Republics at War, 1776-1840

Revolutions, Conflicts and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World

Edited by Pierre Serna, Antonino De Francesco, and Judith A. Miller

Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack (*editors*)
SOLDIERING IN BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 1750–1850
Men of Arms

Ralph Kingston
BUREAUCRATS AND BOURGEOIS SOCIETY
Office Politics and Individual Credit, France 1789–1848

Kevin Linch
BRITAIN AND WELLINGTON'S ARMY
Recruitment, Society and Tradition, 1807–1815

Pierre Serna, Antonino De Francesco and Judith A. Miller
REPUBLICS AT WAR, 1776–1840
Revolutions, Conflicts, and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World

Marie-Cécile Thoral
FROM VALMY TO WATERLOO
France at War, 1792–1815

Mark Wishon
GERMAN FORCES AND THE BRITISH ARMY
Interactions and Perceptions, 1742–1815

Christine Wright
WELLINGTON'S MEN IN AUSTRALIA
Peninsular War Veterans and the Making of Empire c.1820–40

Republics at War, 1776–1840

Revolutions, Conflicts, and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World

Edited by

Pierre Serna
Professor, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France

Antonino De Francesco
Professor of Early Modern History, Università degli studi di Milano, Italy

and

Judith A. Miller
Associate Professor, Emory University, USA

palgrave
macmillan

Contents

Foreword to the Series

The century from 1750 to 1850 was a seminal period of change, not just in Europe but across the globe. The political landscape was transformed by a series of revolutions fought in the name of liberty—most notably in the Americas and France, of course, but elsewhere, too: in Holland and Geneva during the eighteenth century and across much of mainland Europe by 1848. Nor was change confined to the European world. New ideas of freedom, equality and human rights were carried to the furthest outposts of empire, to Egypt, India and the Caribbean, which saw the creation in 1801 of the first black republic in Haiti, the former French colony of Saint-Domingue. And in the early part of the nineteenth century they continued to inspire anticolonial and liberation movements throughout Central and Latin America.

If political and social institutions were transformed by revolution in these years, so, too, was warfare. During the quarter-century of the French Revolutionary Wars, in particular, Europe was faced with the prospect of 'total' war, on a scale unprecedented before the twentieth century. Military hardware, it is true, evolved only gradually, and battles were not necessarily any bloodier than they had been during the Seven Years War. But in other ways these can legitimately be described as the first modern wars, fought by mass armies mobilized by national and patriotic propaganda, leading to the displacement of millions of people throughout Europe and beyond, as soldiers, prisoners of war, civilians, and refugees. For those who lived through the period these wars would be a formative experience that shaped the ambitions and the identities of a generation.

The aims of the series are necessarily ambitious. In its various volumes, whether single-authored monographs or themed collections, it seeks to extend the scope of more traditional historiography. It will study warfare during this formative century not just in Europe, but in the Americas, in colonial societies and across the world. It will analyse the construction of identities and power relations by integrating the principal categories of difference, most notably class and religion, generation and gender, race and ethnicity. It will adopt a multifaceted approach to the period, and turn to methods of political, cultural, social, military, and gender history, in order to develop a challenging and multidisciplinary analysis. Finally, it will examine elements of comparison and transfer and so tease out the complexities of regional, national, European, and global history.

Rafe Blaufarb, Alan Forrest, and Karen Hagemann

Acknowledgements

PS, JAM, and A De F, April 2013

Contributors and Translators

Contributors

Marc Belissa is a *maître de conférences* and *directeur de recherches* in modern history at the Université Paris Ouest Nanterre, France. He has published several works on the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and international relations, among them *Fraternité Universelle et Intérêt National, 1713–1795: Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens* (1998); *Repenser l'ordre européen 1795–1802: De la société des rois aux droits des nations* (2006); and editions of Maby's works *Principes des négociations* (2001) and *Du gouvernement et des lois de la Pologne* (2008). He has co-edited a series of collective works, among them *Acteurs diplomatiques et ordre international fin XVIIIe siècle–XIXe siècle* (2007, with G. Ferragu) and *Républicanismes et droit naturel: Des humanistes aux Révolutions des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (2009, with Y. Bosc and F. Gauthier).

Annie Crépin is a retired *maître de conférences* of the l'Université d'Artois, France. Since 2011, she has chaired the editorial committee of the *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, and is a member of the research board of the Centre d'Études de l'Histoire de la Défense. Publications include *La conscription en débat ou le triple apprentissage de la nation, de la citoyenneté, de la République (1798–1889)* (1998); *Défendre la France: Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (2005); *Construire l'armée française: Textes fondateurs des institutions militaires*, Tome III, *De la Révolution à la fin du second Empire* (2007); *Révolution et armée nouvelle: L'exemple de la Seine-et-Marne (1791–1797)* (2008); *Histoire de la conscription* (2009); 'Soldats et citoyens, soldats parce que citoyens: Les hommes de l'armée nouvelle', in *La Révolution française: Une histoire toujours vivante* (2010); and *Vers l'armée nationale: Les débuts de la conscription en Seine-et-Marne 1798–1815* (2011).

Antonino De Francesco is Professor of Early Modern History at the Università degli studi di Milano, Italy. He has published numerous articles on the French and Italian democratic movements as well as a number of books, including *Il governo senza testa: Movimento democratico e federalismo nella Francia rivoluzionaria, 1789–1795* (1992) and *Mito e storiografia della 'Grande Rivoluzione': La rivoluzione francese nella cultura politica del '900 italiano* (2006). Together with Manuela Albertone, he co-edited *Rethinking the Atlantic World: Europe and America in the Age of Democratic Revolutions* (2009).

He is the author of *The Antiquity of the Italian Nation* (2013), dealing with the political rediscovery of Antiquity in nineteenth-century Italy. Currently he is working, in French, on a book on the historiography of the French Revolution.

Bernard Gainot studied at the École normale supérieure of Saint-Cloud (1968–1972), is *agrégé* in history (1983), and received his doctorate at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France. He is presently an honorary *maître de conférences* in modern history at that university. He earned his *habilitation* to direct graduate research in 2005. His most recent publications include *Les officiers de couleur dans les armées de la République et de l'Empire (1792–1815)* (Paris, 2007); *La democrazia rappresentativa: Saggi su una politica rivoluzionaria nelle Francia del Direttorio 1795–1799* (2010); *Atlas des esclavages: Traites, sociétés coloniales, abolitions de l'Antiquité à nos jours*, with Marcel Dorigny (2006; 4th edn 2013); *Un siècle d'ordre public en Révolution (de 1789 à la Troisième République)*, ed. with Vincent Denis (2009); *Atlas de l'Empire napoléonien 1799–1815,* in collaboration with Jean-Luc Chappey (2008); and Alexandre Berthier, *14 juin 1800: Marengo*, ed. with Bruno Ciotti (2010).

Sylvie Kleinman is a research associate (Centre for War Studies) and occasional lecturer, Department of History, Trinity College Dublin. Her research focuses on Ireland and the French Revolution, and late-eighteenth-century military and cultural history. She is currently expanding her doctoral thesis (Dublin City University, 2005) for publication under the working title *The War in Words: Ireland in French Military Strategy: Translating, Persuading, Invading (1792–1805)*, a synopsis of which was published in Footitt and Kelly (eds), *Languages and the Military* (2012), 25–46. From 2007 to 2009, she was an Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences postdoctoral fellow at Trinity, and her project, the military career and travels in French-occupied Europe of the Irish nationalist hero Theobald Wolfe Tone, is discussed in her '*Un brave de plus*: Theobald Wolfe Tone, alias Adjudant-General James Smith, French Officer and Irish Patriot Adventurer, 1796–8', in *Franco-Irish Military Connections, 1590–1945*, ed. Genêt-Rouffiac and Murphy (2009), 163–188. She is currently finalizing a scholarly edition of Bishop Joseph Stock's diary of the French invasion of Ireland in 1798.

Virginie Martin studied at the École normale supérieure, is *agrégée* and a former member of the Fondation Thiers. Currently a *maître de conférence* at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in the Institut de l'histoire de la Révolution française, she completed her dissertation, 'La diplomatie en Révolution: Structures, agents, pratiques et renseignements diplomatiques: L'exemple des diplomates français en Italie (1789–1796)' in 2012 (Université

Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France). Her dissertation won the Richelieu Prize given by the Chancellerie des universités de Paris; she is preparing it for publication. She is the author of 'Du modèle à la pratique ou des pratiques aux modèles: La diplomatie républicaine du Directoire', in *Républiques-sœurs: Le Directoire et la Révolution atlantique*, ed. Pierre Serna (2009), 87–100; and 'Rome assassine la République (13 janvier 1793): Le diplomate Hugou de Bassville est-il le premier martyr républicain?', in *Le Martyr(e), Moyen-Age, Temps Modernes*, ed. Marc Belissa and Monique Cottret (2010), 123–164.

Judith A. Miller is Associate Professor in the Department of History at Emory University in Atlanta, GA (USA). She is the author of *Mastering the Market: The State and the Grain Trade in Northern France, 1700–1860* (1998) and the co-editor of *Taking Liberties: Problems of a New Order in France, 1794–1804* (2002, with Howard G. Brown). Her present book project is 'The Stoic Voice of the Late French Revolution, 1794–1815'. She is a recipient of Fulbright, ACLS, and NEH and Newberry Library Fellowships, as well as a Bourse Chateaubriand. She won the Koren Prize from the Society for French Historical Studies for the best article written by a North American historian, and the Alexander Gerschenkron Prize from the Economic History Association. She is a Chevalier in the French *Ordre des Palmes Académiques*.

Frédéric Régent is a *maître de conférences* at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in the Institut d'histoire de la Révolution française and is one of the directors of the 'Atelier interdisciplinaire du fait colonial'. He is the author of *La France et ses esclaves: De la colonisation aux abolitions (1620–1848)* (2007; paperback, 2009); *Esclavage, métissage, liberté, la Révolution française en Guadeloupe* (2004); and one of the authors of *Pour quoi faire la Révolution* (2012).

Marie-Jeanne Rossignol is Professor of American Studies at the Université Paris Diderot-Paris 7. She is the author of *The Nationalist Ferment: The Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1812* (2003). She has just published the first French scholarly translation of the narrative of the black abolitionist William Wells Brown with Claire Parfait (*Le Récit de William Wells Brown, esclave fugitive: Ecrit par lui-même*, 2012). Recently she published 'Jacques-Pierre Brissot, and the Fate of Atlantic Anti-Slavery during the Age of Revolutionary Wars', in *War, Empire and Slavery, 1770–1830*, ed. Richard Bessel et al. (2010) and edited a collection of essays on the repercussions of the abolition of slavery and other central decisions on British or ex-British colonies (*L'Empire britannique en héritage, Cahiers Charles V* n°46, with Mélanie Torrent, 2009).

Pedro Rújula is Professor of Modern History at the Universidad de Zaragoza. His research is focused on the political, social, and cultural phenomena in

late modern history, especially the birth of politics during the Peninsular War and the Spanish civil wars throughout the nineteenth century. He is the author of *Ramón Cabrera, la senda del tigre* (1996); *Contrarrevolución: Realismo y Carlismo en Aragón y el Maestrazgo (1820–1840)* (1998); and *Constitución o muerte: El Trienio liberal y los levantamientos realistas en Aragón (1820–1823)* (2000). He co-edited *Guerra de Ideas: Política y cultura durante la Guerra de la Independencia* (2012) with Jordi Canal, and has edited and written introductions for *Vindicación del general Maroto* (2005) by Antonio Pirala; Faustino Casamayor's diaries (2008); *Los Sitios de Zaragoza* by baron Lejeune (2009); and *Memorias* by Marshal Louis-Gabriel Suchet (2012). He edits the magazine *Jerónimo Zurita* and is head of Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza.

Pierre Serna is Professor at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and is Director of the Institut d'histoire de la Révolution française (UMS CNRS 622). For 20 years, he has worked on the questions of disorder and violence among elites and their struggle for power before and during the French Revolution. He has also published *Antonelle, un aristocrate révolutionnaire* (1997). He is the co-author of *Croiser le fer: Culture et violence de l'épée dans la France d'Ancien régime* (2002) and the author of *La république des Girouettes, l'anomalie de la France de l'extrême centre* (2005) and 'Every Revolution Is a War of Independence', in *The French Revolution in Global Perspective*, ed. Suzanne Desan et al. (2013), 165–182. He has been working in two complementary scholarly directions: the genesis of, and the political practices at the heart of, the republics of the modern world; and a research project on the history of animal studies in French political practice and theories during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Mario Tosti is Professor of Early Modern History at the Università degli studi di Perugia, Italy. He is a specialist in the history of ecclesiastical institutions, religious culture, and sentiment between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. He has published several essays and books about the relation between Catholic culture and the processes of state laicization and social secularization that started after the French Revolution. At present he is working on a history of the Papal States.

Katia Visconti is a researcher in Early Modern History at the Università degli studi dell'Insubria, Italy. She has been and is involved in several national collective research projects (2003, 2005). She has published essays on the political and social life in the state of Milan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the moment she is undertaking research on political culture in the Napoleonic age, particularly on the relationship between the national army and the development of patriotism. Her most recent

publication is *L'ultimo Direttorio: La lotta politica nella Repubblica cisalpina tra guerra rivoluzionaria e ascesa di Bonaparte, 1799–1800* (2011).

Translators

Daniel Gascón has translated authors such as Saul Bellow, Christopher Hitchens, and Sherman Alexie into Spanish. His most recent book is the short story collection *La vida cotidiana* (Alfabia, 2011). He is a staff writer for the magazine *Letras Libres*.

Sylvie Kleinman, who also translated some of the French materials, is listed among the contributors to this volume.

Godfrey Rogers received his doctorate from the University of Manchester, UK, for work on provincial France in the nineteenth century. He has translated extensively in French political, social, and economic history, as well as in the fields of demography and epidemiology. He currently teaches an English course at the IUT Michel de Montaigne in Bordeaux, and is a sworn translator at the Bordeaux Appeal Court. He has translated six full-length books and scores of scholarly articles, and has been a member of the French translators' guild (ATLF) since 2000.

Stuart Wilson is a Scottish teacher and translator. A graduate of Edinburgh University, UK, he has lived and worked in Sweden, Spain, and various parts of Italy; he now lives in Central Italy. His translation work includes artistic, cultural, literary, and academic texts. His most recent translation is a book by Antonino De Francesco, *The Antiquity of the Italian Nation: The Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796–1943*.

Abbreviations

AD	Archives Diplomatiques, Paris
ADG	Archives Départementales de Guadeloupe
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris, France
ANOM	Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence
AP	*Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des Chambres françaises: Première série, 1787 à 1799*
AHRF	*Annales historiques de la Révolution française*
ASFi	Archivio di Stato di Firenze
ASMi	Milan State Archives
BCA	Biblioteca Comune di Argenta
BNF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris
DP	*La Décade philosophique*
Moniteur	*Le Moniteur universel*
SHD	Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes

Maps

ITALY IN 1797

Map 1 Italy in 1797

Florida

Bahamas

Atlantic Ocean

Cuba

Saint Domingue   Santo Domingo

Jamaica

Puerto Rico

Caribbean Sea

Viceroyalty of New Spain

Curaçao 2

Tobago 1

Trinidad

Viceroyalty of New Granada

0 100 200 Km

80°0'0"O   70°0'0"O   60°0'0"O

N

Saint Thomas 3

Saint John 3

Saint Croix 3

0   25   50   100 Km

18°0'0"N

66°0'0"O   64°0'0"O

Legend

British colony

French colony

Spanish colony

Reference number :

1 French colony

2 Dutch colony

3 Danish colony

4 Swedish colony

Anguilla

Saint Martin 1 and 2

Saint Barthélémy 4

Barbuda

Saint Eustasius 2

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Antigua

Montserrat

Guadeloupe

Dominica

Martinique

Sainte Lucie

Saint Vincent

Barbados

Grenada

0   25   50   100 Km

63°0'0"O   62°0'0"O   61°0'0"O   60°0'0"O

18°0'0"N
17°0'0"N
16°0'0"N
15°0'0"N
14°0'0"N
13°0'0"N
12°0'0"N

Map 2   The Caribbean in 1789

Introduction

War and Republic: 'Dangerous Liaisons'[1]

Pierre Serna

One would like to break the mould and be able to say that the conjoining of war and republic in our title is a mere turn of phrase. History, regrettably, seems to show the opposite. This need not be a reason to express indignation, however, or to look only to the counterrevolution for the causes of the conflict that rocked the Atlantic world between 1774 and 1815—accepting that republican war began long before 1792, with the patriots of the New World—or to fix responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities upon the French revolutionaries and their divisions, apportioning blame between Brissot and Robespierre and their respective followers. Let us instead spell out in practical terms the value of historical reflection on the relationship between war and republic at the end of the eighteenth century—a relationship alternatively construed as constitutive, inevitable, and seminal, or, on the contrary, as contingent, avoidable, and pernicious.

Eighteenth-century political culture was based in part on the quest for better government, which implied establishing peaceful relations with one's neighbours, and this at a time when the European monarchies were engaging in a succession of increasingly violent conflicts. When eighteenth-century thinkers imagined the future, however, they usually were guided by their knowledge of the past, and in this particular case they were well aware of the strong, yet complex and contradictory, relationship between republics and war in antiquity. The Greek city-states, for example, constructed their defence by inventing the citizen–soldier. Civic virtue was measured there by courage on the field of battle, guarantor of the supreme value: the liberty of all. As the history of ancient Greece illustrates, the republic and the city were founded in the conflict against the other, the 'uncivilized' barbarian with no notion of citizenship. The same applied to republican Rome, and the wars of the French Revolution replicated these civic and heroic gestures in a politicized and mythologized form for virtually instant consumption. The nation was founded in adversity, through the cult of popular heroes,

exaltation of patriotism, acts of courage for the fatherland in danger, and a universal mobilization in the face of peril. War provided a solid basis for the politics of the citizen.

In a different register, civil war, the struggle's other dimension, created division in the body politic. It corrupted the republic and cut the sphere of civic life in half. Far from bringing citizens together or forging a '*union sacrée*', this war threatened to destroy the body politic, whose destructive firepower was turned on itself in a fratricidal conflict. This was illustrated by the history of the Italian city-states in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

The republic at war faced danger from another quarter: when the conflict gave military leaders an autonomy that encouraged them to attempt a brutal takeover of the republic and impose their version of order. The military *coup d'état*, a direct product of the nexus of war and republic, demonstrated the inherent dangers for any civilian power engaged in a conflict that necessarily carried with it the risk of a seizure of power by the military. The career of Cromwell was no less familiar than that of Caesar: The forcible dissolution of the Rump Parliament generated abundant commentary in the eighteenth century, as the perfect illustration of the abuse arising from military leadership.

Thus, the connection between republic and war was not of a kind to shock the eighteenth-century mind. There was acceptance of the principle, illustrated by history, that, in a state where control was exercised jointly through a pooled sovereignty of citizens, those citizens were expected to contribute actively to the defence of the state. Confirmation of this came from antiquity, but also from the recent past, with the birth of the United Provinces and the English Commonwealth, and from the history then unfolding of the nascent United States of America.

In parallel with these known historical facts there was equally the hope of building a politics based on the law regulating relations between sovereign states, which an ideal republic would embody, thus protecting its citizenry from destructive conflicts. Though abstract, this theoretical development found an echo in the growing body of enlightened public opinion, where it caused another idea to gain ground: War was a scourge, one that the monarchical system, and diplomatic regulation overseen by the royal houses, perpetuated without offering any hope for a peaceful conclusion.

In reaction to this, a different conception of the republic emerged, founded largely on thinking about the nature of the rights of peoples to self-determination. This idea looked forward to a conflict-free future, when republics, understood as federated space within which negotiation and discussion would be governed by the same law, would establish the conditions for a new, transparent diplomacy with the capacity to ensure concord between populations. It was a vision associated with Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui and Cesare Beccaria, among others. In the future, the interests

of the populaces would be central to the concerns of heads of state. From this perspective, monarchy was synonymous with war, and kings, far from being peacemakers as the professional court hagiographers made out, were mere freedom-destroying warlords, responsible for the carnage and misery of successive conflicts.

