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Johan Galtung  
Dietrich Fischer

# Johan Galtung

## Pioneer of Peace Research

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Johan Galtung · Dietrich Fischer

# Johan Galtung

Pioneer of Peace Research



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Johan Galtung  
Veronnex  
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Dietrich Fischer  
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# Preface

To me has fallen the great honor of writing a preface for this fine book: “*Johan Galtung, A Pioneer of Peace Research*”.

For the last 15 years I have had the privilege of working closely with the person the book is about. His contagious passion has motivated me to be a “girl scout” for peace, dreaming big and working hard to fulfill the ideals that are most meaningful and most transcendent for our communities and nations.

Trying to approach my task creatively, trying to be fair to all, and trying to write the adequate preface this book deserves, I ask myself the question, What makes Johan Galtung special, outstanding? What defines him as a genius?

A genius is someone who, among other things, achieves a paradigmatic shift. His or her ideas shake up and reconfigure the foundations of the field written about and worked in. This is precisely what the ideas of Johan Galtung have done in the field of peace and conflict.

His deep and precise thoughts and concepts have shaped the science he has founded. He has made constitutive contributions to its methodological, philosophical, social, and historical underpinnings. With his passionate way of being-in-the-world, charismatic and profound, he has changed the way we see conflicts. He has changed the way we “read” conflicts. He has changed the way we think about and approach political and social situations, especially for those of us who have the high honor to be his disciples.

Our world enlarges, and our responsibility and participation in our world grow, as we apply and operationalize his ideas. His theory is no longer just a theory as it becomes an educational, social, and political toolbox. We necessarily become lifelong learners, like our teacher himself who constantly revises his ideas and brings them up-to-date while our digital society changes around us at a dizzying pace.

His thinking incites us to become better and more responsible persons.

His ideas respond to new situations, always opening new horizons. They never rest. More than once following out his trains of thought I have arrived at a point where I look around and say to myself, “Now that I have learned all the answers, I find that all the questions have changed!”

Johan redefines “success” to make it less a personal achievement and more the achievement of a society, culture, or population. Although he uses a simple

definition of “conflict,” *his analysis of it* is complex. In the face of dominant logics of power, he proposes to give voice to all of the parties to a conflict, especially those who are weak and powerless.

For him mediation may require as many mediators as there are parties, in order to accomplish the aim of creating a discursive space where all can be understood.

In every conflict or complaint there are some legitimate needs of the parties that deserve to be heard and validated. In order to be sure this happens, Johan asks and expects that the mediators be primarily spokespersons. Their role calls on them to understand the demands of the parties, taking as a basis for negotiation the components of the demands that express underlying legitimate needs.

Among the many strands of Johan’s theoretical contributions, an important line of thought is his proposal to articulate dimensions of conflict juxtaposing variables from the past and the future; constructive and destructive. Thus he opens up new ways to analyze possible solutions to disputes. We need to learn from the destructive past to avoid repeating it. We need to learn from the constructive past to let it guide us in the present and in the future. Ideally we are trending toward a constructive and positive future. We build with the material found in the criteria of legitimacy already present in the conflict.

Sigmund Freud held that learning about the experiences lived in infancy is fundamental to understanding how a person behaves ever afterwards. The memories of infancy published in Johan Galtung’s autobiography help to explain his theories and his actions as an adult. The opening scene of the book describes his father being carried off to prison, certainly a traumatic incident in the life of a young boy. I believe that this childhood experience is related to the origin of his theory that most nations begin in trauma. I permit myself to add that the majority of individuals have lived through traumas that have marked our lives.

What is most significant about the fact of trauma is that both in the cases of nations and in the cases of individuals there are widely differing capacities to recover from it.

The existence of the trauma, the response to it, and recovery from it, all vary from case to case. Toward the end of the twentieth century, scientists began to develop what is known as the theory of “resilience”. “Resilience” refers to capacity to continue projecting the self into the future in spite of experiences of trauma, crisis, and emotional pain.

Persons showing high levels of resilience share qualities similar to those of the person whose life and work are celebrated in this book. They are creative, optimistic, and passionately engaged. In a crisis situation they focus on the glass half full and not on the glass half empty.

Johan has lived through, learned from, and moved on beyond traumas typical of those so many of us have endured. He has achieved a great capacity to understand and to accompany communities devastated by war and/or by other disasters natural and/or unnatural. His own life and background have contributed to making him the man whose contributions to science and practice the reader will learn so much about in the following pages. Johan is a scientist who brings to crisis situations a

wisdom born of experience underlying the marvelous conceptual tools he has created for analyzing them, for rethinking them, and for finding positive solutions that can be accepted as legitimate by all the parties involved.

Buenos Aires, March 2013

Sara Rozenblum de Horowitz

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**Part I**  
**On Johan Galtung**



Photo 1: Johan Galtung. Photo by Fernando Montiel, Mexico

# Chapter 1

## Johan Galtung, the Father of Peace Studies

**Abstract** This brief overview of Johan Galtung's life and work begins with some of his childhood experiences (such as his father being imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp) that shaped his determination to work for peace. It surveys some of his main new concepts and theories (such as direct, structural and cultural violence, negative and positive peace, rank discordance as a factor of genocide, and peaceful conflict transformation, among many others). It summarizes his contributions in mediating in over one hundred international conflicts, founding peace institutes around the world, publishing over 160 books and over 1,600 articles, teaching thousands of people around the world in conflict resolution and peace building, and inspiring many to devote their lives to peace.

### 1.1 Introduction

Johan Galtung's parents and ancestors were mainly medical doctors and nurses for several generations. So when Johan was born on 24 October 1930, an uncle congratulated his parents saying, "Today a new doctor is born!" Johan indeed became a kind of doctor, but rather than treating individuals, his patients are entire societies with their pathologies, for which he developed diagnosis, prognosis and therapy, using the terms he heard repeatedly at the dinner table.

On 9 April 1940, when Johan Galtung was nine years old, the German warship *Blücher*, with over 2,000 soldiers and sailors on board, led a flotilla into Oslo Fjord to conquer Oslo and occupy Norway. An old torpedo hit the ship, and it burst into flames and sank. Many of the soldiers could swim ashore, but suffered from burns in their throats. Johan's father, an ear-nose-throat surgeon, feverishly operated day and night to save the lives of as many of those soldiers as possible. Johan asked his father, "Were you not sometimes tempted to let your scalpel slip a little?" His father answered, "Absolutely not! The most essential duty of a physician is to save lives, anyone's life, without distinction." This left a deep impression on little Johan.

In 1944, Johan's father was taken with other prominent Norwegians to a Nazi concentration camp in Norway. Every day, his family feared to hear on the radio the news, "In retaliation for English bombing, Dr. Galtung was executed today." But fortunately, one month before the end of the war, his father returned home unharmed. This reinforced Johan's determination to work for the prevention of war.

In 1951, Johan Galtung studied in Helsinki with a scholarship. He asked the librarian for books about peace research. She did not have any, and wrote to the Central Library in Sweden, which had a much larger collection. The answer came, "There are no such books." Johan found this strange. There were thousands of books about war and military strategy research, why should there be no books about research for peace? This was a missing discipline, and he decided that this was his life's calling. He has contributed original research and insights to many areas of intellectual inquiry, having so far published over 160 books and over 1,600 book chapters and articles in scholarly and popular journals. 40 of his books have been translated into 34 languages, for a total of 134 book translations, making him the so far most cited author in the field of peace studies.<sup>1</sup>

Thanks in large part to his tireless efforts, there are today peace studies programmes at universities throughout the world, and a growing number of schools teach children how to handle conflicts constructively. In the United States alone, there are over 500 peace studies programmes at colleges and universities.

School children are enthusiastically practicing the TRANSCEND<sup>2</sup> method of finding mutually acceptable solutions to challenging personal conflicts, and numerous professionals around the world are learning and applying the method. The main focus of the TRANSCEND method<sup>3</sup> is not to merely identify who is guilty and punish those, the traditional legal approach, but to create an attractive new reality acceptable to all those involved. A new organization, Lawyers for Dialogue, is propagating this new approach among their colleagues.

Galtung has also helped mediate in over one hundred international conflicts, often successfully, and in this way helped prevent wars and saved many lives. He is sought by Presidents and Prime Ministers, because he does not necessarily tell them what they like to hear, nor the opposite, but creative insights they do not hear elsewhere. He focuses on positive proposals, not merely criticism of what is wrong. He has also been a frequent consultant to various United Nations agencies.

Galtung has held numerous visiting professorships all over the world. He fluently speaks and lectures in eight languages (Norwegian, English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Danish and Swedish), all learned the hard way after age 20.

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<sup>1</sup> A list of his books is given [Chap. 2](#). A complete list of his publications, regularly updated, can be found on [www.transcend.org/galtung/#publications](http://www.transcend.org/galtung/#publications). Many reports are available for free download at [www.transcend.org](http://www.transcend.org). The covers of his selected major books are at: [http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs\\_PSP06.htm](http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP06.htm).

<sup>2</sup> Transcend means 'going beyond' and refers to Galtung's main institutional basis that is introduced below.

<sup>3</sup> The 'Transcend method' is introduced below.



**Photo 1.1** Johan Galtung. Photo in personal possession of the author

He never reads his lectures, but speaks freely from memory, in well-structured, logical and original ways that are easy to remember. Then he writes up his speeches after he has given them. He is often invited to give the keynote address at international conferences.

Anita Kemp (1985) conducted a survey among 133 peace researchers, many of them members of the International Peace Research Association, which Johan Galtung had helped found in 1964. To the question, “Which person, dead or alive, has influenced your thinking the most”, many names were given, but nearly half (44 per cent) mentioned Johan Galtung, with the next runnerup receiving 12 per cent. He has inspired a generation of dedicated peace workers around the world.





**Photo 1.2** Johan Galtung at the TRANSCEND meeting in Grenzach-Wyhlen, Germany, 15 August 2012. Photo by Stacy Hughes, USA

Johan Galtung was a conscientious objector. He served twelve months as cook and in geographic surveys, the same period as those who did military service. Those opting for a civilian alternative were required to serve an additional six months. Johan agreed to do so, but only if he could work for peace during that time. That was refused by the government, and he was put in jail with murderers and other dangerous criminals for six months. While in jail, he completed his first book, *Gandhi's Political Ethics*, together with his mentor, Arne Naess, a deep ecologist. As assistant of Naess, Galtung searched through Gandhi's voluminous writings and extracted, among many other ideas, 68 norms for behaviour in conflict.

After completing two PhD equivalents, in Mathematics (1956) and Sociology (1957), he was invited to teach mathematical sociology at Columbia University in New York. Before his first class he cleaned the blackboard. One of his students, most of whom were older than he, came to him and said, "You better sit down, the professor may come in any moment." Johan had to explain to him that he was the professor.



**Photo 1.3** Johan Galtung. Photo by Fernando Montiel, Mexico

While at Columbia University, he mediated his first conflict, over desegregation in the school system in the southern states. Through his senior colleague, Professor Otto Klineberg, he got in contact with people in Charlottesville, Virginia, Thomas Jefferson's town. The Ku Klux Klan had already burned a cross, and people were afraid of violence. Three groups were pitted against each other, the white integrationists, the white segregationists, and the blacks. The integrationists tended to be immigrants, but also included Sarah Patton Boyle, a member of the 'First

Families of Virginia'. The cross had been burning outside of her window, as a 'traitor of her class'. After some thousand interviews it became clear to Galtung that even if most people were afraid of violence, very few were ready to commit any and that solutions that could be relatively acceptable to everybody were there for everybody to discover. The segregationists feared revenge from the blacks, whom they had mistreated, but it turned out that the blacks only really wanted equal rights of opportunity for access to the American Dream, which they finally achieved to a large extent.

Instead of writing a book about the conflict, what researchers had typically done up to now, Galtung felt it was his responsibility to mediate, to contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict and to help prevent future violence. He did so successfully.

In 1960, Galtung was offered tenure at Columbia University, but he preferred to return to Europe to build up peace studies there.

On 1 January 1959, Johan Galtung and his then wife Ingrid Eide founded the *International Peace Research Institute in Oslo* (PRIO), the world's first research institute with the word peace in its name. Since then, Galtung has helped found numerous peace institutes around the world, which are thriving today. Without his initiative and constant intellectual support and encouragement, many of them would not exist. In 1964, he founded the *Journal of Peace Research*, which remains one of the leading journals in this field.

Galtung and his colleagues at PRIO published their research findings in a series of working papers and sent them to about 400 social science institutes around the world, including the Institute for *World Economy and International Relations* (IMEMO) in Moscow. They received acknowledgements from many quarters, but never heard anything from IMEMO. It was as if the papers disappeared in a black hole in the universe. In 1982, when Galtung attended a conference at IMEMO, the librarian showed him a locked file cabinet in the basement of the library. Here was the entire collection of papers that he and his colleagues had been sending over the years. Surprisingly, the papers seemed to have passed through many hands, with numerous notes in the margins. In 1991, Vladimir Petrovsky, then Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Johan Galtung in Oslo, thanking him for sending those papers. He explained that during the Brezhnev era, he was part of a group of young scholars who met frequently to discuss new ideas, being aware that their system needed reform. These papers on alternative approaches to peace, security and development provided them with valuable new concepts and concrete ideas how to proceed. Sowing seeds can have unforeseen long term consequences.

In 1966, Johan Galtung was asked by the Council of Europe to do a study of how countries in the Cold War viewed the future. Since they had only a small budget for the study, the method chosen was not a traditional public opinion survey, but a dialogue about predictions and possibilities of cooperation, with only one person in each country: the head of the political department in the Foreign Office, in 19 countries in Europe and North America, during the summer of 1967.

In Washington, the dialogue was with Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Moscow with Jurij Vorontsov. The most interesting answers came from the Warsaw Treaty



**Photo 1.4** Johan Galtung. Photo in the personal possession of the author

Organization countries outside the Soviet Union. They had done a lot of thinking about the future; they knew that they wanted peace, independence and cooperation. Galtung never argued, he only asked questions, to understand their world from the inside, not to have a verbal duel in order to try to convince them of anything. In other words, a true dialogue, not a debate. He probably got better information that way than the CIA, because they mainly listen secretly, without asking questions.

Arising from these dialogues during the Cold War came an idea: a United Nations' Security Commission for Europe, where all parties could sit together and



**Photo 1.5** Johan Galtung in discussion with peace researchers during an excursion prior to the IPRA Conference in Sydney in July 2010. Photo in possession of Hans Günter Brauch

discuss the problems rather than planning nuclear mass destruction. In May 1968 the final report was discussed at the parliamentary gathering of the Council of Europe. The spokesman for the committee, a conservative Frenchman, said,

A Mr. Galtung suggests that we should sit together with Communists and discuss the problems. Anybody who suggests... that is himself a Communist! The chairman obviously did not understand what Nelson Mandela and Yasser Arafat later aptly expressed, Peace is something you make with your adversaries, not with your friends.

The report had been sent to all nineteen countries that had participated in the study. This paved the way for invitations from foreign offices in some countries. In Prague, Galtung presented the content of the report to about seventy foreign office people and others, particularly emphasizing the Security Commission. The Foreign Minister said that the idea was excellent, but that the time was not ripe. But Gandhi argued that the time is always ripe, that the place is here and the time is now.

Twenty-five years later, in 1993, there was a conference in Luxembourg about the world after the Cold War. Galtung's task was as usual to present some solution proposals. Afterwards, Jaroslav Sidevy, ambassador of the Czech Republic to France, approached him and said, "You don't know me, Professor Galtung, but many years ago you gave a talk at the Foreign Office in Prague, I was a young assistant at the time, seated way back in the room. You presented a proposal for a UN Security Commission in Europe and the Foreign Minister said that the time

was not ripe. After that came the spring of Prague 1968, I was a dissident and after the Soviet invasion was sent to the countryside, like Dubcek. I was a teacher, and that lasted until the end of the Cold War in 1989. At that time I was called to the foreign office as deputy minister. Our main problem was to get the Soviet troops out of the country. So we wrote a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, asking him to please withdraw the Soviet troops from our country. The answer was disappointing: “No, we want to modernize the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet Union will become less dominant, there will be more dialogue, more democracy”. We had a crisis meeting and I said: “Maybe the time is ripe for the Galtung plan from 1967?” We sent the plan to Shevardnadze and got as an answer: “The plan is excellent, I am coming next week.” Shevardnadze said that what mattered to him was a ‘successor system’ to the Cold War, not military alliances, to discuss problems and make decisions together. We agreed that he should pull out his troops and that this ‘successor plan’ could be a common position in the Paris negotiations in fall of 1990, the negotiations that would mark an end to the Cold War. The troops were withdrawn, and the communiqué went in that direction. You, Professor Galtung, were the father of the idea, and I was its executor”, he said.

To be there when the time is ripe one evidently has to be there ahead of time. As Schopenhauer said, every new idea will first be ridiculed, then violently opposed, and finally taken as self-evident. But maybe Schopenhauer omitted a phase before all this: the big silence. Countless proposals are dying by being silenced to death; that is why we need peace journalism.

In “A structural theory of imperialism”, one of his most cited articles, Galtung (1971) showed how the centre of the Centre, in collusion with the centre of the Periphery and the periphery of the Centre, exploits the poorest people, the periphery of the Periphery.<sup>4</sup> One of Galtung’s many new concepts and theories is the classification of violence into three types: direct, structural and cultural violence. Direct violence is intentional, directed against a specific group or person, and involves hurting or killing people, but it also includes verbal violence.

Early in 1969, Galtung was working at a Centre for Gandhian Studies in Varanasi, India. One evening, he sat on the flat roof of the building observing homeless people sleeping in the street, children crying from hunger, and sick people waiting to die, with nobody caring for them. It struck him that this is a form of violence as much as violent crime or war, even if nobody walks around with a stick or gun intentionally hitting or shooting people. They suffer a slow death from hunger, preventable and curable diseases and other agonies caused by neglect, inaction, gross inequality and unjust structures of society, including from lack of freedom and democracy that enables people to help shape their lives. He created

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<sup>4</sup> From 1962–1964, Galtung was a Visiting Professor at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Santiago de Chile. There he was inspired and participated in the debate of the school of ‘dependencia’. His article on imperialism helped to stimulate much interest of younger scholars and students to study the contributions on ‘dependencia theory’ by many Latin American scholars.

the term ‘structural violence’ (Galtung 1969) for such phenomena, in contrast to ‘direct violence’. Direct violence is an act of commission whereas structural violence is based on numerous acts of omission and escape attention in cultures, like Western and Christian weak on attention to acts of omission, according to Galtung.


Later Galtung (1990) added the concept of ‘cultural violence’—the intellectual justification for direct and structural violence through nationalism, racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination and prejudice in education, the media, literature, films, the arts, street names, monuments celebrating war ‘heroes’, etc.

Köhler and Alcock (1976) sought to estimate the relative size of direct and structural violence. They observed a positive correlation between per capita income and life expectancy across countries, which increases rapidly at first, and then makes only small gains as income increases further. It is clear that increasing the annual per capita income from 100 to 200 dollars extends life expectancy considerably more than increasing it from 20,000 to 20,100 dollars. If per capita income had been equally distributed across all countries, 14 million lives could have been saved during the year 1965. They did not have data on income inequality within countries, so this is a low, conservative estimate of the extent of structural violence. During the same year, about 140,000 people died in all international and civil wars. Therefore, structural violence is at least one hundred times greater than direct violence. Zimmerman and Leitenberg (1979) pointed out that structural violence is equivalent to 236 Hiroshima bombs being dropped on the children of the world each year. But because the suffering is diffuse, not concentrated in one place at one time, it is ignored by the media.

Galtung (2010b, 2012) has promoted a living economy, with its main focus on the satisfaction of basic human needs of those most in need, as opposed to today’s killing economy, which causes the avoidable death of over 100,000 people every day, many of them children, from hunger and preventable or curable diseases. Negative peace consists of the absence of those three forms of violence, and positive peace includes mutually beneficial cooperation on an equal basis and mutual learning to heal past violence and prevent future violence.

Peace studies, like health studies (medicine) are clearly value-oriented: to save and promote life for all, to meet the basic needs for security, well-being, freedom, identity and a liveable environment (the opposites of death, misery, oppression, alienation and environmental degradation). Some have argued that peace studies are not a science, because they are not ‘valuefree’. With the same argument, one would conclude that a doctor is unscientific if she or he seeks to protect people’s health, or an engineer is unscientific if he wishes to design a bridge that will not collapse. This is obviously wrong. There is a definite need for applied value-oriented sciences that seek to promote desirable goals. Yet they must strictly follow scientific principles of seeking truth. A doctor who falsified medical test results would not help his patients.

The goal of peace studies is to train not only theorists, but also practitioners who can apply what they have learned. Galtung has characterized ‘value-free’ science as follows. You don’t feel well and go to see a doctor. He examines you



**Photo 1.6** Johan Galtung during a plenary discussion at the IPRA Conference in Sydney in July 2010. Photo was taken and permission was granted by Hans Günter Brauch

and says, “You have a very interesting disease, I will describe it in my next scientific publication.” You ask, “But don’t you have a cure for me?” He protests, “Oh no! I am value-free. I do not intervene.”

One particular endeavour of peace professionals, besides conciliation (healing the effects of past violence) and peace building (preventing future violence), is conflict transformation. A conflict involves attitudes (‘enemy images’ and ‘friend images’), behaviour (violent or nonviolent, verbal or physical) and contradictions (incompatible goals), the ABC triangle. Conflicts can rarely be completely ‘resolved’ so that they simply disappear, but they can and must be transformed from being fought with violent means to being conducted by peaceful means, e.g. through dialogue. In this way, conflicts can have a constructive function by helping bring about desirable change. In analogy to medical terminology, conflicts are analyzed in terms of diagnosis (sources of a conflict), prognosis (likely trends without intervention), therapy (proposed interventions to prevent or reduce violence) and also therapy of the past, or ‘counter-factual history’ (what could have been done differently in the past, by whom, to prevent or reduce violence). This can provide valuable lessons for the future.

Through many years of research and practice, Galtung (1998, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010a) has developed the TRANSCEND method of peaceful conflict transformation. He has observed that “bringing the conflict parties to the table” for





**Photo 1.7** Johan Galtung teaching at the World Peace Academy in Basel in March 2012. Photo was taken and permission was granted by Bikash Subedi, Nepal

direct negotiations, as most mediators try to do, can be counterproductive, because it tends to lead to a stream of mutual accusations and a shouting match, and can often exacerbate a conflict instead of resolving it. He has found that it is more effective to apply a three-step approach, the TRANSCEND method:

- (1) Through individual dialogues with all the many parties involved directly and indirectly in a conflict, also those the mediator may dislike, seek to understand their goals, fears and concerns and win their confidence.
- (2) Distinguish between legitimate goals, which affirm human needs, and illegitimate goals, which violate human needs. Whatever we demand from other parties, we must be willing to grant to others. For example, self-determination is a legitimate goal, ruling over others is not.
- (3) Bridge the gap between all legitimate but seemingly contradictory goals through mutually acceptable, desirable solutions sustainable into the future, which embody creativity, empathy and nonviolence, building a new reality.

Two examples may illustrate this approach. The first is an interpersonal conflict: A husband and wife grew increasingly apart. The husband, a businessman selling bicycles, brought his accounting books home and pored over red and black figures in the evening. His wife, who had become increasingly interested in her spiritual life and was fascinated with Buddhism, felt disgusted by her husband's

materialism. She blamed him, “Why are you only interested in money?” He retorted, “If it were not for these black figures, you would not live so well. Look at your good food and fancy clothes, and our nice house that you enjoy!” She protested, “I don’t need all those external luxuries. I prefer a rich inner life.” There was a risk that the marriage could end in divorce. Both had developed affairs. Johan Galtung was asked for advice. He found that both had some legitimate goals, such as providing an income for the family, and an interest in spirituality. What was illegitimate was that both tried to convert their spouse to become like themselves, to adopt their own value system. How to bridge the legitimate goals? The best is a ‘joint project’ that combines the interests of both partners. He suggested that they open a Buddhist bookstore together. It took only one week until the wife began to develop an interest in red and black figures. And after about a month, the husband for the first time read one of the books he was selling. They are still happily married.

A second example deals with an international conflict: In the peace treaty of Rio de Janeiro of 1942, after a border war in 1941, Peru and Ecuador had failed to draw the border high up in the Andes Mountains. Later, they agreed that the border should run along the watershed in the upper Amazon basin. But depending on rainfall, the watershed shifted back and forth. They then tried a river as the border, but it came and went, depending on precipitation and glaciers’ melting. Since



**Photo 1.8** Johan Galtung teaching at the World Peace Academy in Basel, Switzerland in 2011. Photo was taken and permission was granted by Stacy Hughes, USA

1942, Ecuador and Peru have fought three wars over this barely inhabited 500 Km<sup>2</sup> territory and were about to engage in another round of war. The Peruvian air force had already made plans to bombard Ecuador's capital city Quito.

At a peace conference in Guatemala in 1995, Johan Galtung was invited to meet with Ecuador's chief negotiator in the border talks with Peru, a former President. Galtung patiently listened to him complain about Peru's inflexibility and stubbornness. But he also always carefully listens to what people do not say. The negotiator never said that each square metre of territory must belong to one and only one country, because he assumed this to be obvious. That was a principle built into the peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648. So Galtung asked him what he thought of the idea of making the disputed border territory into a jointly administered 'binational zone with a natural park', attracting tourists to bring additional income to both countries. The ExPresident said, "In 30 years of negotiations, I have never heard such a proposal. This is very creative but I am afraid it is too creative, it will take at least 30 years to get used to such an entirely new idea, and another 30 years to implement it. It does not help us now." But out of curiosity, he proposed it to Peru in the next round of peace negotiations, and to his surprise, Peru accepted it with some minor modifications. This led to the Peace treaty signed in Brasilia on 27 October 1998. This zone has since been implemented, and free trade zones, where merchants from the two countries can exchange goods duty-free, have been added.

Galtung pointed out that this initiative cost only \$125, \$25 to extend a ticket from Bogota and \$100 for one night at the hotel and a dinner. By comparison, the 1991 Gulf War to expel Iraq from Kuwait cost \$100 billion, not counting the destruction it caused. Most of all, peaceful conflict transformation before violence begins can save many lives.

Most governments wait until a conflict erupts in war and then intervene with military force, instead of seeking a peaceful solution long before it leads to violence. Such a policy is comparable to driving a car with closed eyes, waiting until we hit an obstacle and then calling an ambulance, instead of anticipating dangers and avoiding them.

We need many more trained mediators who can help transform conflicts peacefully before they lead to violence. Violence is to an unresolved conflict like smoke to fire. To get rid of the smoke, it is necessary to extinguish the fire. And to prevent or end violence, it is necessary to transform the underlying conflict.

There are two approaches to mediation. Some insist that a mediator should only play the role of facilitator and conciliator, without offering any suggestions; the parties alone have the right to propose solution. The mediator should only ensure that the parties do not deviate from the agreed topic and that they focus on solutions instead of accusations about the past.

The second approach about mediation, advocated also by Galtung, recommends that the mediator ought to help the parties by informing them how similar conflicts have been successfully solved elsewhere, and by offering sensible proposals that meet the main goals of all conflict parties, but leave it to the parties to decide

whether or not they accept the proposals. If a doctor who was aware of a cure were to insist that the patient discover it by herself that would be unethical.

Another of many important theories and concepts developed by Johan Galtung is the theory of 'rank discordance'. In many societies, a certain class controls all four forms of power: military, economic, cultural and political. There may be great inequality, but the situation is relatively stable, the underclass has little possibility to improve its situation, except perhaps in a revolution, a rare occurrence. There are also societies where a minority, often outsiders, has been able to establish itself in niches of economic and cultural power—through their talents, skills and hard work—but has little or no political and military power. This is a situation of 'rank discordance'. Examples of such minorities who enjoyed advantages in business, finance, academia and the media, but were weak politically and militarily, were the Armenians in Turkey 1915, the Chinese in Indonesia 1965, and the Tutsis among the majority Hutus in Rwanda in 1994, and also the Jews in Germany in the early 20th century. Added to this came the humiliating Versailles Treaty, Hitler's demagoguery, and willing executioners. Galtung suggests that if the Versailles treaty had been cancelled in 1924, and the German majority been lifted through education and employment into equality, we might have avoided World War II and the holocaust.

This can point the way towards a solution, as President Mahathir in Malaysia has enacted: 'positive discrimination', lifting the Malay majority to the level of the Chinese minority in economic and cultural terms, without lowering the level of the Chinese. This may well have prevented a massacre of Chinese in Malaysia, and shows how similar dangers can be averted elsewhere. Israel would gain from lifting the Arabs out of this social rank discordance.

Galtung fears and seeks to help prevent a coming wave of anti-Semitism in the USA, where Jews have leading roles in academia, the media and on Wall Street, but are a vulnerable minority without political or military power.

Because of such observations, Galtung has been falsely accused of 'anti-Semitism' and 'blaming the victims'. That is a complete misunderstanding! For over 40 years, he has defended Israel's right to exist as a state with Jewish characteristics, also in Arab countries, and he wishes only the best for Israel: lasting peace with its neighbours.

Unlike most others, he has offered a concrete peace plan for the Middle East: In 1964 he visited Israel and Gaza, holding many dialogues. In February 1971, as a Visiting Professor in Cairo (as a colleague of Boutros Boutros-Ghali), he made a proposal about a six-state solution, a Middle East Community of Israel with its five Arab neighbours, modelled after the 1958 European Economic Community. It would have open borders, a council of ministers, commissions for water, border patrols, economy; capitals in the two Jerusalem's; right of return, with numbers to be discussed, as Arafat emphasized. Palestine would be fully recognized, with the borders of with some exchanges: Israeli cantons on the West Bank and Palestinian cantons in northwest Israel. In addition, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in West Asia, with all parties at the table and all issues on the table, without time limit, like the 1972–1975 Helsinki Conference, leading to an Organization for

Security and Cooperation in West Asia, modelled after the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since 1994.

True, Galtung has criticized Israel's disastrous current foreign policy, which advocates an attack on Iran to destroy its nuclear facilities, which would plunge the whole region into a mutually destructive war. But who is a better friend, when someone walks with closed eyes towards an abyss: the one who says, "Go right ahead, you are on the right track", or the one who says, "Stop, turn around, you are in grave danger!" A critic may be our best friend, saving us from a danger or folly.

Applying reason does not mean to justify, or to blame the victims, but to explain, understand, and then remove the causes!

After September 11, 2001, Galtung was on a podium discussion on Austrian television, which included the US Ambassador in Vienna. When Galtung observed that we must try to understand why this terrorist act occurred, the Ambassador was furious and asked, "So you are trying to justify what happened?" Galtung had to explain that nothing can justify such an atrocity, but if we fail to understand why it happened, we cannot prevent a future recurrence.

By 1993 Galtung had had experience with about twenty conflicts, including the following:

- Northern Ireland since 1970, a concrete proposal put forward in Dublin in 1997, and in a committee meeting in the British House of Commons in 1998. The proposal foresees self-rule, without army, security guaranteed jointly by England and Ireland, in cooperation with OSCE and the UN. Numerous dialogues at all levels are to be encouraged. Conflict resolution affecting millions is too important to be left to a few politicians-diplomats-statesmen, a remnant of feudal phases in history. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission like in South Africa and other conflict resolution-reconciliation cultures could assist in the process.
- When Galtung was Visiting Professor in New Delhi in 1971, the daughter of sheik Abdullah, the leader of the Kashmiri independence movement, invited him and his wife to dinner; Abdullah was under house arrest. Galtung proposed greater autonomy for some parts of the Indian federation, as member states of the European Union have different relations to Brussels. Greater flexibility will serve them all. As a first step, there should be reunion of families, cultural cooperation and local economic cooperation. This is needed everywhere, also to overcome the effects of globalization. The Valley could become Indo Pak territory to start with, gradually attaining autonomy, even independence, and they could all come together in a KAFTA, Kashmir Free Trade Association with open borders, as a community with passport also carrying the word Kashmir.
- Korea since 1972, filled with dialogues with Koreans in North and South and in Japan, with proposals about national unification in a two-state confederation and countless very concrete proposals after that, such as restoring the rail link between North and South, which has been interrupted since the Korean War. Galtung met with Kim Dae Jung in 1975 while he was under house arrest. Later

as President, Kim initiated the ‘sunshine policy’ of improving relations with North Korea.

- For Yugoslavia Galtung made many proposals since 1991, but all of them were in contradiction to US and German foreign policy and thus had no chance. In January 1997 there were two non-violent mass demonstrations against Milos- evic, one of them conducted from the senate room in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Belgrade, where Galtung was as a consultant.
- In 2006, when the publication of a series of cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark and other Western countries led to the burning of Danish flags and embassies in Muslim countries, Johan Galtung met on 13 February 2006 in Geneva with high representatives from Denmark and Islamic Clerics, and suggested that Denmark support an Islam West dialogue. It did, and the violent protests ended.

Johan Galtung has made many accurate predictions, based on keen observation of factors that others tend to ignore.

Based on a theory of synchronizing and mutually reinforcing contradictions, Galtung predicted in 1980 the end of the Soviet Empire within ten years, beginning at its weakest point, with the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the Soviet Union, there were five main contradictions: the working class wanting trade unions, the bourgeoisie wanting something to buy, the intellectuals wanting more freedom of expression and impression, minorities in search of autonomy, and the peasants wanting more freedom of movement. Very few believed him at the time, but it occurred on 9 November 1989, two months before his time limit 1990.

Based on a series of 14 growing contradictions, principal among them the contradiction between reality and the American Dream, he expects an end of the US Empire by 2020 (Galtung 2009), with a likely blossoming of the US Republic, once it is freed from the albatross of empire, now with a military budget almost equal to the rest of the world combined, and 830 military bases in 150 countries.

By seeing state terrorism and terrorism dialectically as breeding and nursing each other, he predicted a major terrorist attack on the US like 9/11. What ‘Blowback’ sees as ‘unintended consequences’ was highly foreseeable, given the last two centuries of the West unleashing enormities of violence on the Muslim world. How naïve to believe it would be absorbed and forgotten; how naïve not to see the possibility of nonviolent revolts against Soviet and US repression in client regimes, the German Democratic Republic and others in Eastern Europe, the ‘Arab spring’ in the Middle East!

By comparing the real economy of products for end consumption and the finance economy of products for buying and selling, he predicted economic crises such as those of 1987, 2008 and 2011. If the finance economy has a Dow Jones Index growth of 83 % in the two years 2009–2010, and the real economy a GNP growth of 4–6 %, the ratio 83:5 spells an asynchrony, with a crash as obvious prognosis.

Based on the contradiction between a finite nature and GNP growth measured by processing-trading natural resources, he predicted the ecological collapse.

Focusing instead on health and education, with very little cost to the environment, would make people, not “systems”, grow.

Based on the contradiction in the age-old colonial formula between suppliers of cheap resources and labour, and the Centre demand to live off the value-added, he predicted the 1973 “oil crisis”? That system had cracked politically in 1960 with massive decolonization and in 1973 it cracked economically at its weakest point, oil, and the demand being highly inelastic.

Based on the contradiction between an overwhelming—and mainly impoverished—shia majority and the Shah’s regime based on Westernization, installed by the CIA-MI6 coup of 1953 against the popularly elected President Mossadegh, he predicted the 1978 Iran revolution.

Brilliant Japanese social ‘both-and’ engineering overcame such cherished Western contradictions as State versus Capital, Capital versus Labour and Labour-intensive versus Capital-intensive production. That worked well for Japan, but they forgot contradictions in Japanese society at large, like men versus women, top universities versus all others, state-capital versus nongovernment-nonprofit, and indeed, the contradiction with the rest of the world. Galtung predicted that their push would produce counterforces: US limitations on imports, Third World protests, and imitations in China and the four Asian tigers, leading to a decline of the Japanese economy.

By seeing China’s three cultures, a *Daoist yin-yang* dialectic between a *Confucianism* legitimizing growth, and *Buddhism* legitimizing distribution, Galtung predicted the changes that seem to take place about every 9 years, with a four years confusion break 1976–1980.

As an outcome of the contradiction between the age-old Chinese class structure, *shi’h-nung-kung-shang* (intellectuals-rulers, farmers, artisans, merchants) and Deng Xiaoping’s 1980 policy favouring farmers by marketing their products, and merchants by putting their capital to use—leaving behind intellectuals and workers, Galtung predicted the Tiananmen uprising of spring 1989. Students and workers were both at Tiananmen. The workers were worst repressed. And the students won: the Party is now dominated by intellectuals.

Johan Galtung founded TRANSCEND in 1993 as a network for peace, development and the environment, with members who are both scholars and practitioners. Today it has over 500 members in about 70 countries throughout the world. When he founded the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in 1959, it seemed obvious that there should be a building where the members meet and work together. With the emergence of the internet, it has become possible for people around the world to stay in contact and cooperate, without the need to be physically in the same location.

TRANSCEND (which means, ‘going beyond’), overcoming a contradiction) has four main fields of engagement: action, education/training, information and research.

- Action involves *mediation in conflicts*, from the personal to the global level, done by the TRANSCEND Peace Service, founded in 2010, but practiced already for over five decades before that by Galtung.
- For *education and training*, there is the *TRANSCEND Peace University* (TPU), which Galtung founded in 2000. He serves as its Rector. It offers courses online and onsite, in many places around the world. It is the first global online Peace University. Its faculty is drawn from leading scholars and practitioners in their fields internationally, and it has students on every continent. The participants are not only students, but also professionals seeking to improve their knowledge and skills. Galtung personally teaches on line courses on Advanced Conflict Transformation, Peace Economics and Advanced Peace Theory, with participants from around the world. He is also a frequent guest professor at many universities around the world. Among other places, he teaches four weeks every year at the World Peace Academy in Basel, Switzerland, which he helped found in 2009. He fascinates his audiences with original theories, and many concrete illustrations from personal experience, which make his theories come alive.
- For *information*, there is the *TRANSCEND University Press* (TUP), founded in 2008, which has so far published 11 books; *TRANSCEND University Press Popular* (TUPP), which has so far published 7 pocketbooks; and the *TRANSCEND Media Service* (TMS), founded in 2008, which every week publishes a number of articles dealing with peace and development, including an editorial by Johan Galtung. The articles are examples of ‘peace journalism’, which focuses on understanding the underlying causes of conflicts and proposals for solutions, not the traditional ‘war journalism’, which is limited to reporting how many were killed that day and who is ‘winning’.
- Research is done by members around the world, and is coordinated mainly at the Galtung Institute for Peace Theory and Peace Practice in Grenzach, Germany, bordering on Basel, founded in 2011.

TRANSCEND has regional centres throughout the world and a number of action programmes in which its members are engaged, including peaceful conflict transformation, peacebuilding, peace keeping, nonviolence, reconciliation, peace education, peace journalism, peace business, peace and gender, peace and the arts, and peaceful foreign policies. TRANSCEND members are also engaged in research on federalism, self determination, conflict transformation and psychological assumptions, the dialogue process, local and subsistence economics, models of global economic crises, understanding genocide, preventing terrorism and state terrorism, an early warning index of possible violent conflicts, and an index measuring and suggesting ways of transforming conflicts by peaceful means.

The work of TRANSCEND is done mostly on a voluntary basis. Any modest income for a few staff members has so far come from fees paid for courses and the sale of books. Not being paid by any sponsors gives TRANSCEND independence, without anyone restricting its freedom of expression.

Johan Galtung has two sons from his first marriage with Ingrid Eide from Norway: Harald, born 1962, a communications engineer; and Andreas, born 1958,



an informatics lawyer, author, musician and painter, who illustrated Johan's children's book *A Flying Orange tells Its Tale* (2003): an orange flies at night, visiting all kinds of people around the world, and observes how they handle conflict. It is "a book for children to read to their parents at bedtime, so that the parents can have better dreams".

From his second marriage with Fumiko Nishimura from Japan, with whom he has been married since 1969, he has a daughter, Irene (Greek eirene, peace), who got her PhD in law from the European University Institute in Florence in 2011, with a dissertation on the human right to food; and a son, Fredrik (Norwegian fredsriket, the kingdom of peace), born 1970, who got an MA in Political Science from the University of Hawaii in 1992. He is founder and chief executive of TIRI, an anti-corruption organization, and lives with his Israeli wife in Tel Aviv.

Johan Galtung's tireless work for peace has earned him thirteen honorary doctorates and professorships, and numerous awards, including a Right Livelihood Award (also known as Alternative Nobel Peace Prize) in 1987; the Bajaj International Award for Promoting Gandhian Values, 1993; the Norwegian Literary Prize Brage 2000; the First Morton Deutsch Conflict Resolution Award 2001; the Premio Hidalgo, Madrid 2005; Augsburg Golden Book of Peace 2005; Marburg Golden Book 2007; the DMZ Korean Peace Prize in 2010; the Erik Byes Minnepris, 2011; the Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan International Peace-BUILDER Award in 2011; and the Nepal Peace Prize 2013.

Through his activities as a skilful mediator and peacemaker, as a researcher with a highly creative, original mind, as a prolific author, as an inspiring teacher, and as a kind human being, has made significant contributions to a better world, and has encouraged many people, young and old, to work for the same ideals. For all these reasons, Johan Galtung is widely regarded as the principal founder—or father—of peace studies.

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## Author Biography

**Prof. Dr. Dietrich Fischer** is Director, TRANSCEND University Press. From 2009–2012 he was Academic Director of the World Peace Academy, Basel. From 2003–2009, he was Academic Director of the European University Center for Peace Studies in Stadtschlaining, Austria. Before that he was an Assistant Professor at New York University (1976–1986), a MacArthur Fellow in Peace and Security Studies at Princeton University (1986–1988) and a Professor at Pace University, New York (1988–2003). This article is partly based on Johan Galtung's (2000b) autobiography.

## Chapter 2

# Johan Galtung's Books (1953–2012)

During a period of 60 years, from 1953 to 2012 Johan Galtung has published 165 books. These books are divided into four categories:

- 2.1 Books as sole author: 86 books (A1–A86);
- 2.2 Books co-authored: 32 books (C1–C32);
- 2.3 Books co-edited, with chapters: 20 books (E1–E20); and
- 2.4 Books published by Institutes or Departments: 27 books (I1–I27).

Forty of these books were translated into 34 languages, for a total of 134 book translations. The complete bibliography of Johan Galtung lists until December 2012 a total 1,785 publications. This list is continuously updated and available at [www.transcend.org/galtung/#publications](http://www.transcend.org/galtung/#publications).

### 2.1 Books Published as a Sole Author

- A1 *The Prison Society: An Attempt at Analysis* (in Norwegian, 1959, 247 pp.)
- A2 *Defense Without a Military: A Pacifist Philosophy of Life* (in Norwegian, 1959, 111 pp.)
- A3 *Norwegian Peace Initiatives: 20 Proposals* (in Norwegian 1964, 48 pp.)
- A4 *Peace Research* (in Norwegian, 1967, 109 pp.)
- A5 *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (1967, 534 pp.)
- A6 *Nonmilitary Defense Strategies* (in Finnish and other languages, 1970, 111 pp.), reprinted in: *Essays in Peace Research II*, pp. 378–426.
- A7 *Images of the World in the Year 2000* (1970, 64 pp.)
- A8 *Members of Two Worlds: A Development Study of Three Villages in Western Sicily* (1971, 302 pp.)
- A9 *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (1973, 194 pp.)
- A10 *Ecology and Class Politics* (in Norwegian and other languages, 1972, 62 pp.)
- A11 *A Structural Theory of Revolutions* (1974, 78 pp.)

