

Japan as the Occupier and the Occupied

Christine de Matos and
Mark E. Caprio



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Edited by

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
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List of Abbreviations

ANRI	Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia
BCOF	British Commonwealth Occupation Force
BMA	British Military Administration
BNBCC	British North Borneo Chartered Company
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFPC	Chosun Film Production Corporation
CIE	Civil Information and Education Section (GHQ/SCAP)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMPE	Central Motion Picture Exchange
CRC	Central Reserve Currency
DPI	Department of Public Information (USAMGIK)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FEC	Far Eastern Commission
GHQ/SCAP	General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
GMD	Guomintang
GS	Government section (GHQ/SCAP)
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JCS	US Joint Chiefs of Staff
KCG	Korean Colonial Government
KMT	Kuomintang
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NEFIS	Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service
NSC	National Security Council
OCA	Overseas Chinese Association
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
PHW	Public Health and Welfare Section (GHQ/SCAP)
PWD	Public Works Department
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur
SCCC	Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce

SCCCI	Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
SRA	Singapore Ratepayers Association
USAMGIK	US Army Military Government in Korea
USIS	United States Information Service (today United States Information Agency, USIA)
WMC	War Memorials Committee, Singapore

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Before and after Defeat: Crossing the Great 1945 Divide

Mark E. Caprio and Christine de Matos

Like other Japanese across the empire on August 15, 1945, Saitō Tomoya anticipated that this day would be anything but ordinary, perhaps even a turning point in the war and Japan's imperial history. The media had alerted the empire of the unprecedented announcement to be made that day at noon by the emperor. All subjects were to gather around a radio at that time, which the vast majority did. Although rather allusive in mentioning the 'end' of the war or Japan's 'defeat', the prerecorded message succeeded in achieving its primary purpose: to inform subjects of Japan's decision to accept the Allied terms of surrender as dictated by the Potsdam Declaration. Saitō recalls the imperial message that they must 'pave the way for a grand peace...by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable'¹ as sufficient in convincing listeners of the decisive turn of events.²

The emperor's message, though shocking and in many ways critical in eventually altering Japan's image as a country of war to one of peace, had a gradual rather than immediate effect. Saitō and other now former Japanese occupiers residing in the northern Korean city of P'yŏngyang would not seriously feel its impact until Soviet troops arrived on August 23. Only then would they learn that their anticipated repatriation would be delayed, and their tenure as overseas Japanese nationals extended indefinitely. Saitō would finally return to Japan in July 1948; others, like his father, would not do so for almost another decade, following a detour to Siberia. Many were fated never to return, with some Japanese succumbing to American fire bombings during the Korean War. Delayed repatriation joined other elements of colonial occupation that stubbornly lingered into post-liberation histories, often assisted by the Allied occupations that replaced Japanese colonial rule.

Japanese across the empire faced uncertainties similar to those felt by the Saitō family as their country passed from colonial and wartime occupier to defeated and occupied. Those on the home islands had a less uncertain immediate future regarding their residence: whether or not their home had survived the relentless Allied bombings, they would rebuild their lives among the ruins left by war. Still, uncertainty prevailed: would the Allied occupiers carry wartime grudges and seek retribution? What physical punishment might they inflict on their enemies upon arrival? How would they govern a people with whom they had exchanged gunfire just days previously, and upon whose cities they had recently unleashed aerial bombings the likes of which had never been witnessed in the history of warfare? For Japanese residing overseas in now former imperial territories, the possibility of hostile retribution by those they formerly administered accompanied uncertainties about the arriving Allied occupation armies. The majority understood that defeat in war meant the loss of Japan's empire and inevitable repatriation to the homeland. However, doubts remained over just when and how they would be able to return to Japan, and perhaps the nature of their reception by their fellow Japanese upon repatriation. These concerns carried much heavier weight for the military than civilians due to the possibility of indictment for war crimes.³ Answers to these questions hinged primarily on their new occupiers' administrative policies. Additionally, the proximity and accessibility of their location to the home islands influenced the postwar future of these overseas Japanese.

For Saitō, his family's residence in the relatively distant Soviet-occupied northern Korean city of P'yōngyang, combined with his father's technical expertise and military service, delayed their return to Japan by three years. Saitō remembers family life in post-liberation Korea under Soviet occupation as fortuitous in that, along with other families headed by technicians, his received relatively favorable treatment by Koreans who appreciated the assistance they lent to post-liberation development. At the same time, their lives were challenged by Soviet harassment and the incarceration and deportation of other Japanese military veterans. Tens of thousands of such Japanese were assembled and transported to Siberia as forced labor. Additionally, thousands more Japanese colonial subjects, who had been spread across the empire through conscription or labor mobilization, were also forced to remain abroad.

The young Saitō's life in northern Korea was filled with new experiences as the Japanese sought to continue their lives under Soviet occupation, even as their population dwindled. Only 14-years old when the war ended, Saitō was called upon to teach at the local Japanese school

when it reopened in 1947. He also gained a perspective of the Korean people that his former status as occupier had denied him. Upon meeting the 'rather attractive' Ms Kim, who approached him in search of an opportunity to practice her Japanese, Saitō reflected: 'Why was I so blind to such beauty in Korean female youth during the war?... Was it only me who harbored these misguided thoughts? Surely among the Korean people are more outstanding people like this girl!'⁴

Such a reflection is but one of many that emerged from both the vanquished Japanese and the liberated colonial subjects in the wake of the emperor's surrender speech. The speech had sent many among the liberated out into city and town streets across the empire in celebration, while others with a less than 'patriotic' record from the years of Japanese occupation assumed a lower profile. The vanquished Japanese struggled with what Ian Nish calls the 'imperial hangover'⁵ in trying to determine what defeat meant and how it would challenge their future. A significant number of Japanese refused to return to Japan, assuming new identities among the very people who had previously been forced to relocate to serve Japan's imperial ambitions. Perhaps surprisingly, encounters between liberated peoples and their former occupiers were occasionally cordial and even sympathetic; yet they were also strained or violent as voids in the social order encouraged acts of retribution or scapegoating in both Japan and abroad.⁶ The arrival of replacement Allied occupiers, which included both newly appointed and returning European colonial powers, injected further confusion into this mix. Long-subjugated people often demonstrated frustration over the barriers erected to prevent claims to rights of self-determination and sovereignty, which the Allied powers had long pledged to honor once peace had been restored.⁷ As in Europe, peoples in many parts of Asia initiated their post-liberation period with further violence against both their recent repressive Japanese occupiers and the new ones who installed their own occupation administration in order to 'liberate'.

The Japanese emperor's broadcast had signaled Japan's intention to end its official involvement in the fighting that had spread across much of Asia and the Pacific from the early 1930s. His pronouncement did not, however, bring an immediate end to Japanese influence in the colonies; dregs stubbornly lingered on well after liberation and continued to influence their future. Nor did it bring immediate peace to the region as civil wars and wars of decolonization continued decades into the 'postwar' period. The announcement also triggered political struggles among rival factions jockeying for political space in the emerging nation-states.⁸ The decolonization process continued into, and in some cases outlived, the

cold war as previous members of the Japanese empire pressured their former subjugator to redress colonial-era injustices. New societies also struggled to address domestic legacies from this period of Japanese occupation, including collaboration. The rectification of colonial-era problems were often delayed as the second occupation that replaced Japan's often placed priority on an orderly transition of power in an emerging and uncertain bipolar world. As seen in Saitō's case, this transition often trapped peoples, temporarily or permanently, in the location of their displacement. Across Japan's vast former empire, as well as in the imperial homeland, the scars of war and occupation stretched across the 1945 war-peace divide that often serves as either the endpoint of Japan's period of war or the commencement of its postwar peace.

This volume aims to capture various elements that bridge this 1945 divide, particularly those that accompanied Japan's fall from its suzerain perch as occupier of Asian and Pacific territories to the depths of occupation under its Allied conquerors.⁹ While recognizing differences in administrative purpose (but not necessarily practical influence) in Japanese colonial and Allied postwar occupations, the contributors to this volume consider the influences these had on the peoples of Japan's empire, including the Japanese, with particular attention to the period between 1931 and 1952. In contrast to studies primarily focused on either side of this divide, this volume joins other academic efforts that examine the effects of this transition on Japan and the territories and peoples incorporated into its empire.¹⁰ The imperial rescript that called for the Japanese military to lay down its arms and endure the unendurable thus served as a hinge to connect rather than delineate the two chapters in these histories. Continuities across this 1945 divide reflect the limitations of historical time frames that artificially construct and separate eras and events. These continuities also reveal overlaps in areas of personnel, institutions, and ideas that demonstrate the persistent residues of colonialism that lingered well into post-liberation histories and even into contemporary times.

The chapters that follow examine these issues from three overlapping dimensions: spatial, corporeal, and psychological. How did the agents of occupation attempt to control not only geographic territory, but also human bodies and minds? What procedures did occupiers employ to exert their power and authority, and how did the occupied respond to their efforts and institutions? Did the occupiers experience failures of influence? To what extent did post-liberation occupations differ from the Japanese occupations they replaced? Can generalizations be made about military occupations and their impact across temporal and spatial

boundaries? In addition to Japan's experiences as both an occupier of territory and occupied under the administration of others, chapters in this volume consider transitions of occupation power in places where English-language historiography has been comparatively less active, including Korea, Borneo, China, Singapore, Soviet Russia (Sakhalin), and the Ryūkyū Islands (Okinawa).¹¹ The contributors also explore a wide variety of issues related to occupation, including human migration, film, eugenics, collaboration, national and ethnic identity, labor, legislation, administration, and historical memory.

The territorial dimension: spatial occupation

The most obvious and visible component of an occupation is the control of territorial spaces identified as strategically important to the occupier. Examining Japan's history as occupier and occupied highlights two important points regarding territorial occupations around the globe. First, while the majority of the world's nations have at some point either been occupied by a foreign power or been itself a power that occupied, fewer territories have assumed both roles within a short space of time.¹² Second, while occupations may adopt multiple forms, often distinguished by the anticipated duration of the occupier's articulated goals, they tend to share the long-term ambition of integrating the occupied territory into a broader regional or global framework. Two key comparative examples of territorial occupation include the long-term colonial and the shorter-term trusteeship models. While the former aim to integrate a territory into the temporally unlimited empire, the latter presume a shorter time frame for actual territorial control with a view toward eventual political sovereignty, though not necessarily full economic, military, ideological, and/or cultural independence.¹³

Japan's early history as an occupier follows the colonial model. Meiji-era (1868–1910) Japanese governments declared the territories they colonized on the periphery – including Ezo (Hokkaido), the Ryūkyūs (Okinawa), Taiwan (Formosa), and Korea – as integral parts of a homeland that were later joined by Manchuria and China to eventually form a pan-Asian sphere of 'co-existence' and 'co-prosperity'. However, states on the periphery more closely resembled the trusteeship system, born of the exigencies of war. These peripheral occupied areas included the Philippines and territories in present-day Southeast Asia, which were all to gain self-sovereignty once they had demonstrated their loyalty to Japan and its regional sphere of influence (or, in the case of Thailand, to keep it). In this sense, Japan's latter occupations resembled the

limited-term trusteeship-style occupations designed by the Allied powers to dislodge Japanese occupiers, sweep away the remains of repressive rule, and arm the newly 'liberated' peoples with the political and economic tools they required to integrate into a postwar bipolar global system. Neither the colonial nor the trusteeship-style occupation approached success in matching benevolent rhetoric with benevolent practice: both efforts tended to drift in the direction of the occupiers' changing needs, whether related to the Asia-Pacific War or the cold war.

The spatial occupation also involves the impact of dismantling Japan's territorial empire. The postwar reconfiguration of borders sometimes added to or subtracted from the possessions of the Western colonial occupiers. These territorial adjustments often left people on the 'wrong side' of newly drawn national demarcations. Some were given the choice to relocate, to return to their homelands, or to accept rule under a new military occupation power. In Japanese-occupied Taiwan in 1895, perhaps following a German example in Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, Chinese residents were given a choice to remain or to relocate to China. This option was not always given by the Japanese to those in its occupied territories, but neither was it given to the majority of Japanese residing across their former empire, like the Saitō family. Many, including over 30,000 Japanese who remain buried in sites scattered throughout North Korea,¹⁴ never returned to Japan. Typically, though, the former Japanese occupiers were expected to repatriate to the home islands after the war's end.

It was also not a choice bestowed upon the forced Korean laborers on the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) who, as Igor Saveliev's chapter demonstrates, were forced to endure a Soviet political administration when the territory was returned to the Soviet Union following Japan's defeat. They were subsequently not permitted to return to the Korean Peninsula after their country's liberation.¹⁵ Okinawans too, as detailed in Matthew Augustine's chapter, found themselves on the 'wrong side' of territorial demarcations at war's end, which forced their repatriation from the empire to the American-directed occupation of their homeland. In addition, their Japanese nationality, which they had acquired with the cooption of the islands into Japan's empire, reverted to 'Okinawan' or 'Ryūkyuan' simply by their birthplace being physically severed by US occupiers from the Japanese archipelago.

Okinawan repatriation represents just a dribble in the large flow of Asian migration wrought by the war's end, a story overwhelmed by a similar, but much more extensive, migration of Europeans triggered by Germany's defeat. Colonized peoples displaced by the Japanese included

an estimated 200,000 'comfort' women and hundreds of thousands more used for labor and military duties.¹⁶ After the surrender, over two million Koreans and 500,000 Taiwanese residing in Japan faced the dilemma of whether a bombed-out country or an ancestral homeland that many hardly knew provided a better place to restart their lives. The stringent regulations that limited the possessions with which they could return forced many to forgo repatriation, creating diaspora communities within Japan.

Japanese migrants who had populated the empire returned to a Japan with ample laborers but limited immediate labor opportunities due to inadequate resources. Faced with over six million returning expatriates, the Japanese government continued to encourage migration as a solution to overpopulation,¹⁷ just as it had done to combat similar prewar problems. Satō Shigeru's chapter on Japanese residents in Borneo offers one example of this earlier encouraged migration, detailing how these migrants endured occupation under the British before Japan took control of the island in the early 1940s, and again when the British reclaimed it after their country's defeat. Territorial control, then, had multiple impacts on those within changing borders, including movement within and across those borders according to policies enacted by the current occupying authority.

The physical dimension: corporeal occupation

As can be seen above, the spatial occupation affects human bodies within territories, but this goes beyond migration, forced or otherwise. Corporeal occupation is sustained by discourses and practices that physically define the occupied as inferior in order to justify such control, as Edward Said emphasized in his groundbreaking work.¹⁸ Exploitation of science, for example, involved biologically deterministic experimental design to measure body parts, such as the human cranium, to establish perceived physical superiority over occupied bodies.¹⁹ Consistent among foreign occupiers in the modern era were the negative stereotypes and language that claimed to understand the culture and customs of the people over whom they assumed the 'burden' of control. For instance, the Japanese admonished both Ainu and Ryūkyūan for maintaining the 'uncivilized' custom of tattooing, one of many 'defects' that would have to be corrected before they could be accepted into the ranks of the 'Japanese'.

Mobilization, both at local and distant levels, proved to be the most universal form of corporeal occupation, particularly after the occupier

became engulfed in war. During the war years the Japanese government dispatched both occupied and homeland Japanese across the empire for labor and military purposes. As Louise Young has demonstrated, by creating the state of Manzhuguo/Manchukuo (Manchuria) in 1932 the Japanese government initiated an extensive campaign that encouraged Japanese to relocate to this 'vacant' land.²⁰ Yet it also encouraged over one million Koreans to relocate to make space available on the Korean Peninsula for potential Japanese migrants. This was also the case in other parts of the empire in a less ambitious mobilization at an earlier time in Japan's imperial history, as Satō Shigeru's chapter demonstrates. Here the government assisted Japanese *zaibatsu* in their efforts to exploit the agricultural and forestry potential of Borneo, and encouraged the migration of landless farmers to become transitory landowners.

An equally commonly told story is that of occupied bodies mobilized within the colonies and peripheries and sent to the metropole, where even the majority of 'voluntary' cases involved heavy doses of coercion, discrimination, and exploitation. The type of work these bodies were expected to perform were those deemed by the occupiers to be the most unattractive and dangerous, and thus also acted as a symbol of occupier power. As Christine de Matos' chapter explains, exploitation of labor persisted over the course of both Japan's occupation of foreign lands and the occupation of the Japanese islands by Allied forces, although the form and degree of coercion differed. More recently, mobilization has been described in terms of the potential benefits it provided to the occupied, such as military experience, changes that were accompanied by a more positive attitude shown by the Japanese toward their colonized peoples.²¹

In addition to mobilizing occupied bodies, colonial systems restricted the temporal and spatial movement of those who remained in the colony. Toyoda Maho, in previous research, illustrated how labor legislation enacted by the US military government in Japan restricted female employment (and opened up job opportunities for returning men) by prohibiting night shifts. This in turn rendered women ineligible for any employment that required workers to assume a night shift, such as in the railroad industry.²² OOI Keat Gin explains how the occupying Japanese harshly squeezed the economic activities of resident Chinese in Borneo after Japan assumed administration of the island, which had been previously divided by the Dutch and British. This endeavor redistributed economic and political space on the island and allowed the

indigenous peoples to fill the postwar voids left by the Chinese departure from the economic realm – many through the ultimate form of corporeal control: execution. The literal elimination of occupied bodies across Japan's empire, including from Borneo and, as in John Kwok's chapter, Singapore, reveals the extreme lengths that an occupier may go to exert their power and authority.

Post-Asia-Pacific War occupations based on the goal of introducing democratic reform to territories formerly controlled by the vanquished Japanese, while doing away with wartime forced or slave labor practices, found other ways to manipulate occupied bodies. Starving, unemployed people, explains Christine de Matos, need not be forced to assume unattractive jobs if they have no alternative. This is also demonstrated by the ubiquity of amateur prostitution during Japan's postwar occupation under the Allied forces. Sarah Kovner's research describes the administration of prostitution over the period of US occupation as one 'unique in the annals of the "oldest profession"' in its 'transition from regulated sex work, to outright deregulation, to criminalization – all in a period of unprecedented social upheaval'.²³ These women were originally employed by the Japanese government to shield or protect 'pure' Japanese women from an anticipated unbridled sexual aggression that incoming enemy servicemen often wreak upon the territories they came to occupy. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers later issued anti-fraternization regulations to curb prostitution.²⁴

Occupiers found other ways to control the body, as seen in Toyoda Maho's chapter, which examines the effect that the global eugenics movement had on Japanese medical practices across the 1945 divide. This was a policy advanced by the prewar Japanese and supported by postwar American administrations. Her chapter highlights the influence on the Japanese government of Nazi practices that aimed to create a master race, which drafted legislation allowing for the restriction or elimination of reproductive rights for people deemed 'inferior' due to mental and physical disability.²⁵ This practice of forced sterilization, by limiting the physical agency of the individual, resembles that of anti-prostitution legislation. However, it differs in that the practice of sterilizing people deemed weak or unsuitable was discriminately used in occupied Japan under US supervision to discontinue the family line even for those with non-hereditary disabilities such as Hansen's disease. Thus, there are many ways of controlling occupied bodies: by designating where and when they work, where they live, whether they are permitted to reproduce, whether they are even permitted to *live*.

The cognitive dimension: psychological occupation

The third dimension addressed in this volume is the influence that occupation has on the minds, ideas and memories of occupied peoples. The effect is generally stronger on those colonized where the intent is more permanent and thus the experience more intense. The Japanese, like so many other colonizers, instituted school systems to instruct occupied minds in the 'Japanese way' and their duty to the state and empire. Subtle hints disseminated through the media hinted at the benefits that assimilation and citizenship would provide; these efforts were intensified under wartime conditions to encourage mobilization to places such as mines, factories, or the battlefield. Imperial Japan celebrated royal birthdays, annexation anniversaries, and, later, dates of military victories across its empire to remind the occupied of appropriate allegiances. On these dates, the rising sun flag was displayed, patriotic hymns sung, speeches heard, and parades and parties attended. The rapidly expanding print and radio cultures served as important conduits to disseminate stories and lessons on the importance of events and milestones, and to instruct on proper behavior and attitudes for such ceremonies. These tools used by occupiers to influence identity and behavior are documented in a lengthy resume of research produced on the development of nations and nationalism.²⁶

One such tool is discussed in Brian Yecies' chapter on the use of film to influence identity formation and behavior. The chapter covers the use of cinema across occupations in Korea under both Japanese and American administrations through similar methodology but with differences in outcomes. The Japanese film industry during the wartime period devoted its efforts to creating films designed specifically to indoctrinate Koreans on their imperial responsibilities, whereas the US occupiers showed popular films selected to demonstrate American political and economic values. US occupiers, argues Yecies, also had a second, more subtle, purpose for introducing these films, which was to develop a market for American films in southern Korea.²⁷

The occupation of minds also resulted in decisions to collaborate with the occupiers. This choice later often worked against them when collaborators were transformed into traitors. As Mark E Caprio shows, southern Korean retribution toward 'pro-Japanese' (*ch'inilp'a*) Koreans was extended across the period of US occupation, primarily due to the Americans retaining these Koreans in positions of power following liberation. The US administration also vetoed legislation that might have brought closure to an issue that continues to haunt the South Korean

state. Brian Martin's chapter looks at collaboration from another angle, that of the accused. He assesses Zhou Fohai's arguments that his decision to collaborate with the Japanese was made with the best intentions toward preserving the Chinese nation. Negotiating with the Japanese, rather than engaging in a suicidal battle against the invaders, was a 'patriotic collaboration' necessary to limit the enemy's encroachment on Chinese sovereignty and prevent what he considered an issue of greater concern, that of Soviet penetration into China. Zhou's example raises the difficult question of intent when trying cases of collaboration, and how even the most notorious cases – Zhou was originally given the death penalty – can be argued (albeit often unsuccessfully) as acts of patriotism.²⁸ In the case of the Chinese in postwar Borneo, as OOI Keat Gin shows, many were ostracized as collaborators even though they had been forced by the Japanese to collect funds from the occupied population. Reactions against collaborators in Japan's former colonies, though, paled in comparison to the German zones of occupation in Europe.²⁹

One of the more intrusive ways of occupying minds lies in the deliberate molding of identity. This only becomes more complicated when there is a transition from one occupying power to another. The relative briefness of Japan's history as a colonizer and occupier ensured that many people would undergo either a re-assimilation back into their original ethnic identity or a second foreign assimilation effort. This latter was the case for nearly 24,000 Koreans in southern Sakhalin where, as Igor Saveliev demonstrates, the return of this territory to the Soviet Union separated them from Japan, their homeland and their families after 'liberation'. Thus the first generation of these mobilized and forced laborers encountered two efforts to assimilate them: first the Japanese under colonial occupation, and second the Soviets under cold war administration. The descendants of this generation subsequently developed complicated hybrid identities, and only recently have they been able to visit, or even resettle, in their (South) Korean ethnic homeland. Okinawans, too, underwent a process of 'De-Japanization' or 'Ryūkyūanization' under US occupation – a psychological separation to complement the territorial one.

However, it was not just those subjugated by Japan who had their identities tested and reformed in multiple ways; so too did the Japanese as they transitioned from occupier to occupied, at home and in their former empire. Saitō Tomoya suggests that his fellow compatriots in newly liberated northern Korea strengthened their identity as Japanese in the face of oppression at the hands of the Soviet military. Thus they continued to celebrate national holidays, established a school system,

and organized to assist the repatriation of fellow Japanese. Upon repatriation, however, some found their identity as Japanese challenged primarily by those who had survived the war in Japan, with all of its wartime and postwar chaos and destruction. How did these repatriates, a sizable number who had left their homeland for the purpose of enhancing their social position in the more cosmopolitan colonies, fit into the growing homogeneous identity that developed with the end of war and empire?³⁰ Populating Japan's empire had become a liability. Saitō was warned to stay low during the Korean War by a bureaucratic companion as 'he wore a target on his back' for having resided in what had now become enemy territory.³¹

Yet many Japanese revived their memories of life in wartime Japan, in the colonies, and of their journey home after the war, in a number of ways. One, as introduced by Curtis Anderson Gayle, was through writing in postwar magazines such as *New Women* (Shin Josei), where similarities between the Allied occupation and wartime Japan were noted; defeat had toppled an 'illegal' fascist Japanese state only to replace it with another, US-controlled model. Other Japanese published 'self-histories' (*jibunshi*)³² that recounted their productive lives as colonizers, followed by the months – or, as in Saitō's case, years – they experienced as occupied peoples up until repatriation to Japan. Individual memories are woven into the collective narrative that museums and historical displays organized around the homeland to preserve and teach future generations of the horrors and sacrifices that were made at this challenging time in the nation's history.³³ Mo Tian introduces another avenue for remembering this history and reinforcing its lessons, the *manga*. In examining *My Manchuria* (Boku no Manshū), Tian demonstrates the power that can be generated from this two-dimensional genre to effectively 'translate' the complicated colonial experience, intermixed with nostalgia and violence, to a broad audience. In *My Manchuria* victimization is magnified, as the experience is seen through the eyes of a young boy torn from what he perceived to be his homeland in Manchuria, through the arduous journey back to his ancestral land of Japan.³⁴ The power of the innocent child's voice and viewpoint has been used in many other wartime memories in Japanese literature, anime and manga, including the iconic *Grave of Fireflies* (Hotaru no haka) and *Barefoot Gen* (Hadashi no Gen).³⁵

Historical memory – ways that the period of occupation is woven into the liberated state's collective national narrative – constitutes an important aspect of psychological occupation, and one that endures long after the occupying force has departed. Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama express this point well in arguing:

There is no one-to-one correspondence between a discrete experience and a particular memory, for even experience itself might come to us through mediation. Experience and memory, in other words, are always already mediated and this mediation in turn is always shaped by relations of power.³⁶

Here the legacy of an occupation period is built more on how it is imagined, often privileging the view of those in power, and usually to tell a desired national tale, rather than reflecting the multitude of actual experiences. As C Sarah So has shown in her influential book, the creation of a paradigmatic memory of the 'comfort women' has reduced individual stories to a single narrative, thus eliminating the diversity of situations that brought these women to the military front.³⁷ Post-liberation histories are filled with similar stories designed to influence how occupation periods are to be remembered, and not necessarily only by the liberated. The US occupation of Japan sought to redraw the militarism of wartime Japan as more palatable postwar/cold war images by reimagining the emperor and the new constitution as peace-promoting institutions.³⁸ These images were again revised in the 1980s, as seen in Japan's efforts to rewrite its textbooks and constitution, thus rekindling painful, and occasionally misinformed, memories of the brutal occupation to which Japan subjected occupied peoples in China, Korea, and elsewhere.

Those who occupied, re-occupied, and liberated territories devised a variety of means to remind the populace of key events and personalities used to explain and legitimize transitions of power, and to reverse (or reoccupy) occupied minds. With the Japanese occupier expelled from the territory, a new set of symbols was required to reeducate along an amended national narrative. August 15, which serves as a day of reflection in Japan today, is commemorated in present-day South Korea as a day of liberation from two occupations: Japan in 1945, and the United States in 1948. Though not celebrated in this context, it is also the day that southern Korea formally split into a separate state from its northern counterpart with the formation of the Republic of Korea. Territories that remained occupied decades after the end of the Japanese occupation scripted complicated narratives open to challenges from different sectors of the population. For instance, Guam officially commemorates July 21 as its day of 'liberation' from Japan's occupation. However, the prolongation of the subsequent US presence has encouraged calls for a revision of the national holiday as it is the day that this second occupation commenced.³⁹ Had the US not broken its vow 'to liberate, not to

conquer', as pledged in the 1941 Atlantic Charter and etched into the National World War II Memorial in Washington DC, by absorbing the island, along with other south Pacific outposts, as a postwar military-base trophy?⁴⁰

Replacement occupiers and liberated peoples introduced more permanent ways to commemorate this history, means that are often politicized to fit the national narrative.⁴¹ The fate of the Japanese government-general buildings in Taiwan and South Korea – the former preserved as a Presidential building and the latter literally decapitated in commemoration of a half-century of liberation – offers contrasting examples of the influence of occupation-era memories on postwar histories.⁴² Japanese imperialists had joined other colonial nations in constructing grand buildings that employed the most modern architectural design as their citadels of power, including train stations, banks, police offices, jails, and government offices. Postcolonial governments assumed control over these buildings and, after employing them for similar purposes, turned some that escaped destruction into museums to explain to contemporaries the dominant narrative of this previous occupation. Present-day administrations have contemporized this narrative by assembling new exhibits and erecting new monuments and museums. John Kwok's chapter explains how the return of a pre-Japanese colonial occupier can influence the production of memory and memorials. In this case, the British administration that returned to govern Singapore after Japan's defeat intervened in the planning of a monument to remember the Japanese occupation. Rather than build a new memorial, the dates of this conflict were added to the existing Great War cenotaph. This decision served both to minimize the experiences of Chinese Singaporeans, who had suffered most under Japanese occupation, and to privilege the British imperial view of the war. All of the above bear witness to the politics of war memory and commemoration, and beg the question: to what extent is an occupied mind ever truly liberated?

In 2009 the editors of this volume, Christine de Matos (then of the University of Wollongong, Australia) and Mark E Caprio (Rikkyō University, Japan), attended the *6th International Convention of Asia Scholars* in Daejeon, South Korea.⁴³ At that conference, Christine's scheduled panel on masculinities was canceled and her presentation thrust into a different one on Japan and colonization during the Asia-Pacific War. Feeling that her paper on Australian masculinities in occupied Japan did not fit the topic, she suggested to the conference organizers that it might be more helpful for a potential audience to rename the

panel. The name she suggested was 'Before and after defeat: Japan as the occupier and the occupied'. The organizers agreed. In a conversation over afternoon tea, Christine relayed the story of the panel name change to Mark. 'Hey', she commented, 'wouldn't that make a great name for a book?' Thus this volume was conceived from a brief collegial chat over conference-quality coffee and a last-minute administrative alteration.

Conception is one thing; gestation quite another. Since that time the idea for this book has gone through multiple phases, has seen contributors arrive and depart, and, of course, has developed with the assistance of many people, institutions and organizations. The first public test occurred in Okinawa in August 2011, where a number of the contributors presented their draft chapters (and survived being holed up in their accommodation during a typhoon) at the *Dialogue Under Occupation V* conference.⁴⁴ A second was at a workshop, 'Before and after Defeat: Japan as the occupier and the occupied. Crossing the 1945 divide', held at the University of Wollongong in December 2011. This workshop would not have been possible without the generous sponsorship of The Japan Foundation Sydney,⁴⁵ the Institute for Social Transformation Research (ISTR),⁴⁶ the Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS),⁴⁷ and the University of Wollongong. The intense workshop enabled contributors to have in-depth discussions, with each other and external expert commentators, about the progress of their chapters and the overall direction of the volume itself.⁴⁸

We, as the editors, are also grateful for the advice of our elite army of expert reviewers, each of whom has given up their precious time to aid the contributors in advancing and polishing their research and writing. Enormous thanks to Lionel Babicz (University of Sydney), Dave Chapman (University of South Australia), Vera Mackie (University of Wollongong), Tessa Morris-Suzuki (Australian National University), Hamzah Muzaini (Wageningen University), OOI Keat Gin (Universiti Sains Malaysia), Peter Sales (University of Wollongong), Rebecca Suter (University of Sydney), Nicholas Tarling (New Zealand Asia Institute, University of Auckland), Elise Tipton (University of Sydney), Rowena Ward (University of Wollongong), Nikolai G Wenzel (Florida Gulf Coast University), Sandra Wilson (Murdoch University), and Joseph KS Yick (Texas State University). Other key people to be thanked include Mark Selden, who provided valuable advice about the aims of the project in its very early days, and Jenny McCall, Holly Tyler, Jade Moulds, the anonymous reviewers, and other staff at Palgrave Macmillan for their support and insightful edits and comments that helped to sharpen and strengthen the volume.

The spatial, corporeal, and psychological components of occupation naturally overlap and intersect. The occupied space is integral; however the chapters in this volume tend to privilege one or the other of the latter two components. Thus the volume is divided into two sections that reflect these Physical (Part I) or Cognitive (Part II) dimensions and impacts. Throughout the book, we have opted for the following in terms of names and terminology. Non-western names appear in traditional order, unless an individual has selected to Anglicize their name. Chinese names and terms are usually given in pinyin, with the Wade-Giles provided the first time in brackets. The exceptions to this include when the Wade-Giles is more common, for example Chiang Kai-shek rather than Jiang Jieshi, or when rendering a particular name from a cited document. We use the term Asia-Pacific War to refer to Japan's theater of conflict to acknowledge both the pre-European phase and honor the inclusion of all affected peoples in the Asia Pacific region. When referring to the wider conflict, that is including Europe and elsewhere, World War II is used instead. The meaning of 'occupation' is interpreted most broadly to include any form of military presence or control of territory and bodies, from colonial annexation to transitory rule. In the case of occupied Japan, we use the official term Allied Occupation of Japan to be inclusive of all the occupying nations (United States, Britain, Australia, British India, and New Zealand).

Finally, this volume would not be possible without the contributors themselves. They have all enthusiastically shared the outcomes of their personal research, molded the shape of their chapters to achieve the aims of the volume, and patiently participated in the (often pedantic) editing process. We thank them for believing in the project in the beginning, and staying committed to witness the final outcome of their achievements. It has certainly been quite a journey from that initial spark of an idea over coffee in 2009, but of course not nearly as long or arduous as that experienced by the likes of the Saitō family, and all of those others who were affected, in one way or another, by the events that preceded, crossed, and followed the great divide of August 15, 1945.

Notes

1. 'Imperial Rescript' quoted from translation found in M Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 660–1.
2. Saitō Tomoya, *P'yōngyang de sugoshita 12 nen no hibi* (Twelve Years in P'yōngyang) (Tokyo: Kōyo shuppan, 2009), p. 73.

3. Utsumi Aiko found that 4,682 members of the Japanese armed forces, including 173 Taiwanese and 148 Koreans, were convicted of Class B and C war crimes. See *Kimu wa naze sabakareta no ka: Chōsenjin BC kyū senpan no kiseki* [Why was Kim Tried?: The Locus of Korean BC Class War Criminals] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, 2008), p. 7. See also her 'Korean "Imperial Soldiers": Remembering Colonialism and Crimes against Allied POWs', in TT Fujitani, GM White and L Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 199–217.
4. Saitō, *P'yōngyang de sugoshita 12 nen no hibi*, p. 140.
5. Ian Nish, 'Regaining Confidence – Japan after the Loss of Empire', *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, No. 1 (January 1980): 181–95.
6. This was even more the case after Germany's surrender in May 1945 as peoples relocated over the course of the war made the often long land journey across the continent to either return to their homelands or search for a new one. Asian population movement was frustrated by most people having to travel by ship, which slowed the pace and reduced the inter- and inner-group violence. For European examples see B Shepard, *The Long Road Home: The Aftermath of the Second World War* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2010); K Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2012).
7. Two such occasions were US President Woodrow Wilson's 1918 declaration in his Fourteen Points speech, and pledges from US President Franklin D Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the 1941 Atlantic Charter.
8. RH Spector examines the continuity of the battles that raged throughout the former Japanese empire in the 'postwar' period in his *In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia* (New York: Random House, 2007). For discussions on the ashes of war in Japan see R Rosenbaum and Y Claremont (eds), *Legacies of the Asia-Pacific War: The Yakeato Generation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
9. There are too many texts on the Allied Occupation to name here, but some key ones include JW Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1999); Takamae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002); I Nish, *The British Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952: Personal Encounters and Government Assessments* (Leiden: Brill, 2013); and R Gerster, *Travels in Atomic Sunshine: Australia and the Occupation of Japan* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2008).
10. Other such studies include: JW Dower, 'The Useful War', in JW Dower (ed.), *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 9–32; chapters in ME Caprio and Yoneyuki Sugita (eds), *Democracy in Occupied Japan: The US Occupation and Japanese Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 2007); and A Heylen and S Sommers (eds), *Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010).
11. For Korea see B Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); C Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); BB Oh (ed.), *Korea Under the American Military*

- Government, 1945–1948* (Westport: Praeger, 2002); and S Kim, *Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013).
12. Post-WWII Germany is another obvious contemporary example.
 13. For a longer discussion about defining ‘military occupation’, see C de Matos and R Ward, ‘Analysing Gendered Occupation Power’, in C de Matos and R Ward (eds), *Gender, Power and Military Occupation: Asia Pacific and the Middle East since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 2–4.
 14. Mizuno Naoki, ‘Stories from beyond the Grave: Investigating Japanese burial grounds in North Korea’, *Asia Pacific Journal* 12-9-5 (March 3, 2014): online: <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Caprio/4085>. Other Japanese simply refused to return and some remained trapped in the former colonial outpost for the remaining days of their lives. For the latter, see T Morris-Suzuki, ‘The Forgotten Japanese in North Korea: Beyond the Politics of Abduction’, *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 43-2-9 (October 26, 2009): online: http://japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/3241.
 15. Japan was ceded the southern part of Sakhalin by the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese war (1904–5).
 16. For a history of the comfort women, see C Sarah So, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); for military conscription see B Palmer, *Fighting for the Enemy: Koreans in Japan’s War, 1937–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013) and TT Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); for labor mobilization see KC Kawashima, *The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009) and M Driscoll, *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead in Japan’s Imperialism, 1895–1945* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010).
 17. Toake Endoh reports that Brazil received by far the largest number of postwar Japanese migrants (55,964), following by Paraguay (7,727), Argentina (2,059), Bolivia (1,968), and the Dominican Republic (1,927). See T Endoh, ‘Shedding the Unwanted: Japan’s Emigration Policy’, *Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper 72* (October 2000).
 18. EW Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). Said’s work has encouraged similar discussions on other colonized peoples. For the American views of Filipinos see EM Holt, *Colonizing Filipinas: Nineteenth-Century Representations of the Philippines in Western Historiography* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2002).
 19. SJ Gould provides a useful and readable introduction to this research in his *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: WW Norton, 1996).
 20. L Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
 21. Fujitani (*Race for Empire*) traces this as a change from ‘vulgar’ to ‘polite’ racism.
 22. Toyoda Maho, ‘Protective Labor Legislation and Gender Equality: The Impact of the Occupation on Japanese Working Women’, in Caprio and Sugita (eds), *Democracy in Occupied Japan*, pp. 67–88.
 23. S Kovner, *Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

24. Kovner, *Occupying Power*, p. 3.
25. E Black argues that early 1900s US efforts to enact eugenic legislation influenced Nazi thinking on this issue. See *War against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race* (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows Press, 2003).
26. For colonial occupation development see LTS Ching, *Becoming 'Japanese': Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) and ME Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation of Japanese* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).
27. See also B Yecies and Ae-Gyung Shim, *Korea's Occupied Cinemas, 1893–1948* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011).
28. Zhou Fohai's case resembles that of France's Pierre Laval, whose negotiation with Nazi Germany, he contended, was conducted with the intention of France suffering 'as little as possible'. See JK Brody, *The Trial of Pierre Laval: Defining Treason, Collaboration and Patriotism in World War II France* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010), p. 153.
29. See chapters in I Deák, JJ Gross and T Judt (eds), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
30. Oguma Eiji traces Japanese identity from wartime heterogeneity to postwar homogeneity in his *Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* [The Origins of the Myth of the Homogeneous Nation] (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995).
31. This was after he received a letter from a (now North) Korean friend injured during the Korean War and hospitalized in Beijing. Saitō, *P'yōngyang de sugoshita 12 nen no hibi*, p. 268. See also L Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), chapter 4, and Igarashi Yoshikuni, *Haisen to Sengo no aidade: Okurettekaerishi shatachi* [Between Defeat and Postwar: Late Returnees] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2012).
32. See G Figal, 'Making and Marketing Self-histories of Showa among the Masses in Postwar Japan', *Journal of Asian Studies* 55, No. 4 (November 1996): 902–33. One such history was Senō Kappa, *Shōnen H* [Boy H] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997) that was later made into a popular motion picture.
33. Japan's national narrative, as told in several of its wartime museums, emphasizes the 'Japanese as victim' story. The *Heiwa kinen tenji shiryokan* [Memorial Archive for Peace] in Tokyo retells the story of Japanese repatriation from the empire, and the *Shōwakan* [National Showa Memorial Museum] offers viewers snapshots of life in wartime Japan. Several sites are dedicated to the bombing of Japanese cities, including the two atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See Xiaohua Ma's comparative studies on national war museums as illustrated in her 'Constructing a National Memory of the War: War Museums in China, Japan, and the United States', in M Gallicchio (ed.), *The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in US-East Asian relations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 155–200.
34. A similar approach is used in Yoko Kawashima Watkin's *So Far from the Bamboo Grove* (Sag Harbor, NY: Beech Tree, 2008), which tells the story of the author's harrowing journey from northern Korea to Japan. Its adoption by school districts raised controversy among Koreans who viewed it

- as refocusing its readers' attention away from the true victims, the Korean people that Kawashima Watkin's people had initially violated.
35. Isao Takahata (dir), *Grave of the Fireflies*, Studio Ghibli, 1988; Mori Masaki (dir), *Barefoot Gen*, 1983. These both have, of course, appeared in multiple media formats from manga to novels to television.
 36. Fujitani et al. (eds), 'Introduction', in *Perilous Memories*, p. 1. The editors continue by concluding a need to 'denaturalize and dismember those memories that have become dominant and often officialized over the past half century or so' (p. 4). For historical memory see also chapters in Gallicchio (ed.), *The Unpredictability of the Past*.
 37. So, *The Comfort Women*.
 38. See Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
 39. See VM Diaz, 'Deliberating "Liberation Day": Identity, History, Memory, and War in Guam', in Fujitani et al. (eds), *Perilous Memories*, pp. 155–80. For more on Guam and occupation, see Miyume Tanji 'Japanese Wartime Occupation, War Reparation and Guam's Chamorro Self-determination', in Daniel Broudy, Peter Simpson and Makoto Arakaki (eds), *Under Occupation: Resistance and Struggle in a Militarised Asia-Pacific* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 175–96.
 40. The Atlantic Charter was drafted by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt in August 1941. Article One of this document declares that the signatories 'seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other'.
 41. G Podoler describes the North and South Korean use of monuments as the negative 'struggle over [colonial] memory' in his *Monuments, Memory, and Identity: Constructing the Colonial Past in South Korea* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011), p. 11.
 42. The government-general building in Seoul also served as the headquarters for the American Military Government and the national assembly building for South Korean governments until 1975, when it was turned into a national museum.
 43. For more information see: <http://www.icassecretariat.org/>.
 44. See: <http://dialogueunderoccupation.wordpress.com/duo5oka/>.
 45. See: <http://www.jpff.org.au/>.
 46. See: <http://lha.uow.edu.au/hsi/istr/index.html>.
 47. See: <http://www.capstrans.edu.au/index.html>.
 48. See: <http://lha.uow.edu.au/hsi/istr/UOW116724.html>.

Part I

The Physical Dimension: Corporeal Occupation

2

Cash and Blood: The Chinese Community and the Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–45

OOI Keat Gin

Less than four months after the stealth assault on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in Hawai'i, Imperial Japanese forces occupied territories in Southeast Asia (except Thailand, a wartime ally of Tokyo). Borneo, an island strategically situated as a landing base for aerial operations on two regional targets, namely British Malaya to the west and Dutch Java to the south, was occupied with scant resistance from Western colonial regimes. These regimes included the British protectorates of Sarawak under the Brooke Rajah, British North Borneo administered by the British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBCC), and the British-protected Malay Muslim sultanate of Brunei (all collectively referred to as British Borneo), and Dutch Borneo, comprising the southern and western parts of the island. Imperial Japan occupied Borneo from December 1941 to September 1945. The Japanese military administration differentiated between indigenes and Chinese in the multi-ethnic populace, displaying different attitudes toward each group which were then translated into divergent treatment and policies. The Chinese community received the proverbial short straw of the Imperial Japanese Army's (IJA) and Navy's (IJN) iron-fisted military administration.

Focusing on 'Japan as the occupier', this chapter highlights two conspicuous dictates of Japanese wartime administration toward the Chinese of Borneo, namely the imposition of *shu-jin* (blood money) in IJA-controlled *Kita Boruneo* (prewar British Borneo), and pogroms undertaken in IJN-administered *Minami Boruneo* (prewar Dutch Borneo). An examination of these two dictates contributes to our understanding of Japanese intentions toward the Chinese community of Northern Borneo and, in turn, to evaluate the impact of actions imposed on them. The

shu-jin demands were calculated to financially cripple the Chinese who, hitherto, had dominated the economy, and in turn to facilitate IJA control by forcing Chinese cooperation and creating full dependence on the Japanese. In Southern Borneo, owing to the professed policy of permanent possession (*eikyū senryō*), the IJN eliminated all vestiges of the past, including the Chinese commercial and trading elite who controlled the lion's share of the economy. This break with the past was intended to usher in a new beginning, resulting in the elimination of prominent members of society, including the *towkay*,¹ comprised of the captains of industry and commerce, the educated elite, and community leaders. Consequently, immediate postwar Kalimantan suffered a paucity of Chinese leaders that subsequently led to the marginalization of the community and paved the way for the political ascendancy of indigenes.

The Chinese in prewar Borneo

There is little doubt in our minds that the future development of Borneo can only be accomplished by the Chinese.

Rajah Charles Brooke, *Sarawak Gazette*, Aug 1, 1874

Rajah Charles Brooke of Sarawak was indeed observant, realistic and prophetic in placing such a high premium and expectation on the Chinese. Much has been written of the Chinese in Borneo from the early centuries prior to the advent of the Europeans, including the celebrated Hakka Chinese gold-mining communities in northwestern Borneo, Chinese predominance in trade and cash-cropping from the late 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, and their demographic expansion in the interwar years.²

Across Borneo, Sarawak had the greatest number of Chinese inhabitants, accounting for a quarter of its total population in 1939 (Table 2.1). Demographically, the Chinese comprised 22 per cent of the total population of British Borneo, but a mere six per cent of Dutch Borneo.

Thus on the eve of the Asia-Pacific War, the Chinese of Borneo were a well-entrenched minority. Owing to their trading and commercial activities, the majority of the Chinese were concentrated in urban areas, but the interior population included Chinese farmers in cash-cropping, laborers in mining communities, and enterprising traders and shopkeepers in rural bazaars.

Table 2.1 Population of prewar Borneo

	British N Borneo	Brunei	Sarawak	W Borneo	S & SE Borneo
Census	1931	1931	1939*	1930	1930
Indigenes	210,057	26,746	361,676	689,585	1,327,487
<i>Chinese</i>	50,056	2,683	123,626	107,998	26,289
Europeans	na	na	Na	1077	4,562
Other Asians	22,202	706	5,283	3,787	7,876
Total Population	282,315	30,135	490,585	802,447	1,366,214
<i>Total Population</i>		<i>British Borneo</i> 803,035		<i>Dutch Borneo</i> 2,168,661	
Total Area (km²)	75,821	5,743	124,485	146,760	401,988
<i>Total Area (km²)</i>		<i>British Borneo</i> 206,049		<i>Dutch Borneo</i> 548,748	

Note: * A head count undertaken by the Food Control Department.

Source: Adapted from LW Jones, *The Population of Borneo: A study of the peoples of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei* (London: The Athlone Press, 1966), pp. 18, 31, 33, 63; Volkstelling, *Definitieve Uitkomsten Van de Volkstelling 1930 [Final Result of the 1930 Census]* (Batavia: Department van landbouw, Niveerheid en Hadel, 1930).

Military occupation and administration

After the initial IJA landings and the seizure of Miri on December 16, 1941, the Borneo campaign concluded with the occupation of Banjarmasin on February 10, 1942.³ Borneo was divided administratively into Kita Boruneo and Minami Boruneo under the IJA and IJN respectively, reflecting of the long term aims of Imperial Japan:

the Army has been charged with administration of densely populated areas which demand complex administrative tasks, while sparsely populated primitive areas, which shall be retained in the future for the benefit of the Empire, have been assigned to the Navy.⁴

Thus, it was apparent that territories administered by the IJN were to be maintained for permanent occupation (*eikyū senryō*) and incorporated into Imperial Japan.⁵ Minami Boruneo, a resource-rich (particularly in oil) and vast area (548,748 km²) with a sparse population of only 2.1 million, was ideal for *eikyū senryō*. The IJN possessed different attitudes and policies toward its territories, including establishing a system of civil administration staffed with professional Japanese civil servants.

'Consequently', it was not surprising that 'the Borneo *Minseibu* [regional administrative department] became highly distrustful and suspicious of any political activities, subversive or otherwise, among the local populace'.⁶ Moreover, this policy of permanent occupation contributed to pogroms against the Chinese in West Borneo.

Japanese wartime policy in Borneo focused on five major areas: strategic and/or economic resources, Nipponization, ethnic policy, political participation, and combating subversion. The IJA and IJN shared similar views in terms of policy and implementation with regard to strategic and/or economic resources, but conspicuously different views on ethnic policy, political participation, and combating subversion. From the outset, both the IJA and IJN worked earnestly and tirelessly to resuscitate the oil industry to ensure that this vital, strategic commodity could be swiftly and efficiently harnessed to contribute to Imperial Japan's war effort and subsequent victory. Their efforts paid off, as evidenced by Allied intelligence reports that oil from Miri-Seria-Lutong continued to be shipped to Japan as late as September 1944.⁷ In the domestic economy, *zaibatsu* (large-scale business consortiums) were brought in to hijack the established Chinese distributive trade networks, enforcing compulsory cooperation from Chinese merchants, monopolizing essential goods (rice and other foodstuffs), and forcefully imposing a food self-sufficiency policy.⁸ All economic resources, including foodstuffs, were exclusively reserved for the Japanese soldiery; any excess was for the local populace. Acts of pilfering and smuggling were punishable by death, suggesting that such activities transgressed Japanese priorities.

Ethnocentrism played a central role in the push for the Nipponization of the multitude of conquered peoples. Japanese values, world views, socio-cultural traits (such as, language (*Nihongo*), culture, and spirit (*seishin*)), the all-revered emperor-worship, and the 'superiority' of the Japanese race were forcibly inculcated through an education system that reached both young and old. The most conspicuous and memorable for the subjugated common peoples was attendance at *Nihongo* classes, with the ultimate intention of making the subjugated population 'think, feel and act like Japanese East Asians'.⁹

Japanese attitudes toward the multi-ethnic inhabitants of Borneo were split along ethnic lines, between indigenes and the immigrant Chinese. In assuring indigenous inhabitants that Imperial Japan was not their enemy, an administrative directive of March 14, 1942 declared that

local customs, practices, and religions shall not be interfered with for the time being. The impact of the war on native livelihood should

be alleviated where possible and within the limits set by the need for rendering occupational forces self-sufficient and securing resources vital to national defense. *However, no measures shall be taken for the sole purpose of placating the natives* [emphasis added].¹⁰

But for the Chinese in Borneo and throughout occupied Southeast Asia, where they were regarded as enemies of Imperial Japan, as were those on the Chinese mainland, a different set of principles applied:

The main objective, where the local Chinese are concerned, shall be to utilize their existing commercial organizations and practices to the advantage of our policies...and measures shall be taken to sever political ties among the Chinese residents of the various areas as well as between them and mainland China.¹¹

Moreover, in perceiving the Chinese as a potential and/or real threat, it was emphasized that '[s]trict discipline shall...be exerted against anti-Japanese movements'.¹² The fact that the aforesaid caution was inserted specifically in section '[iv]' for the Chinese under the general heading of 'the treatment of residents in areas under military administration' anticipated the Chinese as *the only community* that could offer a serious challenge to Japanese authority.¹³ In short, the Chinese community were to be economically exploited for Japanese benefit and, at the same time, rendered politically impotent for the security of Imperial Japan.

The IJA's *Gunseibu* (military government) established the *kensankai* (prefectural advisory council), where membership was drawn from local traditional elites – Malay *datu* and Iban *penghulu* and *temenggung*.¹⁴ This rendered enormous prestige to these leaders within their respective communities.¹⁵ Elevating an English-educated Iban to the high office of Resident, an appointment exclusively held in prewar times by Europeans, was unprecedented. Likewise, appointing other educated Ibans as a *Guncho* (District Officer), also previously a European preserve, offered invaluable administrative experiences for these indigenous appointees.¹⁶ Such measures were undoubtedly aimed at garnering native support for the Japanese military regime. In contrast, owing to *eikyū senryō*, neither the *Minseibu* nor the higher authority *Minseifu* (Naval Civil Administration Office) made such sympathetic overtures toward the indigenous elite in Minami Boruneo.

In combating subversion, 'real or suspect...the clamp-down by both IJA and IJN was swift, harsh and merciless'.¹⁷ Although it was justifiable for a wartime military administration to eliminate any threat,

subversion or open opposition to its authority, several prominent killings in Borneo were indefensible, unbecoming for a, so-called, civilized nation like Imperial Japan. The much-documented infamous Sandakan Death Marches were horrific acts by the IJA against Allied Prisoners of War (POWs).¹⁸ Against this background, two conspicuous issues of Japanese wartime administration, *shu-jin* (blood money) in Kita Boruneo and pogroms in Minami Boruneo, are hereafter addressed.

‘Life-redeeming money’

Unlike their brethren in Singapore and Penang, the Chinese in Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo were generally a politically complacent community. Sarawak, in particular, had a sizeable number of Chinese who were second and/or third generation and many were locally born. Familial ties with the mainland, if any, tended to be intermittent and weak. Nonetheless, activists-cum-promoters of the China Relief Fund (from 1937) and the British Spitfire Fund (after 1940) managed to cajole monetary contributions from the Chinese of British Borneo. The outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War¹⁹ in mid-1937 awakened the long slumber of the Chinese toward the ancestral homeland that was then facing invasion and increasing subjugation by a resurgent Imperial Japan:

Activists for the [China Relief] fund invoked patriotism and argued that...all overseas Chinese, including those in remote Borneo, were duty-bound and morally obligated to support China’s struggle against Japan. In other words it became *every Chinese individual’s patriotic responsibility* [emphasis added].²⁰

The local Chinese vernacular press invoked anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese community, who hitherto thought Imperial Japan and the handful of Japanese residents in their midst to be inconsequential.²¹

Thanks to their higher literacy rates, the Chinese in British Borneo were the only community conscious of the geopolitical situation, gleaned from newspapers and the newly-introduced (late 1930s) radio broadcasting. Japan’s imperialistic offensives and China’s miseries were closely followed by most urban Chinese residents, and when the inevitable happened (invasion and occupation), they were wary of what their fate would be. Consequently, when the IJA marched along Gambier Street and Main Bazaar, a third to one half of the Chinese inhabitants

of Kuching had fled to the coastal districts of Santubong to the northwest.²² Chinese females of marriageable age were hurriedly married off to avoid rape and/or enslavement as ‘comfort women’, a euphemism for forced sex slavery, in ‘comfort stations’ (military brothels).²³ Young and able-bodied Chinese men took flight to escape recruitment into forced labor gangs.

Retribution for prewar ‘sins’

The Japanese military authorities were cognizant of the political inertness of the Chinese in British Borneo, notably among the sizeable community in Sarawak. There was even no overt opposition or resistance in the three territories, apart from an inconsequential rear guard defence by the British 15th Punjab Regiment.²⁴ Consequently, instead of launching a *sook ching* (purification through elimination) campaign as in British Malaya,²⁵ the IJA imposed *shu-jin*, ‘life-redeeming money’ or ‘blood money’.

This monetary demand was *regarded* as a cleansing or purification gesture for the prewar ‘sins’ of the Chinese of British Borneo against Imperial Japan, namely their support of the Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) regime, including contributions to the China Relief Fund and to British war efforts. The monetary demands, totaling \$3 million,²⁶ were allocated as follows (Table 2.2):

Table 2.2 *Shu-jin* contributions of the Chinese of Kita Boruneo

Area	Amount (in Straits Dollars)	
Sarawak	Kuching	900,000
	Sibu	700,000
	Miri	300,000
British North Borneo	Jesselton (West Coast)	600,000
	Sandakan (East Coast)	500,000
Total	3,000,000	

Source: Adapted from OOI, *Rising Sun over Borneo*, p. 58; RHW Reece, *The Name of Brooke: The end of White Rajah rule in Sarawak* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 144–5.

The *shu-jin* demands made of the Chinese inhabitants of Kita Boruneo was in line with overall Japanese policy, as outlined in a document titled ‘Principles Governing the Implementation of Measures Relative to the Chinese (*Kakyō kōsaku jissai yōryō*)’, issued by the Military Administration Headquarters in Singapore sometime in April 1942.²⁷

The ironies of life had members of the prewar fundraising committee of the China Relief Fund tasked with the unenviable responsibility of collecting and delivering *shu-jin*.²⁸ The exorbitant amounts demanded had to be given in prewar Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo dollars (equivalent in value to Straits dollars), not the 'worthless' currency notes issued by wartime Japanese authorities. Additional assistance for collection came from members of the newly established *Takeo Kokokai* (United Overseas Chinese Association) that comprised a forced conglomeration of all Chinese associations (clan, surname, dialect, district, village of origin, and others). The Chinese mercantile elite in the major towns bore the heaviest burden of *shu-jin*; those with lesser resources went bankrupt. Those who in prewar times had turned to their brethren in Singapore when faced with financial liquidity lost this avenue of recourse as similar demands were made in occupied Malaya.²⁹ Non-compliance from any quarter was severely dealt with by the *Kempeitai*'s (military police) notorious torture treatments, imprisonment, or summary executions. Nonetheless, the Chinese of Kita Borunee were spared the horrific *sook ching* that in Singapore alone allegedly claimed between 50,000 and 60,000 lives.³⁰

Despite the ever-ominous threat of Japanese punishment, it was highly unlikely that the full amount of monies was delivered as the collectors faced insurmountable obstacles:

collecting the money was an onerous responsibility, not only because of the dislocation of commercial activity but because the amount had to be paid in prewar Sarawak currency. Agreement had to be reached on the liability allocated to each of the dialect group's in Sarawak[s] three new administrative divisions³¹ and these in turn to allocate individual liability as an 8% levy on the accepted value of property. Chinese pockets were highly sensitive at the best of times and this was a payment which brought no return. Those who had not contributed so generously to the China Relief Fund did not see why they should have to bear the penalty.³²

This dire situation in occupied Sarawak was similarly faced in both Brunei and British North Borneo.

In occupied Malaya, only \$28 million of the total \$50 million demanded was delivered and 'the OCA [Overseas Chinese Association] then borrowed the remaining \$22 million from the Yokohama Specie Bank, and people who had not yet paid their [property] assessments were considered to be in debt to the Association'.³³ There was no evidence of

a specific amount delivered or any indication that Kita Boruneo's Kakeo Kokokai undertook the same measures for any shortfall.

The so-called 'Chinese conspiracy'

Turning to the pogroms in Minami Boruneo, the intention is to ascertain the motives for killing Chinese in West Borneo as a part of the overall massacre of prewar Dutch Borneo civilian elites (indigenes and Chinese). There were altogether three phases in the unfolding of interrelated events that subsequently led to mass killing, namely: the 'Haga Plot', Bandjarmasin (mid-May to December 1943); the 'Pontianak Incident', Pontianak (October 1943 to January 1944); and the 'Chinese Conspiracy', Pontianak and Singkawang (August 1944 to January 1945).³⁴

If all the aforesaid had been successfully executed, these events could have led to the overthrow of Japanese rule in Minami Boruneo, the elimination of the Borneo *Minseibu* in Banjarmasin (with branch offices in Pontianak, Balikpapan and Tarakan), and the 22nd *Tokubetsu Kon Kyochi Tai* (22nd Naval Base Force) stationed at Balikpapan. Therefore, the mass arrests of hundreds of civilians by the *Kaigun Tokubetsu Keisatsutai* (*Tokkeitai*), Navy Special Police Unit, followed by naval court martial proceedings that handed out death sentences by firing squad to the head conspirators, and the clandestine beheadings of hundreds of civilian detainees by *Tokkeitai* personnel, were regarded by the Japanese as pre-emptive measures to eliminate a potential threat.

The alleged perpetrators who were arrested and subsequently killed comprised various ethnic groups – Dutch, Eurasians, Malays, Bugis, Javanese, Minangkabaus, Bataks, Menadonese, Madurese, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and Dayaks – who belonged to the higher echelons of local society, including those who held senior positions in the *Minseibu* at the time of their arrest. Besides the entire Dutch colonial officer corps, from the governor to district officers then under internment, the twelve *Dokoh* (Sultans) of Pontianak, Sambas, Ketapang, Soekadana, Simbang, Koeboe, Ngabang, Sanggau, Sekadai, Tajan, Singtan, and Mempawa were also implicated and executed.³⁵

The focus here is on the so-called 'Chinese Conspiracy' or 'Second Pontianak Incident' that was played out in Pontianak and Singkawang between August 1944 and January 1945. Within this six-month period, the *Tokkeitai* took into custody prominent Chinese traders and merchants, community leaders, schoolteachers, and scores of young men resident

in Pontianak and Singkawang. Nothing was heard from the detainees until the appearance of the official account in *Borneo Simboen* on March 1, 1945.³⁶ More revealing of this 'Chinese Conspiracy' was the written statement of Captain Okajima Riki, then head of the *Keibitai* (garrison) and *Tokkeitai*.³⁷

Okajima alleged that the Chinese in Pontianak and Singkawang secretly plotted to establish an exclusively Chinese-dominated autonomous state of West Borneo under the Nationalist Guomindang (GMD; Kuomintang (KMT)) government at Chongqing (Chungking). Its leader-cum-architect was Tjhen Tjong Hin (Tija Kong Siong), the honorary chairman of the *Toseikai* (Chinese Trading Society), who sought to emulate Lo Fong Pak (Luo Fangbo), the 18th century founder of the *Lanfang Kongsai* at Mandor that operated independently of the Malay rulers in West Borneo.³⁸ Apparently, Tjhen's clandestine organization possessed various sections or departments tasked with specific activities, not unlike fully-fledged nation-state machinery, such as economic sabotage, finance, intelligence, guerrilla units, and foreign intelligence.³⁹ Headquartered in Pontianak, Tjhen's organization had cells throughout West Borneo in Mengpatu, Ketapang, Sinawang, and Singkawang. There was even a foreign delegation operating in Singapore.

According to Okajima, an armed revolt was planned for September 21, 1944 to be executed by a battalion-strong combat unit of two or three companies. Prior to this planned uprising, 'attempts were to be made beforehand to kill as many [Japanese] as possible by means of poison... [Japanese] would be invited to the Nippon Gekijo (theatre), where poisoned coffee would be offered to them'.⁴⁰ But the chance arrest of Yo Bak Fie (Yong Bak Fie or Ah Fie) with a shortwave wireless strapped on his bicycle scuttled the entire operation. Yo, who led the espionage activities in Singkawang, was bringing the radio into the interior to allow access to foreign broadcasts.⁴¹

Okajima maintained that 170 persons were arrested and all were executed.⁴² The *Borneo Simboen* account reported 17 chief conspirators sentenced to death by the naval court martial at Soerabaja (Surabaya) and executed in Pontianak. The remainder were killed at Soengai Doerian (Sungai Durian) on the orders of Vice-Admiral Kamada Michiaki, *Shireikan* (Commander) of the 22nd Naval Base Force at Balikpapan.

The exact number of Chinese victims of this pogrom is difficult to ascertain. Immediate postwar investigations uncovered scores of skeletal remains in shallow graves in and around Mandor and Soengai Doerian, the 'killing fields'. According to Captain JN Heijbroek, one of

two officers of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) who conducted investigations in May 1946, 170 Chinese were beheaded at Soengai Doerian, which is consistent with Okajima's claim, and, without specifying ethnicity, a further 1,000 deaths occurred in Mandor and 100 in Ketapang.⁴³

Earlier in March, another NEFIS officer, Captain LDG Krol, reported that 200 Chinese had been executed without identifying the location.⁴⁴ During the dedication proceedings in March 1947 of *Makam Juang Mandor*, a memorial for war victims, the number of deceased was given as 1,500, referring to victims of both the Haga Plot and the Pontianak Incident.⁴⁵ A 1970 Indonesian source from West Borneo claimed 1,534 deaths, of which 903 were Chinese, and plausibly related to the Chinese Conspiracy.⁴⁶ Drawing from these sources, it could be concluded that hundreds of Chinese, but not exceeding a thousand, perished in this third phase of pogroms in Minami Boruneo.

Strategic intentions or 'ghosts in the sunlight'?

It was the *Tokkeitai*, entrusted with the 'highest police powers...to keep peace and order, and undertake all military police work including investigation, arrest, interrogation, and execution of anti-Japanese activities', that was responsible for investigating these alleged 'plots' and 'conspiracies'.⁴⁷ Through the use of torture, the *Tokkeitai* managed to extract signed confessions of guilt from the detainees. These signed affidavits were presented before the navy court martial that meted out the death penalty to the alleged chief conspirators. Others were executed on orders of the commander of the 22nd Naval Base Force at Balikpapan. Clandestinely, with assistance from members of the *Keibitai*, *Tokkeitai* personnel carried out the gory task of decapitating hundreds of alleged conspirators at some remote location far from public notice, and the corpses were subsequently buried in shallow graves dug earlier by common prisoners.

