



# A History of Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Christian Political Values



Dennis J. Dunn

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Dennis J. Dunn  
Texas State University  
San Marcos, USA

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
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Dennis J. Dunn  
San Marcos, Texas



# Growth of Western Values



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## Introduction

On 11 September 2001, 19 Islamic jihadists, mostly from Saudi Arabia and all members of *Al Qaeda*, a Sunni Muslim terrorist group, hijacked and crashed four passenger jets in the USA, with a total loss of almost 3000 lives. Osama bin Laden, the *Al Qaeda* founder, justified their action on religious grounds, declaring Americans were disbelievers in the *Koran* and *Sharia* and fought against Allah in the cause of Satan.<sup>1</sup> Beginning in the summer of 2014 another Sunni Muslim extremist called Daesh in Arabic or ISIS or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant) and led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi committed and continues to commit atrocities in Syria and Iraq, particularly against Christians, Shiite and pro-Western Muslims, and other sects. It also vowed to conquer Rome, the historical capital of Western Civilization, and build an Islamic caliphate to rule the world. On 13 November 2015, Daesh committed mass murder in the streets of Paris and took credit for blowing up two weeks earlier a Russian civilian jetliner over Egypt.

In March 2014, Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine, annexed Ukraine's Crimea into Russia, and mobilized troops on Ukraine's eastern border in support of Russian-backed separatists because, he charged, Western Europe and the USA "have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism" and push a Western agenda around the world that was "aimed against Ukraine and Russia," lands that have a common Orthodox culture and "cannot live without each other."<sup>2</sup> The Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate endorsed the Russian aggression and claimed, "the Russian people are a divided nation on their historic territory that have the right

to reunite in one state body.”<sup>3</sup> On 30 September 2015, Putin intervened in the Syrian Civil War by bombing both Daesh and pro-Western Sunni Muslims who are opposed to his and Iran’s ally, the Alawite, Shia-affiliated Assad regime in Damascus. The USA and the Sunni Muslim governments of Turkey and Saudi Arabia objected to Putin’s action, and Turkey on 24 November 2015 shot down a Russian bomber that crossed into Turkish air space.

In 2014, Pope Francis I beckoned Muslim and other world leaders to halt the butchers of Daesh and condemn and stop those who use religion to commit murder, terrorism, and atrocities. In June 2015, he pointedly urged Putin “to engage in a sincere and great effort to achieve peace” in Ukraine. In September 2015, at the United Nations (UN), he pleaded with the international community to reject “nationalistic or falsely universalist ideologies”; stop and prevent “systematic violence against ethnic and religious minorities”; and “protect innocent people” caught in the throes of sectarian wars.<sup>4</sup> In November 2015, in Africa, he implored Muslims and Christians to work together and to “say no to hatred, to revenge and to violence.”<sup>5</sup>

Why did Osama bin Laden, Daesh or ISIS, and other Muslim extremists commit murder and acts of terrorism in the name of religion and vow to conquer Rome? Why did Putin attack Ukraine and the West, and look to Orthodoxy for justification? Why did Pope Francis step up and condemn violence by Muslim extremists and push Putin to relent in his aggression against Ukraine? Why was and is the West at the center of this turmoil and the common enemy of Osama bin Laden, Vladimir Putin, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? Why has and is religion playing such a momentous role in world affairs?

This book tries to answer these questions and many more related to the strained relationship between the West, Russia, and the world of Islam. It argues that the tension between the West and Russia and Islamic groups and nations is not new. It is part of a struggle that started almost two millennia ago when Christianity first appeared and spawned two divergent, world religions, Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, which, in turn, helped generate and profoundly influence two distinct value systems, which were embedded in and reflective of two large cultural orders called the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire, which appeared in the fourth century, and Christendom or Western Civilization or, more simply, the West, which was a new culture that had to be built from scratch because of German destruction of the western part of the Roman Empire and,

accordingly, evolved slowly from the fourth to the eleventh and twelfth centuries. A third world religion, Islam, appeared in the seventh century. Because it was both a religion and a military-political order and used its military to conquer settled civilizations in Persia, India, and the Byzantine Empire, it was able to use existing infrastructure to produce an Islamic state and yet a third value system in the seventh and eighth centuries.

There were more ancient religions, traditions, and civilizations in the world, including Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, and others, and they all performed critical roles in setting up and maintaining social order, morality, and political identity for their followers. They also expanded, particularly Buddhism, by virtue of trade, military conquest, borderland proximity, voluntary conversions, or diasporas. However, these ancient orders were not as a rule purposely expansive, aggressive, and promotive of a core value system for all of mankind. For the most part, they championed self-contained, quiescent, and harmonious orders—islands of civilization in a turbulent sea—but none of them, except Buddhism, was a world religion, and none, including Buddhism, sought to unite the human family on the basis of its values.

The Orthodox, Islamic, and Western orders, on the other hand, were quite expansionist. They were determined to tame the sea and connect the islands of civilization in a broad archipelago anchored by their value systems, which were based partly on beliefs that they claimed derived from divine revelation and partly on other sources that included Judaism, the customs of founding tribes and nations, and the multifaceted traditions of Greek and Roman Civilizations, which the religions approved of and blessed as having truth and merit. These three orders, and these alone, were and are the reason that the world today talks of globalization, global interdependency, and global civilization.

As they developed and organized their global missions, these three dynamic value systems built impressive, high cultures. They also interacted with and cross-fertilized one another and shared, directly or indirectly, some ideas, institutions, and technology. Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Civilizations were interdependent. They also borrowed from the other non-expansionist orders of the civilized world, particularly India and China, and consistently showed an uncanny ability to adapt to and absorb local cultures and environments. In fact, over the long span of history, they intermingled so much that one could argue that they all—both the expansionist and non-expansionist orders—aided the rise of global civilization and provided insight into human nature and truth.

Nonetheless, even though the world's civilizations interacted and were interdependent, the Orthodox, Islamic, and Western value systems and political identities were different and evolved into rival approaches on how best to organize a global order. They stood for and effected ideas and institutions within society that led to alternative, often adversarial, blueprints of development. The historical struggle among these value systems ebbed and flowed but constituted an overarching trajectory that pitted them against one another on multiple fronts following the collapse of the Roman Empire and often led to the destruction of the customs and sometimes the inhabitants of other civilizations. The word "civilization" is an unwieldy and vague term because it implies that there were clear-cut, cultural orders that were independent of one another. That was not the case. It is also deficient because we are already in an age of a single global civilization that has superseded Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Civilizations. It is used in this book only as a shorthand way to refer to shared values and political identity, which were different and distinct and tended to subsume but not negate nation, race, ethnicity, and language differences.

In the struggle to set up a global value system, Orthodox Civilization appeared as if it would be the dominant order once the western part of the Roman Empire disintegrated. Then in the seventh and eighth centuries, Islamic Civilization seemed to be positioned to be the values hegemon. However, starting in the late eleventh century Western Civilization moved toward a leadership role. Both Orthodox and Islamic cultures slowly but surely started to adjust and attenuate parts of their value system in favor of Western values. The transformation was taxing, drawn out, and destabilizing because it entailed tampering with foundational principles and political identity. Nonetheless, by the advent of the twentieth century the West saw its values, if not its beliefs, approaching global dominance.

In the first three decades of the twentieth century Orthodox Russia experienced four revolutions, which amounted to a fateful fight over Western values. In the Revolution of 1905 the tsar committed to constitutional government, freedom of religion, basic human rights, and private property. However, he involved Russia in foreign entanglements in the Balkans and Central Europe that led to what became World War I, backtracked on his Westernizing policies, and abdicated in a Second Revolution in February 1917. The new government that replaced him, called the Provisional Government, put Russia back on the road to Westernization, but it failed to match its rhetoric with policies and ultimately failed to withdraw Russia from World War I, which opened the door to a Third

Revolution in October 1917 that brought to power a Radical Left extremist group called the Bolshevik or Communist Party. This fanatical element was determined to abort the growth of Western values in Russia and around the world. It created a new empire called the Soviet Union or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The Communists were particularly interested in ending private ownership of land and, ironically, wiping out religiously based values. However, they quickly discovered that they did not have the power to reverse the peasants' determination to become landowners, so they acquiesced in peasant control of the land from 1921 to 1928 while they assembled their coercive instruments, the secret police (variously named the Cheka, the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD), and the Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (KGB), the gulag prison system, and the Red Army. In October 1928 they launched the Fourth Revolution called Collectivization, which was a full-scale attack upon the peasants and bourgeois values in Russia and ended up in a sanguinary totalitarian regime that stymied the growth of Western values in Soviet Russia for most of the remainder of the twentieth century.

The new Soviet state also fomented international revolution in an attempt to overturn the existing global order and replace it with Communist societies governed by the Soviet Union. Its support of revolution helped spark anti-Communist Radical Right parties in Italy, Germany, and Japan, which were also energized by disenchantment over the outcome of World War I and the effects of the Great Depression. It also led to fears of Communism in Eastern Europe, Great Britain, France, and the USA, and played no small role in Western governments' appeasement of the Radical Right, which championed anti-Communism.

However, the aggression of Germany, Italy, and Japan soon threatened peace across Europe and Asia and forced other nations to put their aversion to Communism and its values on hold until they stopped the Radical Right. A Western-dominated alliance that ironically included the Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and their allies in East Europe in World War II. With that victory, Westernization expanded anew. In an amazing advance, epitomized by the formation of the UN and the European Union (EU), Western core values revived across Europe and spread around the globe.

The challenge of the Radical Left and Soviet totalitarianism, though, remained. Here the West, led by the USA and its allies, especially the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Greece, and, significantly, a Westernizing

Turkey, opposed the Communist camp for over half a century in the so-called Cold War. In 1989, the Soviet Empire in East Europe fell and in 1991 the Soviet Union imploded. The Communist model was soon discarded or modified everywhere with the sole exception of North Korea.

With the waning of Communism, Western values grew in the Orthodox countries of Bulgaria and Romania. They also found significant support in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia. Of course, traditional Western states that had been held by force in the Soviet Union—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—and in the Soviet Empire—Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary—quickly reasserted Western values. By 2014, the EU membership counted 28 countries and the UN had 193 members.

Even in the land of Russia, as it recovered from the nightmare of Communism, a reinvigorated Orthodox order sprouted and took steps toward blending its rich cultural legacy with a world moving closer together on the basis of shared values. The Russian Orthodox Church, in particular, experienced freedom and showed signs of renewal and growth. Then, rather precipitously, Vladimir Putin stymied the anabasis of Western values. He subordinated the Orthodox Church to the Kremlin and attempted to push around the world an antiquated version of Orthodox Civilization where the watchwords were autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Russian nationalism. His aggression and myopia hurt Russia, destabilized global order and peace, and stoked enmity between Russia and the West. Russian genius and talent are sorely needed today to help lead the modern global order, but Putin is a policeman, not a philosopher king.

The Islamic world traveled along the same road as Orthodox Russia, except its timing and pace were different. Throughout the twentieth century, Sunni Islamic states like Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia embraced a variety of Western values. Shiite and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East also embarked on a journey to the West, but their path was blocked toward the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century by Islamic fundamentalist groups, like *Al Qaeda* and Daesh, which aimed to replace Western influence in the Middle East and the world with an Islamic order based upon a fundamentalist reading of the *Koran* and the *Hadith*, the sayings and acts of the Prophet Muhammad. Their actions and the anti-Western attitudes of some Islamic intellectuals, who resent Western support of Israel and of the place of Muslims in the emerging modern world, precipitated severe strain between Islamic and Western societies and helped produce chaos and civil war in Asia and Africa.

Nonetheless, Western values continued to evolve around the globe and found increasing acceptance in the Sunni and Shiite world of the Middle East. The so-called Arab Spring and the Iran nuclear agreement in 2015 were and are about growing Westernization. It would not be surprising to see the Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists suffer the same fate as the Communists did in Russia because most Sunni and Shiites, even though they are at odds with one another, are interested in harmonizing Western and Islamic values, not in endorsing fundamentalist ideology. In September 2015, Pope Francis addressed the UN, a product of the Western global order, and urged its delegates to go beyond words and pursue policies to facilitate “human fraternity”; the “rule of law”; justice on the basis of giving “to each his own”; education and self-development, particularly for girls and women; global sustainability; the phasing out of nuclear weapons; and many other ideas based on religious values. His speech was a tour de force before world leaders, including Orthodox and Muslims, who wildly applauded his exhortations.<sup>6</sup>

The world is presently at a crossroads. A global civilization has crystallized and continues to evolve, and Western core values seem to be at its core, but outliers of both Orthodox and Islamic traditions have resisted that global order, so the struggle for a common value system for an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world persists. Nonetheless, in the long perspective of history, there was and seems to continue to be a growing acceptance of Western core values around the globe, including countries with an Orthodox and Islamic heritage.

Part 1 of this book is devoted to describing briefly the history and core political values of Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Civilizations. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the history of Orthodox Civilization and then summarizes its religio-political values. Chapter 3 looks at the history of Islamic Civilization and then describes its religio-political values. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the history of Western Civilization and then turns to a description of its religio-political culture.

Part 2 of this book describes the struggle of these value systems in modern times. Chapter 5 examines Russian Orthodox Civilization’s climactic contest with Western values in the twentieth century. It describes the four revolutions that occurred in Russia in the early part of the twentieth century—revolutions that brought the values rivalry to a head in Russia and around the globe. It reexamines the Third or Communist Revolution in Russia, which saw an extreme Radical Left group take power in October 1917 and launch policies to topple Western governments and nip in the

but the growth of Western values in Russia, particularly private ownership of land, with its policy of Collectivization in 1928–1932, which I call Russia’s Fourth Revolution. The actions of the Radical Left helped stimulate a counterbalancing Radical Right movement in the West, which was reinforced by the consequences of World War I and the Great Depression and which the major Western states had to defeat before they could deal with Russia’s misery and threat to global peace and cooperation. This chapter concludes with a brief outline of the defeat of the Radical Right countries and the inadvertent survival and expansion of Communism after World War II.

Chapter 6 studies the West’s contest with the Radical Left, with Soviet Russia—the so-called Cold War—and of its defeat of Soviet Russia. It also covers the simultaneous and continuing expansion of Western values around the globe.

Chapter 7 looks at the attempt since the 1990s of some extremist Islamic elements to reassert a version of Islamic values as a counter to Western values. It highlights the growth of *Al Qaeda* and other radical Muslim groups and the reaction of the West and the Islamic world to these movements.

Chapter 8 brings the story up to the present-day by describing the relationship between the leading nations, institutions, and groups that advocate for Orthodox, Islamic, and Western values. It notes that Russia under Vladimir Putin and some Islamic groups continue to challenge Westernization, so the struggle to establish a value system for global cooperation and unity goes on, but it also concludes that the majority of the peoples of the world, including Orthodox and Muslim citizens, seem to favor some version or adaptation of Western values. Chapter 9 offers a summary and a conclusion.

This book is a provocative study devoted to comprehending and comparing the history, political identities, and values of Orthodox, Islamic and Western culture in order to better understand the history of the world in which we live. It holds that religion and sacred moral traditions are pivotal in international affairs, not just in the past, which everyone acknowledges, but now, in the present. It further asserts that Orthodoxy, Islam, and Western Christianity influenced the development of religio-political values that are in a struggle to define the ideas and institutions of a burgeoning global civilization. Finally, it gives new insight on where the world community might be evolving.

## NOTES

1. Bin Ladin (2002).
2. Putin (2014).
3. Klymenko (2014), p. 9.
4. Francis (2014 a, b, c, 2015 a, b).
5. *New York Times*, 30 November 2015.
6. Francis (2015b).

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## PART I

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# Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Civilizations: Political Values

Orthodoxy, Islam, and Western Christianity were and are world religions that seek fellowship, peace, unity, and cooperation among peoples. As they expanded, they influenced the birth and evolution of values among their followers, which have been articulated by and reflected in various political iterations. The religions did not predetermine the values, but helped shape them as they evolved within existing cultural and geographical milieus. A systematic comparison of these values provides some insight into historical and contemporary political identities. It also sheds light on potential points of conflict and cooperation among states that continue to reflect Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Christian influences today.

## CHAPTER 2

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# Orthodox Civilization

*[The Byzantine Empire] saw itself as a universal Empire. Ideally it should embrace all the peoples of the earth, who, ideally, should all be members of the one true Christian Church, its own Orthodox Church.*

*Sir Stephen Runciman (1977) *The Byzantine Theocracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 1.*

*[Byzantium] was, in principle, a totalitarian culture claiming a Christian (orthodox) sanctification of the whole life: state, war, economics, family, schools, art, and learning.*

*G. P. Fedotov (1960) *The Russian Religious Mind*, Vol. 1 (New York: Harper Torchbooks), p. 26.*

## BRIEF HISTORY

By the end of the third and beginning of the fourth century, CE, the Roman Empire was dying. Its boundary was a focus of defense rather than a jumping off point of expansion, and enemies and invaders, from Sassanid Persia in the east to German tribes in the west, kept up a steady drumbeat of attacks to breach the border. Ambitious generals, who were now needed more than ever to defend the Empire, competed with one another for power and engaged in debilitating civil wars. Power flowed to the strong man, and the only recognized principle for selecting new leaders was victory in war.

Into the fading world of Rome came Christianity. It was a monotheistic religion based upon the teachings of Jesus Christ who was born around

4–6 BCE in the town of Bethlehem in the Judaea province of the Roman Empire during the reign of King Herod, the Roman governorship of Pontius Pilot, and the emperorship of Tiberius.<sup>1</sup> Jesus was a Jew and his message was inseparable from Judaism, a profound religion of law. Jesus maintained and his followers, called Christians, believed that he was God incarnate, the second person of the Holy Triune God who consisted of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the messiah whom the Jews had been expecting. However, he came not to set up a Jewish kingdom on earth, but to inform all men, not just the Jews, thus inaugurating the first religion of universal fellowship, that God wanted them not only to obey revealed law, the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, but also to follow and move toward him by growing in faith, hope, and, above all, charity (1 Cor 13: 1-13; Matt 5: 3-12). Christ affirmed that the revealed truth that the Jews held sacred—that God was a monotheistic God of mercy and justice, that man was made in the image and likeness of God, and that man was destined to be with God if he followed God’s law, a sacred covenant between God and his creatures—but then he offered a deeper exhortation, a sort of enhancement of the covenant, namely that God wanted man to love one another without qualification and showed what he meant by submitting to death by crucifixion and then rose from the dead, teaching men that they will find eternal life through sacrifice of self. Christ urged men to exercise their God-given free will and reason to discover God, to be with God, to follow God’s laws, to love one another, and to reject sin, a powerful tendency in man toward self-indulgence and hubris that led to destruction and disorder. At death, they would be judged. Christ knew that the challenge of fellowship and followership would be difficult and promised that God would help his creatures on this pilgrimage by imparting grace to them through his direct intercession and through a sacramental Church, which he founded to carry on, interpret, and spread his message to all corners of the earth until his return, called the Second Coming, at the end of time.

Christianity appealed to a wide spectrum of people—elites, working class poor, slaves, and women—and quickly spread to reach by the beginning of the fourth century about ten percent of the population of the Roman Empire.<sup>2</sup> It was a breathtaking, incredible expansion, given that there was no compulsion involved. In 110 CE St. Ignatius of Antioch called the faith “catholic,” a reference to the international or universal mission of Christianity. Chrst’s teaching was described in the New Testament, which was written mainly in the first century C.E. by Christ’s disciples and put together with the Old Testament to form the Bible and sanctioned as

Christianity's canonized gospel by the Christian Church—the organized and hierarchically-led community of believers—some centuries later. It was a book of layered meaning and thus subject to interpretation over time and in light of St. Paul's exhortation that "the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" (2 Cor 3: 6).<sup>3</sup>

The Roman government at first did not know what to make of the mushrooming Christian Church. It was peaceful and it accepted prevailing political authority. That was good. However, it objected to emperor worship, pagan deities, military service, war, and theoretically to slavery, a key plank in Rome's economy.<sup>4</sup> It exhibited exclusivity, carried an air of arrogance and superiority, talked endlessly about its God as the only God, and engaged in a mass ceremony where it celebrated Christ's message of love and had its followers eat the Eucharist—which it claimed was the body and blood of Christ, transformed from bread and wine through powers given by God to priests through the sacrament of Holy Orders. That was bad.

In the end the government decided to persecute it. As early as Emperor Nero in the first century CE, persecution commenced, but it was sporadic and ineffective. In the third century, Emperor Diocletian (r. 284–305 CE) decided to launch a more focused persecution in order to destroy Christianity. By then he had also divided the Empire into an Eastern and Western administration, each with its own Augustus and Caesar, which he thought would halt the debilitating civil war that usually followed an imperial vacancy. He thought that an attack upon Christianity, the return of paganism and emperor worship, and the creation of a system to predict political succession were the remedies necessary to stabilize the Roman Empire.<sup>5</sup>

However, Diocletian's policies failed to halt the Roman Empire's decline. With his retirement in 305, civil war erupted again among ambitious generals, now fighting for the positions of co-Augustus and co-Caesar. In 312, at the battle of Milvian Bridge, Constantine (r. 312–337) proved victorious and assumed power as the Roman Emperor. In 313, he changed Diocletian's policy of persecution and granted toleration to Christianity with the proclamation of the Edict of Milan.<sup>6</sup> In 330, he founded Constantinople on the bones of a small, Greek fishing village called Byzantium, which became the capital city of the Eastern half of the Roman Empire and was often called the Second Rome or Nova Roma. He also created the new position of patriarch of Constantinople, which now gave the Church five patriarchs, including the bishops of Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, and he called upon the bishops to summarize the key beliefs of Christianity, which produced the Nicene

Creed. In 380, the Emperor Theodosius made Christianity the state religion of the Roman Empire.

Constantine's ascension to power and support for Christianity ended the growing chaos in the Eastern half of the Empire and signaled the beginning of both Orthodox Civilization and its first political iteration called the Byzantine Empire, which Constantine's successors carefully cultivated.<sup>7</sup> However, stability in the East did not stop the implosion of the Western half of the Empire, which was drowning under a flood of German tribes, who were illiterate, uncivilized barbarians who had little knowledge and appreciation of Rome's high culture. With imperial authority collapsing in the West, culminating ultimately with the replacement of the Western emperor in 476, the bishop of Rome, also called the pope from the Greek word "pappas" or "father," did his best to maintain order and to work with the various German chieftains, but he was also ultimately counting upon the government in the East to provide security and protection. He had Papal legates, official representatives of the Apostolic See, in Constantinople to represent him and to push to have imperial troops counter and control the German onslaught.

The Byzantines wanted to help the West, but in the fourth and fifth centuries they were engaged in war or cold war with the Persian Empire and thus prevented from conducting large-scale military operations in the West. In the course of the sixth century the tide of battle turned in Constantinople's favor. By the reign of Emperor Justinian (r. 527–565 CE) the Persians slipped into an internecine struggle. With that development, the Byzantine Empire finally had an opening to try to restore imperial rule in the West. Justinian was able to retake Italy, Spain, and North Africa, and establish some influence in Visigothic Spain. His reign was constructive and positive. His major accomplishment was producing a new codification of Roman Law called the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. It was a magnificent achievement. In the East, it reinforced the sinews and foundation of autocratic order. In the West, the *Corpus* gave the pope and the Church the basis for blending natural law and German customary law in order to build what became Western Civilization.

Justinian's reign also provided a solid example of how the rule of law had come to transcend personal ambition in the Christian Roman Empire. Belisarius, the Byzantine general who conquered the Ostrogoths and other German tribes in Italy, was asked by the Germans to be the emperor of the West, an offer that many military commanders would have taken in the tumultuous days of the Late Empire. However, he rejected the proposal and dutifully returned to Constantinople.

By the end of the reign of Justinian, new threats from pillaging Slavs, Avars, and Bulgars in the Balkans and the lands above the Black Sea assailed the Byzantine Empire. And then the Persians recovered and once again slammed into the eastern side of the Byzantine Empire. By the reign of Emperor Heraclius (r. 610–641), Persian armies controlled Syria and Palestine, invaded Egypt, and stood at the edge of the Bosphorus across from Constantinople.

In response to the Persian menace, Emperor Heraclius stripped the frontier provinces of Byzantine troops, gave up most of Justinian's conquests in the West, except for Sicily and a few footholds on the Italian peninsula, reconfigured the Byzantine Empire as a Greek state, and concentrated on the Byzantine Empire's main enemy, the Persians. With resolve and tenacity, Constantinople held up against a combined siege in 626 by Persian, Slavs, and Avar forces, and then, in a remarkable about-face, Byzantine armies under Heraclius decisively defeated and broke the back of Persian power at the Battle of Nineveh in 627.

With that triumph, the Byzantine Empire emerged as the dominant power in the Mediterranean world. Emperor Heraclius toured Persia, assumed the Persian title of king of kings, and visited Jerusalem where he returned relics believed to be from the True Cross that the Persians had looted. The lands that he ruled stretched from Armenia to Anatolia to Persia to Mesopotamia to Syria to Palestine to Arabia to Egypt to North Africa to southern Italy. He also strengthened Greek influence in the Balkans. The Greeks also planned on returning to claim control of the West and to bring the pope under their control.<sup>8</sup>

The future looked bright for the expansion of the Byzantine Empire, and for a time it did grow. It established an Orthodox commonwealth by converting the Serbs in the seventh century, the Bulgarians in the eighth century, and the East Slavs, who eventually emerged as the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian peoples, in the tenth century and established the state called Kievan Rus with a capital at Kiev on the Dnieper River.<sup>9</sup> Increasingly, however, the Orthodox states ran up against the fierce world of Islam, which conquered Persia, Egypt, Syria, North Africa, and the Turkish tribes of Central Asia. On 19 August 1071, the Seljuk Turks devastated the Byzantine army at the Battle of Manzikert. The Greeks lost Asia Minor, which was their breadbasket, catchment area for army recruits, and land shield for Constantinople.<sup>10</sup> In 1240, the Mongols, who were converts to Islam, conquered Kievan Rus and made it a satellite of their empire, calling it the Golden Horde. In 1453, the Ottoman Turks finished off the Byzantine Empire and made Constantinople the capital

of the Ottoman Empire. Islamic values now eclipsed Orthodox values in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and part of the Balkans.

However, the Russians picked up the banner of Orthodox culture and became the heroes and defenders of the Orthodox world. The Russians were the most eastern of the East Slavic tribes. The western East Slavic tribes, the Ukrainians and Belorussians, slipped under the control of the Catholic Poles and Lithuanians in the late fourteenth century after the Lithuanians delivered a major defeat to a Mongol army in 1362 at the Battle of Blue Waters.<sup>11</sup> The Russians remained under the Mongol yoke until 1480, when they forced the Mongols to retreat, established the state of Muscovy, and determined to gather under their national rule all of the East Slavic peoples and their lands and to promote and expand the value system of Orthodox Civilization across Europe and Asia in the face of both Islamic and Western Civilizations. Muscovy, which changed its name to the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century under Peter the Great (r. 1689–1725), was the second political iteration of Orthodox values. It largely replicated the Byzantine Empire except that its advocacy of divine right absolutism reflected some of the arbitrariness of Mongol despotism and showed a certain penchant for the use of force and violence to effect order and for treating the will of the ruling prince or tsar as the “living law.”<sup>12</sup> It was also much more nationalistic, projecting the Russian nation as the agent of God and as the savior and defender of God’s people and truth. In the sixteenth century the Russians proclaimed Moscow to be the Third Rome, the true successor of the Roman Empire and defender of the Orthodox faith.<sup>13</sup> Until the Communist Revolution in 1917, they proved to be stalwart advocates of the core values of Orthodox society.

Below there is an attempt to list the major values of Orthodox Civilization. Inevitably, there is some overlap among the values on the list because they are interrelated and difficult to separate out, but it is important to try to elicit the nuances in order to compare Orthodox values with Islamic and Western values.

## POLITICAL VALUES OF ORTHODOX CIVILIZATION

### *Autocracy and Absolutism*

The main political institution in Byzantine and Russian Orthodox societies was autocracy where the ruler in theory wielded absolute power and claimed to be the representative or Elect of Christianity’s monotheistic

God.<sup>14</sup> Christianity believed that all power, including political power, came from God and, thus, it could coexist with any type of political order that provided it with security and religious toleration, including absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Its focus was on God, salvation, and souls, not politics. In the East, it came to life in an established political order that was already autocratic, so it accommodated itself to that reality. It bowed to and invested the state with sacredness and the autocrat with divine agency.

Under the Russians, sacred autocracy was reaffirmed as a core value of Orthodox Civilization. The Russians buttressed this form of government from their own experience under the Mongols, who had imposed a harsh despotism on them, and came to view the emperor's opinion as the equivalent of the rule of law. They, like the Greeks, offered up a credible, cohesive hero's narrative, reinforced by bishops and clerics throughout the Empire, which bound the citizens to a political configuration—the Orthodox Empire—that was directed by God and had God's Elect—the emperor—as its leader. Ivan the Terrible, who ruled the Russians in the sixteenth century summed up the key political difference between Orthodox society in Russia and the West when he complained to his recalcitrant noble, Andrei Kurbskii, who had taken sides with the Catholic Lithuanians against Ivan, “their [Catholic] rulers do not rule, they follow the directions of their subjects. Russian rulers, by contrast, do not follow the whim of their nobles and aristocrats, they are sovereign.”<sup>15</sup>

### *Caesaropapism*

In Orthodox states, the autocratic government made ecclesiastical authority subordinate to the government. To be sure, under an autocratic Christian government, such as the Byzantine Empire, the rule of law functioned and religious leadership did exercise a degree of autonomy over religious affairs, but always with the approval and oversight of the government—a tradition that Arnold Toynbee called *caesaropapism* and that the Orthodox preferred to refer to as “symphony” or “parallelism.”<sup>16</sup>

From the time of the Church’s legalization in the Roman Empire, its leaders were interested in carving out a sphere of independence and continually maneuvered for autonomy, which led to clashes with the government, including the climactic Photius–Ignatius fight in the ninth century over who could appoint the patriarch. In the end, the emperor won out and henceforth the Orthodox Church remained subordinate to the state.

As Russian historian Paul Miliukov noted in the late nineteenth century, the Eastern Church acknowledged the Emperor's "power as being greater than that of the Patriarch."<sup>17</sup> In the early sixteenth century a leading Russian Orthodox abbot, Joseph of Volokolamsk, declared, "by nature the Tsar is like all other men; but in authority he is like the Highest God."<sup>18</sup> It was precisely the issue of state control of the church that splintered the Christian Church in 1054 into what became the Orthodox Church in the East and the Catholic Church in the West.<sup>19</sup>

The Russian Empire continued and strengthened the caesaropapist tradition. Peter the Great decided in 1700 to leave the office of patriarch vacant and to set up in 1721 a government department called the Holy Synod and headed by a lay government official to manage the Church. Another patriarch was not elected until 1917 when the tsarist autocracy fell, but then the Communists took power.

### *State-Managed Economy*

In both the Byzantine and the Russian Empires, the government dominated the economy. Constantinople had control over the wealthy agricultural provinces of Egypt, Syria, and Anatolia, and managed both the domestic and international trade routes that were centered in the eastern Mediterranean and crossed Thrace, the Balkans, and Anatolia. It licensed businesses and guilds for specialized sales and manufacturing, particularly the high value silk trade. It set the prices of commodities, appointed tax collectors, and built an efficient system of tax collection and, thus, a reliable stream of state revenues, which it generally returned to the economy in the form of salaries to soldiers, government officials, and workers who labored on public works and infrastructure. It also opened up and controlled new silver and gold minting operations, which it used to monetize or remonetize the economy. Its reintroduction of money, particularly the gold-based coin called *solidus* that was in high demand around the known world, not only enabled the government to maintain a reliable civil and military bureaucracy, but also added vibrancy to the Byzantine economy and sparked a broad expansion that was very popular with the military and civilian elites who wanted to be paid in money.

With such leadership and resources, the Byzantine Empire had the most dynamic economy in the world in the fifth through the seventh centuries. However, it was vulnerable to external threats, bureaucratic rigidity, monopolies, inflexibility, and a decided lack of entrepreneurship.

The Russians continued the tradition of a state-managed economy. They controlled the vast Eurasian Plain with its treasure trove of vast natural resources. Under the tsars the economy produced wealth and expanded, but it, too, like the Byzantine state, was hampered by central control, inflexible bureaucracy, a dearth of private property and investment, and a scarcity of inventiveness. It was further restricted by a huge, inefficient labor force of serfs who for centuries were treated as the equivalent of slaves and who did not own the land on which they worked. The economy was built upon their labor and the export of the Empire's vast natural resources and agricultural production, which their labor made possible. Although wealthy, the Russian economy was vulnerable to market demand, trade embargoes, and the depletion of non-renewable natural resources and raw materials.

### *Law as Synonymous with Ruler's Will*

The greatest compendium of Roman law took place in the sixth century when Emperor Justinian had lawyers and legal experts compiled the magnificent *Corpus Juris Civilis*. It consisted of four parts, but at the heart of the whole compendium was the key idea of natural law, which was commonsense law that was embedded in the conscience of every man and was accessible through reason and experience and, thus, stood as an objective standard of justice. Both the Church and the State in Orthodox societies embraced natural law and declared it to be God's law, implanted in man by God as a result of God's role as creator. They further agreed that manmade law—positive and customary—had validity to the extent that it coincided with or was complimentary of natural law.

However, agreement on theory was one thing, realty another. The critical fact for the Byzantine and Russian Empires was that the emperor was the final interpreter of natural law, so that there was no independent way to distinguish between objective law and the will of the emperor. In effect, the natural law tradition in the Orthodox East was curtailed and stifled by the emergence of the autocrat, who destroyed or repressed the objectivity of natural law. In many ways, the Byzantine and Russian autocrats personified Thomas Hobbes' argument in the seventeenth century that the interpretation of natural law was the prerogative of the absolute ruler, which effectively obliterated any objective standard against which to judge and replace the autocrat if he violated natural law or repressed any political activity resulting from individual conscience.

### *Sobornost'*

Christianity was a religion that emphasized fellowship and community, but also placed high value upon individual conscience and encouraged individuals to exercise free will and to develop their God-given talents, thus producing economic and political disparity, including poverty, that strained fellowship and community. Orthodox societies, where the government was highly centralized, resolved this paradox by promoting the continuity and health of the community rather than the individual. Orthodox society did not deny the value of the individual, but simply believed that the individual freely chose the community because the Orthodox community, as ordered and sanctified by God and directed by the autocrat, was “perfect,” and, therefore, best equipped to produce an environment where individuals were able to work out their salvation, even though it suppressed individualism.<sup>20</sup>

Slavophile philosophers in Russia in the nineteenth century coined the term *sobornost'* to refer to this unique commitment to community in Orthodox societies, where individualism was freely abandoned in favor of the organic unity, integration, and solidarity of the community. In the Russian experience, the stress upon community or the collective was paired with the idea of equality of individuals within the collective, which tended to value egalitarianism over individual achievement.

### *Service Oligarchy*

In Orthodox society, the leaders of corporate bodies, including merchant groups, the military, the church, and the political and civilian bureaucracy, constituted an inflexible, oligarchic elite that was appointed by, representative of, and answerable to the sovereign. The members of the oligarchy worked closely with the emperor to form a cohesive bureaucracy that acted as a service aristocracy that controlled trade, tax collection, regional and local government units, guilds, corporations, trade organizations, and military and government appointments. They and their families were interested in the growth and security of the system of politics by oligarchy, a system that rewarded them and favored loyalty above merit.<sup>21</sup>

The oligarchs were a political elite that was complicit with the emperor in ruling society. They did not constitute a loyal opposition to the sovereign. They shored up absolutism and were rewarded, along with their families, with honors and high positions. They helped the emperor main-

tain order, promote the concept of absolutism, and tamp down potential alternatives to sacred autocracy. The sovereign was able to maintain executive authority by stoking conflict and competition among the oligarchs with no point of resolution provided except the emperor's intervention.

### *Subjugation of Cities and Towns to Central Government*

The cities and towns of the major Orthodox states did not constitute free or autonomous entities that had the authority to make their own rules and regulations. They did not set up their own courts to adjudicate local conflicts. The cities and towns had neither charters nor legal standing that distinguished them from any other part of Orthodox society. They were all part of a seamless whole, of one body, of a central political apparatus that emanated from the capital city, from Constantinople, Moscow, or St. Petersburg. As a result, they had no direct representation in the capital, and the central government decided their needs and purpose.

The cities and large towns and their elites were placed under civilian and military bureaucrats who were eventually called governors and who were appointed by and answered directly to the emperor.<sup>22</sup> They collected taxes, oversaw security, and represented the will of the emperor in urban and provincial affairs. The drawback of the system was that the local elites effectively lost their autonomy and were now dominated by the imperial palace, which stymied innovation and talent and opened the door to corruption and cronyism.<sup>23</sup>

### *Messianism*

Both the Byzantines and the Russians believed that the Orthodox faith and the values that it helped to promote were of divine origin and indicated that Orthodox societies were chosen by God to deliver his truth to the world and to promulgate and defend Orthodox Civilization against heretics, infidels, and heathens, especially Westerners. They held that Orthodox societies were God's kingdom on earth.<sup>24</sup> As such, they had a powerful sense of righteousness and messianism—a disposition that grew a certain sense of exclusivity, entitlement, and savior-like mission.<sup>25</sup>

The Russians, when they succeeded the Greeks as the standard bearer of Orthodoxy, enhanced this feeling of messianism. They developed a potent sense of “religious nationalism” and equated the state as the personification of Christian universalism, placing the love of the Russian national

community above justice for non-Russians, which led to repression of non-Orthodox and non-Russian citizens of the Russian state and to intolerance of external religious traditions, particularly Catholicism.<sup>26</sup> For Russian Orthodoxy, the state was “the homeland of the Russian nation” and political identity came from a combination of ethnicity and religion—Russian ethnicity and Russian Orthodoxy.<sup>27</sup>

### *Theological Mysticism*

The autocratic tradition of Orthodox society curbed the interaction between faith and reason and tended to limit innovation. Christianity approved of the dynamics of religious and secular rationalism and of evolving truth, but the autocratic government did not. The Church fought against the Byzantine government’s suffocation, but by the ninth century, it had lost its independence and succumbed to the state. With its freedom curbed, there was less scope for the full range of Christianity’s dynamic implications to evolve, which meant, in Cyril Mango’s words, Orthodox Civilization left “the Holy Spirit with little to do.”<sup>28</sup> After the first seven ecumenical councils, the tradition eventually developed in Orthodox societies that the faith was complete and needed no refinement, elaboration, interpretation, or reinterpretation, that “innovation” was “subversive and dangerous,” and that Orthodox society was perfect and no longer needed any “further development.”<sup>29</sup>

Blocked by the sovereign from the full pursuit of ancient Greek rationalism and alternative political models, Byzantine society and eventually Muscovy and the Russian Empire powerfully embraced a certain theological mysticism that speculated on God, the mysteries of faith, and God’s relationship to man, but had little impact on furthering knowledge, improving the standard of living, or developing limited government. Aristotle and the natural sciences were not taught in the Byzantine world and the fundamental legal structures that established the very possibility of legally autonomous entities did not emerge there.<sup>30</sup> As Christopher Dawson noted, Eastern Christianity’s emphasis upon pure spirit instead of spirit and body, led “to the depreciation of the normal human activity of the discursive reason and to a contempt for all knowledge of the particular and for the humble but necessary discipline of physical science.”<sup>31</sup>

In the end the Byzantines failed to produce either universities or advanced science. The Russian followed suit and many scholars have noted early Russia’s “intellectual silence” and lack of even “Byzantine inquisi-

tiveness.”<sup>32</sup> The Russians did establish universities and pursued science, but only after Peter the Great and his successors borrowed these institutions and ideas from the West in the eighteenth century. They were not *sui generis* products of Orthodox culture.

## NOTES

1. Ricciotti (1947). Ricciotti puts the date of Christ’s birth at 6 BCE, but recent scholarship places it at 4 BCE. All citations and references to *Holy Bible* available at <http://www.biblegateway.com>. Accessed 21 July 2016.
2. Stark (1997), p. 7. According to Torjesen (1995), p. 7, its startling egalitarianism amounted to a “social revolution.”
3. MacCulloch (2010), pp. 127–8.
4. MacCulloch (2010), pp. 114–6, 156–7.
5. MacCulloch (2010), p. 157, 172–6; Crocker (2001), p. 25, 27, and 38.
6. In terms of church history, the basic source for this period is Eusebius ([290s?] 1989). Also see Freeman (2009), p. 317; and Humphries (2006), p. 39.
7. For solid histories of the Byzantine Empire, see Mango (2002), Ostrogorsky ([1969] 1986), Runciman (1965), and Norwich (1997).
8. Nicol ([1988] 1992), pp. 13–4.
9. On the expansion of Orthodox Civilization into East Europe, see Obolensky (2000).
10. Runciman (1965), p. 3; Wilken (2009), p. 21.
11. On the Westernization of Ukraine and Belorussia, see Frick (1995), p. 231; Gudziak (1998), pp. 250–2; Davies (1982), 1: 175. Also see the dated but still useful Halecki (1952) and Halecki (1968).
12. Obolensky ([1953] 1970), p. 21; also see d’Encausse (1992).
13. Strémooukhoff ([1953] 1970), pp. 108–125.
14. Mango (2002), p. 14; Obolensky ([1953] 1970), p. 21, 23.
15. Filatov and Voronstsova (2002), p. 269.
16. Toynbee (1934–61), 4: 346; Sharp (2012), p. 131.
17. Miliukov ([1942] 1972), p. 17.
18. Quoted in Obolensky ([1953] 1970), p. 11.
19. Meyendorff (1981), pp. 49–53.
20. Mango (2002), pp. 14, 16.

21. On the Byzantine oligarchs, see Sarris (2011), pp. 29–31. On the development of the Russian elite, see Crummey (2014).
22. Sarris (2011), pp. 25–26. On the bureaucratic rigidity and near impossibility of the tsar and nobility in Russia to compromise with the peasants, the overwhelming majority of the population, see Saunders (2014).
23. Rautman (2006), p. 127, 137, 141. On Russia's challenges, see the memoirs of Adam Czartoryski, a close friend and liberal advisor to Tsar Alexander I: Gielgud (1888), 1: 256–63, 267–9.
24. Runciman (1977), pp. 1–2, 5, 135; Obolensky ([1953] 1970), p. 23; Cherniavsky ([1959] 1970), pp. 72–74.
25. Obolensky ([1953] 1970), p. 20, 22–3.
26. Obolensky ([1953] 1970), pp. 23–4.
27. Bremer ([2007] 2013), p. 29.
28. Mango (2002), p. 14; Rahner (1992), p. xviii.
29. Mango (2002), p. 10, 13–14. Obolensky showed that both the Byzantines and Russians held to a fixed tradition. See Obolensky ([1953] 1970), p. 11.
30. Shawcross (2008), pp. 89–118.
31. Dawson ([1959] 1981), p. 27.
32. Florovsky ([1953] 1970), p. 135, 137.

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## CHAPTER 3

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# Islamic Civilization

*And fight with them until there is no more fitna [disorder, unbelief] and religion is all for Allah.  
[The new moons] are fixed times for the people and for the pilgrimage.*

*Koran*

## BRIEF HISTORY

In the sixth century CE, the Arabian Peninsula was divided into a northern region that was a frontier border of the Byzantine province of Syria and a southern region that was on the periphery of the Byzantine Empire and home to nomadic Bedouin tribes who were fierce, unruly, and forever fighting. Many of the Bedouins were polytheists and lived in a culture where tribal violence, war, blood feuds, infanticide, polygamy, vengeance, rank materialism, and arrogance were the order of the day. They deeply resented Byzantine encroachment on their culture and nomadic lifestyle. Judaism and various Christian heresies were present in the region and had some followers. Nicene Christianity, which was the official religion of the Byzantine Empire, was known and had made major strides in some of the cities of Arabia, but it did not appear to penetrate too deeply among the desert nomads.<sup>1</sup>

The Arabian Peninsula also had caravan routes and trading centers that benefitted as midpoints between India and the Mediterranean world, including the important towns of Mecca and Medina.<sup>2</sup> Mecca had the Kaaba, the rectangular stone temple that housed the Black Stone that tra-

dition declared descended from the heavens to Mecca around the time of Abraham and which was a place of pilgrimage and tourism. The merchants of Mecca manipulated the Bedouins' religious practices, particularly the Kaaba pilgrimage, to promote fairs, profits, and business. The Greeks were interested in taxing these economic activities, but their main interest in the Bedouins was to recruit them as mercenary troops for their many wars, especially against the Persians. By the late sixth century, however, the Persian threat had largely ebbed, and the Byzantine government no longer had an immediate need for mercenaries in its eastern provinces, which meant there were large groups of unemployed desert warriors spread out across the Arabian Desert.

