

IMAGINING 'AMERICA' IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY SPAIN

Kate Ferris



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*For Sible and Anathi
and to the memory of Jim Ferris.*

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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABCFM	American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.
Academia Sevillana	Academy of Seville.
Afrancesados [lit. Frenchified or turned-French]	Supporters of Enlightenment ideas and opponents of Bourbon absolutism.
ANME [Asociación Nacional de Mujeres EspaÑolas]	National Association of Spanish Women (1918–1936).
Ante proyecto	Draft.
Arbitristas [lit. projectors]	Spanish early seventeenth-century reformers.
Asociación de la Educación de la Mujer	Association for Women's Education.
Ateneo	Athenaeum.
Ateneo de Señoras	Women's Athenaeum, approximately equivalent in activities to the Fomento de las Artes.
Bachillerato	Baccalaureate.
Barrio	Borough or neighbourhood.
Cacique	Political boss.
Caciquismo	Rule by political bosses.
Carbonari	Secret societies that took inspiration from the Italian Carbonari.
Castizo [lit. pure]	Referring to customs, music, etc. considered typical to Madrid in the mid to late nineteenth century.

Centro Hispano Ultramarino	Hispanic Centre for the Colonies.
Colegio Norteamericano	North American College, forerunner of the International Institute for Girls.
Consumos	Excise taxes.
Copla	Poetic form of Spanish popular song.
Cortes	Parliament.
Cristino	Liberal supporters of the regency of María Cristina in the First Carlist War, 1833–1840.
El ‘Desastre’ [lit. disaster]	Used to refer to the loss of Spain’s remaining New World colonies in the Spanish-Cuban-American War, 1898.
Eixample	Nineteenth-century urban planning extension project for Barcelona.
Ensanche	Nineteenth-century urban planning extension project for Madrid.
Episodio(s) nacional(es) [lit. National episodes]	Collection of 46 novels written by Benito Pérez Galdós, between 1872 and 1912, recounting episodes of Spanish history from 1805 until the 1880s.
Escuela de institutrices	School for governesses.
Escuela Normal de Maestras	Normal School for Female Teachers.
Escuela de comercio para señoras	Business school for women.
Escuela de Correos y Telégrafos	School for Postal and Telegraph-workers.
Exposición de Filipinas	Philippines Exhibition (1887).
Flerteo	The act of flirting.
Fomento de las Artes	Liberal educational association intended to benefit the working class.
Género chico [lit. little genre]	Genre of Spanish plays that are short, light-hearted and accompanied by music.
La ‘Gloriosa’	The ‘Glorious’ Revolution of September 1868.
Guardia civil	Civil Guard.
Himno de Riego [lit. Hymn of Riego]	Liberal anthem composed for the Liberal Triennium. Associated with republicanism, it became the anthem of Spain’s First (1873) and Second (1931–1936) Republics.
IIG	International Institute for Girls.
Institucionistas	Teacher or pupil at the Instituto Libre de Enseñanza.

Instituto	State secondary school.
ILE (Instituto Libre de enseñanza)	The Free Educational Institution.
Krausism	Important reforming philosophical school of thought in mid to late nineteenth-century Spain, influenced by the philosophies of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause.
Krausists	Followers of the philosophies of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, introduced in Spain at the mid-century.
Liberal Trienium	Period of liberal constitutional rule, 1820–1823.
Libertad de enseñanza	Liberty of education.
Liberto	Freed slave.
Librecambio	Economic doctrine of free exchange.
Licenciatura	University degree.
Liga contra las reformas	League against colonial reform.
Ultramarinas/Liga nacional	
Madrepatria	Motherland.
Mestizaje [lit. mixed ancestry]	Category of ethnicity used in reference to people of mixed European and Amerindian heritage as part of Spain's colonial system of 'casta'.
Patria chica [lit. small fatherland]	Connoteing the idea that one's locality is a key space or unit of experience of the state and nation.
Pronunciamiento	Military pronouncement intended to effect a change of government.
PSOE [Partido Socialista Obrero Español]	Spanish Socialist Party.
Quinta	Military draft.
Raza Latina	Latin race.
Real Academia Española	Spanish Royal Academy.
República-modelo [lit. model republic]	Epithet habitually used to refer to the USA, positively and negatively.
Restoration	Referring to the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1874–1875, and used to indicate the period of government between then and the flight from the throne of Alfonso XIII in 1931.
SAE [Sociedad Abolicionista Española]	Spanish Abolitionist Society.
Secretario de Legación	Diplomatic or Consul Secretary.

Sexenio democrático or revolucionario	Democratic or revolutionary sexennium, 1868–1874.
Sociedad Matritense de Electricidad	Madrid Electricity Society.
SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands]	German Social Democratic party.
Tertulia	Gathering for discussion and debate, usually held in a public space (e.g. café or bar).
Turnismo	The orchestrated exchange of power between the two main political parties in Spain, Conservative and Liberal, exercised during the Restoration era.
Velada	Soiree.
WBM	Women's Board of Missions. N.B. In this book, I refer variously to the USA/US/ America and to 'Americans' and 'North Americans' to denote the country and inhabitants of the United States of America. Whilst very aware that 'America' and 'North America' are continental designations that include more than just the USA and US citizens, I have opted to use these various designations in part for stylistic reasons, but principally in order to follow contemporary usage. Late nineteenth-century Spaniards used 'norteamericano', 'Estados Unidos' and, even, 'americano' to refer to the USA and its inhabitants.

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Introduction: Imagining ‘America’, Imagining ‘Spain’

In early 1893, Rafael Puig y Valls left his native Catalonia and took ‘the direct train from Paris to New York’ (via La Havre) to take up his position as Spain’s Industry Commissioner at the Chicago World’s Fair.¹ The staging of the final Universal Exposition of the century in the North American ‘mushroom city’—so called because it seemed to have sprung up into an imposing and bustling metropolis virtually overnight—afforded the United States the opportunity to showcase its latest inventions, its wealth and its way of life.² Honoured by the designation of Spain as guest of honour—this was the ‘Columbine’ exhibition, to mark the 400-year anniversary of the ‘discovery’ of the Americas—Puig y Valls was eager to take up his post and learn more about the ‘great North American republic’. On arrival in Chicago, however, he felt suddenly overwhelmed. Having been ‘enchanted’ by New York, its Central Park, lively streets and even some of its looming towers, which remained somehow reminiscent of the Old World, Chicago now struck him as all-American and entirely alien.

I am so entranced and off-balance that it sometimes seems to me that I am living on a planet, which is not the Earth, and that all my preconceptions, ideas and sentiments are in perpetual rebellion in my brain, fighting against currents of varied forces. I do not know how to resolve this no matter how avidly I search for the truth, and for the direction that this highly novel and, perhaps badly termed, American civilisation is taking.³

Puig y Valls' uncertainty about 'American civilisation' connected to a broader disquiet about processes of 'becoming modern' both in the United States and at home. In signalling anxiety around modernity, Puig y Valls was hardly unique. Indeed, the inner angst he articulated on his arrival in Chicago links him to the generation of Spanish intellectuals and politicians preoccupied by national 'regeneration' and finding an appropriate path to modernity for Spain in the years before and, especially, after the loss of Spain's last New World colonies in 1898.⁴ However, Puig y Valls' identification of the United States with a 'highly novel' way of life was not simply a feature of end-of-the-century anxieties about the future; since at least the mid-century Spaniards had been observing and studying the history, contemporary institutions, politics, society and culture of the USA as a means to better understand 'the times we are living in'.⁵

This book starts from two principal premises. The first is that, as historian James Epstein noted, America was 'a place to be imagined' in the late nineteenth century (as today).⁶ The USA was a key imaginary site for late century Europeans, invoked in contemporary debates on questions of constitution and political institutions, democratic practice, economic development, international relations, technological innovation and social reform. Most powerfully, the USA or, as it was often put simply, 'America', was dreamed by Europeans of all social classes and political persuasions as the most modern iteration of civilisation and the embodiment of their own future, for good or ill. Just as the 'Orient' was largely a construct of Western minds and the 'West' at least in part the product of non-Western ideas, so too a good deal of the meaning behind the signifier 'America' was created outside its expanding borders.⁷ This book examines the images of America that circulated in Spain in the second half of the nineteenth century, understanding these as cultural artifacts and products that were at one and the same time constructions of domestic imagination and shaped through creative processes of projection, transfer and exchange that spanned the Atlantic.⁸

The second premise is that, in the words of Claus Offe during his 2004 Adorno lecture, 'we cannot describe America without describing us as America—be it as more or less similar variants of the "Western" civilisation, be it as the configuration of contrasts'.⁹ If the USA was a cipher for modernity, the processes of imagining its modernity provided 'an occasion for reflection and self-interpretation'.¹⁰ The images of America produced in Spain were refracted through the lenses of domestic concerns about nation and empire. This book is interested in the production, circulation

and re-configuration of images of the United States not for what they might (or might not) tell us about the USA, but for what they tell us about how Spaniards took stock of themselves, their political system, their empire, their society and the processes involved in 'becoming modern'. Spanish liberals, whose worldviews form the core of this book, hailed the 'model republic' as worthy of serious study, if not always blind emulation; conservatives damned its 'example [as] too horrible to stir any desire for imitation in Europe'.¹¹

If, in the late nineteenth century, the United States was key to understanding the 'times we are living in', for many Spaniards it was also crucial to understanding their own future: in this reading, the United States appeared as the future, made present. The accolade of modern cultural capital may have gone to Paris, and England may have continued to be hailed as the originator of political liberty, but in its political institutions and practices, religious pluralism, commercial priorities, technological inventions and social relationships it was the country across the Atlantic 'whose present is the dreamed of future to which many nations aspire'.¹² As such, the 'true fictional space' of America was not only a space on which to draw Europe's 'radical other', everything that Europe was not, but also an opportunity for Europeans to 'preview' their own future; both kinds of visions, America as other and America as the future previewed, incited an admixture of satisfaction and fear.¹³

IMAGES AND APPROACHES

The development of Spain as a modern nation and state has been the subject of considerable historiographical interest in recent decades. Early interpretations subscribed to the common contemporary view of nineteenth-century Spain as a country lagging woefully behind other western European nations and the United States in terms of political, socio-economic and urban development.¹⁴ Understanding Spanish history through a 'paradigm of backwardness' formed part of the historiographical mapping of a kind of Spanish *sonderweg*, in which the 'failures' and 'absences' of social democracy and republicanism in the twentieth century were traced back through the supposed failures and absences of bourgeois liberalism and republicanism in the nineteenth (and even back to the *Ancien Régime*).¹⁵ Over the past twenty years, however, historians have broken down the discourse of Spain's failure to modernise according to an idealised blueprint laid down by Britain, France or the USA,

replacing it with a ‘normalising’¹⁶ historiography that has sought to situate the particularities of Spanish industrialisation, urbanisation, growth of a middle class, extension and bureaucratisation of the state, relations between church and state, nationalism and development of liberal, republican and socialist ideals and political institutions within the context of the modernising processes of other contemporary European nation-states.¹⁷

Of course, the ‘nation’ is only one possible scale of experience according to which identities, even national ones, are shaped and articulated. Regional nationalisms (Basque, Catalan, Galician, Valencian), emergent in modern form towards the end of the nineteenth century, posed challenges to the integrity of Spain as a nation-state, but the region and locality were also key units of experience of the nation, state and government, as the notion of the *patria chica* illustrates.¹⁸ One’s local place and local affinities did not always detract from a sense of national belonging, but could form essential building blocks of national identity; the familiarity of the smaller unit of experience could make the abstract and intangible idea of the nation in turn more familiar and more real.

Equally, national ‘imagined communities’ were formed at scales larger than the nation.¹⁹ The rising interest in transnational history in the last decade or so offers another space and mode of identity formation to better understand identities ostensibly confined by national boundaries. As well as being constructed in smaller units (village, town, city, region), national imagined communities were also shaped outside the nation, through the experience of travel and through imaginative processes in direct relation to one or more other countries and/or in relation to supra-national spheres or spaces that ‘transcended’ the nation. Examples of the latter include the idea and physical expression of ‘Europe’ or of the ‘Americas’ or the binary designations of ‘Latin’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ races. Encounters, both formal and informal, with other national communities and with individuals, communities and organisations whose ‘spaces of experience’, identities and practices were associated with different national or multinational contexts were vital reference points in the creation of one’s own national identity. These could be configured as one’s Other, that is, conceived of in relation to what we (think we) are not (or what we hope we are not or think that other people are), as well as what we are²⁰—as in the case of Jean Baudrillard’s late-twentieth century writing of America as Europe’s ‘radical other’²¹—but they could also (and simultaneously) be used to mark out elements of similarity and shared history, culture and practice. Identified differences and similarities at individual, local, national and transnational

scales feed into processes of self-fashioning to produce (and continually reproduce) identities at the individual level as well as imagined communities at local, national, trans- and supra-national levels, and indeed in other group designations.²²

Thus, despite late nineteenth-century Europe's obsession with the nation, and in spite of the continued preference for plotting national histories, which still prevails in our universities, schools and government, we must recognise that the processes of fashioning national identities took place in international and transnational spaces as well as in localities. Ideas and practices from abroad influenced, migrated, were selected, accepted, adapted, modified and rejected as individuals and groups constructed and imagined themselves. Historians have begun to map political and cultural transfers, circulations and 'entangled histories' across national borders and outside other spatial delineations such as empire or region, distinguishing their methodology both from practitioners of 'comparative history' and reception theory.²³ The sociological and political-science conceptual tools of political and cultural transfer and 'diffusion theory' suggest a set of useful vocabulary—'brokerage', 'negotiated diffusion', 'local adaptation'—but above all remind us to think about the means and process(es) of transfer by which ideas, practices and so on move transnationally, as well as the images projected and produced at both ends.²⁴ The terminology, however, is problematic, especially the term 'transfer' itself which connotes movement in one direction, even if many historians who use it would insist that 'intercultural relations' flow back and forth and operate as 'conversations' involving many interlocutors.

The images explored in this book are understood as the fruit of the circulation of many ideas in conversation, including those of the Spanish individuals and groups who articulated images of America, those produced in the USA itself for domestic consumption and also projected outwards towards international audiences. Added to this admixture must be the intervention of intermediary 'brokers', in this case principally in France and Latin America, whose translations, publications and own images of the USA interceded in the complex and messy processes of circulating ideas. Exchanges can be so interwoven it becomes unclear as to where the innovation of an idea or practice lies. That said, whilst forming part of an extensive tangled history of ideas, people and practices in movement, as Latin American and other scholars remind us, evident hierarchies and inequalities of power inevitably conditioned the ways in which ideas circulated. In some respects, late-nineteenth century Spain seems to fit as an 'in-between'

place, whereby its teetering between modernity and traditionalism, between enduring, if diminished, colonial power and (sealed in 1898) weak nation status, and its role as a meeting point between Europe and the Americas, might be likely to engender hybrid and plural cultural forms.²⁵

BRINGING ‘CHANGE UPON THE HEELS OF CHANGE’: THE SEXENIO DEMOCRÁTICO AND RESTORATION

It was clear to the American romantic poet and journalist, William Cullen Bryant, as he travelled Spain in late 1857 that this was a country in transition. The arrival and extension of Spanish railroads and limited press freedoms would, he predicted, increase contacts between Spaniards and citizens of other nations and ‘thrust change upon the heels of change’.

Here is a sea-beach which the tide is rising to overwhelm, and Spain is only a bank lying a little higher than the rest, but equally sure to be submerged at last.²⁶

Bryant may have been sure that the trappings of liberal modernity would soon be evident in Spain, but it would be another eleven years before a successful liberal-democratic revolution, known as *la Gloriosa* would enact modernising political, economic and social reforms in the peninsular. In the event, this reforming project and the progressive liberals and democrats who pursued it would be removed from political power, and the Bourbon monarchy they had overthrown, restored, after six years, leading to the period being conferred the parenthetical designation of the *sexenio revolucionario* or *sexenio democrático* [revolutionary or democratic Sexennium]. The revolutionary six years were politically turbulent and unstable. Over the course of the *sexenio*, between the ‘Glorious’ September Revolution of 1868 and the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1874–75, Spain experienced revolution, two military coups (*pronunciamientos*), a liberal-democratic Constitution, civil war and colonial war, an imported monarch, as well as, for just eleven months, its first republic.

Under the enormous financial pressures of the inherited debt burden and the cost of fighting wars in Cuba and against Carlists and cantonalists on the peninsular, and unable to unite its various constituencies of progressive liberal, democrat and republican support, the revolutionary *sexenio* was ended by a series of *pronunciamientos* in late 1874 and early 1875 which brought about the monarchical Restoration, placing Alfonso

XII, the son of Isabel II who had been ousted in the 1868 revolution, on the throne, and the pseudo-democratic political system of *turnismo*. Both monarch and political system proved highly stable; *turnismo* persisted until the takeover of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in 1923, and the Bourbon monarchy remained as head of state until 1931 when Alfonso XIII, fatally implicated in the de Rivera dictatorship, fled the country as the electorate voted in Spain's Second Republic.

The *sexenio* politicians had proved unable to build a progressive consensus from their disparate constituent groups of progressive liberal monarchists, democrats and republican radicals and thus failed to fully translate a restricted elite and bourgeois movement (with some popular support, especially during the period of the First Republic) into an enduring liberal democracy sustained by broad social appeal and support. Despite its impermanent hold on power, however, the *sexenio* project did produce real and lasting transformations in Spain's social, cultural and political make-up. The political actors of both the *sexenio* and the Restoration, often lawyers, journalists and academics by trade, heralded a new 'professional political class' and signalled the wane, already underway, of an inherited aristocratic monopoly on political power.²⁷ The reforming ideas advocated as integral to the *sexenio* project, including the democratic principles of self-government, inalienable rights and universal (male) suffrage, republicanism, colonial reform, especially the abolition of slavery, economic liberalisation, freedoms of press, association and worship, could not easily be erased from the national political vocabulary and memory.

Liberal political practices were boosted from the codification of individual rights in the 1869 Constitution, in particular the right to associate and the granting of freedom of the press; the rising numbers of political newspapers, clubs, meetings, petitions and demonstrations hints at a political culture opened up to previously excluded Spaniards.²⁸ Under the *sexenio* governments key liberal economic reforms were introduced including the institution of the central bank and the principle of *libre-cambio*. The Restoration system reaffirmed Spain as a confessional state and restored the Catholic Church's central role in educating Spaniards; nevertheless, the discreet religious tolerance of other faiths approved after lengthy debate by the Constituent Assembly in 1869 was permitted to continue, albeit in private. Perhaps the most notable lasting change effected during the *sexenio* was the primacy accorded to parliament over the monarchy in terms of the wielding of political power. To be sure, Antonio Cánovas 'adapting liberal principles to the Spanish reality',

instituted a political system with a monarch as head of state and whose democratic credentials were highly suspect. However, Cánovas' political solution to marry parliamentarianism with stable government by providing for the predictable rotation of periods of Conservative and Liberal party rule made for a system in which parliament and political parties, not the monarch, exercised power (albeit undemocratically). In addition, the threat to parliamentary government posed by the reactionary absolutism of Carlism, which had led to an effective civil war in the 1830s²⁹ and resurfaced in the late 1840s, was decisively defeated militarily in 1875/76, even if its political ideals rumbled quietly on in its northern heartland and fed into the development of a national catholic ideology and vision of 'true Spain', to rival the liberal-republican conception of the nation.³⁰

Cánovas' Restoration project, like that of the *sexenio* politicians he removed from government, had national modernisation at its core. His iteration of modern liberal politics and society prized stability and constitutionality over democracy and identified the constitutional monarch as the national figurehead best placed to deliver these, echoing the familiar liberal concerns, articulated by Tocqueville, that republican democracies might fall prone to the 'tyranny of the majority', imperilling individual liberty.³¹ The democratic experiments of the *sexenio*, particularly the collapse of the First Republic in cantonalist conflict, were read as confirmation of the inherent instability of modern democracy; the Restoration and its *turnismo* politics were intended as a means to modernise and regenerate the nation, restore national pride and international prestige to Spain, whilst preserving and protecting the individual liberties of its growing middle class. In his 'handbook for Spain's modernisation', the *Discurso sobre la nación* of November 1882, Cánovas set out 'the individual and national attributes required for Spain to enter into the era of modernity'³²:

Let us work, produce, save, be rich, be disciplined and organised, live harmoniously, fraternally, and we will begin not only to want to be, but truly to be strong. As with the restoration of our moral force, let us also strengthen ourselves through the dedicated study of the arts and sciences, which fertilise agriculture, which advance industry, which show how to direct commerce, which facilitate communications, which give or prepare abundant rewards to all triumphs, whether it be economic or military, and as much to those who achieve individual merit, as to those who achieve through the collective merit of nations.³³

IDEAS OF AMERICA

The political and intellectual actors of late-nineteenth century Spain, especially those reforming and radical liberals who overthrew the conservative monarchical system in Spain's 'Glorious Revolution' of September 1868 and continued to agitate for democratic reform once the Bourbon monarchy was restored in 1875, operated within deeply cosmopolitan networks. Their search for domestic political solutions was heavily informed by ideas and practices from abroad. The drive to understand domestic issues transnationally—that is from within a transnational frame of reference—was both done knowingly and came naturally to many of the liberal reformers who wanted to bring modernity to Spain. Certainly the September revolutionaries were conversant in current affairs and constitutional and political practices abroad, as were the political leaders of the Restoration. Spanish liberals and democrats corresponded with like-minded counterparts in other countries, including the two Italian 'Josés', Mazzini and Garibaldi, contributing to a 'common pool [...] of social and political thought' and effectively forming a 'Liberal International'.³⁴ Many travelled overseas. Paris and London were the principal destinations for political exiles, both for Spaniards fleeing in the aftermath of the failed liberal revolutions in the 1820s, 1830s and 1850s, and later for conservatives. The leader of the Republican Party, Pi y Margall, Progressive leader Sagasta, and the Radical, Ruiz Zorrilla, were hosted by the French capital before and after the *sexenio*, whilst the monarch ousted in 1868, Isabel II, also set up temporary home there. European radicals identified common cause across their struggles; the first Carlist war (1833–40), which sufficiently divided Spain, to be considered a civil war was also understood as a constituent battle in the European struggle between liberalism and absolutism. Approximately 18,000 foreign auxiliaries volunteered in the ranks of the Cristino liberals, including veterans of the Belgian revolution, Portuguese civil war, British radicals and Italian Mazzinian exiles.³⁵ In return, several Spaniards fought in Italy's wars of unification.³⁶ Time spent living in exile, fighting common enemies or simply studying other societies often led these Spaniards to consider (even if only to dismiss) the adoption of similar ideas and practices at home.

Although conservatives also operated within transnational frames of reference—the conservative liberal politician who engineered the return of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875, Antonio Cánovas de Castillo, was a noted Anglophile—and showed considerable familiarity with other

national political systems and social and cultural mores even as they critiqued these, the positive acclamation of international comparisons and ‘models’ was most closely credited to Spanish liberals. Liberal reformers, especially those counted as Krausists (followers of the philosophy of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, which was introduced in Spain at the mid century and became an influential reforming school of thought) and Regenerationists, were often described as ‘Europeanists’, and their prescriptions to consolidate liberal-democratic political and economic reform in Spain were considered efforts to ‘europeanise’ the country.

Late-nineteenth century liberals, Europeanists and Regenerationists were hardly the first Spaniards to have engaged in a simultaneous process of national introspection and outward-looking search for international comparisons and solutions to domestic problems. Indeed, the antecedents of Spaniards looking beyond the borders of the Iberian Peninsula for answers to the political, social and economic ills they identified at home stretches back at least as far as the early-seventeenth century *arbitristas* [projectors] who ‘bombardeed’ the government of Philip III with proposals for reforming projects that would reduce social inequalities and augment ‘people of the middling sort’, equalise the tax burden across the kingdoms ruled from Madrid, make improvements to agricultural production and transport and reverse the ‘decline to our own days’ that had been set in train following the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella.³⁷ In his assessment of ‘the necessary Politics and Useful Restoration’ of Spain, the prominent *arbitrista* González de Cellorigo analysed contemporary Spain within an international frame of reference, contrasting it sharply to the other kingdoms of Western Europe and identifying its structures as more akin to those of Eastern Europe.³⁸

Despite the rhetoric of ‘europeanisation’, interest in the United States as the place where the utopian promise of the New (modern) World had been realised, with its ‘model republic’, its wealth, its vastness, its technical prowess and its pioneering, practical, assimilating, informal people, became particularly keen in the final decades of the nineteenth century.³⁹ Before the advent of ‘the American century’,⁴⁰ associated with the view of the USA as the dominant global power and, not unconnected, before the advent of ‘anti-Americanism’ as a sustained ideological current,⁴¹ the United States was already seen (by North American and European eyes) as the country most shaped by the forces of modernity in terms of democratic institutions and practices, gender relations, commerce and technologies devoted to improving quality of life and as an ascendant economic and

international power.⁴² Spanish interest in the United States was piqued by the American Civil War. Spaniards, like most Europeans, were gripped by the apparent unravelling of the Union, the extreme violence and huge numbers of casualties brought by fratricidal war, which seemed to bring to the brink of destruction the very institutions that had been projected as models of modern civilisation. But Spanish politicians and intellectuals had earlier cause to track events in the United States; the mid-century machinations of US citizens' filibustering incursions to Cuba with the aim of soliciting Cuba's annexation to the USA and a US-government-backed plan to purchase Cuba from Spain brought official diplomatic relations between the USA and Spain to a low ebb and ensured that, for the rest of the century, Spanish visions of the USA were always tinged with concern at perceived US aggression and competition in the Caribbean, as a potential threat to the integrity of Spain's 'modern empire'.⁴³

The America imagined was no static monolithic entity to the Spaniards who interpreted its multiple and changing faces through a range of emotional and rational lenses, which operated at times in conjunction and at times in competition with one another (and at times a tangled admixture of the two). One lens through which the USA was imagined was, as mentioned earlier, that of the United States as a rival to Spain in contemporary international and colonial affairs. As early as 1820 Thomas Jefferson had expressed the potential value of 'the most interesting addition' of Cuba to the Union; four years later, then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams notably predicted the eventual gravitation of Cuba to the United States in the event of its gaining independence, with his metaphor of the 'apple severed by the tempest from its native tree'.⁴⁴ Even after the passing of the acute 'Cuban crisis' in the mid 1850s precipitated by the last notable filibustering expedition to Cuba launched from the United States⁴⁵ and by the attempts under the Pierce administration to acquire Cuba for the United States, the Spanish press—liberal and conservative—continued to report widely the filibustering activity and plotting of Southern slave-holders who had designs on annexing the island to bolster US slaving interests and of Cuban exiles in New York and Florida.⁴⁶ Pronouncements emanating from the USA—especially those of the president—calling for the immediate end to the continued practice of slavery in the Spanish Antilles were interpreted as unwarranted interference and even an antecedent to belligerence.⁴⁷ The increasing numbers of Cuban émigrés arriving and making their homes in the Eastern port-cities of the United States meant that the USA became another locus for the enactment of tensions between

supporters of Spanish colonialism and the Cuban nationalist and independence movement.⁴⁸ As part of the attempts to counter anti-colonial-Spain rhetoric and activities in the USA, a *Centro Español* was established in 1892 in Tampa, Florida, a key centre for the Cuban independence (and alignment with the US) movement.⁴⁹ Spanish immigrants to the USA in the late century found themselves defending the colonial interests of their birth country; in so doing they developed a strong ‘Spanish national ethnic identity’ with precociously invented and exaggerated traditions, which overlaid previously dominant local and regional loyalties.⁵⁰ For Rafael de Labra, who himself favoured autonomous rule for the colonies, the reconfiguration of the old metropole-colony relationships that was being wrought by increasing Cuban nationalism and the independence movement (centred both in Cuba and the USA) and by the advance of liberal politics including abolitionism in Spain, made interest in the United States essential: as he observed, the ‘peninsular public’ cannot be ‘indifferent’ to ‘American problems [...] especially now that the political and economic reforms of our Antilles and the trend toward approximation and intimacy with our former colonies, now independent and sovereign Republics, are being emphasised’.⁵¹

Related to the lens of the United States as contemporary rival was the psychological response of *ressentiment*, the admixture of ‘suppressed envy and hatred’ and the ‘impossibility of satisfying these feelings’ identified by Liah Greenfeld as a crucial component in the development of nationalism in countries perceived less ‘advanced’ or powerful in comparison to neighbouring states, or states that otherwise constituted important points of comparison, by their inhabitants.⁵² The perceived reduction in Spain’s international standing, brought by the loss of the continental American empire in the 1820s (and intensified by the threatened and then realised independence/annexation of its remaining New World colonies in 1898), and the sense that it was lagging behind its European neighbours and key comparison-states (especially Britain, Germany and France) in political, economic, industrial and technological terms translated into *ressentiment*-laden images of the USA (and of Britain, France and Germany) that rejected the more ‘advanced’ Other and made a virtue of Spanish non-modernity. Such traces of *ressentiment* are evident in Spanish conservative-liberal images of the US republic and democratic practices as venal and corrupt and in images of the USA’s technological modernity as indicative of the absence of culture in the USA.

In addition, Spaniards viewed the United States through a lens that juxtaposed Otherness with familiarity. Whilst many of the images, and the processes through which they were conjured, set out in this book involve a view of the USA as Other, as fundamentally foreign and different to Spain, other images arise from a contrasting sense of familiarity, similarity and shared history between the two countries. Above all, this view was shaped by (and itself shaped) discussions of Spanish and US colonialism. The 'natural civilising impulse' of the North American westward expansion in the nineteenth century, which involved the incorporation of territory once colonised by Spain into the Union, was readily understood as the repetition of the pattern of colonisation and 'civilisation' that the Spanish conquistadors had carried out before them. Peninsular Spaniards who travelled in these newly 'Americanised' lands found the faces, architecture, customs and even natural landscape reassuringly familiar. When Juan Bustamante y Campuzano arrived in New Mexico, he imagined himself back in his *madrepatria*. He saw nothing 'American' in the physical appearance of the state's towns. 'In Santa Fe we could easily have thought we were in Spain, in some Castilian village.' The single-floored and balconied adobe houses and narrow streets, bisected by roads which curved and twisted around the town were 'an unusual thing' in the United States.⁵³ What's more, for him, Santa Fe's inhabitants—'three quarters [...] descendants of Spaniards, Mexicans and Indians'—had preserved their 'essentially Spanish' character 'without the American element being able to erase at all the seal that our ancestors' colonial genius impressed on New Mexico'.⁵⁴

However, viewing the United States through the lens of common colonialism and adventuring expansionism could lead to divergent assessments of the comparative 'civilisation' brought by Spanish colonialism. For the Barcelonian Puig y Valls, the USA's contemporary colonisation of California was ugly and brutal in contrast to what he saw as the holistic, artistic and enhancing legacy of Spanish colonialism.⁵⁵ On the other hand, for Bustamante y Campuzano, among others, Spanish New World colonialism stood for pre-modern civilisation, distinguished from the ultra-modernity of the USA. Santa Fe was 'the most ancient city in the United States' and also 'the one that is most backward of all'.⁵⁶

As Santa Fé enters the movement of the century and adapts more and more to the federal Government regime on which it depends, the prints of former Spanish domination, which have remained so deeply impressed, and which,

two thousand leagues from the *patria*, remind me of the glories of other times, will be erased bit by bit, even if it will be difficult to reach the point where they will be completely extinguished.⁵⁷

Bustamante y Campuzano was quick to romanticise the pre-modern nature of Spanish colonialism but the comparison of civilisations could also be understood as cause for Spanish shame. In this vein, the USA's invitation to Spain to occupy the position of honour at the 1893 Chicago World's Fair, intended as the quad-centennial celebration of Columbus' voyage to the New World, was simultaneously the ultimate recognition of a shared history and an opportunity to reflect on the seemingly polar distinctions between the contemporary standing of the two countries. *El Imparcial* interpreted the USA's insistence on fêting Spain as the Fair's nation-guest of honour as driven by 'that sentiment, which makes the worker enriched by his work think with pleasure of the hut he was born in and build a palace on its miserable ruins'.⁵⁸ There was no simple answer to the comparative evaluation of Spain's past and the USA's recent and present colonialism. The dichotomy could be one between two different kinds of 'civilisation'—the Spanish natural, benign and artistic, the North American uniform, interventionist and mechanised—but it could also be drawn as between a pre-modern, 'backward', albeit romanticised Spanish colonial legacy and a technologically advanced, industrial and progressive American future. Either way, a sense of the shared enterprise of bringing 'civilisation' was part of the framework in which images of the USA were created.

A further lens through which events and figures in the USA were understood was that of the United States as a model or blueprint for the modern way of life: democracy; individual liberties; separation of church and state; education and professional opportunities for women, freer and more informal relations between the sexes, perhaps even women's political emancipation; industrial capitalism, the prioritising of business and wealth creation; the embracing of technological innovations that promised to make life easier and more comfortable; mass forms of entertainment and communication. Of course, any model provided by the United States was not fixed and immobile; for example, the exemplar furnished by the USA in relation to slavery looked very different before 1860 and after 1865. Nevertheless, the idea that the United States offered a clear, universal model of modern life pervaded nineteenth-century worldviews (and has been replicated in some of the historiography), even if it becomes

apparent on closer inspection that the contents of the 'America' conjured as a model or blueprint varied considerably according to the person and context invoking it. Viewed through this lens, the United States acted not only as a crystal ball, allowing for the preview of the challenges Spain might encounter as it became modern, but also provided a kind of compass (and, for a few, nothing short of a detailed map) for navigating modernity.

For Spanish liberals America-as-model functioned largely positively. The republican deputy to the Constituent Cortes convened in the wake of the September revolution, Manuel Palanca, took emulating America to its extreme conclusion when he lamented that the 1869 Spanish Constitution they were writing did not simply copy the US Constitution word for word,⁵⁹ but many Spanish liberals agreed with the liberal-democrat reformer and academic Rafael María de Labra that the study of US history and contemporary institutions and society offered a means to better understand 'the times we are living in'.⁶⁰ However, America-as-model could also be understood negatively, even as an anti-model, a map whose compass pointed in precisely the direction that Spain should avoid.⁶¹ For the most part, though, whilst the model or blueprint for modernity presented a key lens through which to view and understand the USA and, in reflection, themselves, few late-century Spaniards advocated simple emulation or denunciation of the USA's model in its entirety. Their debates on the United States were driven by domestic concerns and were interested in finding a political and social settlement appropriate to the Spanish context. In the end, what the United States offered was evidence, as a 100-year experiment of federalist republicanism and democracy in practice as well as a vision of the future in the present.

The idea of viewing America as a 'model republic' resulted in part from North American perceptions of itself as the originator of an exportable universal political model.⁶² The two universal expositions held in the USA during the late nineteenth century, the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia in 1876 and the 1893 Columbine (to mark 400 years since the 'discovery' of the Americas) World's Fair in Chicago provided particular moments for the USA to put itself on display and to perform modernity.⁶³ One of the most glaring examples of Spanish positive reception of US self-projections can be seen in Spanish abolitionists' readiness to accept and regurgitate the (Unionist) American 'spin' on the Civil War. Both during and after the war, American diplomats in Europe focussed on 'the slavery argument', as the US *chargé d'affaires* in Spain, Horatio Perry, told US Secretary of State William Seward in 1862. Given ideological and

realpolitik sympathy in Europe for the Confederacy's secessionism, the explanation of the US Civil War as an abolitionist war to rid the assurgent, modern United States of the pre-modern relic of slavery was identified as 'the only point which has told' for the Unionist cause.⁶⁴ After the war's end, instead of a fratricidal conflict that had threatened to disintegrate the Union and discredit its ideals and institutions, America's recent history was resold as a kind of ultimate test of those ideals and institutions, from which the 'great republic' had emerged stronger, richer and purged of any un-modern elements.⁶⁵ In his biography of Lincoln, Emilio Castelar repeated this reading of the Civil War as a war of just cause and Lincoln as the great redeemer of America's political model.⁶⁶ Similarly, his fellow abolitionist Gabriel Rodriguez, in a speech to an abolitionist audience at the *Teatro de Lope de Rueda* in 1872, presented the war in the Manichean terms of a 'savage and cruel' South against a 'moderate and humane' North, with victory for the progressive Union never in doubt.

The abolitionists fought in the way that men fight when motivated by a sense of justice: the slavers like criminals who see the fruit of their depredations in danger.⁶⁷

It was not necessary to travel to the USA to encounter US-originating projections of its status as a model republic. American self-projections reached Spanish audiences via multiple routes including the persuasive declarations of US diplomats in Spain and the circulation of American novels, works of non-fiction and stage plays, including Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (the fastest best-seller of its time when it was published in Spanish in 1852),⁶⁸ the works of Poe, Irving, Hawthorne, Fenimore Cooper and Emerson,⁶⁹ and William Cody's wildly popular touring Buffalo Bill show.⁷⁰ Spaniards met and exchanged information and ideas with American citizens, most notably at the Madrid salon of the Spanish romantic poet and liberal political actor, Carolina Coronado, who was married to one-time US *chargé d'affairs*, Horatio Perry, and corresponded with Abraham Lincoln.⁷¹ Rafael de Labra, one of the principal producers of images of the USA in late-century Spain via publications and speeches on the history and contemporary laws and institutions of the USA spanning a half century, used US government documents to formulate his arguments, which he acquired from the US ambassador to Spain, Daniel Sickles.⁷² Spanish abolitionists corresponded with their US-based counterparts, especially Quaker groups, as part of a transna-

tional abolitionist network. Hybrid images and projections of the USA (and of Spain) also resulted from the presence of a small but vocal Spanish immigrant community in the USA, many of whom worked in New York- and Louisiana- based, Spanish-owned factories,⁷³ and who sustained several Spanish-language newspapers reflecting the conservative, liberal and socialist-anarchist political press divisions in their country of birth.⁷⁴

The United States' was not the only national experience to be imagined in terms of model and anti-model. Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, Germany provided a rival set of political, social and cultural models that influenced Spanish national discourse on modernity. Krausists in particular looked to Germany, whilst the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) was modelled on the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) when it was founded in 1879.⁷⁵ Paris was undoubtedly the principal cultural benchmark for Spanish elites: for example, the urban development of Madrid and Barcelona carried out in the 1860s aped Haussmann's wide, easily controllable avenues in Paris. Radical city planners, concerned after 1868 with improving the housing stock and living standards of Madrid's poor, proposed worker *barrios* modelled on Parisian streets and suburbs around Molhouse, Avenida Daumesnil and the rue de Champagne-Premier.⁷⁶ It was not until the twentieth century that the skyscrapers lining the Gran Vía and cafés with names like Chicote's, Miami and Hollywood hinted at a North American influence to Madrid's cityscape.⁷⁷

Politically, however, the influence of France was more complex and subject to flux. Undoubtedly Spaniards followed events there closely, which were often understood as portents. Many progressive liberals and democrats 'revered France as Europe's only republic'.⁷⁸ In the wake of the 1868 revolution, French republican symbols from the tricolour to Marianne to the Marseillaise appeared ubiquitous to the French republican, Eliás Reclus, as he toured the villages and towns of Catalonia, the Levant and Andalusia in 1868–69, though these formed part of an international republican lexicon, interspersed with 'Garibaldian shirts', Phrygian caps, US flags and portraits of Mazzini, Garibaldi and Sixto Cámarra.⁷⁹ However, the French political model very often functioned negatively, among both Spain's liberals and conservatives. The Spanish republican movement was largely federalist, which limited the positive appeal that France's unitary republicanism could exert and conversely increased the potential appeal of US, or Swiss, style federalism in practice.⁸⁰ The brutal suppression of the Paris Commune in May 1871 was experienced with intense shock by Spanish republicans and progressive liberals; the radi-

cal *sexenio* government used the example of the Commune to ban the Spanish section of the International Workers Organisation in 1871 and its influence was blamed for the cantonalist uprisings that contributed to the collapse of the First Republic, and with it, the democratic experiments of the *sexenio*.⁸¹ Indeed, Rafael de Labra insisted that France had lost all credibility as a political model long before, in the Napoleonic aftermath of 1789.⁸² In so doing, he was perhaps influenced by his notable interest in the United States but perhaps also by the teachings of Spanish Krausism, whose principal ideologue, Julián Sanz del Río, adhered to a ‘reasoned and analytical anti-Gallicism’ borne from the conviction that the ‘exclusive predominance of French cultural fashions’ was detrimental to ‘the Spanish genius [and...] exhausted national spirit’.⁸³ Although not expressed with the same degree of xenophobia, such pronouncements were not a world away from the anti-French sentiments of the conservative cultural nationalism sermonised most eloquently by Menéndez Pelayo.⁸⁴

Certainly, the French revolutionary and Enlightenment traditions had been upheld as political models by Spanish liberals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as the derogatory epithet of ‘*afrancesados*’ bestowed on opponents of Bourbon absolutism indicates, and France would again provide an important political model at the turn of the twentieth century. The Dreyfuss affair and its aftermath seemed to confirm the victory of the secular liberal republic in France and was mined as inspiration for Alejandro Lerroux’s galvanisation of Spanish republican intellectuals and working class republicans around the ‘Montjuic issue’—protest, principally circulated in the liberal and international press (including *L’Intransigéant*, the French paper at the centre of the Dreyfuss affair), at the substantiated allegations of illegal detention, mistreatment and torture of prisoners by the *guardia civil* in the wake of a series of anarchist ‘propaganda by deed’ assassinations, which had culminated in the 1896 Barcelona Corpus Christi bombings.⁸⁵ However, in the late 1860s and early 1870s, the opening time frame of this book, the French example—of the extreme politics and violent suppression of the Commune and of the unitary clericalism of Thiers’ Third Republic—sat uneasily as a model for Spanish liberals and republicans. Conversely, newly emerged from its Civil War, the United States presented itself, and its republican-democratic institutions, as having passed the ultimate test of war intact and, indeed, strengthened now that these had been purged of the practice of slavery. As such it proved a timely model of modernity for Spanish reformers seeking,

in the wake of the September revolution, to advance a liberal democracy at home.

Great Britain also provided a different kind of 'model' of a modern state, whose constitutional and political arrangements were particularly admired in Spain, especially after 1875. Even affirmed republicans Gumersindo de Azcárate and Rafael de Labra held in high esteem the stability of Britain's parliamentary system and constitutional monarchy. Britain (very often referred to by contemporaries simply as England) was understood as the originator of the ideal of political liberty. Azcárate declared its parliamentary system (a key distinguishing feature from that other exemplar of Anglo-Saxon democracy, the USA), 'the best guarantee of the progress of peoples and of individual freedom' and adjudged that a more effective separation of powers had been achieved in Britain than in either the USA or France.⁸⁶ Though progressive liberals like Labra, Azcárate and Giner de los Ríos could find much to admire in the British constitutional system, the principal Spanish anglophile was the conservative liberal Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, who sought to emulate Britain's seemingly stable liberal monarchy in his brokering of the Bourbon Restoration in 1875 and introduction of its illusorily democratic, yet functional, political system whereby the conservative and liberal parties alternated periods in power. The 1876 Constitution assigned sovereignty to both Cortes and the Crown and introduced a bicameral parliament.⁸⁷

The appeal of the British political model—and indeed of the US model—was complicated by the frequent conflation of the two systems as originating from the same 'Anglo-Saxon' roots. The supposed racial unity of the Anglo-Saxons—constructed in opposition to their 'Other' (for Spaniards), the *raza latina* or Latin race—was assumed to have commonly shaped the people, culture and institutions of Britain and the United States and was used as evidence of essential differences between Latins and Anglo-Saxons in order to explain political, cultural and socio-economic disparities between them. It was also used to explain the shared—or what were perceived to be shared—political values and institutions of Britain and the United States. The assignment of distinctions in political culture to inheritable 'racial' characteristics followed an established pattern of eliding biological and cultural difference most notoriously associated with the French theorist Arthur but also readily accepted by the nascent discipline of anthropology in Spain.⁸⁸ For many, what united Anglo-Saxons, and distinguished them from Latins and other 'races', was founded in religious rather than biological difference (though the distinctions made between

the characters of followers of Catholicism and Protestantism also fed into the cultural traits that became part of racial identity constructs),⁸⁹ but all agreed that liberty was transported to the USA from Britain in the Mayflower. Thus, praise for the North American constitution and political values at times seemed a proxy for those of the British parliamentary system—and vice versa.

FROM 1868 TO 1898: REVOLUTION, REFORM AND END OF EMPIRE

The temporal remit of this book spans the period from 1868 to 1898. Although the ‘Glorious’ Revolution can be understood as one of a series of nineteenth-century liberal *pronunciamientos*—a military mechanism for bringing about political change of the kind that occurred repeatedly throughout the century—and the fruit of decades of democratic conspiracy and organisation, ‘1868’ did mark an important moment in Spanish national development. As the beginning of what became known as the *sexenio revolucionario* or *democrático* and a time when a new, or modified, post-bellum iteration of the USA as a universal model held sway, ‘1868’ makes sense as a starting point for this study. The September revolution signalled the entry to political power of a group of liberal reforming individuals who previously had been politically influential, but largely excluded from political power. Many of these represented the interests of a nascent urban middle class; some represented reforming colonial interests (but not independence). As has already been noted, the legacy of the revolutionary *sexenio* endured: in the imperfect yet constitutional parliamentary system of the Restoration era; in the developing and vocal urban civil society whose associations and political press continued to agitate for reform; in the liberal pedagogy pioneered by the *The Free Educational Institution*; and, more broadly, in the political vocabulary and culture, which demonstrated that republican and democratic practices could be outlawed (or ridden roughshod over) but not easily unlearned.

Moreover, whilst Spaniards were neither ignorant nor silent on the topic of the United States before 1868—after all, the works of prominent US authors had been available in translation since the 1830s whilst a Spanish version of the US Constitution was already published in Cádiz in 1811⁹⁰—the coincidence of the spectacle of civil war in the USA, the acceleration and improvement of means of transatlantic communication,

especially the laying of the transatlantic telegraph cable in 1866, and the accession to positions of power and influence of a number of Spanish democrats, republicans and federalists with firmly international outlooks, meant that the *sexenio* marked a new intensity in the status and diffusion of North American concepts and practices in Spain. It is little coincidence that Benito Pérez Galdós, the novelist of late-nineteenth century Madrid, declared in his *Episodio nacional* set in the aftermath of the September revolution that 'all the politicians at that time were going crazy' for Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*.⁹¹ The Spanish-Cuban liberal and republican deputy, lawyer and academic, Rafael María de Labra was less effusive than Galdós but nevertheless confirmed that Tocqueville's work was indeed 'very popular in some circles'.⁹²

The book takes as its end point a year heralded as a point of rupture even more than 1868, that of '1898'. As with '1868', the transformations associated with 1898, especially the trend towards national introspection caused by perceptions of Spain's imperial decline and the development of regenerationism as a movement dedicated to studying, understanding and resolving that decline, were already underway well before the final Spanish withdrawal from its Caribbean and Pacific colonies with the December 1898 signing of the Treaty of Paris. Nevertheless, 1898 makes sense as the end date for this book for two reasons. Firstly, because the final end to Spain's New World empire was determined by war with the United States, Spanish images of the United States were understandably overwhelmingly shaped by the threat and then arrival of war with the USA at the end of the nineteenth century. Positive images of the USA did return after the Spanish-American-Cuban War but few Spaniards followed Labra's example in seeking to maintain an 'objective' admiration for US institutions whilst avowing a patriotic adherence to Spain's last colonial stand. Jingoistic images depicting Spain as a helpless vulnerable woman being overcome by a lecherous Uncle Sam, or as a brave lion facing the greed of a pig, predominated in the Spanish illustrated press, whilst the young Spanish pupils and their American teachers at the International Institute for Girls were shouted at and spat upon during their daily walks in the run up to the war and, once war was declared, transferred to the French city of Biarritz.⁹³ In the war's aftermath 1898 was remembered as a key moment in Spanish national self-fashioning, providing an identity for the generation of artists and writers who considered themselves profoundly altered by the end of empire.

Secondly, the end date of 1898 makes sense due to shifts in the global position and perceptions of the United States. Again, international recognition of the USA as a major global power in economic and international diplomacy terms did not simply materialise in the aftermath of the USA's decisive victory against Spain in 1898; recognition of the increasing military, economic and geopolitical might of the USA had been growing since at least the mid century.⁹⁴ However, the acquisition of its own empire, with the adoption of colonial control over the Philippines and Puerto Rico and informal rule over the nominally independent Cuba, marked a shift in internal and external perceptions of the USA from that of a republic founded on the Enlightenment ideal of self-government to imperial overlord.⁹⁵ The year 1898 has often been retrospectively backdated as the beginning of 'the American century' when US hegemonic power, prestige, influence and political and economic interference was widely asserted.⁹⁶ This book demonstrates that well before the advancement of US hegemonic interests and well before coherent processes and ideologies of Americanisation and its corollary, Anti-Americanism, were identified,⁹⁷ late-nineteenth century Spaniards examined US experience and created multiple images of the United States, negative, positive and ambivalent, which were the products of reflections on their own identities, concerns, challenges and understandings of what modernity entailed.

IMAGINERS OF AMERICA

Whilst this book takes in images of America articulated by a wide range of Spaniards amongst whom number royals, conservatives, moderates, republicans, anarchists and businessmen of no declared political allegiance, one group of individuals recur as prolific producers of images of the United States in this period, and thus worked their way to become protagonists of this narrative. These people might loosely be defined as part of the 'new political class' of liberal intellectual and political actors based principally in Madrid, but also in Barcelona, who came to prominence in and around the time of the *sexenio democrático* or who were broadly supportive of some, if not all, of its reforming project.⁹⁸ Arguably, the group then defies further categorisation. The majority, with a few notable exceptions were urban metropolis dwellers though many also had direct experience of colonial life. Most, but not all, were men. Many, though again not all, reflected the political concerns, liberal ideology, lifestyle and consumer practices of the emerging urban middle class. Though the Restoration

abruptly cut many off from the highest echelons of power, and sent some into temporary exile, these people nevertheless remained both politically and intellectually influential. Of course, in this transitional context, categories of 'class' are necessarily fluid; bourgeois families emulated and aspired to be—or be like—the aristocracy (even if, ultimately, it was bourgeois practices that mostly endured) and many among the latter accepted a codified, moderately reforming state, disentailment and land reform in return for a share in the spoils and the consolidation of their position.⁹⁹ What's more, within the growing urban bourgeoisie there was, as Emilia Pardo Bazán observed, a world of difference in the experience of the wife of a rich banker and that of a telegraph clerk.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, despite discrepancies in wealth, social position or religious conviction, the individuals here under the spotlight had a key point of commonality: each had a stake in the liberal state and an interest in shaping the future direction of that state and of Spanish society.

Beyond a commitment to the liberal state, the 'spaces' in which these individuals operated indicate a further aspect of their shared ideological-geographical milieu. Their key spaces of operation included: the *Cortes* [parliament]; liberal *tertulias* and intellectual salons (or more informally, evening gatherings) such as those held at the homes of Carolina Coronado and Rafael de Labra; key liberal educational establishments including the *Fomento de las Artes*, *Ateneo* and the *The Free Educational Institution* founded by Krausist liberal academics who had supported the September revolution and found themselves removed from their university positions after the Restoration; and the meeting places, conferences and publications of the buzzing associational life of the capital, which included reformist movements pushing for liberal political, social, economic and colonial reform.¹⁰¹ A series of biographical summaries illustrates the interconnected preoccupations of this emergent liberal 'establishment'.

Emilio Castelar y Ripoll (1832–99) was a noted political statesman, academic and writer who championed the causes of liberalism and republicanism, serving as the last of the four presidents of Spain's short-lived First Republic of 1873. Having lost his professorial chair in history at the University of Madrid for the anti-Isabelline views expressed in his newspaper, *La Democracia*, and exiled to Paris for his part in Prim's liberal conspiracy of June 1866, Castelar returned to Madrid after the September revolution and, at the age of 37, became parliamentary deputy for Zaragoza (and during the Restoration, for Barcelona). Famed for his oratory, Castelar promoted his political ideals—including moderate republi-

canism, democracy, freedom of religion and the abolition of slavery—in the Cortes, in Madrid *tertulias* [debates], in countless publications and newspapers and in the associations of which he was a prominent member. These included the Association for Tariff Reform (Est. 1859), the Free Society of Political Economy (1857) and the Spanish Abolitionist Society (SAE; 1865). In addition, Castelar joined fellow liberal educationalists in teaching at the *Fomento de las Artes*, the centre for adult education formed in the late 1840s, and in 1869 contributed to a series of Sunday conferences for women organised by Fernando de Castro—then rector of Madrid’s university and one-time president of the SAE—in his capacity as founder of the nascent Association for Women’s Education.

The most prominent champion of republican federalism in late-century Spain, Francisco Pi y Margall (1824–1901) was also a member of the SAE and lectured at the *Fomento de las Artes* and the Sunday conferences for women. A Catalan born into a family of modest means, Pi entered parliamentary politics, like Castelar, after the September revolution where he consistently advocated a federalist republican solution for Spain in addition to land reform and the redistribution of wealth in order to ‘universalise’ the bourgeois revolution.¹⁰² Pi also served as President of the First Republic (for just more than a month between June and July of 1873), replacing the first president (and fellow abolitionist) Estanislao Figueras. Despite holding the presidency, Pi refused to implement his federalist ideals until these were legitimised, ‘from above’, with a constitution; meanwhile ‘intransigent’ federalist radicals, frustrated by the delays of constitutionalising a federal republic, fragmented the republic ‘from below’ into violent and incoherent cantons. Temporarily isolated from parliamentary politics by the return of the Bourbon monarchy, Pi dedicated the first years of the Restoration to teaching and writing, most notably his defence of federalism, *Las Nacionalidades* (1877). However, in 1880 he reconstituted the Federal Party, which he led until his death in 1901, and was returned to the *Cortes* repeatedly in the late century, in 1886, 1891 and 1893. Of this generation of 1868ers—the progressive liberals and republicans associated with the democratic *sexenio*—it was Pi who went furthest in attaching socio-economic reforms to the political programme of liberal democratic and constitutional change and came closest to the growing socialist movement. In 1894 he outlined a progressive social programme that called for considerable land reform and redistribution of wealth, the nationalisation of key industries and the railway, limits to women and child labour conditions, profit sharing schemes and arbitration commissions, compensation

for victims of work accidents and an (anarchist-championed) eight-hour working day.¹⁰³

Like Castelar and Pi, Gumersindo de Azcárate (1840–1914) combined work as an academic with republican politics, first in the centralist republican party and, from 1873, in Ruiz Zorrilla's Progressive Republican party. Azcárate was stripped from his chair in comparative law at the Central University of Madrid on the Restoration, along with four colleagues including Francisco Giner de los Ríos and Nicolás Salmerón, for their refusal to accept the repeal of the principle of academic freedom. Along with his ousted colleagues, Azcárate, helped found in 1876 what became the liberal educational institution par excellence, the *The Free Educational Institution* (Free Institute of Education, ILE), which sought to teach university- and later primary- and secondary-level courses according to the latest pedagogical methods and unencumbered by the orthodoxies and demands of Catholicism and government.¹⁰⁴ In his numerous publications and speeches on the principles of democracy and the role of political parties and heads of state within democratic states, most notably *El Self-government y la monarquía doctrinaria* (1877) and *El régimen parlamentario en la práctica* (1885), Azcárate remained a vociferous critic of the false democracy of the *turnismo* political system instituted by Cánovas.

Also excluded from political power, but in their case permanently and by virtue of their sex, the proto-feminists Concepción Arenal (1820–93) and Emilia Pardo Bazán were important contributors to this generation of reformers, agitating especially in questions of social reform, including the position of women in Spanish society. Between 1842 and 1845 Arenal attended law classes at Madrid University (dressed in men's clothing) and then pursued a career as writer, journalist and reformer; as well as being a committed abolitionist and active in the Red Cross (under whose ambit she managed the Hospital de Sangre de Miranda de Ebro, which treated the wounded on both sides of the Third Carlist War), she campaigned for penal reform and was made the first female Inspector of Women's Prisons by Serrano's provisional government following the 1868 revolution. The democratic *sexenio* proved the right environment for publishing Arenal's early feminist work *La Mujer del Porvenir* (1869), which she had written several years earlier, and which she followed up with *La Mujer en su Casa* (1881), *Estado actual de la mujer en España* (1884) and *La educación de la mujer* (1892). Arenal maintained close friendships with a number of Krausists who were also important actors in the 1868 'generation' including Francisco Giner de los Ríos, Gumersindo de Azcárate and Fernando

de Castro; the latter, perhaps spurred on by his friend's avocation of improved educational opportunities for women in *La Mujer del Porvenir*, as rector of Madrid's university after the September revolution instituted the famous Sunday conference series for women, the *Escuela de institutrices* and, in June 1871, the *Asociación de la Educación de la Mujer*. He also collaborated with Faustina Sáez de Melgar's *Ateneo de Señoras*, a female equivalent to the *Fomento de las Artes*, which opened its doors in 1871.

Emilia Pardo Bazán (1851–1921), almost thirty years Arenal's junior, pursued a highly successful career as a novelist, writer, publisher and cultural critic. Although only sixteen at the time of the September revolution Pardo Bazán credited it as one of 'three important events in my life [that] followed one another in close succession', alongside getting married and wearing long dresses.¹⁰⁵ Despite her relative youth, Pardo Bazán formed intellectual friendships and correspondences with key liberal political actors including Francisco Giner de los Ríos and Rafael de Labra, with whom she also shared an interest in Krausist ideas. Alongside novels and poems, Pardo Bazán published articles of cultural criticism, including in the journal she founded in 1891, *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* and collaborated (like Arenal) with the *Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza*. Like Arenal, Pardo Bazán championed women's education and greater recognition of women's intellectual capacity, establishing the *Biblioteca de la mujer* in 1892, participating in the pedagogical conference of the same year, and nominating (unsuccessfully) Arenal for admittance to the *Real Academia Española*. In 1916, she herself became the first woman to hold a university chair in Spain.

Finally, the individual whose countless publications and teachings on the United States make him the most prominent protagonist of this book is Rafael María de Labra (1840–1918). Born in Havana, Labra spent his adult life in Madrid where he was an intellectual, lawyer, politician, journalist, educator and passionate advocate of colonial reform, republicanism, free trade, abolition and women's emancipation. A committed progressive liberal and republican, like many individuals featured in this book, Labra's first political foray came in 1868 when he participated in Madrid's revolutionary junta and spoke out against slavery and for the inclusion of colonial deputies in the new *Cortes*. A parliamentary deputy between 1871 and 1879 for districts in Asturias, Puerto Rico and Cuba, and senator from 1881 until 1918, Labra declined to serve high governmental office, including the post of colonial minister when it was offered to him in 1873.¹⁰⁶ In 1873 he voted for the First Republic and was part of the committee that

drew up its never ratified constitution. After the 1874 coup that ended both republic and democratic *sexenio*, Labra helped found *Unión Republicana* in 1876 and later the *Unión Democrática*, whose meetings were held at his home.¹⁰⁷ Before, during and after the *sexenio*, Labra remained a stalwart of Spanish associational life, especially the SAE whose newspaper *El Abolicionista* he edited in 1866 and whose presidency he assumed from 1876, and of Madrid's leading educational institutions (including the *Fomento de las Artes*, the *Ateneo*, and the *The Free Educational Institution*, which he helped to found). Labra was another Krausist—that is a follower of the philosophies of the post-Kantian German thinker, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1830) whose ideas quirkily reached Spanish intellectual circles at mid-century via the intercession of Julián Sanz del Río, history of philosophy professor at the University of Madrid.¹⁰⁸

For the self-declared 'thinking minority' who were its Spanish followers, Krausism offered a path to national renewal through its focus on ethics as the driver of human conduct and its 'lofty-sounding concept' of 'harmonic rationalism'.¹⁰⁹ For its detractors, including the leading intellectual of conservative national-Catholicism, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, Krausists were nothing but 'a horde of fanatical sectarians'.¹¹⁰ Spanish Krausists were attracted to Sanz del Río's Krausist teachings for their offering of a 'practical philosophy' that focussed on reform, associationalism and education as the means to achieve a harmonious, organically ordered society.¹¹¹ The moral imperative to actively work towards the end goal of 'universal harmony' and the focus on 'Europeanising' Spain offered a clear, practical way forward to modernise the nation. Krausists took up leading roles in the lobbying civil society associations advocating liberal reform, including abolition and colonial reform, and, given the crucial importance Krausist thought placed on pedagogy, many taught in the most important educational institutions of the capital. In the aftermath of the Restoration, when many liberal *sexenio*-supporting academics were removed from their posts, a group of Krausist educationalists including Giner de los Ríos, Azcárate, Labra and Salmerón, founded (in 1876) the *The Free Educational Institution*, which became a bastion of secular liberal pedagogy.

These individual biographies indicate the overlapping ideas, causes, associations and institutions that bonded this liberal intellectual 'elite'. Most were personally acquainted, and certainly they were all at home in their milieu of lecture theatre, *tertulias* and salons, newspaper column and Cortes floor.¹¹² As such, they can usefully be considered part of a modern reforming 'generation' of 1868, both in terms of their relatively close age

and in terms of having collectively undergone the formative experience of the September revolution, six years of democratic experimentation and the disappointment of the monarchical Restoration and the rolling back of many of those democratic reforms.¹¹³

Though this cohort of liberal activists, pedagogues, thinkers and writers figure centrally in this study, they are not its only characters. Importantly, none of the individuals mentioned thus far ever visited the United States; their images of the country were distilled from what they read and heard about the USA and from the self-image(s) that the USA itself wished to project internationally. But this study also draws upon the rich body of images of the USA published in the broadsheet satirical press—themselves also a source of information for our liberal actors—and upon the testimonies of Spaniards who travelled to and around the United States during the late century and reported back in exquisite detail what they found. These accounts come predominantly from middle-class professionals, including engineers and businessmen, diplomatic attachés and members of Spain's delegation to the Chicago World's Fair as well as a member of the Bourbon royal family, Princess María Eulalia, who wrote letters home from her voyage to Cuba and the USA in 1893. As the daughter of Isabel II and sister of the late Alfonso XII, Eulalia was hardly representative of the new political and intellectual classes, but her perspective offers some particularly fascinating insights, especially her progressive take on the position of women in the United States.

Inevitably, in focussing on images produced by a relatively coherent group of liberals and actors within the liberal state (even if the images they conjured were by no means always coherent), the book omits discussion of other important constituencies that, from their distinct perspectives, profoundly influenced late nineteenth-century Spain. As a military-political force, Carlism, which married an argument about dynastic succession with the ideological defence of Catholic, absolutist Spain in opposition to the political, social and economic effects of liberalism, was largely extinguished by its military defeat in the third Carlist War of the century, in 1872–76.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless Carlists' ideological vision of Spain as a profoundly Catholic, conservative society rightfully ruled by an absolute monarch whose temporal power was divinely ordained fed into the national-Catholic iteration of 'true' Spain and Spanishness. Moreover, albeit in modified form, Carlism resurfaced as part of the Nationalist forces and ideology in the Spanish Civil War. As proponents of a deeply confessional state founded on absolute monarchy and opposition to Enlightenment ideals, Carlists

found little to recommend them to the United States, a republic with a strict theoretic division between church and state. Any pronouncements they did make were unrelentingly hostile to the USA and its ability to serve as a model for Spain, as the following editorial of the Carlist newspapers *El Pensamiento Español*, published in September 1862 in the midst of the American Civil War, makes abundantly evident.

The history of this model republic can be summed up in a few words. It came into being by rebellion. It was founded on atheism. It was populated by the dregs of all the nations of the world. It has lived without law of God or man. Within a hundred years, greed has ruined it. Now it is fighting like a cannibal, and it will die in a flood of blood and mire. Such is the real history of the one and only state in the world which has succeeded in constituting itself according to the flaming theories of democracy. The example is too horrible to stir any desire for imitation in Europe.¹¹⁵

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, Spanish anarchists and socialists, equally crucial in shaping Spanish society and politics in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, operated within networks and frames of reference that were even more cosmopolitan and outward-looking than those of Spanish liberals. Indeed, Spanish anarchists such as Pedro Esteve were active in establishing anarchist cells in Tampa, Florida.¹¹⁶ To both Spanish socialists and anarchists, the United States presented a confusing set of images pointing both to how, and how not, to organise society. As a place that projected itself in utopian terms as a land of opportunity and plenty, which offered hard-working people the chance to rewrite society anew, the USA seemed to show, in the words of one English newspaper, just what could be done 'without State-Church, king or aristocracy'¹¹⁷ However, by the late century, disillusionment and questioning of the manifest connection between political equality (democracy) and socio-economic equality profoundly shaped European working-class images of America. The high profiles of American capitalist barons who plundered natural resources in the single-minded pursuit of profit and lived in unspeakable luxury made it seem more the land of exploitation than of opportunity, although disenchanted images of capitalist exploitation continued to be tempered by images of hope.¹¹⁸

By the time Spanish socialism became organised (the PSOE was founded in 1879) and anarchists in Spain embarked on their propagandistic bombing campaigns in the 1890s, the example set in the USA was done so by

its highly organised, mobilised and effective labour movement.¹¹⁹ In its first issue in March 1886, the newspaper *El Socialista*, lauded the Knights of Labour as a ‘powerful resistance organisation, perhaps the most important in the world’. It was the US labour movements’ successes that struck *El Socialista* above all; over the spring and summer of 1886 the paper followed closely the ‘triumphant’ campaign for the eight-hour work-day, keeping a running tally of the numbers of US workers who, it said, had successfully agitated for a reduction in working hours (2,000,000 by 6 August 1886).¹²⁰ By September, *El Socialista* was convinced that the ‘glorious North American republic’ was on the cusp of another revolution.

Modern capitalism [in the United States] has already invaded the last bastion of the reactionaries: the peasants have been expropriated by capital and vomited into the ranks of the Proletariat. This is the beginning of the end of capitalism. The peasants, dispossessed and proletarianised, uniting with the industrial proletariat, will produce the ultimate and most terrible crisis which will destroy the worst of all worlds: the capitalist world.¹²¹

Spanish anarchists were similarly inspired by their North American counterparts; in emulation of the US campaign for an eight-hour workday, they instituted an Internal Commission of Eight Hours in September 1886 and named their newspapers after Chicagoan anarchist press titles.¹²² The key event in the USA that indelibly shaped both anarchist and socialist images of the United States was the Haymarket bombing in May 1886 and execution of those held responsible in 1887. The trial of eight supposed anarchists, resulting in the execution of four and suicide of one, for the detonation of a bomb at a demonstration in Chicago on 4 May 1886 that killed eight policemen and a number of civilians caused an international sensation and in Spain gave ‘fresh impulse to [the anarchists’] revolutionary movement’.¹²³ May Day and 11 November—the execution date of the ‘Chicago Martyrs’—were ritually observed with portraits and songs dedicated to the martyrs as part of an anarchist civic religion.¹²⁴ When police searched the house of Paulino Pallás, the anarchist who made an attempt on the life of General Martínez de Campos in 1893, they reportedly found ‘photographs of the anarchists executed in Chicago’.¹²⁵

A final group who appear only infrequently in this book, but whose contribution to the development of images of America in Spain must be recognised is the small, but expanding community of Spanish immigrants resident in the United States. Numbering just over 7000 individuals

by 1900 (doubling in number from just over 3000 Spaniards resident in the USA at the mid-century), Spanish communities developed first in Louisiana (principally, these were Spaniards expelled from Mexico during the independence wars) and then in larger numbers in New York, Florida and California.¹²⁶ The trajectories followed by many of these immigrants place them as part of complex, transnational, transatlantic networks. Many found themselves in the USA, temporarily or permanently as it transpired, as a result of journeys and migrations to other parts of the Americas; this was the case with those Spaniards expelled from Mexico during the independence wars, with soldiers who moved on from fighting in Cuba to working in New York or Florida, and with Spaniards sent from the peninsular to work in family businesses and plantations in the Antilles and then on to set up business out-posts and connections in the USA. For example, the Barcelona-born anarchist, Pedro Esteve arrived in Tampa in the 1890s (where he helped establish an active anarchist cell) via Paris and Cuba;¹²⁷ Ramón Silvestre Verea García, the editor of the New York-based liberal paper, *El Progreso*, to whom we will return in Chaps. 5 & 6, emigrated from Galicia in 1855 first to Cuba, where he wrote novels and articles and invented a printing machine whose patent he would later sell in America, then to Puerto Rico, before he arrived in New York in 1865 where he founded a printing press specialising in translation, the aforementioned newspaper dedicated to disseminating ideas and information around political and technological 'progress', and continued inventing.¹²⁸ The socio-economic status of the Spanish immigrants varied considerably; while many worked as cooks, in tobacco factories or as clerical workers for the trading companies operating across the Americas and Caribbean, others, including Manuel Rionda, Vicente Martínez Ybor and Ignacio Haya, who made their homes in the USA in order to further family commercial colonial interests, were wealthy individuals.¹²⁹

These Spanish immigrants were a vital nexus connecting peninsular Spain to the United States. Spanish communities in the US established newspapers and associations, including chambers of commerce, masonic lodges, benevolent, recreational and educational societies, in order to further their interests in their new country of residence, but of course these and other mechanisms were also used to forge and strengthen connections between their *madrepatria* and new home. The forging of business links was of course crucial—to this end Arturo Cuyás used his Catalan-language paper, *La Llumanera de Nova York*, to urge, with increasing frustration, Catalan and Spanish businesses to take greater advantage of the potential

commercial opportunities offered by participation in the 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exposition¹³⁰—but the furthering of political interests (which, of course, were entangled with commercial interests) was also paramount. The *Círculo Colón Cervantes* in New York, for example, initiated a project to erect a statue and fountain depicting ‘Columbus and his Lieutenants’ in Central Park as a symbol of ‘the glory of Spain and her recognition by North Americans [...] and so revealing to the eyes of this Great Republic the attraction that our *patria* will always hold, despite political permutations over Spanish America’.¹³¹ The statue was unveiled to great fanfare on 15 October 1892, declared a public holiday, with a ‘civic-historical pageant’ and procession that took in key New York landmarks and representations of Columbus’ ‘triumphal’ return to Barcelona and his ‘presenting of Indians to Ferdinand and Isabella’.¹³²

The dichotomies of peninsular politics were replicated in the US Spanish communities, between conservatives and liberals, republicans and monarchists, defenders of Spanish colonialism and colonial slavery and advocates of (limited) colonial reform. Conservative US residents like José Ferrer de Couto maintained political connections with peninsular conservatives, including Antonio Cánovas, and advocated loudly against abolition.¹³³ Mindful of the potential influence of the USA’s political model among liberal Spaniards, and also of the influence that images produced by Spaniards resident in the United States could have at home, Ferrer de Couto admonished his liberally minded colleague, Enrique Muñiz (who would, indeed, go on to found a liberal Spanish-language newspaper, *Las Novedades*) for publishing an article presenting the US republic in rosy terms, reminding him,

You should not forget that in Spain there are many fools infatuated with the institutions of this country, to which they attribute the greatest marvels, and that we should not encourage this monster with our praise.¹³⁴

Whilst Enrique Muñiz was far from alone in expressing his admiration for the institutions and ways of life in his adopted country, the views of José Ferrer de Couto and the US-based Spanish colonial interests he purported to represent fit the revisionist historiography on other national contexts which experienced much larger migratory movements to the USA (especially Italy and Germany).¹³⁵ The large-scale migration of Europeans to the United States should not necessarily be read as people ‘voting with their feet’. Decisions to migrate to the USA and the large presence of

European emigrants there, does not necessarily equate to evidence of their wholehearted support and admiration for the United States.¹³⁶

THE CIRCULATION OF IMAGES OF AMERICA

The Spanish protagonists of this book were highly worldly and cosmopolitan individuals, who operated within transnational networks, circulating and exchanging ideas and practices. Images of the United States were composites formed of ideas and information gleaned from Spanish imaginaries of the USA and, as has been noted, of images projected internationally by the USA and its citizens. These images were produced and transmitted through numerous channels: newspapers, periodicals, scholarly journals, academic works, literature, plays, artworks, advertisements, US-invented machinery, personal contacts and more.¹³⁷ Events and comparisons with the USA were cited 'with such frequency' in *Cortes* debates they invoked the fury of the Carlist deputy, Vicente Manterola.¹³⁸ The diplomatic post brought news of presidential addresses, congressional speeches and statistical data. Intellectuals and academics also made the United States a key point of reference: during the thirty years under examination here, lecture series on North American themes including, 'On the representation and influence of the United States of America in International Law' and 'the North-American Revolution of the 18th century' were regularly held at the University, Athenaeum, *Fomento de las Artes* and *The Free Educational Institution*. Many were then published as pamphlets, books or articles in leading intellectual journals like the *Revista de España*.¹³⁹ The USA also figured in associational and *tertulia* debates.¹⁴⁰

Direct contact with 'America' and Americans in person was less frequent but often memorable whether this took place in the context of diplomatic relations and official visits, military encounters, business or pleasure trips. Spain may not have been a de rigueur stop for North Americans on a grand European tour but Prescott, Irving and Ticknor's romantic representations of the country as a timeless and picturesque (as well as decadent and backward) land and the extension of the Spanish railroad system helped it to become an increasingly attractive destination for American travellers touring Europe, as William Cullen Bryant's visits to Spain in 1857 and then again in 1866–67, during which he confirmed a firm friendship with Carolina Coronado and her American husband Horatio Perry, testified.¹⁴¹ William Cody brought his Wild West 'Buffalo Bill' show to Barcelona in December 1889, whilst altogether different images of America were gen-

erated by the presence of US Protestant missionaries in Spain from 1869, who established a handful of evangelical churches and missions on the peninsular with the aim of drawing catholic Spaniards away from Rome.¹⁴²

In the opposite direction, the Spaniards who visited the USA tended to be diplomats, businessmen, engineers or military men, like General Prim, the principal ‘sword’ of the *pronunciamiento* that brought about the September revolution. On his return from leading Spanish troops during the French-led 1862 invasion of Mexico, Prim toured US Civil War army bases and met Abraham Lincoln, an encounter that sealed his ‘enduring admiration’ for the US president.¹⁴³ As has been noted, a small Spanish immigrant community settled in the USA in the second half of the nineteenth century and communicated ideas and images of America to peninsular Spaniards through Spanish-language, US-based publications, and through personal and business contacts.¹⁴⁴ However, with no more than 7000 Spaniards living in the USA at the end of the century, Spanish peninsular families experienced far less than other Europeans did, the phenomena of letters home and returning emigrants full of tales of the highs and lows of working-class life in the USA.¹⁴⁵

The most important conduit of ideas and images of the USA in late nineteenth-century Spain was surely the press. The arrival of news from or about the USA was accelerated and commercialised around the mid-century by the extension of railroads in Spain and the United States, the successful laying of the transatlantic telegraph cable from Newfoundland to Ireland in 1866 and its ‘ruinous competition’—a cable linking the United States and France—in 1869, and the development of news agencies such as Reuters, the Press Association and Associated Press.¹⁴⁶ These elements of the ‘communications revolution’ seemed to bring the USA closer, but did not make the connection between Spain and the United States any more direct. Communications between Spain and the United States mostly operated indirectly. News from the United States travelled along telegraph cables to London, Paris or Havana before being sent on to Madrid and was usually provided by foreign news wire agencies, ‘giant funnels’ that increasingly monopolised the diffusion of news.¹⁴⁷ Often the Madrid-based papers simply reproduced the wire services’ telegrams in full, copied short articles from foreign publications, or had their London correspondents provide articles on the USA. That said, the principal liberal, progressive and Alfonsist [supporters of the Bourbon monarchy] dailies published in Madrid, *La Correspondencia de España*, *El Imparcial* and *La Epoca*, did station their own correspondents in the USA at times,

especially during the great exhibitions in Philadelphia (the centennial exposition of 1876) and Chicago (the 1893 World's Fair), who sent back impressionistic *Cartas de los Estados Unidos*. Whilst some sifting and selecting of information of course occurred in the publication of newswire telegrams, the Spanish correspondents' despatches offer particularly useful insight into the ways in which Spaniards imagined the USA.¹⁴⁸

Similarly, North American works of literature and academic studies of the USA often reached Spaniards via multiple, often circuitous, routes. The works of notable US authors such as Beecher Stowe, Irving, Hawthorne, Longfellow and Poe were published (and critiqued) in Spain, often in several editions; as testament of their esteem, when the Madrid publisher Manuel Tello brought out a series of British and North American authors in 1882, to comprise 16 volumes, the first six were given over to the works of Irving, Poe and Hawthorne.¹⁴⁹ Whilst Washington Irving's fiction was introduced directly to Spain, no doubt thanks partly to his reputation as a historian of Columbus and the Alhambra, most US authors published in translation reached Spanish audiences via French (often translated, sometimes unauthorised, from the French) or through Latin American publishing houses, where North American authors enjoyed considerable popularity and diffusion.¹⁵⁰ For example, Spaniards' introduction to the works of Edgar Allan Poe was largely mediated by Charles Baudelaire.¹⁵¹ Poe became the US author most widely translated into Spanish in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁵² Likewise, James Fenimore Cooper's books were usually translated into Spanish from the French. Others, including Longfellow and Emerson were first encountered in Castilian in Chilean and Argentine versions.¹⁵³ The publication of US authors in translation provided their translators and critics the opportunity to comment upon the USA and shape its images; this was done in both admiration and disapproval, sometimes simultaneously. The novelist-poet and director of the *Academia Sevillana*, Manuel Cano y Cueto, used his publication in 1871 of Poe's *Historias extraordinarias* to observe that

Burning chained Negroes, establishing polygamy in the parades of the West, fixing advertising to walls, without doubt to establish unlimited freedom, or of cures for 'nine month sicknesses', those are some of the characteristic traits, some moral examples of the noble country of Franklin, the inventor of counter-top morality, the hero of a century dedicated to the material.¹⁵⁴

Translators' notes and editors' introductions also entered into the debates on the conduciveness of the USA to the production of art. Cano y Cueto, of the opinion that the United States was filled with smoke-pumping factories and businessmen dedicated only to selling their wares, wondered 'how can poets be born in deserts?'¹⁵⁵ Like Baudelaire, Cano y Cueto insisted that Poe's artistic capabilities developed in the face of, not because of, the environment in which they were produced.¹⁵⁶ For the anonymous translator of Thomas Bayley Aldrich's *La reina de Saba*, on the other hand, the publication of the novel in Spanish would now allow readers to see that the USA was a nation 'where alongside machines, beautiful sentiments are moved to produce works of inestimable artistic value'.¹⁵⁷

The intercession of French and Latin American translators, editors and publishers in the diffusion of American novels in Spain underlines the ways and extent to which the circulation of images of the United States in Spain was mediated through other national discourses. Latin America, of course, formed a crucial point, or rather multiple points, in the communicative relations between Europe and North America.¹⁵⁸ As has been noted, many works of literature and non-fiction from the USA came to Spain via translations and publications from Spain's old—and current—colonies. Many Spaniards who journeyed to the USA travelled there via New World ports, especially Havana, or spent periods of residence in current or former Spanish American colonies before or after residing in the United States. Britain and, especially, France, also had a hand in shaping the images of the United States in Spain. Turning again to Rafael de Labra, we see that the books he used to form his critiques of the US republic were predominantly written by British and French writers: alongside the North American scholar John William Burgess, Labra cited as sources the British works of William Hepworth Dixon (*New America*, 1867) and James Bryce (*American Commonwealth*, 1888) and the French texts of Carlier, Guichot, Jannet, Edouard Laboulaye's three-volume *Histoire des Etats-Unis* (1855–66) and 'precious' *Paris en Amerique* (1863) and, of course, Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835 and 1840).¹⁵⁹

INTRODUCING THE IMAGES OF AMERICA IN SPAIN

What 'America' signified in late nineteenth-century Spain was, in the short answer, different things to different people. The United States of America are, of course, plural, and Spanish notions of the country, its people and political and societal forms reflected that. Distinctions in the experience,

outlook and example set of North and South, Union and Confederacy, the 'European' East, especially New York, the all-American Chicago, the curiosity of Mormon-built desert city Salt Lake City, the 'Wild'—but also in part historically Spanish—West, and in the ways of life of the 'Yankee', the immigrant, the native American, the railway baron and the striking railway labourer were all acknowledged. In this way, distinct and sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting, images of the USA coexisted.

