



Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World

Early Modern and Contemporary Perspectives

ELIANE GLASER



Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World

Also by Eliane Glaser

JUDAISM WITHOUT JEWS: Philosemitism and Christian Polemic in Early Modern England (2007)

Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World

Early Modern and Contemporary
Perspectives

Edited by

Eliane Glaser

Canterbury Christ Church University, UK

palgrave
macmillan



Editorial matter, selection and introduction © Eliane Glaser 2014
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2014
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-02803-7

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2014 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-43988-1 ISBN 978-1-137-02804-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137028044

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	viii
Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World: Early Modern and Contemporary Perspectives <i>Eliane Glaser</i>	1
1 Scripture and Toleration between Reformation and Enlightenment <i>John Coffey</i>	14
2 Some Forms of Religious Liberty: Political Thinking, Ecclesiology and Religious Freedom in Early Modern England <i>Justin Champion</i>	41
3 Moral Logics of Enmity: Indians and English in Early America <i>Ingrid Creppell</i>	73
4 Law and Civil Interest: William Penn's Tolerationism <i>Andrew R. Murphy and Sarah A. Morgan Smith</i>	111
5 John Milton and Religious Tolerance: The Origins and Contradictions of the Western Tradition <i>Nicholas McDowell</i>	134
6 Conformity, Loyalty and the Jesuit Mission to England of 1580 <i>James E. Kelly</i>	149
7 Commonwealth, Chosenness and Toleration: Reconsidering the Jews' Readmission to England and the Idea of an Elect Nation <i>Achsah Guibbory</i>	171

8	Present at the Creation: Diaspora, Hybridity and the Place of Jews in the History of English Toleration <i>Jacob Selwood</i>	193
9	Tolerating 'Mahomet': Or, Thinking about Then, Now <i>Matthew Dimmock</i>	214
10	A Feminism of Convenience: Roger Williams, Egyptian Salafists and Liberty of Conscience for Women <i>Feisal G. Mohamed</i>	235
	<i>Select Bibliography</i>	253
	<i>Index</i>	263

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, for permission to reproduce the cover image. The idea for this volume – and some of the essays contained within it – originated in two seminars on religious tolerance held under the auspices of the London Renaissance Seminar at Birkbeck, University of London. I would like to thank Sue Wiseman, the London Renaissance Seminar and the Department of English and Humanities at Birkbeck. Above all, I would like to thank the contributors to this volume for their thoughtful essays and for accepting the invitation to venture beyond traditional temporal boundaries.

Contributors

Editor

Eliane Glaser is Senior Lecturer at Canterbury Christ Church University, Associate Research Fellow at Birkbeck, University of London, a BBC radio producer, a journalist for *The Guardian* and others, and the author of *Judaism without Jews: Philosemitism and Christian Polemic in Early Modern England* (2007) and *Get Real: How to See through the Hype, Spin and Lies of Modern Life* (2012).

Contributors

Justin Champion is Professor of the History of Early Modern Ideas at Royal Holloway, University of London. His most recent book is *Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696–1722* (2003).

John Coffey is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Leicester. He has written and edited several monographs and collections, including *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689* (2000) and *Seeing Things their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion* (2009).

Ingrid Creppell is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. Her publications include *Toleration and Identity: Foundations in Early Modern Thought* (2003) and the co-edited volume *Toleration on Trial* (2008).

Matthew Dimmock is Professor of Early Modern Studies in the Department of English at the University of Sussex. His books include the co-edited volume *The Religions of the Book: Co-Existence and Conflict, 1400–1660* (2008) and *New Turkes: Dramatizing Islam and the Ottomans in Early Modern England* (2005).

Achsah Guibory is Professor of English at Barnard College, Columbia University. Her books include *Ceremony and Community from Herbert to*

Milton: Literature, Religion, and Cultural Conflict in Seventeenth-Century English Literature (1998) and *Christian Identity, Jews, and Israel in Seventeenth-Century England* (2010).

James Kelly is a research fellow in the Department of History at Queen Mary, University of London. His research interests are in post-Reformation Catholic history.

Nicholas McDowell is Professor of Early Modern Literature and Thought at the University of Exeter. His books include *The English Radical Imagination: Culture, Religion, and Revolution, 1630–1660* (2003) and *Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of Wit* (2008).

Feisal G. Mohamed is Professor of English at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author of *Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism* (2011) and *In the Anteroom of Divinity: The Reformation of the Angels from Colet to Milton* (2008).

Sarah A. Morgan Smith is currently working towards her PhD in Political Science at Rutgers University, with an emphasis on American political thought and issues of civic education.

Andrew R. Murphy is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. He is the author of *Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/11* (2009) and *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America* (2003).

Jacob Selwood is Associate Professor of Early Modern British History at Georgia State University. He is the author of *Diversity and Difference in Early Modern London* (2010).

Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World: Early Modern and Contemporary Perspectives

Eliane Glaser

Introduction

The teleological impulse permeates the historiography of tolerance. According to traditional accounts, the medieval era was characterised by religious uniformity and the persecution of dissent. With the Reformation and the fragmentation of the Christian consensus in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, a number of dissident reformers, including Roger Williams, John Locke and John Milton, began to speak out in favour of freedom of conscience. Their groundbreaking calls for the toleration of religious pluralism were echoed on the Continent in the works of Sebastian Castellio and Hugo Grotius.¹ Although they were met by fierce resistance, the story goes, these pioneering figures achieved a landmark victory with the passage of the Toleration Act in 1689, and laid the foundations for an era of enlightened diversity. The seeds of the tolerationist movement were carried across the Atlantic by Puritan founding fathers such as Roger Williams and William Penn and, later on, found fertile soil in the First Amendment, guaranteeing religious liberty, and the American ethos of welcoming immigrants.

In Britain a relaxed attitude to individual freedom and private life, combined with a rationalist philosophical tradition, helped to incubate this spirit of religious tolerance, which was consolidated in the nineteenth century into a national virtue. It was only natural that the emancipation of minorities, including Catholics and Jews, would follow. Prompted by the Puritan revival on the one hand and waves of immigration on the other, the late Victorian era saw the construction of a patriotic genealogy of tolerance that had its roots in the seventeenth century. As fascism swept across Europe in the early twentieth century, the recovery of a tolerant past became an even more

pressing task: W. K. Jordan's *The Development of Religious Toleration in England* was published between 1932 and 1940, at the same time as the American historian William Haller's *Tracts on Liberty* (1934), a collection of seventeenth-century texts on toleration, and A. S. P. Woodhouse's collection *Puritanism and Liberty* (1938).²

Echoes of this traditional approach to the history of tolerance can still be found, and the desire to follow a trajectory from the first stirrings of nonconformist toleration to the triumph of modern liberty has proven hard to resist.³ Meanwhile, politicians including Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron have become fond of trumpeting tolerance as a great British virtue. In 2006 the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, called on Labour supporters to embrace patriotism, describing the union flag as a 'British symbol of unity, tolerance and inclusion'. In a speech in 2007 to mark the bicentenary of the abolition of slavery, the then culture minister David Lammy said: 'We need to explain to the young why tolerance, why freedom and why human rights are so important, and how we arrived at this place today.' For David Cameron, Britishness is firmly associated with 'a common culture defined by pluralism and tolerance'.⁴

However, these traditional narratives have been robustly challenged by revisionist historians, most prominently Alexandra Walsham in her 2006 study *Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700*.⁵ Walsham demonstrates that the relationship between toleration and intolerance was highly complex, that they were even interdependent, and that many of those who opposed coercion were also against a religious free-for-all. The advent of post-Reformation denominational pluralism was associated with an oppositional hardening, rather than a secular relaxing of attitudes; and even ardent advocates for toleration were primarily motivated by a fierce defence of their own version of religious truth. 'In a context in which truth was held to be single and indivisible', Walsham writes, 'the persecution of dissident minorities was logical, rational and legitimate... To allow men and women to persist in heterodox opinions was in effect to condemn them to eternal torment in hell. Cruelty was thus a form of kindness'; and toleration, accordingly, was 'anathema, a recipe for chaos and anarchy, if not an invitation to apocalyptic destruction'.⁶

The triumphalist celebration of tolerance by contemporary politicians and commentators has also, in recent years, become increasingly qualified.⁷ Heightened religious tensions in the wake of 9/11, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and debates about immigration have complicated the celebration of diversity.⁸ In Britain, David Cameron, Tony Blair

and journalists such as the editor of *Prospect* magazine, David Goodhart, have declared the multiculturalist 'experiment' over. In a speech in 2006 Blair made the following statement: 'Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don't come here. We don't want the hate-mongers, whatever their race, religion or creed.'⁹ This conflation of description and prescription characterises many contemporary exhortations to subscribe to British tolerance: it is one of a set of 'shared values' that in 2005 Gordon Brown wanted to see enshrined in citizenship tests for new immigrants. Tolerance is still held up as an ideal which has the power to promote something called 'community cohesion'. But at the same time it creates a sense of oppressive uniformity and hierarchy and imposes an allegiance to a narrowly defined set of liberal values.

During a speech to mark the 400th anniversary of the King James Bible, David Cameron called for a revival of Christian values to counter what he identified as Britain's 'moral collapse'. He said that 'live and let live' had too often become 'do what you please'. Defending the continuity of the established Church, he continued: 'We are a Christian country and we should not be afraid to say so. Let me be clear. I am not in any way saying that to have another faith – or no faith – is somehow wrong.' He elaborated: 'Many people tell me it is much easier to be Jewish or Muslim here in Britain than it is in a secular country like France. Why? Because the tolerance that Christianity demands of our society provides greater space for other religious faiths too.'¹⁰ In this passage, shot through with pernicious equivocation, tolerance loses its meaning as a neutral or egalitarian quality, and instead appears to be subtly coded as a Christian quality: a kind of benign coerciveness. The moderate, reasonable discourse of the religious *via media* in early modern England as described by Ethan Shagan in *The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) provides a useful analogue here, in the way that it functioned as an ideology of control and a tool of religious, social and political power. The informal muddling-through that is the British accommodation of its religious minorities has since the nineteenth century been presented as its selling point: if pro-tolerance laws are not passed in the first place, they cannot invite a backlash or be repealed. But what if this *de facto* fudge is simply about Britain's failure to resolve its relationship between church and state? In the US, the position of Muslim Americans has been placed under repeated scrutiny since 9/11 as attention has focused on their 'loyalty' to the US, complicated in turn by the increasingly blurred relationship between faith and state. Diversity is frequently hailed as a key aspect of American national

identity, but the repeated patriotic appeals to unity have a normative and homogenising force.

In the slippery statements of politicians, tolerance is revealed as the profoundly paradoxical concept it really is. It often carries an insidious sense of its opposite, intolerance. And tolerance begs the question of whether it can and should be extended to people who are themselves regarded as intolerant, illiberal or punitive, either towards those of other faiths, or towards women, or homosexuals. Those tolerationist 'pioneers' who were highly intolerant of religions they perceived to be either corrupt or persecutory perceived themselves as defending both toleration and the true faith; and contemporary liberals who reject those they label 'Islamic fundamentalists' perceive themselves to be defending both freedom and human rights. Furthermore, tolerance has two distinct senses. One is a benign quality, a positive virtue; the other is a grudging allowance. One is to be tolerant; the other is to tolerate. This ambivalence is embedded in the concept and its history, rendering it enduringly problematic. In the early modern period the term used was 'toleration'; in the modern period it is 'tolerance'.¹¹ This implies that there has been a shift from forbearance to generosity. But the sense of forbearance persists into modern tolerance. In part this is because to tolerate something tends to imply a disapproval of that which is to be tolerated – an aspect which is often now forgotten. And in part the implied munificence of modern tolerance is complicated by the historical transformation from an association between toleration and upstart resistance in the early modern period to one between tolerance and the exercise of power in the modern era. A central problem with modern tolerance is that if it is invested with any substance, any power to be generous, then by definition the playing field is not level. The emphasis on tolerance as a value makes it easy to overlook the fact that it is not only attitudes that are at issue but also the relative position of those adopting them.

This volume of essays is founded upon the claim that the most fruitful connections between early modern toleration and contemporary tolerance are to be made not in terms of origin or teleology but in terms of the mercurial and ambivalent tensions within the concept of toleration/tolerance itself and the way in which it is used. The invocation of the early modern past to bolster the apparently tolerant present often relies on either a distortion of that past or an erasure of its distinctive features, resulting in a hall of mirrors in which the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are interpreted through an anachronistic lens, and contemporary religious tensions remain intransigent because

their historical genesis is poorly understood. The comparative historical approach of this collection attempts to contribute to resolving these impasses. As many of the essays demonstrate, not only was the tolerationism of the early modern period far from straightforward but neither is the tolerance we have 'inherited'; and connecting these insights more fully may even be a step towards ameliorating contemporary religious tensions; it may, in short, encourage tolerance in its best sense. Both periods exhibit tensions surrounding the structural relationship between religion and the civil state, the accommodation of religious diversity and issues of inward and outward faith, jurisdiction, loyalty and power. For example, how are groups – such as early modern Roman Catholics and contemporary Muslims – to live within a civil state (that is either secular or Christian) if they profess allegiance to a different civil authority: to Rome or shari'a law? These religions were and are described as not only religiously corrupt, but also as representing the political threat of sedition.

While acknowledging that a comparative historical approach needs to be precise and discriminating in order to avoid anachronism, this collection aims to throw further light on questions of historicity, presentism and progress. It is perhaps as a result of the attempt to avoid anachronism that contemporary ideas and debates about tolerance have not been sufficiently historicised. As Matthew Dimmock notes in his essay, critics such as Ania Loomba, Jonathan Burton and Gerald MacLean have argued recently that, rather than using historical examples to invalidate reductionist parallels between past and present, such parallels can be used to reveal how contemporary attitudes sometimes resemble those of the early modern period to a striking degree, despite assumptions of progress. This is especially the case in the light of the twenty-first-century resurgence of religious fervour and divisive rhetorics about religious identity.

A note about the focus and scope of these essays. The authors, drawn from a range of disciplines including history, English literature and political science, were invited to frame their work on early modern toleration in ways which recognised current questions about tolerance and intolerance, to deal primarily with the post-Reformation period but also to examine, contextualise and historicise twenty-first-century debates and dilemmas. The authors have responded to this challenge in a variety of ways. Some have set out extensive continuities and contrasts between early modern toleration and contemporary tolerance; some have examined early modern texts with an eye on their evolving reception; some are more tentative about making such cross-period connections *per se*.

The diversity of responses is an indication of the complexity involved in undertaking a comparative project such as this.

The authors examine the political, theological, textual and cultural ramifications of early modern toleration and – where they feel it appropriate – contemporary tolerance; focusing on England (and contemporary Britain) and the US. They address a variety of different denominations and faiths, from dissenting Protestantism to Roman Catholicism, Judaism to Islam. Some important recent work on early modern toleration has shifted the focus away from top-down, official policy and towards a more empirical emphasis on neighbourliness and practical accommodation (or the lack of it), and the reality of tolerant (and intolerant) behaviour and attitudes ‘on the ground’.¹² Differentiating between local contexts helps to avoid the possible pitfalls of the thematic approach, namely, over-emphasising both elite viewpoints and continuities of attitudes over time. It is important not simply to listen to religious and political leaders and prominent intellectuals having conversations, in print, among themselves, but rather to examine the broader reception and diffusion of these ideas, and to examine how religious difference was experienced heuristically by a wide range of people in a variety of linguistic and cultural contexts. But in the pursuit of popular social practice, it is also important not to give up on an examination of religious and political ideology and the power of official exclusion and acceptance, and of temporal shifts in the relative status of those lobbying for toleration/tolerance and proclaiming it. The relationship between church and state may not have featured prominently or explicitly in the daily life of seventeenth-century English Puritans or Papists, but structural questions have subtly informed and continue to inform the role and position of non-Anglicans. There is an uncomfortable resonance, albeit unwitting, between the focus on neighbourliness and ‘getting along’ in the revisionist work on toleration and the emphasis contemporary political leaders place on informal community cohesion. Finally, a comparative intellectual history approach to toleration and tolerance provides an opportunity to test the progress of ideas that, despite their enduringly paradoxical nature, have deliberately been sewn into the political and institutional fabric of national life.

* * *

John Coffey’s essay begins by noting that modern accounts of toleration have tended to prioritise philosophical and pragmatic arguments over scriptural ones (which seem both arcane and archaic). Yet, as he

points out, the Protestant controversy over toleration – from Sebastian Castellio to John Milton to Pierre Bayle – was deeply concerned with textuality and biblical hermeneutics. Any properly historicised account of the controversy must attend to this argument over revealed religion, since the participants themselves devoted so much time and energy to it. Coffey's essay analyses the ways in which Protestant tolerationists construed and deployed Scripture from the Reformation to the early Enlightenment, with particular reference to the central issue of the relationship between Old Testament Israel and the new age of Christianity. Coffey's essay notes parallels between post-Reformation controversy and the contemporary intra-Islamic debate over the death penalty for apostasy, which is largely centred on the interpretation of the Qur'an and the hadith, and on the relative weight to be given to different stages of divine revelation. Not only do contemporary liberal Muslims contend that even tolerant Islam has to engage closely with scripturalism, but in making this argument they cite seventeenth-century Protestants such as Locke. Surprisingly, perhaps, the scriptural character of early modern toleration debates is part of what makes them pertinent to the contemporary world.

If John Coffey reminds us of the scriptural character of early modern tolerationism, Justin Champion emphasises the religious inflection of the development of conceptions of liberty. Champion's essay critiques the dislocation between the history of political thought and its account of the evolution of political liberty, on the one hand, and religious history, which describes the development of religious toleration and freedom of conscience, on the other. Champion shows how liberty was a concept derived from the relationship between individuals and both civil and religious power. Isaiah Berlin outlined a distinction between a positive and negative form of liberty: the former describing a positive freedom to do, be or express something, the negative form implying the absence of coercive restraint upon one's actions. Quentin Skinner added to this a third negative conception of liberty, articulated by neo-Roman thinkers in the early modern period, as restricted 'not merely by actual interference or the threat of it' but also by 'the mere fact that we are living in dependence on the goodwill of others'.¹³ Champion adds a religious dimension to this more subtle and profound notion of liberty and suggests that, despite his pragmatic defence of authority, it is possible to detect in Thomas Hobbes's deconstruction of the natural foundations of power a more radical challenge to the place of religion in public life than Locke's liberal protection of private conscience.

Just as early modern intolerance was often grounded in deeply held religious faith rather than simple antipathy, Ingrid Creppell's essay explores the complex dimensions of a related concept, enmity. Creppell explores in historical detail one of the iconic images of intolerance sketched by Locke: the Christian settlers' breaking of their compact with the innocent 'Pagans' once they had gained sufficient power to do so. She examines the relation between morality and enmity that arose between Native Americans and Puritan settlers in King Philip's War in New England in 1675–1676. (King Philip was the name given by the English settlers to the main leader on the Native American side.) Moral thinking and feeling were not solely strategic or rationalising means to cover drives for domination, she argues, but were essential interpretations of a complex changing world. Enmity cannot be explained by attributing it to religious or racialised difference but must include an account of the larger context of a changing order in which groups need to interpret danger and be ready to act vis-à-vis those who seek a different ordering of political reality.

Andrew Murphy and Sarah Morgan Smith's essay sets out two key elements of William Penn's conception of religious liberty: first, the idea of England (and, later, Pennsylvania) as a civic commonwealth in which political loyalty and allegiance form the basis of citizenship; and second, the rule of law as the supreme guarantor of popular liberty. In contrast to both Ethan Shagan's assessment that there 'was no more slippery proponent of religious toleration than Penn',¹⁴ and Quentin Skinner and Justin Champion's articulation of liberty as an absence of dependence upon authority, Murphy and Smith suggest that Penn's development of a *modus vivendi* liberalism, a minimal political space that allows for the negotiation of deeply contested issues, provides a useful foundation for contemporary tolerance.

Nicholas McDowell takes as his starting point the apparent discordance between Milton's tolerationism and his exclusion of Irish Catholics from the sphere of acceptability. How is one to reconcile Milton's dual legacy as 'racist apologist for the conquest of Ireland' on the one hand and 'liberal hero' on the other? Rather than detracting from his role in the development of the Western liberal tradition, McDowell argues, the limits of Milton's tolerationism are characteristic of that tradition, since modern liberalism disallows groups which are themselves regarded as intolerant or tyrannical or as rejecting the principle of the secular state. McDowell's essay illustrates the fallacy of drawing a clear distinction either between Milton's tolerationist and exclusionist tendencies or between his political theory and his 'literary'

style. He draws out the connections between Milton's apparent equivocations and the tolerationism of the contemporary West, which, despite its ostensible inclusivity, reveals its authoritarianism when faced with the accommodation of a people who are perceived to adhere to a repressive ideology. And he reminds us that the lofty rhetorical style of Milton's writing is as constitutive of Western liberalism as its ambivalent content.

James Kelly observes the tendency among some historians to view Roman Catholics as either 'moderate' or 'extreme': as either outwardly conforming to the Elizabethan settlement and willing to compromise or as actively seeking its overthrow. Little consideration, he argues, has been given to the potential porosity of these positions. Kelly takes as his case study Sir John Petre, a man with a historiographical reputation for moderation and compromise, and demonstrates his active involvement in Catholic politics even while being outwardly conformist. It was hardly surprising, Kelly notes, that Protestant authorities viewed some conformists as even more dangerous than 'honest' separatists. Kelly draws a parallel between the intrusive control exerted by the early modern crown over what counted as inward and outward religion and contemporary attempts by a supposedly secular and neutral state to define the boundary between public citizenship and private faith.

Achсах Guibbory's essay revisits the complicated issues of toleration raised by the prospect of readmitting the Jews to England in the 1650s, exploring shifting and ambivalent attitudes to ideas of the commonwealth, 'chosenness' and exceptionalism. Although England was, officially, a 'Protectorate', the Amsterdam rabbi Manasseh ben Israel suggested in his petition to Cromwell for readmission that the English and the Jews alike were a godly commonwealth. But complicating the idea of the commonwealth was the idea of chosenness. The privilege of being chosen, of being an elect few, was applied by Christian groups during the mid-seventeenth century both to England as a whole and, more divisively, to their particular status as islands of true faith within the state. Moreover, those who advocated Christian chosenness rejected the Jews' continued claim to that status. Guibbory demonstrates, therefore, that there was a tension between the impulse towards shared identities, symbolised by the commonwealth, and the impulse towards particularity and boundaries, symbolised by chosenness. Guibbory suggests that, at the time of the readmission debates, many English Christians associated the Jews with Quakers, fearing that their entry would threaten the stability of the English nation, as the Quakers were feared to do. Guibbory

goes on to explore how ideas of exceptionalism have been applied to the US, in particular by three notable presidents, the last of whom, Barack Obama, has reinterpreted exceptionalism as not exclusive but inclusive. Guibbory also points to contemporary parallels drawn between England and biblical Israel, for example in Jez Butterworth's play *Jerusalem*.

The toleration of the Jews is placed in a broader geographical context in Jacob Selwood's essay. Selwood notes that the renewed Jewish community in England in the second half of the seventeenth century was a product of factors in the wider Atlantic world, as Sephardic traders, expelled from Dutch Brazil, sought a colonial metropole with which to trade from England's Caribbean colonies. Taking the example of Surinam, the English colony that was the first to emancipate Jews in 1665, albeit fleetingly and for reasons of expediency, Selwood explores how concepts of both toleration and intolerance were forged not only in relation to conflicts and accommodations between Christian denominations but also in relation to non-Christians such as Jews, and in dialogue with tolerationist proposals circulating throughout the wider Atlantic world. He argues that the complex and ambiguous ideas about religious and national identity that resulted from these exchanges represent an early precedent of the multiculturalism that is excoriated by contemporary politicians and commentators. Rather than simply offering a non-Christian corollary to dissenting Protestants, England's seventeenth-century Jewish community foreshadows many of the issues arising in today's globalised, multicultural Britain.

Matthew Dimmock's essay engages head-on with the challenges of how to think about early modern attitudes to Islam in a post-9/11 context, and how to historicise contemporary attitudes properly, particularly when they make a claim to a constructed historical provenance. Dimmock places the appearance of a crude and inflammatory film distributed on the Internet in 2012 entitled *The Innocence of Muslims*, which presents a demonised portrait of Muhammad, in the context of early modern versions of this biographical tradition, arguing that a close analysis of early modern sources alongside contemporary ones can show how these kinds of controversial representation have complex histories. Dimmock observes that for all its ostensible vacuousness and modernity, many elements of *The Innocence of Muslims* would have been recognisable to a seventeenth-century audience. Self-consciously up-to-date yet affecting the status of timeless truth, it repackages a tradition that incorporates inverse parallels with the life of Jesus on the one hand and 'authentic' aspects of Islam on the other. Dimmock explores the ambivalent ways in which early modern commentators

such as the cleric and polemicist Alexander Ross engaged with knowledge about Islam, illustrating the chaotic context from which modern 'tolerationism' arose.

Feisal Mohamed juxtaposes two case studies, one from seventeenth-century Rhode Island and the other from contemporary Egypt, to demonstrate how the policing of liberty of conscience coalesces with the policing of shared standards of conduct, and how this coalescence often takes place on the terrain of marital regulation. The first case study confronted Roger Williams at the outset of his Rhode Island experiment, and concerned Joshua Verin's attempt to prevent his wife from attending religious services held in Williams's home. The second case concerns two women who supposedly converted to Islam in order to be able to divorce their husbands, both of whom were Coptic Orthodox priests, a case which played a part in the sectarian tensions lurking beneath the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. In both cases, the principle of liberty of conscience is extended to married women defying their husbands' wishes. And in both cases the extension is a convenient device allowing for the abridgement of the civil rights of husbands to whose confessional sympathies a given society objects. The Verin case also points to a subtle continuity in Williams's thought with his early experience as a secretary to Sir Edward Coke, himself regarded as a supporter of the national Church. Mohamed counters, therefore, as many of these essays do, the notion that tolerance is an abstract ideal of human freedom towards which liberal states strive, arguing that this serves as a distraction from the messy facts of its deployment as a weapon in determining questions of political inclusion and exclusion.

Notes

1. For reasons of expediency and necessary limitations of scope, this essay collection takes early modern England (and contemporary Britain) and US as its focus, while acknowledging that traditional accounts of the rise of tolerance have tended to place disproportionate emphasis on the Anglo-American arena. For European toleration, see Benjamin Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), W. J. Sheils, ed., *Persecution and Toleration: Papers Read at the Twenty-Second Summer Meeting and the Twenty-Third Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society* (Oxford: Ecclesiastical History Society by B. Blackwell, 1984), Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner, eds, *Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman, eds, *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration before the Enlightenment* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998), Ole Peter Grell and Roy

- Porter, eds, *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and Perez Zagorin, *How Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). For further reading on toleration in early modern England, see John Coffey, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689* (Harlow: Pearson, 2000), Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan I. Israel and Nicholas Tyacke, eds, *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), John Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Andrew Hadfield and Matthew Dimmock, eds, *The Religions of the Book: Co-Existence and Conflict, 1400–1660* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), and Andrew R. Murphy, *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003).
2. William Haller, *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution 1638–1647* (New York: Columbia University Press 1934), A. S. P. Woodhouse, ed., *Puritanism and Liberty* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1938), W. K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England, from the Beginning of the English Reformation to the Death of Queen Elizabeth* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932).
 3. Perez Zagorin's theological study *How Religious Toleration Came to the West* appeared in 2004.
 4. David Cameron, *The Observer*, 28 January 2007.
 5. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). For an overview of the Whig and revisionist approaches to toleration, see, for example, Walsham, *Charitable Hatred*, especially Introduction, and Coffey, *Persecution and Toleration*, 1–7. For further critique of the Whig approach, see Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen, eds, *Difference and Dissent: Theories of Toleration in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), Introduction, and Laursen and Nederman, eds, *Beyond the Persecuting Society*, Introduction. Some historians have called for a nuancing of the revisionist approach, suggesting that it does not account for why developments in attitudes towards the accommodation of religious diversity did indeed occur. See, for example, Tony Claydon's review of Walsham's *Charitable Hatred* in *Reviews in History*, <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/568>, accessed 5 April 2013.
 6. Walsham, *Charitable Hatred*, 1–2.
 7. Books on modern tolerance are too numerous to mention fully: see, for example, Michael Walzer's *On Toleration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Susan Mendus's *Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989); and Anna Elisabetta Galeotti's *Toleration as Recognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
 8. It should be noted that in this volume discussions of contemporary tolerance primarily take Islam as their focus, in part reflecting the disproportionate emphasis on Islam in modern commentary and debate about religious diversity.
 9. Tony Blair, speech in Downing Street, as cited in *The Guardian*, 9 December 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/dec/09/religion.immigrationandpublicservices>, accessed 7 April 2013.
 10. <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/king-james-bible/>, 26 March 2013.

11. The terminology used in this volume – ‘toleration’, ‘tolerationism’, ‘tolerance’, ‘liberty’ and so on – is freighted, ambiguous and has changed over time. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)*, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, toleration meant, among other things, ‘the action or practice of tolerating or allowing what is not actually approved; forbearance, sufferance’. Another early modern meaning (from 1609) of toleration was the accommodation of minority religious groups in relation to a dominant national Church. According to the *OED*, the earliest use of ‘tolerationism’ was in 1898, but it remains a useful (if arguably anachronistic) term to denote toleration as a system or principle in the early modern era. In the modern era the term ‘tolerance’ is used more broadly to denote an inclusive (or forbearing) attitude towards religious groups as well as ethnic, homosexual and other minorities. The *OED* dates the first meaning of tolerance as ‘the disposition to be patient with or indulgent to the opinions or practices of others; freedom from bigotry or undue severity in judging the conduct of others; forbearance; catholicity of spirit’ at 1765. ‘Liberty’ has undergone a similarly broadening redefinition.
12. See Benjamin Kaplan’s *Divided by Faith*, Walsham’s *Charitable Hatred* and Nadine Lewycky and Adam Morton, eds, *Getting Along? Religious Identities and Confessional Relations in Early Modern England – Essays in Honour of Professor W. J. Sheils* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).
13. See the summary in Quentin Skinner, ‘A third concept of liberty’ at http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/_pdfs/06/11-skinner.pdf pp. 23–25; for an extended discussion see Skinner, ‘A third concept of liberty’, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 117 (2002), 237–68.
14. Shagan, *The Rule of Moderation*, 320.

1

Scripture and Toleration between Reformation and Enlightenment

John Coffey

That recent years have witnessed a resurgence of historical scholarship on religious toleration is hardly surprising. Rarely has the subject seemed so relevant or so pressing. Of course, earlier historians were equally convinced that it mattered in their own time. W. K. Jordan published his four-volume history of *The Development of Toleration in England* under the growing shadow of fascism in the 1930s, and it was designed as an apologia for fragile liberal values.¹ The Jesuit Joseph Lecler's great work *Histoire de la Tolérance au Siècle de la Réforme* (1955) appeared in the midst of Catholic debates over church–state relations that culminated in the Second Vatican Council landmark Declaration on Religious Freedom.² But twenty-first-century anxieties over religion and politics have injected a new sense of urgency into what might otherwise be a quiet backwater of historical enquiry. While the clash between Islamic militants and the West has caused many to revisit the Crusades and the history of Muslim–Christian interaction, public intellectuals have been equally inclined to turn to the early modern era. This is perhaps most marked in the US, where controversies over church and state are routinely rooted in the eighteenth century. Here the Religious Right fights the secular Left over the Founding Fathers as Protestants and Catholics once fought over Augustine. As Gordon Wood remarked, the Founders have become America's church fathers.³ But we find the retrospective turn in Europe too. Salman Rushdie once pronounced that

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the symposium on 'Religion, Toleration and Coexistence' organised by the Humanities Institute at University College Dublin. I am grateful to Marc Caball and to the participants for their comments. For helpful feedback on a later draft, I wish to thank Richard Bonney and Eliane Glaser.

the problem with Islam was that it had never had a Reformation; he later corrected himself. What Islam needs, he explained, is 'not so much a reformation ... as an Enlightenment'. Either way, he recommended a recapitulation of Europe's early modern learning experience.⁴

In the wake of 9/11, various historians have joined the ongoing debate, keen to demonstrate that early modern history has something valuable to teach us. For sheer ambition, none compares to Jonathan Israel. His 3,000-page trilogy on the radical Enlightenment and its foes is an intervention in contemporary debates about religion and politics, and pits the (allegedly) liberal democratic secularism of Spinoza against the evils of fundamentalism and traditionalism, the spinelessness of postmodernism and multiculturalism.⁵ Another tract for the times (albeit a good deal briefer) is Perez Zagorin's *How the Idea of Toleration Came to the West* (2003). Zagorin argues that 'the modern concepts of religious toleration and freedom' are 'the offspring of Western civilisation', and traces their emergence in the writings of radical Protestants such as Castelli, Milton and Locke. His book concludes with the wish that these ideals would be embraced where they do not exist today – 'including considerable parts of the Islamic world and the few remaining communist countries'.⁶ Benjamin Kaplan's *Divided by Faith* (2007) sets out to undercut the kind of grand narratives told by Zagorin and Israel, Whiggish constructs centred on the liberating feats of progressive intellectuals. But he too has no doubt about what he called the 'immediacy and relevance' of early modern European history. Modern Europeans are now asking themselves the same question as their ancestors: 'Can people whose basic beliefs are irreconcilably opposed live together peacefully?' The early modern answer, suggests Kaplan, was (often, surprisingly) yes. There were 'viable alternatives to bloodshed'. And they were worked out not by grand theorists but by local magistrates and everyday folk who devised various means of coexistence. From this fact, Kaplan draws a moral lesson. The practice of toleration does not depend on other cultures accepting the West's post-Enlightenment secular values – it can develop within deeply traditional religious cultures.⁷

By constructing different narratives about religion, toleration and coexistence, these historians have offered alternative approaches to the challenge of militant religion, and especially resurgent Islam. For Israel, the solution is radical Enlightenment secularism. For Zagorin, it is the moderate Enlightenment value of toleration that emerged from within the Western Christian tradition thanks to its bolder spirits. For Kaplan, our best hope lies in practical, piecemeal practices

of accommodation – regimes of toleration that may well look quite different from one culture to another.

James Simpson tells another kind of story about religion and intolerance in his much discussed work *Burning to Read: English Fundamentalism and its Reformation Opponents*. It displays the same sense of urgency that we see in Israel, Zagorin and Kaplan. He writes against a political context in which ‘fundamentalist reading practices’ are driving the legislative programme of the Religious Right and the militancy of Islamic terrorism. ‘Reading and its consequences’, he warns, ‘are once again becoming capable of violently changing the world.’ *Burning to Read* traces the problem (at least within Christianity) to the harsh literalism ushered in by the Reformation. And he takes aim at the celebration of the Protestant Bible that one finds in scholars such as David Daniell (or broadcasters such as Melvyn Bragg), who see Reformation biblicism as a liberating and democratic development. For Simpson, this Whiggish complacency ignores the dark side of Protestant literalism. Reformation styles of Bible-reading, he alleges, produced nearly ‘Two Hundred Years of Biblical Violence’ in western Europe. Much of this violence was psychological (such as the fear of damnation wrought by reading about predestination). But sometimes it was physical, as when Calvinists re-enacted the iconoclastic purges of Israel’s godly kings.⁸

Scripture and toleration

In this chapter I want to pick up Simpson’s themes of biblical interpretation and ‘biblical violence’. In particular, I will explore the scriptural reasoning of seventeenth-century tolerationists, who sought to neutralise the ‘texts of terror’ used to justify religious persecution.⁹ And I will argue that the post-Reformation toleration controversy was a textual affair. From Castellio to Bayle, tolerationists were preoccupied by the challenge of biblical hermeneutics.

Until the recent surge of interest in Christian Hebraism and the reception history of the Bible, this topic received little systematic attention.¹⁰ For the most part, scholars concentrated on arguments that were deemed ‘relevant’ in a secular age. Students of Locke’s *Letters Concerning Toleration*, for example, devoted exhaustive analysis to his philosophical arguments, but largely bypassed his biblical hermeneutics.¹¹ Even John Marshall’s magnum opus, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*, devoted a number of chapters to expounding the main lines of argument used by tolerationists, but largely bypassed their engagement with the Bible.¹²

This neglect of the scriptural dimension is problematic, for several reasons. In the first place, it is a-historical. It ignores a prominent strand in Locke's texts, and in many other tolerationist works. To marginalise it because it seems irrelevant in the modern age is to distort the text, misrepresent the past and prematurely secularise our subjects.¹³ Second, when scholars ignore the biblical, they forget that the Christian doctrine of religious coercion was scripturally constructed (and so had to be scripturally deconstructed). It was erected by St Augustine in the early fifth century, in seminal letters justifying the repression of the Donatists. And while Augustine advanced abstract theological or philosophical arguments, his case drew heavily on biblical materials. Most famously, he appealed to Christ's Parable of the Great Banquet, in which the host commands his servants to go into the highways and byways to find guests, declaring 'compelle intrare'.¹⁴

Finally, glossing over scriptural argument is intellectually parochial and misses a feature of these debates that is becoming more rather than less relevant. As the philosopher John Gray puts it (in characteristically provocative fashion):

The return of religion as a pivotal factor in politics and war is one of the defining features of the age, and it is time Paine, Marx and other secular prophets were gently shelved in the stacks. The writings of these Enlightenment savants have stirred events for a very brief period in history, now clearly coming to an end. . . . But the books that have most formed the past, and which are sure also to shape the future, are the central texts of the world religions.¹⁵

Gray's prophecy about the shelf-life of secular Enlightenment classics may well prove false, but his point about the persistent power and appeal of scriptural texts remains. The Bible and the Koran are read as intensively as ever, and more extensively than ever before. Across the global South, we see the emergence of what Philip Jenkins calls 'new Christendoms', where the Bible is read devoutly and often taken literally. The problem of violence in sacred texts has taken on a new significance.¹⁶ Given this contemporary context, the scriptural dimension of the early modern toleration controversy merits renewed attention. Indeed, as we shall see, there are striking parallels between the current intra-Islamic debate over apostasy, a debate which turns on the interpretation of the Qur'an and the hadith, and the post-Reformation dispute over religious coercion.

The Robinson circle and the Furly circle

In exploring this particular battle for the Bible, I want to focus on two influential coteries of Protestant tolerationists, one based in London in the 1640s, the other centred on Rotterdam in the 1680s. The first group included the poet and pamphleteer John Milton. Recent analysis by David Adams suggests that Milton's *Areopagitica* was printed on a press owned by Henry Robinson, a London merchant who was part of the intellectual circle of Samuel Hartlib. The press also published pro-toleration works by the future Leveller leader William Walwyn and the founder of Rhode Island, Roger Williams.¹⁷ Certainly, these figures belonged to a network of London-based radical Independents who agitated for far-reaching religious toleration.¹⁸ Four decades later, another tolerationist grouping was hosted in Rotterdam by the Quaker Benjamin Furly. His personal library contained over 4,000 books, including a remarkable range of early tolerationist works, among them Williams's *Bloudy Tenent of Persecution* and its sequel *The Bloudy Tenent Yet More Bloudy* and Milton's *Treatise of Civil Power*.¹⁹ Among Furly's conversation partners were the English philosopher John Locke, the Huguenot scholar Pierre Bayle and the Arminian divine Philip van Limborch. According to John Marshall, these figures were 'at the epicentre of the early Enlightenment'.²⁰

Each of these groups was deeply preoccupied by the problem of Scripture and toleration. That may seem surprising, for to turn from Robinson's circle in the 1640s to Furly's circle in the 1680s is to turn from the world of the Puritan Revolution to the era of the early Enlightenment. It is tempting to draw a sharp contrast between Puritan bibliocists and Enlightenment rationalists. Yet Locke and van Limborch were absorbed in questions of biblical exegesis. As a professor of theology at the Remonstrant seminary, van Limborch naturally cited Scripture copiously in his systematic theology.²¹ For his part, Locke was as much a lay theologian as Milton. He wrote a paraphrase of Paul's epistles, and engaged in intensive exegesis in both *The Reasonableness of Christianity* and the *First Treatise of Government*.²² In one manuscript he listed 21 biblical passages that could be used to teach toleration.²³ As for Bayle, his *Philosophical Commentary* was devoted to countering Augustine's literalist reading of *ces Paroles de Jésus-Christ, 'Constrain-les d'Entrer'*.²⁴

With hindsight, historians have suggested that Europeans were on the cusp of a new intellectual era, and witnessing a major crisis of scriptural authority. And we do indeed see the origins of modern biblical criticism in the writings of Hobbes, Spinoza and Richard Simon.²⁵

But contemporaries living through the 1680s were hardly conscious of entering an age of Enlightenment. As John Marshall has vividly demonstrated, this was 'one of the most religiously repressive decades in European history', epitomised by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.²⁶ If Milton had to worry about Parliament's Blasphemy Act in 1648 and the coercive schemes of Presbyterians and Anglicans, Locke and van Limborch lived to see the persecution of French Huguenots, Italian Waldensians and English Dissenters, the Scottish and English Blasphemy Acts of 1695 and 1697, and the execution of the freethinking Edinburgh student Thomas Aikenhead.²⁷

Moreover, during both periods the practice of religious coercion was underpinned by a scriptural rationale.²⁸ Seventeenth-century political thinkers were immersed in the Old Testament, and defenders of religious uniformity leaned especially heavily on Hebrew Scripture. Not for nothing has Eric Nelson dubbed this 'the Biblical Century' in the history of political thought.²⁹ Roger Williams explained that he would give careful consideration to the case of ancient Israel because 'so great a waeight [*sic*] of this controversie lyes upon this president of the Old Testament'.³⁰ 'The Inquisitors of these days', noted Henry Robinson, 'have no better ground for their strict proceedings, then the Old Testament which expressly commanded Idolatry to be rooted out.'³¹ Milton concurred that 'the main plea' of the would-be forcers of conscience was to the example of 'the kings of Judah', who 'used force in religion'. This had been 'urged with much vehemence to th[e]ir imitation'.³² Furlly's associates operated in a more cosmopolitan and multi-confessional context than the radical Independents of the 1640s, but they too were confronted by an Old Testament case for coercion. The exiled Huguenot pastor Pierre Jurieu held firmly to the teaching of the Reformed confessions on the civil magistrate – that Christian rulers had the same coercive power in matters of religion as their Hebrew predecessors.³³ When van Limborch sought to refute 'the Bloody Opinion of Hereticide', he turned first to 'several Places of the Old Testament, wherein Apostates, false Prophets, and Blasphemers are commanded to be put to Death, Deut. 13.1, &c. Ch. 18.20. Lev. 24.16'.³⁴

At the same time, however, tolerationists needed to tackle New Testament proof texts employed by Augustine and his successors: the Parable of the Banquet; Christ's cleansing of the temple; the violent, blinding conversion of Saul on the Damascus road; the teaching of Romans 13 about magistrates bearing a sword against evildoers; the prophecies of Revelation about the kings of the earth destroying the Beast. All of these texts had been read and applied literally to sanction the use of

physical force in matters of religion. The challenge was to find another way of reading the texts, one that would nullify 'biblical violence' while preserving biblical authority.

Hermeneutical strategies

The Protestants associated with Robinson and Furlly could draw on existing sources and traditions that suggested effective hermeneutical strategies for countering the Augustinian defence of religious coercion. From Josephus and rabbinic commentaries, learned Hebraists had constructed an Old Testament argument for toleration. On the radical wing of the Reformation, Anabaptists and other sectarian Protestants had accentuated the gulf between the dispensation of the Old Testament and that of the New. And the natural law tradition offered control principles that could be used to govern biblical reading. We will consider each in turn: the Hebraic, dispensational and natural law arguments.³⁵

The Hebraic argument

The Hebraic case for toleration has long remained hidden from view, but it has recently been brought to light thanks to the labour of scholars such as Eric Nelson and Jason Rosenblatt.³⁶ They have shown us how the leading Protestant Hebraists of the first half of the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius and John Selden, used rabbinic sources to argue against clericalism and religious persecution. As firm Erastians, these writers were concerned to unify church and state under the authority of the magistrate, and to secure a degree of toleration at the same time. They drew inspiration from the writings of Josephus, who argued that in the Hebrew theocracy there was only one source of law (the civil sovereign), only one jurisdiction (the civil magistrate) and only one rationale for religious law (a civic rationale). In the hands of Erastian tolerationists this approach robbed the church of any independent power of excommunication and placed sovereignty exclusively in the hands of civil magistrates, who would only legislate on religion for civic reasons. The strict application of that criterion, argues Nelson, meant that 'the set of religious matters deemed worthy of civil legislation grew steadily smaller – until at last it was virtually empty'.³⁷

Of course, holding up the Hebrew republic as a model could easily backfire, playing into the hands of Reformed divines who cited Mosaic texts to justify capital punishment for heresy. But Selden had a simple retort. In one vital respect the Hebrew republic was utterly unique – it was a pure theocracy with God as its civil sovereign. For that reason,

idolatry and blasphemy in Israel were literally treasonous, and so subject to capital punishment. In states where God was not the sovereign, by contrast, things were quite different. Even in theocratic Israel, according to rabbinic sources, death sentences could be applied only if a blasphemer profaned God's name in public with deliberate intent before witnesses, and despite being warned against it. As for foreigners, they were only subject to the minimalist requirements of the seven laws given to Noah as enumerated by the rabbis. In non-theocratic modern states it was this minimalism of the Hebrew republic that was to be imitated. As Rosenblatt explains, Selden used rabbinic sources to temper 'scriptural severity'.³⁸

Tolerationist writers in the English Revolution were aware of this gloss on the Hebrew republic. Milton's *Areopagitica* praised Selden as 'the chief of learned men reputed in the land', though he relied on rabbinic scholarship to shore up his case for divorce and republicanism rather than his position on religious liberty.³⁹ Other radical Independents noted that ancient Judaism provided room for toleration. Walwyn and Robinson pointed out that the Jews of Christ's day accommodated a wide degree of doctrinal diversity, including the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection of the dead.⁴⁰ Henry Stubbe, who defended the 'Good Old Cause' alongside Milton in 1659, also observed that Judaism tolerated a range of sects and heresies, including Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes. And he cited Selden to show that Old Testament Israel had tolerated idolatry beyond its borders, even after neighbouring nations were conquered, and that foreigners within Israel were only required to observe 'the seven precepts of Noah'. He provided examples of the Hebrews' tolerance of idolaters: Abraham coexisted with them, Jacob married Laban's daughter ('an Idolatresse'), Solomon displayed generous hospitality to the Queen of Sheba.⁴¹

John Locke (who had been a fellow student with Stubbe at Christ Church, Oxford) agreed that the Hebrew republic practised broad toleration. Although Israel took many foreign captives, he noted, 'we find not one man forced into the Jewish Religion, and the Worship of the True God, and punished for Idolatry, though all of them were certainly guilty of it'. While Jews who committed idolatry were subject to the death penalty, this was because God was 'the King of the Jews', and idolatry was 'an Act of High-treason', a 'manifest revolt' against his rule. In other states, where God was not the civil sovereign, false religion was not treason, and the magistrate could only enforce matters that touched directly on 'Civil Concernments'.⁴² Pierre Bayle dealt with the Mosaic law in the same manner. Because Israel was a theocracy, and God

was the 'supreme and temporal Lord of the Jewish Commonwealth', idolatry and blasphemy constituted 'an overt Act of High Treason', an 'Attempt of Rebellion against the Sovereign Magistrate'. Because idolaters and blasphemers were committing 'Treason and Rebellion against the State', their crime became 'punishable by the Secular Arm'. But 'Christians are under no Theocratical Form of Government', and such considerations did not apply. Instead, 'Convertists' who used coercion on so-called Hereticks should learn a lesson from the Jews. The Jews might have punished those who 'renounced the true God' to worship idols, but they 'tolerated the most detestable Heresys', including that of the Sadducees.⁴³

The Hebraic argument employed by these writers involved a selective appropriation of the Jewish republic. It managed to invoke the Mosaic model and neutralise it at the same time. The Hebrew republic was invoked to undermine independent clerical power, place undivided jurisdiction in the hands of the civil magistrate and secure a wide degree of toleration for religious opinion. It was neutralised insofar as the Mosaic penal laws against idolatry and blasphemy were confined to the unique theocracy of the Jews. Nelson shows how this line of argument was taken up by Hobbes, Harrington and Locke, and he suggests that Hebraic Erastianism was 'the most important and influential tradition of early-modern tolerationist thought'.⁴⁴ But for most of the writers in the Robinson or Furlly circles, it was arguably of less value than a second line of scriptural reasoning. However much they admired Grotius and Selden, Milton and Locke developed a very different account of the relationship between church and state – one that looked to the New Testament rather than the Old. To understand why, we need to turn to what I shall call the dispensational argument.

The dispensational argument

In contrast to the Hebraic argument, this argument focused on the perils of judaising.⁴⁵ It drove a firm wedge between what Milton called God's 'two great dispensations, the law and the gospel', contrasting the coercion of Old Testament Israel and the non-violence of the New Testament Church.⁴⁶ This line of reasoning emerged from the radical wing of the Reformation, and it is no coincidence that its leading exponent in the 1640s was a former Baptist, Roger Williams. The so-called Anabaptists had always resisted the analogy between Old Testament circumcision and New Testament baptism. Williams began his *Bloudy Tenent of Persecution* with a set of propositions, the most startling of which was cited on numerous occasions by outraged critics:

Sixth, it is the will and command of God that (since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus), a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or Antichristian consciences and worships be granted to all men in all Nations and Countries, and that they are only to be fought against with that sword which is only (in Soule matters) able to conquer, the Sword of God's Spirit, the Word of God.⁴⁷

The critical phrase here was 'since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus'. According to Williams, Calvin, Beza and John Cotton were correct to claim that during the age of Israel, religious coercion had been divinely sanctioned. But this power had been abrogated by the coming of Christ. In the Church age, the true faith could be propagated only by spiritual means.

Williams's next proposition clarified and extended the argument:

Seventh, the state of the Land of Israel, the Kings and people thereof in Peace and War, is proved figurative and ceremonial, and no patterne nor president for any Kingdom or civill state in the world to follow.⁴⁸

Here Williams was exploiting typology. He was able to do so because its use was entirely conventional among Protestants, a fact easily overlooked if we take Reformation literalism too literally.⁴⁹ Typology had its roots in early Christian readings of the Old Testament, particularly in the Book of Hebrews, which saw the 'types' of the tabernacle fulfilled in Christ. This Christological typology had been elaborated with great sophistication and imagination by Origen. But after the conversion of Constantine, Eusebius of Caesarea employed typology for a different purpose, portraying the Christian emperor as a new Moses. English Protestants used the Old Testament in both ways, seeing Israel as fulfilled in the Church, but also claiming Protestant nations as 'new Israels'. In the *Bloudy Tenent*, however, Williams used 'spiritual typology' to undermine 'historical typology'.⁵⁰ He devoted many pages of his book to showing 'how weake and brittle this supposed Pillar of Marble is'. The state of Israel had been 'much imitated' by 'Christian' nations, he noted; but it was 'unimitable', 'unparalleled and unmatchable'. It was not intended as a 'pattern' for modern nations or kingdoms; instead, it was a type of the Church. Since the coming of Christ, there were no national churches, and no magistrates stood in the place of the kings of Israel and Judah. The task of the magistrate was 'essentially Civill', and the Church was a purely voluntary body. Where could one find

'the least footing in all scripture for a Nationall Church after Christ's coming'? What 'president' was there under the gospel for forcing the ungodly to participate in Christian worship?⁵¹

Williams pressed this point relentlessly in his tolerationist writings of the mid-1640s and the early 1650s. Appeals to the Hebrew commonwealth were ruled out of court. The proponents of national churches and religious uniformity were required to produce proof from Christ's 'last Will and Testament' (i.e., the New Testament). To advocate an established national church on Old Testament grounds was 'a reviving of Moses', and it prompted the question: 'are you Moses's or Christ's followers?' Coercive state religion was 'but one of Moses's shadows, vanished at the coming of the Lord Jesus'.⁵²

Henry Robinson pursued the same line of thought. He alleged that those whom he called 'the Reformed persecuters' could not produce a 'warrant' or 'commission' from Christ for religious coercion.⁵³ If Christ or the Apostles had intended the church to use force against heretics in future generations, surely they would 'have left some ground or warrant inserted in the letter of the Gospel'.⁵⁴ Yet one could search the New Testament in vain for any such warrant. Robinson's John the Baptist set out the textual evidence. Each chapter began with a string of New Testament texts identifying Christ and his apostle's 'commission', 'order', 'warrant', 'instructions' and 'testimonies'. Robinson listed over 300 biblical texts, not a single one from the Old Testament. By demanding that his critics demonstrate their claims from the apostolic writings, he could load the odds against religious coercion, tithes and national churches.⁵⁵

Milton too relied heavily on the argument from abrogation in his 1659 attacks on 'force' and 'hire', or coercion and tithes. Like Luther, he set up a series of Pauline dualisms between Judaism and Christianity, outward and inward, childhood and manhood, bondage and freedom. Under the Old covenant, force was necessary in religion; under the New, it was replaced by persuasion. God had once joined church and state together; now he had 'severed them'. For Milton (as for Williams), the history of Christianity was a story of fall and restoration. After Constantine, error 'had miserably Judaiz'd the church', introducing 'priests, altars, and oblations', as well as persecution and tithes.⁵⁶ The Reformation had initiated the process of de-judaising and restoring primitive Christianity, but Protestantism was still plagued by judaisers. Hence Milton's warning to 'the New Forcers of Conscience' that Parliament would 'Clip your Phylacteries'.⁵⁷

The problem of Old Testament precedent looms less large in the writings of the 1680s, but it could not be ignored. Pierre Bayle tackled it

in characteristically bold and original fashion. Faced with his fellow-Huguenot Pierre Jurieu, who turned to the Old Testament to justify armed resistance and religious coercion, Bayle set out to problematise appeals to the Hebrews by pointing out their faults. In the first edition of his *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* (1697), he included a notoriously irreverent article on King David, indicting the Hebrew monarch for polygamy, adultery, murder and massacre. According to Walter Rex, his purpose was to turn his fellow Huguenots away from the political and religious violence of the Old Testament to the ethics of Jesus.⁵⁸

Locke and van Limborch took a more conventional approach. The latter maintained that advocates of hericide made a basic category mistake, misapplying Old Testament laws about apostates, blasphemers and false prophets to Christian heretics. But he also employed the dispensational argument: 'the Judicial Laws of Moses, so far as they concern only the Jewish Commonwealth, were abrogated upon the Destruction of that Polity, and are not obligatory to us Christians.'⁵⁹ Locke went further, rejecting the traditional distinction between the ceremonial, judicial and moral elements of the Mosaic law, and insisting that the entire Law of Moses had been abrogated and 'is not obligatory to us Christians... for no positive Law whatsoever can oblige any People but those to whom it is given'. Israel punished idolatry only because it was a theocracy in which church and state were one. After Christ's birth, he continued, a new distinction was made between Church and Commonwealth – 'there is absolutely no such thing, under the Gospel, as a Christian Commonwealth'. This was a claim reminiscent of Roger Williams, who had also argued that under the New Testament the state was purely civil, the church wholly voluntary. And like Henry Robinson, Locke insisted that defenders of coercion possessed no 'Commission' from Christ to use of the sword on behalf of the Gospel.⁶⁰

The natural law argument

This appeal to Christ still left unresolved the New Testament proof texts cited by Augustine and later proponents of religious coercion. Tolerationists often dealt with these in piecemeal fashion, arguing on a case-by-case basis that the texts had been misread. Thus Milton dismissed 'that parabolical proof Luke 14. 16, &c. compel them to come in', on the grounds that parables should be 'expounded by the general scope thereof', not by wresting phrases out of context. He dismissed the relevance of Christ's cleansing of the temple on the grounds that Christ had used whips 'to drive profane ones out of his temple, not to force them in'. As for the burning of magical books by the Christians

of Ephesus, this was a voluntary destruction of their own property, not compulsory censorship by the magistrate.⁶¹

Philip van Limborch took the same exegetical approach in his systematic theology, working through the 'hereticide' proof texts one by one to show why they had been misapplied. Ananias and Sapphira were struck dead by God in Acts, Chapter 5, but not because of heresy; besides, 'we are not to imitate what the Apostles did by a miraculous power' and following 'an express Divine Command'. Romans 13 was irrelevant because the magistrate was not granted dominion over conscience. The destruction of Antichrist by Kings in Revelation 17 was predicted not commanded; and anyway, Antichrist was 'drunk with the Blood of the Saints', not merely mistaken on a point of doctrine.⁶²

Pierre Bayle, by contrast, offered a different solution to the problem, providing what we shall call 'the natural law argument' against coercion.⁶³ He wrote a *Philosophical Commentary* on the classic Augustinian text from Luke, Chapter 14, 'Compel them to come in'. His stated goal was to offer 'a Refutation of the Literal Sense of the Passage', just as others had done in the case of the Old Testament. But he would not do so by commenting on the text like 'Criticks and Divines', who compare it with other passages, examine the context, explore 'the Force of Expressions in the Original', the various senses which they might bear. Instead, he proposed to cut the Gordian knot in one stroke, by setting up a 'single Principle of natural Reason' as the Rule for 'all interpretation of Scripture'. His principle was simply stated: 'That all literal Construction, which carries an Obligation of committing Iniquity, is false.' Every interpretation, then, would be tried before 'the supreme Court of Reason and natural light'. 'By this primitive and metaphysical Light', he explained, 'we have discovered the rightful Sense of infinite Passages of Scripture, which taken in the literal and popular Meaning of the Words, had led us into the lowest Conceptions imaginable of the Deity'.⁶⁴

Bayle's trial of the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23 demonstrated that it violated the 'single Principle' or Rule of God-given Reason by leading inexorably to Iniquity. In the first place, coercion violated 'Ideas of natural Light', by producing hypocritical worship rather than the sincere love, fear and reverence which the supreme being justly deserves. Second, it was 'contrary to the whole tenor and Spirit of the Gospel', which had itself been 'verified' by the 'Original Rule' of 'natural light'. Third, it confounded Virtue and Vice, and so 'overturns all Morality'. Fourth, it gave Infidels 'a very plausible' pretence for persecuting Christians. Fifth, it could not be put into practice 'without unavoidable Crimes'. Sixth, it removed one of the main Christian objections to

Islam: namely, that it was 'built upon persecuting Principles'. Seventh, it was unknown to the Fathers of the first three centuries. Eighth, it undermined 'the Complaints of the first Christians against their Pagan Persecutors'. Finally, it exposed 'true Christians to continual Violences' and turned the world into 'a continual Scene of Blood'. In short, the literal interpretation carried 'an Obligation of committing Iniquity', and was therefore false. Logically, Christians were required to adopt a 'metaphorical' reading of the passage. Christ's 'compel' must refer to the moral force of compelling preaching, not to physical force.⁶⁵

Bayle's natural law argument was open to the criticism that it had set an external authority – Reason – over and against Scripture. But the *Philosophical Commentary* sought to forestall such objections. First, Bayle alleged that 'the whole Body of Divines, of what Party soever, after having cry'd up Revelation... come to pay their homage at last at the Footstool of the Throne of Reason'. Protestants would never concede the Socinian claim that the Trinity or Incarnation are 'contradictory doctrines'. Catholics fiercely denied that Transubstantiation was 'repugnant to sound Philosophy'. Hence all theologians acknowledged that divine Revelation must correlate with God-given Reason.⁶⁶ Second, Bayle stressed that 'natural Light' came from God. Citing the Prologue of John's Gospel, he called it 'the light which enlightens every man'. The Scriptures themselves testified to this 'natural Revelation', 'this primitive and metaphysical Light'; hence it was only right and proper that the special revelation of the Bible lined up with the natural revelation of Reason.⁶⁷ The evident principles of natural light could trump *debatable* interpretations of Scripture, but this did not mean that the clear teaching of the Bible could be undercut by questionable maxims of reason.⁶⁸

Yet in seeking a principle or rule to govern the interpretation of 'infinite passages of Scripture', in the New Testament as well as the Old, Bayle went beyond traditional Reformed theology. Although the concept of 'natural light' had a place within Reformed orthodoxy, Bayle (perhaps unintentionally) reinforced the growing tendency to prioritise natural over revealed theology.⁶⁹ He also went beyond earlier tolerationists. They had sometimes argued that the magistrate could only punish teaching or practice which violated 'natural light'. Thus it was criminal to deny the existence of God or future judgement, since these were allegedly accessible to natural reason, while it was not criminal to deny the Trinity or even the Scriptures, since these doctrines were the product of special revelation.⁷⁰ But rather than using the idea of 'natural light' to demarcate the boundaries of toleration, Bayle used it to regulate

biblical interpretation, apparently elevating it above Scripture. Indeed, many readers in his lifetime and later detected in his writings irreverence and scepticism towards the Bible – not least in the biblical articles of his famous *Dictionary*. His *Philosophical Commentary* fed the Enlightenment assumption that Scripture was ethically superfluous, since its moral teachings were more accessible by the light of nature. For this reason, it arguably marked the close of ‘the biblical century’ in political thought.

Despite the differences between Bayle and other Protestant tolerationists, they had all tried to establish hermeneutical frameworks that would explain which texts should be read literally and which should not, which texts were binding and which had been abrogated. Christian Hebraists had used rabbinic sources to distinguish between what was living in the Hebrew republic (its Erastianism and toleration) and what was dead (its theocratic penal laws). Radical Protestants had applied the dispensational argument in order to show that the state and land of Israel was a type of Christ, fulfilled at his coming, and thus no ‘pattern nor precedent’ under the Gospel. These approaches arguably pointed towards different religious settlements – Selden’s Hebraic argument foreshadowed England’s tolerant, Erastian church establishment after 1689, while the Miltonic case for severing church and state would find its fulfilment in the disestablishment of America’s First Amendment in 1791. But both strategies (like Bayle’s ‘light of nature’ hermeneutic) had successfully tamed or neutralised some of the Bible’s fiercest texts. By reinterpreting Scripture, tolerationists had re-imagined Christendom.

Scripture and toleration in contemporary Islam

This point is not lost on contemporary reformers within the Islamic tradition. Writing in *The Guardian*, the former Islamist Ed Husain praises a 600-page Pakistani *fatwa* condemning suicide bombing and terrorism as unscriptural. He defends the value of such theological interventions by comparing them to John Locke’s works on tolerance. These were, he explains, ‘Christian fatwas in the midst of 17th century European wars of religion. Locke wrote with references to the Bible. His arguments were rooted in theology.’⁷¹ Other Muslim commentators are equally struck by the parallels between Locke and today’s liberal Muslim intellectuals. One recent writer is impressed by how many of these Islamic reformers have shared Locke’s experience of exile. Like him, they operate in a context of great political turmoil and clerical authoritarianism. And like him,

they construct religious arguments against intolerance. 'Muslims', the article concludes, 'can learn more about how to argue for toleration by studying him.' Because Locke speaks the language of belief, conscience and true religion, he is 'more accessible' to Muslim audiences than philosophers who talk of 'secularism'.⁷² A similar case is made by Nader Hashemi in his acclaimed book *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy*, which includes a chapter entitled 'Duelling Scriptures: The Political Theology of John Locke and the Democratization of Muslim Societies'. If Muslims want to use 'comparative historical analysis' to understand their own societies, he argues, they should look to the English Revolution rather than the French, and to the era when political thought involved political theology. Indeed, Hashemi finds striking 'political and religious parallels between Locke's England' and twenty-first-century Iran. Locke is significant because he reveals 'the religious roots of modern liberal democracy' and shows 'how it is possible to find theoretical space within religion to advance an argument for popular sovereignty and human rights'. Like contemporary reformers, he proceeded by 'a reinterpretation – not outright rejection – of religious thought', and was thus able to 'advocate a new political philosophy without alienating his entire political constituency'. He is relevant because his arguments for toleration emerge 'out of a dissenting religious exegesis'. Faced with the authoritarians of the Islamic world, reformers can imitate Locke.⁷³

Academic historians tend to be suspicious of such instrumentalist appropriations of the past. We warn against 'presentism' and the risk of anachronism, and wince at misleading analogies between past and present. Instead of seeking a usable past, we stress that the past is a foreign country, a place for trained historians, somewhere that politicians and public moralists would be best to avoid. We even say that the past should be studied for its own sake (whatever that means). Historians have been quick to highlight the limits of Miltonic or Lockean tolerance, their distance from modern secular liberalism. Yet whether we like it or not, the seventeenth-century thinkers we have discussed are being keenly considered in contemporary debates over religion, coexistence and toleration. When the philosopher Martha Nussbaum excavates America's tradition of religious equality, she pays particular attention to Roger Williams.⁷⁴ In the wake of 9/11, discussion among literary intellectuals centres on the 'biblical violence' or the 'religious terrorism' of Milton's Samson.⁷⁵ When Mark Lilla attempts to explain 'the Great Separation' between religion and politics in the West, he draws a genealogy

originating from Hobbes and Locke.⁷⁶ When secularists man the ramparts to defend the Enlightenment, they are increasingly likely to hail Bayle and Spinoza.⁷⁷

These retrospective glances reflect a sense of cultural *déjà vu*, a perception that twenty-first-century societies are reliving early modern crises. Even among Protestants there are some who look back with nostalgia to the pre-Enlightenment, when heretics and blasphemers received their just deserts. On the fringe of the American Religious Right, a group variously known as Theonomists, Dominionists or Christian Reconstructionists argue that the Mosaic penal laws (including capital punishment for blasphemy) should still apply in Christian states. In conservative Presbyterian circles, the Theonomists and their critics replay the debates of the 1640s.⁷⁸ Yet despite being Exhibit A in almost every alarmist tract written against the Religious Right, the Theonomists' flat repudiation of modern ideals of religious liberty is radically out of step with Protestant opinion since the Enlightenment. Very few contemporary Protestants (whether liberal or conservative) and very few Catholics (whether modernist or traditionalist) would have any quarrel with Article 18 of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public and private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.⁷⁹

Within twenty-first-century Islam, however, this modern doctrine of religious liberty is still deeply controversial. In the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) adopted a very different position in Article 10: 'Islam . . . prohibits any form of compulsion on Man or the exploitation of his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism.'⁸⁰ Whereas the UN's Declaration guarantees what political philosophers call 'exit rights', the OIC's is designed to rule out any missionary intrusion from either Christians or secularists. Behind this clause lies the double standard that once prevailed among Protestants and within Roman Catholicism before Vatican II – freedom for the true religion does not entail freedom for false religion. In the case of Islam, that double standard is underpinned by the traditional law against apostasy. As one

liberal Muslim puts it, 'The implication is that Islam is a religion with free entry, but no free exit.'⁸¹

The debate over whether apostasy should be a capital offence divides some of the most famous names within modern Islam. On the one side, defending the death penalty (at least for apostates who insist on proselytising others), stand leaders such as the celebrated Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi.⁸² On the other, opposing capital punishment for apostasy, are reformists such as the Swiss intellectual Tariq Ramadan, a figure variously touted as a 'Muslim Martin Luther' or a 'Muslim John Locke'.⁸³ While the numbers of people actually executed for apostasy in the Islamic world are tiny (as were the number of heresy executions in seventeenth-century Protestant Europe), there are good reasons for thinking that apostasy and blasphemy codes have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.⁸⁴ The contemporary intra-Islamic debate over apostasy bears comparison with the post-Reformation, intra-Protestant controversy over the civil punishment of heretics and blasphemers. Of course, there are many differences, not least in the contents of sacred texts the conception of scripture and authority, and the historical contexts. The early modern Protestant controversy occurred in a world without liberal democracies or universal declarations of human rights, and played a part in creating that world. Whereas the Christian debate focused on capital punishment for 'heretics', the Islamic debate is centred on the concept of *riddah* (usually translated as 'apostasy'), a quite different category.⁸⁵ Yet in both cases the advocates of repression make a scriptural case, one their critics simply have to address. Moses and Muhammad have to be contextualised. While this could be done by flatly denying the authority of sacred texts, this is hardly likely to win over a religious community. Change is more likely to be effected by thinkers working from within the tradition who persuasively reinterpret scriptural texts, and reform scriptural reading.

This is the project undertaken by Muslim critics of blasphemy and apostasy laws, such as the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, S. A. Rahman, or the professor of Islamic studies Abdullah Saeed.⁸⁶ Where seventeenth-century Protestants had to undermine the scriptural case for coercion made by St Augustine and endorsed by the Reformers, modern Muslims have to counteract the sheer weight of Islamic tradition that lies behind the death penalty for apostasy. As Tariq Ramadan explains, 'The great majority of the Muslim scholars, from all the different traditions and throughout history, have been of the opinion that changing one's religion is prohibited in Islam and should be sanctioned by the death penalty.'⁸⁷ The major schools of Islamic jurisprudence, both Sunni and

Shi'a, concur that apostasy is a capital crime under shari'a law, at least in the case of unrepentant adult males. The basis for this provision is found in the hadith, the collections of traditions about the Prophet which (to varying degrees) have been accorded the status of Scripture alongside the Qur'an itself. Of prime importance is the report that Muhammad said, 'Whoever changes his religion shall be put to death'.⁸⁸

Against this venerable tradition, modern and liberal Muslims make a number of hermeneutical moves that recall the strategies of Protestant tolerationists.⁸⁹ In the first place, they appeal to the Qur'an over the hadith in much the same way that radical Protestants appealed to the New Testament over the Old. And they exploit the fact that while the Qur'an has the status of the word of God directly revealed to the Prophet, this is not the case with the hadith, which have been retold by contemporaries (some more reliably than others). The Qur'an, they argue, warns apostates of punishment in the afterlife but prescribes no temporal punishment. Moreover, it teaches that Islam is spread through voluntary conversion not coercion. The proof text, 'There is no compulsion in religion', is held up as a universal principle, just as tolerationists used the New Testament statement that 'the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but spiritual'. For Rahman the Qur'anic text presents 'a charter of freedom of conscience unparalleled in the religious annals of mankind'.⁹⁰ Traditional jurists limited or nullified this text, not least by suggesting that it had been abrogated by the Prophet's later teaching and practice as recorded in the hadith. For this reason, and in contrast to seventeenth-century Protestants, Muslim opponents of religious coercion challenge the zealous use of the principle of abrogation. Indeed, they seek to overturn the 'master narrative' whereby the tolerant texts of the Prophet's Meccan period are said to have been abrogated by the belligerent sayings and actions of his later rule in Medina.⁹¹ Reformists explain the problematic hadith in various ways, sometimes by questioning their authenticity, but primarily by placing them in the context of military struggle between the Prophet and his enemies. The 'apostates' in question, they maintain, were guilty of treason and armed rebellion, and were not punished simply for rejecting Islam. Traditionalists, by contrast, seem to depict the early Islamic community as a theocracy, much as Hebraists depicted Old Testament Israel: if God is the ruler, then apostasy from Islam or the renunciation of the God of Israel constitutes 'high treason' and 'manifest revolt' and is worthy of death. Nevertheless, Protestant tolerationists and Muslim reformists get to similar conclusions by different routes – the actions of armed prophets (whether Moses

or Muhammad) do not oblige modern states to execute people guilty of purely religious offences.

If these debates have centred on the founders of the respective faiths, they have not ended there, for reformers have had to grapple with subsequent interpretive tradition. Christian tolerationists capitalised on the fact that Christianity emerged and spread as a persecuted minority, and they were able to appeal with William Penn to 'the true Christians, of the first three Hundred Years'.⁹² The early Church Fathers could be played off against medieval and early modern defenders of religious coercion; even the later Augustine could be undermined by invoking his younger and better self. Tolerationists claimed the mantle of 'Primitive Christianity', and blamed the practice of religious coercion on medieval 'popish' declension. Their Muslim counterparts face a more challenging task, since the early jurists were overwhelmingly in favour of capital punishment for apostasy. In comparison to radical Protestant primitivists, Muslim (and Catholic) reformers have been less willing to write off centuries of tradition. But after contextualising draconian codes and pointing to evidence that so-called apostates were actually guilty of sedition or rebellion, they do suggest that apostasy laws were a regrettable development, a departure from the tolerant spirit of the Qur'an.⁹³ At the same time, they can point to the minority report of some early Islamic jurists and pile up testimonies as they seek to demonstrate that their own reading of Scripture has ample support among contemporary divines, scholars and statesmen. In this respect, too, they resemble Protestant tolerationists.⁹⁴

Now, as then, the battle over toleration is an intellectual struggle, a battle for sacred texts. We should not assume – Whiggishly – that the outcome is inevitable or that Islam is bound to follow a Western Christian trajectory. Even if it does, we may expect the debate to be protracted. For religious believers, ancient scripture, historic tradition and communal consensus carry much greater weight than they do for modern secular liberals. Traditional interpretations are innocent until proven guilty. Presbyterians, who had once condemned religious toleration as a 'wicked doctrine' eventually came to embrace the principle of religious liberty, but only after decades of political turmoil and intellectual change. Even then the outcome varied according to national context, and in some circles it is still controversial, as indicated by American theologians.⁹⁵ In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, the process took even longer, and Catholics are still debating whether Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Liberty (*Dignitas humanae*) was a break with tradition, or merely a development of it.⁹⁶ Muslims work

with a different set of sacred texts, with different concepts and with different notions of scripture, tradition and authority, and they find themselves in an extraordinarily diverse set of cultural and geographical locations. But in the twenty-first century, as in the seventeenth, the prospects for religious toleration depend (if only in part) on scriptural hermeneutics.

Notes

1. Wilbur K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, 4 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932–1940).
2. The English translation appeared five years later: Joseph Lecler, S. J., *Toleration and the Reformation*, trans. T. L. Westow, 2 vols (London: Longman, 1960). For the intra-Catholic debate on religious freedom in which Lecler participated see Philippe Denis and Jean-Pierre Massaut, 'Le Père Lecler, la Tolérance et le Concile', *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, 78 (1990), 15–39; Joseph Komonchak, 'Religious Freedom and the Confessional State: The Twentieth-Century Discussion', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique*, 95 (2000), 634–50; Emile Perreau-Saussine, *Catholicism and Democracy: An Essay in the History of Political Thought*, trans. Richard Rex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 127–31.
3. Gordon Wood, 'Rambunctious American Democracy', *New York Review of Books*, 9 May 2002, p. 21.
4. Salman Rushdie, 'Muslims Unite! A New Reformation Will Bring Your Faith into the Modern Era', *The Times*, 11 August 2005; 'Lesson One for the Modern Muslim: Remember, this is not the 8th century', *The Times*, 12 September 2005. Rushdie's articles generated widespread debate, and online searches will reveal numerous articles discussing whether Islam needs a Reformation or an Enlightenment. The idea of 'an Islamic Reformation' pre-dates 2005. See, for example, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996); Michelle Browers and Charles Kurzman, eds, *An Islamic Reformation?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004). The notion of 'an Islamic Enlightenment' appears to have gained traction more recently. See M. Hakan Yavuz, *Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gulen Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
5. Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); *Enlightenment Contested* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); *Democratic Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
6. Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. xii, p. 311.
7. Benjamin Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 12, 357–58.
8. James Simpson, *Burning to Read: English Fundamentalism and its Reformation Opponents* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 8, 10–14, passim.