Into this world of nomads, mercenary soldiers, frontier insecurity, Byzantine neglect, paganism, Judaism, and Christian heresy came Muhammad (meaning "highly praised"), who was born in the city of Mecca around 570 CE. As a young man, Muhammad, who was from the powerful Quraysh tribe of Bedouins, worked as a commercial agent and caravan camel driver for the wealthy widow Khadija, but his real interest was religion. In his travels along the caravan routes in Arabia, particularly the route between Mecca and Medina, where there was a large concentration of Jews and Christians, Muhammad became acquainted with Judaism, the Bible, and various Christian heresies, which were so prevalent in the eastern provinces of the Byzantine Empire. He was, at best, as with most Bedouins, only superficially knowledgeable about Nicene Christianity. All of these influences affected Muhammad and had a role in his religious development.

Eventually Muhammad, aged 25, married his 40-year-old employer. They lived together in monogamy for 26 years and she bore him several daughters, of whom the most important was Fatima, and two sons who died in infancy. He adopted his cousin Ali, the orphan son of his uncle Abu Talib, who married Fatima. Eventually Muhammad had ten wives and two concubines, and of these his happiest times in his later years were with Aisha, who was betrothed to him when he was aged fifty and she was aged six or seven, the daughter of Abu Bekr, the most revered of his original six Companions.

Once Muhammad had married Khadija, he was a man of means and able to devote his full time to religion. Here he proved to be a genius.<sup>3</sup> He had a natural inclination to asceticism, prayer, and reflection, and he was deeply offended by the materialism and violence that swirled around Mecca and its desert environs. He wanted to promote monotheism,

elevate the morality of the Bedouin tribesmen, curb physical appetites, replace vengeance with love of neighbor, uphold self-control, deliver social justice, and foster peace instead of war and bloodshed among those who accepted his teachings.<sup>4</sup> In short, he was interested in improving the behavior and lives of his fellow Bedouin tribesmen. He ultimately founded a new religion that he called Islam, meaning submission to God or Allah in Arabic.<sup>5</sup> One who submitted to Allah was a Muslim, which reduced and transcended all other loyalties—tribes, ethnicities, nationalities, and citizenships.

Islam literally started in 610 when Muhammad announced that God's angel Gabriel had appeared to him and revealed God's will to him, which Muhammad recited aloud verbatim in Arabic. These appearances went on for 22 years, ending only with Muhammad's death in 632. What Muhammad recited during these auditions was, Muslims believed, the most complete and accurate record of God's will and truth and, thus, the major source of Islam's beliefs. Because Muhammad could neither write nor read, it was important for him to memorize or have others nearby who could memorize what was being recited. Eventually, decades after Muhammad's death, the recitations were written down in a book called the *Koran* (recitation), which became the holy book of Islam.<sup>6</sup> The *Koran* was to be taken literally and was in theory impervious to analysis, interpretation, and reason. It was the word of God and had to be accepted exactly as it was stated in Arabic. A Muslim was not to approach the *Koran* with a critical or analytical frame of mind, which implied arrogance and pride. It was God's truth, plain and simple, and was to be memorized, not analyzed. No one could escape its literalism except in those cases where ambivalences and contradictions offered an opportunity for interpretation, but then every Muslim could interpret such passages in his own way, because there was neither a central authority nor a priesthood that interpreted the *Koran*.<sup>7</sup>

Another source of beliefs and guidelines for Muslims was the way Muhammad lived his life (his *Sunna*)—what he did and said. His sayings and actions were eventually recorded in a multi-volume compilation called the *Hadith*. Unlike the *Koran*, the *Hadith* was subject to interpretation, but eventually it, too, tended to be agreed upon and fixed, although still theoretically open to interpretation. The validity of the *Hadith* derived from an unbroken succession of jurists who testified to what Muhammad did and said and who stretched without interruption over the generations from the time of Muhammad to the present.

From the *Koran* and the *Hadith*, Muhammad and “*ulama*” (religious teachers) developed *Sharia* or Islamic law (literally the “path to water” that in the desert meant the “path to life”), which guided virtually every aspect of life for Muslims. *Sharia* was God’s law and the foundation of Islamic life. In theory, there cannot be any other kind of law other than God’s law, so *Sharia* law trumped natural, customary, and man-made law, but in practice other legal traditions persisted and caused tension.<sup>8</sup> *Sharia* law ordered society, defined morality, sanctioned institutions, and outlined social relationships. In time, four different schools of *Sharia* law and jurisprudence (*fiqh*) evolved around the world and these different schools provided some variation on how men and women were to behave and how society was to be organized, but these variations never dared to produce new principles and were vulnerable to the charge of impinging on God’s jurisdiction.<sup>9</sup> For circumstances and areas that the *Koran* and *Hadith* failed to either touch or anticipate, Muslims relied upon analogical reasoning and communal consensus to establish policy and supplement *Sharia* law.<sup>10</sup> Religious teachers and self-confident Muslims also resorted to issuing religious decrees or proclamations called *fatwa* in response to a new development. The *fatwa* may or may not have influence, depending on the authority of its author. In theory, individual Muslims could come to know natural law since it was embedded in human experience and could be found through reason, but *Sharia* law rejected natural law, which created tension and conflict for Muslims who resided in societies based upon natural law.

The order that evolved under Muhammad’s leadership was in every way a religious state. Its beliefs were relatively simple, which added to its appeal, and were summarized in the so-called Five Pillars of Islam. The first pillar was faith. It included belief in Allah and submission to Allah’s will.<sup>11</sup> Faith also involved an acceptance of angels, devils, the Day of Judgment, fate, and divine books. It further included an acceptance of prophets and of Muhammad as the last and greatest of God’s prophets, who included Moses, Abraham, the other Jewish prophets, and Jesus Christ. Muhammad declared that Judaism and Christianity had some truth and that the Old and New Testaments were revealed truth, but that those religions and holy books were incomplete, had gone astray, and were partly erroneous. Islam and the *Koran*, he said, were an improvement on and superior to these monotheistic faiths and their holy books and the last and final source of God’s revelation to mankind. Muhammad also stressed that Jesus Christ was neither the Son of God nor the second person of the

Holy Trinity, concepts that he said bordered on polytheism and idolatry. He claimed that Jesus was a prophet who helped prepare the way for and was secondary to him.

The second pillar of Islam required Muslims to fast during the ninth lunar month called Ramadan, when they were to refrain from food and sexual intercourse between sunrise and sunset. The third pillar obliged Muslims to give alms to the poor in the Islamic community and to support the cause of Allah, the so-called *zakat*, which included financial donations for such activities as building mosques, proselytism, and jihad (Q2:3, Q3:134). The fourth pillar insisted that Muslims pray five times per day at specific intervals from dawn to dusk facing in the direction of Mecca. Finally, the fifth pillar required Muslims, if at all possible, to make a pilgrimage to the Kaaba in Mecca at least once during a lifetime (the *hajj*) during the first 2 weeks of the 12th lunar month, *Dhu'l-Hijja*. The pilgrimage became an international institution where Muslims from around the world gathered at Mecca for what Ibn Battuta (1304–1374), the best-known Muslim sojourner of medieval times, called “the annual congress of the Muslim world.”<sup>12</sup>

In contrast to the relative simplicity of the creed, Islam’s code, the *Sharia*, was complex, detailed, and intricate. It guided Muhammad’s followers on how to live their lives, every aspect of life, with stringent punishment for those who transgressed. It instructed Muslims on diet (pork and alcohol and their derivatives were outlawed), food preparation (*halal*), dress, bathing, hygiene, sex, marriage, child rearing, business, loans (charging interest was prohibited), education, property, justice, courts, and just about every other conceivable human activity. It outlined penalties for all sorts of offenses, including adultery (hundred lashes), stealing (cutting off of the offending limb), for a wife’s disobedience to her husband (whippings), and many other infractions. It also organized time around the moon rather than Caesar’s solar year, which Christianity adopted. In the Islamic calendar there are 12 months that alternate between 29 and 30 days, with the 12th month varying in length to keep up with the moon’s cycle. The year has 354 or 355 days, which means the calendar does not correspond with the seasons, and the festivals of Ramadan and Pilgrimage, the two most important religious activities, might take place in summer or in winter and are ten to eleven days earlier than the year before. Muslims accept the inconvenience because they believe that Allah has willed it.<sup>13</sup>

As Muhammad unfolded his religion, it became clear that Islam was a way of life and that nothing was more important than religion. Those

who believed what he was saying soon formed a tight-knit group, a religious community (*al-umma*) that was sacred and primary, more important than any one individual or his interests. At the apex of this community was Muhammad, who oversaw every aspect of society, from politics to economics to social relationships. He was a theocrat—a religious leader who ordered all aspects of society. *Sharia* law did not allow for the creation of autonomous groups, organizations, or even towns that were independent of the central religious authority. All power was centered in Muhammad, who imposed a hierarchical community of formal inequalities between individuals—men and women, men and slaves, Muslims and non-Muslim—although maintaining that human beings were equal before God and that egalitarianism surpassed individualism.<sup>14</sup> According to Muhammad, individuals were valued and unique creatures of Allah and each was to be free to develop his talents and gifts, but individuals *per se* were not critical. Rather, the community was central and each individual had a role to play in boosting the community and through the community would find fulfillment and ultimately salvation.

Polygamy was encouraged among men, and they could have as many as four wives.<sup>15</sup> Women, on the other hand, were revered but subservient to men and treated as personal property with restricted inheritance rights, although they had jurisdiction over the household economy (Q2: 228–229; Q4: 3, 11, 34).<sup>16</sup> Divorce was simple for men and they often had successive rather than simultaneous wives. Divorce was difficult for women and each wife had only one husband. Women were also to be sheltered from unrelated men, a tradition called *purdah*, and were criticized and severely punished if found in the company of a man who was not a family member. They also had to wear in public a *chador* or *burka* (full covering of the body) and a *niqab* (veil) or *hijab* (headscarf) for modesty and protection against the leering stares of unrelated men. The polygamous family expanded the population of families, tribes, and clans that, on the one hand, augmented security, but, on the other hand, built in a constant parochialism, clan identity, and sectarianism. As for slaves, they were mainly used for services—concubines, cooks, servants, soldiers, and the like—rather than for productive labor, which Islam’s huge peasant population provided, and because of that service emphasis, females, unlike in the West, outnumbered males.<sup>17</sup>

Muhammad instructed his followers that if they followed God’s laws they would find happiness on earth by being a member of the *al-umma*, the vital religious community that nurtured and brought them order

and security, and by expanding that community's control—not conversion necessarily because in Islam there should never be compulsion in religion—over the earth. Muhammad informed his followers that God was with them and that the Islamic state would prevail over infidels and barbarians. He further told them that, even if they faltered by disobeying God, God was loving and forgiving and yearned for them to repent and follow his righteous path and, if their intent were right, he would help them to prevail against sin and against the infidel and, ultimately, gain an afterlife that was a cornucopia of physical delights, which was quite different from Christianity's concept of heaven. Muslims believed in their hearts that when and if adversity occurred, as it inevitably did in both life and on the battlefield, it was Allah's way of testing and cleansing them of their sins, and that in time they would prevail, watch reversals turn into successes, and enjoy both physical and spiritual victory because they were Allah's people and Allah was in control (Q3: 141–142, 146–153).

For 12 years Muhammad preached his religion in Mecca. His community grew, initially among his family and friends and then other tribes. As the number of Muslims ballooned, Muhammad's clashes with local leaders grew. His teachings criticized polytheism, unfair business practices, the manipulation of the Kaaba pilgrimage, and the moral behavior of the different tribes. He was particularly incensed over the exploitation of the Kaaba. For him, the Kaaba was the equivalent of the holy of holies and he wanted it protected from commercialization and reserved for religious purposes.

Eventually the leaders in Mecca decided that Islam and Muhammad were a threat to them and their way of life and they forced him to abandon Mecca. In June or July of 622 Muhammad and his followers fled Mecca and arrived in Medina. This event marked Year 1 in Islam's calendar and is also known as "The Journey."<sup>18</sup> Muhammad vowed to return to Mecca to cleanse the city of its despoilers and make the pilgrimage to the Kaaba a centerpiece of his religion. He was quite willing to use the sword against his enemies and proclaimed that he was an activist prophet in the line of Moses.

In Medina, Muhammad found an asset that he lacked in Mecca—armed soldiers. He had faced great danger in Mecca and was forced to flee for his life because he had no military force. He knew it would be crucial to have soldiers not only to capture Mecca, but also to defend and augment his operation and to unify the tribes.<sup>19</sup> In Medina, he discovered thousands of unemployed warriors—ferocious and professional mercenaries who had been released from the Byzantine Empire's service after the wars with Persia were over. Muhammad soon had auditions with the Angel Gabriel

that allowed him to wed his religion to these warriors and make *jihad* or holy war an essential part of his religion. In contrast to Christianity but very much in line with what many Jews were expecting from a messiah, Muhammad revealed that God's kingdom was of this world. It was to be established by peaceful means, if possible, but by force, if necessary (Q2: 256). According to Muhammad, the world was divided into the realm of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), where peace and security prevailed and where Muslims lived and ruled, and the realm of war (*Dar al-Harb*), where Muslims battled unbelievers and infidels in order to expand the realm of Islam. Muhammad himself led more than sixty-five military campaigns. According to Michael Cook, "the historical salience of warfare against unbelievers in the career of the founder was thus written into the foundational texts."<sup>20</sup> Other religious traditions, like Christianity and Hinduism, experienced warfare, too, but such violence, unlike Islam, was in direct opposition to their primary texts.<sup>21</sup>

Once in Medina, Muhammad went from being simply a religious leader to being a military-political head, but religion was always central, so politics, economics, and military interests were ultimately subordinated to religion. As a politician and military leader who was first and foremost a religious figure, Muhammad built a theocracy, which became the first political iteration of an Islamic order. Through his example, he taught Muslims that religion and power were to be undivided and that politics was "the arena in which Muslims experienced God and which enabled the divine to function effectively in the world."<sup>22</sup>

Muhammad's appeal to the Bedouin warriors to join him had four aspects. It had the already mentioned concept of holy war or *jihad*, which was a brilliant stroke of genius. In *jihad*, a warrior fought to have Allah's cause prevail in the world. If a warrior had the right intention—fighting for Allah's cause—any war became legitimate and, importantly, morally good. This thinking made war making—which the Bedouins did for both a living and an avocation—legitimate, so with the correct attitude the Bedouins were no longer outlaws or brawling tribesmen but Allah's holy warriors. Second, it had the advantage of organizing the tribal warriors into an effective army, which made winning battles and collecting booty more likely. Third, Muhammad sanctioned the taking of booty by warriors. When waging *jihad*, he allowed his soldiers to keep four-fifths of the booty that they gathered (he kept one-fifth for his expenses and charity), and distributed a fallen warrior's share of booty to his widow. Finally, Muhammad declared that Allah had predestined the life and death

of every man and that no one would die “except by Allah’s Leave” (Q3: 145; Q2: 285).<sup>23</sup> With his stress upon fate as opposed to free will and his promise that holy war would bring either earthly or heavenly riches, depending upon whether a warrior lived or died in battle, Muhammad motivated his troops to accept unending pain and suffering, undertake incredible military feats, and hope for martyrdom in the fight against the infidel because war was a religious duty that promised paradise whether warriors lived or died.<sup>24</sup> With such an incentive, Muslims’ fiery zeal for war was inextinguishable.<sup>25</sup> As Khalid ibn-Walid said to his troops in 636 CE on the eve of a battle with Byzantine Christians, “Strive sincerely, seeking God in your work, for this day has what lies beyond it [i.e. the afterlife].”<sup>26</sup> Indeed, Muhammad taught that a wish for death in holy war was the swiftest and most heroic way to paradise (Q3: 143).

For Muhammad, war had five goals: to enlarge Allah’s writ, to protect the community (*al-umma*), to conquer territory, to unify the centrifugal tribes, and, finally, to obtain resources and booty. With the addition of the Bedouin warriors to his entourage, he achieved all of these objectives. And when new territories were added, so were new converts and they then became new sources of martial energy. In the lands west of Mecca and Medina virtually all converts were former Christians.

War became the main engine for the expansion of the Islamic state, but there were other reasons it grew. Muhammad was a charismatic leader, who attracted highly competent military, political, and economic leaders to his cause and created an opportunity for Bedouins to join a local cause, become part of a global movement, and escape the heat and poverty of the desert.<sup>27</sup> The simplicity of the Islamic faith with its five pillars was alluring to Arabs who were confused by the welter of Christian heresies in the East. Islam’s message of inclusion and egalitarianism was also attractive. Everyone, rich and poor and different in any way, was said to be equal in God’s eyes and could find community in the Muslim faith.<sup>28</sup> Islam’s ability to instill order in society was also enticing at a time when the wars between Persia and Byzantium had produced instability. There was also an ethnic appeal to Islam. Arabs liked Muhammad’s elevation of Arabic as the language of God and of the Arabs as God’s new “chosen people,” superior to the Jews and Christians alike (Q1: 111).<sup>29</sup> They took their identity from Islam and came to believe that Arabs had to be Muslim.<sup>30</sup> Even though the Byzantine Empire had a culture superior to early Islam, it was the Muslims who psychologically put the Greeks on the defensive by proclaiming that their clear advocacy of monotheism was superior to such Christian beliefs

regarding the Trinity, icons, and saints, which Muslims charged smacked of polytheism and idolatry. In a shrewd reproach to Christians, Arab coins carried the following inscription: “There is no god but God alone. He has no companions.”<sup>31</sup>

In 630 Muhammad, with his army in tow, returned to Mecca, conquered it, and began to see that his movement had momentum and widespread support. He decided to make Mecca the headquarters of this pulsating force and to use it as a springboard to launch a broad attack against tribes and towns across Arabia that blocked his advance and generally fell within the sphere of influence of the Byzantine Empire. Although he sincerely disapproved of wars of aggression, he urged his follows to fight anyone who resisted Islam, and this rationale of self-defense became effectively a war of expansion. Muhammad gloried in war, announcing that, “to guard Muslims from infidels in Allah’s Cause for one day is better than the world and whatever is on its surface.”<sup>32</sup> By 632, Islam had spread from Medina and Mecca to perhaps one-third of Arabia.

A problem developed when non-Muslim peoples, such as the Jews and Christians in Medina, fell under the control of the Islamic movement. According to Muhammad, non-Muslims, lived “in darkness” and they were not to be indulged, coddled, consulted, or associated with (Q3: 118–120). However, unbelievers were to be given a chance to convert to Islam.<sup>33</sup> If they preferred not to convert, they could accept Muslim rule, live according to their own beliefs and laws, often keep their places of worship, and pay tribute. If they refused either Muslim rule or tribute payment, they were enslaved or killed, and their places of worship reduced to rubble.<sup>34</sup> So Muhammad’s policy was not the *Koran* or the sword, but the *Koran* or tribute or the sword.<sup>35</sup>

Jews and Christians, who could be enslaved, were tolerated as “dhimmis” (protected subjects) if they accepted Muslim rule and paid a poll tax to their Muslim masters for protection, a condition called *dhimmitude*.<sup>36</sup> Their places of worship were generally left intact but some were converted into mosques, and mosques were often built next to or on top of Jewish and Christian holy places, like the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque on Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The Christian and Jewish populations who slipped under Muslim control declined significantly despite toleration because they found life easier as converts than as second-class citizens or they fled.<sup>37</sup>

In 632, the Islamic state faced a major crisis when Muhammad unexpectedly died. There was no plan for succession in place and confusion

reigned.<sup>38</sup> The bewildered followers initially reacted by electing a deputy leader or caliph, who served as imam or religious guide, from among the members of Muhammad's inner circle and the caliph took control of the caliphate, the name of the political territories that were under Islamic control, and led the Islamic community, the *al-umma*.<sup>39</sup> This election started the Era of the Orthodox Caliphate or Four Caliphs (632–661). The last of the four caliphs, Ali, was assassinated and that event started a civil war over succession and led to a schism and rivalry that produced the two major Islamic sects, Sunnis and Shiites.

The dominant sect was the Sunnis, who were mainly at first Arabs and who acknowledged the first four successors and companions of Muhammad and their successors as legitimate caliphs and argued that a blood tie to Muhammad was not necessary for leadership of the Islamic world and, importantly, that political leadership should be held by the strongest and best politician—a type of Caesar, king, or sultan who would then control religion and politics, but might not be an imam or religious figure, although certainly would be a man who was a good and practicing Muslim. They believed that order and acceptance of reigning political authority—which was proof of political strength and invariably an absolute king or sultan—were necessary for the stability and survival of the Islamic community, and there was nothing in the sacred texts of Islam to preclude such an arrangement, although the texts favored combining religion and politics. This form of Islamic Caesarism became the norm during the Umayyad, Abbasid, Seljuk, and Ottoman caliphates that followed the Era of the Four Caliphs. It also became the form of government in the many Muslim states that existed in loose affiliation with or outside of the larger caliphates.

The minority sect was the Shiites (shortened form of *Shia-t-Ali* and meaning followers of Ali, the cousin of Muhammad), who were initially mainly Persians whose Iranian ethnicity did reflect a challenge to Arab claims of primacy in the world of Islam. The Shiites held that the only legitimate heirs of Muhammad were his blood relatives, starting with Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet and the last of the four caliphs, and, after Ali, his other direct descendants. The Shiites believed these blood relatives were divinely inspired leaders of the *al-umma* and the true caliphs and imams. They also insisted that the religious leader be the political leader—a theocrat rather than an Islamic Caesar, king, or sultan. Since leaders who had no blood tie to Muhammad were ruling the Islamic faithful following the death of Muhammad, the Shiites held that these rulers were illegitimate and that Muslims who accepted such a government were living in sin.<sup>40</sup>

These positions pitted the Shiites against the majority Sunni. The Sunnis branded the Shiites as provocateurs and rebels, a charge that they repeat to this day. Nonetheless, the Shiite movement persisted and grew in some of the Arab countries, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, where their political and military allies today—Sadrists, Hezbollah, and Hamas—have made plays for power.<sup>41</sup> The Shiites revered the places where Ali and his son, Hussein, died (Hussein was slain in 680), the cities of Kufa and Basra in Iraq, and they also believed that yet another descendant of Ali, Muhammad ibn Hasan—the so-called 12th Imam—who disappeared at the age of 12 in the ninth century will reappear as a sort of messiah who will lead the Shia, also known as Twelvers, to world power and joy.<sup>42</sup>

The Sunni innovation of placing a political leader in charge of the Islamic community was a departure from Muhammad's model, but, nonetheless, a practical response to the challenge of managing a vast military and political enterprise and, as mentioned, it was not explicitly prohibited by the *Koran* and *Hadith*. On the other hand, it had no clear sanction in Islamic texts or in the example of Muhammad's theocracy.<sup>43</sup> The split between Shiites and Sunnis divided Islam and led to centuries of violence, bitterness, and war between the two factions.

Following the assassination of Ali and end of the civil war, Muslims elected Muawiyah (r. 661–680), who was not related to Muhammad, as caliph. He ended elections and founded the Omayyad dynasty (661–750), moving the capital of Islam to Damascus, where political leaders, eventually called kings or sultans, were distinguished from the caliphs, who were now recognized as religious leaders subject to the military-political ruler. The Omayyad caliphate constituted the victory of the imperialist Arab elite, who was more interested in power and land than in religion, over the interests of Muhammad's theocracy of Medina as symbolized by the Orthodox caliphate. It was also a triumph of centralized government over the rambunctious and rebellious desert Bedouin tribesmen who chafed at any restraint on their opportunistic pillaging.

The Omayyad caliphate provided Islamic society with its administrative structure. The speed of the earlier expansion and the bureaucratic inexperience of the Arabs had made advisable at first the continuation of Byzantine or Persian administrators and tax collectors. By c. 720 Arabs themselves were beginning to replace the non-Muslim personnel in the provincial governments. It was then, too, that Arabic became the official language of law and government, and new Arabic coinage (in gold, silver, and copper) started to circulate. The Omayyad caliphate also changed tax policy. At first all Muslims

had been exempt from the land taxes paid by the conquered provincials, but when conversion to Islam steadily diminished these revenues, exemption of the faithful from land taxes was abolished and a new poll tax was instituted from which Muslims were exempt. The economy was based upon agriculture, trade, and peasant labor. Slavery, as mentioned, was widespread and approved under Islam, but it was primarily a form of consumption—services for the wealthy—rather than a source of productive labor.<sup>44</sup>

The Umayyad caliphate fell in 750 when a revolution established the new dynasty of the Abbasid caliphate that stretched from 750 to 1258. The success of this insurrection was owing to several weaknesses from which the Umayyad rulers suffered after the death of the last great ruler of the line, Walid I (r. 705–715). The Umayyad rulers were politicians and bureaucrats who advanced the economic and political agenda of the western Arab elite. They and their supporters considered themselves the natural leaders of the Islamic movement, superior to non-Arabs and religious fundamentalists, whether Arab or non-Arab. Their weakness was their parochialism and arrogance, a propensity to treat their leadership as an entitlement and to discount the abilities and value of non-Arabs and to underrate the hopes and desires of enthusiastic believers and converts to Islam. The future of Islam was, as with Christianity, in its catholic mission—a faith intended for the entire world. The Umayyad dynasty was overthrown because it was out of touch with Islam's religious dynamic and the religious and political goals of religious Arabs and Persians and such non-Arab converts as the Berbers and Turks.

The Abbasid caliphate that followed the Umayyad era ushered in the golden age of Islamic culture. Even though it, like the Umayyad caliphate, fractured into different power centers and failed to control various Muslim regions, it and the other Islamic states did advance Islamic values, under one ruler or another, over a huge expanse that stretched from India to Spain, and the values helped produce a diverse and rich civilization.<sup>45</sup> The Muslims were particularly fortunate in that they controlled and were able to draw upon and integrate the cultural riches of the eastern half of the Roman Empire, Persia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and part of India into their culture, and they transmitted and improved upon this reservoir of knowledge and, in the process, offered new insights into architecture, navigation, cartography, medicine, interregional trade, philosophy, mathematics, and optics.

In the realm of mathematics, the Abbasid era saw the combination of “Arabic” numerals, which were taken from Hindu civilization, with Greek science, particularly Euclid's geometry, to make possible modern mathe-

matics. The Persian mathematician al-Khwarizmi developed the advanced mathematics of algebra and published his findings in a book called *On the Restoration and Opposition of Numbers*, which Arab intellectuals simply called “The Book” or, in Arabic, “*Al Gebra*.” Al-Khwarizmi also developed trigonometry. Medieval scholars in Europe eventually translated both Euclid and al-Khwarizmi into Latin and helped elevate arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy into mathematical disciplines that underlay sophisticated scientific pursuits in Europe, and Leonardo (Fibonacci) of Pisa wrote *Liber abbaci* (*The Book of Calculations*) in 1202 that made the Hindu–Arabic numbering system accessible throughout Europe by offering concrete examples of arithmetic in action, particularly in the field of commerce. In the field of optics, the Muslims were world leaders.

Muslim advances in medicine were also made, although religious proscriptions kept them from dissecting the body and thus making any advances in the art of surgery.<sup>46</sup> The Abbasids did develop some very good remedies for a variety of illnesses through trial and error and close observation and comparison of symptoms of ill patients. They also built good hospitals and clinics and were widely viewed as producing the best physicians in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

In geography, Abbasid contributions were mainly detailed travelogues and descriptions of geography, which were highly useful and based upon their movement in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Arabs also had access to the writings of Aristotle, and eventually Averroës translated Aristotle from Greek to Arabic and provided valuable commentary on how Aristotle continued to be relevant to society. Although Averroës had very little impact on Islamic society, mainly because the definitive nature of Islamic faith had scant room for analysis by reason, his work was used by scholars in medieval Europe, including St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, after it was translated often by trilingual Jews into Latin.<sup>47</sup> Muslim philosophers commented on and preserved the writings of some of the Classical thinkers, for which mankind is forever grateful, but they largely refrained from analyzing, challenging, or going beyond the assumptions of the Greeks.<sup>48</sup>

Unfortunately, the rich culture of the medieval Islam era was degraded when the Seljuk Turks took over the Abbasid caliphate in the eleventh century and the Mongols followed suit in the thirteenth century, and then Tamerlane in the fourteenth century laid waste to Islamic civilization. Islamic culture recovered under the Ottoman Turks and Safavid Persians, both of whom advanced Islamic core values into modern times. There follows an effort to outline the major values of Islamic Civilization.

## POLITICAL VALUES OF ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION

### *Theocracy or Islamic Caesarism*

For Islam there was and is ideally no distinction between the political and religious leader. Muhammad was both, and Islam has never throughout its history elaborated a doctrinal basis for the separation of religion and politics, even though the *Koran* can be interpreted to provide “a certain legitimization for the separation of religious and political authority.”<sup>49</sup> As such, the ideal political institution of the Islamic state was a theocracy, where one ruler, called a caliph or imam, was both the deputy of God and the successor of Muhammad. He ruled over the caliphate, the territory over which Muslims held sway, including control over all of the Muslims and unbelievers who resided there.

Under the theocratic model, the caliph was a firm ruler and tended toward being an autocrat, although he was restrained by the sacred texts of Islam, *Sharia* law, and the consensus of the community of believers. He was not a despot or the originator of an hereditary line of rulers, but rather a God-appointed protector who did his best to look after the religious, political, social, and economic needs and interests of the community, and he expected to be criticized if he did a bad job and supported if he did good work. In that limited sense, the theocracy supported by Muhammad’s example and the holy texts of Islam could countenance polities that had republican, democratic, and constitutional aspects.<sup>50</sup> Toward unbelievers who fell under his control, the theocrat was an authoritarian figure who tolerated them if they accepted Muslim rule and the superiority of Islam above their own tradition and paid their taxes.

In the decades following Muhammad’s rule, a split occurred in the political and religious roles of the caliph. An autocratic king or sultan (a Caesar-type figure) appeared who was not an imam or religious leader. Such individuals favored despotism and hereditary succession, managed politics and military affairs, and turned over religious matters to religious scholars, who were under him but whose approval he wanted. This duality of authority soon became the norm for the caliphates and the plethora of Muslim states that existed by the tenth century. The absolute monarch was always guided by and sensitive to Islamic beliefs, morality, and *Sharia* law, but the kingship tradition was a departure from Muhammad’s example and was not endorsed, although not prohibited, by Islam’s holy texts. As a result, Muslims across the Shiite–Sunni spectrum believed that the de

facto separation of religious and political authority that evolved in Muslim lands was an aberration and had to be borne rather than endorsed.<sup>51</sup>

During the medieval era, a few Muslim scholars proposed a justification for this duality of authority by looking at politics from the point of view of human nature and philosophy rather than religious texts. They also argued for new ways of looking at the revered sources of Islam, including reducing the influence of “*ulama*” or religious teachers on political issues, particularly their interpretations of the *Hadith* and *Sunna*, and relying for insight more on the *Koran*, which was revealed truth and which was more open to distinguishing between immutable truth and truth for a specific historical occasion that has long passed. However, they did not find lasting support in the Islamic world.<sup>52</sup> Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), a Sunni religious authority, countered them and reiterated that religion was supreme for Muslims and that political and religious authority was indivisible. In his words, Allah put together “knowledge and the pen with their task of persuasion, to power and the sword with their task of victory and domination ... religion without sultan (power), holy war (*jihad*) and wealth, is as bad as power, wealth and war without religion.”<sup>53</sup> Taymiyya’s influence was profound and in modern times is reflected in such Islamic fundamentalist groups as the Wahhabist, the Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, *Al Qaeda*, and ISIS, who claim they want a theocracy.<sup>54</sup>

### *Inseparability of Mosque and State*

At the risk of redundancy, it is worth stressing that a principal value of Islamic culture is that religion, meaning the Mosque, and the political state cannot be separated, that a non-Muslim cannot be the leader of a state where Muslims are the majority, that Islam has a fundamental conflict with democracy that calls for rule of the people because it holds that there is no rule other than the rule of God, that Muslims within non-Muslim states have the right and duty to rule their own religious communities in accordance with *Sharia* law, that Muslims are not permitted to convert to another religion, and that Islam is superior to all other religious traditions and can never take a secondary position. In effect, there is no room for the secular and virtually no way to separate religion from political life. Needless to say, this orientation makes it difficult for Muslims to adapt to secular modern states, leads to alienation between Muslim citizens and other citizens in secular modern states, and makes it well-nigh impossible

to move toward greater global interconnectedness and interdependency, which are hallmarks of the modern era. Muslim political identity comes largely from religion rather than from ethnicity and the goal of many Muslims is a caliphate that unites Muslims in one political community, a brotherhood of believers rather than a nation of citizens who give their first allegiance to the nation rather than to Islam.<sup>55</sup>

### *Religious Domination of Economic Enterprise*

In Islamic states the government loomed over the economy, which it generally organized for the benefit of the community, not the individual, and strove for egalitarianism and the alleviation of poverty through alms giving.<sup>56</sup> It was not overly interested in private enterprise or private property and, thus, ironically undermined the psychological sense of secure property that sustains individual freedom to act on behalf of the community. *Sharia* law did not provide a foundation or condition for the creation of economic autonomous groups, business associations, merchant guilds, corporations, commercial courts, banks, merchant laws, and business partnerships that could operate as independent agencies with their own rules and regulations. It also never permitted the charging of interest (*ribā*) in the way that Judaism and Christianity did.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, Islamic culture awarded prestige to religious and military leaders but not to business entrepreneurs who were not directly involved in the central mission of what was essentially a religious-military enterprise of expansion.<sup>58</sup>

In Islamic states, it was the government and its tax collectors who decided what was appropriate support for the community and on the size of the public sector, including public ownership of land, water, and other resources. Businesses discovered that they could not compete profitably against the huge public sector, and inheritance laws prevented enduring capital accumulation.<sup>59</sup> The government also favored the import of cheap foreign goods because it helped the poor, but that policy inadvertently inhibited the growth of native businesses because there was no protected domestic market. Private property was not secure and as a result some wealthy Muslims spent their money on consumption and non-producing assets rather than on income-producing business and investments and others worried about the security of their property to such an extent that they preferred to carry their wealth with them when they had to travel extensively rather than risk having the state appropriate it.<sup>60</sup>

### *The Notion That Sharia or Religious Law Is Superior to All Other Law*

In Islamic society, the foundational law was *Sharia* law. It derived from Islamic beliefs and largely from the *Koran*. Unlike Roman, European, and Christian law, *Sharia* law was not anchored on the concept of natural law, but, instead, was founded upon revealed truth, which was neither changeable nor subject to interpretation. It took precedence over state and positive law and was the measure used to judge the validity of man-made law. In Muslim-dominated societies, Muslims permitted non-Muslims to run their own communities in accord with their own laws and culture, providing such laws did not conflict with the general principles of *Sharia* law, but insisted that Muslims everywhere, whether in non-Muslim society or not, live according to *Sharia* law, including when its application clashed with the laws of societies where Muslims were a minority.

Eventually, as Islamic states spread, four different schools or interpretations of *Sharia* law evolved, nuanced by various national and cultural traditions, but these schools could not touch the fixed and literal principles of the *Koran*, which came from God and were “unchanging.”<sup>61</sup> Muslim insistence upon the legal primacy and inflexibility of *Sharia* law inevitably created tension between Muslims and non-Muslims and helps explain why the Islamic response to modern, secular society is so fraught with tension.

### *Superiority of Al-Umma (the Islamic Community) to Individuals, and Groups*

Islamic society was first and foremost a religious community (*al-umma*) where community rights and well-being were stressed over individual rights. The *Koran* gave the community the power to judge individual behavior and recognized no such thing as a victimless crime.<sup>62</sup> Every action of every person affected the community. The community was essentially a religious organism, a living being that was protected and guided by Allah.<sup>63</sup> Individuals were considered sinful nullities, but the community was a sacred body. Individuals came and went, but the community persisted and reigned supreme over individuals. In the words of Walid I, the Omayyad ruler in the eighth century, “Satan is with the individual.”<sup>64</sup>

As a result of the diminution of individualism, Islamic society did not develop the principles of due process, legal counsel, adversarial represen-

tation, or innocent until proven guilty. To be sure, individuals had some rights, but the community and the government, acting in the name of the community, easily suspended them, and as Michael Cook noted, “liberty in the sense of political freedom is not a value enshrined in the Islamic tradition.”<sup>65</sup> In contrast to what developed in Western societies, where a man’s home was his castle and off limits to the state and community norms providing he did nothing in his castle to harm the general welfare, all individual behavior in Muslim societies was subject to the judgment of the community, and the state had “a way of turning castles into sand-castles.”<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, the Muslim community was male-dominated and although all believers were said to be equal, the *Koran* clearly stipulated a hierarchy that placed men above women and disadvantaged women in such matters as divorce and inheritance (Q2: 228; Q4: 34).<sup>67</sup> Today, the continuing importance of the religious community is reflected in the belief among Muslims that they, as already mentioned, form a brotherhood and should be together in a political caliphate which is defined and bound by religious beliefs rather than national borders or ethnicities.<sup>68</sup>

### *Civil and Military Officials, Even If Elected, under Ruler*

In Islamic states the theocrat or the religiously influenced autocrat was supreme and appointed or approved of all officials who held positions of leadership in the key sectors of society, including the political, military, economic, and intellectual realms. There were no autonomous organizations or groups that operated in Islamic society. All such agencies and officials answered to the central government and enjoyed no standing separate from the ruler. The ruler appointed and removed bureaucrats, judges, military leaders, and civil servants. There was no independent leadership that stood outside of the government and offered a loyal opposition or alternative policies. Of course, the ruler had to be perceived as protecting the community in accordance with Islamic beliefs and *Sharia* law and, thus, was sensitive to the opinions of religious scholars and subject to religious consensus. In time, some officials could be and were elected by the community of believers, particularly in theocratic states, but these officials had to have the support of the ruler, who could easily undermine them on religious grounds. As a general rule, there was no tradition of an autonomous elite who operated outside the purview of the ruler.

### *Subjugation of Cities and Towns to Central Authority*

Under a theocracy or an authoritarian government led by a Muslim, there was no development of autonomous towns and cities. As with other corporate organizations, *Sharia* law did not protect corporate political groups that shared power with the ruler. Cities and towns were important for trade and commerce, but they were ultimately subordinate to the central government that advocated for and protected religion. Unlike urban centers in the West, cities and towns in Islamic society never emerged as independent centers of thinking, enterprise, or political activity, which were protected by law and had the authority to write and enforce laws that involved their local communities.

### *Jihad or Holy War to Expand and Protect Religion*

Although Muhammad stated that wars of aggression were to be avoided and that only defensive wars were to be waged, it was also clear that any rejection of Islam, perceived as persecution, or any military effort by unbelievers to protect themselves against the burgeoning Islamic movement was a *casus belli* and rationale for offensive war disguised as defensive war. Muhammad and thus Islam's view on war was paradoxical. On the one hand, aggressive war was and is to be avoided and Islam as a religion promoted peace. On the other hand, there can never be peace until the world is under Muslim rule, so war was and is a way of making ultimate peace possible, and Islam was not independent from the state that made war. As Antony Black noted, Islam "made a virtue of war."<sup>69</sup>

War became endemic to the Islamic movement because there were always real and perceived threats to the community, the *al-umma*. In addition, Muslims believed that Allah was with them and had ordained that an Islamic government, using *Sharia* law, would dominate the globe, so making war in Allah's name was not a matter of divining whether or not war was aggression, but fate, a duty, and all warriors who died in Allah's cause were declared martyrs who were guaranteed a place in the hereafter (Q2: 216; Q3: 140). Muhammad said there was nothing more pleasing than waging war in Allah's name. *Jihad* was the obligation of every Muslim male unless there were already sufficient warriors fighting for Allah's cause, but great praise was bestowed only on those who actually went to war and fought for Allah (Q4: 95).<sup>70</sup> In the words of Islamic scholar Marshall Hodgson, Muhammad's vision "led inevitably to the sword," and, in the end, every

Muslim had to meet and pass Islam's "peculiar test" of war.<sup>71</sup> According to Muhammad, Allah wanted martyrs and Muslims should yearn for death before death happened (Q3: 140, 143).

Today many Muslims have diluted the doctrine of *jihad* and define it as personal striving against individual sin. However, fundamentalist Islamic political groups, like *Al-Qaeda* or ISIS, hold to the traditional concept and claim that Muslims must make war against unbelievers.<sup>72</sup>

*Revealed Truth as Complete, Sufficient, Superior to, and at Times Incompatible with Human Reason and Physical Science*

At the center of Islamic life was Islam and at the heart of Islam was the *Koran*, the revealed truth from Allah that Muhammad recited in auditions with the Angel Gabriel. The *Koran* was not open to analysis and therefore offered little scope for reason. It was the immutable and literal word of God and, therefore, was to be accepted as it was recorded without modification, nuance, or interpretation and then memorized so that it could guide human activity and thought. It was also the highest source of knowledge and truth and, as such, discouraged the study of the physical world, which could not hold truth comparable to the holy texts of Islam.

Such a disposition impeded the development of science and the use of reason in understanding the natural world and created tension between Islam and philosophy and science.<sup>73</sup> Natural philosophy and science were not pursued in Islamic states' central educational institutions. The institution of higher education that Islamic society developed at the end of the eleventh century, the *madrasa*, focused on Islamic law and logic, not science. When science and research were pursued, their purpose was to support revealed religious beliefs, not to open the mind to new ideas.<sup>74</sup>

Nonetheless, Islamic states did invest great effort in studying natural philosophy and science, particularly in the fields of architecture, mathematics, astronomy, geography, and optics, and medieval science was mainly within the jurisdiction of Muslims.<sup>75</sup> This was the result undoubtedly of human curiosity and intelligence and of Islamic culture's possession of the insights of civilizations that it conquered, including Persia, India, and especially Greek civilization, which had made progress in science, technology, and the application of reason to an analysis of the natural world. However, the huge expenditure of energy by Muslim scholars did not produce great results, except in the field of optics. The problem seemed to be that the neglect of reason prevented the Muslims from connecting practice and

theory. Most of their successes came about through trial and error rather than the development of the scientific method of observation, theory, and experimentation. In current times, it appears that a form of anti-intellectualism has permeated some Islamic regions, and, as Toby Huff observed, “modern science is perceived as un-Islamic, and those who embrace it are thought to have taken a first and fatal step toward impiety.”<sup>76</sup>

## NOTES

1. Hoyland (2001), p. 147.
2. Hoyland (2001), p. 107.
3. For accessible biographies, see Cook (1983), Hazelton (2013), and Armstrong (2006).
4. Perhaps the best and rather sympathetic treatment of Islamic Civilization is Hodgson ([1974] 1977).
5. Karen Armstrong says that the word “Islam” is etymologically related to the word “salam,” which means peace and implies that peace—inner and outer—can be had through surrender to God. See Armstrong (2002), p. 24. Armstrong (1993) argues that man’s concept of God, not God, has evolved over time.
6. Black (2001), p. 9. For an accessible history of the *Koran*, see Cook (2000). Koranic citations and references in text (e.g., Q2: 228) are from *The Noble Quran* found at <http://www.noblequran.com/> translation/ (accessed 14 July 2016).
7. Rahman (1966), pp. 68–9.
8. Cook (2014), pp. 271–280. Huff (1993), p. 121.
9. Cook (2014), pp. 272–82.
10. Feldman 2008, pp. 47–51. Also see Rahman (1966), p. 71; and Aslan (2006), p. 165.
11. Esposito (2010), p. 12.
12. Quoted in Boorstin (1983), p. 122.
13. Boorstin (1983), pp. 10–11.
14. Cook (2014), pp. 390.
15. Polygamy was common in the desert regions because of the shortage of men and the surplus of women, the high mortality rate among men, and the need eventually to take care of orphans and widows, particularly the wives of fallen warriors and martyrs.
16. According to Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, the subservience of women to men gives Islam a lasting appeal to men. See Crone and Cook (1977), pp. 147–8.