These two interpretations coexisted during the 'irrepublican' years of the second half of the eighteenth century, up until 1776. But they did so in different registers. The republic of history, that of the past, was associated with polemology—with the science and theory of war—an association with mainly damaging consequences. The republic of the philosophers, by contrast, the republic of the future, was what the new-style diplomacy hoped for—the republic that would create the conditions for a perpetual peace, because it was based on the joint sovereignty of people to conduct their affairs together. In a paradoxical yet essential way, both models existed—in some cases supported and propagated by the same members of the republic of letters—with their contradictory premises, historicized fatalism versus philosophical illusion. The actual course of the revolutions in America, Switzerland, the United Provinces, Brabant, France and the sister-republics was shortly to bring these two dimensions into an explosive coexistence.

Before looking at the reality of the combats and confrontations, however, there is another battlefield to be considered: that of words and minds. What did the terms 'war' and 'republic' mean, and how were they interrelated, for contemporaries of the *Encyclopédie* and the Seven Years' War? What meaning was conveyed by these two phenomena, whose paradoxical conjunction was to ignite the powder keg under the old world?

Here is their description in the *Encyclopédie*:

'War'

Yet there are a thousand other infamous licenses, and a thousand sorts of rapine and horror that are shamefully suffered in war. Laws, it is said, should be hushed amidst the clamour of arms; to this, I say, that if the civil laws, the laws of the individual tribunals of each state which sit only in peacetime, must fall silent, it is not the same for the eternal laws which are made for all occasions and for all peoples and are written in nature. But war stifles the voice of nature, justice, religion, and humanity. It begets only brigandage and crimes, and with it marches dread, famine and desolation; it tears apart the souls of mothers, wives, and children; it ravishes the land, drives out the population and reduces cities to rubble. It exhausts prosperous states in the midst of their greatest achievements; it exposes the victors to tragic reversals of fortune. It depraves the morals of all nations, and creates more victims than it eliminates. Such are the fruits of war. At present [1757] the gazettes resound with nothing but the evils it brings on land and at sea, in both old and new worlds, and to

peoples who should be strengthening, rather than severing, the bonds of a benevolence that is already so weak.

'Republic'

It is in the nature of a republic to cover only a small territory, for otherwise it cannot long survive. In a large republic there are great fortunes, and therefore little moderation in men's minds: powers are too great to be placed in the hands of one citizen; interests become individualized: a man first senses that he can be happy, great and glorious without his fatherland; and soon that he can rise alone to greatness on its ruins.

In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subject to exceptions and dependent on hazards. In a small republic, the public good is more readily perceived, better known, closer to each citizen; abuses are less common, and therefore less protected. What enabled Lacadaemonia to survive for so long was that after all its wars, it stayed in its own territory. The only goal of Lacadaemonia was liberty, and the only advantage from its liberty was glory.

The spirit of the Greek republics was to content themselves with their land and their laws. Athens grew in ambition, and passed some of this to Lacadaemonia. But this was more to command a free people than to govern slaves, to head the union rather than destroy it. Everything was lost when a monarchy was established, a government whose spirit was turned towards expansion.

'The Roman Republic'

As the consuls could get the honour of triumph only through conquest or victory, they waged war with extreme courage and zeal. Thus the republic was at continuous and violent war. But a nation always at war, by its principle of government, must of necessity either perish or overcome all others, that in war and in peace were never so quick to attack nor so ready to defend themselves.

In this way the Romans acquired a deep knowledge of military art. In short wars, most examples are lost. Peace brings different ideas; one's errors, even one's virtues, are forgotten. Another consequence of the principle of continuous war was that the Romans only ever made peace as victors; for what advantage would there be of making a shameful peace with one people, to then go and attack another? True to this idea, the Romans increased their demands whenever they were defeated, thus dismaying the victors and imposing on themselves a greater necessity to be victorious. Continually at risk of the most terrible vengeance, they needed steadfastness and valour—virtues that were indistinguishable in them from love of self, family, fatherland, and all that men hold dearest. . . . But

when the legions crossed the Alps and the sea, the men of war who had to be left for several campaigns in the conquered countries, gradually lost their spirit of citizens; and the generals who commanded armies and kingdoms felt their own strength and no longer obeyed. Thus soldiers began to acknowledge only their own general, to place in him all their hopes, and to see the city as distant. They were no longer the soldiers of the Republic, but of Sulla, Marius, Pompey and Caesar. Rome no longer knew if the leader of an army in a province was its loyal general or its enemy.

The *Encyclopédie* article encapsulates the full ambivalence of the term 'republican' for the 'honest man' who was the dictionary's intended reader. Jaucourt addresses first the nature of republican war in its intensity and duration, then the aim of the conflict in the geostrategic issue of the republic's territorial expansion and its frontiers. Next he considers the consequences of armed conflict for civilian society, referring to the creation of the citizen–soldier engaged in the patriotic war effort, associated with the assimilation by individuals of such values as austerity, sacrifice, and sense of duty. Mobilization of this civic fervour represented a civic education and culture in whose construction and maintenance the republic would find the means to survive and, better still, to develop.

Two essential elements are clearly identified: For creating a specific diplomacy and for building the republican peace, the necessary condition is a glorious peace, a victorious peace, one that would bring revolutionary change to the long legacy of European diplomacy. A close reading of the entry shows that this peace in fact implies *guerre à outrance*. A king could lose a war without losing his crown: He merely had to relinquish some territory in the ensuing peace treaty to signify his defeat. Even the Sun King suffered defeat at the end of his reign, and Louis XV was forced to sign a particularly humiliating peace treaty at the end of the Seven Years' War. This was an option not available to the republic: It had to win or perish. That had been the experience of the Dutch 'beggars' in their revolt against the Spanish, and it lay behind Cromwell's building up of the English navy. The choice of 'win or die' was not evidence of some pre-Jacobin aberration or a harbinger of the dangerous specificity of the French Revolution, merely a lucid recognition based on the new science of politics, and formulated with perspicacity by an acute observer like Jaucourt. Nor did he forget the inherent risk to a republican regime from any victorious army—that of usurping its power and of separating from the civilian authority and creating a parallel system to the public institutions.

The natural law approach mentioned above also provides a valid basis on which to establish the ontological break between the republic, understood as the effective realization of the law of nations under which armed hostility was disqualified as being alien to the republic's pacific nature, and war, fundamentally perverse in nature, associated with violent or usurping

governments, like those monarchies not founded on contract or majority support. In this case war is the distant expression of a perversion of the contract that situates the source of the original conflict in property, the rule of the strongest, monarchy, and the conflict endemic to the unstable system of the ruling dynasties.

If the two contradictory dimensions—republican war and monarchical war—functioned at the same time, it was the discourse of the hoped-for peace that triumphed when politics came to be recast in the late 1780s. Into the turbulent *fin de siècle* context there came a third term, adding a further layer of complexity to the already subtle relationship between war and republic: The word was 'revolution', and when transformed into actuality it would redefine the forms of that relationship. For the partisans of radical change, a new contract could be founded only on the desire to realize as soon as possible the ideal of peace between countries, of concord between pacified nations and harmonious ententes between, at long last, sovereign peoples. In control of their own destinies, they would no longer let themselves be dragged into conflicts arising from dynastic interests or inflated personal ambition. Etymologically, revolution represented this return to a preordained order, one that kings had abused solely for their own ends, appropriating the state's violence to oppress their own people and wage war on others. By embracing the dream of the Christian origin of the harmonious community, hopes for remaking peaceful relations between free nations, the rational desire to create a social order devoted to mercantile activities (Montesquieu's 'sweet trade') unimpeded by conflicts, the jurist's hope for a solution through constitutional guarantees within the framework of nation-states—the revolutionary movements signalled clearly their wish to establish a durable peace with their neighbours.

Yet this approach must be qualified by briefly mentioning Rousseau's position and his pessimism, which has sufficient force to stand as a third position in its own right. No irony is too strong for the *philosophe* to scorn the cosmopolitan projects and what he saw as their utopian moralizing— a tissue of fine words and wishful thinking so far removed from reality that merely to articulate it was enough to destroy any hope of peace. In Rousseau's thought, war was fundamental to the existence of states, and confederations of small states offered the only hope for curbing the belligerent excesses of the great kingdoms. Small, united republics were the surest way to future peace.[2]

Since the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century, republicanism had been established firmly as the possible secular extension of Protestantism. Exemplary in this respect was the armed resistance of the republican United Provinces to the Spanish kingdom founded on divine right. Less straightforward in interpretation is the other great political revolution, the seventeenth-century English revolution with its dual dynamic—sectarian and violent from 1640 to 1660, then aristocratic and liberal in 1688—to

which the 'glorious' label was attached because of its peaceful form. Here too, though, the *Encyclopédie* comes to our assistance. A close reading of the entry on 'Revolution' suggests a new interpretation, in which the notion of revolution is bound up inextricably with that of liberty. Henceforth revolution as the conquest of freedom no longer presumed a vocation to restore an order based on a particular religion. If that representation remained pervasive, gone was all connotation of a return to some original point, despite the many references to such an eventuality: An inner meaning now projected it into a hoped-for future where peace would signify concord between societies reconciled with each other.[3]

Discourse on these lines was familiar in the late eighteenth century and appears in the radical texts of the revolutionists. François Boissel, a highly active member of the Jacobin Club and a hardened radical, begins chapter five of his *Projet de constitution et de la politique en général*, entitled 'On civil and political institutions', by attacking property as the source of the first discord, consistent in this with Rousseau's vision of the breakdown of societies into warring hordes.[4] 'The institution of the division and ownership of land should be seen as the origin and cause of all the evils of the world', and that idea forms the prologue to the demonstration given under the fourth heading 'On the institution of the law of war'. Article one asserts that

> The moral and political constitution of an enlightened, free and republican people, having no other basis than the love of humanity, nor any other goal than to fraternize with all the people of the earth, the bloody and disastrous institution of the law of war is abolished for ever. The French Republic shall only recognize a natural right of defence and reprisal in case of attacks or surprise actions against any of its possessions, which shall be invoked only after having exhausted all means of pacification, restitution and indemnity.[5]

Boissel immediately makes clear that diplomatic relations and commerce will be organized with the sole aims of protecting the cause of enlightenment and furthering the peace and liberty of nations. In an original and radical development, he establishes a clear connection between the unchecked increase in trade brought about by the exploitation of wealth and people, and the risks of hostility that this generates. Finally, all citizens, as defenders of the fatherland, are required to 'train one day a week', and the manufactures of arms and equipment for defending the republic are to remain 'active at all times'.[6] Paradoxically, while on the one hand there is a clear wish for nations to disarm, on the other this desire is offset by a constant vigilance that places the citizen on a potential war footing. In this line of thought offensive war is abolished, but war of the required defensive kind certainly is not. War remains a possibility, though in future it would be waged under a natural right of legitimate defence. Peace sets a horizon of expectation,

which some might consider utopian, and forms the point of convergence for a universal republic clearly committed to the elimination of war. 'Seen in this light,' Boissel adds, 'the universal politics can only be a close association of all the beings who make up what we call nature, which is but the regrouping of all the resources with all the means for their development.'[7] The republic carried within it the principle of territorial expansion, imagined here as peaceful and rational—events were to prove it otherwise.

For the complex relationship between war and republic, two conceptions sum up the period preceding the revolutionary explosion. The first is of the 'naturalness' of the combat. In this view, the republic means more than war; it represents a culture of continuous struggle for survival against the ever-present threat from forces at its frontiers, forces which, being barbarian and monarchical, are irremediably hostile and impatient to invade. Such conditions make the citizen a potentially permanent soldier, a 'minuteman' as the American patriots had shown a few years earlier or as the war effort in France was shortly to prove. The second conception was different and consisted in a rejection on principle of this link between republic and war. This was the position that eighteenth-century 'republicans' imagined could be achieved by organizing states into a federation.

In 1792, Robespierre highlighted the risks that a conflict represented for any government emancipated from royalty. In his polemic with Brissot, he detailed the inherent dangers of war in a kingless state, when control of the war risks slipping from the civilian sphere into the hands of the generals, enemies of liberty. Inside France, the republic would become a military dictatorship. The external dangers were well known, and any move to export the revolution to foreign peoples was almost bound to produce counterrevolution in countries which, though notionally liberated, were in reality under the yoke of armed missionaries.[8]

From a constitutive relationship between war and republic to new perspectives for historical research

Reflection on the nature of revolutionary war is not new.[9] At the height of the Cold War, Hannah Arendt defined the terms of the debate by insisting on the essential difference between the American and French Revolutions— the former the result of an unsatisfactory end to the Seven Years' War, the latter a war of defence and aggression that was simultaneously traditional and modern. The geographical remoteness of the nascent United States, she argued, had preserved the young country from the murderous experience that France's position, surrounded by hostile monarchies, had, on the contrary, encouraged. Within that revolutionary war, philosophy nurtured the seeds of a war of ideas, despite forms manifestly inherited from the Old Regime. The revolutionary war contained in embryo a European civil war

that the communist revolutions of the twentieth century would transform into 'a kind of civil war raging all over the earth'.[10] Recent scholarship, in fact, has integrated this approach to civil war as a continuation of opposition to political excess, and traditional war as a possible model for ideological conflict transposed to the battlefield.[11] Where civil war was at worst clandestine and criminal (such as a duel, the smallest civil war of all) or at a medium level was circumscribed within a national or royal territory, with a reversal of the hierarchy of appreciation from the polemological approach, civil war not only was incorporated into war itself, but actually supplied its unique identity: The war became *civil war* because it occurred *during* a revolution. Recognition of this point did not have to wait for the twentieth century, and nor is it necessary to focus narrowly on the French Revolution for its illustration. The Spanish War of Independence and the resistance of the Spanish people will do equally well—the extremes of violence reached as civilians fought soldiers, but also as Spaniard fought Spaniard, provided the tragic subjects depicted by Goya.[12]

Contemporary witnesses of these events (1792–1815), particularly of the wars in the Directory period (1796–1799), were well aware of this new element in the material forms of warfare. The intensity of combat totally transformed the science of warfare, hitherto regulated by the diplomacy of dynastic alliances and the supposed 'wars in lace'. It also harked back to the only civil war of the Old Regime, whose unforgettable violence no one wished to see repeated, the Wars of Religion. The latter rarely get a mention in these general reflections, although the Tuscan and Calabrese resistance of the *Viva Maria* in the counterrevolutionary uprising of 1799 were to provide a reminder of them and add further complexity to perceptions of 'the new warfare'.[13]

Genuinely alarmed by what he saw, Mallet du Pan, lucid as ever, described in his famous *Correspondance* how republicanism was spreading like an oil stain across Europe. Looking beyond its military dimension, he recognized its political reality and ideological vigour, as well as the excess of violence it engendered.[14] Could it have been otherwise? Without referring to the mobilization speeches of the time, or to the fiery passion used by Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac to relate the victories of the republic's armies and galvanize the Convention, we can cite the historians of the Terror, who established early on that for France—torn by internal divisions and a fratricidal civil war—a general and centralized mobilization and a system of coercive laws were essential to raise the men required to fight a war that by any objective standard looked virtually unwinnable in the military conditions of 1792. Robert Palmer has written admirably about the unrelenting, total effort that characterized France's revolutionary government between 1793 and 1794, and that formed the culture of the 'organizers of war, from bureaucrat commissioner (army suppliers) to both senior and subaltern officers'.[15]

Provocative or paradoxical though it may be, let us try to comprehend what France achieved between 1792 and 1799 by proposing a 'what if story' as a parallel. Setting aside the obvious ideological and religious aspects, what would the world be like today, in the early twenty-first century, if Iraq had successfully held off and defeated the coalition led by the United States and containing the best troops from the other NATO countries? Is it so outrageous to think that France managed the impossible, unexpectedly defeating against all the odds the coalition sure of its strength and impatient to finish the job?

This was a point understood by Robert Palmer, and one about which Marc Bloch wrote a book.[16] Born out of shock at France's swift collapse between May and June 1940, Bloch's book is still valuable as an innovative work for precisely that reason. A century and a half earlier, in a different era but similar adverse circumstances, a handful of men, several dozen representatives-on-mission, a few hundred parliamentarians, a few thousand officers, tens of thousands of Parisians and provincials, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers—a tiny minority compared with the 27 million French who made up the nation—succeeded, by dint of total and unflagging mobilization, in gaining an impossible victory, winning a war that by any reasonable standard they should have lost.[17] It was a hard lesson, one the French forgot in the twentieth century, and of which they were to be reminded cruelly by the American historian, a Francophile left genuinely dismayed by the French army's sudden collapse in 1940. If the war did not qualify as 'total' because of the defection of more than 60 departments, victory was due solely to the absolute commitment of the 12 members of the Committee of Public Safety and of a minority of the French population along with them. Paris, Brest, the frontier of Alsace, Lyon after the crushing of counterrevolution, and Marseille recaptured from federalism, delimited a theatre of total economic, social, political and geostrategic mobilization. This dimension of the conflict explains why, in order to secure a striking success, it was necessary to enrol as many citizens as possible in the war effort; indeed, to militarize society. But this carried the dual risk of making Frenchmen into politicized men of arms rather than citizen–soldiers, and of introducing elements of warlike violence into civilian society, thus inflicting lasting damage on the gentleness of manners that republican harmony promised to foster, through the programme for educating the nation—a project personified during the Directory years by François de Neufchâteau, whose commitment to a truly national education lay behind the creation of the *écoles centrales*, the immediate precursors of the *lycées* set up by Napoleon, and of the Institut de France, home of peaceful republican science.[18]

Jean-Paul Bertaud and Alan Forrest have recently probed this link between army and society during the republicanizing process, and raised the question of a possible militarization of French society in the late eighteenth century and especially after experience of the Napoleonic Empire.[19] Can

a transformation of civil society be inferred from a propagation of military values within the machinery of state, a development sanctioned by the Directory and then the Consulate?[20] To do so would require linking the notions of republic and war through the integration of a culture of war whose mass diffusion began in 1793 and continued uninterrupted until the Peace of Amiens in 1802.[21] The war would, in fact, produce or invent a set of values that laid the base on which was constructed a particular conception of the *patrie*, the fatherland—constantly in danger, threatened by the obscure and reactionary forces of tyrants, and therefore by necessity on a permanent war footing: So much so that the soldiers, faced with the disorder instigated by civilians, the '*pékins*', came to believe that they alone were the true guardians of the republican ethic.[22]

Many ingredients contributed to the mobilization of the republic at war: patriotism, revolutionary *élan*, the cult of the battlefield exploit, the republican '*bon mot*' uttered before laying down one's life for the nation. Crucially important, though virtually inaccessible to the historian, was the 'sonic landscape'—the sounds of songs, drums, trumpets, speeches, guns and cannons, all creating a ubiquitous, heavily charged mental and sensory environment. Role models abounded; and the replacement of religious martyrs by republican heroes tapped into an imaginative seam in which Spartans and Romans were emulated with glorious effect. The French Republic self-consciously appropriated the allegory of the helmet-clad Athena to protect the lives or souls of the boy soldiers who were ready to risk or sacrifice their lives. Bara and other drummer boys were the heroes of this new gesture that cemented the link between the republic and war. But images, hymns and harangues were only part of the picture; before long, reality overtook representation. In 1793 there emerged a generation unique in French military history, of generals under 25: Bonaparte, Hoche, Marceau, Brune, Masséna, and Lannes. Capturing the collective imagination, their action was lauded in the chambers during the Directory, continuing a tradition initiated by the Convention, but also in the press, which specialized in reporting military victories, most notably the *Journal de l'armée d'Italie*, and in the engravings now printed in their thousands, disseminating by images all the drama and theatricality of the defenders of the fatherland.[23] This culture of war and republican ideology transformed the representation of the *patrie* and produced, in the 'forge of revolution' (to use a metaphor associated with the father of intemperate, republican audacity), a unique narrative for the birth of a nation. An uncompromising republican, General Championnet drew on this literature of military and civilian hero-creation in the service of the nation to compile a book of simple but exemplary accounts, illustrated with crude but powerful images depicting a people that was victorious because republican, republican because victorious, and that exhibited marks of civilian and military courage, though with a preponderance of the latter.[24]

In her recent history of conscription in France, Annie Crépin deals indirectly with this 'totalization' or move to total war. After beginning by noting the cultural pervasiveness of the war metaphor, she develops a reflection on the concept of a 'continuous war' that shifts the analytical focus away from the intensity of actual conflict, the *moment guerrier*, to the broader issue of long-term organization for a war with no foreseeable end.[25] Alan Forrest goes a stage further and emphasizes the role of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars together in fashioning a French 'temperament' favourable to war.[26] These views have far-reaching implications, since they relate the duration of conflict to the political complexion of the regime. This was something understood by the actors themselves, starting with the Brissotins, who wanted war in order to republicanize Europe and who linked battlefield success to the capacity for revolutionary proselytizing on a continental scale. Jean-Yves Guiomar, meanwhile, has highlighted the originality of the revolutionary moment and its capacity to trigger a new type of conflict, but with the proviso that it be situated in relation to the other European models, as an alternative to that of Prussia, for example.[27]

What, in the context of the revolutionary and republican war, do we understand by 'total war', or, indeed, by the concepts of 'new war' used by Bernard Gainot and 'continuous war' introduced by Annie Crépin?[28] Does the choice of terms come down to academic arguments over words, or is it the expression of genuinely different conceptions of what was new about republican war?

