ANXIETIES, FEAR AND PANIC IN COLONIAL SETTINGS

EMPIRES ON THE VERGE OF A NERVOUS BREAKDOWN

EDITED BY
HARALD FISCHER-TINÉ

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Harald Fischer-Tiné
Editor

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Introduction: Empires and Emotions

Harald Fischer-Tiné and Christine Whyte

The subtitle of this volume is not only a humorous nod to Spanish film director Pedro Almodovar; it also points to our main contention. This book argues that the history of colonial empires has been shaped to a considerable extent by negative emotions such as anxiety, fear and embarrassment, as well as by the regular occurrence of panics. This is perhaps most obvious if we zoom in on the group of the ruling colonial elites. Contrary to their well-known literary and visual self-representations, Europeans who were part of the imperial enterprise were not always cool, calm and collected while 'running the show' of empire.[1] Quite the reverse: one of the seemingly paradoxical effects of the asymmetries characteristic of the *situation coloniale,* which put a minuscule elite of culturally alien colonizers in a position to exercise power over an often numerically stronger 'native'

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population, was the fact that anxiety, fear and *angst* became part of their everyday experience. At least in this respect, it apparently did not make much of a difference whether they were high-ranking officials, merchants, missionaries, ordinary settlers or rank-and-file soldiers.

Empire themed fiction is full of examples of such emotional states of exception. George Orwell's short story *Shooting an Elephant*,[2] for instance, has been rightly celebrated by post-colonial scholars because it debunks the imperial authority masquerade by telling the story of a British police officer in colonial Burma who comes to realize that, in spite of his constant attempts at performing authority, he has completely lost control to the local population.[3] There are also cases in point of embarrassment and outright panic. The first part of Joseph Conrad's novel *Lord Jim* (1900) provides a pertinent example.[4] The book's protagonist, the Englishman 'Jim', is first mate on the steamer *Patna*, which is full with hundreds of Muslim pilgrims on their way from a Southeast Asian port to the Arabian harbour of Jeddah. When the *Patna* is damaged in heavy weather, Jim (together with the captain and the rest of the European crew) panics and abandons it to save his own life, leaving the Muslim passengers to their fate. However, the *Patna* does not sink, the pilgrims are saved and Jim is brought before the admiralty court, where he is stripped of his navigation command certificate for dereliction of duty. What soon becomes evident, however, is that for most members of the community of European expatriates in the Malayan archipelago, the ultimate disgrace consists not in his breach of maritime law, but in the fact that a representative of an 'imperial race' has displayed his incompetence and cowardliness in front of colonial subjects. The embarrassment caused by this failure and the experience of utter social ostracism by his peers drives Jim to perform heroic deeds in the novel's second part in order to recover his lost imperial masculinity.

What makes these vignettes highly relevant for historians of imperialism (and emotions) is that they are not the products of mere literary imagination, but are based on real events. As is well known, George Orwell (that is, Eric Arthur Blair) was a police officer serving in Burma in the 1920s and his short story has an obvious autobiographical character. Joseph Conrad too famously crisscrossed the seas as ship captain for decades before he could live off his writings, and his *Lord Jim* is based on the scandalous case of the S.S. *Jeddah,* whose captain and crew deserted pilgrim passengers *en route* from Singapore to Mecca in 1880.[5] Many

more literary accounts could be cited.[6] They all give historians good reason to tackle the complex relationship between emotions, panics and colonial empires beyond the fictional and the anecdotal in greater depth than has been done so far. The time for such an enterprise seems to be just right.

The 'affective turn' in the social sciences has produced new analyses of the way in which emotions emerge, travel and are performed. Drawing on the observations of anthropologists that emotions are the result of socio-cultural practice and historical context rather than being hard-wired into our brains, new social theory has attempted to trace the relationships between emotion, power and politics.[7] At the same time, there have been attempts to bring the 'inner' or emotional life of empires to scholarly attention through a recent focus on the history of imperial sensitivities, families and friendships.[8] This volume draws on this new literature to explore a particular set of emotions and emotional states that affected the colonized, colonizers and metropolitan publics. As has already become clear, rather than focus on love and affection or on the intimate and private, we are concerned with the impact of the darker affects connected with colonialism. The emotions detailed in the 13 chapters of this anthology played out largely in the public sphere and they were fuelled by rumours, press reports or professional knowledge collection in the form of police or secret service intelligence, scientific surveys, archives, academic literature and so on. The book also brings together examples from a broad range of imperial settings. Though the majority of case studies relate to various colonies within the British Empire, chapters on Dutch and German colonialism also offer alternate contexts. In terms of the timeframe, the contributions cover a long period, stretching from the beginning of the imperial heyday in the 1860s to the crest of the great wave of decolonization in the early 1960s and thus capture the shifting circumstances in which the emotional experience of empire took shape.

As the geographical and temporal breadth of the contributions suggest, this book does not aim to develop a narrow definition of 'colonial panic'. Rather, by providing insights into how emotions like embarrassment, anxiety and fear guided political action and defined social or cultural attitudes, it provides a comparative and *longue durée* view on the numerous origins of imperial panics, examines the various strategies to respond to them and assesses their multi-faceted consequences for historical actors on both sides of the colonial equation.

APPROACHING EMOTIONS IN HISTORY

The idea that emotions are essential to the understanding of history is not a new one. Although this is not the place for a comprehensive review of the vast literature that already exists on the history of emotions, it might nonetheless be helpful to provide a rough sketch of the more prominent developments in the field. As early as 1882, Friedrich Nietzsche deplored an obvious lacuna in historical research by asking 'where can you find a history of love, of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of piety, of cruelty?'[9] Over the course of the twentieth century, such histories gradually began to appear. Johan Huizinga's pioneering examination of medieval emotional life was published in 1919,[10] followed by the work of Norbert Elias on the changing emotional norms of Western Europe and the proliferation of an ideal of self-restraint.[11] In France, the historical interest in emotion intersected with social history in the call of the *Annales* school, and Lucien Fèbvre in particular, to 'plunge into the darkness where psychology wrestles with history'.[12] In the 1960s, E.P. Thompson extended the limits of historical materialist inquiry by rethinking the relationship between social being and consciousness, through the mediation of 'experience'. With this insight into a particular limitation of Marxist theory, Thompson highlighted the central role emotion played in shaping political consciousness.[13] Before long, a new generation of social historians followed Thompson's example by focusing on the previously overlooked lives and experiences of other marginalized groups like women and racial minorities.

However, it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that a body of work readily identifiable as the 'history of emotions' emerged. This new current of research was closely related to the development of the history of the family and gender history, which had done much to overturn the traditional dichotomy between the public and private spheres. In 1985, the Stearns observed that much of the historical literature from the late 1970s and early 1980s claiming to deal with 'emotion' was actually still concerned with the question of changing emotional standards of the era, tackled previously by Elias. This work, the Stearns claim, established the idea of a 'new period in Western emotional history, corresponding to what we call modern'.[14] Thus, by this point, the history of emotions as a field not only reconstituted how certain fundamental categories were understood, but was also being invoked to formulate historical periodization. While the field has remained decidedly Eurocentric (and to some extent rooted in either medieval or contemporary history), its focus on both the

variety of emotional standards and expressions and the manner in which emotional experience was shaped by social expectation make it a fruitful field of enquiry for imperial historians.

Between the publication of the Stearns' groundbreaking article on 'emotionology' or the rules that govern emotional life and this volume, there have been considerable advances in the theorization of the history of emotions. In 2012, the *American Historical Review* invited some of the 'new emotional historians' to introduce and explain the field. This round-table made clear that the field had undergone radical change since the first calls were made to take emotion seriously. Barbara Rosenwein's 'emotional communities' added depth and complexity to the flattening of emotional standards into one homogeneous norm. She argued that historical actors felt their way through multiple and overlapping emotional communities that shaped both their affect and behaviour.[15] William Reddy, on the other hand, drew on anthropological literature to develop the idea that language changed our emotions through the use of 'emotives'.[16] This mutually constitutive relationship between emotions and the language used to express them is subject to change not only through time as historians of emotion have already established, but also through socio-political and cultural context, as well as by particularities of place.

The influence of anthropology and social constructivism on the history of emotions means that non-Western examples from the contemporary context and anthropological literature are frequently cited to demonstrate the diversity of emotionologies across the globe.[17] Until recently, however,[18] this global reach did not extend far back into the past. The juxtapositions of contemporary non-Western society and European or North American societies of the past continue to reaffirm a colonial notion of 'progress' that defines the non-Western world as backward and anachronistic, even as the West represents the eventual *telos* of historical change. The key ideas and foundational texts of the history of emotions such as Elias' *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation* emerged during the late colonial period (the mid-1930s to 1940s) in Western Europe, but, as yet, there has been little examination of this connection.

Despite the field's Eurocentrism, its focus on both the variety of emotional standards and expressions, and the manner in which emotional experience was shaped by social expectation make it a fruitful field of enquiry for imperial historians. The study of emotions in colonial settings thus offers an opportunity to bridge two gaps. On the one hand, it brings the insight of the constitutive power of emotions to imperial history and,

on the other hand, it may help to further de-centre and open up the history of emotions to non-European examples drawn from historical rather than anthropological case studies. A focus on emotions in non-Western settings has the potential to challenge the European periodization of emotional history and to allow a reassessment of the relationship between language, emotion and emotional regime. It is at least plausible to assume that in colonial societies, where the vernacular was side-lined by a colonial language in education, political life and the media, new relationships between multiple languages as well as multiple emotional communities would be formed.

Like most existing studies of emotions in history, this volume focuses on a particular 'set' of inter-connected emotions. Panic, anxiety and shame are often characterized as 'irrational' or 'overblown', but historical study of their expression, particularly in colonial contexts, suggests that these episodes reveal a great deal about the workings of empire and how it was experienced. Richard Grove summarizes one of the underlying themes behind the anxieties and panics of empire as 'anxiety about the nature of western society and anxiety about the ability of man to destroy nature and change the climate of the earth. Implicit in both fears was a suspicion that man might destroy his integrity and himself as a species'.[19]

More recently, panic and anxiety in imperial contexts have been addressed by two edited volumes that deserve to be discussed in greater detail, as their contributions partially intersect with the subject of the present collection. The contributors to the 2013 volume *Helpless Imperialists* edited by Maurus Reinkowski and Gregor Thum explore the sense of imperial vulnerability. Their collection highlights the vertiginous feeling of 'peripety' experienced by colonial authorities upon realizing the wide gap between colonial ambition and their actual political and military reach. Most of the case studies in the collection at hand suggest that the feeling of vulnerability was justified. Not only did the various empires lack resources, they relied heavily on rhetorical flourish and symbolism or grand efforts to demonstrate their military capabilities to maintain a semblance of order. The editors of *Helpless Imperialists* emphasize the persistence of insecurity throughout the colonial period. As the colonizers became established and gathered information about the colonized, the colonized too became familiar with their new rulers and developed strategies to oppose them.[20] The argument that advances in colonial technologies of knowledge gathering by no means prevented the outbreak of panics among the colonizers has recently also been put forward by Kim Wagner in an insightful article

on the 'Mutiny motif'.[21] Wagner regards colonial anxieties as 'structural' or 'systemic' and hence largely unrelated to the actual information and knowledge available to the ruling minority.[22] This analysis places insecurity and vulnerability squarely within the imperial power, suggesting that demonstrations of military or material strength were often merely window displays. In contrast to the somewhat one-sided examples provided by Reinkowski and Thum, the present volume is built on the observation that feelings of anxiety and the experience of panic were by no means the monopoly of imperial elites, but rather were often shared across the colonial divide.

This theme of fear of 'infection' by panic from a colonized population distinguishes our contributing author Robert Peckham's recent volume *Empires of Panic*. Unlike *Helpless Imperialists*, Peckham argues in the introduction to his anthology that in colonial settings, panic was often considered to be an attribute or tendency of the colonized populations. Based on the *Oxford English Dictionary*, he defines panic 'as a psychological state of an emotionally charged group response—invariably construed as irrational—to some external menace, whether natural or manmade, actual or imagined'.[23] He explains its spread primarily through the metaphors of contagion or plague, and discusses how colonial administrators pathologized the so-called 'native' populations of colonized people as naturally violent, secretive, ignorant or hyper-emotional, lending themselves to a continual state of anxiety over potential loss of control.[24]

These 'contagious panics' are represented as parasites reliant on the very feature of empires that denoted their strength—the size and scope of their transnational networks. Because of this, both *Helpless Imperialists* and Robert Peckham's collection share a strong focus on the role of communication and transport technology to spread and fan the flames of incipient panic. They demonstrate that the gathering of information, from frontier zones in particular, often encouraged rather than dampened anxieties in the metropole. Technological advances such as the material development of the electric telegraph system sparked panic and crisis by bringing the concerns of the 'turbulent frontier' directly to the heart of empire.[25] 'A history of panic and disease, then', as Alison Bashford concludes in the epilogue of *Empires of Panic*, 'turns out to be a history of communication and technology.'[26]

In contradistinction to the emphasis in Peckham's valuable collection, the panics and anxieties examined in this volume are not totalizing transcontinental panics of colonizer or colonized spread by electronic

communication or steamboat. While the importance of this dimension is acknowledged in some chapters, contributions mostly focus on more localized examples that demonstrate the interplay between emotions like anxiety and shame on the one hand and the outbreak of panics on the other. In doing so, our authors perform what Robert Peckham suggests: 'the history of a collective panic should, perhaps, be studied in relation to the history of emotions, opening up the question of what emotions are, and how emotion relates to cognition'.[27] A serious engagement with the emotions that served as triggers for imperial and colonial panics seems all the more necessary now as—in spite of his acknowledgement of the importance of the history of emotions—Peckham's volume itself, with its emphasis on media and modes of communication, has little to offer in this regard. Moreover, while *Empires of Panic* grapples more or less exclusively with 'disease panics' in Asian and Australasian parts of the British Empire, the diverse and variegated case studies assembled in this collection allow the reader to consider the differences in emotional response and tenor in a broad array of imperial and colonial cross-cultural encounters. Further, this structure also lends itself to a networked conception of the workings of the empire, which emphasizes the intensity of knowledge circulation and the multiplicity of trajectories not only within but also between empires.

COMING TO TERMS WITH 'PANIC'

Other than the insights provided by the history of emotions, 'moral panic' is another heuristic concept used by some of our authors. The phrase 'moral panic' was popularized, though not coined, by the sociologist Stanley Cohen in 1973.[28] It was first used in the *Quarterly Christian Spectator* in 1830 to contrast the need to remain actively faithful and moral so as to avoid the risk of lapsing into a torpor, or moral panic.[29] However, the next year, the term was used in its modern sense in the *Journal of Health Conducted by an Association of Physicians* to warn of the dangers of a public over-reaction to an outbreak of cholera.[30] From the early to mid-nineteenth century, panic tended to be associated with the 'primitive' as an example of raw emotion, which the superior Western civilization had nearly outgrown. Later, on the cusp of the twentieth century, Gustave Le Bon, the popular but irredeemably racist author of *La Psychologie de la Foule*, came to associate panic with modernity, intrinsically linking it to urbanization and technology.[31]

The concept of 'moral panic' specifically first came to scholarly attention in the 1960s with Marshall McLuhan's *Understanding Media*, which argued that 'The medium is the message' and suggested that new technologies of media caused shifts in perceptions.[32] But it was Cohen's work on perceived deviance and social tension that both brought together these earlier insights and introduced 'moral panic' into common parlance. His analysis highlighted the role of self-proclaimed experts and the media in the simplistic and sensationalist depiction of so-called 'folk devils' (that is, deviant groups allegedly posing a threat to societal or cultural values), thereby stoking the flames of a general panic. By the 1990s, researchers across a range of disciplines were making use of the concept at the same time as the idea took hold in the public imagination.[33]

Much of this literature focused on the seeming obsession with, and amplification of, deviance in both political policy and the media, which often resulted in the episodes of panic.[34] Cultural theorists questioned the ways in which moral panics appeared to divert dissent and maintain the prevailing political order.[35] This British and North American-based body of literature has produced a wide variety of uses of the concept, and a corresponding lack of clarity over what, precisely, defines a 'moral panic'. While Cohen's model highlighted the process by which panics emerged through media representation, later models provided a checklist of attributes to identify the panic post factum.[36] Popular usage of the term in relation to a wide variety of scandals and crises has made it still more difficult to effectively deploy as an analytical framework.

Despite this diversity of understandings, though, the domestic fears of deviance and the panics arising from colonial experience appear to have a great deal in common. Goode and Ben-Yehuda's list of attributes of panic, especially the disproportionality, hostility and volatility that characterize such emotional states of exception, resonate with the concerns of 'new imperial history', as does their concern with gender, race and sexuality. This latter point is particularly momentous because, as Angela Woollacott has trenchantly observed, 'ideas of gender, always linked to "race" and class, were forged in the colonies as well as in the metropole and circulated throughout the empire'.[37] Revealing the underlying emotional life of these processes thus promises to contribute to a better understanding of the complex forging of these categories in both domains.

There are myriad examples of how the sometimes-coalescing categories of race, class and gender were invoked to explain the perceived vulnerability to loss of control, both emotional and psychological. In imperial

contexts, the close connection between ideals of masculinity and colonial power produced a tendency to accuse colonized populations of 'unmanly' and unseemly panic. Racial stereotyping led colonizers to stigmatize colonized populations as being perpetually close to violent outbursts, unpredictable behaviour and loss of moral restraints. Simultaneously, colonial officials and white settlers tried to contrast the putative 'native' hyper-emotionalism with their own alleged self-control and rationality. While 'white' imperial masculinity was thus often constructed against the negative foil of 'native effeminacy',[38] fears of 'black' or 'native' hyper-masculinity simultaneously (and somewhat paradoxically) engendered panics around perceived threats to white women that, in turn, imperilled the 'honour' and hegemony of white men. As the chapters by Gajendra Singh and Norman Etherington powerfully demonstrate, this subject became particularly fraught and liable to spark panic when sexual relations between the races could not be effectively controlled.

The treatment and attempted containment of colonized peoples, which was Cohen's over-riding interest, carries a striking resonance with the treatment and objectification of marginalized groups and social outcasts within a domestic European frame. Sebastian Conrad and Harald Fischer-Tiné, amongst many others, have observed the congruence of an 'internal' civilizing mission aimed at the plebeian elements of German and British society with an 'external' colonial civilizing effort directed at the native population in Africa or India.[39] As we have observed already, in both settings, the seemingly 'marginalized groups' tended to constitute the majority of the population, and their potential threat to the social and colonial political order advocated by the ruling elites increased the likelihood of anxiety and panic among the latter. Interestingly, in most of the case studies in the present volume, a solid basis for imperial anxiety or panic appears to have been absent. This begs the question of what, if these anxieties or panics were misplaced, is the point in studying the underlying events. As Luise White argues about her choice of topic in the book *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa*: 'What better way to re-examine the way historians have thought about evidence, reliability, and truth than by studying the history of things that never happened?'[40] This volume puts together case studies that demonstrate how historical actors, rather than historians, thought about evidence, reliability and truth in the face of seeming crisis. They illustrate that even though the events so feared rarely came to pass, they still engendered huge amounts of 'real' documentation, communication and discussion, and thus help us get a better

understanding of the inner workings of empires and the complexities of colonial relations. A great deal of information was transmitted and gathered in what could be termed 'informal' networks, spreading gossip and rumour.[41] These rumours, as Norman Etherington observes, were then frequently refashioned by authorities into understandable coherent narratives. In attempts to create plausible explanations in the face of seeming disaster, chaos or violence, colonial authorities turned to medical theories, their own archives and existing prejudices about colonial peoples to frame and order flows of information. However, as Richard Hölzl's chapter in this volume demonstrates, there were also cases where the flow of information was interrupted on purpose and a certain type of knowledge was prevented from circulating freely.

These issues of communication, transmission and translation come up in imperial panics in two other ways: the frustration of trying to understand another society and environment felt by colonizing powers, which often manifested as panics and anxieties;[42] and the fault-lines of (mis)communication that permitted the spread of panic. The first 'translation' problem brings systems of knowledge production and recall under scrutiny. The 'particular and sometimes peculiar form' of the colonial archive lent itself to its use in empires in an attempt to apply the lessons of the past and other colonies to contemporary concerns.[43] This allowed not only the transmission of misapprehensions and errors across time and space but also encouraged colonial officials to seek solutions in what was perceived as a centralized authority.

The second problem of translation lay in the new opportunities offered by empire-building to create vast networks of communication. Aided both by technological advances in photography, communications and transport, as well as by an increasingly news-hungry populace in both colonies and the metropole, the imperial and colonial press served as a conduit for the publication and spread of panics and anxieties. However, there is a clear overlap between these two, as becomes clear in the chapters by Bernhard C. Schär, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Robert Peckham. As colonial archives became reliant, in part, on the press to gather information, the press simultaneously encouraged the intervention of the government by launching campaigns and drawing attention towards perceived crises. In this network, however, information travelled imperfectly. Assumptions, prejudices and commercial concerns slanted coverage and as these stories travelled, they lost their context, leaving them open to further misinterpretation.

The Contributions

In order to allow a multi-dimensional analysis of the different facets of colonial panic, the present volume is subdivided into four thematic parts. The first section provides an insight into the concrete medical aspects of imperial panic. In spite of the fact that the problem of the bodily experience of empire for Europeans, and more specifically issues of imperial health, has already been added to the portfolio of ('new') imperial historians some time ago, the literature on the corporeality of empire is still comparatively meagre.[44] The three contributions forming this part bring together cases of anxiety and panic over physical and mental well-being in diverse imperial settings. Dane Kennedy's opening piece places the diagnosis of 'tropical neurasthenia' into its imperial and historical context. As Kennedy observes, the late nineteenth century saw increasing anxiety over an apparent 'breakdown in moral discipline, a failure of governance of the self' exhibited by Europeans in colonial settings and the resistance of Africans to imperial rule. That anxiety about the mental and physical problems experienced by colonizers and colonized people resulted in the development of two different medico-moral theories about their causes. Both theories claimed that these disorders had the same root cause: 'the collision between imperial modernity and indigenous primitivism'. The diagnosis of neurasthenia started to lose purchase in medical circles in the early twentieth century and fell completely from favour after the Second World War. However, the pathologization of African resistance resulted in the behaviour of members of certain anti-imperial movements to be diagnosed and dismissed as a type of 'mania' rooted in mental illness rather than a genuine political agenda. This medical explanatory model, which neatly separated colonizers from colonized, illustrates not only the anxieties felt in the colonies but also the subsequent concerns unleashed in the metropole.

This theme of the differential approaches taken to seemingly abhorrent behaviours amongst colonizers and colonized in response to anxieties and panic is taken up again by David Arnold in his chapter on poisoning panics in British India. Rumours of possible harmful adulterants spread through both the European population, who feared the treachery of their Indian servants, and Indian communities, who identified the colonial state as its 'folk devil'. Again, the fear of some kind of 'degeneration' spurred underlying anxieties that the assumed natural proclivity of Indians to poisoning would be picked up by Europeans. This panic represented, according to

Arnold, a fear of 'internal subversion and internalized attack' amongst both colonized and colonizers. Knowledge of these scares served to further reinforce pre-existing racial assumptions about the barbarity of Indian society and the civilizing effects of imperialism. The panic in the 1830s over Thugs, or murderous peripatetic bandits organized into gangs, was recalled to reaffirm these assumptions. This specific variety of the imperial 'politics of difference'[45] resulted in two different approaches pursued in relation to poison in the colony and the metropole. Legal regulation was implemented in response to poisoning crimes in the Britain, but in India the emphasis was on gathering knowledge about poisons to insulate Europeans from attacks.

The third chapter in this section, Will Jackson's analysis of decolonization and instances of mental breakdown in 1950s' Kenya, shows how the performance of emotion remained integral to the expression of colonial ideology right up to the end of empire. From case histories of 'nervous breakdowns' that occurred among Europeans against the backdrop of the Mau-Mau War (1952–60), Jackson draws out how people's mental states interacted with the wider history of imperialism in the twentieth century. By focusing on individual stories reconstructed from memoirs and psychiatric case files, we can see how actual experiences varied according to the status and position of the person concerned. Perhaps surprisingly, explicit racial anxieties and the concrete fears of Mau-Mau violence did play a role in the narratives of Europeans who were treated for mental illnesses in 1950s' Kenya, but were by no means dominant. What emerges as a more important theme is the vague fear of loss and deprivation, and an underlying dread that the days of the Empire were numbered. Taken together, these three pieces provide powerful examples of how fears about individual well-being were intimately bound to the overarching imperial order.

The second part explores various kinds of discursive responses to imperial panics. It explores how anxieties about sexual transgression, politically motivated violence or betrayal by the colonial subjects shaped the representations of the colonized as well as the self-perceptions of imperial elites. Harald Fischer-Tiné picks up on David Arnold's observation about the enduring reuse of clichés about Hindus as simultaneously cowardly and violent, and shows how these prejudices were used as part of a new rhetoric about colonial 'terrorism'. He uses the panic over the assassination of a high-ranking colonial official in London in 1909 to illustrate his point. In this context, the actual perpetrators of anti-imperial violence were dismissed as brainwashed, mentally unstable or feeble. Fischer-Tiné

shows how this panic, and the subsequent need to find a 'puppet master' of the deluded activists led to the demonization of the political work of the Indian anti-colonial activist Shyamji Krishnavarma, who was one of the most important spokesmen of the Indian national movement in Europe in the early 1900s. In the wake of the panic over the London outrage of 1909, Krishnavarma, a sober rationalist with liberal leanings, was reduced by the British and international press to a two-dimensional religious fanatic and demonic wire-puller, allegedly manipulating weaker minds into merciless killing.

Kama Maclean's chapter on the 'art of panicking quietly' complements the picture inasmuch as it looks at the same phenomenon—Indian anti-colonial 'terrorism' and its effects—but shifts the focus from the imperial metropole to the subcontinent itself. Violent 'outrages' targeting British officials were fairly common in British India since the early 1900s. Focusing on the height of the Indian revolutionary terrorism of the 1920s and 1930s, Maclean shows how the British elites in India were cultivating an ostentatious attitude of stoicism and the proverbial 'stiff upper lip'. They hoped that such a display of strength would help prevent 'imperial nervous breakdowns' by containing the anxieties that resulted from the press reports of terrorist attacks against Europeans that were becoming ubiquitous during the 1920s and 1930s. However, as Maclean argues, this management strategy not only concealed but also reproduced panic, because what appeared to be a failure to register the threat of terrorism was also deemed a failure of governance at a time when constitutional reforms were being debated in India and in Britain.

As the next contribution demonstrates, the First World War catalysed pre-existing anxieties in a variety of ways and provoked comprehensive responses to the perceived threats. Fears of 'racial degeneration' and the destabilizing influence of cross-cultural contact are the main themes of Gajendra Singh's chapter on relationships between Indian soldiers and European women in France during the First World War. This chapter introduces the topic of 'hierarchies of masculinity' as part of the imperial performance of emotion. Inter-racial sexual relationships challenged these hierarchies during the war and were often consciously cultivated by Indian soldiers precisely for this reason. Singh's case study details the various ways in which the sexual transgression of racial boundaries produced paranoia, panic and fear in the British colonial administration as well as among the French public. By briefly examining the reactions of parents and relatives back in India of Punjabi *sipahis* who entertained relationships

with European women, Singh finally brings out sharply the shared character of these anxieties. He shows how the Indian soldiers involved mirrored the colonial panic and began to become anxious about what these cross-cultural relationships might mean for their own familial and religious belonging.

In the third part, the focus shifts from discursive responses to the tangible practical and institutional counter-measures against perceived threats, sometimes amplified by fears of embarrassment on the international political stage, that were implemented by imperial and colonial governments. Such measures included the establishment of new systems of surveillance and discipline, and even incidents of outright military aggression.

Norman Etherington's comparative chapter on the panic over the Morant Bay rebellion of freed ex-slaves in Jamaica in the 1860s as well as a series of rape cases and alleged conspiracies of Ethiopian preachers in the South African colony of Natal (in the 1870s and 1900s) respectively makes some important points. For one, it validates that various kinds of imperial fears could easily collapse into one another. Thus, for instance, his first example demonstrates how anxieties about real or imagined sexual transgressions of black men in South Africa were closely linked to worries about the legitimacy of land ownership. Crucially, all three case studies serve to illustrate one of the main findings of this volume, in that they detail how rumours were refashioned into seemingly coherent narratives as colonial authorities sought to delve backwards into their own archive in the face of current panics.

Next, Daniel Brückenhaus' chapter shows that possible collaboration between Asian anti-imperialist groups in Europe and the German government during the First World War appeared to be an even more dangerous threat to British and French surveillance agencies than the sexual exploits of South Asian soldiers stationed on the Western front. It traces how these self-proclaimed liberal governments of the *entente cordiale* (that is, Britain and France) developed distinctly illiberal politics and alliances with respect to the transnational policing of diasporic anti-colonial activists. As in Fischer-Tiné's contribution, here too the colonial authorities denied agency to the anti-colonialists and assumed that they could only be hapless puppets of an overarching German administration. In hindsight, it seems ironic that it was precisely these persecutory policies that forced the activists to seek refuge in Germany and Switzerland, thereby creating and intensifying the very kind of anti-colonial networks that the policies sought to prevent.

The two remaining chapters in this part deal with different facets of colonial rule in the Dutch East Indies. Vincent Houben provides a comprehensive inventory of the various fears and anxieties that haunted Dutch officials and settlers in Java and Sumatra in the first four decades of the twentieth century. He dwells on the destabilizing effect of the experience of native valour and bravery in colonial battles, examines the impact of acts of 'native violence' on the plantations of Indonesia on colonial representations of social order, and analyses the panic generated by the first instances of violent nationalist resistance in the inter-war years. His *tour d'horizon* ends with a discussion of the shock produced by the 'yellow peril', that is, the expanding Japanese Empire since the 1930s. When combined, Houben's vignettes highlight the ever-present anxiety felt by Dutch officials and settler communities, reinforced by literature of the time as the settlers tried to cope with a rapidly changing environment. As Houben's survey chapter illustrates through numerous examples, episodes of physical violence, the violent rhetoric of Indonesian nationalism and the external threat created through the rise of Japan to the position of a potent military power tended to produce intense instances of panic, which exposed the fragility of the Dutch imperial project.

Bernhard C. Schär's piece zooms in on Dutch imperialism around 1900 when the imperial government in the East Indies refrained from enlarging its colonial possessions, but rather rounded off its empire by annexing islands that it considered rightly its own. Schär's analysis of Dutch imperial support for Swiss scientists on the outer island of Celebes offers a new approach to the question of the inner logics of this phase of Dutch imperial expansion by arguing that one of the lesser-known motives of the policy of rounding off consisted of the fear of embarrassment *vis-à-vis* foreign countries. The chapter adopts a Bourdieuean view on the role of emotions for collective action. For one, the Dutch fear of embarrassment is seen, on a structural level, as a particular disposition of the Dutch imperial habitus, given the rather weak position of this relatively small country *vis-à-vis* imperial giants such as Britain, France or Germany. On the level of concrete historical actors, fear of embarrassment is simultaneously seen as a resource that various historical groups could exploit in the pursuit of competing agendas within the Dutch Empire. The motive of national disgrace and discomfiture was thus invoked by journalists, scientists, missionaries, colonial officials and local rulers for completely different reasons. Together they produced a series of emotional and political crises that forced the Dutch imperial state to increase military involvement in the peripheries of its empire, eventually leading to a new wave of annexations.

The fourth part tackles the problem of 'epistemic anxieties'[46] by reflecting on the connection between anxiety and panic and the production, use, circulation and recycling of colonial knowledge in imperial settings. In Richard Hölzl's account of the missionary panic over native sexual education in German East Africa, anthropological and religious knowledge was also generated. However, it was not disseminated to the colonial authorities or the broader public at home. Instead, the access to this 'secret' knowledge became the privilege of a tiny in-group consisting of other missionaries. Hölzl's chapter shows how German missionaries, drawing from cases observed by their colleagues 'in the field', deliberately developed repositories of anthropological information in response to a panic in order to educate fellow missionaries on these particular issues. The suppression of the flow of knowledge beyond the in-group created a 'field of ignorance' on the one hand, but also a historical stash of acquired knowledge at the disposal of future generations of Christian missionaries on the other hand. Christine Whyte's chapter on the panic over 'human leopards' in Sierra Leone in 1912 shows how the fright was charged by the regurgitation of past prejudices and experiences of violence. The colonial archive—again, colonial officials used to refer to 'Thugee' in India as the ultimate example of native 'savagery'—was consulted to reinforce existing racial stereotypes. The panic ultimately resulted in an explosion of anthropological literature about the 'leopards' being disseminated all over Britain and its Empire. Whyte's detailed analysis of this peculiar genre of texts clearly suggests that the narratives of the 'leopard murders' drew on earlier prejudices about African religion and ritual, and the resulting 'scientific' literature in turn became an important reference point for later investigators.

Finally, Robert Peckham's chapter grapples with a classic trigger of imperial panics: the possible spill-over of contagious diseases from the 'native population' to the European expatriate community. Peckham argues persuasively that colonial panics revolving around the spread of the plague and similar diseases in Asian colonies were closely intertwined with deep-seated anxieties about the potentially dangerous character of 'the crowd'. He argues that although the elite fear of the mob was certainly not only a colonial phenomenon around the turn of the twentieth century, as the popularity of contemporary books like Gustave le Bons *La Psychologie de la Foule* amply testifies, it was definitely amplified when the mob in question was native. His piece provides a succinct comparative analysis of the plague panics that broke out in Hong Kong and Bombay during the second half of the 1890s. It not only reminds us of the existence of an all-pervasive imperial fear of the teeming masses in Eastern cities

but also once more demonstrates how the production and dissemination of imperial knowledge—in this case quasi-scientific knowledge about the dangerously 'contagious' character of native crowds—could generate new sources of anxiety and panic.

In sum, then, the studies collected in this volume examine the various ways in which panics and anxieties were generated in imperial situations and how they shook up the dynamics between seemingly all-powerful colonizers and the apparently defenceless colonized. To be sure, the experience of discomfort, anxiety and moments of panic that occurred was shaped to some extent by the specific imperial setting, but certain shared themes and features can nevertheless be discerned. In particular, the pathologization of so-called native populations of colonized people as naturally violent, secretive, ignorant or hyper-emotional by colonial administrators lent itself to a continual state of anxiety over the potential loss of control. This pathologization, of course, was part of an overarching imperial 'politics of difference' that played out on various levels. The construction of bodies of scientific knowledge that accompanied the spread of colonial rule was one of them. Imperial knowledge generation sought to explain the difficulties encountered in colonial societies through claiming inherent difference between peoples. Medical expertise, anthropological research and intelligence-gathering played key roles in this respect. As we have seen in various case studies, this stereotyping was reinforced and inflamed through popular press reporting on events, which frequently exaggerated current fears by recycling tropes about colonial peoples to generate easily understood copy. At the same time, small and isolated communities of colonists became a ripe breeding ground for rumours and gossip, bringing the objects of panic into their homes and private lives.

Our case studies have demonstrated that there were also less sophisticated imperial strategies of panic management or prevention. The colonial settlers and administrators struggled to practice the outward display of emotional self-restraint considered to be the standard of civilization. As several chapters make obvious, the imperial 'vulnerability' or sense of 'contagion' identified by Peckham and Reinkowski and Thum set the stage for a conflict between the ideal and the reality of emotional expression. As will become apparent throughout this book, the changing and contextually contingent patterns of emotional expression and their relationship to the organization of power in empires can only be fully understood when we grasp the underlying emotional components of moments of colonial crisis and panics.

Notes

1. The phrase is borrowed from the title of a recent, rather uncritical book presenting anecdotes on British imperial governors: Stephanie Williams (2011).
2. George Orwell (1953: 31–40). See also the more detailed discussion of Orwell's story in Kama Maclean's contribution to this volume.
3. Cf., for instance, Ranajit Guha (1997: 482–93).
4. Joseph Conrad (1900).
5. For details on the original case, see Norman Sherry (1964: 545–57).
6. For a discussion of other examples, see, for instance, Yumna Siddiqi (2008).
7. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley (2007).
8. Elizabeth Buettner (2004); Leela Gandhi (2006); Emily Manktelow (2013); and Emma Rothschild (2011).
9. Friedrich Nietzsche (1980: 378–79): 'Wo gäbe es eine Geschichte der Liebe, der Habsucht, des Neides, des Gewissens, der Pietät, der Grausamkeit?'
10. Johan Huizinga (1919).
11. Norbert Elias (1939).
12. Lucien Febvre (1973).
13. E.P. Thompson (1966).
14. Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns (1985: 819).
15. B.H. Rosenwein (2002).
16. William M. Reddy (1997).
17. For example, the Stearns use the example of how anthropologist Jean Briggs describes the emotional standards of the Utku Eskimo tribe towards anger: Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns (1985: 814).
18. An attempt to write a non-Eurocentric, multi-sided history of emotions that is as admirable as it is ambitious has recently been undertaken by an international authors' collective under the aegis of Margrit Pernau and Helge Jordheim (2015).
19. Richard H. Grove (1995: 262).
20. Maurus Reinkowski and Greogor Thum (2013: 8–9).
21. Kim Wagner (2013).
22. Kim Wagner (2013: 193).
23. Robert Peckham (2015: 5).
24. Robert Peckham (2015: 1–15). The relationship between panic and plague, disease and fear is also explored in the work of Guenter B. Risse. See, for example, Guenter B. Risse (2015).
25. Deep Kanta Lahiri-Choudhury (2010).
26. Alison Bashford (2015: 204).
27. Robert Peckham (2015: 5).

28. Stanley Cohen (1973).
29. N.N. (1830: 350).
30. The connections between discourses of disease and imperial panic is explored in Peckham (2015).
31. Gustave Le Bon (1895). See for an English translation: Bon, Gustave Le. 1896. *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. Benn: Digireads.com.
32. Marshall McLuhan (2001 [1964]).
33. Kenneth Thompson (1998: 1).
34. Stanley Cohen (1971); Jock Young (1971).
35. Stuart Hall, C. Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke and B. Roberts (1978).
36. Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (2009 [1994]).
37. Angela Woollacott (2006: 10).
38. For a brief overview focusing on the British Empire, see Brett Linsley (2013).
39. Sebastian Conrad (2009); Harald Fischer-Tiné (2005).
40. Luise White (2000: xii).
41. Emily J. Manktelow (2015). See also Kim A. Wagner (2010).
42. Christopher A. Bayly has famously coined the term 'information panics' to describe this phenomenon: Christopher A. Bayly (1996: 174). See also D.K. Lahiri-Choudhuri (2004).
43. Ann Laura Stoler (2002; 2009).
44. Cf., for instance, Dane Kennedy (1990); Elizabeth M. Collingham (2001); Richard Keller (2001); Eric T. Jennings (2006); and Waltraud Ernst (2010).
45. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010).
46. Ann Laura Stoler (2009).

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The Health of Body and Mind

Minds in Crisis: Medico-moral Theories of Disorder in the Late Colonial World

Dane Kennedy

Could colonialism drive people crazy? In the first half of the twentieth century, many colonial doctors and other scientific authorities came to believe that it could. They advanced two distinct, though intriguingly similar, medico-moral theories to explain the causes and manifestations of mental breakdown among peoples residing in so-called tropical colonies. One theory dealt exclusively with the colonizers and the other exclusively with the colonized. Although both theories have received some attention from historians, they have never been treated in relation to one another.[1] Yet each was in many respects the mirror image of the other. Both sought to diagnose as psychiatric disorders an array of behaviours that were

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regarded as threatening to the colonial order. And both attributed these disorders to much the same root cause—the collision between imperial modernity and indigenous primitivism. Taken together, the two theories gave expression to a deepening anxiety that European empires were on the verge of a nervous breakdown.

The historical context for the rise of these two medico-moral theories was the consolidation of Western colonial rule across large portions of the globe at the turn of the twentieth century, especially in Africa, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. These were regions that the West had come to characterize as the tropics, a geographical conceit constructed around the notion of primitive otherness.[2] As growing numbers of missionaries, merchants, soldiers, settlers and other agents of colonialism entered these regions, so too did physicians and related medical specialists. They were often poorly prepared to diagnose and alleviate the unfamiliar symptoms that many of their patients exhibited. The medical history of colonial rule in these regions is usually presented as a struggle by doctors to combat malaria, yellow fever, bilharzia, trypanosoma, and other deadly microbes and parasites, undertaken with the assistance of the metropolitan institutes of tropical medicine that were founded around the turn of the century. But doctors also confronted health problems in these newly acquired colonies that did not fit easily within the diagnostic framework of the microbe hunters. These were afflictions of the mind.

Explanations of such afflictions assumed a distinctive valence in the colonial context, where they had long been overlaid with colonizers' anxieties about their relationship with the colonized. In the eyes of colonial authorities, mental derangement among colonized peoples was most readily apparent in the individual and collective violence these peoples committed against their foreign overlords. These acts were often attributed to natives' primitive and irrational character, which occasionally compelled them to commit otherwise inexplicable acts of savagery. This provided a convenient explanation for countless unsettling challenges to colonial regimes and their agents. The violence that colonizers inflicted on the colonizer was, by contrast, normalized as a rational response to obstreperous or threatening conduct. But colonial regimes did express concern about those individual colonizers who experienced mental breakdowns or exhibited what was regarded as deviant behaviour. Unlike interpretations of derangement among colonized peoples, which stressed their innate susceptibility to irrational outbursts, explanations of the emotional afflictions that colonists suffered were usually attributed to environmental

forces, which were identified in the nineteenth century as 'tropical ennui', 'tropical fatigue' and similar phrases. These differentiating characterizations of mental disorders among colonizers and colonized would persist into the twentieth century, even as medical and other scientific specialists assumed increasing status as sources of authority on the subject.

While the treatment of the mentally ill had become an increasingly specialized practice in the West from the late eighteenth century onwards, it was only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that psychology, along with its subdisciplinary affiliates, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, came to be seen as a distinct field of knowledge that filtered into the public discourse, where it found a firm niche by attributing certain social problems to particular states of mind. Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung led the way in advancing the case for an association between the individual psyche and social—even civilizational—patterns of behaviour, thereby transforming psychiatry from a mere clinical practice to a mode of meta-analysis. Psychology became an integral element of social thought in Britain and other Western countries in the inter-war years and remained so for decades after the Second World War.[3] Recent scholarship has shown that it assumed increasing importance within the colonial context as well. 'From the 1920s', Warwick Anderson and his co-authors assert, 'psychoanalysis was a mobile technology of both the late colonial state and anti-imperialism'.[4] Psychoanalysis, however, was only one aspect of a much broader set of psychological perspectives that the agents of colonialism brought into play as they sought to understand and explain the troubling emotive effects of the collision between colonizers and colonized.[5]

It should be stressed that it is not the purpose of this chapter to investigate those emotive effects themselves. Discerning a pattern in the multitude of individual psychological responses to the colonial experience poses a daunting challenge, although applying the notion of 'moral panics' to the colonial context provides one promising means of establishing a connection between personal emotions and socio-political pressures.[6] My objective, however, is to show how certain types of emotional disturbances were perceived and interpreted by medical authorities, and how their perceptions and interpretations helped to serve broader social and political agendas. I share the view of Megan Vaughan that 'whilst medical discourses must themselves be seen as constitutive of the problems they describe, they may also reflect … material and political circumstances outside the immediate realm of the medical'.[7] Hence, I will argue that when colonial doctors turned to these medico-moral theories to explain the

seemingly bewildering array of symptoms they observed among colonizers and colonized, they simultaneously managed to associate the afflictions of individual patients with the racial communities to which they were affiliated, to differentiate between the causes, characteristics and cures of mental disorders within the two communities, and to designate those who were subject to such diagnoses as threats to the colonial regime itself.

I: Tropical Neurasthenia

The most influential explanatory framework for the psychic problems that confronted the colonizers of tropical territories in the early twentieth century came to be known as tropical neurasthenia. The term 'neurasthenia' was coined in 1868 by the American physician George Beard, who identified it as a form of nervous exhaustion that afflicted middle-class males in urban industrial environments, where competitive pressures caused them to suffer symptoms such as fatigue, insomnia, headache, irritability and sexual dysfunction.[8] This diagnosis gradually gained credence among medical fraternities across the Western world and by the end of the nineteenth century, neurasthenia was considered the quintessential ailment of modernity.

In 1905, Dr Charles Woodruff, an American army surgeon who had recently returned from the Philippines, announced that neurasthenia was widespread among US forces stationed in the archipelago. As the title of his book made clear, he attributed their neurasthenic ills to *The Effects of Tropical Light on White Men*.[9] This curious claim grafted Beard's now-fashionable diagnosis, with its emphasis on psychiatric disorders, onto long-standing European concerns about the tropical climate. Woodruff's diagnosis struck a sympathetic chord with the growing number of medical officers and other physicians who were struggling to treat the often obscure symptoms their countrymen manifested in newly acquired tropical colonies. Appearing on the scene at the very moment that tropical medicine was establishing itself as a distinct disciplinary field with its own specialists and body of knowledge, it is perhaps not surprising that this new variant of neurasthenia was soon classified as a distinct clinical condition known as tropical neurasthenia. Although it originally came to my attention as a result of research on the white settler communities of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, I soon learned that it was in fact a transcolonial concern from around 1910 through the inter-war years.[10] Articles about tropical neurasthenia appeared in American, British, French, German, Dutch

and Italian medical journals. It received serious attention from some of the leading lights in tropical medicine, including Sir Andrew Balfour, Director of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Sir R. Havelock Charles, Surgeon-General of India, and Aldo Castellani, a prominent bacteriologist at the London School of Tropical Medicine who had discovered how sleeping sickness was transmitted. Large numbers of Europeans working in the tropics came to be diagnosed with tropical neurasthenia. In the Gold Coast, for example, nearly as many of the colonial officials sent home as medical invalids suffered from tropical neurasthenia as from malaria.[11] Similarly, several studies of missionaries found that some 20 per cent of those who had to leave Africa, India and other tropical lands for health reasons were diagnosed with 'nervous conditions of a neurasthenic type'.[12]

Tropical neurasthenia shared tropical medicine's central premise that the tropics presented distinctive challenges to the health of Europeans, but it diverged from tropical medicine's emphasis on the microbial origins of disease, drawing instead on an older tradition of environmental determinism that sought climatic explanations for illness. The tropical heat and humidity had long been considered a leading cause of the deterioration of European health in the tropics, either through its direct destabilizing effect on the body's balance of humours or through the noxious miasmas that resulted from the rapid decay of organic matter in hot weather.[13] Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, German researchers began to give a modern gloss to this traditional suspicion of the 'torrid zone' by speculating that actinic radiation, which forms part of the ultraviolet band of the light spectrum, might have adverse physiological effects on white-skinned people in the tropics.[14] Woodruff took up this investigative thread, making the case that actinic rays were more intense in tropical than temperate zones, that they were capable of penetrating the body in much the same way as the x-rays newly discovered by Marie Curie, and that they were more damaging to light-skinned people of European heritage than to the dark-skinned indigenous inhabitants of Africa and other tropical territories. Woodruff's actinic theory supplied a modern scientific explanation for the long-standing conviction that the tropical climate was dangerous to Europeans, casting it in terms that combined recent advances in physics with popular anxieties about nerve exhaustion and setting it in a context that spoke directly to colonists' concerns about racial deterioration. One telling indication of its influence on how colonizers dealt with the tropical environment were

the widespread adoption of special items of dress to protect them against this newly identified solar threat. The most ubiquitous of these items was the sola topi (or pith helmet), which originated in mid-nineteenth-century India to protect against sunstroke. By the early twentieth century, the sola topi had become the iconic symbol of the colonizer in the tropics, in large part because it was believed to safeguard its wearers against actinic rays. Other protective apparel included the double terai (a felt hat of double thickness), spine pads, sunglasses and a specially designed red fabric advertised under the trade name 'Solaro'.[15] The marketing and utilization of such gear give us an indication of the scale of the concern about the neurasthenic effects of actinic rays.

Not all of the medical specialists who wrote about tropical neurasthenia, it should be stressed, embraced the actinic theory. Some suspected other climatic or environmental factors, such as heat, humidity or even high altitudes. Others stressed social causes, such as contact with diseased or depraved indigenous peoples or simply the sense of loneliness and despair that afflicted those who were stationed in remote regions, isolated from familiar faces and places. But the common thread running through all of these explanations was that tropical neurasthenia was an affliction that specifically targeted white sojourners in the colonial tropics.[16]

Like its metropolitan namesake, tropical neurasthenia was understood to be a form of nerve damage or nerve exhaustion. It presented much the same range of symptoms: irritability, insomnia, lack of appetite, loss of memory, headaches, heart palpitations, phobias, sexual disorders, alcoholism, depression and, in extreme cases, insanity and suicide. Unlike neurasthenia at home, however, this version of the disease was not viewed as symptomatic of modern civilization and its discontents. On the contrary, it was associated with the challenge posed by an environment that was regarded as primitive and therefore presented a special threat to civilized peoples. For colonizers who were used to 'the modern demand for efficiency and the strain of competition', such an environment was seen as psychically disorienting and destructive.[17] What drove whites crazy in the colonies, in other words, was their isolation from modernity.

While most of tropical neurasthenia's bewildering array of symptoms may seem relatively trivial—after all, who doesn't get irritable or suffer sleeplessness occasionally?—what made these symptoms such causes for concern was that they seemed to signal a breakdown in moral discipline, a failure of the governance of the self. This was a matter that greatly alarmed tropical colonies' European communities, whose demographic

weakness relative to indigenous populations caused them to place particular importance on the need to patrol racial boundaries and maintain behavioural norms. The preoccupation with 'prestige' was the most familiar expression of this concern. It can also be discerned in the diagnosis of tropical neurasthenia. As Will Jackson has put it, 'defence against the sun meant protection of the race'.[18] Many of the symptoms associated with this diagnosis indicated deviant behaviour on the part of the patient, behaviour that was seen not simply as unhealthy for the patient, but also as threatening to white authority and corrosive to the colonial project itself. When white sojourners were sent home with neurasthenic ills, we can infer that many of them were invalided not only for their own good, but also for the good of the colonial community as a whole. Tropical neurasthenia served in this sense as a disciplinary tool that emphasized the importance of the governance of the self to the governance of the colony.[19]

Much of the medical literature on tropical neurasthenia can be read in this regard as a moral and racial discourse. It expressed anxiety that deviant or self-destructive behaviour by individuals served as an early warning sign of the degeneration of the race. White men were believed to be at particular risk because they spent so much time on the colonial front lines, engaged in direct encounters with tropical environments and peoples that made them susceptible to alcoholism, depression and other neurasthenic ills. As Warwick Anderson has noted, tropical neurasthenia served in this context as a diagnosis that delineated the boundaries of colonial masculinity.[20] It was attentive above all to sexual matters such as impotence, concupiscence and miscegenation. Physicians writing about tropical neurasthenia repeatedly expressed concern about the large number of single men in the colonies, fearing they would either turn to native women for sexual gratification, thereby fathering a mixed-race progeny and eroding their emotional and cultural ties to their countrymen, or give up sex altogether, thereby generating various neuroses and undermining their masculine sense of self. Marriage to white women obviously offered the most suitable resolution to this problem, but for the majority of white men in the tropics, this was not a viable option: their employers or incomes prevented them from bringing wives to the colonies. For those white women who did take up residence in the tropics as wives or in other capacities, such as missionaries and nurses, tropical neurasthenia was thought to be no less threatening. In addition to contracting the standard array of neurasthenic ills, these women were warned that they would likely suffer from irregular menstrual cycles and frequent miscarriages. They were often advised to

seek rest cures in hill stations or the home country in order to safeguard their health. But this required those who were married to be separated from their husbands for long periods of time, thereby exacerbating the latter's sexual conundrum. And when these women actually managed to conceive and give birth to children, the children themselves were considered highly susceptible to neurasthenic ills, usually made manifest as 'seediness' or feebleness. Parents were urged to send them back to the home country before they reached adolescence, when their hormones made them especially susceptible to the environment's degenerative influence. Emigration societies agonized about placing poor child migrants in tropical colonies like Southern Rhodesia, fearing they lacked the moral discipline to maintain their sense of identity as agents of white civilization.[21] For Europeans of all ages and both sexes, tropical neurasthenia served as an early warning sign of the danger that confronted the white race itself in the colonial tropics. The constant refrain that coursed through this medical discourse was worry that whites might degenerate and disappear as a distinct and dominant race after three generations in the tropics.

While tropical neurasthenia was hardly the only manifestation of the anxieties white sojourners felt about their presence in the colonial tropics, it struck a particular chord in the first half of the twentieth century. Because it spoke the language of medical science and carried the imprimatur of doctors' expertise, it enjoyed considerable influence among colonial communities. It offered a medico-moral explanation of the otherwise baffling array of symptoms so many white sojourners in the colonial tropics seemed to suffer from, offering them reassurance that their psychic complaints could be cured while simultaneously demanding that they exhibit the moral discipline necessary to maintain the stability of the racial order.

However, with the outbreak of the Second World War, the influence of tropical neurasthenia quickly waned. Europeans soon faced a far more obvious and immediate threat to their survival in the colonial tropics—especially in the Pacific and Southeast Asia—than that posed by neurasthenic ills. At the same time, the European troops who fought in these theatres found through force of necessity that they could cope with climatic conditions that seemed intolerable to their predecessors. As a result, tropical neurasthenia largely disappeared in the post-war era. It lost most of its explanatory power even in those Sub-Saharan African countries that had escaped any direct conflict during the war. The challenges of late colonial rule did, however, give increasing importance to another medico-moral theory.

II: Ethnopsychiatry

This second medico-moral theory arose in response to the physical and political threats that indigenous peoples posed to colonial rulers and their regimes in the twentieth century. Although this theory assumed more varied forms than tropical neurasthenia, reflecting the very real differences in the cultural character and socio-economic circumstances of the colonized populations themselves, its most influential version was almost certainly the one that originated in colonial Africa. The school of ethnopsychiatry that developed there played a particularly important role in interpreting challenges to colonial rule as pathological reactions to Western modernity.

Following the late nineteenth-century scramble for Africa, Europeans frequently referred to certain types of African resistance to colonial rule as a kind of 'mania'. This was especially the case when the resistance was led by prophets who derived their authority from visions received during trances or seizures. These prophet movements often bore a resemblance to the cargo cults of the South Pacific and other syncretic religious movements that threatened the colonial order.[22] When their activities resulted in violent clashes with the European authorities, some commentators compared these manifestations of 'mania' to the phenomenon known among the Malay peoples as 'amok' (which gave rise to the phrase 'running amok'). Self-proclaimed prophets were often incarcerated in mental hospitals in order to limit their influence among indigenous populations.[23]

By the inter-war years, Europeans had begun to recognize that the rapid economic changes caused by colonialism were generating new sources of instability in African societies. Urbanization, industrialization and labour migration were creating a new class of Africans that was increasingly divorced from its rural roots and traditional institutions. Medical officials began to worry that the stress of coping with 'civilized' life—characterized as Western ideas, tastes, technologies and institutions—made Africans more susceptible to insanity. This was the main message of a study of mental illness conducted by a medical officer in Nigeria in 1927.[24] It was echoed in a 1935 study by two medical officers in Nyasaland, who argued that a growing number of Africans were being 'driven mad by "acculturation" and the strains of "modern" society'.[25] This preoccupation with the psychological dangers that 'modernization' was presumed to pose for Africans was especially prevalent in colonies with large white settler populations. South Africa, Algeria, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya in particular had settler communities sizeable enough to sustain the critical mass of doctors and other

scientific specialists needed to circulate and legitimate arguments in their meetings and publications about Africans' psychological limitations.[26] At the same time, the relationship between these specialists and leading figures in government, business, journalism and other sectors of society was sufficiently close-knit for such ideas to gain currency and spread among the broader settler public. With rumours of native rebellions often setting settler communities on edge, it proved politically convenient and emotionally reassuring to attribute the prospects of such disturbances not to legitimate grievances, but to the psychological difficulties Africans encountered as they sought to cope with the march of modernity.

No settler colony did more to generate and disseminate such interpretations than Kenya. By the early 1930s, a small but influential group of Kenyan doctors, officials and other professionals had established a eugenics society, convinced that it could contribute to 'the modernity of the colonial project in Africa'.[27] The society's leading proponent was H.L. Gordon, a well-known physician who served for a time as director of the Mathari Mental Hospital in Nairobi and president of the Kenya branch of the British Medical Association. In a series of articles published in the *East African Medical Journal* and in lectures delivered to public audiences in Nairobi, Gordon advanced the view that the African mind was innately inferior in reasoning capacity to the European mind. Although Africans' mental disabilities—identified as amentia—were not considered a serious impediment in their traditional societies, which were, after all, presumed to be primitive, they were seen as a problem for Africans when they came into contact with Western education and modern urban society. The risk to Africans who became Westernized and detribalized was that they would suffer nervous breakdowns. The risk to Europeans was that those breakdowns would result in outbreaks of violence.[28]

The Kenyan eugenics campaign lost steam in the late 1930s when Gordon failed to persuade British imperial officials and their scientific advisors to fund further research on the African brain.[29] Its death knell came with the Nazi's deadly application of eugenics policies before and during the Second World War (though Gordon himself continued for a time to proclaim its benefits).[30] But the post-war era saw a resurgence of interest in the possible dangers that colonial modernity posed for the African mind. Once again, a Kenyan doctor made a key contribution to the debate. Dr J.C. Carothers entered the Kenyan medical service in 1929 and was appointed superintendent of the Mathari Mental Hospital in 1938, succeeding Gordon. Carothers distanced himself from Gordon's efforts to

prove that the African brain was biologically inferior to the European brain, but he held that the 'normal African' lived in 'a world of phantasy' that was only a short step away from schizophrenia. The destabilizing effects of 'Europeanization' were therefore enough to 'exert on those of psychopathic inheritance a strain of such magnitude that mental breakdown of a considerable proportion of these subjects is likely to occur'.[31] In short, he endorsed his predecessor's argument that detribalized Africans could be made mentally ill through too much contact with Western civilization.

In 1946, Carothers obtained a degree in psychiatric medicine and quickly established himself as a leading authority in the newly established field of ethnopsychiatry, which was premised on the conviction that different ethnic groups suffer from different psychiatric problems. In an important two-part essay on 'mental derangement in Africans' that was published in the *East African Medical Journal* (1948), Carothers concluded that the prevalence of insanity was far lower in traditional African societies than in Europe or America, but that its incidence increased substantially when Africans came into contact with Western culture.[32] In the early 1950s, the World Health Organization commissioned him to prepare a report on *The African Mind in Health and Disease* (1953). Here he reiterated his previously stated concerns about the destabilizing effects of colonial modernity on the African psyche. The Colonial Office, in turn, sent him out to investigate mental health conditions in other African colonies. But it was his assessment of the psychological causes of the Mau Mau rebellion that sealed his reputation. This violent uprising, which centred among the Kikuyu people who inhabited the Kenyan highlands, provoked panic in the white settler community and compelled colonial authorities to declare a state of emergency in 1952. Carothers was commissioned by the government to conduct a psychological study of the rebels, whose mysterious oathing ceremonies and bloody panga attacks were already being used to cast them as pathological murderers. His (in)famous study, *The Psychology of Mau Mau* (1956), explained Mau Mau as 'the development of an anxious conflictual situation in people who, from contact with the alien culture [of the West], had lost the supportive and constraining influences of their own culture, yet had not lost their "magic" modes of thinking'. Carothers insisted that the Kikuyu 'badly want to be told just what to do'.[33] Needless to say, this is exactly what the colonial regime wanted to hear.[34]

While Carothers' report was the most influential account of the psychology of Mau Mau, it did not appear in a vacuum.[35] Other prominent figures in colonial Kenyan society voiced similar views. Louis Leakey, the

famed Kenyan archaeologist and anthropologist, conceded that the Kikuyu people had genuine political and economic grievances, but he stressed that they had 'drifted into a state of mental instability and irresponsibility', making them 'psychologically most ready to fall an easy prey to [the] false propaganda' of the Mau Mau leaders.[36] He attributed this instability to their abandonment of traditional beliefs 'without accepting another in its place', leaving them 'without any real guiding principles in their lives' and 'unbalanced in their outlook'.[37] Similar arguments were advanced by Michael Blundell, the powerful government minister and leader of the settler community, and Thomas Askwith, Nairobi's African Municipal Affairs officer and director of the Mau Mau detention camps. Those camps would become notorious because of the murder of 11 detainees by guards at Hola camp, which proved symptomatic of an extensive system of human rights abuses exposed by Caroline Elkins.[38] Askwith, however, had intended the camps not simply to incarcerate and punish rebels, but also to rehabilitate the Kikuyu through so-called cleansing ceremonies and other psychological measures. Rehabilitation teams organized by missionaries, the Moral Re-Armament movement, and other groups sought to cure the rebels of their violent mania, mainly through Christian discipline. The psychological interpretation of Mau Mau became enshrined in the British government's official history of the rebellion, which recapitulated Dr Carothers' diagnosis in its chapter on the rebellion's background. Even Margery Perham, one of Britain's more enlightened colonial experts on Africa, concluded that 'the key to the Kikuyu problem lies in the psychological sphere, in the mental effects of disintegration caused by European contact'. It was an assessment she considered applicable to African nationalist resistance to colonial rule more generally.[39]

Similar interpretations appeared elsewhere in the late colonial world. In the Dutch East Indies, for example, the prominent psychiatrist Pieter Mattheus Palthe attributed the paroxysm of violence that the Indonesians directed against the Dutch, who sought to re-establish colonial control after the Second World War, to a displaced anger against the Japanese that manifested itself in the culturally rooted syndrome of amok. Like Carothers, Palthe advanced a psychological theory that sought to discredit those who fought for independence by diagnosing them as mad.[40] Needless to say, neither Palthe nor Carothers saw any need to supply a psychological explanation for the far more extensive regimes of violence that the Dutch and British directed against their colonial subjects.

III: The Colonial Condition

The two strands of colonial medicine that I have examined here were not, strictly speaking, taxonomically equivalent to one another. Ethnopsychiatry was a disciplinary subfield within psychiatry; tropical neurasthenia was a diagnostic category associated with tropical medicine. Terms like 'frenzied anxiety' and 'amok', which served as signifiers for specific syndromes, bore a closer taxonomic resemblance to tropical neurasthenia than ethnopsychiatry, but frenzied anxiety never caught on as a diagnosis and amok was applied mainly to the Malay peoples. Although ethnopsychiatry corresponded more closely to a disciplinary speciality like tropical medicine, its principal purpose—at least among the specialists examined in this chapter—was to supply a transcolonial explanation of the psychological deficiencies of colonized peoples. For our purposes, then, ethnopsychiatry and tropical neurasthenia serve as the most useful appellations for the medico-moral anxieties that these two bodies of literature voiced about the mental dangers colonialism posed to colonizers and colonized.

Ethnopsychiatry and tropical neurasthenia mirrored one another in various ways. Both bodies of literature issued warnings about what they regarded as ruptures in the disciplinary bonds between the self and the social order, ruptures that were thought to pose existential threats to colonial rule itself. Both attributed those ruptures to the disorienting effects of difference, made manifest in the encounter between certain members of the colonizing or colonized population and conditions they found alien and disorienting. And both characterized that encounter in terms that were essentially psychiatric, involving the breakdown of normative behaviour and the development of pathological behaviour. Implicit in these psychiatric interpretations were moral judgements about their subjects. Carothers and other proponents of ethnopsychiatry, especially in Africa, described colonized peoples as intrinsically childlike, impulsive, superstitious, unreliable, undisciplined, sexually promiscuous and so forth. Tribal norms and sanctions may have managed to keep these moral or character flaws in check, but with colonial modernity's erosion of traditional institutions, such checks had disappeared, creating a psychiatric crisis for those Africans who had become urbanized and Westernized.[41] In many respects, this analysis was not so different from that advanced in the literature on tropical neurasthenia, though the source of danger was reversed. The colonists seen as most susceptible to the disease were those who had slipped out of the stabilizing harness of European civilization,

experiencing estrangement as a result of social isolation and environmental degeneration. In both cases, adult males were considered to be at greatest risk, though tropical neurasthenia was considered a potential threat to almost every segment of the colonist community.

It is also revealing that neither the literature on ethnopsychiatry nor the literature on tropical neurasthenia gave much attention to case studies. Although both literatures purported to address the afflictions of individuals, they cast the problem in group terms, identifying it with specific elements of the colonized or colonizing populations. Given the emphasis that Freudian psychiatry has always placed on the case study, its absence in ethnopsychiatry is striking and has attracted considerable attention. As one historian of African colonial psychiatry has noted, 'clinicians viewed Africans as representatives of a race, rather than as individual patients'.[42] Much the same can be said about how doctors discussed tropical neurasthenia. The affliction was seen first and foremost in terms of race, with attention given to individual cases only insofar as those cases spoke of the dangers that the disease posed to the broader colonial community of whites or Europeans.

At the same time, tropical neurasthenia and ethnopsychiatry characterized the problems that confronted colonizers and colonized in very different ways. One key difference was the nature of their symptoms. Those Europeans afflicted with tropical neurasthenia were seen as suffering from neuroses, not psychoses, and they were manifested mainly in inner-directed, self-destructive symptoms, such as anxiety, insomnia, depression and, in the direst instances, suicide. Ethnopsychiatrists such as Carothers insisted that Africans, by contrast, rarely experienced depression or other forms of neurosis. Instead, their mental problems were said to take the form of psychoses such as schizophrenia, hysteria and—to use Carother's diagnosis of choice—'frenzied anxiety', which most often manifested itself in homicide or other acts of violence against others.[43]

Africans' mental afflictions were also attributed to different causes than those suffered by Europeans. Their problems were rooted in their innate primitiveness, which was released from customary constraints when exposed to the material and intellectual manifestations of civilization. This stood in direct contrast to the plight of Europeans, whose symptoms arose as a result of their encounter with a primitive environment that eroded their ability to advance the cause of civilization. In other words, these two theories expressed anxieties about the outcome of the colonial project itself: the modernity it sought to impose was seen as too powerful for the psyches of the colonized, but too weak for the psyches of the colonizers.

No discussion of these ideas can conclude without acknowledging the counter-discourse that culminated in the work of Frantz Fanon. This counter-discourse also drew on psychological methods and models, but used them to complicate and critique the interpretations I have examined in this chapter. One strand of thought originated with Octave Mannoni, who spent some 20 years as a teacher in Madagascar before returning to France to study with the noted psychiatrist Jacques Lacan. In 1950, he published *Psychologie de la colonization*—first translated into English as *Prospero and Caliban* (1956)—which argued that colonizer and colonized were bound together in a mutually dependent psychological relationship, one in which the colonizer had a pathological desire to dominate and the colonized had a corresponding dependency complex. Mannoni's work inspired Philip Mason, an ex-Indian Colonial Service official and first director of the Institute of Race Relations in London, whose *Prospero's Magic* (1962) advanced a similar thesis.[44] Although Fanon rightly criticized Mannoni for claiming that colonized peoples were psychologically complicit in their own subjugation, Mannoni's work had the virtue of recognizing that many of the problems experienced by colonizer and colonized derived from the system of dominance and subordination that existed between them, a system founded on stark disparities in power. Others who used psychological concepts to expose the human costs of colonialism included the Tunisian-born writer Albert Memmi and the South African Freudian Marxist Wulf Sachs.[45]

No one, however, did more to alter the terms of debate about the psychology of colonialism than Frantz Fanon, the Martinique-born psychiatrist who practised in colonial Algeria during its war of liberation. His enormously influential body of work requires no commentary here.[46] Suffice it to say that the medico-moral discourses I have traced in this chapter did not survive either Fanon's counter-discourse or the nationalist struggles that did so much to inspire it. For Fanon and the cause he served, the moral crisis of colonialism was cast in completely different terms. As a result, the ideas of men like Charles Woodruff and J.C. Carothers now look like quaint relics of a long-gone colonial past. And yet, as Megan Vaughan has observed: 'Fanon wrote within, not outside, the existing colonial literature on psychology and psychopathology.'[47] If we wish to understand the intentions and achievements of Frantz Fanon and his heirs, especially psychoanalytically informed critics of colonialism like Ashis Nandi and Homi Bhabha, we must recognize that they came out of an intellectual heritage that derives in part from these earlier medico-moral interpretations of the colonial condition.

Notes

1. A partial exception is Anna Crozier (2007).
2. David Arnold (2006); Nancy Leys Stepan (2001); Felix Driver and Luciana Martins (2005).
3. See Mathew Thomson (2006); Richard Overy (2009: Chapter 4); Jordanna Baiklin (2012: Chapter 1).
4. Warwick Anderson, Deborah Jenson and Richard Keller (2011: 1).
5. See especially Erik Linstrum (2016). I am grateful to Erik for allowing me to read two chapters of the book in manuscript. For a contrasting perspective, see Mathew Thomson (1999).
6. This chapter originated as a keynote address at a workshop organized by Professor Harald Fischer-Tine on 'Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown: Panics in Imperial Settings', which sought to apply to the colonial world the classic analysis of 'moral panics' by Cohen 2002). Although this phrase and the analytical framework it advances have not received much attention from historians of colonialism, these historians have given considerable attention to racial fears and their repercussions, which certainly can be characterized as moral panics. Two excellent examples from colonial African history are Luise White (2000) and Jock McCulloch (2000). Christopher Bayly (1996) examines the related notion of "information panics," which has been fruitfully deployed by Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury (2010).
7. Megan Vaughan (1991: 7).
8. George M. Beard (1880a, b, 1884). A useful discussion of Beard and his influence is F.G. Gosling (1987).
9. Major Charles E. Woodruff (1905a; 1905b).
10. The following discussion of tropical neurasthenia draws largely on my own work. See Dane Kennedy (1981, 1990, 2006). See also Warwick Anderson (1997, 2006: Chapter 5); and Anna Crozier (2009).
11. Barbara Bush (1999: 61).
12. Price (1913: 1290). See also William G. Lennox (1933: 216–17 [Tables 5 and 6]).
13. See, for example, Mark Harrison (1996; 1999); David Arnold (1996); James Beattie (2011).
14. Ryan Johnson (2009: 550–51).
15. Concerning 'Solaro', see Johnson (2009: 549–50).
16. Indian, Japanese and other non-Western doctors trained in Western medicine did diagnose some of their countrymen as neurasthenic, but they tended to reference American and European metropolitan notions of the affliction, not its tropical variant, which remained firmly fixed within a racialized framework.

17. Sprawson (1916: 196).
18. Will Jackson (2013: 2). This illuminating study of white settlers incarcerated in Nairobi's Mathari mental hospital in the post-Second World War era shows that psychiatric diagnoses of mental illness were inextricably entwined with efforts to discipline social and moral behaviour that threatened racial boundaries.
19. This point is also made by Crozier (2009).
20. Anderson (1997).
21. For a fascinating study of this issue, see Ellen Boucher (2014: Chapter 4); Ellen Boucher (2009).
22. Michael Adas (2011).
23. Sloan Mahone (2006).
24. Jonathan Sadowsky (1999: 100).
25. Megan Vaughan (1991: 108).
26. Lynette A. Jackson (2005); Saul Dubow (1995); Richard Keller (2007).
27. Chloe Campbell (2012: 3).
28. In addition to Chloe Campbell (2012), see Sloan Mahone (2007).
29. Chloe Campbell (2012: Chapter 4); Helen Tilley (2011: Chapter 5).
30. H.L. Gordon (1946).
31. J.C. Carothers (1940: 99, 101).
32. J.C. Carothers (1948: 142–66, 197–219).
33. J.C. Carothers (1954: 15, 23).
34. Carother's work is examined by Jock McCulloch (1995: Chapters 4–5; 2001).
35. The argument in this paragraph is drawn largely from Dane Kennedy (1992).
36. L.S.B. Leakey (1954: 127).
37. L.S.B. Leakey (1952: 60, 85).
38. Caroline Elkins (2004).
39. Margery Perham (1960; 1970).
40. Hans Pols (2011).
41. McCulloch (1995: 61, 96, 139).
42. Sadowsky (1999: 98). See also McCulloch (1995).
43. Carothers (1948: 199–201, 215–16. See also Sloan Mahone (2007: 57); McCulloch (1995: 54, 106–09).
44. O. Mannoni (1991); Philip Mason (1962).
45. Their best-known works are Albert Memmi (1991) and Wolf Sachs (1996). Eric Linstrum (2012) argues that the British psychological tradition was also more critical of colonialism than has commonly been recognized.
46. See especially Frantz Fanon (1994, 2005).
47. Vaughan (1991: 15).

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The Poison Panics of British India

David Arnold

Panic was no stranger to British India. Under colonial rule, the country was subject to a long series of alarms and scares, some of which were sufficiently intense and protracted to amount to 'panics'. Some were essentially confined to the Indian population, while others mostly affected Europeans, but both could contribute to a sense of incipient crisis within the colonial regime. Many panic-making scares arose from the anticipation of external attack, as in the case of panics relating to fears of insurrection and invasion. Thus, Calcutta was thrown into turmoil during 'panic Sunday' on 14 June 1857, as residents, especially white residents, were seized by fear that mutinous *sepoys* from northern India were about to descend on the unprotected city or that its Muslim inhabitants, led by followers of the deposed King of Awadh, would rise up against them.[1] Something similar happened in Calcutta and elsewhere across British India in the middle months of 1942 as the rapid Japanese advance through Southeast Asia, exacerbated by reports from returning refugees of the collapse of British power in Malaya, Singapore

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and Burma, sparked fears of an imminent and unstoppable invasion.[2] Other panics typically related to real or anticipated food shortages (the provocation behind many of the food riots of the period) or arose from fear of deadly epidemics, such as cholera and plague.[3] Panics and the rumours that fed them were, indeed, a relatively common expression alike of Indian and colonial *mentalités* in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century India, and can be seen to demonstrate the inherent weakness of the colonial 'information order'.[4]

This chapter, however, focuses on one type of panic that has not hitherto received much scholarly attention—that surrounding the idea of poisoning. Here the fear was less one of external invasion, of capture and assault, than of internal subversion and internalized attack through what was unknowingly absorbed or inadvertently ingested through food, water and other means.[5] Poisoning and the fear and panic it could generate has been observed for a number of slave-holding societies around the world and had often been seen as representing a kind of covert insurrection on the part of the enslaved. In her account of eighteenth-century Mauritius, Megan Vaughan goes so far as to describe poisoning as the 'colonial crime par excellence', 'a crime of stealth' and 'a crime of the powerless'. Her description suggests that for colonized (and enslaved) people, it was a not uncommon means by which the oppressed could, while still enjoying the relative safety of their anonymity, create an atmosphere of fear and vulnerability among white elites and wreak an at least partial revenge on their hated masters and mistresses.[6]

But the poison scares I want to focus on for British in India were not so racially exclusive or so evidently the province of the 'powerless', for they were to be found among Europeans as well as Indians and reflect a variety of different causes and concerns. In some cases these 'moral panics' (to use Stanley Cohen's suggestive terminology) might reflect the anxieties of only one section of colonial society (European or Indian), but in others they suggest shared ideas about the nature of the 'folk devils' responsible.[7] It is worth noting too, at the outset, that until late in the nineteenth century, newspapers (and hence the mass media that figure so prominently in Cohen's sociological account of the public reaction to 'mods and rockers' in 1960s Britain) played little part in the dissemination of these poison scares and demonic representations of the 'deviants' involved, compared to the role of popular rumour on the one hand and the anxieties of the colonial ruling class on the other.

DEFINING POISON PANICS

What, then, do I mean by 'poison panics'? Historically, the idea of poisoning was a well-established trope in Indian society (as, indeed, it was in Europe), being endowed with a wide spectrum of metaphorical, mythological, cultural and corporeal meanings.[8] Poisoning might be seen as accidental and not always as a result of deliberate malice. For instance, in parts of northern and central India, a condition known as lathyrism was widespread. Caused by heavy reliance among the poor on *kesari dal* made from the plant *Lathyrus sativus,* the condition manifested itself in severe paralysis of the legs and lower body. It was clearly seen as a species of poison, attributed locally to the effects of wind, water or the gram itself, but there was no suggestion that this poisoning was conspiratorial and its effects were met more with resignation than panic.[9] Poisoning was associated, if only by report, as a means by which rulers rid themselves of rivals and would-be usurpers, but it entered the popular consciousness as much as elite machinations. Poisoning might appear as much from its obscure nature as from its semantic versatility to be an elusive concept, and yet from time to time it assumed a more specific and menacing meaning. Fears arose among the Indian population that poisoning was being deliberately used by the British to kill or incapacitate large numbers of people or was part of a plot to deprive Indians of their caste and religion. In India poisoning and pollution (in the ritual sense of that term) were closely related concepts, for both invoked the idea of substances that could be of exceptional danger to physical health and social well-being if they were ingested and internalized.[10]

Rumour abounded on the eve of the Indian Mutiny and Rebellion in 1857, at a time of widespread unrest among the north Indian population about the effects of colonial rule and Christian evangelization, that foodstuffs in the bazaars had been deliberately tampered with (such as wheat flour allegedly mixed with bone-dust) in order to break Hindus' caste and religion. The alarm created by the allegedly 'greased cartridges' of the *sepoys* was of a similarly defiling and, from a colonial perspective, destabilizing nature.[11] Such poison and pollution fears gave a physical immediacy and cultural specificity to a wider mood of suspicion and discontent. Later in the century, there were a number of instances in which Western sanitary practices sparked similar, if more local, alarms. The use of potassium permanganate to disinfect wells against cholera or the aggressive measures taken by the colonial authorities in the late 1890s and early 1900s to

segregate or inoculate those suspected of being infected with plague, or being transmitters of the disease, sent rumour flying, occasioning temporary panics and intermittent riots.[12] The plague disturbances, in particular, demonstrated how politically destabilizing poison scares could be.

These rumours had, no doubt, much in common with similar episodes in Europe, such as the 'Great Fear' of 1789 in France and the suspicions surrounding attempts by doctors to stem the spread of epidemic cholera in France in the 1830s.[13] Clearly 'poison panics', far from being uniquely Indian episodes, had a wide distribution in early modern, and even modern, times. But Indians were, for reasons of caste and religion, particularly sensitive about the purity of the food and water they consumed, and about the potential for bodily violation and status loss caused by inappropriate touching, drinking and eating. Also in India, such panics were more likely to arise from antipathy to colonial rule than from the kinds of class fears that sometimes underpinned such events in Europe (though even there such alarms were often tinged with xenophobia directed against mysterious foreigners or Jews). It is clear from the nineteenth-century Indian examples that in the popular mind, the 'folk devil' was the colonial state and its seemingly sinister agencies—doctors, inoculators, ambulance men and sanitary officers, Christian missionaries, or simply those Europeans and Eurasians who appeared to be acting (during a plague or cholera outbreak) in a suspicious or threatening manner. The perceived intention of the Europeans was to deprive Hindus of their caste and religion by forcing pollution upon them, to capture them in order to extract the bodily fluid known as *momiai* (not unlike Luise White's east African vampires),[14] to recruit them into the army or as indentured labourers to be shipped overseas, or simply to kill off an excessively large and unwanted population. At any moment, as in Simla on the eve of the 1857 revolt, a *momiai* scare might induce temporary panic and cause the flight of Indian labourers and servants.[15]

But there were other, often short-lived, panics in which the colonial factor does not appear to have been prominent, at least so far as causation is concerned. For instance, there was a brief panic over reputed cases of poisoning (with half-a-dozen fatalities) in Calcutta in August 1910 allegedly as the result of consuming poisoned betel nuts. As no one was specifically suspected of planting this poison, its cause was no less alarming for being uncertain. In this instance panic was fed not only by popular rumour but also by reports of sudden illness and rapid death in the city's newspapers, which were collectively accused of 'spreading and keeping up the scare'. But what is perhaps most revealing about this episode is how

quickly the Government of Bengal (already alarmed about political unrest in the province) set up a three-man team of medical experts to investigate. Within a fortnight, the committee had issued its findings, showing that there was little basis for the rumours and that if any illness had been caused, it was attributable to the not uncommon side-effects of consuming betel nuts. Science was invoked to dispel misguided popular supposition.[16]

Europeans' Poison Fears

I want, however, to turn more specifically to European fears and government reactions. My argument is that although, from the viewpoint of the colonial regime, there were a number of intermittent alarms over poison and poisoning arising from specific incidents and causes, these only congealed into a single 'panic', sufficient to command legislative action, in the closing years of the nineteenth century. However, in order to understand the cumulative effect of poison scares on British rule—and to assess the extent to which something like a 'breakdown' occurred as a result—it is first necessary to identify the various individual strands and poison tropes involved.

In general among Europeans, poison panics can be seen to relate to three underling concerns. The first of these played upon fears about the exceptional vulnerability of white society in India and of high-ranking British officials in particular. In other words, although poisoning was not uncommon in nineteenth-century India and affected many more Indians than Europeans, it was given a specific racial and political configuration that underscored the precariousness of a white elite, who in their domestic lives as much as in the administrative roles were heavily reliant upon Indian servants and subordinates. The fear here was not, as in American slave-holding societies, of discontented *slaves* wreaking vengeance on white masters and mistresses (for India was not, in the Atlantic sense of the term, a slave-holding society), but rather of Indian servants who had a real or imagined grievances against their white employer, or whose intimate access to Europeans could be used by others to administer a fatal or incapacitating dose of poison.[17]

Poisoning of this ilk was a 'betrayal of intimacy', to cite a phrase used by Vaughan.[18] There were a number of instances of poisoning (or suspected poisoning) in which aggrieved servants who had been mistreated and physically and verbally abused by their European masters, or subordinates who had (unjustly as they saw it) been dismissed from office or denied

the employment or promotion they had expected, turned against the individual or household they held responsible. H. Hervey cites the case of a *khansamah* (butler) employed by a bad-tempered and abusive European official in a small civil station in northern India who threw a jug of hot milk into the face of his Punjabi Muslim servant, seriously scalding him. In revenge the servant put ground glass into his master's favourite dessert, a guava meringue, but this was detected by the European's wife, who had been alerted by one of her maids.[19] A European fear of treacherous servants was accentuated by events surrounding the outbreak of the 1857 Mutiny and Rebellion, in which many seemingly loyal household servants turned on their now-defenceless employers, seizing the opportunity to murder or humiliate them, or to loot their treasured possessions. But these cases shaded into a more generalized concern about the way in which lax Indian servants might allow Europeans' food to be contaminated with poison, or who, like Indian *ayahs*, used opium to keep their white charges quiet and docile. Some colonial texts give the impression that accidental poisoning was part of the perennial problem of managing Indian servants. According to W.J. Moore's manual of medical advice for Europeans: 'When [Indian] servants are suspected [of causing poisoning], committing the child to some other care is the only course open.'[20]

More immediately alarming to the British from a political rather than a domestic perspective was the calculated use of poison as a means of assassination. That poisoning could be almost routinely used as a political device in India had long been established in British minds and by the early nineteenth century, poisoning, including resort to poisoned robes and poison draughts, formed one of the stock images of the depraved and barbaric nature of indigenous rule.[21] The British accepted that although this practice evidently persisted within the princes' benighted courts and secretive households, it did not threaten them enough to occasion any collective sense of panic. But there was an enduring fear that their political agents or 'residents', located in the princely states and subject to intensive intrigue, might fall prey to such insidious techniques.[22]

The most notorious (and extensively documented) case concerned Malharao, the Gaekwar or ruler of the state of Baroda in western India in 1874, who was deeply antagonistic towards the political agent, Colonel Phayre.[23] Suspecting that the Gaekwar may have owed his accession to the throne to the poisoning of his elder brother, Khanderao, the British regarded Malharao as erratic, vicious and despotic, if not actually mentally unstable. Embroiled in a long-running dispute with the Gaekwar about

the proper administration of the state, Phayre made little secret of his determination to unseat the wayward prince. In what was later described as a 'story of Eastern intrigue', one morning, as he took his daily drink of sherbet and pomalo juice, Phayre noticed that it tasted bitter and had a gritty residue. Subsequent chemical analysis revealed the presence of arsenic and ground-up diamonds (the latter suggesting that the perpetrator was no ordinary poisoner). However, since the drink had been prepared by servants, the prince's direct involvement in the attempted murder could not be conclusively proved (and conceivably the intention of the Gaekwar—despite being dubbed by Adam a 'poison monster' and accused of showing the 'cunning and daring' of the typical 'Eastern poisoner'—was to scare the resident and hasten his departure from the state rather than to kill him).[24] Even before the incident, Phayre (who was kept well informed about the hostile bazaar *gup* or rumours that surrounded him) had become almost paranoid about the possibility that he *might* be poisoned; had he perhaps deliberately tried to frame the Gaekwar? Phayre was promptly moved to another post, and the Gaekwar, investigated by a special commission, was deposed. The net effect of the Baroda poisoning case was to endorse the identification of Indian princes with poisoning (although paradoxically Baroda subsequently came to be regarded by the British as a progressive 'model' state), but it also emphasized the vulnerability of high-ranking officials like Phayre to poisoning by their Indian servants or at the behest of their political opponents. Such episodes further highlighted the fragility of the colonial 'information order' when it came to managing the princely states, though the Baroda case was insufficient in itself to create a 'moral panic' over poisoning or to threaten the overall security of British rule.