17. Segal (2001), pp. 2–4.
18. Cleveland (2004), p. 10.
19. Hodgson ([1974] 1977), 1: 185; Armstrong (2002), p. 27.
20. Cook (2014), p. 221, 390.
21. Cook (2014), p. 221, 234, 239, 241–4, 247.
22. Armstrong (2002), p. xii; Cook (2014), p. 20, 163.
23. Muhammad included fate as an essential belief. See the *Hadith, Sahih Bukhari version, vol. 1: book 2, no. 21, 24, and 35* found at <http://www.hadithcollection.com> (accessed 14 July 2016). For the complete *Hadith collection* with many of its preferred translations/versions, see <http://www.hadithcollection.com>.
24. Karsh (2006), pp. 22–23; Kennedy (2007), pp. 62–3.
25. Sarris (2011). p. 274; Kennedy (2007), pp. 62–3.
26. Kennedy (2007), p. 83.
27. Kennedy (2007), pp. 371–2.
28. Cook (2014), pp. 169–70.
29. Cook (2014), pp. 8–10, 188–9.
30. Hoyland (2001), pp. 246–7.
31. Wilken (2009), p. 20.
32. *Hadith, Sahih Bukhari version, vol. 4: book 52, no. 142* found at [http://www.sahih-bukhari.com/Pages/Bukhari\\_4\\_52.php](http://www.sahih-bukhari.com/Pages/Bukhari_4_52.php) (accessed 14 July 2016).
33. Islam's military caste did not necessarily seek to convert conquered peoples. However, it also did not halt conversions and in time most of the conquered peoples did convert to Islam. On the pragmatic and peaceful approach of Islamic rulers, see Karabell (2007).
34. Initially, Hindus and Buddhists were not considered people of the book and therefore were vulnerable to mass execution. See Kennedy (2007), p. 306. In 2001 the Taliban destroyed the 1500-year-old Buddhas of Bimayn because it viewed them as symbols of heathenism and idolatry. See Cohen (2007), p. A23.
35. Kennedy (2007), p. 374, argued that tribute, rather than conversion, was central for Muslim conquerors. Osama Bin Laden repeatedly dismissed the notion of defensive jihad and pushed offensive jihad. Also see Cook (2014), pp. 228–29; Cleveland (2002), p. 14; and Spencer (2006), p. 64.
36. Lewis (1982), pp. 61–62; Huntington (1996), p. 32; Ye'or (2005); Ye'or (2011).
37. On the general decline of Christianity and Judaism under Islamic rule, see Ye'or (1996). For an excellent study of the way Christians

adapted to, enriched, and were enhanced by Islam in the period before the thirteenth century, see Griffith (2008). Griffith did show the demographic decline of Christians under Muslim rule. Also see Armstrong (2002), pp. 30–31; Wilken (2009), p. 20, 21, 25.

38. Black (2010), p. 117.
39. Crone (2004), pp. 21–2.
40. Black (2001), p. 15.
41. In the convulsed puzzle of the Middle East, Hamas, which was a Sunni organization, was backed by Iran.
42. Crone (2004), pp. 70–1, 118. For a brief overview of Sunni–Shia differences, see *New York Times*, 3 January 2016.
43. Crone and Hinds ([1984] 2003), pp. 1–3.
44. Segal (2001), p. 2.
45. For a good history of Islamic Civilization, see Esposito (1999).
46. Huff (1993), p. 178.
47. Hefner (2010), pp. 1–2.
48. Huff (1993), p. 67; Lewis (1982), pp. 229–30, 237; Stark (2005), pp. 20–1; Farah (1994), p. 199.
49. Cook (2014), p. 327.
50. Cook (2014), pp. 319–34.
51. Crone (2004), p. 16, 43, 243, 277. Armstrong argued that Muslims of all stripes favored absolute monarchy as the most efficient way to rule an agrarian-based empire and “the best and perhaps only way to keep the peace.” See Armstrong (2014), p. 394; and Armstrong (2002), pp. 41–2.
52. Black 2010, pp. 118–121. Also see Black (1993), pp. 62–3.
53. Quoted in Black 2010, pp. 119–20.
54. Rapoport and Ahmed (2010); Armstrong believed that Taymiyya’s extremism was a consequence of being traumatized by the Mongol invasion. See Armstrong (2014), p. 393.
55. Cook (2014), pp. 36–37, 40–2, 52, and 449.
56. Cook (2014), p. 334, 390.
57. Kuran (2011).
58. Segal (2001), pp. 5–6; Kuran (2011), p. 5, 7, 36, 96.
59. Kuran (2011), pp. 78–92; Segal (2001), pp. 5–6.
60. Hanson (2001), p. 262, recounted examples of Ottoman commanders who went into battle with their money, in a sense, in their pocket. On investment disincentives, see Segal (2011), pp. 5–6.
61. Cook (2014), p. 277, 308.
62. Cook ([2001] 2004), p. 596.

63. Crone (2004), p. 16.
64. Quoted in Crone (2004), p. 42.
65. Cook (2014), p. 321.
66. Cook ([2001] 2004), p. 594.
67. Cook (2014), p. 171.
68. Cook (2014), pp. 190–1, 326–27, 335, 359, 387, 443, 446, 449.
69. Black (2001), p. 12.
70. Black (2001), p. 12.
71. Hodgson ([1974] 1977), 1: 185–86.
72. Black (2001), p. 11; also see Cook (2014), pp. 221–8, 390, and Arberry (1955), p. 41.
73. Cook (2014), p. 255.
74. Huff (1993), p. 73, 117.
75. Cook (2014), p. 270.
76. Huff (1993), p. 235. Also see Huff (2010) and Cliff (2011), p. 5, who notes that the goal of Islamists is to eradicate the West and pro-West Muslims.

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## CHAPTER 4

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# Western Civilization

*Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam.*

*Jesus Christ (Matt. 16:18–19)*

*We are like dwarfs seated on the shoulders of giants; thus we see more things than the ancients.*

*Bernard of Chartres (d. 1126), quoted by John of Salisbury as found in Henry Osborn Taylor (1914) *The Medieval Mind*, Vol. 2 (London, Macmillan), p. 159.*

## BRIEF HISTORY

No sooner was Christianity recognized as the state religion of the Roman Empire then the western half of the Roman Empire verged on collapse. In 410, Alaric, the leader of the Visigoths, plundered Rome. In 452, Attila the Hun pillaged northern Italy, but spared Rome when Pope Leo I the Great (r. 440–461) helped convince him to retreat. In 455, the Vandals sacked Rome. In 476, the last Roman emperor in the western part of the Roman Empire was removed and replaced first by a German chieftain called Odoacer and then by a train of German kings who competed to fill the vacuum of power, but none of whom proved strong enough to re-establish imperial rule.<sup>1</sup>

As chaos engulfed the West, Western Civilization began its life. At the center of this new order were the pope and the Catholic Church. It would take centuries, almost a millennium, to put in place the foundation stones for the West, because the pope and the Church had to begin virtually from

scratch.<sup>2</sup> They did have some assets, though, as they embarked on the plan to build Western society. They had a solid group of theologians, bishops, monks, and missionaries who were trained in classical thought, Roman law, and Christian theology. They had a religious hierarchy that was based upon voluntary association rather than coercion. Finally, they had a series of good popes, who knew something about how to survive in the world of politics and how to blend Christian theology, Greek rationalism, Roman law, and German custom into a stable, creative, and dynamic culture. The history of the period is lengthy and intertwined, but it is worthwhile to tease out and describe in some sort of chronological order the main building blocks of Western Civilization in order to understand Western values.

One of the very first components of Western Civilization was the institution of an independent papacy. From the beginning the popes maintained that they were the successors of St. Peter and the leaders of the universal Christian Church that was the institutionalization of Christ's exhortation to give to God, what was God's or, in other words, of a religious authority that was separate from the state.<sup>3</sup> The emperors and some bishops contested the pope's claim to primacy in religious matters, but the emperor in the West was removed, the bishops in the West largely rallied to the pope, and the emperors in the East were preoccupied with their own affairs. Pope St. Gelasius I (r. 492–496 CE) announced at the end of the fifth century a political-religious formula that captured the popes' understanding of Christian dualism—to Caesar, what is Caesar's and to God, what is God's—called the theory of the two powers or two swords. The Gelasian theory held that, while all power came from God, spiritual authority and political authority were independent of one another and operated as two different forms of power—two swords—and each was subordinate to the other in its sphere. In the event of a clash, the theory declared that the spiritual authority was superior to the political and had a right to judge the political and, if necessary, coerce action, which was problematical because the pope wielded moral, not military, power. However, in a world where the ruler and subjects were practicing Catholics, it was potent. More importantly in the long run, the Church's insistence upon dualism opened the door to the idea of limited government and thus to the possibility of Western freedom.

Another related development in the evolution of Western Civilization was the growth of the institution of the papal monarchy that occurred in the sixth century under Pope Gregory I the Great (r. 590–604). In many ways it was a natural consequence of an independent pope and a lack of a

functioning political authority. With a small Byzantine army still in parts of Italy but dwindling as it withdrew to meet growing threats in the East and with a new German enemy, the Lombards, advancing across northern Italy toward Rome, Pope Gregory I assumed office. He set up a first-rate bureaucracy called the papal chancery to manage church affairs, developed the liturgy and rituals of Christian worship, made Benedictine monasticism the standard form of monasticism in the West, and sponsored a vigorous missionary program, including a Benedictine mission to convert the Anglo-Saxons. He was a brilliant organizer and a shrewd diplomat. He became, in effect, the ruler of Rome and central Italy who, even though he had no army, was able to hold sway through the force of his personality and sheer competence and intelligence. He made the papacy the key institution in the emerging order of the West.

A further transformational development for the West was the consequence of Christianity's insistence upon the fundamental equality of all human beings. This belief improved opportunities for women in society and led to the eradication of slavery, which made Europe the first society in history not anchored on slavery. It also spurred a search for sources of energy to replace the muscle of men and women and helped lead to such inventions as the horse collar, windmills, waterwheels, steam engines, gas engines, electric motors, nuclear reactors, and solar panels.

An additional building block in the emergence of Western society was the Church's missionary work. In the fifth century, St. Patrick (c. 387–460/1 or 493 CE) converted the Celts of Ireland to Catholicism and then Irish monks and missionaries played a critical role in helping the Church preserve some of the valuable products of Roman civilization amidst a torrent of German invaders. Irish missionaries also founded schools, libraries, churches, and monasteries in England and on the continent of Europe, particularly from the sixth century onward.<sup>4</sup> In 496, Clovis (r. 481–511), who united the Frankish tribes and founded the Merovingian dynasty, converted and prepared the way for the expansion of Catholicism across Europe. At the advent of the seventh century, the Benedictine monks, led by St. Augustine of Canterbury, laid the groundwork for the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons. It was a major achievement. The English soon produced key leaders and intellectuals, including Venerable Bede (632/33–735), who wrote the *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum* (*The Ecclesiastical History of the English People*), and St. Boniface (c. 672/675–754/755), who became known as the “Apostle of the Germans.” In the eighth century, the Church sent missionaries from

Ireland and England to boost the faith among the Franks of Gaul, the largest and most compact of the German tribes.

A further key institution in the birth of Western society was monasticism. Its significance cannot be exaggerated. Monasticism started in the East where it was initially a movement of severe asceticism. Western monasticism was different from Eastern or Orthodox monasticism in that under the leadership of St. Benedict it emphasized practicality, work, study, and community. The requirement that monks do manual labor brought dignity and respect to workingmen and women and helped to undermine slavery and the desultory life style of the idle rich. It also led to the cultivation of new land. Monks sought to remove themselves from the world of temptation, so they often moved to the extremities of settlements, to places where they had to cultivate the land, drain the swamps, clear the forests, and invent technology. Their work ethic and innovative approach to solving practical problems had dramatic effects on Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, particularly in agriculture, hydraulic engineering, animal husbandry, economic enterprise, and technology. The monks, particularly the Cistercian order, became the leading agriculturists and metallurgists of medieval Europe. They developed new techniques of cattle and sheep breeding that provided a supply of meat, wine, fish, and fleece to Europe's growing population.<sup>5</sup>

The stipulation that monks study and develop their intellects also had dramatic consequences. The Benedictines recommended reading scripture and the lives of the saints, a suggestion that led in virtually every Benedictine monastery to a library and a scriptorium where copies of books could be produced and new books written. The creation of libraries and scriptoria made the monasteries the leading centers of learning and literacy and soon produced monastic and then cathedral schools. The monastic schools focused on theology and known knowledge and pursued a conservative religious curriculum. The cathedral schools, which were located in the towns where bishops had their cathedrals, were much more open to a varied curriculum and they became the precursor of the university, the jewel of medieval European society. In short, the monasteries organized the first schools of Europe, which were central to educating citizens to accept the values of Christianity, and they became the incubator for practical technology—using reason to find ways to work with, exploit, and manage the physical environment for the improvement of the community.

Another critical factor in the birth of the West was the return of some form of central government. With the conversion of the Franks, the

Church had anticipated that the Merovingian kings would fashion a central government that would be the Church's strong partner and promoter, but the successors of Clovis proved to be weak and feckless. When Muslim invaders suddenly threatened Europe in the eighth century, the Church looked for another partner and found him in the person of Charles Martel (r. 714–741), the mayor of the palace of the Merovingian dynasty. Pope Gregory III (r. 731–741) had St. Boniface inform Martel that he could seize and distribute Church lands as land grants or fiefs to his vassals or soldiers to pay for costly cavalry operations against the advance of the Muslims in southwestern Europe. Martel took the land and created a powerful cavalry of vassals that marked a critical shift in the military balance of power in Europe. In October 732, outside of Tours, Martel's army encountered and routed an Islamic force at the Battle of Poitiers.

When Martel died, Pope Zacharias (r. 741–752) backed Martel's son, Pepin the Short (r. 741–768), as the king of the Franks, thereby toppling the Merovingian dynasty and establishing the Carolingian dynasty, named after Charles Martel. The pope had St. Boniface consecrate Pepin's royal authority in 751. Pepin then invaded Italy and forced the Lombards to cede central Italy, including the former Byzantine exarchate at Ravenna and Rome and its environs, to the pope, an event called the Donation of Pepin, which effectively established the Papal States. To counter the charge that the pope received his authority to rule the Papal States from Pepin, the papacy promulgated a document called the Donation of Constantine, which was a forgery, but nonetheless widely accepted because it seemed to be a logical consequence of the pope's critical role in rebuilding order following the collapse of the Roman Empire. It claimed that the Emperor Constantine in the fourth century had given the pope the authority to rule in Italy and to name the imperial representative in the West.

Pope Stephen II (r. 752–757) re-consecrated Pepin king and prohibited the Franks under threat of excommunication from ever having a king not descended from Pepin. He also conferred upon Pepin and his sons, Charlemagne and Carolman, the title of *Patricius Romanorum*, thereby usurping the authority of the Byzantine emperor who alone was supposed to award that title to his representative in the West. The Church's sanction thus became a factor for the legitimacy of political rulers in the West.<sup>6</sup>

When Pepin's son, Charlemagne (r. 768–814) came to power, Pope Leo III crowned him emperor in Rome on 25 December 800, thereby reviving the concept of emperorship in the West and stressing the critical role of the Church in establishing political legitimacy. Under Charlemagne's rule,

Catholicism spread across Europe to Saxony, parts of Scandinavia, and to the borders of Poland, Bohemia, and Austria. It also fortified its position in northern Spain against a possible Muslim attack when Charlemagne set up a march in Barcelona. Throughout his empire, Charlemagne and the Church insisted upon the importance of law and education. At Aachen he set up the Palace School to which he recruited the top intellectuals in Europe, most notably Alcuin, an English Benedictine monk who led a general revival of learning called the Carolingian Renaissance, including the development of a new calligraphy called Carolingian minuscule. In the ninth century, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches reached an agreement that outlined the two missionary fields for their respective missionaries and largely established the Orthodox–Catholic demarcation line that still exists in Europe.<sup>7</sup>

The Church was pleased with Charlemagne's expansion of the faith across Europe, but there was a danger that the Carolingian emperor might become a caesaropapist emperor. Indeed, Charlemagne considered himself a contemporary David, a sort of priest-king who led the Empire and the Church. However, the danger of absolutism dissipated when Charlemagne and his successors followed the German tradition of rulers dividing their lands among their sons. With each division, the threat of absolute central government declined sharply, the Carolingian Empire faded away, and the title of emperor, already hollow, fell into disuse in 924.

In place of a powerful central government there now grew a form of limited government called feudalism, which maintained the hierarchy of kings and eventually a revived titular emperor at the apex of society but had effective power lodged and operating at the level of counts and dukes. The Church found this form of government to its liking because it had laws, rituals, institutions, and protocols, in which the Church participated, to reduce local warfare, maintain general security, protect the Church, and prevent absolutism.<sup>8</sup> By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, power moved to the national level with the formation of national kingdoms in England, France, Scandinavia, Poland, and elsewhere, but a continent-wide absolute empire never materialized.<sup>9</sup>

Feudalism helped produce or sanction a number of key developments that defined or abetted the evolution of limited government in the West. It gave practical political experience to the nobility. Governing was a shared responsibility and was not dependent upon a thin or shallow pool of talent and experience. In addition, feudalism promoted an aristocratic version of federalism—the idea that central and local government coexisted and acted in proportion to the challenge, what the Church later defined as

the principle of subsidiarity. Montesquieu praised this novel idea and the American founding fathers incorporated it into their constitution in the eighteenth century.

Feudalism also gave birth to the institution of parliament. The word “parliament” derived from the Latin word “*parliamentum*,” which meant “talking.” It was a longstanding tradition among the German and other tribes for the king to talk to and seek the advice and approval of the nobility and ecclesiastical officials—the major stakeholders or estates—before making any far-reaching decisions that affected the community. This notion of “what depends on all should be approved by all” was at the heart of the institution of parliament. When the burger class arose in the cities, it made sense for the kings to invite it to the meetings, too, since its members were wealthy and a source of revenue for funding government and wars.

These “parliaments” were commonplace across Europe, from Poland to England to Spain to Portugal. In Poland they were called *sejm*; in Spain and Portugal, Cortes; in France, the Estates General; in the Holy Roman Empire, the diet. In England, it was called the parliament. Some of the parliamentary bodies became so powerful that they effectively blocked the development of national states for centuries. Such was the case in Poland and Germany. In other places, the kings simply avoided calling the estates, the cortes, or the parliamentary bodies into session in order to prevent sharing power, but ended up not being able to obtain support from the elite for their operations. In England, the parliament effectively forged a compromise with the king where parliament controlled the purse strings and the king became an executive and eventually a figurehead with a member of parliament serving as the prime minister.

Feudalism also gave rise to the idea of representation, which was a logical consequence of parliamentary government. Because there were far too many people involved for the king to talk to everyone, the tradition developed to elect representatives of the different classes to talk to the king. Eventually, all citizens obtained the right to vote on who would represent them at the center of power, thus spurring the evolution of democracy.

Feudalism also embedded the rule of law and proper procedure in the mind of the political elite. Kings, nobles, popes, bishops, abbots, and eventually the Holy Roman emperor exercised power and balanced one another according to fixed law, which functioned as a sort of constitution, written or unwritten.

Finally, feudalism produced a precursor to the contract theory of government. Christian dualism had long claimed that rulers received their

authority from God via the head of his Church, the pope. While political leaders agreed that their power came from God, few, if any, acknowledged that the pope was a necessary intermediary between God and them. For the sake of ceremonial and popular legitimacy in a world of decentralized government where most citizens were Catholic, they were content to have the pope's blessing, but they refused to acknowledge that the Church was supreme in any clash with political authority.

In the eleventh century during the lay investiture crisis, Pope Gregory VII and the German emperor Henry IV clashed over Henry's policy of naming bishops and abbots as his vassals. The pope condemned Henry for interfering in Church affairs and to punish him released the German nobility from their oath of loyalty to Henry. The matter was temporarily resolved when Henry begged forgiveness at Canossa in 1077 and the pope relented.

However, the pope's action was a shock to Europe's kings. They considered it to be an unprecedented and dangerous usurpation of authority by the pope, and they quickly searched for another basis for their legitimacy other than God via the Church. Ironically, they found it in a theory of limited government that the Church asserted during the bitter contest between Gregory and Henry. Manegold of Lautenbach (c. 1030–1103), a priest theologian and one of Pope Gregory's defenders, argued in the midst of the lay investiture crisis that government was elected by the citizens to constrain criminals and if the government became criminal, then it broke the pact and the citizens could remove it. Legitimacy was thus not based on divine right, but doing right—living up to the pact, which in Lautenbach's interpretation had to encompass respect for the Church and individual rights based upon divine revelation and Church teaching. Here for the first time was an outline for the contract theory of government, based upon natural law and innate rights related to the Christian view of man as made in the image and likeness of God. This theory was an invitation to Christians and politically savvy individuals to critically examine government policy, using reason to evaluate the behavior of government against the immutable standard of natural law, divine revelation, Church teaching, tradition, and, indeed, right formed personal conscience, with the explicit intention of checking or possibly removing the government, if it were found wanting. It was a seedling in the development of constitutional government, that is, government limited by law. In Antony Black's words, it was "the beginnings of a line of political theory that would lead to John Locke and John Rawls."<sup>10</sup>

However, the European rulers saw in Manegold's theory not only a way of checking the emperor, but also of removing the Church and the pope from the political equation and making society more secular. They agreed that their power was bestowed by the citizens—actually came from God via the citizens and not from the Church or the pope. They claimed that they were God's representatives of the Christian people on earth and that they were sovereign over the entire community within their realm, including the Church. As for the popes, the rulers marginalized them, which became increasingly easy because the popes were being compromised in the eyes of the public by abuses, scandals, and the very act of being so blatantly political. And they did not have armies, which revealed the weakness of the Gelasian theory in a secularizing world, and that point was made rather succinctly when an envoy of French King Philip IV informed Pope Boniface VIII in 1303, "your swords are but a theory, ours are a reality."<sup>11</sup> Emperor Louis of Bavaria, in the middle of a struggle with Pope John XXII, endorsed the position of Marsiglio of Padua (c. 1270–1342) who, with Jean de Jandun, published *Defensor pacis* around 1326 and laid out the case for the Conciliar Movement, which claimed that the pope was less important than an ecumenical council of bishops.<sup>12</sup> With the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, the pope and the Catholic Church were further reduced and political leaders took a direct role in guiding religion, whether they were Protestant or Catholic, and mainly moved toward a position of making religion a private affair. In time, some rulers also moved away from the theory of popular divine right monarchy and claimed that their power came directly from the people whom they represented and protected. Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century clearly articulated the case for popular absolutism, but most kings preferred to continue with a divine right sanction because their subjects were overwhelmingly religious.

Another related but distinct part of Western Civilization's development that went hand in hand with the evolution of law and limited government was Europe's embrace of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. As mentioned, when the Byzantines in the sixth century made a solid effort to reestablish imperial power in the lands that had been the western part of the Roman Empire, they ultimately failed, but left behind the fruit of one of the most significant developments in human history—Emperor Justinian's long-term work to codify Roman law that eventually resulted in the *Corpus*.

This codification of law gave the Catholic Church and the West a handy and well-organized summary of Roman Law, jurisprudence, and legal principles to remove inconsistencies and contradictions in the law, which

was exactly what the Church needed in order to educate the Germans about how to grow a new order and to establish foundational principles for maintaining order and delivering justice, which were at the heart of any order. The *Corpus*, particularly that part called the *Digest*, reflected centuries of established and workable law that grew organically from the experience of Romans working together and with their conquered subjects, so it was a very practical compendium for guiding and structuring human interaction, and, most saliently, it promulgated universal principles called the natural law, which, as mentioned, was embedded in human experience and was accessible to and could be articulated by reason. Natural law was not written law but rather objective truth against which man-made law or positive or statutory law could be measured to determine its validity.

Although the Catholic Church had the *Corpus* from the time of Justinian, it evidently set it aside until it converted and then educated the Germans. By the eleventh century, the Germans were ready for such a sophisticated law code, and the Church produced or “rediscovered” it.<sup>13</sup> The *Corpus* enabled medieval society as a whole to forge limited government, formulate charters for free cities, and create autonomous corporations that were guided by their own rules, including such organizations as universities, courts, and guilds for craftsmen and other professions. The revival of jurisprudence soon affected all of Western Civilization and provided a firm basis for the development of constitutions, individual rights, commercial law, science, and international law.<sup>14</sup> And, unlike in the Orthodox tradition, the natural law, which was at the core of the *Corpus*, was not subject to the interpretation of an absolute monarch, which would nullify its objectivity and universality.

In England, the *Corpus* was introduced by clergy who were educated at the University of Bologna or the University of Paris or at the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford, which branched off from the University of Paris, and who were familiar with Roman law and the Canon Law, which was based upon the *Corpus*. Of course, England had the Common Law, which was customary, unwritten law and the basis of English society. But the Common Law embraced the notion of equity, which was theoretical law that could be reasoned to for situations that Common Law did not cover and was in many ways the equivalent of natural law. In addition, the conquest of England in 1066 by William the Conqueror helped spread knowledge of the Common Law in Europe and of Roman and feudal law in England, which was diffused throughout Europe by the transnational clergy who frequently were educated in Rome and in universities

on the continent. Of particular importance for Western societies were the Common Law concepts of due process, the right of petition, and the notion of representation.

An additional building block of Western Civilization was the invention of the university, which largely came out of the monastic movement. The word “university” meant a corporation, and initially it was a corporation of student clerics who, like other corporate groups, had the authority and autonomy by law to make their own rules and regulations and to hire and fire faculty, who were mainly clerics. The undergraduate curriculum consisted of the arts (the trivium of grammar/literature, rhetoric, and dialectic) and the sciences (the quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music).

Advanced research and graduate universities, like Bologna, Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge, developed a curriculum that was open to change and to the study of pagan or early Christian thinkers and Muslim commentators on pagan philosophers, particularly Aristotle, who were reintroduced to the Europeans through translations, often by trilingual Jews, of their works from Greek or Arabic into Latin. Faculties, not students, controlled the graduate universities and were often organized into colleges of specialization. The first major professional learning center was the medical school at Salerno, which was organized in the tenth century and closely studied Muslim medical insights. The first university was the University of Bologna, which evolved in the eleventh century and was devoted primarily to the study of Roman law, particularly the *Digest* of Justinian’s *Corpus Juris Civilis*, and where Gratian published around 1150 the first compendium of canon law called the *Decretum*. Although the University of Bologna was a *sui generis* learning center that did not originate from either a monastic or a cathedral school, most universities evolved from cathedral schools. The university as an institution spread from Italy to north of the Alps to Paris and then across Europe. The faculty and student clerics at the universities were educated to serve as clerks for the bureaucracies of the Church and the growing, secular political regimes.

However, university faculty and students did more than that. They, along with experienced craftsmen, entrepreneurs, and inventors, also became yet another critical ingredient in the evolution of Western society. The educated and relatively free citizens who researched, studied in, or graduated from the universities or professional apprenticeships were the principal agents of Western culture’s unfettered pursuit of science and laid the groundwork for the development of advanced mathematics, the

scientific method, new technology, inventions, and the exact sciences, particularly astronomy, which was important to the Church in order to clarify the calendar for religious observances.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Europeans acquired translations of mainly works in Arabic that provided summaries and commentary on knowledge from China, India, ancient Greece, and partly from ancient Rome. The Europeans quickly mastered the knowledge and then went on to open up new fields of knowledge and produce technology and inventions based upon that knowledge. There was a vigorous debate between religious rationalists and secular rationalists, but in the end they agreed that faith and reason were compatible. When the Bishop of Paris told Saints Thomas and Albertus Magnus that their theories were impossible because God could not act the way their research indicated, they retorted that nothing was impossible for God, which is the ultimate argument in favor of free inquiry.<sup>15</sup>

Some of Western Civilization's inventions included silver-backed mirrors, magnifying lenses, eyeglasses, and mechanical clocks, which appeared in both Italy and England during the thirteenth century and soon spread across Europe. Eyeglasses enhanced individual education and extended the careers and productivity of cartographers and shipbuilding engineers and other craftsmen who before this invention reached their peak at around age 40 when most human eyes lose their ability to focus on close objects because of a hardening of the eye's crystalline lens. The mechanical clock was the essential invention for measuring longitude (east–west position), organizing the day, synchronizing the activities of sailors, and giving meaning to history as the passage of time and the unfolding of God's plan. It was also the indispensable precursor of the Industrial Revolution, which enhanced European transportation and communication across the world's oceans. In fact, Lewis Mumford and David Landes hailed it as "the key machine" of the modern, industrial era, more important than the steam engine.<sup>16</sup>

Other inventions or refined adaptations from other cultures included the mariner's astrolabe, the dry compass, the latitudinal chart, the sternpost rudder, and overshot and undershot water wheels and windmills, which allowed the Europeans to refine the products of the land and animals into finished goods and to mine the land's mineral resources.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the Europeans invented the gun deck that held heavy cannon below the main deck, which provided ballast and stability and increased a ship's draft as well as its firepower. They streamlined shipbuilding by first setting up a ship's frame and then putting overlapping, pegged, and caulked planks

on the frame like flesh on a skeleton.<sup>18</sup> In place of the flat bottom boat, they constructed the round ship with a broad beam, heavily curved sides, and manipulation of riggings and sails of different sizes and shapes that allowed ships to tack against the wind, sail into the open water far from shore, and navigate across the oceans of the world.<sup>19</sup> The round boat hull displaced water equal to the weight of the ship, so the Europeans could fill their ships with cargo, soldiers, or cannon, and still have buoyant and maneuverable ships that were formidable commercial and naval flotillas. By the time of Prince Henry the Navigator (1394–1460), the Europeans had erected the ocean-going caravel (displacing about 250 tons), which was soon followed by the Spanish carrack (displacing about 1000 tons).<sup>20</sup> All of these inventions bolstered European prowess on the high seas and over the sea-based trade lanes.

In the field of military technology and weapons, the Europeans developed gun metal founding that enabled them to cast siege guns, artillery, a version of the musket, and powerful cannons in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They also worked with gunpowder, which they probably picked up from the Chinese, and compacted it, unlike the Chinese, to obtain powerful explosions by the fourteenth century. The explosive power greatly enhanced propulsion and enabled the Europeans to project iron balls accurately and powerfully across long distances. Installed on their round boat ships, the Europeans could do away with the battering ram at the front of the naval vessel, which was the way that naval engagement had been fought for eons—ships would ram each other and then armed sailors would duke it out—and simply blow their enemies out of the water before a ship could close to ram or turn to launch a volley from its port or starboard side. In the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese used it to establish naval supremacy.<sup>21</sup>

The final pivotal institution that characterized the evolution of Western society was a new system of economic enterprise called capitalism. The term “capitalism” is usually associated with modern times, but it is a rather accurate moniker for what developed in medieval Europe. Capitalism held that the best system to provide for the physical needs of a society was one that valued private property where individuals, using their own talents and property, competed with one another to try to produce the best goods and services at the best price to satisfy the needs of a free market in accordance with the law of supply and demand in order to make a profit. The market set prices, and individuals and their companies either succeeded or failed in fair competition. Individual success depended upon such factors

as good ideas, intelligence, interest rates, luck, hard work, reinvestment, insurance, competent management, labor hires, accurate accounting, loans, timing, good planning, technology, maintenance, public relations, bills of exchange, banking structure, stock shares, corporate organization, and other such factors. Government's role was to provide security and to make sure the market remained competitive and thus it worked to prevent monopolies, cartels, and other forces that tried to manipulate the market.

The sequence of events that led to the development of capitalism in medieval Europe started with the establishment of security. Once safety was largely guaranteed, the population began to balloon. The growing population led to a demand for more goods and services and an increase in the quantity and quality of food. This demand was partially met by introducing more nutritious foods like peas and beans into the European diet, by cultivating more land faster and more intelligently with the invention of such new technology as the horse collar and horseshoe and the rational planting and rotation of crops. These developments, in turn, intensified population growth. Manors became overpopulated, and soon surplus individuals left the manor without fear of being tracked down by manorial lords. The runaway serfs soon filled a need as middlemen between producers and customers of goods and services and emerged as merchants and traders. At first, trade revived between regions where there were shortages, perhaps due to famine or some other catastrophe, and regions where there were abundances. Astute businessmen took full advantage of the law of supply and demand, and St. Thomas Aquinas and the Catholic theologians approved of such exploitation.<sup>22</sup> Trade then moved to luxury goods, particularly spices and silks, with the demand coming from the royal courts or from noble men and women who could afford to pay for such goods.

The merchants eventually organized fairs in different regions and inter-regional crossroads. As more traders from other parts of Europe and elsewhere participated, a money economy returned to Europe to facilitate the transfer of payments for goods and services. Moneychangers, who set the value of money that was not minted under a common standard, soon appeared at the fairs and evolved into bankers, who would hold funds on deposit for the merchants and who would make loans from the deposits to other merchants at a set interest rate in order to cover their liability against withdrawals, robbery, and weather, and to make profits, which then could be loaned out at less risk. The Church opposed the charging of high interest (usury), but eventually agreed that reasonable interest was fine and

it even overlooked high interest if needs were being met. The most successful bankers were initially located in the city-states of northern Italy, particularly in Florence where the Medici family developed many practices associated with capitalism, including banks, interest, bonds, bookkeeping, and joint stock companies.<sup>23</sup> The Italian city-states became fabulously wealthy as a result of being the financiers of the reviving Mediterranean Sea trade.

The merchants, traders, and bankers found some of the tools and strategies to manage and effect this new economic system in the medieval monasteries that were already operating thriving farms and vineyards. The monks were interested in efficiency, productivity, profit for the improvement of the community, and, in general, using reason to organize their farms and vineyards. Many of the merchants and bankers borrowed and adopted to their own enterprises such monastic business practices techniques as competent management, bills of exchange, transparent and accurate accounting, skilled labor, investment, and reinvestment.<sup>24</sup>

As trade revived and capitalist business practices took hold, a new socioeconomic class called the middle class emerged. Within the feudal structure's two-class system—serfs who worked on the manor and nobility who protected them and the lands—there was no place for the merchants, so they simply created a new or middle class to accommodate their needs. They obtained charters or legal documents by purchase, coercion, or rebellion that gave them legal status as burgers or bourgeoisie with the freedom and autonomy to make their own laws and manage their own courts within the burgs, suburbs, or cities where they settled. By law, anyone who lived in the city for one year and one day was considered a citizen, and all citizens were freemen, thus introducing a new legal category of persons who were separate from the serfs and nobility—a middle class.

Soon the middle class was strong enough to ally itself with either kings or nobility, depending upon their agenda and which ally gave them more leverage, in order to push for additional freedom and rights. Some of the merchants groups also organized large trading blocs like the Hanseatic League that dominated trade across the Baltic Sea. This trading route, which stretched from Lisbon to the North Sea to the Baltic Sea to Novgorod to the great Dnieper River system that flowed south into the Black Sea toward Constantinople, was a commercial lifeline between the Byzantine Empire and Western Europe in the fourteenth century.

The middle class and the cities where they lived also played a crucial role in the ending of serfdom and in the reduction of the power of the

feudal nobility in Europe. The cities eventually offered work, since some merchants decided to locate manufacturing centers there to produce a variety of goods and to be near their markets. The workers, like the original middle class, came from the surplus population on the manors. For their labor they were paid in money rather than in services and emerged as a working class or proletariat. Soon the manorial lords had to extend freedom to their own serfs to avoid wholesale flight by their serfs to the cities. The lords worked out an arrangement of being paid in fixed amounts of money in lieu of fixed labor obligations that had characterized the old relationship between serf and manorial lord. The fixed nature of this contract bankrupted many feudal noblemen when inflation devalued the fixed monetary payment. The feudal lords also offered freedom and land to peasants who would be willing to leave the manor and cultivate new land in unsettled locations or on the borderlands of Western states. They also suspended manorial obligations when serfs agreed to participate in crusades. Serfdom, like slavery, quickly disappeared from most of Western Europe by the end of the thirteenth century. By then capitalism, the middle class, and the working class were all in place and playing prominent roles in the emergence of Western Civilization.

By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Western Civilization could be clearly perceived with its core values and institutions. It soon challenged Islamic and Orthodox Civilizations in Europe on five fronts: Southwestern Europe with the Reconquista; Southern Italy and Sicily with the Normans; the Mediterranean Sea basin with the maritime city-states of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa; Southeastern Europe with the crusades; and Eastern Europe with the growth of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth. In the fifteenth century, it opened a climatic sixth front that continued unabated into the twentieth century: a global advance with the Age of Discovery and Exploration, the Renaissance, the Commercial Revolution, the Intellectual Revolution, the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. With its innovations, creativity, laws, limited government, and freedom, it managed to achieve startling wealth and power, establish colonies and bases across the globe, and connect the world's peoples and civilizations together through technology in communication and transportation and a new *Weltanschauung*. Its values took firm root in North America, South America, India, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and parts of Africa, and found support in the Russian Empire from the time of Peter the Great in the eighteenth century and in China and the Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth century. By

the twentieth century, it clearly dominated the contest to find a value system that could sustain global cooperation. There follows a brief summary of the major values of Western Civilization.

## POLITICAL VALUES OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

### *Rise of Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Democracy*

Constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy as preeminent political values of the West have roots that stretch back far into history and include Judaism's avowal of a divinely ordered and created world; ancient Greek philosophers' advice on establishing a harmonious order; Roman law, especially the *Digest* of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*; German custom and experience; Christianity's belief that all power came from God and that every ruler was under the law; and the Catholic Church's historical role in building a political order in Western societies that was limited and based upon law, particularly natural law.

All of these factors finally congealed in the evolution of Western Civilization in the Middle Ages when Western societies established fundamental principles and precedents by which they would be ruled (constitutions, charters, or contracts, written and unwritten) and agreed upon a system of democratic government in which the executive obtained its democratic legitimacy from, and was held accountable to, a legislature (parliament) that represented and was elected by the electorate which over the centuries was broadened to include everyone who was a citizen. Parliamentary democracy directly derived from the medieval practice of kings "talking" (from the Latin *parliamentum*, meaning "a speaking") to the nobility, higher clergy, and eventually the merchants about war, taxes, and other matters because they believed that what depended upon all should be approved by all.

In many ways, England set the standard for rule of law and limited government in Europe and around the world. Building upon the common law tradition of the Anglo-Saxons, the feudal legacy, and Catholicism, the English created a series of institutions that produced a free, inventive society, and beginning in the thirteenth century when the English feudal nobility, guided most likely by Stephen Langdon, the Archbishop of Canterbury, forced King John to agree to the Magna Carta in 1215 at Runnymede. Years later, Mikhail Lunin, a Russian intellectual contrasted the Russian Orthodox Church's support of tsarist absolutism with the midwifery role of the Catholic Church in producing constitutional government in England.<sup>25</sup>

*Separation of Church and State*

When Christianity first appeared and began to grow in the Roman Empire, before it was tolerated and made the state religion, it believed that the state and church were mainly separate. Christ seemingly made clear that Christians were to pay taxes and render to Caesar what was Caesar's, and to God, what was God's (Matt. 22:21). St. Paul added that all power came from God, including the state's power, and that the purpose of state power was to apprehend evildoers and deliver justice (Rom 13: 1-7). No one endorsed any specific form of government, so political power could be exercised by any type of government, including autocracies, oligarchies, constitutional monarchies, and democracies.

The Church did not change its position once the Roman Empire gave it legal standing. Even though the Empire was an autocracy, the Church was determined to exercise independent action in matters of faith and morals and, indeed, to provide binding advice to political leaders. However, the Church's vision of dual authority or dualism only developed in the West where the Catholic Church led the way in building a new order and, in the process, worked effectively to check government and guarantee, at least in theory, its independence. The Orthodox Church in the East was never able to escape the hold of imperial government because the emperor was an absolute monarch who controlled the Church. When the Byzantine Empire fell, the Russian tsar claimed the same authority, so the Church in the Byzantine Empire and Russia never gained its independence.

The effect of separating church and state in the West made possible the evolution of the nation state and eventually nationalism, where political identity was tied first and foremost to ethnicity, rather than religion. By way of contrast, political identity for many Muslims, even those living in the West, was and is inseparable from Islam.<sup>26</sup> They perceive themselves as Muslims first and then only secondarily as, say, Frenchmen or Englishmen. Political identity for Russian Orthodox Christians was a mixture of religion and ethnicity. Since the state was viewed as the agency of Orthodoxy, Russian Orthodox leaders thought that the Russian state was essential to Orthodox culture and that citizens of the Russian state should be Orthodox, which led to discrimination against non-Orthodox citizens. Even when the Soviet Russian state turned against the Church, Orthodox leaders were so invested in the state as the embodiment of Orthodox culture that they continued to support it, helping their persecutors to survive World War II and persecute the Church anew.<sup>27</sup>

### *Capitalism*

Western Civilization produced a form of economic enterprise eventually known as capitalism in the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries when trade and cities revived and the middle class appeared. Its origins are traceable to the development of limited government and Christianity's insistence upon the universality of natural law, the equality and dignity of each human being, the value of work, the monastic tradition that showed virtue had its reward, and the need for individuals to improve the community through self-improvement.

As an economic system, capitalism sanctioned private property and the right of individuals and corporate groups of individuals to develop their talents and to produce through ingenuity and hard work goods and services for sale in a competitive market where supply and demand determined prices in order to earn a profit. It was characterized by such business practices as transparent accounting, bills of sale, investment, reinvestment, the hiring of labor, moneychangers and bankers, insurance, contract enforcement, and the charging interest on loans, which the Church initially opposed but eventually accepted as a reasonable tool to cover risk. It further supported a government that provided security, made sure that the market remained competitive and free, and prevented through laws and tax policies collusion, monopolies, cartels, price-fixing, and large concentrations of unearned wealth accumulation, that is, inherited wealth. It was an economic system that took human nature as it was and then harnessed that nature to the higher goal of improving the standard of living for the whole community.

### *Natural Law and Due Process Concept*

Western society embraced natural law, which it held to be God's law and which was found and described in human experience by human reason and was reflected in individual conscience. All men had a conscience and through reason could come to know such general principles as human equality and the right to life. Natural law was the objective standard by which positive law was to be judged and measured.

The due process concept flowed from natural law and from Christianity's support of individual conscience and of the individual who as a creature of God had dignity and rights, which could not be unfairly trammelled upon or abridged by government without a defined, public process. Due process was also part and parcel of Roman law and the English Common Law, which the West fully embraced. The due process idea guaranteed

that the law would not be arbitrary; would be fairly applied; would be no respecter of persons; and would follow proper protocol, which could vary depending upon national tradition but might include such procedures as writs, warrants, trial by jury, verifiable evidence, eyewitness testimony, and adversarial representation. It also might adhere to such principles as innocent until proven guilty. The whole point of due process was to guarantee that justice would be delivered, within the best ability of a given society's experience, and would gain the support of citizens over time and in changing circumstances because it always strove to be consistent, based on precedent, objective, and in conformity with natural law.

### *The Idea of the Community Benefitting from Individual Freedom*

Long before the Renaissance, Western Civilization cultivated individualism, which was clearly reflected in medieval literature and the Scholastic debates at the universities.<sup>28</sup> The source of its embrace of individualism is more difficult to divine. It certainly had Classical and German roots, but Christianity also supported it.

Christianity put special emphasis upon individual dignity, rights, duty, and responsibility, and offered a persuasive basis for individual freedom. It argued for the ultimate freedom of individual conscience in any confrontation with the state or the church, and clearly stipulated that human beings were more important than rules and regulations, including those that were considered to be from God (Matt 12:12; Mark 2:28). In the Byzantine and Russian Empires and in Islamic states, the development of individualism was cut off by the power of the state in favor of community rights.

In the West, where government was limited, the Christian Church was able to advance the tradition of individualism. It stressed individual dignity, rights, and duties without denying the supreme importance of the community and settled upon a teaching that supported the individual's right to develop his or her talents for the purpose of improving the community, a purpose monitored and enforced by the state. It held that the community benefited when the individual was encouraged to develop his talents whereas Orthodoxy and Islam held that the individual gained when the community was emphasized.

### *Electoral Representation in All Forms of Corporate Bodies*

The idea of representation was a consequence of the parliamentary tradition where the king talked to and consulted with those who had a vested interest in the kingdom. It soon became obvious that everyone could not

fit in one place and meet and speak at the same time, so representatives were elected to speak on behalf of the different classes, and rules and protocols were set in place to give the representatives the opportunity to be heard, and the principle of representative government was born.

The idea of representative government expanded across Europe and had varied success. In England, parliament initially included multiple groups, but eventually it divided into a house of commons and a house of lords, and the house of commons evolved into the principal political force since it not only represented the most citizens, but it also controlled the power of the purse strings. In Poland, the sejm represented mainly the nobility and it failed to function properly. In France, the Estates General represented the major class interests of the French nation—nobility, upper clergy, and the rest of the population—but the king was reluctant to call it into session because he rightly feared that it would curb his freedom of action. The States General in the Netherlands mainly reflected the interests of the burger class.

The idea of representation in other corporate organizations flowed naturally from the desire to hear the voices of all those who were affected by an organization's actions and decisions and the parallel effort to make meetings efficient and possible. Corporations, guilds, universities, and other large entities quickly adopted the idea of accountable representation.

### *Legal Autonomy of Cities and Towns*

As trade and commerce revived, merchants appeared, and they wanted to be able to control their own affairs and to be recognized as a new class in society—a middle class between the nobility and serfs of the feudal–manorial era. It was the middle class who founded the cities and towns and secured through force, bribery, or purchase the charters that guaranteed the cities and towns their autonomy. Citizens of cities and towns with charters were free citizens, subject to the laws of the cities but no longer exposed to the danger of being returned to the condition of serfdom. As autonomous units of government, with the ability to pass laws and collect taxes, the cities and towns emerged as centers of creativity, intellectual energy, and invention. They also helped promote limited, involved government and trained citizens in government, bureaucracy, and law.