Use of the expression 'total war' has been criticized as anachronistic on the grounds that it is disproportionate in relation to levels of industrialization in the late eighteenth century, only really becoming relevant at the start of the American Civil War—a not entirely convincing argument given the considerable economic consequences for the productive system and the heavy burden placed on the budgets of the belligerent countries.[29] The work of David A. Bell points instead to a sociocultural definition of 'total war'.[30] Revolutionary war, then, comes down to the mobilization of an entire population on behalf of an overweening collective ambition, in which patriotic spirit, the notion of public safety and a proto-nationalist dimension merge to form the basis for a spirit of conquest bound up with revolutionary ideals of the liberation of the peoples. For the American historian, this formative instance of 'total revolutionary war' entailed an unprecedented mobilization of sections of society, by coercive or voluntary means, for a belligerent project that became possible only once the monarchy was overthrown and national sovereignty established.[31]

But, in that case, was the French Revolution really the first to embark on this all-out struggle for the survival of a regime no longer based on royal and divine grace but on the social republican pact, or had that not been the achievement of the young United States Republic a few years earlier? The rebellious colonists had accepted a war in which their survival was decided

in an exceptionally violent conflict, one experienced with equal intensity, moreover, by the English home country, which feared dire consequences for its own survival in the event of defeat.[32] The nascent republics made their destinies and their survival dependent on victory, a condition that radicalized the belligerents on both sides, and in France's case led ultimately to a new diplomacy that forced it to seek the 'glorious peace' as the only possible conclusion.[33]

With this introductory framework in place, we need to recall two chronological dimensions by which to situate the contributions to this volume, which formed the backbone of the Franco-Italian conference held in Milan in May 2009. Reflection on the republic and war nexus cannot be conducted in a chronology that starts abruptly in, say, April 1792 or in the spring of 1796 with the Directory's first campaigns. To give due scope for historical reflection and to allow for the role of origins, we must first work in a medium-term perspective extending from the Seven Years' War to the Napoleonic Wars. The 60-year period from 1756 to 1815 represents a logical framework that spans three or four generations of combatants and satisfies the historical conditions necessary for detecting the relationship between regimes and their way of waging war. A new kind of war emerged, in which the exercise of sovereignty took place within and through the armed defence of the fatherland, either by direct and voluntary contribution—a cornerstone of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*—or by the arming of individuals with a view to defending their own possessions and ideals. One new war invented another new war by creating the conditions for and then realizing the act of republican sovereignty.[34] The American example was the matrix.

The focus can then be narrowed to the shorter period from 1792 to 1802, which corresponds to the republican war proper, and with particular attention to the Directory years, when war went in tandem with the setting up of the sister republics and acquired an overtly political aim, that of permanently redrawing the map of Europe. Finally, another particularity deliberately singled out for attention in the 2009 Milan conference was the role of the Italian peninsula as a rich and complex testing ground for republican war.

Is it, then, mistaken to imagine a possible link between the United States federation, born out of war, and the creation of the sister republics around France? Obviously, the conditions were different, not least because the existence of the Senate ensured a degree of equality between the American states that was never achieved in the system of the Great Nation, although it is worth recalling that a long under-appreciated aspect of United States history is the resistance the federal model encountered from states fearful of losing their autonomy during the federalist advance of 1788–1790. But, while the situation in France between 1792 and 1799 was certainly different, all are agreed on the war's role in strengthening the republic, which in turn

had founded its legitimacy in the mystique of a conflict that appeared as an essential crucible of the regime's identity.

An abundant literature, of both older and recent scholarship, has examined the theme of the nation in arms and the relationship between the fatherland in danger and the continuously redefined official baptism of the republic.

Thermidor marked the end of this kind of politics. As contemporaries and historians have noted, one of the results of the end of the Terror was an almost immediate end to the subordination of the generals. They soon recovered their prerogatives and freedom of action, so that from the beginning of the Directory the threat of a military *coup d'état* hung over the civilian institutions, introducing a political variant to the theme of relations between republic and war.[35] After the events of Vendémiaire Year IV (October 1795), it was plain to everyone how much the civilian authorities depended on the military arm, constantly having to call upon the force of arms to defend the institutions.

Similarly, many historians have written about the contradictions that characterized the French Republic under the Directory, when the concept of liberating the peoples was abandoned in favour of waging what quickly came to resemble a war of conquest, and when an immense racket was practised in the occupied countries, transformed into sister republics—not because that was what the authorities in Paris had wanted, but because the generals, foremost among them Bonaparte, wished it thus. Historians from very different generations, Guillot in the early twentieth century, and Hervé Leuwers and Marc Belissa in our own time, have shown the limitations of a republican diplomacy concerned more with interests and calculations than with developing a revolutionary link between war and republic. This is now admitted as the obverse of the Great Nation.[36]

Historical research and reflection continues, however, and new perspectives on the relationship between war and republic have emerged from what Marc Belissa refers to as a new European order.[37] True, the French Republic under the Directory operated a policy of plunder, and philanthropic considerations were rarely uppermost in relations between the sister republics and the mother republic, with the latter usually imposing its domination and political agenda depending on who held power in Paris at the time.[38] No less true, however, is that radical Batavian and Italian patriotic movements were brought into being when the French armies invaded their respective countries and that they represented the seeds of republicanism, for the present and for the future.[39] On the other hand, the formation of a second coalition in 1798, which drove back the patriots from the sister republics and French troops to the natural frontiers, showed the determination of the monarchies to tackle the problem of the French Republic in its entirety. They already were applying the policy that Restoration France would be forced to accept, that of having its sovereign returned in the rearguard of foreign kingdoms

and empires. More than the counterrevolution, it was now the antirepublican crusade that drove the coalition's campaigns of 1798 and 1799. They were finally halted in September 1799, but the situation was sufficiently alarming for General Bonaparte to desert his troops in Egypt and use it as the pretext for seizing power. In so doing he bore out the intuition of Robespierre, when the latter expressed his fears for the republic at war to be victorious or perish, and then to perish in victory from its generals.[40]

In war, the republic had found a fatherland, a nation of values; in victory it would find those who would bury it. Over and above the specific case of France, the war produced a lasting change in the strategic and diplomatic balance, a point appreciated by anyone who travelled and was in a position to judge the continuing upheavals from a distance. One such figure was Volney, who surveyed the known world from the United States after 1795 while on a study trip. He noted the propensity for conflict of the English model, and conceded that the French Republic and its leaders had lost sight of the interests of the nation's citizens to pursue the glory of military victories. The result had been to associate republic with war and encourage negative interpretations of that relationship.

> According to my horoscope, the war is going to flare up again, and since the reason is passion as much as necessity (for our adversary [author: England]), it will be longer and have more revolutionary consequences than appears to be sufficiently understood or measured. Of the two athletes, the one with command of the sea may indeed be excluded, as is threatened, from the continent of Europe, but it will even more certainly exclude its adversary and his allies from the continent of the two Americas. Two or three campaigns will perhaps be enough to provoke and establish the independence of the empires of Montezuma and Manco Cápac, then it will be farewell to Isabella's empire, farewell to the galleons and piastra, whose diverted flow will henceforth fuel the manufactures of Manchester and Birmingham, and give the banks a means of exchange in *hard money*. This will trigger a reaction in the continent of Europe, whose effects will thwart to say the least the over-confident speculations. . . . Happy the nation where the principles of government are to economize blood and money. Moderation in private and public expenditure, respect for and love of justice, and compassion if not actual esteem for the poor human species, and for that portion of it called the people, that is held in such contempt merely to have the right to crush it. Poor Europe, land of slaughter and plaything of conquerors![41]

The decision to highlight the period of the Directory in this volume was taken consciously and for a reason: It was at precisely this time that a new dimension of the war appeared in its relationship with the republic. For Frenchmen from every background, as for other Europeans, the association

of war with the republic was henceforth clearly established, and the form of the question had become: Why a *republican* war?

A number of interacting factors explain the complex ramifications of this debate. The period was rich in developments: 1795 and the question of natural frontiers; 1796 and the campaign in Italy; 1797 and the setting up of the sister republics (eight in all between 1795 and 1799); and the Realpolitik imposed by Bonaparte, with the sacrifice of Venice but consolidation of the Cisalpine Republic. The failed French expeditions to Ireland (1796 and 1798), usually overlooked, merit closer scrutiny. Whatever France's goals (liberation, conquest, or merely forcing England to sue for peace?), sending arms and troops to support Irish separatists was never disinterested or distinct from its ideological mission.[42] The pace further quickened in 1798 with the invasion of another former republic, Switzerland, and the setting up of the Roman Republic, the only sister republic planned by the Directory, not forgetting the Neapolitan Republic, the only sister republic not recognized by the Directory. These factors together make it impossible to approach the Directory and the question of the war as a single entity; instead, each individual case must be contextualized carefully according to its specific circumstances and in relation to the domestic political situation in France.

The new war, fought as of 1795, could no longer be justified using the concept of the *patrie en danger* or the theme of legitimate defence that had been among the driving forces of patriotism and had welded the nation to the young French Republic between 1792 and 1794. The victorious campaigns of 1796 and 1797 rekindled the debate on the meaning of the war and its relationship with the French Republic.[43] Educated opinion in the eighteenth century knew that republican Rome perished once it became an empire. Montesquieu's reflections on the decline of the Roman Empire were equally familiar; and he was also known as a reader of Machiavelli and the *Discourses on the first decade of Titus Livius* (1517). At this historical juncture three solutions existed. France's victorious republic could be transformed into an empire under the control of a victorious general, France could adopt the former diplomatic practice of the eighteenth century and use its territorial conquests as bargaining chips, or France could set up genuine sister republics.[44] Or, of course—since history is seldom as tidy as the analytical categories used by historians—the young republic could appear under all three guises in succession or simultaneously.

The implications of these diplomatic questions were not limited to bilateral relations between states. They were felt also at the level of the populations, who, if they could not be persuaded of the qualities of the republican model, still had to be integrated into the politicization process implied by active citizenship and acceptance of the nature of the regime. In Europe this was an issue in countries like Belgium and Italy where religious feeling was strong. But it also arose in the French colonies, where the abolition of slavery and the introduction of the Republic had sometimes been accomplished

in chaotic conditions. In the French West Indies in particular, the question of the war was central because it not only made slave emancipation possible but—and the point has too often been overlooked—also made possible an experiment in republican integration, by opening the armies of the Republic, including the officer corps, to black recruits. The coming to power of Bonaparte halted this process definitively, black officers being *de facto* excluded from the French armies by the introduction of a model of military advancement controlled from Paris.[45]

The United States experience of a republic born in war suggested another solution, that of a European federative republic. It is for this reason that we must now return to the end of the Directory period and consider the project for a federation that democratic republicans put forward as the ultimate goal of the war associated with the republican idea. In 1798, Matteo Galdi published his *Discours sur les rapports politiques et économiques de l'Italie libre avec la France et les autres États de l'Europe* (1797), in which he defended the concept of a grand federation that ideally could incorporate not only the European sister republics but also the United States. Galdi illustrated his pan-republican project by translating the republican constitutions into several languages.[46] The dream of a European federation as the ultimate objective of a war that first started in 1792 and resumed in 1796 was never realized, despite the proposal made late on by the republican and democratic deputy Briot, who in the summer of the Year VII took up the call for a federation of European republics.[47] Notwithstanding the failure of that proposal, all sincere republican observers possessing the philosophical and political culture of eighteenth-century diplomatic affairs had reached the conclusion that the future of Europe could only lie in shared government of a republican nature, in a forthcoming federation of countries, which was the sole guarantor of peace.[48]

Our volume of essays will suggest answers to the question of whether this was a utopia that the war rendered impossible, or whether the age of revolutions really was the matrix for a European governance, which, though it has attained an era of peace, still has some way to go if it is to become republican. Underlying the structure of the book is a dual dynamic, intentionally ambitious by its scope and by the complexity it imposes, in which an attempt at conceptual refinement is combined with case studies in sharply contrasted geographical contexts. While preparing the volume, and as the team of historians advanced in their research, there emerged a triptych of conclusions—spanning what Robert Palmer dubbed 'the era of democratic revolution'—that connected with a broader historical paradigm, one in no sense predetermined, and that warranted reflection. First, the revolutions of the second half of the eighteenth century carried within them the seed of the republicanism of the new regimes. Revolution was republicanized. Second, the invention of modern republics was akin to a process in which nations constructed their sovereignty by acceding to emancipation through a violent

means, heavily charged with political significance: War. Last, a characteristic of this war—explicit in some settings, implicit in others—was that of being a war of independence. Establishing a new polity went together in subtle and complex ways with the pursuit of a victorious peace, and thus with waging all-out war against the colonizing power or against the dominant dynasties, represented as powers that had accorded themselves the right to intervene in the affairs of the nascent nation.

This upheaval, unique in the history of the Atlantic rim, illustrated a scenario which, though not taking an identical form everywhere, constructed a revolutionary bond or at least a complicity between societies on either side of the Atlantic via a chain of events linking revolution, war of independence, republic, and citizenship. The antithetical movement of antirevolutionary or counterrevolutionary reactions and resistance would have been unrealistic to ignore or underestimate given its dramatic impact on the conditions attending the birth of the republics, and on the mutual violence inflicted by armed revolutionaries and their counterrevolutionary opponents. The task here is to understand how, in asserting the independence of new territories organized by new constitutions, the revolutions were able, not by accident but by design, to come to terms with and indeed embrace the risk of war while at the same time working to create new forms of diplomacy.

The first part of the book casts light on this subtle relationship between a republican model, an acceptance of war, and a new diplomacy. In addressing the question of the North American origins of the French war, Antonino De Francesco draws a comparison between the American War of Independence and the war to save *la patrie* in France, conflicts that each gave birth to a new nation. Virginie Martin and Marc Belissa then explore the originality and specificity of republican diplomacy, whose basis in military victory seemed the only way for the French Republic to secure recognition with dignity. A close and necessary link now developed between obtaining clear decision on the field of battle and establishing the republic on the political scene. That is one of the first conclusions from this book. The fact of having a revolution or setting up a republic was not enough to gain admittance to the concert of nations: Recognition had to be earned. Brissot's political talent lay in having understood this point. Viewed from this perspective, there is nothing surprising about the attraction that the French model exercised on European patriots, most notably the United Irishmen and Wolfe Tone, studied by Sylvie Kleinmann. Coming to Paris in 1796 via the United States, the Irish republican personified the 'international' of republican combatants who were to export and adapt the French model, thus transposing the struggle to other locations, beyond the frontiers of France, notably in the adventure of the sister republics.

Part two focuses on the republics set up in various continents, direct products of revolutionary war, and which laid the bases of citizen

government or founded institutional edifices, some of them ephemeral, others lasting. Four geographical settings are studied: the United States, France, Italy, and Saint-Domingue (which later became Haiti). In all four the birth of the republic occurred in dramatic circumstances. The politics of sovereignty symbolized by the drawing up of constitutions only became a reality when defended by armed force. It was at this juncture that the notion of the citizen in arms was forged. For the American nation, the patriot and minuteman personified a new image of individualism on which to base a modern collective consciousness. In practice this was not realized without difficulty, and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol reveals the limitations of the system when black soldiers sought recognition of their role as citizens. A somewhat different historical experience for France is documented by Annie Crépin, who shows how the collective dimension of the war effort to save *la patrie* created a democratic 'crucible' from which the republic emerged, but with the clear risk of giving a successful military a dangerous degree of power over civilian institutions. A remarkably deft transition is provided by Katia Visconti's study of the 'experiment' held in Milan, in which she highlights the ambiguous character of the Cisalpine Republic, at once subordinated to Bonaparte's tutelary authority and yet refusing to become a mere satellite state of France. A first step towards cementing national unity came with the creation of a Lombard national army, which raised awareness of the potential for self-defence and hence for preserving independence of action. In this instance, too, the birth of national consciousness came in the tumult of war. The fourth and final setting is the Caribbean, and specifically Saint-Domingue, the subject of Frédéric Régent's essay. In this instance, an element of tragedy accompanied the birth of a republic that is unimaginable without the agency of war. By arming the former slaves, the war at a stroke gave them a strength that they later chose to transform into independence, rejecting the return to the docile, slave-based colony envisaged by Bonaparte after 1802.

This helps to explain why the birth of the republics brought violent upheaval to part of the world, turning parts of Europe and America into a battlefield. The far-reaching transformations in the societies concerned included the creation of new norms that situated the republican identity on the side of martial qualities. In a closely argued essay, Judith A. Miller shows how such notions of manliness and warrior masculinity—especially through their exhibition on the stage—emerged eventually as dangerous and destabilizing elements in republican societies kept in a state of permanent military alert. These conditions help to make intelligible the inherent risk of a *coup d'état* facing the republics that had come into being through armed struggle. Bernard Gainot's study shows how the French soldiers present in Central Italy were perceived as an army of occupation. Today's liberators were tomorrow's occupiers. A trap closed on this particular conception of the republic: However effective as administrators, the French

soldiers would be seen inevitably as foreign occupiers and provoke resistance. The last two contributions—Mario Tosti on the Papal States and Pedro Rújula on Spain—are both concerned with environments that proved refractory to republicanization in any form. Yet, paradoxically, they illustrate one of the lessons of the dangerous relations between war and republic: The counterrevolution would feed on republican war to re-cement national unity, around throne and altar in Spain, around *Sanfedism* and the old dynasties in Italy. The republic was viewed here as a heresy to be combated, and the violence of the resistance it encountered gives an indication of how unwilling populations across Europe were to accept the republican form. War in this case was not an inevitable outcome or the fruit of circumstances; it was one of the conditions of the historical link between revolutions, wars of independence and the birth of modern republics. One conclusion emerges clearly: What began in 1776 for America, 1792 for France, 1796 for Italy, 1798 for Ireland, and around 1810 for South America's liberation from Spain was a connection between the founding of republics and wars of independence, whose long history awaits scholarly explication. The studies that follow are the results from a first effort in this direction, and are intended to take us a stage further in our understanding of the birth of the modern world.[49]

Notes

1. Translated from the French by Sylvie Kleinman, revised, with additional material, by Godfrey Rogers.
2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Principes du droit de la guerre: Ecrits sur la paix perpétuelle*, ed. Blaise Bachofen et al. (Paris, 2008).
3. On eighteenth-century philanthropic projects and their limitations, see *Jean Jacques Rousseau: Politique et Nation: Actes du Deuxième colloque international de Montmorency* (Paris, 2001).
4. François Boissel, *Les entretiens du père Gérard sur la Constitution politique et le Gouvernement révolutionnaire du peuple François* (Paris, 1793). Mention also must be made of the decisive influence on this generation of Mably, notably his *De la législation, ou principe des lois par L'abbé de Mably* (Amsterdam, 1776). The entire system of law resulting from the sovereignty of nations was to rest on the idea of peace as the foundation of the domestic social pact and the guiding principle in foreign relations.
5. Boissel, *Les entretiens*, 179.
6. Ibid. 180.
7. Boissel, 'Article premier du principe fondamental de la constitution universelle et de son organisation politique', in Idem, *Les entretiens*, 111.
8. Robespierre held a complex position, of course, not opposed to war as such, yet aware that civil war as a form of internal war was a higher priority than the conflict at France's frontiers urged by Brissot in late 1791 and the spring of 1792.
9. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, historians like Michelet explored the relationship between construction of the *patrie* and the war, in some cases regretting it, as did Jean Jaurès, who nevertheless acknowledged that republican

ideas were exported and propagated by France's armies and administrators. Jean Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, ed. Albert Soboul, 6 vols (1900; re-ed. Paris, 1971), vol. 4, *La Révolution et l'Europe.*

10. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (1963; repr. New York, 2006), 7.