But we should note in passing that poisoning was not confined to Indians and to Indian agency alone. There were European and Eurasian perpetrators as well as victims. The most celebrated case of this kind was the Agra double murder of 1911–12. One of the victims, Edward Fullam of the Military Accounts Department, was poisoned by his wife Augusta and her lover, Henry Clark, a Eurasian assistant surgeon in the Indian Subordinate Medical Service, while the other, Mrs Louise Clark, a former nurse, was bludgeoned to death only after poison had failed to kill her and she had appeared to be 'poison proof'.[25] Although the principals in this story, a crime 'almost without parallel in its diabolical atrocity' according to the inspector-general of police for the United Provinces,[26] were Europeans and Eurasians, Indian go-betweens—household servants and medical attendants—were

also involved in the poison plot, emphasizing the way in which poisoning could transcend the seemingly entrenched racial divisions of high colonial India. The high-profile Fullam-Clark murder case demonstrated the ease with which poisons could be obtained, and used for criminal purposes, by a serving medical officer. The case came too late to influence the Government of India's decision to introduce legislation to regulate the sale of poisons, but an earlier, less publicized case in 1895, in which Ellen Wagner and her accomplice James Cray were suspected of murdering her husband with arsenic, was one important factor in precipitating state action.[27]

There was a second, and more pervasive, European poisoning fear. This reflected European anxieties about India as an alien physical space, but, in some ways still more acutely, as an alien social environment, the dangers of its strange physicality merging with the menace of its religious peculiarities and cultural perversities. There was an underlying colonial belief that India, for all its enormous internal differences of climate and vegetation, was itself a toxic environment. For much of the nineteenth century, many common diseases (including malaria and cholera) were seen as the result of a kind of atmospheric 'poison' caused by poisonous emanations from swamps, forests and human habitations. This 'miasmatic' interpretation of disease was, of course, prevalent in Europe and North America at the time, but it derived particular strength from British arguments about the abnormality of India, for instance, in the way in which cholera epidemics might be linked to the peculiarity of the Indian monsoon or the ways in which a 'tropical' environment gave rise to diseases of exceptional virulence and fatality. Even though by the end of the century this generalized notion of India's toxicity was being disaggregated into a more precise medical knowledge of viruses, bacteria, parasites and vectors, and an enhanced sanitary awareness of the causes of water and food pollution, a language of poisoning continued to inform environmental judgement or to occlude the distinction between one kind of poisoning and another. For instance, in India, still more than in the West, the symptoms of major diseases were seen to emulate or overlap with those of arsenic poisoning. The claim was repeatedly made by colonial doctors that during epidemics of cholera, opportunistic and evil-minded Indians deliberately took advantage of the occasion to poison people with arsenic, knowing that the violent physical signs of poisoning would be virtually indistinguishable from those caused by cholera, and that, at times of epidemic crisis, post-mortem investigations were unlikely to be held and would in any case be unlikely to produce irrefutable evidence of poisoning.[28]

Of more immediate political concern to the British was the threat that poisoning, as a presumed manifestation of India's social idiosyncrasies, posed to the lives and property of its Indian subjects. This was typified by the allegedly widespread use of poisonous (or at least intoxicating) drugs for a range of criminal purposes from theft to cattle-killing and homicide. This seemed, at least to some colonial authorities, to connect poisoning with the notorious 'cult' of *thugi*, the stereotypical 'mods' and 'rockers' (to return to Cohen's terminology of deviant 'folk devils') in the nineteenth-century colonial imagination and sense of moral outrage.[29] There have been a number of recent attempts to reinterpret the phenomenon of *thugi* in nineteenth-century India.[30] The point here is not to interrogate the actuality or otherwise of *thugi*, but to recognize the power that the idea of thug murders had on the colonial imagination—and, to a degree, on colonial policy—in the middle and later decades of the century, and hence its importance to the genesis of colonial poison panics. There was little indication in the early (pre-1830s) colonial literature on thugs that the notorious ritualized strangling and dismemberment of travellers might also be associated with poisoning, though there were passing reference to road poisoning as being a crime 'akin to Thuggee'.[31]

As *thugi* in its conventionally understood form went into apparent decline by the 1850s as a result of the colonial investigations and repressive measures instituted by William H. Sleeman from 1835 onwards, so the man subsequently appointed superintendent of the Thugi and Dacoity Department, Colonel Charles Hervey, drew the government's urgent attention to what he saw as the new, widespread and no less sinister threat of robbery and murder through the administering of poisonous drugs. This was so overwhelmingly identified with the use of the seeds of the common plant *datura* that Hervey repeatedly wrote of 'datura thuggee'. In the creation of 'moral panics', it was important to have a name to which to attach a particular sense of alarm and opprobrium, even if the precise identity of the perpetrators and the extent of their misdeeds was unclear. By combining *thugi* and *datura* into a single phrase, Hervey gave the alleged crime a distinctly Indian identity and created a sense of moral repugnance that resonated in police reports and popular accounts of Indian criminality for decades afterwards. He also showed something of Sleeman's own zeal for self-advancement by calling in 1860 for the authorities to act urgently with respect to what he called 'this heinous crime' and 'now growing evil'. When the secretary to the Government of the North-Western Provinces responded by describing '*datura thuggee*' as

'a crime most dangerous to society and opprobrious to our rule', Hervey adopted the remark with alacrity and used it to press his claim that the crime needed special legislation and a united all-India agency to ensure its suppression.[32]

We can, not unreasonably, suspect Hervey of trying to invent a panic. There was little evidence to support his claim that drug murders were widespread and increasing: in the three years 1864, 1865 and 1866, for the whole of British India, he was able to identify only 416 cases.[33] In terms of violent deaths, poisoning did not rank particularly high, and even among reported suicide cases poisoning trailed behind hanging and drowning.[34] But this very paucity of evidence made him all the more adamant that the crime called for close and careful investigation. The lack of data was due, in his view, to deficiencies in the existing police forces, the divided nature of administrative authority in the patchwork of British and princely territories that constituted central India, and the tendency for such cases not even to reach the police unless poisoning resulted in death. However, Hervey's claims did not pass uncontested by those who doubted that poisoning was more than a minor criminal phenomenon and one that lacked the secretive nature and cultic implications of the original *thugi*.[35] And yet Hervey had undoubtedly helped to create a sense of outrage and alarm that was subsequently developed and capitalized upon by others.

The most striking demonstration of this was the Bengal-based physician Norman Chevers, who gave a detailed account of the 'widespread' crime of *datura* poisoning in his authoritative account of medical jurisprudence in India. In this much-cited text, first published in 1854, and appearing in revised editions in 1856 and (after the Mutiny) in 1870, Chevers identified 'thuggee by poison' as not only a danger to lives and property, but also as more broadly indicative of the 'criminal characteristics of the people of India' and their 'great moral defects'. Poisoning, he claimed, was typical of a 'timid people', of a race more accustomed to duplicity and treachery (the very hallmarks of the *thug*) than to open violence in its criminal activity.[36] Chevers did not seem to be hampered in his views by any want of information. He wrote in the 1856 edition:

> It is only by thoroughly knowing the people, and by fixing the mind sedulously upon the records of their crimes, that an European can learn how strange a combination of sensuality, jealousy, wild and ineradicable superstition, absolute untruthfulness, and ruthless disregard of the value of human life, lie below the placid, civil, timid, forbearing exterior of the native of India.[37]

Datura poisoning may not have been intended to kill its victims, only to incapacitate them for long enough for the robbery to be committed and the perpetrator to escape, but *datura* was increasingly written up in colonial accounts as an extremely dangerous drug rather than a mild narcotic, one that, even when it did not kill outright, could cause lasting incapacity. Although the evidence remained slight, the belief that robbery by poison not only flourished in India but was also a particularly heinous crime, and one that revealed the moral depths of Indian criminality, persisted into the twentieth century. Writing in 1909, H.L. Adam declared that the effects of the drug were 'so disastrous that death itself … would come as a merciful relief'. The methods of the drug robber were 'not unlike those formerly employed by thugs'.[38] Here, then, was a more substantial basis for a colonial poison panic, one which held poisoning to be not just secretive, professional and pervasive, but also an indicator of Indian deviance and depravity.

A further dimension of this mounting alarm at poisoning, and the threat it posed to property, in late nineteenth-century India was the menace of cattle-poisoning, a phenomenon for which, unlike *datura thuggee*, there appeared from the 1850s onwards to be a significant body of evidence.[39] Mainly through the use of imported arsenic, cattle were reputedly being poisoned in large numbers for the sake of their valuable hides. This was said to be the work of Chamar untouchables, who traditionally were responsible for the collecting the carcases of dead animals and, as leather-workers, were customarily responsible for skinning cattle and leather-working.[40] The spate of cattle-poisoning appeared to show not only the dangers of unregulated arsenic and the latent criminality of the Chamars (at a time when a number of similar low-caste and low-status communities were passing under the stringent provisions of the Criminal Tribes Act), but also revealed the sinister hand of the (mostly Muslim) hide and skin merchants who supplied the Chamars with arsenic and stood to gain by the increased availability of the raw material for their increasingly large and lucrative export trade.[41] Although posing no threat to human lives, cattle-poisoning was seen as a threat to the material well-being of the peasants (for whom the colonial state had a paternalist regard as well as a revenue-paying interest) and a challenge to the effectiveness of colonial crime control.

Third, continuing with this overview of the factors contributing to a mounting sense of colonial concern, poisoning became closely identified by the British with indigenous therapeutics and with the Indian systems of medicine (Ayurveda and Unani) at a time when they were attracting

increasingly hostile attention from the colonial state and Western medical practitioners, who questioned the efficacy and safety of the drugs they used and the methods they employed. If anti-dacoity agents like Hervey and writers on Indian medical jurisprudence like Chevers were responsible for generating alarm over *datura thuggee*, so were Western medical officials and practitioners instrumental in creating a scare about the dangerous use of Indian medicinal drugs.

It was recognized from early on in the nineteenth century that Indian physicians and Indian folk medicine made extensive use of powerful and potentially poisonous vegetable and mineral drugs, notably the quartet of aconitum, *datura*, opium and arsenic. These were conventionally used for a variety of different medicinal purposes: as tonics, febrifuges, analgesics and aphrodisiacs, and as treatment for asthma, skin diseases, rheumatism and venereal disease. Some were used as abortifacients, and so, to the colonial regime, were clearly identified with criminal action. But many suicides and accidental deaths could also be attributed to drugs that lived dual lives as therapeutic and life-threatening substances. In part, the problem which the British tried to address was the inherent ambiguity of the substances themselves: a drug like aconitum could be dangerous, but it could also have valuable medicinal properties. It could be viewed in Western scientific terms, and processed and refined so as to isolate its active pharmacological elements, but it was hard to wrench such a drug from its Indian cultural context and constrict its multiple usages and meanings.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, colonial medicine grew increasingly sceptical about the efficacy of many of these drugs or wary of the harmful consequences of their use. For instance, following a visit to Nepal in 1802–03, the pioneering surgeon-botanist Francis Buchanan expressed his alarm at the ready availability and unrestricted use of the poisonous root of the aconitum plant; his dismay was all the greater because of the confusion (alike in Indian bazaars and Western taxonomy) between several different species of aconitum and their varying degrees of toxicity. Even so, aconitum continued to be widely used in both Western and Indian medical practice.[42] Buchanan's was not a solitary voice of concern. As early as May 1843, Frederick Mouat, the chemical examiner in Bengal, called for an investigation into the dangerous drugs and their criminal uses—he counted at least three dozen of them—that were routinely sold in the bazaars of Bengal. In language not unlike that later employed by Hervey in relation to *datura thuggee*, this was, Mouat observed, both a cause of public concern and a matter of 'very great importance to the state'.[43] In

the short term little was done to outlaw supposedly dangerous drugs and yet, despite the absence of clear information as to how a drug was obtained, distributed, sold and ultimately used, such medical 'poisons' continued to fuel the impression of suspicion and danger surrounding indigenous therapeutics and those who administered them. Writing in 1912, H. Hervey explained that: 'Even in the smallest of hamlets a *vythean* or hakeem [practitioners of Ayurvedic and Unani medicine respectively] is to be found—the doctor of the community, who besides practising the healing art, has some knowledge of deadly drugs.'[44] The implication was that when not healing the sick, these false physicians were poisoning wells or supplying the drugs that would result in abortion, witchcraft and murder.

The use of arsenic as a medicinal substance was first adopted by European physicians in India and then strongly condemned by them. Opium similarly teetered between an association with criminality (it was the drug of choice in Indian suicides and one of several devices employed in female infanticide) and recognition of its great therapeutic utility. *Datura*, as we have seen, commanded attention less for its therapeutic properties than for its criminal propensities. Taken together, therefore, a number of drugs in common Indian use were seen by the British as inherently dangerous and so to reflect on the irresponsibility, if not implicit criminality, of indigenous medical practice. Anecdotes and statistics, police records and court cases all served to build an accumulating tale of the dangers or misuse of Indian therapeutics and thus to present, by contrast, the apparently scientific, humane and beneficial nature of Western medicine. Practitioners and proponents of Indian medicine reversed this story to highlight the dangerous or polluting nature of Western medical substances—who but the British could have thought of anything so vile and polluting as 'beef tea'?—and went to great lengths to refute the imputations of poisoning made against Indian medicine. As poisoning rumours suggested, when it came to poisoning, it was not difficult to reverse the censorious colonial gaze and attribute a poisonous intent to British self-interest and malice rather than to Indian criminality and excess.

But, significantly, the 'panic' over Indian drugs and therapeutics was not confined to Europeans alone. To some extent, the idea that many indigenous drugs were by their nature or inappropriate use dangerous was a view shared by at least a section of the Indian middle classes. In Calcutta, Indian doctors who had espoused Western medicine campaigned vigorously for the regulation of the medicinal drugs freely sold in the city's shops or on the streets, which they saw as a real danger to public well-being

and to their own professional authority. The crucial medical intervention in favour of state legislation came with a paper presented to the Indian Medical Congress in Calcutta in 1894. Jointly authored by J.F. Evans of the Indian Medical Service and Chunilal Bose, the chemical examiner for Bengal, it was entitled 'The Necessity for an Act Regulating the Free Sale of Poisons in Bengal'[45] and became one of several starting points for legislation later introduced by the Government of India. Further support for such a regulating act came from a Bengali practitioner, Dr A. Mitra, who expressed his alarm at 'the careless and indiscriminate sale of poisons in the bazaar'. Indian society rather than just the colonial order was seen to be at risk. However, in 1903, when the Secretary of State for India gave his support to the proposed poison legislation, he framed it more widely, claiming that there was, so far as he knew, no other 'civilized country in the world' than British India 'in which the sale and possession of poisons is not carefully restricted'. In drafting its own statement of objects and reasons to accompany the bill, the Government of India repeated the Secretary of State's remarks, observing that it was 'an extraordinary anomaly … that a deadly poison, such as arsenic, which … produces effects very similar to cholera, and which is known to be the agent most frequently employed for homicidal purposes, should be procurable in unlimited quantities in every part of India'.[46]

The State Response to Poison Panics

It is clear, then, that over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Europeans in India (inside and outside the formal apparatus of government) experienced their own 'moral panics' over poisons and poisoning. The 'folk devils' they identified were (among others) Indian princes and Indian servants, the Indian criminal classes who were the apparent heirs to *thugi*, and the unreformed practitioners of Indian medicine. Within this emerging history, one can identify particular episodes or moments in which colonial concerns over poison and poisoning took on something of the character of 'panics'. But perhaps the middle decades of the nineteenth century—from Mouat's alarm at the poisonous medicinal drugs sold in bazaars in 1843, to Hervey's insistence on the *thugi*-like dangers of *datura* poisoners in the 1850s and 1860s, to Chevers' emphasis on the centrality of poisoning in Indian criminality and medical jurisprudence between the 1850s and 1870s, to the episode of the Phayre poison case in 1874—marks the time when a more generalized poison panic seemed to affect the colonial regime.

Thereafter, alarm over poisons and poisoning seemed to abate some-what (though clearly it never went away), to resume again in the 1890s and renewed demands for increased state intervention and vigilance. From the British perspective, the cumulative effect of these poison scares was certainly to reinforce negative images of Indian criminality and barba-rism and, conversely, to reaffirm the moral superiority and legitimacy of colonial rule. But the effect was also to call into question the laissez-faire ethos and non-interventionist stance that the British had maintained for much of the nineteenth century and which the Mutiny and Rebellion of 1857 had helped to affirm. But if sati, *thugi* and female infanticide were sufficiently repugnant to Western sensibilities and colonial governance to call for special, interventionist measures by the state, should there not be the same proactive response to the dangers posed by Indian poisons and Indian poisoners?

Moreover, there was the metropolitan precedent. In Britain public alarm over reports of accidental or intentional poisoning and the high-profile tri-als of arsenic murders helped provoke the 'arsenic panic' of the 1840s. As a result, laissez-faire objections had been overruled to allow for strict regulation of arsenic and other poisons by legislation in the 1850s, and this encouraged the idea that colonial law and colonial governance should follow a similar regulatory path.[47] Indeed, in 1866, the Government of Bombay followed suit with an act (Act VII of 1866) 'to regulate and restrict the sale of poisons in the Bombay Presidency', in which arsenic, *datura* and aconitum were among the vegetable and mineral substances named in the Act's poison schedule.[48] But no further provincial or all-India legislation followed and, by the 1890s, even the Bombay act was seen to be so inadequate and ineffectual as to be a virtual dead letter. It was not until the 1890s, nearly half a century after the British arsenic and pharmacy acts, that the colonial government began serious moves to legislate against poisons and even then, several years elapsed before a first, rather tentative, poisons act reached the statute books in 1904 as Act I. Sometimes referred to simply as 'the Arsenic Act', this highly flawed legislation was extensively revised as Act XII in 1919.[49] One has therefore to explain why it was that the poison scares of the mid-nineteenth century failed to translate into a more immediate sense of crisis, but also why, eventually, after several decades of apparent inertia, poison legislation was introduced.

One can attribute the problems of the colonial state with regard to poi-sons to a failure of its 'information order', and certainly the difficulty of knowing exactly how poisons were used, and by whom, presented particular

and persistent difficulties, not least in India. But the political fear of state intervention—of its efficacy, its morality and its negative consequences—continually haunted the colonial approach to poison. Even though Mouat was expressing alarm in the 1840s at the unchecked availability of poisonous drugs in the Indian bazaar and even though, a decade or two later, Hervey called for strict government measures against the apparently widespread and insidious crime of 'thugi by poisoning', the general tendency of the government in India was to defer action and to delay intervention until in the 1890s and 1900s a combination of only loosely inter-related alarms over poisoning—cattle-poisoning, the poisoning of Europeans by other Europeans, and the dangers seemingly posed by indigenous medicine and the street-level sale of drugs—at last propelled it into action. A propensity for inaction and the innately conservative nature of colonial rule, rather than a defective information order as such, seem better to explain the general response of the British to the poison problem in India.

Why was the state so slow to react? There were several reasons. One was that, despite the periodic scares, poisoning did not appear to be a major and sustained threat to British rule: a Phayre was not threatened every day. Discursively poisoning helped generate a negative Indian 'other', but it did not seem worth committing substantial state resources to try to suppress something so elusive and, in practice, so low in the scale of crime and mortality data. But another reason for the relative inertia of the colonial state was the sheer difficulty of defining what constituted a 'poison' and of separating legitimate from criminal use. Arsenic might be used to kill people and cattle, but in its pure form or its compounds (such as realgar and orpiment), it was also extensively used in paint, dyes and disinfectants, and in the preparation of paper, leather and other industrial goods. It was also widely used medicinally and cosmetically to remove unwanted body hair and whitened the skin. In a colonial situation, without the pressure of public alarm, such as had propelled legislation on the statute books in Britain, it was hard to know how to separate the occasionally criminal from the quotidian and legitimate uses of arsenic. Since the arsenic used in India was largely imported, the government was wary of being seen to single out for prohibition an otherwise inoffensive item of trade, and one with wide industrial and commercial uses.[50]

The government was constrained, too, by a fear of making matters worse by meddling in indigenous medical practice (itself a still largely unregulated field) and by using the corrupt and cumbersome instrument of its subordinate police (or similar indigenous agency) to try to enforce

anti-poison legislation. Some of those the government turned to for advice believed that a plague of corrupt and venal policeman was worse than the occasional case of accidental poisoning.[51] Moreover, as the failure of the 1866 Bombay act indicated, Indian traders and druggists could not easily be made accountable to colonial governance—to keep poison registers (in English and local vernacular) identifying the purchaser, the amount of poison purchased and its intended use, to label their poisons in the approved manner and to mix arsenic with soot or indigo in the required proportion to prevent confusion with an adjacent sack of sugar. Even the names by which various drugs were known in the vernaculars caused bureaucratic confusion and administrative controversy. The colonial state was not devoid of information, but it lacked the political will and the confidence in its own subordinate agencies to translate its concerns into legislative form and effective practice.

It was also repeatedly argued that India was different: it wasn't Britain, and neither the problem of poisons nor the solutions to their use could possibly be the same.[52] For instance, the difficulties of detecting poisoning in India were said to be greater: corpses decomposed rapidly in the Indian heat, and bodies were half-consumed by tigers and other beasts of the jungle before they could be subject to post-mortem analysis. Many of the dead in India were cremated within hours of their demise, leaving little evidence on which to base a chemical analysis. Doctors—especially those trained and equipped to investigate suspected poisoning cases—were too few and far between; for several years, until the Punjab Medical School was established in 1860, samples of food, viscera and vomit from Punjab were sent to Calcutta for forensic tests.[53] In India potentially several poisonous vegetable drugs like opium and *datura* were so readily available (across much of the subcontinent *datura* was a common weed of the roadside and waste ground) as to make it almost impossible to regulate or to ban them. Even the poisonous seeds of the *datura* plant could easily be mistaken for the capsicum and chilli seeds to be found in the contents of many an Indian stomach.[54]

However, while the colonial state was wary of taking overhasty measures against poisons and poisoners, it did respond in other ways, through the creation of new administrative and technical agencies by which it could arrive at a more precise knowledge of poisons and poisoning. A leading example of this was the office of the chemical analyst or chemical examiner.[55] Bengal had a chemical examiner as early as 1840 and two prominent physicians—F.J. Mouat and W.B. O'Shaughnessy—held this

post during its early years. Other provinces followed by the middle or later decades of the nineteenth century, and though charged with an increasing number of other responsibilities, detecting poisons and providing evidence in suspected poisoning cases (involving animals as well as humans) was always one of their principal duties. Here was an example of how a colonial regime responded to an unfolding sense of crisis by utilizing and formalizing technical expertise. These toxicologists (most of whom were seconded from the state medical services) also advised their government on policy matters relating to crime, its prevention and detection. They became an influential part of the system of medical jurisprudence in India, itself one of the main branches of medical and legal enquiry and policy formation in India. By the early twentieth century, the chemical examiner and his department was responsible for a vast amount of technical and scientific business on behalf of the state—not just in relation to poisons but also to food adulteration, the quality of potable water and the testing of chemicals, drugs and explosives.[56]

If, discursively speaking, some of the crude stereotypes of Indian criminality, such as those that Hervey and Chevers had helped to propagate, remained, increasingly poisoning was treated as a highly technical issue. Criminal poisoning and poison panics were not thereby entirely eradicated, but it was widely believed by the early years of the twentieth century that the more common forms of poisoning could now be readily detected. This acted, if not as an actual deterrent to the criminal use of poisons, then at least as a fair assurance that the crime (if reported) was unlikely to go detected, or that, like the betel nut scare in Calcutta in 1910, rumour could more easily be scotched.

Notes

1. John Kaye and G.B. Malleson (1893: 19).
2. Nicholas Mansergh et al. (1973), vol. I, no. 651, and II, no. 4.
3. On these, see David Arnold (1979: 115–45; 1993: Chapter 4–5).
4. Anand A. Yang (1987: 485–505); Christopher A. Bayly (1996).
5. Thus, poison panics seem rather different in nature from the 'rape scares' that have been identified in other colonial contexts. See, for example, Norman Etherington (1988: 36–53).
6. Megan Vaughan (2005: 98).
7. Stanley Cohen (2002).
8. For poison in early Indian medical texts, see Julius Jolly (1977: 148–50). Many of these issues are discussed more fully in David Arnold (2016).

9. Andrew Buchanan (1904).
10. H.N.C. Stevenson (1954: 56–58).
11. Martin Richard Gubbins (1858: 85–89); K.D. Bhargava (n.d.: 9, 13).
12. Anand A. Yang (1987: 494); David Arnold (1987: 55–90).
13. René Baehrel (1952: 351–60); Georges Lefebvre (1973: 62); François Delaporte (1986: 48–58, 135–36).
14. Luise White (2000).
15. Martin Richard Gubbins (1858: 87); F.S.P. Lely (1906: 28–29); Evan Maconochie (1926: 83).
16. Bengal Municipal (Medical) Proceedings, nos 25–26, September 1910, India Office Records [IOR], British Library, London.
17. That this specific distrust of the 'native' servants was apparently a widespread phenomenon is evident from Christine Whyte's contribution to this volume.
18. Megan Vaughan (2005: 99).
19. H. Hervey (1912: Chapter 23); see also the poisoning of the servants of Captain Ludlow in Jodhpur in 1840: Board's Collections [BC], F/4/1897: 80,633, IOR.
20. W.J. Moore (1883: 558).
21. James Tod (1920) provides numerous references to this, for instance, vol. I, pp. 466, 487, 495, 506, 541; vol. II, p. 728, 867, 985, 1138. Later examples are numerous: for example, W.O. Horne (1928: 40–41).
22. For example, the poisoning of Captain Spears, political agent at Bopawur, in May 1829, in BC, F/4/1327: 52490, IOR.
23. *Commission of Enquiry into Charges Laid Against H. M. Mulharrao, Gaekwar of Baroda*, IOR.
24. H.L. Adam (1909: 235).
25. The case has been written up many times; see especially Walsh (1929) and Molly Whittington-Egan (1990).
26. *Report on the Administration of the Police of the United Provinces, 1912* (1913: 8).
27. India, Home (Judicial) Proceedings, nos 80–81, August 1895, IOR.
28. J.D.B. Gribble and Patrick Hehir (1898: 433).
29. At a later date, many suspected poisoners in northern India were *sadhus*, who especially when they were thought to be 'fake' holy men formed a further category of 'deviants' in the colonial view; see, for example, S.T. Hollins (1954: 114–19).
30. Especially Kim A. Wagner (2004: 931–63). See also Tom Lloyd (2008: 201–37).
31. A.J. Arbuthnot (1851: 166–67). This case dated from 1839.
32. George Couper, Secretary, Government, North-Western Provinces, to Charles Hervey, 13 September 1860, and Charles Hervey to Couper, 24 September 1860, in Charles Hervey (1861: 48, 65–68).

33. Charles Hervey (1868). The report is paginated separately for each year: the statistics appear on p. 19 of each report.
34. I.B. Lyon (1889: 496–503).
35. I.B. Lyon, *Report of the Chemical Analyser to Government, Bombay, 1877* (1878: 9–10); A.H. Giles (1885: 78–122).
36. Norman Chevers (1870: 4–8, 103).
37. Norman Chevers (1856: 8).
38. H.L. Adam (1909: 100–01); cf. Eustace J. Kitts (1889: 9): 'Thuggi has died out, but professional poisoning has to some extent taken its place.'
39. For some of the earliest accounts, see Article IX: 'Importation of Arsenic into the Benares Division for Unlawful Purposes', *Selections from Records of Government, North-Western Provinces, vol. IV* (1856: 275–83).
40. Saurabh Mishra (2011: 317–38). Statistic should be 'statistics' on cattle-poisoning appeared regularly in the annual reports of the provincial chemical examiners throughout this period.
41. J.D.B. Gribble and Patrick Hehir (1898: 409–10).
42. Francis Hamilton (Buchanan) (1819: 98–100); Heber Drury (1873: 11–13).
43. Dr F. Mouat, Chemical Examiner, to Secretary, Home, 18 May 1843, Bengal Public Proceedings, no. 26, 12 June 1843, IOR.
44. H. Hervey (1912: 296).
45. *Transactions of the First Indian Medical Congress, Calcutta, 24th to 29th December, 1894* (1895: 467–87).
46. Denzil Ibbertson, 4 July 1903, Appendix L, to India, Legislative Proceedings, no. 16, January 1904, IOR.
47. James C. Whorton (2010).
48. Bombay Acts, 1862–70 (no publication details), IOR.
49. India, Home Judicial Proceedings, nos 426–610, May 1899, IOR; India Legislative Proceedings, no. 16, January 1904, IOR.
50. On the arsenic trade, see V. Ball (1881: 162, 572–73).
51. For internal debates on the poison act, see India, Home (Judicial), Proceedings, nos 426–610, May 1899, IOR; India, Home (Judicial), Proceedings 208–20, March 1900, IOR.
52. C.R. Baynes (1854).
53. *Report of the Chemical Examiner, Punjab, 1873* (1874: 1).
54. D.P. Lambert (1937).
55. As in Britain: see Katherine D. Watson (2006: 373–90).
56. W.B. O'Shaughnessy (1841); cf. 'Annual Report of the Chemical Examiner for 1908' (1909).

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The Settler's Demise: Decolonization and Mental Breakdown in 1950s Kenya

Will Jackson

'I believe that a whole history is contained in the figure of the native underneath the bed'.

André Brink (2009: 43)

Constant to imperial culture was the appearance of strength. In their processions and parades, their rituals and routines and, most enduringly, their writing, British imperialists presented themselves, their identities and their hold over power as safe and secure. However, as historians have increasingly come to recognize, such acts of self-assertion only thinly concealed a subterranean—and no less constant—strain of doubt. Beneath the pomp and ceremony, anxiety was perennial to empire. Fears of native uprising made manifest a collective vulnerability. Episodes of panic, hysteria and vigilante violence gave expression to this fear. While historians have tended to focus on their irrational quality—the uprisings

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that were envisaged existed in the realm of fantasy, not fact—this chapter takes as its case study Kenya during the Mau Mau Emergency (1952–60). Here, colonial fears were justified: there *was* a popular movement afoot to drive the Europeans from the land.[1] However, what at first appears like a pathological element in the settler response obscures the fact that the performance of emotion was itself a vehicle for the expression of colonial ideology. By displaying their feelings publicly and writing of their experience retrospectively, settlers created the lasting impression of a collective racial sensibility. 'The settler' was an affective ideal.

Looking beyond published writing to those Europeans who were treated for mental illness during Mau Mau provides powerful new perspectives. If fear was pervasive in 1950s Kenya, the evidence of the European mentally ill points to the histories *behind* this fear. What psychiatric case files specifically show are the ways in which a range of phenomena—poverty, old age, trauma, isolation and family breakdown—could decisively interact. However, as supporting evidence for a collective nervous breakdown, the utility of those cases with an explicitly racial content is limited: first, by their straightforward numerical paucity (for every patient who mentioned Africans or Mau Mau, there were four who did not) and, second, by the fact that those whose illness did feature Mau Mau were people already enfeebled. Madness may have reflected racial fear but it was the manifest outcome of lifetimes of accumulated psychic damage. In all these cases, individual and family narratives combined with the 'bigger' history of the twentieth century. Decolonization from this perspective entailed much more than the political processes that preceded the emergence of independent nation-states. No less relevant was the commonly felt estrangement from empire experienced by those most intimately caught up in its unforeseen decline.

Mau Mau Fears

'For the upteenth time I put down my book and listened, my hand on my gun.' So began the memoir of Cherry Lander, a settler in Kenya, whose book, *My Kenya Acres: A Woman Farms in Mau Mau Country*, was published in 1957.[2] The image of a solitary reader laying down her book 'for the upteenth time' presents the Mau Mau insurgency not as a significant political movement but as irritant and interruption. Also implied here, however, is something of the anxiety by which Europeans anticipated the possibility of a Mau Mau attack. Lander herself took meticulous precautions. She gave up listening to the radio in the evening so that she could concentrate on sounds

outside. She placed sheet metal over her windows and double locks on her doors. Each evening she varied her routine and was careful not to silhouette herself against a light. 'It was just sometimes', she wrote, 'that I got the jitters in the evenings.' On one night in particular:

> I woke up with the awful feeling that I was surrounded. Something was press-ing on all sides of the house, closer and closer. I lay very still, hardly daring to breathe from fright, but whatever it was didn't make the attack I was expect-ing. At last curiosity overcame me, and I crept shakily out of bed to peep cau-tiously out of the window into the faintly moonlit night. It was cows.[3]

With her image of cows (symbol themselves of the settler farming by which colonial Kenya was romanticized and defended), Lander invites her reader to share in her own feelings of relief. It was the nights that were ter-rifying, their worst feature 'the nervous tension created by living among the evil which was known to be there, but which took no concrete form'. Mornings brought deliverance. As each new day's work began, 'we felt it was another day gained from the amorphous threat which we knew was around us'. Alone in the darkness, however, Lander spent her time con-stantly alert, facing the door, gun to hand: 'At the slightest noise my heart would thump and if the dogs barked I would jump with fright.'[4]

Scholars of various stripes have alluded to the intrinsic and pervasive nature of colonial fears.[5] Of particular relevance here is work that has focused on the unique position of the white settler. Unlike members of the colonial admin-istration, settlers came to stay. A challenge to their position, then, struck at the very core of their identity, jeopardizing not only their security in the present but also the prospects for their future (and that of their descendants). Hence the neurosis of the settler colony, manifest not only in the figure of the native insurgent but also in anxieties over European degeneration, the debilitating results of climate and the possibility that the land would ulti-mately turn against the settler project.[6] As Norman Etherington has argued, in late Victorian Natal panics over the rape of white women and the possibil-ity of a Zulu invasion were the expressions of 'an underlying, non-specific fear'.[7] Long after the 1896 rebellion in Rhodesia, rumours of another native rising continued to intermittently panic the white community. 'The fear of a reprise', suggested Dane Kennedy, 'ravaged settlers' peace of mind'.[8] The panic that gripped South Africa's Transvaal in 1904, according to Jeremy Krikler, proved settlers' 'chronic insecurity'.[9] Most recently, Bill Schwarz identified fear as the perennial feature of the settler experience. 'Fear', he argued, 'was endemic.'[10] Lorenzo Veracini agrees: 'Ongoing concerns with

existential threats and a paranoid fear of ultimate decolonization can be seen as a constituent feature of the settler colonial situation.'[11]

What Veracini identifies as paranoid had become by the post-Second World War period entirely real.[12] With this in mind, this chapter locates the emotional experience of empire—and, specifically, that vulnerability to which scholars have so frequently returned—on the precipice of empire's end, when native insurrection represented the realization of settler fears and when the colonial project was beginning to unravel in political no less than psychological terms. It takes as its case study Kenya in the 1950s, a time when the Mau Mau insurgency ignited all sorts of imaginative associations linking Africa and Africans to violence, savagery and 'unspeakable rites'.[13] Historians have long recognized the instrumental function of the Mau Mau myth (presenting Mau Mau as atavistic or evil clearly served a delegitimizing role),[14] but they have nonetheless tended to take seriously the existence of a pervasive and entirely authentic fear. The Kenya settler was, in John Lonsdale's words, 'the settler alarmed', his reaction one of 'pained panic'.[15] The realization of African conspiracy, wrote Kathryn Tidrick, released settlers' accumulated fear and hate 'with explosive force'.[16] The violence of their response was 'spectacular'.[17] 'The secret oathing of farm workers', David Anderson argued, 'and the rumours of a planned rebellion tapped into a deep well of settler anxiety about their vulnerability amid a hostile African majority.'[18] Such anxiety was intensified by the randomness of attacks, the nature of the violence involved and the fact that trusted domestic servants were frequently implicated in attacks. 'The invasion of the domestic space', Anderson went on, 'added another deeply disturbing psychological aspect to the violence: you knew your killer and he knew you.'[19]

Recounting the settlers' reaction to Mau Mau, Anderson emphasized the murder of one settler family in particular, the Rucks, in January 1953. The Rucks were emblematic of all that white Kenya valorized: popular, sociable, hard-working and well liked. 'It was in people like these that the future of white settler society was embodied', writes Anderson, '[and] in the death of the Rucks, hope for that future seemed to dim'. On the night of 24 January, Roger Ruck, his wife Esme and their six-year-old son, Michael, were hacked to death by a Mau Mau gang. The killing of the child was the ultimate outrage; photographs of Michael's blood-spattered nursery were printed in Kenya and around the world.[20]

What is particularly striking about Anderson's account is his discussion of the settler response. Almost immediately, a march was organized on Government House. Within 48 hours of the murders, the governor of the colony, Evelyn Baring, was besieged. Anderson cites Michael Blundell, a

settler politician holed up at Government House with senior officials and who saw the crowds outside:

> This was my first experience of men and women who had momentarily lost all control of themselves and who had become merged together as an insensate unthinking mass. I can see now individual pictures of the scene—a man with a beard, clutching his pistol as he shouted and raved; another with a quiet scholarly intellectual face, whom I knew to be a musician and scientist, was crouched down by the terrace, twitching all over and swirling with a cascade of remarkable and blistering words, while an occasional fleck of foam came from his mouth.[21]

That 'insensate, unthinking mass' signalled a dramatic inversion: while typically in colonial discourse the crowd figured as an expression of the amorphous 'other', be they the teeming masses of the European slums or the barbarian hordes at the imperial gates, here it was the colonizers themselves who were merged into an unindividuated, unthinking pack.[22] The sobriety and self-control associated with scholarship and science had degenerated into animal lust. The civilized had gone savage. As first-hand testimony, this reads as vivid and seemingly compelling evidence for the mental turmoil that followed 'native' insurrection—and apparent proof for what Margery Perham described as the 'pathological atmosphere' that permeated the European community in the early stages of the Mau Mau Emergency.[23] Notably, Anderson has argued elsewhere that in Kenya panics over 'black peril' were triggered by assaults upon the innocent and helpless—children and the elderly—unlike elsewhere in Africa, where the focus was on white women.[24] Those either at the beginning or at the end of their lives embodied the very impermanence of the settler state. From this perspective, the killing of Michael Ruck represented perhaps the ultimate desecration of the settler dream, his vulnerability as a child standing for the vulnerability of the colony itself. However, if the hysteria that followed his murder might be taken as evidence of some sort of settler mental breakdown, amongst those Europeans actually certified as mentally ill during this period we see something very different. Of these, only a small proportion made reference to Mau Mau. None expressed anything of the public hysteria seen at Government House. Nor did they talk, as did so many memoirists, of the defensive measures taken to fortify their homes against the forest at their edge.[25] Yet, the histories of Kenya's 'white insane' do bear the very strong imprint of decolonization. Indeed, as a documentary corpus, their case files are framed above all by the fact

of a settler colony in decline. However, it was a decline that was prosaic first of all. The European insane did not suffer from a collective fear of Africans' impending freedom, just as they did not suffer from a collective breakdown during Mau Mau. Decolonization had significance not so much as a prospect in Europeans' minds, but as the collective back story to their lives. Its relevance was not so much an object of dread—that is to say, as something positioned in the future—but, rather, as the cumulative causative force that was the European collective past.

Colonial lives

Although it is difficult to be certain as to precise numbers, it is likely that as many as 1,000 Europeans were admitted to the Mathari Mental Hospital in Nairobi between the start of the Mau Mau Emergency in 1952 and its conclusion eight years later.[26] There is not the space here to attempt any sort of comprehensive account of these people, the nature of their lives or the manner of their treatment.[27] Instead, I propose to place those textual fragments that resonate with Mau Mau into deeper biographical context. Doing so presents difficulties as well as advantages. In seeking to understand their disorders, psychiatrists listened keenly to what their patients had to say. However, their recording of this material, filtered through contemporary medical frameworks, is liable to say as much about the preoccupations of the psychiatrist as it does about the patient. In any case, to seek a 'true' representation of madness—that is to say, a singular explanatory answer to make sense of a person's distress—is hardly realistic. No life is coherent until it is *made* coherent, whether by the psychiatrist, the historian or indeed by the individual who chooses to speak or write of their past. Moreover, whereas an investigation into the social meaning of anxiety or fear tends to involve the mapping-out of some sort of prevailing discourse, in psychiatric life histories we encounter a kind of source material that is by its very nature peculiar: at once more fragmented, more dispersed and more enigmatic than published sources such as newspapers might allow. Yet, despite their essentially idiosyncratic nature, what emerges from these case files when examined together is the unmistakable imprint of the past. Racial antipathies, it transpires, emerged from histories that traversed the twentieth century—and the world. Fear of Mau Mau was only one element within complex individual lives. The settler's demise in Kenya was as much to do with social disintegration within the European community as it was any intrinsic racial hatred within the settler mind.

Take, for example, the case of Madeleine Carson.[28] Carson, aged 50, was treated at Mathari for two short periods in the summer of 1957. At first glance, race appears to figure prominently in her illness. 'The existence of Indians and Africans', she told doctors, 'is filthy to me.' During treatment, moreover, Carson showed 'a very strong and pathological contempt for African attendants', which, doctors judged, 'was out of all proportion to the justification'.[29] Taking these details in isolation might appear to support the view that Mau Mau intensified racial fears. In particular, Carson's description of Africans and Indians as filthy chimes with the pervasive colonial association of racial difference with dirt and disease.[30] One might interpret Carson's madness, therefore, in terms of pollution: coming into close proximity with Africans and Indians disturbed the safe distinction between the purity of the self and the corrupting presence of the racial 'other'. Carson's very identity, then—itself inseparable from her social designation as white—was felt to be in danger, a danger only heightened when the widely publicized oathing rituals of Mau Mau took connotations of filthy perversion to lurid extremes.[31] When we look at Carson's statement in context, however, we gain a more revealing perspective. The following is the psychiatrist's annotation in full: 'Existence of Indians and Africans is filthy to me—I cannot stand this lack of hygiene—such barbarians—such grime of years in bathrooms etc.'[32]

'Such grime of years' suggests an element of material privation with which Carson's racial anxieties were combined. Racial fear gave expression to social degradation. Indeed, zooming out from the explicitly racial content in Carson's case file, we encounter many of the features that characterized the European mentally ill during Mau Mau. Carson had come to Kenya in April 1957 from Johannesburg to join her husband. He, in turn, had left South Africa after being declared bankrupt. On the day before Carson left Johannesburg to join him, her mother died. Notably, and like a significant number of other European patients at Mathari, Carson had experienced mental health problems before. In 1935 she had suffered a nervous breakdown after the termination of an engagement. In 1939 she gave birth to a stillborn child (later, she said, she suffered 'delayed shock'). In 1941 she gave birth to a second child, who survived, but she was forced to leave him in South Africa when she moved to Kenya to follow her husband.

Carson spoke in some detail about the distress caused by her husband's bankruptcy. 'He lost everything', she recalled '[and] we went to live in a hovel'. Previously, she had worked as a teacher; when she moved to Kenya, she bought dresses, anticipating a social life. That life did not come to pass. Indebted, isolated, estranged from her son and her home, she found

1950s Kenya an alienating, dispiriting place. While it would be dangerous to assert our own account for her mental state, it is nonetheless the case that the proximity of 'filthy barbarians' represented both more and less than the activation of colonial common sense in pathological form.

On a number of other case files, apparently telling details take on new meaning when placed in deeper biographical perspective. Joanna Harvey, treated at Mathari in 1955, believed that her African cook was poisoning her. Testimony from Harvey's husband, however, revealed that ten years previously she had had an affair with an RAF officer and had fallen pregnant. The baby was adopted at birth. Harvey had not seen it since. Since then, she had been keen to have another child, but her husband 'would not allow it on economic grounds'.[33] Here, the emotional conflicts of a troubled marriage intersected with prevailing colonial discourse to shape what Megan Vaughan has termed 'the idioms of madness'.[34] To understand Harvey's fears of poisoning as the manifestation of collective social neurosis must be to tell only a fraction of her story. Racial fear—the native under the bed, the malevolent cook—had purchase only when psychic damage was already done. Carman Brownlee told doctors of dreams in which she was 'attacked by a kaffir'. Yet, she was also troubled by the belief that her husband 'had other women'. While the 'attack by a kaffir' bespoke the nightmare of white minority rule (the term 'kaffir' suggests a South African provenance), the uncertainty over her husband's fidelity is explicable in part by the fact that at some point in the recent past, he had been 'away for four years' (Brownlee's case file does not state when, where or why). Significantly, it was during those four years that Brownlee began drinking. She consequently spent a year at an institution for alcoholics in South Africa, but by 1953 was drinking methylated spirits. Here the political and the familial were configured as mutually enforcing terrors: neither the absent husband nor the disloyal servant could be trusted. Comprehensible partly by her husband's earlier absence and partly by the Mau Mau Emergency, it was the mutually aggravating combination of these fears that gave them force.

It was not only amongst female patients that Mau Mau appeared within the substance of mental illness. Anthony Atkinson was one of the several thousand British army servicemen sent to Kenya to 'fight the Mau Mau'.[35] In February 1954 Atkinson was certified as schizophrenic and confined to Mathari pending his transfer back to the UK. Initially he had come to authorities' attention when he fired off his rifle without authority to do so. During treatment, however, he told doctors that 'the vigilantes' were after him and that 'the black cooks all [were] Mau Mau'. It is powerful

if fragmentary evidence, suggestive of the terror that military counter-insurgency operations could entail. But racial fear was combined with earlier family trauma. Specifically, it was discovered that Atkinson's parents had been jailed for neglect of their children. At 15, Atkinson had been treated for 'fainting fits'. Doctors noted: 'VD—says yes. Alcohol—says heavy. Psychiatric exam in 1952 because always in trouble.'[36]

In other cases, Mau Mau featured as one element within a range of delusional content. Doctors treating Madeleine Morrison for schizophrenia in 1953, for example, noted:

> Restless, afraid of Mau Mau—testing doors—breaking windows—attempted to drown herself in bath—hears voices of God—described communist and Nazi plots—involved accounts of concealed bodies—wireless beams—noxious fumes etc.[37]

Admitted to Mathari just a week after the Ruck murders, it is unsurprising that Morrison mentioned Mau Mau. However, any colonial aspect to her delusions should be located within the wider historical canvas suggested by her descriptions of communist and Nazi plots. She also told doctors that she believed the African staff at the hospital to be 'communists, carry[ing] concealed pangas'. It is an image that eloquently combines the symbolism of savage Africa with wider Cold War fears. Troubled Europeans in 1950s Kenya did not draw their emotional experience from Africa alone. That Morrison had worked in the intelligence division of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force during the Second World War and had spent time in Transjordan, India, Cairo and Cyprus in the later 1940s goes some way towards illuminating the objects of her concern.

Many Europeans described traumatic experiences related to the Second World War. Often these details appear in cryptic form: a scribbled notation in the case of Valerie Chaplain, for example, that she has been 'nervous since the Blitz'.[38] Harriet Robins was admitted to Mathari in 1954, ten years after she received the telegram informing her that her only son, serving in the RAF, was missing, presumed dead.[39] Both Maria Kleinmann and Katherine Galuska had lost family members in the Holocaust.[40] Alberto Severino, an Italian working on a British-owned farm, had fought in the Second World War and been taken prisoner in Abyssinia in 1941. For six years he was incarcerated in a POW camp before returning to Europe—and to Kenya in 1952. With no relatives to care for him, immigration officials were anxious to know whether his mental affliction was likely to persist. At discharge, he was thought to be recovered, but what the remainder of his life entailed is unknown.

A more complicated case involved Eva Sokolowski. In November 1954 she was transferred to the Mathari hospital from Tanganyika, where she had been living with her husband, a livestock control officer. She had a tortuous past.[41] Born in Poland, Sokolowski was one of the 1.7 million Poles deported to Siberia after Hitler and Stalin partitioned Poland in 1939. When Germany invaded Russia in June 1941, Stalin reconciled with the Polish government-in-exile and agreed to the release of tens of thousands of Polish deportees. Sokolowski was one of these. In the summer of 1942 she was transferred with her family to Persia and from there via India to a refugee camp in Northern Rhodesia. Aged 16 when her country was overrun in 1939, she is likely to have experienced extreme privation: thousands of her fellow Poles died in Siberia, many were summarily executed by the Russians and many more died of disease.[42] Her symptoms, however, have no direct or explicit connection to her traumatic past. Instead, like those of Carman Brownlee, they interleave the possibilities of marital betrayal with those of 'native' conspiracy. In August 1954 Sokolowski began complaining of her husband's behaviour. She accused him of trying to poison her and of pimping with African prostitutes, whom, she believed, he then had murdered, dissolving their bodies in acid.[43] When interviewed by doctors at Arusha, she poured out a stream of invective against her husband:

> She said he was trying to make her a prostitute by giving her aphrodisiac in the form of rhinoceros horn. She said that he forced her to have intercourse with Africans and used her as a prostitute. [H]e is trying to poison her … and has previously killed many of his African women and then given them the acid treatment. She says he does not like natural sexual intercourse, but demands sodomy. She says he is habitually drunk all day.[44]

Sokolowski's delusions dramatically collapse the dominant contemporary image of the benevolent settler-patriarch. Historians are well acquainted with the subversive quality of sex between colonizers and colonized, but what we see here are the psychological ramifications of a regime that forbade so strenuously the slightest possibility of a physical desire between white and black. In Sokolowski's disordered mind, that possibility was displaced onto her husband, a man of whom we know very little—other than that it was due to the demands of his work that the couple left Northern Rhodesia for Tanganyika (notably, Sokolowski's claim that her husband was habitually drunk was corroborated by the Tanganyika doctor who referred her). Yet, perhaps most striking in the detail of this case is

Sokolowski's belief that her husband was giving her an aphrodisiac in the form of rhinoceros horn. In 1950s Kenya so-called 'white hunters' propagated the myth that Arabs and Indians used rhino horn as an aphrodisiac. One of the most famous, J.A. Hunter, wrote in 1952:

> These horns are used for a curious purpose. Orientals consider them a powerful aphrodisiac and there is an unlimited demand for them in India and Arabia. No doubt any man who has a harem of thirty or more beautiful women occasionally feels the need for a little artificial stimulant.[45]

The harem of 'thirty or more beautiful women' was clearly a white, male fantasy. Across the British Empire, the possibility that white women might enjoy anything like the sexual licence accorded to their male counterparts was formidably debarred.[46] The symbolism of the rhinoceros horn, then, carried a powerful yet ambivalent charge: white men's possession of native bodies represented their possession of native lands as well, but in the possibility that African or Asian men harboured a corresponding desire for white women was contained all the vulnerability of colonial rule. Male sexual prowess, then, was an expression of imperial power *and* weakness, while the white female body came to represent both the value and fragility (the 'purity and danger') of the collective racial self. Eva Sokolowski's delusions crystallize this simultaneity of power and weakness, but, more importantly, demonstrate the very real human consequences to which that simultaneity gave rise. In other words, they show how colonial ideologies were 'lived'; how they were translated into subjective human experience. Yet, while the language of madness provides a text of sorts, the fact remains that madness cannot be read out of biographical context. The great value of the psychiatric case file from this perspective is that it combines the psychopathology of empire with its history. It joins together 'black peril' with the Soviet gulag and connects the human history of decolonization with the traumas of Europe's own conflicted recent past.

THE SETTLER'S DEMISE

The terror of Mau Mau operated with unifying, centrifugal force: to be afraid was to feel within that emotional range marked 'white'. Yet the hysteria so pervasive in Kenya during Mau Mau was a form of pseudo-madness; a demonstrative display of racial rage. Unlike those raving outside Government

House in January 1953, those Europeans actually treated for mental illness shared no common point of view. While memoirs of the time typically began with recollections of an inspired decision to settle—of the conception of the settler dream in the would-be settler's mind's-eye—the case histories of the insane show a far more hesitant, accidental and incoherent trajectory. Mary Grayson had come to Kenya because 'she was shy and retiring and thought people did not want her'.[47] Rowan Brookes had been sent out by his employers, an insurance company.[48] James Jackson and Randall Headley were both referred to Mathari by doctors in Tanganyika. Jackson worked on a tobacco plantation; Headley had been a foreman on the railways.[49] Others had spent their early lives in South Africa before moving north in search of work or to get away from family scandal.[50] Eleanor Wylie moved from Nairobi to Johannesburg after she married in 1939. Her husband's death in 1952 punctuated an already unstable existence. Her case notes record:

> She entered a home in Johannesburg end of 1951—stayed 2 or 3 weeks; has been in hotels [in] Salisbury for last 10 months; cannot hold a job; has not worked since October; living by herself and indulging in solitary drinking.[51]

Of the male patients treated at the hospital, just under a third had experience of military service.[52] Dominic Keaton joined the army in 1956 aged 17, having spent the previous ten years of his life in an orphanage.[53] Donald Harmiston had deserted from the merchant navy. 'He had been torpedoed at sea', his records state, 'and was adrift on a raft for three days after which his mind became a blank.'[54] When race does figure in these narratives, it points less often towards pathological fear than it does towards more quotidian kinds of conflict and confusion. Barbara Dalton, a community welfare office treated for depression in 1957, had arrived in Kenya from Southern Rhodesia. Under 'personal history', her case notes record:

> Place of Birth: England. To Southern Rhodesia 19 May 1952; to Kenya 8 Jan 1955. To Kenya from Southern Rhodesia where they do not give home leave. Reason: That's quite complex—I've travelled a lot—during war—Ceylon, Singapore. One day got fed up, went to Rhodesia House.[55]

In Rhodesia, Dalton struggled with the racist divisions that structured settler society. She did not like the colony, her doctor noted; it was 'flat and dry' and she was alienated by 'European attitudes to the Africans'. The colour bar, she recalled, 'was very strong'. Historians have written at

length about the ways in which racial ideologies had by the mid-twentieth century lost much of their intellectual force. However, the experience of Dalton shows how this changing landscape was viewed at eye level.[56] Specifically, we see the emotional conflict that could emanate from the very divisiveness that supported colonial privilege. As a welfare worker, Dalton was committed to the developmental ethos that characterized British imperial policy in the 1950s. But the resistance of Africans to change as predicted was no less frustrating than the racism of the colour bar. 'She has become rather bitter about this', a psychiatrist recorded, '[realizing that] the African doesn't really want to change … shouldn't expect the Africans to be grateful; they're not the same as we are. Gets fits of depression.'[57]

Dalton was disillusioned—first by the fixity of the colour bar and later by the failure of her own liberal ideas for colonial progress. So-called settlers themselves, no less than statesmen and officials, struggled with the contradictions to which late colonial racism gave rise.

The term 'settler' carried ideological claims: it implied not only a common emotional response to the colonial environment but also a shared migratory heritage. In Kenya, the romance of settlement rested on the vision of an Anglophone 'home county' transposed to East Africa's wide open spaces. In fact, Europeans in 1950s Kenya came from all over the world, a testament to the turbulence and fluidity of the post-war years.[58] 'Britain's fairest colony' was a polyglot world: rumours of Mau Mau activated memories from Kandy to Karachi, and Shanghai to Singapore.[59] Andrew Gumbal had spent the five years prior to his admission in 1956 working across East Africa, but had been in India prior to that. His history on the subcontinent combines a personal narrative of drug use and tropical disease with the larger political history of Indian independence. Referred to Mathari from the European Hospital in Nairobi, Gumbal believed that he was under the influence of hashish: he heard 'groans and moans' and saw 'dreamy visions'.[60] While in India, he smoked Indian cheroots; doctors speculated as to whether he smoked ganja as well.[61] If he did, its effects could only have been compounded by a catalogue of debilitating somatic illnesses. 'He has had repeated attacks of malaria, including black-water fever in 1932', it was noted. 'He has also suffered from both amoebic and bacillary dysentery.'[62] After Indian independence, he moved to Zanzibar. In his own handwritten account, he spliced together his own life narrative with the larger history of decolonization:

1926–1947: India, usual tropical diseases and malaria and dysentery.

1947—last 6 months—commanded an AFI battalion during the massacres and atrocities. Several nightmares towards the end.

1948–1950—Zanzibar—a lot of unhealthy work in the mangroves. Plenty of malaria and probable exposure to encephalitis.[63]

The massacres and atrocities to which Gumbal referred were those that accompanied Indian partition, during which as many as a million people were killed.[64] The nightmare that was Indian independence represented, as did Mau Mau, a violent inversion of the entire socio-political edifice that had structured British imperial lives, undermining people, in the words of Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, whose entire sense of self 'was constituted in relations of racial domination'.[65] 'A lot of unhealthy work in the mangroves' resonates less with Mau Mau, however, than with an earlier imperial discourse invoking in fetid nature the potential degradation of the white man therein.[66] Having spent 23 years in India, for Gumbal the pains of a disintegrating empire coincided with the pains of his own mental and bodily deterioration.[67] 'Kenya is a young colony' was the preamble to many arguments in defence of colonial rule, but by 1950 the pioneers of the pre-war days were growing old and infirm. Leslie Barton had come to Kenya in 1919 as a soldier-settler, having served as a flight commander in the First World War. At one stage he had owned 35,000 acres, but, by the time he was admitted to hospital in 1957, he occupied a 300-acre smallholding. Aged 64, he was in failing health. Diabetic and overweight, he suffered from jaundice and was rapidly losing his sight.[68] Referring 70-year-old Alison Grey to Mathari in 1956, a Mombasa doctor wrote:

> This lady, who is alleged to have won several decorations in World War I as a nurse is now in her sixties. She is becoming mentally senile … She had no relatives in this country (and few in the UK who seem to take much interest in her) … She has spent the last few years in and out of second rate hotels. These places are only too pleased to get rid of her when the season starts, as she is not good for trade.[69]

Grey was referred on to a Nairobi nursing home, but other elderly Europeans died, either at the Mathari hospital or soon after discharge. Many of these older Europeans had no family in the colony to support them. Graeme Round, an alcoholic treated in 1956, had been working as a field assistant on a sisal plantation. Having spent over 30 years in Kenya, all his family members, he reported, were dead. Only a few 'stray uncles and aunts' remained, but they did not write and their whereabouts were unknown.[70]

WEAKNESS AND THE END OF EMPIRE

While fear of Mau Mau was a theme running throughout Cherry Lander's memoir, the character of her fellow settlers was another. 'It is the people who count', she wrote. This, she said, was 'the secret of Kenya'.[71] The first settler farm she encountered in the colony, she recalled, belonged to the Winters. 'It was here that I found what charming people farmers and their wives were', she recalled. The Winters had been in the colony for 30 years; their home, with 'fine silver, cut glass, an elegant hostess, and all the comforts of civilized life', was 'a mirror to themselves'. Ann Strong, another settler, was 'one of those warm and friendly people whose nice disposition [showed] in her attractive face. Natural and charming, she [was] a first-class cook and an expert gardener … When she changed from her working clothes she was always beautifully turned out'. Bill, Ann's husband, was 'wise' from many years in the colony. The couple's home had, for Lander, 'that delightful mixture of hard work and comfortable living which seemed to characterize the spirit of Kenya'.[72]

That 'spirit of Kenya' carried powerful political freight. Moreover, it was embodied in a discursive ideal that rested upon the ways in which 'the settler' felt as much as upon what he said or did. While the settler ideal was unequivocal—these were people inspired by the colonial project, committed to its fulfilment and traumatized by its apparently proximate loss—Europeans themselves were hardly endowed with the subjectivity accorded to them in contemporary discourse. If published accounts of Mau Mau appear to afford ample evidence for the terror that it induced, it is important to note their discursive limit. Settlers may have admitted retrospectively to being afraid, but they wrote firmly within the parameters of literary convention. A discourse that emphasized their defensive measures bespoke settlers' resourcefulness and courage no less than their anxiety or fear. Besides the vigilance attributed to them, the histrionic quality of their reaction to Mau Mau served clear political ends. Rather

than indicating colonial weakness, the myth of Mau Mau worked to the distinct advantage of those who advocated that African rebellion be forcibly suppressed. Mental agitation worked as political agitation; emotional turmoil was publicly performed.

As Jonathan Hyslop has noted, episodes of panic have tended to be explained in either political or psychodynamic terms.[73] Instrumentalist accounts have shown how the (frequently violent) expression of colonial fears worked to reinstate embattled hierarchies of gender, class and race, whilst strengthening embryonic or transitional political regimes.[74] Others, following Frantz Fanon, have identified certain psychological predispositions as intrinsic to the colonial 'situation'.[75] What neither perspective allows for is the highly variegated nature of the colonial experience. Fear had diverse effects depending on the social position of the individual concerned and the emotional hinterland to their lives. Racial terrors coursed unevenly through the colonial mind. Thus, the murderous or conspiratorial native could exist simultaneously as a fragment of colonial ideology, as an element in the myth of 'savage Africa' *and* as a catalytic, causative or component part of a particular individual's troubled mental state. However, if the category of the settler was as much an emotional as a behavioural construct, what is striking about those Europeans designated to be mentally ill is that they were all, in various ways, socially marginal and, by extension, racially suspect. Indeed, one hardly needs to subscribe to the view that Kenya's white insane were confined *because* of their racial shortcomings to recognize that across the considerable diversity of their circumstances, the one thing they had in common was their signal lack of a settler subjectivity. Pertinent here may be the analytical distinction to be made between the settler and the migrant. While 'settlers' by definition succeeded—in their endeavours to replicate their culture overseas and contain the resistance of those already there—the migrant was forced to reckon his personal aspirations against social and political forces outside his control.[76] In 1950s Kenya the migrant had replaced the settler. Those contributing to the myth of Mau Mau created the lasting impression that Kenya was in the grip of a collective nervous breakdown, but these were all people securely within the settler fold. While the politicians, memoirists and newspaper correspondents recycled the image of a frightened yet defiant settler archetype, the life histories of the mentally ill point to a far more diverse emotional and experiential range. Nor should the fact of their treatment render those judged to be insane as exceptional: census, welfare and immigration data from the post-war years indicates a

European community characterized by unprecedented levels of transience, poverty and social distress.[77] Most importantly, in their attempts to document their patients' disorder, psychiatrists reached out beyond Kenya—and beyond the present tense. Thus, we can appreciate the genealogy of mental illness; Mau Mau nightmares were only the visible expression of the traumas that marked Europe's own debilitating past. At the end of empire, it was not so much the fear of weakness that marked the settler's demise as the fact of it.

Notes

1. Mau Mau, of course, was more complicated than this. See Daniel Branch (2009).
2. Cherry Lander (1957).
3. Cherry Lander (1957: 51).
4. Cherry Lander (1957: 18, 89, 105).
5. Ashis Nandy (1983); Henry Reynolds (1987: 9–13); Elleke Boehmer (1995: 21–22); Paul Carter (1996: 30); Ranajit Guha (1997: 482–93); Linda Colley (2000: 189); Brian Axel (2002: 198–99); Ricardo Roque (2003: 105–24); Jon Wilson (2008: 45–74); Elizabeth Kolsky, (2010: 163); John Darwin (2013: 116); Kim Wagner (2013: 159–97); Maurus Reinowski and Gregor Thum (2013).
6. Lorenzo Veracini (2010: 81); Dane Kennedy (1987: 128–47).
7. Norman Etherington (1988: 50).
8. Dane Kennedy (1987: 131). For a fairly typical contemporary example of these fears, see Turner (1980).
9. Jeremy Krikler (1995: 498).
10. Bill Schwarz (2011: 119).
11. Lorenzo Veracini (2010: 81).
12. For decolonization in Africa, see R.J. Reid (2009: part v).
13. The literature on Mau Mau is substantial. For its colonial construction, see R.B. Edgerton (1990: 142–72); John Lonsdale (1990: 393–491); D. Kennedy (1992: 241–60); and David Anderson (2005: 77–118).
14. Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham (1966); Marshall S. Clough (1998: 33).
15. John Lonsdale (1990: 407); 'Kenya: Home County and African Frontier' in Robert Bickers (2010: 104).
16. Kathryn Tidrick (1992: 159–60).
17. John Lonsdale (1990: 105).
18. David Anderson (2005: 83).
19. David Anderson (2005: 87–88); see John Lonsdale (1990: 406–07).

20. On the Ruck murders, see also Fred Majdalany (1962: 124); Kathryn Tidrick (1992: 159–60); and Susan Carruthers (1995: 136–37).
21. Michael Blundell (1964: 126–27), cited in David Anderson (2005: 96).
22. For perhaps the best (certainly the most0cited) example of the crowd in colonial discourse, see George Orwell (1953). The classic European text is Gustave Le Bon (1895).
23. Margery Perham (1963), 'Foreword', in Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (1963: xiv).
24. David Anderson (2010: 47–74).
25. See, for example, Mrs. J.C. Appleby (Rhodes House [hereinafter RH], Mss. Afr. S. 846, p. 2); E.C. Palmes (RH, Mss. Afr. S. 946); John Gunther (1955: 319); Elsepth Huxley (1990: 168); Pamela Scott (1991: 169). Settlers' courage and determination in the face of Mau Mau was a theme that coloured much of the international reporting of Mau Mau: Wendy Webster (2005: 121, 133–34).
26. All the patient case files discussed here have been archived as part of a project led by Dr Sloan Mahone of the Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine at Oxford University with the British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA). My thanks to the superintendent of Mathari, Dr Nelly Kitazi, for allowing me to consult these files.
27. For a fuller account, see Will Jackson (2013a).
28. All patient names have been changed to protect anonymity.
29. Mathari Mental Hospital (hereinafter MMH): EU.F.14/57, Discharge Letter: Previous Admissions.
30. Maynard W. Swanson (1977); David Arnold (1993); Anne McClintock (1995: 152–54); Randall Packard (1989).
31. On oathing, see John Lonsdale (1990: 400).
32. MMH: EU.F.14/57, Clinical Sheet, 'Personal History'.
33. MMH: EU.F.4/55, Clinical Sheet, 'Progress and Treatment', history from husband, 24 February 1955.
34. Megan Vaughan (1983: 218–38). For a graphic depiction of family instability in Northern Rhodesia at this time, see Karen Tranberg Hansen (1989: 176–80). For an illuminating investigation into the salience of poisoning as a crystallization of colonial fears, see Krista O' Donnell (1999: 32–54).
35. MMH: EU.M.11/54, Clinical Sheet, 'History of Present Illness'. On the British counter-insurgency operation, see Huw Bennett (2013).
36. MMH: EU.M.11/54, Clinical Sheet, 'Previous Health'.
37. MMH: EU.F.4/53, Clinical Notes on Mrs Morrison, 30 April 1953.
38. MMH: EU.F.7/50, Clinical Sheet: 'Previous Personal History'.
39. MMH: EU.F.34/56, Clinical Sheet: 'Progress and Treatment'.
40. MMH: EU.F.24/57, Clinical Sheet, 'Family History'; MMH: EU.F.1.58, Clinical Sheet, 'Family History'.

41. MMH: EU.F.22/54, Eva Sokolowski.
42. For a vivid social history, see Katherine R. Jolluck (2002). On Polish refugees to British-controlled Africa, see Lynne Taylor (2009).
43. MMH: EU.F.22/54, 1 November 1954, J.R.K. Robson, Government Hospital, Arusha to Dr Smartt, Mirembe Hospital, Dodoma.
44. MMH: EU.F.22/54, Lunacy Case No./54, 10 November 1954.
45. John A. Hunter (1952: 169).
46. On male sexual licence, or opportunity, see Ronald Hyam (1990). For the critical response to Hyam, see M.T. Berger (1988: 83–89); Thompson and Aldrich (2013: 78–81). On the curtailment of European women's sexuality, see Philippa Levine (2004: 134–56). For the Kenyan context, see Will Jackson (2011: 73–94).
47. MMH: EU.F.29/50, Mary Grayson, Clinical Sheet, 'Previous Personal History'.
48. MMH: EU.M.5/59, Clinical Sheet, 'Other Information and Medical History'.
49. MMH: EU.M.11/56, D. Joyce McQueen to Mathari Hospital, 4 July 1956; MMH: EU.M.9/58, Randell Headley, Dr C.G.F. Smartt, Psychiatric Report, 2 November 1957.
50. Examples include Harriet Robins, MMH: EU.F.34/56; Florenze Coetzee, MMH: EU.F.2/58; Adam Fenshaw, MMH: EU.M.14/47; and Belinda Loman, MMH: EU.F.5/57.
51. MMH: EU.F.15/53, Eleanor Wylie, Clinical Sheet, History of Present Illness.
52. For the psychodynamic consequences of military service during the Second World War, see Ben Shephard (2000: 325–28); Joanna Bourke (2005: 197–221).
53. MMH: EU.M.11/57, Discharge Letter, Discharge Letter, 17 July 1957, 'Other Information and Medical History'.
54. MMH: EU.M.102/44, Clinical Sheet, 'Progress of Case'.
55. MMH: EU.F.4/57, Clinical Sheet, 'Personal History'.
56. On the changing ideological landscape, see L.J. Butler (2002); and Ronald Hyam (2006).
57. MMH: EU.F.4/57, Clinical Sheet, 'Progress and Treatment'.
58. Will Jackson (2013a: 92–94).
59. Patients with experience of these places included Alison Riley, MMH: EU.F.3/53; Grace Yandle, MMH: EU.F.27/55; Charlotte Crawford, MMH: EU.F.1/56; Barbara Dalton, MMH: EU.F.4/57; Jack Ellis, MMH: EU.M.10/58; and Jeremy Webber, MMH: EU.M.9/58.
60. MMH: EU.M.1/56, Dr Margetts to Dr Cameron, 24 January 1956.
61. Ganja was a sanskrit word in common use in British India and on the East African coast to describe cannaboid drugs. On the production and consumption of cannabis in the British Empire, see James H. Mills (2005).

62. MMH: EU.M.1/56, Dr Margetts to Dr Cameron, 24 January 1956.
63. The AFI was a wing of the Indian Army, comprised of European volunteer soldiers. MMH, EU.M.1/56, Patient's handwritten notes, 15 January 1956.
64. Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (2009: 60–89).
65. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds (2008: 110).
66. David Arnold (1997); Mark Harrison (1999).
67. Others at Mathari with experience of India included William Hunter, MMH: EU.M.19/50; Lawrence White, MMH: EU.M.8/57; Peter Keddie, MMH: EU.M.13/57; Ronald Jacobs, MMH: EU.M.2/58.
68. MMH: EU.M.14/57, 'Clinical Sheet', Personal History.
69. MMH. EU.F.13/56. Other elderly patients included Andrew Sykes, MMH: EU.M.16/57; Kathleen Sandison, MMH: EU.F.1/55; Eleanor Hallenbranner, MMH: EU.F.10/46; Robert Fallon, MMH: EU.M.27/54; Monica Crocker, MMH: EU.F.10/59; and William Hunter, MMH: EU.M.19/50.
70. MMH: EU.M.12/56, Graeme Round, Clinical Sheet, Family History.
71. Cherry Lander (1957: 182).
72. Cherry Lander (1957: 46).
73. Jonathan Hyslop (1995: 59–60).
74. See, for example, Charles van Onselen (1982: 49–60); Dane Kennedy (1987); John Pape (1990: 699–720).
75. Jeremy Krikler (1995); J.M. Coetzee (1991: 1–35). Later work has more successfully shown the political and psychodynamic in intimate relation. See, for example, D.M. Anderson (2010); Kim Wagner (2013).
76. Will Jackson (2013b). On the theoretical distinction between migrants and settlers, see Lorenzo Veracini (2010: 4); Stephen Constantine (2003); John Darwin (2010: 332–333); James Belich (2009: 149–51).
77. Kenya Colony and Protectorate, 'Report on the Census of the Non-native Population of Kenya Colony and Protectorate Taken on the Night of the 25th February 1948'; KNA: CS/2/6 series: Applications for Deportation Orders, 1951–1957; KNA: AH/13/136-142, 'Distressed Persons: Europeans'; KNA: GH/3/2, British Legion Annual Delegates Conference, President's Report 1959, 6 February 1959.

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Imperial Panics and Discursive Responses

Mass-Mediated Panic in the British Empire? Shyamji Krishnavarma's 'Scientific Terrorism' and the 'London Outrage', 1909

Harald Fischer-Tiné

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the traumatic experiences of those fateful dates that have marked the initial decade of the new millennium (such as 9/11 in New York, 7/7 in London and 11/13 in Paris), there has been a renewed interest in the history of terrorist campaigns and the anxieties they created among targeted populations. Scholars have also begun to pay attention to the historical development of counter-terrorist strategies, the indiscriminate implementation of which sometimes reflected (and still reflects) not so much a real threat than a widespread paranoia of perceived 'enemies of humanity'.[1] Today's *angst*-laden atmosphere bears conspicuous parallels

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with the fear of terrorist attacks that was characteristic of *Belle Époque* Europe, as captured, for instance, in Joseph Conrad's celebrated 1907 novel *The Secret Agent*.[2] Likewise, many of the tropes and metaphors that crop up in present-day terror panics and some of the arguments used in current public debates on terrorism and the appropriate measures to curtail it seem to have been anticipated more than a century ago. This holds particularly true if one chooses to analyse such debates from a post-colonial perspective. As Elleke Boehmer and Stephen Morton have reminded us, now as then, Western discourses on violent acts of resistance exerted by Asians and Africans against the hegemonic powers were shot through with the 'logic of unilateral Orientalism',[3] according to which only the non-Western opponents of the respective hegemon can be labelled 'terrorists'. In both cases, they maintain, 'the threat of the (post)colonial terrorist is presented as a primary trigger for retaliatory action' in the (post-)colony, or as an explanation for the supposed necessity of introducing various forms of state repression at home.[4] Alongside this, several scholars have highlighted the ambiguous role of the mass media in the development of modern terrorism from the late nineteenth century onwards and have pointed to the fact that the rapid spread of print capitalism was as important a pre-condition for its rise and growth as the invention of dynamite.[5] While it is true that the panic provoked by violent attacks is a crucial part of the terrorist strategy – and the media can thus be seen as the terrorists' 'partners in crime', so to speak – there can be no doubt that the press can as effectively collude with the governments targeted by terrorists. As is well known, governments in liberal states have often exploited media-generated anti-terrorist frenzies to defend the curtailment of their citizens' individual freedoms.[6]

In an attempt to elucidate the pre-history of these complex politics of mass-mediated panic in an imperial context, this chapter will contrast an early Indian attempt at creating a discursive basis for violent anti-colonial resistance with the counter-terrorist discourses it provoked. In concrete terms, it will reconstruct the theory of 'scientific terrorism' created by Shyamji Krishnavarma (1857–1930), a forgotten theoretician of anti-colonial violence living in exile in London and Paris, and will analyse the state reactions as well as the media coverage that his writings and the actions of members of his group elicited. The narrative is centred on the single most spectacular incident of political violence connected with Indian nationalists in exile in Europe. The widely broadcast assassination of Sir William Hutt Curzon Wyllie, a high-ranking colonial official in central

London, in the summer of 1909 by a student connected to Krishnavarma's group serves as a useful prism through which to analyse the phenomena under study. The 'London outrage', as it was dubbed by contemporary journalists, unmistakably demonstrated that one of the ugly side-effects of empire-building—the violent resistance of the colonized—was no longer restricted to the colonial periphery, but could pose a serious threat right at the heart of the empire too. The Wyllie murder has recently received some scholarly attention, most notably in the work of Alex Tickell.[7] I intend to build on his insights, while simultaneously pointing to some shortcomings in his argument. Most importantly, I wish to substantiate and extend Tickell's findings through both an in-depth analysis and contextualization of Krishnavarma's 'terrorist manifestos', and a thorough study of the manifold repercussions of and reactions to the 'London outrage' not only in the British metropolis but also around the globe.

I shall argue that the panic which the attack created among Western observers was not only fuelled by an attempt to place it within the tradition of other irrational atrocities of a typically 'oriental' kind (as has been shown by Tickell) but also through a second discursive scheme. The second strategy focused less on the 'terrorist' himself and more on the alleged 'ringleaders' and 'wire-pullers' like Krishnavarma,[8] who were seen as equally guilty, and which sought to portray them as dangerous, but also completely isolated from the wider Indian population. South Asian 'agitators' in general were often represented as having lost touch with the bulk of the colonized population through their (half-digested) Western education, which had supposedly alienated them from their cultural roots. As Robert Peatling has recently argued, this 'isolationism' has been a standing trope in state discourses on terrorism from the nineteenth century right up to the present day and can be read as part of a broader counter-terrorist discursive repertoire that allows for the silencing of the political agenda of those who take to violence against a state considered as 'oppressive'.[9]

Accordingly, Shyamji Krishnavarma was presented almost unanimously in official, semi-official and media accounts as the loathsome head of an international terror network who had 'filled many a young Hindu student with the poison of hate and murder'.[10] Particularly in the contemporary Western press, he was constructed as an iconic and sinister figure, almost reminiscent of Osama bin Laden a century later. As I shall demonstrate, the media representation of Krishnavarma as either a violent 'oriental' or a 'mad' and uprooted product of Western education was diametrically opposed to the latter's sober, legalistic and quasi-academic writings

on the legitimacy of anti-colonial violence. Simultaneously, the terrorist act was widely commented upon in the expanding public sphere back in India. In the subcontinental debate too, the London murder was largely received as an appalling act of barbarism in the loyalist or politically moderate press.

THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL 'TERRORISM' IN COLONIAL INDIA AND THE MAKING OF A 'LIBERAL REVOLUTIONARY'

Although the history of political terrorism in colonial India can certainly still be considered under-researched when compared to other facets of the Indian freedom struggle, particularly during the past two decades quite a few important studies have been published that shed fresh light on the 'uncanny other' of Gandhian non-violent mass nationalism.[11] It will suffice, therefore, to give a very brief sketch of the most important developments that help us to place the specific contribution of Shyamji Krishnavarma in a wider context.

A murder committed by the Chapekar brothers in the Maharashtrian town of Pune in the wake of the anti-plague campaign in 1897 has been retrospectively constructed as a 'foundational act' that established revolutionary terrorism as a distinct current within the broad spectrum of Indian nationalism.[12] The Maharashtrian 'school of violence' pioneered by the Chapekars would soon be provided with a theoretical manifesto in the form of B.G. Tilak's activist reinterpretation of the *Bhagavadgītā*, one of the key texts of brahmanical Hinduism. The 'extremist' leader wrote a book called *Gita Rahasya* in 1908 and used this commentary of the classical Hindu scripture as a vehicle for praising violence as a form of this-worldly action that was sanctioned by the necessities of *realpolitik*.[13] The first formation of an actual terrorist organization took place about five years after the Chapekar murder, hundreds of miles away in Bengal, where, in 1902, the Calcutta *Anushilan Samiti* was founded by Aurobindo Ghose (1872–1950) and his brother Barin.[14] The ideological and physical training the *Samiti* members received in their headquarters on the outskirts of Calcutta was aimed at creating a dynamic avant garde of devoted youngsters who were ever ready to kill and to die for the 'gospel of faith and hope' or 'nationalist creed' that was imagined by their foremost ideologue Aurobindo.[15] The quasi-religious and Hindu-centric character of the *Anushilan Samiti* is well documented in the files of the colonial intelligence services. Thus, for instance, the membership of Muslims was prohibited and its rite of initiation

included a vow before the Hindu goddess Kali.[16] The training pattern, as well as the quasi-religious fervour practised by the Calcutta group, was soon copied by a number of similar *samiti*s (associations) that were founded in Bengal and Maharashtra between 1904 and 1908.[17]

The first major act of violence, which brought terrorism and specifically explosives and their potential use as political weapons to the forefront of discussions among Indian nationalists, was a bomb blast in Muzaffarpore, Bihar. In the widely reported incident, two European women, and not the targeted British District Judge, were killed.[18] The 'Muzaffarpore outrage' in April 1908 and other spectacular terrorist acts that followed in its wake almost instantaneously provoked an outright panic among colonial officials. The anxieties generated by the event grew further after the police raided the houses of suspects, when it transpired that the perpetrators were by no means amateurish Indian dabblers. The documents secured proved that their secret activities were based on knowledge gained from European anarchist organizations. The dangerous skills that had reached India included the detailed technical know-how needed for manufacturing explosive devices as well as the sophisticated organizational techniques used by 'Russian Nihilists'.[19] The ensuing perception of a ubiquitous menace emanating from this global proliferation of 'Russian methods'[20] would soon lead to the design and implementation of a number of counter-terrorism measures by the Government of India.

