as the Japanese were toward Americans. This mutual friendship was not built overnight.

It took many years of nurturing to establish the unique relationship that the two countries enjoyed.

In his 1925 essay, "Japan/American Relations,"[42] Hanihara painstakingly described the extensive reach of US relief during the Great Kanto Earthquake. Calvin Coolidge felt the need to personally direct those relief efforts. Hanihara emphatically reminded his countrymen not to grow forgetful of the sympathy and generosity demonstrated by Americans at that time. Hanihara had witnessed the scale of the day-to-day relief efforts. That action was testament to the warm and genuine friendship the US people maintained toward the Japanese. Elihu Root once said: "Dislikes and suspicions [between nations] can be dissipated by intercourse, better knowledge, courtesy and kindness. Considerate justice can prevent real causes of war."[43]

In a democratic world, diplomacy should reflect the sentiments held by people of the various countries. Modern diplomatic experts increasingly appreciated the crucial role played by public opinion in steering diplomatic outcomes. Japan's intellectual elites had long grasped this concept. Liberal internationalists, such as Tsurumi, not only understood this but also made every effort to put the concept into practice. He traveled overseas giving speeches and participating in international debates.[44] During the 1920s, Japanese intellectuals compared favorably with their Western counterparts. They vigorously tried to moderate the more extreme positions that were rising throughout Japan.

In 1929, the Institute of Pacific Relations held its Third Congress in Kyoto. That meeting marked the first time it had been held in Japan. Honolulu had been the site of the previous two meetings in 1925 and 1927. The Institute was a nongovernment organization focused on the Asia-Pacific region. After its establishment in 1925, the Institute gained a distinctive reputation as one of the primary forums for Pacific Rim discussions. Participants came largely from the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with Great Britain and China later joining as well.

Members hailed from among the leading intellectuals, noted academics, area experts, business leaders, and journalists from each country. Invitations to attend meetings went out to elder statesmen such as former government ministers and political leaders. Funding came mainly from the business sector and philanthropists. The Institute prided itself on its financial independence from any government. Shibusawa Eiichi of Japan was a significant donor to the Institute. Many US foundations, such as the

Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Vanderbilt, were also among its donors. The principal aim of the Institute was "to investigate the truth behind a problem, and to make it known to all concerned nations."[45]

Biennial Institute conferences had been held since 1925. At each one, participants freely voiced their opinions on vital regional issues. Active round-table discussions took place on a wide range of controversial questions. Going through conference records, one perceives that a "brainstorming" environment dominated the proceedings. Debates and discussions, heated at times, took place between leading experts in each field.

Japan's delegation to the 1929 Kyoto conference reflected the best brains the country could offer. Nitobe Inazo led that delegation; members included Rooyama Masamichi, Matsuoka Yoosuke, Maeda Tamon, Takayanagi Kenzo, Tsurumi Yuusuke, and Kabayama Aisuke. The younger members were Matsudaira Saburo and Matsumoto Shigeharu. Hanihara Masanao was also invited to the conference as a diplomatic expert.

The Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Act of 1924 and its implications were discussed extensively at the 1925 conference. The Kyoto conference focused on China and particularly the Manchurian situation. Each participant recognized the international implications that the "China problem" held. Dominating the discussions were the issues of extra territorial rights and the concessions retained by foreigners. Hanihara presented the historical perspective of Japan's long involvement in Manchuria. He explained the way in which the emotional energy that the Japanese public had invested in Manchuria tended to obscure the complex real issues facing that region.

Noted historian Arnold Joseph Toynbee[46] also attended the Kyoto conference. Hanihara, who participated in the same round-table discussion as Toynbee, was greatly impressed by him. He later remarked on Toynbee's extensive knowledge of the Far East and his meticulous preparation for the conference. The fact that Toynbee was mainly an expert on Middle East matters proved no obstacle to his incisive comments.[47] Participants could not help but note the disturbing absence of both the United States and Russia from the League of Nations.

In his report on the Third Conference, Nitobe Inazo detailed the great benefit that the Japanese delegation gained by attending it:

> *. . . [D]elegates from many nations examined together the scope of issues still needing attention in the Pacific region as well as their far reaching implications for the rest of the world. We also forecast new problems that were likely to arise in the near future. We gained insight into how keenly each country was observing changes in the regional situation and consider[ed] possible options.*[48]

The Japanese intellectuals who dominated the first Showa decade were keen observers of the world. By doing so, they were treading down a road shared by their earlier compatriots of the Meiji period. Like their forebears, these leading intellectual lights were wrestling with the then newly developing dynamics of a bewildering international environment. They hoped to discover a successful diplomatic way forward for Japan.

Unfortunately, the major political leaders of their country determinately chose a quite different tactic. The dominant Japanese politicians were turning inward, alienated from then current international reality. For them, the Kyoto conference offered no answers. Basically, it did not exist for those key leaders. In contrast, the same conference proceedings commanded serious consideration in the United States. News media thoroughly covered the conference, reporting on its outcomes.