9. I take the phrase from Phyllis Trible, *Texts of Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narrative* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984). 'Scriptural reasoning' is the name given to the practice of reading each other's scriptures in small interfaith groups: <http://www.scripturalreasoning.org/> (accessed 4 October 2012).
10. These trends can be explored respectively through the journal *Hebraic Political Studies* (2005–) and Michael Lieb, Emma Mason and Jonathan Roberts, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception History of the Bible* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
11. See, for example, the two studies of the Locke–Proast controversy: Richard Vernon, *The Career of Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast and After* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1997); and Adam Wolfson, *Persecution or Toleration: An Explication of the Locke-Proast Quarrel, 1689–1704* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010). Of course, scriptural reasoning was much less prominent in these exchanges than in the Independent–Presbyterian debates of the 1640s, but neither book does justice to Locke's Hebraic and dispensational arguments.
12. John Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 536–679.
13. See John Coffey, 'Quentin Skinner and the religious dimension of early modern political thought', in Alister Chapman, John Coffey and Brad Gregory, eds, *Seeing Things their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), Chapter 3.
14. *The Political Writings of St Augustine*, ed. H. Paolucci (Chicago: 1962), pp. 184–240.
15. John Gray, 'Battle of the Books', *New Statesman*, 31 July 2006.
16. Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*, third edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); *The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); *Laying Down the Sword: Why We Can't Ignore the Bible's Violent Verses* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011).
17. David Adams, 'The Printing and Publishing History of Milton's *Areopagitica*', unpublished paper. I am grateful to the author for allowing me to see this paper.
18. I have explored this milieu in *John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2006), Chapters 4–6.
19. See *Bibliotheca Furliana* (1714), pp. 62, 89, 180.
20. Marshall, *John Locke*, p. 493.
21. Philip van Limborch, *Theologia Christiana* (Amsterdam, 1686, 1700), translated by William Jones as *A Compleat System, or Body of Divinity* (London, 1702).
22. See John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, ed. J. C. Higgins-Biddle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), Appendix II: Index of Biblical References (pp. 220–26). On biblical reasoning in Locke's political thought see Jeremy Waldron, *God, Locke and Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
23. Bodleian Library, MS Locke c33, 24v. The religious character of Locke's case for toleration is underlined by Jack Turner, 'John Locke, Christian Mission, and Colonial America', *Modern Intellectual History*, 8 (2011), 267–97.

24. Pierre Bayle, *Commentaire Philosophique sur ces Paroles de Jésus-Christ, 'Contrain-les d'Entrer'* (1686–1687). I will cite from the contemporary English translation, *A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, 'Compel them to Come In, That My House May be Full'* (1708), edited and with an introduction by John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005).
25. J. Samuel Preus, *Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Noel Malcolm, 'Hobbes, Ezra and the Bible: The History of a Subversive Idea', in his *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Chapter 12; David Katz, *God's Last Words: Reading the English Bible from the Reformation to Fundamentalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 70–152.
26. Marshall, *John Locke*, p. 17.
27. Michael Hunter, 'Aikenhead the Atheist', in his *Science and the Shape of Orthodoxy* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1995), pp. 308–22; Michael F. Graham, *The Blasphemies of Thomas Aikenhead: Boundaries of Belief on the Eve of the Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).
28. This has received relatively little attention in general surveys of toleration debates, though one does find a scriptural index at the end of each volume of Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation*, I, p. 432; II, p. 544. See also Andrew Murphy, *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2001), pp. 96–103.
29. Eric Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 3.
30. [Roger Williams], *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution* (London, 1644), pp. 160, 179.
31. [Henry Robinson], *Liberty of Conscience* (London, 1644), p. 13.
32. Milton, *A Treatise of Civil Power* (1659), in *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Dom Wolfe, 8 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–1982), VII, p. 259.
33. On Jurieu's reliance on the Old Testament see Walter Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), Chapter 6. For a more general survey of Jurieu's intolerance see Marshall, *John Locke*, Chapter 14.
34. Van Limborch, *A Compleat System*, p. 987.
35. On the use and rejection of Old Testament precedent in English debates on church and state, see also Eliane Glaser, *Judaism without Jews: Philosemitism and Christian Polemic in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), esp. Chapter 4; and Acsah Guibbory, *Christian Identity, Jews and Israel in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
36. Jason Rosenblatt, *Renaissance England's Chief Rabbi: John Selden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapters 6–9; Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic*, Chapter 3; 'From Selden to Mendelssohn: Hebraism and religious freedom', in Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, eds, *Freedom and the Construction of Europe*, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Chapter 6.

37. Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic*, p. 91.
38. Rosenblatt, *Renaissance England's Chief Rabbi*, pp. 176–81. The arguments are expounded in Chapters 6–8 and in Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic*, Chapter 3.
39. Milton, *Areopagitica* (1644), in *Complete Prose Works*, II, p. 513.
40. *The Writings of William Walwyn*, ed. Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989), pp. 128–29, 136, 240; [Robinson], *John the Baptist*, p. 81.
41. Henry Stubbe, *An Essay in Defence of the Good Old Cause* (1659), sig. **6, pp. 42–59, 101–20.
42. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, pp. 36–39, 6.
43. Bayle, *A Philosophical Commentary*, pp. 179–80, 183.
44. Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic*, p. 89.
45. Here I agree with Robert Yelle, who has argued (with reference to Roger Williams and others) that 'Nelson underestimates the role that traditional Christian anti-Judaism, particularly as expressed in biblical typology, played in a broader process of secularization'. See Yelle, 'Moses' Veil: Secularization as Christian Myth', in Winnifred Sullivan, Robert Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, eds, *Cultural Lives of Law: After Secular Law* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Law Books, 2011), Chapter 1, quotation at p. 31.
46. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, VII, p. 281.
47. Williams, *The Bloody Tenent*, sig. a2v.
48. Williams, *The Bloody Tenent*, sig. a2v.
49. See Sacvan Bercovitch, 'Typology in Puritan New England: The Williams-Cotton Controversy Reassessed', *American Quarterly*, 19 (1967), 163–91; James P. Byrd, *The Challenges of Roger Williams: Religious Liberty, Violent Persecution and the Bible* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002).
50. The tension between the spiritual typology of Origen and the political typology of Eusebius and its relevance to toleration debates is explored in Henning Graf Reventlow, *The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World* (London: SCM, 1984), pp. 140–44, 180–81.
51. Williams, *The Bloody Tenent*, sig. a2v, pp. 178–79, 183–84, 195.
52. Williams, *Queries of the Highest Consideration* (1644), pp. 1, 3, 6, 13.
53. [Robinson], *John the Baptist*, pp. 99, 18–19, 56–57, 70, 85–86.
54. [Robinson], *Liberty of Conscience*, pp. 16, 22, 28–30; [Robinson], *John the Baptist*, pp. 20, 85–86, 99.
55. [Robinson], *Liberty of Conscience*, p. 3. See also pp. 14–20; [Robinson], *John the Baptist*, pp. 6–7, 84–85.
56. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, VII, pp. 239, 277, 281, 260, 290–91.
57. John Milton, *Complete Shorter Poems*, ed. John Carey (London: Longman, 1971), p. 295. For further analysis of Milton's views on Old Testament Israel see Douglas Brooks (ed.), *Milton and the Jews* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Guibbory, *Christian Identity, Jews and Israel*, esp. Chapter 8.
58. Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle*, Chapter 6. Selections from the essay are anthologised in *Bayle: Political Writings*, ed. Sally Jenkinson (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 36–54.
59. Van Limborch, *A Compleat System*, p. 987.
60. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, pp. 36–38.
61. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, VII, pp. 260–61, 268; II, p. 514.

62. Van Limborch, *A Compleat System*, pp. 988–91.
63. On Bayle's use of natural theology see Ian Harris, 'Toleration and its place: A study of Pierre Bayle in his *Commentaire Philosophique*', in Sarah Hutton and Paul Schurman, eds, *Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp. 225–43.
64. Bayle, *A Philosophical Commentary*, pp. 65–69.
65. Bayle, *A Philosophical Commentary*, pp. 66, 78.
66. Bayle, *A Philosophical Commentary*, pp. 66–68.
67. Bayle, *A Philosophical Commentary*, pp. 68–75.
68. See John Kilcullen, *Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld, Bayle, and Toleration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 103. One could draw an analogy with debates over science and Scripture. A Baylean approach would suggest that firmly established scientific findings (e.g., heliocentrism or biological evolution) should trump debatable interpretations of the Bible (e.g., literalist readings of Joshua's long day or the six-day creation account in Genesis 1–2).
69. See Richard Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 4 vols (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), I, Chapter 6: 'Natural and Supernatural Theology', esp. p. 307.
70. See the arguments of radical Independents such as John Goodwin and John Wildman in 'The Whitehall Debates, December 1648', in A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates (1647–49) from the Clarke Manuscripts* (London: J. M. Dent, 1992), pp. 156–57, 161. Reventlow, *The Authority of the Bible*, pp. 180–81, suggests that despite the Puritan appeal to the Bible, 'the decisive criteria comes from other spheres', not least from natural law.
71. Ed Husain, 'Fatwas can be a Force for Good', *The Guardian*, 26 February 2010.
72. Joy Samad, 'John Locke and Muslim Liberalism', *Journal of Church and State*, 53 (2010), 84–108.
73. Nader Hashemi, *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Towards a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 2, quotations at pp. 17–18, 100–02. The case for drawing on the English rather than the French Revolution is made in Chapters 1 and 3.
74. Martha Nussbaum, *Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
75. John Carey, 'A Work in Praise of Terrorism? September 11 and *Samson Agonistes*', *Times Literary Supplement*, 6 September 2002, pp. 15–16.
76. Mark Lilla, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics and the Modern West* (New York: Random House, 2007). See the extensive online engagements at The Immanent Frame: <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/category/the-stillborn-god/> (accessed 1 October 2012).
77. See, for example, Christopher Hitchens, *God Is Not Great: The Case against Religion* (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), pp. 260–64.
78. See William S. Barker and W. Robert Godfrey, eds, *Theonomy: A Reformed Critique* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), which revisits the arguments of Westminster Assembly divines.
79. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml> (accessed 3 October 2012).

80. Cited in Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 16–17.
81. Mustafa Akyol, *Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), p. 274. See more generally, Chapter 15: 'Freedom from Islam'.
82. See Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, 'Apostasy: Major and Minor' (2006), <http://islam.maxforum.org/2010/04/03/apostasy-major-minor/> (accessed 5 October 2012).
83. Paul Donnelly, 'Tariq Ramadan: The Muslim Martin Luther?', *Salon*, 15 February 2002: http://www.salon.com/2002/02/15/ramadan_2/; Andrew F. March, 'Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam and "Overlapping Consensus"', *Ethics and International Affairs*, 21 (2007), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/21_4/essays/001.html (accessed 5 October 2012). Ramadan himself cites Locke and Voltaire on tolerance in *The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism* (London: Allen Lane, 2010), Chapter 4.
84. See Paul Marshall and Nina Shea, eds, *Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
85. For the complex relationship between concepts of apostasy, blasphemy and heresy in Islam see K. Hashemi, *Studies in Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights: Religious Legal Traditions, International Human Rights Law and Muslim States* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 21–131.
86. S. A. Rahman, *Punishment of Apostasy in Islam* ([1972]; New Delhi: Kitab Bhaban, 1996); Saeed and Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam*.
87. 'Muslim scholars speak out on jihad, apostasy and women' (28 July 2007), at <http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article1163&lang=fr> (accessed 3 October 2012). S. A. Rahman, *Punishment of Apostasy in Islam*, admits he is going against 'the generally accepted orthodox view that a change of faith by a Muslim invites the penalty of death' (p. 134). Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam*, note that 'The vast majority of Muslim scholars writing on the issue of apostasy today follow the pre-modern position' (p. 88), and add that 'since there was unanimous agreement on the punishment of apostasy among pre-modern jurists, it would be very difficult for a modern scholar to oppose such a position in Islamic law' (p. 92).
88. See Saeed and Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam*, Chapter 4; Rahman, *Punishment of Apostasy in Islam*, Chapters 2–4.
89. What follows is a brief summary of the arguments found in Rahman, *Punishment of Apostasy in Islam*, Chapters 1–2; and Saeed and Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam*, Chapter 5. See also the numerous testimonies by moderate Muslim scholars, jurists and political leaders assembled at <http://apostasyandislam.blogspot.co.uk/>
90. Rahman, *Punishment of Apostasy in Islam*, p. 16.
91. For a challenge to this 'master narrative', see Sohail H. Hashemi, 'The Qur'an and tolerance: an interpretive essay on Verse 5:48', *Journal of Human Rights*, 2 (2003), 81–103.
92. *The Political Writing of William Penn*, ed. Andrew R. Murphy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), p. 89.

93. See especially Rahman, *Punishment of Apostasy in Islam*.
94. See Rahman, *Punishment of Apostasy in Islam*, passim; and Saeed and Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam*, pp. 90–98; <http://apostasyandislam.blogspot.co.uk/> (accessed 3 September 2012). Compare with *The Political Writings of William Penn*, pp. 105–11.
95. For an assessment of how Presbyterians initially came to terms with broad conceptions of religious liberty see John Coffey, 'Between Reformation and Enlightenment: Presbyterian Clergy, Religious Liberty and Intellectual Change', in R. Armstrong and T. O'Hannrachain, eds, *Insular Christianity: Alternative Models of the Church in Britain and Ireland, c.1550–c.1750* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 252–71.
96. Perreau-Saussine, *Catholicism and Democracy*; John McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), Chapter 7; Kevin Grasso and Robert P. Hunt, eds, *Catholicism and Religious Liberty: Contemporary Reflections on Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Liberty* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Arnold T. Guminski and Brian W. Harrison, O. S., *Religious Freedom: Did Vatican II Contradict Traditional Catholic Doctrine?* (South Bend, IN: St Augustine's Press, 2012).

2

Some Forms of Religious Liberty: Political Thinking, Ecclesiology and Religious Freedom in Early Modern England

Justin Champion

What did it mean to be a free person in early modern England? Was this freedom a political, religious or moral state? The distinctive answers to this simple question were shaped by context and audience: Archbishop Thomas Cranmer's answer (in the 1540s) may have contradicted that of James II (in the 1680s); republican poet John Milton's would have been different from that of eighteenth-century high church priest Francis Atterbury, and Thomas Hobbes's response contradictory to that of Archbishop William Laud.¹ One thing is unmistakable, however, and almost without exception: any answer would have not been able to avoid taking into consideration concepts of both civil and religious liberty. These accounts might have included defences of the freedom of the true Christian from oppression by the Antichrist, or the liberty of the 'conscience' from persecution by the ungodly, or demands to express a lively faith and true sanctification in acts of free Christian love. Sometimes these languages of religious freedom (exempted from interference by Roman Catholic, Protestant, or sectarian agencies) sat comfortably alongside articulations of civil liberties (the freedoms of citizens from illegal taxation or from prerogative interference in the rule of law). The history of the tensions between these sometimes converging and (more often) conflictual languages was driven by the evolving

Versions of this paper were delivered at Yale University and at Birkbeck College and Royal Holloway, University of London. I am very grateful for comments to Blair Worden, John Marshall, Jeremy Collins and Steven Pincus.

relationships between subject and state, between churchmen and laity, and between bishop and king over the allocation of correct jurisdictional forms of power and authority. In some contexts the claims of 'Christian liberty' trumped those 'liberties' of civil authorities. Questions of jurisdiction necessarily prompted discussions of the nature and limits of obligation: these in their turn encouraged debates between the rival claims of Jerusalem and those of Athens.² In understanding these various conceptions of liberty articulated in such diverse contexts, as will be discussed below, recourse will be made to the philosophical insights of Isaiah Berlin and the subsequent revisions of Quentin Skinner. The suggestion advanced here will be that, although the conceptual architecture developed in those works does not pay enough attention to questions of religious freedom, it nevertheless provides a powerful way of considering those issues. The chapter will therefore outline the ecclesiological traditions of the period, review and present the historiography of the typology of civil liberty and then explore the application of those conceptual insights to the history of religious freedom especially in the context of the fierce anticlericalism of the 'commonwealth' tradition after 1650.³

Ecclesiology and religious liberty

This contribution is a synthetic attempt to bring two sets of historical enquiries to bear on each other: the history of early modern political thought and the history of religious ideas between Reformation and Enlightenment.⁴ Its premise is a profound dissatisfaction with the caesura between the narratives describing the evolutions of discourses of political liberty and those delineating the development of ideas of religious toleration and 'Enlightenment'.⁵ The fundamental question addressed here is, 'how far was "liberty" a conception derived from, or defined by, the relationship between individuals and both civil and religious power?' The simple claim, advanced here (in contrast to the prevailing secular emphasis of current historiography) will be that the relationship between citizenship and conscience was the critical starting point for definitions of *libertas*. The structural coincidence between the demands of Protestant orthodoxy and the civil duties of obligation meant that the 'liberties' entailed in definitions of citizenship were intimately (and perhaps necessarily) connected to contemporary religious identity. That there was an obvious variety of 'religious' understandings of how civil power might legitimately function (ranging from a minimalist account that suggested there could be no positive architectonic

role to the claim that the state had a duty to enforce the injunctions of true religion by its coercive power) suggests that 'liberty' is best explored within a set of themes that involve the connection between religion and politics, rather than the exclusive preserve of civil matters.⁶ Arguments about the nature and legitimacy of the state were, then, shaped by religious concerns: put simply, ecclesiology was a theory of the state. As will be explored below, conceptions of liberty (whether in Berlin's two forms or Skinner's important revision) were products of this nexus.

Before exploring the accounts of the historiographical development of theories of civil liberty, it will be helpful to outline the practical context of the problem of religion for the early modern state. These problematic ecclesiological foundations lay in Constantine's Christianisation of the Roman Empire. This was manifest in the imperial ideology that underpinned first the Henrician (and then subsequent ideas) of the Royal Supremacy and meant that the doctrine of two societies (and the common assumption of the superiority of the *civitatis dei*) bedevilled debates about 'liberty'.⁷ Ecclesiology, then, in the conditions of early modern society, was the seed-ground for ideas of liberty. This has not been the common starting point for historians of liberty in the period. Indeed there has been a pronounced historiographical duality between the study of the history of civil liberty (as an aspect of the broader history of political thought) and the history of religious liberty (conceived of as the rise of the 'liberty of conscience' and ideas of toleration and persecution).⁸ This division of historical enquiry into discrete secular and religious foci has not mirrored the increasing tendency of historians of politics, society and culture to recognise the fusion of the two societies.

It is perhaps now uncontroversial to suggest that the motor of political crisis (between 1500 and 1700) was powered by religious contestation, either among communities or between minorities and civil power. This was, first and foremost, a battle for the legitimate exercise of jurisdictional power and authority, conducted between the various agencies of *regnum* and *sacerdotium*. To complicate the process, over the period, the claims of 'conscience' became ever more strident.⁹ In order to contextualise the discussion of debates about 'liberty' it is imperative to recall that this was an age of routine and brutal religious atrocity – the episodes of the Massacre of St Bartholomew's Day (1572) or the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) punctuated the chronic persecution meted out as 'holy violence'.¹⁰ The experience of exile and assassination affected many, but took place alongside more habitual processes which saw the disenfranchisement of civic rights for many more. Those seeking either refuge from persecution or legitimate resistance to it experienced the

power of the confessional state in tooth and claw. Many of the changes and developments in the modes of political thinking were developed as responses to these sorts of experience.¹¹ From the perspective of the state – whether embracing the traditions of enforced conformity, or initiating active and specific punishments of minorities at moments of political crisis – it is clear there was little to distinguish Protestant policy from Roman Catholic. The fundamental combination of a theory of intolerance which legitimated physical discipline of the body as a Christian duty to save the sinning soul with a political conviction that heresy inevitably led to sedition ensured that discussions of ‘liberty’ necessarily needed to engage with such experiences.¹² The languages of martyrdom, of plotting and exile, exploited both by both recusant minorities and by saintly zealots, informed public discourses alongside more mainstream political theory.¹³

Contrary to the dominant accounts of the history of liberty in the early modern world, it is wise to ponder ecclesiological issues – church and state were the two great millstones betwixt which liberty and conscience were refined. Whether in the form of the persecution of individual conscience or of the state sanction of public religion, the ability to regulate both religious belief and behaviour was arguably the most powerful and immediate manifestation of state power. The fact that the most dominant injunction of political discourse was derived from Romans 13 suggests it was difficult for contemporaries to conceive of, or initiate, discussions of the relationship between power and liberty outside of divine discourses. The prevailing theory of order, premised on a providential conception of the function of government as a *remedium peccati*, suggested that the sites for constraining or extending conceptions of liberty were to be located in the relationships not only between state and subject, but also between monarchy and priest, and priest and believer.

A starting point for thinking about liberty in this frame of mind was the confrontation between godly conscience and ‘ungodly commandments’, whether issued by civil or spiritual authority. As Skinner has established, the early development of Lutheran ideas of ‘office’ suggested that ‘if the magistrate fails in his office ... it must be lawful ... to repel this unjust force with force’.¹⁴ The arguments which dogged the Tudor and Stuart monarchy could be traced back to the related problem of defining the prerogatives and liberties of the Royal Supremacy – that is, of the power of the monarchy, in relation not simply to the community but to the Church too. The debate around ‘matters indifferent’, or over *the de jure divino* claims of episcopacy all in one sense

hinged on the purchase of the language of the Act of Supremacy, which insisted the institution of monarchy be used to 'to the pleasure of Almighty God [and] the increase of virtue in Christ's religion'. For some thinkers the fact that all Christians were part of the visible church, and a community co-incident with the civil commonwealth, implied that the monarchy had certain religious duties. For others, although the monarchy had undeniable duties to promote godly doctrine, and to suppress idolatry, they might not claim *potestas ordinis* – that is, a power to define truth and speak for God. Indeed the tension between the necessity of order and that of evangelical truth was one that insisted that civil authority had power over external aspects of the church, but not over 'the inward and secret court of conscience'.¹⁵ The sixteenth-century Protestant theologian Thomas Bilson (answering his Catholic opponent Allen's Modest defence) made the distinction between those who may 'command for truth' (the *regnum*) and those who may 'direct for truth' (*sacerdotium*). While this limited the authority of the civil state in determining the meaning of revelation or administering the sacraments, it also implied in a very clear way that there were limits to ecclesiastical jurisdiction – 'pastors may teach, exhort and reprove, not force command or revenge'.¹⁶ Although there was considerable dispute about the precise prescriptive ecclesiastical legacy of the apostolic succession (for some the *esse* of the Church was to be found in episcopacy, for some it was with Presbyterian institutions, for others in another form of 'Godly rule'), all agreed that it was the prime function of the Christian magistrate to exhort to godliness and to punish sin, idolatry and heresy.¹⁷

Historians have for many decades deployed a meta-narrative of enlightenment and progress which linked religion and society in the evolving history of liberty in the early modern period.¹⁸ The achievement of the 'rise of toleration' was once thought to be a product of specifically Protestant dimensions of the Reformation: such 'Whiggism' is no longer plausible.¹⁹ Nevertheless there is a considerable and indeed sophisticated historiography devoted to exploring the relationships between 'Puritanism' and 'Liberty'. In an important article Colin Davis has established that the struggles for freedom in the English Revolution took a specific and profound religious form: 'properly understood, liberty of conscience meant submission to God.' Davis's point is that, despite the coincidence of languages of civil and religious liberty, the focus of religious liberty was to free the godly conscience from illegitimate regulation. As he explains, 'What was wrong then with a tyrannical civil authority was not that it deprived its subjects of their liberty or

humanity in some secular sense but that it could prevent their agency under God; it got in the way of Christian subjection.' In this worldview of the radical Protestants of the 1640s and 1650s true freedom lay in being 'subjected to him alone'. Interestingly, Davis uses the conceptual tools of Berlin's distinctions on forms of liberty in his discussion of the Whitehall debate about liberty of conscience: he writes

Are we at that first stage when conscience must be liberated from the magistrates and when safeguards of its liberty be established ... Or are we at the second stage of surrendering our wills and consciences in submission to a living, volatile and demanding God?²⁰

It is possible to articulate ideas of religious liberty in these conceptual forms in reinforcing the claim that the pursuit of freedom was, for many thinkers in the period, a God-oriented activity. Tyranny was a form of subjection which not only actively coerced or persecuted the godly conscience but also more routinely subjected it to authority other than God. As Davis neatly puts it, 'the fundamental issue for the Godly was how to free society for the expression of God's purpose.'²¹

John Coffey has offered some cogent correctives to this view in establishing that there were 'Puritan' voices capable of constructing passionate and sincere arguments in defence of the toleration not just of the godly but also of false religions. Exploring the same Whitehall debates' concern with whether the magistrate ought to have 'any compulsive and restrictive powers in matters of religion', he suggests there was a clear division between conservative and radical tolerationists, the latter being closely associated with the Baptists and those connected with the Leveller movement.²² As Coffey acknowledges, even the radical form of toleration did not permit forbearance to the irreligious and atheistical.²³ In arguing that tolerationists made a claim for 'freedom from the religious authority of the state in order that individuals might submit to God's authority', Coffey is in concord with Davis's account in applying the Berlin distinctions between positive and negative freedom to the issue. Despite clear evidence for the presence of a reasonably extensive defence of toleration, the 'Puritan' writers' influence has been overshadowed by the contribution of Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689), which is still regarded as a milestone on the road to modernity.²⁴

It is a commonplace that the most philosophically 'modern' form of civil and religious liberty is embodied in the life and work of Locke – the *Two Treatises on Government* and the *Letter Concerning Toleration*. Yet, even for Locke (as John Marshall has recently reiterated), there was a

(deliberate) bifurcation between the types of argument constructed to defend political and religious liberties. Indeed the persisting purchase of traditional theological assumptions underpinning his conceptions of 'liberty' (the relationships between a Christian God, the nature of conscience and the foundations of a moral civil life) are most evident in the limitations even Locke placed on the idea of the tolerable conscience. This is not to diminish Locke, but, despite (perhaps because of) his profoundly heterodox theological idiosyncrasies, he still remained committed to a revealed Christianity. Indeed Locke inscribed a number of core assumptions about the existence of divine duties (man as god's workmanship, the ethics of conviction, the 'reasonableness' of a credal minimalism) into the underpinning for his prescriptions for the proper relationships between individual and community, and individual and political authority. In his political writings it was Locke's objective (and achievement) to disconnect religious identity from the business of the purpose and legitimacy of the state. Unlike for many contemporaries, for Locke conscience was not an appropriate agent or even cement for the constitution of legitimate political authority. The consequence of this position was that in matters of conscience, then, political institutions could have no legitimate or even, perhaps more importantly, no effective function. The state had no authority to define, to understand, to recognise or to enforce the claims of an absolute metaphysical or religious truth.²⁵

The limits of Locke's negative understanding of religious liberty can be seen in the way he drew distinctions between tolerable and intolerable religious expression, belief and activity. The application of what we might inelegantly call a political sociability test constrained liberty for some – most significantly, Roman Catholics and atheists. These distinctions – combined with the explicit insistence of the argument against the toleration of any conceivable form of religious commitment – exposed how such ideas straddled the distinction between tolerance (as an attitude and disposition) and toleration (as a social policy and legal regulation). Roman Catholics and atheists were excluded because their convictions implied commitments which transgressed principles (in Locke's view) of either political or social trust.

These limitations on liberty were the result of prioritising the preservation of civil peace over the Catholic or atheist 'conscience'. The principle of religious liberty was constrained by the pragmatic intrusion of traditional 'politics' into the realm of conscience. This not only exposes the Christian premises of Locke's thought and in doing so, indeed, badges him as a man of his times – it perhaps also enables a conversation about

the Christian identity of the moderate form of the 'early enlightenment' project. It is clear too, that Locke has been let off too lightly here by subsequent historians and philosophers. There were clear and unambiguous alternatives to these prudential and pragmatic objections to the toleration of atheists and Catholics, in the thinking of Pierre Bayle, Spinoza and – more importantly – Thomas Hobbes, all of whom in their different ways challenged the assumption that religion was the necessary source for the moral underpinning of political society. These thinkers discussed the freedoms of 'religion' and its relationship to politics rather than the Christian notion of 'conscience'. By claiming that morality was conventional, historical and contingently constructed, they invoked no prior commitment to a divine metaphysics. Hobbes's claim to have based political legitimacy upon a natural law of self-preservation unhinged public morality from divine patterns; the investment of an absolute Erastianism in civil sovereignty (again detached from a revealed template of religious truth) committed him to a transcendence of Christian toleration, and to a war against all religious institutions.

Locke was a heretic on the margins of Anglican and Protestant heterodoxy, but still within a carapace of Christian theological commitments. He aimed to preserve a space for religious liberty free from interference by clerical or civil institutions. There was, however, a contemporaneous discourse – made by men such as Hobbes and Bayle and, later, the republican tradition reinvigorated by Toland – which did challenge the fundamental assumption that religion was a necessary premise of civil order. The Lockean discourse, despite its much later reputation and reception, was still an ecclesiological position resting upon the assumption that theism was necessary for a stable civil life. The Lockean commitment to precepts of non-interference was not intended to lay the corner-stone of an intellectual challenge to the principle of religious truth but was intended to enable the sincere believer to explore their convictions unhindered. Here, writing just over 30 years ago, Herbert Butterfield drew an important distinction between theories of toleration and 'religious liberty' – the latter, he insisted, 'included, of course, the right to reject the whole theory and practice of religion'.²⁶ This distinction is an important but much overlooked one: it is not an aspect of 'liberty' much commented upon in any of the recent historiography. As Butterfield commented elsewhere, 'the extraordinary tenacity of irrational religious prejudice' exercised a profound effect on the development of civil liberties in British life – an influence, as I shall suggest, that still persists deep in the seams of our historical writing.²⁷ The arguments developed for defending liberty of conscience are then to be

strictly distinguished from those that claimed a *libertas philosophandi*. The defence of free thought and freethinking was arguably a different sort of liberty – one that aimed (in the name of ‘enlightenment’) at freeing the human mind (and thereby the body) from the tyrannous dependency on the claims of religious orthodoxy.

Two concepts of political liberty

According to recent commentators, neo-Roman theorists defined liberty ‘in a strictly political sense’: on the contrary, as will be discussed in this section, a theory of religious freedom was at the core of such accounts. While there is clear evidence that such thinkers concerned themselves ‘almost exclusively with the relationship between the freedom of subjects and the powers of the state’, and in particular the nature of the relationship between civil liberty and political obligation, this account occludes the crucial dimensions of ecclesiology.²⁸ The relationship between church and state, and between church and laity, was of fundamental importance in constructing arguments about liberty. There are two core themes which need to be addressed: first, that the starting point for thinking about ‘liberty’ in the early modern period was ecclesiological; and second, that the third form of liberty (as articulated by Skinner) was to be found not just in the civil discourses of the republicans but also in their radical account of intellectual freedom, which challenged the commonplace defence of conscientious toleration. The dominant master narrative for outlining secular accounts of the history of liberty in early modern Europe has been provided in a series of important works composed by Quentin Skinner.²⁹ From the two volumes of *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, 1978) to the synthetic position of *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1998) Skinner has laid the historical foundations and provided an account of those series of moments and contexts which saw the invention and evolution of a recognisably modern language of liberty and rights which themselves allowed the conceptualisation of the state as a free-standing ‘impersonal’ structure. The precise historical contexts for each of these significant accounts were the Italian city state of the Renaissance (which provided sources to explore the republican thinking of civic humanism) and the Europe of the post-sixteenth-century ‘Wars of Religion’. Machiavelli and Hobbes remain the emblematic thinkers for Skinner’s project: the one reanimating ancient ideals of *virtu* against the Christian humanism of his day; the other, in contesting the ‘democratical’ ideals of those

who opposed the Stuart monarchy, constructing an account of the relationship between individual liberty and the state which underpinned a new vision of civil peace. Importantly, both thinkers kicked violently against the pricks of contemporary religious and ethical orthodoxy: they were explicitly and deliberately contrarian in terms of theological assumptions. Despite the key context of religious disorder and conflict (which provides the narrative framework for especially Volume 2 of *The Foundations* under the title of 'The Age of Reformation'), the narrative is resolutely political in character: that, is it eschews reflection on the implications of civil understandings of liberty for religious freedom. Because this work has wielded an extraordinarily powerful influence over subsequent historiography, not simply in the focus of its analytical insights but also, significantly, by determining the secular idiom of such historical enquiry, it is important to outline the shape of the arguments in order to establish connections with the development of ideas of religious freedom. Skinner's writings have been, first and foremost, a history of political argument and political theory rather than of religious understandings.

Skinner's historical writings do, however, offer not only a substantive account of the conceptual changes and innovations over the early modern period but also a method for undertaking such enquiries; they also provide a conceptual structure, then, for thinking about religious freedom. The insistence, now broadly accepted as a commonplace, is that the historical understanding of texts and events in the past is best done by placing them in their proper contexts. Historical meaning can thus be worked through by the calibration of textual performance against contemporaneous linguistic discourses. The writings of men such as Machiavelli or Hobbes were, then, acts performed in specific historical moments, compiled to achieve specific ends. Reconstructing this relationship between text, context and meaning is the task of the historian. In partnership with John Pocock, we now have accounts of the plural languages of political thinking in the period – jurisprudential, common law, historical – but despite this pluralism of discourse the historiography has almost entirely ignored the religious context.³⁰ This is not to claim that Skinner is unaware of the importance of theological argument: the careful explication of Luther's acceptance of arguments for dutiful resistance by inferior magistrates on the legal advice of continental Protestant theologians such as Martin Bucer and Philipp Melancthon, the discussion of the use of the Geneva Bible in the construction of a theory of godly duty, or the acute and precise discussion of the relationship between covenant and contract in the monarchomach writings

of the later sixteenth century, establish that he is perfectly capable of exploring the theological dimensions of 'political' thinking. Volume 2 of *The Foundations* is, after all, a consideration of the problem of disorder prompted by theories of resistance articulated in defence of religious truth. One of the achievements of *The Foundations* is clarity about how the invention of the modern political language (associated with the concept of the 'state') was achieved at the expense of languages of theology and religion.

Two of the major figures in Skinner's account, Hobbes and Locke, were not uninterested in the vocabulary of ecclesiology (*imperium, sacerdotium*) as well as in exploring civil liberty. Political liberty escaped from the claims of theology, but only after a long conceptual engagement. Pocock recently noted this aspect of Skinner's work when he commented: 'it is a curious fact, that since the second volume of his *Foundations* long ago, Skinner has not written much about the encounter between civic authority and spiritual.'³¹ Since the mid-1980s, with a historiography increasingly keen to explore what for shorthand has become known as the 'confessional state', this exclusion looks increasingly difficult to justify. Whether one is entirely comfortable with Jonathan Clark's claims about the persistence of *de jure divino* foundations of political, social and religious institutions in the ancient regime after 1700, the suggestion that religious worldviews still endured, and that therefore 'modern' conceptions of the state remained contested seems undisputable.³²

Much of Skinner's elegant analysis of the nature of early modern liberty has been informed and extrapolated from his dialogue with Isaiah Berlin's two concepts of liberty. Berlin outlined a distinction between a positive and negative form of liberty: the former describing a positive freedom to do, be or express something; the latter, or negative form, implied the absence of restraint upon actions – in other words to be free from coercion or impediment in choosing or undertaking preferred actions.³³ Skinner has suggested that the early modern period saw a process of contestation between variants of these two conceptions of liberty – a dispute most evident in the rival visions of Harrington and Hobbes.³⁴ Skinner has importantly proposed a subtle revision of Berlin's original distinctions in suggesting that the neo-Roman thinkers of the period expressed a 'third' form of liberty. While recognising that participation in the government of a free state was the precondition for individual liberty, Skinner suggested that this freedom itself rested upon a deeper negative conception. It was not simply that active coercion by the state (or other institutions) infringed upon individual liberty,

but, as he explains: 'You will also be rendered unfree if you merely fall into a condition of political subjection or dependence ... you will already be living as a slave.'³⁵ Freedom from a state of dependency or domination (defined as being subject to interference from the arbitrary will of another) is therefore at the core of the neo-Roman theory of liberty. Skinner is very clear on this point: 'Freedom is restricted not merely by actual interference or the threat of it, but also by our awareness of the mere fact that we are living in dependence on the goodwill of others.'³⁶ Skinner traces this conception of liberty as the absence of dependency back to Roman Law sources in Justinian's Codex, and transmitted to the early modern world through editions of the writings of Tacitus, Livy and Sallust. It is also part of his claim that the opposition to the prerogative encroachments of the Stuart monarchy embodied in texts such as the Petition of Right (1628) and those prompted by the final crisis of the early 1640s were evidence of this sort of understanding.³⁷ Hobbes developed his ideas in reaction to these expressions.

As Skinner explains, there were two ways in which people were constrained by knowing that they were 'living in dependence on the goodwill of an arbitrary prince'. First, that 'there are certain things you are not free to say or do'; second, as a corollary of this, 'you will lack the freedom from saying and doing certain things'. In effect, the consequence of this sort of domination was a people fearful of expressing any independence of thought or fearless speech: this was a fundamental and primary form of mental slavery. Differing from Berlin, Skinner is insistent that such a concept did not simply rest upon the idea of the absence of interference (as Berlin had claimed): 'mere awareness' of the possibility of dependence, rather than the concrete existence of 'some visible act of hindrance', was enough. Here the claim of a perceptual rather than physical constraint is significant for the argument to be developed later on in this contribution about the importance of religious liberty. Skinner is insistent, following the arguments of his Classical sources (in particular, Tacitus) that early modern authors were convinced there were profoundly negative psychological consequences of living under a tyranny. Self-censorship, servility and prejudice are the products of such civil corruption.³⁸

Skinner's third form of liberty (from domination, or the possibility of domination) is presented in a political idiom, but – and this is the case advanced here – it is also a category profoundly applicable to religious or intellectual liberty. Freedom from intellectual and mental domination is a powerful way of approaching the consideration of historical theories

of religious liberty. The transferral of this concept from civil matters to religious concerns makes sense because of the confessional nature of the early modern state (expressed in the most basic ecclesiological form of an established Church), which imposed clear and fundamental limits upon the intellectual freedom of the community. The existence of legal constraints – Acts of Supremacy, various 39 Articles, Test Acts, even Toleration Acts – alongside webs of legal conformity enforced by parish, diocesan and national jurisdictions combined to create a system of dependency and domination.³⁹ As Skinner has noted, the distinctive character of neo-Roman political theory suggested a necessary view of the relationship between the liberty of citizens and the formal constitution of the state: ‘it is possible to enjoy our individual liberty if and only if we live as citizens of self-governing republics. To live as subjects of a monarch is to live as slaves.’⁴⁰ If the ecclesiological dimension of the experience of the early modern state is introduced into this structure, could the statement not be adjusted appropriately to include a clause that reads, ‘to live as subjects of an established Church is to live as slaves’? Being dependent upon either a *sacerdotium* or a civil power that claimed either jurisdictional power or doctrinal authority over the public definition of truth might also reduce us to this condition of slavery – indeed, the mere existence of such agencies, without the practical hindrance of specific acts of coercion on aspects of our religious belief or behaviour, would be enough to produce this condition of oppression.

The practical nature of infringements on political liberty also caused profound hindrances to complete religious freedom. The core areas would include the following: each person might have the freedom to (not) go to any specific church; they might wish to (not) believe in the Trinity (or indeed in any other theological doctrine – transubstantiation, the (im)mortality of the soul, the (non-)existence of God, or Angels, or Spirit; they might wish to (not) believe in revelation. Skinner’s powerful account of Tacitean polemic against the dependency produced by the arbitrary power of tyrants and corrupted courts was also turned against religious tyranny. After the 1650s the anxiety about the growth of ‘popery and arbitrary government’ meant that religious vocabulary was the dominant usage in the public war against illegal government. ‘Priests’ were added to a trinity of those who made corrupting dependency, alongside tyrants and courtiers. Anticlerical discourse associated with the word ‘priestcraft’ (which was after all coined by Harrington) was an addition to the Tacitean critique of tyranny adapted for Christian culture.⁴¹

The importation and adaptation of classical republican ideas required some imaginative labour from early modern minds. This also prompts us as historians to recognise the adjustments. Authors such as Tacitus (and for that matter the other relevant Classical sources) composed their works in very distinctive ecclesiological contexts. The Roman state (both republic and empire) had a very different relationship with the religions of antiquity. While it is clear there was a profound hostility (undoubtedly absorbed and redirected by some early modern writers) towards Christianity, often dismissed as atheism, the Roman state drew a very specific distinction between public and private religious practices.⁴² The thinking in Cicero's *De divinatione* and *De natura deorum* is the classic expression of the functional relationship between the public and political *religio* and the corrupted *superstitio* which might be called civic paganism. Political uses of 'prodigies' under the Republic are the most evident example of this public religion: as North notes, 'republican religion is very much more "republican" than we are accustomed to think it. The confusion here lies in the modern tendency to see religion as an area independent of other parts of civic life.' Neo-Roman theories of political liberty were built, then, within an environment which explicitly acknowledged the public political value of religious institutions. This religious dimension has fallen from the historical discussion: a consideration of it may offer a useful conceptual bridge to connecting republican thinking to the Enlightenment.⁴³ There were, of course, critics of public religion – Lucretius being the most profound. Indeed, Lucretian usage of a vocabulary of *oppressa*, as Summers notes, 'conjures up an image of a religion that threatens, pollutes, and cruelly subjugates human life like a despot lording it over his subjects'.⁴⁴ The claim that any public religion based on fear was tyrannous was the core principle underlying both ancient and modern forms of republicanism: the corollary that 'fear' must be subjugated by reason and an understanding of the nature of things was an explicitly political programme. This tradition of thinking about the relationship between politics and religion was consciously absorbed in the post-Renaissance transmission of republican ideas – Machiavelli, especially in the *Discourses* (I. 11–15) engaged with it: Harrington and Rousseau in developing their conceptions of civil religion did so explicitly.⁴⁵ At the conceptual core, then, of neo-Roman theories of liberty was an understanding of the proper relationship between religion and the political state. As will be discussed below, this suggests that an examination of liberty requires careful attention to both religious and civil ideas in order to recapture contemporary meanings successfully.

Republican anticlericalism and religious freedom

The debate about the precise character (and continuity) of civil opposition to the Stuart monarchy in the seventeenth century is still vibrant. One of the ongoing debates concerns the development of these discourses alongside Lockean arguments, and perhaps more importantly the adjustments Anglophone republican authors had to make to the exigencies of writing after 1689, in a fundamentally monarchical regime. Nevertheless, the eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen, irrespective of modern historiographical assertions, thought of themselves as republicans defending liberty against the tyranny of corrupting self-interest. It has been a much ignored conundrum that men such as the early eighteenth-century Freethinking pamphleteer John Toland (who happily devoted considerable energies to editing the canon of republican authors from the 1650s for new audiences after 1700), and the leading eighteenth-century Commonwealth politicians and writers Sir Robert Molesworth and Thomas Gordon, and, still later, the Radical Whig philanthropist Thomas Hollis saw no contradiction between their commitments and those of these earlier men – yet if the strict political reading of their understandings of the relationship between civil liberty and the ‘free state’ is accurate, they must have found living under even the legally constrained Hanoverian monarchy uncomfortable.⁴⁶ This seems not to have been the case, possibly because they saw the greater threat to liberty as originating in ecclesiastical institutions.

Using Skinner’s understanding (that non-dependency underlay the core discourses of liberty) to engage with the ecclesiological thinking of these later republicans may help address some of these issues. Although this is far from being a dominant theme in his writings, Skinner’s own work has implied this connection of conceptions. The interregnum essayist Francis Osborne pinpointed the corrupting role of ‘flattering clergy and courtiers’ in fashioning absolutist defences of monarchy. Milton’s polemic in *Eikonoklastes* can be read not only as a powerful rebuttal of tyranny but also as a critique of the clergy’s role in creating ‘dependence’ in the minds of the people.⁴⁷ Those condemned by men such as Sidney as ‘obnoxious’ for being servile promoters of arbitrary power included not just courtiers but also priests.⁴⁸ Milton, characterised by Skinner as one of the most powerful proponents of a neo-Roman theory of liberty, was absolutely clear that this understanding was premised on religion. As he explained in *The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth* (1660):

the whole freedom of man consists either in spiritual or civil libertie. As for spiritual, who can be at rest, who can enjoy any thing in this world with contentment, who hath not libertie to serve God and to save his own soul, according to the best light which God hath planted in him to that purpose, by the reading of his reveal'd will and the guidance of his holy spirit?

Milton clearly stated the priority: 'This liberty of conscience, which above all other things ought to be to all men dearest and most precious.'⁴⁹ The thrust of Skinner's argument has been to establish that the neo-Roman theory of free states was a 'highly subversive ideology in early modern Britain' because in its fundamental opposition to monarchy it appropriated 'the supreme moral value of freedom and appl[ie]d it exclusively to certain rather radical forms of representative government'.⁵⁰ The exclusive account of liberty as a political and civil matter has marginalised the existing, and pertinent, religious dimension. Given the perceived divine foundations of political authority in the period, the 'reviving libertie' which men like Milton sought to achieve crucially included (as a starting point) resolving the question of toleration. As many contemporaries insisted, the fault with such arguments was that they subverted not only the government of kings but also, by default, the rule of God in the universe.

Skinner's explication of 'the condition of dependance' is a very useful device for understanding the republican critique of clericalism, which persisted into the eighteenth century. It also allows a bridge to be built between the historiographies of political thought, the 'rise' of toleration and the more recent accounts of the Enlightenment. The militant anticlericalism of Whig and commonwealth writers after 1650 explicitly condemned the political consequences of tyrannous 'priestcraft': the writings of Milton, Harrington, Sidney and Ludlow were fine-tuned to legitimate a political agenda which aimed to crush ecclesiastical domination and reinforce the liberty of free thought.⁵¹ In a free state, an 'Anglia libera', as Toland put it, 'men are born in the same condition, and that, when they com to years of maturity, they are equally free to dispose of themselves as Reason shall direct them'. These rational individuals incorporated themselves into 'civil society' for 'mutual delights and assistance' and 'greater security to their persons and possessions'.⁵² Although legislative power was supreme, it was not arbitrary but fiduciary; consequently the 'whole people may call them to account' if the trust of establishing the 'security, welfare and felicity' of the common good was compromised.⁵³ Arbitrary power, especially in the form of an

absolute monarchy, was not really 'any kind of civil government' but 'infinitely worse than the very state of nature'.⁵⁴ The genius of 'free governments' lay in the ability to 'perfect the Felicity of mankind'.⁵⁵ As well as economic and social success, 'arts, inventions, and learning are universally encourag'd, and in the most flourishing condition'; there was no intolerance directed against the free exercise of religious or philosophical expression.⁵⁶ Fundamental to the definition of liberty in a free state was the 'liberty of the understanding'. The free constitution of the national church was arraigned against the tyranny of popish idolatry and superstition. 'Liberty of Conscience' underpinned civil liberty: no one on religious grounds should be deprived of 'any privileges in the state to which they have a Right by birth, naturalisation, or otherwise'.⁵⁷

This theme of a free state acting as a forum for the development of the independent citizen was a consistent mark of commonwealth discourse after 1689: that brief included the establishment of religious freedom. A brief sample of some public texts defending England as a 'free state' in the 1720s written by men such as the political journalists John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon and the leading Whig aristocrat Sir Robert Molesworth indicates these ambitions. Works such as *Cato's Letters* and *The Independent Whig* articulated these core ideas in a cheap, popular and widely broadcast form: these men's work was republished across the century and the anglophone world, as well as being translated into French for 'Enlightened' audiences on the continent. Aiming to secure liberty from all forms of tyranny, the journals indicted the corrupting influence of false religious institutions with a vocabulary of delusion, imposture, enchantment, glamour and bewitchment. The power of senseless words bedazzled the people into believing false ideas and holding prejudices about true liberty: minds were 'addled', 'bewitched' and 'dazzled'. The power of 'senseless sounds' was such that it compromised liberty – for the body to be chained 'their minds must be enchanted and deceived'. The clergy were able to mobilise 'the terror and delusion occasioned by solemn and ill-sounding names' to legitimate arbitrary government. 'Fairy force' and 'Fairy notions' exercised constraining effects on liberty, compromising free speech 'when you might think what you would, and speak what you thought'. The people were 'trepanned into slavery' by the Church's claim to speak for God. 'Gloomy imposture' designed by 'ministers of ambition' made the people dependent upon 'prejudice', 'dreams' and the fantasies of the clerical imagination.⁵⁸ This anticlerical and heterodox discourse, which characterised organised religion as 'imposture', also formed the backbone of the corpus of clandestine literature in circulation amongst radical circles on the Continent.⁵⁹

Thomas Gordon, co-author of much of the journalism which propagated this hostility against the corrupting influence of what Daniel Dennett has recently neatly labelled 'belief in belief',⁶⁰ also spent considerable efforts in developing this theory of dependence explicitly within the framework of the Roman sources which Skinner has so effectively identified as contributing to the articulation of a third concept of liberty. Gordon undertook editions of Tacitus (the *Histories* and the *Annals*) and of Sallust, which proved to be enduringly popular in England, Scotland and Ireland, as well as the American colonies and France: importantly, these volumes were prefaced by lengthy 'political discourses' which anchored the relevance of the works for contemporary politics.⁶¹ As Pocock has summarised, Gordon's achievement was to restore Tacitus as a 'post-republican' narrator of the loss of liberty. One of the keynotes of this analysis was the Constantinian 'foundation of spiritual Tyranny' which had corrupted subsequent civil politics around Europe: thus Rome had 'been since racked under a Tyranny more painful, as 'tis more slow; and more base, as 'tis scarce a domination of men: I mean her vassalage to a sort of being of all others the most merciless and contemptible, Monks and spectres'. This sort of 'domination' by clerical institutions was a persisting problem for the civil government of the eighteenth century.⁶² The problem of religious domination had not compromised the ancient polity of Rome: the belief in *de jure divino* monarchy which underpinned modern servitude was absent, and, despite the superstition of their religion, it had never 'offered such an insult to common sense, as to teach them that their Deities, as capricious as they thought them, warranted Tyranny and sanctified Tyrants'.⁶³

Gordon was keen to portray even primitive Christianity, especially its bishops, as 'ambitious' to cultivate dependency as a grounding for tyranny. The case of Emperor Julian the Apostate was significant. Confronted by a Christian community ('strangely degenerated from the primitive peaceableness and purity, becom[ing] licentious and turbulent to the last degree') led by bishops ('the most complaisant Courtiers') into incendiary sedition, he acted effectively to suppress the churchmen.⁶⁴ Gordon, necessarily guarded in his comments, noted that Julian, despite his paganism, was a positive 'pattern to Princes', while bemoaning that the 'barbarous and Anti-Christian' temper of the 'narrow, monkish and vindictive' clergy had persisted beyond antiquity. Gordon appreciated precisely the Tacitean condemnation of 'debasement' which was the product of 'power unlimited' in contrast to the independence created 'where Law and Liberty reign'. In his commentary the core principle was that mental dependence was both product and producer of tyranny,

for, as he wrote, 'superstition enslaves as effectually as real Power, and therefore confers it'. As Gordon explained, 'where men hold their fortunes and lives at the mere mercy of another, they will fear him as much as they love themselves, and flatter him, as much as they fear him'. The pattern of behaviour in the Roman empire was that all 'independence' of mind and 'free speakers' were subjected to destruction; 'men of elevated minds' were irreconcilable to arbitrary power and thus all 'publick spirit' was 'converted' into 'fear and anxiety': this danger persisted in the eighteenth century.⁶⁵

In an extended discussion of the dangers of flattery Gordon also defended freedom of speech against restraint, which was 'no inconsiderable link in the public chain'.⁶⁶ In the second volume of his editions, Gordon offered 12 further discourses – numbers 9, 10 and 12 dealing with the power that religious delusion could have over the people. In these sections Gordon outlined a succinct account of how contemporary ecclesiastical institutions compromised 'liberty', and therefore, as a consequence, how this could be avoided. At the core of his analysis was a claim that the characters of a people were shaped 'chiefly by education and the exercise of the understanding', given that 'by nature men are alike, all made of the same materials'. The function of government was 'public education, and as the national discipline is good or bad, nations will be well nurtured, or ill'. In all 'civilised' countries the people were 'generally harmless and manageable, where they are not misled or oppressed'. This concept of 'oppression' (as a form of constraint on liberty) was central to Gordon's polemic – 'oppression is apt to make a wise man mad, nay the wiser he is the more he will feel the oppression, because he will the more readily discern it to be unjust'.⁶⁷ What is clear is that this conception of liberty (from dependence and oppression), while having profoundly political repercussions, was conceived of as something intimately connected to religious institutions and freedoms.

The power of religious delusion (Gordon refers to being deceived by 'names and deluders'), manifest in institutions such as the Inquisition (dismissed as 'pernicious impostors'), to bewitch the people was persistent from the Roman empire to contemporary times. 'So effectually bound and blinded' was this enslavement that, a people once so compromised by such seduction, 'they are ready to fight in defence of their blindness and chains, ready to sacrifice and butcher all who would enlighten and release them'. Resisting this 'power and mischief of delusion' was, then, a crucial part of establishing complete liberty. Enlightenment and freedom were cognate projects, for 'When all

inquiry is forbid, all inquirers executed and damned; what can ensue but thick ignorance and barbarity, the triumph of fraud, the exile of commonsense'.⁶⁸ The contradiction of those 'impostors' and 'ghostly deceivers' who claimed to speak for God ('who would not obey, when he is convinced that the Almighty commands?') was a republican imperative. The Enlightenment project against the 'sovereign force of delusion' aimed to free the 'candid spirit' from domination by false religion and the 'nonsense of sounds ... to bear slavery as duty and happiness' saw common ground between religious and civil liberty.⁶⁹ In the 12th discourse, 'of public Teaching and Teachers', Gordon explicated a more definite idea of the duties of the state to ensure that 'public education be rational and just'. This education was more than simply university and school education, but a broader rational understanding directed against the forces of superstition 'which teaches men not to reason, but to fear, not to see, but to believe'. The cultivation of reason was the grounding for the people to 'despise delusion and to abhor deluders ... to honour Governors but to owe no allegiance to oppressors'.⁷⁰

For Gordon, despite the injunctions of primitive Christianity, false religious institutions and ghostly nonsense had historically produced slavery: 'a people led by delusion, especially by religious delusion (the most powerful of all others, and thence the most practised) are the subjects not of the civil magistrate, but of the deluders.' Liberty was preserved against this oppression, by ensuring that the state controlled such institutions to avoid all manifestations of 'spiritual independent power, all chimerical claims to divine right'. A complement to 'unbounded power' in the civil state, 'ghostly ... priestcraft ... has long prevailed into the world, done prodigious mischief in it, and proved always baneful to private conscience and to public liberty'.⁷¹ Ignorance, 'universal slavery', discord and persecution were the products of clerical domination, regardless of confessional identity (Calvin was a 'pope' for burning Servetus).⁷² Gordon's was not a singular voice in articulating this defence of liberty from the oppressive force of corrupt religion. The tradition of civic enlightenment can also be seen in works such as the 1734 edition of Pierre Bayle's *Historical Dictionary*. The dedication to the prime minister, Robert Walpole, noted that the volumes were meant to serve the 'noble end of government' by the enlargement of the understanding and the 'honour and improvement of human nature'. Those who practised 'different politics' by 'cramping the human soul, possessing it with false awe, and debasing it through Darkness and ignorance' were not true magistrates. Dissemination of 'true and extensive knowledge' was fundamental to the 'peace of society'; 'false knowledge' and ignorance,

because capable of raising groundless fears and seditious acts of rage, compromised politics.⁷³

Freethinking and freedom

This polemic for 'freethinking' was by necessity a political argument, both liberating individuals from dependency upon religious institutions and freeing the business of civil life from theological imperatives. Although it is a controversial (and as yet unsubstantiated) claim, there is a case for suggesting that this deeper politics of liberty was to be found initially in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes. This may seem spectacularly improbable (and perhaps even wilfully ignorant), given Quentin Skinner's recent persuasive, and powerful, arguments, which establish that Hobbes's redefinition of civil liberty (as simply the absence of physical obstacles and impediments) was contrived to counter the neo-Roman anxieties of the 'democratical gentlemen' about dependence on the royal will (and to disconnect the implied necessary relationship between a non-monarchical institutional form of free states and liberty).⁷⁴ Much of the language against religious delusion of the eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen discussed above drew from a Hobbist anticlerical vocabulary.

The issue of ecclesiology and 'religious' liberty was fundamental to Hobbes's diagnosis of the threats to civil peace in his times. As Skinner notes, Hobbes commended examples of religious liberty within his state, heralded by the historical untying of the 'knots' upon religious liberty with the triumph of Independency over Presbyterianism and Episcopacy.⁷⁵ Hobbes's views about the relationship between religion and liberty were much more complicated than simply defending the exercise of the 'conscience' under the supervision of the state. Indeed it is debatable whether Hobbes even subscribed to a Christian understanding of 'the revered name of conscience', using it as a synonym for opinion or private belief. The plea to privilege of conscience was one of the core errors the Church and other religious enthusiasts claimed against civil sovereignty identified in Chapter 29.⁷⁶ Hobbes does indeed suggest (in the early days of Christianity) that individuals were free from mental supervision: 'Their Consciences were free, and their Words and Actions subject to none but the Civill Power.'⁷⁷ Indeed the 'the power of the Law' was not appropriately applied to the 'very Thoughts, and Consciences of men, by Examination, and Inquisition of what they Hold, notwithstanding the Conformity of their Speech and Actions'. Indeed the subjection of internal belief to such constraint was something Hobbes attributed

to the Church, who exploited anxieties about salvation to erect their power.⁷⁸ Much of the polemic of *Leviathan* was directed at destroying the domination of the Church over civil society: much of the tone of this anticlerical discourse is set by a core understanding of individual liberty as a form of freedom from dependence.⁷⁹

The starting point for Hobbes's argument was that religion is a natural, powerful and potentially subversive phenomenon. As Hobbes understood it, the combination of the material nature of the human mind and the epistemological state of nature, driven by the added self-interest of clever men (usually labelled 'unpleasing priests'), meant that civil peace was constantly threatened by latent heterodoxy. Where the demands of stable sovereignty called for obligation to one established order, individual 'fear', led by 'conscience', created religious subversion. Importantly, in these arguments Hobbes stigmatised both mainstream Roman Catholic and Protestant doctrines as politically unhelpful. For Hobbes, diversity of belief was a contemporary problem, not because of the implicit intellectual content of a belief but because the ideas motivated men to political dissidence in order to protect their misperceptions of salvation. This was a form of mental dependence cultivated by obnoxious priests which threatened civil order.

One of the pivotal insights of Hobbes's *Leviathan* was that belief systems of individuals and institutions (both civil and sacred) were conventional. Contemporary political culture, premised on an Aristotelian commitment to taking incorporeal ideas for real substance, argued for the divine origins of order. Hobbes exposed the fact that the power of *de jure divino* ideas rested upon their claim to be 'true', while showing that the intellectual content of those beliefs was derived from human agency, rather than supernatural sources. Language, the institution which distinguished man from beast, was thus a foundation of social power. Hobbes's project exposed the social and cultural mechanics of 'belief in belief'. As he pointed out, deploying (in a manner no doubt irritating to clerical readers) a convenient scriptural passage, Romans 10.17, 'Faith comes by hearing', it was no accident that the sources of contemporary political crises lay in dangerous collective passions unleashed by clergymen who, by disseminating competing biblical interpretations, provoked the British civil wars.⁸⁰

The broader ambition of Hobbes's project was to disconnect traditional forms of theological ideas and belief from arguments concerned with the legitimacy of public authority. Hobbes was meticulous in his use of vocabulary – the careful categorical distinctions between opinion,

belief and knowledge outlined the framework of a fundamentally political epistemology. What Hobbes had established in *Leviathan* was of groundbreaking importance: the recognition that beliefs were conventional and, more precisely, that ideas were generated by men and institutions under the banner of truth, for their own advantage – and believed as the ‘truth’ by other men for the same reasons was transformative of the way religious ideas were understood. One immediate consequence of this – and one that Hobbes pursued himself vigorously in his post-Restoration writings – was that, if expressions of religious truth were essentially ideological, then it would be possible by careful reading and criticism to expose the history of such false beliefs: analysis of the historical circumstances of particular institutions made it possible to establish how ‘popery’ and priestcraft had corrupted the history of civil societies. *Behemoth* was a set-piece of analysis showing how the different Protestant confessions had destroyed the Stuart monarchy, while *A Brief Narration Concerning Heresie* executed the same sort of historical analysis, connecting self-interested philosophical ideas to specific bodies of men, for the early Church. This mode of enquiry was a legacy with which Hobbes endowed his radical readers after 1680.⁸¹

One of the even more dramatic consequences of Hobbes’s argument was the removal of the epistemic foundations of public power. No longer was the issue the relationship between true and false, right or wrong: the ‘correctness’ of ideas was defined by public power, not by minorities claiming privileged access to some super-national/natural truth. In effect, Hobbes had laid bare the conventional social mechanism which produced all such ideas: after this insight, then, it would be very difficult for any institution to demand the unflinching belief from the people without the imprimatur of the state. The ‘truth’ as Hobbes understood it, in public, was a set of power claims which necessarily needed to be policed by the civil sovereign; otherwise, as Chapter 29 established, civil disorder was likely. Civil politics was thus freed from dependence upon religious values, just as the private conscience was freed from domination by the Church. This was a very different conception of religious liberty from the dominant Lockean idiom.

Some further explanation is required to appreciate the profundity of Hobbes’s contribution to the development of this alternative idea of liberty from the oppressive power of religion. Hobbes recognised the power of ideas (this is surely one of the paradoxes of such a materialist thinker); he also understood the potentially destructive consequences of un-disciplined religious expression (in fact he claimed that all the serious disorders in human history had been caused by priests of one

sort or another). Hobbes despised mental oppression and ignorance – his extensive theological claims in the second half of *Leviathan* were there to show that a reasonable layperson might construct a civil theology, readily adaptable to the needs of civil peace – that it was possible to show that heterodoxy might be more useful than orthodoxy to the needs of the state. This view may seem wilfully out of kilter with many commonplace accounts of Hobbes – the theorist of the absolute state, voice of the coercive rule of law and the interests of security, authority and order. Yet Hobbes's contribution to the early Enlightenment critique of organised religion is undeniable.⁸²

Hobbes did not align himself with the defence of conscience ultimately expressed in the 'liberalism' of the Lockean project, which sought simply to protect the sincere Christian conscience from invasion by predatory monarchs, priests or neighbours. It is too simple, though, to suggest that Hobbes was authoritarian, intending to legitimate the use of the sword and crosier as tools for collective oppression. There is little evidence that this is the case. Exposing to public view the structure of how all communal beliefs and values were created and sustained by self-interested minorities was an achievement both appreciated and exploited by writers of the later radical Enlightenment. Hobbes secured a space for the freedom of thought within a potentially authoritarian political system, in order to protect the individual mind from personal domination of religion and the religious.

Hobbes's decisive achievement in proposing 'man' as the source of moral and religious value, rather than seek for divine origins, was a turning point in the history of conceptualisations of the nature of human society and its relationship with political authority. Crucially this insight was directed against what he called the 'kingdom of darkness' – not Satan and his legions, but all clergymen who claimed to be ambassadors of Christ. Authors of clandestine manuscripts, publishers of heterodox pamphlets and newspapers were to develop and sustain these arguments and commitments into a much more generic eighteenth-century assault on 'priestcraft'. The transformation of Hobbes's subtle, erudite, witty and ambiguous, post-clerical reading into the sort of explicitly anti-Christian writings of the early and high Enlightenment is a narrative still to be forensically explored.⁸³

In the seventeenth century those concerned to defend 'liberty' often took as their starting point the threat of 'popery'. Such anti-popery, as the century progressed, became identified not simply with Roman Catholic institutions but with a much broader set of religious activities which contaminated even Protestant churches. The consecration

of tyranny ensured that the starting point for establishing any form of liberty was a religious matter. This was most obviously manifest in arguments in defence of liberty of conscience against both the agents, and the condition, of spiritual dependence.⁸⁴ Many of those who addressed the issue agreed that 'superstition' was as powerful a corroder of both institutional and individual liberty, as was physical coercion.⁸⁵ Locke represents the most articulate form of this theorising of a negative form of (civil and religious liberty): neither the state nor other institutions, communities or individuals had any legitimate office to interfere with the minds or bodies of citizens. Despite its elegance (and to contemporaries, its radicalism), Locke's defence of religious liberty had profound limitations: the exclusion of Roman Catholicism and atheists was not simply a contextually explicable aberration, but in fact betrays the fundamentally theological grounding of his thought.⁸⁶

Although the two sets of arguments look similar, there is no case for confirming that the third form of liberty is shared by Locke: for the latter the authority of civil society was still constrained by divine injunctions. The bolder step was taken by thinkers such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Bayle and the later Commonwealthmen, when they articulated a theory of intellectual freedom that deliberately transcended orthodox religious commitments. The anticlericalism of these men was by default a defence of political liberty rather than simply hostility to the Church. The radicalism of this position can be seen in Hobbes's claim that it is possible to construct conceptions of the state without recourse to Christian imperatives. It also underpins Bayle's defence of the moral possibility of a society of atheists. It also lies at the core of Spinoza's defence of the *libertas philosophandi*.⁸⁷ The point here was, surely, that this radical Enlightenment project aimed to free civil society from the constraints of traditional metaphysical commonplaces as the necessary premise for the conduct of an independent and rational life. The radical move made in this theory of liberty was not in the achievement of carving out a space for private Christian conscience but in defending a more fundamental challenge to the presence of religious values in public life.⁸⁸

Notes

1. See Q. Skinner, 'Milton and liberty', *London Review of Books*, 30.10 (22 May 2008), 16–18; idem, 'John Milton and the politics of slavery', *Prose Studies* 23 (2000), 1–22.
2. See the important, but under-recognised, article by J. G. A. Pocock, 'Religious freedom and the desecularisation of politics: From the English civil wars to the Virginia statute', in *The Virginia Statute for religious freedom. Its evolution*

- and consequences in American history, ed. M. D. Peterson and R. C. Vaughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 43–73; M. A. Goldie, 'The English system of liberty', in *The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century political thought (The Cambridge history of political thought)*, ed. M. A. Goldie and R. Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 40–78; see also C. Fatovic, 'The Anti-Catholic roots of liberal and republican conceptions of freedom in English political thought', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 66 (2005), pp. 37–58; S. Zurbuchen 'Republicanism and toleration', in *Republicanism: A shared European heritage: Volume 2. The values of republicanism in early modern Europe*, ed. M. Van Gelderen and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 47–71; J. Dunn, 'The claim to freedom of conscience: Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of worship?', in *From persecution to toleration: The glorious revolution and religion in England*, ed. O. P. Grell, J. Israel and N. Tyacke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 171–193.
3. Berlin's essay establishing the distinction between negative and positive liberty is usefully reprinted and contextualised in *Isaiah Berlin liberty*, ed. H. Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Skinner's revision is to be found in its most focused form in 'A third concept of liberty', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 117 (2002), 237–68.
 4. For an interesting discussion see A. R. Murphy, 'The uneasy relationship between social contract theory and religious toleration', *The Journal of Politics* 59 (1997), 368–92.
 5. For a useful discussion, see, for example, J. Israel, 'Enlightenment! Which enlightenment?' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 67 (2006), 523–45.
 6. See M. J. Braddick, *State formation in early modern England, ca. 1550–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 55–59.
 7. See for example, W. Ullman, 'This realm of England is an Empire', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 30 (1979), 175–206. See also J. Guy, 'The Henrician age', in *The varieties of British political thought, 1500–1800*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 13–46. P. Collinson, 'If Constantine, then also Theodosius: St Ambrose and the integrity of the Elizabethan *Ecclesia Anglicana*', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 30 (1979), 205–29.
 8. J. Coffey, 'Puritanism and liberty revisited: The case for toleration in the English revolution', *Historical Journal* 41 (1998), 961–85; see also idem, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689* (Harlow: Pearson, 2000).
 9. See, for example, J. P. Sommerville, 'Conscience, law, and things indifferent: Arguments on toleration from the Vestiarian controversy to Hobbes and Locke', in *Contexts of conscience in early modern Europe, 1500–1700*, ed. H. E. Braun and E. Vallance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp. 166–79, 222–26; K. Thomas, 'Cases of conscience in seventeenth-century England', in *Public duty and private conscience in seventeenth-century England*, ed. J. S. Morrill, P. Slack and D. R. Woolf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 29–56; E. Leites, ed. *Conscience and casuistry in early modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); J. A. I. Champion, 'Law and the conscience in seventeenth century England', in *Law, the state and religious*

- conscience, ed. J. P. S. McLaren and H. Coward (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998) pp. 13–28.
10. M.A. Goldie, 'The Hilton gang and the purge of London in the 1680s', in *Politics and the political imagination in later Stuart Britain*, ed. H. Nenner (Rochester, NY, and Woodbridge: University of Rochester Press and Boydell & Brewer, 1998), pp. 43–73.
 11. J. H. M. Salmon, *The French religious wars in English political thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); A. McLaren, 'Rethinking republicanism: *Vindiciae, contra tyrannos* in context'. *Historical Journal*, 49 (2006), 23–52.
 12. M. A. Goldie, 'The theory of religious intolerance in restoration England', in *From persecution to toleration* ed. Grell *et al.*, pp. 331–68.
 13. See the excellent B. Kaplan, *Divided by faith. Religious conflict and the practice of toleration in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); G. Glickman, 'Early modern England: Persecution, martyrdom and Toleration?', *The Historical Journal*, 51, 1 (2008), 251–67; A. Walsham, *Charitable hatred: Tolerance and intolerance in England, 1500–1700* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).
 14. Succinctly in Q. Skinner, 'The origins of the Calvinist theory of revolution', in *After the reformation: Essays in honor of J. H. Hexter*, ed. B. C. Malament (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), pp. 309–30 at p. 317; the magnum opus is Q. Skinner, *The foundations of modern political thought volume I: The renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) and *The foundations of modern political thought volume II: The age of reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). See also Q. Skinner, 'Rethinking political liberty', *History Workshop Journal*, 61 (2006), 156–70; idem, 'Classical liberty and the coming of the English Civil War', in *Republicanism*, ed. Van Gelderen *et al.*, pp. 9–28.
 15. W. Cargill Thompson, 'The Two Regiments' (Cambridge University, PhD, 1960), pp. 222, 316.
 16. Cargill Thompson, 'Two regiments', pp. 322–24.
 17. Still the most elegant account is W. M. Lamont, *Godly rule: Politics and religion, 1603–60* (London: Macmillan Press, 1969).
 18. See, for example, R. H. Bainton, 'The struggle for religious liberty', *Church History*, 10 (1941), 95–124; the classic work is W. K. Jordan, *The development of religious toleration in England*, 4 vols. (London, 1932–40). See also P. Zagorin, *How the idea of religious toleration came to the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), and the excellent J. Coffey, *Persecution and toleration in protestant England, 1558–1689* (Harlow: Longman, 2000).
 19. See, in particular, Kaplan, *Divided by Faith*, 'Introduction'.
 20. J. C. Davis, 'Religion and the struggle for freedom in the English revolution', *Historical Journal*, 35 (1992), 507–30, at 516, 521, 524.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 529.
 22. This might be an interesting point of connection with Skinner's account of Leveller concepts of liberty; see Skinner, 'Rethinking political liberty', pp. 161–65.
 23. Coffey, 'Puritanism and liberty', pp. 970, 976.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 982.

25. See J. Marshall, *John Locke, toleration and early Enlightenment culture: Religious intolerance and arguments for religious toleration in early modern and 'early Enlightenment' Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); idem, 'Locke, Socinianism, "Socinianism", and Unitarianism', in *English philosophy in the age of Locke*, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 111–82; idem, *John Locke: Resistance, religion and responsibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
26. H. Butterfield, 'Toleration in early modern times', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 38 (1977), 573–84, at p. 573.
27. H. Butterfield, *Historical development of the principle of toleration in British Life* (London: Epworth Press, 1957), p. 15.
28. See Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*, p. 17.
29. J. G. A. Pocock, 'Quentin Skinner: The history of politics and the politics of history', *Common Knowledge* 10 (2004), 532–50.
30. J. P. Sommerville, *Royalists and patriots: Politics and ideology in England 1603–1640* (London: Longman, 1999); G. Burgess, *Absolute monarchy and the Stuart constitution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); idem, 'Was the Civil War a war of religion? The evidence of political propaganda', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 61 (2000 for 1998), 173–201; J. Scott, *England's troubles: seventeenth-century English political instability in European context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); idem, *Commonwealth principles: Republican writing of the English Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and idem, 'What were Commonwealth principles?' *Historical Journal*, 47 (2004), 591–613.
31. Pocock, 'Quentin Skinner', p. 546; See also P. Springborg, 'Republicanism, freedom from domination, and the Cambridge contextual historians', *Political Studies*, 49 (2001) 851–76.
32. J. C. D. Clark, *English society, 1660–1832: Religion, ideology and politics during the ancien regime*. 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); idem, 'England's ancien regime as a confessional state', *Albion*, 21 (1989), 450–74; J. Innes, 'Jonathan Clark, social history and England's "ancien regime"', *Past & Present*, 115 (1987), 165–200.
33. See Isaiah Berlin, *Liberty: Incorporating 'Four Essays on Liberty'* ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
34. Pocock, 'Quentin Skinner', pp. 542–43, expressed some revisions of this view.
35. Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*, pp. 69–70. Interestingly, although not focused on in this issue directly, J. G. A. Pocock's discussion of 'conditioned liberty' in his 'The classical theory of deference', *The American Historical Review*, 81 (1976), 516–23, offers further context.
36. See the summary in Q. Skinner, 'A third concept of liberty', pp. 23–25, at http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/_pdfs/06/11-skinner.pdf, and idem, 'A third concept of liberty', *London Review of Books* (4 April 2002); for the extended discussion see idem, 'A third concept of liberty', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 117 (2002), 237–68.
37. See now Q. Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
38. Interestingly, the evidence Skinner cites in his close reading of the debate in 1642 does bracket a defence of true 'religion' and 'liberty'; Skinner, 'Rethinking political liberty', pp. 167–68.