### *Universities*

The West did not have direct access to Classical antiquity because of the German invasions, migrations, and conquests. Culture and schooling had

declined rapidly and were virtually non-existent in post-Roman Europe. So the West had to build its culture anew. It had the advantage of the Church as an intermediary with the Classical age and that helped a great deal in stressing the importance of reason, education, and law. It also had the monasteries that organized schools and libraries. The first universities were literally corporations of students who organized to make certain that they would obtain quality education from competent faculty and to prevent price gouging by profit-minded town merchants. Other universities and colleges were organized by faculty who wanted to make certain that they had quality students for advanced and professional study.

The university grew out of Western Civilization's Christian belief that reason and faith were compatible and that God wanted human beings to develop their minds to the fullest extent possible to glorify him and to improve their lives, communities, and environment. As mentioned, some universities simply emerged as learning centers out of the Europeans' sheer desire to learn, but most evolved from cathedral schools in the cities and towns where the bishop had his cathedral. Most of the students and faculty were clerics (or clerks) who were studying to provide public service to the state and church and to train for professions in law and medicine.

The universities developed their own laws and rules and operated as independent forces in society. They provided the learning and research for advancing knowledge and were the jewel of medieval society. They insisted upon academic freedom from both the government and the church and were the main agent for collecting and transmitting knowledge. Universities originated only in Western Civilization, but in time other civilizations, realizing their value, copied the West, but none, including both Islamic and Orthodox states, supported full academic freedom.

### *Unfettered Pursuit of Modern Science*

Christianity believed that faith and reason were compatible, which produced what we might call religious rationalism and secular rationalism. Religious rationalism, which was best articulated by St. Thomas Aquinas, said reason should seek truth by acknowledging the existence of revealed truths, which reason cannot know or prove with certainty, and then proceed by way of deductive reasoning—moving from general truths to specific knowledge—to comprehend nature and gain knowledge. He also stressed right reason's capacity to understand much of the moral law, and noted that some norms are based on "secondary principles" which may change over time.<sup>29</sup>

Secular rationalism, on the other hand, held that because revealed truth was beyond finite reason, it should simply be accepted and put in its own separate but revered category, and reason should be used to study what it was equipped to study, namely natural phenomena. Here, through the process of inductive reasoning—moving from specific observation and testing to general conclusions—man could gain knowledge, including perhaps some insight into God’s creation and thus God himself. The most eloquent spokesman of secular rationalism was the Franciscan monk, William of Ockham.

Both schools of thought enjoyed success and produced pioneering thinkers and ultimately the Scientific Revolution.<sup>30</sup> Out of the religious rationalist tradition emerged great philosophers, theologians, writers, explorers, inventors, and natural and social scientists, some of whom reflected the tradition before Aquinas articulated it and some of whom rejected the Catholic Church as the best or only vehicle for the tradition’s articulation. Representatives of this tradition in rough sequential order from medieval times to the present, reflecting different fields, included Francis of Assisi, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Marco Polo, Prince Henry the Navigator, King Alfonso X the Wise of Spain, Dante, Chaucer, Magellan, Columbus, Cortez, Diaz, Balboa, Pissarro, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, Johann Guttenberg, the Van Eycks, Erasmus, Thomas More, Martin Luther, John Calvin, John Wesley, John Knox, Richard Hooker, El Greco, Velasquez, Cervantes, Francis Xavier, Ignatius Loyola, Matteo Ricci, Richard Hooker, John Milton, Jonathan Edwards, Alexander Pope, Edmund Burke, William Blackstone, James Watt, Cecil Rhodes, Lord Acton, John Henry Newman, Gregor Mendel, Louis Pasteur, Leopold Von Ranke, Hillarie Belloc, Evelyn Waugh, J.R.R. Tolkien, Graham Greene, G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, T. S. Elliott, Christopher Dawson, Eric Voegelin, Arnold Toynbee, Mother Theresa, Desmond Tutu, Martin Luther King, Teilhard de Chardin, Billy Graham, Karol Wojtyla, and Francis Collins.

Out of the secular rationalist tradition there blossomed a rich flowering of philosophers, scientists, artists, inventors, engineers, and historians, including, just to cite a few representative examples, Leonardo of Pisa, Jean Burien, Nicole d’Oresme, Copernicus, Sir Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Pascal, Grotius, Galileo, Johann Kepler, Sir Isaac Newton, John Locke, David Hume, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Benjamin Franklin, and, in modern times, John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, Dmitri Mendeleev, Niels Bohr, and Albert Einstein.

Christianity also stressed that finite man's comprehension of truth evolved over time. The Church taught that God's truth continued to be revealed to man in accordance with man's ability to understand and absorb it, and that religious and secular rationalism played a role in this process. From the Western perspective, the Church was a living institution and God continued to act and communicate through it with Christian believers. In the East, the autocratic government repressed the idea of evolving faith and of religious and secular rationalism. It favored a fixed faith that was not subject to rational analysis because it believed its power was best maintained by stymieing change.

In the West, the notion of an evolving faith and of a dynamic interplay between faith and reason flourished because both the government and the Church, as Western society emerged, were limited but functional. Political and religious authority was strong enough to maintain order and provide leadership, but not so powerful that it could stop intellectuals and clerics from seeking truth, from trying to understand man and his relationship to God, from studying God's creation, and from using reason to find reasonable approaches and solutions to human problems, including political alternatives to absolutism. Separation of church and state made the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment possible.<sup>31</sup>

Because Western Christians believed that truth was evolving, they developed four intellectual attitudes that became essential parts of the intellectual heritage of Western Civilization. They took an interest in history and in the verification of historical documents. For them, the study of history was a way to understand God. From the Christian perspective, God had entered the life of man at a particular time, and history has not been the same since. To study the development of that relationship was critical to helping man know God, and the study of time and its passage was in fact a study of God's relationship with man.

Second, they cultivated a sustained interest in and commitment to seek enlightenment and knowledge. Truth was there to behold and it behooved man to pursue it. Education was the key to knowing God, improving life, and expelling superstition, fear, and ignorance. This commitment to knowledge led the West Europeans to seek knowledge wherever it was found, including Islamic society whose scholars had absorbed and synthesized knowledge from China, India, Greece, and Rome.<sup>32</sup>

Third, the Western Christians concluded that because man's perception of truth was evolving, no one had a monopoly on truth in the sense of the complete story. Rather, knowledge was tentative and to be organized

and formulated in such a way that it could serve as a foundation for further study, the modification of existing knowledge, and the acquisition of new insights, in other words, science. Seekers of truth were to adopt the attitude that they were dependent upon others, needed both humility and skepticism when approaching and relying upon man's collected body of knowledge, and had to follow precise scientific methods so that everyone could follow the search for truth and test the results.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, the Western Christians scientists were not intimidated by established authority. Even though the early scholars of Western Civilization were mainly believing Christians and most of them clerics, they were not cowered by popes or politicians. They relished the debate, dialogue, and free inquiry of intellectual pursuit.

The paradox of Christianity was on full display in the West and it would appear and reappear in subsequent centuries and be characterized by such dramatic personalities as Copernicus, Galileo, and Mendel. Religious authority said one thing, and it would be taken into account, and the truly permanent values were always revered, but it did not stop the pursuit of truth—a fecund and frenetic tension that spurred Western knowledge and culture forward. The continuing argument was a sign of academic freedom in the schools of Europe and an affirmation of Christianity's avowal of the compatibility of faith and reason and of the validity of individual conscience in pursuit of God's truth—seen and unseen.<sup>34</sup> Reason could throw light on truth, and faith could cultivate a moral imagination that guided reason and morality. Western scholars readily borrowed from other cultures, including China, India, and the world of Islam, when they found valuable knowledge. Western culture was depended on central truths, but amazingly open, flexible, and tolerant because power was checked and diffused.

## NOTES

1. Black pointed out that Rome and especially ancient Greece, where multiple political units existed, provided models for the development of political states in the West. Black (1993), p. 64. For general background on the early history of Western Civilization, see Fouracre (2005), McKitterick (1995), and Reuter (1999).
2. Perhaps Christopher Dawson presented the most insightful study of Christianity's pivotal role in the development of Western Civilization. See Dawson (1978), Dawson ([1950] 1979), and Dawson ([1959]

1981). Brown (2003) claimed that the Germans were more assimilated into Roman culture than Dawson allows. Also see Brown ([1967] 2002).

3. Separation of church and state was a novel idea, which is often not appreciated. See Black (2009), p. 225; also see Rahner (1992), p. xviii, 242. Pagden (2008) argued that the idea of separation of church and state was the fundamental difference between Christianity and Islam.
4. Cahill (2000).
5. Stark (2005), pp. 58–9. The monks personified the Christian notion that virtue had its rewards (Matt 6: 33).
6. McKitterick (2001), pp. 17–8.
7. Vlasto (1970).
8. For information on feudal society, see McKitterick (1995), Bloch ([1940] 1961), Bloch (1975). For a solid history of Christendom, the strain between Church and state, and the paradox of the papal monarchy in the medieval era, see Morris (1989).
9. For a pithy history of Western Civilization, see Davies (1996). Also see Bagge (2014), Davies (2001), and Davies (1982).
10. Black (2010), p. 119.
11. Dunn (1982), pp. 118–9.
12. Black (1992), pp. 70–1.
13. For a detailed account of the relevant manuscripts and their transmission, see Radding and Ciaralli (2007).
14. See Berman (1983), Haskins ([1927] 1961), pp. 193–223. Toby Huff maintained that law was the basis for Western science. See Huff (1993), p. 119, 121–48.
15. See Gies and Gies (1995), pp. 229–30.
16. Cipolla ([1967] 1978), p. 31; Gould (1923), p. 66; Landes (1998), pp. 47–8; Mumford (1939), pp. 14–15; Gies and Gies (1995), p. 210; Stark (2005), p. 44.
17. For detailed information on Western science, inventions, and innovations, see Butterfield ([1949] 1965); Whitehead ([1925] 1967); Hall (1970); Gimpel (1976); Landes (1969, 1983, 1998); Lopez (1976), p. 44; White (1962); Rashdall ([1895] 1936); and Hyland (1994); Stark (2005), pp. x–xi, 37–58, 48–9; also see Macfarlane and Martin 2002; Crombie ([1961] 1967), vol. 1; Gies and Gies (1995), pp. 109–17, 229–30; Gimpel 1976; Bairoch (1988); Leighton (1972).
18. Gies and Gies (1995), pp. 154–8, 208–10, 221–5; McNeill (1974), pp. 50–1. The Chinese also had the compass at about the same time,

but they did not exploit it for sailing the high seas and, unlike the Europeans, did not add the compass card and sight, which told the Europeans both the way north and their precise heading. See Stark (2005), pp. 46–7; and McNeill (1982), p. 45.

19. Cipolla ([1965] 1966); Gies and Gies (1995), pp. 154–8, 208, 221–5; Stark (2005), p. 46.
20. Beeching (1982); Hanson (2001); Lane ([1934] 1992), pp. 35–53.
21. On Lepanto, see Beeching (1982); Hanson (2001), p. 257, 268; McNeill (1974), p. 138; Stark (2005), pp. 46–7; on Portugal in the Indian Ocean, see Cliff (2011), p. 337.
22. Stark (2005), p. 65.
23. Ferguson (2008), pp. 41–8. Leonardo of Pisa (c. 1170–c. 1250) introduced Arabic numbers and the decimal system to Europe in 1202, which provided the numbering system necessary for the Renaissance and the Commercial, Scientific, and Industrial Revolutions. See Devlin (2011).
24. On the role of the monasteries in developing capitalist techniques, see Stark (2005), pp. 59–62. It was noteworthy that the development of capitalist enterprises in the late Middle Ages showed that capitalism existed in Europe at least 400 years before the Protestant Reformation. After the Protestant Reformation, it continued to grow in both Protestant and Catholic towns and cities. Max Weber, who theorized that Protestantism fathered capitalism and who persuaded generations of scholars to promulgate that view, was off on his dates (see, for example, Landes (1998), pp. 175–9; and Ferguson (2011), pp. 259–64). Capitalism was a system that evolved out of Christianity, but the pre-Protestant version. In fact, R. H. Tawney argued that capitalism gave rise to Protestantism rather than vice versa, and his point of view at least has the logic of chronology behind it, but he is clearly wrong, too, because there was too much time between cause and effect (over four centuries between the development of capitalism and the advent of the Protestant Reformation) and, more importantly, capitalism thrived in thoroughly Catholic towns that remained Catholic before and after the Protestant Reformation. Capitalism was both a result of fierce competition to control new wealth and a way to organize the economy reasonably, given the reality of human nature and the Christian determination to harness that nature.
25. Lunin (1987), p. 176.

26. Cook (2014), p. 52.
27. Bremer ([2007] 2013), p. 29.
28. Morris ([1972] 2000), pp. 3–7. Black (2009), p. 222, noted, citing Matt 12:12 and Mark 2:28, that Jesus put individuals above rules.
29. Aquinas ([1265–74] 1947).
30. Huff (2010), p. ix.
31. Mark Lilla (2007) argued that Christianity's ambivalence made separation of church and state logical, if not inevitable.
32. Macfarlane and Martin (2002), pp. 38–9.
33. Carroll Quigley argued that the essence of Western culture could be summed up in the following phrase: "Truth unfolds in time through a communal process." See Quigley ([1961] 1979), p. 336.
34. Courtenay (1989), pp. 168–181; Dawson ([1950] 1979), pp. 7–9; and Huff (1993), p. 110, 133. Also see the still valuable Haskins ([1923] 2002). The Catholic Church has often been portrayed as an opponent of science, but this widespread view was misleading. The Church backed science, but it was opposed to the separation of values from facts. It recognized the scientific method as legitimate, but refused to accord it the distinction of the only method to know and search for truth. On the more mundane level of observable facts, that is, the realm of science, the Church was perhaps the principal subsidizer of early scientific research. See Heilbronn (1999). Also see the work of such scholars as A. C. Crombie, David Lindberg, Edward Grant, and Thomas Goldstein.

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## PART II

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# The Struggle of Values and Political Identities in Modern Times

Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Civilizations were dynamic and creative orders that were anchored on core values. Because they were strongly influenced by missionary religions pursuing universal fellowship, these Civilizations, and these alone, drove the world toward a global Civilization. At the same time, even though they cooperated and were interdependent, they produced tension and strife because they competed with one another to have their values be the primary basis for the emerging global order.

The struggle between Orthodox, Islamic, and Western Civilizations played out over centuries, each making strong cases for their value system. By the end of the nineteenth century, Orthodox Civilization had influence in the Balkans and dominated the Eurasian Plain, stretching from parts of Finland and Poland in the west across Siberia and the Pacific Ocean to Alaska in the east, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to Central Asia, the Chinese border, the Black Sea, and part of the Caucasus in the south. Islamic Civilization held sway in Turkey, the Middle East, Persia, North Africa, Asia Minor, Central Asia, South Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and parts of Southeast Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. However, both of these Civilizations lost ground to the West, which controlled not just territory and oceans, but also kept reinventing and transforming itself with a creative impulse that made it the major catalyst in international relations. By the advent of the twentieth century, Western influence and values were in ascendency everywhere, including Orthodox and Islamic lands, and seemingly becoming the basis for global cooperation and unity. Then, rather suddenly, desperate challenges to Western hegemony emanated from both Orthodox and Islamic Civilizations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. We turn first to the contumacy of Orthodox Civilization.

## CHAPTER 5

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# Russia's Revolutions and the Advent of Communist Era

*The theory of Communism may be summed up in one sentence:  
Abolish all private property.*

*Karl Marx*

*Light is coming from the East.*

*Stalin*

## RUSSIA'S REVOLUTIONS, 1905–1930s

Fin de siècle Russia was a boiling cauldron. To vent the pressure, the government of Nicholas II thought of involving Russia in a war with Japan, a state that had intensely adopted Western weapons and military technology. It was not a good idea and perhaps Nicholas would have never declared war on Japan, but Japan was taking no chances. When the Russians refused to negotiate over their push into Korea, Japan preempted Nicholas by sinking the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, thus commencing the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The war ended in 1905 with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan was disappointed with the treaty, but it did take control of Korea, the southern half of Sakhalin Island, the Southern Manchurian Railway (one of the spurs of the Trans-Siberian that the Russians had built), and various mining concessions in Manchuria. It also took over the 25-year lease on Port Arthur that St. Petersburg had held since 1898.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 strained Russia and added to the pressure on the government. On Sunday, 21 February 1905, Fr.

George Gapon, an Orthodox priest, led a group of workers to the Winter Palace to inform Nicholas, “the Elect of God,” about their terrible working conditions. As the throng approached the Winter Palace, Russian troops opened fire, christening the day “Bloody Sunday.” In its wake, the 1905 Revolution exploded, which was the First of Four Revolutions that Russia experienced in the first three decades of the twentieth century. A General Strike was called and a workers’ assembly termed a Soviet was set up in St. Petersburg under Lev Trotsky. Every class in society, with the exception of the aristocratic supporters of the monarchy, opposed the tsar. Nicholas, fearing all was lost, called upon Sergei Witte, his former Minister of Finance, to find a solution.

Witte produced the October Manifesto, which basically granted political, civil, and religious rights to the peoples living in the Russian Empire. It also promised a parliament or duma and elections. The so-called redemption payments of the peasants were canceled. The October Manifesto broke the back of the Revolution and signaled a dramatic growth of Western values. Most citizens now took a deep breath and waited for the government to deliver on its promises. Nicholas fired Witte and sought to qualify the concessions, but, even still, he started or was forced to take some significant steps toward the development of Western values. In the end, the Revolution of 1905 did no fundamental damage to the monarchy and thus the government was able to survive. However, it offered up two lessons. It was now clear that the peasants, the vast majority of the Russian population, were open to changing the existing order. They no longer accepted the ideas that the tsar was the Elect of God and their protector. The second lesson was that war, rather than empowering the regime, would destroy the Romanov dynasty and had to be avoided at all costs.

Peter Stolypin, Witte’s replacement, understood the first lesson. Stolypin was a firm supporter of autocracy, but he also knew that the Russian regime could not survive without the support of the peasantry, so he started to address the land question by consolidating small farming strips into larger and more productive units and making low-interest loans available to entrepreneurial peasants to buy land. It was a brilliant move and might have worked wonders if it had not been disrupted by Stolypin’s assassination in 1911 and by World War I.

While Stolypin worked to give the peasantry a vested interest in the existing system of government, no one seemed to pay attention to the other crucial lesson of the Revolution of 1905, namely, the need to avoid war. As a general rule, Nicholas failed to follow policies to reduce tension

in Europe.<sup>1</sup> He agreed in late 1907 to join France and Great Britain in the Entente Cordiale, which was clearly directed at Germany and which the French hoped would lead to war with Germany. Worse still, Nicholas pursued a reckless policy in the Balkans. When Austria-Hungary precipitously annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, he mobilized his army, only to back down when threatened with war by the Germans. In July 1914, when Austria-Hungary and Serbia faced off again, he mobilized his army for the second time in six years, seemingly oblivious to the lesson of the Russo-Japanese War. If Nicholas had not engaged in rash policies in the Balkans and in French entanglements in Central Europe, partly to thwart the flowering of Western values in Russia, World War I would likely not have occurred. To be sure, there would have been conflict, but, without Russia, the war would not have produced the blood-bath that it did and would have primarily been a fight among Western or Westernizing states over how to divide the collapsing empire of Ottoman Turkey, over global spheres of influence and natural resources, particularly in Africa and Asia, and over the balance of power and the ranking among Western states for the chief role in the West's drive for global unity and governance.

With Russian participation, World War I became an international catastrophe. War weariness and disillusionment quickly took hold in Russia. War moved the country toward the Second Revolution, the February 1917 Revolution, that saw Nicholas II abdicate and an unrepresentative group of leaders from the duma set up an interim government called the Provisional Government. Instead of withdrawing from the war and dealing with the land question and the promise of Western values, the Provisional Government tried to launch a new offensive on the eastern front. As a result, it quickly floundered and magnified the anarchy that was enveloping Russia.

Into the vacuum rushed a fanatical group called the Bolshevik or Communist Party that was intent upon halting the world's growing acceptance of Western values. It was led by Lenin who, with his followers, blended the Western ideology of Marxism with Russian tradition to produce a virulent ideology called Leninism and then Leninism-Stalinism. The advent of this Radical Left ideology was a double irony. It was liked in Russia because it was anti-Western, and yet it came from the West. It was shunned in the West because, while it provided some insight on economic history, it was hardly, with its bias against private property and religion, a prescription for a vital society, and yet it was embraced in Russia, which

was moving before World War I toward both private property and religious toleration.

In October 1917, Lenin and with no more than a handful of supporters was able to take power in what was Russia's Third Revolution since 1905. War dictated the course of this revolution. The Communists won power because the sailors and soldiers, who wanted to get out of the war, threw their support behind Lenin and his party. They did not like the Communists, but the Communists were the only party that promised to withdraw Russia from the disastrous war.<sup>2</sup> Once in power, Lenin quickly made peace with the Germans—the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918—and then shored up the Party's hold on power by creating an internal police force called the Cheka to remove political opponents and repress dissent. The Cheka eventually changed its name to the NKVD and then the KGB.<sup>3</sup> Under the leadership of Lev Trotsky, Lenin also built the Red Army to replace the Tsarist army. He used about 50,000 Russian military officers as the nucleus of the new army and once it was created he guaranteed its loyalty to the regime and created division between its peasant recruits and their families by providing the soldiers with significant benefits—more pay and better living conditions than peasants living in the villages and farms. Lenin also moved the capital from Petrograd to Moscow to gain a buffer against the Germans. When Lenin died in 1924, Petrograd was renamed Leningrad.

Once peace was made with the Germans, supporters of the old regime, the monarchists and the aristocracy, who were called the Whites, immediately challenged the Communists or Reds in a Civil War. The peasants, who constituted perhaps 83 % of the population, and the pro-Western liberals, who represented no more than 1 % of the people, and the moderate socialists, who had support in the same range as the liberals, refused to fight for the old order or the Communists. They disliked the policies of the Whites, who wanted to return the Romanovs to power, and the policies of the Reds, who were against private property and religion. The Western allies, fearing that the Communist peace with Germany would enable the Germans to move troops from the eastern front to the western front and win the stalemated war there, intervened in the Russian Civil War on behalf of the Whites in the hope that their token support would give the Whites an advantage. It did not. If anything, Western support had the effect of identifying the Whites as puppets of foreigners, which proved to be of great propaganda value for the Reds.

World War I soon came to a halt with the German surrender in November 1918, and the Allies withdrew their support of the Whites. The Red Army then inflicted a number of defeats on the Whites and was on the verge of total victory when Poland, which had proclaimed its independence from the Russian Empire in the wake of the tsar's abdication and the Communist coup, declared war on the Communist government of Russia. The Treaty of Riga settled that conflict in March 1921, which allotted to Poland a small slice of Ukraine and Belorussia. The Communists then finished off the White forces and consolidated their hold on power in most of what had been the Russian Empire. The only territories that they were not able to retake were Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kars and Ardahan on the Turkish border, and the small slices of western Ukraine and Belorussia that went to Poland in 1921.

However, once the Civil War was over and the Communists had full power, they pursued a revolutionary agenda. Their first priority was to provoke revolution in the West and in the developing world in order to win control in the struggle for global values. To this end, they established a new foreign policy agency called the Communist International or Comintern. They also set up a foreign ministry called the *Narkomindel* to handle day-to-day relations with other sovereign states, but their main focus was the Comintern and international revolution. Its job was to set up Communist parties around the globe that were subordinate to Soviet Russia and which would do Soviet bidding in helping to start revolutionary activity.<sup>4</sup> In the period near and soon after the end of World War I, the Comintern erected fledgling Communist parties in Europe, Asia, and North and South America, including movements in China, India, and the USA.

At the start, the Comintern's main effort centered on countries in Europe and Asia that were geographically close to Soviet Russia. In Europe, the Comintern facilitated or helped organize uprisings or coups in the post-war era in Hungary, Germany, and Bulgaria. It also penetrated the British labor unions and the Labour Party and tried to convulse Italy where unemployment and disappointment with the outcome of World War I were widespread. In general, however, these endeavors failed or were unproductive. The Communists did attract support from not a few Western intellectuals, particularly in Great Britain, who were enchanted by the Communist Revolution and who helped create some sympathy in the West for Soviet Russia's experiment.

In the summer of 1923, the Comintern made a deliberate attempt to stir revolution in Germany in the wake of the Ruhr crisis. That venture

was crushed by the Weimar government and soon led the Western states to reconsider their isolation of Germany and to begin to address some of Germany's concerns with the Versailles Treaty. In 1924, the USA launched the Dawes Plan, which was a sort of an early version of the Marshall Plan. The American government loaned money to Germany to help stabilize its economy and reduce unemployment, which, in turn, enabled the Germans to start producing goods to earn money in order to make required indemnity payments to the French, British, and others. The next year the Europeans negotiated the Locarno Treaty, which clarified the borders between Germany and its West European neighbors and paved the way for German participation in the League of Nations.

In the end, the Comintern's agitation in Europe in the post-World War I period reduced the chances for revolution in the West, but that object lesson did not dampen the Comintern's enthusiasm for revolutionary activities. It continued to try to destabilize Europe and foment revolution across Europe, and, as a result, stirred anxiety and strong anti-Communist movements, particularly in countries in Central and Eastern Europe that were close to Soviet Russia or, as it was named after 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or the Soviet Union.

The Comintern was also active in Asia. It attempted to find partners in Iran and in the Islamic countries and regions of the Middle East, but Muslims were largely repulsed by Communism's overt atheism. In Turkey, the Communists did successfully align themselves with Kemal Ataturk's nationalist revolution, but he turned against them once he achieved victory and set up the Turkish Republic. In India, the Communists were mainly frustrated. They were able to organize massive rallies, but then the Indians showed little taste for violence, which was a staple in the Communist handbook for taking power. Instead of shedding blood, the Indians sauntered off to temples to pray.

In Outer Mongolia, on the other hand, the Communists achieved a singular victory. There they were able to establish a satellite that was under Moscow's control. In many ways, the Soviets perfected the model in Mongolia that they later imposed upon the countries of Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The Comintern also had success in recruiting Korean and Vietnamese Communists for training in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. It was evidence that the Kremlin was thinking long-term of the day when Communists would make a play to topple French power in Southeast Asia and Japanese control of Korea.

In China, the Communists enjoyed their greatest triumph. They became a partner of Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang (KMT), which was a popular, nationalist movement to expel foreign imperialists and unify China under a Chinese government.<sup>5</sup> By 1927, the KMT was expanding across China. By then Sun Yat-sen had died and had been replaced by General Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang, like Kemal Ataturk, turned against the Communists and orchestrated a massacre of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai in 1927.<sup>6</sup> Some Communist leaders fled, including Mao Zedong, who eventually during the so-called Long March in 1934–1935 succeeded to the top leadership of the CCP. After 1927, the Communists and KMT fought a protracted civil war until they agreed to suspend their fight when Japan attacked China in 1937.

Meanwhile, with the Comintern struggling to incite revolution in Europe and Asia, the Soviet government attempted to fashion a Communist society in Orthodox Russia. Lenin knew that he reigned over a peasant society and he decided to push as far as he could to transform it into a socialist country. After taking power, he launched a massive attack upon religion, particularly against the Russian Orthodox Church. He also nationalized schools, altered school curricula, imposed censorship, promulgated socialist and anti-capitalist propaganda, repressed political dissent, restricted civil rights, and assailed traditional morality. Above all, he planned to extirpate private property and individual entrepreneurship, replacing them with nationalized property and forced collective labor. To realize this fundamental goal of Communism, the Communists held that industrial laborers were trustworthy because they had not been corrupted by private property. Workers were functional, which meant that they did not produce all of what they labored on and did not have ownership of any part of the end product. The peasants, on the other hand, either owned the land or strove to possess it, and they laid claim to the fruit of their work. The Communists knew from the beginning that the peasants would never willingly embrace socialism. The only peasants who could be won over to the Communist cause were those who were wage laborers or hirelings who owned nothing, but only as long as they continued to own nothing. Lenin despised peasants, impugning them as petit bourgeoisie, and Marx wailed against their obtuseness. The Communists wanted to annihilate farmers entirely, but no society can survive without the cultivators of the land.

Lenin's challenge was that the peasants had taken possession of the land during the anarchy of the Romanov collapse, the Provisional Government's

missteps, and the Civil War. They wanted to be landowners. He planned to nationalize the land in order to fund the industrialization of society and to build a majority working class, the natural constituency of the Communists. However, when his program of early collectivization caused gargantuan peasant defiance, more alarming than the White opposition, he decided in March 1921 that power was more important than the immediate imposition of collectivization, so he made a major concession called the New Economic Policy or NEP. This policy allowed peasants to hold land—not the title but control of the land—and to sell surplus produce on the open market after a tax. It also permitted small businesses to be set up. The NEP brought order to the Russian economy and prepared the way for the advent of a bourgeois class that focused on hardworking, enterprising peasants called kulaks and small businessmen referred to as Nepmen. NEP established over 25 million farmer-entrepreneurs, each cultivating his land as he saw fit. The NEP was an economic triumph. Agriculture quickly advanced beyond pre-war levels. Industry did not keep pace, but it was making headway. The NEP period, which stretched between 1921 and 1929, is considered the best period for the Russian peasantry wherein it held the land and worked it as it pleased. Again, it did not own the land; it only held the land, but this seemed to make no difference. In spite of the extremism and anti-religious policy of the Communists, it appeared as though a moderate and liberalizing form of Russian Orthodox society would prevail and perhaps move Russia closer to the West.

By the end of the 1920s a grave crisis hit the Russian economy. The phenomenal success of agriculture under the NEP had created a huge surplus of agricultural products, which depressed prices. By way of contrast, the prices of industrial products, which the peasants wanted to buy, were quite high because of the inefficiency of Russian industry and the government's interest in producing military-industrial goods rather than consumer goods. In short, the peasants were generating record crops, which depressed prices and thus their income, and, at the same time, they found few goods that they wanted to buy and those that were available had high prices. The peasants concluded that they were caught between the blades of a scissors—low prices for their products and high prices for what they wanted to purchase. They responded at the end of the 1920s by organizing a grain crisis, that is, they held their products from the market in order to drive up prices.

The logical way to solve the impasse was to allow the peasants to increase their prices and to import consumer goods from foreign producers in

order to satisfy demand while simultaneously working on a plan to increase domestic industrial production. The Communists, however, did not want to do that. They desired to take the peasants' produce and use it to finance rapid industrialization, increase the size of the working class, and cut short the growing rural middle class by forcing farmers to become employees of the state, that is, workers on government-owned collective farms. The collective farms were of two types—the so-called *kolkhoz*, where the peasant tilled government land but still managed a small plot of land for his own use, and the *sovkhoz*, which was the ideal farm from the regime's perspective where the peasants worked as hired hands on huge farms and owned or controlled neither the land nor the tools to work the land.<sup>7</sup>

Lenin died in 1924. There was a power struggle and out of it Joseph Stalin (r. 1925–1953) emerged the victor. He made a number of pivotal decisions in the late 1920s. In the wake of revolutions failing to catch fire in Europe and Asia, he determined that the capitalist state system, while supine, was still too strong to tip over and that the Communists should use the hiatus to attack other socialist parties so that when the revolution did come, the workers would have no party other than the Communist party to turn to for leadership. So the Comintern, beginning with the sixth Party Congress in 1928, laid out a plan to tear down other socialist parties, even to the point of organizing brawls and street fights, which became quite common in Germany. The open call to violence and fighting spurred fear of Communism and hurt socialist parties throughout the West, but particularly in Germany, where the Radical Right extremists called the Nazis were the main beneficiaries of the Comintern-orchestrated civil war among the socialists.

Stalin also concluded that since the international revolution was on hold, it was a good time to transform Soviet Russia into a Communist state. The Communists had from the start wanted to collectivize farming and end private property, but they did not have enough power to overcome the peasants in the early and mid-1920s. By the late 1920s, they had built up the secret police, now called the NKVD, and the Red Army and they were ready to implement their goal. The so-called Scissors Crisis gave them the pretext to strike. It was Stalin who made the decision, beginning on 1 October 1928, to start what I call Russia's Fourth Revolution, the Collectivization of agriculture. He decided to scrap the NEP and to open up the first five-year plan, to be succeeded by others.

This plan had a dual aspect: coerced collectivization or nationalization of agriculture and a fast, capricious level of industrial development, and

the former was to fund the latter, that is, agriculture would support the cost of industrialization.<sup>8</sup> Through this approach the 25,000,000 or so private farms would be brutally compressed to some 250,000 state-owned collective farms. Once enclosed and subjugated, the peasants could be forced to accept the government's will, which would have been virtually impossible with 25,000,000 individual farms units.<sup>9</sup>

What were the peasants to be made to do once they were put in these mammoth collective farms? They would have to give up most of their products at absurdly low prices and purchase them back along with all other consumers as finished goods at extraordinarily inflated prices—far above what the same products would have commanded had imported products been made available for purchase. The difference, occasionally referred to as the turnover tax, was taken by the government and became the prime source of capital to finance industrialization. The exactions taken from the peasants were called procurement payments, and they constituted between 30 % and 40 % of the farmers' total production. The peasants were to use what remained to keep themselves and their animals alive and to save seeds for next year's crop. If there were any surplus beyond that, they could sell it on the open market. The procurement requisitions guaranteed a reliable source of food for the military, the government and party elites, and the urban workers. The state's policy of forced procurement payments resolved the grain crisis and destroyed the peasants' ability and will to withhold grain.<sup>10</sup>

The collectivization of agriculture began on 1 October 1928, and ran to the middle of the 1930s. It was an upheaval without precedent in history. Perhaps Stalin did not truly appreciate the consequences of what he was planning and the peasantry's reaction to his policy, but he should have known that there would be a bloodbath because he was attempting to reverse the fruit of the earlier revolutions in Russia that had given the peasants' control of the land. Stalin aimed to take the land from the peasants and then bring the peasants back as hired labor to work the land that they had previously controlled and, in their opinion, owned.

The peasants opposed the government with all of their might. However, they had no weapons with which to resist. Possession of arms was outlawed in 1918 and the government had carefully disarmed the population in the years that followed. Nonetheless, the peasants used what they had at hand to fight the government, including sharpened files and clubs. They also killed some of their livestock so that the regime could not confiscate their animals. Their main weapon was a refusal to plant grain beyond what

they needed to keep them and their remaining animals alive. In 1931 and 1932, they followed through with what they called a grain strike, refusing to plant more than they needed for self-preservation. However, the government did not relent. It collected the procurement payments anyway, which led to famine and massive starvation in the countryside and to a further reduction in livestock, which now had to be killed in order to obtain food for survival.<sup>11</sup>

The cost of collectivization was immense. Millions and millions of people lost their lives. There is no firm figure for the total loss of human life because of a lack of accurate records and the conflation of famine victims with purge and resettlement victims, who were the result of some of Stalin's other policies. However, most scholars place the total loss at a range stretching from 5 million to 7.5 million victims, mainly in Ukraine, which was the farming breadbasket and ground zero for the Collectivization drive.<sup>12</sup> Ukrainian researchers refer to this horror as the *Holodomor* ("murder by starvation") and see it as a parallel to the Holocaust.<sup>13</sup>

The second consequence of Collectivization was the quality of lives lost. Of course, all lives were precious, but the Soviets targeted the most enterprising, creative, and competent farmers, the so-called kulaks who had made agriculture under the NEP both productive and efficient. They were largely eliminated or sent to Siberia.<sup>14</sup> They were kept out of the collective farms because they were considered too entrepreneurial and potential leaders of the newly regimented peasantry. It was clear that the regime was not so much interested in a buoyant agricultural sector as it was in control of the population.

The third cost of collectivization was the loss of livestock, and it was mindboggling, a disaster the magnitude of which was unlike any other in history save perhaps for the Thirty Years War in Central Europe in the seventeenth century. Within a few years the livestock of the former Russian Empire was cut in half—cows, pigs, sheep, and, particularly, horses, which the government had planned to replace with tractors, but the tractor production did not keep pace with the elimination of horses and then when tractors finally started to come off the assembly lines, much of the production was shifted to the making of tanks instead of tractors because Hitler had come into power in Germany in January 1933.

A fourth cost of collectivization was that the violence done to so many people through the imposition of a hated system warped the minds of the perpetrators of this violence. Distrust, cynicism, paranoia, and xenophobia filled Stalin's soul. He realized that there was widespread opposition to what

he was doing in the government, the party, and the military. However, he concluded that it was necessary for the sake of the revolution. He decided that there was a far-reaching conspiracy against the revolution that he had been chosen to lead and that the plot involved collaboration with foreign governments. He resolved to purge his real or imagined enemies in a wave of trials that started in 1934 and continued through World War II. Many of the purge trials were public and resulted in the execution of party leaders, generals, and admirals.<sup>15</sup> According to Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav Communist liaison to Stalin during World War II, “every crime was possible to Stalin for there was not one he had not committed.”<sup>16</sup> There is no reliable record on the number of victims of Stalin’s purges, but it can safely be asserted that Stalin was the leading executioner of Communists. In place of his former Communist colleagues, he put lackeys who did his bidding without question.

In the end Stalin created a system of government that used terror to maintain control and brutalize the people through abject fear and unrestrained and arbitrary coercion.<sup>17</sup> The regime covered over the purges by blaming them on police officials who had exceeded their power, on foreign enemies, and on traitors within. With collectivization, it caged and disciplined the Soviet population and took control of all private property and resources. It built up an aura of authority and invincibility and made Stalin into an infallible godlike leader. Stalin’s image was everywhere. Propaganda fed the great myth that such suffering was necessary but that good times were coming and that Stalin was leading and knew the path to a radiant future.

This system of collectivization, massive force, fear, personality cult, suspicion, regimentation, and xenophobia was called Stalinism, a variation of Leninism distinguished by the perverse and paranoid mind of Stalin. It halted the growth of Western values in Russia and set up a model of development that the Communists attempted to use to gain supremacy over the West in the struggle to install a foundation for global amalgamation.

## INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO COMMUNISM, 1920s–1945

The anti-Western attitude and revolutionary thrust of Soviet foreign policy and the violent and brutal attempt to engineer a socialist society in a peasant country—everything from religious persecution to repression of civil and human rights to collectivization and the purges—stirred anxiety about Soviet Russia and Communism throughout the world. Few countries were

willing to recognize the Soviet government as legitimate. For them it was an organized conspiracy to stimulate upheaval and instability. The Red Scare in the post-World War I era was real. In most countries, particularly, in Europe, there was a fear of Communism and most countries tried to stay away from the Soviet Union. This was also the general policy of the USA, Canada, Japan, and the many countries of Latin America.

In some countries, the fear of Communism was a massive problem and opened up opportunities for the Radical Right that grew its base on its opposition to Communism. This was the case in Italy when a Fascist Party under Benito Mussolini came to power in 1922. Mussolini used anti-Communism to attract support, and it was his anti-Communism that brought him the backing of the Vatican and its willingness to end its long-term objection to its loss of the Papal States and to sign the Lateran Treaty in 1929 that established diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Italian government and set up Vatican City as a sovereign state. Mussolini also promised to return glory to the Italian people through war because he thought war was a purgative for good health and for determining worth. He had grandiose designs of transforming the Mediterranean into an Italian lake, reestablishing the Roman Empire, and being another Caesar Augustus. He was a totalitarian like Lenin but he was also Italian, so his movement, although repressive, was seasoned with wine. He did get the trains to run on time and he did drain some of the mosquito-ridden marshes in Italy. He promised to stop Communism, and he was taken seriously by the other major powers because of his swagger, propaganda, and bellicose rhetoric, but ultimately he proved to be a weak stick. His war against Abyssinia in 1936 did not garner much honor or respect for him or the Italian army, and his attack upon little Albania and then Greece went awry. *El Duce* soon found himself relegated to the category of nuisance, posturing as the anemic sidekick of the leading anti-Communist, Adolph Hitler, and trying to pick up scraps from Hitler's ravaging and romping. He ended up adopting Hitler's anti-Semitism for pragmatic, not ideological reasons.<sup>18</sup>

Fear of Communism was also a factor in Japan, which had intervened in the Russian Civil War against the Reds and occupied the maritime province of Siberia until 1922 and northern Sakhalin until 1925. In the 1920s and 1930s Japan built up its war machine and took a decidedly anti-Communist stand. It was also leery of the USA and Western European regimes that seemed to be interested mainly in restraining Japanese power and denying it what its leaders thought was its legitimate place in Asia.

In 1931, with the Comintern-backed CCP and Chiang Kai-shek's KMT locked in civil war, the Japanese invaded Manchuria, changing the name of the Chinese province to Manchukuo.

The Chinese civil war meant that the Japanese were able to occupy Manchuria without challenge. Chiang Kai-shek thought it prudent to postpone dealing with them until after he defeated the Communists. Mao Zedong's Communist forces, however, declared war on Japan, not to fight since they were far removed from Manchuria, but to try to embarrass the KMT into suspending the civil war and made common cause with them against the Japanese. In 1936, Japan joined Germany and eventually Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Comintern now increased its pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to join the CCP in an alliance against Japan by promising to supply a KMT-CCP alliance in a war against Japan and by persuading some of Chiang's Manchurian commanders that their interests would be bettered served if the KMT and CCP joined forces. As Chiang Kai-shek pondered the offer and pressure, the Japanese attacked his forces in 1937. Now the KMT and the CCP fought against the Japanese and suspended their own civil war, but they did not trust one another and both forces operated as independent units. As for the Japanese, they now became entrenched in China, which they were never able to control. They also showed a willingness to move into Siberia against the Soviet Union. In 1938, they launched an attack in the region of the Ussuri River. The Red Army was there and it held its own and convinced the Japanese forces to pull back and reconsider their plans. In the end, the Japanese decided to bide their time and wait to see what their ally in Berlin did before they made their next move.

Fear of Communism was most powerful in Germany where the constant instability and Communist interference in German domestic and foreign policy gave rise to the Nazi Party of Adolph Hitler. Of course, there were other reasons for the growth of the extreme Right parties in Italy and Germany, and these ranged from disappointment over World War I, the Versailles Treaty, incompetent governments, and large-scale unemployment. These same factors helped to grow the extreme Left parties, too, including the Communist Party. But Communism had a major, activist patron in the Soviet Union, and it was threatening all of Europe, and so anti-Communism became the main appeal of the Radical Right.

In 1929, when the Great Depression hit and impacted Germany and other countries across Europe with huge unemployment, the Communists and Nazis grew immensely. In the 1930 Reichstag election the Communists

captured 13 % and the Nazis 18 % of the vote. In the 1932 federal elections the Communists won 14 % and the Nazis 37 % of the vote. On 30 January 1933, the political elite in Germany asked Adolph Hitler to be the prime minister. It backed him because he promised to repress the Communists and, in addition, it thought that it could ultimately control him, thus attenuating his other extreme views, including his vehement anti-Semitism and his plan to go to war to obtain *lebensraum* for the German people, to reconnect East Prussia with Germany proper and eradicate the so-called Polish Corridor, to take Austria and the Sudetenland, to retake Alsace and Lorraine, and to nullify the Versailles Treaty. One reality that was known by the German elite was that it could not control the Communists, who answered to Moscow, so Hitler looked like the only antidote to the growing threat of the extreme Left.

But the nature of extremists is extremism and they do not lend themselves to control, compromise, or moderation. The German elite soon discovered that it could not steer Hitler. Instead, he set up a dictatorship. He then armed Germany in order to face the Communists and to carry out his plan of creating the Third Reich. He also blamed Jews for the Communist threat and pointed out that many top Communists were Jews—Lev Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, Mikhail Tomsky, Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Lazar Kaganovich. Even the Soviet foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, the Nazis pointed out, was a Jew.<sup>19</sup> Hitler's anti-Semitism found fertile ground in Central and East Europe, where there was suspicion in the new ultra-nationalist states that came into being following World War I of anyone who was different and who might be thought to be sympathetic to the radical ideas of Karl Marx.

With conviction and purpose, Hitler untied the moral strictures of the German people. For Jews and Christians, life was thrown into turmoil and confusion. Perspective, truth, and objective reality vanished in a blight of propaganda, lies, unspeakable vulgarities, and police brutality. Hope and optimism died, and the bright light of Western culture was dimmed. Modris Eksteins summed up the tragic consequences: “National Socialism was the apotheosis of a secular idealism” that incited “nihilism,” “scourge,” and “death.” Victor Klemperer, a Jewish professor of Romance languages who lived through the miasma of Nazism, wrote, “it’s astounding how easily everything collapses.”<sup>20</sup>

Hitler's anti-Communism was the main rallying point for the Nazi movement. Domestically, it kept the Christian Churches in line. They were more afraid of Communism than Nazism, although they did not like

the Nazis. Internationally, it kept the Versailles Treaty-enforcers at bay and helped promote a policy of appeasement of Hitler's demands, both in his abandonment of the Versailles Treaty articles related to Germany's rearmament and in his demands that Austria and the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia belonged with Germany.