Hanihara's Last Speech

In 1930, following the Kyoto conference, the Japanese exclusion clause in the act once again emerged at the center of public debate. The trigger was a speech by Hanihara at a farewell for the US Ambassador, William Castle.[49] His speech attracted attention, particularly in the United States. In it, he began by detailing Japan–US relations during the previous two decades, starting with the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

Drawing on his firsthand knowledge, he detailed the ways in which the US State Department and the Gaimusho forged and maintained a harmonious relationship. Whenever a potentially problematic issue arose, the two agencies had worked together to avert any serious damage to the fundamental friendship between them.[50] After conveying this diplomatic perspective, Hanihara launched into his central topic:

> *Now what appears to be an unhappy exception to this splendid record is the unsolved question arising from the American legislative act of 1924. . . . To dispel a popular misconception as to the true nature of that regrettable incident, I am compelled to speak now.*[51]

Six years had passed since the US Congress had approved the Japanese exclusion clause. The anger burning within the Japanese public had never completely subsided. A precise understanding of the events was, however, becoming increasingly obscure. On the US side, the driving force behind the Japanese outrage had never been truly understood, not even from the very beginning. Attempts to comprehend the matter were hardly strengthened by

anti-Japanese politicians who were intent on misrepresenting the true nature of Japan's displeasure.

In Japan, conservatives and an array of extremely nationalistic military factions seized the opportunity created by the widespread resentments. The growing public anger provided them a platform on which to build distrust against the United States. Reports of hostile demonstrations in Japan were reaching US shores with increasing regularity. The American public, ignorant of the principal cause, reacted in kind. The unsettling nature of those perceptions worried Japanese liberals and moderates alike. There was a real danger this time that the developing mistrust and animosity might bring the two countries to the brink of war.

Hanihara was extremely concerned by the direction in which then recent events were heading. Keeping that ominous situation from deteriorating further, in his opinion, must become a priority. The situation has to be dealt with, and urgently, he said. The crucial first step was to sweep away the accumulated misconceptions still held by both countries concerning the enactment of the exclusion clause as part of the Immigration Act of 1924. The real underlying causes behind the inexorable mounting frictions had to be laid bare. The farewell reception for the US Ambassador, attended by journalists from both countries, provided a golden opportunity for Hanihara to campaign for his objective. Invited as an honored guest, he seized the occasion to deliver a somber message.

Hanihara started by countering a specious insinuation favored by anti-Japanese activists. One well-used tactic by those politicians was to paint a picture of an arrogant Japan daring to interfere in US domestic matters by opposing the Immigration Act. Hanihara spoke directly to this point:

> *One thing must be said to dispel a popular misconception as to the true nature of that regrettable incident. It is not so much a question of whether one nation should or should not exercise its sovereign rights in regulating matters relating to its domestic affairs, as has been so often represented. More precisely it is a question of whether one people should treat another people sympathetically or unsympathetically, fairly or unfairly.*[52]

Without mincing words, Hanihara proceeded to describe some of the strategies used by some congressmen back in 1924. Those politicians proved willing to employ whichever method would serve their objectives.

> *In that incident the ambassador of a friendly power, whose warmth of friendship and high regard for the government and the people to whom he was accredited*

> *was everywhere widely known and accepted, was accused of the wanton act of using a "veiled threat" against that very country. The Secretary of State's categorical assurance to the contrary was brushed aside.*[53]

Hanihara continued by pointing out that the proponents of that infamous piece of legislation were determined to disregard the repeated requests from their President. Congress simply ignored all logical arguments put forward by the Secretary of State, he said. Instead, they stubbornly pushed the legislation forward. Nor did they hesitate to employ less than honorable measures to achieve their goals.

> *Naturally, the Japanese Government and people deeply resented this and that resentment is felt now as it was then. Nor will it ever die out as long as the wounds inflicted remain unhealed. A friendship once marred in this manner cannot without difficulty resume its wholesome growth unless some effective remedy is administered.*[54]

Having delivered what only can be described as a very strong message, Hanihara concluded his speech by reiterating his own unshakable confidence in the US people.

> *I should not have referred to this matter had I not had implicit confidence in the high sense of justice of the American people, who have never failed in the long run to be fair and not only to themselves alone but to others as well.*[55]

"Hanihara has broken his silence of six years!" reported major newspapers in the United States. *The New York Time*s carried close to the full text of his speech. *The Washington Post* focused on the need for an "effective remedy" to restore a marred friendship.[56] *The Christian Science Monitor* wrote that former Ambassador Hanihara's speech on the unfortunate situation growing out of the Japanese exclusion clause of 1924 served once again to bring to public attention a thoroughly needless and wanton affront to a friendly power.

The paper also reminded its readers of the conditions existing when the act passed. The moment could be rightly described as "a certain state of hysteria" and a time of "propagandists agitation." In conclusion, *The Christian Science Monitor* posed a question to the American citizens, especially those who were "desirous of maintaining a harmonious relation with the rest of the whole world: Whether the Exclusion Law, so offensive to the Japanese sensibilities, should not now be repealed."[57]

Only very valid reasons could have induced Hanihara to break his silence after all those years. Since returning from the United States, he had tempered his statements concerning Japan–US relations. Hanihara was always careful to moderate his comments lest they incite dangerously extreme reactions. On the infamous phrase "grave consequences" found in the Hanihara Note and the resulting controversy, he strictly guarded his silence. He had referred to it explicitly only once.