39. See M. A. Goldie, 'The unacknowledged republic: Office holding in early modern England', in *The politics of the excluded, c.1500–1850*, ed. T. Harris (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 153–94.
40. See Q. Skinner, 'A third concept of liberty'.
41. See J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, commerce, and history: Essays on political thought and history, chiefly in the eighteenth century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); idem, 'Introduction' in ed. *The political works of James Harrington* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); J. Scott, 'England's troubles: Exhuming the Popish Plot', in *The politics of religion in Restoration England*, ed. T. Harris, P. Seaward and M. A. Goldie (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 107–31.
42. See D. Martin, *Inventing Superstition: From the Hippocratics to the Christians* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
43. For Bayle and Toland using Livy for such purposes see J. A. I. Champion, 'Bayle in the English Enlightenment', in *Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) Le philosophe de Rotterdam: Philosophy, Religion and Reception*, ed. W. Van Bunge and H. Bots (Leiden: Brill, 2008) pp. 153–74; on Roman religion, see M. Beard, J. North, S. Price, *Religions of Rome. Volume 1: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); see also J. A. North, 'Religion and politics, from Republic to principate', *Journal of Roman Studies* 76 (1986), 251–58, at p. 257.
44. See K. Summers, 'Lucretius and the Epicurean tradition of piety', *Classical Philology* 90 (1995), 32–57, at p. 56.
45. See J. S. Preus, 'Machiavelli's functional analysis of religion: context and object', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40 (1979), 171–90; J. M. Najemy, 'Papius and the chickens, or Machiavelli on the necessity of interpreting religion', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999), 659–81; M. A. Goldie 'The civil religion of James Harrington', in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. A. Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 197–222.
46. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); C. Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development, and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959). B. Worden, *Roundhead reputations: The English Civil War and the passions of posterity*. (London: Allen Lane, 2001); idem, 'Republicanism and the restoration, 1660–1683', in *Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649–1776*, ed. D. Wootton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994) pp. 139–93; idem, 'The revolution of 1688–1689 and the English republican tradition', in *The Anglo-Dutch moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact*, ed. J. Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 241–77.
47. See, for example, the discussion of Toland's (1699) 'Amyntor' in *John Toland's Nazarenus*, ed. J. A. I. Champion (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1999), 'Introduction', pp. 18–28.
48. Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* pp. 56, 73, 90.
49. J. Milton, *The readie and easie vway to establish a free commonwealth* (1660), pp. 88–89; see Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*, p. 67, which acknowledges

- the passage, without exploring its purchase on the relationship between religious and civil liberty.
50. Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*, p. 59.
 51. M. A. Goldie, 'Priestcraft and the birth of Whiggism', in *Political discourse in early modern Britain*, ed. N. T. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 209–31; idem, 'The civil religion of James Harrington', ed. A. Pagden, *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 197–222; J. A. I. Champion, "'May the last king be strangled in the bowels of the last priest": irreligion and the English Enlightenment, 1649–1789', in T. Morton and N. Smith, ed. *Radicalism in British Literary Culture, 1650–1830: From Revolution to Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 29–44, 220–26; idem, "'Religion's safe, with Priestcraft is the war": Augustan Anticlericalism and the legacy of the English revolution, 1660–1720', *The European Legacy*, 5 (2000), 547–61.
 52. J. Toland, *Anglia Libera* (1701), pp. 1–2. See, for context, J. A. I. Champion, "'Anglia Libera": Commonwealth politics in the early years of George I', in *'Cultures of Whiggism': New essays on English literature and culture in the long eighteenth century*, ed. D. Womersley, P. Bullard and A. Williams (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2005) pp. 86–107.
 53. Toland, *Anglia Libera*, 4–5.
 54. Toland, *Anglia Libera*, 8.
 55. Toland, *Anglia Libera*, 14.
 56. Toland, *Anglia Libera*, 15.
 57. Toland, *Anglia Libera*, 98–100.
 58. J. Trenchard, T. Gordon, *Cato's Letters or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects*, ed. Ronald Hamowy (Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund, 1995), 2 vols., I pp. 44, 66, 95, 123–24, 238, 329, 439, 462, 465.
 59. See J. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); see also J. A. I. Champion, 'Legislators, Impostors, and the Politic Origins of Religion: English Theories of "Imposture" from Stubbe to Toland', in *Heterodoxy, Spinozism and free-thought in early-eighteenth-century Europe*, ed. S. Berti, F. Charles-Daubert and R. H. Popkin (Leiden: Kluwer Press, 1996), pp. 333–56.
 60. See D. C. Dennett, *Breaking the Spell. Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 200–49.
 61. See T. Gordon, *The Works of Tacitus* (London, 1728–1731), 2 volumes. Subsequent editions in 1737, 1753, 1770, and 1777; see also idem, *The Works of Sallust, Translated into English. With Political Discourses upon that Author. To Which is Added, a Translation of Cicero's Four Orations against Catiline* (London: printed for T. Woodward, and J. Peele, 1744), further editions in 1745, 1762 and 1769. For a brief account see J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion. Volume 3, The First Decline and Fall* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 316–24.
 62. Gordon, *The Works of Tacitus*, vol. 1, p. 80, 122, cited in Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*, at pp. 322–23.
 63. Gordon, *The Works of Tacitus*, vol. 1, pp. 52–53. See also pp. 70–74, on the deification of Augustus and Caligula.
 64. Gordon, *The Works of Tacitus*, vol. 1, p. 91.

65. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 93–97.
 66. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 105–15.
 67. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 93.
 68. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 96–99.
 69. Here the resonances with Hobbes's language are impressive.
 70. Gordon, *The Works of Tacitus*, vol. 2, pp. 117–18.
 71. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 130.
 72. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 138–39.
 73. See Champion, 'Baile in the English Enlightenment', p. 195.
 74. Q. Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
 75. See, Skinner *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*, p. 169:

Not only does he applaud the increase of freedom attendant on the defeat of episcopacy as well as Presbyterianism; he explicitly speaks in favour of the arrangement under which everyone is left at liberty to formulate their religious beliefs according to the dictates of conscience, subject only to the civil power.

76. See T. Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651) p. 31, see also pp. 168–69:

Another doctrine repugnant to Civil Society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civil Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Sovereign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

77. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 384.
 78. *Ibid.*, p. 378.
 79. For an outline of this account of Hobbes, see J. A. I. Champion, "'The Kingdom of darkness": Hobbes and heterodoxy', in *The intellectual consequences of religious heterodoxy 1600–1750*, ed. John Robertson and Sarah Mortimer (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 95–120.
 80. See J. A. I. Champion, 'Hobbes and biblical criticism: some preliminary remarks', *Bulletin Annuel Institut d'Histoire de la Reformation*, 31 (2010), 53–72.
 81. See J. A. I. Champion, 'An Historical Narration concerning Heresie: Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Barlow, and the Restoration Debate over "Heresy"', in *Heresy, Literature, and Politics in Early Modern English Culture*, ed. D. Loewenstein and J. Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 221–53. See also, idem, 'Le culte prive quand il est rendu dans le secret'; Hobbes, 'Locke et les limites de la tolerance, l'atheisme et l'heterodoxie', in *Les fondements philosophiques de la tolérance volume 1*, ed. Y. Charles Zarka, F. Lessay and J. Rogers (Paris: PUF, 2002) pp. 221–53. For an outline of this view see idem, 'How to read Hobbes: Independent, heretic,

- political scientist, absolutist? A review of some recent works on Hobbes', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 11 (2007), 87–98. A narrative context for this view can be found in idem, "'My Kingdom is not of this world': The politics of religion after the revolution', in *The English Revolution c. 1590–1720*, ed. N. Tyacke (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) pp. 185–202.
82. See L. Strauss, *Hobbes's Critique of Religion and Related Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
 83. On Hobbes's reception in the eighteenth-century Republic of Letters see. N. Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and especially Chapter 14, pp. 457–546.
 84. P. Miller, "'Freethinking" and "freedom of thought" in eighteenth-century Britain', *Historical Journal*, 36 (1993), 599–617; A. C. Thompson, 'Popery, politics, and private judgement in early Hanoverian Britain', *Historical Journal* 45 (2002), 333–56.
 85. See Fatovic, 'The Anti-Catholic Roots'.
 86. For a more secular defence of toleration see J. A. I. Champion, '*Respublica Mosaica*: John Toland and the Naturalisation of the Jews, 1714', in *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe*, ed. R. Porter and O. Grell (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 133–56.
 87. See J. I. Israel, 'Locke, Spinoza and the Philosophical debate concerning toleration in the Early Enlightenment (c. 1670–c. 1750)', *Mededelingen* 62 (1999), 1–19. Some of these themes are also explored in idem, 'The intellectual origins of modern democratic republicanism (1660–1720)', *European Journal of Political Theory* 3 (2004), 7–36.
 88. For a modern discussion see R. Rorty, 'Anticlericalism and Atheism', in *The Future of Religion*, ed. G. Vattimo and R. Rorty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 29–43:

For anticlericalism is a political view, not an epistemological or metaphysical one. It is the view that ecclesiastical institutions, despite all the good they do – despite all the comfort they provide to those in need or in despair – are dangerous to the health of democratic societies, so dangerous that it would be best for them eventually to wither away.

3

Moral Logics of Enmity: Indians and English in Early America

Ingrid Creppell

In a well-known and in many ways remarkable passage in *A Letter Concerning Toleration* of 1689, Locke sketched the following example of intolerance:

An inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything, arrive in a Pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of life; those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they all join together, and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by this means takes root in that country and spreads itself, but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in this condition peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated; and unless these innocent Pagans, strict observers of the rules of equity and the law of Nature and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say, unless they will forsake their ancient religion and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and possessions of their forefathers and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then, at last, it appears what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce, and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls, serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.¹

Locke's description of the mindset of the early settlers in the New World condemns them for the hypocrisy of merging religious pretence and

the pursuit of greed and power. His portrayal of the European colonists shows them merely biding their time until they can act on underlying aggressive religious aims. In contrast, the Indians appear as genuine and natural in seeking friendship and coexistence. Through their help the Christians survive and the two peoples 'grow into one body'. Yet Locke also acknowledges the ambiguity in the European mindset. Their intolerance seems driven by 'covetousness, rapine, and ambition', on the one hand, but very much tied to their zeal for the Church as a sign of moral righteousness, on the other. Moral beliefs may serve as pretence but also inspire authentic passion, which propels the early Christian settlers to overturn the peaceful compact. Locke's equivocation is understandable. He sought to paint intolerance as an evil but knew that the self-view of the aggressors was deeply imbued with a higher calling, not simply earthly dominion, and that, in this case, they saw the fight as one against the immorality of the heathen way of life.

I use this passage as an opening to think about the complex moral nature of the conflict that evolved between the Indians and settlers in early New England. In certain basic dynamics of power Locke got it right: the Puritans began by making peace with the natives on original contact, and as they grew in security and population, they gradually rescinded those initial terms of equality and respect. But Locke's picture – while rhetorically and morally powerful – is far too simple from both the Indian and the settler perspective. When conflict erupted in late seventeenth-century New England, the factors leading to it comprised much more than religious zeal and covetousness. Insofar as the volume as a whole seeks to throw light on the mercurial path of tolerance, and the continued power of intolerance, this essay contributes to a better grasp of conflict imbued with deep religious and cultural differences. We contrast the virtue or ideal of tolerance against the continued drive towards intolerance; one seems the inverse of the other, generosity and openness versus the rigidity of religious repression and dogmatism. But intolerance itself is only partially comprehended when reduced to religious motives. Locke opined on the intolerance of the Christians from across the distance of the Atlantic Ocean, and we do so across many centuries or, as the case may be, when indicting those here and now. Delving into the manifestation of intolerance will show a complicated collective reaction to profound changes in society. The intolerance that continued to plague religiously diverse groups may not always have been driven by religion *per se*.

My essay reconstructs the evolution of the relationship between the Europeans and Indians in one particular setting in order to gain a better

understanding of their developing antagonism. The question will be: how and why did enmity come to define the terms of the relation? Where Locke used the frame of intolerance to condemn the colonials, I aim to show that enmity avails us of a richer lens of analysis.²

Before defining enmity as a framework, I want first to consider the uniqueness of the Indian-settler case. Some might argue that violent encounters and hence enmity were inevitable between European explorers and settlers and the indigenous peoples of the New World, so there is nothing puzzling to investigate here. Explorers, traders and colonists from European empires, seeking riches and new lives, were propelled by gigantic appetites and zeal about their missions, whether material or religious. The idea and the reality of conquest characterised relationships among vying powers in Europe and would necessarily apply as well to the much less technologically sophisticated inhabitants on the other side of the Atlantic. Once the inhospitable conditions had been sufficiently mastered, and a steady stream of Europeans began to populate the American mainland, native peoples would resist as they knew how – using their knowledge of the environment, physical ingenuity and violence – to protect themselves from the influx of humans who early on showed avaricious and destructive aims. Enmity, then, looks essentially embedded in tectonic forces coming into contact. Given the vector and structure of these forces, it may seem misleading to search for enmity's 'formation', even if some initial contacts had included treaty-making, 'friendship' or interludes of cooperation. From a distance, these appear in a brief hiatus that was bound to be fleeting.

This broad view of the direction of change does not do justice, however, to the dynamics on the ground at a more local level of interaction. Even if we know the end of the story, the details of its unfolding may be surprising. As Daniel Richter wrote in his study of Indian perspectives on the process of colonisation: 'Whites and Indians had to learn to hate each other – had even to learn that there were such clear-cut categories as "White" and "Indian" – before "westward expansion" across a steadily advancing "frontier" could become the trajectory for a nation that was itself a belated result of the same learning process.³ Or, as Kupperman shows in her study *Indians and English, Facing Off in Early America*:

As the English colonies grew and forced the native communities into smaller portions of their lands or pushed them west or north, the remarks of some colonists became similarly distanced and triumphant. The immediacy of trying to understand a very different

culture with which they were trying to live, and on which they depended, gave way in some accounts to harsh and lifeless stereotyping. But there was never a time when the distanced stance became the sole viewpoint. Although it was increasingly possible for English settlers to live without intimate contact with Americans, many still sought out or were driven into close relationships with Indians.⁴

Much of her book explores the ways in which the English and Indians sought to understand each other and were necessarily thrown together into complex interdependency. We should not assume that a picture of mindless or racialised destruction, driven by greed or Christian superiority, adequately describes the interactions that grew into enmity. While acknowledging the crucial revisions of historical perspective, which writers such as Francis Jennings and others have launched about European racism towards native populations, I also seek to factor in the morally complicated experiences and conceptions of the English and the Indians. Below the broad forces of history and group dynamics, people live on a human scale of interaction, cognition and feeling. Enmity may be a shutting down of reflection, but in the case I examine it is preceded and followed by people struggling to make sense of and manage the forces around them, especially one another.

The question I pose in the chapter is: on what basis did each of the participants in the developing antagonism come to perceive the other as an enemy? The overarching theoretical aim is twofold: to understand better the phenomenon of enmity by exploring it in this particular case, and to illuminate this case by applying the concept of enmity.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 1 I briefly sketch out a definition of enmity and propose how and why we should study it; section 2 defends using the case of King Philip's War and the specific background context of the Indian-settler relationship in the latter half of the seventeenth century; sections 3 and 4 interpret the Indian and settler points of view, respectively; section 5 offers a brief conclusion.

The enemy state of mind: Two models

What is enmity? Which aspects of conflict come into focus by using a lens of enmity? According to the *OED*, enmity is 'The disposition or the feelings characteristic of an enemy; ill-will, hatred; and/or a state of mutual hostility'. This may be too generic a starting point for our purposes, however, if we are trying to understand a distinctive political disposition or political consciousness. As the *OED* indicates, enmity

can be thought of as a state of mind of a people or a relationship between groups or persons. I take these two as interconnected: enmity is a state of mind about a relationship, viewed in extreme negative terms with possible repressive or violent consequences. The structure of the enemy mentality or enmity includes six characteristics: (1) the enemy figure is viewed in telescoped or simplified terms as a hardened other; (2) conversely, it constitutes one's collective self into a hardened action-oriented stance against the other; (3) it involves strong emotion: fear, anger, hate, antipathy and pride; (4) the perception of harm or threat posed by one's enemy is tied to beliefs about what is fundamentally important, among which could be access to essential resources or land, the potential destruction of one's physical survival, well-being, form of life, an order tied to a world-view or one's identity; (5) the self is committed to violent or coercive action (killing others, self-sacrifice, repression) because the enemy's will is conceived as not amenable to communication or non-forced interaction; (6) the enemy concept consolidates a collective point of view, hence, implies a relationship between leaders and people within a collective body. Taken together, these elements conceptualise enmity as a negative state of mind or consciousness (cognitive and emotional) that is action-oriented, held by persons as members of a political group in its struggle to exist in relation to another group viewed as a fundamental threat. In locating the subject in the research fields of conflict or war studies, enmity should be appreciated as a distinct phenomenon. It cannot be equated with abstract just-war reasoning, nor should it be reduced to a behavioural orientation given structures of choice. Enmity is a particular type of hostile consciousness, emotion-laden, incorporating reasons, judgement and a disposition or will to act with a fixed other in mind.

Studies of enmity tend to treat it in three ways: as the behavioural or emotional component of war, as propaganda, or in social psychology as an extreme form of groupism. As a war mentality, enmity is reduced to competition for power and domination, or fear and hate of one's competitor.⁵ In propaganda studies, enmity is studied as a function of images or discourses that reduce the other to crude, stereotyped, monstrous or diabolical exaggerations. For social psychologists, mental states of extreme conflict are explained as a result of a natural human tendency to react to others in terms of group difference.⁶ Fear, domination, stereotyping and the dynamic of identity/difference provide important starting points for understanding general tendencies in collective psychology that would be conducive to enemy consciousness; however, these approaches leave out crucial elements of the phenomenon. Once

one begins to delve into particular cases, however, it seems very difficult to extract a logic of enmity that is not as generic as those above: warmentality, propaganda or social-psychological antipathy. Are we left, then, with individual case studies of wars or stereotyped entrenched animosities (Balkans, Israeli/Arab, Japan/China and so forth)? I believe we can attempt more than that.

I suggest we begin with two models to think about the nature of this form of consciousness. The first I call the material model of enmity. It captures what people generally conceive enmity to be: two groups driven to struggle over 'external' goods (external to the self) which they believe they need and cannot, or do not want to, share: power, land, divergent normative orders. The entities are clearly defined and provoked or motivated to dominate the other in order to secure the necessary goods. A second model can be termed the ideational model of enmity. In this model I highlight the starting point of the changing nature of the entities in struggle: an enemy consciousness emerges as a need to test and prove the existence of a particular form of the collective self. A collective self is not already fully shaped and then mobilised to fight or dominate; rather, what is at stake are the boundaries and coherence of the entity itself. The external goods over which they fight are a means to establish the collective self. We might model these two poles in the following way:

Two models of enmity

Material	Ideational
Actors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • entities are defined 	Actors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • entities are changing, working towards consolidation of self-definition
Claims <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • compete over external goods 	Claims <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • harm, transgression of expectations • struggle over external goods as means for measuring and defining self
Aim <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • victory/defeat vis-à-vis the Other 	Aim <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • political status or recognition vis-à-vis the Other

Note that the typical approach to conflict as 'realistic' versus 'non-realistic' does not map onto this. If realism is about objects and competition over things out there (even normative order), then it is classified as materialist. But if realism is about the formation of the self's status and proof of its dominance, then it will be classified as idealist in this modelling.

Does one or the other of these two types of enemy consciousness better capture most cases? I do not propose to answer that; moreover, many cases of intense and potentially lethal enmity will likely include elements of both. Tests of oneself are carried out through the conquest of land; and competition to secure greater wealth or secure order may open a floodgate to re-conceptualising a political identity. But a distinction of this sort helps us keep track of important features of enmity, which should not all be lumped together. The primary impetus towards enemy formation is not just a materialist struggle over outer goods. It is also an idealist struggle over the constitution of the collective self vis-à-vis another. This model enables us to focus on the ideational bases of the viability of a collective self, especially in studying situations of change and instability. It highlights that an enemy mindset is formed when a set of people – with some pre-existing basis for commonality or unity – come to believe in a vision of themselves – past or future – that must be tested and proven in a situation they take as hostile to their aspiration to achievement of a particular collective being. Enmity is about the constitution of the self through ideational elements – identity, morality and meaning.

I briefly sketch out some basic starting points for a theory of enmity that will help situate historical cases of its emergence. With a minimal theory of emergence, we are then able to reconstruct and analyse the logics of enmity – the ideational means – that make sense of the antagonists' mindsets in the Indian–Puritan relationship. To begin to study enmity, one might start with the phenomenological question: what is the perception of the dangerous other? However, unless that other has amassed means of violence for an imminent attack, perception of another group as one's enemy is open to interpretation. When will this perception arise? What makes another people dangerous, worth potential sacrifice of oneself and the killing of others? Given the myriad, complex elements of an answer (which we could never aim to pin down completely, even aside from the random play of chance), I propose these steps:

- (a) A group of people exists as a unity in more or less persistent, compelling and self-conscious terms for political purposes of protection, provision and ordering of persons within and vis-à-vis others. A people is an ongoing entity of a more or less activated unity, which includes physical and ideational components: bodily protection, meaning and identity.

- (b) A political (and potentially political) group creates, orders and sustains power for a collective end with particular boundaries.
- (c) But human relationships are not static. Power grows, changes and shifts, due to exogenous factors and to intentional human design.
- (d) Growing power destabilises boundaries, at a material and ideational level, though not always initially in overt ways.
- (e) Groups of people in this context of changing power seek to reaffirm a unity, to consolidate itself to maintain past relationships or to achieve conceptions of future selves.
- (f) Enmity – the perception and action-orientation towards a dangerous other – arises when in these power shifts, the intentional or unintentional deployment of power by one people is interpreted by another group as destructive of its existence – however conceived.

Carl Schmitt, perhaps the closest we have to a political theorist of the enemy, locates the essence of the political domain in the decision on the friend/enemy distinction.⁷ In contrast, I view politics as a domain of ordering power for purposes of human existence. Politics includes the element of boundary designation with a potential to alienate, harden boundaries and use them to deploy violence. The political demarcation of boundaries, however, does not require enmity. Politics can generate order without a will against or perception of a destructive other. Enmity arises when a group of persons believes the ordering of power in a particular form will destroy the group's existence or prevent the achievement of the rightfulness of this existence. The crucial element in this minimal theory of emergence, then, is the perception of a group of people that a change in power opens up the possibility, meaning and consequences of that change, to destroy or to achieve its particular self in relation to another people.

Enmity is driven by a group's struggle to exist among other collectivities in a perceived environment of political danger and extreme constitutive harm. This struggle embodies a claim by persons to be a consciously affirmed political body in the face of an other who is seen to deny this. The starting conception of the people may not be completely mobilised as a political unity but harden into a negative stance in the interaction over terms of the relationship of power. Its perception of threat as coming from another group depends as much on its conception of self as its perception of the other; these perceptions are intertwined. A hypothetical situation may help accentuate the importance of the role played by conceptualisation of the self in the emergence of enemy consciousness. If a group of people accepts changes

in the environment, then it does not conceptualise the situation as a case of enmity. When the Mohegan sachem⁸ Uncas formed alliances with the English in mid-seventeenth-century America, he chose not to view the shift in power as a stage of enmity. Or today, were the US to accept the 'rise of China' as an expected part of Chinese development, it would not automatically resort to a hostile interpretation of this change.

Ideational enmity begins from the point of view of the constitution of the self, rather than solely from being against another; thus, it requires that we look at the resources creating and enabling the desire and drive for a collectivity to be a political body. Those resources will be both material (military, economic, physical space) and ideational (moral, identity-based, narrative, symbolic). In reading a particular historical episode of enmity, I ask what were the moral logics that pushed and enabled a people to come together to conceive another as its enemy? Before analysing these moral-narrative logics in sections 3 and 4, I examine the outer-contextual factors that contributed to the action-orientation of enmity in seventeenth-century New England.

Setting the stage for King Philip's War

To examine the emergence of an enemy mindset among the Indians and the English colonists in seventeenth-century America, I use the case of King Philip's War.⁹ The war pitted an alliance led by Philip, sachem of the Wampanoag, in addition to the Narragansetts, Nipmucs and Pocumtucks, against the alliance of the United Colonies – Plymouth, Massachusetts and Connecticut. It took place in New England in 1675–1676, destroying over 10 per cent of the population in the region and affecting nearly 60 per cent of all English towns. In proportional terms, the conflict is often referred to as the deadliest in American history.¹⁰ It stands as a major and defining event in early American political life because of the transformative, long-term effect it exerted on the physical, psychological and political-cultural environment, for both the Indians and English. Physically, it obliterated the ongoing Indian presence in many towns, scattered and enslaved hundreds, realigned tribes and destroyed economies. The war 'cleared southern New England's native population from the land, and with it a way of life that had evolved over a millennium'.¹¹ Its effect on the English was more complicated. Of the United Colonies allied to fight the natives, Massachusetts was most harmed, and its independence as a chartered colony disappeared within the decade. The war undermined the power of the Puritan hierarchy and led to the reimposition of imperial rule. Daniel

Richter notes: 'there were no clear winners, except perhaps the forces of empire.'¹² Nevertheless, it clearly benefited the white population: 'the English established themselves as the dominant peoples – and in many New England towns, the only peoples – allowing for the uninterrupted growth of England's northern colonies right up to the American Revolution.'¹³ Importantly, King Philip's War seared into the minds of both Indians and English a brutal picture of the other. For much of the war the Indians seemed invincible, 'hanging together, like serpent's eggs', as William Hubbard described them.¹⁴ The hardening of the conception of the Indian would contribute to a racialised understanding of American identity juxtaposed against the bloody savages, and reinforce treatment of them as barbaric, violent and uncivilisable.

The question I ask is why and how enmity was created and hardened. In this section I examine three basic levels of the background context, from most general to most specific, which should help us grasp how the terms of interaction appeared to be structured for the two sides. Yet, though fundamental features of conflict were present to 'set the stage', I hope to demonstrate the need to go further and reconstruct the emotional and ideational spark leading to enmity as perceived from the point of view of people in these groups. Human struggles are always a conjunction of structural forces and self-interpreting actions. Let us begin with the outer juxtaposed forces.

A clash of civilisations: in seventeenth-century New England two dramatically different cultures lived side by side. Military and economic technology, religion and cultural tools such as books, literacy, dress, domiciles and so forth threw into sharp relief the question of human differences. Trade knitted people together, and Christian proselytising brought about some amount of religious assimilation. Yet conversion remained rare and was no avenue to an integrated community. Differences between Indian and settler culture had not softened by repeated interaction, cultural borrowing (in both directions) and more familiarity, but had in many ways grown more acute. Distinctions between the native world and a colonising European culture were of primary interest, concern and anxiety for both sides.¹⁵ How did a hyper-awareness of difference *per se* contribute to enmity? Differences mattered for the prospects of enmity here in two ways. First, they potentially dislodged the familiar, unquestioned conception of the self. Difference could elicit fear insofar as it destabilised secure boundaries. Interaction was mandatory for survival, at first for the settlers and then later as well for the natives, who grew dependent through economic ties. The closeness of the living space led to cultural intermixing and borrowing, and what

Kupperman calls attempts to 'incorporate the Other'.¹⁶ Each side sought to fit the other into its scheme of order and meaning. At the opening of relations, with tentative moves towards peace and coexistence between the settlers and Indians in Plymouth and Massachusetts, cultural distinctions offered a source of fascination and experimentation. But that tolerance would not last. The intransigence of the other's difference and the borrowings between them began to appear as a threat to the bearings of one's self. We might think of the dynamic as follows: original openness (wariness + interest/curiosity + tolerance) → time of experiments/testing out of incorporation, persuasion → persistence of difference, competition for adherents → success in some cultural transmission/conversion for both sides → anxiety and fear of loss of core, stable identity. Thus difference played an increasingly powerful destabilising role the greater the involvement became – a threat of transformative difference. This is important for understanding enmity, then, not because the worlds of the English and the natives were 'different' and would thereby necessarily clash, but because intimate proximity and dependence across these stark contrasts shook boundaries of selfhood and political clarity.

A second way in which cultural differences contributed to the possibility of enmity emerged in the intensification of judgement and moral emotion based on distinctions. A moralised form of 'being against' is very different from a primal human psyche to be wary of the stranger. Relationships of ignorance, fear and suspicion are natural sensations and may or may not lead an encounter to take on a hostile demeanour. Judgement and moral emotion, on the other hand, require time to build up and consist in specifically articulated reasons for rejection of the other. Sensations of judgement and moral sanction did not characterise all interactions but operated in the background as an emotional structure, so to speak: Puritans, as a culture of judgement, set the stage for sanctioning the ways of the natives through their sense of superiority, disgust and disdain. Indians reacted to the imposition of that censorious gaze, with feelings of insult, disrespected pride, anger and reciprocal disdain. Kupperman's study of the 'facing off' asserts that for the English 'The first principle of any kind of encounter was the absolute necessity of assuming the dominant position in every relationship. The lesson of history and contemporary society was that all connections were unequal; if you did not dominate, then the other side would.'¹⁷ The principle of hierarchy allowed the English to see within native culture a similar emphasis upon superiority, and to treat Indian leaders and elites differently. However, non-elite Puritans conveyed another attitude, and

the quotidian and ubiquitous circulation of negative emotion and critical judgement increased rather than diminished as the Puritan settlers and natives intersected with one another. Roger Williams, a friend and admirer of native life, pointed out the deterioration in the common person's attitude found in comments such as this:

These Heathen Dogges, better kill a thousand of them then [*sic*] that we Christians should be indangered or troubled with them; Better they were all cut off, and then we shall be no more troubled with them: They have spilt our Christian bloud, the best way to make riddance of them, cut them all off, and so make way for Christians.¹⁸

Therefore, a general harshening and derision – intolerance and heightened ethnocentrism based on civilisational judgment and emotion – would have had an effect on the tenor and content of negotiation between the English and Indians and contributed to the possibility of enmity in line with that tenor of judgment.¹⁹

Struggles over land and sovereignty: the more immediate material elements in the drama unfolding were the terms of the treaties settled between Plymouth Colony and the Indians, going back to 1662, in which Philip had been forced to agree not to sell his land to others. This forced submission had angered him and set up a significant tension with the Plymouth authorities, with Philip violating the agreement's terms. Nearly ten years later, he was compelled to sign an agreement at Taunton on 10 April 1671,²⁰ admitting his resistance to the earlier terms of subjection, and requiring that he give up his arms as well. Two months later, subjection to Plymouth was reinforced by the United Colonies after Philip's attempt to gain some measure of recognition from Massachusetts and Connecticut had gone against him.

Altercations over land were the most concrete manifestation of the irreconcilability of the Indian and settler worlds; however, one should not picture this process simply as natives fighting to keep as much as possible and colonists forcing them to sell.²¹ Over the course of the seventeenth century enormous swaths of aboriginal land had been alienated to the English, often in exchange for the goods that Indians sought and could not live without, given changes in their material culture. Thus the Indians sold their land in trade, on the expectation (sometimes put in writing, often informally assumed) that rights to continued access to hunt, fish, plant and gather would be guaranteed. Jenny Pulsipher, in an important article on the war, has emphasised the role of land and sovereignty: 'The war, which raged in New England from June 1675 to April 1678, was prompted by longstanding Indian

grievances against English infringements on their land and authority.¹²² Certainly, the gradual encroachment on Indian land and the push-back from the natives structured a fundamental conflict of interest. Still, this inexorable transformation of the land and ownership had been happening for decades. The Indians fought back but also acquiesced. To highlight 'land' as the cause of enmity is not sufficient. Both Pulsipher and Kawashima recognise that what was at stake was not land *per se* but autonomy. 'Philip's resort to war suggested that he believed force was necessary to combat English affronts to Indian sovereignty that talk had so long failed to remedy', Pulsipher writes.²³ In destroying the Indians' capacity to make autonomous decisions over the use and sale of their remaining land, the colonists took from them the last vestige of independent life. Not the amount of land but the usurpation of decision-making was at stake.

I want to argue that zeroing in on autonomy or sovereignty still leaves out a key dimension of the antagonism. Yes, sovereignty was of essential importance: a primary genesis for the antagonism was gradual destruction of Indian self-rule. But sovereignty entailed more than that. Self-rule must be understood to have functioned within a relationship of interdependence, recognised through a series of treaties going back to the initial landing of the Puritans in Plymouth. Sovereignty had come to be part of a package deal in which ties of mutual recognition protected space for autonomous decision-making. In this way an acknowledgment of status *vis-à-vis* particular others underscored the essential value of sovereignty. This consideration helps us see that sovereignty cannot be reduced to political supremacy within one's own separate space, but includes a recognition of one's agentic status alongside other decision-makers. Intersubjective recognition of parallel status is bound up in sovereignty and conveys a type of equality.²⁴ The Indians' claim, then, for sovereign autonomy must be viewed as a claim about mutual recognition among other agents, and not just about having a separate power. Daniel Richter provides some evidence for a type of presumed equality in the struggle over sovereignty in this quotation from a later incarnation of settler-native relations:

Teedyuscung and his interpreters tried to point out, by the middle of the 1700s coexistence no longer seemed possible. 'Our differences have sprung from the land or earth . . .,' he said, 'tho it was not the principal thing.' The problem was not land idolatry alone, but idolatry so all-encompassing that it was blind to the needs of the Native people for reciprocity and alliance.²⁵

So far, we have considered two main approaches to explaining King Philip's War: cultural difference and competition over land/sovereignty. Each has accentuated important factors in the development of animus between the protagonists. Yet, these conditions characterised life for many Indians and English groups, whereas King Philip's War happened because one particular set of actors chose the path of enmity rather than acquiescence. I now turn, therefore, to the specific triggering events as another possible avenue for understanding the explosion of hostility.

Legal orders. An indication that the conflict involved a type of confrontation different from another round of altercations over land becomes evident when we turn to the triggering event of King Philip's War. The John Sassamon trial, and the conviction and execution of the Indians alleged to be guilty of Sassamon's murder, acted as a catalyst for the conflagration. The events at issue were the following.

In January 1675 John Sassamon, a Christian Indian, informed Plymouth Governor Josiah Winslow that Wampanoag Indian sachem Metacom (Philip) was making plans and enlisting allies to destroy the English.²⁶ Less than a week later Sassamon's body was found under the ice of a pond near his home, and rumours spread among natives and colonists about the cause of death. His body was examined by Plymouth authorities and found to have a broken neck, swollen head and other wounds. Three of Philip's counsellors were arrested and charged with murder, though only afterwards did a witness – a Christian Indian – testify to having seen the three kill Sassamon. They were put on trial before the Plymouth General Court, with a panel of eight judges, a jury of 12 Englishmen and six Christian Indians assisting to 'healpe to consult and advice with' the legal procedure.²⁷ The three accused denied the charges and countered that this witness owed them a gambling debt and was merely trying to please the English. Nevertheless, the court found them guilty of murder on the testimony of this one witness and sentenced them to hang. During the execution a rope failed for the final suspect. In desperation to save himself he claimed to have watched as the other two carried out Philip's order to kill Sassamon; his reprieve was short-lived, and he was shot within a month. In response to this series of events, within days Philip and his allies set off war-sounding communications: gunfire in the vicinity of Boston, drum-beating, warriors brandishing firearms in the face of English neighbours. The trial and execution taken in isolation could not have sparked Philip to enter the chute of war, but, seen within an ongoing context of creeping English repression, altercation and insult, this monopolisation of the legal process would have been especially galling. While Rhode Island attempted

to prevent hostilities by mediating with Philip, Plymouth refused the efforts, and Winslow demanded that the Wampanoag surrender their weapons and meet with Plymouth's council. On 24 June two headless bodies of Englishmen were found on the road to the town of Swansea, and were taken as a signal of the beginning of war.²⁸ Two days later Massachusetts's troops joined their Puritan allies in Plymouth and full-scale war exploded throughout southern New England for more than a year, until Philip was tracked down back in his home territory and shot on 12 August 1676; remnants of the fighting continued in Maine and New Hampshire until 1678.

The catalytic consequences of the trial might seem to result from its crude justice and the hasty execution imposed by the Plymouth authorities. Hanging Philip's men on the testimony of one witness (itself a contravention of English juridical principle) acted as a display of power and controlled symbolic violence through the drama of the courts. It was indeed that. But, as Yasuhide Kawashima's careful analysis suggests, the trial served as more than a trigger to pent-up anger and competition. The harm brought about by the trial lay also in the public displacement of Indian law.²⁹ Had the English authorities either allowed the Wampanoag to treat the case under their own rules, as they had done in the past regarding Indian persons, or had they involved them in legal procedures as legitimate witnesses, the recognition of standing would have shown an English willingness to sustain tacit norms of reciprocity with the Wampanoag. Instead, Plymouth's imposition of its own legal procedures in such a public space enacted a political usurpation in its denial of native rights to carry out Indian conventions of justice. Granted, ambiguity in the application of legal procedures in these circumstances existed, which allowed the English authorities to impose their rules. The legal clash could be interpreted as a genuinely irreconcilable situation from the point of view of the English: they were terrified by rumours of Philip's mobilising for attack. Sassamon had been the carrier of this information. Therefore, symbolically, Sassamon's murder acted as a flashpoint of action and the English chose to impose legal order to display control over events. An English leader could have interpreted the indeterminateness of jurisdiction in a less imperious manner, however. Their aggressive legal performance demonstrated a rupture of a will to manage conflict in a coordinated way, in which a relationship of reciprocity would be maintained. Thus the results of the trial were a blatant public display of a new order. This public clamp-down demoralisation of the Indians enraged Philip and his Wampanoag warriors and proved the English to be aggressors in their eyes. Its dramatic nature

may have had a different effect from that brought on by the onerous treaties previously imposed upon the Indians.

Do these contextual elements provide adequate account of the motivation towards full-scale enmity? Cultural hostility and ethnocentrism, struggle over land and sovereignty, and legal displacement: we trace their confluence into King Philip's War, and yet these were prevalent conditions. Something seems missing. Let us step back again: the initial insecurity and weakness of the English – if we go back to the founding of Plymouth in 1620 – was replaced by stability and growth in population and land-ownership over those 50 years. The structural relation of power grew to favour the English. Historian Alden Vaughan describes their comfortable disposition at the time: 'In the spring of 1675 few Puritans had any idea that a holocaust was about to strike New England. Everything seemed to be going well in politics, in economics, in Indian affairs.'³⁰ Indeed, a liberalisation of arms trading with the Indians preceded King Philip's War, indicating the unexpectedness of the conflict's explosion from the colonists' point of view.³¹ For the Indians, the traditional way of life had undergone fundamental disruption by the 1660s; many had died from the onslaught of epidemics, and land had been traded for goods and to pay debts to the English. Some – though not many – had converted to Christianity and moved to Christian Indian towns, thereby weakening the bonds between them and the majority of Indians who refused conversion. Traditional native alliances and enmities were broken up and shifted because of the presence of the English, with whom many Indian groups entered into pacts of friendship, notably by this time the Mohegans and the remnants of the Pequots. These background structural changes now pervaded native and English life. Why, in this case, did the more prosaic form of localised conflict and the tacit shifting of order and expectations not prevail? Why the explosion into enmity?

An important missing dimension can be found in the ideational imperatives within and between the two groups. The energy and drive that infused enemy consciousness here came out of constitutive needs to maintain a particular collective identity in the face of greatly transformed conditions for both sides. That is, the emergence of enmity involved (was a product of and a means to) the validation of a collective point of view about who the self fighting the other should be. How else would the protagonists be able to sustain their existence as a collective body with a distinct and powerfully motivating identity? Enmity, then, a state of mind first brought to active form by the Indians against the Puritans, demonstrated a claim about the selfhood of a people driven

to resist what so many of their fellow natives might have wanted to resist but for various reasons could or did not. Struggles over land and sovereignty were a necessary condition for enmity, because land and sovereignty were the means by which these two peoples would negotiate and palpably realise their existence in seventeenth-century New England. But they are not a sufficient basis for understanding the enemy mindset. What was at stake was the capacity of a people to continue to be a people, and peoplehood (to use Rogers Smith's term) requires consciousness of self, made accessible in narrative and symbolic form. If the narrative and symbolic basis of one's selfhood are denied, then the persons constituting the collective self may feel abased and melt away from a collective consciousness; or they may consolidate and rise against those who are seen to be destroying the narrative and symbolic foundations of their life. Narrative possibilities, involving perceptions and choices about identity and morality, must be taken as indispensable for grasping the specificity of a case of enmity. I turn now to examine the moral logics through which the Indians and the Puritans conceived the necessity of this violent struggle.

To be or not to be: Moral foundations of Indian enmity

The emergence of an Indian attitude of enmity towards the English seems both overdetermined and underdetermined. How could the Indians not have felt this, one might ask. Their world had been radically dislocated, and in the process Indian groups had lost power to the newcomers. Yet coexistence forces a closer look into features of the relationship. Many Indian peoples did not choose (if we may call it that) enmity, preferring to survive as cohesive groups under the power and protection of the English or other European rulers. Other tribes strategically made treaties submitting themselves in order to protect their intactness as a collective body, thereby relinquishing political goals. Thus our question should be: what led this particular Indian people to take on the English as an enemy? Were there distinct capacities and ideas that propelled them into this energised, hardened, costly frame of mind? Sources of enmity, I argue, derive from emotions and beliefs about the past and future self that defined this set of Indians in relation to the English colonists. It was a unique narrative of self-understanding and the moral claims attached to it which were important in the formation of a consciousness of enmity in bringing about King Philip's War. The ideational model of enmity helps us focus on moral claims and their connection to protecting the fate of the political body as a

conceptual reality, tying together ideas about the past and future of that body.

To defend this reconstruction of an enemy mindset, I examine the perspective of Philip, sachem of the Wampanoag. I take Philip as both an instigator of action and a mirror reflecting a general structure of attitude and emotion among a larger group of people, who could be inclined to interpret the situation in similar hostile terms. Sentiments and beliefs feeding into a war mentality are always mixed, complicated and deeply ambiguous, even within one individual leader. On the occasion of being asked to discuss the prospect of war, Philip was given an opportunity to spell out his reasoning. This was recorded in John Easton's 'A Relation of the Indian War', written in 1675.³² Easton was a Quaker and deputy governor of Rhode Island in the winter of 1675–1676, when this report was written; Rhode Island, the home of Roger Williams, sought to stay out of the war. The text is one of the only sources for information about the Indian view. While many histories have consulted and quoted John Easton's report on his interview with Philip during the brief few days between Sassamon's alleged murderers' execution and the start of the war, it deserves further analysis.³³

I have laid out six major claims – or 'complaints', as Easton terms them – which Philip is reported to have voiced. As we see in taking each claim in turn, a strong sense of moral anger undergirds Philip's attitude.

- (1) 'They said they had been the first in doing good to the English, and the English the first in doing wrong; they said when the English first came, their king's father was as a great man and the English as a little child. He constrained other Indians from wronging the English and gave them corn and showed them how to plant and was free to do them any good and had let them have a 100 times more land than now the king had for his own people.'³⁴ This claim – of generosity and betrayal – anchors Philip's conception of the history of his people's relationship to the colonists. When Philip begins to lay out his complaints, his first reference is to the fact of his father Massasoit's friendship with the English. Massasoit signed the first treaty between the Indians and English; his protection was essential to the survival of the original Pilgrim settlement in Plymouth in 1621. This memory is critical. After his father's death, the treatment of the next sachem – Philip's brother Wamsutta – appeared callous, and Philip believed Wamsutta (who died after leaving a rancorous meeting with Josiah Winslow) had been poisoned. Philip

now saw his own treatment by the son of the original governor of Plymouth as demonstrating the real intentions of the English. Thus the initial relationship establishing equality and reciprocity had been severed by subsequent Englishmen through their covetousness and superiority. Philip begins his justification of enmity by providing a narrative about the past and its betrayal. English hostility is perceived not in terms of material 'interests' or land but as destructive of the relationship the Indians believed existed. The narrative of the past structured expectations and thereby the conception and emotional experience of harm.

- (2) '[I]f 20 of their honest Indians testified that a Englishman had done them wrong, it was as nothing; and if but one of their worst Indians testified against any Indian or their king when it pleased the English, that was sufficient.'³⁵ The heart of this complaint is the bias and glaring inequity of the English treatment of the Indians as persons of equal status and of a rightful point of view. The manipulation of legal testimony to discount the Indian voice demonstrated English denial of simple rules of fairness, and again proved that the Indian had no standing or status except as a stooge.
- (3) 'When their kings sold land the English would say it was more than they agreed to and a writing must be proof against all them.'³⁶ Here Philip highlights multiple aspects of English trickery: their claim to have gained more in a transaction than the Indians had meant, the deployment of cultural tools to which he and his people do not have access, such as literacy, and his vulnerability to their misuse. Again, the English use writing and legal procedures as weapons to disable fair open exchange and interaction.
- (4) 'Some being given to drunkenness, the English made them drunk and then cheated them in bargains.' The harm of corruption through alcohol was reiterated a few sentences later in this comment: 'the English were so eager to sell the Indians liquors that most of the Indians spent all in drunkenness and then ravened upon the sober Indians and, they did believe, often did hurt the English cattle.'³⁷ Again, additional cultural weapons are intentionally used to corrupt and wreak havoc on the order that sober Indians attempt to maintain.
- (5) 'Now whomever the English had once owned for king or queen, they would later disinherit, and make another king that would give or sell them their land, that now they had no hopes left to kepe any land.' Further proof of the purposeful degradation of Indian traditions and the legitimacy of native institutions is attested in

this observation – the English treat the Indians arbitrarily and mock their rulers through such manipulation.

- (6) ‘Another grievance was that the English cattle and horses still increased so that when they removed 30 miles from where the English had anything to do, they could not keep their corn from being spoiled, they never being used to fence, and thought that when the English bought land of them that they would have kept their cattle upon their own land.’³⁸ Here Philip expresses acute frustration at the inexorability of the spread of the English mode of land use. The English understand the consequences, and yet heedlessly and intentionally enable the destruction of a viable coexistence with the Indian mode of life.

We can interpret this litany of complaints as just a list of grievances. We shall see the English also adopt a set of complaints against the Indians, though theirs will tend to have the form not of grievance but rather of righteous condemnations. Easton makes this point to Philip – Easton and Philip acknowledge that each side claims to have been wronged by the other.³⁹ But Philip asserts that every effort to negotiate competing claims is rigged against the Indians:

They said all English agreed against them, and so by arbitration they had had much wrong . . . for English would have English arbitrators, and once they were persuaded to give in their arms, that thereby jealousy might be removed, and the English having their arms would not deliver them as they had promised, . . . and now they had not so much land or money, that they were as good to be killed as to leave all their livelihood.⁴⁰

Enmity depends on more than grievance, however. It is itself an action orientation infused by and intensifying a hostile frame of mind. The Indians felt themselves confronted with a dead-end – be killed or leave all one’s livelihood. Why did Philip conceive the choice in such draconian terms? Philip’s hardened mindset against the English can be viewed as composed of a number of elements:

- strong narrative about the past: self, pride, recognition and friendship;
- present delineation of deliberate pattern of abuses;
- action-imperative: response required against the public, symbolic display of domination;

- future prospect of certain humiliation and loss of self;
- vague future prospect of possible united Indian resistance.

A hardened consciousness of opposition derives from an intense emotional reaction rooted in expectations from the past, harms in the present and expectations about the future. If enmity is a mentality about the struggle of a collective self to stay alive in space and time, then it may be the case that different people will weight the past, present or future differently.⁴¹ As I have shown, grounds for this anger grew over long years of friction. But that would not have been enough. The inherited idea(l) of the status of Philip's people, who had made a treaty with Plymouth and the English in their first state of vulnerability, functions, I believe, as a primary location of self-awareness. This historical narrative provided a verifiable status for a political body self-conscious about its standing and the relationship of reciprocity and mutual acknowledgment. We saw in Philip's reasoning that the steady decline in friendship and friendliness among colonists and natives was one key touchstone in his mind. The English were now making every effort to dismantle the relationship and implied equality with the Indians piece by piece, in a public and humiliating way. Present-day existence had become a constant series of provocations – a 'long train of abuses'. Philip clearly describes these as a pattern of deception, corruption and disordering.

This structure of belief and emotion models a form of enmity held by Indians who chose not to convert or to go along with the treaties establishing a new regime of power. Those Indians fought for the principle of political and cultural dignity and autonomy living side by side with the English. What would have given them the strength to hold to this position, a position leading to enmity? A past, as I have stressed, provided cultural and political capital to enable them to maintain such ideas. But an additional element of consciousness must also be mentioned. If ideational enmity consists in a struggle over the most fundamental terms of who one is vis-à-vis another, then the possibility of this hostile consciousness being action-oriented assumes a conception with some minimal hope for the future; otherwise, to do battle amounts to collective suicide. With hindsight, we may see the stand-taking as a tragic misperception, but it remained a moment of truth demanding action, to test the reality of a self-consciously organised people. Philip's conception of the future was much less motivating than his reference to the injustice of the past. Still, it was not implausible to aspire to the 'united Indian uprising' which many of the English themselves had feared.

For a local altercation between a sachem and the governor of Plymouth to become a widespread and transformative event, fundamental principles and propitious forces must have been at play. It was not accidental that war broke out between peoples who had shared so much for 50 years. I turn now to examine the English perspective, which contributed to the moral intensification of the struggle.

The Puritan trial of self through the Indian enemy

The move to a qualitatively different enemy frame of mind did not happen simultaneously for Indians and colonists. The Indians took up enmity as a last-ditch attempt to assert themselves against a direction and momentum of change, which they saw destroying their survival as a self-sustaining people tied to a past political-cultural identity. If the Indians are viewed as having expressed an inflamed reaction first – in their war drums, marching and targeted killings – does this support the Puritan claim that their role was simply defensive? '[T]he said War doth appear to be both just and necessary, and its first rise only a Defensive War', wrote Increase Mather.⁴² From the perspective of the Puritans, the types of controlling and repressive policies imposed on the Indians before the war were undertaken to insure growth and security of their towns and settlements, not offensive actions against an enemy. Control and repression over oneself and one's environment constituted essential cultural principles for Puritan existence, after all. In hindsight, we view the Puritans as having clearly gained the upper hand in the power balance; they understood the dead-end into which their demands would back the Indians, but such conformity was necessary for the civilising process. Thus, while technically speaking they did not intentionally push towards a full-blown enmity, they set the stage. To apply a vice to another knowing the potential reaction creates some element of responsibility. Hence, their claim to a purely defensive posture contains a measure of wilful political blindness. Yet the Puritans combined in their inexorable drive to remake a world both the self-righteous assertions of conquerors and fear-filled, passionate, ingenuous claims of insecure religious pioneers.

In trying to make sense of the Puritan treatment of the Indians, two approaches have predominated: the realist and the cultural-ideological. On the one hand, one might view the Puritans as any other body of powerful actors unified to achieve their ends, where political ends are always reducible to power, domination and material resources. Francis Jennings, in *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of*

Conquest (1975),⁴³ portrays them as essentially driven by material interests, but employing religious cant to justify their exploitation of the Indians. His scathing indictment of Puritan moralism towards the native people contends:

Persons and groups reaching for illicit power customarily assume attitudes of great moral rectitude to divert attention from the abandonment of their own moral standards of behavior. Deception of the multitude becomes necessary to sustain power, and deception of others rapidly progresses to deception of self. All conquest aristocracies have followed such paths. It would be incredible if ours had not.⁴⁴

Jennings emphasised the power and land-hungry objectives of the original settlers.

On the other hand, we may find this pure material conquest lens too reductionist an approach. Puritans set sail from Europe driven by powerful beliefs and experiences of oppression endured because of those beliefs. To reject the authenticity of their cultural-religious commitments as mere hypocritical cover for exploitation once they came in contact with the Indians is to ignore intense and deep motivations, which should be of interest to political-social theorists. Once we start delving into the content of those beliefs, however, the all-encompassing, holistic nature of the edifice of the Puritan idea-system begins to exert a centripetal force on the interpreter. 'Understanding' the settlers' experience of enmity becomes a matter of explaining the ideas of the Puritans from within their controlling principles, narratives and terminology. Because their system was so interconnected, comprehensive and self-perpetuating, it would appear the Puritans can only be grasped according to this tight realm of theological meaning and motivation. Perry Miller's silence on the Indian-Puritan relationship can be read as indicating a reduction of the significance of the Indians to being just one of the many types of afflictions that God – as Providence – had sent to test the Puritans. 'The Physical universe is under the continuous control of providence, so that whatever comes to pass – rainstorm, smallpox, earthquake – is not mere natural law but judgment. Afflictions do not just happen, they are literally, acts of God.'⁴⁵ Indian wars were one of these.

Another version of an internalist explanation of the Puritans stresses the classification of Indians as children of darkness. William Hubbard's history of King Philip's War epitomised a typical Manichean discourse of enmity. Indians were denounced as 'those ministers of Satan, ... actuated

by the Angel of the bottomless pit, who possibly since their delusions are but too fold more the children of Hell than they were before'.⁴⁶ Segal and Stineback offer a subtle and fascinating analysis of the Indian–Puritan relationship, showing the extent to which the Puritans were unique among conquering peoples in the moralisation of their objectives regarding the Indians. Still, they tend to reduce the Puritan mentality to the strictures of a set of beliefs: 'the dominant Puritan attitude toward Indians can be characterised as a biblical interpretation of reality in the wilderness', in which the Indians must either come over to the side of God under Puritan dominion or remain in the realm of the Devil.⁴⁷ I discuss this further below. I would argue that this rendition of the Puritan treatment of the Indians cannot explain their enmity towards them, because it remains within a static edifice of logic and does not adequately account for the ideational repercussions of engaging the Indians. We do injustice to the complexity of the interaction if we depict the Puritans as wholly scripted by an unchanging narrative. No doubt, the rigidity of their beliefs prominently distinguishes them from more flexible ideologies; it nevertheless fails to capture the emergence of enmity. Puritan persistence required a constant improvisation to build a new life in a new world.

In line with the Hubbard classification of the Indians as heathens and barbarians, we might conclude that perhaps the best mode for understanding the Puritan conception must be through civilisational prejudice inherent in the English sense of self. We have noted that many English expressed an everyday antipathy towards people they regarded as alien and uncivilised. Yet a prosaic type of hostility – the ethnocentrism based on belief in and the day-to-day enactment of one's superiority – should not be confused with enmity.⁴⁸

These typical approaches have failed to account for certain features of the dynamism and the human struggle driving the Puritans as religious and political people. The minimal theory of enmity I presented earlier (Section 1) can provide an alternative for understanding Puritan hostility. Elements of that model were the following: we assume entities in a process of self-formation; changes in boundaries and power, both material and ideational present disruptions and times of recalibrating relationships; claims by people against one another arise to protect against and/or test and prove one's collective self-realisation. In the case of the Puritans, the nature and intensity of their hostility towards the Indians derived from their own shifting and destabilised identity as their power increased, and as they attempted to make sense of these other – native – humans in God's creation. The essentially ideational nature

of Puritan self-conception increased the importance of comprehending the Indian place vis-à-vis their own. Thus, the power the Puritans were acquiring might turn out to be not only proof of their righteousness but also potentially and paradoxically a means to undermine it.

To understand the threat and the corresponding moral logic of enmity in the New Englanders' response to the Indians, we should think of the Puritans as persons acting according to basic political and religious needs, through a thickly and complexly conceptualised world of theological meaning and action, in an unfamiliar and demanding environment, in relation to other humans whose existence challenged but also provided opportunities for their beliefs and needs. What kind of threat did the Indians pose for the Puritans? The Indians were neither an essentialised enemy, due to some primordial racial difference, nor simply stock figures to be subsumed into a passion play. Rather, they were real persons, and how the Indians acted mattered. Because the Puritans settled down to build a life with families in an inhospitable climate and unknown landscape, they depended upon the local native people for protection from other Indian tribes and for knowledge about survival. This interdependence – even if at arm's length – set the stage for enmity of a profound sort. Even if we believe that war between the peoples was inevitable, given the hegemonising nature of European ideology, technology and political-cultural tools, and native resistance to these, the perception and experience of the Indian as an enemy for the Puritans came about over time through a dialectic of action and interpretation. We have already examined many factors in the stage-setting for their mutual descent into a violent resolution of the relationship. I now want to present important elements in the Puritan interpretation of the morality of this enmity.

The Puritans recognised the Indians as fellow humans, and not just as components of a wilderness to be subdued. The crux of the difficulty posed by the native peoples was precisely their ambiguous position: as potential converts, they would be proof of Puritan success in increasing the realisation of a godly world. As people who had assisted in the past and many of whom were allies in the present, they demonstrated a natural ethics. Yet in their benighted natural condition they were a conundrum, a temptation, an alternative universe, or a tool of the Devil. Puritans had to think and act outside an entirely scripted theological box in order to engage the meaning of the Indians and their relationship to themselves, but that balancing act grew increasingly less tolerant as the years of interaction proceeded. The specific content of the beliefs shaping the worldview of the Puritans provides the basis for

explanation, but remaining within those terms is not sufficient. 'Ideas' or a set of beliefs are always complex, multifarious and open to disagreement even within a cohesive community like the Puritans, and are especially tricky in an environment of change and doctrinal adaptation. In other words, despite the comprehensiveness of Puritan beliefs, their response was a human response even while filtered through powerful controlling ideas. Indian resistance constructed a moral challenge at two main levels, in what it held out as the Other and in what it said about the self. This enmity took on the rebarbative Indian of darkness and attraction and more essentially posed a test of the community's strength, unity and truth.

In order to reconstruct the Puritan view of the moral threat posed by the Indians, I primarily use Increase Mather's account of King Philip's War, *A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England* (1676).⁴⁹ His description of the war is partially a delineation of reasons regarding Indian wrongs and the justness of the Puritan response; Mather lays out this case most directly in the Postscript. The body of the text, however, offers a 'history', and history of a thoroughly instructive sort. While details of the initiation and progress of the war are provided, the 'Truth of things' comes framed in a narrative of Providence, mission and judgement: significantly, a judgement as much about self as about the Other. Mather's text is a passionate interpretation of the meaning of this horrific conflagration. That is, his analysis shows the interpretive categories through which Indian actions and the Puritans own actions must be filtered. What the Indians do, and how the English respond, reverberates in a matrix of higher meaning. In other words, the strength of the Puritan worldview is exhibited in its hermeneutic incorporation of events and actions taken by living persons, those 'facts on the ground' which demand response. Mather demonstrates a necessity in the strife, and in that way grounds its justification through a theological frame as that frame has to stretch to make sense of challenging realities. I focus on two main sources of necessity-meaning in Mather's interpretation of the war.

First, Indian resistance challenged colonials in New England because it sustained the threat of the wilderness. What was this wilderness? 'To begin with, it was simply a void', wrote Miller in *Errand into the Wilderness*.⁵⁰ The errand to build 'a city upon a hill for the eyes of all the people' assumed an open space out of which to carve and sustain a brilliant model of godly community. The Indians were a tool, an opportunity and ultimately an obstacle in that mission. The English at the beginning needed them for survival in the harsh environment of the 'void'; then their conversion became an opportunity for the propagation

of Christian faith, as a new means to industriously cultivate the earth. Mather noted in his Exhortation, in chastising his fellow Puritans for neglecting their purpose as exemplary Christians and their commitment to converting the Indians:

Remember the Errand that our Fathers came into this Wilderness for, and pursue that Interest. In general, it was on the account of Religion, that our Fathers followed the Lord into this Wilderness, whilst it was a Land that was not sown. There are other out-goings of our Nation, besides these Colonies in New-England, but they were not built upon a Foundation or Interest purely Religious, as is to be affirmed of these Plantations. It was with respect to some worldly accommodation, that other Plantations were erected, but Religion and not the World was that which our Fathers came hither for.⁵¹

The wilderness existed as a 'land that was not sown' and therefore offered the Puritans a canvas for their self-realisation. But Indian resistance to conversion and to the spread of the Puritan community then came to be a fundamental threat to the godly mission. The opening line of Mather's history of the war justifies their usurpation of the land:

That the Heathen People amongst whom we live, and whose Land the Lord God of our Fathers had given to us for a rightfull Possession, have at sundry times been plotting mischievous devices against that part of the English Israel which is seated in these goings down of the Sun, no man that is an Inhabitant of any considerable standing, can be ignorant.⁵²

Thus, in one form, the wilderness, as a quasi-theological conception, became, via Indian rejection of the Christian establishment, a realm of hostility and source of enmity. It was no longer a neutral void but a realm of disorder, chaos, wantonness and barbaric destruction. The language of Mather's text highlights this barbaric version of the wilderness. The Indians proved the horrific form of wilderness in their prosecution of the war. Mather dwells on how they

barbarously murdered both men and women . . . , stripping the slain whether men or women, and leaving them in the open field as naked as in the day wherein they were born. Such also is their inhumanity as that they flay of the skin from their faces and heads of those they get into their hands, and go away with the hairy Scalp of their enemies.⁵³

Had the Indians not positively resisted, and quietly continued on their path, even in failing to convert or become more like the English, they would not have posed the threat at the ideational and cultural level they did. Thus the threat came not simply from their otherness and not simply because they fought back. Rather, it arose through the meaning of resistance itself: resistance represented a conscious, public and explicit rejection of English order and its civilised Christian virtues. The threat of the wilderness was then not only its dumb recalcitrance but also its positive malevolence.

There is another element embedded in the threat of the wilderness, which emerges as the years passed. Besides being a blank canvas, or a menacing force, the Indian way of life in the wilderness grew to appear as a realm of alternative order and attractions. James Axtell observes: 'Of all the dangers posed by the "vast howling wilderness" of America, none was more alarming to the New English than that they and their children could be converted from "civility" to "barbarism" by its seductive freedom and its seducing inhabitants.'⁵⁴ Axtell's excellent essay explores the ways in which 'The Indian served as a teacher to the New English in three guises: as neighbor (their hospitable welcomer and uninhibited visitor), as warrior (their mortal enemy or supportive comrade in arms), and as example (a tempting model of a different way of life).'⁵⁵ All of these roles led to a great deal of cultural diffusion, a subtle process that had certainly begun by the time of King Philip's War. While fear of Indianisation or 'turning Indian' (white heathenism)⁵⁶ had not yet reached fever pitch, much of the *Brief History* records Mather's indictment of waning commitment and the lure of a less controlled, doctrinally rigid and pious life. Mather repeatedly harps on the slackening of Puritan single-mindedness – the long hair, commercialism, failure to attend church – all of which are seen to be a provocation of God and therefore explain God's punishing them through the means of war: 'God is greatly offended with the Heathenisme of the English People. How many that although they are Christians in name, are no better then Heathens in heart, and in Conversation? How many Families that live like profane Indians without any Family prayer?'⁵⁷ The threat of an attractive wilderness must be countered by a redoubling of efforts to convert the Indians to Christianity, saving one's own soul in the process. These twin themes abound in the text.

Thus the threat of wilderness virtues had to be categorically denied and the face of the wilderness permanently marked as bloody, anarchic, chaotic, destructive and malevolent. The Indian choice not only to resist conversion but also to fight the encroachment of Puritan order

demonstrated a deep threat to them. In the face of claims by Philip to a space for the Indian way of life, the religious authorities translated political challenges into theological ones. To have recognised publicly and juridically the justifiability of Indian demands to political viability alongside the English would have been a transgression of the Puritans' basic principles of sowing the land into a manifestation of God's order. We should turn now to the other source of necessity-meaning in Mather's work.

Whereas the threat of the wilderness challenged Puritans because of its contrast to their vision of right order – exemplifying a disordered, wrong and sometimes dangerously alluring power – Indian resistance also challenged the solidity of the Puritan sense of self at a more fundamental, inward level. With their growing power, they were changing. Who were they in this new world? What would prove their righteousness? Indian enmity posed a test or trial of the community and its foundation in truth. Thus the second frame of meaning through which Indian resistance must be interpreted is as a test of self, community and truth. Reiner Smolinski comments in his introduction to Mather's *Exhortation* that 'Mather's history of New England's war with the Algonquian King Philip (Metacom) is set in a framework of cosmic struggle between good and evil, God's elect warding off Satan's minions.' Yet the word 'Devil' is used only twice, once voicing his own perspective, when Mather refers to the Indians as 'perfect children of the Devil',⁵⁸ after a particularly gruesome description of them torturing and killing five English colonists. Satanic enmity – as an outer force of evil – is not the language used by Mather in this text. I point this out to emphasise the ambiguity of the Indians within the Puritan worldview, and that they were not categorically relegated to some pre-ordained role.⁵⁹ If it was God's work to provoke the Puritans and demonstrate his anger through Indian resistance, then they could not solely function at the behest of dark forces in the universe.⁶⁰ Enmity towards the Indians is placed within a cosmic drama, but for Mather this does not appear to be a straightforward Manichaeian battle, in which the Puritans exemplify the forces of good against the forces of evil. The drama revolved around the loss of saintliness among the Puritans themselves, but then raised an even more alarming terror, not explicit but lurking behind the great outpouring of literature on the war – the validity of their truth-based community.

As noted before, the new generations of Puritans had slackened in their commitment to the outward faith. The message conveyed through the war, Mather railed, displayed God's anger at their own inner

weakness, both at the individual and communal levels. For Mather, their sins were blazoned across the sky in the calamities afflicting them: 'The Providence of God is deeply to be observed, that the sword should be first drawn upon a day of Humiliation, the Lord thereby declaring from heaven that he expects something else from his People besides fasting and prayer.'⁶¹ Throughout the text, God is interpreted as meting out hardship in order to test his people: 'But God saw that we were not yet fit for Deliverance, nor could Health be restored unto us except a great deal more Blood be first taken from us: and other places as well as Plimouth stood in need of such a course to be taken with them.'⁶² God's Providence is termed awful and tremendous;⁶³ passages from the Bible are brought forth to explain the meaning of God's anger:

Praying without Reforming will not do. And now is the day come wherin the Lord is fulfilling the word which himself hath spoken, saying, I will send wild Beasts among you, which shall rob you of your Children, and destroy your Cattle, and make you few in number, and if you will not be reform'd by these things, I will bring your Sanctuaries to Desolation, and I will not smell the sweet Savor of your Odours. The Providence of God is never to be forgotten.⁶⁴

The name of God is referred to more than 100 times in the course of the text, and Providence 30. These lines exemplify the predominant rhetorical mode of the jeremiad, as Miller and Bercovitch have made famous. Mather clearly pronounces the test to which the Puritans were subject to be of their own religious worthiness in the eyes of God. In this interpretive paradigm, then, the Indians take on a cosmic and stylised role in a narrative about condemnation, self-purification and re-dedication to a life of true religious observance. Here the Indians occupy a derivative status and importance in the morality play of Puritan salvation.

Yet King Philip's War demonstrated the natives' primary role in calling into question Puritan political identity. The evidence for this can be adduced through the following considerations. Mather book-ends the body of his text with an introduction and a Postscript. In these portions of the writing, we can see his justification for the political character of the text most clearly. In his long opening paragraph, Mather explained his purpose in both 'secular' and religious terms. He quotes Polybius about the importance of the historian, who endeavours 'to relate things truly and impartially' and includes a quote in Greek: 'the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of history.' Notably, the Greek authority precedes Mather's references immediately

following to holy Scripture and the 'Ministers of God' in the Old Testament who record 'the providentiall Dispensations of God'.⁶⁵ Mather describes his inspiration to write as a reaction to the false and misleading accounts of the war that have circulated, and aims to write 'a just History of New-England'. Those other writings are either too secular, too materialist or too sympathetic to the Indian enemies. His 'history' is much less technically exact and extensive than Hubbard's; it is didactic and hortatory. But it served the fundamental ideological purpose: to justify the experiment of theological politics.

In the Postscript, the complexity of the problem of Puritan political identity comes to the fore. Whereas throughout the text the point of view of the English and the victims of the war is voiced as unified in one overarching body of people, in the Postscript he is forced to justify why those in other colonies besides Plymouth entered the conflict:

It is known to every one, that the Warr began not amongst us in Massachusetts Colony; nor do the Indians (so far as I am informed) pretend that we have done them wrong. And therefore the cause on our part is most clear, and unquestionable: For if we should have suffered our Confederates, and those that were ready to be slain, to be drawn to death, & not endeavoured to deliver them, when they sent unto us for that end, the Lord would have been displeas'd . . . Yea, all the world would justly have condemn'd us.⁶⁶

Mather claims that they were morally required to come to the assistance of 'our Brethren in that Colony'.⁶⁷ The alliance constituting the United Colonies of New England was a confederation of Puritan polities. Thus the language of 'us' and 'our' refers to the common religious identity of those who would carry on the project of building a city on a hill. In the final paragraph of the text before the Postscript, he speaks of 'our Salvation' such that

great glory may be to his own blessed Name for ever. Let him bring health and cure unto this Jerusalem, and reveal the abundance of peace and truth: And it shall be unto him a Name of joy, a Praise and an honour before all the Nations of the earth, which shall hear all the good that he will doe unto us.⁶⁸

The repetition of self-referential pronouns must be taken to refer to the theologically based ideal polity in New England, insofar as they shared this common identity.

Yet the challenge of Indians fighting against one of your fellow brethren did not only demand a united front because of a shared Puritan identity. The challenge was rooted more deeply in the structure of the experiment of theological politics itself. A moral logic of destroying Indian resistance can be made sense of in the following way. The Puritan colonists sought to create a new Jerusalem to be an exemplar of a community of saints on earth. Integral to the experiment was a real functioning political regime. Politics and religion must be mutually constituted. The success of this political-theological unity testified to the higher goal. But socio-economic and cultural forces, which led to increasing wealth and security of the Puritan community, corroded an unadulterated religious identity. Thus, the identity of the Puritan polity was being challenged culturally from within. Additionally, Indian resistance triggered a deep-seated fear of a united Indian uprising. It was not obvious that they would not gather all the powerful tribes and destroy English life. This double insecurity – from within and without – made the challenge of the Indians intensely resonant. The Indian rejection of Puritan power might succeed. In which case, the experiment of their truth-based theological politics would have failed. More was at stake than an alliance of cultural identity. The very coherence of the truth of God’s message, which constituted a religious–political identity – a message that had infused passionate meaning and empowered people to conquer a new world – was called into question. Will we prove ourselves to be the true saints God initially indicated we were? If we fail, does this signal a failure of the beliefs themselves? Or does the true theology remain untouched by our human failures?

I believe the viciousness of the war was partially due to Puritan righteousness and to cultural rejection of an inferior people, but perhaps more so to the real fear of the failure of this truth, which had to be lived and proved. Their beliefs tied together identity and a concrete community, and the success of that community attested to the truth of the beliefs. The Indians therefore posed a substantive challenge through their actions to the Puritan project to forge a universal model. The Indian attempt to staunch their own cultural dissolution threatened ideological dissolution for the Puritans as well.

Conclusion

My aim in this essay has been to analyse an episode of existential conflict between two peoples in order to understand the elements of the hostile mindset inspiring them. I opened with a passage from Locke

condemning the intolerance of the English in their treatment of the Indians. Locke had focused on the narrowness and covetousness of a righteous group, but I hope that this investigation into the case has brought out the multiplicity of stakes beyond religious intolerance that drove the tragic conflict. I do not deny that a rejection of the equal value of Indian cultural life pre-existed for the English. However, enmity – as a hardened attitude willing to employ force and sacrifice of oneself against another – raises questions of a different order. Europeans deployed force and violence against the native peoples in America as a matter of course in their conquest of the country. But the relationship of the Puritans and the Indians in New England was not of this automatic nature, and it provides a window into a different dynamic of enmity. When a treaty is signed in 1671 in which Philip must recommit ‘to renew my Covenant with my ancient Friends, my Fathers Friends’ (see note 22), and enmity breaks out four years later, we ought to search for underlying moral frameworks that can help make sense of the devolution into violent mutual antipathy. I hope to have shown that the transition into a hostile consciousness unfolded through a more complex moral and political–psychological process.

The devolution to enmity took place in a time of change, when accumulations of power and shifts in order began to emerge in the light of day. The English tested out their hegemonic power, and the Indians reacted against it, attempting to stave off diminution. Both sides feared losing the capacity to be what they had been or what they aspired to be. Each people understood itself to be rooted in morally defensible terms and saw the other as destructive of its essential need and right to live as those terms compelled. For the Indians, a sense of past status as a people vis-à-vis the English led them to interpret the present harms and direction of change as insupportable. They had reasons to act on their own heft, as a recognised community and as a potential leader of a general Indian resistance. This turned out to be futile, but it was not completely obvious that such would be the case in the circumstances of the time. For the Puritans, desperation grew out of much more than a revulsion against a cultural other or against people who sought to maintain a non-Christian way of life. The Puritans were, after all, essentially self-oriented people, constantly scrutinising themselves for failures to achieve their godly mission. Their hardened consciousness of enmity wove together both theological ideas about righteousness against the stubborn children of darkness and the political–psychological need to succeed as a united Puritan project, which would prove their truth. The battle with the Indians presented

a transcendently important time of potential change to re-confirm this project.

The ideational model of enmity helps us to focus on the human level of self-understanding in cases of horrific mutual destruction. It also displays the tremendous power of moral logics in guiding action. In our attempt to trace out the vicissitudes of tolerance and intolerance through critical passages in history, we need to keep in mind the human toll of transformation and that the prospects of a more culturally diverse generous world could not unfold in a peaceful way.

Notes

1. John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), p. 43.
2. I use this passage to illustrate how a seemingly straightforward picture of antagonism can be unpacked to show types and dimensions of hostility, but it is also interesting that Locke, when he drafted this image of intolerance, may have had in mind the conflict I examine in this essay. The fact that Locke points out the intimacy and cooperation between the peoples before the abrupt and violent rescinding of those ties more closely follows what happened in New England than in Virginia. The war began in the summer of 1675; it stirred enormous media interest in London. Jill Lepore traces the 'story as printed' – on 16 August 1675, the first two reports of the war were printed in *The London Gazette*. See her *The Name of War, King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pp. 55–56ff. Given the great popularity of accounts of the war, it would have been extraordinary if Locke were not aware of it. He set sail for France in November of 1675, so would have heard of the war before then. As Increase Mather later wrote: 'the report of poor New England's Calamity, hath caused those that are in Lands afar off to be amazed and troubled' in Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England (1676)*, online electronic text version: <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/31/>. p. 55.
3. Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country, A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 2.
4. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Indians and English, Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 239.
5. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1968). Clausewitz indicates the intrinsic connection between war and the mental state of enmity: see Bk I, I.13, Bk I, I.18 and famously Bk I, I.28.
6. See my 'The Concept of Normative Threat', in *International Theory* Vol. 3, No. 3 (2011), pp. 450–87, for a discussion of this literature.
7. See Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
8. Sachem is the term used for the chief of a tribe or confederation.
9. Given its importance in the legacy of Native-English history, many accounts of the war have been offered. See for a useful synopsis of this literature

- Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp. 155–59. The traditional name of Philip (who had requested an English name) was Metacom.
10. For instance, Lepore in *The Name of War* writes: 'In proportion to population, their short, vicious war inflicted greater casualties than any other war in American history' (p. xi). Of the approximately 9,000 killed, one third were English and two-thirds Native. Mandell provides these figures: 'Of ninety towns in New England, fifty-two (58%) were attacked, twenty-five pillaged (over 25%), and seventeen razed' (Mandell, p. 137).
 11. Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougas, *King Philip's War* (Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 1999), p. 1.
 12. See Daniel Richter's *Before the Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 264, 279–91) for a discussion of the war and its place in the dynamic of planter settlements and imperial reassertion of authority, which eventually set the stage for the American Revolution. The war led Charles II to re-examine Massachusetts's sovereign charter and to begin to reassert royal authority; by 1686 the New England colonies would be folded back under the crown. See also Mandell, 2010, for the detrimental effects on the colonial victors, pp. 137–38.
 13. Schultz and Tougas, p. 1.
 14. William Hubbard, *A Narrative of the Indian Wars in New England* (Brattleborough: William Fessenden, 1814), <http://archive.org/details/narrativeofindia00hubb>. Hubbard emphasised the complicity of nearly all Indians in the treachery; see, for example, p. 113.
 15. See Kupperman, *Indians and English*, for an analysis of the nature of this encounter during the first decades of contact and colonisation. She objects to designating persons as already falling into well-defined groups and prefers to tell the story as one 'about individual people caught up in novel situations and trying to operate by timeworn methods' p. 1. In contrast, G. E. Thomas, 'Puritans, Indians, and the Concept of Race', in *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (March, 1975), pp. 3–27, stresses the inherently racial and discriminatory attitudes of the English from the outset in their contact with the Indians.
 16. She observes:

The first impulse of native leaders was to incorporate the English settlers as clients, and to understand their presence in terms of native ceremonial and political arrangements... This impulse was in many ways the mirror image of the English assumption that the Indians would naturally want to become civilized as Europeans understood civility.