11. Gabriele Ranzato (ed.), *Guerre fratricide: Le guerre civili in età contemporanea* (Turin, 1994); Jean-Clément Martin (ed.) *La guerre civile entre histoire et mémoire* (Nantes, 1995); and, for a chronological development, Jean-Claude Caron, *La guerre civile en France au XIXe siècle* (Seyssel, 2009).

12. See his series on the horrors of war, 'Los desastres de la guerra', in *Goya l'œuvre gravée*, ed. Elie Lambert (Paris, 1948), xiv–xxv.

13. Stig Förster, 'The First World War: Global Dimension of Warfare in the Age of Revolutions 1775–1815', in *War in Age of Revolution 1775–1815,* ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Cambridge, 2010), 101–134.

14. See Mallet du Pan, *Correspondance inédite avec la cour de Vienne, 1794–1798*, ed. Hippolyte Taine (Paris, 1884).

15. Robert Palmer, *Twelve Who Ruled: The Committee of Public Safety during the Terror* (Princeton, 1941).

16. Marc Bloch, *L'étrange défaite* (Paris, 1946). The text was written in 1940 following the humiliating defeat of France by Nazi Germany. In it Bloch refers with pride to his ancestor who was a soldier in the army of 1792.

17. To accept this as a working assumption we must, of course, divest ourselves of the revolutionary rhetoric about the certainty of victory (or death), a standard means of political mobilization. Also to be discarded, however, is the second source of ideological confusion—that of the Third Republic educating and inculcating generations of children with the Valmy myth in which a few thousand ill-equipped soldiers repulsed the Germanic hordes opposing them, constructing the *revanchard* policy for 1870, and constructing the line of thought that inextricably linked the republic and its citizens under arms with certain victory. See John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactic in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–1794* (Urbana and Chicago, 1984); and Alphonse Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française: Origines et développements de la Démocratie et de la République, 1789–1804* (Paris, 1901), 272–274.

18. Dominique Margairaz, *François de Neufchâteau: Biographie intellectuelle* (Paris, 2005).

19. Jean-Paul Bertaud, *Quand les enfants parlaient de gloire: L'armée au coeur de la France de Napoléon* (Paris, 2006) and *Guerre et société en France de Louis XIV à Napoléon 1er* (Paris, 1998); and Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London and New York, 2002).

20. Particular caution is required when defining this still largely unresolved debate, since the questions raised concern the entire eighteenth century. How could the rationalization of war and the instruction and discipline of combatants influence all areas of European society, as suggested by Michel Foucault? Michel Foucault, 'Les corps dociles', in *Surveiller et punir* (Paris, 1975), 137–151. Equally, how did enlightenment utilitarianism and the invention of state knowledge in the service of subjects—the origin of the concept of public service—come to influence theorists of war like the Comte de Guibert? [Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte], Comte de Guibert, *Stratégiques, recueil de texts*, ed. Jean-Paul Charnay and Martine Burgos (Paris, 1977); and Eric Brian, *La Mesure de l'Etat*: *Administrateurs et géomètres au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1994). For an overview see Rafe Blaufard, *The French Army 1750–1820: Careers, Talent, Merit* (Manchester and New York, 2002).

21. Jean-Paul Bertaud, *1799, Bonaparte prend le pouvoir: Le 18 Brumaire An VIII la République meurt-elle assassinée?* (Brussels, 1987).

22. Jean-Paul Bertaud, *La révolution armée: Les soldats citoyens et la Révolution française* (Paris, 1979).

23. Eugenio Di Rienzo, *Marc Antoine Jullien de Paris (1789/1848): Una biografia politica* (Naples, 2000). For Julien as editor of the *Courrier de l'armée d'Italie*, see pages 159–200.

24. Bernard Gainot, 'Le livre du soldat français par le général Championnet, 1799', in *Héros et héroïnes de la Révolution Française*, ed. Serge Bianchi et al. (Paris, 2012). General Championnet, in fact, was continuing the work of the deputy Léonard Bourdon (commissioned by the Convention) in publishing and distributing throughout France the *Recueil des actions héroïques et civiques des républicains français, contenant les trois premiers numéros, précédés de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme, et de la Constitution*, nos 1–4, ed. Léonard Bourdon; no. 5, ed. Antoine Claire Thibaudeau (Paris, Year II [1793–1794]).

25. Annie Crépin, *Défendre la France: Les français, la guerre et le service militaire de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Rennes, 2005), 7, who at the beginning of her book cites Claude Nicolet: 'Second only to religious metaphors are the military metaphors and terms used by republicans: civil wars, as in 1848 and 1871, military disasters or crises as in 1870, 1914 or 1940, have always linked, by some binding destiny, the fate of the Republic to the bearing of arms....' Claude Nicolet, *L'idée Républicaine en France, 1789–1924* (Paris, 1982), 396.

26. Alan Forrest, *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory* (Cambridge, 2009).

27. Jean-Yves Guiomar, *L'invention de la guerre totale, XVIIIᵉ–XIX ᵉ siècle* (Paris, 2004).

28. Annie Crépin, *Histoire de la conscription* (Paris, 2009).

29. A detailed discussion of David A. Bell's book is posted on the IHRF website under '*Controverses* entre Pierre Serna et David Bell', http://ihrf.univ-paris1.fr/spip.php? article320 (10 July 2012).

30. David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (Boston and New York, 2007), 15–20.

31. Idem, 'Declaring Peace, Declaring War', in *Total War*, 84–119.

32. Bernard Cottret, *La Révolution américaine: La quête du bonheur* (Paris, 2003), 208–251; and Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1969).

33. A connection can then be assumed between revolution and global civil war, as suggested by the development of Hannah Arendt's thinking during the 1960s, with the rise of protest movements among America's disaffected minorities, but only if the links between all revolutionary wars are taken into consideration, starting with that for the birth of the United States.

34. Paul Michael Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London, 1987)**.**

35. Bertaud, *1799, Bonaparte Prend Le Pouvoir*.

36. Pierre Serna (ed.) *Républiques sœurs: Le Directoire devant la Révolution atlantique* (Rennes, 2009).

37. Marc Belissa, *Repenser l'ordre européen (1795–1802): De la société des rois aux droits des nations* (Paris, 2006). Virginie Martin's recent thesis has for the first time made it possible to understand the birth of republican diplomacy and its role in the war: 'La diplomatie en Révolution: Structures, agents, pratiques et renseignements

diplomatiques: l'exemple des diplomates français en Italie (1789–1796)', thèse de doctorat, 3 vols (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2011).
38. Antonino De Francesco, *1799: Una storia d'Italia* (Milan, 2004).
39. Annie Jourdan, *La Révolution batave entre la France et l'Amérique, 1795–1806* (Rennes, 2008).
40. Bernard Gainot, *1799, Un nouveau jacobinisme? La démocratie représentative, une alternative à brumaire* (Paris, 2001).
41. Volney to Jefferson, 10 May 1803, in Gilbert Chinard, *Volney et l'Amérique d'après des documents inédits et sa correspondance avec Jefferson* (Baltimore, 1923), 138.
42. Sylvie Kleinman, 'Libérer ou exploiter? L'Irlande dans la stratégie diplomatique et militaire de la France (1792–1805)', in *Les Horizons de la politique extérieure française Stratégie diplomatique et militaire dans les régions périphériques et les espaces seconds (XVIe–Xxe siècles)*, ed. Frédéric Dessberg and Éric Schnakenbourg (Brussels, 2001), 283–296.
43. Michael Broers, 'The Concept of "Total war" in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Period', *War in History* 3 (July 2008): 247–268.
44. Andrew Jainchill, *Reimagining Politics after the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism* (Ithaca, 2008).
45. Frédéric Régent, *La France et ses esclaves*: *De la colonisation aux abolitions, 1620–1848* (Paris, 2007); Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004); and Philippe Girard, 'Napoléon Bonaparte and the Emancipation Issue in Saint-Dominique, 1799–1803', *French Historical Studies* 32/4 (Fall 2009): 587–618.
46. Matteo Galdi, *Constitution des républiques française, cisalpine, et ligurienne avec l'acte d'indépendance des EUA dans les quatre langues française, anglaise, allemande et italienne* (Paris, Year VII [1798–1799]).
47. Briot's speech to the Assemblée des Cinq Cents, 12 Fructidor Year VII [29 August 1799], *Moniteur*, 16 Fructidor Year VII [2 September 1799].
48. Gino Longhitano, 'Industry, Government and Europe: From the Mercantilists to Saint Simon', in *Rethinking the Atlantic World: Europe and America in the Age of Democratic Revolution*, ed. Manuela Albertone and Antonino De Francesco (London, 2009), 180–200; and Pierre Serna, 'Rigomer Bazin et la Restauration: Penser la République dans la Monarchie', in *AHRF* 325 (2001): 53–76.
49. Pierre Serna, 'Every Revolution Is a War of Independence', in *The French Revolution in Global Perspective*, ed. Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson (Ithaca, NY, 2013), 165–182.

Section I
Calling for 'Republican' War

1

The American Origins of the French Revolutionary War[1]

Antonino De Francesco

The most famous of all debates on the reasons for war or peace for a new order—one that could be described as revolutionary, as the creator of a more just and superior political model—must certainly be the one that took place between December 1791 and January 1792 at the Jacobin Club in Paris. On the one side stood Jacques Pierre Brissot, who believed in a war against the whole of Europe in the name of bringing liberty to other peoples; and on the other Maximilien de Robespierre, who feared that such hostility would give rise to a dramatic backlash against the precarious political equilibrium of revolutionary France.[2]

From Jean Jaurès onwards, to stay within the limited and rather reassuring sphere of twentieth-century historiography, no one has ever disagreed with this assignation of roles.[3] Even today, among those who accept the reconstruction of events in terms now considered quite conventional, there still seems no doubt that the two men must be played off against each other. Brissot cannot be spared from an accusation of political adventurism, which encouraged him to play with fire in supporting war. His ruinous choice explains his lack of success, historiographically speaking. Robespierre, in contrast, is always seen as having resisted bravely the Jacobin Club's dramatic drift towards warmongering. The confrontation between the two, although won by Brissot in 1792, led to the scholarly consecration of Robespierre's political astuteness.[4]

This crystallization of positions, which easily surmounted successive waves of historiographical revision in the second half of the twentieth century, ran along the groove leading from Jaurès to Albert Mathiez, but found particular expressive force following the First World War.[5] It was then that Mathiez brought his disagreement with Alphonse Aulard to a head, denouncing the latter for his democratic interventionism.[6] This argument was taken up quickly by his pupil, Georges Michon, known today for his study of the Feuillants, but who from 1920 onwards, and with increasing intensity during the 1930s, managed to refine the paradigm of Robespierre's

27

pacifism.[7] With regard to this point, however, it should not be forgotten (and, indeed, Norman Ingram reminded us) that Michon's balancing act between the roles of academic and socialist activist was a difficult one.[8] His troubled relationship with the SFIO (the French Socialist Party) came to an end—in the 1930s, in fact—with his move towards the Planism-influenced right wing of the CGT (the General Confederation of Labour). During the years of the civil war in Spain, that more conservative movement criticized the warlike tones of the French Communist Party while stressing that France should adopt a resolutely pacifist position.[9]

Michon explained this choice both through writings on revolutionary history and through militant contributions to newspapers, drawing a clear analogy between 1792 and his own period. His views were accepted by other academics who were equally engaged politically.[10] Gaston Martin, for example, reading Michon's work, suggested that France should not espouse a position on the war in Spain.[11] Moreover, with the countdown towards the confrontation between France and Hitler's Germany underway, Michon continued to use the example of Robespierre to demonstrate that military force could never defeat fascism. Thus, in 1939, on the 150th anniversary of the French Revolution, Michon, along with Georges Albertini (the future companion of the collaborationist Marcel Déat), put his name on certain articles presented by the historian Georges Lefebvre, which seemed to evince an opposition to the war.[12] Shortly after the fall of France, with the German occupation well advanced, Michon returned to the theme of revolutionary war. His words left little doubt that his pen was in harmony with the socialist currents that remained susceptible to Hitlerian flattery.[13] More proof of this would come from Albertini himself in 1944.[14]

The example of Michon, in other words, arouses the suspicion that the reconstruction, first by Jaurès and then by Mathiez, of Robespierre's pacifist image (and therefore also of the warmongering logic of Brissot) had ended up producing a monster. Soon this idea was nourished by the disagreement of some with the interpretation, in a national and patriotic context, of Lefebvre's historical exploration of 1789 during the events of 1939.[15] As I have suggested so far, the reconstruction of the duel between Brissot and Robespierre was shaped forcefully by the political preoccupations of the moment and of the historian, and those later analyses had little connection to the actual politico-ideological stakes of the 1791–1792 confrontation.

Much has occurred since 1939, of course, and, if Robespierre's pacifism continues to surface on occasion, there is no doubt that a more measured perspective has been rediscovered.[16] A strong belief in the necessity of war has been attributed to Robespierre that, in the clash with Brissot, he never intended to conceal.[17] Yet, there is still no convincing study that can explain why Brissot, and not Robespierre, emerged so clearly the winner of that dramatic confrontation. Today, the Jacobins' decision to risk playing the war card is still ascribed solely to Brissot's party, which prevailed according to

the testimony of Camille Desmoulins, only because the Brissotins had the support of the provincial societies on their side.[18] This theory, which already was circulating in the early months of 1792, was not one that would be given up soon. It was used as a foundation for the polemical attacks which, following the birth of the Republic, would energize the political challenge launched by the Montagnards against the Girondins.[19] Even given this state of affairs, however—with Paris on this occasion in the minority compared with the provinces—the original question still has no answer: namely, how was it possible for Brissot to bring the majority of patriotic France over to the side of war?

This essay proposes to examine Brissot's political discourse in order to identify which arguments within his rhetorical arsenal allowed him to prevail in his confrontation with Robespierre—a confrontation that was seldom face to face. Comparing their speeches, it seems clear that the example of the American Revolution was the polemical weapon that allowed Brissot to vanquish his adversaries. He deployed the example repeatedly, and it was destined to increase in intensity during the course of his replies to Robespierre. Although Robespierre attempted to counter it, he never completely succeeded in robbing the subject of its effectiveness.

It was no coincidence that Robespierre's weakness on this specific point was spotted by his great ally Desmoulins. Quickly after the debates, in order to delegitimize Brissot, Desmoulins claimed that Brissot's blatant Americanism was proof of a secret agreement between Brissot and Lafayette.[20] The charge was not difficult to sustain, for only a few months before, in April 1791, Brissot had published the three-volume *Nouveau Voyage dans les Etats-Unis* [*New Voyage through the United States*]. This work, much appreciated on the other side of the Atlantic as well, developed in detail his belief in a revolutionary nexus that would bind the two countries tightly together.[21]

In the work, Brissot did not hesitate to remind his readers how indebted France was to the United States for 'the glorious revolution that brought liberty'. Elsewhere, however, he shared his concern that the events of 1789 did not constitute a definitive victory.[22] The possibility remained that the dramatic English precedent from the seventeenth century could repeat itself in France. After all, the English Revolution of 1640 had lost momentum quickly and allowed General Monck to counterattack.[23] It does not appear that Brissot was thinking specifically of Lafayette in these circumstances, as in that very month of April 1791 the general had resigned his command, for the moment, of the National Guard. Lafayette's withdrawal aroused the deep misgivings of Brissot's *Patriote François*, which, because of Lafayette's experience in North America, had treated him as the most dazzling example of the patriotic officer.[24] The lack of legislative and government action aimed at the complete rebirth of the French nation was regarded as both evidence of, and responsible for, a waning of the revolutionary spirit. This accusation

originated mainly with the heartfelt apprehension at the ascent to power of the so-called triumvirate composed of Barnave, Lameth, and Duport. Those three constitutional monarchists had risen in prominence after the death of Mirabeau in 1791. Their first suggestions to the Constituent Assembly, starting with the wealth requirement that deprived part of the citizenship of electoral rights, seemed to herald a sharp attack on equality.[25]

For this reason, faced with an attempt to bring a conservative end to the revolutionary process, Brissot once again took up his pen to propose the American example of a republican ethic that alone would be able to keep France from returning to the old order. The problems appeared to be nearly insurmountable: Only legislative action could sever the many ties to a past of servitude and thus prepare the way for the birth of a new ethic in the French nation along the lines of the United States. In relation to this, Brissot was conscious, however, that he would have to play his cards at the moment of the drafting of the constitution. That constitution, he suggested, should follow the model of the United States Constitution in three salient ways: the elective nature of all positions, the brief interval of time assigned to legislative power, and the multiple constraints placed on executive power.[26]

In this way, he implicitly declared his own republicanism, taking care to confirm his preference for a political system in which the people were sovereign and the holder of executive power was allowed to hold that position for only a defined period. Brissot was certain about the best way to influence the assembly's preferences regarding the nature of the constitution: The Jacobin Club, which he had joined only recently, would play the fundamental role. It would be the club's responsibility to promote the improvement of the citizenry, and to put pressure on the assembly for a suitable array of laws and specific educational measures that would foster in the French the same ethic that the North Americans had exemplified so extraordinarily.[27] In this way, the United States' political model, viewed as the instrument to promote a new social order, was contrasted sharply with the English model and continued to guide Brissot through the difficult political choices that were to come.

Confirmation of his views—as is well known—followed swiftly after the royal flight to Varennes in June 1791. In a climate of fear created by the possibility of an attack by the European powers, Brissot declared himself openly in favour of the Republic, first in the columns of the *Patriote François* and then in the speech to the Jacobins of 10 July 1791.[28] In the circumstances, the example of the United States constitution proved useful to demonstrate the necessity that, from then on, the holder of executive power should be not only elected but also surrounded with powerful restraints on his actions. The events of the American Revolution, moreover, provided the means with which to refute the insinuations of those who claimed that it would be impossible to remove Louis XVI without incurring the armed wrath of the principal European powers.

Faced with this eventuality, deploying references to precedents offered by classical republicanism as well as events of the modern age (from the Dutch Revolt to the English Revolution of 1640), Brissot was careful always to make particular mention of the American Revolution in order to suggest that the French people should be ready to take up arms. The arguments he used were taken from the repertory of the national collective imagination which the North Americans themselves had brought into being so briskly. Brissot reminded people how only the colonies' passion for liberty had led them to victory after seven years of struggle against a far stronger enemy. The evidence lay in the colonists' ability to resist after the first series of defeats, in the heroism of Doctor Warren in the defence of Bunker Hill, and in the courage of Washington's soldiers before the Battle of Trenton. It was the thirst for liberty that had made the difference, which had encouraged entire German regiments to desert and rally to the American flag. That example would be repeated quickly on the Old Continent, because, Brissot proclaimed, 'the American Revolution gave birth to the French Revolution; this latter will be the sacred spark that will unite all the nations whose masters dare draw near to it'.[29]

Brissot, faced with the threat of intervention by foreign powers in that dramatic summer of 1791 when it seemed that France was going to become a republic, hypothesized a repetition of the North American events. He was at pains to stress how the baptism of warfare would generate a renewed French sense of nationhood, when the Old Regime would be overthrown definitively in the name of liberty.