This remark appeared in his 1925 essay on Japanese-American relations.[58] Speaking on the subject of the Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Act, Hanihara wrote:

> *I have no intention of idly defending my role in the incident. It is, however, important for both peoples to know the facts. Knowing the truth would help them to understand the true nature of the subject, enable them to make a fair judgment and allow them to contribute positively to future developments. Because of these considerations, I am willing to state my position regarding the incident. At the time, I represented my country and its people in the United States. In that role and with that responsibility, I have done what I had to do and what was possible under the circumstances. I did so with total fairness and honesty. Everything was done with extreme care and deliberation. I am totally confident that there were no oversights or errors attached to the decisions I made.*[59]

There were still some Japanese who believed that the words "grave consequences" were the reason the exclusion clause gained congressional approval. Hanihara might have been conscious of this erroneous belief and sought to correct it by issuing a clear statement about the events in his essay.

Ever since his return to Japan, Hanihara had advocated a consistent unruffled strategy of patience when dealing with Japan–US relations. He persistently repeated that wounds would take time to heal. Americans would first have to understand the true nature of the Japanese anger. Once understood, the US public would come to favor a reconsideration of the matter. This step would open the way for either amendment to, or repeal of, the Japanese exclusion clause in the act. Hanihara believed this to be the best option and ultimately a path that would promote a better relationship between the two countries. Following his own advice, Hanihara trod lightly for six years, careful to avoid making any comment that might stir up animosity against the United States.

Personal circumstances, however, impelled Hanihara to alter his tactics. A few months prior to Ambassador Castle's departure, Hanihara suffered a

major stroke. Members of his family were genetically prone to high blood pressure. Lacking any effective treatment at the time, most of his relatives had died as a result; none of them reached the age of sixty. Hanihara realized that he himself might have little time left.

Given that grim reality, he felt that the truth could no longer remain hidden. He decided to tell what he knew to be true. That was the compelling reason for him to break "the silence of six years." In fact, at the time of the Castle farewell reception, Hanihara had not yet fully recovered from his first stroke and remained partially paralyzed. The reception occurred while Hanihara was still recuperating in the elegant resort town of Karuizawa. His doctors considered him to be too weak to travel; however, his sheer determination led him to ignore all medical advice. Consequently, he traveled to Tokyo and delivered his speech. The occasion marked his last public appearance.

Hanihara's speech produced tangible results in the United States. Immediately after it, both the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and the Overseas Trade Association of the City of Los Angeles declared their intention to lobby for an amendment to the Japanese exclusion clause. A most unexpected reaction came from the US Congress. On the day following Hanihara's speech, Albert Johnson responded with a public statement:

> *In due time, I expect to move for an amendment to the 1924 act that will give to Japan its proportionate quota. This should end the feeling that has existed in connection with that phase of the 1924 immigration act. I am of the opinion that the House and Senate will accept the amendment.*[60]

Johnson also told a reporter that he had had his proposed amendment in mind for some time, but that his reading of Hanihara's speech prompted him to hasten his action.[61] Johnson's statement took everyone by surprise. The Japanese public had been affronted because they perceived that the Immigration Act had singled them out. The measure had legitimatized racial discrimination aimed directly at them. If the quota system had been applied equally to Japanese immigrants as it had been to Europeans, the problem would never have occurred in the first place.

A response coming from Albert Johnson provided any proposed reform with added significance. He had acted as one of the principal authors of the 1924 act. As Chairman of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, Johnson was a primary mover in pushing the legislation through the House in the first place. The Immigration Act was sometimes referred to as "The Johnson Act" due to his central role.

Johnson's influence had yet to wane in 1930. He was still the Chair of the same House committee. Consequently, he clearly held a position that would enable him to draft and propose a relevant amendment. Johnson's startling reversal caused Japanese expectations to soar. Thoughtful Americans also expected such an amendment to be in the offing.

Gaimusho officials in Tokyo, however, reacted cautiously. They did not want to appear to be pressuring the US government. They hoped the American initiatives alone would drive any desired changes. The Japanese did not want to be accused once more of interfering with US domestic policy. Despite this understandable reluctance, a Tokyo-based US reporter used informal communications with Gaimusho officials to conclude that "though they were reticent to directly comment, it was evident that they were highly gratified."[62] The same article also suggested:

> *It is a strange coincidence, indeed, that Mr. Hanihara's note, misinterpreted though it was, should have been the immediate cause of the passage of the immigration act and that now his speech, after six years' silence, should be the immediate cause of the introduction of an amendment in Congress.*[63]

The *Japan Advertiser*, an English language newspaper published in Japan, welcomed the remarkably speedy response by Albert Johnson. In its editorial, the paper wrote that Johnson's statement showed evidence that US public opinion was finally turning around. It also added that the response reflected the respect in which former Ambassador Hanihara was held. The editorial optimistically predicted that once the amendment was presented to Congress, "the series of unfortunate incidents" created by the Hanihara Note would be entirely forgotten. More fortunate circumstances would then define Japan–US relations.