Having exterminated several leading Chinese in the Haga Plot and Pontianak Incident, in late 1944 the *Tokkeitai* targeted the Chinese business and educated elite of West Borneo by implicating them in a 'conspiracy'. The Chinese, among all other peoples in occupied Southern Borneo, were the most anti-Japanese, and the Japanese were well aware of such sentiments. Therefore this alleged 'Chinese Conspiracy' appeared at first glance to be not wholly out of context.

The aspiring Chongqing connection of Tjhen's autonomous state of West Borneo seemed to be a real possibility in the mindset of Chinese residents in West Borneo, as postwar developments revealed.

Notwithstanding the physical distance and waning familial ties with the Chinese mainland, Chinese patriotic feelings were very much alive among the local Chinese.⁴⁸ They were proud that China stood alongside the United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia as the victorious powers. Moreover,

[w]hen the surrender of the Japanese forces on August 15, 1945 became known in West Borneo, many Chinese confidently expected that Chinese Nationalist troops would liberate Borneo from the Japanese and integrate the Chinese Districts as an overseas province of China.⁴⁹

Such an attitude was openly demonstrated with the Chinese national flag welcoming Australian forces in Pontianak on October 17, 1945.

Nevertheless, for anti-Japanese and pro-Chongqing aspirations to be realized, firearms were needed. But the *Tokkeitai* failed to uncover weapons or radio transmitters during their house searches.⁵⁰ Even if there *was* an anti-Japanese conspiracy among the Chinese, the scale of participation was unlikely to have been as extensive as the numbers who were persecuted.

Why, then, did the *Tokkeitai* conjure such a serious allegation that led to the killing of hundreds of Chinese inhabitants? Okajima contended that he ordered a clamp down on the Chinese in West Borneo to avert an economic crisis, alleging that the Chinese were hoarding goods (such as copra) and withholding raw materials from the factories, apparently to create friction between the Japanese and the local inhabitants.⁵¹ Having a small force of only 200 men under his command vis-à-vis the large local population, he took pre-emptive measures.⁵² Okajima initially reported the *Tokkeitai*'s uncovering of the 'Chinese Conspiracy' to Vice-Admiral Kamada, who ordered him to 'Act at once, in order to prevent [it] spreading'.⁵³ Okajima's harsh actions in West Borneo were motivated by the possibility of economic trouble leading to likely social unrest, concern over the small contingent of troops at his disposal in the event of a revolt, and acting dutifully on his superior's curt instructions.

Other contemporary Japanese, however, held contrasting views, from doubts to total rejection of any conspiracy. Mitsui Usao, a senior official of the *Minseibu* at Pontianak, questioned whether 'the number of persons involved [was] really as large as alleged by the Tokkeitai or did the Tokkeitai exaggerate' the real situation.⁵⁴ Even those in intelligence circles like Hayashi Shuichi, then Chief Intelligence Officer in West Borneo, opined 'there was no armed plot' as alleged.⁵⁵

Japanese citizens in the private sector, who were representatives of the various Japanese commercial concerns, regarded all the allegations and claims as mere fiction. Yoshio Jun from the firm Nanyo Kohatsu thought 'the plot was made up (by the authorities)', while Hosaka Masaji, a representative of Nichinan Kogyo, believed that the *Tokkeitai* 'had blown up the affair considerably'.⁵⁶ It was seen as fabrication because many considered the *Tokkeitai*'s methods of forcibly extracting confessions from suspects through torture as negating all credibility. Hirayama Seiichi, an interpreter attached to the *Keibitai* of Pontianak who bore witness at many interrogation sessions, declared that 'practically all confessions made to Tokei Tai and police, which, as stated, were forcibly obtained by torture, had no value'.⁵⁷ Compounded by the farcical manner of navy court martial proceedings that do not entertain appeals, the whole affair was no better than any kangaroo court, as Lieutenant Yamamoto Soichi, second in command of the *Tokkeitai*, contended.⁵⁸ If these contentions are to be believed, then why did the *Tokkeitai* make up such an incredible story and kill so many people?

The background of members of the *Tokkeitai*, including education, training, and previous postings, appeared to influence their mindset and actions. Prior to West Borneo, many *Tokkeitai* personnel were involved in flushing out communist sympathizers in wartime Shanghai. Unlike their counterparts in the *Kempeitai*, who operated in IJA spheres of authority and whose personnel underwent specialized police training and adhered to a strict disciplinary code, *Tokkeitai* recruits came from humble, peasant backgrounds with minimal or basic schooling. Many had made war promotion to IJN subaltern officers, including Okajima and Yamamoto, without any previous training in police work.⁵⁹ Reflecting this combination of backgrounds and immediate past experiences, members of the *Tokkeitai* were described by Hosaka as 'extremely distrustful of their surroundings, they lived in a kind [of] fear complex and saw ghosts in the sunlight'.⁶⁰

Apparently, the killing of prominent Chinese and the subsequent seizure of their property was part of an overall get-rich scheme perpetrated by IJN administrators in West Borneo. Yoshio Jun believed that 'the conspiracy was an invention of the Japanese [authorities], conceived to make a lot of rich men disappear and to seize their possessions... *The whole affair was an economical plan of the Japanese Government*' [emphasis added].⁶¹ Hayashi Shuichi claimed that he 'received orders from Uesugi [Keimei] and Okajima [Riki] to look for rich people' and that he himself, together with his network of spies, undertook to supply the *Tokkeitai* with a list of wealthy people.⁶² For instance, Hayashi recalled that he

instructed an individual 'WATANABE for the names of rich coprah dealers. These names [he] passed on to the Tokei Tai. The dealers were arrested and executed and the coprah taken by Nanyo Kohatsu'.⁶³

Moreover, Hayashi propounded a very interesting rationalization of the pogroms:

persons, who were against Japan, had to be killed, because the Japanese desired to stay in the Netherlands East Indies for a long time and wished no difficulties. Among those persons...who had to disappear were those...who spoke Dutch, older persons, who remembered the Dutch Administration too well, teachers, etc, so that after this clearance the youth could be educated entirely according to the Japanese idea...[Hayashi] thinks, that this was the policy of the Japanese Government, but also that this policy was not fixed by Uesugi [Keimei] or Okajima [Riki], but upon general orders from Balikpapan or Sourabaya [Surabaya].⁶⁴

The *eikyū senryō* policy was apparently not widely circulated within or outside Japanese military circles. According to Okada Fumihide, Chief Civil Administrator of the South Western Fleet *Minseifu* headquartered in Makassar, 'This [policy] was a military secret and only a small number of people in the executive division were informed of it'.⁶⁵ Hayashi, as Chief Intelligence Officer in West Borneo, might possibly have been privy to this policy.

This 'clean slate' theory appeared to be plausible as the profile of those arrested as alleged conspirators and subsequently executed fitted comfortably with Hayashi's hypothesis. Postwar NEFIS investigator Captain Krol also lent credence to Hayashi's contention:

we are inclined to believe now that the so-called 'plot' was nothing but fiction. In order to obtain the largest possible amount of money from this area [Pontianak] on behalf of the Japanese war-effort, certain groups of the population had to disappear. Youth was [sic] educated in the Japanese fashion, and should be won over for the [Greater East Asia] co-prosperity [Sphere] idea. Older people, too much clinging to the past, had to disappear. In the first place prominent people such as princes, teachers and intellectuals (doctors and officials). Secondly the wealthy dealers, the[ir] possessions...and their industries were to be made available for the Japanese war-effort. This is the reason why the plot came to light at PONTIANAK by a message from Minseibu BORNEO HQ at BANDJERMASIN; the [Japanese] in WEST BORNEO had not perceived anything of a 'plot'.⁶⁶

The *Minseibu* at Banjarmasin, as Hayashi hypothesized, took 'general orders from Balikpapan or Sourabaya [Surabaya]'.⁶⁷ Instructions came from the higher echelons of the IJN, the headquarters of the 2nd South Expeditionary Fleet at Surabaya, and were handed down to the 22nd Tokubetsu Kon Kyochi Tai (22nd Naval Base Force) stationed at Balikpapan.

According to Captain Krol, the college-educated personnel of *Hana Kikan*, the IJN's secret intelligence service, 'undoubtedly played a most important part in this affair'.⁶⁸ The entire *Tokkeitai* outfit was used to execute the scheme; considering their background and low education, 'it is not impossible that the *Tokkeitai* personnel themselves believe in this plot'.⁶⁹ Captain Heijbroek rationalized along similar lines. That the *Tokkeitai* targeted local elite as so-called conspirators gave the impression that 'the Japanese had the intention to exterminate in West Borneo all the people who still had some authority, prominence or education, politically as well as economically'.⁷⁰ He equated this phenomenon with other Japanese colonial territories that he had observed, such as Korea and Manchuria, 'where ... consecutively the upper layers [of society] were removed and substituted by Japanese'.⁷¹

In a proverbial single sweep, the Chinese elite of West Borneo, comprising prominent community leaders, schoolteachers, Guomindang members and wealthy merchants, were eliminated. It appeared to be a devious and calculated strategy to begin anew as Minami Boruneo was intended to be an integral part of Imperial Japan's far flung empire. Hence all vestiges of the past, including personalities in prominent and influential positions, had to leave the stage while their power and wealth were to be assumed by new faces who were fully Nipponized.

Postwar implications and conclusions

Two important outcomes resulted from the wartime phenomena of the Chinese pogrom in West Borneo and the *shu-jin* monetary demands imposed on the Chinese communities of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo. One was the adverse impact on socio-political leadership in postwar Northern Borneo and Southern Borneo, the other was the dislocation of the local economy.

Although community leaders had little choice but to undertake the unenviable and odious task of collecting *shu-jin* from their brethren, this wartime assignment compromised their reputation to a large extent and, in turn, their standing in the eyes of the Chinese community. For Chinese community leaders in prewar Sarawak, Brunei, and British North

Borneo, although they did not possess any real political power during the colonial period, recognition by, and in some cases incorporation as advisors into, the colonial regime earned them enormous prestige and esteemed respect within the community and wider society. For instance, the Brooke Rajahs, from the time of the first rajah, had included Chinese leaders as unofficial counselors to the Sarawak administration with the exalted title of Kapitan China General.⁷²

But involvement in *shu-jin* collection activities portrayed these hitherto respected Chinese leaders as collaborators of the wartime regime. In fact they were perceived as traitors to the community and the motherland by working hand in glove with the much hated Japanese enemy. Emotion overrode rationality in unfairly labeling these leaders as collaborators; if not for their willingness and sacrifice in fulfilling this monetary demand, the Chinese community in Northern Borneo might have suffered the unbridled wrath of the IJA, as was horrifically demonstrated in the backlash to the 'Double Tenth' uprising in Jesselton in 1943, where some 4,000 indigenous people were slaughtered, many of them unrelated to the Chinese-led anti-Japanese rebellion.⁷³ Nonetheless, this traditional *towkay* leadership suffered in that their brethren regarded them as dishonourable and untrustworthy individuals, hence forfeiting their status as community leaders.

However, owing to the non-prosecution of wartime collaborators by the postwar colonial regimes,⁷⁴ the Chinese *towkay*, Iban *penghulu*, Malay *datu*, and *orang kaya* were restored to their prewar positions and status.⁷⁵ In the eyes of their respective communities, these leaders, though, remained tainted. Yet little could be done due to the endorsement of these leaders by the reinstated colonial regimes 'since there were no friendlier people with equal authority to put in their places'.⁷⁶ Likewise for the Chinese community, alternative leaders to the *towkay* could not be found. Therefore the Chinese *towkay* continued their businesses and performed their duties as unofficial advisors to the postwar colonial authorities. Not until the 1950s did there emerge within the Chinese community an alternative to the traditional *towkay* leadership, namely local-born Chinese-schooled communists. These up-and-coming communist activists and cadres attempted to unseat the *towkay* leadership, who were not only drawn from the propertied class but were also labeled as 'running dogs' of Western imperialism and colonialism.⁷⁷ Thus the erosion of traditional Chinese leadership in postwar British Borneo became increasingly pronounced from the 1950s and early 1960s vis-à-vis the youthful communist leadership.

The Chinese in postwar British Borneo also endured formidable challenges in rebuilding their businesses and re-establishing their trading and commercial networks. Chinese bazaar shopkeepers in the interior had to win back the confidence and trust of the local people due to their wartime activities:

What was more telling was the fact that the Chinese towkay, often accompanied by Japanese soldiers, went to native longhouses to demand 'forced deliveries' of rice and other foodstuffs. Furthermore the fact that the once well-furnished shelves of goods in Chinese shops appeared depleted and even empty was perceived in native eyes as a Chinese design to deprive them of daily necessities such as kerosene, matches, cooking oil, etc. Ignorant of the impact of Allied blockade and the demands of the IJA soldiery to take precedence over the local inhabitants, the natives blamed the local towkay for all the shortages and consequent hardships. The overall perspectives of indigenous peoples [were] that the Chinese were collaborators of the Japanese regime hence they (Chinese) were traitors to the Chartered Company administration [of British North Borneo] and the Brooke regime [of Sarawak].⁷⁸

The indigenous backlash was horrific. Twenty-three Chinese heads were taken by Ibans in Kanowit during the interregnum period (between August 15 and September 11, 1945) as retribution.⁷⁹ Thereafter Sino-Iban relations in the Lower Rejang remained strained for several decades.

Across the border, the restored Dutch Borneo in the immediate postwar years had a vacuum in the socio-political leadership of the Chinese in West Borneo. The wartime pogroms had decimated the entire Chinese elite, from business entrepreneurs to intellectuals and schoolteachers, that is, all those 'who still had some authority, prominence or education, politically as well as economically'.⁸⁰ It was not surprising that the Chinese, already a minority and with the added paucity of postwar leadership, did not feature prominently in the revolutionary period that subsequently led to *Merdeka* (independence).⁸¹ Indigenous groups, including the once marginalized and politically inert Dayaks, asserted themselves during this tumultuous period that gained them much political currency in the post-*Merdeka* era. The Chinese in independent Indonesian Kalimantan had scant voice in the political arena that was dominated by Malays and the nascent Dayaks.

Besides suffering political impotency, the Chinese of West Borneo were in dire financial and economic straits in the immediate postwar

period. Not only had Chinese business leaders been decapitated but their property had been seized by Japanese authorities and *zaibatsu*. The dislocated local economy, facing acute shortages and runaway inflation, was in total disarray. The Chinese faced an insurmountable uphill struggle to survive economically, unlike the mostly subsistence-based indigenes, who had a heavy dependence on the market economy, trade and commerce with international counterparts and markets.

While the Chinese in Northern Borneo suffered financial losses resulting from *shu-jin*, their counterparts in Southern Borneo witnessed the elimination of the community's elite and the seizure of most of their businesses and property. The three years and eight months of Japanese occupation dealt a serious blow to the Chinese community of Borneo. Despite the absence of open, armed defiance, particularly in the context of Southern Borneo, the selective elimination of prominent members of the Chinese community was unprecedented and, at first glance, even incomprehensible. But, following the logic of the *eikyū senryō* policy of making Southern Borneo an integral part of the empire of Imperial Japan, it was simply a case of a calculated strategy to achieve this objective. It revealed a Machiavellian stroke in completely removing all remnants of the past and creating a wholly Nipponized younger generation to begin afresh – a plan that was interrupted by Imperial Japan's final defeat.

Notes

1. *Towkay* denotes an entrepreneur or proprietor (shop, firm, mine, or plantation), and is used as an honorific.
2. Yuan Bingling, *Chinese Democracies: A Study of the Kongsis of West Borneo (1776–1884)* (Leiden: Universiteit Leiden, 2000); MS Heidhues, *Gold Diggers, Farmers, and Traders in Pontianak and the 'Chinese Districts' of West Kalimantan, Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); OOI Keat Gin, *Of Free Trade and Native Interests: The Brookes and the Economic Development of Sarawak, 1841–1941* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997).
3. See OOI Keat Gin, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–1945* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 28–37.
4. HJ Benda, JK Irikura, and Koichi Kishi (eds), *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 7.
5. See OOI Keat Gin, "Of Permanent Possession" – Territories under the Imperial Japanese Navy', in P Post, WF Frederick, I Heidebrink, and S Sato (eds), *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 71–86.
6. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–1945* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 74.

7. National Archives, Kew (NA), WO 208/104. Australian Military Forces [19]45, 'Weekly Intelligence Review, No. 131, week ending 21 April [19]45'.
8. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, p. 119.
9. A Reid, and Oki Akira (eds), *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942–1945* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 160.
10. Benda et al., *Selected Documents*, pp. 29–30.
11. Benda et al., *Selected Documents*, p. 30.
12. Benda et al., *Selected Documents*, p. 30.
13. Benda et al., *Selected Documents*, p. 30.
14. *Penghulu* is a Malay title appropriated by the Brooke Raj for Iban leaders whose influence extended beyond several rivers, whereas *temenggung* designated a 'paramount chief', the supreme leader. *Datu* is an honorific for a non-royal Malay chief.
15. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, p. 124–5.
16. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, p. 125.
17. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, p. 121.
18. Forced marches imposed on Japanese soldiery and the evacuation of Japanese civilians in Northern Borneo resulted in thousands of fatalities. See Toyoda Jo, *Sandakan Shi no Tenshin, Gyokusai [Angel of Sandakan, an Honorable Death]* (Tokyo: Mikasa Shobo, 1980), pp. 357–8, and Sato Shigeru's chapter in this volume.
19. The term 'Anti-Japanese War (1937–45)' or 'War of Resistance against Japan' in the last two decades has increasingly replaced 'Second Sino-Japanese War'.
20. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, p. 65.
21. There were Japanese communities involved in fishing, commercial agriculture, mining and logging in prewar British North Borneo and Sarawak. Japanese brothels were notorious in the major towns. See OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, pp. 11–19, and Sato Shigeru's chapter in this volume.
22. CA Lockard, *From Kampung to City: A Social History of Kuching, Malaysia, 1820–1970* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987), pp. 155–6.
23. Consequently, the Kuching area registered a ten per cent increase in population during this period. *Annual Report on Sarawak for the Year 1947* (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 21.
24. OOI Keat Gin, *Rising Sun over Borneo: The Japanese Occupation of Sarawak, 1941–1945* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 25–36.
25. For the massacre of Chinese in occupied Malaya, see Hara Fujio, 'Sook Ching', in OOI Keat Gin (ed.), *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Watt to East Timor* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2004), p. 1,230; and PH Kratoska, *The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History* (St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998), pp. 102–3. The Chinese in occupied Malaya were also burdened with *shu-jin* monetary demands (see note 29).
26. All currency in this chapter is in Straits dollars unless otherwise specified.
27. Benda et al., *Selected Documents*, pp. 178–81.
28. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, p. 66.
29. The whole Chinese community in occupied Malaya were 'ordered to raise a minimum of 50,000,000 yen' as the 'first stage immediately following the cessation of military operations'. Benda et al., *Selected Documents*, p. 179.

- Also, see Tan Yeok Seng, *The Extortion by Japanese Military Administration of \$50,000,000 from the Chinese of Malaya* (Singapore: Nanyang Book Co. Ltd, 1947); and Kratoska, *The Japanese Occupation of Malaya*, pp. 102–3.
30. I Ward, *The Killer They Called a God* (Singapore: Media Masters, 1992), pp. 175–6.
 31. Kita Borneo was administratively delineated into five *shu* (provinces): *Kuching-shu* (prewar Brooke Sarawak's First and Second Divisions, West Borneo, and the Natuna Islands), *Sibu-shu* (Third Division), *Miri-shu* (Fourth and Fifth Divisions, and Brunei), *Seikai-shu* (prewar British North Borneo's West Coast Residency, and Labuan), and *Tokai-shu* (West Coast Residency). OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, pp. 40, 45.
 32. B Reece, *Masa Jepun: Sarawak under the Japanese 1941–1945* (Kuching: Sarawak Literary Society, 1998), p. 120.
 33. Kratoska, *The Japanese Occupation of Malaya*, pp. 102–3.
 34. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, pp. 102–7.
 35. It was unclear whether the aged Sultan of Pontianak died of old age during detention or was murdered by his *Tokkeitai* captors. See Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam, (NIOD): 016932–933, Yamamoto Soichi, 'Interrogation, Pontianak', February 1, 1946.
 36. Published in both Indonesian Malay and Japanese, the *Borneo Simboen*, a daily tabloid, was an IJN mouthpiece where Indonesian editors had to abide by strict censorship and were subject to tight control. See OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, pp. 81–2.
 37. See NIOD: 009821–009832, Okajima Riki, "'The so-called conspiracy amongst the Chinese"', compiled at Kuching by the Japanese, by order of the Captain of Marines OKAJIMA RIKI', First Lt. KA Weerd, NEFIS, May 13, 1946.
 38. See Lo Hsing Lin, *A Historical Survey of the Lan-Fang Presidential System in Western Borneo, Established by Lo Fang Pai and Other Overseas Chinese* (Hong Kong: Institute of Chinese Culture, 1961).
 39. NIOD: 009821–009832, Okajima Riki, 'Conspiracy amongst the Chinese, Chart: Independent Overseas-Chinese State of West Borneo: Planning for Underground Activities, Chungking Government'.
 40. Okajima, 'The so-called conspiracy', p. 7.
 41. Okajima, 'The so-called conspiracy', pp. 1, 4.
 42. NIOD: 019.783–784, Okajima Riki, 'Interrogation Report No. 4/WB Jap, Pontianak', February 15, 1946.
 43. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, The Hague (NMF): INV. NR 2144, JN Heijbroek, 'War Criminals West-Borneo, Pontianak', NEFIS, Capt. Reserve Infantry JN Heijbroek, May 20, 1946, 138–9.
 44. NMF: INV. NR 01955, LD Krol, 'Investigation of War Crime, Pontianak', NEFIS, Capt. Art. KNIL LDG. Krol., March 1, 1946.
 45. Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (ANRI), 1309, Algemene Secretarrie, March 15, 1947.
 46. *Tandjungpura Berdjung: Sedjarah KODAM XII/Tandjungpura Berdjung Kalimantan-Barat* (Tandjungpura Semidam XII, 1970), p. 94.
 47. OOI Keat Gin, 'Kaigun Tokubetsu Keisatsutai – Navy Special Police Unit', in P Post et al. (eds), *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), p. 523.
 48. See Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (AR), Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-indische regering en de daarbij gedeponneerde archieven,

- 'Report on Situation in West and South Borneo', November 1945, 1942–1950: 2.10.14.02 AS 3168, Appendices 2 and 4.
49. Heidhues, *Gold Diggers, Farmers, and Traders*, p. 211.
 50. Krol, 'Investigation of War Crime', p. 3. Also see Okajima, 'Interrogation Report No. 4'. Interestingly, but rather sinisterly, it seemed that the Chinese of West Borneo who enthusiastically participated in the postwar Penjagaan Keamanan Oemum (PKO, Public Security Force) 'suddenly had enough [weapons] to arm the PKO'. Heidhues, *Gold Diggers, Farmers, and Traders*, p. 212.
 51. NIOD: 009821–009832, Okajima Riki, 'Additional Report', March 1, 1946.
 52. Okajima, 'The so-called conspiracy', p. 6.
 53. Okajima, 'Interrogation Report No. 4'.
 54. NIOD: 0097985–0097991, Mitsui Usao, 'Supplemental Report to NEFIS Interrogation Report No. 13, Pontianak', March 9, 1946.
 55. NIOD: 009.800–801, Hayashi Shuichi, 'Extract from 2nd additional report to Interr. Rep. No. 6/WB Jap. Pontianak', March 8, 1946.
 56. NIOD: 019.821–823, Yoshio Jun, 'Supplementary Report to the Interrogation Report No.5/WB Jap. Pontianak', February 21, 1946; and, NIOD: 009799–09803, Hosaka Masaji, 'Extract from Interrogation Report No. 29/WB Jap', March 25, 1946.
 57. NIOD: 009799–09803, Hirayama Seiichi, 'Extract from Interrogation Report No. 35/WB Jap', April 5, 1946.
 58. NIOD 009799–009803, Yamamoto Soichi, 'Extract from Interrogation Report No. 3/WB Jap. Pontianak', February 2, 1946.
 59. Okajima, 'Interrogation Report No. 4'; NIOD: 016932–933, Yamamoto Soichi, 'Interrogation Pontianak', February 1, 1946.
 60. Hosaka, 'Extract from Interrogation Report'.
 61. Yoshio, 'Supplementary Report'.
 62. Hayashi, 'Extract from 2nd additional report'.
 63. Hayashi, 'Extract from 2nd additional report'. 'Watanabe' probably refers to Watanabe Hatsusaburo of Nanyo Kohatsu, who was familiar with copra dealers.
 64. Hayashi, 'Extract from 2nd additional report'.
 65. Okada Fumihide, 'Civil Administration in Celebes', in Reid and Akira, *Selected Memoirs of 1942–1945*, p. 142.
 66. Krol, 'Investigation of War Crime', p. 4.
 67. Hayashi, 'Extract from 2nd additional report'.
 68. Hayashi, 'Extract from 2nd additional report', p. 5.
 69. Hayashi, 'Extract from 2nd additional report', p. 4.
 70. Heijbroek, 'War Criminals West-Borneo'.
 71. Heijbroek, 'War Criminals West-Borneo'. Heijbroek's observations regarding Korea and Manchuria, however, have yet to receive confirmation from scholars.
 72. OOI, *Of Free Trade and Native Interests*, p. 31.
 73. OOI, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, pp. 98–102.
 74. For pragmatic considerations in the postwar geopolitical situation, and especially on the Indian sub-continent, Britain decided 'not to institute further proceedings against persons alleged to be guilty of collaboration with the enemy' and 'where no atrocities or brutality is involved'. NA: WO 203/5991, 'SOI Legal to Liaison Officer, Kuching', April 23, 1946.

75. 'Orang Kaya' or 'Orang Kaya Kaya' in Malay literally denotes a wealthy person, hence this title was accorded to indigenous individuals of wealth and high social standing.
76. KH Digby, *Lawyer in the Wilderness* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 76.
77. OOI, 'The Cold War and British Borneo: Impact and legacy, 1945–63', in Albert Lau (ed.), *Southeast Asia and the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 102–31.
78. OOI Keat Gin, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, p. 126.
79. For the Kanowit killings, see Sarawak Museum Archives, Kuching (SMA), Typescript, 'Annual Report of the District Officer, Kanowit, for the year 1946'.
80. Heijbroek, 'War Criminals West-Borneo'.
81. See OOI Keat Gin, *Postwar Borneo, 1945–1950: Nationalism, empire, and state-building* (London: Routledge, 2013).

3

State, Sterilization, and Reproductive Rights: Japan as Occupier and Occupied

Maho Toyoda

May 11, 2001 marked an important step toward protecting individual reproductive rights in Japan. On that day, after a legal struggle that began in 1998, the Kumamoto District Court ruled that the segregation of Hansen's disease patients in state-run sanatoriums, which had gone on for over half a century, was unconstitutional. The lawsuit was in large part due to the need for a clear statement of state responsibility in a serious infringement of human rights – the violation of individuals' reproductive rights through sterilization and abortion, mostly forced upon them in state sanatoriums.¹ In one example, the head of a plaintiff's group in western Japan, aged 82, acted to hold the state responsible for his forced sterilization. Hospitalized at 23 years of age in 1941, he married a woman at the facility and she became pregnant in 1943. When the pregnancy was discovered, she was forced to have an abortion and he was sterilized.²

The legal basis for these operations was established for the first time by the Eugenic Protection Law (*Yūsei hogo hō*) of 1948. However, the example above took place before the 1948 law was enacted. In fact, its wartime predecessor, the National Eugenic Law (*Kokumin yūsei hō*) of 1940, which was modeled after the Nazi sterilization law of 1933, did not include Hansen's disease as sufficient cause for a sterilization operation. Nor did the Leprosy Prevention Law (*Rai yobō hō*) stipulate sterilization or abortion for such patients. But both surgeries were widely practiced from 1915 in state sanatoriums in Japan and in colonized Korea, Taiwan and other locations, as evidenced by numerous clinical reports at medical conferences.

How were these operations justified? This chapter first looks at how Japan as an occupier/colonizer responded to the issue of Hansen's disease across its empire. It was argued that the Empire of Japan, as a modern civilized nation, should control and eradicate communicable diseases. For this purpose, certain patients were forcibly segregated in national sanatoriums and forced to undergo sterilization. The chapter then shows how the reproductive rights of Hansen's disease patients were handled by Japan, with its increased focus on eugenics, which at the time was believed to offer the promise of a brilliant future for the country.

In the postwar era when Japan became occupied, Hansen's disease, along with other non-hereditary diseases and disabilities, was included among criteria for sterilization and abortion under the new 1948 law. While this law was sponsored by lawmakers and enacted by the Japanese Diet, it was reported to and approved by the occupier of Japan via the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP). When it was submitted for review, one of the GHQ/SCAP staffers called it 'essentially a revival of Nazi race theories and practices'.³ However, GHQ/SCAP officially kept quiet and let the Japanese government enact the law without calling for any major changes to its eugenic nature. How did GHQ/SCAP justify this contradictory attitude? This chapter also looks briefly at how GHQ/SCAP reacted to sterilization clauses in the law, and its population policy in general, and then shows one of several known examples of compulsory sterilization operations performed without the patient's consent in occupied Japan.

Many studies on the reproductive rights of Hansen's disease patients have been completed in Japan. Scholars have undertaken detailed research and survivor interviews, and heavy volumes of collected data have been published devoted solely to Hansen's disease issues, to which this chapter owes a great debt. The landmark of these studies may be the *Final Report* published by the special study council on Hansen's disease problems of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations in 2005.⁴ While there seems to be little to add to this enormous collection of knowledge, by examining and comparing the period when Japan became an occupier to when it was subsequently occupied, this chapter highlights the similarities between Japanese and American occupation and/or colonization. This may complicate the hegemonic American narrative of 'liberation' that demonizes the Japanese as vicious and aggressive occupiers.

From disease control to eugenics

The Japanese government was initially slow to react to Hansen's disease. Before it became classified as a chronic infectious disease at the first

International Lepers Conference in Berlin in 1897, many Japanese people, including government officials, believed the disease was hereditary. Moreover, it was thought of as a 'punitive disease', and patients were often regarded with disgust as granulomas, particularly of the skin and eyes, deformed their appearance. Thus many patients were deserted by their families, relegated to the outskirts of their homes, or even evicted to live on the streets. As a result, patients tended to gather around temples and shrines and act like homeless 'beggars'.⁵ The situation became an issue in the Imperial Diet in the early 1900s. For example, at the 22nd Diet on May 16, 1903, Shimada Saburō, explaining the Leprosy Prevention Bill, called the country's lack of laws to regulate Hansen's disease patients 'a national dishonor'. He stated that Japan, with 35,000 patients, was among 'the world's three highest prevalence nations', while European nations had no or very few patients. He then emphasized that Japanese patients had been treated at private institutions run by 'foreigners', and financed by 'foreign donations', which, he found, stained the nation's honor.⁶

In fact, government inaction had prompted some Christian missionaries to establish private institutions to provide relief for such patients. One of those missionaries, Hannah Riddell, established the Kaishun Hospital in Kumamoto in 1895 with aid from Shibusawa Eiichi, a leading businessman. In 1905, Riddell approached Shibusawa for more financial support. On this occasion, Shibusawa thought it was a national embarrassment to leave 'a horrendous infectious disease like Hansen's disease' in the hands of a few foreign philanthropists. In November 1905, Shibusawa chaired a meeting to invite various prominent figures in government, politics, medicine and journalism in the hope of expanding public awareness of the issue. This meeting became a turning point that led the government to move actively toward preventing the spread of Hansen's disease.⁷

The government's first step was to enact the Leprosy Prevention Law in February of 1907. The law provided that patients without family to support them would be treated in public sanatoriums. Its main purpose, however, was to 'round up and control vagrants'. This was modeled after remote 'leper colonies' used in other 'civilized' nations to ensure quarantine. Accordingly, the government opened five public sanatoriums in 1909.⁸ At one of those five sanatoriums, Zensho Hospital in Tokyo, Mitsuda Kensuke, the hospital director, started to perform sterilizations through vasectomy in 1915. The procedures were introduced to cope with pregnancies in the sanatorium. At first the sanatorium adopted a policy of separating the sexes, but each night men would sneak across to meet their sweethearts, or to rape female patients. Troubled by the

increasing birthrate, Mitsuda gathered the male patients at the sanatorium and told them that they should not produce offspring for the following reasons: the possibilities of maternal infection; aggravation of disease conditions; and infection from men's semen. He then recommended sterilization, and one patient after another 'volunteered' for the operation, according to Mitsuda's later accounts.⁹ Such sterilizations won endorsement at a committee of the House of Representatives discussing the 1929 revision to the Leprosy Prevention Law. Although Tanaka Yōtatsu, a medical doctor, stressed to the committee that it would be inconsistent to perform sterilizations on Hansen's disease patients because of the disease's infectious nature, he nonetheless insisted that such sterilizations should continue and even be extended to house-bound patients.¹⁰

Even with the Leprosy Prevention Law, there were still 15,000 patients in Japan around 1930. To 'exterminate' the disease, Shibusawa and members of the Association of Central Social Work (*Chūō shakai fukushi kyōgikai*) decided it would be unrealistic to rely completely on government agencies.¹¹ In 1931, the Leprosy Prevention Association (*Rai yobō kyōkai*) was established, with financial support from the endowment of Empress Teimei, government subsidies, and other private donations. Local Leprosy Prevention Associations were established in Korea and Taiwan, funded by the Jikei-kai imperial donation, and its imperial backing was repeatedly emphasized throughout the empire.¹²

The idea that Japan, as a civilized nation, needed to eradicate Hansen's disease reached the colonized areas as well. As in mainland Japan, there were several western Christian missions in these areas providing charitable treatments. When the first public institution, Sorok-do Jikei Hospital, was finally created in Korea in 1916, its real purpose was symbolic, to allow the Governor-General of Korea to state that such a sanatorium existed in the territory. Seeing this, Murata Masataka at the Welfare Ministry's Hygiene Bureau argued that it would bring shame on Japan if the government continued to depend on 'foreigners' for Hansen's disease relief.¹³ Mitsuda Kensuke further argued that this would damage the reputation of the Japanese colonial rulers. He pointed out that while the capacity of the Korean Jikei hospital was only 200, the foreign Christian sanatoriums could accommodate 1,200 patients, which had led the Korean population to criticize Japanese imperialism. When the American Mission for Lepers visited Taiwan to consider establishing three new sanatoriums, Mitsuda emphasized that the Japanese government needed to have its own national sanatoriums there.¹⁴ In response, in 1927 the Governor-General of Taiwan

belatedly started constructing a sanatorium, Rakusei-in, which opened in 1930.¹⁵

Around the same time, Nanyō-chō, the South Pacific Agency of the Japanese League of Nations Mandate, established sanatoriums in Saipan in 1926, Jaluit in 1927, Palau in 1931, and Yap in 1932.¹⁶ Although the government and the Jikei-kai imperial fund covered expenses, sanatorium operations were superficial. Family members were encouraged to live with patients and provide nursing care, food supplies came only once a month, a doctor only twice a month, and no treatments were administered. Segregation was aimed mainly at preventing the infection of Japanese nationals who, at the time, exceeded local islanders in number, but if any Japanese were found to be infected they were sent back to mainland sanatoriums.¹⁷ According to the Japanese Association of Public Health (*Nihon Eisei kai*), the number of local patients was relatively small, totaling 71 in 1939 for the four islands.¹⁸ This small number of patients may be another reason for providing virtually no treatment. But establishing sanatoriums enabled Japan to show its 'beneficence' to the League of Nations as well as to local islanders.

Following significant efforts made by leprosy prevention associations founded in 1932 and 1933 in Korea and Taiwan respectively, the capacities of the national sanatoriums in those locations grew dramatically within a few years. Because of the rapid increase of the number of patients, the Korean sanatorium, now renamed Sorokdo Kōsei-en, faced various problems, including sexual relationships and pregnancies. Thus the same policy as on mainland Japan was adopted: couples were allowed to live together provided they received sterilization. In-house marriages and sterilizations started in April 1936, and the number of couples increased from 471 in 1937 to 840 in 1940, meaning the number of sterilizations numbered at least 840.¹⁹

Sterilization and abortion on Hansen's disease patients

Sterilizations were adopted to solve pregnancy issues in the sanatoriums, but Mitsuda and others soon discovered a few additional benefits. For one, they could help ease tensions among male patients by allowing sexual relations within sanatoriums, thus making it much easier to control patients generally. In the sanatoriums, where the male to female ratio was three to one, men strove to prove themselves as upbeat hard workers in order to win the favor of women, often resulting in 'tigers being transformed into cats', in Mitsuda's own words. Mitsuda also found in-house couples useful as they played complementary roles in

daily work activities and provided care for one another as the disease progressed.²⁰ In other words, female patients were regarded not only as housekeepers and nurses, but also as resources used to manage and control the rest of the sanatorium.

In addition, women were forced to get abortions. Based on the assumption that Hansen's disease would transmit to the fetus through the placenta, doctors performed several dissection studies during the period. The first was published in 1911 by Sugai Takekichi and Mononobe Ichini of Sotojima sanatorium in Osaka, who examined six placentas and blood samples from newborn babies since 1910. This was followed in 1915 by Chūjo Suketoshi of Hokubu sanatorium in Aomori.²¹ Later, when induced abortions and artificial interruptions of pregnancies became widely practiced in sanatoriums, doctors began to actively study the aborted fetuses. For example, Kobayashi Wasaburō at Oshima sanatorium in Kagawa gave a paper at the second Japanese Leprosy Conference (*Rai gakkai*) in 1929 on his report of the examination of internal organs from eight fetuses, of three to ten months pregnancy. Kobayashi found microbes from the disease in several organs in seven cases, the exception being a three-month-old fetus because it was still too undeveloped. The conclusion was that if doctors wanted to check for infection, they needed to wait until the later months of pregnancy to check the fetus.²²

In 1937, Muneuchi Toshio of Oshima sanatorium provided a more complete and thorough study at the 37th Okayama local conference of the Japanese Association of Dermatology and Urology (*Nihon hifuka hinyōkika gakkai*). He dissected a total of 26 fetuses, ranging from two to ten months of pregnancy, out of which he removed ten to 20 organs each. Importantly, fetuses of four to five months were the most commonly used in the study, making up 11 of the 26 studied.²³ Let me note here that an abortion during the fourth to sixth months (12 to 21 weeks) of pregnancy carries the highest risk for the mother's life, and present-day doctors would be unlikely to perform one. And there may have been similar cases outside of Oshima sanatorium. The *Final Report*, published in 2005 by the special study council on Hansen's disease problems, found, in six national institutions, a total of 114 fetuses (later four others were found, bringing the total to 118) preserved in formalin, which had supposedly been created between 1924 and 1956. The report also revealed that 29 samples (25.4 per cent) out of the 114 are estimated by their body size to be later than eight months (32 weeks) in development, meaning at least 25 per cent were not abortions but pre- or full-term deliveries. This evidence coincides with testimony given in

court: 'when I delivered a baby, it cried; then the nurse told me my baby was a healthy boy, but after a while the baby's crying stopped in the distance'.²⁴

This leads to a significant question about women's reproductive rights. When Mitsuda persuaded male patients to be sterilized, he explained that pregnancy and delivery would exacerbate the disease. But these words have a hollow ring given the many late-term dissections and fetuses in formalin. I cannot think of any other convincing explanation except the desire of doctors to prioritize their own research over female patients' health. It is possible that doctors wanted to have a wide range of fetus samples, even at the risk of being accused under Japan's criminal abortion law.

For doctors, Hansen's disease patients were like 'weapons to produce contamination'.²⁵ Despite the words of Mitsuda, who portrayed sterilization as a voluntary procedure, the reality was that such operations were almost compulsory if male patients were found to have engaged in sexual relations, or even a ritualized practice when they became adult men. There were also several cases in Korea where male patients received sterilization as a punishment.²⁶ Sterilizations were widely practiced in the state sanatoriums in Japan and colonized Korea and Taiwan, and doctors even became competitive, posting their achievements in clinical reports at medical conferences. For example, at the 25th Congress of the Japanese Dermatological Association (*Hifuka gakkai*) in Nagoya in 1925, Mitsuda mentioned he had carried out 200 vasectomy cases during the past ten years. Nojima Taiji, of the Sotojima sanatorium, added ten more cases. Nojima later conducted 33 more cases at the Oshima sanatorium by 1932, and then reported a total of 100 in 1936. At the 1st Taipei Local Conference of the Japanese Association of Dermatology and Urology in October 1938, Kawakami Yutaka at Rakusei-in of Taiwan also reported 17 cases of his own.²⁷

A compilation of these reports was reviewed in 1940 by Aoki Enshun, Chief of the Eugenic Division of the Welfare Ministry's Prevention Bureau. His investigation revealed that sterilizations were performed at all of the state sanatoriums, including those in Okinawa and Amami islands, for a total of 1,003 cases between 1915 and 1939. The purpose of his investigation was to find important clinical cases and reference materials to prove that sterilization, which was to become legal under the National Eugenic Law of 1940, was a safe operation without any serious long-term effects.²⁸

With the increased interest in eugenics and influence of the Nazi sterilization law of 1933, Japanese Diet members submitted their own

sterilization bills several times in 1934, 1935, 1937, and 1938, but in each case the Diet closed before the bill was passed.²⁹ This was because the Japanese government, especially the Hygiene Bureau, expressed a certain amount of caution; there was the unresolved question of what to do about sterilizations that were being performed on Hansen's disease patients because, since the disease is not hereditary, the eugenics law should not include them. Finally, the newly established Welfare Ministry started to move toward enacting a sterilization law, and established the Race Hygiene Research Society (*Minzoku eisei kenkyū kai*) in the Eugenic Division of the Welfare Ministry to study the matter, inviting doctors, lawyers, and some other eugenicists to become members. A meeting was held in December 1938, where there was a lengthy debate over whether the sterilization law should include Hansen's disease patients. All of the attendees agreed that Hansen's disease patients should be sterilized, but the meeting found it difficult to include them in the sterilization law as long as the law had a eugenic purpose. It was then suggested that the problem should be resolved by revising the Leprosy Prevention Law so that Hansen's disease patients could be given sterilization and abortion procedures.³⁰ Because of these unresolved problems, the Race Eugenic Protection Bill submitted by lawmakers in 1939 once again failed to pass.³¹

At last a bill was submitted by the government that limited sterilization to hereditary diseases and disabilities, and excluded Hansen's disease. At the same time, the government submitted the revised Leprosy Prevention Law to legalize sterilization and abortion. During the deliberations, there was a long discussion on the sterilization of Hansen's disease patients. Tanaka Yōtatsu, a medical doctor, pointed out that it would be a terrible contradiction to have both laws: one to limit sterilizations to those with hereditary conditions and the other to provide for sterilizations on patients with a non-hereditary disease.³² In the end, the bill was enacted as the National Eugenic Law in May and was put into practice in July 1940. However, relatively few sterilizations were performed under the law, with only 454 operations carried out by the end of the war.³³ On the other hand, the revised Leprosy Prevention Law was not brought to the table because of other more urgent legal motions. Tokotsugi Tokuji, the Chief of the Eugenic Division, explained that sterilizations performed on Hansen's disease patients had neither medical nor eugenic purposes, but were done for 'considerable special reasons', and therefore should be allowed even without a revised law.³⁴ As a result, the sterilization of Hansen's disease patients continued implicitly without any legal foundation.

Postwar population problems and the Eugenic Protection Law

The postwar Eugenic Protection Law would never have been passed if mounting concern about the country's overpopulation problem had not existed at the time. Over four million repatriates, combined with the mass discharge of Japanese soldiers, produced a postwar baby boom. During discussions in the Diet, proponents of the law called for compulsory sterilization to prevent rapid population growth and adverse selection, where the 'unfit' in society reproduce a lot, while the 'fit' limit their reproduction. For example, at the 90th Imperial Diet in August 1946, Tanaka Tatsu, a midwife and one of Japan's first female representatives, repeatedly requested that the National Eugenic Law be revised to allow doctors, nurses and midwives to apply for sterilization operations on individuals without obtaining consent from them or their families.³⁵ Her intention was to replace voluntary sterilization with compulsory sterilization to make it more effective. On the other hand, the government held firm against population control and refused to accept sterilization as a means of reducing the birth rate. The Welfare Minister Kawai Yoshinari, for example, said that compulsory sterilization was against the constitutional principle of respect for individuality.³⁶

Kawai echoed the warning of Herbert Passin, the Chief of Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division of GHQ/SCAP's Civil Information and Education Section (CIE). Passin found the actions of Japanese Diet members so serious that he wrote a lengthy note on why he thought it necessary that 'SCAP forbid the Japanese government from undertaking such a program' of 'what is essentially a revival of Nazi race theories and practices'. He criticized the idea that sterilizing people with infectious diseases would remove the danger of contagion from the population, because such diseases 'depend upon local endemic conditions, topographical and climatic conditions, and general conditions of public sanitation and health'. He then recommended to 'forbid the official formulation of any plans whatsoever to "control population", to "improve the race", to eliminate or sterilize "congenitally unfit" or "incurable criminals", or any other similar measure'.³⁷

The argument by Passin, however, caused no further action by GHQ/SCAP. The inaction was exactly in line with its non-intervention policy on population control issues. For example, in February of 1946, when Crawford F Sams, the Chief of the Public Health and Welfare Section (PHW), implied that birth control was the only way to limit Japan's population growth, he nevertheless declared that GHQ/SCAP

had no birth control program.³⁸ This neutral policy on birth control was 'evident from the outset of the occupation', according to Deborah Oakley, a historian who analyzes occupation population policy. With the Nuremberg trials in progress, GHQ/SCAP avoided charges of assisting genocide by saying that 'birth control was the business of [the] Japanese and not of the occupation', as GHQ/SCAP anticipated that 'the Soviet Union could turn birth control into an explosive political issue' at the table of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), which administered the occupation of Japan.³⁹

On the other hand, GHQ/SCAP found the growing Japanese population to be a pressing issue, and thus it tacitly approved the Japanese birth control movement found in Japan's developing laws. Sams, among others, had a theory about how GHQ/SCAP could support reducing the birth rate while keeping clear of direct population control. He believed in the demographic transition model, which predicts that a nation undergoing urbanization as a result of industrialization will find that its birth rate eventually drops. Based on this theory, Sams believed two things should be done to stabilize the Japanese population: promoting the industrialization of Japan, which would inevitably shift the country toward urbanization; and provide the general population with access to information on birth control.⁴⁰ This had already been started by Japanese birth control activists. However, the industrialization of Japan was controlled by the FEC, whose policy stipulated that the level of industrialization in Japan should be kept low. The FEC believed that in order to demolish Japanese militarism and discourage its resurgence, the economic structure should be transformed so that aggressive drive and militaristic ambitions would never recover.⁴¹ But this policy conflicted with the theory of Sams, so he persuaded Frank R McCoy, the American representative to the FEC, that the anti-industrialization policy must be reversed.⁴² It is not certain if his persuasion played any significant role, but the FEC did decide to relax its industrial regulations on Japan, allowing considerable economic and industrial growth as early as August 1947.⁴³ So the stage was set for reducing the birth rate, whereas GHQ/SCAP maintained its official non-interference policy.

This hands-off policy was one possible reason why the Eugenic Protection Law became a rare case of lawmaker initiated legislation in occupied Japan. In Japan, it is commonly bills from cabinet that are enacted; only 20.2 per cent of all legislation up to 1955 was submitted by lawmakers.⁴⁴ In June of 1948, a bill was introduced by a group of members of the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives.

Data on sterilization cases of Hansen's disease patients from the prewar period turned out to be useful to Taniguchi Yasaburō, a medical doctor, when he drafted the bill.⁴⁵ Deemed as 'a most suitable law for devastated postwar Japan', and in stark contrast to the wartime deliberation on the National Eugenic Law, the postwar law passed with surprising ease in June and went into effect in September 1948.⁴⁶ The new Eugenic Protection Law authorized government agencies, known as Eugenic Protection Commissions (*Yūsei hogo iinkai*), to subject people suffering from certain hereditary diseases to forced sterilization, even without their consent. The sterilization operations were called eugenic operations (*Yūsei shujutsu*) and could be performed for a long list of conditions and circumstances, including mental illness, intellectual disabilities, and physical diseases.⁴⁷

This long list of diseases appears to have been added after consultation with GHQ/SCAP. In early May 1948, a month before the introduction of the bill to the Diet, the law simply provided five broad categories, such as hereditary mental disease. Seeing this, a call for more specific conditions came from Alfred G Oppler, Chief of the Courts and Law Division of GHQ/SCAP's Government Section (GS). Oppler noted that none of the broad categories 'fulfill the legal and medical requirements of precise definition which appear to be absolutely necessary in the case of an authoritative act so deeply affecting the individual'. He continued to note that 'even the Nazi sterilization law... specifically spelled out the individual diseases regarded as hereditary by medical science'.⁴⁸ He anticipated that the law as it stood would provide abundant opportunity for abuse, 'particularly in a country where the bureaucracy is still permeated by police state ideologies'. Then he suggested that 'the precise definition of hereditary evils as ground for compulsory sterilization' should be added to the bill.⁴⁹ On a request from the GS, PHW made a suggestion along the lines of Oppler's stance.⁵⁰ As a result, when the bill was submitted to the Diet, an annexed list of so-called maladies was attached, thereby specifying the targets for compulsory sterilization operations.

However, this annexed list became an issue. In late June, Sams, Chief of PHW, objected to the list of diseases, which he found 'with very few exceptions, are of a genetically controversial nature'. Sams pointed out that many of the diseases and disabilities on the list were not generally believed to be transmissible to offspring. He continued that PHW could not 'give concurrence to that part of the bill referable to compulsory sterilization'.⁵¹ In sum, both Oppler of GS and Sams of PHW found forced sterilization problematic on the basis that there would be serious

violations of reproductive rights, and because the bill included many diseases which lacked modern scientific evidence for their heredity.

In addition to compulsory sterilizations, the law provided that physicians could perform eugenic operations and induced abortions at their own discretion, with the consent of the person in question and their spouse, on people who met certain criteria. These included those who suffered from a hereditary pathological disease, a hereditary morbid character, and some other diseases of a hereditary nature. It also gave Hansen's disease as a criteria, the only disease to which the law made a direct reference.

GHQ/SCAP, however, made no references whatsoever to the inclusion of Hansen's disease. While criticizing the vague stipulation for compulsory sterilization, GHQ/SCAP was mute on voluntary sterilization. In the above-mentioned memo, Oppler suggested that 'if the principle is recognized that every human being has the right to do with his body what he pleases...no general objections might be raised to the device of voluntary sterilization'.⁵² Oppler focused on the issue of voluntariness and ignored the fact that during the war Hansen's disease was *not* the target of the sterilization law precisely because of its non-hereditary nature.

Reproductive rights of Hansen's disease patients: a case of alleged forced sterilization

In the postwar period, as sterilization and abortion on Hansen's disease patients became legal, operation records were kept. The graph in Figure 3.1, based on the 2005 *Final Report*, indicates the number of sterilizations and abortions on individuals suffering from Hansen's disease or on their spouses. Sterilization and abortion cases peaked in 1952 and steadily declined from the late 1950s.⁵³

Importantly, postwar sterilizations were characterized by the predominance of female patients. Compared to vasectomy (male sterilization), sterilization on women is a much more complex and high-risk surgery, so prewar operations focused mainly on male patients. Overall, as mentioned earlier, the ratio of male to female patients was three to one. In addition, while sterilization cases fell to almost none after the mid-1960s, abortion cases continued to be around 150 per year until the early 1970s. The number of abortions total more than 3,000, whereas the total number of sterilizations was more than 1,400. These numbers clearly indicate that gender norms, where women were held responsible for any sexual outcomes, added a tremendous burden on female patients.⁵⁴




Figure 3.1 Sterilization and abortion cases of Hansen's disease patients

Source: Adapted from Kensho kaigi, *Final Report*, 2005.

As we have seen, sterilization had been a fairly well-established practice in state sanatoriums since the prewar period. It was stipulated as a condition when patients wanted to have sex, so some patients accepted it as a necessary and routine procedure. Others accepted when told that they would transmit the disease to their children, or that pregnancy and delivery would worsen the disease. It continued as a required procedure and a legal operation under the Eugenic Protection Law.⁵⁵ However, these cases cannot be seen as 'voluntary'. In fact, there were cases of alleged forced operations, some of which were reported to GHQ/SCAP.

For example, in September 1949, Reverend Patrick O'Connor, a reporter for the *National Catholic News Service*, wrote a letter to Sams, Chief of PHW, to the effect that an individual named Sakai Kazumi was obliged to undergo sterilization at the national hospital in Kumamoto. O'Connor added that 'this was not an isolated case', but also urged 'the greatest caution be used in any investigation of this specific case' as 'it is always likely that retaliatory measures may be taken if the hospital officials think that the parties have complained or reported abuses'.⁵⁶

On receipt of the letter, PHW entrusted the investigation to the Welfare Ministry. Sams answered O'Connor with: 'Investigation reveals this man is not a patient in the Kumamoto National Leprosarium and the institution claims that it has no knowledge of this individual.' Sams also quoted article three of the Eugenic Protection Law, which outlines that the consent of the patient and the spouse is required, and then added '[t]his consent is made in writing and kept on file'.⁵⁷ Sams seemed not

to care about the conditions under which the patients had to undergo sterilization. In a memo for the record, Harry G Johnson, at the Medical Services Division of PHW, noted that the Welfare Ministry assured him that 'there is no violation of the law or ordinance in national leprosaria and furthermore, they have no evidence that the law is being violated by individual physicians'.⁵⁸ It seems PHW believed, or tried to believe, what the Welfare Ministry reported to them. As we saw earlier, Oppler of GS noted that in Japan 'the bureaucracy is still permeated by police state ideologies', and even went on to say that 'the official corruption is traditional'.⁵⁹ But PHW never questioned Japanese bureaucratic nature and ideology, and declined to conduct its own investigation.

O'Conner later admitted that Sakai Kazumi, the name given in his letter, was fictitious, which he had used to protect the individual who provided him with information.⁶⁰ Later in December, O'Conner gave the actual name of the patient in a letter to Sams. It took O'Conner a few months to pursue inquires, and he found the orphanage to which the patient had entrusted his infant child. According to the informant, the mother superior at a nearby orphanage, it was 'often the custom of the lepers to change their names on entering the leprosarium and even several times afterwards'.⁶¹ In the end, O'Conner's expectations were realised. He had raised the possibility of retaliatory measures if his source was identified as an informer; patient had indeed changed his story; he now told nuns visiting the hospital that he had undergone the operation of his own free will. This is the exact opposite of what he had said before, and is precisely the kind of switch O'Conner had expected. According to the mother superior, the Welfare Ministry made inquiries at the sanatorium, and the director asked the nuns for an explanation.⁶² Who will ever know what was done to this patient? In September O'Connor had already clearly stated that he 'learned that the practice of compulsory sterilization of lepers is widespread in the State institutions',⁶³ but PHW took the report of the Welfare Ministry at face value. So far, I have been unable to find any further response from PHW regarding this matter. It is highly possible that PHW ignored the allegations of forced sterilization.

Sams made clear in October 1949 that there were several imperfections in the Eugenic Protection Law. In particular, he made strong comments that 'the list of diseases considered hereditary by the Japanese in their law is, of course, ridiculous'. Then he added that 'many of these diseases so listed are not hereditary in the eyes of competent medical authorities in other parts of the world'.⁶⁴ These remarks may reflect his paternalistic sense of mission to teach modern medicine to the medically 'backward'

people in Japan. On the other hand, he also made it clear that it was 'SCAP's policy that the passage of this law, initiated by the Diet, would be a decision of the Japanese government alone' and, therefore, GHQ/SCAP would never intervene on the details.⁶⁵ In short, while pointing out its deficiencies, PHW stuck to its hands-off policy by focusing on the fact that the law was lawmaker initiated, which allowed GHQ/SCAP to evade its responsibilities.

We now know that Sams, the chief of PHW, knew that many of the diseases on the list were not hereditary, and that there were at least several cases where compulsory sterilization operations were performed on Hansen's disease patients. But PHW ignored allegations of compulsory sterilizations and did not investigate the details, nor did it give any instructions even though non-hereditary diseases were on the list of compulsory sterilization. This is because Sams knew that GHQ/SCAP had an excuse for avoiding action in saying that the Eugenic Protection Law came from Japanese legislators. Again, this law gave legal support to actions that even wartime lawmakers considered too controversial to include. The postwar law legalized sterilization on patients with Hansen's disease and other diseases, even though they had been known as non-hereditary since the prewar period. This violation of the reproductive rights of the most oppressed, in the name of voluntary sterilization, was left untouched until 1996, when the law was revised as the Law for the Protection of the Maternal Body (*Botai hogo hō*).

Conclusion

The Japanese governmental project to combat Hansen's disease was motivated mainly by an ambition to be regarded as a modern civilized nation. The solution chosen was to segregate and then sterilize patients so that the sexuality of male patients could be tamed. In cases where conception was discovered, women were forced to undergo abortions and sometimes required to wait until the later months of their pregnancy so that the aborted fetuses could be used in medical dissection experiments. With a repeated emphasis on the blessing of the imperial family, this policy was consistently followed in colonized areas that faced problems with the disease. The Japanese government, as the occupier, did not pay much attention to the 'treatment' or reproductive rights of patients, and when Japan was under occupation neither did PHW.

The fact that PHW was in charge of disease control may have had an impact on this indifference. PHW health and welfare policy had been set up to help smoothly carry out the policies of GHQ/SCAP, according to

a study by Sugiyama Akiko on medical reforms during the occupation. The health and welfare of the occupation forces was the top priority, and for that purpose PHW needed to control the health and hygiene of the Japanese people.⁶⁶ This can also be seen when Japan was the occupier/colonizer, especially in the case of the Pacific islands. For both occupiers, Japanese government and PHW, their only concern was to make society safe by erasing infectious diseases so that the occupation succeeded. Both powers were keenly aware that certain diseases must be kept under control; however, they tended to overlook the reproductive rights of individuals.

At the same time, public health and welfare programs were introduced to give a favorable impression of a benign and caring occupier. By showing superiority, the occupier used medical programs as a tool to turn colonialism and imperialism into charity and benevolence.⁶⁷ This was a main impetus for the Japanese government to establish state sanatoriums in colonial areas, although the actual effect was oppression. In the case of PHW, the prevention of communicable disease was a part of its efforts to demonstrate to the Japanese people that GHQ/SCAP, or maybe Americans in general, 'considered individual human life worth something as a principle of democracy', as Sams later put it.⁶⁸ But, in practice, PHW did not view the reproductive rights of individuals who carried certain communicable diseases as worthy of protection. Such inconsistent beliefs may have resulted from the popularity of eugenics at the time.⁶⁹

Originally, eugenics aimed to improve the genetic composition of a society by preventing hereditary diseases. However, as eugenics became increasingly popular, people turned their attention to the extermination of 'undesired' population groups. Hansen's disease was one of the main diseases that society as a whole thought it necessary to eliminate. Thus the postwar Eugenic Protection Law targeted individuals with physical and mental disabilities of a non-hereditary nature for sterilization operations.

During the Allied occupation a few staffers, like Herbert Passin of CIE and Alfred G Oppler of GS, pointed out that the Eugenic Protection Law was as bad, or worse than, the Nazi sterilization law and warned that it could set the stage for abundant cases of abuse. However, warnings of this kind were rarely heard during the formal articulation of GHQ/SCAP policy, which held that population control of any kind, including sterilization, abortion and birth control, was outside its purview. In addition, the fact that the law was an exclusive product of Japanese thought was repeatedly emphasized. This non-intervention policy appears to

be an implicit approval of Japanese eugenics and population control, without tainting occupation programs. Indeed, eugenics in Japan not only continued well into the postwar era, but was also strengthened by the inclusion of diseases and disabilities of a non-hereditary nature. The Japanese government neglected modern medical and scientific developments and left patients stripped of their reproductive rights. In its failure to intervene, GHQ/SCAP also bears its share of responsibility.

Notes

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4

Labor under Military Occupation: Allied POWs and the Allied Occupation of Japan

Christine de Matos

I was with a work party near Changi collecting barbed wire to be used for fencing when the news [of surrender] came over a secret radio...The barbed wire was then used to fence the Japanese in. *They immediately became the POWs and we no longer had to work for them.* It was lovely [emphasis added].¹

The above recollection from a former Australian POW of the Japan's, Bill Wharton, invokes not just an image of the moment of Japan's defeat in the Asia-Pacific War in 1945; it demonstrates the centrality of labor to the performance of power under conditions of war and military occupation. While it has been widely acknowledged that 'labour was a central feature of colonialism',² it is less recognized in the scholarly literature that labor also has an intimate relationship with military occupation. Occupation, like colonialism, cannot function without access to local labor through various levels of coercion. Labor is not just an economic relationship or structure, but a social act and practice, and it is primarily through sexual relations or work that the occupier and the occupied interact most closely with each other. Perhaps even more important is that labor is a site for the enactment of occupation power, as demonstrated in the epigram, and for its subversion. The primary aim of this chapter, then, is to explore the role of labor in the enactment of power at a grassroots level under conditions of war and military occupation, in the spirit of Foucault's concept of power as (re)produced and disseminated throughout society, not just as an omnipotent force imposed from above.

Australian POW labor in Japanese-occupied territories during the Asia-Pacific War provides one case study in this chapter. Over 22,000

Australians, military and civilian, became prisoners of the Japanese, with a death rate of 36 per cent.³ While the differences between a state of in-conflict and post-conflict are important to note (for instance the temporal dimensions of occupation), research and memoirs in this area provide a rich documentation on labor under Japanese occupation that allows for an exploration of commonalities and contrasts regarding levels of coercion, cooperation, and subversion. While the experience of a POW may be distinct from that of the occupied peoples, each occurred in the same space controlled or influenced by the occupying power, the Japanese, and POW labor resembled that of colonized labor over the course of the war.⁴

The other comparative study for this exploration is the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–52), with a focus on areas occupied by the Australian military. The Australians formed part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), stationed in Hiroshima prefecture. At its height in 1946, Australia contributed around 12,000 to the total of 40,000 BCOF troops (US forces numbered 152,000).⁵ An Australian acted in the role of Commander-in-Chief of BCOF for the duration of the occupation.⁶ There are many legal analyses of the occupation labor reforms, and of the growth and subsequent curtailment of Japanese trade unionism in occupied Japan.⁷ Rather than chart such local developments, the main concern of this chapter is to consider the relationships between labor and occupation power via the BCOF example. By looking at Australian POW labor in Japanese-occupied territories and Japanese labor in Australian-occupied zones, the two primary aims of the chapter are revealed: first, to explore the relationship between labor and occupation at a fundamental level; and second, to implicitly demonstrate the transition of Japan from power over others (POWs) to under the power of others (BCOF) – and the reverse for Australia as an Allied nation.

The analysis of labor and occupation in this chapter is generally influenced by postcolonial studies due to similarities in the relationship of labor to the daily enactment of power. Robert J. Steinfield offers another way to interpret labor under occupation. He has written more generically of free and unfree labor, and the different levels of coercion involved in making people work. In particular, Steinfield rejects the notion of a simplistic dichotomy between the two:

We have to give up the idea that so-called free and coerced labor inhabit completely separate universes and try to understand both in terms of a common framework...As vast as these differences

undoubtedly were [that is, between slave and 'free' labour] they should be understood as establishing the terms of labor along a very broad continuum rather than as binary opposition.⁸

While I do not necessarily endorse the notion of a single continuum, Steinfeld's work points to layers and levels of coercion which can be applied to cases of military occupation to encourage a more complicated understanding of the role of labor. This would include, for example, the notion of 'coercion without enslavement'. The explorations in this chapter utilize Steinfeld's approach within this context to contribute toward a more nuanced analysis of labor, power and military occupation. In the context of Japan's fall from power, it also reveals not only the obvious and profound similarities between labor under colonialism and military occupation, but also suggests that, in the cases of the Asia-Pacific War and the Allied Occupation of Japan, they were intimately interconnected.

Labor as functional necessity

The most obvious role of labor is to enable an occupation to function – bureaucratically, institutionally, and physically. A mutual, if not always welcomed, need is created: occupiers need the occupied to help perform the tasks of occupying, and, due to disruption of local economies caused by war and occupation, the occupied need to work. The occupation machine requires laborers, technicians, access to local knowledge and power structures, interpreters and translators, office workers and administrators, spies, and other 'services' such as hospitality, sex work, and domestic work. Thus the very existence of occupation is largely dependent upon local labor, forced or otherwise. In the case of Japanese-occupied territories during the Asia-Pacific War and the creation of Japan's empire, much of the above was provided by the occupied peoples via coercion or collaboration. The unexpectedly large numbers of POWs gained in the Southeast Asian conflict zones provided Japan with both a challenge in terms of accommodation, and a source of labor to supplement the more exploited occupied in order to advance their war machine.