Significantly, the first legal intervention of the Anglo-Indian colonial state calculated to draw the 'fangs of anarchism'[21] consisted of the curtailment of the freedom of the press. It was targeted at the so-called 'ringleaders' who were supposedly instigating sedition in their newspapers and pamphlets. Already during the summer of 1907, Viceroy Minto announced that while he had 'no desire whatever to restrict [the] legitimate liberty of the Press', he was no longer willing and able to 'tolerate the publication of writings which tend to arouse the disorderly elements of society and to incite them to concerted action against govt [sic!]'[22] Perfectly in line with Peatling's argument mentioned above, the underlying logic was that in general 'the Indian people' was loyal but misled by a handful of incorrigibly vicious troublemakers. The Newspaper Act (VII 1908), which made the incitement to murder a criminal offence, was promulgated shortly after the Muzaffarpore incident in June 1908 and supplemented already existing sedition laws.[23] Simultaneously, the Explosive Substances Act (VI, 1908) was 'enacted for the express purpose of dealing with anarchist crimes'.[24] As its name suggests, it

declared 'the manufacture or possession of explosive substances for any other than a lawful object a substantive offence'.[25]

The Bengali radical Bipin Chandra Pal (1858–1932), one of the leaders of the 'extremist' wing of the Indian National Congress, was one of the loudest Indian voices to point out that, rather than curbing political violence, the politics of unmitigated state repression that become manifest in these legal innovations was largely responsible for its increasing popularity.[26] This view was shared by Shyamji Krishnavarma, the most visible 'apostle of sedition' and terrorism outside India in the decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War.[27]

Shyamji Krishnavarma had received his education in the best Western and Hindu institutions of Bombay[28] before accepting the offer to go to Oxford (1879–85), where he assisted Sanskrit Professor Monier-Williams with editing and translating ancient Hindu texts, while simultaneously pursuing his studies of law and oriental languages. After his return to India in January 1885, Krishnavarma started a typical *Babu*[29] career. He practised as a barrister and served as Divan (prime minister) in several princely states. It was in 1897 that he eventually broke with his life as 'colonial collaborator'. Part of his motivation for renouncing his loyalty to the British so abruptly was undoubtedly personal and has been discussed extensively elsewhere.[30] However, the overall political climate served at least to catalyse his personal frustration with colonial rule and its representatives. He was indeed alarmed by the repressive government policy against 'native' critics of the colonial regime that was taking place in the wake of the Chapekar killings. In the autumn of 1897, he left India and like dozens or even hundreds of other radical expatriates from across the British Empire, he chose London as his place of residence in order to take advantage of the comparatively liberal attitude prevailing in the 'imperial metropolis', which even extended to outspoken critics of the imperial order of things.[31]

It was after many years of preparations and networking activities that Krishnavarma's anti-imperial campaign eventually kicked off in January 1905. He launched a monthly called the *Indian Sociologist*,[32] which would come to be the most important mouthpiece of the diasporic Indian revolutionaries for almost a decade. The founding of an Indian Home Rule Society was the second element of his nationalist campaign. While the work of the Indian Home Rule Society proved to be rather inefficient, the third step that Krishnavarma took, by contrast, was definitely one with very far-reaching consequences: he gave radical Indian nationalism outside

India a home by creating a 'counter-institutional site'[33] at the heart of the imperial metropolis. He bought a huge Victorian mansion in Highgate and dubbed it 'India House' (Fig. 5.1).[34]

With this move Krishnavarma specifically targeted the ever-growing South Asian student community in the UK and back home in India. His concentration on graduates of Western educational institutions reflected his conviction that Indian independence could only be achieved under the leadership of a small intelligentsia that was—much like himself—educated in elite institutions abroad. The provision of cheap accommodation for more than 20 students was combined with the package of 'traveling fellowships' for gifted Indian graduates he had introduced a few months earlier.[35] In true Swadeshi spirit, the candidates had to declare that they were never going to work for or collaborate with the colonial bureaucracy in India, thus 'alluring them away from the charm of Government Jobs towards the service of the motherland'.[36] Not surprisingly, India House, which hosted patriotic festivals and anti-imperialist lectures by both Indian and European revolutionaries on a regular basis,[37] was soon regarded by the British authorities as a 'sink of sedition and a focus of infection'. Because of the supposedly

Fig. 5.1 Shyamji krishnavarma during his London years (c. 1905) (Source: author's private collection)

contagious character of 'seditionism',[38] its residents were put under close surveillance by Scotland Yard.[39] The resulting pressure eventually caused Krishnavarma to shift his headquarters to Paris in June 1907.[40] It was in the subsequent seven years he spent in the French capital that he reached the peak of his global influence. It was also in Paris that he gave up his preference for non-violent agitation and developed his theory of anti-colonial violence, to which we now turn.

THE THEORY OF VIOLENCE: KRISHNAVARMA'S 'SCIENTIFIC TERRORISM'

There can hardly be any doubt that Krishnavarma's decision to give up his hitherto rather cautious strategy of resistance was closely linked to the repressive state measures taken in the meantime by the Government of India that have been described above. The legal innovations that were developed by the British to keep the Indian 'anarchist' wolves at bay eventually persuaded the liberal revolutionary that the propaganda of the word alone would hardly suffice to overturn foreign rule. Pamphlets and journal articles, he felt, were inadequate weapons in the fight against a colonial state whose leadership was apparently ready to throw overboard some of the most basic principles of 'good government'.

Krishnavarma's change of mind on the crucial question of appropriate methods for the struggle against British imperialism can be partly reconstructed through the analysis of a number of editorials he penned for the *Indian Sociologist*, most of which were published between the summer of 1908,[41] when the scope of the counter-terrorist measures adopted by the Government of India became visible, and the autumn of 1909, when such measures were increasingly resorted to throughout the British Empire, including the UK itself. It was in these relatively short pieces that Krishnavarma developed the outlines of a highly ambitious project aiming at a rational and universally valid ideological basis for terrorist attacks directed against individuals and institutions (functionally or symbolically) related to oppressive governments.

The first instance of Krishnavarma's radicalization occurred in early 1908. From February through June of that year, he published a long and very sympathetic serialized report entitled 'The Terrorists' on the activities of Russian and Polish anarchists. The account, in which the US journalist Leroy Scott openly expressed as much admiration for the courage and selflessness of Eastern European anarchists as for their 'acute attention to detail, cool nerve' and 'reckless daring',[42] had originally appeared in the American journal

Everybody's Magazine. Its reprint in the *Indian Sociologist* was introduced by Krishnavarma with the observation that the autocratic regime of the Czar in Russia and British rule in India had much in common.[43] The publication of this series is not only a powerful illustration of the global circulation of political propaganda and the mutual reflexivity of seemingly unrelated political movements; it also leaves no doubt that Krishnavarma had by that stage become fascinated with 'Russian methods'. This is also confirmed by his simultaneously publicized enthusiasm for the invention of 'noiseless guns', which he praised as potentially useful universal tools to combat despotism.[44]

In the August issue of Krishnavarma's journal, the theoretical engagement with terrorist strategies began in earnest in a short editorial with the programmatic title 'The Ethics of Dynamite'. He had borrowed the title from an earlier article by the British libertarian philosopher Auberon Herbert (1838–1906), whose ideas on terrorist violence versus state violence were summarized in a short text in the *Indian Sociologist*.[45] Like Krishnavarma himself,[46] Auberon Herbert was a staunch Spencerian who pushed the ideology of laissez-faire individualism articulated by the Victorian arch-liberal Herbert Spencer to the extreme. The anti-statist theories disseminated in Spencer's books and pamphlets are therefore often regarded as a link between liberal and anarchist thought. Occasionally his ideas were even ridiculed by contemporary critics as 'rich man's anarchism'.[47] Herbert had written his original article on the phenomenon of terrorism in the *Contemporary Review* in reaction to the wave of anarchist bombing that swept across France in the 1890s. The main thrust of his piece was a critique of statist repression and official 'counter-terrorism' as the wrong ways to respond to real or perceived 'anarchist' threats. Krishnavarma quoted a long passage containing the following visionary sentences:

> If we cannot learn, if the only effect upon us of the presence of the dynamiter in our midst is to make us multiply punishments, invent restrictions, increase the number of our official spies, forbid public meetings, interfere with the press, put up gratings—as in one country they propose to do—in our House of Commons, scrutinize visitors under official microscopes, request them, as at Vienna, and I think now at Paris also, to be good enough to leave their greatcoats in the vestibules … I venture to prophesy that there lies before us a bitter and an evil time.[48]

Although Krishnavarma borrowed the catchy title from Auberon Herbert's piece, he developed the argument of the British liberal thinker

in a slightly different direction. He transformed 'the ethics of dynamite' from a libertarian critique of statist counter-terrorism into a full-fledged legitimation of what might be called 'reactive terrorism':

> As for the ethics of dynamite, it may be laid down in a general way that, where people have political power, there is no need for the use of explosives. It only promotes reaction. But where the people are utterly defenceless, both politically and militarily, then one may look on the bomb or any other weapon as legitimate. Its employment then only becomes a question of expediency.[49]

The centerpiece of Krishnavarma's writing on political violence appeared as an editorial in the subsequent issue of the *Indian Sociologist* under the extended title 'The Ethics of Dynamite and British Despotism in India'.[50] According to its author, the essay was contributing to the necessary discussion of 'the bearings of the so-called anarchists' on British colonial rule. Once again, Krishnavarma was inspired by Auberon Herbert, who had based the moral authority of resistance against an aggressor on the self-evident right to react to 'the wrong which has been already committed in the first instance' by some other person or state.[51] For this libertarian advocate of 'voluntaryism', the right of property, which included the right of 'self-ownership', was pivotal. Herbert considered it a 'supreme moral right, of higher rank than all other human interests or institutions'. The idea of self-ownership was therefore also at the core of Herbert's justification of legitimate self-defence through the application of 'direct force'.[52] Krishnavarma recycled exactly this line of argument in his carefully crafted second essay on 'the ethics of dynamite'. He starts out by raising the fundamental issue as to how the presence of the British colonial power in India ought to be assessed. In order to find the right answer, he next offers a sweep over 150 years of British rule in the subcontinent, in which he marshals an impressive array of evidence in support of the position that: 'They are there merely for serving their own selfish ends by the means of an organized robbery on a vast scale.'[53] In what can be considered the key paragraph of his article, Krishnavarma combines the Herbertian ideal of 'self-ownership' with his own knowledge of the Anglo-Indian legal system into a powerful manifesto for armed resistance against colonial oppression:

> According to the Indian Penal Code, a person is at liberty to retain or recover his property by all possible means without fear of punishment … Section 103 of the said code recognises the right of private defense of property to the extent of causing the death of the wrongdoer … it being quite immaterial what means are used for causing the death.[54]

In the ensuing paragraph, Krishnavarma deals with the reproach that Indians propagating armed resistance were nothing but 'anarchists'. In an ostentatiously sober and erudite manner, he first defines the term 'anarchy' as 'a social theory which would do away with all authority'. Next, he observes that the 'physical force party', far from promoting the absence of state authority, wanted to replace the alien despotism with a strong national government. The term anarchy therefore could not 'possibly have any application in their case', even though 'a temporary disorder or confusion' might arise from their revolutionary activities.[55] In a similar vein, he also underscores that violence was certainly not his first choice. The turn to terror had become inevitable and was a last resort only after the recent measures of the British Government of India restricted free agitation. It was the curtailing of the liberty of the press, freedom of speech and the right of public meeting by the colonial authorities, he maintained, which had imposed on 'Indian patriots a corresponding duty to make futile the efforts of the foreign despotism'.[56] This statement again bears clear traces of Herbert's theory, according to which the rights of an aggressor were lost to the same extent that he was infringing on the right of self-ownership. In the worst-case scenario, such a transgression could even amount to the forfeiting of his right to live.[57] Krishnavarma would later occasionally refer to such illegitimate state action as 'state terrorism',[58] although this concept is not further developed theoretically.

It is important to underscore that the doctrine Krishnavarma spelled out in his treatises on the 'ethics of dynamite' radically differed from most other strands of Indian revolutionary terrorism. It is unique in the sense that his theorizing of political violence works without the invocation of Hindu gods or goddesses and mythical or historical heroes as was the case in the fiery revolutionary rhetoric of V.D. Savarkar, whose speeches in favour of armed resistance were, at least according to a British judge, 'Oriental in their imagery'.[59] Nor were they based on the authority of religious scriptures such as the *Bhagavadgītā*, as was the case with Tilak's justification of terrorist assassinations.[60] Krishnavarma's theory of direct action was instead built on explicitly 'rational' grounds and drew heavily on the universal idiom of liberalism. Above all, it relied on a rigorous and meticulous reading of the Indian Penal Code and manifestos written by English social theorists propagating individualism and the sanctity of personal property. This unusual—and deliberately 'derivative'—frame of reference makes Krishnavarma's contribution to the theoretical underpinnings of the anti-imperialist struggle highly distinctive and decidedly discomforting for imperial and colonial authorities.

It also needs to be reiterated that for him, the objective of violence was clearly not primarily to instil terror in the civil population, nor was it perceived as an end in itself. Rather, it was seen as a means to counter the aggression of imperialists, a last option that could be resorted to if other methods of resistance had failed or were not available at all. It is therefore difficult to follow Alex Tickell's Fanonian reading of anti-colonial violence as propagated by Krishnavarma as an indispensable strategy of 'cleansing' and identity-building.[61] By the same token, I would also be critical of Tickell's claim that Krishnavarma's scheme was heavily indebted to Tilak' 'sacrificial nationalism', as there is hardly a place for a quasi-religious *balidān* (life sacrifice) in Krishnavarma's matter-of-fact 'ethics of dynamite'.[62] Tickell's misinterpretation here is largely due to the fact that he unduly lumps Krishnavarma's unique scheme together with the thoughts of his lieutenant Savarkar on violent resistance, which was in fact based mainly on different premises.[63]

The Practice of Violence: The 'London Outrage' and the Prose of Counter-terrorism[64]

The new radical tone in Krishnavarma's propaganda was initially only noticed in the camp of Indian fellow nationalists and among the British intelligence authorities concerned with the surveillance of South Asian 'seditionists'. In February 1909 a wider audience was made aware of his existence when he wrote a letter to the editor of *The Times* directly warning everybody in Britain 'against the risks they run by losing their kith and kin by allowing them to go to India', as every Englishman was regarded as an exploiter and enemy by the adherents of the extremist party.[65] Less than five months later, he would become a public figure and an international icon of anti-colonial 'terrorism'. His sudden rise to prominence was chiefly connected with the spectacular assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie.[66]

William Hutt Curzon Wyllie (1848–1909) was one of the highest executives connected to the India Office. After a long and distinguished career in India, he had returned to London in 1901, where he served as political *aide-de-camp* to Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India. In the months preceding his assassination in July 1909, he had been pre-occupied with the surveillance of Indian students in Britain, whose increasing numbers and growing politicization were considered a serious problem, and

not only by Morley.[67] There was a widespread feeling articulated in the British press and in the House of Commons that the expatriate students, most of whom were living largely isolated from English social life, had become easy prey for demagogues like Krishnavarma and his associates, who purportedly used cheap rents and 'Indian Cookery'[68] to attract them to centres like the India House 'for the purpose of perversion'.[69] Madan Lal Dhingra (1883–1909), on the other hand, was a young student of engineering at University College London. He stemmed from a wealthy, Western educated and entirely loyal family in Amritsar. On his voyage to Britain, however, he became a victim of racist harassment and consequently developed an intense hatred of the colonizers.[70] Dhingra, whose anti-British sentiments were further fuelled by derogatory press articles about Indian students in England,[71] stayed for some time in the Highgate hostel and attended its weekly meetings later on. Under the influence of both Krishnavarma's quasi-scientific justification of political assassination and Vinayak Savarkar's revolutionary charisma, the young Punjabi decided to devote his life to direct action and started seeking a worthy target for an 'outrage'. H.K. Koregaonkar, a former India House resident who later turned approver, explains the rationale that eventually led to the choice of his victim as follows:

> Curzon Wyllie had recently become very obnoxious because he had employed a number of detectives to watch the India House party. It was he who had the idea of starting a house for London Indians to make them loyal. It was he who had gone to Paris to collect information against Savarkar, Harnam Singh and others. He himself was a clever detective; hence he must die. The aim and object of the whole deed was to create the greatest amount of sensation and to establish horrorism [sic!].[72]

The opportunity to establish 'horrorism' finally opened up when the loyalist National Indian Association organized a function for Indian students with a view to better integrate them into British society. The reception was held at the Imperial Institute in South Kensington, one of the most prestigious places that the British capital had to offer. It was attended by a number of high-profile politicians and officials attached to the India office, one of whom was the intended target. Dhingra had to wait for hours for the right moment. Eventually, he managed to get involved in a conversation with Curzon Wyllie, during the course of which he produced the revolver hidden in his jacket. He killed his counterpart with several

shots fired at point-blank range. Dr Cawas Lalcaca, a Parsi physician who tried to come to the aid of the dying Englishman, was likewise shot by Dhingra. The assassin was eventually overwhelmed by several bystanders, at which point he tried unsuccessfully to kill himself.[73] He was arrested on the spot, brought before the court and convicted to death in what must have been one of the shortest murder trials in twentieth-century Britain.[74] He was executed in Pentonville Prison only six weeks after the 'outrage' at the Imperial Institute and immediately acquired the status of a martyr in all factions of the otherwise rather fragmented and quarrelling Indian revolutionary party in Europe.[75]

Dhingra's deed had instantaneous repercussions throughout Britain and India, and elicited manifold reactions in the press as well as among politicians and administrators. One of the most important institutional consequences was the professionalization of British intelligence work following this demonstration of imperial vulnerability. These measures, consisting, amongst other things, in the creation of the Indian Political Intelligence Office, a special counter-terrorist task force which included India experienced police officers, whose linguistic and regional expertise was badly needed to monitor diasporic Indian radicals,[76] has already been described in some detail by Richard Popplewell and Daniel Brückenhaus, so they need not be repeated in detail here.[77] Of greater relevance for our present discussion are the public reactions to the Kensington killing all over the globe and the discursive strategies of counter-terrorism they incited.

There can hardly be any doubt that the imperial establishment in India was put in a state of profound shock when the news of the murders at the Imperial Institute reached Calcutta. Yet, at the same time, some of its highest representatives were eager to exploit the widespread terrorist scare to finally implement comprehensive measures of counter-insurgency without the usual protest of liberal and leftist critics of imperialism at home. Immediately after the attack, Viceroy Lord Minto sent a message to his partner in Whitehall, the Secretary of State for India, John Morley, which deserves to be quoted at some length:

> The murder of poor Sir Curzon Wyllie is horrible … It seems a somewhat terrible thing to say, but together with the grief here there is the universal expression of a belief that good will come from what has happened—that people at home will at last realize the dangers of allowing the hatching of sedition in their midst,—not only for themselves but for us in India. The murders [in India] have produced nothing but a momentary effect at

home—the India House has continued to flourish, the publication of the 'Indian Sociologist' … [has] been allowed to go on as usual, and nothing has been done to destroy the sources of so much iniquity. I am afraid the exaggerated worship of so-called freedom has led the British public to ignore hard facts—and horrible as the lesson has been I hope it will not be useless.[78]

One can almost sense a clandestine feeling of relief that the bloodshed in the heart of London would now eventually turn the public opinion at home away from the 'exaggerated worship of freedom' and bring it closer to the position of the conservative imperialists advocating legal exceptionalism as the only effective method to curb sedition. That such measures were not only considered in confidential correspondence between Calcutta and Whitehall but were also announced in public speeches transpires from a speech given ten days later by Sir Edward Norman Baker, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Addressing the Legislative Council of his Province, Baker bluntly warned the educated Indian public that the colonial state would react with rigorous retaliation without the least respect for the rule of law and without the slightest concern about potential collateral damages if they failed to support its counter-terrorist agenda:

But if they fail to use the peaceful weapon that lies ready to their hands, if they abdicate their authority in favour of a handful young men of immature age, of imperfect or non-existent education and of undisciplined emotions, they may rest assured that the solution will come none the less but that it will be neither painless nor peaceful, and that in the application of the remedy, there will be little room for nice discrimination between the innocent and the guilty.[79]

The general indignation caused by the 'London outrage' thus appeared to open up wide opportunities as far as the acceptance of far-reaching counter-terrorist measures by British citizens (and imperial subjects) was concerned. However, if the strategy deployed by the advocates of retaliatory action by the state was to be successful, it was crucial that the 'irrationality' and 'fanaticism' of the terrorists and the absurdity of their political goals could be demonstrated. In that sense, the depiction of radicals like Dhingra as 'immature' young men 'of undisciplined emotions' is fairly typical of this colonial counter-terrorist discourse. It has already been indicated that there was a strong current in both the official and public perception that young and supposedly 'naïve' Indian

students like Dhingra had to be primarily understood as victims rather than as fully responsible offenders. The young Punjabi was accordingly portrayed as being 'perverted' and instrumentalized by unscrupulous agitators and 'seditionists' who had no support from the Indian people at large. Starting from this premise, it was also plausible to state that their 'mischievous movement might almost be classed with comic opera if it were not on occasion homicidal'.[80] If terrorism can indeed be primarily understood as a strategy of communication,[81] the targeted group can check its efficiency through disrupting the dialogue, by incapacitating the terrorists, by declaring them unworthy of response. Yet this is achieved at the expense of losing another helpful resource, namely a stimulus for public wrath and the quest for revenge. If murderers like Dhingra are only mentally fragile and misguided lads, it is hard to feel anything but pity for them. It is precisely for this reason that the figure of the backer, the ruthless and cowardly manipulator, acquires a peculiar significance. Much more than the terrorist himself, he becomes the butt of public outrage and hatred, and his mere existence justifies exceptional counter-measures. In more ways than one, the strategy used here is reminiscent of a particular strand of anti-Semitism in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. As Paul Knepper has argued, the fact that they were educated and fairly 'assimilated' made Jewish 'anarchists' seem particularly dangerous. He arrives at the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that, in the eyes of some contemporaries, 'anarchist Jews did not throw bombs or stab political leaders; they did something worse … they instigated such attacks to implicate others'.[82]

Along similar lines, English and international newspapers presented Krishnavarma as the 'wire-puller' who was 'truly responsible for the deed',[83] thereby almost exculpating the actual perpetrator. The following excerpt from an article in the London *Penny Illustrated Paper* is fairly typical of this line of reasoning. According to its author, Indian students arriving in the UK:

> Naturally … are a prey to the subtle minds of men like Krishnavarma, who from, his safe retreat in Paris, preaches the doctrine of 'killing no murder'. He has caught the young Oriental at an impressionable age and has persuaded him that the short-cut to Paradise is through a pool of Anglo-Indian blood. The authorities at Scotland Yard have no weapons to combat a thousand year old philosophy newly organised by Krishnavarma.[84]

The orientalist overtones discernible in this short passage are striking. The author utterly misrepresents Krishnavarma's quasi-scientific justification of targeted attacks by depicting it as what might be termed a sort of 'Hindu jihad', building on some ominous 'thousand year old philosophy' which, of course, is never mentioned in Krishnavarma's writings. This rhetoric corresponds to the orientalist motives (like the turban) that were prominent in visual representations of the assassination, such as the widely circulated painting by Cyrus Cuneo reproduced in the *Illustrated London News* (see Fig. 5.2). Such an interpretation is reinforced by other statements where the unsuitability of Western education for Orientals in general is pointed out. In addition, the racial and cultural othering of the 'seditionists' (read 'savages') is also noticeable in the article's subtitle, which stresses 'The practical impossibility of civilizing a savage'.[85] That these strategies were at least partly successful and the newly created image of the 'dangerous educated Indian' spread in English society and particularly influenced the attitude of the lower social classes towards elite migrants from South Asia can be deduced from the fact that several Indian students complained to the correspondent of *The Times of India* that 'since the murders they have been subjected to some petty annoyance from the loiterer and the street Arab'.[86]

The grafting of a novel rhetoric of counter-terrorism onto pre-existing clichés about the putatively irrational and bloodthirsty 'Hindu' occurs in many other writings on the 'London outrage'. Interestingly enough, it was not restricted to the UK or the Empire, but spread rapidly to continental Europe and all over the Anglophone world. In his first political essay published in the Viennese newspaper *Neue Freie Presse*, young Stefan Zweig (who was on the verge of emerging as one of the foremost novelists of the German-speaking world) described the state of shock and fear that had followed Dhingra's deed. An entire country would now 'listen apprehensively to the East', expecting a great insurrection in India.[87] Almost predictably, he constructed a pre-history of the terrorist 'conspiracy', invoking the so-called 'Mutiny' of 1857–59 to describe both the atrocity of the crime as well as the scale of the resulting panic prevailing in Britain:

> The Indian danger is awake. And with every symptom, every bomb, every conspiracy and now, most of all, with this assassination, England shudders in memory of the horrible days of the 'Mutiny'.[88]

Fig. 5.2   Lady Curzon Wyllie trying to help her dying husband while witnesses of the murder are overpowering Madan Lal Dhingra. Contemporary reconstruction of the 'London outrage' in a painting by Cyrus C. Cuneo
(*Source*: Illustrated London News, 16 July 1909, p. 1; provided by the Mary Evans Picture Library)

Meanwhile, in the US, the *Los Angeles Times* accused the 'Hindoo socialist editor' Krishnavarma of making an 'appeal to blood lust' when the latter had warned in a perfectly restrained tone that imprudent and repressive counter-insurgency measures by the colonial government might provoke disturbances in India.[89] By coining the demonstrably inaccurate compound 'Hindoo-socialist', the old cliché of the cruel 'Indian savage' was effectively coupled with that of a more contemporary bogeyman in order to enhance the shock effect. Although Krishnavarma's eclectic worldview—like that of many other Indian 'revolutionaries'[90]—hardly fits in today's manichaeic classificatory categories, he always made it a point to distance himself from socialism and clearly perceived himself as a liberal.[91] The *Washington Post* took the orientalist representation of the incident even one step further. While concerned that the 'same peril might exist in the Philippines',[92] it circulated the rumour that Dhingra had been under the influence of drugs administered to him by the India House 'seditionists' when he killed his two victims:

> Then having poisoned his mind the conspirators poisoned his body. When Dhinagri [sic!] committed these murders he was drunk with bhang, an Indian intoxicant. The effect of that drug is to make a man perfectly callous of what he does and outwardly calm and self-possessed … When he was drunk, the plotters crammed an armoury of weapons in his pockets and sent him on his mission.[93]

Two weeks later, the *New York Times* illuminated its readers that 'bahang' (sic!) was what 'the Hindu usually took to give him 'Dutch courage' when about to commit a deed of violence and blood', before further explaining that 'under its influence these harmless kittens might fatally scratch'.[94] This sensationalist story was reproduced by dozens of other newspapers in the US, Britain and India.[95] It clearly evokes associations with a long tradition of orientalist imagery. The purposeful 'drugging' of perpetrators before they commit their crimes is a running trope in Western writings on the Orient. As James Mills has shown, it was frequently used by the British in India during the nineteenth century in connection with 'local' offences such as 'Suttee' (widow burning), Thuggee, infanticide, the murder of Christians and even the Great Rebellion of 1857.[96] In his seminal study on the creation of 'moral panics',[97] British sociologist Stanley Cohen pointed out some time ago that new groups were often stigmatized as deviant and dangerous through the construction of continuities with pre-existing 'folk

devils'. Such an interpretation would corroborate the arguments recently raised by Alex Tickell, who, in his attempt at 'excavating histories of terror', has discovered strong discursive continuities between the early colonial rhetoric articulated in the anti-'Thuggee' campaign of the 1830s and current 'Terrorism Studies'.[98]

Whereas the 'Thuggee' imagery thus marvellously lent itself to create genealogies of an atavistic 'Hindu fanaticism', orientalist motives of a completely different kind were occasionally invoked in the Western press reactions to the London outrage. In an article on 'The Bomb's Growing Part in India's Unrest',[99] the *New York Times* observed that 'a Hindu figuring in the role of a terrorist' seemed to be 'a grotesque and incongruous statement'. The emergence of Indian terrorism, the author concluded, was thus in open contradiction of the nature of the 'proverbially patient Hindu' and could only be read as the result of a 'phenomenal change' in the generation of the young and Western-educated, due to which 'the erstwhile timid and vegetarian Hindu now thirsts for the blood of the colonial official'.[100] By linking Krishnavarma, who was at pains to make 'rational' political claims on the basis of Western liberal thought and existing legal structures, either to the (partly invented) tradition of atrocious acts committed by 'fanaticised Hindus' or by portraying him as a culturally uprooted product of Western education who had lost the essential traits of his 'race', it was much easier to wilfully disregard his political agenda.

The fact that Austrian and especially American newspapers took such a great interest in the Curzon Wyllie affair is certainly noteworthy inasmuch as it reminds us that, even in the early twentieth century, terrorist acts took place 'in an age of interconnectedness and globalization'.[101] Clearly, anti-colonial terrorism was seen as a global threat. Thus, American journalists were quick to draw parallels to the Philippines or to complain about 'British complacency'[102] in dealing with the revolutionary conspiracy. The perceived laxness of British reactions was even criticized with the hint that its long-term results were 'awaited with no little anxiety by an incredulous world'.[103] That said, it should be emphasized that the international media echo pales into insignificance when compared with the reactions in British India. As one would have expected, the news of the 'London outrage' provoked a flood of comments in the English and vernacular press in the subcontinent. In the hundreds of articles on the assassination that were published in the Indian press, one finds very few voices in defence of Krishnavarma and his circle. A Bombay paper half-apologetically remarked

that his earlier activities in the region as a social and religious reformer were 'praiseworthy' and that his corruption had only begun when he went to England. This, the author readily explained, was owing to the fact that the atmosphere of Europe was 'more congenial to extreme views'.[104] This projection of political violence as typically Western, as a product of the loss of 'Indian values' in the diaspora, is a motif that is repeatedly used. One Marathi gazette was most outspoken in this regard, presenting anarchism as a sort of infectious disease inherent to European and North American societies. This disease, the author assumed, could only be transmitted through the contact with 'contagious' Western thought. He therefore emphatically warned his Hindu brethren: 'If you forsake your religion and philosophy and entrust yourself to the care of Western philosophy, you will turn out to be murderers. The idea of murder belongs to the brutal Westerners.'[105] Krishnavarma's and Dhingra's 'seditionism' is thus seen as an inevitable consequence of their diaspora experience in Europe. This 'occidentalist' reading of terrorism provides an interesting variation of the orientalist trope used in Western media, positing the incompatibility of 'oriental minds' with Western education.[106] The majority of Indian newspapers, however, strongly condemned the 'detestable crime'[107] without any qualification. On the one hand, this reflected a widespread concern with 'anarchical tendencies' in English-educated Indian youth in the subcontinent itself,[108] but on the other hand, it shows remarkable borrowings from the imperial counter-terrorist discourse prevalent among colonial officials and in the Western media. Some of the writers used fairly strong language, labelling Krishnavarma an 'arch mischief-maker' who 'must be annihilated once and for all'[109] or a 'lunatic of the dangerous type',[110] while suggesting that 'the fittest place for him' would be 'a padded room in a lunatic asylum, if not a solitary cell in Dartmoor'.[111]

Apart from the comments in the press, Indian reactions can also be reconstructed through the statements of figures from various camps of the political spectrum. Predictably, the overwhelmingly loyalist Indian princes and aristocrats immediately articulated their abhorrence of both Dhingra's violent act and Krishnavarma's seditious writings, which they regarded as being responsible for it. A letter of condolence by the Maharaja of Benares addressed to the local official of the Indian Civil Service is fairly typical in this respect. H.H. Sir Prabhu Narain fully approved the official remote control interpretation of the terrorist act, expressing his astonishment of the fact that:

The man calling himself Krishna Varma is quietly allowed to preach the doctrine of anarchism in London, and what is most strange [sic!] of all this worst of all criminals, that the villain is allowed to move in society and pose as a patriot. A young dupe will once more be made the scapegoat of the real murderers who will not be slow to prepare another dupe and claim another valuable life as soon.[112]

What is truly remarkable is Prabhu Narain's account of the suspected root cause of such terrorist 'outrages'. Like many reactions on the British sides, his explanation shows a conflation of the threats that are posed by radical Indian nationalism and 'anarchism' of a different kind:

The root of all evil is the perverted idea of humanity and political freedom which is gaining favour in England, and the consequent laxity of the executive and the helplessness of the law. Colonel Sleeman and those who were associated with him would not have succeeded in eradicating Thuggism from India if such notions and niceties of law were prevalent in his time.[113]

The anxieties caused by the incident in South Kensington thus seem to have served to unite conservative elites across the colonial divide. Quite obviously, Prabhu Narain's fear of the 'perverted idea of humanity and political freedom' is the same one that also haunted Lord Minto, while the ruler of Benares apparently also shared a disregard for 'the niceties of law' with Lieutenant-Governor Baker. It is also striking that the discursive overlaps even extend to the 'Thuggee' motive. The call for legal and military exceptionalism is justified by the Maharaja by invoking William H. Sleeman (1788–1856), one of the most ambivalent heroes of early British colonialism in India. During the 1830s and 1840s, Sleeman famously managed to promote his own career by launching an efficient military, criminological and legal campaign against what he portrayed as a conspiracy by a fanatic and violent Hindu fraternity. An important element in his fight against the Thugs consisted in the temporary suspension of the norms of 'rule of law' and 'due procedure'.[114]

While it might not be too surprising that loyalist subcontinental aristocrats shared much in common with British officials, it is intriguing that many leaders of the Indian National Congress joined the choir of those who disgustedly distanced themselves from Krishnavarma's 'scientific terrorism', Mohandas Gandhi being only the most prominent example.[115] Gandhi had met Krishnavarma during his sojourn in London in October 1906, when he spent two nights at India House. He had subsequently portrayed the

revolutionary from Kutch in his journal *Indian Opinion* quite positively as an ascetic patriot completely devoted to India's cause.[116] It is all the more remarkable that the future Mahatma's take on the Dhingra case also reproduces the current official version in minute detail, presenting Madan Lal Dhingra as incapacitated by drugs and Krishnavarma's 'mad ideas'.

> One can only pity the man. He was egged on to do this act by ill-digested reading of worthless writings. His defence of himself, too, appears to have been learnt by rote. It is those who incited him to this that deserve to be punished. In my view, Mr. Dhingra himself is innocent. It is not merely wine or *bhang* that makes one drunk; a mad idea also can do so. That was the case with Mr. Dhingra.[117]

In a way, Gandhi too was capitalizing on the panic created through the London killings and their coverage in the media. The general 'abhorrence'[118] vis-à-vis Dhingra's deed and Krishnavarma's alleged role in it provided an ideal opportunity to expound his own views on non-violent strategies of resistance. His *Hind Swaraj*, written only a few months after the Curzon Wyllie affair, is largely a critique of the 'Russian methods' advocated by Krishnavarma, Savarkar and others.[119]

It is remarkable that in the midst of all the slander, accusations and misrepresentations, Krishnavarma reacted confidently and even managed to exploit the situation to make his voice heard louder than ever before. Using the heightened media attention in the wake of the 'London outrage', he was able to convey a rejoinder to all his critics and in the process introduce his 'ethics of dynamite' to a truly global audience. His letter to the editor of *The Times* in London hence would soon assure him the epithet of 'father of Indian anarchy' and remains, to this day, his most influential piece of writing:

> I frankly admit that I approve of the deed and regard its author as a martyr. I know that this declaration of mine will shock many, but luckily there are even in England some high-minded and thoughtful publicists who seem to agree with me that political assassination is not murder and the rightful employment of force connotes 'force used *defensively* against force used *aggressively*'.[120]

As Nicholas Owen has recently stressed, the fact that such statements were published in a high-profile English daily ought not to mislead us into believing that the British media (let alone politicians) were seriously engaging with

his arguments. Krishnavarma's points, Owen argues convincingly, 'were neither met with censorship nor with reply, but with attempts to undercut authorial competence'.[121] The strategy of discrediting thus was a familiar one: Krishnavarma was once more depicted as 'intellectually feeble' product of a Western education that was ultimately not suited for 'Asian minds'.[122] His unenviable fame as global icon of anti-Western terrorism would end with the outbreak of the First World War in the summer of 1914. A few months before the hostilities commenced, he decided to seek asylum in Switzerland. In his Geneva exile, he largely refrained from political activities during the war in order to avoid provoking his Swiss hosts. Almost simultaneously, the imperial fear of 'native conspiracies' was largely removed by the massive opportunities for censorship and surveillance that opened up due to wartime legislation.[123]

By the time that hostilities had ended in 1918, Krishnavarma had lost touch with events in India and tried in vain to achieve a political comeback. He lived the life of an isolated and ageing veteran revolutionary until his death in 1930. The panic caused by individual 'native seditionists' like him had meanwhile at least partly given way to the equally haunting fear of a large-scale 'Bolshevik conspiracy' against the British Empire—a tendency that was, as we have seen, anticipated in the earlier conflation of various types of 'anarchism'.

Conclusion

It has been the purpose of this chapter to elucidate various political agendas that were connected to the rise of Indian revolutionary terrorism in the first two decades of the twentieth century and to examine in particular the role played by the media in creating and sustaining moral panics in this context. The analysis has concentrated on Shyamji Krishnavarma, who came to be widely held to be an 'intellectual arsonist' and 'godfather of Indian terrorism' in the period under study. However, an exploration of Krishnavarma's theoretical legitimation of political violence has shown that he was probably less interested in spreading panics among the British public than in finding a rational and universally valid ideological base for what he regarded as the last means of resistance for the victims of British imperialism. He regarded violent acts against colonial oppressors as deplorable but unavoidable after other avenues of political protest had been closed due to the counter-terrorist legislation that was implemented in the wake of the first wave of terror attacks in India. In other words, the use of violence for him was primarily a defensive reaction to the confrontation with 'state terrorism'.

It has become apparent that Krishnavarma's carefully composed reflections on the 'ethics of dynamite' were utterly different from the religious imagery and rhetoric deployed by most of his Indian fellow revolutionaries, particularly those active in the secret societies of Bengal and Maharashtra. In his writings there was no talk of 'sacrificing white goats', no invocation of ideals of sanguinary self-sacrifice and no reference to religious sanctions that could possibly whip up the emotions of his compatriots or instil fear in the hearts of Europeans. To a modern reader, his essays would in fact seem suited to invite an engagement in an intellectual debate on the moral legitimacy of colonialism and anti-colonial resistance. And yet they were perceived completely differently by most of his contemporaries. Indeed, a close look at the media reports and official statements in the wake of the 'London outrage' has shown that the public representation of Krishnavarma and his thought stood in stark contrast to his consciously 'rational' and legalistic style of argument. In particular, the media coverage of the first major violent act of anti-colonial resistance in Britain that largely drew on the information based on 'official sources' tried to construct him as a cowardly and gory 'sedition monger' who would sacrifice naïve Indian youths to carry out his 'mad ideas'. The politics of panics that were thus quite obviously pursued by high officials and journalists in Britain and British India drew on established orientalized clichés and invoked 'folk devils' that had long been part of the colonial lore. The authorities in both Britain and India relied crucially on the cooperation of the press, which capitalized on the sensationalist image of 'drugged' suicide killers that were fanaticized by a reckless 'Westernized' wire-puller. According to their reading, Krishnavarma did not have to be taken seriously, as he had not only lost touch with his own organic cultural and social environment but was also dangerously close to Western bugbears such as 'socialists' and 'anarchists'. The panic created by this double threat, it was hoped, would facilitate the acceptance of rigorous counter-insurgency measures which did not have to respect the 'niceties of the law'—a phenomenon, most twenty-first-century observers would be familiar with through the public controversies following the opening of the US penal camp in Guantanamo Bay in 2002.

Finally, a brief investigation into the spectrum of Indian reactions to the Wyllie murder that was supposedly triggered by Krishnavarma's writings has suggested that the 'prose of counter-terrorism' used by British officials and the Western press alike was quickly and surprisingly uncritically picked up by many South Asian observers too. Ironically, the 'perverted idea of humanity

and political freedom' that was cherished in Krishnavarma's writings heavily indebted to English liberal authors seemed to be as 'maddening' and dangerous to a broad array of Indian contemporaries, ranging from Mohandas Gandhi to the Maharajah of Benares, as it was to the colonial authorities. Counter-terrorist tropes and imagery thus effectively circulated on a global scale, cutting across ethnic, political and cultural boundaries. In that regard too, the decade preceding the First World War would seem to invite interesting comparisons with our own post-9/11 times.

Notes

1. Isaac Land (2008: 5–8).
2. Joseph Conrad (1907). Cf. also Clive Bloom (2013: especially 120–25 and 268–73); and Paul Knepper (2008: 295–315). For more general accounts of the so-called *ère des attentats* in Europe, cf. Randall D. Law (2009: 98–111); and Matthew Carr (2011: 15–71).
3. Elleke Boehmer and Stephen Morton (2010: 10–11).
4. Elleke Boehmer and Stephen Morton (2010: 10–11).
5. Peter Waldmann (2011: 92–93); cf. also Peter Schmid and Janny de Graaf (1982).
6. Charles Townshend (2011: 127–30).
7. Cf. especially Alex Tickell (2012a: 135–83; 2012b: 3–18); Nicholas Owen (2013: 143–84); and Ole Birk Laursen (Forthcoming).
8. There is, of course, a long imperial pre-history of discovering 'native conspiracies' and identifying Indian 'wire-pullers'. The Great Rebellion of 1857–59 was certainly the most crucial event in this context. Cf. also Kim Wagner (2010: 225–41).
9. G.K. Peatling (2008: 163).
10. J.N. Farquhar (1915: 359). Cf. also Valentine Chirol (1910: 149 and 152); Government of India (1919: 6); and James Campbell Ker (1973 [1917]: 155–60).
11. Maia Ramnath (2011: 47–56); Christophe Jaffrelot (2003: 299–324); Sukla Sanyal (2008: 759–87); Peter Heehs (2010: 153–76); Peter Heehs (1998); and Peter Heehs (1993).
12. Cf. Partha Chatterjee (2009: 241).
13. The complete English translation of the Marathi text appeared as B.G. Tilak (1926). For an extensive analysis, cf. Shruti Kapila (2010: 437–57).
14. Peter Heehs (1992: 349–70).
15. Aurobindo Ghose (1973: 299).

16. James Campbell Ker (1973 [¹1917]: 159–62). Cf. also David. M. Laushey (1975: 2).
17. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/930, (1909) File 1283, 'Note on the Anarchist Movement in the Deccan'.
18. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/874, (1908), File No. 1961, 'The Revolutionary Conspiracy in Bengal'; see especially Letter No. R.-1, H.C. Woodman, Magistrate of Muzaffarpur to the Chief Secy. GoBeng, 4 May 1908.
19. James Campbell Ker (1973 [¹1917]: 185). For details on the international contacts, in which Krishnavarma and members of the India House Group played an important role, cf. Peter Heehs (1994: 533–56).
20. The term was widely used in the contemporary press as well as by the Indian revolutionaries themselves. For the background of its circulation, cf. also Randall D. Law (2009: 148–49).
21. Valentine Chirol (1921: 87).
22. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/813, (1907), File No. 1771, 'Telegram from the Viceroy, issue of a resolution regarding a method of dealing with the native press', 1 June 1907.
23. For a historical account of the development of colonial sedition laws in India, cf. Aravind Ganachari (2009: 93–110). Cf. also Stephen Morton (2010: 205–11).
24. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/871, (1908), File No. 1934, 'Newspapers Act 1908; The Explosive Substances Act, 1908; House of Commons Questions'.
25. Ibid. The counterterrorist laws would later famously culminate in the Defence of India Act, 1915 and the 'Rowlatt Act', 1919, which allowed for the detention of hundreds of suspected 'terrorists' without trial. See Durba Ghosh (2006: 275).
26. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/955, (1909), File No. 2887, 'Prosecution and conviction of B C Pal for the article "Aetiology of the Bomb"'.
27. 'The Parsi', 4 July 1909, *RNPBO.*
28. For biographical details, see Harald Fischer-Tiné (2014). Older biographical literature on Krishnavarma in English includes: Indulal Yajnik (1950); Har Bilas Sarda (1959); and Ganeshi Lal Verma (1993).
29. *Babu* was a term used since the mid-nineteenth century for Western-educated, literate Indians, working in the colonial milieu. The *Babus* were often ridiculed for 'aping' their colonial masters in the pursuit of their careers without possessing the latter's vim and vigour. Cf., for instance, Anindyo Roy (2001: 113–24); and Mrinalini Sinha (1995).
30. Cf. Harald Fischer-Tiné (2014: Chapter 1).
31. Nicholas Owen (2013); Jonathan Schneer (1999: 184–227); and Antoinette Burton (1998).
32. The paper appeared until 1922, with a long interruption caused by the First World War. Cf. also A.M. Shah (2006: 3435–39).

33. Shruti Kapila (2007: 115).
34. Shruti Kapila (2007: 28).
35. Shompa Lahiri (2000: 122).
36. Malwinder Jit Waraich Singh and Kuldip Puri (2003). Cf. also Indulal Yajnik (1950: 127); and *IS*, II.3, 1906, p. 13.
37. Cf., for example, APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/890, 1908. File No. 3264, 'Speeches at "India House", Highgate Report of the Metropolitan Police, Criminal Investigation Dept., New Scotland Yard', 2nd Sep 1908.
38. For this trope, see also Robert Peckham's contribution to this volume.
39. Quote from *IS*, III.9, 1907, p. 34. Cf. also Alex Tickell (2012b); Richard Popplewell (1988: 56–76; 1995: 125–41); A.C. Bose (2002: 15–29).
40. *IS*, III.8, 1907, p. 31; and *IS*, III.10, 1907, p. 39.
41. The most comprehensive and sophisticated discussion of the violence issue can be found in *IS*, IV.8, 1908, p. 30; *IS*, IV.9, 1908, pp. 33–35; *IS*, V.7, 1909, pp. 33–35; and *IS*, V.11, 1909, pp. 33–35; written at a later stage but also important as an attempt to theorise political violence are the editorials *IS*, IV.9, 1911, pp. 33–35; and *IS*, XI.1, 1913, pp. 1–3.
42. *IS*, IV.3, 1908, p. 12.
43. *IS*, IV.2, 1908, p. 7.
44. *IS*, IV.8, 1908, p. 32; cf. also *IS*, VII.1, 1911, p. 4.
45. *IS*, IV.8, 1908, p. 32. In his otherwise illuminating chapter on the India House, Alex Tickell briefly mentions Krishnavarma's articles on the 'ethics of dynamite', but fails to recognize that the concept is derived from Herbert. Cf. Alex Tickell (2012a: 148).
46. For Krishnavama's reading of Herbert Spencer, see Shruti Kapila (2007). For details on Spencer's anti-statism, cf., in particular, Herbert Spencer (1884).
47. Cf., for instance, Eric Mack (1978: 304). In spite of this link with European anarchism, Herbert is surprisingly absent in Maia Ramnath's otherwise exhaustive book on *Decolonizing Anarchism* (2011).
48. Herbert (1894).
49. *IS*, IV.8, 1908, p. 30; and *IS*, XI.1, 1913, p. 3.
50. *IS*, IV.9, 1908, pp. 33–35.
51. Auberon Herbert (1978b: 142). The idea of self-ownership and the right to defend it is more fully developed in Herbert's essay 'Ten Principles of Voluntaryism and Free Life' (1978a: especially 371–74). This voluntaryist manifesto was originally published in 1897.
52. Herbert (1978a: 317). Cf. also Murray N. Rothbard (2002: 80–82).
53. *IS*, IV.9, 1908, pp. 33.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. However, the notion of a state that was acting without moral legitimacy and hence needed to be resisted was derived not only from Auberon Herbert's works; as Shruti Kapila has correctly observed, it was equally

indebted to Herbert Spencer's ideas on 'voluntary outlawry' and the right of the individual to ignore the state under certain conditions.

57. Cf., for instance, Auberon Herbert and J.H. Levy (1912: 38). In this text Herbert gives a concise summary of the theory that he had articulated in a number of earlier writings.

58. Cf. *IS*, V.3, 1909, p. 11.

59. *The Times of India*, 25 June 1910, p. 10.

60. Cf. Shruti Kapila (2010); and Vinayak Chaturvedi (2010: 417–35).

61. Alex Tickell (2012a: 144–45). Fanon's view on anti-colonial violence as a necessary strategy of purging has famously been formulated in Frantz Fanon (1961).

62. Cf. Alex Tickell (2012a: 151).

63. Alex Tickell (2012a: 148–53).

64. The 'prose of counterterrorism', of course, is closely akin to the 'prose of counter-insurgency' famously described by Ranajit Guha. Cf. Ranajit Guha (1983: 1–42).

65. *The Times of India*, 17 July 1909, p. 11.

66. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/947, (1909), File No. 2384, 'Metropolitan Police inform of the murder of Sir William Curzon Wyllie and Dr Cawas Lalcaca; shot and killed at the Imperial Institute, South Kensington by a Hindu named Dhingra'. The Curzon Wyllie murder has recently been the subject of thorough analysis. I will therefore confine myself to a short sketch of the events and focus on its consequences for Krishnavarma's career as a symbol of terrorism. For a more detailed treatment of the 'London outrage', cf. Alex Tickell (2012a: 135–59); Alex Tickell (2012b: passim).

67. *The Times*, 1 September 1908, p. 5.

68. *The Times of India*, 7 September 1909, p. 8

69. J.D. Rees (1909: 277); and APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/986, (1910), File No. 349, 'Information about the Revolutionary Movement in London'.

70. Alex Tickell (2012a: 136).

71. Alex Tickell (2012b: 8).

72. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/986, (1910), File No. 349, 'Information about the Revolutionary Movement in London'; Statement of H.K. Koregaonkar.

73. Ibid.; cf. also *The Times of India*, 17 July 1909, p. 11.

74. For details, see R.F. Graham Campbell (ed.). 1909. *Central Criminal Court Sessions Paper, Vol CLI, Part 399. Session held July 19th, 1909 and the following days etc*. London: Geo. Walpole, pp. 461–465; Malwinder Jit Waraich Singh and Kuldip Puri (2003); V.N. Datta (1978).

75. Cf., for instance, *IS*, V.8, 1909, p. 29; and *Bande Mataram* 1(1) (1909), p. 4.

76. IOR/L/PJ/12/36, File 4645(c)/21; 'Pay and allowances of Major John Wallinger, 1912–24'; APAC, IOR: L/PJ/12/9, 2812(b)/18

1915–1918, 'Philip C Vickery: deputation to Europe; appointment, pay, allowances and extension of deputation'.

77. Popplewell, Richard (1988: 56–76); and Daniel Brückenhaus (2010: 523–66; 2015: 173).

78. APAC, MSS.Eur. D/573/21 'Morley Collection', 1909.

79. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/955, (1909), File No. 2940, 'Speech of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal regarding the assassination of Sir William Curzon Wyllie', 13 July 1909. That the harsh tone of Baker's speech was well recognized by the Indian public is evident in some of the critical press reactions. See, for instance, 'Sanjivany', 22 July 1909; and 'Hitavadi' 23 July 1909, *RNPB.*

80. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/955, (1909), File No. 2940. It goes without saying that while this position was very influential, there were also dissenting views among commentators in Britain. Winston Churchill and the eccentric poet-cum-politician W.S. Blunt, for example, stated in private that they admired Dhingra's courage and patriotism. Cf. Nicholas Owen (2013: 176–77); and Keer (1966: 60–61).

81. Peter Waldmann (2011: 17–18). Cf. also Brigitte L. Nacos (2002).

82. Paul Knepper (2008: 310).

83. *Penny Illustrated Paper*, 10 July 1909, p. 3.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. *The Times of India*, 24 July 1909, p. 10.

87. Stefan Zweig, 'Die indische Gefahr für England (Anlässlich der politischen Mordtat eines jungen Hindu)', *Wiener Neue Presse. Morgenblatt*, 13 July 1909, pp. 2–4, quote on p. 2. I am grateful to my doctoral student Judith Grosse for making me aware of this source.

88. Ibid. 'Die indische Gefahr ist wach geworden. Und bei jedem Symptom, bei jeder Bombe, jeder Verschwörung und nun vor allem bei dieser Ermordung schaudert man in England zusammen in Erinnerung an die Schreckenstage der "Mutiny".'

89. *Los Angeles Times*, 4 July 1909, p. 15.

90. Cf. also Benjamin Zachariah (2013: 574–92); and Kama Maclean and J. Daniel Elam (2013: 113–23).

91. *IS*, V.5, 1909, pp. 18 f.

92. *Washington Post*, 4 July 1909, p. W 8.

93. Ibid.

94. *New York Times*, 19 July 1909, p. 6.

95. Interestingly, the *bhang* hypothesis is also present in Indian newspapers such as the 'Indian Mirror', 6 July 1909, *RNPB.*

96. Kim Wagner (2013: 157–79); and James H. Mills (2000: 46–47).

97. Stanley Cohen (2002).

98. Alex Tickell (2010: 177–201).
99. *New York Times*, 21 November 1909 [not paginated].
100. Ibid.
101. These are the words political scientist Christina Archetti has used to describe terrorism in the twenty-first century. Christina Archetti (2013: 1).
102. *New York Times*, 19 July 1909, p. 6.
103. Ibid.
104. 'Sami Sanj', 29 July 1909, *RNPBO*.
105. 'Pudhari' (Baroda), 18 July 1909, *RNPBO*.
106. This quasi-medical understanding of indigenous resistance has been explored for the African context in Sloan Mahone (2006: 241–58).
107. *The Times of India*, 14 July 1909, p. 7.
108. Satadru Sen (2012: 13–41).
109. 'Oriental Review', 7 July 1909, *RNPBO*.
110. 'The Indian Patriot', 7 July 1909, *Madras Native Newspapers Reports, [MNNP] 1909*, APAC, IOR/L/R/ 5/114.
111. 'Day's News', 18 July 1909, *RNPBO*.
112. APAC, IOR: L/PJ/6/968, (1909), File No. 3176, 'Murder of Sir William Curzon Wyllie – letter by Maharajah of Benares', 14 July 1909.
113. Ibid.
114. The Literature on Thuggee and its repression is vast. See, amongst others: Tom Lloyd. (2008: 201–37); Kim Wagner (2007); Mark Brown (2002: 77–95); Martine van Woerkens (1995); and Radhika Singha (1993: 83–146).
115. For a general analysis of Gandhi's view on violence and terrorism, see Faisal Devji (2012); and Bhikku Parekh (1999: 171–90). Somewhat less sophisticated and focusing largely on the inter-war period is the discussion in Rama Hari Shankar (1996).
116. M.K. Gandhi (1961: 84).
117. M.K. Gandhi (1963: 428). Nicholas Owen has pointed to the fact that Gandhi later somewhat revised his views and acknowledged that the influence of Krishnavarma's 'scientific terrorist scheme' among young Indian exiles was dwindling and Savarkar's less sober brand of revolutionary rhetoric gained in importance. Cf. Nicholas Owen (2013: 179).
118. Lala Lajpat Rai (2003: 'Condemnation of Wyllie's Murder [Telegram, Lahore 4 July 1909]', in Nanda, *Collected Works of Lajpat Rai*, Vol. 5, p. 3).
119. Jonathan Hyslop (2011: 46).
120. *The Times*, 17 July 1909, p. 10.
121. Nicholas Owen (2013: 169).
122. Nicholas Owen (2013: 169).
123. Chandrika Kaul (2003: 125–30); and Durba Ghosh (2006: 275).

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The Art of Panicking Quietly: British Expatriate Responses to 'Terrorist Outrages' in India, 1912–33

Kama Maclean

INTRODUCTION: VIOLENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY

Given the dominance of mutiny literature in shaping an imperial ethos in the late nineteenth century,[1] it is surprising how little subsequent Raj nostalgia has emphasized the precariousness of British security in India. As several scholars have recently pointed out, the 'ghost' of the Mutiny enjoyed considerable longevity: in 1907, the fiftieth anniversary of the rebellion, fears of a commemorative attack on Europeans sent many scurrying to the relative safety of cantonments and forts.[2] At the height of the 'Punjab disturbances' in April 1919 in Amritsar, women and children were transferred to the Govindagarh fort, 'its gates barring entry to native men'.[3] And yet such stressful experiences seem to recede in the countless memoirs of the Raj, dominated as they are by countless tales of the exhausting social demands of British expatriate life, replete

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with club-going, calling, pig-sticking, tiger-hunting and the like. Where danger does figure in Raj narratives, it is in the form of environmental hazards such as venomous or aggressive fauna, or poorly understood tropical diseases; managing these risks forms part of the bodily challenge of being a Briton in India.[4] Any threat to Europeans posed by violent anti-colonialism in the twentieth century simply didn't bear thinking about; their vulnerability as a 'small elite in a vast and little understood alien society' demanded 'constant and unqualified reinforcement' rather than frank reassessment.[5] The very suggestion that Indians felt so violently about being colonized was in itself an indictment of the Raj.

The most shocking thing about the Mutiny, Lizzie Collingham argues, was that 'the physical impact of colonialism, which violently imprinted the power of the colonizer on the body of the colonized, was reversed'.[6] In 1857, the cultivation of fear through the deployment of violence was suddenly no longer the preserve of the British. Reflecting on the Mutiny through the medium of commemorations, memoirs and novels decades afterwards had the comforting effect of relegating such anti-colonial violence to the past. Remedial actions had been taken and royal proclamations made to ensure that the population was never to be so provoked again. Fears of another mutiny in India never truly receded; James Lunt conceded that 'as recently as 1938', when he was posted to serve in the army in Amritsar, 'we took rifles and ball ammunition with us to church on Sunday'.[7] Despite post-rebellion promises of non-molestation, recent scholarship has emphasized the extent to which 'everyday violence' continued to be a feature of the British Raj.[8] When this violence was returned, as it was on occasion as a way of contesting the limits of sovereignty,[9] it was anything but quotidian.

FROM A SPOT OF 'POLITICAL TROUBLE' TO 'OUTRAGE!': RESPONSES TO ANTI-COLONIAL VIOLENCE

The dominance of Gandhian non-violence in historiography has overwhelmed scholarly studies of anti-colonial violence, providing a somewhat skewed view of late colonialism.[10] This has been compounded by the dismissive or obfuscatory language used in colonial records to describe the phenomenon of Indians conspiring against their erstwhile rulers to create the impression of a marginal phenomenon unworthy of attention. Two secret governmental reports on violent anti-imperial conspiracies in

India—the first issued in 1917 and its companion in 1937—were rather euphemistically entitled *Political Trouble in India*.[11] Inside the covers, the authors were rather more to the point, couching the growth in violence directed at Europeans as a series of 'terrorist outrages', a term laden with the idea of an abrupt and utterly unwarranted upsetting of the colonial order. Just as a 'mutiny' was an expression of an illegitimate and unwarranted impulse of those who had been entrusted with British weaponry, the 'outrage' connoted the fundamental illegitimacy of Indian activists indulging in assassinations, aiming revolvers or hurling bombs at their rulers. A distinctive shift in this wave of anti-colonial violence was that it was orchestrated by educated, urbane Indian activists.[12] Some were inspired by global precedents and galvanized by the circulation of subversive literature, increasingly couched their actions in 'revolutionary' terms.[13]

While increasingly scholars are beginning to draw attention to anti-colonial violence,[14] the emphasis has been focused largely on exposing the intriguing and dynamic praxis of individual 'revolutionaries' and their clandestine organizations who sought to displace the British 'without the decades of negotiations and bartering that … had become established as the only legitimate form of effecting political change'.[15] In the larger historiography of British India, the expatriate experiences of and responses to 'terrorism' have been scarcely acknowledged. Here, I would like to suggest that British writers have underplayed 'political trouble' in India as a tactical response to the challenge of anti-colonial violence in the early twentieth century. Below, I will briefly review the rise of political violence in the inter-war years, with special reference to north India and Punjab, before detailing the responses of the British communities in India to this challenge. The overall trend was a reluctance to gratify the colonized with articulations of panic and fear.

While this was by no means a perfectly unified riposte, there was a general but unstated agreement that to give in to panic was an insufferable weakness that would not behove representatives of the Raj. It would be tempting to ascribe this tendency to the proverbial stiff upper lip—a quintessentially British 'culture of emotional restraint and stoical determination'.[16] This sensibility has been attributed to a range of factors, from the robust politics of British masculinity to the austere, no-nonsense culture of the public school, which for much of the establishment was a formative experience, and several scholars have argued that the valorization of an unshakeable resolve and mettle found particular application in the psychology of colonialism.[17] Most famously, George Orwell alerted his readers

to a tacitly agreed performativity 'imposed on every Englishman in the East' and its disfiguring effects: 'in every crisis, he has got to do what the "natives" expect of him. He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it'.[18] Even so, there are certain hazards in ascribing such heroic resilience to any particular national culture or, for that matter, to governmentality alone.[19]

The ability to channel pluck is an eminently practical affectation, one which emerges over and over as one of a suite of attributes that both constituted and reinforced notions of British imperial 'prestige'. This was tutored throughout Anglo-Indian society, as one steely portrait of the memsahib after another would suggest,[20] but it was particularly cultivated in its official ranks, as Orwell so poignantly describes in his experience as a benighted policeman in Burma. There was 'a deliberate and conscious effort to construct a myth of British invincibility' in the Indian Army,[21] and members of the Indian Civil Service, according to Sir John Kaye, exuded a 'calm confidence which betrays no sign of misgiving, and the very quietude that indicates a consciousness of strength'.[22] In her rich social history of the Raj, Collingham contends that dominance was so perfectly inculcated amongst expatriate Britons that 'even when Indian terrorism was at its height, it did not occur to most of them that an Indian might attack them'.[23] Indeed, one of the inflections of 'outrage' is an element of incredulity.

Age Chalo: Carry On

Long before governments interpreted intelligence reports in the form of colour-coded warnings of the likelihood of a terrorist attack—a strategy aimed at feeding rather than allaying public anxiety—the most prudent response to political violence was to *refuse* to panic. It was a pity, the Punjabi Civilian Malcolm Darling confided to his friend E.M. Forster, that Lord Hardinge's response to the attempt to assassinate him, as he was passing through Chandni Chowk on an elephant on 23 December 1912, was call off the proceedings. It would have been better, Darling opined, had the Viceroy continued with the Durbar:

> for then it would have made a great impression and prevented the seditious party from saying that the Viceroy had never reached Delhi. I expect his nerves were too much shattered, even though he was not hurt. It is a dreadful business—not only in itself, but because it will strengthen the reactionary party.[24]

Media reports of the day indicate that Hardinge was more wounded than perhaps Darling appreciated (he required surgery to remove shrapnel from his shoulder, and his hearing was affected by the blast). Nonetheless, British-owned and loyalist newspapers in India obligingly hailed the Viceroy's fortitude, for after the explosion he had ordered his elephant to trundle along for 125 yards (*Age Chalo*!) before reassessing the situation.[25] And there 'was even a story (alas apocryphal) that His Excellency's first words after the shock of the explosion were "Save the elephant!"'[26] The *jamedar* in the elephant's howdah behind the Viceroy was killed instantly and another was badly wounded.[27]

As Hardinge found, the projection of imperial confidence was easier to aspire to than achieve. There are several indications of strain in the Anglo-Indian body politic in the face of anti-colonial violence, often expressed in the desire for unleashing a volley of fierce and immediate retribution. Forster added to his account of Hardinge's escape that he had overheard the mutterings around him of 'several Englishmen—officials of high position too—[who] were anxious for the Tommies to be turned to fire at the crowd, and seemed very sorry that the Viceroy had not been killed, because then there would have been better excuse for doing such a thing'.[28] While wiser heads prevailed in Delhi in 1912, the heightened incidence of political violence in the inter-war period brought furtive debates to British India about the requisite response to Indian conspiracies. Tensions within the Indian Civil Service (ICS), between officials and non-officials, Provincial Governors and the Government of India, the India Office and Parliament, and between factions within the Conservative Party simmered as it became evident to all but the most strident die-hard that the end of the Raj was nigh. Political violence was intended to inject some urgency into this scenario. *Shabash!* (*Bravo!*), a publication released to celebrate the first anniversary of the attack on Hardinge, exulted that 'it is the bomb that frightens the Government into conceding rights to the people'.[29] To refuse to outwardly panic was to repudiate this strategy.

Imperial anxiety was high in the inter-war years in India, as constitutional change instigated by the Simon Commission was at the fore of Indian political debates, the Depression exerted economic pressure and civil disobedience peaked at the same time that 'outrages' began to rise. All of these factors pointed to an uncertain future for Britons in India at a time when the final touches were being put to Lutyens' grand imperial masterpiece in New Delhi, the Viceregal Palace, inaugurated in 1931. Reams of political intelligence churned out around the Lahore Conspiracy

Case alone (1928–31)[30] were passed between levels of government to establish that a state of 'emergency' existed, which justified oppressive legislative responses to political violence.[31] At the height of the crisis, retrospectively termed 'the strain of 1931',[32] neatly typed memos and pages of official correspondence are ruptured by worried annotations and red-pencilled marginalia.[33] And on occasion, outright panic broke out, such as in the North Western Frontier Province, where in 1930 a tiffin party was broken up when:

> a subaltern in the Welsh Fusiliers … who was very gay and loved firing off pistols, had arranged a picnic party on the Quetta side of the pass, and to amuse the girls and create the right atmosphere, fired off his revolver several times blissfully unaware that a party of very senior officials had stopped on the other side to eat their picnic lunch. They scattered in all directions convinced that they were the victims of an ambush! Strings were pulled (his father was a general) and he got off more lightly than he deserved.[34]

Such responses speak of a heavy psychological impact on Britons in inter-war India. This chapter explores the complex nature of fear in late colonial India, with particular attention to the apparent denial of its existence in the historiography of the European experience in the late Raj.

Inter-war 'Actions' and Reaction

The rise in anti-colonial violence in the 1920s is attributable to the enhanced coordination of attacks on British interests by subversive organizations in India, themselves responding to acts of colonial violence and oppression. Historians concur that the formation of revolutionary groups in inter-war India was a product of youth disenchantment with the collapse of the non-cooperation movement after Gandhi responded to the outbreak of violence in Chauri Chaura by withdrawing the campaign.[35] Additional impetus for revolutionary organizations in north India was the political debate sparked by the Simon Commission and the promise of (what they felt was trifling) constitutional reform, but also the injection of leftist ideologies in India, alongside the government's attempts to limit the influence of such thinking. In north India, the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA), formed by Chandra Shekhar Azad and Bhagat Singh, was an underground, inter-provincial organization of revolutionary activists.[36] Constituted in 1928, it aimed at shaking British

confidence by avenging acts of colonial oppression; by 1931, it was on the decline as its leaders were either killed, executed, arrested or forced underground. This period saw a substantial rise in political violence in north India (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). While the HSRA itself was responsible for a relatively small number of these 'actions', as it called its attacks on British officials and infrastructure, they were high-level attacks, strategically planned with a sophisticated publicity campaign for maximum impact.[37] Its leaders, strategically spread across north India, were acutely aware that they would pay for their politics with their lives, and they mobilized their sympathizers in the Indian-owned media with martyrdom in mind.

The HSRA's signature assassination was carried out by Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Chandra Shekhar Azad in Lahore on 17 December 1928. Their target was J.A. Scott, the Senior Superintendent of Police in Lahore, in reprisal for a *lathi* (baton) charge against a protest against the Simon Commission, during the course of which the aged Punjabi Congress leader Lala Lajpat Rai was gravely injured and later died. Scott, according to a colleague, had mastered the art of the colonial mask; he was 'a dour, gruff Edinburgh Scot who wore a deliberately ferocious expression … known to be on the terrorists' list of marked men, he was always escorted by a bodyguard'.[38] However, an error in identifying Scott led to the three gunning down J.P. Saunders – the Assistant Superintendent of Police – instead, and when an Indian constable, Channan Singh, gave chase, he was fatally wounded. The three revolutionaries made a clean getaway, and posters claiming responsibility yet expressing remorse for the killings were pasted around Lahore the following morning.

It is clear from several HSRA letters and manifestoes—all of them expressing a reluctance for taking human life—that the organization had intended its handful of assassinations to set a fresh agenda in Indian nationalist politics and reinvigorate public engagement after what it felt was the emasculation of successive Gandhian campaigns.[39] The very language of

Table 6.1 Statement showing the total number of officials and innocent victims killed and injured [All India], 1930

Officials	Killed	15
	Injured	31
Innocent victims	Killed	9
	Injured	62

Source: BL, IOR, L/PJ/12/400, p. 85

Table 6.2 Statement giving the number of the more important cases connected with the anarchist movement in which bombs were used in 1930

Province	Number of cases in which bombs were used	Number of casualties	Number of cases in which arrests were made and wrongdoers detected
Bengal	10	17	5
Bombay and Sind	3	2	1
Delhi	1	2	*Nil*
NWF Province	3	*Nil*	*Nil*
Punjab	19	32	10
United Provinces	2	1	1
Total	38	54	17

Source: Legislative Assembly Debates, 28 January 1931, p. 314. BL, IOR, L/PJ/12/390

the 'action' seemed to implicitly critique what it perceived as the concurrent 'inaction' in Congress politics. Gandhi had retreated from active politics after his release from prison in 1924 to concentrate on his constructive programme, emerging to take part in the annual Congress in December 1928 to insist on a policy of waiting for a year before beginning another campaign. Throughout 1929, the Congress leadership was divided over constitutional aspirations, Dominion Status and Complete Independence, the latter more radical, but still inchoate. Once the impact of assassinations became felt in the Indian body politic, several other organizations and individuals began to coordinate bombings and shootings of their own, leading to a discernible rise in the insecurity of the British population in India. Witnessing the escalation of political violence and the growing popularity of the revolutionaries, Gandhi set about organizing what would be the first phase of his second great anti-colonial movement: Civil Disobedience (1930–32).[40]

The first attack by the HSRA was therefore aimed primarily at the police as a critique of its oppressive use of force. The dead man, Saunders, was memorialized in the British-owned press in India as a fresh-faced griffin (for he had arrived in India the year before), a keen and talented cricketer who had excelled in his work and knew of its risks.[41] The Punjab Police pursued the revolutionaries with enhanced fervour as police-killers, although the organization was sufficiently organized and dispersed across a range of hideouts across a number of provinces to continue to operate in

one cell and sphere of activity as another was arrested. Subsequent HSRA attacks would target the legislature in Delhi (with low-intensity bombs on 8 April 1929) and high-level officials, including the Viceroy, Lord Irwin (on 23 December 1929) and the Governor of Punjab, Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency (precisely a year later, on 23 December 1930).[42] None of these attacks succeeded in killing their targets,[43] although they did create an atmosphere 'highly charged with the outrage virus'.[44]

The pursuit of the HSRA by the police, coordinated by a taskforce in Delhi, and subsequently in the courts was aggregated under the rubrics of the Assembly Bomb Case, the Lahore Conspiracy Case and the Delhi Conspiracy Case.[45] As the police hunted down the revolutionaries, they and individuals sympathetic to them began to target the police with death threats, followed up by shootings and bombings. In 1930, a group of activists in Punjab, chafing under the protocols and procedures required by the HSRA leadership in determining whether an attack was strategically justifiable, splintered from the HSRA.[46] This new group, alternately calling itself Asthi Chakkar or the Punjab Avenging Party, dedicated itself to the systematic targeting of the police in Punjab, coordinating a round of booby traps—bombs encased in cigarette cases—in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Amritsar, Lyallpur, Gujranwala and Sheikhpura on 19 June 1930, killing two police officers and wounding four.[47] One of their primary objectives was to eliminate Abdul Aziz, the chief investigator of the Lahore Conspiracy Case; he survived an attack on his home in October 1930, but his orderly did not.[48] By the end of 1930, the Intelligence Bureau was aggregating data in an attempt to calculate the recent trends in revolutionary action. It surmised that while officials were the primary target of revolutionary groups, plans frequently went awry, with 'innocent victims' falling as well (Table 6.1).

The revolutionaries faced substantial logistical difficulties in practicing and rehearsing their attacks—partly a result of the difficulty in accessing illegal arms and discreetly testing bombs. On the day of an action and in the heat of the moment, there was always a margin of error. With the benefit of hindsight, survivors and other officials made light of revolutionary error, injecting humour into their near-death experiences. Hardinge's self-effacing but fictional exhortation to 'Save the elephant!' overlaid the anxiety of the moment in which a Viceroy might have died with gentle wit (the death of Hardinge's *chaprasi* (attendant) notwithstanding). Sir Stanley Jackson was a former cricketer who captained England against Australia in 1905, before serving as the Governor of Bengal (1927–32).

In his final year of office, he was shot at while officiating at a convocation ceremony at the University of Calcutta by Bina Das, but survived, managing to evade a spray of five bullets.[49] 'When asked about the incident, he made light of it, quipping that it was the "Luckiest duck I ever made".'[50]

British historians of empire have tended to be somewhat dismissive of the rise in 'terrorism' in colonial India; partly a product of imperial hubris, partly a desire to iterate that terrorism is an ineffectual strategy in every context, but it is also a consequence of ignorance of revolutionary goals and ideology. Andrew Roberts, for example, dismisses 'the standard of Hindu terrorism' as 'unimpressive', citing Bhagat Singh's bombing on the Legislative Assembly as a failure on the basis that it did not kill anyone; a statement that is doubly flawed.[51] Bhagat Singh was not a Hindu, nor was his organization religious in any sense of the word; more importantly, the explosions were not intended to kill, but, according to the leaflets that followed the bombs into the chamber, to 'make the deaf hear'. Judged by this criteria, the action was a success, sending shockwaves throughout the empire.[52] Far from presenting an occasion for smugness, the rate of error in revolutionary action expanded the anxieties of colonial collaborators, who were likely to be the unfortunate bystanders enumerated in Table 6.2. Applying the standards of 'terrorism' to the violent politics of the revolutionaries (then as now) made their actions fall short by imperial standards. These were calibrated by Britain's ongoing troubles in Ireland. While it is true that the HSRA found much inspiration in the IRA, as reflected in its acronym, it also made substantial departures that went ignored by investigators focused more on punishment than nuance.[53]

Knowing 'Terrorism'

The particular body of colonial knowledge that was constructed in response to political violence as a phenomenon in the early 1900s shaped understandings of insecurity in particular—and, in retrospect, rather peculiar—ways. The first act of 'terrorism' in India is generally agreed to have been the murders of the Bombay Plague Commissioner, Walter Rand, and his assistant, Charles Ayerst, in 1897 in Poona. After the partition of Bengal, however, assassinations seem to have been overwhelmingly organized in Bengal or by Bengalis, the attack on Hardinge coordinated by Rash Behari Bose being an example of the latter.[54] As a result, from relatively early on in the twentieth century, there developed a view that terrorism was a particularly Bengali phenomenon. Sir Charles Tegart, Commissioner of Police

in Calcutta who 'carried his life in his hand for 16 years, and had many hairbreadth escapes from the political assassin',[55] explained why this was so to an audience at the Royal Empire Society in London:

> Owing, I suppose, to the enervating climate of Bengal, his physique and stamina are inferior to that of the up-country Indian. His scholastic career generally resolves itself into an effort, amidst a constant struggle with poverty, to pass the examinations which custom has decreed are the only gateway to a professional or clerical career. Even if in this sense he qualifies himself, he still sees the chances of obtaining employment are few. Partly from these causes, partly from the absence in his educational institutions of the healthy tone which characterizes universities and schools in this country, and partly from lack of friendly association with the right type of European, he develops something very like an inferiority complex. … In the terrorist movements his emotions once stirred found vent in misdirected patriotism. He was flattered by finding his services so much in demand.[56]

Tegart's acknowledgement of the instability of the climate rationale—'I suppose'—seems to concede that the theory was inadequate to the task of explaining the prevalence of revolutionary activity in other provinces, such as Punjab, where the apparent proclivity for revolutionary activities was explained as being the product of its 'martial' culture. The ongoing emphasis on Bengal as a hotbed of terrorism in the imperial imagination was partly a product of textbook knowledge about the province. Valentine Chirol's *Indian Unrest*, based on his articles published in *The Times*, had more focus on Bengal than any other province. Sir Alfred Lyall's introduction to *Indian Unrest* emphasized that 'the centres of active disaffection located in the Maratha country and in Lower Bengal is a phenomenon which can be to a large extent accounted for by reference to Anglo-Indian history'.[57] The closest thing to a manual for understanding political violence in India remained, until 1938, *Political Trouble in India 1907–1917*, a 'confidential publication' whose circulation was supposed to have been limited to government circles and whose intelligence was presented as unassailable knowledge.[58] Fresh political developments were made sense of within the rather wooden framework set by the first iteration of *Political Trouble*, with its heavy emphasis on the hand of Bengalis in every conspiracy.[59] Even in the case of north Indian revolutionary organization, an intelligence report in 1931 surmised that 'there was a definite Bengal element', with conspiracies 'either organized by Bengalis or had the technical assistance of terrorists from Bengal in the matter of bomb-making'.[60]

This reputation was not unwarranted. Bengal consistently featured very highly in returns of revolutionary activity and was the only province to be distinguished by dedicated reports on political violence, with attacks so numerous that they were counted by district.[61] Once this manner of 'knowing' Bengal as the most dangerous province became established in colonial circles, it scarcely shifted, even when political violence rose in other provinces. This is evident in the attitudes of the members of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) posted in the inter-war years. Ann Ewing interviewed over 40 former ICS men who entered the service in the 1930s, asking them about the circumstances of their appointments and their experiences as civilians.[62] What compelled them to apply to the ICS at a time when recruitment had generally slowed? Seeking advice on the wisdom of a career in India, a young F.G. Cracknell was candidly warned by his tutor at Cambridge: 'You may be shot!' (Cracknell ignored this counsel, reasoning that there had recently been a shooting at Cambridge too).[63] P.J. Pringle, who joined the ICS in 1933, had also heard that some officers had 'recently been shot in Bengal'. His father consulted some friends and, on their advice, 'put down Punjab first, Burma quite high, and Bengal last'.[64] Apparently so did many others, for despite his preferences Pringle was dispatched to Bengal, where he served under the governorship of Sir John Anderson, a Home Civil Servant whose management of militancy in Ireland was deemed so successful that he diverted to Bengal to deal with the 'Terrorist outbreak'. Just as Indian activists drew inspiration from their anti-imperial Irish counterparts, so the lessons of law enforcement were imported in the person of Anderson.[65]

The enhanced risk in Bengal created a perverse incentive for one very ambitious candidate. R.S.T. John put Bengal at the top of his list of preferences, explaining to the selection board that 'I had heard that it was a place where people in my walk of life were being shot and than in consequence promotion would probably be quicker than elsewhere. The board seemed to appreciate that point of view. I was assigned accordingly'.[66] While John's was an atypical sentiment, what is significant in Ewing's interviews is that the long-held view of Punjab as the most desirable posting for the 'heaven-born' was scarcely shaken, even though it witnessed an exponential rise in 'outrages' in 1930, for the first time outperforming Bengal (Table 6.2).

The unanimous view of the Punjab as the premier province seems to have been formed by a view that its weather was appealing, it had 'good hill districts, for shooting etc', and its people were admirable and largely

amenable to rule.[67] From the nineteenth century, civilians posted to Punjab were considered a 'corps d'elite', with a disproportionate number of them promoted into the secretariat or appointed to governorships.[68] Punjab's reputation as the province to be in was so entrenched and of such long standing that it was not easily shaken by bombings and attempted assassinations; even so, positive perceptions of Punjab are especially difficult to account for in the wake of the 'Punjab disturbances' and the notoriety of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. Yet, as is clear from Ewart's interviews, ICS candidates' reliance on the knowledge of 'old India hands' saw the perpetuation of dated wisdom which prized Punjab over and above other provinces. Aggregated statistics on outrages that might give pause to an aspiring civilian (Tables 6.1 and 6.2) were rather slippery—Table 6.2, for example, only counts bombings, and many other tables routinely included *dacoities* (banditry) as a terrorist crime. Such returns, in any case, were delivered well after the opportune moment for panic had passed and seem to have been constructed with their prospective audience in mind.[69]

The ongoing desirability of a Punjabi posting is also attributable to the determination of those posted in the province to underplay the rise of violence in their public writings and statements. Malcolm Darling's published reports on conditions in the Punjab countryside during the Depression, for example, were largely devoid of political comment. Only twice did Darling divert from his detailed observations on peasant economies and mentalities to cite their exasperation with Civil Disobedience and to report a derisive opinion of the 'Congress Mongress'.[70] This absence is rather curious, considering that issues of peasant welfare (so dear to Darling's heart) were deeply political and were shared by the revolutionaries of the HSRA.[71] However, his private letters to family read very differently. His worried listing of disquieting incidents of violence against Britons in Punjab reveal a much more troubling aspect of Anglo-Indian life in the inter-war years.

The year 1930 was a difficult one for the Government of India. Following a particularly militant annual session in Lahore in December 1929, the Indian National Congress had voted for Civil Disobedience, and by April, its first round—the Salt Satyagraha—was under way. Gandhi's correspondence at the time makes it clear that part of his rationale for embarking on Civil Disobedience was to draw public attention away from the concurrent excitement around revolutionary action.[72] In the resulting protests, the police and the army were deployed against crowds of *satyagrahis*, testing the loyalties of Indian recruits. Some wavered under the pressure. On 23 April 1930, following the arrest of Ghaffar Khan, a United Provinces (UP)

regiment, the Garhwal Rifles, was called to fire on a crowd of satyagrahis in Peshawar, in the North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP), and refused.[73] Fearful of growing insubordination, in May, the government banned several subversive organizations, prohibited a range of publications and began to arrest Congress leaders. At the same time, revolutionary organizations were active. In Bengal, there was an ambitious raid on the Chittagong Armoury in April, while in Delhi, the HSRA was quietly planning its next move: attempting to rescue its members from prison.