Hanihara remained calm and pragmatic despite being surrounded by mounting excitement. "What is most important, if the plan is acted upon, is that it will remove any trace of the discrimination which has existed against Japan," he told a *New York Times* Tokyo correspondent. Hanihara took this opportunity to reiterate the message that he had tried to convey to Americans over the previous ten years. "It is not so much a question of how many emigrants we send to the United States. We do not want to send our emigrants there if they are not wanted. The issue is that we do not want them to be discriminated against."[64]

Taking Johnson's statement seriously, *The New York Times* examined the possible implications that a new proposal might contain. The paper

observed that hostility toward Japanese immigrants had decreased over the past few years. Therefore, placing Japanese immigration on a quota basis would hardly unleash the sort of anti-Japanese antagonism that was so prevalent prior to 1924.

The quota, after all, would allow admission of only 200 Japanese immigrants a year. However, the article noted that a delicate problem was still ahead: ". . . [T]he danger lies in the effect on Japanese opinion in the event that such a proposal was defeated due to local and party difficulties. Such a course might well further embitter the Japanese."[65] After recognizing such a potential danger, the paper still proceeded to support Johnson's amendment:

> *[Such fear] however should not be used in opposition to the ultimate readjustment of that portion of the immigration restriction law of 1924, but should serve as a reminder that it should proceed in such a manner as to avoid any possible reopening of the old wound.*[66]

Unfortunately, the rising hope in both nations turned out to be an illusion, built on false premises. Johnson never acted on his promise. Looking back, Johnson's statement was no more than a clever political gesture. Sensing that Hanihara's speech would certainly revive criticism of congressional conduct, he very likely realized that he needed to preempt any criticism aimed at his actions. Johnson desperately attempted to salvage his reputation and political career. Fortunately for him, the public and informed commentators of both countries failed to comprehend the basis of his unexpected conversion. A genuine hope, therefore, arose. Both sides felt that existing ruptures would start to heal and that friendly relations would be revived. Instead, the incident ended up only leaving a bitter aftertaste.

In Japan during this same period, liberal forces continued to weaken. Japan's China policy under Tanaka Giichi became increasingly aggressive. His administration turned a deaf ear to all and any cautionary warnings from moderate voices. In 1929, a year prior to Johnson's promise, Tanaka resigned following the Showa Emperor's reprimand. He accepted responsibility for the assassination of Manchurian warlord Zhang Zoulin in the Huanggutun incident of 1928. Hamaguchi Osachi, a liberal and forceful politician, became Prime Minister.

Hamaguchi attempted to lead Japan's international policy back to a strategy based on the principle of cooperation with the West. Overriding

surmountable opposition from domestic conservative forces, he signed the London Naval Treaty for Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament in 1930. A few months later, however, Hamaguchi was gunned down by an ultranationalist youth in an attempted assassination; he survived, but was gravely wounded. Despite deteriorating health, he returned to the National Diet for several months to stabilize the political situation. Hamaguchi, however, never recovered from his wounds and died a year later.

In 1931, the year of Hamaguchi's death, ominous signs became even more evident on the China front. The "Liutiaohu Incident," engineered by junior officers of the *Kantogun*, escalated into an all-out invasion of Manchuria. The warm friendship that temporarily had revived between the Japanese and Americans rapidly cooled down. The last opportunity to rehabilitate that friendship had vanished.

The Passing of Hanihara

On December 20, 1934, both Japanese and US newspapers reported the death of Hanihara Masanao. Only a few months after delivering his speech at Ambassador Castle's farewell reception, he suffered another major stroke and fell into a coma. He survived and regained clear consciousness, but never returned to public life. Nursed by family members over the course of the next few years, he quietly passed away at the age of fifty-eight.

The night before the funeral, a great many people gathered for a wake at the Hanihara residence in Azabu Sakurada-Cho. Official visitors included Foreign Minister Hirota Kooki, as well as Admirals of the Imperial Navy Taniguch Naomi, Ide Kenji, and Takeshita Isamu. Hanihara's personal friends were all there, including Nakajima Kumakichi, industrialist and founder of the Furukawa Zaibatsu. His former Gaimusho colleagues Obata Yuukichi, Tanaka Tokichi, and Yoshizawa Keiichi paid their respects. Of course, his lifelong friend, Tanaka Hozumi, was there to see him off. They had been students together at Waseda. Tanaka was then the president of their alma mater. Together, friends reminisced about the past. Many remembered the days when Hanihara was a young diplomat in Washington, affectionately nicknamed "Hany." The Sakurada-Cho mansion had been shrouded in a hushed silence while Hanihara lay ill. For one night, however, it was as if the brilliance of his diplomatic life was revived.[67]

The funeral took place the following day in Tokyo at the beautiful Aoyama Saijo. One thousand "illustrious persons" attended.[68] Mourners represented official government circles, business leaders, and many other sectors throughout Japan. Those who knew Hanihara well mourned his passing profoundly. However, the wider public was no longer aware of Hanihara's achievements or what he had endeavored to achieve until the very end of his life. This obliviousness seemed to reflect the distinct shift in Japan's political landscape. Influence had shifted away from the sort of liberal ideology that was firmly rooted in international cooperation toward a more hardline doctrine of ultranationalism.