Labor for Australian POWs under the Japanese consisted of working in the dockyards to load ships and trucks, getting firewood from the jungle, building camps, constructing airfields, farming, and working in coal mines and factories. Women were also engaged in manual labor such as land clearing, farming, carrying water, maintaining camp sites

and chopping wood, as well as tasks like gluing envelopes and making silk bags to contain images of gods.⁹ Some were also 'encouraged' to serve in the infamous Officers' Clubs.¹⁰ The building of the Burma-Thailand railway, which McCormack and Nelson have described as the 'common and dominant experience of Australian POWs', represents perhaps the most infamous example.¹¹ This railway, consisting of 668 bridges and 600,000 sleepers laid over 415 kilometers, was built by occupied and POW labor with 'the most primitive equipment' and often by sick, emaciated and dying workers.¹² After the completion of the railway at the end of 1943, the Japanese found themselves with a surplus of POW labor (despite the high death rates), thus many were relocated to other 'work camps'¹³ across Japan's empire. The story of one POW, HS Kildey, demonstrates such relocations: in Singapore he constructed roads for the Japanese army; in Kobe he built ships for the Kawasaki ship building works; and in Fukuoka he worked underground in coalmines.¹⁴ One former POW facetiously refers in his memoir to the role of POW labor as '[o]ur part in the Japanese war effort'.¹⁵

Though not a signatory of the Geneva Convention, and hardly in compliance with its stipulations regarding the treatment of POWs, the Japanese did sometimes honor components of the agreement. POWs were paid at the rate of around 10 cents per day (or 15 cents for NCOs),¹⁶ yet this was often suspended, paid intermittently, or even replaced with food. Except toward the end of the war when Japan became more desperate, POW officers usually did not perform hard labor but instead acted as supervisors and disciplinarians of work parties, or assumed other administrative-type roles, such as collecting and managing the wages of POW labor. Officers often took on the role of a union official, attempting to negotiate better working conditions (more pay, earlier finishing times, time off for the very sick) with the Japanese.¹⁷

This situation quickly reversed after Japan's defeat and subsequent occupation, when the Japanese played their part in the Australian occupation effort. In areas of occupied Hiroshima, such as Kure, BCOF was the largest local employer of labor. Approximately 35,000 to 40,000 Japanese were hired in any given week by BCOF to undertake various tasks, at least during the early period of the occupation.¹⁸ A large number of these employees were women, many of whom found themselves forced into the position of sole breadwinner for their families with the men either killed during the war or awaiting repatriation. Positions with BCOF included domestic labor in occupier homes, manual labor, such as building or searching for and destroying hidden Japanese ammunition (under occupier supervision), 'menial

tasks' normally performed by soldiers (such as shoe polishing), 'sexual services',¹⁹ office work, and translation and interpreting roles (including intelligence gathering).

In contrast to the POWs, occupied Japanese were not forced to work for BCOF, were often provided with one full meal during the workday, and were paid regularly – but by the Japanese government, not the occupiers. Australian military leaders as employers were also expected to abide by the working conditions codified in the trio of postwar labor laws in Japan as they came into existence: the Trade Union Law of 1945 (*Rōdōkumiai hō*), which gave workers the right to organize and seek mediation; the Labor Relations Adjustment Law (*Rōchō hō*) of 1946 that further codified mediation, conciliation and voluntary arbitration; and finally the Labor Standards Law (*Rōdōkijun hō*) of 1947, which focused on working conditions. Without the cooperation of the occupied population in providing workers, the military occupation of Japan could not have been achieved, and certainly not as a relatively benign occupation. Thus, in relation to both Japanese-occupied territories and Australian-occupied Japan, it was fundamental to engage the labor of those occupied.

Labor as establishing and enabling hierarchies of power

The successful enactment of military occupation requires the clear delineation of the social, political, economic, and military roles of the occupier vis-à-vis the occupied, and a justification for this delineation. In essence, occupation power rests on establishing, at least temporarily, the 'superiority' of the occupation force. While some of this naturally rests with military victory, it is usually supplemented by other forms, such as a perceived racial, national, or ideological 'superiority'.

The POWs in Japanese-occupied territories offer an interesting case as their captivity constituted an inversion of white colonial racialism. Labor thus played a crucial role in establishing and performing the new racial hierarchy. The harsh discipline inflicted upon POWs by the Japanese, from overwork and neglect to beatings and executions, can be at least partially explained by racially constructed views of westerners and revenge for past treatment of Japan in international affairs. In a translated speech from Captain Imamura at Karenko camp (Taiwan) in 1942, POWs were apparently told that 'The Americans and British [including Australians] are not allowed to have the haughty attitude over the peoples of Asia or to look them down, which have been their common sense for a long time. If there is any such attitude at all on your part, you shall be severely punished'.²⁰ This feeling extended to some of

those living in Japanese-occupied areas who had previously been under European colonial rule, especially in the early stages of the war. Shortly after he was captured, Rohan Rivett recalls a vitriolic greeting from a Javanese that attacked the Dutch in particular and Europeans in general, praised the Japanese for saving the Javanese, and took pride in the fact that white men and women were now working for the locals and the Japanese: 'Soon all British become coolies. We are masters. We have many hundred Europeans working coolie for us. Very good, no?'²¹

The (mostly) white POWs recognized their physical subjection in this reversed racial hierarchy, but simultaneously psychologically rejected 'having to place their bodies and labour at the service of the Japanese'.²² Norman Carter encapsulates the perceived incredulity at the situation. While being a POW was 'nothing to be proud of at the best of times',

...it was especially galling to surrender to a race who...had been regarded as a simple-minded people, politely bowing their way through life amid a shower of cherry blossoms...a nation of geishas and houseboys. Now Honourable Houseboy had become dishonourable conqueror.²³

Titles of POW memoirs often refer to their time as one of slavery, as in *Slaves of the Samurai*, *Slaves of the Son of Heaven*, or even *White Coolies*,²⁴ this last with the prefix of white as if to emphasize the preposterousness of the situation and that coolies should naturally be of some other color. POWs referred to occupied locals who were forced laborers, the *rōmusha*, as 'coolies', and one in his memoir recalls being 'driven like niggers all day'.²⁵ Hugh Clark emphasizes that, having been brought up under the White Australia Policy, the Australian POWs maintained a sense of superiority and arrogance even while incarcerated.²⁶ POWs described the rates of pay given to them by the Japanese as 'coolie rates'.²⁷ Dunlop notes with surprise in his wartime diary that some of the 'Malay, Chinese and Thai coolies' were promised by the Japanese (though had not necessarily yet received) \$1 for a day's work, a rate much higher than that paid to (mostly) white POWs.²⁸ There were other differences aside from the pay. Chattaway relates the three shifts of work at one of the camps in Thailand; Australians were included in the 4.30pm and 2.30am night shifts while the *rōmusha* 'always worked the day shift'.²⁹ This racial reversal in laboring is evident in an extract from Kent Hughes' poetic *tour de force*:

Where coolie chants were sung before
Upon the docks of Singapore,

Large gangs of Diggers [Australian soldiers] – tanned and tall –
With Gurkhas, wiry, strong and small,
Slaved ceaselessly to load the skips,
And fill the holds of Nippon's ships.³⁰

These POWs were reflecting the dominant narratives of power at the time, that is, white colonial racialized norms. Thus, when Japan was occupied by the Allies after the war, there was a sense from the occupier that the prewar 'normal' racial balance of power had to be restored. Labor in occupied Japan played a role in (re)establishing these hierarchies of power. Functional necessity was shaped by discourses of inferiority that explained to the victor and the vanquished Japan's defeat and justified the Allied position as occupier.

The Allied Occupation of Japan did not involve slave or forced labor, yet the conditions of being occupied necessitated an asymmetrical relationship of power reminiscent of the colonial model. While the occupier in Japan did not have a legal compulsion to enforce servitude – indeed that would be against the ostensible aims of the Allied Occupation – there was a construction of identities and roles, inspired by the colonial imaginary, of what the relationship between occupier and occupied should look like and how an occupied people should behave towards the occupier. Japanese were expected to work under constant supervision and have a 'fitting demeanour' that involved actions such as rising to one's feet, bowing, or otherwise showing respect to their conqueror. To do otherwise was to risk dismissal.³¹ And while the idea of white women laboring manually for the Japanese may have horrified Australians, this was not extended to Japanese women, who were engaged regularly in physical tasks by BCOF, including working on the wharves. Figure 4.1 below depicts Japanese women packed into the back of of truck to be taken out as day laborers for BCOF.

As under colonialism, occupation power was visibly performed through the erection and maintenance of architectural boundaries, for example the BCOF family village of Nijimura, near Hiro. The language of servitude and ownership was often used to describe occupied workers, for example, domestic workers could be referred to as servants or, via colonial vocabulary, as housegirl and houseboy.³² The delineation of labor roles between occupier (supervisor) and occupied (worker) in the occupation workspace reinforced these disparities of power. Another way that labor played a role was through demonstrating ideological



Figure 4.1 Japanese (mainly female) civilian laborers employed by BCOF going off to work packed into the back of an army truck. Kure, Japan, 1946. [Australian War Memorial P01 205.004, copyright expired/public domain]

superiority. That is, by bestowing greater freedoms to workers through occupation labor reforms the occupier: could cement perceptions of their perceived superiority to the occupied/vanquished; could dominate the narrative-creation of the good occupation; and could vindicate their presence as good occupiers and worthy victors.

Labor freedoms, though, had their limitations since, at any point that labor organizations were interpreted as threatening the interests of the occupation, these 'gifts' could be rescinded. Macro-level examples include: the February 1, 1947 general strike ban issued by General Douglas MacArthur; the limitation of the rights to organize and strike for public servants in the 1948 National Public Service Law; and the Red Purges of the late 1940s and early 1950s.³³ Overall, labor, as an act and an idea constructed on western terms and supported by a framework of ideological and racial notions, was fundamental to enabling the performance of occupation power, justifying the hierarchies of power, and delineating the boundaries between occupier and occupied – and reversing the temporary subversion of the colonial 'status quo' by the Japanese in their wartime occupied territories.

Labor as punishment, discipline or site of violence

Labor plays a major role in acting out the asymmetrical relations of power under war and occupation, including as a form of discipline or punishment for perceived transgressions against those who possess power. Labor can be used to put the vanquished 'in their place', as can denial to those seeking work. The role of labor as punishment is palpable in accounts of Allied POWs under the Japanese, and so well documented that it hardly needs further elaboration here. Whether as punishment for surrender, transgressions of orders and rules, failure to show respect, or revenge for perceived poor past treatment of Japan, discipline, violence and starvation were intrinsic components of the Australian POW experience. Work, especially being made to work harder, longer, and faster, could assume the role of punishment, or POWs could be punished for refusing to labor or not working to speed. Violence ranged from face slapping, which EE Dunlop states was 'almost a daily affair' from mid-1942,³⁴ to denial of food and medication, to harsher bashings and even execution. Yet work could also occasionally be used as incentive: in the Osaka POW camp, Colonel Uwata warned POWs against 'slacking down' or 'disobeying orders' due to avoiding 'helping your enemy', and offered those who did their 'tasks conscientiously ... first preference' for repatriation to their loved ones; a promise that was not fulfilled.³⁵

In occupied Japan, Japanese working for the occupation forces and their families were seen as a natural extension of the asymmetrical power relationship. While mostly benign compared to the POW experience, violence also intruded into this relationship. Japanese male workers were often physically and verbally abused by both male and female Allied occupiers, and a number of Japanese women raped.³⁶ One Japanese water transport worker working for the Australian forces, Matsuno Seiso, describes his personal experience:

At first, the other workers couldn't understand English...so the Australian soldiers were frustrated. They often got mad at the Japanese people, yelling at them. At the same time, soldiers had family members who were POWs...so they really hated the Japanese...

[One coxswain] didn't understand Japanese, although he invited the Japanese people's children or friends to come on board. They couldn't understand him so they were cursed at a lot. He kicked them too because he was frustrated at the language barrier.³⁷

In this case, occupation officials kicked not only the workers, but also their friends and families invited on board in what was ostensibly an act of relationship building. These acts of violence – even if random rather than systematic – were relatively common and often motivated as much by racial hatred as by that toward a wartime enemy. While it is difficult to discern where they occurred, statistics show that between 1946 and 1951 there were 522 assaults on Japanese compared to 42 cases vice-versa.³⁸ BCOF attacks on Japanese were under-reported and often anecdotal, as many Japanese feared retaliation, or not being believed, or that it would be useless as BCOF troops would be protected, especially in cases of rape.³⁹ Personal testimonies from interviewees suggest that it was common for BCOF personnel and their families to kick Japanese men on the streets of Kure.⁴⁰ The reference to POWs in Matsuno's account hints at the opportunities – due to the close proximity of occupier and occupied in the working environment – taken for revenge by some for the treatment of Australians in Japanese captivity.

More common in this occupation was the notion of labor itself as a site of punishment. Laboring for the former enemy power, for those from nations formerly under the power of Japanese in the POW camps, was seen as just retribution, whether or not it was accompanied by verbal or physical violence. Another way to punish was to deny access to work altogether, which often occurred to former high ranking officers of the Japanese military when they approached the BCOF Labor Office for jobs.⁴¹ While labor as punishment was expressed in different forms, whether for Australian POWs or the Japanese occupied, each case demonstrates the relationship between labor and the enactment of asymmetrical power relations under conditions of war and occupation.

Labor as a source of agency, resistance or change

Labor is not only a way the occupier can enact their power over the occupied, but it can also act as a source of empowerment *for* the occupied. Workers may challenge occupation authorities, reclaim a sense of individual or group empowerment, and gain some control over one's circumstances and survival. In the case of male laborers, whether Australian POWs in Japanese captivity or Japanese laborers under Australian occupation, work was intrinsically related to maintaining or expressing a sense of masculinity under the feminized conditions of captivity or occupation.

The image on the cover of McCormack and Nelson's book *The Burma-Thailand Railway* is not the more familiar one of the emaciated Australian

male POW in idle captivity or hospital, but is a watercolor of men at work by the official war artist in Malaya, V. Murray Griffin (himself a POW). In this image, the laborers, notably in 1942, are represented as athletic and muscular men hauling logs for the Japanese. The back cover also contains an image of POWs at work, this time in 1944 at Changi, much more emaciated but still represented as tough workers. Similar image choices for POW memoirs are evident in the sketches by Jack Chalker in *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop* (Hintok camp in Thailand),⁴² and Fred Ransome Smith's or Griffin's in Neave and Smith's *Aussie Soldier Prisoners of War*. Several images in the latter,⁴³ and in Chalker's, are of




Figure 4.2 This image captures the extremes of work, neglect, and punishment under the Japanese, drawn by former POW Fred Ransome Smith. Ransome Smith continues to draw his experiences of working on the Burma-Thailand Railway (here at Hell's Pass) to this day. He is currently in his 90s.

Source: With permission, Fred Ransome Smith 2014.

POWs working on the Burma-Thailand Railway and, while the men are all corporeally in various stages of hunger and disease, they are nevertheless impressively represented as hard-working, resilient *men*, even when facing the unspeakable horrors inflicted by their captors; that is, their masculinity (and therefore the nation they represent) is sustained.

Except in the most extreme cases of hardship, work for the male POW was a way of retaining a sense of masculinity and empowerment, and of overcoming the stain of non-participation in the war; they may have been forced to work for the enemy, but the images remain those of action, not of feminized idleness. One Australian POW included the following quotation from Carlyle in his memoir: 'In idleness alone is there perpetual despair'.⁴⁴ The quotation captures the idea of labor playing a role in keeping busy and maintaining morale by not giving in to the negative thoughts that could be nurtured by the inactivity of imprisonment. Thus, at least in the early stages of captivity in places like Changi in Singapore before the full horrors were known, Australian POWs often volunteered to be part of the work parties that labored for the Japanese. In camps where the work was less brutal than the Burma-Thailand railway, for instance laboring on the wharves, many men joined work parties even when not on the roster, or went in place of those who were but wished to stay in the camp.⁴⁵

This volunteering also provided another benefit: the promise (if not always the fulfilment) of a wage. With income, no matter how small, the POWs had a minor source of control over their fate in that meagre rations could be supplemented by purchases from camp canteens or even local (and often black) markets. Some, in places like the occupied Dutch East Indies, risked punishment by purchasing food while out on working parties and smuggling it back into camp.⁴⁶ Working hard could also be a source of personal achievement, until one found that finishing allocated work early often resulted in the Japanese increasing the next day's workload.

Work could be more problematic for female POWs. Rather, the notion of manual labor for (white) women – wood chopping, road sweeping, digging with a hoe-like *chungkal* – was anathema to the idealized feminine role of homemaker and nurturer, at least in its middle-class/colonial sense. Betty Jeffrey resented the Japanese 'ambition...to make us white coolies' and of having to 'carry sacks of rice into the camp when the ration comes, while natives sit round smoking straws and watch and laugh at us'. But the women, like the men, attempted to demonstrate their 'indifference' to their plight: '[o]ne day last week we had to unload a truck full of rice and store it in a Jap garage near by [sic]. There were at

least fifty heavy sacks. They do loathe us and get so mad when we chat brightly and organize a system to make the job easier.¹⁴⁷

Work is also a form of routinization of the occupation power paradigm. That is, the very everyday, repetitive, mundane nature of daily labor functions to normalize the abnormal conditions of occupation or captivity, and even to (temporarily) disguise or obscure the power dynamics operating under these conditions. Thus laboring in Japanese work parties, whether voluntary or forced, provided some structure, routine and control to the POW day. Many POWs, for instance, formed their own work schedules to maintain the camps, nurse each other or grow plots of food to supplement their meagre diet. Jeffrey describes how the POW nurses quickly organized their camp into set routines: ‘Our days are now organized properly – trust nurses! We work to a schedule. Every day we have a different cooking squad of three people who do all the cooking and washing up for the whole house... We also have “housekeepers”, a squad of two each day.’⁴⁸ Sometimes they even paid each other for work in order to redistribute the cash supplies to enable those POWs with less to purchase food from canteens or markets. For instance, Jeffrey cut other POW’s hair for a price of ten cents (20 cents if they had plenty of money, free if they had none).⁴⁹ One POW in a camp in Hakodate even recorded a typical day that demonstrates the centrality of work:

5.00 Reveille	15.00 Smokoh
6.00 Morning Roll Call	15.15 Resume work
6.15 Breakfast (‘rice and stew’)	16.45 ‘Knock off’
7.15 Parade, march 2 miles to work	16.30 March back – clerks
8.00 Start work	16.45 Leave for camp
9.00 Rest or smokoh	17.15 Arrive at camp, dismissed
9.15 Start again	18.00 Supper (‘rice and stew’)
[11 or 12].30 Lunch	19.30 Evening roll call
12.45 Resume work	20.00 Lights out. ⁵⁰

As the POWs were combined into work parties, the dynamics of the group could offer a sense of solidarity, morale and therefore subtle resistance to their Japanese captors. One example of this group dynamic is singing on the way back from a day’s work:

[The Japanese] could never understand why we sang on our way back to camp after the day’s work...after working all day and on through the hours of darkness, when men raised their voices in song as they

splashed, slipped and staggered through the waterlogged road, the guards shrugged their shoulders, pointed to us with one hand and made circular motions round their heads with the other – we had ‘wheels’ in our heads.⁵¹

Other examples of resistance include sabotage of work or fooling their Japanese overseers to reduce work. When digging holes on the railway in Burma at Moulmein, Frank Chattaway claimed they

beat them at every opportunity. Our favourite idea and one that worked almost every day was when working a place that had been worked on before, to scratch the sides and bottom of the hole so as to make it look as if it had been freshly dug and when the Nip came along he would measure it as part of that day’s quota.⁵²

In the end, though, it was work that also defined freedom for the POWs or, more accurately, the lack of work, as exemplified in this chapter’s epigram. This reversal of laboring roles extended beyond the moment of actual defeat. Twomey, in her analysis of photographs of Australian POWs, refers to images of ‘unhappy’ Japanese men ‘labouring and cleaning, watched by large numbers of relaxed-looking Australians. The captions reminded readers that the “tables” had been “turned”.⁵³ This ‘turning of the tables’ was not limited to the Japanese; a common post-POW experience in the Southeast Asian region was to take a rickshaw ride, which, as Sobocinska has articulately stated, ‘functioned as a symbolic representation of the colonial order, with white bodies in comfortable repose being conveyed by the labouring body of the “native”’.⁵⁴ For Australian women in occupied Japan, this reversal is best exemplified by the array of household servants she had, enabling her to act as household supervisor and lady of leisure. Such scenes celebrated the return to the ‘normal’ colonial racial hierarchy in a period where decolonization was still in its infancy.

In Australian-occupied Hiroshima, working for the occupation forces not only provided an income, but also allowed for a sense of normalcy to slowly return and to normalize the presence of the occupier. Japanese working for the occupation forces did so without the constraints of captivity since most workers were free to go to a home (or to what was left of that home) at the end of a day’s work.⁵⁵ However, in the bombed landscape that was postwar Japan (particularly nuclear-bombed Hiroshima, which fell into the Australian zone of responsibility), the



Figure 4.3 An Australian woman outside her home in Nijimura with her three domestic workers

Source: With permission, July 11, 2006.

occupied Japanese still faced issues of hygiene, health, and malnutrition, as had Australian POWs.

Japanese workers used similar techniques to Australian POWs in order to retain morale, and received the same negative reactions from their occupiers. For instance, one Australian occupier records being 'outraged by the cheerful, un-conquered attitudes of Japanese wharf labourers who bustled around shouting and smiling and spitting as if they had never heard of the Coral Sea or – if you like – the Kokoda Trail'.⁵⁶ But occupied Japanese could also achieve empowerment via formal worker and political organizations. In swift reaction to the postwar labor reforms, many unions were formed to give a combined voice to worker issues. While at first these unions were formed with the blessing of the occupier, they could be transformed into spaces of resistance against that occupier, especially in the latter part of the occupation when the cold war was heading into full swing.

Those working directly for the Australian occupier could form their own unions separate to those working directly for government or in private enterprise. However, these occupation worker unions faced

restrictions that other Japanese workers did not have. Most importantly, they did not possess 'the [same] bargaining power of a normal union'. Rather, they were instructed by the US military government:

- a) that in case of political action they may not represent themselves as being supported by the Occupation Force.
- b) that they make no demands on either the Japanese Government or the Occupation Forces that will embarrass the objectives of the Occupation.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, there were a number of strikes held by Japanese employees of BCOF over the course of the occupation, mainly for wage rises. BCOF intelligence was also often used to forestall strikes, especially if they were deemed to interfere with the occupation force. Surveillance was conducted on trade unions, political parties, and other labor gatherings. Strikes that were deemed to affect the occupation were prevented from very early on in the occupation, and those on repatriation ships⁵⁸ not tolerated at all. When the crew of one such ship decided to strike at Senzaki (in the New Zealand area of responsibility) in August 1946, the officer in charge of the repatriation centre threatened the captain of the ship 'with disciplinary action' and successfully halted the strike.⁵⁹ The fact that Japanese workers forged ahead with these strikes shows a level of resistance against occupation authorities and a desire to create their own future, outside of the aims of the occupiers.

Sabotage, in the form of destruction of products of work conducted for the occupation forces, or theft from occupation supplies while on the job, served as subtle forms of resistance via labor. Language could also be a weapon. One BCOF Base Commander noted that '[d]isrespect is very noticeable among clerks and interpreters, especially those who have learnt a smattering of the English language'.⁶⁰ This could be extended to Japanese; rather than acting with respect in this language of social hierarchy, 'the type of Japanese spoken by natives to Japanese speaking Occupation Forces personnel has been in many cases the type of language spoken to servants or between equals of the servant and uneducated labourer class'.⁶¹ Agency could be far less subtle, and it was not unknown for BCOF supervisors to be directly insulted or attacked by their Japanese workers. Carter notes that between July 1946 and September 1951 there were 42 recorded cases of assault against BCOF personnel, and nearly 2,000 cases of burglary, robbery, or (mostly) theft – this last most likely related to opportunities in the workplace.⁶²

While staged in contrasting conditions, both Australian POWs and occupied Japanese used labor to reclaim a sense of agency, to resist and protest against those with power, or to provide routine in an abnormal situation. The fact that there was so much surveillance of labor organizations by BCOF demonstrates their subversive capacity, especially in the emerging bipolar world when labor became the initial frontline of the cold war. Strategic and military interests combined with political aspects of the Allied Occupation to create a confused relationship between BCOF, its employees, and the Japanese labor movement, even if not as severe as the horrific experiences of POW laborers.

Conclusions: the question of coercion and exploitation

There can be little debate over the role of force in the cases of Japan's occupied peoples and POWs in work camps. But to what extent can the case for coercion be applied to the Allied Occupation of Japan? As evident in many BCOF reports, Australian military leaders were proud that they did not have to force Japanese to labor; that the occupied willingly came to the occupier's Labor Office seeking work, and were paid properly for their labor (albeit by the Japanese government). Add to this the trio of postwar labor laws in Japan, and it seems difficult to talk about coercion or exploitation of occupied Japanese labor. Yet there are differences between the idealism behind reform that is used to justify the 'good' occupation of Japan and the daily practices of occupying that are inherently based on maintaining asymmetrical relations of power and the strategic needs of military occupation. Additionally, while the occupiers *needed* to employ local labor in order to carry out the tasks of occupation, thus seemingly empowering the occupied, that situation is little different from the colonial one in which coercion and exploitation have been long acknowledged.

Certainly, labels like slavery cannot be easily applied to the case of occupied Japan, but there are a number of factors that suggest more indirect means of coercion and exploitation. The fact of being occupied, with a constant military presence as a tangible and daily reminder, and as an expression of the power of the occupier, can be seen as a coercive or influential factor in directing employment decisions. While at one level the military presence can be seen as creating opportunities for work, the very lack of other opportunities means there was an absence of choice in employment.

This military presence was exacerbated by great poverty, destruction of local industry, infrastructure, and major local employers through war and military defeat (the previously largest employer was the Kure

naval shipyard), and high unemployment rates. Malnutrition was rife, and starvation, it is said, is an effective inducement to work.⁶³ Thus, there was both a great need to find work and, again, a distinct lack of alternatives. The POWs worked to have access to food, no matter how meagre; the occupied also worked for the occupier and former enemy in order to put food on their family's table. In other words, there was a palpable level of economic coercion in deciding to work for the occupying power and risk subjecting oneself to social ostracism within the local community for working for the enemy, something that occurred with great frequency for Japanese women who worked for BCOF.⁶⁴

Military occupations create an abnormal and, in the end, transient local labor and economic system.⁶⁵ Many Japanese who worked for the occupation force said that they were grateful for the work created by the occupation in a post-defeat, devastated Japan,⁶⁶ but the downside was dependency. As occupation is transient, employment was mostly on a casual basis, effectively as day laborers. Dismissal was a constant threat, even more so for female domestic employees who were subject to regular STD examinations, implying that one of her domestic 'duties' may have been sexual. As Steinfeld's thesis implies, labor even under the most ideal circumstances creates some level of dependency; it is individual circumstances, like war and military occupation, that influences the degree of this dependency.

When it came time to reduce the numbers of BCOF employees as the occupation was winding down, Australian occupiers were not opposed to using extreme methods. One Japanese occupied worker stated that he and his co-workers turned up to work as usual for a company that contracted work to the Australian occupation force

but we couldn't get in because it was wired [barbed wire around the building]. I thought 'that's strange'. I looked up at the first floor. There I saw guns pointing from the window, using an aiming device. We were trying to get in so that the Australian soldiers wouldn't see, but they were aiming at us. So we couldn't get in.⁶⁷

In this case, about 2,000 workers were locked out of their workplace with the aid of BCOF troops. However, the use of BCOF troops to lock out workers did not conform to the new labor laws in Japan, demonstrating again that they could be ignored when deemed to be contrary to the occupying power's interests.⁶⁸ The problem of what to do to avoid economic collapse with the final withdrawal of

Australian occupation troops in the mid-1950s was, therefore, one that Kure, being the center of the BCOF presence, had to face and make plans for.

There are obvious differences between forced Australian POW labor in Japanese-occupied territories and Japanese labor in Australian-occupied Japan; one involving incarceration, force and abuse, the other 'coercion without enslavement'. Yet in each case utilization and control of occupied labor was fundamental to the business of occupying and in performing the asymmetrical relations of power. To occupy, to borrow and adapt a phrase from Foucault about governing, 'is to structure the possible field of action of others',⁶⁹ and in regards to labor under occupation, it is the occupier that defines the terms of engagement. Conversely, work was a means toward agency or to engage in subversion of that occupation power. In the cases explored in this chapter, the moment of defeat in 1945 enabled an immediate transition in the occupation power hierarchy. For Japan, that entailed going from one of power over to that of power under, as noted so palpably by Bill Wharton in the epigraph. Additionally, the intersection of racial constructs, war, and occupation, in each case was influenced by the colonial imaginary of each player. Overall, exploring the cases of Japanese-occupied territories and Australian-occupied Japan contributes toward understanding the enactment of inequitable hierarchies of occupation power – whether intent is benevolent or punitive – and the important role that labor plays in enacting, reinforcing, and resisting those relations of power.

Notes

1. Willohby 'Bill' Wharton in D Neave and C Smith, *Aussie Soldier Prisoners of War* (Wavell Heights QLD: Big Sky Publishing, 2009), p. 200.
2. SW Silliman, 'Theoretical Perspectives on Labor and Colonialism: Reconsidering the California Missions', *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 20, No. 4 (2001): 379.
3. G McCormack and H Nelson (eds), *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History* (St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 162.
4. Thailand was technically free, or even a collaborator, but still highly coerced by the Japanese and their wartime prerogatives and thus will still be considered here under the definition of 'occupation'.
5. C de Matos, 'The Allied Occupation of Japan – an Australian View', *The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (July 27, 2005), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Christine_de-Matos/1765.
6. Lieutenant-General J Northcott (March–June 1946); Lieutenant General HCH Robertson (1946–51); Lieutenant-General W Bridgeford (1951–3, after 1952 as commander of British Commonwealth Forces Korea or BCFK).

7. Some examples include: Matsuzaki Hajime, *Japanese Business Unionism: The Historical Development of a Unique Labour Movement* (Kensington, NSW: University of NSW, 1992); JB Moore, *Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945–1947* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); and TA Tanami, *Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Japan* (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1979).
8. RJ Steinfeld, *Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 8.
9. C Kenny, *Captives: Australian Army Nurses in Japanese Prison Camps* (St Lucia QLD: University of Queensland Press, 1986), pp. 76–7, 110–12.
10. See for example B Jeffrey, *White Coolies* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1957), pp. 30–3; and Kenny, *Captives*, pp. 42–5. For more recent discussions see D Flitton, 'Australian wartime sex slave Jan Ruff-O'Hearne [sic] hits out at "hideous" Japanese denials', *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 25, 1914, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/australian-wartime-sex-slave-jan-ruffohearne-hits-out-at-hideous-japanese-denials-20140224-33d4o.html>.
11. McCormack and Nelson (eds), *The Burma-Thailand Railway*, p. 17.
12. Neave and Smith, *Aussie Soldier Prisoners of War*, p. 264; R Sadler and T Hayllar, *In the Line of Fire: Real Stories of Australians at War, from Gallipoli to Vietnam* (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2006), p. 143.
13. The term 'work camp' is often used in, for example, POW memoirs rather than 'POW camp'.
14. Australian War Memorial (AWM): PR00705, Papers of CPL HS Kiley, 'Statuary Declaration Kenneth Lionel Collins', August 13, 1978.
15. HV Clark, *Twilight Liberation: Australian Prisoners of War between Hiroshima and Home* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 18.
16. This is the amount stated by men in POW/work camps in Southeast Asia. Other examples come from the female civilian internees at Yokohama in Japan of 81 sen (Kenny, *Captives*, p. 111), and the female POWs in the Dutch East Indies of four guilders fifty cents a month (Jeffrey, *White Coolies*, p. 99).
17. See EE Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop: Java and the Burma-Thailand Railway 1942–1945* (Melbourne: Nelson, 1986).
18. J Wood, *The Forgotten Force: The Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan 1945–1952* (St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 80; R Donnelly, 'A Civilising Influence? Women in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan 1946–1952', Hons thesis, Swinburne University, 1994, 11.
19. While BCOF did not of course directly employ sex workers, there were instances where they covertly sponsored particular brothels in order to have an STD-free business available for their personnel. See, for instance, an interview with one of those involved in the Film Australia documentary *The Forgotten Force* (1994).
20. WS Kent Hughes, *Slaves of the Samurai* (Melbourne: Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press, 1946), p. xvii.
21. R Rivett, *Behind Bamboo: Hell on the Burma Railway* (Camberwell VIC: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 77.
22. A Sobocinska, "'The Language of Scars": Australian Prisoners of War and the Colonial Order', *History Australia* 7, No. 3 (2010): 58.7.

23. Cited in R Gerster, *Big-Noting: The Heroic Theme in Australian War Writing* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1987), p. 234.
24. Hughes, *Slaves of the Samurai*; R Whitecross, *Slaves of the Son of Heaven: The Personal Story of an Australian Prisoner of the Japanese during the Years 1942–1945* (London: Transworld, 1973); Jeffrey, *White Coolies*.
25. AWM: PR87/029, Papers of Tomas F Murphy, 'The War Diary of Tomas Francis Murphy of Victoria, Australia'.
26. H Clark in McCormack and Nelson (eds), *The Burma-Thailand Railway*, p. 87.
27. Hughes, *Slaves of the Samurai*, p. 273.
28. Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p. 228. However, there was a much higher death rate among the *rōmusha* than the POWs.
29. AWM: PR90/116, Papers of F Chattaway, 'Handwritten Memoir: Moulmein to Sydney via Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Book II', 31.
30. The poem is 296 pages long. Gurkhas could be claimed as 'honorary British'. Hughes, *Slaves of the Samurai*, p. 112.
31. Carolyne Carter, 'Between War and Peace: The experience of occupation for members of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 1945–1952', PhD thesis, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of NSW, 2002, pp. 304–5, online: http://www.unsworks.unsw.edu.au/primo_library/libweb/action/dlDisplay.do?docId=unsworks_3193&vid=UNSWORKS.
32. For more information see C de Matos, 'A Very Gendered Occupation: Australian women as "conquerors" and "liberators"', *US-Japan Women's Journal* 33 (2007), especially p. 7.
33. Some local examples are discussed in the section on agency and resistance.
34. Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p. 78.
35. AWM: PR00705, Papers of CPL HS Kildey, 'To All Prisoners of War from Colonel Uwata Commander of Osaka POW Camp'. Translator unknown, no date.
36. For a powerful indictment of BCOF acts of rape, see the memoir of Australian journalist and BCOF interpreter AS Clifton in *Time of Fallen Blossoms* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1951), Chapter 20 'Yabanjin' [Barbarians].
37. Matsuno Seiso, interviewed by author, Kure (Japan), September 3, 2004. See also C de Matos, 'The Occupiers and the Occupied: A Nexus of Memories' in *New Voices: Cross-Cultural Encounters in the Australia-Japan Relationship* 1 (2006): 3.
38. Statistics have been carefully compiled by BM Roehner in his report *Relations between Allied Forces and the Population of Japan*, 2009, <http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/~roehner/ocj.pdf> (accessed April 14, 2014). See p. 298 for the cited statistics, based on the research of Carter, 'Between War and Peace', pp. 287 & 289.
39. Carter, 'Between War and Peace', p. 296.
40. Name withheld, interview conducted with author, Melbourne (Australia), July 11, 2006.
41. Noel Huggett (who worked with the BCOF Labor Office), interview with author, Penhurst (Australia), June 6 & 8, 2007.
42. Dunlop, *The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop*, p. 46.
43. Neave and Smith's *Aussie Soldier Prisoners of War*, pp. vi, 1, 73 & 112.
44. Rivett, *Behind Bamboo*, p. 339.

45. Chattaway, 'Moulmein to Sydney via Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Book I', 16.
46. This for instance occurred in Batavia. Chattaway, 'Moulmein to Sydney via Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Book I', 15.
47. Jeffrey, *White Coolies*, p. 107.
48. Jeffrey, *White Coolies*, p. 42.
49. Jeffrey, *White Coolies*, p. 88.
50. AWM: 85/114, Diaries of Cpl WK Edmonds 1 sqn RAAF & POW, 'Routine of Life in Prison Camp Ohas[h]i Japan'.
51. Private Roy Whitecross in Sadler and Hayllar, *In the Line of Fire*, p. 144. This refers to the Japanese believing the Australian POWs were crazy (wheels in their heads) for maintaining such high morale in the work parties.
52. Chattaway, 'Moulmein to Sydney via Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Book II', 3.
53. C Twomey, 'Australian Nurse POWs: Gender, captivity and war', *Australian Historical Studies*, 124 (2009): 267.
54. Sobocinska, "'The Language of Scars'", 58.11.
55. One exception included domestic workers, who often lived in the homes of the occupiers.
56. TAG Hungerford, cited in Carter, 'Between War and Peace', p. 299.
57. AWM114: 423/11/25, '[Intelligence – Intelligence Summaries, Bulletin, Memoranda, Newsletters:]BCOF (Japan) Security Bulletin Nos. 5,6,10,11,13,14, October 1946–July 1947, Report from 904 British Field Security', May 16, 1947.
58. Repatriation could mean Japanese soldiers and civilians to Japan, or the deportation of Koreans, Formosans or Ryūkyūans from (mainland) Japan. Senzaki was especially known as a place to deport Koreans.
59. AWM114: 130/1/8, 'BCOF Daily Intelligence Reports Nos 117–205, August–October 1946 Part 1, Daily Intelligence Report No 143', Part 1.
60. Carter, 'Between War and Peace', pp. 304–5.
61. 'BCOF Intelligence Review', September 20, 1946, cited in Carter, 'Between War and Peace', p. 307.
62. Carter, 'Between War and Peace', pp. 305 & 309.
63. RJ Steinfeld and SL Engerman, 'Labor – Free or Coerced? An Historical Reassessment of Differences and Similarities', in T Brass and M van der Linden (eds), *Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate Continues* (Bern: Peter Lang Publishers, 1997), p. 109.
64. See for instance some of the interviews with Japanese women in the Film Australia documentary *The Forgotten Force* (1994).
65. RP Behal, 'Coolie Drivers or Benevolent Paternalists? British Tea Planters in Assam and the Indenture Labour System', *Modern Asian Studies* 44, No. 1 (2010): 31.
66. This comment is based on interviews conducted in Kure by the author in 2004 and 2007.
67. Okamoto Kazuhiko, interviewed by author, Kure (Japan), September 1, 2004.
68. There was a similar case called the *Nikko jiken* in Hiroshima in 1949, which I have written in detail about elsewhere, where BCOF was used to protect employers, not employees defending their jobs and labor rights, during the

Red Purge. See C de Matos, 'The Case of Nikko Jiken: Occupation, Reform, Power and Conflict', in A Vickers and M Hanlon (eds), *Asia Reconstructed: Proceedings of the 16th Biennial Conference of the ASAA, 2006, Wollongong, Australia* (Canberra: Australian National University, 2006), <http://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/111/>.

69. Cited in Steinfeld, *Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor*, p. 24.

5

More Bitter Than Sweet: Reflecting on the Japanese Community in British North Borneo, 1885–1946

Shigeru Sato

In the city center of Tawau in Sabah, Eastern Malaysia, stands a little belfry.¹ It was built in 1921 by the local Japanese community to commemorate the restoration of peace after World War I. Sabah was then called British North Borneo and had been administered from 1882 by the British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBCC).² Britain and Japan entered into an alliance in January 1902 and fought World War I together against Germany. This alliance, however, became defunct in December 1921, and relations between the two were at their worst during the Asia-Pacific War when Japan attacked and occupied Borneo. The Allied forces fought back and, through intensive bombing, turned British Borneo into ‘a state of devastation unequalled throughout the British Empire’.³ Ninety-nine per cent of the public buildings in British North Borneo were destroyed, and in Tawau the belfry was the only public building that remained unscathed; it still stands, without a bell, symbolizing war, peace, and emptiness.⁴ However, there is no longer a Japanese immigrant community in Borneo; all the immigrants were forced to repatriate after Japan surrendered in 1945.

The Japanese people who were in British Borneo at the time of the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War were mostly agricultural immigrants who had been tenant farmers in Japan with no land to inherit. They immigrated to Borneo to become owners of small abaca (Manila hemp) estates, but most males enlisted in 1944 and became part of the occupation army in Borneo. Half of them died in 1945; all the survivors were shipped back to Japan in 1946. Their social position changed as the wheel of fortune turned, from being landless farmers in Japan to estate owners in the tropics, then occupier, occupied, and finally repatriates.

This chapter examines what made the wheel turn and how this turning affected them.

First waves of emigration

At the beginning of the early modern era, around 1600, small waves of Japanese emigration began to Southeast Asia where Europeans had intensified their trade activities. The waves subsided in the 1630s when the Tokugawa government restricted international travel by the Japanese, but restarted soon after the government lifted the ban in April 1866. As part of the expansion of capitalist European empires in the 19th century, the BNCC promoted immigration and the Japanese responded. There were four distinct phases of Japanese immigration into North Borneo in modern times, starting from 1885 and with turning points in 1916, 1937, and 1941, corresponding to World War I, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Asia-Pacific War. Each phase brought different kinds of Japanese to Borneo.

The first phase commenced as a spontaneous diaspora of individual women and men in search of a livelihood overseas. The oldest recorded case was a group of prostitutes who arrived in the nascent port city of Sandakan in 1885.⁵ Around 1890, another group of 20 women arrived to work at a British tobacco estate as harvesters. The tobacco harvesters apparently had to discontinue their work before long; a 1909 survey showed that there were 119 Japanese in North Borneo consisting of 71 prostitutes, 19 domestic servants, 14 children, and only 15 unspecified others.⁶

Tawau now has a population of approximately half a million people, including a large number of illegal immigrants, but in the 1880s the area was covered in primeval jungle and had only 120, mostly indigenous, inhabitants. In 1903, several Japanese men, headed by Masuda Koichiro, formed a timber exporting company there. In the following year the Russo-Japanese War broke out and the Baltic Fleet blocked the company's trade route to Hong Kong. In response, Masuda shifted into other ventures, such as tobacco estates and pearl farming, which had different trade routes.⁷ At the outbreak of World War I there were 11 Japanese women and nine Japanese men in Tawau. Six of the women were working at two Japanese brothels, while four were mistresses of Dayak, Chinese, Malay, and Indian men. Some of the nine men were managing brothels or small-scale rubber and coconut estates.⁸ Evidently, up to World War I, there was no significant involvement of the Japanese state or large business in Japanese immigration to British North Borneo.

The second phase, 1916–36

The Japanese who erected the belfry in Tawau in 1921 were not prostitutes, pimps, laborers, or small farmers, but company executives. About a century after the Industrial Revolution occurred in Europe, Japan underwent its own during the boom of World War I; the *zaibatsu* (industrial and financial conglomerates) reaped colossal profits and began to look for opportunities to reinvest overseas. Thus Kubota Uneme (affiliated with Mitsubishi) and Kuhara Fusanosuke (founder of Hitachi and Nissan) became the two largest investors in Tawau.

In the middle of World War I, Mitsubishi commissioned Kubota to find a suitable place for investment. Kubota identified Tawau as a good place, where the BNCC offered Japanese developers a land lease of 999 years at a low rent. In 1916, Kubota started a 2,000 acre coconut estate employing 200 workers. Kuhara's company also conducted extensive geological and other surveys in Taiwan, China, Korea, Sakhalin, Siberia, Indochina, the Philippines, and Borneo. Kuhara approached the BNCC in February 1916 and bought 529 acres of existing rubber estates and leased 1,500 acres of adjoining land for new development.⁹ In August 1918, the Japanese residents in Tawau were still no more than 200 but their estates employed some 3,000 workers of various ethnicities. By 1924, the area in Tawau leased to Kuhara and Kubota increased to 26,000 acres. Kubota also managed more than 25,000 acres of coconut and timber extraction in North Borneo, outside Tawau.¹⁰

In the Tawau area during this phase there were, beside the two companies, more than twenty individual Japanese entrepreneurs, the most successful of whom managed 150 acres of coconut estate. However, many of the individual entrepreneurs went bankrupt during the postwar recession. In contrast, the companies affiliated with the *zaibatsu* enjoyed close connections with the large banks, allowing them not only to survive the recession but also to expand by purchasing the many small estates that had become insolvent. Individual Japanese entrepreneurs continued to arrive in the 1920s but, during the Great Depression, many went bankrupt. The *zaibatsu* again profited from small-scale business failures and a series of politico-military events during the Great Depression, such as the Manchurian Incident (1931), the 5.15 Incident (1932), Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), and the 2.26 Incident (1936).¹¹

The rapid expansion of Japanese-owned plantations did not necessarily translate into increased immigration of Japanese people. Japanese

workers were not competitive in the Asian labor market because the average wage for an agricultural laborer in Japan was about four times the wage of a plantation worker from China. In the Japanese-owned plantations, only the top executives and technical staff were Japanese, while their deputies were Chinese or other Asians who supervised the workers using their languages. This mode of management was essentially the same as that adopted by Western colonial enterprises.

Kuhara and Kubota therefore tried to recruit workers from China in 1916 but met with some resistance. That was because in 1915 Japan created widespread anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese by imposing the Twenty-One Demands. The *zaibatsu*, therefore, turned to Taiwan and Java instead. For example, in 1917 Kuhara Estate had 1,078 foreign workers: 370 from Taiwan, 358 from China, and 350 from Java.¹² The series of Japanese aggressive acts toward China thereafter (including the result of the Treaty of Versailles of April 1919 that awarded German rights in Shandong Province to Japan) continued to affront the Chinese, but their reluctance to work for the Japanese did not last long and China soon became the largest supplier of labor. As the plantations expanded in Tawau, Chinese shops in the township multiplied. In 1931 the town had 10,538 residents, consisting of 6,177 Chinese, 2,329 indigenes (collectively called Dayak), 400 Japanese, five Europeans, and 1,625 others (mostly Asians who were not Chinese, Japanese or Dayak).¹³ Of the 400 Japanese, about 150 were affiliated with Kuhara Estate, 50 with Kubota Estate, 100 with the Borneo Fishing Company, and 100 were either with other employers or independent. Prostitution had been banned by this time.¹⁴

The Borneo Fishing Company was founded by Orita Ichiji, who had been a lieutenant-commander of the Japanese Imperial Navy and aide-de-camp to the Governor-General of Taiwan. In 1918, at the age of 36, he retired from the Navy and immigrated to Tawau to start the company. Orita became an entrepreneur but maintained a close relationship with the armed forces, the Japanese government, and the *zaibatsu*.¹⁵ Orita's family, together with five other families from Yamaguchi Prefecture, also experimented with small-scale agricultural immigration, with each family managing a ten-acre estate of abaca in eastern Tawau. Orita covered the initial costs for all six families, including travel, six months' supply of food, one year of lodging, the land lease, land preparation (jungle clearing carried out by the indigenous people), and purchase of construction materials. Orita was not wealthy, his experiment was funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Governor-General of Taiwan.¹⁶ Immigration in this phase was initiated by the Japanese

zaibatsu, closely followed by the tentative involvement of the navy and government.

The third phase, 1937–41

The third phase witnessed heavier involvement by the Japanese government and navy. In August 1936, the government adopted 'The Fundamental Principles of National Policy' (*Kokusaku no Kijun*). This document stipulated that, in conjunction with northward immigration into Manchukuo, Japan should pursue southward national expansion 'peacefully and gradually, with utmost efforts exerted to prevent provocation of other countries and to allay their misgivings against the Empire'.¹⁷ Japan was, however, preparing for possible armed conflict with the other colonial powers and therefore Japan's naval rearmament was concurrently 'to be brought to a level sufficient to secure command of the Western Pacific against the US Navy'.¹⁸

As part of 'peaceful' national expansion into North Borneo, the Governor-General of Taiwan commissioned Kuhara Estate to support a scheme to create a Japanese agricultural settlers' community in the area called Mostyn, located 73 kilometres northeast from Tawau. The initial plan, made in 1937, was to eventually send 2,000 Japanese families to Mostyn. All the prefectural governments throughout Japan selected candidates from healthy and hardworking tenant farmers. Since Japanese immigrants could not compete with other Asians as plantation laborers, the Japanese government helped them become estate owners, and chose abaca as the crop most suitable for people with little capital. Rubber and coconut take five and ten years respectively to mature, while abaca only takes 18 months and remains productive for over ten years. Abaca was also a strategically important material for making cordage for warships.¹⁹

The immigrants became apprentice abaca farmers at Kuhara Estate in Tawau, which set aside 27,700 acres of forest land where the immigrants learned how to convert the jungles into abaca estates. After receiving three-years of training in Tawau, the immigrants moved to Mostyn to apply their new skills to start their own abaca estates. Kuhara Estate carried out preparatory works, like forest clearing and construction of roads, factories, clinics, and schools, and the Governor-General of Taiwan subsidized half of these costs.²⁰ The apprentice immigrants received wages while in Tawau, but after shifting to Mostyn they would have no income from the abaca for the first two years. Therefore, the local *zaibatsu* provided each family with a ten-year loan for leasing the

plot and employing several Asian workers. The abaca estate owners were, however, no mere supervisors; they had to work hard together with their employees in an environment without modern facilities such as piped water and electricity. The first batch of apprentice immigrants in Tawau consisted of 15 families, but ten dropped out after ruining their health during the training. The remaining five families shifted to Mostyn in March 1941.²¹

Earlier, Orita's experiment in family immigration found that small children were too much of a burden. In this third phase, however, the government deliberately chose families with children or elderly parents because community-building was a key aim. Abaca production also included work considered to be suitable for elderly people. In Mostyn, Kuhara Estate, which had by then been renamed as Nissan Norin, built a primary school for the families, which opened on September 1, 1941. The Ministry of Education recognized the school as part of the Japanese national education system.²²

Orita's Borneo Fishing Company also intensified its operations during this phase. In 1937 it became a subsidiary of a bigger company, Nihon Suisan (Nissui). In April 1939, the BNBCC guaranteed the Borneo Fishing Company a virtual monopoly of large fishing operations in British territorial waters and authorised it to export 100,000 cans of tuna a year, mostly to Canada and the United States. Export duties were important sources of revenue for the British. In total, 1,670 Japanese people obtained passports to migrate and work for the Borneo Fishing Company. Many of them were women from Okinawa and Kochi Prefectures who worked in tuna canning and bonito drying factories. As the base for the company's fishing operations, Orita chose an island near Tawau called Si-Amil, which is located between the Sulu and Celebes seas. In 1937 he decided to make another base on Banggi Island, located between the Sulu and South China seas off the northern tip of Borneo. Some employees of the Borneo Fishing Company were puzzled about Orita's choice of Banggi as the base, which did not have much fresh water and did not seem to be a suitable base for either fishing operations or building factories for canning tuna and drying bonito. Nonetheless, in early 1941 the preparation of the Banggi base was just completed when the canning factories on Si-Amil caught fire in mysterious circumstances and Orita ordered the factory workers to relocate to Banggi immediately. This seems to suggest that, when choosing the fishing bases, Orita had future military operations in mind; based on the two islands on the borders of three strategically important seas, Japanese fishing boats could survey Northern Borneo's coastlines for possible future military operations.²³

This third phase also witnessed a rapid deterioration in Japan's international relations. Japanese attacks on China from July 1937 raised consternation among the Chinese in North Borneo. Some staged strikes and others boycotted Japanese goods, but Chinese protests were mild and temporary. Chinese workers' livelihoods, particularly in Tawau, were dependent on Japanese entrepreneurs, and Chinese shops in town were dependent on Japanese customers and their employees.²⁴ The British in North Borneo became nervous about some Japanese activities, including suspicious visits by government officials. Yet they continued to welcome Japanese investment and immigration, even after Britain had decided to side with China in the Sino-Japanese War, and after Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, weeks after the Germans had begun the Blitz of London. For the BNBCC, economic imperatives apparently overrode international diplomacy.

On July 21, 1941, a ship carrying another 24 Japanese immigrants left Japan. Before that ship reached Tawau, America, Britain and the Netherlands froze all Japanese assets. The BNBCC, however, did not implement the decision to the letter. When Japanese plantation managers went to the bank to withdraw money, they were told that their assets had been frozen, but when they pointed out that without money they could not pay the plantation workers (mostly Chinese), the bank reluctantly let them take out the money as before. The British banned the export of strategic resources from Borneo to Japan, but allowed the Japanese in Borneo to sell their produce within Southeast Asia, continue fishing operations, and expand their abaca estates in Mostyn. The first five Japanese apprentice immigrant families finished land preparation in Mostyn in July 1941 and began planting abaca. The abaca project, with only a brief disruption, continued beyond the outbreak of war and, by late 1943, Mostyn grew to be a community of 121 Japanese families consisting of 784 Japanese people, plus a few thousand employees. This community was spread thinly; each twenty-five acre estate had only one Japanese family house and one longhouse for their employees.²⁵

We have observed that Japanese prewar national expansion passed through three phases, starting as a trickle with the arrival of individual women, followed by entrepreneurs of varying capacities, and then by government agents and the armed forces of Imperial Japan. State control over individuals gradually spread and tightened. In the final stages, the immigrants were selected by the Japanese prefectural governments to represent the Empire. Their departure for Borneo was part of Imperial Japan's search for greater living space. The BNBCC needed foreign investment and labor and so channeled the immigrants into their

desired area of economic development. Japanese immigrants to British North Borneo became, so to speak, pawns employed by the Japanese and British Empires in their game of territorial and economic expansion. When the Empires battled, the pawns were trampled on, as the following section shows.

The Japanese as occupier

When news of the outbreak of war in the Pacific came to Mostyn on December 8, 1945, the Japanese community was holding a welcome reception for those who had just moved from Tawau. The following day the British began to intern Japanese citizens. They sent the Japanese in Mostyn to an island off Sandakan Bay called Berhala, which had a leprosarium and was also known as Pulau Hantu (Ghost Island). They interned the Japanese in Tawau in the hospital that Nissan Norin had built. The Japanese did not resist internment but their employees were bewildered, as internment of their employers meant suspension of their work; the stocks of food at the plantations were also running short. To mitigate the negative impact of the war, British District Officer Cole Adams exercised his discretion not to intern about 200 Japanese, including plantation managers, engineers, and doctors, whom he considered essential for the local community and the economy.²⁶

The British authorities in Singapore, however, planned to remove local young Japanese men prior to the Japanese invasion and send them to Australia. The British in North Borneo did not have the capacity to implement the plan, so British authorities in Singapore requested the Dutch to send their ships from Tarakan in Dutch Borneo to British Borneo. Adams was not informed of this arrangement but Dutch ships arrived in mid-December and took 204 men away from Tawau. In other areas of North Borneo, some women and children were also sent to Australia in degrading conditions on the ships. In one instance, a woman with a baby was repeatedly raped on board the ship. Saying 'Sorry!' to her husband, she jumped into the sea holding her baby and drowned.²⁷

The Japanese Army landed in Tawau on January 24, 1942, occupied the area unopposed, liberated the local Japanese, and interned the British instead. They sent them to Berhala Island, except for Medical Officer Dr Blaauw, who apparently worked as a doctor until 1945 when Allied forces rescued him before the Japanese surrender.²⁸ Of the 204 Japanese men sent to Australia from Tawau, 151 were selected for an internee exchange program and 133 returned to Tawau in September 1942.²⁹

The Japanese Army assigned Japanese civilians in Tawau to manage enemy properties throughout North Borneo, such as British plantations and mines. Additional civilians from Japan arrived to carry out economic and civil administration, or to conduct new projects, such as shipbuilding. Agricultural immigration also continued. The Borneo Fishing Company had lost most of their vessels in the British scorched-earth policy, but resumed their operations within a wider region using smaller wooden ships.³⁰

The war necessitated fundamental economic readjustments in the occupied territories. North Borneo had a typical colonial economic structure that involved exporting products resulting from plantation agriculture, mining, petroleum and forest exploitation, while importing industrial goods and daily essentials, including food. To maintain this pattern and keep importing food from mainland Southeast Asia, the occupation authorities initially prepared a budget of 2.83 million yen (on a par with Straits dollars), but the plan fell through because of shipping difficulties. In the interwar years, the bulk of shipping in the region was carried out by vessels that belonged to the colonial suzerains: Britain, America, the Netherlands, and France. Virtually all the large ships belonging to the Allied nations, not including France, left the area prior to the Japanese invasion.³¹

Japan planned to retain Borneo permanently as part of its 'co-prosperity sphere', but right from the beginning of the war they lacked the shipping capacity that was essential for ruling the occupied archipelago. They also lacked the capacity to function as the main supplier of industrial goods to the occupied land or as a large enough market for its exported products. Japan's attempt to construct a 'co-prosperity sphere' by dint of military power was sure to destroy the region's economies and heralded a Japanese defeat.

In the prewar years, over half the rice consumed in British Borneo was imported from mainland Southeast Asia. This importation stopped during the war, so the Japanese planned to convert Borneo's export crop fields to domestic food crops. The BNCC had foreseen that a war would disrupt food supply to Borneo and therefore had made plans to stockpile and ration daily essentials but, while the Company was waiting for approval from Singapore and London, the Japanese invaded. The Japanese implemented their own ration system, commandeered food for their own consumption, and mobilized labor for a range of projects like construction of ships, roads, and airstrips, in addition to food production. The people in North Borneo suffered the consequences of all these, and the occupation authorities

complained that the locals came to regard even the rationing system as a form of theft.³²

A change in the situation of Japanese economic immigrants took place in 1944 when General MacArthur started his island-hopping campaign. The Japanese Army in Borneo, anticipating an Allied attack from the east, tried to augment their defence capability by enlisting most young Japanese men in North Borneo in October 1944, and sending them on a three-month military training program. This training for conscripted farmers included digging foxholes and hiding in them; if enemy tanks arrived they planned to jump out holding explosives and throw themselves under the caterpillar tracks. Similarly, conscripted fishermen were made to practice ramming enemy warships with small makeshift boats loaded with explosives. The new recruits were constantly yelled at, slapped, and indoctrinated with the idea that those who hesitated to die for the nation were cowards. One conscript who received training in Sandakan and was then shifted to Tawau recorded the number of blows he received during his training, which reached 1,000 in three months.³³ Previously innocuous farmers and fishers were thus turned into killing machines. Many of them, however, later perished without a fight while marching through the jungle toward the enemy's landing beaches.³⁴

In October 1944 when local conscription in Borneo was complete, a large number of Japanese troops arrived in the retreat from the Philippines as the US forces retook the colony. Together with those soldiers, the new conscripts were initially deployed in Sandakan and Tawau on the east coast. In early 1945, 9,292 strong military units gathered in Tawau. On January 15, however, B29s began raiding Api (Jesselton, Kota Kinabalu) in the northwest. From then on, the Japanese military command anticipated an Allied invasion from the northwest, and decided to transfer most of the military units from the east coast to the west coast of North Borneo. The soldiers had to march because the sea routes were too perilous, due to submarine and aerial attacks, and also because the Japanese by then had no ships with which to move the troops.³⁵

Marching through the jungles carrying little food was like marching through a desert without water. The Sandakan Death Marches that involved Australian and British POWs are infamous.³⁶ In contrast, the marches that did not involve POWs are hardly known in the English-speaking world, yet their death toll was much higher.³⁷ In the case of the 56th Independent Mix Brigade, the number of the troops who set out on the march from Tawau on April 1, 1945 was 7,617, of whom 4,607 died, mostly during the march. In the case of the 37th Army, more than

20,000 troops set out from various locations on the east coast and about half of them died before reaching the west coast.³⁸

Japanese children, women, and the elderly also marched, fleeing the Allied bombing, shelling, and strafing. The first air raid of Tawau occurred on April 29, 1944 and they continued thereafter. A raid on December 12 resulted in a fire that engulfed rows of shops. The local communities took refuge in seemingly safer places but their temporary shelters were raided again. Relocating in a large group was too conspicuous, so the communities had to disperse, often down to single family units, if not single persons. On April 29, 1945, the Japanese occupation authorities in Tawau ordered Japanese civilians to evacuate to Kalabakan in the west. About 250 people, after travelling three days and two nights by boat, arrived there and found that the local estate lodges were far too small to accommodate them all. Food had to be shipped in from Tawau but Allied torpedo boats often sank the ships. Air raids on Kalabakan began in July. Indigenous people, having been warned by the Allies of the impending raids, left the area at night taking all the boats with them. The Japanese managed to shift to another place but conditions did not improve. About 50 people died during this retreat.³⁹

As most young Japanese male civilians in Mostyn and elsewhere were enlisted, management of the Japanese family-owned estates was gradually entrusted to their employees but, with no market for the produce, estate crops were neglected, plant disease spread, and the jungle began to re-establish itself. People grew food crops to survive. Transporting rice and vegetables to the Japanese fishing communities on Si-Amil and Banggi became precarious. Fishing operations had also become too perilous to conduct. In November 1944, when Allied planes bombed the fish-processing factories on Si-Amil, Orita was there and immediately ordered the people on the island to take refuge in Mostyn. There they destroyed the abaca and grew edible crops, collected fruit, and hunted wild animals to survive.⁴⁰ It was not long before the Allies targeted Mostyn too. In early 1945, the army ordered the Japanese civilian community in Mostyn, which included the elderly and women with infants, to relocate to Keningau in western North Borneo. Those who could walk set out on a long march but they came to realize that such a march would be deadlier than the air raids. Wisely, most of them decided to disobey the military command and return to Mostyn.⁴¹ Most of the 200 or so Japanese civilians on Banggi Island shifted to Langkon on the main island. Then the army in Langkon left to the west, leaving the civilians behind with no provisions for food arranged for them. Meanwhile, Langkon too became a target of bombing, shelling, and strafing. The

civilians decided to march westwards following the route the army had taken earlier. Some remained on Banggi Island and starved to death.⁴²

On May 27, 1945, the Allied forces conducted a large-scale naval bombardment of Sandakan. Two days later, the Japanese troops set out on a march taking more than 500 POWs. At the same time, the Japanese Governor of East Coast Province, Kumabe Taneki, ordered Japanese civilians to relocate from Sandakan to a place 90 kilometres away in the jungle. Concurrently, the army command ordered one army unit to transfer from Ranau to Sandakan in the opposite direction to defend the city from attack. In the midst of this confusion, the Kempeitai in Sandakan began arresting, torturing, and executing many Chinese residents whom they suspected to be spies for the Allies.⁴³

After losing half of their number in the death marches, the surviving troops fought the Ninth Division of the Australian Army that came towards Labuan Island in Brunei Bay. In that final battle, the Japanese Army lost just over 1,000 troops, a small fraction of the overall Japanese casualties in North Borneo, estimated at 18,000. In North Borneo, as in many other places, hunger, exhaustion, illness, and suicide claimed more lives than did enemy attacks.⁴⁴ Nissan Norin lost 167 staff and their family members in this war. The breakdown is as follows: family member deaths from illness (55); staff deaths from illness (40); drowned or killed when ships were sunk (34); deaths in action (33); and assault by local people (five). The deaths in action included conscripted men who died during the marches, and deaths from illness included civilian deaths during the jungle retreats.⁴⁵ Just as the Allied Forces were responsible for destroying the British 'protectorate', the Japanese military command was responsible for many more deaths of Japanese soldiers and civilians than were the Allied Forces. After the surrender, Kuji Manabu, who acted as Governor of the West Coast Province, stated to the Allied interrogator: 'Everybody, Japanese and native, was glad when the end came.'⁴⁶

Repatriation and readaptation in Japan

The Ninth Division of the Australian Army left the region after defeating the Japanese Army in British Borneo, but returned in October 1945 to disarm and repatriate the Japanese. From Tawau they shipped about 2,600 Japanese to Jesselton, where the Japanese waited for several months in an internment camp. The camp accommodated 8,858 military men and 1,833 civilians. The civilians consisted of 720 men, 505 women, and 608 children and babies. The Japanese formed schools in

the camp, which enrolled 150 infants, 250 primary school pupils, and 30 high school students.⁴⁷

The repatriation ship for civilians left Jesselton on March 25, 1946 and arrived a week later at Otake Harbor in Hiroshima Bay. People from mainland Japan were allowed to proceed to their home villages. Those from Okinawa's fishing villages were made to go to Kagoshima by train and wait there until mid-August in makeshift shelters in, initially, wintry weather. Children born in Borneo had never been exposed to such conditions, so with no warm clothes and being underfed, they caught measles or pneumonia to which they had no immunity. Coupled with the unavailability of medicine, more than half of the children died while awaiting repatriation. There were families that lost all of their children. Some Okinawans felt that such tragedies could have been avoided if the repatriation ship had allowed them to disembark in Okinawa before proceeding to Hiroshima.⁴⁸ Japanese military men in British Borneo, many of whom were civilians until late 1944, were obliged to labor in Borneo until May 1946. Due to ill health and a starvation diet, approximately ten per cent died while laboring and waiting for their repatriation ship.⁴⁹

Upon repatriation, readaptation to Japanese society under the Allied occupation depended to a large extent on each person's socioeconomic background. The Japanese community in North Borneo, though small, covered the whole spectrum of Japanese society from highest to lowest. The executives of Nissan Norin and Kubota Estate were mostly graduates of elite academic institutions. Their on-site supervisors were usually graduates of technical colleges. In addition, there were independent entrepreneurs who managed small- or medium-sized estates, or who owned shops or inns, and there were physical workers in farming, fishing, and the sex industry. During the war more were added: military men, government officials, company employees for economic administration, and 'comfort women' from Japan, Korea, and China.⁵⁰

When Japan surrendered, Nissan Norin lost all the estates in Tawau and Mostyn and the money that they paid to lease the 33,200 acres of land. Furthermore, in Japan in December 1946, Nissan became one of the 16 *zaibatsu* that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General Headquarters (GHQ/SCAP) targeted for complete dissolution. The US government, however, soon rescinded the order in an effort to reindustrialize Japan in an emerging cold war setting. Consequently, Nissan Norin underwent some restructuring but survived and managed to retain 40 or so top executives.⁵¹ Nissan Norin's staff members on the lower rungs were less fortunate. One example is a man from Yamagata

Prefecture. Upon graduation from an agricultural high school in March 1916, he was employed by Kuhara's mining company. In 1920 he was transferred to Kuhara Estate in Tawau and, from 1937, he supervised the apprentice abaca farmers. During the occupation he managed British tobacco estates. Upon repatriation, Nissan Norin requested he take 'voluntary redundancy'. He had little choice but to become a farmer in his home village, feeling bitter about the fact that his former bosses retained their executive positions whereas he had to grow vegetables for home consumption only, as he did not have the knowhow for commercial vegetable farming.⁵²

To create the abaca-growing community in Mostyn, the Japanese government had selected tenant farmers with no land to inherit in Japan. The Borneo Fishing Company recruited workers from small fishing villages in Okinawa and Kochi who had no farmland to supplement their incomes. In prewar Japan, primogeniture was widely practiced, and eldest sons inherited most of the family property, if the family had any. There was pressure on the other children to leave the village and find a livelihood elsewhere, like Borneo. When they left for Borneo, they had little to lose in Japan. Upon repatriation, they had lost property and livelihood in Borneo, but they had not even been fully owned; the farmers had unpaid loans, which had to be written off. How those people readapted to postwar Japan is poorly studied and information is hard to obtain. Evidently, some repatriates were eager to return to Borneo. In 1958 when the fishing company Taiyo Gyogyo announced its plan to start fishing operations around Si-Amil, many fishermen applied to participate, including some who had worked there during the expansionist period. In 1962 when Taiyo Gyogyo began to build a bonito processing plant on Si-Amil, local pirates attacked and killed one person, so the company abandoned the plan.⁵³ The Japanese attempt to re-establish a fishing community was thus foiled. Now tourism, particularly scuba diving in the pristine sea, is the main industry at Si-Amil.