- Kupperman, *Indians and English*, p. 174, see also p. 74.
17. Kupperman, p. 234.
 18. Quoted in Philip Ranlet, 'Another Look at the Causes of King Philip's War', in *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), pp. 79–100, p. 87.
 19. See Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontier, Puritans and Indians 1620–1675* (3rd Edition, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995). Vaughan takes note of this important evolution as well: '[T]he earlier Puritan policy had eroded badly by 1675. For several interlocking reasons, the majority of

- the settlers had lost their former determination – however imperfect – to treat the Indians fairly’, pp. xxxi–xxxiii.
20. See Mather, *A Brief History*, pp. 87–88, for text of the treaty.
 21. See Yasuhide Kawashima, *Igniting King Philip’s War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), esp. pp. 35–50, for a helpful analysis of the very complex issues surrounding land, its usage and transfer. See also Charles M. Segal and David C. Stineback, *Puritans, Indians, and Manifest Destiny* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), for discussion of the unique relationship between the Indians and Puritans, in particular, their similarity in imbuing land with spiritual significance because nature was a ‘psychic realm’ suffused with spirits or God: for example, pp. 35ff.
 22. Jenny Hale Pulsipher, ‘“Subjects...Unto the Same King”: New England Indians and the Use of Royal Political Power’, in *Massachusetts Historical Review*, Vol. 5 (2003), pp. 29–57, p. 44.
 23. See also Kawashima, *Igniting*:

a clear trend had been emerging: the growing power and influence of the English at the expense of the Indians, whose control was rapidly declining. The English were now increasingly dominating the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the Wampanoag country... It was these pressures on Indian autonomy that culminated in the outbreak of King Philip’s War. (p. 126)
 24. Our modern use of the term ‘sovereignty’ accentuates the feature of a political body’s independent self-rule. Yet the status of independent decision-making can obtain only because of a collective commitment among sovereign bodies to recognise a set of rules to respect boundaries and independence. Sovereignty implies a level of commonality through equal juridical status to make independence operative. See, for example, Stephen Krasner *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 14–20. I thank Eric Grynawski for drawing my attention to this reference.
 25. Richter, *Before the Revolution*, p. 369.
 26. Sassamon was fluent in English, had studied at Harvard and served as a schoolmaster in the praying town of Natick, but had since returned to serve as translator and secretary for the Indian sachems Metacom (Philip) and his brother Wamsutta. In the course of negotiations with Plymouth over the sale of lands, Philip grew suspicious of Sassamon, whose fluency in reading, writing and speaking English gave him access to legal tools that could be manipulated to colonists’ and Sassamon’s advantage against Philip.
 27. For the basic facts of this case, I have consulted numerous histories but in this paragraph use primarily Mandell, *King Philip’s War* (2010).
 28. The discovery of the dead bodies signalled to the English that a negotiated peace was now impossible and that the will to war on the part of Philip and the Wampanoag was clear. However, they may have been killed in retaliation for a shooting the previous day by colonists of an Indian found pilfering an abandoned house. In any case, the exact details of the first shot remain ambiguous. Readiness to fire by both sides seems to have reached a point of no return. Could it have been diffused, had a party sent out to negotiate contacted Philip in time? In moments like this, one can ask whether a random

- factor (the just-missed timing for mediation) set history on a permanently different track. This is unlikely, not because humans of such different world-views *must* have become enemies, but because in the case of rigid tactics of demanding compliance, push-back was bound to happen.
29. See Vaughan, *New England Frontier*, pp .xxi–xxii, including note 13, where he points out the harshening demeanour of Puritan jurisprudence.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
 31. For liberalisation of arms, see Vaughan, p. 229.
 32. I have used the Easton text in the version available online: <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/33/>. A copy of the report was sent to Sir Edmund Andros, Governor of New York, and the version generally referenced is based on that copy. Others at the time read this report, as indicated by Increase Mather's reference to it in the introduction to his analysis of the war.
 33. Lepore notes the paucity of written explanations of the Native point of view. 'One Englishman said that the war, through the wounds Indians inflicted on English bodies, was Philip's only chance to be "found in print," "drawing his own report in blud not Ink." Maybe dead men do tell tales' (p. 47).
 34. Easton, pp. 5–6.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
 37. *Ibid.*
 38. *Ibid.*
 39. *Ibid.*, see p. 4.
 40. Easton, p. 4.
 41. My interpretation of an enemy frame of mind motivating Philip, his warriors and the allied Narragansetts and others should be taken as a model enabling us to grasp a logic of opposition, not that all who fought the English held an identical mentality.
 42. Mather, *Brief History*, pp. 86–87.
 43. Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America, Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975).
 44. Jennings, p. ix.
 45. Perry Miller, *The New England Mind, from Colony to Province* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 23.
 46. William Hubbard, pp. 323–24.
 47. Segal and Stineback, p. 38. Their introduction offers one of the more extended treatments of the Puritan–Indian relationship.
 48. See G. E. Thomas, 'Puritans, Indians, and the Concept of Race', which argues for an essentially racist Puritan disposition.
 49. *A Brief History*: <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/31/>. As noted previously, the war set off a printing bonanza due to enormous interest in Boston, Cambridge and London, with at least 21 different accounts published in eight years, much of it focused on the gorier aspects. Lepore writes: 'only Mather's and Hubbard's are what we would recognise as actual "histories" of the war' – see pp. 48–68. Francis Jennings's passionate indictment of the Puritan settlement and self-understanding in their treatment of the native peoples focused on Hubbard's work. Hubbard's was the officially sanctioned document of the political leaders of Massachusetts Bay and was

- proffered in England as the best explanation of the war. Both the Mather and Hubbard texts have been used by historians as primary documents for descriptions and understanding the war. I use Mather's because of its more passionate, moral and ideological character.
50. Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 12, note 2.
 51. Mather, *Exhortation*, p. 21, <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/31/>
 52. Mather, *Brief History*, p. 9.
 53. Mather, *Brief History*, p. 14.
 54. James Axtell, 'The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness', in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1972), pp. 335–66, p. 356.
 55. Axtell, 336; see especially pp. 352–66.
 56. Axtell, p. 359.
 57. *Exhortation*, p.6.
 58. Mather, *Brief History*, p. 45.
 59. The status of the native peoples remained an ongoing theological conundrum. Were they the lost tribe of the Jews? Were they incorrigible satanic emissaries?
 60. But see Segal and Stineback, pp. 37–38: 'If God demanded total allegiance to the social, economic, and political tenets of Puritan faith, then a modified form of Puritan-Indian interaction could not alter Puritan conviction that Satan ultimately controlled Indian behavior (though God, of course, permitted him to do so for His own reasons).'
 61. Mather, *Brief History*, p. 12.
 62. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 15.
 64. *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.
 65. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
 67. *Ibid.*
 68. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

4

Law and Civil Interest: William Penn's Tolerationism

Andrew R. Murphy and Sarah A. Morgan Smith

In many ways William Penn is a familiar figure to those interested in the history of religious tolerance and liberty of conscience. The story of a son of privilege who converted to a sect more often associated with the poor and unlearned, then followed his principles of religious liberty to the shores of America and founded a colony dedicated to those ideals, has fired the imagination of generations of scholars and citizens. Penn's life and career have been explored by scholars from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. And yet, just a handful of years short of the 300th anniversary of Penn's death, we still lack an overarching treatment of his political thought.

This chapter, of course, does not present such an overarching treatment; rather, we focus on two elements of Penn's thought that were central to his own search for religious liberty in both theory and practice, and trace them across the broad arc of his public career. First, Penn advanced the idea of England (and, later, Pennsylvania) as a civic commonwealth in which political loyalty and allegiance, not religious affiliation, form the basis of citizenship. For Penn, civil interest was the cement of civil society, and he stressed in 1687 that 'as Englishmen, we are . . . mutually interested in the inviolable conservation of each other's civil rights'.¹ Second, and related, Penn emphasised the rule of law as the supreme guarantor of popular liberty. In the Preamble to Pennsylvania's Frame of Government, Penn argued his case quite plainly: 'Any government is free to the people under it (whatever be the frame) where the laws rule, and the people are a party to those laws, and more than this is tyranny, oligarchy, or confusion.'² While Penn's concept of civil interest offers a minimal ground for generating feelings of civic identity, solidarity and belonging, his emphasis on the importance of fundamental law provides the foundation upon which that civil interest can rest secure.

We conclude by examining some of the broader ramifications of Penn's theory and practice of toleration.

Civil interest: Redefining magistracy

Penn's early activism for toleration

The campaign for toleration in early modern England was simultaneously a campaign against persecution: a positive vision of what government ought to be doing, how it ought to address questions of religious diversity, was always framed by opposition to what government was actually doing. For Penn, considerations of true Christianity and human nature led inexorably to thinking about the proper role of government, a subject that occupied his attention from his earliest works through later years, when he himself would actually wield political power. In *The Guide Mistaken*, written while he was in his mid-20s, Penn briefly outlined a view of civil magistracy that characterised his emerging views on politics, insisting that magistrates remember

That their authority cannot reasonably extend beyond the end for which it was appointed, which being not to enthrone themselves sovereign moderators in causes purely conscientious...but only to maintain the impartial execution of justice, in regulating civil matters with most advantage to the tranquility, enrichment and reputation of their territories, they should not bend their forces, nor employ their strength, to gratify the self-seeking spirit of the priests, or any private interest whatsoever.³

In *The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience*, probably the most systematic treatment of the grounds of toleration he ever wrote, Penn offered a more sustained reflection on the nature of government, which he defined as 'an external order of justice, or the right and prudent disciplining of any society, by just laws'.⁴ In a point critical for the question of toleration, Penn identified legitimate governmental authority as both impartial and limited to 'external' matters: that is, to those things that affect the ability of individuals to live together peaceably and profitably. Defining belief, and religion more generally, in terms of its *interiority*, its spiritual essence properly dealt with by spiritual means, provided Penn yet another component to his case against persecution: Christianity, Penn argued, 'entreats all, but compels none', employing spiritual weapons in the pursuit of spiritual goals.⁵ Persecuting governments are therefore not only exercising power illegitimately (i.e., for

ends towards which the state was never meant to be directed) but are Christian in name only, for they 'overturn' the 'nature' of the faith, 'which is meekness', and thus pervert any good intentions they might have had.⁶

Penn goes on to observe in *The Great Case* that persecution was just as imprudent as it was ineffective, and unjust as it was unchristian, for 'force never yet made either a Good Christian or a Good Subject'.⁷ The fundamental grounding of government is justice, which requires a degree of proportionality between ends and means, such that even if religious dissent were a fault on the part of Dissenters, 'yet the infliction of a corporal or external punishment, for a mere mental error (and that not voluntarily too) is unreasonable and inadequate, as well as against particular directions of the Scriptures'.⁸ The persecuting regime thus oversteps on all grounds, alienates its citizens and, in so doing, undermines its own ability to accomplish the legitimate ends of 'peace', 'plenty' and 'unity'.⁹

In their pursuit of these limited, but vital, functions, all governments ought to proceed in a prudential manner, understanding the difference between fundamental laws (the bedrock of society, which must be maintained at all times) and superficial ones (which may be adjusted due to specific contingencies and circumstances). The persecuting Restoration regime was based on just the opposite set of assumptions: Penn's *The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted* – a purported transcript of his 1670 trial, with fellow Quaker William Mead, on charges of inciting a riot – provides a kind of inverted case study in this respect, of what not to do: it is an indictment of a government that harries loyal religious dissenters into court on vague charges, throws them into prison and seizes their goods, in a reckless attempt at imposing religious uniformity.¹⁰ Such a policy fails to take the distinction between fundamental and superficial laws seriously, punishes pious and loyal citizens, will damage the nation's finances and trade and is ultimately doomed to fail.

Properly assessing and pursuing this prudent and balanced approach to religious differences – which had always existed, and which would continue, no matter how many laws were passed – was in both the people's and the government's interest. Penn joined contemporaries such as Sir Charles Wolseley, in *Liberty of Conscience, the Magistrates Interest*, and Slingsby Bethel, in *The Present Interest of England Stated*, in his attempt to vindicate the notion of 'interest' from its widely understood pejorative sense to a more positive, socially beneficial and constructive meaning.¹¹ Further evidence of the happy coincidence between the interest, properly understood, of magistrates and their people was provided in

The Great Case by an extensive list of historical figures (including many Christian saints, but also pagan rulers from the ancient and medieval world) who tolerated religious Dissenters and reaped the benefits.¹²

The important descriptors indicated above – government as external, as impartial and as dictated by the public interest – suggest the significance of civil peace and prosperity to the conception of government Penn was articulating. Penal laws against Dissenters

are so far from benefiting the country, that the execution of them will be the assured ruin of it, in the revenues, and consequently, in the power of it; For where there is a decay of families, there will be of trade; so of wealth, and in the end of strength and power.¹³

If government is charged with promoting the common good, persecution undermines that goal, especially when considering how crucial religious Dissenters are to the nation's trade.¹⁴ Like other tolerationists of his day, Penn attributed the prosperity of Holland to its tolerant stance towards religious difference.¹⁵ Peace, plenty and unity are the ends of government – not, Penn insists, unity of opinion but a more general notion of civic unity, grounded in the 'external order of justice' mentioned earlier.

Protestant unity and civil interest during the plot and Exclusion years

Penn maintained this commitment to civil interest and a minimal, pragmatic understanding of what unites Englishmen through the 1670s. During the Exclusion Crisis and the popish plot years, calls for Protestant unity were both principled and pragmatic: tolerationists continued to argue for the justness of their cause while at the same time urging unity as essential to the nation's security against the Catholic threat. Earlier we saw how Penn argued that civil magistrates' concerns should be focused on (and their coercive powers directed towards) external, concrete benefits of common life, and not on sectarian matters of conscientious belief. The popish plot – with its rumours of papal intrigue, of scheming Jesuits and their English sympathisers conniving to bring England back into the papal fold – provided Penn with a clear illustration of the principle of civil interest and a way forward in very difficult times. The 'good of the whole is the rise and end of government', Penn wrote in 1679: if 'popery' threatened shared English liberties and thus was more political than religious, civil government could (must, really)

aggressively pursue and prosecute plotters without violating liberty of conscience.¹⁶

In *One Project for the Good of England*, published in the midst of the crisis, Penn argued that although one might hope for a religiously unified society, a more realistic prospect, given the liability of humans to error, would be to 'recur to some lower but true principle for the present'.¹⁷ That lower but true principle was none other than civil interest, 'the foundation and end of civil government... a legal endeavour to keep rights, or augment honest profits, whether it be in a private person or a society'.¹⁸ In this formulation, Penn drew on his earlier definition of magistracy as concerned with external things, defining government as 'a Just and Equal Constitution, where Might is not Right, but Laws rule, and not the Wills or Power of Men; for that were plain Tyranny'.¹⁹ Not only does such an understanding point individuals towards clear and reasonable standards of justice, but it does so in a way that holds irrespective of differences in faith.

Having witnessed his country in the throes of religio-political strife for as long as he could remember, in 1679 Penn applied these general theoretical reflections specifically to the situation in his day, emphasizing the civil bonds uniting English Protestants and the political threat posed by Catholics:

ENGLAND is a Country Populous and Protestant, and though under some Dissents within it self, yet the Civil Interest is the same, and in some Sense the Religious too. For, first, all English Protestants, whether Conformists or Nonconformists agree in this, that they only owe Allegiance and Subjection unto the Civil Government of England, and offer any Security in their Power to give of their Truth in this Matter. And in the next Place, they do not only consequentially disclaim the Pope's Supremacy, and all Adhesion to Foreign Authority under any Pretence, but therewith deny and oppose the Romish Religion, as it stands degenerated from Scripture, and the first and purest Ages of the Church; which makes up a great Negative Union... In short, It is the Interest of the Ruling, or Church-Protestants of England, that the Pope should have no Claim or Power in England. It is also the Interest of the Dissenting Protestants, that the Pope should have no Claim or Power here in England...²⁰

The religious issues dividing English Protestants were real but not fundamental; they did not reach to the core of doctrine. Far more fundamental, and foundational, was the common Protestant rejection of

Catholic claims (both doctrinal and political, since Catholic doctrinal error fed its politically dangerous tendencies).

Taking these several passages together, three main points are worth bearing in mind. First, a commitment to civil interest is a key element of legitimate government as well as social peace. It can refer to a *type* of governmental function (e.g., the preservation of the proceeds from honest labour, or of long-standing legal rights), or it can evoke issues of territorial integrity and national security, and more broadly of peace and prosperity (in this case, 'England' or 'the three kingdoms', as opposed to 'Rome' or 'the French interest'). Thus civil interest can be threatened by two different sets of actors: a government that over-reaches and legislates on things not properly civil (e.g., the persecuting Restoration state) or an external enemy that seeks to undermine the civil government and substitute its own interests for those of the political community (the French king, or the pope).

Second, since religion in the true sense is about loving God above all, and one's neighbour as oneself – faith, Penn argues in *An Address to Protestants of All Persuasions*, another piece published during the plot years, is grounded in love and epitomised by the Sermon on the Mount – then by virtue of its power-hungry nature and its claims to political dominion, Catholicism is not only a degenerate religion ('degenerated from the Scriptures', as he put it in *One Project*) but also a political threat.²¹ The religious error was sincerely felt by English Protestants, and they had no doubt but that the Catholic religion was degenerate and superstitious. But what really raised political concerns were the political implications of Catholicism – 'popery' – the real or perceived intentions of the French king's armies and the pope's claims with regard to civil authority, and the issues of obedience and loyalty that they purportedly raised for English Catholics.

Third, the 'negative union' that Penn invokes, the rejection of Roman religious and political pretensions at the heart of Protestantism, is nonetheless a substantive descriptor. Even though, as Penn acknowledges, real theological issues divide them, English Protestants should not blind themselves to their shared interest in the preservation of English liberties and the defence of Protestantism at home and abroad. After all, were Catholics ever to gain political power in England again, they certainly would not differentiate between Baptists, Presbyterians, Quakers and Anglicans. All would suffer under a popish prince; as one of Penn's contemporaries put it, 'The quarrel now is strictly between Protestant and Papist: since all must suffer together, under the denomination of Protestant, I think it concerns all to stand together, and

unanimously provide for ourselves, by all lawful means.²² The preservation of England's tradition of limited monarchy from the absolutist tendencies of Catholicism was of obvious interest to all citizens of the realm, and would require them to look past their internal divisions in order to face a much more serious external threat.

What all these discussions – of civil interest, of the nature of religion, and of the shared legacy of Protestantism in England – lead to is Penn's diagnosis of a fundamental misunderstanding at the heart of persecuting Restoration policies: 'But there is a twofold mistake that I think fit to remove, First, that the difference betwixt Protestants and their Dissenters is generally managed as if it were civil. Secondly, the difference betwixt papist and Protestant is carried on, as if it were chiefly religious.'²³ Such a view was echoed by other Protestants during these years: in denouncing Louis XIV, and painting in vivid colours the miseries that would attend the establishment of Catholicism in England under a French regime, the author of *Europe a Slave* expressed his desire 'that my brethren may understand me, the dispute is not here about religion: that's but the mantle which covers the design of the popishly affected party and their leaders, to keep off the sitting of Parliaments'.²⁴ The experience of other European nations demonstrated, on this view, that Catholic theology was more compatible with hierarchical and absolutist governments than with any form of political representation; the preservation of British liberties required the rejection of Catholicism in the most emphatic terms.

So Protestant unity, civil interest and anti-popery are all prongs of the same political strategy. Certainly this was true of the Whig programme during the Exclusion Crisis. Indeed, one of the pieces of evidence introduced at the earl of Shaftesbury's 1681 trial for treason was a draft of a bill to form a Protestant association to accomplish, presumably by the combined efforts of armed citizens, what the Parliament had been unable to achieve legislatively: the exclusion of James from the throne.²⁵ And the very title of Penn's *Address to Protestants of all Persuasions* announces the idea of Protestant unity, an ongoing theme in the tolerationist campaigns of seventeenth-century England.²⁶ Much of Penn's *Address* dwelt on the moral sins of the nation – drunkenness; whoredom and fornication; gaming; oath-swearing, cursing, and blasphemy; and profaneness – that threatened to bring God's judgement upon the land and called on the civil magistrate to act swiftly to cut them off.²⁷

But more to the point of this chapter, the *Address* also describes ecclesiastical sins and the propensity of people to persecution as ways in

which England's Protestants continued to fall short of their professed commitment to liberty of conscience. Penn's political project involved fusing the shared *civil* interest of all English Protestants in the integrity of the English civil government with the additional *religious* emphasis provided by their shared renunciation of any doctrine that would undermine that integrity: 'Their interests must needs be one against pope and foreign authority.'²⁸ Continued efforts by Anglicans to suppress Protestant Dissenters, then, would only weaken and undermine their own common interests. Appealing in the interest of 'peace and concord' 'for peace's sake' and in the interests of 'the concord of Christians', Penn insisted that the interest of England's governors and those they governed was one, and that authorities ought not needlessly multiply articles of faith.²⁹

Not only did this understanding of government and its appropriate limitations respect the religious and political liberties of the English people, Penn argued, but it also redounded to rulers' own advantage. Civil interest is not only civil (i.e., not spiritual); it is also *interest*, in the best sense of the word (i.e., not the pursuit of one's own advantage to the exclusion of all else), 'a legal endeavour' to protect the rights and property of all. The preservation of liberty was not only required by principle, but was advantageous as well; Penn reminded his readers that 'more Custom comes...to the King, and more Trade to the Kingdom, by encouraging the Labour and Traffick of an Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Independent, Quaker and Anabaptist, than by an Episcopalian only'.³⁰ Divisions among England's Protestants played into the hands of Catholics by dissolving the bonds of civil interest which strengthened the nation; thus, for Penn, neither Anglicans nor Dissenters should lose sight of the fact that the differences between Protestants and Catholics are almost exclusively political in nature, and not fundamental in terms of religious doctrine. Toleration for Protestant Dissenters was therefore an essential element of the political agenda that sought to prevent Catholic tyranny. (Of course, an English recommitment to Protestant unity would redound to the Quakers' benefit only if England's other Protestants could be brought to see that Quakers were, in fact, Protestants; hence the Society's continuing efforts to escape prosecution under laws directed towards popish recusants, and their zealous protestations that they embraced all the foundational tenets of the separation from Rome.)³¹

Penn's view of civil interest was hardly uncontroversial, though. Indeed, his *One Project* occasioned a pointed reply, *A Seasonable Corrective to the One Project*, which rehearsed many of the familiar arguments

against Dissent. Dissenters were 'peevisish', with 'a phantasie to new opinions' which led them to undermine both church and state.³² And Penn's dogged attempt to remove religious ends from the purview of civil government comes in for direct contradiction: 'Government, as it derives from heaven, so doubtless is it obliged to make heaven its last and highest end.'³³ If one admits that humans have souls, one must also admit that the care of those souls to be a chief concern of the government – and to jettison the idea of religious uniformity is to abandon the very prayer of Jesus in John 17:24 that his church be one.³⁴ If, as Penn claims, the difference within English Protestantism refers only to religious and not civil matters, how does one explain the broad consensus that holds Dissenters responsible for the civil wars, Scottish uprisings and the political unrest fomented by Thomas Venner and the Fifth Monarchy Men?³⁵ And if, as all but the most radical sectarians will admit, the differences between Dissenters and the Church of England do not reach to the fundamentals of faith but relate only to more peripheral issues of rites and ceremonies, then perhaps the political pay-off of the argument about Protestant unity suggests not the toleration of Dissenters outside the Church (as Penn hoped for), but rather a necessity for Dissenters to rejoin the Anglican fold, arguments found in Edward Stillingfleet's well-known *Mischief of Separation* as well as Francis Brokesby's *Perswasive to Reformation and Union*.³⁶

Revolutionary England, 1686–1688

From his earliest days in public life, as we have seen, Penn had urged the state to recognise the limits of its just authority, 'to maintain the impartial execution of justice, in regulating civil matters with most advantage to the tranquility, enrichment and reputation of their territories'.³⁷ This emphasis on civil interest reached its apex in the particular contexts of 1686–1688, as James II pursued relief for Catholics and, eventually, other Dissenters through the exercise of the royal prerogative.³⁸ It was a situation seemingly primed for a civil interest argument, where the principals' differing ecclesiastical affiliations could be counted on to frustrate any attempts to find even a modicum of common religious ground. For Penn and other proponents of toleration who viewed the rights of conscience as linked to the traditional 'rights of Englishmen' expressed in the fundamental law of the land, the situation presented an unexpected clash of connected political values. It was in the interest of both Dissenters and Catholics, Penn insisted, to accept the king's offer of toleration based on the prerogative and to work for parliamentary repeal thereafter.

At the heart of Penn's 1685 *Perswasive to Moderation* is a prudential, interest-driven notion of balanced governance. 'Interest will not lie', Penn wrote on more than one occasion, and as we saw laid out briefly earlier he sought to convince his readers that toleration was in the interest of both magistrates *and* the people.³⁹ Repealing penal laws would remove the chief complaints of Dissenters against the government: the use of informers, upon whose testimony (however unscrupulous the informer) Dissenters' goods were liable to be seized; and the abandonment of jury trials in many cases. In addition, toleration would secure the rights of property and ensure that 'no man suffer[s] in his civil right for the sake of ... dissent'.⁴⁰ The government also would benefit from a policy of toleration, as the people's affections and interests would be aligned with the king, who would have at his command his most skilled citizens, regardless of their faith: 'The King has the benefit of his whole people, and the reason of their safety is owing to their civil, and not ecclesiastical, obedience.'⁴¹ Such a scenario would secure the government both at home and abroad, since 'to be loved at home, is to be feared abroad'.⁴² Neither does Penn neglect the standard arguments about trade and prosperity, arguing that

as men, in times of danger, draw in their stock, and either transmit it to other banks, or bury their talent at home for security ... (and either is fatal to a kingdom), so this mildness entreated, setting every man's heart at rest, every man will be at work, and the stock of the kingdom employed.⁴³

Demonstrable unity focused on civil interest not only produced domestic benefits, such as public tranquillity and prosperity, but also enhanced trade and strengthened national prestige abroad.

This emphasis on the power of interest in politics continues themes raised in Penn's earlier work and promises 'a balance at home' among the kingdom's various religious parties, an improvement in the conditions for trade and an encouragement to 'those that are upon the wing for foreign parts, to pitch here again'.⁴⁴ Persecution, by contrast, presents Dissenters with the options of 'be ruined, fly, or conform'; and what a choice that is: forfeiting one's goods, leaving for other countries or British colonies, or engaging in hypocrisy by conforming to the established Church without true belief in its doctrines.⁴⁵

Penn pressed home the argument that repeal of the penal laws and Test Acts – even in this extra-legal way – was in the country's civil interest, stressing the good will that the Church would engender with

Dissenters (their natural allies against popery) and the importance of cementing a Protestant interest zealous of English liberties.⁴⁶ In the *Second Letter From a Gentleman in the Country* he offers an aphorism – ‘Let each tub stand on its own bottom’ – as a way of emphasising the due limits of church and state:

the government should stand on its own legs, and the church upon hers. The legs of the civil government, is the civil interest of the government, which is that of all the people under it, so that the government is obliged to secure all, because all are for their own interest bound to secure it.⁴⁷

The imagery of seating things on their proper ‘bottom’ also recurred in Penn’s 1688 public defence against charges that he was a closet Jesuit. Penn expressed his hope that ‘if we could not all meet upon a religious bottom, at least we might meet upon a civil one, the good of England, which is the common interest of King and people.’⁴⁸ And in the pursuit of civil interest, the government alone should possess the power of the sword: ‘Twere happy . . . that all parties were disarmed of this sword, and that it were put where it ought only to be, in the civil magistrates hand, to terrify evildoers, and cherish those that do well.’⁴⁹ By the late 1680s, inhabitants of the three kingdoms had endured more than a century of religious and political strife without a clear victory for any one party. Tolerationist arguments from civil interest viewed the civil government’s time, effort and power as better spent on projects that benefited the whole and not just a part: even Catholics, argued one anonymous pamphlet, ‘have by law equal right with others to protection and their birthrights, bound by common interest, as English-men, to desire, wish, and endeavor the welfare of the nation’.⁵⁰

The Church, Penn went on to say, ‘relates to another world, and Christ has provided her another bottom, if she really makes his law the rule of her actions and authority’.⁵¹ The Church of England does not encompass the entirety of English religious life, and later in the same letter, continuing with the tub metaphor, Penn elaborated the actions that would characterise the entire nation meeting ‘upon our common civil bottom . . . as one people with one heart, fear God, after our own persuasion; honor the King, according to our allegiance; and love and serve one another, as becomes the members of the great civil family of this Kingdom’.⁵² Hysteria over Catholics ‘hav[ing] a few offices with us’ is wildly overblown, since Protestants and Catholics have been ‘hunting,

hawking, gaming, and marrying' side by side in England for years.⁵³ The case for repeal of the Test Acts was predicated on the notion that the civil community depends for its smooth functioning on a variety of individuals fulfilling their various roles with skill, and that the magistrate must be able to identify and benefit from the individuals who possess those skills – from law enforcement officers, clerks, tailors and shoemakers to Members of Parliament and the King's Council – without impediment. The tests, by disqualifying from public service anyone with religious views outside particular boundaries, manifestly injure the community.⁵⁴ Penn evoked the ship of state metaphor as a way of illustrating the common civil interest shared by all Englishmen:

If then as Englishmen, we are as mutually interested in the inviolable conservation of each other's civil rights, as men embarked in the same vessel are to save the ship they are in for their own sakes, we ought to watch, serve, and secure the interests of one another, because it is our own to do so; and not by any means to endure that to be done to please some narrow regard of any one party...⁵⁵

The civil interest argument is especially powerful, he insists, in a situation such as England finds itself in now, when 'we cannot agree to meet in one profession of religion'.⁵⁶ And if civil interest is the bottom on which the tub of state should rest, there will always be plenty of ways to punish actual treasonable behaviour, without criminalising religious beliefs.

Penn's *Third Letter* evoked the distinction between fundamental moral and enduring precepts and those that must be fitted to a particular time and place. To repeal a law 'which says, thou shalt not go to a conventicle', is very different from repealing 'one which says, thou shalt not kill or steal', since 'there [are] some laws that are of that moral and enduring nature, no time or accident of state can dispense with' and, on the other hand, other 'laws as are so specially accommodated, that the reason of them may not live three years to an end'.⁵⁷ The *Second Letter* emphasised the enduring foundations of English citizenship – 'Three things strictly speaking make an Englishman: ownership, consent in Parliament, and right of juries' – mirroring precisely the formula he had earlier explicated during his campaigning with Algernon Sidney in 1678.⁵⁸ In a return to recurrent themes, Penn also insists that 'secur[ing] property to all' is the 'first reason of civil government'. The persistence of penal laws violates this fundamental right of property, and

to be an English man, in the sense of the government, is to be a free-man, whether Lord or Commoner, to hold his possessions by laws of his own consenting unto, and not to forfeit them upon facts made faults, by humour, faction or partial interest prevailing in the governing part against the constitution of the kingdom; but for faults only, that are such in the nature of civil government; to wit, breaches of those laws that are made by the whole, in pursuance of common right, for the good of the whole.⁵⁹

It is challenging, of course (for twenty-first-century audiences as well as for Penn's contemporaries), to reconcile Penn's emphasis on the rule of law with his support for James's extra-legal pursuit of toleration – Ethan Shagan has stated that there 'was no more slippery proponent of religious toleration than Penn'⁶⁰ – but note here Penn's bringing together of two elements of legitimate political legislative efforts: legitimate laws are laws made by consent-based political institutions, and they are aimed only at the common good of the whole.

Forced by circumstances to choose between these two principles, Penn determined that the promotion of civil interest in the form of the peace and prosperity promised by toleration was the more urgently needed good. It was more prudent to accept James's use of the dispensing power in order to promote the civil interest of Britain as a whole than to refuse it on too scrupulous legal grounds and leave vast numbers of citizens to suffer needlessly. Yet Penn's conviction that civil interest is common not only in the sense that it is shared by all but also in that it is best protected within the context of the political institutions (jury trials and Parliament) that are most representative of the commonwealth as a whole led him simultaneously to push for James's policies to be ratified by Parliament at the earliest opportunity.

Liberty and law

All of these questions – interest, toleration, the appropriate roles of magistrates – are ultimately about law, and more specifically about English law. Penn always grounded his argument for liberty of conscience, not to mention his concrete efforts to instantiate such principles in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, squarely in his British heritage. To find clear and compelling arguments against persecution, he wrote, one need not scour the *Corpus Civile* of Justinian's laws – instead, one need only recommit oneself to the 'good, old, and admirable laws of England',

which, were they faithfully implemented, would be more than adequate to safeguard liberty and property. Penn's distinction between fundamental and superficial laws enabled him to balance continuity with the need for change and evolution. Fundamental law – most clearly stated in Magna Carta, and in various subsequent royal and parliamentary reconfirmations of Magna Charta – ought never to be abrogated.

Penn vindicated fundamental law in his trial with Mead, arguing that liberty and property were part of an inheritance common to all Englishmen, and the foundation of their civil interest. Such 'ancient fundamental laws... relate to liberty and property, and are not limited to particular persuasions in matters of religion'.⁶¹ In addition, such fundamental rights could only be forfeited by clear violations of such law, and by established procedures for deciding when this had occurred (the classic case being the right to jury trial). *Peoples* reproduced relevant passages from Magna Charta and Coke's *Institutes*. During the trial the two defendants repeatedly described their jury as their 'judges' or 'sole judges'. As the case was being sent to the jury, Penn

appeal[ed] to the jury, who are my judges, and this great assembly, whether the proceedings of the court are not most arbitrary, and void of all law, in offering to give the jury their charge in the absence of the prisoners: I say, it is directly opposite to, and destructive of the undoubted right of every English prisoner, as Cook in the 2. Inst. 29. on the chapter of Magna Charta speaks.⁶²

Penn denounced the court's action in fining the jury for their refusal to render the desired verdict as 'intolerable', and clearly viewed the jury as a means of popular control of the judicial process, a hedge against the tyrannical tendencies of judges.

He also relied on the jury to protect defendants (in this case, himself and Mead) from the politically motivated use of vague common law, and insisted that the court specify precisely the law he was supposed to have broken. Invocations of 'the common law' – and the court recorder's scolding remark that 'you must not think that I am able to run up so many years and over so many adjudged cases which we call common law to answer your curiosity' – were manifestly unsatisfactory, and Penn insisted on clarity:

Certainly if the common law be so hard to be understood, it's far from being very common; but if the Lord Cook in his *Institutes*, be

of any consideration, he tells us that common law is common right, and that common right is the Great Charter privileges, confirmed 9 Hen. III, c.29; 25 Edw. I, c.1; 2 Edw. III, c.8; Coke Inst. 56.⁶³

Penn's preference for the jury over the judge in *Peoples* is consistent with his overall tendency to see a connection between fundamental law and the civil interest that unified the realm: a jury of one's peers, after all, is composed not of men of the same occupation or religion, but simply men who share an experience of living under the laws of a particular society and, ideally, in a particular locale.⁶⁴ Such individuals have a shared interest in ensuring that the rights of the accused under the fundamental law are preserved, for they are their rights as well.

Laws passed by Parliament for the everyday ordering of life, by contrast, were of a different sort, constituting a type of superstructure over the foundations of fundamental law; such 'superficial' law might and indeed must vary with the times or the occasion. Yet Penn found it 'most rational that the superstructure can not quarrel or invalidate its own foundation, without manifestly endangering its security'.⁶⁵ Simply passing legislation through Parliament provided no guarantee of that legislation's legitimacy; after all, Catholics had passed anti-Protestant legislation through Parliament in the past.⁶⁶ Superficial laws that abrogated the essential rights of Englishmen guaranteed by the fundamental law – like those against Dissent – imposed artificial distinctions between persons that tended to rend the fabric of society. Rather than using the power of the state for the common good, persecutory laws encouraged factionalism and destroyed the sense of civil interest that an adherence to the fundamental law should have provided.

In this regard, the persecutory framework of Restoration England itself was at issue, and an anonymous contemporary of Penn's cautioned magistrates to 'look, not so much whether they act regularly according to the late Act against Conventicles, as whether the Act itself be regular and according to the fundamental laws'.⁶⁷ The reasoning was clear:

First, that our fundamentals are the standard and touchstone of all laws. Second, that the legislative power itself is tied up, under a dreadful curse, from making any statute, or law against them. Third, if they should adventure to do it, the people are obliged by the same curse to disobey the laws they make, and to give obedience to Magna Charta ... For no derivative power can null what their primitive power hath established.⁶⁸

Grounding his argument in the British constitution gave Penn's tolerationism the added weight of a common (non-sectarian) tradition with strong appeal to Englishmen of all beliefs. It had the additional benefit of aligning his particular cause with the goals of those within the kingdom who desired to curb the power of the monarchy by tethering it to an understanding of certain fundamentals as higher law. Indeed, with words that were to prove ironic, given his later support for James's use of the suspending power of the crown, Penn defined government itself as requiring 'a Just and Equal Constitution, where Might is not Right, but Laws rule, and not the Wills or Power of men; for that were plain Tyranny'.⁶⁹

Conclusion

Elsewhere, one of us (Murphy) has argued that the primary legacy of early modern toleration debates lies in carving out a minimal political space for the negotiation of deeply contested issues; in other words, in favour of a *modus vivendi* liberalism.⁷⁰ Penn's conception of civil interest stressed that civil loyalty and unity were compatible with religious difference, that unity did not require uniformity and that a commitment to fundamental law could ensure the peaceful coexistence of a wide array of religious groups. His aggressive efforts in the promotion of Pennsylvania to Dissenters across Europe provides evidence of this view in the most practical of ways; theoretically speaking, Penn's identification of civil interests with property and protection from violence and injury contributed to a line of Whig argument that would find its most noted exposition in Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration*. Locke's well-known definition of the commonwealth as a 'society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests... [which] I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like' and a church as 'a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls', like Penn's, seeks to balance civil interest and unity on the one hand, and doctrinal and ecclesiastical diversity on the other.⁷¹ Penn's insistence that 'secur[ing] property to all' is the 'first reason of civil government' also sounds Lockean notes, or perhaps we should say that 'Lockean' political theory strikes notes played a decade earlier by Penn. Nor should this overlapping theoretical space surprise us: though the two men were not personal friends

(and Locke distrusted Penn, due to Penn's support of James II), they both came out of the Restoration milieu of religious and political debate and were heavily influenced by the Dutch example of toleration.⁷²

As the proprietor of Pennsylvania, Penn incorporated his notion of civil interest and the importance of the rule of law into the colony's *Frame of Government*. The *Frame* presents a vision of a legal and political community oriented towards relatively limited but pragmatically vital ends: most of its clauses deal with property rights and questions of public order. Moreover, the institutional design of the new colony reminds us that the power of the magistrates in even these legitimate undertakings is constrained by a fundamental law that protects the liberties of the people. The 'great end of all government', Penn writes, is

to support power in reverence with the people, and to secure the people from the abuse of power; that they may be free by their just obedience, and the magistrates honourable, for their just administration: for liberty, without obedience is confusion, and obedience without liberty is slavery.⁷³

The civil interest arguments and the dedication to law as a fundamental vehicle of civil interest and unity undergirded Penn's colonising effort and his enthusiastic recruitment of 'sober people of all sorts' to his province in America. And by the standards of prosperity and flourishing – if not by Penn's more elevated desires for Quakerly unity – it was a smashing success. Pennsylvania grew from modest beginnings in the early 1680s into what one historian calls the 'richest, fastest-growing, and most cultivated of American cities' by the middle of the next century.⁷⁴

The greatest liberty reserved to the people, of course, was freedom of conscience, which Penn extended to all persons able to 'live peaceably and justly in civil society'.⁷⁵ This application of Penn's thought in America inspired James Madison as an admirable model not only for Virginia but also, later, for the national government. Madison admired Pennsylvania's pluralist society, which, he argued, encouraged liberty by inspiring greater learning as people of various sects interacted with one another, as well as helping to limit the corruption and malaise associated with religious establishments.⁷⁶ Others noted the success of Penn's experiment with toleration as well: Pennsylvania was cited approvingly in a number of anti-religious assessment petitions circulated by Virginia Baptists in the 1780s. There, the petitioners noted, restricting governmental authority to things civil had immeasurably strengthened the

health of the political community: toleration had led to 'better members, of brighter morals and more upright characters' than any of the neighbouring (non-tolerationist) states could claim.⁷⁷

Now, of course, the scope of the toleration explored in this chapter, like the scope of early modern toleration more generally, was always a limited one. Most early modern tolerationists excluded Catholics, for the reasons we have seen, and Locke's famous refusal to extend toleration to atheists continues to occupy the attention of liberal theorists.⁷⁸ At the same time, the passage of the Toleration Act, despite its manifest shortcomings even by early modern standards, was one part of a larger and intensely contested process by which marginalised religious groups gained entry into English public life. (A fuller account of this process would include the 1695 Affirmation Act, which enabled Quakers to participate fully in legal proceedings and judicial processes, the eventual repeal of the Test Acts in the late 1820s and a host of lower-profile political victories by Dissenters and their political allies well into the nineteenth century.) What Penn and his fellow tolerationists struggled to envision was a new type of social imaginary, in which a variety of religious groups could occupy a common public ground without the automatic imposition of the dominant group's truth claims on society as a whole.⁷⁹

Casting our gaze more broadly over the religious and political landscapes of the twenty-first century, we find that the uneasy relationship between religious minorities and the forces of orthodoxy, and the social conflicts that often follow from religious difference, are anything but a relic of the early modern world. Despite enormous progress in the protection of conscience around the world, and the elevation of religious liberty to a cardinal principle of liberal democracy (including, for the past 15 years, an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom in the US Department of State), marginalised religious groups continue to face many challenges in many parts of the world. Whether in the form of formal or informal alliances between religious and political actors, such as the Russian Orthodox Church since the fall of the Soviet Union, or in the continuing efforts to craft working constitutions that will ensure worship rights to all citizens in the wake of the Arab Spring, Penn's notion of a 'bottom' upon which to rest the rights of all citizens continues to hold out an ideal of liberty of conscience and equal citizenship 300 years after it was first articulated.⁸⁰ Nor are the precise meaning and parameters of a term like 'religious freedom' ever quite settled; as the US government prepared to implement President Barack Obama's healthcare legislation in 2012, it found itself under attack both

by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops and several private businesses run by evangelical Christians, each of whom claimed that mandated provision of contraceptives in employee insurance policies constituted a violation of their religious liberties.⁸¹ These sorts of issues, of course, are light years from the kinds of persecution and harassment that animated seventeenth-century political thinkers and actors like Penn and Locke. But they testify to the ongoing power of the ideal of religious liberty as it has come down to modern societies from their early modern predecessors.

Notes

1. William Penn, *Good Advice to the Church of England, Roman Catholic and Protestant Dissenter* (London, 1687); in *The Political Writings of William Penn*, ed. Andrew R. Murphy (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), p. 373. All citations to Penn's works that are included in the Murphy volume will refer to that volume's pagination; other references will cite pagination in the original.
2. WP, 'Preamble to Frame of Government of the Province of Pennsylvania in America, May 5, 1682', in *Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A Documentary History*, ed. Donald S. Lutz (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998), p. 273.
3. WP, *The Guide Mistaken, and Temporizing Rebuked* (London, 1668), pp. 62–63.
4. WP, *The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience Once More Briefly Debated and Defended* (London, 1670); in *Political Writings*, 95.
5. WP, *Great Case*; in *Political Writings*, 89, 93–94; also 117.
6. WP, *Great Case*; in *Political Writings*, 88–89.
7. WP, *Great Case*; in *Political Writings*, 98.
8. WP, *Great Case*, 24; in *Political Writings*, 96.
9. WP, *Great Case*; in *Political Writings*, 99.
10. *The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted* (London, 1670); in *Political Writings*.
11. Wolseley, *Liberty of Conscience, the Magistrates Interest* (London, 1668), pp. 3–5, 17; Slingsby Bethel, in *The Present Interest of England Stated* (London, 1671), called religious imposition 'a mischief unto trade, transcending all others whatsoever' (13). See also John Corbet, *A Discourse of the Religion of England* (London, 1667), sections 9–12, 18–23; and John Owen, *Indulgence and Toleration Considered* (London, 1667), pp. 17–19. For a more recent treatment of related issues, see Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 36–37, 40–41.
12. Penn, *Great Case*, Chapter 6; in *Political Writings*, 105–15.
13. Penn, *Great Case*; in *Political Writings*, 98.
14. See also Owen, *Indulgence and Toleration Considered*, 7, 8; Corbet, *Discourse*, 26; Wolseley, *Liberty of Conscience, the Magistrates Interest*, 8–10; Owen, *A Peace-offering* (London, 1667), pp. 37–38. On the Restoration context, see Gary S. DeKrey, 'Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting Cases for

- Conscience, 1667–1672', *Historical Journal* 38 (1995), 53–83. On religion both as a factor and within the context of other considerations, like economics, in the changing British society of the period, see Keith Wrightson, *English Society: 1580–1680* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), and Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
15. Penn, *Great Case*; in *Political Writings*, 109.
 16. Penn, *One Project for the Good of England* (London, 1679); in *Political Writings*, 122.
 17. Penn, *One Project*, 1; in *Political Writings*, 120. For details of the Plot and exclusion controversies, see J. P. Kenyon, *The Popish Plot* (London: Heinemann, 1972), and J. R. Jones, *The First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678–1683* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).
 18. Penn, *One Project*; in *Political Writings*, 121. Jonathan Scott emphasises this phrase 'honest profits', seeing in it a reference to the Dutch context that was so central to English religious and political Dissent. See his *Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 133–34.
 19. Penn, *One Project*; in *Political Writings*, 121.
 20. *Ibid.*, 122–23.
 21. *Ibid.*, 122; Penn, *An Address to Protestants of all Perswasions* (London, 1679); in *Political Writings*, 171–81.
 22. [Lover of King and his Country], *The Countries Vindication from the Aspersions of a Late Scandalous Paper* (London, 1679), 3.
 23. Penn, *One Project*, 6; in *Political Writings*, 128.
 24. [Jean-Paul Cerdan], *Europe a Slave, Unless England Break her Chains* (London, 1681), pp. 64–65.
 25. Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 327–29.
 26. As Blair Worden has elaborated, Cromwell's tolerationist policies were driven in large part by a desire for Protestant unity against the Catholic threat: see Worden, 'Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate' in *Persecution and Toleration: Studies in Church History* 21, ed. W. J. Sheils (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).
 27. In his recent account *The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion, and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) Ethan Shagan emphasises the repressive nature of this sort of toleration, which eschews doctrinal niceties but just as surely turns the full force of state power on the certain marginalised segments of the populace. Shagan focuses more specifically on *Penn's Address*: 'When we look more deeply at Penn's discussion of state sins . . . we see how thoroughly his vision of toleration was dependent on a coequal prosecution of vice' (p. 308).
 28. Penn, *One Project*; in *Political Writings*, 123. See also *Europe a Slave*: religion is 'but the mantle which covers the design of the popishly affected party and their leaders, to keep off the sitting of Parliaments' (p. 64).
 29. Penn, *Address*; in *Political Writings*, 150, 209–10, 154. Penn sought to boil down articles of faith to an absolute minimum: 'I say then, that the belief of Jesus of Nazareth to be the promised Messiah, the Son and Christ of God, sent to restore and save mankind, is the first and was then the only

- requisite article of faith' (*Address*; in *Political Writings*, 163). The idea that divisions among English Protestants embolden papists and weaken the country's defences was widespread: Francis Brokesby's *Perswasive to Reformation* (London, 1680) insists that 'our divisions afford our enemies great advantages against us' though it ultimately defends the Church of England, noting that Dissenters encourage popish hopes when they leave the Church to hear nonconformist preachers (pp. 14, 29).
30. *One Project*; in *Political Writings*, 126.
 31. 'The Case of the People, Called Quakers . . .', in *To the King, Lords, and Commons, in Parliament Assembled* (London, 1680), pp. 56ff. See also Penn, *One Project*; in *Political Writings*, 132.
 32. *A Seasonable Corrective to the One Project for the Good of England* (London, 1680), 2.
 33. *Ibid.*, 2.
 34. *Ibid.*, 4, 6, 7.
 35. *Ibid.*, 4, 5.
 36. Stillingfleet, *The Mischief of Separation* (London, 1680); Brokesby, *A Perswasive to Reformation*.
 37. Penn, *Guide Mistaken*, 62. 'A learned pen' argued that 'it is matter of right and wrong, betwixt man and man, that the justice of government looks to' (6).
 38. For a more detailed discussion of the issues at stake, see Carolyn A. Edie, 'Revolution and the Rule of Law: The End of the Dispensing Power, 1689', *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 10: 4 (1977): 434–50.
 39. Penn, *A Perswasive to Moderation to Dissenting Christians* (London, 1685); in *Political Writings*, 289, 309 (and Preface to 1686 ed.); *Letter from a Gentleman* (London, 1687); in *Political Writings*, 393.
 40. Penn, *Perswasive*, Preface; in *Political Writings*, 306.
 41. Penn, *Perswasive*; in *Political Writings*, 307–08. Penn cannot resist an anecdote about his own father vouching to the then duke of York, and now the king, for the 'skill, courage, and integrity' of Dissenting sea officers during the First Dutch War (*Perswasive*, 23; in *Political Writings*, 308).
 42. Penn, *Perswasive*, 27; in *Political Writings*, 311.
 43. Penn, *Perswasive*, 33; in *Political Writings*, 315.
 44. Penn, *Perswasive*, 30, 32, 33; in *Political Writings*, 315–15.
 45. Penn, *Perswasive*, 36; in *Political Writings*, 317–18.
 46. Penn, *A Letter form [sic] a Gentleman in the Country to his Friends in London upon the Subject at Penal Laws and Texts* (London, 1687); in *Political Writings*, 393.
 47. Penn, *A Second Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to his Friends in London upon the Subject of the Penal laws and Tests* (London, 1687), 5.
 48. *A Letter to Mr. Penn, with his Answer* (London, 1688), p. 16.
 49. Penn, *Letter*; in *Political Writings*, 393.
 50. Penn, *Second Letter*, 8. See also Henry Care, *Animadversions upon a Late Paper* (London, 1687), pp. 15–16; *Answer from the Country*, 24–25; Penn, *The Great and Popular Objection against the Repeal of the Penal Laws and Tests* (London, 1688), p. 16; Penn, *Some Free Reflections Upon Occasion of the Public Discourse about Libertie of Conscience* (London, 1687), pp. 7, 14.
 51. Penn, *Second Letter*, 5; also 9.
 52. *Ibid.*, 12.

53. *Ibid.*, 16.

54. Penn, *A Third Letter from a Gentleman in the Country, to his Friends in London, upon the Subject of the Penal Laws and Tests* (London, 1687), p. 14:

Should a man's being of any religion, hinder him from serving the country of his birth? Does his going to a conventicle naturally unqualify him for a constable's staff? Or believing transubstantiation, render him incapable of being a good clerk? It were as reasonable to say, that tis impossible for a phanatic to be a good shoemaker, or a papist a good tailor. The very notion is comical.

55. Penn, *Good Advice*; in *Political Writings*, 373.

56. Penn, *Good Advice*; in *Political Writings*, 373.

57. Penn, *Third Letter*, 5.

58. Penn, *Second Letter*, 18. See Penn, *England's Great Interest, in the Choice of this New Parliament* (London, 1679); in *Political Writings*, 384–91.

59. Penn, *Good Advice*, 56–57; in *Political Writings*, 372.

60. Shagan, *The Rule of Moderation*, 320.

61. Penn, *The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted* (London, 1670); in *Political Writings*, 11.

62. *Ibid.*, 13.

63. *Ibid.*, 10.

64. On the question of juries, see John A. Phillips and Thomas C. Thompson, 'Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart England: The Penn/Mead Trial and *Bushell's Case*', *Law and Inequality* 4 (1986), 189–229; Craig W. Horle, *The Quakers and the English Legal System, 1660–1688* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988, 107–113. For background see Christopher W. Brooks, *Law, Politics, and Society in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2008), and the essays collected in *Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal Jury Trial in England*, ed. J. S. Cockburn and Thomas A. Green (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

65. Penn, *Great Case*, 29, 30; in *Political Writings*, 99–100.

66. Penn, *Great Case*, 35; in *Political Writings*, 103–04.

67. *The Englishman, or, A Letter from a Universal Friend* (London, 1670), 12.

68. *The Englishman*, 10, 11.

69. Penn, *One Project*; in *Political Writings*, 121.

70. Murphy, *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2001), Ch. 8.

71. John Locke, *Letter Concerning Toleration*; in *Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 218, 220.

72. See Scott, *Algernon Sidney*, 129–30.

73. Penn, Preamble to *Frame of Government of the Province of Pennsylvania*, 274. Christopher Tomlins has characterised Penn's project as 'a revival . . . of humanism's civic virtue' offered as a corrective to the excessively self-interested politics of Restoration England; see *Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in English America, 1580–1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 278–84.

74. Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 80.
75. Penn, *Frame of Government*, 285–86.
76. James Madison to William Bradford, 24 January 1774, in *James Madison: Writings* (New York: Library of America, 1999), pp. 5–7, as well as Madison to Bradford, 1 April 1774, in *Writings*, 8–9. Madison’s adaptation of Penn’s principles arguably contributed to what Matthew S. Holland has identified as an American rhetorical tradition of ‘civic charity’, in which public unity is based on a shared commitment to the preservation of certain rights within a tolerationist but theistic political context. Holland attributes the origins of this tradition in American political thought to the Puritans, but, as we have demonstrated, a version of it is present in Penn’s civil interest position as well. See Matthew S. Holland, *Bonds of Affection: Civic Charity and the Making of America – Winthrop, Jefferson, and Lincoln* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007).
77. Petition to the Virginia General Assembly, Westmoreland County, 2 November 1785. We thank Robert Martin for bringing these petitions to our attention; see also Rockingham County, 18 November 1784, and Buckingham County, 27 October 1785.
78. See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, *Locke, God, and Equality: Christian Foundations of Locke’s Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
79. Thanks to Mark Goldie for making the link between the social vision of early modern tolerationists such as Penn and the concept of the social imaginary (personal communication, February 2012); see Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).
80. On Russia, see Irina Popovka, *The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and John and Carol Garrard, *Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); on the Middle East, see <http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/>
81. For the Catholic bishops’ statement, see <http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-054.cfm>. For the private employer Hobby Lobby and its legal challenge to the contraceptive mandate, see <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/04/hobby-lobby-risks-fines-to-defy-obamacare.html>

5

John Milton and Religious Tolerance: The Origins and Contradictions of the Western Tradition

Nicholas McDowell

In a prose work, *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, written during the trial of Charles I in January 1649 and published within a fortnight of his execution, John Milton (1608–1674) wrote: ‘No man who knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were by privilege above all the creatures, born to command and not to obey: and that they liv’d so.’¹ This is the first of several ringing declarations of individual liberty which bejewel the *Tenure*: the statement may have influenced Thomas Jefferson in composing the most famous lines of the Declaration of Independence.² The next prose piece by Milton to appear in print, *Observations upon the Articles of Peace with the Irish Rebels*, attacked the Irish for displaying

a disposition not only sottish but inducible and averse from all Civility and amendment, and what hopes they give for the future, who rejecting the ingenuity of all other Nations to improve and waxe more civill by a civilizing Conquest, though all these many years better taught and shown, preferre their own absurd and savage Customes before the most convincing evidence of reason and demonstration: a testimony of their true Barbarisme[.]³

This denunciation of the failure of the Irish to bear the civilising stamp of English conquest appeared in May 1649, three months before Oliver Cromwell’s invasion of Ireland. The Cromwellian conquest of 1649 is, of course, one of the great flashpoints of Anglo-Irish history. The most recent historian of the Cromwellian conquest recounts the story of how

in 1997 the Irish prime minister at the time, Bertie Ahern, refused to enter the office of the newly installed British foreign secretary, Robin Cook, until a portrait of Cromwell was removed.⁴

I have edited both these prose works for the new *Complete Works of John Milton*, which is being published by Oxford University Press in 11 volumes.⁵ When Milton's prose works were last edited, in the mid-twentieth century, in eight volumes published by Yale University Press, the impetus for the project among American scholars in the late 1940s came from the experience of the Second World War and the eventual triumph of liberal democratic ideas that Milton was thought to personify; when the first volumes began to appear in the 1950s, Milton had become for some of the Yale editors 'a banner for civil liberties under the new Cold War repression of political dissent and paranoia aroused by anti-communists' and McCarthyism.⁶ How does the editor of Milton's political tracts in the early twenty-first century deal with these different legacies of Milton as both American liberal hero and racist apologist for the conquest of Ireland? Should we simply expect and accept inconsistency and discordance in the beliefs of a seventeenth-century figure when we try to interpret him in twenty-first-century terms? Or might we find in this inconsistency and discordance a reflection of the liberal ideology that we hold dear in Western culture, and that was indeed partly shaped by the Miltonic inheritance, as is apparent in the cases of Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and also Mirabeau, who in the late 1780s translated Milton's *Areopagitica* (1644) and *Defence of the English People* (1651)?⁷

It will not do to maintain the position, most influentially taken up by Stanley Fish, that because Milton is a second-rate political thinker, any discussion of Milton that does not subordinate his topical involvements and pronouncements to the place of his poetry in the history of literary forms necessarily diminishes the real Miltonic achievement.⁸ In terms of elaborated political theory, Milton certainly was a second-rate thinker, if that; but the influence of his rhetoric of liberty on the development of the Western liberal tradition has been much greater than that of most political theorists of the first rank. As Nigel Smith observes in his energetic recent assertion of the continuing relevance of Milton's language of liberty: 'When Americans hear Milton read aloud, they hear the American constitution, because it is Milton's prose that echoes originally in the voices of Adams and Jefferson.'⁹ Or, as David Quint has put it: 'Today's social democracies are admittedly not paradise, but they do have freedom of speech and they are not ruled by Nimrod-like kings; and for that they owe something to John Milton.'¹⁰

Milton matters not only as a poet who incorporated the classical poetic genres into the vernacular at a level to compete with and even surpass the classics; as a prose writer he has given Western liberalism some of the language through which it conceives of itself. Besides, Milton's politics have always been part of the interpretation of the poetry, in negative as well as positive senses, from the Romantics to T. S. Eliot (who freely admitted that Milton's Puritanism and republicanism shaped his judgement of Milton's poetics) and beyond.¹¹ In other words, Milton's politics are part of the history of Anglo-American literary criticism and have helped to shape that tradition.

The self-proclaimed bastion of liberal values in Britain, the *Guardian* newspaper, put it well in an editorial in advance of the quatercentenary of Milton's birth in 2008:

There is a deep sense in which Milton fashioned the English we have inherited. If that language is our greatest gift to the world then Milton is the vessel through whom it flowed most majestically. In his lifetime Milton deployed it in the service of many public causes: for education, freedom of the press, open debate, religious toleration, divorce reform, republicanism and regicide. For nearly 20 years he largely abandoned poetry for politics (though he wrote some of his greatest sonnets at this time). Inevitably he argued these causes with the assumptions of his era – his male-centred view of education and divorce or his anti-Catholic view of tolerance are not ours. Milton was no democrat, yet he is the fountainhead of our always threatened culture of democratic reasoning.¹²

What can be quarrelled with here is the assumption that Milton's assumptions – including his sectarian understanding of tolerance – are 'not ours'; that we can pick and choose from Milton's anachronistic but mostly nourishing version of liberty, spitting out the bits we find indigestible. The assertion that freedom of conscience is crucial to a virtuous society in Milton's *Observations*, as elsewhere in his prose, depends upon the denial of liberty to those who would deny it to others: universal religious freedom can thus only be attained through the imposition of a fundamental measure of uniformity. In her recent book on the 2004 French ban on the wearing of signs of religious affiliation, *The Politics of the Veil*, Joan Wallach Scott argues provocatively that an insistence on homogeneity is no longer feasible for the West and that it creates the very 'clash of civilizations' which it seeks to suppress.¹³

Milton's Irish pamphlet, gives us, I will suggest, a tract for our times, in that it shows us the authoritarian face of what would become Western liberalism when faced with the assimilation of a religion or a people or a land perceived to be characterised by institutional intolerance and a regressive, repressive ideology.

* * *

On 28 March 1649, only two weeks after Milton had been employed as Secretary for Foreign Tongues by the Council of State of the English republic – itself less than two months old – he was instructed to 'make some observations upon the Complicacion of interest which is now amongst the severall designers against the peace of this Commonwealth, and they to be made ready to be printed with the papers out of Ireland, which the House has ordered to be printed'.¹⁴ The 'Complicacion of interest' refers to the 'Articles of Peace' signed on 17 January 1649 between the Catholic Confederate Association, made up of Gaelic Irish and 'Old English' settlers, and Charles I's lord lieutenant in Ireland, James Butler, marquess of Ormond. Ormond's army was joined in the opening months of 1649 by Cavaliers fleeing England after defeat in the second civil war and the execution of Charles I on 30 January. A further 'complication' was the horror of the mainly Scottish Presbyterian settlers in Ulster at the regicide and their antagonism to an English republican regime dominated by Independents, generally more tolerant of sectarianism and opposed to a compulsory Presbyterian church government in England. By March–April 1649 Ireland had become the site of what looked to the republic's Council of State like an unholy alliance of Irish Catholics, Scottish Presbyterians and English Cavaliers. This alliance threatened to scupper the Council's urgent efforts to establish the authority and stability of the new kingless state by plunging it into a fresh 'British' conflict.¹⁵

On or around 16 May appeared, anonymously but with the imprint 'By Authority', *Articles of Peace Made and Concluded with the Irish Rebels, and Papists, by James, Earle of Ormond, For and in behalfe of the late King, and by vertue of his Autoritie. Also a Letter sent by Ormond to Col. Jones, Governour of Dublin, with his Answer thereunto. And A Representation of the Scotch Presbytery at Belfast in Ireland. Upon which all are added Observations*. Milton's *Observations* is a piece of official propaganda, in other words, and its appearance anticipates the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland in August–September 1649. On 23 March 1649 Cromwell had

used the same language of interest and multiple threat as we find in the instruction to Milton, telling his fellow army officers:

I had rather be overrun with a cavalierish interest than a Scotch interest; I had rather be overrun with a Scotch interest than an Irish interest; and I think of all this is the most dangerous. If they [the Irish] shall be able to carry on their work they will make this [the English] the most miserable people in the earth, for all the world knows their barbarism.¹⁶

Milton agreed with Cromwell on the barbarity of the Irish if not on their worldwide notoriety. The best-known of the various insults in the tract is probably the dismissal of Belfast, home of the Ulster Presbytery, as 'a barbarous nook of Ireland', 'whose obscurity till now never came to our hearing' – a comment which looks ironic only in the light of the unfortunate celebrity of the city over the last 50 years.¹⁷ (Belfast had hardly existed as a town at the opening of the seventeenth century and while it developed after the Jacobean plantation and the influx of English and Scottish settlers into Ireland, it was not until the 1640s that it 'began to acquire more than a merely local importance', with the garrison there from 1642 of the Scottish army under General Robert Monro.)¹⁸

It is not quite a joke to say that, for all these crude and conventional attitudes, some of Milton's best friends were Irish: when Katherine Jones (*née* Boyle), Viscountess Ranelagh (1615–1691), whose nephew and son Milton tutored in the late 1640s, had to return to her homeland in 1656 he expressed his sorrow since 'to me . . . she has stood in the place of all relations'.¹⁹ The impressive Lady Ranelagh, who apparently knew German and Hebrew and who extended some patronage to educational and reforming projects such as the proposed natural history of Ireland by Robert Wood, might have given him a more nuanced picture of the Irish than we find in the *Observations*.²⁰ But, even taking account of the work's polemical purpose, there is no indication of any more subtle understanding of the land or its people. For all his advanced thinking about divorce, the free circulation of information and political rights, Milton subscribes to a conventional Aristotelian taxonomy of sexual and racial difference, according to which women are not only naturally inferior and subject to men, as slaves are subject to their masters, but certain races such as the Irish (and Indians and Turks) are naturally inferior and subject to those who are possessed, or at least potentially possessed in the case of the English, of a higher form of rationality.²¹ So in *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* Milton shifts in

the space of a couple of sentences from proclaiming the original political sovereignty of the people on the authority of Aristotle – the sort of claim that made the tract inspirational for American and French revolutionary thinkers – to insisting that some races are naturally more prone to enslaving themselves:

It being thus manifest that the power of Kings and Magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferr'd and committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in whom the power yet remains fundamentally, and cannot be tak'n from them, without a violation of thir natural birthright, and seeing that from hence Aristotle and the best of Political writers have defin'd a King, him who governs to the good and profit of his People, and not for his own ends, it follows from necessary causes, that the Titles of Sov'ran Lord, natural Lord, and the like, are either arrogancies, or flatteries, not admitted by Emperours and Kings of best note, and dislik't by the Church both of Jews, Isai. 26.13. and ancient Christians, as appears by Tertullian and others. Although generally the people of Asia, and with them the Jews also, especially since the time they chose a King against the advice and counsel of God, are noted by wise Authors much inclinable to slavery.²²

For this latter point Milton could also claim the authority of Aristotle and the humanist tradition, for Aristotle in the *Politics* states that just as the soul naturally rules over the body, so the 'male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and other is ruled'; and in turn masters rule over slaves because 'some men are by nature free and others slaves . . . for these latter slavery is both expedient and right'. Aristotle goes so far as to assert that war is 'naturally just' against such 'men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit'.²³ Such Aristotelian arguments for natural slavery had been used to justify European colonisation and religious war in the sixteenth century, and Milton's denunciation of the 'true Barbarisme' of the Irish is echoed in his disdain in the *Second Defence of the English People* (1654) for those British supporters of monarchy who have sunk to a 'barbarism fouler than that of the Indians, themselves the most stupid of mortals . . . who worship as gods malevolent demons whom they cannot exorcise'.²⁴ If a nation or race show themselves in their behaviour to be by nature slavish, then, according to Aristotelian logic, they leave themselves open to justified conquest and enslavement by rationally superior people. The conquest of Catholic, royalist Ireland by a Protestant and republican

English army could thus be justified for Milton in impeccably humanist philosophical terms.

As a result of the stereotypical characterisation of the Irish as barbarous and savage in the *Observations* and the associations of the pamphlet with the notorious Cromwellian campaign, Milton scholars, many of whom like to claim a proto-liberal position for their author on matters of religious toleration, tended until really quite recently to avoid the work; but, with a renewed taste both for historical and political readings of Milton and for understanding the Civil Wars in terms of the problems of governing the three Stuart kingdoms (England, Scotland, Ireland), critical interest in the tract has risen considerably in the last 15 years. As Joad Raymond archly puts it:

[Milton's] first duty as a state servant was to pen a tract attacking the factions struggling in Ireland, a tract to which scant attention has been paid, perhaps because of the political offence it gives to the image of John Milton as a liberal thinker. It has recently undergone, however, a revival of interest, perhaps because of the political offence it gives to the image of John Milton as a liberal thinker.²⁵

The enthusiasm to enlist Milton as the ideologist of Cromwellian conquest can, however, sometimes race ahead of the facts: a substantial recent collection of essays on the subject of Milton and toleration twice describes the *Observations* as 'defending Cromwell's re-conquest of the rebellious Irish in 1649', when Cromwell did not set sail for another three months after the publication of the tract.²⁶ Nonetheless, as Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns comment in their recent biography, with an eye on twenty-first-century geopolitics: 'Milton produced a tendentious dossier designed to launch and excuse a dubious war of aggression. He would not be the last public servant to do so; though he may, perhaps, have been the first.'²⁷

Milton is here seen as a cog in a machine of state propaganda, justifying an unjust war through false claims in the manner of a faceless official in the Bush or Blair governments. Suddenly, and with a jolt, we seem to have travelled quite a distance from the Milton acclaimed by the general editor of the Yale Milton, Don Wolfe, who was writing in 1941, shortly before America entered the war and when the liberal values of religious toleration and democracy were under profound, immediate threat in Europe: 'That Milton and his fellow rebels spoke for more than his generation is more than ever apparent today, when the most elementary freedoms for which they struggled are more sharply debated than

in any decade during the past century.²⁸ And yet the distance between Wolfe's anti-fascist rebel and the willing pedlar of state disinformation depicted by Campbell and Corns – general editors of the new Oxford edition of Milton – is less real than a matter of perspective.

Milton makes some statements in the *Observations* that would be uncontested and indeed cheered on by any twenty-first-century liberal wedded to the separation of church and state. In response to the claim of the Belfast Presbytery that the tolerationist policies of the new English republic threaten all godly religion, Milton writes stirringly that Presbyterianism

aspiring to be a compulsive power upon all without exception in Parochiall, Classical, and Provinciall Hierarchies, or to require the fleshly arm of the Magistracy in the execution of a spirituall Discipline, to punish and amerce by any corporall infliction those whose consciences cannot be edifi'd by what authority they are compelled, we hold it no more to be the hedg and bulwark of Religion, then the Popish and Prelaticall Courts, or the Spanish Inquisition.²⁹

To use civil power and the sword in matters of religion and conscience, as both Roman Catholicism and Presbyterianism would do, is tyranny. Heresies and errors, declares Milton, must be confuted in debate; they will be subdued by argument not laws, 'by the power of truth, not of persecution'. Freedom of conscience is the ultimate rule of government for Milton:

the best regulated States and Governments through the World . . . have been so prudent as never to employ the Civill sword further then the edge of it could reach; that is, to Civill offences onely; proving alwayes against objects that were spirituall a ridiculous weapon. Our protection therefore to men in Civill matters unoffensive we cannot deny; their Consciences we leave, as not within our Cognisance, to the proper cure of instruction, praying for them. (310–11)

But it turns out the rule is qualified: the new post-monarchical government will, Milton states categorically, 'not tolerate the free exercise of any Religion, which shall be found absolutely contrary to sound Doctrin or the power of godliness' (325). The definition of what is 'absolutely contrary to sound Doctrin or the power of godliness' is not attempted by Milton in his Irish tract, but such terms, which could be taken to cover both secular ('sound Doctrin') and religious matters, are evidently

flexible or vague enough to be expanded to include just about anything the state might want it to include. And it would seem to include for Milton the religion of the great majority of Irish, whether Gaelic or 'Old English' settlers. In *Of True Religion* (1673), published the year before his death, Milton is clear about why Roman Catholicism should not be tolerated:

Let us now enquire whether Popery be tolerable or no. Popery is a double thing to deal with, and claims a twofold Power, Ecclesiastical, and Political, both usurpt, and the one supporting the other.

But Ecclesiastical is ever pretended to Political. The Pope by this mixt faculty, pretends right to Kingdoms and States, and especially to this of England, Thrones and Unthrones Kings, and absolves the people from their obedience to them . . . Whether therefore it be fit or reasonable, to tolerate men thus principl'd in Religion towards the State, I submit it to the consideration of all Magistrates, who are best able to provide for their own and the publick safety. As for tolerating the exercise of their Religion, supposing their State activities not to be dangerous, I answer, that Toleration is either public or private; and the exercise of their Religion, as far as it is Idolatrous, can be tolerated neither way: not publicly, without grievous and unsufferable scandal giv'n to all consciencious Beholders; not privately, without great offence to God, declar'd against all kind of Idolatry, though secret.

(CPW, viii. 429–30)

Roman Catholicism cannot be tolerated for two essential reasons.³⁰ First, it always seeks to dominate the civil power and to subordinate nation states to an international religion, and it strikes against the sovereign power through acts of terrorism like the Gunpowder Plot of 1605: the Pope 'hath not ceas'd by his Spyes and Agents . . . once to destroy both King and Parliament' (430). This is why Milton could deny toleration to Catholics in *A Treatise of Civil Power* (1659), on the grounds of 'just reason of state more then of religion' (CPW, vii. 254). The Irish-born John Toland (1670–1722), radical republican, deist and key figure in the British strand of what Jonathan Israel calls the 'radical Enlightenment', presented Milton as a heroic champion of civil and religious liberty in his 1698 *Life of John Milton*, and offered an approving summary of this 'reason of state' argument against toleration of Roman Catholicism:

[Milton] justly excludes Popery from his Toleration, for being not so much a Religion, as a Politic Faction whereof the Members, whersoever they are, own the Pope for their Superior, to the prejudice of the Allegiance due their Natural Sovereigns. Besides, that they never tolerate others where they have the mastery; and that their Doctrin of Dispensations, or keeping no Faith with such as they count Heretics, renders 'em worse than Atheists, and the declar'd Enemies of all Mankind besides those of their own Communion.³¹

Toland follows Milton by extending the argument about the threat posed by Roman Catholics to 'the Foundations of Civil Society' to a justification of the intolerance of religions which are themselves intolerant and unwilling to accept the common humanity of those who worship differently. Indeed Toland goes on to argue that in *Of True Religion* Milton

shews that Popery (not as it is a Religion, but as a tyrannical Faction oppressing all others) is intolerable, and that the best method of keeping it from ever increasing in this Nation, is by the toleration of all kinds of Protestants or any others whose Principles do not necessarily lead 'em to Sedition or Vice.³²

The Miltonic argument for religious tolerance of Protestant sectarianism and 'any other' religion which does not lead to sedition or immorality is practical as well as philosophical: by fostering religious diversity and liberty of conscience, intolerant or 'tyrannical' religions such as Roman Catholicism will be prevented from establishing supremacy. Here we can see some proof of the claim that 'a survey of English political thought from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reveals that liberal and republican conceptions of liberty exhibited both individualistic and collective features shaped by an ideological confrontation and conceptual contrast with the evils represented by Roman Catholicism'.³³ Anti-popery plays a constitutive role in the development of John Locke's arguments for religious toleration in his 1667 *Essay Concerning Toleration*; Toland recognises this in declaring that Milton's themes in *Of True Religion* have since been 'treated with greater clearness and brevity than ever before in a Letter Concerning Toleration by John Lock'.³⁴

Milton's second reason in *Of True Religion* for refusing toleration to Roman Catholicism appears to have less to do with reason of state than Protestant iconoclasm. Roman Catholicism is idolatrous, both in public and private – it fetishises the material and the formal as an embodiment

of the spiritual. So while Milton accepts, somewhat half-heartedly, that Catholics should not be persecuted simply for being Catholic, beyond any danger they pose to the state ('I suppose it stands not with the Clemency of the Gospel, more then what it appertains to the security of the state'), he nonetheless insists that their idols should be rooted out:

we must remove their Idolatry, and all the furniture thereof, whether Idols, or the Mass wherein they adore God under Bread and Wine... If they say that by removing their Idols we violate their Consciences... they themselves confess in their late defences, that they hold not their Images necessary to salvation, but only as they are enjoyn'd them by tradition. (431–32)

Yet the role of Protestant iconoclasm in the formation of Western notions of liberty is apparent in the analogies that can be made here with the French decision to outlaw the veil as that policy has been anatomised by Wallach Scott. A terrorist threat from global jihad, from an internationalised radical Islam, is faced by Western countries where the political and social structure is predicated on the complete separation of church and state; at the same time, there are religious behaviours in society and material signs of allegiance (what Milton calls idols) to a set of values which can be regarded, particularly in the US and France, as incompatible with the political constitution of the secular nation state – one idol being, in the case of contemporary France, the veil. The allegiance to the separation of church and state, and so to liberty of conscience as a fundamental rule of political society, can also entail the legal imposition of uniformity, or at least the removal of external difference, as a sign of assent, or submission, to these values.