Those in the United States, on the other hand, had forgotten neither Hanihara nor what the former Ambassador represented. Ten years had already passed since his departure from Washington, yet, major newspapers reported fully on Hanihara's death. *The Washington Post*, echoing the sentiment of his many friends in Washington, speculated that the real cause of his death had been "a broken heart because of the strained relations that developed between the United States and Japan."[69] *The Post* once again urged Congress to take remedial action: "To the great sorrow of this diplomat his name was intimately associated with the act of Congress excluding Japanese immigrants from this country. It would be a graceful tribute to his memory to rectify that blunder."[70]

In the same month as Hanihara's death, the Japanese government informed the US government that it would unilaterally abandon the naval limitation agreement embedded in the work accomplished at the Washington Conference. *The Post* pointed that out as signaling a manifestation of "grave consequences":

> *One has only to glance at the break-up of the naval limitation treaties to realize that the exclusion act has been followed by "grave consequences". Unquestionably one of the reasons why Japan is now insistent upon naval equality is the slur upon that race which Congress ineptly sponsored.*[71]

Without any perceivable tangible gain, *The Post* pointed out, the United States had proceeded to deliberately wound the feelings of a proud and sensitive people. This action served as a perpetual and unwarranted insult to Japan. Unjustified congressional delay in repealing the exclusion clause in the act had managed to threaten international stability. *The Post* concluded that, "[t]he grief with which Mr. Hanihara was stricken because of this bungling incident ought to be more keenly felt by the American legislators of 1924 who are still able to view their handiwork."[72]

The New York Times also carried a lengthy article on Hanihara. Much of it described his personality and career. The commentary emphasized that he had endeavored to promote better relations between the two countries. As a young man in his early twenties, Hanihara had first arrived in Washington as an Embassy Secretary during Roosevelt's presidency. His congeniality and lively sense of humor made him one of the most popular young men in the entire diplomatic corps. "Everyone from President Roosevelt and President Taft down to the State Department clerks called him "Hany", *The Times* reminisced. After nine years in Washington and a brief period working at the Gaimusho home office in Tokyo, Hanihara returned to America as Consul-General of San Francisco. He assisted Ishii Kikujiro in the Ishii Mission to Washington, which resulted in the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Hanihara was one of the plenipotentiaries at the Washington Conference. He ultimately became Ambassador to Washington, the youngest ever that Japan had appointed to that post.

The article in *The Times* was colored with an unmistakably warm tone reserved for those who had earned widespread respect and affection. At the conclusion, however, the article returned to the controversial exclusion clause in the Immigration Act. It repeated Hanihara's message at Ambassador Castle's Tokyo farewell: "The Japanese resentment against the Exclusion Act will not die as long as the wound inflicted remains unhealed." Like *The Post*, *The Times* also used the occasion of Hanihara's death to issue a strong warning to Congress, as a fitting homage to Hanihara and what he had striven to accomplish.[73]

After Hanihara's death, Japan–US relations continued to deteriorate rapidly. The ultimate conclusion of this downward path was, as is now known, the outbreak of an extended and vicious war. Desperate attempts by Japanese moderates, intellectuals, and liberal politicians were unable to contain the tsunami-like tide of the ultranationalists leading the country into fascism. Domestically, this process cost many lives. Coups and assassinations were the hallmarks of the 1930s. Many during this period suffered severe persecution, torture, and imprisonment.

This unravelling of the Japanese state was in stark contrast to the 1920s when Hanihara had hoped that the Japanese people would come to see Americans as congenial allies. For Hanihara, the United States remained his second home, where many of his true friends lived. In one sense it was a blessing that he died before seeing his two beloved countries engaged in battle.

In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed a revised US Immigration Law. That legislation finally abolished the notorious exclusion clause in the

act forty years later. The 1964 legislation cleansed immigration policy of all racial restrictions. It also outlawed discrimination against immigrants already settled in the United States on the basis of race, religion, or country of origin.

Later that same year, the United Nations Twentieth General Assembly voted to implement the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[74] It had taken many years for the world finally to recognize the injustice of racial discrimination and the dangers stemming from it. Today, there still seems a long road ahead before the world achieves the reality of racial equality and learns to treat all racial groups with fairness.

Hanihara now rests in the tranquil Tama Garden cemetery at the outskirts of Tokyo. Every spring, in the beautifully tended gardens, cherry blossoms burst into brilliant display. At about the same time, on the banks of the Potomac in Washington, DC, people enjoy an equally splendid display of cherry blossoms. The first cherry seedlings were brought from Japan and planted there in 1912 during the Presidency of William Taft. Hanihara, then a thirty-six-year-old First Secretary at the Embassy, enthusiastically supported the project, which symbolized lasting "American and Japanese Friendship." The cherry blossoms that announce the arrival of spring each year, both on the banks of the Potomac and at the Tama Gardens, belong to the same species, "*Somei Yoshino*"—the most beautiful of all Japanese blossoms.