The effect of these events on the expatriate community comes through in Darling's letters. In May 1930, he told his sister of the breakdown of Sir Norman Bolton, the Chief Commissioner of the NWFP, who after the mutiny of the Garhwali Regiment 'completely went off his sleep and slept only to have the most fearful nightmares that the women and children were being murdered'.[74] The only remedy for it was to put him on the next boat back, 'otherwise he would go mad. And he went'.[75] The week after, Darling reported that 'our political situation is … less violent but psychologically as bad as ever'.[76] Writing to his wife, who had retreated to the hills for summer, the following week: 'The paper today tells of firing near Jhelum + of a bomb at Multan. We are not out of the wood yet.'[77] And in June:

> Bannatyne told me today, 5 troop trains went thro' Lahore northwards 2 or 3 days ago. He too seemed a wee bit less certain about the Indian troops than a few weeks ago, but recruiting is as brisk as ever and that is a first rate sign. … These bombs tho' are unpleasant—the last thrown towards the Club at Lahore. And I see Ughi's disturbed. I think you should close up at night if that gets worse.[78]

John Thompson, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, made a much more cursory but nonetheless extensive listing in his diary, unfortunately in messy shorthand, of his daily travails. He registered the wounding of the two Indian policemen who captured an HSRA member, Dhanvantari, in Delhi; the attempted shooting of Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency; a bomb explosion at Delhi railway station; and the declining morale of the Indian police.[79] On 27 February 1931, he recorded the death, in a shoot out with police in Allahabad, of Chandra Shekhar Azad ('an extraordinary affair'), and as summer set in and the government prepared to vacate Delhi for Simla, he received intelligence from the police on 4 March and again on 11 March of immanent outrages, including threats made directly at the

Viceroy.[80] These threats escalated as a Privy Council appeal against the death sentences of Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru were rejected on 12 February, and after Irwin personally dismissed petitions of mercy tendered by the family of the condemned men, several prominent Congressites, one bearing 39,605 signatures of the citizens of Kanpur, and a 'monster' petition signed by 'over 200 000 persons' from the Bombay Presidency.[81]

When he arrived to take up his position as head of the Delhi Police Force in mid-1930, Gordon Halland noted that 'the underground revolutionary conspiracies were apparently causing a great deal of anxiety to the authorities'.[82] By 1930, the HSRA's main focus of activity was Delhi, where a cell of activists were operating underground from Hindu College.[83] Unbeknownst to Irwin, the HSRA had been forced to abandon an 'action' to bomb his car on 25 March 1929, when it transpired that Irwin was not in the vehicle.[84] Irwin felt, but was remarkably cool about, the blast underneath his train on 23 December 1929, although the bomb was detonated too early to do the desired damage.[85] In his autobiography, *Fullness of Days*, Irwin imagined the disappointment of his erstwhile assassins, crouched in a ditch in the cold, watching through the fog as his train faded into the distance, 'much as a huntsman has the opposite emotion of satisfaction in watching the movement of his fox across the rides of a wood'.[86]

Despite this attempt and the knowledge of other conspiracies afoot, Irwin resented being accompanied by a bodyguard, which might create the impression that he felt threatened and afraid.[87] Halland ordered a car of armed officers to discreetly follow the Viceroy, giving them 'strict orders to keep on my heels but on no account show their weapons which were within easy reach in the bottom of the car'. One morning, Halland was in a cavalcade returning the Viceroy to his Palace in Delhi; all was well, but as his car turned a corner on to Kingsway, Irwin turned around to admire the impressive vista behind him, and:

> spotted the police car following me. Unfortunately one of the men had lifted his rifle to have it closer at hand and Lord Irwin could not help catching sight of it. He therefore realized at once he was being escorted by an armed party and he apparently expressed some displeasure at this … I fully appreciated Lord Irwin's feelings on the subject and the dislike which any man in his position would have for the need of constant armed protection, especially a man with the high moral and physical courage of the Earl of Halifax as he is now.[88]

Irwin's resolve set a high standard. The Governor of Punjab, Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency, was both apologetic and dismissive in his telegram to Irwin on 23 December 1930:

> Sorry to inform Your Excellency that I was fired at leaving the University Convocation Hall today and hit twice on the left arm and back. Neither wound is at all serious and there is no cause for anxiety. Ends.[89]

This telegram was forwarded to the King. The Prince of Wales cabled back to the Governor: 'So very sorry to hear your bad luck' and *The Times of India* optimistically reported that it was 'reliably understood that His Excellency would attend the races after a couple of days'.[90] In retrospect, these responses all seem rather understated. Six shots had been fired at de Montmorency from 'point-blank range' as he was leaving the convocation. The Sub-Inspector of Police beside him was killed, and had the Governor not made a run for it, he too would have certainly died.[91] When de Montmorency did pass away, in his bed at Cambridge in 1955, an obituary published in *The Times* praised his 'invincible courage' after the attempt on his life: 'After his wounds were dressed, the Governor walked to his car coolly smoking a cigarette.'[92]

The *Civil and Military Gazette*, the Anglo-Indian newspaper of Lahore, which by 1930 was struggling to remain viable, responded to the attack on de Montmorency with an angry editorial, blaming its competitors, the Indian press, for creating 'martyrs out of murderers':

> Such outrages are a disgrace to the Province and many Indians feel them most keenly. But so long as the gutter press of India is allowed to carry on its anti-British propaganda, there will be men who will commit such outrages … only recently it was brought to our notice that a newspaper in Lahore, in an article over a column in length, attempted to put on a pedestal those men who had killed Saunders.[93]

Penderel Moon, at the time serving as Assistant Commissioner in Jullundur, recounted the attempt on de Montmorency in a letter to his mother, brightly musing:

> It seems to me very curious that these revolutionary desperadoes don't organize themselves a bit better. Sporadic attacks on high officials serve no useful purpose, but if they made simultaneous attacks on smaller fry—for instance if they attacked within 48 hours at the 24 Deputy Commissioners

in the Province—they would probably kill or disable quite a number of their victims and cause the government a good deal of embarrassment.[94]

Mrs Moon's discomfiture can only have increased when lower-level officials began to fall. On 7 April 1931, the District Magistrate of Midnapore, James Peddie, was shot and killed; on 27 July, R.R. Garlick, the judge who had tried the Bengali revolutionary Dinesh Gupta, was gunned down in his own courtroom days after receiving a death threat; in August came fruitless attempts on the life of a Mr Cassels in Bengal and on Sir Ernest Hotson at Fergusson College in Poona. In October, the President of the European Association in Calcutta was shot at, but survived.[95] December 1931 saw the killing of Mr Stevens, a District Magistrate in the division of Chittagong. This last attack introduced a fresh angle of anxiety when it was revealed that the perpetrators were college girls, Shanti Ghosh and Suniti Choudhury. Weeks later, Bina Das stood up to take aim at Sir Stanley Jackson. A certain consolatory rationale seems to have been introduced into the ICS, as Darling sadly mused to his sister, as though assassination was the ultimate form of promotion: 'Peddie's murder was a tragic affair, such a nice fellow I am told: they generally get the best of us.'[96]

'THE MOST DASTARDLY OUTRAGE'

While the compensable risk to members of the ICS may have been bravely absorbed as part of the job, the murder of a British woman in the Lahore cantonment in January 1931 decisively altered the discourse, highlighting British insecurity in India. On 13 January 1931, Sajjan Singh, a decommissioned solider, paid a visit to the home of Captain Curtis, whom he held responsible for his dismissal from the army.[97] Learning that Curtis was 'out of station', Sajjan Singh left, but, on reflection, returned and 'ran amok' with a sword, attacking first Mrs Curtis and then her two daughters.[98] Mrs Curtis' daughters were hospitalized and survived, reportedly protected from fatal blows by their *sola topi*s,[99] but she did not, succumbing to her injuries later that evening.

The attack on a British woman and her children introduced a fresh level of panic into the expatriate community in Lahore, forcing it to take defensive action. A reserve regiment, the Punjab Light Horse, was re-formed with the explicit 'purpose of defending women and children in times of emergency', offering generous subsidies to those who joined, even tempting the liberal-minded but provident Penderel Moon.[100] Days after the attack, Darling wrote a reassuring letter to his daughter:

> Darling April, I was playing tennis I noticed to my great alarm 3 obvious pirates stealing through the garden, all wearing blue scarves on their heads + one a fire red scarf around his neck. It was a relief to hear they were barbers. Ruth etc Monica + Sheila [the Curtis girls] are doing well. The ladies of Mian Mir [in the Lahore Cantonment] are now learning to shoot with a revolver.[101]

Although Sajjan Singh had no revolutionary connections, the Curtis murder was construed in the press as yet another terrorist attack. The European Association in Lahore swung into action to accuse the government of 'complete ineptitude' and of failing 'to realize the gravity of the situation', with Owen Roberts, a businessman and Member of the Legislative Council, at its fore.[102] The Punjab Legislative Council met to consider further powers to cope with the challenge and was implored by one Mrs Shave 'to help the Government to take measures to make the free movement of European women safe'.[103] Condolence meetings held at the Lahore Gymkhana turned into angry remonstrations against the government.

Surprisingly, compared to its editorial weeks earlier, the response to the Curtis murder in Lahore's British newspaper, the *Civil and Military Gazette*, was relatively contained, although several strident outbursts were vented as letters to the editor. With the sole exception of a letter by Q. Nazir Ahmad, who wrote in to blame the Congress for the attack, none of these outraged correspondents were willing to put their own names to their letters, preferring instead, as many Anglo-Indians did when criticizing their government, to use indignant sobriquets such as 'Common Sense', 'Soldier' and 'Justice'.[104] 'Justice' blamed the attack on Irwin's 'policy of "peace at any price" and conciliation of the malcontents', before firing off a series of rhetorical questions:

> As a citizen and taxpayer of this country, I ask with thousands of others: Are our wives and little children to be left open to such outrages on the part of an unlawful body? Is any protection going to be afforded to them? Is this weak-kneed policy ever to be discarded? Where has our prestige gone and why? … It is a pity we have not a little of the American spirit which would undoubtedly introduce the lynch law to mete out justice in such cases.[105]

The pressure of political violence exacerbated existing divisions in the British expatriate community. While the Moons and the Darlings of the ICS did their best to uphold up the steel frame of the Raj, others later

registered that they often felt that the government in Britain was in the wrong, and chafed against the policies of the Viceroy, who 'was in a different world!'[106] The Indian public sphere whispered that, fed up with Irwin's willingness to negotiate the release of political prisoners with Gandhi, de Montmorency had cracked under the pressure and wired his resignation to the Secretary of State—other tellings had it that the entire Punjab civil service resigned; the colonial archive records neither.[107] The non-official European community, comprised of commercial, missionary and planting communities, also reacted sharply. Unlike the members of the ICS, whose entrants after at least the mid-1920s had been made aware that the twilight of empire was upon them, the future of non-officials in an independent India was bleak, with no compensatory pay-outs for a career cut short by decolonization.[108] Their sense of entitlement to security was acute and they began to mobilize accordingly against what they saw as the weak government of Lord Irwin; in Lahore, the formation of a 'League of Loyal Citizens' was proposed, although it never eventuated.[109] Such anxieties were opportunistically taken up by Winston Churchill, and the pro-imperialist wing of the Conservative Party, backed by die-hards in the Indian Empire Society and the India Defence League, to oppose the inevitable extension of political reforms in India.[110]

PANIC, THE PRESS AND PROPER CONDUCT

In stark contrast to contemporary governments, which seem to find the construction of a population fearful of terrorism productive, in inter-war India the government sought to minimize the rise of political violence directed at Europeans. Reports and selective statistics issued to the British Parliament—demanded by those eager to criticize operations in India—seem to have underplayed the incidence of political violence.[111] The media was, during this period, largely muted by a Press Ordinance that was in place from the onset of Civil Disobedience, although not all presses complied with the new and expanded construction of sedition.[112] There also seems to have been a concerted attempt to pressure British-owned newspapers by the government to 'hold the line', and to refrain from sensationalist responses to the rise in violence against Europeans.[113] As we have seen, after its editorial following the attack on de Montmorency, the *Civil and Military Gazette*'s response in Lahore was curiously restrained. This was a time when the government was endeavouring to positively influence the Indian-owned press through the Central Bureau

of Information; it is hard to believe that the *Gazette*'s criticism of Irwin and endorsement of vigilantism did not prompt an intervention.[114] In Calcutta, *The Statesman*'s outspoken editor, Arthur Moore—later dismissed from both the Legislative Assembly and *The Statesman* for his persistent criticism of the government—set the standard, lecturing his readership of the irresponsibility of a town hall meeting of the Europeans who threatened 'to take the law into their own hands' if the government did not stop terrorism in its tracks.[115]

The Anglo-Indian practice of outward forbearance was deceptive, for it was coupled with furtive and strenuous attempts by the Government of India to anticipate 'outrages' and arrest the revolutionaries responsible. The Intelligence Bureau in Delhi was quietly pre-occupied with secretive investigations, carried out in liaison with an internal government department—Indian Political Intelligence—'a shadowy and non-avowed organization' based in the India Office.[116] For obvious logistical reasons, memos and reports generated on subversive activities were only circulated internally, were routinely marked secret and, on occasion, were communicated in cypher.[117] Indeed, their relatively late declassification in the 1980s withheld an important source of information to scholars seeking to understand revolutionary and nationalist dynamics.[118] Ensnaring revolutionary suspects required a great deal of operational confidentiality, including garnering of sensitive intelligence from underground informants, some of whom were certainly posing as revolutionary activists and whose identity was closely protected.[119] These concerted attempts to limit the spread of information on the investigation of 'terrorism' in inter-war India was construed by a fearful British expatriate community as inactivity.

By contrast, organizations such as the HSRA adopted the opposite policy, actively seeking publicity as part of its strategy of popularizing its politics.[120] Several HSRA members, including Bhagat Singh and Sukhdev, had dabbled in journalism and enjoyed friendships with journalists and editors in nationalist newspapers in Punjab, UP and Delhi, with the result that much of the coverage in Indian-owned newspapers was sympathetic to the revolutionary cause. By the end of 1929, Bhagat Singh was a household name, his distinctive portrait widely disseminated to the extent that he was recognized, according to Jawaharlal Nehru, 'even in villages'.[121] The government was put in the unenviable position of having to execute an eminently popular figure. The revolutionaries effectively turned their prosecution in the courts into publicity, their confessions in court serving as propaganda, padded out by their defiance of the court proceedings.

The difficulty in dealing with such recalcitrant prisoners further undermined the government's position, as the secretary to the Government of Punjab explained:

> the delay in bringing to justice the murderers of Mr Saunders and Head Constable Chanan Singh has, in particular, had a disheartening effect, especially on the police, and although the morale of the latter is at present higher than it was several months ago, another outrage on a member of the service might well have serious consequences, if ground were given for the belief that Government had failed to deal firmly with revolutionary and kindred activities. The feeling that it might have done more to do so in the past does undoubtedly exist and is widespread among European and Indian members of the services. Similar misgivings are freely expressed by the friends and supporters of Government, who have been puzzled and perturbed by the policy of toleration and by the spread of revolutionary and communistic doctrines.[122]

The fear of losing its supporters and collaborators, particularly in the police and the army, as well as growing criticism in the expatriate community in India and in the Conservative Party in Britain, forced the government to take action. On the basis of emergency conditions, it pushed through an Ordinance enabling the revolutionaries to be tried in absentia. This expedited the judicial process and in October 1931, judgments were handed down on all the accused in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, with death penalties to Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru. Once the death sentences were carried out, the anti-imperial response was so powerful that the Government of Punjab compiled a dossier, correlating the escalation of attacks against Europeans and the police with the rise of 'eulogies of martyrs' in Indian newspapers. An Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Bill was introduced to the Legislative Assembly in Delhi, being passed and enacted in September 1931. This made it unlawful for any 'newspaper, book or other document containing any words, signs or visible representations' to:

(a) incite or encourage, or tend to incite or to encourage, the commission of any offence of murder or any cognizable offence involving violence, or

(b) directly or indirectly express approval or admiration of any such offence, or of any person, real or fictitious, who has committed or is alleged or represented to have committed any such offence.[123]

With this legislation, the government sought to silence a public culture of adulation of revolutionaries, discernible even within Congress circles. This legislation represented an attempt to forge a level playing field, in which *neither* side would publicly acknowledge the extent to which political violence challenged the Government of India.

The rise of violence aimed at Britons and their collaborators in the inter-war period was a graphic indication that the imperial grasp on India was beginning to loosen. That these attacks formed the backdrop against which Irwin instigated debates with the Congress and other stakeholders about constitutional reforms—in the niceties of another Round Table Discussion, the culmination of a series of *tête-à-tête*s with Gandhi—seemed all the more outrageous to his critics in India and at home. Inter-war India was a transitional period; after the Government of India Act of 1935 was debated and passed, both the Raj and India had to recalibrate long-standing relationships as colonizer and colonized as power was devolved to Indians at the provincial level. British communities and individuals adjusted to this reality differently, many inwardly and privately. In India, the maintenance of a certain mien that performed notions of authority and dominance became a management strategy and a method of containing the anxieties and fears attended by imperialism. There was no comparable script for preparing to bow out of empire.

NOTES

1. Gautam Chakravarty (2004).
2. Kim A. Wagner (2010); Christopher A. Bayly (1996: 316).
3. Vinay Lal (1993: 35–60).
4. Elizabeth Buettner (2004: 253). Britons resident in India are often referred to even in the scholarly literature as 'Anglo-Indian', although as Buettner argues, this is a doubly unstable term, as was to become a synonym for 'Eurasian' communities, which neglects to acknowledge the role of Scots and Irish in the administration and policing of the Raj. I prefer to use 'expatriate Briton' and variations of that term.
5. Francis G. Hutchins (1967: 201).
6. E.M. Collingham (2001: 111).
7. James Lunt (1973: xviii).
8. Taylor C. Sherman (2010); Jonathan Saha (2011: 844–53).
9. Achille Mbembe (2003: 11–40).
10. In the following sections, I will draw upon some arguments made in my recent book; however, this chapter explores in some depth something the

book does not: the British expatriates' experiences of political violence. See Kama Maclean (2015).

11. James Campbell Ker (1973 [1917]); H.W. Hale (1974 [1937]).
12. Durba Ghosh has drawn attention to the phrase 'gentlemanly terrorists' and 'bhadralok dacoits [middle-class bandits]' by intelligence committees formed in Bengal that aimed to arrest political violence. See Durba Ghosh (2006: 273).
13. Kama Maclean and J. Daniel Elam (2013a).
14. A sampling of recent work would include Maia Ramnath (2011); Harald Fischer-Tiné (2014); Shruti Kapila (2010: 437–457).
15. Kama Maclean and J. Daniel Elam (2013b: 116).
16. Thomas Dixon (2013).
17. A very cursory sampling: Ashis Nandy (1983); Francis G. Hutchins (1967); Mrinalini Sinha (1995).
18. George Orwell (1950 [1936]: 2).
19. I am thinking of Rabindranath Tagore's 1905 ode to determination, *Ekla Chalo Re* (Keep on walking, alone), which was sung to the revolutionary Jatindranath Das—a member of the HSRA whose expertise was in bomb-making—as he lay dying of pneumonia, contracted after he had been violently force-fed during a hunger strike in September 1929.
20. Susan Bayly emphasises the strict decorum and 'requisite *sang-froid*' expected of British expatriate women (as well as the important exceptions to the rule) in her introduction to Iris Macfarlane (2006: xvi–xxxix).
21. Douglas M. Peers (1991: 567).
22. Cited in E.M. Collingham (2001: 142).
23. E.M. Collingham (2001: 142).
24. E.M. Forster (1953: 14).
25. 'The Delhi Outrage: His Excellency's Condition', *The Times of India*, 27 December 1912, p. 7; 'The Delhi Outrage: Lord Hardinge's Fortitude', *The Advertiser*, 30 December 1912, p. 10.
26. Dennis Kincaid (1973: 279).
27. 'The Viceroy Wounded', *The Times of India*, 24 December 1912, p. 7.
28. E.M. Forster (1953: 14).
29. E.M. Forster (1953: 118).
30. There were several Lahore Conspiracy Cases. The first, centred around the Ghadar movement, was prosecuted in 1915; the second was the larger conspiracy organized by the HSRA, centring around the assassination of Saunders, prosecuted in 1930. To this is sometimes added a second conspiracy, also in 1930, of satellite or former HSRA members who sought to persecute the investigators of the Saunders case. See Hale (1974 [1937]: Appendix 2).

31. See, for example, 'The Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931', National Archives of India (hereinafter NAI), Home Political, 4/36 Part 1, 1931.
32. H.W. Hale (1974 [1937]: 30).
33. See, for example, markings emphasizing violent turns of phrase in the Indian media in NAI, Home Political, 13/XI/1931.
34. P. Cartwright, 'Notes on Life in India', Cartwright Papers, Cambridge South Asia Archive, p. 9.
35. Bipan Chandra (1979: 225); Sumit Sarkar (1983: 251); Bipan Chandra et al. (1988 : 247).
36. In some contexts, the A stood for 'Army'.
37. Kama Maclean (2015: Chapter 2).
38. Jack Morton, 'Indian Episode (A Personal Memoir)', p. 41. BL, Eur Mss D1003/1.
39. 'The Philosophy of the Bomb' (1930) in *Indian Proscribed Tracts*, South Asia Mircoform Project (SAMP), Reel 3, item 28 (unpaginated); Letter from Sukhdev, *Young India*, 23 April 1931, reproduced in *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (hereinafter *CWMG*), New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Vol. XLVI, pp. 397–99.
40. I elaborate on this claim in *A Revolutionary History*, especially Chapter 5.
41. 'Saunders' Brilliant Record: Promising Career Cut Short', *The Times of India*, 19 December 1929, p. 14. To this *The Times* of London added that he had 'won his way to the esteem of his fellow-countrymen and of good-class Indians in Lahore'. 'The Lahore Murder', *The Times*, 19 December 1928, p. 11. Much less was made of 23-year-old Channan Singh, although his action in chasing the assassins was described as 'courageous … worthy of the best traditions of the Punjab Police Force'. *The Times of India*, 19 December 1929, p. 14.
42. Both of these attacks, Lord Irwin fancied, were timed to commemorate the attack on Hardinge. Irwin to Viscount Halifax, 24 December 1930. British Library (hereinafter BL), Mss Eur C152/28. However, reading the accounts of surviving revolutionaries, it is evident that the attack on Irwin at least was calibrated to inject additional pressure to his meeting with Congress leaders later that day. For further details on the attack and its immediate political impact, see Kama Maclean (2015: 164–71).
43. The shooting attack on the Governor of the Punjab resulted in the death of an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. The gunman, Hari Kishen, had been recruited by members of the HSRA, but he claimed in the court case that he acted alone. For further details of the shooting, see Kama Maclean (2015: Chapters 5, 6).

44. Report on the political situation in the Punjab for the fortnight ending 31 December 1929, NAI.
45. There were other related court cases, such as the Lamington Road Outrage, but many of them either collapsed due to want of evidence, or were not successfully linked to the HSRA by the prosecutors.
46. Gulab Singh (1963).
47. Statements of Terrorist Crime up to 1930. BL, India Office Records (hereinafter IOR), L/PJ/12/400, p. 78.
48. Statements of Terrorist Crime up to 1930. BL, IOR, L/PJ/12/400, p. 81.
49. 'Rare Display of Coolness by the Governor at Point-Blank Range', *The Times of India*, 8 February 1932, p. 9; S. Das (2004).
50. Ramachandra Guha (2002: 453, fn. 26). I am grateful to Robert Travers for drawing my attention to this anecdote.
51. Andrew Roberts (1991: 31).
52. 'British Press "Sees Red", *Hindustan Times*, 11 April 1929, p. 1.
53. 'The History of a Legend: Accounting for Popular Histories of Revolutionary Nationalism', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 6, 2012, pp. 1540-1571.
54. James Campbell Ker (1973 [1917]: 330–31).
55. 'Terrorism in India: Effect on Students', *The Times*, 12 November 1932.
56. C. Tegart (1932) *Terrorism in India: A Speech Delivered before the Royal Empire Society* (London: Royal Empire Society), pp. 7–8. Tegart Papers, Box 4, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge.
57. Valentine Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, London: Macmillan & Co, 1910.
58. J.M. Ewart, 'Preface', in H.W. Hale (1974 [1937]: ix); J. Daniel Elam and Chris Moffat (2016).
59. Where other provinces listed the names of suspects with 'history sheets' in the appendices of *Political Trouble*, for the sake of brevity, the section on Bengal noted that it had 'about 2,000 suspects on record'. James Campbell Ker (1973 [1917]: 443).
60. Weekly Report of the Director, Intelligence Bureau of the Home Department, Government of India, 24 September 1931. BL, IOR, L/PJ/12/390, p. 80.
61. Compare, for example, H. Williamson (1933) *A Note on Terrorism in India (Except Bengal)* (Simla: Government of India Press) and the corresponding but slightly longer *Memorandum on the History of Terrorism in Bengal* (Calcutta: Government of Bengal) published in the same year. BL, IOR, L/PJ/12/397, pp. 79–101 and pp. 102–44, respectively.
62. Ewing Papers, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge.
63. F.G. Cracknell, ICS, UP 1932-47, Ewing Papers, p. 63. This seems to be a reference to an incident in which an undergraduate shot and killed his

tutor, fatally wounded a member of the Cambridge Police Force and turned his weapon upon himself. *The Times*, 5 June 1930, p. 11.

64. P.J. Pringle, ICS 1933-47, Bengal. Ewing Papers, p. 36.

65. Michael Silvestri (2000: 479).

66. R.S.T. John, ICS 1932-47, Bengal, Ewing Papers, p. 134.

67. B.A.C. Cook, ICS 1922-47, UP, Ewing Papers, p. 12; Morton, 'Indian Episode', p. 91.

68. Clive Dewey (1993: 201).

69. Statistics provided to the House of Commons, for example, do not align with those of the Intelligence Bureau in Delhi. See Kama Maclean (2015: 7).

70. 'The zemindar [landlord] is very sore about the fall in prices and attributes it in part to "Congress Mongress".' 'Diary of My Tour, 1930–31, Wisdom and Waste', Darling Papers, 2:1, Centre of South Asian Studies (CSAS), Cambridge, pp. 33; 236.

71. See the HSRA's 'Philosophy of the Bomb'. Darling was once told by a CID officer of the importance of his work in the Cooperative Movement, and that it was 'most important to prevent the revolutionaries getting a hold of it'. Darling to Josie, 13 March 1931. CSAS, Darling Papers, 1:15, Envelope 1.

72. Gandhi to Irwin, 4 May 1930, *CWMG*, Vol. XLIII, p. 389; Interview with *Young India*, 11 March 1930, *CWMG*, Vol. XLIII, p. 42.

73. Irwin to George V, 30 April 1930. BL, IOR, Mss Eur C 152/2. This was all the more unexpected because the Garhwalis were Hindus, while the crowd they were ordered to fire upon were predominantly Muslim; that they would refuse to do so ran counter to generations of colonial knowledge that ordered the structuring and deployment of army regiments along and against religious solidarities. The Garhwali regiment was charged with mutiny.

74. Darling to Irene, 11 May 1930. CSAS, Darling Papers, 1:10, Envelope 1.

75. Many officials, feeling their lives under threat, did the same. Jock Scott, the Superintendent of Police in Lahore—the man the HSRA was after when it killed Saunders—sailed home after receiving so many death threats, as did Gordon Walker, the District Magistrate who tried the Viceregal Special Bomb Case. 'Police Unearth Plot: Mr Scott Leaves', *Hindustan Times*, 28 April 1929, p. 1; D.D. Khanna, interviewed by S.L. Manchanda, 16 May 1976. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Oral History Transcript (hereinafter NMML OHT), Acc. no. 294, p. 47.

76. Darling to Irene, 18 May 1930. CSAS, Darling Papers, 1:10, Envelope 1, p. 153.

77. Darling to Josie, 20 May 1930. CSAS, Darling Papers, 1:15, unpaginated.

78. Darling to Josie, 13 June 1930. CSAS, Darling Papers, 1:15, unpaginated.

79. Sir John Perronet Thompson Collection. BL, Eur Mss F137/24, 1930 Diary.
80. Thompson Collection, BL, Mss Eur F137/25, 1931 Diary.
81. NAI, Home Judicial, 152/I/31 & K.W; 'Monster Petition to Viceroy', *Civil and Military Gazette*, 2 March 1931, p.1.
82. G.H.R. Halland, 'Punjab Patrol: Some Memories of an Indian Police Officer', CSAS, Halland Papers, p. 296.
83. B.P. Jain, interviewed by Uma Shankar, 3 June 1987. Interview no. 221, CSAS, Cambridge, Oral History Collection.
84. S. Varma, interviewed by Hari Dev Sharma and S.L. Manchanda, 16 February 1972. NMML OHT, no. 502, p. 95.
85. See Kama Maclean (2015: Chapter 5).
86. Earl Halifax (1957: 142).
87. Irwin may have resented this all the more keenly due to his disability—he was born without a left hand. His biographer Andrew Roberts surmises that this did not generally affect him adversely, 'although it may have added to a tendency to be slightly sensitive'. Roberts 1992: 6). Photographs of Irwin indicate that he was generally careful to conceal the missing part.
88. Halland, 'Punjab Patrol', p. 303.
89. Telegram from Montmorency to Irwin, 23 December 1930. BL, IOR, Mss Eur C 152/2, no. 94.
90. 'Lahore Outrage Condemned', *The Times of India*, 25 December 1930, p. 11.
91. Khanna, OHT, p. 37; De Montmorency to Irwin, 24 December 1930. Halifax Papers, BL, IOR, Mss Eur C152/27. The gunman, Hari Kishan, had been instructed not to harm 'a hair on the head' of a nationalist leader, Dr Radhakrishnan, who happened to be standing in between the doorway and the fleeing Governor. K. Murty Ashok Vohra (1990: 48).
92. 'Obituary: Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency', *The Times*, 26 February 1955, p. 8.
93. Editorial, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 24 December 1930, p. 2.
94. Moon to Mother, 25 December 1930. Penderel Moon Papers, BL, EUR MSS, F230/2.
95. 'President of European Association Shot', *The Times of India*, 30 October 1931, p. 11.
96. Darling to Irene, April 20, 1931. CSAS, Darling Papers, 1:10, Envelope 2, p. 182.
97. This section draws on and extends the description in Kama Maclean (2015: 191–93).
98. *Report on the political situation in the Punjab for the fortnight ending the 15th of January, 1931*; Report of the Director, Intelligence Bureau, 22

January 1931, BL, IOR, L/PJ/12/390, p. 22. For further detail on the attack, see Kama Maclean (2015: Chapter 6).

99. Darling to Josie, 15 January 1931. CSAS, Darling Papers, 1:15, Envelope 1.

100. Moon wrote to his father that he had not the slightest sympathy with the objectives of the Light Horse, but it helped him to defray the escalating costs of keeping an animal at stable. Moon to Father, 2 February 1931, Penderel Moon Papers, BL, Mss Eur F230/3.

101. Darling to Josie, 18 January 1931. Darling Papers, 1:15, Envelope 1.

102. 'Terrorism in the Punjab: Government blamed by Europeans', *Civil and Military Gazette*, 19 January 1931, p. 1.

103. 'Punjab Government Condemns Violence', *Civil and Military Gazette*, 18 January 1931, p.1.

104. *Civil and Military Gazette*, 15 January 1931, p. 3; 18 January 1931, p. 3; 19 January 1931, p. 3.

105. 'Justice', Letters to the Editor, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 18 January 1931, p. 3.

106. Jardine, ICS UP, 1921–47, Ewing Papers, p. 28.

107. B.C. Lal, interviewed by Hari Dev Sharma, 20 June 1969. NNML OHT, no. 637, p. 18; 'The Shade of Bhagat Singh at Karachi', *The Tribune*, 25 March 1931, p. 11; Kama Maclean (2015: Chapter 6).

108. Benjamin Zachariah (2001: 53–72); H.M.L. Alexander (1982: 1–12).

109. 'Justice for All', *Civil and Military Gazette*, 18 January 1931, p. 3.

110. I. St John (2006: 104–124).

111. See Kama Maclean (2015: Chapter 7).

112. Kama Maclean (2014: 7–34).

113. It is evident in the memoirs of provincial governors and journalists alike that any governor worth his salt had regular meetings with editors of important newspapers in his province.

114. Milton Israel (1994: 36–37). See Ian Stephens' account of the pressures on the editor of *The Statesman* during the Quit India movement: Ian Stephens (1966: Chapter 3).

115. Editorial, *The Statesman*, 30 July 1931, p. 8.

116. 'Administrative History of the Indian Political Intelligence'. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/A2A/records.aspx?cat=059-lpj12&cid=-1&Gsm=2008-06-18--1.

117. Early investigations into the Assembly Bomb Case were communicated entirely in cypher, although this had to be abandoned when the Chief Commissioner in Delhi complained that it took too long to decode and held up the investigations. Thompson to Haig, 15 May 1929. NAI, Home Political, File no. 192/29.

118. Kama Maclean (2015: Chapter 1).
119. See, for example, the secrecy enjoined upon the reader in 'Notes on Terrorism', 1932. BL, IOR, L/PJ/12/404, p. 111.
120. 'The History of a Legend: Accounting for Popular Histories of Revolutionary Nationalism', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 6, 2012, pp. 1540-1571.
121. J. Nehru (1973) 'On the Lahore Executions', Speech at the Congress Session, Karachi, 29 March 1931, p. 505.
122. Haig to Emerson, Assessment of the Lahore Congress, 3 January 1930. BL, IOR, L/PO/6/56 (i), p. 22.
123. *Legislative Assembly Debates*, Vol. V, No. 1, 7 September 1931. NAI, Home Political, 4/36 Part 1 1931.

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Mirrors of Violence: Inter-racial Sex, Colonial Anxieties and Disciplining the Body of the Indian Soldier During the First World War

Gajendra Singh

In 1939, some two decades after the Armistice, Mulk Raj Anand wrote and published *Across the Black Waters*. The novel was the second part of a trilogy narrating the experiences of Lal Singh from adolescent rebellion, to military service in the Indian Army in France during the First World War, to his return homes and involvement in (Indian) revolutionary nationalisms. For Anand, it was at once a memorial to a soldiering father from whom he had become estranged and an expression of frustration at his father's social conservatism. Anand's *sipahis* (or 'sepoys') were horrified by the brutality of battlefield justice, constantly questioned the worth of their white British officers and enthralled by the sexual possibilities of transnational military service:

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And he could see Marie as he had seen her by the brook for the first time: she had seemed like a young animal, a playful doe, teased by that lion cub of an André, and teasing him, her budding youth bursting in her cries and shrieks with a turbulence that had confounded his senses and made him stare at her for recognition … And now she sat demure, but clear and still, remote and near, her challenging eyes bent over her full pouting mouth, altogether not beautiful, but full of a light that seemed to stream through her dark head.

…

'How beautiful she is,' he said to himself, as she uttered little cries of helplessness at the chicks rustling in and out of her hands. 'How innocent!' For nothing seemed to exist to her, neither the war, nor the soldiers, only the chicks. He recalled that when the soldiers had whispered and twittered and called as they issued out of the house, she had ignored them utterly, and had walked along, demure and grown up, but simple as a child. And now she was lost in her little game.

…

Lalu lifted the basket and walked through the noisy, busy market, his tear-stained eyes averted from Marie, his head surcharged with madness.[1]

Sex was an ever-present in the lives of Anand's *sipahis*. His soldiers visited brothels in Orleans, yearned after village girls near Ypres and confessed how much they 'liked the look' of French women in imagined letters back home.[2] But it yet remained incidental to Anand's narrative, always made impossible and pushed into the realms of the what-might-have-been and the unrequited, because of *sipahis*' rustic simplicity and the psychological impediments of trying to cross racial frontiers: '"They kiss on the mouth then here?" asked Lalu blushing with a modesty that had received a shock and a thrill at the same time.'[3] Anand's otherwise admirable *Lalu* trilogy fell short in its presentation of the sexual (or near-sexual) encounter between Indian soldiers and European women during the First World War. It missed the complexity with which French/Western/white femininity was imagined and discussed by *sipahis* at the time; the extent to which it could become both *Fanoniste* opportunity[4] and the source of shame and disgust. It ignored the paranoia, panic and fear displayed by colonial powers at what inter-racial, wartime relationships might mean for colonial hierarchies of masculinity (something that has only begun to be explored in relation to colonial armies).[5] And Anand only ever hinted at the constraints imposed upon the women involved—further entrapped by colonial and gendered discourses of correct, white womanly behaviour.[6]

What Anand missed is partly realized in this chapter.[7] It is an investigation of inter-racial sexual desire between Indian soldiers and British and French women during the First World War; of juvenile fantasies, sex-work and the development of consensual and loving relationships. That these sentiments were recorded, stored and still survive in transcribed letters was due to particular, and peculiar, discourses of military paternalism in the Indian Army. Under the peculiar logic of British imperialism, Indian *sipahis* were the epitome of Kipling's half-savage and half-child: in need of a nurturing, civilizing hand and back-of-the-hand-discipline. They were both to be provided with more generous welfare provisions (from *batta* payments to the activity of District Soldiers' Boards)[8] and disciplined more harshly than their white peers (flogging was used as a summary punishment in the Indian Army until 1920).[9] The attitude of the Indian Army towards letters by its soldiers was shaped by these discourses of military paternalism. From the beginning of the First World War, the Indian Army encouraged its soldiers to write home to assuage feelings of anxiety, loneliness and despondency.[10] The Army provided green-coloured, self-sealing letter cards in which soldiers were encouraged to scribble their thoughts once per week. Military officials remarked with some amazement at the numbers of *sipahis* who had learnt to write just so they could pen their own letters.[11] Soldiers keenly requested language primers and newspapers, and even took to incorporating French phrases in their prose to add to or cover any gaps in their knowledge of their vernacular: 'Of course people would laugh, but "can en fait rien" [sic].'[12] For those who remained illiterate or unable to write a full letter, there was an intimate, shared literacy that accompanied the asking of a friend or acquaintance in the platoon to help pen a letter; a collective literacy of shared language, metaphor and sentiment. By the autumn of 1915, there were up to 50,000 letters being written by, to and between Indian soldiers in France every week, and, one would expect, tens of thousands more from *sipahis* in East Africa and the Middle East.

Yet, although *sipahis* were allowed to speak, they were never permitted to speak freely. The decision to allow Indian soldiers to voice their fears and concerns was made to further institutionalize and perfect military paternalism. After Indian soldiers arrived in France in the winter of 1914, their letters were no longer to be censored as they were in British battalions—by an orderly reading out aloud a selection of letters to a junior officer entrusted to excise any that betrayed operational details. A special Chief Censor of Indian Mails was appointed, whose purpose, with the

help of his staff, was to read, analyse, translate and record every letter sent by and to a *sipahi* in the field.[13] The space of speech was created as an intelligence exercise. Those letters that displayed suitable amounts of humility and deference became prototypes for propaganda pieces for British Military Intelligence, such as Rudyard Kipling's fictionalized versions of soldiers' letters published in 1917 to counter Indian nationalist activity in the USA (later repackaged as *The Eyes of Asia*).[14] Even that correspondence had to be effaced in its public display and before it re-emerged in Kipling's study, stripped of any exchange of operational details or words and sentiment that may have been 'detrimental to the prestige and spirit of British rule'.[15] And, as with the majority of other letters, the entexted retelling of sexual encounters, whether fantasy or real, were among the first letters to be excised.

This does not mean that the detrita that remain accessible to the historian—type-written and pencilled draft summaries of letters later folded into digestible reports for British Intelligence—are static texts inescapably fixed under a censorious gaze. The very attempts to translate, record and then excise these letters only furthered their embattled, polysemous nature. Despite the Censor's best efforts, his reports perpetually opined the 'Oriental' turns of phrase that made effective censorship impossible; soldiers constantly manipulated their language out of an awareness that it was being read but misconstrued, transcribed but only in part.[16] A partial presence remains of authorial intent in these letters (something I have written about at greater length elsewhere).[17] In that partial, haunting presence, the enacted and performative violences of the colonial Indian Army were twinned and mirrored in the violences soldiers began to perform upon their own bodies. Inter-racial sex both threatened imperial hierarchies for the colonial military and enflamed markers of ethnicity and religion for soldiers trapped in the trenches of France. It led to extraordinary efforts to police and prevent its occurrence, first by the Indian Army and then by its soldiers alone.

Eating Mathai in Brighton: Traversing Taboos and the Emergence of the 'Sex Problem'

The final decision, in July 1914, to send an Indian Corps to France and Belgium as part of the initial British Expeditionary Force (*sipahis* comprised a third of Britain's initial forces in the field) necessitated the

hurried creation of a separate military support structure for Indian soldiers in Europe. The Indian Army operated under its own military law and regulations, and under its own rubric of appropriate punishments and rewards. The creation of separate hospitals for the treatment and convalescence of Indian wounded was of chief concern. The demand for Indian hospitals followed the sudden realization—from the first Indian casualties in the Ypres Salient in October 1914—that the war would be more bloody than forecast and that pre-planned field hospitals lacked both beds and medical expertise. The sites for Indian hospitals—dotted around Brighton and in Hampshire—were chosen in the belief, distilled from earlier climactic theories of race,[18] that the warm(er) climes of the south coast of England would better suit Oriental soldiers (and, in the case of the Brighton Pavilion, that gaudy, Orientalized architecture and furnishings would better suit the Eastern mind).[19] Finally, and for this chapter most importantly, the organization and day-to-day running of the hospitals were shaped by the problem of inter-racial sex.

The largest Indian military hospital was established in January 1915 in the Brighton Workhouse (officially named the Brighton Poor Law Institution and afterwards used as part of the Brighton General Hospital). Colonel Sir Bruce Seton of Abercorn, formerly Deputy Director-General of the Indian Medical Service, was appointed as its commander.[20] Within weeks, Seton set about rectifying the vices endemic to the Indian soldiers under his care—drink and sex:

> It was evident from the very first that drink and the sex problem were factors which would have to be reckoned with. A large proportion of the followers, the sweepings of Bombay City, were to be found to be habitual drunkards; and the ill-advised conduct of the women in the town, though partly innocent in intention, was bound to result in the gravest scandals. To deal with these problems it was necessary to draw up absolutely inflexible rules governing the granting of permission for passes outside the precincts.[21]

Seton prefigured that fear which Ann Laura Stoler has characterized as 'métissage': the 'threat to white prestige', 'European degeneracy and moral decay' implicit in the sexual mixing of the colonizer's body with that of the colonized.[22] Unsurprisingly, the measures Seton took to prevent sexual liaisons between Indian men and British women at the Kitchener Indian Hospital, as the establishment came to be known, were met with disapproval and anger by the *sipahis* concerned. In the letters written by

Indian wounded and hospital staff, concerns were expressed that their officers were overstepping the bounds of legitimate authority; parallels were drawn with the maltreatment of Indian soldiers elsewhere; and forms of protest were enacted to force Seton into a rethink.

The colonial body in Britain during both World Wars became a troubling mixture of desire, envy and revulsion. As Richard Smith has argued, the broadening of recruiting practices beyond regular soldiers and reservists in Britain brought about a crisis of white masculinity. It arose in the context of the sudden prevalence of psychiatric disorders among soldiers (Charles Myers, who became the first and only consulting psychologist to the British Army, was documenting cases of 'shell-shock' from 5 November 1914),[23] the constant necessity to relax requirements for military service because of the poor health and stature of British men,[24] and a well-established Eugenics movement warning of the fear of racial degeneration:

> The average physique was good enough, but the total included an astonishing number of men whose narrow and misshapen chests, and other deformities or defects, unfitted them to stay the more exacting requirements of service in the field … Route marching, not routine tours of trench duty, made recurring casualties of these men.[25]

The colonial soldier offered a striking contrast, whether it was the 'magnificently proportioned' Caribbean soldiers,[26] black GIs in Britain during the Second World War—'Honey you should see how the "old women" like to go around with negroes here. Perhaps they like to go around with them because they have immense Penises'[27]—or the 'beautiful' men of India described in the diaries of British nurses:

> They are nearly all 47th Sikhs, perfect lambs: they hold up their wounded hands and arms like babies for you to see, and insist on having them dressed whether they've been done or not. They behave like gentlemen, and salaam after you've done them. They have masses of long, fine, dark hair under their turbans done up with yellow combs, glorious teeth, and melting dark eyes. One died. The younger boys have beautiful, classic Italian faces, and the rest have fierce black beards curling over their ears.[28]

The colonized body became the site of sexual fantasy and consensual sex. But in both conflicts, this was not without its consequences. Prosecutions and less formalized violence against black American soldiers was the

subject of Graham Smith's seminal work *When Jim Crow Met John Bull*, Richard Smith and Jacqueline Jenkinson have documented some of the racist attacks of inter-racial couples that occurred in London and elsewhere from 1917 to 1919,[29] and the BBC was moved to commission a television series in 2011 examining the official horror in Britain at the presence of the 'half-caste' child in its port cities.[30] Indian *sipahis* also featured in this tale of sexual success and official frustration.

In the case of Indian soldiers, British military authorities took preemptive action to try and segregate Indian men from white women. British nurses were barred from attending to Indian military wounded with the exception of the Lady Hardinge Hospital at Brockenhurst in Hampshire, which was the only hospital funded by a private charity (the Indian Soldiers' Fund under the auspices of the Order of St John of Jerusalem), and a handful of female nurses who served in hospitals in France. Commanding officers of Indian battalions and hospitals in Europe forbade any inter-racial marriage, even without official prompting, and resisted French attempts to relax the restriction until the autumn of 1916. But, in spite of these efforts to limit contact, encounters with European women and Indian men were common. A large number of soldiers' letters referred to European *mems* of all backgrounds. Wealthy French spinsters and widows were portrayed as desperate to secure the 'carnal pleasure' of *sipahis*—Sikhs and men of the Service Corps apparently earned as much as '6, 7 or 8 francs' a time[31]—or as matronly figures showing platonic concern:

> My mother, like you this French mother does all she can for my comfort and thinks much of me. I cannot write sufficiently in praise of what she does for me. If on any day, by reason of the press of work, I do not return till evening, the people of the house come in search of me and complain about me being absent for so long. At the time when I was away and could not find time to write either to you or her she came close to the place where I was and where no one is permitted to come, and asked to see her boy, and brought with her a hamper of things to eat. What more can I say about the concern she has for my welfare?[32]

Sex-workers were written about voluminously. Jai Singh relayed at length his intention to journey into the 'fairylands' of Paris and his plan to spend 'Rs. 250 in four days',[33] and others commented on the easy sexual gratification available outside their hospital grounds or on the streets of English towns:

> English girls are very free in their nature and they love Indians very much … Love-making and breathing in Europe is nothing but a matter of choice, friends are plenty when purse is full.[34]

And more 'virtuous' girls of marriageable age made their way into soldiers' narratives. Many *sipahis* indicated that they were in consensual relationships with one or, in the case of Abdul Jaffar Khan, two Frenchwomen by 1915.[35] Others commented on their desire to wed the English 'mems' that they had met:

> I am sick, but there is nothing the matter with me, nor am I wounded … Tell [censored] not to be anxious about me, for when I come back I will bring him a lovely girl to marry such as he could not find among all the Mahsuds. If the war comes to an end I will bring you a 'mem' from England. So do not be distressed, but pray always, for safety is difficult.[36]

Thus, not only did soldiers partake in sexual relationships with European women, but the issue of these transcolonial liaisons formed a large part of their correspondence. Europe became a phantasmagoria and the site of sexual transgression for the colonized soldier.

For some *sipahis*, the sexual contact spurred deeper thoughts. It became a conduit through which they could question what it was that made them, as Indians, different from their white counterparts. One hospital worker began his letter in wonder of European sexual liberation and pleasure in extra-marital affairs—'[she said] it does not matter how poor you may be I am quite ready to lie openly with you'.[37] This prompted him to ponder why it was that these consensual relationships involving Indian *sipahis* were condemned and frowned upon by their officers when similar liaisons involving British soldiers did not receive the same treatment.[38] Mithan Lal, a storekeeper at the Kitchener Indian Hospital, wrote of the contrast between the freedoms given to the English populace of Brighton and the freedoms denied Indians at the hospital. Mithan went on to compare the life of *sipahis* in hospital to that of the political prisoners and convicts in the penal colonies of the Andaman Islands: 'Convicts in India are sent to the Andaman Islands; but we have found our convict station here in England. Tell me, how are they treated?'[39] Finally, Ram Jawan Singh, a wounded soldier at Brighton, unfavourably compared the treatment of Indian soldiers in Britain to how the French treated their 'Algerian subjects': '[are they] allowed to go out to the town when off

duty without any guard to look after them? … what pay do they get under the French Republic? … What uniform are they given?'[40] It may not quite have amounted to a *Fanoniste* moment—the claiming of a 'white whiteness' through the caressing of a white breast[41]—but there was a tentative questioning of colonial truths that accompanied the more carnal side of *métissage* at Brighton. Evelyn Howell, the Chief Censor of Indian soldiers' correspondence, anxiously marked out these letters as deserving of special attention by his superiors in the Indian Army and at the India Office. The ideas and assumptions engendered by transcolonial liaisons were seen as the most dangerous aspects of inter-racial relationships: 'detrimental to the prestige and spirit of European rule'.[42]

The heightened levels of official and local anxiety inspired Seton to act. At least one case of an Indian medic—Sohan Lal—being charged with criminal assault on a local 15-year-old girl had already reached court (although the case ended with Sohan's acquittal because of the supposedly 'loose' character of the young woman involved).[43] Seton forbade Indian personnel from leaving hospital grounds[44]—with the exception of Indian 'Native' Officers (VCOs) and hospital staff who could leave if granted a pass. To enforce this, Seton ordered 'barbed wire palings' to be erected on the walls surrounding the hospital. (British) Military Police guards were stationed around the perimeter of the hospital in order to prevent 'cases of "breaking out"'[45] and were ordered to punish soldiers breaking the rules with a 'dozen lashes'.[46] Measures were introduced to prevent visits to and from neighbouring military hospitals,[47] and rations for patients were cut, to the extent that one soldier claimed that he only received '2 *chataks* of *ata* [120 grams of flour]' per day and 'those who eat sugar do not get milk, or ghee'.[48] Finally, limits were imposed on how many of the seriously wounded at the hospital would be invalided back to India or transferred elsewhere out of suspicion that soldiers would feign illness to escape Seton's measures.[49] It was not an unreasonable suspicion. Soldiers did mutilate their own bodies or feign illness in order to obtain a temporary or longer-term relief from front-line service; a mixture of the perfectly rational desire to escape the killing fields of Flanders and the war trauma engendered by the profound irrationality of the Front.[50] But only at the Kitchener were extraordinary measures taken to prevent all occurrences of self-inflicted wounds. For Seton, the stringent disciplining and domiciliation of the Indian body was the means to prevent *métissage* in all its forms—from sexual encounters to the exchanging of ideas.

The measures taken in the Kitchener resulted in an almost immediate response from soldiers unwilling to accept this new draconian regime. These ranged from attempts to sneak past the guards posted at the hospital grounds in the dead of night to *sipahis* endeavouring to arrange their transfer to other hospitals.[51] One particular instance of dissent is noteworthy, involving Sub-Assistant Surgeon Jagu Godbole, both because it is referred to in several soldiers' letters[52] and because, after his arrest and conviction, the man in question was unafraid to outline his reasons for committing the crime. Jagu wrote a series of letters to his father on 14, 16 and 19 December 1915. They all began with the hospital worker questioning the view aired by his parents and teachers in Bombay that 'our morality is higher than the morality of the English'[53] because, for Jagu, it led to the denial of bodily desires:

> It is natural that out minds should lean towards those we love, and the English song ['It's a Long Way to Tipperary'] brings out this feeling. Among us we would immediately say, 'What a fool you are, to thus take the name of women when going to war, instead of naming God.' Owing to this fear, in place of saying the words 'sweetest girl' we should say the name of Pandurang or some other god. Thus, while actually thinking of our women we will make pretence and put into our song the name of a god. How can this be looked on as moral?[54]

However, while Jagu expressed his admiration for the greater sexual freedoms found in England in his letters, he went on to describe how the permissive atmosphere of Brighton had changed for the worse:

> The same forces are, however, in operation, notwithstanding what I have said, in England, which is following in the footsteps of India. I meet many people here, and old men and women say to me 'Do whatever you like, but do not approach any girls'. They must be doing the same thing to their own people.[55]

It is this perceived change that Jagu used to justify his crime—the attempted murder of Colonel Seton—for which he received 'seven years' rigorous imprisonment':[56]

> Now, please listen to what I have to say carefully. I have committed a great crime. Notwithstanding the fact that *lakhs* of Hindus are dying for the sake of England, they have not been allowed to go about here freely. This very

ungratefulness I have been unable to bear. So one day taking a pistol I went to kill the Colonel and was caught, and have been in imprisonment for the last month … If I get off well and good; if not, I will live the life of an ascetic. Do not be anxious and do not look for any letters, and do not write to me.[57]

As Jagu commented, he was willing to sacrifice his own happiness—to 'live the life of an ascetic'—in order to force redress and 'provide for the liberty of the individual'.[58]

Jagu's example inspired others. Although the majority of those at the Kitchener Hospital did not attempt anything as dramatic as the assassination of Seton, a series of collective but anonymous petitions appeared to the King-Emperor and the Viceroy of India. They were embedded in *sipahis* correspondence and written in order to inform 'the public of England' that 'the military authorities in charge of our hospital are not treating us as they ought to have done'.[59] As time went on, these petitions appeared to grow in size and number as they captured the mood of wounded soldiers treated elsewhere and motivated them to create joint petitions with their fellow *sipahis* in Brighton: 'To the Emperor of India, England, from the sick of whose Petition this is that no British Officer nor Indian Doctor cares for us. They deal hardly with the sick. The British Doctor beats the sick.'[60] Some of the men who admitted drafting 'applications' or 'memorials' in their correspondence, such as Ram Jawan Singh, regarded this activity as only the first stage in their protests. He and others were prepared to 'move on further if we do not find any satisfactory reply'.[61] While there is no evidence that the *sipahis* at Brighton did 'move on further' before the hospital was closed some months later in December 1915,[62] what did occur at the Kitchener does nonetheless show how differing attitudes towards *métissage* in the military created discontent both for individuals such as Jagu Godbole and for Indian patients as a whole.

'Could a Man Be So Perverted to Lose His Religion for the Sake of a Woman?': The Mirroring of a Colonialist Neurosis

The petitions and protests of Indian soldiers in hospitals in England appeared to have had some effect by the autumn of 1916. Towards the end of 1916, the Indian Army in France decided to sanction marriages between some of its *sipahis* at the Front and French women. It

was, officially, a favour to the French government which had requested that bars on inter-racial marriage, in this particular case, be relaxed.[63] But the concession was enacted through the peculiar racialisms of the colonial Indian Army: only Muslim *sipahis* were given permission to marry. French women suddenly became acceptable receptacles for the lascivious sexual desire of Indian Muslims. The reaction from the *sipahis* concerned was mixed. *Sipahis*' correspondence charts the descent from initial glee, to concerns that it was all a ruse to detain soldiers in the killing fields of France or convert them to Christianity, to an eventual push for sexual abstinence. *Sipahis*' began to mirror their superiors' horror and panic at what the racial mixing of bodies would mean for their own religious identities. And, just as the decision to allow inter-racial marriages was refracted by the racial theories of the Indian Army, so marriages came to be discussed through the prism of a soldier's faith.

Much like the soldiers of any other army at any other time, and as described earlier, both Muslim and non-Muslim Indian soldiers wrote of their sexual adventures in France in quite graphic and earthy language. Novel European sexual positions were discussed—'contrary to the custom in our country they do not put their legs over the shoulders when they go with a man!'[64] Soldiers exchanged boasts that they had bedded more than one woman at a time or that their bodies were so in demand that they were being paid by French women to have intercourse with them—'especially Drabis and Sikhs [who] have got a lot of money from this'.[65] And, more than one *sipahi* talked of settling down with a French partner or two:

> Just tell me, if I were to bring them out what would be the difficulties in the way? Do you think that I should bring them with me? Would there be any harm? Of course people would laugh, but 'can en fait rien' [sic 'ca ne fait rien' or 'that doesn't change anything']. Your mouth will water when you see them but you won't be able to see. You will do your best no doubt to peep around the corner! Well write me at length what the drawbacks may be, as compared with the advantages. Both of them are quite willing to come![66]

There was of course the odd letter at this time in which the writer asserted that he was appalled or disgusted at the prospect of sleeping with European women, but they were more to appease concerned parents or loved ones in India than any indication of genuine sentiments. Jai Singh was one of those who had sworn that he would not indulge in 'carnal pleasures' to his family. A letter to a fellow soldier reveals that his promise was insincere:

I am off to Paris which has been hitherto 'out of bounds' to everyone but officers. Now we (up to Dafadars) can go. Paris is a city of fairyland and God will give us an opportunity of seeing it. I will write [to] you all about it. Whatever happens do not let anyone know about this. I intend to enjoy whatever pleasures there are. Don't let anyone know that Jai Singh is spending Rs. 250 in four days. If father heard of it he would be very angry. I should like to marry in France but I am afraid the family would be ashamed. You can marry very fine girls if you like.[67]

When the first marriages were sanctioned between Muslim Indian *sipahis* and French women in October 1916, the initial reaction was also largely positive. Men such as Nazir Ullah were motivated enough to leave the army and go in search for work that would offer better remuneration because of the feelings that he had towards his 'Mademoiselle':

I have arrived in India. I have given up the idea I had of going to Mesopotamia. I am in search of some means of livelihood which will enable me to satisfy my longing to marry my 'Mademoiselle'. At present she remains in Marseilles.[68]

Those who were engaged to marry, such as Inayat Ali Khan, wrote long letters that unequivocally defended the women who had captured their hearts from claims that they were sex-workers or were otherwise 'morally impure':

Whatever you have written about Bernadette is entirely false. She is an unmarried girl and surrounded by modesty and moreover, I rely on her, and she has given me her youthful promise that she will never look at another man. Further my actual seal remains imprinted upon her.[69]

Finally, some non-Muslim *sipahis* appeared to have actively considered converting to Islam or Christianity so that they could marry in France, in spite of the unease it provoked among their parents:

Consider, how could I possibly consent to your becoming a Musalman and marrying a Moslem wife, or embracing Christianity and marrying a Christian wife? Have you no shame? Do you think I brought you up so that you might marry a Christian wife? Could a man be so perverted to lose his religion for the sake of a woman? You were one who had a promising future before you in the world, and yet you proceed to wreck your life by being a traitor to your faith! … It is the greatest disgrace for a Hindu to become a Mohamedan or a Christian, do not therefore blacken your face before

the whole world. … Now I give you my last advice, viz. to put away this unprofitable idea from your mind, and never to allude to it in future. And if you reject my advice, take care how you bring such a woman to my house, for she will be beaten on the head with a shovel a thousand times.[70]

It is clear, therefore, that many Muslim and non-Muslim soldiers were fairly open to inter-racial sex, sexual experimentation and even marriage. There remained an echo of anxiety at what inter-racial and inter-religious marriage might mean—either explicitly in letters from *sipahis*' parents or more implicitly in the repeated assertions that were made of French women's virtue—but these remained confined to the marginalia of soldiers' letters. Or, at least, they did in the first few years of Indian soldiers' service abroad.

There was a marked change in tone in *sipahis*' correspondence on the issue by the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the issue of inter-racial sex leading to inter-racial marriage became an issue of faith, especially for Muslim *sipahis*. In August 1916, the supposedly lax sexual mores of Muslims began to be seen as a reason for God turning his back on the followers of Islam:

The holy festival of Ed was celebrated here by the Egyptians in a very strange way. … The festival lasted from 1st to 3rd August [sic] … During these 3 days we did not meet a single Egyptian who was not the reverse of virtuous and well conducted. Each man encountered was more or less the worse for drink, and having at least one 'nightingale' sitting beside him in his carriage indulged in all kinds of lewd and obscure songs. It was all very wrong … The part of the town occupied by Courtesans was worth seeing. On one side a 'nightingale' in the possession of an Arab sang loudly. On the other a 'nightingale' embraced an Egyptian, while some poor Hindustani looked on and wondered when his turn would come … Great Kazis [Judges] and Muftis [Law-givers] and Devotees, who had rigorously kept the fast for a month, merely awaited their opportunity at the approach of evening to carry away their 'nightingales' and despoil them in the dark. It was a strange sight watching the flittings in and out, here and there, of the 'rose-faced' ones. Shame! Shame! The very ground cried out for protection, and praying to God said 'for a day like this make a new earth for I am no longer able to endure the suggestive gait and the thrust of the painted heels of these creatures'.[71]

In November 1916, coded letters emerged that were sent by soldiers to others who were known to have had relationships with French women and that accused them of adopting the garb and customs of European men in an attempt to become 'Misters' or 'Gentlemen':[72]

> Alongside me a Bulbul is lying. I had intended putting her in this envelope and sending her to you. But I realise that you have no desire for an Indian Bulbul. Tell me, have you a Bulbul [in France] or not? You surely must have one 'Mister'! Do you understand what I mean?[73]

In case these warnings were too oblique, in 1917 these letters metamorphosed into threats of harsh repercussions for any individuals found to be taking 'cups of tea in hotels' (visiting brothels) or who were engaged to French women; both were seen as the first steps to an individual abandoning his faith and 'becoming a Christian'.[74] The nature of these repercussions became apparent in the 38th Central India Horse, where Ajab Khan wrote in October 1917 of the social ostracization that met soldiers who were found to have venereal disease:

> If I had not done my best to advise and restrain Wazir Zada Khan his condition would have been disastrous. As soon as he reached Marseilles he contracted venereal disease. The same thing happened when he went to Rouen. In the Sircar's house if anyone commits murder he gets punished and the matter is finished; but if a man gets venereal disease each and everyone perpetually looks askance at him.[75]

The result of Muslim soldiers 'looking askance' at other *sipahis* who had pursued relationships with French women can be seen in the 6th Cavalry. Several *sowars* in that squadron appeared to have married Frenchwomen, and a significant number of those had had children with their partners. By the end of 1917, however, not one of those *sowars* claimed to be content with married life. Lance Dafadar Mohamed Khan began his first letters after his wedding by defending his decision to marry a Frenchwomen and refuting allegations that he intended to stay on in Europe and convert to Christianity:

> You seem to have made up your mind that Mohamed Khan will never return to India. This is an absolute error. Do you suppose that because a man has married he cannot come back? … I made the girl a Mohamedan before I married her. Why are you so displeased? If my wife likes to go to India well and good. If not she can stay in France. I will not stay here and nor did I ever promise to do so. … Do not imagine that because I married a European I have become a Christian, never![76]

After he was stripped of his 'stripe' due to the insistence of the men under his command in June 1917, he wrote letters claiming that he had been

forced into the wedding through no fault of his own. His new wife had written 'to the King in London and asked permission for me to marry her … without my knowledge', his commanding officer had forced him to perform the ceremony, and he still cursed his misfortune—'I swear to God I did not want to marry but after the King's order I should have got into grave trouble if I had refused.'[77] Finally, after being flooded with letters from as far afield as Calcutta that accused him of being an apostate, he begged forgiveness for the 'sin' he had committed and cursed his own child for being the daughter of a 'Kafir':

> I have wept much since Kariz Fatima's illness. What you have written that Margaret is my daughter now and that I don't care about Kariz Fatima at all, is wholly false. Kariz is part of my heart and Margaret is the daughter of a Kafir from whose hands it is unlawful even to drink water.[78]

It is impossible to know to what extent troopers in the 6th Cavalry were aware of official attempts to limit sexual encounters in hospitals elsewhere; whether there was an awareness that the language of condemning sexual boundaries had been articulated before by the Army and that other *sipahis*' had actively resisted attempts to prevent the sexual traversing of racial frontiers. It is equally difficult to know, given the imperfect, haphazard nature of military censorship and the collective literacy of the trenches, how aware *sipahis* were of each other—of just how typical the 6th Cavalry was—and precisely how many times a particular letter was reread and re-interpreted in its journey from author to intended recipient. There were notable chain letters that circulated among Muslim troops connecting personal religious observance to the imperilled body of Islam through the Western intrusion into Arabia. This did have an effect on how Muslim *sipahis* re-interpreted their faith and upon attitudes on correct sexual conduct, as I have previously argued elsewhere.[79] There were also a multitude of others registers that informed and may have informed each articulation of sexual desire and its reverse, from Jagu Godbole's lengthy defence—'the English song brings out these feelings', 'we should say the name of Pandurang or some other god'—to Mohamed Khan's slow lament—'Do you suppose', 'Do not imagine', 'I have wept much since Kariz Fatima's illness'. In other words, there is a danger of assuming a too simplistic reading when using fragments of what were, in their original, chains of communication linked to other unknown letters and inaccessible memories and registers. The letters remain fragments of verse and prose that it is impossible to fully

decipher and difficult to integrate into an authoritative narrative. And yet, even in accepting that, there remains a perceptible change in the tone of the letters by Muslim *sipahis* that were recorded and which are accessible that cannot be so easily dismissed or ignored:

> We are keeping a fast since 2nd July, and we have now completed 25 days. May God look kindly on our effort, Amen. I have had much discussion with Abdul Khalik Khan about the keeping of the fast. He said 'Your people gain no credit by keeping the fast, since God has dispensed with us all, whereas you continue to fast.' I replied 'The life which we are now leading is one which God would not inflict even on a dog, as it is a time of unspeakable hardship with death always at hand, and perhaps by the grace of God we may gain heaven by reason of our self-denial … Amen!'[80]

Conclusion: Mirrors of Violence

The First World War was, for the British in India, the fulfilment of a particular colonial fantasy: of an imperial periphery reaching maturity through its efforts to fight for and save the metropole. A full third of the original British Expeditionary Force in France was drawn from soldiers of the Indian Army. And it was a fantasy enshrined in the imperial ephemera of the day—the newsreel footage documenting George V's visit to Indian wounded in Brighton in January and August 1915[81] and tales of 'the brave and reckless Gurkhas' in *The Empire Annual for Boys*.[82] But in this very fulfilment of colonial fantasy came sudden and unhidden colonial neuroses. The presence of the Indian soldiering body in Europe gave birth to fears of their exposure to 'seditious literature' abroad—a fact which necessitated the creation of the office of the Chief Censor of Indian Mails—and then, as this chapter has showed, fears of their exposure and interaction with European women. This twinning of fantasy and neurosis—of desire and anxiety—had an older history.

By the eve of the First World War, it had been written into the governing maxims of the Indian Army. It was apparent in the codification of Indian military law in 1911, and the lists of attendant regulations and punishments that emerged in ensuing years. In drawing up the Indian Army Act, the Viceroy and his Council reproduced wholesale the statutes of the (British) Army Act of 1881. Guidance was given in the preface of each Indian military legal manual that readers should refer to its British parent if anything was unclear.[83] The form and format of the 1881 Army

Act was so rigidly adhered to in the drafting of the 1911 Indian Army Act that phrases only applicable to British soldiers were accidentally replicated in the Indian version.[84] Under this legal gaze, Indian *sipahis* were to be indistinguishable from their white counterparts. It was a sober and synchronic juridical discourse that acted as a contrasting twin to the mutable and fluctuating racial theories that governed military recruitment—except that the military legal discourse in India only ever approached synchrony. Legal acts, manuals and regulations were never quite perfect and required the accumulation of extra phrases and language. And in that accretion of extra language, colonial military jurisprudence adopted its own contrasting twin. Indian military law began as an undifferentiated replica of British jurisprudence, but was soon suffused with colonial paranoia: the desire to first bruise and then soothe the body of the *sipahi*. During the First World War, the Indian Army inflicted forms of bodily violence upon its soldiery that exceeded anything that occurred in the British Army, but also created a whole schema of special privileges for *sipahis* that were denied their metropolitan peers (the *batta* system, land grants, District Soldiers' Boards and so on).[85]

The twinning of bodily violence and patronage in the colonialist imagination was mirrored among Indian soldiers. It provides the framework within which the simple act of permitting marriages between Indian Muslim *sipahis* and French women in 1916 could be transformed from a grudging favour by the Indian Army to a threat to the religious faith of all (Muslim) *sipahis*. It helps to explain how the language used to describe the sexual encounter in soldiers' letters could journey from transgressive thrill to shame and disgust. Disciplining one's own body became a means of securing concessions, whether it was through imposing forms of religious observances and sexual abstinence as discussed here or through the widespread use of self-mutilation and induced illness at other times and in other spaces. However, this use of violence was not just a simple inversion of colonialist methods of control. The redress that Muslim *sipahis* sought was not necessarily in this life, but the next—'The life which we are now leading is one which God would not inflict even on a dog, as it is a time of unspeakable hardship with death always at hand, and perhaps by the grace of God we may gain heaven by reason of our self-denial … Amen!'[86]—and the body that needed salvation was not just personal or regimental, but of all Islam. Attitudes towards inter-racial and inter-religious sex were shaped by a burgeoning pan-Islamism among Indian Muslim soldiers, and further shaped that pan-Islamist sentiment as soldiers began to have dreams from

the Prophet and were compelled to share his message with others: 'I saw in a dream the Prophet reading the Koran'; [87] '[he said that] Mohamedans who drink wine and committed fornication and did other things forbidden by Islam would die the death of an unbeliever';[88] 'It is the beginning of death. The end is at hand. Since I was born I never heard the like of this letter'.[89]

It was an understandable response. The First World War enacted a fluid deconstruction of all that colonial soldiers were instructed to value; comrades would die, officers drafted in and out of battalions were unable to communicate with the men under their command, and the military ideals of *izzat* and *shaheedi* (honour and martyrdom) were impossible to maintain amidst 'the rank stench of those bodies'.[90] Disciplining the body became the panicked language of identity and cultural formation for individuals subject to colonial military discipline and the horrors of the Western Front. Bodily purity/bodily discipline became an (ir)rational response to the irrational, nightmarish, steampunk reality of living through the trenches: of cavalry troopers armed with a lance and side-arm being pushed into combat next to a trundling tank, and infantrymen having to fix bayonets while being machine-gunned:

> God knows whether the land of France is stained with sin or whether the Day of Judgment has begun in France. For guns and of rifles there is now a deluge, bodies upon bodies, and blood flowing. God preserve us, [from] what has come to pass. From dawn to dark and from dark to dawn it goes on like the hail that fell at Swarra Camp ... God grant us grace, for grace is needed. Oh God, we repent, oh God, we repent.[91]

Notes

1. Mulk Raj Anand (2011 [1939]: 178–84).
2. Mulk Raj Anand (2011 [1939]: 185–87).
3. Mulk Raj Anand (2011 [1939]: 46).
4. Frantz Fanon (1987).
5. Beginning with Graham Smith's seminal work *When Jim Crow Met John Bull*, which explored the prosecutions and less formalized violence against Black American soldiers guilty of traversing racial and sexual frontiers during the Second World War. In more recent years, Richard Smith has documented some of the racist attacks on Caribbean soldiers in consensual relationships with British women in London and elsewhere from 1917 to 1919 and Kimloan Hill has discussed racial tensions over the sexual success of Vietnamese labourers in France. See Graham Smith (1987); Richard Smith (2005); Kimloan Hill (2011).

6. As with the character of Irène in Rachid Bouchareb's *Indigènes* (with the exception that the object of her affection was Messaud, an Algerian *tirailleur*) or Hana's desire for Kip/Kirpal Singh in *The English Patient*. Rachid Bouchareb (dir.), *Indigènes* (2006); Michael Ondaatje (1992). Philippa Levine (1998: 104–30)has offered an overview on some of the constraints imposed upon 'unruly' women.

7. 'Partly' because I too focus on the male gaze (albeit that of soldiers) rather than of the women involved. It is a legacy of the fact that the Censor never preserved letters to soldiers from British or French women to soldiers (and, perhaps, due to the language gulf, such messages were never written).

8. Concern over the low pay of Indian soldiers and the difficulty for the Indian Army to obtain funds for a significant increase in wages until 1921 (when the pay of *sipahis* was increased from Rs. 11 to 16 per month) led to the implementation of a raft of irregular payments over and above the regular wage. The most systematized form of irregular payments was *batta*, which was initially implemented to cover fluctuations in the price of food grain, but which became a fixed payment worth Rs. 2 *anna* 8 per month in 1887 and Rs. 5 in 1914. Individual British officers were even encouraged to provide gifts to their soldiers as part of the *batta* system, and as a way of reinforcing the special bond between the 'native' soldier and his white superior. Cf. Kaushik Roy (2008).

9. In peacetime, George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India between 1895 and 1903, estimated the number of soldiers of the Indian Army being flogged annually at 'one in two thousand' or one every other battalion. This probably increased in the First World War. No official record was kept, but at least one case is known of a *sipahi* being flogged in Mesopotamia (recorded because he was attached to a British battalion), and officers, perhaps inspired by the frequency of the practice in the Indian Army, wrongly administered the punishment among other colonial troops from the Caribbean. Cf. Gerard Oram (1998); Richard Smith (2005).

10. For a selection of some of these letters, see David Omissi (1999).

11. 'Under stress of necessity many Indian soldiers during their stay in Europe have learned to read and write their own languages, and primers and spelling books come in large quantities from India to [soldiers in] the Army.' Captain E.B. Howell, 11 December 1915; *Reports of the Censor of Indian Mails in France, 1914–1915* (hereinafter *CIM 1914–1915*); Military Department Papers, Asia and Africa Collection, British Library, L/MIL/5/825, Part 8.

12. Abdul Jaffar Khan (Hindustani Muslim), Signal Troop, Sialkot Cavalry Brigade, France, to Dafadar Inayat Khan, Rohtak, Punjab, India, 20 August 1916, *Reports of the Censor of Indian Mails in France, 1915–1916* (hereinafter *CIM 1915–1916*); Military Department Papers, Asia and

Africa Collection, British Library, L/MIL/5/826, Part 7. The expression 'ca ne fait rien' also entered the everyday speech of British, Dominion and American soldiers (as 'san fairy ann', 'san ferry ann', 'sanfarian', etc.). W.H. Downing (1990: 183); Hugh Kimber (1927).

13. 'Towards the end of September 1914 the Lahore and Meerut Divisions of the Indian Army, with the normal complement of British troops included, began to arrive in France. The Force was disembarked at Marseilles and after a few days' rest there was conveyed by train to Orleans. The route chosen for the troop trains was a circuitous one leading through Toulouse and other places in south-western France. While the force was in transit a member of the Indian Revolutionary Party [*Ghadar* Party], if it may be so called, was arrested in Toulouse, and upon examination his pockets were found to be stuffed with seditious literature intended for dissemination among Indian soldiery .

The authorities, thus set upon their guard, decided that, at least during the stay of the Indian troops in Europe, their correspondence must be subjected to systematic examination, and cast about as [sic] a suitable person to appoint as Indian Mail Censor. It was not easy to find anyone possessing anything like the requisite qualifications, but eventually Second Lieutenant E.B. Howell, a member of the Political Department of the Indian Civil Service, who chanced to be serving in France as an interpreter attached to a regiment of Indian cavalry, was chosen and directed to undertake this duty.' Captain E.B. Howell, 'Report on Twelve Months' Writing of the Indian Mail Censorship', 7 November 1915; *Reports of the Censor of Indian Mails in France, 1914–1918* (hereinafter *CIM 1914–1918*); Military Department Papers, Asia and Africa Collection, British Library, L/MIL/5/828, Part 1.

14. Kipling's versions originally appeared without any acknowledgement of their provenance in the *American Saturday Evening Post* between May and June 1917. However, Kipling's private diary and correspondence reveals that he had been tasked to write a propaganda piece to counter any 'seditious' or pro-Indian nationalist sentiment in the USA and was provided with extracts of *sipahis*' real letters as a guide to what soldiers were thinking. Cf. Thomas Pinney (1999: 374–75).

15. Howell, 19 June 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 4.

16. 'The first extract illustrates how almost impossible it is for any censorship of Oriental correspondence to be effective as a barrier. Orientals excel in the art of conveying information without saying anything definite. When they have a meaning to convey in this way, they are apt to use the phrase "Think this over till you understand it", or some equivalent, to the reader … It naturally follows that the news conveyed is extremely vague, and gives rise to wild rumours.' Howell, 15 February 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 1.

17. Cf. Gajendra Singh (2014).
18. Distilled in the maxim: 'In the hot, flat regions, of which the greater part of India consists … are found races, timid both by religion and habit, servile to their superiors, but tyrannical to their inferiors … In other parts … where the winter is cold, the warlike minority is to be found.' General Sir Garret O'Moore Creagh, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, 1909; Stephen P. Cohen (1971: 48).
19. Seven Indian military hospitals were established in Britain in the First World War: the Kitchener Indian Hospital in the Brighton Workhouse and at the Royal Pavilion at Brighton, and smaller institutions at Milford-on-Sea, New Milford, Bournemouth, Brockenhurst and Netley (the last was a temporary hospital closed in February 1915).
20. Bruce Seton was also the father of the somewhat successful actor of the same name.
21. *Report on the Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton*, Colonel Sir Bruce Seton Papers, European Manuscripts, Asia and Africa Collection, British Library, MSS Eur/F143/66.
22. Ann Laura Stoler (1992: 515).
23. Cf. Charles Samuel Myers, 'A Contribution to the Study of Shell Shock. Being an Account of Three Cases of Loss of Memory, Vision, Smell and Taste, Admitted into the Duchess of Westminster's War Hospital, Le Touquet', *The Lancet* 185(4772) (13 February 1915), pp. 316–20.
24. The first 'bantam battalions' of men who failed to exceed the minimum height requirement of 5′3″ were established in Britain as early as 1914.
25. Captain J.C. Dunn, 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers; quoted in Richard Smith (2005: 14).
26. *New Haven Chronicle*, 14 October 1915; Richard Smith (2005: 104).
27. Letter from a British Officer (unnamed). Graham Smith (1987: 199).
28. Anonymous (Katherine Lourd) (1915: 97–98).
29. Richard Smith (2005: 113–117); Jacqueline Jenkinson (2009).
30. As part of its intriguingly named 'Mixed Race Season' in October 2011.
31. V.S. Pranje (Maratha), I.S.M.D., Lahore Indian General Hospital, France, to Pirdan Singh, Ward Orderly, Depot, 54th Poona Horse, Ambala, Punjab, India, April 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 3.
32. Kot Dafadar Wazir Khan (Punjabi Musalman), Meerut Cavalry Brigade, France, to Mother, Shahpur dist., Punjab, India, 23rd May 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 5.
33. 'I am off to Paris which has been hitherto "out of bounds" to everyone but officers. Now we (up to Dafadars) can go. Paris is a city of fairyland and God will give us an opportunity of seeing it. I will write [to] you all about it. Whatever happens do not let anyone know about this. I intend to enjoy whatever pleasures there are. Don't let anyone know that Jai Singh is

spending Rs. 250 in four days. If father heard of it he would be very angry. I should like to marry in France but I am afraid the family would be ashamed. You can marry very fine girls if you like.' Jai Singh (Hindu Jat), 6th Cavalry or 19th Lancers, France, to Sirdar Singh, Lahore, Punjab, India, 6th November 1917; *Reports of the Censor of Indian Mails in France, 1917–1918* (hereinafter CIM 1917–1918); Military Department Papers, Asia and Africa Collection, British Library, L/MIL/5/827, Part 5.

34. Nabi Buksh (HM) [unknown regiment], Kitchener Indian General Hospital, Brighton, England, to Frarijie Esq., Head Clerk, Cantonment Magistrate's Office, Neemuch, NWFP, India, 12 June 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 4.

35. 'Just tell me, if I were to bring them out what would be the difficulties in the way? Do you think that I should bring them with me? Would there be any harm? Of course people would laugh, but "can en fait rien". Your mouth will water when you see them but you won't be able to see. You will do your best no doubt to peep around the corner. Well write me at length what the drawbacks may be, as compared with the advantages. Both of them are quite willing to come.' Abdul Jaffar Khan (Hindustani Muslim), Signal Troop, Sialkot Cavalry Brigade, France, to Dafadar Inayat Khan, Rohtak, Punjab, India, 20 August 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 7.

36. Dad Gul Khan (Pathan—Mahsud), 129th Baluchis, Hospital, England, to friend, Waziristan, NWFP, India, 18 March 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 2.

37. J.H. Godbole (Maratha Brahmin), Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Indian General Hospital (Kitchener), Brighton, England, to H. Godbole, Dapoli, Rutnagari dist., Bombay Presidency, 16th November 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 8.

38. Ibid.

39. 'Alas, we are not free to go about at will. In fact we Indians are treated as prisoners. On all sides there is barbed wire and a sentry stands at each door, who prevents us from going out. In cases of urgent necessity, when the C.O. is satisfied that urgency exists, leave of absence for three hours is obtained with great difficulty … If I had known that such a state of affairs would exist, I would never have come. In India we were assured that once our work for the day was finished, we would be free to go where we pleased … If you ask me the truth, I can say that I have never experienced such hardship in all my life. True, we are well fed, and are given plenty of clothing; but the essential thing—freedom—is denied. Convicts in India are sent to the Andaman Islands; but we have found our convict station here in England. Tell me, how are they treated?' Mithan Lal (Hindustani Hindu), Storekeeper, Indian Convalescent Home, New Milton, England, to Maulvi Abdul Jabar Sahib, Ballygunj, Calcutta, Bengal, India, 2 December 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 8.

40. Ram Jawan Singh (Hindustani Hindu), Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to Mr Jacques Derel, 5th Avenue Victor Hugo, Vernon, France, 26 September 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 6.
41. Frantz Fanon (1987: 63).
42. Howell, 19 June 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 4.
43. According to an undated news-cutting found by Philippa Levine(1998: 116).
44. *Report on the Kitchener Indian Hospital.*
45. Ibid.
46. Both the *Report on the Kitchener Indian Hospital* and soldiers' correspondence made mention of this. For example: 'Formerly we used to go into town, but the men began to misbehave badly and we were stopped from going. Now only the sick go to the town. If anyone climbs the wall and stays out he gets a dozen lashes. We are let out into the town once a month—and then only two or three men with two or three white soldiers. For this we have only ourselves to thank, for had those rascals not misbehaved we should still be allowed to go out every day. In the days when there was no restriction two or three men used to spend a couple of nights or more in this town. They were given a dozen lashes, but this did not prevent them from behaving as before.' Assistant Shopkeeper Tulsi Ram (Punjabi Hindu), Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to a friend, Peshawar, NWFP, India, 12 August 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 4.
47. 'The Pavilion Hospital is in the middle of town and to go to and from is forbidden, for the patients are not allowed to go between hospitals which are in the town.' Muhabbat Khan (Pathan) [unknown regiment], Hospital in Brighton, England, to Abdullah Khan, Peshawar, NWFP, India, 2 July 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 4.
48. Sepoy Hoshanki [sic] (Dogra), 37th Dogras, attached 41st Dogras, Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to Lance Naik Hira Singh, 74th Infantry, attached 59th FFR, France, c. September 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 5.
49. 'England is a dog's country. India is a very fine country. Our people are very angry. They do not allow us out to the bazaars etc. They do not let the French or English talk to us nor do they let us talk to them. The English [Officers] have now become very bad. They have become dogs. Our Indian soldiers are very much oppressed, but they can do nothing. Now they have sent us across the river [English Channel]. There is an abundance of everything but there is not honour. No black man has any 'izzatt'. Men wounded 4 or 5 times are sent back to the trenches. Men who have lost their arms or legs are sent back to India.' Sepoy Pirzada (Pathan) [unknown regiment] Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton,

England, to Zaman Khan and Hasan Shah, 40th Pathans, Depot, Fategarh, UP?, India, 3 June 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 4.

50. Cf. Gajendra Singh (2014: Chapter 3).

51. Or even back to the Front on rare occasions: 'I am very much annoyed because the officers here are very bad. The work which they give us here to do, if I were to do it, could not be accomplished [if I worked] day and night. I came here to serve as a soldier, but they threaten me with severe punishment. I have written to the officer commanding the 47th Sikhs to say that I want to come away from my present task. I do not care for death … But I will not be spoken to by Babus in a way that pierces a soldier's heart. It is worse than bullets.' Ward Orderly Diwan Singh (Sikh), 'at one of the hospitals in England', to Bir Singh, 47th Sikhs, France, 24 July 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 4.

52. For example: 'I am left here still, as there was a case in which I was concerned. A sub assistant surgeon threatened the surgeon of my hospital (who is a Colonel but who expects to be promoted to General) with a revolver. By the Grace of God the revolver missed fire [sic misfired], and I immediately caught hold of the man.' Nahar Singh (Hindu Jat), Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to Lance Dafadar M. Bashir Khan, 30th Lancers, France, 27 November 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 8.

53. Jagu Godbole (Maratha Brahmin), Sub Assistant Surgeon, Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to India, 14 December 1915; *CIM 1914–1918*, Part 3.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Jagu Godbole (Maratha Brahmin), Sub Assistant Surgeon, Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to India, 19 December 1915; *CIM 1914–1918*, Part 3.