It is notable that in *Of True Religion* Milton accepts that the actions of the state against idolatry should be applied only to 'our Natives, and not Forreigners, Privileg'd by the Law of Nations' (431). Milton would have regarded the Irish as among 'our Natives' in that the country had been one of the three Stuart kingdoms before the Civil Wars. But his expression of dismay and disgust at how the Irish had preferred to remain 'absurd and savage' rather than accept the values exported in 'civilizing Conquest' by England is reminiscent of the reactions of some in the US to the violent resistance in the Middle East to the export and imposition of liberal democratic values of individual liberty and religious toleration. There has been much debate in recent years about whether the US can be defined as an empire: if 'empires tend to militate in favour of a particular set of values as universal and to seek to impose it

as widely as possible by persuasion, adscription, coercion and sometimes even extermination', then the US in 2001, like England in 1649, fulfils one criterion.³⁵ Milton's particular anger against the Scottish-born Ulster Presbyterians in the *Observations* is that they have become Catholic-like in their intolerance and tyrannous will to power, and so embody the failure of empire, in the form of the Ulster Plantation of the first decade of the seventeenth century, to civilise Ireland by freeing it from a tyrannical religion. James I may have sought to pacify an unruly Ulster through the migration of Calvinist planters, but in Milton's view the planters, or rather the faction of Presbyterianism for which they stood in the *Observations*, had come to present as great a threat to the liberties of the English republican state, prime among them liberty of conscience, as the Gaelic Irish.³⁶

Don Wolfe, for whom Milton was an anti-fascist hero in the 1940s and an anti-McCarthyite hero in the 1950s, came to recognise what he called the 'limits of Miltonic toleration' in a classic article of the 1960s.³⁷ An edition of Milton's prose in the early twenty-first century needs to register fully those limits even as it highlights the ennobling flights of the Miltonic rhetoric of liberty which echo through Western liberal visions; and by doing so it is an edition that is a sign of its times as much as the early volumes of the Yale prose works. It might be objected that an edition of Milton's prose can never have much of an impact on the school or even the undergraduate classroom, where students will only usually encounter the poems, or bits of them, and so the matter of Milton's politics and how they relate to liberal ideology will seem very remote indeed from issues of rhyme, image, genre and character. But then what of the controversy that followed John Carey's claim in 2002 that if Milton's closet drama *Samson Agonistes* (1671) really does, as Stanley Fish and others have argued, legitimate Samson's final act of suicidal mass-murder against the Philistines, then, in the aftermath of the suicidal religious violence of 9/11, Milton's work should be 'withdrawn from schools and colleges and, indeed, banned more generally as an incitement to terrorism'? For Carey, 'September 11 has changed *Samson Agonistes*, because it has changed the readings we can derive from it while still celebrating it as an achievement of the human imagination'.³⁸

Carey's point, easily misrepresented, was that *Samson Agonistes* leaves the moral and religious legitimacy of Samson's actions very much open to debate and judgement. And yet it has been shown that a series of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Protestant commentators on the biblical Samson interpreted his violence as a legitimate act, inspired by God, against a tyrannical power; in his defence of the execution

of Charles I to a European audience in 1651, translated by Mirabeau nearly 140 years later, Milton himself invoked the example of Samson as someone who ‘thought it not impious but pious to kill those masters who were tyrants over his country’.³⁹ While *Samson Agonistes* can be discussed in terms of the suicidal violence of anti-democratic, anti-Western terrorists, Milton’s poetic work nevertheless explores the same ideas regarding the legitimacy of resistance to tyranny as are explicitly addressed in the regicide writings which have helped give voice to the democratic and liberal tradition of the West. The interpretation of the treatment of political violence, imperial conquest and religious tolerance in Milton’s prose can help us see the paradoxes and problems of liberalism today, and students’ sense of the moral resonance of great imaginative literature will be sharpened if they are allowed to ask some of the same questions of the poetry.

Notes

1. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. D. M. Wolfe et al., 8 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–1982), iii. 198. All further references to Milton’s prose are to this edition, henceforth referred to as *CPW*.
2. John Tanner and Justin Collings, ‘How Adams and Jefferson Read Milton and Milton Read Them’, *Milton Quarterly*, 40, 3 (2006), 207–19 (p. 214).
3. *CPW*, iii. 304.
4. Micheál Ó Siochrú, *God’s Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland* (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 1.
5. My edition of the 1649 prose writings appears in *The Complete Works of John Milton. Volume VI: Vernacular Regicide and Republican Writings*, ed. N. H. Keeble and Nicholas McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
6. See Sharon Achinstein’s stimulating piece ‘Cold War Milton’, *University of Toronto Library Quarterly*, 77, 3 (2008), 801–36 (p. 803).
7. Tony Davies, ‘Borrowed Language: Milton, Jefferson, Mirabeau’, in ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner, *Milton and Republicanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1995), 254–71. See also Annabel Patterson, *Early Modern Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chapter 8; Christophe Tournu and Neil Forsyth, eds, *Milton, Rights and Liberties* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007).
8. Stanley Fish, ‘Why Milton Matters; Or, Against Historicism’, *Milton Studies* 44 (2005), 1–12.
9. Nigel Smith, *Is Milton Better than Shakespeare?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 4.
10. David Quint, ‘Recent Studies in the Renaissance’, *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, 38 (1998), 173–205 (p. 186).
11. See, for example, the opening of Eliot’s ‘A Note on the Verse of John Milton’: ‘As a man, he is antipathetic. Either from the moralist’s point of view, or from the theologian’s point of view, or from the psychologist’s point of view, or from that of the political philosopher... Milton is unsatisfactory’ (*Milton*:

- A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Louis Martz (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966), 12).
12. 'England's Glory', lead editorial in *The Guardian*, 6 December 2008.
 13. Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
 14. *A Chronology and Calendar of Documents Relating to the London Book Trade 1641–1700*, ed. D. F. McKenzie and Maureen Bell, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), i. 252.
 15. Among the many books which offer a narrative of the complicated events and alliances in Ireland in the opening months of 1649, see the cogent narrative in Ó Siochrú, *God's Executioner*, pp. 52–76.
 16. 'Cromwell's Speech to the General Council of the Army at Whitehall, 23 March 1649', in *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, ed. W. C. Abbot, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937–1947), ii. 36–39.
 17. CPW, iii. 304, 317, 327. Milton's charge against Belfast appears, for example, as an epigraph in *The Belfast Anthology*, ed. Patricia Craig (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999).
 18. J. C. Beckett, 'The Seventeenth Century', in ed. J. C. Beckett and R. E. Glasscock, *Belfast: The Origin and Growth of an Industrial City* (London: W. & J. Mackay & Co., 1967), 26–39 (p. 30).
 19. Milton's (Latin) letter of 21 September 1656 is printed in *Works of John Milton*, ed. Frank A. Patterson *et al.*, 18 vols in 21 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931–1938), xii. 78–83.
 20. On Ranelagh's circle and interests, see Sarah Hutton's entry in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
 21. On Milton and slavery, see essays by Martin Dzelzainis, 'Conquest and Slavery in Milton's *History of Britain*' and 'The Politics of *Paradise Lost*', in ed. Nicholas McDowell and Nigel Smith, *The Oxford Handbook of Milton* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 547–68, 407–23. On the common imagery applied by the English to the Irish and other races supposedly open to conquest and enslavement due to their natural incapacity to rule themselves, see, for example, Nicholas Canny, 'The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 30 (1973), 575–98.
 22. CPW, iii. 202–3.
 23. Aristotle, *The Politics*, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6–7, 11.
 24. CPW, iv. 343.
 25. Joad Raymond, 'Complications of Interest: Milton, Scotland, Ireland, and National Identity in 1649', *Review of English Studies*, 55 (2004), 315–45 (p. 316).
 26. Elizabeth Sauer and Sharon Achinstein, 'Introduction'; Elizabeth Sauer, 'Toleration and Nationhood in the 1650s: "Sonnet XV" and the Case of Ireland', in ed. Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer, *Milton and Toleration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1–19 (p. 2); pp. 203–23 (p. 211).
 27. *John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 218.
 28. *Milton in the Puritan Revolution* (London: Cohen and West, 1941), ix.

29. This point is well made by N. H. Keeble, 'The Christian Temper of John Milton', in ed. Paul Hammond and Blair Worden, *John Milton: Life, Writing, Reputation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 107–24; see also Andrew Hadfield, 'Milton and Catholicism', in ed. Achinstein and Sauer, *Milton and Toleration*, 186–99.
30. Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 609–14; see also Justin Champion, *Republican Learning. John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696–1722* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); John Toland, 'Life of John Milton', in *The Early Lives of John Milton*, ed. Helen Darbishire (London: Constable and Co., 1932), 167.
31. *CPW*, iv, 343.
32. Darbishire (ed.), *Early Lives of John Milton*, 192.
33. Clement Fatovic, 'The Anti-Catholic Roots of Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom in English Political Thought', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 66, 1 (2005), 37–58 (p. 38).
34. See, for example, Gordon J. Schochet, 'John Locke and Religious Toleration', in ed. Los G. Schworer, *The Revolution of 1688–1689: Changing Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Darbishire (ed.), *Early Lives of John Milton*, 192.
35. Felipe Fernández-Armesto, 'Imperial Measures', *Times Literary Supplement*, 24 September 2010.
36. See the fuller discussion of this issue in Nicholas McDowell, "'The Scottish inhabitants of that Province are actually revolted": John Milton on the Failure of the Ulster Plantation', in ed. Éamonn Ó Ciardha and Michaél Ó Siochrú. *The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 238–53.
37. Don M. Wolfe, 'Limits of Miltonic Toleration', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 60, 4 (1961), 834–46.
38. 'A Work in Praise of Terrorism?', *Times Literary Supplement*, 6 September 2002.
39. Milton, *Second Defence of the English People* (1654), in *CPW*, iv, 401–02. See further Richard Serjeantson, 'Samson Agonistes and "Single Rebellion"', in ed. McDowell and Smith, *Oxford Handbook of Milton*, 613–31.

6

Conformity, Loyalty and the Jesuit Mission to England of 1580¹

James E. Kelly

In Elizabethan England, under the 1559 Act of Uniformity, church attendance was compulsory on Sundays and Holy Days for all those aged 14 or over. The law was enforced ‘upon payne of punishment by the Censures of the Church, and also upon payne that every p[er]son so offending shall forfeite for every suche offence twelve pens’.² The 1581 Act imposed a fine of £20 a month on Catholic recusants – a huge leap from the normal 12 pence.³ Obviously the authorities had become uneasy following the arrival in 1580 of the Jesuits Edmund Campion and Robert Persons, who challenged the Elizabethan regime’s legitimacy by urging Catholics not to attend the state Church.⁴ Reports for non-attendance may have been many, but the number of parishioners not receiving communion was even more significant. Church papistry was a major reason for non-reception. Communion had to be taken at least three times a year, usually at Whitsunday, Easter and Christmas. According to one John Earle as late as 1628, church papists always found a way to avoid receiving this sacrament, which they viewed as an aberration of the true communion:

Once a moneth he presents himselfe at the Church, to keepe off the Church-warden, and brings in his body to save his bayle. He kneels with the Congregation, but prayes by himselfe, and askes God forgiveness for coming thither. If he be forced to stay out a Sermon, he puls his hat over his eyes, and frownes out the houre, and when hee comes home, thinkes to make amends by abusing the Preacher.

I am grateful to David Crankshaw, Michael Questier and Bill Sheils for their comments on this chapter at various stages of its development.

His maine policy is to shift off the Communion, for which he is never unfurnish't of a quarrel, and will be sure to be out of Charity at Easter; and indeed he lies not, for hee has a quarrel to the Sacrament.⁵

Thus, many crypto-Catholics avoided fines by nominally conforming. They attended the service according to statute but did not receive communion. Some scholars have argued that this style of conformity was a strategy adopted by those who shied away from the political implications of Catholic separatism.⁶ Yet in this article it will be suggested that church papistry can be viewed itself as just as politically informed an act as the overt separatism urged by Campion and Persons. It will be argued that this kind of conformity was not, as so many scholars imply, a rejection of contemporary Catholic political agendas but instead a carefully judged response to political issues generated by the course pursued by the Elizabethan state. There was more than one Catholic political option available in the 1570s and 1580s, and it was not a case of simply distinguishing between political loyalty and religious affiliation.

I

Voluminous documentation, including wills, domestic accounts and some correspondence, exists for one notable Catholic family, yet little concerted effort has been made to study Sir John Petre, later first Baron Petre of Writtle. He was the son of Sir William Petre, the latter a man politique in the extreme. Originally, the family was from south Devon, until William Petre⁷ came to Essex, served four Tudor monarchs – including over ten years as principal secretary of state – built Ingatestone Hall (near Chelmsford) and acquired vast estates.⁸

William Petre's second wife was Anne Tyrrell (*née* Browne).⁹ John Petre, the individual on whom this article is focused, was the couple's third (but only surviving) son. He was born in 1549, Reginald, Cardinal Pole later acting as his confirmation sponsor.¹⁰ In 1567 John Petre was admitted into the Middle Temple, and on 17 April 1570 he married Mary, daughter of Sir Edward Waldegrave, who had been prominent in the reign of Mary I and had subsequently died in the Tower of London for hearing Mass and harbouring priests.¹¹ John Petre chose his own wife, an unusual act at this level of society and one that may have been governed by religious considerations.¹² It was noted by the Catholic exile Sir Francis Englefield that John's parents were delighted with his decision,¹³ even though the bride's father had been a political prisoner and a strong Catholic.

On the death of Sir William, on 13 January 1571/1572, John succeeded his father's vast estates. Perhaps not reaching the same 'dizzy heights' as his father, such as membership of the Privy Council, John was, as Edwards describes him, 'a county magnate of considerable eminence, who carried out his public duties seriously and thoroughly'.¹⁴ He was apparently an entirely loyal servant of the crown and scrupulously conformist. He was high sheriff of Essex 1575–1576¹⁵ and was knighted at the end of his tenure. From 1584 to 1587 he was knight of the shire for Essex, then the deputy lord lieutenant of Essex from 1588 to 1603, as well as commander of a regiment of 600 local men levied in order to repel the attempted Armada invasion. He was collector of the forced loan for Essex from 1590 to 1598,¹⁶ as well as one of the commissioners for the county musters.¹⁷ Furthermore, he was a prominent Essex magistrate from 1573 onwards and also sat on the commission of justices charged to examine and restrain papists and seminary priests in the south-east corner of Essex, not to mention the 1591/1592 commission against Jesuits and seminary priests.¹⁸ In 1603 James I raised John to the peerage as Baron Petre of Writtle.¹⁹ He died on 11 October 1613.

John Petre was, however, one of those whom many contemporaries would have called a 'church papist'. According to a former servant of the Petres, the informer George Eliot, in 1581:

The said S[i]r John [Petre] had many tymes before p[er]swaded me to go to the churche for fashion[n] sake, and in respect to avoide the daunger of the lawe; yet to keepe myne owne conscience. And then at the same time, he p[er]swaded me to do the lyke sayinge I might lawfullie doe it and furdur saithe he [']do you thincke there are not that goe to the churche that beare as good a mynde to godwarde, as those th[a]t refuse, yes and if occasion serve wilbe able to doe better s[er]vice then they w[hi]ch refuse to go to the churche. Yet would I not for anye thinge wishe you to p[ar]ticipate w[i]th them eyther in there prayers or com[m]union.['] And I verylie thincke S[i]r John[n]e[s] althoughe he Goethe to the churche dothe not receive the com[m]union.²⁰

Eliot was not the most reliable of witnesses,²¹ but there is no reason to think he was lying in this case. The timing of this allegation is highly significant. Eliot's remarks were contextualised by the contemporary debate over recusancy and occasional conformity.²² On Eliot's account Petre was saying that it was ludicrous to think that the range of Catholic responses to contemporary issues was linked to out-and-out separation.

Instead, Petre was using his church papistry as a disguise, a false visage behind which he was able to operate and 'doe better s[er]vice then they w[hi]ch refuse to go to the churche'.

Put bluntly, John Petre claimed to be seeking to promote the interests of his co-religionists even if he was not opting for full-scale recusancy. If anything, his words to Eliot can be viewed as an ill-timed 'spitting of the dummy', the words of a man irritated by the notion that he was not a strong Catholic because of his occasional conformity and was somehow guilty of betraying his faith. Therefore, Questier is only partly correct when he comments that this outward conformity allowed some Catholics to maintain a distinct identity, undermining the state's intention.²³ It was more than this – Petre's actions suggest that such people could positively agitate for Catholic political objectives.

II

Of course, all this is a long way from suggesting that John Petre was some sort of Jesuitical sleeper. However, his social circle was riddled with Catholics prior to the Jesuits' arrival in 1580. For example, Lewis Barlow, one of the first four seminary priests to return to England and the man the Jesuit Robert Persons credited with coming up with the idea of the 1580 mission,²⁴ had entered the Middle Temple only three months after John and seems to be mentioned in some Petre family accounts.²⁵ His ministry was located close to the Petres, most notably at Borley in Essex,²⁶ home of the Waldegraves, John's in-laws. Thus, John probably knew one of the first Catholic missionaries to England, and it surely cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence that this individual then ministered to members of John's family. Certainly, he was known by the Petre servant and later renegade Eliot.²⁷

During the 1570s and 1580s the priest with arguably the strongest links to the family was John Payne. Payne entered Douai College in 1574.²⁸ Often neglected is just what a close relationship there was between Douai and the Jesuits at this time, a quarter of the College's founding members entering the Society.²⁹ Moreover, the college's head, William Allen, continually suggested Jesuits for the mission, and wrote to this effect to Claudio Aquaviva, the Jesuit father-general, on several occasions.³⁰

Payne was heavily associated with members of the Society. He had doubts about the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist during his time at Douai. However, at the first Mass of a fellow missionary, he allegedly received a vision of the crucified Jesus rising from the chalice.

He immediately informed his Jesuit confessor. William Allen's friend the Catholic polemicist Gregory Martin wrote to Edmund Campion on the matter.³¹

Payne was ordained on 7 April 1576. Shortly afterwards he left for England with Cuthbert Mayne, but not before the pair had been on a Jesuit retreat.³² Mayne's and Payne's other travelling partner, Henry Shaw, had been at St John's College, Oxford. Both Shaw and Mayne had been contemporaries of Campion; the latter had been a room-mate of the famed Jesuit.³³ Andrew Hegarty has suggested that Payne had also been at the college.³⁴ After some difficulties in crossing, Payne was in Essex, apparently at Ingatestone Hall, home of John's mother, by 15 July 1576, at which time George Godsalf arrived at Douai with a letter from Payne which strongly urged the sending of more priests.³⁵ Payne, therefore, must have gone almost directly to the Petres, a family which was headed by a leading conformist; in short, he knew where to go.

Subsequently, Payne was arrested at Anne, Lady Petre's house at the start of 1577.³⁶ He was, however, soon released³⁷ and was listed as Anne Petre's servant in a government report filed in November 1577.³⁸ Shortly after this he arrived at Douai on 14 November 1577 with three law students, whom he took to Paris the following day.³⁹ By June 1578 he was again back at Ingatestone Hall; he witnessed Anne, Lady Petre's will.⁴⁰ He then seems to have flitted back and forth between the Continent and England, as confirmed by the priest Robert Johnson, another of Eliot's 'victims', who had replied to Eliot's claim not to know where Payne was that the priest had 'gone beyond the seas'.⁴¹ Eliot claimed that Payne was at Ingatestone around Christmas 1579, one of the few allegations Payne did not deny.⁴² At some point around 1579 he was also in London, for Henry Chadderton, on his arrival at the English College, Rome, in 1599 claimed that he and his sister had 'hired rooms in the house of a pious Catholic woman who was frequently visited by Jesuits... In the same house there lived the future martyr, Mr Payne the priest.' At this time Chadderton was in contact with Thomas Pound, a Jesuit lay brother.⁴³ Chadderton was also related to Ralph Bickley SJ.⁴⁴ Payne was clearly in touch with the Jesuit network. Interestingly, the Jesuits had not arrived by this time, yet Chadderton blatantly describes the house as being frequented by Jesuits. Perhaps this means that it became so after the Jesuits' arrival, a matter telling in itself, or that the house was perceived to be a Jesuit base, meaning that Payne was understood by some to have close relations with them. Certainly, at his execution the crowd believed Payne to be a Jesuit.⁴⁵ Continuing his trips to the Continent, Payne also may have been in Paris in 1580.⁴⁶

Payne was captured in Warwickshire in July 1581,⁴⁷ having allegedly said Mass at William More's house at Haddon, Oxfordshire; the family were part of the extended Petre network. Eliot claimed to have been present and that Godsalf said Mass there two days later.⁴⁸

Following his arrest, Payne was sent to the Tower and tortured brutally.⁴⁹ However, despite the trial of Edmund Campion and the others all revolving around Eliot's claims that Payne had been the mastermind behind a plot to kill the queen,⁵⁰ Payne was not tried with them. Rather, he was tried separately in the Essex assizes held at Chelmsford. Considering that he was alleged to have been such a major player in the conspiracy, whose infamy continued long after his death, even being raked up as part of the indictment against Philip Howard, earl of Arundel, in 1589,⁵¹ why was Payne not sentenced with Campion and the other accused? The most probable answer is that it was designed to teach someone a lesson. Considering that the Petres were so strongly Catholic and that Payne had such close links with them, the likely intended recipients of this stern rebuke were John and his family. When the Privy Council confirmed the place of Payne's trial in March 1581/82 to the Essex justices of assize,⁵² John's position must have been extremely uncomfortable. That the sentence of execution was carried out in Chelmsford only serves to underline the primary purpose of the proceedings.

Just over a month after Payne's execution on 2 April 1582, a letter was sent from the court, dated 20 May. Signed by Thomas Radcliffe, third earl of Sussex, it stated:

The Q[ueen's] moste excellent Ma[jes]te beinge enformed that the Ladie Peeter is p[re]sented for a Recusant, And understandinge that at this p[re]sent she is greate w[i]th Chylde, hathe of her gratiouse favo[u]r and upon good Respecte[s] bene pleased that all p[ro]cedinge[s] againste her for any presentment or Indytement in any suche Cause should be Stayed, untell her Ma[jes]te shoulde signifie her pleasure to the Contrarye.⁵³

The timing of this letter is extremely interesting and could be interpreted as an effort to stop the alienation of a wealthy and powerful family over religion.⁵⁴ However, there is another possible interpretation. The earl of Sussex was heavily involved in the recent attempt to secure the proposed marriage between the queen and Francois, duke of Anjou, the youngest son of Catherine de Medici. Sussex was the principal councillor champion of the match. It has been argued that

the Jesuits' mission to England in 1580 was connected with this projected marriage. Rumours were circulating that the queen was looking for Catholic or crypto-Catholic supporters for the proposed marriage,⁵⁵ whilst Catholics were reporting that, therefore, it was an appropriate time for clergy from the Continent to present themselves in England. Sussex himself was gathering a group of noblemen around him in support of the proposed marriage who at the very least were regarded as Catholic sympathisers. Among these Catholic supporters of the marriage there were some who urged the launch of a Jesuit mission to England. Only several of these marriage supporters are known, but they included William Cornwallis and Frederick Windsor, fourth Baron Windsor, both of whom were in contact with John Petre around this time.⁵⁶ In other words, the Jesuit mission may have originated from English Catholics; as Lake and Questier argue, 'the genesis of the mission is to be found in English Catholics' perceptions of an opportunity for an explosive entrée into English politics at a time when the regime seemed to be in crisis.'⁵⁷ John and his wife attended the court from October 1580 to early summer 1581, just when the marriage negotiations were taking place.⁵⁸ Sussex certainly knew John, the latter's account books recording that the two were in contact in August of that same year.⁵⁹ He had a home at nearby New Hall in Boreham and presented a 'standing cuppe' to John's first-born son, William, acting as the child's godfather.⁶⁰ Moreover, John was included in Sussex's will in a list of local notables who were described as 'my loving friends'. He acted as an executor of the will, and surviving papers show that he conscientiously performed this role.⁶¹ Furthermore, the Petres' 'family patron', Lord Burghley, acted as the will's overseer; he was also a supporter of the Anjou match.⁶² Therefore, Sussex, a privy councillor and lord chamberlain of the household, had perhaps personally intervened with the queen on the Petres' behalf, as the letter shows no sign of having originated from the Privy Council. All this was secured at the very time he was gathering Catholic noblemen around him, including acquaintances of John, for support of the audacious marriage plan, and whilst these very same Catholics were advising that the time was apt for the Jesuits' mission.

Let us consider this evidence. Before his final arrest in July 1581, when he was back in England, Payne had been shuttling between his homeland and the Continent. He had also been in contact with a fledgling Jesuit network at home and abroad, and had written to Douai urging the sending of more priests, claiming the time was apt for their arrival. All this fits into the time-scale of the build-up to the Jesuit mission to England. Immediately after his execution, his main patrons, the Petres,

received protection from recusancy charges thanks to a letter signed by one of the prime advocates of the Anjou match, the 'crisis' that precipitated the Jesuits' arrival. Moreover, amongst English Catholics at the time, Payne seemingly received more prominence than many other martyrs.⁶³ As we saw above, such was Payne's apparent infamy that Eliot was able to pretend that Campion's arrest had been merely a happy by-product of his search for the priest, though the dates do not fit his claims.⁶⁴ In short, I argue that Payne was a go-between, the middleman connecting England and those abroad who were in the process of putting the Jesuit mission in place. As Questier and Lake suggest, the impetus for the mission seemingly came from English lay Catholics. Considering his activities and ties to the principal proponent of the Anjou match, as well as his being head of the family sheltering a possible Jesuit go-between, the evidence strongly suggests John Petre's involvement with the institution of the Jesuit mission to England.

III

In this context it is worth considering the contacts John Petre had in Rome at the very launching of the Society's 1580 mission to England.

The Petres had close ties with the Pascalls of Great Baddow, Essex; the families were related, and Robert Pascall was Anne, Lady Petre's godson.⁶⁵ Moreover, John Petre had regular contact with this family: some of them appeared in his account books as early as April 1570.⁶⁶ Like many other Catholic families, the Pascalls employed an unlicensed tutor.⁶⁷ In 1576 the archdeaconry court recorded that one 'Godsafe' was living in the house of Pascall of Great Baddow, yet was a recusant and teaching boys without licence.⁶⁸ This tutor was almost certainly George Godself, the former Marian deacon whom Payne had sent abroad to become a priest and with whom he was captured.⁶⁹ The family also had links with the later renegade priest Anthony Tyrell, as did the Petres.⁷⁰ The Catholic networks to which the Petres belonged are very prominent here.

Of particular interest is John Pascall, who, though hard to place in the pedigree, was certainly one of the Pascalls of Great Baddow.⁷¹ There had been an Andrew Pascall at Exeter College, Oxford, entering in 1575. Another one, whose first name is unknown, was there in 1572.⁷² With near certainty, this latter figure can be identified as John Pascall, who, according to Persons, had been a 'schollar to M[aste]r Sherwin in Oxford & dearly beloved of him, & being young & sanguin of complexion is feruent in his religion would oftentimes breake forth into zealus speeches

offring much of himself'.⁷³ This proximity is underlined in a letter sent by Ralph Sherwin to the former Exeter College student Ralph Bickley, by that time in Rome, in which he writes 'M[aste]r Paschall saluteth you hartely'. The letter was dated from Paris on 11 June 1580, a time when Payne was rumoured also to be in the city.⁷⁴

Pascall had arrived in Douai on 29 August 1577,⁷⁵ shortly after Godsal's June arrival – had Payne also sent Pascall abroad? From 1578 the Privy Council belatedly developed concerns about Pascall's whereabouts and his recusancy.⁷⁶ By 1579 Pascall was in Rome and was recorded as a theological student at the English College.⁷⁷ This meant that he was there at the time of unrest in the college; he was on the side that asked for Jesuits to be appointed as administrators there.⁷⁸

Pascall was a leading figure in the college and in the Jesuit mission to England. It was seemingly Pascall's job to quiz new arrivals, both for news from England and for their purpose in coming to the college. According to a spy, throughout July and August 1579 Pascall asked several new English arrivals about the proposed Anjou match, and displayed a good deal of bitterness towards the queen while he did so.⁷⁹ Furthermore, when William Allen arrived in September 1579 to discuss preparations for a possible Jesuit mission, 'his chiefeste gide & only companion & of his counsell was John Pasquall, and used him in all matters as before I [i.e., the spy] have said both at whome and abroad, at meat & meale.' As such, 'at that tyme begane Pasquall to florische & everye thinge w[hi]ch was to be used in any manner of respecte muste firste be demaunded of M[aste]r Pasquall whether he had any likinge of it. His yea was never refused & his naye never disliked.' Therefore, it is hardly surprising that when discussions about those to embark on the Jesuit mission took place in October 1579, 'Pasquales credite was suche that thos w[hi]ch he nominated & made sure to him were appointed', whilst he also became 'solisiter' to the pope for support. In February 1579/1580 it was decided to send six priests and four gentlemen to England:

Of w[hi]ch companye John Pasquall was appointed one of the chefest/his office as the chiefeste paye master/that is to saye/ to provide meate drinke & clothe/and all things nedfull for the prestes as well in ther travell as in England.⁸⁰

On 18 April 1580 Pascall was one of those who set off from Rome with Persons and Campion on the founding Jesuit mission to England.⁸¹ He was present when the group met Cardinal Borromeo in Milan and appears to have continued his leading role in the mission; it was he,

Campion and Sherwin who confronted Theodore Beza in Geneva.⁸² It was decided that Pascall should enter England through Rouen with Sherwin.⁸³ However, like the others, Pascall was taken prisoner after several months in England⁸⁴ and, though initially standing firm, wilted under threat of torture.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, his prominence in the mission cannot be doubted; as Campion said at his own trial, Pascall was as 'guilty' as he.⁸⁶ This was a man with whom the Petres had close contact.

However, he was not the only one – there was another, just as prominent, also with close Petre ties. In fact, it is these Petre connections that appear to explain the proximity between Pascall and Ralph Sherwin. As already noted, Sherwin had been John Pascall's tutor at Exeter College, Oxford. He had been a Petrean fellow, nominated by John Petre's father, yet John gave him permission to go abroad with the future Jesuit, John Currie, in 1575. The college continued to list him as a fellow until 1577, despite his already having been ordained at Douai.⁸⁷ Through the Exeter College link Sherwin also maintained a significant friendship with the future Jesuit Ralph Bickley, who followed him to Rome.⁸⁸

Like his companion Pascall, Sherwin was to play a decisive role in the English College, Rome. It was here that he formed an extremely close relationship with the Jesuits, so much so that he was regularly mistaken for a member of the Society.⁸⁹ He had arrived in Rome in 1577 and became heavily involved in the agitation at the College. As one of its leaders, he delivered a series of damning indictments against what he saw as the lackadaisical Welsh administration. Moreover, Sherwin was the principal agitator for the institution of Jesuit control. During this time he was in regular advisory contact with Persons, who suggested the missionary oath, which Sherwin was the first to swear.⁹⁰ With such proximity and the compatibility of their ideals, it is little wonder that Sherwin was ready to pledge his life both for the conversion of England and for the Jesuit way of proceeding.⁹¹

Thus Sherwin was chosen to accompany the Jesuit mission to England, despite being a secular priest. Persons describes Sherwin as being one of the principal members of the group, often seemingly working on a par with Campion, and speaking excellently in front of Cardinal Borromeo.⁹² The future Petre chaplain, Henry More SJ, later recorded that Persons and Sherwin remained in regular contact throughout the mission, Persons being responsible for the Jesuit wing.⁹³ Sherwin was executed with Campion and Alexander Briant, both Jesuits, reportedly even kissing the hands of the executioner once he had finished butchering Campion, a sign of both his readiness for martyrdom and his closeness to Campion.⁹⁴

Sherwin's proximity to Persons and the Society is revealed in a letter later sent by the Jesuit to Agazzari in Rome, commenting that 'Your Sherwin who burned with such zeal at Rome, with no less ardour of spirit' preached relentlessly wherever he could.⁹⁵ The personalisation indicated by his describing Sherwin as 'belonging' to Agazzari is very strong. Agazzari had become head of the English College following Sherwin's campaign, yet Persons's words indicate a deeper relationship than mere college rector to student: it is as if the two Jesuits viewed Sherwin as 'one of their own'. As such, his memory was invoked when the college was engulfed by the archpriest controversy⁹⁶ at the end of the sixteenth century. Cardinal Sega was called upon to investigate the disagreements and noted:

Shame upon those students who gainsay the judgement [to maintain Jesuit control of the College] and wish of those who when the College was going to be founded were the first to propose that it should be placed under the government of the Society, of the two Sherwins, Cornelius, and Briant, and other martyrs of Christ, who, as the students well know, were ever most closely attached to the Society.⁹⁷

In the view of all, even after the event, Sherwin was inseparable from the Jesuit mission. Furthermore, the three men highlighted by Sega as instrumental in the College's Jesuit ethos, and key allies of the Society, were all tied to the Petres in some way.⁹⁸

IV

We have seen that John Petre was in contact with a network both at home and abroad. There were people at the seminaries who knew John well, and it seems reasonable to conclude that they were part of the reason for John's proximity not just to the seminary priests but especially to the Jesuits. However, there is surviving evidence of an extensive cross-Channel network of which John was a central member.

John Woodward, a rather neglected figure, looks like one of McGrath's and Rowe's old Marian priests who prepared the way for the seminary-trained missionaries.⁹⁹ He had been rector of Ingatestone parish church from 1556 to 1566 before resigning in protest at the ongoing church reforms; he subsequently became chaplain to the Petres at Ingatestone Hall.¹⁰⁰ By 23 May 1577 Woodward was recorded as being at Douai.¹⁰¹ As with the Marian deacon Godsalf, it may have been

Payne who sent Woodward abroad for his 'refresher' course in Tridentine Catholicism.¹⁰² Woodward's involvement with John Petre did not cease there. In November 1576 John's accounts note that £10 was delivered to 'Rice Gruffith M[aste]r Talbotte[s] man the ixth daie at London to be delv[er]ed to M[aste]r Jo[h]n Woodward'. A similar entry on 6 May 1577 records that 40 shillings were sent via the same man.¹⁰³ The accounts of John Petre's brother-in-law John Talbot reveal Griffith regularly made this cross-Channel run. For example, on 4 November 1576, John Talbot gave £20 'in London to the handes of Rice to be made over to M[aste]r George Talbot to Arras', whilst on 30 August 1578, as on several other occasions, Griffith returned from abroad with money, including some from Antwerp.¹⁰⁴ In other words, Talbot had a man who was travelling abroad and maintaining regular contact with Catholic exiles. Moreover, John Petre was using this go-between.

However, Woodward was not merely seeing out his days in sunnier and more 'Catholic' climes. Having left England in the autumn of 1578 and before he arrived in Rome on 1 February 1578/1579, the anti-Catholic propagandist Anthony Munday had stopped off at Amiens in France, where he was 'given to understand that there was an old English priest in the town, whose name was Master Woodward'. Thus, with his companion, Munday duly sought out the said priest for the particular purpose of securing some form of aid to help in his journey to Rome. Less than cryptically, Woodward allegedly replied:

I am a poor priest, and here I live for my conscience' sake, whereas, were things according as they should be, it were better for me to be at home in mine own country. And yet trust me, I pity to see any of my countrymen lack, though I am not able anyway to relieve them: there be daily that cometh this way to whom, according to my ability, I am liberal, but they be such as you are not, they come not for pleasure but for profit, they come not to see every idle toy, and to learn a little language, but to learn how to save both their own and their friends' souls, and such I would you were, then I could say that to you, while (as you be) I may not.¹⁰⁵

This was perhaps not the greatest missionary speech, but apparently Woodward ploughed on regardless during the walk to the lodgings he was willing to offer them, all the while urging their conversion and extolling the virtues of the pope whilst slandering the queen and her lackeys on the Privy Council.¹⁰⁶ The following morning he called the travellers to him, again willing their conversion. They agreed,

prompting Woodward to write letters to William Allen at Rheims, one recommending them for priestly formation and the other detailing news of England, perhaps supplied to him through Rice Griffith's visits. He then willed them to commend him to Allen.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, Woodward was not whiling away the hours of his retirement but was arguably a major 'bridging point' in the Catholic missionary network. It was seemingly known that he was the man to see if one wanted to become a priest. Moreover, he was clearly on friendly terms with Allen, at this time the undisputed leader of the English missionary effort. As such, Munday does not hesitate to name Woodward's activities in the same breath as those of Allen; he was allegedly a central cog in the process of gaining Englishmen for the seminaries.

Notably, Pascall and Sherwin visited Woodward in Rouen on their way into England with the 1580 Jesuit mission.¹⁰⁸ Woodward was Sherwin's uncle and had played an important role in securing Sherwin's election as a Petrean Fellow at Exeter College, Oxford. Sherwin himself recognised this, as well as his emotional bond with his uncle, in a letter written to him the day before his martyrdom.¹⁰⁹ Thus Sherwin and Pascall had strong connections both with John Petre and with one of Petre's other clerical clients. Moreover, Woodward appears at this time as a signatory to a letter supporting the exiled Bridgettine community in Rouen.¹¹⁰ Nuns from the convent had been present at Lyford when Campion was captured.¹¹¹ Interestingly, after Campion's execution in 1581, Persons headed to Rouen and become a strong advocate of the community.¹¹² In view of the fact that he was aware of Woodward, it seems highly likely that Woodward was known to him, especially as Woodward was reported as still being there in November 1582.¹¹³

Woodward continued to be active in the English Catholic cause. In October 1584 a spy reported that those in Rouen included 'M[aste]r Peeters a priest uncle to S[i]r John Peters M[aste]r Woodward & M[aste]r Clitherall priest[s]'. Moreover, the spy reported Woodward's involvement in a network supplying money for the English mission, and the informant also detailed a route into the country through Great Yarmouth in Norfolk.¹¹⁴ From the report the exact nature of Woodward's role is unclear, but he was certainly identified as a go-between for the Catholics in England and those on the Continent. As he was in contact with John Petre and his brother-in-law Talbot, it seems highly likely that they formed part of this same network.

Thus, in the context of this network, the question of how so many priests knew to go directly to the Petres or their circle may possibly be answered. The suspicion is further strengthened by remembering

Woodward's apparent contact with Persons, the Jesuit describing him as 'a very grave priest'.¹¹⁵ The latter had established a scheme for sending priests back to England with Rouen his operational centre.¹¹⁶

V

Traditionally, the life of John Petre, first Baron Petre, has been presented as one of weak conformity. He has typically been dismissed as one of the new breed of country gentleman, reluctant to risk material well-being for something as trifling as conscience. Up to a point, this view is correct: John Petre did offer tacit conformity to the regime, providing mundane, yet apparently loyal, service throughout his life. Like many church papists, he had a wife who was a determined recusant, the daughter of a man who had died imprisoned in the Tower of London for his faith. John's presence at the Middle Temple, something of a bastion of church papistry, only seems to confirm the point: John was nothing more than a 'middle-of-the-road' church papist.

However, there were whisperings that constantly dogged him. Not only was his wife Catholic, but so too were most of his family. There were accusations that nominations to the Petrean fellowships at Exeter College were simply a ruse for promoting Catholic candidates.¹¹⁷ Indeed, many of the individuals involved in the launch of the English mission, and especially the Jesuit component from 1580, were linked to John in some way. Besides accommodating the priest who connected the planners of the Jesuit mission and England, John's family also had extensive ties to the main protagonists on the Jesuit mission itself; two leading figures – Ralph Sherwin and John Pascall – were well known to the Petre circle. Moreover, John had demonstrable contact with English Catholic exiles living on the Continent, most notably the family's former chaplain the Marian priest John Woodward. In addition, he was linked to those involved in the Anjou match negotiations that precipitated the Jesuits' arrival. Either we must accept that John Petre was the unluckiest man alive, in that he always seemed to pick 'bad eggs' for his friends, and just happened to find himself in the frame or on the periphery of such a major Catholic and national event, or else his role and church papistry needs radical reassessment. This article has argued for the latter, demonstrating that John Petre was anything but a meek, quaking-in-his-boots conformist. Instead, he was a key, if covert, figure in the formation of Catholic networks that crossed national boundaries.

The church papistry adopted by John Petre was markedly different from that of other prominent conformists. For example, Sir Anthony

Browne, first Viscount Montague, would only entertain clergy ordained in England during the reign of Mary I. He refused patronage to the seminarists and Jesuits, possibly out of loyalty to a regime that was hostile towards these 'new' clergy. Montague's cousin John Gage, of West Firlie in Sussex, appears to have done the same.¹¹⁸ Donna Hamilton has controversially argued that Anthony Munday, who wrote a sensational account of his visit to the English College, Rome, was also a church papist, though of a politically loyalist persuasion.¹¹⁹ The lines between recusancy, church papistry and conformity were not clear, as demonstrated by a case in York in the later 1580s. In this example, involving the executed laywoman Margaret Clitherow, the Catholic laity and clergy were engaged in debates about to what degree offering outward attendance at Protestant services even constituted conformity and acceptance of the religious settlement.¹²⁰ As such, it is hardly surprising that a significant voice amongst the authorities, particularly that of godly Protestants, viewed some conformists as even more dangerous than 'honest' separatists; those hiding behind a 'false visage' were able to disguise their activities from necessary scrutiny.¹²¹ John Petre may, therefore, be a distinctive example, but it would appear that the association between church papistry and conformity has been overdrawn. His behaviour would indicate that the term 'church papist' is very imprecise and a far more nuanced understanding is required.

Such a scenario has links to contemporary issues of tolerance and religious integration. The obvious allusion is to the experience of the Muslim community in the UK. A passing glance at any media outlet will reveal modern expression of the 'extremist/moderate' debate given voice about this particular faith group.¹²² Nevertheless, the comparison can be overdone: whilst there are obvious similarities, there are also striking differences. For example, there is no law banning Muslim clerics entering the country, as there was against Catholic priests in the early modern period. Moreover, whilst a Muslim could theoretically become the monarch, Catholics remain barred from this lofty position through the Act of Settlement, still in force today and, despite the talk of reforms allowing royal daughters to ascend the throne, there is no sign of this institutional discrimination being removed from the statute books.

A better fit may be to point to the dangers of when a state attempts to dictate which parts of a major religion are acceptable. Eamon Duffy has noted that the Reformation under Henry VIII began with the crown 'asserting a new power over conscience and over the English Church, which no modern Englishman would be likely nowadays to put up with for a second'. In short, the crown 'asserted an unprecedented right ... to

redefine what the Christian faith was'.¹²³ In fact, modern incarnations of a similar mindset abound, this time with the secular, allegedly neutral state in the position of the crown. In France, Muslim women are banned from wearing the burka, the secular authorities decreeing that it is not a matter of faith. In the UK the law courts decide that it is not an expression of Christian conviction to wear a cross, a decision Shami Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty, described as a 'theological adjudication that secular courts are not supposed to do'. Indeed, she asserted, such a decision 'interferes with someone's right to manifest their religion if you prevent them doing something that they consider to be an expression of their faith', and she stated bluntly, 'The notion that there is a bright line between private sphere where you can do what you like and the public and work space where you check an important part of your personality at the door can have, I think, dangerous and unintended consequences for everyone.'¹²⁴ As such, an almost farcical paradox develops where the self-professedly secular state makes self-evidently theological decisions about what are and what are not fundamental tenets of major world religions. Whilst purporting to allow freedom of conscience in private, it simultaneously legislates about it in public, creating a dichotomy between the two and attempting to force a split between the inward faith and its outward expression. In the early modern period John Petre was one amongst many forced by the state to make just such a division between the public and the private.

Notes

1. In the text, split dates have been used between 1 January and 24 March. Original spelling in all quotations from early modern manuscripts has been retained, except for the transposition of i to j, u to v, v to u, and y to i, where necessary in order to conform to modern usage. The following abbreviations have been used: *CSPD* for *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series*, ed. M. A. E. Green and R. Lemon (12 vols. for 1547–1625, London 1856–1872); *APC* for *Acts of the Privy Council of England 1542–1628*, ed. J. R. Dasent *et al.* (46 volumes, London 1890–1964).
2. A. Luders *et al.*, eds, *The Statutes of the Realm*, 11 volumes (London: Record Commission, 1810–1828), iv, p. 357.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 657–658.
4. P. Lake and M. C. Questier, 'Puritans, papists and the "public sphere" in early modern England: The Edmund Campion affair in context', in *The Journal of Modern History* 72 (2000), 605–611.
5. Quoted in A. Walsham, *Church Papists: Catholicism, Conformity and Confessional Polemic in Early Modern England* (2nd edition, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), p. 96.

6. J. Bossy, *The English Catholic Community 1570–1850* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1975), p. 157; M. C. Questier, *Catholicism and Community in Early Modern England: Politics, Aristocratic Patronage and Religion, c.1550–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 162–167.
7. F. G. Emmison, *Tudor Secretary: Sir William Petre at Court and Home* (London: Longmans, 1961); article on Sir William Petre, by C. S. Knighton, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* accessed online June 2012.
8. W. R. Emerson, 'The economic development of the estates of the Petre family in Essex in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', unpublished D.Phil. dissertation (Oxford, 1951), p. 32.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
10. C. T. Kuypers, 'Thorndon: Its history and its associations: Part III', in *The Brentwood Diocesan Magazine* 3 (1920), 80.
11. A. C. Edwards, *John Petre: Essays on the Life and Background of John, 1st lord Petre, 1549–1613* (London and New York: Regency Press, 1975), p. 17; article on Sir Edward Waldegrave, by A. Weikel, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. For the Waldegraves' Catholicism, see B. C. Foley, 'The breaking of the storm', in *Essex Recusant* [hereinafter cited as *ER*] 3 (1961), 1–15.
12. J. Bossy, 'The Counter-Reformation and the people of Catholic Europe', in *Past & Present* 47 (1970), 56.
13. *CSPD Addenda 1566–1579*, p. 279; article on Sir Francis Englefield, by A. J. Loomie, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
14. Edwards, *John Petre*, p. 10.
15. A. Hughes and J. Jennings (comp.), *List of Sheriffs for England and Wales from the Earliest Times to AD 1831 Compiled from Documents in the Public Record Office*, Lists and Indexes, IX (London: Public Record Office, 1898; New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1963), p. 45; *APC 1575–1577*, p. 155.
16. *APC 1590–1591*, pp. 185–187; *APC 1596–1597*, p. 460; *APC 1597–1598*, p. 559.
17. *APC 1598–1599*, pp. 643, 701; *APC 1601–1604*, p. 138.
18. Essex Record Office, MS D/DP/O60.
19. ERO, MS D/DP/F154, is a general pardon granted by letters patent to John, Lord Petre, on James's accession. His son William also received one: ERO, MS D/DP/F155.
20. British Library, MS Lansdowne 33, fol. 148r.
21. See B. C. Foley, 'Bl. John Payne, seminary priest and martyr, 1582', in *ER* 2 (1960), 67–68.
22. See Lake and Questier, 'Puritans, papists', 587–627.
23. Questier, *Catholicism*, p. 50.
24. P. Hughes, *The Reformation in England*, vol. 3 (London: Hollis and Carter, 1954), p. 286. The mission was the supply of English Catholic priests, trained in specially built seminaries on the Continent, to England in an effort to minister to the residual Catholic community and, more expressly, to win the country for Catholicism.
25. H. F. MacGeagh and H. A. C. Sturgess eds, *Register of Admissions to the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple: Volume I, Fifteenth Century to 1781* (London: Butterworth, 1949), p. 31. Barlow may be the individual mentioned in ERO MS D/DP/A17 (receipts, 1568–1569); (rewards September 1569 and April 1570).

26. G. Anstruther, *The Seminary Priests: A Dictionary of the Secular Clergy of England and Wales 1558–1850*, vol. 1 (Ware and Durham: St. Edmund's College and Ushaw College, 1968), p. 22.
27. BL, MS Lansdowne 33, fol. 145r.
28. For Payne's life, see Foley, 'Payne', 48–75.
29. J. Morris, 'Blessed Edmund Campion at Douay', in *The Month* 61 (1887), 35.
30. T. Clancy, 'The first generation of English Jesuits', in *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* [hereinafter cited as *AHSI*] 57 (1988), 153.
31. Anon. (ed.), [Fathers of the congregation of the London Oratory], with an introduction by T. F. Knox, *The First and Second Diaries of the English College, Douay, and an Appendix of Unpublished Documents* (London D. Nutt, 1878), p. 311.
32. Knox, *Douay*, p. 103.
33. G. Kilroy, *Edmund Campion: Memory and Transcription* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 45.
34. A. Hegarty, *A Biographical Register of St John's College, Oxford, 1555–1660* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011), p. 387. My thanks to Andrew Hegarty for his advice on this point.
35. Knox, *Douay*, p. 107, quoted and translated in Foley, 'Payne', 50. Godself subsequently became a priest: Anstruther, *Priests*, p. 133.
36. Knox, *Douay*, p. 115.
37. Foley, 'Payne', 51. It is unclear whether he was banished or left of his own accord.
38. P. Ryan (ed.), 'Diocesan returns of recusants for England and Wales, 1577', *Miscellanea XII*, publications of the Catholic Record Society 22 (London, 1921), p. 49.
39. Knox, *Douay*, pp. 130–131.
40. ERO, MS D/DP/F8.
41. T. B. Howell (ed.), *A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanours from the Earliest Period to the Year 1788, with Notes and Illustrations*, I (London: Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1816), p. 1067. Nobody appears to have been surprised that Payne would have done this.
42. W. Allen, *A Briefe Historie of the Glorious Martyrdom of Twelve Reverend Priests: Father Edmund Campion and his Companions*, ed. J. H. Pollen (London: Burns & Oates, 1908), pp. 89–90.
43. Article on Thomas Pounce, by T. M. McCoog, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
44. *The English College Rome, Responsa Part I: 1598–1621*, ed. A. Kenny, CRS 54 (London, 1962), p. 57.
45. Allen, *Briefe Historie*, p. 93.
46. Foley, 'Payne', 51–52.
47. The National Archives, E351/142, mem.23d (section for 1580–1581).
48. BL, MS Lansdowne 33, fol. 149r. For the Mores as part of the Petre network, see J. E. Kelly, 'Learning to survive: the Petre family and the formation of Catholic communities from Elizabeth I to the eve of the English civil war', unpublished PhD thesis (King's College London, 2008), pp. 84–85.
49. TNA, SP 12/157/24; *APC 1581–1582*, 172; Foley, 'Payne', 52–55.

50. BL, MS Lansdowne 33, fols 147r–147v; Allen, *Briefe Historie*, pp. 89–96.
51. A. G. Petti (ed), *Recusant Documents from the Ellesmere Manuscripts*, CRS 60 (London, 1968), p. 32.
52. *APC 1581–1582*, p. 347.
53. ERO, MS Q/SR 81/4.
54. It should be noted that Lady Petre was pregnant with her second son, John, at the time, though the authorities did not later pursue the charges.
55. T. M. McCoog, 'The English Jesuit mission and the French match, 1579–1581', in *The Catholic Historical Review* 87 (2001), 191.
56. McCoog, 'French Match', 187, 190, 209.
57. Lake and Questier, 'Puritans, papists', 612; J. Bossy, 'English Catholics and the French marriage', in *Recusant History* [hereinafter cited as *RH*] 5 (1959–1960), 2–16; McCoog, 'French match', 185–213; article on Thomas Radcliffe, third earl of Sussex, by W. T. MacCaffrey, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
58. D. Mateer, 'William Byrd, John Petre and Oxford, Bodleian MS Mus. Sch. E.423', in *The Royal Musical Association Research Chronicle* 29 (1996), 25; Kuypers, 'Thorndon', 84.
59. ERO, MS D/DP/A18 (extraordinary charges August 1581).
60. ERO, MS D/DP/F213; Mateer, 'Byrd', 24.
61. ERO, MSS T/A 557, D/DP/F240/1.
62. McCoog, 'French match', 191; article on William Cecil, by W. T. MacCaffrey, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
63. Foley, 'Payne', 68. Notably, Allen informed the rector of the English College, Rome, Alfonso Agazzari SJ, of his death, whilst Persons made several mentions of him: *ibid.*, 74–75; T. M. McCoog, 'Robert Parsons and Claudio Acquaviva: Correspondence', in *AHSI* 68 (1999), 117.
64. A. F. Pollard (ed.), *Tudor Tracts 1552–1588* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), pp. 454, 473. Payne had already been captured by the time of Champion's arrest on 17 July 1581; Payne was delivered to the Tower on 14 July: Foley, 'Payne', 53. Eliot perhaps implies that he got the scent of Champion's trail whilst hunting and then capturing Payne.
65. ERO, MS D/DP/F8.
66. For example, ERO, MSS D/DP/A17 (rewards April 1570), D/DP/A18 (receipts 1 November 1576), D/DP/A24 (28 April 1593, 28 July 1593), D/DP/A28 (October 1596, June 1597), D/DP/A30 (27 December 1595), D/DP/A25 (6 December 1605), D/DP/A26 (5 December 1607, 29 February 1607/8, 13 September 1610), D/DP/A27 (23 February 1613/14), D/DP/E25, fols 94r–96v.
67. N. C. Elliot, 'The Roman Catholic community in Essex 1625–1701', unpublished M.Litt. dissertation (Oxford, 1976), p. 52.
68. M. W. O'Boy, 'The Origins of Essex Recusancy', unpublished PhD thesis (Cambridge, 1995), p. 33.
69. Kelly, 'Learning to survive', pp. 83–84.
70. *The Troubles of our Catholic Forefathers, Related by Themselves*, vol. 2, ed. J. Morris (London: Burns and Oates, 1875), pp. 294–300, 337; Anstruther, *Priests*, pp. 361–363.
71. ERO, MS T/G 24/84; M. Bernard, 'Paschall of Great Baddow', in *ER* 8 (1966), 15.

72. J. Foster, *Alumni Oxoniensis: The Members of the University of Oxford, 1500–1714*, vol. 3 (Oxford: Parker & Co., 1891–1892), p. 1125; C. W. Boase, *Registrum Colegii Exoniensis Part II: An Alphabetical Register of the Commoners of Exeter College, Oxford* (Oxford: Baxter, 1894), p. 242.
73. Archives of the British Province of the Society of Jesus, Collectanea Pi, p. 107.
74. ASJ, Anglia A I, fol. 34r.
75. Knox, *Douay*, p. 128.
76. APC 1577–1578, pp. 327–328; M. Gabriel, 'Essex papists in 1578', in *ER* 2 (1960), 3.
77. H. Foley (ed.), *Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus*, vol. 6 (London: Burns and Oates, 1875–1883), p. 68; Bernard, 'Paschall', 12–13.
78. Bernard, 'Paschall', 13.
79. BL, MS Harleian 296, fols 112r–112v. Similar accounts are in BL, MSS Add. 48,029, fols 121r–142v, and 48,023, fols 94r–109v. Negotiations surrounding the proposed marriage were well known on the Continent and were much talked about by English exiles: McCoog, 'French match', 195.
80. Pascall and Allen regularly visited the pope regarding the mission: BL, MS Harleian 296 no.30, fols 112v–113r.
81. Foley, *Records*, 6, p. 69.
82. ASJ, Collectanea Pi, pp. 110–111; Anglia A I, fol. 33r.
83. ASJ, Collectanea Pi, p. 115; Anglia A I, fol. 33v; F. Edwards (ed.), *The Elizabethan Jesuits: 'Historia Missionis Anglicanae Societatis Jesu' (1660) of Henry More* (London and Chichester: Phillimore, 1981), p. 129.
84. APC 1580–1581, pp. 294–195; TNA, SP 12/149/81, SP 12/149/82, SP 12/149/83.
85. ASJ, Collectanea Pi, pp. 107–108.
86. Howell, *State Trials*, p. 1055.
87. Boase, *Registrum*, p. 50; Ryan, 'Diocesan returns', p. 100; for Petre influence at Exeter College, see Kelly, 'Learning to survive', pp. 77–81.
88. ASJ, Anglia A I, fols 33r–34r.
89. For example, BL, MS Lansdowne 982, fol. 22r.
90. Foley, *Records*, 6, p. 130.
91. Edwards, *Elizabethan Jesuits*, p. 68.
92. ASJ, Collectanea Pi, pp. 105–106, 110–111. Notably, only Sherwin and Campion were allowed to speak at the mass trial of priests, underlining Sherwin's importance: Edwards, *Elizabethan Jesuits*, p. 174.
93. Edwards, *Elizabethan Jesuits*, p. 95.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 128–129, 136; Allen, *Briefe Historie*, pp. 34–43. Briant also has Petre links: Kelly, 'Learning to survive', p. 80.
95. B. Camm, *Lives of the English Martyrs*, vol. 2 (London: Burns and Oates, 1905), pp. 379–380.
96. For an overview of the controversy, see M. C. Questier (ed.), *Newsletters from the Archpresbyterate of George Birkhead*, Camden 5th series, vol. 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Also J. Bossy, 'Henri IV: The appellants and the Jesuits', in *RH* 8 (1965), 80–122.
97. Foley, *Records*, 6, p. 52. The mention of two Sherwins is seemingly a mistake.

98. For Cornelius's Petre links see Kelly, 'Learning to survive', pp. 79–80, 97.
99. P. McGrath and J. Rowe, 'The Marian priests under Elizabeth I', in *RH* 17 (1984–1985), 103–105.
100. B. C. Foley, 'John Woodward, Marian priest 1530?–1597/8?', in *ER* 4 (1962), 13–15. Woodward had also acted as tutor to John Petre: Kuypers, 'Thorndon', 81.
101. Knox, *Douay*, p. 121.
102. William Allen actively encouraged old Marian priests to come and do this: Anon. (ed.) [Fathers of the congregation of the London Oratory], with an introduction by T. F. Knox, *The letters and memorials of William Cardinal Allen (1532–1594)* (London: Nutt, 1882), pp. 58–59.
103. ERO, MS D/DP/A18 (rewards November 1576, 6 May 1577).
104. BL, MS Add. 46,461, fols 53v, 57r. Griffith later became a priest: Anstruther, *Priests*, pp. 381–382, 408. George was John Talbot's son; a Talbot had arrived at Douai with Woodward: for the relationship between Talbot and Petre, see Kelly, 'Learning to survive', pp. 95–98.
105. P. J. Ayres (ed.), *Anthony Munday: The English Roman Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 7–8.
106. Ayres, *Munday*, p. 9.
107. Ayres, *Munday*, pp. 10–13. The letters are not extant.
108. *Memoirs of Robert Persons SJ*, ed. J. H. Pollen, CRS 2 (London, 1906), p. 199. The pair were definitely in Rouen on 3 July 1580, presumably crossing soon after: P. Ryan, 'Some correspondence of Cardinal Allen, 1579–1585, from the Jesuit archives', *Miscellanea VII*, CRS 9 (London, 1911), p. 24.
109. Foley, 'Woodward', 14; ASJ, Anglia Ai, fols 46r–46v.
110. TNA, SP 12/146/114.
111. Pollard, *Tracts*, p. 460.
112. Edwards, *Elizabethan Jesuits*, p. 140; V. Houlston, *Catholic Resistance in Elizabethan England: Robert Persons's Jesuit Polemic, 1580–1610* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 49, 125.
113. TNA, SP 15/27A/124.
114. TNA, SP 12/173/64. It was also reported that two of Lady Talbot's sons, as well as one of Lady Paulet's, were in Rouen under the charge of a priest called 'Delahyd'. Rice Griffith had delivered a half-year annuity to a Mr Delahyde for John Petre: ERO, MS D/DP/A18 (annuities November 1576, 6 May 1577). A David de la Hyde, who was ejected from his fellowship at Merton College, Oxford, for refusing the Oath of Supremacy in 1560, had acted as John's Petre's tutor after Woodward: Mateer, 'Byrd', 22.
115. Pollen, *Memoirs of Persons*, p. 199.
116. A. Dures, *English Catholicism 1558–1642* (Harlow: Longman, 1998), pp. 22–23.
117. TNA, SP 12/160/56.
118. Questier, *Catholicism*, pp. 59–60, 164, 184–186.
119. D. B. Hamilton, *Anthony Munday and the Catholics, 1560–1633* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. xvi–xviii.
120. P. Lake and M. Questier, *The Trials of Margaret Clitherow: Persecution, Martyrdom and the Politics of Sanctity in Elizabethan England* (London: Continuum, 2011), pp. 59–67.
121. Lake and Questier, *Margaret Clitherow*, p. 141.

122. For further consideration of this point, see Lake and Questier, *Margaret Clitherow*, pp. xi–xiv.
123. E. Duffy, *Saints, Sacrilege and Sedition: Religion and Conflict in the Tudor Reformations* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), p. 10.
124. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/7547406/Shami-Chakrabarti-judges-fuelling-fears-over-Christians-unfair-treatment.html> date accessed 20 June 2012.

7

Commonwealth, Chosenness and Toleration: Reconsidering the Jews' Readmission to England and the Idea of an Elect Nation

Achsah Guibbory

The proposal to readmit the Jews to England in 1655 triggered a controversy which spread beyond Whitehall and involved issues about national identity and toleration that extended across the Atlantic and have persisted into our present times. The prospect of Jewish readmission raised the question of what it meant to be an elect nation or a chosen people, pitting competing understandings of chosenness against each other, as Christian England confronted the twinned spectres of the immigration of an alien people and seduction by a religion deemed to be anti-Christian.

The concept of a 'chosen people' originates in Exodus, where God says, 'if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine: And ye shall be unto me . . . a holy nation' (Exod. 19:5–6). The phrase 'chosen people' carries the sense of 'separateness', the Hebrew word for 'holy' (*ka'dosh*) meaning separate. Over the millennia Jews have struggled with this idea, sometimes uncomfortable with it. Nevertheless, the idea of being specially loved by God has long been attractive. Paul and Augustine redefined Israel as those people who embraced Christ and his gospel, the new 'covenant' replacing the covenant with the Israelites at Sinai and later Jews. Martin Luther described the church as faithful Israel, and the papacy as Babylonian captivity, from which God was delivering the church. Calvinism, with its theology of predestination, separated even reformed Christians into the 'elect' and the much larger group of the 'reprobate'. Though it is said that Christianity is 'universal',

and the reformed church was transnational, the idea of a chosen people did not disappear from the Christian world. Post-Reformation England used biblical narratives of Israel to legitimise her own national identity as she separated from Rome.¹ That England was physically set apart from Europe seemed to some English people to confirm her separate, special identity.

People disagreed about what it meant to be Israel, or who actually belonged to it, whether the true Israel was the whole nation or just a part. During the Civil Wars, supporters of the king and Parliament, Anglicans and Puritans, each laid claim to the title, believing God was with them, and their opponents the enemy of Israel. On the day Charles I was executed (30 January 1649) claiming he was the Davidic king, Parliament declared England a 'Commonwealth'. Legislative and executive power would be in themselves and a Council of State. Expecting the nation to be a light to the world like the restored Israel of Isaiah (Isa. 60:1–3), Parliament passed acts for 'the promoting and propagating of the Gospel...in New England' (27 July 1649), and against cursing (28 June 1650) and 'Incest, Adultery, and Fornication, where-with this Land is much defiled' (10 May 1650).² As befitted a godly nation, Parliament and supporters of the new regime invoked analogies with biblical Israel. Some analogies identified the new commonwealth with redeemed Israel as described in the Hebrew prophets, its rightful rulers restored, others with Israel delivered from Egyptian bondage and entering Canaan. Authorised by Parliament, Oliver Cromwell (their Gideon) waged war in Ireland and Scotland to suppress insurrection. As a commonwealth, England had a sacred mission, though there were challenges. George Wither worried that many enemies 'shall endeavor to hinder our possessing the promised Land, the Canaan of Liberty'.³

When Cromwell disbanded Parliament in December 1653 and became Lord Protector, England was still considered a 'commonwealth', though modern historians call the period the Protectorate and Cromwell's enemies accused him of being like a monarch. It was thus to a commonwealth which understood itself as Israel that Rabbi Menasseh ben Israel presented his petition for Jewish readmission in late 1655. He had been encouraged by Cromwell and, even earlier, by English millenarians including Samuel Hartlib and John Dury. Menasseh presented his 'Humble Addresses' and petition to Cromwell and his Council of State on 5 November, hopeful of a favourable result. Cromwell convened a conference at Whitehall that began meeting on 4 December. The conference was summarised by the Baptist millenarian Henry Jessey, one of the first to have written to Menasseh in Amsterdam and now a member of

the conference.⁴ According to Jessey, sharp debate took place 'at several meetings, some more private, and some more publick at White-Hall, and else where'.⁵ Earlier support for Menasseh and Jewish readmission had faded. On 18 December Cromwell abruptly adjourned the conference, abandoning the proposal without reaching a decision.

Two influential pamphlets filled with anti-Jewish sentiments took the issue to the broader public. William Prynne's *Short Demurrer to the Jewes* appeared just before the dissolution of the conference, and was published in an expanded second edition in 1656. William Hughes's *Anglo-Judaeus, or the History of the Jews, Whilst here in England* appeared less than two weeks after the conference ended. Both authors presented themselves as lawyers and historians of England, Prynne's title page declaring the Jews' 'total, final Banishment by Judgment and Edict of Parliament, out of England, never to return again'. The pamphlets revived the blood libels against the Jews, but more than the traditional view that Jews were anti-Christian was at work. Opposition to Jewish readmission was also the product of a particular moment in English history. Lucien Wolf long ago wondered why not one major voice came to the defence of Menasseh's petition in late 1655,⁶ even though his English friends had encouraged Menasseh's *The Hope of Israel* (translated into English by Moses Wall), which went through multiple editions between 1650 and 1652. But the situation in England had changed. Radical sectarian activity had escalated, and was imagined as linked with the Jews and Judaism, prompting the conviction that Judaism posed an increasing threat to the nation. It is within this context that we need to understand the fear Menasseh's petition provoked.

Menasseh requested that Jews be allowed to live in England 'protected from all wrongs, as the English are, or should be', that they be allowed 'publick Synagogues' and 'a burying place out of the Town' and that they be permitted 'to Traffick as freely in all sorts of Merchandize, as other strangers'.⁷ What seemed particularly impertinent to Hughes was that Menasseh requested that Jews be unconfined in their being and their worship: 'that the Great and glorious Name of the Lord our God may be extolled, and solemnly worshiped and praised by us through all the bounds of this Common-wealth'.⁸ Not to live in a ghetto, or a separate section, but to live and worship freely throughout the country. So Prynne and Hughes set out to prove that the Jews were an inherently alien people and a danger to England.

Prynne and Hughes begin by asserting that the Jews never lived in England until they were 'brought from' Rhone by William the Conqueror, himself an alien, not English.⁹ Hughes describes how, from that

moment, they 'spread throughout the whole Land: no Town at all considerable, but multitudes in it'. Jews are foreign bodies that do not belong on English land, a 'plague' which spreads, and a people to whom the English have a 'native enmity', which accounts for their violence towards the Jews in the twelfth and thirteen centuries.¹⁰ Prynne, writing as a 'Christian and English Free-man', is upset that Jews not only want to be in England but to have the same 'protection ... AS THE NATIVES THEMSELVES'.¹¹ The prospect of them being buried in 'English soyl' disturbs him, as it does Hughes.¹² Hughes imagines a pure, native England and Englishness which existed in the distant past, was contaminated by Jews and foreign kings but has been restored now that England is a commonwealth. Monarchical government and the Jews are linked; both oppressive, each supporting the other.

Allowing these 'aliens' not only to live in England but to practise their religion would threaten 'the Natives'. Pointing out the danger in Menasseh's desire 'that every place [in England] should be blessed with their Religion', Hughes envisions a catastrophic future in which Christian England is taken over by Jews and Judaism. This fear was shared by Prynne, whose outrage is palpable when he complains that Menasseh wants 'PUBLICK SYNAGOGUES, not onely in ENGLAND, but IN ALL OTHER PLACES'. Hughes asks, why cannot they 'as well serve God where they are'. England must be protected from foreign elements that would deplete the wealth and destroy the 'weale' (the good, the health, the wealth) of England, 'another Land of Goshen'.¹³

A different notion of the Commonwealth appears in Menasseh's *Humble Addresses*. Now that 'the Kingly Government' has been 'changed into that of a Common-wealth', Menasseh hoped 'the ancient hatred' towards the Jews 'would also be changed into good-will', as if a commonwealth were by definition more inclusive. Emphasising what is shared (that is, common) rather than what divides, Menasseh told Cromwell and his larger English audience, 'your Highnesse and your Christian Councill ... have so great knowledge of, and adore the same one onely God of Israel, together with us'.¹⁴ This statement surely shocked many English Christians (as it did Prynne and Hughes), who did not believe that Christians and Jews worshipped the same God. But Menasseh knew that the English people embraced the Old Testament as well as the New, and that the Commonwealth represented itself as biblical Israel. Did this not suggest that the English and the Jews both worshipped the same God of Israel?

Hughes's commonwealth was not Menasseh's. It is an exclusively Christian one, whose boundaries and laws are drawn to exclude others.

Its very separateness defines it as God's chosen, God's people. Hughes made the identification of England with biblical Israel explicit as he described England's deliverance from supposed Jewish oppression in 1290, the year the Jews were expelled. England was liberated after '220 years (longer by five or six than their Ancestors were in Egypt) during which time we may easily see the English Nation was as in bondage'. The English are the Israelites, the Jews Egyptians. To bring the Jews back, would be to return England to bondage. 'English liberty' would be lost.¹⁵

We have here the clash of chosen nations. The Jews, claiming to be God's beloved people and expecting that they would eventually enjoy the fulfilment of the Hebrew Bible's promises, wanted admission to an England that also claimed to be God's beloved, the true Israel. How could a chosen nation embrace and tolerate a people who also claimed to be God's chosen people but differed in religion?

That would demand toleration of what was deemed a false religion.¹⁶ The problem was not just that English Christians distinguished between the 'true Christian' religion and the 'false' Jewish religion. There was no agreement about what constituted 'true' (reformed) Christianity. Proliferation of radical sects especially in the 1650s made Protestants who were committed to having ordained clergy and Bible-centred, Christ-centred worship anxious that England's reformed religious identity was precarious. Fifth Monarchists, expecting the earthly reign of King Jesus, threatened the social order, as did the provocative antics of the Ranters, who thought themselves free from sin, no longer bound to any laws. But it was not just the social disorder, the fear of 'levelling'. Anti-Trinitarian sectaries such as Socinians, Ranters and Quakers seemed not fully Christian. Quakers seemed most dangerous because of their greater numbers, appeal and visibility. Spreading through England, Quakers increased during the 1650s to 'between thirty and sixty thousand, out of a total population of some five million'.¹⁷ That is, they constituted about 1 per cent of England's population – the same percentage that Jews do today in the UK, according to the 2011 census.¹⁸ A minority, but a recognisable one; and the Quakers were activists. It is my claim that the perceived Quaker threat, particularly in 1654 and 1655, helped doom support for Menasseh's petition.

* * *

Connections both real and imagined between the Quakers and Jews are important to understand, for they impacted the controversy surrounding Jewish readmission to England. Quaker-Jewish relations were varied

and complicated. Even as Quakers identified with the suffering Jesus and accused their persecutors of being like the 'Pharisees and scribes',¹⁹ their enemies accused them of rejecting Christ. The biblical tropes and narratives that Quakers regularly adopted established kinship with the biblical Jews. But Quaker description of themselves and their suffering also suggested an analogy with contemporary Jews seeking admission.

Though the Quakers were indigenous, they seemed 'strangers', people who were not at home in England, and the language they used to describe their condition came from Hebrew prophets who described Israel's sufferings in exile. Quakers from the 'Northern Isles' had been 'scattered into Barbadoes, Virginy, New-England, and other Islands there-a-wayes, and Countreyes elsewhere'.²⁰ Anthony Pearson declared that God's 'Seed' 'hath layen in bondage in a strange Land' – a comment that ominously defined England itself as a 'strange land'.²¹ Francis Howgill echoed Jeremiah and Isaiah when he lamented that his Quaker 'Friends', the 'Sons of Sion ... hath been as a widow desolate', and have 'wandered up and down in the long night of darknesse and knew no rest', 'cast out' by brethren, exiles in their own country.²² In their own eyes and those of others, the Quakers were homeless. They were often charged with vagrancy. But God was now 'gathering' his 'scattered' people.²³ The powerful story of dispersion followed by gathering, the core of the prophetic books of the Hebrew Bible, was shared by Quakers and Jews. The narrative made sense of their experience and gave them hope. Menasseh invoked it when he argued that before the redemption of the Jews and their return to their land they needed to be dispersed throughout the earth, including England. Burroughs invoked it when he wrote from Dublin to his friends 'in England': 'To all you called, chosen', 'you that were scattered in the cloudy and dark day', who 'art counted as desolate ... and reckoned the least of the Nation', God has now 'gathered' them 'into the fould'. They are the Israel spoken of in Ezekiel (e.g., 36:19, 24), Isaiah (e.g., 11:11–12; 54:6–8; 60:15), Jeremiah (e.g., 31:10) – specially blessed, 'a chosen Generation'.²⁴

The chosen are the afflicted. Indeed, suffering is the mark of the chosen. Pearson told Parliament (and anyone who would read his pamphlet) about the 'afflictions and sufferings of the innocent by the hands of your ministers and servants'. He named more than 30 of the people of God in 1653 who lay in Yorkshire, Cumberland and Westmorland prisons.²⁵ Others were persecuted in Lancashire.²⁶ Sixteen fifty-five was a particularly bad year. One pamphlet described the persecution of 'innocent' 'servants of Jesus', Margaret Vivers and Nathaniel Weston, who entered a Banbury church and testified against the 'false prophets'

(English clergy) and 'false worship' there. Among the 'servants' of God 'haled' before 'the Magistrates' and imprisoned was Anne Audland, who published *A True Declaration of the Suffering of the Innocent*, defending herself from charges of blasphemy. Sent by God, like Moses to Pharaoh, to demand 'let Israel go free', she insisted she had only been 'speaking the word of the Lord to the people'.²⁷ Margaret Newby and Elizabeth Courten, coming to Evesham for a meeting, were placed in the stocks for 15 hours, their legs spread, before being sent out of town into the freezing night.²⁸ George Whitehead told how he, John Harwood and Richard Clayton were 'persecute[d]' by the 'Magistrates' and 'Priests of this nation' when they passed through Bury in Suffolk as 'witnesses' of the 'light' 'cry[ing] against' proud 'hirelings' as the Hebrew prophets had (he cites Isa. 6:11; Micah 3:11, Jeremiah 38:6, Ezek. 34:3, Amos 7:10).²⁹

Quakers rejected the idea that the nation was Israel, proclaiming they were 'Citizens' not of England but 'of the heavenly Jerusalem, which is the mother of us all'.³⁰ They drew a line between the English nation (which, as William Dewsbury said, sought to build up 'Sion with Blood') and the people of God, persecuted by the nation. Thomas Speed asked, 'Is there scarce a prison this day in the Nation, in which some servant of the living God or other is not prisoner' to the 'insatiable fury' of the nation's 'Chief Priests'.³¹ As in the prophets (for example, Isaiah 34:1-2, 40:17, 23), 'nations' is a negative word in Quaker writing. 'Nations' are the enemies of the 'chosen'. Burroughs told 'the camp of the Lord in England', 'prepare your selves to battle' against England.³²

Isaiah proclaimed, 'the indignation of the Lord is upon all nations' (34:1-2). Quakers followed the prophet's lead, confronting the most powerful. Soon after Cromwell became Lord Protector, John Camm and Francis Howgill addressed him, first in person, then in print. Camm threatened the 'terrible' day of the Lord was coming unless Cromwell would 'take off the oppression from the necks of the people', removing the 'yoke' of bondage by tolerating all sectarian differences. Howgill, delivering 'the word of the Lord' that came to him as he was 'waiting in James Park at London', told Cromwell: 'thus saith the Lord, I chose thee out of all the Nation' and broke the oppressor's 'laws', and 'art thou now going to establish them again?' If Cromwell did not 'take away all those Laws... concerning Religion' and 'deliver' those who had been imprisoned for their faith, he would be 'trodden down'.³³ For the Lord was coming to redeem his people; he would strip the nations of their power.