Events went differently at first, as is well known: Brissot's speech, both democratic and warlike, at the Jacobin Club earned him both a candidature to the Legislative Assembly in September and—in contrast—ferocious attacks from the most reactionary sectors of French political society.[30] It is worth noting that these assaults were the product of an orchestrated campaign of denigration against a politician—Brissot—who had become one of the most prominent figures among the king's adversaries. Better than any other statesman, precisely because of his constant references to the United States model, he represented the republican spirit of the time.[31] Evidence of his pre-eminence is provided by the fact that his speech of 10 July was printed in the United States very quickly, with a preface in which the translator Joseph Nancrede, a professor of French in Massachusetts, emphasized the importance of the initiative:

The part the author has acted and his opinion on the subject, declared in so formal a manner, must render it so much the most interesting to this people, so conversant with the liberties and rights of mankind, as the example of her courage and political knowledge has been the great focus where France has acquired her liberties. America cannot but see with pleasure a diffusion of sentiments which their author imbibed during his residence here.[32]

Elected to the Legislative Assembly, not without a great deal of difficulty, Brissot pushed forward his ideas, starting from his very first intervention at the end of October 1791. Here, with the proposal to extend the revolutionary dynamic to foreign policy, he maintained that no threat against the armed counterrevolutionaries on the frontier made any sense if the warning did not include also the German princes who were providing them with protection.[33] In favour of repressive measures directed at the counterrevolutionaries, he therefore would have viewed with some interest the echo of this request that came, even though under the orders of Louis XVI, from the new War Minister Narbonne that December.

The court's unexpected alignment with those who wanted a war against the emigrants gathered at the frontier, however, did produce the first fissure within the Jacobins. Robespierre, who again, just a few days before, had demanded armed intervention, was suspicious that the flag of patriotism run up by the court concealed some deception. He immediately proposed that such enthusiasm be reined in.[34] Brissot, however, kept to his line. His first speech on the war, held at the Jacobin Club on 16 December 1791, was aimed at reuniting a society that had been divided greatly by the question of an armed attack on Coblenz, a topic that was a favourite with the king himself.

Nothing in Brissot's first speech, however, offered a glimpse of the proposal that he flung out during the debate, a demand for a war on all Europe in the name of liberty. His objective in the first address was, rather, to support an intervention along the border to punish the 'protectors of rebels' in the name of a war of liberty and not a war of conquest. It was a manoeuvre already provided for in the constitution and rendered necessary by the intrigues that the emigrants continued to foment in the very heart of the country.

In more detail, Brissot was careful to emphasize that the war was necessary in order to consolidate freedom. He maintained that the risks were low, for none of the great powers would move to assist the counterrevolutionaries. At the same time, such an act of aggression, an extraordinary and unique occasion to sharpen the spirit of sacrifice, would both renew a sense of solidarity in the soul of the nation and be a source of education to the new generations: It would lead to 'a nation invigorated, unspoiled, moral' because, against the persistence of the Old Regime, 'only war can bring heads to the same level and revive the soul'.[35]

It was precisely at this point that he inserted repeated references to the American Revolution, saying that France should follow the model from across the Atlantic where 'seven years of war are worth . . . a century of morality'. France should neither fear the betrayal of the army—which would come to the same end as the traitor Benedict Arnold—nor harbour the suspicion that a victorious king could put an end to the revolution, for 'Washington could not find thirty soldiers to support his treachery. We French are worth

as much as the Americans and we will not have the king-Washington.'[36] As Brissot argued, the American Revolution was useful for exorcising all anxieties relating to the possibility of the conflict's unpredictable consequences, as well as for accepting the challenge of executive power. He had no intention of relaxing his guard in the face of this contest. The unity called for by the minister in the name of a now imminent war depended—as he told it— on the behaviour of the court alone. The certainty that the nation would foil any eventual plot induced him to confront the government openly, suggesting that 'if he be a patriot, then the Jacobins will become government secretaries and royalists'.[37]

Put in these terms, it was seen that Brissot's belligerence was a clamorous challenge to the Crown and, what is more, that he was fighting on terrain chosen by the government. He was in no doubt at all that France would emerge a better nation from the war and that the cause of liberty and equality would gather force in just such a dramatic context. The republican question, which Brissot carefully avoided through the use of singular rhetorical artifice, still stood out as the foundation stone of his argument.[38] To see the game the court was playing while at the same time denouncing the Feuillants' thirst for power meant keeping the Jacobins, who had first demanded war on the emigrants, at the centre of political debate.[39] It signified, moreover, opening the way for the nation's extraordinary resources, its patriotic energies. The country's regeneration through aggression would render an authoritarian solution impossible, flinging open the door to usher in a political society wholly in line with that of the United States.

Brissot's intervention immediately worried Robespierre. Robespierre was unhappy with the casual way Brissot was inclined to concede everything to the court—including entrusting responsibility for the hostilities to the generals Lafayette, Rochambeau, and Luckner, notoriously close to Louis XVI—simply in order to involve the court in open warfare. For this reason, Robespierre attempted unsuccessfully to stop the immediate publication of Brissot's speech and hurried to make himself heard by the Jacobins just two days later. The eloquence of Brissot's speech, however, obviously had had a great impact on those present. Robespierre, in response, found himself forced to couch his own, contrasting, arguments, within the terms defined by his opponent. Thus, from the very beginning, Robespierre was obliged to declare a similar desire for war, while framing it in the context of the national interest. He therefore suggested that they should first attack the enemy within, and only then, if it still existed, the enemy beyond their borders.

While Brissot gave his support to an assault across the border to make the court show its hand, Robespierre turned the matter on its head. He recalled history's lesson that, in political periods bristling with factions, every war fostered the birth of military ambition. Julius Caesar, Cromwell, and Pompey demonstrated how war was used to turn armed forces, recruited for other objectives, against the cause of liberty. History likewise taught that no people

had succeeded in establishing liberty in the face of civil and religious conflict that was accompanied by a frontier war: nor could the illusory references to the recent events in America hold up, for, in fact, this example alone was enough to pour light upon the insubstantiality of Brissot's political decisions. Did the Americans have to fight both fanaticism and treachery within and on their borders against a league armed against them by their own government? And since, with the help of a mighty ally led by Washington, and aided by the mistakes of Cornwallis, they triumphed against all odds over the tyrant who made open war upon them, does this imply that they would have won had they been governed by the ministers and led by the generals of George III?[40]

Thus, daring to describe the situation as a snare set by the court, Robespierre declared that it was not opportune to 'declare war at the present moment'. He claimed that the Legislative Assembly instead should respond to the manoeuvre by ordering the manufacture of weapons and their immediate distribution to the National Guards. The people themselves should be equipped only with pikes, while further exceptional measures should be arranged, all aimed at bringing treacherous ministers to trial and continuing with the repression of counterrevolutionaries and refractory priests. Moreover, even if, despite everything, war was still declared, the Legislative Assembly should prosecute the minister Narbonne immediately and sequester the property of all the counterrevolutionaries, in order to reassure the nation concerning the will to repress the intrigue at the very heart of the country.

In this way, criticizing the deputies for being carried away by the wave of collective emotion instead of enlightening French society about its true interests, Robespierre was able to conclude with his famous words that opposed the launch of hostilities: 'Tell us no more that the nation wants war. The nation wants the efforts of its enemies confounded and its interests defended by its representatives: in the eyes of the nation, war is an extreme measure and the nation wants nothing to do with it.'[41]

Although care should be taken not to isolate this passage from the context of the total argument, however, it appears clear that Robespierre's position was anything but pacifist. Instead, he believed that preparations should be made to resort to arms in the eventuality—one that should indeed be hoped for and certainly not feared—that the *redde rationem* with the court would be reached. And it is important to stress how Robespierre, too, even though from an opposing perspective with regard to Brissot, maintained the United States as a definite point of reference. It constituted a mirror designed to reflect, as a clear antecedent, the ideal of a people's war against their sovereign.[42]

This was an option that others—such as Billaud-Varenne—would take up, but with which not everyone in the antiwar faction agreed.[43] Even Desmoulins, for example, while to a large extent going along with Robespierre's arguments, was careful to distance himself from the United

States model, instead using Machiavelli and his precedents in the classical world to demonstrate the inevitable authoritarian drift of every war.[44] The young Machenaud alone—this, however, only in the weeks that followed—openly protested against the war in the name of a civilizing process free from the horrors of violence.[45]

For this reason, Brissot, aware of how the example of the United States had electrified the Jacobins, held firm to his line. He proposed the events across the Atlantic as the birth date of a world made anew, and one that France now was assisting to flourish marvellously on the old continent. Given those ideas, it is worth reading his second speech to the Jacobins, given on 30 December 1791. It followed a parliamentary intervention the day before, in which he continued to draw attention to the international situation.[46] In the society's headquarters, responding to the host of criticisms, he reminded his listeners to be fully aware of the intrigues organized by the executive and not to doubt for a moment that the court intended to review the constitution in order to introduce a second house and restore political honour to the nobility. Speaking before those who accused him of falling into a trap, however, he reminded them how, thanks to the United States, humanity now stood at the beginning of a new political era and that traditional categories were no longer useful to understand the events of the last few years. There existed, in fact, an irresistible urge towards liberty that had spread from the United States to the whole of Europe. On this side of the Atlantic, France constituted the powerful lever ordained to work upon this desire.[47] This argument made it impossible to employ either the political precedents of antiquity or those of the early modern age as valid comparisons. Responding to Robespierre's objections that no people ever had established liberty while fighting against both internal and external enemies simultaneously, Brissot once again advanced the idea of going to war, on the grounds that nothing comparable to the French Revolution had ever taken place before: 'But why should we care about the existence or not of such a thing? Does there exist in ancient history a revolution such as ours? Can you show us a people that, after twelve centuries of slavery, has won back its liberty? We shall create what has never before existed....'[48]

Brissot went on carefully to corroborate this point of view. He first dismantled all the historical precedents that seemed to contradict it and then listed the numerous examples drawn from the American Revolution that helped legitimize it further. The episodes of ancient Rome and the Dutch Maurice of Nassau were to be regarded by now as mere false analogies: Revolutionary France was a world so distant from them that nothing in the past could possibly bear comparison. In contrast, in order to demolish Robespierre's doubts, Brissot employed events from United States history to support his claims. The victories of Trenton, Saratoga, and Yorktown confirmed how a revolutionary people could rise above a lack of training and means. Obscure colonial officers like George Washington, or physicians such as Warren, or

bookshop owners like Knox, could become extraordinary soldiers, capable of making life difficult even for a professional military man as experienced as Cornwallis.

Following the example of the United States, another new people, those who inhabited all of France and who formed the bastion of the Revolution, thus were called upon to bring about the transformation of the entire old continent. They would do so through an offensive war that would become a war of liberation from the chains of the Old Regime. To bolster his conviction, Brissot explained that the news of a possible French attack on Coblenz had already roused Belgium and Holland. He announced that a simple declaration of war would be enough for those peoples to rush to free themselves from the despots who had ruled over them for too long. Thus the idea of a crusade for liberty was born—one that would destroy the external threat and that nothing from within would be able to halt. Challenging Robespierre once again, he charged the people of France with the duty to oppose the plots that certainly would arise within the country, but at the same time he reiterated how, faithful to the name that the Jacobins had given themselves, the intervention would not erupt into an armed insurrection (as Robespierre predicted) but rather would be an 'insurrection that would not disturb public opinion'. This revolt would pave the way for a review of the constitution and, in consequence, the elimination of the monarchy.

Robespierre responded to this new speech by Brissot, once again at the Jacobins, with two more interventions in the first few days of January 1792. He attempted to dismantle Brissot's argument by pointing out the differences between the events in the early United States, to which he paid respect, and those that seemed to loom on France's political horizon. As before, however, he had no intention of casting doubt on the sacred nature of a war in the name of liberty:

> as much as Brissot do I love war with the aim of obtaining the kingdom of freedom and I too could indulge in the pleasure of predicting all the marvellous things it would bring. Were I master of the destiny of France, if, at my own pleasure, I could manage its resources and its forces, I would have sent an army to Brabant long ago, I would have brought succour to the people of Liège, I would have smashed the weapons of the Batavians: such expeditions are meat and drink to me.[49]

In contrast to this declaration of principle, however, Robespierre quickly added that he never had considered declaring war on those 'pygmies' gathered at the border and that his interest was directed towards the terrible 'enemy within' that gave them support. His whole speech was directed fundamentally against the court and its reputation, once again in terms of its implausible warmongering, and as the place where the plot to bring the revolution to an end had been masterminded. Faced with such a

threat, Robespierre insisted that the challenge of an offensive war should not be accepted, all the more so given that the arguments in favour of a decision of this sort made use of comparisons that he interpreted as paradoxes.

> Why should we heed, for example, your long and pompous dissertations concerning the American war? What is there in common between an open war fought against tyrants and a system of intrigues led by the government itself against the birth of freedom? If the Americans had triumphed over English tyranny fighting under the banner of England and the orders of its generals against its own allies, then the American example would be useful. We could also cite the example of the Dutch and the Swiss, had they trusted in the Duke of Alba and the princes of Austria and Bourgogne to revenge their outrages and to ensure them their freedom. What do we care for the quick victories over the despotisms and aristocracies of the universe that you sing of to the tribunes? As if the very nature of things should bend so easily to the fancy of an orator![50]

His denunciation of Brissot's demagogy did not stop here, but was repeated in his references to the international situation: Robespierre once again defined the example of the United States in opposing terms, excluding the idea that the country, by itself, had made the liberation of France possible, just as 1789 had not liberated the rest of Europe automatically. In fact, he made no bones about the difficulty of such a venture and declared himself unfortunately to be convinced that Europe's Old Regime was much stronger than Brissot, in the wilds of his fantasy, would have them believe. From here he returned to his call for a preliminary war on the 'enemy within', resorting in this case to the very example provided by both the American Revolution and the Parisian 14 July: 'Successful moves are those made directly against the tyrants, such as the American insurrection or the 14 July. But war at our frontiers, provoked, guided, by the government, in the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, is a move in the wrong direction, a crisis that may lead to the death of the political body.'[51]

   At this point Robespierre could resume his attack once again on the court and Brissot, convinced neither by Brissot's modernizing verve (the analogy with Rome in his opinion remained more than valid) or by his ambiguity with respect to the appointment of Lafayette as the head of the army. Where Robespierre found himself in agreement with Brissot, however, was in the hope that the great betrayals that Brissot wished for would truly come to pass: Only in this way would the longed-for insurrection take shape. This hope, however, seemed a frail one: up to that point, the adversaries had shown themselves capable of great guile. Thus, the risk of opening hostilities under the banner of the court remained what it had always been.

In other words, it would not be the patriots who would profit from the dramatic repercussions of the war. Instead, thanks to the actions of some general suddenly covered with glory and honours, it would be the enemies of the revolution themselves who would benefit.

By the time Robespierre returned to conclude his oration just a few days later, however, the political situation had suddenly transformed: from 4 January onwards, it had become clear that the court did not truly believe in the military operations. The *Patriote François* insisted on its faith in the new political ideas of the moment and claimed that it had been correct to accept the executive's challenge regarding the issue of a preventive war.[52] Not only that, but two days before Robespierre's intervention the editor of the *Sentinelle*, Louvet, had spoken out. Louvet backed the reasons for war and condemned Robespierre's speech, while simultaneously clarifying Brissot's new line: a declaration of war against the enemy beyond the frontiers and at the same time a show of force against the 'enemy within'.[53]

When Robespierre rose to address the Jacobins, then, his position had been weakened further and he was forced to express his ideas in contrasting terms. While confirming that it was necessary to be suspicious of the court and emphasizing once again the illusory nature of employing the illustrious precedent of the United States to interpret the political circumstances of the present, he relaunched his plea for a popular mobilization directed at eliminating internal opponents.[54] In this context, he was able to put forward his own proposal for a generalized war, which went from unmasking plots within the country to opening fire on Leopold II of Austria and all the other tyrants of the earth:

What reawakening, encouraged by the energies of its representatives, people win back the courage that for a moment makes all oppressors shiver; we crush the enemies within; war against conspirators and despotism and then to march on Leopold; march on all the tyrants of the earth, these are the terms with which a new orator—who, at the last sitting, supported my principles in the pretence he was fighting them—demanded war; it is to these terms and not to the cry of war or commonplaces of war for so long appreciated by this assembly, that we owe the applause with which he was honoured. It is with these terms that I myself demand war. What am I saying? I go much further than my adversaries themselves: because if these terms are not approved, I again demand war; I again demand war not as an act of wisdom, not as a reasonable solution, but as the resort of desperation. I demand war with another condition, which no doubt is a matter of agreement between us; because I do not think that the war party wants to deceive us. I demand war as it has been painted for us. I demand war as the genius of freedom will declare it, as the French people themselves will have it, and not as the vile intriguers might wish it, and as ministers and generals, even patriots, might wish us to have it.[55]

With a highly effective oratorical manoeuvre, Robespierre, therefore, was able to appeal to all the nation's revolutionary forces (from the men of 14 July to the soldiers of Châteauvieux, from the citizens of Comtat to the numerous National Guards) in order to mobilize them against Leopold II and at the same time to insinuate that Brissot would have placed them all under the orders of the court and Lafayette, thus neutralizing that extraordinary conscription. 'I will speak frankly', Robespierre argued, 'if war, such as I have presented it, is impracticable, if it is the war of the Court, the ministries, the patricians, the intriguers, that we are forced to accept, then, far from believing in universal liberty, I cannot even believe in yours.'[56]

He concluded with the hope for a future time when it would not be the peace of tyrants that would sustain the fate of humanity, but instead an exterminating sword for every form of despotism. It was a conclusion which nonetheless left the way open to reinaugurate the war against Leopold II, if only those who had been in favour of it for so long were wise enough to couple it to a reinvigoration of the revolutionary struggle within France.

This option was adopted quickly by Brissot. Since the end of December he had been careful to insist repeatedly on the necessity of internal revolutionary measures. On 18 January 1792, speaking at the legislature, along with calling once again for a crusade for liberty, he proposed that counter-revolutionaries should be treated with great severity.[57] In his third speech to the Jacobins, given two days later on 20 January, he again criticized Robespierre, while summing up his own position. It was easy to demonstrate how Leopold II already had a hostile attitude towards France and how the court, certainly not coincidentally, had abandoned all pretence of wanting war. It followed that the sovereign had cast off his mask, and, in cahoots with Leopold II, had shown an inclination towards hostilities only to frighten the revolutionary front and force it, under the fear of war, into political submissiveness. Brissot, thus, was able to conclude that his own political proposal—to declare war first—was the correct one, as it would have been possible to deal with aggression outside French territory in a more advantageous way. Thus, he touched on the crucial point of the management of the war, resolutely putting distance between himself and Lafayette and at the same time declaring his conviction that Lafayette's role in the war would have been minimal. The war, as Robespierre himself had declared repeatedly, was a people's war.

With this conclusion to his speech, it could be said that the reasons for his disagreement with Robespierre had almost been overcome, provided that both of them could find common ground on the necessity of declaring war, this time simultaneously both within and outside the country.[58] The president of the session was quick to realize this, and suggested an embrace between the two contenders, a fact emphasized by the *Patriote François*. The newspaper noted how Robespierre had 'declaimed his affection for M. Brissot and invited the assembly to deal again with the important question of war in

order to examine the measures necessary for its success and he aroused the hope that both he and M. Brissot will find easy agreement on this point'.[59]

As is known, however, Robespierre, while agreeing to the embrace, had maintained all his own reservations in relation to the actions of Brissot. On 26 January, Robespierre made a third intervention against the war, obstinately recapitulating all his criticisms of Brissot's political standpoint.[60] Robespierre's denunciations were of no use, however, given that Brissot's positions, all directed at exalting a revolutionary war based on universalistic values, were shared by the vast majority of the Jacobins. The reasons for Robespierre's defeat remain in question, and, in this regard, an influential part appears to have been played by the constant references to the United States precedent with which Brissot peppered his warmongering rhetoric. It is certainly not mere chance that Robespierre treated the subject with kid gloves, attempting to make distinctions between the North American events and those which were appearing on the French horizon, without, however, denying the fundamental importance of the former. The recognition of the inspirational value of the American Revolution, which Robespierre always supported firmly, was such that his references to France's different nature and backwardness in comparison to the American colonies' resplendent devotion to homeland produced the opposite effect, guaranteeing an extraordinary lift for the war party at the heart of the Jacobins. From this perspective, it was precisely Robespierre's inability to develop a critical stance on the model of the United States that weakened his position. The War of Independence became, in the Jacobin imagination, the shining path to victory that beckoned them forward.