- A12 *Peace, Violence and imperialism: 6 Essays in Peace Research* (in Norwegian, 1974, 214 pp.)
- A13 *Essays in Peace Research, Short Edition* (1974)
- A14 *Is Peace Possible? Studies in Peace and Imperialism* (in Swedish, 1975, 335 pp.)
- A15 *Peace: Research—Education—Action. Essays in Peace Research I* (1975, 405 pp.)
- A16 *Structural Violence: Contributions to Peace and Conflict Research* (in German, 1975, 156 pp.)
- A17 *Peace, War and Defense. Essays in Peace Research II* (1976, 471 pp.)
- A18 *What Will Happen to Norway?* (in Norwegian, 1977, 251 pp.)
- A19 *Imperialism and Revolutions: A Structural Theory* (in Italian, 1977, 129 pp.)
- A20 *Methodology and Ideology. Essays in Methodology I* (1977, 271 pp.)
- A21 *Peace and Social Structure. Essays in Peace Research III* (1978, 564 pp.)
- A22 *Toward Self-Reliance and Global Interdependence* (1978, 85 pp.)
- A23 *Development, Environment and Technology: Towards a Technology for Self-Reliance* (1979, 51 pp.)
- A24 *Papers on Methodology. Essays in Methodology II* (1979, 251 pp.)
- A25 *Peace and World Structure. Essays in Peace Research IV* (1980, 736 pp.)
- A26 *Peace Problems: Some Case Studies. Essays in Peace Research V* (1980, 491 pp.)
- A27 *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective* (1980, 469 pp.)
- A28 *One Should Prophecy on the Future* (in Danish, 1980, 36 pp.)
- A29 *Schooling, Education and the Future* (1982, 91 pp.)
- A30 *Processes of Conflict in the World in the 1980s* (in Norwegian, 1981, 79 pp.)
- A31 *Environment, Development and Military Activity: Towards Alternative Security Doctrines* (1982, 142 pp.)
- A32 *Defending Differently* (in German, 1982, 321 pp.)
- A33 *Self-Reliance. Contributions to an Alternative Development Strategy* (in German, 1983, 193 pp.)
- A34 *The Struggle for Peace: The Bajaj Memorial Lectures* (1984, 128 pp.)
- A35 *There Are Alternatives! Four Roads to Peace and Security* (1984, 221 pp.)
- A36 *Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism. Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell* (in Norwegian, German and Spanish, 1984, 162 pp.)
- A37 *About Peace* (in Spanish, 1985, 159 pp.)
- A38 *The Way Is the Goal: Gandhi Today* (1992, 224 pp.)
- A39 *United States Foreign Policy As Manifest Theology* (1987, 22 pp.)
- A40 *Buddhism: A Quest for Unity and Peace* (1988, 161 pp.)
- A41 *Methodology and Development. Essays in Methodology III* (1988, 260 pp.)
- A42 *Transnament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace Research VI* (1988, 433 pp.)
- A43 *Europe in the Making* (1989, 190 pp.)

- A44 *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (1989, 79 pp.)
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## 2.2 Books Published as a Co-Author

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**Part II**  
**Key Texts by Johan Galtung**

## Chapter 3

# Violence: Direct, Structural and Cultural

Violence is any avoidable insult to basic human needs, and, more generally, to sentient *life* of any kind, defined as that which is capable of suffering pain and enjoy well-being. Violence lowers the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Violence to human beings hurt and harm body, mind and spirit. Hurting/harming one of them usually affects the other two through psychosomatic transfers; an example of one of the most solid theorems in social science: *violence breeds violence* within and among actors, in space and over time.<sup>1</sup>

Violence leaves deep wounds, *trauma*, that is difficult to heal. Violence to the mind takes the form of distorted cognitions and emotions, and to the spirit the form of hopelessness, possibly because a meaning-producing project failed. In the phenomenology of violence meaning for one may be violence to the other; like the German, Italian and Japanese quests for *Neuordnung*, *nuovo ordine*, and *dai-to-a kyoeiken* for the peoples living in Europe, in the Mediterranean space, and in Greater East Asia respectively.

Threats of violence are also violence, as insults to mind and spirit, creating distortions and hopelessness through fear.

The object of violence is any carrier of life, particularly a human being, an actor, individual or collective (group, country).

The subject of violence can be any actor, as in intended actor or *direct violence*. Or, a structure at work, churning out harm, causing basic human needs deficits, as in un-intended, indirect, or *structural violence*. Or, culture at work when used to legitimize direct and structural violence, the legitimation then being indirect-direct/indirect, or *cultural violence*. Or, it can be Nature at work, like a tsunami, but then not always avoidable.

The effects of direct and structural violence on four classes of basic needs, i.e. *basic violence*, are indicated in Table 3.1. The basic needs—identified through dialogues in many parts of the world—are: *survival* (negation: death, mortality); *wellness* (negation: misery, morbidity); *freedom* (negation: repression); *identity*,

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<sup>1</sup> This text was initially written for the *Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace*. This text and all others that are following are reproduced here with the permission of Johan Galtung who holds the copyright for all his own texts.

meaning (negation: alienation). The result is four types of direct and four more complex types for structural violence:

*First comment:* Table 3.1 is anthropocentric. A fifth column could be added for the needs of the non-human rest of nature; the *sine qua non* for human existence. ‘Ecological balance’ is a frequently used term for environment system maintenance. If not satisfied there is ecological degradation, breakdown, imbalance. Eco-balance is to the environment what survival + wellness + freedom + identity are for human basic maintenance; if not satisfied the result is human degradation. The sum of all five, for all, might be one definition of ‘peace’.

But ‘ecological balance’ is a very broad category treating a biota (non-life) and biota (life) alike. Violence defined as insults to life would focus on biota, only indirectly on a biota. Moreover, there are such difficult and important questions as ‘balance for whom?’ For human beings to reproduce themselves? At what level of economic activity, and for what numbers of humans? Or, for the ‘environment’ (a very anthropocentric term!) to reproduce itself? All parts, equally, at what level, what numbers of non-human life? Or both human and non-human?

*Second comment:* the mega-versions of the pale words used above for violence should be considered. For ‘killing’ read *extermination, holocaust, genocide*. For ‘misery’ read *silent holocaust*. For ‘repression’ read *gulag/KZ*. For ‘alienation’ read *spiritual death*. For ‘ecological degradation’ read *ecocide*. For all of these together read ‘omnicide’. The words might sound like someone’s effort to be apocalyptic were it not for the fact that the world has experienced all of this during the last 50 years; closely associated with the names of Hitler, Stalin, Japanese militarism and US fundamentalism. Violence studies, an indispensable part of peace studies, may be a horror cabinet, but like pathology reflects a reality to be understood.

*Third comment:* the content of Table 3.1, as it stands.

The first category of violence, killing, is unproblematic. So is maiming. Added together they constitute ‘casualties’ used in assessing the severity of a war. But ‘war’ is only a particular form of orchestrated violence, usually with at least one actor being a government.

To see peace merely as the opposite of war, and limit peace studies to war avoidance studies, and more particularly to avoidance of big wars or super-wars (defined as wars between big powers or super-powers), and even more particularly to the limitation, abolition, or control of super-weapons, is rather narrow.

**Table 3.1** A typology of insults to needs due to violence

	Survival	Wellness	Freedom	Identity
Direct violence	Killing	Illness	Repression	Alienation
	Maiming	Misery	Detention	Desocialize
	Siege		Expulsion	2nd class
	Sanctions			Citizenship
Structural violence	Exploitation A	Exploitation B	Fragmentation	Penetration
			Marginalization	Segmentation

Source The author

Important interconnections among types of violence are left out, particularly the way in which one type of violence may be reduced or controlled at the expense of maintaining or even increasing another. Like 'side-effects' in health studies, very important, and very easily overlooked. Peace studies should avoid that mistake.

Included under maiming is also the insult to human needs brought about by siege/blockade (classical term) and sanctions (modern term). To some this is nonviolence since direct and immediate killing is avoided. To the victims, however, it may spell slow, intentional killing through malnutrition and lack of medical attention, hitting the weakest first, the children, the old, the poor, the women. By extending the causal chain the perpetrator does not have to face the effect of his violence.

He even 'gives the victims a chance', usually to submit, meaning loss of freedom and identity instead of life and limbs, trading the latter for the former types of direct violence. But the mechanism is the threat to the livelihood. Gandhian economic boycott, however, combined refusal to buy English textiles with the collection of funds for the merchants precisely not to confuse the key issue by threatening their livelihood.

The category of 'repression' has a double definition, the 'freedom from' and the 'freedom to' of the International Bill of Human Rights. Two categories have been added as concomitants of other types of violence: detention, locking people *in* (prisons and concentration camps) and expulsion, meaning locking people *out* (banishing them abroad, or to distant parts of the country).

The category of 'alienation' is based on 'socialization' in the sense of internalization of culture. There is a double aspect: to be desocialized, taken away from own culture, and to be resocialized into another, like the prohibition of one and the imposition of another language or religion. One of these does not presuppose the other. But they often come together in the category of second class citizenship, with the subjected group (not necessarily a 'minority') being forced to express dominant idiom and not their own, at least not in public space.

The problem is that any socialization of a child, in the family, at school, by society at large, is also brainwashing imposed upon a defenceless child. We might conclude that nonviolent socialization is to give the child a choice, e.g., by offering him/her more than the cultural idiom of the parents.

To discuss the categories of structural violence an image of a violent structure, and a vocabulary, a discourse, is needed to identify the aspects and see how they relate to the needs categories. The archetypical violent structure has exploitation as a centre-piece, meaning that some, the topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs. There is 'unequal exchange'. Hiding behind this euphemism are in fact underdogs so disadvantaged that they die (starve, or wither away from avoidable diseases): Exploitation A. Or they may be alive in a permanent, unwanted state of misery, including malnutrition and illness: Exploitation B. Under A they die from the deficits, from having less. Under B they suffer, but linger on.

The way people die from exploitation differ in space and time. In the Third World typically from diarrhea and immunity deficiencies, and in the 'developed' countries

from avoidable and premature cardio-vascular diseases and malignant tumors. Toxic pollution and the stress induced by the social environment play a major role at the end of long and very ramified causal chains and cycles. Add to this the world No. 1 morbidity: unipolar depression (bipolar is No. 4). Clearly Nature has us programmed to die sooner or later. But an avoidable ‘sooner’ may have causes that are structural rather than natural. And most human beings prefer ‘later’, even much later. And the limits of the avoidable are pushed outward all the time.

A violent structure does not only leave marks on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit. The next four terms can be seen as parts of exploitation, or as reinforcing components in the structure. They function by impeding consciousness-formation and mobilization; two conditions for struggle against exploitation. *Penetration*, implanting the topdog mind inside the underdog so to speak, combined with *segmentation*, giving the underdog only a very partial view of reality, will impede consciousness-formation. *Fragmentation*, keeping the underdogs away from each other, with *marginalization* keeping the underdogs on the outside, will impede mobilization.

However, these four should also be seen as structural violence in their own right, and more particularly as variations on the general theme of structurally built-in alienation and repression. They have all been operating in gender contexts, as parts of patriarchy, even if women do not have higher mortality and morbidity rates but in fact higher life expectancy than men, provided they survive gender-specific abortion, infanticide, and the first years of childhood. Exploitation, alienation and repression go hand in hand, as violence, but are not identical.

So far the focus has been on vertical structural violence, on structures allocating human beings to niches where some get (much) more and some (much) less than others for basic needs. But there is also a horizontal structural violence where the person is trapped, equally and equitably, in a web of horizontal structures so tight that no individuation is possible. *Too tight*, and *too vertical*, do not exclude each other but add up to a structural too much. And there is also a *too little*, under-structuration rather than over-structuration, where the person is left without any structural steering or guidance.

How about violence against nature? There is the direct violence of slashing, burning etc., also like in a war. But the structural violence would be more insidious, not intended to destroy nature but nevertheless doing so by the pollution and depletion associated with chemical industry, leading to dying forests, ozone holes, global warming etc. What happens is transformation of nature through *industrialization*, leaving non-degradable residues and depleting non-renewable resources, combined with a world-encompassing *commercialization* that makes the consequences non-visible to the perpetrators. Two powerful structures at work, indeed, legitimized by economic growth. Consequently, the buzz-word ‘sustainable economic growth’ may turn out to be only a more refined form of cultural violence.

Let us turn to cultural violence as those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to justify, legitimize direct or structural violence. Stars, crosses and crescents; flags,

anthems and military parades; the ubiquitous portrait of the Leader; inflammatory speeches and posters come to mind. However, the category is much broader.

Thus, mentioned above are ‘aspects of culture’, not entire cultures. A person encouraging a potential killer, shouting ‘Killing is self-realization!’ may prove that the English language is capable of expressing such thoughts, but not that the English language as such is violent. Entire cultures, or religions, can hardly be classified as violent; this is one reason for preferring the expression “Aspect A of culture C is an example of cultural violence” to cultural stereotypes like ‘culture C is violent’.

On the other hand, cultures—like *machismo*, or fascism—could be imagined and even encountered, with not only one but a set of aspects so violent, extensive and diverse, spanning all cultural domains, that the step from talking about aspects of cultural violence to violent cultures may be warranted. For that conclusion, however, systematic research is needed.

One place to start would be to clarify ‘cultural violence’ by searching for its negation. If the opposite of violence is peace, the subject matter of peace research-studies, then the opposite of cultural violence would be ‘cultural peace’, meaning aspects of a culture that serve to justify, legitimize direct peace and structural peace. If many and diverse aspects of that kind are found in a culture it can be referred to as a ‘peace culture’. A major task of peace research, and the peace movement in general, is the never-ending search for a peace culture. It is problematic, however, because of the temptation to institutionalize that culture, making it obligatory with the hope of internalizing it everywhere. And that imposition of a culture would already be direct violence-against identity.

Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look and feel right, or at least not wrong. Just as political science is about two problems, the use of power and its legitimation, violence studies are about two problems, the use of violence and the legitimation of that use. Negative peace studies are about the non-use of violence and its delegitimation, and positive peace studies about the use of harmony and its legitimation. The psychological mechanism is always internalization. The study of cultural violence highlights the ways in which the acts of direct and structural violence are legitimized, internalized, and thus rendered acceptable in society.

Cultural violence may work by changing the moral colour of an act from red/wrong to yellow/permissible or even green/right; an example being ‘murder on behalf of the country as right, on behalf of oneself as wrong’. Another way is by making reality opaque, permitting us not to see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent. Obviously this is more easily done with some forms of violence than others; an example being *abortus provocatus*. Peace studies needs violence typologies; much like a pathology is among the prerequisites for health studies.

One such typology is given in Table 3.2. Focusing on visible and invisible effects of direct violence in six ‘spaces’.

It is telling evidence of the materialism of our culture that usually only the first column is considered and the second column not. The military headquarter body counts in terms of numbers killed and wounded (only recently the numbers raped and displaced are sometimes included) is a caricature of reality.

**Table 3.2** Visible and invisible effects of violence. *Source* The author

Space	Material, visible effects	Nonmaterial, invisible effects
<i>NATURE</i>	Depletion and pollution; damage to diversity and symbiosis	Less respect for non-human nature, reinforcing “man over nature”
<i>HUMANS</i>	<i>Somatic effects</i> : numbers killed numbers wounded numbers raped numbers displaced	<i>Spiritual effects</i> : bereavement traumas, hatred revenge addiction victory addiction
<i>SOCIETY</i>	The material damage to buildings, infra-structure	The structural damage the cultural damage
<i>WORLD</i>	The material damage to infra-structure	The structural damage the cultural damage
<i>TIME</i>	Delayed violence; land-mines transmitted violence; genetic	Structure transfer culture transfer; <i>kairos</i> points of trauma and glory
<i>CULTURE</i>	Irreversible damage to human cultural heritage	Violence culture of trauma, glory; deterioration of conflict-resolving capacity

The case is reminiscent of mainstream economic analysis with its focus on only material factors (nature/land, labour, capital) and their effect in producing and commercializing goods and services, adding it up as net and gross national products; but neglecting the enormous costs of “modernization” on nature, the human spirit, structure and culture in general. A major task of peace studies is to unmask the structural violence behind the cultural violence of economism, and the direct violence behind the cultural violence of militarism.

One aspect of militarist propaganda is how it makes the spiritual effects of direct violence invisible. Imagine an average of ten persons bereaved for each person intentionally killed: family, kith and kin, friends, close neighbours. The killed are dead, the bereaved are traumatized. The trauma may be converted to hatred that may be converted into revenge addiction. To this should be added the sense of glory and victory addiction that may result from being the winner, and we have two major mechanisms behind ‘violence breeds violence’.

Two additional mechanisms are hinted at in Table 3.2:

- structural damage, the verticalization of structures organized for violence with hidden chains of command that easily become permanent features of countries liberated through violence;
- cultural damage, the rapid growth of a culture of violence to justify all the direct violence, with long lasting impact.

Conclusion: violence is a pathology, to be treated as such.



# Chapter 4

## Cultural Violence

### 4.1 Introduction

‘Cultural violence’<sup>1</sup> are those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) that can be used to justify, legitimize direct or structural violence.<sup>2</sup> Flags, military marches, the portrait of the Leader everywhere, inflammatory speeches, many national anthems, come to mind. However, let us postpone the examples (see Sect. 4.4 below), starting with conceptual analysis.

Thus, mentioned above are ‘aspects of culture’, not entire cultures. A person encouraging a potential killer, shouting ‘Killing is self realization!’ may prove that the English language is capable of expressing such thoughts, but not that the English language as such is violent. Entire cultures can hardly be classified as violent, a reason for preferring the expression ‘Aspect A of culture C is an example of cultural violence’ to cultural stereotypes like ‘culture C is violent’.

On the other hand, cultures could be imagined and even encountered with not only one aspect but a set {A} of aspects so extensive and diverse, spanning all cultural domains that the step from talking about cases of cultural violence to

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published as “Cultural Violence” in the *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1990, pp. 291–305. The permission was granted by the author as the copyright holder to republish this text here. This text was originally presented as a lecture at the University of Melbourne Peace Studies Group in March 1989 and at the Summer Schools in Peace Studies at the University of Oslo and Hawaii in July 1989. I am indebted to the discussants at all these places.

<sup>2</sup> Thus, ‘cultural violence’ follows in the footsteps of another concept, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, in: *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. 1, ch. 2, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1974 (originally in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6 1970, pp. 167–91) where ‘structural violence’ was introduced for the first time (not the same as institutionalized violence, like vendetta). (For a recent very constructive critique and effort to develop the idea further see Michael Roth: “Strukturelle und personale Gewalt: Probleme der Operationalisierung des Gewaltbegriffes von Johan Galtung”, *HSFK Forschungsbericht*, 1/1986; Frankfurt am Main, April 1988.) A similar concept is introduced by Hans Saner in Personale, “strukturelle und symbolische Gewalt” in: *Hoffnung und Gewalt. Zur Ferne des Friedens* (Basel: Lenos und Z-Verlag, 1982), pp. 73–95.

violent cultures may be warranted. For that a systematic research process is needed. This article is about that process.

One place to start would be to clarify ‘cultural violence’ by searching for its negation. If the opposite of violence is peace, the subject matter of peace research/studies, then the opposite of cultural violence would be cultural peace, meaning aspects of a culture that serve to justify, legitimize direct peace and structural peace. If many and diverse aspects of that kind are found in a culture we can refer to it as a ‘peace culture’. A major task of peace research, and the peace movement in general, is that never ending, search for peace culture, problematic because once identified there will be the temptation to institutionalize that culture, making it obligatory with the hope of internalizing it everywhere. And that would already be violence.<sup>3</sup>

Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel right, or at least not wrong. Just as political science is about two problems, the use of power and the legitimation of the use of power, violence studies are about two problems, the use of violence and the legitimation of that use. The psychological mechanism would be internalization.<sup>4</sup> The study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society. One way cultural violence works is to change the moral color of an act to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable from red/wrong; an example being killing in the name of the country as right, in the name of oneself as wrong. Another way is by making reality opaque, permitting us not to see the act or the fact, or at least not as violent. Obviously this is more easily done with some forms of violence than others’. An example being *abortus provocatus*. Hence, peace studies is in need of a violence typology; much like pathology for health studies.

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<sup>3</sup> There are many efforts to create the ‘new man’ (and woman?). In the West each new branch of Christianity is an effort, so is humanism, so is socialism. But any inculcation in others of any single culture is in itself an act of direct violence (meaning intended by the actor), usually implying desocialization from one culture and resocialization into another; including the very first socialization of the young (defenseless) child. But if culture is a *conditio sine qua non* for a human being, we are born with none (only predispositions) and inculcation is an act of violence then we are faced with the basic problem of education: is ‘educate’ a transitive or intransitive verb? Of course it is both, related hermeneutically. Peaceful education, including socialization would probably imply exposure to multiple cultures and then a dialogue, as argued below. Neither Christianity, nor humanism is good at this; in fact, we still do not know *how* to do this.

<sup>4</sup> We then schematically divide control mechanisms into internal and external, positive and negative; identifying ‘internal, positive and negative’ as good and bad conscience respectively; external positive as reward and external negative as punishment. ‘Internalization’ is deeply rooted (in the person system) conscience, ‘institutionalization’ is deeply rooted (in the social system) punishment and/or reward. Both serve to make the act come forth: ‘naturally, normally, voluntarily’. This piece of elementary social science serves to locate cultural and structural violence centrally in general social science theory construction.

**Table 4.1** A typology of violence. *Source* The author

	Survival needs	Well being needs	Identity needs	Freedom needs
Direct violence	Killing	Maiming	Desocialization	Repression
			Resocialization	Detention
			Secondary citizen	Expulsion
Structural violence	Exploitation A	Exploitation B	Penetration	Segmentation
			Marginalization	Fragmentation

## 4.2 A Typology of Violence

If we see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs lowering the real level of needs satisfaction (far) below what is potentially possible, then one typology can be obtained by combining the distinction between direct and structural violence with four classes of basic human needs. The four classes used here are the outcome of extensive dialogues in many parts of the world<sup>5</sup>; viz., *survival needs* (negation death, morbidity); *well being needs* (negation misery, morbidity); *identity, meaning needs* (negation: alienation) and *freedom needs* (negation: repression).

The result is eight types of violence with some sub types, easily identified for direct violence, more complex for structural violence (Table 4.1).

A first comment should be that this table is anthropocentric. A fifth column could be added for the rest of nature. ‘Ecological balance’ is probably the most frequently found term used for environment system maintenance. If not satisfied the result is ecological degradation, breakdown, imbalance. Ecobalance corresponds to survival + well-being + freedom + identity as very broad terms for human basic maintenance. If not satisfied the result is human degradation. The sum of all five, for all, defines ‘peace’.

But ‘ecological balance’ is a very broad category treating abiota and biota alike. Moreover, there are such difficult and important questions as ‘balance for whom?’ For human beings to reproduce themselves? At what level of economic activity and what numbers? Or, for the environment to reproduce itself? All parts, equally, at what level, what numbers? Or both combined?

Second, the extreme versions of the pale words in Table 4.1 should be contemplated. For ‘killing’ read *extermination, holocaust, genocide*. For ‘misery’ read *silent holocaust*. For the types of alienation read *spiritual death*. For ‘repression’ read *gulag*. For ‘ecological degradation’ read *ecocide*. The words would sound like someone’s effort to be apocalyptic were it not for the fact that we have experienced all of this during the last 50 years alone; closely associated with the names of

<sup>5</sup> See my chapter “Basic Human Needs”, in: Lederer, Antal, Galtung, *Basic Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate* (Königstein: Hahn 1980).

Hitler, Stalin and Reagan<sup>6</sup> and Japanese militarism.<sup>7</sup> In short, violence studies, an indispensable part of peace studies, may be a horror cabinet, but like pathology reflects a reality to be understood.

Then some comments on the content of Table 4.1 as it stands. The first category of violence, killing, is unproblematic. So is maiming. Added together they constitute ‘casualties’ used in assessing the magnitude of a war. But war is only a particular form of orchestrated violence, usually with at least one actor a government. To see peace as the opposite of war, and limit peace studies to war avoidance studies, and more particularly to avoidance of big wars or super-wars (defined as wars between big powers or super-powers), and even more particularly to the limitation, abolition or control of super weapons, is rather narrow. Important interconnections among types of violence are left out, particularly the way in which one type of violence may be reduced/controlled at the expense of increase/maintenance of an other. Like ‘side-effects’ in health studies, rather important, but easily overlooked. Peace research should avoid that mistake.<sup>8</sup>

Included under maiming is also the insult to human needs brought about by siege (classical term) and boycott (modern term). To some this is nonviolence; to the victims it may mean the slow but intentional killing through malnutrition and lack of medical attention, hitting the weakest first, the children, the old, the poor, women. By making the causal chain longer the actor does not have to face the violence directly; he ‘gives the victims a chance’, usually to submit, meaning loss of freedom and identity. In other words, trading the last two for the first two types of direct violence, today in the form of economic sanctions.

The category of ‘alienation’ can be defined in terms of socialization, meaning the internalization of culture. There is a double aspect: to be desocialized, away from own culture, and to be resocialized into another culture; like the prohibition and imposition of languages. One of these does Dot presuppose the other. But they often come together in the category of second class citizenship with the subjected group (not necessarily a ‘minority’) being forced to express dominant culture and not their own, at least not in public space. The problem is, of course, that any socialization of a child, in the family, at school, by society at large is also forced, brainwashing, giving the child no choice. Consequently, we might get to the conclusion, not that far fetched, that nonviolent socialization is to give the child a choice, e.g., by offering him/her more than one cultural idiom.

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<sup>6</sup> For an effort to compare the three systems (not only Hitlerism and Stalinism as is now very common with *glasnost* revisionism) see my *Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism: Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell*, in Norwegian edition 1984, Spanish edition 1985 and German edition 1987; English edition forthcoming 1990. Not three persons but three political systems are being compared for their origins.

<sup>7</sup> There are strong similarities built around *shinto* themes of chosenness. For an analysis see Sabura Ienaga, *The Pacific War: 1931–1945*, Random House 1978, particularly p. 154 for the *hakko ichiu* (the eight corners of the world under one roof) concept.

<sup>8</sup> The easy approach is to dump all ‘side-effects’ at the doorsteps of some other disciplines demanding that they shall clean it up conceptually, theoretically, practically-like economists do.

The category of 'repression' has a similar double definition, the 'freedom from' and the 'freedom to' of the International Bill of Human Rights,<sup>9</sup> with historical and cultural limitations.<sup>10</sup> Two categories have been added explicitly because of their significance as concomitants of other types of violence: detention, meaning locking people in (prisons, concentration camps) and expulsion, meaning locking people out (sending them abroad or to distant parts of the country).

To discuss the categories of structural violence an image of a violent structure, and a vocabulary, a discourse, is needed in order to identify the aspects and see how they relate to the needs categories. The archetypical violent structure, in my view, has exploitation as a centre piece, simply meaning that some, the topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs.<sup>11</sup> There is 'unequal exchange', a euphemism. The underdogs may in fact be so disadvantaged that they die (starve, wither away from diseases) from it; exploitation A Or they may be left in a permanent, unwanted state of misery, usually including malnutrition and illness; exploitation B And here we should not only think in terms of the way people die in the Third World, from diarrhea and immunity deficiencies; but also of the way people die in the 'developed' countries, avoidably and prematurely, from cardio-vascular diseases and malignant tumors. But all of this happens within complex structures and at the end of long and very ramified causal chains and cycles.

But a violent structure does not only leave marks on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit. The next four terms can be seen as parts of exploitation or as reinforcing components in the structure. They function by impeding consciousness formation and mobilization; two conditions for effective struggle against exploitation. Penetration, implanting the topdog inside the underdog so to speak, combined with segmentation giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on will do the first job. And marginalization, keeping the underdogs on the outside, combined with fragmentation, keeping the underdogs away from each other will do the second job. However, these four should also be seen as structural violence in their own right They have all been operating in gender contexts even if women do not have lower (but in fact have higher) life expectancy than men, provided they survive gender specific abortion, infanticide, the first years of childhood.

How about ecological balance? The direct violence is obviously slashing, burning etc., like in a war. The structural violence against nature would be more insidious, not intended to destroy nature: the pollution and depletion associated

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<sup>9</sup> A document consisting of the Universal Declaration of 1948, the two Covenants of 1966 and an Optional Protocol. The Bill has not yet attained the stranding it deserves, among other reasons because of U.S. failure to ratify the Covenants.

<sup>10</sup> See Johan Galtung, "How Universal Are the Human Rights? Some Less Applaudable Consequences of the Human Rights Tradition", Paper prepared for the Nobel Symposium on human rights, Oslo, June 1988.

<sup>11</sup> For many variations on structural violence, see my *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. III, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1978, Parts I-III.

with modern industry, leading to dying forests, ozone holes, global warming etc. What happens is transformation of nature through industry, leaving non degradable residues and depleting non-renewable resources, combined with a world encompassing commercialization that makes the consequences non-visible to the perpetrators.<sup>12</sup>

### 4.3 Three Types of Violence

With these comments ‘violence’ is defined in extension by the types given in Table 4.1, using direct and structural violence as overarching categories or ‘super-types’. ‘Cultural violence’ can now be added as the third super-type and put in the third corner of a violence triangle. Stood on its direct and structural violence feet the image invoked is cultural violence as the legitimizer of both. Stood on its direct violence head the image is structural and cultural sources of direct violence. Of course, the triangle always remains a triangle. But the image produced is different and all six triangles (three pointing downward, three pointing upwards) tell somewhat different stories.

There is a basic difference in the time relation of the three concepts of violence. Direct violence is an event; structural violence a process with its up and downs, and cultural violence a ‘permanent’,<sup>13</sup> remaining essentially the same for long periods given the slow transformations of basic culture. Put in the useful terms of the French *Annales* school in history: *evenementielle*, *conjoncturelle*, *la longue duree*. This means that the three forms of violence enter time differently, somewhat like the difference in earthquake theory between the earthquake as an event, the movement of the tectonic plates as a process and the fault line as a more permanent condition.

This leads to a three-strata image (complementing the triangle image) of the phenomenology of violence, useful as a paradigm generating a wide variety of hypotheses. At the bottom is the steady flow through time of cultural violence, a substratum from which the other two can derive their nutrients. In the next stratum the rhythms of structural violence are located. Patterns of exploitation are building up, wearing out, or torn down, with the protective accompaniment of penetration-segmentation preventing consciousness formation and fragmentation marginalization preventing organization against exploitation and repression. And at the top, visible to the unguided eye, is the stratum of direct violence with the whole record of direct cruelty perpetrated by human beings on each other. Barefoot empiricism carries that far.

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<sup>12</sup> Hence it is at this level environmental degradation has to be counteracted, through de-industrializing and de-commercializing processes, not by converting one type of pollution or depletion to another through patchwork approaches to this major global problem.

<sup>13</sup> For this distinction between types of variables see Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Ideology*, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1977, chapter 9, “Generalized Methodology for Research”.

Generally, a causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence can be identified. The culture preaches, admonishes, eggs on. Direct violence is used to establish structural violence; then come the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage, and to keep the structure intact. Ordinary, regular criminal activity is partly an effort by the underdog to “get out”, to redistribute wealth, get even, get revenge (‘blue collar crime’), or by somebody to remain or become a topdog, sucking the structure for what it is worth (‘white collar crime’). Both direct and structural violence deprive people of needs. When this happens suddenly we can talk of trauma. When it happens to a group, a collectivity, we have the collective trauma that can sediment into the collective subconscious, and become raw material for major historical processes and events.

The underlying assumption is simple: ‘violence breeds violence’. Violence is needs deprivation; needs deprivation is *serious*; one reaction to needs deprivation is direct violence. But that is not the only reaction. There could also be a feeling of hopelessness, a deprivation/frustration syndrome showing up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal. Given a choice between a boiling, violent and a freezing, apathetic society as reaction to massive needs deprivation, the topdogs tend to prefer the latter. They prefer ‘governability’ to ‘trouble, anarchy’. They love ‘stability’.

However, this should not be seen as the only causal chain in the triad. There are linkages and causal flows in all directions, a reason why the triangle may sometimes be a better image than the three-tier stratum model. Africans are captured, forced across the Atlantic to work as slaves, millions killed in the process, in the Americas. This massive direct violence over centuries quickly seeps down and sediments as massive structural violence, with whites as topdogs and blacks as underdogs and equally massive cultural violence with racist ideas everywhere. After some time direct violence is forgotten, slavery is forgotten and two labels show up, mild enough for public consumption: ‘discrimination’ for massive structural violence and ‘prejudice’ for massive cultural violence. Such sanitation of language is itself cultural violence.

But the vicious violence cycle can also start in the structural violence corner. Social differentiation slowly takes on vertical characteristics with increasingly unequal exchange, and these social facts would then be in search of social acts for their maintenance, and cultural violence for their justification. Or, the vicious cycle could have its origin in direct and structural violence together, with one group treating another group so badly that they feel a need for justification and eagerly accept any cultural rationale handed to them. More than one thousand years ago Nordic Vikings attacked, cheated and killed Russians; would that not be good enough reason for formulating the idea that Russians are dangerous, wild and primitive, meaning that one day they may come back and do the same to us as we did to them?<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Rather, it is almost incredible how peaceful that border high up in the North has been between such a small and such a big country, supposed by some to be eager to fill any ‘power vacuum’.

Could there be still a deeper stratum, human biology, with genetically transmitted dispositions or at least predispositions for aggression (direct violence) and domination (structural violence)? The potential for direct and structural violence is certainly there. But so is the potential for direct and structural peace. In my view the most important argument against biological determinism, postulating a drive for aggression and dominance comparable to drives for food and sex, is the high level of variability in aggressiveness and dominance, but not in the pursuit of food and sex. We seem justified in postulating drives for food and sex because we find people seeking them under (almost) all external circumstances. But aggression and dominance occur with tremendous variation, depending on the environment, including the structural and cultural conditions. Of course, the argument may be that the drive is still there, only not always strong enough to assert itself under all circumstances. In that case the concern of the peace researcher would be to know those circumstances and explore their removal or modification.

Let us reap an immediate harvest from this taxonomic exercise, using it to clarify the concept of militarization as process, and militarism as the outcome of that process. Obviously, one aspect is a general inclination toward military action, whether provoked or not, whether to settle or initiate conflict. This inclination brings in its wake the production and deployment of appropriate hardware and software. However, to study militarization only in terms of past military activity records, and present production and deployment patterns is superficial,<sup>15</sup> leading to facile conclusions in terms of personnel, budget and arms control. Good weeding presupposes getting at the structural and cultural roots, as suggested by the three strata paradigm. Concretely this means identifying structural and cultural aspects that would tend to reproduce the readiness for military aggression, such as mobbing of young boys at school, primogeniture,<sup>16</sup> unemployment and exploitation in general; heavily nationalist and sexist ideologies,<sup>17</sup> etc. The combination, building military teaching components into high school and university curricula,<sup>18</sup> and

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<sup>15</sup> This, of course, is the general approach taken by SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the yearbooks and other publications; very useful as documentation at the surface level but not deepening the understanding of the phenomenon so much that real counter-measures can be imagined and enacted.

<sup>16</sup> These factors are very often held to be important in explaining Japanese aggressiveness, e.g., by Ruth Benedict in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. Ienaga, *op. cit.*, is also quoting these factors. Obviously, the aggressiveness displayed in a major war is a multi rooted phenomenon. 'Explaining' aggressiveness is best done to the enemy, not to oneself where 'justified indignation' is the word.

<sup>17</sup> When the tram passed the Imperial Castle in Tokyo the passengers used to stand up and bow to the Emperor. And the *shinto* Yasukuni shrine is still a major center of the national and nationalist constructions in Japan. After their defeat in the 23 July 1989 elections the new LDP Prime Minister, Kaifu, did not visit the shrine on the anniversary of the capitulation 15 August 1945, well knowing that the winds were blowing more from the left.

<sup>18</sup> Personally I have not seen any country with such a deep integration of the military into the university as the U.S. (R.O.T.C.) F even permitting the military to buy students with scholarships and to give classes filled with militarist propaganda.



disseminating militarism as culture, should merit particular attention. But structure and culture are usually not included in arms control studies, both being very sensitive areas.

#### 4.4 Examples of Cultural Violence

Let us now return to the six cultural domains mentioned in the introduction religion and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal science with one or two examples of cultural violence from each domain. The logic of the scheme is simple: identify the cultural element and show how it can be used to legitimize direct or structural violence.

*Religion.* In all religions there is somewhere the sacred, *das Heilige*; let us call it 'god'. A basic distinction can be made between a transcendental God outside us and an immanent god inside us, maybe also inside all life.<sup>19</sup> The Judaism of the Torah, founded almost 4,000 years ago, visioned God as a male deity residing outside planet Earth. A clear case of transcendentalism from which many consequences follow, taken over in the derived religions of Christianity and Islam. With god outside us, as God, it is not inevitable but certainly likely that some will be closer to that God than others. A catastrophic idea. Moreover, in the general occidental tradition of not only dualism but manichaeism, with sharp dichotomies between good and evil there would have to be something evil corresponding to the good God: Satan. Again transcendental and immanent representations are possible, with God and Satan possessing or at least choosing their own, and with god or satan not to mention god and satan being inside use.

But whom does God choose? Would it not be reasonable to assume that He chooses those most in His image and leaves to Satan to choose the others? This would give us a double dichotomy with God, the Chosen Ones (by God), the Unchosen Ones (by God, chosen by Satan) and Satan; the chosen heading for salvation and closeness to God in heaven, the unchosen for damnation and closeness to Satan in hell. However, heaven and hell can also be reproduced on earth, as a foretaste or indication of the afterlife. Misery/luxury can be seen as preparations for hell/heaven, and class as God's finger.

With a transcendental God this all becomes meaningful. An immanent concept of god as residing inside us would make any such dichotomy an act against god. The first three choices listed in the Table are found already in Genesis. The last one is more typical of the New Testament with its focus on right belief, not only on right deeds. The other two are found as scattered references to slaves and to giving

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<sup>19</sup> Another theological distinction of equal importance is whether we are born with original sin (as some Christians would claim), original blessing (as others would claim), both (a Hindu Buddhist karmaist position?) or neither (an atheist position). The combination (transcendental God; original sin) has tremendous implications for controlling people, fully understood by Luther.

to God what is of God and to Caesar what is Caesar's. The upper classes referred to as being closer to God have actually traditionally been three:

- Clergy, for the obvious reason that they possessed special insight in how to communicate;
- Aristocracy, particularly the *rex gratia dei*, and
- Capitalists, if they are successful.

The lower classes and the poor were also chosen, even as the first to enter Paradise (the Sermon on the Mount) F but only in the afterlife. The six together constitute a hard Judaism Christianity-Islam which can be softened by giving up some positions and turned into softer Islam, Christianity and Judaism by adopting a more immanent concept of god (Francesco d'Assisi?).

The consequences in the right hand column of Table 4.2 could also follow from other premises than a theology of chosenness; the table only postulates contributing, sufficient causes.

For a contemporary example consider the policies of Israel with regard to the Palestinians. The Chosen People even have a promised land, the *Eretz Yisrael*. They behave as one would expect, translating chosenness, a solid element of cultural violence into all eight types of direct and structural violence listed in Table 4.1. There is killing; maiming, material deprivation by denying them (on the West Bank) what is needed for livelihood; there is desocialization within the theocratic state of Israel with second class citizenship to non-Jews, there is detention, individual expulsion and perennial threat of massive expulsion There is exploitation, at least as exploitation B.

The four structural concomitants of exploitation are all well developed; efforts to make the Palestinians see themselves as born underdogs, at most heading for second class citizenship by 'getting used to it'; giving them small segments of economic activity, keeping them outside Jewish society both within and outside the Green Line, and dealing with Palestinians in a *divide et impera* manner (as in the Camp David process), never as one people.

There is neither massive extermination, nor massive exploitation A of the sort found in many Third World countries under the debt burden, above all hitting children. The violence is more evenly distributed over the eight types. To some, setting their sights low, defined by Hitlerite or Stalinist extermination and

**Table 4.2** The chosen and the unchosen

God chooses	And leaves to satan	With the consequence of
Human species	Nature, forests, oceans	Speciesism, ecocide
Men	Women	Sexism, witch-burning
His people	The others	Nationalism, imperialism
Whites	Coloured	Racism, colonialism
Upper classes	Lower classes	'Classism', exploitation
True believers	Heretics, pagans	Inquisition, persecution

Source The author

Reaganite exploitation A, this means that no mass violence going on, proving how humane the Israelis are. Such perspectives are themselves examples of cultural violence, indicating how low our moral standards have become in this century.<sup>20</sup>

*Ideology.* With the decline, and perhaps death not only of the transcendental but also the immanent god through secularization, successors to religion in the form of political ideologies, and to God in the form of the modern state, would be expected to exhibit some of the same character traits. Religion and God may be dead, but not the idea of sharp and value-loaded dichotomies. The lines may no longer be drawn between God, The Chosen, the Unchosen and Satan. Modernity requires only the distinction between Chosen and Unchosen; let us call them Self and Other. Archetype: nationalism.

A steep gradient is then constructed, inflating, even exalting the value of Self, deflating, even debasing the value of Other. At that point structural violence can start operating. It will tend to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: people become debased by being exploited and they are exploited because they are seen as debased, dehumanized. When Other is not only dehumanized but has been successfully converted into an 'it', deprived of humanhood, the stage is set for any type of direct violence,<sup>21</sup> blaming the victim. This is then reinforced by the category of the "dangerous it", the 'vermin', or 'bacteria' (as Hitler described the Jews); the 'class enemy' (as Stalin described the 'kulaks'); the 'mad dog' (as Reagan described Qadhafi) the 'cranky criminal' (used for 'terrorists'). Extermination becomes not only psychologically possible but a duty. The exterminators, like 55 guards become heroes to be celebrated for their stamina.

Using the six dimensions of Table 4.2, it is easily seen how this can be done without any transcendental god: only human beings are capable of self-reflection; men are stronger/more logical than women; certain nations are modern/carriers of civilization and the historical process more than others; whites are more intelligent/logical than non-whites; in modern society the best are at the top and hence entitled to power and privilege. Certain tenets of belief (e.g., in modernization, development, progress) are apodictic, not to believe in them reflects badly on the non believer, not on the belief.

All of these ideas have been and are strong in Western culture although the faith in male, Western and white innate superiority has been badly shaken by the struggles for liberation by women, non-Western peoples (such as the Japanese economic success over the West), and coloured people inside Western societies. The United States, the most Christian nation on earth, has served as a major battle ground, inside

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<sup>20</sup> For more details about this, see Johan Galtung, chapter 3, "The Middle East Conflict" in *Solving Conflicts: A Peace Research Perspective*; Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989 and *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine*; Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989. For an excellent study of the theme of chosenness in this connection, see Hans-Ruedi Weber, "The Promise of the Land; Biblical Interpretation and the present situation in the Middle East", *Study Encounter*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1971.

<sup>21</sup> A major theme of the fascinating and scary dystopian novel by Margaret Atwood, *The Handmaid's Tale*, New York, Ballantine Books, 1987.

and outside, for these struggles. Reduction of cultural violence in the U.S. becomes particularly important to the extent that country sets the tone for others.

But these three assumptions were all based on ascribed distinctions; gender, race and nation being known at birth. They are hard to maintain in an achievement oriented society. If modern society is a meritocracy, to deny power and privilege to those on the top is to deny merit itself. To deny a minimum of “right orientation” is to leave the field open to any belief, including the challenge to power and privilege for the meritorious and to any strict borderline between human life and other forms of life. In short, residual chosenness will stay on for a while.

The ideology of nationalism has its roots in the figure of Chosen People, religiously or ideologically justified, should be seen in conjunction with the ideology of the state, statism. Chapter 9 in the post war Japanese peace constitution, that short lived effort to make some cultural peace, stipulated that ‘The right of belligerence of the [Japanese] state will not be recognized’.<sup>22</sup> Evidently Japan had forfeited that right, whereas others, presumably the victors, exited from the war with the right intact, maybe even enhanced.

Where did that right of belligerence come from? There are feudal origins, a direct carry over from the prerogative of the *rex gratia dei* to have an *ultimo ratio regis*. The state can then be seen as an organization needed by the Prince to exact enough taxes (and, after 1793, conscripts) to pay for the increasingly expensive armies and navies. The state was created to maintain the military rather than vice versa. But the state can also be seen as one of the successors to God inheriting the right to destroy life (execution), if not the right to create it. But many also see the state as having the right to control the creation of life, exerting authority superior to that of the pregnant woman.