Before and after the defeat

Japanese national expansion into British Borneo was begun by individuals with little or no organizational backing in the late 19th century. In 1916, 1937, and 1941, the *zaibatsu*, the government, and military forces began to lead movements of immigrants. The immigrants worked mainly in agriculture and fishery but, during the war, they became part of the occupation forces. When Japan was defeated, many local people jeered at or even assaulted and killed them as defeated invaders.

However, international and interpersonal relations were not the same. Even those who attacked and killed the Japanese did not harm those they had been acquainted with before the war; on the contrary, they often protected them. International relations changed but interpersonal relations, once cultivated, often continued throughout the war.⁵⁴

The Japanese were instrumental in transforming the wilderness of Tawau into a vibrant city surrounded by lush plantations. The construction, however, contained the seeds of destruction. The wartime destruction occurred at two levels: physical and structural. Physical destruction came mostly from Allied aerial bombings, strafing, and naval bombardments. Structural destruction came from the Japanese scheme to construct 'a co-prosperity sphere', which disrupted the pre-existing economic order. The Japanese propagandized that their aim was to terminate the colonial exploitation of Asians by Western powers; their real aim was to redirect economic gain from the Western powers to the Japanese Empire.⁵⁵ The Japanese attempt to achieve this aim by dint of military power was doomed to fail; whether they achieved their aim after the war through 'neo-colonialism' remains open to debate.

After defeating Japan, reconstruction of the shattered protectorate was too heavy a burden for the BNCC, which had been struggling financially. The British government took over the administration and auctioned the former Japanese-owned estates, which fell mostly into the hands of the ethnic Chinese. These Chinese have become economically dominant although they constitute less than ten per cent of the population of Tawau or Sabah. Certain facilities constructed during the Japanese occupation, such as roads and airfields, were upgraded after the war and are still in use in Sabah. The plantation economy also greatly expanded. Thus the wartime destruction also contained the seeds of a renewed construction.

Since the mid-19th century, political administration of northern Borneo changed hands from the local sultans to the British, to the Japanese, back to the British, and then to Malaysians and Bruneians. The estate crops changed from tobacco, to coconut and rubber, to abaca, and then to oil palm and cocoa. Despite all of these changes and wartime disruption, the trajectory of construction has continued. In 1973, being solicited by a Malaysian company, Nissan Norin went back to Borneo and started a joint venture to export timber to Japan from the Kalabakan area that had witnessed the deaths of so many Japanese civilian refugees.

The town of Tawau has also changed. In 2008, Sabah Urban Development Corporation completed a large urban complex in the town

center and called it Kuhara Point. The name comes from the fact that the town has developed along the region's trunk road, called Kuhara Street, which Kuhara Estate had built to connect the estates to the harbor. Tawau also has Kubota Street and Kubota Golf Country and Course, as well as Dr Yamamoto Street, named after the head of Tawau Hospital who was the only qualified doctor in the district for many years.

In 1918, soon after the *zaibatsu* began to invest in Tawau, they built a Japanese cemetery. Many wooden grave markers decayed as time passed. In the 1970s, former Japanese residents visited the cemetery and made a request that it be refurbished. The Japanese government agreed to fund the project. Nissan Norin donated a stone monument, which bears 257 names of the Japanese who lived and died there, including Kubota Uneme and Orita Ichiji.⁵⁶ As for the belfry, the Rotary Club of Tawau carried out restoration work in 2006 and it is now under the care of the Sabah State Museum.

Decades after the Japanese defeat, some of the former immigrants to Mostyn, particularly those who had been relatively successful in starting life anew in postwar Japan, formed a friendship association and produced 12 newsletters from 1975. Those newsletters contain many bitter-sweet reminiscences. The bitterness is related to the physical and emotional sufferings during the war. The sweetness comes from their dreams, albeit abortive, of becoming estate owners in the South Seas, and the exotic taste of tropical fruits. The newsletters do not reveal, however, whether their life in Japan *before* their emigration was sweet or bitter. Many would no doubt have felt like Urashima Taro, or Rip van Winkle; the wheel had turned full circle and all they had gained was grey hair and wrinkled hands.

What intertwined in this process was not just war and peace; individual immigrants, the *zaibatsu*, the state authorities, and the armed forces entangled to create the momentum. In the early modern era, Japanese state authorities prevented people from traveling overseas. Yet from 1937 they directly promoted immigration by using peasants as pawns in their imperialist game of territorial expansion. When the game was over, all the pawns were removed from the occupied territories. Such removal was, in the final analysis, not a satisfactory solution because immigration was not the problem; the imperialist scheme was. The immigrants had reason to feel more bitter than sweet about their relationship with a state that had utilized them in their botched scheme. Nonetheless, many returned immigrants rightfully cherished and cultivated sweet reminiscences of their youth in the land below the wind that they once considered their home.

Notes

1. For photographs of the belfry, visit <http://www.etawau.com/PlacesInterest/BellTower.htm>.
2. The British North Borneo Chartered Company was assigned to administer North Borneo in August 1881, with Alfred Dent as the first chairman, and its administration remained in the hands of the BNBC until 1945. North Borneo became a protectorate of Great Britain in 1888.
3. 'Reconstruction and Development Plan for North Borneo', cited in K Goodlet, *Tawau: The Making of a Tropical Community* (Kota Kinabalu: Opus Publications, 2010), p. 127. See also C Leong, *Sabah: The First 100 Years* (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nan Yang Muda, 1982), p. 187.
4. Why the bell is missing is unknown, but it is likely that the Japanese melted it down during the war to use as scrap metal. Many temple bells in Japan disappeared for the same reason.
5. These women, led by Kinoshita Kuni, became famous owing to Yamazaki Tomoko's book, *Sandakan Brothel No. 8: An Episode in the History of Lower-Class Japanese Women* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1999).
6. Hara Fujio, *Eiryō Maraya no Nihonjin* (Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economies, 1986), p. 129; Yutaka Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigrants and Investments in North Borneo* (Kota Kinabalu: The Sabah Society, 2010), p. 20; Mochizuki Masahiko, 'Sandakan to Nihonjin 2: Kinoshita Kuni to joshigun ni tsuite', *JAMS News* 26 (2003): 16–19; Hara Fujio, *Wasurerareta nanyō imin: Maraya toko Nihonjin Nomin no kiseki* (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1987), p. 145.
7. Kumano Seichi, 'Nihonjin no kyu Eiryō Kita Boruneo ni okeru kojū jigyo', *Boruneo*, 6 (May 1985): 42.
8. Mochizuki, 'Sandakan to Nihonjin 2', 16–19; Takahashi Toshio, 'Eiryō Kita Boruneo to Nihonjin', *Boruneo*, 11 (May 1996): 78.
9. *Nissan Norin Kogyō shashi* (Tokyo: Nissan Norin, 1985), pp. 5–9 & 29; *Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shinpo*, July 12–15, 1924.
10. *Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shinpo*, July 12–15, 1924; Goodlet, *Tawau*, pp. 39–42; Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigrants*, pp. 66–8.
11. *Nissan Norin Kogyō shashi*, p. 32.
12. Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigrants*, p. 62.
13. *Eiryō Kita Boruneo jijo* (Tokyo: Taiwan Ginko Tokyo Chosabu, 1942), pp. 33–65.
14. *Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shinpo*, October 22–4, 1935; *Hochi Shinbun*, November 23, 1940; Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigrants*, p. 150.
15. Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigrants*, pp. 90 & 118–25.
16. Takahashi Toshio, 'Kita Boruneo iju keikaku ni tsuite', *Boruneo*, 12 (May 1999): 67–73.
17. 'Kokusaku no Kijūn', <http://mavi.ndl.go.jp/politics/entry/bib00118.php#content>.
18. 'Kokusaku no Kijūn'.
19. *Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpo*, November 23–October 1, 1932; *Eiryō Kita Boruneo jijo*, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1928, pp. 20–31, reprinted in *Iminchi jijo*, Vol. 8 (Tokyo: Fujii Shuppan, 2000).
20. *Eiryō Kita Boruneo jijo* (Tokyo: Taiwan Ginko Tokyo Chosabu, 1942), pp. 34–6.

21. Takahashi, 'Kita Boruneo iju keikaku', 67–73.
22. Yamanaka Nobuo, 'Mostyn Kokumin Gakko Enkaku', *Boruneo*, 11 (1996): 50–1.
23. Mochizuki Masahiko, *Boruneo ni watatta Okinawa no gyofu to joko* (Tokyo: Yashinomi Books, 2007), p. 3; Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigration*, pp. 85–126.
24. Danny Wong Tze-Ken Osman, 'Anti-Japanese Activities in North Borneo before World War Two, 1937–1941', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 32, No. 1 (February 2001): 93–106.
25. Takahashi Toshio, 'Kita Boruneo iju seisaku o megutte', *Boruneo*, 6 (May 1985): 18–21; Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigrants*, pp. 166–8.
26. Nagao Eiichi, 'Kamakura Maru kikan Tawao hirachisha shuki', *Boruneo*, 11 (May 1996): 35–6; Goodlet, *Tawau*, pp. 106–7, 121 & 137.
27. *Nissan Norin Kogyo shashi*, p. 52; Mochizuki, *Boruneo ni watatta*, pp. 97–102.
28. SR Evans, *Sabah (North Borneo) under the Rising Sun Government* (Singapore: Tropical Press, 1991), pp. 29–30.
29. *Nissan Norin Kogyo shashi*, p. 52; Nagao, 'Kamakuramaru kikan', 35–41; Mochizuki, *Boruneo ni watatta*, pp. 97–102 & 192.
30. *Kita Boruneo Gunsei Gaiyo*, pp. 14–25. A scorched-earth policy is a military strategy to destroy anything that might be useful to the enemy.
31. During much of the war, up until March 9, 1945, Japan maintained a diplomatic relationship with Vichy France. In French Indochina the Japanese and the French conducted a 'joint defence' of Indochina against the Allied forces.
32. Boeicho Boei Kenkyujo Senshishitsu (comp.), *Shiryoshu nanpo no gunsei* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1985), pp. 404–16.
33. Kuse Doryu, 'Hokubu Boruneo Sanuki Heidan toshite ikinuku', 467, http://www.heiwakinen.jp/shiryokan/heiwa/13onketsu/O_13_467_1.pdf.
34. March survivors did fight, some putting into practice their earlier training in blowing up tanks; fishermen, however, could not practice maritime attacks because the Allies destroyed the scores of purpose-built boats before they were put to use.
35. Toyoda Jo, *Sandakan shi no tenshin, gyokusai!* (Tokyo: Mikasa Shobo, 1980), pp. 35–42.
36. Some recent books are: MK Cunningham, *Hell on Earth: Australia's Greatest War Tragedy* (Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2013) and P Ham, *Sandakan: The Untold Story of the Sandakan Death Marches* (Melbourne: Random House Australia, 2012).
37. One Japanese memoir has been translated into English: Ueno Itsuyoshi, *An End to a War: A Japanese Soldier's Experience of the 1945 Death Marches of North Borneo* (Kota Kinabalu: Opus Publications, 2012).
38. Kuse, 'Hokubu Boruneo Sanuki Heidan', 476–7; Morita Rokuro, 'Kita Boruneo no sento', 1–6, http://www.heiwakinen.jp/shiryokan/heiwa/10onketsu/O_10_001_1.pdf.
39. Igawa Sotaro, 'Ichigo ichie', *Boruneo*, 3 (May 1979): 12–16; Ishibashi Yoshimichi, 'Nihonjin to Tawao to no kanren nenpyo', *Boruneo*, 6 (May 1985): 45–59.
40. Mochizuki, *Boruneo ni watatta*, pp. 150–67.
41. Nihei Toshio, 'Bokyo no chi o tazunete', *Boruneo*, 12 (May 1999), 96.

42. Mochizuki, *Boruneo ni watatta*, pp. 59–64; Goodlet, *Tawau*, p. 132.
43. Takahashi Toshio, '5 tabi Boruneo no daichi e', *Boruneo*, 12 (May 1999): 40–1.
44. Toyoda, *Sandakan shi no tenshin*, pp. 357–8.
45. *Nissan Norin Kogyo shashi*, pp. 62–4.
46. Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Institute of War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam (NIOD): Indonesian Collection 9860, item 2178, SEATIC Intelligence Bulletin No. 237, Interrogation of Kuji Manabu, June 15, 1946.
47. Mochizuki, *Boruneo ni watatta*, pp. 165–78; Igawa, 'Ichigo ichie', 12–16.
48. Akamine Shinkichi, 'Hiun, Okinawa e no hikiagesha', *Boruneo*, 10 (May 1993): 23–6.
49. Honji Sosuke, 'Sandakan no omoide to kikan', *Boruneo*, 9 (May 1991): 31–5. The maximum number of calories the Australian occupation forces officially allowed a surrendered Japanese soldier was, initially, 1,685 per day, which proved insufficient for a laboring soldier. Australian War Memorial (AWM) 54: 556/3/2, Telegraphed cipher messages, c.1945; AWM54: 376/5/4, Proclamation orders and instructions issued by BBCAU (British Borneo Civil Administration Unit), October 12, 1945.
50. Hata Ikuhiko, *Ianfu to senjo no sei* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1999), pp. 106–8 & 127.
51. *Nissan Norin Kogyo shashi*, pp. 65–83, 114–20, 165–6 & 173–6.
52. The author's personal communication with his son, Yamamura Shizuo, born in Tawau, July 23, 2011.
53. Shimomoto, *Japanese Immigrants*, pp. 116–17.
54. Akamine Shinkichi, 'Kaiso: Api jiken', *Boruneo*, 7 (May 1987): 13–17.
55. The contradiction between the two aims – resource exploitation and political liberation – derived from the difference between the Japanese military and the government. The military was deeply interested in securing strategic resources while the government was more interested in political and diplomatic issues.
56. For details visit <http://www.etawau.com/PlacesInterest/JapaneseGrave.html>.

Part II

The Cognitive Dimension: Psychological Occupation

6

Colonial-Era Korean Collaboration over Two Occupations: Delayed Closure

Mark E. Caprio

There are hundreds of able and useful men who are denounced and ostracized as pro-Japanese. But who are the self-righteous denouncers? Most of them are the very fellows who, up to the 'Noon of the 15th of August, 1945', bowed to the East, repeated the Japanese national oath, and shouted banzai for the *Tenno* [Emperor], on every public occasion in schools, in churches, in factories, in Government and great business offices, in department stores and in wedding and funeral gatherings. Most of [them] Japaneseized their names (Anonymous, October 20, 1945).¹

The author of this diary entry, probably the venerable Korean scholar Yun Ch'ihō, accents the importance of August 15, 1945 as, rather than simply the day that Korea gained its liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the day on which collaborators shifted their allegiance from one occupier to another. These Koreans, he continued, now accuse other Koreans of collaboration to 'cover up their unsavory past' and to 'extort money from the fears and worries of certain persons for party and personal pockets'. Though written in the third person, the author of this diary entry suggests that he himself has suffered from the 'stones' thrown by these 'blackmailing patriots [who brag about having] saved Korea from the Japanese militarism [but] had no more to do with the liberation of Korea than the man in the moon'.²

This diarist wrote at a time when the Korean Peninsula was experiencing a confusing transition: being liberated from one occupation and reoccupied by two others, the Soviet Union in the north and the

United States in the south. The Allied powers' vague promise of Korean independence 'in due course' opened the door for speculation over just when these new occupiers would withdraw, while encouraging aggressive political activity that prompted sustained violence as groups bearing competing political ideologies jockeyed for influence.³ The US occupiers inadvertently contributed to this violence by initially maintaining former Japanese occupiers in their positions, and their Korean subordinates more permanently, ostensibly until other non-tainted Koreans could be trained. Pro-Japanese Koreans occupying positions of power delayed the resolution of collaboration issues for another half century, allowing these Koreans to influence southern Korean politics and society after the founding of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August 1948. On the one hand, from a practical viewpoint, delaying closure of this issue made sense; Koreans who had worked under the Japanese had the skills that post-liberation Korea required for its political and economic development. Yet, at the same time it protected the unequal social hierarchy that predated Japan's occupation of Korea. The ideological divisions encouraged by emerging social divisions manifested in a violence that indirectly contributed to the outbreak of conventional war in June 1950.

Late 20th century efforts to address colonial-era collaboration issues managed to create pro-Japanese lists and identify those who gained by Japanese rule, before coming to a sudden halt in 2008 with the return of a conservative government.⁴ Why this problem survived prewar and post-liberation occupations to continue to haunt South Korean society into the 21st century is the primary focus of this chapter. It first considers the necessity of Japan recruiting influential Koreans like Yun Ch'iho to legitimize its colonial occupation over the Korean Peninsula, and the residue that this recruitment left during the American occupation, even as various southern Korean efforts sought to sweep away these dregs of colonialism. The debates that surfaced over the Korean ability to render fair judgment and appropriate punishment on those suspected of colonial-era collaboration were particularly inhibited by those deemed colonial-era traitors (also regarded as among the more qualified) who held positions of power in the American administration. Examining this history reveals that efforts to resolve this problem faced additional pressure from both within (local leftist groups and a divided peninsula), and without (the emerging cold war), over which time the definition of 'national traitor' dramatically shifted from being pro-Japanese to being pro-North (communist) Korean. Social divisions, molded in part by these lingering dregs, contributed to a domestic strife

that spread across the peninsula, which eventually evolved into traditional warfare from June 1950.

Collaboration under Japanese occupation

Foreign occupiers and indigenous governments share a common need to recruit locals to help govern and police the territory over which they have jurisdiction. Success in gathering local collaborators helps foreign occupiers handle logistics, such as communication with the subjugated people, and injects legitimacy into their administration, particularly if the collaborator's name has value. An individual's decision to cooperate is a rather complicated one. For example, behind any decision lies questions regarding the gains and losses to be incurred by rebelling against their controllers, or the interests they might be able to protect by collaborating with them. Pak Chihyang sees the line separating resisters from collaborators as rather thin; the side on which an individual will fall is more their adaptation to circumstances than an indication of their level of patriotism.⁵ This cooperation, however, is risky. The duration of a foreign occupation is most often unclear. Decisions one way or the other are encouraged by a perception of the strength of the outsider's position in the occupied territory.

The above calls into question the degree to which collaborators can be held accountable for their decisions. This is particularly so after one foreign occupier leaves and the basis on which to judge a previous collaboration is established by the replacement occupier.⁶ Indeed, determining collaboration as an act of treason should be, although most often it is not, a rather complex process. Often, as in post-liberation Korea, new anti-collaboration laws are freshly created after the fact. Judgments are often rendered without consideration of difficult gray areas. For example, in what ways might pre-occupation experiences influence the decision to collaborate? Do traditionally debased or discriminated people violate an expected allegiance or loyalty to their country through collaboration with the invader? Or does their past as a social outcast exempt them from such charges?⁷ To what extent do people owe allegiance to an authority that has been overthrown? Are their actions excusable if they are cajoled through use of force, intimidation, arrest, and torture? To what extent, as one French official argued, is one guilty of collaboration if it prevented a greater injustice?⁸ Thus, in addition to the treasonous activity itself, consideration of the social, economic, political, and psychological gray areas that complicate apparently easy judgments is also required in establishing responsibility.

Scholars like Takahashi Shōji and Im Chong-guk have found collaboration right across Korean-Japanese modern relations.⁹ Initial Korean interest in Japan focused on its post-Meiji Restoration advancements. Koreans participating in an 1881 tour to Japan to observe the effects of Japan's Meiji Restoration developed an interest in this model of modernization. Several studied at the present-day Keiō University, a school founded by Fukuzawa Yukichi, then considered to be Japan's foremost scholar on Western culture and ideas. One student, Kim Okkyun, led a hapless coup attempt, with Japanese assistance, to eliminate the pro-China Min element from the government.¹⁰ Japanese influence and cooperation was also apparent in the ideas introduced by the Kabo Reform Movement (1894–6). Koreans, many forced but others as volunteers, assisted the Japanese as military laborers in Japan's wars with China (1894–5) and Russia (1904–5). Yet most often cited are the collaborative actions that assisted Japan's more aggressive penetration of the Korean Peninsula from 1905, to be followed by its 35-year colonial occupation (1910–45).

Among the earliest Koreans to seek Japanese rule were members of the *Ilchinhoe* (Advance in Unity Society) that formed just prior to the establishment of Korea as a Japanese protectorate in 1905. This group worked closely with the *Kokuryūkai* (Black Dragon Society) and organized demonstrations calling for Korea's takeover by Japan, though it disbanded soon after annexation. The legacy of this group survived into the postcolonial era as the Japanese continued to exploit them as an example of Korean interest in being annexed by a reluctant Japanese state.¹¹ Japanese who argue for their country's benevolent colonial history also quote Korean Emperor Sunjong's Imperial Rescript as proof of Korean aspirations for Japanese annexation. Here the monarch allegedly lamented:

In view [of Korea's] long standing weakness and deep-rooted evils, We are convinced that it would be beyond Our power to effect reforms within a measurable length of time... Under these circumstances, We feel constrained to believe it wise to entrust Our great task to abler hands than Ours [Japan], so that efficient measures may be carried out and satisfactory results obtained therefrom.¹²

Recently, scholars have begun to consider the intentions of these Koreans as more complex than simply traitorous support for Japanese imperial activity.¹³

From 1905 the most notorious early pro-Japanese Korean collaborators were the so-called five-traitors (*ojōk*) who, as members of the

pro-Japanese cabinet, signed treaties that promoted Japan's annexation. Additionally, Korean aristocrats displayed support for Japan's absorption of Korea by joining a tour to the colonial capital, which landed the participants in Tokyo on November 3, just as the Meiji emperor celebrated his birthday, a move that suggested Korean acceptance of Japan's occupation.¹⁴ During the US occupation after the Asia-Pacific War, the perspective of a weak Korea encouraged US President Franklin D Roosevelt's impression that Koreans were too weak to govern themselves and thus required a period of tutelage prior to their gaining sovereignty. This impression perhaps influenced a decision by General Douglas MacArthur to use Japanese and Japanese-trained Koreans to help administer the US occupation zone in southern Korea from September 1945.

Colonial-era collaboration increased exponentially from the early 1930s, when Japan made deeper inroads into the Asian continent. One elderly Korean explained that Manchurian incidents encouraged fence-sitting Koreans – those who were neither pro- nor anti-Japanese – to shift their faint patriotic sentiments toward supporting Japan's mission.¹⁵ We can assume that this support resulted, in part, from many Koreans, mesmerized by Japan's success, identifying with the colonizer's mission. However, there may have been a more practical reason behind this cooperation; convinced by Japan's successful expansion that Korean independence was beyond hope for the foreseeable future, cooperation rather than rebellion was the more prudent response. Additionally, Japan realized after July 1937, when fighting escalated in China, that it would have to adjust its gradual assimilation policy in Korea to encourage greater Korean cooperation.¹⁶ Representative examples of this shift are found in various government-general reports designed to strengthen *Naisen ittai* (Japan-Korea, one body) and, by extension, *Mansen* (Manchuria and Korea) relations.¹⁷

Many of these documents centered on ways that the colonial government could define, and encourage, collaboration by colonial subjects in the war effort. Their help was most urgently needed to inform the rest of the Korean people of their wartime responsibilities and urge participation. Many Koreans later found guilty of collaboration crimes had assisted the Japanese in recruiting young Korean men for the Japanese armed forces when, from 1938, they began to accept applications for the volunteer corps (*shigantai*). Koreans such as Yun Ch'ihō and Ch'oe Namsŏn penned articles in the Korean-language newspaper that explained the role their fellow country people were to assume under wartime conditions. Businessmen like Kim Yŏngsu were pressured to 'donate' a share

of their profits to the war efforts.¹⁸ Local Korean leaders also assisted Japanese administrators in drafting capable Koreans for work details, including girls as ‘comfort women’ and men as laborers and soldiers.¹⁹ Elderly Koreans, many of whom would be awarded peerages, served on advisory committees that sought input on ways that the Japanese could strengthen the *Naisen* and *Mansen* geographic bodies.²⁰

Considering possible reasons behind a Korean’s choice to cooperate with the Japanese goes beyond investigations conducted to date. Whereas the evidence itself, examined objectively, may uncover traitorous acts, the subjective reasoning that accompanied an individual decision also requires consideration. Yun Ch’iho’s case (the scholar cited in this chapter’s epigraph) is most useful because he often used his extensive diary to explain his actions. His family’s social birthright as *sŏŏl*, a descendant of a concubine, prevented his clan’s members from sitting the civil service exams that determined high government positions until the last decades of the Chosŏn period (1392–1910), thus suggesting pre-annexation motives. Yun participated in a number of late 19th century reform movements, such as the short-lived Independence Club (1896–8), that ended with charges of treason being levied against the participants. These efforts certainly merit reconsideration today in light of the fate that Korea suffered, partly due to failure to reform its political, economic, and social institutions. The possible effect that these failures may have had on Yun’s decisions during the period of Japanese rule is a consideration missing from evidence that discusses his collaboration.

Should Yun have had the chance to face his accusers in court, he would also have had to explain his negative response to the March First (1919) Independence movement. His diary consistently reveals his support for practical advancement over emotional (and idealist) political movement, as we see in his March 2, 1919 entry: ‘If shouting *Mansais* [*sic* *Manse*, roughly, *viva* Korea] through the students will win a national independence there can be no subject nation or race in the world.’²¹ Elsewhere, he recognized independence as an aspiration dear to Koreans. But, he cautioned, rather than sending ‘ignorant folks to jail for yelling “*mansei*” now is the time for Koreans to learn and wait’.²² Regardless of how this thinking is considered in contemporary times, it must be studied within the colonial context as Koreans confronted the reality of a Japanese administration that showed no signs of retreating from their peninsular homeland. Might Yun’s support for a gradual development of the Korean people toward their eventual independence, one held by a large contingent of nationalists at the time, be considered a prudent response to the circumstances then facing the Korean nation?

Yun's writing also contains much damaging evidence: he attended government-general events such as imperial birthdays; he wined and dined important Japanese officials who passed through Keijō; he praised Japan's wartime activities, on at least one occasion, by leading the *banzais* to the Japanese emperor at a wartime rally; and he praised the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Singapore that brought Japan into the war with the United States and Great Britain.²³ Intertwined in these diary entries were others that reveal the continued harassment to which the Japanese military police subjected him during the war. Yun was, after all, a Christian who spoke a number of foreign languages and maintained an extensive list of foreign contacts. Yun as 'Anonymus' attempts to explain this behavior as forced rather than voluntary:

Korea was a part of Japan, and so recognized by other powers including America... If so, the Koreans were Japanese, willy nilly. Then, as the subjects of Japan, what alternative could we, *who had to live* in Korea, have but to obey the orders and demands, however arbitrary, of the Japanese regime? ... Therefore, it is nonsense to denounce anybody for what he did under the status of a Japanese subject [original emphasis].²⁴

His emphasis on the words 'who had to live' in Korea suggests 'absence' as a traitorous activity. In other words, those who fled Korea were equally, if not more so, guilty of anti-Korean activity. They deserted their country at the time of its greatest crisis. Yun often noted differences of opinion with the Korean Provisional Government that existed in China and the United States. As we shall see, members of this group, along with other returning Koreans, politicized this issue in the people they accused of colonial-era collaboration. One such returning Korean, Syngman Rhee, ruthlessly endeavored to establish a southern Korean government and fought to block efforts to resolve peaceful unification, as well as collaborator issues, both before and after his rise to the ROK presidency in 1948.

Post-liberation attempts to create anti-traitor legislation

The sequence of events that surrounded the Japanese emperor's August 15, 1945 radio address briefly delayed the transition in southern Korea from Japan as colonial occupier to that of the US military as post-liberation occupier, the bulk of which would not arrive until September 8. The Soviet declaration of war against Japan on August 9, followed by troops

crossing onto the Korean Peninsula on August 18, placed it in a position to quickly establish a military presence in northern Korea. Japan's surrender did not instantly end its occupation of southern Korea, which strengthened the position of collaborators in at least two ways. First, continued Japanese control prevented the 'wild retribution' that peoples in liberated European states faced after Germany's surrender.²⁵ The transition delay in Korea also provided collaborators with an opportunity to entrench themselves in post-liberation power positions, one strengthened by decisions made by the US soon after it commenced its occupation of southern Korea.

The Japanese, anticipating a Soviet occupation of the entire peninsula, had expected foreign troops to arrive quickly. In an effort to gain safe passage from the peninsula, the government-general recruited Yŏ Unhyŏng,²⁶ a moderate leftist with whom they had shared numerous conversations in the past, who quickly formed the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (*Kŏn'guk Chunbi Wiwŏnhoe*). Yŏ, who had spent time in prison in the late 1930s for refusing to cooperate with the Japanese,²⁷ maintained contact with Soviet Union officers established during his visit to Moscow in 1922. His acceptance, however, attached conditions that included the colonial administration not interfering with programs he would establish in preparation for Korean independence.²⁸ Upon learning that the United States would occupy southern Korea, the Japanese reversed course, accusing Yŏ of disseminating Communism across the peninsula. Responding from Okinawa to Japanese warnings of 'communist and independence agitators', Lieutenant General John R Hodge advised the occupiers to keep the peace under the present [Japanese] administrative machinery.²⁹ Yŏ, as a rival to Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, would later be accused of Japanese collaboration, as the stigma of *ch'inilp'a* (pro-Japanese faction) became a political sword often brandished between rivals.

Yŏ Unhyŏng, along with others such as Kim Kyusik, would continue to search for a formula that strengthened a Korean United (political) Front (*t'ongil chŏnsŏk*) until his assassination in July 1947. In addition to exerting energy to form a truly unified party among Koreans of different political views, he consistently called for the exclusion from political influence of Koreans who had supported the Japanese colonial administration. These two efforts intersected; a resolution to the pro-Japanese issue became a bone of contention among, primarily leftist, groups who later criticized conservative groups for incorporating these Koreans into their political mechanisms.

The apparent favoritism that the arriving Americans displayed toward pro-Japanese Koreans raised suspicions over their actual mission in southern Korea. Most damaging was Proclamation No. 1, issued by MacArthur in Tokyo: 'Until further orders, all government officials... shall continue to perform their usual functions and duties'.³⁰ As in Japan, US occupation forces preferred pragmatism to sentiment; administrating indirectly through experienced personnel would be more efficient than having to quickly train new recruits. Whereas Japanese directing Japanese posed minimal problems in Japan, a different result emerged when these same Japanese were required to direct the peoples they had colonized previously, both in Japan and in Korea.³¹ Korean protests forced the US administration to amend Proclamation No. 1 to direct that all Japanese, but not the Koreans they trained, be immediately dismissed. This new approach, however, did not necessarily end Japanese influence. Political advisor Merrell Benninghoff wrote that the 'removal of Japanese officials is desirable from the public opinion standpoint but difficult to bring about for some time. They can be relieved in name but must be made to continue [to] work.'³² Nor did it affect Japanese-trained Koreans. Their retention raised the level of violence in southern Korea by leftists, who targeted their places of employment – government offices and police boxes (*kōban*) – in verbal and physical attacks. Conservatives such as Syngman Rhee would soon identify this leftist force as Korea's new enemy; the expertise that Koreans had gained through their colonial-era training, they reasoned, would be pivotal in defeating this enemy.

The preponderance of property held by the Japanese and their Korean supporters made land reform a key prerequisite toward resolving the collaborator issue in post-liberation Korea. The Soviet occupation, on the contrary, opted to administer through the People's Committees rather than directly. It announced its land reform policy on March 5, 1946, where land held by 'imperialist Japanese' and 'national traitors' would be redistributed to those farmers who tilled it. This policy eased two problems in the north that would linger in the south: land redistribution and collaboration. Northern Korea's apparent success in resolving these problems only exacerbated those in the south, particularly after northern landlords began migrating south of the 38th parallel.³³ Southern Korea announced its land distribution plan two days after the Soviets publicized their plan. Southern land would be sold to tenant farmers for payment in product over a fifteen-year period. Richard D Robinson, who served in the US Army Military Government in Korea's (USAMGIK) public information department, praised the basic plan but

reflected that, as tenant farmers lacked faith in the American command to implement the program, they opted to delay 'any Korean [land] reform program until a *Korean* Government were established'.³⁴ This delay maintained the assets, and thus the social status, of many Koreans whose colonial-era actions were less than patriotic. It also armed leftist rebels, who some felt defined pro-Japanese too broadly, with a cause to rally the masses. One American official revealed such suspicions by scribbling in the margins of a letter from a disgruntled People's Republic (*Inmin Konghwaguk*) leader: 'Attempt to eliminate the bourgeois from all positions of responsibility. Even though no proof of being pro-Jap.'³⁵

The Soviets did not immediately or completely sweep northern Korea clear of Japanese influence, but they did eliminate it from positions of power. US maintenance of pro-Japanese Koreans, in addition to serving as targets for leftist groups, helped block the passage of anti-collaborator legislation. Hyung-Kook Kim estimates that in October 1946, one year after the US arrival, as much as 82 per cent of the southern Korean police force was Japanese-trained.³⁶ More importantly, as Bruce Cumings demonstrates, the majority of the top brass in southern Korea's post-liberation police force had served under the Japanese, including many who fled from the north. Cumings quotes Ch'oe Nŭng-jin, chief of the Korean National Police Detective Bureau, as describing the office as a 'refugee home' for Japanese trainees.³⁷

Many Koreans also sensed that the US decision to maintain the Japanese colonial administration was part of a broader plan to resurrect Japan from the ashes and return it to a hegemonic position in East Asia, albeit under American direction. Soon after the guns of World War II fell silent, rumors warned that the seeds of World War III had been planted and that this time Japan would join the United States in a war against the Soviets. Rumors of US-Japanese collusion heightened in 1948, a time of violent battles between the South Korean government and local opposition groups, to the extent that Commanding Officer John R Hodge felt compelled to respond. He countered:

'That the United States is building Japan back as a military power.' This is a flat falsehood that gains credence among the uninitiated because United States authorities recently announced a humanitarian plan to get the Japanese to where they can feed and clothe themselves and cease to be a burden on the rest of the world's economy. This plan has nothing whatsoever to do with restoring Japanese military power, either physically or potentially.³⁸

The US administration's decision to employ experienced Japanese-trained Koreans provided political groups with propaganda fodder to use against competing factions. We see this message in the following leaflet distributed on Seoul streets by the Comrades Office (Korean not given):

The remainders of the Japanese Imperialism and the racial traitors, who revolted against the Korean race, are flattering to the foreign power and doing a reactive conspiracy. It is because there are the gangsters dreaming but to fill their own pockets, as the Japanese cat's paw that had sucked the Korean people's blood before, that a foreign power came to concern the home political affairs of Korea... Let us sweep out the remainders of the Japanese people of Seoul; who are the followers that dare buy the Japanese property? There is no purchasing of robber's goods. Let us kill the Japanese and the racial traitors.³⁹

Their failure to sweep southern Korea clear of pro-Japanese Koreans is shared by that of more formal attempts to resolve Korea's colonial-era legacy. Both efforts suffered from the US shift in support from central to extreme conservative political groups.

On two occasions prior to the Korean War (1950–3), Korean assemblies debated legislation to formally accomplish this goal. The first attempt was in 1947, when the Interim National Assembly (*Nam Chosŏn kwado chŏngbu*) deliberated the 'Special Law Dealing with National Traitors, Pro-Japanese Collaborators and Profiteers'. The first draft of this legislation, read before the assembly on April 22, established the following categories of guilt:

First category would include those who participated in signing the treaty of annexation in 1910, lawyers and members of noble families...and those who have been members of the Japanese Diet. Second category would include those who converted from the Korean Independence movement to cooperate with the Japanese, military and civil officials who directly or indirectly prosecuted Korean revolutionists, leaders of organizations whose purpose was to hinder the independence movement...those who instigated people to destroy public installations and murder people in order to hinder rehabilitation and those who prosecuted fellow-countrymen while using foreign power as a shield for their activities.⁴⁰

This version offered a relatively wide definition of traitor that extended the parameters of collaboration by also including those actions taken after liberation, a point that would be hotly debated by this interim assembly. Also of concern was whether the Korean monarchy should be tried, presumably over statements that encouraged Japanese annexation, as quoted above.⁴¹

The law proposed three levels of traitorous crime. The most serious level, which was subject to 'prison *sine die*', targeted 'national traitors', those who had 'worked against the interests of the nation or hindered the movement for national independence in conspiracy or in cooperation with Japan or other foreign powers'. This included Koreans who had: planned, negotiated, and signed treaties with Japan between 1905–10; accepted a Japanese peerage or been appointed to the Japanese Parliament; destroyed public utilities or committed murder; collaborated with the Japanese; or 'persecuted, murdered, inflicted punishment on those who have worked for the cause of independence or...given instruments or commanded others to commit such crimes'. The middle category, 'Japanese collaborators', implicated Koreans 'who have worked against the interests of the nation by compromising themselves in sinister activities, utilizing themselves of the Japanese influence during the Japanese domination over Korea'. These Koreans played an important but, in comparison to 'national traitors', secondary role in Japanese colonial networks. 'Japanese collaborators' inherited, rather than accepted, peerages; served as functionaries of organizations that undermined Korean independence; participated in or contributed money to Japan's war industry; or held leading positions in local political or military organizations. Koreans found guilty at this level faced short-term imprisonment, loss of citizenship rights, and possible property confiscation. The third, 'profiteers', level targeted those Koreans who had 'disturbed economic stability and caused economic distress by [their] unscrupulous activities'. Penalties for these offenses included prison sentences of up to five years and fines of double the sum of the profits they had illegally accumulated. The legislation also called for the establishment of a committee and special court system to try the cases and established guidelines to sentence the guilty. Lighter sentences, for example, could be given to those who showed remorse or who confessed of their own accord.⁴²

The United States cited political rivalry as its reason for blocking the passage of this legislation, as hinted at by Joseph E Jacobs. Jacobs noted a concern that USAMGIK would eventually veto the bill due to political division between the conservative majority and the liberal minority in the interim assembly. The political advisor observed:

The Rightists, comprising all the elected and several of the appointed members who had been largely men of substance under the Japanese, strove to draft a law in such broad terms that only notorious collaborators no longer living or, if living, hiding in shame, would be affected. The minority so-called leftist members, all appointed, who are either returned exiles or had been obscure figures during the Japanese regime, wanted a law that would end the day politically for those who had prospered under the Japanese.⁴³

A question also emerged as to whether Koreans sought comprehensive conviction or symbolic closure. Assembly Chair Kim Kyusik suggested the latter when he revealed to a US official that he expected 'few, if any convictions' under the legislation. Most Koreans in high positions, he continued, 'hesitate to initiate a formal charge lest their own past should be scrutinized by their political enemies in retaliation'. The legislation, he admitted, 'was purely for the record, purely to save national face; purely to prove to history that there was no legal break in the continuity of Korean national independence'.⁴⁴

USAMGIK apparently suspected otherwise. On November 20, 1947 Kim received a letter from Deputy Military Governor Brigadier General GC Helmick announcing USAMGIK's plans to 'withhold approval' of the legislation. In the letter, he expressed appreciation for the assembly's efforts:

There is no doubt that those who supported the Japanese regime, with treasonable intent against Korean national ideals, or who collaborated with it without unavoidable necessity, should be punished, or at least excluded from participation in Korean national life.⁴⁵

Helmick then addressed the primary difficulty in administering punishment:

ascertaining who should be branded as traitors and collaborators [as i]t must be remembered that the Japanese occupation was of long duration. In a sense all Koreans had to work for, though not with, the Japanese in order to survive at all; but some collaborated willingly with the Japanese and aided their tyranny. The former, in a very real sense, are guiltless; but the latter should suffer the odium attaching to all traitors. A clear distinction should be made between these two classes.⁴⁶

He then listed other problems that USAMGIK saw with the legislation: Korean collaborators were also men of ability, thus it 'would be wrong to

exclude from government office excellently qualified personnel'; US officials harbored doubts as to whether the assembly 'clearly represent[ed] a consensus of the entire Korean nation', a curious point given that the US administration had appointed half of its members to ensure broad political participation; and Korean division prevented its fair implementation across the Korean Peninsula, as 'punishment of traitors should be a result of the demand of a united people, and provide for the same standards throughout Korea'. Time, he concluded, was on Korea's side as 'there is not a statute of limitations for offenses against national interest'.⁴⁷

Kim challenged Helmick's reasoning. Why had 'the Military Government...entrusted to it with enactment of laws which would be the foundation of the reconstruction of Korea politically, economically and socially', only to doubt its ability to represent the Korean people when it attempted to carry out this directive? He continued:

if you are not in a position to approve this law because it is enacted by members who do not represent the entire people, is there any law which is already approved by you with satisfaction, and which will not exercise undesirable influence upon the entire people, because it is enacted by members representing only part of the people? Hence, we wish to know what measure you will take in case of eventual disturbances that might arise as a result of your policy, infringing the prestige of the Legislature, and encouraging traitors and collaborators.⁴⁸

By the Military Government's logic it must revise Ordinance No. 118, the very decree that empowered the Interim Legislative Assembly, until after 'unification of North & South Korea is realized'.⁴⁹

Helmick begged for time to prepare his response to the many questions addressed by the Assembly. Finally, the American official appeared before the body where, Acting Political Advisor William R Langdon reported, he suggested a compromise, the deferment of 'executive approval and [return] the bill... to the Assembly after final study'.⁵⁰ Whether this transpired is not known. However, no substantive legislation appeared prior to the May 10, 1948 election that led to the formation of the Republic of Korea in mid-August. We can only speculate as to any unspoken reasons that may have influenced the US decision to veto this legislation. Pressure from behind closed doors may have come from Koreans such as Syngman Rhee who, while not directly threatened by the bill, had surrounded himself with people who faced possible punishment from

the new legislation.⁵¹ Richard D Robinson blames the National Police, the 'greatest political force' in southern Korea by 1946, who vowed to oppose the US occupation administration unless Hodge vetoed the anti-traitor legislation.⁵² Indeed, supporters of the bill felt threatened by members of the Korean police force. Yŏ Unhong, the younger brother of Yŏ Unhyŏng, feared that Cho Pyŏng'ok, who headed the national police force, would form a political party as a backlash to any anti-traitor legislation. He also claimed that the police had compiled a list of the bill's supporters.⁵³ The multiple attempts on his elder brother's life, including the successful one in July 1947 by Sin Tong'um, a member of the nationalist White Clothing Society (*Paekŭisa*),⁵⁴ might have been motivated by Yŏ's consistent support for anti-collaborator legislation.

Delayed and incomplete justice

On September 22, 1948, five weeks after the founding of the ROK, the newly inaugurated national assembly promulgated the Law for the Punishment of Anti-National Acts. The American political (but not military) occupation was completed, and a new Korean government assumed responsibility for bringing national traitors to justice. Newly elected President Syngman Rhee, never a fan of these efforts, was soon put on the defensive when he had to protect members of his own cabinet from accusations of pro-Japanese activity. He urged that, given the delicate condition of the state, the legislation be delayed. In an address before the National Assembly he criticized members of the Special Investigation Committee for 'roaming the city [with policemen] arresting people and torturing them', and urged a 'temporary suspension' of the legislation if it 'threatens public security'.⁵⁵ Investigations soon ended and the newly promulgated National Security Law, passed that same year, redefined traitorous crimes as pro-communist activity, while placing a statute of limitations on Anti-National Acts investigations.

The number of people convicted under this legislation was extremely small when compared to European cases, as were convictions made under the anti-communist National Security Act.⁵⁶ One July 1949 report issued by the American embassy found that over the previous seven months, 263 Koreans had been arrested, but only 147 indicted under anti-collaboration legislation. Of these, only 16 Koreans had been tried and sentenced.⁵⁷ These low numbers were influenced, as before, by police intimidation. Special Investigation Bureau Chair Kim Sang-duk observed that 'no member of the old Committee was willing to stay in

his post following the fight between it and the police and that cooperation between the police and the Bureau would be impossible in the future were the old members to remain'.⁵⁸ Of the 16 Koreans tried, one was found innocent, three were given prison sentences (including one for life), two were placed on probation, and nine were stripped of their civil rights for periods ranging from three to ten years. One, Kim Tökki, was sentenced to death for his role in blocking independence-directed activities as a member of the Japanese police force.⁵⁹ Investigations ended on September 22, 1948 when the National Assembly dissolved the Special Investigations Bureau. From this time, only Koreans who had dodged the proceedings by fleeing overseas or slipping underground could face charges of colonial-era collaboration.⁶⁰ Further investigations would have to wait another four decades, when the success of the democratization movement in 1988 reopened inquiries on unresolved issues of the early post-liberation decades, including collaboration.⁶¹ These efforts, too, would die prematurely with the return of a conservative government in 2008.⁶²

A satisfactory resolution of collaboration issues suffered from a number of factors, one being the failure of US occupation forces to first sufficiently prepare for its administrative responsibilities following Japan's defeat, and then for blocking Korean attempts to pass anti-traitor legislation. Feeling an apparent need to control southern Korean politics, the United States refused to back a wartime Korean government in exile or train and arm Koreans battling the Japanese in Asia. This negligence left the new occupiers with limited choices after Japan's defeat. The most practical (given the circumstances), the reinstatement of colonial-era officials, proved to be the most harmful to their efforts. Doubts about Korean competence resurfaced after the US arrival, as demonstrated by USAMGIK's continued reliance on Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans in its administration of southern Korea. Re-entrenching these Koreans enabled them to control their fates even after the founding of the ROK and after the National Assembly passed anti-traitor legislation. Though Korea avoided the intense bloodbath that liberated European peoples experienced in the aftermath of World War II, the slow, protracted violence targeting alleged pro-Japanese collaborators resulted from occupation policies that produced, and then unnaturally and unnecessarily sustained, the dregs of this colonial era. By opting for a tacit avoidance of this issue early South Korean governments further delayed a solution and, as Anonymous feared, endured decades where Korea sacrificed the 'gift' of true unified liberation to 'personal ambitions, factional intrigues and sectional hatred'.⁶³

Notes

1. Anonymous, 'A Korean Discusses Koreans', March 19, 1948, Hanguk charyo kaepalwon (ed.), *Records of the US Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1945–1949*, Vol. 3 [hereafter IAK] (Seoul: Arūm chulpansa: 1995), pp. 62–4. I analyze Yun Ch'ihō as collaborator in my 'Loyal Patriot or Traitorous Collaborator? The Yun Chiho diaries and the question of national loyalty', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 7, No. 3 (2007).
2. Anonymous, 'A Korean Discusses Koreans', 63.
3. Commanding officer Lieutenant General John R Hodge lamented there being 'an unknown number of political parties or groups... It would appear that any Korean of average intelligence who knows a hundred other Koreans can form a political party and make vocal demands.' 'Conditions in Korea', in *John R Hodge mūnsōjip, 1946.6–1948.8*, Vol. 3 (Seoul: Institute of Asian Cultural Studies, 1995), p. 2.
4. Pak Chi Hyang's *Yun Ch'ihō Hyōpnyōk ilgi* [Yun Ch'ihō's Diary of Collaboration] (Seoul: Isu'p, 2010) is exceptional in this regard. See also K De Ceuster, 'The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea', *Korean Studies* 25, No. 2 (2002): 207–42.
5. Pak, *Yun Ch'ihō Hyōpnyōk ilgi*, p. 18. Alan Morris cites R Vailland's thoughts in his *Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed: Writers and the Mode Rétro in Post-Gaullist France* (New York/London: Berg, 1992), pp. 16–17.
6. T Brooks, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 9; and P Davies, *Dangerous Liaisons: Collaboration and World War Two* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004), p. 10.
7. One example is the fighter plane donated by the debased *paekjōng* (literally 'white people') group who worked the 'death professions'. Joong Seop Kim, *The Korean Paekjōng under Japanese Rule: The Quest for Equality and Human Rights* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 15.
8. Peter Davies terms this 'shield philosophy' in his *Dangerous Liaisons*, 24. Pierre Laval argued that by meeting with Adolf Hitler and maintaining contact with the German government he 'accepted the difficult role of defending [French] interests'. P Laval, *The Unpublished Diary of Pierre Laval* (London: Falcon, 1948), pp. 72–4.
9. Takahashi Shōji, 'Chōsen to Shinnichiha' [Korea and Japan-Friendly Koreans], in Ōe Shinobu, Asada Kyōji, Mitsuya Taichirō, Gotō Ken'ichi, Kobayashi Hideo, Takasaki Takashi, Wakabayashi Masatake, and Kawamura Minato (eds), *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, Vol. 6 [Modern Japan and its colonies] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2005), p. 124. Im Chong-guk divides Korean modern traitorous activity into six periods in his *Ilche ch'imryak kwa ch'inilp'a* [Imperial Japanese Invasion and the Japan-Friendly Korean] (Seoul: Changsa, 1982), p. 11.
10. Yi Tae-jin considers such Koreans as 'pro-Japanese' (*ch'inilp'a*) traitors in his *Kojong sidae ū chaejonyōng* [Rethinking the Kojong era] (Seoul: T'aehaksa, 2005), pp. 165–90.
11. Murata Haruki, 'The Annexation of Korea was Decidedly not a Case of Colonial Rule', <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmyfmnNwsC4> (accessed October 9, 2010). (This clip now seems to have been removed.)

12. Quoted from the *Seoul Press* (August 29, 1910). That Sunjong actually wrote these words is debatable. See my 'New Interpretations of Japan's Annexation of Korea: A conservative agenda groping for "normalcy"', *Acta Koreana* 13, No. 1 (2010): 113–34.
13. GW Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, politics, and legacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), chapter 1; and Y Moon, *Populist Collaborators: The Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1896–1910* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
14. ME Caprio, 'Marketing Assimilation: The press and the formation of the Japanese-Korean colonial relationship', *Journal of Korean Studies* 16, No. 1 (Spring 2011): 1–25.
15. Cho Pyöngsang, 'Shiganhei wo ko ni mochite' [My son the volunteer soldier], *Chösen* (March 1940): 61–3. See also Takahashi, 'Chösen no Shinnichiha', 124.
16. See T Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
17. One important report was titled 'Chösen sötokufu jikyoku taisaku chösakai shimon töshinan shian' [Korean government-general investigative meeting to devise counterstrategy to meet the present situation], in Sin Chubaek (ed.), *Ilcheha chibae chöngch'aek charyojip*, Vol. 15 [Compilation of materials on control policy under imperial Japan] (Seoul: Koryö söim, 1993), pp. 409–671.
18. C Eckert, *Offspring of Empire* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), Chapter 4.
19. C Sarah So, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
20. ME Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), pp. 188–93.
21. Yun Ch'ihö, *Yun Ch'ihö ilgi*, Vol. VII [Yun Ch'ihö diary] (Seoul: Kuksa p'yöngch'an wiwönhoe, 1973–86), March 2, 1919.
22. *Yun Ch'ihö ilgi*, Vol. VIII, June 5, 1920.
23. Yun, recalling the prejudice he experienced abroad, saw these victories as payback, the war as one between the 'yellow race' and the 'white race', *Yun Ch'ihö ilgi*, Vol. XI, December 8, 1941.
24. Anonymous, 'A Korean Discusses Koreans', 63.
25. In Czechoslovakia, an estimated 19,000 to 30,000 German lives and an unknown number of local lives were lost as 'people heeded their leaders' calls and immediately began to "cleanse" the country of Nazis, Germans, and their Czech collaborators'. B Frommer, *National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in postwar Czechoslovakia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 33–4, 43. Peter Davies offers the following estimates: Norway 50,000, Belgium 50,000, France 91,600. Davies, *Dangerous Liaisons*, pp. 46 & 177.
26. The Japanese invited Yö Unhyöng to Tokyo soon after the March First Independence demonstrations in an effort to appease the movement. Kan Doksun, *Yö Unhyöng hyöden 1: Chösen sanichi dokuritsu undö* [A Critical Biography of Yö Unhyöng 1: Korea's March First Independence Movement] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2002), Chapter 6.
27. Yi Kihyöng, *Yö Unhyöng P'yöngjön* [Yö Unhyöng, a Critical Biography] (Seoul: Silch'ön munhaksa, 2010).

28. B Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergences of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 71.
29. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, pp. 127–8.
30. 'Proclamation No. 1 by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur', September 2, 1945, in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States VI* [hereafter *FRUS*] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 1043–4.
31. The Japanese government incited riots in 1948 when, on directions from SCAP, they ordered Korean ethnic schools closed. ME Caprio, 'The Cold War Explodes in Kobe – The 1948 Korean ethnic school "riots" and US occupation authorities', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 48–2-08 (November 24, 2008), <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Caprio/2962>.
32. 'The Political Advisor in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State', September 15, 1945, in US State Department, *FRUS VI*, pp. 1049–50.
33. Northern efforts remain unclear, although some people in certain areas, such as large landowners, police, and military, were purged.
34. See Harvard University Yenching Library (HUYL): RD Robinson, 'Betrayal of a Nation', unpublished manuscript (1950): 85–6.
35. HUYL: Gillette Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, 'Yun Il to Brigade General Harris', October 25, 1945. Yun, chief of the South Kyōngsam Province Branch of the People's Republic, sought to instruct Harris on Korea's traitors and patriots.
36. Hyung-Kook Kim, *The Division of Korea and the Alliance Making Process: Internationalization of internal conflict and internationalization of international struggle, 1945–1948* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), p. 148.
37. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War I*, pp. 166–7.
38. 'Jacobs to Secretary of State: Press release by General John R Hodge', June 16, 1948, *IAK*, Vol. 9, p. 493. Similar suspicions emerged in 1949 correspondence between North Koreans, Soviets, and Chinese where the leaders considered whether Japan would assist South Korea if war broke out. AV Torcov, *Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu* [Truth and riddles of the Korean war], trans. Shimatamai Nobuo and Kim Songho (Tokyo: Soshinsha 2001), pp. 104–5.
39. 'G-2 Periodic Reports', October 21, 1945 (Seoul: Institute of Asian Culture Studies, Hallym University, 1999), pp. 188–9.
40. 'G-2 Periodic Reports', April 23, 1947, 68.
41. 'G-2 Periodic Reports', May 9, 1947, 121.
42. 'Special Law on Pro-Japs, National Traitors, and Profiteers', *IAK*, Vol. 11, pp. 207–9.
43. *IAK*, Vol. 11, pp. 205–6. See also Hō C. '1947nyōn Namchosōn kwa toipbop üiwōn üi "ch'inil p'a ch'ōbōlbōp" chechōngkwa ku sōngkōl' [The Establishment and Character of the 1947 Southern Korean Interim Assembly 'Pro-Japanese Penalty Legislation'], *Hanguk kŭnhyōndaesa yōngu* 12 (Spring 2000): pp. 168–9.
44. *IAK*, Vol. 11, pp. 205–6.
45. 'Helmick to Kim, Chair of Korean Interim Legislative Assembly', November 20, 1947, in *IAK*, Vol. 11, 193–4.
46. 'Helmick to Kim', 193–4.
47. 'Helmick to Kim', 193–4.
48. 'Questionnaire', December 3, 1947, in *IAK*, Vol. 11, pp. 199–201.

49. 'Questionnaire', 199–201.
50. Langdon to Secretary of State, December 15, 1947, in *IAK*, Vol. 11, p. 202.
51. Im Mun'am [Im Moon-Chan], *Nihon teikoku to daiminzoku ni tsukaeta kanryō no kaisō* [Reflections of a Bureaucrat who Worked for Imperial Japan and the Republic of Korea] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2011).
52. Robinson, 'Betrayal of a Nation', 143 & 146.
53. 'G-2 Periodic Reports', July 8, 1947, 342. Cho, who managed the Poin Mining Company, was one of the many Koreans who survived the transfer of administrations. After liberation he informed USAMGIK on the pro-Japanese communists in Yō Unhyōng's CPKI. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, pp. 95 & 141.
54. Yō's biographer describes Sin as a pro-Japanese Korean who grieved over the emperor's August 15, 1945 radio message. Yi, *Yō Unhyōng*, pp. 483–4 & 486–7.
55. For a translation of 'Presidential Statement' see *Chosŏn Chongan ilbo*, February 16, 1949, in *IAK*, Vol. 11, p. 530.
56. *IAK* contains a number of collaborator lists. See, for example, on February 18, 1949 'complete list of [33] Koreans publicly announced to have been arrested by the Special Investigation Board' (Vol. 11, pp. 528–9), and a similar May 14, 1949 list (Vol. 11, pp. 541–2). Among Korean collaborators were a novelist, Yi Kwang-su, an independence movement leader, Ch'oe Rim, and a national historian, Ch'oe Namsŏn.
57. K De Ceuster gives the total number of cases as follows: 682 cases opened; 559 prosecutions; 38 cases referred to court; and 12 cases prosecuted. 'The Nation Exorcised', 214.
58. EF Drumright, 'Arrests and Trial of "National Traitors" since 1 May 1949', July 9, 1949, in *IAK*, Vol. 11, pp. 543–7.
59. *IAK*, Vol. 11, p. 551. Apparently, Kim's sentence was never carried out.
60. 'John Muccio to the Secretary of State', September 26, 1949, in *IAK*, Vol. 11, pp. 34–5.
61. Early efforts included translations of *ch'inilp'a* literature (Takahashi, 'Chōsen no Shinnichiha', 123–4), and Im's 1982 book (*Ilche ch'imryak kwa ch'inilp'a*). These efforts intensified from the early 1990s. See Panminjok munje yŏn'gu so (ed.), *Ch'inil p'a 99 in* [99 members of the pro-Japanese group] (Seoul: Tosŏch'ulgwān dolpyegae, 1993, 2002).
62. Private efforts continue. In April 2008 the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities and the Committee for Publication of a Directory of the Biographies of Pro-Japanese Collaborators announced a new list of 4,776 'known collaborators' to be released that August. See 'New List of Pro-Japanese Collaborators Sheds New Light on History', *Hankyoreh*, April 30, 2008, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/284955.html (accessed June 10, 2013).
63. Anonymous, 'A Korean Discusses Koreans', 64.

7

Film and the Representation of Ideas in Korea during and after Japanese Occupation, 1940–8

Brian Yecies

Attracting hearts and minds

This study considers the recurring themes contained in selected films shown in Korea before and after Japan's defeat to offer insights into how Japanese and US occupation authorities attempted to capture the hearts and minds of the occupied. In order to show how this theoretically worked, this chapter examines two of the most notable co-productions from the early 1940s, *Homeless Angels* (Choi In-gyu, 1941) and *Suicide Squad at the Watchtower* (Imai Tadashi, 1943, hereafter *Suicide Squad*). This investigation also includes a number of Hollywood films shown in Korea between 1946 and 1948, such as *In Old Chicago* (1937) and *You Can't Take It with You* (1938). In each case, the occupation authorities screened films to reorient Korean audiences toward their social, political and economic worldview. Despite tremendous scope, most histories of the Japanese and US occupation periods lack a rigorous discussion of this significant cultural policy.¹ Furthermore, conventional accounts of cinema in Korea only address the struggles that Korean filmmakers experienced during both eras, highlighting the limitations that threatened the expression of local culture.² This investigation builds upon these former studies by providing a complementary viewpoint on how such screenings resulted in complex intersections between cinema, culture, and politics, before and after Japan's defeat in 1945.

In 1937, as Japan escalated preparations for war with China and after Governor-General Minami Jirō formalized the assimilationist ideology of *naisen ittai*, or 'Japan and Korea as One Body', colonial Korea underwent a fundamental change.³ During this period, the Korean Colonial

Government (KCG) used locally produced feature films as tools to draw Koreans toward Japanese ways of thinking and living. In particular, the Japanese authorities enforced a strict film policy that prohibited the exhibition of Western entertainment and ‘spectacle’ films while promoting pro-Japanese propaganda films made under a ‘system of cooperation’.⁴ In this situation, Korean filmmakers collaborated with their Japanese counterparts and ‘co-produced’ films that aimed to draw Koreans into Japan’s cultural ambit while promoting allegiance and loyalty to the Empire.

Within a year, Japan had escalated its war preparation efforts by unleashing a program of ‘unbridled nationalistic consciousness’ throughout its Empire.⁵ As part of this campaign, the KCG’s censorship apparatus began blocking the entry of films with Western themes by banning nearly all those from the United States, causing a steep decline in the dynamic cinema-going culture of the 1920s to the mid-1930s – known as the ‘golden age of Hollywood in Korea’.⁶ Considered in the context of Japan’s cultural primacy, this ‘harmless entertainment was never harmless’.⁷ The resulting vacuum was eventually filled by a host of films imported from Japan, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, although it was difficult to replace the sheer volume of American films that had flooded the market over the previous two decades.

As the balance began to shift toward Japanese films, Korean filmmakers sought out increased opportunities with Japanese colleagues from Shōchiku, Tōhō, Nikkatsu, and Shinkō Kinema, which were the most active Japanese film companies. While filmmakers from *both* countries shared misgivings about having to produce propaganda films, Japanese filmmakers (such as Tasaka Tomotaka, Saito Torajiro, Toyoda Shiro, and Imai Tadashi, writing in popular film and entertainment magazines such as *Kinema Junpō*, *Eiga Hyōron*, *Nihon Eiga*, *Eiga Junpō*, and *Shin Eiga*) genuinely looked forward to collaborating with their Korean counterparts, whose creativity was well-known despite limited technical opportunities.⁸

By August 1940, the production, distribution, and exhibition of all films in Korea had come under the purview of the Korean Film Law, a replica of the 1939 Japan Film Law. All films made in Korea were now subject to strict censorship. Scripts could be banned if they ‘misrepresented’ Japanese national culture or detracted from the advance of Japan’s ‘ideological project’ in Korea; they were also banned if they contained content that had the potential to create disorder, to insult the imperial family, or to tarnish Japan’s political, diplomatic, military, or economic reputation.⁹ Not all the films made and exhibited in Korea at this time

were propaganda films. However, the themes embodied in the surviving films co-produced by Korean and Japanese filmmakers following the enactment of the Korean Film Law offer insights into how a fluid and dynamic type of Japanese nationalism was constructed, growing directly out of the exhaustive approval process of colonial censorship.

In order to adapt themselves to this new draconian policy environment, Korean filmmakers had begun using the Japanese 'national' language and adopting Japanese names and – at least on the surface – expressing the nationalistic ideals expected by the colonial administration. Under Governor-General Jirō's heavy-handed rule (1936–42), and his banner of 'education is the guiding force behind national culture',¹⁰ Korea's film industry was transformed into a propaganda tool that followed the assimilationist policy of *naisen ittai* and the monolingual use of the Japanese language by Korean students inside all schools.¹¹ Within this context, and to use the basic language of Western philosophy, the KCG sought to underwrite the local film industry through co-productions, which were intended to infiltrate the national popular consciousness, bolstering the Korean people's innate 'common sense' with the 'good sense' of the Japanese. To this end, films made in the late colonial period replaced the escapist experience that had previously been a strong element of cinema-going with an intensified type of propaganda cinema.¹² Koreans had little choice but to comply with Japan's tightening grip on all aspects of cinema culture, including the requirement to speak Japanese in films.