That said, a number of key figures, events, tropes and *lieux de mémoire* recur in Spanish imaginaries of the United States and are worth highlighting here. The USA's founding documents, especially its Constitution and amendments, were understood as crucial vectors of republican and democratic ideals; its municipal politics and vibrant civil society, which Tocqueville identified as key, were signifiers of these ideals in practice. Other events in the practice of US democracy were similarly widely dispersed but invoked negative responses in order to mark out positions in relation to political events and currents in Spain. The contested US election in 1876 and the corruption scandals associated with the presidency of Ulysses Grant and the Tammany Ring in New York were manna to the Spanish conservative press, always delighted at an opportunity to question the USA's 'pretty theories'. At the spectacle of political 'indecision' and 'agitation' during the 1876 US presidential election, for example, *La Epoca* sardonically augured 'may God free the North-American republic from these civil struggles, which are so atrocious in this Old world!'¹⁶⁰ Spanish liberals salvaged what positive 'spin' they could to argue that at least in the United States corrupt officials like Boss Tweed, described in terms all too familiar to Spaniards as a *cacique*, were brought to book and that the USA remained 'the first and greatest democracy of the Modern Age'.¹⁶¹ The impeachment of President Andrew Johnson eight years earlier had been easy for liberals to cast in a positive light—it demonstrated that the president 'is responsible, just like any other functionary'—but the 1877 Great Railroad Strike and, in 1886–87, the Haymarket Affair proved more tricky. For the monarchical *La Epoca*, of course, the railway worker strikes were effectively social revolution and constituted the beginning of the end of the 'república-modelo': the more progressive *El Imparcial* spat back that the ill-informed *La Epoca* should know that the US federal government had determined that no 'new measures of precaution' were necessary to quell 'the excesses and abuses which had been committed on various rail lines by the rioters'.¹⁶² Still, the railroad, eight-hour day and May Day strikes and Haymarket attacks alarmed progressive liberals; in

particular they declared the unrest in Chicago in May 1886 ‘deplorable’, the situation ‘critical’ and, once again, ‘social revolution’.¹⁶³ As the regent, Maria Cristina, declared at the state opening of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on 10 May, ‘my government [Sagasta’s Progressive Party] is worried, as it is right to be, by a problem which [...] is the cause of profound concern in society and of attentive study by all thinking men’.¹⁶⁴ By now, of course, it was Pablo Iglesias’ socialists who looked on with admiration at ‘the extraordinary worker agitation existing in that country’ and its seeming successes.¹⁶⁵

Other noted events, figures and tropes or aspects of the United States captured Spanish imaginations for their ability to encapsulate multiple facets of the supposed American way of life and of modernity. The railroad network—if not the working conditions of those who constructed and ran it—was lauded in the accounts of every Spanish visitor to the USA and in many of those who had never crossed the Atlantic. More than any other innovation, the railroads that traversed the North American continent and from 1869 connected its Atlantic and Pacific coasts seemed to embody North Americans’ capacity to ‘tame’ the natural landscape and, as Marx put it, to ‘annihilate space by time’. It also, along with the Suez Canal and the Trans-Indian Peninsula Railroad allowed Jules Verne to imagine a round-the-world trip in just 80 days.¹⁶⁶ Spaniards marvelled at this ‘iron belt’, which seemed a cipher of the ‘American way of life’ in its dedication to speed, comfort and wealth generation. They also recognised the railways’ cost—to the wild landscapes described to them in the novels of Fenimore Cooper and to the railroads’ passengers, workers and drivers who risked—and paid with—their lives in horrific accidents and derailments.

Likewise, the late-century World’s Fairs staged in the United States, particularly the 1893 exhibition in Chicago, showcased the ‘American way of life’ to an international audience. Spanish journalists, delegates and visitors marvelled at the vast Fair complex, the Electricity Building and other displays of ‘elements of life which will completely transform the civilisations of the different peoples of the Earth’.¹⁶⁷ Because this was designated the Columbian exhibition, for the 400-year anniversary of the ‘discovery’ of America, Spain was declared guest of honour: the Duque de Veragua opened the Fair and Spanish valuables and exhibits, including replicas of the Pinta, Niña and Santa María, were sent over in such quantity that the satirical paper *Blanco y Negro* predicted that ‘only the walls will remain in Spain’.¹⁶⁸ However, images of the World’s Fair also critiqued Chicago’s brash, impersonal architecture, sniped at administrative failings and snig-

gered at the spectacle of the Women's Congress, during which, in what seemed to them an example of the world-turned-upside-down, women spoke out for the right to vote. As has been noted, Spain's guest-of-honour status was also read as the illustration of the very different iterations of Spanish and North American civilisation of a shared space.

The figure of Thomas Edison and his 'prodigious inventions' like the electric lightbulb and the kinetoscope appeared to combine two typifying elements of the North American man: his capacity to invent and his capacity to make money. A less obvious figure, though one who evidently struck a chord with Spanish abolitionists and feminists, given their frequent references to her, was Anna Carroll. Carroll had counselled Lincoln on the constitutional legality of emancipation, freed her own slaves and provided crucial strategic advice to the Unionists during the Civil War. The failure to acknowledge or reward the decisive part played by Carroll in the winning of the war and declaring of abolition was considered by her Spanish admirers all the more unforgivable 'on the part of a free and great people'.¹⁶⁹ In addition, a series of American maxims were frequently deployed in Spanish texts in the original English, whose usage indicated both their familiarity to Spaniards and their distance from Spanish realities. These included signifiers of American societal informality (flirt) and materialism (comfort, profit, progress, business forever). In this latter bracket can be included two phrases considered watchwords of American life, 'go ahead!' and 'time is money!' Put together, as they often were, they signalled the trinity which, it was thought, drove American modernity: force of will, speed and wealth.

The most important event that shaped late-century images of America was that country's Civil War of which Abraham Lincoln was the key figure. The Civil War was an international newsworthy event, which could be followed in Spain with a time lag of less than a week thanks to the reports transmitted via telegraph and steamship.¹⁷⁰ The war was understood by all as a major crisis for the 'young republic' and a threat to the very existence of the Union. The Civil War also proved the most problematic aspect of the USA's history and character for liberal Spaniards to assimilate with their view of United States as a positive model of a modern society. As has been noted, many liberals responded to the disjunction of a democratic Union preserved by violence and to the shocking prospect of the bloodiest conflict since the Napoleonic Wars by accepting the victorious Union's own version of the war as a 'supreme test' of the unity, ideals and institutions of the nation, a test that the USA had ultimately passed.¹⁷¹ The

United States could now ‘present to the world [...] a great nation of 40 million inhabitants, all free’.¹⁷² Many abolitionists, including Coronado, Castelar and Rodríguez expanded upon this to see Spain’s fate, then also embroiled in a colonial ‘civil’ war linked to the continued practice of slavery in Cuba, as connected to that of the United States; to this end, abolitionists frequently adapted to the Spanish context Lincoln’s words, spoken shortly before he was assassinated, that the Civil War was a ‘punishment imposed on both North and South of the Union’ by God for the ‘disgrace’ of slavery.¹⁷³ Peninsular opponents of colonial reform and to the abolition of slavery in Spain’s colonies (or at least of the kind of immediate and uncompensated abolition enacted in the United States) were incredulous that liberals would wish for their Cuban ‘brothers’, ‘the same misfortune, the same cruel sacrifices, identical death’!¹⁷⁴ What’s more, they said, Lincoln’s decreeing of immediate abolition had been an expedient of war and couldn’t possibly serve as a model for Spanish colonial reform.

The following chapters explore in more depth the construction, circulation and deployment of Spanish images of the United States. There are inevitably important themes that do not have a chapter dedicated exclusively to them here: some, such as America as a place where education was understood as the key to self-improvement or the idea of America as a land of socio-economic mobility—a place where an abundance of land and opportunity meant that pioneering citizens could write society anew, but also a place where fortunes were made and lost in an instant—link a number of the themes explored in the book and therefore weave in and out of multiple chapters. The images that are analysed in individual chapters were identified as those holding the greatest relevance for late-century (especially liberal) Spain in terms of volume of output and connection to domestic anxieties about modernity. Chapter 2 considers the image of the United States that predominated in late nineteenth-century Spain, that of the universal republic, its Constitution and democratic traditions. Chapter 3 examines the place of images of abolition in the United States in the debates over Spain’s continued tolerance and practice of slavery (which persisted until 1873 in Puerto Rico and was not finally ended in Cuba, the most highly prized of Spain’s colonies, until October 1886). Chapter 4 turns its attention to the so-called women’s question. The position of (white) women (of means) in the United States who could access higher education, most notably via the ‘Seven Sisters’ colleges, pursued careers and had achieved the vote in four states of the Union before the end of the century seemed a kind of crucible of modern womanhood in practice;

the chapter examines Spanish appropriations of images of North American women in the debate over the position of women in Spanish society as part of the liberal agenda of social reform. Chapter 5 takes as its focus technology, inventions, urban planning and communications and turns the spotlight on how Spanish imaginings of the USA as the land of inventions, patents and technological advancement caused them to confront their own ambivalences towards technological modernity. Chapter 6 turns its attention to investigate the imagining of essential differences between Spaniards and Americans in terms of the constructed racial designations of Latin and Anglo-Saxon. Religious, cultural and behavioural traits such as a perceived love of liberty and individualism were transmuted into inheritable biological race markers in images that helped contemporaries to make sense of shifting contemporary notions of empire and of Spain as an imperial power and of the distinctions they identified in the political, economic, social and cultural developments of the two countries divided and connected by the Atlantic Ocean.

What unites these chapters is the assertion that, following Tocqueville's lead, when these Spaniards looked at America they 'saw more than America'.¹⁷⁵ Instead, to paraphrase that follower of Tocqueville, Édouard Laboulaye, they saw Spain in America.¹⁷⁶ Europeans and Americans colluded to present the USA as the universal modern nation, allowing those who imagined it to see themselves and their own anxieties about modernity in reflection. Images of the United States were deployed in sophisticated and complex debates, which were principally borne from local and national concerns. For the liberal and radical individuals who emerged on the Spanish political scene with the revolutionary *sexenio*, who were preoccupied with political, social and cultural reform and remained if not at the centre of political power, then at the centre of politico-intellectual life in the Spanish capital, the United States was self-evidently 'the country whose present is the dreamed-of future of other nations'. But even fervent Americophiles rarely saw the United States as the only blueprint or map of modernity, to be slavishly followed. Its conservative detractors were less equivocal in rejecting the US model wholesale, but even they could find something to admire in the 'great republic', perhaps in its crackdown on striking workers and anarchists or, if nothing more, in its having absorbed 'the dregs of all the nations of the world'.¹⁷⁷ Rather than serving as a blueprint for a model or anti-model for modern living, the utility of US *república-modelo* came in its provision of a century-old experiment of federal republicanism, democracy, industrial capitalism, religious tolerance

and so on in practice, for good and ill. Whether the USA signalled the course Spain should also take—or not take—this was a country worth examining. Like Puig y Valls, whose uncertain musings about the future opened this introduction, nobody could be sure what the modern world would be like. But, as Rafael de Labra suggested, perhaps one way to find out was to study the United States. The history, Constitution, institutions, society and practices of the USA were, as Labra observed, a prism through which late-century Spain could analyse its own values and put them to the test.

If there is a people that can consider themselves the product of the nineteenth century, this people, with its flaws and attributes, is the people of the United States. I am a man of my century; and I believe it has achieved much and has a great deal to commend itself to history; and the insults and slander awarded to our time irritate me; and I think that where we can best see our blunders and our just choices, our miseries and our glories, is in action, turning our eyes to the great republic on the other side of the Atlantic.¹⁷⁸

NOTES

1. R. Puig y Valls (1894) *Viaje á América* (Barcelona: Tipolitografía de Luis Tasso) p. 7. Puig y Valls found the naming of the Paris-Le Havre train that connected with the ship that would set sail for New York rather ‘pompous’.
2. See W. Cronon (1991) *Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, 1848–1893* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company).
3. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 181–2.
4. This particular Spanish manifestation of fin-de-siècle angst must also be placed firmly within a wider European context. Eric Storm makes the argument that crisis of the ‘generation of ’98’ in Spain, traditionally understood as a purely national phenomena and reaction to the loss of the colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, actually predated the colonial defeat of 1898 and should rather be seen as part of a European-wide transformative intellectual debate in which nineteenth century ideals of positivism, reason and ‘progress’ were being challenged and rejected. E. Storm (2001) *La perspectiva del progreso. Pensamiento político en la España del cambio del siglo (1890–1914)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva).
5. R.M. de Labra (1881) *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Imprenta de Aurelio J. Alaria) p. 1.

6. This observation was made with respect to Victorian Britain. J. Epstein (2000) “‘America’ in the Victorian Cultural Imagination” in F.M. Leventhal & R. Quinault eds. *Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership* (Aldershot: Ashgate) p. 107.
7. E. Said (1995 f.1978) *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin); A. Bonnet (2004) *The Idea of the West* (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan). This idea is explored in depth in A. Körner, N. Miller, A.I.P. Smith eds. (2012) *America Imagined. Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
8. See M. de Certeau (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press); R. Hoggart (1965 f.1957) *The Uses of Literacy* (Middlesex: Penguin); M.S. Archer (1988) *Culture & Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
9. C. Offe (2004) *Selbstbetrachtungen aus der Ferne: Tocqueville, Weber und Adorno in den Vereinigten Staaten*. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp) p. 10. Cited and translated in: M. Thier (2012) ‘A World Apart, A Race Apart?’ in A. Körner, N. Miller, A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined* p. 162.
10. C. Offe *Selbstbetrachtungen aus der Ferne* p. 10; cited and translated in: M. Their (2012) ‘A World Apart, A Race Apart?’ p. 162.
11. *El Pensamiento español* 6 Sept. 1862; cited and translated in: D. Jordan & E. Pratt (1931) *Europe and the American Civil War* (London & Edinburgh: Oxford University Press) p. 252.
12. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 30 Jan. 1878.
13. See J. Baudrillard (1988) *America* (London & New York: Verso) p. 95; J. Epstein “‘America’ in the Victorian Cultural Imagination” pp. 107–8.
14. J. Nadal (1975) *El fracaso de la revolución industrial en España, 1814–1913* (Barcelona: Ariel); B. de Riquer i Permanyer (1994) ‘La débil nacionalización española del siglo XIX’ in *Historia Social* vol. 20 pp. 97–114.
15. For a discussion of the ‘paradigm of backwardness’ see I. Saz (2001) ‘Paradojas de la historia, paradojas de la historiografía. Las peripecias del fascismo español’ in *Hispania* LXI/1 207 pp. 143–76. See also Mónica Burguera and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara’s introduction, ‘Backwardness and its discontents’, to the special issue of *Social History* vol. 29.3 2004 pp. 279–83.
16. See Mark Lawrence’s review of Guy Thomson’s 2008 work, *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain: Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854–1875* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), which is itself a fine example of the ‘normalising’ trend in nineteenth-century Spanish historiography. For the review: M. Lawrence, review of *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain*:

Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854–1875, (review no. 956) URL: <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/956> Date accessed: 16 July, 2012.

17. Indeed, in some iterations, the historiographical revisions amount to what Isabel Burdiel has identified as the replacement of the myth of failure with the myth of success. I. Burdiel (1998) 'Myths of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism' in *Journal of Modern History* vol. 70 pp. 892–912. See, for example, D. Ringrose (1996) *Spain, Europe and the "Spanish miracle", 1700–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); J. Cruz (1996) *Gentlemen, bourgeois and revolutionaries. Political change and cultural persistence among the Spanish dominant groups 1750–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); idem (2011) *The Rise of Middle-Class Culture in 19th Century Spain* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press); J. Álvarez Junco (2002) *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain. Populist Demagoguery and Republican Culture, 1890–1910* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press); idem (2011) *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press).
18. On the ways in which identification with one's local place can serve as a building block for the nation and national identity (and not only as a competitor to these) see: A. Confino (1997) *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press); C. Applegate (1990) *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press); A. Körner (2011) *Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy* (London: Routledge).
19. B. Struck, K. Ferris, J. Revel (2011) 'Introduction: Space and scale in transnational history' in *The International History Review* vol. 33.4 pp. 573–584.
20. B. Anderson (1991) *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* revised edition, (New York: Verso); E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (1984) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); E. Said *Orientalism*.
21. J. Baudrillard *America* passim; B. Smart (1993) 'Europe/America: Baudrillard's fatal comparison' in C. Rojek & B.S. Turner eds. (1993) *Forget Baudrillard?* (London: Routledge) pp. 47–69.
22. The earlier approaches of Benedict Anderson (on 'imagined communities') and Hobsbawm and Ranger (on the 'invention of tradition') tended to see the actual process of imagining or inventing as occurring within national boundaries, perhaps because they were developed in relation to nineteenth and twentieth century societies where nationalism was a dominant creed and the nation, the principal unit of historical analysis. Even Edward Said's

notion of 'Othering', whilst it is of course comparative, requiring a foreign 'other' against which to measure and construct one's own identity, is not transnational in the sense that the construction of self-identity is conceived as taking place in a national context, for example within France or Great Britain. On this point, see H. de Velde (2005) 'Political Transfer: An Introduction' in *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire* vol. 12.5, pp. 205–21.

23. In the past, scholars who have taken comparative and transnational approaches to history have sometimes seen their work as theoretically antagonistic, even though there is much that is common to the two approaches and neither precludes the other: comparative historians are usually considered to view the two or more national case studies they investigate as independent and distinct, which they then compare; transnational historians, meanwhile, take the relationship and processes of exchange between the countries they study as their starting point, often finding greater interest and import in the processes of exchange and 'transfer' than in their results. Reception theory, on the other hand, might be considered to focus predominantly on the end stage of 'cultural transfer', recognising the creativity of process of reception and their (re)production of effectively new cultural products. See D. Cohen & M. O'Connor eds. (2004) *Comparison and History. Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (London & New York: Routledge). On cultural transfer, see M. Espagne & M. Werner eds. (1998) *Transferts. Les Relations Interculturelles dans l'espace Franco-allemand (VIIIe-XIXe siècle)* (Paris: Editions Recherche sur les Civilisations) and H. de Velde 'Political Transfer: An Introduction'. On reception, see P. Hohendahl (1977) 'Introduction to Reception Aesthetics' in *New German Critique* no. 10 pp. 29–64. Despite the drawing of distinctions, 'transnational history' has often been used as an inclusive umbrella term which can include many, if not all, of these approaches. K. Patel (2010) 'Transnational History' European History Online. URL: <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transnational-history>; date accessed: 20 Sept. 2015.

24. Sociological 'diffusion' was explored in E.M. Rogers' work on (1983) *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press). Though its link to modernisation theory and its insistence on transfers from a 'centre' to a 'periphery' are problematic, diffusion theory provides some useful ways of thinking about the uses of transfers, for example, to highlight 'hyper-difference' in the case of actors who wish to emphasise distance and difference to the object of transfer and its location of 'origin', or 'over-likeness', which alludes to a perception of the positive benefit in citing and applying foreign models or transfers to another national context. Charles Tilly's identification of aspects of the mediated nature of cultural transfer whereby

local groups deliberately diffuse and adapt, endorse, or modify and appropriate a transferred idea or practice, are also relevant. See the special issue on 'Political Transfer' in *European Review of History* vol. 12.2, 2005, especially H. de Valde 'Political Transfer: An Introduction' and C. Tilly 'Introduction to Part II: Invention, Diffusion and Transformation in the Social Movements Repertoire'.

25. On hybridity and in-between spaces, see, for example, S. Santiago (2001) 'The space in-between' in *idem*. ed. (A.L. Gazzola trans.) *The Space In-Between: Essays on Latin American Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press); N. García Canclini (C.L. Chiappari & S.L. López trans.) (1995) *Hybrid Cultures. Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press); A. Rama (1997) 'Processes of Transculturation in Latin American Narrative' in *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies* vol. 6.2 pp. 155-171.
26. W.C. Bryant (1859) *Letters of a traveller. Series 2* (New York: Appleton) letter XII. pp. 148-9.
27. J. Millán & M. Cruz Romeo (2004) 'Was the liberal revolution important to modern Spain? Political cultures and citizenship in Spanish history' in *Social History* vol. 26.3 p. 299.
28. See R. Serrano García 'Introducción' and M. Morales Muñoz 'Cultura política y sociabilidad en la democracia republicana' in R. Serrano García ed. (2002) *España 1868-1874. Nuevos enfoques sobre el Sexenio Democrático* (Valladolid: Consejería de Educación y Cultura). On the late-century liberal press, see D. Ortiz Jr. (2000) *Paper Liberals. Press and Politics in Restoration Spain* (London: Greenwood Books).
29. M. Lawrence (2014) *Spain's First Carlist War, 1833-40* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
30. J. Álvarez Junco *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* Chap. 7 'The "Two Spains".'
31. D.H. Doyle (2015) 'Widely noted and long remembered: The Gettysburg Address around the world' in S. Conant ed. *The Gettysburg Address* (New York: Oxford University Press) p. 274.
32. A. Blanco (2007) 'Spain at the crossroads: Imperial nostalgia or modern colonialism?' in *A contra corriente* vol. 5.1 p. 10.
33. A. Cánovas del Castillo (1997) *Discurso sobre la nación: Ateneo de Madrid, 6 de noviembre de 1882* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva) p. 141; cited in A. Blanco 'Spain at the crossroads' p. 10.
34. M. Isabella (2009) *Risorgimento in Exile. Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 26. It's worth noting, as does Isabella, that the 'liberal international' was a site where 'liberalism' was constantly negotiated and re-elab-

orated. Liberalism, as a political current was not static and was iterated differently in different settings and contexts.

35. M. Lawrence *Spain's First Carlist War, 1833–40* pp. 97–100.
36. G. Thomson (2008) 'Giuseppe Mazzini and the globalisation of democratic nationalism, 1830–1920' in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 152, pp. 267–8. See also I.M. Pascual Sastre (2001) *La Italia del Risorgimento y la España del Sexenio Democrático* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas) pp. 376–96.
37. J.H. Elliott (2002) *Imperial Spain 1469–1716* (London: Penguin) pp. 299–300; 310.
38. J.H. Elliott *Imperial Spain 1469–1716* p. 310.
39. It is argued that by the mid-century, 'America', as a connotation of the fulfillment of utopian promise in the New World, had come to be accepted as associated particularly with the USA at the expense of South America, at least in the European and North American view. G. Murphy (2005) *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press).
40. The idea of 'the American century' as a time of US hegemonic power, prestige and influence (and of a non-isolationist USA) dates to Henry Luce's essay of the same name, published in *Life* magazine during the Second World War. Though it constituted a treatise on the USA's contemporary and future role in world politics, it has often been projected backward, with the origins of 'the American century' being connoted with US victory in the Spanish-Cuban-American War in 1898. Olivier Zunz, for example, begins his discussions of the making of the 'American century' in the 1870s. A. Brinkley (2003) 'The concept of an American century' in R.L. Moore & M. Vaudagna eds. *The American Century in Europe* (New York: Cornell University Press) pp. 7–24. O. Zunz (1998) *Why the American Century?* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press).
41. A. Körner 'Introduction' p. 4 & N. Miller 'Conclusion' pp. 236–7 in A. Körner, N. Miller, A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined: On Anti-Americanism*, see P. Roger (2002) *The American Enemy: A Story of French Anti-Americanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); D. Lacorne, J. Rupnik, M.F. Toinet eds. (1990) *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
42. The notable absence here is culture. The view that Europe was the locus of a cultured civilization, as well as cultural modernity, and that 'culture' in the United States was either entirely lacking or bought in from Europe was ubiquitous.

43. B. Rauch (1948) *American Interests in Cuba: 1848–1855* (New York: Columbia University Press). W.H. Bowen (2011) *Spain and the American Civil War* (Columbia & London: University of Missouri Press) pp. 149–56.
44. See J. Franklin (1997) *Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History* (Melbourne & New York: Ocean Books).
45. See T. Chaffin (1996) *Fatal Glory. Narciso López and the First Clandestine U.S. War Against Cuba* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia) and S. Urban (1956) ‘The ideology of Southern imperialism: New Orleans and the Caribbean, 1845–1860’ in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* vol. 39 pp. 48–73.
46. See, for example, *La Epoca* 3 Feb. 1872; 7 Jan. 1873 ‘Los Estados Unidos y Cuba’. Diplomatic relations between Spain and the USA continued to be made difficult by the sense of rivalry over Cuba. One flashpoint came in November 1873 after Spain summarily executed a number of US citizens who had been found aboard the *Virginius*, carrying arms and supplies to Cuban independence fighters during the Ten Years’ War. R.H. Bradford (1980) *The Virginius Affair* (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press).
47. AHN AGA (10) 26.01 54/8044—833 ‘List of propositions presented to US Congress in favour of Cuban insurrectionists’ Dec. 1896; (10) 26.01 54/8052 ‘Reports from the Pinkerton Detective Agency from agents in Cuba’ 1897; (10) 26.01 54/8053 ‘Associated Spanish and Cuban Press reports 1897/8’.
48. A.M. Varela-Lago ‘Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles: The Spanish Diaspora in the United States (1848–1948)’ Unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego, 2008. pp. 21–2. See also G.E. Poyo (1989) ‘*With all, and for the good of all: The emergence of popular nationalism in the Cuban communities of the United States, 1848–1898*’ (Durham: Duke University Press).
49. A.M Varela-Lago ‘Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles’ p. 7.
50. A.M Varela-Lago ‘Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles’ pp. 10; 20–53.
51. R.M. de Labra (1897) *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* (Madrid: Tipografía de Alfredo Alonso) p. 14.
52. See L. Greenfeld (1992) *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge Mass. & London: Harvard University Press) especially pp. 15–17; 177–8; 222–8.
53. J. Bustamante y Campuzano (1885) *Del Atlántico al Pacífico. Apuntes e Impresiones de un Viaje a través de los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Victor Saíz) p.155.
54. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 156.
55. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 24–31.
56. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 157.

57. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 158.
58. *El Imparcial* 2 May 1893.
59. See J. Oltra (1972) *La influencia norteamericana en la Constitución Española de 1869* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos) pp. 97–100.
60. R.M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana* p. 1.
61. *El Pensamiento español* 6 Sept. 1862; cited and translated in: D. Jordan & E. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War* p. 252.
62. On the meeting of US self-perceptions and foreign observations of the United States as a political model, in the Italian case, see P. Gemme (2005) *Domesticating Foreign Struggles. The Italian Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity* (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press).
63. See R.W. Rydell (1993) *World of Fairs: the century-of-progress expositions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
64. See D. Jordan & E.J. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War* p. 249.
65. A.I.P Smith (2012) 'Land of opportunity?' in A. Körner, N. Miller, A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined* pp. 19–49.
66. C.P. Boyd (2011) 'A man for all seasons' in R. Carwardine & J. Sexton eds. *The Global Lincoln* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 189–205.
67. Speech given by G. Rodríguez 'La abolición de la esclavitud en los Estados Unidos', published in (1872) *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* (Madrid: Publicaciones de la Sociedad Abolicionista Española) pp. 17–8.
68. L. Surwillo (2014) *Monsters by Trade. Slave Traffickers in Modern Spanish Literature and Culture* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press) pp. 40–1.
69. J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria (1996) *Literatura en traducción. Versiones españolas de autores americanos del siglo XIX* (León: Universidad de León).
70. N. Snyder Yost (1979) *Buffalo Bill. His Family, Friends, Fame, Failures, and Fortunes* (Chicago: Sage); L.S. Warren (2005) *Buffalo Bill's America. William Cody and the Wild West Show* (New York: Alfred Knopf).
71. L. Surwillo (2007) 'Poetic diplomacy. Carolina Coronado and the American civil war' in *Comparative American Studies* vol. 5.4. p. 411; See William Cullen Bryant's letter describing Coronado's salon. W.C. Bryant *Letters of a traveller* letter XII.
72. Labra described receiving a 'semi-official' US report on cotton production from Ambassador Sickles, which he used to argue that economic production in the US South had not been adversely affected by abolition in any lasting way. See R.M. de Labra (1874) *La abolición de la esclavitud en el orden económico* (Madrid: M Martínez (Sociedad Abolicionista Española)) pp. 209–210.
73. A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles' p. 22.

74. A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles' pp. 22–3. These papers numbered, for example, the conservative *La Crónica* and *El Cronista*, the more moderate *Las Novedades*, the progressive *El Progreso*, which is discussed in further detail in Chap. 5, as well as anarchist newspapers and pamphlets. On the Spanish-language anarchist press in the USA, see: G.E. Poyo (1985) 'The Anarchist Challenge to the Cuban Independence Movement, 1885–1890' in *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos* vol. 15.1 pp. 29–42; R. Núñez Florencio (1991) 'Los anarquistas españoles y cubanos ante la Guerra de Cuba' in *Hispania* vol. 51.3 pp. 1077–1092.

75. J. Álvarez-Junco *The emergence of mass politics in Spain*. p. 55.

76. C. Díez de Baldeón (1986) 'Barrios obreros en el Madrid del siglo XIX: ¿Solución o amenaza para el orden burgués?' in L.E. Otero Carvajal & Á. Bahamonde eds. *Madrid en la sociedad del siglo XIX* vol. 1 (Madrid: Graficinco) pp. 124–6.

77. D. Parsons (2003) *A Cultural History of Madrid* (Oxford: Berg) p. 85.

78. J. Álvarez-Junco (2002) *The emergence of mass politics* p. 55.

79. *La Revista Blanca* 'Impresiones de un viaje por España, por Eliás Reclus' Mar. 1932; 1 April 1932; 15 June 1932.

80. See F. Pi y Margall (1877) *Las Nacionalidades* (Madrid: Imp. De Eduardo Martínez).

81. J. Álvarez-Junco (2002) *The emergence of mass politics* p. 54

82. R.M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 9.

83. J. López-Morillas (F. López-Morillas trans.) (1981) *The Krausist movement and ideological change in Spain, 1854–1874* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 65.

84. L. Litvak (1990) *España 1900. Modernismo, anarquismo y fin de siglo* (Barcelona: Editorial Anthropos) pp. 160; 181.

85. Lerroux saw Montjuic as 'the Dreyfus affair for Spain', whereby anarchists and the *guardia civil* took on the roles of the Jews and military respectively and the affair was used to defend and advance a secular model of society and individual liberties. That said, as José Álvarez-Junco points out, in so doing the Spanish secular intellectuals were 'comparing themselves unrealistically to their peers', not least given the very different outcomes of the Dreyfuss affair in France, where a left-wing coalition government rehabilitated Dreyfuss and curtailed military and church influence, and of the Montjuic affair Spain, where the cause galvanised intellectuals and working-class republicans but led to little lasting unity between the two and little concrete political change. J. Álvarez-Junco (2002) *The emergence of mass politics* pp. 55–64.

86. Azcárate noted that in Britain, the head of state 'should not, therefore, intervene in the legislative by means of initiative, sanction or absolute vote;

nor in the executive, allowing the fiction that he does it all through the medium of ministers, or by really doing it by itself; nor in the judiciary; justice being administered in his name and magistrates receiving their authority from him', G. de Azcárate (1878) *El poder del jefe del estado en Francia, Inglaterra y los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de J.C. Conde) p. 100. See also: R.M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 394.

87. The 'actually existing' Restoration system was more oligarchical than that of Victorian Britain, as Vincent observed, due to the persistence of an 'unreformed rentier class' and the domination of the executive in Spain. M. Vincent (2007) *Spain 1833–2002, People and State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 52.
88. J. Goode (2009) *Impurity of Blood. Defining Race in Spain, 1870–1930* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press).
89. R.M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* pp. 43–4.
90. P. Grases (1987) 'Introducción' in *Primera traducción castellana de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos de América, Filadelfia 1810* (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) pp. 17–8; D. Armitage (2007) *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) pp. 117–122.
91. B. Pérez Galdós (1987 f. 1906) *España Trágica*. (Episode 42 of *Episodios Nacionales*) (Barcelona: Círculo de Lectores) p. 51. Whilst Galdós is now conventionally held as the principal chronicler of bourgeois Madrid and a major author of the late-nineteenth century, it has been noted that his appeal and reading audience during his lifetime was limited by poor literacy rates, the relatively high cost of books and Galdós' ideological appeal. Certainly, his *Episodios Nacionales* were popular among the contemporary reading public, more so than the works for which he is now best known, and his appeal among 'educated liberals', whose views he shared and reflected, was strong. See E. Rodgers (2003) 'Who read Galdós? The economics of the book trade in nineteenth-century Spain' in N.G. Round ed. *New Galdós Studies. Essays in Memory of John Varey* (Woodbridge: Tamesis) pp. 11–25.
92. R.M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* p. 18. This key moment in the Spanish reception of Tocqueville came despite the fact that, by this point, Tocqueville's own compatriots had already started to mock his image of US society as a sugar-coated one, 'l'Amérique en Sucre' as one of the protagonists of Victorien Sardou's play *Chez l'Oncle Sam* put it. V. Sardou (1875) *Chez l'Oncle Sam* (Paris: Michel Lévy) p. 10.
93. C. Zululeta (1984) *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras. Historia del Instituto Internacional* (Madrid: Editorial Castalia); C. Scally Grigas (2004) 'Mission to Spain: Alice Gordon Gulick and a transatlantic project

to educate Spanish women, 1872–1903’ Unpublished PhD thesis, Washington State University.

94. See, for example, B. Rauch *American Interests in Cuba: 1848–1855*.
95. J. Sexton (2005) ‘The Global View of the United States’ in *The Historical Journal* vol. 48.1 pp. 261–276.
96. A. Brinkley ‘The concept of an American century’ pp. 7–24; O. Zunz *Why the American Century?*.
97. On the development of a coherent ideology of ‘Anti-Americanism’ in the late nineteenth and, above all, twentieth century, see P. Roger (S. Bowman trans.) (2005) *The American Enemy. A story of French Anti-Americanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
98. It should be acknowledged that the term ‘intellectual’ first appears in use in Spain at the end of the century, in the context of the Lerroux-instigated ‘Montjuic affair’ and used in relation to ascending ‘generation of 98’. Nevertheless, it is a useful way of describing the activities of this earlier ‘generation of 68’ *avant la lettre*. J. Álvarez-Junco *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain* p. 63
99. J. Cruz (1996) *Gentlemen, bourgeois and revolutionaries*; M. Vincent *Spain 1833–2002* chapters 1 & 2.
100. E. Pardo Bazán (1889) ‘The Women of Spain’ in *Fortnightly Review* vol. 45 p. 892.
101. On the relationship between the ‘social movements’ in mid-to-late-century Spain, see A. Gil Novales (1968) ‘Abolicionismo y librecambio’ in *Revista de Occidente* no. 50 pp. 154–81.
102. Despite the similarities in trajectories, Castelar and Pi fundamentally disagreed on the foundations of democracy (the individual or society) and the form that an eventual Spanish republic should take—centralist or federalist.
103. J. Álvarez-Junco *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain* p. 53.
104. On the *The Free Educational Institution*, see P.F. Álvarez Lázaro & J.M. Vázquez-Romero eds. (2005) *Krause, Giner y la institución libre de enseñanza: nuevos estudios* (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas).
105. Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes. URL: www.cervantesvirtual.com/portales/pardo_bazan/autora_biografia/ accessed: 19 Sept. 2015.
106. M.D. Domingo Acebrón (2006) *Rafael María de Labra: Cuba, Puerto Rico, las Filipinas, Europa y Marruecos en la España del sexenio democrático y la restauración (1871–1918)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas) pp. 34–5.
107. M.D. Domingo Acebrón *Rafael María de Labra* p. 35.
108. On the curious development and influence of Krausism in Spain, see J. López-Morillas *The Krausist Movement*.
109. J. López-Morillas *The Krausist Movement* pp. vii; xi.

110. M. Menéndez Pelayo (1880-1) *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles, por el doctor Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo* (Madrid: Librería Católica de San José) pp. 385-6; cited in J. López-Morillas *The Krausist Movement* p. 8.
111. J. López-Morillas *The Krausist Movement* p. 40.
112. Many corresponded with one another. For example, the principal correspondents of Rafael de Labra, with whom he maintained 'a fluent and continuous correspondence' included Francisco Giner de los Ríos, Nicolás Salmerón, Manuel Becerra, Francisco Pi y Margall, Ruiz Zorrilla, Estanislao Figueras, Concepción Arenal, Félix de Bona, and Julio Vizcarrondo. M.D. Domingo Acebrón *Rafael María de Labra* p. 49.
113. Arenal and Pi were older, born in 1823 and 1824 respectively, and Pardo Bazán, younger, born in 1851. The model of generational cohorts bound, not by age or life-cycle, but by key shared, formative experience was first formulated by Karl Mannheim (1928) 'Problem der Generationen' in *Kölner Vierteljahrsschriften für Soziologie* vol. 7 pp157-80 & 309-50. See also: M. Roseman ed. (1995) *Generations in Conflict. Youth revolt and generation formation in Germany 1770-1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
114. Carlists supported the claim of Don Carlos to succeed his brother, Ferdinand VII, to the Spanish throne, refusing to recognise Ferdinand's passing of the 1832 Pragmatic Sanction which had made Ferdinand's young daughter, the future Isabel II, heir apparent ahead of Carlos.
115. *El Pensamiento español* 6 Sept. 1862; cited and translated in: D. Jordan & E. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War* pp. 251-2.
116. P. Avrich (2005 f. 1995) *Anarchist Voices. An Oral History of Anarchism in America* (Oakland & Edinburgh: AK Press) p. 393.
117. *Reynold's Newspaper* 1 Feb. 1857.
118. A.I.P. Smith 'Land of Opportunity?' pp. 24-9.
119. The Socialist newspaper, *El Socialista*, declared that 'today there is surely no country where strikes are happening as frequently as in the North-American federal republic'. *El Socialista* 16 April 1886.
120. *El Socialista* 19 Mar. 1886; 28 May 1886; 19 June 1886; 6 Aug. 1886.
121. *El Socialista* 10 Sept. 1886.
122. This was the case with the Seville newspaper *La Alarma*; cited in G.R. Esenwein (1989) *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press) p. 152.
123. G.R. Esenwein *Anarchist Ideology* p. 158.
124. G.R. Esenwein *Anarchist Ideology* pp. 155-60.
125. *El Diario de Barcelona* reported in its front page article on 25 Sept. 1893, that 'in the evening there was a thorough inspection of the house [Paulino Pallás] inhabited, finding a multitude of anarchist proclamations, the pho-

tographs of the anarchists executed in Chicago, and various letters originating from France, which gave him instructions on how to carry out a social revolution.'

126. For the development of the Spanish immigrant communities in the U.S., see A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles', including figures documenting the growth of Spanish communities in the US on pp. 25–6.
127. P. Avrich *Anarchist voices* p. 393.
128. In 1895, Verea García was compelled to leave the US for Guatemala, then Buenos Aires due to his stance against US imperial interests in the Caribbean. A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles' p. 51.
129. A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles' pp. 28–31.
130. A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles' pp. 35–6.
131. AHN Min. de Asuntos Exteriores (MAS) Relaciones Culturales (RC) (10) 3.04 54/1283 4th Centenary of Discovery of America; report from A. Baldesano y Topete, Spanish Consul in New York.
132. AHN Min. de Asuntos Exteriores (MAS) Relaciones Culturales (RC) (10) 3.04 54/1283 4th Centenary of Discovery of America; Proposal from J. Navarro, A. Baldesano y Topete & A. Cuyas, 10 May 1892
133. A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles' pp. 40–1.
134. Muñiz published the letter in which Ferrer de Couto set out this admonition in an editorial in his paper, *Las Novedades*, as part of a 'pamphlet war' with Ferrer de Couto's conservative *El Cronista*. Muñiz was particularly incensed by Ferrer de Couto's insinuation that liberalism equated to anti-colonialism and a lack of patriotism, and countered that Ferrer de Couto was dangerously Anti-American. The letter was published as part of Enrique Muñiz and José García's 26-page pamphlet published in June 1876, *Nuestra defensa. Contestación a los alevosos y embozados ataques que Don José Ferrer de Couto ha dirigido en "El Cronista" contra D. Enrique Muñiz y D. José G. García* (New York, 1876). Ferrer de Couto replied to this pamphlet with a 100-page booklet, *La Verdad*. On the conflict between the journalists and papers, see A.M. Varela-Lago 'Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles' pp. 43–6. The translation of Ferrer de Couto's words is also taken from her work, on p. 45.
135. M.P. Friedman (2007) 'Beyond "voting with the feet": Toward a conceptual history of 'America' in European migrant sending communities, 1860s to 1914' in *Journal of Social History* vol. 40.3, pp. 557–75.
136. A. Körner 'Barbarous America' in A. Körner, N. Miller, A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined* pp. 125; 150–2.
137. Due to its interest in textual, as well as pictorial and performative images of the USA in Spain, the book primarily focuses its attention on the production and reception of these images by literate Spaniards who comprised just 28.4% of the population in 1887 and 36.2% at the turn of the twentieth

century. 'Popular' images of the USA did of course exist, including the handful of *zarzuelas* and plays with North American themes, but these (and the reviews of them) generally came from the pens of professionals or other middle-class theatre-goers. A more systematic survey of working-class, non-literate Spanish imaginings of the United States awaits completion.

138. Cited in J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana en la Constitución Española de 1869* p. 43.
139. For example, Gumersindo de Azcárate's *El poder del jefe del estado en Francia, Inglaterra y los Estados Unidos* was first delivered as a lecture series at the ILE and was also serialised in the *Revista de España*.
140. See, for example: (1873) *Una sesión de la Tertulia Radical de Madrid. Sesión del 16 de enero de 1873* (Madrid: Imp. Teodoro Lucuix); (1872) *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda por Castro (Fernando), Bona, Torres-Aguilar, Sanromá, Acosta, Labra y Rodríguez (Gabriel)*, (Madrid: Sociedad Abolicionista Española).
141. W.C. Bryant II & T.G. Voss eds. (1992) *The Letters of William Cullen Bryant: 1865–1871* vol. 5 (New York: Fordham University Press) pp. 139–40.
142. See C.S. Grigas 'Mission to Spain'.
143. D.H. Doyle 'Widely noted and long remembered' p. 285. Prim ended Spanish participation in the French-led invasion when it was realized that they intended to impose a European monarch.
144. The US census of 1900 showed just 7050 Spaniards living in the US, principally in New York, Louisiana, California and Florida. See B. Sánchez-Alonso (2002) 'European Emigration in the Late Nineteenth Century: The Paradox of Spain' in *The Economic History Review* vol. 53.2 pp. 309–312 and R.A. Gomez (1962) 'Spanish immigration to the United States' in *The Americas* vol. 19.1 pp. 59–78.
145. Immigrant visions of America (north and south) circulated widely in Italy before and after the turn of the century, not least in novel form, most notably Edmondo De Amicis' *Sull'Oceano* (1889). Italian emigrant 'imaginaries' have also been subjected to much historiographical scrutiny. E. Franzina (1992) *L'immaginario degli emigranti. Miti e raffigurazioni dell'esperienza italiana all'estero fra due secoli* (Paese: Pagus) and idem. (1996) *Dall'Arcadia in America. Attività letteraria ed emigrazione transoceanica in Italia* (Turin: Fondazione Agnelli).
146. On the role of the telegraph in accelerating and commodifying the circulation of 'news' in the North American context, see M. Blondheim (1994) *News over the wires: The telegraph and the flow of public information in America 1844–1897* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). On competition between transatlantic cable companies, see G. Cookson

(1999) “Ruinous competition”: The French Atlantic Telegraph of 1869’ in *Entreprises et Histoire* v. 23.

147. M. Blondheim *News over the wires* p. vii.
148. On the press see D. Ortiz Jr. *Paper Liberals*.
149. On the translation and publication of US authors in 19th century Spain, see J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción*.
150. J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción* pp. 15–21.
151. J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción* p. 15.
152. J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción* p. 128.
153. J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción* pp. 151–179.
154. M. Cano y Cueto (1871) *Historias extraordinarias* (Seville: Eduardo Perié) p. 5; cited in J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción* p. 109.
155. M. Cano y Cueto *Historias extraordinarias* p. 5; cited in J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción* p. 109.
156. A. Körner ‘Barbarous America’ p. 145. See C. Baudelaire (C. Tacou & S. de la Rouchefoucauld, eds.) (1994) *Edgar Allan Poe: sa vie et ses ouvrages* (Paris: La Herne) p. 12.
157. T. Bayley Aldrich (1891) *La Reina de Saba* 2nd ed. (Valencia: Pascual Aguilar Editor) p. 5 (anonymous prologue); cited in J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria *Literatura en traducción* p. 17.
158. N. Miller ‘Conclusion’ p. 235.
159. Rafael María de Labra cited these sources in his works, *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* and *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*. Tocqueville’s classic work on *Democracy in America* had already been published in Spanish a handful of times, from 1836, but it was around the time of the September Revolution that it acquired particular popularity in Spain. See J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana en la Constitución Española de 1869* p. 44.
160. *La Epoca* 22 Nov. 1876.
161. R.M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 43.
162. *La Epoca* 26 July 1877; *El Imparcial* 29 July 1877.
163. See, for example: *El Imparcial* 5 May 1889; *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 8 May 1886; *La República* 8 May 1886.
164. *El Imparcial* 11 May 1886.
165. *El Socialista* 16 April 1886.
166. S. Kern (1983) *The culture of time and space 1880–1918* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson) pp. 212–3.
167. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 77–8.
168. *Blanco y Negro* 11 Feb. 1893. On the Spanish government’s preparation for its role as ‘guest of honour, see: AHN MAS RC (10) 3.04 54/1284.
169. C. Arenal (1989 f. 1870/1883) *La Mujer del Porvenir. La Mujer de su Casa.* (Barcelona: Ediciones Orbis) pp. 150–1; E. Pardo Bazán *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* Feb. 1893; *La Ilustración de la Mujer* 15 April 1884.

170. M. Blondheim *News over the wires*.
171. Speech given by G. Rodríguez 'La abolición de la esclavitud en los Estados Unidos', published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* pp. 17–20.
172. R.M de Labra (1877) *El Derecho Internacional. Los Estados Unidos de América* (Madrid: Administración de *El Abolicionista*) pp. 9–10.
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174. *La Epoca* 2 Jan. 1873 'La Nación Española á su parlamento'.
175. A. de Tocqueville (B. Frohnen ed.) (2002) *Democracy in America* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc.) p.12.
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177. *El Pensamiento español* 6 Sept. 1862; cited and translated in: D. Jordan & E. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War* p. 252.
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A Model Republic? The United States, the Constitutional Question and Political Practice in Spain

Without doubt, the image of the United States that predominated in late nineteenth-century Spain was that of the modern republic. Indeed, *república-modelo* was very often used by Spanish writers as a shorthand to denote the USA, deployed with admiring intent by those who prized and promoted its example, and with denigrating sarcasm by the critics who failed to identify it as a positive exemplar of anything other than the dangers and perversions of modernity. The United States' republican constitution and democratic traditions and practices lay at the core of Spaniards' understanding of what the country represented, its modernity and—depending on one's perspective—its successes or its shortcomings. Much of Spanish discourse about the USA—whether ostensibly addressing the issue of slavery, the state of the economy or political developments—contained a subtext of promoting or discrediting the USA as a model republic and the applicability of its republican democracy to Spain. Spats in the Madrilenian press, for example, over the 1877 US railroad strikes or the Haymarket affair in Chicago in 1886 centred upon whether these should be interpreted as the USA's '1789', signalling the beginning of the end of the 'young republic', and thereby indicting the 'model-republic'.¹ In Spanish imaginings of the United States, it seemed, all roads led to the republic.

This chapter addresses the pervasive images of the USA as the epitome of a modern republic with the intent not to ascertain how truthful and exact these images may have been, but rather to explore how these images reflected domestic concerns in Spain and what they reveal about Spanish

self-analyses of its own political system and its place in the modern world. Nineteenth-century Spaniards were well versed in debating and experimenting with political models, changing constitutions seven times in the course of the century all the while (between 1812 and 1936) maintaining more years of representative constitutional government than any other country in continental Europe.² The debates on the political model of the United States fed into and reflected the broader search for a political settlement at home.

The political actors of the late nineteenth century, especially the reforming and radical liberals who sought the overthrow of the absolutist and restoration regimes, operated within deeply cosmopolitan networks with respect to the circulation and exchange of ideas and the search for domestic political solutions. Whilst there may have been broad agreement that the United States' brand of republicanism and democracy was important, there was little consensus as to how the founding documents, principles and practices of the United States should be understood, or what exactly was key to the seeming success of the USA's political system. One's understanding of what the US political model actually was depended on national and partisan concerns, which were both peculiar and contingent.

The federal republican model provided by the USA was not the only exemplar of republican virtues available to late nineteenth-century Spanish political elites preoccupied with constitutional and political reform. Political opinion in Spain was fractured into factions of conservative and liberal monarchists and democratic republicans, and within the republican camp divided further into groups advocating a federal republican model, those who insisted upon a centralised unitary republican system and others still who insisted that republican and democratic reform would be incomplete without a concurrent revolution in socio-economic structures and relations. In the minds of Spanish reformers, therefore, the republican model of the United States was one of many. As such, it competed for influence with the model and symbols of the French republican tradition, with the populist republicanism embodied by Giuseppe Garibaldi, with the Swiss example of cantonalist federalism, and even with Britain's increasingly democratic constitutional monarchy. While most Spanish republicans looked to a variety of models and exemplars of modern republics and republicans in making their case for a Spanish republic, the constitutional model provided by the USA remained important particularly among prominent progressive liberals and radicals, especially and, unsurprisingly,

for Spanish federalists. The grass-roots of the republican movement, people who frequented the republican cafés, clubs and casinos found in many Spanish provincial centres and *pueblos*, especially in Andalusia, Catalonia and the Levante, were drawn as much to populist international symbols of republicanism offered by the French revolutionary experience and by Garibaldi as they were to images of Washington, Lincoln and other ciphers of North American republicanism.

This chapter traces the trajectory of the North American republican model in late nineteenth-century Spain, recognising its status as a contested and competing national constitutional model and set of symbols. Of course, the ways in which the American republic was imagined varied in accordance with changes in the contemporary political landscape, and different aspects of its republican and democratic model were highlighted at different times and by different groups and individuals. Nevertheless, the continuity in Spanish interest in the USA's particular brand of republicanism is striking, from the heady days of revolution and popular sovereignty of the democratic *sexenio* through to the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy to the Spanish throne and establishment of the undemocratic yet stable political system of *turnismo* that characterised the final quarter of the century.

The following section explores the roles played by transnational political models in framing national debates about domestic conditions and how best to approach a modern future in Spain, locating the place occupied by the political model of the United States as an exemplary republic within these networks and debates. The second section focuses on the creation and deployment of images of institutional republicanism and democracy according to Spanish readings of the founding documents of the United States, particularly its constitution. Spanish observers of the US republic did not always concur as to what the vital ingredient(s) of the 'young republic' actually was or were. A third section examines the different aspects of the US political system emphasised by Spanish politicians and writers as key to understanding its success (or otherwise) and its relevance as a political model. Here, the focus on the decentralised federal nature of American institutions, on an abstract notion of Anglo-Saxon liberty or on the vibrancy of its civil society, especially at a municipal level, fed from and into domestic concerns about how a modern political system could be fashioned or perfected at home. The final section reminds us that the USA presented a highly contested political model to outside observers; aspects of its political system and history were imagined negatively and could be

held up as evidence, not of a model worthy of emulation, but of precisely what Spain should not aspire to. The American Civil War (1861–65) and later scandals of political corruption seemed to mark the US republic as barbaric.³ The bloody ‘test’ of the American Civil War, which had threatened the very existence of the US republic, is a constant presence through the chapter: praise for US political institutions and values had to be reconciled with the knowledge of the violent Civil War and could be seized as evidence of its anti-model, rather than model, status. So too with news of the political corruption scandals that dogged America’s ‘Gilded Age’ after the war’s end. Civil war and political corruption signalled the limits of imaginaries of the United States as a model republic. In the end, even for those Spanish republicans who loudly proclaimed their admiration of the USA’s political apparatus and foundational principles, with one or two exceptions the ‘model-republic’ functioned not as a universal blueprint for modern politics but as a repository of republican and democratic experience that could be mined for evidence of how these did and could work *in praxis*.

SPANISH REPUBLICANS AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL NETWORKS AND MODELS

Within Spain, republicanism remained a constant, if highly fractious, political current throughout both the democratic *sexenio* (the period of political turbulence from 1868 to 1874/75, which included, for eleven months of 1873, the First Republic) and the period of renewed monarchical rule from 1875 known as the Restoration. The development of parliamentary political parties in Spain over the course of the nineteenth century involved a complicated process of jostling factionalism, as groups continually splintered, merged and forged new alliances. Of course, Spaniards who upheld republican ideals did not necessarily agree as to how state and society ought otherwise to function politically, socially and economically. Spanish republicans could also be liberal (either relatively moderate or more radical), socialist or anarchist. Beyond broad agreement on principles in support of democracy and against monarchy, clericalism and military involvement in politics, there existed little consensus among Spanish republicans as to how a future republic ought to look and act. The fractures of the Spanish republican ‘movement’ were neatly outlined by Gumersindo de Azcárate in his anonymously written memoir of the revo-

lutionary *sexenio*, published in 1876. In this memoir, he declared himself a supporter,

not of the individualistic, narrow, and senseless Republic of those who, paying pagan worship to mere form, imagine that they have everything when they have that kind of Republic; nor the revolutionary and disorganising Republic of those who are trying to revive the class struggle and solve in one day delicate questions which demand deliberation and maturity of judgement; but the Republic that is at once reformist and conservative.⁴

Moderate⁵ republicans like the democrat Emilio Castelar championed the classic liberal tenet of the freedom of labour as the fundamental basis for societal harmony and state intervention in the economy as its enemy. Whilst acknowledging the disharmonious relationship between capital and labour and supporting workers' right to associate, Castelar was no advocate of state-led redistribution of wealth, let alone social revolution. Instead, he looked forward to a time when, with the monarch's and monopolistic oligarchs' political and economic power removed, individual citizens of the future republic would be free to seek their fortunes unhindered, with equality of opportunity.⁶ More radical republicans could be distinguished from 'individual democrats' like Castelar and from one another by their attitudes to social reform. Francisco Pi y Margall, one of the most tenacious advocates of federalism in Spain and leader of the Federal Republican Party (f. 1868 as a splinter of the Democratic Party), recognised the need to address the 'social question' and to redistribute land and wealth to the propertyless classes in order to 'universalise' the bourgeois revolution. However, though he was later considered a father of Spanish anarchism for his promotion of Proudhon, Pi was not remotely as radical or revolutionary as the Bakuninite anarchist Anselmo Lorenzo and fellow members of the Spanish branch of the First International, established in the wake of the September revolution, demanded.⁷ Nor did the Internationalists share the Federal Republicans' faith in non-violent and state-mediated methods of bringing about societal change. When in May 1870 the federalist Fernando Garrido criticised worker abstention from the political process, Lorenzo and his *La Solidaridad* colleagues retorted:

We are convinced that the federal Republic and all these liberties, which are called political, are insufficient to realise the social reforms, which we support. [...] Us workers should today do nothing but organise and spread the principles of The International.⁸

Two other contemporary political currents deserve mention here for their ambivalence towards the republican ideal. At the moderate end of the progressive-liberal-democratic spectrum was the highly influential group of Spanish Krausists, followers of the ideas of the German theorist, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. Krausism was an offshoot of liberal political thought concerned above all with creating societal harmony through public education, associationalism and other measures that would allow individuals to find their appropriate place within a natural social hierarchy. Most Krausists were also republicans: Krausist Nicolás Salmerón, for example, became the republic's third president and after a period of brief exile in Paris following the Bourbon Restoration, remained an active advocate of republicanism. However, the ordered, utopian vision of society augured by Krausists precluded neither republicanism nor monarchism. Some Krausists who were professed republicans, including Gumersindo de Azcárate and Rafael María de Labra, nevertheless expressed admiration for the model of constitutional monarchy exemplified by Great Britain.⁹ Advocates of democracy and universal suffrage, their belief in a hierarchical social order led them to support a more conservative-liberal republic than the type envisaged by Pi or Garrido: 'the Republic that is at once reformist and conservative', in the words of Gumersindo de Azcárate.¹⁰

Towards the other end of the progressive-liberal-democratic spectrum, Ruiz Zorrilla's Radical Democratic Party emerged from the splintering in 1871 of the Progressive Party following the assassination of General Juan Prim, the leader of the *pronunciamiento* that heralded the September revolution. At the outset, Zorrilla's radicals resembled Pi's Federal Republican Party in all but its adherence to the republican ideal. The radicals supported social reform, free trade, universal male suffrage and the separation of state and church and opposed the *quinta* [draft] and *consumos* [indirect taxes].¹¹ In contrast to the federalists, however, they argued that Spain was not yet ready for a republic. The experience of the *sexenio*'s brief monarchical experiment, however, signalled an about-face for the radicals. Despite having been an advocate and counsellor of the imported Savoyard monarch Amadeo during his short reign, following his abdication Zorrilla morphed into a rallying figure for Spanish republicanism, becoming a leading conspirator for the return of the republic from exile in Paris until shortly before his death in 1895.

Republicanism appealed to significant sections of the Spanish urban bourgeoisie and lower-middle classes and drew support from workers and artisans in many provincial *pueblos*.¹² Even before the 1868 'Glorious'

Revolution and the (temporary) arrival of male universal suffrage in its wake, the Spanish population had become 'politicised' in the sense of being exposed to modern 'mass politics' and presented with the opportunity (for men, principally) to engage with political debate and join political networks that operated both formally and informally.¹³ Members of republican clubs and *tertulias* often met (as had the secret *Carbonari* societies and networks of the 1850s) in cafés and taverns in cities and provincial towns. Spaces conducive to republican political sociability also included workshops, night schools and centres for worker education, mutual-aid societies and co-operatives as well as, of course, the streets, where public demonstrations and street parties took place and, at particularly fractious times, barricades were erected.¹⁴

Popular republicanism found expression in locally produced and distributed newspapers and pamphlets, in *coplas* and popular songs—above all the *Himno de Riego* in ode to the Liberal Triennium (1820–23)—sung in neighbourhoods and in theatres and in the waving and wearing of flags and symbolic items of clothing, such as Phrygian caps, Garibaldian shirts and clothing decorated with the initials R.F. to denote *República Federal*.¹⁵ Popular republicanism included support for Pi's brand of federal republicanism and social reform—in mayoral elections in 1868, candidates from the Federal Republican Party won in 20 provincial capitals including Barcelona and Seville, although throughout the *sexenio* the party never rose above 15% of *Cortes* deputies—but also tended towards the anarchical, as the disintegration of the First Republic into cantons during the summer of 1873 demonstrated.¹⁶ Without underestimating the mobilising capacity of republicanism in this period, the factional, fluid and often contradictory nature of the distinct ideologies and programmes that sheltered under the republican umbrella during the *sexenio* contributed heavily to the failure of Spain's first practical experience of republicanism after less than a year in existence.¹⁷ Republican pluralism continued after the Restoration, but the ideal of a representative, secular and reforming republic, which would restore popular sovereignty, formed the cornerstone of the utopian hopes for a significant section of both the working class and the urban bourgeoisie.¹⁸

The political 'model' provided by the United States and its brand of federal republicanism was, of course, not the only repository of republican virtues available to Spaniards concerned about constitutional and political reform at home. European liberal and democratic-minded reformers and revolutionaries 'drew on a common pool of [...] social and politi-

cal thought', corresponded with their counterparts in other countries, visited them and sometimes directly intervened and participated in their struggles.¹⁹ The experience of political exile following the European revolutionary waves of 1820–21 and 1848, and the defeat of Spanish liberal experiments in the 1820s, 1830s and 1850s, which brought together small communities of European democrats in Paris, Brussels, London and even New York, assisted the transfer of ideas and practices between national movements and individuals.²⁰ The links between nineteenth-century Italian and Spanish democrats, for example, is well documented. Spain proved a 'short-lived' exile destination for Italians and other Europeans who fled failed revolutions and constitutional experiments for the 'utopia' of the Liberal Triennium (1820–23).²¹ Later, important Spanish progressives, democrats and radicals, including Emilio Castelar, Francisco Pi y Margall, Fernando Garrido and José María Orense shared ideas, experiences and methods with Italian Risorgimento leaders, including the two 'Josés', Mazzini and Garibaldi.²² Mazzini had already admired the 'perfect' liberal *pronunciamiento* and guerrilla bands of 1820s Spain, but it was during the 1850s and 1860s, following the failure of the 1848 European revolutions, that the Spanish and Italian republican and nationalist movements particularly converged: the Spanish Democrat Party, founded in April 1849, aspired in its programme and tactics to be a Mazzinian 'party of action'.²³ Spanish *Carbonari* and insurrectionists drew inspiration from the Young Italy movement and Garibaldi's redshirted volunteers in successive uprisings, most notably in Loja in 1861;²⁴ indeed, several travelled to the Italian peninsula to fight in the wars of unification.²⁵ For their part, many Italian Risorgimento exiles spent the mid century fighting for national independence and liberal revolutions in Spain, Spanish America and Greece.²⁶ The interconnectedness of the political thinkers, agitators and fighters opposed to absolutist and restoration power in Europe, despite the often disparate and conflicting creeds they professed, make it possible to speak of a nineteenth-century 'liberal international'.²⁷

Popular expressions of republicanism also drew on an international vocabulary and world of signs. Phrygian caps, habitually worn by Marianne, adorned the US national seal and featured in Washington Irving's (1819) *Rip van Winkle*, whose eponymous protagonist awakes to find be-capped Americans celebrating their new republic. The French republican, Eliás Reclus, toured Spain with Fernando Garrido in the days following the September revolution when, in the absence of a monarch on the Spanish throne, numerous towns and villages declared themselves 'for the repub-

lic'.²⁸ In Barcelona he noted the singing of the 'hymn of Garibaldi' and in San Felíu de Guíxols, the young republicans who came out to accompany Garrido and Reclus on their entrance into the village wore 'Garibaldian shirts' and republican caps, waving red republican flags and torches.²⁹ In Valencia he heard shouts of 'Long live the French Republic' to accompany the ubiquitous *vivas* 'to the federal Republic' and everywhere the *Himno de Riego*, the Spanish republican anthem that recalled the leader of the 1820 liberal *pronunciamiento* and had undertones of the *Marseillaise*.³⁰ In Llagostera, 'the walls of the Casino were decorated with portraits of Garibaldi, Lincoln, Orsini, and the famous *Tabla sinóptica de los derechos y deberes del ciudadano*' whilst on their arrival in Palamós, on the Catalan coast, Garrido and Reclus were greeted by 'a crowd that crossed our path waving two flags in the wind that obliged us to bow respectfully: that of Spain and of the United States'. The two flags, 'symbol of the Alliance between the United States and Europe' (an alliance that would have surprised many in government, given the habitually frosty relations between the two countries over the issue of Cuba), were planted in the ground and the *Himno de Riego* was played.³¹

Both Lincoln and Garibaldi were imagined as republican exemplars, the distinctions between them blurred by the projection of similarly romantic life narratives. Garibaldi had achieved—and cultivated—iconic status as an international champion of republicanism and nationalism since his exploits on behalf of Latin American independence movements and, especially, thanks to his contributions to the 1848–49 revolutions in Rome and Venice and, in the 1860s, to the unification of Italy. His potency as a romantic political hero and populist republican symbol was strong in Spain as it was throughout Europe and the Americas.³² Biographies and historic novels of the Italian military leader were published in Spain, democratic newspapers advertised special offers for his lithograph portrait and he had provided the inspiration (and projected leadership) for a planned uprising of 'Garibaldinos' in Andalusia in 1863–64, including the insurgents' choice of dress and style of facial hair. He was again adopted as a figurehead by cantonalists during the 1873 uprising.³³

Like Garibaldi, only more so, Lincoln was a 'global figure' onto whose image contemporaries and subsequent generations projected their particular concerns and agendas.³⁴ The sixteenth president of the United States was variously and at once: the man of humble origins who rose to be leader of a powerful nation; the great emancipator of slaves; the near-destroyer and/or saviour of the Union. Biographies of Lincoln pro-

duced in Spain (including those by Emilio Castelar and Rafael de Labra) told a narrative of simple rural beginnings, via self-education and hard work, moral and religious conviction, to measured but determined statesman, ending in secular martyrdom. As Carolyn Boyd has shown, Spanish republicans, many of whom were also abolitionists and most of whom were federalists, tended to construct an image of Lincoln as emancipator and interpreted the Civil War as a war of just cause—the emancipation from slavery—brushing over or ignoring Lincoln's centralist refusal to countenance the Confederacy's 'right' to self-determine secession from the Union. In this reading, Lincoln became (in Castelar's words) the sanctifier of the republic; the abolition of slavery effectively removed any war-related sticking point from the USA's status as model-republic.³⁵

The supporters of the First Spanish Republic insisted on emblems that related to the 'national historical reality' all the while entangling transnational republican symbols and reference points.³⁶ This was not because Spanish republicans lacked historical symbols of their own in which to invest new meaning in and after 1868. As Reclus discovered on his tour of Spanish provinces in the grip of glorious revolutionary fervour, portraits of Sixto Cámara and copies of the 1812 Cádiz Constitution adorned the walls of republican clubs alongside images of Lincoln, Garibaldi and Marianne. The notes of the *Marseillaise* were played alongside those of the home-grown *Himno de Riego*, whilst the Spanish republican flag and American stars and stripes were held aloft together. Individuals, documents, allegorical figures and so on associated with liberalism and revolution in different national contexts, including their own, were lauded by Spanish republicans precisely because they considered these to be transnational, that is transcendental of the nation. Spanish republicans identified common cause and experience with liberal and national independence struggles across Europe and the Americas.

In addition to the claiming of republican figureheads and symbols from different national contexts as fundamentally transnational, the political 'capital' of different national republican experiences to act as exemplars or models worth celebrating and emulating changed over time as their perceived value and relevance evolved according to domestic circumstances in Spain. By the time of the 1868 revolution, the model of the US republic was in ascendance. The symbolic potency of French republicanism persisted in revolutionary Spain, as Reclus' observations testify, but the credibility of France's unitary republicanism as a model for liberal Spaniards was severely curtailed by the 1870s as they looked back on the

vacillations of the early and mid century and witnessed the brutal suppression of the Paris Commune. The centralism of Thiers' Third Republic (1871–73) also jarred with the preference of most Spanish republicans for a decentralised federal system of rule. The cantonal republicanism of Switzerland was deemed too particular to its context to have a wider application. The example set by Italian republicans and the newly unified kingdom of Italy, so important during the years of Fernandian absolutism and Isabelline rule, did still have popular currency among radical Spaniards during the *sexenio democrático*. Mazzini and Garibaldi wrote to congratulate Garrido and Castelar following the 'Glorious Revolution' to express their optimism at the prospect of a republican Spain; returning the favour, the federalist republicans of Andalusia adopted Garibaldi as their figurehead in the cantonalist uprising of the summer of 1874 against that Spanish republic.³⁷ The far less radical Emilio Castelar was inspired both by Garibaldi's 1867 Congress of Peace and Freedom and the excitement of the September revolution, Europe's first successful revolution for twenty years, to propose a republican Latin Union, led by Spain and encompassing France, Italy and Portugal.³⁸ However, there was a clear divergence between the Spanish and Italian routes to modern nation-statehood, which made it difficult for Spain's new liberal leaders to continue to take their cues from the Italian republican tradition. The decision of the Spanish Constituent Assembly in June 1869 to reinstate the monarchy (albeit of a different dynastic house) as Spanish head of state—voted for by 181 deputies in contrast to 68 in favour of a federal republic—disappointed Mazzini and Garibaldi and diminished their ability to act as political guides for the *sexenio* politicians. General Prim's introduction of Amadeo of the House of Savoy as Spain's new king only compounded the opening gulf between Italian and Spanish radical liberalism.³⁹ Instead, it was the republic across the Atlantic, with its federalist system and one century of experience of republicanism in practice, that was now 'indispensable' to the Spanish liberals.⁴⁰

THE NORTH AMERICAN 'MODEL' AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

Following the September revolution, the most crucial question to be resolved remained that of the constitution. Nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism was characterized by its utopian vision of the constitution as a

panacea: the idea that lasting political and social change could be wrought, as Marx put it, 'by one stroke of the pen'.⁴¹ Despite or perhaps because of the drafting of seven constitutions in one century, the utopian faith placed in the principle of constituent power by Spanish liberals served as something of an exemplar for contemporary European constitutionalists. Two constitutions—those of 1869 and 1876—bookended the Spanish *sexenio revolucionario*, both monarchical. A new constituent assembly was established following the advent of the First Republic in February 1873 to draw up its founding document and determine its form of republic but the First Republic did not endure long enough for a republican constitution to be ratified. Whilst the revolutionary *sexenio* politicians looked to their own constitutional tradition in drafting these documents, they also looked to a much more enduring constitution (in reality a set of disparate documents): that of the US republic. Spain's 1869 Constitution in particular owed much to the US Constitution.

The political workings of the United States were familiar to Spanish radicals. Many of the leaders and new deputies of the *sexenio democrático* had visited the USA—both General Domingo Dulce and General Prim spent time in the United States. Prim, who visited New York and Washington on his return to Spain from Mexico in 1862, met with Abraham Lincoln during his stay in Washington and recorded the deep impression this visit made upon him.⁴² In the absence of personal experience, Spain's new rulers could better acquaint themselves with the American political system via the numerous books and pamphlets being published on the US Constitution and democratic system. The translated editions of classic foreign works on the USA by Alexis de Tocqueville and Édouard Laboulaye were either published in Spanish for the first time or republished with increasing popularity during the late 1860s.⁴³ Works of North American history and the US Constitution translated into Spanish increasingly filled bookshelves and journals, including the *Revista de España*.⁴⁴ The new journals and newspapers, flourishing under the relaxation of censorship that accompanied the September revolution, also demonstrated their close acquaintance with the United States' brand of republicanism. Luis Rivera, director of the nascent satirical journal *Gil Blas* and republican candidate in the 1869 Constituent Assembly elections, shortly before the polls declared himself for 'a republic like that of the United States', which he considered more appropriate to the 'traditions, history [and] customs of Spain' than the Swiss federal model.⁴⁵

The publication of such works was not just the result of happy coincidence; in 1868 a new translation of the US Constitution was published, directed particularly at the nation's 'youth', with the express purpose of disseminating information and ideas 'indispensable [to] the period which we are going through'.⁴⁶ The translation of the Constitution and accompanying notes were written by Agustín Santayana, one-time colonial governor in the Philippines and father of the future American philosopher, George Santayana. (Agustín Santayana moved with his son from Madrid to Boston to join his family in 1872, returning alone after a few short months.)⁴⁷ Santayana believed that study of the American political system in Spain had been hindered because 'knowledge [of its Constitution] has only been spread imperfectly, and through the intermission of its adversaries'. Current events, in particular the upcoming 'general election and the absolute freedom of the people's representatives to establish the form of Government that their expertise and patriotism deem most adequate for the Spanish Nation' rendered essential a better understanding and 'keeping in mind' of 'the principles on which the great contemporary republic is based'.⁴⁸

It was the advent of the September revolution that had convinced Santayana that the time was propitious to circulate the text of the US Constitution in translation, but the ending of the democratic *sexenio*, with the liberals' failure to make their modernising reforms last now apparent, also proved a prompt to publish on the North American democracy. First published in 1876 and reprinted in 1880, the liberal *Nueva Prensa* published an account of the 'truly free' *Los Pueblos Jóvenes*—the United States and Australia—that in its later edition included a full translation of the US Constitution.⁴⁹ Like Santayana, the *Nueva Prensa*'s motivation was didactic but the tone of its mission statement was somewhat gloomier.

[To show] how firm and productive are the steps made on the path of progress by peoples who in their tradition do not have clouds darkening their intelligence and obstacles inhibiting their free will, or hallucinations forcing or rushing them, such is the work we set out, with the intention to contribute with our limited power to the regeneration of our *patria*, since ancient times lost on paths that distance her from her happiness, and presently fought over and overcome in its interior by the noble desire to find a way to restore and rebuild her past and her present as a secure and indispensable basis for a blessed future.