Combine nationalism with steep Self-Other gradients, and statism with the right, even the duty to exercise ultimate power, and we get the ugly ideology of the nation state, another catastrophic idea. Killing in war is now done in the name of the nation comprising all citizens with some shared ethnicity. The new idea of democracy can be accommodated with transition formulas such as *vox populi, vox dei*. Execution is also done in the name of ‘the people of the state X’; but like war has to be ordered by the State. Much of the pro life sentiment against abortion is probably rooted in a feeling that abortion at the discretion of the mother erodes the power monopoly of the state over life. If anti abortion sentiment really was rooted in a sense of sacredness of the fetus (*homo res sacra hominibus*) then the pro-life people would also tend to be pacifists, and against the death penalty, and be outraged at the high mortality levels of blacks in the U.S. and others around the world. Of course, the priority for choice rather than life is another type of cultural violence, based on a denial of fetus life as human, making the fetus an ‘it’.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> For an analysis, see my *Japan in the Pacific Community*, Japanese version 1989, English version 1990, chapter entitled “Peace Politics for Japan: Some Proposals”.

<sup>23</sup> My own position, not very original, is this: the fetus is life, hence sacred. Everything possible should be done to avoid a situation where life is destroyed, wilfully or not. After all alternatives

Combine the ideology of the nation state with a theologically based Chosen People complex and the stage is set for disaster. Israel (Yahweh), Iran (Allah), Japan (Amaterasuokami), South Africa (a Dutch 'reformed' God), the United States (the Judeo-Christian Yahweh God) are relatively clear cases; capable of anything in a crisis. Nazi Germany (the nazi Odin/Wotan God) was in the same category. The Soviet Union is probably still laboring under its tasks as a Chosen People, chosen by History (capital h) as the first nation state to enter Socialism. And France has the same superiority complex only that any idea of being chosen by somebody would indicate that there is something above France, an intolerable idea. France chose herself, *un peuple élu, mais par lui meme*, exemplified by the archetypal act when Napoleon was to be crowned by the Pope in 1804. He took the crown from his hands, and crowned himself.

*Language.* Certain languages those with a Latin base such as Italian, Spanish, French and English, but not those with a Germanic base such as German and Norwegian make women invisible by using the same word for the male as for the entire human species. The important movement for non sexist writing<sup>24</sup> is a good example of deliberate cultural transformation away from cultural violence. The task must have looked impossible when some courageous women got started, and yet it is already bearing fruit.

Then there are more subtle aspects of language where the violence is less clear, more implicit. A comparison of basic features of Indo European languages with Chinese and Japanese<sup>25</sup> brings out certain space and time rigidities carried by the Indo-European languages; a corresponding rigidity in the logical structure with strong emphasis on the possibility of arriving at valid inferences (hence the Western pride in being so logical); a tendency to distinguish linguistically between essence and apparition leaving room for the immortality of the essence and by implication for the legitimacy of destroying what is only the apparition. However, this is deep culture, the deeper layers of that bottom stratum in the violence triad, and the relations to direct and structural violence become much more tenuous.

*Art.* Let me just make one point, important for the present emergence of a European Union as the successor to the European Community of 1967.<sup>26</sup> How does Europe understand itself? The myth tied to the name 'Europa' in Greek mythology is not very helpful. The understanding of Europe as the negation of the non-European environment carries us much further. And that environment at the

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(Footnote 23 continued)

have been exhausted the decision belongs to those who created that life, generally a woman and a man, with veto power to the woman and right of consultation to the man.

<sup>24</sup> For an excellent guide see Casey Miller and Kate Smith, *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing*, New York, Harper and Row, 1988 (2nd edition).

<sup>25</sup> See Johan Galtung and Fumiko Nishimura, "Structure, Culture and Languages: An Essay Comparing the Indo European, Chinese and Japanese Languages", *Social Science Information*, 22(6), 1983, pp. 895–925.

<sup>26</sup> For an exploration of this process see my *Europe in the Making*, New York, Taylor and Francis, 1989, chapter 2.

time of the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Period was the gigantic Ottoman Empire to the east and the south, reaching the walls of Vienna (1683), conquering Syria and Egypt (1517), vassalizing Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria afterwards, leaving only the Sultanate of Fez and Morocco with the small Spanish Habsburg enclaves, two of them still there. The only non Oriental (meaning Arab, Muslim) environment was Russia, poor, vast in space, and time. Sleeping, but giant.<sup>27</sup>

Obviously Europe had to understand herself as the negation of the enemy to the south and southeast, and developed the metaphor of 'oriental despotism', still very much in place in the European mind, to come to grips with the 'environment'. Typical of the 'oriental despot' was callousness and arbitrariness. Like the European Prince he killed, but ruled by his own whims, not by law. Sexually he enjoyed an access (the harem) his European colleagues could only dream of sneaking out at night violating peasant girls; so did the ordinary Muslim not constrained by Christian monogamy. In France a school of painting emerged in the 19th century representing oriental despotism in a setting of sex and/or violence. Henri Regnault's *Execution Without Process* and Eugene Delacroix's *The Death of Sardanapal* are good examples. Hegel, copied by Marx, also saw oriental despotism and oriental (or Asian) mode of production as negative, homogeneous, stagnant.

It belongs to this syndrome that the non Arab part of the semicircle around Europe, Russia, also had to be seen in terms of oriental despotism. That despotism could fit the tsars as a description is perhaps less objectionable, but oriental? The figure has probably influenced our image of Russia and the Soviet Union for centuries, and still does, as intended slurs on either.

*Empirical science.* One example of cultural violence would be neo-classical economic doctrine, understanding itself as the science of economic activity. Strongly influenced by the Adam Smith tradition, neo classical economics now studies empirically the system prescribed by its own doctrines, finding their own self fulfilling prophecies often confirmed in empirical reality. One part of neo classical dogma or 'conventional wisdom' is trade theory based on 'comparative advantages', originally postulated by David Ricardo, developed further by Heckscher and Ohlin, and by Jan Tinbergen. The doctrine prescribes that each country should enter the world market with the products for which that country has a comparative advantage<sup>28</sup> in terms of production factors.

In practice this means that countries well endowed with raw materials and unskilled labour shall extract raw materials and those well endowed with capital and technology, skilled labour and scientists, shall process them. And thus it was that Portugal gave up its textile industry and became a mediocre wine producer,

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<sup>27</sup> For an excellent analysis see Mogens Trolle Larsen, "Europas Lys", chapter 1 in Boll-Johansen, Harbsmeier, eds., *Europas Opdagelse*, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1988. For the paintings, see pp. 21 and 23.

<sup>28</sup> This was originally proposed by David Ricardo, put in the language of neo-classical economics by Heckscher-Ohlin, Jan Tinbergen, and Paul Samuelson.

whereas England got the stimulus, the challenge needed to develop her industrial capacity still further.<sup>29</sup> The consequences of this doctrine in the form of the generally vertical division of labour in the world are visible for most people to see. Structural violence all over the place<sup>30</sup>; among and within countries.

In other words, the comparative advantages doctrine serves as a justification for a rough division of the world in terms of the degree of processing the countries impart to their export products. Since this is roughly proportionate to the amount of challenge they receive in the production process, the principle of comparative advantages sentences a country to stay where the production profile has landed them, for geographical and historical reasons. Of course, there is no law, legal or empirical, to the effect that countries cannot do something to improve their production profile, a basic point made by the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu.<sup>31</sup> But to do so is not easy when there are immediate gains to be made by not changing the status quo, for those who own the raw materials/commodities. And thus it is that the “law” of comparative advantages legitimizes a structurally intolerable status quo. In short, the ‘law’ is a piece of cultural violence buried in the very core of economics.

*Formal science.* But for sure this cannot be said of mathematics? Not so obvious. If mathematics is viewed as a formal game with one basic rule, that a theorem T and its negation T cannot both be valid, then assumptions are woven into the game that may have violent consequences. Even when mathematical logic explores polyvalent logic, the tool used is bivalent logic with its strict line between valid and invalid, *tertium non datur*. And it is easily seen that it has to be that way, inference being the cement of the mathematical edifice with *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* being key procedures. No inference can be made with ambiguous truth value for the antecedents or for the inference itself.<sup>32</sup>

This means that mathematics disciplines us into a particular mode of thought highly compatible with black white thinking and polarization in personal, social and world spaces. The either or character of mathematical thought makes it an exciting game. But as a model for a highly dialectic human, social and world reality it is far from adequate. And *adequatio* is the basic requirement for culture, symbolic space, if it is to guide us in visioning a less violent potential reality.

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<sup>29</sup> Joan Robinson, the Cambridge economist, has pointed this out forcefully in a number of articles.

<sup>30</sup> This is the basic theme of the article “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, chapter 13 in the set of articles referred to in footnote 10 above. The article is updated somewhat in *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. VI, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1988, as “‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’ Ten Years Later”.

<sup>31</sup> His basic point is simply this: use all surplus value accumulated to improve the factors of production, not for luxury consumption by the owners of the factors of production, to get out of the trap. Simple and wise, this is what Japan did, but hardly what Japan today would like to see too many others do today.

<sup>32</sup> This theme is developed in some detail in my *Methodology and Development*, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1988, chapter 41 “Theory-formation as Development”, particularly 4.4, “Contradictory Reality and Mathematics: A Contradiction?”, pp. 162–75.

*Cosmology.* Having said this much, let us end this section returning to the problem of the transition from cultural violence to violent culture. Such global judgments could be arrived at, as mentioned in the introduction, by identifying an extensive and diverse number of cultural aspects, in religious and ideological thought, in language and art, in empirical and formal science; all of them serving to justify violence. However, there is also another approach: to explore the substratum of the culture for its ‘deep culture’, of which there may be several.<sup>33</sup> We would be looking at the roots of the roots, so to speak; the cultural genetic code that generates cultural elements and reproduces itself through them. That this becomes very speculative is not so problematic; it is in the nature of science to postulate deeper layers, spelling out implications, testing the hard core of the theory around the ragged edges.

The cosmology concept is designed to harbour that substratum of deeper assumptions about reality,<sup>34</sup> defining what is normal and natural. Assumptions at this level of depth in the collective subconscious are not easily unearthed, leaving alone uprooted. And it is at this level that occidental culture shows so many violent features that the whole culture starts looking violent. There is chosenness and strong centre periphery gradients. There is the urgency, the *apocalypse now!* syndrome precluding the slow, patient building and enactment of structural and direct peace. There is atomistic, dichotomous thought with deductive chains counteracting the unity of means and ends. There is arrogance toward nature counteracting the unity of life. There is a strong tendency to individualize and rank human beings, breaking up unity of man. And there is a transcendental, absolute God with awesome successors. The whole culture possesses a tremendous potential for violence that can be expressed at the more manifest cultural level and then be used to justify the unjustifiable. That there is also peace in the Occident, sometimes even emanating from the Occident is something of a miracle, possibly due to the softer strands.

The problem is that this type of thinking easily leads to a sense of hopelessness. Changing the cultural genetic code looks as difficult as changing the biological genetic code. But even if this should be possible, cultural engineering could be a form of violence as problematic as genetic engineering. Should that be left to ‘chance’ meaning to those with power and privilege.<sup>35</sup> A very difficult and important field for future peace research.

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<sup>33</sup> An important post-structuralist position: digging deep, below the surface is not a transition from multiplicity to simplicity. Deep occidental culture, for instance, is no unambiguous. I would, for instance, argue that Christianity can only be understood in terms of at least as two varieties, a hard (more transcendental original sin oriented) and a soft (immanent/original blessing oriented). Others see a more complex variety of deep cultures.

<sup>34</sup> Cosmology is then defined, roughly, as “the deep culture of a civilization, including the general assumptions underlying the deep structures”.

<sup>35</sup> When does the culture, particularly the deep culture, have sufficient plasticity (Scholem) for the culture to be molded, reshaped? In times of crises? After a deep trauma has been inflicted



## 4.5 Gandhi and Cultural Violence

What did the Master himself have to say about these tricky problems, open as he was to exploring alternatives to both direct and structural violence? His answer was to reproduce, from his ecumenism, two axioms that in a sense summarize *Gandhism*: *unity of life* and *unity of means and ends*. The first follows from the second if it is assumed that no life, and particularly no human life, can be used as means to an end. But even without that assumption the first follows from the second since means and ends are supposed to exhibit unity anyhow. But how do we understand ‘unity’? A reasonable interpretation, using the ideas developed in the preceding sections, would be in terms of closeness, against separation. In our mental universe all forms of life and particularly human life, should enjoy closeness and not be kept apart by steep Self Other gradients driving wedges in social space. Any justification derived from the hard core of a culture, e.g., the calling as a Chosen People, would be rejected when in conflict with this even higher, even ‘harder’ axiom.

How can we understand unity of means and ends? As bringing other mental elements, such as acts, and facts brought about by acts, close together. They should not be kept separate by long causal chains driving wedges in social time. To initiate long social sequences leading to take off or revolution, investing in industry or the industrial proletariat, is not good enough. The means have to be good in themselves, not in terms of distant goals, way down the road as witnessed by the millions sacrificed on the altars of industrialism in the name of ‘growth/capitalism’ and ‘revolution/socialism’. Justification derived from empirical confirmation, ‘it works’, is rejected when in conflict with this even higher, even ‘harder’ axiom.

Any Self Other gradient can be used to justify violence against those lower down on the scale of worthiness; any causal theory can be used to justify violent means by nonviolent ends. Gandhi would be as sceptical of Marxist ideas of revolution and hard work, sacrificing a generation or two for presumed bliss the day after tomorrow, as of liberal/conservative ideas of hard work and entrepreneurship, sacrificing a social class or two for the bliss of the upper classes tomorrow, or even today.

The conclusion drawn by Gandhi from these two axioms was respect for the sacredness of all life (hence vegetarianism) and acceptance of the precept “take care of the means and the ends will take care of themselves”. Thus the unity of life doctrine is very different from a doctrine of ‘ecological balance’ since it means enhancing all life, not just human life; and all human life, not just the categories chosen by some (to Gandhi distorted or misunderstood) religion or ideology. And the unity of means and-ends would lead to a doctrine of synchrony, calling for

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(Footnote 35 continued)

including the trauma of inflicting deep traumas on others? We know little about this, but these are among the questions to be asked.

work on all issues simultaneously<sup>36</sup> rather than the diachrony of one big step that is assumed to trigger the *force motrice*. Archetype: the Buddhist wheel where elements of thought, speech and action tend to be at the same level of priority, not the Christian pyramid with more focus on some (e.g., faith) than others (e.g., deeds).<sup>37</sup>

## 4.6 Conclusion

Violence can start at any corner in the direct structural cultural violence triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners. With the violent structure institutionalized and the violent culture internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized, repetitive, ritualistic, like a vendetta. This triangular syndrome of violence should then be contrasted in our mind with a triangular syndrome of peace in which cultural peace engenders structural peace, with symbiotic, equitable relations among diverse partners, and direct peace with acts of cooperation, friendliness and love. It could be a virtuous rather than vicious triangle, also self-reinforcing. The virtuous triangle would be obtained by working on all three corners at the same time, not assuming that basic change in one will automatically lead to changes in the other two.

But does this inclusion of culture not broaden the agenda for peace studies considerably? Of course it does. But why should peace studies be more narrow than, for instance, health studies (medical science)? Is peace easier than health, less complex? And how about biology, the study of life; physics, the study of matter; chemistry, the study of the composition of matter; mathematics, the study of abstract form; all fairly broad. Why should peace studies be more modest? Why draw borderlines at all in a field so terribly important in its consequences, and also so attractive to the inquisitive mind? If culture is relevant to violence and peace, and no doubt it is, then only the dogmatic mind will exclude it.

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<sup>36</sup> Look at Gandhi's life. The political agenda he took on was staggering: *swaraj*; the exploration of *satyagraha* and *sarvodaya*; the uplift of the Indians in Africa, the *harijans* in India, the women; and the communal struggle between Hindus and Muslims. At no point did Gandhi say: I do one of these, and the others follow.

<sup>37</sup> This is explored in some detail in *Methodology and Development*, chapter 1.1, "Back to the origin: On Christian and Buddhist Epistemology", particularly pp. 25–6.

# Chapter 5

## Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend Method)

### 5.1 A Summary of the Approach<sup>1</sup>

#### Conflict Workers

1. Conflict workers (peace workers) apply for membership in the conflict formation as outside parties. Their credentials: as fellow human beings, they bring in general conflict knowledge and skills with compassion and perseverance, but no hidden agendas.

#### Dialogue

2. Dialogue is the tool used to explore the conflict, with one party at a time, making no effort to 'win' or persuade: it is an ongoing brainstorming process in which time, questioning and answering are shared equally, it means being honest, outspoken, tactful, careful and 'normal'. Respect for conflict dialogue partners is essential: for them the conflict is deadly serious, they have suffered and are often highly educated, knowledgeable, experienced, but trapped in and by the conflict, seeing no way out. In return, demand respect and equality from them as a condition for constructive work together. For conflict/peace workers to be genuinely new to a conflict, avoid specialization on conflict parties and issues. Aim at quality dialogue and involvement, not just at the 'high level' (nos. 3–5 from above may be useful); treat everybody well regardless of level; each single dialogue is 'the' dialogue. The setting can be anywhere, even 'high level' offices, but open-ended time is best. Avoid recording/notes, unless agreed.

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<sup>1</sup> A Manual Prepared by the Crisis Environments Training Initiative and the Disaster Management Training Programme of the United Nations (THE MINI-VERSION) Alfaz del Pi, December 1996; Geneva, May 1997; Kyoto, November 1997; copyright United Nations, 1998: Utilization and duplication of this training module and its contents is permissible; however, source attribution to the UN *Crisis Environments Training Initiative* (CETI) and the *Disaster Management Training Programme* (DMTP) is required.

**Conflict Theory**

3. Conflict theory: conflict as both Destroyer and Creator, as potentially dangerous both now and in the future because of the violence, but as a golden opportunity to create something new.

**Conflict Practice**

4. Conflict practice requires empathy, non-violence, and a creative approach: understanding conflict partners from the inside, feeling their logic, identifying valid goals and non-violent approaches to attain them, eliciting creativity from all parties in order to find ways of transcending incompatibilities.

**Violence Theory**

5. Violence theory: Direct, structural and cultural violence that hurts both directly and indirectly, and the culture justifying it.

**Violence Practice**

6. Violence practice: Identify roots of violence in culture, structures, actors and untransformed conflicts; early warnings.

**Transformation**

7. Transformation: There is no alternative to transformation: changing violent attitudes/behaviour, applying creativity to contradictions.

**Peace Dialogues**

8. Peace dialogues: explore diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy together. Avoid linearity, keep dialogue flowing back and forth. Sequence: past therapy (what went wrong, what could have been done)—prognosis—diagnosis—future therapy. Sow seeds, ideas. Expose old codes of state-system/nation-system; positive images for Conflict the Creator and negative images for Conflict the Destroyer; emphasizing joint roles in developing new codes; preparing parties for meeting each other some day ‘at the table’.

**Conflict Transformation**

9. Conflict transformation can then, in principle, happen at all levels of conflict: global, social, inter- and intra-personal.

**Peace Transformation**

10. Peace transformation also presupposes a peaceful context as provided by peace education/journalism, the continuation of the work after violence, and readiness to reopen peace agreements.

## 5.2 Introduction: Conflict Theory and Practice—A Perspective

A conflict has its own life-cycle, almost like something organic. It appears, reaches an emotional, even violent climax, then tapers off, disappears and often reappears. There is a logic behind this, since individuals and groups (such as nations and states) have goals:

- goals may be incompatible and mutually exclusive, like two states wanting the same land, or two nations wanting the same state;
- when goals are incompatible, a contradiction, an issue, is born;
- the more basic the goal, such as basic needs and interests, the more any actor or party with unrealized goals feels frustrated;
- frustration may lead to aggression, turning inwards as attitudes of hatred, or outwards as behaviour of verbal or physical violence;
- hatred and violence may be directed towards those who hold the goals and stand in the way, but it is not always that “rational”;
- violence is intended to harm and hurt (including oneself) and may breed a spiral of counter-violence in the form of defence and/or revenge;
- this spiral of violence becomes a meta-conflict (like a cancerous metastasis), going beyond the goals of preserving and destroying.

In this way, a conflict may acquire eternal life, waxing and waning, disappearing and reappearing. The original conflict recedes into the background, as when Cold War attention focused mostly on nuclear missiles as a means of destruction.

Conflicts may combine, in series or parallel, into complex conflict formations with many parties and many goals, because the same parties and/or the same goals are involved. The elementary conflict formation with two parties pursuing one goal is rare, except for pedagogical purposes or as the polarized product of hatred and violence leading to simplified conflict formations. The normal conflict has many actors, many goals, and many issues, is complex, is not easily mapped, yet that mapping is essential.

### 5.3 Life-Cycle of a Conflict

A conflict may be divided into three successive phases: before violence, during violence and after violence, separated by outbreak of violence and cease-fire. This does not imply that violence is unavoidable, or that conflict = violence/destruction. All three (A, B and C) have to be considered in all phases:




Fig. 5.1 Life-cycle of a conflict. Source The author

Figure 5.1 may look formidable, but it is actually quite simple. On the horizontal axis is time, in the Greek sense of *khronos*, time that flows, physical time. But then there are two *kairos* points, time that stops, time that punctuates the flow of time: the outbreak of violence and then the cessation of violence, the cease-fire. No doubt these are important events.

But there was also conflict before the violence broke out. Four foci for conflict work have been indicated: violent cultures that legitimize violence, like machismo; violent structures that exploit, repress and alienate people; violent actors, bullies with no concern for the hurt and harm they cause; and, lastly, how they combine to form basic conflicts that are left unattended.

In the following it is indicated what to do in the three phases. This manual focuses on Phase I, with some remarks on Phases II and III.

### **5.3.1 Before Violence**

It is cynical to describe this as the ‘prevention’ phase in which to avoid violence. A basic conflict is enough reason in itself for serious attention. People are already suffering. Moreover, a conflict is also an invitation for the parties involved, the society, and the whole world to move ahead, directly taking up the challenge presented by the issues, with an attitude of empathy (with all parties), non-violence (also with a view to preventing the meta-conflicts from developing) and creativity (to find ways out).

The task is to transform the conflict upwards, positively, finding positive goals for all parties, imaginative ways of combining them without any recourse to violence. It is the failure to transform conflicts that leads to violence. Each act of violence can be seen as a monument to that human failure.

The diagram suggests four foci for conflict work in this phase. Violence may be rooted in violent cultures that justify violence; in violent structures (of repression, exploitation and alienation, of keeping apart people who want to be together or too close for comfort those who want to be apart); and in violent actors attracted by violence (to show prowess, to gain power) and by hatred (to build their own identity against other groups). As hatred and dispositions to violence increase, empathy, non-violent approaches and creativity become even more indispensable. But in a deeply polarized conflict formation  $\hat{u}$  precisely when they are most needed as such talents are given less chance to emerge, grow, and blossom.

However, never forget the conflict, the goals that stand in each other’s way. Those conflicts bring together the violent cultures, violent structures and violent actors; any inattention carries increased harm and hurt in its wake.

A concrete example: Turkish ‘foreign workers’ (who are often German citizens) in Germany. A minimum four-foci program:

#### **5.3.1.1 A Focus on the Cultures**

We are generally speaking of cultures of hard nationalism, demanding “Germany for Germans, Turkey for Turks”; and cultures of violence: conflicts are not to be solved in a way satisfactory to all parties, they are there to be won. To challenge such cultures is necessary, but will take a long time. Missing peace cultures have to be substituted.

#### **5.3.1.2 A Focus on the Structures**

There is usually a combination of exploitation and excessive closeness. Missing peace structures, like a Council for Inter-group Relations where nations can meet and solve issues will have to be introduced before they become even more intractable because of spiralling violence.

### 5.3.1.3 A Focus on the Actors

Sometimes they can be identified because they themselves announce their readiness to use violence. Take them seriously, engage them in dialogues about all aspects of the situation. Neglecting them will make them more intractable. If violence occurs then a judicial process of keeping them in prisons is insufficient. The dialogue has to continue, if not with victims or their families, then with others of the same nation.

### 5.3.1.4 A Focus on the Conflicts

Issues may include scarcity of schooling, housing and jobs, and threats to identity. Obviously, any country's capacity to receive foreigners has an upper limit. A ceiling is not necessarily a concession to hard nationalism, nor is increasing a country's capacity a concession to pressure from the outside. An identity based on hard nationalism is more problematic. In our shrinking world there is only room for soft nationalisms, filled with curiosity about the Other, and with the capacity to enter into a dialogue.

The general task is clear: to bend the conflict process upward, into the 'peace region', by making cultures, structures and actors more peaceful so that conflicts can be handled without violence. The whole conflict syndrome is transformed and embedded in the upper half of the Table, which is where it should be.

Concretely, focus on peaceful cultures may bring in the human rights tradition, and focus on peace structures calls upon the democratic tradition. Both are useful examples of broader approaches. But they are not unproblematic as, for example, in the case of cultural differences. They fit better into Western 'I'-cultures with high emphasis on individualism, individual rights and individual minds, voting in elections and then being counted.

They fit less into 'we'-cultures with great emphasis on groups (clans, tribes, nations), collective rights and dialogues to consensus.

A focus on peaceful actors may bring in more women, and more actors in the religious/intellectual or commercial traditions, less in the aristocratic/warrior tradition. This may serve to mobilize sufficient empathy, non-violence and creativity to transform the conflict; whether this comes about through dialogues with all parties separately, or through direct dialogues, 'at the table'.

Structural violence may be as bad as, or worse than, direct violence. People die or lead miserable lives because they are politically repressed, or economically exploited, or deprived of the freedom to be close to those with whom they identify or forced to be close to those they do not like. To refer to this as 'early warning' of direct violence to come is, as mentioned, cynical and disrespectful of the suffering already there. Direct violence should be seen as a warning that comes too late, of unbearable structural and cultural conditions, exploited by cynical actors.

And that gives us another perspective on development. The traditional perspective uses the *more developed countries* (MDCs) as models for the *less*



*developed countries* (LDCs), seeing the differences in what they have as deficits in the latter. Deficits are then handled by getting the money, through own earnings (e.g., through export), grants or loans, to import from the MDCs the things deemed necessary for them to be (more) developed.

The MDCs, however, originally developed by producing themselves, to substitute imports. Imports to reduce the deficits become like transplants that do not take hold and are rejected after some time. And any import means more resources for some people and fewer for others. Conflicts are bound to arise because of inattention to culture and structure and the ensuing friction and possible violence may more than cancel any material gains made.

A more basic definition of development may read as follows: development means building the capacity to transform conflict.

Reduce cultural violence through work in schools, de-glorifying and demystifying violence, adding how to handle conflicts with empathy, non-violence and creativity.

Reduce structural violence through the 1966 Human Rights Convention Against Repression (political and civil rights) and exploitation (economic, social and cultural rights).

This is not a substitute for the economic development mentioned above. But after some cultural and structural reconstruction a society may be ready for more meaningful economic development. Projects that could improve the livelihood of millions could be better rooted. So Phase I should include the 3 R's: Resolution, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation; not waiting for violence to strike or for violence to end!

### ***5.3.2 During Violence***

During violence, the primary task is of course to stop the violence, because it is bad in itself and because it makes the original conflict more untractable. But first, some reflections may be useful on why human beings make the transition from Phase I to Phase II.

The first answer comes out of the original, root conflict: violence is used to incapacitate the other party or parties in order to impose the first party's own goals. This is sometimes called a "military solution", an oxymoron if the word "solution" means "acceptable".

The second answer also comes out of the original conflict but is less rational: aggression because of frustration, of being blocked by somebody; violence out of hatred.

The third answer comes out of meta-conflict logic: conflict as an opportunity to gain honour and glory by winning; and to show courage and gain honour and dignity even when not winning.

The fourth answer also comes out of the meta-conflict: violence as revenge for violence suffered, now or in the past.

These are four important reasons to be taken very seriously. At no point, however, is there any assumption to the effect that violence is intrinsic in human nature, like the drives for food and sex. The latter are found wherever there are humans, in space and time. The drives may be suppressed, but that only proves the point about their universality. Violence is there all the time as a potential, but that potential is only activated when:

- a basic conflict is left unattended (a negative cause!), without empathy, non-violence and/or creativity to impose an outcome, or out of frustration; or
- the culture justifies the transition from conflict to meta-conflict as an opportunity win, to gain honour through violence, or it justifies violence as compensation for violence.

The conclusion is clear: basic conflicts, like basic wounds, should not be left unattended, nor should violence be justified.

However, violence does not last and spread forever; if it did there would be no humans around. Violence abates, for instance because belligerents run out of:

- means of destruction (hardware/weapons, software/people);
- targets to destroy (material, people);
- willingness to destroy (less 'fighting spirit', more disgust);
- the hope of winning; the parties predict the same outcome.

This gives us four ways of terminating violence: through embargoes on weapons and mercenaries; evacuating people and removing targets (scorched-earth tactics); demoralizing soldiers by clarifying the visible and invisible consequences of violence so as to induce conscientious objection; pointing out that in the long run all parties will lose because of the spiralling violence.

But there is also the fifth possibility of intercession between the parties. If the concern is with peace by peaceful means, this paves the way for operations under [Chap. 6](#), but not for [Chap. 7](#) of the UN Charter. What is suggested in the Table is that peacekeeping operations could be improved by calling on expertise not only in military reasoning and the means of violence, but also in police skills, non-violence skills and mediation capabilities.

Since women would tend to relate more to people than to hardware they could perhaps constitute 50 % of the units. Moreover, numbers should be vastly increased. In short, a blue carpet of peace-keepers, not only blue helmets, so dense that there is little space left for fighting. And peacekeeping would then also include the 3 R's: Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution; not waiting till the violence is "over".

### 5.3.3 *After Violence*

After violence, the relief that violence is over may make people blind to the invisible, long-lasting consequences of violence (such as traumas and the desire for more glory and revenge) and blind to how cultures, structures and actors may have become even more violent. The task is more difficult and more complex than before the violence. The mere task of reconstruction after the violence, rehabilitating the wounded and rebuilding after material damage, may be so difficult that reconciliation to solve the meta-conflict and resolution to solve the original, underlying conflicts are forgotten or postponed, possibly forever.


The tasks to be engaged in are formidable:

- Reconstruction After Violence: An Overview
- Rehabilitation: the trauma and collective-sorrow approach
- Rebuilding: the development approach
- Restructuring: the peace-structure approach
- Reculturing: the peace-culture approach
- Reconciliation After Violence: An Overview
- The reparation/restitution approach
- The apology/forgiveness approach
- The theological/penitence approach
- The juridical/punishment approach
- The codependent origination/karma approach
- The historical/truth commission approach
- The theatrical/reliving approach
- The joint sorrow/healing approach
- The joint reconstruction approach
- The joint conflict-resolution approach.

The world is ill-equipped for most of these tasks. There is an ‘Executive Outcomes’ for violence, but not for undoing violence. And there is a simple reason why this is so important. The expression ‘after violence’ is too optimistic. Do nothing about the roots of a basic conflict, do not transform conflict, and the violence will be reproduced when the horrors of the last violence are no longer in conscious memory, but ‘only’ in the subconscious. And ‘after violence’ easily becomes ‘before violence’.

## 5.4 Conflict Outcomes and Conflict Processes

*Exercise:* a table, on the table an orange, two kids seated at the table; what happens? As many ideas as possible, please! And don’t be arrogant, most people manage at most 8 of 16:



**Fig. 5.2** Conflict: The five basic outcomes. *Source* The author

Figure 5.2 presents the five general types of outcomes in a conflict with two parties. Here [1] and [2] are the same, they both mean that one party prevails. In a concrete conflict each general type has several specific interpretations:

### [1, 2] One Party Prevails

- *The Rule of Man*: Fight it out, might is right (to be avoided)
- *The Rule of Law*: Adjudicate, some principle (like need, cultural preference)
- *The Rule of Chance*: Some random method
- *Compensation*: Broadening (triangle), deepening (double conflict).

### [3] Withdrawal

- Walk away from the situation
- Destroy or give away the orange Just watch the orange
- Put it in the freeze.

### [4] Compromise

- Cut the orange Squeeze the orange
- Peel the orange, divide the slices
- Any other division.

### [5] Transcendence

- Get one more orange
- Get more people to share the orange
- Bake an orange cake, have a lottery, divide the proceeds
- Sow the seeds, make a plantation, take over the market.

### **Basic Thesis: The More Alternatives, The Less Likely The Violence**

The Transcend method is biased in favour of transcendence, trying to go beyond, 'disembedding' the conflict from where it is located, and 'embedding' it elsewhere. Go beyond that one orange, get one more ('teacher, you forgot one orange!'). Or focus on the most important part of the orange, the seeds, plant them.

So much for basic conflict outcomes, how about the basic processes or approaches used in conflict? They are related:

- **Thesis No. 1:** Violence tends to lead to [1, 2], one party prevails; Violence is used to impose the victor's goal over the vanquished; or: to prevail = being on top, violence is a process.
- **Thesis No. 2:** Adjudication also tends to lead to [1, 2], one party prevails; Adjudication is used to decide who is right (not guilty, not liable); or: to prevail = being right, adjudication is a process.
- **Thesis No. 3:** Prevarication tends to lead to [3], withdrawal; Withdrawal implies the time is not ripe, status quo is preferred; or: to withdraw, prevarication is a process.
- **Thesis No. 4:** Negotiation between parties tends to lead to [4], compromise; Compromise, assuming one party does not dictate; or: to obtain compromise, negotiation is a process.
- **Thesis No. 5:** Dialogue with the parties tends to lead to [5], transcendence; Transcendence, defining a new situation; or: to transcend the conflict, dialogue is a process.

In other words: the outcome is already hidden in the process, and the process chosen depends on the outcome wanted in a conflict.

## Chapter 6

# The Transcend Method in Conflict Mediation Across Levels

The TRANSCEND approach to peace is inspired by the medical approach to health, based on Diagnosis-Prognosis-Therapy.<sup>1</sup> The method is dialogues with all parties and parties inside parties, high up, low down and side wards, to map the conflict in terms of parties and their goals, to explore the legitimacy of the goals using law, human right and basic needs, and then to go for the overarching bridge between legitimate goals to some new reality accommodating all parties in the sense that they find that outcome preferable to the alternatives: imposing one party-goal over the others ('winning'), a bland compromise, or just doing nothing.<sup>2</sup>

These proposals, from the participants, the mediator(s), or both, are not a priori positions imposed on complex realities, but coming from the parties through complex mediation dialogues, based on, 'what is the ideal world you would like to live in where this conflict is concerned' then 'what is the reality', then 'was some time in the past better; what went wrong' and 'what are you most afraid of for the future'. In short, idealism dream, realism, nostalgia, nightmare as modes of conceiving of the conflict. The experience is that this approach yields very rich insights in both goals and obstacles and ideas about what to do and what not to do. The goals are then sifted for their legitimacy and there is the search for some reality where legitimate goals are accommodated.

The book *50 Years: 100 Peace & Conflict Perspectives*<sup>3</sup> is a first report on this activity, 100 cases over 50 years Ten cases, two for each level—micro between persons, meso within societies, macro between societies, mega between regions and meta for the world, will be reported here, five 'successes', five 'failures'. We say quote-unquote as nothing is forever; reality is dialectic.

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<sup>1</sup> Conflict Literacy and Competence as an Approach to Peace. Keynote, European Psychological Association, Oslo 10 July 2009.

<sup>2</sup> For the general theory, with forty case studies, ten from each of the micro-meso-macro-mega levels, see Johan Galtung, *Transcend & Transform*, London, Boulder CO: PLUTO, Paradigm, 2004, now in 25 languages. The book has some more details on cases 5-7-9 in this paper.

<sup>3</sup> Galtung/MacQueen (2008: 261). (available from [www.transcend.org/tup](http://www.transcend.org/tup). The date at the end indicates when the mediation was concluded.).

## 6.1 Case 1: Micro Success—A Business Man, A Buddhist Woman, A Marriage

[1] **Diagnosis.** There was that couple in a small town somewhere and I was giving a workshop on some international conflict and somebody came and told me that the couple needed help. And that is exactly what mediation is about, helping people, at least helping them to help themselves.

They had been together since high school days and looked to all like the perfect couple: he a successful businessman, she a fine wife and mother. Till ‘the midlife crisis’ struck, somewhere in the middle of their forties. A possible diagnosis: running out of projects, love-sex-marriage-household a routine, the children have left the nest and no new project is in sight.

Enters the conflict. He is sitting doing with black and red numbers for surplus and deficits. She explodes: “So materialistic when What matters is a rich inner life, not just money—and I find it in buddhism!” He retorts: “Well, you have lived quite well off these black figures, just look at your clothes and you accessories!” Her angry answer, “I can do without all that”, and his “you have become so esoteric recently, almost impossible to talk with you”. The rest is easily imagined.

And some adventures start taking place on either side.

[2] **Prognosis.** All is set for separation and divorce, in other words for killing the live relation, even organism, which is a marriage. They will not die, their relation may. Or the type of exchange just reported will continue ad infinitum as the rock around which they are dancing their ritualistic dance, not totally devoid of some morbid pleasure.

[3] **Therapy.** To be helpful an image is needed of what a therapy might look like.

Somebody had pointed out that he should not do his accounting at home, displaying naked ‘materialism’ for her eyes. Others had pointed out that they should both be tolerant, respecting the other as they are, and change their speech to be more acceptable to the other. Have long walks, new more exciting forms of sex.

In other words, outer behaviour modification that may have some impact on inner attitudes, both useful. But this does not touch the root of the conflict, the between part, that they both saw the lifestyle of the other, the basic pursuit of external versus internal riches, as incompatible. Nor does it touch the context void, the lack of projects around which they can rebuild the relation. Walking, sexing, good, but the project has to go to the very core of the conflict. All these other proposals are actually form of conflict repression, like parent and kindergarten teacher giving quarreling children some diverting toys.

Obviously both goals, a positive balance and the pursuit of a rich inner life, are completely legitimate. Hence, the both-and formula of positive transcendence pursued by TRANSCEND is like in the Bible, Give to God that of god and to Caesar that of Caesar; to the wife that of Buddha and to the husband that of business. Bu-bu was on my mind when I softly indicated, “how about thinking in

terms of jointly, on a 50–50 basis, running a bookstore for Buddhist books? They embraced the idea immediately. Both felt accepted, their life style recognized, and equally so. And after a short while she developed a sense of black and red figures, partly because her own money was involved. And he did what he had never expected to do: he read one of the books he was selling.

**Report:** Success, with a question: Why did we not find it? Maybe because culture offers only winning or compromise, and counselling only behavioural modification and conflict repression, being insensitive to conflict as incompatibility to be solved? (Feb 2009).

## 6.2 Case 2: Micro Failure—Men, Women, Marriage, Culture

[1] **Diagnosis.** Imagine on the one hand a family logic based on collectivism and verticality, with the family as a very tight group filled with mutual rights and obligations and at the same time very hierarchical along generation-gender-age lines, from an elderly grandfather down to some little girl. And then on the other hand a family logic based on individualism and horizontality with very much emphasis on self-realization, also outside the family Self, and little attention to norms flowing along family generation-gender-age lines.

In the first logic much would be lived inside the family; in the second a much smaller proportion and a much higher proportion outside, together with others in the same generation, gender and age group.

In the first logic a new marriage is decided by the older generation, in the second generation the older generation is informed. There is the in-between of the boy asking the coming father-in-law for his daughter's 'hand'; a pattern yielding to the couple deciding.

[2] **Prognosis.** Imagine now a marriage with the husband from one logic and the wife from the other, settling in a country with one or the other logics dominant. There are eight possible combinations. What will happen? The bond of love-sex-marriage is strong. But so are the social forces, as witnessed by the major case of Muslim immigrants to Western countries.

Take one of the eight cases: a collectivist-vertical wife, with an individualist-horizontal husband, in the husband's country. The wife's life would be centered on the family, having problems creating collectivist verticality in other groups, the host society being weak in that regard. Given school and work outside logic will penetrate into the family, and children will see what to the mother is love as control. The husband will easily relate to other women, share work projects, be infatuated, maybe have an affair, maybe all three; totally at odds with the wife's logic of family loyalty with children having the mother as primary authority, and the mother reproducing herself in the children—particularly in her daughters. As a



result the wife may become lonely socially, have problems with her children, and with an unfaithful husband who all see themselves as normal.

Take one of the other cases: they settle in the wife’s country, where her logic is the normal logic. The children are close to the mother. Control is now also seen as love. The husband is the odd man out. Family interaction overfills his time budget, and his emotions.

In an extended family somebody will always have a problem, or something to celebrate. He is supposed to be in on all of that. Loyalty and faithfulness is not only to the wife, but to the whole “system”. Unfaithfulness with body, mind or spirit takes on another tonality when it is inside the wife’s system, and might evoke much more jealousy. The husband may escape, his spirit and body wandering.

[3] **Therapy.** Some possible therapies would include:

- awareness of the social logics operating on them, seeing the Other less as controlling, difficult, unfaithful, and more as enacting a logic, usually without being fully aware of what happens;
- clarifying before marrying the “rules of the game”, which might imply calling on some outside expertise as such insight is rare;
- mutual respect for the logic of the others, simply learning to live with the difference, “she is like that”, “he is like that”;
- either changing to the logic of the other, or to the host society;
- settling in a third country, speaking a third language;
- creating their own niche with an individualist-vertical or collectivist-horizontal logic;
- separating, divorcing, or simply not marrying. (Oct 2002)

**Report:** I have tried to help in several cases, but have failed. Could the norms be too internalized, and also institutionalized?

### 6.3 Case 3: Meso Success—Nepal

[1] **Diagnosis.** This conflict molecule combines 11 conflict atoms in a structural violence leading to major direct violence:

Fault-line	Issue	Possible remedy
1 Humans/Nature	Depletion-pollution	Appropriate technology
2 Gender	Repression of women	Appropriate representation
3 Generation	Young people	Appropriate representation
4 Class: Political	His Majesty, King	Parliamentary democracy Constitutional monarchy
5 Class: Military	Royal Nepal Army	Parliament control of army

(continued)

(continued)

Fault-line	Issue	Possible remedy
6 Class: Economic	Misery, inequality	Massive uplift from below Land reform Temple land reform Strong cooperative, Public and private sectors
7 Class: Culture	Marginalization	Massive literacy campaign Sharing of culture
8 Class: Social	Dalits	Appropriate representation Economic-cultural measures
9 Nationalities	Dominant culture Unitary state	Mother tongue education Devolution-soft federalism
10 Territories	Misery, inequality	Massive uplift from below
11 Others/Nepal	Intervention	Reconfirm panch shila

The high level of cris-cross, entropy, may dampen mobilization.

[2] **Prognosis.** A high entropy conflict will display much micro- and little macro-dynamics unless at revolt level major energy.

[3] **Therapy.** M(aoists) and K(ing) dominate because of weak Third Parties = PP, mainstream political Parties; civil society, NGO, maybe 2,000 strong; People in general; Parliamentary Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy as processes. Three measures needed are:

- PP get their act together in a strong program for social change, inviting M and K to join the roundtable talks, creating with M an interim government, and a process for revising the constitution. They could also be triggered into such action by People turning to the streets, and-or by strong civil society pressure.
- A statement from M of allegiance to parliamentary democracy.
- A statement from K of allegiance to constitutional monarchy.

The National Human Rights Commission could continue playing a major role in this peace process, and, for instance:

- organize an experimental roundtable with all parties, using human rights discourses with appropriate processes to address the issues, including monitoring of ceasefire processes and of civil-political and socio-economic-cultural rights implementation generally;
- organize *sarvodaya* uplift experiments locally, calling on impressive *Sarvodaya* experiences in Sri Lanka and Dr Ari Yaratne and appropriate technologies of Ashok Khosla’s Development Alternatives in New Delhi;
- organize a general conference on peace-human rights interfaces;
- initiate a Truth and Reconciliation process.