Two representative films made amid the atmosphere of patriotic fervor and rising war hysteria – *Homeless Angels* and *Suicide Squad* – illustrate the ways that filmmakers in Korea were exploring and interpreting the concept of *naisen ittai*, following the passing of the Korean Film Law in 1940. These 'transcolonial coproductions' not only attempted a 'code-switch' into Japanese along linguistic, cultural, and political lines,¹³ but in the process they also employed certain constructions of identity as a vehicle for demonstrating unity and loyalty in the process of 'becoming one body' with Japan.

From attraction to allegiance

Following the promulgation of the Korean Film Law, the industry's primary purpose was to act as a key mechanism for creating a new popular consciousness. A fresh breed of feature films was designed to inculcate educational messages intended to transform Koreans into loyal subjects of Japan. *Homeless Angels* was one such film. It

was produced by Korea's Goryeo Film Association with an all-Korean cast, including stars Kim Shin-jae, Lee Wuk-ha, Kim Il-hae, and Mun Ye-bong. No Japanese characters appeared in the film. This drama, directed by Choi In-gyu (aka Sinkei Jaku), was inspired by the true story of a pastor who rescued homeless children in Seoul and resettled them in an orphanage in the countryside. At the time of its release, despite being mainly in Korean (with Japanese subtitles), *Homeless Angels* was one of the most popular Korean films to be shown in Japan, garnering initial praise as a 'Ministry of Education recommended film'.¹⁴ It was approved by the censorship board in Korea in mid-July 1941, and was screened in Japan between late September and early October 1941.



Figure 7.1 *Homeless Angels* (1941). Advertisements, *Asahi Shimbun* (from left to right, and top to bottom September 26, 1941: 2; October 2, 1941: 2; September 30, 1941: 2; October 2, 1941: 2)

Source: Author's personal collection.

Although the Japanese Home Ministry eventually objected that the film had been tarnished by scenes portraying Koreans in traditional clothes and speaking in Korean.¹⁵

Some of the Japanese film advertisements for *Homeless Angels* that appeared in newspapers like *Asahi Shimbun* compared the film to *Dead End* (William Wyler, 1937). This Academy Award nominated *noir* crime drama, starring Humphrey Bogart, Sylvia Sydney, and Joel McCrea, and shot by celebrated cinematographer Gregg Toland, featured a gang of street kids living in a New York City tenement slum in the docklands of the East River, a stone's throw from luxury apartments. The mutual loyalty shown by the street kids in *Dead End* and the survival tactics they adopted are strongly reminiscent of *Homeless Angels*. Judging by the promotional campaign run by its Japanese distributor, Tōwa, this production was a much anticipated and poignant story on a par with Japanese films, such as *Introspection Tower* (Shimizu Hiroshi, 1941), which dealt with children in a rural reform school and the fascist education to which they were subjected.¹⁶ In addition, live shows accompanied the film in several cinemas around Tokyo, including a solo concert by popular singer Shōji Tarō at the Ginza Theatre, and several acts at the Asakusa Kokusai Theatre, the largest theatre in Asia at the time.¹⁷ Screenings at the Asakusa also included operatic performances by the Shōchiku Girls and an appearance by popular actor Mitsugu Fujii. Hence, the exhibition of *Homeless Angels* in Japan differed markedly from its Korean release, and had no parallels in Korea.

The popularity and acclaim surrounding *Homeless Angels* is unsurprising given that both producer Lee Chang-yong (founder of the Goryeo Film Association) and director Choi In-gyu grew up on a steady diet of Hollywood films, which overwhelmingly dominated the Korean market between 1926 and 1936. At that time, cinema in colonial Korea was a vibrant business, involving the production of a relatively small number of domestic films and the distribution and exhibition of a much larger number of American feature entertainment films, plus some British, Chinese, French, German, Italian, and Russian films. However, following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the KCG began reacting to the cultural and ideological alarm bells sounded by this plethora of American films, and Korean film industry personnel, who numbered over a hundred by this time, had little choice but to contribute to the making of films that extolled particular ideas. Lee, Choi, and the whole of the production crew made *Homeless Angels* not only to survive by meeting the KCG's new demands on the film industry and to demonstrate allegiance to the Empire, but also to further develop

their craft, which was inspired primarily by the conspicuous consumption of Hollywood films.

The discovery in 2005 of a print of *Homeless Angels* has shed new light on the film and its possible reception, not least because of its indisputable demonstration of how thoroughly assimilated Korean filmmakers had become with respect to the ideology of *naisen ittai*.¹⁸ By setting out the values and practices that Koreans should aspire to, *Homeless Angels* created a direct connection with the new controlling aims prescribed by the 1940 Korean Film Law. The film opens at a bar in Jongno District, the social and cultural heart of Seoul. Two men are bartending while hostesses, wearing traditional Korean hanboks, Japanese kimonos and Western-style dress, serve and drink with the customers. Dr Ahn, the wealthy Korean owner of a medical clinic and a large riverfront farmhouse, is drinking heavily alone at a table. He is approached by Myung-ja (played by colonial *and* post-colonial film star Kim Shin-jae) and her brother Yong-gil, two homeless 'street angels' selling flowers and cigarettes. In contrast to the other patrons, Dr Ahn extends a compassionate smile to the children and gives them money. His warmth also contrasts starkly with the adult squatters who abuse Myung-ja and Yong-gil in some dank back room. The narrative elements in these opening scenes construct binary links between wealth, happiness, compassion, generosity, social mobility, and 'good citizenship' on the one hand, and poverty, unhappiness, cruelty, social exclusion, and 'poor citizenship' on the other. Throughout the film, Dr Ahn maintains an attitude of benevolence toward his fellow Koreans; especially by sharing his holiday farmhouse with his brother-in-law (a minister), who is himself selflessly creating a self-sustaining community of street children destined to become volunteer soldiers.

Both the minister and the doctor function as surrogate fathers (and guardian angels) to the children. Both men show traits of leadership in the community, and both lead efforts to unify and transform their fellow Koreans as though every one is in need of rescue or repair. Both advocate obedience, loyalty, and honor in terms of good citizenship, which in this context means being a good colonial subject. For example, Dr Ahn treats people who are sick in body and spirit. At the end of the film he fights to defend the children against a group of malevolent squatters – who have come to the farm to seize Myung-ja and Yong-gil – but then treats their (literal) wounded bodies and (figurative) souls after they are injured by a collapsing bridge. The men agree to let the good doctor 'operate' on their sinful souls, which he does by advising them to change their ways and to avoid dishonorable behavior in the future.

Following this symbolic undertaking, which swiftly resolves conflicts between the characters, Dr Ahn turns away from the, now transformed, men and pauses to face the Japanese flag being raised by the minister.

The coda to this final scene, which is set on the riverbank facing the farmhouse, shows the group of orphaned children and the adults bowing in unison and jointly pledging their allegiance to the Empire. The eldest boy in the group shows his budding leadership potential by asking everyone to bow, and then leading the citizen's pledge of loyalty to the Emperor in Japanese, a language the orphans do not use elsewhere in the film. Although this scene is awkwardly inconsistent with the rest of the film, the Korean producer Lee Chang-yong was no doubt aware that this ending, with its emphasis on unity between Japanese and Koreans, would meet with the approval of the colonial authorities and censorship offices in both Korea and Japan.

Given the severe limitations placed on the industry at this time, *Homeless Angels* is notable for its aesthetic achievements. Some commentators have noted that the depiction of poverty-stricken, homeless children, played by amateur actors on real locations, predates the major works of the Italian neorealist movement such as *Open City* (Roberto Rossellini, 1945) and *Shoeshine* (Vittorio De Sica, 1946).¹⁹ The strong sense of realism in *Homeless Angels* undoubtedly reflected the harsh social conditions under which Koreans were living at the time, although this may not have been intended as a critique of Japanese rule. After completing *Homeless Angels*, Choi fine-tuned his loyalty to the Empire by producing stronger propaganda texts, such as *Tuition* (1940, aka *Tuition Fee*), *Children of the Sun* (1944), *Vow of Love* (1945), and *Sons of the Sky* (1945), which endorsed militarism and elevated the concept of collaboration with Korea's Japanese overlords to the status of a systematic program.²⁰

Exhibiting a different kind of message to that found in *Homeless Angels*, the action film *Suicide Squad* offers an expanded view of the imperial ideology of *naisen ittai*. *Suicide Squad* was a Japanese–Korean co-production made jointly by Tōhō and the Chosun Film Production Corporation (CFPC), which was formed in April 1942 after the KCG forcefully consolidated all Korea's film companies. The film emulated the American action films so popular with local audiences while utilizing the conventions of Japanese wartime documentaries.²¹ The KCG supported *Suicide Squad* with financial and in-kind support. The film was directed by Imai Tadashi, who would later become a prolific and controversial film director. Imai's assistant director was Choi In-gyu, of *Homeless Angels* fame. The film starred popular Japanese actors Takada Minoru and Hara

Setsuko, and the well-known Korean actors Kim Shin-jae (also from *Homeless Angels*) and Jeon Ok.

Resembling American action stories of the period, such as *I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang* (1932), *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1935), and *Captain Blood* (1935), films that all screened in Korea in the 1930s, *Suicide Squad* is set around a border security watchtower in the north of Korea. The story portrays the selfless devotion of border policemen in Korea and Manchuria in 1935, before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In the village surrounding the watchtower, Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans seemingly live together in harmony. Attacks by anti-Japanese bandits threaten their peaceful life. In one scene, a Korean policeman and a Chinese restaurant owner are killed while confronting these bandits, who are enemies of the state. When the battle begins, male and female villagers hide in the local police station and contemplate a Japanese-style group suicide rather than face surrender. At the last minute they are saved by the Japanese authorities who defeat the insurgents. The border officers' allegiance to the Empire offers a further example of *naisen ittai*, as does the lengths to which they are prepared to go to demonstrate their unity with Japan, including the willingness of mothers to kill their babies and themselves in the service of the war preparation effort.

Most of the dialogue in *Suicide Squad* is in Japanese, even when the Chinese restaurant owner converses with his son. Korean is heard only momentarily, when Korean characters are asked to use their native tongue. Various details reinforce the reality that languages other than Japanese are discouraged, for example signs beside a phone and in a classroom that read, 'Use only the national language'. Clearly, the characters in this propaganda vehicle have been thoroughly assimilated.

Tōhō promoted *Suicide Squad* in both Korea and Japan as a 'breath-taking' and 'exciting' production that had employed five thousand locals as extras and was three years in the making. The project was planned around the same time as *Homeless Angels*, and no doubt exploited the close ties that director Choi and producer Lee Chang-yong had developed with Tōhō (and Imai) before the formation of the consolidated CFPC. Newspaper advertisements promoted *Suicide Squad* as the biggest action movie of its kind in Japanese film history (Figure 7.2). Women – in particular Yoshiko (played by Hara Setsuko) – are shown taking up arms to protect the frontier of the Empire against invading bandits. Even the children of this border town, who are asked to supply their mothers with bullets, have a crucial role to play in ensuring the security of the nation. Not only are the guns pictured in these advertisements reminiscent



Figure 7.2 *Suicide Squad at the Watchtower* (1943). Advertisements, *Asahi Shimbun* (from left to right, and top to bottom April 1, 1943: 4; April 15, 1943: 4; April 18, 1943: 2; April 21, 1943: 2; April 11, 1943: 4)

Source: Author's personal collection.

of those used in promotional material for numerous Hollywood films shown in Korea (and Japan) during the 1920s and 1930s, but the fight scenes in the film are also redolent of “cowboys and Indians” movies from Hollywood in which the heroes on horseback return with the cavalry to save the whites under siege.²² The heroes of *Suicide Squad* are the Korean and Japanese citizens who engage in combat with the ‘enemies of the state’ in an inhospitable environment.

This film made no bones about the ideology of nationalism and its importance in maintaining stability and achieving success for the Empire. As others have noted, the heart of *Suicide Squad* is its depiction of ‘national community formation that mobilizes the space and metaphor of the border between Korea and Manchuria to visually and narratively produce a multi-ethnic nation made up not only of metropolitan Japanese but of loyal Chinese and Koreans as well’.²³ However, in terms of the ways that the gender and ethnic hierarchies of the early 1940s intersect in this ‘national community’, Chinese and Korean men are regarded as inferior to their Japanese counterparts, while the female characters are also aligned according to a hierarchy. Within this contested space are alternating messages of ‘enlightenment’ and ‘indoctrination’.²⁴ With its clear-cut thematic boundaries, the film provided a model for imperial filmmakers by demonstrating how co-production ventures were feasible while also promoting a clear ideological message.

Suicide Squad entertained sizable audiences in Korea, earning a reported ¥97,148 (approximately US\$22,638) from screenings in Seoul, Pyongyang, and Pusan.²⁵ Judging by its box office takings, the film was a relatively successful attempt to introduce militaristic propaganda into the action-adventure and melodrama genres that had been popular before the wholesale ban placed on films imported from the United States. *Suicide Squad* set out the case for a united front by Koreans while serving as a military recruiting tool for the KCG. Against this background, the film suggests that ordinary Koreans could be transformed into not just loyal subjects, but also heroes of the Empire, whose contribution would prove vital if Japan was to win the war.

Thus, after 1937 the film industry in Korea was rapidly being transformed from a cinema scene dominated by commercial entertainment films to one shaped by the political, economic, and social imperatives of Japan’s wartime colonial agenda. For Korean filmmakers, collaborative pathways such as those pursued in the production of *Homeless Angels* and *Suicide Squad* – including the ways in which these films portrayed their characters – were critical for avoiding censorship in Korea. Such an approach improved their chances of gaining approval to exhibit a

Korean film in Japan, although this was an even harder task than passing the local censor. The promulgation of the Korean Film Law in 1940, and indeed the large-scale reorganization of the industry in 1942 with the establishment of the CFPC, hastened the process of removing what little autonomy Koreans had enjoyed in an industry already dominated by Japanese studios.

Re-assimilation through American celluloid dreams

Following the end of the Asia-Pacific War, Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge and his US occupation forces began disarming the Japanese military in Korea with the interim plan of transforming the southern part of the Korean Peninsula into a 'self-governing', 'independent', and 'democratic' nation, while safeguarding the wellbeing of its people and rebuilding their economic base.²⁶ Within months of Japan's defeat, American film distributors – following the adage that 'trade follows the flag' – rushed their most popular films back to the southern half of the peninsula.²⁷ Local cinemas were soon inundated with a range of Hollywood films containing glamour, spectacle and high production values, which the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) believed would assist the country to reverse four decades of Japanese influence. The films selected by the US authorities for screening during this period were action-adventure and historical biopics, followed by melodramas, screwball comedies, musicals, westerns, crime/detective thrillers, science fiction, and animated cartoons produced between the mid-1930s and the early 1940s. The graphic imagery used in local newspaper advertisements for these films primarily attracted Koreans, and then US troops, a welcome secondary audience.

The USAMGIK 'film project' was advanced under the auspices of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and with the advice of the Office of War Information's (OWI) Central Motion Picture Exchange (CMPE).²⁸ During this time, the CMPE – the American film industry's East Asian outpost that controlled the distribution rights for Hollywood films – and the USAMGIK's Motion Picture Section in the Department of Public Information (DPI) contributed to the re-establishment of Hollywood's dominance in Korea, reprising the glory days of 1926 to 1936.²⁹ Many of the glamorous spectacle films that the CMPE and DPI eased into the market, and which anchored the USAMGIK's propaganda operation in Korea, were used to evoke a sense of personal, cultural, and political liberty. Instead of thinking and acting like Japanese, Koreans were now expected to think

about what America in general, and democracy in particular, had to offer them. Hollywood films became key vehicles for achieving this task.

To ensure the unhindered dissemination of an 'official' American popular culture – and with scant regard for the democratic principles they so strongly touted – the US occupation authorities began purging the marketplace of 'unwanted' films in mid-April 1946.³⁰ After this date, the requirement for censorship approval from the USAMGIK became an effective way of quashing the efforts of anyone attempting to use film to promote debate on a range of social and political issues, including communism. Films that were exhibited but that failed to satisfy the USAMGIK's democracy criteria included Leni Riefenstahl's *Olympia* (1936), the Italian fascist propaganda film *Lo Squadrone Bianco* (1936), and Julien Duvivier's poetic realist gangster film *Pépé le Moko* (1937). These and other foreign (and unauthorized US) films were all quickly confiscated by the USAMGIK's Department of Police, primarily because the DPI intended to block films with communist allegiances. Simply put, this type of intellectual activism, and the promotion of movies that might have offered alternative views of America and American culture, was seen as an obstacle to the USAMGIK's cultural reorientation program.

In April 1946, the first batch of authorized Hollywood films arrived in Seoul via CMPE-Japan. It included *Queen Christina* (1933), *Barbary Coast* (1935), *Mr Deeds Goes to Town* (1936), *San Francisco* (1936), *The Great Ziegfeld* (1936), *The Buccaneer* (1938), *The Rains Came* (1939), and *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* (1940). These thoughtfully chosen films were 'prestige pictures' in the sense that they were 'injected with plenty of star power, glamorous and elegant trappings, and elaborate special effects'³¹ – attractive packaging to present the core democratic reform values that the US government wanted for Korea.³² The sheer spectacle and extreme foreignness of these Hollywood films enabled audiences to take a holiday from the chaotic social, political, and cultural change occurring around them.³³ The positive portrayal of modern Western city life in these films was an important criterion in selecting them for exhibition in southern Korea. Furthermore, many were Academy Award winning (or nominated) films, such as *In Old Chicago* (1937), *You Can't Take It with You* (1938), *Suspicion* (1941), *Random Harvest* (1942), *Rhapsody in Blue* (1945), and *Casablanca* (1942).

In addition to having achieved popularity in the United States, these films were singled out for Korean audiences because they presented well-dressed people scurrying along the skyscraper-lined, car-filled streets of Manhattan, Paris, and other modern cities. In these settings, men took

the lead in heterosexual coupling, which depicted lovers embracing openly in larger than life studio sets and natural locations alike. While many films contained strong moral messages affirming the final victory of justice (through scenes depicting orderly court proceedings, rule by law, trial by jury, and legal representation) and the importance of hope, others affirmed equal rights for women, religious freedom, racial diversity, and patriotism. However, these themes were often expressed through the depiction (or as the result) of acts of violence, vigilantism, public disorder, deception, desperation, frailty, suicide, theft, murder, killings, adultery, sexual discrimination, racism, and corruption. But equally, men were shown displaying toughness, competitiveness, and open and dominant heterosexuality, as husbands and fathers motivated by a strong work ethic that brought them and their families material success.

It goes without saying that some of the mixed messages unintentionally conveyed by Hollywood films resulted from the emphasis placed by US-style democracy and capitalism on the agency of the individual (as opposed to the established power structures and collective decision-making characteristic of traditional societies like Korea). Individuals let loose to follow their own agendas could lead to positive outcomes (for example, increased social mobility and wealth creation through hard work), or to negative ones (proliferation of crime, social inequality). Hence, there was an overt discrepancy between the uplifting values celebrated in the abovementioned films and the very undemocratic pressures swirling around Hollywood in the late 1930s, such as anti-Nazism, anti-fascism, and anti-communism, and then the blacklist hysteria ten years later, instigated by the US House Un-American Activities Committee.³⁴

Despite these blatantly incongruous elements, Hollywood films were decidedly used to sway public opinion toward democratic and capitalist ways of thinking and acting. Such screenings foregrounded the 'common sense' ideals of a so-called American dream. That is, they showcased the development and progress of major cities, frontier towns, big industry (mainly oil, trains, and manufacturing), and common people overcoming poverty and enjoying modern forms of leisure activities, all as part of a deliberate campaign to assimilate Koreans into a US-led worldview through exposure to opinions, beliefs, attitudes, and values that reflected American cultural norms. It was the very complexity of this culture that was effectively represented through film in this context.

Fox's big budget spectacle film *In Old Chicago*, released in Korea in early May 1946, exemplified some of the mixed messages received by Korean audiences from Hollywood. This film showcased major stars

Tyrone Power, Alice Faye, and Don Ameche, who together delivered a dramatic message about overcoming poverty and fighting corruption. The film was inspired by the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 and showed how the city was rebuilt through determination and perseverance. *In Old Chicago* portrays an Irish family struggling to survive in a 'modern' society at a time when rough frontier towns like Chicago were full of opportunity and wealthy people kept African-American house servants.

In the first five minutes of the film, as the family is seen traveling from the country to Chicago in their horse-drawn covered wagon, the father is killed while chasing a passing steam train – a sleek symbol of modernity. From a non-Western cultural standpoint, the film is jam-packed with a wide range of positive and negative behaviors, including chivalrous men helping well-dressed women across muddy streets, unmarried couples kissing and hugging, fist fights and police raids in saloons, dancing girls in revealing clothes, and breaking and entering into private homes. Yet, as an overriding coda, *In Old Chicago* ends with the optimistic sentiment 'Out of the fire comes steel', underlining the film's projection of the themes of righteousness, corruption (and the need to fight it), and manifest destiny in the context of industrialization and the expansion of America. While the physical setting of the story shares some of the gritty feel of post-liberation Korean society, Asian audiences must have had difficulty in finding the democratic message in a story where 'moral turpitude' is so openly and abundantly on display.

Films such as Frank Capra's *You Can't Take It with You*, exhibited in April 1947, again exposed Korean audiences to imaginative ideas about social relationships. Based on a Pulitzer Prize-winning play, this screwball comedy focuses on the eccentric and emotionally volatile members of the Sycamore family, headed by the patriarchal Grandpa Vanderhof (Lionel Barrymore), who has rejected the dreary business world in favor of a hedonistic lifestyle. Surrounded by people engaged in a variety of frivolous and bizarre activities, Alice Sycamore (Jean Arthur) – who is romantically involved with the affluent and courtly Tony Kirby (James Stewart) – appears to be the only 'ordinary' member of the family. Kirby's introduction to this unconventional household creates a comic yet awkward atmosphere, which is exacerbated when we learn that his father, a calculating industrialist (Edward Arnold), plans to demolish the Sycamore's neighborhood and build a munitions factory. As this drama of incompatible class relations and conflicting personal and social values unfolds, Tony must choose between a cold-hearted lifestyle centered on ambition and wealth, and a future filled with personal happiness, acceptance, and warmth.

In *You Can't Take It with You* – which won multiple Academy Awards, including Best Picture and Best Director – an interclass couple appears free to pursue an intimate relationship, resulting in a ‘happy ending’ that portrays wealthy people sacrificing their personal gain and championing community and family values (and men and women kissing in public). This was one Hollywood film among many that embraced themes of social mobility and change through marriage in the face of seemingly incompatible class relationships, pitting ambition and wealth against happiness and social acceptance. The theme of heterosexual coupling and marrying without parental or family consent – set against a backdrop of modernity, including the bustle and monumental grandeur of Wall Street and city skyscrapers, and advanced technology such as cars, cameras, elevators, telephones, taxis, and guns – was linked to the desire for social mobility through the acquisition of material wealth in a modern society.

Unfortunately, little is known about how Korean audiences received this and other American films screened during the occupation period. Suffice it to say that they contained themes and motifs local viewers would have found in striking contrast to the colonial ideology of the Japanese occupation, let alone the traditional values to which Korean audiences were accustomed. In fact, USAMGIK was well aware of the criticism directed at the undesirable elements found in some of the aforementioned Hollywood films. According to one mid-1947 report submitted to the US Department of State, a committee of American educators who had conducted a survey of local attitudes in Korea was disappointed at the CMPE's failure to offer appropriate films to Korean audiences.³⁵ In reality, there was a limit to the ability of Hollywood films to infuse Korean audiences with American values.

Nonetheless – and in spite of the golden age of Hollywood in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s – Korean audiences were exposed to visual and thematic representations through Hollywood films in the mid to late 1940s that were foreign to their own cultural and Confucian traditions, including theft of property, fraudulent activities, malicious intent, crimes against individuals and authority figures, and illicit sexual contact. In addition, cinema-going in this era enabled audiences to mingle in ways that transgressed long-standing Korean Confucian (and Japanese) practices, which required physical separation between noblemen and commoners as well as between men and women. The onslaught of Hollywood spectacle films exposed local audiences to aspects of American culture that challenged established values and created a backlash among traditionalists.

Despite USAMGIK's campaign to re-orientate the southern half of the Korean Peninsula away from the former colonial government's anti-democratic, anti-American and militaristic ideology, there is no way of knowing whether the popularity of these films resulted in the implanting of American notions of democracy and gender equality in Korean audiences. Nevertheless, the seeds for nurturing increased cultural proximity between America and Korea had been planted with this specific end in mind. In this way, it should not have been too difficult for the US authorities to select for general release films with a predominantly positive message while winnowing out their less edifying counterparts. Films such as *Mr Smith Goes to Washington* (1939), *The Life of Emile Zola* (1937), *Mr Deeds Goes to Town*, *Penny Serenade* (1941), *The Rains Came*, and *Random Harvest* were some of the eminently suitable vehicles that the USAMGIK and CMPE used for showcasing democratic and other 'wholesome' ideals and values that represented the best of what America had to offer.

Eventually, a steady diet of Hollywood productions proved too much for Korean audiences, including president-in-waiting Syngman Rhee. According to an anonymous article published in 1948 in the right-wing newspaper *Chung Ang Shinmun*,³⁶ American pictures seduced Koreans with the 'thrill of murder and gangsterism, with fickle and promiscuous love, with frenzied jazz, and with the pleasures of life in foreign countries', thereby seriously affronting Korean cultural and moral norms.³⁷ Other critics were concerned that Koreans were mindlessly consuming the eroticism, glamour, and fantasy depicted in American films without considering the massive gulf between everyday life and culture in the United States and Korea.³⁸ The open expressions of sexuality and other boisterous behavior portrayed in these films were regarded as culturally insensitive and potentially injurious to Korea's Confucian traditions and national pride. The proponents of such views, such as colonial-era filmmakers Choi In-gyu and Lee Chang-yong, were more interested in seeing *and* producing films with what they considered more appropriate and edifying themes, to counter both the overt propaganda of the Japanese colonial period and the perceived vulgarity and objectionable content of Hollywood films.

While it is difficult to prove the efficacy and long-term impact of the USAMGIK's propaganda campaign on Koreans, a 1962 survey carried out by the US Information Service (USIS) for foreign affairs in Washington DC showed that the vast majority of the population (over 72 per cent) displayed a general acceptance and appreciation of the United States.³⁹ This positive attitude toward the United States outstripped Korean

appreciation of any other major nation and its culture, reflecting the close practical ties between the two countries and indicating that the implementation of US policy in Korea had been generally well received. A few years later in 1966, when over 1,000 Korean university students were surveyed, a majority of the respondents revealed a qualified acceptance of the cultural transformation that had unfolded in Korea since liberation from Japanese occupation: 56 per cent claimed to be very happy or fairly happy with their own standard of living, while the vast majority (83 per cent) saw economic instability and poverty as important problems facing the nation.⁴⁰ This data suggests that in the 1960s young middle-class Koreans were particularly focused on the nation's economic life, a system that was being molded by the recent achievements of capitalism and democracy. As a representative sample of the Korean population and the cultural attitudes of the time, the respondents' perceptions of the United States as the international benchmark for both developments suggested a complex relationship, but at the same time they confirmed the findings of the 1962 study, insofar as both showed evidence of an acceptance of the United States and its influence. For Koreans, the United States had become the touchstone culture, the only one that could meet their aspirations for a steadily improving standard of living.

Through the USAMGIK occupation, Koreans were reintroduced to Hollywood films that embodied a Western sensibility, not simply out of a desire to entertain the masses, but explicitly because studio moguls, such as Spyros P Skouras (president of 20th Century Fox), had long convinced the US government that 'the American motion picture cannot be over estimated [sic] as a weapon in an effort to win the allegiance of the people of the Far East'. For Skouras and his fellow movie magnates, Hollywood films were seen to be the most effective tool bar none for introducing citizens of foreign nations to 'American freedom, American products and the American way of life', to the unwavering extent that 'they have always been anathema to the dictators' – banned by Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and eventually the KCG – in their 'campaign of conquest'.⁴¹ Although the economic (capitalist) and political (democratic) institutions introduced by the United States had a considerable impact, in themselves they only partially account for the transformation of Korean society during this period. In explaining the socio-cultural mechanisms that helped change the way Koreans thought about themselves, their practices, and their aspirations, both at national and international levels, film and the representation of democracy and capitalism it incorporated was crucial. Hence, one of the key socio-cultural

mechanisms that supported and even drove change in the immediate postwar period was the film industry.

Conclusion

The films produced and exhibited during Korea's two major occupation periods were vulnerable to the tangled intersections between cinema and politics, resulting in the failure of the assimilation strategies behind these productions. Notwithstanding, after 1940 the KCG used the production of films such as *Homeless Angels* and *Suicide Squad* for three powerful, motivational purposes: as a propaganda tool to recruit young soldiers; to evoke a sense of allegiance to the Empire; and to remind Koreans (and Japanese) of the Japanese government's ethic of *naisen ittai*. With Japan's growing involvement in the Asia-Pacific War, the nation needed to recruit more young Korean soldiers to fight at the front. Thus, the film industry was crucial to the achievement of these aims, with local Korean audiences exceeding 20 million viewings in 1940 alone. In the cinema, some concessions were made to Korean cultural susceptibilities, but this practical military end was always in view.

The promotional images appearing in the Japanese and Korean film advertisements for *Homeless Angels* and *Suicide Squad* focused on the story lines and the circus-like spectacle offered by each film, while avoiding the exploitation of cultural difference. In other words, they pitted the unity between the lead characters against the common enemies of the Empire (and the ideology of *naisen ittai*): figuratively, in the form of social malevolence, and literally, in the shape of invaders from the North. The Japanese release of *Homeless Angels* was promoted in an industry-based event focusing on the stars and the film's production team, and the live stage shows at the Asakusa Kokusai Theatre before the film's premiere. Although each exhibitor used slightly different images in their advertising, they all sought to stimulate public interest and encourage patronage for these and other films that served to cement loyalty to the Japanese Empire in the hearts and minds of the audience, no matter where they were screened.

In short, the late colonial-era films discussed here attempt to portray a milieu that minimized the cultural differences between Korea and Japan; not by blending the culture of the two nations indiscriminately, but by using the domineering strategy of enfolding Korea into Japan on cultural, intellectual, and practical levels. However, despite their commitment, the authorities in Korea struggled to create a unified linguistic, class, ethnic, and cultural bond between the two countries, even after

imposing a uniform national language. In reality, complete assimilation was unattainable because Koreans could never become equal to Japanese in all respects.⁴² While a number of the films made after the 1940 Korean Film Law could be called collaborative or transcolonial co-productions, they failed to achieve the level of cultural diversity and mutual economic benefit that official co-production efforts embrace today.

After Japan's defeat, the USAMGIK used Hollywood films as a tool to undo whatever allegiances to the Empire had persisted through a heavy diet of colonial propaganda films. Films such as *In Old Chicago* and *You Can't Take It with You* were used to expunge the 'common sense' ethics propagated by the former colonial government, replacing them with 'good sense' principles, such as democracy and capitalism, which were endorsed through a US political realignment of the major Axis nations and their territories after the end of World War II. Whether or not all the films selected by the CMPE successfully transmitted lasting democratic values to Koreans as the USAMGIK had hoped, the entertainment and exoticism associated with America certainly lingered in the minds of local audiences. Hence, 'tutoring' Koreans in the realities of 'modern life', as portrayed in the Hollywood films analyzed here, fitted within USAMGIK's larger aims for managing the country's transition to economic stability and political autonomy.

In pursuing this course, USAMGIK succeeded in exposing local audiences to specific cultural ideals through film screenings that ushered in a new age of cinema in Korea, while establishing the foundational moments in the creation of a new stage of Western cultural sensibility in Korea. Even though the themes and characters beloved by Hollywood represented a fantasy culture, these American films contained a set of idealized qualities against which Koreans could measure themselves. In so doing, Koreans could create the feelings and attitudes evident in the changing social environment of the 1960s, allegiances that were clearly divergent from those circulating in the later stages of Japanese rule. Repeated exposure to the social and ethical values conveyed by the US films discussed above, which could not have differed more from the propaganda films that local audiences had watched between 1940 and 1945, offered Koreans a revitalized cultural model to which they could now aspire.

This chapter has attempted to uncover the conditions and consequences of political change rather than explain the effects that the production and dissemination of this media had on audiences. Although the *naisen ittai* project collapsed with Japan's surrender in 1945, and USAMGIK misjudged the impact that Japanese colonialism had had on

Korea, their attempts to use film to help achieve their social and cultural ideals and goals formed a significant chapter in the history of Japan's occupation of Korea. This chapter has done no more than scratch the surface of a complex and elusive subject. Future study of this subject will undoubtedly benefit from further analysis of Japanese films imported into Korea and consumed by domestic audiences during the colonial period, as well as of domestic films produced in South Korea immediately following liberation, and the influence of decades of exposure to Hollywood movies on Korean directors in the postwar period. The author hopes that the preliminary findings presented here will inspire others to explore these critical but as yet understudied areas.

Notes

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1. Previous studies on US Army Military Government in Korea primarily analyze the political and economic dimensions of US occupation. For example, see GM McCune, 'Post-War Government and Politics of Korea', *The Journal of Politics* 9, No. 4 (1947): 605–23; EG Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York: King's Crown Press 1951); B Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: WW Norton, 1997); and BBC Oh (ed.), *Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948* (Westport: Praeger, 2002).
2. See H Lee, *Contemporary Korean Cinema: Identity, Culture, and Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); EJ Min, JS Joo and HJ Kwak, *Korean Film: History, Resistance, and Democratic Imagination* (Westport: Praeger, 2003); HI Yi, 'The Korean Film Community and Film Movements during the Post-liberation Era', B Yecies and A Shim (eds), *Traces of Korean Cinema from 1945 to 1959* (Seoul: Korean Film Archive, 2003), pp. 11–89.
3. For a detailed discussion of *naisen ittai*, see CJ Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the colonial origins of Korean capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), pp. 224–52.
4. See C Chung, 'Negotiating Colonial Korean Cinema in the Japanese Empire: From the silent era to the talkies, 1923–1939', *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review e-journal* 5 (2012): <https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-5/Chung>.
5. See SF Lindstrom, 'Nationalism Reported Making Japan Tight Market for Films', *Motion Picture Herald*, January 16, 1937: 33.
6. B Yecies, 'Systematization of Film Censorship in Colonial Korea: Profiteering from Hollywood's First Golden Age, 1926–1936', *Journal of Korean Studies* 10, No. 1 (2005): 59–84.

7. M Baskett, *The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), p. 22.
8. T Ōta, 'Chōsen Eigakai No Tenbō' [The Prospect of the Korean Film Industry], *Kinema Junpō* (May 1938): 12–13.
9. See T Sakuramoto, 'Korean Film during the 15 Year War – Korea in a Transparent Body', *Kikan Sanzenri* 34 (1983): 184–91.
10. Quoted from a speech by Governor-General Minami Jirō delivered to Korea's thirteen provincial governors in April 1937. See Government-General of Tyosen, *Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937–38* (Tokyo: Toppau Printing Co, 1938), p. 227.
11. W Dong, 'Assimilation and Social Mobilization in Korea: A Study of Japanese Colonial Policy and Political Integration Effects', in AC Nahm (ed.), *Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule* (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1973), p. 168; MJ Rhee, 'Language Planning in Korea under the Japanese Colonial Administration, 1910–1945', *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 5, No. 2 (1992): 94.
12. Based on the descriptions of the films known to have been made between 1940 and 1945 in Japanese and Korean film periodicals of the time, most of these films envisaged a world in which, as a result of unbending loyalty to the Emperor's will, there would be full cultural integration between Japanese and Koreans.
13. See NA Kwon, 'Collaboration, Coproduction, and Code-Switching: Colonial Cinema and Postcolonial Archaeology', *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review e-journal* 5 (2012): <http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-5/Kwon>.
14. PB High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years' War, 1931–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), pp. 307–8.
15. Sakuramoto, 'Korean Film during the 15 Year War', 186.
16. For a brief discussion of *Look-Back Tower* (aka *Introspection Tower*), see High, *The Imperial Screen*, p. 306.
17. See B Powell, *Japan's Modern Theatre: A Century of Change and Continuity* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 34–5.
18. Between 2004 and 2005, Korea Film Archive researchers discovered prints of *Angels and Spring in the Korean Peninsula* (1941) in the Chinese Film Archives in Beijing. Previously, *Suicide Squad* was one of only three colonial-era feature films – along with *Figure of Youth* (1943) and *Love and Commitment* (1945) – unearthed in 1989 in the Tōhō Studio archives in Japan.
19. For example, see YI Lee, *Hanguk Yeonghwa Jeonsa* [History of Korean Cinema] (Seoul: Sodo, 2004), p. 202.
20. Choi actively participated in the new production system by directing these explicit propaganda 'message' films, designed to educate young male Koreans about military service and recruit them into the armed forces, while also persuading them to embrace loyalty to the Empire.
21. JL Anderson and D Richie, *The Japanese Film: Art and Industry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 130.
22. TT Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p. 310.
23. Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, p. 307.
24. See N Mizuno, 'A Propaganda Film Subverting Ethnic Hierarchy?: *Suicide Squad at the Watchtower* and Colonial Korea', *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review e-journal* 5 (2012): <http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-5/Mizuno>.

25. Sakuramoto, 'Korean Film during the 15 Year War', 190.
26. Explicit details of these plans are found in published sources such as General Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, *Summation No. 11: United States Army Military Government activities in Korea for the Month of August, 1946*, pp. 12–13.
27. SB Self, 'Movie Diplomacy: "Propaganda" value of Films Perils Hollywood's Rich Markets Abroad', *Wall Street Journal* 6 (August 16, 1944): 6.
28. Copies of the OWI's *Government Information Manual*, which encouraged the use of film as propaganda, are available in National Archives and Records Administration, Maryland (NARAI): RG 208, Records of the OWI, Records of the Historian Relating to the Overseas Branch, 1942–5.
29. See Yecies, 'Systematization of Film Censorship in Colonial Korea'; B Yecies, 'Sounds of Celluloid Dreams: Coming of the Talkies to Cinema in Colonial Korea', *Korea Journal* 48, No. 1 (2008): 16–97.
30. See Ordinance No. 68, 'Regulation of the Motion Pictures', in GHQ/SCAP, US Army Forces, Pacific, 'Monthly Summation No. 8', *US Army Military Government Activities in Korea* (Tokyo, May 1946), p. 88.
31. T Balio, *Grand Design: Hollywood as a Modern Business Enterprise, 1930–1939*, Vol. 5 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 180.
32. To make these films more palatable to local audiences, Korean *byeonsa* (live narrators) were recruited to introduce these Hollywood spectacle films. According to historical reports, local audiences lapped them up, whether or not they understood them or appreciated the cultural values they contained. NARAI: RG59, Decimal File 1945–49, Box 7398, US Embassy, Seoul 1950, US-DOS, 'Dispatch No. 657', January 2, 1950.
33. A point noted by domestic film critics at the time. See Lee, *History of Korean Cinema*, p. 4.
34. There was also a major point of divergence between the 'democratic' principles showcased by the USAMGIK 'film project', and the US occupation authority's practice of retaining Korean public officials (as well as institutions and policies) from the KCG. See: Y Chung, 'Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea', *Korea Journal* 42, No. 3 (2002): 18–59; and ME Caprio's chapter in this volume.
35. NARAI: RG59, Box 7398, Department of State, Decimal File 1945–49, 'Report of the Educational and Informational Survey Mission to Korea', June 20, 1947, 35–6.
36. *Chung Ang Shinmun*, March 31, 1948.
37. This quotation, part of an English translation of the original article, is contained in NARAI: Records of the US-DOS relating to the internal affairs of Korea, 1945–49, microfilm reel No. 7, Decimal File 895, 'Dispatch No. 80: Korean Opposition to American Motion Pictures', April 7, 1948.
38. Lee, *History of Korean Cinema*, p. 4.
39. See NARAI: RG 306, Box 20, HM 1991, Records of the United States Information Agency, Exhibits Division, Records Concerning Exhibits in Foreign Countries, 1955–67, Korean Survey Research Center, 'Study of Korean Attitudes Towards the United States', USIS-Seoul to USIA-Washington, June 18, 1962.
40. See NARAI: RG 306, Box 8, HM FY1991, Records of the United States Information Agency, Office of Research, Records of Research Projects,

International Research Associates, 'Project Quartet: An Opinion Survey among Korean Students', 1966.

41. Skouras' comments appear in: 'Letter to Mr Spyros P Skouras from Dwight Eisenhower', January 16, 1953. NARAII: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), Document Number: CIA-RDP80R01731R000900100014-1. Available at: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/search/site/spyros%20P.%20skouras>.
42. See ME Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 201-7.

8

Patriotic Collaboration?: Zhou Fohai and the Wang Jingwei Government during the Second Sino-Japanese War

Brian G. Martin

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) has not receded into the past for the Chinese, but remains a complicating factor in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. This is largely because of the way the Chinese government has used the War to gain an advantage over the Japanese government during periods of tension, and to stimulate anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment to bolster its nationalist credentials in a new post-communist age. This continuing politicization of the War means that, despite the huge number of works published in China over the last twenty years, it is still extremely difficult for Chinese historians to entirely break free from a narrow nationalist narrative that privileges the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The only real change in recent years has been the progressive inclusion of Chiang Kai-shek and the wartime Guomindang military into this narrative, an indication of the further trumping of communist ideology by nationalism.

In a nationalist reading of the Sino-Japanese War collaborators, or those who cooperated with the Japanese, are excoriated as *hanjian*, a term that is conventionally used to mean traitor but literally means a betrayer of the Chinese race.¹ The implication is that by assisting an enemy to damage China, an individual crosses a fundamental boundary that denies them the right to be considered a 'real' or 'genuine' Chinese person. The act of collaboration effectively deracinates the individual involved. This approach gives short shrift to any attempt to understand the reasons adduced by collaborators for their collaboration or to delineate the political context within which their choices were made.

It simply demonizes the collaborators and leaves it at that. The present chapter seeks to understand collaboration as one political strategy in a period of military and political crisis and avoids demonizing its advocates. It does so by discussing the justifications made by one leading collaborator, Zhou Fohai (1897–1948), both at his trial in 1946 and in various public statements he made in 1939–40 at the time of the organization of the Wang Jingwei government. In this way it seeks to elucidate the motivations of the collaborationist Wang Jingwei government.

Comparing the Wang Jingwei regime with Vichy France

The narrow focus on the resistance role of the CCP (and latterly the Guomindang) leads one to consider that contemporary China faces its own Vichy syndrome regarding the Sino-Japanese War, where the demands of the nationalist historical narrative deliberately obscure the realities of the wartime period.² One way to understand the phenomenon of collaboration is to compare the Chinese experience with similar situations in contemporary occupied Europe, notably the French collaborationist Vichy regime (1940–4).³ Allowing for the markedly different political, cultural, and historical environments in which the two regimes operated, one can still identify general similarities between the Wang Jingwei government (1940–5) and the French State (*l'Etat Francais*) that replaced the Third Republic.

Both regimes argued that they constituted a buffer between the occupying German and Japanese forces and their respective populations to mitigate the worst excesses of the occupiers. They constructed an image of self-sacrifice by their respective leaders, Petain and Wang Jingwei.⁴ Both regimes were geographically limited states that did not enjoy complete control over their respective national territories. Vichy's writ was limited to central and southern France, and after 1942 was itself occupied by the Germans. The authority of the Wang Jingwei government was limited effectively to the occupied areas of central and southern China, and it did not directly control the other occupied areas of North China or Inner Mongolia. Both regimes, however, did enjoy a degree of genuine autonomy, although this was certainly constrained by the economic and financial demands of the occupying powers.

Both, nevertheless, actively sought to participate in the new orders created by Germany and Japan, the New European Order and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. The Wang regime, however, did better than Vichy on this front. Unlike Vichy, in 1943 it finally gained

Japan's recognition as a co-belligerent and succeeded in replacing the restrictive Basic Treaty with a Pact of Alliance with Japan.⁵ Given their contested legitimacy, both regimes used terror tactics against their opponents as an instrument of policy. Vichy organized the paramilitary *Milice Française* that carried out an extensive terror campaign in 1943–4. The Wang regime established a Security Service General Headquarters that engaged in an urban terror campaign against Guomindang and communist guerrillas who operated from the Shanghai foreign settlements in 1939–41.⁶

One further feature shared by Vichy and the Wang regime was their pronounced anti-communism. In the case of Vichy, this reflected prewar tensions between the political Left and Right, together with the traditionalist and anti-republican values espoused by Petain. Wang Jingwei and those associated with him after 1940 were scarred by the abrasive revolutionary politics of the First United Front between the Guomindang and the CCP in the 1920s. Two of Wang's key lieutenants in his collaborationist government, Chen Gongbo (1892–1946) and Zhou Fohai, the subject of this chapter, had been members of the CCP who left in the late 1920s. Like many former communists, they were both hostile to communism in the 1930s and 1940s.⁷

At the same time there were marked dissimilarities between the two regimes. Their origins were quite different. Vichy was a legitimate regime, the constitutional successor to the Third Republic whose representatives had voted full powers to Petain. Wang Jingwei's regime, on the other hand, was a breakaway group from the legally constituted Government of the Republic of China, temporarily located in Chongqing (Chungking),⁸ and therefore its legitimacy was always contested by the Chongqing government.⁹ The ideological positions of the two regimes also differed. The Vichy regime rejected the democracy of the Third Republic and organized itself as an authoritarian French State espousing conservative social values. The Wang regime, in contrast, continued to celebrate Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) as the founder of the Chinese Republic and advocated the same Nationalist (Guomindang) revolutionary ideology as the Chongqing government, based on Sun's Three People's Principles. Wang, indeed, saw himself as Sun's natural political heir; he had transcribed Sun's will on the latter's deathbed, which subsequently served major legitimizing and ritual functions within the Guomindang.¹⁰ Further, despite a shared anti-communism, the Wang government was a less exclusive regime than Vichy. There was no equivalent in the Wang regime, for example, of Vichy's targeting of Jews through anti-semitic laws and periodic round ups.¹¹

The Wang Jingwei government and Zhou Fohai

From Japan's perspective, the Wang Jingwei government was the final outcome of a relatively extended period of experimentation from 1937 to 1940 to find, in Timothy Brook's term, an effective 'occupation state' that would provide the framework within which Japan could engage in the orderly extraction of resources for its war economy.¹² The process went through several different phases. Initially, as Brook describes it, this occupation state was created in an ad hoc manner, by Japanese Special Service agents co-opting local elites in occupied Jiangnan to set up collaborative local governments by establishing compliant peace maintenance committees.¹³ Where the Japanese had difficulty finding local figures to collaborate with them, they set up their own 'governments' with limited success, such as the Great Way Government in occupied Chinese Shanghai which lasted for barely five months in 1937–8.¹⁴

By early 1938, Japan's determination to destroy Chiang Kai-shek's government was clearly indicated by the severe terms that the Japanese Imperial Conference decided to impose on China in its Fundamental Policy of January 11, 1938.¹⁵ The corollary of this policy was the decision to set up occupation states on a regional basis: the Provisional Government of the Republic of China in North China inaugurated on December 14, 1937; and in Central China, the Reformed Government of the Republic of China created on March 14, 1938. These regimes, together with a Mongol autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, seemed to indicate at the time an intention on the part of Japan either to keep China politically fragmented or to create eventually some form of federal government with a weak national mandate.¹⁶

The limitations of this approach, however, led Japan to reassess its strategy. After two years of protracted negotiations with Wang Jingwei and his breakaway peace movement, an agreement was reached on creating a Reorganized Government of the Republic of China, with pretensions to nationwide rule whose purpose was to directly challenge Chiang Kai-shek's Chongqing government. From the outset, however, Wang's government was circumscribed by the restrictive terms of the Basic Treaty with Japan signed finally on November 30, 1940, which undercut its national pretensions. These terms were eventually relaxed when the Basic Treaty was replaced by the Pact of Alliance between the Wang regime and Japan in October 1943 that, by placing the Wang government on a more equal footing with Japan, was regarded by its leaders as a major success.¹⁷

In the 1940s Zhou Fohai was one of Wang's key lieutenants, but, prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, he had not been a close ally of Wang. On the contrary, Zhou was closely associated with Chiang Kai-shek. He had been a leading member of the CC Clique that controlled the Guomintang's party organization and party security service, and which had been a factional enemy of Wang's group in the 1930s.¹⁸ It was Zhou's pessimistic view that China could not defeat Japan and his belief in the need to secure peace through a negotiated settlement that propelled him towards Wang Jingwei in the course of 1938. Many in Guomintang government circles shared Zhou's pessimism, especially after the withdrawal from Nanjing and the subsequent retreat from Wuhan, but, unlike Zhou, most of them remained with the Chongqing government.¹⁹

Subsequently, Zhou played an important role in the negotiations with the Japanese in 1939 for the creation of a 'peace' government led by Wang Jingwei.²⁰ He was a key member of that government after 1940, holding the posts of Minister of Finance and Director-General of the Central Reserve Bank, Deputy Head of the Executive Yuan, Minister of Police (in 1940) and, finally, Mayor of Shanghai. A year after Pearl Harbor, Zhou became less convinced of the prospects for a Japanese victory in the Asia-Pacific War and so he sought to hedge his bets. He re-established contact with the Chongqing government and played a dangerous double-game in Nanjing, cooperating with the Guomintang underground while maintaining his official posture as a leader in the collaborationist government.²¹

In light of his active cooperation with Chongqing in the latter part of the War, Zhou anticipated a return to politics after a decent interval, once he had formally surrendered to the returning Guomintang forces in Shanghai in September 1945. Indeed, he was protected initially by Dai Li (1895–1946), Chiang Kai-shek's notorious spymaster, as well as by Chiang's own reluctance to try those leading collaborators who were formerly in his regime for fear of damaging the legitimacy of his government.²² The situation, however, changed during the course of 1946: Dai Li died in a plane crash in March and Chiang came under increasing pressure from both the CCP and non-communist public figures to bring all the collaborators to justice. As a consequence, Zhou was put on trial in late 1946, found guilty and sentenced to death on November 7 and, although his wife organized an appeal, the death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court on January 20, 1947.²³ With all avenues closing off, in desperation Zhou sought out his old CC Clique bosses (Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu) to appeal directly to Chiang Kai-shek on his

behalf, which they did, and Chiang commuted Zhou's sentence to life imprisonment.²⁴

Collaboration as a form of patriotism: Zhou Fohai's defence

In his deposition to the Court, Zhou presented a very articulate, persuasive, and forceful defence of his collaboration, and one which he sustained under questioning from the public prosecutor. This was unsurprising, given that Zhou was a facile writer who had penned an appreciation of Sun Yat-sen's 'Three People's Principles' that served as the Guomindang's orthodox interpretation throughout the 1930s and, as acting director, had been in charge of the Party's propaganda program immediately prior to his defection.²⁵ As the following discussion will show in its references to Zhou's writings in 1939–40, his arguments in support of his collaboration were consistent over time.

Zhou's central argument was that collaboration in the interests of peace was in fact a patriotic act, and was a form of martyrdom by which Wang and his group sacrificed themselves and invited the calumny of their peers in the interests of saving China.²⁶ This portrayal of collaboration as a form of patriotic sacrifice appeared consistently in Zhou's public statements from the beginning. In 1939, when he was organizing the peace movement in Shanghai, Zhou described both Wang and himself as national martyrs:

Mister Wang, therefore, adopting a resolute spirit, decided to sacrifice himself completely for the nation and the race, and left Chongqing in order to publicly proclaim his advocacy of peace and engage in the peace movement. Now, since my views were similar to those of Mister Wang's, and as I was moved by Mister Wang's fearless spirit of sacrifice I resolved to break away from everything and to follow Mister Wang and to do my duty to the utmost for the nation and the race.²⁷

In describing collaboration as a sacrifice for the nation and the race, Zhou was deliberately constructing a riposte to the accusation that the collaborators were in fact 'traitors to the race *hanjian*', thus denying that the epithet 'traitors' could be applied to them.

Zhou's journey to collaboration began with his strong belief that China alone could not win against Japan, and that the longer it resisted, the worse would be its ultimate defeat. He therefore argued forcefully in 1937–8 for the need to open peace negotiations with Japan in order to

preserve as much as possible of China's sovereignty. In advocating a diplomatic settlement Zhou, at the time, had the support of leading Chinese figures, including the prominent intellectual and philosopher Hu Shi (1891–1962) and the leading military figure Xiong Shihui (1894–1974), none of whom ultimately followed him into collaboration.²⁸ Zhou saw himself as a realist who forced himself to face unpalatable facts, in particular that China's power was inferior to Japan's and that, although China might obtain sympathy from the Great Powers, it could expect no practical help.²⁹ Given the then international situation, he denounced those who persisted in believing in China's ultimate victory as 'building castles in the air'. He went on to say: 'Who among people with a bit of nationalist thought and patriotic spirit are willing to embrace defeatism? But hard facts will not allow us fantasies. For this reason I conclude that the war must end in utter defeat.'³⁰ His objective, therefore, was to avoid the chaos that he believed would follow China's defeat by negotiating a peace agreement with Japan. Zhou was also motivated by his deep suspicions of both the CCP and the Soviet Union, and he believed that they alone benefitted from the Sino-Japanese conflict and would also benefit from the chaos that would follow China's inevitable defeat.³¹ It can be argued that Zhou was rather prescient in his views on the communists. In the event, the anti-Japanese war strengthened the CCP's position in North China and provided it with the means to effectively challenge the Chiang Kai-shek government in the civil war that followed. Zhou's pronounced anti-communism was shared by many of his colleagues on the Guomindang right, especially the members of the CC Clique, and it also provided some common ground between him and Japanese officials.

Throughout the negotiations with the Japanese on the formation of a government in 1939, Zhou insisted on maintaining the symbols of China's sovereignty. These included the implementation of Sun Yat-sen's 'Three People's Principles', freedom for the Guomindang to pursue its activities, the retention of the name National Government for the new collaboration government, and the flying of the Chinese national Blue Sky White Sun flag. The Japanese insisted that the new government use the Five-Barred flag of the early Republic, so Wang delegated Zhou to discuss the issue with the Japanese and, after a series of tough negotiations in Tokyo and Shanghai, a compromise was agreed that the Blue Sky White Sun flag could be flown but with a yellow pennant carrying the Japanese-inspired slogan 'peace, anti-communism, national reconstruction'.³² It is clear that Zhou understood the importance of maintaining the symbols of sovereignty to differentiate the Wang government from the two earlier collaboration governments

set up by the Japanese – the Provisional Government in Beiping and the Reform Government in Nanjing. By extension, it was also an attempt to persuade the population of the occupied areas that the collaboration government was a legitimate continuation in Jiangnan of the previous National Government.

In his deposition, Zhou argued that the creation of the Wang collaboration government was not detrimental to the interests or the security of the Chongqing government, since it was set up in those areas that were already under Japanese control, and its military forces were no match for those of Chongqing. He also noted that collaborationist officials were not necessarily the lackeys of the Japanese and, by implication, could harbor patriotic sentiments. Zhou observed that Jose Laurel, who had been President of the Japanese-sponsored Filipino 'Republic' and had been indicted for treason after the war, had not only been pardoned but had gone on to become a notable figure in Filipino postwar politics. This prompted Zhou to note rather wistfully that 'the people of the Philippines are able to distinguish this [that puppet officials were not necessarily running dogs of the Japanese], [but] our China seemingly cannot fully accept this'.³³ In support of his contention that collaborationist officials could be patriots, Zhou argued that the Wang government, far from aiding the Japanese, actually impeded their military by a policy of deliberate procrastination in the face of Japanese demands. Using a clause in the 1939 agreement by which Japan officially recognized China's sovereignty, Zhou and other collaborationist officials enlisted the support of the Japanese Embassy to drag out the decision-making process on all military requests.³⁴ They even sought to exploit the professional rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy.³⁵

While undoubtedly there were regime officials who sought to limit the depredations of the Japanese military, Zhou emphasized this aspect for obvious reasons: to reinforce his argument on the essential patriotic spirit of the collaborationist officials like him, and so bolster his defence at his 1946 trial. But there was another reason for such behaviour. Given the collaborationist government's limited authority vis-à-vis the Japanese military, its officials needed to engage in such activities to shore up its own legitimacy as a Chinese government.

Zhou sought to illustrate his contention that the members of the collaborationist Wang government were inspired by a sense of patriotism and a concern for the population of the occupied areas by reference to his own activities in that government. He noted that as Minister of Finance he regained control over three taxes from the Japanese:

customs, salt and consolidated tax. As Chairman of the Committee to Administer Enemy Property, he obtained the return of Chinese commercial and industrial property expropriated by the Japanese military in the early stages of the war and, where some of these were Sino-foreign ventures with British and American firms, was able to retain the foreign capital. Zhou also emphasized his role in ameliorating the conditions of ordinary Chinese as Mayor of Shanghai from January 1945, when he persuaded the Japanese gendarmerie to reduce the number of checkpoints in the city, thus freeing up communication for its citizens, and arguing for an increase in the rations of rice and other foodstuffs for the city's population.³⁶

Zhou also attempted to make the case that the creation of a puppet currency – the Central Reserve Currency (CRC) – in 1941–2 was a positive development since its aim, according to him, was to end the use of Japanese military scrip by which all prices in the occupied areas were denominated. Zhou argued that his program of currency reform was a patriotic act as it eventually ended the arbitrary use of Japanese military scrip that had caused great hardship to occupied populations and was implemented in the face of serious opposition from the Japanese military. This was, however, less than half the story. The issuing of a puppet currency was extremely contentious from the Chongqing government's viewpoint; it therefore greatly exercised Zhou's interrogators and necessitated him writing a supplementary deposition devoted to it. We will return to this issue in the next section.³⁷

Zhou devoted a considerable part of his deposition to describing his activities in support of the Chongqing government after he had covertly 'surrendered' to Chiang Kai-shek, through Dai Li, at the end of 1942. As an overture to discussion of his 'surrender', Zhou emphasized that he had 'firmly opposed' Japan's recognition of the Wang Jingwei government; his reason was his initial belief, shared by other leading members of that government, that the Wang government would serve as a bridge between Chongqing and Japan in order to achieve a 'comprehensive peace' settlement. For this reason, the Wang Jingwei government had retained the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of China (Chongqing), Lin Sen, as its formal Head of State – Lin had been Chairman (that is President) of the National Government since 1932 – with Wang as Acting Chairman.³⁸ Zhou felt that formal recognition by Japan would destroy this role for Nanjing, since Chongqing would never accept such recognition. At this time, in late 1940, the Konoe government was in indirect contact with Chongqing and was consequently reluctant to grant official recognition to the Wang Jingwei government as long as there was a chance that it could reach an agreement

with Chiang Kai-shek.³⁹ It is possible that Zhou's statements allude to his involvement in at least encouraging such contact. In his deposition, Zhou states that he wrote letters of introduction for a Chongqing government emissary, Zhang Jingli, to the Japanese Prime Minister, Konoe, and the Foreign Minister, Matsuoka; Zhang had been sent by Chongqing to Tokyo to try and dissuade the Japanese from recognizing the Wang Jingwei government. However, once the die was cast with the signing of the Basic Treaty, Zhou had no further problems in working effectively within the structure of the Nanjing government for the next two years.⁴⁰

In describing his covert 'surrender' to his interrogators, Zhou stressed his patriotic nature and his own desire to seek to re-establish his personal bonds with Chiang.⁴¹ By emphasizing his past personal connection to Chiang and his covert intelligence activities for Chongqing, he hoped that he might be restored to Chiang's inner circle. From early 1943, Zhou engaged in underground work for the Chongqing government.⁴² This involved a variety of activities: establishing and protecting a radio transmitter to maintain direct contact with Chongqing; collecting and transmitting intelligence reports on Japanese troop movements and on the location of Japanese arms and fuel dumps; assisting and rescuing Chongqing agents operating in the occupied areas; arranging matters with the puppet military commanders to ensure that they cooperated in the counteroffensive in Jiangnan planned to coincide with the expected landings of US forces on the Chinese coast; and eliminating 'traitors', such as the assassination of the head of the Wang security service, Li Shiqun, which Zhou planned at the behest of Dai Li. Finally, once Japan surrendered, Zhou secured Shanghai for the returning Guomindang civil and military authorities and prevented the communists from exploiting the political vacuum to seize power. In his deposition, Zhou emphasized the undoubted dangers attendant on this double game:

I carried out my work in the tiger's den; its dangers were in fact equal to those fighting at the front. I was always arguing with the Japanese, and there were those Japanese officers, especially from the Kempeitai, who put the cap of 'peaceful anti-Japanese resister' and 'Chongqing element' on my head... [S]o among the enemy Kempeitai there were some extremists who thought of doing me harm.⁴³

The limits of patriotic collaboration

Whatever the original intentions of the Wang 'peace' government, its creation posed a threat to the National Government in Chongqing.

After the signing of the Basic Treaty, it was clearly a rival government to Chongqing and no longer a potential 'bridge' between Japan and Chongqing. There were now two governments claiming to be the National Government, both advocating diametrically opposed policies: Chongqing stood for resistance to Japanese aggression, while Nanjing advocated collaboration with Japan as the only means by which China could guarantee its sovereignty in a future Japanese-dominated Asian region. Both governments claimed that their very different policies were patriotic.

From its inception, the Wang government sought to undermine and delegitimize the Chongqing government. In its first years, from mid-1939 to December 1941, for example, the Wang regime's security service launched a violent campaign to secure Shanghai and Jiangnan for the regime and to eliminate Chongqing's security service. In this campaign, Zhou Fohai played a prominent role, both as a senior member of Wang's 'Orthodox' Guomindang's Security Service Committee and as Minister of Police (after March 1940).⁴⁴ The Wang regime also immediately created its own administrative institutions to replace those of Chongqing in Jiangnan, and annulled all the laws and regulations of its predecessor. Under questioning from Public Prosecutor Chen Shengzu, Zhou was forced to admit that one of the first acts of the Wang government was to nullify all legislation promulgated by the Chongqing Nationalist Government.⁴⁵ The manifesto establishing the Wang government categorically stated that 'within China there is only one legal Central Government, so all the domestic laws and regulations and the treaties and agreements contracted by Chongqing are completely null and void'.⁴⁶ From the beginning, therefore, whatever Zhou Fohai and the other members of Wang's peace movement desired in terms of building a 'peace bridge' between Nationalist China and Japan, their aspirations were undermined by the imperatives of creating a government whose legitimacy depended on delegitimizing its Chongqing rival.

A particular area of insistent questioning by the public prosecutor was the currency reform of 1941–2.⁴⁷ The replacement of the Nationalist government's currency, the *fabi*, by the Wang government's CRC was regarded by Chongqing as a major blow that undermined its financial integrity and loosened its hold over the Chinese banks in Shanghai.⁴⁸ As the Wang regime's Minister of Finance and Chairman of its Central Reserve Bank, Zhou was directly responsible for this currency reform. Although Zhou argued that the reform had a patriotic intent, since its purpose was to progressively eliminate the use of Japanese military scrip, Chongqing was more concerned about the effects on the *fabi*; all *fabi*

were withdrawn in favour of CRC from Jiangnan and occupied Central China in the autumn of 1942 at an arbitrarily unfavourable rate of 2:1. Realizing the importance of the currency issue to his accusers, Zhou wrote a supplementary deposition specifically addressing the issue in which he apologized repeatedly saying that he was 'extremely distressed' and that his 'conscience was extremely disturbed' at the time by this issue.⁴⁹ He argued that the problem was the Japanese determination to eliminate the *fabi*, which declined dramatically in terms of the Japanese military scrip and, since the CRC was at that time pegged at 1:1 with the *fabi*, its value also declined markedly. According to Zhou, this situation forced his hand and he broke the 1:1 peg on March 30–1, 1942, which stabilized the CRC.⁵⁰ He states that even after breaking the peg he remained 'vehemently opposed to the [Japanese policy] of rendering the *fabi* valueless', and so he strove to ensure that the withdrawal of the *fabi* for the CRC was at par. In this he failed, according to Zhou because of Japanese obduracy, and after protracted negotiations conducted through his Japanese senior economic advisor, Aoki Kazuo, a compromise was reached in which the *fabi* would be withdrawn in favour of the CRC at a rate of 2:1.⁵¹

This apologetic argument, stressing his patriotic concerns about the fate of the *fabi*, was clearly designed to impress his interrogators and judges. At the time, however, his major concern had been strengthening and stabilizing the CRC. In a radio broadcast he made on July 21, 1942, Zhou stated that the creation of the CRC was designed to strengthen the administrative powers of the Wang government and to provide a foundation for Sino-Japanese financial collaboration. He went on to say that the CRC strengthened the Wang regime's political and economic position and that it had helped also to stabilize commodity prices.⁵² Despite his carefully crafted deposition on the currency reform, Zhou appears to have been unsettled by the way the public prosecutor kept returning to this issue. At one point Zhou was forced to admit that, as Minister of Finance, he had issued an order in February 1942 forbidding the population in the occupied areas from using the *fabi* currency, although he argued that he was 'coerced' by Japanese Military Headquarters. But he evaded another question on whether he had ordered that anyone found using *fabi* would be shot. Zhou also admitted that about two thirds of the recalled *fabi* went to the Yokohama Specie Bank where it was used to purchase goods and materials, presumably by the Japanese military. This would appear to contradict his statement in his Supplementary Deposition, where he stated that the withdrawal of the *fabi* ensured that the Japanese military could not use this currency to purchase goods and

materials in the border area.⁵³ Zhou, in other words, sought to avoid, where he could, this extremely contentious issue for which he had direct responsibility and, when he could not, tried to put his actions in the most favourable light possible, a tactic that was blunted by the insistent hostile questioning of the prosecutor.