Accept, then, our work with kindness, thanks to the goodwill of its purpose and the rectitude of the intentions guiding us, which lovers of the well-

being of our *patria* search for with effort, which is neither exhausted nor defeated by obstacles and setbacks, and [sought] on the paths of political liberty and dignity of man, the solution to problems painfully taking up the attention and absorbing the activity of Spanish political society. [...] This is also a free, energetic, although for now useless, protest against the infantile and irrational determination to stifle the free expression of thought in the final years of the nineteenth century.⁵⁰

The influence of what the Restoration leader Antonio Cánovas called ‘that famous democracy’ was not only felt in terms of its usefulness as a reference point for debates in the Madrilénian press. The language, ideals and political principles that shaped the North American republic were appropriated by Spanish reformers in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution as they moulded the constitutional and political arrangements of the new, liberal, modern Spain. Political ideals and values derived from the United States pervaded the political culture of the revolutionary *sexenio* and helped shape many of its new institutions including its Constitution, Senate, judicial system and militia. The degree of familiarity felt by the *sexenio* politicians with the constitutional arrangements and political machinations of the USA was reflected in the frequency with which events there were cited in *Cortes* debates, even those ostensibly unrelated to relations with the USA, by all sides of the house. As the Carlist deputy Vicente Manterola acidly observed to his fellow Constituent Assembly deputies in 1869, ‘since you so frequently call to mind the United States [...] in many of your discourses’, the political system of the United States had become something of a benchmark for the Spanish constitution writers.⁵¹

Few argued for the wholesale adoption of the US republican model. When the republican deputy to the Constituent *Cortes*, Manuel Palanca, declared that the preamble to the 1869 Constitution ‘is so similar that it could almost be said that it is a translation of the United States’ Constitution’ and that his only reservation was that their new constitution didn’t copy that of the United States entirely word for word, he was upbraided by fellow deputy Cirilo Álvarez Martínez, the former justice minister in Leopoldo O’Donnell’s Liberal Union government of 1856. Álvarez lamented the ‘servile’ imitation of what he conceded were ‘good models’, declaring:

I do not know why what is in the Constitution of the United States, which can be excellent for that country, and what is in the work of the French

Constituent Assembly and which is not Spain's own, should be brought here. What we need is a constitution that responds to our past, that gives guarantees to our present to strengthen us, and that, looking to the future, will make the realisation of our aspirations more likely.⁵²

For Álvarez, Spanish national traditions were being eroded and undermined by this borrowing from 'foreign' constitutions. Spain's *pasado* and *porvenir*, its 'spaces of experience' and 'horizons of expectations' in the language of Reinhard Koselleck, were, he insisted, so different to those of the United States and even to those of France as to render their constitutional models of little use to the Spanish constitution writers.⁵³

Palanca and Álvarez represented polar ends of the spectrum when it came to adopting 'foreign' constitutional models; most of the new political and intellectual elites who enjoyed positions of influence during the revolutionary *sexenio* occupied the middle ground and tended towards a broadly positive view of the US political system. Guided by their Spanish concerns, they noted, discussed and sometimes appropriated those aspects of the US Constitution that appeared most relevant to the national context. In so doing, they often conflated its various founding documents and evolving amendments. The aspects of the US political system that they chose to highlight because they seemed relevant to contemporary Spanish concerns—the championing and primacy of individual 'inalienable' rights, democratic practice, liberty, and, above all, federalism—were then presumed to characterise the US constitutional model in its entirety.

A central tenet of Spanish imaginings of the American system of government was the association made between the US Constitution and the natural or 'inalienable' rights of man. The constitution writers of 1869 embraced the concept of inalienable rights and placed it the heart of their founding document. As Oltra observed, the Spanish Constitution of 1869 copied, almost literally, the entire preamble of the US document and took its lead from the USA in preserving the inalienable rights—translated into Spanish as *los derechos ilegislables*—of Spanish citizens.⁵⁴ The first article of the 1869 Constitution granted Spaniards, for the first time, their rights as individuals to associate, assemble, petition, practice religion (or not) and to publish (and from 1873, for Spanish males, to vote). The 1869 constitution writers' belief that government's foremost duty was the protection of individual rights indicates a rejection of a Rousseauian or Hobbesian contract as the fundamental basis of social relations and the right to rule.

Instead, the primacy—and inalienability—of the individual's rights *before law* was borrowed directly from the American tradition. As the veteran federalist republican and now Constituent Assembly deputy (until that assembly plumped for the monarchy), José María Orense, noted in his declaration to the *Cortes*, the United States furnished not only the abstract concept but also the evidence needed of the practicability of the theoretical ideal of inalienable rights. 'These rights are called inalienable', Orense explained, and continued:

Well, then, the Constitution of the United States says [that] if the Chamber acts against individual rights, this is not law, because the citizen that has to suffer as a result would resort to the right of appeal and the matter is closed.

Sr. Alvarez [his opponent in debate] should see that it is not only a practical theory, but a natural one. But the Honourable Gentleman told us "How! It's an absurdity!" In the end, listening to the Honourable Gentleman it appeared that we proposed and explained something that has never been seen in practice [...] The Honourable Gentleman does not understand the inalienable rights such as they are practiced in the great republic of the United States.⁵⁵

Thus, the debt owed by the 1869 Spanish constitution writers to the founding documents and practical example set by the US republic was openly acknowledged. Whilst many of the *sexenio* reforms safeguarding individual rights and suffrage were dismantled following the Restoration, the language of 'self-government' and 'inalienable rights' did not simply disappear. Pi y Margall in his 1877 defence of federalism, *Las Nacionalidades*, continued to advocate the entrusting of individual rights to federal government, given that such rights existed 'prior and superior to all written law, and consequentially out of reach of all powers'.⁵⁶ It was the duty of central government within a federal system to guarantee (and not merely, as he warned, to provide the conditions for) individual rights, 'thus I prefer on this, as on many other issues, the Constitution of the United States'.⁵⁷ The debates of the revolutionary *sexenio* firmly planted 'inalienable rights' and 'self-government' in the liberal-political dictionary; the terms, apparently untranslatable at mid century, were now rendered easily into Spanish as *los derechos ilegislables* without further explanation or considered 'a well-known thing' in the original.⁵⁸

The notion of 'self-government' may have cemented itself in the political lexicon but, of course, this does not mean it was ever a political reality.

Quite apart from the continued electoral and political corruption and low voter turnout of Spanish democratic practice, the Spanish Constitution of 1869 did not entrust sovereignty to the ‘people’. Palanca’s observation that the Constitution’s preamble mimicked that of the US Constitution so closely it might have been lifted word for word is deceptive insofar as it overlooks significant differences between the two constitutions and appears to ignore the influence of long-standing, home-grown liberal values in Spain since 1812. The US Constitution begins, of course, with ‘We the people...’, enshrining the notion of popular sovereignty; in the Spanish document sovereignty was entrusted not to the people but to the Spanish nation.⁵⁹ Nor did the Spanish Constitution provide easily for the addition of amendments, perhaps a reflection of the idea that if the constitution was to be a panacea, it could hardly be an evolving document in need of further perfecting. Moreover, the crucial difference between the two constitutions was that Spain’s was monarchical. Following from that, the 1869 Constitution lacked one of the crucial checks on executive power provided by the North American document, that of impeachment: this perhaps helps explain the number of newspaper inches in the Spanish press expressing amazement and admiration at the trial in office of President Andrew Johnson or the ‘harmonious and peaceable’ disbanding of the armies at the end of the US Civil War. That the head of state could be impeached without violence or military intervention or that soldiers could seamlessly return to civilian life without ‘the slightest turmoil’ might be—in the words of one satirical journal—‘perfectly logical’ in the USA but was unthinkable in ‘this land of black sheep’ where armed militias formed and disbanded with each change of government and the intervention of the army in politics was so commonplace it had become a ritualised mechanism for changing the political guard.⁶⁰ military *pronunciamientos* brought both the revolutionary *sexenio* into being in 1868 and the First Republic to an end in 1874.⁶¹

In its enshrining of national rather than popular sovereignty, the 1869 Constitution revealed its roots in the founding moment and document of modern liberalism in Spain—and the event from which the term ‘liberal’ in its modern political sense originates—the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz. The constitutional arrangements put forward in 1812, like those of 1869, included the defence of national sovereignty, the separation of powers and election on the basis of universal male suffrage as well as acceptance of the monarchy and of Catholicism as the official religion of Spain. National political traditions were hardly brushed aside during the *sexenio*—whatever

Álvarez's fears—in favour of the wholesale adoption of the USA's constitutional model. Instead, domestic political values and traditions were blended with ideas and concepts from outside, where these were seen to have been proven in practice.

The First Spanish Republic became political reality in February 1873, effectively by default, upon the abdication of the imported King Amadeo who had had his fill of the 'continuous strife' of *sexenio* politics. To the surprise of many Spaniards, republicans included, as well as international observers, Spain became the 'youngest' modern republic and so opened a discourse of mutual respect with the 'first' and 'greatest' contemporary republic. The US government had been the first to acknowledge the legitimacy of the provisional government following the September revolution, and was again the first to recognise the new republic. The official ceremony of recognition, which took place in the *Presidencia del Poder Ejecutivo* on 15 February 1873, sought to underline the historic links that 'unite Spain with the American people' as well as the novel ties of shared liberalism, democracy and republicanism that would now 'consolidate the triumph of the Republic'.⁶² On behalf of the US government, its ambassador, the 'illustrious' Sickles—not the epithet he was usually assigned by the Spanish press given his attitude towards Cuban independence—declared that,

The United States of America, which occupies a considerable part of the continent consecrated to civilization by the valour and faith of Spain, cannot but contemplate with emotion and sympathy the conversion into a Republic of the empire of Ferdinand and Isabel. The American people, convinced by the constant practice of free institutions during the past century, of the immense efficacy of these in promoting the progress of nations, sees with deep satisfaction that Spain has found in its example the way of laying down her prosperity and power on its solid foundations.⁶³

Even if the self-projection of America as the world leader and exemplar *sin qua non* in modern democracy as a systematic policy of state was only in its infancy, there were evidently plenty of American individuals who were more than willing to promote this image abroad. In his reply, the newly installed first President of the First Republic, Estanislao Figueras, reciprocated with his acknowledgement of the mutual debt 'between Spain, which by her efforts brought there the beginnings of civilization and America, which by her example brings the fruits of liberty and democracy here'.⁶⁴

Whilst the US population owed the Spanish a debt of gratitude ‘because it was discovered by the audacity of our navigators, subjected by the effort of our heroes, converted to the faith by our missionaries’, in recompense the Spanish reformers currently seeking to resolve ‘the difficult problem of uniting democracy with liberty’ were indebted to:

the sublime pilgrims, to those who founded your institutions [which] have united in perfect equilibrium social authority and natural rights, the turbulent life of democracies and the perfect stability of powers, the expansion of all the aspirations of the human spirit and the respect for interests and the law.⁶⁵

Thus the transatlantic transfer of ideas and practices was painted as the repayment of a favour: Spain had exported ‘civilisation’ to the Americas and would now import from there democratic and liberal principles in practice.

Such sentiment of mutual exchange and influence, though it seems to neglect national liberal traditions, may well have reflected Figueras’ genuine interpretation of the nature of Spanish republicanism and of the relationship between Spain and the United States. It was also proclaimed with a *realpolitik* eye on events in the Spanish colony of Cuba. The advent of the First Republic in Madrid had also marked a change of policy in Havana, where the insurrectionist war continued. The republic appointed a new captain-general, Pieltain, who pursued a policy of rapprochement with Cuban creoles, extending the archetypal liberal freedoms of the press and the right to associate in an effort to capture support away from the Spanish party. Federal republican clubs were established in Havana.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, these measures fell short of the far-reaching colonial reforms demanded. Government intention firmly remained to maintain Spanish sovereignty in Cuba. Indeed, reference was made to the island in Figueras’ speech to the US ambassador. ‘In the New World we have a considerable and integral part of our national territory under the Spanish flag’, Figueras reminded Sickles, which he augured would facilitate communications and understanding between the two republics. Aware, of course, of the gap between this ideal and the reality of the Cuban war of independence and of US sympathy with (and designs upon) Cuba, Figueras asserted that in order to achieve this ‘civilising end’, they would need to count upon ‘the energy of all Spaniards, the virtue of the new institutions, the fruit that the forgetting of old mistakes should bring forth and the public opinion of the

United States, which exercises such, and so justified, a moral influence on the whole American continent'.⁶⁷ However, if the new leadership thought that the advent of the Spanish republic would persuade the US government and 'public opinion' to drop their support for Cuban independence (and annexation) they were to be disappointed.

Despite Spanish republicans' efforts and Ambassador Sickles' expectation that the Republic would be assured a 'glorious destiny', the First Republic lasted just eleven months. Having inherited an almost bankrupt state and fighting war on two fronts (in Cuba and, on the peninsular, against the Carlists), the new republican leaders of Spain, who of course were themselves split between unitarians and federalists, also faced fierce opposition, seemingly from all quarters: from conservative monarchists (both Carlists and Alfonsists), moderate liberals who favoured a constitutional, democratic monarchical settlement and from radicals (socialists and anarchists) who expected the Republic to deliver tangible socio-economic reform, if not revolution, at an important juncture in the development of bourgeois capitalism, localised urbanisation and industrialisation.⁶⁸ Faced with these challenges, and from the summer of 1873 with the establishment of federalist cantons and violent separatist republican uprisings in Andalusia and the Levante, the First Republic's leadership reacted by repeatedly reinventing itself. Historian Ángel Bahamonde counted five distinct 'republics' within the eleven-month rule of the First Republic, including a federal republic imposed 'from above', a 'social republic', a period of cantonal republicanism 'from below', and, towards its end, a conservative republic bordering on dictatorial rule.⁶⁹ The First Republic had four presidents and six different governments before it effectively was ended by General Manuel Pavía's coup on 3 January 1874. It continued in name only under General Serrano until the end of the year when Cánovas brokered the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy.⁷⁰

For all its chaotic reinvention and changing political alignments, in recent years historians have rightly questioned the traditional tendency to treat the First Republic as an embarrassing parenthesis, understanding the period solely through 'a prism of failure'.⁷¹ To be sure, Spain's first practical experiment in republicanism was somewhat brutish and certainly short. However, to understand it exclusively as a 'failure' would be to ignore its (and more broadly the democratic *sexenio*'s) enduring legacy. Republican and democratic language and the concepts they encapsulated, very often borrowed from the United States, such as 'self-government', 'inalienable rights' and 'meetings' (the latter indicative of the associationalism that

had become fundamentally ingrained in Spanish liberal practice) could not be unlearned.⁷² The protagonists of the First Republic were removed from power and positions of influence (including their university chairs) on the return of the monarchy and in some cases went into exile, but soon regrouped. Many returned to representative politics, including Castelar, Azcárate, Pi and Labra; all combined continued political careers with teaching commitments in the key educational institutions of the Restoration years, including the *Ateneo* and the *Instituto Libre de Enseñanza*.

Similarly, any assumption that the end of the republican experiment in 1873 signalled both the discrediting of federalism and a federalist vision for Spain and the decline and ultimate demise of interest in the United States as a model republic, would be erroneous. Political ideals and values derived from the United States continued to enjoy popularity after the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1874-5, even if the *sexenio democrático* had marked a high point in their status and diffusion in Spain.⁷³ Books on the US political system were published either in translation or directly in Spanish, including many penned by the republican politicians now removed from power.⁷⁴ Conferences and lectures were held at the *Instituto Libre de Enseñanza*, the new teaching home of the ousted democratic liberals, and the *Fomento de las Artes*, on topics including 'the power of the head of state in France, England and the United States', '*self-government* and the doctrinarian monarchy' and 'the Republic of the United States of America'. The Madrilénian press, meanwhile, continued to couch their public quarrels about news emanating from the USA in terms of its relevance as a *república-modelo*. The conservative *La Epoca* remained as eager to indict the 'pretty theories' of the USA in 1877 as in 1893.⁷⁵ The North American republican model still exerted sufficient interest that it was deemed necessary to discredit or defend it.

THE SECRET OF THE USA'S SUCCESS

Despite the great interest in the American political system and its potential for emulation in Spain, there was little consensus among Spanish observers as to which aspects of the *gran república* were key to its apparent success. Was a republic essential to democracy and vice versa or might a constitutional monarchy have the potential to be as democratic as a republic? Was the key to the 'great republic' its federalism; the flexibility of its system of government; or the capillary networks of political activism and 'grass roots' democracy that comprised its civil society and provided, in

Castelar's words, 'a school of liberty'?⁷⁶ Was its secret even American at all, or did the US model simply distil values and ideals developed in the Old World, namely Britain?

The United States' federalism was, unsurprisingly, one area in which liberals took a keen interest, and which they saw as instrumental to its *república-modelo* status. The majority of Spanish republicans, at least in the political-intellectual class, were federalist and the republican constitution formulated in 1873, but never ratified, was federalist, taking its cues very clearly from the United States.⁷⁷ The Spanish federation would comprise 17 states, each of which would be free to compose their own constitution, legislative, executive and judicial organs, provided these respected the division of federal and state powers laid down by the federal constitution and remained true to its democratic underpinnings. Francisco Pi y Margall, the most noted advocate for federalism in Spain, drew heavily on the example of the United States in his defence of the theory, *Las Nacionalidades*, published in 1877, just three years after the apparent failure of the republicans' practical experiment in federalism.⁷⁸ In both its generalist and intricate arguments, *Las Nacionalidades* called on the political system of the United States as evidence of the practicability and efficacy of federalism. For example, Pi insisted that the US Constitution struck the correct balance between the jurisdictions of federal and state law. Here, Pi's point of comparison with the United States was that of Switzerland. Given the recent experience of the cantonal uprisings, as well colonial and civil war, it is perhaps not surprising that Pi should 'confess' his admiration for the provisions in the Swiss Constitution allowing for the suppression of rebellions of states against the federal government, constitution and its laws: the Swiss one was a constitution devised 'for a people used to revolts'.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, in terms of the rule of law, he pronounced the US Constitution to be most in keeping with federalist principles and the most logical.⁸⁰ Likewise, the United States had got it right when it came to the federalist system of customs and duties—no internal duties were levied on goods transported between states within the confederation—and in leaving all aspects of business and commerce to the jurisdiction of individual states, with the exception of commercial dealings with the native American population.⁸¹

Pi's pronounced belief in a federal rather than unitary form of republicanism of course helps explain why the US and Swiss constitutions were his most natural points of reference. The obvious counterpoint was the unitary republic in France. Recent events on the other side of the Pyrenees

undermined the authority France's republican model might otherwise have enjoyed among Spanish elites. In May 1870, as a French plebiscite ratified a new liberal constitution, Luis Rivera saluted the 'good Republicans' seeking to install a unitary republic in France even if 'here we are all federal republicans'.⁸² The violent suppression of the Paris Commune in spring 1871 by Versaillais troops shocked Spanish republicans. Paris was retaken in a 'bloody week' in May during which national troops overran the *fédérés*' barricades and killed in combat or summarily executed up to 25,000 suspected communards.⁸³ The Third Republic's installation, under the command of Adolphe Thiers, of a centralised, unitary (and, to many, clerical) republican system only contributed to its further loss of credibility as a model. Luis Fors, *La Igualdad*'s correspondent in Paris, observed in January 1872 that 'what is happening today in France shows once more the superior qualities of the federal Republican form'.⁸⁴ Acknowledging that 'not all evils suffered by the French people are children of the unitary republican form in force here', he attributed the 'injustices that prevail' in France to the government of the 'decrepit' Thiers.⁸⁵ The source of his criticism on this occasion were the actions of the 'clerical' and 'ultramontane' elements of the unitary government to block the provincial governments' educational reforms in favour of universal compulsory (and in many cases free) education. The stifling of what Fors considered the population's spontaneous 'thirst for education' was the clear result of its unitary, rather than federal, system of rule.

If a federal Republic, the only logical one for democratic peoples, was in force in France, the benefit of popular education would be a fact, because the provinces, being autonomous in their internal organisation, would set out the project of Jules Simon in the majority of departments, judging it a necessity for its well-being and progress. But the phantasmagorical Republic of 4th September has to its great misfortune the quality of being among the ranks of the Unitarian ones, for that reason the departments will be attacked viciously in their most noble aspirations by that lair of Ultramontanes called the Assembly of Versailles.⁸⁶

The crises of French republicanism—the 'impossible politics' (to paraphrase Tocqueville) of the Second Republic, the fratricidal violence involved in suppressing the Commune and the centralised republican form taken by Thiers' and MacMahon's conservative Third Republic—'haunted' Spanish republicans.⁸⁷ It precluded the *sexenio* elites from turning to France as a republican guide, though Proudhon remained influential among Spanish

federalists. In return, both Thiers and later Léon Gambetta distrusted the ‘radical nature’ of Spanish federalism.⁸⁸ Indeed Rafael María de Labra insisted that the end of France as a credible political role model for Spain had occurred much earlier, in the aftermath of the 1789 revolution and the ‘so-called Napoleonic Code’ which betrayed and ‘reigned over the general ruin of the intent of 1789’.⁸⁹ France’s political inconsistency in the subsequent sixty years and ‘the extraordinary number of Constitutions, not only diverse but conflicting [...] have deprived her until today of the authority to speak on this matter’.⁹⁰ The United States, on the other hand, furnished a comparatively stable and long-lasting experiment of federalism: even the Civil War, which had threatened to destroy the Union, could be ‘spun’ as evidence of the ultimate resilience of its federal system.

In his dissection of contemporary politics, Labra also sought to move beyond the conventional dichotomy of federal republic versus unitary republic, United States versus France. He argued that his contemporaries had misunderstood the character of the North American federal republic and appropriated it erroneously in their arguments for and against a federal system in Spain. For Labra, the principal concern was to demonstrate the compatibility of federalism with the nation. He argued that republic, nation and liberty were mutually reinforcing and signalled the supplanting of local privileges, interests and allegiances with ‘the principle of human solidarity’ over the greater distances and more numerous frontiers that characterised the modern age. Spanish federalists were quite mistaken when, ‘focusing only on north American appearances’ they sought to ‘destroy national unity, in the name of a federalism that in America only served to *unite*’.⁹¹ Not that this should be mistaken for the advocacy of unitary republicanism, Labra insisted. What was needed was a form of republican rule that harmonised ‘local life’ or ‘provincial and municipal authority’ with ‘general life’, or that of the nation, organised according to ‘an organic principle which implies first of all and above all (and hence on the sovereignty of the Nation as well as the autonomy of the town) the natural, indispensable and inalienable right of human personhood’. It was in this regard, Labra asserted, that the experience of the United States, especially in its recent troubled history, ‘is of exceptional value’.⁹²

With French-style unitary republicanism discredited and the descent of their own federalist experiment into cantonal insurrection, the post-*sexenio* writings and speeches of Spanish progressive liberals were more qualified in their support for the US political system than they had been between 1868 and 1874. The constitutional model with which the United States princi-

pally ‘competed’ was now that of Great Britain. The Restoration political system constructed by Antonio Cánovas, which succeeded in appearing representative without being democratic, aspired to emulate the much envied and seemingly stable liberal constitutional monarchy operating in Britain. Cánovas, a great anglophile, had already advised the then Prince Alfonso’s enrolment at Sandhurst Military College during the *sexenio* in order that he learn from England’s (never Britain) ‘constitutional traditions’.⁹³ The cornerstones of the Restoration Constitution were the crown and the bicameral *Cortes*. The conservative architect of the Restoration was not the only admirer of the British monarchical system. Many liberal politicians and intellectuals opposed to the Alfonsist Restoration and its politics of *turnismo* were also anglophiles, including the Gayango family, Francisco and Hermenegildo Giner de los Ríos (founders of the *The Free Educational Institution* in 1876), Rafael de Labra and Gumersindo de Azcárate. Labra and Azcárate published works during this period comparing the foundational laws and systems of rule of Britain and the United States, but for many it was not so easy to distinguish between the assumed political ideals of the two Anglo-Saxon countries. Indeed, their values were very often conflated. Praise for the American Constitution and political values often seemed a proxy for those of the British parliamentary system. As Gumersindo de Azcárate told his illustrious audience at a Columbine anniversary conference in 1892, the North American was not ‘an entirely new national type’ who had constructed ‘a substantially different civilisation’ across the Atlantic. The distinctions between the political orders of the new and old world were of scale rather than essence:

Even in the political order [of the United States], which appears the most original, it is easy to see the entire Anglo-Saxon tradition in the North American Constitution, despite the distance which at first glance appears to exist between a unitary monarchy, with an aristocracy and an official religion, and a democratic and federal republic, in which the churches are absolutely independent of the state.⁹⁴

Azcárate’s opinion was widely shared. In this view, what was key to understanding the USA’s (and by extension Britain’s) politics was the ideal of liberty. In a series of lectures given at the *Instituto Libre de Enseñanza*, later published in 1881 as a book entitled *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII*, Labra heaped admiration upon British institutions and political values as the originators of the modern democratic era. Contemporary

political history, he declared, did not begin as he had once thought, in France in 1789; rather ‘the eyes of the thinker, the historian, of the statesman, always turn to other people that all of us proclaim as teacher, to England’.⁹⁵ In Labra’s interpretation, Britain was lauded as the inventor of political liberty; the importance of the United States came insofar as it had transformed the peculiar and contingent vision of liberty invested in British institutions and ideals into a political principle or theory with universal application—and had put this principle into practice. Thus, ‘it was necessary that the English spirit pass through America’ and for this reason, ‘the Bill of rights of 1776 [the Virginia Declaration of Rights] which decisively influenced the French stage of 89, [...] has remained the objective of the political order of modern democracy’.⁹⁶ Despite the USA’s lack of a parliament and its role as a conduit and practical crucible, rather than originator, of the value of political liberty, the United States remained crucial for Labra, most notably for its proving of the link between political liberty and nationhood and its demonstration of the unifying properties of federalism. The imperfections of the North American presidential system may have meant that it could not be viewed uncritically ‘as *the* model country and the *non plus ultra* of political advances’, but the United States nevertheless represented ‘the first and largest democracy of the Modern Age’.⁹⁷

Labra’s reference to the ‘imperfections’ of the presidential system points to the importance he and other liberal observers of the United States attached to the role accorded to the executive branch in the separation of powers. Again, this was an aspect of constitutionalism in which the British and North American systems were elided in Spanish imaginings. It was also an area in which Spanish interest was driven above all by historical domestic concerns; radical liberals had already felt compelled to seek publicly the ousting of monarchs deemed unfit to rule twice that century, unsuccessfully in the case of Ferdinand VII towards the end of the Liberal Biennium, but successfully, of course, in the case of Isabel II who was forced to abdicate in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. The concern was to avoid any possible return to absolutism. After all, the third Carlist war, and with it the military threat of installing an absolutist-leaning, deeply clerical rule in Spain, had only ended in 1876 and the disappointment—from a progressive and radical perspective—at the rolling back of democratic laws at the end of the *sexenio* demonstrated that ‘progress’ did not always march, smoothly and ineluctably, forwards. Spanish interest in the process of impeachment and worries about the provisions around executive power in the US political system must be linked to domestic

concerns about the extent of monarchical authority. Spanish liberals failed to reach concordant views on the US system's ability to provide effective checks and balances on the power of the executive branch. The *Nueva Prensa* in 1880 identified the four-year presidential term and the possibility of accusing, trying and condemning the president whilst in power as sufficient checks on the extensive powers accorded to him, which they acknowledged exceeded even those of a constitutional king. The ability to subject presidents to criminal trial and impeachment was well known, given the 1868 impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, an event monitored closely, if not entirely accurately, in the Spanish press.⁹⁸ That the head of state could be put on trial whilst in office without violence or military intervention was a source of great astonishment—and admiration—for Spanish liberals all too accustomed to extra-parliamentary and extra-judicial methods of bringing about political change;

In America, the most complicated and serious political issues end like all ordinary issues with a trial and a verdict by the judge. For us, to arrive at a solution to the simplest issues, it is essential to disrupt public order, create social conflicts and produce disturbances whose beginning is known and even sought, but whose scope no one knows.⁹⁹

The subjecting of the president to the full severity of the law was 'the secret of a good organisation of executive power'; those who did not approve of this constitutional arrangement, *Nueva Prensa* declared, 'cannot truly call themselves liberals'.¹⁰⁰

If they love liberty, if they understand it as the rational way of working, not as the negation of all duties, if they understand that liberty obliges much, tyranny little or none at all, they should turn their eyes to this model people and be inspired by its institutions and its customs, not to obtain a servile and absurd imitation of its laws, but to discover the goal that guides their own path, under the standard of democracy, toward an equally prosperous and flourishing state.¹⁰¹

Gumersindo de Azcárate, however, was more sceptical about the powers accorded to the US president and, for that matter, to the heads of state in France and Great Britain. Convinced of the need to address this topic in his 1878 lectures to the *Institution* by the recent political crisis in Paris, Azcárate undertook a comparison of the powers and checks accorded to heads of state.¹⁰² (The comparison of the United States, France and Britain

was valid, he maintained, given that there was little difference between a constitutional monarchy and a republic.)

In France, he observed, the president was the head of the executive branch, could intervene at will in the legislative branch to propose laws, to use his powers of suspending veto, and, with the agreement of the Senate, to dissolve the chamber of deputies. In Britain, the greatest degree of separation of power had been achieved: executive power lay with the cabinet, the legislative with the parliament, the judicial with the courts and the authority to nominate ministers and dissolve parliament with the monarch. In the United States, meanwhile, the president's power resided almost exclusively in the executive branch, with authority to intervene in the legislative only to use the suspending veto and to address the house but not to propose laws nor to dissolve the legislative chamber. In all three countries the head of state had the authority to grant pardons, control the army and direct foreign policy. In Britain, the head of state could not be held to legal account, in France only in cases of high treason whilst in the United States, as the impeachment of President Johnson illustrated, the president 'is as responsible as any functionary'.¹⁰³ Thus, if in France the president was granted 'initiative without limits', in the United States 'he is absolutely denied it'.¹⁰⁴ In Azcárate's comparative exercise the power of the US presidency thus emerged as the most diluted and subject to the greatest checks.

It was this distrust of presidential power that had paradoxically led, according to Azcárate, to disparaging associations between the authority of the American president and that of a king. The exclusion of the president from intervening, debating and engaging with the legislative branch ensured that US presidents made use of the sole method of intervention open to them, that of the veto:

when he judges a decision by the legislative power to be unjust or inappropriate, it could be the case that it does not become law, despite having the support of the majority of the chamber and it being the true representation of the country.¹⁰⁵

This had been the case with President Johnson who, 'far from conceiving of himself as a mere magistrate of the legislative Power, attributed a supremacy for himself, which could be deduced from the *written law*'. The French system precluded an intervention in the executive of the type of Johnson's impeachment, though equally, 'if the marshal Mac-Mahon

had found himself at the helm of a state like the Anglo-American [sic], the crisis experienced in the neighbouring country would have been less distressing'.¹⁰⁶ Though all three systems came in for criticism from Azcárate, the one that appeared most satisfactory was the one founded upon constitutional monarchy.

You will be in agreement with me, in that Queen Victoria, even if she wanted, could not adopt an attitude comparable to the one adopted by Johnson in the United States in 1867 or by marshal Mac-Mahon in France in 1877. Well this is because there the ultimate consequences of the principle of *self government* having been deduced, the *parliamentary regime* has unravelled completely and as a consequence the function and the power of the head of State has become enclosed within its proper limits, within which they should today be contained, in monarchies as in republics.¹⁰⁷

Not all observers of the United States focussed on the political principles and values enshrined in America's founding documents or institutions as they tried to unravel the secret of the USA's apparent 'success'. Many Spanish observers of America, particularly those who had travelled there, joined with international observers, including Argentinian statesman Domingo Sarmiento, the French 'Americophile' Édouard Laboulaye and the editors of Italy's liberal *Nuova Antologia*, to insist that what cemented America's modernity could not be found in documents and institutions but instead had to be sought in its political processes and practices: how its democracy was made, not constituted. What was worthy of note—and perhaps of emulation—was its political culture, how its people were educated politically and how they made politics work. Images of the Capitol building in Washington on the opening day of Congress depicted the seat of the US legislature as the physical embodiment of modern, popular sovereignty.¹⁰⁸

What particularly impressed was the way in which democracy was practiced locally. Images abounded of the United States as a place where democratic practices were firmly rooted in communities, where sheriffs and other office holders were elected by their neighbours, where local government was effective, where men and women formed networks of associations and pressure groups and where philanthropists—often women—directed their wealth and energy toward the 'public good'. 'The strength' of the United States, declared *El Progreso*, 'comes from the fact that the citizen is all and the government is nothing'.¹⁰⁹ Large, festive political rallies, such as the

republican reunion in Middlebury attended by José Jordana y Morera, and the proliferation of newspapers around election time (even if they did tend to focus, negatively, on the deficiencies of political opponents) gave the impression of a lively civil society that seemed far removed from their own.¹¹⁰ The *Nueva Prensa* concluded gloomily that ‘we have to consider American municipal organisation [...] as a dream as golden as it is unsustainable’.¹¹¹ *Caciquismo*, the practice of negotiating power and privilege between the political centre and the *patria chica* (the local unit of experience of government and nation) through clientalist networks mediated by local bosses or *caciques*, endured through the revolutionary *sexenio* and well into Spain’s twentieth century. ‘Everywhere’, the *Nueva Prensa* lamented, ‘the fatal influence of a politics that corrupts and poisons everything’ could be felt.¹¹²

That said, the perception of the theatricalities of US democracy was not always complimentary. The pageantry and commercialism of American elections—the financial resources needed to mobilise support for candidates across such a large territory and the employment of modern business practices to advertise candidates as if they were products—appeared vulgar and uncivilised.¹¹³ Besides the distasteful selling of politics, there were several aspects of the processes and functioning of US democracy that struck Spaniards as far from model. Those who professed admiration for the US republic had to somehow reconcile what they had to admit were malfunctioning or corrupt democratic practices with their insistence on the advanced or exemplary nature of North American politics. Meanwhile, those who were opposed to the modernity that the United States was deemed to embody could seize upon the corruptions and imperfections in its democratic culture as evidence that the USA was more anti-model than exemplar. The final section sets out the contours of the limits of the United States as a political model of the modern democracy.

THE LIMITS OF THE US POLITICAL MODEL

If the value of the ‘model-republic’ was in its provision of evidence of a modern democracy and the ‘spirit of liberty’ *in praxis*, then Spaniards could not fail to address the less positive results of this democratic experiment. US elections were occasions when ‘the nation threw itself at politics en masse with vivid interest’, but they were also ‘venal and despicable there, like in few other places’.¹¹⁴ The political scandals of the Gilded Age, most notably the political patronage and vote rigging epitomised by the

‘political machine’ at Tammany Hall in New York City and the corruption associated with the presidency of Ulysses Grant, were closely followed in the Spanish press.¹¹⁵ Presidential elections in the United States, the *Ilustración Española y Americana* reported, were often violent and ‘truly grotesque’. The spectacle of suspected illegal voters in New York imprisoned in ‘Davenport’s cage’ for the duration of election day was enough to set ‘Heraclitus and Democritus crying and laughing’.¹¹⁶

The best-known example of political corruption in the United States, was without doubt that associated with the so-called Tammany ring in New York in the 1860s and early 1870s. The name of William Tweed, the ‘boss’ of Tammany Hall infamously caricatured by Thomas Nast, would be recognised by any literate Madrilénian who read the *Cartas de los Estados Unidos* posted to the larger Spanish dailies by foreign correspondents based in New York and Washington. *La Epoca*, for example, always keen to diminish the USA as a shining exemplar of political modernity, covered the internecine working of party politics closely, especially that of the ‘Tammany club, made famous by Tweed’.¹¹⁷

Indeed, the curious manner of Tweed’s recapture in Galicia in the autumn of 1876, following his escape from jail some months earlier (where he was imprisoned for twelve years for defrauding New York City of \$200,000) served only to increase his notoriety in Spain. At the same time, it hints at the pervasion of American political caricature, especially Thomas Nast’s work for *Harpers Weekly*, across the peninsular. Tweed was apprehended in Vigo, identified by the Spanish officer who recognised him thanks to Thomas Nast’s depiction of Tweed as a thief all too willing to punish ‘lesser’ juvenile thieves in his caricature ‘Tweed-le-dee and Tilden-dum’, published in June 1876. That a Spanish officer on the periphery of the peninsular was familiar with Nast’s caricature of Tweed, suggests a wider circulation of images of the contemporary USA than simply among the political cognoscenti and intellectual elites of the capital. Still, a note of caution, one that indicates the complexity of questions of ‘reception’, must be sounded. Nast’s cartoon, which the secretary of the American Legation in Madrid, Alvey A. Adeé later told him, ‘made you famous in Madrid’, was not read entirely as had been intended. The first report of Tweed’s arrest informed that a certain ‘Twid’ had been captured in Vigo for the crime of ‘kidnapping two American children’—the arresting Spanish officer, familiar enough with the cartoon to recognise the man from his caricature but unable to understand its explanatory annotations, written in English, read the cartoon literally and thus pre-

sumed Tweed guilty of child abduction, seemingly ignorant of the accusations of political corruption.¹¹⁸

News of the corrupt power of political ‘bosses’ like Tweed must have seemed all too familiar to Spanish readers, accustomed to *caciquismo* in their own political system, and revealed the flaws in the idealised republic across the Atlantic. Gumersindo de Azcárate noted that political parties in the United States were stronger and more influential than those in any other country and pointed particularly to the crucial role played by the local boss or, as he translated it into a term easily recognised by his audience, ‘*gran cacique*’.¹¹⁹ Anton Majujo, *La Epoca*’s US correspondent, also reported to his readers ‘the immensely powerful political leagues, known here by the name “Rings”, federal and provincial officials who are nominated because of their influence and which I do not need to describe, as in Spain we, unfortunately, have many, very prominent examples in the provinces’.¹²⁰ Spain had its own gulf between *pays légal* and *pays réel* to rival that of the USA’s Gilded Age. Political relationships between Madrid and the provinces, rulers and ruled, were negotiated through clientelist power networks, which were mediated by local bosses or *caciques*. These wealthy and influential intermediaries in effect *were* the state in their localities. Through the trading of favours, practices of patronage and election rigging they guaranteed local votes and taxes, essentially shoring up existing provincial political and socio-economic hierarchies. The introduction of universal male suffrage in 1890 did little to halt the election fixing or to realign the relationship between local and national politics in the provinces.¹²¹ However, back in the United States it seemed that at least some measures were being taken to halt and dismantle political corruption. The difference between the American bosses and the Spanish *caciques*, at least as it appeared to Azcárate, was that in the USA, as the imprisonment of Boss Tweed and other corruption-combating measures demonstrated, corruption did not go unpunished forever.

And if at time they let *politicians* help themselves at will, there comes a time when laziness and indifference are shaken up, as the New Yorkers did in 1871, when they defeated, brought charges against and threw into prison, where he died, the famous Tweed, the chief or *Boss* of the *Tweed Ring*, who had taken over the administration of the city with great harm to the general interest and to public morale.¹²²

CONCLUSION

The democratic *sexenio*—and particularly the period of the First Republic in 1873—represented a high point of the appeal in Spain of the ‘model republic’ offered by the United States. But the end of the Spanish revolutionary moment did not signal the end of the USA’s relevance as an exemplar of republicanism and democracy in practice. Concepts such as ‘inalienable rights’ and ‘self-government’ became commonplace in the political lexicon and culture of Spanish political elites and did not disappear. The coming of the Spanish-Cuban-American War, of course, shifted the argument and made it much more one-sided.

Two wider points emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the historiographical narrative of the *sexenio* as failure is discredited by the persistence of currents of republican and democratic sentiment and language and the legacy of associationalism cemented by republicans’ and radicals’ ‘perfection’ of the use of clubs and meetings. Far from being an immediately forgotten parenthesis or simply a shorthand for the failure of nineteenth-century liberalism in Spain, the democratic experiment conducted in the late 1860s and early 1870s evidently left its mark. The reforms and ideals of the *sexenio democrático* and especially of the period of the First Republic, for all their contradictions, vacillations, shortcomings and—ultimately—impermanence, nevertheless helped consolidate the principle of popular sovereignty in the political vocabulary of Spanish elites, if not as an enduring political reality.¹²³

The second point is that interest in the United States for the most part formed part of a sophisticated debate, which was principally borne from national concerns. The images of America as the locus for modern, democratic politics in action were in part US self-projections, but they were also produced and reproduced in Spain, shaped by liberal domestic concerns: how to make federalism work in alignment with the nation; how to produce a foundational document that inscribes political liberty and generates stable government; how to secure Spain from a return to absolutist rule; how to ensure vibrant political cultures in the municipalities, where venal and corrupt politics, if it could not be eradicated, would at least go punished. As Luis Rivera observed in *Gil Blas*, the US model-republic provided the evidential material for political arguments between conservatives and liberals over Spain’s ‘path to modernity’. As a radical republican, Rivera, of course, was invested in imagining the stability and success of the US republic, for this meant the silencing of those ‘blessed barons’ who

would ‘applaud’ at ‘the most insignificant disruption’ in the United States and would delight in any decline in its authority.

Learn, they would have exclaimed, learn what is the fatal end of civilization and progress: here you have, this *pueblo ilustrado* as the *liberalescos* call it, this country that the ungovernables present as a model, it is destroying itself, annihilating itself in civil wars, which will before long lead to an early death. There is no doubt, this country carries death in her bosom. Alas, poor country, poor again and poor a thousand times if no Neo-Catholics rise up for her good to regenerate and transform her!¹²⁴

For the liberal political leaders of the *sexenio*, preoccupied with national and political reform, the example of the United States mingled with national liberal traditions as well as other influences. As such, the utility of the North American *república-modelo* was not in any ability to offer a perfect, universal blueprint for a modern republic. This it could not provide. Rather, it was found in the practical evidence, as it were, thrown up by its near-100-year constitutional experiment in republican federalism and democracy in practice, which the new Spanish politicians and intellectuals could mine for those principles and policies that they felt had been vindicated by the American experience. In the words of the so-called father of the September revolution, José María Orense, the ‘system that the US practices’ deserved emulation.

as I am guided in the experience of life by the countries in which our ideals are realized, I proclaim the system practiced in the United States the most complete, given that it has achieved such good results there.¹²⁵

NOTES

1. These spats in the Madrid press, principally between the conservative *La Epoca* and moderate liberal paper *El Imparcial* over the ‘correct’ interpretation of the US railroad strikes and their implications for the upholding of the United States as the model republic began with *La Epoca*’s article on 27 July 1877. *El Imparcial*’s first direct retort to *La Epoca* in relation to the strikes was published on 29 July 1877.
2. A. Shubert (1990) *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Unwin Hyman) p. 5.
3. See A. Körner (2012) ‘Barbarous America’ in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined. Explaining the United States in*

Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America (New York: Palgrave) pp. 125–59.

4. G. de Azcárate (Published anonymously as 'W') (1876) *Minuta de un testamento, publicada y anotada por W...* (Madrid) pp. 85–6. Cited in J. López Morillas (1981) *The Krausist Movement and ideological change in Spain 1854–1874* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 112.
5. Here, I intend 'moderate' simply in the sense of 'not radical'. This is not to be confused with the Moderate Party f. 1834 which was broadly conservative-liberal and supportive of the Bourbon monarchy in outlook and indeed merged with the Liberal Union in 1874 to form the Liberal-Conservative party under Cánovas.
6. C. Schmidt-Nowara (1999) *Empire and Antislavery. Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press) p. 76.
7. The Spanish Socialist party (PSOE) was founded later, in 1879, under the leadership of Pablo Iglesias.
8. A. Lorenzo (1974) *El Proletariado Militante* (Madrid: Zero) p. 89. This was an issue that also highlighted early divergences within the nascent workers' movement. For example, Lorenzo dismissed the mission statement of *La Federación*, the newspaper inaugurated in 1869 by the Barcelona-based *Centro federal de las sociedades obreras*, which declared 'that the Democratic Federal Republic is the most advisable form of government for the interests of the working class' as 'imposed by political conventions on the weak convictions of nascent anarchism, as a sort of original sin which bars it from its great revolutionary work' A. Lorenzo *El Proletariado Militante* pp. 84–5.
9. See, for example, G. de Azcárate (1877) *El self-government y la monarquía doctrinaria* (Madrid: Librería de A de San Martín); R.M. de Labra (1881) *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Imprenta de Aurelio J Alaria).
10. G. de Azcárate (Published anonymously as 'W') *Minuta de un testamento* pp. 85–6.
11. C. Schmidt-Nowara *Empire and Antislavery* p. 140.
12. For example, see Guy Thomson's excellent exploration of republicanism and insurrection among Andalusian Democrats: G. Thomson (2010) *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain. Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854–75* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
13. See G. Thomson *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain* for the extension of political engagement and activity before the advent of a liberal-democratic state (quotations from p. 8).
14. M. Morales Muñoz (2002) 'Cultura política y sociabilidad en la democracia republicana' in R. Serrano García ed. (2002) *España 1868–1874. Nuevos enfoques sobre el Sexenio Democrático* (Valladolid: Consejería de Educación y Cultura) pp. 211–230.

15. M. Morales Muñoz 'Cultura política y sociabilidad en la democracia republicana' pp. 211–234; E. Reclus (2007) *Impresiones de un viaje por España en tiempos de Revolución* (Logroño: Piedra de Rayo).
16. M. Vincent (2007) *Spain 1833–2002. People and State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 40.
17. See L. Santiago Díez Cano (2002) "Existió alguna vez la I República? Notas para recuperar un periodo historiográfico" in R. Serrano García ed. *España 1868–1874* pp. 75–91. Also see C.A.M. Hennessey (1962) *The Federal Republic in Spain. Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement 1868–1874* (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p. 76.
18. See M. Suárez Cortina (2001) *El gorro frigio. Liberalismo, democracia y republicanismo en la Restauración* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva) pp. 19–24.
19. On the interaction between Spanish and Italian republican liberals see: I.M. Pascual Sastre (2001) *La Italia del Risorgimento y la España del Sexenio Democrático* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas); G. Thomson (2001) 'Garibaldi and the legacy of the revolutions of 1848 in Southern Spain' in *European History Quarterly* vol. 31.3 pp. 353–95 and idem (2008) 'Giuseppe Mazzini and the globalisation of democratic nationalism, 1830–1920' *Proceedings of the British Academy* 152, pp. 237–273. See also M. Isabella (2009) *Risorgimento in Exile. Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
20. M. Isabella *Risorgimento in Exile* pp. 21–31.
21. M. Isabella *Risorgimento in Exile* p. 33.
22. For example, Fernando Garrido had close contacts with both Mazzini and Garibaldi; the latter wrote to congratulate Garrido following Spain's 'Glorious Revolution'. G. Thomson 'Garibaldi and the legacy of the revolutions of 1848 in Southern Spain' p. 361.
23. G. Thomson 'Giuseppe Mazzini and the globalisation of democratic nationalism' pp. 252–3.
24. See G. Thomson *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain*.
25. One such individual was Leonardo Sánchez Deus who had fought against the 1856 coup which brought the 'Progressive Biennium' to an end and later joined Garibaldi's 'Thousand', becoming a trusted officer of both Garibaldi and Mazzini. A brief account of his political life is given in G. Thomson 'Giuseppe Mazzini and the globalisation of democratic nationalism' pp. 267–8. See also I.M. Pascual Sastre *La Italia del Risorgimento* pp. 376–96.
26. M. Isabella *Risorgimento in Exile* p. 8.
27. M. Isabella *Risorgimento in Exile*.
28. Reclus' diary account of his time and travels in Spain in late 1868 and 1869, originally destined for a French audience, were republished some

years later in *La Revista Blanca* between 1 March 1932 and 1 November 1933 because of the seeming parallels identified between the revolutionary situation following the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1868 and the political climate of the Second Republic. It has also relatively recently been published in book form: E. Reclus (2007) *Impresiones de un viaje por España en tiempos de Revolución* (Logroño: Piedra de Rayo).

29. *La Revista Blanca* 1 Mar. 1932 'Impresiones de un viaje por España, por Eliás Reclus'; 1 April 1932 'Impresiones del Elías Reclus durante in viaje por España en días de revolución'.
30. *La Revista Blanca*: 1 Mar. 1932; 1 April 1932; 15 June 1932. Using the Marseillaise in different political contexts was not new at the time: A. Körner (1997) *Das Lied von einer anderen Welt. Kulturelle Praxis im französischen und deutschen Arbeitermilieu 1840–1890* (Frankfurt & New York: Campus).
31. *La Revista Blanca* 1 April 1932 'Impresiones del Elías Reclus durante in viaje por España en días de revolución'.
32. See L. Riall (2007) *Garibaldi. Invention of a Hero* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).
33. A. Altadill (1860) *Garibaldi en Sicilia ó la unidad italiana* (Madrid: Librería de E. Font); M. Gil de Salcedo (1860) *Garibaldi e Procida ó las pascuas sangrientas de Sicilia* (Madrid: Imprenta de D. Antonio Gracia y Orga); see also G. Thomson (2001) 'Garibaldi and the legacy of the revolutions of 1848 in Southern Spain' pp. 353–395.
34. See the fascinating book on the transnational appropriations and imaginings of Lincoln edited by Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton: (2011) *The Global Lincoln* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
35. C.P. Boyd (2011) 'A man for all seasons' in R. Carwardine & J. Sexton eds. *The Global Lincoln* pp. 189–205.
36. See M.A. Orobon (2005) 'Marianne y España: La Identidad Nacional en la Primera República Española' in *Historia y Política* no. 13 pp. 79–98.
37. G. Thomson 'Garibaldi and the legacy of the revolutions of 1848 in Southern Spain' pp. 361; 385.
38. See *La Igualdad* 29 Sept. 1870 & 15 Aug. 1870 'El pacto de los pueblos latinos'. C.A.M. Hennessey *The Federal Republic in Spain* p. 90.
39. G. Thomson 'Giuseppe Mazzini' pp. 271–2; I.M. Pascual Sastre *La Italia del Risorgimento* p. 433.
40. A. Santayana (1868) *Constitución de los Estados Unidos de América traducida del inglés con algunas notas y observaciones por Don Agustín Santayana* (Director que ha sido de la administracion local de Filipinas) (Avila: Imp. D P. Vaquero y Comp.) preamble.
41. K. Marx *New York Daily Tribune* 23 Mar. 1855; See E. Storm (2001) *La perspectiva del progreso. Pensamiento político en la España del cambio del siglo (1890–1914)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva).

42. Joaquín Oltra related Prim's visit to the USA during the Civil War, the astute observations he made whilst there and on his return to Madrid about the military strength of the US and its potential as a future adversary of Spain over the question of Cuba. J. Oltra (1971) 'La visita del general Prim a los Estados Unidos' in *Atlántida* vol 9 (no. 49) pp. 61–70. See also J. Oltra (1972) *La influencia norteamericana en la Constitución Española de 1869* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos) p. 34.
43. Tocqueville's classic work on *Democracy in America* had already been published in Spanish a handful of times from 1836, but, as Oltra notes, it was around the time of the September Revolution that it acquired particular popularity in Spain. J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana* p. 44. The work of Édouard Laboulaye, *París en América* was published in Madrid in 1862 and again in 1885. [(1862) *París en América por E. Laboulaye* (Madrid: Librería Cuesta); (1885) *París en América por Edouardo Laboulaye* (Madrid: Dionisio de los Ríos, Impresor)]. The translation of his *Estudios sobre la Constitución de los Estados Unidos*, translated by Joaquín Guichot, appeared in 1869 (Seville: E. Perié). Édouard Laboulaye's *Histoire des Etats-Unis*, which included discussion of the US Constitution followed in Spanish translation in 1873–4 [(1873–4) *Historia popular de los Estados Unidos: comprende no solo la narración de todos los hechos históricos, sino que además trata de la constitución, gobierno y de todo cuanto pueda dar a conocer aquel gran pueblo de América por Edoardo Laboulaye* (Barcelona: Librería Ibérica de Victor Pérez)]
44. Examples of works on the United States written directly in Spanish include: B. Agulló y Prats (1866) *Constitución política de los pueblos modernos* (Barcelona: Imp. Del Porvenir); Nicasio Landa's article 'La caridad en la Guerra' published in the *Revista de España*, vol 3.6; and Florencio de Vaamonde's 'Estudio sobre la crisis política actual de los Estados Unidos'. See J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana* pp. 44–6. This interest showed no sign of letting up in the Restoration period with the publication of several first-hand accounts of the United States including those of Miguel Suárez, the Spanish consul to Boston [(1876) *Estados Unidos de América. Memorias Comerciales. Dirigidas al Ministerio de Estado* (Madrid: García y Compañía)] and Rafael Puig y Valls, Spain's Industry Commissioner at the 1893 World's Fair in Chicago [(1894) *Viaje á América* (Barcelona: Tipolitografía de Luis Tasso)]. In terms of academic analyses of the USA, the leading interpreter of the United States in late nineteenth-century Spain was Rafael María de Labra who wrote on topics including the abolition of slavery in the United States (1873), US colonial history and revolution (1881), international law (1877) and the contemporary republic (1897).

45. *Gil Blas* 23 Jan. 1869 ‘Gil Blas al pueblo, en confianza’.
46. A. Santayana *Constitución de los Estados Unidos de América* preamble.
47. H. Saatkamp & M. Coleman (Winter 2014 edition) ‘George Santayana’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/santayana/>.
48. A. Santayana *Constitución de los Estados Unidos de América* preamble.
49. Biblioteca de ‘La Nueva Prensa’ (1876) *Los Pueblos Jóvenes: la Australia- Los Estados Unidos de América* (Madrid: Imprenta Pes 6); La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa (1880) *Los Pueblos Jóvenes. Estudio Histórico-Filosófico sobre los Estados Unidos y la Australia* (Madrid: Victoriano Suárez).
50. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes*. pp. 3–4.
51. Cited in J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana* p. 43.
52. Cited in J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana* pp. 97–100. See also *idem*. (1999) ‘Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence in the Spanish Political Tradition’ in *Journal of American History*, vol. 85 no. 4 p. 1373.
53. On the notion of historical time, see R. Koselleck (1985) *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press) pp. 267–288.
54. J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana*.
55. Cited in J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana* pp. 113–4.
56. F. Pi y Margall (1877) *Las Nacionalidades* (Madrid: Imp. De Eduardo Martínez) pp. 137–9.
57. F. Pi y Margall *Las Nacionalidades* p. 139.
58. Joaquín Oltra has asserted that before 1868 the term was relatively alien to Spanish political culture, evidenced by the fact that it remained untranslated and apparently untranslatable. For example, the 1865 Spanish translation of Laboulaye’s (writing as Lefebvre) classic work, *Paris in America*, included the term ‘self-government’ left in the English with a footnote to explain its meaning to readers. By 1877, however, the term had apparently pervaded the political culture, at least of progressive liberals, such that Gumersindo de Azcárate published a treatise entitled simply *El self-government y la monarquía doctrinaria*, which assumed no need to translate the term. It was also Azcárate who declared in 1894 that the US Constitution’s protection of individual liberties was a ‘well-known thing’. G. Azcárate (1894) ‘Los Estados Unidos’ in *El Continente Americano* vol 2 (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico ‘Sucesores de Rivadeneyra’) p. 34.
59. One should perhaps not read too much into this distinction, although it remains worthwhile highlighting. José Álvarez-Junco, in his tracing of the evolution of Spanish nationalism over the course of the nineteenth century, has shown how earlier in the century absolutist and conservative political

factions failed to appropriate the idea of the ‘nation’ to their cause, preferring instead to act in the name of religion or the *patria* (which Álvarez-Junco considers effectively a substitution for ‘monarch’, with no attached notion of popular or national sovereignty as found in *nación* or *pueblo*). This allowed Spanish liberals to lay claim to the ‘nation’ as their own, which they consistently did from 1812. It was only towards the end of the century, when liberalism appeared less firebrand and more parliamentary (now that socialism had taken over the mantle of ideology of revolution), that conservatives sought to claim the ‘nation’ as theirs to protect and exalt. J. Álvarez-Junco (2011) *Spanish identity in the age of nations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), chapter 7 The ‘Two Spains’.

60. *Gil Blas* 26 April 1868 ‘Crónica política’.
61. The frequent intervention of the Spanish army in politics, the repeated forming and disbanding of liberal national militias according to the government of the day until 1856, the widespread unpopularity of the draft, and recent and on-going wars in Cuba and against the Carlists and cantonalists help explain why Spanish elites paid particular interest to the relationship between state and the army and how this was negotiated elsewhere. F. Pi y Margall *Las Nacionalidades* pp. 165–7; *Gil Blas* 26 April 1868 ‘Crónica política’ & 17 May 1868 ‘Crónica política’. See C.P. Boyd (1979) *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press); J. Cepeda Gómez (1999) *Los pronunciamientos en la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid: Arco Libros).
62. *La Igualdad* 16 Feb. 1873 ‘El abrazo de dos pueblos’.
63. *La Igualdad* 16 Feb. 1873 ‘El abrazo de dos pueblos’.
64. *La Igualdad* 16 Feb. 1873 ‘El abrazo de dos pueblos’.
65. *La Igualdad* 16 Feb. 1873 ‘El abrazo de dos pueblos’.
66. C. Schmidt-Nowara *Empire and Antislavery* p. 154.
67. Reported in *La Igualdad* 16 Feb. 1873 ‘El abrazo de dos pueblos’.
68. L.S. Díez Cano ‘Existió alguna vez la I República?’ p. 15.
69. Á. Bahamonde Magro (1996) *España en democracia: el sexenio, 1868* (vol. 23 of *Historia de España*) (Madrid: Historia 16).
70. For a recent account of the obstacles facing the first Spanish republic and of the historiography of the republican experiment, see L.S. Díez Cano ‘Existió alguna vez la I República?’ pp. 75–91.
71. Santiago Díez Cano has pointed to: the enormous conjunctural challenges facing the leaders of the republic including the pragmatic thrust of contemporary European international relations which left the Spanish Republic short of external support; the inheritance of a virtually bankrupt state made only worse by the fighting of war on two fronts; and the Republic’s coincidence with a decisive ‘moment’ in terms of the social question and

liberal-capitalist development. L.S. Díez Cano 'Existió alguna vez la I República?' pp. 84–6.

72. L.S. Díez Cano 'Existió alguna vez la I República?' pp. 75–91 and R. Serrano García 'Presentación' in *idem. ed. España 1868–1874* pp. 7–14.

73. Oltra attributed the intensity of interest in US political values during the *sexenio* and the willingness of Spain's new rulers to appropriate these to improved transatlantic communications and thus increased familiarity with the history and institutions of the US as well as to the similar predicaments in which the Spanish constitution-writers in 1869 and their North American counterparts in 1787 found themselves, namely in a constitutional vacuum with no single self-evident way in which to fill it. J. Olra *La influencia norteamericana* p 137.

74. This group of works includes: Rafael María de Labra's (1877) *De la representación é influencia de los Estados Unidos de América en el Derecho Internacional* (Madrid: Imp. de Aurelio J. Alaria), (1881) *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Imp. de Aurelio J. Alaria) and (1897) *La república de los Estados Unidos de América: orígenes, instituciones jurídicas, carácter social, representación moral y política* (Madrid: Tip. de Alfredo Alonso); Gumersindo de Azcárate's (1877) *El poder del Jefe de Estado en Francia, Inglaterra y los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Estab. Tip. de J.C. Conde y Compañía) and (1894) 'Los Estados Unidos' in *El Continente Gigante* vol. 2 (Madrid: Estab. Tip. de 'Sucesores de Rivadeneyra').

75. *La Epoca* 29 July 1877; 30 Sept. 1893.

76. Cited in C.P. Boyd 'A man for all seasons' p. 197.

77. During the cantonalist uprising from the summer of 1873, one break-away dissident group in Cartagena requested to join the US federation. Reported in J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana* p. 51. Roque Barcia, a *Cortes* deputy from 1869, as well as author of a history of the United States, wrote on 16 December 1873 to the US ambassador in Spain requesting permission to raise the 'glorious federal banner, accepted in the whole North [...] the standard that flies in Philadelphia' on their ships, castles and bastions.

78. F. Pi y Margall *Las Nacionalidades*.

79. F. Pi y Margall *Las Nacionalidades* pp. 137–9.

80. F. Pi y Margall *Las Nacionalidades* p. 157. Pi declared that he would not emend the judicial system as practised in the United States, save for one minor point: he would not subject litigious citizens of different states to the jurisdiction of a federal court, but would rather allow the litigious parties to choose themselves where they would prefer the case to be tried.

81. F. Pi y Margall *Las Nacionalidades* p. 131

82. *Gil Blas* 12 May 1870.

83. See R. Tombs (1999) *The Paris Commune, 1871* (New York: Pearson Education Inc.) especially pp. 177–183.

84. *La Igualdad* 20 Jan. 1872 'Correspondencia de Paris'.
85. *La Igualdad* 20 Jan. 1872 'Correspondencia de Paris'.
86. *La Igualdad* 20 Jan. 1872 'Correspondencia de Paris'.
87. It was according to C.A.M Hennessey that Spanish republicans were 'haunted' by the perceived failure of republicanism in France. C.A.M. Hennessey *The Federal Republic in Spain* p. xiii
88. C.A.M. Hennessey *The Federal Republic in Spain* p. xv.
89. R.M. de Labra *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 9.
90. R.M. de Labra *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 9.
91. R.M. de Labra *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* pp. 442-3.
92. R.M. de Labra *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* pp. 442-3.
93. M. Fernández Almagro (1972 f.1951) *Cánovas, su vida y su política* (2nd. Ed) (Madrid: Ediciones Tebas) p. 246.
94. G. de Azcárate 'Los Estados Unidos' p. 43.
95. R.M. de Labra *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 9.
96. R.M. de Labra *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 10.
97. R.M. de Labra *La revolución norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 443.
98. Joaquín Oltra noted the Spanish press' curiosity in, as well as their sometimes failure to fully understand, the process of Andrew Johnson's trial. J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana* p. 50.
99. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes* p. 112.
100. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes* p. 108.
101. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes* p. 108.
102. The Parisian crisis which prompted Azcárate's lectures came to be known as *seize mai*. In an effective coup d'état, MacMahon sacked Simon in order to reassert conservative republicanism in the face of what was seen as excessive anticlericalism. Republican newspapers were prosecuted and republican meeting places persecuted. Nevertheless, in the elections that followed in October 1877, the republicans retained their parliamentary majority by 317 seats to 199. See R. Tombs (1996) *France 1814-1914* (London: Longman) p. 441.
103. G. de Azcárate *El poder del jefe del estado*, p. 92.
104. G. de Azcárate *El poder del jefe del estado en Francia, Inglaterra y los Estados Unidos*, p. 98.
105. G. de Azcárate *El poder del jefe del estado*, p. 99.
106. G. de Azcárate *El poder del jefe del estado*, pp. 100-101.
107. G. de Azcárate *El poder del jefe del estado*, p. 101.
108. See *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 16 Dec. 1873 'Washington: Aspect of the surroundings of the Capitol on the opening day of Congress.
109. The paper went on to note that this was the inverse of the situation in Spain where 'the government is the master and the people, their almost enslaved servants' *El Progreso* no. 3 March 1884 p. 1 'Estados Unidos'.

110. J. Jordana y Morera *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social de los Estados Unidos* p. 159; A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano* p. 96.
111. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes* p. 124.
112. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes* p. 124.
113. See A. Körner 'Barbarous America' pp. 125–59.
114. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano* p. 14–5.
115. On corruption in the US during the Gilded Age see M. W. Summers (1993) *The Era of Good Stealings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) or R.W. Cherney (1997) *American Politics in the Gilded Age. 1868–1900* (Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson Inc.) especially pp. 54–6.
116. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 8 Dec. 1876 'Nueva York: Votantes ilegales detenidos en la nueva Casa de Correos'.
117. See *La Epoca* 22 July 1877 'Cartas de los Estados Unidos'.
118. For an account of the improbable circumstances of Tweed's apprehension in Spain thanks to Nast's caricatures, see A.B. Paine (1904) *Th. Nast. His Period and his Pictures* (New York & London: Harper Brothers) pp. 336–7 or M.W. Summers *The Era of Good Stealings* pp. 11–14.
119. G. Azcárate 'Los Estados Unidos' p. 35.
120. *La Epoca* 22 July 1877 'Cartas de los Estados Unidos'.
121. See J. Varela Ortega (1977) *Los amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial) and also M. Vincent *Spain 1833–2002* pp. 72–8.
122. G. Azcárate 'Los Estados Unidos' pp. 35–6. Similarly, Majujo reported on new measures to prevent public employees participating in party politics. These measures, he underlined, would not deprive public employees of their sacrosanct and constitutional right to freedom of speech. *La Epoca* 22 July 1877 'Cartas de los Estados Unidos'.
123. See R. Serrano García ed. *España 1868–1874* pp. 8–10.
124. *Gil Blas* 17 May 1868 'Crónica política'.
125. Cited in J. Oltra *La influencia norteamericana en la Constitución Española de 1869* p. 105. It was Eliás Reclus who described Orense as the patriarch of the revolution; *La Revista Blanca* 15 June 1932.

Abolition, Emancipation and War: The United States in Spanish Political Culture and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba

The fracturing of the ‘Great Republic’ across the Atlantic, already understood as a rising economic, ideological and diplomatic power on the global stage, into two competing republics (the USA and CSA [Confederate States of America]) and consequent brutal civil war between them to determine whose vision of America would dominate, was a source of immense interest in Europe.¹ Even if the meaning(s) of the Civil War (1861–1865) were interpreted differently in different contexts, it was widely agreed that the issue of slavery and its abolition held the key to the war, in no small part thanks to Unionist diplomatic efforts, which promoted the view that this was a war against slavery, one that would vindicate and fulfil their nation’s founding principles. The inseparability of war from questions of slavery and abolition was a nexus that Spaniards found easy to recognise. In Spain’s remaining colonial empire in the Caribbean, slavery, abolition and war also appeared indivisible; the growing movement for Cuban independence, which led to war against colonial Spain in 1868, made abolition part of their programme of demands, thereby sealing the perceived link between the causes of independence and abolition there.

In addition to connecting demands for abolition to a wartime context, the ending of slavery was also anticipated as a potential cause of war; this was spectre of a ‘race war’ or the sustained retributive violence that the black population might meet on the white inhabitants of Cuba in the midst and aftermath of gaining their emancipation. With images of the Haitian slave revolution fresh in their minds, an expectation that the majority black/mixed Cuban population could similarly rise in violence

against those who had enslaved and exploited them had long ruled creole and metropolitan elite fears and helped tie the ‘ever-faithful isle’ to the Spanish empire long after the former colonies on the American continent, north and south, had claimed their independence.²

Observation of the US Civil War and its aftermath confirmed the seemingly inextricable melding of war and abolition, causing it to be deployed as a ‘barometer for predicting the future of Spain’s own colonial slave policy’.³ Conservative detractors of the ‘model’ presented by the US republic and democracy, and of colonial reform in their own country, used the fratricidal violence of the Civil War—which, as one newspaper put it, was conducting both sides ‘on the road to becoming barbarians’⁴—to argue that, if Spain were to follow the US’ lead in decreeing the immediate abolition of slavery in its colonies, it could only provoke or exacerbate colonial conflict. The immense racial divisions of post-bellum society in the USA only served to reinforce their fears of peri- or post-emancipation violence in Cuba. Spanish proponents of colonial reform, for the most part also liberals who were predisposed to admire the political ideals and institutions of the USA, also recognised the connection between war and abolition, seeing in the USA’s experience of abolition in wartime evidence that Cuban abolition could be achieved in analogous circumstances. If they agreed on nothing else, all concurred that the indissolubility of abolition from war in the US case made it highly relevant to Spain’s colonial crises between 1868 and 1898.

During the *sexenio revolucionario*, in the *Cortes*, conferences and cafés of the capital, Madrid’s political elite excitedly debated the new possibilities for Spanish politics and society. Part of this debate focused upon Spain’s continued support for the practice of slavery in the Antilles, which persisted until 1873 in Puerto Rico and was not finally abolished in Cuba, the most highly prized of Spain’s colonies, until October 1886. Indeed, Cuba remained at the forefront of Spanish political concerns throughout the *sexenio*. Many of the men associated with the Glorious Revolution had first-hand experience of colonial affairs—Prim, Serrano, Dulce and Topete among them—and might be expected to take an ‘enlightened’ view of colonial reform. Other supporters of the September revolution were confirmed abolitionists, such as Castelar, Sagasta and de Labra. It was therefore little surprising that one of the first acts of the military junta established in Madrid after the Cádiz *pronunciamiento* was to declare the principle of ‘free womb’ in Cuba and Puerto Rico, even if this was never put into practice given that those ruling Cuba remained initially loyal to

the crown. Thus, the prospects for the abolition of slavery in the Spanish Antilles seemed auspicious. To complicate matters, however, the *sexenio* governments faced war on several fronts: civil war with the outbreak of the third Carlist war from 1872 to 1876, and the cantonalist republican insurrections in the summer of 1873; and colonial war, with the war for independence in Cuba (1868–1878). Coinciding with the advent of progressive rule in Spain, which seemed sure to bring with it some form of colonial reform, rebels rose up and established bases particularly in the east of the island; their leader Céspedes, declared the abolition of slavery as part of the rebels' programme.⁵ The Atlantic colonies' constitutional position as provinces ruled through temporary 'exceptional rule' denuded a large part of the population, both enslaved and free, from political rights; the interests of those arguing for freedom from colonial rule thereby converged with those arguing for freedom from slavery.⁶ One of the effects of this back in Madrid was that those who expressed their opposition to slavery had to take great care lest their patriotic commitment to the empire be called into question.

The Spanish colonisers had been the first to introduce African slave labour in the New World, subsidising the traffic of slaves to Cuba, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo in the early sixteenth century.⁷ In 1860, Cuba had a slave population of around 360,000. Working principally in sugar cane and tobacco plantations, enslaved Cuban workers worked alongside rented slaves, indentured labourers from Asia, as well as black, white and mulatto wage-workers, often on the same plantation estates.⁸ During the nineteenth century there was a 'spectacular resurgence' of slave trafficking and use of enslaved labour in the Spanish Caribbean colonies (and in Brazil, before and after independence).⁹ At the same time as emancipations were taking place, and abolition decreed, in British and French colonies, the newly independent Latin American states (with the exception of Brazil) and in the states of North America, planters and the colonial authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico were expanding cultivation areas, building industrial-sized plants and harnessing new technologies including steam power and the railways in order to benefit from the rising global demand for sugar.¹⁰ This expansion of sugar production using enslaved labour brought more than 700,000 slaves from Africa to Cuba in the years after 1800.¹¹ The 'scale, productivity and technological sophistication' of this 'massive slave-worked sugar complex [...] far surpassed' those built up by British and French colonial slave-holders in previous centuries.¹²

Although trading in slaves had been nominally halted since 1817, the illegal importing of slaves to Cuba had continued, even increasing in the 1850s, until it was finally ended in 1867 due to pressure from the British and the newly abolitionist USA. The trafficking may have ended but the practice of enslaved labour did not, although the combination of war and revolutions in both Cuba and Spain the following year set the course for the gradual erosion of slavery laws until final abolition came in 1886. In 1870 the liberal government ushered in by the September revolution passed the Moret Law, a 'free womb' law that liberated children born to enslaved women, albeit requiring them to remain with their mother's owners until adulthood, as well as elderly slaves. This was followed in 1873 by the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico, again with the caveat that newly freed men and women work for their previous owners for three years. In 1880, following the Pact of Zanjón, which ended the Ten Years' War (1868–1878) with Cuba and recognised the freed status of those who had fought with the rebellion against Spain, the Madrid government introduced a 'patronato' [indentured labour] system and also decreed the future abolition of slavery, set for 1888. In the end, this came two years sooner.¹³

The view of a resurgence, rather than waning, of the slave trade and use of slave labour late into the nineteenth centuries in the Spanish-governed Atlantic colonies reflects trends in recent scholarship on the subject which emphasise a period of 'second slavery' in the Atlantic world, and, in the nineteenth century Spanish-ruled world, a period of second or 'modern empire'.¹⁴ Earlier generations of historians explained the (late) ending of slavery in the Spanish colonies according to structural changes that made increasingly evident the internal contradictions of using slave labour, technological advancements and innovations in the way sugar was produced. Some asserted that Cuban plantation owners, unlike their North American counterparts, had only an economic and not a moral attachment to slavery. Such analyses argued that slavery in Cuba was dying out naturally and that the decreeing of abolition simply acknowledged a process that was already underway.¹⁵ Other historians have directed their attention to events in Madrid and, in particular, to evolutions in Spanish colonial policy. For Arthur Corwin, for example, the abolition of slavery in Cuba resulted principally from decisions taken in the metropolitan centre, under pressure both at home and internationally to push Spain towards more 'advanced and civilised' ways of organising labour.¹⁶

More recently, however, the narratives of the gradual demise of Atlantic slavery under threat from greater efficiencies of technology and

pressure from politically and economically liberal ideals held in the colonial centre have given way to the view of a strengthened slave-economy and attachment to slavery among the planters and colonial powers in Cuba and Puerto Rico as well as of a metropolitan centre that was at best in favour of a 'controlled transition to freedom' and of a colonial population of freed men and women and still enslaved people who were in large part architects of their own emancipation.¹⁷ Scholars including Christopher Schmidt-Nowara and Rebecca Scott have asked a new question: why, despite the ascendancy of political and economic liberalism in the independent nations of Latin America and in colonial Spain, was the continued practice of slavery in the Spanish colonies (and Brazil) so entrenched and 'resistant to abolition' until close to the end of the nineteenth century?¹⁸ In so doing, focus has shifted to events in the colonies themselves (and to the metropole-colony relationship) and the actions of the free and unfree people living there. The impetus to abolition given by war has been recognised.¹⁹ Abolition was not simply decreed from afar and above.

The arguments put forward in this chapter must be placed in the context of these important debates. Whilst the 'action' discussed here took place almost exclusively in the metropolitan centre and focuses on the words and events leading towards abolition, rather than the processes of emancipation, in no way does this intend to detract from the central role in bringing about abolition and emancipation from slavery that was played by colonised and enslaved people in the colonised lands. This chapter deals with the organisations, debates and laws that were established, performed and enacted in Spain during and after the (for Spain) transformative period of the revolutionary *sexenio*. Certainly these form only part of the story of emancipation and of the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico and Cuba. However where they did have sizable influence was in processes of self-fashioning in late-century Spain. The discourse on abolition that was formed in Spain, principally in Madrid and Barcelona, crucially informed the ways in which politically engaged Spaniards imagined themselves and their place in the modern world. Whilst the moral and economic arguments against the continued use of slavery were of course important to Spanish abolitionists, above all, as Christopher Schmidt-Nowara pointed out, it was the idea that slavery was the 'historical residue of absolutist regimes' and antithetical to 'the imperatives of individual liberty' that concerned them most.²⁰ In short, the continuance of slavery in the colonies threatened Spaniards' ability

to consider themselves, and be considered, modern. The connections between abolition and modernity as they informed liberal Spain's understanding and projection of itself as a modern people and nation are the focus of this chapter.

In the Spanish political classes' debates, the processes of abolition and emancipation experienced in other nation-states figured heavily and were hailed variously as exemplars or as evidence of the 'danger' and threat to stability posed by abolition. In particular, the models of Great Britain, France and the United States were widely debated, though none more so than the United States.²¹ This chapter examines, first, the ways in which the distinct path to abolition in the United States was harnessed in Spain during and after the upheavals of the *sexenio revolucionario*, both by those advocating the abolitionist cause and those alarmed by the prospect of the end of slavery in Cuba. Here the apparent inseparability of abolition and war was key. Secondly, the chapter considers Spanish discourse on the aftermath of abolition in the United States, driven on all sides by concerns to avoid a 'race war' in Spanish Cuba. The racial fractures of the post-bellum United States, including segregation and lynching Klansmen horrified and fascinated Spaniards, providing fodder for conservative Spaniards' arguments that the USA was a brutal, uncivilised place, not a model of modern civilisation. Spanish Americophiles were compelled to craft carefully their counter-arguments, sometimes incorporating twists of logic, to argue that the evident difficulties wrought by the continuing legacies of slavery after abolition then being faced in the USA were being steadily overcome. Moreover, they insisted that such difficulties only reinforced the utility of studying the US case as a set of possible lessons for an eventual post-emancipation Cuba.