This aspect was clear at once to some of Robespierre's supporters. Delacroix, intent on demonstrating that Robespierre was an authentic revolutionary and Brissot a mere intriguer, noted how the opinions of those who rejected the idea of an offensive war implied

> remaining . . . in your homes and on your frontiers, armed from head to foot; so you must prepare yourself for a war of positions and imitate the Americans who made war in their homes; so, you will always have the advantage of terrain and the easy supply of your provisions; you will not violate your sublime declaration of peace for the whole world; you will not take the scourge of war to another people.[61]

The insistence on the example of the United States indicates how the reference appeared obligatory in order to oppose Brissot on the grounds that appeared to have given him such a decisive advantage. For the same reason, other Jacobins, noting the defeat of Robespierre's position, thought it was opportune to change direction rather than rely on that same historical precedent. Firmly rejecting the model of the United States, they pointed out that the choice of an offensive war could give rise to scenarios that harked

back to the English events of the seventeenth century. An example was pro-
vided by the actions of Desmoulins, after the *Patriote François*, still under
Brissot's control, accused him of wanting to close the legislators' eyes to
the dangers of gambling. From that moment on, Desmoulins tried to dis-
credit Brissot in every possible way, first with the libellous *Brissot démasqué*
[*Brissot Unmasked*], in which he collected all the allegations that the reac-
tionary movement had been concocting against Brissot for a long time.
When hostilities erupted, Desmoulins' new journal, the *Tribune des patriotes*,
gave credence immediately to the insinuation that Brissot and Lafayette were
bound by some hidden agreement. More curious is the fact that in these two
works Desmoulins began to display a timely awareness of English revolution-
ary history. The first proof of this change in strategy was offered by *Brissot
demasqué*, in which Desmoulins accused his opponent of being a 'round-
head', quickly adding in a footnote that the term used to describe the men of
Cromwell had been readopted in recent times by some officers in Lafayette's
entourage.[62] In the first edition of his new journal, the *Tribune des patriotes*,
entirely given over to denouncing Lafayette's political activities, Desmoulins
moreover seized the occasion to attack Brissot savagely, referring repeatedly
in this context to the English events of 1640.[63] Shortly after, with the war
by now underway, Desmoulins denounced a secret accord between Brissot
and Lafayette, which in public was revealed by their respective enthusiasm
for the United States, but which in private sought to reproduce the results of
1640.[64]

   The argument is not a new one, for one recent interpretation has explored
how the group of Cordeliers showed great interest in classical republicanism
and how the English example of the seventeenth century was a sure point of
reference for wide sectors of French Jacobinism.[65] The interventions against
the war, however, suggest some doubt about the depth of awareness and
consequently about the completeness of the ideological context in which
similar references took shape. It is astonishing to think, in fact, that, as far
as Desmoulins was concerned, his knowledge of the English Revolution was
based fundamentally on his reading of the work of Paul de Rapin de Thoyras,
the French Huguenot who had escaped to England and whose writings were
much appreciated by Hume.[66] Desmoulins made repeated references to its
pages, in fact, in order to draw analogies between the war then in progress
and the one that brought Cromwell to power.[67] Such insistence, however,
seems to indicate that this recourse to the precedent of 1640 was the con-
sequence of a specific political circumstance rather than the product of an
original political culture. In other words, it was not the reflection of a widely
defined ideological universe, but, rather, the simplest means of breaking
the revolutionary French–American link that provided the basis for Brissot's
successful concept of an all-out war on Europe. The outcome of the debate
on war, won by Brissot through his repeated use of the North American
precedent to define the French context, thereafter would only convince

Desmoulins to put distance between himself and that particular relationship, in order to rummage through the storeroom of history for other precedents and other analogies. The example of the English Revolution was, in other words, a mere polemical instrument, which the difficult progress of French military operations and Lafayette's political confidence had brought usefully into play, conjuring up the menacing figure of Cromwell's ghost. Thus, the revolutionary war, begun in the name of universalism and universal liberty, actually soon would be presented as a counterrevolutionary threat. This dramatic shift, the result of the events of 1792, would decide the destiny, not only of the monarchy, but also that of a budding republic—one which, born in the wake of defeat, certainly would not be able to lay claim to origins modelled on the famous undertaking across the Atlantic.

Notes

1. Translated from the Italian by Stuart Wilson.
2. The reference is to Jean Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, 8 vols (Paris, 1922–1924).
3. Jean Jaurès (1859–1914), the socialist leader and historian, author of *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, 8 vols (Paris, 1922–1924).
4. Exemplary in this regard is David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (Boston and New York, 2007), 111–119.
5. Albert Mathiez (1874–1932), historian and founder of the Société des Etudes Robespierristes, as well as the author of more than 20 books on the French Revolution.
6. James Friguglietti, *Albert Mathiez: Historien révolutionnaire (1874–1932)* (Paris, 1974), 152–158. Alphonse Aulard (1849–1928) held the first chair of the French Revolution at the Sorbonne from 1885–1922.
7. Georges Michon, *Essai sur l'histoire du parti feuillant: Adrien Duport* (Paris, 1924); Idem, 'Robespierre et la guerre, 1791–1792', *Annales révolutionnaires* 12 (1920): 265–311. But also see the observations of Sergio Luzzatto, *La Marsigliese stonata: La sinistra francese e il problema storico della guerra giusta, 1848–1948* (Bari, 1992) [Sergio Luzzatto, *L'impôt du sang: La gauche française à l'épreuve de la Guerre Mondiale, 1900–1945* trans. Simone Carpentari Messina (Lyon, 1996), 123]. The Feuillants were a group of constitutional monarchists who emerged in July 1791 after Louis XVI and his family attempted to flee France. The Feuillants opposed a war declaration, fearing in particular that it would radicalize the Revolution further.
8. Norman Ingram, 'Repressed Memory Syndrome: Interwar French Pacifism and the Attempt to Recover France's Pacifist Past', *French History* 18 (2004): 319–330.
9. David Bidussa, 'Gli intellettuali e la questione della pace, 1938–1941', in *Vichy, 1940–1944*, ed. Denis Peschanski (Milan, 1986), 69–92.
10. Georges Michon, *Robespierre et la guerre révolutionnaire, 1791–1792* (Paris, 1937), 8: 'Has posterity learnt from the teaching of Robespierre? Apparently not, judging by the incomprehension of the democrats and socialists that in the great majority remain partisans of the wars of liberation.'
11. See Georges Martin, 'Le "camarade Robespierre" ', *La République*, 14 January 1936; and also Idem, 'Trois discours de Robespierre', *La République,* 15 June 1937.

12. See Georges Lefebvre, *La Révolution française* (Paris, 1939), 91.

13. Michon, *Le rôle de la presse en 1791–1792: La déclaration de Pillnitz et la guerre* (Paris, 1941), 26–39.

14. Georges Albertini, *Le parti de la guerre depuis 1789* (Paris, 1944), with a preface by Dominique Sordet, who wrote: 'there has always been since 1792, a party, both to the right and to the left, which advocates the adventure of war. Invariably, the adventure turns out badly.'

15. On the role of Georges Lefebvre concerning the act of distancing oneself from pacifism in the 1930s, see Antonino De Francesco, 'Daniel Guérin et Georges Lefebvre, une rencontre improbable', *La Révolution française* 2 (2010), document accessible online at: http://lrf.revues.org/index162.html.

16. In particular, Maximilien Robespierre, *Pour le bonheur et pour la liberté: Discours* (Paris 2004), 8–19.

17. Michael Rapport, 'Robespierre and the Universal Rights of Man', *French History* 10 (1996): 312–315.

18. 'The society was split into two parties for four months and these parties, which tore each other apart, took their names from the two members who were most often on the stage, for or against the war, Robespierre and Brissot. Brissot seemed to have the majority there but Robespierre almost always had the unanimity of the tribunes.' *La tribune des patriotes, ou journal de la majorité* 1 (30 April 1792): 29–30.

19. This is the basis of the accusations of federalism made against the Girondins from the Republic's first weeks of life. See Antonino De Francesco, *Il governo senza testa: Movimento democratico e federalismo nella Francia rivoluzionaria, 1789–1795* (Naples, 1992), 65–71.

20. See in this regard the repeated mentions in no. 1 of *La tribune des patriotes* entitled 'Commençons par vous, M. Lafayette'. Marie-Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, the former Marquis de La Fayette, was a hero both of the American Revolution and in France after 1789, when he had taken the leadership of the National Guard. By late 1791, however, Lafayette had adopted moderate views that would lead him over time to be at odds with the Revolution's radicalization. At the time of these debates, he had the command of the Army of the Centre and then of the Army of the North.

21. Jacques Pierre Brissot, *Nouveau voyage dans les Etats-Unis de l'Amérique septentrionale fait en 1788*, 3 vols (Paris, 1791). For the awareness of the new edition in the United States, see the *Columbian Centinel* 41 (1 February 1792): 161.

22. Brissot, *Nouveau voyage*, vol. 3, 16.

23. Ibid. vol. 1, ix.

24. See the *Patriote François* 622 (22 April 1791).

25. Ibid. 594 (25 March 1791).

26. Brissot, *Nouveau voyage*, vol. 1, xxvii.

27. Ibid. xiv.

28. See the *Patriote François* 683 (22 June 1791) and *Discours prononcé par M. Brissot à l'assemblée des Amis de la Constitution le 10 juillet 1791 ou tableau frappant de la situation actuelle des puissances de l'Europe* (Paris, 1791).

29. Ibid. 5.

30. Eloise Ellery, *Brissot de Warville: A Study in the History of the French Revolution* (Boston, 1915), 216–223.

31. Simon Burrows, 'The Innocence of Jacques-Pierre Brissot', *Historical Journal* 46 (2003): 843–871.

32. Brissot, *A Discourse Upon the Question Whether the King Shall Be Tried? Delivered Before the Society of the Friends of the Constitution*, at Paris, at a Meeting, 10 July 1791, trans. P. J. G. de Nancrede (Boston, 1791), iii–iv. See also the report in the *Columbian Centinel* of 19 October 1791.

33. *Archives parlementaires* (*AP*) *de 1787 a 1860*. Première série, 1787 a 1799: recueil complet des débats legislatifs et politiques des Chambres francaises (Paris, 1969), vol. 34, 468–469.

34. See Robespierre's speech to the Jacobins of 28 November 1791, in which he claimed war to be absolutely necessary. Maximilien Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, 9 vols, ed. Marc Bouloiseau et al. (Paris, 1958), vol. 8, 24–25 and 35–36.

35. Brissot, *Discours sur la nécessité de déclarer la guerre aux princes allemands qui protégent les émigrés, prononcé le 15 décembre 1791* (Paris, 1791), 15–16.

36. Ibid. 14.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid. 21–22.

39. Ibid. 22–24.

40. Robespierre, 'Sur le parti que l'Assemblée Nationale doit prendre relativement à la proposition de guerre, annoncée par le pouvoir exécutif, prononcé à la Société le 18 décembre 1791', in *Oeuvres,* vol. 8, 60–61.

41. Ibid. 64.

42. 'I sum up. War must not be declared now. First we need weapons made everywhere without pause; we need to arm the national guards, we need to arm the people, if only with pikes. . . . ' Ibid. 63.

43. 'Certainly, Messieurs, Pennsylvania would not have entrusted Washington with the conquest of its liberty if after the break with the Metropole he had become the flagrant courtesan of George III; or, if the Americans had made such a mistake, it would surely not be the only place in the civilised world where true freedom reigns at last.' J. N. Billaud-Varenne, *Discours sur cette question: Comment doit-on faire la guerre, au cas qu'il faille la déclarer?* (Paris, 1791), 13.

44. Camille Desmoulins, *Discours sur le parti que l'Assemblée nationale doit prendre relativement à la proposition de guerre, annoncée par le pouvoir exécutif* (Paris, 1791).

45. 'What others could not achieve by devastation, fires, assassinations (because war is nothing but a great duel) we will achieve through wise, humane laws, which will spare the blood and property of citizens.' F. Machenaud, *Second discours sur la guerre et les moyens de sauver l'état* (Paris, 1792), 24.

46. *AP,* vol. 36, 29 December 1791, 600–612.

47. 'Find a point of leverage to move the universe against tyranny and the universe is free. Now, we have this point. What do I mean? There is one in each hemisphere, the USA in one, and France in the other. So here we have two eternal manufacturers of general liberty, two refuges for those who find it nowhere else.' Brissot, *Second discours sur la nécéssité de faire la guerre aux princes allemands* (Paris, 1792), 14.

48. Ibid. 15.

49. Ibid. 75.

50. Ibid. 79–80.

51. Ibid. 86.

52. *Patriote François* 883 (10 January 1792).

53. Jean-Baptiste Louvet, *Discours sur la guerre, prononcé à la Société le 9 janvier 1792* (Paris, 1792).

54. 'instead of reciting the exploits of people who have conquered their freedom fighting against their own tyranny, we should consider our circumstances as they are and the effect of our constitution'. Robespierre, 'Suite du discours sur la guerre', in *Oeuvres*, vol. 8, 100.

55. Ibid. 106–107.

56. Ibid. 108.

57. *AP*, vol. 37, 17 January 1792, 464–471.

58. Brissot, *Troisième discours sur la nécessité de la guerre* (Paris, 1792).

59. *Patriote François*, 894 (21 January 1792): 82.

60. Robespierre, 'Troisième discours sur la guerre', in *Oeuvres,* vol. 8, 132–152.

61. Delacroix, *L'intrigue dévoilée, ou Robespierre vengé des outrages et des calomnies des ambitieux* (Paris, 1792) 5.

62. 'It is you Brissot that made yourself the paranymph of your lost cohorts, you with your flat hair, your round head … hiding Lafayette with your caution … that gave a pretext to his satellites to cry aloud for him again … the puritans of Cromwell's times had their hair cut round. Some of Lafayette's aide-de-camps made this republican hairstyle a fashion.' Camille Desmoulins, *Jean-Pierre Brissot démasqué* [Paris, 1 February 1792], 28–29 and 55.

63. 'Now if I go to the Jacobins and take aside one of these determined republicans that always have the word republic in their mouths, J. P. Brissot or G. Boisguyon, for example, if I question them about Lafayette—they would answer to my ear, I judge him to be a republican more than Sydney, more than Washington, or I could well reread the history of all factions and nowhere see this phenomenon, which belongs only to our days, of a man that, placed amongst three different opposing parties fighting to the death … could for four years keep the leadership of all these different parties … Cromwell himself, the Alexander of Tartuffes, was not able to fill this triple role so well'; and 'I open the history of the English revolution from 1640 to 1658 … . I see the main events that happen today are a repetition of these facts.' *La tribune des patriotes*, 12–13, 25–26.

64. Ibid. 12.

65. Rachel Hammersley, *French Revolutionaries and English Republicans: The Cordeliers Club, 1790–1794* (Woodbridge, 2005), 136–158 and, more recently, Idem, *The English Republican Tradition and Eighteenth-Century France* (Manchester, 2010).

66. Concerning Rapin, see Michael G. Sullivan, 'Rapin, Hume and the Identity of the Historian in Eighteenth-Century England', *History of European Ideas* 28 (2002): 145–162.

67. *La tribune des patriotes*, especially pages 118 and 161.

2

In Search of the 'Glorious Peace'?

Republican Diplomats at War, 1792–1799[1]

Virginie Martin

In a memoir to the Committee of Public Safety in the spring of 1793, the French foreign minister Lebrun queried whether the French Republic could—and should—eschew recourse to negotiation.[2] His question concerned the very nature of the war that had begun in 1792. Was it in fact a revolutionary war, a war of 'principles', fought with the aim of liberating all the peoples of Europe, which thus made 'the cannon the great negotiator'? Or was it a war to save the Republic, a war of 'national defence', in which case 'the channel of negotiation represents a natural method'?[3] The question of why the war was being fought and how it could be brought to an end came up repeatedly; with it came another question, that of the role of republican diplomacy in the wars of the Revolution.

In 1792, the French Republic was born in and of the war; in 1799, it died in and of the war. During the summer of 1799 its legitimacy was killed twice over—killed in fact, by the military defeats inflicted by the armies of the second coalition; killed in law, by the 'trial' mounted against its foreign policy by public opinion and the neo-Jacobins. The Republic can be said to have died as the result of a long illness, namely its inability to make peace. The fact that Bonaparte alone managed to bring France out of the war, with the peace treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, was a symptom of this fatal weakness and an implicit disavowal of republican diplomacy. A general of the Consulate had achieved what successive diplomats of the Republic had all failed to do. If republican diplomacy failed or did not try to resolve the revolutionary wars, what needs to be explained is the tacit or perhaps active support it gave to the war, given that the failure of diplomatic negotiations so clearly contributed to bringing down the First Republic.

Curiously enough, these ambiguities in the relationship between war and diplomacy have seldom been studied in their own right, not least because the existence of an inviolable link between war and the Republic has always been taken for granted. The revolutionary wars are presented as the logical

consequence of the political divorce between Europe's monarchies and the French Republic. Whether the diplomatic deadlock was encouraged actively by the revolutionaries themselves (through their deliberate break from the basic protocols of the European diplomatic order), or structurally determined as an objective for their foreign interlocutors (through the hostility of the 'crowned heads' to dialogue with the representatives of the 'vile' regime), it has invariably been interpreted as illustrating the fundamental incompatibility between republican values and the conventions of diplomacy: the incompatibility, that is, between the established and codified practices of diplomatic relations, as laid down for two hundred years or more in treatises on the law of nations, and, on the other hand, the political virtues that the Republic was presuming to export to the courts of Europe using its diplomats as carriers.[4] For most historians, the inference is clear: If the Republic was intrinsically bellicose, the reason lay with its fundamentally proselytizing and subversive character. Whether driven by the narrow interests of national power, or moved by the lofty ideal of exporting revolutionary ideals across Europe, the Republic appeared to rule out on principle the recourse to diplomacy as a weapon for peace. By this logic, extreme belligerence and active propaganda went together, defining a diplomacy whose content was in essence revolutionary rather than republican. Lacking the means or the ambition to become an instrument of negotiation, republican diplomacy was transformed instead into a vehicle for revolutionary propaganda: among its requirements was military expansion, among its expressions was the implausible 'glorious peace', and its inevitable sanction was 'total war'.[5]

It is these assumptions that need to be questioned in an exploration of the complex links between diplomacy and war during the First Republic. Attempting to make sense of those links means 'continuing the integration of a history of ideas with the practices of the executive power'.[6] For republican diplomacy owed as much, if not more, to its practitioners, and to the information that guided their actions, as it did to the ideological positions of the decision-makers in Paris. By comparing political discourse on diplomacy, as studied by Marc Belissa, with the reality of diplomatic practice, it will be possible to measure the disparity between the principles enunciated from the legislative tribune and the instructions the executive issued to its agents, as well as the distortion that affected the norms of official policy when translated into concrete diplomacy.[7] As Michel Biard has done for another category of actors sent out into the field, the representatives-on-mission, what is needed is an analysis of the 'dissonances, of the facts that can cause a practice to move away from its initial theoretical bases', and an exploration of how such dissonance has been a source of invention as much as of dysfunction.[8] Analysing the links between war and diplomacy during the First Republic through the prism of its diplomatic agents thus presents a two-fold interest: first, of understanding why the various plans for negotiation drawn up in Paris between 1792 and 1795 all ended

in failure; second, of putting into broader perspective a phenomenon until now treated solely within the period of the Directory: the takeover of negotiation by the military.[9] The circumstantial dimension of this development is well known: the impossibility of negotiation given the refusal of dialogue by the coalition powers, and the gradual acquiescence of the Directory anxious to retain the support of the military. I shall try to go beyond this, however, and show how both phenomena—the failure of negotiation and the incorporation of the diplomatic sphere into the military sphere—derived from the actual working of the republican executive after 1792. I shall consider the discourse on war and the diplomatic practice of the agents sent to Italy between 1792 and 1799, to identify some elements with which to answer three questions. First, did the Republic perish because it lost—in Lebrun's words—'the final kind of war, the war of negotiations'?[10] Second, did the Republic corrupt diplomacy to the point that it was no longer the 'art of peace' and became 'another means of waging war'?[11] And, lastly, was it because the Republic's diplomats had always seen themselves not as agents of peace but as auxiliaries of the Republic's armies, that through their actions and writings they became a permissive or even a contributory factor in the pursuit of war?