Cooperative action like disarmed soldiers cooperating in health camps, building schools and roads, would be useful and symbolic.

To say that action rewards the direct violence of terrorism is as misplaced as to say that inaction rewards the structural violence of status quo. This is not about pleasing or displeasing parties. There is so much suffering in Nepal because of repressive, exploitative structures, violence and fear. Action should be for the sake of those who suffer, to reduce *dukkha* and increase *sukha*; politics in the best sense of that word. The manoeuvring of the actors, the political alliances, who gets what is politicking; indispensable, but no goal in itself. Nepal must rise to the occasion, addressing real issues (May 2003).

**Report:** As one of many I did my part, not unsuccessfully, as seeds sown.

## 6.4 Case 4: Meso Failure—Sri Lanka

[1] **Diagnosis.** Imagine we work with a conflict formation with six parties in order to break out of ‘Sinhals versus Tamils’, like:

1. ‘hard’ Sinhals: among them much of the buddhist clergy
2. ‘soft’ Sinhals: among them much of Ariyaratne’s *sarvodaya*
3. Muslims (10 % of the 18.6 million; 14 % Tamils, 76 % Sinhals)
4. Sri Lanka Tamils, with 15,000 LTTE “Tigers” facing 150,000 troops and a considerable (one million?) diaspora, with world opinion impact.
5. Indian Tamils, in Tamil Nadu (50 million)
6. New Delhi, Hindu India (with large Muslim minority).

The most elementary mistake would be a focus only on [1 + 2] versus [4], excluding [3] and [5 + 6]; which is 1/10 of the people; and major outside parties. There is much more going on, below or above:

- [4] + [5] versus [1 + 2] + [6], Tamil secession-union versus Colombo-New Delhi;
- [1 + 2 + 3 + 4] versus [5 + 6], Sri Lanka versus India, ignoring the Big Neighbour.

There is a double asymmetry at work: the Sinhals outnumber the Tamils and Muslims; Tamils and Muslims in India outnumber the Sinhals who have no mother country to turn to; this is their only land.

There are, of course, the old colonial power England, the USA and the ‘international community’, changing the discourse from inter-nation/self-determination to terrorism versus status quo, possibly with a Tribunal if the LTTE Tigers are ‘unreasonable’.

[2] **Prognosis.** With less than 1 % participating in the violence but 63,000 killed since 1983 we can assume more than half a million bereaved, with deep personal trauma-hatred fuelling the conflict.

Policing a determined group using violence for nationalist ends is at worst impossible, at best prohibitively costly. Governments will pursue military solutions with large-scale offensives, but pinpoint counter-attacks will deny them that, so will long-term revenge. A lose–lose agenda that makes negotiation-mediation shallow and hollow.

[3] **Therapy.** The following is based on dialogues with all six:

- A. Territorial and non-territorial federalism Tamil-Muslim-Sinhala. The map does not invite ruling with rulers, drawing lines for Swiss style federalism. The Tamils are scattered all over in addition to the concentrations in the North and East. A bicameral parliament—one traditional territorial, and one non-territorial for the nations might reflect both the territorial and ethnic aspects of Sri Lanka, with autonomy in cultural, local economic and legal affairs and joint decision-making for foreign, security, financial and logistic affairs. Three parties may soften the present polarization. The state guarantees human rights for languages and religions, joint currency and general foreign policy, and a federal and national police-military, also in a national rather than territorial Tamil part.
- B. Functional independence for both Tamils and Muslims, with the right to associate with Tamils and Muslims in India and elsewhere, and Tamil consulates abroad. A free flow of people, goods and services and ideas—like the French and Italian speaking in Switzerland relate to France and Italy—as one of many nonmilitary approaches to security.
- C. The Indian model. If New Delhi can have a Tamil Nadu as a state in India, then Colombo can have a Tamil Eelam in the Northeast as a part.
- D. SAARC will have to take on umbrella functions. There are some parallels to Kashmir. Hindus and Muslims have mother countries, but not the Ladakh Buddhists. Some of them might agree that it is better to stay together (“The Valley”) than joining either, yet they want free flow of people, goods and services and ideas.

It might be interesting to combine the two conflicts since the implications are the same: loosening up, more flexibility. (Dec 2000)

**Report:** Total failure for the TRANSCEND team with the worst scenario predicted over-enacted, underestimating Sri Lanka as a sacred land, and the Tamils being an economic-cultural, not only terrorist, challenge.

## 6.5 Case 5: Macro Success—Ecuador/Peru

[1] **Diagnosis.** By classical state system logic, celebrating its 350th anniversary since the Treaty of Westphalia, each piece of land, clearly demarcated, belongs to one and only one state. But what if two or more states claim the same piece of land, because there are two divortium aquarum, water-sheds, or a border river that comes and goes?

- [2] **Prognosis.** The classical answer is a war to arrive at a “military solution”, and this is what Ecuador and Peru did in 1942, 1981 and 1995, following the 1941 war. Another answer is to have a strong, big state or community of states, take over, as a “mandate”.
- [3] **Therapy.** An answer much more in line with an increasingly borderless world would be for the states to administer a disputed territory together as a condominium. If both parties have reasonable claims, then rather than dividing the disputed territory define it as joint territory shared by the contestant parties. Rather than fighting it out, the joint territory may be used for cooperative ventures. But exactly what would that mean?
1. The two states could make the ‘zona inejecutable’—where the Rio de Janeiro Protocol from January 1942 did not establish a precise boundary so that the treaty could not be executed—a binational zone, a condominium with both flags.
  2. They could establish a protected natural park with the help of the IUCN, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and its Programme on Protected Areas, making the zone more untouchable, in the interest of both peace and the environment. The park would be jointly administered whether a border between the two has been clearly demarcated or not.
  3. Camping facilities for youth and others from both countries would fit into a natural park, like they do elsewhere.
  4. They could establish economic zones for joint ventures inviting companies from both sides. Factories might have to be outside an ecological zone, but administrative facilities could fit in; no major problem in today’s electronic world.
  5. The troops of the two countries would disengage and withdraw, and procedures would be established for joint security, patrolling, early warning of military movements, etc.
  6. Work has to be done adjusting the legal codes to each other, to adjudicate crimes and facilitate cooperation.

In short, two countries with a history of hostility could use conflict creatively to grow together at the disputed point, and at the speed national sentiments would tolerate and demand.

7. But they could also go further, internationalizing the zone, retaining binational administration and sovereignty as a fall-back. Two more flags could come up: the United Nations and the Organization of American States, alongside the national flags.
8. A compound for negotiating border (and other) disputes would be constructed, for parties from anywhere in the world.
9. UN-OAS peacekeeping troops would internationalize security, using contingents from the two countries, and others.

10. The area could become an international zone of peace, and a registry for such zones could be established at the United Nations, with emerging rules for a code of conduct.

Regional organizations like OAU, OSCE might be interested in the same constructive approach to border disputes, and follow-ups, using such zones as staging areas for peacemaking and peacebuilding.

If intergovernmental organizations cooperate, so could international people's organizations from Latin America, giving more substance to an international civil society (August 1995, June 1998).

**Report:** The proposal 'binational zone, natural park' was a success, discussed with an ex-President, and with the military leadership.

## 6.6 Case 6: Macro Failure—Israel/Palestine-Middle East

For Israel and Palestine there is no security at the end of the road of violence; only increased violence and insecurity.

Israel is in the most dangerous period of its history:

Increasingly militarist, fighting unwinnable wars, increasingly isolated and with ever more enemies, exposed to violence, non-violence and boycott from within and without with the USA sooner or later making support conditional on concessions. The basic change in South Africa, from inside and outside, comes to mind:

- Israel's moral capital is rapidly depreciating, is probably negative in most countries, slowly also changing in the USA;
- Israel suffers from a de facto military coup, offering the electorate a choice of generals with limited agendas;
- Israeli violence and intransigence mobilize resistance and struggle in the Arab and Muslims worlds, if not in the sense of inter-state warfare then in the postmodern sense of terrorism against Israeli state-terrorism. Highly motivated volunteers willing to enter this struggle are in unlimited supply;
- Sooner or later this will include the 18 % Israeli Arabs;
- Sooner or later this may lead to massive nonviolent struggle, like 100,000 Arab women in black marching on Israel;
- Economic boycott of Israeli may come, like for South Africa initiated by NGOs and followed by local authorities and, like South Africa, maybe more important morally than economically;
- Again like for South Africa, US policy may change:
  - economically Israel is becoming a liability, given trade-oil problems with Arab countries no longer willing to see the USA as a third party; with imminent boycotts and pressure to disinvest;

- militarily Israel may commit the USA to a highly ambiguous war, and bases are available elsewhere (Turkey, Kosova, Macedonia);
- politically Israel is a liability in the UN, the EU, and NATO allies, may not legitimize violent intervention. USA may prefer a reasonable agreement to supporting a loser (the Shah, Marcos).

Could this peace package be more attractive to reasonable people if the context changes in the way foreseen here?

1. Palestine is recognized as a state following UNSC Res. 242, 338; with 4 June 1967 borders, with small land exchanges;
2. The capital of Palestine is in East Jerusalem;
3. A Middle East Community, MEC, with Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria as full members, with water, arms, trade regimes based on multilateral consensus; and an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East with a broader base;
4. The Community is supported by the EU, the Nordic Community and ASEAN, financially and for institution-building expertise;
5. Egypt and Jordan lease additional land to Palestine;
6. Israel and Palestine become federations with 2 Israeli cantons in Palestine and 2 Palestinian cantons in Israel;
7. The two neighbour capitals become a city confederation, and also host to major regional, UN and ecumenical institutions;
8. The right of return, also to Israel, is accepted in principle, numbers to be negotiated, within the canton formula, for Palestinians as well as for Jews, equity being a peace condition;
9. Israel and Palestine have joint and equitable economic ventures, joint peace education and joint border patrolling;
10. Massive stationing of UN monitoring forces.
11. Sooner or later a Truth and Reconciliation process.

Mediating a peace package should not be a country, or a group of countries; but a respected person or group of such persons. (Aug 2001)

**Report:** A failure so far, the MEC modelled on EC Rome 1958 is not on the agenda, only a two states ‘solution’, like Germany-Luxembourg.

## 6.7 Cases 7 and 9: Mega-Meta Successes—East/West Cold War

- [1] **Diagnosis.** The core conflict is inter-state class conflict against the dominant North–Western corner of Europe and the world, coupled to intra-state class conflicts; as was the fascism of Southern Europe and Nazism of Central Europe and the decolonization struggles. WWII was used to beat Nazism and

Fascism, neo-colonialism was used to beat decolonization, and the Cold War to beat the absurd Soviet Union.

In this struggle between Northwestern Europe and the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe, the Northwest presented the conflict as being between democracy-market and dictatorship-plan, not as world and social class conflict; reducing complexity to a conflict of two parties over one issue. On top of this a potentially devastating meta-conflict over the threat and use of nuclear arms monopolized the attention, at the expense of Eastern Europe and images of the ideal society, capitalist versus socialist as being the conflict core issues.

[2] **Prognosis.** The prognosis was war, but not in the East–West core arena in Europe, with the possible exception of the Berlins-Germanies as battle-field (hence the vast German peace and dissident movements). Displaced wars over Third World allegiance were more likely—Korea, Viet Nam and the near-war over Cuba being examples—but nuclear escalation into the core area was not impossible.

But there was also another prognosis: the collapse of the Soviet Union as an absurd society, with an intolerable disconnect between myth and reality, and that was what eventually happened.

[3] **Therapy.** Remedies proposed during the Cold War included

- for conflict transformation: a permanent organization for dialogue and implementation under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva: a Security Commission for Europe (SCE): using as a model the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)<sup>4</sup>;
- for the arms race-war threat: GRIT<sup>5</sup> and defensive defence,<sup>6</sup> based on conventional, para-, and non-military components;
- People's Diplomacy: with peace and dissident movements. (Jun 1964, 1984)

**Report:** Thousands, millions, were working on such alternatives to war and the threat of war. I did so by sowing such seeds at all levels in East, West and Neutral-

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<sup>4</sup> See Johan Galtung: "Regional Security Commissions: A Proposal", Chap. 6 in Johan Galtung and Sverre Lodgaard, eds., *Co-operation in Europe*, Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1970; pp. 73–83, particularly pp. 77–80. The proposal (p. 77) is "a United Nations' system of regional security commissions, standing in the same relation to the Security Council of the UN (UN Charter, Chap. 8, Articles 52, 53 and 54) as the regional economic commissions (ECE in Geneva for Europe, ECLA in Santiago de Chile for Latin America, ECA in Addis Ababa for Africa and ECFAFE in Bangkok for Asia) have to ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council. Thus, we are suggesting an SCE, SCLA, SCA and SCAFE" (p. 77, SCAFE would today be SCAP, "Asia-Pacific").

<sup>5</sup> Gradual Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction, by Charles Osgood, in *An Alternative to War and Surrender*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1967; possibly the most important idea coming out of US peace studies during the Cold War.

<sup>6</sup> See Johan Galtung, *There Are Alternatives*, Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984, in eight languages, particularly Chap. 5.



Nonaligned; through a project for Council of Europe the SCE carried into political reality by Czechoslovakia.

## 6.8 Case 8: Mega Failure—Healing the Crusades

- [1] **Diagnosis.** On 27 November 1095 Pope Urban II made a call for what became known as the first Crusade in the French town of Clermont. In 1291, the Crusades came to an end with the Christians defeated. But a real declaration of peace has never been made.
- [2] **Prognosis.** The Crusades stand out in history as an example of how religion is used to justify war. Even today collective memories and a crusade mentality persist, defining a “Gulf Syndrome”, with Catholic-Protestant countries against a Muslim country with a major Crusade experience, the massacre of Baghdad in 1258.
- [3] **Therapy.** On 26–27 November 1995, a dialogue was convened at the Swiss Institute for Development in Biel-Bienne, bringing together leading representatives of the Christian and Islamic faiths: Ayatollah, professor Mohammad Taghi Jafari, Tehran; Sheikh Ahmad Kuftarou, Grand Mufti of Syria, Damascus; Nuncio, Archbishop K. J. Rauber, Bern; Metropolitan Damaskinos, Bishop of the Orthodox Church, Geneva; and scholars and clerics.

Pope John Paul II sent his blessings and a message to the symposium through Cardinal Angelo Sodano, Secretary of State of the Holy See:

It is opportune to reflect on these events, in order to draw vital lessons for today. His Holiness renews the call of the Second Vatican Council which urged that a sincere effort be made to achieve mutual understanding, so that, for the benefit of all, Christians and Muslims would together preserve and promote peace, liberty, social justice and moral values.

### Communiqué:

The adherents of Islam and Christianity proposed the following to members of their respective faiths and all others:

- to try to understand other religions the way their followers understand themselves, as a condition for true dialogues;
- to develop school material in history, civic education and religious education, particularly material about the two religions, acceptable to all parties;
- not to abuse the freedom of speech when speaking and writing about other religions;
- to work together to identify, develop further and put into practice an inspiring ethic of peace, liberty, social justice, family values, human rights and dignity, and nonviolent forms of conflict resolution;

- to establish permanent inter-religious councils to further mutual respect and understanding;
- to cooperate across religious borders in Bosnia to reconstruct the country;
- to discuss with people in the media more responsible, peace-promoting forms of journalism.

On this day of the ninth centenary of the call for the Crusades, we call upon Christians, Muslims and all others, to go beyond mere tolerance. We must open our hearts and minds to each other.

Instead of sensing danger when somebody is different let us be filled with joy at the opportunity to learn, to enrich and be enriched, to live in peace and create peace.

Like everything else the two largest religions in the world are also subject to development. While keeping the basic message of devotion let us find new ways, acts and words. It is within the spirit of freedom of interpretation of one's own religion that genuine respect for other religions can evolve.

Let the next 900 years and beyond be an era of active peace built in our hearts and our minds, and enacted in our deeds. (Nov 1995)

**Report:** The meeting was a resounding success, but we failed in spite of many efforts to make the media and public opinion interested.

## 6.9 Case 10: Meta Failure—United Nations

[1] **Diagnosis.** As pointed out very often, the UN is a product of the Second World War. Like the N<sup>3</sup>rnberg and Tokyo trials were victors' justice, the UN was the victor's world organization, with unmistakable Anglo-American imprint. The Soviet Union and China were recognized as co-allies, including when the former changed to the right and the latter to the left. France was probably more out of old Congress of Vienna 1815-Versailles 1919 habits. The UN is now out of date, and the so-called reform plans do not even articulate the issues.

In the veto nucleus of the UNSC are four Christian countries and one Confucian, leaving 1.3 billion Muslims unrepresented and UNSC with as little legitimacy in Muslim countries as four Muslim countries would bring to the Christian world. Then there is the veto of feudal political formations. And the marginalization of the General Assembly in security matters. And the absence of an effective, directly elected UN Peoples' Assembly. And the location in a hostile USA.

[2] **Prognosis.** The UN becomes increasingly irrelevant, out of touch with a democratizing world, and incapable of change having built-in guarantees against doing so.

[3] **Therapy.** Evidently a regionalized world needs a truly globalized UN to help mitigate their relations, with all regions members of a very different Peace and

Security Council (taking the name from the African Union), and without that feudal relic the veto power. And, equally evidently, much of the conflict mitigation has to be the regions' own job, bilaterally and multilaterally. As the lights of Anglo-America are fading quickly time is coming for an *ex oriente lux*, more particularly from China and India, Chindia—together with Russia 40 % of humanity—and the core powers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the SCO. Two of the oldest civilizations on earth, with continuities of thousands of years, as opposed to the rather recent UK and its more recent progeny, the USA.

In the richness of oriental light some spectral lines stand out, illuminating a world hoping for better guidance than one legitimized and killing intervention after the other:

- the Gandhism of India, hoping that India will also be ever more inspired by one of the greatest humans ever, their own;
- the Daoism of China, hoping that China will also be ever more inspired by some of the greatest insights ever, their own;
- the Panchsheel of them both, the Five Principles (mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, equal and mutual benefit, peaceful co-existence), as world guidelines, but also;
- the *panca sila* of Indonesia (one nation, humanitarianism, democracy and consent, social prosperity, one god—meaning faith, guidance), as domestic guidelines.

Nonviolence, sophistication, world and domestic traffic rules; not endless interventionism. Today's Asian blend of age-old wisdom and youthful energy could inspire a world of pessimism and fear.

The UN does not belong to the West, Anglo-America, USA, New York, Manhattan. The UN could move culturally so as to become more global, relocate to Hong Kong with spoken English and written Chinese for the next 60 years or so, get away from listening devices and US crippling, being surrounded by one party in a key conflict, US Jews. Then, if democratization is such a good idea it might be worth practicing by using each member state as a constituency, electing fairly and freely as many representatives as they have millions of inhabitants—minimum one—to an increasingly powerful UN Peoples' Assembly. And the other way round: US Embassies in all countries. It can, must, be done. (Dec 2007)

**Report:** Again, we failed in bringing such “seeds”, developed in very many dialogues, to political and media attention.

Let me now try to draw some conclusions.

The reader will understand that the basic method is the same at all levels, as described in connection with Case 1. Carefully executed dialogues, but anchored not in the struggle and the usually black-white images of ‘them versus us’, their narratives of suffering. All of that is needed, but if the mediation is anchored in the past it may stay there. Thus, more or at least as important, as exploring traumas

linked to childhood sexuality might be a dialogue over “What does the person you would like to be in five years look like?”.

Our dialogues are anchored in the future-constructive of “What does the marriage you would like to have look like?”, “What does the UN you would like to see look like?”, and then searching for something new that might accommodate legitimate goals, dreams, images. Conflict parties report that such questions are very rarely asked, and even more rarely answered. So they start stuttering, search for metaphors, whereas their narratives of struggle and suffering, and how bad is ‘Other’, flow easily, endlessly. It looks as if our whole civilization is past-oriented and focused on the destructive—the media being a key factor in conditioning people in that direction.

The mediation is guided by the ‘mantra’ empathy-nonviolence-creativity: deep listening, particularly of what is not mentioned; abstention from the verbal violence of moralism-criticism; focus on creative ends and the means to obtain them. This applies to all levels, as does frustration of a conflict with goals being blocked, aggression against an Other seen as the blocker, or apathy out of despair, polarization of attitude and behaviour. And this also means that what works at one level may serve as a fretful hypothesis for another level, like a Buddhist bookstore in a small town in Europe inspiring a natural park in a binational zone in the Andes. Or vice versa. There are synergies and serendipities across levels.

And yet there are the failures, even if nobody known whether those seeds may not sooner or later blossom, reach people closer to decision-makers, etc. And there are successes, but nobody knows what they may look like after some time, particularly if people take them for granted, like they often do with a marriage, insensitive to the needs for some “love and tender care”. Solutions need nurturing.

How do I explain successes (by no means claiming to be the only cause) and the failures (again not claiming to be the only cause)?

Truth is, I am not sure. Had I been, I would have gone straight to that button, or lever, and pushed it. Thus, after the meeting with the top leadership of the Ecuador military 5 June 1998 I had a feeling that Case 5 above would work out, but no certainty. That the SCE part of Case 7–9 would work so well, via one particular carrier, came as a surprise that the actor made known to me early 1993, 16 years after the seed had been sown—on evidently fertile ground in the Czech foreign ministry—and 3 years after it had been implemented. East–West was evident, as a very active part of the peace movement I felt the progress, and in 1980 even predicted the fall of the wall before 1990. When Margaret Thatcher and so many others greeted the fall 9 November 1989 with “nobody could have been predicted this” my reaction was, of course, “how little did they know those politicians high up”.

However, there is one obvious cause of failure: the forces against any change are too strong. For case 2 I mention deeply internalized and institutionalized norms, or whole cultures. For Case 4 a Holy Land, to the Sinhala Buddhists, challenged by a creative minority, not unlike Jews in Germany and Armenians in Turkey. For case 6 the USA-Israel alliance. For Case 8 something very different:

the basic Christianity-Islam fault line was not yet on anybody's mind. And for Case 10, indeed, the Big Powers, and the state-system as such.

Conclusion: More Peace Education. More Peace Journalism. Now.

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## Chapter 7

# The Master of Masters: Mohandas Gandhi

*There is no road to peace. Peace is the road (Gandhi).*  
The time has come for the master of masters, Gandhi.<sup>1</sup>

Gandhi is often portrayed as an ‘idealist’, particularly by ‘realists’ who hold military power, force, to be the ultimate mover in international relations, and in politics in general.

If we use the term ‘idealist’ not for abstention from violence, but for being driven by an idea, usually a simply, reductionist basic axiom, then this would fit the realist, and also quite a lot of idealists in the first sense.

But it does not fit Gandhi. His mind and actions were far too complex, holistic and woven into a complex Indian reality.

Rather, the ‘realists’ are in a tough spot, having only one remedy for a vast variety of problems: seek and destroy. They also have a tendency to disregard the two iron laws of violence:

- [1] the victors will be stimulated to seek more victories;
- [2] the vanquished will be stimulated to seek revenge.

Admittedly, those processes may take some time, making violence the approach of the short-sighted, out for a quick applause.

Thus, look at those two amateurs in politics at work: Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, and Sir Cyril Radcliffe. Look at Mountbatten urging Radcliffe to move the partition line so that the favorite, India, could have easy access to Kashmir. We know what happened. We know Gandhi’s stand against partition. He lost; the Mountbattens won. But we were treated to the same sorry sight as in Israel-Palestine relations: After an enormous amount of patient nonviolent work on both sides (and here I include the *intifada*, by Middle East standards very soft), politician amateurs took over, building realism and spheres of interest into it via the ‘Oslo process’. And with what result?

Fortunately, the English language makes a distinction between being a ‘realist’ and being ‘realistic’. Maybe realism is its dark side and idealism its bright side. Gandhi certainly privileged the ‘nonviolence of the brave’ over and above violence. But he also privileged violence over the ‘nonviolence of the coward’, doing

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published in: *Johan Lackland: on the Peace Path Through the World*, autobiography.

nothing, sitting on the fence, waiting, possibly the kind of 'nonviolence' that gives rise to the misnomer 'passive resistance' (probably invented by some 'realist'). Even a very cursory glance at Gandhi's masterpiece, a book destined to become a saving grace for this horrible century, his autobiography *My Experiments With Truth*, shows rather clearly that his resistance was rather active.

Thus, look at his life's political agenda:

- [1] Struggle against *racism*, in South Africa
- [2] Struggle for *independence, swaraj*
- [3] Struggle against the *caste system*, for the *harijans*
- [4] Struggle against *economic exploitation*, for *sarvodaya*
- [5] Struggle against *communal strife*, for peace between Hindus/Muslims
- [6] Struggle against *sexism*, for liberation of women
- [7] Struggle for *nonviolent ways of struggling, satyagraha*.

Of eight fault-lines in the human construction, between humans and nature, between genders, between generations, between races, between castes and classes, between nations, between countries, Gandhi picked up six. Had he lived longer he would definitely have become an ardent environmentalist. Actually, in his action he was one, probably also in his thoughts, only his speech was less explicit. And generational divides he did not really touch. He was a good Hindu in that regard, honouring the *moksha* phase in this life, maybe also in his own.

This is a modern, even post-modern politician! This is not the usual compartmentalization of politics in race issues, anti-colonialism, anti-caste, anti-class, for communal harmony, for gender equality. His vision speaks through his life's work: *unity of humans*. But that means that he endowed some beings that had been deprived of that stamp with human quality: Indians in South Africa, the subjects of British colonialism, the untouchables, the *shudras*, those on the other side of the communal fence, the women. Please note: In the first two he also fights for himself, as an Indian in South Africa indeed identifying with his clients, and as a British colonial subject.

And then he spreads out, covering the field, now in a sense working against himself, the *vaishya*, the well positioned politically and economically, the Hindu, the man.

Of course this became too much, for some, for three, for one, for Godse; 50 years ago to the day of the murder, I am writing these lines. But I have a slightly different angle: What a miracle that the Master was given 78 years to teach and inspire us all. That in itself is a testimony to the strength of his nonviolence, in spite of the bullet that killed him in the end.

Godse's message was clear: India will be a better place without Gandhi. Godse wanted the same India as Nehru and his successors wanted: modern, industrial, armed, capable of military action. And the military even co-opted Gandhi's funeral procession. What a sacrilege, what a crime.



**Photo 7.1** Johan Galtung. Photo is in possession of the author

Gandhi's message in his martyrdom was also clear: Here I failed? My nonviolence had not touched his heart. The rest of us may also draw another conclusion: His basic struggle was that uphill fight for a new way of struggling, his *satyagraha*.

Before looking at what happened to *satyagraha* after Gandhi, let us focus on one rather important point. Gandhi privileged the common man and woman in a dramatically inequalitarian society ridden by caste/class, and the common country



in a dramatically inegalitarian world ridden by colonialism. Somehow that highly realistic politician + saint found the key button to push for colonialism to 'dismantle' (Churchill's word, that 19th or 18th century figure that had been catapulted into the 20th century).

With India gone 15 August 1947 the British Empire was finished, the rest was some spasms of reactionary nostalgia. With British imperialism gone Western colonialism was finished, the rest until Portugal finally gave in can be characterized the same way.

Of course there were residues. One of them, Hong Kong, was 'handed over' 1 July 1997, close to 50 years after *swaraj*. And Prince Charles lost the opportunity for England, the West, to display the greatness of reflection: no word of sincere apology for the horrors of British imperialism in China, including drugging a whole nation. That apology would have brought applause, gratitude and good trade deals, but it never came.

To stand up for the common country and the common man and woman makes a person a saint. But it does not create followers among those who see themselves as (much) more common than others. Maybe we can say that after Gandhi's death India went back to normal. It is very hard to find any trace of Gandhism in Indian foreign policy. What can be found is a ritualistic administration of the memory of the great man in numerous institutes of Gandhian studies, adding little or nothing to the theory and practice of nonviolence, and not that much to our knowledge of Gandhi either. He remains his own best biographer.

But his greatness is not to be judged by his reception in his home country after he had delivered *swaraj* and became the Father of the Nation. Gandhi belongs to the world, as evidenced by the successes of nonviolence in the second half of this horribly violent century:

- [1] the liberation of arrested Jews in Berlin, February 1943
- [2] Gandhi's *swaraj* campaign in India; Independence from 1947
- [3] Martin Luther King Jr.'s campaign in the US South from 1956
- [4] the anti-Viet Nam war movement, inside and outside Viet Nam
- [5] the Buenos Aires Plaza de Mayo mothers against the military
- [6] the 'People's Power' movement in the Philippines, 1986
- [7] the Children's Power movement in South Africa, from 1976
- [8] the *intifadah* movement in Occupied Palestine, from 1987
- [9] the democracy movement in Beijing, spring 1989
- [10] the *Solidarnosc*/DDR movements which ended the Cold War.

More could have been added, but let us first make some short comments on some of the complexities of these ten cases:

- [1] Many Jews returned to work after having been released and were re-arrested and killed in such a way that nonviolent action was much more difficult. Others were able to hide. Nonviolence is not a single-shot action.

- [2] Britain was also weakened by World War II and the contradiction between fighting autocracy, yet hanging on to colonialism. Gandhi's action sharpened that contradiction.
- [3] Official segregation has ended, while unofficial segregation remains, again an argument why nonviolence is a process, not a single-shot event.
- [4] Basically the Vietnamese won a violent war, but the nonviolence probably weakened the resolve on the US side.
- [5] Essentially leaderless, so the peace prize was given to an outstanding man instead (Alfonso de Esquivel).
- [6] Probably more middle class than a movement of, for and by the really oppressed; so it should have been continued.
- [7] To this could be added the moral impact of economic sanctions, divestment, and the positive example of Zimbabwe at the time.
- [8] The action repertory of the movement included throwing stones, but the argument would be that by regional standards this is already nonviolent.
- [9] Major violence was used by government forces, but probably against the workers trade union movement rather than against the student democracy movement.
- [10] The fact that violence was used in Romania does not make the actions in Poland and the GDR less nonviolent. In Hungary the transformation was a conventional, slow political change, and transformations in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria—not to mention the Soviet Union—can probably best be seen as domino effects from GDR and Poland. In GDR mass migration was a major nonviolent tactic. The nonviolent counter-coup in August 1991 in Moscow belongs here, but with some doubts: not because the Yeltsin counter-coup was not nonviolent, but because the coup itself may not have been credibly violent, but possibly staged (e.g., as a way of getting rid of Gorbachev, who at that time had dismantled the Soviet Empire, but not given into Western economic demands). The coup was amateurish and half-hearted.

To write the history of this violent century without also exploring its nonviolence, is to malign the century even further. Such negligence reveals considerable ideological bias and intellectual incompetence, widespread in “security studies.”

Here is a list of ten basic mechanisms behind nonviolence:

- [1] The threat of direct violence or the structural violence is intolerable to major groups in the country.
- [2] A constructive alternative has been formulated and communicated to Other in speech, writing, demonstrations, etc.
- [3] There is a clear and present danger that violence of some kind will be used if active nonviolence is practiced, in other words, a real risk to Self is involved.
- [4] The commitment to nonviolence is clear, applying not only to acts, but also to speech, and, if possible, to thought.
- [5] There are Self-to-Other acts of friendliness, love.

- [6] Nonviolent action then serves to communicate, to Other and outsiders, that Self will never surrender to oppression, is willing to face the consequences, and wants a positive relation.
- [7] Dissociation (non-cooperation and civil disobedience) from Other the oppressor and association with Other the person may then change the mind—and even the heart—of Other.
- [8] If the oppressor uses violence to counter nonviolence, then demoralization of Other facing the consequences of his violence on nonviolent resisters may serve to change his mind.
- [9] If Other uses long-distance violence, including economic boycott, to avoid facing the consequences, then outside parties must be mobilized to make the consequences clear to him.
- [10] If the socio-psychological distance Self-Other is based on Other dehumanizing Self, then nonviolence may have to include outsiders in a Great Chain of Nonviolence. Some of the intermediaries will share many social characteristics with the oppressed; others will be socially closer to the oppressors. Gandhi mediated the nonviolence of the masses to their rulers.

Uppermost in the mind should be the three basic concerns of nonviolent action: That action is to be directed against the bad relation between Self and Other, not against Other as such; that action should build love rather than hatred, and peaceful rather than violent behaviour; and that Other is at all times invited to share this enriching experience—including assurances to Other that there is space for him in a future society. The point is to behave in such a way that the conflict becomes transformed upwards. The parties should emerge from the conflict not only with better social relations, but also as better persons than they were before, better equipped to take on new conflicts nonviolently. Those inclined to violence yesterday or today may thus become the mediators of tomorrow.

Of course this does not always work. Self may have the first six points under control, but then Other may fail to respond as hoped for in the next four points. One possibility is to try again; another is capitulation, which should never be viewed as permanent. To accept violence is in itself violence.

Gandhians would emphasize the role of greater purification of Self for conflict transformation to take place. This theory has the advantage of placing the burden on OneSelf and on something one can do (e.g., through meditation), and the additional advantage of being non-falsifiable (“There has been no change of heart in Other? You need more Self-purification!”).

This factor should certainly not be excluded, as nonviolence so obviously does work spiritually, from spirit to spirit. But that should not exclude political work on, and with, outside parties. In mechanisms [9] and [10] above they are crucial.

At any rate, let nobody claim that no conflict exists—no matter how internalized the hatred, how institutionalized the violent behavior, and how intractable the contradiction, the incompatibility, the issue—that cannot be transformed through nonviolence. I am *not* saying *nonviolence always works*. There is no panacea

hypothesis. But many oppressed groups might have come much further toward autonomy had they used nonviolence.

The hypothesis that *violence never works* can be argued, however:

First: There are the number of people killed and bereaved; the number of people traumatized in body, mind and spirit, and those affected by that; the physical damage to human habitat and nature. Most of this harm is irreversible. And these are only the visible effects of violence, ignoring basic side-effects—like mainstream economists excluding externalities of economic action. Only by ignoring this vital point can the prophets of violence reach a positive conclusion as to the use of violence.

Second: If violence leads to change in Self-Other relations, then this is done by incapacitating Other. But an enforced outcome is not sustainable because it is not accepted, and is unacceptable because a defeated Other is no longer Other.

Third: There has been no positive transformation in Self, but even a negative transformation since a victory may trigger an addiction to violence, and lead to more violence next time.

Fourth: There has been no positive transformation of Other, but possibly a negative transformation since that defeat may also trigger an addiction to violence and lead to revenge, one barrier having been removed by having been the object of violence, so that there is no danger of incurring a moral deficit.

Hence the conclusion: Gandhi was so much more realistic.

And yet all that has just been said about nonviolence, the cases and the underlying assumptions, would today have been unthinkable without that Indian gift to humanity. His language, here softly translated for people of our times and maybe with social science inclinations, was spiritual, very far from the materialism and behaviorism of the “Skinner box,” conditioning pigeons through the administration of shocks and sugar (translation: bombing and trade/aid). Maybe Gandhi simply had much more respect for human beings, and with that respect also made them worthy of his respect?

One thing is certain: Nonviolence as a key component in conflict transformation has come to stay. The main obstacle in the experience of this author is a macho/warrior logic defining violence as the male and heroic/courageous thing to do, seeing nonviolence as female. We are in the center of feminist critique of politics saying this; they have said it better than most. I remember being called as a mediator between Kurdish factions to the place used by the French presidency, Rambouillet Castle outside Paris, July 1994. The factions had been killing each other. But 200 Kurdish women had managed, nonviolently, to bring about a ceasefire. I urged the male negotiators to bring those women into the process, and by that suggestion managed to unify them. “We should fight like women? Imagine Kurdish women won with such nonviolence, what would then happen to us? We should live under the yoke of women leaders for the rest of our lives?”

I think this is where the debate is mainly located, not about efficacy. Gandhi knew that. To him women were the best *satyagrahi*. Also in that sense was he more modern than our tradition-driven politicians. And much, much more realistic.

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## Chapter 8

# High Road, Low Road: Charting the Course for Peace Journalism

Imagine a blackout on everything we associate with medical practice; never to be reported in the media.<sup>1</sup> Disease, however, is to be reported fully, in gruesome detail, particularly when elite persons are struck. The process of disease is seen as natural, as a fight between the human body and whatever is the pathogenic factor, a micro-organism, trauma, stress and strain. Sometimes one side wins, sometimes the other. It is like a game, even like a sports game. Fair play means to give either side a fair chance, not interfering with the ways of nature where the stronger eventually wins. The task of journalism is to report this struggle objectively, hoping that our side, the body, wins.

That kind of journalism would be disease-oriented, and the journalist could refer to himself as a disease journalist or correspondent. He would be firmly rooted in the tradition of midwifing negative events hitting elites into news. His concern would not be to highlight how diseases might be overcome, except by means as violent as the disease itself (open heart surgery, chemo- or radiotherapy.) The softer approaches would go under-reported; so would anything known as preventive medicine.

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published as: “Constructive approaches to community and political conflict”, in: *Track Two*, Vol 7, No 4, December 1998, pp. 7-10.

Fortunately, reporting on health and disease has liberated itself from that fatalistic tradition. There is also a clear tradition of health journalism.<sup>2</sup> But there is not, yet, a corresponding tradition of ‘peace journalism’ whereas ‘war and violence journalism’ seem to be in good standing. But exactly what could be the content of that concept, peace journalism?

In general there seem to be two ways of looking at a conflict, the high road and the low road, depending on whether the focus is on the *conflict* and its *peaceful transformation*, or on the meta-conflict that comes after the root conflict, created by *violence* and *war*, and the question of who wins. Media even confuse the two, talk about conflict when they mean violence.

*The low road*, dominant in the media, sees a conflict as a battle, as sports arena or gladiator circus. The parties, usually reduced to two, are combatants in a struggle to impose their goals. The reporting model is that of a military command: who advances, who capitulates short of their goals; counting the losses in terms of numbers killed, wounded, and material damage. The zero-sum perspective draws upon sports reporting where “winning is not everything, it is the only thing”. The same perspective is applied to negotiations as verbal battles: who outsmarts the other, who comes out closest to his original position. War journalism has sports journalism, and court journalism!, as models.

*The high road*, the road of peace journalism, would focus on conflict transformation. Conflicts would be seen as a challenge to the world, like having 2,000 nations wanting a nation-state in a world with only 200 countries, and only 20 nation-states. As people, groups, countries, and groups of countries seem to stand in each other’s way (that is what conflict is about) there is a clear *danger* of violence. But in conflict there is also a clear *opportunity* for human progress, using

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<sup>2</sup> An example would be the excellent Health (and Science) page in the *International Herald Tribune*, which could serve as a good model for a Peace/Conflict Transformation page, filled with information, reports on new thinking, critical evaluation. To explore this analogy consider the typical finding from a UCLA study about TV violence as reported in *Washington Post*, 6 February 1996, “Study Finds Real Harm in TV Violence”:

- “Perpetrators of violent acts on TV go unpunished 73 % of the time”, “When violence is presented without punishment, viewers are more likely to learn the lesson that violence is successful”.
- Most violent portrayals fail to show the consequences of a violent act, “no harm to the victims” (47 %), “no pain” (58 %).
- Few programmes (only 4 %) emphasize nonviolent alternatives to solving problems. Translated into illness/health reporting this means:
  - Nothing is done about a disease 73 % of the time;
  - Disease does no harm (47 %), leaves no pain (58 %);
  - There is no alternative to disease, such as prevention (96 %).
  - Centuries ago this was an adequate description of attitudes to illness/health: little was done, disease is bad luck. That has fortunately changed, but violence in the media has continued unabated; see Thomas E. Radecki, “Violent Behavior Images Diet of Media Violence”, *Social Alternatives*, May 1987, pp 8–21.

the conflict to find new ways, being imaginative, creative, transforming the conflict so that the opportunities take the upper hand. Without violence.

There is no argument that violence should not be reported. *But the first victim in a war is not truth that is only the second victim. The first victim is, of course, peace.* Good reporting—low or high road—should obviously be truthful. But truth journalism alone is not peace journalism. And truth does not come easily given the tendency to take sides once the “who wins” perspective has been adopted. If one side is backed by one’s own country, nation, class or paper/station/channel, the low road invites untruthfulness, as witnessed in the Gulf, Somalia and Yugoslavia wars.

Here is a short list of tasks for peace correspondents, elaborated below:

- [1] What is the conflict about? Who are the parties, what are their real goals, counting the parties beyond the conflict arena where the violence, if any, takes place? The list is often long.
- [2] What are the deeper roots of the conflict, in structure and culture, including the history of both?
- [3] What kind of ideas exist about other outcomes than one party imposing itself on the other, particularly creative, new ideas? Can such ideas be sufficiently powerful to prevent violence?
- [4] If violence occurs, how about such invisible effects as trauma and hatred, and the wish for revenge and for more glory?
- [5] Who are working to prevent violence, what are their visions of conflict outcomes, their methods, how can they be supported?
- [6] Who initiate reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution, and who are only reaping benefits like reconstruction contracts?

More reporting of this kind, and the conflict in and over Northern Ireland would have entered a more peaceful phase long ago. Focus on the violence of IRA/RUC only hid the conflict and nourished more violence. Focus on nonviolent outcomes, empathy with all parties, creativity: and peace may come.

Building on this introduction, Table 8.1 is an effort to fill both concepts with operational content<sup>3</sup>:

Good reporting on conflict is not a compromise, a little from the left hand column, a little from the right, but favours peace journalism and opposes war journalism. If a society sees a need for war reporting, better leave it to the ministries of (dis)information, of defence (war), of foreign affairs, etc. Do not corrupt the media by giving the task to them, having them take it on voluntarily, or forcing

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<sup>3</sup> Lest the journalist reader comes up with facile remark that this is only arm-chair theorizing constructed in some university, permit me to add that I worked three years part time as a journalist for the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, 1960–1962 and in 1965, producing a number of radio and TV programs. I remember very well the thrill of interviewing the Dalai Lama, Fidel Castro etc., and how much more meaningful interviews with more common people were in understanding what was going on.



**Table 8.1** Peace journalism versus war journalism. *Source* the author

Peace/conflict journalism	War/violence journalism
<p><b>I. Peace/conflict-oriented</b>                      explore conflict <i>formation</i>,                      x parties, y goals, z issues                      general 'win, win' orientation                      open space, open time;                      causes and outcomes anywhere,                      also in history/culture                      making conflicts transparent                      giving voice to all parties;                      empathy, understanding                      see conflict/war as problem,                      focus on conflict creativity                      humanization of all sides;                      more so the worse the weapons  <i>proactive</i>: prevention before                      any violence/war occurs                      focus on invisible effects of violence                      (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</p> <p><b>II. Truth-oriented</b>                      expose untruths on all sides                      uncover all cover-ups</p> <p><b>III. People-Oriented</b>                      focus on suffering all over;                      on women, aged, children,                      giving voice to the voiceless                      give name to all evil-doers                      focus on people peace-makers</p> <p><b>IV. Solution-oriented</b>                      peace = nonviolence + creativity                      highlight peace initiatives,                      also to prevent more war                      focus on structure, culture                      the peaceful society                      aftermath: resolution, re-construction,                      reconciliation</p>	<p><b>I. War/violence-oriented</b>                      focus on conflict <i>arena</i>,                      2 parties, 1 goal (win), war                      general zero-sum orientation                      closed space, closed time;                      causes and exits in arena,                      who threw the first stone                      making wars opaque/secret                      'us-them' journalism,                      propaganda, voice, for 'us'                      see 'them' as the problem,                      focus on who prevails in war                      dehumanization of 'them';                      more so the worse the weapon  <i>reactive</i>: waiting for violence before                      reporting                      focus only on visible effect of violence                      (killed, wounded and material damage)</p> <p><b>II. Propaganda-oriented</b>                      expose 'their' untruths                      help 'our' cover-ups/lies</p> <p><b>III. Elite-Oriented</b>                      focus on 'our' suffering;                      on able-bodied elite males,                      being their mouth-piece                      give name of their evil-doer                      focus on elite peace-makers</p> <p><b>IV. Victory-oriented</b>                      peace = victory + cease-fire                      conceal peace-initiative,                      before victory is at hand                      focus on treaty, institution                      the controlled society                      leaving for another war, return if the                      old flares up</p>

them into that kind of journalism like the Pentagon did in the Gulf war, following the English model from the Falkland/Malvinas war.<sup>4</sup>

We tend to focus on wars between states, but the advice for peace journalism applies also to violence between other groups, to rape and wife battering, mistreatment of children, race and national strife, class conflict, where violence is reported and blame usually fixed on one side.