The chapter focuses particularly on the United States, as an example of abolition whose complexities and ambiguities allowed it to be manipulated by both sides, as a nation that was viewed not only as a possible model of emancipation but also of democracy and republicanism and as a state that intervened directly in the question of slavery in Cuba. The case study of the way in which Spaniards imagined the causes, processes and consequences of abolition in the USA provides an opportunity to explore the importance of 'models' of emancipation as well as the relationship posited between abolition in an international context and the domestic political discourse in Spain surrounding questions of democracy, liberalism, republicanism and modernity.

‘AN IMPOSITION [...] OF THE TIMES
AND CIRCUMSTANCES’: DEBATING ABOLITION DURING
THE SEXENIO REVOLUCIONARIO AND AFTER

Already before the advent of the First Spanish Republic and the political upheavals of the *sexenio revolucionario*, those Spaniards with an eye on developments across the Atlantic, realised that events there—the centrality of abolition to the Unionist cause and the increasingly likely prospect of victory for the North in the US Civil War—would surely have repercussions in Spain. The confluence of the Spanish crown’s commitment to protecting the land- and slave-holding interests of its aristocracy (and its own) in the colonial territories, the importance of Southern cotton to the growing Catalan textile industry and Lincoln’s hostility to the (temporary) Spanish re-annexation of Santo Domingo in 1861, might have been expected to align the Spanish government with the pro-slavery cause of the Southern Confederate States of America.²² However, the failure of Confederacy diplomatic efforts to capitalise on their ‘natural ally and friend’ in Madrid²³ and, conversely, the more astute and ultimately successful diplomatic efforts of the US *chargé d’affaires*, Horatio Perry and his Spanish wife, Carolina Coronado, ensured that the Spanish crown declared its neutrality in June 1861 and even forced the departure of Confederate ships from Spanish ports.²⁴

Even if Spanish diplomats in Washington harboured hopes for a Confederate victory, which might have provided political and moral support for a slave-owning Cuba against possible international pressure, following the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation and Gettysburg Address, they were forced to conclude that a victory for the South was no longer realistic. With that, they determined, the demise of slavery in the whole of the Americas was surely only a question of time. What’s more, the prospect of victory for the northern-based and anti-slavery Union raised again the prospect of greater intervention by a post-war US government in the movement for Cuban independence, including the possible annexation of the island. To this end, the Spanish ambassador to the USA, Gabriel Tasser, advised his government in Madrid in July 1865 that it might be prudent, even if only as a way to counter the threat of continued North American interference in Cuba, to look towards abolishing the practice of slavery in the Antilles colonies.²⁵

During the democratic *sexenio*, the political debates on the abolition or continuance of the practice of slavery in Cuba crystallised around two principal movements, both established in the 1860s in response to the

seeming international shift towards manumission and emancipation. The Spanish Abolitionist Society [*Sociedad Abolicionista Española*, SAE] was founded in April 1865 by the recent Puerto Rican émigré in Madrid, Julio Vizcarrondo and his American wife Harriet Brewster.²⁶ Its founder members, who figured among the stars of liberal politics, included (besides the two colonial ministers already mentioned) Emilio Castelar, Félix Bona, Gabriel Rodríguez, Rafael María de Labra and Nicolás Salmerón. From the start the Abolitionist Society proved popular; within a year it had amassed more than 700 members, filling theatres for its meetings, encompassing a female section organised by Harriet Brewster and numbering Concepción Arenal, Carolina Coronado and Faustina Sáez de Melgar among its active members, and a weekly newspaper, *El Abolicionista*.²⁷ Debates took place in the *tertulias* in the cafes and public demonstrations were staged in the streets of the capital. The meeting of the *tertulia radical* on 16 January 1873, for example, was devoted to a debate on colonial policy and the abolition of slavery and was timed to follow an abolitionist demonstration held in Madrid on the 12th, reportedly attended by between 10,000 and 16,000 people, many holding placards calling for 'immediate abolition' and citing the names of abolitionist heroes: Wilberforce, Buxton, Lacroix and Lincoln.²⁸ Also from the start, the 'American' influences of the organisation, or at least a perception of these, were evident. Vizcarrondo was recalled as the 'soul' of the society; 'he began the movement, organized it, united us, encouraged us, he looked after the meetings and the publications of pamphlets and the *Abolitionist* [newspaper], and he did all this with a zeal, a diligence, and a practical sense that betrayed his Anglo-American education.'²⁹

Vizcarrondo had been converted to the abolitionist cause in the United States. Like many young Puerto Ricans and Cubans from wealthy families, he was sent to the USA to complete his higher education, an experience that often led to the acquisition of firm liberal convictions. In 1854 he returned to Puerto Rico from the USA with his new American wife, immediately liberated his slaves and began working for the cause of emancipation. What's more, the Society's members acknowledged the influence of events in the USA as providing an important impetus for the coagulation of disparate 'lone voices' calling for abolition into a full-fledged, organised movement. As Gabriel Rodríguez remarked, 'the American Civil War influenced opinion in Spain giving tremendous support to the hitherto isolated efforts of our abolitionists'.³⁰

As a cause embraced by many of the liberal political actors thrust into positions of power by the September revolution, the abolitionist cause was inextricably linked to the broader movement for liberal political-economic (and to a lesser extent social) reform on the peninsular. The most poetic connection made between the claims to modern political liberty in the name of which the revolutionary *pronunciamiento* had been enacted and the need to abolish colonial slavery if these claims were to be made good was provided by Carolina Coronado. In her poem ‘On the abolition of slavery in Cuba’, read to a meeting of the Abolitionist Society in October 1868, she questioned, ‘By what right, noble Castille, /do you keep their hands in chains, /when, enslaved by the call of liberty, /you break sovereign sceptres?’³¹ The continued failure of those who had broken ‘sovereign sceptres’ to enact significant colonial reform and to end the practice of slavery caused the initial expectation of 1868 to give way to disappointment and disillusion, as Gabriel Rodríguez made clear on the eve of the First Republic.

One of the great mistakes of the Spanish revolution consists in having ascribed little importance to colonial reform, agreeing to uphold a *status quo* there that is incompatible with the liberal principles proclaimed and established in the metropole, incompatible with morality, incompatible with civilisation and modern rights. Spanish liberal parties have ignored or neglected for many years a fundamental principle of political order, formulated by Lincoln in that famous maxim: “A nation cannot be half free and half slave”.³²

The failure of the nascent republic to match the enactment of radical reform at home with the immediate abolition of slavery in the *Ultramar* remained an enduring source of national shame. As the Abolitionist Society’s president, Fernando de Castro, noted, Spain was the only country ‘among the cultured peoples’ to continue the practice; the other major slave-trading nations, Britain, France and the United States had all formally abolished slavery and the slave trade by 1833, 1848 and 1865, respectively.³³ What’s more, within these three nations, the volume of voices speaking out against Spain’s refusal to legislate abolition was growing increasingly loud, especially in Britain and, increasingly, in the United States. Back in Madrid, the abolitionists’ dismay at their ‘progressive’ government’s failure to abolish slavery once and for all throughout the Spanish Caribbean was all the more piquant given that successive ministers of *Ultramar* were

also members of the Abolitionist Society. Manuel Becerra, colonial minister from September 1869 to April 1870 and his successor, Segismundo Moret, the minister responsible for decreeing immediate abolition in Puerto Rico in 1873 as well his eponymous law of 1870 which set in train a process of gradual abolition in Cuba that would be completed by 1888, were both leading members of the abolitionist movement. The efforts of these Society members whilst in office, however, fell well short of their fellow abolitionists' demands for the immediate end of the practice. Still, even as the six-year experiment in increased democracy and liberalisation came to its chaotic conclusion, the committed abolitionist and democrat, Rafael de Labra continued to see the end of slavery as an imperative 'of the times and circumstances'.

Today the civilised world demands abolition; the appropriate term for the end of the dreadful colonial problem and the war in Cuba, a condition for the September revolution, an imposition—yes, imposition—of the times and circumstances, which at this time no party in Spain could resist.³⁴

Compounding the liberals' sense of shame at the disharmony between domestic reform and colonial status quo was the abolitionist discourse that pinned responsibility for the transatlantic slave trade and slavery in the USA to Spanish ancestors. In this discourse it was imperative to act to end slavery in the Spanish colonies in order to atone for perceived Spanish responsibility for having originated the practice in the Americas.³⁵ The loss of Spain's continental American empire in the 1820s and perceptions of current national decay were understood as punishment for this iniquitous contribution to modernity. Religious and emotive language to this effect filled abolitionist speeches and writings. In her 1861 'Ode to Lincoln', Carolina Coronado agonised that 'the valiant conquerors' exploits/have ultimately led/to the expansion/of the hateful domain of slavery'.³⁶ By imagining the fate of the then war-torn Union as a ship buffeted in the 'terrible ocean' that separated and connected Spain and the United States, Coronado identified the outcome of the US Civil War as intimately allied to Spain's own future as a modern, progressive nation-state. To fail to act seemed to carry with it the risk of divine punishment in the form of fratricidal war, national humiliation and Spain's continued absence from the club of 'great' modern, progressive nations. Religious invocations against the impiety and inhumanity of slavery were made with an eye to the detrimental impact the continued practice of slavery might have on the for-

tunes of their country—and their own soul—rather than the physical and immoral suffering caused to slaves in the here and now. Gabriel Rodríguez ‘tremble[d] at the thought of the bad things that this conduct [the continued practice of slavery in Cuba] has in store for us’.

If, due to the incompetence and bad intentions of certain men, one of those terrible moments arrives for Spain, when, as Lincoln said, Providence, punishing the people that abandon the path of justice, demands that we loose the riches accumulated through the work of slaves, and that at the strike of a sword a drop of our blood springs forth, paying for every drop spilled by the whip, we are at least left with the consolation of saying in our conscience: “It was not our fault; God’s will, will be done!” (*Great applause.*)³⁷

To be redeemed—and to be modern—slavery in the Antilles had to end.

The voices of abolition were not, however, the only ones to organise themselves during the *sexenio democrático*. In response to the rise of the abolitionist movement, the outbreak of the independence war in Cuba, and the evident (if flawed) reforming spirit of the revolutionary governments at home, parallel coalitions developed that promoted the interests of land- and slave-holders in the Antilles, aiming to prevent radical colonial reform and arguing especially fiercely against immediate, unindemnified abolition. In 1871 the *Centro Hispano Ultramarino* was founded by the Marqués de Manzanedo, to unite Spaniards who had previously resided in the Antilles. Similarly, alarmed at the passing of the bill to abolish slavery in Puerto Rico, at the end of 1872 the former captain-general of Cuba (1859–62), General Serrano (who had declared *veintre libre* in Cuba whilst head of the provisional government immediately following the 1868 revolution) established the *Liga contra las reformas ultramarinas* or *Liga nacional*, to advocate gradual and indemnified abolition—if abolition had to take place at all—and to defend ‘*Cuba Española*’. Many opponents of colonial reform were conservative monarchists, but as Serrano’s presence in the *Liga* indicates, the values of the Glorious Revolution were not only the preserve of the abolitionists. The anti-reform lobby also invoked the ‘sacred names of humanity and liberty’ in whose cause the September revolution had been declared to argue against the decreeing of immediate abolition in Cuba. According to their argument, immediate abolition would flout the principle of fraternity. Just as the American Unionists had assured the economic, social and political ruin of their slave-holding

‘brothers’ in the South, so too would the decreeing of immediate abolition in Cuba meet ‘the same misfortune, the same cruel sacrifices, identical death’ on ‘our brothers from *Ultramar*’.

‘What then were the triumphs of the glorious September revolution?

Why are they legislating for us and without us?’³⁸

Participants on all sides of the debate on slavery and abolition employed transnational frames of reference to argue their case. The pages of *El Abolicionista*, the official weekly newspaper of the SAE, were filled with articles reporting on historical or contemporary emancipation processes and other newsworthy stories from elsewhere in the world from Brazil to China. Of the three principal ‘paths to abolition’ to which Spaniards might have looked in order to learn lessons, the interest of *El Abolicionista* lay predominantly in the US and British cases, with the greatest expression of admiration reserved for the process of emancipation in North America. Between 1872 and 1874, thirteen articles in the newspaper directly recounted and evaluated abolition in the USA and six others reported on American issues more widely; in comparison, during the same period eleven articles discussed British abolitionism, a further six reported on abolition in British-ruled colonies and one further article reported British news unrelated to abolition. In this two-year period, not a single article reported on France, neither on the complex process of abolition in the French colonies nor on French affairs more generally.³⁹

Images of US-style abolition circulated in Spain in multiple forms. These images were composites made up of ideas and information gleaned from Spanish imaginaries of the USA and presented in Cortes debates, academic lectures, *tertulias* and in print and of images projected internationally by the USA and its citizens. Visions of US abolition produced in and by Americans encompassed US diplomats’ promotion to the Spanish crown and public of the civil war as a just war against slavery (to ensure European tacit support for the North), interchanges between Spaniards and Americans in the Madrid salon of Spanish-born US citizen (by marriage) Carolina Coronado,⁴⁰ correspondence between Spanish and American abolitionists as part of the transnational transatlantic abolitionist network (the correspondence between Carolina Coronado and Abraham Lincoln is the most noteworthy of many such connections⁴¹), as well as printed works of fact and fiction.

By far the most influential US novel around the mid-century, in Spain as throughout much of Europe, was Harriet Beecher Stowe's sentimental abolitionist work, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was first published in translation in Spain in December 1852 and quickly became a best-seller. It was re-translated and re-published in 1853 more quickly than any foreign novel had been before, and it was serialised in several of the national daily newspapers including *La Epoca*, *La Nación* and *Las Novedades*.⁴² On the basis of calculated serialisation and diffusion rates, Lisa Surwillo estimated that the abolitionist novel, or fragments of it, reached a readership of between 210,000 and 787,500, which translates to 5 to 20 % of all Spanish readers, or between 1 and 5 % of the population.⁴³ Such a wide circulation in a short space of time ensured that *Tío Tom* became, almost overnight, a 'veritable celebrity among the *dramatis personae* of Spanish literature'.⁴⁴ What's more, contemporary newspapers' and novelists recourse to 'wrapping' political news and commentary in 'parables and apologetics' in order to avoid suppression at the hands of the royal censor, enabled Spaniards' adeptness at reading an American novel about American slavery as a treatise on the conditions of slavery, and call for abolition in Cuba.⁴⁵

The distinction between home-grown images and those sanctioned and promoted by the USA globally were of course blurred given the interactions between the two. Rafael de Labra, whose numerous publications and speeches on the history and contemporary political, legal, economic and social workings of the USA spanning a half century made him one of the principal producers of images of the USA in late-century Spain, used US government documents to formulate his arguments, which he acquired from the US ambassador to Spain, Daniel Sickles.⁴⁶ The many translations and re-editions of Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* provided opportunities for translators and publishers to contextualise the novels with prefaces, introductions and footnotes setting out pro- or anti-slavery views.⁴⁷ The American novel also inspired several Spanish imitations or homages which transferred the action to a Spanish colonial setting, such as the stage-plays, *Haley, ó el traficante de negros*, first staged in Cádiz in October 1853 and *La Cabaña del tío Tom*, first performed in Madrid in the same year.⁴⁸ However, Spanish readers had already been introduced to the character of the sympathetic runaway slave, 'Negro Tomás' via the best-selling 'María' trilogy of Spanish author (and translator of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*) Wenceslao Ayguals de Izco, of which the first two instalments were published between 1845 and 1847 and thus predated the

publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe's work.⁴⁹ The various editions and stagings of *Tío Tom* reflected and promoted a range of attitudes towards slavery and abolition in Puerto Rico and Cuba from the demand for immediate abolition to the tacit acceptance of the continuance of slavery, understood as essential to the maintenance of Spanish rule in the islands. The stage-play, *Haley*, for example was more reformist than abolitionist. Crucially it focussed on the slave trader. The character's repentance at the end of his life (and of the play) and final act to free the slaves aboard his ship, allowed its dramatists, Ángel María de Luna and Rafael Leopoldo de Palomino, to suggest a possible path forward for Spain and the Antillean colonies that would not jeopardise Spanish colonial rule but also would not lead to the much-feared 'Haitian' race war or US-style civil war.⁵⁰ Valladares' *La Cabaña del tío Tom*, conversely, put forward pro-slavery arguments, presenting 'free Blacks', personified by the mulatto character Harris and emancipated slave, Bengalí, 'not slave traders or slave owners as the greatest threat to society in [this] vision of America'.⁵¹

Within the broad transnational transatlantic network of abolitionist societies and individuals, Spanish and US abolitionists corresponded and exchanged ideas. For example, on 15 October 1872, *El Abolicionista*, like many of the major Spanish newspapers, reproduced a message sent from the American Quakers to King Amadeo, conveying their 'sincere petition in favour of the immediate and complete abolition of slavery in all Spanish dominions', which they felt qualified to convey 'having suffered the sad consequences of this scourge of humanity and now in presence of the benefits produced by emancipation, which has breathed new life into our *patria*'.⁵² Equally, the *Abolitionist Society* did not stint from writing themselves to the US government to complain of the continued presence of North American plantation owners in Cuba who persisted with the practice of slavery despite its prohibition in their own country.⁵³ The Society urged that the USA follow the example of the European states, which, on abolishing slavery and the slave trade in their colonies, had also prohibited their citizens from possessing slaves anywhere. The USA, it argued, should do this not only in the 'interest of humanity' but also in the 'interest of Spain'.⁵⁴

The US experience of abolition was highly visible in Spain, most especially during the *sexenio*. Images of the United States were crucial to shaping discussions and bolstering arguments for and against abolition and about the pace of any process of emancipation. During the 1870 *Cortes* debates over the Moret Law, which freed only certain categories of slaves

and set in train a gradual ending of slavery, the USA came to the fore in the arguments of both the defenders of the gradual approach and advocates of immediate, outright abolition.⁵⁵ Moret himself justified his law on the basis of US experience. His moderation, he told the *Cortes*, was informed by his desire to ‘prevent great evils such as the terrible war that cost the United States so much’. After all, he added, ‘the great Lincoln did not want to abolish slavery till 1900’.⁵⁶

The US ‘model’ of abolition lent itself to being held up as a model—or anti-model—of abolition, perhaps more so than the experience of abolition and emancipation in other national settings, because it was the most recent example of abolition, because there appeared to be certain analogies between the Spanish and American contexts, namely negotiating abolition at a time of war, and above all because its difficult and complicated dynamics offered ‘evidence’ to those on all sides of the argument in relation to the aspects of colonial reform in Cuba that most troubled Spaniards: whether to decree immediate, uncompensated abolition, or to follow a more gradual path; and, especially, whether and how to abolish slavery in the midst of war.

The fear that abolition and war (‘race war’ or civil war) were inextricably linked was widely held.⁵⁷ The US experience, in which slavery was held as the principal driver of the Civil War and war was the prime context in which abolition took place, seemed to confirm this nexus. The war of independence then being fought in Cuba, which would rumble on for ten years and which had, through Céspedes’ addition of gradual, indemnified abolition to the independence programme, secured the harnessing of abolition and independence as common cause, only reinforced this perception. In addition, events in Haiti, which had become the world’s first ‘black republic’ in 1804 after the successful slave-led revolution during which white slave owners were killed, were frequently invoked by Spanish colonialists (as it was throughout Europe and the Americas) to warn against the danger of ‘race war’, imagined to lie in all places with a sizable or majority black enslaved population.⁵⁸ Cuba, with its large black and mixed population (both free and enslaved) and war of independence already underway, seemed to provide the perfect combination of factors to continue this connection.⁵⁹

The inescapable bond between war and abolition was thus difficult to deny and certainly, in contemporary understandings of the United States’ case, could not be disentangled. Spanish opponents of colonial reform insisted that US emancipation could not be separated from its wartime

context (both in the sense of being a wartime expedient and in the sense of stoking conflict); any declaration of immediate abolition in Cuba could not avoid sparking or exacerbating a similarly fratricidal conflict in Spanish Cuba. The conservative daily *La Epoca*, always unstinting in its criticism both of colonial reform in the Antilles and of the 'Great Republic' across the Atlantic, reacted to the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico, just decreed, by devoting its front page on 2 January 1873 to a defence of the status quo in Spain's colonial policy. Claiming to speak for 'the Spanish nation', the article's author, J.A.S. Argudio, claimed that immediate and unconditional abolition would lead Spain away from its rightful position as 'the august representative of European civilisation in America' and inexorably towards 'ruin, inevitable infallible ruin' in the form of 'the absorption of the continent by the supporters of Monroe'.⁶⁰ For Argudio, colonial reform, which should include the gradual elimination of slavery, could only come after peace had been restored in Cuba. What convinced him of this were the lessons of 'modern history' offered by the recent history of the USA. As such, the conservative Argudio found himself in agreement with the liberal Moret that the 'lessons' of US abolition pointed to gradual abolition.

Like Moret, Argudio was convinced that Lincoln acted from principle in his pronouncements in favour of a gradual process of the 'withering away' of slavery and insisted that the Emancipation Proclamations were vehicles of wartime expediency with disastrous results. The slow process of abolition in the states of New Jersey and New York, decreed in 1784 and 1799 respectively but not effectively fully practised until 1830 and 1837, had allowed time 'not so much to *indemnify* the liberator, as to *prepare* and educate the liberated, who was to come into the enjoyment of rights and exemptions he did not previously know'.⁶¹ However, 'the fate of the separatist States was different, for whom the decree of immediate and unconditional manumission was applied and where war was concurrent to subversion, criminality, escapes, and the scattering and relaxation of discipline, etc. etc.'

If Argudio was convinced that abolition could not be enacted in wartime if Spain were to avoid inflicting 'on our brothers of *Ultramar* with a calm conscience, the same cruel sacrifices, identical death [as Southern slave-holding interests in the US]', then proponents of immediate abolition were equally convinced that the independence war then being fought in Spain positively required colonial reform in order to bring peace. In

his concluding remarks to the Abolitionist Society conference in 1872, Gabriel Rodríguez spelled out for his audience the ‘two lessons our *patria* should make use of’ that he believed could be drawn from the US experience of abolition in war.

First of all, one cannot compromise on certain social injustices. Transition and tolerance might in certain cases avoid particular harm to a generation but its egotism augments the evils that shall later weigh down the next generations. The second lesson tells us that immediate and radical abolition, beyond being the only possible option, is the one that causes the fewest losses and disturbances. The laws of gradual abolition are either never fulfilled, or when fulfilled give rise to those violent conflicts these laws pretended to forestall.⁶³

The first lesson was one that Rodríguez insisted ‘our poor *patria* is already learning in that ill-fated Cuban war’, a war that he saw as ‘originating in our tolerance of slavery, sustained by our weakness in dealing with slave owners and which will last, in some form or another, until slavery disappears’.⁶⁴ Indeed, he was convinced ‘that the War would have ended long ago’ if the Constituent Cortes had in 1869 ‘at least decreed the abolition of slavery for the slaves belonging to Cubans who rebelled against Spain’.⁶⁵

Of course, the enormous violence and bloodshed of the US Civil War, which seemed to threaten and call into question the very foundations of the ‘Great Republic’ did pose a problem for the Spanish abolitionists who proposed the USA as a model of abolition for Spain. The brutality of the Civil War and its self-evident fratricidal nature fed into negative images of America as a place of barbarity and an absence of civilisation.⁶⁶ How could the USA experience of abolition be presented as an inspiration when it was so bound up with a conflict that had seemed to bring the USA to the brink of destruction? Some, like Rodríguez, dealt with this difficulty by presenting the war in simple, polarised terms as a crusade of the morally righteous North against a corrupt and cruel South, carried out with the express purpose of bringing an end to the practice of slavery, with victory for the progressive Union always assured.⁶⁷

With the larger, richer, more active and intelligent population, and fighting for a just cause, it [the Union] made gigantic efforts, in a short time, to raise armies superior to any before seen in history, multiplied the progress

and inventions of arms, and using force in the only legitimate way, which is the defence of liberty and justice, swept from the soil of the fatherland the abomination of slavery, converting into free beings four million men, previously stooped under the vile whip of their own brothers. Four years were required for this great work: four years of desolation and struggle; four years in which human blood ran in streams, and immense riches were destroyed; a terrible lesson, which shows us once more how dearly a people pays its crimes and weaknesses. (*Good, good*)

The war on the South's part was savage and cruel: on the North's part moderate and humane. [...]. The abolitionists fought in the way that men fight when motivated by a sense of justice: the slavers like criminals who see the fruit of their depredations in danger. (*Approval!*)⁶⁸

Indeed, this reading reflected the version of history projected by the Unionists themselves during and after the conflict, including by the US chargé d'affairs in Spain, Horatio Perry, who told US Secretary of State William Seward in 1862, 'I am using the slavery argument. This is the only point which has told for us, and editors have not ceased to reproduce it'.⁶⁹ Others adopted another US-promoted explanation of the conflict as the ultimate test of its ideals and institutions, a necessary purging of its unmodernised and undemocratic aspects, from which the USA had emerged better and stronger. The analogy between Lincoln as the 'redeeming eagle' of the US republic, through abolition, and the need to similarly sanctify Spain's modernity by ending its acceptance of slavery was made clear by those who took this line, including Coronado and Castelar.⁷⁰ There were a few individuals, however, who did not shy away from addressing the complexities of the American Civil War and what these might mean for Spain. The most outstanding example is Rafael María de Labra, the Cuban lawyer who represented Puerto Rico in the Madrid *Cortes*.

Labra's reading of the connections between civil war, slavery and abolition in the United States was informed by his wider liberal and Krausist convictions relating to free trade, education and reform as the route to a harmonious society. For him, the reduction of the US Civil War to the sole question of an abolitionist North versus a pro-slavery South—granted that 'the slave owners and those resisting abolition are precisely the separatists'—ignored the multiplicity of its causes.⁷¹ Instead, Labra pursued a more subtle line of argument, namely that, although during the Civil War the question of the continuance of slavery in the South became inextricably bound to the question of Southern separatism, it did not follow

either that the war resulted solely from the slavery debate or that when immediate abolition was finally decreed it was simply a wartime expedient. Assessing Lincoln's thought processes in the 'agonizing moments' in the run up to the Emancipation Proclamation on the first day of 1873, Labra argued that Lincoln was motivated by the need to 'weaken the enemy', to 'take advantage of the military resources that his own adversary offered him, to avoid the difficulties and the compromises that his respect for the status quo caused him, and to use the enthusiasm that the great cause of abolition had awakened in the North'.⁷² Despite the military context and pragmatic timing of Lincoln's first steps towards enacting (initially gradual) abolition, Labra explained Lincoln's reluctance to enter into the abolitionist debate early in the war as evidence of his efforts to maintain the Union, whilst this still seemed possible, and pointed to the final constitutional abolition of slavery in 1865, which was immediate and unequivocal, as evidence of Lincoln's personal commitment to the principle of immediate abolition.⁷³

In formulating his argument, the independence war in Cuba, then in the fifth of its ten years, was to the fore of Labra's mind. Labra's concern was to simultaneously demonstrate that a fervent and polarised debate on abolition need not necessarily end in fratricidal war and that immediate abolition had been in the USA—as it should be in Spain—a matter of principle rather than expediency. Anxious to avoid any inference that attempts to abolish slavery in Cuba would exacerbate or lead to war there as bloody as that recently experienced in the USA, Labra pointed to the different nature of the violent struggle for Cuban independence; 'the fight between the insurgents and the Government is, [...] in Cuba, of a completely different nature in its origin, its reality and its meaning, to that of the dispute sustained by the armies of Lee and Grant and the efforts of Davis and Lincoln'.⁷⁴

The figure of Abraham Lincoln, as discussed in Chap. 2, was an international 'protean symbol', whose global appeal reached its zenith during the final third of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth.⁷⁵ The imagined Lincoln was sufficiently versatile to resonate with people in widely differing contexts and circumstances and to allow for the projection of varied hopes and concerns onto his image. In late-century Spain, as Carolyn Boyd points out, the imagined Lincoln was effectively 'a man for all seasons', invoked by 'Spaniards whose political and cultural values have otherwise diverged remarkably'.⁷⁶ Above all it was the image of Lincoln as the 'Great Emancipator' that resonated and was projected most brightly.

Spanish abolitionists reverently included him in their roll call of heroes of emancipation alongside William Wilberforce and Toussaint L’Ouverture.⁷⁷ His actions and words were time and again cited, not only in Coronado’s romantic poetry but in the abolitionist speeches of Rodríguez, Castelar and Labra among others, who repeatedly paraphrased Lincoln’s famous House Divided speech of 1858. ‘A people cannot be half slave, half free [sic]’, Rodríguez and Labra both told the *tertulia radical* in 1873, alluding to the incongruence of the domestic liberal reforms of the *sexenio* and the continuance of slavery in Spain’s colonies as well as to the need to enact immediate abolition in Cuba in order to bring an end to the war for independence then being fought there.⁷⁸ The evolutions and changing circumstances in which Lincoln’s speeches and writings were produced meant that he was summoned both by those insisting upon immediate, unindemnified abolition and, as we have noted in the cases of the progressive Moret and conservative Argudio, for those seeking a more gradual and compensated end to slavery in the Spanish Antilles. Readings of Lincoln as a principled supporter of gradual abolition were given short shrift by Labra, who ended his explanation of the interplay of wartime pragmatism and principled commitment in the eventual evolution of abolition in the USA with the admonition: ‘hence one shall not talk of the gradual abolitionism of Lincoln. No talk of the very special nature of abolition in the United States’.⁷⁹ Fernando de Castro agreed. Before the context of war made it permissible, he argued, Lincoln could not have decreed abolition across the USA because slavery came under the remit of state, not federal legislature, but he doubted that Lincoln would have ‘hesitated a single moment’ had he found himself in ‘our country, where the Cortes have the perfect and recognised right to legislate on everything regarding our colonies’.⁸⁰

Labra and Castelar both wrote multiple accounts of Lincoln’s life, intended as ‘tool[s] of political mobilisation and civic instruction’ in reforming liberalism as a counterpoint to the rising interest in socialist and anarchist thought.⁸¹ Other biographies posited Lincoln as ‘worker’ or as republican martyr, whilst Alfonso Jouault’s biography, translated into Spanish immediately upon its original publication in French in 1876, depicted Lincoln as a secular god, ‘the most just man the nineteenth century has seen’ and a ‘living incarnation of dignity and the rights of manual labour’, whose life had developed in parallel with the progress of his country, ‘marching between darkness and silence to the peaceful conquest of the New World with work and liberty’.⁸²

For Rafael de Labra, the lesson that could be drawn from the United States did not simply relate to how the process of abolition should unfold. He also drew on the US experience to make the case for abolition and, as we will see later, to address how the aftermath of the eventual abolition of slavery should be managed.

Labra wrote extensively on the abolition of slavery in an international context, in which US examples and references featured prominently. In 1873 he devoted an entire book to the United States, written ‘with a political goal and to allow the reader to make pertinent comparisons with our Antilles’ ahead of upcoming debates in the Cortes on Cuban abolition.⁸³ The book was also serialised in *El Abolicionista* from May 1873. In this work, Labra outlined the socio-economic and political cases for abolition. Feeling the moral case to be self-evident and unassailable, he concentrated his efforts on refuting and assuaging the fears of those who argued that abolition would bring economic ruin to Spain’s most profitable colony. In so doing, he rebutted the arguments that the opponents of abolition—who often had colonial economic interests themselves—saw as their strongest weapon.

Thus, both in *La Emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* and the later *La Brutalidad de los Negros* (1876), Labra built an argument to counter the ubiquitous slave-holder claims that immediate and unindemnified abolition would lead to high levels of absenteeism, crime, vagrancy and poverty among the suddenly liberated and supposedly ill-prepared black population.⁸⁴ He turned to the US example for the evidence to support his case, claiming that it proved the fears that emancipation inevitably led to a decrease in productivity—the presumption being that free men do not work as hard as their enslaved counterparts—were entirely unfounded. As he pointed out, far from harming production levels, the abolition of slavery had actually proved beneficial in terms of increasing profits and improving the US economy in general. Whilst acknowledging the undesirable short-term effects of emancipation, such as increased vagrancy, which he attributed to the state of war, Labra’s main evidence showed that in the years since the end of the Civil War, the production of cotton, tobacco, corn and rice in the old slave-owning states, now produced using the labour of free men, had not only regained the levels of pre-war years but actually surpassed these.⁸⁵ What’s more, census figures revealed that the population of the cotton-producing states had increased by 83.4 % since 1860, which Labra cited to refute the slave-holder argument that ‘in freedom and without the

attention of their masters, slaves would turn into vagrants and depraved men, exposed to hunger and death, in such a way as the race would be soon exterminated'.⁸⁶ Leaning as ever on the US model as well as on Krausist philosophy, Labra asserted that, with the essential help of educational and welfare organisations to help *libertos* manage the transition from enslaved to free status, Cuban ex-slaves would go on to make an invaluable contribution to society.

Abolition was desirable for its economically and morally redistributive effects upon society because it would fundamentally alter the conception of 'work' through its elevation of the intrinsic value of labour.⁸⁷ This was a key element in the Spanish abolitionist debates, which mirrored and were heavily informed (both in terms of personnel and ideology), by earlier and concurrent debates on the freeing of economic markets and the ending of protectionism in Spain's 'second empire'.⁸⁸ Free trade dictated a free labour market, making slavery incompatible with liberal economics.⁸⁹ Cuban slaves, like white working-class Spaniards, had the right to sell their labour freely—indeed this was the basis for a harmonious liberal-capitalist society—although it was not expected that non-white Cubans would form anything other than a docile, industrious proletariat under a white Hispanic middle class.⁹⁰

Beside the socio-economic argument for abolition provided by the US model, Labra also cited the political case for emancipation, again finding in the USA a model for Spanish political leaders to emulate. Here, slavery was simply judged incompatible with the United States' democratic system and therefore—since the USA represented the most progressive form of government, Labra believed—with democracy *per se*. After all, he observed, Jefferson had included in a draft version of the US Constitution a paragraph condemning the British king for having sanctioned slavery and used his veto to oppose the decision of the US assembly to halt the traffic of slaves, which was removed only at the insistence of the slave-owning states of Georgia and South Carolina. Thus, for Labra, sure of the incompatibility of democracy and slavery, the subsequent growth of the abolitionist movement in the USA during the course of the nineteenth century came as no surprise. If anything, what was more remarkable was the tenacity of the practice of slavery.

Thus, the progress of the idea, and the advance of the emancipatory cause should not be surprising. It was in the nature of things: it would have been impossible to avoid. But what is difficult to understand is that slavery, which

had everything counting against it in the great political evolution of 1789, would not only remake itself from the terrible onslaught of the revolutionary period, would not only avoid the problems of the period of the first ten constitutional amendments, would not only resist the abolitionist propaganda that in 1826 led to the formation of a representative Congress in Baltimore of the eighty emancipatory societies existing already in the whole Republic, but also in the end would take the offensive and resolve to give battle to the spirit and logic and all the interests of the American revolution, with the aim to make the heinous institution barely approved by the 1789 charter, triumph over all of this.⁹¹

The intransigence of the US anti-abolitionists up to 1865 was explained as a protracted geopolitical clash between conservatism and progress. Slavery was supported predominantly in the South, he elaborated, where the most traditional and conservative settlers were found. In the more urbanised North, being more favourable towards industry, having a greater concentration of workers and also having stronger puritan traditions and spirit of protest and liberty, not only did slavery quickly disappear, or indeed never arrive, but these areas also formed the heartland of the organised antislavery movements.⁹²

Labra's insistence on abolition as a prerequisite for progress and modernity found wide echo, as the laments of the abolitionist supporters of the September revolution affirmed. This also formed the core of the *post-sexenio* discourse, as Spanish liberals looked back after the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875 and tried to understand how they had failed to create a lasting liberally-reformed Spain. The reforming climate of the early 1870s had not only provided ideal conditions for colonial reform but had demanded it. Abolition had been 'a condition of the September revolution', Labra declared, and it remained the key to ending the ongoing colonial war and 'a requirement of the civilised world'.⁹³

Whilst the model of abolition in the USA provided a variety of potential lessons for Spain to absorb, the view from Spain of the United States was also tinged by caution and sometimes hostility. The degree of political and practical support, notably the supply of arms sent unofficially to Cuban separatists by US politicians and civil associations, the extent of US economic interests in Cuba and the recent history of US governmental efforts to purchase Cuba or otherwise incite filibuster invasions that might lead to the island's annexation, meant that the USA constituted a potential competitor and a threat to the integrity of the Spanish 'second

empire'.⁹⁴ Memories of the 'Cuban crisis' precipitated by US minister to Spain (between 1853 and 1855) Pierre Soulé's machinations under the Pierce administration to acquire Cuba for the United States, ensured that the Spanish press continued to report widely any US attempt to intervene in the issue of slavery and Cuban independence, from President Ulysses Grant's messages urging the end of slavery in Cuba, to American Quakers' petitions to King Amadeo for the 'complete and immediate abolition of slavery in all Spanish dominions', to the filibustering activity and plotting of Cuban exiles in New York and Florida.⁹⁵ Pronouncements emanating from the USA—especially those of the president—calling for the immediate end to the practice of slavery were interpreted by Spanish conservatives as unwarranted interference and even as an antecedent to belligerence. The *Liga Nacional*, in their January 1873 manifesto calling for a halt to colonial reform and the taking of gradual steps towards abolition, accused the US administration of attempting to 'move the direction and future destiny of our provinces in America from Madrid to Washington'.⁹⁶ Only *El Abolicionista*, driven as it was to assert its abolitionist message and posit the USA as a model of how this could be effected, failed to read US actions as a threat to Spanish sovereignty.⁹⁷

So close was the intertwining of Spanish abolitionist debates, the Ten Years' War, fears of annexationism and the realities of US-based support and assistance for the Cuban independence fighters, that the members of the SAE and other advocates of immediate abolition time and again felt themselves compelled to protest their patriotism and opposition to Cuban independence. Not only did they remain vulnerable to the *Liga*'s argument that abolition 'would divide the forces of the loyalists of *Ultramar*, and its practice would bring disturbance to the production of Cuba, depriving our cause of the economic resources necessary to support it against the enemy'.⁹⁸ Spanish abolitionists were also susceptible to the criticism that by putting forward the US experience of abolition as the model that Spain ought to follow, they were effectively declaring support for the country that was most vocally and directly intervening in what official Spain saw as a colonial insurrectionist movement but which many in the USA (and elsewhere) identified as a war of independence, if not a perfect opportunity for annexation.⁹⁹ A commitment to 'colonial exploitation' was 'a cornerstone for Spanish liberalism', just as it had been for absolutists.¹⁰⁰ In response to the biting accusation that Cuban independence would inevitably follow abolition—backed up by comments made by the American ambassador in Madrid, Daniel Sickles, a friend of several of the metropoli-

tan abolitionists—the *Abolitionist Society* indignantly affirmed their commitment to the ‘integrity of the patria’ and to the continued ties between colony and metropole, blood ties that were imagined to irrevocably link peninsular Spaniards to the creole settlers in Cuba and Puerto Rico.¹⁰¹ What’s more, the SAE took the opportunity to turn the accusation of wanting patriotism around, charging the *Liga* with aligning itself with Sickles’ view that Cuban independence would follow abolition because Spanish imperial rule was predicated only on slavery and the exercising of corrupt economic monopolies.

Do the men of the *Liga* believe this? Do they think that national integrity in America is only sustained by monopolies and slavery? What a terrible argument against the patriotism of that very *Liga*! What a horrible insult to the men, who without owning negroes, nor exploiting the contracts of war, nor the supply of public markets, nor the administration of confiscated assets, nor the political and administrative post, spend their money and expose their life for a principle!¹⁰²

Images of US abolition thus provided an ambiguous example for both Spanish abolitionists and those who opposed the ending of slavery and colonial reform in the Spanish Antilles. The Spanish Abolitionist Society and many of its members took cues from the United States in formulating their arguments in favour of immediate, unindemnified abolition in Cuba: the perceived incompatibility of slavery and modern democracy; the evidence that immediate abolition was the most appropriate and effective method; how to organise and fight for abolition. These were lessons gleaned from viewing and imagining the United States (and elsewhere). However, those who argued against immediate abolition in the colonies, including committed abolitionists who, finding themselves in government, were driven by concerns to halt the war for independence and prevent ‘race war’ in Cuba also drew their arguments from the US case. So did the League against colonial reform, for whom the United States’ experience showed that immediate abolition went hand in hand with war and—what was more, they said—the United States was currently stoking the flames of Cuban insurrection. In this way, the US furnished both a motive and model for debates on colonial reform in Spain. US interference in the ‘Cuban question’ helped to ensure that colonial reform remained a crucial but sticky issue for late nineteenth-century politicians and that images of the process of abolition in the USA remained contested.

AFTER ABOLITION: SPANISH IMAGES OF THE POST-EMANCIPATION USA AND THE ‘PROBLEMA NEGRA’

Despite being a confirmed exponent of the immediate abolition of slavery in the Spanish Antilles and an admirer of the process of immediate and unrecompensed abolition that had taken place in the USA, Rafael María de Labra felt compelled to reflect on what he termed the United States’ ‘so-called *problema negra*’, by which he intended ‘political, economic and social problems of major importance [which] are the effect of the relations of negroes and Chinese with whites’.¹⁰³ His interest (and that of others) in the after-effects of abolition and the position of the ex-slaves now living as free men and women in the United States was of course not disinterested, but guided by the desire to better understand the complex implications of the abolition of slavery for society and politics in Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico. Thus, while remaining convinced of the moral as well as political and economic necessity of abolition, for Labra it was essential to acknowledge the difficulties of post-emancipation societies as well as their successes.

Labra was by no means the sole member of Madrid’s political and cultural elite to comment on the consequences of abolition in the USA and what these might mean for Spain’s colonial future. Other abolitionists also identified a possible connection between the present condition of ex-slaves in North America and the future prospects for the peaceful coexistence of ‘whites’ and ‘people of colour’ and continued colonial rule in Spain’s Antillean colonies. Even for those committed to abolition, the ‘spectre’ of the Haitian revolution and the belief that ‘race war’ could easily and imminently be transported to Cuba remained a significant factor in their analyses of the possible outcomes of abolition. Liberty had come suddenly and during wartime in the USA, Gabriel Rodríguez noted in 1873, conditions which were not conducive to the smooth re-establishment of social order. They were also conditions that appeared analogous to the contemporary Cuban context, where the war for independence was ongoing as Rodríguez spoke to the Abolitionist Society conference in Madrid. According to Rodríguez, these conditions made a violent response to abolition—from freed slaves as well from those opposed to the emancipation of the slaves—more likely. To avoid this, it would be necessary to immediately disband the army upon abolition—which, Rodríguez remarked, had taken place with great rapidity and ease in the USA—and to provide opportunities for educating the newly liberated black population.¹⁰⁴

The Spanish abolitionists were unanimous in identifying education as key to ensuring racial equality and harmony after emancipation. What's more, they considered the introduction of education programmes and opportunities for ex-slaves in the United States exemplary. Already in 1873, Rodríguez noted approvingly that 'today the question of the education and work of the former slaves can be considered completely resolved in the United States, and it has been resolved without disturbances or conflict, thanks to everyone's patriotic and humanitarian efforts'.¹⁰⁵ The mechanisms that had apparently effected this smooth transition from a largely and forcibly illiterate enslaved population to literate and educated free citizens (or at least free citizens with the possibility to become literate and educated) were described in greater detail by Labra. From his vantage point in 1897, his positive assessment of the post-emancipation USA seemingly unclouded by the looming prospect of war, Labra argued that liberation necessarily proceeded hand in hand with education, just as enslavement had been intricately linked to enforced illiteracy. The 'liberating' armies of the North introduced schools in the areas they controlled, to which 'thousands of freed men presented themselves, asking to be taught'. By early 1868, he said, 4000 schools for ex-slaves had been inaugurated, including 1500 during the first year of the war. In addition, 40,000 learned to read in regimental schools.¹⁰⁶

Besides singling out the educative role played the army, Labra also praised the work of the US government and, especially, philanthropic organisations and individuals in providing timely opportunities for improving ex-slaves' education and literacy. In this, he included individual philanthropists such as George Foster Peabody and pioneering institutions like Oberlin College, 'founded for the coeducation of sexes, which opened its doors, breaking with all sorts of prejudices toward the coloured race'.¹⁰⁷ Rodríguez, writing in *El Abolicionista* some years earlier, pointed to Howard University, founded in 1867 solely for black students, as his exemplar and proof of 'the many and the great things that can be done, without effort, and in little time when there is the will and the adequate and indispensable organisation to do them'.¹⁰⁸ The university provided classical as well as more practical forms of education and, Rodríguez noted with interest, 'it further does what is possible to help the students who merit it, giving them work and ways to sustain themselves' with either manual work or positions in government offices. Whilst Spanish abolitionists concurred that the primary to tertiary educational establishments for ex-slaves set up in the immediate wake of emancipation in the United States provided posi-

tive lessons ‘for us [...] in favour of education of negroes and the elevation of their intellectual level’, it was remarked, with some irony, that provisions for the ‘re-education’ of the white ex-slave-owning population in the Southern states of the USA had proved far less successful.¹⁰⁹

Whilst championing the importance of education provisions for freed slaves and their right to realise their intellectual potential, Labra nevertheless displayed the hierarchical attitude towards race that prevailed even among staunch abolitionists. Labra mapped his idealised relationship between races onto his Krausist understanding of the natural stratification of social relationships according to gender and class. Thus, the freed black population’s right to education was envisaged as serving the same purpose as workers’ or women’s education (causes that Labra also supported), namely to allow these groups to fulfil their potential within the parameters of the subordinate role assigned to them in a naturally hierarchical society. Labra continually referred to what he called the innate ‘goodness of the negroe’¹¹⁰ and in a conference speech to the *Fomento de las Artes* in 1880 spelled out his vision of black people’s essential character.

The black is cheerful and good-natured (in fact, he is much more cheerful than he is intelligent) but that same quality joined with his robustness makes him terrible when accosted. He loses his moral faculties and becomes a wild beast.¹¹¹

The image was one of black people as naturally industrious yet docile workers, most suited to serving as the colonial proletariat under a white creole capitalist class. Under pressure, though, he believed black people to be prone to act instinctively, like animals. Similarly, under Labra’s leadership, *El Abolicionista*, which carried on its frontispiece the archetypal abolitionist image of a kneeling, chained slave appealing for recognition of his humanity, attributed the continued high rate of infant mortality among the free black population revealed by the 1870 US census to ‘the almost complete absence of maternal feelings in black women’, a supposed legacy of the system of slavery.

Under such a system, maternity dies and as a consequence, when women obtain freedom, they do not even know how to take care of their offspring: hence why children die in large numbers.¹¹²

Such racist mapping of colonial relationships between populations of different colour reflect a world-view that saw the abolition of slavery and

the realigning of colonial racial relationships as part of the same discourse as the issue of forging an effective, potential-realising white working class in the capitalist societies of the industrialising nations of Europe. Cuban slaves, like white working class Spaniards had the right to sell their labour freely—indeed this was the basis of a harmonious liberal-capitalist society—but it was not expected that non-white Cubans would enjoy the social mobility that was the supposed capitalist reward for hard work, as the abolitionist and then serving colonial minister Segismundo Moret's vision of a post-emancipation 'picturesque landscape' well illustrated. Inside a 'modest house lit by the rays of the setting sun' he imagined, 'a black mother embraces her child. As the father returns from work he lovingly greets his son. The planter, the former master, passes by on horseback through the beautiful farm where hordes of slaves once lived. [...] The planter waves in friendship to the former slave, who affectionately returns the greeting'.¹¹³ What was key for the liberal proponents of colonial reform was not so much an idealistic belief in racial equality and human morality, but their understanding of political economy and their positing of the principle of free wage labour above all else.¹¹⁴

Given the motivation behind much of the interest in race relations in the post-bellum USA, that was to draw conclusions as to the possible effects of emancipation in Cuba, Spanish commentators remained preoccupied throughout the late century with assessing the extent of the USA's successes and failings in overcoming the problems associated with the legacy of slavery and the politics of race.

The evaluations began almost as soon as the 13th amendment to the US Constitution had been passed and ratified in 1865. The early assessments of Spanish liberals during the *sexenio democrático* and first years of the Restoration tended towards positive admiration of the steps already taken and cautious optimism for the future. As images of US race politics generated by Spaniards who were associated with the cause of colonial reform and with radical *sexenio* politics more broadly, there was an evident self-interest in underlining the seemingly more positive outcomes of emancipation in the USA. The glowing evaluations of state and civil society initiatives to provide education facilities for the freed population and corresponding expectations of education's transformative powers have already been noted. Similarly, *El Abolicionista*, naturally concerned with disseminating a positive image of racial politics in the USA since 1865, published numerous articles in the first half of the 1870s noting 'advancements' including increases in the black population and agricultural production, and greater savings and higher marriage rates among the

freed black population in the South. The newspaper used the records of the 1870 US census to quash the habitual Cuban slave-holder claims that abolition would lead either to the prompt extinction of the black population or conversely to the overtaking of the white population through force of numbers. The census figures revealed that between 1860 and 1870 the black population of the USA had increased 9.21 % to 4,880,000 while the white population, more than twice the size of the black population, had grown by 24.39 %, meaning that ‘the increase [in the birth rate among the black population] does not inspire fear nor can it be deduced that the South is destined to become a country of negroes’.¹¹⁵ The tacit admittance that a large or majority black population might legitimately ‘inspire fear’ reflected concerns about the racial make-up of the Cuban population.

In a similar vein, an article from May 1875 admired the recent passing of the Civil Rights Act (struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional in 1883), which ‘has as its aim making racial equality effective, positing that negroes shall be admitted to public spaces in the same way as whites and that they can sit with them in train carriages, at hotel tables, in theatres and in reserved steamship salons, etc. etc’.¹¹⁶ Describing the Act as ‘the crowning of the constitutional amendments that abolished slavery’, the paper acknowledged that the part of the bill that would have required integrated schooling had been defeated, but affirmed nevertheless that ‘no one will be able to deny this *bill* a social reach of the first order’.¹¹⁷

At the same time, eager as it was during the radical *sexenio* to assure Spanish politicians that abolition would not damage the Cuban economy nor provoke serious social unrest, let alone ‘race war’, *El Abolicionista* could not paint an unequivocally optimistic picture of life in the USA after emancipation. The increased black population and especially migration from rural to urban areas since emancipation (for example, the black population of Charleston, South Carolina had increased 50 % in the five years since the Civil War’s end) brought with it ‘damage equally to the morale of the negroe and his health, because they live crammed together in small dwellings and against the rules of hygiene’.¹¹⁸ The paper carried the Mississippi governor’s report concerning ‘the fondness of some negroes for alcoholic beverages and a certain abandon in their customs’ whilst the continued high infant mortality rate among the black population, for which *El Abolicionista* blamed a supposed lack of maternalism among liberated black women, has already been noted.¹¹⁹

As the years passed, a more pessimistic view of the current state of race relations in the USA prevailed, although there was disagreement as to

where the blame for the failings of the post-bellum USA should be placed. Juan Bustamante y Campuzano unflinchingly placed the blame on black North Americans for failing, as he saw it, to improve their social position. He reserved his sympathy for ‘the great sufferings and humiliations’ of ‘the people of the South, the formerly great slave owners [...] even finding themselves governed by the negroes who had until recently still been their slaves, and in any case having to recognise them as their equals in political rights’.¹²⁰

Conversely, the liberal daily, *El Imparcial*,¹²¹ in an article entitled ‘Blanco y Negro’ timed to coincide with the 1892 US presidential campaign, impugned the white population in its bleak assessment of the relationship between the various ‘races’ that made up the US population. Noting on the one hand the potential of the black vote in the forthcoming elections to ‘weigh significantly in the electoral balance’, on the other it avowed continued racial hostility and segregation to be a new ‘form of slavery’.¹²² Writing, of course, eight years after the final decreeing of abolition in Cuba, the journalists had the Spanish colony firmly in mind as they wrote. In the first place, it was observed, the rising birth rate among the US black population signalled that ‘in two or three states of the Union the mass of the population is already black’ and ‘the more the number of people of colour increases, the greater the resentment whites express against them’.¹²³ Secondly, those who believed that ‘miscegenation’ would prevent violence between the black and white populations were being thwarted in their efforts to promote interracial mixing because of what the paper described as ‘the repugnance of whites, and in particular of white women, that people of colour arouse’. Finally, it observed, ‘the liberal laws’ had not sufficed to counter segregation in practice nor, especially, the continued hostility of white Americans towards their black compatriots.¹²⁴ In a conclusion directed primarily at the Spanish liberals who continued to laud the US political model almost unconditionally, the article ended on a cautionary note.

Therefore the future of the great North American republic is not as encouraging as some, dazzled by the splendours of today, believe.¹²⁵

By the end of the century, the difficult legacy of slavery and open racial fractures of American society were inescapably visible to interested Spaniards. That post-war society in the USA was racially segregated, a segregation that was enforced with brutality and violence, was abun-

dantly clear. The Forestry engineer, José Jordana y Morera, who visited the USA in the 1880s, highlighted the treatment of its black population as the fundamental flaw of the United States, which belied its claim to embody the principles of democracy, liberty and equality. On this basis he called into question the supposed greater modernity of the USA over Europe.

The errors made by the United States also hurt me more, juxtaposing them with the eminently democratic spirit which has always shone in their acts, in their customs and their laws. Effectively, it cannot be explained how a people that has sustained one of the most bloody civil wars registered in history to achieve the freedom of negroes, still maintains the fact, if not by right, of a law of castes, which keeps it separated from the man of colour, to an extreme unknown in Europe, where if less republican, we are certainly more liberal with individuals of that race.¹²⁶

The dimension of post-bellum North American racial politics that evoked the greatest (often lurid) fascination among Spaniards (both travellers to the USA and those who imagined the USA from home) was the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and, especially, the practice of lynching. With the clear exception of the Civil War, to which they were of course connected, no other American groups and practices seemed to offer clearer evidence of the barbarism and apparent absence of civilisation of the supposed ‘most modern of nations’. In addition, lynching and the Ku Klux Klan served as a salutary warning, wheeled out both before and after the ending of slavery in Cuba in 1886, of the kind of ‘race warfare’—in reality, the one-sided meting out of racist violence—that might be unleashed in Cuba in the aftermath of emancipation. Indeed, the Klan took on an almost mythical quality insofar as it was invoked and commented upon by the Spanish press even at times when it was barely active.¹²⁷ Its image, as a defining cipher of the brutal side of American modernity, continued to hold sway in the Spanish imagination of the USA long after its effective defeat in the courts by 1871. Equally, although the application of ‘Lynch’s law’, whose victims were overwhelmingly black and, like the KKK’s victims, were targeted for perceived transgressions of racial, social, economic, legal and moral codes and mores, had been a phenomenon of arbitrary and vigilante-style ‘justice’ in the USA since the late eighteenth century, its heyday as a ritualised and publicly acceptable form of community punishment (as evidenced by the profusion of posed photographs of

smiling white faces before a lynched black corpse) came in the 1890s.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, from the *sexenio revolucionario* (1868–74) to the end of the century, Spaniards repeatedly articulated their fascination with this ‘brutal extreme’ of North American life.¹²⁹

Whilst Spanish commentators abhorred lynching,¹³⁰ their repugnance was based more on what they thought it signified about American disregard for the rule of law than on feelings of empathy or sympathy with the black population. Juan Bustamante y Campuzano, the Spanish diplomat who was convinced that the predominance of black men and women employed in domestic service in Washington a mere twenty years after the abolition of slavery confirmed their status as an ‘inferior race’, voiced his disgust for lynching as a ‘facilitating medium of doing justice in America’.

The example given by [the original magistrate Lynch who gave his name to the practice] has had terrible consequences. The law of Lynch has become a mortal weapon in the hands of the people. Frequently and invoking this law, one sees the masses rising up in arms, be it on some occasions to impede the decision of judges, freeing the prisoner, or as a case is coming to a close—and this is the most frequent—to make him suffer the last appeal.¹³¹

Lynching was seen as the sign of an uncivilised people who sought to bypass their courts and official channels of justice, rather than being constitutively connected to the politics of race. To this end, some, including Bustamante y Campuzano were prepared to accept lynching as a necessary evil in the ‘lawless’ Wild West, where they agreed civilisation was still absent. As such, he imagined the eventual demise of the practice as the politics of Manifest Destiny led to the westward extension of American rule and ‘these districts are occupied by an honourable population, hard working, respectable and in their constitution strong enough not to find itself having to recur to these extreme measures, subject to the most severe reprobation in all civilised countries’.¹³²

The evocation of images of the Ku Klux Klan and lynching as representative of America’s barbarous, uncivilised side was intimately aligned to domestic political arguments between republicans and conservative and liberal monarchists. For conservatives, the barbarous disregard for the rule of law evinced by the practice of lynching undermined any pretensions that the American political system should serve Spain as a democratic (and

republican) model. In the political turmoil of January 1873, just weeks before the power vacuum at the head of the Spanish state would lead to the pronouncement of the First Republic, when the USA as a constitutional model was being widely debated in the country's *Cortes*, press, lecture halls and *tertulias*, the conservative daily *La Epoca*, published an article relating the story of John Lynch and his eponymous 'law', as well as the post-bellum origins of the Ku Klux Klan and Know-Nothing party. The less than subtle implication of the article was that the United States had no moral authority to intervene in Spanish colonial affairs and still less should it be exalted as a political model for Spain to emulate. *La Epoca*'s ire was directly principally as Spanish 'Americophiles', not at the practice of lynching and the Ku Klux Klan.¹³³

These facts [about the origins of the Lynch law, Ku Klux Klan and Know-nothings] should serve to form an opinion on the authority with which the United States pretends to impose on Spanish colonies, Christian and Catholic, and as such, humane and soft with the slave, a fond love toward negroes, against whom they have invented the [practice of] hanging from a tree, lantern or fence, without formation of a case, the assassination by virtue of the decree of a secret society, and the popular, almost permanent riots and agitations to embrace the work of whites or impede the prosperity of Africans.¹³⁴

Recognising themselves as the 'Americophiles' targeted by *La Epoca*'s article, the writers of *El Abolicionista* published its riposte two days later. In it, they corrected the 'errors' of *La Epoca*'s account of Lynch's life story and of the Know-Nothing party and retorted that their admiration for the USA was naturally reserved for US abolitionists, whose costly victory over their pro-slavery compatriots only added, in their eyes, to their 'moral authority to defend the abolition of slavery in Cuba'.

In support of their thesis *La Epoca* recalls that the United States has been the *patria* of the *ley de Linch*, the *Ku-Klux-Kan* [sic] and the *Know-Nothing*. Let us now ignore some of our colleague's errors, in particular, with respect to the first and the last point; but even if the judge Linch and his brutal procedures took place in North Carolina and targeted the *maroons* [*cimarrones*] of the *Dismal Swamp*; it being true that the *Ku-Klux-Kan* was a secret society in the South directed against the freed slaves; it being in a way positive that the *Know-Nothing* fought white immigration to sustain slavery, does this colleague not consider that all this was the work of slavers, that the

slavers have been defeated and humiliated in the great republic after 1865 and that when one talks of the United States [as a model] one always takes for granted that one is dealing with the enemies of the *Ku-Klux-Kan* and the abolitionists, who are the only ones who desire and defend abolition in Cuba? What greater authority can there be than that of the heroes of Potomac and the martyrs of the White House!¹³⁵

El Abolicionista returned to state its final word on the topic at the end of the month. This article, penned by Ladislao Corral, claimed that the struggle against segregation and racism in the USA was being won as the complex set of conditions—referred to as ‘legitimate fears’—in which the Ku Klux Klan arose had been superseded: cotton production had increased, the economic reconstruction of the South was tangibly underway and the ‘inebriation’ with which black people first welcomed liberty had faded. The free black population now realised that ‘if [liberty] establishes them as citizens on the level of their former masters, it does not give them the right to consider themselves dominant, where they have been slaves’.¹³⁶ Thus, Corral argued, given his assessment that the bases on which the Ku Klux Klan had been founded were fast mutating and disappearing, ‘we do not believe our hope that all the differences in political conditions between the sons of this great people will soon be erased to be illusory’.¹³⁷

Corral’s optimism may seem naïve but it stemmed from the heavy investment placed by Spanish abolitionists in the USA as a model for ending slavery since the outbreak of the US Civil War which, as we have seen, many Spaniards had understood along the lines projected by the Northern Unionists, as a just war against slavery. Segregation, racial violence and the difficulties of Reconstruction after the Civil War’s end were tricky for Spaniards, not only abolitionists, to square with their positive admiration of the USA’s political institutions and ways of life. Even Rafael Puig y Valls, whose account of his time spent as part of the official Spanish delegation to the 1893’s Chicago World’s Fair was otherwise dominated by wonder and praise at the vast, progressive and modern North American nation, had to express his horror at events which took place in Roanoke, Virginia, during his stay.

A mob of 3,000 men lynched the negroe Smith, hung him from a tree, formed a pyre in the square and burned him; and not happy with this outrage, it pursued the mayor and the chief of the troops to lynch them as well, and while all this was happening the Governor was enjoying the delights of

the *World's Fair* without worrying for an instant about what happens in his State, which he believes to be the best of all worlds.¹³⁸

The practice of lynching seemed emblematic of a fundamental hypocrisy between *pays légal* and *pays réel* in the USA, that is between a Constitution (including its 13th amendment) and political institutions that claimed to have instituted the most advanced modern democracy (politically and technologically) on the one hand and actually existing practices that effectively excluded many from that democracy, often violently, on the other.

The abolitionists, so invested in America as a positive model and so concerned with curbing fears of 'race war' after eventual abolition in Cuba, had to find a way of recognising and accounting for Reconstruction-era segregation and racist violence without irreparably damaging their claims for the USA to serve as a model for abolition in Cuba. Ladislao Corral, as we have seen, emphasised the Ku Klux Klan as a brief response to the immediate conditions and 'fears' of the post-war South. Fellow abolitionist, Gabriel Rodríguez, insisted that racial segregation and violence in the post-bellum USA must be attributed more broadly to the white population of the Southern states, especially 'lower class and less educated whites' and 'the political leaders of the South' who supported slavery and whose 'moral reconstruction' had progressed little.

The whites of the slave States have neither forgiven nor forgotten yet. Unable to continue defending their unjust cause with their faces uncovered, they have resisted the implementation of emancipation and the elevation of negroes to the dignity of citizens by all means.¹³⁹

Rodríguez's firm conviction that the process of abolition followed in the USA offered the most appropriate 'lesson' for Spanish colonial reformers ensured that he also adhered to the optimistic line taken by Corral. He told his audience of fellow abolitionists,

You can be assured that [the complete reconciliation of races and the forgetting of former dissensions] will be achieved very soon, and a generation will suffice for the hatreds and resentments, sad and necessary consequences of the war, to disappear. (*Certainly, certainly!*).¹⁴⁰

From here, Rodríguez, followed a confusing, somewhat contradictory line. Key to 'the complete reconciliation of races and the forgetting of

former dissensions' was 'the moral reconstruction of the Union', which 'has not progressed far regarding the white population'.¹⁴¹ At the same time, he admired the policies of the Reconstruction-era politicians, including temporary military governance of Southern states, which he insisted was not based on 'cruelty and vengeance' because 'nobody is deprived of their rights and liberties, nor is one beaten, nor imprisoned, nor executed as easily as in other places'.¹⁴² The insistence that the USA 'could already present to us an example of a truly free people, whose sons all have and exercise the same rights, without distinction of colour or race' was paramount.¹⁴³

Outside abolitionist circles, disillusionment with the USA as a model of modernity and, indeed, the circulation of images of the USA as a culturally vacant land, which lacked (and effectively was the negation of) the values of European civilisation, was not uncommon in late nineteenth-century Europe.¹⁴⁴ Spain did not want for such images; throughout the period under study, conservatives wasted no opportunity to denigrate the idea of the 'república-modelo' and the values associated with it. The idea of the USA as the inverse of Spanish (and, by extension, European) civilisation gained more widespread currency in the final decade of the century, in step with the increased belligerent rhetoric and diplomatic-military spats between Spain and the United States in the lead-up to war in 1898. Deputies' speeches to the Cortes, newspaper articles as well as cartoons and caricatures in the satirical press (as the '*Medallas Yanquis*' cartoon [Fig. 3.1] published in *Blanco y Negro* in June 1898 illustrates) often alluded to the charge of hypocrisy, centring on the USA's apparent inconsistencies between its government's proclamation of equality and democracy and the attitudes and actions towards black people (as well as towards native Americans and some immigrants) enacted there. In this context of growing belligerence between the Spanish and North American governments, the image of the USA as a place which perpetrated violence, discrimination and segregation on the basis of race against part of its own population, served Madrid's patriotic political and cultural elites as 'evidence' of the failings of the 'Great Republic'.¹⁴⁵

The question of abolition in Cuba was one of the most pressing issues facing the politicians and political classes of the *sexenio revolucionario* and the Restoration. The recent path to abolition, and its aftermath, in the United States was not the only model of abolition available to Spaniards as they debated colonial reform in their dwindling, but highly prized 'second empire'. However, it was the one that proved most influ-




Fig. 3.1 Joaquín Xaudaró, *Medallas yanquis* [Yankee medals] *Blanco y Negro*, no. 370, 4 June 1898. Ink and pencil on paper, 320 × 220 mm. Museo ABC de Dibujo e Ilustración, Madrid

ential and was considered most relevant on all sides of the debate, even though what it actually modelled and how relevant it was to Spain and Spanish colonial reform was highly contested. Was Lincoln committed in principle to gradual or to immediate abolition?; did the inseparability of abolition from civil war in the USA negate the ability of the US path to act as an exemplar or did the war-time context increase the relevance of US abolition to Spanish colonial politics, itself mired in war?; did the violent racial politics of post-bellum US society make it effectively an anti-model or did it show a way through the inevitable difficulties of establishing a unified post-war and post-abolition society of ex-slaves and ex-slaveholders?

To further complicate the roles played by images of US abolition in Spain in the second half of the nineteenth century, the discussion of abolition both in the USA and in Cuba could not easily be divorced from the perception that the United States constituted a rival to imperial Spain in Cuba.

The American path to abolition was appropriated heavily by Spaniards precisely because its images were so malleable. The visions of US abolition produced in Spain were not always accurate; indeed, they were often startlingly misinformed and simplistic. Certainly, the images of abolition circulating in Spain that emanated from the USA were predominantly those produced by supporters of the Unionist cause, above all Harriet Beecher Stowe's sentimental and righteous portrayal of slavery and emancipation that took Spain, and Europe, by storm. Equally, of the images produced in Spain (of course all were to different degrees composites of various national productions), those of Spanish abolitionists, fervent in their arguing for an immediate end to the stain of slavery in Cuba, were the most developed and widely circulated.

The principal driver of Spanish interest in the path to abolition in the USA was war. The indivisibility of the Emancipation Proclamations from their civil war context made their study all the more relevant in the eyes of both abolitionist and anti-reform Spaniards who, for the most part, understood the Cuban independence struggles in the final thirty years of the century as a domestic conflict, taking place in a province integral to the Spanish nation. Conflict of a different but related kind lay at the heart of Spanish interest in the racial politics and segregated society of the post-bellum USA. Creole and metropolitan elites drew parallels between the sugar-producing plantation economies of pre-revolutionary Haiti and colonial Cuba and the cotton-producing plantations of the American

South and their large minority or majority black/mixed populations. This line of thinking only intensified fears that 'Cuba' might one day become a watchword for racial conflict and violence to match that of 'Haiti'. Finally, besides reflecting a concern for self-salvation and for the principle of a hierarchical society founded upon the notion of free labour, Spanish interest in post-abolitionist America also served to stoke the discourse on what constituted civilisation and progress in the late nineteenth century. The abhorrence expressed at the practice of lynching and at the activities of the Ku Klux Klan—which persisted as a central facet of the Spanish image of contemporary race relations in the USA even after it had ceased to operate systematically—resulted from their perceived incompatibility with the rule of law, progress and civilisation, attributes that the USA was supposed to exemplify. Thus, while those who sought to discredit the republican and democratic ideals embodied by the USA as being inappropriate for Restoration Spain could seize upon the continuance of racial conflict there as evidence of their correctness, admirers of the USA struggled to reconcile these 'barbarous' practices with their vision of the USA as the model of a civilised and progressive state.

NOTES

1. See, for example, D. Jordan & E. Pratt (1931) *Europe and the American Civil War* (London & Edinburgh: Oxford University Press).
2. A. Ferrer (1999) *Insurgent Cuba: race, nation and revolution 1868–1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press) pp. 1–2.
3. L. Surwillo (2007) 'Poetic diplomacy. Carolina Coronado and the American civil war' in *Comparative American Studies* vol. 5.4, p. 411.
4. These comments were published in an article in the Carlist newspaper, *El Pensamiento Español* in September 1862, and were cited in D. Jordan & E. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War* p. 251.
5. A. Corwin (1967) *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba 1817–1886* (Austin & London: University of Texas Press) pp. 224–6. R. Scott (1985) *Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The Transition to Free Labour, 1860–1899* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) pp. 46–7. This was a gradual abolition, with indemnity and subordinated to the needs of war, designed to both rally international support for the cause of Cuban independence—which it did, especially among individual Americans, many of whom sent voluntary aid—but also to avoid displeasing overly Cuba's landed and slave-owning elites. Albeit the result of expediency, the adding of abolition to the rebellion's political programme meant that a link was made between

the causes of abolition and of independence in Cuba, and between the abolitionist causes in Cuba and the USA.

6. See C. Schmidt-Nowara (2011) *Slavery, freedom and abolition in Latin America and the Atlantic World* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press) pp. 144–7.
7. C. Schmidt-Nowara (2011) ‘Introduction: Caribbean emancipations’, special issue of *Social History* vol. 36.3 p. 257.
8. The practice of slavery in Spain’s colonies has often been imagined, certainly by contemporaries, as somehow ‘less cruel’ than that practiced in the USA and the British-ruled Caribbean—an idea recognised even by those campaigning for abolition.
9. C Schmidt-Nowara *Slavery, freedom and abolition* p. 4.
10. See C Schmidt-Nowara *Slavery, freedom and abolition* pp. 12–14.
11. Estimates Database (2009) Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, www.slavevoyages.org accessed 15 August 2013. Also cited in C. Schmidt-Nowara *Slavery, freedom and abolition* p. 4.
12. Quotations from C. Schmidt-Nowara ‘Introduction: Caribbean emancipations’ p. 258.
13. A useful table outlining the key dates and events that marked the end of slavery in the Spanish Caribbean and Brazil can be found in C. Schmidt-Nowara *Slavery, freedom and abolition* p. 146.
14. On the idea of a ‘second slavery’ in the nineteenth century, see D. Tomich (2004) *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital and the World Economy* (Boulder, CO.: Rowman & Littlefield); on Spain’s ‘second empire’ or ‘modern empire’, see Alda Blanco (2007) ‘Spain at the crossroads: Imperial nostalgia or modern colonialism?’ *A contra corriente* vol. 5.1, pp.1–11.
15. Interpretations that rest on the notion of the internal contradictions and inevitable dying away of the practice of slavery in Cuba have been put forward by historians such as Manuel Moreno Fraginals and Eugene Genovese. See R.J. Scott (2000) ‘Explaining Abolition: Contradiction, Adaptation and Challenge in Cuban Slave Society 1860–86’ in V.A. Shepherd & H. McD. Beckles eds. *Caribbean Slavery in the Atlantic World* (Oxford: James Currey Publishers) p. 1087.
16. R.J. Scott ‘Explaining Abolition’ p. 1087.
17. The quotation comes from C. Schmidt-Nowara ‘Introduction: Caribbean emancipations’ p. 259.
18. See R. Scott *Slave emancipation in Cuba: The transition to free labor*; C. Schmidt-Nowara (1999) *Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press) *passim* and *idem*. *Slavery, freedom and abolition* *passim*.
19. See C. Schmidt-Nowara *Slavery, freedom and abolition* p. 6.
20. C. Schmidt-Nowara *Slavery, freedom and abolition* p. 3.

21. In the earlier nineteenth century it seems that the actions of the British government and the influence of British abolitionists had a greater impact on Spanish abolitionism. For example, Wilberforce's writings were translated into Spanish by the advocate of abolition of both the slave trade and slavery, Joseph Blanco White. Similarly, the famous diagram of the *Brooks* slave ship was circulated in Spain, along with Thomas Clarkson's (1825) (A. de Gimbernat trans.) *Grito de los africanos contra los europeos, sus opresores, ó sea rápida ojeada sobre el comercio homicida llamado Tráfico de Negros*, (Barcelona: Imprenta de José Torner) See C. Schmidt-Nowara *Slavery, freedom and abolition* pp. 129; 134–5.
22. W.H. Bowen (2011) *Spain and the American Civil War* (Columbia & London: University of Missouri Press), especially pp. 2–6. See also D. Jordan & E. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War* pp. 245–9.
23. The Spanish foreign minister, Saturnino Calderón Collantes described Spain thusly to the Confederate representative in Madrid, Pierre Rost. Reported in W.H. Bowen *Spain and the American Civil War* p. 78.
24. L. Surwillo 'Poetic diplomacy' p. 411.
25. A. Corwin *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba* p. 162. A resounding victory for either side in the Civil War was seen as a potential portent of renewed US intervention in Cuba. After all, Southerners including Jefferson Davis had been involved in annexation attempts before the war. Only a divided and thus weakened USA offered the realistic prospect of no, or little, US involvement in Cuba. Hence, it was specifically victory for the anti-slavery North that made an abolitionist policy a potentially useful strategy for the Spanish government seeking to head off any post-war US interventions in their Caribbean colonies.
26. See A. Corwin *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba* pp. 154–7.
27. The organ of the Spanish Abolitionist Society, *El Abolicionista*, was published in Madrid from June 1865. Publication was suspended in mid 1869 until October 1872, when the newspaper was published with a new sequence until 1876.
28. *El Abolicionista* 20 Jan. 1873.
29. Joaquín María Sanromá, cited in A. Corwin *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba* p. 158.
30. Cited in A. Corwin *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba* p. 162.
31. L. Surwillo 'Poetic diplomacy' p. 416.
32. Speech by G. Rodríguez, published in (1873) *Una sesión de la Tertulia Radical de Madrid. Sesión del 16 de enero de 1873* (Madrid, Imp. Teodoro Lucuix) p. 9.
33. Given that the practice of slavery did, in fact, persist in Brazil until 1888, this seemingly constitutes an instance of the Spanish democratic liberals,

committed in their rhetoric to principles of equality and human dignity, displaying an element of their own prejudices by not counting Brazil among the 'cultured people'.

34. R.M. de Labra (1874) *La abolición de la esclavitud en el orden económico* (Madrid: Imp. De M. Martínez), p. viii.
35. Historian James Sweet went considerably further in his argument that the 'racist thought' in the USA that facilitated the practice of slavery there had its origins in Iberian ideology, which was transplanted to the Americas with the conquistadores. J.H. Sweet (1997) 'The Iberian roots of American racist thought' *The William and Mary Quarterly* vol. 54.1 pp. 143–66.
36. C. Coronado (1861) 'Oda a Lincoln' in *La América. Crónica Hispanoamericana* – Madrid. I have followed the translation used by L. Surwillo in 'Poetic diplomacy' p. 413.
37. Speech given by G. Rodriguez 'La abolición de la esclavitud en los Estados Unidos', published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* p 32.
38. *La Epoca* 2 Jan. 1873 'A la Nación Española en su parlamento'.
39. Table 1. Comparison of number of articles, published in *El Abolicionista* in the years 1872–1874, making reference to other countries or regions. A distinction has been made between articles that refer (i) directly to the abolition of slavery or issues relating to emancipation and (ii) other aspects of that nation, historical or contemporary but unrelated to slavery and abolition.