Quaker men and women published provocative pamphlets, preached on the street and posted writings on the doors of churches, which they mocked as mere 'steeplehouses'. They entered churches, sometimes

preaching after the minister had concluded but also interrupting the service to 'witness' and challenge the ministers. So disruptive were they that on 15 February 1655 Cromwell issued a proclamation, prohibiting 'the disturbing of Ministers and other Christians in their Assemblies and Meeting'. 'Many' 'Quakers and Ranters' were violating the 'Freedom and Liberty' of the church-going people. If these disturbers did not desist, 'all Officers... of Justice' should 'proceed against them accordingly'.³⁴ Very many Quakers found themselves imprisoned in 1655.

A horrific account of a Quaker prison experience came from Humphrey Smith. Writing 'From the Dungeon', Smith told how he and two friends were arrested walking to a meeting in Evesham in November 1655. Their situation replicated that of the Israelites. 'There arose up a new Mayor, who knew not the Righteous seed, as there rose up a new King in Egypt... and he saw the people of God increase, and was vexed at it'. Evesham's mayor, aided by the 'seargeant', commands them 'in the name of the Protector' to stop meeting in the street, and throws the Quakers in prison.³⁵ They are deprived of candles, their books and writings, a stool to sit on and bedding. For days they are given neither bread nor water. Finally they are offered the 'town' allotment of bread and beer but insist on having bread and water from their friends. Then the prisoners are placed in the dungeon, a 'Hole' 'not twelve foot square', with one four-inch opening for food and straw. There they are kept 'with our own dung in the same room'. When Smith requested the dung be removed, he was put in the stocks. For 14 weeks they have lived in this dark, airless room, with the 'stink of our own dung'. The smell that emanates is so terrible that people in the street cannot come near the prison.³⁶

Quaker accounts of affliction, intended to confirm their chosen status, mirrored the condition of the Jews, persecuted and wandering, aliens expelled from the places where they dwelled. So it is not surprising that Quakers developed a sense of affinity with the Jews, living as well as biblical. Soon after the failure of the December 1655 Whitehall conference, the Quaker leaders Margaret Fell and George Fox began publishing pamphlets addressed to the Jews abroad, sensing there was a possibility of converting them.³⁷ But if Quaker-Jewish analogies and shared biblical tropes led Quakers to identify with contemporary Jews, they also hardened the view of the conservative English godly that the Quakers were actually too much like Jews.

Quakers considered themselves true Christians, perhaps the only true Christians in England. They accused English clergy of reading the Scriptures according to the letter rather than the spirit (as Paul had said

of the Jews, II Corinthians 3), of following the Levitical practice of tithes and of understanding Christ in a material way (as a person who died and would come again) rather than spiritually. Because they 'walk after the flesh' (cf. Romans 8:1) and deny Christ 'to be the light of the world',³⁸ England's clergy and magistrates must be of 'that generation' of 'Cain's race' including the 'Scribes and Pharisees, that with their Priests put Christ to death'.³⁹ That is, Quakers vilified their persecutors as anti-Christian Jews.

To many of their countrymen, however, Quakers did not seem fully Christian. Cromwell's proclamation had distinguished between 'Christians' and these disturbers of the peace who interrupted church congregations. Quakers seemed to diminish the authority of the Bible, and thus were linked with 'the Papists'.⁴⁰ They abjured Calvinism, the theology of the orthodox, since they taught that the divine 'light' was already within every person – a doctrine that could be dangerously appealing as it enlarged the bounds of God's mercy.⁴¹ But what seemed especially to make Quakers not Christian – and implicitly Jewish – was that they denied the divinity of Jesus Christ, the importance of the crucifixion and his second coming in the flesh, though they insisted they did not reject Christ but only understood him as risen spiritually, within the individual person, dwelling in the heart or conscience.⁴²

In the months before Menasseh presented his petition, a flurry of anti-Quaker pamphlets appeared charging Quakers with denying Christ. One, addressed to John Thurloe, secretary of state and secretary to Cromwell, accused Quakers of reviling 'that Jesus Christ, which died at Jerusalem'. They 'offer violence to God and Christ'.⁴³ These were the charges brought traditionally against the Jews, and they were repeated when Prynne and Hughes revived the stories of Jews killing Christian children in medieval England. Simply to think of Christ spiritually was, in effect, to kill him again, which is what Quakers did when they taught that Christ is to be only 'understood Parabolically or Figuratively'. 'Tell me what religion these men are of', the author asks, 'are they Christians?'⁴⁴ Richard Baxter charged that Quakers preach 'there is no Christ'; they are 'children of the Darkenesse', who carry on 'the Works of darkenesse'. He asked

Whether those that...deny that there is any such Person as Jesus Christ who suffered at Jerusalem; now glorified in heaven in the humane nature, and only call somewhat within themselves by the name of Christ, I say, whether these are not abominable Infidels, having nothing to do with the name of Christians?

'Was there ever a Generation of men on whom the Image of the devil was more visible than on these?'⁴⁵ Baxter applies to the Quakers the diatribes Christians conventionally applied to Jews. One pamphlet suggested their distinctive way of 'saluting' each other was like that 'among the Jews'.⁴⁶ We might recall how in jail Humphrey Smith wanted only food brought by his Quaker friends, as if he, like Jews, had a special diet. John Toldervy, when he recovered from his Quaker errors, lamented that his association with the Quakers 'debarred me of my living and conversing with men'.⁴⁷ Quakers were accused of being like Pharisees because of their concern with purity and separation: 'The Pharisees it is fully known did separate themselves from the rest of the people, upon an account of a conceit they had of their own surpassing holiness [Luke 18:9] ... How fully is this the spirit of these men?'⁴⁸

By the time Menasseh presented his petition, Quakers had become an inescapable presence in England not just because of their increasing numbers and disruptive preaching but also because, as Kate Peters has shown, they used print in an organised, sophisticated way to disseminate their ideas. After George Fox began preaching in 1652, by 1656 'nearly 100 named Quaker authors had had their writings published ... contributing to a total of nearly 300 (291) publications'.⁴⁹ Each year, the number of pamphlets increased. Thirty-six Quaker pamphlets survive from 1653, 61 from 1654, and over 100 in 1655.⁵⁰ No wonder that in the controversy about Jewish readmission we hear the refrain that England, weakened by sectarian opinions, was vulnerable to being seduced away from the Christian faith. Jessey explained that even 'some' at the Conference who 'desir[ed] heartily the Jews conversion, yet feared greatly, it would prove the subversion of many here, if Jews were suffered to return hither, because so many here are soon carried aside to new Opinions'⁵¹ – new opinions that did not seem Christian.

A few people inclined to opening doors. Moved by the public opposition to the Jews, the Baptist Thomas Collier published a defence of these 'poor rejected people', who should be permitted 'a being in this nation'.⁵² A broadsheet by the Quaker William Tomlinson proclaimed it was time for the English to 'shew mercy' to Jews, and 'not to be forgetful to entertaine strangers'.⁵³ But for most the situation seemed risky. Religion had not been 'settled'. When Colonel Hays addressed Parliament in a debate concerning religious toleration in February 1655, he insisted that to grant 'too large a Toleration' would 'dishonor God and disorder the State'. Hays looked to ancient Israel's 'National Church', and cited the Bible's instruction that 'the stranger that comes nigh [the Tabernacle] shall surely dye'.⁵⁴ Hays as well as Hughes shows how Jewish

Israel could be distorted to exemplify the godly community that was self-contained and to reject 'the stranger', which in the minds of many English people included both Quakers and Jews.

Some thought the Quakers and sectaries actually intended to turn England Jewish. A pamphlet published in 1655 complained about those who 'would sweep down our Fundamental Laws' and bind 'our Barresters...Prentices to Moses' – a 'rare device to turn ours selves Jewes'.⁵⁵ It specifically listed the Quakers, though it was the Fifth Monarchists who wanted to restore Mosaic judicial law. If the spreading Quaker infection was making England susceptible to becoming 'Jewish', allowing the Jews to live and worship freely in England would further the transformation. Prynne thought the Jews had 'an intended design' in coming into England to subvert 'Christianity itself, without any thoughts of turning Christians themselves'.⁵⁶ Though Prynne imagined Jews as inveterate enemies, circumcising and crucifying Christian children,⁵⁷ his real fear was not of Jewish anti-Christian violence but of the Jews' ability to seduce a spiritually weakened people from their Christian faith.

Hughes and Prynne tied the Jewish threat to the rise of heterodoxy in England. Prynne thought it 'a very ill time to bring in the Jews, when the people were so dangerously and generally bent to Apostacy, and all sorts of Novelties and Errors in Religion; and would sooner turn Jews, than the Jews Christians'. As Hughes put it, 'too many [have] already taken up, if not their opinions, yet such as border near upon their hold'. Already, 'hundreds if not thousands' of English people are 'veiled under the name of Christians' but would 'appear' publicly if the Jews were granted admission and 'an open way of their Worship in England'. Far from being potential converts, the Jews have 'ambition to draw others to them'. 'So many opinions amongst us... have affinity with Their [the Jews'] Tenents, as, denying Christ in reality, though not in words (by taking away his Natures, Offices, and the Real History of him) there are but few steps betwixt them and that wherein principally the Jews dissent from us'.⁵⁸ Hughes clearly is thinking of Quakers.

Hughes and Prynne were not alone. According to Jessey, many 'Preachers' at the conference worried that the English would be 'seduced', and that it would be impossible to 'prevent those evils' (p. 2). Even John Dury, who earlier had encouraged Menasseh's hopes for Jewish readmission, now shared this fear. Just after the conference, Dury wrote from abroad *A Case of Conscience, Whether it be lawfull to admit Jews to come into a Christian Common-wealth*, addressing his friend Samuel Hartlib. He considered it 'lawfull' for any 'civil Society of men' to admit

them, but not necessarily 'Expedient', the 'Expediencie' needing to be determined by the particular nature of the 'time' or 'place'. While sympathetic to the Jews' plight of being 'made strangers everywhere', he insisted that they would have to 'live ... as strangers' in any Christian society that 'received' them.⁵⁹

The problem was that Jews always 'forme a Society or kind of Common-wealth among themselves' that threatens the stability of the host commonwealth. So even if a nation were to admit them, firm rules must be established, 'restrain[ing]' Jews 'from some things', 'induc[ing]' to others. The Jews would not be allowed to blaspheme 'the Person of Jesus Christ' (Menasseh had already said they never do) or profane 'the Christian Sabbath'. They could not proselytise or engage in religious disputes with Christians. They would need to allow themselves to be instructed by Christians in the Christian faith, all the while living 'by themselves', not 'inroaching upon others beyond their bounds' and performing 'their worship' 'in their own tongue', presumably so Christians could not understand it and be drawn in. The Jews' separateness is at once dangerous and necessary to enforce so they do not 'bring a yoke upon us'. Dury still hoped for the eventual calling of the Jews – in the future they 'may be made partakers again with us' – but only God knows 'the times and seasons of their deliverance', and he could not argue from such hopes 'for any particular admittance of them at this time'.⁶⁰ Though Dury professed his love for the Jews, his position in January 1656 was not far from either Prynne or Hughes, for he too feared the English 'Common-wealth' might fall to the Jews, losing its liberty and its faith, and thus her status as an elect nation.

* * *

Issues raised in the seventeenth century over the readmission of Jews to England have had an ongoing history and a continuing relevance. We hear a lot today about 'exceptionalism', a concept grounded in the biblical notion of chosenness, which played such an important role in the controversy over Jewish readmission. Over time its meaning has repeatedly been challenged and redefined. There is always a tension between competing human desires: the desire to reaffirm boundaries that are necessary to identity, and the desire to break down the fences that divide people. Because the insistence on boundaries seems to inhere in the idea of a 'chosen' or 'elect' nation, the question has been: is it possible to redefine chosenness so that it can be inclusive, tolerant of difference?

The preoccupation with the nation as Israel, as God's chosen, was not limited to seventeenth-century England. It led to British Israelism, first fully articulated in 1840 by John Wilson, who claimed that Western European and British people are descended from the Lost Ten Tribes of the Northern Kingdom of Israel conquered by Assyria in 722 BC. British Israelism was institutionalised in 1919 in the British-Israel-World Federation, which still exists, and it played a role in the 1917 Balfour Declaration committing Britain to establishing a national home for the Jewish people.

In the early seventeenth century identification of the English with biblical Israel was exported to America, where it shaped articulations of America's national identity. English Puritans who came to America brought with them a vision of themselves as the new Israel. They were travelling to a land they imagined as Canaan – traces of this idea remain in the names of New England towns such as New Canaan, Bethel and Goshen. In a speech on the ship *Arabella* in 1630, as they were about to land, John Winthrop declared they were coming to the 'Citty upon a Hill'. He called his companions God's special people and advised them to follow the prophet Micah's counsel 'to doe Justly, to love mercy, and to walke humbly with our God'. Then they would find that 'the God of Israell is among us'. Winthrop closed with Moses' words of farewell and warning, in Deuteronomy 30, as the Israelites were about to enter Canaan: if they followed God's ways, they would flourish; if they didn't, they would perish. 'The eies of all people are uppon us', said Winthrop, 'soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our god in this worke wee have undertaken', they will be shamed and taken over by 'Curses... til wee be consumed out of the good land'.⁶¹ Winthrop's words about the 'Citty upon a hill' would long resonate in America. They encouraged the idea of Manifest Destiny in the nineteenth century.⁶² They would also be echoed in later expressions of 'American exceptionalism' in its different forms. This belief in America's specialness is very much with us.

Winthrop was referring to Matthew 5: 14–16, where Jesus tells his followers: 'Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid... Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.' Behind Jesus' words lies Isaiah, who was so important to the godly in England and whom Jesus here reinterprets. There is Isaiah 42: 6–7 'I the LORD... will... give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles; To open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house.' And Isaiah 49:6: 'I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou

mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth.' In Isaiah 60 God addresses Israel: 60:1–2 'Arise, shine; for thy light is come, and the glory of the LORD is risen upon thee. For, behold, the darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people: but the LORD shall arise upon thee, and his glory shall be seen upon thee.' Jesus reclaims Isaiah's prophecies as he speaks to his followers suggesting they are the redeemed Israel, a light to the rest of the world. In seventeenth-century America, Christians such as Winthrop saw themselves as spreading the light of the gospel to the 'dark' world, bringing the truth of Christianity with them. In England, in the middle of the Civil Wars, Milton echoed Isaiah (in *Areopagitica*, 1644) when he envisioned England bringing the light of reformation to the rest of Europe. The Quakers saw themselves as this risen Israel, trying to awaken others to the light within. Behind these diverse expressions of identity and mission stood Isaiah's prophecies, which have continued to play a role in America.

We think of America as the product of the Enlightenment, and of the Enlightenment as a secular movement overturning the superstitions of religion in an effort to liberate 'man'. But Old Testament narratives are embedded in Enlightenment tropes of deliverance from bondage, as we see particularly well in the Statue of Liberty.

The Statue of Liberty was a gift of the French people to the American people in 1886 on the 100th anniversary of the American Revolution, which made America a republic, separate from England, which was again a monarchy. Garbed in flowing robes, the Statue is Libertas, Roman goddess of freedom. This neo-classical monument represents 'Liberty enlightening the world', her torch 'a symbol of enlightenment'.⁶³ But her torch also presents America as a 'light to the nations', embodying Isaiah's words about redeemed Israel's role. The allusion to Isaiah is reinforced by Emma Lazarus's 1883 poem, 'The New Colossus', engraved on the brass plaque at the statue's base. Emma Lazarus was a Jewish woman, descended from a prominent Sephardic family that in the seventeenth century was among the earliest Jewish settlers in New York (then called New Amsterdam), the first colony to admit Jews. The last lines of the poem – 'give me your tired, your poor/Your huddled Masses yearning to Breathe free' – are well known. We think of immigrants who have come to America over the centuries. But few realise that the poem echoes Isaiah's description of Jerusalem, the 'woman forsaken' but once again loved by God (Isa. 54:6–8), and of the in-gathering of the 'afflicted' by their 'Redeemer' (Isa. 54:11, 8), the in-gathering that both the Quakers and Menasseh in the seventeenth century envisioned for God's faithful Israel. Emma Lazarus gave new life to the promise

that exile will be followed by redemption, but also to Isaiah's expansive vision of the holy city of Jerusalem, open to all peoples. America is the 'mother of Exiles', who takes in 'the wretched refuse', the 'homeless, tempest-tost' and the 'poor'. This is not the heavenly New Jerusalem described by John in Revelation but Isaiah's restored Jerusalem, existing on this earth, open to all, receiving the homeless and precious to God.

Speeches by American presidents over the last three centuries have invoked this biblical vision of America's special role. I want to consider three of them, which repeat Isaiah's idea of a redeemed Jerusalem (now identified with democracy, liberty and America as a land of opportunity), even while they try to answer what it might mean to be 'chosen'.

In 1630 Winthrop, about to set foot in the new world, looked hopefully to America as the new Jerusalem, chosen and protected by God. Fleeing from the oppressive bishops of the English Church, Winthrop's Puritans wanted freedom for their worship but were not themselves tolerant, which is why Roger Williams broke from the Massachusetts Bay Colony and founded his settlement of 'Providence' in what would become Rhode Island. Winthrop became founding Governor of Massachusetts. It is one of the ironies of history that Winthrop's ideas and words have been repeated by later presidents whom Winthrop would never have accepted as belonging to the true Israel, God's people.

First, consider the Gettysburg Address, delivered on 19 November 1863, at the consecration of the National Cemetery where Union soldiers were buried, by Abraham Lincoln, a president by that time committed to the emancipation of African-American slaves, who saw their experience as that of ancient Israel in Egypt, hoping for miraculous deliverance. 'Fourscore and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.' Lincoln's America, like Winthrop's, was a 'nation under God' – but Lincoln's vision was darker. His words suggest that America could not be the redeemed Israel, despite being 'conceived' in liberty in 1776, unless there was 'new birth' – a re-conception – 'of freedom'. Extending the definition of who would be included in a redeemed and free America, Lincoln urged his audience to 'dedicate' themselves to the 'great task remaining before us' to establish a 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people, that shall not perish from the earth'.⁶⁴ It was not enough to consecrate a cemetery, to 'set [it] apart' as something sacred. America had yet to make itself a holy land, set apart by being the only nation on earth that would be a home for all – blacks as well as whites – a place of liberty and

equality (though that dream has been a long work in progress). Lincoln does not mention Israel or Jerusalem in his speech, but he didn't need to: the references were implicit, understood in a land where people knew their Bible.

The second speech was given 100 years later, by John F. Kennedy, to the Massachusetts General Court, on 9 January 1963, just before Kennedy assumed the office of president. Kennedy spoke movingly of Massachusetts as his 'home'. He invoked the idea of America's exceptionalism as he explained that Massachusetts's 'leaders have shaped our destiny long before the great republic was born'. Linking America's 'republic' with that of ancient Greece, Kennedy declared that what Pericles said to the Athenians 'has long been true of this commonwealth: "We do not imitate – for we are a model to others".' But it was not just Greece but Israel that Kennedy apparently had in mind, for he then said that John Winthrop had been his mentor during the last 60 days as he constructed his presidential administration:

I have been guided by the standard John Winthrop set before his shipmates on the flagship *Arabella*, three hundred and thirty-one years ago, as they too faced the task of building a government on a perilous frontier. We must always consider, he said, that we shall be as a city on a hill – the eyes of all people are upon us.

Then Kennedy ended with his hallmark redefinition of what it means to be privileged – dedication to service to others. 'Of those to whom much is given, much is required.'⁶⁵

It was a momentous occasion. For the first time a Catholic had been elected president of America. Kennedy adopts in this speech the words of John Winthrop – that early Puritan – as his own, as if affirming, indeed insisting upon his Americanness. There is more than American exceptionalism at work here. For Kennedy to invoke Winthrop is to prove himself a Patriot, that he goes back to the origins of America, even though his family were immigrants from Ireland, and Roman Catholics.

Finally, there is President Barack Obama's 2011 State of the Union speech, delivered on 25 January. Obama has been repeatedly criticised by conservatives for refusing to embrace American exceptionalism. After this speech, House Speaker John Boehner complained to CNN host Kathleen Parker that the word 'exceptional' had not appeared in Obama's speech. Kathleen Parker continued the discussion in her Sunday column in *The Washington Post*: 'On the right, the word

exceptional – or exceptionalism – lately has become a litmus test for patriotism... So why won't Obama just deliver the one word that would prompt arias from his doubters?'⁶⁶ Robert Schlesinger, in his column in *U.S. News*, retorted that Obama 'has uttered [the word]; he has embraced the concept more explicitly than [his] predecessor' Ronald Reagan, who is usually credited with reviving the image of the 'shining city on a hill'. Though Schlesinger defended Obama,⁶⁷ it is important to see how Obama's speech carefully recalibrates the idea of exceptionalism, whose roots lie in Isaiah's vision of a restored Jerusalem that is a light to the world.

Throughout his speech Obama proclaims what 'set us apart as a nation', the phrase recalling the biblical description of Israel as 'set apart', a holy nation. What is 'at stake right now is not who wins the next election' but 'whether we can sustain the leadership that has made America not just a place on a map, but a light to the world.' Obama redefines the unique and exceptional in order to make America's specialness reside in her unique inclusivity. What could be a more appropriate argument for America's first black president, whose language and values are so often biblical? The redeemed world is to be located on earth, and humans have an obligation to create it.

A few quotations from his speech show how Obama redefines exceptionalism: 'We are part of the American family. We believe that in a country where every race and faith and point of view can be found, we are still bound together as one people; that we share common hopes and a common creed.' Echoing Lincoln's emphasis on the 'great task' before us, and Kennedy's insistence that 'to those to whom much is given, much is required', Obama insists America has work to do at 'this moment' in history. He tells Congress (as well as the nation), 'the American people want us to work' 'together' to make America a place where 'new jobs and industries take root'. The speech is full of projects, full of requests to 'do things'. We hear the familiar note of exceptionalism. 'We are the first nation to be founded for the sake of an idea – the idea that each of us deserves the chance to shape our own destiny. That is why centuries of pioneers and immigrants have risked everything to come here.' Obama emphasises not so much freedom but 'responsibility' and the need to 'knock down barriers', to stop expelling from our country students who are 'not American citizens' – in violation of the promises of the Statue of Liberty, the mother whose arms are always open. How carefully Obama invokes the notion of America as exceptional, while redefining what it means to be special. Though he admits at the end that we have 'determined

enemies' in the world and that we must defeat them, Obama's rhetoric remains resolutely inclusive: 'we must . . . build coalitions that cut across lines of religion and race and religion. America's moral example must always shine for all who yearn for freedom, justice, and dignity.'⁶⁸ America is exceptional because it is inclusive, but only if people work to make it so.

* * *

I conclude with a recent British play which reflects this ongoing obsession on both sides of the Atlantic with being, in some sense, 'Israel'. Jez Butterworth's *Jerusalem* – a critical hit in London and on Broadway – opened in London in 2009, moved to Broadway from April to August 2011 and returned to London for its final run, October 2011 to 14 January 2012. *The Guardian* named it 'one of the best dramas of the 21st century'.⁶⁹ In the performances, the Tony-winning actor Mark Rylance played Johnny 'Rooster' Byron, a defiant middle-aged outcast who lives in an old Airstream mobile home in the woods on the edge of a fictional Wiltshire village where he enjoys and dispenses drugs and alcohol, profanity and sex, attracting a loyal small band of followers (including under-age girls). The play takes place on St George's Day (23 April, also Shakespeare's birthday). Rooster has been served an eviction notice – a modern bourgeois estate is to be built on his land. He is the lone hold-out and has posted on his mobile home ('Waterloo') a sign that reads, 'Fuck the New Estate'. The play is riddled with irreverence but begins and ends with the hymn 'Jerusalem' (hence the play's title) sung by a winged girl alone on stage. The words come from William Blake's poem 'And did those feet in ancient time', which was set to music by Sir Hubert Parry in 1916, as inspiration to the soldiers in the First World War. For some time 'Jerusalem' has been England's 'most popular patriotic song', an 'unofficial national anthem', an alternative to 'God save the Queen', sung on St George's Day in English cathedrals, churches and chapels, as well as on other occasions.

And did those feet in ancient time
 Walk upon England's mountains green,
 And was the holy lamb of God
 On England's pleasant pastures seen?
 And did the countenance divine
 Shine forth upon our clouded hills
 And was Jerusalem builded here?

The hymn ends with the resolve to not cease fighting 'Til we have built Jerusalem/in England's green and pleasant land'. For Blake the industrial revolution was ruining England. In the twenty-first-century play, the enemy is the march of time and the modern world, which is destroying an older, natural, wild, irreverent England, embodied in the outrageous, manic Rooster Byron, whose last name itself connects him with England's literary past, which seems everywhere present in this modern quasi-Shakespearean play, where Rooster is at once king and fool, Falstaff and mad Lear.

Jerusalem has a contemporary edge that disturbed the British theatre critic for *The Daily Telegraph*, Dominic Cavendish, who found it a 'disquieting' play about 'our national identity'.⁷⁰ In New York, Jez Butterworth brushed off the charge of being politically reactionary: 'I have absolutely no idea what the State of The Nation might be. I live on a [pig] farm in the middle of nowhere... I was really trying to write something about the passing of time.' In a later interview he explained, 'I started off trying to write something about England, and I ended up writing something about myself, and a sense of loss, of my own attitude towards change.'⁷¹

In *Jerusalem* we witness the clash between the sterility of modern civilisation and the vitality of the past, of nature, but there is a strangely religious feeling. For Rooster is not just a natural force, mouthing profanities. He is a spiritual leader for his followers, and the hymn sung at the end, after Rooster and his world have been destroyed and the curtain has fallen, is at once a funeral hymn for Rooster and all he represents and a call for action to rebuild the green Jerusalem. Religion gets a subversive twist in this raucous play. Still, it is hard to think of a better example of how biblical narratives and the idea of a chosen nation, however secularised, remain alive and powerful in British and American culture.

Notes

1. See Achsah Guibbory, *Christian Identity, Jews, and Israel in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
2. *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, ed. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, vol. 2 (London: Stationery Office, 1911), pp. 18–20, 197–200, 393–96, 387–89.
3. George Wither, *Respublica Anglicana* (1650), pp. 1–2.
4. See David Katz, 'Menasseh Ben Israel's Christian Connection: Henry Jessey and the Jews', in ed. Yosef Kaplan, Henry Mechoulan and Richard H. Popkin, *Menasseh ben Israel and his World* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1989), pp. 117–38.

5. Henry Jessey, *A Narrative of the Late Proceeds at White-Hall, Concerning the Jews* (1656), p. 2.
6. Lucien Wolf, *Menasseh Ben Israel's Mission to Oliver Cromwell* (London: Macmillan, 1901), p. xliii.
7. 'The substance of the late Proposals', in Jessey, p. 12.
8. Menasseh Ben Israel, *To His Highnesse the Lord Protector of the Common-wealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland. The Humble Addresses* (1655), sig. A2v.
9. William Hughes, *Anglo-Judaicus, or the History of the Jews, Whilst here in England* (1656), p. 5; William Prynne, *A Short Demurrer to the Jewes* (1655), pp. 2, 4.
10. Hughes, pp. 7, 14, 7.
11. Prynne, sig. A2r, sig. B2r.
12. Prynne, p. 7; Hughes, pp. 8–9.
13. Hughes, p. 35, sig. B2r, pp. 27, 47.
14. Menasseh, sig. A2v–A3r.
15. Hughes, pp. 31, 21.
16. See John Coffey, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England 1558–1689* (London: Longman, 2000), on different kinds of toleration.
17. Rosemary Moore, *The Light in their Consciences: Early Quakers in Britain 1646–1666* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), p. 34.
18. See http://cdn.yougov/cumulus_uploads/document/sl6avzlerp/Religion.pdf
19. See, for example, Francis Howgill, *A Woe Against the Magistrates, Priests and People of Kendall* (1654); William Dewsbury, *A True Prophecy of the Mighty Day of the Lord, Which Is Coming and is Appeared in the North of England, and is Arising Toward the South* (1654), pp. 10–11; Edward Burrough, *Truth Defended* (8 August 1654), pp. 6–7; Anne Audland, *A True Declaration of the Suffering of the Innocent, Who is Hated and Persecuted Without a Cause* (3 March 1655); Richard Farnsworth, *The Brazen Serpent Lifted up on High* (1655).
20. William Dewsbury, *The Mighty Day of the Lord is Coming* (1656), p. 1.
21. Anthony Pearson, *To the Parliament of the Common-Wealth of England* (1653), p. 1.
22. Francis Howgill, *This is Onely to Goe amongs Friends* (1655).
23. Burrough, *Truth Defended* (1654), p. 3.
24. Burrough, *To the Camp of the Lord in England* (1656), pp. 15, 16, 19, 20.
25. Pearson, title page, and pp. 3–5.
26. *The Persecution of them People they call Quakers* (1655).
27. *The Saints Testimony Finishing thru Sufferings* (1655), pp. 4, 8; Audland, pp. 1, 6.
28. Humphrey Smith, *Something Further Laid Open of the Cruel Persecution of the People called Quakers* (16 January 1656), p. 6.
29. George Whitehead, *The Path of the Just Cleared; and Cruelty and Tyranny Laid Open* (1655), pp. 4–5, 14–19.
30. Burrough, *To the Camp*, p. 16.
31. Dewsbury, *A True Prophecy*, p. 8; Thomas Speed, *Christ Imocency Pleaded: Against the Cry of the Chief Priests* (1656?), sig. A3v.
32. Burrough, *To the Camp*, p. 21.
33. *This was the Word of the Lord which John Camm, and Francis Howgill was Moved to Declare and Write to Oliver Cromwell, Who is Named Lord-Protector* (18 April 1654), A2r, A2v, A4r–4v.

34. *By His Highness: A Proclamation Prohibiting the Disturbing of Ministers and other Christians in their Assemblies and Meetings* (1655). Quakers were commonly linked with the Ranters, as in *The Quakers Fiery Beacon, Or, the Shaking-Ranters Ghost* (1655), but Quakers such as George Fox insisted on their difference from Ranters, with their carnal ways.
35. Smith, p. 2.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
37. See, for example, Margaret Fell, *For Manasseh Ben Israel. The Call of the Jewes out of Babylon* (1656), and George Fox, *A Visitation to the Jewes* (1656).
38. Burrough, *Truth Defended*, pp. 18, 9.
39. [Priscilla Cotton and Mary Cole], *To the Priests and People of England We Discharge Our Consciences and Give Them Warning* (16 October 1655), p. 1. Cf. George Fox's *The Trumpet of the Lord Sounded* (1654) and *A Warning to the World* (1655). Francis Howgill, *The Inheritance of Jacob Discovered. After his Return out of Egypt* (1656).
40. See, for example, Richard Baxter, *The Quakers Catechism, or the Quakers Questioned* (1655), p. 26.
41. Margaret Fell, *A True Testimony from the People of God* (1660), sig. A1v, A2r.
42. J. N., *An Answer to Twenty-Eight Queries sent out by Francis Harris to those People He Calls Quakers* (1 Oct 1655), argues that Quakers do not 'throw' Scriptures 'aside' but read them by the spirit, and claims that every one is born with the pure spiritual light of God within (pp. 9, 11).
43. Ralph Farmer, *The Great Mysteries of Godliness, and Ungodliness* (1655), sig. A4r.
44. Farmer, *Great Mysteries*, sig. A3r, A4r. Farmer, *Mysterie. Babylon the Great*, separate title page within *Great Mysteries*, pp. 27, 30.
45. Baxter, pp. 2, 3, 11, 30.
46. *The Perfect Pharisee* (1654), pp. 32–33.
47. John Toldervy, *The Foot out of the Snare* (1656), p. 45.
48. *Pharisee*, pp. 32–33, 48–49.
49. Kate Peters, *Print Culture and the Early Quakers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 21.
50. Moore, pp. 241, 33.
51. Jessey, p. 8.
52. Thomas Collier, *A Brief Answer* (1656), sig. A2v, pp. 2, 14.
53. W. Tomlinson, *A Bosome Opened to the Jewes* (1656).
54. Carlisle, James Hay, earl of, *Collonel Hays Speech to the Parliament upon the Debate Concerning Toleration* (20 February 1655), pp. 14, 19.
55. *The Quakers Fiery Beacon*, p. 5.
56. Prynne, sig. B2v.
57. Prynne, pp. 17, 23, for example.
58. Prynne, sig. A3v; Hughes, sig. A2v, pp. 49–50.
59. Jessey, p. 2. John Dury, *A Case of Conscience* (1656), p. 3.
60. Dury, pp. 4, 5, 8, 4, 7, 9.
61. John Winthrop, 'A Modell of Christian Charity', in *God's New Israel: Religious Interpretations of American Destiny*, ed. Conrad Cherry, rev. and updated edition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 40.

62. On America's redemptive mission, see Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
63. See <http://www.nps.gov/stli/faqs.htm/> accessed 7/15/2012.
64. <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=36&page=transcript/> accessed 14 August 2012.
65. <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/OYhUZE2Qo0-ogdV7ok900A.aspx> accessed 14 August 2012.
66. See, transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1101/26/ps.01.html, and <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/28/AR2011012805190.html>, both accessed 29 July 2012.
67. See <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schelsinger/2011/01/31/>. Accessed 15 June 2012. See also, John A. Gans Jr, 'American Exceptionalism and the Politics of Foreign Policy', *The Atlantic*, 21 November 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/american-exceptionalism-and-the-politics-of-foreign-policy/248779>. Accessed 15 June 2012.
68. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20029565-503544.html accessed 14 August 2012.
69. <http://www.royalcourttheatre.com/whats-on/jerusalem-west-end> accessed 14 August 2012.
70. Dominic Cavendish, 'Jerusalem: why no fuss about this radical play?' 23 February 2010, in *The Telegraph*; <http://telegraph.co.uk/culture/theatre/726587Jerusalem-why-no-fuss-about-this-radical-play.html> (accessed 15 July 2011).
71. See <http://www.JerusalemBroadway.com/about/> accessed 7/15/2011; these comments or the interview with Butterworth in NYC no longer appear on this website, as of 16 June 2012. Cf. Butterworth's interview 2 November 2011 with Sarfraz Manzoor for *The Guardian*: www.guardian.co.uk/stage/video/2011/nov/02/jez-butterworth-jerusalem-video-interview.

8

Present at the Creation: Diaspora, Hybridity and the Place of Jews in the History of English Toleration

Jacob Selwood

Over the last decade voices on both sides of the Atlantic have attempted to write the obituary of multiculturalism. In newspaper opinion pieces, published books and political speeches calls have issued from both right and left to rethink attitudes towards religious and cultural diversity. In Britain, as in the US, this debate has served as an intersection for a variety of volatile issues, ranging from immigration and the relationship between church and state to concerns about Islamic radicalism and the nature of national identity. The combination of a tepid allegiance to national symbols and the ongoing celebration of immigrant linguistic, religious or cultural traditions has, according to many commentators, been a corrosive one, resulting in a dangerous weakening of social cohesion, if not the outright fostering of extremism. This is a narrative based in both tragedy and irony. An indigenous tradition of religious toleration is taken to be a central part of what it means to be British, yet that tradition is seen to have resulted in an undue acceptance of groups who do not share the core British value of tolerance. For some, the only way to defend diversity has been to expose its limits. As Tony Blair stated in a now famous 2006 speech, '[o]ur tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don't come here.'¹

The tradition of toleration taken to be under assault has its roots in the seventeenth century. For scholars its trajectory is now a complex one, less a result of the steady expansion of rights and liberties than the product of contingent and qualified strategies that suffered many twists, turns and reversals. Yet even with the rejection of Whiggish teleologies, religious toleration is often regarded as having emerged from a Christian context, beginning as a strategy to contain strife between

Anglicans, Catholics and Protestant Dissenters. By virtue of their tiny numbers during the early modern period, English Jews, Muslims or other non-Christian minorities have played at best a small supporting role in the historiography. Thus, if toleration is what makes Britain Britain, it is taken to have begun largely as a Christian affair, expanding only later to embrace the wider religious, ethnic and cultural difference of other groups. Those groups came late to the party and, by implication, must obey the rules set by their hosts.

Yet early modern English strategies of toleration developed not only in response to Christian denominational pluralism but through engagement with non-Christians, of whom Jews are a prime example. More than just a species of Restoration Dissenter, Socinians with peculiar dietary laws, Jews forced the English to engage not just with Jewish theology but with Jewish difference, and with forms of identity that defied simple categories. To be Jewish in an early modern context meant not just to practise Judaism but to be identified, variously, as Spanish and Portuguese, Catholic and alien, merchant and Marrano. And the nation's burgeoning maritime empire meant that the English shaped their reactions to Jews not just in England itself but around the world. To factor Jews into the history of English religious toleration is to make that history about more than religion and to take it far beyond England's shores.

The resulting accommodations and responses include important precedents forged in a colonial context that drew not only on English ideas but also upon the circulation of policies and proposals throughout the wider Atlantic world. As this chapter will show, the English first fully emancipated Jews in Surinam in 1665, albeit fleetingly and for the most expedient of reasons, drawing upon earlier Dutch colonial examples that, in turn, were authored by Sephardic Jews in Europe. Antipathy, too, crossed borders and oceans, with both the crown at home and colonial governors overseas responding to anti-Jewish complaints that echoed between locations as far afield as Barbados and Tangier.

We may not be able to draw a clear line between such seventeenth-century examples and contemporary attitudes towards diversity. Yet tolerationist ideas emerged partly through engagement with mutable, diasporic identities, and with non-Christian groups who straddled both geographic and categorical boundaries. Issues of hybridity and diaspora are part of the early modern as well as the post-colonial world and helped to shape attitudes towards difference in the seventeenth century as now. In this sense, antecedents of modern multiculturalism were present at the creation of early modern toleration.

Jews in the history of religious toleration

Jews are marginal to the legislative history of English religious toleration. While Parliament passed laws restricting the activities of Roman Catholics and Protestant Dissenters, no religious laws directly targeted practitioners of Judaism. Yet although England's Jewish community was able to live openly after the readmission of the 1650s, the ability of its members to participate fully in the political and civil life of the realm was severely restricted by laws aimed at Christians. The 1661 Corporation Act demanded that civic governors receive Anglican communion, a stipulation extended to all office holders by the Test Acts of 1673 and 1678.² The Toleration Act of 1689 legalised Protestant Trinitarian Dissent, albeit with certain restrictions (Dissenters, for example, were to keep their doors unlocked during services). Yet the Test and Corporation Acts remained in effect, and nonconformists, Jews included, were barred from holding both municipal and national office or attending university.³ As David Katz has noted, Jews were 'victims of neglect' rather than overt persecution, remaining outside of the scope of the Toleration Act by virtue of their Unitarianism.⁴

While Jews born within the realm were, like others, legally English, foreign-born Jews were barred from naturalisation, which required Anglican communion.⁵ Until the second half of the seventeenth century naturalisation, attained by act of parliament, was largely limited to those born overseas of English parentage, most immigrants seeking the more limited rights granted by letters patent of denization. However, the decades after the Restoration saw both more immigrants receiving parliamentary naturalisation and growing calls for the collective naturalisation of various categories of alien.⁶ As naturalisation became available to larger numbers of aliens, Jewish immigrants faced a growing disability. Unlike those Christian strangers who were able to become full English subjects, foreign-born Jews who became denizens could not escape aliens' duties (unless their letters patent of denization included a special clause to that effect), inherit land or bequeath it to children born before parental denization.⁷ Attempts to rectify this famously faltered when the Jewish Naturalisation Bill, passed in 1753, was repealed during the same year following public outcry.⁸ Full Jewish emancipation came only in the nineteenth century. The Test and Corporation Acts were repealed in 1828, while naturalisation and a seat in parliament became possible without a Christian oath in 1845 and 1858 respectively.⁹

If Jews were largely the victims of legal restrictions aimed at others, they have also occupied a marginal place in the historiography of

religious toleration in England.¹⁰ That historiography has itself seen a loss of consensus in recent decades, with many historians seeing in early modern examples of toleration less an emancipatory trajectory as a set of contingent, largely temporary strategies designed to contain religious disorder. Those early moderns who advanced tolerationist principles tended to do so, as Alexandra Walsham has noted, in order 'to ensure survival and to facilitate restoration to exclusive rule rather than [as] an end in and of itself'.¹¹ At the same time, early modern Jewish history has also suffered the erosion of grand narratives, with the 1656 readmission of Jews to England losing its watershed status amidst recognition both of a Jewish presence in the realm earlier in the century and the legal ambiguities of the readmission itself.¹² That loss, however, is perhaps not such a bad thing. The prior emphasis on a singular, threshold year for the appearance of modern Anglo-Jewry did not come without cost. As James Shapiro has argued, to 'claim that a formal, legal Readmission took place in 1656 is... to assent to a set of unexamined assumptions about the legitimacy of the Expulsion, the absence of Jews before this date from England, and the nature of English toleration'.¹³ We can now jettison those assumptions and plot new interpretive paths.

New directions: Difference in a global context

Early modern Jewish history can suggest new directions for the wider history of religious toleration in England, reminding us that it is not just about religion but also about difference, whether confessional, cultural or ethnic. Jews spanned a variety of religious categories, just as to be Jewish in the early modern period, as now, implied far more than religion. Jewish identity was both hybrid and multiple, fluctuating between open Jewish practice, dissimulative crypto-Judaism and a New Christian faith that, while often sincere, retained Jewish familial ties. It also intersected with Spanish and Portuguese nationhood. A small group of Iberian *conversos* had resided in London in the first half of the sixteenth century, an offshoot of the community in Antwerp, although it largely dispersed following pressure by the Spanish government on the English crown to root out New Christians retaining ties to Judaism. By the end of Elizabeth's reign as many as 100 Portuguese of Jewish origin were present in the metropolis, to be expelled by the English crown in 1609 following denunciations of Judaising from within the community.¹⁴ The suspension of recusancy laws against Spanish subjects under Charles I saw the return of a population of Spanish crypto-Jews. It is this group that would openly embrace Judaism in the 1650s.¹⁵

For London's Sephardim, Spanish identity could prove far more problematic than status as a Jew. In 1656 Antonio Rodrigues Robles, part of a community of Iberian New Christians who traded between England and the Canary Islands, and a resident of the metropolis since 1648, found his goods seized following denunciation to the English authorities. Robles suffered persecution not as a Jew but as a Spanish subject during a time of war between England and Spain. Although regularly attending Mass at the Spanish ambassador's residence, Robles denied that he was either Spanish or Catholic, instead maintaining that he was Jewish in both nation and religion. The authorities called a number of witnesses, some of whom testified to Robles's Jewishness, others to the depth of his Catholicism. Ultimately, they were unable to resolve the ambiguities of his identity, releasing him on the grounds that he was not, in fact, an enemy Spaniard, yet unable to acknowledge that he was Jewish.¹⁶ Can the English authorities be said to have tolerated Robles's Jewishness, given that they did not see him as a Jew? Unlike his English interlocutors, we cannot discount his Jewish status, for in many respects he was an archetypal seventeenth-century Jew. In this case, and in the case of early modern Jews more generally, we must take into account both the multiple nature of Jewish identity itself and the degree to which the English conflated Jews with other groups.¹⁷

Factoring in Jews to the history of religious toleration also makes that history a global one. Jewish hybridity was in part a result of the far-flung nature of Sephardic settlement. And the English forged their responses towards Jews not only in London but around the world. As England's nascent empire grew, so too did contact with the scattered communities of the Jewish diaspora. At times, these encounters could seem perplexing. James Jenefer, the captain of the English vessel *Saudades*, struggled to capture the essence of Portuguese *converso* identity in his journal, writing that 'they are not Christians turned Jews, but rather Jews turned Christians, but still retaining their Jewish principles'. They had, however, 'engrossed the best part of the wealth of this kingdom, and by terror of the Inquisition, convey it away to the great impoverishment thereof'.¹⁸ Elsewhere, Jews lived openly. Established communities thrived from Livorno to Tangier, and in areas of the Caribbean beyond the reach of Spanish and Portuguese control. All of these groups – New Christians, Jews and crypto-Jews – remained tied by kinship and commerce. The English, in turn, both traded with and ruled over members of the Sephardic diaspora, in locations as varied as North Africa and South America.¹⁹

If the readmission now carries less weight as a watershed event, it remains important as part of a larger process that is only apparent when we step outside of Europe. As Jonathan Israel has noted, the resettlement of Jews in England ‘was primarily a Dutch and Dutch Brazilian initiative... undertaken in the interests of Sephardi Jewry generally’.²⁰ The loss of the Dutch colony in Recife to the Portuguese in 1654 led to the dispersion of its sizeable Jewish population throughout the Caribbean, including to English possessions such as Barbados. In the aftermath of the English Navigation Act in 1651, Jews in England’s Caribbean territories faced limitations on their trade with Amsterdam, with which they retained extensive religious and commercial ties.²¹ Menasseh Ben Israel sought to establish an open Jewish presence in the English metropolis with which the Dutch Sephardic diaspora in English overseas territories could trade. And at least one of his emissaries had intimate ties to the new world. Emanuel Martinez Dormido accompanied Ben Israel’s son on his 1654 mission to London. Dormido had settled both of his sons in Recife, petitioning Cromwell for aid in recovering lost assets after the Portuguese had seized the colony. He would also co-author a petition to Charles II that would lead, in 1664, to the first written statement of protection for England’s Jews, arguably of greater legal significance than the readmission itself.²²

Toleration in English Surinam

The following year Surinam became the first English territory to provide expansive, explicitly enumerated religious and civil rights for Jews. In scope this far eclipsed both Cromwell’s unofficial toleration and Charles II’s statement of protection. The 1665 ‘Grant of Privileges by the Governor, Council, and Assembly of Surinam, to the Jews’ offered not only freedom of worship but full status as English subjects for both present and future members of the community.²³ Charles’s declaration the year before had consisted only of an assurance that ‘he hath not given any particular order for the molesting or disquieting’ of his Jewish petitioners, together with a brief assertion that he would continue to extend his favour to England’s Jews ‘so long as they demean themselves peaceably and quietly with due obedience to his... laws and without scandal to his government’.²⁴ The Surinam grant, in comparison, offered recognition for the Jewish Sabbath, Jewish marriage rites and elements of Jewish law. Moreover, Surinamese Jews were now ‘considered as English-born’, expected to be ‘true subjects’ of the king.²⁵ Jewish immigrants to England, meanwhile, would lack a legal path to

full subjecthood until 1845 (aside from a brief interlude in 1753), a right that those settling in England's other American colonies would receive earlier, although not until 1740.²⁶

The grant was designed to shore up a faltering colony. While stating the desirability of attracting colonists 'of whatsoever country and religion', it was issued by the colonial governors to retain existing Jewish settlers while encouraging others to move to the colony from neighbouring Dutch territories.²⁷ Surinam was in English hands from 1650 until 1667, and its Jewish population was at all times relatively small.²⁸ Around 100 Jews had settled in the territory by the mid-1660s, fleeing Cayenne after its capture by the French. The community grew following the arrival of Jews from the Netherlands and Livorno who had initially sought settlement in Dutch Caribbean and South American colonies.²⁹ The colony was, however, in a tenuous state. Settlers complained both of disease and of insecurity of tenure, prompting the colonists to secure from proprietor Lord Willoughby 'a satisfactory declaration which stopped many then upon the wing ready to depart the colony to some place where they might not be tenants at will'.³⁰

The grant aimed to provide as conducive an environment as possible for Surinam's Jews. It began by affirming that the existing Jewish population had 'proved themselves useful and beneficial to the colony'. As an incentive to remain it declared that '[e]very person belonging to the Hebrew nation', whether an existing settler or a future resident, 'shall be considered as English-born'. With security in both real and personal property for themselves and their heirs, Jews were to 'have full liberty to plant, trade, and do whatsoever they may consider conducive to their advantage, and profit', on condition only that 'they shall be true subjects of our Sovereign Lord the King of England'. Along with status as English subjects, the authorities also exempted Jews from serving in 'any public office in this colony', a right presumably not enjoyed by other settlers. During peacetime they were also exempt from 'personal duty', permitted instead 'to send a substitute', although in time of war the authorities required that Jews perform military service.³¹

Enjoying the status of English subjects, Jews were also permitted to exercise their religion freely. The grant made it clear 'in the most ample manner possible' that members of 'the Hebrew nation' were free 'to practise and perform all ceremonies and customs... according to their usages'. It stipulated that Jewish wills were to be honoured, and that Jewish marriage rites would 'be held valid in every respect'. Those preventing Jews from 'the observance of their sabbath or festivals' were 'to be considered disturbers of the public peace' and were 'to be punished

accordingly'. Jews also received exemption from court appearance or other legal business, including the payment of claims, during holidays or the Sabbath. They were allowed to maintain 'a tribunal of their own', where the 'deputies of their nation may pronounce sentences in all cases not exceeding the value of ten thousand pounds of sugar'. Oaths were to 'be administered in conformity with the customs of the Hebrew nation'. The authorities also granted the Jewish community ten acres of land for a synagogue, school and burial ground. All this at a time when, in England, toleration consisted of a barebones statement of royal protection.

The 1665 grant demonstrates the complex circulation of tolerationist ideas both within Europe and between Europe and the New World. In 1657 Brazilian Sephardic Jewish exiles residing in Middelburg had presented the Dutch West India Company with a proposal, written in Portuguese, that would form the basis for the rules governing a Jewish settlement in the Dutch colony of Essequibo (in modern-day Guyana).³² The following year Charles Longland, the English agent in Livorno, sent an English translation of this Jewish-authored text to Secretary of State John Thurloe.³³ In a previous letter to Thurloe, Longland had noted the possible utility of Sephardic Jews to English interests, writing that 'Spanish is become now the Jews' mother-tongue... in which respect they will be very useful to the Dutch in their plantation... If our planters at Surinam took the same course it would be much to their advantage.'³⁴ And take it they did. When, in 1665, the colony's governors sought to retain the Jewish population and attract further Jewish settlement from neighbouring Dutch territory, they did so by offering privileges as extensive as those that the Dutch had granted.³⁵ The Dutch polices had been based on proposals drafted by Middelburg's Jews, in the possession of the English as early as 1658. In this sense, examples of English toleration emerged not only in response to the presence of Jews but also by drawing, indirectly at least, upon ideas authored by Jews themselves.

The rights offered by the English to Jews in Surinam constitute an important colonial precedent in the wider history of Anglo-Jewish toleration. Full English emancipation of Jews happened first in Surinam. While this fact has gone largely unnoticed by recent historians, it was acknowledged by Lucien Wolf as early as 1897, when he argued that 'the honor of first practicing Jewish emancipation belongs to British America'.³⁶ Wolf based this statement on the erroneous conclusion that Longland's translation (the so-called Egerton Manuscript) was, in fact, an original set of 'privileges... granted by the Commonwealth to the Brazilian Jews who settled in Surinam in 1654'.³⁷ Jews, he asserted, first

received explicit rights from the English in Surinam two years before their readmission to England, 'the first attempt at complete emancipation known to Anglo-Jewish history'.³⁸ Wolf was wrong about his source: the English did not extend toleration to Jews in Surinam as early as 1654. A decade later Samuel Oppenheim argued plausibly that the document was, in fact, a translation of the rights offered by the Dutch to Jews in Essequibo, which he dated to 1658. And in 1973 Robert Cohen demonstrated that these were, in turn, originally drafted in Portuguese by Jewish exiles from Dutch Brazil late in the previous year.³⁹ Yet while Wolf's suggestion proved chronologically incorrect, he was right about the precedent set by English toleration in Surinam. As he himself noted, 'the Surinam privileges of 1665 were quite as sweeping as those' offered, he thought, in 1654, but really written in 1657 by Jews in Middelburg.⁴⁰ They were also far more expansive than either the unofficial Cromwellian readmission or Charles II's 1664 statement of protection.

Subjecthood and nationality after the loss of English Surinam

The history of English Surinam is an ephemeral one, lasting no more than 17 years. Yet the English privileges lived on. After the territory was lost to the Netherlands in 1667, the new colonial authorities shaped their policies towards the Jewish community by in part drawing upon the English grant.⁴¹ And the English continued to regard Surinam's Jews as English subjects. In June 1675 an English delegation arrived in the colony charged with securing the removal of those of the king's subjects who had remained behind following the colony's loss but who now wished to depart.⁴² Upon their arrival, the royal commissioners addressed the colonists as 'His Majesty's subjects in Surinam as well the Hebrew nation as English'.⁴³ Their efforts at evacuation would include the colony's Jews.

The English drew upon the composite nature of British monarchy to argue that the Jews, while members of a distinct nation, were full subjects of England's king. This was soundly rejected by Surinam's governor, who equated subjecthood with nationality. During a meeting with the English delegation he produced a Dutch copy of the 1667 treaty of surrender. While conceding that the document authorised the removal of the English on the king's ships, he argued that Jews were not to be considered English, and thus were not subject to evacuation. The English commissioners, in turn, responded by rejecting both the Dutch text and

the governor's conception of the relationship between nationality and subjecthood. Stating that they refused 'to be governed by Dutch translation', they produced 'the original in Latin', which 'made mention of the word subject... which the Jews were to his Majesty before the Articles of Surrender'. And if the word 'subject' 'be not allowed to be a general word of comprehension the Scotch and Irish may be detained as reasonably as the Jews'. Jews, in other words, might be members of the Hebrew nation, but they, like the Scots and Irish, were also subjects of Charles II, with the resulting right to removal from the colony.⁴⁴

The Dutch governor ultimately prevailed, refusing to allow the colony's Jews to depart with the English delegation. Yet the English held fast to the notion that Surinam's Jews were subjects of the English king. When the governor suggested that the commissioners sign an 'instrument' emphasising those matters upon which the two sides had managed to reach agreement, the English refused. According to commissioner Edward Cranfield, 'we thought it not reasonable to sign any stipulations, the Jews being, by the capitulation of surrender, in the same condition as his Majesty's natural born subjects'.⁴⁵ Almost all of those Jews were, in the end, left behind. When the delegation's three ships set sail on 9 August 1675, its human cargo consisted of 250 English subjects ('all whites') and 981 slaves.⁴⁶ There were no more than two Jews on board.⁴⁷

Those Jews who had wished to leave with the English mission appear to have been small in number, probably around ten families out of a Jewish population of no more than 250.⁴⁸ Along with a tally of passengers transported from the colony, Cranfield included a list of 'such persons of the Hebrew nation' wishing to leave for Jamaica but prevented from doing so by the Dutch, and who requested another opportunity to depart. This was signed by ten people, including Aron da Silva, the colony's largest Jewish slave-owner.⁴⁹ The following year da Silva and another of the signatories, Isaac Perera, petitioned the Privy Council on behalf of themselves and ten others, complaining that the Dutch continued to prevent them from departing with their property. While the council backed their transfer to Jamaica, there is no evidence that they ever succeeded in leaving.⁵⁰

The Jewish community remained in Surinam, thriving into the next century and beyond.⁵¹ In 1788 David Nassy, one of its members, co-authored a history of the territory. His *Essai Historique sur la Colonie de Surinam* included the full text of the 1665 English 'Grant of Privileges', now the earliest surviving copy of English Surinam's experiment in religious toleration.⁵² That experiment, like the readmission of Jews

to England itself, was the product of forces operating on both sides of the Atlantic, a result not only of exchanges between Jews and Christians but also of competition between Europe's maritime empires.

The wider Caribbean context

The English evacuees from Surinam arrived in Jamaica early in September 1675.⁵³ There the crown also pursued broadly tolerationist policies. In doing so, agents of royal power tended to support Jewish settlers in the face of hostility from Christian colonists.⁵⁴ In 1670 Lord Arlington, the secretary of state, had ordered the colony's new lieutenant-governor, Thomas Lynch, to 'give all possible encouragement to persons of different opinions in religion'. He should 'suffer no man to be molested, in the exercise of his religion, so he be content with a quiet and peaceable enjoying of it'. Arlington also instructed Lynch to 'dispense with the oaths of supremacy and allegiance, except to members and officers of the Council, finding some other way of securing allegiance'.⁵⁵ Lynch, in turn, would be generally sympathetic to the island's Jewish population. In December 1671 he had noted that 'his Majesty cannot have more profitable subjects than they and the Hollanders, for they have great stocks and correspondence; are not numerous enough to supplant us, nor is it to their interest to betray us'. He did, however, leave open the possibility that 'they may come to connive at some little underhand trade'.⁵⁶

Some of Jamaica's merchants, however, objected to the colony's Jewish population. These complaints, when passed on to the royal authorities, received short shrift. In June 1672 a group of Port Royal merchants petitioned Lynch, complaining of 'the infinite number of Jews which daily resort to this island and trade amongst us, contrary to all law and policy'. In fact, only 17 of the town's 507 householders were Jewish by 1680. Yet according to the petitioners, Jews represented a serious economic threat. Despite the fact that parliament forbade aliens from selling by retail, Jews in Port Royal had formed 'a kind of company, and trade with a joint stock', buying up not only 'the choicest and best goods' but often 'whole cargoes... which they can better bear because of their own penurious way of living'. In this manner, Jews 'gain excessively', taking 'the whole measure to the trade themselves', to the ruin of English merchants.⁵⁷ The crown, however, seems to have brushed off such petitions. A month later members of the Council of Foreign Plantations wrote to the king regarding 'several letters, petitions and complaints' in the American plantations. In doing so they

recommended that 'in relation to Jamaica... due encouragement... be given to the Jews, the Dutch and other nations to settle and inhabit there'.⁵⁸

Anti-Jewish complaints in the English Caribbean, like tolerationist ideas, drew upon wider currents. The content of the Port Royal petition, and others like it, made similar charges as those levelled in London during the same period, which alleged that Jews conspired together to eat up England's trade and evade legal restrictions.⁵⁹ Lynch's petitioners, in levelling charges against Jamaica's Jewish population, appealed to the lieutenant-governor's experience travelling in Europe, suggesting that having visited 'the most considerable trading cities and places' on the Continent he 'cannot but be sensible to these truths' and to 'how this sort of people do engross to themselves the whole trade where they are'.⁶⁰ And one Barbadian anti-Jewish complaint called attention to the precedents established by colonial policies in distant English territories. In June 1681 'certain inhabitants', in petitioning the colony's assembly, complained of the 'barbarous inhumanity and subtle conspiracy of the Jewish nation in general against all Christendom but more especially against our native country of England'. In doing so they pointed out that such Jewish perfidy had 'began to be regulated by the king's governor of Tangier by removing that nation from residing there'.⁶¹ When the English moved against the Jewish community of a distant North African colony, some in Barbados took notice.

While all Jews in Surinam had been granted full English subjecthood, in Jamaica and Barbados, as elsewhere, most Jewish settlers were only able to attain the more limited status of denizen. There are, however, indications that some Jews did become subjects. In 1671 the Jamaican lieutenant-governor, Thomas Lynch, writing to Secretary Arlington regarding an anti-Jewish petition, mused that 'I suppose [the decision] will not be to expel them, for there [are] but 16 without patents [of denization] and they say they belong to [those] that are naturalized'.⁶²

This was, presumably, a result of a suspension of the Christian oath normally required by colonial naturalisation prior to the 1740 Plantation Act, echoing inconsistencies found in other colonies.⁶³ Yet even if some Jewish settlers to Jamaica were able to become naturalised, their status remained questionable beyond the island's shores. Until the end of the seventeenth century agents of the crown often denied that colonial naturalisation carried force outside of the granting colony, a fact that makes the attempt to evacuate Surinam's Jews on the grounds that they were English subjects all the more remarkable.⁶⁴

Even the English subjecthood of Jews native to the colonies remained open to question. In May 1699 the attorney-general received an enquiry about one Abraham Mendes, 'born of Jewish parents' in Barbados and trading as a merchant in London. The query asked whether Mendes was 'to be esteemed an alien in point of custom and other duties, or one of His Majesty's English born subjects?' The attorney-general, Thomas Trevor, affirmed that he was indeed English, writing that 'he is to be taken as one of his Majesty's natural born subjects being born within the King's dominions'. His co-respondent, Samuel Dodd, agreed, arguing that a person born in the American plantations 'is not an alien nor chargeable to pay alien's duties but is as free as if he had been born in England'.⁶⁵ Yet someone had thought it necessary to ask.

Conclusion

Both tolerance and intolerance make Britain Britain, and both have roots in the early modern world. They emerged not only in response to conflict between Christians, but as a result of encounters with the seventeenth-century antecedents of the modern multiculturalism that prime ministers and editorial writers now denounce. Contact with the early modern Jewish diaspora forced the English to respond to non-Christian difference, both within England itself and around the world. Those responses include examples of toleration that demonstrate the ability to encompass that difference without regarding it as a threat.

The privileges granted by the English to Jews in Surinam stand as the early modern high-water mark of Anglo-Jewish toleration. Allegiance to a composite crown ruling the multiple nations of the British Isles proved flexible enough to allow the English to declare that Jews in the colony were full English subjects, while recognising them as members of a distinct Hebrew nation with its own rights and privileges. While the status of Jews was contested in other English territories, and limited within England itself, those in Surinam, at least, briefly gained rights not enjoyed by Jews in England until the nineteenth century. Those rights, in turn, drew upon ideas, policies and proposals circulating not just within England but throughout Europe and the wider Atlantic world, including some of Jewish authorship.

When such examples of toleration occurred, they were largely the product of pragmatism rather than idealism. The English implemented expansive policies towards Jews in Surinam to save a haemorrhaging slave colony, in doing so reaping the benefits of hosting a loyal Spanish-speaking population. And while the crown and central government

tended to deny the demands sought by anti-Jewish petitioners in London, Jamaica or Barbados, that munificence was equally expedient, with its own limits and blind spots. The royal treasury happily accepted the higher taxes to which Jews were subject, either in the form of specifically anti-Jewish levies in the colonies or because Jewish immigrants to England, denied full naturalisation, usually paid the higher rate of customs accorded to aliens.⁶⁶

It would be as misguided to celebrate early modern toleration for its global roots as it would be to laud it as the product of a peculiarly British tradition. While tolerationist policies emerged in response to the heterogeneity of empire, that heterogeneity was simply a fact. Where the English embraced it, they did so for practical reasons, to bolster colonies or to compete with other imperial powers. Britain's current diversity is also a fact, neither a recent development nor something that is going away. And British people of all backgrounds frame their reactions to that diversity for equally pragmatic reasons. There are many grounds to celebrate, rather than reject, the heterogeneity of our own times. We can take our cue from at least some of our early modern forebears by recognising the advantages that such a society confers.

Notes

1. Tony Blair, 'Speech on Multiculturalism and Integration', 8 December 2006, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10563> (accessed 14 February 2011). Prime Minister David Cameron echoed these sentiments in a speech on 5 February 2011. See David Cameron, 'Speech at Munich Security Conference', 5 February 2011, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293> (accessed 14 February 2011). For recent works critical of multiculturalism see, for example, David Goodhart, 'Too Diverse?' in *Prospect*, 20 February 2004, <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2004/02/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigration-globalisation/> (accessed 14 February 2011); Christopher Caldwell, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West* (New York: Doubleday, 2009). Eliane Glaser has discussed some of the implications of Blair's speech in 'Be Tolerant or Else', in *New Humanist* 122.3 (2007), <http://newhumanist.org.uk/1452> (accessed 11 April 2011). When quoting from early modern sources, I have modernised all spelling, capitalisation and punctuation and have extended all abbreviations. Dates are in Old Style, with the exception that the year is taken to have begun on 1 January. When a date from an original source is within quotation marks, however, I have not altered the beginning of the year. I am grateful to Nick Wilding, David Sehat, Ann Claycombe and the participants in the Georgia State University history department's brown bag workshop for providing feedback on drafts of this chapter. I would also like to thank Jonathan Israel

and Natalie Zemon Davis for answering queries about the English toleration of Jews in Surinam.

2. John Coffey, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689* (Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 2000), p. 168; Alexandra Walsham, *Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 60.
3. Walsham, pp. 267–68; Henry Straus Quixano Henriques, *The Jews and the English Law* (London: J. Jacobs, 1908), p. 162; David S. Katz, ‘The Jews of England and 1688’, in Peter Grell, Jonathan Irvine Israel and Nicholas Tyacke, eds, *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 236.
4. Katz, ‘The Jews of England and 1688’, p. 249.
5. After Calvin’s Case of 1608 all people born within the English king’s territories were deemed English subjects. See Chapter 3 of Jacob Selwood, *Diversity and Difference in Early Modern London* (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010) and Jacob Selwood, ‘“English-Born Reputed Strangers”: Birth and Descent in Seventeenth-Century London’, in *Journal of British Studies* 44.4 (2005), 728–53. While letters patent of denization did not require communion, from 1609 naturalisation stipulated taking the sacrament. See J. M. Ross, ‘Naturalisation of Jews in England’, in *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* 24 (1975), 62.
6. See Selwood, *Diversity and Difference*, pp. 113, 118–24.
7. Naturalisation was available by act of parliament and made the recipient a full English subject. Denizens received their status by royal letters patent and remained aliens by birth. See Irene Scouloudi (ed.), *Returns of Strangers in the Metropolis 1593, 1627, 1635, 1639: A Study of an Active Minority*, Huguenot Society of London Quarto Series, vol. 57 (London: Huguenot Society, 1985), pp. 3–4; Ross, p. 60; Todd M. Endelman, *The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 74; Selwood, *Diversity and Difference*, pp. 48–50.
 While at least some letters patent of denization granted to Jews contained a clause stipulating payment at the same rate as the English-born, payment of aliens’ customs by denizens appears to be the norm. See Scouloudi, p. 29; Andrew Pettegree, *Foreign Protestant Communities in Sixteenth-Century London* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 15. For an example of a Jewish denizen paying English rates see the discussion of ‘Hayne’s case’ by David Katz in ‘The Jews of England and 1688’, pp. 218–20, and David S. Katz, *The Jews in the History of England, 1485–1850* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 146–49. The case is also discussed in Holly Snyder, ‘English Markets, Jewish Merchants, and Atlantic Endeavors: Jews and the Making of British Transatlantic Commercial Culture, 1650–1800’, in Richard L. Kagan and Philip D. Morgan, eds, *Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism, 1500–1800* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 55–56. While many scholars use the terms ‘naturalisation’ and ‘denization’ interchangeably (the list of ‘naturalised’ seventeenth-century Jews in Ross, p. 71 presumably mainly counts denizens), to do so obscures important differences in status.
8. Endelman, pp. 74–76; Justin Champion, ‘Toleration and Citizenship in Enlightenment England’, in Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, eds, *Toleration*

- in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 138. The Plantation Act of 1740 had allowed Jews who had lived in England's American colonies for seven years to become subjects 'without offending their religious beliefs'. Endelman, p. 75.
9. For the implications of the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts for Jews, see U. R. Q. Henriques, 'The Jewish Emancipation Controversy in Nineteenth-Century Britain', in *Past and Present* 40 (1968), 126–27. For changes in naturalisation, now to be bestowed directly by the home secretary, see Ross, p. 66. The ability of Jews finally to take seats in parliament is discussed in Endelman, pp. 102, 107.
 10. For example, Walsham's *Charitable Hatred* and John Coffey's *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England*, while mentioning Jews, remain largely focused on the Christian context. For Jews in the wider European context, see Heiko A. Oberman, 'The Travail of Tolerance: Containing Chaos in Early Modern Europe', in Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner, eds, *Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Chapter 11 of Benjamin J. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). For a discussion of early modern Christian attempts to ground tolerationist ideas in Jewish sources, see Chapter 4 of Eliane Glaser, *Judaism without Jews: Philosemitism and Christian Polemic in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke, England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
 11. Walsham, p. 3. See also Oberman; Andrew R. Murphy, *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). Murphy argues that seventeenth-century tolerationist ideas fail to underwrite 'the celebration of difference *per se*', merely seeking a 'way of negotiating differences without resort to bloodshed'. See Murphy, p. 15.
 12. For the events of the readmission, see David S. Katz, *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603–1655* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 190–244; Coffey, pp. 155–57; Jonathan I. Israel, *Diasporas within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews, and the World of Maritime Empires (1540–1740)* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2002), pp. 407–20. For criticism of the readmission's watershed status, see James Shapiro, *Shakespeare and the Jews* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 55–62; Eliane Glaser, 'Commemorating a Myth', in *History Today* 56.3 (2006), 45–47. A more detailed reassessment of the readmission can be found in Chapter 5 of Glaser, *Judaism without Jews*. As David S. Katz notes, the first '[C]onfirmation of the Status of the Jews in Writing' was issued in 1664, by Charles II. Katz, *Philo-Semitism*, p. 243. See National Archives (hereafter NA), London, SP 44/18, pp. 78–79, discussed in Selwood, *Diversity and Difference*, pp. 154–55.
 13. Shapiro, pp. 61–62.
 14. See Endelman, pp. 17–19; Nabil Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 3; E. R. Samuel, 'Portuguese Jews in Jacobean London', in *Jewish Historical Society of England – Transactions* 18 (1953–1955), 171–87; Shapiro, pp. 62–76.
 15. Endelman, p. 18; Katz, *Philo-Semitism*, pp. 2–3.

16. I have discussed the Robles case in more detail in *Diversity and Difference*, pp. 141–48, and 'Jewish Immigration, Anti-Semitism and the Diversity of Early Modern London', in *Jewish Culture and History* 10.1 (2008), 5–8. For Robles's initial petition and depositions before the Council of State, see NA, SP 18/126, fols 256r–267r. For the resulting examinations before the Admiralty Commissioners, to whom the case was referred, see NA, SP 18/127, fols 36r–36v. For their final report see NA, SP 18/127, fol. 64r. See also Edgar Samuel, 'Antonio Rodrigues Robles, c. 1620–1688', in *Jewish Historical Studies* 37 (2002), 113–15; *DNB* (s.v. 'Robles, Antonio Rodrigues'); Shapiro, p. 190; Katz, *Philo-Semitism*, pp. 236–37; Snyder, 'English Markets', pp. 50–52, 54.
17. Jonathan Gil Harris makes a similar point in *Sick Economies: Drama, Mercantilism, and Disease in Shakespeare's England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 71.
18. Historical Manuscripts Commission, 15th Report, appendix, part one, *The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth*, vol. 3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1896), pp. 23–24. Jenefer made this observation some time between October 1672 and June 1673.
19. These communities are discussed extensively in Israel's *Diasporas*. See also R. D. Barnett and W. M. Schwab, eds, *The Sephardi Heritage*, vol. 2, *The Western Sephardim* (Grendon, Northants: Gibraltar Books, 1989); Kagan and Morgan, eds, *Atlantic Diasporas*.
20. Israel, p. 407.
21. Israel, pp. 396, 403. The Jewish population of Recife peaked in the 1640s at around 1,450. Israel, p. 367.
22. For Ben Israel's aims and Dormido's background see Israel, pp. 407–11. Petitions by Dormido to Cromwell, for both Jewish readmission and the recovery of his goods, are printed in Lucien Wolf, 'American Elements in the Resettlement', in *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* 3 (1896–1898), 88–93. For the 1664 petition and Charles II's response, see NA, SP 44/18, pp. 78–79, discussed in Katz, *Philo-Semitism*, p. 243.
23. The grant is reproduced in Samuel Oppenheim, 'An Early Jewish Colony in Western Guiana', in *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society* 16 (1907), 179–80, and Wolf, pp. 94–95. The earliest surviving copy of the grant seems to be a version printed in David de Isaac Cohen Nassy's *Essai Historique sur la Colonie de Surinam* (Paramaribo, 1788), vol. 2, pp. 122–25 (in Dutch). For an English translation, see Jacob R. Marcus and Stanley F. Chyet, eds, *Historical Essay on the Colony of Surinam, 1788*, trans. Simon Cohen (Cincinnati: American Jewish Archives, 1974). The grant is reproduced in appendix 2, pp. 188–89.

According to James Williamson, 'There is no record of this grant in English archives, but a Dutch copy is preserved at Paramaribo'. See James A. Williamson, *English Colonies in Guiana and on the Amazon, 1604–1668* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 165, n. 4. As evidence for a surviving Dutch manuscript in Paramaribo, Williamson cites J. S. Roos, 'Additional Notes on the History of the Jews in Surinam', in *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 13 (1905), 130. Roos, rabbi of the Dutch congregation of Paramaribo, refers to an 'official Dutch translation (Col. Arch.)', without providing any further details. The small amount of later scholarship referring to the grant cites the version printed in Marcus and Chyet, eds, *Historical Essay*

on the *Colony of Surinam*, the translation of the 1788 *Essai Historique*. See, for example, Robert Cohen, *Jews in Another Environment: Surinam in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1991), p. 124; L. L. E. Rens, 'Analysis of Annals Relating to Early Jewish Settlement in Surinam', in Robert Cohen, ed., *The Jewish Nation in Surinam: Historical Essays* (Amsterdam: S. Emmering, 1982), p. 34. My own correspondence with the National Archives of Surinam suggests that no manuscript copy survives there, although one may be preserved in the archives of the Jewish community in Paramaribo, or in the National Archives of the Netherlands (further research is needed in this respect). I am grateful to both Jonathan Israel and Natalie Zemon Davis for their advice about the provenance of the grant.

24. NA, SP 44/18, p. 79.
25. 'Grant of Privileges', in Oppenheim, p. 179.
26. Endelman, pp. 74–76; Champion, p. 138; Ross, pp. 65–66. Colonial practice was, however, inconsistent, and there are examples of Jews being naturalised before 1740. See, for example, James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), p. 115.
27. Oppenheim, pp. 150–53. Oppenheim asserts that the grant was issued to retain existing Jewish sugar planters, who, though small in number, were vital to the colony. More recently, L. L. E. Rens has argued that most Jews did not settle in Surinam until 'the second half of 1665', arriving *after* authorities issued the grant as 'an invitation to Jews in general, and the Cayenne Jews in particular'. See Rens, p. 34.
28. Oppenheim, pp. 98, 156. See also Vincent T. Harlow, ed., *Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623–1667* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1925), p. 142. Williamson suggests that English settlement did not begin until 1651. See Williamson, p. 153.
29. Wim Klooster, 'The Jews in Suriname and Curacao', in Norman Fiering and Paolo Bernardini, eds, *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West, 1450–1800* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001), p. 350. Klooster cites Samuel Oppenheim's suggestion that Jews might have been present in Surinam by 1643 (Klooster, p. 364, n. 2). See Oppenheim, p. 97. See also Israel, pp. 401–03, 526. Lucien Wolf has suggested that some Jews settled in English Surinam following expulsion from Recife in 1654. See Wolf, p. 80.
30. 'Lieutenant General Byam's Journal of Guiana from 1665 to 1667', British Library, Sloane MSS 3662, fol. 27v. Also cited in Oppenheim, p. 150 (Oppenheim provides an incorrect folio number).
31. 'Grant of Privileges by the Governor, Council, and Assembly of Surinam, to the Jews', 17 August 1665, reproduced in Oppenheim, pp. 179–80.
32. Robert Cohen, 'The Egerton Manuscript', in *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 62.4 (1973), 339–40; Israel, p. 401.
33. Cohen, 'Egerton Manuscript', p. 340.
34. Quoted in Oppenheim, p. 107.
35. Oppenheim, pp. 112–13; 160–61. For Longland's translation of the Portuguese proposals see British Library, Egerton MS 2395, fol. 46. It is reproduced in Oppenheim, pp. 176–78, and Cohen, 'Egerton Manuscript', pp. 341–43.