If the prosecutor's insistent questioning on the currency reform issue dented Zhou's defence of the patriotic nature of his collaboration, even more damaging was his admission of limited success in protecting the Chinese population of the occupied areas from the depredations of the Japanese military. As noted in the previous section, Zhou emphasized his success in regaining control over three key taxes, but these were only partial successes. Although Zhou tried to limit the amount of salt that the Japanese military could use, this ended in abject failure. The Japanese military merely ignored the regulations of the Wang government and, with their control of the communications networks, engaged in smuggling salt 'on a massive scale'. Zhou admitted his impotence: 'I could only sigh helplessly as I did not have the means to stop them.'⁵⁴ In an effort to try and control the amount, price and type of product the Japanese military could obtain, Zhou set up the Committee to Review the Control of Goods and Materials under his chairmanship. Zhou used this committee to spin out discussions and delay decisions, and so the Japanese military were very reluctant to participate in its proceedings. Eventually the Japanese, in exasperation, effectively sidelined the committee by creating their own general purchasing agency and 'only unimportant questions' then came before the committee. Zhou's complaints to the Japanese embassy were ineffectual as the embassy had no authority over the Japanese military headquarters.⁵⁵ The efforts by Zhou to curb the Japanese military's ability to take what it wanted from the population of the occupied areas were largely ineffectual, and that population remained prey to the forced purchases and seizures of goods and materials by the Japanese military headquarters.

Although not mentioned by Zhou, there was one area where the Wang government was directly involved in coercive activities, the program of rural pacification. Motivated by its strong anti-communist bias, the Wang regime willingly cooperated with the Japanese military in conducting extensive sweeps against communist guerrillas in the rural hinterland of the occupied areas from 1941, which greatly disrupted the lives and security of the rural inhabitants. Although the implementation of this program was in the hands of the Wang regime's intelligence tsar Li Shiqun, Zhou was responsible for its

general oversight and negotiations with the Japanese, and so was the most senior member of the government responsible for the program.⁵⁶ In this instance, the Wang government certainly did not act as a buffer between the Japanese military and the population of the occupied areas, quite the reverse.

While Zhou stressed the patriotic nature of his covert 'surrender' to Chiang Kai-shek in late 1942, there are other constructions that can be put on his return to Chongqing. It can be argued, for example, that his 'surrender' represented Zhou's acknowledgement of the failure of his policy of collaboration. Like Wang Jingwei, Zhou's initial motivation for collaboration was to obtain a peace with Japan that would safeguard the essentials of China's sovereignty. Such an effort, however, would also have to involve the Chongqing government, and any chance of winning over Chongqing was ended when Japan officially recognized the Wang government as the National Government of the Republic of China via the Basic Treaty, a point that Zhou himself recognized. At the same time, Zhou came to realize that, from the Japanese point of view, the creation of the Wang government was only a stratagem to better secure their gains in China.⁵⁷

There was also an element of *realpolitik* in his covert 'surrender'. By the time he sent his 'surrender' to Chiang via Dai Li at the end of 1942, the international situation had changed dramatically. As a result of Japan's attack on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Sino-Japanese War had been subsumed into a larger Asia-Pacific War with global implications. Chongqing was no longer alone and isolated but was allied with the United States, the United Kingdom and other members of the newly formed United Nations that were fighting fascism. Although the Allies suffered a number of reverses early in 1942, notably in Southeast Asia, the long term prospects for Chongqing looked a lot better than they had a year earlier. In the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, Zhou Fohai gave a bleak assessment of the prospects for the Wang government. In one scenario outlined by Zhou, Japan might at first be victorious, but would be defeated ultimately because of its lack of resources; in another, even if Japan actually won, its victory would result in China being reduced to a Japanese colony. Neither scenario, therefore, boded well for the fortunes of the Wang government.⁵⁸ A growing disillusionment with Japan, and a realistic assessment that the international situation was becoming more favourable to Chongqing, propelled Zhou to reconsider his political situation and to seek to reposition himself to take advantage of changing political and international circumstances.

Conclusion

Zhou Fohai's initial motivations for collaboration were undoubtedly his belief that China on its own could not win a war with Japan, and that only a peace agreement could ensure China's sovereignty in a regional environment increasingly dominated by Japan. In this sense, Zhou could argue that his collaboration was a patriotic act since it was motivated by a desire to save China from the twin catastrophes of aggressive Japanese militarism and an ill-considered strategy of resistance to the end, as advocated in certain quarters of the Nationalist government. He also believed that the only beneficiaries of a protracted war between China and Japan would be the Soviet Union and the CCP, a prospect that appalled him.⁵⁹

Zhou believed that his patriotic motivation could be sustained through the activities of the Wang 'peace movement' in 1939 and, perhaps, even during the early months of the Wang government. Nevertheless, the process of setting up a collaborationist government undermined any prospect of future openings towards Chongqing, especially as the efforts to legitimize this government involved the delegitimization of the Nationalist government. A further complication for Zhou was that, working more closely with the Japanese after the signing of the Basic Treaty, he realized progressively that the Wang government had limited leverage with the Japanese military headquarters that exercised real power in the occupied areas, and that the Japanese organ with which the Wang government had the best relations, the Foreign Ministry, could not control the military.

Although the situation improved somewhat in 1943 with the replacement of the Basic Treaty by a more generous Pact of Alliance and the return by Japan of the foreign concessions to the Wang government, it was too little too late.⁶⁰ With the entry of the United States into the war, the Sino-Japanese conflict was increasingly subsumed into a global conflict, and the tide was slowly turning against Japan. Zhou understood this, and his 'voluntary submission' to Chongqing was an admission that his policy of patriotic collaboration had failed; he now sought to salvage his political reputation as best he could.

Zhou was one of a number of right-wing Guomindang politicians who, at the outset of the Sino-Japanese War, feared that China would be overwhelmed either by the Soviet Union or Japan. Neither outcome was palatable to them. But some, such as Zhou, made the calculation that dealing with Japan was the lesser evil. As Zhou expressed in his diary in 1938: 'I am extremely pessimistic. People like me do not want to be the

running dogs of Russia or to join the communist party, and we certainly are not willing to be the puppets of the Japanese, so, apart from suicide, what is to be done?’⁶¹ Faced with an impossible choice, Zhou chose what he regarded as the lesser evil, and in choosing cooperation with Japan he believed that he was guided by a sense of patriotic duty.

With the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Wang Jingwei government enjoyed a propaganda afterlife as the epitome of national betrayal. The Maoist regime drastically simplified the complexities of the Second Sino-Japanese War with its propaganda line of a people’s war, in which the communist base areas and the mobilization of the peasantry in a guerrilla war were put forward as the keys to victory. In this new reading, the Nationalist government’s role in the war was reduced almost to invisibility, and the Wang Jingwei government was dismissed as merely a traitorous puppet running dog of Japan. The opening up of China in the 1980s saw the unshackling of China’s recent history from the narrow Maoist propaganda line. Greater attention has been paid to the role of the Guomindang government and Chiang Kai-shek in the War of Resistance, a development that both reflects and benefits from the Communist Party’s greater emphasis on nationalism and economic development than on communist ideology. The opening up of the archives since 1987 has allowed scholars, such as Professor Huang Meizhen, to interrogate the historical record directly and to begin publishing documents on the Wang government, thus allowing that regime to speak for itself. As it relates to this chapter, the late Cai Dejin’s scholarly edition of Zhou Fohai’s diaries enables us to understand in Zhou’s own words the complex reasons for his collaboration and his view of his role in the Wang government. However, there is still a long way to go before Chinese secondary works on the War give a balanced account of the Wang regime. This is clear from the title of Cai’s own history of the Wang government, ‘A Freak of History’.⁶² The history of collaboration remains hostage to the politics of China’s relations with Japan, and as long as they remain volatile it will be difficult for Chinese historians to give a completely objective account of the history of the Wang Jingwei regime.

Notes

1. F Wakeman Jr, ‘*Hanjian* (Traitor)! Collaboration and retribution in wartime Shanghai’, in Wen-hsin Yeh (ed.), *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 298–302.
2. H Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); E Conan and H Rousso, *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past* (Hanover: Dartmouth College, 1998).

3. JH Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 352–8; and M Zanasi, 'Globalizing *hanjian*: The Suzhou trials and the post-World War II discourse on collaboration', *The American Historical Review* 113, No. 3 (June 2008): 731–51. On Vichy see the classic RO Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
4. On Petain's sense of sacrifice see M Curtis, *Verdict on Vichy: Power and Prejudice in the Vichy France Regime* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2002), p. 63; P Burrin, *Living with Defeat: France under the German Occupation* (London: Arnold, 1996), pp. 69–70. On Wang Jingwei see Zhou Fohai's comments in this chapter.
5. On France see AS Milward, *War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), pp. 132–65; Burrin, *Living with Defeat*, pp. 130–144, 228–277. On China, Takafusa Nakamura, 'The Yen Bloc, 1931–1941' in P Duus, RH Myers & MR Peattie (eds), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 171–86; Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, p. 308.
6. J Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 230–1; Burrin, *Living with Defeat*, pp. 437–47; R Vinen, *The Unfree French: Life under the Occupation* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), pp. 124–6, 328–9; BG Martin, 'Shield of Collaboration: The Wang Jingwei regime's security service, 1939–45', *Intelligence and National Security* 16, No. 4 (Winter 2001): 89–148; F Wakeman Jr, *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. Jackson, *France*, pp. 65–80, 147–54; Vinen, *The Unfree French*, pp. 53–9; CM Wilbur, 'The Nationalist Revolution: From Canton to Nanking, 1923–1928' in JK Fairbank (ed.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol 12: Republican China 1912–1949, Part 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 527–720; HL Boorman and RC Howard (eds), *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 196–201, 405–9.
8. The standard pinyin system of transliteration is used here.
9. Jackson, *France*, pp. 132–6; Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 167–276.
10. Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 136–233; Jackson, *France*, pp. 148–54; Vinen, *The Unfree French*, pp. 53–9, 71–7. On the Wang regime and Sun's political philosophy, see discussion in this chapter.
11. M Marrus and RO Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), and Curtis, *Verdict on Vichy*.
12. T Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 12–13.
13. Brook, *Collaboration*, pp. 32–61.
14. T Brook, 'The Great Way Government of Shanghai' in C Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 157–86.
15. Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 76–82.
16. Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 89–97, 110–6, 123–33; T Brook, 'The Creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938' in DP Barrett and LN Shyu (eds), *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 79–101.

17. Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 297–9, 308.
18. BG Martin, 'The Dilemmas of a Civilian Politician in Time of War: Zhou Fohai and the First Stage of the Sino-Japanese War, July–December 1937', *Twentieth-Century China* 39, No. 2 (May 2014): 54–75.
19. Martin, 'The Dilemmas of a Civilian Politician'.
20. On the formation of the Wang government, Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, and GE Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
21. BG Martin, 'Collaboration within Collaboration: Zhou Fohai's Relations with the Chongqing Government, 1942–45', *Twentieth-Century China* 34, No. 2 (April 2009): 55–88.
22. On Dai Li, F Wakeman Jr, *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
23. 'The Capital High Court judgement, 7 November 1946' in Nanjing Shi Dan'anguan (ed.), *Shenxun WangWei Hanjian Bilu*, Vol. 1 [Record of the Trials of the Traitors of the Wang Jingwei Puppet Government, hereafter *SWWHB*] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 229–38; 'Zhou Yang Shuhui's appeal, 14 December 1946' in *SWWHB*, pp. 251–67; and 'The Supreme Court's judgement, 20 January 1947' in *SWWHB*, p. 267–72.
24. 'Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu's appeal to Chiang Kai-shek, 25 January 1947' in *SWWHB*, p. 273; 'Chiang Kai-shek's commutation of Zhou Fohai's death sentence, February 3, 1947' in *SWWHB*, pp. 273–4.
25. Martin, 'The Dilemmas of a Civilian Politician'.
26. Zhou Fohai, 'Jiandande Zibai [A Brief Deposition]' in Cai Dejin (ed.), *Zhou Fohai Riji*, Vol. 2 [The Diaries of Zhou Fohai, hereafter *ZFHRJ*] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1986), p. 1275. On Konoe's peace proposals, see Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 213–4.
27. Zhou Fohai, 'Huiyi yu qianzhan [Recollecting the past and looking to the future]' in *ZFHRJ*, Vol. 2, p. 1220. This essay was originally published in the Shanghai *Zhonghua Ribao* [China Daily], July 22–4, 1939.
28. Martin, 'The Dilemmas of a Civilian Politician'.
29. 'Record of Zhou Fohai's Interrogation for 21 September 1946' in *SWWHB*, p. 112.
30. Zhou Fohai (1939) in *ZFHRJ*, Vol. 2, p. 1212.
31. Zhou Fohai (1939) in *ZFHRJ*, Vol. 2, p. 1209.
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9

Trapped in the Contested Borderland: Sakhalin Koreans, Wartime Displacement and Identity

Igor R. Saveliev

As Tessa Morris-Suzuki points out, ‘the lines that are drawn on the map determine which paths of movement are possible and which impossible, which journeys are legal and which illegal’.¹ The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 and World War II of 1939–45 twice moved the line of the Russo (Soviet)-Japanese national border on Sakhalin Island. The last re-drawing of the national border trapped nearly 24,000 descendants from the Korean Peninsula,² who had been brought to the island just before and during the Asia-Pacific War. These Koreans were not repatriated to their homeland at the end of the war, unlike many thousands of others who were in Japan and other parts of the former Japanese Empire, due to a complex combination of factors.³

The fate of this minority group, the Sakhalin Koreans, did not attract much attention from governments, the public, or scholars⁴ until the end of the cold war. The beginning of democratization in Russia and the significant improvement in international relations in Northeast Asia in the late 1980s created grounds for an open discussion on a return to their homeland by politicians, the media, and academics in Russia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. In the early 1990s, for example, two Sakhalin scholars⁵ gathered a large body of oral and written evidence showing the exploitation of Korean laborers in the imperial period and the ambiguity of their status in postwar times.

This chapter attempts to shed some light on the history of this almost unknown group of ethnic Koreans displaced during the colonization of the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific War. It attempts to

demonstrate differences between the experiences of Sakhalin Koreans during wartime under a Japanese colonial regime and then postwar under a Soviet administration, and briefly examine what was peculiar to their experiences in comparison with those of other Koreans displaced through colonization and war. This chapter pays particular attention to the transformation of the cultural identity of Sakhalin Koreans and of their sense of belonging, an important facet in the experiences of any group of displaced people that, naturally, occupies a significant place in studies on Korean diasporas.⁶

Koreans in a ‘multi-ethnic borderland’

The historical and cultural background of the region’s development as a contested borderland helps us to understand the causes of dislocation and the course of transformation in the cultural identity of Sakhalin Koreans. The southern part of Sakhalin (or *Karafuto*⁷ in Japanese) had been a contested territory and a transitory ‘war trophy’ for almost a century. It was in the joint possession of Russia and Japan from the 1850s to the 1870s, until the Saint Petersburg Treaty of the Exchange of the Kurils for Karafuto of 1875 declared it a Russian territory. Thirty years later, in accordance with the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 that ended the Russo-Japanese War, the southern part of the island was ceded to Japan. The Soviet Union, Russia’s successor, took revenge for this indignity in 1945 when Soviet troops seized the island at the end of the Asia-Pacific War.

The continuing rivalry over the southern part of Sakhalin and its role as a strategically important and resource-rich border resulted in closer attention being paid to the island. Morris-Suzuki emphasizes that Karafuto had been seen by the Japanese government as a ‘frontier’ ‘in two senses of the word: as an area bordering on a foreign nation’; and as ‘the leading edge of Japan’s imperial expansion into “undeveloped” wilderness’.⁸ Later, after Japan’s Karafuto became Soviet Sakhalin again in the conditions of the unfolding cold war, the new Soviet administration had the same attitude. To enforce this frontier territory, it hastened to replace the Japanese population with ‘mainland’ Soviet citizens immediately after the end of the war.

Karafuto was already multinational at the time it became a Japanese territory in 1905, although almost all Russians left this territory immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War.⁹ Thirty years later, in the mid-1930s, the vast majority of its population of 300,000 consisted of Japanese settlers dispatched by the imperial government. However,

indigenous populations (Ainu, Uilta and Nivkh), 200 Russians and 5,813 Koreans¹⁰ added some diversity to what was going to become Japan's northern bastion on the 'iron' border with the Soviet Union. Among the many destinations for Korean laborers, recruited or forced by Japanese authorities to work in various parts of the empire before and during the Asia-Pacific War,¹¹ Karafuto occupied a significant position. In the 1930s, when imperial demand for mineral resources became especially acute, the island emerged as an important source of coal for Japan.

The strong demand for labor, combined with a high unemployment rate on the Korean Peninsula, caused the rapid growth of the Korean community in Karafuto in the mid-1930s. Most were recruited from the Korean Peninsula, while others came to the island via Japan.¹² Bok Zi Kou and Kuzin distinguish three major periods of recruitment of Koreans for work on Sakhalin: 1) recruitment of contract laborers (September 1939–February 1942); 2) recruitment by the Japanese government (March 1942–September 1944); and 3) recruitment according to the wartime labor law (October 1944–August 1945).¹³ Although the methods of recruitment differed depending on the period, as Morris-Suzuki observes: 'the line between voluntary migration and coercion was blurred even before 1942'.¹⁴ As some interviewees stated,¹⁵ many agreed to work in the mines on Sakhalin due to the high unemployment rate in their homeland and bogus promises of high pay. Some were introduced to Sakhalin mining companies by local employment service centers. Korean village officials and Japanese police played the main role in recruitment, especially during wartime, when the majority of laborers were forcibly brought to Karafuto.¹⁶ Thus, 90-year-old Kim Yun De, whose fate is quite typical, recalls in an interview with a Russian news agency:

Japanese soldiers came to our village in Korea in 1943 and dragged me and other members of my family out of my house. They said they were taking us to Sakhalin to work in a mine, and promised it would be for only two years. But as you see, I'm still here.¹⁷

Although the total number of Koreans sent to Karafuto is unknown, it seems that their numbers fluctuated significantly between the late 1930s and the early 1940s, depending on the policy of Japanese companies and government agencies supplying manpower to various regions of the empire in accordance with the 15-Year Colonization Plan (*Jiūgonen Takushoku Keikaku*). In a decade, the percentage of the Korean population in southern Sakhalin increased from two per cent to 4.8 per cent.¹⁸

Some scholars argue that the Korean population may have peaked at 50,000.¹⁹ However, statistics compiled by the Japanese authorities for 1935–41 (see Table 9.1) do not support this estimate. The only time the total number of Koreans on the island might have significantly increased was the three-year period in 1942–4, but statistics for that time are not available. In 1944, most coalmines in Esutoru and some mines in other parts of Karafuto were closed because of a shortage of cargo ships to transport coal.²⁰ This might have caused the sudden decrease in the number of Koreans on the island, who had ostensibly been sent by the mining companies to other parts of the empire.

The limitation of Korean labor to mostly coal mining (a smaller number of them worked in lumber yards and on road construction) determined the patterns of residence in Karafuto. Most Koreans lived in small coal mining towns like Esutoru (present-day Uglegorsk) with a Korean population of 5,300 in 1945, Shiritori (Makarov), and Kawakami (Sinogorsk).²¹ Some Koreans moved with their families but, as interviewees attest, many came to Sakhalin single and married Korean women already on the island.

The making of a Japanese subject

How did wartime displacement affect the lives and identity of this dislocated group of Koreans? Was Karafuto, as a ‘new space for migration’, a real land of opportunity for unemployed people brought from the Korean Peninsula? The recollections of Sakhalin Koreans published in Russia and Japan describe their hardships in Karafuto and show great hostility from Korean workers toward their Japanese employers²² who, in the words of Stephen Epstein, ‘dehumanized’ them.²³ A typical example of such dehumanization was the exploitation of many Korean workers

Table 9.1 Number of Koreans in Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto), 1906–45

Year	Total Number	Male	Female	Year	Total Number	Male	Female
1906	24	17	7	1937	6,592	4,153	2,439
1921	465	437	28	1938	7,625	4,803	2,822
1925	3,206	2,324	882	1939	8,996	5,915	3,081
1930	5,359	3,703	1,656	1940	16,056	11,661	4,395
1935	7,053	4,521	2,532	1941	19,766	13,603	6,163
1936	6,604	4,231	2,373	1945	23,500	15,356	8,142

Source: Adapted from Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku* (1974), p. 352 and Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline* (1993), p. 33.

in the coal mines of the, so-called, *takobeya* (the hole of the octopus in Japanese) system, where workers lived in overcrowded barracks of up to 80 men in each room, worked long hours every day without days off and almost without pay, and were cruelly treated and beaten for even minor misbehavior.²⁴ This system, 'the darkest side of colonial development',²⁵ was initially created for convict labor on Hokkaido and was later expanded to non-convict contract workers in northern Japan and on the Korean Peninsula. In other companies, Koreans were persistently underpaid, receiving 30–40 per cent of the salary of Japanese co-workers on Sakhalin.²⁶ As a reaction to such treatment, there were cases of Korean riots and even Japanese overseers being murdered by Korean workers driven to despair by the hard work, fines and beatings.²⁷

To control this minority group of laborers, the Japanese authorities in Karafuto pursued the same policy of Japanization (*kominka seisaku*) implemented on the Korean Peninsula²⁸ and in other, so-called, *gaichi* (external colonized territories, in contrast to *naichi*, Japan proper). Its purpose was 'to turn Koreans physically and mentally into a people serving the emperor'.²⁹ This Japanization manifested itself in various ways. As interviewees stated, the Japanese authorities prohibited Koreans from speaking any language but Japanese in public places and at work.³⁰ As in other *gaichi*, according to the amendment to the Education in Korea Law, the use of the Korean language in Korean schools was banned, and Koreans were forced to adopt Japanese-style names under the program of 'registry name change' (*soshikaimai*). Students and adults were required 'to sing in unison and swear an oath of allegiance as *Kokoku-Shinmin* (retainer people of the imperial nation)'.³¹ The enforced change of their group affiliation to 'subject of the Japanese Empire' was obviously another reason for hostility against the Japanese among Koreans in Karafuto, equally as important as cruel exploitation in the workplace. This policy led to what Stuart Hall calls 'the fragmentation of identity'. The case of Sakhalin Koreans serves as evidence that 'the subject, previously experienced as having a unified and stable identity, is becoming fragmented; composed, not of a single, but of several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved identities'.³²

This fragmentation of identity becomes even more complex in the case of second-generation Koreans in Karafuto. For children born on, or brought at a very young age to, the island the Japanese language became their native tongue. Many Sakhalin Koreans of the first and second generations in their seventies, who were interviewed in Ansan and Incheon 60 years later in 2008, spoke Japanese better than any other language:

I went to a junior-high school on Sakhalin. All our teachers were graduates of the University of Tokyo. My instructor in Japanese grammar was my homeroom teacher. She was a great teacher. Even now, when I read in Japanese, I can read it fluently.³³

Therefore, *kominka seisaku* caused serious intra-generational differences among ethnic Koreans in Karafuto. While the first-generation migrants brought to the island were cruelly exploited by their Japanese employers and forced to change most elements of their cultural identification, such as the language of communication and personal names, the second generation, under the pressure of the Japanese educational system, unconsciously obtained proficiency in the Japanese language and acquired some elements of Japanese culture. Despite the fall of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese language remained an important marker of their identity and, as will be shown below, to some extent separated them from Korean culture and the following generations, who received an education in the Korean and/or Russian languages.

In 1945, when military collision with the Soviet Union became imminent, inter-ethnic relations on the island became further strained. Some Koreans were accused of spying for the Soviet Union. There were several incidents in which Koreans were murdered by the Japanese police. For example, on August 21, 1945, 27 innocent Koreans, including three women and six children, were brutally massacred by a group of Japanese soldiers in the village of Mizuho (present-day Pozharskoe).³⁴

Following the Japanese defeat in the war and seizure of the island by Soviet troops, the imperial dream of a 'northern frontier' populated by obedient subjects collapsed, and, for Koreans, this migration destination proved to be a trap that cost the lives of some and signified long-term disconnection from their extended families for many, some of whom remained on the Korean Peninsula or in other parts of the Japanese Empire. The promised 'land of opportunities' appeared to be what Kratoska calls 'a story of death and dislocation of holocaust proportions'.³⁵ The nightmare of forced Japanization and cruel exploitation ended in August of 1945. What remained was a complicated cultural identification, proficiency in the Japanese language, mixed memories of parents' underpaid hard work, children's Japanese school education, and the faint hope of a return to the homeland. These experiences of Koreans in Karafuto were very similar to experiences in Hokkaido, Taiwan, and other parts of the Japanese Empire, including the, so-called, *naichi* (Japan proper). However, the postwar period, during which they

resided in Sakhalin, also made their experiences quite different from those of Koreans in the other parts of the former Empire.

Temporarily Korean? The ambiguity of the transitional period, 1945–early 1960s

The sudden disintegration of the Japanese Empire resulted in mass migration flows, including the return of ethnic Koreans to their homeland. However, the end of the war did not signify the end of war hardships for Koreans on Sakhalin. The category of *gaichijin* was suddenly abolished by the Japanese government, and the status of those who, like Sakhalin Koreans, belonged to this category of the Empire's population was suddenly changed to foreigners (*gaikokujin*). As Morris-Suzuki notes, 'when, in December 1946, the Allied occupation authorities in Japan reached agreement with the Soviet Union about the repatriation of "Japanese nationals" from Soviet territory, Koreans were excluded from the definition "Japanese nationals," despite the fact that as colonial subjects they were still administered as Japanese until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952.'³⁶

Only 450 ethnic Koreans 'escaped to Japan in the first chaotic phase of evacuation'.³⁷ Contemporaries of those events, particularly Sakhalin Koreans themselves, recall that many tried to disguise themselves as Japanese, while some Japanese, who were married to Koreans and desired to remain on the island, disguised themselves as Koreans.³⁸ Korean spouses of Japanese citizens were allowed to repatriate to Japan, but were declined any kind of allowances and employment when they arrived there. Therefore, most Koreans, whose numbers were estimated at 23,500 (15,356 male and 8,142 female) in 1945, remained on Sakhalin Island.³⁹

Two inter-related factors affected the destiny of the Koreans on Sakhalin: postwar tension in Northeast Asia; and the same high labor demand that had brought Koreans to Sakhalin in the previous period. The Korean Peninsula was split into the Soviet and US zones of occupation in 1946 and, eventually, into the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. The Soviet Union only had diplomatic relations with the DPRK, so Koreans in Sakhalin were, potentially, able to move only to that country, even though most of them were descendants of migrants from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the development of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the DPRK resulted in the introduction of 26,065 Korean contract workers (*pagyonnomuja* in Korean) under

the inter-governmental agreement of 1946–9. Only half of them, 14,395 people, returned to their country,⁴⁰ which further diversified the Korean diaspora in Sakhalin. Bok Zi Kou sees the arrival of contract workers from the DPRK as a factor that impeded the repatriation of the Sakhalin Koreans.⁴¹ The admission of Korean contract workers demonstrates that the Soviet government was not only reluctant to facilitate the outflow of the working-age population from the island, but, on the contrary, also attempted to attract additional labor force from outside the region to rebuild its economy and further develop various industries on the island.

Obviously, the Soviet authorities were hasty to employ Koreans in the mining and other industrial sectors. The Soviet administration released Koreans from the cruel Japanese system of exploitation. Needless to say, *takobeyas*, with their inhuman treatment, were immediately liquidated. According to recollections of Sakhalin Koreans, published in both Russia and Japan, and documents of the Soviet government, the Soviet administration granted them exactly the same workplace rights as Soviet citizens.⁴² In contrast to the former extortionate underpayment by Japanese mining companies, Koreans received exactly the same salary as Russians, excluding only a special stipend for contract workers from the European part of the Soviet Union recruited to work in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. At the same time, Koreans recalled that those who later tried to escape the coalmines in the first postwar years were also punished by the Soviet administration.⁴³ During the transitional period in the late 1940s, the Soviet administration required Koreans to stay with the companies for which they had worked during the war and to follow the wartime labor regulations of working seven days per week, which had been adopted on June 26, 1940.⁴⁴ The Soviet administration also restricted their mobility within the country and even within Sakhalin, which had the status of a border security zone, until the early 1960s, when most Koreans naturalized and obtained Soviet internal identification documents. As one respondent describes,

[t]here were some restrictions. My father could not go outside Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, because he had no passport [internal identification document – *IS*], and he needed to get special permission to leave his place of residence each time. Those who went without permission and were caught paid fines.⁴⁵

Working alongside Russians in the mines, most Koreans established good relations with the majority population and acquired some proficiency

in the Russian language.⁴⁶ They recollect that Russian migrants arriving from the mainland were very poor themselves. As many Russian men had perished in the war, some Russian women married Koreans, as the majority of Korean workers were single men.⁴⁷

Other rights of the Korean population, whose absolute majority was still not naturalized, were also limited during the first postwar years. As government documents of that period certify, most Koreans in Sakhalin could not join fishermen's and other associations, could not take out mortgages, and were not entitled to pensions or single-mother allowances. These restrictions, however, were gradually relaxed at the beginning of the 1950s.⁴⁸

Amid the expectations of repatriation to their homeland or Japan on the part of Koreans and the uncertainty of their status in Sakhalin, the Soviet administration treated them as temporary residents. Thus, according to the Ordinance of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, 'About the Issuance of Temporary Identification Documents and Registration of the Japanese Population in Southern Sakhalin' of February 2, 1946, all Koreans residing in the former Japanese Karafuto and registered by the local authorities received only 'temporary residence permits' instead of conventional Soviet internal identification documents (passports).⁴⁹

The temporary status of ethnic Koreans prevented their integration into Russian society from the late 1940s to the early 1950s. Yet, the Soviet administration, eager to 'de-Japanize' and 'Sovietize' them, immediately shut down all Japanese schools and began introducing Soviet ideology to the Korean residents. The ideological work, aimed at strengthening labor discipline and the dissemination of communist ideas among the Korean (and Japanese) population, began immediately after the end of the war and was guided by the ordinances of the Soviet administration and the local Communist Party Committee. It also subsidized regular Korean language radio broadcasts and a Korean language newspaper called *Lenin'e Gillo* (Following Lenin's Path).⁵⁰

Under this ideological influence and the control of the Soviet administration, Koreans were encouraged to pursue their native Korean culture by speaking their language, using Korean names, eating Korean food, and celebrating their traditional festivals. The shift to Korean language education as requested by the Korean residents,⁵¹ with the support of Soviet authorities, was part of this process. Korean schools, where all subjects were taught in Korean, were opened as early as October 1945 in Uglegorsk (Esutoru) and Makarov (Shiritori), areas of concentrated Korean residency.⁵² Five others were set up by December of the same year.

On September 1, 1946, the first day of the new academic year, nine more schools started teaching children in areas with the highest concentration of Korean population, namely: Higashi Shakudai (Uglegorsky District); Okunai and Ryukushi (Lesogorsky District); Nevelsk, Minami Naioshi (Nevelsky District); Tamarikishi (Poronaisky District); Okhotami and Nishi Neiren (Dolinsky District); and Kawakami (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsky District). There were already 36 Korean schools on Sakhalin by the beginning of 1948, 68 (including 14 junior high schools) in 1950, and 87 by 1952.⁵³ As interviewees mentioned, the number of students was initially very small, but soon increased and their total number peaked at 7,000 in 1952.⁵⁴

The education system selected mainly Sakhalin Koreans as teachers for its schools. However, most of them had a very low educational status themselves. Thus, among 110 school teachers, 73 had not even completed their high school education, and 24 had graduated only from elementary school.⁵⁵ To fill this gap, the Soviet authorities recruited college-educated Central Asian Koreans – descendants of late 19th and early 20th century immigrants – to teach in Korean schools on the island and to conduct other kinds of instruction and guidance for Sakhalin Koreans.⁵⁶ About 2,000 ethnic Korean teachers, interpreters, journalists and even policemen were sent from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Sakhalin Island to assist in the integration of their compatriots and, in the words of Andrei Lankov, ‘to keep an eye on the new Korean community’.⁵⁷ Their contributions to education and other spheres were quite significant. Thus, the graduates of the Tashkent College of Theatre and Arts became the core of the troupe of the Korean drama theatre already established by May 1948.⁵⁸ As victims of Stalin’s forced relocation in 1937, this time they were employed by the Soviet government to contribute to the education, integration, and indoctrination in communist ideology of the former involuntary subjects of the Japanese Empire. Needless to say, fulfilling this role complicated the relations between the Central Asians and these Koreans. Even though they worked together and socialized in everyday life, they felt differences of identity acutely and were sometimes even reluctant to permit the younger generation to look for marriage partners in each other’s groups.⁵⁹

As non-Soviet citizens could not be accepted in Soviet higher educational institutions, such as the Sakhalin Pedagogical College, most young Koreans had few opportunities to obtain a college education⁶⁰ until they began taking up Soviet citizenship in the 1950s. Moreover, even after changing their nationality, Korean youth were quite reluctant to obtain higher education, and their parents did not encourage

their children to study. This reluctance could be attributed to two main factors: the need to work and support their families, and the uncertainty about their future due to aspirations for returning to the Korean Peninsula.⁶¹ Moreover, there were gender differences in education. For example, parents often did not allow girls to continue their studies. One female interviewee states:

As I had completed the eight-year course at the Japanese school, my father told me that I did not need to go to a newly opened Korean school to study Korean. I learned this language much later, listening to my daughter who studied it in a Korean school.⁶²

Needless to say, reluctance to obtain education greatly affected the future lives and careers of Sakhalin Koreans. Their low educational level and education in the Korean language prevented most of them from succeeding in Soviet (later post-Soviet) society. The revival of Korean culture among the younger generation in the postwar years did not resolve the main problem, repatriation to the historical homeland, which caused, to some extent, the marginalization of this minority group in the 1950s.

Some delays in the elaboration of a coherent integration policy allowed another political force, the Stalinist regime of the DPRK, to attempt to fill this gap and extend its influence to the Korean community in Sakhalin in the 1950s. The success of North Korean governmental agencies in persuading a large number of Koreans in Japan to support the North Korean regime, and even move to the DPRK,⁶³ encouraged its government to conduct the same kind of propaganda on Sakhalin.⁶⁴ In May–June of 1958, the Consulate General in Nakhodka, which initially only supervised the work and residence of their citizens working in Sakhalin and the Kuriles according to the inter-governmental agreement, carried out a campaign to repatriate contract laborers from the DPRK who expressed a desire to take Soviet citizenship, and to attract Sakhalin Koreans into citizenship of the DPRK.⁶⁵ North Korean officials often approached them with the promise of a good life and free education. One of the Sakhalin Koreans recalls:

In 1957, North Korea called Koreans on Sakhalin to come, promising them free education for young people. Where can you find such paradise as our country? they were saying. Many went there, from Sakhalin and from Japan. My uncle, who left Korea in 1943, also went to North Korea to search for his wife and daughter who he left there.⁶⁶

As a result of that propaganda, 6,346 Sakhalin Koreans took citizenship of the DPRK and 5,096 of them moved to that country.⁶⁷

However, the Soviet authorities soon put an end to North Korean activities among the Korean population on the island against a background of worsening relations with the DPRK and the radicalization of its regime. Stories about the harsh treatment of those who moved to the DPRK infiltrated the Soviet Union, and Sakhalin Koreans lost interest in that country, even though it was their only chance to return to the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁸ Some of the returnees to the DPRK managed to re-emigrate to Sakhalin.⁶⁹ The Communist regime in Soviet Sakhalin appeared to be much more liberal than the Stalinist regime in the DPRK. Because the Soviet authorities curbed the activities of the DPRK in influencing Koreans in Sakhalin and there were no diplomatic relations with the ROK, Sakhalin Koreans had never been divided into being supporters of one or the other country, as in Japan, and, when diplomatic relations with the ROK were established in 1990, they remained politically neutral in the North-South discourse but with more sympathy toward the democratic ROK.

Therefore, life and working conditions of Koreans in Sakhalin largely improved as part of the Soviet Union. Having been stateless for a period in postwar Japan, Koreans in Sakhalin received the same salary as majority Russians and enjoyed all the rights of other Soviet citizens. Later, in contrast to restrictions on Korean naturalization and their exclusion from job opportunities in Japan,⁷⁰ the naturalization of Koreans in Sakhalin was facilitated and encouraged by the 1950s.⁷¹ However, their mobility, even within the Soviet Union, was restricted in the first postwar years and continued long after. Although the revival of Korean cultural identity was partly encouraged by the Soviet administration, the inability to return to the Korean Peninsula due to a combination of factors caused the same sense of homelessness that ethnic Koreans had experienced in Japan in the postwar period and deepened inter-generational identity differences.

Delayed assimilation: the making of a Soviet citizen in the early 1960s

In the early 1960s it had finally become obvious that Koreans would not be repatriated and would have to settle permanently in the Soviet Union, so local authorities then shifted toward Russian language education. Bok Zi Kou, a professor in the Sakhalin University of Pedagogy and an ethnic Korean, recalls that he was summoned to the Sakhalin Region

(*Oblast*) Communist Party Committee and questioned on his opinion about the reorganization of Korean schools. When he answered that Korean language education should be continued and better developed, the Regional Communist Party Committee First Secretary strongly disagreed with him: 'Why would you like to destroy the fate of Korean youth? They will not be able to enter any university in this country!'⁷² Soon after this discussion, all Korean schools were closed by the Soviet government in accordance with the Sakhalin Oblast Executive Committee Ordinance No. 169 of May 13, 1963.⁷³ Bok Zi Kou describes this shift in education policy as an attempt to enforce Russification. However, the decrease in the number of Korean schools to 32 with 7,239 students in 1963,⁷⁴ along with other evidence,⁷⁵ demonstrates that Koreans themselves, concerned about their future, increasingly sent their children to Russian schools. Because of that, even being led by an ordinance from Soviet local authorities, the closure of Korean ethnic schools was not as dramatic as that in Japan in the late 1940s.

Later, young Koreans were even discouraged from learning Korean. Thus, a second-generation Sakhalin Korean recalls:

When I studied at elementary school, if anyone spoke with a Korean accent, he/she was scolded for that. When I entered my elementary school, the Korean language was taught one class a week, and later it was cut from the curriculum. We tried to study the Russian language better and to make our pronunciation correct... If someone wanted to apply to a college in Moscow and other large cities, he had to submit a special recommendation letter along with his application. We were encouraged to apply only to colleges in Khabarovsk, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk.⁷⁶

This oral evidence shows that those young Koreans who went to school in the early 1960s received their education in the Russian language that had become their native tongue. Had some subjects at school and in college been taught in Korean, Koreans in Sakhalin obviously would have preserved their culture better. Yet, as a result of the restrictions, the younger (third or fourth) generation members no longer feel a strong attachment to either state on the Korean Peninsula and, usually, do not speak Korean.

Once again, this further complicated inter-generational identity differences. According to the census of 1988, 32,000 out of 35,000 ethnic Koreans in the Sakhalin Oblast held Soviet citizenship. Only 456 were citizens of the DPRK and 2,621 were stateless.⁷⁷ However, even

after that, Koreans were discouraged from moving to 'mainland' Russia, which obviously strengthened their attachment to Sakhalin. A certain number of gifted high school graduates (some interviewees estimated their number at 2,000) were admitted to colleges and universities across the Soviet Union. They obtained top-quality educations and later built successful careers in Soviet society.

Even though young Koreans were discouraged from learning their own language, the Soviet government's restriction on their mobility resulted in a certain degree of homogeneity in Korean communities on Sakhalin. The high rate of marriage within the community and residence in the areas with a high percentage of Korean population helped Sakhalin Koreans to preserve some elements of their cultural traditions, such as festivals, customs, and food,⁷⁸ and later was an important factor in their rediscovery of their Korean-ness when the democratization of Russian society began in the late 1980s.

Conclusion and postscript

Examining the (dis)continuity between colonial subjects and postcolonial migrants, Ulme Bosma demonstrates 'the ways the colonial past has left material and non-material legacies, ranging from metropolitan demographics and culture to ongoing ideological and possibly psychological impacts'⁷⁹ on the example of migration from former colonies to metropolitan countries. The case of Sakhalin Koreans represents another facet of postcolonial migration – from one part of the disintegrated empire to another – showing that the 'lines drawn on map' sometimes make repatriation impossible or delay it by the lifespan of several generations.

In the conditions of the unfolding cold war, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, intended to resolve the whole range of issues relating to the territories and peoples involved in the Asia-Pacific War, did not solve the problem of the homelessness of Sakhalin Koreans and repatriation to their historical homeland. Except for a failed attempt to attract some Sakhalin Koreans to the DPRK, the repatriation of this group of postcolonial migrants was a protracted one, lasting the whole second part of the 20th century. It took four and a half decades after the end of the war, when relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK were established in 1990, for repatriation to become a reality. Members of the first and second generations, born before Japan's capitulation in the Asia-Pacific War on August 15, 1945, then received permission to move to a specially built 'native village' (*Gohwangmaeul*) in the city of Ansan, and

later to municipal apartment blocks in Incheon and other cities under a Korean government support program. They were granted South Korean citizenship and provided with a monthly pension and other allowances. However, their initial separation from their families in the ROK was now followed with a new traumatic family rupture, this time from their children and grandchildren who were ineligible for the program and had to remain in Russia.

Comparing the wartime and postwar periods, it might be suggested that, despite sharp differences in employment terms and the treatment of workers – that is, a cruel wartime labor system until 1945 and employment on the same terms as other Soviet citizens in the postwar period – both the Japanese and Soviet administrations were keen to restrict the employment and residence of this group of Koreans to certain industries, especially mining, and a certain region, Sakhalin. In combination with the ideological pressure of both regimes, these policies transformed their Korean sense of self and their sense of belonging several times. The Japanese Empire's strong assimilation policy (*kominka seisaku*) in the period from the mid-1930s to 1945 was aimed at erasing Korean identity and nurturing a sense of being Japanese. After 1945, the Soviet government's policy appeared to be much more liberal, allowing Sakhalin Koreans to revive their Korean identity, partly reinforced by the DPRK's efforts to influence and even repatriate them. However, from the early 1960s, young Koreans were educated in Russian.

The 'transformation' from 'a people serving the emperor' into Soviet citizens loyal to the Communist Party caused a different fragmentation of the cultural identity of Sakhalin Koreans in each generation, depending on the policy and education in each period which, in turn, caused significant inter-generational variations in their language abilities and self-identification. Like many other stories of dislocation and the formation of other Korean diasporas in various countries, particularly in Japan, the case of Sakhalin Koreans serves as evidence that identity fragmentation is an important facet in the 'ongoing ideological, psychological' and possibly other impacts on the colonized/occupied and dislocated population groups. Despite inter-generational differences in identity, the wartime forced migration and long-term postwar mobility restrictions constructed their collective memory, while, for all of them, the name of the area of their relocation, Sakhalin, became an important marker of their identity, distinguishing them from Koreans in other parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and from other Koreans in the former Japanese empire. The case of Sakhalin Koreans eloquently demonstrates that the unresolved issues

related to war and colonization seriously affected not only the lives of the displaced people, but of all the following generations of their families.

Notes

I would like to thank Mark E Caprio, Christine de Matos, Brian Yecies and the anonymous expert reviewer for insightful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter. Interviews used in this chapter have been carried out by the author in four cities with the greatest concentration of Russian Koreans in the Republic of Korea (Seoul, Ansan, Incheon and Busan) from September 2007 to October 2008. The names of all respondents have been changed.

1. T Morris-Suzuki, *Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 32–3.
2. Korean diasporas in the former Soviet Union consisted mainly of three kinds: descendants of 19th century migrants who moved to the Russian Empire in the pre-revolutionary period; Sakhalin Koreans, descendants of those who were brought to the island to work the coal mines in the 1930s–40s; and postwar contract workers from the DPRK recruited through USSR-DPRK inter-governmental agreement in 1946–9.
3. M Caprio and Yu Jia, 'Occupations of Korea and Japan and the Origins of the Korean Diaspora in Japan', in S Ryang and J Lie (eds), *Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), pp. 28–9.
4. Exceptions include JJ Stephan, *Sakhalin: A History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), and Sugiura Kohei and Suzuki Isshi, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku – Hokkaidō, Chishima, Karafuto hen* [Records of Korean forced migration and forced labor] (Gendaishi Shuppankai: Chosenjin kyosei renkou shinso-chosadan, 1974).
5. Bok Zi Kou, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline* [Koreans in Sakhalin] (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 1993), and AT Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy: zhizn' i tragediia sud'by* [Far Eastern Koreans: Life and the Tragedy of Fate] (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Dalnevostochnoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 1993).
6. For example, see: Kashiwazaki Chikako, 'The Politics of Legal Status: The equation of nationality with ethnonational identity', 13–31; S Ryang, Sonia, 'Introduction: Resident Koreans in Japan', 1–12; and Ryang, 'The North Korean Homeland of Koreans in Japan', 32–54, all in S Ryang (ed.), *Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).
7. Karafuto was the Japanese name of the southern part of Sakhalin Island that Russia ceded to Japan according to the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905. Soviet troops occupied this part of the island in August 1945. The Treaty of San Francisco (1952) confirmed the ownership of this territory by the Soviet Union.
8. T Morris-Suzuki, 'Northern Lights: The Making and Unmaking of Karafuto Identity', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, No. 3 (2001): 646.

9. IA Senchenko, *Sakhalin i Kurily – istoriia osvoeniia i razvitiia* [Sakhalin and the Kuriles – A history of the exploration and development] (Moscow: Moia Rossia, 2006), pp. 360–1.
10. Morris-Suzuki, 'Northern Lights', 645; Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 198.
11. See, for example, PH Kratoska (ed.), *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories* (New York and London: ME Sharp, 2005).
12. Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 371–432.
13. Bok Zi Kou, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy: problemy i perspektivy* [Sakhalin Koreans: Problems and perspectives] (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalinskoe Oblastnoe Knizhnoe Izdatelstvo, 1989), pp. 18–20; Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnyekoreitsy*, pp. 198–9.
14. Morris-Suzuki, *Borderline Japan*, p. 39.
15. For example, interview with Vitalii, 79-year-old, Sakhalin-born.
16. Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 363–432.
17. 'Sakhalin: Merging History and Culture', *Russia Today*, September 24, 2010.
18. Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 351–2.
19. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, pp. 199–200.
20. AE Ostashev, 'Sakhalinskii ugol: ocherki istorii ostrovnoi ugolnoi promyshlennosti v seredine 19–nachale 20 v' [Sakhalin Coal: A history of the island's coal mining in the mid-19th–early 20th century], <http://alexsakh.narod.ru> (accessed November 21, 2011).
21. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 201; Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, p. 32.
22. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 229; AT Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy: istoriia i sovremennost' (Sbornik dokumentov, 1880–2005)* [Sakhalin Koreans: History and current state, 1880–2005] (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalinskoe Oblastnoe Knizhnoe Izdatelstvo, 2006), p. 94; AE Ostashev, 'Sakhalinskii ugol'; Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 371–432.
23. S Epstein, 'Review for "A Forgotten People: The Sakhalin Koreans" by Dai-Sil Kim Gibson, 1995', *Western Folklore*, 57 (1998): 77–9.
24. Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, pp. 44–5; Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, 203–4; Ostashev, 'Sakhalinskii ugol'.
25. Morris-Suzuki, 'Northern Lights', 662.
26. Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 371–5; Che Kil Song, *Karafuto chōsenjin-no higeki: saharin chōsenjin-no genzai* [The Tragedy of Koreans in Karafuto: The current situation of Koreans on Sakhalin] (Tokyo: Daiichi Shobo, 2007), pp. 90–1.
27. Ostashev, 'Sakhalinskii ugol'; Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 371–432.
28. Kashiwazaki, 'The Politics of Legal Status', 19.
29. Utsumi Aiko, 'Japan's Korean Soldiers in the Pacific War', in PH Kratoska (ed.), *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories* (New York and London: ME Sharp, 2005), p. 83.
30. Interview with Emilia, aged 69, Sakhalin Korean; Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, p. 372.
31. Utsumi, 'Japan's Korean Soldiers in the Pacific War', 83; Interview with Emilia, aged 69, Sakhalin Korean.
32. S Hall, 'The Question of Cultural Identity', in S Hall, D Held and T McGrew (eds), *Modernity and Its Futures* (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity, 1992), pp. 276–7.

33. Interview with Anna, aged 72, Sakhalin Korean.
34. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, pp. 204–5; CheKil Song, *Karafuto chōsenjin-no higeki*, pp.141–82.
35. Kratoska (ed.), *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire*, p. xv.
36. Morris-Suzuki, 'Northern Lights', 666.
37. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 229; Morris-Suzuki, 'Northern Lights', 666.
38. Interview with Oleg, aged 70, Russian.
39. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, pp. 200, 229–31.
40. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, pp. 231–2; Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, p. 106.
41. Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, p. 109.
42. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, pp. 212 & 230; Morris-Suzuki, 'Northern Lights', 666; Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 375–6.
43. Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, p. 82; Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 229.
44. Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, p. 93.
45. Interview with Maria, aged 54, second-generation Korean, self-employed.
46. Interview with Anna, aged 71, first-generation Sakhalin Korean, retired.
47. Sugiura and Suzuki, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō-no kiroku*, pp. 375–7.
48. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, pp. 237–9.
49. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 215; Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, p. 105.
50. AN Lankov, 'Sakhalin Koreans Undergo Russification', *The Korea Times*, 25 October 2009; Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, pp. 93 & 113.
51. Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, p. 97.
52. Interview with Vitalii, aged 79, first-generation Sakhalin Korean, retired; Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 260.
53. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 260; Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, pp. 117, 139–41.
54. Interview with Anna, aged 71, first-generation Sakhalin Korean, retired; Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 260.
55. Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, p. 104.
56. Interview with Irina, aged 55, Russian Korean, born in Russia; Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, pp. 115, 118 & 128.
57. Lankov, 'Sakhalin Koreans Undergo Russification'; See also Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 240.
58. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 260.
59. See IR Saveliev, 'Mobility Decision-Making and New Diasporic Spaces: Conceptualizing Korean Diasporas in the Post-Soviet Space', *Pacific Affairs* 83, No. 3 (2010): 475–98.
60. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 237.
61. Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, p. 105.
62. Interview with Emilia, 69-year-old, Sakhalin Korean.
63. Ryang, 'The North Korean Homeland of Koreans in Japan', 34–9.
64. AN Lankov, 'North Korean Mirage Collapses in Sakhalin', *The Korea Times*, 23 October 2009.
65. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, pp. 231–2, 240 & 247.
66. Interview with Anna, aged 71, first-generation Sakhalin Korean, retired.
67. Larisa Zabrovskaya, 'Sakhalinskie koreitsy: novyi povorot sud'by' [Sakhalin Koreans: A new turn in destiny], *Okeanskije vesti*, January 1, 2002.

68. Lankov, 'North Korean Mirage Collapses in Sakhalin'.
69. Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, p. 243.
70. Kashiwazaki, 'The Politics of Legal Status', 20–2; Ryang, 'The North Korean Homeland of Koreans in Japan', 34–5.
71. Kuzin, *Sakhalinskie koreitsy*, pp. 153, 202–3.
72. Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, p. 107.
73. Bok, *Koreitsy na Sakhaline*, pp. 104 & 106.
74. Kuzin, *Dalnevostochnye koreitsy*, p. 260.
75. Lankov, 'Sakhalin Koreans Undergo Russification'; interview with Anastasia, aged 62, Russian, employed in education.
76. Interview with Maria, aged 54, second-generation Korean, self-employed.
77. Zbrovskaya, 'Sakhalinskie koreitsy: Novyi povorot sud'by'.
78. See, for example, Che Kil Song, *Karafuto chōsenjin-no higeki*, p. 90.
79. Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen and Gert Oostindie, 'Introduction. Postcolonial Migrations and Identity Politics: Towards a Comparative Perspective', in U Bosma, J Lucassen and G Oostindie (eds), *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States in Comparison* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn (Books, 2012), p. 9.

10

Collapsing Past into Present: The Occupation of Japan as Seen in the Journal *New Women*

Curtis Anderson Gayle

Yi's story from within occupied Japan

Through the early postwar journal *New Women* (*Shin Josei*) it becomes possible to see how the Allied Occupation of Japan directly affected those who were on the margins of Japanese society and not in a position of power, privilege, or wealth. The difficulties, ironies and, at times, illegitimate acts of the occupation had a very pronounced impact on the weakest links in the chain of Japanese society, those who were the most vulnerable to economic hardship, social discrimination, and psychological intimidation by authority. First-person narratives from many who had to live under occupation on a daily basis suggest that, even though the Asia-Pacific War had ended and the Japanese empire had disbanded, there were frightening similarities between life in the prewar Japanese state and life in early postwar Japan. From within these discursive exclamations, it is also possible to put together a composite picture of mnemonic linkages between the wartime past and the early postwar present. The present and the past were, in other words, brought into one larger moment of crisis. Nineteenth-century French historian Jules Michelet once made the relevant point that it is for the present that we look back to the past.

Even though the year 1945 and the reality of defeat did mean fundamental changes in Japanese historical consciousness and everyday life, for some there were also alarming points of continuity between the past and the present. Carol Gluck and others have analyzed 1945 as a point of departure and space of difference between a dark past and possibilities for the present and future.¹ This point of departure was, in a

broad sense, marked by a sense of willful and deliberate ‘amnesia’² that served to slice away the mistakes of the past and instead focus upon how the present moment was one of possibility and rejuvenation. In spite of this general assumption in much contemporary Japanese historical research, this chapter shows how the past was invoked in ways that warned about the dangers of excessive power and coercion wielded by the Allied Occupation, especially through the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) in Tokyo, and the Japanese government. There were indeed specific ways in which the past was collapsed into the present within a common mnemonic space. Put alternatively, the war that had just ended was not simply forgotten for the sake of moving forward – beyond the years of horror that had seemingly come to a dramatic conclusion – but was, in fact, drawn out and remembered in ways that provided clear warnings about present danger in the eyes of some. These perceived dangers were rooted in the transformation of the Allied Occupation, in the eyes of many, as liberator from Imperial Japan and fascism to intimidator and oppressor of the Japanese public.

In response, there were many avenues and forums through which to protest, directly and indirectly, the policies and practices of the Allied Occupation. This was precisely where ordinary people raising their own voice came into play. During the early postwar period history writing, and what some have called women’s ‘self-writing’, represented a vibrant method for ordinary people to make their everyday grievances and aspirations public.³ This trend could also be seen in journals and writing forums from women without any training in history writing or in professional writing per se. Through the pages of the journal *New Women*, for example, many ordinary women who had been without a voice sought to become historically and socially relevant. Ordinary working women, and also men, found their own voice both individually and collectively. As one reader wrote in the Readers’ Column (*dokusha dayori*), this new journal, which was founded in 1950, could become ‘a source of unity for women throughout Japan to work towards liberation of the nation and peace’.⁴ Although in the prewar and wartime years women were ‘trapped in feudal customs’, it was now possible to utilize this new journal ‘to escape from difficult lives’ and begin anew.⁵ Against this backdrop, the memory of wartime suffering was never far away. As Nikaidō Maruko declared in the January 1951 issue, ‘during World War II it was women who suffered the most’, and from this realization she and others would work to ensure that ‘such a tragedy never again takes place’.⁶ Writing in this new forum for working women represented a

way to exercise their subjectivity and make their voices heard. Putting pen to paper and creating an independent journal for working women and men represented one specific way to directly, but non-violently, challenge the Allied Occupation of Japan and the postwar state.

One of the most striking examples in *New Women* was that of a Yi Shōko, a 14-year-old Korean affiliated with the left-wing *Chungryun* (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) group. Yi gives us a graphic and compelling first-person narrative of what it was like to be a young Korean girl in occupied Japan, where there was not only a crack-down on all forms of social and political dissent, but also a war being waged on the Korean Peninsula in 1950. The article begins in autobiographical form and includes a discussion of both past events, such as the annexation and formal colonization of Korea by Japan in 1910, up to what the author herself experienced as present-day discrimination against Koreans in Japan during the Allied Occupation. Yi first tells us about her mother, who grew up in prewar Japan, and confesses that she was ‘embarrassed to wear traditional Korean clothes’. She continues, ‘why do Koreans have to feel this way’ when we are legitimate residents of Japan? She also asks, ‘how come my Japanese friends look down on Koreans?’⁷

Yi tells us that in the prewar era at school, her mother and many young Koreans living in Japan had to ‘constantly take part in wartime military drills with Japanese students’, and were regularly warned ‘you must give up everything for the emperor and devote yourself to him’.⁸ Yi notes that in the postwar period she herself had even ‘begun to feel sad and resentful that I was born Korean’, and adds that when she discovered at school that her ancestral homeland had been colonized by Japan in times past, she ‘cried her eyes out’. Yi continues:

Japanese imperialists colonized Korea and made Korean people suffer, put them into poverty, and behaved like demons! The same roads we descendants and parents, brothers and sisters now walk on were those which saw great suffering... Our fatherland and national culture were taken away by force during a long period of Japanese imperialism.⁹

Most critically, Yi links the past and the present by suggesting that, just as in the colonial days in which her mother had lived, the Japanese government and the Allied Occupation of Japan were again engaged in deliberate and systemic intimidation through what Yi calls ‘the bloody suppression’ of Koreans.¹⁰ This began during the years of colonization by Japan, and continued in the postwar years owing to the

way 'former colonial inhabitants' of Japan were treated by the Japanese government, all with the acquiescence of the occupation authorities. Although Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese were colonial subjects within the Japanese empire, in 1945 those living in Japan, about 1.2 million people, were summarily declared 'foreign nationals' and denied any rights of citizenship or protection under the new postwar constitution, passed in 1946. From as early as 1945, Koreans were legally declared *gaikokujin*, or non-Japanese residents. For those Koreans who chose to stay in Japan this meant the loss of any possibility of acquiring Japanese citizenship. This legal and political condition was affirmed in 1952 by the Japanese state when it regained its formal independence and those declared 'foreign nationals' during the occupation became permanent non-citizens.¹¹

In April 1948, the Japanese government issued an order to close Korean schools, under pressure from GHQ/SCAP. As a result, there were mass demonstrations in Osaka and Kobe, areas with Korean schools and large Korean communities. Yi recounts what took place at the hands of the police during these demonstrations. She recalls, the police numbered 'in the thousands' and 'Kim Tai'ichi, who was a friend of mine, was shot and killed by police' during the demonstrations.¹² Although the occupation authorities and the Japanese government accused students and parents of inciting the riots, Yi tells us quite clearly that the Japanese police were the ones who initiated physical violence in the above incident. Describing the physical brutality inflicted upon herself, Yi says:

I was hit with an iron club, from my buttocks up to my head. I saw that most of my friends were being forcibly evicted from the [Korean] school, and that one boy who was hit with an iron club had collapsed with blood running down from his head. As I looked in another direction, I saw one young girl being repeatedly hit by a number of men with an iron club.¹³

In the above narrative, Yi suggests that things for Koreans in Japan had not changed all that much between the pre- and postwar eras. Even though her homeland had been liberated from Japanese rule by 1950 and the outbreak of the Korean War it had now become embroiled in war and, more concretely, the policies and ideologies of the postwar Japanese state and the Allied Occupation had branded Koreans in Japan as criminals, aggressors, and agitators. In the eyes of Yi there was, moreover, not all that much difference between the colonial state and the postwar occupation that enabled and legitimized the excesses of both the United

States and Japan. This was, for Yi, as much a psychological and physical form of intimidation as it was a political or ideological one.

As all of this suggests, through the personal memories of women such as Yi, the journal *New Women* was able to provide a very marked temporal fusion of past and present. According to some of those writing for the journal, there was little difference between, for example, the suppression of Koreans by the wartime imperial state and their continued intimidation in postwar Japan under the Allied Occupation. This is significant in several respects. Most notably, the discursive imagery used to criticize the occupation is that of discredited Japanese fascism and imperialism. Obviously, the Allied Occupation was quite different in many ways from the prewar imperial system and the system of wartime mobilization by the state. Not only had sovereignty been transferred from the emperor to the people, but from 1945 a host of economic, social, and political reforms were put into effect, not least being the right of suffrage for all Japanese women. At the same time, however, for Yi and for many Koreans the postwar occupation of Japan by America and its allies was in certain ways as brutal and as painful as the colonization of Korea by the Empire of Japan. Put differently, even though it seems historically and practically lopsided to compare the wartime system of domestic mobilization by the Japanese government to the postwar occupation of Japan, the prevailing level of oppression and physical violence toward those who dissented made certain people feel the historical clock was ticking backwards rather than forwards.

Why did women writing in this journal, among others, feel that history was regressing rather than progressing? A key to understanding the fear behind the admonitions of women writing in the journal can be found in the Reverse Course.¹⁴ From about the summer of 1948, the US occupation authorities decided to rebuild Japan as a capitalist showcase to thwart the Soviet Union and the rise of communist China, no matter what the social, material, or psychological costs. Within the Reverse Course, however, the Red Purge, which began in early 1950, marked a series of determined and repressive policies specifically designed to silence many forms of dissent in response to what the occupation authorities saw as the rise of communist influence in East Asia.¹⁵ The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 added fuel to the fire and convinced both the American and Japanese governments that communism was infiltrating Korea's next door neighbor. It was within this historical maelstrom that Yi, and others discussed below, began to record and express their fears, experiences, and dreams in the journal *New Women*.

The directive to initiate the Red Purge came from General Douglas MacArthur, as SCAP, to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1949. Implemented the following year, the Red Purge included the mass firing of JCP members and those working in labor unions, in both the public and private sectors, and also a mandated censorship of the Japanese media.¹⁶ In July 1950, the occupation authorities ordered private companies, the media, and public institutions to purge (fire/dismiss) all those who were considered radical. Given the early spirit of enthusiasm toward the Allied Occupation, it was only natural that those affected by the Red Purge quickly came to see the influence and presence of the United States and its allies as a stinging betrayal of the original aims of the occupation and the spirit of the 1946 Japanese Constitution, the latter representing a fundamental break with the social policies of the wartime Japanese state. By early 1950, intellectuals and workers, educators and farmers, women and men, realized that the Reverse Course and the Red Purge were not merely matters of government policy but were, instead, directly linked to everyday life, employment and unemployment, life and death.¹⁷

***New Women* and occupation as fascism**

The pages of *New Women* ring out with similar admonitions as to the darkness of the early postwar period and the dangers that lay ahead. Writing in late 1950 and early 1951, for example, contributor Katō Kenzō appealed to readers of *New Women* to beware of what was fast becoming a postwar brand of Japanese ‘fascism’, one which mandated nothing less than resistance from all quarters of society. Katō, who had been imprisoned, argued that ‘Japan is now undergoing a nefarious form of government even worse than the wartime government of Tōjō Hideki’. Katō went as far as to say that the public were being ‘colonized’ by their own government and urged readers to engage in forms of ‘organized resistance’.¹⁸ In this respect, the pages of *New Women* echoed many contemporary progressive voices who took aim at the occupation as a form of postwar colonization of Japan by the United States, arguing that just as wartime China had been made a colony of Japan, the latter was now a colony of America.

GHQ/SCAP and the Japanese government were equally complicit in this situation. The government saw Koreans, those working in labor unions, and anyone who publicly questioned or challenged its legitimacy, as agitators and a threat to public order. Since the reconsolidation of state power in Japan required that the government have firm

control over the economy and its population, at least firm enough to quell any major social or political unrest, the Yoshida Administration welcomed and helped advance the Red Purge. Sheldon Garon notes that by the late 1940s the ruling Liberal Party, the Yoshida Administration, and big business were already trying to make their own labor policy and that, as a result, 'by the latter half of 1950, the Yoshida cabinet felt strong enough to carry out its own Red Purge'.¹⁹ Garon adds that the government not only 'encouraged the dismissal of thousands of alleged communists', but also 'went further to dissolve the *Sanbetsu* (National Council for the Coordination of Labor Unions)' and replace them with more cooperative and pliant unions in places like factories.²⁰ The *Sanbetsu* was, in fact, one of the organizations which helped found *New Women* in 1950.

The journal was very different from other women's journals either in the prewar years or during the latter half of the 1940s. Women's journals in the prewar era were often concerned with issues of women's enlightenment and, in particular, the eventual attainment of suffrage.²¹ In this sense, prewar women's journals were linked to various movements and, as in the case of *Bluestocking (Seitō)*, were geared toward making these kinds of political goals a reality for middle class women, their primary target audience.²² Although concerned with everyday life, prewar women's journals more or less focused on creating organized forms of women's subjectivity for middle class women. In addition, although an interesting form of women's 'self-writing' did exist before 1945, this was limited to upper middle class women and did not focus on working class or marginalized women in the way it would begin to do after 1945. Working class women would have to wait until after the war to have their voices heard.