<i>Country/region</i>	<i>(i) articles relating to slavery & (ii) other topics abolition</i>	
Puerto Rico	22	12
Cuba	17	9
United States	13	6
Great Britain	11	1
'British colonies'	7	0
South America (Spanish-speaking)	3	1
Brazil	1	0
Portugal	1	0
Liberia	1	0
Africa	1	0
China	0	3
India	0	2
Java	0	1

40. See William Cullen Bryant's letter describing Coronado's salon. W.C. Bryant (1859) *Letters of a traveller. Series 2* (New York: Appleton) letter XII.
41. L. Surwillo 'Poetic diplomacy' p. 411.
42. See J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria (1996) 'Primeras traducciones españolas de 'La cabaña del tío Tom' *Livius* 8 pp. 99–119; L. Surwillo (2005) 'Representing the slave trader: *Haley* and the Slave Ship or, Spain's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*' *PMLA* 120.3 pp. 768–82; and L. Surwillo (2014) *Monsters by Trade. Slave Traffickers in Modern Spanish Literature and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) pp. 40–1.
43. L. Surwillo *Monsters by Trade* p. 41.
44. L. Surwillo *Monsters by Trade* p. 41.
45. L. Surwillo *Monsters by Trade* pp. 42–3. As Surwillo points out, a 'vibrant literary circle' existed contemporaneously in Cuba, producing novels and other works that criticised Spanish colonial policy in Cuba and called for abolition, such as Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda's 1841 *Sab*. Gómez de Avellaneda's novel, like many other Cuban abolitionist works of literature, was censured in Spain and so circulated narrowly there until the late century. This made the free and extensive circulation of Beecher Stowe's novel all the more significant.
46. Labra described receiving a 'semi-official' US report on cotton production from Ambassador Sickles, which he used to argue that economic production in the US South had not been adversely affected by abolition in any lasting way. See R.M. de Labra *La abolición de la esclavitud en el orden económico* pp. 209–210
47. See, for example, L. Surwillo *Monsters by Trade* pp. 44–5.
48. A. Luna & R.L. Palomino (1853) *Haley, ó, el traficante de negros. Drama en cuatro actos, en prosa*. (Cádiz: Pantoja); R. Valladares (1853) *La cabaña de Tom ó la esclavitud de los negros* (Madrid: Vicente de Lalama).
49. The final book in the trilogy was published in 1855, after the publication in translation (translated by the same author) of Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. This work, *El palacio de los crímenes*, consciously connects to the themes of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and finds commonality between the plight of Spain's slaves in the colonies with the vanquished and exiled metropolitan liberals. L. Surwillo *Monsters by Trade* pp. 32–3; 38.
50. See L. Surwillo *Monsters by Trade* 32–3; 54–5 and idem. 'Representing the slave trader' pp. 768–82.
51. L. Surwillo *Monsters by Trade* pp. 32–3; 58–9.
52. *El Abolicionista* 15 Oct. 1872 'El Mensaje de los Kuákers'.
53. *El Abolicionista* 14 July 1873 'Mensaje importante'.
54. *El Abolicionista* 14 July 1873 'Mensaje importante'. Indeed, just such a law was put forward to the US Congress in January 1876.

55. A. Corwin *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba* p. 250.
56. A. Corwin *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba* p. 250.
57. A. Corwin *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba* pp. 224–6.
58. A. Ferrer (1999) *Insurgent Cuba* *passim*.
59. In the 1862 Cuban census, for the first time during the nineteenth century, the statistics showed that the white population outnumbered the ‘non-white’; almost 54 % were listed as ‘white’. By 1887, this had increased to 68 %. The increase in the percentage of the Cuban population considered ‘white’ was the result of both the halting of the slave trade from Africa and a conscious policy of ‘whitening’—increased immigration to Cuba from Spain. However, a look at the population statistics for the various regions of the island presents a more complex picture. In the eastern provinces of the island, for example, where the 1868 insurrectionist movement originated and quickly gained ground, the percentage of the population declared ‘non-white’ in the 1862 census was much higher. In Guantánamo 27 % of the population was white, 28 % free coloured and 44.5 % enslaved, whilst in Santiago, 25.4 % was white, 39.8 % free coloured and 34 % enslaved. See A. Ferrer *Insurgent Cuba* pp. 54–5; 96.
60. *La Epoca* 2 Jan. 1873 ‘A la Nación Española en su parlamento’.
61. *La Epoca* 2 Jan. 1873 ‘A la Nación Española en su parlamento’.
62. *La Epoca* 2 Jan. 1873 ‘A la Nación Española en su parlamento’.
63. Speech given by G. Rodríguez ‘La abolición de la esclavitud en los Estados Unidos’, published in (1872) *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* (Madrid: Publicaciones de la Sociedad Abolicionista Española) p. 31–2.
64. G. Rodríguez ‘La abolición’ p. 32.
65. G. Rodríguez ‘La abolición’ p. 32.
66. See A. Körner ‘Barbarous America’ in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined. Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) pp. 125–59.
67. G. Rodríguez ‘La abolición’ pp. 17–18.
68. Published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* pp. 17–8.
69. D. Jordan & E.J. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War* p. 249 for the quotation.
70. D. Jordan & E.J. Pratt *Europe and the American Civil War*. See also Lisa Surwillo’s discussion of Coronado’s ‘Ode to Lincoln’ and ‘The Redeeming Eagle’ in ‘Poetic Diplomacy’, pp. 412–3; 418. On both Coronado and Castelar, see C. P. Boyd (2011) ‘A man for all seasons’ in R. Carwardine & J. Sexton eds. *The Global Lincoln* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 189–205.

71. R.M. de Labra (1873) *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Sociedad Abolicionista Española) p. 2.
72. R.M. de Labra *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* p. 38–9.
73. R.M. de Labra *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* p. 43.
74. R.M. de Labra *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* p. 2.
75. R. Carwardine & J. Sexton (2011) 'The Global Lincoln' in idem eds. *The Global Lincoln* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 3–27.
76. C. Boyd (2011) 'A man for all seasons' pp. 189–205.
77. See, for example, the reports of the abolitionist demonstration held in Madrid on 12 January 1873, at which demonstrators carried banners and placards citing the names of their abolitionist heroes. *El Abolicionista* 20 Jan. 1873.
78. (1873) *Una sesión de la Tertulia Radical de Madrid. Sesión del 16 de enero de 1873* (Madrid: Imp. Teodoro Lucuix) p. 22.
79. R.M. de Labra *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* p. 43.
80. *El Abolicionista* 31 Nov. 1873 'La esclavitud en los tiempos modernos'.
81. C.P. Boyd 'A man for all seasons' pp. 196–7.
82. A. Jouault (1876) *Abraham Lincoln, su juventud y su vida política. Historia de la abolición de la esclavitud en los Estados Unidos* (Barcelona: Imprenta de la Gaceta de Barcelona) pp. 13; 61–2.
83. R.M. de Labra *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* pp. 1–2.
84. See R.M. de Labra (1876) *La Brutalidad de los Negros* (Madrid: Imp. De Aurelio J. Alaria).
85. The figures supplied by Labra came from a 'semi-official' US report given to him by Ambassador Sickles. According to the report: the production of cotton had increased from an average of 3,000,000 bales per year between 1850–1860 to 3,200,000 bales in 1869 and 3,800,000 in the first nine months in the 'cotton year' of 1871; the production of tobacco increased from its 1850–1860 average of 261,000,000 lbs. per year to 307, 934,000 lbs. in 1866; the production of corn rose from an average 300 million bushels (between 1850–1860) to 400 million bushels in 1867; whilst Louisiana produced its most abundant crop of rice ever in 1869–1870. See R.M. de Labra *La abolición de la esclavitud en el orden económico* pp. 209–210.
86. R.M. de Labra *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* p. 66.
87. R.M. de Labra *La emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* p. 75.
88. C. Schmidt-Nowara *Empire and Antislavery*, Chaps. 3–5.
89. A. Gil Novales (1968) 'Abolicionismo y librecambio' *Revista de Occidente* n. 59 pp. 154–181.
90. See, for example, the speech given by S. Moret y Prendegast to the Cortes, 20 June 1870 in (1870) *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes 1869–1871* (Madrid: J.A. García) 14: 8998–9; cited in C. Schmidt-Nowara

(1995) “Spanish Cuba”: Race and class in Spanish and Cuban Antislavery Ideology, 1861–1868’ in *Cuban Studies* vol. 25, p. 114.

91. R.M. de Labra (1881) *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Imp. de Aurelio J Alaria) p. 373.
92. R.M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana* pp. 374–5.
93. R.M. de Labra *La abolición de la esclavitud* p. viii.
94. See B. Rauch (1948) *American Interests in Cuba: 1848–1855* (New York: Columbia University Press).
95. See, for example, *La Epoca* 3 Feb. 1872; 7 Jan. 1873 ‘Los Estados Unidos y Cuba’. The Quakers’ petition to King Amadeus was reported in *El Abolicionista* 15 Oct. 1872 ‘El Mensaje de los Kuákers’.
96. Reported in *La Epoca* 13 Jan. 1873 ‘Manifiesto de la Liga Nacional’.
97. See, for example, *El Abolicionista* 15 Oct. 1872; 30 Dec. 1872; 26 May 1873.
98. Cited in *El Abolicionista* 28 Jan. 1873 ‘El manifiesto de la Liga contra las reformas ultramarinas’.
99. The Abolitionist Society recognised this vulnerability. *El Abolicionista* 28 Jan. 1873 ‘El manifiesto de la Liga contra las reformas ultramarinas’.
100. C. Schmidt-Nowara (2006) *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press) p. 9.
101. *El Abolicionista* 28 Mar. 1873.
102. *El Abolicionista* 28 Mar. 1873.
103. R.M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*, p. 293.
104. Rodríguez noted and lamented the significant disparity between the Spanish and North American armies in their composition and their role in national life. He commented that the US army was disbanded just a few months after the Civil War’s end and that soldiers and officers alike returned to their homes and old professions ‘swapping the sword for tools, without it occurring to anyone, who had been in the former role during the drama of war, that they should now live in idleness, maintained, respected and almost adored by their fellow citizens, or pretending to exercise public powers, linking them to their person and that of their friends and companions in arms’. This was, he declared, far removed from the Spanish experience: ‘What a difference between these events and those witnessed in the old European nations and especially in Spain, where we believe the Marshalls or Captain Generals superior to other men, and cannot conceive of them living like the common people! How could we subsist in Spain without two or three Generals in the ministry, and a great sword, always blank and raised to threaten the real or supposed enemies of public repose? (*Laughter and applause*)’. Speech by G. Rodríguez ‘La abolición de la esclavitud en los Estados Unidos’ pp. 23–4.

105. G. Rodríguez 'La abolición' p. 25.
106. R.M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*, p. 292.
107. R.M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* pp. 292–7.
108. *El Abolicionista* 8 May 1873 'La educación de los libertos en los Estados Unidos'.
109. See the speech made by G. Rodríguez to the Abolitionist Society conference, published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* pp. 26–7.
110. R.M. de Labra *La Brutalidad de los Negros* p. 2.
111. R.M. de Labra (1887) 'El negro Santos de Santo Domingo. Conferencia dada en el 'Fomento de las Artes' la noche del 8 de Enero de 1880' in *Estudios biográfico-políticos* (Madrid: Imp. de 'la Guirnarda') p. 87. Cited and translated in C. Schmidt-Nowara 'Spanish Cuba' p. 115.
112. *El Abolicionista* 30 April 1874 'El ultimo censo de los Estados Unidos'.
113. Speech given by Segismundo Moret y Prendegast to the Cortes, June 20th 1870 in (1870) *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes 1869–1871* (Madrid: J. A. García) 14:8998–9. Cited in C. Schmidt-Nowara 'Spanish Cuba' p. 114.
114. To this end, as Christopher Schmidt-Nowara pointed out, *El Abolicionista* frequently ran articles publicising and discussing the works of Samuel Smiles and J.S. Mill. See C. Schmidt-Nowara *Empire and Antislavery* pp. 175–6.
115. *El Abolicionista* 30 April 1874 'El ultimo censo de los Estados Unidos'.
116. *El Abolicionista* 5 May 1875.
117. *El Abolicionista* 5 May 1875.
118. *El Abolicionista* 30 April 1874 'El ultimo censo de los Estados Unidos'.
119. *El Abolicionista* 28 Jan. 1873 'Los Estados Unidos despues de la Guerra civil'.
120. J. Bustamante y Campuzano (1885) *Del Atlántico al Pacífico. Apuntes e Impresiones de un Viaje a través de los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Victor Saíz) pp. 130–1; 418.
121. The 'modern' Madrid-based national daily first published in 1867 was founded by, and took on the world view of, Eduardo Gasset y Artíme, a liberal who served in various governmental posts during the *sexenio revolucionario*, including the Colonial Ministry until he had to resign having voted against the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico. Reaching a circulation of 45,000 during the Restauration, it was described by Azorín as the 'pinnacle' of journalism of its time and was highly influential in government and political circles. J.C. Sánchez Illán (1996) 'Los Gasset y los orígenes del periodismo moderno en España, *El Imparcial* 1867–1906' *Historia y Comunicación Social* n.1.
122. *El Imparcial* 23 June 1892 'Blanco y Negro'.

123. *El Imparcial* 23 June 1892 'Blanco y Negro'.
124. *El Imparcial* 23 June 1892 'Blanco y Negro'.
125. *El Imparcial* 23 June 1892 'Blanco y Negro'.
126. J. Jordana y Morera (1884) *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social de los Estados Unidos*. (Madrid: Tipografía de Manuel G Hernández) p. 2
127. The often disparate groups of white men known as the Ku Klux Klan had their origin in the 'restless' aftermath of the US Civil War, but became particularly prominent from 1867 and operated principally in the small towns and rural areas of nine Southern US states. A violent, murderous force, which 'rode out' at night and terrorised black communities, the Klansmen opposed and sought to prevent the newly freed black populations' participation in political and economic life and the intervention of Unionist politicians and policies from the 'north', as well as what they characterised as black people's moral and legal 'transgressions'. Thanks mainly to effective prosecutions and martial law, the Klan—as an organisation at least—was largely defeated by the end of 1871. On the origins and early years of the Ku Klux Klan, see D.M. Chalmers (1987) *Hooded Americanism. The History of the Ku Klux Klan*, (Durham: Duke University Press) Chaps. 1 & 2.
128. Chinese-origin, native American and some white people, such as those accused of looting following the 1871 Chicago fire, were also lynched.
129. *El Imparcial* 23 June 1892 'Blanco y Negro'.
130. The only article found that expressed its approval for lynching was that published in the *Ilustración española y americana* on 5 November 1871, in response to the lynching of (white) people who had been caught looting in the wake of the fire that devastated Chicago in 1871.
131. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico*, pp. 130–1; 272.
132. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico*, p. 272.
133. *La Epoca* 8 Jan. 1873.
134. *La Epoca* 8 Jan. 1873.
135. *El Abolicionista* 10 Jan. 1873 'Golpe en Vago'.
136. *El Abolicionista* 28 Jan. 1873.
137. *El Abolicionista* 28 Jan. 1873.
138. R. Puig y Valls (1894) *Viaje á América* (Barcelona: Tipolitografia de Luis Tasso) pp. 184–6.
139. Speech by G Rodríguez, published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* p. 26.
140. Speech by G Rodríguez, published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* p. 27.
141. Speech by G Rodríguez, published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* p. 27.

142. As proof of this Rodríguez noted the release (in 1867) of ex-president of the Confederate states, Jefferson Davis, and his subsequent travels to Europe 'with the consent of the government, against which he had for years sustained a fratricidal battle'. Speech by G Rodríguez, published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* p. 27.
143. Speech by G Rodríguez, published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda* pp. 30–1.
144. See A. Körner 'Barbarous America' pp. 125–159.
145. In his analysis of the symbolic representations of Spain and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century Sebastian Balfour found that the tropes of Spain as noble, courageous and martial in spirit were distilled into the metaphor of the 'lion' whilst the representations of the USA as racially impure, greedy for money, cowardly, mercenary and plebian were transformed into the cipher of the 'pig'. See S. Balfour (1996) "The Lion and the Pig": Nationalism and National Identity in Fin-de-Siècle Spain' in C. Mar.-Molinero & A. Smith eds. *Nationalism and the nation in the Iberian peninsula. Competing and conflicting identities* (Oxford: Berg) pp.107–117.

‘Liberty’ or ‘License’? Images of Women in the United States and the ‘Woman Question’ in Spain

The ‘glorious’ liberal, democratic revolution of September 1868 was at its core a male enterprise. In purely gendered terms it was a regressive step, replacing a female monarch with rule by men. The ‘virile, masculine officers’ Generals Prim, Serrano and Topete and the political leaders who followed them into power decried Isabel II in terms of age-old gendered notions of female chastity and honour. Her ‘vices’—her supposed superstition, insensitivity, promiscuity and physical unattractiveness—were deemed sufficient to grant the progressive men of the *sexenio* the moral authority—for the *sexenio* was indubitably a moral enterprise—to ‘honourably dethrone the dishonourable’.¹

The revolutionary programme declared in the wake of the September revolution demanded universal suffrage, freedom of education and the equalisation of rights but the new political citizenship was not expected to extend to Spanish women. Indeed, the liberal political agenda, imbued as it was with bourgeois morality, accepted and reflected the idealised notion of distinct spheres of activity for men and women, simultaneously exalting and suppressing women into imagined ‘angels in the house’.² Emilio Castelar, who campaigned ceaselessly for abolition, free trade, religious tolerance and male suffrage, believed that extending political rights to women ‘would simultaneously disrupt society and the household’.³ His fellow president of the First Republic, the ardent federalist Francisco Pi y Margall, told an assembly of women gathered in 1869:

Women can influence the march of a people's politics; but by exerting her actions upon her husband, her father, her brothers, her children if she has any, igniting their love for humanity and the *patria*. I repeat: in the domestic household, not outside of it, is where woman should fulfil her destiny.⁴

The great late-century novelist, journalist, publisher and cultural critic, Emilia Pardo Bazán, may well have had Castelar and Pi y Margall's words—certainly the sentiment they evoked—in mind when twenty years later she declared that, 'for the Spaniard, I do not hesitate to say, however liberal and advanced his ideas may be, the ideal of woman is not in the future but in the past. The model wife is still the same as she was a hundred years ago'.⁵ Even 'the most liberal man in Spain', she declared, if he were asked to describe the characteristics of the ideal woman, would draw inspiration from the figures of womanhood presented in the Bible or in Fray Luis de León and Juan Luis Vives' sixteenth-century conduct texts, *La perfecta casada* and *De la instrucción de la mujer Cristiana*. He would conjure up a woman who was both 'stoic' and 'angel' whom he would then 'place within a crystal barrier which should separate her from the world through the help of ignorance'.⁶

Nevertheless, even if the Spanish liberal imagination in the late nineteenth century (including that of most Spanish women) precluded women from full political citizenship, women were, of course, politically active before and after but especially during the revolutionary *sexenio*. Historian Gloria Espigado Tocino has pointed out that 'the "political woman" was a possibility unexpectedly opened up by revolutionary change'.⁷ The Republican Association of Women was established in Madrid in July 1869 with the twin aim to aid workers and women, 'the two most disenfranchised social classes';⁸ women, including Carolina Coronado, Concepción Arenal and Faustina Sáez de Melgar, were also influential activists for abolition (as they were in many other national contexts)⁹ through their writings and through the women's chapter of the Abolitionist Society founded in 1865.¹⁰ In addition, though not the eventual recipients of political emancipation at this time, the so-called woman question was firmly placed on the liberal agenda for social reform, thanks to the confluence of the rise of middle-class 'associationalism' as part of a burgeoning public sphere and the utopian reformist air of the *sexenio*.¹¹ The coming to power of a new, liberal political class in 1868 determined to enshrine in law 'new rights and liberties' and to extend the vote to all Spanish men raised expectations that such profound political reforms would surely have a transformative

impact of some kind on other subjugated groups, especially for enslaved people in the colonies but also for women. Nobody expected—or even called for—female suffrage to be instituted immediately; debate instead concentrated on questions of women's status, education, work and access to the professions and the impact any such changes might have on family and society. The evolution of the 'woman question' in late nineteenth-century Spain emerged in the context of domestic political upheaval and uncertainty and embryonic networks of middle-class pressure groups and associations, often peopled by the same individuals.

There was no organised feminist suffragist movement in Spain until the creation of the Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Españolas (National Association of Spanish Women ANME) in 1918 and, save for an unsuccessful attempt in 1877 to grant female heads of household the right to vote, very few progressive or radical Spanish men included female emancipation (or even greater participation in public affairs) in their plans for shaping a modern, liberal society in Spain.¹² Contemporaries and some historians have thus claimed a relative absence of 'serious' feminist debate in late nineteenth-century Spain and have attributed this to the strong influence of the Catholic Church in Spanish politics and society and to the slow development of an industrialised middle class, who in any case were stripped of their transformative potential by their compromise with the ruling class and acceptance of the democratic-in-name-only political system of the Restoration era. In this view, early feminist movements arose in industrialised countries with strong free-thinking and Protestant traditions.¹³ However, whilst the advocates of women's emancipation were few, unorganised, circumscribed by predominant gender stereotypes and therefore often offered ambivalent and contradictory visions of women's capabilities and roles, they were serious. Despite the limitations of liberal and Krausist attitudes towards women, the climate of the *sexenio revolucionario* did indeed foster debate around emancipating and educating women, and about women's roles within the family and society generally, among some of Spain's political and intellectual classes. The 1868 revolution had a 'decisive influence' on 'women's culture' even if, as the feminist Concepción Sáiz Otero observed sixty years later, this was an *episodio nacional* 'that Pérez Galdós did not write'.¹⁴

By the end of the century, the issue of female education had come to occupy a key place in liberal debates, with journals, progressive conduct literature and pedagogical conferences devoted to the topic. A number of pioneering Spanish feminists contributed to this debate and began to

push the boundaries of what was deemed acceptable female behaviour. If in 1842 Concepción Arenal had to dress in men's clothing in order to attend classes at Madrid's Central University (later the Complutense), by the end of the century Emilia Pardo Bazán openly defied expectations by combining a career as a novelist, journalist and cultural critic with her role as a mother and the first female students taught exclusively by women had publically received their university degrees from Arenal's alma mater. Whilst these developments might seem small relative to the cause of female emancipation, they remain significant. Moreover, whilst the 'woman movement' in Spain only gained wide support after the turn of the century, a concern for the relationship between family, society and state lay at the core of the liberal project in the final decades of the nineteenth century. The crucial question of women's place in the liberal family and society therefore occupied the liberal political class and their conservative critics, as did a growing awareness of altering or 'threatened' gender roles elsewhere.

In seeking to make sense of shifting gender roles, or the possibility of such shifts, Spanish feminists, liberals and conservatives often looked abroad to the position of women in politics and society elsewhere in Europe and the Americas. For example, Fernando de Castro, who as rector of the University of Madrid in the years following the September revolution instituted the noted Sunday conference series for women and the Association for Women's Education, derived inspiration for his projects on women's education from Germanic and French sources.¹⁵ Faustina Sáez de Melgar declared herself 'motivated by the progress of the most cultured Nations on the planet' to establish the *Ateneo de Señoras*, as a commitment to the 'majestic carriage of civilisation now triumphant in Spain' in the wake of the September revolution.¹⁶

Much attention focussed on the lives of women in the United States, unsurprisingly perhaps, given that white women of means there could access higher education, most notably via the 'Seven Sisters' colleges, and pursued careers in settlement work, as teachers, missionaries, doctors, nurses, writers, journalists, librarians, businesswomen and more rarely as university lecturers and lawyers.¹⁷ American women achieved the vote in four US states before the end of the century—in Wyoming (1869), Utah (1870), Colorado (1893), and Idaho (1896)—and female activists campaigned loudly and eloquently for full universal suffrage as well as for other forms of social and welfare reform.¹⁸ The expanded educational and professional horizons of these middle class, white, usually Protestant

women affected their attitudes towards domesticity: the birth rate fell; many chose not to marry; and those who did knew that the marriage could be ended through divorce.¹⁹ The ever-optimistic American writer of best-selling self-help books, Orison Swett Marden, was getting ahead of himself somewhat, but perhaps not so far as to be out of sight, when he excitedly proclaimed in 1894:

The greatest discovery of the century is the discovery of women. We have emancipated her, and are opening countless opportunities for our girls outside of marriage. This freedom is one of the greatest glories of the nineteenth century.²⁰

Spanish women, by contrast, had (theoretical) access to just two years of elementary education, could not work as judges, civil servants, sit on juries, testify legal documents or vote, and had limited rights to buy and transfer goods, deposit money and conduct business, which deferred entirely to their husbands upon marriage. Married Spanish women were required by the civil code to obey their husbands, who were their wives’ legal representatives and administered any communal goods; wives had scant legal recourse in cases of adultery or in relation to her children (including extra-marital). Divorce was rejected as a ‘Protestant heresy’.²¹

If the ‘discovery of women’ was the ‘discovery of the century’, or at least of the United States’ century, it follows that American women and the images of them that were projected and produced elsewhere would be taken as ciphers of both the USA and of modernity.²² American women were viewed as emblems (and repositories) of their country’s present and other nations’ futures. The reactions of Spaniards to the seeming liberties of American women varied considerably. Still, the Spanish images formed of American women more often than not fit within two reductive stereotypes: matrons and misses. The first image, the ‘matron’, prioritised education, industriousness, material means, morality and strength of character. The second image, the ‘miss’,²³ focussed on beauty, coquettishness, materialism and carefree relations between the sexes. Both images contained emancipation and independence at their core: independence of thought, of means and of movement (the apparent possibilities of US women to move around freely, without compromise to their ‘honour’, were frequently noted by Spanish observers). Of course, both images, already highly reductive, were circumscribed by race and class. Spanish

images of black American and of working class, often immigrant, women were of course produced, but with far less frequency and these were not taken to stand as ciphers of national identity or experience.

Conservative Spanish businessmen, whose work took them to the United States, reported back with bemusement, affection and often distaste the flirtatious character of US women and the sharp differences they perceived between them and their Spanish counterparts. Krausist educationalists and intellectuals looked with some approval to the model provided by the East Coast women's colleges and female emancipatory movements and tried to reconcile their admiration for the educational provisions in the USA with an insistence that Spain would need to change its attitude towards women's public roles at its own pace, acknowledging that reform was still a long way off. The pioneers of Spanish feminism viewed the United States as a kind of crucible of modern womanhood in practice from which they could retrieve an 'arsenal of facts' to bolster their claims for female equivalence and greater participation for women in public life.

This chapter examines the image of North American women from diverse perspectives: from the viewpoints of Krausists such as Rafael de Labra, Fernando de Castro and the Giner de los Ríos brothers; the pioneering feminists of the late nineteenth century Concepción Arenal and Emilia Pardo Bazán; and of Spanish travellers to the USA, from the royal visit of Princess María Eulalia de Borbón in 1893 to diplomatic attachés and middle-class professionals with experience of working in the USA including Adolfo Llanos, José Jordana y Morera, Rafael Puig y Valls and Juan Bustamante y Campuzano. Focussing on three interlocking aspects of American women's lives—political emancipation, education and their behaviour and appearance—which absorbed Spanish observers of the US, the chapter examines both idealised and imagined US womanhood (though of course with some grounding in 'reality'), through academic texts, lectures and fiction, as well as Spanish encounters with 'real' (though of course shaped by imagination) American women, both on Iberian and American soil.

POLITICAL EMANCIPATION AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

It was Concepción Arenal, the first woman to attend a Spanish university, pioneer of Spanish feminism and author of its foundational text, *La Mujer del Porvenir* (1869), followed by *La Mujer de su Casa* in 1883, who asserted that the experience of modern women and the women's eman-

cipation movement in the United States furnished an 'immense arsenal, where those fighting the mistake that is putting women down and the injustice that is oppressing them can provide themselves with arms'.²⁴ The arsenal to which Arenal referred in particular was the work by pioneering US feminists, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony and Matilda Joslyn Gage, which provided the first written account of the early feminist movement. The first two volumes of the *History of Woman Suffrage* were published in 1881 and 1882, shortly before Arenal published the updated *La Mujer de su Casa*.²⁵ For Arenal, this book, and the experience of North American suffragists that it chronicled, was of inestimable valuable, because it provided 'facts, many facts, which should give the proponents of the spiritual inferiority of women cause to think', and 'facts with which to respond to those wearing us out with facts' were what had been hitherto lacking.²⁶

In this voluminous work, which one might well call great, the facts are irrefutable; and just as the philosopher of antiquity proved movement by walking, so the North-American woman proves her spiritual rise by rising, and her fortitude by fighting.²⁷

Even before she was able to draw upon the voluminous *History of Woman Suffrage*, in *La Mujer del Porvenir*, Arenal drew heavily on the 'facts' of women's status and experience in the United States as she made the case for the future emancipation of women in Spain; the very title of her work recognised that the kinds of rights and freedoms attained by US women were not yet conceivable for Spanish women. She began her argument, and her referencing of the United States by questioning the notion of male 'moral superiority' and refuting the idea of women as the inherently 'weaker sex'. If women were indeed weaker and morally inferior to men then, she reasoned, surely one would expect to find higher numbers of women than men committing suicide or crime, especially given the oppression under which women lived.

Poorer, more disregarded, and more badly educated, their circumstances are more typical of those giving in to the temptations of crime and paying a higher tribute to prison and the scaffold.²⁸

In fact, she demonstrated, the opposite was the case; 'in the United States, where [women] are better educated and have better chances to

gain an honest living, the number of criminal women is so low, that when establishing the penitentiary system the reformers believed they could do without [women's prisons].²⁹ Similarly, in Spain, the prison population comprised seven men for every woman and one in four crimes carried out by men were committed 'against people' compared with one in thirteen crimes committed by women. Following this logic, she asserted, it seemed unreasonable to conclude that men were the 'better' sex.³⁰

A few short months after Arenal published *La Mujer del Porvenir*, her close friend Fernando de Castro, the liberal and Krausist priest-academic made rector of Madrid's university following the September revolution, began to make good on the promise he had undertaken on assuming the rectorship to open up the university to groups habitually excluded from formal education (beyond elementary level), including 'special courses aimed at completing the education of women'.³¹ Amongst the initiatives to which he gave his support, including Sáez de Melgar's *Ateneo de Señoras*, Castro organised a series of noted Sunday morning lectures for Madrilenian women on the topic of women's education. These lectures were delivered by Castro himself and by fellow Krausist liberals including Moret, Sanromá, Pi and Labra. Though the lectures were ostensibly limited to the issue of education, the speakers naturally ranged beyond this brief to also consider questions of gender and family from philosophical and political perspectives. Most speakers agreed with Castro that a sharp—yet harmonious—divide existed between the genders, justifying man's assignment to public life and woman's consignment to a private, domestic sphere. Female education was considered necessary insofar as her roles of influence within the family, as counsellor to her husband and educator to her sons, required it.³² In this assertion—of theoretical separate spheres and the desire to keep women unsullied from political engagement—Castro and his fellow speakers were in plentiful company. Rafael de Labra, however, distinguished himself from his fellow lecturers by arguing that woman's immediate task was to act to end her oppression by her husband, the law and the state. What was needed was the full instatement of legal rights for women, including civil marriage.³³ He believed that full voting rights for women would eventually follow.

Labra's defence of woman's emancipation—a phrase which 'barely stated, [is] corrected and swamped with buts, invectives and all kinds of criticisms'—was rooted in two contexts, that of the Spanish radical *sexenio* and that of nineteenth-century modernity and 'progress' epitomized by the United States. In reference to the first context, Labra suggested

that his female audience ask the men 'who today walk the streets swelled with pride for the rights that the revolution has granted them' what argument they had used 'to condemn the monopoly on the direction of public affairs exercised by certain and given classes', implying that this logic also vindicated women's participation in political life.³⁴ As we saw, however, at the beginning of this chapter, the atmosphere of democratic excitement and expectation which followed the September revolution, as towns and villages declared themselves, somewhat prematurely it turned out, for the Republic and colonial reformers felt sure, again prematurely, that the extension of political liberties at home would soon be replicated in the Antilles, did not extend far into the territory of women's political emancipation. Women were important and decisive political actors during the *sexenio* but remained excluded from 'hard' political power and rights. Female political actors like Coronado and Sáez de Melgar had to find alternate ways to act and express themselves politically in the face of the conviction held by such leading *sexenio* lights as Emilio Castelar and Francisco Pi y Margall that they, along with all others of their sex, should confine their political activity to 'the domestic household'.³⁵ Labra was right to connect the extension of political rights to more Spanish men during the *sexenio* with the possible extension of rights (though not yet the vote) to women, but only insofar as the political advances being gained by men brought into sharper relief the continued denial of those rights to women (as it did to other groups, including slaves). Two decades after the demise of the six-year democratic experiment, as men regained many of the liberties reined back following the Restoration (these would soon include universal male suffrage), Emilia Pardo Bazán reported that the uneven extension of political rights meant that effectively the gap between sexes was now even wider than it had been before 1868.

Each new conquest made by the stronger sex in the field of political liberty deepens the moral abyss that separates it from the weaker, and makes the role of the latter more passive and ill-defined. Educational freedom, religious freedom, right of public meeting, the suffrage and the whole parliamentary system only serve to transfer to one half of society, the masculine, the strength which the other half is gradually losing.³⁶

Perhaps the second context informing Labra's 1869 Sunday conference arguments on women's emancipation, that of the nineteenth century as a century of 'civilisation' and 'progress' best exemplified by the United States,

would prove more durable. The influence of the political model set by the United States was present in his assertion that civil, legal and political rights are essentially individual and, it followed, gender-blind. It was also present in his refutation of the conservative objection to female involvement in political life on the basis that the shouting, scandals and passions of contemporary political life were incompatible with, and would corrupt, female nature. It was ‘a very serious error’, Labra reminded his audience, ‘to imagine the coexistence of women, equipped with their full rights, and society as it is at this moment’. This would be tantamount to imagining ‘a citizen of the United States in the circumstances of the late Roman empire’.³⁷ The United States was thus imagined as a present-future or present-utopia—the kind of modern, progressive state to which Spanish radical liberals aspired, played out in the present—in which women would wield full political rights. However, Labra, like Arenal, understood the different present-day conditions and ‘horizons of expectations’ at work in contemporary Spain and the United States. Like Arenal, Labra limited his vision of female political action accordingly and spoke of emancipation in the future tense. In addition, of course, his own liberal and especially Krausist views shaped the parameters of female political participation that he could imagine possible. In the present United States ‘custom’ ensured that only ‘individuals, naturally equipped with an ability for it and who have known and been willing to cultivate these favours from heaven’ reached the higher echelons of political power; the law played no part in this, given that legally any man was entitled to enter politics. So too would custom regulate female participation in politics.

Well then, let us imagine women with their rights reinstated in a society that has reached this point through political progress. It is true that she can *legally* occupy high posts, but it is also true that customs, all the more respectable when they do not violate the most insignificant right, will not allow individuals to rise to these positions with impunity, without *aptitude*, without distinction to sex. Women, who have been capable of being queens in the turbulent times of *doña* María de Molina and of Isabel *la Católica*, satisfied with the ability to directly influence the press with their opinion, and indirectly with their vote in elections, will abstain from what does not sit well with their physical weakness, distracts them from important tasks and the consuming attentions of the domestic household.³⁸

Of course, with these pronouncements, Labra was directly responding to the two principal criticisms of women’s political emancipation, that is to say that women would ‘prostitute’ themselves in politics (i.e., be corrupted

by it, like men) and that family life would be eroded. Nevertheless, he articulated a vision in which women would be politically free and emancipated but would know their ‘natural’ place, not dissimilar to his vision of imagined emancipated slaves. Equally, Arenal’s ambivalence towards female suffrage, her framing of the argument for women’s education in terms of their roles as wives and mothers, and her claiming of a wider range of professions for women, which she then limited according to perceived essential feminine qualities, reflected the difficulty of renouncing the dominant gender ideology of the day, which painted women as domestic angels, moral creatures born to nurture and ruled by emotion and heart, not reason and the mind.³⁹

In *La Mujer del Porvenir*, Arenal insisted that the female emancipation that she advocated related to the concession of civil, not political, rights for women and the right to pursue a profession (or at least those suitable for her physical aptitudes and the ‘tenderness’ of her heart). Arenal’s later work, *La Mujer de su Casa*, published in 1883, put forward a modified position on female suffrage. In both works, Arenal’s perspective was shaped and defended according to evidence from the United States, including (in the later work) the recently published first two volumes of *History of Woman Suffrage*. Her earlier objection (in 1869) to women’s participation in politics stemmed from her view of the political sphere as ‘a field of confusion, lies and often of injustice’ and her scepticism at the emancipatory argument that women, through their participation, would prove a moralising force in the corrupt, noisy, rude and dishonourable world of politics. In some states of the USA, Arenal had conceded, women already had the vote, in certain circumstances, and ‘according to official and authorised reports, to great benefit, with respect to decorum and good behaviour in electoral colleges, as well as to better choices being made in elections’. Two preoccupations, however, held her back in 1869 from endorsing female suffrage in Spain: firstly, as conclusive proof of the ‘civilising’ impact of women in politics, the US case ‘lacks decisive authority’ because at that point ‘it neither has the extensiveness nor the time to constitute experience’. Secondly, whilst female suffrage ‘might be good in the United States’, it could not (yet) be applied to Spain because Spanish women ‘do not have today the education, the prestige, the character and the firmness’ to deal with the corrupt, venal, disreputable business of Spanish politics—she referred to the ‘criminal depravity that exceeds the usual wherever a deputy to the *Cortes* is elected’. As such, she feared ‘that instead of cleaning up the electoral atmosphere they would contami-

nate themselves with it'. Though she accepted that this might change in the future, the 'stench' in the Spanish political system was currently in ascendance.⁴⁰

Thirteen years later, the limited experience of women's participation in politics in the USA could offer more authoritative evidence as to its effects and Arenal was ready to acknowledge the lessons 'that time continues to teach'.⁴¹ Back then (in *La Mujer del Porvenir*), given the prevalence of 'ignorance' and dishonour in Spanish politics and given that 'conceding votes to *all* today in Spain means giving hundreds and thousands of votes to a few, who do not tend to be the best', it was natural that 'we wish[ed] for women to maintain a convenient distance, to not get themselves dirty'.⁴²

The 'facts' that now convinced her that the right to vote could and should be extended to women, albeit still deferred to a future date, came from a US report issued in June 1882 by the US Senate Committee charged with evaluating the possible amendment of the Constitution to extend the federal vote to women. The report gathered testimony on the impact of women on the political process. For example, it stated that in Wyoming and Utah, where both women and men could vote in municipal elections, women demonstrated 'more *morality and discernment than men*'.⁴³ Women's participation in politics apparently had indeed had the desired civilising impact. The governor of New York state, where women could be admitted into school governing bodies, testified to the 'admirable results' of women's participation 'not only because of the number of new members, but, mainly because it raised the moral and intellectual level of the men put forward as candidates, encouraging them to work more enthusiastically in their posts'. The report also observed that women's presence (not active participation) in political meetings 'contributed a lot to the increased sincerity, a raising of the level, and better manners, in debates'.⁴⁴ Thus, the Senate Committee report concluded, 'the Commission proposes that the Federal Constitution be reformed, conceding equal rights to all citizens of the United States without distinction by sex'.⁴⁵ As Emilia Pardo Bazán summarised, on the death of Arenal in 1892, it was 'information gathered in North America, where it was shown that females vote with more morality and discernment than males [which] destroyed the old convictions of *señora* Arenal' and persuaded her that 'the day can and will come'—this still remained a deferred prospect—'when universal suffrage will be a reality and a great benefit'.⁴⁶ Once more, the USA was imagined to furnish a 'real-life' demonstration in the present and in tangible form, of Spain and the industrial West's future.

Despite Arenal and Labra’s repeated recourse to the experiences of women and limited political emancipation in the USA in formulating their case for lifting the subjugation of Spanish women, both of these early pioneers of women’s rights were alert to the pitfalls of following international comparisons and imitations too closely. It was ‘for today’s Spain’ that Arenal had formulated her modest emancipatory demands for education and the right to play a part in public civil life; ‘in other countries and in different times one could ask for, and perhaps advantageously, accomplish more’.⁴⁷ She recognised that the comparisons made between Spain and ‘other countries’—in her case, principally the USA—might ‘inspire disdain and discouragement, and the desire to go abroad to enjoy the benefits of a more advanced civilisation’. She therefore urged her female readers—‘you that prefer the sickly, deformed and unfortunate son’—to stay and instil in Spanish men a recognition of ‘how vile and how culpable he is, who abandons one’s own to their disgrace’ and to create ‘a new, a great political school’.⁴⁸ Labra was more insistent that the women’s movement in Spain must not blindly imitate the ‘disruptive and cataleptic propaganda of the Yankee and English reformers’ the Saint-simonians and the ‘exaggerations of the female *espirits forts*’, which could prove counter-productive in the ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘redemption’ of the ‘weaker sex’:

There is another way open to you: do not forget the context you live in, and notice that in certain endeavours one has to account for justice, yes; but do not forget this—also *effectiveness*—Make use of the arms that you have at hand.⁴⁹

The arms at Spanish women’s disposal, according to Labra’s classical liberal perspective, were the powers of persuasion and rhetoric. Women should make use of their voice in the public domains of the press and *tertulias* as well as within the family and in ‘intimate conversation’. Above all, echoing Arenal, he urged them to educate their children ‘in the implacable passion for liberty and justice’.⁵⁰ Though unable to escape the conventions of his day in attributing women the power to teach and to influence, but not to act or to effect change, Labra remained convinced that political emancipation would come to Spain; this was one of the struggles ‘of the century’ and would necessarily succeed because ‘one advancement calls upon another advancement’.⁵¹ Unable, in the end, to stop himself casting around for international benchmarks, he called attention to the US conventions’ calls for universal suffrage and to Australia where the female vote

'is a fact, a reality, a definite conquest of civilisation'⁵² in order to convince his audience of well-to-do Madrilenian women that they too would be 'invincible'.⁵³ For Labra and Arenal then, the end goal was identified as the current or proximate position of the USA, but the methods used and pace of reform would need to be appropriate to Spain.

The nascent calls for emancipation in the final third of the nineteenth century did not, as Arenal made clear, simply mean the appeal for female suffrage. Women also sought societal acceptance for a greater public role (which some already pursued) whether in terms of practising a profession, running a business or playing an active and leading role in associational life. Again, such demands were of their time: the premise of Arenal's *La Mujer de su Casa* was to demonstrate the incompatibility of a purely domestic role for women, occupied solely in the maintenance of house and family, with a modern people 'who has to be, or has the ambition to be free, and who needs liberty'.⁵⁴ Once again, the living embodiment of women's freedom to fulfil public, as well as private, roles was found in the United States. There, women could work in medicine, like the 'miss doctor' Josephine Water at Mount Sinai hospital in New York, as lawyers, notaries, pharmacists, ships' captains and served on juries.⁵⁵ It was held that North American women enjoyed the greatest degree of liberty in public life, although whether or not this was deemed a good and desirable thing varied depending on one's perspective. On the one hand, Princess Eulalia 'enviously consider[ed] American women' and confessed to feeling 'always painfully oppressed by the opinion expressed among us that women should not take any initiative'.⁵⁶ On the other hand, Adolfo Llanos managed to land himself in a public spat in the USA when he wrote a newspaper article declaring that women in the USA were trapped by their liberty; the acid American response came to the effect that US women were at least not shy, weak and enslaved like their Spanish counterparts.⁵⁷

The public roles of North American women were showcased to an international audience like never before on the occasion of the 1893 World's Fair in Chicago. In the Woman's Building, under the direction of Chicagoan businesswoman, socialite and philanthropist Bertha Honoré Palmer, the Board of Lady Managers presented an exhibition of women's work, administered and judged women's exhibits and organised congresses and social events. Spain was one of the few countries that did not send a Women's Committee to the Fair, much to Mrs. Palmer's chagrin; the head of the Spanish delegation to the Fair, González de Campillo, lamented the lost opportunity to promote the 'talents and virtues' of 'eminent Spanish women' like Concepción Arenal.⁵⁸ The spectacle of visiting

an exhibition whose building had been designed by a woman, Boston architect Sophia Hayden, whose works and installations were designed by and celebrated women, managed by a female administrative board, and staffed by women, with a first-aid station run by female medics and chemists, was an unmissable prospect for Spanish delegates, visitors and reporters at the Fair.⁵⁹ As one correspondent put it, 'one of the novelties of the Chicago Exposition with which they thought to impress us further was the pavilion they called the Woman's [Building]' since it is 'well known' that North American women lived in greater liberty than European women and 'thence North American women derive the arguments to consider themselves highly superior to European women'.⁶⁰ The congress arranged by the Board of Lady Managers succeeded in 'marvelling' him, though it elicited more amusement than genuine admiration. The women delegates' calls for political and civil rights were not, he said, anything new 'especially in America, but that does not mean that it sounds better to Spanish ears'. For him, the image of 'the woman taking her vote to the urn will always remind us of the famous zarzuela *La Isla de San Balandrán*', a theatrical production first staged in Madrid in 1862, and set on a fantastical Atlantic island in whose world-turned-upside-down plot, 'women are in charge' whilst men 'take care of domestic things'.⁶¹

The bemused scepticism of *La Ilustración Española y Americana*'s correspondent was shared by many Spanish visitors to the Women's Building and other aspects of female involvement in the World's Fair. Puig y Valls, for example, was scandalised by the Board of Lady Managers' 'stormy sessions during which one lady, carrying out priestly functions, raises her hands to ask for God's blessing', sniped at their 'scantly charitable and Christian' in-fighting, grumbled at the closing of the Midway Plaisance after the Board's investigation of immorality in its dancing halls, and confessed—upon witnessing a marchpast of 'fifty uniformed girls' in the Iowa pavilion—that he would rather 'see these young ladies mending their fathers' and brothers' shirts than performing a service nobody requires, and which openly contends with the special state of women in the world'.⁶² Princess Eulalia's was a relatively lone Spanish voice of approval for the kind of public liberty enjoyed by American women, as put on display in the Women's Building.

They enjoy a freedom of action that I believe to be as useful as it is beneficial in any country; I think with some bitterness that if this progress is one day realised in Spain, where oriental blood has left a deep mark, it will be too late for me to take advantage of it myself.⁶³

In her envy of female freedoms in the USA, Princess Eulalia departed from the conventional attitudes of Spanish aristocratic ladies (and the upper-middle class women who sought to emulate them) to eschew employment or public life beyond charitable engagements; as Pardo Bazán put it, ‘the distinguishing mark of a “lady” is to do nothing at all’.⁶⁴ Of course, there were notable examples of Spanish women engaged in professional careers and public engagements: Concepción Arenal worked as a writer and journalist from the 1850s and was appointed Inspector of Correctional Institutions for Women by Serrano’s provisional government in 1868 having already served as Inspector of Women Prisons in 1864–65; Carolina Coronado and Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda forged notable careers as writers, as did Faustina Sáez de Melgar and Emilia Pardo Bazán who combined literary activities with journalism; Arenal, Coronado and Sáez de Melgar were all politically active for the abolitionist cause; Sofía Tartilán founded and edited *La Ilustración de la Mujer* from 1872; the first female Spanish doctor Mariana Castels practised from the 1880s.⁶⁵ Even women like the romantic novelist María Pilar Sinués, who idealised the classic and somewhat illusory concept of separate spheres in her writing, in many respects contradicted her own ideal-type of the ‘*ángel del hogar*’ with her economic independence, lack of children and separation from her husband.⁶⁶

Thus, in Spain as in the United States and other Western European countries, opportunities for professional and intellectual fulfilment were present for some women in the second half of the century. Still, these women of relatively privileged backgrounds who were able to pursue professional careers and often to combine these with raising a family remained exceptional. The dearth of educational opportunities available to middle-class Spanish girls—it was really only the few young women born to free-thinking families of means who were able to attend one of the secondary schools intended to train teachers, telegraph operators and business-women—and the strength of societal opposition to professional women ensured that the worlds of most middle class Spanish women remained centred on their familial roles. For poorer urban and rural women, of course, not working was not an option for, as Pardo Bazán observed, ‘the equality of the sexes, though denied by the written code and in social spheres in which life is idle, is established by the poverty of the peasant, the journey man, and the farmer’.⁶⁷

EDUCATION

The liberal penchant for establishing reforming associations and pressure groups in 1860s Madrid extended to the cause of women’s education. Indeed, improving the opportunities for women’s education was an integral part of the stable of causes taken up by progressive liberals aiming to modernise the country through a programme of political, social and economic reform. As such, it sat alongside the other liberal pet causes of customs reform, colonial reform and abolitionism. The *Ateneo de Señoras*, the Sunday conference series for women, the *Asociación de la Educación de la Mujer* and the *Escuela de Institutrices*, which advocated and provided education for women, were all founded in the key years of 1869–71, just as the Constituent assembly met to devise a new liberal constitution for Spain, and the passage of the 1870 Moret Law to free children born to enslaved mothers in the colonies was debated. Further consolidating the chains linking liberal associational life, the individuals who established the associations promoting women’s education and who worked actively within them were also key officers and activists in parallel associations working for the other noted liberal causes including colonial and tariff reform and republicanism. Segismundo Moret, Emilio Castelar, Rafael de Labra and Francisco Pi y Margall all participated in the 1869 Sunday lectures series founded by Fernando de Castro. Segismundo Moret and Félix de Bona were also members of the Free Society of Political Economy (f. 1857) and among the founder members of the *Sociedad Abolicionista Española* (f. 1865); Moret, of course, was also the colonial minister responsible for the ‘free womb’ law to which he gave his name. Castelar was a key member of both the Abolitionist Society and the Association for Tariff Reform. He was also a towering political figure during the *sexenio*, serving as the final president of the ill-fated First Republic. Similarly, Rafael de Labra, combined multiple roles as a deputy to the constituent *Cortes*, abolitionist and educationalist. In short, the cause of women’s education (but not political emancipation) was a modern liberal cause and thus appeared to these progressive men a natural extension of their liberal commitment to extending political participation (for men), to free labour (emancipation from slavery) and movement of goods (tariff reform), and to improving the working and living conditions of the working class (as for women, in order that they be more productive and effective).

These men were not drawn to championing women’s education (or abolition, or the improvement of workers’ living conditions and educa-

tion) because they saw women fundamentally as their equals. As we saw in Chap. 3, Spanish abolitionists very often accompanied their commitment to the moral, as well as political and economic imperatives for ending slavery with condescending attitudes and actions towards black people, enslaved and free, which indicate a belief in liberty but not equality. Similarly, women's education was upheld by the Spanish men and women who championed it as a just cause because it would allow women to fulfil to their maximum potential the natural roles accorded to them by society (wives and mothers), but not so that they could challenge traditional societal hierarchies.

The Krausist beliefs of many of the men involved with the Association for Women's Education, including Castro and Labra, helps explain their position.⁶⁸ For its Spanish followers, Krausism offered a way of regenerating and modernising Spain. Krausist thought envisaged a harmonious society founded on greater but not absolute equality of its compositional groups. Society was conceived as an organic whole in which each sector played a distinct and delineated part; its ultimate goal of harmony would be achieved when each of these sectors realised, accepted and fulfilled their particular role. Followers of Krausist thought were morally obligated to work actively towards the end goal of societal harmony and the means to its achievement were reform, associationalism and, especially, education—hence the crucial importance placed on pedagogy by Krausists, many of whom, unsurprisingly, were educationalists.⁶⁹ The purpose of education was to 'enlighten' and equip sectors of society—workers, women or the soon-to-be-liberated slaves in Cuba and Puerto Rico—so that they could understand and fulfil their potential within the parameters of their naturally assigned roles. After the Bourbon Restoration, when many Krausist professors were moved from their university posts, the *The Free Educational Institution* (ILE), which they founded in 1876, became the principal vehicle for disseminating this secular, liberal philosophy and for working towards their harmonious end goal. Adult education centres and the lecture series and associations for women's education were also conceived as instruments for this purpose. Thus, whilst playing a fundamental role in advocating and providing new educational opportunities for women, the *Instituto* and other associations and bodies dedicated to female education were circumscribed by the hierarchical worldview that shaped and reflected prevailing liberal attitudes towards race and class.

It was in 1869 that Concepción Arenal had written that women should not yet be accorded the vote because they still lacked the 'education' to use

it judiciously. That same year marked the beginning of a crucial period in the development of educational opportunities for women in Spain, which aimed to redress precisely that lacuna. As has been noted, in 1869, perhaps spurred on by his friend's words and certainly inspired by the reforming context of the democratic *sexenio*, Fernando de Castro inaugurated in February the Sunday conference series for women, on the subject of women's education, followed in December by the *Escuela de Institutrices* and, in June 1871, by the *Asociación de la Educación de la Mujer*. In that year also the *Ateneo de las Señoras* began work (following its declaration in December 1868), presided by Faustina Sáez de Melgar, as a kind of female equivalent to the male *Fomento de las Artes*, providing free adult education but with a curriculum 'adapted' to its female working- and middle-class pupils, teaching the subjects necessary to groom 'angels of the hearth'—that is women with sufficient education to teach their children and keep their husbands interested and amused—and only in the case of the most 'destitute' to provide preparation for work. The female vocational college, the *Escuela de Institutrices*, another of Castro's initiatives, complemented the work of the *Escuela Normal de Maestras* (f. 1858) and was joined by the *Escuela de Comercio para Señoras* in 1878 and the *Escuela de Correos y Telégrafos* in 1882, which would train women for work as telegraph operators, the only civil service positions open to women until 1918.⁷⁰ The *Escuela de Institutrices*, in particular, which was not restricted to girls who wanted to become teachers, offered a new kind of education, one which included the 'latest notions' of psychology, natural history, physics, history, literature, geology and pedagogy. For Concepción Sáiz, the schools for female teachers formed 'the *célula germinativa* of all female culture developed in Spain in the last quarter of [...] the century'.⁷¹

The 1857 Public Education Law ordered the provision of both girls' and boys' elementary schools in municipalities with populations of more than 500.⁷² However, boys outnumbered girls in primary schools almost four times over.⁷³ Primary education officially lasted for just three years (between the ages of 6 and 9) and was intended to provide moral and religious preparation for girls and young women, to equip them for their role as educators and nurturers of their families. This viewpoint, that women should be educated (only) insofar as they would become better mothers and wives, formed the backbone of progressives' arguments in favour of women's education to the end of the century and was a 'tactic' already successfully employed in the USA and elsewhere in Europe for gradually spreading acceptance.⁷⁴ State investment in education remained

low—1.5 % of the national budget, compared with the 14 % spent in the USA, 10 % in Britain and 8 % in France—whilst illiteracy rates remained high, particularly among women.⁷⁵ The 1860 census revealed a national illiteracy rate of more than 75 %, which, when broken down by gender, comprised 86.1 % of women and 64.8 % of men.⁷⁶ Literacy rates improved only slightly to the end of the century: in 1887 81.2 % of Spanish women and 61 % of Spanish men (71.6 % of the population) were illiterate; at the end of the century 71.5 % of women and 55.8 % of men (63.8 % of the population) remained illiterate.⁷⁷ Access to secondary education was highly restricted, though reforms were enacted during the final third of the century: for example, from 1868, thanks to Ruiz Zorrilla's declaration of the *libertad de enseñanza*, young women had the right to enrol in *Institutos* and universities on *bachillerato* and *licenciatura* programmes, though the few that did so did not attend co-educational classes but were taught privately. The university degree certificate 'of competence' granted did not carry official weight entitling women to practice their chosen career.⁷⁸ As Scanlon comments, in the reforming climate of the *sexenio* and even after, it was near impossible to argue for women's continued ignorance such that even those absolutely opposed to women's political emancipation found it prudent to voice their support for female education, advocating a curriculum firmly restricted to the domestic arts.⁷⁹

Spanish liberals who from 1869 (genuinely) supported the extension of educational opportunities for women, from those who placed an educated wife and mother at the heart of the modern liberal family to the few who sought a more radical repositioning of women's place in society as a whole, looked to the United States as a pioneer of women's education. To a lesser extent, conservative opponents also corralled 'evidence' from the USA to argue, for example, that women who received formal education were more susceptible to illness and infertility.⁸⁰ However, it was overwhelmingly Spain's liberals who pointed to the USA as the exemplar of the benefits of educating women. Mixed-educational colleges (which *El Imparcial* felt the need to explain to its readers 'consist of educating men and women together'), which made no distinctions based on race or gender provided 'an example to old Europe'.⁸¹ But it was perhaps the female colleges on the United States' East Coast, which became collectively known as the Seven Sisters that elicited the greatest interest. Arenal quoted at length Trippeau's description of secondary schooling in the USA, including the foundation of Vassar College in 1861 as 'an important date in the history of public education in the United States' for its recog-

nition of women’s right to a secondary education. Arenal herself seconded Tripeau’s testimony to the ‘in no way’ inferior intellectual ability of the Vassar students, in comparison with boys of their age, observing that ‘the progress of women in the United States in secondary schooling continues to confirm their ability for it. Today it is not only the outstanding students, but also prominent professors, who stand out in the centres of secondary education’.⁸² Arenal’s arguments in favour of female education worked on distinct levels. She demonstrated that the education of women would benefit men as, their intellectual curiosity engaged, women would no longer be so focussed on their ‘passions’ and would be ‘more reasonable and more loving’; she showed that the limits currently placed on female education, and work, prevented women from fully benefitting society and their families and stoked societal ills including poverty and prostitution and led to unsatisfied and unhappy wives, husbands and children. She proved the falsity of the notion that women were intellectually inferior to men.⁸³

The ‘question’ of women’s education, and the example provided by the American experience, permeated more popular cultural forms of expression. As has been noted, the 1862 satirical zarzuela by Cristóbal Oudrid, *La Isla de San Balandrán*, presented the audience of the Teatro de la Zarzuela, where it premiered, with a world-turned-upside-down fantasy island in which women occupied political and military positions of power and took the lead in their relationships with men, whose time was spent ‘mending old clothes, bringing the children to bed, cooking, they put shoes on us and comb us, and to kill their free time, they weave, they spin and knit’.⁸⁴ This reversal of ingrained gender roles in a new world utopia/dystopia setting was portrayed as being as ridiculous as it was horrifying. Harmony could only be restored to the *Isla de San Balandrán* once the Spanish (male) interlopers to the island led the men in revolt against their oppression and the island’s queen acquiesced to a constitution in which ‘women and men will be equal’ but in which ‘I [Luis, one of the Spaniards] rule to all appearances, and my wife will rule in my heart’, bringing the fantastical San Balandrán into line with the supposed gender realities of contemporary Spain.⁸⁵

A very different image of new world women was projected some thirty years on in a play written by Enrique Gaspar, dubbed ‘a Spanish Ibsen’ by Pardo Bazán for the feminist themes of his work.⁸⁶ Indeed, the play, *La Huelga de Hijos* (1893), premiered in the same year that a translated version (to Catalan) of Ibsen’s *The Doll’s House* was debuted on the Spanish stage, in Barcelona.⁸⁷ *La Huelga de Hijos* features a Spanish adolescent with

the makings of a ‘new woman’, Henny, who has been brought up by her father in the United States and returns to Spain where the ensuing inevitable clash of cultures feeds the play’s humour and drama. The plot follows the crisis and eventual resolution of Henny’s reunion with her Spanish mother who, in true zarzuela fashion, turns out to be the lover of her fiancé’s father. Henny is, as her fiancé remarks, ‘the perfect type of the modern woman’ thanks to her upbringing and education in the United States.⁸⁸

While Henny confronts and is confronted with the attitudes of ‘old’ Spain in the shape of her aunt Carmen, her own ‘modern’ attitudes, learning and behaviour are admired by the principal male characters—her father, uncle and fiancé—and envied by her Spanish cousin, Julia. Carmen blames Henny’s education ‘at a college in the United States’—where even her name, Enriquetta, ‘was replaced by some gibberish’—for the fact that she is now ‘lost’: ‘they turned her into a wise woman’, Carmen exclaims with horror.⁸⁹ But Gaspar presents Carmen’s fears for the consequences of her niece’s education as both ridiculous and false, most persuasively through the character of Julia. While Henny is ‘a woman without coquetry’ having fallen in love with Salvador whom she views as an equal ‘companion’ and not a master, Julia flirts and flits ‘with one today and another tomorrow, whining and talking insipidly’.⁹⁰ It is Julia herself who recognises the value of Henny’s temperament and education as she comments, ‘I hang my head in shame [...] when comparing myself to my cousin and realising how little I know’. It is not that Julia feels herself less intelligent than Henny, but rather that she has not received her education: ‘And it is not because of a lack of ability, but because I have not been taught. I actually feel that all this fits into my head, but I do not dare say so’.⁹¹ When Julia describes her education—the classical education ‘of her sex’, and we might add, of her class—it is Henny’s turn to be horrified.

And nothing else? Nothing that would allow the girl here to change bit by bit? She has to remain a child until the eve of dawn [coming of age], but with the obligation to guess the next day what makes a woman. That is taking a soldier into battle without giving him the arms to defend himself.⁹²

For Henny, the purpose of her education was neither to replace sentiment with reason nor to supplant men’s roles, *a la San Balandrán*. Rather, echoing the earlier arguments made for example by Concepción Arenal, Gaspar suggests, through Henny, that the educative model of the United States allowed women to better fulfil their roles in the modern, liberal family.

Henny: ... (to Carmen): Do you see? I also grow flowers. So when you get to know me more thoroughly, you will be convinced of the benefits of an education, which, without the prudery of the French colleges, nor the timidity of the English governess, allows us through the fortitude of our spirit and through the development of our intelligence the companionship of men during times of work and struggle; without letting it impede the opening, in those moments dedicated to its worship, of those mysterious angel’s wings that always lend love to women.⁹³

Gaspar clearly intended to present Henny, shaped by her North American education, as a positive, sympathetic agent: it is through her reason, clarity, persuasiveness, compassion and ‘daringly valorous vindication of the rights of women’ that she brings about a happy conclusion for herself.⁹⁴

How far Gaspar’s approval of the ‘modern woman’ was shared by the Spanish audiences who saw his play is, of course, more difficult to judge. When Ibsen’s *The Doll’s House* was first staged in Madrid in 1899, by an Italian touring company, the *Heraldo de Madrid* observed approvingly that it ‘did not please the *respectable* public’.⁹⁵ However, a contemporary report of the reception of Gaspar’s play was altogether more positive. Emilia Pardo Bazán, who one might expect to be predisposed to approve of at least the play’s themes, reported that ‘I left in wonder [...] at the culture of the public. The piece is daring and I thought the auditorium would erupt two or three times’.⁹⁶ In the theatre there was ‘not even a murmur of protest’ at the continued relationship between Henny’s mother, Maria, and her lover, despite her re-acquaintance with her ‘legal family’. She herself certainly admired the ‘feminist’ themes of the play—which she likened to those of *The Doll’s House*—particularly the heroine’s agency and refusal to be a victim, which she contrasted sharply with Mariana, the heroine of Echegaray’s eponymous play, who commits ‘the common error among women: giving their destiny out of their own hand’. Nevertheless, her recognition that *La Huelga de Hijos* occupied ‘new territory’ in its positive portrayal of educated women and rejection of moral inequality between the sexes and her great surprise that ‘certain currents [...] arrive even here’ suggests that Gaspar’s ‘Ibsenian’ play represented the exception, rather than the rule, in Spanish theatre at the close of the nineteenth century.⁹⁷ Indeed, as Gaspar himself recognised through Henny, the meeting of American and Spanish visions of female education was without doubt an uneasy confrontation.

Henny: I will not say more. I must appear to you... this way...monstrous.

Carmen: Monstrous, no, but very strange, out of the ordinary.

Henny: Exactly what I think about you. I find you created for a different world, where existence revolves around playing nocturnes and embroidering shoes.⁹⁸

As American and Spanish views of women's education collided in fiction, so too did they in reality. In 1892, Alice Gordon Gulick, an American Protestant missionary who had been living—and educating young girls—in Spain since the early 1870s, realised her long-held aim of creating the 'Mount Holyoke of Spain', the International Institute for Girls (IIG) in San Sebastián.⁹⁹ The story of Gulick's efforts to establish a girls' school using curricula, methods and teachers from the new women's colleges in the US has been traced by the Spanish and American historians Carmen de Zululeta and Carol Scally Grigas.¹⁰⁰ Gulick had been educated at the elite female Mount Holyoke seminary, founded by Mary Lyon in 1832 to give women an education that would be both equal to that of the best East Coast male colleges and fervently spiritual, in keeping with Lyon's Congregationalist faith. She was a 'woman of her time' not only in her embracing of her role as missionary (conceived of according to contemporary notions of racial, cultural and religious superiority) which offered her—as it did so many white, middle class, educated North American women—the chance of personal and professional fulfilment, but also in her continued robust advocacy of women's education, of education as key to human progress, and of the modern educational curriculum and practices then being followed in the United States.

Having arrived in Spain in late 1871 with her new husband, William Gulick, charged with extending the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Mission (ABCFM) and Women's Board of Missions' (WBM) Protestant evangelism on the peninsular,¹⁰¹ the Gulicks settled first in Santander. Here, Alice Gulick was horrified by the 'medieval obscurity' of the provincial public education system and resolved to 'transform' her young students via the 'strong, sane, spiritual and well-rounded qualities of American women'.¹⁰² Initially instituting a primary school and taking the Sunday school for the children of the small protestant community locally, Gulick began teaching girls in her home in Santander, often in exchange for domestic work, in late 1877. This informal arrangement grew into a fully-fledged secondary school (eventually also including a kindergar-

ten and night school for workers) known as the *Colegio Norteamericano*, transferring in 1881 along the coast to San Sebastián. From 1890—it has been suggested with the assistance of Gumersindo de Azcárate,¹⁰³ whom Alice Gulick knew through his late first wife—students at the school were enrolled to take bachelor degree exams at the nearby male *Instituto* in Guipúzcoa. In 1894—two years after the IIG’s official incorporation into Massachusetts’ law—two of Gulick’s students were enrolled in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at the University of Madrid. In 1897, these two students, Esther Alonso and Juliana Campo, became the first women in Spain taught entirely by women to receive higher degrees.¹⁰⁴

Alice Gordon Gulick’s stated aim was to establish ‘Spain’s Mount Holyoke College’; this was to be achieved by teaching a North American-style syllabus and methods, using female teachers educated in the pioneering women’s colleges of the East Coast. The school taught mathematics, history, geography, literature, sciences, modern languages and physical education alongside more traditional subjects such as music, fine art and needlework, required by the state. It used ‘new American educational methods’, which emphasised practical and direct forms of learning, via experimentations and excursions. The sole concession to traditional Spanish pedagogical methods appeared to be the use of oral examinations, held in public, which, happily, also functioned as an effective publicity tool. To deliver this education, Gulick recruited alumni of seminaries and colleges who conformed to the ideal type of the North American ‘new women’.¹⁰⁵ In addition, she enticed female US graduates, often on their grand tours of Europe, to work as volunteers at the school, appealing to their sense both of Christian mission and charity and national superiority, as she told them, ‘America cannot give Spain a better gift than these recently graduated teachers, recent graduates of Christian colleges and full of altruistic love’.¹⁰⁶

Gulick was undoubtedly adept at publicising the ‘Spanish Mount Holyoke’ both in Spain and—always seeking financial backing for the school beyond what was budgeted by the ABCFM and WBM—in the United States. In her relentless publicising and fund-raising on behalf of the school, Gulick epitomised the image of the American ‘matron’, who combined forthright (and successful) business sense with philanthropy and the idealisation of the transformative power of education. Term dates and courses were advertised in regional newspapers as distant as Seville. Musical *veladas*, public examinations and the girls’ daily walks about the city constituted ‘living’ advertisements. Gulick’s Victorian sociability, pay-

ing visits and receiving visitors at home, firmly inserted her into a network of local, national and international liberal elites concerned with questions of education and religion; whilst in the United States, her public speeches and even exhibition of the school at the 1893 Chicago World's Fair produced the funds necessary to establish the school and ultimately transport it to Madrid. The greatest account of the school, however, was provided by its remarkable success: attendance levels varied (and undoubtedly dipped in tandem with unease in the political relationship between Spain and the United States in the 1890s) but at its height the IIG taught 100 day-pupils and 50 boarders. The academic achievements of its pupils were remarkable: 17 of the 24 Spanish women to pass the *bachillerato* [bachelor's degree] between 1894 and 1898 were taught in the school; the school and its pupils regularly outperformed their male counterparts in the *Insituto* and at university.¹⁰⁷

The Mount Holyoke-style principles and methods of female education employed by Gulick in Northern Spain had a direct and particular impact on three groups of Spaniards. In the first place, its greatest effect was naturally on the women who studied under Gulick. Most of her graduates went on to become teachers in evangelical schools, others became pharmacists—both common career choices for educated women—whilst many who didn't graduate nevertheless took up positions in Protestant missions.¹⁰⁸ Frustratingly, this is also the group who have left the scarest records of their impressions of the American education they received. Perhaps the reported response of Alonso and Campo at being asked by the impressed university professors as to who had prepared them for their oral examinations provides some indication of this; their answer reportedly came, simply, 'women'.¹⁰⁹ In addition, the origins of the first school in Alice Gulick's Santander home, which reputedly came about when a local seamstress, Aresenia Reguera, overheard Gulick explaining to her employer the functioning of women's education in the United States and subsequently told Gulick that she too 'desired an education', suggests that the pupils recognised the distinctly 'foreign' nature of the education they received there.¹¹⁰

Secondly, the *Colegio Norteamericano*, and later the IIG, made a strong impression on the local population from where many of its pupils were drawn (although some came from as far away as Andalusia). Students came not only from the small Protestant communities in Spain, but also from the schools of the Rio Tinto mining company and from Catholic families interested in giving their daughters a 'modern' education; Gulick,

for example, reported to her American funders that parents of her pupils had observed to her that their children ‘are learning something and they have never learned anything yet in Catholic school’.¹¹¹ Initial opposition and hostility to the school because of its Protestant confession appears to have given way to admiration as its academic prestige increased; attendance figures jumped sharply in 1887 to 117 students upon the securing of arrangements with the *Instituto* to allow the female pupils to enter the *bachillerato* exams, suggesting that a number of parents agreed with the retired Spanish colonel who was ‘struck by the superior education of American girls’ and his wife’s observation that ‘I don’t know anything and we want our girls to have a different education’.¹¹²

The school’s identity as both North American and Protestant is difficult to disentangle: Gulick was careful to downplay the Protestant elements in the founding documents and corporation of the IIG, yet her model was the congregational Mount Holyoke and not, say, the less evangelical Wellesley College. Gulick viewed her task as one of spiritual as well as intellectual transformation and the high numbers of students who joined the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (which was administered by Anna Adams Gordon) or went on to teach in Missionary Schools in Spain attests to the important place accorded to Protestantism in the school. Nevertheless, whether because this reflected reality or because it suited her purposes of attracting evangelical donors without offending their patriotic sensibilities, Gulick was always adamant that any local hostility to the school was the result of the confession and not the nation with which it was identified. There was perhaps something in Alice Gulick’s claims: the school was apparently denounced from many local pulpits. In one sermon, the priest declared, ‘it is the best school in town, but you should not, by any means, allow your children to attend it’.¹¹³

However, the link between local perceptions of the school and evolving views of the USA was also undeniable. In 1895, the number of day pupils at the school halved suddenly from 100 to 50 and the following year Alice Gulick complained of ‘constant persecution’ of the students such that teachers could ‘seldom take the girls out for their daily walk, or even go out by ourselves, without being followed and shouted after by rude boys and girls, and often spit upon’.¹¹⁴ Some of the local newspapers mounted a hostile campaign against the ‘American Protestants’.¹¹⁵ By 1897, the daily walks, a key pedagogical component and previously the provider of positive free publicity, were abandoned altogether. Gulick may have remained convinced that local resentment resulted from anti-Protestantism and not

anti-Americanism (though she did acknowledge a certain local ‘misunderstanding’ of US policies towards Cuba), but this separation seems arbitrary, especially given the context of growing antagonism between the two countries; more likely, as the Spanish ambassador to the USA observed to Gulick in Washington in April 1898, shortly before the declaration of war, it was that ‘Yankee and Protestant are rather a bad combination’. ¹¹⁶

The third Spanish cohort to be directly affected by the ‘Spanish Mount Holyoke’ encompassed liberal educationalists, both locally and in Madrid. The academic achievements of Gulick’s pupils and her prowess in publicising and developing networks of support for her school, brought the IIG to the attention not only of professors of the Guipuzcoa Institute, but also to those of the *The Free Educational Institution* and even to the highest ranking members of the Liberal Party; a private secretary to Sagasta visited the college in the summer of 1884 to verify the glowing accounts of its ‘academic excellence and modern curriculum’. ¹¹⁷

Among the leading free-thinking and liberal academics in Madrid, even after the Restoration, which curtailed religious tolerance reforms and interrupted several leading intellectual-politicians’ careers, Gulick found like-minded enthusiasts of educational reform, including the education of women. Gulick remarked, for example, that she had spoken ‘with several of the prominent educators who believe in the higher education of girls in Spain as absolutely necessary for the uplifting of the nation’ in Madrid in the autumn of 1892, presumably when she attended the Pedagogical Conference at which Emilia Pardo Bazán and others discussed ‘The education of men and women. The relationship and differences between them’. ¹¹⁸ Her greatest champions among Spanish educationalists were also Krausist *Institucionistas* including Gumersindo de Azcárate whom Gulick met through his late first wife, a family friend of hers, and Nicolás Salmerón, who chaired the examining tribunal of Alonso and Campo. The professors on the tribunal were initially surprised that the two students would be prepared by female teachers in San Sebastián and not, as was usual, in private lessons with university professors. Subsequently convinced by Gulick that ‘[she] can do it!’, the professors on the tribunal awarded Alonso and Campo the highest possible mark, *sobresaliente*, and commented on their excellent preparation. ¹¹⁹ The room where Alonso and Campo sat their oral exams was reportedly packed with male students, listening to the professors’ questions, which ‘went on and on, making many things outside of the programme’. ¹²⁰ Of course, as well as intellectual stimulation and satisfaction, curiosity and novelty must also have

been at play here. As Alonso and Campo’s tutor, Anna Webb, remarked, ‘[the professors’] astonishment was scarcely complimentary to our sex’.¹²¹

Alice Gulick’s ‘Mount Holyoke in Spain’ was clearly a resounding academic success. The academic renown of the school was such that it attracted pupils from across the peninsular, including Cádiz, Malaga, Madrid, Valencia and Catalonia, in some cases because of and in others despite its Protestant confession. Also despite its American identity, the school retained all of its boarders when it transferred to Biarritz on the outbreak of the Spanish-Cuban-American War in April 1898. The professors of the ILE and University of Madrid encouraged Gulick to move the school or to establish a branch in Madrid, because nobody was educating girls, as she put it, ‘as we are able to do’.¹²² The absence of any institution comparable to the *Colegio Norteamericano* and later IIG, however, points to its exceptional status and the unique (in Spain) education it provided. Alonso, Campo and the girls who took the academic prizes at the *Instituto*’s annual awards—to the whistling and cat-calls of some of the male students—were exceptions rather than the rule. The Krausist professors’ surprise at the academic excellence of the female students, and the fact that they had been taught by women, was effectively an indictment of the education handed out to most Spanish girls, as Anna Webb observed. Whilst a select few of mostly bourgeois girls and women gained access to a ‘North American education’ thanks to Alice Gordon Gulick, the vast majority of Spanish girls and women remained excluded from secondary and tertiary educational institutions until well into the twentieth century.

‘LIBERTY’ OR ‘LICENSE’? WOMEN’S APPEARANCE AND BEHAVIOUR

Spanish images—particularly those imagined by Spanish men—of American women’s appearance and behaviour might best be characterised as double-edged. The women of the United States were either ‘the most beautiful and slender women [...] perhaps in the whole world’, elegant, independent and self-sufficient or they were dangerously free, outrageous flirts and materialistic spendthrifts—and also, of course, ‘beautiful’.¹²³ As well as being understood as among the principal receptors of modernity, that is of movements to extend the suffrage, to extend educational opportunities and participation in the professions and public spheres, women were also taken as reliable measures of modernity; that is to say the extent to which

women had access to modern reforms and broader liberties (or to put it bluntly, the extent to which women were modern) was taken as a barometer of the modernity of the nation more widely. As Nicola Miller put it, national modernities were ‘calibrated’ through (imagined) women.¹²⁴ American women, then, taken to be the most modern of women, were imagined to embody the best and worst aspects of modern life.