57. Ibid.

58. J.H. Godbole (Maratha Brahmin), Sub Assistant Surgeon, Indian General Hospital (Kitchener), Brighton, England, to H. Godbole, Dapoli, Rutnagari dist., Bombay Presidency, 16th November 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 8.

59. Ram Jawan Singh (Hindustani Hindu), Storekeeper, Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to his father, Lucknow, UP, India, 30 September 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 6.

60. Letter addressed to the King-Emperor, from Milford-on-Sea, 24 April 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 3.

61. Ram Jawan Singh (Hindustani Hindu), Storekeeper, Kitchener Indian Hospital, Brighton, England, to his father, Lucknow, UP, India, 30 September 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 6.

62. It was later reopened as a hospital for British wounded.

63. According to several letters, it was the appeals of French women and the French government that finally caused the Indian Army to relax its stance on inter-racial sex and marriage.

64. Balwant Singh (Sikh), French Post Office 39, France, to Pandit Chet Ram, Kang, Amritsar dist., Punjab, India, 29 October 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 7.

65. V.S. Pranje (Maratha), I.S.M.D., Lahore Indian General Hospital, France, to Pirdan Singh, Ward Orderly, Depot, 54th Poona Horse, Ambala, Punjab, India, April 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 3.

66. Abdul Jaffar Khan (Hindustani Muslim), Signal Troop, Sialkot Cavalry Brigade, France, to Dafadar Inayat Khan, Rohtak, Punjab, India, 20 August 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 7.

67. Jai Singh was one of those who had sworn that he would not indulge in 'carnal pleasures' to his family. A letter to a fellow soldier reveals how insincere this promise was: 'I am off to Paris which has been hitherto "out of bounds" to everyone but officers. Now we (up to Dafadars) can go. Paris is a city of fairyland and God will give us an opportunity of seeing it. I will write [to] you all about it. Whatever happens do not let anyone know about this. I intend to enjoy whatever pleasures there are. Don't let anyone know that Jai Singh is spending Rs. 250 in four days. If father heard of it he would be very angry. I should like to marry in France but I am afraid the family would be ashamed. You can marry very fine girls if you like.' Jai Singh (Hindu Jat), 6th Cavalry or 19th Lancers, France, to Sirdar Singh, Lahore, 6 November 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 5.

68. Nazir Ullah (Hindustani Muslim), c/o Rev. N.G. Leather, St Stephen's College, Delhi, to Risaldar Satter Shah, 34th Poona Horse, France, 11 April 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 3.

69. Inayat Ali Khan (Hindustani Muslim), Depot, 6 Cavalry, Sialkot, Punjab, to Abdul Jabbar Khan, 6th Cavalry, France, 2 February 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 2.

70. Naubet Rai (father) (Punjabi Hindu), Rawalpindi, Punjab, India, to Mehta Deoki Nandan, Supply and Transport Agent, Marseilles, France, 18 June 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 4.

71. Anwar Shah (Punjabi Mussalman), Camel Corps, Suez, Egypt, to Aurangzeb Shah, Signal Troop, Lucknow Cavalry Brigade, France, 18 August 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 7.

72. 'Is this the effect of the climate of France, that is washes all love out of the heart and makes it hard like a stone? Have you become a perfect "gentleman"? Turn aside any thought of becoming a "Gentleman"!' Anon. wife (Punjabi Mussalman), Ludhiana, Punjab, India, to Jemadar Khan Shirin Khan, No. 1 Base Remount, Rouen, France, 4 April 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 3.

73. Ahmed Ali (Punjabi Mussalman), 5th Cavalry, Risalpur, NWFP, India, to Yakub Khan, Mhow Cavalry Brigade, France, 28 September 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 8.

74. 'I swear to you that although I have been in France for two and a half years, I have not even taken so much as a cup of tea in a "hotel". I swear also that up till this moment I have committed no evil deed in France and nor am I a Christian. I am your true son, and your advice is plainly written on my heart.' Mohamed Feroz Khan, Ward Orderly (Punjabi Mussalman), Ambala Cavalry Field Ambulance, France, to father, Chaudhuri Ghulam Ahmad, Sialkot dist., Punjab, India, 7 December 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 5.

75. Ajab Khan (Pathan), 38th CIH, France, to Amir-ud-Din, Peshawar, NWFP, India, 14 October 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 5.

76. Mohamed Khan (Hindustani Mussalman), 6th Cavalry, France, to Ahmed Khan, 12th Infantry, Calcutta, India, 28 May 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 3.

77. Mohamed Khan (Hindustani Mussalman), 6th Cavalry, France, to Dafadar Ghans Mohamed Khan, Rohtak, Punjab, India, 18 June 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 3.

78. Mohamed Khan (Hindustani Mussalman), 6th Cavalry, France, to Dafadar Manvah Khan, 5th Cavalry, Risalpur, NWFP, India, 20 August 1917; *CIM 1917–1918*, Part 4.

79. Cf. Gajendra Singh, 'Throwing Snowballs in France: Muslim *Sipahis* of the Indian Army and Sheikh Ahmad's Dream, 1915–1918'. *Modern Asian Studies* 48(4) (2014).

80. Nur Mohamed (Pathan), 38 Central India Horse, France, to Sultan Mohamed Khan, Turangazai, Peshawar, NWFP, India, 26 July 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 6.

81. *The Indian Hospital, Royal Visit to Royal Pavilion Hospital, Brighton*; Screen Archive South East, Brighton, Sussex, SASE 950000/9.

82. Danvers Dawson (1918).

83. 'The War Office "Manual of Military Law" has furnished the model on which the present work has been compiled, and the rulings contained in that manual have been largely drawn upon in its preparation. When the works of legal writers, other than the authors of the abovementioned [sic] manual, have been quoted, the source of the information in the text has been indicated in a footnote.' *Manual of Indian Military Law, 1911*, 2nd edn (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1922), Preface to the First Edition by Malcolm Henry Stanley Grover, Major-General, Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

84. Such as when 'the property of the Crown' was referred to when the proper term in India was 'the property of the Central Government'. *The Indian Army Act, 1911 (Act No. VIII of 1911): As Modified up to the 15th October,*

1937; Military Department Papers, India Office Records, Asia and Africa Collection, British Library, L/MIL/17/5/1817, paragraph 126.

85. Cf. Kaushik Roy (2008); Tan Tai-Yong (2005).
86. Nur Mohamed (Pathan), 38 Central India Horse, France, to Sultan Mohamed Khan, Turangazai, Peshawar, NWFP, India, 26 July 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 6.
87. 'Snowball letter' retranscribed by *Sipahi* Gasthip Khan (Punjabi Mussalman), France, to Pir Sahib Akhbar Khan Badshah, Jhelum, Punjab, India, 4 July 1916; *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 6.
88. Abdul Alim (Hindustani Mussalman), Signal Troop, Sialkot Cavalry Brigade, France, to Risaldar Farzand Ali Khan, 6th Cavalry Depot, Sialkot, India (May 1916); *CIM 1915–1916*, Part 5.
89. 'Pir' Dil Khan (Pathan—Mahsud), 129 Baluchis, France, to Naik Mir Gul Khan, Secunderabad Brigade Hospital, France, 2 September 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 5.
90. Siegfried Sassoon, 'The Rank Stench of those Bodies Haunts Me Still', 1916.
91. Amir Khan (Punjabi Musalman), 129th Baluchis, France, to his brother, Lance Naik Zaman Khan, 34th Regiment, Rawalpindi, Punjab, India, 18 March 1915; *CIM 1914–1915*, Part 2.

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Practical and Institutional Counter-measures

Colonial Panics Big and Small in the British Empire (1865–1907)

Norman Etherington

Since popularized by Stanley Cohen, the term 'moral panic' has been applied to diverse historical phenomena in many different eras. Cohen's 1972 study centred on a fairly innocuous media panic over the alleged social dangers posed by teenage gangs associated with distinctive fashion statements of the early 1960s: Britain's 'Mods' and 'Rockers'.[1] Despite the transitory nature of both the youth styles and the public anxiety, the concept of panic struck a chord with social scientists, who subsequently employed it to characterize occurrences ranging from fairly harmless worries about girls consuming 'alcopops' to existential fears about the safety and security of whole nations, as witnessed in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on New York's Twin Towers. Evidently researchers find the concept of societal panic useful, but have not as yet agreed upon its analytic parameters. A case can be made out for the development of a more refined model designed to illuminate panics in European imperial and post-colonial situations. This chapter takes up the question of scale through the comparative study of three panics in colonies of the British

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Empire. The first extended from 1869 to 1874 in Natal, South Africa and concerned a supposed threat to white women from black male rapists. The second afflicted Jamaica from late 1864 to 1866 amid fears that a general insurrection of the black population would exterminate the colony's official and social elites. The third revolved around African Christian evangelists who were seen as agents of sedition undermining the foundations of white supremacy in Natal during the first decade of the twentieth century. The first case is based on research conducted some years ago in South Africa. In order to extend the investigation, I employed the hypothesis that fault-lines in colonial mentalities would become more visible in situations of crisis. One such notorious crisis was the so-called Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica in 1865, another was the conflict dubbed Bambatha's Rebellion in Natal during the years 1906–07. The hypothesis proved fruitful in directing attention to panics over Native Baptist chapels in Jamaica and 'Ethiopian' preaching in Natal. Those panics, rather than the violent events themselves, provide the material for a comparative analysis which suggests that where a hegemonic power or ruling elite perceives the fragility of its control over a suppressed or disempowered population, relatively minor disturbances can provoke outsized anxieties.

Natal's Black Rape Scare of the 1870s

Panic about black male sexual assaults on white women cropped up frequently in colonial Southern Africa. Anxiety about the 'Black Peril' that gripped Natal in the late 1860s surfaced again in the 1880s.[2] Fear spread right across the Union of South Africa and the neighbouring colony of Southern Rhodesia during the first decade of the twentieth century.[3] A striking feature of all these panics was that the public disquiet bore no relation to the reported incidence of black on white rape, which was miniscule. During Natal's rape scare of 1869–74, the incidence of black sexual assaults on white women reported to police actually declined from previous levels. Analysis of court records reveals nine prosecutions in the period 1866–68 as against six during the years 1869–73.[4]

Consequently, most of the evidence about the panic comes from those who perceived a threat. In the late 1860s newspapers began reporting fears and rumours circulating among the white residents of the principal towns of Pietermaritzburg and Durban. Prominent citizens, editors and politicians called for action to protect white womanhood. Despite the widespread alarm, few cases went to court and when they did, most

accused perpetrators were acquitted. After reaching a peak in 1872, the panic gradually subsided. By 1875, the black peril had ceased to be a subject of discussion in the colonial press. Throughout the panic, most public comment on the threat of sexual assault came not from women, but from men who claimed to speak on their behalf on a subject beyond the bounds of discussion for females' delicate sensibilities. African voices are absent from the archival record.

Moreover, almost all the allegations reported in the press concerned *attempted* assaults rather than accomplished rapes. Evidence was generally skimpy and circumstantial. In May 1872 women in Pietermaritzburg were said to have seen dark figures lurking about their houses—figures who vanished into the shadows when white men gave chase.[5] The next year, a storekeeper investigated a noise in his daughter's bedroom found a window open and reportedly saw a nude black man running away.[6] On another occasion a woman said she had been touched by a stranger in a public street in Pietermaritzburg. An editorial in the local paper claimed the incident showed the need for a Vigilance Committee to supplement the official police.[7] Servants often came under suspicion in an era where the employment of African 'houseboys' was common. Being found in a woman's bedroom without having been summoned there could result in a charge of attempted rape. The courts treated a servant's mere presence in a white girl's bedroom at night as *prima facie* evidence of intent to rape.[8]

Given the scant evidence for rising black sexual assaults against white women, what sustained the panic? As is often the case, scaremongers argued that what could be seen in the police courts represented only the tip of an iceberg. It was said, for example, that many more cases would come before the courts were it not for the 'shocking' and 'indelicate' female evidence required to sustain a conviction.[9] This was precisely the argument used to justify lynching in the post-bellum American South; accused prisoners must be executed prior to trial lest a white lady suffer intolerable embarrassment before a jury of her peers.[10]

Demonstrably, the panic had little to do with anxieties about sexual assault per se. The European settler community paid little or no attention to the common crime of white male rape of black women. Such cases rarely came before the courts and when they did, according to reports in colonial papers, accused white rapists could expect acquittal. Cases of African male assaults on African women, which had been punished by death under independent chiefs prior to colonization, were tried by magistrates under a British version of 'Native Law' and were rarely reported in

the press. There was also a marked difference in the treatment accorded to convicted rapists. Public opinion as expressed in newspapers demanded the death penalty for black men who raped white women but not for white male rapists, who generally got off lightly. An attempt by the colonial legislature to impose capital punishment on black men convicted of sexual assaults on white females was vetoed by Britain's Colonial Office on the ground of racial discrimination. Sir Frederick Rogers informed the governor of Natal that 'savages will hardly believe that the Government really abhors the crime which it punishes, if it does not punish it in all alike'.[11] With a hint of sarcasm he foreshadowed favourable consideration of a law permitting imposition of the death penalty on all convicted rapists. 'If it be considered that this law would be over severe on men of European origin, it will be for the Legislature to consider whether this evil is or is not over balanced by the necessity of protecting European women.'

The absence of tangible threats to white women complicates the discussion of scale. Since proven African assaults were negligible, the rape scare might be regarded as no more calamitous than the rise of Mods and Rockers analysed by Cohen a century later. What matters, however, is what Natal colonists *believed* was at stake. Why did the colonial press devote columns of discussion over several years to the 'black peril'? What caused members of the Legislative Council to debate 'the increase of Kafir outrages, and more especially those committed on European females'?[12] Why did the Anglican clergy spend most of a diocesan synod in 1872 discussing the black menace to morality?

One way of approaching these questions is to look at other eruptions of anxiety among the colonial elite. Two were especially prominent: fear of invasion from the adjacent Zulu kingdom and an alleged rise in crimes against property. Natal had been created in the late 1830s through annexation of a huge territory wrested from the Zulu monarchy. A new boundary between the still-independent kingdom and the colony had been drawn at the Tugela River north of Durban. From that day forward, it was anticipated that the well-armed kingdom would attempt to retake its lost lands. Conversely, the Zulu kings expected that at any time Natal might mount a military campaign to extinguish their independence, as had happened to so many other chieftaincies on the ever-expanding Eastern Cape frontier. Always the subject of rumours on both sides of the border, this balance of apprehension occasionally spiralled into a mutually reinforcing panic. In 1861, in the mid-1870s and during the run-up to the Anglo-Zulu war of 1878, settlers abandoned their farms and 'went into laager', that is, took up defensive positions.[13]

When the colonial press wrote of a rising tide of crimes against property, they meant African crime. Complaints about thefts, cattle-rustling and burglary in the 1860s and 1870s were based almost entirely on anecdotal evidence. Outside the main towns, policing was almost non-existent, so overall statistics for the colony were hard to come by. The authorities paid scant attention to crimes perpetrated against Africans by other Africans, leaving the punishment of those offences to chiefs, who retained a modicum of authority. Thus, the complaint of rising crime was expressed in vague generalities. Take, for example, this assessment by a Methodist missionary in 1872:

> The whole of the Native population of Natal is not what it once was. Crimes which were scarcely known years ago, such as cattle stealing, assault, murder, theft, burglary &c are becoming very common now, and do not augur well for the future.[14]

The comment—beloved of shock jocks since the time of Cicero—that things were never so bad was commonly voiced in relation to both black rape of white women and crime against white settlers' property.

In the context of nineteenth-century Natal, concerns about rape, invasion and property can be seen as three facets of a single gnawing fear among white male colonists about potential loss of possessions. From a legal point of view, married women were still treated in many senses as the property of their husbands. In England, medieval jurisprudence had treated rape as a violation of a man's property, whether father or spouse. The lingering legacy of that doctrine made the threat of black rape akin to other crimes against property.[15] Rape is also, of course, an invasion. Settler fears of a Zulu invasion paralleled and overlay fears about the invasion of women. One could also argue that, in a deeper sense, angst about thefts and invasions brought to the surface an irremediable, perpetually guilty conscience about the invasions and thefts of land that underpinned the whole colonial enterprise. Had the indigenous population precipitously declined, consciousness of the settlers' original aggression might have eventually subsided. But in Natal—where the overwhelming black majority was so visibly present and the apparatus of racial repression tightened from year to year—there was no forgetting.

Clearly anxieties about race and social control—not tangible threats to white women—were at the root of the panic. This complicates the discussion of scale. Since proven African male assaults on white women were

negligible, the case might be regarded as being blown up beyond proportion. On the other hand, in the minds of the panic merchants, nothing less than the entire apparatus of white control over the numerically overwhelming black majority was at stake. The imperilled white woman not only represented the homestead, but also stood for the fragile edifice of colonial authority as a whole. In relation to scale, what seems to have mattered most was the ratio of Africans to colonists rather than the scale of the threats articulated in the public arena.

PANIC OVER BLACK BAPTIST PREACHERS BEFORE AND AFTER THE MORANT BAY 'REBELLION' OF 1865

At Morant Bay in Jamaica, Governor Edward Eyre faced an altogether more tangible challenge to the colonial order. In October 1865 a mob of black peasants gathered at the courthouse to protest what they regarded as a miscarriage of justice. When troops fired upon them, the crowd rushed forward with sticks and machetes. The chief judicial officer of the parish and several other local grandees were killed as the courthouse burned. Upon hearing the news, Eyre proclaimed martial law across the eastern districts of the island and sent troops to adminster what proved to be exceptionally brutal punishment to guilty and innocent alike. He rounded up old political foes and dissenting clergyman and sent them for trial by courts martial along with captured members of the courthouse mob. Some were jailed and the rest were executed. Meanwhile, British troops terrorized the rural countryside, meting out summary justice with on-the-spot killings of suspected rebels. During the campaign of reprisals, an estimated 439 people were killed, 1,000 dwellings burned and 600 people flogged.[16]

The stomach-churning initial reports of the killings at the Morant Bay courthouse set off a debate on race and colonial violence across the British Empire. Eyre's despatch related how an Anglican clergyman 'had his tongue cut out whilst still alive' and an attempt had 'been made to skin him'. One 'black gentleman', formerly a Member of Assembly, 'was ripped open, and his entrails taken out'. Many others were said 'to have had their eyes scooped out; heads were cleft open and the brains taken out'.[17] The *Jamaica Colonial Standard* said that following these atrocities, the rebels:

left for the Baptist chapel to have a prayer meeting, and to thank God for their success, intending afterwards to return and remove their dead. After half an hour spent in psalm-singing by those blood-stained wretches one of

their leaders addressed them, pointing to the favour which the Almighty had shown in delivering their enemies into their hands, and exhorting them to further acts of fanaticism, as ordered to them by God for their deliverance.[18]

The governor's despatch elevated the rebellion to an imperial crisis by pointing out that 'the whole outrage could only be paralleled by the atrocities of the Indian Mutiny' eight years earlier.[19] In England, *The Times* newspaper led the charge in presenting the Morant Bay Rebellion as proof that slave emancipation was a failed philanthropic experiment. Neither freedom nor missionary Christianity could extinguish the ineradicable savagery of the 'Negro character'.

The tone of the imperial discussion shifted with the discovery that every one of the reported atrocities perpetrated after the riot at the courthouse was a fiction. No eyes had been gouged, no skulls cleft, no brains scooped, no entrails spilled, no bodies flayed. Nor had there been any hymn singing or prayers of thanksgiving at the Baptist chapel. The spotlight shifted to Governor Eyre. Apologists for Christian missions and believers in racial equality accused him of grossly exaggerating the threat to the colonial order posed by the Morant Bay rioters. Committees for and against the prosecution of Eyre sprang up, including some of the most notable British intellectuals of the time.[20] For the governor (and by implication against doctrines of racial equality) were Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, Alfred Lord Tennyson, Charles Dickens and Roderick Murchison. Against were John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, John Bright, Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer. A Royal Commission was despatched to Jamaica to collect additional evidence. A central question was whether Eyre's actions constituted a rational response to a grave threat or a panicked overreaction to a local riot.

Methodist minister Henry Bleby advanced the thesis that Eyre's reaction to the news from Morant Bay was simply one more instance of a long-standing tendency for Jamaica's ruling elite to panic in the face of any challenge. In his view:

the outbreak at Morant Bay … was simply a local riot, magnified by the craven feats of the civil and military authorities of the island into '*a dreadful rebellion,*' and made the occasion and pretext for shocking excesses … During the dark days of slavery, panics not unfrequently occurred in Jamaica, proving the chronic state of fear and apprehension in which the colonists lived, while they reaped the profits of a system fraught with cruel injustice and oppression to the African race … These were sometimes attended by

circumstances exceedingly ludicrous, arising out of the trifling facts which were sufficient to throw a large portion of the community into a condition of the wildest excitement and dismay.[21]

From this perspective, every panic, no matter how trivial the cause, raised the prospect of a catastrophic uprising that would sweep away every vestige of colonial authority. On one occasion, a 'widespread panic' in the parish of St Thomas in the East followed the discovery of a Methodist Society class ticket among the goods of a deceased slave which bore the printed words 'The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force':

> Too ignorant to understand that this was only a verse of the New Testament, which was printed on the ticket and given to the possessor of it as a token of Church membership in the Methodist Society, the intelligent officials on the estate, and the astute magistrates, and other authorities of the parish … at once jumped to the conclusion that some fearful conspiracy was on foot to destroy the lives of the white inhabitants, of which this 'seditious paper' furnished the 'proof strong as holy writ'.[22]

Only a last-minute discovery of the mistake forestalled a proclamation of martial law.

According to Bleby's interpretation, official attitudes were a major factor in determining how any particular panic would play out. Following his lead, it is revealing to chart the changing moods of Governor Eyre before, during and after the crisis at Morant Bay. In July 1864 he had made an official tour of the island, during which he professed to have discerned no sign of distress, discontent or hostility among the black peasantry.[23] The problems that elicited his sympathy were the travails of plantation owners and administrators. In his opinion, immorality, thievery and drunkenness among the labouring classes had aggravated a labour shortage which threatened the continued existence of the sugar industry. Consideration would have to be given to encouraging immigrant workers, particularly Africans who had been 'liberated' from contraband slave ships. Much of the black peasantry had fallen into immoral habits that exacerbated their reluctance to work for the wages that planters could afford to pay. Until the peasants could be made to 'erect better dwellings and thereby obtain the means of adopting social habits more in accordance with decency and propriety',[24] there was little hope of instilling an improvement in either their sexual or their work ethics.

Within a few months of delivering this confident, if insensitive assessment of the state of the island, Eyre faced an unexpected challenge. Edward Underhill, lay secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society, sent a private letter to Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies detailing the many ills afflicting Jamaica's impoverished peasantry. Secretary Cardwell forwarded the letter to Eyre along with a request for information on its accuracy. The governor replied that the recent increase in thieving had nothing to do with people starving: 'It is the young and the strong of both sexes, those who are well able to work, and not the old or infirm, who fill the Gaols of the Colony, and I fear it is rather an indisposition to labour than an inability to procure work, which in most cases leads them to steal.' He anticipated that a new law permitting flogging as punishment for thieving would have a salutary impact. Nonetheless, he pledged to ask parish authorities and heads of religious organizations for 'their views on the various allegations'. Predictably, officials and most ministers of the established church agreed that any distress suffered by the peasantry was owing to their own improvidence. According to Henry Westmoreland: 'Taking them as a whole there are no people in the world occupying the station they do, so well off.'[25] The Bishop of Kingston deplored the common people's refusal to work for wages so long as they could subsist on simple food. His 'wife and English maid servant' agreed that 'fully half the women come to Church dressed not in cotton prints, but in muslins or other more expensive materials. A few are in the very height of the fashion, according to their own ideas'.[26] Many of the Anglican clergy traced the current unsatisfactory state of affairs to the extraordinary religious revivals that swept Jamaica between 1860 and 1862. Encouraged by 'that awful profanation of religion, known as "The Revival"', people abandoned the fields to participate in prayer meetings and lewd parodies of confession.[27]

While such testimony pleased the governor, his decision to circulate Underhill's letter proved a catastrophic miscalculation. Soon it got into the colonial papers and self-appointed representatives of the common people began holding 'Underhill Meetings' at towns throughout the island. Because Baptists made prominent appearances at these protests, Eyre pinpointed them as the chief agents spreading dissatisfaction among an otherwise contented peasantry.[28] This fed into a long Jamaican tradition of blaming Baptists for stirring up trouble.[29] As the Underhill meetings multiplied, the first rumours were heard of a planned rising. On 20 July 1865 John Salmon, Custos of St Elizabeth, forwarded a number of papers from persons 'distressed by rumours of intended disturbances by the Negroes'.

'I am told', he went on, 'the chat among the Negroes is, "Buchra has gun, Negro has fire stick"' (meaning that the guns of the white elite were balanced by the threat of arson).[30] Salmon thought a show of force by a naval vessel might have a calming effect, so Eyre ordered one to the north coast. Other rumours predicted a rising on 1 August, the anniversary of slave emancipation. A planter's 'house girl' stated several times 'that the black people have agreed upon rising in arms at the above period for the purpose of murdering the upper classes and destroying and afterwards seizing their properties'.[31] In a familiar pattern the rumours circulating among the ruling class fed a countervailing rumour mill among the common people.[32] One was that the Queen had 'sent out a large sum of money to be laid out in the purchase of lands to be divided among them', but that the local magistrate had kept it for himself. Another was that the blacks were to be once again enslaved.[33] The two rumour mills fed off each other, sparking low-level panics in several parishes.

By September 1865, when he received Cardwell's congratulations for thwarting the planned insurrection, Eyre had fashioned the events, whispers, political unrest and rumours of the last few months into what seemed to him a coherent narrative.[34] At the beginning of the year, the island had been as he described it after his tour of the country districts. The people were content, but needed prodding towards more consistent habits of labour and morality. Unfortunately this acceptable state of affairs had been upset by the unfounded allegations of Underhill on behalf of the Baptist Missionary Society. Baptist preachers—ever a source of sedition—and unscrupulous demagogues like the radical assemblyman George W. Gordon had, through the Underhill meetings, convinced ignorant peasants that they suffered under some kind of oppression. Some of these, according to the reports and rumours that had come to his attention, had been plotting insurrection in their hovels and chapels since July. It was in this state of mind that he received the news of the murders at Morant Bay the following month. Here, surely was the feared insurrection, led by ignorant, superstitious Negro Baptists spurred on by irresponsible agitators. His prompt and decisive action was 'the saving of Jamaica. The whole Colony has been upon a mine, which required but a spark to ignite it'.[35]

The rumours circulating throughout Jamaica in the immediate aftermath of Eyre's campaign of terror in the eastern districts were more precise and consistent than the vague threats of arson and insurrection reported in July and August. Taken together, they suggested that the atrocities said

to have been perpetrated at Morant Bay were about to be repeated in every parish. As reported in the press and the governor's despatches, the Morant Bay rioters had marched in good order to the courthouse carrying weapons and blowing on conch shells. Their preparations had been carried on in secret meetings held at their so-called Native Baptist chapel, where superstitious Revivalist religion mixed with seditious politics. From the reports pouring into government offices, this dangerous combination of secret chapel meetings, plotting, arming and drilling had become general. On 1 November an Anglican vicar reported that blacks in his region had 'had been holding nightly meetings for some time past & moreover have been seen in the early morning as if undergoing a drill, that conversations of a most rebellious and seditious nature have been very recently overheard'.[36] In the parish of Westmoreland various sources attested to midnight meetings held by 'a man named Cameron' who 'drills every night from one to two hundred of the people of that and the surrounding districts'.[37] A Methodist minister learned that 'secret Religious Meetings are being held in this neighbourhood under the name of "Revival Meetings" and that such meetings are held all night and that persons come from a great distance to attend them'. To prevent such gatherings from breeding rebellious fervour, he recommended banning 'all meetings that are not appointed by religious societies acknowledged by the island as such'.[38] A colonel of the Western Interior Militia had heard from a local clergyman that 'that there was evidently something going on for that there has been a great deal of shell and horn blowing at night all around him'.[39] Another correspondent had 'been informed by a black man named Higginbottom that there is a "Society" of correspondents, with officers, and connected with the issues raised by Gordon and Underhill'. The Rebellion at Morant Bay 'was part of an organized plan, fortunately not mature'.[40] A search of premises near Round Hill where people had been 'keeping secret meetings … for a long time past' uncovered a cache of stones and 'spears or lances'. A man in the neighbourhood who belonged 'to the same band or society called Revivalists' was found to possess three similar wooden spears.[41]

When a Royal Commission was called to determine whether Eyre's response to Morant Bay had been proportionate to the threat, the governor based his defence on those reports along with responses to a questionnaire he circulated in December 1865, eliciting the opinions of clergymen, magistrates, police and other persons of importance. Among other things, they were asked:

Whether the outbreak at Morant Bay was entirely local and caused by the accidental occurrences of the moment, or whether it was a predetermined movement though prematurely developed?

Whether there was any reason to suppose disaffection, seditious feelings, or evil intentions extended to any other parish besides St. Thomas in the East?

Whether you have reason to believe the outbreak at Morant Bay was premature, and that some later period in the year had been intended for such outbreak, or for a more general one?

Whether the spirit of disaffection which existed or may still exist in St. Thomas in the East or any other parish was led to, stimulated, or encouraged by the proceedings or teachings of George W. Gordon or others.[42]

The result was a flood of testimony that the plotting of a general rising at Christmas had been going on for many months, that the signs of a mutinous spirit among the peasantry had been evident for some time, and that military drilling and other preparations for rebellion had been conducted secretly at chapels throughout the island. This clearly indicates a panicked state of mind among the Jamaican elite, but whether it predated the Morant Bay riot or was induced by it is impossible to say at this distance. Eyre's submission to the Royal Commission and some incomplete files of Jamaican newspapers supply most of the surviving evidence. Certainly Eyre slanted his questionnaire towards the outcome he desired, but the statements of the respondents read like authentic manifestations of individual perceptions. In contrast to the picture of a contented and docile peasantry painted in their testimony during the governor's tour of 1864, respondents now spoke of 'a defiant and insolent demeanour amongst the young men and women'.[43] Revivals had led to secret chapel meetings, which in turn had spread the spirit of rebellion. At 'the meeting houses with native preachers', a general rising had been planned for Christmas.[44] Had it not been prematurely launched at Morant Bay and decisively crushed by the governor, 'a scene of carnage would have ensued frightful to contemplate'.[45] Jamaica would have become a second Haiti.

Compared with Natal's black rape scare, Jamaica's panic was explicitly concerned with the survival of the colonial order and the ruling class. There was also a more complex interplay between state action and public opinion. Governor Eyre blamed Edward Underhill for stirring up discontent among the peasantry. As the Underhill Meetings grew in strength and fervour, the first rumours of a planned insurrection reached the press. By the time of the affray at the courthouse, the governor had convinced himself that irresponsible demagogues had spawned mutinous plots at Native Baptist chapels, where secret meetings were conducted beyond the reach of police surveillance. Because the 'Negro race' was 'most excitable and impulsive', any 'seditious or rebellious action was sure to be taken up by and extend amongst the large majority of those with whom it came in contact'.[46] It was nonetheless difficult to collect concrete proof of the rebels' plans for the reason that:

> As a race the negroes are most reticent, and it is very difficult to obtain from them full or specific information upon any subject … It will be easy to understand from this trait in the negro character that a conspiracy may exist and even have extensive ramifications without the Government or any white individual being in any way aware of it … [Furthermore] the negroes exercise a reign of terror over each other which deters people from giving information of any intended outrage, or from assisting in any way to frustrate its perpetration.[47]

On this analysis even the most trivial hint of trouble could generate panic among the colonial elite. This was evident in answers to the questionnaire Eyre circulated following the Morant Bay emergency: short on content but filled with apprehension. This brings us back to Henry Bleby's contention that the so-called Morant Bay Rebellion was no concerted insurrection, but merely one more proof of 'the chronic state of fear and apprehension in which the colonists lived'. Even more than Natal, the upper classes in Jamaica felt the pressure of numbers. An estimated 14,000 whites dominated a black population of some 440,000.[48] Disparities in income and power could hardly have been greater anywhere in the British Empire. It might reasonably be concluded that the elite lived perpetually on the edge of a societal nervous breakdown. Any hint of concerted action against constituted authority raised the spectre of Haiti and bloody revolution. For that reason, there could be no panics about innocuous social phenomena;

every crisis, however small, posed a potentially existential threat to colonial control. It could be argued that Eyre was consciously or subliminally aware of that fact and deliberately stoked the fires of public anxiety as a means of excusing the bloody excesses of his Morant Bay campaign.

THE ETHIOPIAN MENACE IN NATAL, 1900–07

During both the Natal rape scare and the Jamaican panic, the locus of fear settled on the least knowable section of the subject population. In Natal it was the shadowy figure of the black sexual predator lurking in the bushes; in Jamaica it was the Native Baptist congregations of tiny rural chapels beyond the purview of established churches and missionary societies. The most deep-seated anxieties could be projected onto them precisely because they were so little understood. At the turn of the twentieth century, another vaguely known personage became the focus of a panic over 'the Ethiopian menace' in Natal. This time it was the independent African Christian preacher who was said to threaten the edifice of white supremacy. When a so-called rebellion broke out in 1906, officials united in declaring that 'Ethiopianism appears to be at the bottom of it'.[49] For several years this label had been indiscriminately applied by the colonial authorities to any black Christian evangelist operating without European supervision. For the previous decade, the government of Natal had been engaged in an increasingly harsh campaign to bring indigenous evangelists under control. They were blamed for every manifestation of African resistance to authority in word or deed.

The term 'Ethiopian' derived from the biblical prophecy (Psalm 68:31) that 'Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God'. An ordained African minister from Natal coined that name for the church he founded after breaking with the Methodists in 1892. In 1896 the Ethiopian Church joined itself to the African Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States, a large and venerable black church which seized this opportunity to launch missions to Africa.[50] Soon colonial officials throughout Southern Africa were labelling virtually all African religious initiatives Ethiopian, including informal preaching in city streets. Although none of the so-called Ethiopians engaged in overt acts of crime or rebellion, their sermons could be construed as subversive, especially when they invoked the catchcry 'Africa for the Africans'. Like everything else about the independent churches, the slogan could be interpreted in a number of ways. According to black preachers, it aimed simply at convincing parishioners

that they rather than missionaries must carry out the work of converting the continent to Christianity. To missionaries, it appeared a challenge to their authority as well as a demand for their departure. To panicked politicians, it suggested the displacement of white supremacy with black supremacy.

The structure of colonial government had considerably altered since the rape scare of the 1870s. The grant of 'Responsible Government' in 1893 transferred authority from appointed officials to politicians elected by an all-male and practically all-white electorate. Although the imperial government retained the power to veto legislation blatantly at odds with the British Constitution, it strove to interfere as little as possible with the internal administration of the colony. Once in the driver's seat, settler politicians set about hardening the apparatus of white supremacy. The touchstone of administrative practice was the subjection of the African population to 'Native Law' on the argument that the despotic rule of chiefs which they had enjoyed prior to colonization was the form of government best suited to their culture and character. Only now the supreme chief was Natal's governor, acting on the advice of the prime minister and the cabinet. Legal provision existed for Africans with education and property to apply for exemption from Native Law but it was rarely granted. Once upon a time, Natal officials had expressed pride in the advancement of 'Christianity and Civilization'. The new regime doubted the capacity of Africans to adapt to either. Consequently, every black preacher became an object of suspicion.

The full force of the state was deployed against declared Ethiopian ministers. The charismatic blind preacher Johann Zondi was charged under Native Law with seditious preaching and was held without trial for four years.[51] Funiselo Solani of the Amakusha sect was first accused of 'preaching sedition under the cloak of religion' in June 1900 and henceforward kept under continual police surveillance. The local magistrate identified him as the man 'I have been most been most anxious to catch'. He had sent plain clothes policemen 'to try & trap him', but all in vain.[52] When it emerged that Solani came from the neighbouring Cape Colony, the authorities invoked border protection regulations to revoke his pass. Similar proceedings were instituted against independent preachers from other parts of South Africa. When three preachers arrived from Pondoland to join Solani, the police pounced. Because they had failed to obtain a pass at the border, 'they were arrested, charged before the Magistrate, Harding, under the Pass Law and the heavy fine of £5 (each) was inflicted

on with the alternative of 2 months H[ard] L[abour]'. After paying the fines, they were banished from Natal as 'undesirables'.[53] A Xhosa preacher, J.B. Mfazwe, came under intense police scrutiny when he protested against the persecution of African preaching. The Chief Commissioner of Police learned that he was a Xhosa man from the neighbouring Cape Colony who first appeared in Natal in the autumn of 1900 and claimed authority 'to establish a purely Native Church'.[54] He was affiliated to the American National Missionary Board of America, which claimed to represent some two million Negro Baptists.[55] In 1901 he used a letter from the Board's Secretary, L.G. Gordon, to support his application to celebrate marriages. The Undersecretary for Native Affairs replied blandly that his request had been refused. Meanwhile, police were commissioned to keep him under surveillance:

> With reference to the Rev. J. B. Mfazwe, the following personal description may be of assistance to you:

> Middle aged native; rather stout in build; about 5′7″ in height; complexion very black; thick lips; large prominent forehead; usually wears clerical dress and spectacles; speaks English; and wears his wool rather long.

In the absence of any evidence of criminal behaviour, the Native Affairs Department tried invoking the pass laws. Although his own pass was found to be valid, his wife's and his daughter's were not and they were ordered to return to 'their home in the Cape Colony'. Undeterred, Mfazwe tried to carry on his preaching alone in neighbouring Zululand, where he died of malaria in April 1903.[56] What the Mfazwe case demonstrates above all is the scale of the official anxiety provoked by the Ethiopian Menace. An extraordinary amount of money and personnel in the supposedly cash-strapped colony of Natal was devoted to the surveillance of Christian evangelists.

Throughout the course of the panic, not a single prosecution of any black clergyman reached the colonial courts. No seditious sentiments were proved to have been uttered in any sermon or meeting. This did not deter the government from widening its campaign to include virtually all African Christian ministers of religion. In 1902 American missionaries who commended F.R. Moor, Secretary for Native Affairs, for refusing to license Ethiopians preachers as marriage celebrants were shocked to discover that the government proposed to remove that authority from

all African clergy, including those affiliated with foreign missions. Moor did not consider that 'such power should be given to natives as they were not yet fit for it.'[57] The following year he went further, introducing legislation requiring all ministers, white and black, to register as marriage officers.[58] This removed missionary recommendations as a decisive factor. Like exemptions from Native Law, registration was left to the discretion of colonial officials who refused the vast majority of applications from African preachers while approving almost all of those from whites.

In 1904 the government announced that the Natal Native Trust would prohibit all black preaching unless it was conducted under the personal supervision of white clergy. In an address to the annual meeting of the Anglican Maritzburg Missionary Association on 12 May, Governor Henry McCallum announced that while the government 'gave every opportunity and encouragement to the white missionaries':

> they had made it an axiom now that black missionaries should not be allowed to practise on their own initiative. They had to get a white missionary in touch with them to supervise them. It was thought that by this means, and by such means as had been adopted to prevent the performance of marriage ceremonies without due license, that they would be able to keep in hand a movement they were determined to throttle, and which practically meant disloyalty.[59]

Throttling extended to physical destruction of churches. In July 1904 the Inspector of Location Lands reported that he had found that Europeans had left the church and school at Tabamhlope. The Secretary for Native Affairs immediately wrote to the local magistrate directing that police be sent to demolish the buildings.[60] That such things could happen in the heyday of European enthusiasm for Christian missions attests to the panicked state of mind gripping politicians and officials.

White missionaries, who were in the best position to know what motivated black evangelists, found the harshness of the government campaign puzzling. Though he had little sympathy for the Ethiopians, Reverend A.H. Chapman of the Natal Baptist Association told the Minister for Native Affairs in 1905 that their appearance simply expressed 'the desire of the Natives to have their full share in Church work, and it ought not to be regarded as a political movement'. The Minister begged to differ, stressing the information his department had collected from every corner of the colony: 'We have here secret service men and we get a lot of information from

them and Mr. Samuelson [Undersecretary for Native Affairs], knowing the Natives as well as he does—he is in touch with every Native in the Colony.'[61] The claim was preposterous at a time when the black population was estimated at more than a million and outnumbered the white settlers by a factor of ten to one.[62] By pretending to an omniscient level of surveillance, the Minister for Native Affairs betrayed his government's real anxiety, which was that they knew far too little about what the subject population was thinking. Attributing all 'seditious' and 'disloyal' sentiments to independent African preaching served a similar purpose to the focus on Native Baptists in Jamaica. It held at bay the discomfiting thought that the subject population harboured genuine reasons to wish them gone. All would be well if the malcontents and agitators could be silenced. These were most likely to be found among literate Africans, such as the Bible-reading clergy.

Official rhetoric on Ethiopianism emphasized the threat to white supremacy rather than the danger of a general insurrection. When Reverend Chapman made representations on behalf of African Baptist preachers, the first question put to him by the Undersecretary for Native Affairs was: 'I suppose you recognise the necessity and the propriety of European supremacy and the ascendancy of the White Races?'[63] Another official wrote that through 'the sinister Ethiopian propaganda disseminated throughout the country since 1892, loss of confidence in the white man's rule became inevitable'.[64] Governor McCallum commenced his interrogation of the distinguished black Congregational minister, John Dube, by asking that he 'acknowledge that we are the ruling race'.[65]

Present-day historians are unanimous in seeing the Natal disturbances of 1906 as a tax revolt of rural people.[66] Settlers and officialdom sought to exonerate themselves from blame by agreeing with the governor that 'Ethiopianism was at the bottom of it'. Henry McCallum clung to that position throughout the conflict, even as it became apparent that local chiefs in Natal and Zululand were the locus of resistance. When the governor hardened his position by pointing specifically to African Christians associated with the American Zulu Mission, outraged missionaries were forced to publicly refute the charges made in his despatches to the Colonial Office 'in which he has associated the name of the Mission with the Ethiopian movement'.[67] The official *History of the Zulu Rebellion 1906* written by a member of the Department of Native Affairs concluded, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that 'the part taken by Christian natives in the Insurrection was a large and prominent one. The teaching of many Native preachers, generally belonging to Ethiopian

denominations, was of a distinctly seditious character'.[68] As in Jamaica, a pre-existing panic was invoked by officials to scapegoat a particular group and thereby to absolve themselves from blame for the violence generated by their policies and actions. Like Eyre, they insisted that it was owing solely to their promptness in crushing the first sign of resistance that planning for a wider insurrection had been disrupted.[69]

Conclusion

The three panics covered in this chapter deserve to be termed colonial panics pure and simple, rather than moral panics as delineated by Cohen. They occurred in colonies where a small elite ruled a huge majority of ethnically different subjects. In each case the ruling elite insisted that their subject populations had previously lived contented and docile lives, despite richly documented histories of disturbances, resistance and panic. This self-induced societal amnesia or denial helped hold deeply rooted anxieties at bay. However, at the least sign of trouble, a panic could take hold, during which a primal fear rose to the surface—that the colonized would rise up and wreak a just revenge on those who violated their lands, livelihoods and persons. Even in the Natal rape scare, where the ostensible object of concern was individual sexual assaults on white women, a rhetorical association with invasion and violation of property was commonly made in press reports.

Differentiating big panics from small ones is complicated because fears expressed in the public arena bear no relationship to the acts which provoked them. In the Natal rape scare everyone—that is to say, everyone in the settler community—was scared, while practically no one was raped. A Jamaican panic about a general rising preceded the riot at Morant Bay and actual losses of life at the courthouse were relatively small. It was evidently the Underhill Meetings with their open expression of black discontent that gave rise to the initial panic. After Eyre's campaign of reprisals, a secondary panic took hold, imaginatively shaped to echo the official line that agitators had whipped up a superstitious and excitable peasantry into plotting an island-wide insurrection at midnight meetings in Native Baptist chapels. At the turn of the twentieth century in Natal, a white supremacist regime feared that the rise of an educated African population would challenge the assumptions underpinning colonial rule. Ignoring the rational petitions of black political groups, officialdom focused on the supposedly ignorant and fanatical Ethiopian preachers. Not a single case of physical resistance

motivated by independent preachers could be proved, but that did not deter the ruling class from embarking on a general persecution of all African clergy. When armed resistance manifested itself in the tax revolt of 1906, officials claimed that was but a front for an all-out rebellion fomented by Ethiopians. In these three situations it appears that periodic panics laid bare an underlying substratum of anxiety that was pervasive and persistent. It most likely reflected the huge numerical disparity between the colonizers and the colonized. Where colonists outnumbered indigenous or slave populations, persistent anxieties may have been less in evidence.

NOTES

1. Stanley Cohen (1972).
2. Jeremy C. Martens (2002).
3. Charles van Onselen (1982: 1–73); Jonathan Hyslop (1995); Jeremy Krikler (1995); Tim Keegan (2001); Dane Kennedy (1987: 128–47); John Pape (1990); Jock McCulloch (2000); Oliver Phillips (2011).
4. Norman Etherington (1988: 39).
5. *Natal Witness*, 14 May 1872.
6. *Natal Colonist*, 4 February 1874
7. *Natal Witness*, 12 May 1874.
8. *Natal Colonist*, 28 October 1873.
9. *Natal Witness*, 19 December 1865.
10. The comparison with the black rape menace in the American South did not escape the notice of Natal papers; see *Natal Mercury*, 14 May 1872.
11. Select Document 5, 1870, Natal Legislative Council, 2nd session, 5th Council. KwaZulu-Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.
12. Legislative Council Proceedings, 23 June 1868.
13. G.B. Nourse (1949); A. Isaacs (1980); P.A. Kennedy (1976).
14. J. Jackson, Jr. to the Secretaries of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, 14 October 1872. Methodist Missionary Society Archives, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
15. The background to nineteenth-century reform of the property acts is explored in Lee Holcombe (1983). Two frequently quoted pronouncements of jurists sum up the previous situation: Blackstone's comment that 'In law husband and wife are one person, and the husband is that person'; and Matthew Hale's dictum of the seventeenth century that 'the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto the husband which she cannot retract'. Some of the complexities involved in disentangling marriage from property in

different cultures are set out in Renée Hirschon (1984: 1–20). The legal background to the question of rape in marriage is discussed in Diana E.H. Russell (1982: 17–24).

16. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1866 [3683] Jamaica. Report of the Jamaica Royal Commission. Part I. Report (hereinafter JRC), p. 25. See also Gad Heuman (1994); and Devon Dick (2009).
17. Eyre to Cardwell, 20 October 1865, CO 137/393, Colonial Office Papers, British Archives, Kew (hereinafter CO).
18. Reprinted in the UK Daily News, 14 November 1865.
19. Eyre to Cardwell, 20 October 1865, CO 137/393.
20. See Bernard Semmel (1962).
21. Henry Bleby (1868: 5).
22. Henry Bleby (1868: 5–6).
23. Eyre to Cardwell, 23 July 1864, CO 137/384.
24. Eyre to Cardwell, 23 July 1864, CO 137/384.
25. Westmoreland to Eyre 10 March 1865, CO 137/390.
26. Observations on Dr Underhill's letter by the Reginald Courtenay, Bishop of Kingston, 2 March 1865, CO 137/388.
27. C.R. Chandler, Island Curate of St. George's, Guy's Hill, St. James' to the Bishop, 6 March 1865; J.R. Radcliffe, Minister of the C of E, Kingston, 20 April 1865, CO 137/390.
28. Eyre to Cardwell, 20 September 1865, CO 137/392.
29. Catherine Hall (2002).
30. John Salmon to Eyre, Malvern, 20 July 1865, CO 137/392.
31. Eyre to Cardwell, 24 July and 7 August 1865, CO 137/392.
32. For other instances of rumours influencing official attitudes and politics in the British Empire, see Kim A. Wagner (2010) and Martin Sökefeld (2002).
33. Eyre to Cardwell, 7 August 1865, CO 137/392.
34. Cardwell to Eyre, 8 September 1865, CO 137/392.
35. Eyre to Cardwell, 20 October 1865, CO 137/393.
36. John Farquharson to Col. Whitfield, 1 November 1865, enclosed in Eyre to Cardwell, 3 Nov. 1865, CO 137/394.
37. Dr J. Adolphus to B. Vickers, enclosed in Eyre to Cardwell, 7 November 1865, CO 137/394.
38. R. Hutchinson to J. Lyon, 30 October 1865, enclosed in Eyre to Cardwell, 7 November 1865, CO 137/394.
39. W. H. Cooke to B. Vickers, enclosed in Eyre to Cardwell, 7 November 1865, CO 137/394.
40. J. Parry to H. Westmoreland, 5 November 1865, enclosed in Eyre to Cardwell, 7 November 1865, CO 137/394.
41. H. Lawrence to Salmon, 16. November 1865, enclosed in Eyre to Cardwell, 23 November 1865, CO 137/395.

42. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1866 [3682] Papers laid before the Royal Commission of Inquiry by Governor Eyre (hereinafter PLGE), pp. 94–95.
43. Custos Hollingsworth to W.R. Meyers, 5 January 1866, PLGE, p. 99.
44. Capt. Kent, Stipendiary Magistrate to Myers, 4 January 1866, PLGE, p. 94.
45. Custos Hollingsworth to W.R. Meyers, 5 January 1866, PLGE, p. 99.
46. Eyre, Introduction PLGE, p. 1.
47. Eyre, Introduction PLGE, p. 2.
48. Population of Jamaica by Census of 6 May 1861, MSS 884, Jamaica National Library.
49. GH 1468 Secret Telegrams, Governor to Admiral, Simon's Town, 12 February 1906, No. 3, Government House Papers, Pietermaritzburg Depot of the South African Archives.
50. James Campbell (1995: 1–2).
51. F.R. Moor to Minister Lands and Works, 10 January 1902, file 94/1902, SNA 1/1/295, Secretary for Native Affairs papers, Pietermaritzburg Depot of the South African Archives (hereinafter SNA).
52. P.W. Shepstone, Mag. Alfred Div. to SNA, 16 April 1901, SNA 737/01; Report of C. Meiners, Sub Insp.N.P., Harding 16 November 1901, file 2271/1901, SNA 1/1/293.
53. Report of C. Meiners, Sub Insp.N.P., Harding 16 November 1901, file 227/1901, SNA 1/1/293.
54. S.O. Samuelson, USNA to Mag. Upper Umkomanzi, 18 April 1901, SNA 1/1/291.
55. L.G. Gordon to L.T. Evans, 29 September 1902, enclosed in L.T. Evans to J. Chamberlain, undated letter, CO179/225, British Archives.
56. Files on J.B. Mfazwe 1616/1902 with later notations, SNA 1/1/296.
57. Notes on an interview of 8 April 1902, Secretary for Native Affairs Papers, SNA 1380/1902.
58. Natal Act 44, 1903.
59. *The Times of Natal*, 7 June 1904.
60. George Leuchars, SNA to Mag. Escourt, 21 July 1904, SNA1494/04.
61. Notes of an interview with Rev. A.H. Chapman in Minister for Native Affairs Office, 3 October 1905, SNA 2502/05.
62. Edgar Brookes and Colin Webb (1965: 248).
63. Notes of an interview with Rev. A.H. Chapman in Minister for Native Affairs Office, 3 October 1905, SNA 2502/05.
64. James Stuart (1969 [1913]: 514).
65. Notes of an interview enclosed in McCallum to Elgin, 20 May 1906, CO 179/235.
66. Beginning with Shula Marks (1970) through to Sean Redding (2006).
67. Minutes of the Semi-Annual Meeting of the American Zulu Mission convened at Malvern, 28 January 1907, ABC 15.4, v. 21.

68. James Stuart (1969 [1913]: 420).
69. McCallum to Elgin, 16 February 1906, CO 179/232.

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Imperial Fears and Transnational Policing in Europe: The 'German Problem' and the British and French Surveillance of Anti-colonialists in Exile, 1904–1939

Daniel Brückenhaus

When early-twentieth century Europe became one of the most important centres of anti-colonial activism, British and French authorities reacted by rapidly expanding their government surveillance throughout the continent. This chapter argues that one of the most crucial factors causing Western European officials to create these new transnational police networks was their anxiety about activists from their own colonies forming alliances with Germans. As will become clear, Western reports about such alliances were neither entirely fictional, nor can they be described simply as truthful representations. This chapter will trace numerous instances in which anti-colonialists did indeed cooperate with Germans, but it will also pay close attention to how the Western authorities, through a selective reading of the evidence, often exaggerated the threat of these alliances. Moreover, as we will see, the British and French authorities

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frequently misinterpreted the nature of such German-anti-colonial coalitions by underestimating the agency of anti-colonialists in dealing with their German allies.

In recent years, scholars have provided insightful studies of government fears of rebellions and revolutionary uprisings in non-European colonial territories, as well as the resulting attempts of the colonizers to contain those perceived dangers through surveillance and policing.[1] Meanwhile, this chapter contends that it is equally valuable to study the connections between colonial fears and policing within Europe itself. Examining how fears of German-anti-colonial alliances motivated governments to extend their surveillance across inner-European borders, and how the increased level of surveillance forced anti-colonialists to move from one European country to the other, allows us to explore how imperial anxieties contributed to the internationalization of conflicts over colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century.[2] Moreover, the geographical focus on Europe enables us to see how the Western authorities' fears about threats undermining the stability of their non-European territories were connected to their anxieties about the military, political and ideological challenges they faced within Europe proper.

This chapter identifies several reasons for Western misgivings about German-anti-colonial cooperation. Most obviously, these new coalitions posed a threat to the Western empires because in Germany, anti-colonialists had access to considerable financial resources and were relatively protected from colonial control. However, it also shows that cooperation between Germans and non-European activists constituted a more wide-ranging ideological challenge to the British and French authorities. At a time when democracy in Germany remained fragile and contested, many anti-colonialists pursued their goal of full democracy in Africa or Asia with the help of precisely those Germans, both left- and right-wing, who resisted the Western project to spread liberal democracy throughout Europe. These alliances thus illustrated that among Europeans, to be anti-Western frequently meant being anti-democratic, while among people from the colonies, to be anti-Western usually implied being involved in a struggle for more democratic forms of governance in their original home countries. These novel German-anti-colonial coalitions thereby laid open the contradictions within a Western political model that combined liberal and democratic political ideals at home with autocratic rule in the colonies.

As this chapter shows, it is possible to distinguish between four periods in which different kinds of alliances were formed between anti-colonialists and various German groups; alliances which, in turn, repeatedly caused

an extension of French and British government surveillance. In the first phase, lasting from the formation of the French-British *Entente Cordiale* in 1904 until the end of the First World War, Western surveillance focused on an emerging project of cooperation between the German government and anti-colonialists. During a second period, from 1918 to 1925, many Western observers pointed to the danger of a 'Germano-Bolshevik' alliance of German communists, German conservative government officials and non-European anti-colonialists against the Western empires. At the same time, these years also showed important differences between the French and British approaches to Germany. While the French authorities took a more straightforwardly confrontational stance, some British officials tried to 'draw Germany into Western Europe', by creating ties with German pro-Western forces. A third phase, lasting from 1925 until 1933, temporarily saw an end to the cooperation between German government officials and anti-colonialists, but alliances between anti-colonialists and German communists further increased in importance in those years. This caused members of Western political police institutions to send additional agents abroad, and eventually inspired them to increase cooperation with German conservative authorities, based on shared government fears of the radical left. In a final stage, after the Nazis came to power in 1933, this anti-leftist cooperation initially continued. However, after 1936, the Nazis returned once more to the earlier German government strategy of 'official' cooperation with anti-colonialists, thereby rekindling Western fears about right-wing, rather than left-wing, colonial intrigues conceived on German ground.

Alliances between Germans and Anti-colonialists before and during the First World War (1904–18)

Beginning in 1905, increasing numbers of political activists from the Western empires' colonies chose to carry out their political work in Britain, and, soon after, in France.[3] These anti-colonialists took advantage of the liberal laws of Western Europe, which stood in contrast to the harsh legal rules against 'subversion' that were in place in the autocratically ruled colonies.[4] However, when more and more politicized immigrants began to arrive in Britain, it did not take the authorities long to institute new measures to keep those newcomers under control. The Special Branch—a political police organization that often imported colonial methods of policing into the metropole (many of its leading officers were veterans of

the Indian or Irish police forces)[5]—shadowed anti-colonialists throughout Britain. This, in turn, led to a feedback cycle in which anti-colonialists and the authorities began to push each other to form increasingly transnational networks. A heightened level of police persecution, inspired by events such as the murder of a British official by an Indian anti-colonialist in London in 1909, soon led many colonial activists to relocate their centres of activity from Britain to continental Europe.[6] In reaction, the British authorities extended their police institutions abroad, making them as transnational as the emerging anti-colonial networks. A dedicated Indian Section of the London Special Branch was created, which then developed into the Indian Political Intelligence Service (IPI), an organization that increasingly targeted the activities of Indian activists and other 'subversive orientals' both within and beyond national borders.[7]

From the beginning, this extension of transnational policing was connected to Western misgivings about Germany. In 1904, the treaties forming the *Entente Cordiale* had been concluded between France and Britain, inspired by anxieties about German aggression in the colonial sphere and by fears of Germany's rising economic and military power. After decades of tensions between France and Britain, the authorities of these two countries now cooperated in the creation of a discourse that set them in opposition to Germany, based on a perceived divide between Western enlightened liberalism, and German aggressive and illiberal tendencies.

This developing anti-German alliance was of crucial importance in shaping the terms of British and French debates about transnational policing and government cooperation. As ever-greater numbers of anti-colonialists from the British colonies began to hide in France, British and French police officers increasingly began to work together. For example, in 1910, the French authorities outlawed a congress, aimed at supporting the cause of full Egyptian independence from British rule, that had been planned together by Egyptian and Indian activists in Paris. Many observers interpreted this new level of British–French cooperation as a sign of the growing power of the 'spirit of the Entente'.[8]

Police cooperation was further strengthened when the British and French authorities connected their more general fears of German aggressive expansion—which was reflected in numerous fictional works depicting a potential invasion of Britain by German spies[9]—to the prospect that Germans might undermine inner-European racial solidarity by forming a new kind of pact with anti-colonialists. In this interpretation, Western officials were influenced by German publications such as Friedrich von

Bernhardi's *Germany and the Next War* (1911), which argued that a potential anti-colonial uprising in the colonies would severely threaten Britain's strategic position by diverting valuable military resources.[10]

From the very beginning, fears of such dangerous alliances influenced the extension of Western imperial policing throughout Europe. British police officers searched for any possible connections between Germans and anti-colonialists. In London, for instance, the German origins of a prominent anti-colonialist's landlady turned her into a target of the British police.[11] Beyond Britain's borders, the German background of the partner of a Paris anti-colonialist made her suspicious to the British authorities.[12] Soon, British spies began to report on the contacts of Indian anti-colonialists with German socialists.[13]

It is important to note, meanwhile, that in the pre-war years, the new level of pro-colonial Western government cooperation was by no means supported by everyone in Britain and France. Some observers, especially those on the left of the political spectrum, saw such cooperation as a worrying sign of the dissolution of both national sovereignty, and the very liberal ideals that supposedly set the Western countries apart from their German neighbour. As one observer noted, 'we had not thought that the Entente Cordiale would lead us to such surprises'.[14] Continued resistance to Western government cooperation became visible, for instance, with the 'Affaire Savarkar' in 1910. In July of that year, the Indian activist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who was to be brought from Britain to his trial in India, managed to escape from his ship in the French harbour of Marseille, but was returned to the boat by a French police officer. In reaction, a widespread campaign in favour of Savarkar's release developed, spanning the liberal and left-wing milieus of both France and Britain.[15]

Once the First World War had begun, the critical liberal and left-wing voices that had opposed French–British government cooperation before 1914 lost much of their influence. As a British official commented, even more so than before the war, the French were now 'most ready and anxious to help' the British.[16] This gave British officials unprecedented access to French territory. While some left-wing pressure on the French government remained and prevented cooperation from ever becoming total, the British could now silence Indian activists in France or even remove them from the country. For instance, the Indian anti-colonialist Bhikaji Rustomji Cama was forced to end her openly political activities in France, and her mobility within that country was restricted,[17] and after January 1915, the Indian activist S.R. Rana was exiled to spend the rest of the war on the French-ruled island of Martinique.[18]

It was this new level of persecution that led a growing number of anti-colonialists to flee from France to Switzerland[19] and Germany. Ironically, the Western police institutions thereby contributed to the creation of the very German-anti-colonialist alliances that they were so afraid of. A number of anti-colonialists from the British and French Empires soon began to cooperate with German officials of the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (News Service for the Orient).[20] Together, Indians and German officials worked on a number of 'schemes' aimed at weakening the Western colonial empires. For example, they tried to send weapons to India for a planned anti-colonial uprising, they made efforts to control 'oriental' students and prisoners of war in Germany, and they created propaganda materials aimed at convincing Allied colonial soldiers to desert.[21]

This new German-anti-colonialist alliance, in turn, was crucial in causing a further extension of police networks, thereby contributing to the general European shift towards more intense government surveillance during the First World War.[22] Seemingly, in France, government worries about 'German-anti-colonial cooperation' contributed significantly to the first attempts to put people from the French colonies under political surveillance. Those fears were inspired by reports about German efforts to win over the local inhabitants of Morocco and other Arab-speaking French colonies,[23] as well as by the suspicion that a number of Vietnamese immigrants in France were conspiring with the Germans against the French Empire.[24] Between 1915 and the end of the war, special organizations for the surveillance of colonial workers and soldiers were created, and an extensive postal censorship system was used to check for potential subversive political statements.[25] The censors focused, especially, on the danger of German agents swaying soldiers from French Indochina with exaggerated notions of German power and military strength.[26]

However, the Western view according to which German decision makers were simply using anti-colonialists as tools for their own schemes was indicative of a systematic misconception in French and British interpretations of German-anti-colonial cooperation. The notion of 'orientals' being 'steered' by clever white agents would remain powerful until 1918 and beyond. Such 'agent theories' allowed the French to maintain their racist assumption that 'colonials' were, in most cases, simply not developed enough to lead and organize such resistance by themselves. Moreover, these theories also diverted attention away from the possibility that the activities of British and French administrators themselves might be the cause of discontent in the colonies.[27]

In reality, the situation in Germany was considerably more complex. German officials, themselves still rulers over a sizeable colonial empire, certainly did not act out of any notion of equality with non-European anti-colonialists. They did indeed *attempt* to use these activists in a purely strategic manner. However, in fact, the same was true for the anti-colonialists in Germany, who, in turn, tried to use the Germans as a means towards their own goals. Moreover, anti-colonial activists consistently demanded equal treatment with Germans and, in some cases, broke off cooperation when they realized that the Germans were unwilling to accept them as full partners. Indians successfully demanded the same quality of office equipment as their German partners, insisted on communicating directly with the Foreign Office and convinced the German officials to let them write their own articles rather than just translating texts written by German 'oriental experts'.[28]

In the end, the German-'oriental' projects met with limited success, one reason being precisely such conflicts over equal treatment. However, as we will see, the Western anxieties evoked by such 'schemes', as well as the structures and ideologies of transnational surveillance that Western authorities developed in reaction to them, would influence the European political landscape for years to come.

THE 'GERMANO-BOLSHEVIK THREAT' (1918–25)

Through the Allied victory in 1918, the German goal of using anti-colonialists to gain a military advantage against the British became irrelevant. However, the armistice did not lead to the end of Western fears about anti-colonialists working together with Germans. The French authorities, especially, who often saw themselves as involved in a continued, though unofficial, state of war with Germany, suspected German right-wing and conservative government officials of maintaining their cooperation with colonial activists. In addition, French officials also thought that new alliances were emerging behind the scenes. After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the founding, in 1919, of the Communist International (which had one of its main centres in Berlin), there seemed to be the danger that radical left-wing Germans might form a second group of potential allies of anti-colonialist movements.

The double threat of intrigues by communists and German government agents against the Western empires was important in convincing French colonial officials and politicians not simply to discard the wartime surveillance institutions, but to maintain and even expand the level of surveillance

directed at politically active immigrants from the colonies.[29] Thus, the French authorities contributed to a Europe-wide trend of keeping in place the structures of the 'national security states' that had been created during the war.[30] French officials throughout the early 1920s believed they had found worrying signs that German left- and right-wing forces not only supported anti-colonialists separately but also in fact cooperated with each other in a surprising three-way alliance aimed at subverting the French Empire through 'Germano-Bolshevik intrigues'.[31] By bringing forward this argument, French officials were able to fuse into one master threat their three prevalent political anxieties of the period: the fear of a renewed German attack on France, the fear of a communist undermining of French society and the fear of growing resistance to French colonial rule.

Again, there certainly was some empirical basis to this interpretation. According to the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, Germany lost all of its colonies, and the Rhineland was to be occupied by Allied troops for the next 15 years. In addition, between 1923 and 1925, French and Belgian troops occupied the German Ruhr area in retaliation for a German delay in delivering raw materials as part of the war reparations. Under these conditions, a number of German writers began to argue that their own country was in danger of being colonized by the Western powers.[32] Some German nationalists therefore proposed that members of all nations victimized by imperialism—including Germany—should work together in newly founded organizations such as the League of Oppressed Nations.[33] Resistance to 'foreign oppression' also led to certain temporary coalitions between German right- and left-wing forces. While the German government cooperated with Soviet Russia in circumventing the anti-rearmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, a short-lived communist campaign based on Karl Radek's argument that the Germany of 1923 was 'not a subject but an object of imperialistic politics' addressed right-wing resisters of the Ruhr occupation.[34] Other 'national Bolshevik' authors such as Paul Eltzbacher stressed that the *Entente* powers had to be prevented from making a 'European India' out of Germany.[35]

Anti-colonialists in Germany were able to gain a certain amount of support and protection by making use of such German anti-Western sentiments and by creating a shared 'discourse of suffering', which appealed, to some extent, to Germans of both right- and left-wing political persuasions.[36] At the same time, it is important to point out that the 'national bolshevist' discourse was both short-lived and, for the most part, relegated to the margins of the German political spectrum. However, while

'Germano-Bolshevism' was of much less influence in Germany than French spies assumed, its spectre was of central importance in the history of transnational policing, as it became a considerable impetus for the further extension of the French surveillance apparatus.

The level of surveillance increased, first of all, within the French Empire's borders. For instance, in 1923 French officials 'seized and destroyed' a journal with critical articles on the Ruhr occupation that had been smuggled into the French Île de la Réunion in the Indian Ocean.[37] In the same year, in France proper, the authorities sentenced to a prison term the French left-wing activist Marcel Cachin, who had, in the occupied Rhineland, publicly criticized the 'vast consortium destined for the colonization of Germany' that the Allies were creating.[38]

Moreover, the perceived threat of Germano-Bolshevism led to a further extension of French surveillance into Germany itself. French officials worried that anti-colonialists might use the occupied Rhineland to get in touch with German agitators. Soon, an intricate system of surveillance was aimed at preventing a German 'invasion of the minds' of the soldiers and military workers from French Indochina who were stationed in this area (apparently 1,150 of them were present in the German Rhineland in 1920).[39] French officials began to remove soldiers who had entered romantic relationships with German civilians, as they feared that the soldiers' female partners might easily indoctrinate the Asians with German propaganda.[40] The extensive French postal censorship often focused on letters that expressed admiration for German culture or that seemed to mirror German voices against the 'ruination' of Germany by the Western powers.[41] When the soldiers, who were stationed in one of Germany's most industrialized regions, expressed their admiration for German economic prowess, one inspector recommended sending the troops to Paris and Lyon to show them that the French were not lacking in similar accomplishments.[42] Vietnamese people who moved to the Rhineland individually, rather than as part of the military, equally came under the gaze of the authorities.[43] In 1920 a special surveillance apparatus was created that was aimed at the people from French Indochina living in that region.[44] In order to undercut a money flow from Vietnamese merchants in the Rhineland to left-wing anti-colonial organizations in France, the authorities outlawed the trading of goods such as photographic equipment that many Vietnamese were engaged in.[45] Moreover, the French authorities made it increasingly difficult for Vietnamese travellers to get the safe-conduct passes necessary to enter the occupied Rhineland.[46]

Fears of German-oriental alliances also caused the French authorities to send their agents into unoccupied German territory beyond the Rhineland. French surveillance efforts were often aimed at Cameroonian immigrants in German cities such as Hamburg and Berlin. A former German colony, Cameroon had been divided up between the French and the British after the end of the war. French officials were now worried that some Cameroonians might still maintain their allegiance to their former colonial masters and secretly agitate against French rule. In reaction, French spies tried to create a full register of all Cameroonians in Germany,[47] and they followed Cameroonian activists such as Martin Dibobe through Berlin, and tried to obtain government documents proving German–African cooperation.[48]

Dibobe's story provides a succinct example of how French interpretations of the data they collected were influenced by their anxieties about suspected schemes of the German authorities. French officials did pick up on real contacts between German government officials and Africans; however, at the same time, the records also show, yet again, the French tendency to underestimate the anti-colonialists' own initiative. The documents that French informants collected did indicate that Dibobe had indeed been trying to enter an alliance with the German government in order to gain the acceptance of Africans as 'Germans', and full legal equality in a future German Cameroon. However, the French authorities, influenced by their 'agent theory', believed that rather than bringing forward the proposal himself, Dibobe was simply reacting to German prompts.[49] In a similar vein, it seems as if Western officials falsely ascribed the founding of the first African mutual aid organization in Germany to a politically inspired German government initiative.[50]

When studying Western approaches to Germany during the early 1920s, it is illuminating to compare the relationship between German and French officials to the relationship between German and British officials. Just like the French, the British authorities were fearful about potential alliances between activists from their colonies and Germans, both government agents and communists. British agents reported about the competition between various Berlin Indian factions for communist money, as well as about their contacts to the German right-wing scene (including the early Nazi Party).[51] Like the French authorities, the British established an extensive secret service network in the country, leading one German official to complain about the 'high level of Entente espionage concerning colonial issues' on German territory.[52]

However, while French officials only focused on sending undercover agents to Germany to unmask suspected 'schemes', at least some British officials also attempted to secretly cooperate with German officials and convince the German authorities to expel or extradite the anti-colonialists still active in their country. In 1920 a secret system of German–British information exchange was established between the London Special Branch and the Berlin police.[53] This was indicative of the improving German–British relations in this period more generally, which stood in contrast to a more clear-cut German–French antagonism.

German officials' reactions, in turn, were divided in terms of the strategies that they thought should be employed towards Britain, reflecting the existing inner conflicts in Germany between pro-Western and anti-Western political forces. Some anti-Western officials did indeed try to continue the wartime cooperation with Indian or Egyptian anti-colonialists living in Berlin and other cities. They sometimes played a double game, for instance assuring the British that they were doing everything they could against the activities of 'subversives' in their country, while secretly warning these same anti-colonialists to change their location whenever they came under closer British scrutiny.[54]

Other German officials, in contrast, decided to win British goodwill by being more helpful to British political police. However, this pro-Western faction had to employ complex communication strategies, for many Germans saw any sign of handing over anti-colonialists to the Western countries as further evidence of Germany being 'colonized' by foreign agents. When a German government employee unofficially promised the British to put the Indians in Germany on a ship 'with through destination to India' and this (secret) promise was then made public by a British official in front of the Indian Council of State, the German authorities were quickly forced to deny that any official offer of cooperation had taken place, and the proposal was buried.[55]

British officials therefore often tried to provide their German counterparts with the opportunity to persecute anti-colonialists according to German laws. For example, in July 1923 British authorities discussed amongst each other the prospect of informing the Germans that the wife of Indian activist M.N. Roy was living in Germany illegally.[56] In September of that year, Roy and his wife barely escaped arrest for printing their paper in Berlin under a false cover, based on information that likely came from British sources.[57] The new level of police harassment eventually forced Roy and his wife to leave the country for Switzerland and, soon after, France.[58]

These developments are indicative of the increasing trend among German officials to choose cooperation with Britain over confrontation, leading to a reduction of Western anxieties about anti-colonial plots being stirred up by the German government.

Western Fears of Alliances between Communist Germans and Anti-colonialists (1925–33)

The growing willingness of some British and German officials to work together formed part of a process of 'normalization' of Germany's position within Europe—a development that would eventually lead to the Locarno Treaties of 1925. As relations between German officials and the Western powers improved further in the late 1920s, members of the right-wing anti-Western factions in Germany, who earlier had still considered reviving the old wartime alliances with anti-colonialists, lost much of their influence. Simultaneously, in French official sources, fears about government-inspired anti-colonial schemes moved to the background. However, contacts between German communists and non-European anti-colonialists continued to exist, and in fact intensified in the late 1920s. It was these alliances at the left of Germany's political spectrum that the apprehensions of Western surveillance institutions were now focused on.

One example of this kind of cooperation that worried Western officials is provided by the League Against Imperialism (LAI), the most influential anti-colonial organization in Europe during this period. With its headquarters in the German capital, the LAI continued Berlin's tradition as a meeting place for anti-colonialists from many different colonies of the British and French Empires.[59] From Germany, the League organized large-scale anti-colonial congresses in Brussels (1927)[60] and Frankfurt (1929)[61], as well as a counter-exhibition to the 1931 International Exposition in Paris.[62] Moreover, from Berlin, the League was able to plan and establish sub-branches all over the world, including in London, Paris and South Africa. The League thereby broke new ground by challenging, simultaneously, all of the different colonial empires, in contrast to earlier organizations that had focused on only one specific colony or one specific empire.[63]

Once more, Western surveillance officials reacted to this threat by arguing that anti-colonialists were 'steered' by Germans. In this case, however, these fears were not focused on the German authorities. Instead, from the beginning, Western police officials were convinced that the League was secretly run by European—and especially German—orthodox communists.

This interpretation contributed considerably to French and British agents making new ventures abroad. Police spies noted down all of the speeches given at the League's congresses and reported them back to Paris and London.[64] After the 1931 exposition, Western agents intensified their secret surveillance in Germany.[65] The British authorities soon included the most prominent LAI leaders in a secret 'Black List' of people who were refused travel permits, and British and French officials tried to disrupt the LAI's information networks worldwide.[66]

Yet again, Western views about German influence on anti-colonialists were certainly not created out of nothing. While some prominent members of the League such as the Indian Virendranath Chattopadhyaya did not, at least initially, see themselves as communists, several of the LAI's leaders, including the left-wing media mogul Willi Münzenberg, who had first developed the idea for the League, were of a communist German background. Again, however, one can see here 'agent theories' at work, which led European police to systematically underestimate the agency of non-European anti-colonialists. The secret service officials were correct in determining that the LAI had been founded under the heavy influence of the Communist International, and they were equally correct in identifying the *goal* of the Comintern—and its German branch more specifically—of controlling the LAI and directing it towards a communist agenda. However, the authorities used an oversimplified model of explanation, which assumed that these intentions were fully realized. In fact, in its early phase, in order to avoid seeming communist and in order to achieve the Comintern's goal of using the League as a 'neutral intermediary' between itself and the nationalist movements in the colonies, the LAI supported, and was supported by, even those anti-colonialists who were not part of the radical left-wing milieu. The League thereby enabled the extension across borders of anti-colonial networks whose immediate goals only overlapped partially with those of the communists.[67]

However, while Western fears now focused on German communists rather than on German officials as potential partners of anti-colonialists, it also remained clear for all observers to see that the German government was not usually repressing these foreigners' activities in their country either. One reason for this official tolerance was that the League leaders, in these years, did not focus their attacks on the German government—which, after all, no longer ruled over any colonies at that point in time—but instead directed nearly all of their energies against Britain and France.[68] Moreover, in its early period, by being open to members of all

political persuasions (as long as they were opposed to colonialism), the League could portray itself as part of a liberal, democratic discourse, at the very moment when, in Germany, 'Western-style' democratic ideas were on the rise more generally. Between 1924 and 1929, a period sometimes called the 'Golden Age' of the Weimar Republic, the economic uncertainty and the state of near-civil war of the immediate post-war period seemed to have been overcome. German democracy was strengthened. Therefore, there was less pressure on the government to fight potential left-wing 'subversion'. As the Republic became more stable, a more relaxed German government approach towards the radical left developed. One could even argue that, ironically, the partial success of the Western project of extending liberal democracy to Germany protected the anti-colonialists in that country. This once again points to the paradoxical foundations of the Western European political system, with its combination of inner-European democracy with autocratic rule elsewhere.

In reverse, once democracy in Germany became weaker, British and French imperial interests were served better. From 1929 onwards, the situation of anti-colonialists in Germany began to deteriorate. In those years, the Great Depression de-stabilized the Weimar Republic both economically and politically, gradually leading to a state of inner warfare. The new, authoritarian German right-wing governments of the 'emergency decree regime' of the early 1930s became increasingly intolerant and fearful of left-wing 'subversive activities' in the country. At the same time, the League also moved towards a more confrontational attitude, including an open embrace of communism, based on the Comintern's decision, at its Sixth World Congress in 1928, to give up its earlier United Front initiatives and adopt a more aggressive stance towards the moderate left.[69] This shift reflected, in part, the undermining of liberal democracy in Germany, together with the rise of radical political parties in that country.

The League now also broke its earlier tacit non-aggression pact with the German government. From 1929 onwards, its members began to work together with left-wing Black associations, including the Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre (LDRN) and the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUC-NW), which established new kinds of transnational connections between France and Germany.[70] These groups soon began to publicly criticize Germany's own colonial past.[71] Their attacks appear to have contributed further to moving German officials towards supporting Western imperial interests, at the very moment when Germany was moving away from the 'Western model' regarding democracy at home.

Instances of pro-colonial cooperation between German and British officials now became even more frequent, based on shared government anxieties about the left-wing threat in Germany. The German government increasingly outlawed public meetings of anti-colonialists in Germany, and communications between the German authorities and British imperial officials intensified, even to the point at which a British writer recommended that the Germans provide information on Indian anti-colonialists spontaneously rather than only on demand.[72] Based on their notion that the existing left-wing anti-colonial organizations threatened German and British interests equally, German officials prevented the creation of new Indian clubs in Berlin, as well as radio broadcasts that were critical of the British Empire.[73] Then, on 21 December 1931, the increasing pressure of the German authorities on anti-colonial groups culminated in a police raid on the Berlin headquarters of the LAI. While the League was not yet dissolved entirely, everyone present was arrested, several members were expelled from the country, and all written documents were confiscated.[74]

Almost immediately after the raid, the German police appear to have shared with the British colonial police institutions the information they had obtained.[75] In stark contrast to what had been perceived by anxious Western observers in earlier years, the German authorities now seemed to be on a path towards becoming reliable partners in colonial surveillance across Europe.

The Nazi Period (1933–39)

The newly intensified level of cooperation between German and British administrators against anti-colonialists, who were now seen as 'dangerous leftists' in both countries, survived the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933. The Nazis quickly destroyed the left-wing anti-colonial organizations in Germany. The International Secretariat of the League Against Imperialism in Berlin was reported to have been 'closed' on 15 March 1933.[76] The Black organizations in Germany, such as the ITUC-NW, were also dissolved and outlawed.[77] Left-wing anti-colonialists in Germany now only had the choice of either refraining from political activities entirely or fleeing to other European countries. Several anti-colonialists were imprisoned without a warrant, and there were police beatings, confiscations of property and expulsions.[78]

At first view, these events might seem to signify a clear-cut break from the Weimar Republic period in terms of the treatment of anti-colonialists, as part of the Nazis' more general turn towards radical racism as the core

of the new German social and political order. However, in fact, the picture looks rather more complex. When it came to racial policies, the Nazis certainly did make it impossible for non-European anti-colonialists, as 'non-Aryans', to ever become part of the German nation. Yet, in contrast to the Nazis' brutal treatment of the Jewish population of Europe, immigrants from the Western empires' colonies usually did not have to fear imprisonment or death because of their 'non-Aryan' status in and of itself. While during their time in power, the Nazis strove to remove the Jewish population from their territory, culminating in systematic mass murder in the later years of their rule, when it came to immigrants from the French and British colonies, foreign policy concerns frequently over-ruled the demands by more radical Nazi Party members for more drastic measures to be taken against these activists in Germany.

Rather than being primarily a race-based attack, the dissolution of anti-colonialist organizations in 1933 seems to have been a radicalized version of the early 1930s crackdown against left-wing anti-colonialists and communists under the 'emergency decree regime'. The Nazi attacks appear to have occurred as part of a more general assault on independent left-wing organizations in Germany. This becomes clear from the fact that after 1933, immigrants from the British and French colonies were generally allowed to remain in Germany without direct government harassment, as long as they refrained from political activities (however, Hitler and other leading Nazis continued to speak of 'orientals' in highly derogatory terms, and non-Europeans experienced much grassroots racism from the German population.)[79]

The Nazi government's intolerance towards the left-wing political activities of anti-colonialists on German territory, in turn, was strengthened further by its continued goal of maintaining good relations with Britain. Nazi strategy was based, in part, on the idea that the shared German-British anxieties of a communist takeover might help create an understanding between the two powers, allowing Hitler to pursue his programme of gradually increasing German influence throughout Europe.

To be sure, in a brief, unusual instance of taking the side of the Indian anti-colonialists in Germany, the British authorities, which were under pressure from British leftist politicians,[80] had protested against the confiscations and expulsions mentioned above, criticizing such measures against their own subjects as uncivilized.[81] However, all in all, British–German relations do not seem to have suffered considerably when it came to the issue of anti-colonialism. In the mid-1930s, secret cooperation remained firmly in place between Britain and Germany. For example, British officials provided the

Germans with photographs, passports and handwriting samples in order to identify LAI members, and they inquired about information obtained during the raids against Padmore's ITUC-NW offices in Hamburg. The Nazis, in turn, shared with the British the names of 'mysterious refugees'.[82]

It thus becomes clear that, as long as the two powers could refer to their shared fears of the communist movement, Germany's internal development away from Western-style democracy was compatible with its continued support for autocratic Western imperialism. From the point of view of observers in the mid-1930s, the Nazis' aggressive attacks on anti-colonialists seemed to have completed the gradual erosion of Germany's status as a space for anti-colonial activity. From a Western perspective, the fears of German government cooperation with anti-colonialists during the First World War, the anxieties about anti-Western Germano-Bolshevik plots during the early 1920s, and the fears, in the late 1920s, of German communists attacking the West, now all seemed to be a thing of the past.