The war focus in war journalism will polarize and escalate, calling for hatred and more violence to avenge and stop 'them', in line with a neo-fascist theory of war termination: let them fight and kill each other till they get 'ready for the negotiating table'.<sup>5</sup> The broader category is 'peace enforcement', peace by warlike means.

Peace journalism tries to depolarize by showing the black and white of all sides, and to de-escalate by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence. How successful has to be seen. But changing the discourse within which something is thought, spoken of and acted upon is a very powerful approach.<sup>6</sup>

Peace journalism stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies, but is not 'investigative journalism' in the sense of uncovering lies only on 'our' side. Truth holds for all sides, just like exploration of the conflict formation and giving voice (*glasnost*) to all.

Peace journalism is a 'journalism of attachment' to all actual and potential victims; war journalism only attaches to 'our' side. The task is to report truthfully both war and peace, shaming the adage that 'peace must be working, there is nothing in the media'.<sup>7</sup> The task of peace journalism is serious, professional reporting, making these processes more transparent. The task of peace advocacy is better left to peace workers.

Peace Journalism does essentially what journalists do anyhow, keeping in mind a maximum number of items from the left hand column. The eye for the essential,

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<sup>4</sup> This is described very clearly by the leading specialist on war reporting, Philip Knightley, in his *The First Casualty*, New York, London: Harcourt Brace, 1975 ("truth" is his first casualty, although it is of course 'peace'). Also see Mira Behan's excellent *Kriegstrommeln: Medien, Krieg und Politik*, München, DTV, 1996, on the war reporting from Yugoslavia. In that case the role of the public relations agencies (particularly Hill & Knowlton and Ruder Finn) seems to have been so massive, and filters to sort out PR virtual reality from real reality so few, that it is difficult to assess the situation without knowing what the PR firms transmitted.

For an earlier period, *Reporting World War II, American Journalism*, Parts I (1938–1944), II (1944–1946), Library of America, 1995 is an excellent source. War is described as 'organized insanity', as 'madness'; attacks are not 'surgical', civilians are not 'collaterals' (that kind of sanitized Newspeak is the predicament of our generation). Still, the focus is on war, not peace.

<sup>5</sup> Anybody advocating anything like that might ask whether they themselves would be willing to be killed, sacrificed, for the sake of somebody getting to the 'table', some kind of altar. In that case the faith in the 'table' as peace instrument must be as high as the patriotism of yesteryear.

<sup>6</sup> See Johan Galtung and Richard Vincent, *U.S. GLASNOST: Missing Political Themes in U.S. Media Discourse*, Cresskill NJ: Hampton Press (March 1999).

<sup>7</sup> A good example would be many years of disarmament and cooperation in reconstructing the country in Nicaragua, by the Centro de Estudios Sociales (Apartado 1747, Managua, Nicaragua), headed by Alejandro Bendaña and Zoilamé\_Ica Narváez.

the devotion both to facts and to hope, the need to be a good writer, to work quickly and hence to be a good administrator of own time; all of that remains the same.

But new types of knowledge would be needed, such as identifying the conflict formation, the parties, their goals and the issues, and not fall into the trap of believing that the key actors are where the action (violence, war) is. In medicine no physician would make the mistake of seeing a swollen ankle as an ‘ankle disease’, s/he would be on the watch for possible disturbances in the cardio-vascular system and the heart. The problem is not necessarily where it shows up, that holds for the body as well as for the conflict, for a ‘race riot’ and a case of mistreatment of children as well as for inter-nation and inter-state conflicts. To know where to look requires practice, learning from more experienced colleagues, and from the past. What would peace reporting in earlier wars have looked like?

How can the drama of working for peace, the struggle to see the violence and the festering conflict as the problem, and from there to arrive at conflict transformation, be reported in such a way that it becomes exciting news? How is excessive moralism avoided keeping in mind the basic point: reduce human suffering, increase human happiness? Not easy. But not impossible.

An example: reporting on peace proposals. Somebody has come up with a plan: an intergovernmental organization, NGO, government, some other conflict party, an individual. The task of the peace journalist is to identify such initiatives, give them voice, highlight positive points, stimulating dialogue, not signaling any agreement or disagreement, add the plan to the peace culture of the conflict provided it stands for *peace by peaceful means*. But the task is also to ask difficult questions, pointing out possible deficits. Here is a short checklist aiming more at the plan than at the person or group behind it:

- [1] What was the method behind the plan? Dialogue with parties, and in that case with all the parties? Some trial negotiation? Analogy with other conflicts? Intuition?
- [2] To what extent is the plan acceptable to all parties?  
If not, what can be done about it?
- [3] To what extent is the plan, if realized, self-sustainable?  
If not, what can be done about it?
- [4] Is the plan based on autonomous action by the conflict parties, or does it depend on outsiders?
- [5] To what extent is there a *process* in the plan, about who shall do what, how, when and where, or is it only *outcome*?
- [6] To what extent is the plan based on what only elites can do, what only people can do, or on what both can do?
- [7] Does the plan foresee an ongoing conflict resolution or is the idea a single-shot agreement?

- [8] Is peace/conflict transformation education for people, for elites or for both, built into the plan?
- [9] If there has been violence, to what extent does the plan contain elements of reconciliation?
- [10] If there has been violence, to what extent does the plan contain elements of rehabilitation/reconstruction?
- [11] If the plan doesn't work, is the plan reversible?
- [12] Even if the plan does work for this conflict, does it create new conflicts or problems? Is it a good deal?

In other words: do not take peace and conflict work lightly!

Given the urgency the task is much overdue, but better late than never.

*What would a code of peace journalism look like?* A war journalist is basically operating under the rules imposed by his military command. To whom or what does the peace journalist owe his/her allegiance? To 'peace'? Maybe too abstract. To present and future victims of violence/war? Better, but what does that mean? How about keeping secrets? Even if the long term goals, the what and why, are clear and out in the open, the who, how, when and where of a major nonviolent campaign may have to count on a surprise effect.

*How could a monitoring process be initiated?* Peace journalism, like anything else, should be evaluated, including quality (with prizes, of course), quantity (what percentage of the media are carrying material of that kind), and the extent to which this reaches the reader/listener/viewer. The hypothesis that the public is disinterested could be tested and differentiated: who accept (women? young people? middle class?), who reject (men? middle aged? lower/upper class?).

For good peace work empathy, creativity and nonviolence are needed. Exactly the same is required of the peace journalist. And that includes dialogues with war journalists.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Many, reporting war or peace or both, are "Journalists Who Risk Death" *International Herald Tribune*, 5 August 1997, by Anthony Lewis: "In the last 10 years, 173 Latin American reporters, photographers, columnists and editors have been murdered. ... They were just doing their ordinary job: trying to publish the truth". Risk should unite all kinds of journalists." For an excellent introduction for any kind of journalist to the intricacies of conflict, see Richard E. Rubenstein et al., *Frameworks for Interpreting Conflict: A Handbook for Journalists*, Fairfax: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 1994. The present author's *Peace By Peaceful Means*, London, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1996, Part II is about conflict analysis and resolution. For the reality of war reporting, see Wilhelm Kempf, *Gulf War Revisited: A Comparative Study of the Gulf War Coverage in American and European Media*, Konstanz: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung, September 1996, and by the same author *Media Coverage of Third Party Initiatives—A Case of Peace Journalism?* Projektgruppe Friedensforschung, Conference on Peace Journalism, Konstanz, 13–15 June 1997. From that same conference, also see the excellent paper by Heikki Luostarnen and Rune Ottosen, *Challenges for Journalism in Restricted Conflicts After the Second World War*, also with a checklist of what to look out for.

## Further Readings

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# Chapter 9

## From a Twentieth Century of War to a Twenty-First Century of Peace?

### 9.1 The Twentieth Century: From Border Wars to Fault-Line Wars

Too optimistic? Oh yes, especially when written under the shadows of Western civilization at its worst: Orthodox killing Muslims, Protestant/Catholics bombing the Orthodox; old patterns re-enacted. But let us try, '21st century' not seen as January 1 Year 2 K but rather in the neighbourhood of December 31 Year 2099.<sup>1</sup>

Being located near the watershed between two centuries, even two millennia, maybe we start looking back at the 20th century now ending. We know ours was a century of horrors: wars/genocide/torture, repression/exploitation/alienation, and ideologies like colonialism/bolshevism/nazism/dai-to-a/maoism. But what were the major conflict formations? What was it about?

Coming out of the 19th century there were considerable residues from feudalism and slavery, and, indeed, colonialism. All over the world the struggle against the suppression of women and the young, and against the exploitation of the non-whites and the workers set the tone for a century focused on *gender and generation, race and class* and the liberation of the suppressed, including their right to vote and to be elected. And then there was that fifth fault-line in the human construction, the *nation*, the struggle for equal citizenship, including by becoming an independent country, like my own country, Norway, from 1905.

All over the world the ruling *states* were basically the instruments of Males: Older, White and Bourgeois, from Anglo-Saxon and other Western nations, ruling directly or indirectly, through their vast systems of colonialism and imperialism. The struggle against that tiny MOWB-syndrome on earth is still on.

That fault-line struggle was projected on the macro-level of inter-state relations in two major conflict formations:

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published in Paul Wapner and Lester Edwin J. Ruiz (eds.), *Principled World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 250–260.

- *the struggle for decolonization* (including the US Civil War), essentially a struggle for the liberation of the non-white, pitting countries in the Northwest, the USA and Northwestern Europe, against most of the rest of the world (including, one century earlier, England against the American Revolution); and
- *the struggle against countries where working classes to some extent had become a ruling class*, under the banner of nazism in Central Europe, of fascism in Southern Europe, and the banner of communism in Eastern Europe (in the Balkans under both of them).

We might talk in terms of *category as opposed to state wars*, with all kinds of ideological overlays, and considerable sympathy for the three ideologies mentioned in the Northwest corner. There was also a First World War, pitting the United States against Germany in the struggle to be successor to Great Britain in the world system. But that was a *classical state war*, like from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia onward, where elites, males, older, white and bourgeois, from Anglo-Saxon and other Western nations, used *their* states and *their* armies against each other. There was also this aspect in the Second world war, but less so than in the First world war. There was a working class (often called ‘populist’) element; Nazi, Fascist or Communist, hated by that 19th century transplant into the first half of the twentieth century, Sir Winston Churchill, and his class. From München onward the policy was clear: *let the lower classes fight each other*, in a European civil war of communists against nazi-fascists. However, in the end MOWB turned out to need the help of the Soviet Union against nazism, and got it, as ‘allies’.

The Soviet Union survived and the Cold War was the second confrontation within this syndrome. The Soviet Union was not defeated, but imploded, as an absurd society. As the century came to a close that major challenge to the Northwest and the MOWB elite, legitimized by the human rights and democratic order originally brought into being to put some constraints on their power, submitted to capitalism (Serbia a little less so).

History moves slowly. No agenda has been completed; in fact, human agendas rarely are, they linger on. We would expect the Northwestern corner of the world, under the leadership of the USA and its little UK helper, to continue the pattern of race/class exploitation, and to continue preparing for the Big Battle with exploited races and classes. In other words, we would expect class conflict, between colored, very poor people and “males: older, white and bourgeois from Anglo-Saxon and kindred Western nations” to deepen. And we would expect inter-regional formations, like the US quest for control of Eurasia (JCS memorandum 570/2 from 1943,<sup>2</sup> repeated by Brzezinski in his *Foreign Affairs* 75th anniversary article<sup>3</sup>), by NATO expanding eastward and AMPO westward, to be a key to the 21st century.

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<sup>2</sup> Planning for post-war bases began in 1942, barely a year into the Pacific War, when Franklin D. Roosevelt requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a global study of bases for an “International Police Force. The military complied by presenting Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 570/2 to the President in the autumn of 1943. Prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, JCS 570/2 divided the world into three areas: “participating or reciprocal military rights” [Atlantic

(Footnote 2 continued)

locations]—“exclusive military rights” [Alaska, the Philippines, Micronesia, Central America, and the Caribbean] and “participating rights” as one of the Great Powers enforcing peace [Indochina, Eastern China, Korea and Japan]. From Hayes, Zarsko and Bello, *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific* (New York: Penguin 1986), p. 19, among other sources drawing on E. Converse, *United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System 1942–1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). The ‘three areas’ correspond, roughly, to the NATO system of April 1949, expanded in scope and domain 50 years later; the TIAP system (*Tratado Interamericano de Paz*) or Rio de Janeiro system, of 1947; and the AMPO system based on the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty of 1951. The foundation was JCS 570/2 1943, and “by late 1945, the military high command had come to the consensus, reflected in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document 570/40, that bases in the Philippines, Marianas, and the Ryukyus would be the most vital in the Pacific”. A modest beginning.

<sup>3</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia”, *Foreign Affairs* September/October 1997, 75th Anniversary, Vol. 76 No. 5, pp. 50–64. The title reflects both a US/Western tendency to think big, and to be arrogant: to have a geostrategy about somebody else is already questionable, to do so treating a major part of humanity as objects for own security and enhancement is beyond questionable. A collection of basic points: “Eurasia is home to most of the world’s politically assertive and dynamic states. All the historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia. The world’s most populous aspirants to regional hegemony, China and India, are in Eurasia, *as are all the potential political or economic challengers to America’s primacy* (italics ours, p. 50). *Comment*: What does it mean to us/US is the only perspective. “A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia” (p. 50). *Comment*: A very clearly expressed ambition by the third region. “What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America’s global primacy and historical legacy” (p. 51). *Comment*: Code words: Global primacy = world hegemony historical legacy = manifest destiny. “In the short run, the United States should consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia. This strategy will put a premium on political maneuvering and diplomatic manipulation, *preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition that could challenge America’s primacy*, not to mention the remote possibility of any one state seeking to do so” (italics ours, p. 51). *Comment*: Codewords: perpetuate pluralism = split and rule, Political maneuvering/diplomatic manipulation = machiavellianism This type of article will rather engender a ‘hostile coalition’. “—the only real alternative to American leadership is international anarchy: (pp. 51f). *Comment*: Not one word wasted on the equity/legality option. “In a volatile Eurasia, the immediate task is to ensure that no state or combination of states gains the ability to expel the United States or even diminish its decisive role” (p. 52). *Comment*: US presence an occupation? Also against popular will? “Its/careful strategic calculus/goals should be to divert Chinese power into constructive regional accommodation and to channel Japanese energy into wider international partnerships” (p. 68). *Comment*: China should behave well in the region; Japan should engage in wider partnership/above all with the USA/. Thereby, “China’s aspirations to regional preeminence and global status would be diminished” (p. 59). “Japan should not be America’s unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Far East, nor should it be America’s principal Asian military partner.” “A disoriented Japan, whether lurching toward rearmament or a separate accommodation with China, would spell the end of the American role in the Asia-Pacific region—” (p. 63). “Unlike China, which can seek global power by first becoming a regional power, Japan can gain global influence only if it eschews the quest for regional power”. *Comment*: Who, then, is America’s principal Asian military partner? China?—then better not bomb China’s Beograd embassy. “—Americans and Japanese must first set in motion a triangular political-security dialogue that engages China. Such three-way American-Japanese-Chinese security talks could eventually involve more Asian participants, and later lead to a dialogue with



But what happened to gender, generation and nation? They are there. We would expect nations of all kinds to try to break out of states they consider prisons. They will get the support of the Northwest to the extent they represent the upper tier interests mentioned; otherwise not (example: Israel/Palestine). And we would expect ugly backlashes against women, for instance by decreasing their numbers through selective abortion; and against the old, maybe through patterns of euthanasia. Some of this may be avoided if the level of awareness is high enough.

In short, we expect the following conflict formations;

- *Geoeconomic conflict formation: The World Economic Crisis;*
- *Geomilitary conflict formation: The NATO/AMPO Expansion;*
- *Geopolitical conflict formation: The State/Nation Controversy;*
- *Geocultural conflict formation: The Christian-Muslim Antinomy;*
- *Three Europes conflict formation: Cath/Prot-Orthodox-Muslim.*

In all five class and/or race are prevalent. These are not the classical formations with elites using states to move borders. States are used, but to fight categories across fault-lines.

The general absence of solidarity with the poor is remarkable, with the gap ratio in purchasing power between the top and the bottom 20 % expanding at a rate above 3 % annually (the rate of growth of the average is below 3 %) and 3 persons owning more than the 48 % of the world's countries, at the bottom. That the poor to a very large extent are non-Christian, coloured and/or women goes without saying. They live all over; not only in Eurasia, however. But their states, the big states, are in Eurasia: Russia, China, India, Pakistan—and the sum total of what the USA has designated as 'rogue' or 'pariah' states is not so small either. Add up all of this, assume 4+ nuclear powers among them, assume an increasing level of coordination to the point of de facto alliance formation, and the NATO/AMPO system headed by the USA has managed to produce a worthy enemy for a clash of super-regions. The only positive point the present author is able to see in this picture is the relatively quick solution of the Kashmir problem: Eurasia cannot tolerate a conflict of that magnitude in its midst. The USA, on the other hand, will

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(Footnote 3 continued)

the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe. That, in turn, could eventually pave the way for a series of conferences by European and Asian states on security issues. A transcontinental security system would thus begin to take shape." (pp. 63f). *Comment:* With the United States at both sides of the table. "Geostrategic success in that venture would be a fitting legacy to America's role as the first and only global superpower" (p. 64). *Comment:* Any effort to manage, even micro-manage, others (Russia should become a confederation of European Russia, a Siberian Republic and a Far Eastern Republic, Ukraine should see herself as a part of Central Europe, the European Union must admit Turkey, etc.) *without giving them the same realistic chance to micromanage the USA* is known as hegemony, certainly fitting to "America's role as the first and only global superpower", and carrying the seeds of its own destruction because of the counterforces it will produce. Any effort to conceive of the world in terms of regions, states and governments as if human beings did not matter will carry the seeds of its own destruction because of the popular forces it will generate—like WTO and MAI.

need and use to the utmost the Balkan and the Korea conflicts, and supply all their allies with missiles.

## 9.2 The Horrors of the Twentieth Century and the Role of the State

All these phenomena have one thing in common: the *state* is the key instrument for internal and external power, making the ownership of the state a key issue (MOWB in the central states, their trusted clients in the periphery, and anti-MOWB in the evil states). The state was certainly used for the world wars, as classical wars, and as category wars, including for genocide. The state was used for colonial wars, also including genocide. The state has been used for torture; non-state torture is a trifle in comparison. The state is the ideal instrument for repression, depriving everybody under its sway of civil and political human rights, including their lives under capital punishment. Cooperating with capital forces the state can also sustain patterns of exploitation, depriving everybody under its command of economic, social and cultural rights. And, inspired and informed by its cultural elites the state can engage in massive alienation like depriving groups under its command of their own idiom, their myths, their belief systems.

*But one thing the state is not good at: abolishing itself.* Non-states often fight states, like in the struggle against colonialism, against MOWB, or like in the struggle against capitalism, against MOWB, or women fighting MOWB, or younger people fighting MOWB. But they all tend to end up either in the state, or by founding a new state, after a secession struggle, or after a revolution. In short, the state/non-state dialectic tends to strengthen the state-system at the expense of some few single states. Anti-MOWB movements conquer states, turn them into their instruments, and even go to war against MOWB-states. But chances are that they end up as neo-MOWB states.

Why? Very simple: the state-system has a certain logic and is capable of shaping different people the same way, as can be seen today in the war of social democrats against Serbia. The old adage “to he who has a hammer the world looks like a nail” holds also for social democrats when they become statesmen. They may also be more sensitive to Serbian blatant infraction of human rights, and more sensitive to the calls for Atlantic solidarity than conservative, nation-centric MOWBs.

Being the successor to the absolute monarchies, or to the monarchs or princes themselves, with their monopoly on force, states tend to see conflict as raw material for their power aggrandizement. A conflict solved is an opportunity foregone. Conflicts shake the system, some parts loosen, are up for grabs. Big states, like big vultures, circle in the air, waiting for the opportunity. They may bomb, a little or much, softening the *melee* of smaller states and non-states, prying some parts loose, rearrange, oftentimes calling cemetery/desert “peace” (Tacitus).

So, how can I retain a minimum of optimism confronted with this very contemporary war over a conflict it would even have been easy to solve (consult Yugoslavia under [www.transcend.org](http://www.transcend.org)), and with such rather dark visions for the 21st century? Because of an analytical category I have found interesting: *absurdity*. I define it as the decoupling between culture and structure. An example: the Soviet Union. The culture contained visions of utopia, of elimination of not only misery but classes, war and violence and repression. What they got was poverty, but also a new class society, war, violence and repression. The culture contained a major cognition, predicting that capitalism would collapse. Capitalism failed to live down to the prediction.

The classical case for absurdity as a category is, of course, Anderson's Emperor with no clothes on; and only a child was adult enough to voice the decoupling. The adults were all brainwashed by the culture to live in virtual rather than real reality, like people breathing the thin air of financial economy (culture), oblivious of the crisis in the productive economy of overprotection and underconsumption (structure). Needless to say, absurdity constitutes a very unstable equilibrium. In the Soviet Union I date the absurdity crisis from the early 1970s. From that point on the system could only be kept alive by the stepped up threat from the USA (the 'theatre' missiles).

The absurdity of saving lives through bombing and of protecting the rule of law by breaking it, does not pass unnoticed. Bombing/destroying Iraq, bombing/destroying Serbia, bombing Sudan, bombing Afghanistan, all of this after having destroyed Korea and then Viêt Nam—in all cases with results very different from what was expected, does not pass unnoticed. Of course, there is no assumption that MOWBAS (with Anglo-Saxon for US/UK explicitly added) will pay attention; they are not the world's most belligerent countries for nothing. But the rest of the world starts paying attention to such points, and may one day arrive at a conclusion: the world has a major problem, not terrorism, nor small scale local potentates although all such problems have to be taken seriously, and creatively. The name of that problem is the United States of America, and its mother, turned little daughter. From that point on alliances will start withering, the blind allegiance under the spell of US charm, opulence, intellectual creativity, and leadership will fade away. A turning point is coming, quickly; USA, beware.

I would then add: this could be wrong. Do not mistake the US elite top of the system for the system. More important is a deeper phenomenon we can witness every day: the absurdity of the state system. Interestingly, the demise of the state as the guardian of welfare, as an economic actor and protector of distribution, went extremely quickly, using the absurdities of the late Soviet system for political leverage. That may easily pave the way for more basic questions: how about the capacity of the state to protect its citizens against violence relative to its capacity to kill, including its own? How about the capacity of the state system to solve its own conflicts? Could it simply be that state system and peace system are mutually incompatible?

Basic thesis: *we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of the state system; not the end of the beginning*. The feudal system ended because it killed, repressed,

exploited, alienated more people than it provided with survival (secure lives), well-being (a reasonable livelihood), freedom and identity. There were/are islands and niches where these four basic needs are reasonably well met. But certainly not the system as a whole.

That means that we are probably *heading for the Big Turning Point*, like for monarchy, slavery, colonialism, patriarchy. All four may continue in softer forms. Centuries of struggle against the English monarch of absolute powers led to a turning point, so did the English anti-slavery campaign, so did Gandhi's anti-colonial struggle, so does the feminist revolution. Ultimately the anti-nuclear movement will reach even the US Government, the only place from which the instruments of nuclear holocaust may finally be delegitimized. So will the anti-war movement. With neither wars nor peace the state is as absurd as the Emperor.

### 9.3 The Mixed World: States Together with Non-States

Global governance will be defined here as the concerted action for meeting human needs by territorial and non-territorial actors together. The capacity of the state-system to put constraints on itself being very limited, world government by a concert of states is not what we are talking about. One additional reason is that the road seems to pass through regions that develop into super-states conducting super-wars, in other words what we may be heading for now in the relation between the Catholic/Protestant, Slavic-Orthodox and Turko-Muslim blocs. A Russo-Chinese bloc may take shape with India/Pakistan, brought into being by the synchronized expansion of NATO eastward and AMPO westward. But these can also be the absurd phenomena that will lead us closer to the turning points.

The question is, what then? Does the non-state take over? Not if we are thinking in terms of governance, concerted state-nonstate action; non-state essentially meaning civil society, which in turn splits into two components, the international people's organizations, IPOs, also known as NGOs (non-territorial) and the local authorities, LAs (territorial and non-territorial, some kind of archipelago). Much has been said about these systems. There is the danger or romanticizing them, especially if we forget that nations, groups of people with a strong sense of what is sacred to them in space and time, also are NGOs of some sort, often of a very vicious, exclusivist, dualist sort, yearning to creep into the hide of a their own state to wreak havoc on earth, or at least on the neighbours. However, these are the exceptions. Basically one fact stands out: non-states, be that NGOs or LAs, are unarmed.

We can now distinguish between five phases in the evolution of the state/nonstate dialectic, of the total system:

- *Phase 1*: In Europe the modern *state system* dates from the *Treaty of Westphalia* of 24 October 1648, 350 years ago, with the *right of war in the interest of the state* as one characteristic. In China that was the system at the axial time, from

- 500, the time of Confucius, Lao-Tse, the Buddha, The Warring States (till –221 when China became unified in the Chin Dynasty). There is a tacit coordination in the system defined by the culture of the warrior castes. Thus, in that system values like honor, courage and dignity may be shared, limiting the excesses of violence.
- *Phase 2*: The state system with its right of war has to start coordinating itself, at least at the top. Major IGOs (international governmental organizations) emerge, starting with the Vienna Concert of 5 countries against Napoleon, following up with the League of Nations in 1920 (against Germany-Austria) and 24 October 1945 with the United Nations and a Security Council of the leading states against Nazi Germany and Militarist Japan. Today we are almost back to Vienna: the Contact Group, against Yugoslavia, consisting of the Security Council minus China plus Germany and Italy. The idea of coordination by concert remains.
  - *Phase 3*: Social protests start building up as social revolutions against excessive state power and as social movements against Clausewitzian war, or in favor of softening, war (Henri Dunant, Red Cross in Geneva, being an example); exercising some pressure on their governments. Typically each group works on its own government. The governments, in turn, are coordinated in some inter-governmental organizations at the top, later on extending downwards in the state-system (the UN).
  - *Phase 4*: Some of these people's movements come together as *the Hague System* of 1899, with *ius ad bellum/in bello*, and as the international peace organizations after the First World War (such as War Resisters' International, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the International Peace Bureau) and the numerous NGOs and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) after the Second World War. In the European Platform for conflict mediation no less than 475 organizations, the overwhelming majority NGOs, are listed. The growth rate is well above 10 % per year, meaning a doubling every 7 years. In this field the sky is the limit. Non-territorial space does not know limits; for our planet, adding oceans, the limit is  $4\pi R^2$ . With the amount of social activity in today's world ridiculously limiting, forcing the adventurous into non-territorial space.
  - *Phase 5*: The INGOs then start exercising direct pressure on the IGOs, starting with the UN Environment Conference in Stockholm 1972; developing NGO fora into major features of world politics. At this point the UN contribution to the development of democratic practice cannot be overestimated. Democracy is only partly, not even mainly about elections (and particularly not about a choice between only two and almost identical parties, with a participation down to 37 %). Democracy is about participation. And the UN made that possible, providing the infrastructure for a super-IGO to interact with a super-INGO. Hundreds or thousands have participated in this, as they also would have done had states organized NGO fora in parallel with the sessions of the national assemblies (and not only basing the interaction on the very limited perspectives of political parties). This is a major pointer to the future.

- *Phase 6*: But even more important is the next phase. Non-states–NGOs, LAs, TNCs–start substituting for the world politics of governments. They are usually not operating secretly, have more contact with people and do not have armies - but normative and contractual power. No doubt there will be gangs roaming around, no doubt there will be the need for a world police of sorts. But there will not be states with the legitimate right to be armed to the rim and the brink and beyond, investing enormous amounts in a weapons technology which in turn is one of the driving forces in the arms races.

So, this is my utopia: a world territorially rooted in local communities, woven together by dense networks of IPOs/NGOs but around values and/or interests, and serviced by TNCs who have discovered ways of giving first priority to the needs of those most in need. These three points are related: TNCs that fail to live up to this basic premise will be boycotted by NGOs, and deprived of the permit to operate by LAs. Better cooperate.

Thus, the key to the transition from a *20th century of war to a 21st century of peace* lies in the transition from state to non-state as the point of gravity for world politics, as it has been for a long time in many countries for domestic politics. People live in their communities, they relate through their organizations (including families)—in short, civil society. The state provides/protects the setting making this possible. But the state then gradually withers away, not because it is “no longer needed to protect capitalism” but because it is has reached its level of absurdity being more of a threat than a benefit to most people. In its place comes a combination of the LA/NGO/TNC system in a world setting making this possible.

The task, then, is to make this package of non-state world politics as rich, dense and peace-building as possible, noting that such cooperation is in and by itself peace-building. But there is no anarchist illusion that a “world setting” is not needed, nor any hobbesian delusion about the enormous amount of coercive power that has to be assembled at the top. What we have in mind, not very original, is of course an improved version of the United Nations, liberated from the veto power of certain states, with a United Nations Peoples’ Assembly (based on NGOs, LAs and direct vote with one representative/million, using states as election districts), open only to members who do not break international law and do pay their dues, and not located in a big power capable of exercising political pressure.

The UN power at the top should, in addition to the police forces mentioned, be based on normative and contractual power. Just to mention one example of many: the globalization of human rights. Human rights had a double function: to check the power of the state (“freedom from”), and to turn the power of the state in a positive direction for the citizen (“freedom to”). We keep the former as a constraint on the United Nations, and then turn to the UN rather than to a vanishing or illegitimized state system. The world system, through the LAs and using NGOs to a large extent as conduits (as they already do) will provide what is needed for people to survive, with their basic material needs guaranteed, with freedom and with their identity protected. The setting for the latter would be the local rather than the state community, the 200 states being a very inadequate setting for at least

2,000 nations seeking their identity through statehood. The protected local community may work better.

#### **9.4 Abolition of the State System = Colonial System = Slavery System?**

The reader will have noticed that the thesis is not to abolish the war system by abolishing the military. The point here is that the state system, especially at its top, especially at its most self-righteous (it used to be Christian or Muslim self-righteousness, it looks as if democracy/human rights have taken over) is inherently belligerent in its motivation; moreover, they have the capability of amassing the arms needed. World politics should be more in the hands of actors more motivated for peace, and less capable of launching wars.

The world has in the last centuries witnessed two reasonably successful transformations: the abolition of slavery and the abolition of colonialism. Both institutions were seen as indispensable, normal and natural. If the slaves or the colonies were let loose anarchy would for sure follow. They both needed that firm disciplinary hand from above, being only semi-human. Even if not semi-human, even if granted status as humans, abolition of slavery and/or colonialism is tantamount to abolishing a Western civilization firmly based on the economic fruits derived from those institutions.

Well, they were both abolished and MOWB is still in power, the income back broader than ever. In other words, do not expect too much. All those rationalizations were clearly totally wrong. I am not afraid of any hidden validity there. I am more afraid of the validity of that old adage, *plus ça change plus c'est la même chose*, that the enormous cultural, structural and direct violence of the 20th century will twist any soft global governance into a caricature of itself. So, proceed softly, create pockets, regional zones of peace first.

# Chapter 10

## Democracy for Peace and Development: An Ever-Expanding Agenda

### 10.1 Politics as the Search for Balance

*Politics is conflict resolution.*<sup>1</sup> Good conflict resolution is based on empathy with the concerns of all parties, on creativity (development!), and nonviolence (peace!). Democracy claims to know how to do this. But democracy is also subject to dialectics. Democracy should never become rigid but be innovative, not only be a source of innovation. Democracy can be seen as a way of making development and peace sustainable; in and with nature, and as human, social and world growth and peace. If we want development and peace to be enduring conditions in Time, then political development becomes a part of social development and democracy development a part of political development. Any type of development is process, so these two processes must also be sustainable.

Democracy, however, is not unproblematic as a concept. Four words: rule, rulers, ruled and rules, can be combined to build a simple definition: *Democracy is rule according to rules that make the rulers accountable to the ruled.* The definition is general and opens for two interpretations.

*In Democracy A decisions are based on consensus, after a dialogue, with everybody, rulers and ruled, participating.*

*In Democracy B decisions are based on majority rule after voting, with everybody, rulers and ruled, participating.*

Democracy A is what we associate with 'tribal' politics, and high level political bodies with consensus rules.

Democracy B is what we associate with Western, Athenian or Westminster, democracy, so far only about 2,500 years old.

In Democracy A the basic instrument is the *dialogue*, an exchange of arguments with no beginning and no end, much like a conversation. There is no winner and no loser, as opposed to Democracy B where the basic instrument is the *debate*. In fact, mature democracy presupposes both; dialogue toward consensus in the

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<sup>1</sup> This text was published first in: György Széll und Wiking Ehlert (eds.), *New Democracies and Old societies in Europe*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 102–110. The permission to republish this text was granted by Johan Galtung, the copyright holder, on 19 January 2013.






Fig. 10.1 Six units and their relations for democratization. Source The author

smaller groups, debates toward majority in the larger settings. The question is, which are these settings? What is it that has to be ruled and run in a democratic manner, particularly if we want a political system so subtle and so sensitive that it can catch small signals from the people and convert them into concrete ideas that can be put on the agenda and ultimately also into practice?

One answer to that critical question might flow from the general observation that the general *Society* model practiced all over the world today, “modern” society, for good or for bad, rests on three pillars, all more or less well developed: *Civil Society*, *State* and *Capital*. There are people all over. The overwhelming majority are in Civil Society, the sum total of all the organizations, including families and clans, people organize. For State and Capital the focus is on the people running those institutions, not on the numerous employees.

All three have their *World* counterparts. The States come together in the International Govern-mental Organizations, the IGOs, particularly the UN. Capital comes together in the Transnational Corporations, the TNCs. And the civil societies come together in the international civil society, the NGOs in UN jargon, nongovernmental organizations (international peoples’ organizations, IPOs, is a better expression). That gives us six units and their relations for democratization (Fig. 10.1).

There is the inner triangle at the level of Society, and the outer triangle at the level of the World. Obviously, *if the market is globalizing so must democracy*; in fact, it should have been ahead of the market rather than as now be lagging behind. In each triangle, there are three “pillars” and three relations between these pillars;  $3 + 3 = 6$ . And then, with two triangles we get  $2 \times 6 = 12$  queries: how could unit or relation become more democratic, or democratic at all?

Democracy, rule by the *demos*, the people, as opposed to the rule by the gun, the decree or the money of the military, intellectual or merchant elites, is here seen as *bene per se*. What else should be the purpose of rule than people, and who know better what they want than the people themselves? Of course people like everybody else make mistakes, but then it is their mistakes. And people like everybody else grow by taking on the challenge of making decisions and living by the consequences of those decisions. If in addition democracy could have built into it an element of *biocracy*, of rule for, by and of life, not only humans but Life as such would stand out as the highest value. But that is not, or at least not yet, a part of the dominant Western political culture.

Let us now proceed point by point:

[1] *Democratizing the People and Civil Society*. If democracy is not only for the people but also by the people, then it is in the people that democracy has to be built. Education enters as the basic instrument; and if the structure rather than the word is the message this would call for participatory schools, filled with dialogue and debate, not only one-way teaching. Not only exchange of words to outwit the other side, but the joy of the brainstorming, of exploring and discovering together, the synergies of minds opening up to each other. May be with more focus on how to obtain consensus than on how to win a debate; the latter is often uncomfortably similar to a fight. And the culture of democracy has to have nonviolence as a cornerstone. The problems we must come to grips with in the near future are so enormous that the culture of violence will easily take root in very fertile soil.

One point more about the culture of dialogue as opposed to debate. Dialogues in principle lead to deeper understanding of the other side. Not all truth rests with one side, as the vote cutting through a debate might make us believe. Even majorities may be wrong. If the issue is public sector versus private sector, or State versus Capital, then a debate will tend to end in favour of one or the other (in the age of the merchant with the latter). A dialogue will incorporate valid points from both and tend to end in favour of both—and rather than an either-or. In this particular case, there are at least three both-and: the social democratic solution, the Japanese formula and the Chinese yin/yang, switching from one to the other, trying to get the best of both. Eclecticism, in short.

[2] *Democratizing the relation between People and State*. This is, of course, where most of the theory and practice about democracy has traditionally been located. The Ruled are the People, the Rulers have been located in the State. We shall question that later; suffice it here to say that there are two traditional solutions:

– *indirect democracy, or ‘parliamentocracy’*. Based on freedom of thought, speech and assembly, on secret ballot to elect representatives and an executive accountable to the Assembly of those representatives, this institution remains a pillar of human development. In principle it allows for not only majority rule (or at least the majority of the representatives) but also for a nonviolent transfer from one set of rulers, with one agenda for the society, to the next set of rulers with

another agenda. In other words, nonviolent agenda change, not only nonviolent ruler change.

- *direct democracy through referendum and initiative*. The latter is crucial. A referendum may also be a strategy used by the Rulers to overrule the Assembly; the initiative guarantees that the Rules can also initiate the referendum process and that the Rulers have to abide by the outcome. This may certainly also be a strategy to get around the Assembly. In other words, direct democracy can serve as a corrective on indirect democracy, complementing it; a reason why parliamentarians so often are against it. Measured by this standard there is only one democracy in the world, Switzerland, which with 1/1,000 of the world population accounts for 60 % of the national referenda in this century.

Both direct and indirect democracy can also be *local*.

[3] *Democratizing the State*. The point here would not be to have votes inside all ministries, but to develop further other aspects of the culture of democracy. Thus, one basic point is transparency. Freedom of Information acts fall in this category as terribly important instruments to make the House of the Rulers more accessible so that the Ruled can feel at home. Investigative journalism is another approach, but much too dependent on the individual journalist.

Another point is better education of the Rulers, whether they are in the Legislative, the executive or the Judiciary. Better understanding of the culture, theory and practice of democracy is indispensable for the Rule of Law to function. But ruling elite should also be able to foresee, not in order to outwit the People but in order to be prepared for what the People might demand. And that may not necessarily coincide with what the Rulers have planned for them. Both may be wrong, there is no idea here that Truth and/or Virtue is located in only one or a few of the points in the diagram. But if we go by the rules of democracy the agendas of the rulers have to yield to the agendas of the people.

[4] *Democratizing the relation between State and Capital*. This relation is, of course, absolutely crucial. There should be an open, transparent channel for permanent dialogue where the concerns of either ‘pillar’ can become known to the other side. In the absence of such channels lobbies, pressure groups and corruption will fill the void, grossly distorting any democratizing of the People-State relationship. For that reason the State-Capital channel should be open to the People, meaning that such dialogues should take place in public space.

At this point, something more about ‘public space’. The ballot booth stands in public space but the act is not public; it is not only secret but also lonely (the curtain is drawn). In public space verbal and other acts are observed by others, and there is feedback. Ample, diverse, accessible public space is indispensable for democracy. In practice this means readers’ access to newspapers (and not only as short OpEds), viewers’ and listeners’ call-in access to electronic media, ample physical space in buildings and open squares etc. for meetings, also improvised, easy Internet access.

But then there is also the problem of content. One particular articulation of Civil Society, the party system, has to learn how to make posters, ads and sound/view-bites: with content. A poster only with a head, the name of the party and an empty slogan is an insult to the People. At least some parts of the party program could be given, with some empty space for passers-by to write in their comments. Thus, there is much to learn from the Chinese wall poster tradition. Politicians have become too infatuated with the intellectual level of the merchant, advertising, and should learn to rise above that abyss.

One good substitute for old village squares is the shopping mall, known in the Middle East tradition as the *souk*. We must learn better how this precious public space can become the Hyde Park corners of the world. There is nothing like real people meeting real people in a real setting, any mediation through media will always introduce an element of virtual reality. Free availability of public space is as important for democracy as education, and should be guaranteed.

[5] *Democratizing Capital*. Again a basic point is transparency, and one formula is industrial democracy, whether it takes the form of quality circles, assemblies, *congestion*, whatever. However, one point is often lost sight of: how to make the company more transparent to the outside, to the potential customers or clients. Ideally there should be dialogue cycles involving employers-employees-customers; a pattern which might also be in the interest of the Rulers, the company owners. Instead of spying on customers through market surveys, how about a dialogue about possible new products? How about taking people and their tastes seriously instead of trying to twist and shape them? How about expanding the cooperative tradition to the customers?

[6] *Democratizing the relation between People and Capital*. Today much of the relation takes the form of advertizing, in other words of idiotizing, one-way messages designed not to engage in any dialogue but to lure, persuade without even a debate. The argument that nobody is forced to buy the product bypasses the basic point: the ad as an insult not only to human intelligence, but as a subversion of the democratic tradition of message and counter-message, the verbal give and take. Hence, as a very minimum there should be to constraints on advertizing: the readiness to provide more text, more information, and the willingness to engage in dialogue. No ad without equal space and time to challenge, for instance in radio and TV debates about precisely the products advertised. Today, however, advertizing is almost taboo. Like the priest in church the merchant advertizing cannot be contradicted, and to have serious doubts about the message is defined as libel.

[7] *Democratizing the International Civil Society*. Essentially this is the world version of [1] above. But there are also some additional points relating to the NGO as a way of bringing together people from all over the world. Thus, does the organization have a reasonably democratic structure and process, or does it have a self-appointed President, for life? Is there a democratic dialogue inside the organization? Is the organization reasonably representative not only of the continents

but of the civilizations of the world? Does it have a headquarter only in the world Northwest, or does it have some kind of rotation pattern giving the chance to others to share the spin-offs from international organizations?

[8] *Democratizing the relation between People/NGOs and the UN*. In this field there are two very interesting institutions to build on: the Consultative Status given to a number of NGOs by the UN and the Specialized Agencies, and the NGO conferences parallel to the major UN conferences on special topics. Actually, national democracies might have something to learn from this: having an active civil society and not only the party system discussing the agenda of the national assembly at the same time, and close in space.

But this could be developed much further. Why not aim for a *United Nations People's Assembly*, a UNPA, in addition to the UNGA, the United Nations General (or Governments') Assembly?<sup>2</sup> Based on NGOs, or, better, on direct vote with each member state as a constituency and one representative per million inhabitant? If the European Union and the Indian Union can do it, why not also the World? And then, a gradual process of transfer of power from UNGA to UNPA, to people.

[9] *Democratizing the United Nations/IGOs*. In addition to the arguments about transparency and education, some of the points made under [7] above apply. Thus, how about rotating the headquarter? The UN does not belong to the West, the US, New York state, New York City, Manhattan, East River. It belongs to the world as an expression of the aspirations of people, states and what not all over the world. Fifty years in the West (by 1995) may be enough; how about East Asia in general and perhaps Hong Kong in particular for the next 50 years? And, how about Freedom of Information Acts, the way the European Union is slowly accepting?

[10] *Democratizing the relations between the UN and the TNCs*. The argument is the same as for [4] above: a vacuous relation is easily filled with lobbies and corruption (as the European Commission knows only too well). One possible approach would be for the UN to create a *United Nations Corporate Assembly*, a UNCA, as a consultative organ. Both the UNGA and the UNPA might demand of the UNCA to come up with plans for decreasing environmental destruction and increasing gainful employment, in a triangular dialogue essential to global democracy.

[11] *Democratizing the TNCs*. The argument and the suggestions would be a combination of [5], [7] and [9] above. Very basic is rotation of headquarters to make them truly transnational, the TNCs probably being more flexible in this.