There appeared to be general agreement on American women’s beauty and charm. Whilst undoubtedly reflecting the aristocratic circles in which she moved, Princess Eulalia declared herself surprised by the ‘elegance and refinement of the ladies whose dress is more sober, less loud and of extravagant luxury than that of our lands,’ given the ‘particular opinion of American women’ formed ‘on the other side of the ocean’.¹²⁵ Images of American women’s beauty soon began to break down, however. ‘Elegant ladies’ of the USA were used to sell face cream to rich Madrilenian women and North American fashions were dubbed ‘the dress of the future’.¹²⁶ Such images were laced with *resentiment*-heavy inferences to artifice. The common association of images of beautiful American women with advertisements for lotions and potions pointed to the supposed enthusiasm of women for modern inventions, whether labour-saving domestic appliances or rejuvenating creams, but also carried with them the suggestion of cheating nature through artificial and materialistic means. Pardo Bazán’s comment that foreign fashions, ‘though they may suit their inventors, render us ridiculous’ contained within its faint praise a similarly distancing note.¹²⁷

Images of North American beauty were also heavily refracted through perceptions of race and class. Jordana y Morera insisted that in the USA women’s beauty was ‘generalised’, such that ‘they do not look old, decrepit, hunched, full of wrinkles and bold, as one can often find during the day in Europe’. Nor did one find in America, ‘women with the same signs of decrepitude, nor with their features so irregular, if not repulsive, like the ones that around here form the class of the ugly’. However, his ‘generalised’ image of North American beauty was thoroughly white.

All the most outstanding qualities of beauty of the Northern European race seem to have been reunited in these women, further improving their aesthetical shape and proliferating with an extraordinary vigour.¹²⁸

Spanish images of American beauty and elegance were associated with Anglo-Saxon features (whatever these were) and the comportment of the middle-class women of Boston and Philadelphia. Chinese, native American and black American women, miserably dressed and ‘dulled’ by

their poverty, were conspicuously absent from the accounts of the beauty and liberty of American women.

An archetype of American Anglo-Saxon beauty was Frances Cleveland, who was just 21 when she married President Grover Cleveland and became the First Lady in June 1886. The Clevelands’ marriage in the White House was followed in every last detail in the US press and by the crowds who assembled outside. Frances Cleveland became an instantly recognised figure whose image was used to sell illustrated newspapers, goods and political pamphlets and memorabilia. She came to particular attention in Spain in 1893 when during her second term as First Lady she welcomed the Spanish Princess Eulalia on her royal visit to the USA. The satirical journal *Blanco y Negro* set aside its habitual mocking tone to publish on its front page the first illustration in Spain of ‘Mister Cleveland’s beautiful wife’ whom it considered ‘at this time the most elevated, pleasant and interesting figure of the North American Republic’.¹²⁹ Princess Eulalia herself declared her ‘very good-looking’.¹³⁰ Frances Cleveland—known as ‘Frank’ among friends and family and as ‘Frankie’ to the press—was educated at Wells College, championed women’s education (but not political emancipation) and hosted Saturday morning receptions at the White House for working women. Her image therefore captured many of the qualities of the American ‘new woman’ although her attainment of her position via marriage and abstinence from active political engagement precluded her from truly epitomising this modern female type.

Whilst contemporary Spaniards spoke of the modern woman (but never the ‘new woman’) they certainly observed marked differences between the modes of behaviour practised by and accepted of women in Spain and the United States. Most displayed a patriotic loyalty to their countrywomen finding virtue in their ‘innocent ignorance’, ‘immaculate purity’ and hearts full of ‘feelings’, even if ‘they did not have a library in their head’, unlike the liberated women of the United States.¹³¹

Spanish images of North American women focussed above all on their perceived liberty. They (in reality a select few) were free to pursue careers, make their own money and participate in politics. One of the aspects of North American women’s liberty that most surprised Spanish observers were the personal freedoms enjoyed by young Americans, particularly women. Young women were perceived to move (relatively) freely about their cities and country, lightly or un-chaperoned by older or male relatives, and to enjoy considerable freedom in their relationships with the opposite sex.¹³² Jordana y Morera, for example, admired *la norteamericana*

cana's 'ease and resolve', her natural coquettishness, and the way in which she expected the man accompanying her to act neither as her maître d' nor as her banker.¹³³ Jordana y Morera encountered directly the personal freedom of women and the ease of relationships between young men and women in the form of two acquaintances and subsequent travelling companions, Miss Fanny and Miss Nelly.

Miss Fany [sic] and Miss Nelly [...] received me on their own in the *parlour*, because there all sons and daughters, without distinction by sex, receive their visits independently of the other members of the family, if they are the only ones being visited. Young single women pass by the streets with the same liberty and accept the company of friends and boyfriends on walks, at the theatre and on excursions. [...]

I know full well that this liberty, unusual in Europe, is the target of major criticism of foreigners on this side of the Atlantic, who visit the homeland of Washington for the first time, but observing the facts from up close, and taking account the conditions of character, temperament and education, even the most demanding person is soon convinced that this custom does not have the disadvantages it could have in the Latin peoples of our old Europe. On the contrary, there it is useful for the fortification of character, the ennoblement of spirit, and for giving a lift to dignity itself, extolling the natural independence as reason develops. [...]

After all, men, the implacable critics of these vices in women, always turn out to be the ones that incite and sustain them. [...] The excellent results achieved by the liberty enjoyed by young people consist only in the good sense of men, in the general sense that they are inspired by women and by the education one and the other receives. This is the secret, and if it is dangerous to introduce similar customs in Europe, one should take into account that here the harm arises from everyone preaching a morality that we do not have the virtue to practise.¹³⁴

The ability of young American women to travel and receive visitors independently and to socialise freely with young men of their own age must have come as quite a surprise to a Spaniard whose country legally required women under the age of 25 to seek parental permission to leave the family house, and was a place where (as Pardo Bazán observed) couples were rarely seen together on the street and to give one's arm to one's companion in public was considered the height of bad taste.¹³⁵ But as Bustamante y Campuzano remarked, the freer relationship between the sexes in the USA, which for Jordana y Morera signalled elevated levels of education and respect in both genders, also constituted a potential

minefield for ‘the recently disembarked European’, as yet unfamiliar with ‘American habits and traditions’.¹³⁶ The particular object of Bustamante’s wry observation was the *flerteo* --‘translated into Spanish, read as *coquetería refinada*’-- a ‘pre-eminent national institution’ in the USA, but a ‘sweet illusion’ liable to catch out the poor European who finds himself the sudden recipient of a *bella neoyorquina*’s smile, which would be ‘very meaningful in other countries’.¹³⁷ He would soon realise that such flirtations ‘never last more than a week’ and were simply a local custom ‘to which one should not assign any importance’. Flirting may well have been a national pastime—‘an American woman who does not flirt, is not an American woman’—and one apt to trip up the unsuspecting European visitor, but it contained neither dishonest nor false intent. ‘Used not to conceal their impressions from infancy’, young American women ‘express in such a clear way [...] their sympathies and antipathies’ far removed from (as Jordana y Morera put it) ‘the scandalous abuse of make-belief which recalls the times of Roman prostitution’ engaged in by ‘our ladies’, both single and married.¹³⁸

Not all Spanish observers viewed North American liberties so sympathetically. Adolfo Llanos put forward a fierce critique of US women’s liberty of lifestyle, stoked by a public argument in the US press in which his assertion that American women were trapped by their liberty was countered with the accusation that Spanish women were effectively enslaved.¹³⁹ Llanos argued that the North American woman enjoyed ‘absolute’ and, therefore, ‘dangerous’ liberty. Free to go out when she pleased, receive whom she pleased ‘in her room’ and ignore parental advice, ‘no one holds her to account for her actions, and supported in law, she comes and goes, talks and works as dictated by her will and whims’.¹⁴⁰ Saxon ‘frigidity’ might help protect American women from indiscretion, he supposed, but the fallacy of this free female lifestyle, enshrined in law, was revealed when combined with passion—as it surely must where women were concerned—as was evident for all to see ‘in the statistics of vice [and] the uninspiring scenes that astonish the foreigner in public places and on solitary walks’.¹⁴¹

For Llanos, then, liberty of lifestyle was incompatible with love; the proof was in ‘Yankee’ marriages ‘which are different to all others in the world’ with ‘spouses who [...] consider the sacrament a friendly bond, which is devoid of any obligations and which can easily be broken’ and in Americans’ constant recourse to the courts to resolve personal matters in public, in cases of divorce, petitions for indemnity after the breaking-off

of engagements and prosecutions for bigamy and polygamy.¹⁴² The blame for this lay not with women—‘she, by herself, is innocent, spiritual and beautiful’—but with the men of the USA who, in giving women education and personal freedoms, had bestowed them ‘a liberty which degenerates into license at every turn’.¹⁴³ Llanos backed this image of licentious women with a rather dubious statistic: in New York, 38 women a day were arrested, mostly for vagrancy, drunkenness and bad conduct, some for violence, whilst in Madrid ‘which is not a model town or one of virtue’, no more than 12 per day were arrested and not for the previously mentioned crimes. Having admitted that Madrid has a population a third of the size of New York’s, it is curious that he should be outraged by a female arrest rate in New York, which proportionately was roughly in line with that of Madrid.¹⁴⁴ What’s more, Llanos’ questionable analysis of female crime rates in the USA was contradicted by that of Concepción Arenal, an expert in the Spanish penal system, which, as has been noted, found that women were far less likely to commit crimes and be imprisoned, despite their disadvantaged position.

What united those who admired the personal and financial independence of American women and those who decried their perilous ‘license’, was their consistency in assigning responsibility for the behaviour of women to men. Modern or traditional, enjoyers of ‘liberty’ or of ‘license’, women were denied agency. For Jordana y Morera, the positive personal freedoms enjoyed by young American ladies came down to the ‘good sense’ of American men;¹⁴⁵ for Llanos, these same women’s defects, faults and errors ‘were due to men’.¹⁴⁶ For Pardo Bazán, albeit lamenting the lack of opportunities and liberties of Spanish women, ‘the woman is as the man deliberately makes her’.¹⁴⁷ US men, Llanos claimed, did not respect, dignify nor esteem women: they made them work; they kissed them openly in the street; they left them to stand in carriages when no seats were free; and they even left them to drown, as a recent case of shipwreck in which men helped themselves to life jackets whilst women perished, illustrated.

This is not say that the yankee is a coward and lacking in generosity: it means only that the yankee is used to considering women like any man, and if there is an instance of disturbance, he acts as if women did not exist, and neither distinguishes between sexes nor knows about gallantry.¹⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

The United States was (once again) viewed as the modern pioneer or, like it or not, as the shape of things to come in relation to women’s political rights, their right to education and the liberty of relationships between the sexes. The terms in which Spaniards discussed the USA indicate that some liberal individuals were in favour of female emancipation, as practised—or imagined—in the USA, albeit coupled with the feeling that Spain would need to follow its own route to emancipating women. Educationalists, especially those clustered around the *The Free Educational Institution*, actively pushed for improved education opportunities for Spanish girls and women as the speakers at Castro’s Sunday conferences for women and Azcárate and Salmerón’s support for the work of Alice Gulick in Santander and San Sebastián testify. Some could even envisage the advantages of women’s future political emancipation for the nation. Nobody advocated full equality—certainly not in the foreseeable future and possibly not ever—for women: it was imagined that women’s jobs would always have to be appropriate to the ‘sensibilities’ of the female sex, requiring neither physical strength nor ‘authority’, and the argument for educating women still had to be made in terms of her relationship with men and the primacy of her domestic roles.

A more predominant view of women’s status among middle-class Spaniards is typified by individual travellers to the USA, like Llanos, Jordana, Puig y Valls and Bustamante y Campuzano. All remained amazed by what they encountered in the United States. All responded differently to the seeming greater liberty enjoyed by women there—some amused, some impressed, most dismayed—and almost all agreed that they preferred ‘their own’ Spanish women who didn’t ‘have a library in their head’. ¹⁴⁹ For all the admiration of the US approach to the ‘woman question’, any efforts at reproducing this in Spain such as those of Alice Gulick, whilst very successful were exceptional. Once again, Rafael de Labra appears to have judged his times astutely in his assertion that, in contrast to ‘the Yankee and English reformers’, Spanish women ‘have another way’ to the emancipation that, he believed, would inexorably come. Their ‘road’, which for him included use of the press, conversations in *tertulias* and in the home and above all the education of their children, would be slower but more secure. ¹⁵⁰

Finally, these Spanish observations of US modernity as exemplified by US women conform to and confirm intersections between gender and moder-

nity identified by other historians in other national contexts.¹⁵¹ Women could be the barometer or yardstick of modernity, measuring out its extent, and they could be symbols of modernity, but they could not make it. As barometers (or calibrators, in Nicola Miller's words) of modernity, women were imagined, for the most part passively, as recipients of the 'advances' of modern times, whether voting rights, education and professional opportunities or domestic appliances and beauty creams. As key recipients of modernity, women were also upheld as its symbols. Both 'real' individuals, like Frances Cleveland, and homogenised 'cipher' women, onto whom a heap of attributed values and behaviour were projected, like the 'miss' and the 'matron', were imagined to epitomise female behaviour and attitudes in the modern age. Pictorial images of the two nations, which increased in volume and intensity in the 1890s as war between Spain and the United States became an increasingly real prospect and then reality, depicted the United States as a male figure—a grotesque, greedy Uncle Sam, occasionally transfigured into a pig—threatening the helpless, often cowering, figure of Spain—always represented as female (sometimes young, sometimes older).¹⁵² All of these intersections of gender and modernity denied women agency and connected women to modernity only in relation to men. Orison Swett Marden declared women the 'discovery' of the century, casting men (presumably) as the agents of discovery.¹⁵³ North American women's liberty of movement and relationships came thanks to men's 'good sense' and, equally, their 'license [...] was due to men'.¹⁵⁴ Conventional contemporary parameters of thought ensured that the arguments made for and against women's political and intellectual emancipation were conceived in terms of women's relationships with men, and how any emancipatory steps would affect (male-dominated) society. How would women voters affect and be affected by the rowdy, often corrupt political system made by men? Could men be truly modern if they did not have a modern woman at their side? Concepción Arenal closed her treatise on 'the woman of the future' with the plea: 'we want [woman] to be the companion of man. She was able to be that to the ignorant man of past centuries, without education; she will not be to the modern man, whilst the harmony of her ideas is not the same as the harmony between their feelings'.¹⁵⁵ She opened her case for 'the women of her house' to become a relic of the past with a similarly relational argument privileging male agency.

If things of the mind could be weighed like those of the spirit, one would clearly see that men taken as a mass, as the saying goes, we mean taken as

a large community, in the *measure* that they *reduce* women, *are reduced* by them, materially, morally and intellectually. [...] If the American had not elevated (at least relatively) women, they would not have been able to *hacer la América* [make America], as has been said.¹⁵⁶

Of course, in reality, her own political campaigning and activity belied this denial or subordination of modern women’s agency. As she, Sáez de Melgar, Pardo Bazán, Gordon Gulick and her path-breaking students Alonso and Campo, and many others demonstrated, whether acknowledged or not, women were also makers of modernity.

NOTES

1. S. L. White (1999) ‘Liberty, Honor, Order: Gender and Political Discourse in Nineteenth-Century Spain’ in V. L. Enders & P. B. Radcliff eds. *Constructing Spanish Womanhood. Female Identity in Modern Spain* (Albany, NY.: State University of New York Press) p. 240. See also: R.A. Gutiérrez Lloret (2009) ‘Da icona della libertà a disonore della Spagna: immagini della regina Isabella II nel processo di legittimazione sociale e politica della prima monarchia liberale spagnola (1830–1868)’ in G. Guazzaloca ed. *Sovrani a metà. Monarchia e legittimazione politica tra Otto e Novecento* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino).
2. G. Espigado Tocino (2012) ‘El género sometido a consideración durante el sexenio democrático (1868–1874)’ in M.C. Marcos del Olmo & R. Serrano García eds. *Mujer y política en la España contemporánea* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid) p. 37; A. Blanco (2001) *Escrivoras virtuosas: narradores de la domesticidad en la España isabelina* (Granada: Universidad de Granada: Caja General de Ahorros de Grenada). The entry of the ‘angel in the house’ image into Spain can be dated to 1859 and the publication of Pilar de Sinués’ book *El ángel de hogar* (Madrid: Imp. y Estereotipia Española de los Señores Nieto y Compañía), which took its title from the translation of the title of Coventry Patmore’s poem. R. Serrano García (2012) ‘Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer krausismo’ in M.C. Marcos del Olmo & R. Serrano García eds. *Mujer y política* p. 95.
3. Cited in G. Scanlon (1986) *La polémica feminista en la España contemporánea 1868–1974* (Madrid: Akal) p. 148.
4. See M.A. Orobon (2012) ‘Alegorías y heroínas: Usos políticos de la imagen femenina en el sexenio democrático (1868–1874)’ in M.C. Marcos del Olmo & R. Serrano García eds. *Mujer y política* p. 26 and also G. de la Fuente Monge & R. Serrano García (2005) *La revolución Gloriosa. Un ensayo de regeneración nacional (1868–1874)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva) pp. 106–7.

5. E. Pardo Bazán (1889) 'The Women of Spain' in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 45, pp. 881–2.
6. E. Pardo Bazán 'The Women of Spain' p. 883.
7. See G. Espigado Tocino (2005) 'Mujeres "radicales": utópicas, republicanas e internacionalistas en España (1848–1914)' in *Ayer* v. 60 pp. 15–43; idem. (2010) 'Las primeras republicanas en España: prácticas y discursos identitarios (1868–1874)' in *Historia Social* v. 67 pp. 75–93; the quotation is from idem. 'El género sometido a consideración' p. 39.
8. G. Espigado Tocino 'El género sometido a consideración' pp. 38–9.
9. The prevalence of women abolitionists and the connections between the movements for abolition and for women's emancipation (both in terms of personnel and mutual ideological influences) has been well documented. See J. Roy Jeffrey (1998) *The Great Silent Army of Abolitionism: Ordinary Women in the Antislavery Movement* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press); J. Fagan Yellin (1989) *Women and Sisters: The Antislavery feminists in American Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
10. See, for example, H. Partzsch (2012) 'Violets and abolition: The discourse on slavery in Faustina Sáez de Melgar's magazine *La Violeta* (Madrid, 1862–66)' in *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* vol. 89.6 pp. 859–75 and L. Surwillo (2007) 'Poetic diplomacy: Carolina Coronado and the American Civil War' in *Comparative American Studies* vol. 5.4, pp. 409–22.
11. The development of associations dedicated to promoting free trade, colonial reform, the abolition of slavery in the Antilles as well as workers' and women's education between the late 1850s and 1870s was such that the period has been termed Spain's 'age of societies' and is credited as the beginnings of a flourishing 'public sphere' on the peninsula. C. Schmidt-Nowara (1999) *Empire and Antislavery. Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press) p. 74.
12. Though the right to vote was one of its affirmed aspirations, the ANME did not campaign for women's suffrage in an organised, let alone militant, way. See G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista en la España contemporánea* p. 151.
13. G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista en la España contemporánea* pp. 3–12.
14. Concepción Sáiz pointed particularly to the reforms brought by the radical leaders of the *sexenio* in the field of education, such as the institution of the *Escuela de Instruções*. C. Sáiz Otero (1929) *La revolución del 68 y la cultura femenina* (Madrid: Librería de Victoriano Suárez).
15. The influence of Krause and Fröbel on Castro have already been noted. Serrano García also notes the presence of texts by contemporary French writers, Jules Simon and Eugène Pelletan, in Castro's library as well as the overlap between Castro's ideas and theirs. In addition, he suggests that in

establishing the 1869 Sunday conferences series, Castro may have had in mind the educational project set up by the French minister of the Second Republic, Victor Duruy, in 1867. The French project was publicised in Spain by the journal, *La Enseñanza*. R. Serrano García ‘Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer krausismo’ p. 96; 98.

16. *La Iberia* 17 Dec. 1868 p. 3 ‘Variedades’.
17. Educational and professional opportunities also improved for black American women between the end of the Civil War and the turn of the century but black women were notably disadvantaged compared to their white counterparts. See L. D. Gordon (2002) ‘Education and the professions’ in A. N. Hewitt ed. *A Companion to American Women’s History* (Oxford: Blackwell) pp. 228–237.
18. It is worth remembering that ‘anti-radical’ women also mobilised and spoke out against the enfranchisement of women, anti-discrimination policies and social and welfare reform. See K. Delegard (2002) ‘Women’s Movements, 1880s–1920s’ in A. N. Hewitt ed. *A Companion to American Women’s History* pp. 328–9.
19. The birth rate fell from 7.0 in 1800 to 3.56 in 1900; approximately 10 % of American women born into the first college-going female generation (i.e. born around 1860–1880) did not marry; the divorce rate rose to 5 % by 1900. L.D. Gordon ‘Education and the professions’ p. 239.
20. O. Swett Marden (1894) *Pushing to the Front, or Success Under Difficulties*. (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin) p. 101. His book was translated into Spanish some years later as (1913) *¡Siempre Adelante!* (Barcelona: Editorial Parera). Cited in N. Miller (2012) ‘Liberty, Lipstick and Lobsters’ in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined. Images of the United States in Europe and Latin America* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) p. 81.
21. For the legal position of women in Spain see G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* pp. 122–158.
22. Nicola Miller’s discussion of the images of US women produced across Europe and Latin America is very instructive here. N. Miller ‘Liberty, lipstick and lobsters’, especially pp. 81–4.
23. The term *miss* was very often used by Spanish and other foreign commentators in the original English and italicised to describe the young American women they encountered. As Nicola Miller observes, the use of the term in English and in italics served as a distancing tool, to suggest that ‘misses’ were to be found in the USA, but not at home.
24. Arenal wrote *La Mujer del Porvenir* by 1861, but it was published only after the September Revolution in 1869; *La Mujer de su Casa* was published in 1883, at which time Arenal updated some of the points made in the first work via adjournments in footnotes. C. Arenal (1869) *La Mujer*

del Porvenir (Madrid: Oficina Tipográfica del Hospicio); idem. (1883) *La Mujer de su Casa* (Madrid: Gras y Compañía Editores) p. 102.

25. I have been unable to find out if and when the *History of Woman Suffrage* was translated into Spanish and published in Spain. However, given the short time lag between the publication of the first two volumes of *History of Woman Suffrage* and of Arenal's *La Mujer de su Casa*, it is possible that Arenal encountered this work in the original English-language US publication.
26. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* pp. 103–4.
27. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa*. p. 103.
28. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* p. 26.
29. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* p. 27.
30. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* p. 27.
31. See R. Serrano García 'Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer Krausismo' pp. 96–9.
32. See C. Schmidt-Nowara *Empire and Antislavery*. p. 92–3.
33. R.M. de Labra (1869) *Conferencias Dominicanas sobre la Educación de la Mujer. Quinta conferencia sobre la Mujer y la Legislación Castellana* (Madrid, Imp. de M Rivadeneyra). Civil marriage was indeed legislated in 1870, though its impact was muted after the Restoration and further diminished in the 1889 *Código Civil* through its restriction to non-Catholics. As this limitation suggests, the impetus for the introduction of civil marriage appeared to stem more from anti-clerical impulses than any concern for women's rights. Labra's insistence on civil marriage as part of the set of rights essential for the elevation of women's status is thus notable.
34. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* p. 13–4.
35. Cited in M.A. Orobón 'Alegorías y heroínas' p. 26.
36. E. Pardo Bazán 'The Women of Spain' p. 883.
37. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* p. 14.
38. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* pp. 16–7.
39. See L. Charnon-Deutsch (2001) 'Concepción Arenal and the Nineteenth-Century Spanish Debates about Women's Sphere and Education' in L. Vollendorf ed. *Recovering Spain's Feminist Tradition* (New York: The Modern Language Association of America) pp. 198–216.
40. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* p. 69. The liberal trope of education as a pre-requisite for political participation featured heavily in Spanish discussions of female emancipation and much attention was paid to the task of providing education opportunities for women, as will be seen later.
41. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 108.
42. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 108.
43. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 108. (Italicised in the original Spanish.)
44. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 118.

45. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 110.
46. *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* 3 Feb. 1893; C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 108.
47. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir*.
48. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* p. 117.
49. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* p. 32.
50. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* p. 33.
51. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* pp. 34–5.
52. Australian women were granted the federal vote in 1902 (following New Zealand’s example set in 1893), although individual states began to enfranchise women from 1895. Women who met property-holding criteria could vote in local elections (not parliamentary) from 1861; it is presumably to this that Labra referred when he described, in 1869, female suffrage in Australia as ‘a fact’.
53. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* pp. 34–5.
54. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 16. Arenal accepted that there were some jobs that women would not be able to fulfill.
55. See *La Ilustración de la Mujer* 15 April 1884; C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* pp. 60–1; *El Imparcial* 20 May 1893.
56. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 9 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. (1949) *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893. Mi viaje a Cuba y Estados Unidos.* (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud).
57. A. Llanos (1886) *El Gigante Americano. Descripciones de los Estados Unidos de América del Norte* (Madrid: Tipográfico de Ricardo Fé) p. 24.
58. AHN MAS RC (10) 3.04 54/1284 Report from the head of the Spanish Legation (with additions by the Ambassador) to the Minister of State, 1 Sept. 1892.
59. *El Imparcial* 2 May 1893.
60. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 8 Aug. 1893 ‘Congreso de mujeres en Chicago’.
61. José Picón (words), Cristóbal Oudrid (music), (1862) *La Isla de San Balandrán* (Madrid: Imp. de Cristóbal González) Act I, Scene III. The *Ilustración*’s correspondent’s ‘memory’ of the zarzuela, triggered by the image of voting American women, seems somewhat selective; the imagined island was not a democracy, but ruled by a queen. The zarzuela’s own imagery was itself somewhat confusing given that the first female character encountered, a military leader on the island, was depicted wearing a Phrygian cap—a thoroughly republican symbol.
62. R. Puig y Valls (1894) *Viaje á América* (Barcelona: Tipolitografía de Luis Tasso) pp. 176; 185–6.
63. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 9 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II*.
64. E. Pardo Bazán ‘The women of Spain’ p. 893.

65. Adrian Shubert notes that at least 56 women published novels in Spain in the nineteenth century. A. Shubert (1990) *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Unwin Hyman) p. 42.
66. See M.C. Urruela (2001) 'Becoming angelic: María Pilar Sinués and the woman question' in L. Vollendorf ed. *Recovering Spain's Feminist Tradition* pp. 160–175.
67. E. Pardo Bazán 'The women of Spain' p. 894.
68. R. Serrano García 'Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer Krausismo' pp. 89–109; G. Capellán de Miguel (2006) *La España armónica. El proyecto del Krausismo español para una sociedad en conflicto* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva).
69. Fernando de Castro, like many Krausists, was heavily influenced by the contemporary writings on pedagogy of Friedrich Fröbel, such that Krausism has at times been referred to as Krausofröbelism. R. Serrano García 'Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer Krausismo' p. 93.
70. For an account of these organisations, see G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* pp. 30–9. On the closure of the civil service to women, with the exception of the telegraph office, see A. Shubert *A Social History of Modern Spain* p. 41.
71. C. Saíz *La revolución del 68 y la cultura femenina* pp. 29;33.
72. G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* p. 17. R. Serrano García 'Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer Krausismo' p. 94.
73. A. Shubert *A Social History of Modern Spain* p. 37.
74. L. Charnon-Deutsch 'Concepción Arenal and the Nineteenth-Century Spanish Debates about Women's Sphere and Education' pp. 198–216; R. Serrano García 'Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer Krausismo' p. 95.
75. G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* p. 50.
76. J.L. Guereña (1996) 'Infancia y escolarización' in J.M. Borrás Llop *Historia de la infancia en España contemporánea, 1834–1936* (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales/Fundación Germán Sánchez Ruipérez) p. 352; R. Serrano García 'Las mujeres en el discurso y en la práctica del primer Krausismo' p. 94.
77. G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* p. 50.
78. G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* p. 48.
79. G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* pp. 24–5.
80. The assertion that a US (and Danish) investigation had revealed a link between education and female illness and sterility was reported in *El Mundo Femenino*. See L. Charnon-Deutsch 'Concepción Arenal and the Nineteenth-Century Spanish Debates about Women's Sphere and Education' pp. 198–216.

81. *El Imparcial* 20 May 1893.
82. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* p. 91.
83. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* pp. 88–92. See also G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* pp. 23–4.
84. *La Isla de San Balandrán*, Act I, Scene III.
85. *La Isla de San Balandrán*, Act 1, Scene XV.
86. Gaspar's time-travelling work, which is now perhaps most famous, *El anacronópete* (1887), presents as ridiculous the desire of one of its protagonists, don Sindulfo, to 'go back' to a time when women obeyed men. E. Pardo Bazán *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* Dec. 1893 'Un Ibseniano español—La huelga de hijos'.
87. See H. Gregersen (1936) *Ibsen and Spain. A study in comparative drama* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) p. 59. The title with which *The Doll's House* was presented in 1893, *Nora*, suggests that the version staged in Catalan was taken from, or heavily influenced, by the German stage-version of the same title. *The Doll's House* is now more commonly known in translation as *La casa de muñecas*. It is thought that it was not staged in Madrid until 1899, when it was presented by an Italian touring company. It was only in 1908 that a Castilian version, translated via the French, was staged in Madrid. Idem. *Ibsen and Spain* pp. 80–1.
88. E. Gaspar (1893) *La Huelga de Hijos. Comedia en tres actos y en prosa* (Madrid: Florencio Fiscowich, Editor) Act I, Scene V.
89. E. Gaspar *La Huelga de Hijos*. Act I, Scene V.
90. E. Pardo Bazán *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* Dec. 1893 'Un Ibseniano español—La huelga de hijos'.
91. E. Gaspar *La Huelga de Hijos*. Act 1, Scene VI.
92. E. Gaspar *La Huelga de Hijos*. Act 1, Scene VI.
93. E. Gaspar *La Huelga de Hijos*. Act 1, Scene VI.
94. E. Pardo Bazán *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* Dec. 1893 'Un Ibseniano español—La huelga de hijos'.
95. H. Gregersen *Ibsen and Spain*. p. 80.
96. E. Pardo Bazán *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* Dec. 1893 'Un Ibseniano español—La huelga de hijos'.
97. E. Pardo Bazán *Nuevo Teatro Crítico* Dec. 1893 'Un Ibseniano español—La huelga de hijos'.
98. E. Gaspar *La Huelga de Hijos*. Act 1, Scene VI.
99. The International Institute for Girls in Spain moved to Biarritz during the Spanish-American-Cuban war in 1898; it then transferred to Madrid, where it is still active.
100. C. Zululeta (1984) *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras. Historia del Instituto Internacional* (Madrid: Editorial Castalia); C. Scally Grigas (2004) 'Mission to Spain: Alice Gordon Gulick and a transatlantic project to educate Spanish women, 1872–1903' Unpublished PhD Thesis, Washington State University.

101. The September revolution of 1868 paved the way for the arrival (or return) of Protestant missionaries in Spain. The most notable Spanish Protestant missionary was the Rev. Antonio Carrasco who ensured Spain's place within the established transatlantic evangelical and social reform networks of the time; Carrasco was drowned crossing the Atlantic in 1873, as he returned from an evangelical conference in New York, where he had represented the *Alianza Evangélica*, then the most significant protestant synod in Spain. C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' pp. 19; 35.
102. E. Gordon (1971) *Alice Gordon Gulick; her life and work in Spain* (New York: Fleming H. Revell) pp. 109–110; C. Zululeta *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras* p. 88; C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 26.
103. This suggestion is made by Carol Scally Grigas in 'Mission to Spain' p. 114.
104. C. Zululeta *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras* p. 115.
105. On the North American 'new woman', see J.V. Matthews (2003) *The rise of the new woman: The women's movement in America 1875–1930* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee).
106. Cited in C. Zululeta *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras* p. 107.
107. C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 168.
108. Twenty-one of 24 girls who graduated in the years up to 1893 went on to become teachers, whilst 2 became pharmacists. Alonso and Campo, the two students who were the first women to complete university degrees in Spain, taught solely by women, returned to teach at the IIG for a time. Twenty-nine other non-graduates worked in other capacities in protestant missions. C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' pp. 178–200.
109. C. Zululeta *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras* p. 115.
110. The account of the *Colegio Norteamericano*'s origins come from Mary Stedman Sweeny's 'Historical Sketch of the International Institute for Girls in Spain' and is cited in C. Scally Grigas. "Mission to Spain" p. 48 and C. Zululeta *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras* p. 88.
111. Letter from Alice Gulick to Miss Carruth, 14 Sept. 1878, cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 52.
112. Letter from Alice Gulick to Abby Child, 1 Oct. 1885, cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' pp. 69–70.
113. Cited in C. Zululeta *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras* p. 112.
114. 'Papal Land—Spain', WBM Annual Report 1896 pp. 33–4; cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 186.
115. C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 189.
116. *Missionary Herald* Sept. 1898, 'The International Institute for Girls in Spain'; cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' pp. 191–2.
117. See C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 59.
118. On Gulick's remarks see C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain'. p. 165.

119. Salmerón's comments reported in: E. Gordon *Alice Gordon Gulick* p. 126, cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 172. See also Zululeta C. *Misioneras, feministas, educadoras* p. 115.
120. *Life and Light* February 1897 'From Mary L Page', cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 177.
121. WBM Annual Report, 1896, 'Spain', cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 175.
122. Letter from Alice Gulick to Harriet Stanwood, 27 Nov. 1895, cited in C. Scally Grigas 'Mission to Spain' p. 176.
123. J. Jordana y Morera (1884) *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social de los Estados Unidos*. (Madrid: Tipografía de Manuel G Hernández) chapter 3; A. Llanos (1886) *El Gigante Americano. Descripciones de los Estados Unidos de la América del Norte* (Madrid: Tipográfico de Ricardo Fé) chapter 2.
124. N. Miller 'Lipstick, liberties and lobsters' pp. 82–96.
125. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 1 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
126. *El Correo Universal* 16 June 1870 'A las damas españolas'; *La Ilustración de la Mujer* 15 April 1884, supplement: "Revista de Modas y Salones".
127. E. Pardo Bazán 'The women of Spain' p. 895.
128. J. Jordana y Morera *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social* p. 48.
129. *Blanco y Negro* 17 June 1893.
130. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 20 May 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
131. *El Imparcial* 20 May 1893 'Las mujeres en América'.
132. No reference was made in the sources I've examined to amorous same-sex relationships.
133. J. Jordana y Morera *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social* p. 48.
134. J. Jordana y Morera *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social* pp. 171–3.
135. See E. Pardo Bazán 'The women of Spain' p. 895; G. Scanlon *La polémica feminista* p. 125.
136. J. Bustamante y Campuzano (1885) *Del Atlántico al Pacífico. Apuntes e Impresiones de un Viaje a través de los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Victor Saiz) p. 57.
137. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* pp. 57–8.
138. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 59; J. Jordana y Morera *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social* p. 48.
139. Puig y Valls also noted the prevalent view in the USA that Spanish women remained 'stupefied by domesticity and slavery, [and] did not have any other use than to bring children to the world, and humbly bowing her head in front of her owner and master'. However, he asserted that the 'American ladies' had had to revise this view upon viewing the Spanish

women's section at the World's Fair. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 145–6.

140. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano*. p. 29.
141. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano*. pp. 30–2
142. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano*. pp. 30–2.
143. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano*. p. 28.
144. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano*. pp. 24–5.
145. J. Jordana y Morera *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social* p. 173.
146. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano* p. 28
147. E. Pardo Bazán 'The women of Spain' p. 895.
148. A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano*. p. 38.
149. *El Imparcial* 20 May 1893 "Las mujeres en América".
150. R.M. de Labra *Conferencias Dominicanas* p. 32.
151. N. Miller 'Lipstick, liberty and lobsters' *passim*. C. Davies (2005) 'On Englishmen, Women, Indians and Slaves: Modernity in the Nineteenth-century Spanish-American Novel' in *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* vol. 82, no. 3–4, pp. 313–333.
152. See J. Álvarez-Junco (2001) *Mater Dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus) p. 360 and S. Balfour (1996) "The Lion and the Pig": Nationalism and National Identity in Fin-de-Siècle Spain' in C. Mar.-Molinero & A. Smith eds. *Nationalism and the nation in the Iberian peninsula. Competing and conflicting identities* (Oxford: Berg) pp. 107–117
153. O. Swett Marden *Pushing to the Front* p. 101.
154. J. Jordana y Morera *Curiosidades Naturales* p. 173; A. Llanos *El Gigante Americano* p. 28.
155. C. Arenal *La Mujer del Porvenir* 114–5.
156. C. Arenal *La Mujer de su Casa* p. 22.

Patents and Profit: The Image of the USA as the World's Pioneer in Technology, Engineering, Communications and Urban Planning

That the United States seemed new to Spanish eyes was not solely because of its *nuevo mundo* mantle, a legacy of the continent's 'discovery' in 1492 by old-world conquistadors. It also epitomised novelty in the contemporary, 'modern' age because it was a country whose people seemed to be constantly inventing and innovating in the fields of technology, science, engineering, communications and industry. Its inhabitants were pioneers not only insofar as their 'manifest destiny' induced them to journey and populate ever westwards, but also because they achieved or certainly claimed firsts in dreaming up, manufacturing and marketing inventions and products that seemed as though they would (and indeed did) change the way that people lived: electrical light, the telegraph, telephone and celluloid film.¹

The United States appeared young, innovative and advanced; cities like Chicago and San Francisco seemed to spring up and accumulate inhabitants, not to mention grand public monuments, institutions and the latest services, in a matter of a few decades. Even natural disasters like the fire that devastated Chicago in 1871 were no match for the *Homo Americanus'* capacity to invent and build. What's more, these new cities were connected by a capillary network of railways, which from 1869 could proudly claim to have linked the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. Besides being scientifically and technologically advanced, Americans also appeared rich; millionaires like the Vanderbilts and the Rockefellers were perhaps extreme examples, but most Americans—it was imagined—were governed by dollars, adept at commerce and swore by the maxims of 'go ahead' and 'time is money'.

Spanish repetition of North American maxims promoting tenets of industrial capitalism point to the extent to which this image of America as a land of patents and profit was produced in America itself and exported abroad, much like the manufactured goods it marketed worldwide. By the late nineteenth century, the idea of technological determinism, that is that innovations in science and technology were instrumental in driving human 'progress' and change, 'had become dogma' in North American society, as had the view that it was their own country that best epitomised technological modernity.² Books, paintings and lithographs celebrated *Eighty Years' Progress of the United States, Triumphs and Wonders of the 19th Century, Men of Progress* and *The Progress of the Century*, whilst the Worlds' Fairs held in Philadelphia in 1876 and in Chicago in 1893 offered Americans the opportunity to present themselves as the forerunners in technological modernity to an international audience.³ American (and international) consumers of these technological cultural products were told that they were living in an era that 'has achieved triumphs and accomplished wonders equal, if not superior, to all other centuries combined' and that technological manifest destiny would carry the USA endlessly 'westward', geographically and metaphorically, towards ever-greater advancement and dominance.⁴ Of course, the idealised equation of technological innovation with progress was also strongly critiqued by contemporaries on the basis that 'moral progress has not kept pace' with 'material power'.⁵ Such criticisms are evident, for example, in the writings of Jefferson, Carlyle, Hawthorne, Melville, Thoreau and Twain. Technological innovations and the profits they offered, wrote Thoreau, represented but 'improved means to an unimproved end'.⁶

Just as proponents of the idea that technological determinism was driving the USA ever closer to the pinnacle of human achievement were confronted by critics in the USA, so too did Spain produce nuanced understandings of the relationship between nature, man, science and technology as well as ambivalent evaluations of the implications of technological discoveries and innovations for contemporary and future societies. The audience for scientific knowledge in late-century Spain was relatively small, restricted in part by poor literacy rates, but it was growing and receptive to new ideas. The emphasis placed on individual and press freedoms by the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1868 made the *sexenio democrático* a fertile ground for the development of scientific disciplines in Spain.⁷ Although the monarchical Restoration after 1874 removed some of the governmental financial support for the academic sciences, these continued to develop

and find receptive audiences even if proponents of evolutionary thought, such as the Barcelonian professor of natural history, Odón de Buen, often came in for sharp criticism by the exponents of a conservative national-Catholic ideological vision for Spain.⁸

Whilst inventions like electricity and developments in communications such as the extension of the railways and the laying of transatlantic telegraph cables seemed ‘wonderful’ and ‘marvellous’ to Spaniards in the true sense of these words, these sentiments were accompanied and tempered by more ambivalent and even negative responses. Certainly these scientific developments elicited wonder, fascination and anticipation, but they also provoked mistrust and fear. These fears were born of unfamiliarity with the technical and mechanical workings of the inventions, of witnessing of the very real dangers to life and to ways of life that accompanied the inventions, as well as of the perceived threat they were imagined to pose to the ‘Spanish’ values of art and aesthetics. As Bernhard Rieger detected among British and German audiences encountering scientific and technological change, a sense of dislocation, fear and confusion at the encounter with the unfamiliar coexisted with an often positivistic fascination with ‘novel artifacts’.⁹ This admixture of awe and discombobulation invoked in the encounter with large-scale and powerful technologies has been termed, in reference to American audiences, the ‘technological sublime’.¹⁰

Among late nineteenth century liberally minded Spaniards, as this chapter demonstrates, the prevailing attitude towards the pioneering inventions and technological advancements emanating from the USA was positive, guided by an overriding feeling that Spain would need to emulate the USA’s advances in the fields of technology, engineering and communications in order to ‘catch up’ with the ‘most modern of nations’.¹¹

European scientists had long operated within cosmopolitan transnational networks to exchange information, ideas and knowledge.¹² Spanish scientists and technological innovators were no exception: a Catalan version of the spinning jenny was in use in textile production there by the end of the eighteenth century; Spaniards journeyed abroad, especially to France, to acquaint themselves with new methods and inventions both openly and by deception, a process which was in Spain, as elsewhere, ‘a major vehicle for technological transfer’.¹³ Images of the USA as ‘the modern technological nation’ appeared within a complex field of images that also viewed other nations, especially Britain and France, as important sources of scientific and technological modernity and that saw domestic contributions to the production of scientific knowledge as vital ingredients

in Spain's regeneration.¹⁴ The features understood to particularly define US-style technological modernity were its attention to the commercial applications of inventions, the drawing up of patents and reaping of profit, its seeming focus on producing machines, buildings, railway carriages and so on that would meet Americans' desire for 'luxury' and 'comfort' and the emphasis on designing superlatives; the 'longest', the 'biggest' and the 'greatest'. The repeated use in Spanish publications and press reports referencing US inventions of these words—luxury, comfort, biggest, greatest—italicised and left untranslated, in English, emphasised both how these watchwords encapsulated US technological modernity and their distance from Spanish realities.

In order to examine the complex and often ambivalent responses of Spanish elites to the image of the United States as the world's pioneer in inventing, constructing and accumulating wealth, this chapter analyses the public discourse surrounding three predominant 'images' of US innovation and advancement that prevailed among educated Madrilénians and Barcelonians. Firstly, it considers attitudes towards North American inventors and inventions, from reports of the obscure (such as a machine designed to speed the shaving of horses' hair¹⁵) and the immoral to the more sublimely useful and revolutionary—Edison's application of electrical energy to the recording and transmitting of sound being a case in point. Whilst Spaniards expressed their amazement at Americans' capacity for invention, their attitudes were moderated by what they saw as the incompatibility of technological progress with beauty, both natural and man-made, as well as by fears of the risks such innovations posed to existing ways of life and, particularly, by mistrust of US predominance in fields that had military applications. Such fears only grew as the frosty relations between Spain and the USA over the question of Cuban independence became increasingly hostile and finally belligerent at the end of the century.

Secondly, the perceived primacy of the United States in the fields of urban planning and civil engineering will be examined. The rapid establishment of cities particularly in the mid and far west, proved a great and not disinterested source of fascination for Spaniards who compared (and usually contrasted) the development of urban centres in previously sparsely populated settlements like Chicago and San Francisco, with sophisticated public services, transport and communication systems, with that of their own cities and towns, especially the recent extensions to Spain's political and economic capitals, Madrid and Barcelona. Again, positive admiration for the innovations of the USA was qualified by aversion to the aesthetic

aspects of American cities, which seemed only to confirm their belief that modern technological progress was antithetical to beauty and art.

A final section will examine the impressions formed relating to the symbol *par excellence* of the USA's apparent ability 'to annihilate space by time' through technological development—the railway network.¹⁶ Perhaps more than any other innovation, the railroads that criss-crossed the North American continent, linking its coasts, seemed to encapsulate the domination of nature and the acceleration of social and economic exchange achieved by modern man. The railways represented speed, comfort and wealth but not without cost. The price of progress in this case was paid by America's fabled natural wilderness, by the railway workers who did not share in the wealth generated by the industry in which they worked, and indeed by the passengers who risked their lives when they travelled in trains that were prone to accidents and crashes. Linked to this was the image of Americans' ability to amass great fortunes and of the USA as a place where all had the potential to become wealthy, where money dictated actions and relationships and whose population seemed to be naturally proficient in business and commerce. Such impressions often elicited expressions of *resentiment*.¹⁷

THE USA AS THE LAND OF INVENTIONS AND PATENTS

In characterising the USA as a nation of inventors and innovators, Spanish commentators on the goings-on 'across the Atlantic' certainly adhered to the notion of scientific and technological advances as being 'modern wonders'.¹⁸ The Spanish press and travellers to the USA took great delight in chronicling the most weird and wonderful of North American inventions. Adolfo Llanos observed that the 'yankee' possessed 'the craze for inventing and soliciting patents' such that 'he who does not know how to invent a phonograph, invents a string to sustain a watch in a pocket, a fastening device for buttons or an utterly useless trinket'.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the satirical and illustrative journals took it upon themselves to catalogue the more outlandish and improbable inventions coming out of the United States. In so doing, most echoed, either literally or in paraphrase, the much repeated trope that 'if it hasn't been invented yet, an American soon will' or, in the words of *Blanco y Negro*, put the other way: 'what a north American does not invent, no one invents'.²⁰ Like *Blanco y Negro*, a satirical journal inaugurated in 1891 with the stated aim of highlighting the contrasts of 'modern life' between the serious and the humorous, the sublime and the

ridiculous, the *Ilustración Española y Americana* poked fun at the most incredulous American inventions, directed at times at innovations that would eventually become ubiquitous.

Thomas Edison was surely the American inventor most familiar to the Spanish reading public. His name recurred in countless articles, which reported on his innovations in telephony, the use of electricity, the recording of sound and of moving images among others. Edison was held to combine two of the principal characteristics that typified the *Homo Americanus*: the ability to invent and innovate and the ability to do business and make money. As such, he came to embody the image of the American as inventor and pioneer in the technological sphere. For example, in an article wearily entitled ‘another invention from Edison’, the leading Alfonsoist and conservative newspaper, *La Epoca*, reported in 1893 on the arch-inventor’s development of the kinetoscope, an appliance which, the paper hubristically observed, would be ‘for sight what the phonograph [shall be] for hearing, such that, with both united in one, one will see and hear through space and time’.²¹ Moving from abstract claims of Edison’s elimination of space and time to the practical mechanics of his invention, *La Epoca* addressed its readers as an educated public that, though unfamiliar with Edison’s kinetoscope, was not expected to be ignorant of the scientific rationale behind it. The machine worked, it explained, by placing a series of photographic plates ‘located on a perfectly jointed cylinder, which turns like that of the phonograph’ to reproduce ‘human gesture with all the expression of life, and with the speed of movement, the different expressions of physiognomy and distinct actions of the body methodologically adjusted’.²² The technological premise of the kinetoscope—a series of still images viewed at speed to attain the effect of movement—and the precedent (the phonograph) on which it was based were neither alien nor incomprehensible to the Spanish literate classes. Indeed, *La Epoca* presupposed its readers’ familiarity with the phonograph. Nor was the kinetoscope presented as an invention that would remain foreign to Spaniards for long; the implication was that, as Edison predicted, ‘the *kinetógrafo* would in the future be as indispensable as the phonograph’ in Spain, as in the rest of the modern world.

The manner in which earlier technological developments emerging from the USA were communicated to the Spanish public suggests a shift in that public’s level of familiarity with the concepts, workings and vocabulary of technology in the final decades of the nineteenth century.²³ Just fifteen years before *La Epoca* introduced the kinetoscope to its readers in

terms that recognised their education and familiarity with technology, its great rival, the liberal *El Imparcial* had deployed much simpler terminology to explain another important invention to its presumed unfamiliar readership: the telephone, or as *El Imparcial* explained in January 1878, the transmission not of 'the written word, but of the word itself, the word as it is spoken'.²⁴ Although months had now passed, it acknowledged, since the North American press had announced this 'prodigious invention', the news of which 'appeared to many as one of those tales that have made the American press so famous', and communication by telephone had been experimented in Morocco and was at that time being introduced in Prussia, the principles and practicalities of transmitting sound as electrical signals through cables were considered so unfamiliar that the paper felt compelled to spell these out in detail.

The agent should talk slowly, in a clear manner and without straining the voice: he should pronounce the syllables separately, taking particular care in enunciating the last ones.²⁵

As alien as the telephone seemed, however, *El Imparcial* was keen to urge 'our rulers to introduce in Spain this highly useful advancement' and had little doubt that this apparatus would prove as significant as 'other great advancements' such as the 'application of steam to locomotion and electricity to communication', which 'caused true revolutions in industry and social relations'.²⁶ Importantly *El Imparcial* saw the telephone not as entirely revolutionary but as 'advanc[ing] [...] the period we are living in'. Technological modernity, in which *El Imparcial* implicated its readership using the inclusive 'we' and 'our', meant that 'the telephone was being used almost from the time it became known'. This, the paper maintained, was crucial.

Today human thought does not elaborate a true idea, without immediately obtaining its realization, without society acquiring it for its betterment and progress. This feature separates and differentiates our society and civilization from the past.²⁷

The earlier introduction of the telegraph had also given rise to similarly hubristic pronouncements on the acceleration of time. As part of a conference held at the Royal Academy of Sciences in 1861 to discuss the influence of developments in the exact sciences upon construction, Don Cipriano Segundo Montesino ended his intervention with a eulogy to

the impact of technological advances that spread ‘wellbeing and progress everywhere’, in particular the telegraph, ‘which eliminating distances and almost nullifying time, takes the word on the wings of electricity to the confines of the civilised world’.²⁸ These Spaniards, at least, subscribed to the vision of innovations in communications like the telephone, telegraph and extension of the railway network as positive ‘modern wonders’ and barometers of modernity, which radically altered society not least because of the way in which they seemed to annihilate distance and time. Crucially, they also believed that they would do the same for Spain. To this end, they understood Spain as an enthusiastic participant, albeit a relative latecomer, in the drive to technologically modernise social and economic relationships. Successive Spanish governments sought to stimulate the introduction of modern technologies at home. The national patent system, codified in law in 1820, 1826 and again in 1878, was intended more to promote the emulation and diffusion of foreign technologies than to encourage domestic innovation. Following the 1878 industrial property law, the number of patent applications and trade in property rights increased dramatically (to 31,000 applications between 1878 and 1902, from a total of approximately 5000 between 1826 and 1878) and a professional class of Spanish patent agents developed to facilitate the securing of patents, although, again, this was primarily geared towards securing Spanish patents for foreign-designed and often manufactured devices.²⁹

The democratic *sexenio* had, through its preserving of the freedom of expression and from censorship, its climate of tolerance and provision of financial support, provided a hospitable environment for the development of academic scientific disciplines, via the establishment of university chairs and learned societies and the strengthening of existing institutions such as the Royal Academy of Sciences.³⁰ Although many academics who had been supportive of the democratic (and republican) *sexenio* project were removed from their positions after the return of the Bourbon monarchy, the Restoration-era governments remained broadly supportive of the academic sciences, with the partial exception of those Spanish professors who advocated Darwinist and Haekalian ideas.³¹ In the final decades of the nineteenth century, legislation was passed not only in the field of patents and industrial property rights, but to regulate and promote public works and the further extension of the railroad system. Spanish scientists and engineers themselves sought to stimulate greater domestic innovation and scientific awareness, not least through a plethora of popular science books, including Odón de Buen’s 4-volume *Historia Natural* (1891–

95), intended as a luxury publication packaging evolutionary thought for Spanish and Latin American middle-class consumption and journals and newspapers dedicated to circulating scientific and technological news, such as *La Semana Industrial*, *Industria e Invenciones* and the New York-published *El Progreso*.³² Articles discussing science and innovation were also published in the mainstream press. Whilst the notable expansion of publications and other activities intended to scientifically educate the Spanish literate public indicate the existence of a scientific public sphere, receptive to rational, secular scientific thought, the continued and indeed intensified sense of purpose of scientists like Odón de Buen in popularising the sciences after 1898, into the first decades of the twentieth century, point to their perception that Spain's 'scientific culture' remained weak.³³ What's more, Spain remained heavily reliant on foreign technologies well into the twentieth century, with the exception of some domestic industries including chemicals and food, beverage and tobacco production.³⁴

Notwithstanding the efforts to encourage home-grown technologies and scientific enthusiasm, a current of ambivalence also characterised Spanish reception of modern technologies in general and of American technological modernity in particular. These attitudes point less to a sense of *resentiment* engendered by perceived 'backwardness' than to anxiety about some of the implications of technological modernity. Spaniards associated Edison particularly with his most well-known 'invention'—the incandescent light bulb—and other developments of practical applications for the use of electricity.³⁵ The possible future applications of electrically generated light seemed vast to the late nineteenth-century mind. As Carolyn Marvin has shown, electric light appeared the most probable medium of mass communication—being at the time more reliable than telephone or wireless forms of communication—and thus was the focus of fanciful predictions and experiments, including the idea to project illuminated lettering and messages onto the clouds and moon in the night sky.³⁶

The reactions of the Spanish press towards the novel applications of electricity were more complex than simple unbridled enthusiasm. Electrical spectacles became fashionable in Spain, as they were in the United States and Britain, though they were less outlandish than the plans for 'advertising on the clouds' or the electrical celebrations held in New York and Chicago to celebrate Admiral Dewey's return from the Philippines in 1899 or in London to mark Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee in 1897.³⁷ Still, the arrival of electrically powered street lighting in Spain, installed in the principal public spaces of Madrid for the occasion of King Alfonso XII's

wedding in January 1878, sparked much admiration and boasting from the newspapers and journals based in the city. The *Ilustración Española y Americana* waxed lyrical about the illumination of the Puerta del Sol from whose surrounding buildings ‘the central lamps brilliantly stood out; their long metal arms each sustained three large crystal globes, in matte white, which were torches of electrical light filling the wide square with a very light brightness, similar to a full moon on a beautiful summer night’.³⁸

However, the destructive, even lethal power of electricity meant that there was a certain irony to its ubiquitous association with progress and modernity. To the *Ilustración Española y Americana* it came as no surprise that in the USA ‘the electric spark’ was to become ‘the new agent of death’—the modern method of capital punishment—given that ‘modern man expects everything from this current, and wants it to intercede everywhere’.³⁹ Though the world’s first state-sanctioned electrocution did not take place until four years later,⁴⁰ in 1886 the paper charted the passing of ‘the age of burning at the stake’ in favour of ‘the age of burning at the wire’, reporting the imminent introduction of the electric chair, which would deliver death at the push of ‘a button’. With heavy irony, the journal noted that this was, nevertheless, a sign of progress; ‘some years ago, executing someone electrically would have required taking the prisoner to a terrace with an umbrella fixed to the back of his neck’.⁴¹

As the century neared its end, the tone of the Spanish press reporting of American pioneering inventions shifted from one broadly characterised by admiration, amusement and bemusement to more critical assessments that frequently ridiculed or were hostile to advancements in technology and communications infrastructure in the USA. Since the mid-century, the USA had intermittently signalled its desire to see the island of Cuba, just 92 miles from the coast of Florida, become independent of Spanish colonial rule, if not annexed to the United States. However, during the 1890s the US government’s interventions in the Cuban independence war increased in both frequency and belligerence. Aid to the Cuban rebels in the form of financial and ‘filibuster’ (the pirating of arms) assistance evolved into direct military intervention when an explosion on the US Battleship Maine anchored off Havana in February 1898 furnished a justification for declaring war on Spain. The growing intensity of the bellicose rhetoric between the two governments fed into the rising open antagonism displayed by the Spanish press towards the USA, including its technological modernity, particularly given that some of these technologies, such as the improved communications networks provided by telephones,

telegraphs and the railway network, would have direct implications for the execution of the war. In the aftermath of the Spanish-Cuban-American War, the parliamentary deputy Eduardo Vicenti was moved to declare that there had been 'no fight'. Spain had 'had to confront a machine invented by some electrician or some mechanic' and was 'beaten in the laboratory and the offices but not on the sea or on dry land'.⁴²

Vicenti's posturing after the event does not square with either the resounding naval defeats of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba in the spring and summer of 1898 or the open acknowledgement of the superior size, newness and technological sophistication of the North American fleet expressed in the Spanish press before and during the war.⁴³ Spaniards keen to maintain the remnants of their new world empire in 1898 clearly had cause to fear the consequences of North American technological invention. However, even contraptions apparently entirely unrelated to war were satirized as evidence of American belligerence, particularly in *Blanco y Negro*. From 1895, the satirical journal that had commenced publication four years earlier, departed from relatively gentle fun-poking at outlandish anecdotes of American ways of life towards a more biting satire of American-style 'progress'. In July of that year, the magazine's publisher-proprietor Luis Royo Villanova published a satirical poem 'to the electric lighthouse of New York' that parodied the twin tropes of the USA as the pioneer of technological progress and as the seat of political liberty brought together in the shape of the Statue of Liberty 'enlightening the world' [Fig. 5.1]. The verse ridiculed the notion of the USA as a leader in either technology or liberty. The light emanating from the statue that was intended to guide sailors safely home had the collateral effect of leading 'thousands' of birds, confused by the unnatural light, to their deaths; the USA's very brand of liberty was adjudged similarly seductive and illusory:

Oh Colossal Lighthouse! Your vivid lights
are Liberties' sharp emblem:
who understands you well; you guide,
while who ignores your system
you seduce with magnetic attraction,
and in your wings burns misery.⁴⁴




Fig. 5.1 Juan Martínez Abades, *Al faro eléctrico de Nueva-York. La Libertad iluminando al mundo* [To the Electric Lighthouse of New York. Liberty illuminating the world] *Blanco y Negro*, no. 221, 27 July 1895. Gouache, ink and pencil on card, 510 x 380 mm. Museo ABC, Madrid



Fig. 5.2 Mecachis (Eduardo Sáenz Hermúa), *Portfolio de la semana. El fonógrafo americano* [Weekly portfolio. The American phonograph] *Blanco y Negro*, no. 305, 6 March 1897. Gouache, ink and paper on card, 157 × 312 mm. Museo ABC, Madrid

Two years later, in 1897, the journal published a satirical cartoon [see Fig. 5.2] depicting the demonstration of Edison's phonograph—a machine for recording and replaying sound, first patented in 1878—that imagined the innocuous device playing a combative role. The cartoon portrayed 'the Spanish ministers' being demonstrated the functioning of 'this prodigious invention by Edison', which upon inspection, it was revealed, 'is no more than a cylinder that endlessly repeats the vulgar senatorial song of Morgan, Sherman, Cullom, etc. etc.', the members of the US administration most vocal in their support for the Cuban independence fighters and hostility towards colonial Spain. According to the list of 'recitals' pinned to the wall above the phonograph, which was patriotically laid out on a stars-and-stripes flag, the phonograph's repertoire consisted of: firstly, an 'anti-Spain speech'; secondly, 'the second act of the same'; thirdly, 'a continuation of the previous'; and, finally, 'the same as the first'.⁴⁵ The text accompanying the cartoon defiantly added that the machine's inventor would soon have his comeuppance; 'there will come a day when they will put an end to the machine, sending the "subservient of the phonograph" packing, or be it the yankee that teaches such marvels'.⁴⁶ A further example from *Blanco y Negro* [see Fig. 5.3] parodied the USA's capacity for inventing by imagining a machine designed 'to manufacture yankees'. From 'cheap'




Fig. 5.3 Mecachis (Eduardo Sáenz Hermúa), *Máquinas para fabricar yankees* [Machine for making Yankees] *Blanco y Negro*, no. 258, 11 April 1896. Ink on card, 154 x 210 mm. Museo ABC, Madrid

materials, including ‘filth’, ‘fat’, ‘sawdust’ and ‘left over bits of cork’, the whirring and whisking of the steam-driven machine produced identikit ‘Yankees’, replete in top hat and tails.⁴⁷ These satirical commentaries fit the mechanism of *ressentiment*, identified by Liah Greenfeld as a key dynamic in the development of modern nationalism in the West.⁴⁸ Unable to assert Spanish equality with the USA in the technological sphere, due to the disparity in scientific and technological innovation and application that would be made so traumatically evident with the 1898 ‘disaster’, *Blanco y Negro*’s cartoonists opted not simply to disparage this perceived aspect of the North American character, but, importantly, to assert Spain’s difference—as a nation unimpressed by such modern machines of homogenised mass production—in the face of the increasing enmity and evident military superiority of the USA.

This image of the hypocrisy of the USA as an emblem of modernity and liberty coincided with a marked shift in gear from 1895 in journals

like *Blanco y Negro*'s satirical treatment of the USA, which moved from benign mockery of American mores and predilections for patents and generating wealth from inventions to outright derision of the USA's perceived attempts to dominate in the sphere of technology as well as international diplomacy, mirroring the deteriorating relationship between the Spanish and US governments over Cuba. *Blanco y Negro*'s hostility to the USA's intervention in the Cuban question as well as to its technological prowess only intensified. In July 1898, at the height of the Spanish-Cuban-American War and just a few weeks after the decisive naval battle of Santiago de Cuba in which the Spanish Caribbean fleet was destroyed, the journal vented the fullness of its hostility to the United States and its brand of technological modernity. Reproducing the United States' entry to the painting section of the turn-of-the-century Paris Exhibition, the journal declared with venom that the American 'colossal painting' in which 'all [the Yankees] had their hand' was sure to win. The painting depicted a ferocious harbour battle scene, which *Blanco y Negro* had helpfully labelled to show figures representing 'Cuba' and 'Philippines' being carried away by American troops under the overwhelming force of their fleet, assault canon and petroleum-armed soldiers. The USA's purpose in pursuing scientific and technological discoveries—in short in seeking 'progress'—did not have a civilising intent, but had a dangerously self-interested and destructive end in sight, as the accompanying text underlined.

Chemistry, mechanics, metallurgy, in brief, all science at the service of destruction, has supplied this Great Republic this brilliant apotheosis, which is the synthesis of the picture: explosive projectiles, formidable machines of warfare, cannons and rifles loaded with substances hitherto forbidden, sow death, destruction and annihilation in the name of progress, of a quintessential progress that does not give any value to man.⁴⁹

The American version of progress was also ridiculed in an accompanying article in *Blanco y Negro*, this time decrying the danger that the USA posed to one of its own innovations, the transatlantic cable. Already convinced of the hypocrisy of a nation which, it said, professed to wage war against Spain 'in the name of humanity and progress' but whose humanity 'has consisted in supplying arms to the savages, in the employment of dynamite cannons and the use of explosive and incendiary projectiles, prohibited by the most elemental rights of people', the journal was little surprised that the USA was now destroying the emblems of its own progressiveness.⁵⁰ Detailing the extraordinary mechanics of the 'arsenal of hooks' loaded

onto boats moored just outside Havana needed to lift, secure and then cut the metal cables, the journal asked rhetorically; ‘how will they boast of love for [progress], those who destroy one of its most precious conquests, such as the submarine cable?’⁵¹ The superiority of the United States in the field of invention appeared inextricably linked to the country’s ascendancy in military and diplomatic terms.

MUSHROOM CITIES AND UNNATURAL LANDSCAPES

The fear and envy that tempered the positive admiration and excitement generated among educated Spaniards by the USA’s prowess in the worlds of business, technology and communications reached its apogee in the outrage and hostility expressed toward the military applications of American innovations. However, concerns about American-style technological ‘advances’ had long been expressed relating to the affront these were seen to pose to beauty and nature. In so doing, the vision of progress and modernity embodied by the USA’s drive for mechanisation and technological improvement was held up by many as undesirable and, what’s more, as the antithesis of Spanish predilections for the arts, the aesthetically pleasing and the natural world. In this image, modernity appeared ugly and, given its unattractiveness, Spain should not covet it. Of course, it was not a vision shared by all Spaniards, nor did every aspect of US-style modernity appear aesthetically repulsive. However, the frequency with which American mechanical, technological and urban developments were decried as unsightly and unnatural is striking.

Such criticisms of the human impact on the environment in the USA arose broadly in two fields: firstly, the forms of urbanisation, architecture and the development of city services in the USA were often characterised as taking place at the expense of aesthetics. Man-made structures in the USA—aside perhaps from the truly extraordinary such as the Brooklyn Bridge—were rarely imagined as beautiful. Secondly, the trappings of technological and industrial progress were perceived to spoil, if not actively harm, the natural life and landscape of the USA. This section explores the ambivalent attitudes of the literate and urban Spanish classes in Madrid and Barcelona towards the peculiar brand of urbanisation and architectural development they saw as emblematic of the USA.

The natural beauty of the North American landscape, especially the wildernesses of the mid and far west, was known to educated Spaniards. Spanish travellers who published accounts of their journeys around the

USA told of the 'sea of vegetation' constituted by the 'immense solitudes' of the Kansas plains and of the Rocky and Californian mountains.⁵² A good deal of their impressions of the vast 'virgin territory' of the United States would have been gleaned from their reading of the works of American authors, including James Fenimore Cooper. Fenimore Cooper's works were published extensively both as books and in *follettins*; the number of translations—often thirdhand, via the French version—and editions of his works published in Spain exceeded those of any other American writer, including Poe.⁵³ His work, including his most famous novel, *The Last of the Mohicans* (1826), presented an image of America that was characterised by pristine wildernesses and populated by brave pioneers and 'noble savages'. With this vision of the American natural landscape as a pristine wilderness rich in natural resources in mind, it is unsurprising that some Spaniards viewed the intervention of American men and women in this landscape in the name of 'progress' as spoiling or even destroying this idyllic pastoral image.

The greatest impact on the natural American landscape during the late nineteenth century came, of course, from urbanisation. The development of US cities astonished European observers for the rapidity with which they were constructed; Juan Bustamante y Campuzano, for example, described San Francisco as an 'improvised city' because just thirty-six years had sufficed 'to create from nothing a population that would have taken centuries to form in Europe'.⁵⁴ The vast urban centres that aroused the greatest interest—and ambivalence—among late nineteenth-century Spaniards, though, were the cities of New York and Chicago.⁵⁵

New York, which was often the arrival point for Spaniards visiting the USA, including Juan Bustamante y Campuzano, Rafael Puig y Valls and Borbón, who arrived in the city aboard the *Reina María Cristina* in May 1893 to begin the first official visit of a Spanish royal to the 'New World' continent, very often struck those arriving from the 'old world' as a 'European' city in its mix of people, languages and culture. Italian, French and Spanish could be heard spoken by people with 'Old World features', food prepared in European styles could be eaten in the city's restaurants and imported English and French plays predominated in the city's theatres.⁵⁶ The city's architecture, civil engineering projects and monuments, however, seemed to be designed in a vernacular that was less familiar. The New York skyline, already punctuated by skyscrapers like the New York World Building and the (then under construction) Manhattan

Life Insurance Building, the Statue of Liberty and the Brooklyn Bridge, seemed to Puig y Valls curiously incomprehensible with its,

large buildings of the city covered in strange domes, small towers rounding them off, crowding together on the horizon and projecting one on top of the other, forming a jumbled and pretentious pile, the signs of colossal dimensions, painted in shrill colours, as if the neighbours of this town accused all of humanity of suffering from severe myopia. Everything overwhelms the spirit subjugated by this orgy of movement, noise and colour which forms a monstrous, strange, unusual ensemble, in the face of which all appreciation results incomplete and all judgement impossible.⁵⁷

Thus, the city with its ‘coaches everywhere, noise of metalwork, intermingled web of electrical wires, [...] and suspended trains’, was described as ‘strange’, ‘monstrous’ and inexplicable.⁵⁸ Its heterogeneous and often confusing forms—busy streets underneath elevated transport tracks dwarfed by vertiginous skyscrapers—elicited excitement but also disgust. For Bustamante y Campuzano, as for Puig y Valls, the physical appearance of the city was messy, dirty and ugly. As the former observed, ‘advertisements and signs cover the walls of the houses. The telegraph posts criss-cross in all directions in front of them, as if we were in the middle of a field, without taking into account at all that they more or less spoil the places in which they are erected. They are useful and that’s all’.⁵⁹ This notion of the American city (and people) as one whose overriding concern was practical, not aesthetic, prioritising utility, comfort and technology over beauty, was one that persisted among Spanish commentators.

Some physical aspects of New York City—in particular its great monuments—stood out as symbols ‘of all that the North American genius is capable of realising’.⁶⁰ Impressive constructions like the New York World Building, the Standard Oil Building and the imposing boulevards and squares of Broadway, Fifth Avenue and Madison Square Garden didn’t fail to ‘enchant’.⁶¹ The Statue of Liberty illuminating the world, a present from the French government to the United States erected in 1886, educed admiration for the way it rose ‘majestically from the waves as if to welcome one’s entrance into the classical country of free institutions and democracy’,⁶² even if it later formed the butt of satirical jokes about the perceived hypocrisy of American liberty [see Fig. 5.1].

The attitude toward perhaps the grandest (at least in civil engineering terms) monument of the decade was less equivocal. The Brooklyn Bridge,

inaugurated in 1883, struck the Spaniards who described it to their compatriots as truly awesome for its sheer scale and for the advanced engineering know-how that its construction had required. Even though it was by no means the first modern suspension bridge to be constructed either in the United States or Europe, it was at the time the longest. The 'imposing' bridge, 'suspended in the air'⁶³ between Brooklyn and Manhattan, was, as Princess Eulalia wrote to her mother, 'a marvel of engineering' as well as 'simultaneously a model of unprecedented grandeur and slenderness'.⁶⁴ The bridge, she explained, was elevated 25 m above the high tide level and had five lanes, 'two for trains, two for the trams and carriages, and one for pedestrians'. Its enormous weight was supported by steel cables 'with the thickness of a tree of good dimensions'.⁶⁵ Indeed, for Princess Eulalia, the Brooklyn Bridge appeared as a direct and physical confrontation with modernity itself in the way it 'produces the sensation of challenging logic'.⁶⁶

As awe-inspiring as it was, images of the Brooklyn Bridge also combined the sense of a technological modern spectacle with fear about the risks of technological modernity, echoing similar attitudes toward rail travel. Shortly following its inauguration, around 30 people died on the stairs at the top of one of the bridge's two towers; overcrowding caused some to fall amidst rumours of a possible collapse and others reportedly died as a result of the rush to see what had happened. Despite 'this detail', the bridge was adjudged an unmitigated 'triumph of engineering science'.⁶⁷ The deaths were perceived, as were many of the dangers that accompanied scientific and technological advancements, as an almost inevitable sacrifice and certainly a price worth paying for material progress. Indeed, Bustamante y Campuzano suggested that the 'detail' of the 30 deaths at the bridge's opening would be 'incomprehensible to the amateur in engineering science', the implication being that anyone who was familiar with the bridge's importance as a piece of pioneering civil engineering would somehow understand the deaths.⁶⁸ The perception of scientific and technological progress as dangerous, even life-threatening, and the way in which this shaped Spaniards' image of the United States' prowess in these fields is examined more closely later in this chapter.

If New York was often considered somehow European, Chicago was without doubt all-American. In fact, Chicago appeared to Spaniards as the very epitome of the modern USA for its dedication to commerce and industry as well as for its newness and scale. All the Spaniards who visited the city and wrote of their time there marvelled at the speed with which the

city had risen from ‘fifteen houses and a population of one hundred souls’ in 1830 to a city of ‘magnificent buildings, splendid streets, and impressive squares and walks’ and 30,000 inhabitants just forty years later.⁶⁹ In addition, the city became increasingly familiar, and as a result representative of the USA, to Spaniards as the site of the 1893 World’s Fair, by which time the city had a population of 1,200,000.⁷⁰ In recognition of the 400 year anniversary of the ‘discovery’ of the Americas just passed, Spain was declared guest nation of honour at the Fair and therefore had a large contingent of government and commercial representatives present in the city, some of whom published accounts of their time there when they returned. A further contingent of Spanish journalists covered the Fair and dispatched reports—along the telegraph wires—to their home papers so that Spaniards in the peninsular could read of the goings-on at the World’s Fair almost as they happened.⁷¹

Chicago seemed very new and very big: Puig y Valls, in Chicago as part of the official delegation to the Fair, wondered if the city had been constructed ‘for giants and by a superior race that only conceives the monumental and grandiose’ given that everything, from the Masonic Lodge to the banks to the hotels,

appeared to me refined quarries in whose strata a giant race had occupied itself in working with enormous hammers and chisels on doors and windows, outlandish columns, disproportionate friezes, smooth, naked, cold trappings, sustained by arches of I don’t know how many centres, almost always lowered, functioning as colossal backs that sustain the heaviness of a quarry of dressed stone.⁷²

It was, he decided, a city that typified a people ‘whose formula is encapsulated in its famous boldness: “Everything American is the greatest in the world”’.⁷³ Its 20-storey skyscrapers, which ‘defy the clouds’, seemed a challenge to nature. If further proof of this were needed, the rapidity with which the city had been rebuilt following its decimation by fire in 1871 (an event widely covered by the Spanish newspapers and journals)⁷⁴—reportedly within six months of the fire, 180,000 new homes had been constructed—earned it the nickname, ‘the phoenix of cities’,⁷⁵ and the astonished conclusion of *El Imparcial*’s correspondent that, ‘human workmanship appears more abundant in Chicago, faster and more productive than in any other place’.⁷⁶ J. Vilardell, *La Epoca*’s man in Chicago, however, was under no illusions as to the secret of this seeming ‘miracle’:

the 'power of money' sufficed to explain the resurgence of this 'improvised city'. The city's size and exponential growth rate, though impressive, did not entirely delight; Vilardell informed his readers that he, unfortunately, would not be able to verify on their behalf the prediction that Chicago would count 8,000,000 inhabitants within the next half century, 'because I do not like large cities, apart from Paris'. Life in cities that numbered a population of several million, 'is the same as', he said,

living in a desert settlement: family life is impossible, the distances deprive one of the pleasures of intimate friendships, one spends a lot of money, one does not master the town at all. Long live my village with its bell tower, its farms and its festival! I left from there to go all over the world: to it [the village] I will return, if God and the yankees allow me.⁷⁷

Chicago also had few if any of the 'European' cultural reference points that had made New York an only partially alien encounter for Spanish visitors. Puig y Valls' first impressions of the city are worth reproducing at length for their rich evocation of the blend of wealth, opportunity, dirt, darkness and misery that made up Chicago:

I am, then, already in the first commercial centre in the world; its special physiognomy, its Babylonian traffic, its colossal buildings, its atmosphere dotted by black ink staining a grey sky, sad and discoloured, the rays of sunlight do not manage to give these masses prominent colours, they are always dominated by dirty colours of red sandstone, of dull irons, of granite in which black mica dominates; by tram cars lacklustre from use, by large carriages and coaches following their paths weighed down by the heaviness of the years; the stream blackened by the residue of the smoke that the thousands of chimneys spew out, the dirty, uneven, neglected pavements of a careless common administration; the attire of the people is strange, ridiculous, sometimes pretentious... all things that constitute a sensation of peculiarity, the large disorderly stain of the American Far-West, with all its spirit, its grandeur, its opulence, its miseries, its crazy ambitions and its boundless and measureless audacity.⁷⁸

The vision of Chicago as a smoky, chaotic place whose melancholic vastness was not alleviated by the modern telegraph wires that connected its dislocated suburbs was not unrepresentative. Princess Eulalia, habitually complimentary of everything and everyone she encountered on her US tour, could not hide from her mother her immediate dislike for Chicago's

‘gigantic housing [...] many of which have more than twenty floors [which...] make the city a lot uglier, in my opinion, and make it uniform and gloomy. [...] It appears to want to remove us far from the sun’.⁷⁹ To her, Chicago was utterly foreign, both to ‘the beaming cities of the tropics and even to our Southern cities, where the low houses do not imprison the views, where the magic of the sky and the swinging trees can be enjoyed, on a background of an ever changing light’.⁸⁰ Once again, progress US-style seemed to work contrary to, not in conjunction with, nature.