The break from the prewar past was not, however, absolute or complete. Even though there was much new about *New Women*, there was also a bit of conscious recognition of the prewar years. Most notably, the very title, *New Women*, indicates a reference to the pioneering feminists of the Bluestocking group of the 1920s during the Taishō period. It can also be argued that the title was inspired by the idea of the New Woman, or *atarashii onna*, from the Taishō period. Likewise, in using the word *josei* for women the journal's editors were following the practice begun by the feminist journal *Josei* of the 1920s. In other words, the postwar journal *New Women* was not a completely new idea and consciously planted its roots in the 1920s, linking the early postwar period with the prewar era, or at least what was then seen as the extractable past (that is, the Taishō era) that could stand separately from the 1930s and the early Shōwa

period as a time of social progress and thus as a period that could offer examples for early postwar progressive voices.

To a greater extent than in times past, the founding of *New Women* did make it easier for working women to write their own stories, histories, and testimonials in order to create their own subject positions and convey their own oppression and pain in everyday life. Of course, this trend did not suddenly just appear in 1950, and *New Women* was not the first postwar journal of its kind. Between April 1946 and August 1950, the journal *Working Women (Hataraku Fujin)* also served ordinary working women and published their articles and letters. This earlier journal gave special attention to institutional and structural changes affecting women. These included themes like: 'working women and the postwar constitution'; 'the civil rights of women'; and 'working women and labor unions'.²³ In an important sense, *Working Women* also reflected the optimism and hopes for postwar democracy during the early years of occupation. By July 1950 and the last issue of that journal, however, there was virtually none of the optimism seen in 1946, and we find instead pointed references to 'the enslavement of Japan' by the occupation and the difficult days of the new decade that had just dawned.²⁴ Unlike *Working Women*, those writing in *New Women*, moreover, often utilized their own personal and private memories to conjure up parallels between the wartime Japanese state and the early postwar Allied Occupation. The leap between these two early postwar women's journals suggests that by 1950 some were becoming actively aware of how the occupation was threatening, rather than enabling, Japanese democracy. In this key respect, *New Women* not only 'vividly reflected the social situation' of the time, it also featured regular columns such as 'Reporting the Truth' (*Shinjitsu no Ki*), a forum through which women and others could directly discuss 'gender discrimination, incidents of human rights abuses, problems associated with everyday life and problems in the workplace'.²⁵

Many of those associated with *New Women* were also involved in social activism and social protest. In fact, the journal was created in 1950 as the successor to *Working Women* with the assistance of the Japan Communist Party as part of an effort to support cultural activities by working women within the overall context of circle groups and nationwide history writing movements. Some of the groups directly involved with the establishment of the journal included the Japanese Democratic Women's Council (*Nihon Minshu Fuji Kyōgikai*) and the National Council for the Coordination of Labor Unions (*Zen Nihon Sangyō Betsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi*), both directly involved with popular

movements for worker rights and the rights of women. Many of those who read and contributed articles to *New Women* were also involved with cultural activities and circles sponsored by the Japan Communist Party. Given the strong organizational support behind it, the journal enjoyed a wide national circulation and its growth in circulation paralleled the expanding nationwide popularity of the JCP during the early and mid-1950s, partially as a result of the overall repressive stance taken by the Japanese state.²⁶

Everyday life as a precarious undertaking

In the letters written to *New Women* by Japanese working women during the early years of its existence, we can get a very real sense of how the wartime past remained an important part of the present. One of the best examples of this are comments regarding 'Listen to the Voices from the Sea' (*Kike Wadatsumi no Koe*), a collection of letters written during the war by student volunteers mobilized to fight and ultimately give their lives for the emperor. In 1950, this collection of letters was made into a popular movie of the same name. Influenced by the letters published in the book and depicted in the movie, Miyamune Sarayō begins her own contemporary letter to a certain Y san, who died in the war as a student volunteer. Writing in a column titled 'Reporting the Truth', Miyamune begins her letter by warning her readers that there are times when 'history repeats itself'. In her letter to the girl who gave her life during the war, she continues: 'I recently saw the movie *Listen to the Voices from the Sea* and thought of you when I heard that a student named Kawanishi was recently shot by a police officer from behind during the postwar occupation.'²⁷ Miyamune also says in her imaginary letter to Y san that 'although your life was short, only 30 years, you were able in your heart to resist... Why did you have to die like this, at the hands of such vicious brutality?'²⁸ Adding to this raw emotion, in the same issue of *New Women*, Gomyō Shigeko reminds readers that 'Japanese know the horrors of war and we were the first country to be hit with atomic bombs'. This is precisely why the 'limiting of free speech and violent repression' by the Allied Occupation of Japan today should be resisted, these things have led to 'war and total destruction' in the past and they can easily do so again.²⁹ The eternal return of history was, in this respect, something very real and very frightening and was reflected in the observations and fears of those writing in the early 1950s. For them, the memory of the wartime era was still alive and still connected to the reality and the politics of the present. All of this suggests that the

sense of crisis brought into play by 1950 was making the present seem very reminiscent of the dark past.

The disturbing picture of a society that had returned to a virtual state of war (with the state fighting against hard-working people who were trying to negotiate everyday life under difficult circumstances) is echoed in the words of those writing about brutality and violence against those seeking to find jobs as day laborers. For example, in the November 1950 issue, Sekiguchi Miyoko notes: 'I returned to Japan from Manchuria with my husband and children in September 1946' and at that time 'we were facing problems in finding housing, food and employment'.³⁰ As a result, she and her husband both became day laborers. The very same day she went to the government-run agency in charge of apportioning daily work, it seems over 500 applicants like herself, all seeking piecemeal day work, had been turned away as a result of the lack of any available work. Incensed, Sekiguchi demanded to speak to the person in charge. In her contribution to *New Women*, she tells us that when the protestors tried to meet with the person in charge, they were set upon by the National Police Reserve 'like a storm' and were 'hit and knocked down violently', with many needing to be taken to hospital. Sekiguchi also says that 'many were killed or injured' in this incident and that one person had his 'head split open about 5 centimeters', and another his 'chest bone fractured'. Finally, we are left with Sekiguchi's frightening conclusion: 'In a Japan today that is supposed to be democratic, we see things before our own eyes such as these.'³¹ Sekiguchi's message is clear; she and others feared that Japan was returning to the kind of authoritarian repression of ordinary people that had been a legitimate part of the wartime regime.³² For those too young to remember what the wartime period was like, Sekiguchi and others advised looking to the present as a key to understanding what had happened in the past.

Through their narrative techniques, many who contributed articles, columns and autobiographical writings to *New Women* were able to conjure up a truly unnerving sense of similitude between the wartime period and the occupation era. They described convincingly how life under the Allied Occupation was waging a daily war on the bodies and minds of ordinary women, factory workers, and Korean residents of Japan. For instance, in the December 1950 issue, Mizugi Yōko and Imai Tadashi tell us about 'a certain company in Marunouchi which had decided to summarily lay-off any female employees who belonged to company-based labor unions'. As they describe it:

In the rain these women were crying and appealing for help from passers-by because their employer had just illegally fired them. Labor union members from the company next door [upon hearing the news] were indignant and yelled out 'these are inhumane times'.³³

In addition to the fact that there were no legitimate grounds for firing these workers, they were subjected to the humiliation of bodily expulsion from their workplace and physically thrown onto the street without any warning. Such acts of violence by those in authority, and indeed blatant violations of human rights and labor laws, were more than a political reality; they came as a psychological and physical shock to ordinary women and men precisely because they marked a betrayal of the new constitution and all that was supposed to be different about the postwar period now that Japan had set out on a path toward postwar democracy.

A very graphic and unsettling depiction of how this worked can be found in the December 1950 issue in an article titled 'But We are not Afraid'. Recounting what had happened just one month earlier in southern Tokyo at the Mitsubishi East Japan Heavy Industries Factory at Shita-Maruko, the article states that 45 workers (all of whom belonged to the workplace based labor union at the company) were suddenly, and without explanation, fired. They were 'given the sudden and nasty news "you are now all fired. Get out of this factory ASAP"'.³⁴ Security guards actually walked around 'looking for the 45 and ejected them from the premises while the workers were still in their work clothes' in a move intentionally meant to 'expose' and to humiliate the workers as 'subversive' and 'dangerous'. Readers of this article are told that four or five who resisted were physically 'pursued around the factory and carried out by their hands and feet'.³⁵ The discussion then proceeds to similar incidents in the southern part of the Tokyo area, such as a certain electronics company in which 15 workers were purged as the National Police Reserve were mobilized to handle the situation. In this instance, the police even 'took out their pistols and aimed them directly at members of the labor union'. Tokunaga Nao and co-authors describe the incident in which a certain Yamagishi Akio was shot and killed by police as 'blood gushed out from his left shoe'. The sense of urgency and immediacy here is crystal clear: 'We believe that there is now among Japanese workers and families a struggle to the death for survival'.³⁶ Not only were their jobs being taken away, but the assault upon the dignity and bodies of these workers suggests very strongly that psychological intimidation and bodily pain were also meant to show that the

workers had no rights and were, in fact, subject to arbitrary physical and psychological intimidation and harm if they did not comply with the authority of their superiors at work, municipal demands, and the overall climate of top-down dictates coming from the police, the state, and GHQ/SCAP. By emphasizing how these forms of authority were invading and subverting the space of the human body within everyday life, those writing in *New Women* were showing clearly that the personal was political, and the political personal.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that through the pages of the early postwar journal, *New Women*, we can locate a space of historical memory that in very clear detail collapsed otherwise accepted distinctions between the regime of wartime mobilization and that of postwar Allied Occupation democracy.³⁷ Many of those writing in *New Women* were very clearly alarmed by how far both GHQ/SCAP and the Japanese government were willing to go for the sake of public order. By 1950, many were so alarmed that they labeled the occupation a form of direct colonization of Japan by the United States. Drawing upon the recent past, they argued that Japan had returned to a condition similar to the wartime years, when state power and national political authority completely usurped the rights of citizens and imperial subjects. By inscribing the recent past onto the present, women writing in this journal showed that one form of illegitimate government – the presumptive occupation of a fascist state during the wartime years – had been succeeded by another, namely, the Allied Occupation of Japan and the Japanese regime it was supporting. The mnemonic device of utilizing the recent past to characterize the present was perhaps the ultimate way to express a sharp objection to what was happening during the latter years of the occupation and, moreover, to call for organized resistance.

As we have seen in this chapter, some of the weakest segments within Japanese society saw the early postwar period as a time in which it had become possible to raise their voices in ways not possible during the prewar years. Even though there were many differences between the past and the present, prewar and postwar, those discussed in this chapter saw it necessary to invoke the ghosts of the past and to claim that they were still haunting the present. Although this might not seem radical or extreme, in the context of a past that had, through defeat in 1945, been declared dead and buried, some of those alarmed by developments in the early postwar period were able to invoke parallels with the darkest

days in modern Japanese history. Through the journal *New Women*, a good number of ordinary women sought to show how the moment of the present was not necessarily one of liberation or freedom, but was, instead, an immanent moment of repetition and crisis. The voices quoted in this chapter clearly did not consider the wartime past and Japanese fascism as something that had come and gone. Rather, they saw it as a potentially integral, though deadly, part of modern Japanese society and politics during the early 1950s.

At root, those writing in this journal, like many others during this period of upheaval, were very much aware that the conclusion of World War II signaled the beginning of a new era. Within this climate of transition and transformation perhaps one of the strongest metaphors to bring home the dangers of excessive state power was to suggest a moment of similitude between these very two disparate periods – the wartime and the early postwar. In this important sense, those writing in *New Women* were, in effect, saying that there was very much a transwar element to governance in Japan, an element whose object was public order at all costs, even if it meant the abject denial of human rights, civil rights, and the principles of democracy which the Allied Occupation itself had brought into play through the postwar constitution and other reforms. Most of all, those who put pen to paper and those who protested were no doubt aware of this very painful and indeed cruel irony of history. That is perhaps exactly why they chose to articulate the state of the Allied Occupation of Japan as nothing less than a return to the bad old days that were supposed to have been exorcised out of modern Japanese history and relegated to the attic of obscurity.

Notes

1. Discussion of both the difference and mnemonic elision of pre- and postwar in Japanese public memory can be found in, for example, C Gluck and SS Graubard (eds), *Showa: The Japan of Hirohito* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1993).
2. In many ways there has been a postwar amnesia about the prewar and wartime years. See for example JJ Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).
3. Regarding the prewar period, see R Loftus, *Telling Lives: Women's Self-Writing in Modern Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004). For more on history writing by ordinary women and men in early postwar Japan, see CA Gayle, *Women's History and Local Community in Postwar Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).
4. 'Dokusha Dayori', *Shin Josei* (February 1951): 107.
5. Shin Josei Henshūbu, 'Sōkann no Kotoba', *Shin Josei* (October 1950): 26.

6. Nikaidō Maruko, 'Tetsumado no Naka kara no Tegami', *Shin Josei* (January 1951): 41.
7. Li Shōko, 'Watashi wa Chosenjin', *Shin Josei* (April 1951): 14.
8. Li, 'Watashi wa Chosenjin', 15.
9. Li, 'Watashi wa Chosenjin', 15.
10. Li, 'Watashi wa Chosenjin', 15.
11. See for example, S Ryang and J Lie (eds), *Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
12. Li, 'Watashi wa Chosenjin', 16.
13. Li, 'Watashi wa Chosenjin', 18.
14. For more on the Reverse Course, see Yoshida Yūta (ed.), *Sengo Kaikaku to Gyaku Kōsu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2004). I choose the summer of 1948 as the start of the Reverse Course, although this date is open to debate. It is clear, however, that by the middle of 1948 a number of segments of Japanese society began to collectively protest against policies and politics implemented by both the Allied Occupation authorities and the Japanese government.
15. For more on the Red Purge, see Matsumoto Kiyoharu, *Nihon no Kuroi Kiri*, Vol. 2, (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 2004).
16. See for example JW Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1999), especially Part Three.
17. See CA Gayle, 'Shin Josei ni Miru Sengo Bunsuitan to shite no 1950 nen', *Shakai Bungaku*, 33 (2010): 105–17.
18. Katō Kenzō, 'Tetsumado no naka kara no Tegami', *Shin Josei* (January 1951): 41.
19. S Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 240.
20. Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*, p. 240.
21. Fuji Shuppan, 'Fukkoku ni Atatte', *Sengo Josei Kaihō Undō no Senkaku* (Tokyo: Fujishuppan, 2010), p. 1. For more on feminism in prewar Japan, see V Mackie, *Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment and Sexuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
22. See Shin Feminizumu Hihyō no Kai, *Seitō o Yomu* (Tokyo: Gakugei Shoin, 1998).
23. See for example, Hori Makoto, 'Shinkenpō to Hataraku Fujin', *Hataraku Fujin* (June 1946): 18; Aoyanagi Morio, 'Fujin no Kōminken', *Hataraku Fujin* (April 1948): 14; Itō Kimiko, 'Hataraku Fujin to Rōdō Kumiai', *Hataraku Fujin* (April 1946): 18; Itō Ken, 'Mura no Minshuka', *Hataraku Fujin* (April 1946): 30.
24. *Hataraku Fujin* (July 1950): 108.
25. See Fuji Shuppan's notification and advertisement of publication of *New Women*. <http://www.fujishuppan.co.jp>.
26. My thanks to Professor Fujime Yuki of Osaka University for providing this information.
27. Miyamune Sarayō, 'Shinjitsu no Ki: Ankoku no Nagare ni koshite-Kahoku Chihō de Senshi shita Y ni', *Shin Josei* (October 1950): 16.
28. Miyamune, 'Shinjitsu no Ki', 16.
29. Gomyō Shigeko, 'Arashi no Akegure', *Shin Josei* (October 1950): 19.
30. Sekiguchi Miyoko, 'Zassō no yo ni Tsuyoku', *Shin Josei* (November 1950): 27.
31. Sekiguchi, 'Zassō no yo ni Tsuyoku', 28.

32. See Yasushi Yamanouchi, JV Koschmann and Ryūichi Narita (eds), *Total War and Modernization* (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1999).
33. Mizugi Yōko and Imai Tadashi, '1950 Nen Sayonara Tokushū: Taidan Eiga wo Megutte Ima kara Asu e', *Shin Josei* (December 1950): 19.
34. Tokunaga Nao, Ide Naho, Fukagawa Misao, Toda Saki, Mitsui Mitsuko and Nagata Yasuko, 'Gendai Zadankai: keredo watashitachi wa osorenai', *Shin Josei* (December 1950): 63.
35. Tokunaga et al, 'Gendai Zadankai', 63.
36. Tokunaga et al, 'Gendai Zadankai', 64.
37. For more on this theme in the postwar, see C Gluck, 'The End of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium', *Public Culture* 10, No. 1 (Fall 1997): 1–23.

11

Dividing Islanders: The Repatriation of 'Ryūkyūans' from Occupied Japan

Matthew R. Augustine

When the Allies severed imperial Japan from its Asian empire in the wake of World War II, well over eight million people headed home, crossing over newly redrawn national borders. This large-scale population movement, referred to as repatriation, included an estimated 6.7 million Japanese nationals returning from overseas colonies and occupied territories. It also included 1.6 million Asians returning from Japan to their liberated homelands.¹ The repatriation of Okinawans proved to be an anomalous case, as many went to mainland Japan while others returned to the newly renamed Ryūkyū Islands. Tens of thousands of Okinawan migrants had already begun repatriating during the last years of the Asia-Pacific War, but their postwar repatriation reflected the ambiguous status of the Ryūkyūs in relation to Japan.

The ambiguity that characterized the postwar status of the Ryūkyū Islands was a direct result of US wartime policy, which alleged that the archipelago and its inhabitants were not an integral part of Japan. For example, in July 1943 the Territorial Subcommittee of the State Department drafted its first policy document regarding the 'Liuchiu' (Ryūkyū) Islands, proposing that they be detached from Japan.² In June 1944 the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) published the results of its ethnographic study, which documented how Okinawans were discriminated against for not being fully Japanese. Consistently emphasizing the cleavage between Japanese and Okinawans, the OSS report suggested US forces might utilize this rift in psychological warfare and in the postwar occupation of Okinawa. Five months later, the US Navy produced a civil affairs handbook on the Ryūkyūs, which reminded the reader that the Ryūkyū Kingdom had been stripped of its sovereignty when Japan

annexed and renamed the islands Okinawa prefecture in 1879.³ These wartime documents prepared for the anticipated invasion of Okinawa later helped shape the perceptions of American officials who served in the postwar occupation.

The end of the Battle of Okinawa in late June 1945 effectively marked the beginning of US military rule in the Ryūkyū Islands. Imperial Japan's defeat in August resulted in the Allied Occupation of Japan and the division of the Ryūkyūs from Japan. In the process of administratively separating these islands from post-imperial Japan, one of the chief tasks for the two occupations was to physically separate so-called Ryūkyūans from Japanese through repatriation. The Ryūkyūan repatriation program coordinated between occupation authorities oversaw the return of over 173,000 people throughout the Ryūkyūs. However, the official regulation of this population movement failed to resolve several outstanding issues related to the division of the Ryūkyūs from Japan.

This chapter examines how war, occupation, and division affected the relationship between Japan and the Ryūkyū Islands shortly before and after 1945. In particular, the chapter focuses on repatriation and how it affected the following three problems faced by Okinawans during this period: (1) Japanese discrimination; (2) Okinawa's semi-colonial status; and (3) the denial of Ryūkyūan autonomy. To this end, the Japanese government's implementation of wartime repatriation from 1943 is measured against the American-initiated postwar repatriation program through 1949, paying special attention to the impact of US policy. The restoration of Okinawa's pre-annexation name, Ryūkyū, coupled with the repatriation of Ryūkyūans, was part of an American effort to justify the separation of Okinawa from Japan. However, most Okinawans never identified themselves as Ryūkyūan, and many of them did not repatriate but remained in Japan. The story of Okinawan repatriation – the process of dividing islanders – thus reveals contradictory objectives of the American occupation in its quest to dismantle Japanese rule in the Ryūkyūs and replace it with US military rule.

Wartime repatriation

The repatriation of Okinawans did not begin with Japan's defeat and occupation in 1945, but was first implemented by the imperial Japanese government during the final years of the Asia-Pacific War. In order to evacuate civilians before the American invasion, nearly 16,200 Japanese nationals were repatriated from Micronesia between 1943 and 1944. Most of these wartime repatriates were Okinawans, who constituted an

absolute majority of the colonial population in the Japanese mandated islands of Micronesia. Okinawans had migrated to these islands to escape economic deprivation and overpopulation at home, taking advantage of opportunities afforded them as colonists, even though other Japanese migrants often discriminated against them. As the US military's island-hopping campaign pushed north in 1944, 9,100 Japanese civilians were also repatriated from the Philippines, another archipelago where Okinawans constituted a majority of the Japanese population.⁴ A far greater number of civilians subsequently had to be relocated from Okinawa itself before the island prefecture became the last major battlefield in the Pacific. Over the course of nine months, an estimated 60,000 residents of the Nansei Islands, including Okinawa, were evacuated to the Kyūshū region in mainland Japan while another 22,000 were relocated to Taiwan by March 1945.⁵ An examination of such wartime population transfers not only addresses important questions of continuity and comparison with postwar repatriation but also reveals the meaning of repatriation itself.

Repatriation is usually defined as the act of returning people, assets, or artifacts to their country of origin, but does not address whether this return is voluntary or enforced.⁶ Japanese scholarship often describes the return migration of overseas Japanese during the war as repatriation (*hikiage*), characterizing it as an enforced population movement. According to this view, large numbers of Japanese civilians in Japan's colonies and occupied territories such as Micronesia and the Philippines were forced to repatriate to the Japanese homeland.⁷ The tide of war was already turning against imperial Japan in late 1943 when the Greater East Asia Ministry ordered the South Seas Government to return elderly men and women over sixty years old, in addition to mothers and their children younger than sixteen years in age. In response, the South Seas Government submitted a list of eligible repatriates to the Japanese military authorities, who in turn dispatched Navy cruisers that transported them to Japan proper.⁸ However, the enforced repatriation from Micronesia was interrupted by Allied air raids and submarine attacks, which claimed the lives of 1,580 Japanese nationals, including many Okinawans, on their return journey.

The large-scale evacuation from Okinawa that followed the fall of Saipan in July 1944 demonstrates the difficulties involved in enforcing repatriation. On July 7, the Japanese military's General Staff Office in Tokyo ordered the governors of Kagoshima and Okinawa Prefectures to repatriate 100,000 residents from the five largest islands in the Nansei Islands by the end of the month. The implausibility of carrying out

such an enormous undertaking in such a short time was immediately apparent to Urasaki Jun, an Okinawan prefectural government official charged with the task of evacuating Okinawans. For one, though the repatriation order reflected the imperial government's heightened sense of urgency, the Okinawan public did not yet understand how close they were to the war front. Furthermore, the increasing number of incidents involving Japanese Navy ships and ferry liners torpedoed off the waters of Okinawa discouraged Okinawans from taking the government-sponsored voyage to either Japan or Taiwan. However, the devastation caused by American air raids over Okinawa on October 10 changed the picture altogether, and suddenly the risk of boarding a repatriation ship did not seem nearly as bad. Urasaki recalled that the prefectural authorities no longer faced any difficulty encouraging people to leave Okinawa, as the increase in evacuations continued through March 1945.⁹

The enforcement of repatriation, despite mounting problems, reveals the real purpose behind these wartime population transfers. The Japanese government's stated objective in each repatriation order emphasized the necessary humanitarian measure aimed at safeguarding the lives of innocent civilians. Yet some Okinawan scholars are more critical of the government's delayed and reckless implementation of wartime repatriation, which resulted in thousands of civilians coming under fire and perishing at sea.¹⁰ Furthermore, the fact that these relocations were limited to the elderly, mothers, and children reveals that their presence was regarded as a drain on the military, which was busily preparing for an all-out battle. From Saipan to Okinawa, the buildup of military bases and securing food supplies were the absolute order of the day; those who could not directly contribute to the war effort were told to leave. While tens of thousands of civilians were thus removed from the war front, they were replaced by an even greater number of Japanese soldiers who were shipped in for mortal combat. Such a systematic relocation of specific segments of the overseas Japanese population aimed at maximizing military objectives is perhaps more akin to wartime evacuation than repatriation.

Another aspect of the wartime population movements that requires clarification is the question regarding who went where, which also pertains to the important distinction between repatriation and evacuation. The imperial Japanese government adopted the word *hikiage*, or repatriation, when it ordered the Japanese nationals residing in its colonies and occupied territories (*gaichi*) to return to the Japanese home islands (*naichi*). This is the same word that was used when referring to the repatriation of Japanese nationals after the war. While repatriation may

be the appropriate term for describing the 25,300 Japanese who departed from such places in the *gaichi* as Micronesia and the Philippines, it is problematic when applied to the relocation of 82,000 civilians from the Nansei Islands that were administratively a part of the *naichi*. However, the Japanese government's reference to the evacuation of Okinawans as repatriation was not a careless choice of words. Rather, it reflected the government's discriminatory attitude that Okinawa was not really considered a part of the home islands and that Okinawans were not really Japanese. Such official discrimination was also a reflection of the semi-colonial status of Okinawa within the Japanese empire, dating back to the annexation of the Ryūkyū Islands in the early Meiji period.

Urasaki Jun's observations of Okinawan evacuees in Kyūshū help illustrate the widespread discrimination they experienced. Urasaki recalled that Okinawan evacuees were the talk of the town wherever he went. Japanese locals in general made derogatory comments about the demeanor of elderly Okinawan women, some of whom were tattooed or wore distinctive kimonos. But many locals expressed surprise at discovering that the younger Okinawan women and children looked no different from themselves. For a people who were sometimes associated with aborigines (*dojin*) in Micronesia, Okinawans came across almost 'too respectable-looking'.¹¹ In reality, Urasaki noted that the schoolchildren from Okinawa were, on average, more educated and well-mannered than their counterparts in rural Kyūshū, attesting to the success of the Japanese assimilation policy in Okinawa.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government continued to refer to the evacuation of Okinawans to Japan as repatriation, implying that Okinawa was not an integral part of the home islands. On the other hand, wartime population movements within mainland Japan – such as the large numbers of people who took refuge from the Allied air raids in the Japanese countryside – were called *sokai*, or evacuation. Okinawans themselves began using this word when they were evacuated to mainland Japan, thus reflecting their close identification with Japan throughout the war years.¹² The removal of Okinawans from their home islands was, ultimately, an evacuation to an unfamiliar environment in Japan from where they hoped to repatriate as soon as the war ended.

Meanwhile, the US military decided to occupy Okinawa not only as a wartime base of military operations for the final attack on Japan, but also as a strategic American base after the war ended. When the US Tenth Army combat units landed on Okinawa Island on April 1, 1945, Admiral Ernest King requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the Ryūkyū Islands be considered as an area for the United States to have

exclusive military rights.¹³ On the same day, Admiral Chester Nimitz issued the 'United States Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 1', placing the Ryūkyūs under military occupation by the US Navy, thus administratively detaching the islands from Japan. By surrendering unconditionally on August 15, the Japanese imperial government formally agreed to relinquish its sovereignty over the Ryūkyūs. Japan's administrative control over Okinawa was thus replaced by US military rule in the Ryūkyūs in what Urasaki Jun referred to as the 'disappearance of Okinawa prefecture'.¹⁴

Postwar limbo

When Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa was transferred to the United States at the end of the Asia-Pacific War, the fate of Okinawans was left in a state of limbo. Uncertain of how Japan's defeat and the separation of Okinawa would affect their status, many Okinawans who wished to return home had no choice but to wait for the naval blockade of Okinawa to be lifted. While Okinawa remained off limits, the US military began repatriating Japanese nationals, including Okinawans, from Japan's overseas empire to the home islands. Japanese officials were soon confronted with the consequent problem of a growing number of Okinawans in Japan who were displaced by the war and division, a problem worsened by the absence of clear guidance from American authorities. A comparative examination of American and Japanese policies in the immediate aftermath of war reveals conflicting priorities and approaches to resolving this problem of Okinawans in limbo.

The US government's plans for repatriation after the war were discussed as early as October 1943 by a group of Far East specialists from the Office of Strategic Services, the Department of State, and the Navy. However, no decisions were reached until the Allied heads of states met at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. The pertinent section of the 'Proclamation Defining Terms of Japanese Surrender' simply stated: 'The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.'¹⁵ In other words, the Potsdam Declaration said nothing about repatriating Japanese and non-Japanese civilians, noting instead a general policy for returning Japanese military personnel. The JCS subsequently issued specific policy measures for military repatriation in September.¹⁶ US policy for civilian repatriation was thus postponed while the Japanese authorities complied with Allied orders to begin demobilizing and repatriating Japanese military personnel.

Immediately after defeat, the Japanese government was too preoccupied with repatriating overseas Japanese to give much attention to the Okinawan minority who wanted to return to their home islands. In addition, former colonial subjects, such as Koreans and Taiwanese, along with Chinese conscript laborers, demanded that they be repatriated to their respective homelands. Unlike the numerically dominant Koreans in Japan pouring into the congested ports of Hakata and Senzaki, the far smaller number of Okinawan evacuees heading towards Kagoshima did not present such a pressing problem. The government was forced to respond, however, when these Okinawans were joined by demobilized soldiers and laborers released from conscription, many of whom gathered in Kyūshū. In response, on September 20, 1945 the Home Ministry issued a memorandum outlining the government's policy towards administrative matters relating to Okinawa prefecture. The memorandum ordered the establishment of what was later called the Provisional Okinawa Prefectural Office (*Rinji Okinawa-ken Jimusho*) in Fukuoka to handle all matters concerning Okinawans in Japan. At the same time, the Ministry encouraged Okinawans to transfer their family registers (*koseki*) to their adopted prefecture and assimilate to the local customs so that the evacuees could establish roots there.¹⁷

The Japanese government's initial policy of persuading Okinawan war evacuees to remain in Kyūshū instead of repatriating did not take into consideration the reality of deteriorating living conditions. The evacuees were at first able to make ends meet with remittances sent from home, but after the fall of Okinawa they did not even know the whereabouts of family members, much less count on any remittances. Life became even more difficult when Japan's defeat suddenly resulted in the large inflow of Japanese repatriates returning to their hometowns and villages. In some areas of Kyūshū, villagers reportedly told evacuees that they had to leave immediately. To make matters worse, neighbors began turning against the evacuees when groundless rumors began to spread that the military defeat in Okinawa was largely due to Okinawan 'spying'.¹⁸ As a result, local authorities in parts of Kyūshū stopped providing food rations for Okinawans, forcing many to rely on the black market for their survival. Such discriminatory behavior against Okinawans in Kyūshū led to several incidents, which required the mediation efforts of local US occupation forces to resolve.¹⁹

Okinawans who were evacuated to Kyūshū during the war were joined by a growing number of Okinawans who arrived in Japanese ports after the war. In fact, Okinawans were among the first Japanese nationals to be returned to Japan from various parts of the defeated empire in

the Asia-Pacific region. However, a vast majority of Okinawan returnees initially had to be shipped to mainland Japan, as Okinawa remained off limits after the US military invasion in April 1945. At this early stage, the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Power (GHQ/SCAP) carried out repatriation on an ad hoc basis, prioritizing the return of demobilized soldiers and military personnel to Japan. On September 25, the first official repatriation ship from Micronesia arrived at the port of Beppu in Ōita prefecture carrying 1,600 Imperial Navy personnel.²⁰ Starting on October 19, repatriates from Yap, Truk, and other islands in Micronesia were shipped to the port of Uraga in Kanagawa prefecture. Having captured and occupied many of these Pacific islands over a year before the war ended, the US military was eager to demobilize its own forces stationed there and therefore began repatriating Japanese who had survived the bloody conflict. Ultimately, over 135,800 Japanese nationals survived the war in Micronesia; most of the estimated 95,000 military personnel were mainland Japanese, while more than half of the 40,500 civilians were Okinawan.²¹ At this point, however, the US military had not yet decided what to do with Okinawans after they were shipped to Japanese ports such as Uraga.

Despite the deteriorating condition of Okinawan returnees stranded in Uraga, the Japanese government did not ask GHQ/SCAP for their immediate repatriation to Okinawa. Instead, the government planned for these returnees to establish residency in the Kantō region, just as it was encouraging war evacuees to do the same in the Kyūshū region. The Home Ministry's memorandum on Okinawa, mentioned above, stipulated that, 'measures for assisting repatriates should be administered and executed by the prefectures that have received them'.²² The word repatriates (*hikiagemin*) here originally referred to the Okinawan evacuees in Kyūshū, but also applied to Okinawan returnees who arrived from overseas to other parts of Japan. As a result, Japanese officials from Kanagawa prefecture were expected to assist Okinawan returnees from Micronesia and the Philippines relocate from the reception center at Uraga to residential neighborhoods. Although local districts within Kanagawa prefecture initially refused to accept Okinawan returnees, neighboring prefectures – especially where Okinawans had resided since before the war – began accepting them. From January through July 1946, 6,349 Okinawan returnees from the Philippines, Micronesia, and elsewhere were relocated to seven prefectures in and around Kanagawa prefecture.²³

Contrary to the wishes of many Okinawan returnees and evacuees in Japan, the Japanese government did not advocate repatriation to

Okinawa. From the government's perspective, repatriation strictly meant Japanese nationals returning to mainland Japan. As long as Okinawans remained Japanese nationals, despite continuing discrimination, they were encouraged to adopt residency in Japan instead of returning to the US-occupied Ryūkyū Islands, which were beyond the jurisdiction of the Japanese government. The US military's prioritization of demobilizing and repatriating overseas Japanese military personnel did not include any special provisions for repatriation to the Ryūkyūs, contributing to the ongoing problem of Okinawans in limbo. Okinawans in Japan who awaited repatriation to their home islands, therefore, could not count on either Japanese or American authorities to get them there, at least until GHQ/SCAP decided how to resolve this problem.

Registering 'Ryūkyūans'

General Douglas MacArthur, who presided over GHQ/SCAP, held a view of Okinawans that was in sharp contrast with that of the Japanese government, especially in regards to who Okinawans were and where they belonged. In one of the first memoranda issued on the subject, GHQ/SCAP on November 1, 1945 included 'Ryūkyūans' among other 'non-Japanese' such as Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese who were eligible for repatriation to their home countries.²⁴ Admiral Chester Nimitz of the US Navy's Military Government in Okinawa shared this view that Ryūkyūans should be repatriated, but not to Okinawa where the economic and social structure was so thoroughly upset by the ravages of war. Although the main island of Okinawa remained off limits, Nimitz agreed that the other island groups in the Ryūkyūs could accommodate repatriates from Japan. On January 5, 1946, GHQ/SCAP directed the Japanese government that 'Ryūkyūans now in Japan who desire to return to their homes in the Ryūkyū Islands, except Okinawa, will be repatriated to the homes without delay'.²⁵ As a result, between January and March 13,675 Ryūkyūans were returned to the island groups of Miyako, Ishigaki, and Amami.²⁶ The repatriation of Ryūkyūans to these island groups reflected the US military's expansion of command in the Ryūkyūs beyond Okinawa. More importantly, this first wave of repatriation revealed GHQ/SCAP's view that since Ryūkyūans were not really Japanese, they should be encouraged to return to their home islands.

General MacArthur was eager to send back the large number of Ryūkyūans remaining in Japan, particularly those who were from the island group of Okinawa, and moved forward with plans to register

them for eventual repatriation. On February 17, 1946, GHQ/SCAP issued a directive to the Japanese government to begin registering Ryūkyūans – along with Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese – to ascertain the number of those who desired repatriation.²⁷ As a result, the Home Ministry compiled basic records of these minority groups in Japan for the first time in the postwar period, revealing that 141,369 out of 200,784 Ryūkyūans registered their desire to repatriate.²⁸ This registration of ‘non-Japanese’ signaled a turning point in GHQ/SCAP’s effort to separate them from the Japanese. GHQ/SCAP attempted to use this registration as a tool for what might be called a de-Japanization policy; liberating Asian nationals from Japanese rule. By de-Japanizing Asian nationals in Japan, GHQ/SCAP recognized them as former colonial or semi-colonial subjects, granting them the freedom to repatriate or remain in Japan.

The problem with GHQ/SCAP’s de-Japanization policy was that most Okinawans resisted the American reference to them as Ryūkyūan. Okinawans were disinclined to identify themselves as Ryūkyūan because mainland Japanese since the prewar era had used the name, *Ryūkyūjin*, as a pejorative term implying their inferiority. While a majority of Okinawans complied with the registration order, many were in fact upset by GHQ/SCAP’s designation, while others directed their anger at the Japanese government for registering them as ‘non-Japanese’. Long-term residents demanded an explanation of when and how they had become non-Japanese and why they had to repatriate like the people of Japan’s former colonies.²⁹ Still others wanted to know if Ryūkyūans were considered Japanese nationals, and what would happen to the legal status of those who returned to the Ryūkyūs? GHQ/SCAP avoided directly addressing such sensitive issues, warning instead that those who refused to register for repatriation would lose their privilege of free passage to the Ryūkyūs.

By the time registration was required for Okinawan repatriates, Occupation authorities and Japanese officials had come to view their presence in Japan as an economic and administrative burden. According to the official history of the Occupation, not only were Okinawans considered a ‘serious welfare problem but their continued care imposed an added strain upon an already extended budget’.³⁰ This was a major reason why General MacArthur was so anxious to remove Okinawans and thus decided to register them in preparation for their return. Concurring with this view, the Japanese Ministry of Welfare readily administered this registration, which it maintained would have ‘a great impact on the food ration and the maintenance of security in mainland Japan’.³¹ The cost of relocating Okinawans in Uraga and the provision of food,

shelter, and medical care for others in Kyūshū was beginning to take a toll on the Ministry's budgetary constraints. The Japanese government therefore abandoned its earlier position of encouraging these refugees to settle in Japan, and instead supported their expulsion in order to ease the social and economic burden in occupied Japan.

From the time GHQ/SCAP ordered the registration of Okinawans as Ryūkyūans, General MacArthur repeatedly pressed the US Navy to resume repatriation to the Ryūkyūs. The Navy, for its part, used the outbreak of smallpox as an excuse to postpone accepting repatriates from Japan while the Military Government tried to procure additional food and shelter for residents of the Ryūkyūs. This deadlock was finally broken on July 1, 1946 when the US Army relieved the Navy of responsibility for running the Military Government in Okinawa, thus giving GHQ/SCAP greater authority over civil affairs in the Ryūkyūs. On July 22, MacArthur's General Headquarters convened a conference in Tokyo, attended by the new Deputy Commander for Military Government and his staff, and hammered out a repatriation schedule. Two days later, GHQ/SCAP directed the Japanese government to return all Ryūkyūans who registered their desire to repatriate to their home islands. Okinawa was thus reopened for the first time since April 1945.

The long-awaited repatriation to the Ryūkyū Islands resumed on August 15, 1946, and GHQ/SCAP aimed to return all registered Ryūkyūans by the end of the year. According to the official history of the Occupation, 141,582 Ryūkyūans were repatriated from January through December 1946.³² However, GHQ/SCAP was eager to remove even more Ryūkyūans who remained in Japan. Starting on February 14, 1947, therefore, individuals who had originally registered to repatriate but chose not to do so were once again encouraged to apply for repatriation, subject to Occupation approval. Because of their burden on the Japanese economy, in reality, all those who desired to return were generally granted this permission. Small groups of Ryūkyūans continued returning from Japan in 1947 and 1948 until GHQ/SCAP directed the Japanese government to notify individuals that travel by right of repatriation would be suspended after August 1949. By this time, the total number of Ryūkyūan repatriates from Japan had reached 173,483.³³

For nearly four years from November 1945 to August 1949, GHQ/SCAP consistently promoted the repatriation of Ryūkyūans in Japan, as it did with other groups of non-Japanese. General MacArthur's view that Ryūkyūans were not really Japanese was shaped by wartime US reports on the Ryūkyū Islands and its inhabitants, including the OSS's ethnographic study and the US Navy's civil affairs handbook. Both of these

reports referenced Commodore Matthew Perry's signing of a compact between the United States and the Ryūkyū Kingdom in 1854, noting that the Ryūkyūs were not historically a part of Japan.³⁴ Nearly one hundred years later, American officials revived the name of the former kingdom before Japanese annexation, revealing the US view of Ryūkyūans as a semi-colonial underclass forcibly assimilated into becoming imperial Japanese subjects. This view of post-annexation history was prevalent in various Occupation-period documents, including those pertaining to repatriation. For example, the official history of the Occupation maintains that Ryūkyūans had been under a 'nominal suzerainty of Japan' for more than 300 years and possessed 'nominal Japanese citizenship', presenting difficulties when it came to repatriating them.³⁵ Although the repatriation of all non-Japanese was strictly on a voluntary basis, in reality GHQ/SCAP encouraged Ryūkyūans to return to their home islands for distinct reasons: to serve as a justification for maintaining the separation of the Ryūkyūs from Japan, and for perpetuating the direct US military rule there.

Repatriates and the politics of independence

The repatriation of Okinawans complemented the administrative separation of Okinawa from Japan, and also contributed to the contemporary debate over the future political disposition of the Ryūkyū Islands. Okinawans in Japan and at home were divided over this question, as recent wartime and postwar experiences strongly affected their views. One unforeseen consequence of GHQ/SCAP's de-Japanization policy was that Okinawan repatriates from Japan were often the most vocal in calling for political autonomy in the Ryūkyūs. In particular, the repatriation of progressive Okinawans proved influential in the formation of new political parties in the Ryūkyūs, many of which espoused self-government. On the surface, the push for Ryūkyūan autonomy appeared to conform to the US policy objective of dismantling Japanese rule in the Ryūkyūs. Just as the public discourse on independence was picking up momentum, however, it was confronted by emerging American plans for the militarization of Okinawa.

In order to understand the influential role played by Ryūkyūan repatriates, their rise in political prominence must be contextualized within the process of resettlement in postwar Ryūkyūan society. The reintegration of over 141,000 Ryūkyūan repatriates in 1946 alone had a tremendous impact on the lives of those returning as well as those who had remained in their home islands. Nowhere was this more evident than on

Okinawa Island, where at least 320,000 refugees – or more than three-quarters of the total number of war-survivors – were still being relocated from civilian refugee camps when the first repatriates began to arrive.³⁶ Repatriates disembarking at Kubasaki port in Okinawa joined tens of thousands of local residents who were leaving refugee camps in a chaotic process of resettlement on war torn Okinawa. Since the US military commandeered vast amounts of land, many residents who lost their homes to military bases were forced to move to different islands or even emigrate overseas. Repatriates and refugees alike thus became displaced people within their own home island, exacerbating socio-economic conditions in Okinawa.

One prominent group of repatriates who infused Okinawan politics with progressive views consisted of those who had been active members of the League of Okinawans (*Okinawajin renmei*) in Japan. Liberal political and ideological views strongly informed the League, which was founded in Tokyo on November 11, 1945. Matsumoto Saneki, an Okinawan member of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), broached the idea of forming the League with Iha Fuyū, one of the most famous Okinawan intellectuals and ‘father of Okinawan studies’. Iha became the chairman of the League, which immediately sent a petition to General MacArthur requesting assistance for Okinawan evacuees and returnees, while criticizing the Japanese government for deteriorating conditions.³⁷ Other founding members included Higa Shunchō, a prominent scholar and editor for the socialist-inspired magazine *Kaizō*, and Nagaoka Chitarō, who had spent a year in post-revolutionary Moscow as a correspondent for *Kaizō*. Prewar liberals and intellectuals thus dominated the League’s leadership.

JCP support for Okinawan independence, which affected the political views of large sections of the Okinawan community in Japan, appeared to complement GHQ/SCAP’s de-Japanization policy. In early postwar Japan, the JCP re-emerged as a powerful political force under the leadership of Tokuda Kyūichi, himself an Okinawan who supported independence. The JCP had welcomed the Allied forces as ‘an army of democratic revolution’ and, by extension, decided to endorse the separation of Okinawa from Japan. When the administrative separation of the Ryūkyū Islands was made official on January 29, 1946, the JCP responded by congratulating the Okinawan people on gaining their independence. The JCP’s Fifth Party Congress in February sent this message to the first national convention of the League of Okinawans:

Having suffered for centuries under Japanese dominance and having been subjected to exploitation and oppression under the rule of Japanese imperialism since the Meiji period, you must be overwhelmed with joy now that you have gained the independence and freedom for which you craved so long in this period of global democratic revolution.³⁸

Historian Ota Masahide has argued that the widespread jubilation over the prospect of liberation and independence among Okinawans on the mainland probably inspired the JCP to celebrate Okinawa's detachment from Japan.³⁹ Editorials in *Jiyū Okinawa* (Free Okinawa), the newsletter of the League of Okinawans, captured the sense of freedom and energy leading up to the first national congress of the League. A month before the national congress, the third issue of *Jiyū Okinawa* carried headlines like '[We] Advocate Forming an Alliance with Democratic Forces' and 'Okinawans and the Democratic Front'.⁴⁰ The League's three-day congress that started on February 23, 1946 in Kawasaki City, Kanagawa prefecture, brought together over one hundred representatives from the regional branches of the League in the Kantō, Tōkai, Kansai, Chūgoku, and Kyūshū regions. Miyazato Eiki, president of the Kyūshū chapter, declared: 'The time has come [for Okinawa] to be liberated from over 300 years of political, economic, and social oppression. If Okinawa fails to stand up now, it will never have another chance.'⁴¹ Miyazato then sent a message in support of political independence to the Civil Administration in Okinawa, the only political organization that was operating under the control of the US Military Government at the time. To emphasize his pro-independence stance, the message was written in the Okinawan language, or *Uchinaaguchi*, which Japanese authorities had repressed before the war.

The repatriation of progressive Okinawans who were politically active in Japan caused considerable friction with conservative Okinawans who dominated the Civil Administration in Okinawa. In particular, leading members of the League of Okinawans, such as Miyazato Eiki, Kuwae Chōkō, and Yamashiro Zenkō, who repatriated in late 1946, were deeply disillusioned by the harsh reality of direct military rule in occupied Okinawa. Having witnessed the implementation of sweeping democratic reforms in occupied Japan, they blamed the Civil Administration for failing to demand parallel reforms from the Military Government in Okinawa. In response, Yamashiro called on others to organize what was called the Okinawa reconstruction meeting, which met in May 1947

and attracted over three hundred people from throughout Okinawa.⁴² The main themes discussed at the meeting centered on the need to stabilize economic conditions and to establish political institutions that represented the will of the people. The organizers of the meeting then sent a report to the Civil Administration that called for elections to form a more truly representative government in Okinawa.

The growing political strength of activist repatriates, such as Yamashiro Zenkō and Kuwae Chōkō, became apparent through 1947, as they joined forces with local progressives and leftists in spearheading a grass-roots democratization movement in Okinawa. Those who attended the second Okinawa reconstruction meeting initiated this movement when they decided to form a political organization that championed greater autonomy and democratic governance. The Democratic Alliance, the first political party in postwar Okinawa, was thus born on June 15. Members of the League of Okinawans who repatriated and helped establish the Democratic Alliance then lent their organizational experience to carrying out a petition drive that called for direct elections to replace the Military Government's appointment of council members. Yamashiro and Kuwae were rewarded for their efforts in February 1948 when direct elections were held and they were elected assembly members of their respective hometowns.⁴³ Other Okinawan repatriates who were involved in the socialist movement and union activism in prewar Japan joined the newly formed People's Party, which also called for the establishment of popular government. These and other political parties initially welcomed American-style democracy, although their quest for autonomy would later put them on a collision course with the Military Government.

The problem with Okinawan calls for autonomy was that the US Military Government never explicitly promised sovereignty for an independent Ryūkyūan state. While the Military Government spoke of political and economic rehabilitation, in reality the first three years of apathy and neglect earned US-occupied Okinawa the nickname of the 'forgotten island'.⁴⁴ Popular resistance against the Military Government's empty promises of democratization, coupled with poor economic conditions, led to Okinawa's first protest movement sparked by labor strikes between 1948 and 1949. At about the same time, US policy toward the Ryūkyūs was overhauled when the National Security Council (NSC) decided to develop the archipelago as a strategic base for containing the spread of communism in the Asia-Pacific region. This fateful decision meant that Okinawa, in particular, was transformed into a huge military base complex that the Department of Defense

would soon label the 'keystone of the Pacific'. Japanese officials also recognized the geostrategic importance of Okinawa in the cold war, as they engaged their American counterparts in peace negotiations that included an agreement on the political disposition of the Ryūkyūs. Article 3 of the ensuing San Francisco Peace Treaty legitimated indefinite US military rule in the Ryūkyūs while promising 'residual sovereignty' to Japan, thus denying Okinawans their short-lived dream of gaining autonomy.

Conclusions

Okinawan repatriation is part of a regional history of large-scale population movements in Asia that began during the Asia-Pacific War and continued well after the Allied victory over Japan. The Japanese government's wartime repatriation program was aimed at evacuating children, women, and the elderly; in other words, only those who could not be counted on to defend Japanese territory. They were ordered to depart immediately, leaving behind their loved ones and embarking upon a perilous journey at sea that claimed many lives from enemy fire. The enforcement of such a hasty and limited evacuation policy, coupled with the Japanese military's focus on mobilizing all remaining civilians for the war effort, stands in contrast to the Allies' postwar repatriation program. The Allies implemented a carefully organized plan to safely return all Japanese and non-Japanese – soldiers and civilians – to their respective homelands, reflecting a commitment to separate Japan from its former colonial empire in Asia. In this sense, as historian Lori Watt argues, repatriation was part of a process that can be described as 'third party decolonization', with the Allies in charge of their respective areas of occupation.⁴⁵

Repatriation played a central role in deconstructing the Japanese empire, but was particularly problematic for Okinawa and its relationship with Japan. Long before the Asia-Pacific War, many Americans alleged that Japanese migrants in Asia, not to mention in the United States, were agents of imperial Japan's colonial expansion. By returning these settler migrants from Japan's colonies and occupied territories, repatriation was meant to serve as a critical means of postwar decolonization. The repatriation of overseas Japanese nationals was therefore enforced throughout the Asia-Pacific region, whereas Asian nationals – as 'victims' of Japanese colonialism – were free to repatriate or remain in Japan. However, at times Okinawans were considered colonizers in places like the Philippines and Micronesia, while Japanese all too often

discriminated against them wherever they were. Whether Okinawans were Japanese or a colonized minority group was a crucial distinction, but US Occupation authorities never clearly defined their legal status. As a result, the repatriation of Okinawans proved an anomalous case, many heading for Japan from overseas while others returned to the Ryūkyū Islands.

The ambiguous status of Okinawa and its people was intertwined with problems of ethnicity, identity, and history. From the very first memorandum outlining the need to repatriate Okinawans from Japan, GHQ/SCAP consistently championed their de-Japanization through repatriation. De-Japanization also meant Ryūkyūanization, a process by which US military authorities encouraged Okinawans to identify with the Ryūkyūan past.⁴⁶ De-Japanization focused on physical separation and psychological estrangement from Japan, while Ryūkyūanization aimed to construct an independent identity based on history and culture. These twin processes together enabled General MacArthur to echo Commodore Perry in proclaiming that Ryūkyūs were not historically a part of Japan, implying that the US was assisting the Ryūkyūs to restore its independence from Japan. On the other hand, Japanese officials held that the separation of Okinawa and its people after the war made Japan a divided nation.

Many Okinawans felt more ambivalent about their severed relations with Japan after the war, a feeling that was reinforced by repatriation from Japan. The American initiative of de-Japanization and Ryūkyūanization implied decolonization, liberation, and independence, ideas that some Okinawans were undoubtedly uncomfortable with while it gained in popularity among others. In fact, many liberal Okinawans in Japan openly advocated autonomy and self-government, committing themselves to working towards the realization of these principles upon their return to the Ryūkyūs. However, these repatriates were immediately confronted by the unsettling gap between democratic reform in occupied Japan and direct military rule in the Ryūkyūs. Over time, disillusioned repatriates and residents alike came to recognize the various problems they faced – Japanese discrimination, Okinawa's semi-colonial status, and the elusive dream of Ryūkyūan autonomy – as American justifications for maintaining the separation of the Ryūkyūs from Japan. Ultimately, the American policy of de-Japanization backfired when resistance against indefinite US military rule led Ryūkyūan residents to demand reversion to Japan. The subsequent reversion movement ironically amounted to a critique of the US military's neocolonial rule in the Ryūkyūs.

Notes

1. Exact figures on repatriation vary according to different sources. The overall estimate quoted here is from the latest study on repatriation in Japanese: Araragi Shinzō (ed.), *Teikoku hōkai to hito no saiidō: Hikiage, sōkan, soshite zanryū* (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2011), pp. 6–7.
2. Ota Masahide, 'The US Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Japan Proper,' in RE Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1987), pp. 296–7.
3. For further details about the Navy and OSS reports, see DT Obermiller, 'Dreaming Ryūkyū: Shifting and Contesting Identities in Okinawa,' in C Gerteis and T George (eds), *Japan since 1945: From Postwar to Post-bubble* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 71–2.
4. For detailed studies on the Okinawan immigrant communities in Micronesia and the Philippines, see M Peattie, *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1988), pp. 153–60; and EM Kaneshiro, "'The Other Japanese": Okinawan Immigrants to the Philippines, 1903–1941,' in RY Nakasone (ed.), *Okinawan Diaspora* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), pp. 71–89.
5. The Nansei Islands consist of the entire chain of islands southwest of Kagoshima Prefecture in Kyūshū, Japan, to Taiwan. The 60,000 people who were evacuated to Kyūshū were from Okinawa and the Amami Islands, while the 22,000 who were sent to Taiwan were mainly from Miyako and Yaeyama Islands.
6. For discussion on the issue of voluntary versus involuntary repatriation, see R Ward, 'Delaying Repatriation: Japanese Technicians in Early Postwar Japan,' *Japan Forum* 23, No. 4 (2011): 472–83.
7. See, for example, Wakatsuki Yasuo, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1991), pp. 42–3; Mori Akiko, 'Aru Okinawa imin ga ikita Nan'yō Guntō – Yōsaika to sono hamon no motode,' in Araragi, *Teikoku hōkai to hito no saiidō*, pp. 133–4.
8. Kōseishō Engokiyoku, 'Nan'yō guntō zaijū hōjin no naichi hikiage oyobi sono zaigai zaisan ni tsuite' (1956), cited in Kōseishō, *Hikiage engo no kiroku* (Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 2000).
9. Urasaki Jun, *Kieta Okinawaken* (Naha: Okinawa jiji shuppansha, 1965), pp. 268–70.
10. For example, Miyagi Osamu, 'Ajia taihei'yō sensōchū oyobi shūsengo no hikiagesha,' in Yonabaruchō kyōiku iinkai (ed.), *Yonabaruchōshi, shiryōhen1*, Imin (Yonabaruchō 2006), pp. 198–203 & 209–11.
11. Urasaki, *Kieta Okinawaken*, pp. 54–5. The Okinawa prefectural government dispatched Urasaki to investigate and report on the conditions of Okinawan evacuees in Kyūshū from late September to early October 1944.
12. Urasaki, *Kieta Okinawaken*, p. 31.
13. RD Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar US-Japan Relations, 1945–1952* (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001), p. 19.
14. This is the title of Urasaki Jun's book in Japanese: Urasaki, *Kieta Okinawaken*.
15. *The Department of State Bulletin* XIII, No. 318, July 29, 1945.
16. DE Richard, *United States Naval Administration*, Vol. 2 – *The postwar Military Government Era, 1945–1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1957-[63]), p. 27.

17. Naimushō, 'Okinawaken ni taisuru gyōseisochi ni kansuru ken,' September 20, 1945, cited in Urasaki, *Kieta Okinawaken*, pp. 263–8.
18. Higa Shunchō, *Okinawa no saigetsu: Jiden teki kaisō kara* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1969), p. 210.
19. For examples of incidents involving Okinawan evacuees in Kyūshū, see Naha-shi Kikaku Bu Shishi Henshū Shitsu (ed.), *Naha shishi shiryō hen*, Vol. 3, Part 8: *Shimin no senji-sengo taiken ki 2* (Naha: Naha-shi Kikakubu Shishi Henshūshitsu, 1981), p. 402.
20. Kōseishō Shakai Engokyoku, *Engo 50 nenshi*, pp. 18–19. Cited in L Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), p. 24.
21. Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory*, p. 26.
22. Naimushō, 'Okinawaken ni taisuru gyōseisochi ni kansuru ken,' September 20, 1945. Urasaki, *Kieta Okinawaken*, p. 267.
23. Uraga hikiage engokyoku, *Uraga hikiage engokyokushi*, pp. 143–51.
24. SCAPIN 224, 'Repatriation of Non-Japanese from Japan,' November 1, 1945. Reproduced in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *GHQ shirei sōshūsei*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Emuti Shuppan, 1993), pp. 340–2.
25. SCAPIN 558, 'Repatriation to Ryūkyū,' January 5, 1946. SCAP, *GHQ shirei sōshūsei*, Vol. 3, pp. 851–2.
26. During this period, 33,075 Okinawans were repatriated from Micronesia to Okinawa Island, while a limited number also repatriated from Taiwan to Ishigaki and Miyako Islands. Aniya Masaaki, *Innumi kara: 50 nenme no shōgen* (Naha: Nahashi, 1995), p. 13.
27. SCAPIN 746, 'Registration of Koreans, Chinese, Ryūkyūans and Formosans,' February 17, 1946. SCAP, *GHQ shirei sōshūsei*, Vol. 3, pp. 1,122–3.
28. This official figure compiled by the Japanese government does not accurately reflect the total number of Ryūkyūans in Japan, as a considerable number never showed up for registration.
29. Y Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the US Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 111.
30. GHQ/SCAP, 'Treatment of Foreign Nationals,' *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945 through 1951*, VI, part 4 (Tokyo: GHQ/SCAP, 1952), p. 30.
31. Takagi Nobuo, '1946 nen no "hi-Nihonjin" chōsa to Amami renmei Nansei shotō renmei,' *Kyora*, 2 (January 1997): 32–3.
32. GHQ/SCAP, 'Treatment of Foreign Nationals,' 32.
33. AG Fisch, Jr, *Military Government in the Ryūkyū Islands, 1945–1950* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 94–5.
34. For a detailed analysis of Perry in the Ryūkyū, see GH Kerr, 'The Mouse and the Eagle: Perry in Okinawa, 1853–1854,' *Okinawa: The History of an Island People* (Tuttle Publishing, 2000), pp. 297–341.
35. GHQ/SCAP, 'Treatment of Foreign Nationals,' 29–30.
36. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryūkyū Islands*, pp. 89–90.
37. For further details on the formation of the League of Okinawans, as well as their petition to General MacArthur, see Tomiyama Ichirō, *Kindai Nihon shakai to 'Okinawajin': 'Nihonjin' ni naru to iu koto* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2006), pp. 252–63.

38. Ota Masahide, 'The American Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Mainland Japan,' *Essays on Okinawa Problems* (Gushikawa: Yui shuppan, 2000), p. 186.
39. Ota, 'The American Occupation of Okinawa', 189.
40. 'Shuchō, minshu seiryoku to kessei seyo,' 'Minshusensen to Okinawajin,' *Jiyū Okinawa*, No. 3, January 25, 1946.
41. Ota, 'The American Occupation of Okinawa', 189.
42. Yamashiro Zenkō, 'Araya no hi' (12), *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, 27 March 1982. This meeting is referred to as the Okinawa *kensetsu kondankai* in Japanese.
43. Kuwae Chōkō, *Tsuchi ga aru asu ga aru: Kuwae Chōkō kaikoroku* (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu sha, 1991), pp. 52–8.
44. F Gibney, 'Forgotten Island,' *Time*, 28 November 1949.
45. Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, pp. 12 & 190–208.
46. For further details on the idea and process of Ryūkyūanization, see Obermiller, 'Dreaming Ryūkyū,' 69–88.

12

Memories of the Japanese Occupation: Singapore's First Official Second World War Memorial and the Politics of Commemoration

John Kwok

On February 15, 1967, the 25th anniversary of the Fall of Singapore, the city state's official memorial remembering the local victims of the Asia-Pacific War was unveiled. This memorial is officially named the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation and is, ostensibly, a national one. Yet this was not the first attempt to build an official memorial commemorating the experiences of Singapore's civilian population during the Japanese Occupation (February 15, 1942–September 12, 1945). The first attempt to memorialize local victims of the war and occupation was in 1948, when the Singapore Cenotaph that honored the war dead of World War I was rededicated as a World War II memorial. This was Singapore's national war memorial until the last official wreath was laid there by a Singaporean minister on Remembrance Day in 1968. After that year, official commemorations shifted to the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation.

The commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War in Singapore, in its official and unofficial forms, has been the subject of recent study by many scholars. Historian Kevin Blackburn's seminal work 'The Collective Memory of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Creation of the Civilian War Memorial of Singapore'¹ traces the history of the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, drawing out themes that characterize popular memory and the language of commemoration in Singapore. Hamzah Muzaimi examines popular sentiment

and approaches to war commemoration in Singapore. Muzaimi argues that, despite the government's efforts to cultivate a Singaporean memory of the war in Singapore, a combination of factors, including conflicts between cultures, experiences, and religions, and an absence of interest or time explain why there has been a 'lack of a culture of commemoration in Singapore'.² This chapter aims to explain why. It examines the first attempt to commemorate the Asia-Pacific War in Singapore in 1948, taking the discussion about building an official memorial back to an earlier debate in postwar Singapore. The first official British attempt to commemorate the war and occupation was supposed to be inclusive of the memories of all local civilians and service personnel who suffered. As this chapter will show, it was a failed attempt. But the failure illuminates the challenge of accommodating the voices of the fallen when commemorating war in a colony that was governed by Europeans but had a population that was not, and had suffered during the war under the brutal regime of a second occupier.

The call for war memorials

War memorials occupy a special space in a community. They are spaces for rituals of mourning and to commemorate the war dead, especially those who do not have a grave. Communities are, at least at the public level, reunited at war memorials, where the war dead are symbolically remembered, and the memories of war expressed and ritualized into a language of commemoration.³ War memorials and the commemoration of war, however, are seldom neutral. As historian Jay Winter argues, war memorials and commemoration are often a political act.⁴ They enable survivors of the war to express the selflessness and dedication of the war dead, and carry the message that communities and the nation can continue in freedom because of these dead.⁵ The commemoration of war also functions as a form of dialogue between the living and the war dead; the building of memorials is a form of public recognition demonstrating efforts to remember, creating a place 'where people could mourn... and [are] seen to mourn'.⁶

The British defeat and surrender on February 15, 1942 marked the end of the Battle of Singapore and led to the Japanese Occupation. For locals who took little part in the battle, the date marked a change in regime from British colonial rule to Japanese Occupation. Singapore was renamed Syonan-to, the Light of the South, marking its change from being on the periphery of the British Empire to becoming an

intermediary possession of the Japanese Empire, the conduit between the Japanese metropolis and its periphery at Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The occupiers reorganized local social and economic institutions to emphasize Japanese culture and commerce. The Japanese Occupation officially ended on September 12, 1945 when Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command, arrived at the Singapore Municipal Hall to accept the official Japanese surrender. However, the Japanese had already surrendered on August 15, 1945. The official ceremony in Singapore was simply to mark the return of the British and the colonial reoccupation of Singapore.

The British Military Administration (BMA) was established after the official surrender ceremony to facilitate the transfer of colonial administration in postwar Singapore. The immediate concerns of the BMA were dismantling Japanese fortifications and restoring essential public services, such as transport and sanitation, which had been neglected during the Japanese Occupation.⁷ The locals added two more issues to the BMA's list: the first was to investigate and address the Japanese atrocities against civilians in Singapore during the Japanese Occupation; and the second was to find a way to officially remember the victims of the war. The former issue was addressed by the BMA in February 1946 when Colonel Cyril Wild was appointed to head and initiate war crimes investigations in Malaya and Singapore.⁸ The latter issue was put on hold until a more permanent civil political administration was in place. This was despite the fact that within months of the Japanese surrender the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs under the BMA began to receive unsolicited public proposals for official war memorials to honor victims of the war. While war commemorations and the dedication of communal war memorials took place at the local level, the question was what could be done at the official level.

The BMA was dissolved in April 1946 and Singapore made into a British Crown Colony. The advisor to the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, HT Pagden, immediately recommended to the new Colonial Administration that a committee be formed to coordinate the building of official war memorials in Singapore. Pagden suggested that the committee consist of members who survived the Japanese Occupation and whose loyalty to Britain was without question. If local community leaders were nominated, Pagden believed that local community interests, rather than commemoration at an imperial level, would dominate proceedings. Pagden had good reason to highlight this point, the biggest issue that would confront this committee would be the voice and postwar mood of the Chinese community in Singapore.