[12] *Democratizing the relation between People and TNCs*. The arguments from [6] below apply. The TNCs would do well to have dialogue with people outside their own board-rooms, not only to steer clear of boycott actions, but also to become better at making products that satisfy people's basic needs.

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<sup>2</sup> The ideas about the UN are developed further in a paper written for the Independent Commission on Global Governance, and published by them, Oxford University Press, 1995.

## Further Readings

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# Chapter 11

## What Does Professionalization Mean in Peace Research?

### 11.1 On Professionalization in General

Generally, the sociology of professions identifies three characteristics of a profession<sup>1</sup>:

- [1] There is a range of *skills* with which a range of professionals will handle a range of problems for a range of clients, with proven competence. The clients have an idea of what to expect from the professional, and the professional of what to expect from a client.
- [2] There is a professional *code of conduct*, defining the relation of a professional to the clients, other professionals and others. The code of conduct may be supported by an oath.
- [3] There is a pattern of *accountability* of the professional to the clients, to other professionals, and to others.

Professionalization of peace work moves us beyond peace research and studies, both indispensable for skills. The purpose of peace research is to produce inter-subjectively communicable and verifiable *knowledge* according to the general rules of research. Thus, research is incompatible with secrecy, as research has to take place in public space. And one purpose of peace studies is the communication of the findings of peace research, in line with general rules for education, another public space activity. The free access of the rest of society to what happens is of the essence. As peace workers are not planning to hurt or harm, in other words to exercise violence, s/he has nothing to conceal.

In the following a person exercising the peace profession will be referred to as 'peace worker', like 'social worker', or 'peace professional' like 'health professional'. Others may find 'peace specialist' more dignified. 'Manager' must be avoided as active participation of the clients, those seeking professional advice, is of the essence. 'Facilitator' is much better.

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first presented as a keynote, at the 21st Conference of the International Peace Research Association, in Calgary, Canada on 1 July 2006.

## 11.2 Government Realism Versus Peace Movement Idealism: *Tertium non datur?*

To understand better where peace research may be heading, let me juxtapose governments and one special non-government, the peace movement. The governments of the state system of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia in a Eurocentric view of history were successors to feudal lords, kings, emperors. They entered violence-war-peace with *ultima ratio regis*, the King's last argument, the gun, with frequent use; to he who has a hammer the world looks like a waiting nail. But that also holds for the negation of the government, the peace movement: to he who has a mouth the world looks like an attentive ear.

*Realism* as a doctrine is based on the 'ultima' above, force, not persuasion from basic principles, nor bargaining offering incentives, nor decision-making by authoritative bodies. A derivative of this thesis would be that the final word belongs to whoever has superior force, the big sticks of the big powers. In the present world Anglo-America; a peace proposal unacceptable to them is not 'realistic'.

The supreme goal of the realist will be security, meaning low probability of being hurt/harmed by the violence of any Other. The underlying philosophy is that Evil exists, ready to turn violent for violence's own sake, and that the only counter-measure is sufficient strength to deter and/or crush Evil; thereby producing security.

*Idealism as a doctrine* is based on persuasion from basic principles, particularly principles held to be universally valid, even self-evident. Such principles tend to be of the ought—rather than the is—variety, like the sacredness of (human) life, meaning (human) life should be considered sacred. But what if Other does not share that noble view? Or, 'in a war there are only losers'. But what if winning can be defined as losing least? An endless debate, with strong statements about human nature. Words, words, words.

Let us try to present the two positions along some dimensions, in no way claiming that the juxtaposition is complete, nor that there is not a solid range of variation. What we are looking for is, of course, a way of bridging the gap, even contradiction bolstered by solid hatred on both sides, and the use of violence, or nonviolence (Table 11.1).

This is a clear case of thesis versus antithesis, at least as presented in this Table, not denying that reality is more complex. It does not follow that the alternative, a *tertium*, has to be a synthesis. Dialectics offers three non-exclusive possibilities: a positive transcendence, synthesis, accepting basic features of both, a negative transcendence denying the validity of both, and a compromise picking some of this and some of that.<sup>2</sup>

We are talking about two world views, both of them found within the same societies, and not only in the West although we sense the contradiction between

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<sup>2</sup> For more on this and most of the topics mentioned in this paper see the author's *Transcend and Transform*, London, Boulder CO: Pluto, Paradigm Press, 2004; published in many translations.



**Table 11.1** The Government movement and the peace movement

1 Actors	Government movement Foreign office-military	Peace movement Permanent, conjunctural
2 Basic mode	Realism based on <i>ultima ratio</i>	Idealism based on ratio
3 Epistemology	Empiricism fact-based pragmatism	Criticism value-based moralism
4 Theory	<i>Security paradigm</i> based on strength Humans tend toward evil	<i>Persuasion paradigm</i> based on moral strength Humans tend toward good
5 Method I	Elite conferences	People's meetings
6 Method II	Negotiating harmonized national interests	Resolutions, advocacy
7 Method III	Demonstrations of – incentive power – threats of force	Demonstrations of –moral power –people power
8 Method IV	Violent action, like bombing	Nonviolent action like economic boycott

*Source* The author

(A Gandhian boycott of the USA might work, mass demonstrations not)

carry-overs from feudal faith in force and enlightenment faith in human *ratio* and appeals to reason.

Realism, as spelt out above, would make allies of the carrier of Anglo-American world dominance in today's world, the United States of America, say Yes–Yes–Yes to Washington DC. And idealism would make the peace movements in the same countries say No–No–No to whatever comes out of their foreign offices. The world views are so contradictory that they become each other's antithesis.

And yet we see in the present concrete case of the 'US-led Coalition' in the war in and over Iraq one government after the other defecting. Without necessarily saying so, they actually do what their peace movements have demanded, they pull out. But this is more an act of protest than an alternative peace policy.

The best way of exploring these two peace discourses further is probably not by elaborating them, but by asking the question: how can this contradiction be transcended, if at all? There are eight jobs according to the Table, so let us look at all eight.

But first permit me a little note from my own autobiography. I refused military service and became a conscientious objector in 1951 because I found the governmental approach unacceptable; and in 1954 refused the alternative 'civilian service' because it was only a way of saying No, not a way of serving peace. The outcome was half a year in prison winter 1954–1955 for a more extreme No. I have lived this contradiction, at one time (early 1960s) being both some kind of consultant to the Norwegian foreign office, a member of the board of *War Resisters' International* (in London) and president of its branch in Norway. And unhappy with them all; one essentially built on bullets and bombs, the others on words.

So I will try to guide the reader toward a peace profession as something arising out of this contradiction because that is how it came about in my case. As an effort to bridge the gap.

Obviously we are looking for an actor, the peace professional, who could transcend this government-peace movement dichotomy. The idea that governments are somehow on Track 1 and non-governments on Track 2 freezes this dichotomy in its present form. And begs the question whether governments are not often on Track 1 hoping that non-governments could compensate and bring about Track 0 as a resultant. Given the damage governmental diplomacy is capable of doing this is a highly optimistic view. We need a better answer.

Some features of that answer are clear.

First: a peace professional will have governments and non-governments as clients and dispense advice to both. Like the health profession the skills would be available not only to friend and foe alike, but also to uniformed (government) and civilian (non-government). The peace professional would not think of friend-foe or uniformed-civilian, but of actors desperately in need of any advice that might move the actor system closer to peace. Peace is a relation among actors, a system, not a property of one actor alone. The peace professional would engage in dialogues with the actors, but have the actor system on top of his or her mind.

Second: the peace professional rejects violence as does the peace movement, based on the idealism of the heart, but combines that with the realism of the brain. Concretely, this leads to *peace by peaceful means*, rejecting violence less on moral grounds than on pragmatic grounds. Violence does not work. Shedding blood in a battle-field is like leeches sucking blood: not only that it does not work; it may even make matters worse. While not denying some preventive and curative effects of minimum (threat of) violence, the approach would exclude violence from the peace-creating repertory, building more on *ratio*, less on *ultima*.

Third: the basic difference is here. Without rejecting empiricism linking theory and data, and criticism linking data and values as basic modes of intellectual activity, the focus will be on the third possibility: *constructivism*, linking values and theory. The values emerge from the legitimate goals of the parties to a conflict, and the theory from viable realities. The idea would be to search for a new reality where the parties might feel that their goals can be sufficiently comfortably accommodated.

Imagine a child busily adding and subtracting integers, establishing that  $5 + 7 = 7 + 5 = 12$ , moving on to  $7 - 5 = 2$ , and then running the head against the wall when trying to tackle  $5 - 7$ . The contradiction between being mathematically correct and handling  $5 - 7$  dissolves the moment negative numbers, a *new mathematical reality*, has been introduced. And, the child is no longer stuck.

The task is not to be stuck between the pragmatism of linking data to theories and the moralism of linking data to values. The peace professional will look for something new, like a physician who has realized that if the 'system' had sufficient self-healing capacity then it would already have produced health. Neither single-minded empiricism, nor single-minded moralism will help although they should not be disregarded. An intervention bringing in something new is needed, for peace as well as for health.

Fourth: both the security and the persuasion paradigms fall short of the desirable. The former fails because efforts to deter by violence may stimulate an arms race, and efforts to crush by violence may produce trauma and stimulate a violence

race with a vicious cycle of retaliation. And the latter fails, being based neither on ideas, nor incentives, nor threats. Neither facts, nor values, are sufficient guides for action. The parties get stuck.

A government confronted with insecurity—a risk of violence—derives an action agenda from the security paradigm. Neither the most brilliant analysis a la Noam Chomsky, nor the most stinging moral admonitions a la Pope John Paul II, provide guides for action beyond the status quo of No, No, No. This is where the peace professional enters, focusing on unresolved present conflicts, unconciliated trauma from past violence, and unresolved conflicts in the past, for constructive action. A rich action agenda.

This calls for *mediation* for the conflicts of the present, and *conciliation* for the conflicts of the past, dropping the ‘re’ as it has a connotation of restoring a not necessarily desirable past. This is the essence of the *peace paradigm*. Deep conflicts exist. They may lead to violence. There is a way out: *solve the conflicts*, present and past. If done well, we get peace, and with it security.

But these are only two of the tools in the tool chest of the peace professional. Here is a longer list of remedies:<sup>3</sup>

- [1] peace research and peace studies
- [2] basic needs satisfaction, peace culture, peace structure
- [3] goal restraint and consequence analysis
- [4] mediation for conflict transformation by peaceful means
- [5] anger control
- [6] peace-building, with peace education and peace journalism
- [7] nonviolence and soft peace-keeping
- [8] conciliation for the removal of past traumas from the agenda
- [9] creating virtuous peace cycles.

This is not the place to spell them out. The challenge is to stick to “peace by peaceful means”, neither succumbing to violent governmental pragmatism nor to the status quo of “not in my name” peace movement moralism. Points 1–4 above are preventive therapy, points 5–8 curative therapy, and point 9 builds positive peace into the system, releasing the creative and constructive potential of conflicts rather than the potential for violence and destruction. All based on diagnosis and prognosis of social ills. Much to do.

What, then, corresponds to Methods I, II, III, IV? Given the general idea that direct violence is the smoke that comes out of the fire of conflicts not resolved, or from past violence with no conciliation? Generally speaking through the power of the word, *dia logos*, by helping the parties to deeper insights rather than by bribing them, threatening them or telling them how bad they are.

This, of course, is very similar to one basic assumption of psychotherapy: the talking method. Or sociotherapy rather, as violence, like conflict and peace, is a

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<sup>3</sup> See Johan Galtung: “Conflict Transformation By Peaceful Means” in Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, eds., *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, London: Routledge.

relation. A system of actors, not only single actors, is in need of change. The peace professional has to talk with all actors; *how* can be disputed. There are schools here as elsewhere, all with some valid points.

Like the Table, The TRANSCEND approach has four phases:

- *Method I*: Meeting all parties, one-on-one.
- *Method II*: Empathic dialogues to elicit creativity.
- *Method III*: Demonstrations of
  - transcending goals, positively or negatively
    - creating a new system reality, capable of accommodating the legitimate goals of all parties.
- *Method IV*: Joint action to transform the conflict, always checking whether it works. If not, Methods I–II–III–IV again.

This approach differs substantially from both conventional, mainstream government and peace movement action. The moral impulse, the (almost absolute) No to violence, is shared with the peace movement, but the pragmatism of step IV is shared with governments. There is no apodictic position, no a priori truth. Everything is tested for its validity and everything has to pass that test.

The focus is no longer on one party winning, like ETA or Madrid; nor on all parties winning, the famous win–win. The focus is on the relation, the system, on Spain moving forward, into new and better realities. *Those who rest on carpets of gold, carpet bombing, or fly moral carpets are often short on ideas.* Peace professionals have the opposite profile. *Tertium datur.*

### 11.3 There is a Demand Out There: A Trip Around the World

Half a century after the tiny beginnings of peace research after World War II—including founding IPRA, the International Peace Research Association, 42 years ago, those foggy autumn days in London—some of us think we have a solid supply to offer. But, there is always the nagging question: is there a demand out there?

There is, and the listener/reader will pardon me for giving as cases what I know best: what I myself have been asked to do, say, this spring 2006, from mid-February to mid-June to be precise. Twelve cases, twelve processes to be more precise, some more, some less successful, all with a certain promise. The initiative often came from a go-between capable of organizing a direct encounter with one or more of the parties in the conflict. In no case did any of the parties cover any travel expenses. There was no honorarium. But the trip was combined with workshops on mediation, conciliation etc., and that balanced the budget. One formula, among several?

Before delving into the cases: from where would we not expect any such demand, directly, or indirectly, via a go-between?

Obviously from actors to whom ‘winning is not everything, but the only thing’. Hegemons, may be, and their challengers? Or actors who think they have mastered the necessary and sufficient skills themselves, in need of no outsider’s advice, even softly offered under four eyes, or eight if both come with a colleague, using the one-on-one formula? Whatever the reason the present author has not been approached, directly or indirectly, by the USA or by Norway; but by many other countries, including the UK.

The description of the cases will be down to the minimum necessary and sufficient to identify the issue and the nature of the demand (more details on [www.transcend.org](http://www.transcend.org)). Here they are:

- [1] *Denmark versus Islam*, in Geneva. Added to the cartoons came Danish refusal to dialogue and the newspaper’s earlier refusal to print cartoons about the ascent of Jesus Christ to heaven, as it might hurt Christian sensitivities, *and* the burning of Danish flags and embassies, with economic boycott. The demand was for mediation.
- [2] *Germany versus the Herero people*, in Windhoek. The issue was apology and compensation for the 1904 massacre, compounded by a court case against Germany (‘apologizing is admitting’), other EU members fearing the consequences of apology and compensation, and the nature of any compensation. The demand was for conciliation.
- [3] *Sri Lanka*, in Vienna. The issue was the breakdown of the cease fire agreement with the warring parties still hoping to force their solution. Of the five scenarios—unitary state, devolution, federation, confederation, independence—asymmetric, bicameral federation still seems preferable. The demand was for mediation.
- [4] *Israel–Palestine*, in Berlin. The issue was to build a peace structure around a Middle East Community of Israel with its five Arab neighbours (Palestine fully recognized according to the UN resolutions), like the European Community for Western Europe after the Second World War. The demand was for new approaches.
- [5] *Turkey–Armenia*, in Istanbul. ‘Something happened’ in 1915, with high complexity, and involving many more than those two. The search is also for a discourse to articulate what happened so that this major issue can be removed from the political agenda for the region to move forward. The demand was for conciliation.
- [6] *The Kashmir issue*, in New Delhi. TRANSCEND took the initiative, with a former Pakistani foreign minister, a member of the Indian National Security Commission and myself proposing a “new reality” to accommodate India, Pakistan and Kashmir; well received and discussed at the top levels. The demand was for mediation.
- [7] *Myanmar*, in Yangon. A military dictatorship stands for Myanmar autonomy and integrity against secession, the opposition supported by the outside for democracy and human rights. An agenda with all four goals, removing past

traumas in favour of cooperative futures, might work. The demand was for mediation and conciliation.

- [8] *Cambodia*, in Phnom Penh. ‘Something happened’, indeed, 1975–1979: Khmer Rouge against Phnom Penh, but in the same period, 1961–1989, and before that, much else also happened. To select one atrocity for a tribunal may serve punitive justice. But the problem of conciliation remains. The demand was for holistic conciliation.
- [9] *Korea*, in Seoul. The Korea war 1950–1953 played a major role in the Cold War discourse, started in 1948 with the Cheju uprising against US occupation. North Korea’s cause, to help South Korea against US aggression, was not unfounded. The demand was for conciliation, using a history commission to explore what happened.
- [10] *Japan–China/Korea*, in Tokyo. Prime Minister visits to the Yasukuni shrine that turns uniformed Japanese who died into gods deepens the war trauma. An alternative memorial dedicated to uniformed and civilians, from all countries, was solicited by, and presented to, a major LDP faction. The demand was for conciliation.
- [11] *USA*, in Washington. The US Empire is on its way down, US foreign policy must change, but how? Workshops are being organized, the peace movement is unprepared as is the Democrat ‘opposition’. The demand is for peace research and peace paradigms.
- [12] *Mexico*, in Puebla. Latin American integration is coming, and one problem will be foreign policy in general, and toward the USA in particular. Workshops are being organized, most people seem unprepared. The demand is for peace research and peace paradigms.

The listener/reader will have noticed that the demand can usually be formulated in terms of mediation and/or conciliation. But there is also a demand for more basic services, like building peace structures, and for peace research to explore what is needed. But all the other offers in a peace professional’s chest, with nine remedies, are lurking in the background and will of course sooner or later be brought up by the peace worker.

Does this work? [1] did. There have been dialogues and the burning has stopped. But an apology, an exploration of the line between freedom of expression and respect for what is sacred to others, and the lifting of the boycott has still to come.

[2], [5] and [8] are complicated, much work is needed. [3] looks bad right now (spring–summer 2006), but going to the brink again may possibly produce peace, and not only ceasefire, talks next time. [4] is probably the only formula for Middle East peace, but is a long term project even if more needed than ever. [6] may stand a good chance as long as those two leaders are in power, and that will not be forever. [7] has slow dynamism on its side and is compatible with the idea of Myanmar being in control, not some ‘international community’. [9] may become an important part in the North–South Korea process. [10], in one way or the other, will be on the agenda. [11] and [12] are for a more conscious near future.

We are dealing with systems, not single actors. Peace workers have to become relation specialists, with maximum knowledge about the capacity for peace-making, -keeping, -building of all the actors. Obviously, most such processes take time, like complicated diseases for human beings. And no remedy comes with the guarantee that it will always work. It may even be counterproductive, so be watchful. But the demand is enormous. And, we have much to offer.

## 11.4 The Code of Conduct and the Problem of Accountability

TRANSCEND felt the need for some guidelines arising out of experience, and to be tested by more experience. Here they are:

[A] *Mission Statement: Peace by Peaceful Means:*

- By *peace* we mean the capacity to transform conflicts with empathy and creativity, without violence; a never-ending process.
- By *transforming conflicts* we mean enabling the parties to go ahead in a self-reliant, acceptable, and sustainable manner.
- By *with empathy* we mean the ability to understand the conflict also the ways the parties understand the conflict themselves.
- By *creativity* we mean channeling conflict energy toward new, innovative ways of satisfying basic human needs for all.
- By *without violence* we mean that this process should avoid.
- Any threat or use of direct violence that hurts and harms,
- Any use of structural violence that demobilizes the parties.

[B] *The relation between the conflict worker and him/herself:*

- [1] Your motivation should be to help the parties transform the conflict, not your own promotion, materially or non-materially.
- [2] You should possess skills/knowledge for the task and develop them further, but never use the conflicts only to acquire them.
- [3] Do not have a hidden agenda, for yourself or for others, beyond conflict transformation. Have nothing to conceal.
- [4] Your legitimacy is in your skills, knowledge, creativity, compassion and perseverance, and ability to stimulate the same in the conflict parties; not in a mandate or organizational backing.

[C] *The relation between the conflict worker and the parties:*

- [5] Do not enter a conflict if you yourself have an unresolved conflict with any one of the parties or bear too deep grudges.
- [6] Empathy/dialogues with *all* parties, also those you dislike.
- [7] Do not manipulate. Play with open cards, say what you do.
- [8] Respect demands for confidentiality, do not attribute.

- [9] Do not receive honoraria, gifts etc. from the parties beyond ordinary hospitality.
- [10] Communicate between the parties only with their permission.
- [11] Speak with one tongue, not one version for one party and another for the others, granted that the focus may be different.
- [12] Be open to new ideas, do not become a prisoner of any plan.
- [13] Never propose any outcome or any process that cannot be undone. You may be wrong.

[D] *The relation between the conflict worker and society:*

- [14] Do not seek personal or organizational credit.
- [15] Disappear from the conflict formation when no longer needed.
- [16] Plans for conflict outcomes and conflict processes belong neither to you, nor to the parties, but to the system at large.
- [17] Share your skills, knowledge, experience with others; try to contribute to a general conflict transformation culture.
- [18] Do not receive direct funding from past, present or future conflict parties who have used, use or may use your services.
- [19] Conflict work is public service. The reward is to do it well.
- [20] All conflicts are born equal and have the same right to transformation. No conflict is at a 'higher level' than any other.

Particularly important are [4], [13] and [20]. As mentioned, the code comes out of experience. This is the kind of thing that has to be tested against the experience and moral philosophies of others, for a good dialogue aiming at an ever better code. And the essence of that code, the moral maxims in a kantian sense, might one day provide a basis for the equivalent of an hippocratic oath.

But how about accountability? This is a right and duty kind of thing, between society and the profession, and between the profession and the individual professional. You give us/me the right to exercise the profession, and we/I assume the duty to do so according to a code of conduct. This is very different from the peace movement, protected as it is by the human right of freedom of expression, with no clear duty ever defined. It is more similar to the governmental approach. There are the Vienna protocols for the exercise of the diplomatic profession, and the Geneva Conventions for the exercise of the military profession. They set some limits even if the very essence of diplomacy, the skills of negotiation, seem to be exempt from any code of conduct and any accountability. Except to whoever pays the piper and hence, as the saying goes, is entitled to call the tune: the diplomat's foreign office. Or—if s/he is not simply seconded—the international governmental organization, the IGO, like the UN. The ultimate test remains the national interest, or the IGO, or the UN, interest.

Not so for the peace profession. The ultimate test is the human interest and nature's interest, not the interest of systems like local levels, nations, states, regions, the world. The test of the pudding is in the eating. Is there a transformation heading for peace? Do people lead better lives, with less suffering, more fulfillment? Or less *dukkha*, more *sukha*, in age-old buddhist terms?



## 11.5 Time Has Come, with Health Professionals as One Model

Health studies are highly inter- and trans-disciplinary, as even the most cursory look at the curriculum of any medical school will prove. But health studies are also inter- or trans-national. Ideally speaking, medical doctors have no father/motherland. Not only can they practice anywhere, but they have a value overriding patriotism, sexism, racism and so on: *health*. The Hippocratic Oath demands of them to treat friend, foe and Other alike, as mentioned.

We are moving in that direction also in the field of peace studies, promoting a value more important than national interests: *peace*. We are not there yet, nor is the task of inter/trans-disciplinarity carried as far as it merits. But conflict studies, or conflictology—as basic to peace studies as anatomy, physiology and pathology to health studies—span the whole spectrum from micro via meso and macro to mega conflicts, from individual psychology way into global, not only inter-state and inter-nation studies, two sides of international relations. Increasingly peace researchers feel at home at all these levels.

We need inter/trans-disciplinarity because traditional social sciences are so closely related to the growth of the waning Western state system, in the era of imperialism. Thus, world history is conceived of as parallel nation, state and regional histories. The social sciences politology, economics and sociology are clearly dedicated to the three pillars of the modern state, State, Capital and Civil Society, one at the time, endowed with a historicity not given to colonized peoples for whom anthropology was invented. And economics even explores only one economic system, capitalism ('capitalistics' would be a better word.) This is not good enough. The social sciences are badly in need of globalization.

Transcending state borders is only one of these challenges, however. There are other fault-lines in the human construction: gender and generation, race and nation, class (political, economic, military, cultural depending on the power involved), environment. Peace studies need transcending paradigms for them all, with no built-in assumption favouring one fault-line side or the other.

A major task of peace studies is to come to grips with *massive category killing*, referred to as 'genocide' when against a nation. Killing of unborn and born women may be the major form. Another is death by starvation, or by preventable or curable diseases. Health studies are focussed on avoidable diseases, including pandemics; peace studies focus on avoidable violence(s), including massive category killing. With more work on positive health and peace, not only to prevent disease and violence, they can both serve as guide lights for higher levels of human self-realization.

Trans-disciplinary and trans-fault line peace studies are around the corner. Security studies are the easy prey of upper class, white, old male patriotism from the Anglo-American countries producing settlers on the lands of others (like Israel). They have much to feel insecure about. Peace studies and 'security through peace' would serve them much better than 'peace through security'.

With deep globalization comes professionalism, and with professionalism come the dangers of self-righteous narrowness. Hence the need for pure academic peace studies able to analyze and critique practices emerging from within its own ranks.

But more challenges will line up. Whoever pushes in any direction, like peace researchers looking for more ways of turning theory into practice, and practice into theory, should not be surprised if counterforces appear. *Actio* always provokes *reactio*.

Other disciplines will try cooptation, like “the problem of peace is basically psychological”, hence Peace Psychology courses. Excellent when combinable with respect for a broader view, for the forest, not only for a tree or two. Taken alone, a step backward.

The strong reactions, however, will come from the professions that feel threatened, like diplomacy. The Track I/Track II formula, ‘governments do I, NGOs do II. Let us divide the turf’ is simply not good enough. Inter-state diplomacy—representation, information and negotiation—may in its present form be a dying institution, and not only because others do better jobs. The problem goes deeper, into the notion of peace as harmonized national interests. Where is nature’s interest? The human interest? The local level interest? The regional interest? The gender, generation etc. interest? The global interest? The world is more complex today, demanding a very multi-layered approach. The peace workers of the future can be useful all over, but not if they are tied to national interests; the concern of very few people anyhow.

A foreign office is not necessarily the obvious place to turn peace theory into peace practice, nor a peace ministry for that matter. We are moving away from the world as an inter-state system, toward an inter-regional, inter-local authorities, inter-human, inter-gender/generation/race/class world; all dependent on the environment. Merely blowing fresh air into the Westphalia system is suboptimal. Train the diplomats to do a better job and move ahead in all the other systems. With nature’s interest, and the human interest, as the ultimate test.

## 11.6 Conclusion

Research and theory guided peace work to produce more peace, not only more research, have come to stay. Bridging the gap between foreign policy pragmatism and peace movement moralism.

## Further Reading

Galtung J (1974) *Peace as a Profession and New Peace Action Roles*. Chair in Conflict and Peace Research (CCPR), (University of Oslo, paper no 8, p 20).

# Chapter 12

## On the Causes of War and Its Abolition

### 12.1 The Causality Discourse

Causality is, as often said, not a law but the form of a law; a discourse used to bring some understanding to a chaotic world. In that discourse the two words ‘cause’ (C) and ‘effect’ (E) are subject to rules of speech: E cannot precede C in time. And the connective relating them, an arrow, like  $C \rightarrow E$ , translated as ‘C causes/leads to/is followed by E’, or some synonyms, is two-way.<sup>1</sup>

$C \rightarrow E$  is for a sufficient cause, SC, meaning that wherever C is present so will E; immediately or with a time lag.  $C \leftarrow E$  is for a necessary cause, NC, meaning that whenever E is present there is or has been C. Some causes may be necessary and sufficient,  $C \leftrightarrow E$ .

If E is war an example often used these days of a sufficient cause is ‘resource scarcity’, and an example of a necessary cause is availability of arms. To get a better understanding we may insert intermediaries, or ‘steps’, between C and E, or E and C if we reason backward (the case of necessity). The result is a causal chain, often referred to as a ‘mechanism’, from physical sciences and their application in engineering, to understand ‘how it works’.

The basic idea, then, is to control the set  $SC + NC$  so that

- if we pursue E, then realize E by realizing  $SC + NC$ , or
- if we reject E, then negate E by negating  $SC + NC$

The causal discourse is highly pragmatic, result-oriented, even though it also opens for neutral E’s that are neither pursued nor rejected. The test of understanding is ‘whether it works’, as opposed to mathematics where the test is ‘whether it is valid’.

Let us then make a distinction between positive and negative causes, the positively existing and the negatively not existing. There is an epidemic, people die.

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first presented at: *Gipri, Ecole d’été: Les causes des guerres à venir*, Geneva 31 August 2007 and at the University of Basel, Institute of Sociology, as “Öffnung: Krieg Aethologie Abschaffung” on 12 September 2007.

The cause? Some positively existing micro-organism, for sure. But perhaps also something negatively not existing, like absence of adequate immunity whether brought about naturally or artificially (inoculation), absence of hygiene, early warning, health services for preventive and curative care. The epidemic came like a tsunami, invaded, killed and left.

Thus, a negative cause of war can be postulated: the absence of adequate conflict transformation whether the substance is mainly economic, political, military or cultural (usually a mix). Like an immune system conflict transformation creates resistance against such causes as war enthusiasm, hatred, desire for trauma revenge, or the hope for glory. Positive causes should be removed (primary prophylaxis) and negative causes introduced (secondary prophylaxis).

We could now introduce circular causation with the effect as a cause reinforcing the first cause which in turn reinforces the effect, in a positive feedback cycle, or reduces the first cause in a negative feedback cycle. Rather than linear chains we get loops and all kinds of configurations, with no clear beginning or end; a more adequate map of reality revealing side-causes and -effects.

Somewhere in our minds lurks another grammatical rule for the causal discourse. If good effects have good causes and bad effects bad causes, then we can either keep, or throw out, the cause-effect bundle. Problems arise when good causes have bad effects and bad causes good effects. But good causes may be used for other, good, effects, and good effects may be caused by other, good, causes. For this Linear causation is insufficient; we need branching processes.

## 12.2 Enters Aristotle

Aristotle closed our discourse horizons through his *tertium non datur*, there is no third possibility, a proposition is either true or false. This canonized the dilemma, the either-or, where buddhist epistemology opens for the tetralemma, including the both-and and the neither-nor. But then Aristotle opened our discourse horizon at another point by postulating four types of causality, not only one, not to be confused with the co-arising dependency of buddhist epistemology, opening for circular and spiraling causation.

Aristotle has four types of causation, the efficient, material, formal and final causes, in Latin *causa efficiens*, *causa materialis*, *causa formalis* and *causa finalis*. Imagine I want to understand what happens when I write this article. Yes, my fingers touching the keyboard of my computer is the *causa efficiens* for the final article. But that computer, with printer, paper etc., is the *causa materialis*; remove it and there would be no article. The *causa formalis* is the form of the article, the kind of linear introduction-body-conclusion form authors tend to follow. And the *causa finalis* is my image of what I want to communicate, even the final conclusions I can conjure upon my mind. An image is needed; to be changed in the process.

We *may* put the other three into the *causa efficiens* as necessary causes? The goal and the form, both in my mind, and the computer at my finger tips, existed

prior to the article. The author is a body-mind-spirit-computer complex, with the brain giving signals to hand and fingers and the computer being an extension of the body, the mind storing the form, and the spirit the image of the finished, final, article. That complex is sufficient cause for the article; in aristotelese a *causa efficiens* causing, ‘effecting’, the effect.

But in doing so we lose something. First, the Aristotle Four is a useful typology, and hence a check-list, of causes. Second, the Aristotle Four have a human touch dignifying the goal. Causation is not only a *push* by an efficient cause like my fingers. There is also a *pull*, a *telos* to be pursued and attained. Push and pull hand in hand so to speak. As the song has it, “if you do not know where you are going any road will take you there”, is the push without the pull of a goal. The pull without a push is also well known: zillions of books and articles have whispered to some author, *Write me, please!* The *causa finalis* was there, but the *causa efficiens*, the author ready, dying! to go, was absent. Maybe because of over-pull?

Matter, *causa materialis*, adds material causation to the mental goal and form. That matter has to be shaped, formed to provide the link between push and pull: the *causa formalis*.

Compare an author to a stone in free fall. The force of gravity is the *causa efficiens*. That implies the matter of stone and Planet Earth as *causa materialis*. And the other two? We attribute goals to life, adding intent for humans, not to stones ‘seeking their natural place, down’. There is form in the curve linking time and distance of free fall even if not in the stone. There may be *causa finalis* and *formalis* somewhere. To place them in the stone, however, is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

Now compare a stone in free fall to an author in free fall. Given his goal of survival he might like to change the form relating time and distance, from  $g = 9.8$  to  $g = 0$  or even negative; making it a self-denying prophecy. Stones may not harbor *causa finalis* and *formalis*. Humans may. Aristotelian causation is for human not only natural sciences, for subjects not only objects.

## 12.3 Enters War

The *causa finalis* is clear and the unambiguity of the pull, the intent to *win*, reinforces that cause. The *causa materialis* is also clear: arms and army, geography, the strategic and tactical interrelations of all capabilities and circumstances.

Together they may constitute sufficient cause: We have the capability, the circumstances are propitious, our goal is crystal clear, get going! *Causa finalis* and *causa materialis* are both necessary; together they are sufficient. Aristotle’s typology of causes may also be used for a typology of wars.

However, intent and capability are deemed insufficient. *Ius ad bello* demands a just cause, *Ius in bellum* establishes rules of combat. We might introduce as *causa efficiens* an unsolved contradiction, and as *causa formalis* the rules of combat; some of them in the structure of combat, like between uniformed people only, some in the culture of combat, like in the rules of proportionality. But that is surface form.

Deeper down there may be deep cultures of dualism, manicheism and the idea of an armageddon as final arbiter, DMA, and deep structures of past victories frozen into hierarchies to be preserved or destroyed.

This defines war as a deadly sports game where winning is not everything but the only thing. The more unsolvable the contradiction, the stronger the arms/army, the more elaborate the rules, the higher the urge to win, the more likely the war—by all necessary means (Clausewitz) compatible with the rules.

But could the rules not have a dampening effect on warfare? Possibly, but it could also be argued that more arms/army will be needed to compensate for belligerence ruled out by the rules. In short, the total synergy of the four causes is what matters.

## 12.4 Enters Peace

The *causa efficiens* is clear: transform the underlying conflict so that the parties can live with it without violence; in other words negative peace. The *causa finalis* is equally clear: transcend the gap between the parties, create some symbiosis, even synthesis; in other words, positive peace.

In UN jargon they are known as peace making and peace building respectively. Peace keeping enters as *causa materialis* to dampen violence by peaceful, non-violent, defensive means.

The *causa formalis* would be the whole culture of peace, including the rules of conviviality and mediation-conciliation; *with the pull from a compelling solution as a key causa finalis*, not only the push away from the present. *And* the structure of peace, symmetry, reciprocity, equity; the ‘equiarchy’ opposed to hierarchy. Underlying this would be a deep culture of tetralemma, yin-yang and transcendence, not dualism/dilemma, manicheism and armageddon. Problem: where are the monuments, street names, the history on the side of peace rather than war?

Back to *causa materialis*: does peace beyond materialize? Answer: in zillions of mutually beneficial equitable exchanges, so normal and natural that we do not even notice them. Like the air around us we pay attention to their absence. But we may, perhaps, be trained to see them, mobilizing peace education and journalism to focus on the positive, not only the negative.

War is a process from ‘just cause’ to ‘victory’, peace is a process from ‘conflict transformation’ to ‘transcendence’. Both have the Aristotle Four as causes to sustain them, but they are certainly more crystallized and articulated on the war side. Our presentation is symmetric, state system reality is not.

## 12.5 Enters War Abolition

The table below summarizes the argument so far: (Table 12.1).

The table suggests eight approaches to war abolition in the 21st century, trailing the slavery abolition of the 19th and the colonialism abolition of the 20th centuries.

**Table 12.1** Causes of war and peace

Aristotle four	War	Peace
Causa efficiens	<i>Intention</i> : unsolved contradiction	<i>Peace-making</i> transformed contradiction
Causa materialis	<i>Capability</i> : arms and army	<i>Peace-keeping</i> nonviolent peace forces
Causa formalis	Rules <i>ad bello</i> Rules <i>in bellum</i> deep culture DMA deep structure of hierarchy	Rules of conviviality Rules of mediation-conciliation deep culture TeY-YTr deep structure of equiarchy
Causa finalis	<i>Victory</i> by winning	<i>Peace-building</i> by transcending

*Source* The author

They are weakening the causes of war and strengthening the causes of peace, guided by the Aristotle Four causation discourse:

- by delegitimizing war as a means even if the end is legitimate
- by arms/army control, distargeting/de-deployment, disarmament
- by critiquing war rules and war deep culture and structure
- by focusing on the visible and invisible costs of violence
- by giant mobilization of mediation and conciliation
- by giant mobilization of nonviolent peace forces
- by improving peace rules and peace deep culture and structure
- by focusing on the visible and invisible benefits of peace.

All of this is happening today. There is a giant struggle between the war and peace paradigms, the former passing under the name of security. A giant institution, the military, is heading for decline and fall. That global struggle is a worthy successor to the tired struggle between domestic left and right.

## Chapter 13

# Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution: The Need for Transdisciplinarity

**Abstract** Peace studies seeks to understand the negation of violence through conflict transformation, cooperation and harmony by drawing from many disciplines, including psychology, sociology and anthropology, political science, economics, international relations, international law and history. This raises the problem of the complementarity, coexistence and integration of different systems of knowledge. In fact, all of the human and social sciences are products of the post-Westphalian state system and so reify the state and its internal and international system and focus on this as the main source of political conflict. Conflicts, however, can arise from other distinctions involving gender, generation, race, class and so on. To contribute to peace building and conflict resolution, the social sciences must be globalized, developing theories that address conflicts at the levels of interpersonal interaction (micro), within countries (meso), between nations (macro), and between whole regions or civilizations (mega). Psychiatry and the “psy” disciplines can contribute to peace building and conflict resolution through understanding the interactions between processes at each of these levels and the mental health or illness of individuals.

**Keywords** Conflict resolution • Interdisciplinarity • Peace studies • Systems theory

Peace studies aims to understand violence and its negation by conflict transformation (‘negative peace’) and peace-building by cooperation and harmony (‘positive peace’). To advance this task, peace studies must draw from many scientific disciplines. This raises the problem of the complementarity, coexistence and integration among different systems of knowledge.

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Each science is a culture, with canons for filtering the false away from the true and the invalid from the valid; and sometimes also the unethical-wrong from the ethical-right, the unaesthetic from the aesthetic and the sacrilegious from the sacred. The purified text is knowledge, surrounded by subtexts and supertexts, deep texts and contexts.

Each science is also embedded in a structure, usually vertical or hierarchical, with producers and consumers of that knowledge. The producers of knowledge can be divided into masters, disciples and apprentices, cut through by horizontal layers of peers. There is nothing “neutral” or “objective” about this structure, but it is reasonable to demand of a science that its culture and its canons are made explicit, available for scrutiny by anybody. The ability of the producers of knowledge to make explicit their assumptions becomes a criterion of validity. Moreover, the science, both in its culture and its structure, should be public, that is, take place in public space. Secrecy is the antithesis of science. This is so because the ultimate test of validity is not objective but inter-subjective knowledge, with premises and conclusions that are acceptable to a broad range of observers. There is a double problem here: in order to communicate scientific knowledge and reproduce it, much of the culture of science must be internalized; for the observers verdict to have consequences they must occupy a position, like that of a “peer” for a peer review, inside the structure. Science requires us to be insiders and outsiders at the same time. In short science is explicit, public and intersubjective.

### 13.1 The Place of the Social Sciences in Peace Studies

Violence and war, conflict and peace, all have one thing in common: they are relational. Violence takes place between perpetrator and victim, war between belligerents, conflict between goals held by actors and by implication between actors, peace between actors, as a peace structure, with a peace culture. The actors may be individuals or collectivities; either way, the basic measure of peace is what happens to human beings, the extent to which their basic needs and basic rights are met. *Homo mensura*: man is the measure of all things (Protagoras). Given this, how does the study of peace relate to the social sciences? They are all important.

*Psychology*, with its focus on individuals, usually at the micro level, informs us of the extent to which peace has been achieved, that is when basic needs are met for survival and wellness. These needs include having a range of life options rooted in viable identities, and having basic rights, which are not only civil and political. Psychological analysis is crucial, also for understanding intra-personal and inter-personal conflict; but we should not expect or demand much insight in larger levels or structures of conflict.

*Sociology*, focusing on interaction and structure, is by definition more relational and hence structural and hence better suited for understanding how violent relations and structures produce more violent relations, and what a peace structure among persons and groups might look like. Anthropology, focusing on meaning

and culture, familiar with a broad range of very different societies, is better suited for understanding how violent cultures reproduce themselves, and what a peace culture for persons and groups would look like. (Of course, both sociology and anthropology are concerned with the interactions of structure and culture, albeit with different emphases.) Political science (*Staatswissenschaft*) is equally crucial, as it focuses on the use and abuse of power, processes of legitimation and contestation, and the institutions that carry and maintain power over time.

While *economics*, which focuses on transactions of economic values, is also structural and systemic, this level of analysis easily loses sight of the person as it concentrates on sustainable system growth rather than meeting the basic needs of the most needy. The same limitation potentially applies to sociology, anthropology and political science as well: human beings are easily overshadowed by structure, culture, and institutions.

*International relations* (IR) is actually a misnomer as the focus of this discipline is on the state (that is an institutional actor identified with a territory over which it claims jurisdiction), not the nation (a group carrying a language, a religion, visions of past, present and future and a rootedness in place). IR analyzes the state system in ways that are analogous to what sociology, anthropology, political science and economics do for group systems, identifying interaction structures, economic transactions, power and institution-building, with perhaps less emphasis on cultures. Law and *international law* (IL) focus on institutionalized norms, mainly proscriptions, ruling out some acts of commission, and on the extent to which descriptive reality conforms to these norms. History follows actors through time, exploring changes and continuities, often with a focus on elite individuals at the expense of common people, and on actors at the expense of structures and cultures.

Needless to say, peace studies needs all of these disciplines, much like health studies (aka as medical studies, another misnomer) needs physics, chemistry, anatomy, physiology, pathology, and so on. And yet health studies is more than a multidisciplinary sum of the parts, forced by therapy to deal with the total person. As the person is an integrated system, health studies must integrate the multiple disciplines and levels of description into a coherent theory. The same applies, of course, to peace studies.

For peace studies, however, there is a major problem hidden in the closet: all of the human and social sciences are the products not only of the Enlightenment, but also of the post-Westphalian state system, from 1648 onward, in Europe. In other words, the social sciences emerged in tandem with the crystallization of the state system in the 17–19th centuries. Sociology was the study of society, and society was identified with the country, a territory governed by a state. Anthropology was very consciously created by the colonial powers as the study of state-less societies. It was a very fruitful negation of the others, proving the argument about statism precisely by being its exception. Political science, as *Staatswissenschaft*, was the study of exactly that: the exercise of power within and by the state. Economics was essentially the economics of single states, with attention to transactions with other states, using GDP and GNP as the key measures. A very important exception is

Marxism, which explicitly focused on capitalism as a world system transgressing state borders. IR was the study of inter-state relations, with law and international law studying the normative regulation of intra- and inter-state relations. History was above all the history of single states, with the main consumers of history in the school system being trained as future citizens through shared myths in collective memory.

And *psychology*? Is it really the study of people struggling or failing to adjust to these social changes? The focus on the individual person allowed for a border-free science, the residual problem being how to achieve sufficient sensitivity to the enormous structural and cultural variations.

This brief genealogy suggests the following thesis: the social sciences as we know them reify the state and the state system. If this is a bias, what is the remedy? In one word: the globalization of the social sciences. Certainly, we cannot pretend that states do not exist, but the state system may be fading away, yielding to a system of regions and to some extent to a global system. The social sciences will have to survive the limited lifespan of the state system. Territory is cut through by fault lines, with territorial tectonic plates moving and buckling, creating tremors and shocks. But there are other fault lines reflecting gender and generation, race and class, inclusion/exclusion, and national identification. These have implications for the future of social sciences as they may be applied to peace studies.