Diplomatic agents, theorists of war: The rhetoric of belligerence

A revolutionary regime defines its diplomatic culture relative to a pre-existing international order according to three types of response: rejection and isolation (of which war is the expression), efforts to overthrow or subvert neighbouring states (through revolutionary propaganda), and, lastly, an attempt to establish normal relations with these states (through negotiation).[12] In this regard, it is striking to observe how much the option that consistently dominated the discourse of the diplomatic agents diverged from that being advocated at exactly the same time in Paris. In the case of Italy, while the central government in Paris favoured negotiation, the diplomats were concerned only to extend the war.

There is broad acceptance for the view that, once diplomatic solutions had been rejected, the only outcomes for the revolutionary wars were the total extermination of the counterrevolutionary enemy through military victories, or the conversion of the peoples to the revolutionary ideal through proselytizing. Yet at no point, not even in the most intense phase of the war or at the height of the Terror, did the Republic break off its diplomatic ties with the European states, nor did it ever make propaganda the basis of its international relations. At the level of central government, diplomacy continued to be viewed as a method for breaking the deadlock of war and as the expression of a republican respectability that excluded, at least in theory, the recourse to propaganda.

Under the First Republic, the term 'negotiation' in fact denoted two lines of conduct: first, to prevent the coalition from getting larger, and thus adding to France's enemies, by a scrupulous respect for the neutrality of states that had not sided against France; and, second, to detach individual coalition members by making bilateral peace treaties, and thus adding to the number of friendly or neutral states. In the legend spun by the Thermidorians, most prominently Cambacérès, these two strands of republican diplomacy dated from the 'reactionary turning point' of the summer of 1794, whose expression in the diplomatic sphere was the abandonment of the revolutionary diplomacy of the Terror in favour of a moderate diplomacy.[13] In reality, however, they were the very foundations of republican diplomacy. This diplomacy had always had two targets: one was the coalition powers with whom dialogue had to be restored so as to loosen the coalition's stranglehold; the other was the 'secondary' states, who were to be supported in their neutrality and perhaps even won over to the idea of a 'counter-league'[14] or 'counter-coalition'.[15] The provisional Executive Council, under the influence of Danton, first experimented with this two-pronged diplomatic approach in the autumn of 1792. It was generalized by the first Committee of Public Safety after the decree of 13 April 1793,[16] and applied in a piecemeal fashion by the second Committee until July 1794.[17] From the spring of 1793, therefore, diplomacy was viewed as a means to give other countries an interest in the prospect of peace and union with France, while after the turning point of Thermidor it was instead seen as a means for 'dictating peace' to the belligerents by negotiating with them from a position of strength.[18]

Within this general framework for negotiation, between 1792 and 1795 the French executive accorded particular attention to Italy. Its aim was to use every available means to maintain or recover neutrality for the Kingdom of Naples, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the republics of Genoa and Venice, but also to continue the negotiations engaged with Austria and Britain. Italy, therefore, had to be kept out of the theatre of war and remain the preserve of diplomacy. Except for a few isolated and small-scale military operations, this moderate diplomatic line was maintained in Paris until the spring of 1796.[19] France's diplomatic agents in Italy, however, took the diametrically opposite position and championed a pro-war policy. As early as 1793, they were arguing that Italy was where the glorious peace—though the concept did not yet exist—could be secured.

From 1792 onwards, the pro-war thrust of diplomatic discourse shifted from the register of rhetoric to that of obsession. A discourse legitimating war was a constant feature of the period and enjoyed unanimous support in diplomatic circles. Nearly all the agents, regardless of their rank, length of service, or political opinions, sought to convince the executive power of the need to continue and extend the war in Italy. Self-appointed theorists of war alongside the military men, they produced a steady stream of strategic

and tactical commentaries on the forms of military intervention, so that the majority of diplomatic reports from this period in fact read like campaign plans. In this way, the diplomatic agents made a crucial contribution towards a definition of war—'war as it should be', in John Lynn's phrase.[20] Yet this pro-war discourse stood in contradiction to the campaign plans (focused on the Rhine) and the negotiating plans (focused on the neutral powers) being defined in Paris at the same time.

Most of the French diplomatic agents posted to Italy between 1792 and 1795 drew up plans for military attack, with no interruption or even slackening in this output over the period as a whole.[21] So, although it was their job to apply policy changes and explain them abroad, the agents seem not to have viewed the diplomatic change of direction marked by the decree of 13 April 1793 as a reason for adopting a different kind of diplomacy towards the Italian powers.[22] On the contrary, in 1793 as in 1792, all stuck to their theory about the need to extend the war to the Italian peninsula. In addition, the great majority of these campaign plans recommended a military operation against Piedmont and against the Milan region via Genoa, a course of action at odds with the policy of conciliation towards the neutral states followed between 1793 and 1794.[23] By proving that Genoa's neutrality was in fact false or feigned, the diplomats were seeking to legitimate the violation of its territory. For the French Foreign Ministry, Genoa was one of the Republic's indispensable markets for food supplies and for that reason had to be conciliated, but the city was also 'the key to Italy', the compulsory point of passage for any invasion of the peninsula. Lastly, after the summer of 1794, and going against the Thermidorian doctrine of '*paix partielles*' with individual states and respect for neutrality, the French diplomats in Italy drew up more campaign plans than ever before, but with one crucial difference: The earlier one-off projects limited to clearly defined geographical and strategic zones were now replaced by plans for a general invasion. Slowly but surely, a project was taking shape for bringing the Italian peninsula under French control.

By setting out in their dispatches the main lines of this 'fictitious' war, the French diplomatic agents helped to create and legitimate the idea of the Italian campaign, and ultimately to ensure its translation into reality. By attempting to define both meaning and direction for the war, they were trying to make up for the inconsistencies and failures of the government. The executive repeatedly demonstrated that it was incapable either of prosecuting the war or of bringing it to conclusion, lacking as it did a well-defined plan of campaign and a consensus about how to capitalize on military victory or about what was to become of French territorial conquests. As a result, the diplomatic dispatches reflect a continual telescoping of two discourses: one on the neutrality that it was the task of the diplomats to monitor, reinforce, and measure; the other on the war that they wanted to see exported to Italy. A kind of schizophrenia thus ran through

the diplomacy of the Republic. Officially, its agents had the mission of consolidating and assessing Italian neutrality, yet at the same time they were trying to prove its futility to their ministry so as to wield more influence in the definition of campaign plans and diplomatic programmes. The disparity between the orders from Paris about the nature of their diplomatic mission in Italy, and the information they put into their dispatches about the nature of republican war in Italy, reveals two contradictory conceptions of the future of Italy. Not until the spring of 1796 was this contradiction finally resolved, in favour of war and at the expense of diplomacy.

Indirectly, the divergence between diplomatic discourse and ministerial instructions shaped the whole definition of the war waged by the Republic, and may also explain the failure of peace negotiations. The contrast between the plans for war coming out of Italy and the plans for negotiation coming down from Paris illustrates the major problem of how diplomatic practice is adapted to official instructions, that is, the relationship between the theory of war and the practice of negotiation. It has added relevance here in that the diplomatic agents involved themselves as actors in the war: when they used intelligence as a weapon and put it at the disposal of the generals, it was with the aim of seeing their theory of war receive a practical application.

With diplomatic agents as actors in the war and intelligence as an arm of war, Jean-Paul Bertaud has argued that the wars of the Revolution constituted the 'first subversive war' because the battlefield confrontations were also played out as a struggle between competing ideologies.[24] In comparison with earlier periods, diplomats now became key actors in a war of opinion, though one fought less with political propaganda than with military intelligence. Thus, there was not a single diplomatic agent who did not maintain a parallel correspondence with the generals of the Army of Italy, a practice, moreover, long encouraged by the executive. These links, established at a very early stage between diplomats and the military, were reinforced and extended after the spring of 1793 when the first representatives-on-mission were sent out to the armies. It was around this network, formed on either side of national frontiers by diplomatic agents, military men, and representatives-on-mission, that a republican diplomacy of war progressively took shape. The groups involved worked together in three main areas of activity: negotiating loans and dispatching supplies; scrutinizing the preparations of neutral states for the event of military operations; and, above all, gathering intelligence on the strength, positions, and movements of enemy armies. The principal mission of diplomatic agents was, then, to satisfy the needs of the Army of Italy for food supplies and, in particular, for intelligence. The revolutionary wars transformed diplomatic information into military intelligence, and turned a method of negotiation into a means of warfare. More than a negotiator, the diplomat became an auxiliary of the military, since he was the army's eye in foreign territories.

This development is explained in part by the manner in which the intelligence field was organized during the Revolution. Military intelligence came under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not that of war. As Howard G. Brown has shown, the army's central administration included no department dealing specifically with intelligence.[25] At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence was not concentrated in a permanent and centralized unit, but functioned, as it had under the Old Regime and as it would continue to do under the Empire, in a spirit of 'permanent improvisation' and, above all, in a decentralized manner.[26] The vast majority of intelligence missions operated not from Paris but from the diplomatic posts themselves, and were intended to supply intelligence directly to the armies rather than to the ministry. In a real sense, diplomats, to use Bonaparte's formula, became the 'accredited spies' of the army.[27]

This had two consequences. First, the confusion between diplomacy and war that predominated at the level of central government was carried over to the French frontiers as an increasingly close cooperation between diplomatic and military agents. Second, with intelligence 'decentralized' in this way, it became more likely that the political sphere would lose control over it to the military. The close ties forged between the military and diplomats from 1792 onwards account for the ease with which generals under the Directory enrolled part of the diplomatic corps on behalf of their private policy and became free to disregard the course defined in Paris. By taking over diplomatic intelligence and monopolizing access to information about foreign states, the military could steer French foreign policy in the direction it wanted.

From 1792, the close ties between civilian agents and the military steadily undermined the authority of Paris, a process made easier by the tacit support that generals and diplomats received from the deputies-on-mission. Invested with exceptional powers, the representatives had a tendency, particularly in frontier regions, to take over ministerial authority for themselves. While their mission was primarily to secure the material resources for the war, they also acquired a considerable influence in diplomatic affairs through a number of *arrêtés* or regulations, whose extremely broad scope has been demonstrated by Michel Biard.[28] The deputies-on-mission were crucial intermediaries between national and local life, initiators of a form of political decentralization; but, through their close ties with the diplomatic agents over whom in theory they had authority, they also introduced a form of diplomatic decentralization.[29] By lending their authority to the bellicose intentions of the French agents in Italy, they undermined ministerial decisions and brought the war plans that went unheeded in Paris a step closer to execution.

The consequences of this gradual emancipation from ministerial orders are well illustrated by the 'decentralized' and highly personal policy conducted around the Franco-Genoese frontier between the autumn of 1793 and the

spring of 1794 by Jean Tilly, *chargé d'affaires* at Genoa, with active backing from the deputies-on-mission to Nice and Toulon. Five of the latter, all Montagnards, were particularly important: Augustin Robespierre (known as Robespierre le Jeune), Jean-François Ricord, Christophe Saliceti, Paul Barras, and Stanislas Fréron. On three separate occasions in this period, while Paris never departed from its line about the need to respect Genoese neutrality, these deputies-on-mission brought France to a position of war with Genoa.

In October–November 1793, the frontier network took the lead in making diplomatic capital out of an incident to try to prove that Genoa was not 'defending' its neutrality.[30] Advised by Tilly, Augustin Robespierre issued a series of decisions that amounted to a declaration of war against Genoa.[31] At the same time he lobbied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch an expedition against Piedmont and Milan via Genoa, persuading the minister Deforgues to support the need for this expedition.[32] The reports that Deforgues made to the Committee of Public Safety repeated verbatim the arguments of the representatives and diplomatic agents.[33] This pressure did not produce the desired result, however, since on 17 November 1793, at the Convention, Robespierre in person disavowed the actions of his younger brother and restated the necessity for 'civil and military agents to respect and uphold respect for the territory of all friendly or neutral nations'.[34]

Undeterred by this setback, Tilly took advantage of the return to Nice of Robespierre le Jeune, Ricord, and Saliceti in the spring of 1794 to again try to pressure the Committee of Public Safety into action.[35] It is worth noting that by this time correspondence with his own ministry had virtually ceased and was conducted only with the deputies-on-mission in Nice. During the summer of 1794 this group was behind a series of incidents and reports hostile towards Genoa. In mid-July, Robespierre le Jeune travelled to Paris to put before the Committee of Public Safety a plan for a military invasion of Italy prepared with officers of the Army of Italy (notably Bonaparte) and a number of diplomatic agents. In mid-August, without consulting the Commission for External Relations, Albitte, Ricord, and Saliceti sent General Bonaparte to the Genoese Senate to demand repairs to the roads between Genoa and Piedmont—in readiness, that is, for an invasion. Finally, again in August 1794, Tilly informed the deputies-on-mission of a project for the English, Spanish, and Austro-Sardinian fleets to meet up in the Vado roads. The need to prevent this expedition, which in his eyes justified a French attack, met with the approval of the representatives and also of the Commissioner for External Relations, who passed the information on to the Committee of Public Safety. By the end of August 1794, therefore, relations between France and Genoa were again at breaking point.

In early September, however, the replacement of Tilly by Jean-Baptiste Dorothée Villars, and of Saliceti, Albitte, and Ricord by Louis Turreau and François-Joseph Ritter, showed the desire of the Thermidorians to mend relations with the neutral states and to break up a frontier network that had

become too much of a liability and was difficult, even impossible, to control. In practice, however, this new diplomatic course had little effect, since both new deputies-on-mission in their turn opposed the conciliatory policy. They first of all supported Tilly, objecting to his recall and defending his campaign plans, and later issued Villars with orders that completely contradicted the moderate instructions he had received from the Committee of Public Safety before leaving for Genoa.[36] The example of the Genoa diplomatic post demonstrates that these border networks had the capacity to undermine, if not undo, the policy defined in Paris. If the representatives-on-mission gave their backing to the doctrine of war advocated by the diplomats, however, this was because, like them, they got their intelligence from a single source: the '*espions-patriotes*' or patriot-spies.

Use of patriot-spies by French diplomats to keep the Army of Italy supplied with a steady stream of military intelligence dates from the spring of 1793. Events in Genoa three years later, prior to the launch of the Italian campaign, notably the close collusion between commissioner Saliceti, General Bonaparte, diplomatic agents Cacault and Faipoult, and refugee patriots, were a result of the system that had evolved out of the informal networks linking the various groups of participants since 1793.

The fact is that, whether consciously or not, these diplomats made themselves spokesmen for the demands of the patriots, or at any rate vehicles for their concept of war. The patriots had a single goal, the commencement of the Italian campaign, seen as the only means to 'revolutionize' the Italian states. Their whole strategy was geared to convincing the French of the feasibility, utility, and justice of this war, and it is the partisan quality of the information supplied by the patriot-spies that goes a long way to explaining the general consensus that gradually emerged in French diplomatic circles about the necessity of this campaign. The patriots always presented the issue of the French invasion of Italy as inextricably bound up with that of Italian revolution; in so doing they played a fundamental role in the shift that occurred in the writings of the diplomats away from a strictly military discourse and towards a 'political' discourse on war and on war aims.[37]

From May–June 1793, at the request of General Brunet, Tilly built up a network of informants, described by him as 'friends and acquaintances, some acting voluntarily, the others from interest'.[38] This network grew considerably between the spring of 1793 and that of 1794. From Novi, where he had sent an agent to gather intelligence in Tortona and Alessandria, he recruited 'friends' in these two localities, which enabled him to acquire 'new intelligence contacts in Milan and Turin' but also in Livorno, Pavia, and Rome. The same spies supplied him with extremely detailed military intelligence, and revealed the relations between Genoa and the coalition, information that Tilly forwarded to the deputies-on-mission and the ministry. It was also through the Piedmontese, Neapolitan, and Cisalpine patriots who had taken refuge in Genoa, Nice, and Oneglia, and who worked

as spies for Tilly, that he was kept informed of the various conspiracies being hatched in Turin, Naples, and Milan.

The informants based in Genoa at this time also included many members of the 'anti-oligarchical conspiracy'.[39] Tilly openly encouraged this group's projects for reform.[40] More importantly, he gave its main figures protection by enlisting them in various capacities to the French legation. Among these were the apothecary Felice Morondo and the surgeon Pietro Bonomi; a Genoese noble, Marco Frederici, who, with the approval of the deputies-on-mission, was appointed 'commissary to La Spezia, in charge of provisioning for Corsica'; and Lombardi, a man of law who became the 'lawyer of the French nation in Genoa' and served as Tilly's go-between with the Piedmontese conspirators.

Tilly's diplomatic strategy was thus based not on himself openly encouraging plans for a revolution in Genoa, but on according his protection to the patriots who were preparing them, on the pretext of using them as informants. During the summer of 1794 it was on precisely those grounds that Tilly solicited the deputies-on-mission and the ministry for measures to secure the release of his 'protégés', who had been arrested by the Genoese Senate after being found guilty of 'language tending to incite the people to revolt'.[41] For its part, the Senate denounced Tilly's links with the subversive patriots to obtain his recall, invoking for this the principle of non-interference. This example helps to show how the diplomacy practised by certain agents could change its nature and evolve into something quite different: an intelligence network set up for a narrowly military purpose came to be used to encourage underground or clandestine enterprises of political propaganda.[42]

According to one definition, intelligence services are a 'chain stretching from observation of the raw fact through to the action that is the consequence'.[43] Analysis of that chain in the context of the First Republic's policy towards Italy reveals two major dysfunctions. The first relates to the process of producing intelligence. The collection of raw information by spies, mostly of Italian patriot origin recruited by diplomatic agents on foreign postings, and its transformation into intelligence through analysis and synthesis at the hands of those agents, was shaped by a political agenda directed almost exclusively to a single objective: the need for a French military campaign to bring the revolution to Italy. The second dysfunction concerns how this intelligence was transmitted to the decision-making organs. After first passing through the hands of generals and deputies-on-mission, it did not necessarily get as far as the central executive; many orders that should have come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Committee of Public Safety in fact came from decentralized organs. The reasons for the close relations between the military, representatives-on-mission, and diplomats lay in the sources and objects of diplomatic intelligence; the consequence was the short-circuiting of a ministerial policy that did not match their own vision of the policy to be followed in Italy.

The unanimity and persistence over time of the pro-war stance of French diplomacy still raises problems. Why, from 1792 onwards, did the agents advocate an extension of the war rather than negotiations that could have led to peace? Why, without exception, were they so easily influenced or convinced by the arguments of the Italian patriots?

The ideological foundations of war diplomacy: National interest or republican propaganda?

In every one of the invasion projects drawn up between 1792 and 1796, the overriding concern of the diplomatic agents seems to have been the defence of French national interest. For this group, the revolutionary wars represented an opportunity for France to recover a hegemonic position in Europe and thus a means for redressing the military and diplomatic defeats of the second half of the eighteenth century. French diplomacy was probably the place of conception for the Italian campaign, as well as the milieu in which originated the term *la Grande nation* and the ideology of the 'glorious peace'. Yet it was in the same diplomatic sphere that the 'Italian dream' developed, which implied much more than straightforward military conquest. Indeed, the originality of the diplomatic discourse on war derived from the fact that it went much further than a simple campaign plan; it also embraced a far-reaching political project that, though military invasion was certainly a prerequisite for its realization, did not seek the establishment of military control as its conclusion or objective.