In particular, it was the architecture of Chicago that seemed so different to that of the ‘old world’ and therefore so difficult to understand. Chicagoan architecture, according to Puig y Valls ‘exaggerated the yankee element which flourishes in stunted form in New York’ insofar as it was ‘more shapeless, of less elegant profiles, of less smooth lines, of a more sober ornamentation, duller, and why not say it, less cultured’.⁸¹ The big, the brash and the bold took precedent over ‘art’ in US architecture. With the dome of the Capitol in Washington particularly in mind, Jordana y Morera noted the ‘defect from which, in general, all public buildings in the United States suffer’, which was ‘the effort to stand out and [...] to eclipse the others of its class’ by disproportionately enlarging towers, domes and the like. This ‘infantile ambition to be able to put a very large number in the descriptive text of the building, as an expression of the total height of the monument’, according to Jordana said little for the ‘artistic taste of the north Americans, and reveals on the other hand, a certain childish passion for the grand’.⁸² As ever, though, the Spanish vision of North American architecture was not entirely disparaging,

What the nation’s buildings lacked in aesthetic qualities, they made up for in terms of comfort, well, this the Americans have been able to realise like no one else, and originality, given their ability to assemble pre-constructed high rise buildings at high speed, which I think has never been put into practice in any other country.⁸³

Puig y Valls agreed that comfort, along with utility, was the ‘essential aim’ of American architecture.⁸⁴

Liking or disliking the architecture and cityscapes of New York and Chicago was one thing; whether US practices in urban planning and civil engineering could or should be applied in Spain, however, was another matter. The Spanish commentators argued universally that city design and US-style planning was entirely unsuitable for Spain. The futuristic urban

planning solutions imagined—and sometimes implemented—in the USA seemed wholly at odds to the composition of Spanish cities and how they were inhabited. For example, Puig y Valls was quick to decry what was an outlandish and surely improbable plan (but one that he could imagine might ‘possibly be realised shortly’) to improve Chicago’s transportation network: a road and walk-way system based on three tiers at different levels; ‘the subterranean’ for ‘travellers’; ‘the ground level’ for ‘cars and lorries’ and ‘a third one on the level of the first floors’ for pedestrians, an innovation that, he was sure, ‘will be *very enjoyed to the ladies*'.⁸⁵ This past future, although it never came to fruition, tells us much about the past present in which it was conceived and the parameters of the possibilities that individuals at that time could imagine.⁸⁶ As improbable as the fantasy-transport plan might seem now, to this late nineteenth-century Spaniard, it seemed perfectly realisable—but, crucially, only in America and certainly not in Spain. The Chicagoan vision of a tri-level city transport network seemed to Puig y Valls a solution that would be utterly inappropriate in Spain, as it ‘would completely disrupt all the perspectives of our architecture, engineering and municipal politics’ and threaten ‘the artistic cities that are the pride of the Latin race and the model in which the Saxon race have found their best inspiration’.⁸⁷ If ever such a plan was unveiled in Barcelona, ‘following the axis of the Ramblas and the Paseo de Gracia, without considering the beauty of our best streets and most valued viewpoints, it would produce a real revolution depriving the city of all its charm’.⁸⁸

Puig y Valls’ explanation of the gulf between North American and European architectural and urban forms founded on perceived essential differences between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon ‘races’, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the connections between them. The Anglo-Saxons, he declared, based their urban model on that of the Latins, having learnt ‘mechanics and construction [...] in our books and founding their work in the enthusiasm of our spirit and the marvellous work of the centuries, as accumulated by the settler races of the ancient world’.⁸⁹ Thus, Barcelonians, being ‘Latin’, placed beauty and aesthetic considerations to the fore in the development of their city whilst by implication, for Anglo-Saxon Chicagoans the primacy of practical progressive interventions was clear. What Chicagoans actually created, however, was a ‘modern tower of Babel’—a city that was dangerous, with potentially unsafe high-rise buildings unlikely to stand the test of time and served by a transport system that regularly sacrificed human lives in an arrogant drive for acceleration and the fulfilment of the ‘time is money’ maxim.⁹⁰

Other more—literally—down-to-earth characteristics of American cities were also considered by the Spanish travellers from the point of view of their applicability to Spain, and were again judged lacking. In particular, the grid system of neat blocks of numbered streets as a method of formally planning the construction and extension of cities, ubiquitous in the USA, was rejected by Spanish visitors as monotonous and unattractive. The cities of the USA ‘*en cuadricula*’ were ‘of a blurred and cold physiognomy’⁹¹ and complicated to navigate:

With each step I took I appeared to find myself in places I had already passed before; each corner, each square reminded me of something I was seeing not for the first time; and the monotony of American cities is such that, apart from very rare exceptions, they resemble one another like drops of water. The craze of building them all according to the same plan, always using and even abusing the same straight lines that extend to the infinite, ends up being tiresome, and one wishes enthusiastically to come across some irregularity that would vary a little the systematic work of ruler and set square.⁹²

This professed dislike for the regularity of American grid cities seemed to breezily ignore the mid nineteenth-century extensions to the Spanish cities of Barcelona and Madrid—the *Eixample* and the *Ensanche*—which also followed a repetitive grid pattern. Neither Bustamante y Campuzano nor Puig y Valls referred directly to the modern extensions to their own home cities in their commentaries on American city design. It does not seem implausible, though, that they may have had them in mind when forming their opinions of US grid cities.

What is clear is that the designers of the urban expansions to Madrid and Barcelona in the second half of the nineteenth century did use North American cities as reference points as they devised their plans for Spain’s political and economic capitals. In both cases, American grid-plan cities were mined as evidence of how such urban designs functioned in practice, but were not prized as models to be emulated. Ildefonso Cerdà, the designer of Barcelona’s *Eixample*, was more damning in his assessment of the example set by US cities than was Madrid’s planner, Carlos María de Castro. Cerdà’s assessment was that the ‘modern American administrations’ had found themselves in the enviable position of designing in ‘virgin terrain, with urbanisations that formed and enlarged as if by magic and, for the same reason, were in the most favourable disposition to do everything that could suit them’. In the end, although ‘they had done something

more than the civilizations of ancient Europe, they made an important step towards perfection, without reaching it'.⁹³ Whilst admiring, for example, the numerical nomenclature and arrangement of New York's streets (albeit noting the complications of long addresses that included the intersection of two streets, plus apartment building, floor and flat numbers), he criticised the creation of hierarchies of avenues and streets, especially given that 'this seal and distinction of class and importance came from the Administration, and from a democratic Administration'.⁹⁴ The nomenclature of both New York and Washington streets, judged Cerdà, may have favoured 'the inhabitability' of the city but served badly its 'highway administration'.

In this point the Americans have not been able to overcome the preoccupations of our Europe [sic], which is all the more notable when dealing with men who boast of sovereignty over everything that is ancient, and present themselves as the only good servants of the universal movement of humanity: and they have not been able to serve it in their houses!⁹⁵

Above all, whilst discussing contemporary and past urban planning elsewhere, in Paris, London and ancient Rome as well as in North America, Cerdà's plan for Barcelona, which was only ever partially put into effect, evolved from his meticulous study of Barcelona itself and the living conditions and practices of its working-class population.

Carlos María de Castro, who drew up the plans for Madrid's *Ensanche* to the north and east of the old city at the end of the 1850s, told in his account of the project's evolution of the international exemplars that had informed the urban extension of the Spanish capital. The model provided by US cities, especially New York, was considered along with those of London, Paris and Barcelona (whose *ante-proyecto* was completed before that of Madrid although both were approved in 1860). In presenting the statistical data of the city to support an extension plan with larger open spaces and lower per capita density housing, Castro compared the population size and urban death rate of Madrid with several European as well as US cities including Philadelphia, Charleston, Boston and Baltimore.⁹⁶ When it came to the specific design and distribution of the new blocks, the points of comparison that Castro deemed most salient were London, Paris, Barcelona and New York. The American city, however, did not emerge particularly well from Castro's comparison. Castro was interested in evaluating the distribution of blocks within a grid system in the city-

models from the perspective of the design of their light shafts and the way in which light and air circulated around and inside the interior of the blocks against the criteria of health, aesthetics and comfort. The design of blocks typical to New York (and also the City of London) with interior courtyards entirely surrounded by constructions often several stories high, whilst resulting in sizeable internal gardens or patios, were criticised because ‘being enclosed by buildings on all sides, the renewal of air is not as easy as in a square or as it would be in those patios and gardens if the construction was interrupted at some points’.⁹⁷ Such a system, though workable, was not as satisfactory in terms of allowing a free circulation of light and air as that of the traditional Spanish *plaza* and was certainly less preferable than the models provided by outer London and Ildefonso Cerdà’s Barcelona *Eixample*. Cerdà’s planned model might have been less economically profitable than the high density of New York but ‘we will recommend them [...] preferred by the well-to-do classes of the population as the most convenient for health, for the convenience of room distribution, and finally, for the independence of families’.⁹⁸ Thus, although North American grid cities, especially New York, were used as points of reference in the modern extension planned for Madrid, the cultural reference points that positively inspired the conservative urban planner Castro, and were actually incorporated into his plan were those of Cerdà’s Barcelona and, above all, Haussmann’s Paris.⁹⁹

Castro’s plans for expanding Madrid, based on a bourgeois vision of *barrios* housing and separating different classes of Madrilenians was never fully realised in part because of its reliance on private capital and enterprise, but was nevertheless highly influential. It also gave way to more radical (unrealised) visions of how the modern city of Madrid should look and operate. It was, as contemporaries including Simmel and Benjamin so eloquently observed, in the city that ‘modernity’ and its associate rapid social, technological and psychological changes would have their most immediate and profound impact.¹⁰⁰ Madrid, though its experience of modernisation may have differed from the modern urban ‘ideal-types’ of London, Paris and New York, was of course not immune to the features of modernity. The city’s population tripled from 167,000 in 1797 to 500,000 in 1900. As was previously noted, electric street lighting was introduced in the Puerta del Sol for the royal wedding in 1878 and was gradually extended by the *Sociedad Matritense de Electricidad* to illuminate the city over the following years.¹⁰¹ In addition, monumental buildings synonymous with industrialised bourgeois modernity, such as

the National Library, the Stock Exchange, the De la Unión department store and train stations at Delicias and Atocha sprang up in the city in the last decades of the century. The Paseo de Recoletos and the Buen Retiro park, which moved from royal to public ownership following the 1868 revolution, provided grand promenades for the evening *paseo* and seemingly more modern settings for middle-class sociability than the chaotic, convivial (and more frequented) *mentidero* [meeting or gossiping point] of the Puerta del Sol.¹⁰² The Retiro park also hosted Madrid's own crystal palace, built for the 1887 *Exposición de Filipinas*.¹⁰³ The city even had its very own flâneurs, those archetypes of modernity, albeit Madrilenian flâneurs differed from Benjamin's aloof and solitary Parisian originals in their combining observation and reflection with frequent interruptions and social interactions as they strolled the city.¹⁰⁴ Such amenities and practices that comprised the hallmarks of an urbanised and capitalist bourgeoisie mingled and overlapped with the city's traditional *castizo* working class *barrios*; indeed the cultural forms of *costumbrismo* idealised and sanitised this meeting of supposed old and new, traditional and modern, illustrated by the enormous popularity of the *género chico* theatre spectacles.¹⁰⁵

Madridlenians' self-conscious and self-professed desire to modernise and to catch up with the leading industrial capitals of the day was also articulated in radical, largely unrealised, urban plans, which departed from Castro's conservative segmented plan and were principally driven, like Cerdà's plan for Barcelona, by the need to ameliorate living conditions for the city's expanding working class. The most significant of these utopian schemes were Angel Fernández de los Ríos' vision for *El Futuro Madrid*, published shortly after the September revolution, which imagined four worker *barrios* of a hundred houses, each with a small garden and served by schools, libraries and assembly rooms and Arturo Soria's extraordinary plan for a *ciudad lineal*, which envisaged residential and commercial space along a single spacious corridor serviced by a public transportation system.¹⁰⁶ However, fundamentally modern as they were, the urban visions of Fernández de los Ríos and Soria, like that of Castro, were inspired far more by the example of Paris than of New York. Fernández de los Ríos, for example, conceived and wrote his plan for modern Madrid whilst exiled in Paris and the designs for the worker *barrios* he proposed were modelled on similar French examples in Molhouse (which Fernández de los Ríos had seen at the 1867 World Exhibition in the French capital) and on the Parisian Avenue Daumesnil and rue de Campagne-Premier.¹⁰⁷ It was not until the early twentieth century that the American influence really hit

Madrid, when US-inspired skyscrapers were built along the new Gran Vía, including exact replicas of towers in New York, and fashionable bars and cafés began to take their cue from the USA, adopting names such as The Miami and Hollywood.¹⁰⁸

Whilst Spaniards did not fail, then, to express their admiration for outstanding examples of American expertise in engineering, in particular the Brooklyn Bridge, their attitude towards what they considered the classic features of US-style architecture and urban design—giant towers, big, brash architectural forms and monotonous grid systems—were far less positive. Rarely did Spaniards express a liking for the aesthetics of North American cities, aside from New York, which was in any case pronounced ‘European’. What’s more, when it came to modernising their own cities, they found positive models on which to imprint their designs for the future shape of Madrid or Barcelona not in North America, but in Europe and in particular in the example set by Paris, turned by Haussmann into a blueprint of the modern, bourgeois capital city.

THE USA AS A LEADER IN COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMERCE

One of the most potent pieces of evidence that the United States was the ‘people whose present was the dreamed-of future to which many nations aspire’ was furnished by its apparent success in vanquishing time and distance through the development of modern communications systems.¹⁰⁹ Telegraphs and telephones connected people almost instantaneously with important consequences for business, the reporting of news and spread of information as well as for social relationships and cultural practices. Distances within the larger American cities were ‘shortened’ and inconvenient topographical features surmounted by the introduction of subway systems, elevated railways and funicular trams. Even the conventional postal service ‘which is so important in modern society’ was said to be delivered in the USA with greater speed and efficiency than anywhere else and was considered well worthy of emulation in Spain.¹¹⁰

Most emblematic of the perceived North American drive to dominate nature, distance and even time, however, was the extension of the ‘trans-continental’ railway network. This ‘iron belt’,¹¹¹ which from 1869 was boasted to connect the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the USA, was upheld as singularly representative of the North American way of life: the extensive

railroad network of steam-powered trains symbolised all that was modern, progressive and American in its ‘unnatural’ speeding of communications and the transfer of people, goods, information and ideas, in its dedication to comfort (for the few who could afford it), and in its facilitating of the creation and accumulation of wealth.

Conversely, as George Stephenson toured Spain for a month in 1845, he remarked that, ‘during the whole of that time [I have not] seen enough people of the right sort to fill a single train’.¹¹² Had he been able to visit again perhaps fifteen years later, his assessment would surely have changed. By the 1850s ‘railways fever’ had hit Spain. Its first rail line was built in 1848 to connect Barcelona and Mataró in Catalonia. From the mid-century the Spanish crown heavily invested capital and energy in developing its own railroad system, according to some contemporaries to the detriment of other scientific projects.¹¹³ By then, Spain also had its own ‘railway baron’ or rather marquis, in José de Salamanca and grand stations in Madrid (Mediodía, now Atocha) and Barcelona.

Following the Railway Law of June 1855, at which time just 456 km of track had been laid in Spain, the construction of an effective, national railroad system began to gain some pace, with almost 5000 km of track built by 1868.¹¹⁴ The results, however, disappointed those who imagined the construction of the rail network as a great nation-building project: the dependence upon scientific and engineering expertise, building materials and manufactured products from abroad, primarily from France, in order to construct Spain’s rail network meant that it brought only ‘token’ benefit to Spain’s industrial and commercial sectors and to the broader national economy. In a seeming hurry to legitimate Spain as a progressive modern nation to rank alongside the leading imperial powers of the day through the building of a national rail network, the 1855 law had awarded large subsidies to rail companies and waived customs duties on imported construction materials and fuels. Essentially, the Spanish railroads were built by foreign (principally French) companies, using imported materials and expertise, but funded largely by Spanish government subsidies and bonds purchased by Spaniards, leading some Spanish historians to label it an episode of ‘reverse colonialism’.¹¹⁵ It also disappointed those who compared the development of Spain’s railroad with other national networks. Convinced that the railways were the best ‘barometer of a country’s wealth and its degree of prosperity’, liberals noted that by this measure the United States ‘forms the most advanced nation when it comes to the material

prosperity of its residents'; boasting the 'fabulous sum' of 116,864 km of railroad in contrast to Spain's comparatively paltry 5226 km.¹¹⁶

At the same time, the railroad network was also recognised as a symbol of the price of progress: these costs were paid by the natural landscape, both 'tamed' by the laying of miles of track and the makeshift towns that punctured the American wilderness so vividly described by Fenimore Cooper, and lost as a blurred backdrop of space traversed but not directly experienced by train passengers. Costs were also paid by the workers in the railway and associated industries who were moved to protest at their low pay and working conditions in wildcat and general strikes; and by the many victims who died in the horrific railway accidents and derailments of the industry's infant years. Thus, the railways seemed to encapsulate the best and worst aspects of American modernity.

Virtually every Spaniard who wrote of his or her time in the USA in the late nineteenth century wrote of their admiration for the North American railway system. Indeed, for many, the very first thing they described in their accounts was their astonishment at the advanced technology, extension and speed of the USA's railways.¹¹⁷ Princess Eulalia's first letter to her mother on setting foot on the North American mainland recounted how the train that had carried her along the Pennsylvania railroad from New Jersey to Washington had covered a 'distance [...] in five hours [that] is perceptibly the same separating Madrid and San Sebastián.' This, she noted, meant travelling at a 'without doubt dizzying' speed, however the advanced design of the railroad and carriages ensured that one felt 'less shaken than in ours'.¹¹⁸ The rapidity of the railways was understood as a reflection of the significance placed on acceleration and the most profitable use of time in the North American psyche. If the phrase 'killing time' was used 'so frequently' in Spain, Princess Eulalia noted, its polar opposite—'gaining time'—was the watchword of North Americans:

Life is intense and directed in the sense of extracting the highest performance with minimal effort. Thus the train does not stop, not even to take on water; canals, dug in the centre of the rails fuel the engine when it needs it during its progress.

It is such a developed civilization, the moral horizon is so peculiarly extended and life appears less tiresome and therefore so much more tolerable. No vacillation and no shrugging; the game of ideas corresponds to its acts; it appears that they want to gain time over eternity.¹¹⁹

Juan Bustamante y Campuzano identified the same attribute during his travels in the USA, which he described as Americans' 'tireless activity, which does not allow them a moment of rest, and a resolute fondness of movement and travel'. The American way of life was an unceasing to-ing and fro-ing, 'an unstoppable race, for which all possible and impossible means of transport are allowed'. Such was the American's desire to arrive quickly at a given destination that Bustamante y Campuzano was moved to speculate that, were it possible to 'give direction to balloons', North Americans 'would form a queue at the ticket office, and the tickets would perhaps even sell at a premium' (thus anticipating the Montgolfier brothers' achievements by just a few years).¹²⁰ The perception that the railways shortened distances and accelerated time—or rather altered the subjective perception of the space-time continuum—was of course not limited to American railways; such tropes had informed the experience of rail travel since the mid-century, in Britain and France as in the United States.¹²¹ Whilst shortening the subjective experience of distance travelled between two points, the development of the American railway (as in other colonial and post-colonial settings) had the effect of appearing to amplify space, through its rendering accessible (and thus rendering American) previously remote and relatively inaccessible areas.¹²² The American railroads arguably exemplified Benjamin's assertion that 'mechanical reproduction' led to standardisation at the expense of uniqueness and of genuine aesthetic experience: Unlike Charles Dickens, for whom the impressions outside the carriages of the South-Eastern Railway Company's express train from London to Paris were as vivid and rich as those inside, Puig y Valls experienced the landscape on a train journey from Salt Lake City to San Francisco as a monotonous succession of settlements,

without change in their colour and construction [...]; the column of the veranda, the door, the doorjamb, the arc, the eaves, all the same or similar, reminiscent of an eternal machine, moving day and night, delivering the same pieces to the market, of a single mold, monotonous, able to kill all artistic sentiment in the most gifted being.¹²³

The American landscape, constantly reproduced, and the train's passengers, like the goods it carried, became commodities devoid of their particular context, their singularity and therefore of their 'aura'.¹²⁴

The US railways did not just represent a modern preoccupation with speed and technological precision. They also constituted—for those who could afford it—the height of modern luxury and comfort.

One thousand miles lie between New York and Chicago, or be it 1,500 kilometres, and this trip, which would in Spain cost more than 60 hours and 40 *duros*, is made in 27 hours and even in 25, spending 22 dollars on the journey, 5 idem on the *Pullman-car* and 3 idem for two divinely seasoned meals and a lunch that can be enjoyed calmly in the restaurant-car.¹²⁵

The design of North American train carriages had differed from European models since the 1830s. North American carriages consisted of long carriages with a central aisle dividing seats that could be tilted to face either direction. In comparison with the European model of cramped, class-divided carriages separated into unconnected compartments with facing seats, American carriages were considered more ‘democratic’, allowed greater mobility and avoided the ‘confused, undecided and upset’ feelings engendered by sitting opposite fellow passengers in embarrassed silence, described in exquisitely squirming detail by Simmel.¹²⁶

The ‘democracy’ of North American classless carriages was ended, however, with the introduction of the first-class Pullman cars from 1859. The Spanish press reported widely and published illustrations of the Pullman train carriages, which combined ‘luxury and good taste [...] on the outside, simplicity and elegance; on the inside, *confort* [sic] and luxury’.¹²⁷ Princess Eulalia concurred: borrowing Mr. Pullman’s very own wagon to travel from Chicago to Niagara Falls, she declared, ‘it is impossible to find greater comfort in a train; this carriage in particular is a true rolling compartment; there is nothing missing and even the most insignificant details are provided for’.¹²⁸ The carriages were modelled on luxury steamships; their services included ‘baths, both tub and shower, barbershops, manicures, lady’s maids, valet service, news tickers, libraries, current periodicals and hotel and railroad directories, smokers’ accessories and, of course, the fullest possible facilities for sluicing and gentling the patrons with wines and strong waters’.¹²⁹

The Pullman carriages might have been ‘palace-carriages’ that afforded wealthy Americans the latest comforts as they travelled, but there was also a touch of *ressentiment* in Spanish travellers’ engagement with these ciphers of modern comfort and travel. Reporting on his visit to the Pullman factory, where the luxury train carriages were built, Puig y Valls disclosed his feeling of ennui at the stereotypical superlative epithets employed in relation to the Pullman carriages: ‘The best in the world [...] which is to say, or means to say: mortal misery, abandon all hope; beyond the United States of America, there is nothing greater.’¹³⁰ The perceived North American

predilection for boasting to have designed or built the biggest, the most technologically advanced or most commodious products, proved tiresome and evoked disdain. Indeed, faint echoes of satisfaction can be detected in Puig y Valls' pronouncement that, despite the standardisation of time brought with the 1889 division of the USA into four time zones intended precisely to end the chaos wrought by different railroad companies working to their own time, 'itineraries in North America are dictated by the pleasure of never taking them into account for anything'.¹³¹ Nevertheless, even he could not always escape the vainglorious claims of Americans' superlative inventions. The Corliss engine he saw at the factory, purchased by Mr. Pullman at the 1876 Philadelphia World's Fair, was, he admitted, 'clean, beautiful, majestically moving its steering wheel, without noise nor vibration. I would almost exclaim without shame: *The best...* if I did not fear to sin where so many in America have sinned'.¹³²

The US rail network's seeming embodiment of that nation's prizeing of technological achievement and progress as well as comfort and luxury fed into a third trope that recurred in Spanish images of the railways, that of the North American's aptitude for and valuing of wealth creation. The railways constituted a central component of the USA's imagined inordinate riches on many levels: that of the private bankers and investors, the 'very rich citizens of the country of Croesus' who formed 'enterprises of north American capitalists' to fund the construction of railroads; that of the luxurious and comfortable train carriages, just described, which permitted the USA's wealthiest citizens to travel the country smoothly, speedily and in style; as well as that of the profits generated by the railway's facilitation of commerce and transportation of people and goods in a country where, after all, 'time is money'. The immense volume of traffic on North American railways was recognised as a key factor in generating the nation's wealth. Because of the size and population of Spain, Puig y Valls accepted, similarly large volumes of rail traffic could not be expected. Still, he thought, a comparison of 'the relation that exists between the roads and railways built in the territory of the Union and that existing between similar elements of traffic in Spain' would be worthwhile insofar as it would highlight whether Spain was giving excessive preference to road traffic. His supposition was that a transport network centred upon 'low tariffs and high traffic' like the USA, would allow not only the rail companies but the nation in general to enjoy greater prosperity.¹³³

There was, however, at least one group of people who were not included in the accumulation of riches generated by the USA's railway

industry. As Puig y Valls observed, the workers in this most modern of industries were seldom party to its profits. His visit to the Pullman factory left him and his fellow delegates ‘astonished and satisfied’ by the owner’s implementation of ‘the marked and perhaps brutal motto of the true yankee: “nothing for the labourer and everything for work”’.¹³⁴ The concern of the factory management was ‘neither charity, nor philanthropy, *business forever*’.¹³⁵ Their only interest in working conditions stemmed from a desire to introduce ‘the most advanced procedures’ in order that workers laboured ‘comfortably’ and produced the highest quality work ‘in calm spirits’.¹³⁶ Wage cuts and poor working conditions caused US railroad workers to strike, most notably in 1877 and also at the Pullman factory itself in 1894. However, despite Puig y Valls’ observations, the Spanish press and commentators were too concerned by the potential for worker unrest at home to be moved by the American railroad workers’ plight. *El Imparcial* and *La Epoca*, which covered the unfolding of the ‘Great Railroad Strike’ during the summer of 1877 day by day, and Antonio Aguilar y Correa, the Marqués de La Vega de Armijo, who published an account of the strikes in 1879, varied in the intensity of their criticism of the workers and the violence of the strikes. All, though, were principally concerned with accounting for and containing the spread of such ‘socialism’, recognised as the ‘concern of many nations’, and with assessing the extent to which the 1877 strikes in the USA discredited its democratic institutions and the credibility of the ‘model republic’.¹³⁷

The cost of the USA’s railway network was paid not only by the industry’s workers or by the ‘taming’ of previously pristine landscapes which could be conceived as either the despoiling or the civilising of nature. It could also be measured in human lives. Accidents on the railways—crashes and derailments—took place with such frequency that rail travel was considered a dangerous occupation. Newspapers reported with increasing sensation the details of gruesome deaths and mutilations caused by train crashes, which took place on Spanish soil such as the ‘catastrophe’ of the Barcelona–Zaragoza postal train, which derailed in July 1876 killing 14 and leaving an ‘unshaped pile of pieces of metal and wood, from which disfigured or degraded human bodies stick out’.¹³⁸ In the USA the speed and volume of rail traffic and complexity of railroad junctions (and the absence of standardised time before 1889) only multiplied the number of accidents and fatalities. The fascination and admiration expressed towards the USA’s expansive modern railroad network was coupled with an awareness and fear of the dangers it carried. The ‘atrocious speed’ of

the trains passing through the crossing point of four railroads between Chicago and Niagara Falls caused Puig y Valls to shiver at the thought that 'the smallest carelessness could end my journey in a tragic fashion'.¹³⁹ Miguel Suárez's 'commercial memoir' of the USA written almost twenty years earlier demonstrated that Puig y Valls' panic at the risks of rail travel were far from unfounded: in the year between December 1874 and December 1875, he counted 1191 'misfortunes' resulting in 234 deaths and 1094 injured, making a daily average of 3.26 accidents, 0.64 deaths and 3 injured over the year. Collisions, as distinct from accidents involving just one train, accounted for a third of the total, whilst two or three major crashes in the previous year had caused the average numbers of deaths and injuries on the railways to increase on preceding years.¹⁴⁰ Collisions were so commonplace that they had given rise to a new verb, 'to telescope': 'When two trains, colliding with each other, cause this unpleasant accident, they are said to have telescoped.'¹⁴¹ In addition, as Bustamante y Campuzano noted, train derailments 'are a very common occurrence in this country', given both the 'extraordinary circulation on all the lines' and 'the speed at which the locomotives go'. Indeed, Puig y Valls' recognition of the danger of rail travel proved prescient; on his journey around the western United States after the close of the World's Fair, he was involved in a train accident himself. Journeying from San Francisco towards El Paso, the train in which he was travelling accidentally ran over and killed two young railroad workers. Puig y Valls' dismay at being caught up in a fatal rail accident was only compounded by the fact that, as the young workers lay dying for several minutes, their fellow labourers simply picked up their tools and resumed their work.¹⁴²

To some it seemed that such deaths were a necessary sacrifice in the name of progress. Perhaps because the USA's present was assumed to be Spain and the rest of Europe's future, the attitude of Spanish observers towards the deaths and dangers of the North American railroads was predominantly one of sorrowful resignation. Unlike turn-of-the-century Britain and Germany, where Bernhard Rieger found a public discourse eager to discuss ways of improving safety features and reducing risk in the new aerial and naval forms of transport, these late nineteenth-century Spaniards debated the causes of rail accidents—excessive speed and volume of traffic—but did not suggest ways in which these accidents might be prevented, or even that they could or should be.¹⁴³ Rather, the accidents and risks were glumly accepted as an unavoidable part of becoming modern. Modern life, declared Bustamante y Campuzano, 'is nothing but

a bitter battle in which everyone fights to the death' and in the United States the battle's prize worth fighting—and dying—for was the 'quest for riches'.¹⁴⁴ If becoming modern was a battle, then those who died in the positivistic march towards material progress like the victims of rail crashes and other modern transportation disasters, or even the financial victims of stock market crashes, bankrupted and sometimes driven to suicide by their loss, were akin to soldiers sacrificed on the battlefield. And, after all, when the objective has been achieved,

Who cared for the victims, the less fortunate, who have been left behind in the field after the skirmish?... Perhaps one has never paid too much attention, relatively speaking, to the soldiers that have died in an act of war, when it has ended in a brilliant victory for the nation that has lost them?¹⁴⁵

It was judged, and not without disapproval, that in America victory in the war for modernity was measured in dollar signs. The 'triumph of the dollar' was all important and 'is well worth attaining at the cost of some sacrifices'.¹⁴⁶ Time and again, Spanish commentators asserted that the United States' *raison d'être* was commerce and the pursuit of profit. To this end, those who journeyed there insisted on visiting and reporting upon what they regarded as the USA's true temples—New York's Wall Street and the Stock Exchange. Bustamante y Campuzano told of the 'pompous names' of 'King of the railways, [...] King of oil or King of something else' given to leaders in different business sectors, the regal soubriquets serving only to underline the hierarchy of commerce and wealth.¹⁴⁷ Princess Eulalia wrote to her mother that she had visited the Stock Exchange 'at the most active hour of *business*' when 'transactions were at their absolute peak'.¹⁴⁸ The *Ilustración Española y Americana* shortly after published their impression of just such a scene: throngs of men were depicted waving, running, shouting, arguing and fighting with one another as they sought to make the greatest possible profit, the chaos of the human scene jarring against the serenity and palatial surroundings of the building in which they worked.¹⁴⁹

The Spanish writers, journalists and satirists who propagated this image of the USA as a land obsessed by business, profit and accumulating wealth prompted a range of often negative judgements about the morality of valuing money above all else, echoing the critiques of technological determinism emanating from the USA itself. *Blanco y Negro* ridiculed the North American uber-rich. William Vanderbilt, it noted ironically, must be 'one

of the most miserable beings to have ever been born', given that, as the biblical saying prophesised, it would be easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for him to enter the gates of heaven. Describing the enormous safe he had recently had hewn from granite, marble and steel in order to store his reported 'one hundred million pesos', the journalist augured that God might also afflict him with 'a capital like the one weighing on *mister* William Vanderbilt, so that we can sacrifice ourselves for the working classes, entrusting them with the construction of a box similar to that of the cited unhappy American'.¹⁵⁰ On a more serious note, they also contrasted 'the two poles' of the multi-million fortunes of the Vanderbilts and the Rockefellers with the 130 provincial teachers who had recently demonstrated before the governor of Malaga to protest at the forced closure of their schools for lack of pay.¹⁵¹ Puig y Valls was equally disparaging of the naked materialism which he identified with the USA: downtown New Yorkers were so busy that 'they elbow, push and step on each other, without even turning their heads to say: excuse you', so apparently consumed were they by their efforts to make money.¹⁵² This was a 'new nation of racial parvenus' who think 'that the only thing admirable and worthy of praise in the world, is the grouping of units of zeros accompanying the stupid dollar sign which makes them conceited, devaluing artistic expression they neither value nor understand'.¹⁵³

In this vision, the North American primacy of commerce and money was immoral, impious, and contrary to aesthetic values of artistic merit and beauty. It is significant that Puig y Valls imagined American commercialism as a racial trait of Anglo-Saxonness, connected to a lack of artistic capability and aesthetic appreciation. As discussed in Chap. 5, essential differences were identified between Americans and Spaniards as members of opposing racial groups, Anglo-Saxons and Latins. These binary designations were used to establish and articulate differences that were for the most part cultural, historical and behavioural, which were then transmuted into essential physical 'racial' traits that were inherited through the generations. Ascribing an aptitude for technological modernity (and corresponding absence of 'art' and cultural modernity) to the Anglo-Saxon race and the converse preference for art and culture at the expense of technology to Latins, was a trope familiar to late century Spaniards.

To conclude, the attitudes of the Spanish educated elite towards the primacy of the United States in the fields of technology, engineering and communications and to their particular forms of urban development were characterised by ambivalence. On the one hand, this image of the United

States engendered distance and fear: Americans' propensity for inventing and patenting novel machinery and means of communication was viewed with bemusement, but increasingly with suspicion and hostility, as the belligerent rhetoric between Spain and the USA over the fate of Cuba escalated toward war in 1898. The potential military applications of North American innovations and the evident superiority of the USA in military-technological fields appeared to directly threaten the Spanish colonial state. A different kind of fear, one which was assumed to be an inevitable by-product of the uncertainties of modernity was prompted by the real risks associated with modern machines, not least with rail travel. The prevalence of collisions, derailments and 'telescoping' on the busy and complex railroad network of the USA seemed to illustrate the unavoidable sacrifices that were required in the 'battle' to become modern. What's more, the correlation made between the American railways, inventions and forms of urbanisation and both the accumulation of wealth and the 'civilising' of the natural wilderness provoked a degree of distaste: American monumental buildings and skyscrapers designed according to a lexicon that exalted the big, the bold and the brash were judged ugly, unnatural and antithetical to Spanish aesthetic values of beauty and art. The railway barons and kings who amassed fortunes thanks to the extension of the railway network, as well as those who profited from the railroads in fulfilment of the 'time is money' maxim were viewed with some aversion and perhaps also a dash of envy. The characteristic notion of accelerating communication and annihilating space and time, not only within the USA, but also between nations, including Spain and the USA, did not necessarily make for more meaningful cultural exchanges and greater understanding between the two nations.

Aversion to technological modernity, as exemplified in the United States, however, was only part of the story. The vision of a future, powered by US-led advances in technology, such as the 'glorious event' of 'the triumph of electricity', was seen by many as one in which Spain could and was participating. As Puig y Valls declared, perhaps optimistically given what was involved, all that was needed was a forward-looking vision to search for fundamental technological and modern solutions that would allow humans to harness 'natural forces' and would radically alter mankind's relationship with nature, with their work and with each other. The most likely place to look for such a vision could be found across the Atlantic. Though US expertise in science and engineering, 'frenetic progress [and...] great material advances', were believed to have

been achieved at the expense of the arts and literature, the capacity of Americans to exploit their natural resources, to find innovative solutions and to overcome the inbuilt difficulties of their land—from the railway system that linked disparate settlements and facilitated westward colonisation to the funicular trams that annulled San Francisco's steep inclines—was considered well worthy of admiration and perhaps imitation. Simply put, both the 'dogma' of technological determinism and its critique pervaded Spanish discourse on the relationship between man, machine and progress just as it did US discourse, even if Spain was only just beginning to experience at first hand many of the technological innovations that had been experimented in the USA for some time. For better or worse, the sense was that Spain would need to emulate—or at least experiment—the innovations in science, engineering, communications infrastructure and urban development pioneered in the USA, as it too 'became modern'.

NOTES

1. Even if the complex, often transnational, processes through which new technologies were developed make it difficult to describe them simply as American inventions, it is certainly the case that from the final third of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, the USA created and presented itself as 'the modern technological nation'. See T.P. Hughes (1989) *American Genesis. A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm* (New York: Penguin).
2. M. Roe Smith (1994) 'Technological Determinism in American Culture' in L. Marx & M. Roe Smith eds. *Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism* (Cambridge, Mass. & London: MIT Press) p. 7. Arguably, and certainly earlier in the century, Britain could lay claim to the 'crown' of technological modernity. World-changing technologies, including telegraphy and the light bulb, were patented almost simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic but were claimed as national 'firsts'.
3. C.L. Flint et al. (1864) *Eighty Years' Progress of the United States* (New York: L. Stebbins); J. P. Boyd (1899) *Triumphs and Wonders of the 19th Century* (C.W. Stanton); Painting by Christian Schussele 'Men of Progress' (1863); Lithograph: Currier & Ives 'The Progress of the Century' (1876). See M. Roe Smith 'Technological Determinism in American Culture' pp. 6–11. R.W. Rydell (1993) *World of Fairs: the century-of-progress exhibitions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
4. J. P. Boyd *Triumphs and Wonders* p. i; M. Roe Smith 'Technological Determinism in American Culture' p. 7.

5. R.W. Emerson 'Works and Days' (1857, 1870) in *Emerson's Works* vol. 7, Society & Solitude (Houghton: Mifflin) p. 166. See M. Roe Smith 'Technological determinism in American Culture' p. 26 and L. Marx (1964) *The Machine in the Garden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 229–65.
6. H.D. Thoreau (W. Howarth ed.) (1854, 1981) *Walden: and other writings* (New York: The Modern Library) p. 46.
7. T.E. Kaplan (1970) 'Positivism and liberalism' in C. Lida & I. Zavala eds. *La revolución de 1868. Historia, pensamiento, literatura* (New York: Las Americas) pp. 254–266; T.H. Glick (1988) 'Spain' in idem. ed. *The Comparative Reception of Darwinism* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press) pp. 307–345.
8. A. Nieto-Galan (2012) 'A republican Natural History in Spain around 1900: Odón de Buen (1863–1945) and His Audiences' in *Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences* vol. 42.3 pp. 159–89; F. Papanelopoulos, A. Nieto-Galan, E. Pediguero eds. (2009) *Popularizing Science and Technology in the European Periphery, 1800–2000* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
9. Much historiography on the fin-de-siècle crisis and its association with technological and scientific discoveries and developments, which asserts the disconcerting and unsettling impact of innovations in technology and communications as they were increasingly applied to daily life in the industrialised West and emphasises the way in which these innovations dislocated people from what they 'knew' or were familiar with. In contrast, others including Bernard Rieger, have pointed to the ambivalence in societies' and individuals' responses to technological change. Ultimately, far from holding back or halting the 'progress' of the practical application of scientific and technological novelties, public reactions to such changes facilitated continued technological development. For a discussion of these debates and the latter argument, see B. Rieger (2005) *Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) chapter 1.
10. D.E. Nye (1994) *American Technological Sublime* (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press).
11. The classic historiographical interpretation of nineteenth century Spain has been of a nation lagging woefully behind other western European nations and the United States in terms of political and economic development. See J. Nadal (1975) *El Fracaso de la revolución industrial en España, 1814–1913* (Barcelona: Ariel). More recently, the idea of Spain's failure to modernise and the underpinning idea of the inevitability and desirability of modernisation according to an ideal blueprint laid down by Great Britain or the United States, has been challenged. Political, economic and technological development in nineteenth-century Spain, as elsewhere, occurred

unevenly and sporadically, not following an inexorable positivistic path but nevertheless perceptibly taking place. Still, a perception of the need to 'catch up' with the other European powers with regards to scientific and industrial development and political change in the direction of liberalism and democracy did indeed inform the thinking of many Spanish political and cultural elites. What's more, the introduction of new scientific and technological forms of production and communication did occur later in Spain than, for example, in Britain, France or Germany and was heavily reliant on expertise, materials and investment from abroad. See, for example, A. Elena & J. Ordóñez (2000) 'Science, Technology, and the Spanish Colonial Experience in the Nineteenth Century' in *Osiris* 2nd series, vol. 15, pp. 70–82.

12. Processes of scientific and academic exchange have received a good deal of historiographical attention. See, for example, D. Rodogno, B. Struck, J. Vogel eds. (2014) *Shaping the transnational sphere. Experts, networks and issues (1850–1930)* (New York: Berghahn Books); C. Charle, J. Schriewer, P. Wagners eds. (2004) *Transnational Intellectual Networks: Forms of Academic Knowledge and the Search for Cultural Identities* (Frankfurt: Kampus).
13. A. Nieto-Galan (2003) 'Under the banner of Catalan industry' in A. Simões, A. Carneiro, M.P. Diogo eds. *Travels of learning: a geography of science in Europe* (Boston: Klewer Academic Publishers) pp. 189–212.
14. The Spanish movement of regenerationism, which sought to scientifically diagnose and remedy what was perceived to be Spain's slow modernization and associate national decline is most closely associated with Joaquín Costa.
15. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 15 May 1871.
16. Karl Marx described the railways as the 'annihilation of space by time' in K. Marx (1857–61 [written]; 1939 [first published]; 1993 [this edition]), *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) p. 524. The 'annihilation of space and time' was a trope that was frequently used to describe the impact of railways. It is interesting to note that Schivelbusch observed that its use had died out in Western Europe by the mid nineteenth century because the railroad had by then become assimilated as part of daily life. In Spain, however, the aphorism of the railways 'annihilating space and time' was still often invoked up to the end of the century, indicating that the normalisation of rail travel in this part of Western Europe occurred later. See W. Schivelbusch (1986) *The Railway Journey. The Industrialisation of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century* (Leamington Spa: Berg) pp. 33; 130.

17. On the idea of *resentiment*, see L. Greenfeld (1992) *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press), especially pp. 15–17; 177–8; 222–8.
18. B. Rieger *Technology and the Culture of Modernity* p. 20. See also A. Nieto-Galan (2012) ‘Scientific “marvels” in the public sphere: Barcelona and its 1888 International Exhibition’ in *Host - Journal of History of Science and Technology*, vol. 6 pp. 7–38.
19. A. Llanos (1886) *El Gigante Americano. Descripciones de los Estados Unidos de la América del Norte* (Madrid: Tipográfico de Ricardo Fé) p. 16.
20. *Blanco y Negro* 1 Nov. 1891 Un’ poco de todo’.
21. *La Epoca* 14 May 1893 ‘El “kinetógrafo”’.
22. *La Epoca* 14 May 1893 ‘El “kinetógrafo”’.
23. It must be recognized that to some extent the principles of telephony were simply more difficult for any late-century public to grasp than the principles behind the kinetoscope, which used an optical illusion that had long been deployed in other artifacts, including children’s toys. Telephony, on the other hand, represented the first time that human voices had been sent through electrical wires. I’m grateful to Aileen Fyfe for pointing this out.
24. *El Imparcial* 4 January 1878 ‘El telefono’.
25. *El Imparcial* 4 January 1878 ‘El telefono’.
26. *El Imparcial* 4 January 1878 ‘El telefono’.
27. *El Imparcial* 4 January 1878 ‘El telefono’.
28. Published in C.M. de Castro (1860) *Memoria Descriptiva del Ante-Proyecto de Ensanche de Madrid* (Madrid: Imprenta de D José C de la Peña) p. 53.
29. See D. Pretel & J.P. Saíz González (2011) ‘Patent Agents in the European periphery: Spain 1826–1902’ in *History of Technology* vol. 31 pp. 97–114. Overall, the percentage of patents applied for in Spain that related to foreign technology remained consistently high, and indeed slightly increased in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Between 1770 and 1878, 64 % of all patents related to foreign technology or to the Spanish introduction of patents for technologies designed elsewhere. Between 1878 and 1907, this percentage was 67.7. J.P. Saíz González (2002) ‘The Spanish Patent System, 1770–1907’ in *History of Technology* vol. 24 p. 66.
30. T.E. Kaplan ‘Positivism and liberalism’; J. Goode (2009) *Impurity of Blood. Defining Race in Spain, 1870–1930* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press) pp. 39–40.
31. See A. Nieto-Galan ‘A republican natural history in Spain’ pp. 159–89.
32. On Odón de Buen’s science publications for popular consumption and the contours of Spanish scientific audiences, see A. Nieto-Galan ‘A republican natural history in Spain’, especially pp. 180–2.
33. A. Nieto-Galan ‘A republican natural history in Spain’ p. 184.
34. J.P. Saíz González ‘The Spanish Patent System’ p. 67; 73.

35. Edison was by no means the only pioneering nineteenth-century inventor to contribute to the development of electrical lighting, however he is usually credited with its 'invention' given that he patented the first versions of the 'glow-bulb' in 1878–1879 and was particularly successful in publicising his innovations and in commercialising the use of electricity for lighting and other practical domestic purposes. See P. Israel (1998) *Edison: A Life of Invention* (New York: John Wiley & Sons) and A. Millard (1990) *Edison and the Business of Innovation* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press).
36. C. Marvin (1988) *When Old Technologies Were New. Thinking About Communications in the late Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 184–9.
37. C. Marvin *When Old Technologies Were New* pp. 182–3.
38. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 30 Jan. 1878.
39. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 30 April 1886 'Crónica general'.
40. C. Marvin *When Old Technologies Were New* p. 149.
41. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 30 April 1886 'Crónica general'. Marvin noted the heated debates over capital punishment by electrocution, which took place in the USA at the end of the nineteenth century. In particular, the gruesome details of the death of Albert Kemmler, the first person to be officially electrocuted in August 1890, whose body convulsed protractedly and was badly burned before eventually dying, were widely published and discussed. While some argued that death by electrocution was an 'efficient and humane' way of killing, provided it was carried out by experts, others argued either that electricity was 'too beautiful to be subjugated to such work as that' or, more prosaically, that by associating electricity with death it would make the task of persuading people to introduce electricity and electrical appliances into their homes more difficult. Indeed, she also notes the success of Edison and his followers in linking the rival 'alternating current distribution system' of George Westinghouse with the efficiency of death by electrocution, in the hope of discrediting Westinghouse's system to the benefit of their own. C. Marvin *When Old Technologies Were New* pp. 149–150.
42. After the 'disaster' of 1898, Eduardo Vincenti, declared that 'the United States won not only because it was the stronger, but also because it was better instructed and educated, yet under no circumstances was it more valiant. No Yankees bared their breasts before our troops: our army had to confront a machine invented by some electrician or some mechanic. There was no fight. We were beaten in the laboratory and the offices, but not on the sea or on dry land.' Cited in A. Elena & J. Ordóñez "Science, Technology and the Spanish Colonial Experience in the Nineteenth Century" p. 81. Indeed, although they perhaps overstate their case, in this

article Elena and Ordonez assert that it was Spain's 'failure' to modernise or its delay in developing modern scientific, technological and industrial capabilities that meant that it also 'lagged behind' the European powers in terms of colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century, and was unable, ultimately, to defend its empire.

43. Colección Herres (1898) *Los Estados Unidos por dentro* 3rd. ed. (Madrid: Tipografía Herres).
44. *Blanco y Negro* 27 July 1895 'Al faro electrico de Nueva York. La Libertad illuminando al mundo'. For a discussion of contemporary ideas that viewed electricity as the demonstration of human triumph over nature, in contest with nature and bringing order to natural chaos, see C. Marvin *When Old Technologies Were New* pp. 113–7.
45. *Blanco y Negro* 6 Mar. 1897 p. 16.
46. *Blanco y Negro* 6 Mar. 1897 p. 16.
47. *Blanco y Negro* 11 April 1896 p. 20.
48. L. Greenfeld *Nationalism* pp. 15–17.
49. *Blanco y Negro* 23 July 1898 p. 15.
50. *Blanco y Negro* 23 July 1898 p. 17.
51. *Blanco y Negro* 23 July 1898 p. 17.
52. J. Bustamante y Campuzano (1885) *Del Atlántico al Pacífico. Apuntes e Impresiones de un Viaje a través de los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Victor Saiz) p. 152; R. Puig y Valls (1894) *Viaje á América* (Barcelona: Tipolitografía de Luis Tasso) Book II.
53. J.J. Lanero & S. Villoria (1996) *Literatura en traducción. Versiones españolas de autores americanos del siglo XIX* (León: Universidad de León) p. 67.
54. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 222.
55. While Washington, D.C. interested and impressed Spaniards as the seat of North American democracy, it was not particularly admired as a city, being dismissed by Juan Bustamante y Campuzano as a sleepy, provincial town. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 93.
56. See, for example, R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 25–6 and J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 76.
57. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 24.
58. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 3 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. (1949) *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893. Mi viaje a Cuba y Estados Unidos*. (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud).
59. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 54.
60. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 366.
61. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 30.
62. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 46. It should be noted that Bustamante y Campuzano was writing before the statue was permanently in place; however, the statue's form was by then well known.

63. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 46.
64. Letters from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 2 June 1893 & 3 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
65. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 3 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
66. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 2 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz A ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
67. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* pp. 368; 366.
68. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 368.
69. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 324.
70. *La Epoca* 13 May 1893 'Chicago'.
71. Both *La Epoca* and *El Imparcial* had correspondents in Chicago for the World's Fair, whilst journals like *La Ilustración Española y Americana* and *Blanco y Negro* regularly reported on the goings-on of the World's Fair, including, in *La Ilustración Española y Americana*'s case, illustrations of many of the national pavilions and major exhibits.
72. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 49.
73. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 47.
74. See, for example, *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 5 Nov. 1871 & 15 Dec. 1871.
75. *La Epoca* 13 May 1893 'Chicago'.
76. *El Imparcial* 2 May 1893 'Mushroom City'.
77. *La Epoca* 13 May 1893 'Chicago'.
78. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 47.
79. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 6 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
80. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 6 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
81. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 49.
82. J. Jordana y Morera (1884) *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social de los Estados Unidos*. (Madrid: Tipografía de Manuel G Hernández) pp. 53–4.
83. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 425.
84. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 28.
85. The italics, and direct use of English was made by the author himself. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 54.
86. On historial time, see R. Koselleck (K. Tribe trans.) (2004) *Futures past: on the semantics of historical time* (New York: Columbia University Press).
87. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 55.
88. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 56.
89. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 57–8.
90. The frequency with which the epithet 'Babylonian' or references to the tower of Babel were applied to Chicago is striking. See, for example:

R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 57; *La Epoca* 13 May 1893 'Chicago'; *El Imparcial* 2 May 1893 'Mushroom City'.

91. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 229.
92. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 328.
93. I. Cerdà (1867) *Teoría general de la urbanización, y aplicación de sus principios y doctrinas a la reforma y ensanche de Barcelona de Ildefonso Cerdà* (Madrid: Imp. Española) p. 565
94. I. Cerdà *Teoría general de la urbanización* p. 566
95. I. Cerdà *Teoría general de la urbanización* p. 567
96. C. M. de Castro *Memoria Descriptiva* p. 84.
97. C. M. de Castro *Memoria Descriptiva* p. 163.
98. C. M. de Castro *Memoria Descriptiva* p. 163.
99. On the influence of Haussmann's Paris on Madrid's city planners, see C. Díez de Baldeón (1986) 'Barrios obreros en el Madrid del siglo XIX: ¿Solución o amenaza para el orden burgués?' in L.E. Otero Carvajal & A. Bahamonde eds. *Madrid en la sociedad del siglo XIX* vol. 1 (Madrid: Graficinco) pp. 121–2 and D. Parsons (2003) *A Cultural History of Madrid* (Oxford: Berg) pp. 81–4.
100. See D. Parsons *A Cultural History of Madrid* pp. 3–9.
101. D. Parsons *A Cultural History of Madrid* pp. 57; 77.
102. On Madrilenian flâneurs and practices of strolling and sociability in the late nineteenth century, see V. Rodríguez-Galindo (2014) 'A patchwork of effects: Notions of walking, sociability, and the flâneur in late nineteenth-century Madrid' in R. Wrigley ed. *The Flâneur abroad: Historical and International perspectives* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing) pp. 142–65.
103. D. Parsons *A Cultural History of Madrid* p. 57.
104. See V. Rodríguez-Galindo (2014) 'A patchwork of effects', especially pp. 144–50.
105. For a discussion of the relationship between modernity and the city, and in particular of the folly of juxtaposing and measuring 'backward' traditional provincial cities like Madrid against an industrialised modern ideal-type city, exemplified by London, Paris or New York, see D. Parsons *A Cultural History of Madrid* p. 6.
106. A. Fernández de los Ríos (1868) *El futuro Madrid* (Madrid: Imp. de la Biblioteca Universal Económica). Alberto Soria published his ideas in the journal of the Compañía Madrileña de Urbanización, *La Ciudad Lineal*, from 1897. Both these visions were only partly realised, Soria's ciudad lineal existing now as a subway stop and area on the outskirts of Madrid. On the radical nature and importance of Fernández de los Ríos and Soria's plans, see C. Díez de Baldeón (2005) 'Barrios obreros en el Madrid del siglo XIX' pp. 121–6 and M. Neuman & J. Gavinha (2005) 'The Planning

Dialectic of Continuity and Change: The Evolution of Metropolitan Planning in Madrid' in *European Planning Studies* vol. 13.7, pp. 988–992.

107. C. Díez de Baldeón 'Barrios obreros en el Madrid del siglo XIX' pp. 124–6.
108. D. Parsons *A Cultural History of Madrid* p. 85.
109. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 30 Jan. 1878.
110. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 22 June 1877.
111. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 424.
112. Cited in A. Shubert (1990) *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Urwin Hyman) p. 18.
113. This argument is put forward by Alberto Elena and Javier Ordóñez in 'Science, Technology and the Spanish Colonial Experience in the Nineteenth Century', *passim*.
114. A. Shubert *A Social History of Modern Spain* p. 17.
115. A. Shubert *A Social History of Modern Spain* pp. 17–18. See, also, A. Elena and J. Ordóñez 'Science, Technology and the Spanish Colonial Experience in the Nineteenth Century' for the argument that the construction of the Spanish railways was an episode of 'reverse colonialism'.
116. *El Abolicionista* 30 June 1876 'Los ferro-cariles en España'.
117. This was the case, for example, with Bustamante y Campuzano's *Del Atlántico al Pacífico*.
118. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 19 May 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
119. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 19 May 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
120. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* pp. 230–1.
121. Many noted Victorians wrote of the enchantment of their first experiences of travelling by rail at speed. Charles Dickens' 'A Flight' (originally printed in *Household Words*, 1851) is a classic of its type.
122. See W. Schivelbusch *The Railway Journey* p. 89.
123. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* Book II, p. 24. W. Benjamin (1968) 'The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction' in H. Arendt ed. *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken Books) pp. 217–242.
124. On the way in which the opening of the railroads brought about a loss of 'aura', in Benjamin's terms, through the reproduction and standardisation of landscape and even time, see W. Schivelbusch *The Railway Journey* pp. 41–4.
125. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 21.
126. Schivelbusch identifies the difference in carriage design as arising from the fact that European carriage designers took their lead from the stagecoach, which train travel replaced, whilst the major point of reference for the

North American design was the steamboat. Because the steamboat (like American trains) had to cover long distances between settled areas, it provided greater self-sufficiency and mobility for its passengers. See W. Schivelbusch *The Railway Journey* p. 75 for Simmel's response to the changing cultural experience of travel by train and pp. 98–107 for the different evolutions in carriage design.

127. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 25 Dec. 1870 'Estados Unidos - Ferro-carril'.
128. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 17 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893*.
129. L. Beebe (1961) *Mr. Pullman's Elegant Palace Car* (New York) p. 285, cited in W. Schivelbusch *The Railway Journey* p. 111.
130. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 208.
131. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 43; see also W. Schivelbusch *The Railway Journey* p. 44.
132. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 43.
133. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 216. Evidently a man of contradiction, Puig y Valls also advocated that Spain should emulate some of the more protectionist policies of the USA. Whilst in Salt Lake City, he noted and 'recommend[ed] to Spanish economists' a saying posted in the city's tram-cars that read: '*When you spend a dollar for foreing [sic foreign] goods you are making Utah 1.00 \$ poorer*' Ibid. Book II, p. 22.
134. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 216–7.
135. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 217.
136. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 217.
137. See A. Aguilar y Correa, Marqués de La Vega de Armijo (1879) *La huelga en los ferrocarriles de los Estados Unidos de la América del Norte en 1877* (Madrid: Eduardo Martínez); *La Epoca* 26–29 July 1877, 31 July 1877, 1–4 Aug. 1877; *El Imparcial* 28–30 July 1877.
138. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 8 July 1876.
139. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* p. 41.
140. M. Suarez (1876) *Estados Unidos de America. Memorias Comerciales. Dirigido al Ministerio de Estado* (Madrid: García y Compañía) p. 33.
141. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 91.
142. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* Book II, p. 64.
143. On the British and German public discourse which acknowledged the inherent risks of new technologies but was keen to find ways of minimising these dangers and making new forms of transport safer, see B. Rieger *Technology and the Culture of Modernity* pp. 53; 69–79.
144. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* pp. 29–31.
145. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* pp. 29–31.
146. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* pp. 29–31.

147. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 53.
148. Letter from Princess Eulalia to Queen Isabel II, 3 June 1893, published in A. Giménez Ortiz ed. *Cartas a Isabel II. 1893.*
149. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 30 Aug. 1893 'Panic in the New York Stock Exchange'.
150. *Blanco y Negro* 31 May 1891 'Verdades y Mentiras'.
151. *Blanco y Negro* 23 Aug. 1891 'La vida moderna'.
152. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 51.
153. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* Book II, p. 19.

Race, Religion, Progress and Decline: Imagining Difference Between the United States and Spain

People of Spanish origin, with an imagination as burning as their weather, devoted themselves especially to fine arts. The Anglo-Saxon people, as cold in their reasoning as the weather they live in, dedicated themselves more to the useful arts. We are more poetic, they more practical. We created literary circles, they schools; we paint beautiful pictures, they draw crude machines that produce beautiful works; we trust in the fertility of the soil to cover our necessities, and they entrust to their intelligence and their study the invention of mechanical ways to defeat the relative infertility of their lands. We have the men of letters and they have more men of commerce; we have more economists and they have their public funds rated higher on the stock market; all in all we form nations of idealists and die of hunger; they form industrial nations and we pay them tribute in what we eat, in how we dress and what shoes we put on. While we offer prizes for the best composition on a glorious event, they open railways in our lands, exploit our mines, sell us their manufactured products for our luxury and necessities and fill our ports with their ships. We will be the more civilized, if you want, but they are richer and enjoy more comforts than us; the countries they inhabit seem like gardens sown with palaces; ours seem like wastelands; in ours we see the work of a rough nature in some parts, poetic in others, or wild in the remaining ones; in theirs one sees everywhere the hand of the engineer that crosses rivers on daring bridges, drills into mountains bases and covers the land with a railway network.

El Progreso, January 1884

This was the rallying cry of the opening page of *El Progreso*, a journal published for the first time in 1884 with the promise to 'make known

in Spanish the main foreign language publications, especially those referring to inventions and advances in Mechanics, Industry, Art etc., Politics, Medicine, philosophy and religion'.¹ The journal was published in New York, at the printing presses of its Galician-born, free-thinking, liberal republican editor, Ramón Silvestre Verea García. During his time in the USA, Verea García embraced American technological modernity, and indeed participated in it, through the sale of printing machinery and via his own invention, patented in 1878, of a calculating machine. His experience of modern life in the USA induced him to lament the apparent slow development of 'progress' in Spain, which he framed according to the juxtaposition of the fundamentally divergent attributes and traits of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon 'races'.

The contours of Latinity and Anglo-Saxonism as racial designations took shape in the nineteenth century as part of the modern invention of race as an essential category of human existence, which carried within it scientifically identifiable immutable and inherited physical, behavioural and cultural characteristics. The binary concepts of Latin and Anglo-Saxon were formed through a conscious process of Othering (which also took in other racial designations including 'Slav' and 'German', the latter often elided with 'Anglo-Saxon') and used as keys to unlocking and explaining the distinctiveness of their own and others' societies and ways of life. Nineteenth-century distinctions of race were expressed in the language of essential biological difference but in fact melded historically constructed notions of cultural, religious, moral, intellectual, socio-economic and physical difference. Thus, in its comparison of Latins and Anglo-Saxons and the relative aptitude of each 'race' to meet the challenges of modernity, *El Progreso* was far from exceptional. Climactic considerations aside, culturally constructed and at times relatively subtle perceptions of racial difference—in this instance between industrious and progressive Anglo-Saxons and the artistic, arduous but anachronistic *raza latina*—coloured the way late nineteenth-century Spaniards, conservatives and liberals, conceived of themselves, of 'others', of their empire and of their position along the path to modernity.

An understanding of the world shaped by concepts of race and racial difference, underpinned by (pseudo) scientific theory, enjoyed considerable currency in Spain in the second half of the nineteenth century, as it did in much of contemporary Europe and the Americas.² Spanish iterations of modern social science disciplines that claimed to pinpoint racial identities, including anthropology, ethnography and criminology, emerged from the

late 1860s, behind, but not by far, the institutional development of social sciences in Britain and France, and contemporaneous to their development in Germany, Italy and, indeed, the United States.³ The reforming political climate of the democratic *sexenio*, during which liberal and republican academics occupied positions of political influence (and, vice versa, politicians were influential academics), provided hospitable institutional and financial support—including legitimacy-lending university chairs, learned societies and professional bodies—for the academic foundation of Spanish scientific disciplines that aimed to empirically uncover the essential qualities of the Spanish race and feed this into government policy and educated public opinion. The latter, already well versed in Romanticism, vigorously debated scientific positivism, Darwinist evolutionary theory and social Darwinist theories of national ‘origins’ and essential differences between supposed superior and inferior peoples and civilisations.⁴ The seismic shock caused in Spain by Prussian military victory over France in 1870–71 as well as the later colonial defeats for Spain and Italy at the close of the century were read in a social Darwinist key as battles for power between distinct races. Although the Bourbon Restoration ejected many of the liberal and republican-minded academics in the new social science disciplines from their university seats and withdrew governmental financial support from their institutions, as Joshua Goode argues, this prevented neither the continuing development of the disciplines nor their ability to influence official policy.⁵

By the late century, the use of ‘race’ to construct differences between people and the following view that racial differences were key shapers of societies and historical change were dominant lines of thought; Hippolyte Taine, the French philosopher who enjoyed considerable fame south of the Pyrenees, asserted that ‘race’ was a principal determinant ‘from which historical events derive’.⁶ Imagined racial differences may have driven historical change, but, of course, the ways in which race and racial differences were imagined were themselves historically contingent. As such, there is, as Goode points out, no continuous trajectory of Spanish racial identity ‘from Isabella to Franco’, no more than there is in the German case ‘from Luther to Hitler’.⁷ Historical-cultural constructs were grafted to perceived inherited essential physiological characteristics according to contemporary knowledge and need(s) to create distinct races and concomitant racial identities. Crucially, the modern formulation of Spain’s racial identity, to which these new academics contributed, was predicated on the concept of racial fusion, not purity. For the racial

theorists of the nineteenth century, the Spanish *raza* was constructed as a conquering and unifying force, on the basis of their understanding of Spain's imperial and religious past as one marked by contact, conquest and conversion. The absorptive and unifying qualities that shaped the Spanish *raza* were then adopted as an explanatory framework for national (past) greatness, (present) decline and decay and (future) regeneration. This prizing of 'fusion' over 'purity' does not mean that Spanish racial identity and theorising was somehow more benign than other national manifestations. Though the conceived Spanish *raza* made great virtue of its inclusionary properties, it also contained 'exclusion' at its core. As ever with the deployment of racist thought, 'someone, or some group, is always left out'.⁸

Both racial theorists and the wider population saw little difficulty in eliding physical and biological distinctions with cultural and behavioural differences in their conceptions of race—all were understood as hereditary qualities that could be transferred down the generations and thus served as markers of particular races.⁹ Cloaking cultural constructions of perceived difference in the language of biology and scientific rationality to describe what were almost invariably considered essential evolutionary racial categories, Spanish commentators, like the majority of their European and American counterparts, referred to qualities, characteristics and personality traits that were not essential but constructed according to historical developments, socio-economic disparities, religion and even climate. Indeed, though the term most frequently employed was *raza*, outside academic circles it was virtually interchangeable with *pueblo* and both were used to refer not only to groups of people who spanned different national boundaries (Latin, Anglo-Saxon, black and white) but could be also restricted to the people of a single nation (the Spanish or US race, for example).¹⁰

Contemporary notions of race ambiguously blended physiognomic with biological, socially and culturally imagined distinctions to create unequal and hierarchical visions of human 'progress' across nineteenth-century Europe and the Americas. In Argentina, for example, Domingo Sarmiento tied race to global political and economic development in his assessment that 'barbarous' Indians, 'prehistoric' blacks and even 'atrophied' Latins were unfit for self-government and democracy in comparison to the infinitely superior Anglo-Saxons. To his mind, the racial deficits he identified in his Latin countrymen and women could only be overcome through education and, above all, a concerted policy of 'whitening'.¹¹

In the United States, the assertion of the nation's 'Manifest Destiny', in which the political principles seen to epitomise the USA were equated to the innate superiority of its (Anglo-Saxon) population to justify and render inevitable its continental expansion and 'civilising mission', had come to permeate political, intellectual and popular discourses on questions of nation, race, empire and progress by the mid century.¹²

Similarly, for many among the Spanish political and cultural elites, the apparent disparities in development and 'progress' they saw around them, including those between Spain and the ascendant United States, could be explained by race. Even within images that conceived America in sophisticated and complex ways, the application of simplified binary designations that juxtaposed 'Anglo-Saxon' and 'Latin' was an extremely common way of accounting for the distinctiveness of US politics, culture and society from their own. The actual content of these denotations was highly flexible and imprecise (which indeed lent them strength), conflating political, societal and religious formations with innate natural and biological properties. As such, the terms Anglo-Saxon and Latin were understood as racial distinctions even when they were used to indicate cultural, behavioural and even climactic similarities and differences. A sense of being Anglo-Saxon, shared between Britain and the United States, was used on both sides of the Atlantic (including, of course, with considerable enthusiasm in Britain and the United States themselves) to explain the apparent potency of these two country's political and economic systems, the one the undisputed world superpower and the other in seemingly quick ascendance, which were no longer under one rule but could still be said to be united by race. If shared racial origins and qualities explained the modernity and progress of the United States and Britain, it followed that Latinity—a sense of racial affinity between peoples of the western Mediterranean (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy) and those who had emigrated to the Southern Americas from there—might offer the key to understanding the perceived tardiness of modernity in Spain.

Late nineteenth-century Spanish conceptions of race and of racial difference must be understood in the context of shifting contemporary world-views of Spain as an imperial power. Of course, mid- and late-century Spain was (in part) a waning imperial power, whose politicians and intellectuals were increasingly obsessed with national decline and explaining the demise of the Spanish empire following the successful independence movements in the continental American colonies between 1810 and 1824. However, late-century Spaniards also viewed theirs as a nation-state

whose present and future was distinctly imperial. As Alda Blanco points out, Spain's nineteenth-century or 'modern' empire, which included the Philippines, North Africa, Puerto Rico and, prized above all, Cuba, has often been forgotten by historians or dismissed as 'almost incomprehensible imperial fantasies', and is largely absent in Spanish historical memory more broadly.¹³ However, as she makes clear, the 'former present' of late-century Spain 'was undeniably imperial'.¹⁴ The Franco-Spanish invasion of Mexico and Spanish annexation of Santo Domingo in 1861 can only be understood as imperially informed ventures. Although there were no more attempts at imperial gain during the democratic *sexenio* and the Restoration that followed, the focus of political leaders remained firmly on the maintenance of Spain's existing empire through reform and war. The political figure most clearly associated with Restoration politics, Antonio Cánovas, was unequivocal in his speech to Madrid's *Ateneo* in November 1882 as he set out his views on the modern nation and Spain's future. In this speech, he insisted that it was 'our duty, [...] to be included in the ranks of the expansive, dominant nations, which have taken it upon them to accomplish the arduous task of civilising the entire world'.¹⁵

Changing and often conflicting perceptions of race played a prominent role within Spain's modern imperial identity, influencing politicians and commentators of all political persuasions both during the *sexenio revolucionario* and the Restoration. Racial politics also informed the arguments of those calling for an end to slavery and colonial reform in the Spanish Antilles; if their proposed reforms were enacted, the claim of economic dependency that was used to defend the continued retention of Puerto Rico and Cuba's colonial status would have to be replaced with another set of ties. The most obvious alternative basis for justifying the continued colonial relationship was the imagined 'blood tie' that connected Spaniards on the peninsular to the white creole colonial settlers. By claiming common blood and identity between white Spaniards, Puerto Ricans and Cubans, the 'otherness' of black and mulatto Cubans and Puerto Ricans was asserted by default.¹⁶ The Cuban independence leaders José Martí and Antonio Maceo may have imagined a raceless society—composed not of 'whites nor blacks, but only Cubans'—as the foundation of Cuban nationhood. However, from Madrid, in spite of insistence on the positive effects of racial fusion and consequent relative lack of interest in classifying multiple racial types in the peninsular population, distinctions of race in the colonies appeared very real.¹⁷ Spanish colonialists and

Cubans opposed to independence manipulated and exploited perceptions of racial difference and prejudice in order to disprove the Cuban nationalist leaders' claims that Cuba was and would be a raceless nation and to undermine their cause of independence. Instead, they used racist ideology around *mestizaje* to exacerbate divisions within the independence movement along racial lines and to engender fear in the white creole population, drawing a thread between the struggles for Cuban independence and the Haitian revolution, by now a byword for 'race war'.¹⁸

The remainder of this chapter takes a more detailed look at how 'race' inflected Spanish images of the United States and in turn of Spanish national identity and society. Malleable concepts of Latinity and Anglo-Saxonism were produced and filled with contingent cultural attributes, assigned essential physiological qualities and were then deployed to establish difference and to make sense of perceived disparities in the political, economic, technological and cultural outputs of the countries separated and connected by the Atlantic. As such, the positing of fundamental differences between Europeans and Americans in the twentieth century, which tended to adopt the unambiguous terminology of advancement vs. decline and of hostile, simplistic 'Anti-Americanism' has antecedents in the multivalent discourse on Latins and Anglo-Saxons, which grew in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Having explored in a first section the content and deployment of designations of Latin and Anglo-Saxon races, the chapter turns to examine the correlation between race and religion in images of Latinity and Anglo-Saxonism. To a considerable extent, the foundation of perceptions of essential difference between Spaniards and US citizens was the distinction between Catholicism and Protestantism. The divergent religious paths that Latins and Anglo-Saxons followed after the Reformation was imagined to have indelibly shaped the characteristics of each race and secured the historical trajectories of each. As the chapter shows, whilst religion was held as a, if not the, key marker of difference between Spain and the USA, the construction of religious and racial distinctions very often overlapped and, indeed, were conflated, making it difficult to distinguish how far contemporary Spaniards saw Americans as a race, or a religion, apart. In a final conclusion, the chapter considers the perceived influence of immigration on imaginaries of the United States, and of the Anglo-Saxon race, pointing to some of the limits to images of the United States as a universal fatherland predicated, like Spain, on the idea of racial fusion.

RAZA LATINA VERSUS RAZA ANGLO-SAJONA

The racial distinctions imagined by Spaniards in the late nineteenth century were not only those that juxtaposed ‘black’ to ‘white’. Appearing in Spanish intellectual discourse from the 1860s and 1870s, a crucial binary that was seen as key to understanding divergent levels of ‘progress’ amongst the nations of Europe and the Americas was that drawn between Latins and Anglo-Saxons. Latinity provided a conceptual tool with which to lay claim to common origins, a common character, shared history and culture amongst the inhabitants of the southwest Mediterranean. Founded on a sense of shared ancient Roman forbearers, Latinity and its essential attributes seemed to offer late-century Spaniards a key to understanding both national glory and decline.¹⁹ Increasingly, it also afforded a means for asserting common interests, after imperialism, between Spaniards and white Latin Americans, although the alternate notion of *hispanidad* came to provide this function in the twentieth century.²⁰ It even furnished a pretext for efforts to forge a transnational political union with Latinity as the criteria for membership, as in the case of Emilio Castelar’s proposals at the end of the 1860s (always more of an ideal than realistic prospect) for a Latin Union of republics, taking in France, Italy and Portugal, and led by Spain, regenerated and propelled to leadership by the first successful liberal revolution in Europe since 1848.²¹

If Latinity allowed Spaniards to assert what the French, Spanish, Italians and Portuguese shared, then its opposing denotation of Anglo-Saxon allowed for the ‘Othering’ projection of what Latins were not onto the inhabitants of Britain and the USA. The terms Latin and Anglo-Saxon were historically constructed and were predicated on the identification of divergent political institutions and values, language, religious and cultural practices and even on climactic differences, but they were understood as racial distinctions, transmuted into essential inherited and immutable characteristics and even physiological differences. Even where the differences being discussed were entirely cultural, religious or historical, the language used was that of *raza*. The elision of physiological, cultural, linguistic and behavioural properties that was fused in designations of race was captured in the writings of Juan Bustamante y Campuzano, who arrived in the USA in 1882 to take up a position as *Secretario de Legación*. In his account of his experiences and travels in the ‘young nation’, Bustamante described his pleasure on reaching Santa Fé, to hear Spanish spoken (albeit, as he noted, with a Mexican accent) and, ‘in the appearances, in the extreme fickleness

of the representatives and in the animated and expressive gestures accompanying their conversations, recognised the remains of our *raza latina*, whose fiery character has so little in common with the cold and calculating character predominating in diverse States of the Confederation'.²²

Of course, both concepts, Latinity and Anglo-Saxonism, could be formulated without reference to the other, as in fact they often were. Madame de Staël used language as the classifying tool in her Romantic division of Europe into communities of Latins, Germans and Slavs.²³ The mid-century iteration of Latinity was driven in large part by French discourse in which antagonisms between French and American imperial interests were recast as essentialist struggles between Latin and Anglo-Saxons, with the latter understood as the aggressor. This discourse found its most fervent expression in the *Revue des Races Latines*, a journal that from 1857 to 1864 urged 'Latin races, let us defend ourselves!', whose editor, Gabriel Hugelmann had been turned on to 'Latin' culture during his years spent in Spanish exile after the 1848 revolution.²⁴ Indeed, the Spanish debates around its membership of a Latin race, which emerged in the 1860s and 1870s, were decisively shaped by the military defeat of France by Prussia in 1870. Spanish despair, articulated by Antonio Cánovas, José Castro y Serrano and others, at the humiliation that this defeat meted out on 'the leader of the *raza latina*' clearly posited the Germanic or Teutonic 'race' as the Latins' Other.²⁵ That said, as the century progressed, and certainly by its end, the juxtaposition of Latinity to Anglo-Saxonism became an increasingly common formulation.

In Spain, the particular dimensions of the discourse on Latin vs. Anglo-Saxon races were informed by the competition between Spain and the United States for economic and political influence in the Spanish colony of Cuba, which rumbled throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and, of course, dissolved into military conflict in 1898. The contact between Spanish (Latin) and North American (Anglo-Saxon) 'races' in the New World ensured that, even in its initial development, 'Anglo-Saxon' constituted a clear 'Other' for the Spanish formulation of their identity as Latins, one that was understood as (potentially) conflictual from the start. To this end, even Spanish abolitionists like Félix Bona—unstinting in their praise for the model of abolition and emancipation furnished by the United States—understood contemporary events in Cuba (in 1872, during the Ten Years' War) as no less than a showdown between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon races for control of the American continent.