However, soon afterwards, the Nazis radically shifted course. While in the early to mid-1930s, colonial immigrants in Germany were tolerated if they kept quiet politically, now the Nazis moved towards re-activating, on a larger scale, the older project of cooperation between the German government and anti-colonialists. From 1936/1937 onwards, Hitler began to take a more confrontational stance towards Britain.[83] This went together with the Nazis creating new political organizations for activists from the Western empires' colonies. Now dubbing themselves the saviours of the colonized people from Western rule—in spite of their emerging parallel goal of reclaiming colonies in Africa—the Nazis used a double strategy. As part of their politics of 'Gleichschaltung' ('bringing into line'), they attempted to control and direct any kind of activity of 'colonials' on their territory. This included efforts to suppress any anti-German or left-wing activities among them, but now it also involved a much greater interest in cooperating politically with some of these non-European activists.[84]

During the war, as Britain entered an uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union, the Nazis began to take up again the older strategy of cooperating with those 'oriental' activists who, giving up their earlier left-wing views, were willing to accept the German government's offer of support. In this situation, the lines of conflict surrounding anti-colonialism in Europe were to shift once more. British officials' fears of anti-colonial communism had initially inspired them to work together with the Nazi government. However, during the war years, the danger of a right-wing victory would

cause the British to cooperate, temporarily, even with a number of those left-wing anti-colonialists (both from Europe and the colonies) whom they had only very recently spied on and tried to control.[85]

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Western fears of German-anti-colonialist alliances were an important driving force behind the extension of colonial surveillance across inner-European borders. Analysing these alliances and their effect on Western European police officials allows us to bring together in novel ways the history of emotions with the history of transnational colonial surveillance, European international relations and political ideologies.

As has become clear, instances of cooperation between Germans and non-European anti-colonialists illuminated the inner contradictions underlying a Western political project that combined liberal, democratic rule 'at home' with autocratic rule in the non-European territories. Throughout the chapter, we have seen how, very often, the two Western goals of championing democracy in Europe and upholding imperial rule elsewhere were difficult to reconcile. For example, by increasing French–British transnational police cooperation against Germany's anti-colonial allies, the Western authorities undermined the very foundations of their metropolitan liberal political ideals. In the early 1930s, in turn, it was precisely the waning of Western-style democracy in Germany and the coming to power of the Nazis that led to the temporary suppression of anti-colonial activities in that country, thereby stabilizing Western European colonial rule.

German-anti-colonial alliances evoked Western anxieties, in part, because they threatened one of the most important ideological 'tools' that had been developed to reconcile the contradiction between liberalism and colonialism, namely the notion of a 'civilizing mission'. According to that ideology, autocratic rule in the present was portrayed as a precondition for bringing Western European-style democracy to the colonies at some point in the future. The anti-colonialists who were willing to work together with Germany, in contrast, obviously rejected the British 'helping hand', choosing to rebel against the current colonial injustices rather than relying on the promise of eventually being granted their freedom.

Moreover, German-anti-colonialist alliances also threatened what could be called a second, inner-European, 'civilizing mission', aimed at bringing

liberal democracy to Germany. The fact that German support for anti-colonialists was often rooted in the perception that Germany itself was being 'colonized' by the Western powers made clear many Germans' strong reservations against being 'taught' by Western Europeans.

Some of the strategies developed by Western authorities against German-anti-colonialist alliances can be read as a reaction to these challenges and contradictions, showing an effort to protect the image of a successful Western civilizing mission even against contrary evidence. For instance, by systematically downplaying the agency of anti-colonialists in their workings with their German allies, Western officials could uphold the view of the colonized population as naïve and primitive, and in obvious need of a strong French or British guiding hand. The notion of 'Germano-Bolshevik intrigues' in the immediate post-First World War period, in turn, allowed the Western surveillance institutions to fuse all of their principal fears into the image of one united, anti-Western and anti-democratic threat, thereby maintaining the idea that the Western authorities were needed to uphold the liberal project against a worldwide conspiracy, even if non-democratic methods had to be employed in doing so.

Western anxieties about German-anti-colonial 'subversive alliances' therefore went beyond the merely strategic level of 'anti-insurgency'. Instead, these fears were connected to deeper internal tensions within the British and French imperial projects. While Western administrators wished to keep these contradictions hidden, the activities and alliances of anti-colonialists in Europe constantly brought them to light, creating a dangerous reminder of the fragility of Western imperial ideology.

Notes

1. See, for instance, Kim A. Wagner (2010; 2013: 159–97); Christopher A. Bayly (1996); and D.K. Lahiri Choudhury (2004: 965–1002). See also the chapters by Kama Maclean, Norman Etherington and Vincent Houben in the present volume.
2. For some important examples of recent works that stress the inherently international and trans-imperial dimensions of anti-colonialism in this period, see Erez Manela (2007); Manu Goswami (2012: 1461–85); Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton (2012: 390–431); Ali Raza et al. (2015); and Michael Goebel (2015).
3. The importance of 1905 as a starting point for anti-colonialist activities in Europe is stressed by Harald Fischer-Tiné (2007: 325–44). On the signifi-

cance of this moment in motivating worldwide challenges to empire, see also Cemil Aydin (2007: 71–78); and Pankaj Mishra (2012: 1–8).

4. See, for instance, Nicholas Owen (2013: 143–84).

5. See Bernard Porter (1987: 193 f.). For fingerprinting as an example of policing methods that emerged, at least in part, in a colonial setting, see Ginzburg and Davin (1980: 25–27). See also Simon A. Cole (2001: 60–118); and Chandak Sengoopta (2003).

6. See Harald Fischer-Tiné's chapter on the 'London outrage' in the present volume. On the assassin, see V.N. Datta (1978). On the extension of the police forces, and of postal censorship, in reaction to the murder, see the files in the British National Archive (hereinafter 'NA'), MEPO 2 1297, as well as Bernard Porter (1987: 163, 176; 1989: 130 f.). On the movements of anti-colonialists to Europe before and after the murder, see Veer Savarkar, *Inside the Enemy Camp*; English translation of the Marathi original, available at http://www.savarkar.org/content/pdfs/en/inside_the_enemy_camp.v001.pdf, pp. 44–45; 'Les Révolutionnaires Indiens', 20 June 1908, Archives Nationales de France (hereinafter 'AN'), F 7 12900; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 30 September 1907, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections (hereinafter 'BL, OIOC'), POS 3094. In 1909 there were about 250 politically active Indians present in Paris; see Richard J. Popplewell (1995: 135).

7. Note dated 25 January 1909, AN, F 7 12900; Richard J. Popplewell (1995: 135–41).

8. On the planned congress and its prevention, see Congrès National Egyptien. Statuts, AN, F 7 13439; 'L'interdiction du congrès jeun-égyptien', *Liberté*, 16–17 September 1910. On the ensuing public debates in France, see 'Le Congrès Egyptien interdit: Conversation avec Farid-Bey', *La Parole*, 18 September 1910; 'Le Congrès Egyptien', *L'Humanité*, 27 September 1910; 'Au sujet de l'interdiction du congrès égyptien', Paris, 16 September 1910, AN, F 7 13439; 'Proclamation à la Nation Française', *L'Humanité*, 17 September 1910.

9. See David French (1978: 355–70); David A.T. Stafford (1981: 489–509); Nicholas Hiley (1986: 635–70).

10. See Friedrich von Bernhardi (1914: 95–97); A.C. Bose (1971: 83).

11. Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 23 October 1909, BL, OIOC, POS 3094; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 25 December 1909, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.

12. See the notes on Rana's wife on British Embassy paper in 'Révolutionnaires Hindous—Dossier pour M. le Directeur de la Sûreté Générale', AN, F 7 12900.

13. See Raj Kumar et al. (1998: 151 f.).

14. 'Le Complot Hindou', *L'Éclair*, 23 December 1908.

15. See Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey Bart, 19 July 1910; Paul Cambon to Sir Edward Grey, 23 July 1910, NA, HO 144 1063; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 30 August 1910; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 11 October 1910, BL, OIOC, POS 3095. See also Janaki Bakhle (2010: 51–75). For the first English-language, book-length biography of Savarkar, see Dhananjay Keer (1966).

16. Annexure 2 to Enclosure No. 1: Note on the possibility of seditious persons tampering with the loyalty of our Indian troops at Marseilles, 16 April 1915, BL, OIOC, L MIL 7 17347.

17. Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 8 December 1914, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.

18. Decypher of telegram from Sir F. Bertie (Bordeaux), 20 November 1914; Crewe to Grey, India Office, 23 November 1914, NA, FO 800 56B; Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence of 29 December 1914, 12 January 1915, 23 February 1915 and 17 August 1915, BL, OIOC, POS 3095; A.C. Bose (1971: 34).

19. See Harald Fischer-Tiné (2015).

20. Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence of 20 October 1914, 8 December 1914, 15 December 1914 and 29 December 1915, BL, OIOC, POS 3095; A.C. Bose (1971: 85); Upendra Narayan Chakravorty (1997: 110).

21. See, for instance, Franziska Roy et al. (2011); Maia Ramnath (2011: 70–94, 166–93); Thomas G. Fraser (1977: 252–77); Nirode K. Barooah (2004: 39–54); Donald M. McKale (1998); Herbert Landolin Müller (1991); Gerhard Höpp (1996: 186 f.).

22. On this shift, see Peter Holquist (1997: 415–50).

23. See Martin Thomas (2008: 79–88).

24. On an important court case in which a number of Vietnamese activists were accused of working together with Germany, see Statement of Nguyen-Nhu-Chuyên, Centre des Affaires d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (hereinafter 'CAOM'), 3slotfom29; Sophie Quinn-Judge (2002: 14); Phan Van Truong (2003 [1928]: 116–59).

25. Note, Paris, 26 December 1915, CAOM, 1slotfom4; Contrôle des Tirailleurs et des Travailleurs Indochinois, Senegalais et Malgaches, 18 April 1917, CAOM, 1slotfom4; Olivier Sagna (1986: 122–27); Patrice Morlat (1990: 55–59).

26. See Contrôle Postal Indochinois, March 1918–August 1918, CAOM, 1slotfom8.

27. On this topic, see also Martin Thomas (2008: 73–106).

28. Protokoll der ausserordentlichen Sitzung vom 24. März 1915, Berlin, 30 March 1915, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (hereinafter 'PAAA'), R 1502; Protokoll der 1. (ausserordentlichen) Sitzung der

Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient am 1. Juni 1915, PAAA, R 1502; Nirode K. Barooah (2004: 48–53).

29. Between 1917 and 1923, a police institution originally aimed at the surveillance of members of the military from French Indochina developed into the Service de Contrôle et d'Assistance des Indigènes, which was to keep under control any immigrants from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (accompanied, from 1925 onwards, by the Brigade Nord-Africaine, which targeted North African immigrants in France). See Arrêté, 12 December 1923; Textes de Principe Portant Création et Organisation du Service, CAOM, 1slotfom4; Plan d'Exposition, n.d., Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris (hereinafter 'APP'), DA 768; Patrice Morlat (1990: 77–81); Clifford Rosenberg (2006: 109–67); Olivier Sagna (1986: 127–64); Michael Goebel (2015: 44–54).

30. See Peter Holquist (1997: 444 f.).

31. See, for example, Compte rendu des renseignements, 25 January 1924, AN, F 7 14980.

32. See Jared Poley (2005: 215–47); Shelley Baranowski (2011: 116–58).

33. Le Ligue des Nations Opprimées de l'Orient, n.d.; John de Kay, n.d.; Le Commissaire Spécial à Monsieur le Directeur de la Sûreté Générale, 28 October 1922, AN, F 7 13467; Adolf Hitler (1939: 744–47).

34. Louis Dupeux (1985: 178–85).

35. Louis Dupeux (1985: 57).

36. In a recent study, Kris Manjapra shows how the fascination with India among both radical right-wing and radical left-wing Germans, and the alliances these Germans formed with Indian anti-colonial immigrants in the first half of the twentieth century, were connected to their attempt to set their country apart from Western European political and cultural models. See Kris Manjapra (2014: 56–87, 176–79). See also Nathanael Kuck (2014: 154–57).

37. Le Gouverneur de l'Île de la Réunion à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies, 25 April 1924, CAOM, 3slotfom92.

38. 'Comme Poincaré M. Herriot déclare: "Nous n'évacuerons pas la Ruhr." Marcel Cachin montre ce que cache le Plan des Experts. M. Dubois, ex-président de la C.D.R., avoue le néant de la politique des réparations', l'Humanité, n.d., AN, F 7 15938 1, and the documents in AN, F 7 15938 2.

39. Le Haut Commissaire de la République Française dans les Provinces du Rhin à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies, Contrôle Général des Troupes Indo-Chinoises en France, 3 July 1920, CAOM, 3slotfom29.

40. Rapport sur la Tournée de Contrôle effectuée à l'Armée du Rhin par le Résident Supérieur Contrôleur Général des Troupes Indochinoises en France [Guesde], 27 June 1921, CAOM, 1slotfom10; Contrôle Postal

Indochinois de Marseille, second half of June 1923, CAOM, 1slotfom8; Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Ministre de la Guerre (8ème Direction—5ème Bureau), CAOM, 1slotfom11.

41. Contrôle Général des Troupes Indo-Chinoises. Rapport Confidentiel, 1 August 1920, CAOM, 1slotfom8; Rapport du Résident Supérieur Contrôleur Général des Troupes Indochinoises au sujet de la situation matérielle et morale des détachements annamites de l'Armée du Rhin et du détachement du 6e Escadron du Train à Metz, 1924, CAOM, 1slotfom10; Le Contrôleur Général des Troupes Indochinoises à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l'Indochine, 11 July 1923, CAOM, 1slotfom8; Contrôle Postal Indochinois de Marseille, April 1923; Contrôle Postal Indochinois de Marseille, second half of June 1923, CAOM, 1slotfom8.

42. Rapport du Résident Supérieur Contrôleur Général des Troupes Indochinoises au sujet de la situation matérielle et morale des détachements annamites de l'Armée du Rhin et du détachement du 6e Escadron du Train à Metz, 1924; Monsieur Vinay à Monsieur le Contrôleur Général des Troupes Indochinoises, Paris, 2 October 1923, CAOM, 1slotfom10.

43. Rapport de la Préfecture de Police, Paris, 12 December 1919, CAOM, SPCE 364; Compte rendu de tournée dans la 15e région du 18 au 23 novembre 1919 à Monsieur Guesde, Résident Supérieur Contrôleur Général des Troupes Indochinoises à Paris, CAOM, SPCE 364; Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre, 11 December 1919, AN, F 7 13405; Note Confidentielle, Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine à M. le Directeur de la Sûreté Générale, Paris, 26 December 1919, AN, F 7 13405; Report by Edouard, Paris, 10 November 1919; Report by Edouard, 8 November 1919, AN, F 7 13405; Le Haut Commissaire de la République Française dans les Provinces du Rhin à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies, Contrôle Général des Troupes Indo-Chinoises en France, 3 July 1920, CAOM, 3slotfom29.

44. Le Résident Supérieur, Contrôleur Général des Troupes Indochinoises en France à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l'Indochine en mission, 28 December 1920, CAOM, 1slotfom4; Le Ministre des Colonies à M. Tirard, Haut-Commissaire de la République Française, dans les provinces du Rhin, 4 May 1920, CAOM, 1slotfom11.

45. See Note de M. Jean, 3 February 1920; Note de M. Jean, Paris, 22 April 1920, CAOM, 2slotfom6; Rapport de Jean, 8 January 1920; Note de Jean, 6 February 1920, CAOM, SPCE 364; Note de Jean, 29 January 1920, CAOM, 2slotfom6.

46. See, for instance, the report on the activities of this group, dated 19 July 1922, AN, F 7 13405; Phan Van Truong (2003 [1928]: 191 f.).

47. Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre (Cabinet Militaire), 30 October 1919, CAOM, 3slotfom92.

48. See Le Ministre de la Guerre à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies (Cabinet), 27 September 1920, CAOM, 3slotfom92. See also the various agents' reports and copies of letters and government documents attached to Rapport, dated 10 July 1920; Association allemande destiné à provoquer des troubles dans les Colonies Françaises, 31 December 1919, CAOM, 3slotfom92. On Dibobe's background, see Eve Rosenhaft and Robbie Aitken (2008: 162–172).

49. See Annex 3 to Rapport, dated 10 July 1920; Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre (Cabinet Militaire), 30 October 1919; Rapport, dated 10 July 1920, CAOM, 3slotfom92. German officials never accepted Dibobe's demands. After deleting a sentence in which Dibobe criticized the pre-war German colonial regime, they forwarded to the German National Assembly, and later used for propaganda purposes, a letter of Dibobe's in which he pledged allegiance to the new, democratic Germany. In contrast, an additional document that described in detail the Cameroonians' demands, and that Dibobe submitted to the Colonial Ministry, was never allowed to reach either the National Assembly or the European public. See Stefan Gerbing (2010: 47–63); Adolf Rüger (1975: 1296–1306); Eve Rosenhaft and Robbie Aitken (2008: 170); Robbie Aitken and Eve Rosenhaft (2013: 199–201).

50. See Association allemande destiné à provoquer des troubles dans les Colonies Françaises, 31 December 1919, CAOM, 3slotfom92. On the activities of the African organization, see Peter Martin (2004a: 73–80); Robbie Aitken and Eve Rosenhaft (2013: 203).

51. See, for instance, Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence of 21 February 1921, 28 March 1921 and 9 May 1921, BL, OIOC, POS 32126. See also Nirode K. Barooah (2004: 157–77); Conference of Orientals at Munich, 8 January 1923; Conference of Orientals at Munich, 12 January 1923, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12102. If correct, these reports contradict Hitler's later statement in *Mein Kampf* where the future German dictator stressed that he had always been opposed to coalitions between German radical nationalists and colonial activists. See Adolf Hitler (1939: 744–47).

52. Aufzeichnung, Berlin, 28 April 1920, PAAA, R 77414. See also Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 17 March 1921, BL, OIOC, POS 32126, which quotes from a letter, written by an Indian, according to which Germany was 'full of British spies'. The writer thought that this made it 'very difficult to work secretly'.

53. Geheim!, London, 19 October 1920, NA, GFM 33 3557.

54. On the internal debates in the German administration about this strategy, see Aufzeichnung. Berlin, 14 December 1920, NA, GFM 33 3557; Aufzeichnung, 20 December 1920, NA, GFM 33 3557. See also Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 26 January 1920, BL, OIOC, POS 32124.

55. Foreign Office to Dufour, S.W.1, 18 December 1925, NA, GFM 33 3557; Copy of Telegram from Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for India, 19 January 1925, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 223; Copy of Telegram from Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for India, 21 June 1925, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 223; Foreign Office to Dufour, S.W.1, 18 December 1925, NA, GFM 33 3557; Deutsches Generalkonsulat für Britisch-Indien und die Kolonie Ceylon to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Simla, Calcutta, 6 October 1925, National Archives of India, Delhi; An die Deutsche Botschaft in London, Berlin, 6 January 1926, NA, GFM 33 3557.

56. Letter to Hose, 13. July 1923, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 55.

57. Minute Paper, 29 November 1923, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 48; Indian Communist Party, 3 January 1924, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 49; Minute Paper: Indian Communist Party, 28 May 1922, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 46.

58. Indian Communist Party, 23 April 1924, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 49. On Roy's activities throughout Europe, see Kris Manjapra (2010).

59. See Fredrik Petersson (2014: 49–71); Nathanael Kuck (2014: 152–54).

60. See Vijay Prashad (2007: 16–30).

61. See Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 30 June 1929, CAOM, 3slotfom148; Jürgen Dinkel (2012: 220–22).

62. On the planning of the counter-exhibition from Berlin, see IPI to Peel, 5 February 1931, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 270; Note sur la propaganda révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 March 1931, CAOM, 3slotfom149. The Berlin office of the LAI apparently provided 25,000 out of the 32,000 francs that constituted the total budget of the Paris counter-exhibition; see Report, 31 October 1931, CAOM, 3slotfom5. On the counter-exhibition, see also Herman Lebovics (1992: 98–110); and Jennifer Boittin (2010: 103–07).

63. Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 May 1926, CAOM, 3slotfom144; League against Colonial Oppression, Egyptian Department, Berlin, 17 September 1926, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 265; Copy of a letter by Nehru, Montana, 7 March 1927, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 266; His Majesty's Consulate-General to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Batavia, 20 July(?) 1927, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 267.

64. The Congress of the League against Cruelties and Oppression in the Colonies, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 266. For a French report, see Note sur la

propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 28 February 1927, CAOM, 3slotfom145.

65. M. Pierre de Margerie, Ambassadeur de la République Française à Berlin, à Son Excellence Monsieur Aristide Briand, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Berlin, 9 March 1931, CAOM, 3slotfom5.

66. Arthur Hirtzel to Mr. Ferard, 5 December 1927; IPI to Peel, 20 December 1927; IPI to Peel, 12 April 1928; Minute Paper. Action to be taken against members of the League Against Imperialism, 21 December 1927, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 268. On the British government's strategy of using passport regulations to control the voyages of anti-colonialist Indians, see Shompa Lahiri (2010: 76–80).

67. On the League's communist connections, see Fredrik Petersson (2013; 2014: 49–71); and Peter Martin (2004b: 181, 186). On Chattopadhyaya's initial non-communist identity before his conversion to communism in 1929, see Nirode K. Barooah (2004: 267). On the notion of anti-colonialists in Europe being 'enabled' by their connections to European communists, without being fully controlled by the communist movement, see Brent Hayes Edwards (2003: 263). Between 1927 and 1929, the League in fact received much of its funding from non-communist-affiliated organizations in the colonies, such as the Indian National Congress. See Michele Louro (2013: 332, 335, 338).

68. See Fredrik Petersson (2013: 435). However, the LAI did speak out repeatedly against the German popular movement to restore Germany's status as a colonial power. See Petersson (2013: 422).

69. At the 1929 Congress in Frankfurt, the majority of participants were communists and the French police now noted that 'contrary to the Brussels Congress, the hand of Moscow did not fear to show itself openly this time'; see Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 August 1929, CAOM, 3slotfom144.

70. On the connections between the LDRN and the LAI, see Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 March 1927; Note sur la propaganda révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 30 April 1927; Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 30 November 1927, CAOM, 3slotfom144; Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 28 February 1927, CAOM, 3slotfom145; Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 July 1929; Note sur la propaganda révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 October 1929, CAOM, 3slotfom148. On the founding of a LDRN section in Berlin, see Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 October 1929, CAOM, 3slotfom148; S. Exzellenz Herrn Hirkl [?], Gouv. Dr.

Seitz, Berlin, 19 December 1929(?), BA, R 1001 4457 7. The ITUC-NW had its headquarters in Hamburg. On the founding of this organization, see Jonathan Derrick (2008: 196); Hakim Adi (2013: 40–46).

71. See, for instance, Köhler, Abteilungs-Direktor im Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland an die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, 12 December 1929, Bundesarchiv, Berlin (hereinafter 'BA'), R 1001 4457 7.

72. Report, 14 March 1930, NA, KV 4 110.

73. An den Herrn Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Berlin, 7 July 1930, PAAA, R 77415; Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin, 7 July 1931, PAAA, R 77459; 'Rundfunk und Aussenpolitik', *Berliner Tageblatt,* 26 July 1930; Herrn Schmidt-Reimer, 29 July 1930, PAAA, R 77415; Herrn Ministerialrat Scholz, Vorsitzender des Überwachungsausschusses der Funkstunde A.G. Berlin, 10 September 1930; Herrn Ministerialrat Scholz im Reichsministerium des Innern, 11 October 1930, PAAA, R 77415.

74. 'Polizeiaktion gegen die "Liga gegen den Imperialismus". 16 Verhaftungen—Verweigerte Auskunft', *Die Rote Fahne*, 22 December 1931; 'Polizeiaktion gegen Münzenberg-Liga. Fünf Ausländer noch in Haft', *Vorwärts*, 23 December 1931; Der Polizeipräsident an den Herrn Minister des Innern, Berlin, Betr.: Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, 31 December 1931, BA, R 1501 20200.

75. From late December 1931 onwards, the British authorities were reading documents that had been obtained in the police raids; see To H. Williamson, 31 December 1931, BL, L P&J 12 271; To Mr. Nott-Bower, 15 March 1932, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 272.

76. Aus Lagebericht PolPräs. Berlin, 16 March 1933, BA, R 1501 20200.

77. Report without title, 5 March 1933, CAOM, 2slotfom19; Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 March 1933, CAOM, 3slotfom147.

78. Memorandum, 27 March 1933, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 73; Dieckhoff to Sir Horace Rumbold, 25 March 1933; A.C.N. Nambiar an das Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 30 March 1933, PAAA, R 77416; Memorandum, 27 March 1933, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 73; 'Hitler's National Germany: A Sample, by Soumyendra Nath Tagore', *Advance*, 4 June 1933; Der Preußische Minister des Innern an das Auswärtige Amt, 18 April 1933, PAAA, R 77416; Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer, 31 March 1933, CAOM, 3slotfom147; Report without title, 5 March 1933, CAOM, 2slotfom19.

79. See Federation of Indian Students Abroad an seine Exzellenz den Herrn Reichsminister des Auswärtigen, 6 August 1934, PAAA, R 77417; Germany and India, 5 April 1934; Hindusthan Studenten Klub an Seine Excellenz den Herrn Reichsminister des Äußeren, Herrn von Neurath, 30 March 1934, PAAA, R 77417; Maria Framke (2012: 117–30).

80. Deutsche Botschaft London an das Auswärtige Amt, 11 March 1933; Deutsche Botschaft London an das Auswärtige Amt Berlin, 17 March 1933, PAAA, R 77416; 'British Nationals in Germany', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 March 1933; Telegram from Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin), 25 March 1933, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 273.

81. British Embassy Berlin to Herrn Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieckhoff, 8 March 1933; Bericht für den Reichsminister, 10 March 1933; British Embassy Berlin to Herrn Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieckhoff, 18 March 1933, PAAA, R 77416. Together with a campaign by anti-colonialists in Europe, who successfully pressured the Nazi government with potential bad press abroad and a boycott of German goods in their home countries, these protests eventually led to the Nazis taking back their expulsion orders and returning the anti-colonialists' confiscated property. See Ausgewiesene Inder; Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt an den Herrn Minister des Innern, 26 June 1933; Nambiar an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, 5 June 1933; Deutsches Konsulat Bombay an das Auswärtige Amt Berlin, 1 June 1933; Ref. ZR. Schmidt-Rohlke [?] an das Polizeipräsidium Berlin, 28 June 1933; Entwurf für Brief an den Herrn Polizeipräsidenten in Berlin, 31 July 1933; An die deutsche Botschaft in London, 31 August 1933; Der Preußische Minister des Innern, 23 May 1933; Ausgewiesene Inder; British Embassy, Berlin, 17 November 1933; An das Preußische Ministerium des Innern, 25 November 1933, PAAA, R 77416; Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt an Auswärtiges Amt, 26 March 1934, PAAA, R 77417.

82. To V.V., 17 May 1933; To V.V., 25 March 1933; M.I.5 (Captain Liddell), 15 June 1933, NA, KV 2 1382; M.I.5 (Captain Liddell) to V.V., 27 November 1933, NA, KV 2 1382; Susan Campbell (online). According to Campbell, 'British authorities were in close contact with their German counterparts in hopes of getting their hands on Padmore's "yellow trunk", presumed to contain material that would have been useful to MI5.'

83. On the shift towards a more aggressive German colonial propaganda aimed at Arab countries, once the Germans were faced with the possibility that Britain and France would not tolerate further German expansion in Europe, see Jeffrey Herf (2009: 32).

84. See, for instance, Indian Societies and Associations in Germany, 8 September 1939, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 410.

85. Examples of anti-colonialists who worked together with the British authorities during the war include Noor Inayat Khan, Nancy Cunard and George Orwell. See the files on Khan in NA, HS 9 836 5; Shrabani Basu (2006); Nancy Cunard and George Padmore (1942). On Orwell's propaganda activity during the Second World War, see Douglas Kerr (2002: 473–490; 2004: 43–57); C. Fleay and M.L. Sanders (1989: 503–18).

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Repertoires of European Panic and Indigenous Recaptures in Late Colonial Indonesia

Vincent Houben

A post-colonial perspective on Dutch colonial history in Indonesia has not yet been fully realized despite the fact that a resurgence in the historiography of Dutch colonialism occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. The scientific reappraisal of colonial history was, during this period, mainly fact-driven and tried to avoid a critical view of what had happened. It omitted any reference to post-colonial theories, which have shifted the attention of historians to the subjectivities of colonialism, its asymmetries of power, the epistemic violence of colonial discourse and the complexities of suppression. Studies by non-Dutch scholars, such as Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper, or self-critical studies by Dutch leftist scholars, such as Willem Wertheim and Jan Breman, were either largely ignored or dismissed as offensive to national self-esteem.[1] It was no accident that in 2012 Ulbe Bosma still had to write on the question as to why there has been no post-colonial debate in the Netherlands.[2] However, within the broader context of the resurgence of Dutch colonial

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studies in the 1980s and 1990s, many themes emerged that are essential to a post-colonial reassessment of Dutch colonialism. An effort to integrate Dutch colonialism into broader post-colonial history-writing is the way to go forward and to move beyond the trope of Dutch colonial exceptionalism. A recent special issue of the leading journal on Dutch history exemplifies the search for what is called 'new Dutch imperial history'.[3] This chapter tries to follow up on this by looking into what Dutch historical literature and some archival documents can tell us about the theme of imperial panic.

THE SETTING

Although the first Dutch trading fleets already arrived in Indonesia at the turn of the seventeenth century, the process of acquiring formal hegemony over this huge archipelago took until the early twentieth century, when the last outlying islands, the tips of Sumatra and New Guinea included, were incorporated. Colonial power was by far not evenly distributed among the islands. The European presence was most prevalent on the island of Java and somewhat less on Sumatra, whereas elsewhere it was restricted mainly to the main coastal towns. The Europeans were faced with an indigenous population whose numbers outstripped them 3,000 times in 1920.[4] This imbalance could therefore only be compensated by clever modes of direct and indirect control. The numbers of Dutch colonial administrators were also very modest, as in the whole of Java in 1920 there were only 196 of them.[5] An awareness of the restricted human capacities of the modern colonial state created European anxieties in the first place.

It is still a matter of debate whether the nineteenth-century Dutch East Indies can be entirely studied as part of empire. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper frame it as the result of maritime extension of a small state driven outward by necessity, since during their its sixteenth-century conflict with Spain and Portugal, spices were no longer delivered and had to be obtained independently. Thus, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) applied imperial strategies, but from the eighteenth century onwards, its capacity, especially in the face of British competition, was dwindling. After 1800, the Dutch state took over and thus the Dutch empire was transformed. Certainly, within the Dutch East Indies, imperial repertoires were prevalent, in the sense that pragmatic, interactive and accommodating modes of power had to be employed in order to create 'sovereignty as shared out, layered, overlapping'.[6] But at the same time, the Dutch could not presume to represent imperial power equivalent to that of the British, implying that their kind of imperialism was more vulnerable from the very start.[7]

From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, colonial domination changed in character as a consequence of multiple modern revolutions. A mobility revolution in the form of steam shipping, the advent of train travel, the introduction of telegraphed message transmission to be followed by telephone communication, motorized land transport and finally air travel ensured that was hitherto a fragmented space was turned into a single, more coherent whole. Connections between as well as within the islands became more regular than before and increased markedly in speed. An administrative revolution led to a system of rule that was much less localized, less dependent on intermediaries and much more subject to stringent regulation from the centre in Batavia and Buitenzorg in West Java. This deepening of Western rule occurred despite the pendulum of governance swinging back and forth between centralization and decentralization. At the same time, a process of state formation was driven forward, which enabled the colony to act more autonomously vis-à-vis the European motherland, but also transferred more responsibilities to it. A capitalist revolution introduced large international enterprise to the Dutch East Indies, most notably in the plantation, mining and oil sectors, but much less so in the form of industry. These enterprises necessitated the mobilization of labour to an unprecedented degree. Finally, from the late nineteenth century onwards, a process of urbanization took place, which led to the emergence of a series of large urban conglomerations, particularly on the north coast of Java. Thus, the Dutch East Indies in the 1920s was a very different place in comparison to the 1860s.

The modernization of the East Indies was part of the Dutch idea of being engaged in a huge project, but the colonizers gave little consideration to how this project would conclude. In 1901, a so-called Ethical policy was introduced in which the idea of tutelage was promoted. The 'Ethical' policy aimed to both establish effective Dutch authority throughout the entire archipelago and develop the country and people in the direction of self-government under Dutch leadership and based upon a Western model.[8] The promotion of development of indigenous society as a moral obligation was to be realized by pursuing rational objectives, the installation of certain regimes, a high degree of state interventionism and the acquisition of strategic information. Operating in the East Indies, the Dutch were faced with an oversized scope for policy making, but their actions, according to Van Doorn, were tuned to a typically Dutch style of technocratic governance: 'precise and tidy, thrifty and sober, frugal and decent, without fantasy but thorough'.[9] There was a certain consciousness of the unnatural character of

colonial rule, but this was covered in legitimizing reasoning—on the 'lifting up' of the population, the redemption of a 'debt of honour' towards the indigenous populace and the preparedness of sharing the benefits of Western civilization. Since the Dutch chose to ignore the finiteness and lopsidedness of their increasingly conservative colonial project they therefore concentrated on the maintenance of peace and order. But stability and the desire to transform the area colonized in the direction of western modernity constituted a severe dilemma from the very start.[10]

The impacts of these multiple modernizations upon the indigenous societies of the East Indies were manifold, affecting people in places close to Western centres of power much more than elsewhere, but its effects were felt, at least indirectly, everywhere. Whereas in earlier phases of Dutch presence, highly personalized connections between Europeans and inhabitants of the East Indies were frequent, the increased scale of colonial intervention, its formalization and technocratic character created a colonial divide of sorts which had not existed before. In Indonesian terms, a sharp distinction between *sini* (us) and *sana* (them) appeared, signalling the existence of two different worlds that were connected through narrow avenues of compulsion and suppression instead of multiple and more equitable formats of interaction. In this vein it was only natural that at the edges of these two societies, frictions would occur, which in turn created fear and anxiety particularly on the Western imperial side.

However, it would be misleading to see the dynamics within indigenous East Indies society as a mere result of delegated Western modernity only. The increase of scales and the accelerated mobility of people and ideas happened throughout Asia, including those parts that had not been colonized. Siam would be one example of this and Japan another. In these countries rapid modernization occurred without direct European intervention, although many of the mechanics of empire were applied there too—the delineation and extension of boundaries, the centralization of the administration and the promotion of economic development. Also, only through indigenous agency could colonial modernity be realized. This modernity, as I have argued elsewhere, worked in several directions and was often contested or reversed.[11]

ANXIETY, FEAR AND PANIC IN COLONIAL SITUATIONS

In order to frame historical events and developments in the Dutch East Indies or late colonial Indonesia during the first four decades of the twentieth century, the concepts of 'representations' within 'changing social

orders' and that of 'crisis' offer a plausible vocabulary.[12] Representations determine the way in which people perceive and interpret the social world. These are not only perceptions of and reflections on a particular social order, but also descriptions and forms of portrayal which create as well as uphold a particular social order. Representations are negotiated in the public sphere and are often, especially in situations of crisis, put under stress due to contestation. In a colonial situation the encounter of different, culturally distinct representations is unavoidable and the potential for conflict is much higher than in circumscribed social contexts. More than elsewhere, colonial social orders are constituted both through cultural programmes aimed at producing legitimacy and through systems of repression which impact strongly on existing social practices. In the two-way interplay between representations and social orders, disturbances may occur when either dominant representations no longer fit social realities or social change has made existing representations of social order increasingly irrelevant. In such situations, crises are most likely to occur, particularly when actors are forced to become explicit on what bothers them, whereas contexts seen as normal do not provoke explicit positioning.

Situations of crisis are bound to lead to fear and even panic. Crises depend on being viewed as such by those involved and depend on their cultural pre-suppositions. Especially in the West, crises are considered to mark exceptional situations and seem to be characterized by rapid change, underlining the contingency of social processes as well as the fragility of social constructs. In contrast to thinkers who attribute crisis to systemic imbalances, German historian Reinhart Koselleck attributes it to criticism that is the subversion of what is only seemingly self-evident through pursuing new ways of thought.[13] Although Koselleck looked at the subversive character of crisis in the form of enlightened criticism of French absolutism, this perspective opens up the possibility to see the rise of Indonesian nationalist thinking as a part of crisis. On the other hand, whether local populations within the Indonesian archipelago framed their experiences with colonialism in the format of crisis is doubtful, at least before they were exposed to colonialism or, even more so, nationalism.

Colonial situations are very much prone to crisis, since the semblance of European hegemony and its representations were easily and frequently destabilized. Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler have pointed out that colonies as laboratories of modernity never produced controlled conditions on the ground.[14] The reverse side of 'rust en orde' (tranquillity and order) was a continuous stream of more or less violent 'incidents'

that proved exactly the contrary to happen. There was a flip side to contemporary triumphal Western narratives of power and control, since these belied the existence of strong underlying feelings of insecurity. With the opening up of a colonial divide in the late colonial era, these feelings of anxiety and fear deepened since what the Other thought or planned to do became much more difficult to surmise. Also, as a consequence of modernization, the speed and the scale of discomforting events for the colonizer seemed to increase markedly. In retrospect, what ended in the Indonesian revolution against the re-imposition of Dutch rule in 1945 was preceded by decades in which a crescendo of disturbances of the colonial order occurred. Those involved were, consciously or unconsciously, aware of this.

Whether empires as a whole ever were on the verge of a nervous breakdown is unclear, but certainly some of the imperial agents were at specific junctures. Yet it is important to distinguish between a range of mental stages. Colonial situations were always accompanied by anxiety, simply because European (as well as non-European) actors felt insecure in unfamiliar contexts encountering people from other cultures, since these might show unexpected and therefore potentially dangerous behaviour. Fear and angst ran deeper, the former being a negative anticipatory feeling with regard to a situation of insecurity or threat, whereas the latter indicates an existential, non-directional feeling of alarm. Panic goes even further and constitutes a sudden, uncontrollable outburst of angst. All these dimensions of fear are linked to concrete situations at particular moments in time and depend on human agency. However, all four states of mind are not merely individual and can become collective in nature, especially in situations perceived as disorderly and particularly contingent.

Frontiers of Violence Producing European Panic

The most intense instances of European panic were connected to violence. This violence could be part of colonial warfare, violence in the workplace or the threat of violent revenge against colonial oppression. So instead of being a glorious place where the white man takes up his burden, the Dutch East Indies could very quickly turn into a nightmare. Two 'exemplary' cases are given here to illustrate how potentially dangerous a place the Dutch East Indies was for Europeans.

Experiencing Colonial Battle

Hendrik Colijn (1869–1944), a Governor General and Minister of Colonies, started his career as an officer in the colonial army and had directly been involved in mortal combat. Most dramatic are his private letters to his wife during the conquest of the Balinese settlement of Cakranegara on Lombok in 1894, which awkwardly he urged her to share with others.

To begin with, Colijn addressed the heroic burden of being a captain in battle, carrying ultimate responsibility for the men under his command and, by consequence, much less for the Balinese standing in front of him: 'One false command, one thoughtless or hesitant action throws dozens into death and turns happy women and children into abandoned widows and orphans.'[15] Then he decided to launch an attack:

> This is a moment I will never in my life forget. A brutal storm attack took place. An awful rain of bullets was poured out over us. The cries of victory of ours mixed with the battle cries of the Balinese and the wailing of the wounded. It was as if everything was on fire. Many around me fell.[16]

Finally the brutal end game was described as follows:

> The enemy now, since they did not see any escape devoted itself to death. Up till eight times they attacked my company with lances lowered down. Even young beautiful women with infants on the arm joined in the battle … after the eight attacks only few remained, who asked for mercy, I believe thirteen. The soldiers looked at me requesting for permission … I turned around to light a cigar. A few heartbreaking cries sounded and when I turned around again the thirteen were also dead.[17]

This is a remarkable piece of historical evidence on the reality of Dutch colonial warfare, so much in contrast to the contemporary peaceful civil order of the late nineteenth-century Netherlands, of which the Dutch East Indies project was imagined to be the tropical extension. Colijn's lines transported several powerful messages to the European reader. There apparently existed a huge contrast between peaceful life at home on the one hand and a dangerous frontier on the other, where civility ended and only the fittest could survive. However, the cataclysmic clash that took place was also a reassuring sign of Dutch prevalence, as all so-called enemies were

put down and there was—so one was assured—no real panic in the midst of chaos. Colijn also was quite open about being merciless towards the remaining 13 Balinese, implying that it was a necessary proof of strength in the face of an enemy that neither respected Dutch sovereignty nor followed the unwritten rules of regular warfare.

Context teaches us more about why Colijn acted in such a brutal manner. The Dutch attack on Cakranegara in 1894 was in fact an act of revenge against the Hindu Balinese kings who ruled over Lombok and were engaged in suppressing a Muslim Sasak revolt. This then provoked a Dutch intervention, in which at first the Dutch were defeated and about 100 soldiers killed and more than 270 were injured, the largest number of casualties in one event so far. The so-called 'Lombok treason' was meted out in the press as a national catastrophe both in the colony and in Holland. It led to a huge outcry in the Dutch public sphere, which then provoked a heavy-handed retaliation in order to restore Dutch national pride. Dutch newspapers repeated the terms the European press in the Indies had used to express the public feelings about the event: 'despondency, hurt pride, fear for the Dutch position on Java, feelings of revenge, and the wish to do something'.[18]

The military operation described by Colijn ended with what the Balinese call *puputan*, a final battle that is concluded by mass suicide. Such a kind of collective suicide was later repeated thrice. In 1906 the two royal families of Den Pasar and Pamecutan on Bali conducted a ritual of purification, then dressed up in white and went out for the final battle against the Dutch, in which over 1,000 Balinese were killed. In 1908 a similar incident occurred in Klungkung.[19] These *puputan* impressed the Dutch very much and undoubtedly instilled fear, because it illustrated the fact that Balinese would actively seek death, whereas Europeans in the Dutch East Indies did their utmost to prevent it. Such adversaries created anxiety, although this feeling was often over-ridden by utterances of pretended superiority. Later on, after having been completely pacified, the image of Bali was turned into that of a peaceful tropical paradise.

Violence in the Workplace

On the whole, late colonial society was structured in a way so that too much direct contact between Europeans and indigenous people could be avoided. However, in the workplace, particularly on large-scale plantations, this was not the case and the violence occurring here also increased European feelings

of anxiety, occasionally spilling over into outright panic. In a piece of colonial fiction we can read the following on coolie assaults, Asian manual labourers suddenly attacking white overseers for apparently no apparent reason:

> Assaults can be occasioned by a stinging slap delivered in unjustified anger. Assaults may follow upon a smarting insult. Attacks may happen suddenly, perpetrated by normally docile and compliant coolies, for no other reason than that their wife was unfaithful and they just had to lash out in revenge at somebody.[20]

In the second half of the 1920s in East Sumatra, the largest plantation belt of Southeast Asia, a worrying increase in the number of coolie attacks on European overseers occurred. Whereas in 1924 a total of 20 attacks were registered, in 1928 these numbered 152 and peaked in 1930 with 414 during a single year. This meant a dramatic upsurge even if the total number of coolies over these years increased as well.[21] Europeans in East Sumatra and the colony in general were very alarmed about this development. Violence as part of colonial labour relations became a major vehicle for European anxieties. Beyond instances of colonial warfare, these kinds of transgressions came from the indigenous side, were abrupt, unexpected and therefore beyond Western control. Ann Stoler has shown how feelings of an imminent crisis were aggravated by European stories of native violence and how the rumours connected to these stories were uneven and contradictory in nature.[22] These narratives constituted an 'epistemic murk' since they confused the clear-cut dichotomies between Europeans and the colonial subjects, showing that colonial authority constituted a highly vulnerable and non-hegemonic mode of control.

Colonial novels give us an immediate impression of how contemporaries experienced violent events on plantations. Of outstanding fame was the 1930s novel *Rubber* by M.H. Székely-Lulofs. The daughter of a colonial civil servant, she married a planter and went to East Sumatra in 1918 and started to write on her experiences there. Her books were translated into many other languages and the discomforting contents of these exposed her to vehement domestic critique because of causing a loss of prestige on behalf of Dutch colonialism. But she was outstanding in the way she rendered things as they happened on the ground.[23] In *Rubber*, the fear of coolie attack against the husband of the main female figure Marian plays a big role. When her husband Frank comes home early unexpectedly to dress up for a burial of a young, just previously murdered European assistant, Marian turns pale, thinking:

> Murdered … A coolie attack … There it was: the first murder of an assistant she experienced! … Thus this morning, when she bathed Bobbie [her son] … or when she got dressed … then a young Dutch male was killed … stabbed to death… slaughtered … and nobody knew of it, except the coolies …when she gave Bobbie his porridge … or when Frank came home for breakfast … just at that time, somewhere in the rubber gardens, lay this murdered young man.[24]

Later Marian's fear proves to be justified since her husband also gets killed, which turns her into a victim too. He had been instructed to take over a neglected section of the plantation, with 'bad folk' and a 'bad spirit' close to a Malay village where many former Islamic pilgrims (*haji*) lived, 'a hotbed of incitement against everything European'.[25] Upon approaching a young coolie who refuses to work, Frank is all of a sudden knifed. Afterwards the perpetrator kneels down:

> indifferent, cool … almost senseless … he had laid down the knife with the blood beside him … the primitive man, who all of the sudden without reasoning, illogical, unrestrained, had been awake to his hot passions and suddenly turned back to sleep again.[26]

In these again powerful words, all the prejudices and fears of Europeans against Indonesian manual labourers are epitomized. Coolies were seen as 'lazy natives' with a brutal temper, which could suddenly erupt into senseless behaviour.[27] Such racist prejudices were widely circulated within imperial settings. The plantation was, like the battlefield, a frontier. Especially on the fringes, where the Malay village world of Islam clearly prevailed, the local world remained out of reach for the Europeans.

European Angst for Indonesian Recaptures

More than instances of physical violence, new ideas and social movements developed into an increasingly severe threat to the colonial order. Indonesians have always fought back but often their voices, since they were orally transmitted or written in local languages, remained unnoticed at the colonizers' side and could not reach the subalterns. But this could no longer be the case after an Indonesian public sphere, both secular and Islamic, emerged by the end of the nineteenth century. A Western-educated intelligentsia came to the fore that was able to enter the discursive space

of colonialism, exposing its hegemonic and exploitative nature using the means of print capitalism and political action. Anthony Reid has shown how at this juncture anti-imperial nationalism prevailed over other formats such as ethnic nationalism.[28] Often there was a harsh reaction on the Dutch part, involving the arrest, imprisonment and exile of Indonesians who challenged Dutch supremacy. Increasingly the colonial order was put under strain and, as time passed by, the Europeans, both officials and the broader public, were driven by angst of Indonesian activists who were thinking and acting back.

One example of the battle of ideas that ensued between the Indonesians and the Dutch was a pamphlet that was published in Dutch and Malay in 1913 on the occasion of the commemoration of the establishment of the Dutch monarchy 100 years earlier. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo used the occasion to launch a full-blown attack on the delusiveness of the Ethical policy:

> An ethical wind (angin tanfau) blows through the parliament of the Dutch kingdom, which in turn brings changes for our fate. Indeed has Holland these days the *intention* to care for us, such as a parent cares for his children, indeed *this is said by those who are able to know*! But if this is really true, if Holland really has this *intention*, thank God! Connected to this, if you remember the situation with that child, then the following question emerges: will Holland really seek to learn us how to walk? Would Holland not teach us that those have a perfect life who can stand on their own legs?[29]

The divide between official development rhetoric and real purpose in the colonial relationship was painfully exposed and could not really be refuted from the Dutch side. Increasingly they were put on the defensive, and the vulnerability of Dutch colonial rule produced huge anxiety and also fear. At first, Indonesian modernity was seen as something that could be co-opted and encapsulated within the colonial project; then the strategy was to monitor indigenous dynamics, but silence the most vocal nationalist leaders in the hope to contain the danger; finally, when nationalism had turned into an anti-colonial mass movement, the Dutch colonial state resorted to outright suppression in order to instil fear on the side of the indigenous population. Monitoring was done by an Office of Native Affairs, but later the main task shifted to the political intelligence service, resulting in a panoptical repressive apparatus, as voluminous colonial records show. Repression took place behind a façade of legalism. But legal boundaries were transgressed, notably

through the introduction of 'special rights' (in Dutch: *exorbitante rechten*) for the Governor General, who could then order the arrest and imprisonment of any person suspected of being a threat to the colonial order.

In *De Stuw*, a journal edited by high-ranking liberal colonial officials, the special rights were put to scrutiny as follows:

> Should they be kept, abolished or reformed? Why is society considered to be not sufficiently protected by criminal law against the disturbance of public peace and order? It appears not enough to put preventive intervention, when the public peace and order is endangered, up against the merely repressive effect of criminal law … The difficulty lies somewhere else. The motive for the application of the special rights … points towards a feared mass psychological effect of the acts or mere presence of the targeted person. That the chance of massive, the public order threatening, insurrection is larger in the Indies than in Holland seems on good grounds hard to deny.[30]

Here the rhetoric of protection and the need for intervention was openly driven by a fear of mass revolt. This threat was, according to the same authors, very real and a consequence of a volatile mix between traditional values, socio-economic change and awareness on the part of the colonized of what colonialism was really about. Therefore, 'special rights' were, despite their legal dubiety, in the end appropriate:

> Besides older causes of this phenomenon, such as the narrow mental and social horizon of broad layers in society … strong docility towards religious and feudal leaders, a strong effect of current and most militant eschatological expectations—besides all these stand modern causes which are no less strong. There is the economic and social but above all psychological conflict, caused by the penetration of trading and the money economy, accompanied with a shift of social classes … Added to this is the much sharper awareness of the colonial relationship … and finally the curious relationship between mass and intellectuals, who, despite existing differences amongst each other, look up to one another in order to realize their desires and the apotheosis of their ideals. The basis for the special rights can thus be accepted.[31]

The fear expressed in 1930 was based on concrete experience. In 1926–27, major revolts had already broken out in West Java and West Sumatra, for which the colonial authorities blamed the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia). In his private correspondence with the minister of colonies, Governor General A.C.D. de Graeff consoled himself in December 1926 that nowhere had the bases taken part in the resistance:

It has been the trash of the native society, bought by the leaders of the PKI. This gives a big consolation but this is countered by the fact that the population faces this passively instead of actively, as they consider the riots exclusively as a threat to *European* authority and therefore remain more or less indifferent and here and there show some enjoyment of someone else's mishaps because the Europeans have had another bad time.[32]

De Graeff was a proponent of the Ethical policy and wanted to negotiate with the nationalists. However, in the same letter he complained that he faced with an increasingly aggressive press, colonial officialdom and a European public calling for repression. He predicted that if the Dutch would resort to basing their colonial power on army, police and criminal law only, they would soon be out. This was a shrewd observation, underlining the fact that by that time, leading Dutch colonial officials already thought that colonial rule had been put into jeopardy.

During the 1930s, more conservative Governor Generals would opt for even harsher repression instead of negotiation with nationalist leaders, further adding to angst in a colonial society hit hard by the global economic depression. For the first time, laid-off Europeans were turned into urban poor, eroding a colonial social order in which they, because of their skin colour, had always been of higher social status and wealthier than the Indonesians. In 1933 huge panic suddenly erupted both in the colony and Holland because of the 'mutiny' of Indonesian personnel on the Dutch warship *De Zeven Provinciën*. This vessel was on a tour along the northwest coast of Sumatra when, on 4 February 1933, lower personnel, facing salary cuts, refused to take orders and then took over the command of the ship. After a week of nervous deliberations and media upheaval, a plane bomb was thrown on the ship, killing 23 individuals on board. It was not entirely clear whether this so-called mutiny was carried out by Indonesian communists or reflected a spontaneous act of insurrection.[33] In the ensuing Dutch parliamentary elections, there was a clear shift to the right and Colijn became Prime Minister, whereas the communist Member of Parliament Hendrik Sneevliet was sentenced to five months' imprisonment because he had argued that the *De Zeven Provinciën* incident signalled the beginning of the anti-colonial revolution.

External Threats and Further European Anxieties

With the so-called awakening of Asia, the Dutch East Indies could no longer be seen in isolation, either from the European or from the Indonesian perspective. Indonesian nationalists were utterly aware of

political developments in Japan, China, the Philippines and India. From there lessons could be learned and emulated, be it how to modernize (Japan) or how to emancipate from imperial rule (the Philippines and India). The Dutch, actively monitoring what the Indonesian activists were thinking and writing, were aware of the transnational dimensions of Indonesian nationalism. An important stream within this was also connected to modernist Islamic ideas, the result of an increased interaction with the Arab world and Indonesia.[34] Islamic fervour had always been a continuous source of anxiety on the Dutch part.[35]

The rapidly changing Asian environment, in a direct as well as an indirect manner, aggravated European fears and the main response was to stress the exceptionalism of the Dutch East Indies. Growing political conservatism in Holland led those responsible for colonial policy to refute the accommodation strategy pursued by the Americans in the Philippines and the British in India. In 1916 in the *New York Times*, Hendrik Colijn openly criticized the US Jones Act, as his experiences over many years in the Dutch East Indies had shown him that 'the brown race' lacked the character to let its members act as independent administrators. In 1931 Governor General Simon de Graaff reacted negatively towards the roundtable conferences on constitutional reform in India, stressing the huge cultural, economic and social differences between British India and the Dutch East Indies, which were accompanied by a totally different organization of colonial rule.[36]

However, the rise of Japan and its increasing military expansionism could not be ignored and the 'Yellow Peril' became an important source of late colonial anxieties. Japan had become such an important player in the Asia Pacific region that in the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese were given European legal status in 1899. The outcome of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904–05 made a big impression, but the idea at that time was that Japanese expansion would remain confined to Northeast Asia. Since the First World War, cheap Japanese industrial exports to the Dutch East Indies increased markedly and large Japanese trading companies began setting up business there. In the 1930s the Dutch feelings of unease and occasional alarm over the Japanese southward advance grew. In 1935 the colonial government established a Bureau of East Asian Affairs (Dienst der Oost-Azatische Zaken) in order to monitor Japanese policy and the behaviour of Japanese citizens in the Indies, which were suspected of being mostly spies. Earlier, Japanese publications by Yusoburo Takekoshi and Hosaka, arguing in favour of a conquest of Java and Sumatra in order

to free the Indonesian population from Dutch rule, became known and publicly discussed. In the 1930s a Japanese-Malay press emerged in which Japan promoted itself as the protector of Islam and Indonesian nationalism. Among the Dutch, the feeling of threat slowly shifted to a feeling of immediate danger, as images of big clouds building up in the Pacific were replaced by a feeling of anticipation of an imminent devastating storm.[37] This storm swept colonial rule aside when the Japanese occupied the Dutch East Indies in 1942.

Concluding Observations

My digressions have shown that during the late colonial period, from the 1890s until the early 1940s, tensions and social strains on behalf of the Europeans in the Dutch East Indies were increasing. All the key elements of what could be labelled as 'imperial anxiety' were present. A lack of knowledge on what drove the psyche of Balinese opponents on the battlefield or aggressive coolies on Western plantations was couched in orientalist schemes of oriental backwardness versus European reason, highlighting the idea of innate difference between colonizer and colonized. But this could not erase a growing underlying feeling of unease and impotence by individual Europeans in the face of an overwhelming majority of 'natives'.

Later, with the emergence of Indonesian nationalism, the Dutch became much better informed on indigenous society through their close monitoring of developments. But now a different kind of danger had emerged, which undermined the cornerstone of coloniality as such—a shared belief in the superior strength of Western rule coupled with a joint wish that the Indonesians should enjoy the blessings of progress within a colonial power construct. The wish to break out of the colonial relationship was increasingly shared by the Indonesian masses and, although the Dutch tried their utmost to dampen this down, they were aware that their grip on events was loosening.

This feeling of anxiety was heightened by a threat from the outside, the rise of an expansionist Japan and processes of political emancipation under way in other parts of Asia. The cases discussed in this chapter also show that an underlying feeling of anxiety was time and again raised to the level of fear and sometimes outright panic in the case of unexpected clashes between Dutch rulers and colonial subjects. Particularly when panic signalled a situation of crisis on the part of the Europeans, intensified flows of information, in the form of rumours, sensational press articles and political

debate, occurred between the colony and Europe, transgressing boundaries between spaces that were socially disconnected despite the fact that modern transport technology had brought them closer.

But the cases brought up here show deeper patterns of imperial crisis, panic and anxiety. Colonial society was a space characterized by physical as well as epistemic violence and such spaces produced more fear than was the case in supposedly orderly Western societies. As long as the violence was executed by the Europeans, they had nothing to fear, but when the prevalent pattern was reversed, dominant representations of social order in colonial society were destabilized, as these representations were based on European notions of civility and orderliness. Therefore, transgressions of these notions or even the threat of these produced stress among Europeans who wanted to install and maintain a modern regulatory state in alien surroundings. In the end, however, violence is a resource to act and communicate open to anyone,[38] which of course included colonial subjects. Thus, imperial panic both as a consequence of and a response towards violence manifested the fragility of formal empire, which ultimately necessitated its demise.

NOTES

1. Remco Meijer (1995). The Dutch expression 'Oost-Indisch doof' is an intriguing example of 'othering' which signals that complete deafness was somehow linked to being colonial.
2. Ulbe Bosma (2012).
3. Marieke Bloembergen and Vincent Kuitenbrouwer (2013).
4. In 1920, according to official statistics 34.4 million indigenous people lived on Java and 13.8 million on the Outer Islands, whereas Java was inhabited by only 133.316 Europeans and the Outer Islands by 31.713 Europeans. See Peter Boomgaard and Hans Gooszen (1991: Tables 5, 6a2, 16 and 17a).
5. H.W. Van den Doel (1994: 422).
6. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010: 301).
7. In the middle of the 1980s, Dutch historians, notably Maarten Kuitenbrouwer and Henk Wesseling, conducted a controversial debate on whether Dutch colonialism was part of modern imperialism or not. In her study on Jambi (West Sumatra), Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994) concluded that Dutch expansion was not different from imperialism elsewhere.
8. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1981).
9. J.A.A. van Doorn (1994: 95).

10. J.A.A. van Doorn (1994: Chapter III).
11. Vincent Houben (2008).
12. These terms were central to the collaborative research center SFB 640 (2004–2012), in which I participated. See: https://www.huberlin.de/de/forschung/szf/forschungsmanagement/veroeffentlichungen/fober/anhang/SFB/sfb640_html (accessed 22 October 2016).
13. Thomas Mergel (2012).
14. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (1997: 5).
15. J. de Bruijn (1998: 22).
16. J. de Bruijn (1998: 27).
17. J. de Bruijn (1998: 30).
18. J. van Goor (1985: 43).
19. M.C. Ricklefs (1993: 134–36).
20. Lily E. Clerkx (1991: 66).
21. Vincent Houben and Thomas Lindblad (1999: 77).
22. Ann Laura Stoler (1992).
23. Rob Nieuwenhuijs (1978: 349–51).
24. M.H. Székely-Lulofs (1936: 108).
25. M.H. Székely-Lulofs (1936: 178).
26. M.H. Székely-Lulofs (1936: 187).
27. Alatas (1977).
28. Anthony Reid (2010).
29. Vincent Houben (1996: 82).
30. *De Stuw* (April 1930).
31. *De Stuw* (April 1930).
32. National Archive, The Hague, De Graeff collection, inv.no. 23, letter 14 December 1926.
33. A view corroborated in J.C.H. Blom (1983).
34. Michael Laffan (2003).
35. Karel Steenbrink (1993).
36. C. Fasseur (1984: 36, 39).
37. Vincent Houben (2013).
38. Jörg Baberowski (2012: 14).

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'The Swiss of All People!' Politics of Embarrassment and Dutch Imperialism around 1900

Bernhard C. Schär

It happened in the summer of 1902. Two Swiss naturalists, Paul and Fritz Sarasin, found themselves on an expedition traversing the highlands of the island of Celebes, a region virtually unknown in Europe at the time. Known today as the Indonesian island of Sulawesi, back then Celebes was one of the largest islands in the Dutch colonial empire in Southeast Asia, roughly four times the size of the Netherlands or Switzerland. The Sarasins brought with them 80 armed porters, who had been recruited with the assistance of the island's Dutch colonial authorities. However, on 19 July, as the expedition reached the autonomous Kingdom of Sigi, 50 of their porters deserted them. The Raja of Sigi refused to provide the Swiss with new porters and the expedition seemed doomed. However, instead of turning back, the two Swiss naturalists and their accompanying colonial official, Willem Brugman, wrote a letter to the Governor of Celebes, stating that 'through the malicious actions of the prince of Sigi the prestige of the Royal Netherlands Government in the interior

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of Celebes … has been harmed'.[1] A messenger brought the letter to the Governor, G.W.W.C. Baron van Hoëvell, stationed in Makassar on the southwest peninsula. He immediately telegraphed his superior, the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, stationed in Buitenzorg near Batavia on the island of Java. The telegram read:

> If our prestige in central Celebes is not to sink to zero for years, then powerful and immediate action is necessary. Requesting therefore authorization to head off immediately with the [battle cruisers] H.M. Utrecht and Java, both here in the roadstead, and an infantry company, to occupy the bay of Palu with a landing division and to advance with the infantry into the main place of the Kingdom of Sigi in order to lay down the law.[2]

The Governor General's office admittedly felt that a single warship—the *H.M. Utrecht*—would suffice, but otherwise had 'no objections to your recommended course of action'.[3] So, a few days later, on 15 August 1902, a battle cruiser arrived at the Bay of Palu in central Celebes and landed 300 marines from the Dutch colonial army to aid the two distressed Swiss research travellers. The threatening military gesture achieved its desired effect: the Raja of Sigi abandoned his opposition to the Swiss expedition, which henceforth no longer encountered any obstacles. Three years later in 1905, the Sarasins published their travelogue, in which they thanked the Dutch government effusively for a 'support so active in nature as is probably almost unprecedented in the history of science'.[4] In the meantime, the Governor of Celebes, Baron van Hoëvell, had returned to the Netherlands, where among other things he co-published the specialized journal of the Ethnology Museum in Leiden. In a lengthy review of the travel account by the two Sarasins, he did not refrain from offering thoughtful recollections from his perspective about the turbulent summer of 1902: 'Often I heard jealous chauvinists complain: "Why are these Swiss being helped this way?"' The former governor reminded his audience what in his view had been at stake:

> It was … about our national honour.—I knew that the eyes of the entire scholarly world were on these travellers … —What would well have happened if their travels across Celebes … had once again failed because of the resistance of local power holders and their population.—Would one then, in foreign countries, not have rightly scoffed derisively again about our illusory colonial possessions and characterized us as a nation that is not even in a position to make it possible for peace-loving travellers to travel through its territory.[5]

* * *

For those of us interested in the significance of emotion in the history of European imperialism, this episode that occurred in the summer of 1902 at the periphery of the Dutch colonial empire is interesting for a number of reasons. Obviously the Dutch decision to deploy troops in the Bay of Palu was not part of a larger imperial strategy developed in the metropole in The Hague. Rather, the decision was taken quite spontaneously by colonial officials in the periphery—the governor on Celebes and the governor general near Batavia. Also, the decision was neither motivated by obvious economic, strategic or any other interests that the literature on imperialism and political theory has for a long time characterized as 'rational'. Both the Sarasins and the local colonial officials argued their case for Dutch military intervention in the name of Dutch 'prestige', 'national honour' and in order to prevent ridicule and 'derision' from 'foreign countries'.

The episode thus illustrates that Dutch imperial policies were driven, in this instance, by a set of strong emotions: national honour and fear of embarrassment. Ute Frevert, one of the most renowned historians of emotions, has recently synthesized her own research of many years as well as that of others in a programmatic essay on 'Emotions in History'.[6] As she argues, feelings of honour, shame and embarrassment were among the strongest emotions in the European middle classes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was not only the case for individuals; national politics was also very much modelled on manly honour. Wars between nations were seen as continuations of duels between men, who had been socialized in a culture of 'honour' in student fraternities, the army and schools.[7]

This research on individual and national honour has successfully criticized older 'rationalist explanations' for political action by illustrating the power of—seemingly irrational—emotions. However, as scholars from political sociology have recently argued, the dichotomy between 'rational interests' and 'irrational emotions' should not be overstated. Emotions can be quite rational, as they are managed and exploited by various players in pursuit of particular goals.[8]

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate that feelings of national honour and shame among European men were by no means emotions that emerged historically in a purely 'Western' context, as implied in large parts of the historiography on the issue.[9] Rather, honour and shame were, to a certain degree, imperial feelings as they were also tied to fears of losing

control over the 'uncivilized' in the colonies. Furthermore, I argue that honour and shame were not irrational emotions, but were instead, following Frevert's adaption of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, part of a social 'game'.[10] As Bourdieu discussed in his seminal analysis of the 'Kabyle society' in Algeria, members of a given society share certain cultural traits—namely, a shared understanding of honourable and shameful behaviour.[11] Competition and struggles within these societies led players with different economic, social and other backgrounds to engage in a certain social 'game' as they exploited notions of honour and create feelings of shame in order to advance their particular causes within their communities.[12] As I will show in this chapter, Governor van Hoëvell's talk about Dutch 'national honour' being at stake was part of such a social game within Dutch society in the Netherlands and their colonies. This social game, however, cannot be understood in a narrow national framework, since 'foreigners' such as the Swiss researchers on Celebes as well as 'foreign countries' observing the Netherland's conduct in their colonies obviously played an important role in this story.

Taken together, Ute Frevert's insights into the political significance of feelings of honour, the sociological notion of historical subjects' abilities to manage and exploit such emotions in pursuit of competing goals, as well as awareness of the transnational character of the Dutch empire allow for a new understanding of (Dutch) imperialism around 1900. However, in order to get a better analytical grip on the story, we first need take a closer look at Dutch fears of derision by 'foreign countries'.

Dwarfs in a Game of Giants: The Netherlands in the Imperial World

In order to feel shame and embarrassment, one needs, in Ute Frevert's words, an 'audience of peers'.[13] It is only when peers observe one's disgrace, do feelings of shame develop such strong emotional power that they call for action in order to restore one's honour, and to avoid being seen as a coward. The most relevant peers for the Dutch in the late nineteenth century were the three strongest imperial powers of the time—the British, the French and the Germans. Compared with these powers, the Dutch position in the imperial world was one full of tensions. H.L. Wesseling famously characterized the Dutch as a 'Giant that was a Dwarf'—a small, neutral and not very significant country within European power politics,

but an imperial 'Giant' with a vast overseas empire only surpassed by Britain.[14] Dutch and other colonial historians have analysed this particular nature of Dutch imperialism extensively since the 1990s, speaking of a 'strange case' (Wesseling), a 'colonial paradox' (Fasseur) or a particular form of 'passive aggressiveness' (Osterhammel).[15] For our purposes, it suffices to note that, according to Frevert and Bourdieu, a person's or, indeed, a nation's objective position in the world gives way to particular subjective, emotional dispositions. Seeing themselves as 'Dwarfs' in a game of 'Giants' made the Dutch, I would suggest, particularly prone to feelings of shame, since it was difficult for them to compete in this game of national honour. Therefore, fear of shame in front of 'foreign countries' was part of the Dutch imperial 'habitus'.[16]

In order to 'keep up' with the 'Giants', the Netherlands developed different strategies. For one, the Dutch made sure to secure support from Britain, who had not only taken hold of the Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia during the French occupation of the Netherlands in early nineteenth century, but had also returned those 'possessions' to the Dutch following the Congress of Vienna in 1815. To a large degree, the Netherlands' status as a colonial power depended on British generosity, which, of course, was not unconditional. The Dutch were expected to maintain order and favourable conditions for trade in the region. If they failed to do so, they had to accept intervention, for example, when the British took control of the northern parts of Borneo in the 1880s.[17] Another way of 'keeping up' for the Dutch was their policy of 'abstention' developed in the 1840s. The idea was to refrain from expensive expansion of Dutch direct rule into the so-called 'Outer Islands'. Instead, the Dutch restricted their direct control over their main islands, Java and the larger parts of Sumatra. On the other islands, among them Celebes, which was one of the largest, the Dutch tried to gain indirect control by pressuring indigenous rulers to sign contracts and thereby recognize Dutch sovereignty.[18]

A third and last way of trying to 'keep up' developed towards the end of the nineteenth century in the larger context of intensifying 'civilizing missions' by other imperial powers. The Dutch developed a particular kind of imperial philosophy, which, from 1901 onwards, they called 'the ethical policy'.[19] The idea was that colonized subjects should no longer be exploited, but rather should benefit from Dutch presence in the Indies by receiving Christianity, education, better housing, modern infrastructure and other traits of European 'civilization'. The 'civilizing mission' was of

special relevance for Dutch national self-perception as a 'small', peaceful, neutral and benevolent nation. It served the Dutch to distinguish themselves from the (supposedly) far more brutal policies of the British, the French or the Germans. Moreover, as we shall see, supporting supposedly altruistic projects by scientists or missionaries in the Indies was far less expensive than competing with imperial projects of the 'Giants', who were expanding their rule not only in Asia, but also in Africa.

As Dutch colonial historians have shown, the problem with these strategies of 'abstention' and 'ethical policy' was that they were full of paradoxes. In the long term, there were no 'cheap' alternatives to 'real imperialism'. On the contrary, they led to a particular Dutch version of imperialism that was characteristic of the greater Southeast Asian context. Thus, like the case of the British in Malaya or Burma, the Dutch felt they were 'pulled into imperialism' not because the government in The Hague had a clear intention (let alone a concise plan) of doing so, but rather because of forces in the colonial periphery itself. Fasseur famously called this the Dutch 'colonial paradox'—in spite of the rhetoric of 'ethical policy' and 'abstention', the Dutch began, in the 1890s, to conquer all the so-called Outer Islands in the far-flung archipelago, bringing all of them under direct Dutch rule by 1910.[20] These military 'pacifying' missions were far from 'ethical'. In the case of Celebes, for instance, the colonial army committed several atrocities against resistance fighters and their families from the highlands, who—armed with very few rifles but bristling with spears and short swords (*klewang*)—threw themselves against Dutch infantry and artillery.[21]

One of the main questions among Dutch colonial historians during the so-called 'imperialism debate'[22] of the 1990s was how to explain this shift from 'abstention' to violently conquering the Outer Islands—a policy which the Dutch at the time euphemistically called 'rounding off' the empire. Dutch historian Elsbeth Locher-Scholten provided an explanation in 1994, which—as far as I am aware—closed the debate and is still regarded as valid today. She maintained that 'the brains' behind Dutch 'rounding off' were 'local colonial administrators who no longer wished to accept the existing situation'.[23] They were not motivated by economic or geostrategic considerations, but rather by 'the fear of diminishing the prestige of the colonial government, and the need to maintain vigorous Dutch authority'.[24] These administrators were joined by civil servants, military men and scholars in the Indies who 'spoke the language of governance. Maintenance of Dutch authority was their first professional aim'.[25]

The quote by Baron van Hoëvell, the governor calling for war-ships to help Swiss naturalists in the highlands and securing 'our prestige in central Celebes', seems to perfectly confirm Locher-Scholten's view. Indeed, I agree with her claim that 'subjective' ideas of 'prestige' and 'authority' need to be taken in to account. However, expanding on her view, I would suggest that we not only need to take into account the cognitive side of subjectivity (notions and ideas of prestige), but indeed also the emotional side (fears of embarrassment and feelings of honour). Interestingly, in her paper written more than 20 years ago, Locher-Scholten herself refers to a certain 'emotional … climate of the day',[26] yet without systematically integrating this point into her analysis. In the remainder of this chapter I will thus develop the relevance of emotions further by looking at the case of Celebes. Also, by drawing on recent research, I will expand Locher-Scholten's model by including not only Dutch colonial officials to the story, but also journalists, missionaries, scientists and, indeed, two non-Dutch nationals: the Sarasins.

Celebes: Setting the Stage

As mentioned above, the Dutch were particularly prone to feelings of shame, given their particular subject position as 'Dwarfs' in a game of 'Giants'. 'Abstention', the 'civilizing mission' and 'ethical policy' can be seen as strategies for coping with this problem. However, as a closer analysis of the case of Celebes reveals, these strategies by no means eased the tension, but instead—in paradoxical ways—strengthened it. The 'ethical policy' triggered crisis, drew public attention to those crises and thus created the necessity of re-establishing Dutch national honour in the eyes of onlooking peers.

Therefore, in the case of Celebes, 'civilizing' efforts and 'ethical policy' brought two new groups of players to the island in the 1890s. The first were the two Dutch missionaries Nicolaas Adriani and Albert Kruyt. Financed by the 'Nederlandsch Zendelinggenootschap' (Dutch Mission Society), they sought in particular to Christianize the 'pagan' population of the island's highlands—a region unfamiliar to Europeans at the time—adopting for these people the Buginese term 'Toraja' (literally, people from the mountains). The Dutch colonial authorities hoped that by providing what from their perspective was very cost-effective support to these missionaries, they could do something to counter the spread of Islam.[27] The second group that received 'ethical' support from the Netherlands

consisted of the two aforementioned Swiss naturalists, Paul and Fritz Sarasin. As descendants of the Basel patrician elite, the two cousins possessed practically inexhaustible financial means.[28] This allowed them to devote themselves to careers as 'gentlemen scientists'. From 1893 to 1896 and 1902 to 1903, they spent a total of four years on the island. They too entailed relatively few costs for the colonial authorities; hence, Baron van Hoëvell, when discussing the travel report of the two Swiss researchers, was completely correct when he described the military intervention to protect the Swiss in 1902 as an opportunity for his country 'to be great where even a small country can be great'.[29]

Of course, the problem for the Dutch missionaries and the Swiss naturalists was their lack of direct access to those highland landscapes, bodies and souls that interested them. The ruling Bugis and Makassarese constantly renewed their efforts to prevent the Europeans from penetrating into the highlands. 'Breaking through this resistance constituted the most paramount and most difficult work on our travels', declared Paul Sarasin during a talk at the Geographical Society in Bern, for example, after his return to Switzerland in 1898.[30] The paradoxical effect of the seemingly cheap 'ethical' support for the missionaries and scientists on Celebes was thus that it provoked political crisis with local rulers. Crisis, as we shall see, fuelled feelings of frustration towards the colonial government among different sectors of the Dutch colonial society in the Indies. Various players thus used those crises to engage in a kind of 'politics of embarrassment', thus managing and exploiting the fears of an imperial 'Dwarf' to lose face in a game of 'Giants'.

CRISES IN CELEBES AND 'A GREAT CRY' IN THE NEWSPAPERS

The first group we need to consider are the journalists. As Governor Baron von Hoëvell mentioned in his reflections quoted at the start of this chapter, the summer of 1902 was not the first time that the two Swiss travellers had created a public image of the Netherlands as a merely 'illusory' colonial power.[31] In fact, a few years earlier in 1895, a similar crisis took place during an expedition through the southwest peninsula. As the Sarasins and their men reached the Kingdom of Enrekang, the Raja's armed troops forced them to return to Makassar.

There, the Governor of Celebes and his officials were 'very upset about the incident', as one of the Sarasins wrote to his mother in Basel. The Dutch tried to encourage the Sarasins to repeat the journey, evidently issuing to the Swiss naturalists 'the most beautiful promises. They feel … embarrassed, *all the more so since the Dutch newspapers are making a great cry about the matter*'.[32]

Indeed, the editor of the *Makassaarsche Courant*—the Dutch newspaper in the small port colony of Makassar—published a rather lengthy article about the 'failed' journey of the Sarasins, criticizing the Dutch colonial government's incompetence:

> Whether the government is in the position to help these doughty travellers, we very much doubt. It is probably demoralizing for these two gentlemen, who invest their money, yes even their lives, for science, to have to suffer this shipwreck because of the stupid fearfulness of these Uncivilized! Great pity, too, for science, which would have been enriched with a treasure of new insights, had the two doctors been able to complete their journey undisturbed! … Thus, for us, central Celebes continues to remain unknown and mysterious.[33]

Editors from other Dutch colonial newspapers instantly picked up not only the story but also the polemics from the *Makassaarsche Courant*, which spread like wildfire through the archipelago, from where it then travelled to the Netherlands, as the editors in the metropole started to report on the story.[34] Since the journalists henceforth reported on practically every step taken by the Sarasins on the island of Celebes—and, in particular, every measure undertaken by the Dutch colonial authorities to protect the two Swiss naturalists—the Sarasin expeditions acquired great symbolic significance. Their success was no longer a merely private or scientific matter. Since not only the Dutch but also the foreign press reported on the story, it turned into a kind of public test of the Dutch colonial authorities' ability to provide security for two supposedly peace-loving, harmless scientists by putting down the resistance of the 'uncivilized' local rulers.[35]

As a consequence, the Sarasins turned into something like media stars. After having returned to Switzerland in 1896, they decided in 1902 to return to Celebes, where they were greeted with great enthusiasm. 'The paper wishes these keen Swiss much success!' called out the *Bataviaasch Dagblad* on 11 February 1902 to the two cousins, for example, even before the men had disembarked in Batavia. The two Swiss naturalists

wanted to journey right across the highlands of central Celebes, which for the Dutch still remained unknown and unexplored. Thus was established the context for the crisis mentioned at the start of this chapter. As had previously been the case in the summer of 1895, local rulers once again prevented the Sarasins from continuing their journey, news that spread like a shock wave throughout the empire and beyond, all the way to Europe.

As in 1895, Dutch journalists in the colonial empire in particular exploited the opportunity to inundate the colonial government with criticism. It is interesting to see how they commented on the fact that the Sarasins were non-Dutch citizens. The editor of the *Bataaviasch Nieuwsblad* sarcastically maintained, for example: 'The Sarasin gentlemen can consider themselves lucky that they are not Netherlanders.' According to the editor, the colonial troops had moved out only because of the Sarasins' elevated status as foreigners. Normally, the Dutch colonial state did not possess sufficient resources to equip 'military expeditions for Netherlanders who fell into a quandary in the outer territories'.[36] *De Locomotief* reminded readers that for decades, Dutch troops had vainly attempted to subjugate the defiant sultanate of Aceh. The paper criticized the colonial authorities for now risking further conflict on Celebes: 'Our soldiers must once again move out … For it would make a very bad impression, even in Switzerland, which does not possess colonies, if we cannot get two of their famous compatriots through Celebes, which is "ruled" by us.'[37] When, because of the turbulent events of the summer of 1902, the Royal Geographical Society in Amsterdam also began dealing more intensely with the two Swiss naturalists, who had previously been published exclusively in German specialized journals, the *Sumatra Post* reported derisively:

> Is it not actually a disgrace for the Netherlands that the [Sarasins'] results came to us first in German, or—what is even wackier—that these two scholars had to come from Switzerland, of all places—in terms of colonialism and seafaring an insignificant country!—in order to do that work which one actually expects from us?[38]

These polemics arose due to the special position of the Dutch press in the empire, one that had developed in the 1850s as a reaction to the failed reform efforts of the 1848 revolution. The Dutch-speaking population in the empire did not have much say in matters relating to the colonial government. At the same time, as a result of ever-greater economic liberalization in the second half of the nineteenth century, increasingly larger groups of European traders and businesspeople were settling in the colonies. The empire developed

a kind of public sphere that became more and more open with its criticism of the conservative and authoritarian colonial regime. This manifested itself most visibly in the empire's thriving press, which consisted of numerous daily newspapers. As shown by the studies of the historian Gerard Termorshuizen, the editors of these newspapers cultivated a pithy, bullish and polemic language which they used to subject the colonial regime to constant critique.[39] The game of exploiting the fearfulness of colonial authorities to generate public embarrassment constituted an essential element of journalistic culture in the Dutch East Indies. The fact that the Sarasins came 'from Switzerland, of all places' added further zest to the polemics.

Scholars: 'Better the Sons of One's Own Fatherland'

Dutch academic circles also used the fact that the Sarasins were Swiss for their own purposes. As Robert-Jan Wille has shown in his studies about Dutch natural scientists and biologists in particular, they too were unhappy about the colonial state's policies and pointed to the other European nations that had sent scientists to 'their' colonial empire.[40] They felt that they did not receive enough political support, especially compared to their colleagues from Great Britain, France and Germany. Whereas these other states actively promoted scientific research in their colonial empires, the Netherlands limited its colonial support for science to the botanical garden in Java, which played an important role in the plantation economy, and some other smaller institutions.[41] In contrast, support was virtually non-existent for researching the so-called Outer Islands, which therefore, as a matter of fact, still remained 'unknown and mysterious' for Europeans until the end of the nineteenth century, something that scholars and also the colonial press never grew tired of emphasizing. This was also the reason why a strikingly large number of 'foreigners' who arrived with their own funds earned their scholarly laurels by exploring the Dutch Indies. The most famous example is probably the Briton Alfred Russel Wallace, who travelled through the archipelago during the 1850s and in his research developed the notion of evolution through natural selection at the same time as Darwin.[42] His research turned the archipelago into one of the hotspots of nineteenth-century evolutionary science. Like the Galapagos Islands, which played a crucial role in Darwin's theorizing about evolution, the island world of the archipelago in the Dutch East

Indies constituted a region where some of the core ideas of the theory of evolution could be tested. In particular, Wallace claimed that the evolution of animals and plants over time had followed particular geographical patterns creating a strict division between the western and eastern part of the archipelago. According to him, all islands to the west of the Makassar Strait between Borneo and Celebes belonged to the Asian fauna, while all islands to the east belonged to the Australian Fauna. 'Wallace's line', as this hypothesis came to be known, was very controversial, particularly because various animal species on Celebes actually seemed to be of Asian, and not Australian, descent. This anomaly also created a tension with the general theory of evolution, which is why—following Wallace—many other European naturalists concentrated their efforts to the island world in the Dutch Indies trying to 'solve' some of these highly prestigious and intricate scholarly problems. Scientific excitement in the Malay Archipelago, a term invented by Wallace, was heightened even further by discoveries of 'primitive tribes' on these remote islands who supposedly had survived in isolation since the beginnings of human evolution and were thus seen as evidence of the 'missing link' between primates and humans. For these reasons, many ambitious 'foreigners', like the Sarasins, travelled through the Archipelago to further their careers.[43]

Against this background, Dutch naturalists not only intensified their efforts to lobby the colonial ministry in the Netherlands but also increased public pressure.[44] To be sure, in contrast to the colonial press, they did not explicitly speak in public about any 'disgrace'. But in his extensive discussion of the Sarasins' research travels, the editor of the upscale *Royal Geographical Journal* in Amsterdam made it unmistakably clear 'that we would have preferred to see that Dutch young men had been at work there in our Dutch possessions in order to bring in such a rich booty for one's own fatherland; that we would have preferred even more to see that the considerable costs for the military and navy had been spent for scientific investigations of the sons of one's own fatherland.'[45]

Missionaries: 'Open the Eyes of the Government to Deficiencies on Celebes'

The two missionaries stationed on Celebes, Nicolaas Adriani and Albert Kruyt, were also dissatisfied. The people of central Celebes—the 'Toraja'—generally showed little interest in the Gospel. For the missionaries, the

reason for this was simple. The 'pagan' people of the highlands were subjects of the Kingdom of Luwu, the largest kingdom on the island. With respect to Dutch colonial power, it was also mostly autonomous. The Muslim rulers of Luwu refused to cooperate with the Christian missionaries, and the Dutch colonial state was too weak to force them to do so. In this situation, the missionaries used every opportunity to publicly criticize the 'barbaric' circumstances on Celebes, which persisted due to the weakness of the Dutch in their colonial empire.[46] On the occasion of a lecture in 1900 in Batavia, the capital of the Dutch colonial empire, for example, Adriani characterized the Kingdom of Luwu as 'a weak realm with a completely degenerated government and a population succumbed to opium and gambling, which lives entirely at the expense of the surrounding Torajas'.[47] As various historical studies about Albert Kruyt have shown, the missionaries on Celebes enjoyed considerable political influence, since they were the only Europeans who had mastered the language of the highland societies and as ethnographers had developed a deep understanding for the social and political conditions on the island.[48] Kruyt in particular played a central role in the decisions in Makassar and Batavia to conquer Celebes. Therefore, it is not surprising that he already knew what lay in store for the Kingdom of Luwu, months before the actual invasion. In a letter to the Sarasins from November 1904, he explained that he considered military invasion to be 'highly necessary viewed from a colonial-imperialist position'.[49] According to his conception, only with military force could 'the external supports of paganism [be] torn down, while the mission advanced the internal, spiritual process of change and purification of the pagans'.[50]

In our context, it is important to note that the political and emotional crises caused by the Sarasins, as well as the associated public polemics, very much served the missionaries' interests. When the two Swiss naturalists were turned back in Enrekang in 1895, Adriani felt that his position had been reaffirmed, as he reported to the Sarasins in a letter: '[H]ow slight the influence of our government yet still is!' He, too, interpreted the event as an expression of weakness, for which the colonial administration should be ashamed:

> So close to Makassar and how the governor must have been … annoyed over the misunderstanding of his authority. I do not know whether I am deceiving myself, but I do not get the impression of a strong regent from Mr. van Braam Morris [the Governor of Celebes at the time].[51]

The two missionaries encouraged the Swiss naturalists to publicize observations they had made on their journeys regarding a sensitive matter, pertaining specifically to a transport of slaves from the highlands of Celebes. The Netherlands had formally abolished slavery in its empire in the 1860s. However, due to the growing European demand for spices, the trading in slaves—who continued to be used in plantations on Borneo as well as on the Spice Islands located further north—remained a lucrative commercial sector for Arab intermediaries.[52] Unknown to the Dutch public in Europe as well as in the empire at the time, such slaves were being abducted from Celebes and other islands. On their expedition of 1895, the Sarasins encountered such a slave transport by chance and considered making it public in their travelogues, which were being printed in the journal of the Berlin Society for Geography. Albert Kruyt explicitly encouraged them to do so: 'Precisely in the interests of the regime, it would be good to shine more light on these conditions.'[53] The strategy was successful. The Sarasins' travel report triggered a sudden surge of discussion in the Dutch press in the empire as well as in the Netherlands regarding the subject of slavery on Celebes. For, as *De Locomotief* noted in 1902, not until 'these words of the well-known Swiss travellers P. and F. Sarasin' did it become 'known in Europe that a slave trade is being conducted on Celebes, at a fairly large scale domestically, that—despite our century-old presence on this island—is still largely unknown'.[54]

In short, the scandal surrounding the ejection of the Sarasins from Enrekang in 1895 and from Sigi in 1902, as well as the 'discovery' of a slave trade on Celebes organized by Arab traders, greatly served the interests of the missionaries, who lobbied for the takeover of power both to the colonial regime and in their own publicity work. With a glance towards the large public interest in the Sarasins, in 1906 Kruyt concluded in retrospect: 'In large part, we owe it to them [the Sarasins], that the eyes of the government were opened to the many deficiencies on this large unknown island.'[55]

The Officials and the Sarasins: 'Amice!'