Notes

1. Hanihara Masanao to Hanihara Mon, 9 December Showa 2 (1927), Hanihara family papers.
2. 緒方竹虎 (1888–1956).
3. Ogata Taketora, *Waseda Seishin to wa Nani ka,* Waseda Gakuhoo, Showa 25 (1950) November Issue.
4. Ibid.
5. *Japanese Delegates Mourn: Pay Tributes to Okuma as Great Statesman and Teacher*, The New York Times, January 7, 1922.
6. Hanihara, Masanao, *Kokumin no Gaikoo Teki Kunren,* Gaikoo Jihoo, No. 506, 1 January Taisho 15 (1926).
7. Ibid.
8. 治安維持法 (Chi-an Iji Hoo).
9. 特高(特別高等警察 Tokubetsu Kootoo Keisatsu).
10. Thomas Jefferson, *Letter to Charles Yancey, 1816, in* Jefferson, Thomas 1903–04. *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Memorial Edition, Vol. 14,* Washington, DC: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, p. 384.

11. Root, Elihu (1912) "Making Peace Permanent," *Nobel Peace Prize Lecture*. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1912/root-lecture.html, 19/02/2014.
12. See Chap. 3.
13. Hanihara Masanao, *Kokumin no Gaikoo Teki Kunren,* op. cit.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Sun Yat-sen, *Nippon wa Hadoo ni Hashiru Oobei no Tesaki ni Narunoka, Soretomo Toohoo no Dentoo de Aru Oodoo o Mamoru Kanjoo to Naru no ka,* in Sun Yat-sen lecture *Dai Ajia Shugi,* delivered in Koobe, 28 Novermber 1924, Nippon Zenshi (Japan Chronik), Koodan Sha, 1991, p. 1037.
17. Hanihara Masanao, *Taishi Kanken,* Gaikoo Jihoo, 15 May Showa 3 (1928), Gaikoo Jihoo Sha.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. See Chap. 1.
23. Hanihara Masanao, *Toojin Gaikoo o Imashimu,* Gaikoo Jihoo, 1 April 1929, Yooshun Bai Dai Goo, Gaikoo Jihoo Sha.
24. Ibid.
25. What Hanihara referred to was: *Taishi Seisaku Kooryoo,* announced by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, July 7 1927.
26. Hanihara, Masanao, *Toojin Gaikoo o Imashimu,* op. cit.
27. Ibid.
28. *Plain Speech in Japan by Masanao Hanihara, Formerly Ambassador to Washington*, The Washington Post, 24 May 1929.
29. *Hanihara Taishi Kaeru: Nichibei Kankei wa Yuruyuru to Kookyuu to Niko Niko no Oogenki de Kataru,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 4 August 1924.
30. *Hanihara Expects Exclusion Repeal,* The Washington Post, 5 August 1924.
31. Shibusawa Eiichi Biographical Resources, Vol. 3, Sec. 3, Part 1, Chap. 3 *Kokusai Shinzen*, Shibusawa Memorial Archives.
32. Pusey, Merlo J., *Charles Evans Hughes,* The Macmillan Co., New York, 1952.
33. Ibid., p. 517.
34. 鶴見祐介 (1885–1973).
35. The Institute of Politics in Williamstown, Massachusetts, was a well-known research center for international relations.
36. *Sees A New Epoch in Exclusion Act: Yuusuke Tsurumi Says It Means "Grave Consequences" in Changing Japanese Policies,* The New York Times, 13 Aug 1924.
    America's Future Hinges Upon Japan, The Washington Post, 13 Aug 1924, op. cit.

37. *America's Future Hinges Upon Japan,* The Washington Post, op. cit.
38. *America's Future Hinges Upon Japan,* The Washington Post, op. cit.
Sees A New Epoch in Exclusion Act, The New York Times, 13 Aug 1924, op. cit.
Reasserts Fear of Ambassador: Japanese Discusses the Immigration Law, The Boston Globe, Aug 13, 1924.
39. *Humiliation Day Falls Flat in Japan,* The New York Times, July 2, 1925.
40. Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichi Bei Kankei ni Tsuite,* Kokusaihoo Gaikoo Zasshi, Vol. 24, No. 9, Bunsei Shoin, 1925.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Root, Elihu, *The Effect of Democracy on International Law: Opening Address by Elihu Root as President of the American Society of International Law April 26, 1917*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet No. 30, Originally published by The Endowment, Washington, DC, in 1917, Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library, April 2013, p. 6.
44. Further on Tsurumi, see Ueshina Kazuma, *Koohoo Gaikoo no Senkusha Tsurumi Yuusuke 1885–1973,* Fujiwara Shoten, Tokyo, 2011.
45. Hanihara Masanao, *Taiheiyoo Mondai Choosakai no Gaikyoo,* in Nitobe Inazo, ed., *Taiheiyoo Mondai,* Taiheiyoo Mondai Choosakai, September Showa 5(1930).
46. Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889–1975), Historian, a nephew of the economist Arnold Toynbee.
47. Hanihara, Masanao, *Taiheiyoo Mondai Choosakai no Gaikyoo*, op. cit.
48. Nitobe, Inazoo, *Jo,* in Nitobe Inazo, ed. *Taiheiyoo Mondai,* op. cit.
49. William Richards Castle, Jr. (1878–1963), Ambassador to Japan in 1930.
50. Hanihara, Masanao, *Speech*: *Kassuru Taishi o Okuru no Ji,* at the occasion of farewell dinner hosted by Nichi Bei Kyookai, for departing US Ambassador Castle and Mrs. Castle on 23 May, 1930, Gaikoo Jihoo No. 614, 1930.
51. Ibid. Also quoted in *Our Exclusion Act Still Irks Japan*, The New York Times, 24 May 1930.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Radford, Nicholas, *Article 1,* The Washington Post, May 24, 1930.
57. *Japan and the Immigration Law,* The Christian Science Monitor May 28, 1930.
58. Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichi Bei Kankei ni Tsuite,* op. cit.
59. Ibid.