Anti-Communism also opened the way for German control of East Europe. The dozen or so small states there had no protector. They were afraid of Germany, but more fearful of Soviet Russia with its abhorrent policies of violence, atheism, and collectivization. These small states were easily manipulated by the bogeyman of Communism, both in their domestic and foreign policies. Hitler soon subverted the young, small, eponymous democracies that had appeared in Eastern Europe after the breakup of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires at the conclusion of World War I—a beneficial fruit of Western religio-political values. Initially, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic States tried to follow the French republican model, but after the Great Depression and the emergence of the Nazi model, many of them abandoned their democratic experiment for military dictatorships or authoritarian regimes. The new governments lost perspective on their own national interests in fits of ultranationalism and irredentism that led to tension among neighbors and exposed the whole region to manipulation by the Nazis.<sup>21</sup>

Germany also softened up the East European governments by agreeing to buy their agriculture produce at market or above market prices in the wake of the Great Depression, when their foreign markets dried up. No state in Eastern Europe could resist the Germany offer, not even Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The Germans took over their economies and tied them to Germany's economy by paying high prices for food but placing the payments in German accounts that were blocked other than for purchases of German goods. In effect, the countries of Eastern Europe became part of the German war machine and economic engine.

Meanwhile, in Europe, Hitler openly violated the Versailles Treaty, rearmed Germany, remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936, and supported Franco's forces in Spain against its Republican government in July 1936. He annexed Austria in the so-called *Anschluss* in March 1938 and took the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia in September 1938 after the English and French decided to appease him at the Munich Conference in the hope of avoiding war. In March 1939, Hitler dismantled the rest of Czechoslovakia, making Bohemia and Moravia into protectorates of the

Reich and Slovakia into a satellite of the Reich under a puppet by the name of Monsignor Josef Tiso, who was a fervent Slovak nationalist more than a Nazi, but he initially proved to be a willing tool of the Nazis.

The Communists were not displeased with the advent of the Nazi movement because Hitler's policies of remilitarizing the Rhineland and openly violating the Versailles Treaty meant or should have meant an intra-capitalist war. However, Stalin had not factored in the West's fear of Communism and thus willingness to appease Hitler's war machine if it meant war between Germany and Soviet Russia. To guard against this growing possibility, the Comintern changed tactics in 1936 and adopted policies that went under the name of the "Popular Front" and "Collective Security." The Popular Front ordered the world's Communist parties to reverse policy and to start cooperating with other socialist parties against the Radical Right. Collective Security called upon capitalist countries to cooperate with the Soviet Union to preserve peace through the League of Nations and various treaties of cooperation. The most prominent spokesman for Collective Security at the League of Nations, which the Soviet Union joined in 1934, was the Soviet foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov.<sup>22</sup>

In fact, Hitler wanted to go to war against the USSR, but he wanted the West first to allow him to annex the Polish Corridor. Here the British and the French drew the line and declared that any attack upon Polish territory would mean war. The British and French ultimatum gave Stalin hope that he could now become Hitler's ally instead of his enemy because he could offer the German dictator an alliance that would allow him to go after British and French and avoid the two-front war that led to Germany's defeat in World War I. To entice Hitler, Stalin replaced Litvinov, the voice of Collective Security, with Molotov, his trusted henchman who was not a Jew. Hitler did not bite on the bait, but the English and French did. They saw Stalin's gambit as a threat to them because they needed the threat of a two-front war to restrain Hitler, so they dispatched a diplomatic mission to Moscow to talk to Stalin about joining them in a Collective Security Pact against Nazi Germany. That action did provoke Hitler and he sent his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, to Moscow on 23 August 1939. On that very day, Hitler and Stalin reached an agreement—the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact or Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. This treaty guaranteed Soviet neutrality or a one-front war should Germany become embroiled with the British and French over his plan to take part of Poland. In a secret protocol the two dictators divided parts of Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union, with Germany planning

to take the bulk of Poland and the USSR aiming to annex the eastern part of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland. The agreement thus insured war between Germany, Britain, and France, and put space between Stalin and Hitler though the re-annexation of the borderlands.<sup>23</sup>

The Communists now became very unpopular in the West as a result of their compounding with National Socialist Germany. In making this move Stalin was hoping for a long period of collaboration with Hitler and for a long and exhausting war between Germany and the Western Allies. When both were worn down and when their peoples were prepared for a revolutionary means of exit out of the bloodbath, the Soviet Union would come in fresh and sweep the field, insuring the triumph of the world revolution in the West as in the East. Stalin believed that Nazi Germany could be his means of destroying the stabilized conditions that eventually followed World War I and return everything to flux where the intervention of a fresh, strong Soviet Union could advance the world revolution. He informed the Politburo on 19 August 1939 that an agreement with Germany would lead to war in the West and would permit “us to stay out of the conflict, and we may hope [later] to be able to find our way advantageously into the war. [Our] experience of twenty years shows that, in time of peace, it is not possible to have a Communist movement in Europe [in any one nation] for the Bolshevik Party to take power.”<sup>24</sup>

On 1 September 1939, the Nazis attacked Poland and the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east on 17 September 1939. The cataclysm of World War II soon engulfed the world. The English and French declared war against Germany, but not the USSR, in order to support Poland. Playing upon the French and British fear of Germany and of widening the war by declaring war against the USSR, the Soviets took territory from Finland, the Baltic States, and Romania in 1939–1940.

In fact, Hitler did not want to fight England and France. He wanted to go after the Communists, but he first had to deal with the English and French who had declared war on Germany. From the end of September 1939 to April 1940 there was very little fighting on the Western front. Hitler made one peace proposal after another to the Western Allies, but they rejected his overtures, so he concluded that he would have to attack them directly to mitigate the possibility of a two-front war.

In spring 1940, he invaded Denmark, Norway, and the Benelux countries. France surrendered in June 1940, and Mussolini now joined Hitler. At the same time, Hitler forced England to retreat from the continent of Europe. In the summer of 1940, he launched a massive air attack against

England to coerce its surrender, but the English refused to buckle. He planned an invasion of England, but his heart was not in it. His desire was to move east against Communist Russia. When the Soviets took Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania while he was preoccupied with the English and the French in the summer of 1940, he decided he could no longer wait to go after the Communists. It was a fateful decision. He was in fact opening up a two-front war, but he apparently concluded that the British were basically beaten and could not offer much of an offensive threat in the West and that his military forces were so superior to the Red Army that he could possibly defeat it in one swift battle in the summer of 1941, so the risk of a two-front war was reduced. In June 1941, he attacked the Soviet Union. A showdown with England was postponed—a fortuitous development that allowed England to recover and help organize Hitler's destruction.

Meanwhile, the Japanese, attacked the colonies of the European states across Southeast Asia in 1940–1941. Throughout their occupied territories, they did horrible things to the people of Korea, China, and Southeast Asia, and they have yet to confront this terrible and brutal record.<sup>25</sup> On 7 December 1941, Japan attacked the USA at Pearl Harbor, bringing the USA into the war. The Nazis declared war on the USA in support of their Japanese ally, and the USA made the decision to defeat Germany first and Japan second.

After Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet Union suffered enormously. It sustained huge losses of men and territory, but, of course, it had lots of both.<sup>26</sup> In the end the Soviet Union rode out and survived the Second World War, even as Tsarist Russia had escaped ruin at the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte, because of space, climate, numbers, and the character of the people—strong and brave and able to withstand incredible hardships and suffering. It also persevered because of the excesses of the invader. Embarking on a crusade against Communism, Hitler proceeded to maintain its most grievous feature: the collective farms. He kept these because it was the most effective way of controlling the conquered people. He put into effect a savage law of hostages, a ratio of 100 to 1, that is, for every German soldier killed by a guerrilla behind the lines, 100 Russians would be shot, irrespective of whether they had anything to do with guerrilla action or not—the 100 to 1 law. Also the maltreatment of prisoners of war was a factor. There was no attempt to conceal this abuse. It was perpetrated right before the eyes of the population, so the harshness of the occupation, in general, sank in. The Nazis also brought their racist policies

and the Holocaust. Although it seems paradoxical to say, it was probably fortunate for the Soviet system that the German dictator mistreated the people of Soviet Russia as badly as Stalin abused them.<sup>27</sup>

There was another important factor in play that helped explain the Soviet Union's survival, and that was aid from the Western states, particularly the USA under the leadership of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. As the worldwide Great Depression that started in 1929 tightened its grip in the early 1930s and as aggression and war became accepted policy for some states, American voters rallied around Roosevelt. He worked on two fronts. He had to confront the Great Depression and he had simultaneously to check the totalitarian states. On the domestic side, he quickly moved to try to ease the hardship of the Great Depression in the USA with a number of innovative initiatives.<sup>28</sup> His policies were often ad hoc, seat-of-the-pants responses that lacked substance and failed to solve problems, but he inspired the American people and many others around the world to believe that solutions were possible and to hope for a better future. His beaming optimism and ebullient charm, which made many politicians bend to his will and many competent people willing to use their talents and skills to make government efficient and successful, helped Americans and non-Americans believe that the USA would recover from the Great Depression and assume a role in global leadership.

Internationally, he tried to contain the growing militarization that was gripping the major powers. When he realized that the League of Nations and diplomacy were not working to curb Japanese aggression, German remilitarization, and Italian belligerency, he sought new strategies to contain the threats. He increased America's military strength and he also sought out the Soviet Union as a balance against Japan and Germany. His decision to recognize Stalin's Soviet Union in 1933 was a moral and political dilemma, because Stalin was organizing a mass killing of peasants in the Soviet Union, persecuting religious believers, and leading an international conspiracy that was devoted to stimulating war, violence, and revolution, and exterminating the whole Western value system. Nonetheless, he did it. He ultimately concluded that Stalin might be a vile and unscrupulous dictator whose Communist movement had largely precipitated the Radical Right and international aggression, but he also now represented a potential check on Japanese and German aggression and was no longer the nemesis of the West but more likely the necessary midwife for "backward" Russia to move quickly to the status of a modern, industrial power and

to converge with Western societies along a continuum that was leading to democratic socialism.<sup>29</sup>

Within the USA, Fr. Charles Coughlin, the radio priest who was openly pro-Nazi, complicated Roosevelt's ability to rally American public opinion against the Nazis and behind the Communists. Coughlin railed against FDR, calling him "Franklin Double-Crossing Roosevelt," and on any given Sunday might draw as many as ten million listeners to his broadcasts.<sup>30</sup> He was the precursor of the modern broadcast media personality that blurred the line between church and state and used his bullhorn to sow dissension, discord, and confusion at a time of great peril.<sup>31</sup> Increasingly, Coughlin was criticized for his extremism, anti-Semitism, and open support for Mussolini and Hitler. By 1936, he was in eclipse, condemned not only by many American Catholic bishops, but also by average Americans. FDR's landslide win in 1936, when the priest claimed he would deliver 9,000,000 votes against FDR, sealed Coughlin's demise.

Some leaders, like Winston Churchill, recognized the fact that only the USA could halt the Radical Right states and, in time, the Communists. It was a country with immense talent, wealth, vast natural resources, a huge population, incredible organizational skills, and idealism. It respected law and order, freedom, justice, individualism, limited government, openness, plain speaking, practicality, and religious toleration. It was the natural leader of the West. Its president was a man who put Western values into concrete form in the Atlantic Charter.

However, Roosevelt was ultimately quite naïve about Stalin and the Soviet Union. He declared in 1943 to his former ambassador to the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt, that he thought Stalin "won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace."<sup>32</sup> This was an absurd observation. The Soviet Union was an ideological state that had precipitated the conditions that led to extremism and war. The fact was that the West was committed to cutting out the cancer of Nazism and to defeating Imperial Japan and that that Western commitment inevitably meant support for and survival of the Soviet Union because the task of defeating Germany would be immensely easier if Germany had to divide its forces and face a two-front war as it had to do in World War I. And so it was. The Soviet Union survived and Nazi Germany went down to defeat. Japan also was conquered, but the Soviets did not enter the war in Asia until 8 August, one week before the Japanese surrendered on 15 August. But the Soviets, too, could have been restrained.

Stalin had lost support in the West because of his treaty with Hitler, but with the backing of Western governments he rapidly made up ground and gained new conquests in the public opinion of the West. In the USA, during the Second World War, the Soviet regime gained favor not only on the Left and among intellectuals, but also among many ethnic and racial groups who were alienated by Nazism. And while not all of these new gains would be held after the war, a good deal of this pro-Soviet feeling outlasted the war. It was more important in Great Britain where a numerous and influential segment of the British intellectuals became pro-Soviet in sentiment. The infiltration by Soviet sympathizers of the British civil service, the educational system, and the trade unions went far and extended to the highest levels.<sup>33</sup> Thus a font of goodwill was accumulated in the West to stand the Soviets in good stead at the end of the war when victory was achieved and the spoils were to be divided. The USA and Great Britain made sweeping concessions to the Soviet Union in both Europe and Asia at the expense of not only the defeated powers, Germany and Japan, but also of peoples who had been forced into association with these defeated powers, Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, Baltic peoples, and even of peoples on the Allied side, Poles and Chinese. These concessions that were made were neither politically wise nor militarily necessary and, in effect, meant that the USA and Great Britain had fought the Nazis only to have a good part of Europe fall to the Communist dictator.<sup>34</sup>

One of the greatest ironies of the struggle of Orthodox, Islamic, and Western values was that the Soviet Union, which was an ogre produced in Russia, survived the Second World War, which it had helped precipitate by provoking a Radical Right movement in some Western societies. The West had to annihilate the Radical Right, but needed the assistance of the Soviet Union to do so, so Leninism–Stalinism outlasted Nazism.

## NOTES

1. Lievan (2015), Chaps. 4–7. Paul Miliukov, who was in the duma, provided a brilliant critique of Russia's unpreparedness for war in November 1916. He actually favored intensifying the war effort, which is what he did when he became the foreign minister of the Provisional Government that succeeded Nicholas in 1917. See the excerpt from his speech to the Duma that was reproduced as “The Crisis of Tsarist Government,” 30 November 1916 in Miliukov (1916).

2. Lenin argued that the war was an imperialist war and had to be both resisted and exploited to advance the international revolution. See Lenin (1916).
3. The secret police actually had multiple name changes and increasing responsibilities. See Shearer and Khaustov (2014), p. 2.
4. Frisov et al. (2014), pp. 245–6; Degras (1956), p. 238.
5. Mitter (2013), p. 44.
6. Mitter (2013), p. 49. Stalin interpreted the Shanghai disaster as a victory because it weakened imperialism in China “and thereby facilitated the development of the home of the world revolution, the development of the U.S.S.R.” See Degras (1952), p. 238.
7. Graziosi (1996); Viola (1996), p. 44; Ulam (1987), p. x.
8. Khlevniuk (2015), p. 110; Nove (1969), pp. 158–9; Brzezinski (1967), p. 188.
9. Walter Duranty, the pro-Soviet bureau chief for the *New York Times* in Moscow from 1922 to 1936, praised the coerced compression. See Duranty (1935), p. 287; also see Ulam (1987), p. ix.
10. Jasny (1949), p. 363.
11. Stalin maintained that the peasants had hidden food and pretended to be starving. See Fitzpatrick (1994), pp. 74–5; and Fitzpatrick (2015), pp. 82–3. Shearer and Khaustov (2014), pp. 91–101.
12. Khlevniuk (2015), p. 349, n. 31; Davies and Wheatcroft (2004), pp. 412–5; Naimark (2010). Also see Conquest (1986); Ulam (1987), pp. vii–viii.
13. Marples (2007); Luciuk (2008).
14. Over two million of the Kulaks were relocated in the Ural, Western Siberia, and Kazakh regions. See Shearer and Khaustov (2014), pp. 101–10. Also see Conquest (1986), pp. 4, 70; Ulam (1987), pp. vi–viii.
15. See Documents 101–103 in Shearer and Khaustov (2014), pp. 10, 187–92. Also see Getty and Naumov (2002); Conquest (1986), p. 7.
16. Djilas (1962), p. 187.
17. With the opening of the archives in Russia following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, researchers began to reveal the extent of the Russian nightmare. See Shearer and Khaustov (2014) on the secret police as the main tool of Stalinism; also see Figes (2007); and Kuromiya (2007).
18. Michaelis (1978).
19. Christopher Browning reported that the training manual for Nazi workers taught that the main challenges to *lebensraum* and racial

purity were Marxism/Bolshevism, Liberalism, and Christianity. See Browning (1993), p. 180.

20. Eksteins (1989), p. 303; Klemperer (1998), p. 5.
21. On the positive and negative effects of nationalism in East Europe, see Rothschild and Wingfield (2000), pp. 1–21.
22. Dunn (1998), p. 49.
23. Dunn (1998), pp. 98–9. The best book on the Nazi–Soviet alliance is Read and Fisher (1989).
24. Quote is from the copy of Stalin’s speech that T. S. Bushuevaia found in the “Secret Booty Funds of the Special USSR Archive,” first published in *Novy mir* in 1995 and cited in Raack (1996), p. 51. Comintern records revealed that Stalin planned for a long-term tie with the Nazis and did not sign the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact in order to gain time to build up the Red Army to confront the Nazis. See Frisov et al. (2014), p. 248.
25. For a solid study of Japanese atrocities in China, see Chang (1998); Mitter (2013), pp. 8–12.
26. Overy (1997), pp. 73–124.
27. Dunn (1998), p. 123.
28. A good biography of Roosevelt is Smith (2007). Also see Black (2003). On his foreign policy see Dallek ([1965] 1995).
29. FDR’s confidant, W. Averill Harriman, said that FDR thought Stalin was a necessary evil to modernize Russia. Harriman and Abel (1976), p. 170. Also see Dunn (1998), p. 7, 279, n. 6, who interviewed Harriman.
30. “Double-crossing” comment from Bennett (1969), p. 12; for information on Coughlin, see Brinkley (1982); Tull (1965).
31. Warren (1996), p. 6.
32. Bullitt (1948), p. 94. George Kennan, the leading American diplomatic expert on Russia, recalled in 1975 that, “...Roosevelt, for all his charm and for all his skill as a political leader, was, when it came to foreign policy, a very superficial man, ignorant, dilettantish, with a severely limited intellectual horizon.” See Kennan (1975), p. 31.
33. Miner (2003), p. 277; Haslam (2011), p. 32. Also see Evans and Romerstein 2012).
34. Zubok (2007), p. 2, 6, 27, 29–30; Weeks (2011), pp. 215–221; Kennan (1961); the still valuable study by Eubank (1985), who made the case that the concessions were outlined at Teheran and only finalized at Yalta; Dunn (1998), p. 222, 246–7.

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## The Resurgence of Western Values, 1945–2000s

*The spiritual void of countries ruled by Communists was real. The Pope was right.*

*Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema, former Communist  
New York Times, 9 January 1999*

*The years ahead will be a great one for our country, for the course of freedom and for the spread of Civilization. The West will not contain communism, it will transcend communism. We will not bother to denounce it, we'll dismiss it as a sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.*

*Ronald Reagan, New York Times, 18 May 1981*

The Communists misread the victory of World War II: they thought it was the result of the superiority of their value system. It was not. They were saved inadvertently, but they had been so strengthened that it would take until 1991 to get rid of them. The Communist bacillus, which settled in Orthodox Russia and then spread to other parts of the world, had to be defeated—an effort called the Cold War—in order to facilitate the continuing spread of for the West's religio-political values, which was a far more important story than the expansion of Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union and reflected the continuation of a millennium-old historical trend. Although there was overlap between the Cold War and the growing acceptance of Western values in the second half of the twentieth century, we will look at each story separately.

## COLD WAR: EXPANSION AND FALL OF COMMUNISM

From 1945 to 1991 the Soviet Union and the West were at odds, with the Soviet Union expanding and the West attempting to contain its growth, the era of the so-called Cold War. Many scholars and observers break the Cold War into parts, beginning with Stalin's expansion at the end of World War II, followed by Nikita Khrushchev's period of thaw, then by renewed tension over Cuba and Vietnam, then by the period of détente under Leonid Brezhnev, then by a time of renewed tension under Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko, and, finally, by another thaw under Mikhail Gorbachev that ultimately ended with the implosion of the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> However, since tension was always there and varied only in acuteness it would be better to look upon this era as one unhappy period during which the whole world was paying for the grievous errors of two World Wars and the abomination of Communism.<sup>2</sup>

The USA was hoping that the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union would continue and evolve into a pattern where the Soviet Union would increasingly move away from its support of international revolution and Leninism–Stalinism and toward democracy, the rule of law, and Western values, a sort of return to the fledgling steps that the regime of Nicholas II started to take after the October Manifesto. Such hope was forlorn. Instead, with the Soviet Union gathering in sweeping rewards through the largess and consent of its Western Allies, the victorious coalition fell apart. Why? First, coalitions always fall apart once their purpose is achieved. The record of history is perfectly clear here. It should have surprised no one. It is implicit in the dynamism of history, which post-war Germany illustrates. Germany was converted from an active to a passive factor. Instead of what Germany was to have, the question was now who was to have it? It was natural for the Kremlin with one part of Germany, a very large and valuable part, to strive to gain the rest. It was a matter of life and death for Great Britain to prevent such an enormous accretion of power to the Soviet Union because Soviet Russia plus Germany would be the answer to the USA plus Great Britain. Here alone, in respect to the German question, there was sufficient reason for the rupture of the coalition.

Second, leading powers of the world inevitably drift into rivalry. They take opposing positions and try to line up lesser powers. Or the lesser powers themselves choose between the leading powers and come down on the side of one or the other.

Finally, and most importantly, the Soviet Union remained a vehemently anti-capitalist, anti-Western state that was determined to expand Communism around the globe. In fact, its support of international revolution was the major reason for the collapse of the coalition and for the Cold War. Once only a hope, 1917–1939, the world revolution was now feasible. There had been an immense strengthening of the Soviet Union in its central position in the Eurasian landmass, after all, the main part of the world. It had been extended westward through Poland into Central Europe with the creation of four satellites: Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The Soviet Union had been extended southward into the Balkans with the creation of four other satellites: Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Finally, the Soviet Union had been extended eastward into China and half of Korea. As a result, the pressure had been lifted on both flanks of the Soviet Union. There was a sort of void both to the west and to the east through the flattening out of both Germany and Japan, which no longer counted among the world states. These nations formerly had been strong powers. They had been a real counterbalance. Great Britain and France were weak. They could not make up for Germany and Japan. As for the USA, it was far away. So the balance of power had been broken and the Soviet Union faced an open field. Stalin wanted, in Vladislav Zubok's words, a “‘socialist empire,’ invincible and protected on all flanks.”<sup>3</sup> It was predictable that the USSR undertook at once to exploit this golden opportunity and to get busy in Europe as well as in Asia and in the rest of the world. We turn to describe Soviet expansion first in those parts of Europe and Asia that fell to them or their European allies directly at the end of World War II and then in those parts of the world where they tried to expand after the war in the second half of the twentieth century, including Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. As for the USA and the West, it responded to Soviet expansion by adopting a defensive policy called containment, an effort to frustrate Soviet expansion without resorting to direct war, and by pushing Western values across the globe.

#### *Parts of Europe and Asia Annexed into or Controlled by Soviets or Their Allies*

In Europe, as already alluded to, the Soviets were able to annex into the Soviet Union the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; the Romanian territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina; the Czech region

of Trans-Carpathia; the eastern part of Poland, including Galicia and the key city of Lvov; and the region of Konigsberg or East Prussia that the Soviets renamed the Kaliningrad Oblast. Then they were able to set up Communist regimes that were part of the Soviet Empire and answered directly to Moscow in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, some sooner than others but all in place by the end of 1948. They also gained influence when their allies Tito and Enver Hozha took over Yugoslavia and Albania, respectively. In addition, the Red Army occupied about one-third of Germany, including East Berlin, which Moscow reconfigured into a separate state under its control in 1949 called the German Democratic Republic (GDR or DDR) or East Germany. Each of the satellite regimes, except for Yugoslavia and Albania, had national Communist leaders at the helm who were under the Kremlin's control and who moved only with the approval of Soviet ambassadors and Red Army commanders. The Soviets also occupied about one-third of Austria, but here they refrained from setting up a Communist satellite, content to just occupy Austria with the Red Army. In Asia the Soviets annexed the Kurile Islands from Japan, occupied the northern half of Korea, and took control of Manchuria from China and Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government.<sup>4</sup>

In the regions annexed to or directly controlled by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, the Communist model was generally imposed with brutality and gratuitous violence, sometimes calibrated to local circumstances.<sup>5</sup> Throughout these lands the Communists took away private property, organized the agricultural sector into collective farms, started industrialization keyed to Soviet priorities, discriminated against peasants and the middle class and intellectuals in favor of the working class, took over all educational institutions, imposed a Marxist-Leninist perspective on the school curricula, monopolized the arts and news media, imposed totalitarian structures and policies that allowed for no variation from or criticism of the Soviet model and required complete obedience to the USSR's needs, and, finally, instituted a campaign of religious persecution. The Communists attacked all believers—Jews, Muslims, Protestants, Orthodox, and Catholics—but the Catholic Church was singled out because it was the dominant religion of Eastern and Central Europe. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example, Catholic schools were taken over by the state, some bishops and clergy were arrested, including the primate of the Catholic Church in Hungary, Cardinal Joszef Mindszenty, and the Vatican was prevented from filling vacancies in episcopal ranks. A major hit to the Catholic Church was the suppression of the Uniate Catholic rite

that numbered close to five million believers, mainly in Galicia and Trans-Carpathia. The Kremlin used the Russian Orthodox Church to engineer a “reunion” of Ukrainian Catholics and Orthodox Russians, which fulfilled a long-term policy goal of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy and made the western Ukraine a dynamic center of the otherwise down-trodden and ravaged Orthodox Church, but Orthodoxy, like all religion, was not to be given a new lease on life. It was only being used to hurt the Catholic Church in Ukraine, not to revive and live in a Communist world, which had no place for religion.<sup>6</sup>

In imposing the Soviet model on Eastern Europe, the Soviets ran into the usual problems associated with the Communist system—an inefficient economy, a dispirited and listless population, a reliance upon force to rule, a lack of popular legitimacy, and an alienated religious population. All of those traits were evident in the USSR before it ever expanded. However, there was a massive new problem, namely the Catholic Church in Poland. It was so large and so well organized that it would take a herculean and bloody campaign to bring it under control, and the Communists, including Stalin, did not want to launch that type of persecution yet. The immediate post-war period was still unsettled and the West was very discontent over the fate of Poland, which had fought against the Nazis and did not deserve to be abandoned to the Russian Communists. The Kremlin wanted to soft-pedal its domination of Poland, to win the Poles to its side and to make the Communist Polish regime popular, and the best way to do that, it thought, was to provide economic benefits, to stroke a shared fear of Germany, to reward Poland with land at the expense of Germany (the Oder-Neisse territory), and to try to undermine the Catholic Church in propaganda whenever the Vatican showed sympathy for the plight of post-war Germans. In effect, the Communists were biding their time and gathering their strength for a day or reckoning, much like they did with the NEP. The problem of the Catholic Church could wait. The Communists were busy pushing revolution around the globe. The important fact was that Moscow had Poland and could cudgel the revolution there, as they had done in Soviet Russia, when they were ready.

In the European lands that their Communist allies controlled, the same pattern was followed, although there the allies did so not because Moscow forced them, but because they believed that the Soviet model would lead to modernization and that they were part of the broad revolutionary trend to replace capitalism with socialism. However, there was one aspect to the Soviet model that would become a problem for the Communist allies

of the Kremlin and that was Moscow's assertion of a claim of primacy among all Communists in the world, the right of the Soviet Communists to demand subordination of all local interests to Soviet interests on the grounds of Soviet Russia's pioneering role in discerning, starting, and leading the Revolution, a sort of bowing by Communists everywhere to what Russia perceived as its interests and a recognition of its pivotal place in world history. This doctrine of primacy reflected continuity with Russia's historical-religious messianism—its claim to be a messiah chosen to lead the world to salvation.

### *New Expansion Efforts: Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa*

With World War II over, Stalin made a deliberate effort to spread Communism beyond the territories that he already controlled. In Europe, he went after two countries immediately—Greece and Turkey. He went after Greece with civil war and he went after Turkey by open threat of conquest, since in Turkey there was no element to cooperate within the population, the Turks being solidly anti-Russian as well as anti-Communist. Greece was rescued by American intervention that came in the form of the Truman Doctrine and at the behest of Great Britain. The civil war in Greece eventually petered out with the defeat of the Communists, though it was rather a severe affair. It was after the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948 that the avenues of Communist assistance to the Greek Left were blocked, ending the prospects of a victory there. As for Turkey, it was saved by making it known that it would fight the Soviets and that the USA under the Truman Doctrine would provide support. The Turkish-American position led Stalin to back off of his demand for a lodgment or several lodgments on the Straits and for the cession of territory in Asia Minor.<sup>7</sup> He was careful to avoid any war that would directly involve the Soviet Union against the USA.

Besides Greece and Turkey, Stalin also tried to take West Berlin and to prevent the Western-occupied zones of Germany from being consolidated in 1948–1949 into the Federal Republic of Germany (the FRG or West Germany), but here again the Western powers blocked him and circumvented his ground blockade of West Berlin with an airlift. Stalin also offered support to the Communist parties in Italy and France in the post-war period in the hope that they might win free elections, but both parties went down to defeat against the background of the USA promising economic assistance to rebuild war-torn economies and tightening Soviet control of the East European Communist Bloc.

By 1948–1949 Stalin's attempts to push Communism in Europe led the USA to produce the Marshall Plan and the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The Marshall Plan provided loans and economic assistance to countries to rebuild their economies and to make democracy and private property more attractive than Communism's policies of authoritarianism and nationalization. NATO was a defensive military alliance, anchored on the military power of the USA, which offered Western Europe security and protection from the Soviet Union. It was a dramatic step that allowed the nations of Western Europe to rebuild their economic and political order behind an American shield without the draining expense of paying for a large military establishment in the face of the Soviet Union's threats. The Americans put talent, treasure, and time into lifting the body and spirit of Europe and other parts of the world to resume the mission of building a global order based on Western values. The American effort was not selfless, but it was self-sacrificing and incredibly far-sighted. It allowed the Europeans to flourish and take control of their destiny.

The Soviet Union viewed the Marshall Plan and NATO as sophisticated ploys to undermine Soviet totalitarianism in East Europe. To guard against any defection from its Bloc, the Soviets refused to allow any of its satellites to participate in the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Plan and placed all of its East European colonies into an economic straitjacket called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or Comecon and a military alliance called the Warsaw Pact. They also made it clear that they would use force to keep their empire intact. In 1956, when the Hungarians made a bid to escape the Soviet Bloc, they were suppressed by Warsaw Pact troops. Similarly, when Czechoslovakians tried to liberalize their regime in 1968, they, too, were beaten down, and the Kremlin announced the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, which declared that force would be used to prevent any country that had a Communist regime from "backsliding" or changing its political and economic system. In any event, the Marshall Plan and NATO demonstrated to Stalin and his successors that the USA would protect Europe and that it was too dangerous to continue to push Communism there.

Asia, however, was another matter. Here Moscow pursued a careful, but aggressive policy. At the end of the war with Japan in 1945 and with the indulgence of the American government, Stalin controlled Manchuria. After he stripped Manchuria of much of its industry that had been put there mainly by the Japanese during their period of occupation, he converted it

into a new and powerful base for the Chinese Communist movement, transferring the CCP's center of gravity where the Long March had left it in Shensi province to Manchuria where there were much better means of communication, plenty of food, and a very large stock of military equipment left over from the Japanese surrender to the Soviet army at the end of the war. Allied to this powerful revolutionary movement and in control of the Eurasian land mass, the Soviet Union was definitely stronger than the USA and its ally, Chiang Kai-shek's KMT, and so in four years of warfare, the grand prize was won, and all of China save the island of Taiwan became Communist in October 1949, marking the birth of Red China.<sup>8</sup>

Hardly pausing at all, Stalin then went after Korea, but he went after Korea by proxy, not directly. North Korea was a Soviet satellite and was armed to the teeth. In 1950, it set upon South Korea, which was in the American sphere, and beyond Korea was Japan. The USA had been responsible for flattening out Japan and so now it had to intervene to protect that country. This was the real reason for the American war in Korea—keeping the Soviets out of Japan. The USA had to protect Japan, since it was prevented from protecting itself. North Korea was not strong enough to withstand American intervention and soon American troops were all over North Korea. Then Stalin, still relying on proxy, launched Red China into the fray, and the American army was almost pushed out of all of Korea, nearly driven into the sea, losing most of South Korea as well as its conquest of North Korea. But it rallied and when a ceasefire was arranged it had gotten back to near the line of division between North and South Korea, leaving Korea divided as it remains to this day.<sup>9</sup> In the end Moscow had failed to take South Korea and had failed to get at Japan, in part because it lacked naval strength. But at the same time we must note its finesse—others did the fighting. American dead stood at 36,516 and wounded at 103,284. Soviet causalities were zero. That sort of stalemate was supportable for Stalin and his regime, and, moreover, the Kremlin had the big prize in hand—China was Communist.

If Communist expansion was contained in northeast Asia along the line that ran along the 38th parallel through the middle of Korea, it nevertheless was to achieve a major triumph in Southeast Asia, in Indochina. And it would achieve this triumph, first, as a result of long and patient groundwork by the Soviet Union; second, as a result of the imperialist greed of France; and, third, as a result of American folly. Indochina was that rather extensive region in Southeast Asia between India and China, everything that lies to the south of both of them or to the southwest of India. The

western part of Indochina fell to Great Britain in the 1800s. All of Burma had been conquered by 1886 and annexed to the British Empire out of which it would promptly exit in 1947. France seized the eastern part of Indochina between 1858 and 1893, leaving a precarious independence to Thailand in between. The British from the west and the French from the east and southeast generously left off at the Thai border in order to have a convenient buffer state between them, so that these colonial powers would not get too close to one another.

In the eastern part of Indochina, more or less tacitly assigned to France, there were five countries or areas. Two of these did not cause much trouble. These were the inner states, the hinterland or backcountry states of Cambodia in the south and Laos in the north and center. They succumbed to French rule rather easily. Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1863, and Laos 30 years later, in 1893. The main part of Indochina, however, did not fall easily, namely the three countries along the coast of the South China Sea. These three countries were Tonkin in the north, Co Chin China in the south, and Annam in between. The French conquered these three regions during the Second French Empire, under Napoleon III between 1859 and 1867. And the work of conquest was completed under the Third Republic during the ministry of Jules Ferry, 1883–1885. Here in the future Vietnam, the natives did not simply accept the imposition of French rule as the backcountries of Cambodia and Laos had done. They fought the imposition, especially in the north, in the region known as Tonkin where there was hard and bitter fighting for the last two years, the natives being supported by China in their resistance to French aggression. And so in Vietnam and especially in the north there was a tradition of national resistance to French imperialism.

There followed 57 years of subjugation to France. It ended abruptly in 1942, when in a rapid campaign French rule was extinguished by Japan. But Japan later lost the war to the USA, and so the natives in Indochina were now free. Japan put an end to French rule and then Japan had lost the war. If it had remained like that, the subsequent story might have been much happier.

But in Washington the decision was taken that since France was an ally and had been a great power, it must be made mighty again by restoring its lost empire by reimposing the yoke of French imperialism upon millions of now free natives. Years later Robert S. McNamara, the secretary of defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, said that the USA had made a mistake in doing that, and he was right.<sup>10</sup>

At any rate, once the decision was taken in Washington to back the French, the USA became enmeshed in Vietnam. It turned into a very difficult war because the natives were not left to mill about ineffectively and eventually to lose out. Leadership came to them from afar, and yet it was their own leadership—Communists who had been trained in the Soviet Union since the early 1920s. This Communist core trained in the Soviet Union was Vietnamese in origin, and now from 1945 onward they were either already on the scene or would soon be arriving to assume direction of the national liberation movement, of the war of independence against France and its American sponsor.

The center of resistance to France after 1945, as in the 1880s, was in the north, in the Tonkin area, affording a fine example of historical continuity, of how a tradition of resistance, long suppressed, can rise again. It was this tradition that had impelled young Vietnamese to go to a strange and distant country to be trained in its education institutions and in its military camps. The Comintern had done its work well, and a great accretion of strength came to the native cause, now anti-French and anti-American, when China became Communist in 1949, creating a common frontier and direct access to North Vietnam for both Red China and the Soviet Union. In March 1953 Stalin died, but his successors, led by Nikita Khrushchev, maintained the Communist drive in Southeast Asia. In 1954, the French sustained a crushing defeat at Dienbienphu and were henceforth out of the picture unless there were direct American intervention.

The Eisenhower Administration had by then supplanted the Truman Administration, which had begun all this, and the issue of intervention or non-intervention was fought out in the bosom of this Administration, secluded from public view. The decision went against the mouthpiece of the war party, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, so there was no direct American intervention.<sup>11</sup> At British prompting, an agreement was reached at Geneva in 1954 to divide Vietnam—the north became independent under Communist rule; the south continued under anti-Communist rule, but won its freedom from France.

However, despite the fact of its independence and its republican character, South Vietnam lay under the curse of nationalism, for its leadership was tainted with its former subservience to France, now transferred to the USA by force of circumstance. South Vietnam was honeycombed with Communist guerrillas, called Viet Cong, and it was not to make it on its own. It was going under when direct American intervention took place under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. The climax of this

intervention came in April 1969, under the new Nixon Administration, when American troops in Vietnam numbered 543,400. Now this was a very large American force, and yet there was no victory. The South Vietnamese fought with little spirit, and in the USA anti-war sentiment mounted and divided the country. Finally, a decision was made to “wind down” the war by resorting to saturation bombing and by gradually withdrawing American troops and shifting the burden to the natives in South Vietnam. But this solution also proved unavailable, and in 1975 the remaining Americans and the South Vietnamese were engulfed in a common disaster, and sustained defeat, abandoning vast stores of supplies and military equipment, leaving virtually intact the lavishly outfitted base, Cam Ranh on the southeast coast of Vietnam. All of Vietnam was united under Communist rule in May 1975.<sup>12</sup>

Vietnam then established a sphere of influence over Cambodia and Laos and turned over to the Soviets not only a military base, but also the major naval base at Cam Ranh in the southeast Pacific. When the Sino–Soviet rift broke out, Vietnam lined up with the Soviet Union and maintained an army on China’s border. It fought a brief, bloody border war with China in the early months of 1979 and proved to be a powerful ally of the Soviet Union, with an army larger than India’s for a few years. The lesson of Vietnam was that the USA, in containing Communism, had to avoid the mistake of confusing nationalism with Communism.

It was in the late 1950s and the 1960s that the Soviet Union finally broke into Africa and Latin America.<sup>13</sup> In 1959 the Castro regime assumed sway over Cuba. It was a close ally of the Soviet Union and served as both a base for the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles aimed at the USA, which precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and as a source of Communist mercenary troops who were inserted by Moscow in civil wars in Africa when local Communist forces needed a helping hand to turn the tide of conflict in their favor. Cuba remained the lone beachhead for Communism in Latin America for about 20 years, and then Nicaragua opened up. There was a civil war in that disconsolate land that in 1979 led to the triumph of a leftwing regime. The Communists assumed control of all the levers of power in Nicaragua, leaving only a façade of representation to the non-Communist element that went along.

In Africa, the Soviets also found some success in expanding their influence. African nationalism boiled over after the World War II, and national independence movements sprang up everywhere. Yet the gains registered by the Soviet Union were less than could have been expected in a situa-

tion made to order for weakening the Western powers through depriving them of their colonial possessions. The Soviets were not as successful in exploiting the force of nationalism in Africa because Great Britain and even France saw the handwriting on the wall. They retained their colonies as long as possible in the face of growing movements of national independence, but then they yielded and granted independence to their colonies, leaving Nikita Khrushchev somewhat perplexed and attributing this unexpected development to the mounting strength of Communism.<sup>14</sup>

The British and the French were worn out by the two world wars, and France was further weakened by the war in Vietnam. And so they gave up. In 1956 France, the most stubborn power in keeping its possessions, recognized both the independence of Morocco and Tunisia. It would not do as much in Algeria. There a long and bloody war of liberation took place between 1954 and 1962. The French fought stubbornly in Algeria because of the oil resources and the large number of French settlers in Algeria. The Kremlin gave some aid to the Algerian nationalists and won some sympathy among them, but it never attained a grip on the movement before or after independence. Algeria was friendly to the Soviet Union and, as an Arab country, had moved closer to it over the USA aid to Israel, but at no time was it under Soviet domination.

It was in respect to the Portuguese colonies that the Soviets had more success, and this was so largely because of Portuguese obduracy. It was not until Portugal was broken by revolution at home under the strain of persistent colonial warfare, stoked by the Communists, that it gave up in the early 1970s. In the Portuguese colonies of Angola on the west coast and Mozambique on the east coast—the two main colonies—the native Africans were divided into rival national movements, and Moscow chose one or another of the rivals, whichever was stronger. In Angola, Moscow backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Moscow's influence in Angola relied mainly on indirect intervention. It inserted there thousands of Cuban soldiers, estimated at 15,000–16,000, and sometimes 20,000, and numerous East German engineers, who served as Soviet proxies. At first, the MPLA was not in the south, but later it prevailed due to the steady support of Moscow and Cuba and because of the default of the USA in the support of the rival, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). This default of US support stemmed from the reaction in Congress over the miscalculation in Vietnam. UNITA, though bereft of American support, was still able to hang on to some parts of Angola because of some aid from South Africa, which opposed Soviet influence in Africa.

Moscow also won some tenuous influence in Mozambique. The Mozambique Liberation Front or FRELIMO won independence from Portugal in 1975. It quickly aligned itself with Communism, accepted aid from Moscow, but retained some ties with the West. In 1977 civil war broke out, some Cuban troops were introduced, and the Soviet-aligned regime, now called the People's Republic of Mozambique, was able to continue in power, but an anti-Communist insurgency also grew in strength. The civil war was not resolved until 1992, after the USSR fell, when Mozambique repudiated Communism.

Finally, the Soviet Union had marginal success in an African country that was already independent, namely, in Ethiopia. There was strife between Ethiopia and Somalia, a country to the south, and the Soviets at first gave aid to Somalia, but there was a revolution in Ethiopia in the 1970s that saw the triumph of a Marxist government, so Moscow, in view of the fact that Ethiopia was a larger country and had a Marxist regime opened to its influence, switched sides. It threw down Somalia and espoused the cause of Ethiopia, injected some thousands of Cuban troops, and brought about the triumph of Ethiopia over Somalia. The Soviets supported a military dictatorship and Marxist regime in Ethiopia, but it also had to support the Ethiopian economy with huge investments and aid. It was a costly outpost, but held out the possibility of being a springboard for further advances in Africa.

Soviet gains in Africa did not come at the cost of distracting it from Asia where it was as active as before. The Kremlin tried to gain influence in the Middle East by exploiting the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and aligning with anti-Western nationalist movements, but it found little traction because Communism had virtually no appeal there. Moscow gained some influence in the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen or South Yemen in 1969, the first and only Communist nation in the volatile Middle East. Yemen was at the southwestern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It lay across the straits that connect the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, which was an arm of the Indian Ocean, and so it was at a very strategic point, and was the eastern complement or counterpart of Ethiopia on the African continent to the west. Now the British had a major base at Aden, the chief town of South Yemen, and this former British base now became another bastion of Soviet power in southwest Asia. And so at either end of the southern part of Asia, at Aden in South Yemen and at Cam Ranh in Vietnam, southeastern and southwestern strongholds, the Soviet Union had major bases. South Yemen signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1979, which was renewed in 1984.

In 1979, the Soviet Union made its last effort at expansion by invading Afghanistan. Afghanistan had some resources, but its strategic position was what made it important to Moscow. In some respect Afghanistan is the heartland of Asia because Iran and Turkey and the Arab countries lie to the west and India and China to the east. Control of Afghanistan is a long step southward toward the Indian Ocean and not too far from the weak states of southwestern Asia and the Persian Gulf and its vast oil reserves. In Soviet hands, it meant Soviet enclosure of Iran from the east as well as from the north. Control would also bring power directly to bear on the shaky state of Pakistan, beyond which was India, and it was not an unimportant link in a possible encirclement of China—the Soviet Union to the north, Vietnam in the southeast, Afghanistan in the central western part of the continent, and a pro-Soviet India in the south. Encircling China would have been a monumental task, but control of Afghanistan was a step in that direction and Soviet control of it would at least put pressure on China.