As Locher-Scholten mentioned in her 1994 analysis, local colonial administrators, 'who no longer wished to accept the existing situation',[56] were among the most important lobbyists for conquering the Outer Islands. Unfortunately very few sources that specifically pertain to the competent officials on Celebes in the years leading up to colonial invasion starting in

1905 have survived. However, the available sources reveal that they also had a keen interest in benefiting from the Sarasins' presence on the island as well as from public polemics surrounding their travels.

As on all of the so-called Outer Islands, the Dutch colonial officials in Celebes were notoriously under-equipped for pursuing their task of negotiating local rulers to accept Dutch authority. Not only did they lack vessels with which to maintain regular diplomatic relations with local rulers residing along the coasts and large rivers, but their maps were bad as well, and they did not have enough money even for mundane items such as office premises. This changed drastically when the Sarasins arrived. For their expeditions they hired up to 100 porters, whom the officials in Makassar and the Minahassa peninsula gladly recruited from among the coolies. On all important expeditions, a Dutch official accompanied them as an interpreter. In this way, local colonial officials for the first time obtained insights into the political and social circumstances of the island's highlands, which were otherwise inaccessible and unknown to them. The fact that the Sarasins helped one of the officials, after his retirement, sell his ethnographic collection to the Ethnological Museum in Berlin for 4,500 marks strengthened the friendship, as did the fact that they, along with a few of their relatives in Basel, gave generous financial aid to the struggling missionary school on the Minahassa peninsula. For a period of six years they also paid a pension of 500 Swiss francs to the widow of a deceased official whom they had befriended on Celebes (equal to approximately 25 per cent of her widow's pension from the state).[57] In other words, the Sarasins and their relatives in Basel were actually financing parts of the Dutch colonial infrastructure on Celebes.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the Swiss naturalists and the colonial officials on Celebes became quite good friends. Two of the most influential officials came from so called 'Indian-Dutch' families—two brothers from Makassar, Willem and J.A.G Brugman, about whom only a little can be gleaned from the literature or sources. It is certain that members of the Brugman family were already working as interpreters for the Dutch authorities in the seventeenth century.[58] Because of their familial relationships to the Buginese and Makassarese communities, the Brugman brothers possessed, as a Dutch observer wrote in 1905, 'the necessary sense of tact in order to eliminate the understandable mistrust of the princes; the courage to dwell with them unarmed for weeks on end, as well as the angelic patience in order to convince the princes of their mission, in part during multiple days and nights of ongoing negotiations'.[59] In short, the

Brugman brothers may well have secretly been the most powerful men on the island, since they shaped Dutch policies with regard to the local rulers. The world of the Brugman brothers did not revolve around The Hague or Amsterdam or also even around Batavia, but rather around Makassar. Celebes was 'their' island. Consequently, the political dealings of these men always seemed intent on creating circumstances that pressured their superiors in Makassar and to an even greater extent in Batavia and The Hague, so that these superiors with their 'high resolutions'—as Willem Brugman once scornfully wrote to the Sarasins—'take on our views'.[60] Thus, the Brugman brothers also appear not to have had anything against the media's scandalization of the imminent failure of the Sarasin expeditions and its mockery of the associated 'weakness' of Dutch colonial rule. The fact that one of the Brugman brothers—when travelling on official business a few months after the similar sighting by the Sarasins—also saw a slave transport and ensured that the press got wind of it further supports this view (Fig. 11.1).[61]

The attitude of the Brugmans' superior, Governor Baron van Hoëvell, seems not to have been categorically any different. He became a dear friend of the Sarasins, addressing them as 'Amice!' in his many letters. For him, the governor post in Makassar was the crowning achievement of a long career in the service of the Dutch colonial administration.[62] He had previously already served for years on Celebes' northern Minahassa peninsula, as well as on other islands of the colonial empire. During this time, he had been repeatedly irritated because officials in Batavia had for decades 'bound the hands' of him and his men, as he wrote to the Sarasins when the takeover of power he had so long desired began on Celebes in 1905. Had matters gone his way, he would have 'forcefully' intervened much earlier.[63]

I therefore believe that his intervention during the summer of 1902 mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, when he sent a war-ship to rescue the Sarasins, was not irrationally driven by external circumstances, namely the necessity to protect Dutch 'national honour', as he wrote in hindsight. Rather, he and his fellow colonial officials were very much interested in creating political crisis on Celebes. This allowed him to strategically appeal to feelings of honour and shame within the Dutch colonial administration in Batavia and The Hague, as well as in the Dutch public sphere, to foster those policy changes he and the other local officials had been working towards for a long time.

Fig. 11.1   Willem Brugman in a white uniform, right arm akimbo, in the middle, accompanied the Sarasins on all of their important expeditions. In the foreground are the rajas of Palu bay, who allowed the Swiss to pass through their territory in the summer of 1902 only because they were pressured by Dutch gunboats (photo from the archive of the *Museum für Kulturen*, Basel).

The Rajas

What about the players on the side of the Bugis and Makassarese? Their perspective is the most poorly documented by the historical sources. To be sure, the Buginese have a long tradition of historiography and the documentation of political events. However, as of yet, few of these chronicles have been developed and edited.[64] In particular, no sources pertaining to the kingdoms relevant here—Enrekang, Sigi and Luwu—have, to my knowledge, thus far been accessible for historical research. Therefore, we can only speculate. It is certain that the Dutch greatly feared that a successful rebellion in the colonial empire would encourage further rebellions. Thus, the sources specifically comment on the temporal proximity of the Sarasins' expulsion from Enrekang in 1895 with the conflict on Lombok, an island further south, which could only be contained with great difficulty.[65]

We know, too, that ruling families from various royal houses cultivated close diplomatic relationships. Therefore, we cannot rule out that the expulsions of the two Swiss naturalists from Enrekang in 1895 and from Sigi in 1902 occurred strategically in order to expose the weakness of the Netherlands and encourage other political actions. However, establishing the perspectives and experiences of the various communities on Celebes—as well as on all of the other 'Outer Islands'—by means of non-European sources remains one of the most urgent desiderata in Dutch colonial historiography.

Concluding Remarks

This micro-study describes events that were part of the larger process of the 'strange case' of Dutch imperialism around 1900, when forces from the periphery drove the Netherlands to violently 'round off' the empire in spite of its efforts of 'abstention' and 'ethical policy'. This study offers new perspectives on older debates on how to explain these regime changes. The case of Celebes supports the view that Dutch imperialism on the Outer Islands was not brought about by obvious economic or geostrategic interests, but much rather by subjective notions of 'prestige' and 'authority'. However, this explanation ought to be expanded to include not only subjective ideas but also emotions such as national honour, shame and fear of embarrassment. The way I see it, the Netherlands had a particular disposition to such kinds of feelings given their particular position as an imperial 'Dwarf' in a game of 'Giants'. There seemed to have been a constant risk of humiliation in front of foreign European nations. Yet, one of the many paradoxes of the Dutch strategies to avoid such humiliation—namely, lending seemingly cost-effective 'ethical' support to non-governmental players such as the missionaries or scientists—was that it actually increased tensions with local rulers and thus created a number of crises. Adopting a sociological approach to emotions, allowing for historical subjects not merely to be governed by emotions but also to be able to manage and exploit emotions in pursuit of competing agendas, we can see these crises as opportunities for various players. Newspaper editors scandalized the resistance of Bugis rulers to the Swiss expeditions as part of their general criticism of the Dutch colonial government. In a similar vein, these public polemics supported the missionaries' pursuit of more direct Dutch control to help their proselytizing efforts. In addition, local Dutch colonial officials on Celebes seemed to have promoted and benefited from public scandals in their lobbying efforts for more imperial control over 'their' island.

This study also serves as an argument for a more transnational understanding of (Dutch) imperialism. Not only did the fear of losing face to 'foreign nations' obviously play a considerable role in the Dutch colonial mind, but also the actual, physical presence of 'foreigners', such as the Sarasins, was constitutive of Dutch imperial policies. This was not only because their travels created political and emotional conditions for Dutch imperial forces in the periphery to call for policy changes, but also because they and their family members in Basel actually financed considerable parts of the Dutch colonial infrastructure on Celebes.

Furthermore, this example also shows that historical analysis of feelings of honour and shame among the European middle classes cannot restrict itself to a purely 'Western' framework. Honour and shame were also imperial feelings, since they obviously were tied to the ability or inability to discipline the 'uncivilized' in the colonies.

Notes

1. Quoted from Paul and Fritz Sarasin (1905: vol. 2, 59). All quotes from sources in this chapter are translated from German and Dutch. I thank Bernard Heise for his translation of an earlier, German version of this chapter into English. I am indebted to Robert-Jan Wille, Martin Dusenberre, Christine Whyte, Harald Fischer-Tiné and my colleagues (especially Judith Grosse) from the Chair of History of the Modern World at ETH Zurich for their valuable comments on an earlier draft version of this chapter.
2. Telegram Baron van Hoëvell to General-Gouverneur Rooseboom, Makassar, 8 August 1902, National Archives in The Hague (hereinafter 'NA'), 2.10.36.02, Mailrapporten Openbaar. Translated from Dutch.
3. Telegram by the General-Gouvernor's secretariat to Baron van Hoëvell, Buitenzorg, 9 August 1902, MA, 2.10.36.02, Mailrapporten Openbaar.
4. Paul and Fritz Sarasin (1905: vol. 1, vi).
5. Baron van Hoëvell (1908: 82–83), highlighted passages in original.
6. Ute Frevert (2011).
7. Ute Frevert (2011: 74).
8. Jeff Goodwin et al. (2001); Birgit Aschamann (2005); for an excellent overview of the historiography, see Bettina Hitzer (2011).
9. In her otherwise very illuminating reflections, Frevert seems to distinguish between an evolving 'Western' history of emotions and a more static history of 'non-Western cultures cherishing a sense of honour and honour practices which seem to have been lost in mainstream western societies'. Ute Frevert (2011: 40).
10. Ute Frevert (2011: 41).

11. Pierre Bourdieu (1977).
12. For a recent plea for a 'Bourdieuan approach' to the history of emotions, see Monique Scheer (2012: 193–220).
13. Ute Frevert (2011: 45–6).
14. H.L. Wesseling (1989: 58–70).
15. C. Fasseur (1979: 162–87); Jürgen Osterhammel (2011: 634–37). The standard work on Dutch imperialism is still Maarten Kuietenbrouwer (1991). See also Vincent Houben's chapter in this volume for an overview of the historiography.
16. The 'habitus' in Bourdieus theory consists of incorporated dispositions to feel, act and think in a way that corresponds with an individual's objective position in the social world. With regard to emotions, Frevert speaks of 'a system of emotional "dispositions" that in turn produces and structures social practices': Ute Frevert (2011: 41). See also Monique Scheer (2012) for an extensive discussion of the matter.
17. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994: 91–111); A.J. Stockwell (1999: 371–94).
18. Maarten Kuietenbrouwer (1991: 88–123).
19. The classic work on Dutch 'ethical policy' is Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1981); for an overview of recent debates, see Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben (2009).
20. C. Fasseur (1979); Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994). See also Vincent Houben's chapter in this volume.
21. Bernhard C. Schär (2015: 178–82); Terance William Bigalke (1982).
22. The 'imperialism debate' of the 1990s evolved, in quite a similar fashion to the current debates on 'New Imperial History', as a result of historians working from archives of the British Empire suggesting universal explanatory frameworks. This challenges European historians, as Locher-Scholten observed, working from archives that are not as 'easily accessible due to an internationally little known language' to think about whether or not explanatory frameworks from 'international' historiography fit realities outside the former British Empire. For the Dutch debate, see Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994); for the case of Switzerland, a country with no empire, but with an economy that depended heavily on access to the British, Dutch and French Empires, see Thomas David and Bouda Etemad (1998: 17–27).
23. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994: 96).
24. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994: 107).
25. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994: 109).
26. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994: 106).
27. Albert Schrauwers (2000).
28. Bernhard C. Schär (2015: 42–60).
29. Baron van Hoëvell (1908: 82).
30. Paul Sarasin (1898: 14).

31. Baron van Hoëvell (1908: 83).
32. Fritz Sarasin to Rosalie Sarasin-Brunner, Makassar, 31 January 1896, in State Archives of the Canton of Basel-Stadt (hereinafter StABS), PA212a, T2, Vol. XLI, 65, emphasis added.
33. *Makassaarsche Courant*, 26 September 1895.
34. *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 10 October 1895, p. 1 and 19 December 1895, p. 6; *Java-Bode*, 7 September 1895, p. 2; *De Locomotief*, 5 September 1895, p. 3.
35. Examples of press reports can be found in *Makassaarsche Courant*, 5 February 1896; *De Locomotief*, 11 February 1896 und 27 February 1896; *Java-Bode*, 12 February 1896; *Soerabaijasch Handelsblad*, 13 February 1896*; Rotterdamsche Nieuwsblad*, 13 February 1896; *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 17 March 1896; *Nieuws van den dag: kleine courant*, 18 March 1896. The Sarasin travels were discussed in scholarly and popular geographical journals. See e.g. *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, 1895/1896, p. 150; and *Globus. Illustrierte Zeitschrift für Länder- und Völkerkunde*, 15 January 1903, pp. 45–47.
36. *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, 13 August 1902.
37. *De Locomotief*, 16 August 1902.
38. *De Sumatra Post*, 11 October 1902.
39. Gerard Termorshuizen (2001); Ulbe Bosma et al. (2005).
40. Robert-Jan Wille (2007) and (2015a).
41. Wim Van der Schoor (2012); Robert-Jan Wille (2015b: 253–76).
42. John Van Wyhe (2013).
43. Bernhard C. Schär (2015: 197–240).
44. See Robert-Jan Wille (2015b) for a detailed analysis of Dutch scientists' political strategies at the time.
45. A.L. Hasselt (1902: 240).
46. Between 1893 and 1905, Kruyt wrote no fewer than 70 articles, 13 annual reports and 11 travel reports. They were either published in the *Journal of the Rotterdam Missionary Society* or *the Royal Dutch Geographical Society*, as well as in other scholarly journals. In his writings he constantly remarked on the deplorable weakness of the Dutch colonial state. See Gerrit Noort (2006: 544–60).
47. Nicolaas Adriani (1932: 36).
48. Magie Noort (2006); Albert Schrauwers (2000); Joost Coté (1996: 87–107); J.A. Arts (1986: 85–122).
49. Albert Kruyt to the Sarasins, Posso, 13 December 1904, in StABS, PA212a, T2, Vol. XVII, 54.
50. Quoted in Magie Noort (2006: 227).
51. Nicolaas Adriani to the Sarasins, Poso, 7 September 1896, in StABS, PA212a, T2, Vol. XVII, 3.
52. Terance Bigalke (1983: 341–63).
53. Kruyt to the Sarasins, Poso 24 February 1896, in StABS, PA212a, T2, Vol. XVII, 26.

54. De Slavenhandel ob Celebes (Teil 1), in *De Locomotief*, 28 June 1902, p. 5.
55. Albert Kruyt (1905: 774).
56. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994: 96).
57. Bernhard C. Schär (2015: 140–82).
58. Heather Sutherland (2009: 319–56).
59. H. von Kol (1903: 121).
60. W.H. Brugman an die Sarasins, Makassar, 20 September 1903, in StABS, PA 212a, T2 IX, Beamte, Dok. 27.
61. Reports in *De Locomotief*, 14 October 1896, p. 2; *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 11 November 1896, p. 2; *Makassaarsche Courant*, 9 October 1896.
62. G.W.W.C. Baron van Hoëvell, in *Encyclopaedie van Nederlansch-Indië*, ed. by Van der Lith, P.A., tweede deel (H-M), 's Gravenhage, Leiden 1899, p. 44–45.
63. Baron van Hoëvell to the Sarasins, Leiden, 19 October 1905, in StABS, PA212a, T2, Bd. IX, 37.
64. William Cummings (2002).
65. Bernhard C. Schär (2015: 140–82). See also Vincent Houben's chapter in this volume.

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'Knowledge' and 'Ignorance'

Arrested Circulation: Catholic Missionaries, Anthropological Knowledge and the Politics of Cultural Difference in Imperial Germany, 1880–1914

Richard Hölzl

Introduction[1]

In 1927 the French cultural anthropologists Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) accused missionary ethnographers of Eurocentric thinking.[2] They were trying to find the European division of body and soul in the non-European individual, while Lévy-Bruhl held that such a division did not exist among the 'primitives', nor was there such a thing as the individual. According to him, the 'soul of the primitive' was identical with the body and the group. While his criticism was quite true for missionary linguistics, which aimed at identifying the vocabulary and concepts for the vernacular bible and for translations of the Roman catechism,[3] his own idea of 'primitivism' surely was cultural othering of a more obvious kind.

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Looking back to the turn of the twentieth century, we find that the heyday of missionary anthropology was short-lived. As soon as anthropology had established a set of methods and institutionalized the scientific field, missionaries (with few exceptions) were eclipsed from the scientific discourse on the nature and culture of man.[4] Likewise, missionaries seem to have retreated from the scientific debate, devoting their ethnographic abilities to other ends. Missionary ethnographic activity and research did not stop, but more often than not, the results ended up in mission libraries only or circulated as typescripts within the missions' inner circles.

European missionaries assembled information about the populations of their mission fields for the purpose of proselytization in order to translate religious texts for preaching, for pastoral work (for example, that concerning marital problems or childrearing) and for the introduction of newcomers to the mission field. Apart from the fact that scientific publication channels were not very receptive to missionary works, publication for a wider public was merely a byproduct. Often it was deemed inappropriate and on occasions even indecent. Sometimes missionary encounters with the depths of the social and cultural fabric of the mission fields came as a shock, translating into moral panic and ending up in the non-proliferation of extensive bodies of anthropological knowledge.

Missionaries have only recently been rediscovered as brokers of cultural knowledge about peoples around the world.[5] This chapter strays sideways from this trail of research. It unearths a case of colonial moral panic and the consequent arrested transfer of ethnographical knowledge.[6] In the particular case I am examining, panic ensued after the 'discovery' of the 'secret' of Unyago by German and Swiss Benedictine missionaries of Ndanda Abbey in 1908. The abbey is situated on the southeastern edge of colonial German East Africa, today's Lindi region of the United Republic of Tanzania. Unyago—not always under this name[7]—is an initiation procedure practised by several peoples of the region (in particular, the Mwera, Makua, Makonde and the Yao) that had successively entered the Ruvuma river region from Southern Africa during the nineteenth century and that distinguished themselves within East Africa by a matrilineal social structure.[8] The different groups did not adhere to one religious cult and one set of religious practices. African religion in this area was organized locally, serving the needs of small groups under the leadership of a Mwenye (village leader). However, cultural interaction was frequent, and different forms of initiation, ancestral cults and worship at tree shrines were common to most people.[9] Not only were there as many readings of

Unyago as there were parties involved in the cultural encounter around it—members of different local societies, African Christian converts, African and European colonial officials, and missionaries from various denominations—but the procedure itself was also in flux due to the social conditions (colonial rule and warfare, migration, economic transformation) in south-eastern Tanzania at the time.

The discovery and the ensuing moral panic triggered frantic inquests into the initiation practices of the people of this region, especially those of the Mwera and the Makua, among whom the Benedictine mission worked. The result was a body of knowledge of considerable density and depth compared to the professional anthropology of the time. Moral panic, as a sociological term, is often used synonymously to public moral scandal.[10] Indeed, it is not 'merely' an immediate, affective human reaction, but is also a form of cultural interaction. It may well trigger a public scandal or not. Conversely, it may lead to secrecy and the covering up of the cause for a potential scandal, as in the case of the Benedictines' encounter with Unyago. Still, keeping things hidden from public attention does not render them politically and socially ineffective. Arrested transfer in this case, I argue, resonated on several levels—in the colonial contact zone, in the political debate of the colonial metropole and in the scientific field of anthropology. One may ask how moral panic in the colonial context relates to colonial anxiety along the lines that Ranajit Guha has put to discussion[11] and, for that matter, to the colonial psycho-pathologies that have been discussed in the colonial discourses of the time.[12] The preferred term in Germany was *Tropenkoller*, which might be translated as 'tropical fit'.[13] Guha's idea of anxiety denotes a characteristic trait of colonial interaction as such rather than the particular case of an alleged violation of a moral code resulting in a panicky reaction by those who adhere to the code in question. *Tropenkoller*, on the other hand, seems to denote the lapse of an individual into an irrational, allegedly natural and primitive (as opposed to civilized), even pathological state of mind. It therefore alienates and isolates the individual colonialist from the group, much in contrast to incidents of moral panic, which seem to integrate groups and align them along the moral standard.

In the wider frame my argument aims at differentiating the notion of cultural brokerage and knowledge circulation (and even its opposite). Cultural encounter and the production of cultural difference are not only governed by economic or political interest or formations of the colonial discourse, but also as brought about in concrete settings and by social

interaction.[14] The Benedictines' encounter with Unyago is certainly not the only case where missionaries faced grave moral dilemmas[15] and the implications of the resulting conflicts for imperialism remain to be studied.

Uncovering the 'Nature' of Unyago

When reading the entries of June and July 1908 in the diary of the Benedictine Mission at Ndanda today, one is struck by the sense of urgency and moral indignation that is displayed by the diarist P. Klemens Künster after having been informed about the meaning and the actual practices of Unyago.[16] Up to the summer of 1908, the missionaries had regarded Unyago as 'quite harmless'. This changed immediately after the *mwalim* (teacher) Innocent Hatia had confided in Brother Cyprian Hölzl and given a detailed account of the initiation procedures that the Makua people held every summer for several weeks. Unyago, the diarist noted, was 'a devilish fetish ceremony' with 'repulsive customs'.[17] The 'discovery' of the secret of Unyago had a range of consequences for the Ndanda mission. Immediately after Innocent Hatia had given his rendering of the practices during Unyago and Künster finished jotting down the details in the diary, he began to inquire further. Hatia had only reported about Unyago for boys. When Künster secured information on the girls' initiation a couple of days later, he noted into the diary (5 July 1908): 'even much worse', 'the pen jibs at writing it down'. Under the impression of penetrating a secret, the fathers at the mission acted swiftly. On various occasions new information was added into the diary and at the end of the year 1908, an appendix is attached that sums up the results of the investigation and also gives details about the so-called 'secret fraternities' among the people in the vicinity of the mission. Having supposedly established the basic facts about the initiation procedures of the Makua and Mwera people in the Ndanda mission field, the fathers contacted their superior in Dar es Salaam, Bishop Thomas Spreiter. Spreiter found the allegations about Unyago to be in part confirmed by his Yao porters and other Coastal Tanzanians. In mid-December, the Bishop issued a pastoral letter to all Benedictine missions in East Africa, in which he restated the findings about the Unyago procedures, cited ethnographical works by Carl Velten and Karl Weule and, finally, asserted that several of the practices common during Unyago were in fact indecent and heathen superstition. In pastoral practice, however, he asked his missionaries to be careful, educate, explain and gather more

information. In the long run, the mission was to break the tradition by establishing boarding schools, in particular for girls, and hospitals to educate about childbirth and childrearing.[18]

The discovery of the secret of Unyago changed the way missionaries brokered their encounter with initiation procedures to their German constituency. The earlier 'quite harmless' version had been related openly in the mission journals. Father Anton Ruedel described Unyago in 1900 as a 'game' at the centre of which stood the circumcision of boys by their godfathers. After this, a 'master of ceremony' would do 'ceremonies' and the boys would stay in small huts in the woods with an elder, the *mkubwa*. At the end of this period, the boys were again received in the village with a feast and new clothes. The girls' initiation would 'mainly consist of instructions, some of them valid, some superfluous, some even objectionable'.[19] In a letter of 1897, a Sister Klara merely expressed concern about the setback Unyago presented for religious instruction—children were kept from school for several months during Unyago—and she related the air of secrecy that the whole process had to the eye of the foreigner.[20] Unyago was seemingly a typical, primitive ritual, as was to be expected from the so-called 'heathen natives' of East Africa. And it could conveniently be employed for missionary propaganda. The missionaries had no intention of intervening in the Unyago procedures, even those of Christian converts. The new version of Unyago passed on by the mission teacher Innocent Hatia and investigated by Father Klemens and others never featured publicly in the journals and brochures of the Benedictine mission.

The reading of Unyago the missionaries put together in the summer of 1908 from the description of Innocent Hatia and other converts, and that triggered the incident of moral panic was far more than a mere *rite* of passage and initiation. It was a long process of teaching on the fundamentals of social relations, including sexual education for boys and girls. Father Klemens wrote into the mission diary: 'The second main teaching [by the mkubwa during Unyago] is an instruction … a seduction into sexual intercourse with women. These instructions explain every little detail … the parts of the female vulva … the ways to exercise the coitus, that the boys before the women and they before them shall be denuded, and also the details of the actions during coitus and the ways to arouse sexual desire in women by the hands' touch.' The diarist's entries concerning girls' initiation differs from this inasmuch as he put more weight on the physical details. Explicitly, he describes physical assaults on the girls by 'old hags'

in order 'to prepare' the girls 'for indecent use'. The hymen would be destroyed by the thrust of a finger, the clitoris enlarged by manipulation[21] and sexual intercourse trained. The diarist concluded that Unyago was a 'system invented with devilish shrewdness to seduce girls to a refined form of fornication'. In the background he saw Islam looming and its propagation of polygamy. Further description included a discussion of a kind of *ius primae noctis* and the preparation as well as the due course of a traditional wedding night.

THINGS FALL APART? THE BETRAYAL OF A SECRET AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THE MISSION FIELD

Even though the Benedictine bishop in Dar es Salaam had urged clemency, Father Klemens and the other missionaries of Ndanda went from moral panic to moral rigour. The mission went a long way in its efforts to suppress Unyago in the following decades and brought the mission of Ndanda to the brink of failure. Later Benedictine missionaries blamed this strategy for the spread of Islam in the Lindi region of Tanzania and considered it a grave mistake.[22] This conclusion may be going too far, since 'becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania' was a far more complex process and was certainly not only an option taken for want of an allegedly better alternative to Catholicism.[23] And, equally important, negotiating Unyago was a rather complex interaction between African converts and traditionalists, the Benedictines and the colonial administration. Still, one is tempted to narrate this story along the lines of Chinua Achebe's seminal novel *Things Fall Apart* (1958), a slow process of dismantling of traditional lifestyles, religious beliefs and community spirit under the influence of colonial rule and missionary conversion strategies.

After all, the cultural broker Innocent Hatia was a son of Hatia IV, paramount chief of the Makua.[24] According to the mission reports, the chief had many sons, two of them Christians, Simon and Innocent, while several others were Muslims. However, Hatia IV himself adhered to the established beliefs of his people. He had entertained good relations to the Ndanda mission since 1900, allowed the missionaries to build schools and did not discourage converts. Christian converts, on the other hand, remained involved in Makua social and spiritual life, including the annual Unyago with the consent of the mission. The breaking point in Hatia's life and reign came in 1905/1906, when he joined the Maji Maji war against the German colonial occupiers. Although he negotiated peace separately

early on during the war, he was interned in a government prison.[25] Afterwards he was described as a 'broken man';[26] his people were 'in a sad state, only just coming out of the *pori* [wilderness] again' when a German ethnographer passed through the area in 1906.[27] The aftermath of the Maji-Maji war was characterized by the raids ('punitive expeditions') of the colonial army and massive food shortages. This experience may well have led his son Innocent and others to bind themselves even closer to the mission. It represented a safer bet in the consolidated colonial space. Yet this was probably not the only reason for Innocent Hatia's progressive religious and cultural conversion.[28] Innocent Hatia became a long-term pillar of Catholicism and was among those Africans who kept the mission going during the First World War. While the German Benedictines were interned and banned from Tanzania, he cared for those affected by the hunger crisis and held sermons.[29]

For Christian converts, the Unyago controversy became a walk on the high-wire after 1908. The bishop in Dar es Salaam retained his careful position and warned his missionaries not to alienate the population by aggressive suppression, a position that was confirmed by the German East African Conference of Bishops in 1912.[30] The Ndanda missionaries lobbied the local government to intervene, but the district officer was reluctant to side with the missionaries. Interpreting Maji Maji as a religious war, German colonial officials tried to avoid triggering conflict in this field. Still, in the summer of 1909 the district officer advised the local African officials, the Akida and the Jumbe, to ask permission to perform Unyago by the mission. When Hatia IV came to obtain consent, he received the verdict that Unyago was 'absolutely forbidden'. The Makua decided to proceed with Unyago covertly, as the Ndanda diary recounts: 'They carry on secretly though in constant fear. And where a ceremony is found out the participants resp. the leaders learn to feel the pain inflicted by the walking stick of the Reverend Father Prior'. The Christian boys and girls and all those who attend our school we have had taken out by the Jumbe and have them put under our care here at the station'.[31] Some missionaries expressed doubts about this oppressive strategy, but they were in a minority and had no effect on the mission's policy. Father Ambrose Mayer, for example, recommended competing with Unyago by setting up Christian ceremonies 'to consecrate directly puberty and sexual life'.[32] He also developed a detailed design for a new African Christian ritual that should encompass teaching in puberty, marriage life and pregnancy all in one. Mayer died in 1917 and his writings were forgotten.[33]

The First World War and its aftermath were burdensome in southern Tanzania in many ways, not least because of the hunger crisis in 1915/1916.[34] The missionaries, however, left the region, only to return with an even stricter policy on Unyago in 1922. The Benedictine Abbot of Ndanda, Gallus Steiger, declared initiation rites and male circumcision in particular to be absolutely incompatible with an adherence to Catholicism. One of Steiger's successors, Siegfried Hertlein (Abbott of Ndanda, 1976–2001), comments on the period: 'Either you gave up your tradition, or you remained outside.'[35] Missionary work practically came to a standstill. Few students lined up for baptisms, no significant number of adults converted and hardly any outstations were founded until 1929. Most converts participated in Unyago secretly; if found out, they often received punishment according to church law, and some were excommunicated.[36] In 1928 Tanganyika's conference of bishops discussed the problem, but no common policy could be found, and the bishops decided against bringing the question to Rome, 'as this will only lead to problems'.[37] Father Joachim Ammann (Abbot of Ndanda 1932–49) wrote at the time: 'but I pray to God that he may not judge us with the same harshness we use in judging and condemning the customs and intentions of others to whom we came to announce the mercy of God and his paternal goodness and communicate to them the grace and redemption of our redeemer'.[38] Ammann finally stopped the obviously failing policy of suppression in 1937 and—despite of opposition from Benedictines in Germany—tolerated a 'purified' version of Unyago supervised by missionaries and Christian elders. The latter were assembled by the Catholic Action Committee, a lay organization presided over by Innocent Hatia. Ammann's decision was obviously triggered by an intense argument with clan elder of the Mwera, Antotela, who accused Ammann of thwarting social coherence and the morality of the young by preaching against Unyago.[39]

The Roman Catholic Benedictine mission competed not only with African religion in the area and Islam, but also with the neighbouring Anglican Mission at Masasi. The Universities' Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) had been in the area more than 30 years, since 1876, before realizing the scope and depth of Unyago, at about the same time that the Catholic mission at Ndanda did.[40] In 1913 the mission prohibited Christians from participating in Unyago and initiated the first 'Christian Jando', an initiation procedure for boys under missionary supervision, which resulted from the complaints of African clergy and teachers. It was also their pressure that inspired the Anglican Bishop Vincent Lucas to choose a fresh

approach to Unyago in the 1920s. Certainly their willpower was key to actually establish a Christian initiation in the parishes often against the will of the headmen.[41] Lucas took an approach of cautious anthropological engineering: 'it is frequently the case that the destruction of one custom may damage and endanger the whole social fabric … Indeed, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that ceremonies and beliefs of peoples of lowly culture are so closely bound up with economic and social factors of various kinds that the ill-considered destruction of its ritual and beliefs may involve vital wounds to the whole structure'.[42] Evaluating the Makua and Yao initiation rituals in particular before and during puberty, Lucas did not differ markedly from his Roman Catholic neighbours at Ndanda. During all five stages of initiation, he held, 'invaluable instruction is given, mixed with varying amounts of old wives' tales and some teaching which is definitely opposed to the Christian ideals of holiness … As the purpose of the physical deformation taught in the first [stage] seems to be directed to the increasing of the sexual appeal it must be regarded as morally dangerous … All the five rites are accompanied by the singing of definitely obscene songs accompanied with undesirable dancing to the drums'.[43] Lucas did not believe that the initiation process as a whole could be suppressed, but he doubted that there were any 'Christian missionaries who would maintain for one moment that the rites should be allowed to go on according to the old customs'. His solution was to 'Christianize tribal customs' and thereby remove the aspects of physical manipulation and sexual education, and replace the allegedly indecent songs and dances with Christian songs and thanksgiving masses in the church. Periods of education by Christian elders and 'matrons' were retained; the initiation process as a whole was strictly supervised by missionaries. The Anglican bishop's view of Unyago was impressed by a sense of 'tribalism' much like the concept of 'indirect rule' which dominated British colonialism in Tanganyika at the time. The bishop hoped to preserve the ritual without having to retain the social depth of traditional socialization. The anthropologist E.O. James, who generally advocated anthropological engineering along the lines of the British social anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, carefully voiced his doubts about 'how far this adaptation really satisfies the tribal conditions of initiation and is calculated to produce the same results as a preparation for entrance into the adult life of the community with all its consolidating sanctions and beliefs'.[44] In the end, as Terence Ranger notes, the attempt to Christianize Unyago was fairly successful, 'though not exactly in the way anticipated by Lucas'.[45]

The Inner Circle: Keeping the Intimate Secret

Historians have long dwelt on the 'tense and tender ties' within colonial societies, excavating the relationships between colonizers and the colonized at the 'intimate frontiers'[46] of empire, the heavily sexualized, gendered and racialized constructions of the body of the 'other', the scandalous sexual violence in colonial rule and its potential for public scandalization in the colonial metropoles of Europe.[47] What has been less noticed, quite naturally, are the silences produced by moral panic.

There were a number of colonial scandals in Germany with intimacy at their centre, such as the Carl Peters scandal,[48] the Rechenberg scandal[49] and the scandal of Atakpame.[50] Broad public discussions on intimate and sexual relations were triggered by a parliamentary motion put forward by a majority of Social Democrats, the Catholic Centre and left liberals in the Reichstag to safeguard inter-ethnic marriages by law. The public debate during these incidents was more than explicit concerning the intimate details involved. Missionaries have been involved in the process of scandalizing the intimate relations within colonial society (prostitution, extramarital intercourse, child abuse) by passing on information about moral transgressions of colonialists to parliamentary representatives or the media.

On matters other than intimacy, missionaries sought contact to scientists freely, added considerably to anthropology's body of knowledge and used a scientific image for mission propaganda.[51] However, cases like the one presented above did not make their way to European publics. The more information the missionaries gathered on Unyago, the firmer and tighter became their resolve to keep this knowledge within the inner circles of the mission and not to pass it on to their home audiences, not even to scientific experts. Londa Schiebinger and Robert Proctor have referred to this aspect of arrested circulation by using the term 'agnotology', the study of a politics of selecting, even covering up knowledge and information about unwanted and unspeakable topics.[52] In a particular case study, Schiebinger has shown how indigenous knowledge about abortifacients was not transferred to Europe.[53] The extensive knowledge that the Benedictines assembled on Unyago is another example of this kind of arrested circulation of knowledge.

Father Klemens' notes in the station diaries and Bishop Spreiter's lengthy pastoral letter of 1908 had only been the start of the missionaries' enquiries into Unyago. Already in 1910, Father Ambrose Mayer delivered a 200-page unpublished treatise entitled 'The Sexual Life of the Negro:

Unyago and the Mission'. Father Joachim Amman wrote memoranda in March ('A Treatise on the Boys' Unyago of the Mwera') and October 1928 ('Report on the Unyago of the Mwera'). By 1930, he had put together a large manuscript on the 'Life and Customs of the Wamwera'.[54] These texts were received by the heads of the mission, the Bishop at Dar es Salaam and later the Abbot of Ndanda, and never published, but copies circulated in European abbeys of the Missionary Benedictines to educate future missionaries about their clientele and the pastoral conflicts that were to be expected.[55]

The Unyago papers were part of a larger body of ethnographic work that was assembled by missionaries for guidance in pastoral theology and in preparation for pastoral conferences in the mission field.[56] The material was circulated among the missionaries and well-kept in the monastic libraries, but was never officially published at the time. Because of the Unyago controversy, the Benedictines increasingly realized that cultural misunderstandings seriously threatened their enterprise. And professional anthropology seemed to present some guidance on this matter. In the person of Father Meinulf Küsters (1890–1947), the Missionary Benedictines encouraged a young priest to study anthropology in Vienna, acquire a doctoral degree in Leipzig and engage in the professional ethnographic survey of their East African mission field.[57] He arrived in the Lindi province in 1927/1928, both as an Assistant Professor at the Ethnographic Museum in Munich and as an educational supervisor for the mission. Apart from ethnographic objects, photographs, documentary films and questionnaires, he documented the lifestyles of the peoples of southern Tanganyika in almost two dozen volumes of hand-written diaries.[58] The ethnographic recording of the Mwera was supposed to become a monograph (Habilitation). For unknown reasons, Father Meinulf decided against publication, left his post at the Munich museum in 1932 and became a full-time missionary in Tanganyika. However, his manuscript on the Mwera is preserved in the Benedictine mission's archive at St Ottilien, Germany, and was finally published in 2012 by a Munich-based ethnographer. Although Father Meinulf had had full access to the material on Unyago and had taken part in the pastoral conferences that discussed the Unyago question extensively in the late 1920s, he did not include initiation in his manuscript. It took another 80 or so years before ethnographic material gathered by the mission was brought to the public in the 2012 edition of Küsters' Mwera book, which also includes Father Joachim Ammann's report on Unyago.[59]

Intimacy and the Moral Corset of Nineteenth-Century Catholicism

Explaining the missionaries' panic and the consequent arrested circulation of ethnographic knowledge about Unyago affords some understanding of the particular moral constitution of nineteenth-century Catholic orthodoxy. German Catholic missionaries were rooted in a conservative and asexual, even anti-sexual ethic. Furthermore, most of them—being priests or monks—had subscribed to strict celibacy. During the nineteenth century, a reverence for female virginity and purity—epitomized in the cult of the Virgin Mary—had formed not only among the ordained, but also in broad circles of the Catholic population.[60] Likewise, all forms of sexuality and desire that did not take place between married couples for the purpose of procreation were deemed not only indecent, but even prone to devilish incursion.[61] The Catholic moral code of the time branded many forms of intimacy and any personal pleasure involved in sexual activity as sinful and rendered sexual encounters of any kind—even the legitimate marital procreative variant—unspeakable, not to mention physical manipulations and introductions to sexual intercourse for juveniles as described in the mission diaries of Ndanda.[62] Like any other moral code or law, this orthodox view on intimacy was bent to a degree in social realities; it was dodged in the dark corners and even circumvented by many ordinary and generally faithful Catholics. The Catholic moral code tells us about appearances, discourses and the power to cover up or bring to the fore intimate relations (bigotry), just as the dominant Protestant bourgeois code did.[63]

In addition, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw new religious fundamentalism and belief in the supernatural, be it divine or the opposite, often intertwined with a fixation on suppressing sexuality and intimacy. This period saw a revival of Catholic orders, of the belief in the working God's grace in everyday life, in miracles, and the social reality of the devil. Often the devil allegedly took form in deviant sexuality, whereas holy visions were implicitly connoted as intimate encounters with the divine.[64] Not only was moral rigour strictly administered and enforced by priests, in schools, in the cubicles and from the pulpits; since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the number of miracles, of appearances of the Holy Mary, of allegedly blessed and holy men and women, and of stigmatized virgins soared. These forms of popular piety were encouraged by a theological neo-scholasticism that began to dominate orthodox Catholicism.[65] The number of pilgrimages to holy sites rose accordingly. From the 1850s

onwards, priests and monks—Jesuits and Redemptorists—embarked on a virtual crusade through the Catholic parishes of Germany.[66] Under the slogan of 'Popular Mission' (*Volksmission*), they agitated the faithful, spread the gospel, often invoking the hope of a new heavenly order, and more often instigated the fear of the workings of the devil. 'Unchastity' and 'impurity' were regarded 'more than any other sinn' as the 'ugliest blemish to the holiness of the baptized—him being a member of Christ's body'.[67] This was also regarded as universal and paramount in the mission field.[68] It was under this moral regime that the German and Swiss Benedictine monks were brought up and later entered the services of the Church. With the onset of a German colonial empire in Africa and Asia, those German Catholics who joined the missionary conquest experienced a scope of cultural diversity that was often hard to accommodate with the narrow worldviews of the milieu from which they came.

There is a second development that shaped the Ndanda missionaries' perception and politics concerning Unyago. Already after the French Revolutions of 1789 and 1830 and the European revolution of 1848/1849, an increasingly fundamentalist Catholic avant garde had developed critical views on urban lifestyles.[69] By 1900, when the fixed gender dichotomies of German bourgeois society gradually began to erode and sexual scandals shook German society, an increasingly anti-modernist interpretation of cultural change characterized Catholic evangelism. Catholic organizations, along with conservative Protestants, fought against prostitution and 'white slavery', 'indecent' literature, theatre, early cinema and so on.[70] Adding to all this, the widely received publications of Sigmund Freud, Havelock Ellis or Albert Moll on children's sexuality made sex education a topic for public debate.[71] The Ndanda diarist Father Klemens reflected this: 'From all the facts [on Unyago] we learn how much those pedagogues in Europe approach native heathendom, who advise a full instruction of sexual intercourse.'[72] For the missionaries, the so-called 'heathen' and 'primitive' peoples represented very ambivalent imaginations: on the one hand, they appeared unspoiled by modern European vices; on the other hand, they were presented as naïve and prone to devilish incursion due to a lack of self-control. That—in the case of Unyago—sexual morality was negotiable between government, mission and the East African population was hardly a situation to announce publicly to the pious mission supporters of Germany.

One may argue that this may well have been true for certain evangelical Catholics, but the majority of the German governing elites were beyond such provincial attitudes; in fact, they were rather more metropolitan in

outlook. But this would merely double the culture war rhetoric against Catholicism that already characterized the debate in imperial Germany.[73] Instead, we may speak of a broad but far from unanimous alliance of conservatives that led a cultural war on more than one front—against political liberalism, working-class politics and lifestyles, sexual libertinage and cultural difference. The Anglican bishop at Masasi whose attempts to create African Christian ritual became a source of wide discussion at the time was strongly criticized by German Protestant theologians.[74]

Transferring the Unspeakable? Resonances in the Political Debates of the Metropole

German overseas colonialism was a latecomer compared to the Spanish, Portuguese, British and even the French Empires. The German public had contemplated and debated imperialism, racial supremacy and the European civilizing mission since the eighteenth century.[75] Nevertheless, the German polity and public during the 1880s was only slowly realizing that it had acquired a significant colonial territory overseas and that this required considerable effort in terms of brain power, staff and not least fire power. The period between 1904 and 1907—partly because of the colonial wars in German South-West and East Africa—were a breaking point in the short history of German colonialism. The German public had to realize that there actually was a costly colonial empire with seemingly unruly populations.[76] The media coverage of colonial scandals and wars was broad, and fierce criticism ensued over colonialism, as well as its modes and its costs.[77] Colonial rule became a central topic of the 1906 election campaign to the Reichstag. The subordination of the uprising and the ethnic groups involved became synonymous with national pride, great power status and racial supremacy. Second, the German government was forced to acknowledged that the colonial territories were not a mere sidetrack of German politics that could be cooked over a small flame, but required investment in a viable and well-staffed colonial civil service and material infrastructure, in knowledge gathering and in colonial social policies. While the immediate reaction to a colonial uprising was a military crackdown on the alleged insurgents, a second step entailed more lenient and negotiated ways of ruling the colonies, almost like the 'indirect rule' that the British colonial administration devised for some colonies in the 1920s.[78]

However, German historians have also emphasized another trend that characterized Germany way beyond the colonial sphere. A whole range of social relations and discourses,[79] including anti-Semitism, eugenics and homophobia, but also matters of the private sphere, like marriage, intimacy and education were increasingly framed in bio-political perspective. The most prominent debate within the colonial discourse was undoubtedly the one about mixed marriages in the colonies. Mixed marriages were outlawed by a governor's decree in German South-West Africa (1905) and German East Africa (1906), and by a decree of the Colonial Office in Samoa (1912). While the 1905 and 1906 bans had already sparked public debate, the 1912 decision provoked a concerted action by the Reichstag, which filed a resolution demanding that the government put proper legislation before it clarifying the legal status of and sanctioning existing and future marriages between German men and women from the various colonized countries. However, the government and the colonial office never presented such legislation.

Some historians have explained the shift in colonial policies against mixed marriage on the level of a discourse increasingly driven by bio-political, racialist considerations.[80] The colonial space and encounter merely served as a kind of 'reality check'; actually, policies on the ground varied and were rather less monolithic than the colonial discourse in imperial Germany suggested.[81] Others, in particular Lora Wildenthal, hold that the turn against mixed marriages really originated in the colonies, where the comparatively few cases of actual or intended marriage came into conflict with a new colonial masculinity relying on white supremacy, expropriation of the colonized population and strictly segregated spheres of life.[82]

However, looking closely at one particular position in this discourse and its inter-connectedness to colonial encounters in the social space of colonial German East Africa reveals that there are deeper implications of colonial encounter and colonial discourse than have hitherto been suggested. The Catholic position on mixed marriage, voiced by the Centre Party in the Reichstag, but also by missionaries and intellectuals, was shaped just as much by the missionary encounters in the German overseas colonies as it gave in to hegemonic discourses within the political realm of imperial Germany. The particular fashioning of the position on inter-racial marriage—it was legitimate as such, but culturally unviable and therefore to be discouraged—had its origins in the missionary reactions to non-European intimacy, marriage customs, initiation rites and sexual education, reactions that can rightfully described as moral panic. It has been emphasized by

historians that sexual scandals in imperial Germany were carefully crafted inter-plays of mass media journalism, political activism and moralist foot stamping.[83] Compared to the public excitement of colonial scandals, which even today attracts the attention of historians, other cases of moral panic developed largely unnoticed by the public.

'Cultural difference' as cited by the missionaries against mixed marriages was the rather unspecific term to coat and veil the alleged immorality of the colonized population, particularly the intimate and sexual relations that took place. It seems to be characteristic for colonial moral panics that the initial encounter cannot be translated, or at least not distributed widely and in detail within the home constituencies of the colonizers. As a matter of fact, there is no direct evidence that the experiences of moral panic translated into the Catholic policies on mixed marriages and 'cultural difference' of late imperial Germany.[84] However, there are hints and circumstances that suggest a close connection.

The Benedictine Bishop of Dar es Salaam, Thomas Spreiter, who was closely informed of the Unyago question at Ndanda, was asked to fill in a questionnaire on the topics of 'mixed blood' and 'mixed marriages' in 1912. One question asked: 'Do you think an official (and happy) marriage between Europeans and native women is a) possible, b) recommendable (from a religous-ethical, a racial …, a legislative viewpoint)?' The Bishop answered:

> From an abstract viewpoint a happy marriage may even be possible, but hardly in practice. Such a marriage is certainly not desirable, neither from a religious, nor a racial, or a legislative perspective. Even the Negroes say, he white and the black people ought to stay among themselves. Here, below the Equator, Europeans never stay forever, all wish to go home eventually. At home a black wife is impossible. To rid themselves of their cumbersome wives with their many faults, they will file for divorce, some even undertake bigamy. In the end, we will have more sinning and distraction than now. There is no other remedy—other than true piety—than marrying European woman and the obligation to care for sufficient alimentation. Also strict punishment of abortion, and stronger racial self-esteem than hitherto, so as to prevent the highly educated and civilized European from throwing himself away to the otherwise despised Negress.[85]

Spreiter wrapped his arguments in a complicated at times ironic language, pivoting any direct allusion to matters of sexuality. He underlines the hubris of allegedly civilized Europeans who nevertheless entertained intimate relations with allegedly inferior women. While he gave the doubtful

reliability of the men's commitment to their African wives pride of place in his argument, he nevertheless added racialist notions and the well-known pre-conceptions regarding a supposedly unbridgeable 'cultural difference'.

Father Amandus Acker (1848–1923) argued along the same lines in an article for the *Koloniale Rundschau* of 1912. Acker was head of the Mission of the Holy Spirit in Germany, a former missionary in Zanzibar and a prominent figure in the Catholic mission movement of the time. He conceded and even emphasized the cultural and racial supremacy of the German 'Herrenvolk', but insisted on marriage between Germans and women from the colonies as a basic 'human right' and a moral principle over-riding considerations of cultural and racial difference. He insisted that a future 'mixed race', quite naturally resulting from the colonial situation, should be assimilated into the German *Volk*, since it was only the 'denigration from birth, upbringing in filth and among inferior races that make the mixed blood seem inadequate, and the lack of education and the proper milieu'.[86] Otherwise he feared the development of a new mixed colonial population in opposition to German colonial rule and much more able to thwart it than the existing populations were.

Just before the First World War Theodor Grentrup , expert of church law and missionary of the Mission of the Divine Word, summed up the position of the Catholic Church on the question of mixed marriages. He held that even Christianity could not 'change at once heart and soul of the Negro people and lift them up to the height of culture over-night'. Therefore, mixed marriages were not to be encouraged by the missions of the Catholic Church. Grentrup saw 'differences in the anthropological quality', the long-term consequences of which nobody could really judge.[87]

The arguments of mission leaders like Spreiter, Acker or Grentrup resonated in the Centre Party's position during the debate on mixed marriages in the Reichstag. Sessions 53, 55 and 56 on 2, 7 and 8 May 1912 debated a motion by the budget commission that government put forward legislation on inter-ethnic marriages in the German colonies. The legislation was designed to provide legal security to existing marriages, including their offspring, and would not bar partners from marrying in the future. All speakers emphasized the alleged racial superiority of European colonialists; even the left-wing Social Democrat Ledebour found that 'out of all so-called 'wild' peoples … the Samoans are probably the most developed, physically and mentally', while others ranked below them.[88] He nevertheless argued in favour of future inter-ethnic marriages. The speakers of the Catholic Centre Party, Gröber and Erzberger, both strongly defended the motion of the budget commission, arguing that marriage was an 'unalienable right

by nature': 'Forbidding marriage between natives and whites is a violent act against unalienable human rights', Erzberger told the assembly.[89] Gröber and Erzberger argued that the overwhelming majority of children of mixed ethnic decent derived from extra-marital intercourse. Thus, banning mixed marriage would not alter the development of a 'mixed race' in the colonies, but, on the contrary, would increase concubinage and prostitution. Nevertheless, they deemed mixed marriages to be undesirable. Gröber argued: 'I do not hesitate to admit … that my political friends and I also do not view those racially mixed marriages as desirable, and indeed because and as long as the cultural levels are differing to such a strong degree as they do today.'[90] The Centre Party hesitated to subscribe to the openly racialist argument put forward by the government's representative in the debate, Wilhelm Solf, head of the colonial office and former governor of Samoa, and other conservative and right-wing liberal members of the Reichstag. Instead, the Centre Party argued on the basis of a 'cultural difference' which was to be erased in the long run by the work of Christian missionaries.

Missionary judgements about the intimate relations of the colonizers and the colonized were not primarily argued from a bio-political, racialist perspective; instead, the arguments were drawn from the field of 'culture'. They insisted that so-called indigenous populations needed careful and gradual re-education. In particular, monogamy, the moral and sexual role of women and men, and childrearing were to be remodelled along Christian lines. This argument certainly justified the missionaries' role in the colonies and was tinged with contemporary ideas of progress and civilization, as well as a pre-occupation with the primitive and the zeal of religious conversion. But an alleged 'cultural difference' was also rather unspecific, even diffuse as an argument, just as the whole Catholic position on mixed marriages was. This is not only a derivation of the general disposition of the colonial discourse in imperial Germany; it is also rooted in the moral panic of the cultural encounter, a consequence of an arrested transfer of ethnographical knowledge and experience.

Consequences for Scientific Anthropology: Resonance or Absorption?

In the wider sense, this inability to translate and transfer resulted not only in vague deliberations about 'cultural difference', but also muted the missionary transfer of knowledge and indirectly furthered a particular

understanding of so-called primitive customs and social formation as ritu-
alistic and ceremonial in the field of anthropology. While it is certainly
plausible that during the process of professionalization of anthropology,
missionaries lost much of their standing as reliable witnesses and as provid-
ers of ethnographic data, missionaries themselves grew reluctant to share
sensitive information with the scientific public. One may regard this as a
missed opportunity for anthropology, since missionaries were the only real
participant-observers at the time.

When the renowned German anthropologist Karl Weule arrived in
southern Tanzania in 1906, he experienced a mode of cultural encounter
that was different from that experienced by the missions. The Leipzig-
based scholar visited two Unyago celebrations during his journey and
published two extensive accounts: one scientific report for the Colonial
Office in 1908 and a monograph in the same year.[91] The visit of the fes-
tivities was facilitated by the government's local African administrator, the
Akida Sesu bin Mwanyi, who also functioned as an interpreter and infor-
mant for Weule.[92] In Weule's book *Negerleben in Ostafrika*, Unyago is a
stylized ritual, almost like an operetta. In sequences of dances and singing,
young girls are presented to a tribal public after the completion of their
education. He describes a sequence in which the teachers present the girls:

> The second major part of the programme at the beginning brings a rep-
> etition of a sequence of part one: at first the debutants enter, even deeper
> veiled in yellow shawls, faces and arms completely hidden from view. Now,
> before the bonfire, the freshly tuned band sets in, and again the continuous
> refrain begins: "Chihakatu cha Ruliwile" etc.; again the centre parts of the
> bodies whirl in belly-dance … the eldest of the teachers freely steps in front
> of the others and waits for the things to come displaying a critical face …
> Like a glittering butterfly one motley bundle of rags separates from the
> mass, dances tenderly before the hag; "nande äh, äh, nande äh äh", the
> chorus sets in; of the bundle the white man just about sees the head and
> toes, everything in between is blurred beyond recognition. Only my hearty
> approach unveils: the girl's pelvis is "shivering".

Weule describes a symbolic, theatrical performance—dances, singing, *pro
forma* examinations. His idea of Unyago is quite far from the process of
diligent education and gradual approaches to adult life and responsibilities
of the Mwera, Makua, Yao and Makonde people. In his popular book,
Unyago is a singular ritual act, a staged play or performance.

Weule's second account of the journey is an ethnographic record of several peoples in southern Tanzania. It includes a detailed description of the initiation procedures of the Makua, the Yao and the Makonde. In a matter-of-fact style, Weule describes the boys' initiation, including circumcision, and the four stages of girls' initiation, including the practice of extending the *labia minora* during the earliest stage (for girls aged seven to nine). Weule also discloses his informants. While he could easily find information from Yao and Makua elders on boys' initiation, he was less successful concerning the girls' Unyago. A few Yao and Makua women gave hints in exchange of 'relatively high pecuniary expenses'.[93] The recordings of the Makua girls' initiation procedure were particularly difficult for Weule. Not only did he not find reliable informants—with the exception of a Makua woman owing tax to the government and two elderly Matembwe women who volunteered to disclose Makua traditions—he also voiced doubts about the decency of the latters' accounts: 'One may at first shy away from writing this stream of awful details down. But I do not want to be accused of scientific concealment. And I also do not think that prudery has a place in ethnology.'[94] And he showed sympathy for the missionaries' silence on the subject.[95]

In spite of all the details recorded, Weule could not see the social depth of the initiations and their importance for the comparatively small and volatile social groups living mostly (with the exception of the Makonde) scattered about southeastern Tanzania at the time, which was emphasized by later anthropologists.[96] Most likely his perceptions owe much to the early ethnographic mode of travelling—long and exhaustive caravan trips between individual places of interest, pausing for quick stops at the dwellings of different ethnic groups quickly jotting down hand-written records, bargaining for artifacts and laboriously preparing photographs and cameras, all of which was guided in many ways by experienced local agents and interpreters.[97] Ethnographic fieldwork was not self-evident for an academic anthropologist like Weule, and certainly not in the form of 'participant observation' that Bronislaw Malinowski and other social anthropologists would put forward a generation later. Furthermore, Weule, who has been described as a marked nationalist, was travelling under the guidance of the colonial administration and into the centre of the Maji Maji war that had only just ended. His gaze was certainly that of a colonial ethnographer who was scanning a territory with the purpose of recording information to facilitate governance.[98]

In the same year (1908) that the missionaries in Ndanda 'discovered' the 'secret' of Unyago, an anthropologist in France, Arnold van Gennep, completed his major work, the *Rites de Passage*.[99] Van Gennep is credited with marking the importance of rituals that invest individual physiological transformations with social meaning for any society. Initiation is a major building block for his theoretical edifice. What is of interest for my argument is that van Gennep does not link initiation and—often an integral part of it—circumcision with the sexual sphere. Initiation for him is a symbolic act that employed the mutilation of the body to mark the transformation of the personality.[100] Since primitive societies allegedly had no concrete understanding of the act of procreation, he deemed it unlikely that initiation was linked to sexuality. For ethnographical material, he relied on prominent anthropological works such as James Frazer's *The Golden Bow* (1890–1905), but also on ethnographical material, including Karl Weule's scientific report on his 1906 journey. Thus, a more condensed version of Unyago manifested itself in van Gennep's examinations of initiation rites. He took great pains to assemble cases from all over the world that demonstrated his hypothesis that initiation rites were not necessarily functionally linked to puberty, but served a purpose of social integration that was essentially the same in most traditional societies. The Unyago for Yao girls, as presented by Weule, indeed fitted well with this theory, since its several stages covered the period from the age of seven to ten until about six months after each delivery of a child.[101] The question whether the withdrawal of missionaries from the discourse on initiation furthered a ritualistic understanding of traditional education processes cannot be answered in one case study. However, in view of van Gennep's influence on twentieth-century cultural theory and studies, the hypothesis is intriguing and calls for further examination.

Conclusion

The case of Unyago leads into the shallow waters of the colonial encounter and points to the intricate entanglements of cultural transfer. It is neither an example of mere European pre-conceptions lived out to the detriment of the colonized, nor a case of smooth gathering and processing of cultural information and knowledge. It may best be described as an assemblage of rather productive cultural misunderstandings. Unyago in all its various understandings was the product of cultural negotiation involving a motley set of agents, European and African missionaries, African leaders, male

and female elders, schoolchildren, colonial officials, professional ethnographers, their informants and 'travel agents', and anthropological theorists at the end of the scientific food chain.

The missionary readings of Unyago differed widely before and after July 1908. Innocent Hatia, the chief's son, had sparked a reaction of moral panic when he disclosed some of the procedures of the boys' initiation to the Ndanda fathers. It resulted in a frantic search for more information during the course of 1908, in the production of a large body of missionary ethnographic knowledge over the next generation and in an arrested circulation of this knowledge to the home constituencies of the Benedictine mission. 'Colonial anxiety'[102] as an integral part of the colonial situation and the self-consciousness of the colonizer explains this development to a certain degree. But the case also affords a much more circumstantial understanding of the moral background of the Ndanda missionaries. Most of them were firmly rooted in the moral cosmos of nineteenth-century European Catholicism, which rendered intimacy and sexuality not only unspeakable, but also prone to the incursions of the devil.

As I have argued, missionary moral panic had effects on three levels. First, it presented a major stumbling block for the Catholic mission in the area. For decades, the Ndanda mission dragged behind neighbouring missions in terms of the number of conversions. Only after the mission's policy switched from suppression to tolerance from the late 1930s were missionaries gradually integrated into the social and cultural life of local communities. The comparison with the Anglican UMCA mission in the neighbourhood at Masasi showed the alternative. Urged on by an forceful African clergy, it was able to adapt to a greater degree to the needs of Christian converts. Nevertheless, the English missionaries had urgent moral concerns about initiation, as did, for example, the Lutheran missionaries among the Maasai.[103] Second, in Germany the panicky reaction of missionaries towards diverging expressions of partnership, sex education and adolescence led to ambivalent positions on marriages between the colonizers and the colonized. While the Catholics in the Reichstag voted against attempts by the colonial office to bar inter-ethnic couples from entering into marriage, they also regarded such marriages as undesirable, citing 'cultural difference' as a reason. Behind this rather unspecific, even foggy term lay quite concrete experiences of moral panic, such as the Unyago case, which could, however, not be articulated in more precise terms. Third, the Unyago encounter was symptomatic of a growing dilemma facing the Catholic missions' approach to ethnographic

knowledge, but also of professional anthropology increasing disinclination towards missionary ethnographic work. On the one hand, missionaries acquired intimate knowledge of a quality that neither armchair anthropologists nor academic empiricists could acquire at the time. On the other hand, missions were increasingly reluctant to communicate their experiences and information, and academic professionals became an increasingly less receptive audience for missionary ethnography.

The Unyago case, for all its rootedness in a concrete locale and the particular set of agents that negotiated it, was certainly not the only case of colonial moral panic. It may reflect the character of the colonial encounter in a wider sense. The particular disposition of European colonialism, the moral fabric and the ideological framework did produce a whole series of non-transferable subjects, fields of ignorance and arrested circulation, resp. 'closed circuit knowledge' (knowledge that was purposefully kept within small group of insiders). Phrasing the problem with Foucault, We find a colonial discourse that renders some problems 'speakable' and mutes others. Referring to Foucault and the post-colonial positions in his wake, this is an expression of power and discursive hegemony. At this point, however, we have not yet arrived at a sufficient explanation of 'why' and 'how' these forms of agnostology came about. Judging for the present case and paraphrasing a book title by Glenn Penny and Matty Bunzl, one has to notice that worldly and divine provincialism worked hand in hand to produce ignorance on an imperial scale.[104]

Notes

1. I wish to express my gratitude to Patrick Harries (1950–2016), whose inspiring comments and writings have shaped my ideas of mission ethnography. I also thank Rebekka Habermas, Samwel Mhajida and the African Diversities Seminar in Göttingen for their very valuable critiques of earlier versions of this chapter.
2. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1965: 111).
3. Birgit Meyer (1999); G. Dotsé Yigbe (2014: 159–76).
4. There are exceptions, such as Henry Junod. See Patrick Harries (2007). German-speaking Catholic missionary anthropology developed its own institutions clustering around the Vienna-based missionary Father Wilhelm Schmidt, who founded an Institute for Anthropology and published the *Journal Anthropos*. See Karl Rivinius (2005); Suzanne Marchand (2003).

5. Patrick Harries (2007); Patrick Harries and David Maxwell (2012); Rebekka Habermas (2010: 257–284), Ulrich van der Heyden and Andreas Feldtkeller (2012).

6. The study of this and other forms of ignorance has recently been termed 'agnotology'. See Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (2008). For concepts on knowledge circulation that shape the current discussion, see Fischer-Tiné (2013); Raj (2007); Sivasundaram (2010).

7. A.M. Hokororo describes Unyago (in Kimwera and Kiyao; Unyao in Kimakua) as a lifelong process of ritual and social learning, of which initiation and circumcision are one stage. See A.M. Hokororo (1960: 1–2).

8. On matrilinearity in East Africa in general, see Aylward Shorter (1974: 67–68).

9. Terence O. Ranger (1976: 223–27), J.A.R. Wembah-Rashid (1975: 139–48).

10. Garland gives a concise summary of the sociological discussion of 'moral panic' and its causes: 'Facilitating conditions include (i) the existence of a sensationalist mass media (although historians identify moral panic episodes in the mid-19th century and before … perhaps an effective channel of collective communication is all that is needed); (ii) the discovery of some new or hitherto unreported form of deviance; (iii) the existence of marginalized, outsider groups suitable for portrayal as "folk devils"; and (iv) an already primed, sensitized public audience. As for precipitating causes, the literature suggests that these have to do with transitions in the social, economic or moral order of the society. Threats to existing hierarchies; status competition; the impact of social change upon established ways of life; and the breakdown of previously existing structures of control—these are the deep sources of surface panics most often identified … Moral panic targets are not randomly selected: they are cultural scapegoats whose deviant conduct appals onlookers so powerfully precisely because it relates to personal fears and unconscious wishes.' Garland (2008: 14–15).

11. Ranajit Guha (1997: 482–93).

12. See Dane Kennedy's chapter in this volume.

13. See Johannes Fabian (2000); Albert Wirz (2000: 23–48); Hubertus Büschel (2008: 241–56); Eva Bischoff (2013: 117–36); Sandra Maß (2013: 92–116).

14. For the role of missionaries, see, for example, Richard Hölzl (2011: 7–34); Rebekka Habermas and Richard Hölzl (2014).

15. For another example from Tanzania, see Kim Groop (2006: 69–81). In a very exceptional piece of criticism of ethnographic romanticism, the theologian W. Schneider put together a whole range of examples of supposedly deviant sexuality among so-called primitive societies all over the world to prove the point that the primitive were far from innocent, but were living

the state of the original sin. See W. Schneider (1885: 267–297); see also G. Lennartz (1920: 61–71).

16. Monastic diaries have a tradition of centuries and presented in this case the basis for the official chronicle of Ndanda Abbey, kept for future generations, but also sent in copy to the Mother House of the Missionary Benedictine Congregation in Germany. The diaries and chronicles were intended for various inner circles of the congregation.

17. *Diary of Ndanda Abbey, May 1908 to October 1910*, p. 5, Archive of the St Ottilien Benedictine Abbey (ArchOtt) Z 2.1.32. All translations of German originals in this chapter are mine.

18. Pastoral letter by Bishop Thomas Spreiter, 2 November 1908, ArchOtt Z 1.01.

19. Anton Rudel (1900). Ruedel was cited extensively by the military doctor and ethnographer Friedrich Fülleborn (1906: 62–64). See also Cyrillus Wehrmeister (1906: 64–67). In 1898 the ethnographer Carl Velten published a short account of the circumcision practice of the coastal Swahili, where he hinted at a period of education in the 'woods' after the actual circumcision. See Carl Velten (1898: 59).

20. Anon. (1897), 'Aus einem Briefe der Schwester Klara', *Missionsblätter* I: 92–94.

21. Wembah-Rashid (1975: 106) describes the first stage of girls' initiation as an education process including sex education, domestic craft, women's duties in society, as well as 'surgical operation of the clitoris and mannual[!] pulling of the labia minora'. See also Hokororo (1960: 3).

22. Siegfried Hertlein (2008: 325–26).

23. Felicitas Becker (2008).

24. On Hatia's role as one of the 'Big Men' of the area, see Felicitas Becker (2004: 1–22).

25. See John Iliffe (1979: 174, 194). On Hatia's opinion towards mission, see L. Doerr (1971: 204–05). On the Maji Maji war in general, see Felicitas Becker and Jigal Beez (2005); James Giblin and Jamie Monson (2010).

26. See Siegfried Hertlein (2008: 155 ff.).

27. Karl Weule (1908a; 1908b: 7).

28. In a recent account of religious change in southeast Tanzania after Maji Maji by Felicitas Becker Christianity is strangely absent. The author emphasizes that belief in healing, witchcraft and other non-Islamic and non-Christian faiths remained strong throughout the twentieth century. The Unyago case is certainly an example that conversion to Christianity did not mean abandoning adherence to other forms and practices of belief. See Felicitas Becker (2010: 295–321).

29. Siegfried Hertlein (2008: 263–64). On Catholic mission teachers in the area, see Hölzl (2016).

30. 'First we must know the customs, at least in their general traits, and only then we may fight them. Only the evil parts must be rooted out, the unimportant and indifferent may—under certain circumstances—be retained, or it may be used to force out the evil. To enter with furor and strict prohibition has no effect on heathens and only minor success among Christians.' Pastoral letter by Bishop Thomas Spreiter, 2 November 1908, ArchOtt Z 1.01. See also the minutes of first East African Bishops' Conference *Beschlüsse der ersten Konferenz der ostafrikanischen Bischöfe*, Daressalam 1912, S. 7, ArchOtt Z.1.31.

31. *Diary of Ndanda Abbey, May 1908 to October 1910* ArchOtt Z 2.1.32., pp. 58 ff. See also Tanzanian National Archive (TNA) G 9/8 Letter Fr. Anton Ruedel to Government, 16 December 1912; Letter District Officer Wendt to Government, 18 December 1912.

32. See Siegfried Hertlein (1983a: 212–13).

33. Some of his manuscripts are kept at St Ottilia, ArchOtt A.1.8.3. Papers of Fr. Ambrose Mayer. Others were lost during the First World War. See on his Unyago ideas *Nambiliya-Blättle, April 1910*, hand-written manuscript, pp. 57–187, ArchOtt A 1.8.3. Papers of Fr. Ambrose. He also relied on mission teachers in his findings, e.g. on Pauli Meli in Kurazini, near Dar es Salaam (see p. 59). See also Fr. Benno Heckel, who urged clemency and lenience in a letter to the head of the Benedictine mission, Abbot Gallus Steiger, in 1922, advice that was not heeded by the Abbott. Fr. Benno held mission policies responsible for very early initiations and advised 'serious ethnographic field work' instead of 'pointless inquisitions'. See Benno Heckel to Gallus Steiger, 6 June 1922, ArchOtt Z 1.16.

34. Michael Pesek (2010), John Iliffe (1979: 240–72).

35. Siegfried Hertlein (2008: 386).

36. See *Results of the Pastoral Conference in Kigonsera, 22.–24.2.1928* ArchOtt Z 1. 17, or [L. Kilger], *Abbatia Nullius Lindi, Afr. Orient*, unpublished manuscript, p. 2, ArchOtt Z 1.17: 'During the puberty festivities (initiation, unyago), in particular, children and adolescents are introduced and bound so tight to the old customs that the influence of Christian education is almost completely lost. We have not managed to cut the Christian children from this heathen ritual.'

37. See Siegfried Hertlein (1983b: 110).

38. Siegfried Hertlein (2008: 323).

39. Marc Ntetem (1983: 157–59).

40. Terence O. Ranger (1976: 227).

41. See Terence O. Ranger (1976: 241–47).

42. As cited in Edwin O. James (1948: 15).

43. W.V. Lucas (1948: 46 ff.).

44. Edwin O. James (1948: 19).

45. Terence O. Ranger (1976: 221).
46. Alberto Hurtado, as cited in Ann Laura Stoler (2006: 24).
47. See, for example, Anne McClintock (1995); Alex Butchart (1998); Ann Laura Stoler (2002); Philippa Levine (2004). On sexual scandals, see Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton (2009).
48. Frank Bösch (2009: 225–328); Arne Perras (2004).
49. Heike I. Schmidt (2008: 25–59).
50. Rebekka Habermas (2009: 295–319).
51. Linda Ratschiller (2014: 241–61).
52. See Robert Proctor (2008: 1–35).
53. Londa Schiebinger (2008: 149–62).
54. On the various manuscripts, see Maria Kecskési (2012: 18–21).
55. Based on a paper he delivered at the University of London's Department for Colonial Education, Fr. Benno Heckel, the St Ottilien Benedictine's resident in London, published a short treatise on the Yao without referring to the range of manuscripts on the neighbouring groups. He painted a very positive picture of the practices and effects of Yao education and Unyago without a hint on the troublesome conflict of the mission and the proponents of tradition among the peoples of southeastern Tanzania. See B. Heckel (1935).
56. In the library of Peramiho Abbey (Songea District/Tanzania) a number of mostly unpublished manuscripts about language and lifestyles of the populations in the vicinity are kept. See, for example, H. Meyer (1937); E. Ebner (1987 [1955]).
57. On Küsters, see Maria Kecskési (1990: 301–02; 2000: 331–33; 2009: 46–50).
58. Küsters recorded the Wamwera, the Wamatengo, the Wandendeule, the Wapangwa and the Wangoni. His ethnographic papers are kept in the archive of the St Ottilien Benedictine Abbey (Germany), ArchOtt A 1.8.3. Further correspondence and a body of ethnographic photographs remain in the archive of the Ethnographic Museum in Munich (Archiv Museum für Völkerkunde, München, Brieforder Küsters). His eight journals with hand-written (partly shorthand) notes on the Wamuera comprise many paragraphs on Unyago; see Küsters, Ethnographische Notizen [1928], Vol. 2, 43–50; Vol. 3, 1–17, 19–46; Vol. 4, 1–14.
59. See Maria Kecskési (2012: 18–21). While Kecskési muses that Küsters may have planned a special publication on Unyago, I would venture that even in 1930, Unyago was not 'transferable' for the mission. In an article on childrearing and education, he also did not mention the topic; see M. Küsters (1931: 66).
60. Nicole Priesching (2004); David Blackbourn (1993).
61. Uta Ranke-Heinemann (1988: 287 ff.). On self-discipline and Catholic morality, see Andreas Heller (1990).

62. Uta Ranke-Heinemann (1988: 3 ff.). Some nineteenth-century theologians and medical doctors advised female genital mutilation to preclude any attempts of masturbation.

63. For an overview on the history of sexuality in the German-speaking countries, see Franz X. Eder et al. (1999); and the still valid summary in Thomas Nipperdey (1998: 95–112).

64. Uta Ranke-Heinemann (1988: 341).

65. Hubert Wolf (2013: 358–84).

66. Alphons de Liguori (1696–1787), founder of the Redemptorist order in the eighteenth century, laid out a strict moral code on marriage and legitimate sexual activity, and introduced the central argument for the nineteenth-century dogmas on papal infallibility and the immaculate conception. See Uta Ranke-Heinemann (1988: 359).

67. A handbook on mission sermons in 1885, as cited in Klemens Jockwig (1967: 366). For the relationship between internal and colonial missions, see Rebekka Habermas (2008: 629–79).

68. See J. Mausbach (1914); and G. Lennartz (1920).

69. Siegfried Weichlein (2005: 93–109).

70. Esther Sabelus (2009); Kaspar Maase (2012); Edward Ross Dickinson (2014: esp. 13–76). Indecent literate and imagery was held responsible for a 'premature' sexual awakening that was regarded as evil and prone to result in sexual 'perversions'. For an example of this kind of sexual ethic, see Michael Müller (1968: 128–33).

71. Lutz Sauerteig and Roger Davidson (2009: 1–2).

72. *Diary of Ndanda Abbey, May 1908 to October 1910*, p. 5, ArchOtt Z 2.1.32. 8. On the history of sexuality and deviance, see Michel Foucault (1990); and for Germany in the years after 1900, see Michael Hagner (2010).

73. Michael B. Gross (2004); Manuel Borutta (2010).

74. Siegfried Hertlein (1983b: 110); and Marc Ntetem (1983: 146–149).

75. See Susanne Zantop (1997).

76. For a concise summary of German colonialism, see Sebastian Conrad (2012).

77. On critical attitudes towards colonialism, see Benedikt Stuchtey (2010).

78. Jan-Georg Deutsch (2002: 93–103), Thomas O. Beidelman (2012: 39–84).

79. See, for example, Frank O. Sobich (2006); Anette Dietrich (2007: 137 ff.).

80. See again Frank O. Sobich (2006: 352–58); Felix Aster (2005: 39–53); Pascal Grosse (2000: 145–92) who focuses on the influence of racial anthropology and eugenics on the colonial discourse. See also Anette Dietrich (2007: 339 ff.). However, Birthe Kundrus sees an increasing impact of cultural and political arguments about the lower state of civilization among the colonized and the importance of the 'prestige of the white

man' for upholding colonial rule. See B. Kundrus (2003). For an influential trigger for the German discussion, see Ann Laura Stoler (1992: 514–551; 2000).

81. The debate concentrates on the few actual cases of and applications for marriage in the German colonies (German Southwest Africa, German East Africa, Samoa). See Lora Wildenthal (2001: 79–130); and Birthe Kundrus, (2003: 219–79). For a detailed family history descending from a 'mixed marriage', see Kathrin Roller (2004: 194–211).

82. See Lora Wildenthal (2001: 79–130).

83. See Rebekka Habermas (2009); Frank Bösch (2009); Norman Domeier (2010).

84. A study on Catholic missions in imperial Germany has shown that the dominant argument against inter-ethnic marriages was indeed 'cultural difference' rather than 'racial purity'; see Michael Weidert (2007: 219–20).

85. Bishop Spreiter, 10 May 1912, Arch. Ott. Z 1.0.6, Dok. 104. On this document, see Richard Hölzl (2011), Michael Weidert (2007: 219–220).

86. Amandus Acker (1912: 465). Another missionary, Fr. Max Kassiepe warned of an alleged degeneration of 'children of mixed race'. He also argued that 'black women' were not civilized enough to be an equal companion to 'white men' and thus ended up as enslaved in marriage. Finally he held that the consequence was a violation of the sacrament of marriage, since Europeans would inevitably divorce African wives. See M. Kassiepe (1912: 296–97).

87. Theodor Grentrup (1914: 29).

88. G. Ledebour (1912) in *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*. Stenographische Bericht 13. Legislaturperiode, 1. Session Vol. 265 (Berlin: Verlag der Buchdruckerei der Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung), p. 1735.

89. M. Erzberger (1912) in *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*. Stenographische Bericht 13. Legislaturperiode, 1. Session Vol. 265 (Berlin: Verlag der Buchdruckerei der Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung), pp. 1741–42.

90. A. Gröber (1912) in *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*. Stenographische Bericht 13. Legislaturperiode, 1. Session Vol. 265 (Berlin: Verlag der Buchdruckerei der Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung), p. 1725.

91. Karl Weule (1908a, 1908b). Apart from these, Weule had published several smaller articles, added a range of objects to the Leipzig Ethnographic Museum and handed on phonographic material to linguists in Berlin. See Karl Weule (1908a: III). See on Weule's role as a "colonial" ethnographer during his 1906 journey, Zimmerman (2006).

92. The missionary Fr. Ambrose Mayer, who was generally critical of Weule's work, held that the latter's informants were less reliable and thorough than the Catholic mission teachers. See Ambrosius Mayer (1914).

93. See Karl Weule (1908a: 31).

94. See Karl Weule (1908a: 118.) The Matembwe women had actually demonstrated the manipulation of the labia minora on themselves during their interview with Weule and had told him that Makua initiation procedures included an exemplary *coitus interruptus* by an elder couple to educate the girls.

95. Karl Weule (1908a: 29).

96. See J.A.R. Wembah-Rashid (1975: 87–139): Initiations 'were schools in a traditional society equivalent to modern formal schools. They played just as an important role as the present schools do if not more' (p. 87); 'In other words [initiation of boys] is an institution where transmission of the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of the older generation to the younger one was done; and where the new generation was prepared for the future. For, then the new generation was accepted into society as full participants in the duty of maintaining the ready created traditions and developing new ones for the continuation of their society' (p. 100). See also Terence O. Ranger (1976: 234–38).

97. Weule himself gave his fatigue and exhaustion as a reason to end his research; he was 'fed up': 'Without pausing one day I had worked from early morning until late at night; now I wanted and could no more. More than once I found myself walking by the most interesting ethnographic facts, without even noticing.' Altogether he had spent about four months in his research area, which covered the whole southeastern region of the colony (from Lindi at the East African coast to the Lake Nyassa). See Karl Weule (1908a: 137).