Singapore before the war

Prewar British colonial Singapore was a mosaic society made up of many communities. The majority of the colony was composed of non-European immigrants. The British were a minority community and they governed the island with the loyalty of a minority English-educated local elite. Among non-European immigrants, ethnic heritage and homeland loyalties played a huge part in local communal and individual identity. The Indian diaspora community in Singapore, for example, was far more concerned with political developments pertaining to India's independence in their native homeland than matters in Singapore.⁹ The Malay community in prewar Singapore was seen by other communities to be indifferent to the British regime.¹⁰

The Chinese made up the majority of the island's population, but they were not monolithic since there were three distinct groups. One group was the Straits Chinese, who were descendants of early Chinese immigrants and local Malays. They retained their Chinese heritage but not the Chinese language, conversing instead in Baba Malay.¹¹ The Straits Chinese were also British-educated, employed in government service, and known colloquially in colonial Singapore as the 'King's Chinese'.¹² The second group was the English-speaking, Anglophile Chinese. They had extensive contact with the British and were educated in English schools. The majority of the Singapore Chinese community, however, consisted of Overseas Chinese, who were Chinese-educated and Sino-centric. They had minimal contact with the British authorities and perhaps only a little more with other ethnic minorities.¹³ Clan associations, native dialect groupings, and political ideology further divided them. However, it was this group of Chinese that would transform the attitudes of the Chinese in Singapore, uniting them into one Singapore Chinese community, and influencing postwar developments for an official war memorial.

Local Chinese anti-Japanese movements

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Overseas Chinese made their pro-China and anti-Japanese sentiments clearly known. For example, they boycotted Japanese manufactured goods imported to Singapore by intimidating Chinese businesses that stocked these products, labeling them as 'traitor merchants',¹⁴ and by bullying customers to stop them patronizing these stores. Running parallel to the boycott were the more popular relief fund efforts organized by Overseas Chinese organizations,

Chinese medium schools, and clan associations to raise money and recruit volunteers to aid China.¹⁵ To coordinate fundraising activities, the Nanyang National Salvation Movement was founded and Tan Kah Kee, a prominent Chinese community and business leader in Singapore, was elected to lead it.¹⁶ He would play an important part in the building of Singapore's war memorial in the postwar era. The relief fund efforts were later known collectively as the China Relief Fund and the term was synonymous with the local Chinese anti-Japanese movement.¹⁷

When war came to Malaya and Singapore, the Overseas Chinese, with the approval of British authorities, formed the Committee of Mobilization of Singapore Overseas Chinese to organize the Chinese to assist the British. Believing that Tan was the person who could unite them in the war effort, the Overseas Chinese elected him to lead this committee.¹⁸ The Committee raised a volunteer army called the Singapore Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army, more commonly known as Dalforce. The volunteers donned blue uniforms, a color that was deliberately chosen due to its nativist significance. When the Communist Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army fought under the banner of the National Revolutionary Army of China against the Japanese, they adopted blue uniforms as their standard.¹⁹ For Japanese and Chinese alike, the war in Malaya and Singapore was simply an extension of the war in China.²⁰

Japanese atrocities and the Chinese in Singapore

The Japanese treatment of the Chinese after the Fall of Singapore was twofold and brutal: exacting reparations and what they called a standard mopping-up operation, which will be discussed later. Despite the diversity shown above, the Japanese treated the Chinese collectively as one group. In March 1942, a month after the Japanese victory in Singapore, the Japanese merged all Chinese organizations and clan associations in Malaya and Singapore under one organization called the Overseas Chinese Association (OCA). They then quickly punished the Chinese for their local China Relief Fund, using the OCA as a local proxy to carry out a 'Voluntary Contribution Campaign' to raise \$50 million dollars in the local currency as a donation to the Japanese war effort and as a demonstration of loyalty.²¹ The sum demanded was close to a quarter of the local currency in circulation in 1941,²² and the Japanese gave the OCA a two-month deadline. The OCA, under duress, met the demand and the deadline by pooling the contributions and resources of the Singapore Chinese community, raising a total of \$22 million dollars.

To make up the balance, the Chinese took out a loan from the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank at an interest rate of six per cent.²³ The Singapore Chinese community thus remained heavily in debt during the rest of the Japanese Occupation. However, the events that would become central to Singapore Chinese memory were the massacres conducted by the Japanese during the occupation.

After the Fall of Singapore, the Japanese military launched what it later described as a standard mopping-up operation after a successful military campaign. They announced that locals were to be screened between February 21 and 23, 1942 to weed out what were described as 'pro-Chinese individuals',²⁴ members of anti-Japanese resistance movements and criminal elements in the colony. The Kempetai (Japanese Military Police) was in charge of the operation. Five locations were designated as screening areas and all Chinese residents in Singapore were ordered to report to one of them.²⁵ When the operation was launched, it was clear that it was directed exclusively against the Singapore Chinese population, particularly young Chinese males.

The Kempetai planned for each screening to have three checkpoints. The first checkpoint was to be manned by local informants who were willing to cooperate with the new regime.²⁶ Their identities would be protected by ensuring that they wore a hood. Everyone would pass the first checkpoint in one line and the hooded informants would single out any they thought were suspicious individuals. These suspects were then required to move to the second checkpoint, where Kempetai officers would take over the screening process. A more detailed investigation was to be carried out on each individual suspect. Those whose background was deemed clean would be allowed to leave. The third checkpoint was reserved for suspects who did not pass the second checkpoint and required even further investigation. Locals who passed the checkpoints were to be issued with a 'good citizen' card.²⁷

The reality was somewhat different. The Kempetai was not prepared for the scale of the operation and the two day deadline to complete it. The sheer number of people forced the Kempetai to merge the three checkpoint system into one to speed up the process. There was also no uniformity in procedure between the screening centers. Survivors of the screening process each had different accounts of their experience. Ng Seng Yong was a Chinese youth at the time of the Japanese Occupation and he and his family reported to a screening center at the Telok Kurau English School, following the instructions of a Japanese soldier. The women at the screening center were immediately released, indicating that the Japanese were specifically targeting the Chinese male

population. In the school compound, a Japanese soldier simply broadcast a question to all the Chinese men: 'those educated in Chinese, put your hands up'.²⁸ Those who raised their hand were led away. Although he had been educated, Ng had attended an English medium school and therefore did not raise his hand. Ng's group was soon released. He later found out that those who had raised their hands were transported to a remote location and massacred by machine gun fire.²⁹ Ng had two nephews in that group.

At another screening center in the Chinatown district, Neoh Teik Hong was interviewed by a hooded informant before being released.³⁰ On his way out of the center, he noticed a lorry parked on the left side of the building. Neoh saw that those who had been interviewed were either allowed to go home or put into the lorry. No further checks were made on those who did not pass the first round of interview. Neoh later learned that those who were in the lorries 'would never come back'.³¹ Those detained by the Kempetai at the screening centers were immediately sent away for what the Japanese called severe punishment, a Japanese Imperial Army euphemism for execution. The Kempetai did not investigate further any of the suspects they detained; the screening process alone took longer than the two days allocated and they ran out of 'good citizen' cards long before the screening operation was completed.³² The Kempetai thus resorted to stamping the red print meant for the cards on shirts, sleeves or any part of the body of the locals who passed inspection.³³ This only served to fuel Chinese animosity against the Japanese since the entire process resembled the inspection and branding of livestock. The screening operation and the issuing of 'good citizen' cards was merely a front to disguise that the real motive of the Japanese Imperial Army was to purge the Chinese population in Singapore.³⁴

After the war, the mass screening operation and the executions that followed were called *Dai Kensho* by the Japanese, which means great inspection.³⁵ To the Overseas Chinese, it was *Sook Ching*,³⁶ which means purge or cleansing,³⁷ and they claimed that the Japanese massacred 50,000 Chinese. Their claims were not far from the figure in the affidavit of a Japanese military journalist, based in Singapore during the Japanese Occupation, who claimed during the Singapore War Crimes Tribunal in 1947 that the number of Chinese massacred ranged somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000.³⁸ The Japanese, however, put the official number of deaths at around 6,000.³⁹ The Sook Ching massacres became pivotal events influencing the way the Overseas Chinese would remember the war; it was their equivalent of the Nanjing Massacre.

The massacres did not distinguish between the different groups of Chinese that had existed in prewar Singapore. Historian Wang Gungwu, a survivor of the Japanese Occupation, remembers that the Japanese made no distinction whether one was a local born Chinese or an immigrant from China, and it did not matter if one supported the anti-Japanese movements or not: 'all Chinese were at the receiving end of the war and would be treated the same'.⁴⁰ After the war, the Sook Ching massacres became part of the shared memory of the Japanese Occupation that cut across the many Chinese communities in Singapore, blurring the distinction between the groups of Chinese mentioned earlier. Thus, the once diverse Chinese community drew comfort and unity in postwar Singapore from the common suffering experienced during the Japanese Occupation. It was not surprising, then, that after the war one of the earliest and loudest appeals for an official war memorial in Singapore came from the combined Chinese community, one that in postwar Singapore resembled an embryonic nationalist ethnic group with a belief that, because they had suffered more than any other during the Japanese Occupation, their sacrifice should be privileged in public memory.

The War Memorials Committee

On July 18, 1946, in response to the popular call for an official war memorial, the British Governor of Singapore, Franklin Charles Gimson, recommended the establishment of a committee to advise the government on the form of a 'purely...Singapore memorial'⁴¹ as official recognition to the memory of local civilian war dead. The Colonial Secretary of Singapore, PAB McKerron, was instructed to form this committee, known later as the War Memorials Committee (WMC), and the Governor instructed that members 'should be English-speaking'.⁴² Membership would include one representative from each of the local veteran and volunteer organizations, like Dalforce, the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force, the Malayan Anti-Japanese Army, and the Passive Defense Force, that had participated in the defense of Singapore.⁴³ Ethnic communities in Singapore were allowed one representative each, except for the Chinese community; the Governor felt that the Chinese were already well-represented by the veteran organizations.⁴⁴ However, this was quite likely a calculated move. Tan Kah Kee, the de facto leader of the Chinese anti-Japanese movement discussed earlier, had fled Singapore before the British surrender but returned after the war to lead a campaign for a separate and official war memorial for Chinese war dead. Tan rejected even the possibility of a combined war memorial on the grounds of

'conflicting religious interests'⁴⁵ with other ethnic communities in Singapore. Tan's campaign ran contrary to the Governor's WMC, and Gimson's guidelines were clearly deliberately drawn up to exclude Tan.

On July 25, 1946, the first meeting of the WMC was officially convened. The committee, however, soon realized that despite including the Chinese veteran organizations, it needed to include the broader civilian Chinese voice. Excluding them would send a political message that the group that had borne the brunt of the Japanese Occupation, and made up the majority of the population, was being ignored. After the first meeting, the WMC invited the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee and the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) to sit on the committee.⁴⁶ Since it now included two organizations that represented the Singapore Chinese community, the WMC wanted to make sure its members would not be too influenced by them. Thus the WMC also invited the Malayan Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve as counterweight to the Chinese organizations. To further counter the influence of Tan and the Chinese, the WMC launched an official and public appeal for suggestions and ideas for a memorial that was inclusive, popular, and reflected a broader local memory of the war.

War memorial proposals

On September 14, 1946, the press officially called for proposals to build an official war memorial in Singapore dedicated to civilians who died during the war.⁴⁷ All proposals were to be sent to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs by October 7. The *Straits Times* reported the ideas that the WMC had been considering, such as, it was not to be just 'a monument' but it could take the form of projects like 'a public park, or the foundation of special funds for scholarships for further education and financial assistance to distressed dependents'.⁴⁸ The *Malaya Tribune* also ran the public appeal on the same day, covering much the same ground, but adding that the memorial had to be inclusive to honor the 'thousands of others who died' during the Japanese Occupation and not only focus on the '5,000 Chinese massacred by the Japanese soon after Singapore fell in 1942'.⁴⁹

The response from the public was largely positive, and 12 proposals were received by the WMC. The Singapore Association was one of the first to respond on September 24, 1946. It suggested that the war memorial should take the form of a tuberculosis hospital and a sanatorium, maintaining that public funds should not be 'wasted on an impressive stone memorial'.⁵⁰ The Singapore Kiaw Thong Exchange similarly proposed a tuberculosis sanatorium.⁵¹ The War Department Civilian

Staff Association of Singapore submitted a proposal for a memorial on an even larger scale to be dedicated to the general population of Singapore, a Free Hospital 'with a suitable monument erected at the entrance to the hospital'.⁵² The strong desire for hospitals and sanatoriums was probably indicative of the extent of health problems in Singapore after the Japanese Occupation. However, what was striking was that these and many other proposals placed an emphasis on the whole community. The Singapore Social Welfare Council, for example, proposed a functional war memorial in the form of a community center fully equipped with theatres, classrooms, libraries, study rooms, handicraft workshops, music rooms, art studios, and restaurants where 'all races can meet for the pursuit of cultural ends'.⁵³ The local press commended that this proposal hit the 'right note for this new Singapore that has emerged from the surrender, the occupation and the liberation',⁵⁴ and editorialized that its multiracial concept was clearly well ahead of its time, 'more like the Singapore of 2000 AD than the Singapore we know'.⁵⁵

One proposal that stood out was submitted by the South East Asian Federation of China Relief Funds. The Federation wanted an exclusively Chinese war memorial in the form of a traditional stone monument. The chair of the Federation was none other than Tan Kah Kee, who had coordinated the Chinese anti-Japanese resistance campaigns before the war and had led a campaign for an exclusive and official Chinese war memorial since 1946. Tan even followed up the proposal with a personal letter to the WMC on October 4, 1946, setting out his reasons for a separate Chinese war memorial.

Tan wrote that the Chinese war dead must be honored with a war memorial because the Singapore Chinese community practiced ancestor worship. Tan explained that a Chinese memorial would function as a symbolic ancestral grave that would thus serve the Chinese community's needs.⁵⁶ Therefore, for the Chinese community, the erection of a war memorial went beyond issues of commemoration. Although Tan had no objections to a combined war memorial to reflect racial harmony in Singapore, he reminded the WMC that if offerings of pork were made during commemoration services (a practice that was common in Chinese rituals for the dead) at an official war memorial that included other races and ethnic groups, it would offend the Muslim community in Singapore and 'may give rise to Sino-Malay clashes'.⁵⁷ 'We must as far as possible,' Tan wrote, 'avoid creating another Wailing Wall.'⁵⁸ While Tan reassured the WMC that the erection of a Chinese memorial would 'not encroach in any way on that of the Inter-racial Memorial', he remained adamant that there was 'sufficiently important grounds to justify for a separate

Chinese Memorial on the part of victims [sic] families'. Tan claimed that the Chinese community had the right to erect their own memorial at an official level in Singapore because the number of Chinese victims 'top the list out of all proportion to that of other races'.⁵⁹ Interestingly, Tan found it necessary to reassure the WMC that his community's desire for a separate war memorial should not be interpreted as an expression of Chinese national sentiment: 'I would like to dismiss any probable misapprehension that this idea [for an exclusive Chinese war memorial] is fraught with national sentiments as quite groundless and ridiculous.'⁶⁰ His statement, however, was revealing and indicative that the postwar Singapore Chinese community was no longer mosaic but a nascent nationalistic community. Tan concluded his letter to the WMC with a passionate appeal for a site at Bukit Timah, the site where the Japanese war shrine and memorial Syonan Chureito once stood, to be allocated for a Chinese war memorial. He argued that the site would meet the religious requirements of the Singapore Chinese and would acknowledge the fact that the Chinese had suffered more than any other group during the Japanese Occupation. The community, he claimed, was prepared to meet the cost of building such a memorial. All he asked of the WMC was its endorsement of the site at Bukit Timah. The WMC described Tan's letter as an 'ardent plea'⁶¹ and did not send a reply.

Reviewing the proposals

After it had carefully considered each proposal, the WMC met on January 29, 1947 to narrow down their preferences on the form of the memorial. It decided that proposals for functional memorials like hospitals and tuberculosis sanatoriums were government and municipal responsibilities and would not be considered as memorial projects.⁶² The WMC then considered the other proposals and nominated four possible forms that the war memorial might take: a special relief fund and scholarships for the dependents of victims; scholarships for higher education to enable the people of Singapore to take part in the administration of the government; a community center; and a public park with a monument.⁶³ The first of these to go was a special relief fund. The WMC believed government departments like the Department of Social Welfare, the Education Department and the Volunteer Forces Record Office provided financial relief and free or assisted primary education for dependents of victims of the war.⁶⁴ Their work should not be duplicated by a war memorial fund.⁶⁵ The WMC also noted that in honor of the 1948 Silver Jubilee celebrating the anniversary of the King and Queen's wedding, the Silver Jubilee Fund would be available to provide further financial assistance to

these dependents.⁶⁶ The next to go were the higher education scholarships. Originally conceived to train locals to take up higher administrative posts in Malaya to assist its advancement to self-government after the war, the scholarships became irrelevant after Singapore was politically separated from Malaya and made into a British Crown Colony with its own constitution, British governor, and a nominated executive council.⁶⁷ Unlike British Malaya, there were no plans to prepare Singapore for immediate self-government.

The WMC finally settled on a plan that was loosely based on the proposal submitted by the Social Welfare Council for a community center.⁶⁸ Yet it faced problems of cost since early estimates put the scheme out of the reach of WMC funds.⁶⁹ Consequently, the committee unanimously decided that it would create a war memorial park complete with a monument, while the construction of a community center 'should be left to existing interested bodies'.⁷⁰

Site of the memorial

After deciding the form the war memorial would take, there was still one last issue to be settled, its location. The WMC laid down two criteria: the war memorial park had to be within easy access of the city; and, at the same time, the park had to provide 'a worthy setting for the War Memorial'.⁷¹ If the WMC had found the task of deciding the form of memorial difficult, the choice of site was to be even more problematic.

Public land in or close to the Singapore district was limited. The Singapore Improvement Trust, the Land Office, and the Municipality of Singapore assisted the WMC by proposing possible sites. The site that topped the list was empty land within the Singapore city district at Ann Siang Hill. This site, however, only had two acres of flat land available and, while it was considered 'an admirable site for a memorial, it would be too small for a Park'.⁷² Other sites that were proposed were even more problematic and, in some cases, potentially controversial. Two sites were on consecrated ground: the Chinese Teochew cemetery in Orchard Road; and the site of the former Japanese war shrine and memorial Syonan Chureito at Bukit Timah. The former, although located within easy access of the city, was private property and owned by the Ngee Ann Kongsi, an influential Chinese clan association. The WMC claimed that there would be 'difficulties in the disposal of the graves'⁷³ with this site, but more likely they did not want to deal with the Chinese when it came to negotiations. The site at Bukit Timah, where Syonan Chureito once stood, was rejected because it was deemed too far away and was 'unsuitable in view of its association with the Japanese shrine

and Japanese [war] dead'.⁷⁴ More importantly however, if this site was developed into a war memorial park it would indicate that the WMC was endorsing Tan's and the South East Asian Federation of China Relief Funds' political stand by erecting a war memorial over a former enemy's sacred ground dedicated to their war dead.

With its list of locations running short, the WMC began considering using land that had been recently reclaimed from the sea. This, at least, would not be privately owned and, more importantly, would be free of controversy and fit the WMC's criteria. A parcel of reclaimed land that had become Connaught Drive was reportedly 'going to waste'⁷⁵ and seemed to be a suitable site. Its only limitation was its small size.⁷⁶ By January 1947, the WMC still could not decide on a suitable site, although it was quite clear that the Connaught Drive reclaimed land was emerging as the favorite. Even though it had the same limitations in size as Ann Siang Hill, Connaught Drive had one advantage, it adjoined an established memorial, the Singapore Cenotaph, an Imperial war memorial dedicated to fallen British volunteers from Singapore during the First World War.

The Singapore War Crimes Tribunal and the esplanade plan

As the WMC deliberated over the site of the memorial, an event would completely alter the trajectory of the project. On March 10, 1947, the Singapore War Crimes Tribunal found seven Japanese officers guilty,⁷⁷ two of them generals, for ordering and carrying out the Sook Ching massacres. Five defendants, including the highest ranking officer on trial, Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma, were sentenced to life imprisonment; the rest were sentenced to hang. While the Singapore Chinese community praised the work of the prosecution, they protested immediately against the sentences. Leaders of the Chinese community organized a Singapore Chinese Appeal Committee and accused the tribunal of handing out 'inappropriately lenient'⁷⁸ sentences for the five given prison sentences. Popular sentiment in the Singapore Chinese community expected the death penalty for all seven defendants. The trial was concluded on April 2, 1947 and the executions were scheduled to take place at the end of June. And that may explain what followed.

In May 1947, plans for Singapore's official Second World War memorial were finally announced to the public. On May 22, 1947, the *Straits Times* reported that 'a memorial to Singapore's war dead was discussed and approved at a recent committee of the Singapore Ratepayers Association'.⁷⁹ By this time, responsibility for the project had passed from the WMC to the Singapore Ratepayers Association (SRA), but there

are no records explaining why. The SRA was a pro-British organization made up of English-educated local elites and businessmen, formed in the early 1900s to represent their business interests in the colony. It was quite likely that the Colonial Administration needed local loyal voices to counter the sentiments of the Chinese in the wake of the trial. The SRA made only one change to the WMC's original proposal, but it was indicative that the first official Second World War memorial in Singapore would carry a strong imperial message.

The SRA's scheme continued where the WMC had left off, the location (Connaught Drive) remained unchanged. However, there would be no separate monument for Singapore's civilian war dead. The *Straits Times* reported that the president of the SRA had instead produced a plan that proposed a modification of the existing Cenotaph.⁸⁰ The Cenotaph would be expanded to include two granite urns, one to include the remains of an unknown soldier, the other the remains of an unknown civilian. One side of the Cenotaph would continue to commemorate the fallen from the First World War, the other civilian victims of the Second World War,⁸¹ and the new park would commemorate victims of both. Construction of the park and modifications to the Cenotaph were to begin once all reclamation activities had been completed. Ironically, its centerpiece would be an imperial and traditional commemorative war memorial. The incorporation of a Second World War memorial into an imperial war memorial sent a political message that reminded the people that Singapore was still a British possession.

On September 26, 1948, the Singapore *Sunday Times* ran the headline: 'The Cenotaph Plan Shelved'.⁸² According to the report, the proposed modifications to the Singapore Cenotaph had now been abandoned. Despite the promotion of the proposal through the press and multi-language leaflets, public support was lacking.⁸³ Rather than an expansion, the years 1939 to 1945 would simply be added to the steps on the south side of the Singapore Cenotaph, mirroring the steps on the north side that listed 1914 to 1918 for the Great War. The inscription at the top of the Cenotaph on the south side would match exactly that on the north side, 'Our Glorious Dead'. Nor had work on the park made substantial progress. Colonial Secretary McKerron, who oversaw the creation of the WMC and the entire war memorial project from the start, announced that the Singapore Public Works Department (PWD) would simply plant as much turf as they could so that by Remembrance Day there would be 'a large area of green grass on the reclaimed land on the sea side of the Singapore War Memorial'.⁸⁴ While footpaths would also be laid out in preparation for Remembrance Day, the question of beautifying

the grounds with ornamental gardens would 'have to be left to the Municipal Commissioners and the Government'.⁸⁵

The politics of commemoration

The dates for the Second World War (1939–45) and the choice of Remembrance Day to commemorate the war dead would hardly have resonated with the people of Singapore and hence explains the lack of public support for the Cenotaph Plan. For example, there were five steps that led to the monument and each step was inscribed with the years of the Great War (1914–18) starting with 1914 and ending with 1918. The years for Europe's Second World War (1939–45) would need seven steps if it were to aesthetically and symbolically mirror those for the Great War. As the photographs in Figures 12.1–12.5 show, taken after the modifications were made to the Singapore Cenotaph, no extra steps were added for the Second World War. The extra two years were instead simply inscribed on the monument continuing from the steps. However, if the years for the Second World War memorial began with the year 1941, which reflects the local memory of the Asia-Pacific War in Singapore, five steps would have been sufficient. The decision to use 1939 as the starting point for a local war memorial, and the choice of Remembrance Day for its dedication, is indicative that the memorial was commemorating an imperial war. The dates were Eurocentric and had little resonance with a people whose war was centered on the years 1941–5, and particularly February 1942 rather than November 1918.⁸⁶ The emphasis had shifted back to the First World War and therefore to imperial themes.

By 1950, the Colonial Administration was putting the final touches to the Singapore Cenotaph. All that was left was the choice of words to be inscribed on its plaques. It settled on 'They Died That We Might Live', which was inscribed in Malay, Chinese and Tamil on bronze panels. Combining a Second World War memorial with a war memorial of the First World War was acceptable practice in Europe, Australia, and the United States, but it carried different connotations in postwar Singapore.⁸⁷ The First World War had not affected the people in Singapore as it had the peoples of Europe, and for the countries that fought for either side, like Australia and Turkey. If the Singapore Cenotaph was incorporated as the centerpiece of a Second World War memorial park, it would privilege a colonial past and render the local experience and memory of the war secondary at best.

The first Second World War memorial in Singapore was neither a site of mourning nor remembrance, but in a sense a message that reinforced British colonial rule. The colonial government had no desire to recognize one race above another in commemoration, or to encourage overt expressions inimical to colonial rule. It would be only twenty years later and after the end of British colonial rule that the question of an official war memorial for the Chinese war dead in Singapore was taken up again. Freed from British colonial rule, Singaporeans could finally erect and dedicate an official war memorial to their own victims of the war. The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI), the successor of the SCCC that sat on the WMC in 1947, continued from where Tan Kah Kee left off. Their efforts finally led to the building and dedication of the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation in 1967.

Postscript: the Singapore Cenotaph today



Figure 12.1 North side of the Singapore Cenotaph dedicated to the fallen in the First World War

Source: Photo taken by John Kwok, May 21, 2014.



Figure 12.2 Steps on the north side of the Singapore Cenotaph, each one representing a year in the First World War. The bronze panels are honor rolls

Source: Photo taken by John Kwok, May 21, 2014.



Figure 12.3 South side of the Singapore Cenotaph dedicated to victims of the Second World War

Source: Photo taken by John Kwok, May 21, 2014.



Figure 12.4 Steps on the south side of the Singapore Cenotaph, each one representing a year in the Second World War. Note that it starts from 1939, the year when the Second World War began in Europe

Source: Photo taken by John Kwok, May 21, 2014.




Figure 12.5 Southside inscription in the four official languages: English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil

Source: Photo taken by John Kwok, May 21, 2014.

Notes

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13. Lee, *The Singapore Story*, p. 87.
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21. Kratoska, *The Japanese Occupation of Malaya*, pp. 101–3.
22. Lee, *The Syonan Years*, p. 147.
23. Lee, *The Syonan Years*, p. 147.
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27. Frei, *Guns of February*, p. 149.
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29. NAS: Accession No. 283, Ng Seng Yong. Years after the end of the war, mass graves were discovered in remote places in Singapore. The largest site was at Siglap.
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31. NAS: Accession No. 107, Neoh Teik Hong.
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34. See Frei *Guns of February*, p. 147; *The Straits Times*, March 19, 1947.
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41. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(6) and (113), 'Combined War Memorial', British Military Administration. National Archives of Singapore, microfilm number NA871.

42. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(6), 'Combined War Memorial', British Military Administration. National Archives of Singapore, microfilm number NA871.
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45. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(19), 'Combined War Memorial', British Military Administration. National Archives of Singapore, microfilm number NA871.
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47. *The Straits Times*, September 14, 1946.
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54. *The Straits Times*, October 30, 1946.
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61. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
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70. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
71. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
72. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
73. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
74. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
75. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
76. NAS: BMA/CA/81/45/(113).
77. The focus of this trial was on three ranking commanding officers: Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma, Commander of the Japanese Imperial Guards

Division; Major-General Kawamura Saburo, Commander of the Singapore Garrison and the Singapore Defence Force; and Lieutenant-Colonel Oishi Massayuki, Commander of the Kempetai in Singapore. The remaining four were rank and file officers. The proceedings of the trial were reported in detail in *The Straits Times*, March 19, 1947.

78. I Ward, *Snaring the Other Tiger* (Singapore: Media Masters, 1996), p. 87.
79. *The Straits Times*, May 22, 1947.
80. *The Straits Times*, May 22, 1947.
81. *The Straits Times*, May 22, 1947.
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83. *The Sunday Times*, September 26, 1948.
84. *The Sunday Times*, September 26, 1948.
85. *The Sunday Times*, September 26, 1948.
86. The Fall of Singapore took place in February 1942, but it can be said that the local people of Singapore experienced war for the first time when Singapore was bombed by the Japanese on December 7, 1941.
87. J Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*, pp. 8–9.

13

A Textual Reading of *My Manchuria*: Idealism, Conflict and Modernity

Mo Tian

The memories of one person, whether he or she is a high-ranking state official or an agrarian settler, never reveal the historical truth of the power of the Japanese state. But the memories of many people of different nationalities, classes, genders, and generations who try to remember at various points – the ‘presents’ – bring us at least closer to such truth.¹

The two volume work *My Manchuria* [ぼくの満州], written by Japanese manga artist Morita Kenji, is a provocative reconstruction of Japan’s colonial Manchuria project. Morita was born in 1939 in Manchuria and spent his childhood there until his return to Japan in 1946. From the 1990s he, as a Japanese repatriate, began to engage in activities related to Manchuria. Since 2002, he has organized several manga exhibitions about the experience of Japanese expatriates in several Chinese cities. The original version of *My Manchuria* was a manga series published between October 1997 and March 1999 in the Sunday Edition of *Red Flag* [しんぶん赤旗日曜版], a newspaper published by the Japanese Communist Party.² The manga was later revised to be published as two volumes by a Tokyo-based publisher in 2001.³ According to Morita, his short childhood in Manchuria and bitter experience of postwar repatriation to Japan inspired him to create this work.⁴

My Manchuria introduces a collection of personal accounts from the memories of Japanese settlers who lived in Manchuria during the Second World War. They construct a historical discourse of remembering that links the past with the present. *My Manchuria* consists of two intermingled parts. The first part, written by Morita, is the account of his childhood experience in Manchuria during the 1930s and 1940s. It is

presented in the form of a comic story narrated by a Japanese boy called Shigeru. Depicting his schooldays and childhood play in the neighborhood, his family trip to Fengtian (Hōten in Japanese, now Shenyang), the Soviet intrusion and his repatriation to Japan, the narrative vividly constructs a landscape of everyday life for the people living in colonial Manchuria. The second part, as an intermingled supplementary section to the first part, consists of personal accounts written by former Japanese residents in Manchuria, which are added at the end of each chapter. These accounts, received by the newspaper and the publisher, are selected from personal letters of those individuals who shared similar experiences to Morita's in Manchuria. It is important to point out that they are presented as text rather than as illustrations in *My Manchuria*. Given the fact that multiple authors have contributed to the writing of the book, the term 'my Manchuria', as the title suggests, may refer to an individual yet collective construction of the Manchuria experience.

In spite of its use of simplistic language and visuals that target a general readership, the depth and complexity of *My Manchuria* deserves close academic scrutiny. As Tamanoi has argued, the 'memory map' serves to 'organize in terms of time and space the narratives of those who remember', and reveals 'complex interactions between the present and the past'.⁵ In this sense, the book can be treated as a potent medium for exploring a wide range of cultural and political issues. The author warns us in the preface that '[my] memory [of Manchuria] is rather ambiguous and moreover fragmented', and 'it may differ from the reality' and stay somewhere 'between fiction and non-fiction'.⁶ The manga can therefore be read as both a fictional and a realistic account of history that engages the retelling and imagining of historical reality. In this sense, *My Manchuria* can roughly fit into the category of what Bryce and Davis have argued is 'historical representation'.⁷ The manga story, in combination with personal accounts in *My Manchuria*, by providing a visual and textual reconstruction of Manchuria's history, blurs the boundary of memory and reality. Nevertheless, the book is a source that helps to explore the historical realities of Manchuria during Japanese domination. In remembering Manchuria, accounts by Morita and other authors present a representation of Manchuria in which harmony, conflict, and resistance coexisted to constitute a contradictory colonial experience. The memory map of manga narratives by Morita unfolds a picture involving multifarious agents, including Chinese and Japanese children and adults, housewives, and soldiers to explore the Manchuria experience. In the meantime, the personal reminiscences by Japanese residents in Manchuria during the 1930s and 1940s correspond to Morita's

representation and provide written evidence for reflections on the Manchuria experience.

This chapter does not aim to provide an overall assessment of the visual and stylistic aspects of the manga narratives in *My Manchuria*. Rather, it offers a textual reading of those narratives through a careful selection and analysis of some of the dialogue that runs throughout the book. The chapter poses the question: How does the manga deal with the apparent contradiction between the harmony that was proclaimed by the Japanese propagandists and what we know was the reality of conflict and resistance? The chapter argues that the harmonious 'utopia' constructed through the manga images of the serene pastoral landscape of Manchuria uncovers its internal political positioning and hierarchal power grounded in racial inequality, and confirms the colonial power mechanisms of Manchuria.

Why historical memory?

The collective memory of the Second World War is globally significant in affecting political production, which has created a discourse of victimization in postwar historical understanding. The consciousness of victimization engages political efforts to evaluate war history from the viewpoint of justice and injustice. For instance, Germany's acknowledgement of guilt for the Holocaust has been regarded as a constructive state policy. In contrast, Japan's reluctance to make similar recognition of its colonial past, on the grounds that the state of Japan was victimized by the international situation and that its political agenda during the Second World War was honorable, has been seen as an obstacle to reconciliation in East and Southeast Asia.⁸ However, the historical intricacies of the Second World War are far more complex than constructing a black and white picture and making judgments about war in moral terms. It is important to take into account the emotional experience of those who participated in war ventures, including their nostalgia, remembrance, and trauma. Therefore, there is a need for historians to register the recollections of those who engaged in war atrocities, victimizer and victimized alike, from sources other than official documentation. In other words, it is important for historians to investigate ways that this period of history and the subjectivity of war history at large can be evaluated. In the context of Manchuria, since memory treats the historical agents who are now old but alive as the major historical sources, it is a crucial task for historians to register the experience of those who lived in a particular historical time.

In postwar historical research, memory has been treated as a source of social knowledge. However, the study of memory has hardly gained a prominent position in historical research and has long been regarded as less trustworthy material for history.⁹ Since the 1990s, we have seen the return of memory to historical research, a trend that investigates the construction of memory and history and their interrelationship, rather than the nature of memory alone.¹⁰ The concept of memory allows for an emphasis on the politics of memory, precisely because of the ways that the production and construction of memory through cultural practices have as their foundation the notion that memories are part of a larger process of cultural negotiation. This idea defines memories as narratives, and as fluid and mediated cultural and personal traces of the past. The practice of memory is an activity that engages with, produces, reproduces, and invests meaning in memories, whether personal, cultural, or collective.¹¹ As an infinite yet refracted reality, memory transforms the way that the past and present are conceptualized.

The academic interest in memory builds on the work of Halbwachs, who argues that an individual understanding of history is linked to the collective consciousness of a certain historical period.¹² Historical memory is frequently categorized into collective memory and individual memory. Individual memory, often regarded as emotional memory, is a personal interpretation of history.¹³ The memory of one's life experience influences the formation of one's identity and perception. Collective memories work in much the same way in that they foster and define group identities, telling a group where they have come from, who they are, and how they are supposed to act in the present and the future.¹⁴ In short, collective memory is understood as representing a past shared by the group or community.¹⁵

As Zhang has argued, the written historical record is a small part of the historical past, a selected, reorganized, altered, and constructed past; a combined product of human subjective emotions, prejudice, and social power relations.¹⁶ We can see that it is the fragmentation, fluidity, and the way in which, ultimately, negotiation aim at an impossible uniformity that makes the inquiry into historical memory so fascinating.¹⁷ However, we may also question whether and to what extent memory reflects historical truth.

Memory as an individual and collective construction, however, does not exist in isolation from historical, cultural, and social contexts. In the context of Manchuria's memory, the memories of people who lived there still speak 'genuinely' about at least some part of the past by relating to their social, political, and cultural background. For some, their memory is tinted with romantic and idealistic colors, which evokes nostalgia of a

'beautiful' past. For others, Manchuria may not have been quite as pleasant and enjoyable. The differences in the way of remembering must have been associated with identity, power relations, and institutional systems. In this sense, the act of remembering Manchuria becomes linked to its historical complications. These reminiscences reflect instances of historical truthfulness to help constitute an integrated picture of an alternative Manchuria experience. To contextualize the memory of Manchuria, it is essential to understand the practices of the historical agents living in that land. *My Manchuria* provides such reflections from those who lived through that historical experience. Their memory embodies at least a certain historical logic that speaks of a truth.

Summarizing the ideology of Manchukuo

Current studies of Manchukuo often apply the concept of colonial modernity in historical discourse.¹⁸ The viewpoint on Manchukuo's modernity holds that Manchukuo was established as a laboratory for colonial experimentation and as a showcase for a non-Western imperialist accomplishment. Japanese colonial authorities constructed that Japanese colonialism was developmentalist in its logic and brought modernization to its colonized peoples. The formulation of Manchukuo's ideology constitutes an important aspect of colonial modernity. Specifically, the Manchukuo government, during the 1930s and 1940s, promoted the idea of a kingly way [王道] and ethnic harmony [民族協和].¹⁹ These two concepts were the essential constructs of colonial Manchuria. The kingly way was initially invented as a vague political thought in Chinese intellectual history. It expresses the idea of benevolent rule by the ruler to govern the state. In Confucian thought, especially that of Mencius, two concepts of rulership existed, the hegemonic way [霸道] and the kingly way. The former was supposed to be based on the subjugation of people by force, the latter on the benevolence and propriety of the ruler emanating through his virtues. Despite the highly artificial nature of this theory, the kingly way can be perceived as an ideal that pertains to political morality, with Confucian ethics as its core values.²⁰ Ethnic harmony is a doctrine formulated to construct a unified Manchurian identity that accommodates Han Chinese, Manchus, Koreans, Mongols, Russians, Japanese, and other minorities under Japanese leadership. The alleged harmonious ethnic integration is essentially a policy that establishes a stratified order in which the Japanese race is regarded as the core and the other races as inferior counterparts.²¹ Kingly way and ethnic harmony formed, then, a set of cosmopolitan ideologies inclusive of moral, political, economic, and cultural belonging that aimed to bring

the people of Manchukuo together under Japanese control. In other words, these concepts were used by Japan to make its domination more acceptable to the colonial subjects in Manchuria.

Characterizing Shigeru's family

In *My Manchuria*, the main character, Shigeru, was born in Tokyo in 1939, raised in Manchuria, and repatriated to Japan in 1946 when he was seven years old. He is an innocent boy who loves Manchuria and makes friends with the Chinese there. Shigeru's father is a Japanese nationalist who believes in the Japanese propaganda and at the same time is friendly with the Chinese. Shigeru's mother is a woman who follows the Confucian virtues of 'assisting husband and educating children' [相夫教子] in the family. The concept of humanism is applied to Shigeru's family by the author Morita to add a little color to the life of Manchuria. For instance, when Shigeru and his family learned of the sad story of a woman who waited in vain for the return of her son, Shigeru's father noted: 'the feeling of missing their children is shared by parents in all countries'.²² It appears that maternal love in Shigeru's family transcends cultural and ethnic borders, and further brings the notion of humanity closer to the discourse of the Manchuria experience. The concept of humanism corresponds to Japan's promotion of harmonious coexistence in Manchuria. In this way, the implications of violence inflicted by the Japanese colonial authorities in Manchuria have been overshadowed, if not obscured or ignored, by the dimensions of humanity and love.

A Japanese land of delight

My Manchuria depicts Manchuria as an exotic land. The eyes of Shigeru reflect Manchuria as scattered pieces of myth and mystery. The exoticness of Manchuria is particularly evident in a story about Shigeru's family trip to Fengtian, a dream journey for Shigeru. In the story, Shigeru's family went shopping, bathed in hot springs, bought souvenirs, and generally spent their time in a relaxing and comfortable way. The city landscape of Fengtian evokes from Shigeru feelings of curiosity and adoration. The scenes include people of various professions, such as barbers, fish sellers, tobacco stand vendors, and beauty consultants, who help strengthen the sensuality of Manchuria. It seemed to Shigeru that all those sellers, that is the local people of Manchuria, were enjoying life. To Shigeru, the experience of Manchuria takes on further

poetic connotations when his father talks to him about a willow of Manchuria:

This willow is a kind of tree friendly to the people of Manchuria. Its figure in winter looks like a clenched fist that grows out of the soil. When spring comes, it begins to bud at once. In the early summer, its seeds ride on a fluff taken by the wind flitting around, turning trees into an indispensable real feeling of the summer.²³

The narrator's tone conveys his appreciation of the natural beauty of Manchuria.

A quote in the book from the renowned film director Yamada Yōji gives a more honest picture of Manchuria. He enumerated the considerable pleasures of Manchuria enjoyed by the Japanese population there, but also noted in conclusion the difference between the Japanese and Chinese at that time:

The Asia express, Smirnov's Russian bread and cheese, Victoria's Western-style confectionery, dinners at the Yamato Hotel, [Chinese] water dumplings, Tianjin *baozi*,²⁴ the running horse-drawn carriage that scattered white breath in cold winter, Western cars, the sunset at the other side of the wide Songhua River, the sea-bathing at Xingxingpu. A boy's recollections will boundlessly float not merely upon figure and color, but also upon smell and taste, the coldness sensed on the skin, sound and voice that remained on ears... In other words, at that time, the miserable lives of the Chinese who were hired for low wages and exploited by the Japanese was taken for granted by us.²⁵

The example above shows that the picture of Manchuria included delight as well as racial hierarchy. The miserable lives of the Chinese reflect the other side of the Manchuria experience, undesirable and uninviting, making the historicity of Manchuria more intricate and contradictory.

Harmony in the eyes of children and adults

In *My Manchuria*, the concept of ethnic harmony, proposed by the Japanese as the basis for a unified Manchurian identity, runs throughout the whole book as a general theme. In fact, the idea of ethnic harmony is most noticeable in the representation of resistance and conflict between the Chinese and Japanese. Ironically, the fictionalized harmony in the adult's world is strikingly different from that in the children's world. On

the one hand, *My Manchuria* represents children's innocence about the existence of ethnic hierarchy. At the same time, some Japanese children are represented as opposing the idea of harmony in the state. On the other hand, the depiction of the adult world gives an even more complicated picture. Many Japanese parents in Manchuria restrained their children from having any contact with the Chinese, and the majority of Chinese parents held feelings of hatred and fear against the Japanese. It is assumed that the Chinese were unable to express explicit opposition to Japanese control in Manchuria, and thus the hatred and grudges they held against the Japanese acted as a form of resistance against oppression.

The harmony among children is well illustrated in such examples as the repeated depiction of Japanese and Chinese children playing together. After the family trip to Fengtian, Shigeru gave his Chinese playmates souvenirs he had bought during the trip, indicating that the friendship among children goes beyond ethnic boundaries.²⁶ Not yet fully influenced by social hierarchies, Shigeru's belief in ethnic harmony is manifest through his act of being friendly to his Chinese playmates.

Yet another scene confirms such interracial friendship and children's indifference to racial hierarchies even more explicitly. Before the Soviet army conducted air raids on the land of Manchuria in 1944, after which social conditions in Manchuria became rather intense, Japanese and Chinese children continued to play outside their homes on nights of a full moon until very late.²⁷ Another scene vividly indicates the Japanese children's acceptance of Chinese culture. In the spring festival of 1945 when air raids had already begun in Manchuria, Japanese children still relished Chinese spring festival rice cakes in their air raid shelter to celebrate Chinese New Year.²⁸ The tasting of Chinese food and the celebration of Chinese New Year by the Japanese children further suggests their acculturation to Chinese culture. In other words, it shows that children were indifferent to the war situation in Manchuria. The following recollection by Mori Riichi in the book shows his personal view of ethnic boundaries among children:

Until the end of the war, Japanese in Manchuria had been standing in an overwhelmingly superior position to the Manchurian locals. However, now I think that my father had been an amazing humanist and he treated the Chinese employees and coolie laborers gently and kindly. I remember that after the war, since we returned again to Fengtian, we still played with Chinese and Korean children, and that we acted in an equal and fair position [with them]. I was rather

ignorant about the adult world, but [I thought] there was neither war nor national borders among children.²⁹

The manga representation shows that children in Manchukuo were unconscious of propaganda, discarded social constraints, and befriended each other. They acted in a way that showed that neither the promotion of racial harmony nor the reality of racial discrimination mattered to them. They treated each other on an equal basis and transcended cultural and political barriers.

Some cases in *My Manchuria* even metaphorically represent the Chinese as being physically superior to the Japanese. For example, one scene depicted Chinese and Japanese children taking part in a skating competition. A Japanese boy pledged that 'the Japanese will never lose', but he finally lost in the skating contest.³⁰ To suggest that Chinese surpass Japanese in the context of a skating competition can be seen as a way of discounting the ethnic stratification of colonial Manchuria, by showing that there were circumstances in which Chinese could beat Japanese without serious political consequences.

However, most reminiscences by Japanese former residents of Manchukuo in the second part of the book have confirmed that strong ethnic barriers did exist in reality. For example, Kobayashi Noriko noted in 'Born in China':

Born in Manchuria, I... spent my time [there] not even thinking about 'being friends with Chinese', etc... There were elementary, junior high and girl's schools there. Those schools only had Japanese children and Chinese children could not attend those schools. Department stores were also intended only for the Japanese. I had no contact with the local Chinese and I could not speak Chinese either... The local children were envious at seeing us Japanese children attending school with school bags.³¹

It is evident that despite the style of communication between Japanese and Chinese, the privileges enjoyed by the Japanese in Manchuria did constitute an obstacle to making contact with fellow Chinese. The hierarchy between Japanese and Chinese questions the theoretical basis of ethnic harmony and its application in reality.

Some adult characters in the book, including Shigeru's father and his friends, are represented as being friendly to the Chinese. The attitude of Shigeru's parents can be seen from the scene in which they are educating Shigeru about ethnic harmony. When Shigeru pointed to the national

flag of Manchukuo and asked his mother about its meaning, his mother answered: 'Ethnic harmony among the five races means that Japanese, Han Chinese, Mongols, Manchus, and Koreans make friends with each other and support Manchukuo.' Then Shigeru questioned: 'Putting Japan in the first place in addressing the five races means that Japan is the greatest doesn't it?' Shigeru's provocative question silenced his mother. At this point, Shigeru's father joined the conversation: 'Making friends is not limited to the five races. In fact, [you should] befriend Americans and Europeans and all of humanity alike. In addition, [you should] also make friends with birds, horses, cattle, flowers, and fish.'³² The panhuman considerations of Shigeru's father aptly diminish the confrontation among Japanese themselves about Japan's supremacy in Manchuria.³³

The book also uses Japanese social and cultural etiquette as a means of elevating ethnic harmony and reducing explicit descriptions of violence within the structure of Japanese colonialism in Manchuria. There is one scene describing a direct encounter between Shigeru's father and a Chinese. On seeing Shigeru's father, a Chinese girl became scared and saluted to him in panic. Shigeru's father smiled and said, 'It is not the army here, so it is fine not to salute. Thank you for always playing with Shigeru.'³⁴ This expression of gratitude by Shigeru's father, as a Japanese resident in Manchuria, decreased the power hierarchy that existed among the Chinese and Japanese. The attitude of Shigeru's father seems to indicate that he could easily distinguish between state and individual. The depiction of the army as a symbol of state power indicates that the relationship between Japanese and Chinese could be truly harmonious within a context free from state intervention.

The representation of Japanese nationalism is also reflected in the book as an important dimension associated with war and peace. There is a scene in which Shigeru's father educates his son on how to be a Japanese man, he says: 'Be proud to be a Japanese man. It is not very difficult to do. To become a man, one must first [learn to] endure.' Then he clarifies the meaning of endurance: 'When you feel sad, lonesome, scared, and in pain, clench your teeth and endure. Even when you feel like crying, you should act like a man by not shedding tears easily... However, tenderness is [also] necessary for one to be a real man.'³⁵

Shigeru's father's views on endurance and manhood can be read as a symbol of Japanese nationalism. To Shigeru's father, personal emotion should not be involved in building willpower and manhood. It can be argued that the construction of Japanese nationalism at this point foreshadows the later thematic development of war and peace in the book. In a conversation with his son during the Soviet attacks on Manchuria,

however, Shigeru's father elaborates his principles about war. He says: 'Remember, war is a quarrel between states. When we set rules to the quarrel, it will become a sport, the same as boxing and sumo. In other words, we will do whatever we can to win the war.'³⁶ At this point, he seems to de-moralize the act of war and violence on the grounds of nationalism.

One character in the book, Yanagi Ryūtarō, who is a friend of Shigeru's father, asserted in a conversation with a group of Japanese residents arguing about their concerns for the war situation of Japan that 'Manchuria is not the right place for a quarrel among the Japanese'.³⁷ The implication here is that Manchuria is supposed to be a place for harmony among the Japanese; however, there is no mention of the Chinese side. The implication might well be that Japanese should stick together in the face of the Chinese majority. The following dialogue between two Japanese children suggests how the adults educated Japanese children about the idea of ethnic harmony:

Japanese child: If you [Shigeru] go and play with the Chinese, you will not be able to attend school.

Shigeru: Why? My mom told me to make friends and play with them...

Japanese child: If you play with the Manchu children, [our] Yamato spirit will be disgraced.³⁸

The above dialogue suggests that Japanese parents could have been teaching their children to discriminate against the Chinese. This representation shows that mutual friendship is unlikely to have existed between the Chinese and the Japanese.

Conflict and resistance

Colonial Manchuria underwent immense social change. Conflict and resistance characterized by violence, cruelty, and uncertainty constantly existed in relations between Chinese and Japanese, which constitutes another aspect of the Manchuria experience. There is an interesting scene in which Japanese and Chinese children first play together and then start to a fight each other:

Japanese boy: Chinese are bullying the Japanese!

Then the Chinese boy's father appears and, out of fear, forces his son to apologize to the Japanese:

Father: Apologize to the Japanese children!

Chinese girl: He did nothing wrong.

Father: Whatever you say will be fine! Just apologize!

Chinese boy (to the Japanese boy): I am sorry!

Father (to the Japanese boy): Please forgive my son only this time.³⁹

The above scene clearly indicates the fear the Chinese had of the Japanese and the difference in their social status. Later, the tension further develops into an adult-level conflict. After this incident, parents of the Japanese children who were 'bullied' by the Chinese boy blamed Shigeru's mother for her improper education and Shigeru for befriending the Chinese:

One Japanese mother: Isn't Shigeru standing on the side of the Manchu kids?

Another Japanese mother: How have you educated your child at home?

Shigeru's mother: I asked Shigeru about the quarrel, but his story sounds quite different... as for quarrels among children, both sides should be blamed for their fault.⁴⁰

The children's quarrel *per se* seems to be void of ideological coloration; however, it is the adults that elevate it to a level of political significance. Shigeru's mother resolves the conflict, and then instructs Shigeru to be 'friendly' with others. The attitude of Shigeru's mother can be seen as opposing, if not resisting, interracial animosity. It indicates that some Japanese people felt, to a certain extent, the appeal of ethnic harmony and made an effort to put this idea into practice.

Several other scenes further enhance the impression of the interracial tension between Japanese and Chinese. For example, a fight between Japanese soldiers and a Chinese man demonstrates this point well. In the scene, a Chinese man shouts at Japanese children, telling them not to enter the yard, but he is then stopped by the Japanese military police. Upon hearing the order from the Japanese, he suddenly throws out a bucket of water to attack the Japanese. On seeing this, the Japanese military police try to catch him, but fail.⁴¹ In fact, the Chinese man was the father of one of Shigeru's friends. In the final days of Japanese colonial Manchuria, the same Chinese man became a member of the Chinese liberation force whose role was to supervise the defeated Japanese soldiers. His resistance during Japan's domination and his role during

China's liberation period elucidate the continuity of his attitude toward the Japanese. In other words, his 'illegal' and 'informal' resistance has finally developed into a form of 'justified' and 'acknowledged' resistance. In confronting Shigeru's parents, he declares: 'As an intelligence officer, I was trying to spot you, Japanese, every day. Normally I would have thrown you out, but because my daughter cried and begged me, I could not do it.'⁴² The above is a vivid representation of the Chinese animosity against the Japanese and the Chinese adults' perceptions of the Japanese.

A paradox

In the beginning of *My Manchuria*, Nishimura Keiya, a former resident of Manchuria, mentioned the contrived character of Japan's colonial project of Manchukuo:

My father was a bureaucrat of the 'old Manchukuo'. His job was primarily related to the investigation of [Manchuria's] land and customs. My father was a proficient speaker of the Chinese language and he loved China. He might have dreamt of the construction of the ideal state [of Manchukuo], but when confronted with [his] role in Manchukuo's history, his role in serving the construction of Manchukuo, the 'puppet state', shall not be denied. Although I was only three years old at the end of the war, I was not liberated from the victimizer consciousness. I think that the only compensation for [Japan's] victimization [of China] is through friendship.⁴³

Nishimura seems to be ambivalent about his father's sentiments for Manchuria. On the one hand, his father's proficiency in the Chinese language and passion for China indicates his positive attitude toward the Chinese people and culture. On the other hand, he knew very well the nature of Japan's enterprise in Manchukuo as a colonial project, and that friendship is the only way to achieve conciliation and to extricate the Japanese from a victimizer consciousness.

As Japan's defeat in the Asia-Pacific War became inevitable, conditions in Manchukuo deteriorated. To ensure the supply of energy, Japan initiated a statewide mobilization to collect roots of pine trees and horse excrement. At an entrance ceremony to Shigeru's school, the school principal awarded souvenirs to everyone for collecting horse excrement.⁴⁴ According to the school principal, horse excrement was

to become the energy for airplanes. When Manchuria was subjected to air raids by the enemy of the Japanese, the children shouted 'Stay strong, Japan!' and they were expecting that the horse excrement would work. Against everyone's expectations the weapon fueled by horse excrement failed to support the Japanese defense against the enemy. The use of horse excrement as fuel for wartime needs suggests the breakdown of the Japanese empire and of its rule in Manchuria.

The declining living standards of the Japanese and limited war potential of Japan indicates the disappearance of Japanese supremacy in Manchuria. Further, the increase of interracial tension between the Chinese and Japanese, in opposition to the ethnic harmony that Japan promoted when Manchukuo was established, suggests the decline of idealism. Finally, Japan's capitulation directly led to the collapse of its rule and idealism in Manchuria, which in turn encouraged the resurgence of Chinese nationalism. For example, after the Chinese Liberation Army occupied Fengtian, anti-Japanese propaganda began to permeate the social discourse of Manchuria. Such slogans as 'Kick the Japanese out' and 'Kill the Japanese' suggest that the Chinese could finally truly express their repressed hate of the Japanese at the moment of victory.⁴⁵

The explicit expression of hate ironically indicates that the advertised ethnic harmony disappeared only to be replaced by the desire for revenge. Chinese revenge against the Japanese conversely aroused hate of the Chinese in Japanese minds. In contrast to Chinese hatred, the book also explicitly depicts a scene of a crying Japanese boy throwing a hand grenade at the Chinese to express his 'reversed' hatred and revenge. However, the hand grenade fails to explode, symbolizing the total collapse of Japanese colonial power.⁴⁶ In the end, the constructed ethnic harmony, enthusiasm, and material prosperity of Manchuria turned out to be no more than a historical delusion.

Takao Midori, a former resident of Manchuria, admits in the book that the Japanese in Manchuria were victimizers and she seems to be ashamed of the experience. To Takao, the affluent life in Manchuria enjoyed by the Japanese vis-à-vis the misery of the Chinese has been the constant inquiry of her life.⁴⁷ Her memory, built on the historical past, pushes her to look for connections with the past to 'grasp the comprehensive history [of Manchuria]', and she also feels solitude in her search. The contradictions between the Japanese and the Chinese penetrate her mind, making the experience of Manchuria 'incomprehensible'. It is suggested that memory along with truthfulness are pushing each other towards an authentic reality.

In reminiscences, people hardly ever recollect Manchuria's devotion towards ideological construction. The testimony of Yamagishi Shigeharu demonstrates the rejection of ethnic harmony:

[It] was already after the outbreak of the Pacific war, there was still an atmosphere of victory in the life of the Japanese under the protection of [Japanese] colonial policy, and life was more affluent than that in my hometown [in Japan]. Though in theory only we had been taught about the kingly way paradise based on ethnic harmony in elementary schools, the attitude of the Japanese was [still] condescending, and [they] naturally disparaged and discriminated against other ethnicities... These things [worshiping Shinto shrines by the Japanese] annoyed the local [non-Japanese] residents. Once they complained about it, the Japanese would openly assault them under the umbrella of God's glory by saying 'how dare you defy the God?'⁴⁸

Manchuria under Japanese colonial domination as a historical phenomenon was always a paradox, a combination of enthusiasm, development, nostalgia, and contradiction. In spite of the variations in personal memories, feelings of contradiction are always felt and expressed by Manchurian residents. For many Japanese, Manchuria had been a paradise. For the Chinese and other ethnic groups, however, it had been a place of misery and suffering.

Thus far, *My Manchuria* demonstrates a recollection of Manchukuo's contradictions. Even exoticism was constructed on the basis of ethnic inequality in Japanese eyes. The gradual decline of Manchuria precipitated the failure of its invented tradition. Therefore, we can see that the attempt to construct an ideal state supported by local people was not realized. Ideological slogans of ethnic harmony and a kingly way remained empty theoretical constructs, which made no formidable impact on the life of Manchurians. The constant ethnic conflicts between Chinese and Japanese obstructed, if not betrayed, the ideals of building Manchuria into a paradise in which everyone is treated with respect.

Conclusion

My Manchuria is an attempt to represent an individual and collective remembering of historical Manchuria. It is a project of recollection and imagination about Manchuria, in which Morita's manga

illustrations serve as a personal interpretation of historical truthfulness, and the text from multiple narrators constitutes a reconstruction of collective remembering. In the book, the individual and collective memories are not represented as independent elements. Rather, they are presented as an integrated picture through which historical knowledge is constructed and communicated. In other words, *My Manchuria* as evidence of *subjective* historiography critiques the interpretation of Manchuria in written sources and reproduces a historical representation from the viewpoint of memory. Its textual and pictorial narratives develop from exoticism, harmony, and resistance, to the desolate collapse of idealism and modernity. The changes of Manchuria's situation from idealism to realism, in line with the involvement of the Japanese Empire in the Asia-Pacific War, reflects the diachronic development of colonial Manchuria and, more importantly, reveals the changes in power relations between Chinese and Japanese agents in Manchuria. On the one hand, the pastoral Manchuria depicted appeals to the local population, the Japanese in particular, and the longing and nostalgia for a dream land. On the other hand, the brutality of Manchuria betrays the idealism. The contrasting images built on ideology and reality redefine the relationship between social ideal and reality.

Japan's attempt to build Manchuria into a modern state of egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism was unrealized, if not a failure. This chapter argues that the memory of Manchuria as a source of social knowledge and historical evidence is a political act of remembering that has much to do with the conditions of colonialism, with a focus on political violence and idealism. The representation elaborated in *My Manchuria* is a product of political interaction between agents of Manchuria and Japan situated in a hierarchy of power relations. The memory construction of *My Manchuria* engages the hierarchical structure in the logic of Japanese colonialism and demonstrates how colonial experience affects historical memory in the process of remembering, translation, and transplantation. It can also be argued that *My Manchuria* serves as a model of what Morris-Suzuki terms 'history as identification', in which our relationship with the past is involved with and engaged in imagination and empathy, an argument that emotions of passion, fear, hope, and pleasure coexist with the academic tendency to construct history as pure reason and knowledge.⁴⁹

Notes

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In this paper, Manchuria and Manchukuo are used separately. Manchuria is a term that refers to the geographical region in Northeast China, while Manchukuo is used to refer to the client state (1932–45) established by Japan in Northeast China. Pronunciation of Chinese and Japanese terms in the paper is provided only in the language of the original source. The English excerpts of *My Manchuria* used in this chapter are translations of the original Japanese by the author.

1. Mariko Tamanoi, *Memory Maps: The State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), p. 161.
2. The newspaper is aimed at a general readership, rather than one with a specific political stance. The manga column in the newspaper from which *My Manchuria* originated was characterized by a wide coverage of current political affairs. It is assumed that the political character of the manga column in the newspaper is consistent with the political views of the Japanese Communist Party.
3. See Morita Kenji, *Boku no Manshū* (Tokyo: Bansei Shobō, 2001).
4. At the end of 2011, I corresponded with Morita to enquire about his motive for creating *My Manchuria*. According to the reply, his intention was to reflect the authentic experience of Manchuria and portray what Manchuria meant to the Japanese who lived in that land during the 1930s and 1940s. In the meantime, Morita himself was careful in addressing political correctness in his book, he said it was an attempt 'to promote Sino-Japanese relations'. Morita's view on the history of Japanese aggression in China during the 1930s and 1940s, however, is not clear from his correspondence. Neither is his political standing on historical issues between China and Japan clearly reflected in *My Manchuria*.
5. Tamanoi, *Memory Maps*, p. 19.
6. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, preface.
7. Bryce and Davis classify the genre of manga in the following categories: fantasy/the mythological and surrealism of the everyday; historical representations; horrors/the supernatural; humor; political representations; religion and spirituality; science fiction; *shōjo/josei* romance and homosexuality/heterosexuality; and sports. See M Bryce and J Davis, 'An Overview of Manga Genres', in T Johnson-Woods (ed.), *Manga: An Anthology of Global and Cultural Perspectives* (New York: Continuum, 2010), pp. 37–8.
8. See R Cribb and K Christie, 'Remembering, Forgetting and Historical Injustice,' in R Cribb and K Christie (eds), *Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), pp. 2–3.

9. Tamanoi, *Memory Maps*, pp. 4–5.
10. See J Fentress and C Wickham, *Social Memory* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), p. 8.
11. See D Ben-Amos and L Weissberg (eds), *Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999); JJ Climo and MG Cattel (eds), *Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives* (California: AltaMira Press, 2003); J Boyarin (ed.), *Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time and Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); KL Klein 'On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse', *Representations* 69 (2000): pp. 127–50; M Sturken, 'Memory, Consumerism and Media: Reflections on the Emergence of the Field', *Memory Studies* 1, No. 1 (2008): 73–8; P Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); A Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
12. See M Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
13. For discussions on memory, see Toshimi Morimura, *Shikakuhyōshō to shūgōtekikioku: rekishi, genzai, sensō* (Tokyo: Shunpōsha, 2006).
14. J Gillis, 'Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship', in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 7.
15. W Kansetainer, 'Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies', *History and Theory* 41, No. 2, (2002): 180.
16. Zhang Weiming, 'Lishijiyi ji renleixueyanjiu', *Guangxi MinzuYanjiu* 81, (2005): 42.
17. B Trefalt, 'Waiting Women: The Return of Stragglers and Japanese Construction of Womanhood in Collective Memories of World War II, 1972–1974', *Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context* 5 (2001), online <http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue5/beatrice.html>.
18. See TE, Barlow (ed.), *Formation of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 6; Kikuchi Yuko, 'Introduction', in Kikuchi Yuko (ed.), *Refracted Modernity: Visual Culture and Identity in Colonial Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), pp. 6–11.
19. See D Earl, *Emperor and Nation in Japan* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964); L Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); P Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); P Duara, 'Ethnos (minzoku) and Ethnology (minzokushugi) in Manchukuo', *Working Paper Series* 74, Singapore: Asia Research Institute (2006): 3–30; Yamamoto Shin'chi, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, J Fogel, trans. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
20. 'Kingly way' is a well discussed theme in Chinese intellectual history. For example, Yan's research examines the nature and power of Chinese political philosophy and its relevance to 'hegemonic way' and 'kingly way'. See Yan Xuetong, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, DA Bell and Sun Zhe (eds), E Ryden trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). However, the discussion about Japanese adoption of this political doctrine in the colonial practice of Manchukuo remains insufficient.

21. Morris-Suzuki has provided an elaborate discussion on the historical construction of race and ethnicity in Japanese discourse. See T Morris-Suzuki, 'Race', in *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space Nation* (New York: ME Sharpe, 1998), pp. 79–109.
22. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, pp. 145–6.
23. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 140.
24. *Baozi* is a type of steamed, filled bun or bread-like item in various Chinese cuisines.
25. Yamada Yōji, 'We, Born in Manchuria' [*Manshūsodachi no watashitachi*], in Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 258.
26. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 162.
27. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 74.
28. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 75.
29. Mori Riichi, 'Children are Equal' [*Kodomo wa taitō*], in Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 97.
30. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 238.
31. Kobayashi Noriko, 'Born in China' [*Chūgoku Umare*], in Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 156.
32. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, pp. 45–7.
33. The philanthropic love for humankind and animals can be interpreted as part of Buddhist thought. It may be argued that the approach of adding religious elements to the colonial discourse on Japan's domination over Manchuria undermines the coercion and violence within the system of Japanese colonialism.
34. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 113.
35. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, pp. 169–71.
36. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 65.
37. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 38.
38. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, pp. 16–7.
39. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, pp. 22–5.
40. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, pp. 29–32.
41. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 84.
42. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 137.
43. Nishimura Keiya, 'My Manchuria in the Beginning' [*Hajimari Watashi no Manshū*], in Morita *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 219.
44. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, pp. 9–10.
45. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 122.
46. Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 202.
47. Takao Midori, 'The Sequence of Returning to the Homeland' [*Kikoku no junban*] in Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 1, p. 158.
48. Yamagishi Shigeharu, 'Manchuria, the Hometown in My Heart' [*Kokoro no naka no furusato Manshū*], in Morita, *Boku no Manshū*, Vol. 2, p. 163.
49. See T Morris-Suzuki, *The Past within Us: Media, Memory, History* (New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 22–7.

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