Afghanistan had languished as a moribund Oriental monarchy, causing the Soviet Union no trouble whatsoever. In 1973, it got stirred up over the overthrow of its monarchy and the advent of a republic, but the republicans fell out with one another and came to blows. In 1978, in a bloody coup Soviet-backed Communists took power in Afghanistan. Infighting followed, and then an Islamic insurgency started. The Kremlin did not like the direction of events and feared that their protégés might lose out, which would repudiate both the Brezhnev Doctrine and the myth of Communism's inevitability.<sup>15</sup> The Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan in December 1979, overthrow the existing regime in another bloody affair, and install its puppet, Babrak Karmal, who supported a large Soviet military presence.

However, the Soviet invasion was contested, and soon the Soviet Union found itself bogged down throughout the 1980s. The record showed that the Afghans were a brave and warlike people whom the British failed to subjugate in 150 years of effort. The Soviet invasion led to a guerrilla resistance movement that was supported by coalition of powers, including the USA, China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and a host of other smaller countries. In the end, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its first and only direct intervention outside of Eastern Europe, was a disaster. It turned out to be the Soviet swan song and the last major attempt by the Soviet Union to expand Communism. In 1988, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and within three years it collapsed.

### *Collapse of Communism*

Throughout the late 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Soviet Union pushed the international revolution and the expansion of Communism. It had some success in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but by 1991 the Soviet Empire collapsed. Although there are still a few countries in the world that maintain Communist regimes, all of them, with the exception of North Korea, are much changed and bear little relationship to the Leninist–Stalinist system that the Soviet Union was pushing. Why did Communism collapse or why was it repudiated? First, there was the often-overlooked doctrine of Soviet primacy, which led to a general fracturing of the Communist movement after World War II. The doctrine of Soviet primacy held that the Soviet Union came first and that Communist regimes and parties everywhere had to place its interests even above their own. It was natural that this doctrine should evolve in the 1920s and 1930s when the Soviet Union was the only Communist country.<sup>16</sup> It stood to reason that you had to protect the one thing that you already had before you could hope to move on. But as soon as other communist countries came into being, this doctrine of Soviet primacy caused problems, and it did so immediately. In 1948, Yugoslavia deviated from the pattern and placed its own interest above those of the motherland of Communism. This was rank heresy, so Stalin excommunicated Yugoslavia.<sup>17</sup>

Then in 1959, another Communist nation, China, potentially the strongest of all, would go the same way, making it necessary for the Russians to modify their doctrine of Soviet primacy. But the Soviet regime had become so rigid and so hidebound that it was impossible for it to modify this doctrine or any other, and so Soviet primacy was like the collectivization of agriculture. It was upheld despite everything. And in this case it was upheld at the cost of the loss of China.

Some scholars have written that the occasion of the break between Moscow and Beijing was due to ideological differences, the conflict over de-Stalinization, and so forth.<sup>18</sup> This was not the major issue. The trouble between the two major Communist powers was more elemental. It was in 1959 that Khrushchev made it known to China that it was not to become an atomic power.<sup>19</sup> To the Chinese Communists this meant the denial of equality. Why should they be inferior to Russia? They had 3700 years of history behind them whereas Russia had existed for barely 1000 years or less, if you take Muscovy as the starting point. There were 150,000,000 Russians in existence, and there were over a billion Chinese. So why should

they take a second seat to the Soviet Union? When they saw that they were to be denied equality, that they were to occupy an inferior position within the Communist camp, all of their nationalism and perhaps racialism boiled over at this insult. And so the split came. And there was no solution. Even when the USA intervened in Vietnam, the Soviets and Chinese did not reconcile, but each helped the Vietnamese on their own. In an amazing combination of hostility toward one another but continuing cooperation to give aid to Vietnam, they collectively put through the victory of that country, despite their own bitter quarrel.

A second reason for the decline of the Soviet Empire was its inefficient economy and its resulting inability to finance its imperial obligations and support of international revolution. The command economy discouraged entrepreneurship and creative individuals and kept power in the hands of an oligarchy of party officials who were more interested in personal loyalty and in retaining power than in economic growth. Corruption, inflexible bureaucracy, an absence of coordination among economic sectors, a lack of a pricing mechanism to reflect true costs and profits, and large-scale waste and mismanagement of resources promoted gridlock and vast inefficiencies. Despite controlling one-sixth of the arable land on the globe, which was divided into larger and increasingly less productive state farms, the Soviet Union could only feed its people by maintaining one the world's largest fishing fleets. And the standard of living in the Soviet Union, the most advanced Communist country in the world, was shockingly low, below that of Finland, Austria, West Germany, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and so many other countries that had eschewed Communism in favor of capitalism. It maintained itself by exporting natural resources, particularly gas and oil. The tradition of authoritarianism was a factor, but the blind commitment to ideology was the main culprit in producing such inefficiencies and handicapping the Soviet economy.<sup>20</sup>

A third factor in the unraveling of the Soviet Empire was the Soviet government's inability to persuade the preponderance of the population that Communism represented their values and fulfilled their spiritual needs.<sup>21</sup> The Communist regimes were viewed as an organized conspiracy of radical ideologues who used force and violence to push their ideology and maintain their rule. The Soviet Bloc had all the earmarks of a vast gulag where the jailers watched the prisoners, the prisoners looked over their shoulders at the jailers, and everyone talked of the great experiment and the magnificent future that was ahead, but alas knew they lived in a Kafkaesque world where the first order of business was survival.<sup>22</sup> There

was no expectation of privacy, respect, dignity, and rights. There were only duties and obligations and not to their fellow human beings, but to the Party and its whims. Quotidian life in the Soviet Bloc revolved around propaganda, police, censorship, food lines, and endless bureaucratic red tape. Subjects were discouraged from reading unapproved books, thinking critically, or talking to the misguided stranger from within or from without. People endured the repressive mechanisms by going underground, by confiding their hopes in family and friends whom they trusted, by engaging in the black market to meet basic needs, by resorting to satire and black humor, by drowning dreams in vodka, by circulating self-published (*samizdat*) literature, and by meeting clandestinely in small groups to enjoy art and literature and, in some cases, to pray. Life was drudgery, work was a bore, and the future was bleak. Some people lived to get out of the Soviet Empire and died trying. Most swallowed hard, adjusted to the paranoia, and hoped for a better day.

A fourth cause of the Soviet Union's demise was its repression of non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union. Lenin once called the Russian Empire "the prison house of nations," a reference to the fact that the Russians controlled millions of non-Russian minorities who lived in traditional homelands and comprised the majority of the total population of the Russian Empire. He was right, but when he and the Communists took power in 1917 they did nothing to alter that reality. The Soviet Union remained a Russian-dominated state and a prison for over 100 minority national groups, but it was even more repressive than Tsarist Russia because the Communists used modern technology, sophisticated weapons, shrewd propaganda, and massive police powers to tamp down national aspirations. The same policy of suppression of nationalism was imposed upon the countries of the Soviet Bloc in the 1940s.<sup>23</sup> The Communists' explanation of their policy was that nationalism was a legitimate force when a region was being exploited by imperialist, capitalist powers. In that circumstance, nationalism had to be stoked to weaken global capitalism. However, when a country had become a polished jewel of classless cooperation, which the Communists believed that the Soviet Union had achieved, then nationalism was an anti-revolutionary and regressive sediment that had to be ruthlessly removed. Their ideology told them that economic relationships and concerns superseded national identity and interests. Like religion, nationalism was part of a superstructure that reflected the underlying discontent associated with the economic injustice of the capitalist era, but it was not itself a driving force in world history and would soon be flaked off.

A fifth issue in the hollowing out of the Soviet Union and its empire was its persecution of religion. From the very first days of Communist rule in Russia and then after World War II in Eastern Europe, a religious dissident movement mushroomed in protest against Communist persecution of religion. In Soviet Russia during the bloody years of the 1920s and 1930s the dissent movement was mainly underground because of the state's massive campaign against religion. In 1937 when the Communist government, after 20 years of brutal persecution, took a census to measure their success against religious belief, they were dumbfounded to discover that most people still held religious beliefs and that they were willing to admit as much even though the government taking the census was tormenting them.<sup>24</sup> The Communists redoubled their efforts against religion in the wake of that census, which kept religious dissent in the recesses of society. After the Nazis invaded the USSR in June 1941, Stalin moderated his attack upon religion. Stalin tried to manipulate religious and national sentiment in defense of the Soviet state. It was a brazenly expedient policy, but it did meet with some success. The Russian Orthodox Church played a major role in rallying the Russian people against the Nazis.<sup>25</sup> Some Russian Orthodox believers actually thought the Soviet government was about to end its persecution of religion.

Such was not the case, however. Religious persecution persisted during the late war years and post-war years. Religious dissent remained strong, but again was mainly a subterranean movement. There was a slight thaw in the anti-religious policy when Stalin died and Khrushchev came to power in the mid-1950s, and that hiatus gave the religious dissent movement enough hope to surface and challenge the Soviet policy.

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, a significant religious dissent movement had crystallized above ground and was led by men and women of faith who inspired countless others, leaders like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Baptist preacher Georgi Vins, and later the Orthodox priest Alexander Men'. In Lithuania, too, a Catholic anti-Communist movement grew. In Ukraine, the suppressed Uniate Catholic Church grew into a sizeable underground church. It received help from the powerful Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which the Communists were having trouble controlling, particularly after the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the launching of the policy of de-Stalinization.<sup>26</sup> Muslims, too, challenged the anti-religious policies. The Soviets could not control religious dissent, which soon allied itself with nationalist forces and splintered Soviet society into numerous shards.

For the Communists, the burgeoning religious dissent movement was an anomaly—a disquieting and bold repudiation of their ideology. Khrushchev resumed a violent attack on religion throughout the Soviet Empire and this policy was continued under Leonid Brezhnev who ruled between 1964 and 1982, by Yuri Andropov who was in power from 1982 to 1984, by Konstantin Chernenko who held sway between 1984 and 1985, and, finally, by Mikhail Gorbachev who presided over the Soviet denouement between 1985 and 1991. In 1988, Gorbachev, with the Soviet Union reeling from its numerous problems, finally modified Communism's anti-religious policy.

A sixth explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Empire was related to the religious issue, and that was the opposition of the Catholic Church in Poland to Communist rule, which was mentioned earlier. The fact was that the Communists were never able to bring this Church to heel. In 1978, the Catholic Church elected as pope the Polish cardinal archbishop of Cracow, Karol Wojtyla, who took the religious name of Pope John Paul II. The new pope was a towering figure, a profound intellectual, a charismatic personality, and a spiritual leader who captivated and inspired millions of Christians and non-Christians around the world, but particularly behind the Iron Curtain. Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Czechs, Slovaks, Belorussians, Hungarians, Romanians, and Russians were moved by him, who was viewed not only as one of them, because he had suffered with them under Communist rule, but who was also able, even though he had no army or police, to frighten the Communists.<sup>27</sup>

The Communists were confused by the Polish pope. On the one hand, their ideology predicted that religion was unimportant and declining. On the other hand, the Polish pope showed religion was a vaunted force. Almost singlehandedly, he sparked the creation of the Solidarity labor movement in Poland and encouraged the underground religious dissidents in Lithuania and Ukraine to assume a public stand. He started what George Weigel called “The Final Revolution” and brought Communism face to face with its own contradiction—claiming to improve mankind by killing and enslaving men.<sup>28</sup> For Timothy Garton Ash, he was the main reason for the implosion of the Soviet Empire, which Ash summarized as follows: “Without the Pope, no Solidarity. Without Solidarity, no Gorbachev. Without Gorbachev, no fall of Communism.”<sup>29</sup>

In the end, the Soviet leadership had no answer for the Polish pope. In 1989, in the face of widespread opposition to Communist rule, Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine and the use of force and allowed the

East Europe satellites to break from the Soviet Bloc and set up independent states.<sup>30</sup> They quickly moved away from Communism, started to make the difficult transition to Western-style governments and economies, and virtually all of them applied for and were given membership in the EU. Most of them also joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In December 1989, Gorbachev met with the pope and agreed to allow religious freedom in the Soviet Union, including the reconstitution of the suppressed Ukrainian Catholic Church. On Christmas Day 1991, the Soviet Union devolved into 15 new governments.

The final factor in bringing down the Soviet Union was the American policy of containment.<sup>31</sup> As mentioned, it kept Communism holed up behind the Iron Curtain and prevented it from taking power in Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, West Germany, West Berlin, Japan, and South Korea. It was also somewhat successful in checking the growth of Communism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and it encouraged the Soviets to withdraw voluntarily from Austria in 1955. However, it failed to block the advance of Communism in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Its greatest failure was confusing nationalism and Communism in South Vietnam, which led to the debilitating Vietnam War and the unification of all of Vietnam—North and South—under a Communist government in 1975. Another misstep was Cuba, where the Communists were able to grasp and hold on to power in 1959 by tapping Cuban nationalism, Soviet aid, and omnipresent and visceral resentment of North American influence. Cuban-American relations finally improved in December 2014.

### POST-WAR EXPANSION OF WESTERNIZATION

In many ways, the various reasons for the fall of the Soviet Empire were part of a larger reality, namely the revitalization and expansion of Western core values in Western and Central Europe, Asia, North and South America, Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the Middle East, and in that sense the Soviet Union ultimately fell because it could not compete with those values. In the words of President George H. W. Bush, the Cold War was a struggle of values “for the very soul of mankind.”<sup>32</sup>

The story of the growth of Western values in the period following World War II is rich and complex and can only be outlined here. Suffice it to say, that with the end of World War II and the defeat of the Axis forces, it soon became clear that a new world order was taking root. One of the first indications that Western values would prevail in the post-war

era was the fact that the Western nations organized an international trial called the Nuremberg Trials in order to hold those who committed heinous crimes accountable. The Nuremberg Trials took on the issue of political sovereignty and stressed that all sovereign states had to abide by natural law and that they would be held accountable in a court of law and punished for violation of the natural law. In effect, the Western Allies declared that there existed first principles that preceded and took priority over laws of sovereign nations and guaranteed human beings security from crimes against humanity. This was a surprise for the Soviets, who were one of the major violators of natural law, but they cynically went along and proved quite willing to condemn the Nazis for war crimes.<sup>33</sup> However, the Western states were laying down a new international standard and the Soviets endorsed it and, accordingly, would be judged by it and condemned whenever they violated it.

A second sign that Western values were becoming the basis for an emerging global civilization was the creation of the UN with its headquarters in New York. The UN, which was largely the idea of Western nations, led by the USA, was a forum, reflecting Western values, that gave legitimacy to governments and provided a place where nations could try to resolve problems without resorting to violence and where they could seek justice if force were necessary with the backing of some of the world's most powerful countries. For example, the UN authorized force to be used to balance Soviet-backed North Korea's aggression against South Korea in 1950.

The UN was also a place where people from around the world could judge a country's behavior and compare the three competing value systems in terms of their economic performance, standard of living, and relative freedom. Most nations, including the Islamic, Orthodox, and Communist nations, joined the UN. All of countries in the Western Hemisphere, from Canada to Chile, were founding members of the UN. In addition, six Muslim majority countries were founding nations, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. China, India, South Africa, Liberia, and Yugoslavia were founding members. The Soviets were reluctant participants, but as long as they had the veto, they went along with this new international body. They saw it as an institution of the West and initially they wanted all of their nationality-based republics to be members, so that they would not feel isolated in a sea of pro-Western states. However, they withdrew their request, which had been approved, before the first meeting of the UN because they did not want to remind the world that they ruled over so many subject nations. Thus, from the outset it became clear

that the UN was a vital institution of global civilization and could affect Soviet behavior.

The UN soon became a place where numerous other international institutions were borne, refreshed, revitalized, or sanctioned, which were based on Western values. Most of the world nations, from a variety of cultures, joined and participated in these organizations, which included the World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, the World Food Program, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and so many others, which Stephen Sestanovich called “the most valuable institutions of international cooperation.”<sup>34</sup> In addition, Western values were reflected in the many international agreements and treaties that the UN endorsed, including laws on the treatment of refugees and immigrants, the exploration of space, the navigation of the seas, and countless other activities that concerned humanity as a whole. Other international initiatives that came out of the West and found international support included the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Another major development in the second half of the twentieth century was the explosive growth of international reporting and news coverage by the Western media and by independent groups, churches, and non-government organizations in the West that provided a running commentary on international developments. Virtually all governments around the world, with a few exceptions, were covered by the free press and by the independent news groups. The reporters largely used Western values to judge societies and, as a result, tended to pressure governments to try to accept some of the West’s religio-political values. The Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe were a particular focus of attention because they could be easily compared and contrasted with the free countries of Western Europe. The reports overwhelmingly documented the fact that the USSR and other Communist regimes were dismal, inefficient, repressive, wasteful, dictatorial, unrepresentative, exploitative, abusive, intolerant, and soulless. The Communists did not like that image and did make some changes as early as the Khrushchev era. By the time Gorbachev took power, he was anxious to make dramatic and fundamental alterations, and the Western news media documented his acquiescence in the unraveling of the strictures of the Soviet Empire in riveting detail, from the *New York Times* reporting on anti-Soviet demonstrations in the Baltic States to Cable News Network televising, minute by minute, the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. Gorbachev told Ronald Reagan that he wanted to open the Soviet Union to freedom, to, in effect, become like Western states.<sup>35</sup>

Another example of the growth of Western values was the creation of the NATO alliance and establishment of the EU, which resulted from the American-financed Marshall Plan and European Recovery Act. NATO, which has already been described, was much more than a military alliance. It was an opportunity for Europeans to grow, innovate, and reconnect with traditional values in a relatively safe environment, at least one where there was some security and deterrence against threats.<sup>36</sup> And it had its Asian parallel when the USA made military agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and many Southeast Asian nations.

As for the EU, it stands as one of the most significant developments in world history. Working with the Christian Democratic political parties and such leaders as Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, and Konrad Adenauer, the USA and its allies engineered and supported the creation of what Monnet called “the United States of Europe,” which grew into the Common Market and then the EU. It started in spring 1951 when West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg signed the Treaty of Paris that created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and put Europe’s coal and steel industries under the common management of these member states. In 1957 the six founding members signed the Treaty of Rome that enhanced cooperation by creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom). Ten years later they merged the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom into the European Communities (EC). In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the UK joined the EC. In 1979, a European Parliament in Brussels was elected through direct, universal suffrage. In 1981, Greece joined the EC. Spain and Portugal became members in 1986 when all members also agreed to work toward the creation of a single EU. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed and it created the EU, which replaced the EC. In 1993, the EU states allowed the free movement of people, capital, goods, and services across their borders without visas or passports. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden were accepted into the EU, bringing the total member at the end of the twentieth century to 15 countries.<sup>37</sup> The EU continued to add members in the twenty-first century after the Soviet Union and Communism collapsed in East and Southeastern Europe, and these additions will be discussed later, but it should be noted that the EU was a major force for the expansion of Western values. One concrete example came in 1975 when the EU threw its weight behind the Helsinki Accords. This international agreement, sponsored by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, had three major parts called

“Baskets.” Basket one dealt with maintaining the political status quo in East Europe and Basket two arranged for Western economic assistance to the Soviet Bloc—both Baskets reflecting Soviet inability to compete with the dynamic Western states of Europe. Basket three, which the Vatican helped draft, focused on human rights based on natural law. The Communists thought it was meaningless because of sovereignty, but they soon found out otherwise. The Helsinki Accord was international law, and monitors were set up inside and outside of the Soviet Bloc to report on and judge Communist behavior.

Another clear indication of the strength of Western values was that Communism found little support in South or North America and only marginal support in Africa. All of the nations in the Western Hemisphere remained committed to Western values, with the lone exception of Cuba and Nicaragua, but even here there was no effort to impose the full range of Communist policies, from collectivization to religious persecution, and in many ways their Communism was more of a case of standing up to Yankee imperialism than of embracing Soviet values. All of the other nations of South and North America were quite active in advancing Western values around the globe. Brazil, Argentina, Columbia, and Canada served lengthy terms on the UN Security Council. Canada was particularly effective in helping with international peacekeeping missions, humanitarian aid crises, refugee issues, and financial support for building democracy in such countries as Ukraine. Brazil emerged as a leader in energy, technology, and democracy. Argentina produced the first Latin American pope, Francis I, in 2013. Of course, some of the best universities in the world were and are located in South and North America, and the entire hemisphere pursued economic agreements that laid the foundation for the growth of EU-type relationships.

Another indication of the acceptance of Western values as a basis for global civilization was the post-war blossoming of Westernization in Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Each of these countries sprouted vibrant economies under competent and generally representative, if not always democratic, governments. Japan and the Asian tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—made Communist societies look like Stone Age states, and the difference in development cut away at both the legitimacy and attractiveness of the Communist ideology.

Taiwan, in particular, had a transformational impact on China. In 1949, under Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT leadership, Taiwan, in contrast to

Mainland China, selected a development path that combined Western religio-political values with those of Confucianism and Buddhism. Although at first a one-party state like China, Taiwan eventually emerged as a bastion of democratic government with an innovative and dynamic economy. It outpaced China, which helped convince the Communists to move away from the Communist model and toward Western religio-political values.

China's turning toward the West occurred in the last few decades of the twentieth century. The Chinese, like the Russians, initially pursued a Leninist–Stalinist model of development after World War II. These policies were devastating to China, but, unlike the Russians, the Chinese began to diverge from the ideology in the course of the Cold War and follow the Western model that was showing success everywhere around them.

Under Deng Xiaoping (r. 1978–92), China basically abandoned Communism as a model and adopted a version of Singaporean Lee Kuan Yew's state capitalism that continued one-party dictatorship but allowed new, creative elites to emerge in the economic and technical spheres and deemphasized religious persecution of believers who would not challenge party rule, with the exception of Islamic Uighurs and Buddhist Tibetans, whose repression had more to do with national cohesion than religious persecution. The Chinese established free enterprise zones and opened trade with the USA and the EU. China also sent tens of thousands of students to universities in the West for training in technology and science. By the end of the twentieth century, it was showcasing a middle class, a rising standard of living, and a modicum of freedom for some of its citizens. In addition, Great Britain returned the Crown Colony of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Hong Kong was a free market, dynamic economy that immediately added momentum to China's move toward Westernization.

Israel was yet another example of the expansion of Western values in the post-war world. In 1948, the UN, led by the USA and the Soviet Union, carved Israel out of British-controlled Palestine, a land that was populated mainly by Muslims. Israel was the result of the drive by Zionists for an independent homeland for Jews, a desire by the Western powers to assuage their guilt over a history of anti-Semitism and insensitivity during the Holocaust, and, finally, a strategy by the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the Middle East where Muslims were uniformly opposed to atheistic Communism. Perhaps, too, the West saw the creation of Israel as an icebreaker for Western culture in the congealed sea of Muslim tradition

and fundamentalism. In any event, Israel, after flirting with the Soviet Union, quickly became a protégé of the West and mainly of the USA. It was a throwback to the Kingdom of Jerusalem that the Christian crusaders established in the twelfth century, but now, of course, it was a Jewish state but one that had all the cultural characteristics of the Western value system.

The problem with this island of Western culture in a sea of Muslims was that it has tended to be exclusive rather than inclusive, and, like many Islamic countries, did not adhere to a strict separation of church and state.<sup>38</sup> However, it was more than willing to give opportunities to Arabs who would accept Israel as a Jewish state and at its inception was open to working together in one state with the Palestinians.<sup>39</sup> Today a “one state solution” again seems viable because all efforts to set up a two-state solution have floundered on the growth of Israeli settlements in Palestinian lands and Palestinian irreconcilability and violent reaction to Israeli expansion. A two-state arrangement would hinge upon mutual and reciprocal economic benefits similar to the agreements between France and Germany after World War II that led to the EU.

Yet another outstanding example of the growth of Western values was India, which is the largest democracy in the world. It gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947. At the same time, most of the Muslim region of India became, in a bloody transition characteristic of the twentieth century, the separate state of Pakistan. In 1971, the eastern Muslim region of Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh.

Although India initially sided with USSR in the Cold War because China was its rival in Asia and Soviet Russia was hostile to China after the Sino-Soviet rift, India was always sympathetic to Western values, particularly democracy, education, pursuit of science and technology, economic entrepreneurship, autonomous cities and towns and corporations, and the rule of law. It also leaned toward religious toleration and passed laws to separate church and state, but it is overwhelmingly a Hindu country and resents proselytism by foreigners. Today India is one of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries and is a pioneer in technology, filmmaking, and agriculture. It is poised to be one of the leading states in the twenty-first century.

In summary, across the global landscape from Brazil to India to Africa to the Middle East, Westernization was embraced or found a welcoming, if nuanced, reception in the latter part of the twentieth century. As in the beginning of the twentieth century before the Communist Revolution,

Western values seemed to be reaching a point by the end of the twentieth century where they found general acceptance in the struggle to establish a footing for global unity, cooperation, and modernization. However, there was an element in the Muslim world that was diametrically opposed to the growth of Western values and which constituted what Michael Cook called “a large and conspicuous exception to the normal pattern” of Westernization, and we now turn to that story.<sup>40</sup>

## NOTES

1. See, for example, Gaddis (2005) and Gaddis (1997).
2. Haslam (2011), pp. 1–2.
3. Zubok (2007), pp. 61, 163, 336. Also see Kennan to Byrnes, 22 February 1946, U. S. State Department (1969), pp. 696–709; and Mastny (1976), pp. 373–4.
4. Zubok (2007), pp. 27–30.
5. Zubok (2007), pp. 2, 6, 336.
6. Bociurkiw (1996), Dunn (1977).
7. Acheson (1969), pp. 194–201, 212–235; Haslam (2011), pp. 74, 80.
8. Mitter (2013), pp. 345–64; Haslam (2011), pp. 113–6.
9. Acheson (1969), pp. 402–425, 441–455, 529–38; Haslam (2011), pp. 119–32. Stalin apparently considered attacking Europe while the United States was preoccupied in Korea. See Mastny (2006), p. 18.
10. McNamara (1995). A.D.S. Greenway (2014) knew it was a mistake in the 1960s.
11. Ambrose (1988), p. 327.
12. Herring (1979).
13. On the Cold War in the Third World, see Westad (2005).
14. Khrushchev (2007), pp. 810–1, 869–81; Haslam (2011), pp. 146–51; and Hatzivassiliou (2014), pp. 40, 48.
15. Wilson Center (1 December 1979). Also see Haslam (2011), pp. 319–27.
16. Ulam (1974), p. 185.
17. Djilas (1957), pp. 174–5; Ulam (1952, 1974), pp. 461–5.
18. For example, see Lüthi (2008).
19. Wilson Center (4 April 1958) and (20 June 1959); Ulam (1974), pp. 681–2.

20. Hanson (2003).
21. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou stressed that the Soviet Union could never match the United States on values. See his Hatzivassiliou (2014), pp. 8–9.
22. Anne Applebaum provided a sense of the reality and legacy of the prison in her two excellent books: Applebaum (2003, 2013).
23. Brzezinski (1967), pp. 405–8; Conquest (1991, 2000), pp. 150–8.
24. Kolarz (1961), p. 12.
25. Dunn (1977), pp. 83–4; Miner (2003), pp. 68–89.
26. Dunn (2004), pp. 167, 174–6.
27. Dunn (1977), pp. 174–9.
28. Weigel (1992).
29. Quoted in Barnes and Whitney (1995–2014).
30. Zubok (2007), p. 342.
31. Haslam (2011) shows that American foreign policy was central to the upending of Communism. Also see Hatzivassiliou (2014), pp. 8–9.
32. Bush (2004), p. 1; Leffler (2007), pp. 3, 8.
33. George Kennan opposed the Nuremberg Trials because of the hypocrisy of having the Soviet Union there as a judge.
34. Sestanovich (2014), p. 3.
35. Matlock (2004), p. 326.
36. Hatzivassiliou (2014), pp. 8–9.
37. On the EU, see Andrew Moravcsik (1998).
38. Lewis (1993), p. 186, suggested that both Israel and the Islamic states would improve by adopting the idea of separation of church and state.
39. Karsh (2010) argued that many Palestinians wanted to be part of the Israeli experiment, but that a radical leadership doomed them to opposition, hostility, and isolation.
40. Cook (2014), pp. 440–41.

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## Islamism on the March, 1990s–2016

*I bring the men who desire death as ardently as you desire life.*

*Khalid ibn-Walid, 7th Century warrior and companion of Muhammad*

*The object of jihad is to bring the whole world under Islamic law.*

*Bernard Lewis (1995) The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2000 Years, p. 234*

With the Cold War ending and with the world trying to come to grips with the detritus of Communism, Western values moved ahead in the struggle for global values, including winning support in a few important Islamic countries. Turkey and some other parts of the Islamic world that had been Western colonies, countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, strengthened their embrace of some Western values, particularly by establishing a measure of representative and democratic government, fostering economic enterprise, setting up universities with a varying degree of academic freedom, tolerating minority cultures, supporting some women's rights, broadening the interpretation of *Sharia* law, instituting some separation of mosque and state, and proposing to define *jihad* as an internal, individual war against sin.<sup>1</sup>

However, just as in Russia, there appeared a powerful, extremist current in Islamic society called Islamism that challenged Western values and offered fundamentalist Islamic ideas as an alternative for global order.<sup>2</sup> Islamism produced its extremist parties and personalities, including *Al Qaeda* led by Osama bin Laden and Daesh or the ISIS/ISIL headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or Caliph Ibrahim.<sup>3</sup>

## ISLAMISM'S REVOLTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Increasingly, as Western influence expanded around the globe in modern times, some Muslims came to believe that the Ottoman Empire was losing ground to the West because it was not sufficiently and aggressively Islamic. In the eighteenth century, there arose among Sunni Muslims in Arabia a movement known as Wahhabism, which was named after its founder, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Wahhab, who was a follower of Ibn Taymiyya, was a Sunni religious philosopher from the Najd area of Arabia, which was ruled by the House of Saud under the Ottoman Turks. He called for Koranic fundamentalism, rebellion against the Turks, and *jihad* against the West. Members of the House of Saud in Arabia embraced his version of Islam, which viewed the ruling Ottoman Turks as supine and religiously lax.<sup>4</sup> The Turks tried to fend off the Wahhabists, but they grew in strength across Arabia.

For the Ottoman sultans the solution to Turkey's plight was not a renewal of fundamental Islamic values, but, on the other hand, they had no answer of their own. A few Muslims thought Westernization was the key, but they were marginalized. Besieged by both external and internal critics, the Turks by the end of the eighteenth century desperately searched for a panacea to their conundrum—a desire to maintain Islamic values as a basis for global civilization but unable to compete with Western states or the Russian Empire.

When the Wahhabists revolted against the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the Turks used the Egyptians to suppress the Saudi-led rebellion, but the movement remained strong and drew additional strength from Arab resentment over the fact that when the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War I, the British and French, with the approval of the League of Nations, refused to support the emergence of independent states and established "mandates" throughout the Arab Middle East with Great Britain in control of the Arabian Peninsula. The Wahhabist movement eventually resurfaced in the Arabian Peninsula, and helped spur other Sunni fundamentalist political movements called the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism in Egypt in the 1920s. As unrest spread, the British relented and recognized the House of Saud as the legitimate government of an independent and united Saudi Arabia in 1933. Independent Saudi Arabia then made Wahhabism its state religion.

Wahhabist Saudi Arabia quickly emerged as a leading influence among Arab Sunni Muslims and among many non-Arab Sunni Muslims. Its

power came from two sources: it was the protector of Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, and the host of the annual pilgrimage, so Muslims around the world looked to Saudi Arabia for leadership. In addition, huge oil discoveries in the 1930s brought Western oil companies, particularly Standard Oil of California, and enormous sums of money into Saudi lands.<sup>5</sup> Many Saudi families close to the House of Saud became incredibly wealthy, including the bin Laden family which organized the chief construction company to meet the needs of the oil fields and the building boom across Saudi Arabia that oil money sparked. The patriarch of the family, Muhammad bin Laden, started as a bricklayer and eventually built the bin Laden construction company into the Halliburton of Saudi Arabia—the government contractor of choice that constructed whatever the Saudi government wanted, including military bases, royal palaces, government buildings, and religious edifices. One of his sons, Osama bin Laden, was deeply religious and eventually turned his full attention to Islam and the tradition of the *jihad*.<sup>6</sup>

The Wahhabists now had massive financial resources to spread their version of Islam around the world, and they had great impact on Muslims everywhere, including minority Muslim communities in Europe and North America. Soon, however, conflict arose between the Saudi royal family and the religious fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, to be sure, were religious conservatives and Wahhabists, too, but they fashioned expedient policies to work with the West in exploiting their oil fields and in modernizing parts of their economy and infrastructure. The fundamentalists were violently anti-Western because they believed the West was anti-religious, arrogant, destructive of tradition, and threatening to the position of the conservative religious elite. They also took exception to the emblems of modernity that began to appear in the Saudi Kingdom—motorcars, telegraphs, telephones, and radios.<sup>7</sup>

While pressure built between the Islamic fundamentalists and the pro-Western Saudi regime, additional developments unfolded that discouraged and then outraged Muslim believers and fueled fundamentalism. The Communists and Nazis irritated Muslims by promoting a political order in the 1930s and 1940s that, on the one hand, assailed family, community, and religion, and, on the other hand, promoted materialism, class and ethnic division, and a relative morality that justified deportations and genocide. Then in 1948 Islamic irritation exploded into palpable anger and violent hostility when the UN, a creation of the West, partitioned the land of Palestine, including the city of Jerusalem, and created out of the

partition the state of Israel and a remnant land for the Palestinian people. It made no difference to the Muslims that the Jewish people were from Judea/Israel and thus had an historical and ancestral claim to this holy land. For the Muslim world, the establishment of Israel in Palestine was an unbearable injustice, provocation, and insult— injustice because the mainly Muslim Palestinians, who had nothing to do with the Holocaust, were forced to pay the price to assuage Western guilt over the Holocaust; provocation because the creation of Israel in the Middle East exposed Muslims to more Western influence and atheistic Communism from Soviet Russia; and insult because the Islamic world was too weak and divided to prevent the injustice and provocation. In the world of Islam, anti-Semitism grew exponentially and borrowed heavily from Nazi propaganda.<sup>8</sup>

A series of wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors ensued, stretching from 1948 to 2006, in which the Israelis, backed by the USA and other Western powers, have generally defeated and humiliated their Arabic neighbors. In the latest war, which took place when Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in the summer of 2006 after an Israeli soldier was kidnapped and the Lebanese Hezbollah shelled Israel, the Israeli army proved unwilling or incapable of annihilating Hezbollah and had to settle for a ceasefire. The Palestinians, some of whom were directly ruled and others of whom were expelled from their land to make way for Israeli settlements, organized an opposition movement called the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to contest Israeli sway. The PLO organized guerrilla warfare and rebellion against Israel and from its center in the West Bank tried to negotiate with Israel for a Palestinian state. Since 1988 a more militant and better organized faction of Palestinians called Hamas, which broke with the PLO, has irritated Israel with systematic shelling, which led in winter 2008–2009 and in summer 2014 to an Israeli invasion of the Gaza strip, where Hamas has its headquarters. In 2015, sporadic clashes erupted between Palestinians and Israelis. Adding to the long-range security fears of the Israelis, the population of the Palestinians, as well as the other Arab peoples in the Middle East, increased at a much faster rate than the Israelis because of natural reproduction. In general, the norm in Israeli–Palestinian relations since the founding of Israel has been hatred, bloodshed, humiliation, arrogance, and fear—a recipe for unending conflict.

Pressure in Saudi Arabia, which derived from the Saudi regime's contradictory support of fundamentalism and of Western governments, intensified throughout the twentieth century, particularly after the founding of

Israel and the string of Israeli victories over Arab armies. The Saudi royal family found a safety valve to release part of the pressure by sending some of the fundamentalists abroad, by building extravagant mosques around the globe, and by ostentatiously underwriting fundamentalist Islamic missionary efforts worldwide. The Saudis also paid for the building of fundamentalist schools, the madrasas in Pakistan and elsewhere, that became a training ground for suicide bombers and practitioners of extreme anti-Western asymmetrical warfare. They also nourished a Pakistani and Afghan version of Islamic Sunni fundamentalism called the Taliban, which put down roots in the northwest provinces of Pakistan and those parts of Afghanistan that bordered on Pakistan's northwest regions, particularly among the majority Pashtun tribe. The Taliban was also supported and cultivated by the Pakistani government through its Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI to challenge through terrorism and guerilla warfare India's control of Kashmir, a region of contention between India and Pakistan since 1947.<sup>9</sup> India, in turn, eventually supported the so-called Northern Alliance, an amalgam of warlords and tribal leaders that arose mainly in the northern part of Afghanistan in the 1990s, to stymie the growth of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. Shiite Iran also aided the Northern Alliance to curb the influence of the Sunni Taliban.

Other secular and Western-leaning Sunni Muslim rulers were uncomfortable and defensive over the fundamentalist movement as it grew in power and supporters, fueled by Saudi money. The governments of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Morocco, all led by secular Muslims, who were interested in catching up to at least the Western standard of living, knew that they, too, were targets of the Islamic fundamentalists and, in response, they largely dropped all serious efforts to become democracies and instead built up severely authoritarian governments, while keeping the patina of democracy, in order to hold on to power and keep the extremists in check. They also increasingly embraced Islam, diluting their secularist proclivities and introduced religion into government and education. The Saudis financed religious reaction and violence around the world, including among their fellow Sunni pro-Western regimes, but they decided that they had no choice because it seemed to be the only way to reduce pressure and save themselves.<sup>10</sup>

The Saudis were in a dilemma, but then the Kremlin came to the rescue. There were over 50 million Muslims who were concentrated in the Soviet republics in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and southern Russia. The Kremlin feared the advance of Islamic fundamentalism into the Soviet

Union via Afghanistan, which bordered and shared ethnic ties with populations in Soviet Central Asia and was wedged between a Sunni fundamentalist Islamic movement in Pakistan and the Shiite fundamentalist regime in Iran. There were other vulnerable portals, including Azerbaijan and Chechnya, but these regions were within the USSR and already policed by Soviet security forces. Afghanistan was different. It had a Communist government, but it was weak and caught up in civil war. Its very instability made it an attractive target for Islamic extremism. In December 1979, the Red Army invaded Afghanistan to shore up the Kremlin's Communist puppets, to maintain the myth of Communism's inevitability and irreversibility, to secure the strategic asset of Afghanistan, and to proscribe the advance of Islamic fundamentalism. However, the USA, China, and many Islamic states cooperated to back and arm fundamentalist Afghan guerillas called the *Mujahideen*. The Soviet invasion force quickly found itself in quicksand. The guerillas were elusive and well-armed. Bombing did little, since there was little infrastructure to explode, and the mountainous terrain helped the guerillas and impeded Soviet forces. For the Soviet Union, Afghanistan soon became a nightmare, and Islamic extremism, rather than being contained, put down deeper roots in Afghanistan and sent shoots across the Soviet border into the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a godsend to the Saudis. It enabled them to combine their support of Islamic fundamentalism and of the West, particularly the USA. Islamic fundamentalists, including the deeply religious son of the Muhammad bin Laden family, Osama bin Laden, piled into Afghanistan, to thwart the Soviets because they were followers of the godless ideology of Leninism–Stalinism. The USA joined the fundamentalists because the Soviet Union was a Cold War antagonist and the opportunity to tie it down in Afghanistan by supplying Islamic fundamentalists with weapons and logistical support seemed providential.<sup>11</sup> The USA could support religion, proving that it was not anti-religious and certainly not anti-Islam, and it could weaken Communism.

The US policy was myopic because bin Laden and the Islamic extremists used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a legitimate and emotional call to *jihad* against non-Islamic societies. Fundamentalist Islam was as anti-American as it was anti-Soviet. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988, lost its empire in Eastern Europe in 1989, and then collapsed in 1991, fundamentalist Islam shifted its focus to the USA, the leader of the West. In 1988–1991 Osama bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire, organized the Wahhabist political movement called *Al Qaeda* (meaning

“the base”) to bring down the USA, turn back the tide of Westernization, and force Islamism on the world.<sup>12</sup> Just as Lenin was the leader of Russian extremism, Osama bin Laden was a chief advocate of Islamist extremism. He left Saudi Arabia in 1991 and set up his headquarters in Sudan. The bin Laden family and company broke with him publicly in 1993 and the Saudi government stripped him of his Saudi citizenship in 1994. In May 1996, the USA pressured the Sudanese government to expel him. He then returned to Afghanistan where he put down strong roots. He had financial support from conservative Saudi and Persian Gulf princes, various Islamic charities, perhaps members of the bin Laden family, and, of course, his own personal wealth.<sup>13</sup> He also found backing in the neighboring tribal areas of Pakistan, particularly the northwest territories of Waziristan and Baluchistan. In August 1996, he issued a fatwa declaring war on the USA.<sup>14</sup>

At the same time that bin Laden set up shop in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Sunni Taliban, backed by the Pakistani military, assumed power in Afghanistan and imposed a strict theocracy that saw reform-minded Afghans and Muslims purged and executed en masse and women booted out of school and the medical and business professions and clothed in burkas, the traditional dress of conservative and often uneducated women. Importantly, the Taliban also cooperated with and offered sanctuary to the *Al Qaeda* organization of Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden had concluded that the USA was his sworn enemy and that the Saudi government had to be replaced because it had perfidiously defiled Islam by allowing the USA to position its forces in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East.<sup>15</sup> Soon bin Laden’s fatwa against the USA fomented attacks. In August 1998, *Al Qaeda* bombed the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. In October 2000, it attacked the USS Cole in the territorial waters of Yemen.<sup>16</sup> The USA observed the growing attacks with mounting anxiety.

Simultaneously with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the other major branch of Islam, Shiitism, also went through a fundamentalist revolution. The home of Shiitism was Iran, the home of the non-Arab, Persian people. In 1979, the regime of the Shah collapsed and Ayatollah Khomeini set up a theocracy, which was based on the *Koran* and Muhammad’s example.<sup>17</sup> In many ways, Khomeini’s coup represented the ideal iteration of what a government should be for Islamic society. The religious leader was supreme. There were elections for political leaders and appointments for other key positions, but all officials answered to and usually only stood for office if they had the sanction of the religious leader.

Under Khomeini, Iran was violently and impulsively anti-American because the USA had propped up the secular government of the Shah for decades. In violation of international law, the Muslim revolutionaries took over the American embassy and held US diplomats captives for over a year. They released them in November 1980 after the Reagan election victory.

Most Iranian Muslims were angry and embarrassed at what had happened to their country under American tutelage. The more radical believers were determined to reestablish a strict Islamic order. For a time, it worked, but soon many of the Iranians began to tire of the religious police and the mullahs' interference in daily life and personal relationships. Nonetheless, the stoking of anti-Americanism and the inability of the American leadership to see the stoking for what it was—a domestic tactic to keep reformers in check—kept Iran and the USA from finding a new modus vivendi. In 1980, Saddam Hussein attacked Iran because he saw war as an opportunity to enhance his position over Iran in the oil rich Persian Gulf region, to put down Shiite fundamentalism that might embolden the majority Shiite Arab population in Iraq to challenge Sunni domination, and, finally, to land blows against Shiite Muslims whom he considered to be heretics, even though he himself was not a religious purist. The Iran–Iraq War was a bloody conflict in which Saddam used weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—poisonous gas—against the Iranians and Iraq's own Kurdish population whom he deemed to be his opponents or sympathetic to the Shiites of Iran. The war ended in 1988.

Two years later Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait and its huge oil fields. The USA, with UN support, organized a massive international effort against Iraq, including the Iranians, and pushed Iraq out of Kuwait in what was called the Persian Gulf War or the First Iraqi War. The USA, the UK, and France then established a no-fly-zone over Iraq, which meant that the Iraqis no longer had much of an independent air force, that the USA could spy on virtually all of Iraq, and that Saddam Hussein was shackled, although angry and spiteful and spitting anti-Americanisms by the mouthful. In addition, the USA pushed the UN to establish an inspection regime to search for WMD in Iraq. The inspectors searched every known crook and cranny of Iraq's war making capability and found nothing, but the pressure of inspection put additional restraints on Saddam Hussein. Even though the inspections were suspended and then restarted haphazardly, their very availability curtailed Iraq's sovereignty, flexibility, and offensive capability. At the same time, Iraq repeatedly violated or ignored a long string of UN resolutions, which made it appear as a threat

to its neighbors, an impediment to Middle East stability, a source of disruption to the world's oil supply, and a potential ally of terrorists—an appearance that while useful to check Iran was suicidal if it provoked the USA.

By this time, the Taliban had taken over the government in Afghanistan and allowed *Al Qaeda* to set up shop. Osama bin Laden soon orchestrated a worldwide campaign of bombings and suicide attacks against the USA. The mother of all attacks came on 11 September 2001, known around the world as 9/11, when 19 *Al Qaeda* operatives, mainly from Saudi Arabia who were residing in the West, commandeered American commercial airliners and deliberately crashed them with all their passengers into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania after the passengers tried to retake control of the plane. It was the worst terrorist attack ever in American history and took the lives of 2993 persons, including the hijackers, from 90 countries.<sup>18</sup>

### AMERICAN INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

The USA responded to 9/11 by invading Afghanistan in November 2001. It had the support of the world community, including the Iranians, who provided valuable intelligence. It was a time for leadership. It was a time to mend fences with the Iranians. It was a time to build bridges to the Muslim world. It was a time to annihilate bin Laden and his *Al Qaeda* terrorist movement. The Saudis and all of the pro-Western Muslim states were behind the USA.