60. *Will Move to Amend Ban on Japanese: Representative Johnson, Author of Law, to Ask Substitution of Nominal Quota,* The New York Times, May 24, 1930.
61. Ibid.
62. *Proposal of Quota Pleasing to Japan,* The New York Times, May 25, 1930.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. *A Japanese Quota,* The New York Times, May 26, 1930.
66. Ibid.
67. *Ko Hanihara Shi no Nigiyaka na Tsuya,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 23 December 1934.
68. *Hanihara Shi Kokubetsu Shiki,* Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 1934.
69. *It Was the Truth,* The Washington Post, Dec. 21 1934.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. *M. Hanihara, Envoy of Japan, 58, Dead,* The New York Times, December 20, 1934.
74. UN resolution 2017, Nov 1, 1965.

Selected Bibliography

Monographs in English

Burkman, Thomas W. 2008. *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and world order: 1914–1938*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

The United States Department of State. 1939. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, vol. II. Washington, DC: Department of State.

Hanihara Chow, Misuzu. 2003. *The study of Japan in Australia: A unique development over eighty years*. Kyoto: International Research Centre for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken).

Ichioka, Yuji. 1988. *The Issei: The world of the first generation Japanese immigrants, 1885–1924*. New York: The Free Press/A Division of Macmillan.

Lauren, Paul Gordon. 1996. *Power and prejudice: The politics and diplomacy of racial discrimination*, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press.

MacMillan, Margaret. 2002. *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its attempt to end war*. London: John Murray (Publishing) Ltd.

Meaney, Neville K. 2007. *Towards a new vision: Australia and Japan across time*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Meaney, N., T. Mathews, and S. Encels (eds.). 1988. *The Japanese connection*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Miller, David Hunter. 1928. *The drafting of the covenant*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Niiya, Brian (ed.). 1993. *Japanese American history*. Los Angeles: The Japanese American National Museum.

Pusey, Merlo J. 1952. *Charles Evans Hughes*. New York: The Macmillan Co.

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2

Monographs in Japanese

Asada, Tadao. 1993. *Ryoo Taisen Kan no Nichibei Kankei*. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.

Gaimusho (ed.). 1971. *Nippon Gaiko Bunsho Taisho 8*. Tokyo: The Gaimusho.

Gaimusho (ed.). 1972. *Nippon Gaiko Bunsho: Taibei Imin Mondai Keika Gaiyoo, Taisho*, vol. 24. Tokyo: The Gaimusho.

Gaimusho (ed.). 1977. *Nippon Gaiko Bunsho, Washinton Kaigi*. Tokyo: The Gaimushoo.

Gaimusho (ed.). 1979. *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho: Taisho 13*, vol. 1. Tokyo: The Gaimusho.

Gaimusho Hyakunen-Shi Hensan Iinkai. 1969. *Gaimusho no Hyaku Nen*. Tokyo: Hara Shobo.

Hara, Keiichiro (ed.). 1981. *Hara Takashi Nikki*. Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan.

Ito, Nobuya. 2008. *Gaiko Jiho Soo Mokuji: February 1898–April 1945*. Tokyo: Nippon Tosho Sentaa.

Kiyosawa, Kiyoshi. 1928. *Kuroshio ni Kiku,* Tokyo: Banri Kaku Shoboo.

Kobayashi, Tatsuo (ed.). 1966. *Suiu Soo Nikki: Rinji Gaikoo Choosakai Iinkai Giji Hikki Nado*. Tokyo: Hara Shobo.

Miwa, Kimitada (ed.). 1997. *Nichibei Kiki no Kigen to Hainichi Iminhoo*. Tokyo: Ronso Sha.

Mori, Oogai. 1904. *Ooka Ron Koogai*. Tokyo: Shunyoodoo.

Okakura, Tenshin. 1968. *Meiji Bungaku Zenshuu,* vol. 38: *Okakura Tenshin Shuu*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shoboo.

Sawada Renzo. 1950. *Gaisenmon Hiroba*. Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten.

Matsumoto Shigeharu, and Kunihiro Masao. 2001. *Shoowa Shi e no Ichi Shoogen*. Tokyo: Tachibana Shuppan.

Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan (ed.). 1955. *Shidehara Kijuuroo*. Tokyo: Shidehara Heiwa.

Journal Articles and Other Documents in English

Meaney, Neville. 1996. *Fears and phobias: E. L. Piesse and the problem of Japan 1909–39*. Occasional papers series, no. 1. Canberra: National Library of Australia.

Meaney, Neville. 1997. *Australia's changing perception of Asia*. The Japan foundation papers, no. 2. Sydney: The Japan Cultural Centre.

Memorandum: The Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara) to the Secretary of State, April 10, 1924 (later known as the Hanihara Note), *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1924*, vol. II, 369–373. Washington, DC: Department of State, 1939.