98. On *gouvernmentalité*, see Michel Foucault (2007); and Peter J. Pels (1997: 175).

99. S. Kalinock (2001: 128–32); U. Stohrer (2008).

100. Arnold van Gennep (1960: 75–79).

101. Arnold van Gennep (1960: 87).

102. Ranajit Guha (1997).

103. See Kim Groop (2006: 69–81).

104. See Glenn Penny and Matty Bunzl (2003).

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'The Strangest Problem': Daniel Wilberforce, the Human Leopards Panic and the Special Court in Sierra Leone

Christine Whyte

In early 1912, a 'human leopard' was caught in the act and turned king's evidence.[1] He testified that members of the Human Leopard Society, a secret society accused of ritual murders across West and Central Africa, had committed between 20 and 30 murders since 1907 in the Imperri district of Sierra Leone.[2] The local District Commissioner (DC) passed this information on to the Governor of the colony at the end of July and by mid-October, 336 people had been arrested. Amongst those prisoners

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was nearly every native chief in the district.[3] The sheer volume of the cases, as well as the importance of many of the suspects to the government, seemed likely to overwhelm the local justice system. In response to this seeming crisis, the Governor commissioned a Special Court to efficiently deal with all the cases as a group and issued an Ordinance granting the colonial government wide-ranging powers. In Section Two of the Ordinance, the Governor was empowered to declare a chiefdom under suspicion as a 'proclaimed district', which gave the DC the right to 'arrest anybody therein'. Even the text of the Ordinance itself stated that 'this power seems drastic'.[4] Colonial police and DCs were granted special judicial powers within the 'proscribed districts' and colonial officers wrote to the Governor asking for permission to burn villages to the ground because they were populated by human leopards.[5] Rumours of conspiracy and rebellion spread through official channels. One Freetown administrator even claimed that it was likely that the majority of the servants in Freetown were members of Human Leopard Societies.[6]

These British observers believed that human leopards were organized groups who planned and committed murders in order to satisfy certain ritual requirements. Major R.G. Berry outlined the presumed modus operandi of the society in an article in the *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* in 1912. Members of the society were thought to be in possession of a medicine, known as Borfima, which needed to be periodically 'refreshed' with human fat and blood. This Borfima was then used to attain economic and political power. Once it began to fail, a meeting of the society would be called and a member would be required to 'provide' a victim. The victim, thus identified, would be attacked by the gang, and murdered by one or more dressed in a leopard skin and wielding a three-pronged knife, designed to imitate the wounds inflicted by an animal attack.[7] In these accounts, the victim would then be mutilated, with some body parts cooked and eaten, while others were used to refresh the Borfima. This narrative was constructed from earlier fictional, exploratory and anthropological accounts,[8] as well as the testimony of witnesses, accusers and accused.

Survivors of attacks often claimed that human leopards were people who literally transformed themselves into animals through transmogrification. Others, especially the British investigators, argued that the transformation was achieved symbolically through a leopard-skin disguise. While British officials scoffed at the idea of shape-shifting men, they took other aspects of the supposed ritual very seriously. Little attention was paid to the identity and possible motivations of victims, accusers, and accused; the courts assumed

that the murderers were driven only by a lust for blood to satisfy dark spiritual beliefs. Working from this assumption, colonial officers argued that the paucity of evidence was because the population was either terrified of the power of witchcraft or had been sworn to an oath of secrecy. This assumption, which in many ways reflects the extent to which the Sierra Leonean population had been constructed as a mysterious and irrational 'other', drew on colonial memories of past violence or supposed conspiracies. Little material evidence was ever produced to back up claims of a widespread conspiracy.[9]

This lack, paradoxically, served as evidence in itself; proof of a 'native' conspiracy against colonial authority.[10] The reports of the murders and the testimony of self-confessed 'human leopards' sparked what Christopher Bayly has termed an 'information panic' in Freetown. He describes this kind of panic as 'the feeling of the fledgling colonial administration that it knew nothing of the local society and that the locals were combining to deny it information'.[11] The area had come under formal British rule only 16 years earlier, with the declaration of the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, which was followed by an uprising and a brutal war of conquest. This chapter argues that the 'information panic' of 1912 and the resulting Special Court were triggered because Sierra Leonean testimonies about the murders aroused two sets of imperial memories in the colonial government. The first was memories of colonial violence and uprisings such as Thuggee in India and the recent Sierra Leonean rising, known as the Hut Tax War. The second was how accusations of ritual murder and cannibalism were connected with the construction of racist beliefs in the era of the slave trade. The elaboration of cannibalistic ritual perpetuated by the 'leopards' spoke to deep-rooted fears and myths about racial difference propagated at the time of the transatlantic slave trade. The focus on cannibalism as the key motive behind the murder reflected deep-seated beliefs of the British observers about race and Sierra Leone in particular.

For the Sierra Leoneans making the accusations, these claims of cannibalism and ritual murder had a different significance. Changing political and economic structures in the Protectorate, coming soon after the devastating violence and destruction of the Hut Tax War, prompted a groundswell of reaction, which manifested itself in these struggles in the colonial courts. Witchcraft, cannibalism and human sacrifice were considered horrific crimes in Sierra Leone. Cannibalism in particular was closely associated with pride, illegitimate wealth and social oppression. As Mariane Ferme, a social anthropologist of the Mende, explains: 'Eating a person is the manifestation—to a greater degree—of the kind of hubris

that can get one in trouble for not respecting social inferiors or for exploiting one's dependents. It reflects an excessive greed for power, which inevitably results in trespassing the boundaries of legitimacy.'[12] In the case of human leopard accusations, the leopards themselves were powerful symbols, denoting political power and strength. The identity and motivations of the accused and accusers give us insight into the impact of colonial conquest and development schemes within communities. In order to look at these events in detail, this chapter traces the narrative of a man who was once an accuser, but ended up as one of the accused: Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce, a missionary, Paramount Chief and suspected human leopard.

Daniel Wilberforce: Early Life and Missionary Hopes

Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce was a native of Sierra Leone, born on the American Mission in Shenge, the son of a Krio[13] caretaker. His father named him after the white American missionary Daniel Flickinger. His last name, Wilberforce, resonated strongly with the history of the Sierra Leone Colony. Daniel's father came from the Colony, which was settled in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century by 'recaptive' or freed slaves. William Wilberforce, British MP for Hull and architect of the Slave Trade Abolition Bill, was an active agent in the founding of this small colony for the 'repatriation' of slaves and their descendants from the UK, Canada, the USA, South America and the Caribbean. On his mother's side, Wilberforce was descended from a Sherbro ruling family.[14] He was related, to both the Krio people of the Colony and southern Protectorate elites. This background gave him access to a wide range of local knowledge about religion and politics as well as languages. His birth on the American Mission gave him access to one further cultural-linguistic world, the American education system. Like his father, Wilberforce found work at the mission and ended up as a youth working for the Mission in the USA. The missionary Daniel Flickinger discovered his namesake at this manual labour and, impressed with his intelligence, recruited him as a trainee for the United Brethren Church (UBC). Under Flickinger's patronage, Wilberforce was supported through high school and then trained as a missionary. Letters about him from the mission school emphasize his unique capabilities as a missionary. Milton Wright wrote: 'Wilberforce is a native, and if he adheres to us, he will be a permanent worker, and so his wife; hence they will be worth a half dozen transient missionaries … They can use the Sherbro

language, Americans cannot.'[15] He was 'honoured as a model man and a Christian' at his graduation.[16] The mission administration was delighted by his seemingly ideal combination of local knowledge, Christian faith and training, and his supposed 'racial' advantages. Newly married to an African-American woman, Elizabeth Harris, he returned to Sierra Leone in 1878 to work at the Clark Theological School.

In 1890, one of Wilberforce's servants was murdered at Gbambaia and Wilberforce suspected that it was the work of the Human Leopard Society. He encouraged Chief Gbanna Bunjay to call in the Tongo Players, or in Mende *tôngô mô*, literally 'a person who detects witches'.[17] This vigilante group was given some guidelines by Wilberforce himself to 'not implicate innocent persons', 'not plunder the goods or property of the accused' and: 'On no account should you allow old grudge to enter into this meeting.'[18] Wilberforce's guidelines hinted at prior problems experienced with the investigations of the *tôngô mô*, where individual grievances led to false accusations and extortion. Accusations had been made against powerful or wealthy individual people for political reasons. As Sehree, an informer, told the colonial police in 1890: 'Poor people are not accused of being human leopards. It is only rich people with property.'[19] The potential for the 'witchfinder' to exploit their power was also suggested by Wilberforce's plea that the *tôngô mô* should not target the wives and children of the guilty and sell them into slavery. The investigations of the *tôngô mô*, corrupt or not, resulted in the summary executions of more than 30 people, including Chief Bunjay himself. In 1891, reports reached the colonial government in Freetown of the Chief being burnt to death for *bôni hinda*, Mende for 'leopard business', that is, murder in the cause of Human Leopard Society ritual.[20] A proclamation was then issued on 5 May 1892, stating that the Tongo Play was banned and every Tongo Player should leave the Colony within 21 days or be 'deported as a Political Prisoner'.[21] Banning the *tôngô mô* led to reports of more murders, which the colonial government, newly aware of the menace of the Human Leopard Society, legislated against it in the Human Leopard Society Ordinance of 1895.[22] From then on, the British judicial system was forced to step into the witchfinder's shoes and investigate and punish these crimes.

The 1898 Hut Tax War

British authority was being felt more strongly in the other areas of life in the Protectorate. The Department of Native Affairs was opened in 1891 to centralize dealings with the rural areas around the Colony.[23] Letters of

protest appear throughout the Native Affairs Letter Book for the 1890s: complaints about the Frontier Police, interference in chiefly elections and the crackdown on slave-trading.[24] These three assertions of authority on the part of the colonial government caused disruption to the sources of chiefly authority, but also set up 'competing foci of power relations', setting the authority of the colonial officers in place of the chiefs.[25] The Krio elite in Freetown pressured the British government to formalize their hold on the rural areas and, in 1896, the Protectorate Ordinance consolidated and strengthened British rule over what had been a semi-official sphere of influence made up of a patchwork of individual treaties in the chiefdoms surrounding the Colony of Sierra Leone.[26] The Ordinance established the boundaries of the Protectorate, laid down the regulation of law and order, and established a tax on households.

However, by late December 1897, colonial administrators were suspicious that chiefs would refuse to comply with the tax. A widespread ban on trade was enforced by the network of Poro societies, male initiation societies related to trade and local politics, bringing trade in palm products to a halt. The Poro societies was regarded with a mix of suspicion and horror by the authorities.[27] Believed to be responsible for whipping up resistance and also often conflated with witchcraft and violence, Poro societies were the colonial state's main competitor for political hegemony in the Protectorate, acting both as gatekeepers for chiefly status and as arbitrators of trade relations. Amongst colonial officials, rumours of secret meetings and armed resistance became rife.[28] Chiefs, believing themselves to be allies of the British Crown, wrote to the Freetown government protesting against the extension of taxation. This tactic of petitioning and legalistic argument met with no success and when the Governor dispatched a force of Frontier Police to arrest one recalcitrant chief, Bai Bureh, an armed conflict decisively began. Bureh led the rising in the north of the Protectorate, which was directed mainly at colonial officers, the Frontier Police and the troops called in by the colonial government. But in May 1898, a rising erupted in the southern region of a very different type.

To the colonial government, while Bureh and his northern Temne followers were following the pattern of a recognizable insurgency, in the south, Mende rebels were behaving in an inexplicable manner. Governor Cardew wrote on 28 May that: 'The rising in the Mende country has been of a particularly savage and brutal character.'[29] He particularly singled out the killing of American women at the United Brethren Church (UBC) mission. The murder of white women enraged and horrified public opinion in Britain and

the USA. Following their deaths, a violent counter-insurgency campaign was unleashed. One of many reports reads: 'Went to Bogo—burning villages en route—no important insurgents found … I have the honour to attach *in extensor* a list of the Towns burnt which may do something towards showing these people the madness of their actions in the rising.'[30] Commander Wallis' memoir of the campaign proudly boasts: 'We made great slaughter here.'[31] And the murdered missionaries were not forgotten in London, the USA or Rotifunk. In all three places, the mission and colonial government memorialized them as martyrs. Plaques commemorating their violent deaths were erected in Rotifunk and the chapel was renamed the Martyrs' Memorial Church. In the mission newspapers, anguished eulogies emphasized the sacrifice of the dead, particularly the female missionaries.[32] The war was reinterpreted in biblical terms by church leaders as a 'trial of savage warfare' and the fallen missionaries' lives as a sacrifice to a renewed vigour of proselytizing.[33] American and British audiences used the Hut Tax War, particularly the violence against the women of the mission, as evidence of the innate savagery and violence of the people of the Protectorate, and Africans in general. Theories of 'race instinct' and immutable biological difference seemed to be confirmed by the lurid media reports of the 'outrages' committed on the fallen bodies of white Christian women.[34]

Wilberforce also lost much in the conflict. His settlement, Danville, was attacked and his mother and sister were killed trying to flee to Freetown. He himself barely managed to escape to the Native Administration headquarters in the Imperri chiefdom. But once the conflict died down, Wilberforce played a vital role for the colonial government, reporting on the state of the rural areas, agriculture and possible sources of further unrest.[35] After the worst of the fighting, he wrote to DC Alldridge that 'Headmen of towns in Imperri, come humbly submitting themselves and begging for peace' and in spite of the fact that he had 'lost greatly and suffered much by the act of these people', he argued that, as a compassionate Christian and 'a native of the district having rights which very few of the leaders of the raid can claim', he would be able to 'secure peace'.[36] He positioned himself as the perfect intermediary between the government and the people. With connections to Sherbro royalty through his mother as well as a Western education and Christian mission position, he had an inherited authority as well as an established position. In return for his services and loyalty, he was appointed Paramount Chief of the Imperri district. His appointment did not follow the usual processes—he refused to become a member of Poro, the usual election procedure was abandoned

Fig. 13.1 Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce in a ceremonial chief's outfit (used with permission of the United Brethren Historical Center, Huntington University, Huntington, Indiana)

and there was uncertainty about his legitimacy to stand as a candidate at all. But his closeness with the British reassured the people of Imperri that his chieftainship would bring an end to the devastating violence of retribution that had followed the rebellion, and so he was grudgingly accepted (Fig. 13.1).

COLLABORATION, CONSPIRACY AND CANNIBALS (1903–06)

From the beginning of Wilberforce's tenure as chief, Governor Charles King-Harman enthusiastically supported his appointment and made efforts to persuade the local community of his merits. Despite this, a second crisis for Wilberforce came in 1906. Between 1898 and 1905, the government, through its new generation of loyalist chiefs like Wilberforce, wrought great changes in the Protectorate. The Frontier Police prosecuted more blatant cases of slave trading, new trade routes were opened into the interior, particularly through the newly built railway, and rural areas became sites of experimentation in new agricultural methods and newly introduced crops. In Sherbro country, DC Thomas Alldridge pursued ambitious plans to establish palm plantations as well as giving local families detailed orders

on growing cotton and jute.[37] The failure of the American cotton crop in 1904 increased the pressure on West African administrators to make up the shortfall. Many new schemes were resisted by local elites—one DC wrote to the Colonial Office, exasperated: 'The chiefs of Sierra Leone will not grow cotton just because traders in Manchester think they ought to.'[38] In 1903, a Circuit Court was established by the British to deal with all offences against the Human Leopard and Alligator Societies Ordinance.[39] Reported cases had been increasing since the ban on *tôngô mô*. In period of the circuit court (1903–12), 17 cases of human leopard crimes were heard and 186 people were charged with murder.

At this time, Wilberforce's constituency became suspicious of him and his 'hybrid' status. He was an enthusiastic proponent of modern agri-cultural methods, but these methods did not just affect the crops in the ground—government intervention and changes to the way in which food was grown affected relations within extended families—traditional gender roles were also being subverted, a change exacerbated by the educational opportunities offered to girls in mission schools. Wilberforce appeared to be at the centre of many of these changes. In addition, his legitimacy was easy to question. He failed completely to live up to the traditional ideal or the ritual requirements of a chief. By 1903, a strong party had formed against Wilberforce in the Imperri district.[40] He still had the support of Acting-Governor King-Harman, but his rivals to the chiefdom, recovered from the shock of the war of 1898, were assembling evidence against him. In 1903, Governor King-Harman observed that: 'His European dress, his domestic life, his complete severance from fetish customs, all continue to place him out of touch with his wild and lawless subjects, and but for the moral support he receives from the Government I believe his rule and probably his life would come to a speedy conclusion.'[41] The Governor still had faith in the abilities of Wilberforce's unique 'border-crossing' person and 'took occasion to strengthen his position' on this tour.

Reflecting the colonial government's continued trust in Wilberforce's loyalty and faith and his unique insight into Sierra Leonean society, in 1904, Wilberforce was asked to be a 'native assessor' on a human leopard case. The Circuit Courts relied on a European judge appointed by the colonial government as well as three 'native assessors'.[42] Native assessors were appointed to bridge the gap between the experts on British legal systems and the legal, cultural and social traditions of local communities in the colonies. They served a dual role: on the one hand, recruited from the ranks of respected elder elites, they gave a veneer of legitimacy to the alien

and new legal court system introduced by the colonial government; on the other hand, European judges could mine assessors for information and advice to justify the selective application of British justice. The preference was for elder men; in the case in Ronietta District, the DC wrote that he 'did not think His Honor would have cared to sit with two female Chiefs against one man' and so a chief named Bai Farmin was recruited alongside Daniel Wilberforce.[43] However, in this case Wilberforce's advice to release the suspect was ignored. The Acting Circuit Judge, E.T. Packard at Panguma, wrote to the Governor to say that he would 'attach less importance' to Wilberforce's opinion now that he knew that he was 'suspected of Complicity in the Human Leopard Society'.[44]

The accusation of Wilberforce coincided with rising anxieties in the colonial government. Concerns were raised in 1906 about the 4,000 square miles of the Sierra Leone Protectorate held in concessions by the West African Produce Company and the state of Sierra Leonean trade in the Houses of Parliament to the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill.[45] Another 'collaborator chief', Madam Yoko, committed suicide in the same year.[46] And, most worryingly of all, in a repeat of events of the 1890s, another Poro ban was called on palm products and other commodities for export. This alarmed the Freetown administration, not just economically, but also because it raised the spectre of possible rebellion again. Despite Wilberforce's lack of standing in the Poro society, he was blamed in part for this renewed Poro activity, increasing the suspicion of him in his intermediary role. The colonial state started to turn on its own allies. Wilberforce wrote in his memoir of the injustice of holding the chief responsible for all the ills of his chiefdom.[47] In this account of his first trial, *The True Verdict; Or Cannibalism in Sierra Leone* (1906), Wilberforce locates the source of the allegations in a cooperation between the colonial government, government agents hostile to him personally and chiefly rivals in Imperri.

Wilberforce's rivals were displeased with him on two grounds. He was seen as an illegitimate claimant to the chieftaincy and as the willing tool of the colonial government in implementing new agricultural policies. Both these factors presented threats to the sources of power and influence of the local elites. At the same time as he was viewed with suspicion by his rivals for seemingly not following ritual and tradition, Wilberforce's American church backers were growing more alarmed by his apparent embrace of 'barbaric' practices. In 1905, the *New York Times* reported on his chieftaincy, saying: 'It is charged that after a service of twenty-five years as a

missionary the negro minister has been lured back to heathenism, and has become chief of his old tribe of devil worshippers.'[48] In a letter to Reverend J. Howe in 1906, Bishop Milton Wright discussed Wilberforce, saying: 'He evidently fails to appreciate the abhorrence of our people for polygamy and treachery.'[49] Wilberforce's race, previously seen as his key advantage as a missionary to Africa, made him suspicious in a new age of biological and scientific racism. His position in Sierra Leonean society seemed to be proof of his degeneration into 'savage custom'. And in the midst of this crisis, when the more hostile Leslie Probyn replaced the supportive King-Harman as Governor, Wilberforce was brought to court to face charges relating to human leopard crimes.

Wilberforce tried to challenge the court's authority over him by virtue of his American citizenship, but the Circuit Court found that, as a chief, he could no longer lay claim to American citizenship and was bound by 'native' law. However, the Governor 'issued a Fiat … removing the trial of Wilberforce from the Circuit Court to the Courts of the Colony'.[50] This action seems to have been at instigation of the American Vice Consul, Raymond P. Dougherty, who wrote to Reverend Hough at the Mission Headquarters of his success in getting Wilberforce tried as an American citizen. Dougherty also reported that Governor Probyn was able to force Wilberforce to resign his position as chief in order to be granted this concession.[51] After the loss of his political position, Wilberforce attempted to return to his role as a missionary and further develop his settlement, but was caught up in the wider panic of 1912.

The Special Court (1912)

Tensions continued to rise in rural areas as the colonial economy intervened even more forcefully. Lever Brothers made an attempt to establish palm oil concessions in the northwestern areas of Sierra Leone in 1907 and 1914.[52] Plantations were established and new cash crops were introduced. At the same time, complaints about chiefs abusing their privileges increased as they imposed monetary levies, harsh court fines and demands for labour on their ever-increasing farms.[53] And reports of murders continued to arrive on the desk of the District Commissioners. Reports of killings were concentrated in the parts of the forest with histories of intensive international trading contact, both for the slave trade and the new cash crops of the colonial state.[54] The location and victims of the murders are telling. Victims were usually taken from farms and *fakais*. Fakais were slave

villages, located slightly apart from the main town or village, but close to the plantations. Palm kernel plantations, many of which were established in the nineteenth century in the transition from slave to 'legitimate' trade, were particularly targeted.[55] The victims were mainly women and the children of slaves.[56] The accused were mainly chiefs and wealthy traders.

In 1910, the government, confused about how to proceed with this ongoing onslaught of murders, contacted the India Office to ask for a copy of the dictionary of 'Ramasee'.[57] This lexicon had been compiled in the 1830s by William Henry Sleeman, a British administrator in India as a tool in the fight against 'Thuggee'. Sleeman believed that the 'Thugs' were killing and robbing travellers as an act of ritual worship of the goddess Kali. He claimed that: 'The Thug associations have been taught by those whom they revere as the expounders of the will of their Deity, that the murders they perpetrate are pleasing to her, provided they are perpetrated under certain restrictions, attended by certain observances, and preceded and followed by certain rites, sacrifices and offerings.'[58] In response to this seeming epidemic of ritual murder, Sleeman developed a set of advanced criminological tools to map and track the alleged 'Thugs'. As in the human leopard cases, he relied on the testimony of 'approvers', former Thugs who gave evidence against their compatriots.[59] One key piece of evidence that Sleeman relied on was the claim that the Thugs shared a common slang or dialect, called Ramasee. He claimed that his Ramasee vocabulary contained 'every term peculiar to their associations with which I have yet become acquainted'.[60] There is no extant evidence that the vocabulary was put into use or even despatched to Freetown, but clearly the investigators in Sierra Leone could see parallels between their cases and the Indian example. Desperate for tools to aid their investigation, they looked to this 80-year-old case for clues.

Following this, the Solicitor-General went to Imperri from Freetown to investigate: out of 336 individuals who were in custody, 42 were committed for trial, three turned king's evidence and 291 were discharged. In order to cope with the sheer number of suspects and the complex questions raised by the nature of the supposed crimes, a Special Court was established in 1912 to try these cases. Later on, 66 others were arrested, all of whom were committed for trial; the total number committed was therefore 108, including several Paramount Chiefs and leading men from the different chiefdoms. In fact, one colonial officer commented at the time that there soon would 'hardly be a chief left in the country'.[61] Complaints of chiefly abuse of privilege and stories of human leopard murders were deeply intertwined. In this period,

chiefs, deprived of a means of generating capital, were being encouraged and financially rewarded by the government for increasing production in labour-intensive crops. The resulting pressure on labourers and slaves was generating growing resentments. Men were being pressured into roles traditionally held by women. Women were leaving husbands, the colonial courts were upholding their right to leave, and the chiefs were growing visibly wealthier. In the face of the seeming disintegration of close-knit communities, people turned to symbols heavy with historical meaning and moral significance in order to bolster community solidarity. When Sierra Leoneans told the DC that the chiefs were literally 'eating their people', they were reinforcing and extending long-standing complaints of violent and oppressive practices. These colonial courts then became sites where local struggles could be played out, as people attempted to harness the legal power and judicial violence of the colonial state to their own ends.

The government took the complaints seriously, but the underlying message was lost in translation. Instead, growing concern over the role of secret societies led to a series of amendments being made to the existing legislation to strengthen the power of the government in cases of alleged human leopard activity. Fears of a repeat of the Hut Tax War prompted extraordinary legal amendments. A verdict of 'innocent' would no longer be enough to free the accused—mere suspicion of membership could be used to deport the 'politically undesirable'. A 1912 amendment permitted evidence of membership or even just association with a society to be presented in court. The motivation for the change is revealed in a terse note in a governor's despatch: 'Suggests amendment in Sec. 4 to facilitate securing convictions. Requests approval'.[62] These amendments were pushed through, despite objections by the Sierra Leonean Krio elite on the Legislative Council in Freetown. The Krio saw these changes as the thin end of a wedge that could leave the principles of justice and law in tatters and subvert their claims to political and legal influence in the Protectorate. They requested amendments, until finally the government suspended the Standing Orders and pushed the law through. The government failed to understand the Krio concerns and registered only that they seemed to be allying themselves with the people of the Protectorate. This alliance again raised concerns, and memories, of rebellion. In the 1898 rebellion, colonial officers in Freetown had laid much blame with the Freetown media and 'frontier black lawyers' for inciting the rural population.[63] The suggestion of collusion rang alarm bells and convinced the government that special attention and forceful action was needed in the case of secret societies.

The only evidence the government had was testimony of accusers and the co-accused. Attempts to gain further corroborative evidence failed due to what the government believed was a 'very strong oath of secrecy'. The Special Court of 1912 took frequent liberties with the law in order to secure convictions. As well as the 'guilty even if proven innocent' Ordinance quoted above, in the trials, a convergence of witness testimonies can also be seen. The interaction between the interrogators and paid informers led to increasingly standardized accounts from witnesses. Material evidence proved impossible to find. The rumoured leopard-skin costume or baboon hide disguise of the murderers were always with another person or hidden in the bush, watched over by spirits. Testimonies appeared to reflect a desire to provide the narrative the colonial court was seeking. One confession states that the accused was wearing 'clothes' when he captured a small girl on a bush path. Later, he reflects back and says: 'No, I was lying when I said clothes, in fact I was wearing a skin. A skin of hair. In fact, it was a baboon skin.'[64] In addition to these evidentiary deficiencies, there was an assumption that the entire community was complicit.[65] Governor Edward Merewether argued that Sierra Leonean nature made it impossible to quash the societies: 'The blind belief of the natives in the efficacy of the medicines the fact that periodical human sacrifices are considered to be necessary in order to renew the efficacy of those medicines; and a tendency on the part of some natives to cannibalism pure and simple-all these causes will contribute to the survival of this baneful organization.'[66] A type of racial determinism had now arisen in the colonial prosecution, which convicted on the basis of communal guilt.

Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce's unique position allowed him to fight against his relegation to the status of 'native'. Following his conviction in the Special Court, he again appealed on the basis of his American citizenship. His argument was that, as a US citizen, he could not be tried in 'native court' under the legislation designed for local people—his trial should be of the same type that any European would expect. His subsequent retrial found him innocent, but the damage had already been done. In the view of his church, he was an irredeemable savage, 'the strangest problem'[67] of their mission. The rumours and accusations were enough to convince the colonial government that he was an 'undesirable' and his standing with the people of his chiefdom had been destroyed by his perceived collaboration with the colonial authorities. The British government exiled him from Sierra Leone in 1913, and little more is known of what became of him.

In assessing the human leopard trials, Donald Burrows, of the West African Medical Staff, wrote in the *Journal of the Royal African Society* in 1914:

That it exercises a weird and potent influence is undoubted; for, within the last seven or eight years, among those arrested and, in many cases, hanged for murders committed in its cause, are educated Christian clerks, traders, head men and chiefs of towns, and also catechists and missionaries! It is incredible, but none the less the fact, that natives who have had the advantage of prolonged residence and education in Europe and America, and whose attendance also at places of Christian worship was assiduous and 'earnest', should have concurrently sworn allegiance to this strange god, the cult of which seems to fascinate regardless of religion, in the same way that 'Thugghi' in India numbered among its devotees representatives of the most widely different and antagonistic religions.[68]

It seems likely that one of the missionaries Burrows refers to was Daniel Wilberforce. He believed that even the long assimilation to Western culture experienced by Wilberforce was not sufficient to prevent his degeneration and backsliding into savagery. In fact, the identity of the accused suggested that Western acculturation or 'detribalization' made Africans more rather than less susceptible to this 'weird and potent influence'. At the same time, the murders evoked memories for the colonial government of earlier 'scares' with Thuggee in India. The Thuggee campaign has also been characterized as a 'panic', though with some basis in crimes committed as a result of the upheaval of colonial rule.[69] The Sierra Leonean reference to the archive of the empire to learn the lessons of Thuggee suggests that little reflection had occurred in the preceding 80 years. Yet, rather than Kali-worshipping bandits, the panic in Sierra Leone erupted over cannibalistic were-people.

Cannibalism and Consumption

That cannibalism was the crime that sparked this panic was no coincidence. Accusations of cannibalism had a deep cultural resonance in Sierra Leone for both Europeans and Sierra Leoneans. In 1914, after the Special Court had dealt with the many cases raised, Berry published another paper on the Human Leopard Societies in the *Journal of the Royal African Society*, which gives the colonial narrative of the Human Leopard murders. After first giving a summary of racial thinking in his introduction, he then swiftly outlined around 10,000 years of African history as one of

'lesser' racial groups being conquered or pushed out by 'Hamitic' groups.[70] Berry's paper then recycled the use of stories of African cannibalism in eighteenth-century pro-slave trade propaganda, declaring: 'These people, from the earliest we know of them, have been much given to cannibalism, and have suffered perhaps more than any others from slave raids.'[71] The paper details the history and society of the region, making reference to Arab historians, who also spoke of 'a cannibal belt'.[72] Cannibalism is further linked to 'racial degradation', as the Sherbro and Bullom people (who inhabited the Imperri district) are described as 'the remnants of a race known to the Arab historians of the Soudan as the Lem-Lem, or Gem-Gem, a degraded cannibal people who were always pushed south to the unhealthy bush along the coast'.[73] A report of the 1912 Special Court in the Canadian *Rideau Record* stated that the 'leopard society is one of the most curious of the many forms of fetichism [sic!] among the lower races of men' and that 'members of the society are cannibals, but apparently not because of any love for "long pig"', but rather because of their faith in the ritual power of the consumption of human flesh.[74] Berry's widely distributed published account made use of pictures of female initiation rites taken by Krio photographer Alphonso Lisk-Carew alongside pictures of alleged paraphernalia of witchcraft to further exoticize and denigrate the regular lifecycle rituals of the Mende.[75]

Accusations of cannibalism have deep historical roots and significance for Africans too. In his famous slave narrative, Gustavus Vassa, or Olaudah Equiano, asked a fellow captive 'if we were not to be eaten by those white men with horrible looks, red faces and loose hair'.[76] In Sierra Leone, stories and accusations of cannibalism conveyed a particular ritual significance that was not necessarily present in other African contexts. Rumours and fears of cannibalism spread about the slave trade's seeming 'consumption' of human beings became powerful metaphors for the commodification of people and their labour.[77] The slave trade and witchcraft ritual became intimately inter-connected throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the transatlantic slave trade created a demand for slaves throughout Sierra Leone, a demand served, in part, by the shaping of anti-witchcraft practices to condemn accused witches to slavery.[78] These metaphors gained a new purpose in Mendeland, the area of Sierra Leone where the majority of human leopard accusations occurred. When the 'moral community' was threatened anew by the predation of chiefs and the colonial state, accusations of cannibalism took on a new purpose.[79] Just as the slave traders of the nineteenth century grew individually and suddenly wealthy by preying

on the local communities, in the twentieth century the legacy of the slave trade made Mende people suspicious of the *nouveau riche* and powerful created by colonial trade and connections. Material and political success had become inextricably linked with dubious practices of oppression and violence against the community, often on good grounds. Further, as agricultural anthropologist Paul Richards notes, individualism presented a direct threat to cooperative farming methods and livelihoods.[80] Both Europeans and Sierra Leoneans drew on the embedded history within accusations of cannibalism to make wider points about their social world. However, while European stories propped up racial beliefs, tapping into a past of violence against Africans, the Sierra Leonean story represented resistance to commodification.

Conclusion

Several key themes arise in the 1912 panic over human leopards that can also be seen in other colonial panics. The perennial fear of an unseen and unknown conspiracy became panic when associated with violence of the past. Daniel Wilberforce was suspicious to his American sponsors, the British government and the people of his chiefdom because of his position as a broker for the colonial state and his racial identity. The gaps in knowledge were filled with ever more anxious speculations, which then became an established narrative of fact. Delving into the colonial archive for tools to understand these phenomena reinforced the new panics. In the colonial setting, race, violence and the symbology of different cultures took on greater significance. When knowledge is lacking, people often turn to imperfect historical analogies to manage contemporary problems. Often, the historical narrative is remoulded to fit the gap. The recycling of tropes about cannibalism in Africa from pro-slave trade debates and the constructed connection between the human leopards and the rising of 1898 demonstrates how historical discourses and events became powerful symbols in the decision-making process of the state. However, cannibalism, the slave trade and the rising of 1898 had also generated powerful symbols and anxieties amongst the Sierra Leonean people. In Sierra Leone, these symbols were deployed to generate solidarity on behalf of both the colonizers and the colonized—but to very different purposes. Racial condemnation, anxiety about the potential for conspiracy and insurgency, and fear of the unknown came together to create a colonial panic. Sierra Leonean anxieties about changing agricultural practices, anger at

the oppressiveness of the new chiefly elites, and trauma in the aftermath of a brutal colonial occupation found little room for expression in the new regime. Cannibal accusations, drawing on cultural forms and memories of corrupted regimes, became the means to resist chiefs and predatory elites. Wilberforce, stuck between racial condemnation and colonial collaboration, was caught up twice and his story demonstrates how vulnerable these liminal figures were.

In order to understand panic in a colonial setting, it is necessary to dig deeper into the colonial archive and to examine its recursive practices and uses. The archive generated by the state, the media and other observers tends to coalesce around one simplified narrative, and it takes empirical work to bring the panic back to its historical context and trace its often deep-rooted sources. Murders provide the historian with a glimpse into the lives of people otherwise disregarded in the archive, at the moment of their deaths. In Sierra Leone, the attacks were real, but how to interpret them was dependent on which historical and social myths people drew upon. From the perspective of the accusers, the growth of the colonial economy and the end of the slave trade had introduced hugely increased labour coercion and violence into the lives of slaves and labourers in the region, resulting in a backlash against the chiefs. And, finally, the new generation of chiefs' modernising agricultural practices and allegiance to the colonial government created suspicion amongst the Imperri elite about their loyalty and fitness to rule. Stories about human leopards in Sierra Leone generated a panic in the British imperial administration that led officials to undertake extraordinary legal measures and a reassessment of the working of the colonial judiciary. The courts and district officers constructed their own 'story' of the human leopard society which warned of conspiracy, rebellion and violence. However, the stories that were told by the accusers, if listened to carefully, can actually tell us a lot about the concerns, fears and experiences of slaves, labourers and subsistence farmers in rural Sierra Leone.

Notes

1. In 1912, Sierra Leone consisted of two separate, but inter-connected, areas: the Colony and the Protectorate. The Colony comprised the capital, Freetown, and the peninsula area, and had been settled by British settlers since the late eighteenth century. The Protectorate, on the other hand, was only taken under formal British rule in 1896. The Imperii district bordered

on the Colony and had been subject to more intensive British policing and government for longer than the rest of the Protectorate.

2. Sierra Leone National Archive (SLNA), Circuit Court Records, 1907 to 1911.
3. SLNA, Despatch from the Governor of Sierra Leone reporting on the measures adopted to deal with unlawful societies in the Protectorate, August 1913.
4. SLNA, Human Leopard and Alligator Amendment Ordinance, 1912, Section 2.
5. SLNA, Special Tribunal for the Trial of Leopard Murders Cases in the Northern Sherbro District, 18 September 1912, Minute Paper C. 177.
6. SLNA, Confidential Minute Papers, 126, Special police to control Leopard murders, 1913.
7. Donald Burrows (1914: 145–46).
8. For example, Valentin Fernandes wrote of cannibalistic war rituals in the sixteenth century in Sierra Leone. See also Rosalind Shaw (2002); Henrietta L. Moore and Todd Sanders (2001: 52). District Commissioner Thomas Joshua Alldridge described the Human Leopard Society and the Tongo Players in his 1901 account of Sherbro: Thomas Joshua Alldridge (1901: 153–60). Another example is J.C. Grant's comic novel *The Ethiopian* published in Paris in 1900, which featured an African, educated as a missionary in Britain, who returned to the imagined land of Westeria and founded a Human Leopard Society. J.C. Grant (1900).
9. One object said to be associated with the Human Leopard Societies ended up in the British Museum: a dagger with three blades. According to the anthropologist Paul Basu, this may have been acquired by George Garrett when he was District Commissioner in Sherbro between 1891 and 1893. See Paul Basu (2011: 32).
10. David Pratten (2007: 13).
11. Christopher Bayly (2000: 174).
12. Mariane C. Ferme (2001: 183).
13. 'Krio' refers to the descendants of freed slaves, Maroons and other immigrants to Freetown. The Krio formed the core of the African political elite in Freetown and sought to extend the 'civilized and Christian' influence of Freetown society over the hinterland areas.
14. 'Sherbro' denotes a language and a geographical area in the southern coastal region of the Sierra Leone Protectorate. More detail about Wilberforce's life can be found in his book: Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce (1886). See also Gareth Griffiths' biographical article: Gareth Griffiths (2009).
15. United Brethren Historical Center (UBHC), Milton Wright Collection, Huntington, Indiana, Letter to Jacob Howe (1906?).

16. UBHC, Milton Wright Collection, Huntington, Indiana, Letter, recipient illegible (1877).
17. Paul Richards in Knight (2000: 90).
18. SLNA, Minute Papers, Native Affairs, Letter from Daniel Wilberforce to the Headmen and Chiefs assembled at Gangarmah for the suppression of Cannibalism in the Impereh country. 1890.
19. SLNA, Enclosures in Governor's Despatches, 26 August 1890.
20. SLNA, Minute Papers, Native Affairs, 651/1890, Letter from Daniel Wilberforce to Sir James S. Hay, Governor-in-Chief, 21 October 1890.
21. K.J. Beatty (1915: 4–6).
22. In this same year, newspapers around the British Empire reported on the Human Leopard Society in Sierra Leone. In New Zealand, for example, the *New Zealand Herald* reported that men belonging to the 'Human Leopard Society' 'had been in the habit of secreting themselves in the bush near the various villages. Anyone who ventured out was set upon and killed, and a cannibal feast was afterwards held'. 'Cannibalism in West Africa' *New Zealand Herald*, 12 October 1895, 2.
23. The Colony of Sierra Leone comprised only Freetown, its surrounding area of the Western Peninsula and the Imperri district in 1890.
24. SLNA, *Native Affairs Letter Books*, Number 593.
25. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (1986: 5). The Comaroffs argue that colonial authorities became another source of patronage and power in African politics, which both granted them influence and exposed them to potential manipulation and attack.
26. Allen M. Howard (2006: 26).
27. Poro, frequently referred to as a 'secret society' in the archive, was a kind of fraternal order in Sierra Leone, which allowed for the conduct of trade and politics across chiefdom borders. While the organization did emphasize secrecy, this related more to the content and types of knowledge passed on during initiation than membership or activities. For example, in 1907 A.R. Wright published an article claiming that 'the most important [secret] society is the Porro'. A.R. Wright (1907: 424).
28. J.D. Hargreaves (1956: 69).
29. TNA CO/267/438, Governor's Letterbook, April to May: Letter, 30 April 1898.
30. TNA, CO 267/439, DC Alldridge, July 1898.
31. Charles Braithwaite Wallis (1903: 106).
32. For more on this, see Paul Basu's upcoming publication on the Rotifunk massacre.
33. UBHC, Milton Wright Collection, Huntington, Indiana, Letter from Bishop Wright to Reverend J. Howe, Dayton, Ohio, 3 April 1914.
34. This motif also echoes earlier experiences of colonial violence and uprising. In the Indian Mutiny of 1857, for example, the supposed 'defilement' of

European women was widely publicized to the metropolitan public. See A. Blunt (2000).

35. SLNA, Enclosures in Governor's Despatches, No. 54, 15 July 1898.
36. SLNA, Enclosures in Governor's Despatches, No. 229, 18 October 1898.
37. SLNA, District Commissioner's Letterbook, 1904–06.
38. SLNA, Northern Provinces Report of 1906.
39. K.J. Beatty (1915: 209).
40. Arthur Abraham (1978: 246).
41. SLNA, Minute Papers, Number 842, 1903.
42. Bonny Ibahow explains how the use of native assessors spread through the British Empire in an attempt to solve the contradictions between the colonial and 'customary' legal systems: Bonny Ibhawoh (2009).
43. SLNA, Minute Papers, 3891, 1904, As noted above, Daniel Wilberforce was recruited as an assessor while serving as Paramount Chief.
44. SLNA, Minute Papers 5091, 1904.
45. Hansard, House of Commons, Debate 10 December 1906, vol. 166 cols 1548–49.
46. Arthur Abraham (2003: 173).
47. Gareth Griffiths (2009: 442).
48. 'Negro Convert Backslid. Is Now Chief of His Old Tribe of Devil Worshippers' *New York Times*, 10 March 1905.
49. United Brethren Church Archive (UBHC), Indiana. Letter dated 5 July 1906, Dayton, Ohio.
50. SLGA, Court Record Books, Moyamba District, 11 January 1906.
51. UBHC, Letter to Rev. S.S. Hough, Dayton, Ohio, from Consular Service, Freetown, 9 January 1906.
52. Despatches relating to the Sierra Leone Oil Palm Industry and the Establishment of the Oil Palm Plantation, Sessional Paper, No. 12 of 1925.
53. Vernon R. Dorjahn (1960: 130–34).
54. Paul Richards (2000: 89).
55. Milan Kalous (1974: 34, 40).
56. Milan Kalous (1974: 127, 43, 97, 121, 141, 224, 271). See also, Shaw in Moore and Sanders (2003: 60).
57. British Library, Asia Pacific and Africa Collection, India Office Records: L/PJ/6/986, (1910), No. 379: 'With reference to the Human Leopard Societies in Sierra Leone, makes inquiry as to the methods adopted in India for the suppression of Thuggee.' Harald Fischer-Tiné kindly alerted me to the existence of this document.
58. Sir William Henry Sleeman (1836: i).
59. There is a considerable literature on the Thuggee cases, much of which revolves around the question of to what extent the Thugs ever really existed or if they were a colonial construction. Considerable research has also been

carried out on the legal repercussions of the government's campaign against thugs. See Radhika Singha (1993); Kim A. Wagner (2007); Mark Brown (2002); Martine van Wœrkens and Catherine Tihanyi (2002).

60. Sir William Henry Sleeman (1839: 75).
61. SLNA, Despatch from the Governor of Sierra Leone reporting on the Measures adopted to deal with unlawful societies in the Protectorate, August, 1913.
62. TNA, CO 267/543, Governor's Despatches. Quoted in Griffiths (2009: 446).
63. 'The Rising in Sierra Leone', *The Times*, 24 August 1898, p. 9.
64. SLNA, Box 684 (3), CSO Confidential Series 1913, Confidential File, 'Activity of the Baboon Society'.
65. Again, this resonates with the history of the Thuggee; see Radhika Singha (1993 105).
66. A. Gray (1916).
67. UBHC Archive, Indiana. Milton Wright Papers. Letter from Bishop Wright to Reverend J. Howe, Dayton, Ohio, 3 April 1914.
68. D. Burrows (1914: 151).
69. Kim A. Wagner (2007).
70. R.G. Berry (1912: 16–23).
71. R.G. Berry (1912: 22).
72. R.G. Berry (1912: 28).
73. R.G. Berry (1912: 32).
74. 'Brutal Society of Death', *The Rideau Record*, 10 April 1913, 6.
75. Nanina Guyer provided information about the identity and origin of the photograph. Alphonso Lisk-Carew worked as a photographer in Freetown and his images of Mende women, taken between 1908 and 1910, were sold as postcards to tourists and visitors from his store in Freetown. R.G. Berry (1912: Plates I and III).
76. Olaudah Equiano (2013: 72).
77. Matthew J. Christensen (2005).
78. Rosalind Shaw (2002: 231–32).
79. Mariane C. Ferme (2001: 162).
80. Paul Richards (2000: 91).

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Critical Mass: Colonial Crowds and Contagious Panics in 1890s Hong Kong and Bombay

Robert Peckham

INTRODUCTION: 'DIS-ORIENTATION'

This chapter explores the construction of 'panic' as a communicable condition in two colonial settings of the British Empire during the late nineteenth century: Hong Kong and Bombay. Although very different in administration—Hong Kong was a crown colony—both were strategic port cities and commercial hubs, reliant on migrant labour and conceived as gateways to vast, populous hinterlands.[1] Both were to experience the Third Plague Pandemic, which diffused globally from China in the 1890s, killing some 15 million people worldwide.[2] If Hong Kong marked the onset of the pandemic, at least in a British imperial context, in India 'the focus of the state's most vigorous [anti-plague] measures were in Bombay and its Presidency between 1896 and 1902'.[3] To be sure, the

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impact of bubonic plague in Bombay (and India) far exceeded the limited disruptions in Hong Kong, where 2,485 individuals perished in 1894 as opposed to an estimated 43,870 in the city of Bombay from September 1896 to September 1899, and 250,336 in the Bombay Presidency as a whole.[4] Nonetheless, the disease challenged colonial authority in the crown colony, while exposing divisions within the local elites. If the plague served as a testing ground for novel scientific ideas about disease causation and transmission, tensions were also revealed between colonial and local conceptualizations of 'medicine', 'health' and 'disease'. Within this broad, comparative context, the focus of this chapter is on the colonial 'crowd' as a site for new discourses of panic and infection. The aim is to explore the crowd as it figures in colonial writing as a mechanism of disease propagation and an object of analysis closely connected to panic.

The chapter argues, first, that the plague epidemics in the 1890s in Hong Kong and Bombay provide illuminating case studies for exploring contagion as the discursive ground for colonial constructions of panic. Second, it maintains that studying the responses to these collective panics may shed light on the assumptions that informed colonial representations of indigeneity in relation to aggregate categories, such as race or caste. While colonial experience has been—and continues to be—narrated through an archive of biographies and 'life histories',[5] there have also been attempts to challenge representations of non-Western societies defined exclusively in collective terms, in order to recuperate individual 'subaltern lives'.[6] Finally, the chapter suggests that the plague epidemics in the 1890s provide a novel context for rethinking turn-of-the-century metropolitan crowds and the ways in which colonial experiences in the 'Tropics' helped to shape modern metropolitan panics.

Native 'overcrowding' was generally understood by colonial officials, both medical and otherwise, to be a predisposing cause of the plague.[7] By the same token, susceptibility to panic, like disease, was associated with an Asiatic proclivity for crowd-living. Epidemic disease incited native crowds, even as crowds were construed as producing contagious panic. According to this circuitous logic, the one was causative of the other: 'panic and flight' were 'concomitants' of infection.[8] While late nineteenth-century metropolitan commentators studied the crowd as a phenomenon linked to technological, environmental and behavioural changes, the crowd was also considered to be a throwback to primitive forms of collectivity, reflective of an innate atavism. As Daniel Pick has observed: 'The crowd inverted the law of evolution and moved from present to past'.[9]

The violence and unpredictability of crowds in the metropole had long been noted.[10] However, the quickening pace of urbanization, expanding public spaces and the development of rapid transportation from the mid-nineteenth century encouraged an unprecedented scale of mobility and the coalescence of individuals into 'masses'.[11] By the 1890s, the metropolitan crowd had become an object of study, as the state sought effective social-distancing and crowd-control measures to reduce the potential for crowds to spread epidemics and panic. Diseases that flourished in dense populations were understood to be 'crowd-diseases', while fear of city crowds had created a new pathological condition by 1871: 'agoraphobia'.[12] At the same time, crowds were reified through practices linked to the proliferating institutions and agencies of the state. Statistics, census returns, public health measures and policing were instrumental in producing new kinds of collectives. Innovative means of representing and managing data enabled new forms of governance and state intervention.[13]

In 1893, *The Lancet* noted in an editorial entitled 'Disease and Panic': 'It is very questionable whether even the actual havoc wrought by disease upon the lives and health of those whom it visits is more to be dreaded than its frequently withering effect upon their moral nature'. As the journal concluded: 'Misapprehensions, unbounded self-concern and consequent excesses have characterised only too truly and too often the conduct of sick and sound alike'.[14] An epidemiological discourse of 'contagion' was important in the construction of 'panics', which were invariably conceived as contagious, transmigrating between people in crowds. The crowd was understood in terms of a medical discourse of contagion and feverishness. The new science of bacteriology from the 1880s, which underpinned epidemiology and an emergent practice of public health, did not supersede—as one report on the International Sanitary Conference declared in 1894—the 'fear and mystery' of pre-modern responses to disease, in which 'improvised precautions [were] dictated by panic'.[15] On the contrary, as this chapter argues, science helped to reframe and, paradoxically, to legitimate panic as a form of pathology.

The preoccupation with the 'masses' as an 'aggregate of individuals' went hand in hand with an accelerating counter-impulse to disaggregate groups into ever-smaller subcategories.[16] The tension in scales between thinking en masse and on the individual level was reflected in contradictory tendencies: an expansive public health approach that dealt with 'populations' cut across a bacteriological approach, centred on the laboratory, that endeavoured to identify and neutralize specific pathogens. According to the French physician

and sociologist Gustave Le Bon, writing in 1895 as a diagnostician of the crowd, panic was a clear example of 'contagious power as intense as that of microbes' that took possession of the crowd. 'In consequence of the purely destructive nature of their power', Le Bon remarked, 'crowds act like those microbes which hasten the dissolution of enfeebled or dead bodies'.[17] Popular science and social commentary conjoined. Crowds were defined in relation both to the 'mass' and to the invisible 'atomic' agents of panic and disease that circulated through them.[18] Such pathological readings of the panicked crowd characterized accounts of the plague epidemics in Hong Kong and Bombay, where crowd behaviour was invariably framed in relation to disease and contagious panic. Medical language functioned as a way of delegitimizing 'native' collectivities, even as it implicitly acknowledged their malignant power.

The resurgent interest in crowds from the 1890s reflected contemporary European concerns with the rise of radical movements and, in France, with the experience of the Paris Commune (1871), conservative populism from the late 1880s and the crisis of mass democracy in the Third Republic.[19] Colonial contexts and, in particular, racial thinking also had an important impact on crowd theory. Le Bon was profoundly influenced by racial anthropology and took an interest in the study of comparative colonial systems in North Africa, the Middle East and India. In his work on French Algeria, he championed the British 'segregationist' approach, arguing against assimilation and calling on the French to learn from the British experience.[20] He held that his insights into crowd psychology had much to teach the colonial military.[21] Meanwhile, the language used to describe the 'degenerate' crowds in European cities and the 'overcrowded' slums in which they dwelt became increasingly redolent of a colonial discourse that focused on the degenerate native masses.[22] While the metropole was a 'heart of darkness' reminiscent of the 'ghastly devastation' of 'Central Africa',[23] the multitudes of Asia were another recurrent spectre in this urban critique of the crowd. Overcrowding was associated in particular with Asia, the 'swarming' *officina gentium* (workshop of the world).[24] The expanse, diversity and sheer populousness of the East were viewed as posing distinct challenges to rational and effective governance. As Haun Saussy has noted:

> If Asia is home to a majority of the human race, the populousness of Asia has long been described as a mere plurality without individuality, a passive reservoir or labor power awaiting orders from an imperial throne—in short, a crowd of the 'defective' kind, observed by individuals who see themselves

as members of purposive historical movements (Christianity, progress, the dialectics of freedom, and so on).[25]

There were, of course, significant differences in the way that Indian and Chinese crowds were understood by Western commentators.[26] Particularly after the Rebellion of 1857, which led to the administrative 'reconstruction' of British India,[27] crowds were overwhelmingly viewed in negative terms: their heterogeneity and volatility undermined the social order. As Douglas Kerr has noted, the year 1857 was critical in establishing 'the great myth of colonial crowd anxiety'.[28] Subsequent unrest in India, particularly the 1893 Bombay riots that saw Hindu and Muslim clashes, the intervention of the military and the eruption of 'gang' conflict, underscored the latent violence of native crowds and the propensity for sanitary 'breakdown' that the city's 'overcrowding' represented.[29] For Rudyard Kipling, overcrowded Indian trains, in particular, were lethal vectors of infection:

> The people crowded the trains, hanging on to the footboards and squatting on the roofs of the carriages, and the cholera followed them, for at each station they dragged out the dead and the dying.[30]

Although it implied a putative norm, the concept of 'overcrowding' was generally fluid; it had more to do with a visual economy of teeming natives than with an objective distribution of bodies in space. However, increasingly, there were efforts through comparative analyses to evaluate relative urban densities. Thus, reflecting on the lessons of the 1893 riots, *The Lancet* noted 'the extreme density of the population' in Indian cities: if London had 222 persons per acre, Bombay had 760 with the population displaying 'the habits of domesticated cattle'.[31] Conversely, Chinese crowds tended to be viewed in more positive terms, at least until the counter-discourse of the 'Yellow Peril' became dominant after the anti-foreigner Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901). Nonetheless, the 'teeming' Chinese crowd also emerged as a threat at moments of crisis before 1900 and particularly during outbreaks of disease.[32]

Empire in the 'Era of the Crowd'

In 1895, Le Bon had declared the advent of the 'Era of the Crowd',[33] observing that 'contagion' was central to the dynamic of crowd formation and behaviour. In the anonymity of the crowd, individuals lost their sense

of individuality and responsibility through a process of 'submergence'. Ideas and emotions spread between 'submerged' individuals like a contagious disease. 'When the structure of civilization is rotten', Le Bon contended, 'it is always the masses that bring about its downfall'.[34]

Crowds were to test colonial governments across the British Empire. Asia, in particular, was associated in the British imperial imaginary with riotous and often hostile crowds.[35] As Bernard Cohn has noted of the British in India, they appear:

> to have felt most comfortable surveying India from above and at a distance—from a horse, an elephant, a boat, a carriage, or a train. They were uncomfortable in the narrow confines of a city street, a bazaar, a *mela*—anywhere they were surrounded by their Indian subjects.[36]

Many commentators were struck by the scale and density of populations in the East, which was fully revealed in India with the 1901 census.[37] Bombay was 'admitted to be the most crowded city in the world'.[38] As an enumerative instrument, the census, along with maps, health reports and population studies, may be understood as a colonial strategy for organizing native masses into more manageable units.[39] Yet often the immensity of the population seemed to resist classificatory logic. Rajnarayan Chandavarkar has noted, for example, how:

> The exigencies of public order policing, and situations of crowd control, exposed the weaknesses of the police and, indeed, laid bare their own sense of vulnerability. In colonial discourse, it was an essential characteristic of the Indian crowd that unless it was quickly dispersed it would rapidly get out of control.[40]

India was deemed to be a place of savage mobs, which exerted a 'disorientating' effect on colonials. As Michael Valdez Moses has argued, in imperial British writing, the Western colonizer often found himself or herself subjugated to the native environment, 'overthrown, confused, panicked, frustrated, and turned back upon [himself or herself]'.[41] 'Panic-stricken' and 'disorientating' crowds were a recurrent feature of reporting on India.[42]

Hong Kong and Bombay were both portrayed as port cities backed by a teeming hinterland, where colonial residents were in danger of being overrun. 'The intimate intercourse' between Hong Kong and the

Mainland was a source of anxiety for colonials, with an incessant traffic of steamers, junks, sampans and thousands of jostling migrants crossing the border annually.[43] In the eyes of one colonial commentator in the 1890s, Hong Kong was a heaving 'incongruous mass' (or 'an odd conglomeration of fluctuating molecules').[44] The population, composed overwhelmingly of male Chinese migrant workers 'temporary residing in Hong Kong for purposes of industry and trade', was amorphous and indefinable.[45] According to the 1891 census, European and American residents, including military and naval personnel, amounted to 8,545 persons out of a total population of 221,441. Of the 210,995 Chinese residents, 154,647 were natives of Guangdong Province, with only 7,286 describing themselves as natives of Hong Kong. The 1891 Census Report noted the issue of Chinese 'overcrowding' with the Registrar General, James Stewart Lockhart, quoting with approval from a work on *Chinese Characteristics* that 'in China breathing seems to be optional … We hear much of Chinese overcrowding, but overcrowding is the normal condition of the Chinese'.[46] Swamped by Chinese immigrants, Hong Kong was portrayed in the British newspapers as a 'pest-hole'.[47] William Simpson, Professor of Hygiene at King's College London and the author of an influential report on the plague, attributed disease in Hong Kong in part to the 'social scale and floating nature of the population'.[48] The city was filled with up to 1,000 registered lodging houses and 40,000 people lived on boats.[49] Indeed, the plague was to reveal to colonial officials above all the pervious, equivocal borders between Hong Kong and Chinese Canton (Guangzhou), and the impossibility of regulating the 'floating' Chinese population that moved between them.[50] As Simpson observed, the crown colony was 'one vast dêpot'.[51]

The presiding metaphor here was one of liquescence: a tide, a burst dam, a swollen river, a tumultuous sea.[52] Metaphors of bursting riverbanks and irrepressible flows would subsequently pervade the 'Yellow Peril' literature of the early twentieth century, such as S.N. Sedgwick's *The Last Persecution* (1909), in which China is imagined as overflowing 'her walls like a flood'.[53] In such writing, China is evoked as a place where 'Oriental' bodies blended into a volatile, indistinct and vast aggregate. The coolie's body, as Ross Forman has observed, was 'an amalgamated force'.[54] Chinese crowds were also frequently imagined in zoomorphic terms: 'teeming' or 'swarming' like locusts, or other 'parasitic' insect life; a pestilential and undifferentiated collective spreading lethal contagions: leprosy, tuberculosis and plague.[55] During the plague epidemics, native crowds in both cities were invariably described as being enraged, rampaging or overreacting.

The native plague-crowd (ubiquitously described as 'panic-stricken') exemplified a lack of self-restraint and rationality in the 'Oriental', who was blinkered by 'morbid prejudices' and 'fanatical notions',[56] even as he demonstrated a native propensity for criminal violence: his 'mad beliefs' spurred him to 'riot'.[57]

Hong Kong: Panic and the Chinese Mob

Reports of the plague in Canton had reached Hong Kong early in 1894, with newspapers noting the 'increasing fear and alarm' of the local Chinese population, fuelled by 'rumours of an alarmist character'.[58] Following an extraordinary meeting of the Sanitary Board, Hong Kong was formally declared an infected port on 10 May 1894.

From the outset, the plague was viewed by colonial agents as a disease of crowds and overcrowding, fitting into the framework of another 'Asiatic' disease that had loomed large in Europe from the 1830s and been closely connected to crowds: cholera.[59] Earlier sanitary reports and, in particular, the report on the sanitary conditions of Hong Kong by Osbert Chadwick, who visited the colony in the early 1880s, had drawn attention to the unsanitary Chinese neighborhoods, characterized by their over-crowding. Chadwick's report, published in 1882, had been a spur to the establishment of a Sanitary Board and to the passing of a Public Health Ordinance in 1887.[60] While crowds were a salient feature of the port city, crowded native living quarters, characterized by a lack of ventilation and restricted light, were viewed by colonial officials as providing the perfect environment for 'filth diseases' to flourish. The propensity for disease was thus linked not only to climate and environment but also to native crowd-living. Diseases such as cholera and plague were construed as distinctly Asian and related to the filth that was 'characteristic of the masses in this part of the world'.[61]

The packed tenements in the poor Chinese districts of Taipingshan and Kennedy Town, where the plague was concentrated in Hong Kong, were repeatedly criticized for their 'over-crowding'. The emanations of crowded spaces—the stink, cacophony and the potential for violence—were reflective of the crowd's contagious nature. Steamers 'crowded' with Chinese passengers from Canton were seen as the main pathway of contagion. As William Simpson noted in his epidemiological treatise on the plague, 'the migration of panic-stricken people from infected centres' and the 'movements of crowds' were key to the spread of disease.[62]

From the moment that Hong Kong was declared an infected port, the colony had been 'more or less completely panic-stricken'.[63] The colonial state's response to the epidemic of bubonic plague in Hong Kong—with the imposition, for example, of restrictions on rights of assembly and travel, and 'vigorous house-to-house visitation'[64]—produced counter-panics in the colonized population, which in turn justified colonial anxieties about being outnumbered or crowded out. Several hundred soldiers of the Shropshire Light Infantry Regiment (the so-called 'Whitewash Brigade') were enrolled to enforce sanitary measures. Their work was impeded by stone-throwing crowds and specific charges were brought against individuals for inciting violence. A hustling 'mob' disrupted a meeting at the Tung Wah Hospital with 'a strong body of Indian constables' dispatched to restore order.[65] A headline in the *Hongkong Daily Press* proclaimed 'Threatened Riots in Chinatown', with the newspaper condemning 'the ignorance and stupidity which peculiarly belong to the multitude of the natives'.[66]

In mid- to late May 1894, 'malicious rumours' circulated through the Chinese population about the government's malevolent designs. Tales abounded of native children abducted and pregnant women gruesomely dissected. Chinese bodies were reputedly cut open and bile was extracted from their livers as a remedy for the plague. 'Contagious' rumours created 'something akin to a panic'.[67] Inflammatory placards and posters in Canton similarly alleging that the British authorities were experimenting on native bodies prompted colonial concerns that 'the passions of the mob' would be further roused. In Canton, foreigners were targeted by 'ruffians'. Two female missionaries, Drs Bigler and Halverston—attacked by 'a howling and maddened mob'—were rescued at gunpoint by a Captain Barton of the Imperial Maritime Customs with an uneasy peace maintained by the presence of the British gunboat *HMS Rattler* close to shore.[68] 'Suspicion and hatred' had broken out, the *Hongkong Telegraph* noted, 'in the blank minds of an ignorant Chinese mob'.[69] In official reports and newspaper accounts of these disturbances, the heroism of the Westerners caught up in the violence is delineated in contradistinction to the viciousness of the undifferentiated and nameless Chinese rabble. Such descriptions entail a 'de-individuation', wherein the Chinese 'seem irreducibly alien in terms of culture and race'.[70] In contrast, the individuality of the non-native observers is 'produced and sharpened by the teeming numbers around them'.[71]

By late June, the Governor, Sir William Robinson, estimated that tens of thousands of 'panic-stricken Chinese' had fled Hong Kong for the Mainland.[72]

In the midst of the plague epidemic, commentators conjectured that within months there would be 'hardly a single Chinaman left in the Colony': trade would cease, the harbour would close and the newspapers—devoid of a readership—would be filled with nothing but plague statistics.[73] As one medical journal announced at the end of 1894, the plague in Hong Kong had revealed the importance of 'the gunboat as a sanitary agent': 'In many of our Eastern colonies the Chinese, in virtue of their numbers, their cohesiveness, and of their importance as a body to the commercial, manufacturing, agricultural, and labour markets, presume sometimes to dictate to the Government; by threats of strikes, of boycotting, and of riots they have, in more than one instance, gradually been permitted by weak-kneed and confiding governors to set up an *imperium in imperio*'.[74]

Yet for all the talk of panic and mob violence, the plague in Hong Kong did not trigger the collapse of the colony or the kinds of social and political disintegration so vividly imagined in official correspondence and news reports.[75] Instead, the plague in Hong Kong conjured up the spectre of an empire in reverse; no longer knitting together the scattered dominions of empire, imperial pathways—shipping lanes, railways and telegraphs—were fatally undermining the *pax imperia* with infective panic.[76] 'We are now a closed circuit—a machine complete and balanced in all its parts. Touch one and you influence all', wrote the politician and geographer Halford Mackinder at the turn of the twentieth century, noting the way in which global inter-connectedness had created the prospect of dangerous new volatility.[77]

Bombay: Microbes and Masses

In the subcontinent, the impact of the plague was on an altogether different scale. Plague arrived in Bombay—a city of some 850,000 people—in September 1896, with many commentators speculating that it had diffused westward from Hong Kong. From October 1896, Bombay's Municipal Commissioner, advised by the Surgeon General, had declared that all those afflicted by the disease would be forcefully isolated.[78] The Epidemic Diseases Act No. 3 passed in 1897 extended the sanitary measures across India, investing local authorities with supplementary powers.[79] Plague cases were segregated and relocated to 'health camps', with dwellings disinfected, evacuated or demolished. Attempts were made to confine the plague to Bombay, with travel and crowd prevention measures

enforced. Public meetings and Hindu festivals were curtailed, with the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca being prohibited in 1897.[80] If such interventions were themselves evidence of the state's panic, they fuelled 'a wild unreasoning panic' amongst sections of the local population.[81] As a medical journal noted in November 1896, there were 'elements to be dealt with besides the mere medical treatment of the disease, and at times these threaten to be serious. Numerous riots and disturbances of more or less magnitude are constantly being fomented'.[82]

As in Hong Kong, commentators noted how panic dispersed in a manner similar to the disease itself. Disease 'attacked' and 'spread' just as panic diffused through the violent crowds. The recurrence and interchangeability of the terms 'panic-stricken' and 'plague-stricken' in news reports reinforced this equivalence of panic with disease. Commentators worried about the contagious nature of native walkouts, which threatened to undermine preventative measures, since the colonial system was dependent on local policemen, railway workers, 'sepoys' and coolies to help with the disinfection of plague dwellings:

> Scattered as they [native sanitary workers] are through every portion of the city in large numbers, any unrest or tendency to strike among them immediately affects numerous other low-caste natives, and every development of panic or alarm straightway spreads to the immediate surrounding.[83]

One commonplace interpretation of panic was as an expression of the 'general terror of an Oriental population' in the face of new, progressive scientific methods. As *The Times* of London remarked in the wake of the plague riots: 'Almost every great reform which British rule has made in the cause of suffering humanity or of equal justice in India has been introduced amid a panic of opposition, often culminating in armed uprisings'.[84] Or as an editorial in *The Lancet* noted in the midst of the 1898 riots, the disturbances were the result of the 'logical methods' of the West running up against 'Oriental traditions and prejudices'. The imperative was not only to deal with the spread of disease, but also to assuage the 'fanaticism' of 'the teeming native populations of India'.[85]

In the investigations of the Indian Plague Commission, established in 1898 under the chairmanship of T.R. Fraser, as well as in numerous other reports, the 'segregation' of the sick was invariably juxtaposed against 'riotous' local crowds, native stampedes and colonial fears of 'a vast panic and exodus' of the population.[86] The aims of the Bombay Plague Committee

were explicitly 'to keep down the death-rate while preventing panic and trade dislocation'.[87] Enraged by colonial sanitary interventions, local crowds could turn into violent mobs, throwing stones, setting property alight and committing 'many grievous and some fatal assaults on Europeans'.[88] Medical and public health reports included accounts of the 'wholesale exodus of panic-stricken inhabitants'.[89] The emphasis focused on 'the prejudices of the masses'[90] and the chaos of the native throng desperate to flee the infected city:

> When the plague was at its height, and the exodus in full flow, the scenes at the railway stations were striking, a motley crowd of natives of every caste and creed, pressing, and shouting for tickets, and then, as the train steamed in a hurrying anxious throng, old and young alike, tottering under enormous bundles of household goods.[91]

Analogous to the disease panic, native strikes and labour unrest were viewed as infective: they diffused outwards from a 'massed' core, disrupting production and paralysing the city. Disease and unrest became facets of a compounded socio-pathological condition. Social phenomena were 'diagnosed' and a biomedical terminology was integrated into analyses and discussions of native unrest. Panic and 'unfounded and unreasonable fear',[92] for example, were seen as 'infecting' the mill-hands who gathered with sticks and stones outside the Arthur Road Hospital at the end of October 1896 intent on its demolition.[93] In 1897, the city was 'infested with numbers of starved idlers' and 'crowds of indigents' jeopardizing the labour market and posing 'a menace to public health'.[94] In early 1898, riots broke out with 'hysterical' crowds gathering to stone and mob sanitary inspectors. Disturbances spread through the city, prompting the mobilization of troops, and leading to dock and railway worker strikes.[95] Crowds were imagined through a pathological idiom as embodiments of plague. The emphasis was on numbers; on anonymous and savage collectives. 'King Mob', as one newspaper expressed it, 'was impervious to reason'.[96]

In his 1905 historical and epidemiological treatise on the Asian plague, William Simpson noted the 'particular danger attached to crowds moving from one place to another'.[97] Simpson's report shifts between macro and micro scales: while the unhealthy movement of crowds is deemed responsible for the dispersal of disease, the teeming multitudes are compared to the swarming 'crowds' of bacilli observable in the 'buboes'

(swollen lymph nodes) of a living patient under the microscope. Native masses become scaled-up equivalents of pathogenic agents:

> In the living plague patient the bacilli are generally very abundant in smear specimens of the contents of the buboes and in the sanguinolent effusion around them, crowds being seen in the microscopic field; they are not infrequently to be seen in the interior of the white blood corpuscles.[98]

Medical reports remarked on the ways in which the organs of those infected were 'crowded' with multiplying bacilli.[99] The language of the epidemiologist converged with that of the crowd psychologist. Pathogens behaved like crowds, just as crowds mimed the pathogenic processes of microbial life-forms. On the one hand, such formulations reaffirmed the assumptions of late nineteenth-century biology and biological sociology articulated by anthropologists and criminologists such as Scipio Sighele, author of *La delinquenza settaria* [*Sectarian Criminality*] (1897), who conceived of the crowd as a neurophysiological phenomenon. As J.S. McClelland has remarked: 'In the body cells suggest behaviour to cells, and in the crowd individuals suggest behaviour to individuals'.[100] On the other hand, there was an implicit analogy between the unsightly masses or 'buboes' caused by the disease and the 'masses' that threatened the state's stability. The plague-riddled bodies of the coolies, 'crowded' with bacilli and characterized by malignant masses, conflated with the overcrowded cities, massed with toxic detritus, which were home to the recalcitrant native 'masses'.[101]

Conclusion: Biology and the Socio-pathology of Panic

While David Arnold has noted the ways in which the plague epidemic in India legitimated colonial medicine's intrusive 'gaze' and its 'assault' on the native body,[102] the focus of this chapter has been on a counter-impulse: a colonial preoccupation, not with the individual body, but with the native 'mass'. For Arnold, the aim is to recover subaltern identities from the anonymous, 'jostling crowd'.[103] In contrast, the emphasis in this chapter has been on the crowd as a discursive phenomenon produced to account for specific behaviours, to attribute culpability and to justify the operations of the 'panicked' state.

Crowds in Hong Kong and Bombay were both medical and civic concerns, providing a context within which violence was understood as both crime and pathology. Yet despite their prominence in the colonial archive, crowds have received surprisingly little attention from historians of empire. This chapter contends that examining the feedback effects and entangled nature of panics in relation to the colonial crowd may reveal much, not only about the history of modern panic, but also about the history of empire in a period of simultaneous retrenchment and expansion. In so arguing, the chapter has sought to engage with two central themes of this edited collection: first, how imperial knowledge helped to generate new anxieties in the colonies, even as it provided a framework for conceptualizing those anxieties; and, second, how fears of violence permeated the relationship between the metropole and the colonies.

By the 1890s, the question 'what is a disease and how does is spread?' was closely linked to the question 'what is a crowd and how does it work?' Concerns with defining and understanding the dynamics of both phenomena—disease and crowds—often overlapped in official correspondence and reports. If the ontology of the crowd remained ambiguous, the identity of disease was also contested, despite the development of bacteriology and parasitology.[104] Monolithic but heterogeneous, characterized by incessant motion and lacking a fixed identity, the nebulous crowd resembled an infectious disease, which was increasingly defined on two scales: the microscopic and the macroscopic. While bacteriologists grappled with microbial disease agents, epidemiologists and public health officials sought to understand disease on the population level.

The concerns of laboratory science and public health with identifying the causative agents of infection and mapping the dynamics of their diffusion were intertwined with a socio-pathological discourse of crowd behaviour, with panic understood in bio-medical and social terms. As Robert Nye has observed, the reliance of late nineteenth-century crowd theorists 'on the mechanistic and structural terminology of the natural sciences not only helped the acceptance of their own writings, but gave them a substantial share of the responsibility for popularizing these same basic principles in the popular consciousness'.[105]

While late nineteenth-century accounts of crowds tended to emphasize their murderous and riotous natures—with crowds understood as 'something leprous' akin to a disease'[106]—the crowd was also conceived in terms of its liberating potential.[107] Similarly, if the panicked crowd undermined authority and challenged the rational basis of the state's operations, it also

provided opportunities for reinforcing and extending the institutions of the state, as well as testing scientific premises. Reading crowds in this way becomes a means of exploring how panic was understood to destabilize imperial networks, even as it held out possibilities of outspreading those networks over the perilously volatile masses of the governed.

NOTES

1. See Prashant Kidambi (2007: 23); W.J. Simpson (1903: 5–6, 22, 36).
2. Myron Echenberg (2007: 5).
3. Rajnarayan Chandavarkar (1998: 234–35).
4. James A. Lowson, 'The Epidemic of Bubonic Plague in Hongkong, 1894', *Hongkong Government Gazette*, 13 April 1895, pp. 369–422 (at p. 397); an estimated 20,489 died from the disease between 1894 and 1923; J.K. Condon (1900: 8). As David Arnold has noted, the plague in India 'was so massive in scale and so fraught with political, social and demographic consequences that it could sustain many different approaches and interpretations' (1987: 55).
5. David Lambert and Alan Lester (2006).
6. See David Arnold and Stuart H. Blackburn (2004); see also Clare Anderson (2012).
7. See, for example, Lowson, 'The Epidemic of Bubonic Plague', p. 372; W.F. Gatacre (1897: 51).
8. W.J. Simpson (1903: 3).
9. Daniel Pick (1989: 92); on the 'primivite' and 'modern' aspects of panic, see Peckham (2015: 4–7).
10. See, classically, George Rudé (1981 [1964]); on the changing nature of 'crowds' in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Britain, see Nicholas Rogers (1998).
11. On the crowd in nineteenth-century France, see Susanna Barrows (1981); J.S. McClelland (2010 [1989]).

12. Felicity Callard (2006: 873–89).
13. See, for example, Ian Hacking (1990); Theodore M. Porter (1986); Alain Desrosières (1998); Mary Poovey (1995).
14. 'Disease and Panic', *The Lancet* 142(3656) (23 September 1893), p. 754.
15. *The Times* (London), 8 February 1894, p. 3.
16. Mary Poovey (1995: 3–6). As Michael Tratner has noted, commentators have seen the nineteenth century as both 'the peak and the end of individualism' (1995: 7).
17. *La psychologie des foules* (1895) published in English as *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1896), pp. xix–xx. Le Bon drew on the work of Gabriel Tarde, Hippolyte Taine and Scipio Sighele, who had all developed theories of crowd behaviour.
18. On Le Bon as a medical pathologist, see Robert A. Nye (1975: 14).
19. Robert A. Nye (1975: 14).
20. Gustave Le Bon (1887); 'L'Algérie et les idées régnantes en France en matière de colonialisation', *Revue Scientifique* 15 (8 October 1887), pp. 448–57.
21. J.S. McClelland (2010 [1989]: 214).
22. Gwendolyn Wright (1991: 53).
23. General W. Booth (1890: 13).
24. For a locus classicus of China as the *officina gentium*, see Thomas De Quincey's *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater*, first published in the *London Magazine* in 1821 and afterwards in book form; see De Quincey (1823), which is discussed in Douglas Kerr (2008: 54).
25. Haun Saussy (2006: 250).
26. As Tie Xiao notes in his account of the crowd in early twentieth-century Chinese literature and thought, there was a similar ambivalence, and recognition of 'the antimony between terror and liberation' within the collective; see Tie Xiao (2011).
27. Christopher A. Bayly (1988: 169–99).
28. Douglas Kerr (2008: 59).
29. Jim Masselos (1993).
30. Rudyard Kipling (1899 [1890]): 64–65.
31. 'The Sanitary Condition of Bombay during the Recent Riots', *The Lancet* 142(3655) (16 September 1893), pp. 720–21.
32. Ross G. Forman (2013: 130–60).
33. Gustave Le Bon (1896: 8).
34. Gustave Le Bon (1896: xviii).
35. The theme of the 'immense [native] crowd' is poignantly broached by George Orwell in his essay 'Shooting an Elephant' (1936), where 'the sneering yellow faces' of the coolie mob incite the protagonist police officer to violence; see George Orwell (2003: 31–40).

36. Bernard S. Cohn (1996: 10).
37. On the 1901 census, see Richard Harris and Robert Lewis (2013). Douglas Kerr offers insightful readings of literary texts to explore how 'the East has been imagined in the figure of the crowd' (2008: 53–78).
38. 'Notes from India (The Plague in India)', *The Lancet* 151(3891) (26 March 1898), pp. 898–99 (at p. 898).
39. Bernard S. Cohn (1987: 224–54); see also Richard Harris and Robert Lewis (2013).
40. Rajnarayan Chandavarkar (1998: 228–29).
41. Michael Valdez Moses (2007: 44–45).
42. 'India', *The Times* (London), 10 January 1887, p. 5.
43. W.J. Simpson (1903: 22).
44. E.J. Eitel (1895: i).
45. Osbert Chadwick (1882: 9).
46. James H. Stewart Lockhart, 'Census Report 1891', *Hongkong Sessional Papers*, 15 August 1891, pp. 373–95 (at pp. 374–75).
47. E.J. Eitel (1895: 279).
48. W.J. Simpson (1903: 6). Simpson had been sent to Hong Kong in January 1902 by Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
49. W.J. Simpson (1903: 35–36).
50. Robert Peckham (2016a).
51. W.J. Simpson (1903: 6).
52. The instability and heterogeneity of the crowd has historically been likened to water, tides, seas and ocean storms; see Jeffrey T. Schnapp (2006: 1–45) ('Tides', 3–7). The water metaphor was to reach its culmination in a colonial context, perhaps, in Benjamin Kidd's assertion that 'in the tropics the white man lives and works only as a diver lives and works under water'; see Benjamin Kidd (1898: 54); 'Floating population' had similar connotations in Chinese; see Li Zhang (2001: 33).
53. Ross G. Forman (2013: 130).
54. Ross G. Forman (2013: 139).
55. James Cantlie (1890; 1897). On Chinese 'slums' and zoomorphic images, see Robert Peckham (2016b: 44).
56. 'The Plague in Hongkong', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 21 May 1894, p. 2; 'The Plague in Hongkong', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 22 May 1894, p. 2.
57. 'The Plague in Hongkong', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 21 May 1894, p. 2.
58. 'Hongkong Sanitary Board', *Hongkong Daily Press*, 10 May 1894, p. 2.
59. 'Crowds and Cholera', *The Lancet* 140(3594) (16 July 1892), p. 158.
60. Osbert Chadwick (1882); P.B.C. Ayres, 'Report of the Colonial Surgeon for 1894', *Hongkong Government Gazette*, 12 August 1895, pp. 906–915 (at p. 912).

61. 'Sanitation Among Chinese', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 22 May 1894, p. 2; however, Chadwick was, on the whole, sympathetic to the plight of the Chinese.
62. W.J. Simpson (1905: 201).
63. 'The Plague in Hongkong', *The Times* (London), 28 August 1894, p. 6.
64. Sir William Robinson to Lord Ripon, 20 June 1894, Great Britain, Colonial Office, General Correspondence: Hong Kong, 1841–1951, Series 129, CO129/163, pp. 457–78, Public Record Office, Kew, London.
65. 'The Plague in Hongkong', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 21 May 1894, p. 2.
66. 'The Plague', *Hongkong Daily Press*, 21 May 1894, p. 2.
67. Sir William Robinson to Lord Ripon, 23 May 1894, CO129/163, pp. 175–93; see also the dispatch of 24 May with an enclosure from the British Consul at Canton.
68. 'The Anti-foreign Riot in Canton', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 14 June 1894, p. 2; 'Anti-foreign Riot in Canton', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 12 June 1894, p. 3.
69. 'The Anti-foreign Riot in Canton', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 14 June 1894, p. 2.
70. See M. Keith Booker's analysis of George Orwell's account of teeming crowds in Marrakech in M. Keith Booker (1997: 78).
71. Douglas Kerr (2008: 53).
72. Sir William Robinson to Lord Ripon, 20 June 1894, CO129/163, pp. 457–78.
73. 'Hongkong Six Months Hence', *Hongkong Telegraph*, 15 June 1894, p. 2.
74. 'The Gunboat as a Sanitary Agent', *British Medical Journal* 2(1772) (15 December 1894), p. 1389.
75. Robert Peckham (2013: 212).
76. On the ways in which telegraphy worked to undermine colonial order, see Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury (2010).
77. Halford Mackinder (1900: 271); see also Robert Peckham (2013: 216).
78. M.E. Couchman (1897: 3–5).
79. M.E. Couchman (1897: 32).
80. See Saurabh Mishra (2011).
81. M.E. Couchman (1897: 10).
82. 'The Plague in Bombay', *British Medical Journal* 2(1874) (28 November 1896), p. 1606.
83. M.E Couchman (1897: 11); see also Ian J. Catanach (2007: 241–67); Rajnarayan Chandavarkar (1992: 203–40); Ian J. Catanach (1988: 149–71); Ira Klein (1988: 723–55).
84. 'Indian Affairs', *The Times* (London), 14 March 1898, p. 7.

85. 'Fanaticism, Sanitary Methods, and the Spread of Plague', *The Lancet* 151(3890) (19 March 1898), pp. 797–98.
86. M.E. Couchman (1897: 12).
87. Sir James MacNabb Campbell (1898: 59).
88. Sir James MacNabb Campbell (1898: 24).
89. 'The Plague in Calcutta', *The Lancet* 152(3916) (17 September 1898), pp. 738–42; 'The Plague', *The Times* (London), 15 January 1897, p. 5
90. W.F. Gatacre (1897: 205).
91. M.E. Couchman (1897: 21). For a discussion of Bombay railway stations as sites of plague panic, see Robert Peckham (2016a: 132–33), where this passage is discussed.
92. Robert Nathan (1898: III: 293).
93. Robert Nathan (1898: I: 136).
94. Sir James MacNabb Campbell (1898: 4).
95. See 'Plague Riots at Bombay', *The Times* (London), 10 March 1898, p. 5.
96. Quoted in David Arnold (1987: 68).
97. W.J. Simpson (1905: 199–200, 357).
98. W.J. Simpson (1905: 82).
99. Advisory Committee for Plague Investigations in India, 'Report on Plague Investigations in India', *Journal of Hygiene* 7 (10 July 1907): 323–476 (at 399); Carol Benedict (1996: 141).
100. J.S. McClelland (2010 [1989]: 168); see also Scipio Sighele (1895).
101. See, here, Erin O'Connor's perceptive analysis of cancer and 'masses' (2000: 60–101).
102. David Arnold (1993: 200–39).
103. David Arnold (1993: 1–7).
104. See Michael Worboys (2000). Worboys is interested in the plurality of germ theories current between 1865 and 1900.
105. Robert A. Nye (1975: 12).
106. Elias Canetti, quoted in Christian Borch (2012: 237).
107. Robert A. Nye (1975: 42).

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[1] Note: Page numbers followed by "n" denote notes.