Then the unthinkable happened. Instead of taking advantage of this moment and convergence of forces and knocking *Al Qaeda* off and establishing a new relationship with Shiite and Sunni secular leaders, the USA invaded Iraq on 19 March 2003. It pulled most of its troops out of Afghanistan before bin Laden and *Al Qaeda* were decisively defeated and turned the occupation of Afghanistan over to the UN. Bin Laden and the leadership of *Al Qaeda* and the Taliban escaped from the caves of north-east Afghanistan into which the US forces had driven them and crossed the border into the tribal northwest provinces of Pakistan where members of the Pakistani ISI and army directly and indirectly supported both the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban.<sup>19</sup>

The American government, under President George W. Bush, said it invaded Iraq because Saddam Hussein had a hand in 9/11 and had WMD that he might provide to *Al Qaeda*. That rationale was dubious because

there was no convincing proof that Iraq was complicit in 9/11 or that Iraq still had WMD. Furthermore, even if it did have WMD, Iraq was not an immediate threat to the USA since the USA was overflying the country with its air force and spy satellites, had UN inspectors on the ground in Iraq, and had a strong ally among the Iraqi Kurds, who ruled part of northern Iraq with limited autonomy. In addition, Saddam Hussein was one of those secular Muslims whom *Al Qaeda* was attacking and attempting to replace with religious leaders.

Many politicians and analysts have concluded that the US invasion of Iraq was the biggest mistake ever in American foreign policy.<sup>20</sup> History will judge that conclusion, but there is no question that the decision to deemphasize Afghanistan where *Al Qaeda* was and attack Iraq was controversial and divisive. It was further exacerbated by a lack of a long-range plan for Iraq once Saddam Hussein was toppled and by a lack of diplomatic skill in convincing Muslims that this was not a war against Islam and persuading the world community that it was not a war of hubris, hyper-power bullying, and hegemony over the oil supply.<sup>21</sup> The cost was enormous for the USA. In 2009, the USA agreed to leave Iraq entirely by 2011, which it did, after suffering, as of December 2011, 4487 dead and 32,226 wounded and expending over 900 billion dollars on Iraq in direct costs (as of 2011), not counting indirect costs (such as future Veterans Affairs, disability pensions, debt service, equipment depreciation and replacement costs, and the soaring price tag of homeland security to neutralize the Islamic backlash), which Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz put at over three trillion dollars.<sup>22</sup>

Since the rationale for the war was suspect, particularly after American forces found no WMD in Iraq following the invasion, speculation over the real motivation of the Bush Administration's attack on Iraq became a cottage industry. Some scholars argued that the Iraq War was an opportunity for Bush to prove that he was smarter than his father who failed to topple Saddam Hussein after the First Gulf War.<sup>23</sup> This pseudo-Freudian argument that had Bush going against Saddam Hussein because it would prove the son was better than the father lacked credibility. Certainly Bush wanted to distinguish himself from his father and he did reject the advice of his father's key advisers who counseled him against going to war in Iraq, but the removal of Saddam Hussein would neither prove that the son was smarter than his father nor that the son thought that it would show he was better than his father. The father, President George H. W. Bush, could have taken down Saddam Hussein, but chose not to do so because it would have led to a Pandora's box, which the USA avoided in 1991.

General Colin Powell had warned the father then, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the need to avoid the occupation of Iraq, and he had repeated that advice in 2003, when he was the son's secretary of state, telling George W. Bush that if he invaded Iraq, "It's going to suck the oxygen out of everything.... This will become the first term."<sup>24</sup> But circumstances had changed, particularly with the possibility of terrorists having access to WMD in the wake of 9/11, so Powell's advice had to be weighed against a new threat. It is too earlier to conclude that the Iraq war was an unadulterated error, but explaining it as a consequence of an inferiority complex, particularly without compelling evidence, was patently deficient. In addition, George W. Bush had nothing to prove. He had showed himself to be a solid governor of Texas and he had run an effective presidential campaign.

More convincing than the pseudo-Freudians were those analysts who agreed with the chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, Alan Greenspan, who believed the reason for the invasion of Iraq was to make money by controlling, even only temporarily, Iraqi oil.<sup>25</sup> The Americans were buying oil for \$20 a barrel before the invasion, and after the invasion, which disrupted supplies and disturbed what was called the oil patch, the price of oil predictably shot up, as high as \$145 a barrel on 11 July 2008. The large oil-related companies made obscene profits from the spike in the price of oil resulting from the war. Skyrocketing oil costs accompanied by two tax cuts that redounded to the benefit of high-income individuals sent the US economy into a deep recession in 2006–2010, which increased unemployment and drove down the price of labor—benefits which also accrued to big business and industry. In addition, the high price of oil and gas made it attractive for the oil and gas industry to drill for new wells in environmentally sensitive regions and to squeeze more product out of old oil and gas fields in the USA through an environmentally hurtful process called fracking that would have been difficult to pursue if there were not a "patriotic" demand to make the US energy independent of Iraqi oil, which was curious since the USA did not obtain its oil from Iraq. In short, the war in Iraq was a cornucopia for the oil and gas industry and their owners and investors, including presumably the Bush and Cheney families.<sup>26</sup> In the Watergate scandal, "deep throat" told the *Washington Post* reporters to follow the money. Doing so in the case of the Iraqi war makes the oil motive persuasive.

Ironically, some of the main beneficiaries of the rise in the price of oil and gas, aside from the oil and gas industry, were anti-American

individuals, groups, and regimes. Wealthy supporters of *Al Qaeda* in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states benefited massively. Iran also gained. The hike in oil's price enabled Iran to build up its strength, defy Western sanctions against building itself into a nuclear power, and become the most powerful regional player in the Middle East, with major leverage among Shiites in Iraq, who controlled the government there once the Americans toppled the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein; among Shiites in Lebanon where the Shiite Hezbollah movement was a power broker; and among the Sunni Hamas party in Palestine, which was vying for power with the more pro-Western PLO.

Russia was another winner. The increased cost of oil and then natural gas, which was in demand as an alternative fuel to oil, allowed Russia, which had become much more reasonable and less aggressive in the wake of the USSR's collapse, to resume a more forceful and anti-American policy, including using oil and gas to pressure its former satellites in East Europe, to strike tiny Georgia in August 2008 and Ukraine in spring 2014, to play both sides of the American–Iranian divide, and to try to split the USA–EU coalition on many issues from NATO to an alternative to the American dollar as the currency of choice for world trade and the pricing of oil. It also permitted Vladimir Putin and his viceroy, Dmitri Medvedev, to quiet domestic critics of their reassertion of authoritarian government, to undercut the rebellion in Chechnya, to improve relations with China, and to send a small flotilla in 2008 into the Caribbean to show support for the anti-American policies of Venezuela and Cuba.

The high price of oil also aided Hugo Chavez, the leader of Venezuela, to become much more blatantly anti-American and to finance anti-Americanism throughout Latin America and elsewhere around the globe. He supported Iran, Nicaragua, Serbia, Cuba, and Russia against American policies and interests. He also led strident attacks upon the USA in the meetings of the Organization of American States. After his death in 2013, the Venezuelan government continued the anti-American policy.

The final irony was that the great recession that hit the USA in 2006–2010 reduced America's financial ability to fight terrorism because it cut government revenues and it deeply tore at the fabric of American society. The recession hit the working class and middle class very hard and unemployment remained at near record levels into 2014.

Besides oil, there was another persuasive school of thought that sheds some light on Bush's motive for going to war with Iraq. It believed that the Iraq War was the result of the influence of a powerful group called the

Neo-Conservatives, who had taken over key portfolios and positions in the US government under President George W. Bush.<sup>27</sup> Their goal was to set up a democratic regime in the heart of the Muslim Arab world, which would then serve as catalyst for democratic change throughout the Middle East and create a geopolitical environment that was more favorable to Israel, which sat isolated in the Middle East as a democratic country surrounded by enemies on all sides who were demographically overwhelming it. The Neo-Conservatives, following the fall of the Soviet Empire, were convinced that everyone in the world was now on the same page and moving in the same direction—toward democratic capitalism, a message that Francis Fukuyama popularized in the 1990s with the publication of his book called *The End of History and the Last Man*.<sup>28</sup> Israel was the keystone in the Middle East, the Neo-Conservatives believed, and the USA had to protect it at all costs, but transforming Iraq into a democratic country would give Israel a potential ally and perhaps lead to a wholesale march toward democracy in other Muslim countries.

In retrospect, it does appear that Bush was influenced by the Neo-Conservatives to believe that it was his destiny to change the Middle East. Bush was a Christian who believed that freedom was a gift from God and that Saddam Hussein was blocking God's gift to the Iraqi people. Of course, that sort of argument could be made against any dictator and it was a recurrent theme in American foreign policy, but Bush did not invoke it against other dictators and generally tried to avoid nation-building elsewhere in the world. He seemed to have invoked it against Saddam Hussein because he was persuaded by the Neo-Conservatives and their allies that Saddam Hussein had had a hand in 9/11 and had WMD, and, perhaps more importantly, that an invasion would be almost cost-free and allow democracy to grow in Iraq.<sup>29</sup> In addition, removing Saddam Hussein had the bonus of enhancing Israeli security, an important goal of evangelical Christians who were an important constituency of Bush and who held that Israel's existence and well-being were prerequisites to the Second Coming of Christ. The Neo-Conservative arguments, in other words, blended with and reinforced Bush's own view of the world and interests, even though the Neo-Conservatives mainly did not share his religious faith or explanation for growing Westernization.<sup>30</sup> Of course, it did not hurt their argument that an invasion would lead to American control of Iraqi oil.

There was a compelling truth in the Neo-Conservative approach: the world had been moving toward Western values for centuries. However, in the Middle East, both the Neo-Conservative view and the growth of

Westernization were complicated by the fact that Israel, while a projection of Western culture, had a nearly insurmountable challenge of persuading Muslims in the Middle East to move along the path of Westernization. Many Muslims could not get beyond the very fact of Israel's existence, which forced Israel to defend itself and adopt policies of exclusion and expansion rather than of inclusion and partnership. A more appropriate model for democratizing the Middle East might have been Turkey altered by EU-mandated membership criteria.<sup>31</sup> In addition, the Neo-Conservatives limited USA's options in the Middle East, thus ironically making the USA less able to protect Israel and infecting some Israeli leaders with a certain hubris and confrontational arrogance vis-à-vis its Muslim neighbors because it had the USA in its corner.<sup>32</sup> To make matters worse, the Neo-Conservatives did not seem to realize that toppling the Iraqi regime would redound to Iran's advantage and Israel's disadvantage. Not surprisingly, geopolitical realities hardly affected the thinking of Bush's evangelical Christian supporters, who used a highly skewed and creative interpretation of the Bible for their geopolitical insights.<sup>33</sup>

The American invasion of Iraq, like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, was a godsend to Islamic extremists. They now reiterated their call for *jihad* against the USA, because of what they described as an unwarranted invasion and violence against a Muslim people, and they had in Iraq a venue that jihadists could easily access to fight against the American military occupation.<sup>34</sup> Moderate, pro-Western Sunni regimes could not assist the Americans. It would not only appear as if they were supporting the West against Islam, but also the American effort to take down the secular Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein seemed particularly fraught with danger—they were also secular Sunni regimes and the collapse of the military forces of Iraq would redound only to the advantage of religious extremists in Shiite Iran and their Shiite allies in the Middle East, some of whom were formidable opposition blocs in their own countries.

In addition, the American effort in Iraq was seen as a boon to Israel, and there was no balancing diplomacy or effort by the Americans to help the Palestinian people in their conflict with Israel. The Americans also could not count upon the coalition that had helped them and paid for the first Iraqi war in 1991. Many leaders across the globe thought the war was unjustified and foolhardy. The Bush Administration strained to make it appear as if there were a large coalition, but most of the troops were American forces. Some countries that hoped to curry favor with the USA, like Albania, Moldova, and Georgia, sent token forces. Other countries,

like Lithuania and Poland, who wanted to impress the USA and thank the Americans for their help against the Russians during the Cold War, also sent token forces. Turkey, a NATO member and close US ally, demurred from assisting the USA. Germany and France also took a pass. Spain and Italy sent minimum support. Great Britain sent a large contingent of 5500 troops, but it was in the face of popular opposition and it earned Prime Minister Tony Blair scorn and eventually cost him his job.

The USA compounded its rather isolated position in Iraq by failing to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim people, build bridges to religious leaders, engage the Iranians, and comprehend and exploit the differences between moderate and extremist Muslims. It also neglected to cooperate with reform-minded Muslim leaders to curb the anti-modernizing tendencies of Islam, expand human rights and educational opportunities in the Middle East, increase employment, and moderate authoritarianism. As a result, many moderate Muslims in Arab societies were frustrated. There was little growth, freedom, and opportunity, and some of them turned increasingly to Islamist fundamentalism.

For *Al Qaeda* and Muslim extremists the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan and the confusion and factionalism it caused between the USA and its allies opened up additional opportunities to advance the agenda of Islamic extremism. The extremists organized a campaign of violence around the world to try and intimidate governments to keep them from closing ranks with the USA and to send a message that a new order was at hand and that any government, particularly in Muslim countries, which cooperated with the West was a target. On 22 December 2001, Richard Reid, an *Al Qaeda* operative, tried to explode a bomb on an American Airlines jet over the Atlantic Ocean. In the summer of 2002, the Indonesian affiliate of *Al Qaeda*, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, bombed nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 people and injuring 209, mainly Westerners. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, *Al Qaeda* organized “*Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia*” and aligned itself with Sunni insurgents who opposed the new regime that the Americans had installed in Bagdad. A campaign of violent and effective bombings and attacks pushed the USA into a defensive position, which by 2007 was making the Iraqi occupation look increasingly like a disaster. On 11 March 2004, Muslim terrorists bombed trains in Madrid and took the lives of 191 Spaniards. They also bombed busses in London on 7 July 2005 and took seven lives. In 2007, they exploded a car bomb at Glasgow Airport that disrupted air service across Great Britain. In the Philippines, *Abu Sayyaf*, an ally of *Al Qaeda*, engaged and continues to engage in a

campaign of bombings, kidnappings, and guerilla warfare. In November 2008, *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (army of believers), a Muslim extremist group with ties to the Pakistani ISI, organized a shooting and bombing rampage in Mumbai, India, killing 173 and wounding 308 people. The issue between India and Pakistan was primarily Kashmir, but the continuing ambivalence of Pakistan toward Muslim extremists, whom the ISI wanted and wants to use to pressure India, was helpful to *Al Qaeda* and its allies. The Islamic terrorists put strong roots down in the Pakistan–Afghan border region and established footholds and sources of funding in almost every Muslim society. They also utilized the technology of globalization to push their message and win support.<sup>35</sup> In the revolutions for freedom, representative government, and human rights that roiled the Arab Middle East in 2011–2015, Muslim extremists attempted to find a toehold and they established a base in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and temporarily in Mali, from which the French army routed them in 2012. They also sought with some success to recruit followers among the growing population of Muslims in Western Europe. In 2014, a particularly virulent strain of fundamentalism called Daesh or the ISIS appeared. It was more bloodthirsty and fundamentalist than *Al Qaeda*. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, planned to erect an Islamic state on the bones of Shiites, moderate Sunnis, Christians, and anyone else who did not accept his view of Islam, much like Stalin had decided to build the Communist state by murdering millions and millions of Orthodox, Western Christian, and Islamic believers, and anyone else, including fellow Communists, who dissented from his worldview.

The Islamic fundamentalists have found financial supporters throughout the Islamic world from wealthy Muslims who view donations as fulfilling their duty to give alms and to support *jihad*.<sup>36</sup> They also draw backing in recent times from pro-Western and secular Muslims who blamed Western colonial policies for widespread poverty and unemployment in the Muslim world, resented the subservient position into which the Western model of development placed Muslims, and disliked Western hypocrisy that touted representative government, but prevented democratic governments from emerging in the Middle East and preferred to work mainly with unrepresentative and corrupt Arab elites to exploit the region.<sup>37</sup> These Muslims were truly shortsighted and provided evidence for Samuel Huntington’s opinion that “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the

inferiority of their power.”<sup>38</sup> Huntington’s view is hyperbolic, but it is time for responsible Muslim leaders to denounce and take action against the extremists. Ironically, funding was also coming from European governments that paid Islamic radicals huge ransoms to free their kidnapped citizens.<sup>39</sup>

Conflicts, too, waged across Africa and Asia wherever Christian and Islamic communities touched. Often these brutal engagements were influenced by political and economic interests, but religious differences were manipulated and stoked by extremists to stir violence and war.<sup>40</sup>

Despite the success and enthusiasm of *Al Qaeda* and Islamic extremists for *jihad* and terrorism around the globe, the tide began to turn against them by 2007–2008. Slowly but surely, governments around the world improved their anti-terrorism security and began to tamp down the terrorist attacks. Moderate Muslim regimes started to take firm action against the terrorists in their midst and to curb the extremists’ ability to recruit. Importantly, the USA changed its strategy in Iraq, forged a tie with Sunni forces to end the insurgency, and then with the Sunnis as allies pummeled *Al Qaeda* forces in Iraq. The Americans were also able to reduce Sunni outrage over the removal of Saddam Hussein and obtain Sunni agreement to accept a new Iraqi government where the Shiite majority would have a dominant voice but which also promised to be solicitous to Sunni and Kurdish interests.<sup>41</sup> By 2012 the USA, now under the leadership of President Barak Obama, had removed its combat troops from Iraq, and the Iraqis were left to sort out their future, which not surprisingly included a hefty measure of anti-Americanism. The Americans were willing to stay in Iraq and support the Shiite government of Nouri al-Maliki, but the Shiites refused the American offer. In fact, they wanted nothing to do with the USA, and al-Maliki instituted a regime that favored Shiites and cut out the Sunnis who soon became totally disillusioned with Shiite rule.

As the US position in Iraq improved, *Al Qaeda* and the Taliban enlarged their bases in the mountainous northwest provinces of Pakistan, from which they menaced the UN forces left to control Afghanistan and undermined the caretaker government of Hamid Karzai, the leader whom the Americans had favored following their invasion and toppling of the Taliban. In November 2007, they also began to expand their position in Pakistan, moving from the northwest region into the Waf Valley, only three hours by car from the capital city of Islamabad. This advance was partially caused by the effectiveness of the US use of drone predators to attack *Al Qaeda* and Taliban forces in their mountainous hideouts in

northwest Pakistan and also by the opportunity to piggyback on organized demonstrations against General Pervez Musharraf. The demonstrations were precipitated by Musharraf's political opponents who declared that his declaration of emergency rule in November 2007 was to prevent elections and keep himself in power rather than to corral the danger of terrorism, which he claimed was his motivation. Tragically, when emergency rule was lifted and elections prescribed, the extremists assassinated in December 2007 Benazir Bhutto, the one candidate who many had hoped would be able to initiate some measure of reconciliation between the West and alienated Muslims in Pakistan. Musharraf himself resigned in 2008 and Bhutto's husband was elected president. The Taliban and *Al Qaeda* in the meantime expanded in 2009 into Swat, only 90 minutes by car from the capital of Islamabad. The Pakistan military pushed back and has held the extremists in check, but it did not want to annihilate them because they were useful to keep Afghanistan destabilized and to put pressure on India.<sup>42</sup> On 16 December 2014, the Taliban murdered 132 schoolchildren at the Army Public School in Peshawar, and the army retaliated and then turned the Taliban's attention back to destabilizing Afghanistan where Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai replaced Karzai in September 2014.

With the advent of the Obama administration, a new policy of engagement with the world of Islam was enacted. So far this overture has been problematical, but it continued, and the effort itself was encouraging.<sup>43</sup> The Obama administration increased in 2009–2010 the number of American troops in Afghanistan, to stress again the campaign against *Al Qaeda* that was deemphasized in 2003. However, the rationale for the policy was undercut by *Al Qaeda*'s movement into Pakistan and elsewhere around the globe. Afghanistan has returned to its condition of division among warlords and geopolitical maneuvering between Pakistan, India, and China, and the Obama administration's decision to try nation-building there in 2009—the so-called policy of counterinsurgency—was unsustainable by 2011. On 1 May 2011 in a daring, surgical strike, a team of American SEALS found and executed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, some 30 miles from the capital of Islamabad.<sup>44</sup> That event opened the door for the Obama Administration to announce that the Afghan war was no longer in America's best interest. In June, President Obama announced that the USA had largely achieved its goals in Afghanistan and ordered an accelerated pullout of American troops from the Afghan war. However, the plan of withdrawal was reversed in 2015 when the Afghan government asked for continued assistance because Pakistan had increased its support

of the Afghan Taliban and gave it safe havens in Pakistan from where it launched growing attacks against Afghanistan.<sup>45</sup> The USA also sent over 3500 military advisors in Iraq to battle a growing Sunni insurgency affiliated with Daesh. The American effort in Afghanistan and Iraq was at a huge cost to the Afghan, Iraqi, and American people, and only history will be able to determine if it was worth the cost.

## NOTES

1. In a thorough study of Islamic publications and Internet sites, Feldman (2008); also see Lawrence (2000).
2. Most Islamists or advocates of political Islam are fundamentalists, i.e. they base their platform on the ancient texts of Islam, but not all Islamists are fundamentalists and not all fundamentalist are Islamists. See Cook (2014), pp. xviii–xix.
3. Warwick (2015).
4. Lewis (1993), pp. 120–21.
5. Yergin (2008), pp. 272–74.
6. Lewis (1993), pp. 121–30. The bin Laden family was covered in Coll (2008). The Halliburton analogy came from Coll.
7. Yergin (2008), p. 268.
8. Küntzel (2007). Küntzel documented an expedient lifting of Nazi anti-Semitic tracts, but Karen Armstrong stressed that anti-Semitism was foreign to Muslims until 1948. See Armstrong (2002), p. 21.
9. Gall (2014).
10. Baer (2004), Clinton (2009).
11. On the CIA's handling of *Al Qaeda* and its growth, see Coll (2001). Bin Laden greeted US support of *jihad* in Afghanistan with approval. See Coll, *The Bin Ladens*, 292. The role of the CIA was also documented, in part, in Crile (2001).
12. The best information on Osama bin Laden is found in Coll (2008) and Bergen (2011). *Al Qaeda*'s first stirrings were in 1988. See Coll (2008), pp. 336–38. Also see Bergen (2006) and Bergen (2001).
13. The 9/11 Commission that investigated the financing of the 9/11 attack concluded that *Al Qaeda* obtained most of its money from Islamic charities in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia as part of the Islamic obligation to give alms to the needy, the *zakat*, and from the old money transferring system in Asia called *hawala*. See National Commission (2004).

14. For Islamist extremists, the American constitution that created a wall between church and state was anathema. In an open letter to Americans, purportedly written by Osama bin Laden and published in November 2002 (bin Laden 2002), the charge against the USA and the motivation for 9/11 and the terrorist war were outlined and the worst sin of the Americans was that “You are the nation who, rather than ruling by Shariah of Allah in its Constitution and Laws, choose to invent your own laws as you will and desire. You separate religion from your policies, contradicting the pure nature which affirms Absolute Authority to the Lord and your Creator.” Also see Lewis (2003), p. 159. On Pakistan’s support of *Al Qaeda*, see Haqqani (2013) and Gall (2014).
15. The information on Osama bin Laden is found in Coll (2008).
16. Karsh (2006), pp. 226–227.
17. The best book on modern Iran is Takeyh (2009).
18. The best book on 9/11 remains Wright (2006).
19. See West (2011), Gall (2014), pp. 37–38, 54–55, 76, 299–300.
20. See, for example, Rothkopf (2014), Hagel with Kaminsky (2008), Rich (2007), Ricks (2007), pp. 430–31, 442–43.
21. Chandrasekaran (2007).
22. Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008).
23. Weisberg (2008), p. 185.
24. Bob Woodward reported this quote. See Ricks (2007), p. 48.
25. Greenspan (2007), p. 463.
26. Ironically, fracking increased the global supply of oil, which led to a price and profit cut in 2015. The Saudis and, thus, OPEC planned no decrease in production in 2016 in order to drive American shale producers out of the market and to protect market share.
27. For information on the Neo-Conservatives, see Heilbrunn (2007), and Halper and Clarke (2005).
28. Fukuyama (2006).
29. Draper (2007), pp. 188–9. On Bush’s Christianity, see Mansfield (2003), Carnes (2000); on Bush’s acceptance of the Neo-Conservative positions, see Woodward (2002, 2004, 2006).
30. Bush informed French president Jacques Chirac that biblical prophecies were unfolding in the Middle East. See Eichenwald (2012).

31. Some said Lebanon was the model, but it was problematical. See Mackey (2008).
32. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) argued that the Israeli lobby dominated US foreign policy to the detriment of America's interests.
33. The Neo-Conservatives did not agree with the evangelicals' prediction of Israel's future—the Jews would be converted or annihilated as the Second Coming approached—but they liked the ardor of the “Christian Zionists” in helping to bring American power to bear in support of Israel. See Heilbrunn (2007), pp. 138–9. The Christian Zionists “find” evidence in the Israeli–Arab conflicts that the last days of judgment are imminent. Paradoxically, the Christian evangelicals have little use for or interest in Arab Christians.
34. Elliott (2007), pp. 72–81, 96, 98, 100.
35. Kelsay (2007), Harris (2007), Rashid (2008), Bobbit (2008).
36. *New York Times*, 8 September 2014. Qatar, in particular, was linked to funding Islamists; Gall (2014), pp. 299–300.
37. Lewis (2002), pp. 152–59. Scholars have offered various explanations for what is perceived as the backwardness of present day Islamic Civilization vis-à-vis the West. On Islam and its culture as the chief reason, see Landes (1998); on social custom and religious rules, see Kur'an (2010); on bad government, lack of investment, imperialist policies, and similar explanations, see Findlay and O'Rourke (2007), and Mansfield (2004).
38. Huntington (1996), p. 217.
39. *New York Times*, 30 July 2014.
40. Griswold (2010).
41. On the American gift to Iraq, see Ajami (2007).
42. Constable (2011) and Gall (2014). Islam is not the problem for Pakistan. Rather, it appears to be consistently poor leadership and Saudi support of Islamic extremist elements.
43. For background and early assessments, see Esposito (2010), Cole (2009), and Kull (2011).
44. On bin Laden, see Bowden (2012), Bergen (2012), Mahler (2015), pp. 42–7, 56–8.
45. See Haqqani (2013), Gall (2014), pp. 299–300; Zakaria (2014).

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## CHAPTER 8

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### The Struggle: Current Scene

*[Prince Vladimir's] spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.*

*Vladimir Putin, 18 March 2014*

*Do jihad in the cause of God, incite the believers and be patient in the face of this hardship.*

*Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Daesh, New York Times, 5 July 2014*

At the advent of the 16th year of the twenty-first century, it appears that Western values continue to be the basis for global cooperation and interdependency. Most of the world's peoples have adopted or are showing interest in some Western values. However, outliers in Russia and some Islamic societies and groups continue to reject Western values and promote antiquated variations of Orthodox and Islamic values, which add an additional layer of conflict and tension to global affairs and destabilize international cooperation and unity.

#### ORTHODOX CIVILIZATION

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new Russian republic emerged under President Boris Yeltsin and a group of oligarchs who purloined huge parts of the Russian economy. Yeltsin sought to take steps toward building a democracy, but he proved ineffective. The challenges were gargantuan

and included massive corruption, disregard for the rule of law, a tradition of coercion and central planning, an inefficient agricultural sector, disruption of trade patterns, an outmoded industrial sector, a decline in the standard of living, psychological confusion and ambivalence associated with the implosion of the Soviet Union, violent struggles for power and resources, reduction in global influence, fear of foreign encroachment in the Russian homeland and sphere of influence, and an inability to reconcile the national aspirations of minorities who were unable to set up their own states following the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 with the interests of Russian nationalists. Then there was the problem of Yeltsin's alcoholism, which made consistent, determined, and patient leadership problematical. Perhaps, though, the major challenge was to decide upon which road to take going forward—to pick up where Russia was going on the eve of World War I and blend Orthodox and Western values, produce a free society that could tap the talents of the Russian people, and become part of a dynamic global order, or to resurrect the old, discredited police state model that had prevailed under the tsars before 1905 and pursue a contradictory and divisive policy of struggling against the West while simultaneously copying the West.

In the end Yeltsin and the oligarchs decided that Russia, which was still the largest and one of the wealthiest states in the world, needed a strong and enlightened hand to get it through the confusion of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1998, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin prime minister and then acting president in 1999 when Yeltsin resigned. Putin had been head of the Federal Security Service, the new name of Russia's secret police. Putin took power, was elected president in a hastily called election, and provided the strong hand, but little enlightenment. He announced that Russia was at a crossroads, which it was, but he was no fan of choice. He was a policeman, a law and order man cut from the same cloth as Tsar Nicholas I.

Putin's goal was to resurrect the old model of the Orthodox police state, something like the Russian Empire of Nicholas I where the guide-words were Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Russian Nationalism. He quickly and unceremoniously carved the heart out of the few democratic institutions that had sprouted up in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. Putin largely wiped out the free press and media; made governors appointees of the Kremlin rather than elected officials; invested in the military, police, and espionage agencies; gathered about him an oligarchy of political and economic henchmen who supplemented the Yeltsin team; fanned a form of hysterical and crude nationalism that claimed Russia was under

siege by foreigners and perverts; and orchestrated campaigns of repression and intimidation against anyone who objected to the new authoritarianism—non-Russian nationalities like the Chechens, liberals, non-Orthodox believers, and reform-minded intellectuals.

Putin also made a farce of Russia's federal elections. When the constitution prevented him from running as president again in 2006, he had Dmitri Medvedev, who was his protégé, serve as president from 2006 to 2012 and appoint him prime minister, and then in 2012 he ran for president and was reelected to a six-year term. Furthermore, he announced that the constitution might be changed to allow him to run again in 2018. His political party called United Russia dominated the duma, where his decisions were rubberstamped. He retained Potemkin-like elections and institutions to make it appear as if his power were limited. He has also erected a personality cult that has portrayed him as a strong man, a benevolent tsar who listens to the people and has their interest at heart, but who will protect them from foreigners, invaders, heretics, and agents provocateurs.<sup>1</sup>

Putin, moreover, established the old caesaropapist relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Church quickly endorsed the new direction. Under Yeltsin the Church seemed to be heading in the direction of a Western model where it would be independent of the state. After decades of persecution, it emerged as a vigorous institution and tried to rebuild itself and civil society.<sup>2</sup> It had the respect of the Russian people and far more credibility than the media, army, police, and government.<sup>3</sup> It attempted to redefine its relationship with the state and to free itself from state interference, which would go a long way toward moving Russia in the direction of a Western model. It also studied closely the ideas of religious freedom and the nature of human rights and showed a marked interest in reaching out to Orthodox diasporas, particularly in Syria.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, it showed an interest in a program of renewal and reform of an amazing group of Russian Orthodox intellectuals, who mainly took up residence in Paris after the Communist coup d'état in 1917, and included such brilliant thinkers as Nikolai Berdyaev, George Florovsky, Sergius Bulgakov, George Fedotov, and Simeon Frank. In 1998 their journal called *The Way* was made available for the first time on CD-ROM in Russia.<sup>5</sup> The Church was also interested in the reforms and liberal agenda of the Moscow Council of 1917, which was held after Tsar Nicholas abdicated and before the Communists took power.<sup>6</sup>

However, under Vladimir Putin and new Patriarch Kirill I, who assumed office in 2008, the Russian Orthodox Church backtracked and pushed policies of political repression, autocracy, and an aggressive for-

eign policy against Ukraine and Georgia. It now operates, much like it did under the tsars, as a department of the state, and it is particularly anti-Western and divisive in Ukraine where it controls a large number of churches, openly supports Russian aggression against Ukraine, and shows disdain for Ukraine's five million Uniate Catholics, one million Latin Catholics, and those Ukrainian Orthodox believers who refuse to acknowledge the Moscow patriarchate's jurisdiction.<sup>7</sup> It was a sign of strain, rather than of hope, when Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis met briefly on 12 February 2016 at the airport in Havana, Cuba, and jointly urged the world to embrace traditional morality. It was the first meeting ever between a Russian patriarch and a pope. Putin arranged the event to attempt to burnish Russia's public image, but it was telling that the meeting took place neither in Moscow nor in Rome and that Patriarch Kirill was not an independent agent (Fig. 8.1).<sup>8</sup>

In foreign policy, Putin renewed the struggle with the West and determined to contest the growing Westernization of the world. He made Russia more strident, assertive, nationalistic, and aggressive. He aimed to split



Fig. 8.1 Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis in Havana, Cuba, 12 February 2016

Europe from the USA and to make Russia the decisive arbiter of events in Europe and across Eurasia. His foreign policy showed consistency, caution, duplicity, hypocrisy, splitting tactics to divide opponents, and a propensity to take the initiative to change the status quo. In 2008, he used force to detach Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and in March 2014, in a brazen move and in defiance of the Budapest Memorandum that committed Russia to respecting Ukraine's territorial sovereignty in return for Ukraine giving up its nuclear stockpile that it had as a result of the USSR's implosion, he took the Crimea from Ukraine and orchestrated a campaign to destabilize Ukraine by placing Russian troops on its borders and sending armed rebels and Russian nationalists into Ukraine, particularly in the Donetsk–Luhansk border region. Russian military advisors were also sent in to help Russian separatist rebels and on 17 July the separatists, with Russian help, shot down a Malaysian passenger jet with a loss of 295 lives, which disturbed the West but failed to generate a policy to restrain Putin.<sup>9</sup> Putin justified his attack on Ukraine by claiming that Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia are one people who are united in the Orthodox faith and cannot be separated by the West. The terror-famine in Ukraine in 1932–1933 was dismissed as a shared nightmare. He also threatened Moldova, the Baltic States, and Poland.<sup>10</sup> On 29 July 2014, the USA charged that Russia violated the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or I.N.F. Treaty, of 1987, which is the backbone of American–Russian arms control effort that helped end the Cold War, by testing ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles capable of flying 300–3400 miles. The Russian missile testing was an immediate threat to all of Europe.<sup>11</sup> In September 2015, Putin sent military advisors and bombers to Syria to attack any and every opponent of the Assad regime, which included not only Daesh, but also pro-Western Muslims, which led Turkey to shoot down a Russian bomber that crossed the Syrian–Turkish border in November 2015. He continued the same policy in 2016 (Fig. 8.2).

In short, Putin pursued many policies that smacked of a revived, outdated version of Orthodox values, including autocracy underpinned by a coterie of obliging political and business oligarchs, caesaropapism, a state-controlled economy, law as a reflection of the ruler's will, cities and towns dependent on the center, communitarianism, a lack of a free press, increased xenophobia, a reliance upon force rather than reason and diplomacy, and a certain sense of exceptionalism and entitlement about Russia's place in the world and its sphere of influence. He has promoted a type of messianism, reminiscent of Orthodoxy's Third Romanism, which



Fig. 8.2 Protest at UN against Putin, Assad, ISIS, and Hezbollah, 18 December 2015

had Russia as a God-chosen savior and unifier of the world and the West as its mortal enemy.<sup>12</sup> Putin and his cronies played the card of Russian nationalism and xenophobia and turned Russia onto a dark path that seeks to revive some form of empire, what some have termed Putinism.<sup>13</sup>

In contrast to Russia, other Orthodox countries have embraced Western values. Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Romania are part of the EU. Orthodox Serbia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine would like to belong, and Montenegro was interested in NATO membership in 2016. There is genuine interest across the Orthodox world in the religio-political values of the West. The major block to an expansion of these values is Russia. One way forward might be for the USA and Russia to work toward a plan to include Russia in NATO, to focus on mutually beneficial confidence-building measures that would address Russia's desire for security and respect, but also would pay heed to neighbors who feel threatened by Russian chauvinism and aggression, and to work as a tandem with moderate Islamic governments to contain the threat of global Islamic terrorism. Another helpful approach might be some kind of religious partnership, which could reduce suspicion and xenophobia.

Christopher Dawson, the eminent British historian, thought at one time that the institution of monasticism, which Orthodoxy and Catholicism still share, would be a basis for the reunification of these Christian Churches.<sup>14</sup> Ultimately, change will have to come from within, from Russians who have a broad historical perspective and realize that Russia can reach its potential through values that give opportunity and freedom to the Russian people. Putin wants a world where his version of the Orthodox value system is the basis for global unity, but he lacks the imagination and intelligence to realize that Russians, unleashed from the state, can transform Russia and the world. Russia is a country of immense talent, but its authoritarian government prevents its citizens from developing that talent, which, in turn, keeps Russia in a semi-colonial relationship with the developed world where it supplies raw materials (largely oil and gas) and remains in a subordinate position, which it resents and rejects—a perfect formula for irrational behavior and continuing tension.

Alas, there is the fact that Putin's aggression must be stopped and that that might only be achieved by a deliberate and comprehensive Western policy, led by the USA and Germany, that weakened the Russian economy through sectoral sanctions, provided military and economic assistance to states directly threatened by Russian aggression, including placing NATO troops in the Baltic States and Poland and engaging China to pressure Putin, and obtained Russian compliance with the I.N.F. Treaty.<sup>15</sup>

## ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION

Islamic society is complex and Islam as a religion is in transition. Islam today constitutes 1.7 billion believers, 23 per cent of the world's population, and its numbers are increasing. Most Muslims show an earnest interest in freedom, human rights, and democracy, and they want an education, prosperity, peace, and an opportunity to develop their talents. Malala Yousafzai, the 15-year-old Pakistan girl who wants "every girl to go to school" and who was the co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2014, represents that dream.<sup>16</sup> She also symbolizes the struggle in Islamic culture between the vast majority who want modernization and a vehement and violent minority who have tried to block progress in the name of a hijacked version of Islam. On 9 October 2012, Malala was shot in the head on her way to school in Swat valley by a Taliban gunman. She survived, addressed the UN on 12 July 2013, and now is an advocate globally for the right of girls and women to obtain an education. She is a

beautiful example of the fruit of the synthesis of Islamic, Orthodox, and Western Christian values. The birth of a single global civilization, reflecting the rich cultures of world's peoples but largely based upon Western values, seems amenable to most Muslims, but they rightfully demand that their culture and religion be treated with respect.

The world of Islam's reaction to Westernization is quite varied and reflects at least five different strains. Iran represents one response. It is officially anti-Western, anti-American, and anti-Semitic. It is a source of great tension and instability in the world today. Its goals include an Islamic global caliphate under Shiite control, so Sunni regimes are targeted; the annihilation of the state of Israel, so the Israelis are implacable enemies; and the growth of a traditional Islamic society based upon the *Koran* and *Sharia*, so all non-Islamic societies are condemned. It has some shibboleths of Western institutions in that elections are held and a government façade exists separate from the conservative clerics, but the reins of power are in the hands of the ayatollah. The regime is anxious to obtain and use modern Western technology and science, particularly related to military weapons, to keep the West at arm's length, to imperil Israel, to lead the Middle East, and to keep their own citizens at bay. It states that it wants to unite Muslims, and has formidable allies in Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq, yet it leads a minority faith that is deprecated by majority Sunnis and is targeted by such Sunni extremists as the Taliban, Deash, and *Al Qaeda*, and is competing with Saudi Arabia for supremacy in the Persian Gulf region. It proclaims that it wants peace, yet it preaches militant *jihad* against Israel and the USA and is maneuvering to obtain nuclear weapons.

Iran, though, suffers from ambivalence between its professed faith and reality. It is anti-Western, yet it borrows technology from the West and sells its oil to the West and other non-Islamic states. It claims to represent the future, yet its youthful citizenry appears tired of the religious police and the regime's repressive political and incompetent economic policies and today is in open opposition to the theocratic government. There are significant elements in the population who want to change the clerical order and to engage in reform. It is an ancient culture with a very talented population, which is largely stymied by the religious authorities.

Iran seems to be on the precipice of change. It signaled in 2013 that it wanted dialogue with the West. It was undoubtedly motivated by the crushing economic sanctions that the West imposed on Iran, by the growing instability in Syria and Iraq where its Shiite allies were in a deadly fight with Sunni groups, and by Iranians who wanted to join the modern world.

In late 2013, multinational discussions commenced to resolve the issues of Iran's nuclear power ambitions and the sanctions. In September 2015, President Obama's decision to phase out sanctions in return for a 15-year delay in Iran's nuclear program was not blocked in Congress and put the USA and Iran on the road to a new and perhaps transforming relationship.<sup>17</sup> On 16 January 2016, the USA and the EU lifted the sanctions on Iran and released its frozen assets totaling over \$100 billion (Fig. 8.3).

A second element in the Islamic mosaic is what we can call moderate Muslims in Muslim-majority states. The moderates constitute by far the vast majority of Muslims in the world. They are not extremists and they want to engage in modernity without having their faith pilloried. The largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia, is relatively pro-Western. Similarly, Malaysia and Bangladesh, largely Muslim states, are open to the West. These countries have inchoate democratic orders and value education and mutually rewarding investments and arrangements.<sup>18</sup>

The moderate Muslims are looking for respect and opportunities. They are proud of their faith and react to any perceived insult or any attempt



**Fig. 8.3** Iran's President Hassan Rouhani and Pope Francis at the Vatican, 26 January 2016

to brand them as terrorists.<sup>19</sup> Occasionally, this understandable defensive attitude plays into the propagandistic aims of the extremists, but the vast majority of Muslims reject and oppose the terrorists who use Islam to legitimize their war against modernization and for power. They genuinely want peace, prosperity, and respect. On two separate, recent occasions Muslim leaders reached out to the West for dialogue. A month after Pope Benedict XVI's speech at the University of Regensburg in 2005 in which he quoted a Byzantine emperor about Islam's penchant for violence, Muslims addressed an open letter to the pope in which they gave a balanced critique of his speech on reason—the core of his Regensburg address—and, importantly, criticized Islamic extremists. In 2007, a larger group of Muslim scholars from around the world published a long statement called "A Common Word Between Us and You" and addressed to all Christian religious leaders. It asked for cooperation on the basis of shared teachings, particularly monotheism and love of the one and only God.<sup>20</sup> On 12 July 2013, Malala in her address to the UN declared that Muhammad, Jesus Christ, Buddha, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Gandhi Jee, Bacha Khan, Mother Teresa, and her mother and father taught her to embrace compassion, education, change, non-violence, forgiveness, peace, and love. On 30 November 2015, Pope Francis reached out to Muslims and declared on a visit to Central Africa Republic, "Christians and Muslims are brothers and sisters."<sup>21</sup> In a real sense, Pope Francis and Malala symbolize the new age of global civilization and the possibility of close cooperation among the world's diverse cultures and peoples (Fig. 8.4).