In this chunk of Spanish earth the destinies of young America would, sooner or later, have to be decided: on the one side the banner of Castile fluttered in Cuba by Spanish hands; on the other the stars of the Union, waved in the wind by the robust arms of the Yankees in the United States, until it is known to whom America finally belongs, if it is to be completely Latin with our race, or completely Anglo-Saxon with the sons of Washington and Franklin.²⁶

The Spanish ‘Othering’ of Anglo-Saxons in contrast to their own Latinity was not a one-way street; indeed, the North American debates around the mid century in relation to the possible purchase and incorporation of Cuba into the United States had revealed a propensity to view Latins as ‘Other’ by Anglo-Saxon-identifying North Americans, and point to one of the stumbling blocks of the racial underpinnings of the ideology of Manifest Destiny. Whilst adhering to the common view of Cuba as a territory that rightfully belonged within the United States and, indeed, pursuing its purchase, Secretary of State James Buchanan pondered how, upon completion of the transaction, they might ‘Americanise’—by which he intended ‘Anglo-Saxonise’—Cuba. In so doing he gave official legitimation to the often-aired opinion among US citizens, especially in the South, that any eventual admittance of Cuba as one of the United States would entail the incorporation of ‘black, mixed, degraded and ignorant, or inferior races’.²⁷ Others worried specifically that it was ‘the Spanish race [in Cuba] which can never be assimilated to our own’.²⁸ That such concerns went right to the top of US politics was demonstrated by President Fillmore’s annual message of 1852.

Were this Island [Cuba] comparatively destitute of inhabitants, or occupied by a kindred race, I should regard it, if voluntarily ceded by Spain, as a most desirable acquisition. But, under existing circumstances, I should look upon its incorporation into our Union as a very hazardous measure. It would bring into the Confederacy a population of a different national stock, speaking a different language, and not likely to harmonise with the other members.²⁹

The content of the signifiers Latin and Anglo-Saxon is hard to pin down; both provided flexible vessels into which producers of images of Latins and Anglo-Saxons could pour their own meanings. These, as with ‘race’ itself, were ‘prismatic categories’,³⁰ capable of refracting differing, even opposing, worldviews. Conservative and traditionalist monarchists,

liberals and republicans, Catholics and anti-clericals overlaid their divergent political ideologies onto the idea of Latinity to produce multiple understandings of what this signified. For some, the idea of Spain's direct heritage to ancient Rome helped explain the contemporary decline they identified among Latin countries. Antonio Cánovas, for example, in 1870 lamented the 'double humiliation on the heads of all Latin people' caused by the 'simultaneous catastrophes' of France's capitulation to Prussia and the demise of the Vatican's temporal powers upon its incorporation into the territories of the new Italian nation-state.³¹ Conversely, the Roman antecedents of the Latins also indicated the path to modern regeneration through the beneficial results of racial mixing (understood as a central feature of the Roman empire). For others, what bound Latin countries together were to be found in the common pursuit and co-operation in present-day economic, colonial and cultural affairs. For others still, their sense of Latinity was more spiritual than material, emphasising above all the shared Catholicism of Latin nations in contrast to the Protestantism of the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon races.³² Whilst the loudest promoter in Spain of the idea of a Latin race, the journal *La Raza Latina* founded in 1874 by Juan Valero de Tornos, tended towards a conservative Catholic-monarchical outlook, Spanish liberals also embraced their own conceptions of a Latin race, among them Emilia Pardo Bazán and Emilio Castelar.

At its core, 'Anglo-Saxon' connoted the idea of the shared or indelibly connected political, economic, religious, linguistic and cultural values held in the United States and Great Britain, a sense that was enthusiastically promoted on both sides of the Atlantic and had been introduced to continental Europe by Tocqueville and Chevalier in the 1830s.³³ As ideas of Britain (by which most intended, and spoke or wrote of, England) and the USA's common Anglo-Saxon status circulated, the projected values, ideals and characteristics of the two countries were very often conflated. In Spain, images of the United States and Britain were elided particularly in reference to the political values of liberty and democracy that both were seen to uphold. The liberal academic Gumersindo de Azcárate spoke of 'the Anglo-American state' and found it 'easy to see the entire Anglo-Saxon tradition in the North American Constitution', whilst the early feminist Concepción Arenal routinely referred in her writings to 'the Anglo-American woman' who enjoyed certain personal, professional and sometimes political liberties.³⁴ As discussed in Chap. 2, Rafael de Labra expanded on this conflation of Anglo-Saxon political institutions and ideals in his 1881 work on *La Revolución Norteamericana del siglo XVIII*.

Here, he suggested that the notion of political liberty had originated in England but it was in the United States that the principle had really been tested in practice and transformed into a universal ideal. In this way, 'the English spirit pass[ed] through America'.³⁵

The limit to the elision of the English and the American was to be found in the image of the Yankee, the all-American figure who was identified to bear Anglo-Saxon roots and characteristics but whose relation to the Englishman was decidedly ambiguous. The Yankee figure, of whom Uncle Sam was the most infamous caricature, was more informal and uncouth, and by implication, uncivilised, than his English cousin. He was a businessman, driven by materialism and consumed by the watchwords of profit that were always reproduced in Spanish texts in distancing italics and untranslated, 'Go ahead!' and 'the greatest in the World'. He was also lecherous, both sexually and in metaphorical reference to US territorial expansion in the Americas; cartoon images represented a lascivious, weighty Uncle Sam menacingly leaning in towards the defenceless female figure of Spain, especially in the run-up to the Spanish-Cuban-American War.³⁶ Adolfo Llanos tried to deploy a little more nuance in his sketch of the 'North American man [...] for the sons of the *raza latina*'. The 'classic yankee', he claimed, was a distinct and established racial type, who maintained certain affinities with his English relatives and remained undiluted by continued immigration to the United States;

He [the Yankee] cannot be compared, because he is unique; he is similar to the English, but not like a copy of the original, nor like a son to the father; he laughs more, he enjoys himself more, he dares more than the English; he has the same calm, the same coldness, but with intermittences; he pays tribute to the same or greater extravagances, as long as they produce something; he does not understand the sublime nature of a useless anomaly, of a gratuitous sacrifice and of a superfluous eccentricity: behind every action he has to see an enterprise.³⁷

Llanos ended his assessment by trying to put the comparison in terms that his Spanish readers would understand: 'The English comes close to Don Quixote, and the Yankee cannot be distinguished from Sancho Panza: he always pursues a lucrative objective, a practical end.'³⁸ The Quixotic metaphor found later echo in the post-*desastre* ruminations of the *Revista contemporánea* which urged Spain's transformation from a Quixote to a Panza, the latter this time imagined embodied by British institutions.³⁹

If the content of the designations Latin and Anglo-Saxon was open to variation, so too were the potential uses to which these racial markers were put, albeit all were deployed in order to set out and explain perceptions of national standing and relative progress. For many, the images constructed of Latin and Anglo-Saxon races were consciously oppositional and often loaded with *resentiment* at US encroachments in the Spanish Antilles. As such, these images, which projected each race as embodying diametrically opposed and conflicting traits, were deployed to present a polarised view of the modern (Western) world, in which modernity and tradition, civilisation and barbarism grappled for dominance. Other uses to which the concept of Latin and Anglo-Saxon races were put were softer in their assessments, identifying often fundamental differences between the two 'races' but not positing one as superior to the other (more modern, perhaps, but not necessarily superior). Finally, whilst Spaniards from all political persuasions, including radical liberals and proponents of abolition and colonial reform, couched their analyses of contemporary global affairs in the racial terms of Latins vs. Anglo-Saxons, not all were convinced of the correlation between race and progress. A minority rejected the idea of race as the pre-eminent factor guiding modern development, albeit whilst maintaining a vision of humanity that fell well within the parameters of the prevailing racist discourse of late-nineteenth century Europe.

The racial concepts of Latins and Anglo-Saxons were used to articulate perceived essential differences between two worlds. Very often, in Spain as in the United States, this was formulated as Latin decadence and traditionalism vs. Anglo-Saxon progress and modernity. Early adoptions of the notion of Latinity as a reaction to the assertion of Prussian military ascendancy led Lily Litvak to insist that 'the Latin idea was essentially anti-Saxon and anti-Germanic'.⁴⁰ In Spain, it was not only French defeat but also the threat of US intervention in Cuba, whether through its economic weight to purchase the Spanish colony or through its military supremacy to take it, that prompted responses fitting Liah Greenfeld's notion of *resentiment*.⁴¹ The economic and military disparity between Spain's shrinking empire and the expanding spheres of influence of the United States ever clearer, many Spanish images not only denigrated the Anglo-Saxon (or, especially, Yankee) race but established themselves as the antithesis of all that was understood to connote.

The discourse of 'Latin decadence' and 'Anglo-Saxon progress' was undoubtedly one of polarisation, working powerfully to shape the formation of Spanish national identity to the end of the century. Although

Spain's Latinate 'decadence', evident not just in the loss of its continental New World empire but also in its relative slow pace of industrialisation and, to liberal minds, in its failure to effect lasting democratic reforms, was not always portrayed negatively, it did seem to confirm Spain as not modern. The opening editorial of *El Progreso*, the journal dedicated to science, industry and innovation cited at the opening of this chapter, asserted that Latins and Anglo-Saxons had diametrically opposed interests and attributes, but sought to present these as not necessarily reflective of one's superiority and the other's inferiority. The Spanish race, *El Progreso* insisted, was dedicated to literature, art and 'ideals', whilst the Anglo-Saxon race was cold, practical and industrious. Neither race was judged more intelligent than the other, nor were the natural resources at the disposition of each considered any greater in one country than the other. However, though each race was accorded their 'natural' sphere of interest, *El Progreso*, outlining its vision of the modern world and Spain's place in it, did make a judgement about which characteristics it believed to be most suited to the demands of modernity. The Spanish, for being valiant, creative, philosophical and artistic might be more 'civilised', but it was the Anglo-Saxon race that was wealthy and progressive; it was they, then, who possessed the character traits that really mattered in the late nineteenth century.

While the art of war, Latin, metaphysics and theology were the favourite studies [of the Spanish race], humanity remained confined to ignorance, slavery and fanaticism.⁴²

It was only 'when learned men dedicated themselves to the examination of the physical world, to the observation of the laws governing the universe and the objects that make it up, [that] the era of progress really began'. Spanish Latins now lagged behind the Anglo-Saxons 'in agriculture, industry and commerce, in commodities and wellbeing' and, worse still, had become dependent upon them. In this vision, the cause of this lay in the divergent national characteristics of each race.

Because we sing while they work; because we start off the edifice of progress by the dome and are always up in the air; they begin with the foundations and build solidly.⁴³

The blaming of Spain's failure to keep up with the powerful nations of the modern world—in relation to empire, commerce, industry, wealth and

so on—on the country's supposed Latin nature, was a frequent trope of Spanish liberals urging the industrial, commercial and democratic modernisation of their country. However, it was not a position that was universally held. Some questioned whether a Latin race could even be said to exist. Benito Pérez Galdós doubted that the 'dream of panlatinism' was realisable, except in a distant future, observing that 'the kinship and that pride in Roman descent are problematic issues [...]; language is not a sufficient bond of kinship nor does it reliably ensure friendship'.⁴⁴ Others similarly questioned the existence of an Anglo-Saxon race spanning both sides of the Atlantic, wondering whether the North American settlers' decision to separate from the 'English' metropolis made it impossible to imagine the two as a single race with identical characteristics and values.⁴⁵

It was Rafael María de Labra, the *Cortes* deputy, university professor, Krausist, champion of colonial reform, abolition and women's education, who meditated on the feasibility of understanding the English and American as of the same race. In all of his copious writings on the history and contemporary politics and society in the United States, Labra displayed an ambivalent position towards the notion of Latin and Anglo-Saxon races and the supposed essentialist struggle for continental and global supremacy between them, relative to many of his compatriots. A man of his times in many respects, Labra used 'race' as a paradigm through which to understand national differences and disparities and historical developments. In his 1873 work detailing the abolition of slavery in the United States, Labra defended the legitimacy of comparing the conditions of slavery in Cuba with those in the state of Louisiana due to (in part) 'the similarity in customs of one country and the other, colonised by the same race, the *raza Latina*'.⁴⁶ However, when he came to publish his state-of-the-US study, *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* thirty years later (based on conferences and classes given to Madrid workers at the *Fomento de las Artes* during the 1895–96 academic year) Labra was highly equivocal in his assessment of the idea and impact of distinct Latin and Anglo-Saxon races whose fundamental difference could account for the disparity in political and industrial development in their respective nations.⁴⁷ At a time (1897) when Spanish publications were filled with simplistic caricatures of examples of the malevolent, materialistic, empire-grabbing 'Yankee race', driven by innate greed to steal a defenceless Cuba from Spain, Labra insisted that 'races' were culturally, not biologically, formed and, crucially, were not static categories. Thus the characteristics Labra ascribed as Anglo-Saxon, having been bequeathed by the 'English'

to their colonial subjects in North America, were ‘the love of individual liberty and a certain spirit of particularism, which could make the existence of a people difficult if they did not compensate their impetus with power and the habit of association, which in England is valued mainly as a force complementary to individual energies’.⁴⁸ To this end, he described the Anglo-Saxon as ‘the most political race of the modern world’. An innate ‘love of liberty’ that fostered individual initiative ensured that theirs was the character most suited to the demands of modernity and to a century ‘like the nineteenth, characterised by its prominent and even exaggeratedly individualistic tendency’. In this way, Labra said, Anglo-Saxonism helped account for the rising pre-eminence of the United States in the modern world.⁴⁹

What’s more, Labra identified racial diversity, not purity, as key to understanding the USA’s success, thereby making a link between the contribution of ‘healthy, hopeful and vigorous’ immigrants of different ethnic origins to the United States and the important contemporary debates about racial fusion as the cornerstone of Spanish identity.⁵⁰ Labra had ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the idea that ‘racial fusion’ had positively marked the development of the Spanish *raza* then being promoted by fellow liberally-minded anthropologists such as Pedro González de Velasco and Ángel Pulido, through his correspondence with the regenerationist Joaquín Costa and connections at the *Ateneo* and the *The Free Educational Institution* (ILE).⁵¹ The ILE, the private free-thinking liberal school that Labra helped to found in 1876 following the removal from their academic posts of radical liberals who had supported the democratic experiments of the *sexenio*, offered courses in anthropology from 1878 and pioneered the development of social anthropology in Spain.⁵² Labra’s fellow Krausist, abolitionist and democrat, Emilio Castelar, who taught alongside him at the *Ateneo*, was a friend to both González de Velasco and Pulido; Pulido detected in Castelar’s faction of possibilist republicans the same slow, evolutionary approach to political change that he identified in evolutionary biology. He also related to Castelar’s historical analysis of Spanish democracy and liberty (and Catholicism) as intricately connected to its ‘fusion’ of Celto-Roman and Visigothic ancestry.⁵³ In this reading, the move towards establishing a Spanish racial line based on purity, which began with the 1492 Edict of Expulsion, had steered Spain off course racially, away from the heterogeneity that was its greatest source of strength. It followed, then, for both Castelar and Pulido, that the reintegration of Sephardic Jews into Spain’s contemporary racial mix could be

the answer both to Spain's liberal-democratic deficit and its stunted economic development; indeed, Pulido embarked on a campaign to repatriate Sephardic Jews to Spain in the 1880s (Castelar had earlier mooted the possibility of the revocation of the Edict of Expulsion in an 1869 speech), a cause for which he worked continually until his death in 1932.⁵⁴

Most significantly, Labra rejected the argument that the United States' success in the fields of industry, technological advancement and invention, commerce and political development resulted from characteristics peculiar to their race. In the conclusion to his study of the 'great Republic', Labra dismissed the correlation posited between progress and race, arguing instead that progress was the work of 'mankind', not the preserve of a particular race. Progress, therefore, could equally come to Spain;

The argument that certain judicial advancements and social benefits are due exclusively to the conditions of a given race has to be rejected. [...] These exaggerations, of great influence in national education, have to be contrasted to the reality of things, the truth of History, vigour and the power of principles. Because it is necessary that everything corresponding to human nature, that enshrines the dignity, the conscience and the liberty of men, which is a precise consequence of a rational theory of Right, all of this can live and lives in all latitudes and at the core of every society. The problem consists of bringing the means of applying these advancements to people of a different history and character.⁵⁵

Developing his argument further, Labra asked the obvious question of why, if progress was a question of race, the liberal and democratic institutions apparently associated with 'progress' had also developed in countries whose populations were 'made up of the most different and opposing races':

How is it ignored that these institutions, apparently specific to the Saxon race, have prospered and prosper in Latin peoples and even in cities made up of the most different and opposing races and after truly terrible contradictions and struggles? By chance did the expanding British institutions not prosper, and will continue to prosper, in Northern and Southern Canada, despite one being English and the other French? Do they not prosper in the Bahamas, whose population is black, and in Trinidad, whose population was Spanish, and in Jamaica, where whites and black live?⁵⁶

His conclusion, then, was that the modernity of the United States was the fruit of human, not Anglo-Saxon, endeavour. It followed that what was

required to allow Spain to join the United States as a modern and progressive state, was will or *voluntad*:

On this assumption, it can be confirmed, without brushing aside due consideration of the particular circumstances of America, of its geographical and historical situation and everything that can favour the development of certain institutions and certain interests there, I say it can be confirmed, that all the fundamental and the effective things that have been done in the Republic of the United States is the *work of man*; and thus that everything can be attempted and realised in other nations, within the sense, the current, the ideas and the commitments of the contemporary Age and taking account, for its method of application, of its singular note and the very special conditions of the place, the environment, and the demands of History. [...] Moreover to do all this, to achieve these advances, what is needed above all is will. That is to say, the will to aspire, the will to work, the will to study and to take advantage of the examples, the will to persevere and to insist until success is achieved.⁵⁷

Though Labra perhaps went furthest in his rejection of the coupling of modern progress and Anglo-Saxonism, he was not alone in suggesting that any defects in Spanish efforts to become modern, whether the result of racial or other factors, could be overcome. The project to repatriate Sephardic Jews to Spain, supported by Castelar and Pulido, was intended ‘to lead to the recovery of Spain’s racial health’, but there were others who, like Labra, sought the solution to the nation’s halting modernity outside the racial sphere. *El Progreso*’s opening editorial, to which we have repeatedly returned, despite listing the polarised attributes of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon races, according to which the Anglo-Saxons emerged the better equipped to face the challenges of the modern world, did not view the present Anglo-Saxon supremacy as irremediable. As a journal dedicated to ‘inventions and advances’, their answer was for Spaniards to reorient themselves and their learning towards practical and progressive solutions in commerce, science, medicine and engineering as well as the arts. Spaniards would also need to change their moral attitude towards making money, given that wealth was an essential prerequisite for a stable government and entry into the modern, progressive world.

Uniting both Labra and *El Progreso*’s assessments was the conviction that there was no essentialist, inevitable reason for the evident disparities in modernity. ‘The Anglo-Saxons’ were not ‘more intelligent than the *Hispanos*’ ‘and ‘their soil [was not] more fertile than ours’. What they did

have over Spain, though, was ‘stable government’ and the ability to absorb and assimilate people from elsewhere (though, significantly, this was not formulated in the language of race).

We ask the foreigner arriving on our shores what his political and religious attitudes are, where he is from and where he is going; and even when he becomes a citizen, we call him *el extranjero* [the foreigner]; they on the other hand have torn down the doors so that all can enter without being bothered or even observed. These great revolutionaries opened their doors to all men and introduced themselves in all nations, while we lock ourselves in our house like a snail in its shell.⁵⁸

Above all, Labra and Verea García insisted that the key ingredient to Spanish modernity was will or *voluntad*. Asking ‘what are we missing to shake off the yoke?’, Verea García replied, ‘will and nothing more than the will to change the system in our studies’.⁵⁹ Labra agreed that all that separated Spain from emulating the USA’s successful entry into the modern world was *voluntad*. To this end he cited the North American maxim par excellence, which seemed to encapsulate this idea of wilful and unstinting determination: Go Ahead!—which he translated as ¡*Adelante*!

Everything there told men: *Adelante!* The obstacles to marching on do not derive from other men: they were the obstacles of an exuberant but blind, vincible and tameable nature.⁶⁰

A RELIGION APART?

Though the idea of a *raza latina* in opposition to a *raza anglosajona* was conceived and presented in biological terms, these were historically contingent constructions based in large part on perceived cultural distinctions, as much as on biologically inscribed physical traits. The nascent academic scientific disciplines that sought to identify, classify and explain the development of human race(s), in Spain as elsewhere, elided physical and cultural attributes, finding evidence of particular racial traits in historical memory and assigning these as inherited biological characteristics. In France, the prominent scholars Arthur de Gobineau, Ernest Renan, Gustave Le Bon and (the ‘wildly popular in Spain’) Hippolyte Taine, used ‘race’ to describe historically and culturally constituted differences.⁶¹ The pioneers of Spanish anthropology, ethnology and criminology were

similarly willing to fix cultural attributes to race. Lay accounts unsurprisingly followed this academic lead, crediting the boundaries between Latin, Anglo-Saxon and other races to a mix of blood, birthplace, climate, different scholarly aptitudes, moral outlooks and attitudes towards individual qualities and aspirations.

The most crucial component of the culturally defined racial differences perceived between Latins and Anglo-Saxons was that of religion. The primacy of religion as the key marker of Latinity and Anglo-Saxonness crossed political boundaries, encompassing, for example, both the leading conservative cultural commentator of the late century, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo and the liberal feminist intellectual Emilia Pardo Bazán. Menéndez y Pelayo's ultramontane and anti-French world view led him to identify Latinity with (Italian) Catholicism, writing of the 'Latin and Christian light',⁶² whilst Pardo Bazán (who was also a committed Catholic) was brought via her interest in individual liberty to similarly conclude that it was religion that ultimately separated the Latin from the Anglo-Saxon.

Individual liberty, Protestantism are Anglo-Saxon; political liberty, Catholicism are Latin. The exceptions do in no way contradict this general observation. [...] There is no remedy other than admitting the mysterious work of ethnic abilities.⁶³

Protestantism was so frequently equated with Anglo-Saxons (and in a peculiarly American context, 'Yankees') as to be understood as virtually indistinguishable. *Blanco y Negro*, for example, described 'Anglo Saxon' Yankees as descending 'in a direct line from those philanthropic and austere Puritans who mined in England to disembark in Massachusetts' as it mused satirically on US assistance to the Cuban independence movement.⁶⁴ Protestantism was identified, for good and ill, as a chief defining characteristic, which was imagined to determine Anglo-Saxons' focus on individualism, political liberty, industrialism, commerce and materialism. Even Rafael de Labra, though he did not suggest that Protestants were inherently more liberal or democratic than others—Catholic or free-thinkers—made much of the first British settlers to the USA's flight from religious persecution and intolerance, contrasting this sharply with the conquistador soldier-adventurers of other colonising nations in the New World. In Labra's narrative, the primacy placed on religious freedom by the Pilgrim Fathers formed a key part of the 'moral base' of this 'exceptional country'.⁶⁵ Religion, then, and specifically religious difference (to

Spain), was seen as a key contributor to the attributes of the Anglo-Saxon race most closely associated with modernity.

The contrasts drawn between Spanish and US forms of religiosity did not only relate to perceptions that the individualism, liberalism and industry that was identified with the modern United States arose from the Protestant religious beliefs of its early settlers. The multiplicity of religions and religious sects found in nineteenth-century USA and its combination of a constitutionally tolerant secular state and a deeply religious society elicited enormous curiosity among Spaniards who visited there. In this image, religious pluralism was associated with a modern way of life but was largely identified as a negative, even absurd, side to modernity. The 'innumerable sects' of 'modern Protestants' occasioned significant interest among Spanish observers of the United States; the New England Shakers, for example, and their 'grotesque' dances were just one such 'ridiculous aberration'.⁶⁶ No religious sect fascinated more than the Mormons. The *Ilustración Española y Americana* published a long article in September 1877 on the Mormon religion, in recognition of the recent death of Brigham Young, whilst Juan Bustamante y Campuzano dedicated an entire chapter of his travel account to the religion. In answer to his rhetorically posed question, 'what is Mormonism?', Bustamante came up with the emphatic answer: Mormonism is, in social, political and religious terms, the manifest negation of the ideas, customs and beliefs of our century.⁶⁷

In addition to its exhibition of American-style religious pluralism in practice, the Mormon religion was a source of fascination particularly for its association with polygamy. For Bustamante y Campuzano, polygamy was 'a principle worthy only of laughter'.⁶⁸ The *Ilustración Española y Americana* noted that Brigham Young 'had sixteen wives' and, taking the opportunity to flaunt another favoured negative trope of America, further commented 'and only the 15th demanded and obtained a divorce in the North American courts'.⁶⁹ Puig y Valls, like Bustamante y Campuzano, visited Salt Lake City on his travels through the United States in order to sate his curiosity as to 'what magic could transform the free and civilised woman into an enslaved and degraded one'.⁷⁰ For him, Mormonist polygamy presented a fundamental contradiction in the American self-declaration to have 'discovered' and liberated women (and again, provided a cheap opportunity to criticise the facility of divorce).

The United States, which have established the law of divorce; on American territory where there are women who have three or four husbands listed in their purses, and men that have calmly passed by as many wives, all living happily among sons who must already be difficult to classify, are hypocritically shocked at polygamy, and the outraged legislative chambers of the country have strictly forbidden the greatest of worldly abominations. But in Utah, as in all parts, the law is accepted, but not obeyed, and the peaceful Mormon people discreetly continues its work, practicing the known Biblical precept.⁷¹

That said, whilst they all ridiculed and denigrated Mormonism and especially the practice of polygamy, all could not fail to comment, with some admiration, on the ‘populous and flourishing’ city built by Young’s Mormons in the Utah desert in less than half a century.⁷² Bustamante y Campuzano reserved further grudging admiration that ‘two men equipped with an uncommon talent’ had managed to create ‘one of the most complicated matters pending resolution before the House of Representatives today’.⁷³

Images of religious plurality in the United States could not be constructed without reference to the domestic context of debates around religious tolerance in Spain. The tone of the relationship between church and state in modern Spain was modelled by the *Cortes* of Cadiz’s abolition of the Inquisition and legislation of freedom of expression and clergy reform, which led supporters of a politically powerful and privileged church to pin their hopes to the reactionary politics of either the absolutist or merely deeply conservative branches of the Bourbon monarchy.⁷⁴ The confrontation of the Catholic church and its ultramontane and conservative monarchical constituencies with a growing urban, industrialised liberal-republican citizenry, which advocated religious tolerance and was often anti-clerical and free-thinking, and the consequent (at times violent) struggle over the relationship between church and state is an important narrative key to nineteenth-century Spain. Indeed, the historiographical designations of modern Spanish history as a history of ‘two Spains’ have at their core the positing of an existential battle for supremacy between the values of Catholic monarchic traditionalism and the ideals of anti-clerical liberal and socialist republicanism.⁷⁵ The notion of ‘two Spains’ produces a historical narrative that privileges the nation and state at the expense of other dimensions and scales in which Spanish modernity was constructed and articulated, including imperial, local, female and transnational reali-

ties, but it is undoubtedly the case that opposing national-Catholic and liberal-republican constituencies emerged powerfully in the late nineteenth century, each painting 'civilisation' and the Spanish-imagined community in their own image.

Certainly, the political debates around the proper extent of freedom of worship and religious tolerance were among the fiercest of both the democratic *sexenio* and the Restoration. The reforming *sexenio* governments enacted changes that built on earlier progressive attempts to mark out a reduced, separate sphere for the Church, principally through disentailment.⁷⁶ The *sexenio* governments suppressed religious communities, removed their property-owning rights and introduced civil marriage but failed to agree on the question of freedom of religion. Although the First Republic sought to legislate a measure that would have firmly separated church and state it did not last long enough to see this enacted. The issue of religious freedom remained a key sticking point for Cánovas' Restoration; although the 1876 Constitution rolled back the religious reforms introduced during the *sexenio*, restoring Catholicism to its prior position as sole state religion, reinstating and providing state support for religious orders and returning education to the church's sphere of influence, Cánovas' efforts to appease the more liberal elements of the Restoration system by allowing religious pluralism and freedom of worship *in private* proved a controversial fudge that satisfied few.⁷⁷

Late-century Spaniards could not fail to have the domestic debates over religious freedom—from the Restoration pastorals and sermons that damned liberalism as responsible for 'everything wrong with society'⁷⁸ to the anti-clerical sentiments of contemporary literature, including the works of Pérez Galdós and Clárin—in mind as they imagined religious pluralism in the United States. Puig y Valls' excursion to Salt Lake City served to remind him 'once more [of] the potency of religion, as I return to my beloved Spain I sadly see the horrors of unbelief and the negation of love, which turns men into beasts and civilization into barbarity'.⁷⁹ His first encounter with religious practices in the USA, however, had caused him to reflect not on waning religiosity and anticlericalism but on religious tolerance (or the lack thereof) at home. At the Congress of Religions in the Art-Palace at the Chicago World's Fair, which he attended as part of the official Spanish delegation, Puig y Valls was astonished at the ecumenical and multi-faith engagement between 'the high dignitaries of the Catholic Church, with Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists, Levite clergy, ladies... all apparently looking for an ideal religion, a sort of

spiritual ‘volapuk’ summarising all the aspirations and mystical ideals of humanity’.⁸⁰ Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and people of other faiths applauded one another’s speeches ‘because the attendants are of the opinion that all the named religions have a basis of truth, justice and elevated aspirations, which are holy and worthy of eternal reward’.

And for us, who have grown up in some part of Spain, where we have learned, because that is how we were taught, that there is only one true religion, and that we should not even accept, as long as it is not in the holy and fertile field of charity, those professing religious beliefs different to ours, to see the highest dignitaries of the Catholic Church accept without mistrust, the co-operation of people motivated, without doubt even mistakenly, by the best intentions, to diffuse diverse religious ideas, even the calmest intelligence is weakened to consider whether, at the end of this century winds of rebellion and madness are erupting everywhere or if a new world will emerge from this civilisation, of a similar external appearance to ours, which will regenerate the blood and spirit of humanity.

I do not have the power to elucidate on such deep problems; what is being set out is, in my opinion, a new aspect of the religious movement in the world, and following it, to contain or control it, if necessary, will be a work of high wisdom. It is not yet possible to imagine whether it is only a single episode of one Exposition, a work in which the highest minds of all American churches and the most moderate propagandists of Asian and African religions have intervened or are intervening.⁸¹

Religious identity was intricately bound to one’s political and national identity as *El Progreso*, whose editorial on the fundamental differences, partly founded in religious difference, between Anglo-Saxons and Latins opened this chapter, discovered to its cost in March 1885. The journal was forced to defend itself from the accusation levelled by a certain Señor Mayar that its ‘comparison [...] between the Anglo-Saxon race and ours regarding material progress’ intimated a concerning lack of patriotism.⁸² Señor Mayor’s denunciation of the journal as unpatriotic was founded upon the affront he perceived to ‘Spain, Catholic par excellence’. Anglo-Saxons may have the advantage over Spain ‘in material progress’ he recognised; and ‘for that they are Protestants’. *El Progreso* disputed his depiction of ‘the Anglo-Saxons as a race stripped of all human sentiment’ who prized the individual before the collective, citing the abolitionist efforts of the United States and Great Britain, and pointing to the number of charitable associations in New York. They declared, ‘[if this] means that

Protestantism carries progress along with it, we want the whole world to be Protestant' and protested the charge of lacking patriotism.

If we criticise our compatriots it is because we want the title of Spaniard to be a symbol of all that is good, all that is great and all that is enlightened; it is because our pride lies in Spain being the most advanced and free nation making up the civilized world.⁸³

Religion, race and progress were elided in the imagining of the USA because they were elided in the fashioning of self-identities in Spain. Very few of the liberals brought to prominence and power by the September revolution were atheists, even if a significant number were free-thinkers, and it was not religion *per se* but the political and social hegemony and actions of the church and clergy that came in for sharp criticism and reform during the revolutionary *sexenio*. The alignment of the Spanish Catholic Church earlier in the century with political absolutism and conservatism and its support for the old social order fed into anticlericalism and patchworks of 'dechristianisation' along regional, class and gender lines.⁸⁴ Progressive and radical liberals, socialists and anarchists rejected the political church and its perceived right to hegemony in political, social and cultural life (education being a particular point of contention), identifying the church as a key impediment to Spain's attainment of modernity; conservative monarchists, Carlists and other supporters of a return to the old regime attacked the liberal state as seeking to remove the Church from its traditional and rightful role as guide over all aspects of Spanish life, identifying the attacks on the church as evidence of Spain's degeneracy. Even for those who fell in between the two extremes, including the many liberal Catholics like Castelar and Pardo Bazán, religion, politics and perceptions of national progress and decay were soldered together.

The argument put together by the liberal *Nueva Prensa* in its analysis of *Los Pueblos Jovenes* (Australia and the USA) points to the kinds of contortions of logic that liberals who adhered to Catholic teachings were forced into by the complicated interplay between ideas of religion, liberal politics, decadence and regeneration. Eliding race and religion, the author began by arguing that societies are shaped 'according to beliefs and faith' and 'among these the religious are the primary ones determining and making the others possible'.⁸⁵ He then constructed an argument that posited the 'Latin spirit' as a foreign import which had pushed Spain from 'liberty' to absolutism, perhaps in conscious echo of Castelar's noted line, pronounced

during his *Cortes* debate with Vicente Manterola in which each outlined opposing visions of the nation, secular-liberal and Catholic-conservative: ‘in Spain, the ancient is freedom; the early modern, despotism’.⁸⁶ In this vision, the medieval *pueblo* was depicted as ‘a free people, lovers of the privileges of reason’, holding religious ideas ‘particular to the Spanish nation’. Left to their own devices, the author was sure, ‘would have given rise to the Reformation, born in Germany, or at least a community of tendencies with it’ in Spain. However, it was the ‘Latin spirit’, that is the Italianate Pontifical counter-Reformation, that intervened and exported itself to Spain instead of the German reformationary spirit. This ‘Latin spirit’ was, ‘if not contrary to liberty, then the enthusiastic generator of the authoritarian principle and unity’. The prevailing of this Latinate counter-reformationary spirit set Spain on its course towards monarchical absolutism.

From the moment when our religious cult was banned and the purely Latin triumphed, leaving our consciousness suppressed by a strange and indisputable authority, we distorted our way of being within humanity, and contorted the paths we should have followed in life, and consequently stumbled on to identify ourselves more and more with the exclusively Latin spirit, which in the early modern age, could not be ours, in order to fall into the Caesarism of kings and the authoritarianism of popes, just as these formed in the rotten heart of the *raza latina*, in ancient Rome.⁸⁷

This correlation of Latinity with Catholic counter-reformationary ideals was then taken to account for the fundamental distinction between the modern revolutions that had shaped the nineteenth-century (European and American) world; the American and French Revolutions. The French Revolution could not be reliably compared to the American because revolutions in Latin countries ‘in which the Catholicism and absolutism of kings took hold’ could not be considered rational movements. Rather, these constituted the ‘last and inevitable protest of humanity, which cannot die, against the tyrants who oppressed it’.

They are admirable and worthy of indulgence for the injustice that they destroy and the efforts they reveal, but not for the justice they proclaim and the liberty they give to the spirit’.⁸⁸

The *Nueva Prensa*’s prescription for modern Spain was thus less the completion of a liberal-bourgeois revolution and more a reformation.⁸⁹

CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS TO THE PÁTRIA UNIVERSAL

After the ‘disaster’ of 1898, and the definitive loss of the remnants of Spain’s New World Empire, Latinity and the Latin race were depicted almost exclusively in terms of decadence and decline. The ‘progressive decadence of four centuries’ of the Latin race explained the final defeat of the Spanish empire as it had Italy’s colonial defeat at Adwa in 1896 and France’s defeat to Prussia in 1870–71.⁹⁰ Whilst the Latin race atrophied, the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic races continued to surge ahead. In the diagnoses of the generation of 1898, the now unmistakable divergence between the aptitudes for modernity of Latins and Anglo-Saxons were attributed to the different religious paths (still conceived as carrying inheritable characteristics) and to the different historical racial admixtures followed by Latin Spain and the Anglo-Saxon nations of Britain and the United States (and often Germany).⁹¹ Spain and the United States were, it seems, both a race and religion apart.

But even before the 1898 disaster the binary of Anglo-Saxon advancement and Latin decline had been one of the produced meanings of late-century images of Latin and Anglo-Saxon races. The designations Latin and Anglo-Saxon were flexible, malleable vectors, capable of containing and conveying multiple meanings to different ends. In addition to simple juxtapositions of progress vs. decline, Latins and Anglo-Saxons were imagined always as different, but not necessarily always as unequal. The perceived pragmatism, individualism and prizing of profit seemed to have equipped Anglo-Saxons to adapt easily and quickly to the challenges of modernity, but this did not lead all Spaniards to pessimistically assume that the innate traits bestowed them by their Latin ancestry would prevent them and their nation from becoming modern. Even after 1898, Latinity could be construed as part of the solution to national decline, although in its early twentieth-century iteration ‘Latin’ had an increasingly nationalist inflection—in Menéndez Pelayo’s words ‘the Spanish nation’ was the ‘Amazon of the *raza latina*’⁹²—and was also used as way to reassert the bonds between the Spanish *madrepátria* and its former colonies in the southern Americas.

Just as the meaning and uses of Latinity shifted over time, the designation of Anglo-Saxon, also, of course, varied and changed over the second half of the nineteenth century, both in its application by those who considered themselves Anglo-Saxon and in Spanish imaginaries of the United States. The identification of the USA as part of an Anglo-Saxon race of course had to contend with the presence of indigenous native Americans,

black Americans, Creoles and immigrants from Europe and Asia who also lived within its (expanding) national borders. The importance of immigration to the United States, which became an increasingly recognised dimension of Spanish images of the country, meant that, certainly by the late nineteenth century, the identification of the population of the United States as an Anglo-Saxon race imagined on the basis of blood ties was questionable to say the least. Both the westward and southward expansion of American territory and increasing immigration to the USA from Ireland, Italy, Eastern Europe and China, for example, meant that by the end of the nineteenth century cultural attributes overtook blood ties as the chief marker of what made the Anglo-Saxon race Anglo-Saxon, allowing the concept to adapt to an increasingly diverse North American population.⁹³ Writing from a British perspective at the turn of the century, Frederick Chapman observed that:

the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ practically ceases to be a race designation [...] It stands rather for a civilisation; for ideals and institutions, originating indeed with a certain type of mankind, but no longer its exclusive property. [...] Any rational being brought up under the dominance of these ideals and identified therewith, whatever his ancestral life currents, – Teutonic, Celtic, Semitic, Mongolian, Malay or African—is an Anglo-Saxon.⁹⁴

However, despite the relative ‘porousness’ and evident hybridity of the idea of Anglo-Saxon, there were of course well-defined limits to the flexibility of its boundaries; for those claimed to belong to it, Anglo-Saxon remained an assertion of racial superiority.⁹⁵

Immigrants to the United States encountered the notion of ‘being Anglo-Saxon’ with some ambivalence. Some embraced it, identifying with the values of political liberty and individual opportunity for which it was considered a short-hand, while others, including John Fleming, questioned just how far North Americans ‘were allied in blood to the Anglo-Saxon on the other side of the Atlantic’ and found the idea ‘that every white man is an Anglo-Saxon’ to be ‘false and [...] offensive’.⁹⁶ The experience of a great many immigrants was of course not one of being welcomed and incorporated into the privileged ranks of Anglo-Saxon America. The prospective migrants from European countries whose populations were emigrating there en masse by the end of the century had ample opportunity to encounter press reports and accounts of returned emigrants describing the brutality of the immigrant experience, highlighting the crime, exploitation and hostility to which they should expect to be subjected.⁹⁷

Thus, though it remained a potent force, the racial exceptionalism of those who lauded the Anglo-Saxon character of the United States faced ‘de-Saxonising’ challenges from indigenous and immigrant citizens in the USA who did not recognise themselves as Anglo-Saxon, neither in blood nor culture.⁹⁸ In turn, this complicated the visions of those contemporary Spaniards trying to reconcile and understand the USA’s seeming progressiveness through the contested prisms of the United States as Anglo-Saxon and as a land of revitalising immigration. The racial theories gaining ground at home, which posited the historical mixing of races as the source of past Spanish greatness, added a further refraction to Spanish-grown images of immigration in the United States.⁹⁹

The radical-liberal Spaniards who wrote and lectured on the United States and were intellectually invested in presenting it as a model for modern life idealised the notion of the USA strengthened by the ‘smelting-pot’ of its citizens. Both Rafael de Labra and Gumersindo de Azcárate spoke of the positive impact of immigration and the mixing of races in fostering industry, innovation and profit.¹⁰⁰ Labra eulogised the harmonious coming together of different peoples with their distinct attributes to form a ‘universal fatherland’.

The population of the United States depends mainly on the emigration of other peoples: the impulsive Irishman, the thoughtful German, the persevering British, the lively and changeable Frenchman, the wise Italian, the fantasist Spaniard, the industrious Chinese, the good-hearted Negroe... all races, all families have ample space there, all bring their contingencies, all fit, live and prosper under that protective flag, all contribute with their ideas, their spirit, their capital to the development of that country, which could well be called the *pátria universal*.¹⁰¹

Labra’s idealised image of the USA as a universal fatherland in which people of different races joined to become both American and modern reflected his liberal Krausist worldview, but was not readily reflected in the realities nor in other images of racial and immigrant politics in the USA. There were evident limits to the extent to which the United States represented a universal land, welcoming and assimilating people from around the globe as Americans. Labra failed to include in his list of peoples who contributed to the construction of the modern United States the indigenous population, displaced and segregated in ever-diminishing reserves, perhaps because his view of the native American population coincided with

the pervasive stereotype of uncivilised, work-shy ‘*salvajes*’ who had failed to cultivate and make prosperous the resource-rich lands they ‘roamed’.¹⁰² The ‘good hearted negro’ and ‘industrious Chinese’ might have been surprised to find themselves included in the USA’s universal *pátria*. In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited the immigration of ‘ethnic Chinese’ into the United States, the first US immigration law to particularly target a specific ethnic group. Spanish commentators expressed almost universal approval for the USA’s decision to restrict Chinese immigration and pedalled exoticising stereotypes of the Chinese communities in San Francisco as ‘solicited by all the seductions of their favourite vices: opium and gambling’, as compromising ‘morality and public health with their dirtiness and obscenities’ and (this is Labra) containing evident ‘moral flaws’.¹⁰³

To the Spanish ambassador in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, the ‘problems’ caused by Chinese immigrants were ‘clear’. Though ‘hard-working’, their willingness to work for daily rates at which ‘a white man cannot live’ and propensity to return to China, before or after death, taking any accumulated goods and wealth with them, meant that ‘they do not contribute to general progress’. His mean diatribe ended with the nasty nugget that this ‘persevering race, friends of profit, follows, like the Jews, the noise of metal being minted’.¹⁰⁴

The conservative Spanish daily, *La Epoca*, agreed. Drawing parallels with the Chinese immigrant population in the Spanish Philippines, and taking a swipe at Spanish anthropologists’ theories of racial fusion, on the occasion of the renewal of the Exclusion Act in 1893, the paper noted with satisfaction that the United States was experiencing ‘a real reaction against ethnographic optimism’, which had claimed that ‘through the mixing of different races, the Yankee people would come to form a human type superior to ancient ones’. Instead, mass immigration to the United States showed only that ‘foreigners bring, among other things, the roots of socialism and anarchism’, prompting ‘the fear that these great masses of new settlers would end up erasing the distinctive features of the American character’.¹⁰⁵

The impact of immigration on the image of Americans as Anglo-Saxons solicited a paradox: the citizens of the USA were now imagined as being linked by a worldview and values founded on a common cultural heritage, language and set of institutions and values associated with the love of and spread of liberty, but also as a people whose ‘progress’ was measured by continental expansion and empire. In this image, then, a dominant Anglo-Saxon race stood at the head of a paradoxical empire of liberty.

NOTES

1. *El Progreso* Jan. 1884 vol. 1.1 p. 1 'Estudios equivocados'.
2. Joshua Goode has argued this, counter to the traditional historiographical and popular view that had imagined a lack of racial thought in Spain, including in its variant of fascism. J. Goode (2009) *Impurity of Blood. Defining Race in Spain, 1870–1930* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press).
3. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* p. 32.
4. T.E. Kaplan (1970) 'Positivism and liberalism' in C. Lida & I. Zavala eds. *La revolución de 1868. Historia, pensamiento, literatura* (New York: Las Americas) pp. 254–266; T.H. Glick (1988) 'Spain' in idem. ed. *The Comparative Reception of Darwinism* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press) pp. 307–345.
5. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* pp. 39–40.
6. H. Taine (1863) *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* vol. 1 (Paris: Hachette) p. xxv; cited in M. Thier (2012) 'A world apart, a race apart?' in A. Körner, N. Miller, A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined. Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) p. 163.
7. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* p. 12.
8. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* p. 14.
9. On the development of ideas around inherited, transmissible characteristics in scientific and academic thinking, see L. Otis (1994) *Organic Memory. History and the Body in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).
10. Acknowledging what Ada Ferrer points out is the impossibility of reconciling what are constructed and contingent categories of perceived racial difference with references made here to what the 'white' or 'black' populations of Spain, the United States and Cuba thought, said and did, this work uses the racial distinctions and labels employed by contemporaries—black, mulatto, white, Latin and Anglo-Saxon, rather than anachronistically imposing current categories such as African-American or afro-Cuban. Though these latter categories may have a less uneasy ring to our ears, they do not necessarily fit the distinctions identified by and ascribed to late nineteenth-century Europeans and Americans. For a discussion of the complexities of language and writing about race in a historical context, see A. Ferrer (1999) *Insurgent Cuba: race, nation and revolution, 1868–1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press) pp. 10–12.
11. See A. Helg (1990) 'Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880–1930: Theory, Policies, and Popular Reaction' in R. Graham ed. *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870–1940* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press) pp. 37–70.

12. On the fusion of the championing of the expansion of US political principles with a sense of racial superiority among American Anglo-Saxons, see R. Horsman (1981) *Race and Manifest Destiny. The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press), especially the introduction.
13. A. Blanco (2007) 'Spain at the crossroads: Imperial nostalgia or modern colonialism?' in *A contra corriente* vol. 5.1 pp. 1–11.
14. A. Blanco 'Spain at the crossroads' p. 4.
15. A. Cánovas del Castillo (1997) *Discurso sobre la nación* (Madrid: Biblioteca nueva) p. 131; cited in A. Blanco 'Spain at the crossroads' p. 9.
16. See C. Schmidt-Nowara (1999) *Empire and Antislavery. Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874*, (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press) pp. 119–122.
17. The phrase attributed to Antonio Maceo, the Cuban mulatto who began as a foot soldier during the 1868 independence movements and rose through the ranks to become a general, is quoted in J. Ibarra (1967) *Ideología mambisa* (Havana: Instituto Cubano del Libro) p. 52. The intellectual leader of the Cuban independence movement, José Martí expounded a belief not only in the equality of races but in the inexistence of racial difference; for him 'race' existed only as an artificial imperialist invention, used to divide anti-colonialists and to justify colonialism and empire. See A. Ferrer *Insurgent Cuba*, p. 4.
18. In Spain, as throughout the slave-owning nations of Europe and America during the nineteenth century, Haiti—as the location of a successful slave-led revolution—loomed large and repeatedly as a motif for the danger of 'race war', leading to a 'black republic', which was perceived to lie in all areas with a sizable or majority black enslaved population. In the Spanish context, it was especially raised as a spectre by those arguing against the abolition of slavery and independence in Cuba. Indeed, the equation of the Cuban independence movement—which certainly began as, and fundamentally was, a multi-racial project—with the threat of 'race war' was energetically encouraged by Spanish colonialist propaganda and to an extent had the effect of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy; the more the independence movement was presented as a bid for black power in Cuba, the less 'white' Cubans were persuaded to join or continue in the movement. For a discussion of the symbolic appropriation of the Haitian revolution and the idea of a possible 'race war', see A. Ferrer *Insurgent Cuba*, *passim*.
19. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* p. 30.
20. For example, articles from the Chilean journal, *el Renacimiento Latino*, were republished in great detail in *La España Moderna. L. Litvak (1990) España 1900. Modernismo, anarquismo y fin de siglo* (Barcelona: Editorial Anthropos) p. 161.

21. On the ideal of a political republican union, tied together by Latinity, see C.A.M Hennessy (1962) *The Federal Republic in Spain. Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement 1868–74* (Oxford: Clarendon Press) pp. 89–91.
22. J. Bustamante y Campuzano (1885) *Del Atlántico al Pacífico. Apuntes e Impresiones de un Viaje a través de los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Victor Saiz) p. 156.
23. See M. Thier ‘A world apart, a race apart’ p. 175.
24. See M. Thier (2011) ‘The view from Paris: ‘Latinity’, ‘Anglo-Saxonism’, and the Americas as discussed in the *Revue des Races Latines*, 1857–64 in *The International History Review* vol. 33.4, pp. 627–644.
25. The defeat of the Italian colonial army at Adwa in 1896 only intensified the sense of despair at the military decline of the Latin nations. L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 158–161. The quotation from J. Castro y Serrano is cited on p. 160.
26. F. Bona (1872) ‘La esclavitud en Cuba’, speech published in *Conferencias anti-esclavistas del teatro de Lope de Rueda*, (Madrid: Sociedad Abolicionista Española) p. 5.
27. R. Horsman *Race and Manifest Destiny* p. 282.
28. R. Horsman *Race and Manifest Destiny* p. 282.
29. R. Horsman *Race and Manifest Destiny* p. 283.
30. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* p. 11.
31. ‘A. Cáceras ‘Discurso pronunciado el día 26 de noviembre de 1870’ in *Problemas contemporáneos I* (Madrid, 1884), cited in L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 160.
32. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* p. 30.
33. M. Thier ‘A world apart, a race apart?’ p. 165.
34. G. de Azcárate (1878) *El poder del jefe del estado en Francia, Inglaterra y los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de J.C. Conde) p. 101; C. Arenal (1883) *La Mujer de su Casa* (Madrid: Gras y Compañía) p. 103.
35. R. M. de Labra (1881) *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Imprenta de Aurelio J. Alaria) pp. 9–10.
36. See J. Álvarez-Junco (2001) *Mater Dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus) p. 360 and S. Balfour (1996) “‘The Lion and the Pig’: Nationalism and National Identity in Fin-de-Siècle Spain” in C. Marín Molinero & A. Smith eds., *Nationalism and the nation in the Iberian peninsula. Competing and conflicting identities* (Oxford: Berg) pp. 107–117.
37. A. Llanos (1886) *El Gigante Americano. Descripciones de los Estados Unidos de la América del Norte* (Madrid: Tipográfico de Ricardo Fé) p. 7.
38. A. Llanos (1886) *El Gigante Americano* p. 7.
39. L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 169.

40. L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 195.
41. See L. Greenfeld (1992) *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press), especially pp. 15–17; 177–8; 222–8.
42. *El Progreso* Jan. 1884, vol. 1.1 p. 1.
43. *El Progreso* Jan. 1884, vol. 1.1 p. 2.
44. B. Pérez Galdós (1923) *Obras inéditas* vol. 3 (Madrid) ‘Política española’ pp. 258–9; cited in L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 161.
45. R. M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 99.
46. R. M. de Labra (1873) *La Emancipación de los esclavos en los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Sociedad Abolicionista Española) p. 20.
47. The *Fomento de las Artes* was an organisation dedicated to providing adult education for workers in Madrid. Instituted in the late 1840s and quickly appropriated by middle-class reformers as a means of educating workers in their theories of political economy and the harmonious relationship between capital and labour, the *Fomento* provided classes in vocational training, political economy and languages. It also arranged conferences and lectures by leading Spanish intellectuals; many abolitionists and proponents of Krausism spoke there during the *sexenio revolucionario* and the Restoration. See C. Schmidt-Nowara *Empire and Antislavery* pp. 78–9.
48. R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*. p. 80.
49. R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* pp. 210–211.
50. R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*, p. 205.
51. M.D. Domingo Acebrón (2006) *Rafael María de Labra. Cuba, Puerto Rico, Las Filipinas, Europa y Marruecos, en la España del sexenio democrático y la Restauración (1871–1918)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas) p. 49.
52. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* pp. 32; 82–3.
53. Castelar did see Visigoth (and Arab) racial incursions as somewhat diluting the Spanish race’s democratic tendencies (symbolised by the reign of Charles V who by virtue of his upbringing in Flanders was considered of ‘Visigothic descent’), but above all focused on the heterogeneity of Spain’s racial composition as reflecting a propensity for democracy. In keeping with the view that the political propensities of a national people arose from their racial makeup, he identified the success of the September revolution as ‘the reconquest of Spain’s racial spirit’. E. Castelar (1870) ‘Breve historia de la democracia española’ in *Cuestiones políticas y sociales* vol. 3 (Madrid: A. de San Martín y Agustín Jubera) pp. 145–168; cited in J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* pp. 189–90.
54. J. Goode *Impurity of Blood*, Chap. 8.
55. R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*, pp. 354–5.

56. R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*, pp. 354–5.
57. R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* pp. 354–5.
58. *El Progreso* Jan. 1884 vol. 1.1.
59. *El Progreso* Jan. 1884 vol. 1.1.
60. R. M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* p. 21.
61. M. Thier ‘A world apart, a race apart?’ p. 163.
62. Cited in L. Litvak *España 1900* pp. 160; 181.
63. E. Pardo Bazán (1891) *Obras completas* vol. XIV ‘De siglo a siglo’ p. 205; cited in L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 161.
64. *Blanco y Negro* 29 April 1897.
65. R. M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* pp. 70–1; 82.
66. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 1 Dec. 1873.
67. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 286.
68. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 286.
69. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 1 Dec. 1873.
70. R. M. de Puig y Valls (1894) *Viaje a América* (Barcelona: Luis Tasso) p. 14.
71. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje a América* p. 19.
72. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 1 Dec. 1873; R. Puig y Valls *Viaje a América* pp. 21–2.
73. J. Bustamante y Campuzano *Del Atlántico al Pacífico* p. 286.
74. See, for example, J. de la Cueva (2003) ‘The assault on the city of Levites: Spain’ in C. Clark & W. Kaiser ed. *Culture Wars. Secular-Catholic conflict in nineteenth-century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 181–2.
75. See S. Juliá (2004) *Historias de las dos Españas* (Madrid: Taurus) and J. Álvarez-Junco (2011) *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press) Chap. 7 ‘The “Two Spains”’. In addition, J. de la Cueva sets out the ‘culture wars’ between liberal and Catholic Spain in the city of Santander in ‘The assault on the city of Levites: Spain’ pp. 181–201.
76. A. Shubert (1990) *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Unwin Hyman) pp. 147–8. V. Cárcel Ortí (1979) *Historia de la Iglesia en la España contemporánea* (Madrid: Palabra).
77. A. Shubert *A Social History of Modern Spain* pp. 148–9; J. Álvarez-Junco *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* pp. 275–6.
78. A. Shubert *A Social History of Modern Spain* p. 155.
79. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje a América* book 2 p. 22.
80. It was this experience (alongside that of the Women’s section of the Fair) that Puig y Valls provided as an example of the alienation he felt upon arrival in the USA, the description of which opens the introduction to this book. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje a América* book 1 p. 182.

81. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje a América* book 1 pp. 182–3.
82. *El Progreso* Mar. 1885, vol. 2, no. 15 p. 269.
83. *El Progreso* Mar. 1885, vol. 2, no. 15 p. 269.
84. A. Shubert *A Social History of Modern Spain* p. 161; 165–7. Shubert points out that, using the observance of Easter Sunday as a measure, religious observance fell below 70 % in the 1870s and to less than 40 % by the end of the century, in the province of Logroño.
85. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa (1880) *Los Pueblos Jóvenes. Estudio Histórico-Filosófico sobre los Estados Unidos y la Australia* (Madrid: Victoriano Suárez) p. 67.
86. Cited in J. Álvarez-Junco *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* p. 273.
87. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes*. pp. 67–8
88. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes* pp. 78–9.
89. La Redacción de la Nueva Prensa *Los Pueblos Jóvenes* pp. 78–9.
90. P. Picavea, cited in L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 169.
91. L. Litvak *España 1900* Chap. 8 ‘Latinos y anglosajones. Una polémica de la España de fin de siglo’ pp. 155–200.
92. Cited in L. Litvak *España 1900* p. 182.
93. See P. Kramer (2002) ‘Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910’ in *Journal of American History*, vol. 88.4, pp. 1315–1353.
94. F. Chapman (1900) ‘The Changed Significance of “Anglo-Saxon”’ in *Education*, vol. 20, p. 364.; cited and discussed in P. Kramer ‘Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons’ pp. 1323.
95. See P. Kramer ‘Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons’ pp. 1315–1353.
96. J. Fleming (1891) ‘Are we Anglo-Saxons?’ in *North American Review* vol. 153, pp. 253–6; cited in P. Kramer ‘Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons’ p. 1324.
97. A Körner (2012) ‘Barbarous America’ in A. Körner, N. Miller, A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined. Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America* pp. 150–2.
98. P. Kramer ‘Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons’ pp. 1315–1353.
99. See J. Goode *Impurity of Blood* passim.
100. G. Azcárate (1894) ‘Los Estados Unidos’ in *El Continente Americano* vol. 2 (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico ‘Sucesores de Rivadeneyra’) 18 p. 10.
101. R. M. de Labra *La Revolución Norte-americana del siglo XVIII* pp. 21–2.
102. R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* p. 311.
103. R. M. de Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 34–5; *La Epoca* 23 May 1893; R. M. de Labra *La República de los Estados Unidos de América* p. 299. Only Jordana y Morera criticised the Chinese Exclusion Act as contrary to the revolutionary principle of fraternity and reminiscent of ‘Old World’ preju-

dice. 'The law prohibiting Chinese immigration in that country also does not correspond to the ideas of *amor fraternal*, the puritanical foundation of the campaign of William Penn. It has been dictated under the rule of a sort of economic monopoly, which could perhaps justify the unspeakable persecution to which the Hebrew race is subjected in some nations of our old Europe, and what I cannot explain to myself, these being peoples that boast of being Chrstian'. J. Jordana y Morera (1884) *Curiosidades Naturales y Carácter Social de los Estados Unidos* (Madrid: Tipografía de Manuel G.Hernández) p. 2.

104. Reproduced in I. García-Montón ed. (2002), *Viaje á la modernidad: la visión de los Estados Unidos en la España finisecular* (Madrid: Editorial Verbum) pp. 276–7.

105. *La Epoca* 23 May 1893.

Conclusion

The year 1898 in many ways marked a decisive shift in the way America was imagined in Spain. Certainly, the entry of the United States into the ongoing war between the Spanish colonial army and Cuban independence fighters in the Spring of 1898 was a crucial moment in shaping how both nations imagined themselves and the self-images they projected internationally. In Spain, the swift defeat to the USA intensified a sense of angst in the country's intellectual and political leaders, in part symptomatic of the wider European fin-de-siècle crisis of rationalism and in part a national and introspective response to humiliating defeat, the destruction of the fleet, loss of prestige and of Spain's remaining new world colonies.¹ The Spanish-Cuban-American War was collectively evoked as *el desastre* [the disaster] and a generation of artists, intellectuals and politicians—dubbed the generation of '98—dedicated themselves to analysing the reasons for Spain's supposed decadence and to bringing about national regeneration.

Aside from noted but few and isolated episodes of opposition, the war proved popular in Spain and was taken as a nation-building opportunity, not least because more than 200,000 Spaniards were sent to serve in Cuba and the Philippines and much of society at home was mobilised for war.² Already from the mid 1890s disparaging and satirical images of the United States appeared in the Spanish press whilst political works were published to justify continued Spanish colonial rule in the Antilles and to denounce the illegitimacy of American intervention, all but eclipsing the often nuanced and ambivalent verdicts on US politics, society and international relations that had characterised the late century. Although the war did

elicit some pacifist and critical responses, attitudes like those of the radical liberal politician and academic, Rafael María de Labra, who both shortly before and after 1898 declared the USA ‘the most complete triumph of modern democracy’, found little echo, especially in the popular press.³ Instead, patriotic bullfights were dedicated ‘to the public in general, to the Army and the Navy, so that not a single Yankee will remain in all the universe’; patriotic poems were entered into national newspaper competitions denouncing the USA as ‘scourge of the earth’; American eagle symbols were removed from US consulate buildings; and children at the girls’ school modelled on a US women’s college in San Sebastián discussed in the previous chapter were ‘spit upon [...] by rude boys and girls’ and suffered ‘constant persecution’ as war between the two countries neared.⁴ In popular imagery and in the satirical presses, the USA and ‘Yankees’ were portrayed not with the eagle they used to represent themselves, but rather, disparagingly, as pigs and with the associated motifs of bacon and ham. At other times, turning the new/old world dichotomy on its head, the figure of Spain was depicted as a young, innocent, virginal lady being ogled and manhandled by a lecherous Uncle Sam.⁵ Even progressive politicians now denounced the USA as a ‘nation of chicken farmers’.⁶

All that said, whilst 1898 did signal an important change in the relationship between Spain and the United States and in the self-identities of both, the idea that ‘1898’ marks a clear rupture or turning point risks overstatement. One of the key aims of this book has been to show how the United States became a crucial site of imagination for Spaniards, most notably for the emerging politically engaged liberal and democrat actors clustered in Spain’s (few) urban centres, *before* 1898, that is before the USA became a hegemonic power and before the so-called Americanisation of Europe. It is not the case that the USA leapt into Spanish political consciousness in the throes and aftermath of the 1898 defeat as studies of twentieth century American influence on Spanish culture have implied.⁷ America was equated with ‘the modern way of life’ already in the period immediately *before* ‘the American century’.⁸

Just as nineteenth-century North Americans studied Spanish history and politics, whether Prescott’s ‘black legend’-influenced *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabel* (1837) or Washington Irving’s *Life and Voyages of Christopher Columbus* (1828), often buoyed by a romantic vision of Spain as a ‘pleasing but backwards’ place peopled by gypsies, bullfighters and *pícaros* ‘who were caught in a time warp that prevented them from embracing modernity of any sort’, so too nineteenth-century

Spaniards examined Tocqueville's, Laboulaye's, Bryce's as well as their own writers' evaluations of 'the country whose present is the dreamed-of future of other nations'.⁹ Imagining their fates linked by Columbus, both Spaniards and North Americans mined each other's experience for 'evidence' as they constructed their own national self-images. In part these narratives followed the trope of two 'nations', connectors of the old and new worlds by the 'discoveries' of 1492, cast upon divergent paths towards tradition and decline for Spain and modernity, progress and prosperity for the United States. Prescott, for example, insisted upon linking the USA's origins with its Spanish-sponsored 'discoverers' and thus identified in the Spanish golden age the germs of liberal government, patriotism and independence which then flourished in the USA, determining that it was Spain's subsequent turn to absolutism and inquisition that cast its fortunes in a different (for him opposite) direction to his own country.¹⁰

The late nineteenth-century encounter between Spain and the USA was not simply one between tradition and modernity, and was not understood as such.¹¹ Nor was it, as has been suggested, a straightforward story of mutual revulsion and 'othering'. Certainly, many late-century Spaniards looked to the USA from a position of despair at the perceived relative absence of technological, political and moral (in the case of slavery, for example) progress of their own nation and, it must be said, all saw the USA as the epitome of modernity, whether positively or negatively defined. However, mutual revulsion mixed with mutual fascination, spurred on by self-criticism from both sides. The sense that Spain and the United States were somehow linked, even if with opposing fates, by Columbus' voyage limited the extent of their mutual 'otherness'.¹² This was not a simple story of North American self-congratulation at its progress and prosperity against Spanish self-loathing at their 'backwards' political, economic and social systems. It was precisely because the moderate and radical political and social actors thrown to prominence by the September revolution saw themselves as modern that they were so interested in the USA as a model or crucible of (more advanced) modernity. The USA was just further along the line than Spain. Nor did this mean that they blindly coveted and copied all that the North American example had to offer. Negative images of America as 'a barbarous repudiation of everything that mattered in the Old World',¹³ which used, variously, slave-holding, lynching, political corruption and, above all, the Civil War to exemplify the brutality and lack of civilisation in American life, ebbed and flowed, co-existing

alongside the positive depictions of a prosperous, innovative model of democracy, republicanism and Anglo-Saxon liberty.

The year 1898, then, does not mark a point of complete rupture in that both countries had formed imaginaries for self-fashioning long before the war over Cuba. Nor did it mark a permanent shift in Spanish perceptions of the USA. The jingoistic depictions of bullying Yankees and imperialistic Uncle Sams did not last long among progressives, even if they fed into emergent, often incoherent, conservative anti-Americanism.¹⁴ As has been mentioned, Rafael de Labra, not a person inclined to such populist imagery in any case, lectured and published on the ‘triumph’ of America in 1903. On both sides of the Atlantic, the ‘instinctive mutual attraction’ between Spain and the USA (according to contemporary Hispanist, Martin Hume) was apparent in the Spanish interest in the ‘advanced institutions of the Anglo-Saxon peoples’, and in Miguel de Unamuno’s insistence in 1906 that ‘the United States of America is today the nation in which the things of Spain are studied most and best’.¹⁵

Nations are constructed transnationally as well as at national, regional, and local levels and by individuals. Both Spanish and North American identities were shaped via the production of self-images and images of other countries and the consumption (and reproduction) of others’ images of themselves. This book has been largely concerned with images of the United States produced locally, in Spain and by Spaniards, on the basis that such images say much more about their producers and their view of world than they do about the subject of the images. However, it must be recognised that the processes to produce these images comprised a complex set of interactions involving US-produced images of itself and US- (and other) produced images of Spain as well as Spaniards’ ideas of the USA in relation to Spain. The emerging liberal elites in Madrid, Barcelona and other urban centres of Spain looked to the USA at least in part because the USA set itself up as the universal nation and the embodiment of modernity, something to be emulated, but this does not mean that the power relationship was simply one of: US produces, Spain receives and follows. Those opposed to colonial reform in the Antilles and, especially, to US-style immediate and uncompensated abolition like the *Liga contra las reformas ultramarinas* would be horrified at such a prospect, as would the many Spaniards who drew a sharp distinction between a Spanish predilection for the arts and an American capacity for invention, income generation and material comfort at the expense of the production of fine culture. This was not a story of proto-‘Americanisation’.

Equally important is the point that Spanish perceptions of the USA were produced, enacted and consumed within a multi-layered web of relationships spanning Europe, North and South America. In the same way that this was not a unidirectional relationship of the dominant dictating to the dominated, nor was it simply a bilateral relationship.¹⁶ Knowledge and ideas about the USA circulated in the transnational transfer and travel of people, news, books, plays, machinery and more across a multi-pointed network that took in London, Paris, Havana and Buenos Aires as well as Washington DC, New York, Madrid, Barcelona and Cádiz. In fact, Spain's historical role as an imperial power in the 'New World' meant that Spanish perceptions of the USA were as likely to be mediated via South America as via Europe and positioned Spain as a key node in the transatlantic crossings of ideas and images between the three continents. Late-century Spain's past as a global imperial power in the Americas and specifically as the sponsor of their 'discovery' is also significant in helping to explain the uneven but not polarised power relationship between Spain and the USA in the late nineteenth century discussed earlier. Despite the evident imparity—made all too clear in 1898—between the global reaches and import of the two countries, many Spaniards, from the conservative Puig y Valls to Estanislao Figueras, the first president of the First Republic, asserted that the USA should feel as indebted to Spain for its historical 'civilising' (as they saw it) impact, as Spain might towards the USA's present-day modernising and democratic example.¹⁷

The research for this book and the germination of its arguments were conducted under the auspices of a collaborative project (funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council [AHRC]) at University College London, to examine, comparatively and transnationally, the production and reception of images of the 'American way of life' in late nineteenth-century Europe and Latin America. As such, Spanish perceptions of the USA can be placed within an international frame. Our joint findings showed that the United States was an important part of the 'imagined lives' of many Europeans and Latin Americans, among workers as well as intellectual and political elites albeit, in Spain, where illiteracy was high and for which the USA was not an important emigrant destination, images of America circulated much more readily among the latter.¹⁸ Across all the countries examined as case studies for the project (Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Cuba) we found a highly diverse range of images and imaginings of the United States, determined as much if not more by the locality that produced them than by the way in which the

United States presented itself. Although there were key events, individuals, 'cultural products' and tropes that resonated across borders—the figures of Washington and Lincoln, the idea of commerce and profit above all encapsulated in the much cited phrase *time is money*, Harriet Beacher Stowe's abolitionist novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852) and the Civil War to name a few—what 'America' signified was absolutely not fixed, neither across or within the nations we examined.

In Spain, the cosmopolitan and internationally observant liberals who rose to prominence around the September revolution were especially fascinated by, or at least chose to emphasise in their writings, lectures and debates, those imagined features of the USA that seemed most relevant to the domestic concerns of the day. Its republican principles and democratic practices chimed with the ideals of the constitution writers of the *sexenio revolucionario* as well as with the concerns of those removed from power and positions of influence following the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. Its path to abolition, the context of civil war and its aftermath of reconstruction was understood as a crucial model/anti-model by the champions and critics of colonial reform. Its seeming capacity for inventing and developing technology that could improve the efficiency and comfort of its population captivated those eager to push forward Spain's cities and their industrial and communications networks but also alerted them and others to the hazards of industrial and technological modernity. The effects of education and emancipation on its women (at least its white women of means) were viewed with curiosity, both admiring and horrified, by men and women mulling the prospects for women's education in Spain. Its Anglo-Saxonness was taken as explanation for all that separated this 'most modern of nations' from Latin Spain.

That Spanish perceptions of the United States were neither frozen nor slowly evolved along a clear trajectory, from wonderment to hostility or vice versa, is important but it is not a characteristic distinctive only to the relationship of images between the USA and Spain. In Spanish imaginings of Britain there was a similarly ambivalent competition between perceptions of Britannia as the originator and upholder of liberty and stable parliamentary government and as a hectoring imperial bully. In their perceptions of France, the image of inspirational revolution jostled with that of brutal chaos and unbendable centralism and, even if its position as a, if not *the*, cultural model remained undiminished into the twentieth century, its political 'moral authority' was all but spent by the time of the crackdown on the Paris Commune. Equally, perceptions of the United States in

other European and Latin American nation-states fluctuated in line with domestic concerns. For example, British ex-chartist George Julian Harney invoked an image of ‘proud’ enfranchised former slaves in Reconstruction-era America to mark out his disappointment at the 1867 Second Reform Act’s failure to extend voting rights to all working men.¹⁹ In Argentina, the political ‘model’ furnished by the USA, particularly its federalism, became a key contested tool in framing the internal debates between the centre and regions following independence.²⁰ In Italy, where the American Civil War coincided with national unification, sensational reports of the fratricidal violence of the Civil War cemented the loss of any political capital held by the USA’s republican model, especially its federalism, which was blamed for the ability of the Southern states to protest abolition (and had already been roundly criticised by Mazzini).²¹

Spain may have looked in many directions for its cues on how to ‘be modern’ but the frequency with which the USA’s model of political, economic, technological and social modernity was cited and mined in late-century Spain, and thus its looming presence on the imaginative ‘horizons of expectation’²² of Spanish moderates and liberals does make this particular dynamic stand out. America’s self-projection as the universal modern nation was not accepted uncritically, but it did help Spaniards to divine and define how they wished to become modern citizens and the kind of modern nation they wished to build. The last word on this must surely go to Rafael María de Labra, the indefatigable student of the USA and of the modern world—and reformer of his own:

I say that we can affirm that all that is fundamental and effective that has been achieved in the Republic of the United States is the *work of man*; and therefore I say that all can be attempted and realised among other peoples, within the sense, currents, ideas and compromises of the contemporary Era, taking into account, as to how it is applied, the singular elements and very particular conditions of the locality, the environment and the exigencies of History.²³

NOTES

1. E. Storm (2001) *La perspectiva del progreso. Pensamiento político en la España del cambio del siglo (1890–1914)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2001).
2. For instances of Spanish opposition to the war, see S. Balfour (1996) “‘The Lion and the Pig’: Nationalism and National Identity in Fin-de-Siècle Spain” in C. Mar.-Molinero & A. Smith eds. *Nationalism and the nation in*

the Iberian peninsula, pp.109–10. See also M. Vincent (2007) *Spain 1833–2002: people and state* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 81.

3. R.M. de Labra (1897) *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*. (Madrid: Tipografía de Alfredo Alonso) pp. 135–7 & idem. (1903) *Repúblicas Contemporáneas. Francia, los Estados Unidos de América. Estudios de Política y Legislación Comparadas* (Madrid: Alfredo Alonso).
4. A. Shubert (1999) *Death and Money in the Afternoon. A History of the Spanish Bullfight* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 211; C. Serrano Seco (1999) *El nacimiento de Carmen. Símbolos, mitos, nación* (Madrid: Taurus) pp. 149–50; C.S. Grigas (2004) ‘Mission to Spain: Alice Gordon Gulick and a transatlantic project to educate’ Unpublished PhD thesis, Washington State University p. 188.
5. See S. Balfour “‘The Lion and the Pig’: Nationalism and National Identity in Fin-de-Siècle Spain” p. 111.
6. J. Álvarez Junco (2002) *The emergence of mass politics in Spain. Populist demagoguery and republican culture 1890–1910* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press) p. 86.
7. S. Del Campo & E. Gil-Calvo (1994) ‘A Parallel Case: Mixed Reactions to American Influence on Spanish Popular Culture’ *The Tocqueville Review* 1994 vol. XV n. 2.
8. See A. Körner ‘Introduction’ and N. Miller ‘Conclusion’ in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. (2012) *America Imagined. Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) pp. 1–18; 225–240.
9. R. Kagan (2002) ‘Introduction’ in idem ed. *Spain in America. The origins of hispanism in the United States* (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press) p. 8; idem. (1996) ‘Prescott’s Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain’ in *The American Historical Review* vol. 101 no. 2 pp. 423–446; *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 30 Jan. 1878.
10. R. Kagan ‘Prescott’s Paradigm’ pp. 426–431.
11. This point was also made by F.B. Pike (1981) ‘The Psychology of Regeneration: Spain and America at the Turn of the Century’ in *The Review of Politics* vol. 43.2 pp. 218–241.
12. AHN Min. de Asuntos Exteriores (MAS) Relaciones Culturales (RC) (10) 3.04 54/1283 4th Centenary of Discovery of America; report from A. Baldesano y Topete, Spanish Consul in New York.
13. A. Körner ‘Barbarous America’ in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined*. p. 125.
14. See D. Fernández de Miguel (2012) *El enemigo yanqui. Las raíces conservadoras del antiamericanismo español* (Zaragoza; Genueve Editions).

15. M. Hume (Oct. 1909) 'The United States and Spain' *International Conciliation* 23 p. 5; M. de Unamuno 'Los hispanistas norteamericanos' (Salamanca, agosto de 1906) in M. de Unamuno (V. Ouimette ed.) (1997) *De patriotismo espiritual: Artículos de 'la Nación' de Buenos Aires, 1901–1914* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca,) p. 58: both cited in R. Kagan *Spain in America* pp. 1–2.
16. See N. Miller 'Conclusion' pp. 234–7.
17. R. Puig y Valls *Viaje á América* pp. 79–80; Figueras' comments reported in *La Igualdad* 16 Feb. 1873 'El abrazo de dos pueblos'.
18. See N. Miller 'Conclusions' pp. 225–6.
19. A.I.P. Smith 'Land of opportunity?' in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined* p. 24.
20. K. Ferris 'A model republic' in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined* pp. 61–4.
21. A. Körner 'Barbarous America' in A. Körner, N. Miller & A.I.P. Smith eds. *America Imagined* pp. 125–159.
22. R. Koselleck (K. Tribe trans.) (1979) *Futures Past: on the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, Mass. & London: MIT Press) pp. 267–288.
23. R.M. de Labra (1897) *La República de los Estados Unidos de América*. (Madrid: Tipografía de Alfredo Alonso) pp. 355–6.

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