Root, Elihu. 1912. "Towards making peace permanent," Nobel Peace Prize lecture. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1912/root-lecture.html. Accessed 19 Feb 2014.

Root, Elihu. 1917. "The effect of democracy on international law," Opening address by Elihu Root as president of the American Society of International Law at the eleventh annual meeting of the society in Washington, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 26, 1917 (Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library).

Sissons, David C. 1986. "Australia's first professor of Japanese: James Murdoch," unpublished paper, 1985. Papers of David Sissons, Canberra, National Library of Australia; also in *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, vol. 10.

Walker, David, and John Ingleson. 1989. The impact of Asia. In Meaney, N. (ed.), *Under new heavens: Cultural transmission and the making of Australia*, Victoria: Heinemann Educational Australia.

Journal Articles and Other Documents, in Japanese

Beikoku ni Okeru Hainichi Mondai Zooken: 1924 Nen no Iminho ni Taisuru Kooshoo Oyobi Koogi, Taisho 12 December–13 June, unpublished, Tokyo, The Gaimusho Archives, 1924.

Hanihara, Shokikan, *Nippon Imin Jootai Shisatsu Hookokusho,* Meiji 41, Tokyo, The Gimusho Archives, November 10, 1908.

Hanihara, Masanao, *Ronsetsu: Nichibei Kankei ni Tsuite, Kokusai Gaiko Zasshi*, Vol. 24, No. 9, Tokyo, 1925.

Hanihara, Masanao, *Kokumin no Gaikoo Teki Kunren,* Gaikoo Jihoo, No. 506, Taisho 15 January 1, 1926.

Hanihara, Masanao, *Gaiko Jihoo no Chichi Ariga Hakase o Omou,* Gaiko Jihoo, No. 539, May 15, 1927.

Hanihara, Masanao, *Taishi Kanken,* Gaikoo Jihoo, May 15, Showa 3, 1928.

Hanihara, Masanao, *Toojin Gaikoo o Imashimu,* Gaikoo Jihoo, Yooshun Bai Dai Goo, April 1, 1929.

Hanihara Shokan, 1972. Official translation to Japanese of Hanihara note. In *Nippon Gaikoo Bunsho, Taibei Imin Mondai Keiga Gaiyoo,* Chapter 15, Part 2, ed. Gaimusho, 783–792. Tokyo: Gaimusho.

Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Ware ni Imin no Yoo Nasi,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, May 15, 1913.

Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Tsingtao wa Danjite Ryooyuu Subekarazu,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, November 15, 1914.

Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Siberia Shuppei Hiki Agu Beshi,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, September 15, 1918.

Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Kokusai Renmei no Chuushin Jigyoo,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, February 5, 1919.

Ishibashi, Tanzan, *Jinshu Teki Sabetu Teppai Yookyuu no Mae ni,* Tooyoo Keizai Shimpoo, February 15, 1919.

Ito, Nobuya, *20 Seiki Zenpan no Nippon Gaiko Rondan to Gaiko Jihoo (1), Matsuyama Daigagu Ronshu*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2008.

Kokusai Renmei Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai (1), Taisho, November 7–March 8, Tokyo, The Gaimusho Archives.

Konoe, Fumimaro, *Ei-Bei Hon-i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu,* Nippon Oyobi Nippon Jin, December 15, 1918.

Mamiya, Kunio. 1989. *Ookuma Shigenobu to Jinshu Sabetsu Teppan Mondai, Waseda Daigaku Shi Kiyoo*, vol. 21, no. 25. Tokyo: Waseda University.

Miyaji-Lawrence, Tsuneko. 1998. Rose, Wattle and Chrysanthemum. In *Japanese in Australia: 1867–1998.* Sydney: Japan Club of Australia Commemorative Issue.

Oka, Yoshitake. 1959. Pari Heiwa Kaigi ni Okeru Amerika Gaikoo to Waga Kuni Yoron. In Saito, Makoto (ed.), *Gendai America no Naisei to Gaikoo*, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai.

Shibusawa, Eiichi. Biographical Resources, vol. 3, *Kokusai Shinzen*, Shibusawa Kinenkan.

Shibusawa, Sei-en Kinen Zaidan Ryuumon Sha (ed.). 1955. *Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Siryoo.* vol. 34, Chapter 3, held at Shibusawa Kinenkan, Tokyo.

Yoshino, Sakuzo, *Gakujutsu Joo yori Mitaru Nichibei Mondai,* Chuuoo Kooron, January 1914.

Yoshino, Sakuzo, *Sekai no Daishuchoo to Sono Junoosaku Oyobi Taioosaku,* Chuuoo Kooron, New Year Edition, 1919.

Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Nanzo Kokusai Renmei Kanyuu o Chuucho Suru,* Chuu-oo Kooron, January 1919.

Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Koowa Kaigi ni Taisuru Kokumin no Kakugo,* Chuu-oo Kooron, March 1919.

Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Jinshu Teki Sabetsu Teppai Undoo Sha ni Atau,* Chuu-oo Kooron, March 1919.

Yoshino, Sakuzoo, *Jinshu Teki Sabetsu Teppai Mondai ni Tsuite,* Chuu-oo Kooron, May 1919.

Index

M. Hanihara Chow, K. Chuma, *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-58154-2