A third aspect of Islamic reaction to Westernization is found among Muslims living in Western societies. Some of these Muslims have seemingly accepted separation of church and state, limited and representative government, and a range of human rights. Nonetheless, there is some chafing between the two cultures in Europe, and it is attributable not only to high poverty and unemployment among the Muslims, but also to values. Some young Muslims, particularly in France, reject Western secularism, women's rights, human rights as defined in Western constitutions, parliamentary government, and Western law. They are attracted to Islamic fundamentalism, anti-Semitism, *Sharia* law, and *jihad*. On 7–8 January 2015, three Muslim extremists in a coordinated attack murdered 17 people in and around Paris, including targets at the offices of *Charlie Hebdo*, the French magazine that satirized radicals who commit heinous crimes in the name of Islam, and at a kosher supermarket.<sup>22</sup> On 13 November 2015, another Muslim



Fig. 8.4 Nobel-Peace Prize Co-winner Malala Yousafzai, United Nations, 25 September 2015

group affiliated with Daesh murdered more than 120 innocent civilians and wounded hundreds others in downtown Paris. Disturbing to many French, thousands of French Muslims have enlisted for *jihad* in Syria and Iraq. In addition, the Muslim population is growing as a result of higher reproduction rates and immigration laws that allow Muslims to bring in extended families from Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and other former French colonies in Africa, and the numbers work against assimilation. Some observers see a massive problem in the offing.<sup>23</sup> Great Britain also has a growing issue as Muslim numbers increase and some Muslim leaders demand that Islamic beliefs and law be taught in public schools and communities where Muslims are a majority.<sup>24</sup> Nonetheless, the Muslims are in the West because it is better than their own society, and Muslim and Western leaders are trying to work on solutions. The West, particularly Germany and some other member of the EU, accepted by early 2016 hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring out of war-torn Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Turkey represents yet another response of Muslims to Westernization. Under Atatürk and his successors, the Turks built a Western-style state founded on Turkish nationalism and carefully avoided involvement

in World War II until the very end when they came in against the Axis Powers. After the war, they joined the USA in alliance and have increasingly moved toward a society based upon Western values à la the American model while simultaneously trying to balance those values with Islam. For most educated Turks there is no conflict between Islam, democracy, and human rights. In fact, Turkish historiography now views Turkey as part of the West and takes credit for modern Western societies.<sup>25</sup>

Today, the determination to pursue Westernization remains undiluted in Turkey. Even though Turkey elected an openly Islamic government in 2007, the government and the Turkish elite are committed to joining the EU. For them, there is no conflict between Islam and European values. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a staunch Muslim, has declared that the only way forward for Turkey is full membership in the EU.<sup>26</sup> He and many other Muslims know that there is work to be done on ironing out some aspects of the Islamic–Western embrace, and toward that end, the Ankara School of Theology initiated a reform of Islam that holds out the hope of showing clearly and authoritatively that there is compatibility between Islamic and many Western religio-political values.<sup>27</sup> In addition, Turkey and other modern Islamic countries have been attempting to develop a new model where there is separation of mosque and state and where the government, while being based upon Islamic principles and on *Sharia* law and the *Koran*, is also secular. So far there has been no doctrinal basis for these experiments, but that is not to say that it cannot happen.<sup>28</sup> The Turkish Religious Affairs Directorate or Diyanet, for example, published in May 2013 a seven-volume encyclopedia that offers modern interpretations of some parts of the *Hadith*, which, in turn, can offer insight into the application of the *Koran*'s enduring truths for modern times. While this work and the efforts of the Ankara School of Theology do not articulate a canonical basis for secular government, it does show that such a position is possible. Ibrahim Negm, a key advisor to the Grand Mufti, who is the highest Sunni legal authority in Egypt, praised the Turkish work and said that Turkey stands as “the antithesis of the Wahhabi-Salafi model.”<sup>29</sup> Indeed, the Turks have been working to help the Middle East develop along a path of shared Islamic and Western values, and their effort and experience hold out the hope of not only transforming the Middle East, but also of drying up support for Islamic extremism. However, they have shown ambivalence toward Daesh because they view it as a check on both Kurdish empowerment and the Shiite-aligned regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.<sup>30</sup>

Yet another response to Western values occurred in the Arab world, which is submerged in a crisis. In 2011–2013, Western values helped spark revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria that fall under the broad heading of what has been called optimistically the “Arab Spring.”<sup>31</sup> While it appears as if some Western values are taking hold in Tunisia, the so-called “Arab Spring” has led to violence, civil war, tribal divisions, and sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. In Syria an uprising, which started in 2011 against the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, descended into a full-blown civil war with extremist Muslims of all types involved and with Iran and its Hezbollah ally from Lebanon backing Assad, and various Sunni regimes, most notably Saudi Arabia, supporting the rebels, even though the rebels were increasingly dominated by such terrorist organizations as *Al Qaeda*, the so-called Al-Nusra Front, and a truly malignant offshoot of *Al Qaeda* called Daesh or ISIS. Worse still, the Shiite regime of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq pursued myopic, sectarian policies that alienated Sunnis. The Shiite government broke its promise to show statesmanship and inclusiveness for Sunnis and Kurds. In 2014, the Sunnis in Iraq allied with Daesh, and the Syrian Civil War spread to Iraq, threatening general war and catastrophe for the entire Middle East and the world. From war-torn and newly captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, the leader of Daesh, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, exhorted Sunni Muslims in July 2014, “Do jihad in the cause of God, incite the believers and be patient in the face of this hardship.” And then he admonished them, “If you knew about the reward and dignity in this world and the hereafter through jihad, then none of you would delay in doing it.”<sup>32</sup> The ISIS terrorists engaged in abominable atrocities, killing Christians, Shiite Muslims, Sunni Kurds, and minority believers called Yazidis. Pope Francis on 10 August asked the world to help the people of Iraq and Syria and decried religious terrorists by declaring, “war is not to be waged in the name of God.” On 21 August, he renewed his plea to the world and said, “in these cases, where there is an unjust aggression, I can only say that it is licit to stop the unjust aggressor.” One month later he pleaded with Muslim leaders to denounce the extremists. The Daesh threat so alarmed President Obama that he decided in September and November to send military advisors to Iraq, to train and arm moderate Syrian rebels who were battling ISIS and the Assad regime, and to organize a coalition to bomb Daesh positions both in Iraq and Syria.<sup>33</sup> The Iraqis simultaneously replaced al-Maliki with Haider al-Abadi, who vowed to win back Sunni support for the Iraqi government. On 21 August, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel declared that Daesh

“is beyond anything that we have seen.”<sup>34</sup> This was not true. War and violence were an integral part of fundamentalist Islamism’s heritage. By fall 2015, Daesh and Islamist fundamentalists had firm control of parts of Iraq and Syria, and Russia and the USA discussed the possibility of a joint strategy to check the threat, but as of early 2016 their cooperation was complicated by Assad using barrel bombs against his own citizens and Russia’s bombing of pro-Western rebels opposed to Assad.

Meanwhile, in Egypt the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi, won the presidency in 2012 in a democratic election after Hosni Mubarak’s abdication, but he was removed from power in July 2013 by the army because he failed to convince the Egyptian military and a preponderance of the Egyptian people, including some Muslim, Coptic Christian, and secular elites, that he would respect minority rights and would solve Egypt’s economic malaise without imposing on Egypt an Iranian-type theocratic government. In new elections, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won the presidency in June 2014. He promised to lead this key Arab state toward Westernization, but in early 2016 he still had not laid out a plan to solve Egypt’s economic malaise and bridge over differences between Islamists and secularists. He saw the West and Israel as a potential help in Egypt’s modernization plan and viewed both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as retrograde, hostile forces.<sup>35</sup>

It is not easy to build a modern state that respects the rule of law and a loyal opposition; balances secularists, fervent believers, and the Sunni-Shiite divide; and tries to overcome decades of authoritarian government, political fragmentation, bad and corrupt government, poverty, polarization between the wealthy and poor, high unemployment among a very youthful population, politically inexperienced leaders, broken infrastructure and educational institutions because of a lack of investment, dependence upon oil and gas income, the legacy of imperial neglect and exploitation, and a general shortage of water.<sup>36</sup> It took Ataturk and brilliant and committed Turkish leaders over half a century to lay the groundwork for modern Turkey. Of course, a few of Islam’s autocratic governments can marshal incredible resources because of oil revenues for a specific task and build universities like King Abdullah University of Science and Technology in Jeddah in three years by hiring world-class science and technology faculty or erect luxury hotels and business centers like the Makkah Hilton and Towers where believers can pray in air-conditioned rooms while overlooking the Kaaba or construct in the desert the Indoor Ski Slope in the Mall of

the Emirates in Dubai, but, in the end, the autocratic tradition of Islamic societies stifled and stifles continuous change and individual creativity.

Bernard Lewis, the world's leading authority on the Middle East, is hopeful that the Arab Spring will mean that political authority will come from within, from the development of intermediate institutions and bodies, rather than from above, from which it has traditionally derived, and that such authority will include women. Otherwise, he thinks the Middle East, as soon as its oil and gas are depleted or superseded by new energy technology, will lapse into insignificance.<sup>37</sup> This sort of pessimism is echoed by the Syrian-born poet Ali Ahmad Said, who uses the name Adonis. On 11 March 2006, he made the point clear in interview with Dubai TV in Paris. "The Arab individual," he said,

is no less smart, no less a genius, than anyone else in the world. He can excel—but only outside his society.... If I look at the Arabs, with all their resources and great capacities, and I compare what they have achieved over the past century with what others have achieved in that period, I would have to say that we Arabs are in a phase of extinction, in the sense that we have no creative presence in the world.... We have the quantity. We have the masses of people, but a people becomes extinct when it no longer has a creative capacity, and the capacity to change its world.<sup>38</sup>

Today, the gloom has only grown and Islamic Arab society, in the view of some leading Islamic thinkers, is collapsing.<sup>39</sup>

Finally, there is a minority element in Islam that rejects Western values and follows leaders who encourage and engage in holy war, violence, mayhem, and terror in the name of Islam and base their actions on the *Koran* and the *Hadith*. These extremists are not reconciled to a global civilization based upon Western values, and they have worked to prevent broad-based cooperation between Islam and Christianity and between political leaders from Islamic and Western countries.

Modern Islamist extremism took root in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century and grew in the twentieth century into a major terrorist network. It was fueled by Islamic religio-political values, Saudi money, hostility to the West's religio-political values, the creation of Israel, and Western exploitation of Middle East resources, often in complicity with secular Muslim governments. It was further energized by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and then the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. The extremists have mounted and

continue to try to launch terrorist attacks against Western interests and pro-Western Muslim societies across the globe, and they have had some success in recruiting young, disaffected Muslims living in Western societies. They are also able to hide among the large immigrant communities from North Africa and the Middle East in Europe. And they are seeking to exploit for their advantage turmoil throughout the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen where civil wars have erupted.

Islamist extremism hardly constitutes a blueprint that anyone wants, aside from the extremists themselves, but it does have a clear doctrinal basis in Islam's foundational documents. Ayaan Hirsi Ali has argued in her book *Infidel* that it was pointless for moderates to argue with extremists because the *Koran* and the *Hadith* had passages in them that supported violence and war against infidels.<sup>40</sup>

The deep fissure today between Muslims is not only the split between Shiites and Sunnis, but also the way the *Koran* and *Hadith* are interpreted, and this division has tragic consequences for world peace and harmony. In effect, this division is one that is best described by the terms moderate Islam and extremist Islam. Moderates, who are both Shia and Sunni and who represent the vast majority of Muslims, stress those parts of the *Koran* and *Hadith* that promote peace, toleration, and respect. While they also support a literal interpretation of the *Koran* and *Hadith*, they simultaneously interpret the *Koran* and *Hadith* as allegorical and, thus, full of layers of meaning that soften the harsh and violent passages found in the *Koran* and *Hadith*.

The extremists, on the other hand, promote the literalism and finality of interpretation of the *Koran* and *Hadith*, especially those parts that support violence, war against Jews and infidels, *jihad*, conversion, and martyrdom against the non-Muslim world. Furthermore, they argue that since many of the most violent verses came later in Muhammad's life, when he was a political as well as a religious leader, they have more legitimacy than the tolerant, peaceful verses that came earlier in his life. This doctrine of abrogation, that the old and mature Muhammad was modifying, correcting, and "abrogating" earlier positions, the extremists claim, negates many of the peaceful and tolerant verses in the *Koran*, but it also adds to great confusion because the pacific verses are still in the *Koran* and quoted by extremists in an act of dissimulation to disarm non-Muslims and Muslims alike about their true intentions.<sup>41</sup>

Perhaps the two most controversial passages in the *Koran* that moderates and extremists disagree on are the "sword verse" and "the treatment

of innocents verse.” The “sword verse” states that Muslims should “slay the idolaters whenever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush.” Extremists interpret that verse literally as an order to kill non-Muslims. Infidels are to be given an opportunity to convert, but if they fail to take advantage of this opportunity, they are to be slain without mercy, and if a Muslim should die in such an effort to expand Islam and do battle against the infidel, such a believer will go directly to heaven.

Moderate Muslims view the sword passage allegorically and stress that Islam is a religion of peace and toleration. They will defend their faith if provoked, but they do not aggressively make war or seek converts by force. The “innocents verse” faces the same polarized interpretation. The extremists take it as *carte blanche* to slay innocents in order to punish villainy, which they hold to be any action that diminishes Islam and its expansion. The Israeli state is a particular target for such extremists. For them, there are no innocents in the battle against the Jews and Zionism. Similarly, with the attack upon the USA on 11 September 2001 they saw no innocent victims.

For the moderates, of course, such an open attack upon innocents is absolutely prohibited by the *Koran*. It is a betrayal of the Islamic faith, and has no justification whatsoever.<sup>42</sup> For them, Islam is a religion of peace, toleration, and justice. Fortunately for the world, most Muslims are moderates.<sup>43</sup> However, the extremists have both a doctrinal and historical basis and are a source of continuing challenge to moderate Muslims who want to or are reforming their societies.

The remedy to Islamic extremism might be for Islamic religious authorities and leaders to denounce the extremists as un-Islamic, reassert that *jihad* is an internal war against sin and that Islam opposes terror and suicide bombings, prohibit Muslims from providing financial and other support for jihadists, and find a basis for modern society in updated interpretations and understanding of Islam’s sacred texts. In addition, it would be critical if the rich Islamic states poured money into secular education and worked toward some modus vivendi between Sunnis and Shiites. Some Muslim governments are taking a strong stand against such fundamentalists, but it would be transforming if Islamic religious scholars publically and continuously condemned such actions as un-Islamic.<sup>44</sup>

Islamic society has dealt with controversial issues in the past. For example, it has, in practice, modified *Hadith* and *Koran* positions on slavery and polygamy (not in all Islamic societies), and perhaps here again the

Ankara School of Theology might play a role. In the wake of the burgeoning association between violence and Islam, President el-Sisi told clerics in Egypt in January 2015 that “it is unbearable that the thought that we hold holy pushes the Muslim community to be a source of worry, fear, danger, murder, and destruction to all the world.” He demanded that they correct this misunderstanding of Islam by Muslims and lead “a religious revolution.”<sup>45</sup> His exhortation to Muslim religious leaders is encouraging and should be followed up with an offer by the Western states to coordinate with Muslim regimes the fight against the extremists and to help with education and economic development.

## WESTERN CIVILIZATION

At the advent of the twenty-first century, Western values are continuing to evolve and spread around the globe. In Europe, the EU member states were keen on writing a constitution to guide their political cooperation and growing unity. In 2002–2003, a European convention finally drew up a draft of a constitution and submitted it for approval to the voters of the member states. Meanwhile, in 2004 ten new states became members of the EU, including Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, followed by Croatia in July 2013.

Today the EU counts 28 states among its members, including Orthodox Romania and Orthodox Bulgaria, where ten percent of the population is Muslim. In addition, six states that are on the waiting list to join the EU, including Turkey, Albania, Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, and Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have been given potential candidate status. Perhaps the most incredible aspect of this truly amazing emerging “United States of Europe,” is the EU’s ability to affect positive change in favor of human rights and peace in a variety of culturally different countries without resorting to force.<sup>46</sup> Countries are not allowed to join or to stay in the EU unless they respect civil and human rights, abide by the rule of law, and maintain an open society that is transparent and accountable. The benefit of membership clearly outweighs international or federal intrusion into domestic affairs.

Some scholars think that Europe is in decline today because it is highly secularized and the EU refuses to acknowledge its Christian roots.<sup>47</sup> Such a judgment is partly off the mark. Christian Europe has always had a secular tradition. In addition, the value of separation of church and state requires

that the EU (not individual states) be independent of any church, so such a stance is not outside of its tradition.<sup>48</sup> To embrace publicly its religious foundation would limit its attraction to countries holding to non-Western Christian traditions and thus curb its ability to promote Western religio-political values in Orthodox and Islamic countries and elsewhere. If it were pushing beliefs instead of values based upon beliefs, it would not have been and be as effective as it is in promoting human rights and dignity for which Christian beliefs call.

The fact is the majority of Europeans remain committed to the Christian belief system. Many Europeans do not go to church or even publicly advertise their nexus with Christianity, but they adhere to Christian values, support international government and non-government agencies that focus on helping people improve their lives and develop their talents, back human rights around the globe, and, despite the lingering economic recession, are some of the most generous donors to charity per capita in the world.<sup>49</sup> A recent poll by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation found that 70 percent of Germans were believers.<sup>50</sup>

The growth of the EU and its soft power effectiveness in promoting human rights, political freedom, and creativity are transforming not just countries that have an undeveloped or lapsed Western Christian tradition, but also those that have an Orthodox and Islamic order. With the creation in Europe of an EU presidency and foreign minister in 2009 and with the German leader Angela Merkel saying in 2012, “more Europe, not less,” Europe is poised again to assume a leadership position in the push for Western values around the globe. In fact, in spite of the lack of clerical leadership, some authors in the twenty-first century view Christianity not only as surviving but also showing signs of resurgence in Europe.<sup>51</sup>

Now Europe could do with religious refreshment and spiritual renewal, but that calls mainly for religious leadership and so far that has not crystallized. Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue* thinks Europe needs another St. Benedict, and historian Robert Louis Wilken believes that the situation calls not so much for a new Benedict “as a new Charlemagne.”<sup>52</sup> The problem does not seem so much to be that there is a lack of interest or yearning for religious insight, but, rather, that the Christian Churches have not yet found dynamic and innovative leadership. Religious leaders are by nature conservative, almost reactionary. They want to protect the community and think protecting the status quo is the safest course. As a result, they are not natural leaders of change, even though in the case of Western Christianity, change is its mandate. In many ways, they seem to

be out of touch with the central message of Christianity and thus have lost millions of followers in Europe and increasingly in the USA, Canada, Latin America, and elsewhere. For example, in the case of the Catholic Church, respect for clergy and church attendance has declined because of many reasons, including the Vatican's criticism of nuns for caring too much about the poor, its identification with right-wing political platforms, its defensive and anemic response to the clerical pedophilia scandal, its insensitivity to women, its lack of response to growing economic disparity and social injustice, and its preoccupation with money and power. Pope Francis I was a breath of fresh air and has promised transformational change. He shocked many bishops but pleased millions of people when he announced that, "shepherds should smell like the sheep." He could be the catalyst for stimulating interest in religion among the Europeans.<sup>53</sup> In any event, people seem to want and need a society that draws strength from spiritual and religious roots and therefore should be religiously active. The three missionary value systems—Orthodox, Islamic, Western—are anchored on religion, and the emerging world order is built upon Western religio-political values, but values and order cannot be sustained without beliefs.

Western values are also shining brightly across Latin America and in Canada. Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Costa Rica have strong democracies, constitutions, and the rule of law. All of the Latin American states and Canada are active participants in the UN programs to improve world health, to maintain and fund peacekeeping missions, to promote human rights, and to protect refugees and immigrants. Nations from North and South America work through the Organization of American States to advance democracy, human rights, security, and economic development throughout the Western Hemisphere. Religious freedom is the rule throughout these nations, where Catholicism and Protestantism remain vibrant, and Argentina happily gave to the world Jorge Mario Bergoglio, better known as Pope Francis I.

Besides Europe, Canada, and Latin America, Western values are continuing to sprout in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, and even now Myanmar, the former Burma. They are also strengthening or reviving across Africa, especially in Botswana, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Senegal, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi, Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, and, of course, South Africa. Even a failed state like Somalia seems to be turning around and

joining the march toward market economies and democratic institutions. Foreign investors, from China to Brazil to India to the EU to the USA, believe that Africa will be the home of the world's economic tigers in the twenty-first century. Christianity, too, is spreading rapidly there.<sup>54</sup>

China's leaning toward Westernization also persists in the twenty-first century. Hong Kong's strong democratic tradition has helped here, and so far the Beijing government has not been heavy-handed in its treatment of Hong Kong's liberties and traditions. If fact, Hong Kong's model seems to be pushing China toward more representative rule.<sup>55</sup> And China's leaders are undoubtedly aware that the movement toward the Western model enhances China's ability to persuade Taiwan to reunite peacefully.

To be sure, China is still a one party dictatorship, but there are hopeful signs of Westernization. The growth of an independent judicial system, the right to bring suit in court, the growing toleration of religious pluralism, an emerging middle class, a growing responsiveness to international law, toleration of a free press in parts of China, and the new effort to protect private property are all signs of increasing Westernization. In addition, literacy is growing, cell phones and Internet connections are widespread, thousands of Chinese students continue to study at Western universities, and published law is facilitating business start-ups and international partnerships. China is also fully engaged with the world community, has opened itself up to a degree to foreign press coverage, joined other states in patrolling the Gulf of Aden to tamp down piracy, and has indicated a willingness to help rebuild Afghanistan to prevent terrorists from using it to stir turmoil among Muslims in China. It is also taking a major role in the International Monetary Fund, is playing a positive role in trying to stabilize the world economy, and is setting up a new Asian bank. China is also reminding the world that it was an ally of the West against fascism in World War II and it now praises Chiang Kai-shek, who was once dismissed as a lapdog of the West, for his effort against Japan in World War II.<sup>56</sup>

Interestingly, Christianity is growing in China, and the government is tolerating that growth. The regime maintains that there are 21 million Christians (16 million Protestants, 5 million Catholics), but other sources say the figure is much higher. Zhao Xiao, a former Communist Party leader and convert to Christianity, claims confidently that there are 130 million Christians in China and the China Aid Association, a Texas-based lobby, supports that claim, which would mean that there are more Christians in China than Communist Party members (about 74 million). The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life emphasizes that the

official number misses Christians who are not affiliated with the mainline Christian Churches, and the Center for the Study of Global Christianity in Massachusetts estimated that there were about 70 million Chinese Christians in 2008 and forecasts that the number will burgeon to 218 million by 2050, a remarkable 16 percent of the population. And the growth has been almost entirely indigenous and concentrated among the middle class, where Christianity is associated with modernity, science, and business.<sup>57</sup> In addition, the government has opened a dialogue with the Vatican and seems to be attempting to connect its ancient Taoist/Confucian culture to Western values and institutions, much as the Jesuits had done in China in the seventeenth century.<sup>58</sup> In August 2014, Pope Francis announced that China has nothing to fear from the Catholic Church and that Christianity is quite compatible with Confucianism, which might open the door to improved Vatican–Beijing relations.<sup>59</sup>

Internationally, however, China is pushing its weight around Asia and the Pacific region. The regime would do well to remember not only the balance of power doctrine, but also the history of opposition to imperialism and to repressed minority nationalism. Its arrogance and attempts at hegemony caused Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, the USA, the EU, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to work against China.<sup>60</sup> If China were to adopt an EU-type policy of shared power and reciprocal benefits toward its neighbors, it could probably avoid the pitfall of stirring nationalist opposition in its sphere of influence, to say nothing of promoting peace and prosperity throughout Asia and the Pacific, and lead the way to an Asian version of the EU.<sup>61</sup> If the twenty-first century is China's, it will be a “Westernized” China.

The USA still stands as the most persuasive and most vigorous example of Western values. It is the lynchpin in the world order, but it does face many challenges. One of the most urgent problems is the polarization in income distribution. The USA proved that capitalism was a highly effective economic system for producing wealth. It unleashed the power of individualism and self-profit in order to maintain and improve the community, but because of tax laws and rates of return on capital a few individuals have concentrated wealth in their hands, huge income disparities have developed, and the community has suffered from a lack of investment, which has led to declining public schools, antiquated public infrastructure, inadequate public health programs, and individual advancement on the basis of wealth rather than merit. In the USA, capitalism seems to be being drained of its goal of community growth and veering toward

an Ayn Rand-type society of unadulterated and unabashed self-interest, a type of society devoid of and unaffected by Christian virtue and values. The problem is one of calibration and might be addressed through localized, progressive reform or, as economist Thomas Piketty has suggested, through a fair, non-punitive progressive income tax.<sup>62</sup>

Another major challenge is the flood of illegal immigrants and refugees crossing the southwestern border of the USA. This is a crisis, but it should be looked at as an opportunity. People are coming because of the attractiveness of what the Western value system has produced. The solution to the illegal immigrant problem can be found in the rather extraordinary initiatives that the Americans and the Europeans undertook after World War II—the Marshal Plan, the European Recovery Act, and the NATO. The USA, Canada, and the Latin American elites should move quickly to invest in and rebuild the nations of the Western Hemisphere and create something like the EU—a sort of United States of the Americas. There is a crying need for statesmen and creative individuals to step forward with clear, just, brilliant, and inventive solutions to a fundamental challenge of the success expansion of Western values, namely the desire of people to be part of a Western-style society and the lack of an opportunity to do so without leaving their own country.

## NOTES

1. Putin (2015).
2. Garrard and Garrard (2008).
3. Thomas (2010), p. 96.
4. One consequence of its effort to influence and protect Orthodox diasporas is the Russian Orthodox Church's support of the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria because the regime was protecting Syrian Orthodox Christians, who constituted before the Syrian Civil War perhaps ten percent of the Syrian population.
5. Arjakovsky (2013) and Dunn (2014), pp. 627–8.
6. Destivelle (2015).
7. Klymenko (2014) pp. 5, 9–10. Also see Simpson (2001) and Higgins (2014), p. 8.
8. Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill (2016).
9. Myers (2015), pp. 464–5, 468–9, 470, 473–80.
10. Putin (2014). On threats, see Myers (2015), pp. 444–5, 458, 466, 471.

11. Myers (2015), p. 45; *New York Times*, 29, 30 July 2014.
12. Putin (2014). Myers (2015), pp. 269, 276, 319, 382–6, 403, 444–7, 499n.
13. Myers (2015), pp. 442, 475–6.
14. Dawson ([1959] 1981), 23–27.
15. Zakaria (2014a, b). On the critical importance of maintaining stability in Russia and bringing its government into partnership with the West, see Brzezinski (2012).
16. Yousafzai with Lamb (2013), p. 4.
17. See U. S. White House (2016); also see Elizabeth Drew (2015).
18. Esposito (2010), p. 65, points out that authoritarian regimes are far more numerous than democratic governments in Muslim states.
19. Sayeed (1985) argues that Islamic states are changing under the pressure of Westernization, but that that change will be based on Islam. Also see Esposito (2010), pp. 197–9.
20. Wilken (2009), pp. 25–6.
21. *New York Times*, 30 November 2015. The text of Malala's speech can be found at Yousafzai (2013).
22. *New York Times*, 8, 9, 12 January 2015.
23. Bawer (2009); Hussey (2014); Cohen (2014), p. 20.
24. *New York Times*, 23 July 2014.
25. Turkish historiography views the fall of Constantinople in 1453 as the beginning of modern history that made possible the Protestant Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. See Brockett (2014), pp. 399–433.
26. Heneghan (2013); also see *New York Times*, 12 March 2008, for Erdogan's statement. On the election of Islamic representatives, see *Financial Times*, 3 May 2007; *New York Times*, 20 July 2007. Erdogan is a politician who happens to be Muslim rather than a clerical leader who is a politician. He is committed to separation of church and state and that is a key difference between Turkey and Iran. He has tried to blend Islam and Western values and is showing success.
27. When they started the so-called *Hadith* Project, Turkish scholars insisted tactfully that their effort was not a reform of the *Hadith* but the presentation of enduring truths for changing circumstances of life. See Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (2008).
28. Black thought separation of church and state was essential. See Black (2010), pp. 116, 120–1.
29. Heneghan (2013).

30. Barnard (2014), p. A10. On Turkey as a model, see Shadid (2011), pp. 1, 6 WK. Also see *New York Times*, 17 April 2011.
31. For background, see Gelvin (2012).
32. *New York Times*, 6 July 2014.
33. Francis (2014a, b). On Iraqi government's role in rise of ISIS, see Hosken (2015).
34. Hagel (2014).
35. Hamid (2014) argues that dictators are more threatened by moderate opponents than extremists because they look better if the only alternative is extremism or theocratic government.
36. Hubbard and Rick Gladstone (2013); also see Kuran (2010), pp. 292–302.
37. Zakaria (2012). Lewis pointed out that the total exports of the Arab world, outside of oil and gas, was less than that of Finland.
38. Quoted in Friedman (2007), p. A23. Also see Huff (1993), pp. 235–6.
39. Friedman (2015).
40. Ali (2007) and Ali (2010).
41. Arberry (1955), p. 41.
42. This verse is a huge loophole that extremists use to justify suicide bombings, assassinations, and wholesale terrorism. See Kelsay (2007) and the review of Kelsay's book by Manji (2008), p. 8. See Armstrong (2002), p. 190.
43. Pew (2015). Also see Wright (2008, 2011), Bhutto (2008), Ramadan (2008a, b), Takeyh (2009), Constable (2011), and Hubbard (1999).
44. The Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shawki Allam, has at least declared that *Daesh* has violated the principles of Islam. See Trew (2014). Zakaria (2015) argued persuasively that Pakistan is the key to resolving the Taliban problem for the West in Afghanistan.
45. *New York Times*, 9 January 2015, p. 10.
46. Vachudova (2005). The turmoil in 2016 in Turkey (a failed coup sparked by the slowing pace of democracy and secularization) and England (a vote in favor of leaving the EU mainly because of immigration) will, in this author's view, be resolved and both countries will remain committed to the EU. For background, see *New York Times*, 21, 24 June; 15, 18, 19 July (2016).
47. MacIntyre ([1981] 2007), pp. xvi, 263; Wilken (2009), p. 23. Weigel (2005), p. 160, thinks that Europe's secularism signals decline and presages what will eventuate in the USA.

48. The EU members maintain a variety of national church-state traditions that include an established church in England and Greece, a pluralist preference in the Netherlands, separation of church and state in France, and a tiered framework of privileges for different religions in Poland and Slovakia. See Monsma and Soper (1997).
49. Charitable Aid (2014). The amazing help that the Europeans, particularly the Germans, extended in 2015–16 to refugees from war-torn Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, was truly remarkable. See *New York Times*, 12 November 2015; 6 April 2016.
50. Klymenko (2014).
51. Jenkins (2007), p. 288.
52. MacIntyre ([1981] 2007), pp. xvi, 263; Wilken (2009), p. 23.
53. Vallely (2015), pp. xviii–xii.
54. Jenkins (2002), pp. 255–6, 271–2.
55. Cheung (2011), pp. 713–738; *New York Times*, 3, 15 February; 16 March 2007; 30 May; 2 August; 16, 18 December 2008; 22 June 2010; Khanna (2008). Also see Tsang (2007).
56. Mitter (2013), p. 9.
57. *The Economist* (2008); Thomas (2010), p. 95; David Aikman (2003); *New York Times*, 29 July 2014.
58. *New York Times*, 8 May 2008; 11 and 29 July 2012; 18 August 2014.
59. *New York Times*, 13 and 18 August 2014.
60. Yang (2011); *New York Times*, 8 September 2010; 2 June, 2 August 2012.
61. Kissinger (2011) sees the possibility of a Pacific community not unlike the Atlantic community. Also see Jonathan Fenby (2009), Kissinger (2014) and Spence (1999).
62. See Burns (2009) for the logic of capitalism without an egalitarian touch. On tax change, see Piketty (2014), pp. 348–50, 572. On localized reform, a sort of second gilded age, see the persuasive evidence James Fallows and his wife, Deborah, have found at Fallows (2016).

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## Conclusion

*I want education for the sons and the daughters of all the extremists especially the Taliban.*

*Malala Yousafzai, United Nations, 12 July 2013*

*Attempts to justify criminal acts with religious slogans are altogether unacceptable. No crime may be committed in God's name, "since God is not the God of disorder but of peace" (1 Cor 14:33).*

*Patriarch Kirill I and Pope Francis I, Havana, Cuba, 12 February 2016*

A study of the past 2000 years reveals that religion is critically important in international affairs, not just historically, which is generally recognized, but in contemporary times, which is not acknowledged.<sup>1</sup> It further shows that Orthodoxy, Islam, and Western Christianity, alone among the world's major religions and sacred moral traditions, strove for universal fellowship and generated religio-political values to effect global fellowship, and thus were the principal historical catalyst for what is now widely recognized as globalization—the condition of global interdependency that marks the modern world and is yielding a global civilization. It additionally demonstrates that these value systems, while they shared and interacted, competed with one another to define the ideas and institutions of this burgeoning global civilization. Finally, it concludes that the most significant development in world history for the past millennium is the advance of Western values around the globe. All other major events are part of or reactions

to this dramatic and inexorable reality. Whether the issues are constitutionalism, democracy, free enterprise, the rule of law, religious freedom, the Age of Discovery, the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment, Industrialization, China's surging capitalist economy, India's technological innovations, Japan and Southeast Asia's modernization, the expansion of the EU, the birth of international institutions like the UN, the persistent strength of Western science and creativity, or, on the other hand, Muslim jihadists spilling innocent blood in videotaped beheadings and slaughters and Russian-backed rebels brutalizing the Ukrainian people and shooting down a Malaysian airliner, Western values are at their center. Westernization is the key to comprehending world history since the medieval era.

The West, influenced strongly by Christianity, sought from its beginning to create a global society based upon shared values. Both Orthodox and Islamic societies, similarly motivated by world religions, competed with the West to determine the value system that would be the basis for global civilization. The rivals shared ideas, institutions, and technology, but their values were different and were in many ways incompatible. The struggle among the three missionary values systems was intense, but about 1000 years ago the West surged to the forefront and began to connect the world's civilizations into a unified and interdependent whole based upon its values and institutions. Today most countries have accepted Western values and their products as the basis of modern civilization and international cooperation. Bin Laden's followers and Putin's supporters have not and are actively seeking to halt Westernization and replace it with some version of their own values, which have mainly been superseded, modified, or rejected as a foundation for global cooperation and unity.

Nine interrelated reasons appear to help explain why Western values are becoming the basis for global unity and cooperation. First, Western values produced the most powerful and successful societies that the world has ever seen. Such empirical success bred imitation and led other cultures to borrow the products of the West, partly for reasons of survival, and such borrowing inevitably led some of these cultures' educated and intelligent citizens to look for the key to Western success and found it in Western values, which they then tried to absorb and blend with their own tradition.

Second, Western values embraced natural law. Natural law was a body of principles that was universal and found in the common experience of man and ascertained through reason rather than through religious texts or pronouncements. As such Western values seem to have a sanction that

transcends and preempts man-made law and government edicts and makes justice and due process seem possible in a world of diverse cultures. For Christians, order comes from law and law comes from God, but whether people are religious or not, there is an appeal to values that extol principles that are validated both by reason and experience.

Third, Western values have a religious, spiritual, or ancient moral sanction. In Christopher Dawson's view, the West is all about uniting "the nations and the continents in an all-embracing spiritual community."<sup>2</sup> Most people in the world, according to a Pew Foundation survey, are and remain religious and spiritual.<sup>3</sup> It stands to reason that Western values are of interest to some people because of their religious roots. Many Western scholars have dismissed or marginalized religion and spirituality as a factor in international politics and relationships, but it seems clear today that religion and spirituality continue as an essential part of the human condition and that Western values are appealing precisely because they have a religious approbation.

Fourth, the West favored limited government. This was the sine qua non for the realization of most of its other values. In both Orthodox and Islamic cultures, the government was autocratic and under the control of a political or religious dictator who largely curbed change and innovation. The Byzantine and Russian Empires, for example, had the same faith as Western society, but the Orthodox Church was not independent enough from the state to pursue the political and social implications of Christianity. In the West, where the government was limited, Christianity could unfold its message of individual self-actualization and self-transformation. People were free to develop their talents, and that freedom to change the world drove Western societies forward. In addition, the rule of law that curbed government created the possibility for the legal autonomy of cities and towns and the concept of democratic representation of all forms of individual and corporate groups.

Fifth, the Western value system has international support because it has proven valuable and successful in helping individuals to develop their talents within a community framework. It glories in and rewards individual achievement on the basis of merit and competition. The West supported individual and corporate rights, duties, and freedom, which Christianity sanctioned. It spurred citizens, no matter if they were Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, or Taoists, to develop their talents and to contribute to the well-being of the community. Individuals and groups of individuals called corporations and guilds were protected by law and, within their

legal rights, were allowed, indeed encouraged, to pursue truth, to exercise power, to seek their fortunes, and to work hard to help themselves, their families, and their communities. In contrast to both Orthodox and Islamic cultures, which put the community before the individual, the West held that the best way to enhance the community was to give freedom and corresponding responsibility to the individual. It could do this because it believed that the individual had dignity, rights, intelligence, and free will, and could, with the help of reason and faith in an environment where government was limited, lead an ordered and productive life. It was a societal attribute that saw incredible innovation and feats of courage and faith by individuals and corporate entities across the socioeconomic spectrum. What was to be avoided was unfettered, laissez-faire, self-centered aggrandizement, which would destroy or undercut national and global cohesion. In a religiously centered world, the whole point of competition, of allowing individuals to be free to develop their God-given talents, of permitting groups of individuals and nations to push to do their best, was to improve the greater community and the global commonweal. Community growth and improvement, the good of mankind as a whole, was the central purpose of globalization of the type that religiously based Western values pursued and pursues and that Orthodox and Islamic societies want. It turns out that the rest of the world wants it, too.

Sixth, Western values provide an environment and governing system where different cultures can coexist not just with toleration, but also with appreciation and celebration of their diversity. The West accepts and assimilates what it finds valuable in other cultures. It is open to the diversity of creation and to cultural traditions that are rational and supportive of human growth, ingenuity, freedom, and responsibility. As a result, many people from diverse cultures and parts of the world find elements of their culture in the West and are thus open to adopting Western values and then tolerating and enjoying cultural diversity within their own societies. As mentioned, imitation of the West by other societies furthered the Westernization of the world. It is noteworthy, too, that Western values have a secular aura as well as a religious sanction, and that this secular nature made them more attractive to non-Western religious elites because they could adapt them to their own tradition without appearing to accept Western religiously sanctioned values. In short, the world could be Westernized without becoming Christian.

Seventh, Western values separate church and state. Although Western values are strongly influenced by religion, they also prevent religious and

political authorities from practicing policies of absolutism and discrimination. An absolute government can frustrate creativity, but so can an unlimited religious authority. In an atmosphere where church and state are seamless, there will be little tolerance for diversity, academic freedom, and an unimpeded search for truth. In Orthodox and Islamic societies there was no separation of church/mosque and politics. In Orthodox countries the state controlled religion—a tradition called caesaropapism—and thus forced religious authority to support its policies, which were often self-serving. Even today, in Russia, the state has an undue influence on the Orthodox Church. In Islamic society, the preferred government type was a theocracy where religious authority dominated the state, although for most of its history, Islamic states had regimes where the state controlled religion. In either case, though, the autocratic nature of the state suppressed initiative and invention. By contrast, in Western countries the trend was that the state checked the church and the church restrained the state, while all the time maintaining a vigorous religious and political life that was connected to immutable truths, and the result was a preference for toleration and freedom that bolstered the creative talents of people and has proved to be largely appealing to diverse religious and spiritual groups around the world.

Eighth, the West maintained that faith and reason were compatible. In contrast to both Orthodox and Islamic orders, Western Civilization held that reason was an absolutely fundamental and essential power that came from God and could throw light on both faith and nature. In a dynamic and spirited debate, Western intellectuals, who were mainly at first religious scholars and clerics, supported the two intellectual movements that we have called religious rationalism and secular rationalism. These intellectual approaches opened the door to the evolution of faith, the realization that faith unraveled in proportion to man's ability to absorb its mysteries that were contained in revelation. They also opened the door to the evolution of knowledge of nature, the realization that nature was revealed in proportion to man's ability to acquire and absorb knowledge or science, to work for and discover it “as if we were God's spies.”<sup>4</sup> It was these intellectual movements that catapulted the West into an intellectual and scientific leadership position and the founding of universities where all other societies were following the West. It is important to reiterate that secularism derives from the Christian message and is not alien or antithetical to Christianity. Christianity sanctions the study of physical phenomena, including man, because it is God's creation and, with God's grace,

might lead to knowledge of God but certainly to knowledge of the physical world that is useful and beneficial to mankind's growth and stability.

This attitude allowed the West to tap the creative talents of its citizens such that it could constantly change to meet fresh challenges, acquire salient information, develop au courant technology, master unfamiliar frontiers, tolerate and appreciate diversity, or regroup, revive, and reform after mistakes and disasters, because its search for truth was tied to the permanent truths associated with Christianity that gave the West stability, coherence, direction, and an abiding and optimistic desire to find truth and improve life with all of its idiosyncrasies.

Finally, the Western value system embraced change and saw change as its mandate, so it was and is forever responding to new knowledge and avoiding decay and senescence. It was anchored on core principles, but holds that there was no conflict between faith and reason, which makes the West an incredibly inventive culture. Because of the West's ability to innovate and change, it ended up holding a huge military-technological advantage against both Orthodox and Islamic states, in fact so advanced that it reinforced these states' predilection to rely upon authoritarian regimes to try to close the gap, only to find that there was and is a long-term inverse relationship between centralization and innovation, such that they could never catch up but only hope to compete by buying, copying, or stealing Western advances. Today, the West continues to hold a massive advantage in every conceivable field. In addition, it has worldwide, popular support. Some Orthodox nations have joined the EU while Russia persists in the policy of the Romanovs, basically aping Western technology without embracing Western values. As for Islam, it has its Western-leaning states and these seem to be tilting many Islamic states toward the West. Unfortunately, it is plagued by terrorists, assassins, and suicide-bombers, who have caused massive problems for international security and commerce, particularly for the travel and tourism industries, but who are not currently a genuine threat to the West or to global order. They mainly damage Islamic societies where they seemingly have some support but largely represent division among Muslims and frustration over Muslims' place in a modern, Westernizing world.

The possibility of a global civilization united by common values is not because of any resurgence of the USA or of European nations as superpowers—the world is now multipolar with power diffused among the USA, China, India, the EU, Brazil, Japan, Russia, South Africa, the ASEAN Bloc, and an array of middle powers like Canada, Nigeria, Mexico, and

Turkey. It is because the vast majority of the world's peoples and nations are moving toward an acceptance of forms of Western values.

John Darwin points out that empires of the past have come and gone and that the Western dominance of the world was not foreordained and will not be permanent. However, the West has been the only "empire" that is truly global and, while its political and economic writ has contracted, Westernization has grown and has permeated many of the world's cultures and holds out a very good possibility of uniting the world's people in a global civilization while simultaneously, because it stresses tolerance, allowing different religions and national traditions to proliferate.<sup>5</sup>

The road ahead calls for leaders of great intellect, broad vision, unusual diplomatic skill, and deep understanding and appreciation of the interdependency and rich diversity of the human race and its multiple religiously or sacred morally based cultures in order to build a global civilization that respects human rights, values human freedom and its corresponding responsibility, and promotes human creativity. Religious leaders, in particular, have a pivotal role to play in reforming and updating their beliefs—putting new clothes on permanent truths—and in reaching out to one another around the globe to reinforce values that most religious and sacred moral traditions have now discovered within their own traditions in order to further the process of global unification and cooperation.

There is still a struggle between Western, Orthodox, and Islamic values, which is so vividly on display today in Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq, but the advance of Western values around the globe is the principal and awe-inspiring narrative of world history for over a millennium and it is on magnificent parade in China, India, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, South Korea, Ghana, Botswana, South Africa, Chile, Argentina, Cuba, Canada, Mexico, Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, England, Ireland, France, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Israel, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and virtually every other country and continent in the world and every international institution of cooperation, human improvement, and creativity. This book is a framework to help understand the roots, complexity, persistence, and importance of this central reality of world history, and to formulate appropriate and comprehensive policies to complement and facilitate its growth in the future. The destiny of the human race is fellowship—the central mission of the three world religions of Western Christianity, Orthodoxy, and Islam—and the world seems like it prefers the values of the West to achieve that fellowship.

## NOTES

1. The historiography on the importance of religion in human history runs the gamut from being a vital organ to an appendix. Scholars like Christopher Dawson and Russell Kirk treat it as the sine qua non of human history (see Dawson (1978) and Kirk (1991)). Others like Diamond (1997), Hobsbawm (2011), and Kissinger (2014) give it short shrift in the metanarrative of history (they see geography, economics, and politics and balance of power) as the engine of history, respectively. Until quite recently, many social scientists viewed religion as more of a cultural accident like music, food, dance, or architecture than as a fundamental force influencing the flow of events and the relationships between countries and civilizations. For them its persistence was a consequence of poverty, a reaction against modernity, and a relic that would diminish eventually in importance in the face of increasing education, secularization, and modernization. Since 9/11, such scholars have had to explain religion's sudden intrusion as an actor in international history. The response has been threefold. Some of them have argued that the evidence indicates that secularization, not religion, is growing, and further that religion's resurgence, if it can be asserted at all, is a consequence of increased visibility due to modern communication technology (see Norris and Inglehart 2004; Haynes 2007). Others have concluded that religion was neglected as a factor, but it is only one of many perspectives that should be considered in any analysis of international events (see Fox Sandler 2006). Finally, some say religion is very important and is here to stay because it is a sign of the postmodern world where new models that include religion are replacing the secular Western paradigm. See Thomas (2006), and Michael and Petito (2009).
2. Dawson (1978), p. 412. Also see Jenkins (2002), Thomas (2010), pp. 93–101, Smith (2008).
3. Pew (2012).
4. From Shakespeare's *King Lear*, vol. 3, quoted in Boorstin (1983), p. v.
5. Darwin (2008), p. 505. Chua (2008) argues that toleration is the essential ingredient of a great power. Fukuyama (2014) sees institutions, particularly liberal democracy, as the only basis for world order, but he limits his vision by focusing on nation states rather than the larger idea of values and he does not clearly connect institutions with values and ideas.

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