36. Wolf, p. 86. L. L. E. Rens, writing in 1982, concurred with Wolf's much earlier assessment, writing that the Surinam grant 'is the first time in English history that full religious liberty and citizenship were granted to Jews'. See Rens, p. 34.
37. Wolf, p. 85.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
39. Oppenheim, p. 161; Cohen, 'Egerton Manuscript', p. 340.
40. Wolf, p. 86.
41. Oppenheim, pp. 112–13, 161; Rens, p. 36. The articles concluded between Governor William Byam and the Dutch Admiral Abraham Crynsens in March 1667 included liberty of conscience and a confirmation of the estates of existing English and Jewish colonists. The text is reproduced in Harlow, pp. 216–19. I am grateful to Natalie Zemon Davis for bringing this source to my attention.
42. This was the second of two missions to evacuate English subjects. The first, in 1671, evacuated 517 colonists, although no Jews appear to have been among them. See Rens, p. 38. For a narrative of both evacuation efforts and their aftermath see Rens, pp. 38–43. The Jewish population of Surinam in 1667 seems to have been around 200. See Rens, p. 36. Documents relating to the 1675 mission have been printed in J. H. Hollander, 'Documents Related to the Attempted Departure of the Jews from Surinam in 1675', in *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society* 6 (1897), 9–29. Manuscripts relating to the mission can be found in National Archives, CO 278/3. Hollander reproduces much of this material, though not all. Here I draw upon the manuscript sources.
43. NA, CO 278/3, p. 150. Printed in Hollander, pp. 23–24.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 151–52. Printed in Hollander, pp. 25–26.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 160. Printed in Hollander, p. 29.
46. This according to a report written on 30 May 1676 and presented to the Privy Council on 31 January 1677. See NA, CO 278/3, pp. 166–68 (the passenger figures appear on p. 167).
47. According to Rens, the two Jews on board were Isaac de la Parr, an overseer who departed with 30 slaves, and Gabriell de Solis, about whom nothing is known (Rens bases his assumption that he is Jewish on his name). As he notes, Cranfield's report refers to de la Parr as having been 'naturalized by Act of Parliament', a curious fact given the sacramental restrictions in place. See Rens pp. 40–41, and NA, CO 278/3, p. 153, printed in Hollander, p. 27.
48. Israel, p. 527.
49. Rens, p. 41. For de Silva's wealth, see Israel, pp. 526–27.
50. NA, PC 2/65, pp. 120, 128. The petitioners described themselves as 'his Majesty's subjects being made free denizens by letters patents under the Great Seal', an interesting assertion given that, if in Surinam in 1665, they would have been English subjects by virtue of the Grant of Privileges. NA, PC 2/65, p. 120. Rens convincingly argues that the petitioners and those they represented remained in Surinam. See Rens, pp. 41–43.
51. See Israel, pp. 527–28; Rens, p. 42; Wieke Vink, *Creole Jews: Negotiating Community in Colonial Suriname*, Caribbean Series 28 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010).

52. Nassy, vol. 2, pp. 122–25. See note 23 above. Rens credits Nassy with wildly overestimating the size of both Surinam's seventeenth-century Jewish population and the number of Jews who left for Jamaica after its loss to the English. See Rens, pp. 29, 42.
53. NA, CO 278/3, p. 164.
54. Jonathan Israel notes that in both Jamaica and Barbados opposition to Jews tended to come from merchants and clergy, while some planters sided with the crown and its governors. See Israel, p. 522.
55. *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies* (hereafter *CSP Colonial*), vol. 7 (1669–1674), p. 146 (31 Dec 1670, no. 367). See also Herbert Friedenwald, 'Material for the History of the Jews in the British West Indies', in *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society* 5 (1897), 50–51, and Jacob A. P. M. Andrade, *A Record of the Jews in Jamaica from the English Conquest to the Present Times* (Kingston, Jamaica: The Jamaica Times Ltd., 1941), p. 5. Andrade's wording incorrectly implies that the governor's instructions were in response to Lynch's 1672 forwarding of an anti-Jewish petition to Arlington.
56. NA, CO 1/27, no. 58, fol. 169v. See *CSP Colonial*, vol. 7 (1669–1674), p. 298 (17 Dec 1671, no. 697).
57. 'The Humble Petition of the Merchants of Port Royal', reproduced in Friedenwald, pp. 73–75. See also *CSP Colonial*, vol. 7 (1669–1674), pp. 366–67 (11 June 1672, no. 848). The wording of the version in *Calendar of State Papers* differs slightly from that reproduced in Friedenwald, pp. 73–75. Also discussed in Aubrey Newman, 'The Sephardim of the Caribbean', in *The Sephardi Heritage*, vol. 2,; in Israel, pp. 524–25; and in Holly Snyder, 'A Sense of Place: Jews, Identity, and Social Status in Colonial British America, 1654–1831' (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2000), pp. 167–68. Snyder's dissertation provides a comprehensive study of the status of Jews in Georgia, Rhode Island and Jamaica. For numbers on the colony's Jewish population, see Newman, pp. 451–52.
58. *Colonial Entry Book*, no. 94, p. 97, reproduced in Friedenwald, pp. 75–76.
59. See Chapter 4 of Selwood, *Diversity and Difference*, especially pp. 148–53, an article version of which appeared as Selwood, 'Jewish Immigration'.
60. 'The Humble Petition of the Merchants of Port Royal', reproduced in Friedenwald, pp. 73–75. See also *CSP Colonial*, vol. 7 (1669–1674), pp. 366–67 (11 June 1672, no. 848).
61. NA, CO 1/47, no. 6. See *CSP Colonial*, vol. 11 (1681–1685), p. 69 (9 June 1681, no. 134). Tangier's governor expelled the colony's Jews due to suspicions that they were allied with neighbouring Moors. This was despite instructions to foster Jewish settlement. See Israel, pp. 426, 436. For further complaints against Jews in Barbados see Israel, pp. 397–98 and 523–24.
62. NA, CO 1/27, no. 58, fol. 169v. See *CSP Colonial*, vol. 7 (1669–1674), p. 298 (17 Dec 1671, no. 697).
63. See Kettner, pp. 114–15. In England's colonies, governors usually issued patents of denization, while colonial assemblies passed bills of naturalisation, though occasionally these roles were reversed. See Kettner, pp. 83; 90–91.

64. Kettner, pp. 80; 74. See Kettner, p. 94 for an example of English authorities denying the portability of colonial naturalisation. For a more ambiguous example involving denization, see Kettner, p. 93.
65. British Library, Additional MS. 30218, *Revenue Opinions, 1673–1707*, fol. 235r. This is reproduced in Andrade, p. 4, although without a reference to the original source. Here I quote from the original manuscript.
66. For a 1693 attempt to levy special taxes on Jews in Jamaica, see Friedenwald, pp. 87–89. For a similar 1695 measure see Israel, p. 526. For a petition by Jamaican and Barbadian Jews from the same year complaining of higher taxes see *CSP Colonial*, vol. 14 (1693–1696), p. 521 (28 June 1695, no. 1921). See above for denizens paying aliens' customs.

9

Tolerating 'Mahomet': Or, Thinking about Then, Now

Matthew Dimmock

The moment at which I write seems a fairly propitious one to be reflecting on early modern ideas of toleration in relation to Islam, but also to be questioning what the study of early modern attitudes to Islam might mean for the present. The scholarly field of 'encounter' in this period, and specifically of the Christian–Islamic kind, has grown considerably in the last ten or 15 years, from the publication of Nabil Matar's *Islam and Britain* in 1998.¹ A rich seam of scholarship on different aspects of this topic now runs through early modern studies.² In one obvious sense, then, the field is well established, but in others – questions of methodology, in the extent and scale of a corpus of primary source material and the development of a coherent sense of the implications of this study for twenty-first-century culture and politics – remain indistinct and disputed.

Some of these uncertainties can be traced back to the circumstances in which scholarly concern with such matters emerged and flourished. A number of conjoined factors might be identified: the much vaunted 'turn to religion' in early modern studies that one leading proponent recently suggested had emerged out of the Rushdie 'Affair' that began in 1989; the recent recovery of the central position occupied by the Ottoman Empire in the Afro-Eurasian spheres of the early modern world (and beyond); the continuation of a New Historicist fascination with the recovery of 'Others' with its debt to Foucault and other post-war theorists (and, by extension, an earlier neglect of such matters). Finally, and most obviously – if also most problematically – there is the role played by 9/11 and the ensuing 'War on Terror'.³ It would be disingenuous to deny that such events have played a prominent part in the startlingly new prominence of Islam in the Western imagination – despite assertions from Salman Rushdie and others that this prominence

was anticipated or presaged by the furore surrounding *The Satanic Verses*. In commercial and funding terms, 9/11 and its aftermath are either directly or indirectly the major factor in generating research into contemporary interaction between what is often reductively characterised as a Christian West and an Islamic East.⁴ This is borne out by the way both academic and non-academic publishers alike tend to advertise such work as a ‘prehistory’ to current conflicts. Indeed, Maleiha Malik has explicitly commented on how academic research, ‘since 9/11, has had to quickly “catch up” with contemporary and popular interest in Muslims and Islam’.⁵

At the time of writing controversy rages once again: in this case surrounding a crude and inflammatory film (or, at least, an elongated trailer for a film that may or may not exist in a feature-length cut) that has come to be known as *The Innocence of Muslims*, written and produced by US-based Sam Bacile, an alleged pseudonym for an Egyptian Coptic Christian named Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, who is currently in hiding and charged with a series of crimes.⁶ Initially the film seems to have been shown in Los Angeles to a small audience and little comment, but its dubbing into Arabic and appearance on YouTube initiated a spiral of protests and violence that has resulted in a series of deaths around the world.⁷

More important for this chapter than the circumstances of its production or the nature of the opposition to the film is its content: out of a framing device dramatising the brutal persecution of Egyptian Copts by stereotypical Muslims is generated a polemical reconstruction of the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Many disparate voices have demanded the film be banned and removed from the Internet, and YouTube has restricted access from a number of countries involved in protest (although it is still freely available in the US, most of Europe and elsewhere). Through an analysis of early modern sources, and in response to recent critical scholarship in that field, I want to explore the tensions between the position of the Prophet Muhammad in contemporary Western culture and the legacies of earlier intolerance, an intolerance that created a caricatured Mahomet. I further hope to initiate a kind of dialogue between *The Innocence of Muslims* and this earlier archetype in order to think through the implications of their sameness and difference. Ultimately this dialogue will suggest that in such cases censorship is a blunt tool with unpredictable consequences, and that to ban a work so clearly opposed to tolerationist ideals, and to do so in the cause of toleration, plays into the hands of extremists of every stripe, and weakens rather than strengthens that cause.

In a series of poorly edited, poorly acted clips stitched together in order to create some sense of a narrative arc, we see the development of the central Prophet figure (apparently named George in the original version, before Muhammad was transparently over-dubbed) from a base-born servant of unknown parentage in erotic thrall to a wealthy woman, through a garbled, confused and probably Satanic revelation which they both exploit for their own gain. He becomes sexually rapacious and indiscriminate in his lust, a hypocritical, cruel and gratuitously violent figure prepared to manipulate his similarly brutal followers and his new religion (conspicuously plagiarised from Christianity and Judaism) in order to achieve sexual conquests, wealth and worldly power. He allows no argument or questioning of the Qur'an – explicitly his creation – which is shown to justify adultery, paedophilia, incest and murder.⁸

Aside from the debates triggered once again by the misrepresentation of Muhammad in the West (following Pastor Terry Jones's promise to put him on trial for 'crimes against humanity' of 2010–2011, Pope Benedict's ill-judged quotation of a fourteenth-century text that referred to the Prophet as a man of violence in 2006 and the *Jyllands-Posten* Danish cartoon controversy of 2005/2006) and their complex and often uncomfortable intertwining of religion with ideals of free speech, this film would seem little more than trash, better to ignore than to scrutinise.⁹ And yet, although I am not going to defend the abhorrent politics of the film and its makers, it does raise further – and perhaps surprising – questions regarding both contemporary and early modern ideas about Islam and about tolerance. What is particularly curious about *The Innocence of Muslims* is that its content, in all but a few elements, would not have seemed unfamiliar to a considerable proportion of early modern English men and women.¹⁰

Instead of the Prophet Muhammad – a form only recently adopted in the West – early modern readers and audiences would have known of a man, an heresiarch, named 'Mahomet' whom they placed at the centre of a theological system that uncannily mirrored their own.¹¹ This insistent paralleling of Christianity with 'Mahometanism' stemmed from a Christian fabrication of Mahomet in medieval polemic as a type of infernal Christ. Ever more elaborate versions of the resulting biography proliferated from meagre beginnings in which myth was spun around some garbled elements of the hadith, the miraj and the Qur'an itself (the latter first translated into Latin in 1143).¹² By 1600 English readers might find numerous versions of Mahomet's life where they could read of how he borrowed liberally from Christianity and Judaism to create his heresy; how the hypocritical 'law' that resulted was tailored to his

own unnatural and excessive lusts and those of his followers.¹³ They might read of his multiple wives, of his elaborately faked revelation and of his authorship of the 'Alcoran', a book he fraudulently pretended to be divine. Such readers would also have been well aware of the extreme violence that characterised Mahometan expansionism – embodied for them in the Ottoman Empire – and of its genesis in the power lust of its progenitor.¹⁴

As a version, however misleading, of the Prophet Muhammad, the early modern caricature (consistent across writing as diverse as a sermon preached at the Baptizing of a Turk, Thomas Lanquet's popular historical compendium *An Epitome of Chronicles* and Shakespeare's *1 Henry VI*) is strikingly consistent with the caricature at the centre of *The Innocence of Muslims*.¹⁵ However, where there are minor differences between the two, they are instructive. Early modern accounts from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries tend prominently to narrate widely circulated narratives unmasking how Mahomet cynically faked the miracles through which he gulled his followers into believing him to be divine. These often involve the training of animals to suggest divine agency – doves trained to pick peas from the ears to create the illusion of a visitation of the holy spirit, for instance – but were already being discredited by the later seventeenth century.¹⁶ *The Innocence of Muslims*, in contrast, deliberately emphasises sexual behaviour considered at least unorthodox by those specific constituencies who seem to be targeted by the filmmaker. Whereas excessive lust was explicit in earlier manifestations of this spurious biography, the writer of *The Innocence of Muslims* carefully draws its viewers' attention to the sanction Muhammad is shown to give to paedophilia (in particular), but also to incest and homosexuality.

What do these correspondences and differences tell us? The differences indicate the ways in which the stories of the Prophet Muhammad that 'Western' audiences tell themselves are not unchanging but are rather culturally and historically specific. This alone is a riposte to those who seek to sustain a narrative of endless and consistent vituperation.¹⁷ The prominence of a paedophile prophet in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries reflects the relatively new sanctity accorded the innocence of childhood and the moral outrage associated with this particular crime. The close focus on Muhammad's marriage to the six-year-old Aisha chooses to ignore the evidence that such practices were not unusual in seventh-century Arabia – or indeed in many other parts of the pre-modern world – and nor had this element of Muhammad's biography raised any comment in polemical lives of the Prophet before.

Instead, earlier lives tend to focus on the existence of multiple wives as evidence of excessive lust, and specifically on the marriage to his first wife, Khadijah, as a demonstration of his cynical rise to wealth and influence, since such narratives emphasise her position as wife of Muhammad's powerful employer and his apparent bewitching of her.¹⁸ Reading Western retellings of Muhammad's biography in this way is thus a useful index of shifting cultural nightmares – he has been imagined as an idol, a magician, an Antichrist, an Ottoman-style warlord, an 'impostor', an atheist, an instrument of Satan, a terrorist and now a paedophile.

Conversely, the almost relentless focus in medieval and early modern accounts of Mahomet and his biography (referenced by writers as well known as More, Tyndale, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Donne, Marvell and Milton) fell on his deliberate faking of miracles and thus on the ways in which Mahomet conspicuously failed to live up to the model of Jesus. The life develops in this way for a number of reasons: initially because the example of Jesus Christ was all-pervasive in Christian culture, and provided a template for legitimate divinity that all other figures who were thought to aspire to prophethood were measured against (and inevitably found wanting). Mahomet is thus distorted by Christian authors and then blamed for the resulting divergence. This distortion is further exaggerated by the process of circulation and reproduction, in which it is repeatedly augmented and rewritten to serve changing polemical purposes. Mahomet becomes an archetypal villain whose biography is an exemplar of vice and *cupiditas*, one modelled on (but the inversion of) lives of Christian saints and of Jesus.¹⁹ He becomes contained and explained in these terms, the latest in a long line of discredited arch-heretics. Finally, the seemingly endless replaying of faked miracles serves to dramatise this lack of divinity and in the process affirm the authentic model of Christ once again. It is notable that these narratives of Mahomet do, in some later accounts, also present an opportunity for reflection on the Machiavellian possibilities of unbelief and thus the manipulation of the credulous, and in these terms Mahomet becomes a means of exploring anxieties about divinity and its visible signs – leading in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to a wholesale rethinking of divinity.²⁰

The life of Muhammad presented in *The Innocence of Muslims* – perverse as it may at first seem – is therefore a more 'authentic' biography than its early modern predecessors because it incorporates the Muslim perspective that Muhammad was not divine, nor claimed to be, but was instead a mortal messenger conveying God's word to mankind. In this

sense it is a distant product of debates in northern Europe about the status of the Prophet that took place in the later seventeenth century and after, as writers such as Henry Stubbe, John Toland and others sought to articulate their own Christian positions by redefining – and to some extent vindicating – the figure of Mahomet.²¹ Both recognised that reliance on the absurd caricatures of the Christian tradition only encouraged Muslims to laugh at them – and that insistently paralleling Christ and Mahomet invariably distorts the latter. However, having acknowledged that this legacy informs elements of *The Innocence of Muslims*, the earlier tradition is not entirely absent, since the choice of actor playing Muhammad, his costume and his make-up, might well be intended to suggest a parallel with standard Christian depictions of Christ (it might also be argued that Christ is implicit in the action).

The differences between the Muhammad presented in *The Innocence of Muslims* and a dominant early modern perspective thus demonstrates how the detailing of this life is culturally specific. But the more substantial similarities remain, in content and in form. Beyond the pithy recognition that a twenty-first-century polemic, released only in fragments on the internet, would have been familiar to a broadly literate inhabitant of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Anglophone world, what might these similarities tell us about tolerance and intolerance? Perhaps most obviously, such continuities betray a sense of the context from which *The Innocence of Muslims* emerges. This is not a narrative that, beyond its chaotic framing sequence, has any direct connection with an Egyptian Coptic Christian tradition, despite press coverage suggesting the contrary. Its production is clearly motivated by perceived depredations against the Coptic community by Egyptian Muslim groups, and this impetus (if the film is anything other than inflammatory rhetoric dressed up in political comment) has driven the film's creators to extreme positions. In doing so they have – like many early modern Christians – chosen to fall back on opprobrious narratives of Muhammad to articulate their position, and to articulate a beleaguered but defiantly universalising Christian message. In moving to these extremes, however, 'Bacile' and his backers and advisers draw upon a narrative that has been cherished, augmented and sustained not in the Egyptian Coptic community, but rather by the American Evangelical right.²²

In right-wing evangelical circles, the relativist and tolerationist legacies of the Enlightenment (themselves complex and contested in this area, as I shall come to discuss) that had a pronounced impact on governmental policy in both the US and the UK in the nineteenth and

particularly the twentieth centuries have been largely rejected. Instead, prominent figures continued to espouse narratives of Muhammad that bore increasingly slight relation to either mainstream non-Muslim public opinion – for whom Muhammad was an increasingly benign, if perhaps peripheral, figure – or to Muslim traditions. Whereas evangelist energies had through much of the twentieth century been directed towards preaching and conversion amongst Muslims at home and abroad, towards the century's end and then in a polarised post 9/11 climate, prominent figures of the religious right – Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Franklin Graham and others – have used the media and Muhammad to gain prominence for their churches. One polemical outlet for this position, Jack T. Chick's 'Chick pamphlets', propagates a narrative of Muhammad that is strikingly similar to that of *The Innocence of Muslims*. In a range of invective pamphlets designed specifically to evangelise, and complete with spurious academic authorities, we are privy to the unmasking of a malevolent, manipulative, violent and Satanically inspired prophet, whose paedophilia is made especially prominent in a pamphlet designed for children – 'The Little Bride' – and who is insistently paralleled with Christ – as in *Allah Had No Son*.²³

Chick's compulsion to confront and intervene has an obvious polemical purpose, but these pamphlets are specifically directed at Muslims rather than simply confirming conservative Christians in their prejudices. The biography of Muhammad in these hands is an evangelical instrument, tuned and re-tuned to the tenor of the times. This too is a reminder of deeper origins, since a medieval template for the life had been fully established in the twelfth-century Toletano-Cluniac corpus (and subsequent works), itself partly evangelical in purpose and based on the skills and knowledge of early converts to Christianity. Periodic attempts by evangelist Christians to press missions for the conversion of Muslims are recorded across the late medieval and early modern period, and later, including prominent missions in twentieth-century US, as Thomas S. Kidd has detailed.²⁴ Similarly, the fetishisation of Christian converts from Islam – although often assumed to be an early modern phenomenon – continues in evangelist circles today, as demonstrated in the prominence given to the Caner brothers, Baptist converts from Turkey, and their *Unveiling Islam: An Insider's Look at Muslim Life and Beliefs* (2002).²⁵

So when former Southern Baptist Convention President Jerry Vines made the controversial assertion that Muhammad was a 'demon-possessed pedophile' in 2002, he was articulating a narrative of Muhammad's life that anticipated and informed the preoccupations of

The Innocence of Muslims. At the time many commentators castigated Vines for falling back on narratives centuries old that had been born of evangelical fantasies, theological disputation and fear, and updating them for maximum impact in the polarised circumstances of the early twenty-first century. But where does this leave toleration?

In 1689 John Locke had published *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, in which he influentially asserted that ‘neither Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Iew, ought to be excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because of his religion’, a statement often imagined as one of the opening salvos in Enlightenment re-evaluations of religion and the nature and possibility of tolerance.²⁶ How has the narrative espoused by Vines in 2002 and in *The Innocence of Muslims* in 2012 survived Locke’s relativism and an age of apparent rationality? It is certainly the case that attacks on the Christian mythologies of Muhammad in the name of an often pan-imperial tolerance began in England as early as Locke’s era, the later seventeenth century, and the demolition of this tradition was endorsed by those who sought to attack Islam as well as those who attempted to vindicate it in this period.²⁷ By Syed Ahmed Khan’s excoriation of Sir William Muir’s *The Life of Mahomet and History of Islam, to the Era of the Hegira* (1858) in his own *A Series of Essays on the Life of Mohammed, and Subjects Subsidiary Thereto* (1870), it was clear that the sensibilities of Muslim subjects needed to be tolerated – if not incorporated – and a sequence of incidents from the Lord Chancellor’s censorship of Thomas Henry Hall Caine’s play *Mahomet* to the *Satanic Verses* controversy confirmed this in no uncertain terms.²⁸

The return to prominence of a vituperative narrative of the life of Muhammad towards the end of the twentieth century has – as I’ve acknowledged – some roots in a much earlier tradition. However, a closer examination of Vines’s remark that Muhammad was a ‘demon-possessed pedophile’ suggests discontinuity as much as continuity. Of these two accusations, the first can be seen clearly in the early Christian tradition. However, as in *The Innocence of Muslims*, the emphasis falls here on the careful identification and exploitation of elements of an ‘authentic’ Muslim tradition, largely unknown to the majority of late medieval and early modern Christians who imagined Mahomet as an anti-Christian fraud. The idea that Muhammad was demon-possessed owes something to that earlier tradition, but also refers more directly to the contentious issue of the ‘Satanic Verses’ – those verses allegedly introduced into the Qur’an by Satan and only later removed – a phrase introduced into the West by the celebrated Orientalist Sir William Muir in 1858 and, of

course, brought to international prominence in the furore that followed the publication of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* (1989).²⁹

The second element of Vines's assertion – the accusation of paedophilia – is, as we have seen, extrapolated from Muslim traditions surrounding the Prophet and then manipulated to exploit the current prominence of this particular crime in Western cultures (and it is similarly prominent in the Caner brothers' book).³⁰ Vines's words thus demonstrate a concern for authenticity and the manipulation of Muslim tradition in a series of half-truths that again suggest an evangelist motivation, and which makes his version of Muhammad as much a product of a relativistic, post-Enlightenment age (a relativism denied in Vines's universalising rhetoric even as he twists it for his own purposes) as of an earlier Christian mythology.

Twenty-first-century evangelical rhetoric about the Prophet Muhammad therefore stems primarily from a different, later, tradition of Christian/Islamic engagement than the medieval/early modern version – but it seeks to disguise or elide that difference in order to affirm a polarising narrative of unchanging conflict and incompatibility. The notion with which I began, that the content of *The Innocence of Muslims* seems likely to have been familiar to an early modern English audience, is thus true only to a certain extent. The emphasis on fraud, unnatural lust and violence would indeed have been recognisable, but these elements are generated by the religious context out of which the life emerges, since they specifically refer to key polemical differences between Mahomet/Muhammad and Jesus Christ. As long as Christian groups continue to espouse such polemic, these contours will necessarily be present (and they are key features of heretics/villains in the Western tradition). The crucial difference between the evangelical context of *The Innocence of Muslims* and early modern imaginings of Mahomet is one of authenticity and its limits. Both versions are false, yet purport to be authentic. It is the insulation of early modern notions of Mahomet from Muslims and Islam that allows a crude caricature to flourish – and it begins to crumble once that insulation breaks down. The Prophet Muhammad portrayed by Vines and 'Bacile' is a more insidious phenomenon, one designed to generate maximum controversy but carefully engineered to utilise every possible element of authentic Muslim belief in achieving a spurious legitimacy (and thus an evangelical validity). In the circumstances of its creation, its content and its dissemination it is a product of the twenty-first century, but it is intended to look much older.

A close analysis of early modern sources alongside contemporary ones can therefore show how, despite widespread assumptions to the

contrary, these kinds of controversial representation have complex histories. Early modern study can also indicate unexpected connections between such representations and tolerance – even, perhaps, foster tolerance itself. Although scholars researching this period are often reticent in pressing the trans-historical implications of their research, there are some notable exceptions. At the beginning of his book *Traffic and Turning* (2005) Jonathan Burton considers the example of Abdul Hamid, the adopted name of John Walker Lindh, ‘the American Taliban’. Burton uses Hamid to think about the ways in which conversion to Islam remains unthinkable for many, and subject to what he calls ‘radical, public remediation’. His work offers:

a prehistory to contemporary interest in and representations of Islam in Western culture following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Today, as in the sixteenth century, Islam is often seen as a religion of error.³¹

Burton’s implication is that offering a prehistory to contemporary Western ideas about Islam can, at a time of conflict between a military alliance dominated by the US and militants claiming to fight for Islam, undermine simplistic teleologies and offer a more nuanced sense of the connections that he acknowledges exist between Islamic ‘error’ in the sixteenth century and now. It stands as a warning against over-simplification.

In his book *Looking East* (2007) another leading figure in the field, Gerald MacLean, confronts the same issue more explicitly, and questions contemporary (and historically specific) assumptions embedded in terms such as ‘East’ and ‘West’ – particularly concerning the place of Turkey. He writes that the study of early modern Christian/Islamic engagements

are of considerable importance at a time when there are many who, occupying positions of considerable power and authority, would insist, not only that Turkey is East and Euro-America is West, but that the only possible connection between them is inevitable and unceasing conflict. What we can learn from the past, and must teach if there is to be a future in which scholarship and teaching have any place, is that Christianity, Islam and Judaism were not and are not incompatible, that none has ever held an inviolable monopoly over the truth, and that none rests upon a theology requiring the elimination of the others despite the doctrinal fantasies of some evangelical ministers, bellicose rabbis, deluded self-appointed imams and belligerent secular nationalists.³²

For MacLean, the study of the past – and particularly of the early modern past – can illuminate the multifarious ways in which different religious groups bound by a common Abrahamic lineage have engaged with each other over time. Despite the recourse to universalising rhetoric by members of each religious group (another potential connection between the sixteenth and the twenty-first centuries), individuals as well as religious cultures are not necessarily incompatible: Elizabeth I's alliance with the Ottoman Sultan Murad III established in 1580 is an obvious example.³³ Furthermore it is often the now rather overdetermined moment of encounter – whether involving travellers, diplomats, captives, conquerors or converts – that demonstrates most emphatically how cultural contact in this period was necessarily improvisatory, despite (or because of) rigid preconceptions.³⁴ Further underlying MacLean's assertion of relevance is a perhaps idealistic sense of the humanities classroom as a space that might generate nuance and tolerance in society at large.

There is an abiding pessimism in such academic writing that seems to be focused on the ways in which the historical record has been misconstrued and erroneously enlisted in the service of those who seek to generate conflict (as in *The Innocence of Muslims*). This is taken further in the introduction to a recent anthology of sources that seeks to make the raw materials of these histories more widely available, written by Ania Loomba and Jonathan Burton. They press the value of this kind of detailed literary/historical approach in a world,

where religion has become more, not less, important in defining human collectivities; where national differences have not eroded but have proliferated in the face of increasing international contact; where terminologies of 'crusades' or 'jihad' are being invoke anew in the context of contemporary geopolitics; and where, despite the so-called flattening of the globe, new battle lines are defined in terms of a 'clash of civilizations'.³⁵

Indeed, in pressing the same point as Burton and MacLean, here Loomba and Burton turn the standard equation on its head: rather than present a historical narrative in which the critic must refute attempts to make reductive connections between now and then, they offer an unexpected vision of the present that looks more like popular imaginings of the late Middle Ages and early modern periods. In doing so, they assert the relevance of early modern notions of religion and religious encounter to the present and challenge similarly reductive notions of historical

progress and enlightenment – the contemporary world, they suggest, is becoming less tolerant and more divisive.

If they differ on precisely how and why, these two scholars agree that research into early modern attitudes to Islam can challenge present-day assumptions. Yet offering a prehistory does not necessarily explain the apparent continuance of certain attitudes and the disappearance of others – for that a close analysis such as that offered at the start of this chapter is necessary (although it is, of course, informed by such prehistories). Nevertheless, approaching research into early modern attitudes to Islam from this ‘presentist’ perspective, with the intention of offering a prehistory to the present, can raise questions about the nature and emergence of tolerance towards Islam in the seventeenth century.

One of the most important documents relating to Anglo-Islamic relations is the first English translation of the Qur’an, published in the chaotic circumstances of 1649. *The Alcoran of Mahomet* was translated not from the Arabic but rather from the French edition of the diplomat Andre du Reyer which had appeared in 1647, and it thus has a complicated relationship with a burgeoning Arabist culture in northern Europe at this point. It was printed as a political document but was also the product of a sophisticated French culture of Islamic engagement, and this controversial document – the title *The Alcoran of Mahomet* indicating its polemical position – is self-consciously presented to English readers for the very first time.³⁶

Originally planned for dedication to King Charles I, it appeared only after the regicide and a struggle with the Parliamentary authorities, who allowed its printing following consultation and the addition of a ‘Caveat’ by cleric and polemicist Alexander Ross.³⁷ Towards the beginning of his text Ross notes that:

I know the publishing of the Alcoran may be to some dangerous and scandalous; dangerous to the Reader, scandalous to the higher Powers, who notwithstanding have cleared themselves by disliking the publishing, and questioning the publishers thereof: but for the danger, I will deliver in these ensuing Propositions my opinion, yet with submission to wiser judgments.³⁸

The responsibility for the text thus falls squarely on the reader, particularly since the translator seems to have chosen to remain anonymous. But the reader must not approach the text ‘promiscuously’, as Ross later warns, in a deliberate echo of John Milton’s earlier *Areopagitica* (1644),

which had argued vehemently for intellectual liberty. In some respects, Ross responds directly to Milton, who had written:

Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human vertue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with lesse danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity then by reading all manner of tractats, and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.³⁹

Here Milton is clearly in favour of promiscuous reading (by which he means random or indiscriminating), since God has given man a questioning mind and he can only truly comprehend through exposure to error – thus all books should be tolerated as means the better to understand truth. Perhaps inevitably, given his subject matter, Ross is more equivocal, beginning his appended 'Caveat' in confrontational fashion, and in the process introduces the challenging dilemma he is faced with – he must justify the translation and publication of the Qur'an while decrying its content:

Good Reader, the great Arabian Impostor now at last after a thousand years, is by the way of France arrived in England, and his Alcoran, or gallimaufry of Errors, (a Brat as deformed as the Parent, and as full of Heresies, as his scald head was of scurf) hath learned to speak English. I suppose this piece is exposed by the Translator to the publick view, no otherwise than some Monster brought out of Africa, for people to gaze, not to dote upon; and as the sight of a Monster or mishapen creature should induce the beholder to praise God, who hath not made him such; so should the reading of this Alcoran excite us both to bless God's goodness towards us in this Land, who enjoy the glorious light of the Gospel, and behold the truth in the beauty of holiness; as also to admire God's Judgments, who suffers so many Countreys to be blinded and inslaved with this mishapen issue of Mahomet's brain, being brought forth by the help of no other Midwifry than of a Jew and a Nestorian, making use of a tame Pigeon (which he had taught to pick corn out of his Ears) instead of the holy Ghost, and causing silly people to believe, that in his falling-sickness (to which he was much subject) he had conference with the Angel Gabriel.⁴⁰

Ross's opening remarks affirm Jonathan Burton's notion that 'Islam is [and has been] often seen as a religion of error', a word that in this case

fits into a well-established vocabulary of heresy. He turns to rehearsing the key elements of a medieval biography – false miracles and epilepsy – and repeatedly affirming (as the title of the book itself does) Mahomet's authorship, thus denying divine revelation. It is the monstrosity of the Alcoran that offers him the chance to justify its appearance in England in 1649 – the book is a monster born of a monstrous birth from a monster and, like any monster 'brought out of Africa', people should appraise it as a prodigy that reminds them of the grace of God and of the perfection of their own faith.

This is a similar rhetorical device to the one Luther employed to justify the printing of the Qur'an in Latin in the previous century, the *Machumetis Saracenorum principis, eiusque successorum vitae, doctrina ac ipse Alcoran*, yet Ross goes further. He enumerates a lengthy list of heresies, ranging from the 'damnable errors' one might find recorded in scripture, to 'the modern Histories of the East and West Indies' and 'the damnable Heresies of the modern Familists, who deny Christ's Divinity, making as many Christs as there be illuminated in their Congregations'. He asks, 'are not also the Heresies of the Socinians, Anti-trinitarians, Adamites, Servetians, Antisabbatarians, and many others exposed to the view of all that will read them?'⁴¹ If all these heresies are readily available to English readers, then, Ross asks, what justification can there be for prohibiting the Alcoran? The intention here is to castigate the current religious settlement and the proliferation of sects in England, but in lamenting this descent into relativism he draws attention to the fragile religious tolerance that existed in mid-seventeenth-century and draws Islam into the frame, indicating that Mahomet's eventual arrival in England was inevitable. Indeed, Ross's justification for the publication of the Alcoran – even as he reproduces a vituperative biography of Mahomet and attacks the tenets of Mahometanism – is itself a kind of toleration, albeit a toleration that is designed to demonstrate quite how debased English religious culture has become. Although Ross's broad strategy to justify publication thus appears to endorse Milton's notion of 'promiscuous' reading – that people must know error in order to know truth – it is a strategy forced upon him by the degeneracy of the times. He specifically denies that the Alcoran should be read promiscuously (perhaps in a critique of Milton's position even as he elsewhere borrows heavily from it) and argues that,

if all Men were like Bees, to suck Hony even out of Henbane, there might be no danger in reading the Alcoran, but most Men are like Spiders, suck securely Poyson even out of the sweetest Roses; therefore they only may surely and without danger read the Alcoran, who

are intelligent, judicious, learned, and throughly grounded in Piety, and principles of Christianity; but weak, ignorant, inconstant, and disaffected minds to the Truth, must not venture to meddle with this unhallowed piece.⁴²

This was a royalist cleric writing in support of orthodoxy – any justification he offered for the publication of the *Alcoran* needed to be strongly tempered with moral guidance and Christian authority.

The Alcoran of Mahomet was the first of many translations of the Qur'an into English, translations that by the early twentieth century were increasingly undertaken not by Christian orientalists but by Muslim scholars, and presented as a means of understanding Islam and extending toleration. The rapid growth of a market for such translations, such as those by Mirza Ab'ul Fazl (1910), Maulana Muhammad Ali (1917 – the first to include Arabic text), Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall (1930), Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1934) and N. J. Dawood (1956), further indicates an expanding literacy in British culture about Islam, as well as increasing numbers of British Muslims as the twentieth century wore on.⁴³ The 1649 translation would seem to be an inauspicious beginning, and a strange place to look for the justification or initiation of toleration. If there is any such thing, it operates in accordance with the upside down nature of the times. However, Ross would follow his work on *The Alcoran of Mahomet* with a text that initially seems highly similar – his ΠΑΝΣΕΒΕΙΑ [*Pansebeia*], or, *A View of All Religions in the World* (1653) – but which by its very nature generates relativism and toleration.⁴⁴

Not that relativism and toleration are Ross's intention in writing the *Pansebeia*. In response to those who argue that it were better if other religions were not acknowledged at all, he insists that such an assertion 'is frivolous, and the reason thereof ridiculous; for the end wherefore these different opinions in Religion are brought into the light, is, not that we should embrace them, but that we may see their deformity and avoid them'.⁴⁵ This argument, based on antiperistasis, is very similar to that inspired by (but lacking the nuance of) Milton's *Areopagitica* and articulated in his earlier 'Caveat' to the *Alcoran*, that

truth though comly in it selfe, is yet more lovely, when compared with falshood . . . how should we know the excellency of light, if there were no darknesse; the benefit of health, if there were no sicknesse; and the delights of the spring, if there were no winter; Opposita juxta se posita clarius elucescunt: The Swans fethers are not the lesse white,

because of their black feet; nor Venus the lesse beautiful, because of her Mole.⁴⁶

Again the contrast with Milton comes in the directed and starkly oppositional nature of Ross's examples – darkness and light, health and sickness. In addressing the critics of his book (which passed through a number of editions), his expectation is that they will attack him not directly for relativism but rather for popularising, even generating, heresy. It is true, Ross acknowledges, that 'the world is pestered with too many Religions, and the more is the pittie; yet this Book made them not, but they made this Book. He that detects errors makes them not.'⁴⁷ Yet in attempting to assess each religion in the world according to the same set of criteria – as Samuel Purchas had attempted to do in his *Pilgrimage* of 1613 – invariably gives each a kind of validity and requires Christianity be subject to the same scrutiny.⁴⁸ The structure and rationale of the *Panthebeia* implies as much.

Ross follows the Old Testament in asserting that all religions stem from the same root – that God allowed 'men who in the beginning were of one language and religion, to fall into a Babel and confusion, both of tongues and false religions, for not retaining the truth'.⁴⁹ More importantly, these non-Christian religions have much more in common with each other and with Christianity than with atheism, which is one of Ross's major targets. In doing so he seems to come very close to endorsing a pantheological relativism:

When we look upon the different multiplicity of Religions in the world how that in all times, and in all places, men though otherwise barbarous, have notwithstanding embraced a religion, and have acknowledged a Divinity; I say when we look upon this, do we not admire the impudency of those Atheists in this age, who either inwardly in their hearts, or outwardly in their mouths dare deny the Essence, or else the providence of God; and count all Religions but inventions of humane policy. How can those Atheists avoid shame and confusion when they read this book, in which they shall see, that no Nation hath been so wretched as to deny a Deity, and to reject all Religion; which Religion is a property no lesse essential to man, and by which he is discriminated from the Beasts, than rationality it self.⁵⁰

In arguing that religion defines man and culture Ross succeeds in utterly excluding the atheist (a phantom regularly chastised in the most vehement terms across the early modern period). In the process of doing

so, however, he almost inadvertently affirms the conceptual sameness of all religions. Despite his heavy-handed insistence on an intention to use this work to highlight the exceptional truths of Christianity, and his use of Christianity as a benchmark against which to measure relative heresies rationally, his own methodology generates the opposite perspective, a sense of similarity and common parameters, even a common irrationality. Certainly controversial contemporaries such as Hobbes, Spinoza, LePeyrere and, later, Toland were beginning to make these connections.

Even as they researched and disseminated material concerning non-Christian religions – and particularly Islam – in the mid- and later seventeenth century, clergymen like Ross were caught in a bind. A demand for up-to-date and authentic scholarship in a contested print market meant they could not easily fall back on the assumptions of the past, and yet to publish such material in an environment increasingly engaged with the wider world and characterised (if often polemically) as tolerationist risked falling further into debased relativism. Ross's solution was repeatedly to affirm certainty in his convictions; others were less convinced. To circulate such material was to risk it being read promiscuously.

Twenty-first-century notions of toleration and free speech in 'the Western world' emerged unplanned and falteringly from such fertile chaos. The creation and expansion of the internet have meant that now – as then – licensing and censorship of material, regardless of its accuracy, are contentious and difficult. People now inevitably read and view an extraordinarily wide range of material promiscuously, although not necessarily in a Miltonic sense. The task of scholars is to demonstrate that no text exists in a vacuum, sealed from the past, and to ensure – as Burton, MacLean and Loomba in different ways have argued – that people can encounter and counter such texts in informed and tolerant ways. Only then will polemic such as *The Innocence of Muslims* be understood for what it is, and where it comes from.

Notes

1. Nabil Matar, *Islam and Britain, 1558–1685* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
2. Daniel Vitkus, *Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England* (New York: Columbia, 2000), and *Turning Turk: English Theater and the Multicultural Mediterranean* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Gerald MacLean, *The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580–1720* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jonathan Burton, *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, DE: University of

- Delaware Press, 2005); Matthew Dimmock, *New Turkes: Dramatising Islam and the Ottomans in Early Modern England* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Linda McJannet, *The Sultan Speaks: Dialogue in English Plays and Histories about the Ottoman Turks* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Bernadette Andrea, *Women and Islam in Early Modern English Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Mark Hutchings, 'The "Turk Phenomenon" and the Repertory of the Late Elizabethan Playhouse', *Early Modern Literary Studies* Special Issue 16 (September 2007), and his forthcoming edition of *Three Jacobean 'Turkish' Plays* (Manchester University Press, 2012).
3. One of the few early modern scholars working in this area to have directly referenced this impetus is Jonathan Burton: *Traffic and Turning*, p. 17.
 4. Rushdie has recently described *The Satanic Verses* as 'a harbinger... certainly one of the first visible signs of what has now become a much larger phenomenon', *The Observer*, 26 June 2011, p. 5. See also the interview with Susanna Rustin, 'Salman's Children', *The Guardian*, 2 October 2010, p. 30.
 5. Maleiha Malik, 'Anti-Muslim prejudice in the West, past and present: an introduction' pp. 207–12, in Maleiha Malik ed., *Anti-Muslim Prejudice in the West, Past and Present* special issue of *Patterns of Prejudice* 43.3–44 (July/September 2009) p. 207.
 6. See the overview by Peter Bradshaw, 'Innocence of Muslims: a dark demonstration of the power of film', *The Guardian*, 17 September 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/film/filmblog/2012/sep/17/innocence-of-muslims-demonstration-film.
 7. Amongst extensive media coverage, the most comprehensive recent article on the controversy surrounding the film is Michael Joseph Gross, 'Disaster Movie', *Vanity Fair*, 27 December 2012, www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-innocence-of-muslims.
 8. The film remains widely available on YouTube: most recently at www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmodVun16Q4.
 9. Terry Jones was quoted in *The Huffington Post* (07 May 2011) and *The Guardian* (02 May 2011). Pope Benedict XVI controversially quoted a fourteenth-century text by the Byzantine Manuel II Paleologos asserting that Muhammad had issued a command 'to spread by the sword the faith he preached'. See the coverage in *The Guardian* (15 September 2006). The Danish cartoon controversy followed the publication of 12 images in *Jyllands-Posten* on 30 September 2005. This is analysed in detail in (the itself controversial) Jytte Klausen's *The Cartoons That Shook the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
 10. This life, as understood by early modern Christians, is further explored in Matthew Dimmock, *Mythologies of the Prophet Muhammad in Early Modern English Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
 11. For a detailed exploration of the genesis of this idea, the reader is recommended John Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia, 2002), and Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (2nd edition. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1993).
 12. This first translation – *Lex Mahumet pseudoprophete* – was completed by Robert of Ketton in 1143.

13. For example, in the account that begins Ralph Carr's *The Mahumetane or Turkish Historie, Containing Three Bookes*... (London: Printed by Thomas Este, 1600), and in numerous other publications.
14. Some of the earliest accounts of Mahomet printed in English deliberately emphasised his violent nature, a theme that continued throughout the early modern period. This is graphically presented in the illustration that accompanies the title page to *Here Begynneth a Lytell Treatise of the Turkes Lawe called Alcaron. And also it Speketh of Machamet the Nygromancer* (London: Wynkyn de Worde, 1519), which depicts a preacher looming over his Muslim congregation holding a sword aloft.
15. Meredith Hanmer, *The Baptizing of a Turke. A Sermon Preached at the Hospitall of Saint Katherine, Adjoining unto her Majesty's Tower the 2. of October 1586, at the Baptizing of one Chinano, a Turke, Born at Nigropontus* (London: Robert Waldegrave, 1587); Thomas Lanquet, *An Epitome of Chronicles Conteyninge the Whole Discourse of the Histories as well of this Realme of England, as al Other cou[n]treys, with the Succession of their Kinges, the Time of their Reigne, and What Notable Actes they did ... Gathered out of the Most Probable Auctours* (London: William Seres for Thomas Marshe, 1559); 'Was Mahomet inspired by a dove?/Thou with an eagle art inspired then', William Shakespeare, *1 Henry VI* (1.2.140–141), *The Norton Shakespeare*, Stephen Greenblatt [Gen. Ed.]. (New York and London: Norton, 1997).
16. In books as diverse as Lancelot Addison's *The First State of Mahumedism being an Exact Account of Mahomed, The Author of the Turkish Religion, his Prophecies about his Coming, Pedigree, Parents, Tribe, Birth, Education, Marriages, Filthiness of Life, Pretended Revelation, Retirement, Collections and Composure of his Alcoran, of his Conventicles at Mecca, Where He Gained his First Proselytes, &C* (London: for Will Crook, 1678) sig. A.2r–A.3v; Humphrey Prideaux, *The True Nature of Imposture fully Displayed in the Life of Mahomet. With a Discourse Annex'd, for the Vindication of Christianity from this Charge, etc.* (London: William Rogers, 1697) p. 31; and throughout Henry Stubbe's influential (and controversial) manuscript 'The Originall & Progress of Mahometanism' (c. 1571).
17. Such as those evangelists detailed in the final chapter of Thomas S. Kidd's *American Christians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), although Samuel Huntington's thesis regarding a 'Clash of Civilizations' is often referenced in this context: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
18. This first marriage is highlighted in the core medieval sources – such as Vincent of Beauvais's *Speculum Historiale* – and is thus prominent in the first texts printed in English concerning 'Mahomet', such as Ranulf Higden's *Polychronicon* and John Lydgate's *Fall of Princes*.
19. Matthew Dimmock, "'A Human Head to the Neck of A Horse": Hybridity, Monstrosity and Early Christian Conceptions of Muhammad and Islam', pp. 66–88, in ed. Matthew Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield *The Religions of the Book: Christian Perceptions, 1400–1660* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.74–76.
20. Such rethinking, generated out of the Deist/Socinian controversies of the later seventeenth century, is detailed in Justin Champion, *The Pillars*

- of *Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 1660–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Humberto Garcia, *Islam and the English Enlightenment, 1670–1840* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).
21. Stubbe, 'The Originall & Progress of Mahometanism'; John Toland, *Nazarenus or, Jewish, Gentile, and Mahometan Christianity* (London: J. Brown, J. Roberts and J. Brotherton, 1718).
 22. Kidd, *American Christians and Islam*, pp. 147–54.
 23. Jack T. Chick, *Allah Had No Son* (Ontario, CA: Chick Publications, 1994), *The Little Bride* (Ontario, CA: Chick Publications, 2004), and *Men of Peace?* (Ontario, CA: Chick Publications, 2006).
 24. Kidd, *American Christians and Islam*, pp. 120–43.
 25. Ergun M. Caner and Emir F. Caner, *Unveiling Islam: An Insider's Look at Muslim Life and Beliefs* (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 2002). See also Kidd, *American Christians and Islam*, pp. 147–48.
 26. John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration Humbly Submitted* (London: for Awnsam Churchill, 1689) p. 54.
 27. See note 15 above.
 28. Kristan Tetens, 'The Lyceum and the Lord Chamberlain: The Case of Hall Caine's *Mahomet*', pp. 49–64, in ed. Richard Foulkes *Henry Irving: A Re-Evaluation of the Pre-Eminent Victorian Actor-Manager* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); a useful overview of the *Satanic Verses* controversy can be found in Kenan Malik, *From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy* (London: Atlantic Books, 2009).
 29. Discussed in M. M. Ahsan, 'The *Satanic Verses* and the Orientalists', *Hamdard Islamicus*, 5.1 (1982), 27–36.
 30. Caner and Caner, *Unveiling Islam*, pp. 41–45; Kidd, *American Christians and Islam*, pp. 147–48.
 31. Burton, *Traffic and Turning*, p. 17.
 32. Gerald MacLean, *Looking East: English Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 11–12.
 33. Discussed in Dimmock, *New Turkes*, pp. 87–90.
 34. The pre-eminent scholar of early modern cultural encounter is Sanjay Subrahmanyam, exemplified in his *Three Ways To Be an Alien: Travails & Encounters in the Early Modern World* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2011).
 35. Ania Loomba and Jonathan Burton eds, *Race in Early Modern England: A Documentary Companion* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 28.
 36. The first translation of the Qur'an into Latin, the *Lex Mahumet pseudo-prophete*, had been completed by another Englishman, Robert of Ketton, in 1143. It was this version that formed the basis of the first printed version of the text in Christendom, the *Machumetis Saracenorum principis, eiusque successorum vitae, doctrina ac ipse Alcoran*, which was compiled by Theodore Bibliander, justified by Martin Luther and printed in Basle in 1543.
 37. Matthew Birchwood, *Staging Islam in England: Drama and Culture, 1640–1685* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2007) pp. 15–16, 64–68.
 38. Alexander Ross, 'A needful Caveat', in *The Alcoran of Mahomet* (London: [s.n.], 1649), sig. Ee.1r.

39. John Milton, *Areopagitica; a Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicens'd Printing, to the Parliament of England* (London: [s.n.], 1644), p. 13.
40. Ross, 'A needful Caveat', sig. Ee.1r.
41. *Ibid.*, sig. Ee.1v.
42. *Ibid.*, sig. Ff.3v.
43. Mirza Ab'ul Fazl, *Selections from the Koran* (Allahabad: G. A. Asghar & Co., 1910); Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Holy Qur'an* (Woking: Islamic Review Office, 1917); Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran. An Explanatory Translation* (London: A. A. Knopf, 1930); Allama Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Quran: An Interpretation in English* (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1934); N. J. Dawood, *The Koran. A New Translation* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956).
44. Alexander Ross, *Pansebeia, or, A View of all Religions in the World with the Severall Church-governments from the Creation, to These Times: also, a Discovery of all known Heresies in all Ages and Places, and Choice Observations and Reflections Throughout the Whole* (London: T. C. for John Saywell, 1653).
45. Ross, *Pansebeia*, sig. A.5r–A.5v.
46. *Ibid.*, sig. A.5v–A.6r.
47. *Ibid.*, sig. A.6r.
48. Samuel Purchas, *Purchas his pilgrimage. Or Relations of the world and the religions obserued in all ages and places discovered, from the Creation vnto this present In foure partes . . .* (London: William Stansby for Henrie Fetherstone, 1613).
49. Ross, *Pansebeia*, sig. A.9r–A.9v.
50. *Ibid.*, sig. A.7r.

10

A Feminism of Convenience: Roger Williams, Egyptian Salafists and Liberty of Conscience for Women

Feisal G. Mohamed

Returning to England in 1652 on business for Rhode Island Colony, Roger Williams tries to do the polite thing: he looks up Anne Sadleir, a daughter of the man who recognised his early talents and gave him a start in the world, Sir Edward Coke, and sent her a grateful letter along with a copy of his *Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health* (1652).¹ Williams chose to send this lesser-known work precisely because it is his least polemical. He mentions in his letter ‘2 or 3 things’ he has published ‘since landing’ and another ‘large Discourse at the presse’, referring to a paper on propagating the gospel, as well as to *The Hireling Ministry None of Christ’s* and his soon-to-be-released *Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*. But he describes those works as ‘Controversiall’ and likely to trouble Sadleir’s ‘Meditations’.² The *Experiments*, by contrast, are written in the form of a letter to Williams’s wife in her illness and, as he further points out, are dedicated to Lady Frances Vane, wife of the younger Sir Henry Vane, a prominent dedicatee even if not one whose views Sadleir would share. With some more name-dropping that signals his prominence in England’s new order, Williams writes that ‘it hath pleased the Generall himselfe [Cromwell] to send for me and to entertaine many Discourses with me at Severall Times’.³ Describing his departure from England, Williams declares Laudian persecution to have persuaded him ‘against the National Church and Ceremonies and B[isho]ps beyond the Conscience of your dear Father’. On his way to Bristol, and thence to America, he had paid Coke a final visit at Stoke House, but ‘durst not acquaint him with my Conscience and my Flight’.⁴ He fully expects Sadleir to disagree with his religious views, but declares that reproof can

be more valuable than empty 'Applause and Commendation', expressing his humility in a turn of phrase that could easily be taken as an insult by a woman of Sadleir's standing who held the values of the time: 'I have bene oft glad in the Wilderness of America to have bene reprov'd for going in a Wrong Path and to be directed by a naked Indian Boy in my Travells.'⁵

Williams was far from disappointed in his hope for reproof. Sadleir was as staunch a supporter of the national church as one imagines possible, illicitly cleaving to the Book of Common Prayer throughout the 1650s.⁶ The opening sentence of her reply to Williams suggests that she is less than impressed by his connections to the grandees of the new regime, stating that David's complaint in Psalm 79 is now 'ours':⁷ 'O God, the heathen are come into thine inheritance; thy holy temple they have defiled; they have laid Jerusalem on heaps' (Ps. 79:1). She returns Williams's book unread, stating that she prefers to confine her reading to the Bible, 'the late Kings Booke [*Eikon Basilike*]; Hookers Ecclesiasticall Policie; Reverend Bish. Andrew[e]s sermons with his other divine meditations; Dt Jer[emy] Taylers works, and Dt. Tho. Jacksone upon the Creed'.⁸ Such are the men her father deemed 'the glorious lights of the Church of England', and which Sadleir prefers to the 'new lights that are soe much cri'd up', though 'in the conclusion they will prove but darke lanthorns'. Signed, 'your friend in the old way'.⁹

To this rebuff Williams offers a composed and gracious reply. He declares himself grateful to have received Sadleir's letter and dutifully states that he will make every effort to read the books she has suggested, though one assumes he was already at least passingly familiar with this catalogue of English conformism's greatest hits. But composure and grace can sometimes be effective means of needling a hostile correspondent, and to that end they are supported in this letter by the kind of spiritualist language that must have been known to irk friends of the 'old way' and by Williams sending a copy of one of the works that he recognised as likely to annoy Sadleir, *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*.¹⁰ Sadleir again returns the book unread, and in her terse reply lays the blood of the *Wars of the Three Kingdoms* on the hands of those agitating for liberty of conscience: 'since it has bin left to everie mans conscience to fancie what religion he list, there has more christian blood bin shed, then was in the ten persecutions.' Signed, 'your friend in the old and best way'.¹¹

At this point Williams's appetite for reproof is apparently sated, and he fires back an enumerated list of the faults of the crown and national church. In a way that Williams's twenty-first-century celebrators should

note,¹² he also makes clear his disdain for those religions included in the broad toleration of *The Bloody Tenent*, all of whom fall into the damnable error of placing faith in externals:

the Jewes believe Christ Jesus was a Deceaver, because he came not with external Pompe and Excellencie.

The Turkes (so many Millions of them) prefer their Mahomet, before Christ Jesus, even upon such carnall and Worldly Respects, and yet avouch Themselves to be the only Muselmanni or True Believers.

The Catholicks account us Hereticks, Diablo'es etc. and Why? but because We Worship not such a goulden Christ, and his Glorious Vicar and Lieftenant.

The Severall Sects of Common protestants content themselves with a Traditionall Worship, and boast they are no Jewes, no Turkes, nor Catholicks, and yet forget their own Formall dead Fayth, dead Hope, dead Joyes, and yet Nescio vos, I know you not, Depart from me, wch shall be thundred out to many Gallant professours and Confidents, who have held out a Lampe and Forme of religion.¹³

Williams signs off with his sense of what is rightly the 'old way', and in the same stroke reveals himself to be the less pithy member of the exchange: 'the Old Way, wch is the Narrow Way, wch leads to Life, wch few find'. In a further letting out of pent-up steam, he adds a postscript pointing to Jeremy Taylor's sympathy with nonconformists in *A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying* and asking Sadleir to 'read over impartially Mr Miltons answer to the Kings booke'.¹⁴

Equally fed up with this exchange, Sadleir opens her reply by declaring that Williams 'has a face of brass, so that [he] cannot blush'.¹⁵ To the suggestion of Taylor's book, she is less than receptive: 'I say it and you would make a good fire.'¹⁶ She declares that she 'trembled' when she read Williams's aspersions 'upon that king of ever blessed memorie Charls the Marter' and is hardly enthused about the prospect of reading *Eikonoklastes*:

For Meltons book that you desire I should read if I be not mistaken, that is he that has wrot a book of the lawfulness of devorce, and if report sais true he had at that time two or thre wives living. This perhaps were good Doctrine in new England, but it is most abominable in old England. For his book that he wrot against the late King that

you would have me read, you should have taken notice of gods judgment upon him who stroke him with blindness, and as I have heard he was faine to have the helpe of one Andrew Marvell or els he could not have finished that most accursed Libell.¹⁷

Milton, as we know, quite liked polygamy as an idea but never had the temerity to engage in it, and Sadleir is rehearsing old insults in branding him a divorcer and libertine. Rather newer insults are those on Milton's blindness, which had become total only months before this letter was likely written, and the charge of relying on Marvell.¹⁸ As Gordon Campbell notes, the charge would seem outlandish if not for the fact that Sadleir is well placed to have reliable information: her sister Bridget was an acquaintance of the Marvells and mother to Cyriack Skinner – Milton's pupil in the 1640s, addressee of two sonnets in the 1650s and later anonymous biographer – giving more substance than we might initially confer upon Sadleir's claim that Milton required young Marvell's assistance.¹⁹ Sadleir ends by requesting that Williams trouble her no more with his letters 'for they are verie troublesum to her that wishis [Williams] in the place from whence [he] came'. No further correspondence between the two survives.

This less than friendly exchange of letters raises a host of questions. How could Williams have so misread the way in which Sadleir would respond to him? *The Bloody Tenent* had already been cried down before Parliament in Herbert Palmer's 1644 address – the same artefact of Presbyterian paranoia on heresy denouncing the libertinism of Milton's divorce tracts – and Williams must have known of his reputation in old England.²⁰ Was Sadleir entirely accurate in stating that her father was 'constant' to the liturgy of the English church 'both in life and in death' and felt that 'no reformed church had the like'?²¹ As Elizabeth's attorney-general, Coke certainly seemed a stalwart defender of the national church and the royal supremacy. But the Coke that Williams knew was the parliamentarian resisting Caroline autocracy and one of the chief authors of the Petition of Right. Williams is aware that he is departing from the ideals of his early mentor. But is that break more subtle than we might expect, and does his clear respect for Coke continue to influence him even after his departure from England and from the communion of the national church?

These are too many questions to answer at present. To shed a particle of light on some of them, we shall look at Coke's thought on religion and royal authority. We shall then explore an early challenge to the religious liberty of Providence plantation, the attempts of Joshua

Verin to prevent his wife from attending religious services held in Williams's home. The difficult questions that Verin's actions pressed upon a fledgling community with a limited legal regime bring to light the ways in which policing liberty of conscience coalesces with policing shared standards of conduct, and how this coalescence often takes place on the terrain of marital regulation.

Turning to the present, we shall see how such concerns played no small part in the sectarian tensions lurking underneath the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. In both of these instances, American and Egyptian, the principle of liberty of conscience is extended to married women defying their husbands' wishes. And in both of these cases the extension justifies abridging the civil rights of husbands holding unwelcome confessional sympathies. While exploring some of the structural similarities of these temporally distant claims for women's liberty of conscience, we shall treat them as historically discrete entities each with its own set of pertinent contexts. As I have described elsewhere, such analysis can avoid the pitfalls of the presentist fallacy if each historical moment, present and past, is treated as a monad: as the independent object of good-faith scholarly enquiry, rather than a device manipulated to serve polemical ends.²² With this proviso firmly in mind, we might examine one such monad alongside another, each alerting us to contours of the next. We tend to be sceptical of neat-and-tidy historical narratives and thus might think instead of history as a canvas painted in the pointillist style: its patterns are visible at some remove, can remain ambiguous and often feel constructed. Thinking in this way also suggests the possibility of comparing two brushstrokes at some distance from one another, both for their internal qualities and for the ways in which each contributes to its immediate surroundings. That comparison is not inherently more of a distortion than is any other pattern-seeking.

I.

Sir Edward Coke offers strident defences of the national church and royal supremacy. The first is in a commentary on *Caudrey's Case* of 1591. In this moment of noisome objections from Separatists and disciplinarian ministers within the church, Coke endorses the authority of bishops to deprive a dissenting minister of his living with little warning. But he must get past a legal sticking point in the process. Robert Caudrey, parson of the rectory of South Luffenham, was deprived of his living for preaching against the Book of Common Prayer. The Elizabethan statute at issue, however, states that a first offence carries

the punishment of six months' imprisonment and the loss of one's living for a year, with the second offence resulting in deprivation of all of one's spiritual livings. Caudrey was deprived after his first offence, and was furthermore convicted without full opportunity to defend himself in open court: he did not appear before the High Commissioners hearing his case and so was convicted 'by default'.²³ Coke nonetheless defends the bishop of London's authority so to have acted. The punishments mentioned in the statute, he argues, are in 'affirmative' language only, rather than a negative language to the effect of 'and not otherwise, or in no other manner or form'.²⁴ The primary effect of the statute, then, is to vest bishops with the authority of enforcing the Book of Common Prayer by dint of the crown's ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Coke lays a good deal of emphasis on that role of the crown, summoning precedent from the statutes of Edward the Confessor, William I, Henry I, Edward I, Edward II, Edward III, Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, Henry VI, Richard III, Henry VII, Henry VIII and, of course, Elizabeth I. These show a tradition in English law of the crown's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, so that heresy, marriage, excommunication and other such matters were long settled under the aegis of royal authority, and not in 'foreign', which is to say Roman, courts. Rather than making an unprecedented break with Rome, Henry VIII had simply defended the traditional privileges of the crown and taken an action consistent with the ancient law.²⁵ The same is true of Elizabeth's exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in enforcing use of the Book of Common Prayer: the crown had ever exercised its dual function of implementing laws temporal and spiritual.

Such a position lends itself readily to anti-Roman invective. Coke presents as monstrous outrage the bull of Pius V excommunicating Elizabeth and imposing a papal curse upon all those who respect her authority.²⁶ For a subject to publish such a papal bull is 'treason in the highest degree', as can be readily extrapolated from the law of Edward I declaring it treasonous to publish a Bull excommunicating a subject.²⁷ In addressing Elizabeth's actions against Jesuits and priests, Coke argues that she had shown great clemency until they 'in secret corners whispered and infused into the hearts of many of the unlearned subjects of this realm, that the Pope had power to excommunicate and depose Kings and Princes'.²⁸ In the 1606 Preface to his *Charge Given at the Assises Houlden in Norwhich*, Coke makes equally clear that Elizabeth was lenient with recusants for as long as she could be, and that Roman Catholic demands for 'tolleration' are 'but a colourable pretence' striving to advance the pope's efforts against the crown.²⁹

In the same preface Coke also shows no shortage of disdain for those Separatists claiming Reformed scruples. The 'Brownings' are for the most part 'simple & Illiterate people', and those among them with some shred of learning are 'arrogant, and willfully perverse, fitter to be reformed by punishment, rather than by argument'.³⁰ Those who are not separatist, however, but who 'contend against some ceremonies used in the Church' are subjects with whom James 'is not a little grieved' but are the least dangerous sort and should be punished only when they 'growe insolent'.³¹

Such are the ground-notes of Coke's position on religion throughout his career: the crown's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, at the height of its legitimacy when supported by parliamentary consent; the Roman and, to a lesser extent, separatist affronts to that jurisdiction; and ecumenism towards those willing to work within the framework of the national church. With these in mind, we can explain his apparent inconsistencies. Coke had secured livings for members of the godly party who had resisted Whitgift, including George Leedes, his brother-in-law, and Richard Rogers. One such minister, Francis Bradley, repaid the favour with a sermon dedicated to the attorney-general.³² Before the reign of James, Coke seemed to recognise that civil order would be advanced by inviting moderate puritans into the fold of the national church. That priority persists into the reign of Charles I. In the parliament of 1625, Coke sided with those who deemed the Arminian Richard Montague to be a threat to religious unity in the realm, and was among those incensed by the king's attempt to protect Montague from parliamentary action by declaring him a royal chaplain – though Stephen White plausibly suggests that these members were using the attack on Montague to create a precedent for their real target, Buckingham.³³ Summing up his view of matters religious, Coke justifies the action against Montague by saying that the 'ancient Brittons' were conquered because of their lack of 'united counsels' – a point made with reference to Tacitus' remarks on British factions, 'Dum singuli pugnans, universi vincuntur' ('when they fight singly, they are all vanquished') – and 'so it will be in Divinity, if every private man may put out books... not allowed by the Convocation'.³⁴

Such is the environment in which a young Roger Williams would have learned about the relationship between law and conscience. He begins his career in Coke's service as a note-taker in Star Chamber, an excellent breeding ground for antipathy to the national church. As we know, after leaving England his sentiments on liberty of conscience did not rest well in Salem, and with some like-minded colonists he purchased land

from the Narragansett tribes of present-day Rhode Island to establish Providence plantation – helping him administer the transaction was the younger Sir Henry Vane, whose ideas on liberty of conscience were also unwelcome in Massachusetts.

It was not long before the colonists in Providence had to confront a challenge to their communal concord in the shape of Joshua Verin, whom they disfranchised in 1638. Colonial records of the seventeenth century are generally sparse, and many of Rhode Island's are thought to have been lost when Providence was sacked and burned by the Narragansetts in 1676.³⁵ The official record of the Verin incident is a single sentence: 'It was agreed that Joshua Verin upon the breach of a covenant for the restraining of libertie of conscience, shall be withheld from the libertie of voting till he shall declare the contrarie.'³⁶ For further details we must look to the letters of Williams and to John Winthrop's *History*. Williams may be alluding to Verin in a letter of May 1638 that describes an 'unruly person' openly declaring in town meetings his hope 'for a better Government then the Country hath yet', though Williams suggests that the government this person has in mind would involve the 'Raping of the Fundamentall Liberties of the Country'.³⁷ In a letter dated 22 May, Williams provides his version of events leading to Verin's disfranchisement:

Sir we have bene long afflicted by a young man, boysterous and desperate (Philip Verins sonn of Salem) who, as he hath refused to hear the word with us (wch we molest him not for) this twelve month so because he could not draw his wife a gracious and modest woman to the same Ungodliness with him, he hath trodden her under foote tyrannically and brutishly: wch she and we long bearing though with his furious blowes she went in danger of Life at the last the major vote of us discard him from our Civill Freedome, or disfranchise etc.³⁸

In his *History* Winthrop fills in a few details, suggesting that he had heard other accounts of the incident. From Winthrop we learn that one 'Arnold', 'a witty man of their own company', objected to Verin's disfranchisement on the grounds that free exercise of conscience included a man's government of his wife.³⁹ The gathering did not adopt that view, though it also did not adopt the view held by some in attendance 'that if Verin would not suffer his wife to have her liberty, the church should dispose her to some other man, who would use her better'.⁴⁰

When noticed, this episode is touted as yet another example of Williams's forward-looking vision of liberty of conscience, which

extended in his mind to men and to women.⁴¹ Perhaps it is. But Williams's and Winthrop's accounts have different emphases. Williams elaborated upon Verin's violence towards his wife, Jane, though he also mentions in passing that Verin had been a disagreeable member of the community for some time. He also does not mention the diversity of opinion within the community on what, if anything, should be done about Verin's behaviour. Winthrop makes no mention of Verin's violence, and from Winthrop we learn that the prayer meetings at issue were held in Williams's home. Though he claims that the community did not 'molest' Verin for not hearing the word with them, Williams also describes Verin's refusal to hear the word as 'Ungodliness'. Surely he felt personally piqued that Verin did not deem the meetings held in the Williams home to be worth attending – and indeed deemed them events to be avoided – as he must also have felt personally piqued if Verin was the loud objector to the colony's form of government. Williams certainly makes clear that he finds Verin generally to violate the decorum of the community. Does personal animosity lead him to embellish the story of Verin's violence towards his wife, which Winthrop does not include because it was not verified by other sources? Williams is trying to convince his friend that Verin's legal complaints against Providence should not be heard in Salem. His many personal stakes in this affair should prevent us from taking his account in the letter to Winthrop entirely at face value. And if we do not take it entirely at face value, then the claim of violent restraint of Jane Verin's liberty of conscience seems like something of a pretext by which a disagreeable member of the community could be stripped of his citizenship.

Such a pretext may have been necessitated by the limited legal resources that Williams, and Providence, had available: English law and the charter of the colony. Any legal action taken against Verin would have to be justifiable according to one or the other; Providence had eschewed England's ecclesiastical legal regime, with its many convenient devices for isolating and punishing disagreeables. Verin's violence towards his wife would not be sufficient grounds by which he might be despoiled of his property rights under English law. The eighteenth-century jurist William Blackstone describes a husband's physical correction of his wife as within his legal rights under the common law, though that power 'began to be doubted' in 'the politer reign of Charles the second'.⁴² By the law of the time, forcing a divorce on Verin would have been the equivalent of despoiling him of property, and the community had no grounds on which to do so. Indeed in a letter of November 1650, well after he left Providence, Verin demands that he be able to

exercise property rights over his land. The claim is taken up in a town meeting, and Verin is sent a reply assuring him that, if he appears in court to claim his right, the town will do him justice.⁴³ A violation of the colonial charter that could justify the disfranchisement of this public nuisance had to be found, and the charge of restricting Jane Verin's liberty of conscience fitted the purpose: it allowed the colonists to bar Verin from voting in their assemblies. The kind of further action suggested by some colonists – divorcing the Verins and finding Jane a more suitable husband – could not be justified by recourse either to English law or to the charter. If, as has been argued, the common law's defence of property rights is one of most persistent concerns of Coke's jurisprudence, Williams may have retained this lesson from his early patron in his years in Providence, and been careful not to encroach upon it while taking firm action against Verin. And he may also have learned from Coke a more expansive view of civil order than is often attributed to him: Williams's consistent claims on the magistrate's administration of the second tablet of the decalogue leaves a good deal of social regulation within legitimate reach.

It is not amiss to suggest that the community at Providence did, in fact, see liberty of conscience as extending to men and to women. But we might also surmise that this small and close-knit community had a pest in its midst that it wished very much to remove. Defending Jane Verin's liberty of conscience offered a legal means by which peace, and firmer unity of religious opinion, could be restored in the plantation. Though agreeing to allow full liberty of conscience, the early records of Rhode Island suggest that, in a way to become typical of American Protestantism, the community expected rigid conformity in all things else. The records read like the minutes of a meddlesome condominium association, policing the use of common areas and fining those individuals who are more than 15 minutes late for a meeting or who do not adequately tend their property. Verin's 'boysterous' nature likely nettled Providence well before he was charged with restraining his wife's religious freedom.

II.

Citizens of the twenty-first century should be little surprised to find projected onto marriage values in the penumbras of law, religion and convention. Milton is often described as modern in his arguments for companionate marriage. He is perhaps equally modern in styling marriage a commonwealth in miniature: as the divorce tracts make clear, the

marriages that a polity deems licit signal its ideals of citizenship and harmonious community. The religious idiom of current American backlash against gay marriage thinly veils anxieties on the fragility of masculinist heteronormativity in public and private realms. That's clear. A less familiar example in the West, and one with suggestive parallels to the Verin case, is the controversy in Egypt surrounding Wafaa Constantine and Kamilia Shehata. The rumours swirling around these women are almost identical. Both are married to Coptic Orthodox priests. And both women were supposed to have converted to Islam in order to divorce those priests, divorce and remarriage being matters on which the Coptic Orthodox Church frowns deeply and on which shari'a is uncharacteristically casual.⁴⁴

Like many nations who are heirs to the Ottoman millet system, Egypt has a complex tangle of confessionally based personal status laws. The 1938 personal status regulations for Orthodox Copts were drafted by the Orthodox General Community Council, which at that time presided over cases of family law, rather than the Holy Synod of the Coptic Orthodox Church. In a 1971 decree Pope Shenouda III rejected these regulations on the grounds that divorce could be granted only in cases of adultery. But Egyptian courts continued to apply the 1938 regulations. Copts who divorced in the courts were still considered married in the eyes of the church. Under pressure from Shenouda, in 2008 the Coptic Community Council revised the personal status regulations of 1938 so that divorce could be granted only in cases of adultery or change of religion.⁴⁵ By this decision, the easiest path to divorce for Coptic Orthodox women became a change of religion: under Egypt's personal status law for Muslims, a woman may apply for a unilateral, or *khul*, divorce, though in choosing this path she renounces her financial entitlements. That law applies to Muslims and to those in inter-confessional marriages. In a sensational 2001 case the Coptic Orthodox actress Hala Sidqi converted to Syrian Orthodoxy so that her marriage would be considered inter-denominational and she could obtain a *khul* divorce from her Coptic Orthodox husband.⁴⁶ He would later sue the Coptic Orthodox Church for not recognising that divorce and thus not allowing him to remarry within the church, a point to which we will return.

The Wafaa Constantine saga began when she was reported missing by her brother on 27 November 2004.⁴⁷ Within a week, authorities informed her family that she had been removed from her village, Abul-Matameer, to live 150 kilometres away in Cairo because she had converted to Islam and was in the protection of a Muslim family. In such situations the potential convert was typically delivered to local church

officials so that her intentions might be confirmed, but in 2003 state security had abruptly stopped using such 'reconciliation committees'.⁴⁸ The case sparked weeks of protest from Copts in Abul-Matameer, who claimed that Constantine had been coerced. Rumours surfaced that she had fallen in love with a Muslim co-worker and converted so that the two could be married, though when interviewed that co-worker denied the existence of any romantic relationship. With Coptic protests shifting from Abul-Matameer to Cairo, the matter came to the attention of the highest levels of authority, and Pope Shenouda III reportedly called Hosni Mubarak's chief of staff to request that Constantine be returned to the church. Returned she was, and quickly whisked away to undisclosed churches and monasteries, where she could be interviewed by priests on her confessional commitments. After those interviews church officials reported that Constantine believed herself still to be a Christian.