For example, in order to globalize IR, making it trans-border, we must add to its current focus on inter-state relations, an attention to relations that are inter-gender and inter-generation, inter-race and inter-class, inter-inclusion/exclusion as well as inter-national. This requires looking at the world as a whole, without subdivision into states, to examine both diachronic (historical) processes as well as synchronic studies of dynamics.

Peace studies is as concerned with gender, generation and these other social distinctions, as it is with states. The state system has no monopoly on violence, war, conflict and peace, nor does IR have any monopoly on peace studies. Peace studies is about the human condition in general, concerned with our fulfilment (in the terminology of Buddhism's Pali canon: *sukha*) as humans through positive peace, and the reduction of suffering (*dukkha*) through negative peace, regardless of how the causal chains or circles and spirals, or what not, spin or weave their ways through the human manifold.

The consequence of this broader systemic view is that we must aim for trans-disciplinarity across all the levels of the human condition, not simply a multi-disciplinary sum of the single-level focus and bias of each particular social science discipline. The sum of a handful of limited or biased visions will not provide a clear overview or integrative understanding of the whole. That being said, there is much to learn from each discipline. What follows are some social science "gems" from the author's notebook:

From psychology comes the notion that we are steered, or at least guided, by forces inside ourselves of which we are not aware (whether the biochemical processes of the brain or the information processes of our subconscious). Awareness of these forces can be liberating, in that it enhances the freedom is to

choose your own guiding lights. However, much of this psychodynamic psychology has focused on psychopathology and it would be helpful if positive psychology were more developed.

Sociology contributes the observation that interactional processes or relations can be beneficial or not, equitable or not, and that they can combine into structures in many ways, often with pyramids (hierarchical structures) and circles (cyclical processes) as building blocks. Anthropology makes it clear that the cultural variety of humanity is immense, and alerts us to differences between with 'I-cultures' and 'we-cultures' as part of the foundation of social structure and process.

Political science reveals the differences between hard and soft forms of power: economic (reward), military (punishment), cultural (persuasion) and political (decision-making). Peace politics is based on the development of the soft forms of power through equitable, defensive, peaceful and democratic institutions centred on basic human needs and rights.

Economics shows that there are alternatives to mainstream economies and modes of regulation and exchange well-suited to the task of guaranteeing wellness for all humans on earth with ecological balance. IR identifies successes in the political domain such as the European Community's accommodation of Germany and the Helsinki Conference's design of a new beginning for Europe, more inspiring than numerous failures. History teaches that there are branching points in all histories where other options could have been chosen, and that counter-factual histories may be as important as the factual ones. Law, IL and human rights are powerful ways of projecting an image of the good-peaceful society or world on the screen of the future, raising fundamental questions about basic needs, deep culture and structure and challenging the status quo.

Countless other examples of contributions from the social sciences to peace studies could be mentioned. The basic point here is only to suggest how insights that originate within one discipline can then travel to the next, so that the focus on a trans-disciplinary issue such as peace generates trans-disciplinarity.

Unfortunately, peace studies often fare badly when particular models and approaches from a range of sciences are brought to bear. Rather than shedding light on complex systemic issues, these models oversimplify and assume that one level of analysis holds the key. There are a variety of reductionistic approaches to peace that illustrate the dilemmas in developing a truly transdisciplinary approach.

For example, a common assumption from psychology is that achieving 'peace equals healing trauma'. Certainly, addressing the psychological and social impact of trauma is necessary, but it is far from sufficient. Given the *homo mensura* principle, addressing individual trauma is necessary, but like the general rehabilitation of human beings after violence, or the reconstruction of houses destroyed by conflict, this involves an undoing of damage, reducing or removing some of the effects of violence, but does not address its causes that generally lie in an unresolved conflict somewhere.

Another common psychological view is that, "peace is attained by telling your story." Again, being able to narrate one's experience of suffering and injustice may be helpful for healing trauma, but it is neither necessary, nor sufficient for

peace. With a good solution, or transformation, of the root conflict, negative cognitions and emotions tend to be blunted, receding into the background. The narratives of past conflict and injustice, when presented in public space may rekindle the conflict. It is essential not to confuse what is good for the individual with what is good for the conflict formation.

Among practitioners of conflict resolution, there is sometimes the assumption that peace equals conciliation. Conciliation is to violence what mediation is to conflict: mediation loosens the knots of incompatibility, conciliation clears the past of trauma, gives closure, and opens for a future of joint projects with negative peace as a minimum project. Both are indispensable, but must be followed by joint projects that build peace.

From a political perspective, some assume that, 'peace is insured by the presence of democracy'. In fact, democratic government or institutions are neither necessary nor sufficient for peace. Nonviolent conflict transformation capacity is needed, but does not come automatically with fair and free elections. A minimalist, military perspective might "equate peace with ceasefire." While the absence of violence is good in itself, a ceasefire may also serve rearmament and redeployment for the next stage of warfare. Moreover, mediation may run parallel to warfare.

For many, the pursuit of 'peace is synonymous with the struggle for human rights'. However, as presently construed, the local protection of human rights is neither necessary nor sufficient for global peace. A state good at dispensing human rights to its citizens may also demand a payback of human duties, including giving one's life for that state. Conflict transformation is needed and does not come automatically with the currently dominant understanding of human rights.

From the point of view of human rights organizations and other international bodies, the 'path to peace runs through the exposure of violence'. The monitoring and reporting of violence is necessary—the truth should be known—but it also can be counter-productive by fuelling the cycle of violence. What is also needed is peace journalism reporting: Who are the real parties to the conflict? What are their goals? Where and how do these goals clash? And what are the proposals for solutions, from people at all levels of the social system, based on diverse experiences both within the conflict situation and elsewhere?

Many are convinced that, 'economic and social development will lead to peace'. If development includes building the capacity for nonviolent conflict transformation then peace will be an outcome. However, if development merely intensifies the desire for more material wealth and resources, then the consequence may be more war rather than peace.

As my comments on each of these approaches to peace suggest, peace building has its own logic and requirements. In the end, there is no substitute for the analysis or 'diagnosis' of the conflict and the articulation of specific proposals for solutions or transformations (Galtung 2008).

## 13.2 Handling Conflict: The Need for Trans-Disciplinarity

Let us now apply this thinking about conflict, peace and their relations to a major problem of our times, related to transcultural psychiatry, and even beyond that field.

Something new has happened in the morbidity pattern in the world. According to the World Health Organization (WHO 2008), mental disorders are now playing a major role. We are not going to explore the methodology for this conclusion but only take note that unipolar depression is the number one disease around the world for both genders, with some variations, and that bipolar depression, manic-depressive disorder, is number four. Between these two are somatic disorders that make people incapable of handling their work for shorter or longer periods (the definition of disease morbidity), but among these many common somatic complaints, like chronic pain, may also be expressions of depression. Mental disorders are still surrounded by taboos.

The pattern for morbidity and disability is not the same as the pattern for mortality. Most people do not die from depression (though suicide may be a lethal outcome of depression). While the epidemiological distinction between the largely contagious diseases of traditional societies and diseases of modernity (such as cardiovascular disease and cancer) has been bridged by AIDS, it is still a useful distinction because it correlates with the level of modernity. What is interesting about the new morbidity pattern is that it cuts across the so-called North–South divide. The USA and Colombia are in the first rank among American countries in prevalence of anxiety disorders (The World Health Organization Consortium for Surveys 2004). We would hardly have seen this so clearly one generation ago. Something has happened.

Let us first take note that this poses an enormous challenge to the physicians of the soul—psychologists and psychiatrists. Suddenly they are catapulted into the limelight. It is not clear that the professions are up to the challenge. The tendency in both psychology and psychiatry is to locate diagnosis and treatment inside the individual, who is viewed as the carrier of the disorder or disease. If context is considered at all, it is usually just the nearest environment. But depression may involve much larger patterns. However, in order to see this, we need to expand the meanings of ‘depression’.

Here is my first effort: depression is a sort of action paralysis that occurs when our goals and efforts appear meaningless. The level of vital energy decreases, body temperature decreases, the production of energy lessens because low demand dampens the supply. What has happened? If we take “not knowing in and out, apathy, action paralysis, meaninglessness” as the diagnosis, what is the appropriate therapy and what would be effective prophylaxis?

Although I have described this in terms of the individual’s state of mind, this is not a single factor model, but rather involves four very different factors, one from each of the four levels of organization of the human condition:

- *Micro*, within and in between individuals, particularly those who are closest to us;
- *Meso*, within the country, between genders, between generations, between classes, between nations;
- *Macro*, between countries, between nations; and
- *Mega*, between regions, between civilizations.

This is a multi-level approach to mental health. It recognizes that part of the etiology of depression is far beyond the micro level in which the “psy” disciplines specialize, meaning that it lies outside the range of direct psychological intervention.

This is where peace studies enters, not only as a transdisciplinary approach but also as a multi-level one. We must use models from all four levels, analyzing the synergies in the processes at each level, the causal links across levels, and the isomorphisms between levels.

A general model for conflict can be found in the book, *Transcend and Transform* (Galtung 2004). Briefly: X wants something as a goal; the same is the case for Y; the goals seem to be incompatible; X and Y therefore see each other as a source of frustration and aggression is pouring out. Or, when  $X = Y$  and frustration is turned inward, the aggression is directed against the person him or herself. We all experience this sort of conflict at the micro level almost continuously. Sometimes it comes out as verbal violence, accompanied by body language, sometimes as physical violence. Sometimes it is inner-directed like violence against a goal; sometimes even as violence against the very idea of having a goal.

In conflicts between two parties there are always five possible outcomes:

(1) X gets what it wants and Y nothing; (2) Y gets what it wants and X nothing; (3) both give up their goals or give up everything to a third person; (4) they meet somewhere in between; or (5) perhaps with a little assistance, they create a new reality where both X and Y can feel at home. I call this final possibility “positive transcendence.” These are the possibilities—and some of them can be solutions, with acceptance by all the parties involved and sustainability.

Unfortunately, few people are aware of all of these options. Many people are limited to one-point solutions: “I must always be the winner,” or “I am the permanent loser;” or they are limited to only two possibilities: “it is either you or me,” *tertium non datur*. With these limited options, depression is just around the corner. When three possible solutions are imagined, the situation is somewhat better: there is also the possibility of a compromise, finding something in between. But in the compromise there is also an element of capitulation. Negative and positive transcendence, however, demands imagination and creativity. What do we have to do so that this becomes part of our culture, which is taught in schools? We can use this basic model at all four levels of organization, and I have presented 10 case studies for each of the 4 levels (Galtung 2008).

Understanding meso-level conflicts requires different models. To address this, I have been working with the simple geometric forms of pyramid and circle as representations of the structure of the system. In the circle all positions are equal, in the pyramid there is a high and low. Call the vertical structure of the pyramid

alpha and the horizontal circle beta. In alpha, the link-saving is bought at the expense of verticality; in beta, horizontality is bought at the expense of much linking work. The two structures, alpha and beta, then constitute a dilemma, but let us explore it by means of a tetralemma, as both of them can be strong or weak:

- Alpha weak, beta strong: *Equiarchy*, small-scale society.
- Alpha strong, beta strong: *Polyarchy*, traditional society.
- Alpha strong, beta weak: *Hierarchy*, modern society.
- Alpha weak, beta weak: *Anarchy*, postmodern society.

All societies have all four structures, but the centre of gravity shifts over time.

‘Small is beautiful’ points in the direction of equiarchy, but in relation to the larger social world equiarchy has a marginalizing effect because it is directed inward. The recognition that it is important to create larger structures points in the direction of polyarchy, but this risks overloading the linking work. Clans, extended families, villages, feudalism, the military and the church—*los poderes facticos*, today in the form of state, corporation and university—are hierarchical, exploitative, disempowering. Finally, anarchy can be as under-demanding as polyarchy is excessive in its demands.

These social structures correspond to four ways of getting depressed. The appropriate therapy moves the system toward an equilibrium in the middle or re-establishes a functional rotation rhythm between the four structures. When working in 1975–1976 as a consultant on the methodology of the WHO international study on schizophrenia, my general observation was that the individual exposed to a social system with ‘strong alpha with weak beta’ structure (which characterizes modern, urban, industrial societies) was particularly vulnerable to poor outcome. Here this scheme is expanded to recognize four types of structural violence, in addition to that of hierarchy: the overload of polyarchy, the marginalization of equiarchy and the loneliness of anarchy.

The meso-level provides individuals with foci for identification as economic class (Marxism) and gender (feminism). If the identification is strong, the decline of one’s own group is depressing. Analysis of the meso-level makes people aware the victim of the deep structures they participate in that are part of their tacit social worlds.

The macro-level concerns conflicts that occur between states and between nations. The macro level of analysis addresses the processes of strong identification with one’s own country—patriotism, and one’s own nation—nationalism. This level involves countries playing cards with human beings, through wars and lethal games that leave behind millions of losers with deep wounds in their souls.

As we proceed to the mega-level, many might feel that we are now somewhat removed from the individual, but this is not at all the case. Consider that small, secure, evangelical-Lutheran Norway close to two centuries ago, constitutionally protected itself against those who believed in Judaism and the Jesuits. Today, the prevalence of even more divergent ways of life and forms of belief, in a country such as Norway, is an obvious consequence of the ever-extending reach of transport and communication, forces which make globalization ultimately unavoidable, whether we like it or not.



These ways of life will come closer still, into our soul. And there will be many of them, not only Muslims, as dominant media narratives suggest. If we cling to the identity we have become accustomed to, we shall soon wake up realizing we are not at home in the age of globalization. And at this point, it becomes important to have more options than ‘us or them’, whether the problem is where to place mosques in the urban environment or the tenets of faith inside our soul. We have learned that ‘only us’, intolerance, is incompatible with human rights and that tolerance, ‘space for them as well’, is not good enough. The next step is dialogue, ‘you are different from me, how exciting!’ Brainstorming, respect, curiosity. We have nothing to lose in making this step, only much to gain, much enrichment.

There is also a fourth stage, mutual learning, which holds the key to the future. Let us take the three Abrahamic religions as examples, as they are close to us and to each other. Let us extract some of the best from all of them, values that include the following:

- From *Judaism*: dialogue, truth as a process, not as a declaration.
- From *Orthodox Christianity*: optimism, the long-term perspective, spanning centuries.
- From *Catholic Christianity*: the distinction between sin and sinner.
- From *Protestant Christianity*: the principle of here I stand, I cannot do otherwise.
- From *Islam*: Islam equals peace, which equals submission; Zakat, sharing with those who are suffering; and wisdom expressed in Sura 8:61, “when your antagonist inclines toward peace you do the same.” There is great wisdom in each of these traditions. We need to be free to gather from the wisdom of the world and globalize the enormous insights humanity has produced.

We labour under the burden of the four layers of human existence, which sometimes weigh heavily upon us. In addition to the depressing social structures that leave one overburdened or under-challenged, we may identify strongly with a country on its way down so that the depression of the country becomes an individual’s own depression. We may be threatened, or enriched, by the encounter with very different worldviews and ways of being. And we are often incapable of creating that little bit of new reality that can dissolve even hard, solution resistant conflict through the ‘both-and’ of positive transcendence.

The ‘psy’ disciplines can provide a tremendous service to the world to the extent that they open themselves to the whole range of problems that may underlie the problem of depression. If they do not approach the manifold problems of depression with courage and optimism, no one else will do it. And we know what the result will be: a rainbow of multicolour pills, blocking deeper understanding.

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## Chapter 14

# What is a Culture of Peace and What are the Obstacles?

A culture of peace is a culture that promotes peace.<sup>1</sup> But what is peace? I have two metaphors.

The first metaphor is *health*, like ‘peace is to violence what health is to disease’. A person can be healthy, a person, a group, a state, a nation, a region, a civilization can be peaceful. A world can be peaceful, at least better than today.

But we also talk of peace between persons, groups and so on. The second metaphor is *love*. Love is the union of body, mind and spirit, or, to be more precise, the union of those unions. The miracle of sex and physical tenderness. The miracle of two minds sharing joy and suffering, *sukha* and *dukkha* as buddhists would say, resonating in harmony. And the miracle of two persons having a joint project beyond themselves including reflecting constructively on the union of body and mind, and spirit.

The body that is the economy. The mind that is the polity. And the spirit, that is the culture, particularly the deep, collectively shared, subconscious culture. I have left out the fourth source of power, the military. My concern is *peace by peaceful means*. And to all those working on ‘just war’ in these days of USA-Iraq crisis I would suggest as an exercise to explore ‘just slavery’, ‘just colonialism’, ‘just patriarchy, suppressing women’ first. Maybe the idea occurs that evils should be abolished, not justified.

Unfortunately, many institutes and universities doing peace studies are actually doing war studies, counting violent conflicts meticulously, analyzing them, sometimes looking into how they ended, the cease-fire. But one thing is a cease-fire process, sometimes with a third party stepping in, punishing them if they break the cease-fire, rewarding them if they do not, making the cease-fire pay for itself.

This may or may not be a good approach to peace, but it is not the same as a peace process. Peace, as pointed out using the love metaphor, is a positive relation between parties, of union, togetherness. The condition is mutual respect, dignity, equality, reciprocity. In all three areas, spirit, mind and body; culture, polity, economy. Let us look at all three.

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first presented at The Barcelona Forum, Barcelona 29 August 2004.

Each culture, in my experience, has some kind of gift to a world culture of peace, like the Western *equality for the law*, the Polynesian *ho'o pono pono*, the Somali *shir*, the Cheyenne *calumet*. Sometimes we have to dig to find it. And the idea of a big world parade of contributions to that world culture is excellent; even I am a little bit less convinced about the Peace Olympic games. It could be too competitive, with gold, silver and bronze medals when we need dialogue and mutual learning.

To demonstrate the point about spiritual richness permit to list what I in my little life, a tiny second in the history of world cultures, have learnt from the world religions:

*From Judaism:* that truth is not a declaration of faith but a process through dialogue with no end, like in the *Talmud*.

*From Protestant Christianity:* the Lutheran *hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders*, here I am, I have no alternative; the significance of individual conscience and responsibility; and equality in the face of the Creator.

*From Catholic Christianity:* the distinction between *peccato* and *peccatore*, between sin and sinners, of a stand against the sin but at the same time pardoning, forgiving the sinner.

*From Orthodox Christianity:* the optimism of Sunday Christianity as opposed to the necrophilic Friday Christianities of the other two: Christ has arisen, is among us.

*From Islam:* the truth of Sura 8:61, when the other shows an inclination toward peace that so do you; peace breeds peace. And the truth of *zakat*, of sharing with the poor.

*From Hinduism:* the trinitarian construction of the world, as Creation, Preservation and Destruction. Applied to conflict this means: pursuing creation by seeing conflict a challenge to be creative, preserving the parties, avoiding destruction.

*From Buddhism/Jainism:* nonviolence, *ahimsa* of course, but then to all life, bringing in the whole earth, not only the human part, and the earth-human interface. And as a part of this what in Japanese buddhism is known as *engi*, that everything hangs together, causation is co-dependent, no beginning, no end; nobody is totally guilty or totally innocent, we all share responsibility is reducing *dukkha*, suffering and increasing *sukha*, fulfillment, liberation for all, including ourselves.

*From Confucianism:* the principle of isomorphic harmony, harmony inside ourselves, inner peace, in the family, school at work, in society, in the country and the nation, in the region and the civilization; with all levels inspiring each other.

*From Daoism:* the principle of *yin-yang*, the good in the bad and the bad in the good, and the bad in the good in the bad and good in the bad in the good and so on; a complexity far beyond Western dualism.

*From Humanism:* the idea of *basic human needs*, to some extent reflected in the *basic human rights* as a general guide-line for human action in general and politics/economics in particular.

Recommendation: pick the best from all, don't waste time wrestling with strange, obscure, even anti-peace messages. Let nobody tell you cannot do that,

that you are not permitted to pick and choose, and not permitted to be eclectic. Drink from the world's wisdom to your heart's desire!

The major sociopolitical obstacles to a culture of peace, is, indeed, a culture of war and violence. Like in the media.

We see it on television. The minor factor is the display of unbridled violence with the victim lying in his/her own blood and the perpetrator escaping. The first major factor is the lack of display of the invisible effects of violence, the sorrow suffered by the bereaved, the trauma, the hatred, the urge for revenge and revanche; and the sense of glory in the perpetrator who got away with it. And the second major factor is the lack of display of alternative ways of handling conflict, through conflict transformation, empathy, nonviolence, creativity. No 'TV violence study' has covered all three adequately.

From interpersonal violence there is a direct link to interstate wars. There is a war journalism that systematically focuses on violence and who wins, like a soccer game, leaving out the invisible effects and the alternatives. Peace journalism starts with two questions. What is the conflict about? And what are the possible solutions? A president who has nothing better than "the conflict is between good and evil" and "the solution is to crush evil", will not survive sustained questioning. Except as sheer war propaganda, in a war culture.

But the war culture is also based on what is said; like being a *Chosen People* by the Almighty, accountable only to Him. The world order has their God on top, then the Chosen People under God (leaving no space for international law and human rights), then Chosen Allies, then the Rest, including the UN. They see themselves as exceptional, with the right, even the duty to be in breach of human rights and UN resolutions, whether the Almighty is Yahweh, God or Alla'h.

Peace can only be based on equality and equity. A structure with basic inequality, inequity, asymmetry—not giving to others what they demand for themselves—is a recipe for basic trouble, sooner or later. *Equality for the law* is a Western contribution to a culture of peace; exceptionalism is the opposite, hence anti-peace. This goes for genders and generations, for the groups in society, for states and nations, for regions and civilizations.

The war culture is based on Chosenness, Glory and Trauma, backed up by Dualism, Manicheism and the promise of a violent encounter, and Armageddon. CGT, DMA. These days we hear it from fundamentalist terrorists and fundamentalist state terrorists. So,

*Moderates all over the world unite! we have only fundamentalists to lose. In a peace culture of Empathy, Creativity, Nonviolence.*

The human spirit is capable of accommodating cultures of war and cultures of peace; like the human body is capable of hosting both pathogens like HIV dangerous to self and other and sanogens like vitamins. The same goes for the culture of any society. We have to open our hearts to the immense significance of the human spirit for a more peaceful civilization, driving out anti-peace!

But peace is made neither by culture alone, nor by politics and economics alone. It is made by all three, synergistically. The formula for peace is always equality, equity, and mutual respect. We have to learn to celebrate not only the

peace elements in our own culture but also in others. “I celebrate your gift to humanity and you celebrate mine” is a good basis.

But how do we nonviolently stand up against naked aggression, like the United States in Iraq? Learn from Gandhi, participate in a massive boycott of US export products.

There is talk of boycott of US products all over, building on successful action against the apartheid regime in South Africa, against Deutsche Shell in the North Sea, and against the French nuclear testing in Polynesia. The purpose of the boycott is to turn US corporations against US belligerence and disrespect for treaties and world cooperation.

The boycott would cover *consumer goods* from movies, CocaCola-MacDonald to cars and gasoline, *capital goods* of all kinds and *finance goods* like dollars (use euros, yen and others) and US bonds and stocks, demanding that governments do not buy and that corporations divest from US firms, starting with the most reprehensible corporations.

The average profit of a US corporation is around 6 %, meaning that even modest participation will have major impact. Even a 3 % decline in sales will place the trustees/executives in a dilemma between loyalty to Washington geofascism and their own profits.

Likely counter-measures against a boycott will include:

- pressure on governments to outlaw boycott; problematic because market freedom is a major part of neoliberal ideology;
- corporations asking Washington for compensation; problematic given the US economy in general and the federal budget;
- decreasing expenditure by laying off more workers; problematic because collective protests are now increasing very quickly;
- US boycott of products from boycotting countries; problematic given US consumer dependence on foreign products, and solidarity, buying from US-boycotted countries.

The boycott should be informed by gandhian nonviolence. The purpose is to reduce and eliminate the US military and economic grip on the world, not to kill US children. An emergency relief program for those who suffer in the US should be considered. The target is the US Empire, not the US Republic.

What happened to dealing with the USA with dignity? The dignity is there, but not for the illegitimate aspects of US foreign policy; they have to be resisted. A policy like this, making a strong distinction between the US Republic and the US Empire, is not “anti-American”, meaning being against everything American. There is good in the bad and bad in the good; relieve the USA of sin by refusing to cooperate, and then have the best possible relation with that marvelous people.

Put differently: there is nothing in conflict and peace theory saying that we shall build compromises to everything and treat everybody equally. The conflict between slave and slave-owner, between colonialist and colony, was not solved by compromise but by resisting evil. Incidentally this resistance is also a part of the Hindu, not just the gandhian, tradition and found in other spiritual traditions as well.

Some words about the economics of peace. Taking basic needs and equity as our guidelines the first goal is satisfaction of basic needs, probably best done locally and nationally. And the second goal is equity, equal exchange guiding trade relations in the global space. What could be more important goals for economic activity than to give people a life in dignity, and build relations between countries that are equitable?

We cannot permit an economy to kill people at the tune of 100,000 a day, a quarter of that starving, the other three quarters suffering the deficit in affordable health services. And we cannot permit trade relations grabbing the natural resources of other peoples, and even protecting the robbery by military means.

In short, we have work to do. Let good spirits guide us.

## Further Reading

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# Chapter 15

## Human Rights: From the State System to Global Domestic Policy

### 15.1 The Human Rights Pillars: The State System and the Enlightenment

In this essay human rights encounter Durkheim's *le social*—that *sui generis* beyond the sum of individuals.<sup>1</sup> 'The social' is here seen as structure and culture. A structure is a web of social interaction. We are *in the structures* as individual and collective actors, steered-guided by rewards-punishment to the extent of *institutionalization*. And a culture is the web of meaning. *Cultures are inside us* as individual and collective actors, steered, guided by a sense of good and bad feelings, to the extent of *internalization*.

The human rights tradition carries the imprint of its origin in 17–18th century's European history: a *state system* officially born on the day of the Westphalia Treaty 24 October 1648, and the *Enlightenment* associated with early 18th century France, like with Voltaire and Rousseau. Migrating across the Atlantic it inspired the 1776 US Declaration of Independence and the 1787 Constitution, then crossed the Atlantic again and inspired the 1789 French constitution. From France to France.

The state system structures the rights and duties of states. One right is the right of war and one duty is to declare the war in advance; the right that Japan was deprived of in Article 9 of its constitution. States are conceived of as sovereign, conditioned by nothing but themselves, like the construction of individuals in Western Antiquity and Western Modernity-Renaissance; actually in denial of the *sui generis*.<sup>2</sup>

The enlightenment is a secular culture removing the divine from christianity: from the economy (Adam Smith; but surviving as invisible hand); from the human mind (Kant, but surviving as the stars above); from mechanics (Laplace, *je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothèse*), from evolution (Darwin), from history (Marx), from


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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published in: *Human Rights and the Social*, Seoul National University, 5–6 November 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Like the famous Margaret Thatcher thesis that there is no such thing as society, only individuals; thereby in principle denying the basis of sociology as a science.



**Fig. 15.1** Organization of states. *Source* The author



individual moral struggle (Freud). Quite some project, even if God survived as *l'être suprême*.

How, do the two socials interlink with human rights?

The human rights were embedded in a structure with the state system up front, carrying an enlightenment culture, being a product of its context. But precisely how?

As a triadic *structure* with an organization of states as norm-senders, the states—as an organization with ultimate power inside a country—as norm-receivers, and humans, or more precisely *men* and *citizens*, as norm-objects. In French, *le droit de l'homme et du citoyen*. In legal language this makes individuals the rights-holders, and states the duty-holders. The duty of the duty-holders is to see to it that the rights of the right-holders are met. Again, quite some project.

In this triadic structure the state organization gives legitimacy to states who receive the human rights norms by signing and ratifying, in return for states being accountable in human rights terms; and the states guarantee the rights of the individual citizens in return for such citizen duties as paying taxes, military service and respect for the state (Fig. 15.1).

The norm content, their culture, reflected enlightenment secularism. Not only was the divine, as expressed in the Ten Commandments, removed as norm-sender, but also as a source of legitimacy and as the judge holding individuals accountable.<sup>3</sup>

Even non-divine spirituality, attachment to some reality beyond the sum of individuals—like the web of life (Buddhist) or the togetherness in the divine (Islam) or the membership in a clan or in social harmony (Chinese, Japanese)—is

<sup>3</sup> Very problematic, indeed, for god-states like the USA, Israel and Iran, accountable to that higher authority only; in the case of the US a closely 'under God' that there is hardly space for any UN Charter or International Bill of Human Rights in-between.

removed.<sup>4</sup> The social comes as the naked individualism of the ubiquitous ‘everyone’, in short as an I-culture. Even the right of self-determination is individualized to voting, not as a right bestowed on a we, a we-culture-structure, like the culture of the village as a habitat, of a traditional craft, of a clan.

The human rights culture is one of concreteness, a basic concern being that the thesis “a human right has been/has not been met” can be verified, or at least falsified. There is an implicit behaviorism evident to any eye perusing the 12 December 1948 UD and the 16 December 1966 CP and ESC Covenants the first and second generations respectively. In principle rights-holders have claims on duty-holders, and adjudication is based on holding the empirically observed and non-observed evidence up against the normatively defined right and wrong. The concrete and empirical will then tilt the rights away from the spiritual and mental toward the somatic and behavioral.

The third human rights generation effort to accommodate peace, development and the environment inside a human rights discourse is problematic as these are social level constructs. But Article 28 of the UD may come to the rescue, normalizing to everyone language: Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

## 15.2 Globalization Challenging the Pillars

The two–three centuries old context for the human rights tradition has in the meantime changed dramatically. Both pillars are shaking under the impact of globalization processes toward an increasingly borderless and an increasingly shrinking world. ‘Borderless’ refers to the gradual erosion of the borders between states, and ‘shrinking’ to all human categories, any Other, coming closer, even so close that such borders as fault-lines, between genders and generations, classes and nations, are also either erased, *or reinforced*.

For eyes trained on territorial borders only it may look as if we are moving toward a one state-one nation world; the single state being the world, and the single nation humanity. In other words, a world government in a world without major fault-lines of any kind, only individuals, many, diverse, but borderless, and with the three generations of human rights as constitution.

*Not so.* The pillars are shaking under globalization:

- *the state system is fading* in a territorially increasingly borderless world, *but*
- *secular enlightenment is challenged*, by other world views now coming very close to the secular West given massive immigration.

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<sup>4</sup> See Galtung and MacQueen, *Globalizing God: Religion, Peace and Spirituality*, TRANSCEND University Press, 2008, see <[www.transcend.org/tup](http://www.transcend.org/tup)>.

Concretely, states—except the big ones beyond 100 million—are yielding in salience to such actors as *local authorities* (LAs), *nongovernmental organizations* (NGOs), *transnational corporations* (TNCs), regions, globally the UN. And: Nature.

Secular I—culture enlightenment is competing with religion, spirituality, and we-cultures. The idea of Western secularism becoming a universal world view, like in Matt. 28:18–20, is fading. Structures and cultures are dialectic with forces and counter-forces within and between. Surprising only to linearists.

### 15.3 The Social is Changing: So Also the Human Rights?

We start with the hypothesis of the fading state system. There are two major problems. First, do states really have the power, resources and legitimacy to implement human rights if they so want? And second, given the CP and ESC records of many states, particularly the bigger ones, is it obvious that they so want? If incapable, or unwilling, or both, do some states still serve a useful purpose in the human rights construction?

Or, could other actors, like regions, be more useful, given the mobility and cultural shocks mentioned? How about regions—European, African, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and the coming Latin American, Islamic, East Asian and possibly Russian?

Beyond that, could we possibly imagine another approach, in fact broadening all levels in the triadic construction?

To start at the top: the UN has been very skilful in accommodating non-state actors as carriers of world views ‘in consultative capacity’. Sooner or later a Security Council will reflect the regions, not like today giving the EU two vetoes and the others none. There are platforms for NGOs. The TNCs are brought in under the heading of social compacts (the LAs are absent, however). For a human rights council to consult with all of them, even bringing them in, should not be too complicated.

At the middle level: why not take the whole catalogue of rights and add non-state to state actors as duty-holders, adding not only regions but also NGOs-TNCs-LAs? Europe as a region is both norm-sender, duty-holder, sender of legitimacy and receiver of accountability. That formula could be generalized to other regions, some may be ready, some not, under the aegis of the UN.

At the bottom level: adding collective to individual rights-holders, to accommodate we-culture concerns.

These processes are evolving today, with the European region, the NGO Amnesty International, and the social compact approach up front. The human rights discourse accommodates them all up to some point, which in itself is no small achievement.

But with structures changing, meanings of human rights will also change. Late 18th century human rights delivered a fragmented, individualized citizenry to the state, against payment in human rights currency, and with the right for the state to

exact payback in obedience currency, ultimately their life, serving the wars promoted by the state. A good deal?

With duty-holders more dispersed the loyalty-subservience of the rights-holders will not be the same. Loyalties, payback obligations, felt or real, will also be dispersed. From a world with a fragmented system of states with fragmented citizenries a more pluralistic human rights structure should promote a more complex web of rights and duties. More entropy, more peace.

Adding collective rights will increase this complexity. Take the three examples of possible 'Asian' collective rights: the recognition of villages, traditional crafts and clans as rights-holders brings rights- and duty-holders closer together. Potentially this should open for a linkage between the human rights tradition of *entitlements*, because it is a right, and the tradition of *mutual rights and obligations* often rooted in compassion. But here some care has to be exercised. A state, or a region, or others, may protect a threatened village or craft by making monetary or other resources available, but that in itself does not guarantee that individual rights, for instance to a livelihood, will be met. In other words, the logic is not that I- and we-cultures, one good, one bad, are opposed to each other, rather that they are complementary. We need both.

Compare the human rights tradition to a classical family, here a little idealized, but far from atypical. There are one or a few breadwinners, not necessarily male, who contribute more materially than they receive. There are those very young or very old who receive more than they contribute. The setting provides for continuous and contiguous satisfaction of many basic needs. There is a master of distribution, usually the mother-wife, apportioning to the family members according to need more than according to contribution. And all of this carried by a sense of family togetherness and family sharing.

The comment is, of course, that the internal we-culture of the family comes to nothing when no bread can be earned; then they need security nets internal and external to the family. But the basic point is that in a reasonably typical family meeting the needs of all is internalized as a culture, and institutionalized in the structure. Not doing so will lead to bad internal feelings and negative sanctions. Members of a family generally want to do to each other what they have to do.

And in that lies the crux of the matter. Let us say we are searching for a structure and culture of human rights so that rights are met because duty-holders want to do what they have to do, must do. Or, do what they must do because they want to do so, as the song goes, doing what comes naturally.

If conceived of as a part of the legal tradition the focus is on negative institutionalization, punishing the duty-holder for not exercising the duty, lamenting how this genius human rights bridge between domestic and international law falls short because it is not enforceable in an anarchic world. The legal tradition is punishment oriented; the socio-anthropological tradition is equally or more internalization oriented.

Norms are rooted inside us, not only communicated from the outside as reward and punishment. But one condition for this to happen is that the norms, *in casu* the human rights norms—and that is the reason why from the beginning of this essay

they have been referred to as norms, not as laws—are felt as a part of the culture dwelling inside us, not as a foreign implant imposed from the outside. If the deep culture is secular-individualist the human rights come as ripe fruits from that tree, just spelling out the obvious. Individual freedom of expression, for instance, comes as a basic right, as a part of the deeper individual self-realization. Unproblematic.

However, when the twin assumptions of secularism and individualism are not satisfied problems arise. Take the Buddhist case. There is a deep spirituality seeing the web of relations between all sentient life, past-present-future, as more real than the individual manifestations of life. This means that how one relates is more important than who one is. Relations matter more than attributes. ‘I relate, hence I am’ overshadows the individualistic ‘I think, hence I am’, and even more so if those thoughts are supposed to be Cartesian only.

In some Buddhisms the ethical budget is collective: what my ‘I’ has done of good comes to my near others as a merit because they inspired me. And conversely, whatever that ‘I’ has done of bad comes to that ‘we’ as a demerit because of acts of omission: they should have warned me, stood by me, helped me in that critical moment. My act of commission was contingent on their acts of omission.

The human rights implication is the right to relate. But in an atomizing post-modern social order with high loneliness that may be impossible. A social crime; some kind of genocide.

## 15.4 The Case of Islam: A Note

Let us hold the Islamic social—with Abrahamic roots like Judaism and Christianity but with more distance to secularism and individualism—up against human rights. *Togetherness* in the divine, and social *sharing*, are essential constituents. There is that of the family, hence brothers, sisters, in the five pillars of Islam. The *shahada*, the declaration of faith with the *salat*, prayer in a position of submission, *Islam*, express togetherness. The *zakat*, sharing with the poor, and the *ramadam*, a month of fasting reminding the believers of what it means to have nothing to eat and drink, are social acts, not individual attributes. Beyond the right not to be hungry is the duty to share so that nobody is hungry.

Objection: meeting the right is an end that can be met by many means. However, if the means also become autotelic ends, then sharing, like togetherness, becomes a right, not only a duty, moving up in the means-ends hierarchy. To be enshrined.

Pillar No. 5, the *hajj*, pilgrimage to Mecca, is strong on both togetherness and sharing. A ritual; but the right to that practice is as essential as communion to a catholic. A human rights bill silent on such essentials is not compelling.

Tariq Ramadan, in “What I Believe”,<sup>5</sup> lists life, dignity, justice, equality, peace and nature as key Islamic values. The right to life and dignity can perhaps be individualized, but the others are relational. The freedom to express the Danish

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<sup>5</sup> Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 (sic).

Mohammed cartoons were in breach of the recipients' right not to be insulted. Secularism-individualism is a stand alienating Muslims<sup>6</sup> and others. Changing human rights language so as to make Muslims feel at home seems more adequate than demanding of Muslims that they secularize, meaning that they give up Islam.

## 15.5 The Right to Life: And to the Afterlife—A Note

The human rights tradition includes the right to life. It would have been more credible had there been a right to live in a social and world order where everything is done to solve conflicts by peaceful means before they turn violent.

But the human rights tradition does not include the basic human concern of all times: our body has only a finite lease on life. Many are the formulas to extend that lease beyond the death of the body into an afterlife, like the Christian promise of salvation for an eternal afterlife, on the condition of the right faith and-or deeds. The enlightenment spirit would, and should, certainly exclude any right to salvation as something beyond the capacity of any duty-holding state. But it is not beyond the capacity of a duty-holding state to make available concrete factors seen as necessary conditions for access to an afterlife to the believers, like the places of worship,<sup>7</sup> confession etc. Referring to the November 25 2009 Swiss referendum on forbidding minarets the argument might be that these institutions should be visible, maybe also audible (the mosque muezzin, the church bells). For the believer there is much at stake. Freedom of faith assumes freedom of practice.

If afterlife is seen in terms of progeny, then the rights of a clan as social actor enters. If afterlife is contingent on being member of a group with a collective ethical budget, then institutionalized isolation has to be avoided. All of this is within the capabilities of relevant duty-holders if they are not limited to states as organizations.

The enlightenment threw out the divine, and in that process also came close to negating the spiritual. But the spiritual has material foundations, and their protection is a human right.

## 15.6 Human Rights Meeting Social Science: A Note

There is a huge problem here. I have built this essay around the idea that the human rights tradition was resting on two pillars, the state system and the enlightenment, both of them challenged by a vast array of interconnected

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<sup>6</sup> Which means one out four humans, there being now 1,570 million Muslims in the world (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 9-10-2009).

<sup>7</sup> For interesting reflections, see Julian Barnes, *Nothing to Be Frightened Of*, New York: Vintage, 2009.

processes we refer to as globalization. I have tried to make the point that human rights will have to change, at least bend; or else crack. They will not get out of this encounter untouched.

Others hailing from that vast intellectual continent social sciences, including law and history, may see this wholly or partly differently.

The problem with the social sciences is that they are also the children of the state system and the enlightenment. The unit they address, with the honourable exception of anthropology, is the country-state: sociology, economics, political science (the German *Staatswissenschaft*), international studies, a misnomer for what is actually interstate studies. Rarely do they transgress borders. Comparative sociology is not the same as a sociology of the global social system. Nor do the many charts paralleling the historical diachronies of components of our human abode, the world, add up to world history. Law is ‘municipal’—a strange word for domestic—but is more global as international law even if much is tied to the state system. And psychology? Maybe the study of the misfits in that system?

‘Social’ means state, it seems. And ‘science’ means empiricism, even behaviourism, depriving human beings of their inner essence, the spiritual ability not only to see themselves but to transcend what they see. Which they do again and again, but so much social science tries to freeze them in static, non-contradictory, laws called findings.

The unavoidable conclusion from this analysis is that the social sciences suffer from the same deficits as the human rights: They are all children of the same union of the structure of the state system with the culture of enlightenment. The problem is whether they are capable not only of suggesting remedies but even of analyzing deficits from which they themselves are suffering. An objection might be that if experienced as deficits they could be particularly capable.

However that may be, the peace research discourse is an effort to elaborate epistemologies capable of accommodating such problems. A key term is ‘trans’, like in transnational, translevel, and transdisciplinary,<sup>8</sup> go beyond; liberating the peace concept from any particular nation or civilization, from the state system, and from any particular social science. All cultures have something to contribute, all levels of human organization—micro-meso-macro-mega—have their conflicts and patterns of cooperation, each social science has important insights to offer. Transdisciplinary foci, like conflictology and paxology, are efforts to bring such insights together.

However, there is a deeper level than “trans”, like an epistemology of dialectic holism. The world is, indeed, a *holon*, with countless forces and counterforces, contradictions, in other words dialectics. Nothing is permanent, including that rule.

Human rights as they emerged are not forever, nor is “the social”, any social, nor the sciences to come to grips with the social. Hence this essay, as an indication

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<sup>8</sup> Johan Galtung, *50 Years: 25 Intellectual Landscapers Explored*. TRANSCEND University Press, 2008, <[www.transcend.org/tup](http://www.transcend.org/tup)>.

of where the current dialectics may take us. Yield or break, like the famous cherry tree branch overloaded with wet snow. Adapt or die. Better the former, particularly with something so valuable as human rights.

### **Further Reading**

Galtung J, (1994): *Human Rights in Another Key*. (Cambridge: Polity Press): 184



## Chapter 16

# The Soviet Case: Six Contradictions and the US Case: Fifteen Contradictions

In the comparative study of the decline of ten, and fall of nine Empires, No. 10 being the US Empire, in 1995 (see the Prologue), with an economic focus, the conclusion was that no single factor but a syndrome of four factors was the general cause:

- a division of labour whereby foreign countries, and-or foreigners inside one's own country, take over the most challenging and interesting and developing tasks;
- a deficit in creativity related to a deficit in technology and good management, including foresight and innovation;
- one or several sectors of the economy neglected or lagging;
- and, at the same time, expansionism as ideology-cosmology, exploiting foreign countries and-or one's own people, inviting negative, destructive reactions.<sup>1</sup>

The syndrome idea came from an earlier study of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire,<sup>2</sup> Part III in this book, the object of many single factor theories. The syndrome idea was then applied to the Soviet Empire in 1980,<sup>3</sup> focusing on six contradictions:

- [1] between the Soviet Union and the satellite countries,
- [2] between the Russian nation and other Soviet Union nations,
- [3] between the city and the controlled countryside,

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published in Galtung (2009).

<sup>2</sup> Johan Galtung, with Tore Heiestad and Erik Rudeng, *On the decline and fall of empires: the Roman empire and Western imperialism compared*. Oslo: University of Oslo, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, pp. 71. (Trends in Western civilization program, 15), (Oslo Papers, 75). Also published at: Tokyo: UN University, 1979, pp. 71 (HSDRGPID-I/UNUP-53), and in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.) *Review*. New York: Research Foundation of the State University of New York, IV, 1980, 1, pp. 91–154. Condensed version in: *Comprendre: revue de politique de la culture*, XLIII/XLIV, (1977/1978), pp. 50–59.

<sup>3</sup> Johan Galtung, with Dag Poleszynski and Erik Rudeng, *Norge foran 1980-årene* (Norway facing the 1980s). Oslo: Gyldendal, 1980, p. 85.

- [4] between a socialist bourgeoisie and a socialist proletariat,  
 [5] between socialist bourgeoisie liquidity and nothing to buy,  
 [6] between the myth of Communist Utopia and Soviet reality.<sup>4</sup>

## 16.1 The Soviet Case: Six Contradictions

The 1980 prediction was that the Berlin Wall, the weakest point in the empire, would fall within 10 years, followed by the Soviet Empire. The theory was “synchronic, synergic maturation of contradictions, demoralizing Centre and Periphery elites”. Elites would control one or two contradictions, but be overwhelmed by more, and they were. The Berlin wall fell on time 9 November 1989.

After the wall came the Soviet fall, by the whimper of demoralized, corrupt, fat, alcoholized ego-maniac elites, feeding also on Radio Erevan jokes. Fit for the survival of self and family, but unfit for the survival of the Empire. The faith was gone.<sup>5</sup>

How does faith evaporate from so many true believers in the Soviet model? Based on observation during the Cold War, a process with seven phases could sometimes be identified in Euro-communists:

- *Phase 0*: everything is perfect, hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil. But no paradise is forever.
- *Phase 1*: reports of something not being according to the model reaches ears and eyes, but is rejected as anti-Sovietism.

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<sup>4</sup> Using the theory of spaces (*Peace By Peaceful Means*, Part IV on Civilization) to identify contradictions we might get

- *nature*: toxic pollution, lowering the life expectancy,
- *human*: general anomie, disconnect between norms and action,
- *social*: nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 listed,
- *world*: no. 1 listed,
- *time*: rigidity, basic change being overdue,
- *culture*: no. 6 listed, disconnect between myth and reality.

Written this way the similarity to the US Empire configuration becomes more clear; only that in the next chapter the focus is on *world*, divided by power dimension.

<sup>5</sup> Which in no way means that all one had to do was to sit and wait till the Soviet Empire imploded. Behind all those six points there is concrete human consciousness, individual or collective action, confrontation, struggle. Vaclav Havel rightly complains (*The Japan Times*, November 17 2004) that faith in supposed laws of the market and other ‘invisible hands’ that direct our lives reduces the space for individual moral action and social critics to naive moralists or elitists. Havel certainly was one, but the Velvet revolution probably was more an effect of concrete action in East Germany than of internal critique.

- *Phase 2*: there may be something to the reports, but due to external circumstances—like bad weather, the interventionist wars, and the Great Patriotic war, aftermaths—and will disappear.
- *Phase 3*: yes, there is even much truth to the reports, but it is all due to one man, Stalin, and will disappear with him.
- *Phase 4*: yes, and it is systemic, structural, rooted in mistakes like top-down party political rule and state planning.
- *Phase 5*: yes, and it is systemic, cultural, ideological; the Marxist capitalism-socialism-communism sequence is simply wrong. Human, all too human. Some elements in the mind of the true believer are untouchable, like the two structural elements, let alone the key cultural-ideological elements. However, as data start piling up there is a tactical withdrawal that permits, first, acknowledging that there are such rumors, second, that they are empirically true but due to circumstances, third, due to something crucial but a human individual, not systemic. Fourth, fifth: the systemic bastions crumble, structural elements first, then key cultural tenets of the ideology. End of faith. And then, what?
- *Phase 6*: the Soviet Union was entirely wrong from the beginning, and any enemy of that enemy of humanity is a friend.

Time has come to leave one empire to embrace the next as perfect. No *yin/yang*, no mature judgment in this story.

But there is also another way of telling this story, and, like the above story, with a direct carry-over to the US empire. The focus is then on world space, and more particularly on the relation between the efforts at global governance in the 20th century, the *League of Nations* and the *United Nations*, with their member states.

The League also had a council of victorious powers, England, France, Italy and Japan, the latter two being among the victors in the First World War. Later on Germany and the Soviet Union were added, whereas the US Senate refused to make the USA join at all.

Of these six Japan went to war against China in 1931, Italy against Ethiopia in 1935—both of them using bombardment of the civilian population, Italy also with gas—Germany against Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the Soviet Union against Finland in 1939. They all defined themselves as above the law, as exceptions, against the Kellogg-Briand treaty of 1928. They exited from the League, they were condemned, but the League, international law and general human morality all proved too weak. The League died, partly for that reason as there are limits to the disconnect between rules and actual behaviour, between authority and compliance. If one goes, so does the other.

And all four engaged in their favourite pursuit, building empires by the sword. And all four empires were dismantled, the first three by the bang of the sword, the fourth by the whimper of an implosion. Today no country has defied the authority of the successor, the UN, as much as the USA at the world level, and its clone, Israel, at the more regional level. The conclusion is clear: defy international morality, even if not backed by force, and you harvest the end of empires,

including your own. Whether by a bang or a whimper is another, and rather important question.

## 16.2 The US Case: Fifteen Contradictions

The reader will already have substituted George W. Bush for Stalin in the story of the seven phases above, second-guessing the author. But we are not there yet, first the contradictions.

The decline and fall prediction for the Soviet Empire was based on the synergy of six synchronizing contradictions, and the time span for the, literally speaking, crack, in the wall, was 10 years. The decline and fall prediction for the US Empire was based on the synergy of 15 synchronizing contradictions, and the time span for the contradictions to synchronize and synergize, working their way to decline and fall was estimated at 25 years in 2000. There are more contradictions, the US Empire being more complex, and the time span longer, the US Empire being more sophisticated.

After the first months of President George W. Bush (twice selected) the time span was cut to 20 years because he sharpened many of the contradictions posited the year before, and because his extreme single-mindedness made him blind to negative, complex synergies. He just went ahead; blind-folded by his autism, living in a virtual reality protected by ideology and ignorance.

President William J. Clinton (twice elected) was seen in a different light. Confronted with a pattern of contradictions, he canceled an intervention in Somalia, evidenced heavy doubts and little enthusiasm in a war against Serbia, and fired a couple of missiles against Sudan and Afghanistan. Being super-intelligent, demoralization in high places and sex in strange places, were the consequences. Hypothesis: the Republicans tried to impeach him, not for too much sex but for too little faith, using the former as a pretext. The effort misfired, but a highly non-demoralized George W. Bush, a true believer, captured the US Presidency.

Here is the list of 15 contradictions, as posited in 2000:

### I. *Economic Contradictions (US-led system WB/IMF/WTO-NYSE-Pentagon)*

- [1] *between growth and distribution*: overproduction relative to demand, 1.4 billion below \$ 1/day, 100.000 die/day, 1/4 of hunger
- [2] *between real economy and finance economy*: currency, stocks, bonds overvalued, crashes, unemployment, contract jobs not positions
- [3] *between production-distribution-consumption and nature*: ecocrisis, depletion/pollution, global warming

### II. *Military Contradictions (US-led system NATO/TAP/USA-JapanAMPO)*

- [4] *between US state terrorism and terrorism: Blowback*
- [5] *between US and allies: except UK-D-Japan, allies will say enough*
- [6] *between US Eurasia hegemony and Russia–India–China: 40 % of humanity*
- [7] *between US–led NATO army and the EU army: a Tindemans follow-up*

### III. *Political Contradictions (US exceptionalism under God)*

- [8] *between USA and the UN: The UN ultimately hitting back*
- [9] *between USA and the EU: vying for Orthodox/Muslim support*

### IV. *Cultural Contradictions (US triumphant plebeian culture)*

- [10] *between US Judeo-Christianity and Islam: the UNSC nucleus has four Christian, and none of the 56 Muslim countries.*
- [11] *between US and the oldest civilizations: Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Aztec/Inca/Maya*
- [12] *between US and European elite culture: France, Germany, etc.*

### V. *Social Contradictions (US–led world elites vs the rest: World Economic Forum, Davos vs World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Belem)*

- [1] *between state–corporate elites and working classes of unemployed and contract workers. The middle classes?*
- [2] *between older generation and youth: Seattle, Washington, Praha, Genova and ever younger youth. The middle generation?*
- [3] *between myth and reality: the US Dream and US and world reality*

## Reference

Galtung J (2009) *The Fall of the US Empire—And Then What?* (TRANSCEND University Press) ([www.transcend.org/tup](http://www.transcend.org/tup)).

## Chapter 17

# Positive and Negative Peace

Any concept of peace includes the *absence of direct violence between states*, engaged in by military and others in general, and of massive killing of categories of humans in particular. But peace would be a strange concept if it does not include relations between genders, races, classes and families, and does not also include *absence of structural violence*, the non-intended slow, massive suffering caused by economic and political structures in the form of massive exploitation and repression. And the *absence of the cultural violence* that legitimizes direct and-or structural violence.<sup>1</sup>

All these absences of types of violence add up to *negative peace*; as by mutual isolation, unrelated by any structure and culture. Better than violence, but not peace, because *positive peace* is missing in this conceptualization.<sup>2</sup> An overview (Table 17.1).

This gives us six peace tasks: eliminating the direct violence that causes suffering, eliminating the structures that cause suffering through economic inequity, or, say, walls once placing Jews, now Palestinians, in ghettos, and eliminating cultural themes that justify one or the other. The task known as ceasefire is only 1/6 of a complete peace process.

But then come the three tasks of building direct, structural and cultural peace. The parties exchange goods, not ‘bads’, not violence. The structural version of that builds cooperation into the structure they are parts becomes sustainable, with equity for the economy,<sup>3</sup> and equality for the polity.<sup>4</sup> A structure based on reciprocity, equal rights, benefits and dignity, “what you want for yourself you should

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published in From Charles P. Webel and Jørgen Johansen, Eds. *Peace and Conflict Studies: A Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 75–79.

<sup>2</sup> For more on this see Johan Galtung, *Peace By Peaceful Means*, London etc.: SAGE, 1998, Part I.

<sup>3</sup> A very weak, undeveloped field, in economic theory and practice, with the social, economic and cultural rights of the 16 December 1966 Human Rights Convention being an effort, but not yet ratified by a leading state in the state system, the United States.

<sup>4</sup> And that is where democracy (one person one vote) and human rights (every one is entitled-) enter, gradually not only within countries, but also among them. Political scientists have been far ahead of economists in giving meaning to equity.

**Table 17.1** Direct, structural and cultural violence

Violence	Direct violence Intended harming, hurting	Structural violence Unintended harming, hurting	Cultural violence Intended or unintended justifying violence
Negative peace	[1] absence of ceasefire	[2] absence of no exploitation; or no structure = <i>atomie</i>	[3] absence of no justification; or no culture = <i>anomie</i>
Positive peace	[4] presence of cooperation	[5] presence of equity, equality	[6] presence of culture of peace, and dialogue
Peace	Negative + positive	Negative + positive	Negative + positive

Source The author

also be willing to give Other”. And a culture of peace, confirming and stimulating the other two.

Apply this to a couple:

- *Violence* can be physical, like wife-battering, or verbal, bad-mouthing;
- *negative peace* is the absence of all that, passive co-existence;
- *positive peace* is active love, the union of body, mind and spirit.

Thus, negative peace is like a point, neither violence, nor positive peace. Violence is a region of actors exchanging ‘bads’. and positive peace another region of actors exchanging ‘goodies’.

This idea can be developed further, with two actors, X and Y, avoiding suffering, Sanskrit *dukkha*, and pursuing fulfilment, sanskrit *sukha*.

X and Y can now relate to each other in three ways:

- they go up or down the *dukkha-sukha* gradient together
- when one goes up the other goes down, and vice versa
- there is no relation

In other words, high positive correlation, high negative correlation, little or no correlation; the correlations being diachronic, not synchronic, identifying trajectories. Or: *symbiosis*, *antibiosis*, *abiosis*.

Below is a diagram with X-axis and Y-axis, each axis running from  $-9$ , extreme suffering (I want to leave this life) to  $+9$ , extreme fulfillment (I want to stay here forever), cutting each other in the origion of neither-nor.

Figure 17.1 has a main diagonal from  $-9$ ,  $-9$  through the origion to  $+9$ ,  $+9$  where the two parties enjoy maximum fulfillment, singly, or jointly in positive harmony (in Quadrant I), and maximum suffering, singly or jointly in negative harmony (in Quadrant III). “Harmony”, then, does not mean joy, happiness, but ‘swinging in tact’, ‘attuned’, for good as also for bad.

But, on the diagram’s bi-diagonal, from  $-9$ ,  $+9$  in Quadrant IV to  $+9$ ,  $-9$  in Quadrant II, the dyad, singly or jointly, experiences the disharmony of fulfilment for one and suffering for the other, with origion as neither-nor.

Let us now tilt the diagonals toward the X axis, starting with the main diagonal. They still grow or suffer together. But a great gain for X is now a small gain for Y; and a great loss for X a small loss for Y. There is asymmetry, *inequity*, parasitism.





chance only". They may delude themselves and each other, and in the despair over their inability to produce joint fulfilment produce joint suffering. Negative harmony instead of positive. Or they may recouple. Or hope for a better coupling to come with the help of 'time'. But 'time' is no substitute for hard work on the relationship.

An adolescent leaving the parental home 'to go his-her own way' is obviously decoupling. This may last forever. But with sufficient maturity in both recoupling at higher levels may happen.

Here is one image of 'coupling', not only in marriage, from Daoism: "Share in the suffering of others. Delight in the joy of others. View the good fortune of others as your good fortune. View the losses of others as your own loss."

Another is in the Zulu *ubuntu*, "I am in you, you are in me, we are in each other." Both tap definitions of a strong spiritual coupling in a *we-culture*. The unit of suffering and joy is a *we*, not two I's.

Compare this to the *Golden Rule*, positive (or negative):

*Do (not do) unto others what you (do not) want them to do unto you.* The subject for *sukha*, and for *dukkha* avoidance, is an individual, 'you'. The rule is ego-centric, an ethical device for self-satisfaction, highly compatible with Abrahamitic individualism. The ethical budget is individual, I-culture, not collective, *we-culture* oriented. And it may not even be very smart, as G. B. Shaw pointed out: 'their tastes may be different'.

Something of the same applies to the Kantian dictum,<sup>6</sup> "Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip eines allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne."

What Kant introduces here is not a *we-culture* but a traffic rule for individualist co-existence: the validity of an act is linked to its generalizability. Kant wants a multilateral normative umbrella; the Golden Rule is more bilateral. That rule may be useful, if attention is paid to individual and cultural differences, for positive co-existence in an I-culture, but does not produce the *sui generis* union of a *we-culture* in the daoist sense above, as exemplified in the definition of love.

So far we have *degree of coupling*, strong versus weak, as illustrated by the perfect versus worn-out clutch, and *positive versus negative* coupling. But how does coupling come about? Using the pillars of peace studies, Nature, Culture and Structure, there are three types of answers.

*Nature* produces coupling, the extreme case being Siamese twins, one-egged twins in general another, siblings, in short genetic sharing. Being of the same species is already a (weak) coupling.

*Culture* produces coupling as internalized harmony, like in friendship and love. Primary relations (family, school) produce stronger internalization, but also stronger disharmony "when things go wrong".

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<sup>6</sup> "Always act so that the thesis underlying your will could serve as a general law."

*Structure* produces coupling as institutionalized cooperation, in secondary relations (school, at work), and in tertiary relations (belonging to the same category, gender, generation, race, class, nation, territory).

Thus, there are *inner versus outer coupling*, steering us from within by good and bad conscience, and from without by reward and punishment. We-cultures would produce very strong inner couplings. But I-cultures, guided by the Golden Rule and/or kantianism, also produce inner couplings, only of a different nature. Love is based on inner we- and I-cultures, and a marriage on an outer social pact, triggering sanctions from all kinds of structures. If one fails the other coupling devices may still be there.

We can now reap the harvest of all this by linking the concepts of positive and negative peace to the idea of coupling, using the quadrants:

- Quadrant I is *positive peace* when there is coupling, positive harmony and symbiosis; and more symmetric, equitable, the closer to the diagonal;
- Quadrant III is *violence* when there is coupling, negative harmony and symbiosis; and more symmetric, equitable, the closer to the main diagonal;
- Quadrants II and IV are *fulfillment for one and suffering* for the other, negative coupling, disharmony, antibiosis; and more asymmetric, inequitable, the closer to the bi-diagonal, a good illustration of *structural violence*.
- The origin is *negative peace* with both X and Y at the “no peace, no war” point of no coupling-indifference-abiosis.

Quadrant I accommodates not only direct, intended, but also structural, institutionalized peace. Quadrant IV accommodates direct and structural violence. In quadrants II and IV there must be something strong on the side of the party extracting benefit: structural violence. But the structural elements in quadrants I and III should not be underestimated: a ritualized marriage may be good for both; wars may be institutionalized like vendettas.

From this we can already draw some conclusions:

- *positive peace and violence-war* are similar in having positive inner or outer (or both) couplings in common, in other words a joint project like a European community, or a world (meaning European) war;
- *conflict and structural violence* are similar in having negative inner or outer (or both) couplings in common, in other words a joint anti-project.
- *negative peace*, like a cease-fire, is a limited and limiting category suitable for dualist minds: violence versus its absence.

Thus, the road from war to positive peace may not be that difficult to travel. Joint projects buoyed by passion are in both, only the content has to be changed. But in negative peace there is little passion, abstention from any joint project, and withdrawal into mutual indifference.

Peace theory and practice are about getting out of Quadrant III direct violence, of Quadrants II and IV structural violence, and into quadrant I, direct and structural, positive peace, beyond bland, origin negative peace.

But how? *Gandhi's answer*<sup>7</sup>: by decoupling in quadrants III and II–IV,

- using *nonviolence* instead of violence in quadrant II;
- using *non-cooperation*, even *civil disobedience*, in quadrants II and IV;
- using *constructive action*, recoupling, building peace, for quadrant I.

Gandhi's theory and practice went far beyond Western security theory and practice with clearly paranoid features. To Gandhi the level of coupling was the key variable as opposed to praising peace, and blaming violence. The work for positive, or as a minimum negative, peace implies changing interaction relations more than actor attributes, and that is exactly what decoupling and recoupling are about. Great. A genius.

## Further Reading

Galtung J (2008) "Towards a Grand Theory of Negative and Positive Peace: Peace, Security and Conviviality", in: Murakami, Yoichiro; Schoenbaum, Thomas J. (Eds.): *A Grand Design for Peace and Reconciliation: Achieving Kyosei in East Asia* (Cheltenham, UK, and North Hampton, Massachusetts, USA: Edward Elgar): 90–106.

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<sup>7</sup> See Johan Galtung, *The Way Is the Goal: Gandhi Today*, Ahmedabad: Navajivan, Gujarat Vidyapith, 1992.

## Chapter 18

# Conciliation as Liberation from Trauma

The point of departure is in the past. Something terrible has happened: somebody was badly hurt-harmed, traumatized. There is a narrative of acts of direct violence; physical, verbal, both.<sup>1</sup>

There is a demand for action. Three words starting with R are called upon as at least verbal carriers of the demand: *reconstruction*, *resolution* and *reconciliation*. 3R.<sup>2</sup> A tall bill to meet.

*Reconstruction* stands for undoing the non-human damage, at least as *restoration* of the *status quo ante*, what was before. In a sense an easy job: there are memories, photos, maps, drawings—even monuments—centuries, millennia, old. Materially restoration is possible.

More problematic is the human reconstruction, better known as *rehabilitation*, or *healing*. We sense prostheses and crutches, but also miracles of modern and natural medicine; leaving no scars, no traces.

If human beings have a body, a mind and a spirit, then there are three very different tasks to be done under this heading.

The body task would work on visible and less visible parts of the body, restoring them, ideally 100 %. That physicians often are good at this should not make us conclude that it is easy. The implication may also be that they have worked harder, are simply better at it, and, by implication, that the specialists on the mind and the spirit—anything with ‘psycho’ and ‘religio’ in it—have not been up to the challenge. We should demand a rehabilitation of the mind with the trauma memories removed, or softened down to the acceptable, and a rehabilitation of the spirit renewing the joy, lust for life, a new *élan vital*.

Then there is *resolution* of underlying issues, seeing the damage done as a symptom of something deeper, to be solved. A landslide that tends to recur after heavy rains; violence that tends to recur after heavy exploitation, repression, alienation. *Contradiction, conflict*.

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<sup>1</sup> This text was first published in: Santa Barbara et al. (2012: 213). Permission to republish this text was granted by TRANSCEND University Press.

<sup>2</sup> A first version of this part of the book was published in Spanish (Galtung 1998a: 126).

A trauma did not just happen *to* somebody, but *between* some-bodies. In this “between” actors conflict is located. *Reconciliation* is non-material more than material, and “socio” more than ‘psycho’.

The actors, individual and-or collective, at least two, are often allocated to two roles; Perpetrator, P, and Victim, V. The goal is a future less haunted by the traumas of the past. One formula would be reconciliation in the present; to clear the past; to build a future. Closure, healing, opening. One reason for doing so is that traumas of the past are major *bellogens*, carriers of war and violence in the present, and in the future. A good reason why something must be done to remove or reduce the traumas. But there are other reasons.

We start with Trauma with two actors, Time with three parts, and put the five together in something like the Swiss or Red Cross flags (Fig. 18.1).

That cross is the stage for the human drama of reconciliation.

No happy ‘+PEACE’ ending is guaranteed, even no ending at all. The trauma narrative ‘\*TRAUMA’ comes with space and time coordinates—*here, then*. But the trauma then flows from past into present into an uncertain future. The task is to stop or reduce that flow.

Why? As mentioned, because the flow may carry more violence in its wake, even much more. But then an important additional reason.

To see that, let us introduce two controversial assumptions:


*Assumption 1:* Traumatizing the victim also traumatizes the perpetrator

*Assumption 2:* They have a latent joint interest in exiting from trauma

A process of reconciliation has to make the assumptions come true, by conveying the suffering of V to P, and the joint interest, over time.

The traumas loom large on the conscious horizons, and deep into the sub-conscious of both actors. They transfigure, disfigure their mental and spiritual lives. And they claim attention, incessantly.

**Fig. 18.1** The reconciliation cross. *Source* The author



We can use the *shoa* as an example, and raise the question: who is, *today*, more traumatized, Jews or Germans? The *naqba* may one day be similar. Today Palestinians are more traumatized, and the Israelis are still in a state of denial; tomorrow that may change.

Enters a Conciliator, C, talking with both, one-on-one, saying:

*Conciliator*: I am deeply aware of what has happened, having listened to your narratives attentively, with much empathy. What happened has left deep traces on both of you. It cannot be erased from history, nor from your memories. It can never be forgotten. But it should not be permitted to make both of you much less as humans, as countries, than you could be. You are suffering, living much below your capacity, dominated as you are by the traumas. Day and night.

There is a saying: 'Time heals all wounds'. Not true. That does not come about by itself. Hard work is needed. And it may take time.

What I suggest is to reduce the weight of the traumas in your lives. That process is called conciliation. For both of you with your past. And, if possible, with each other, for present and future. There are many and quite different ways of doing this, and I can tell you about them, one-on-one, or together, as you want. You may find some unacceptable, others more useful. Meeting each other might also be useful, but is no condition. I can be your go-between, provided you agree with my being that. And provided you so want.

A third role has now been introduced, the Conciliator, C.

The legitimacy rests on C's knowledge and skills and track record, not on a diploma hanging on the wall.

The idea is to stop the trauma flow from past into the future by intervening in the present. Two extremes cases can be identified.

There is the light case: perpetrator and victim meet at some time and place of their own choice, shake hands, and minds, and say to each other, "let us put this behind us."

And then there is the heavy case with perpetrator denial, and victims building their entire lives around the traumas suffered.

Our approach to conciliation is based on three different aspects in this first stage: *acknowledgement*, *elaboration* and *project*, AEP. If P and V go along to some point much has already been obtained.

*Acknowledgement*. The negation of acknowledgment is *denial*. Perpetrator denial drives the victim crazy. The perpetrator may deny, even destroy the evidence that something happened, out of feelings of *guilt* or the fear thereof, or of being accused. But the victim may also deny that anything happened, out of feelings of *shame* or the fear thereof, or of humiliation. Both denials are key obstacles. And yet, in spite of that, or exactly because of those denials, they are both deeply traumatized and need help. The perpetrator has to speak the unspeakable, "yes, I did something". And the victim "yes, I was badly hurt by what happened". Get it out, in the open. Acknowledgment.

If the perpetrator, *peccatore*, sinner, now distances himself from the act, *peccato*, sin, it would be even more helpful: "I wish it could be undone". But there is

no such condition at this early stage. The point is to overcome denial on both sides, moving the issue into the space of consciousness, for both, for joint articulation.

*Elaboration.* The negation of elaboration is to leave it at that. But the complexity of human affairs should enter the narratives. The perpetrator should voice why, what went on inside him. And the victim should have the chance to respond, challenge. The narratives should be deepened and might one day coalesce into a joint, shared narrative. But some articulation of the past is needed, even if not shared.

*Project.* The negation of a project is to leave it at that. But time flows into future and the Other is still there. A project like jointly helping the children after a bitter divorce has impact on past and present and may even close the past. The marriage is gone, but there is a joint, promising project for the future that may even clear the past if the past has been articulated. A clean divorce.

There are two types of projects. They have in common *peaceful coexistence* of the two parties over time, meaning no more violence. Peaceful coexistence then constitutes a context for projects.

As a minimum this adds up to *passive peaceful coexistence*, like a couple after verbal, possibly also physical, violence divorcing, but agreeing that past is past; no more hurt and harm. This negative peace should then be made explicit, even in the form of a contract.

However, much better is *active peaceful coexistence*. The couple designs—with some help from a creative conciliator?—cooperation, for mutual and equal benefit, about joint property and the children. How about a fund for the children's education rather than using an unequal split, court-ordered or not, as a form of punishment of the Other?

But, if they can agree on this, why divorce? Because there may be other reasons behind decoupling, literally speaking: incompatible visions of marriage. For what are we married? And yet they may have the maturity neither to use the future for revenge, nor for passive emptiness, but for a positive peace, based on equality.

The goal is clearing the past, closure, healing, and building a future. The means at this introductory stage are acknowledgment, elaboration and projects for peaceful coexistence. AEP. All three are related to all three goals in complex ways. Healing wounds may open the future; a project for the future may clear the past. The conciliator has to build a strong interest in liberation in both; even, if possible, a joint interest in helping each other.

Given this, we need a paradigm for reconciliation in the double sense given above: healing inside the parties, and between the parties closing the violent aspects. Summarized as 'putting it behind us'.

There are two rather difficult gaps that have to be bridged.

Violence has created and solidified a gap between victim and perpetrator. Passive, even active co-existence, should be created.

And then there are the gaps inside victims and perpetrators; between a mature, reflecting spirit, processing the traumatic traces of the shock in the deeper recesses of their minds. Getting on top.

We assume the trauma to have left conscious memories–cognitions and emotions–of suffering in the victim, and some feelings of unease in the perpetrator unless inflicting harm has become too routine, like soldiering, shooting, bombing, gassing.<sup>3</sup> These cognitions-emotions are not only available, but ever-present, as flashes and nightmares.

But we also assume trauma elements deeper down in victims and perpetrators alike. If not universal they are at least frequently encountered in conciliation practice. They are often ‘repressed’ (Freud), they have become ‘shadows’ (Jung), and have to be mastered through the three very helpful stages inspired by Freud and Jung:

- *Awareness*: such trauma elements are probably programming me;
- *Consciousness*: I want to know them to come to grips with them;
- *Healing*: I want to liberate myself from them for a new start.

The triple task is to come to grips with trauma elements like.<sup>4</sup>  
*7 trauma elements in the Victim, conscious and subconscious:*

- VI: *innocence*: this happened for no reason located in me;
- VS: *shame*: I have been humiliated as vulnerable and stigmatized;
- VF: *fear*: the perpetrator may do it again as I am stigmatized;
- VH: *hatred*: I hate the perpetrator for making me suffer so much;
- VR: *retaliation*: make him suffer at least what I have suffered;
- VE: *entitlement*: I am offended and entitled to be treated with care;
- VM: *moral credit*: I can draw upon my trauma as moral credit.

*5 trauma elements in the Perpetrator, conscious and subconscious:*

- PL: *legitimacy*: violence is bad but there were good reasons;
- PG: *guilt*: I have done something unmentionable and basically wrong;
- PF: *fear*: one day the victim will come back and do the same to me;
- PH: *hatred*: I hate the victim for what he might do to retaliate;
- PD: *deterrence*: I must prevent any victim retaliation.

Let us try out the last of these 12 points on a super-traumatic situation: black-white relations in post-slavery USA, slavery being traumatic; post-slavery in a certain sense even more so.

The perpetrator tries to legitimize (Jim Crow) violence as defense, from higher cognitions and deeper emotions. “These niggers are a threat to our very existence-security.” “I simply hate them.” The perpetrator sees his own act as caused, and that causal chain passes through the victim before ending in the perpetrator as violent effect.

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<sup>3</sup> However, from all countries now reports are emerging about how veterans suffer not only reliving the fear of being killed but living the remorse at killing. Thus, *Intervention: The International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict*, has much material.

<sup>4</sup> Empirically encountered in the author’s practice, see [Chap. 10](#); not an office desk exercise.



And this is what the victim will deny, pledging total innocence: “This has nothing to do with anything I did, you are the cause!” Conciliator: how about the problematic relation between you—like between Jews and Germans?<sup>5</sup>—inviting both to seminar discussions in history, sociology, as good models to emulate in reconciliation work.

At this point the basic difference between legitimation and explanation becomes crucial, even indispensable:

- *legitimation*, is not explanation, but a stamp of approval from some legitimizing source; does not allow for the act to be wrong;
- *explanation* is not legitimation but allows for acts to be wrong; identifies causes to be realized/removed for such acts not to happen.

Thus, past US interventions in Arab countries do not justify 9/11 atrocities, but may explain 9/11 as a ‘blowback’. Not to be confused.

The perpetrator may try to explain his own act as caused, even as over-determined by history: I had no choice; no space for “free will”. He does not even have to legitimize. He sees himself as a leaf in torrential rains, ultimately falling down where the forces bring him.

If the victim, USA, could explore this view with the perpetrator much evil intention will be taken out of the trauma equation. Rather, they are sharing a joint *karma*. Destiny brought them together. The trauma no longer carries shame, nor guilt. What happened, happened. Shared hatred, and fear of retaliation, may even disappear together.

But if the perpetrator insists on a causal chain passing through the victim—“you provoked me”—then the immediate reaction is usually self-righteousness, “So, you are blaming the victim!” Intention is not taken out of the equation. And the same goes for Jim Crow.

If both parties have violent inputs, V loses innocence, a major bargaining card, by being violent. They become equal, sharing shame and guilt, with fear and hatred spread over past, present and future. The symmetry is a good basis for conciliation. The trauma elements are similar, and may wither away with mutually acceptable explanation; “we are in it together”. Symmetry as perpetrators makes them equal.

But the additional trauma elements in the victim, entitlement and moral credit, complicate the matter. There are benefits in a trauma.

The first benefit is inside V. Victimhood publicly flaunted carry privileges: “I have been offended, humiliated, stigmatized, I have a right to wear the *persona*, mask, of the offended. Better handle me with care; I even have the right to hit back.” The French expression is *ressentiment*, sounding more serious than English resentment. The *han* in Korean points in the same direction.

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<sup>5</sup> In other words, focusing not only on Jewish vulnerability and suffering, and German prejudice, discrimination and extreme violence, but also on the relation between, say, a minority high on economic and cultural, and a majority high on political and military power.

Like carrying *Handicapped* on the dashboard trauma entails certain privileges. That metaphor may actually be appropriate in identifying lasting victimhood as a mental handicap. The victim will construct his-her life around the trauma, tied to it as his-her albatross rather than letting it go, searching for new horizons, programs, projects. The trauma *is* the project, possibly even a life-long project if there is no exit in sight. The conciliator's task is to create an exit.

The second positive aspect of trauma is between P and V, in a society of individuals, and in a community of countries. Metaphor: a *world trauma bank*, with traumas entered publicly, meaning that all know that others know about their suffering. The trauma carries interest, compensating for traumatized time. Moral capital is in black ink, "moral high ground", to be drawn upon as socio-political capital. However, there is the danger of depreciation of the traumas deposited, and an inflation effect if too many traumas are deposited. The prize trauma account is for genocides, hence the Jewish-Israeli jealous insistence on *shoa* uniqueness to prevent any depreciation.<sup>6</sup>

And then there may also be the possibility of negative trauma balance if the account-holder incurs debits by inflicting trauma on others. The bottom line of the account is a moral deficit in red ink.

What can be done to reduce somebody's trauma capital, used to extract compensation, and to be above the law, entitled to violence? And then occupy the high moral ground, preaching to the world?

Answer: Perpetrator, turn the relation around, become a Victim. Establish your own trauma credit. Turn yourself from a bona fide net perpetrator into a bona fide creditor victim. Use control of the media to claim your newly won moral high ground. Examples: post World War I history with Germany presenting the victim side; post World War II history with Austria doing the same, "the first victim of Nazism".

North Korea has trauma claims on Japan? Focus on the abduction of some Japanese to North Korea as if it were of the same magnitude as Japanese colonialism.<sup>7</sup> China has trauma claims on Japan? Focus on navy incidents; important, but no match for Nanjing genocide.

Palestine has trauma claims on Israel? Focus on suicide bombing that way; important, but no match for *naqba*-occupation.

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<sup>6</sup> For a penetrating review of the Israeli case, see Baruch Kimmerling, "Israel's Cult of Martyrdom", *The Nation*, 10 and 17 January 2005. He points out that "the boundary between perpetrators and victims began to be blurred in disturbing ways, raising troubling questions about the role some Jews had played in the Nazi campaign of destruction. In the 1954 Kastner affair, the carefully policed boundary between victim and perpetrator all but evaporated, upsetting the stability of Israel's entire political system". The banking analogy would be to bad money, impure traumas, chasing out the good. Hence much has to be done to collect pure traumas, like collecting freshly minted, solid, coins.

<sup>7</sup> I am indebted to Fumiko Nishimura for this important point.

Germany abstained from this after World War II and focused on the suffering they had caused.<sup>8</sup> Japan uses Hiroshima-Nagasaki more than Germany uses Hamburg-Dresden. They are both, like the USA, ambiguous; perpetrators *and* victims; a difficult role to handle. The USA focuses on victimhood, Pearl Harbor and 9/11. And Norway on the killing of 77 22 July 2011, but not on Norway as perpetrator in Afghanistan.

Maybe states are too immature to handle cognitive dissonance?

Managing a trauma account, like any crisis management, can become a life-long project, tying the victim to the albatross, not letting it go. No albatross, no moral credit. A trauma, once healed, can no longer be drawn upon. There may be records of the account, but no positive balance to draw upon. Closure means account closure.

And that is dramatic if the victim has developed trauma management competence, exacting solidarity and the right to punish all over with impunity, like Washington after 9/11. Taking the other side is dangerous, carrying a risk of reconciliation and closure; hence, keep distance, never admit that you have been reconciled.

A deep dialogue between P and V might help. What looks like V having moral power over P may then turn out to be more complicated. P may have shaped V more by V assuming victimhood than by the trauma. The USA was shaped on 9/11 by 19 Arab young men, and then by itself. And Al Qaeda could watch from the sidelines a great country destroying itself, unable to understand why what happened had happened.

Of course both P and V are marked and marred by such major events. The event is on top of them, not the other way around. That ‘other way around’ is precisely the goal of healing.

Reconciliation has to happen between them, in the P, V-relation. But the work within them is equally or maybe even more important. The general formula is for the spirit to absorb the impact the trauma had on the deeper layers of their minds, on how their minds have been distorted and programmed by the event, and made

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<sup>8</sup> The photo of Chancellor Willy Brandt on his knees in front of the memorial in Warsaw in 1970 is unforgettable—as a part of the reconciliation engaged in by Germany. Possibly the best apology any government has offered in recent times and from a non-believer. No Japanese prime minister has done anything similar for Nanjing; nor any US president for Hiroshima-Nagasaki. The Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto issued an official “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for his country’s actions in WWII in 1998 (the same wording as Prime Minister Murayama has used in 1995—*International Herald Tribune*, 13 January 1998). British veterans’ groups said the apology was not enough.

But unforgettable is also the bombing of German cities by the Anglo-Americans, very well documented in Friedrich (2003, 2004). Officially there has been no effort to “equalize”, meaning canceling the trauma accounts against each other. In the German public this is a frequent theme (the present author heard it for the first time in 1949, hitchhiking in war-ravaged and occupied Germany; then while visiting Dachau in 1955). Robert McNamara came close in the way he talked about the burning of 100,000 Japanese in the major raid on Tokyo in the documentary *The Fog of War*. For the German case see Buruma (2004).

them play roles, games. Undo that immature trauma program, and then, reprogram!

However, “you have nothing to be ashamed of, no reason to feel humiliated or stigmatized” is too superficial to have any impact. The basic point for the victim lies in the perpetrator’s, and also the victim’s, relation to the deep understanding of what happened.

Either the victim has to be convinced that the trauma was unintended, like a typhoon hitting a house, twisting it to pieces. Or the victim has to share, be a part of the causation, meaning sharing responsibility. Or the perpetrator has to place his legitimacy cards on the table and have them rejected, one by one. Legitimacy is the soil whence violence springs. Like causation it can be changed.

The perpetrator intention has to be absent, or shared, or rejected. Or all three. Directly, between them, or indirectly via the go-between services of the conciliator.

Again, for this process to get started, at the very least both must acknowledge that something bad happened, be willing to elaborate the why and how, and to look into the future for liberating projects.

An ambitious programme. Key trauma elements may resist liberation being resilient, even precious, parts of the personality, fuelling a life project of retaliation, justice. The AEP program defines a new life project, of liberation, healing; maybe also for the perpetrator.

Let us summarize what has to be done, using this approach.

Whether P and V are individuals or countries, micro or macro, there are two inside and one in-between job. The tall bill mentioned.

The best would be if the inside jobs could be done by P and V. In both a mature Spirit would tell the weak Mind: “Stop playing self-destructive games. Like perpetrator paranoia, and victims living off their traumas. Like both of them being steeped in hatred and fear. Lick your wounds to heal them, not to celebrate and display them. Do some mind-cleansing. Raise your head, face the future. Restore!”

But outside help may be needed. The task of the conciliator is to increase P and V consciousness of trauma elements in command of the mind, lifting them up for P and V to see how they deform their lives. The method is talking it through. No pills, no medicine; the elements will only come back with a vengeance after that kind of repression.

The conciliator has to engage in psychiatry. And, in ‘sociatry’; repairing, or creating, a relation of at least peaceful coexistence.

Much empathy is needed for the inside jobs, and much creativity for the in-between job. Their shared history by definition includes violence. Underlying that violence there may or may not be an identifiable conflict badly in need of conflict transformation. The conciliator is mediating both inside and in-between, making reconciliation even more difficult than conflict transformation.

The inside and in-between jobs co-exist in a loop of mutual causation. Solve one and the other may follow. Maybe the in-between job is the easier one, transforming the conflict with a conflict-sensitive project; for countries like for persons.

But the problems have to be acknowledged and elaborated, by both. Only then does it make sense to come up with some project. A. E. P. For a beginning; then more dimensions, then the deeper approaches.

## Further Readings

- Galtung J (1998a) *After Violence: 3R, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Resolution. Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence* (Princeton, NJ: TRANSCEND): 115.
- Galtung J (1998b) *After the Violence: Truth and Reconciliation*, *L'Ateneo*, Anno XIV, No 5, Novembre/Dicembre: 17–22.
- Galtung J (2005a) *On the Psychology of Reconciliation (in English, with a Japanese summary)*, in *Prime*, No. 21 (Tokyo: International Peace Research Institute, Meiji Gakuin University): 5–20.
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- Santa Barbara J; Galtung J; Perlman D (2012) *Reconciliation: Clearing the Past, Building a Future* (TRANSCEND University Press) ([www.transcend.org.tup](http://www.transcend.org.tup)).

# On Johan Galtung



Johan Galtung, Dr. h.c. mult., a professor of peace studies, was born in 1930 in Oslo, Norway. He is a mathematician, sociologist, political scientist and a pioneer of peace studies. He founded the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (1959), the world's first academic research centre on peace studies, and the *Journal of Peace Research* (1964). He has helped establishing dozens of other peace centres around the world.

He taught as a professor for peace studies at universities all over the world, including Columbia (New York), Oslo, Berlin, Belgrade, Paris, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Sichuan, Ritsumeikan (Japan), Princeton, Hawai'i, Tromsø, Bern, Alicante (Spain) and many others on all continents. He has motivated thousands of individuals to dedicate their lives to the promotion of peace and the satisfaction of basic human needs.

He has mediated in over 100 conflicts between states, nations, religions, civilizations, communities, and persons since 1957. His contributions to peace theory and practice include conceptualization of peace-building, conflict mediation, reconciliation, nonviolence, theory of structural violence, theorizing about negative versus positive peace, peace education and peace journalism. His unique imprint on the study of conflict and peace stems from a combination of systematic scientific inquiry with a Gandhian ethics of peaceful means and harmony. He has conducted research in many fields with his original contributions to peace studies, to human rights, basic needs, development strategies, a world economy that sustains life, macro-history, the theory of civilizations, federalism, globalization, the theory of discourse, social pathologies, deep culture, peace and religions, social science methodology, sociology, ecology, and future studies.

He is author or co-author of more than 1,600 articles and over 160 books on peace and related issues, including *Peace By Peaceful Means* (1996), *Macrohistory and Macrohistorians* (with Sohail Inayatullah 1997), *Conflict Transformation By Peaceful Means* (1998), *Johan uten land* (autobiography, 2000), *Transcend & Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work* (2004, in 25 languages), *50 Years—100 Peace and Conflict Perspectives* (2008), *Democracy—Peace—Development*

(with Paul Scott 2008), *50 Years—25 Intellectual Landscapes Explored* (2008), *Globalizing God* (with Graeme MacQueen 2008), *The Fall of the US Empire - And Then What* (2009), *Peace Business* (with Jack Santa Barbara and Fred Dubeé 2009), *A Theory of Conflict* (2010), *A Theory of Development* (2010), *Reporting Conflict: New Directions in Peace Journalism* (with Jake Lynch 2010), *Korea: The Twisting Roads to Unification* (with Jae-Bong Lee 2011), *Reconciliation* (with Joanna Santa Barbara and Diane Perlman 2012), *Peace Mathematics* (with Dietrich Fischer 2012), *Peace Economics* (2012), *A Theory of Civilization* (forthcoming 2013), and *A Theory of Peace* (forthcoming 2013). In 2008, he founded the TRANSCEND University Press ([www.transcend.org/tup](http://www.transcend.org/tup)). 36 of his books have been translated into 33 languages, for a total of 134 book translations.

He is founder (in 2000) and rector of the TRANSCEND Peace University ([www.transcend.org/tpu](http://www.transcend.org/tpu)), the world's first online Peace Studies University. He is also the founder and director of TRANSCEND–International ([www.transcend.org](http://www.transcend.org)), a global non–profit network for Peace, Development and the Environment, founded in 1993, with over 500 members in more than 70 countries around the world. As a testimony to his legacy, peace studies are now taught and researched at universities across the globe and contribute to peacemaking efforts in conflicts around the world.

He was jailed in Norway for 6 months at age 24 as a Conscientious Objector to serving in the military, after having done 12 months of civilian service, the same time as those doing military service. He agreed to serve an extra 6 months if he could work for peace, but that was refused. In jail he wrote his first book, *Gandhi's Political Ethics*, together with his mentor, Arne Naess.

As a recipient of over a dozen honorary doctorates and professorships and many other distinctions, including a Right Livelihood Award (also known as Alternative Nobel Peace Prize), Johan Galtung remains committed to the study and promotion of peace.