In the way of serial drama, this popular plotline was soon recycled with a few embellishments.⁴⁹ In July 2010 Kamilia Shehata, also the wife of a Coptic priest, was reported missing by her family in Minya, a rural governorate approximately 200 kilometres south of Cairo. The family's suspicion that she had been kidnapped by Muslims who forced her conversion sparked Coptic protests in several Egyptian cities. Shehata resurfaced saying that she and her husband had a dispute, that as a result she had gone to live with a friend, and that she had never converted to Islam. She made a televised statement declaring that she was staying in a monastery of her own accord. Muslim groups were unpersuaded, particularly those least persuadable of Muslims, the Salafists. They commenced waves of protests demanding that Shehata be released, claimed that scores of new converts were being forcibly detained by the church, and formed a 'Coalition for the Support of New Muslims'. Shehata's supposed imprisonment became a rallying point for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups, and with deadly results: a few hours after a demonstration on New Year's Eve 2010, the midnight Mass in Alexandria's Two Saints Church was bombed, killing 23; and it was given as justification for a November 2012 bombing that killed 58 worshippers in a Baghdad church.

The Constantine and Shehata affairs fit rather neatly into the prevailing narratives of many of Egypt's Muslims and Copts. For Muslim fundamentalists they are yet another example of the Mubarak regime's inability to protect the faithful, and in this case indicate an overly tender handling of Egypt's Christian minority betraying the influence of American patrons. And for Copts the violent reaction to supposed conversions confirmed the hostility of Egypt's Muslim majority. This in turn

justified continued endorsement of a Mubarak regime that had received the support of Pope Shenouda III as a bulwark against Muslim extremists. Even after the broad participation of confessional groups in the revolution leading to the collapse of the Mubarak regime in February 2011, Salafist groups held protests calling for the release of Shehata. These protests allowed the Salafists to style themselves the true protectors of Islam – as opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, which had largely avoided the Shehata affair – and to avail themselves of a compromised security environment to take violent action against Copts, engaging in violent clashes, setting fire to churches and looting homes. In May 2011 violent clashes between Muslims and Copts left 12 dead and two Cairo churches in flames, all started by rumours that a Muslim man's wife had been kidnapped by Copts. In October 2011 such clashes resulted in the death of 24 Copts, largely at the hands of the Egyptian army, which opened fire on protesters and ran them under the wheels of armoured vehicles.⁵⁰

All of this happens as the issue of Coptic divorce and remarriage is being addressed in Egyptian law, and in ways that the church deems an encroachment upon its jurisdiction. Two Coptic Orthodox men, including the ex-husband of Hala Sidqi, had sued the church for refusing to allow remarriage after the courts had granted them divorces. On 29 May 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court issued a ruling demanding that the Coptic Orthodox Church recognise second marriages, on the grounds that all Egyptian citizens have the constitutional right to marry and form a family. In a defiant response, Pope Shenouda III declared that he would not abide by the decision.⁵¹ Should the church's new pope, Tawadros II, be equally intransigent in the face of pressure from his flock, more suspected conversions, and with them more overblown inter-religious strife, seem inevitable.⁵²

And one wonders if real advances in women's rights are tenable in this climate of acrimonious battle between a deeply patriarchal Coptic Orthodox Church and a deeply patriarchal Salafist interpretation of Islam. Lest we have any illusions at all about Salafist commitment to women's rights, these groups are wont either to bar women completely from their demonstrations or to require that women protest from behind the niqab. One of the most popular posters at their protests was an image of Shehata wearing a niqab, signalling not only that she had converted but had become a convert of the Salafist kind. Neither side has anything remotely resembling a *per se* commitment to the religious liberties of women, and certainly not to the human rights of women more generally, though each is willing fiercely to fight for

Constantine or Shehata. Much more explicitly than in the Verin case, we see here a pretextual claim that a woman's liberty of conscience has been impinged upon, which claim then supports action against those to whom one was already opposed. The Mubarak regime took a typically double-mouthed approach to such issues: assuring Copts protection against Muslim extremists, and claiming an Islamic identity visible in laws making conversion to Islam easily obtained and conversion to Christianity virtually impossible. Only time will tell whether Egypt's post-revolutionary constitution will offer bona fide protections for the rights of women, or advance a Salafist agenda by paying lip-service to women's social role, affording the freedom to move only in a closely prescribed path. Tellingly, over the course of drafting the human-rights activist Manal al-Tibi resigned from the Rights and Freedoms Committee of the Constituent Assembly, citing counter-revolutionary efforts to encroach upon personal freedoms by the assembly's Islamist majority and by elements answering to the military.⁵³

In analysing the Shehata affair, Saba Mahmood has pointed to the tendency for women to 'serve as placeholders for broader claims about culture, identity, and territoriality ... [who] might be the objects of such narratives (to be saved or repudiated) but they are seldom its subjects or agents'.⁵⁴ The observation is most explicitly true when women's liberties are being curtailed; it is also sometimes true when women's liberties are being defended. A Whig historian with a face of brass might see in such moments the seeds planted for a later blossoming of women's rights. We might be more sceptical when fundamentally anti-feminist belief systems are deployed to defend a woman's liberty of conscience, particularly when supposed encroachments upon that liberty are being made by individuals already deemed an affront to community standards. In the cases of Jane Verin and Kamilia Shehata, those who took up the cause of free expression of conscience seemed very much to have other battles at the fore of their attention. We have seen Anne Sadleir lament that the confused notion that every person should follow the light of conscience leads inexorably to bloody confessional strife and tramples upon the order provided by the national church. If we disagree with this assessment, it is to the extent that claims for this individual liberty are often not so individual at all but are deployed by believing communities towards ends that may or may not advance religious liberty in the polity as a whole. For all of the objectionable slenderness of his ecumenism, Coke clearly saw this in his remark on liberty of conscience serving as a 'colourable pretence' for those recusants awaiting opportunities to foment civil strife. And claims of tender conscience

often engage in a dubiously legitimate defence of women as particularly vulnerable believers in need of protection.

Notes

1. Roger Williams, *Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health* (1652; Wing W2762). For his assistance in preparing the research for this chapter, I am indebted to Patrick McGrath, doctoral candidate at the University of Illinois.
2. Roger Williams, letter to Mrs Anne Sadlier, c. April 1652, *The Correspondence of Roger Williams*, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, 2 vols. (Hanover and London: Brown University Press, 1988), 1: 357. Williams, *The Fourth Paper, Presented by Major Butler... By R.W. Unto Which is Sunjoynd the Fifteen Proposals of the Ministers* (London, Printed for Giles Calvert, 1652; Wing W2763); *The Hirelings Ministry None of Christs* (London, Printed for Giles Calvert, 1652; Wing, W2763); and *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody by Mr Cottons Endeavour to Wash it White in the Blood of the Lambe* (London, Printed for Giles Calvert, 1652; Wing W2760).
3. Williams, letter to Mrs Anne Sadlier, c. April 1652, *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 358.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. See Victoria E. Burke, 'Sadleir, Anne (1585–1671/2),' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004).
7. Letter from Mrs Anne Sadleir, after April 1652, *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 360.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, 360–61.
10. Letter to Mrs Anne Sadleir, c. summer 1652, *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 363–65.
11. Letter from Mrs Anne Sadleir, c. summer or autumn 1652, *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 365–66; emphasis mine.
12. See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, *Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 54, which makes Williams sound rather like a defender of the The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 'Williams also thinks damage to conscience an intrinsic wrong, a horrible desecration of what is most precious about a human life.' See also John M. Barry's largely adulatory biography, *Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul: Church, State, and the Birth of Liberty* (New York: Viking, 2012).
13. Letter to Mrs Anne Sadleir, c. winter 1652/1653, *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 375.
14. *Ibid.*, 1: 376.
15. From Mrs Anne Sadleir c. winter 1652/1653, *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 377.
16. *Ibid.*, 1: 379.
17. *Ibid.*, 1: 378.
18. Sadleir's letter is written in the winter of 1652/1653; the first record of Milton's blindness is dated 9 July 1652, and is likely very close to the

- time when he became completely blind. See Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns, *John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 211–12, 423n44.
19. Campbell suggests that Sadleir may be mistaken in that Marvell was more likely to have helped with the first *Defensio* than with *Eikonoklastes*. See William Riley Parker, *Milton: A Biography*, 2 vols., 2nd ed., ed. Gordon Campbell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 2: 964, 1022. Milton's two sonnets to Skinner are 'Cyriack, whose Grandsire on the Royal Bench' and 'Cyriack, this three years day these eyes, though clear', in *Complete Shorter Poems*, ed. Stella P. Revard (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2009), pp. 306, 366–67.
 20. See Herbert Palmer, *The Glass of God's Providence... Held Forth in a Sermon Preached to the Two Houses of Parliament* (London, 1644; Wing P235), 55–56.
 21. Letter from Mrs Anne Sadleir, c. winter 1652/1653, *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 379.
 22. See my *Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism, Cultural Memory in the Present* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), esp. 10–18.
 23. Caudrey's Case, (1591) 77 Eng. Reports 1 (1378–1865), 6.
 24. *Ibid.*, 7.
 25. *Ibid.*, 33–38.
 26. *Ibid.*, 41.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. *Ibid.*, 44. Coke continues: 'This was high treason by the ancient laws of England; and thereupon Campion, Sherwin, and many other Romish Priests being apprehended... [were] by the ancient common laws of England, indicted, arraigned, tried, adjudged, and executed, for high treason against their natural allegiance which they owed their liege sovereign.'
 29. Robert Pricket, *The Lord Coke his Speech and Charge* (London, 1607; STC 5491), sig. F1r.
 30. *Ibid.*, sig. G1r–G1v.
 31. *Ibid.*, sig. G2r.
 32. See Allen D. Boyer, *Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 184–88.
 33. See Stephen D. White, *Sir Edward Coke and the Grievances of the Commonwealth 1621–1628* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 204–05.
 34. *Journals of the House of Commons*, 1: 809. Coke refers to Tacitus, *Life of Cnaeus Julius Agricola*, section 12.
 35. See Samuel Greene Arnold, *History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations*, vol. 1 (Providence: Preston and Rounds, 1899), 408–09.
 36. *Record of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations*, ed. John Russell Bartlett, vol. 1: 1636–1663 (Providence, RI: A. Crawford Greene and Brother, 1856), 16.
 37. Letter to John Winthrop, early May 1638 (?), *Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 1: 154.
 38. *Ibid.*, 1: 156.
 39. John Winthrop, *The History of New England from 1630 to 1649*, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1853), 340–41; available at books.google.com
 40. *Ibid.*

41. See, for example, Edward J. Eberle, 'Another of Roger Williams's Gifts: Women's Right to Liberty of Conscience', *Roger Williams University Law Review*, 9 (2004): 399–407.
42. William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, vol. 1, ed. Wayne Morrison (London: Cavendish, 2001), 341 [I.xv].
43. *Records of Rhode Island Colony*, 17.
44. As Kenneth Cuno points out, among the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Maliki took the most benign view of divorce. The tendency in shari'a is to emphasise the mutual obligations of marriage – obedience from the wife, financial support from the husband – and to grant divorce when those obligations are unfulfilled. In interpretations that began to prevail over the twentieth century, a wife's obedience could be forced. See Kenneth M. Cuno, 'Disobedient Wives and Neglectful Husbands', *Family, Gender, and Law in a Globalizing Middle East and South Asia*, ed. Cuno and Manisha Desai (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009), 5–11.
45. See Bernard-Maugiron, 369–70.
46. See Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, 'Divorce and Remarriage of Orthodox Copts in Egypt: The 2008 State Council Ruling and the Amendment of the 1938 Personal Status Regulations', *Islamic Law and Society*, 18 (2011): 382.
47. This account of Wafaa Constantine's conversion draws primarily on Reem Nafie, 'When the Social Becomes Political', *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, 16–22 December 2004 (accessed 13 September 2012), weekly.ahram.org.eg
48. Mariz Tadros, 'Behind Egypt's Deep Red Lines', *Middle East Research and Information Project*, 13 October 2010 (accessed 22 September 2012), available at merip.org
49. Details on the KamiliaShehata episode are drawn from the following: 'Pope Not Summoned for Testimony in Alleged Convert Case, Official Says', *Al-Masry Al-Youm* 4 April 2011 (accessed 23 September 2012), available at egyptindependent.com; Emad Khalil, 'Copts Call for Million-Man Protest to Protect Cathedral from Salafis', *Al-Masry Al-Youm* 2 May 2011 (accessed 23 September 2012), available at egyptindependent.com; Saeed Nafea and Theresa Kamal, 'Church Source: Husband of Woman who Allegedly Converted to Islam Disappears', *Al-Masry Al-Youm* 4 May 2011 (accessed 23 September 2012), available at egyptindependent.com; Ahmed Zaki Osman, 'Salafis Protest for Release of Alleged Convert to Islam', *Al-Masry Al-Youm* 20 April 2011 (accessed 23 September 2012), available at egyptindependent.com
50. See Osman, 'Salafis Protest', *Al-Masry Al-Youm*; David D. Kirkpatrick, 'Clashes in Cairo Leave 12 Dead and 2 Churches in Flames', *New York Times* 8 May 2011 (accessed 23 September 2012), available at nytimes.com; William Dalrymple, 'Egypt's Copts Face an Uncertain Future', *The Guardian* 10 Oct 2011 (accessed 23 September 2012), available at guardian.co.uk. Many of these tensions between Copts, Salafis and Egyptian authorities were replayed over the YouTube film *The Innocence of Muslims*, on which see Matthew Dimmock's essay in this volume and my 'Muhammad "Film" Protests and the Crimes of Fundamentalism', *Huffington Post* 14 September 2012 (accessed 29 March 2013), available at huffingtonpost.com

51. See Mariz Tadros, 'Behind Egypt's Deep Red Lines', and Karima Kamal, 'Coptic Remarriage: How to Solve the Impasse,' *Al-Masry Al-Youm* 8 June 2010 (accessed 14 September 2012), available at egyptindependent.com
52. See David D. Kirkpatrick, 'Coptic Church Chooses Pope Who Rejects Political Role', *New York Times* 4 November 2012 (accessed 29 March 2013), available at nytimes.com
53. On al-Tibi's resignation, see 'Manal al-Tibi's Resignation Letter to Egypt's Constituent Assembly', trans. Bassem Sabry, *Ahram Online* 26 September 2012 (accessed 1 October 2012), available at english.ahram.org; and 'Constituent Assembly Member Resigns over Islamist Domination', *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 24 September 2012 (accessed 1 October 2012), available at egyptindependent.com. When describing an 'Islamist majority' in bodies such as the Constituent Assembly, it is important to distinguish between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. The former has shown relatively little interest in fundamentalist social causes, while such causes are the very lifeblood of the latter.
54. Saba Mahmood, 'Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt', *American Ethnologist*, 39 (2012): 58.

Select Bibliography

- Abbot, W. C., ed., *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937–1947)
- Achinstein, Sharon and Elizabeth Sauer, eds, *Milton and Toleration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
- Achinstein, Sharon, 'Cold War Milton', *University of Toronto Library Quarterly*, 77, 3 (2008), 801–836
- Akyol, Mustafa, *Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011)
- Andrea, Bernadette, *Women and Islam in Early Modern English Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
- An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed, *Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996)
- Armstrong, R. and T. O'Hannrachain, eds, *Insular Christianity: Alternative Models of the Church in Britain and Ireland, c.1550–c.1750* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013)
- Ashcraft, Richard, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986)
- Bainton, R. H., 'The Struggle for Religious Liberty' *Church History*, 10 (1941), 95–12
- Birchwood, Matthew, *Staging Islam in England: Drama and Culture, 1640–1685* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2007)
- Bossy, J., *The English Catholic Community 1570–1850* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1975)
- Boyer, Allen D., *Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003)
- Braddick, M. J., *State Formation in Early Modern England, ca. 1550–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
- Braun, H. E. and E. Vallance, eds, *Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1700* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
- Brooks, Douglas, ed., *Milton and the Jews* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
- Browers, Michelle and Charles Kurzman, eds, *An Islamic Reformation?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004)
- Burgess, G., *Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996)
- Burgess, G., 'Was the Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 61 (2000 for 1998), 173–201
- Burton, Jonathan, *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2005)
- Butterfield, H., 'Toleration in Early Modern Times', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 38 (1977), 573–584

- Butterfield, H., *Historical Development of the Principle of Toleration in British Life* (Epworth Press, London 1957)
- Byrd, James P., *The Challenges of Roger Williams: Religious Liberty, Violent Persecution and the Bible* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002)
- Caldwell, Christopher, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West* (New York: Doubleday, 2009)
- Campbell, Gordon and Thomas N. Corns, *John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- Carey, John, ed., *Complete Shorter Poems of Milton* (London: Longman, 1971)
- Champion, J. A. I., ed., *John Toland's Nazarenes* (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1999)
- Champion, J. A. I., 'How to Read Hobbes: Independent, Heretic, Political Scientist, Absolutist? A Review of Some Recent Works on Hobbes', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 11 (2007), 87–98
- Champion, J. A. I., '“The Kingdom of Darkness”: Hobbes and Heterodoxy', in *The Intellectual Consequences of Religious Heterodoxy 1600–1750*, ed. John Robertson and Sarah Mortimer (Leiden: Brill, 2012) 95–120
- Champion, Justin, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 1660–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
- Champion, Justin, *Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696–1722* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003)
- Chapman, Alister, John Coffey and Brad Gregory, eds, *Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009)
- Cherry, Conrad, ed., *God's New Israel: Religious Interpretations of American Destiny*, revised and updated edition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998)
- Coffey, J., 'Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution', *Historical Journal*, 41 (1998), 961–985
- Coffey, John, *John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2006)
- Coffey, John, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England 1558–1689* (London: Longman, 2000)
- Cohen, Robert, ed., *The Jewish Nation in Surinam: Historical Essays* (Amsterdam: S. Emmering, 1982)
- Daniel, Norman, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* 2nd edition. (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1993)
- Darbishire, Helen, ed., *The Early Lives of John Milton* (London: Constable and Co., 1932)
- Davis, J. C., 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution', *Historical Journal*, 35 (1992), 507–530
- DeKrey, Gary S., 'Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting Cases for Conscience, 1667–1672', *Historical Journal*, 38 (1995), 53–83
- Dimmock, Matthew, *Mythologies of the Prophet Muhammad in Early Modern English Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
- Dimmock, Matthew, *New Turkes: Dramatising Islam and the Ottomans in Early Modern England* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005)
- Dimmock, Matthew and Andrew Hadfield, eds, *The Religions of the Book: Christian Perceptions, 1400–1660* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)

- Duffy, E., *Saints, Sacrilege and Sediton: Religion and Conflict in the Tudor Reformations* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012)
- Dures A., *English Catholicism 1558–1642* (Harlow: Longman, 1998)
- Eberle, Edward J., 'Another of Roger Williams's Gifts: Women's Right to Liberty of Conscience', *Roger Williams University Law Review*, 9 (2004), 399–407
- Edwards, F., ed., *The Elizabethan Jesuits: 'Historia Missionis Anglicanae Societatis Jesu' (1660) of Henry More* (London and Chichester: Phillimore, 1981)
- Endelman, Todd M., *The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002)
- Fatovic, Clement, 'The Anti-Catholic Roots of Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom in English Political Thought', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 66, 1 (2005), 37–58
- Galeotti, Anna Elizabetha, *Toleration as Recognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
- Glaser, Eliane, *Judaism without Jews: Philosemitism and Christian Polemic in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)
- Glickman, G., 'Early Modern England: Persecution, Martyrdom and Toleration?', *The Historical Journal*, 51, 1 (2008), 251–267
- Goldie, M. A. and R. Wokler, eds, *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
- Grasso, Kevin and Robert P. Hunt, eds, *Catholicism and Religious Liberty: Contemporary Reflections on Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Liberty* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006)
- Grell, Ole Peter and Roy Porter, eds, *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
- Grell, Ole Peter, Jonathan I. Israel and Nicholas Tyacke, eds, *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)
- Guibbory, Achsah, *Christian Identity, Jews and Israel in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
- Guminski, Arnold T. and Brian W. Harrison, O. S., *Religious Freedom: Did Vatican II Contradict Traditional Catholic Doctrine* (South Bend, IN: St Augustine's Press, 2012)
- Hadfield, Andrew and Matthew Dimmock, eds, *The Religions of the Book: Co-Existence and Conflict, 1400–1660* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
- Haller, William, *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution 1638–1647* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934)
- Hammond, Paul and Blair Worden, eds, *John Milton: Life, Writing, Reputation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
- Hardy, H., ed., *Isaiah Berlin: Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Harris, T., ed., *The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500–1850* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2001)
- Harris, T., P. Seaward and M. A. Goldie, eds, *The Politics of Religion in Restoration England* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1990)
- Hashemi, K., *Studies in Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights: Religious Legal Traditions, International Human Rights Law and Muslim States* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008)
- Hashemi, Nader, *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Towards a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

- Henriques, Henry Straus Quixano, *The Jews and the English Law* (London: J. Jacobs, 1908)
- Hirschman, Albert O., *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977)
- Houlston, V., *Catholic Resistance in Elizabethan England: Robert Persons's Jesuit Polemic, 1580–1610* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)
- Hunter, Michael, *Science and the Shape of Orthodoxy: Intellectual Change in Late Seventeenth-Century Britain* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1995)
- Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)
- Hutchings, Mark, *Three Jacobean 'Turkish' Plays* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012)
- Hutton, Sarah and Paul Schurman, eds, *Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008)
- Israel, Jonathan, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
- Israel, Jonathan, *Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750–1790* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
- Israel, Jonathan, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- Israel, Jonathan, 'Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 67 (2006), 523–545
- Israel, Jonathan, 'Locke, Spinoza and the Philosophical Debate Concerning Toleration in the Early Enlightenment (c. 1670–c. 1750)', *Mededelingen*, 62 (1999), 1–19
- Israel, Jonathan, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
- Jenkins, Philip, *The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- Jenkins, Philip, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)
- Jenkinson, Sally, ed., *Bayle: Political Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 2000)
- Jennings, Francis, *The Invasion of America, Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975)
- Jordan, Wilbur K., *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932–1940)
- Kagan, Richard L. and Philip D., eds, *Morgan Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism, 1500–1800* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009)
- Kaplan, Benjamin, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007)
- Kaplan, Yosef, Henry Mechoulam and Richard H. Popkins., eds, *Menasseh ben Israel and his World* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1989)
- Katz, David S., *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603–1655* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)
- Katz, David S., *The Jews in the History of England, 1485–1850* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Kenyon, J. P., *The Popish Plot* (London: Heinemann, 1972)

- Kettner, James H., *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978)
- Kidd, Thomas S., *American Christians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009)
- Kilcullen, John, *Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld, Bayle, and Toleration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)
- Klausen, Jytte, *The Cartoons That Shook the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009)
- Komonchak, Joseph, 'Religious Freedom and the Confessional State: The Twentieth-Century Discussion', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 95 (2000), 634–650
- Kupperman, Karen Ordahl, *Indians and English, Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000)
- LaFantasie, Glenn W., ed., *The Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 2 vols. (Hanover, NH and London: Brown University Press, 1988)
- Lake, P. and M. Questier, *The Trials of Margaret Clitherow: Persecution, Martyrdom and the Politics of Sanctity in Elizabethan England* (London: Continuum, 2011)
- Lamont, W. M., *Godly Rule: Politics and Religion, 1603–1660* (London: Macmillan Press, 1969)
- Laursen, John Christian and Cary J. Nederman, eds, *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment* (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998)
- Lecler, Joseph, S. J., *Toleration and the Reformation*, trans. T. L. Westow, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, 1960)
- Lepore, Jill *The Name of War, King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998)
- Lewycky, Nadine and Adam Morton, eds, *Getting Along? Religious Identities and Confessional Relations in Early Modern England – Essays in Honour of Professor W. J. Sheils* (Ashgate: Farnham, 2012)
- Lieb, Michael, Emma Mason and Jonathan Roberts, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception History of the Bible* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
- Lilla, Mark, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics and the Modern West* (New York: Random House, 2007)
- Locke, John, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Indianapolis: IN: Hackett Publishing Co, 1983)
- Loewenstein, D., J. Marshall, eds, *Heresy, Literature, and Politics in Early Modern English Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
- Loomba, Ania and Jonathan Burton eds, *Race in Early Modern England: A Documentary Companion* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)
- Lutz, Donald S., ed., *Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A Documentary History* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998)
- MacLean, Gerald, *Looking East: English Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)
- MacLean, Gerald, *The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580–1720* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
- Malcolm, Noel, *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)

- Malik, Kenan, *From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy* (London: Atlantic Books, 2009)
- Malik, Maleiha, ed., *Anti-Muslim Prejudice in the West, Past and Present*, special issue of *Patterns of Prejudice* 43.3–4 (July/September 2009)
- Mandell, Daniel R., *King Philip's War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010)
- Marshall, John, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
- Marshall, Paul and Nina Shea, eds, *Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)
- Matar, Nabil, *Islam and Britain, 1558–1685* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
- Matar, Nabil, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)
- May, Henry F., *The Enlightenment in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976)
- McDowell, Nicholas and Nigel Smith, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of Milton* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
- McGreevy, John, *Catholicism and American Freedom: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003)
- McJannet, Linda, *The Sultan Speaks: Dialogue in English Plays and Histories about the Ottoman Turks* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)
- McLaren, A., 'Rethinking Republicanism: *Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos* in Context', *Historical Journal*, 49 (2006), 23–52
- McLaren, J. P. S. and H. Coward, eds, *Law, the State and Religious Conscience* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998)
- McMichael, Jack R. and Barbara Taft, eds, *The Writings of William Walwyn* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989)
- Mendus, Susan, *Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989)
- Miller, P., '“Freethinking” and “Freedom of Thought” in Eighteenth-Century Britain', *Historical Journal*, 36 (1993), 599–617
- Mohamed, Feisal G., *Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism, Cultural Memory in the Present* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011)
- Moore, Rosemary, *The Light in Their Consciences: Early Quakers in Britain, 1646–1666* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000)
- Morrill, J. S., P. Slack and D. R. Woolf, eds, *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
- Morton, T. and N. Smith, eds, *Radicalism in British Literary Culture, 1650–1830: From Revolution to Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
- Murphy, Andrew R., *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America* (University Park: The Penn State University Press, 2003)
- Murphy, A. R. 'The Uneasy Relationship between Social Contract Theory and Religious Toleration', *The Journal of Politics*, 59 (1997), 368–392
- Murphy, Andrew R., ed., *The Political Writings of William Penn* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), 373
- Murphy, Andrew R., ed., *The Political Writing of William Penn* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002)

- Nederman, Cary J. and John Christian Laursen, eds, *Difference and Dissent: Theories of Toleration in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996)
- Nelson, Eric, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010)
- North, J. A., 'Religion and Politics, from Republic to Principate', *Journal of Roman Studies*, 76 (1986), 251–258
- Nussbaum, Martha, *Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 2008)
- Pagden, A., ed., *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
- Patterson, Annabel, *Early Modern Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
- Perreau-Saussine, Emile, *Catholicism and Democracy: An Essay in the History of Political Thought*, trans. Richard Rex (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012)
- Peterson, M. D. and R. C. Vaughan, eds, *The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Its Evolution and Consequences in American History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
- Pettegree, Andrew, *Foreign Protestant Communities in Sixteenth-Century London* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
- Phillipson, N. T. and Q. Skinner, eds, *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
- Pocock, J. G. A., ed., *The Political Works of James Harrington* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)
- Pocock, J. G. A., ed., *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
- Pocock, J. G. A., 'Quentin Skinner. The History of Politics and the Politics of History', *Common Knowledge*, 10 (2004), 532–550
- Pocock, J. G. A., *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975)
- Porter, R. and O. Grell, eds, *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
- Preus, J. Samuel, *Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
- Questier, M. C., *Catholicism and Community in Early Modern England: Politics, Aristocratic Patronage and Religion, c.1550–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
- Ramadan, Tariq, *The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism* (London: Allen Lane, 2010)
- Raymond, Joad, 'Complications of Interest: Milton, Scotland, Ireland, and National Identity in 1649', *Review of English Studies*, 55 (2004), 315–345
- Reventlow, Henning Graf, *The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World* (London: SCM, 1984)
- Rex, Walter, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965)
- Richter, Daniel K., *Before the Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011)

- Richter, Daniel K., *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001)
- Rosenblatt, Jason P., *Renaissance England's Chief Rabbi: John Selden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- Saeed, Abdullah and Hassan Saeed, *Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004)
- Salmon, J. H. M., *The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959)
- Samad, Joy, 'John Locke and Muslim Liberalism', *Journal of Church and State*, 53 (2010), 84–108
- Schwoerer, Los G., ed., *The Revolution of 1688–1689: Changing Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
- Scott, J., *Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
- Scott, Joan Wallach, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010)
- Scribner, Bob and Ole Peter Grell, eds, *Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
- Selwood, Jacob, *Diversity and Difference in Early Modern London* (Burlington, VT, and Farnham: Ashgate, 2010)
- Selwood, Jacob, "'English-Born Reputed Strangers": Birth and Descent in Seventeenth-Century London', *Journal of British Studies*, 44, 4 (2005), 728–753
- Shagan, Ethan, *The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
- Shapiro, James, *Shakespeare and the Jews* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)
- Sheils, W. J., ed., *Persecution and Toleration: Papers Read at the Twenty-Second Summer Meeting and the Twenty-Third Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1984)
- Simpson, James, *Burning to Read: English Fundamentalism and its Reformation Opponents* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007)
- Siochrú, Micheál Ó, *God's Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland* (London: Faber and Faber, 2008)
- Skinner, Q., *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
- Skinner, Q., 'Rethinking Political Liberty', *History Workshop Journal*, 61 (2006), 156–170
- Skinner, Q., *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought Volume I: The Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
- Skinner, Q., *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought Volume II: The Age of Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
- Skinner, Quentin and Martin van Gelderen, eds, *Freedom and the Construction of Europe*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
- Skinner, Quentin, 'John Milton and the Politics of Slavery', *Prose Studies*, 23 (2000), 1–22
- Skinner, Quentin, 'A Third Concept of Liberty', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 117 (2002), 237–268
- Sommerville, J. P., *Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640* (London: Longman, 1999)

- Stewart, M. A., ed., *English Philosophy in the Age of Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
- Stewart, M. A., *John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
- Strauss, L., *Hobbes's Critique of Religion and Related Writings* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011)
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *Three Ways To Be an Alien: Travails & Encounters in the Early Modern World* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2011)
- Tanner, John and Justin Collings, 'How Adams and Jefferson Read Milton and Milton Read Them', *Milton Quarterly*, 40, 3 (2006), 207–219
- Taylor, Charles, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003)
- Thompson, A. C., 'Popery, Politics, and Private Judgement in Early Hanoverian Britain', *Historical Journal*, 45 (2002), 333–356
- Tolan, John, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002)
- Tomlins, Christopher, *Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in English America, 1580–1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
- Tournu, Christophe and Neil Forsyth, eds, *Milton, Rights and Liberties* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007)
- Turner, Jack, 'John Locke, Christian Mission, and Colonial America', *Modern Intellectual History*, 8 (2011), 267–297
- Tuveson, Ernest Lee, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968)
- Tyacke, N., ed., *The English Revolution c. 1590–1720* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007)
- Van Gelderen, M. and Quentin Skinner, eds, *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage: Volume 2. The Values of Republicanism in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
- Vattimo, G. and R. Rorty, *The Future of Religion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005)
- Vernon, Richard, *The Career of Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast and After* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1997)
- Vitkus, Daniel, *Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000)
- Vitkus, Daniel, *Turning Turk: English Theater and the Multicultural Mediterranean* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)
- Waldron, Jeremy, *Locke, God, and Equality: Christian Foundations of Locke's Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- Walsham, Alexandra, *Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006)
- Walsham, Alexandra, *Church Papists: Catholicism, Conformity and Confessional Polemic in Early Modern England* (2nd edition, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999)
- Walzer, Michael, *On Toleration* (New Haven, CT, London: Yale University Press, 1997)
- Wolf, Lucien, *Menasseh Ben Israel's Mission to Oliver Cromwell* (London: Macmillan, 1901)

- Wolfe, D. M. et al., eds, *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, 8 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953–1982)
- Wolfe, Don M., 'Limits of Miltonic Toleration', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 60, 4 (1961), 834–846
- Wolfson, Adam, *Persecution or Toleration: An Explication of the Locke-Proast Quarrel, 1689–1704* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2010)
- Womersley, D., P. Bullard and A. Williams, eds, '*Cultures of Whiggism*': *New Essays on English Literature and Culture in the Long Eighteenth Century* (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2005)
- Woodhouse, A. S. P., ed., *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates (1647–1649) from the Clarke Manuscripts* (London: J. M. Dent, 1992)
- Wootton, D., ed., *Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649–1776* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994)
- Worden, B., *Roundhead Reputations: The English Civil War and the Passions of Posterity*. (London: Allen Lane, 2001)
- Yavuz, M. Hakan, *Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gulen Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)
- Zagorin, Perez, *How Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)

Index

Note: Letter 'n' followed by the locators refer to notes.

- Abraham, 21
Abrahamic, 224
Abul-Matameer, 245, 246
act against conventicles, 125
act of settlement, 163
act of supremacy, 45, 53
act of uniformity, 149
Adams, David, 18
Adams, John, 134 (n. 2), 135
Agazzari, 156 (n. 63), 159
affirmation act (1695), 128
Aikenhead, Thomas, 19
Aisha, 217
Ahern, Bertie, 135
Alcoran, the, 217, 217 (n. 16), 225, 225 (n. 36, 38)
Ali, Abdullah Yusuf, 228
Ali, Maulana Muhammad, 228, 228 (n. 43)
Allen, William, 152, 153, 156 (n. 63), 157, 157 (n. 80), 160 (n. 102), 161
Al Qaeda, 246
al-Tibi, Manal, 248
American ethos, 1
Amiens, 160
anachronism, 5, 29
Ananias, 26
Antichrist, 26, 41, 218
anticlericalism, 42, 53, 55, 56, 61, 62, 65, 65 (n. 88)
antiperistasis, 228
apostasy, 7, 17, 31, 32, 33
 debate over death penalty, 31, 32, 33
 interpretation of Koran and the hadiths, 7, 17, 32, 216
arab spring, 128
Arabella, the ship, 183, 186
archdeaconry court, 156
Aristotle, 139
Aristotelian taxonomy, 62, 138
Arlington, Lord, 203, 203 (n. 56), 204
Arminianism, 18, 241
Articles of Peace Made and Concluded with the Irish Rebels (Anon), 137
atheism, 30, 46, 47, 48, 54, 65, 128, 143, 218, 229
Athens, 42
Atterbury, Francis, 41
Audland, Anne (*A True Declaration of the Suffering of the Innocent* (1665)), 177
Aquaviva, Claudio, 152
Axtell, James, 100

Babylonian captivity, 171
Bacile, Sam, 215, 219, 222
 Nakoula Bassely Nakoula, 215
 The Innocence of Muslims, (2012), 10, 215, 217–22, 224, 230, 247 (n. 50)
Balfour declaration, 183
Barbadoes/Barbados, 176, 194, 198, 203 (n. 55), 204–6
Barlow, Lewis, 152, 152 (n. 25)
Baron Petre of Writtle. *see* Petre, Sir John
Bayle, Pierre, 7, 16, 18, 21, 24–8, 26 (n. 63), 30, 48, 54 (n. 43), 60, 65
 Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1697), 25
 Historical Dictionary, 60
 Philosophical Commentary, 26
Belfast, 137, 138, 138 (n. 17), 141
Benedict XVI, Pope, 216, 216 (n. 9)
Bercovitch, 102
Berlin, Isaiah, 7, 42, 42 (n. 3), 43, 46, 51, 52
Bethel, Slingsby, (*The Present Interest of England Stated*) 113

- Beza, Theodore, 23, 158
- Bible, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, 102
- Acts, 26
 - Christ cleansing the temple, 19, 25
 - II Corinthians, 179
 - Deuteronomy, 183
 - Exodus, 171
 - Ezekiel, 176
 - Geneva Bible, 50
 - Hebrew Bible, 175, 176
 - Isaiah, 172, 176, 177, 183–5, 187
 - Jeremiad, the, 102
 - Jeremiah, 176, 177
 - John, 27, 119
 - King James Bible, 3
 - Luke, 25, 26, 180
 - New Testament, 22, 24, 25, 27, 32, 174
 - Old Testament, 7, 19, 19 (n. 33), 20–7, 24 (n. 57), 32, 174, 184, 229
 - Parable of the Great Banquet, 17, 19
 - Psalms, 248
 - Revelations, 19, 26, 185
 - Romans, 19, 26, 44, 62, 179
 - Saul on the road to Damascus, 19
 - Sermon on the Mount, 116
- Bible, as text, 28, 236
- as authority, 18, 20, 27 (n. 70), 31, 34, 102, 175, 179, 180
 - biblical hermeneutics, 7, 16, 34;
 - Hebraic case for toleration, 20, 22, 28; dispensational case for toleration, 20, 22, 28; natural law case for toleration, 20, 26, 27, 27 (n. 70)
 - biblical exegesis, 18, 29, 50
 - interpretation of, 17, 27 (n. 68), 28
 - knowledge of, 186
 - modern biblical criticism, 18
 - reception history, 16
 - styles of reading, 16, 17
 - typology, 23
- Bickley, Ralph, 153, 157, 158
- Bilson, Thomas, 45
- Blackstone, William, 243
- Blair, Tony, 2, 3, 140, 193
- Blake, William, 188, 189
- blasphemy, 21, 22, 30, 31 (n. 85), 41, 177
- blasphemy act, 19
- Boehner, John, 186
- Book of Common Prayer, 236, 240
- Borromeo, Cardinal, 157, 158
- Bradley, Francis, 241
- Briant, Alexander, 158, 158 (n. 94), 159
- Brown, Gordon, 2, 3
- Bridgettine community, 161
- Britain, 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 56, 123, 136, 183, 193, 194
- moral collapse of, 3
 - accommodation of religious minorities, 2 (n. 5), 3, 4 (n. 11), 5, 6, 193, 194
- British Israelism, 183
- Brokesby, Francis (*Perswasive to Reformation and Union*), 118 (n. 29), 119
- Browne, Sir Anthony, Viscount Montague, 163
- Bucer, Martin, 50
- Buckingham, Earl of, 241
- Burghley, Lord, 166
- Burka, 164
- Burton, Jonathan, 5, 214 (n. 3), 224, 226, 230
- Traffic and Turning*, 223
- Burroughs, 176, 177
- Butler, James, 137
- Butterfield, Herbert, 48
- Butterworth, Jez, 10, 188, 189, 189 (n. 71)
- Jerusalem*, 10, 188
- Caine, Thomas Henry Hall (censorship of *Mahomet*), 221
- Cairo, 245–7
- Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, 30
- Calvin, Jean, 23, 60
- Cato's Letters*, 57
- Campion, Edmund, 149, 150, 153–4, 156–8, 156 (n. 64), 158 (n. 92), 161, 240 (n. 28)
- Cameron, David, 2, 3, 193 (n. 1)
- pernicious equivocation, 3

- Camm, John, 177
- Campbell, Gordon, 140, 141, 238
- Caner bros (*Unveiling Islam: An Insider's look at Muslim life and beliefs*), 220, 222
- Carey, John, 145
- Castellio, Sebastian, 1, 7, 15, 16
- Catherine de Medici, 154
- Catholic Confederate Association, 137
- Caudrey, Robert, 239, 240
- Cayenne, 199, 199 (n.27)
- Cavaliers, 137
- Cavendish, Dominic, 189
- Chakrabarti, Shami, 164
- Champion, Justin, 7, 8, 218 (n. 20)
- Chick, Jack T., 220
The Little Bride, 220
- Christ Church, Oxford, 21
- Christianity
Anabaptists, 20, 22, 118
Anglicanism, 6, 19, 48, 116, 118–19, 172, 194–5
Baptists, 22, 24, 46, 116, 118, 127, 172, 180, 220
Calvinism, 16, 145, 171, 179
Catholicism, Roman, 6, 30, 65, 116, 117, 141, 142, 143, 197
Catholicism, tridentine, 160
Christian values, 3
Christian Hebraism, 16, 28
Christian humanism, 49
Christian mythology, 222
Coptic Christians, Coptic orthodoxy, 11, 215, 219, 245–7
Crypto-Catholicism, 150, 155
English dissenters, 19, 113, 114, 118 (n. 29), 118–21, 126, 128, 194–5
episcopacy, 44, 61 (n. 75), 118
Erastianism, 20, 22, 28, 48
Fifth Monarchists, 119, 175, 181
French Huguenots, 18, 19, 25
Independency, 61
Italian Waldensians, 19
Jesuits, 14, 114, 121, 149, 151–63, 240
presbyterian/presbyterianism, 16 (n. 11), 19, 30, 33, 33 (n. 95), 45, 61, 61 (n. 75), 116, 118, 137, 141, 145, 238
primitive Christianity, 24, 33, 58, 60
protestant Hebraists, 20
protestant tolerationists, 18
Quakers, 9, 18, 90, 113, 116, 129, 127, 128, 175–81, 178 (n. 34), 184; as 'Pharisees and scribes', 176, 179–80
Ranters, 178 (n. 34)
Russian Orthodox church, 139
Cocinians, 27, 175, 194, 227
- Cicero, 54
de divinatione, 54
de natura deorum, 54
- civic commonwealth, 8, 45, 111
- civil authority, 5, 42, 44, 45
- Chadderton, Henry, 153
- Charles I, 134, 137, 146, 172, 196, 225, 241
- Charles II, 82 (n. 12), 198, 198 (n. 22), 201–2, 243
- citizenship, 8, 9, 42, 111, 122, 128, 200 (n. 37), 243, 245
- citizenship tests, 3
civitas dei, 43
- Clark, Jonathan, 51
- Clayton, Richard, 177
- Clitherow, Margaret, 163
- Coffey, John, 6, 7, 14–40, 46
- Cohen, Robert, 11
- Coke, Sir Edward, 11, 235, 238–41, 240 (n. 28), 244, 248
Institutes, 124
- Cold War, 135
- Collier, Thomas, 180
- commonwealth, 9, 42, 55, 56–7, 111, 123, 126, 172, 174, 182, 200, 244
civic, 8, 45
Christian, 25
Jewish, 22, 25
- Commonwealthmen, 55, 61, 65
- communion, 143, 149, 150, 195, 195 (n. 5), 238
- Conference of Catholic bishops, 129

- conscience, 24, 26, 29, 30, 42, 44,
 45, 47, 48, 60–4, 119, 128, 141,
 151, 160, 162–4, 179, 181,
 201 (n. 42), 241
 antichristian, 23
 freedom of, 1, 7, 32, 127, 136
 liberty of, 11, 41, 43, 46, 56, 57, 65,
 61 (n. 75, 76), 111–13, 115, 118,
 143, 145, 236, 239, 241–4, 248
 Constantine, Wafaa, 245, 245 (n. 47),
 246, 248
 Constantine, Emperor, 23, 24, 43
 conversion, 19, 32, 82, 83, 88, 98–100,
 158, 160, 180, 220, 223,
 245 (n. 47), 246–8,
 Cook, Robin, 135
 Corns, Thomas N., 140, 141
 Cornwallis, William, 155
 Corporation Act, 195, 195 (n. 9)
 Cotton, John, 23
 Council of Foreign Plantations, 203
 Courten, Elizabeth, 177
 covenant, 24, 50, 105, 171, 183, 242
 Cranfield, Edward, 202, 202 (n. 48)
 Cranmer, Thomas, Archbishop of
 Canterbury, 41
 Creppell, Ingrid, 8, 73–110
 Cromwell, Oliver, 9, 117 (n. 26), 134,
 135, 137, 138, 140, 172–4, 177,
 178–9, 198, 198 (n. 22), 201, 235
 crusades, 14, 224
 Currie, John, 158

 Daniell, David, 16
 Davis, Colin, 45, 46
 Davis, Natalie Zemon, 193 (n. 1), 198
 (n. 23), 201 (n. 42)
 Dawood, N. J., 228
 De Silva, Aron, 202, 202 (n. 50)
 Declaration of Independence, 134
 Declaration on Religious Freedom, 14
de jure divino, 44, 51, 58, 62
 Dennet, Daniel, 58
 devil, 96, 97, 101, 180
 Dewsbury, William, 177
 diaspora, Jewish, 194, 197–8, 205
 Dimmock, Matthew, 5, 10, 214–34,
 247 (n. 50)
 dispensational argument, 20, 22, 28

 diversity, 1–3, 5, 6, 193–4, 206, 243
 doctrinal/religious, 21, 62, 112, 126,
 143
 divine metaphysics, 48
 Dodd, Samuel, 205
 Dominionists, 30
 Donatists, 17
 Dormido, Emanuel Martinez, 198, 198
 (n. 22)
 Douai college, 152, 153, 155, 157–9,
 160 (n. 104)
 Duffy, Eamon, 163
 Dury, John, 172, 181, 182
 A Case of Conscience, 181
 Dutch Brazil, 10, 198, 199, 201
 Dutch West India company, 199,
 200–2

 Earle, John, 137, 149
 Easton, John, 90, 90 (n. 32), 92
 A Relation of the Indian War (1675),
 90, 90 (n. 32)
 ecclesiology, 42, 43, 49, 51, 61
 Egerton manuscript, 200
 Egypt, 11, 31, 172, 175, 178, 185, 215,
 219, 239, 245, 246–8
 elect, the, 9, 101, 171, 182
 Eliot, George, 151–4, 156, 156 (n. 64)
 Eliot, T. S., 136, 136 (n. 11)
 Elizabeth I, 196, 224, 238, 240
 emancipation
 of African-Americans, 185
 of the Jews, 195
 of minorities, 1
 in Surinam, 200
 empiricism, 6
 Englefield, Sir Francis, 150
 English college, 157–9, 163
 Enlightenment, the, 7, 15–19, 30, 42,
 54, 56, 59, 60, 64–5, 184, 219,
 221, 222
 Enlightenment rationalists, 18, 60
 enmity, 8, 73–109, 174
 ideational model, 78–82, 88, 89, 93,
 96, 100, 106
 material model, 78, 81, 84, 91, 94–6
 relation to morality, 8, 79, 89, 97,
 102
 Ephesus, 26

- Erastians. *see* Christianity
 Essenes, 21
 Essequibo, 200, 201
 see also Guyana
 Essex, 150, 152–3
 Great Baddow, 156
 high sheriff of, 151
 deputy lord lieutenant of, 151
 assizes, 154
 ethnocentrism, 84, 88, 96
Europe a Slave, Jean-Paul Cerdan, 117
 Euro-Indian antagonism, 74 (n. 2), 75,
 76, 85
 Eusebius of Caesarea, 23, 23 (n. 50)
 Evesham, 177–8
 exceptionalism, 9, 10, 182, 183,
 186–7
 exclusion crisis, (n. 17), 117,
 118, 115
 exegesis. *see* Bible
 Exeter college, 156–8, 161–2
- fairly force/notions, 57
 Falwell, Jerry, 220
 fascism, 1, 14
 Fazl, Mirza Ab'ul, 228
 Fell, Margaret, 178, 178 (n. 37)
 Fifth Monarchy Men, 119
 Firle, Sussex, 163
 First Amendment (1791), 1, 28
 Fish, Stanley, 135, 145
 Foucault, Michel, 214
 Fox, George, 178, 178 (n. 34), 180
 Francois, Duke of Anjou, 154–7, 162
 Franklin, Benjamin, 135
 freedom, 2, 4, 4 (n. 11), 11, 15, 24, 30,
 41, 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 56, 61
 (n. 75), 62, 64, 65, 100, 140, 184,
 187, 188, 242, 248
 of expression, 31, 248
 of religion, 14, 14 (n. 2), 41, 42, 48,
 49, 50, 53, 57, 128, 136, 178,
 185, 198, 244
 of speech, 59, 135, 136
 fundamentalism, 15
 Islamic, 2, 4, 246
 reading practices, 16
 Furly, Benjamin, 18
 the Furly circle, 18–20, 22
- Gage, John, 163
 Gettysburg address, 185
 Gideon (in relation to Cromwell), 172
 Godsalf, George, 153–4, 153 (n. 35),
 156–7, 159
 Goodhart, David, 3, 193 (n. 1)
 Gordon, Thomas, 55, 57–60
 Goshen, land of, 174, 183
 Graham, Franklin, 220
 Gray, John, 17
 Great Yarmouth, 161
 Griffith, Rice, 160–1, 160 (n. 104)
 Grotius, Hugo, 1, 20, 22
 Guardian, the, 28, 136, 188
 Guibbory, Achsah, 9, 10, 171–92
 gunpowder plot, 142
 Guyana, 200
- hadith, the, 7, 17, 32, 216
 Haller, William, (*Tracts on Liberty*
 (1934)), 2
 Hamid, Abdul. *see* John Walker Lindh
 Hamilton, Donna, 163
 Harrington, Sir James, 22, 51, 53,
 54, 56
 Hartlib, Samuel, 18, 172, 181
 Harwood, John, 177
 Hashemi, Nader (*Islam, Secularism and*
Liberal Democracy), 29
 Hays, Colonel, 180
 Hebrew theocracy, 20, 21, 22, 25
 Islamic theocracy, 32
 Hegarty, Andrew, 153
 Henry VIII, 163, 240
 heresy, 20, 22, 26, 31, 31 (n. 85), 44,
 45, 216, 227, 229, 238, 240
 hereticide, 19, 25, 26
 hermeneutics. *see* Bible, as text
 historicising contemporary attitudes,
 5, 7, 10, 214
 historiography, 1, 42, 45, 50, 51, 194,
 195, 196
 history
 of liberty, religious/civil, 43–5
 of religious ideas, 7, 42
 of political thought, 7, 19, 50
 of toleration, 2, 4, 6, 111, 194,
 197, 200

- Hobbes, Thomas, 7, 18, 22, 30, 41, 48–52, 61, 65, 230
Leviathan, 62–4
- Hollis, Thomas, 55
- homosexuality, 4, 4 (n. 11), 217
- Hooker (*Ecclesiastical Polity*), 236
- Howard, Philip, Earl of Arundel, 154
- Howgill, Francis, 176–7
- Hubbard, William, 82, 82 (n. 14), 95–6, 98 (n. 49), 103
- Hughes, William, 173–5, 179–82
Anglo-Judeus (History of the Jews), 173
- human rights, 2, 4, 29, 30, 31, 237 (n. 12), 247, 248
- Husain, Ed, 28
- iconoclasm, 16, 143, 144
- idolaters, Hebrew tolerance, of, 21
- idolatry, 19, 21, 22, 25, 45, 57, 73, 85, 142, 144
- identity, 4, 5, 10, 42, 47, 48, 60, 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 94, 96, 102, 103, 104, 111, 152, 171–2, 175, 182, 183, 184, 189, 193, 194, 196, 197, 248
- immigration, 1, 2, 171, 193, 206
- incest, 172, 216, 217
- Indians (American), 73–110, 138, 139, 236
- Indianisation, fear of, 100
- Ingatestone hall, 150, 153, 159
- Inquisition, the, 141, 197
- instrumentalism, 29
- intolerance, 2, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 29, 44, 57, 73, 74, 75, 84, 105, 106, 137, 143, 145, 205, 215
- Iran, 29
- Islam, 2 (n. 8), 6, 7, 10, 11, 14–17, 27–34, 144, 193, 214–16, 220–3, 225–8, 230, 245–8
- Salafist, 235, 246–8, 248 (n. 53)
- Sunni, 31
- Shi'a, 32
- Islamic fundamentalism. *see* fundamentalism, Islamic
- Islamic militancy, 16
- Islamic radicalism, 193
- Islamic terrorism, 28
- Israel
- biblical, 7, 10, 16, 19, 21–3, 25, 28, 32, 99, 171–8, 180–1, 183–8
- contemporary, 15, 78, 183, 186, 187–8
- Israel, Jonathan, 15, 16, 142, 193 (n. 1), 198, 203 (n. 55)
- ben Israel, Menasseh, 172–6, 178, 180–2, 184, 198
The Hope of Israel, 173
- James I
Eikon Basilike, 236
- James II, 41, 117, 119, 123, 126, 127
- Jefferson, Thomas, 134, 135
- Jenefer, James, 197, 197 (n. 18)
- Jenkins, Philip, 17
- Jennings, Francis, 76, 94, 95
The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (1975), 94
- Jerusalem, 42, 103, 104, 177, 179, 184–7, 189, 236
- Jessey, Henry, 172, 173, 180–1
- Jesus Christ, 10, 18, 23–5, 119, 130, 152, 175, 176, 179, 182–4, 218, 222, 237
- Jewish naturalization bill, (1753), 195
- jihād, 144, 224
- Johnson, Robert, 153
- John Walker Lindh, 223
- Jones, Katherine. *see* Viscountess Ranelagh
- Jones, Terry, 216, 216 (n. 9)
- Jordan, W. K. (*The Development of Religious Toleration in England*), 2, 14
- Josephus, 20
- Judaic toleration
- of sects, 21
- of heresies, 21
- Judaism, 6, 21, 24, 173, 174, 194–6, 216, 223
- Julian the Apostate, Emperor, 58
- Jurieu, Pierre, 19, 25
- Justinian
- Codex, 52
- Corpus Civile, 123
- Jyllands-Posten, 216

- Kaplan, Benjamin, 15, 16
Divided by Faith (2007), 15
- Katz, David, 195
- Kawashima, Yasuhide, 85, 87
- Kelly, James, 9, 149–70
- Kennedy, John F., 186–7
- Kidd, Thomas S., 220
- King David, 25, 172, 236
- King James Bible. *see* Bible
- King Philip's war (1675–6), 8, 76,
 81–95, 98, 100–2, 105
 King Philip's six complaints, 90, 92
- Khadijah, 218
- Khan, Syed Ahmed (*A Series of Essays on the Life of Mohammed*), 221
- Koran *c/r*, 17
see also Qur'an
- Kupperman (*Facing Off in Early America*), 75, 83
- Laban's daughter, 21
- Lake, Peter, 155, 156
- Lammy, David, 2
- Lanquet, Thomas (*An Epitome of Chronicles*), 217
- Laud, William, Archbishop, 41, 235
- Lazarus, Emma ('The New Collossus'), 184
- Lecler, Joseph (*Histoire de la Tolérance au Siècle de la Réforme* (1955)), 14
- Leedes, George, 241
- LePeyrere, 230
- Levellers, 18, 46
- liberalism, 8, 9, 29, 49, 64, 126, 136, 137, 146
- libertas*, 42, 49, 65, 184
- liberty, 2, 7, 42–9, 58–9, 62, 65, 124, 126–7, 134–6, 144, 145, 175, 182, 199, 200 (n. 37), 201 (n. 42), 242
- civil, 42–9, 51, 55–7, 60, 61
- of conscience, 11, 41, 56–7, 111–13, 115, 118, 123, 128, 142, 144, 145, 236, 239, 241–4, 248
- religious, 1, 8, 21, 30, 33, 33 (n. 95), 41, 47, 55, 61, 63, 65, 111, 128, 142, 238; Lockean, 47, 55, 65; Hobbesian, 61–5
- intellectual, 53, 226
- libertas philosophandi*, 65, 49
- modus vivendi* liberalism, 8, 126; *see also* William Penn
- political, 7, 42–9, 49–53, 65
- positive and negative forms, 7, 42 (n. 3), 47, 51, 65; *see also* Isaiah Berlin
- relationship between individual and civil/religious powers, 46, 49
- statue of, 184, 187
- Lilla, Mark, 29
- Limborch, Philip van, 18, 19, 25, 26
- Lincoln, Abraham, 185–7
- literalism, 16, 23
- Livorno, 197, 199, 200
- Livy, 52, 54 (n. 43)
- Locke, John, 1, 7, 8, 15–19, 21–2, 25, 47, 48, 51, 55, 63–5, 73 (n. 2), 73–5, 104–5, 126–9, 221
- adoption by contemporary Muslim commentators, 28–31, 31 (n. 83)
- Letters concerning Toleration*, 16, 46, 73, 126, 143, 221
- The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 18
- First Treatise of Government*, 18
- Two Treatise on Government*, 46
- Longland, Charles, 200, 200 (n. 36)
- London, 18, 74 (n. 2), 98 (n. 49), 150, 153, 160, 162, 188, 196–8, 204–6, 240
- St James Park, 177
- Tower of, 150, 162
- Loomba, Ania, 5, 224, 230
- Louis XIV, 117
- Lucretius, 54
- Ludlow, 56
- Luther, Martin, 24, 31, 44, 50, 171
- Machumetis Saracenorum principis*, 225 (n. 36), 227
- Lyford, 161
- Lynch, Thomas, 203, 203 (n. 56), 204
- Machiavelli, 50, 218
- Discourses*, 54
- MacLean, Gerald, 5, 224, 230
- Looking East*, 223
- Madison, James, 127, 127 (n. 76)
- Magna Charta, 124–5
- Mahmood, Saba, 248

- Mahomet, 214–34, 237
 demonisation of, 214–34
- Malik, Maleiha, 215
- Manichaeism, 101
- manifest destiny, 183
- Marrano, 194
- Marquis of Ormond. *see* Butler, James
- Marshall, John, 16, 18, 19, 46
- Martin, Gregory, 153
- Marlowe, Christopher, 218
- martyrdom, 44, 153, 156, 158, 159, 161
- Marvell, Andrew, 218, 238, 238 (n. 19)
- Marx, Karl, 17
- Mary I, 163
- Massachusetts general court, 186
- Massasoit, 90
- Matar, Nabil (*Islam in Britain*), 214
- Mather, Increase, 94, 98
A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England (1676), 74 (n. 2), 98–103, 98 (n. 49)
- Mayne, Cuthbert, 153
- McCarthyism, 135, 145
- McDowell, Nicholas, 8, 134–48
- McGrath, 159
- Mead, William, 113, 124
- Mecca, 32
- Medina, 32
- Melancthon, Philipp, 50
- Menasseh, 172–6, 179–82, 184
- Mendes, Abraham, 205
- Middelburgh, 200–1
- Middle Temple, 150, 152, 162
- Miller, Perry, 95, 98, 102
Errand into the Wilderness, 98
- Milton, John, 1, 7, 8, 9, 15, 18, 19, 21–2, 24, 25, 28–9, 41, 55–6, 134–48, 184, 218, 225–30, 237–8, 238 (n. 18), 244
Areopagitica, 18, 21, 135, 184, 225, 228
Defence of the English People, 135, 139
 exclusion of Irish Catholics, 8, 134–45
Eikonoklastes, 55, 237, 238 (n. 19)
Observations upon the Articles of Peace, 134, 136, 138, 140–1, 145
- racist apologist or liberal hero, 8, 135
- rhetorical style, 9, 135, 145
- Samson Agonistes*, 29, 145–6
- Secretary for Foreign Tongues*, 137
- The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, 134, 138
- tolerationism of, 8
A Treatise of Civil Power, 18, 142
Of True Religion, 142–4
- Minya, 246
- Mirabeau, 135, 146
- Miraj, the, 216
- Mohegans, the, 88
- Mohamed, Feisal, 11, 235–52
- Molesworth, Sir Robert, 55, 57
- monarchy, 44, 45, 126, 139, 184, 201
 absolute, 55
de jure divino, 58
 Hanoverian, 55
 limited, 117
 Stuart, 50, 55, 63
- Monro, General Robert, 138
- Montague, Richard, 241
- Mosaic law, 20–2
 judicial, 181
 penal, 20, 22, 30
- Moses, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 177, 181, 183
- More, Henry, 158
- More, William, 154
- Morgan Smith, Sarah, 8, 111–33
- Mubarak, Hosni, 246
- Muhammad, 10, 31–3, 215–27, 216 (n. 9), 247 (n. 50)
see also Prophets
- multiculturalism, 10, 15, 193, 194, 205
 multicultural experiment, 3
- Muir, Sir William (*The Life of Mahomet and History of Islam*), 221
- Munday, Anthony, 160, 161, 163
- Murphy, Andrew, 8, 111–33
- Muslim brotherhood, 247, 248 (n. 53)
- Narragansetts, the, 81, 94 (n. 41), 242
- Nassy, David, 202 (n. 53)
Essai Historique sur la Colonie de Surinam, 202

- national cemetery, 185
 natural law, 20, 25, 26, 27, 48, 95
 Navigation act, 198
 Nelson, Eric, 19, 20, 22
 New Amsterdam, 184
 see also New York
 New England, 8, 74, 74 (n. 2), 81, 82,
 84, 87–9, 97–9, 101, 103, 105, 237
 New Historicism, 214
 New World, 185, 198, 200
 New York, 109, 184, 189
 Newby, Margaret, 177
 9/11, 2, 3, 10, 15, 29, 145, 214,
 215, 220
 Nipmucs, the, 81
 Noah, seven precepts of, 21
 North J., 54
 Nussbaum, Martha, 29
- Oath of Supremacy, 180, 214
 Obama, Barack, 10, 128, 186–8
 Oppenheim, Samuel, 201
 Origen, 23, 23 (n. 50)
 Osborne, Francis, 55
 Ottoman Empire, 24, 217–18, 224, 245
- paedophilia, 216–18, 220
 Paine, Thomas, 17
 Palmer, Herbert, 238
 pantheological relativism, 229
 Pasquall, John, 157
 Parker, Catherine, 186
 Parry, Sir Hugh, 188
 Pascall, Andrew, 156
 Pascall, John, 156–8, 157 (n. 80),
 161–2
 see also Pasquall
 Pascall, Robert, 156
 Payne, John, 152–7, 160
 Pearson, Anthony, 176
 Penn, William, 1, 8, 33, 111–33
 An Address to Protestants of All
 Persuasions, 116, 117
 Frame of Government, 127
 The Great Case of Liberty of
 Conscience, 113
 The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties
 Asserted, 113
 Perswasive to Moderation, 120
- One Project for the Good of England*,
 115
A Seasonable corrective to the One
Project, 118
Second Letter From a Gentleman in the
Country, 121, 122
Third Letter, 122
- Perera, Isaac, 202
 Pericles, 186
 Peters, Kate, 180
 petition of right (1628), 52, 238
 Pequots, the, 88
 Persons, Robert, 149, 150, 152, 156–9,
 161–2
 Petre, Lady Anne, 153, 154 (n. 54),
 156
 Petre, Sir John, 9, 150–6, 158–64
 Petre, Sir William, 150
 Petrean fellowships, 161
 Pharisees, 21, 176, 179, 180
 phenomenology, 79
 Philip, sachem of the Wampanoags,
 81, 86, 90
 Pickthall Muhammad Marmaduke,
 228
 Pius V, 240
 Plantation Act, 1740, 195 (n. 8)
 pluralism, 1, 2, 50, 194
 Pocock, John, 50, 51, 58
 see also Skinner
 Pocumtucks, the, 81
 Pole, Cardinal, 150
 policy
 governmental, 219
 official, 6
 social, 47
 political theory, 8, 44, 50, 126, 135
 neo-Roman, 52, 53, 56
 Polybius, 102
 Port Royal, 204
 Portuguese, 194, 196–8, 200–1, 200
 (n. 36)
 postmodernism, 15
 post-reformation, 2, 5, 7, 16, 17,
 31, 172
 Pound, Thomas, 153
 predestination, 171
 presentism, 5, 29
 priestcraft, 53, 56, 60, 63, 64

- prison, 113, 176–8, 183
 privy council, 151, 154–5, 157, 160,
 202, 202 (n. 47)
 prodigies, 54, 227
 propaganda, 77, 78, 137, 140
 property rights, 120, 122, 124, 126,
 127, 243–4
 Prophets, 17, 176–7
 false, 19, 25, 32
 Micah, 177, 183
 Prospect magazine, 3
 Providence, 95, 98, 102, 185, 229, 238,
 242, 243, 244
 Prynne, William, 174, 179, 181–2
 Short Demurrer to the Jewes, 173
 Pulsipher, Jenny, 84–5
 Purchas, Samuel (*Purchas, his
 Pilgrimage*), 229
 puitans, 6, 8, 18, 45–6, 74, 79, 81,
 83–5, 84 (n. 21), 87–9, 96, (n. 47),
 48, 49), 98 (n. 49), 99–105, 101
 (n. 60), 136, 172, 183, 185–6, 241
 founding fathers, 1
 puritan biblicists, 18
 puritan revival, 1
 puritan revolution, 18

 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, 31, 228
 Queen of Sheba, 21
 Questier, Michael, 152, 155, 156
 Quint, David, 135
 Qur'an, the, 7, 17, 32, 33, 216, 221,
 225, 225 (n. 36), 226, 227, 228

 rabbinic scholarship, 20, 21, 28
 racism, 76
 Radcliffe, Thomas, Earl of Sussex, 154
 radical independents, 18, 19, 21, 27
 (n. 70)
 rationalist philosophy, 1, 18
 Rahman, S.A., 31, 32
 Ramadan, Tariq, 31
 Ranelagh, Viscountess & Jones,
 Katherine, 138, 138 (n. 20)
 Raymond, Joad, 140
 Reagan, Ronald, 187
 reason, 26, 27, 54, 56, 60, 61 (n. 76),
 134, 142, 143, 226

 reasoning, 77, 136
 scriptural, 16, 16 (n. 11),
 18 (n. 22), 22
 Recife, 198, 198 (n. 21), 199 (n. 29)
 Reconstructionists. *see* Dominionists
 recusants, 44, 118, 149, 154, 156, 162,
 240, 248
 reductionism, 95
 reductionist parallels, 5
 Reformation, the, 7, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23,
 24, 42, 45, 50, 119, 163
 reformed theology, 27, 172, 175,
 238, 241
 religious coercion, 2, 20, 22, 33, 51,
 53, 145
 divine sanction of, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25
 by force, 65
 lack of justification in gospels, 25,
 26, 31
 religious equality, 29
 religious identity, 10, 42, 47, 48, 60,
 103, 104, 152, 175, 196, 197, 248
 rhetorics of, 5
 religious persecution, 1, 2, 16, 19, 20,
 24, 41, 43, 44, 60, 112, 113, 117,
 120, 123, 129, 141, 176, 195, 197,
 215, 235
 justification of, 16
 religious persuasion, 24, 83, 145
 religious pluralism, 1, 2, 50, 194
 religious right, the, 1, 16, 30, 220
 Regnum, 43, 45
 reprobate, 171
 republicanism, 21, 54, 136
 Restoration, the, 63, 113, 116, 117,
 125, 127, 194, 195
 revealed religion, 7, 27, 32, 47, 48
 revelation, 7, 27, 45, 53, 216, 217, 227
 revisionism, 2, 6
 revocation of the edict of Nantes,
 19, 43
 revolution
 American, 82, 184
 Egyptian, 11, 251
 English, 21, 29, 29 (n. 73), 45
 French, 29 (n. 73)
 industrial, 189
 Puritan, 18
 Rex, Walter, 25

- Reyer, Andre de, 225
 Richter, Daniel, 75, 82, 85
 riddah. *see* apostasy
 Rheims, 161
 Rhode Island, 11, 18, 86, 90, 185, 235, 242, 244
 Robertson, Pat, 220
 Robinson, Henry, 18–22, 24, 25
 the Robinson circle, 18–22
 Robles, Antonio Rodrigues, 197, 197 (n. 16)
 Rogers, Richard, 241
 Rosenblatt, Jason, 20, 21
 Ross, Alexander, 11, 225–30
 pansebeia, a view of all religions of the world, 228
 Rotterdam, 18
 Rouen, 158, 161, 162
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 54
 Rowe, 159
 royal supremacy, 54, 250, 251
 royal will, 61
 Rushdie, Salman, 1, 214
 The Satanic Verses, 222
 Rylance, Mark, 188

 sacerdotium, 43, 45, 53
 sacraments, 56
 Sadducees, 21, 22
 Sadleir, Anne, 235, 236, 237, 238, 248
 Saeed, Abdullah, 31
 Salem, 241–3
 Sallust, 52, 58
 Sapphira, 26
 Sassamon, John, 86
 murder of and subsequent trial, 86–7, 90
 Saudades, the, 197
 Schmitt, Carl, 80
 Schlesinger, Robert, 187
 Scott, Joan Wallach, 136, 144
 scriptural severity, tempering of, 21
 secularism, 15, 29, 30
A Seasonable Corrective to the One Project (1680). *see* William Penn
 Sega, Cardinal, 159
 Selden, John, 20, 21, 22, 28
 Selwood, Jacob, 10, 193–212
 Sephardim, 197

 Servetus, 60
 Shaftesbury, Earl of
 trial of, 1681, 117
 Shagan, Ethan, 8, 123
 The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England, 3
 Shakespeare, 188, 189, 218
 1 Henry VI, 217
 Shapiro, James, 196
 shared values, 3
 Shaw, Henry, 153
 Shehata, Camelia, 245–8
 Shenouda III, Pope, 245–7
 Sherwin, Ralph, 156–9, 161, 162
 Sidney, Algernon, 133
 Sidqi, Hala, 245, 247
 Simon, Richard, 18
 Simpson, James, (*Burning to Read: English Fundamentalism and its Reformation Opponents*) 16
 Skinner, Cyriack, 238, 238 (n. 19)
 Skinner, Quentin, 7, 8, 42–4, 49, 50–3, 55, 56, 58, 61
 The foundations of modern political thought, 49
 Liberty before liberalism, 49
 slavery, 2, 52, 53, 57, 60, 127, 139
 Smith, Humphrey, 178, 180
 Smith, Nigel, 135
 Smith, Roger, 89
 Smolinski, Reiner, 101
 social psychology, 77
 Socinians, 27, 175, 194, 227
 Solomon, 21
 Soviet Union, 128
 sovereignty, 20, 29, 48, 61, 62, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 139
 Speed, Thomas, 177
 Spinoza, 15, 18, 30, 48, 65, 230
 St Augustine, 14, 17, 18, 19, 25, 31, 33, 171
 St Bartholomew's Day Massacre, 43
 St George, 188
 St John's College, 153
 St Paul, 18, 24, 171, 178
 Star Chamber, 241

- Stillingfleet, Edward (*Mischief of Separation*), 119
 Stubbe, Henry, 21, 219
 Sultan Murad III, 224
 Summers, K., 54
 Surinam, 10, 194, 198–206
 emancipation of the Jews, 201
 grant of privileges, (1665), 202
 Tacitus, 52, 54, 241
 Histories, 58
 Annals, 58
 Talbot, John, 160–1
 Tangier, 194, 197, 204
 Tawadros II, Pope, 247
 Telegraph, the, 189
 Test Acts, 122
The Innocence of Muslims (2012), 10,
 215, 217–22, 224, 230
 terrorism, 28, 29 142, 145
 textuality, 7
The Independent Whig, 57
 theism, 48
 Theonomists, 30, 33
 Thurloe, John, 179, 200
 Toland, John, 48, 54 (n. 43), 55, 56,
 142, 143, 219, 230
 Life of John Milton, 142
 tolerance, 1–6, 28, 29, 47, 74, 83, 106,
 111, 136, 143, 163, 193, 205, 216,
 219, 221, 223–5, 227
 ambivalence of, 4
 as grudging allowance, 4
 as paradoxical concept, 4
 as a positive virtue, 1, 2, 4, 74
 toleration, 1, 2, 4–8, 10, 14–18, 20–3,
 28, 34, 42, 43, 45–9, 56, 65
 (n. 86), 112, 118–20, 123, 127,
 128, 136, 140, 142–5, 171, 175,
 180, 193–4, 196–8, 200–2, 205–6,
 214–15, 221, 227–8, 230, 237
 implication of disapproval, 4
 practice of, 15
 Toleration Act (1689), 1, 53, 195
 toleration of religious pluralism, 1
 tolerationists, 1, 7, 33, 34, 46, 114,
 117, 121, 126, 128, 141, 194, 196,
 200, 203–4, 206, 215, 219
 Toletano-Cluniac corpus, 220
 Tomlinson, William, 180
 Tower of London. *see* London
 transubstantiation, 27, 53, 122 (n. 54)
 Trenchard, John, 57
 Trevor, Thomas, 205
 Trinity, the, 27, 53
 twentieth century, 135, 217, 220, 221
 tyranny, 46, 52–3, 55, 57–8, 65, 111,
 115, 118, 126, 141, 146
 Tyndale, 218
 Tyrell, Anne, 156
 Ulster, 137, 138, 145
 the Ulster plantation, 145
 Uncas, Mohegan sachem, 81
 union flag, 2
 United Colonies, 81, 84, 103
 Boston, 86
 Connecticut, 81, 84
 Maine, 87
 Massachusetts, 81, 83, 84, 87, 186,
 242
 Massachusetts Bay Colony, 185
 New Hampshire, 87
 Pennsylvania, 8, 111, 123, 126, 127
 Plymouth, 81, 83–8, 86 (n. 26),
 90–1, 93–4, 103
 Swansea, 87
 Virginia, 127, 176
 Unitarianism, 195
 unity, 2, 79, 80, 98, 113, 114, 117–20,
 126, 127, 241
 politico-theological, 104
 Universal Declaration of Human
 Rights (1948), 30
 Vane, Lady Frances, 235
 Vane, Sir Henry, 235, 242
 Vatican II (Declaration on Religious
 Liberty (*dignitas humanae*)), 33
 Vaughan, Alden, 88
 Venner, Thomas, 119
 Verin, Joshua, 11, 239, 242–5, 248
 Vines, Jerry, 220–2
 violence, 79, 80, 87, 105, 126, 145,
 146, 174, 179, 181, 215–17, 222,
 243
 biblical, 16, 17, 20, 25, 27, 29, 43
 virtu, 49

- virtue, 4, 26, 45, 74, 100, 116
 British, 1, 2
 Vivers, Margaret, 176
- Waldegrave, Sir Edward, 150, 152
 Waldegrave, Mary, 150
 Wall, Moses, 173
see also Menasseh
- Walsham, Alexandra, 2, 196
Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700, 2
- Walpole, Robert, 60
 Walwyn, William, 18, 21
 Wamsutta, 90
 war on terror, 214
 Weston, Nathaniel, 176
 whigg history, 15, 16, 33, 45, 193
 White, Stephen, 241
 Whitehall, 46, 171–3
 conference, 1655, 178
 Whitehead, George, 177
 Whitgift, 241
 Williams, Roger, 1, 11, 18, 19, 22, 22 (n. 45), 24, 25, 29, 84, 90, 185, 235–9, 237 (n. 12), 241–4
Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, 18, 22
The Bloudy Tenent Yet More Bloudy, 18
- Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health*, 235
The Hireling Ministry None of Christ's, 235
- Willoughby, Lord, 199
 Wilson, John, 183
 Windsor, Frederick, Baron of Windsor, 155
 Winslow, Josiah, 86–7, 90
 Winthrop, John, 183–6, 243
History, 242
 Wither, George, 172
 Wolf, Lucien, 173, 200, 201
 Wolfe, Don, 140, 141, 145
 Wolseley, Sir Charles (*Liberty of Conscience, the Magistrates Interest*), 113
 Wood, Gordan, 14
 Wood, Robert, 138
 Woodhouse, A. S. P. *Puritanism and Liberty* (1938), 2
 Woodward, John, 159–162
- Yorkshire, 176
- Zagorin, Perez (*How the Idea of Toleration Came to the West* (2003)), 15, 16