Four arguments were advanced systematically to justify the French military intervention in Italy, which, depending on the period and the agents, occur in roughly the same order of importance. These arguments were economic (Italy was the breadbasket of France); strategic (Italy represented a zone of influence to seize from Austria and a market to deny to Britain); military (the intervention would not be difficult); and, finally, political, with the need to avenge 'French dignity' and, in lesser measure, to support the 'friends of the French'. It would be wrong, however, to infer from the predominance of the rhetoric of national interest that French diplomats looked on the Italian states simply as areas for military conquest and the Italian peoples simply as counters in the diplomatic bargaining game. As a motive for going to war, national interest was less polemical, less dangerous, and more consensual, than that of liberating a people, an option with proselytizing connotations and which had never really been on the programme of republican diplomacy. This does not mean that diplomatic agents supported the war only for the reasons they gave officially to the ministry: Extending the war in Italy would, of course, increase the French Republic's preponderance in Europe, but it also meant furthering republican ideas and the republican form of government.

Doubts are permitted, however, as to the sincerity of French diplomats in their commitment to the Italian patriot cause. On that view, the French agents were interested in the patriots only for the military intelligence they supplied and for the material and moral assistance they could give to French armies. Evidence for this can be adduced from the fact that the moves to discredit the Italian Jacobin movement permanently by identifying it with 'anarchism' actually preceded the discovery of the Babeuf conspiracy: One full month before the arrest of the conspiracy's principal leaders, most notably Buonarroti, in May 1796, the French diplomatists had already sealed the fate of the Italian revolution, when they rejected such a course as undesirable.[44] In so doing they were guilty of betraying their patriot allies, deliberately destroying their standing with the ministry before proceeding to sacrifice them on the altar of French national interest, after having used them for a conquest that did not result in the promised and expected Italian revolution.[45] The diplomats had made themselves spokesmen for the revolutionary projects of their Italian sources merely because they thought this would help convince the authorities in Paris of the ease and legitimacy of the military campaign. At the level of diplomatic discourse, national interest had triumphed over the principles of the liberation of the peoples. Thus was the 'dream' redefined: from being Italian it was now totally French. Ultimately, therefore, it looked as if the diplomats had all along approached the patriots with a cynical view of the use they could make of them, an attitude which in some ways looked ahead to the relations of the *Grande Nation* with the sister republics.

In arguing against the thesis of the 'betrayal' by republican diplomats of the Italian revolutionary cause, the first point to stress is the importance of the moral support that French agents gave to the Italian patriotic movement between 1792 and 1795. The diplomats may have taken no direct part in the conspiracies, but they did give them strong encouragement. It should also be remembered that the great majority of the agents, even those with the most radical opinions, held strongly to the idea that the republican war was a novel form of war, one that implied treating the populations with consideration, respecting local conditions (notably in matters of religion and property), and initiating the peoples into liberty, by letting them see that they had more to gain from republican domination than from monarchical rule.[46] Italian emancipation would be achieved first by liberating the Italian peoples from the foreign oppressor, followed by gradually introducing them to liberty under French guidance. Set out by French diplomats as early as 1792, these precepts in fact contain the essence of the Directory's policy towards the sister republics: republics born from military conquest, republics subject to French political control, republics based on the French constitutional model but in which there was no longer a place for revolution.

In this respect the unanimously negative verdict the agents delivered in the spring of 1796 on the project to 'republicanize' Italy reflected their

knowledge that all previous attempts to export revolution by force of French arms had failed, but also the conviction that applying the radical programme of the Italian patriots would have disastrous consequences. Something they could not have realized at the outset was clear to them by 1796: Their response was less a 'betrayal' of the patriot minority than a recognition that it was unrepresentative of Italian public opinion at large and that the aspirations of this enlightened minority were not in tune with those of the 'fanatical' majority. This is why the diplomatic agents all called for a gradual form of republicanization that would be conducted over a longer period and under the firm but disguised supervision of French civilian agents. In this sense, the project to republicanize Italy was not abandoned but simply postponed, made conditional, in fact, on the coming to political maturity of a people viewed as not yet ready for liberty. Rejecting military servitude and also political control, this political project was primarily a programme to reform, through republican education, the *mœurs*, the customs and characteristics of a foreign people. The Italian dream propounded by the French diplomats aimed at slowly returning Italy to its republican roots by giving back to its peoples its republican ways of life: More than a programme to republicanize the states, it was a project to regenerate the peoples. That this dream came to naught under the Directory and turned into a nightmare during the Triennio in no way diminishes the fact that underlying it was a republican ideal of emancipation that was impossible to confuse with the imperial idea of hegemony.

Lastly, it should not be forgotten that those who opposed the republicanization of Italy before the campaign began were the same as those who were later highly critical of the armistice of Cherasco and the series of 'partial peaces' signed by Bonaparte in 1796. The consensus over the diplomatic discourse on war disintegrated once it became apparent that the war actually fought in Italy did not correspond to that imagined and described by the agents, thereby perhaps confirming the defeat of the diplomatic by the military sphere. The advocates of extreme solutions, who sided with the clienteles of military men in order to flout the Directory's orders more easily and to continue the republicanization of Italy by force, were opposed by those who argued the need for republicanism to make itself 'liked' by putting an end to the military control of the sister republics.

To this extent, therefore, the rejection of negotiations between 1792 and 1796, the rejection of the partial peaces of 1796, and the rejection of the status quo imposed by the Directory may all have originated in one and the same principle that conferred on republican diplomacy a more coherent and permanent ideology than appears to be the case. Peace with the kings set limits to French influence in Europe, and, since the two were construed as inextricably linked, limits also to the extension of the republican form. The war was the solution by which to consolidate national power and equally to ensure a republican predominance in Europe based on creating a zone of

influence in the form of the sister republics. In the discourse of diplomacy, therefore, French national interest always went together with republican influence in Europe. It was over the forms of this influence and the actual content of exported republicanism that the diplomatic agents disagreed, first among themselves, then with the executive power in Paris, and finally with the military.

Conclusion

Jean-Louis Soulavie, the Republic's resident in Geneva between 1793 and 1794, summed up neatly the reasons for the failure of republican diplomacy: 'One does not negotiate for a cause one dislikes, any more than one fights or passes laws for it.'[47] The reluctance of the French agents to apply the official diplomatic programmes, whose form and content they disapproved of, explains in part the difficulty of the French executive in gaining acceptance for its negotiation plans. The definition of war used in Paris supposed a 'diplomatic culture' very different from that aspired to and practised by the diplomatic agents, with the support of the representatives-on-mission and the military. This divergence created the conditions for the 'dangerous liaisons' between military leaders, deputies-on-mission, and diplomats.

Considerations of 'national dignity' and 'republican resolve' precluded dialogue with sovereigns, who consistently refused to accept the Republic's agents as genuine diplomatic interlocutors. So, with negotiation impossible, the only way the Republic could command respect and impose a 'glorious peace' was by coercion backed with armed force. In this sense, the concept of 'armed negotiation' that formed a basic component of republican diplomacy was not an ideological principle expressing the power ambitions of a fundamentally bellicose republic, but a diplomatic necessity dictated by circumstances. For it was to the military victories that the French diplomats owed their voice and visibility; without them, they were reduced to the role of 'extras' on the European diplomatic scene.

From the role of diplomatic 'extras', the agents went on to become key figures in the war. As they were unable to perform the tasks of negotiation and representation, their mission mainly involved supplying information to the government and, most of all, to the military. Diplomacy might not be able to help the Republic to put an end to the war, but it could help it to win the war. Once it was clear that the only way to win the peace was by winning the war, diplomacy became rather more than a simple auxiliary of the republican armies: It was a key site for developing the theory and practice of republican war. A shift in functions then occurred, leading to a confusion of the fields: If the diplomats played a major role in the military domain, the military from an early stage invaded the domain of diplomacy.

The vacancy of the French throne after August 1792 weighed upon the construction and operation of republican diplomacy. Bereft of its symbolic

head and lacking a centralized organization, the French diplomatic machine began to fragment, the quality of the information it produced declined, and the work of its agents lost direction, to the point of making some of them unmanageable. Republican diplomacy took shape in the service of the war but was in the end completely taken over by the war; it not only legitimated the war but was itself in turn legitimated by the war. Perhaps the Republic died not from the war but from a diplomacy whose practitioners never considered it as an effective instrument for peace, just as a way to 'end a war'.

Notes

1. Translated from the French by Sylvie Kleinman, revised, with additional material, by Godfrey Rogers.

2. Pierre-Henri-Hélène-Marie Lebrun, known as Lebrun-Tondu (1754–1793), started out in Liège working in the Tutot bookshop before setting up the *Journal Général de l'Europe* that was published between 2 June 1785 and 11 August 1792. In January 1791, following the failed revolution at Liège in which he had taken an active role, he escaped to Paris, where he joined up with Dumouriez, becoming his contact for refugees from Liège and Brabant. In the spring of 1792, Dumouriez got him a position in the Foreign Ministry in charge of the section corresponding with Holland and the Austrian Netherlands. In this period, together with Hugues-Bernard Maret, he became the main architect of Dumouriez's 'Belgian Plan'. At the start of the Republic, Lebrun was elected foreign affairs minister, a post he held until his arrest on 4 June 1793. Formally accused on 5 September 1793, he was guillotined on 27 December 1793. On Lebrun and his links with Dumouriez, see Patricia Chastaing Howe, *Foreign Policy and the French Revolution: Charles-François Dumouriez, Pierre Lebrun and the Belgian Plan, 1789–1793* (New York, 2008); Idem, 'Dumouriez and the Revolutionizing of French Foreign Affairs in 1792', *French Historical Studies* 3 (1986): 367–390.

3. AD *Mémoires et Documents* [MD], France, 651, fol. 1, 'Mémoire sur la situation politique de la République française à l'égard des puissances de l'Europe (1793)'.

4. Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey, 'The Reign of the Charlatans is Over: The French Revolutionary Attack on Diplomatic Practice', *Journal of Modern History* 65 (1993): 706–744; Idem, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity* (Columbus, 1998), 298–330, 323–327; and Idem, 'Courtesans of the King: Diplomats and the French Revolution', *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History* 32 (2004). http://hdl .handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0032.007 (11 August 2011).

5. David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (Boston and New York, 2007).

6. Michel Biard and Pierre Serna, 'Introduction', *AHRF* 332 (2003): 5.

7. Marc Belissa, *Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713–1795): Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens* (Paris, 1998); Idem, *Repenser l'ordre européen (1795–1802): De la société des rois aux droits des nations* (Paris, 2006).

8. Michel Biard, 'Comment vivre la politique en député de terrain?', in *Dire il Politico, Dire le politique, il 'discorso', le scritture e le rappresentazioni della politica*, ed. Bruna Consarelli (Padova, 2001), 47–63.

9. Raymond Guyot, *Le Directoire et la paix de l'Europe, des traités de Bâle à la deuxième coalition (1795–1799)* (Paris, 1911); Jacques Godechot, *Les commissaires aux armées*

sous le Directoire: Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre pouvoir civil et militaires, 2 vols (Paris, 1941).

10. Cited by Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, 8 vols (1895–1904; repr. Paris, 2003), vol. 3, 416. The phrase appears in the instructions of 7 June 1793 to Philippe-Antoine Grouvelle, whose nomination as *chargé d'affaires* to Copenhagen was validated by the Committee of Public Safety on 10 June.

11. Lucien Bély, *L'Art de la paix en Europe, naissance de la diplomatie moderne (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles)* (Paris, 2007).

12. James David Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society* (Oxford, 1993); Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture* (Princeton, 2002).

13. Jean-Jacques de Cambacérès, *Mémoires inédits: Eclaircissements publiés par Cambacérès sur les principaux événements de sa vie politique*, ed. Laurence Châtel de Brancion, 2 vols (Paris, 1999), vol. 1, 272–285.

14. AD, M. D. France, 651, fol. 59, 'Mouvement diplomatique', report by Lebrun to the Committee of Public Safety adopted in the meeting of 26 May 1793.

15. AD, M. D. France, 651, fol. 131, 'Considérations sur nos rapports politiques avec les puissances neutres', report by Deforgues to the Committee of Public Safety, 8 Frimaire Year II [28 November 1793].

16. Alphonse Aulard, 'La diplomatie du premier Comité de Salut Public', *La Révolution française* 18 (1890): 125–166, 232–259, 355–366, 434–462; 19 (1890): 27–47; Albert Mathiez, *Danton et la paix* (Paris, 1919), 138–172.

17. In the 'Rapport sur la situation politique de la République' of 27 Brumaire Year II [17 November 1793] that he presented to the Convention on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre called upon all the states interested in France keeping her position in Europe to form a league of neutrals. In his report of 15 Frimaire Year II [5 December 1793], he restated the official abandonment of propagandist diplomacy, insisting that 'the French have not caught the mania for making nations happy and free in spite of themselves'.

18. See Virginie Martin, 'La diplomatie en Révolution: Structures, agents, pratiques et renseignements diplomatiques: l'exemple des diplomates français en Italie (1789–1796)', thèse de doctorat, 3 vols (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2011), vol. 2, 156–262.

19. Between the summer of 1792 and the spring of 1796, the executive power undertook only piecemeal actions in the Italian peninsula. Some were aborted (like that planned against Rome following the assassination of Bassville in February 1793), while others failed (like the expedition attempted against Sardinia in February 1793) or produced no clear advantage (as in the case of Latouche-Truguet's expedition against Naples in the autumn of 1792 or the conquest of Oneglia, Loano, and Saorgio in the spring of 1794).

20. John A. Lynn, 'Le discours sur la guerre et la réalité de la guerre: Un modèle culturel', in *Combattre, gouverner, écrire: Etudes réunies en l'honneur de Jean Chagniot*, ed. Yves-Marie Bercé et al. (Paris, 2003), 487–502. In English: 'The Discourse and the Reality of War: A Cultural Model', appendix in John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 358–369.

21. Over 50 'campaign plans' and projects for military intervention in the Italian peninsula have been identified in the diplomatic correspondence held at the Quai d'Orsay, for the period 1792–1795. The following were among the most prolific authors: Alexandre de La Flotte (*chargé d'affaires*, Florence, April 1791–July 1793), Pierre-Paul de Naillac (minister plenipotentiary, Genoa, July 1792–March 1793),

Nicolas François Tricot de Lalande (*chargé d'affaires*, Turin, January–December 1792), Charles Godefroy Redon de Belleville (secret agent, Genoa, October–November 1792), Armand-Louis de Mackau (minister plenipotentiary, Naples, April 1792–October 1793), Ange-Marie Eymar (secret agent, Genoa, December 1792–December 1793), Pierre-François Lachèze (consul, Genoa, February 1793–March 1797), Jean Tilly (*chargé d'affaires*, Genoa, March 1793–September 1794), Charles Reinhard (secretary to the legation, Naples, February–September 1793), François Cacault ('agent of the republic in Italy', 1793–1796), André-François Miot (minister plenipotentiary, Florence, February 1795–December 1796), Jean-Baptiste Dorothée Villars (special envoy, Genoa, September 1794–January 1796).

22. The decree of 13 April 1793 made 'reciprocal non-interference' the basis of republican diplomacy, thus repudiating the 'propagandist' implications of the decree of 19 November 1792. AD, M. D. France, 652, fol. 74, 'Instructions générales pour les agents politiques de la République française en pays étranger, 1 juin 1793'.

23. See, for example, the instructions from the minister to the diplomatic agent in Genoa, Jean Tilly. AD, *Correspondance politique* [hereafter *CP*], Genoa, 167, fol. 167, letter from Lebrun to Tilly, 23 April 1793: 'After consideration of the neutrality of the Republic of Genoa by the Executive Council and the Committee of Public Safety, it has been decided that this neutrality will be respected on our side, in every respect, and that the necessary orders to this effect will be given to the different agents of the republic. . . . You will explain these principles using the energy their importance demands, and you will also state in the clearest way that the French Republic will respect for other powers the rights it asks for itself today, by not interfering for any reason in their internal government.'

24. Jean-Paul Bertaud, 'Voies nouvelles pour l'histoire militaire de la Révolution', *AHRF* 219 (1974): 66–94.

25. Howard G. Brown, *War, Revolution and the Bureaucratic State: Politics and Army Administration in France (1791–1799)* (Oxford, 1995); Idem, 'Pouvoir, bureaucratie et élite d'état: la politique révolutionnaire du contrôle et de l'administration de l'armée (1791–1799)', *AHRF* 303 (1996): 119–138.

26. Alain Montarras, 'Le renseignement sous Napoléon', in *'Il n'est point de secrets que le temps ne révèle': Etudes sur l'histoire du renseignement*, ed. Maurice Vaïsse (Panazol, 1998), 77–85.

27. Alain Montarras, 'Espionnage', in *Dictionnaire Napoléon,* ed. Jean Tulard (2nd edn, Paris, 1999).

28. Michel Biard, *Missionnaires de la République: Les représentants du peuple en mission (1793–1795)* (Paris, 2002), 46–47. The original purpose of these *arrêtés* was to implement the legislation passed by the Convention, but they could also anticipate on or interpret some legislation in a very broad sense. After 17 July 1793, the *arrêtés* had the force of law unless repudiated by the Convention.

29. In accordance with article 18 of the decree of 30 April 1793 that defined their powers.

30. This incident was the capture by the British of the French ship *La Modeste* in the port of Genoa on 5 October 1793. Deemed not to have 'defended' its neutrality in an appropriate manner, Genoa was held to be guilty of complicity with the coalition.

31. On 13 October 1793, Ricord and Saliceti drew up a proclamation threatening Genoa with armed reprisals if no reparations were made for the attack on the French vessel. Robespierre le Jeune then issued a first *arrêté* seizing their ships in all the Republic's ports, and a second one suspending postal dispatches to Italy;

finally, he advised diplomatic agents to prepare for the speedy repatriation of French nationals and ordered Tilly to leave his post if Genoa did not accede to French demands.

32. AD, *CP*. Gênes, fol. 411, letter from Robespierre le Jeune to Deforgues, 17 October 1793; AN, AF II 63, doss. 463, fol. 24, letter from Robespierre le Jeune to the Committee of Public Safety, 17 October 1793. See also the two letters from Robespierre le Jeune to the Committee of Public Safety of 2 and 16 November 1793 published in *Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public avec la correspondance des représentants en mission et le registre du conseil exécutif provisoire*, ed. Alphonse Aulard, 30 vols (Paris, 1889–1971), vol. 7, 195–196; vol. 8, 480–481.

33. AD, *CP* Gênes, 168, fol. 427, Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Executive Council and the Committee of Public Safety, 5 Brumaire Year II [26 October 1793]; AD, *CP* Gênes, 168, fol. 439, Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Committee of Public Safety, 10 Brumaire Year II [31 October 1793].

34. This report was in fact confirmed by the decree of 22 December 1793, which, as well as putting the full blame for the *Modeste* incident on the British, exonerated the Genoese and led to the end of the military operations planned for Italy.

35. Robespierre le Jeune, with Saliceti and Ricord, was put in charge of organizing the revolutionary government in Nice in March 1794.

36. They advised him to be firm, to threaten Genoa with armed reprisals and to adopt in his 'communications with the Senate of Genoa the dignity and tone of a great Republic'. They ended up requesting that he be recalled, reporting to the minister that he 'had replaced the simple republican dignity appropriate for the envoy of a powerful government that was a friend to liberty, with the mark of an ambassador to a king'. AD, *CP* Gênes, 169, fol. 29: Copy of the letter written by representatives Turreau and Ritter to Villars, from Nice, 1 Frimaire Year II [21 November 1794]; fol. 55, Letter from the representatives-on-mission in Nice to the Committee of Public Safety, 5 December 1794.

37. Anna-Maria Rao, *Esuli, l'emigrazione politica italiana in Francia, 1792–1802* (Naples, 1992), 69.

38. AD, *CP* Gênes, 167, fol. 221, letter from Tilly to Lebrun, 18 June 1793.

39. Pietro Nurra, *Genova nel Risorgimento, pensiero ed azione* (Milan, 1948), 39–40; René Boudard, *Gênes et la France dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIᵉ siècle (1748–1797)* (Clermont-Ferrand, 1962), 76–77.

40. Among the 'seditious' writings that Tilly brought into Genoa illegally and with the complicity of the representatives was an 'Avis d'un membre du Grand Conseil à ses collègues', which was to be disseminated in Genoa to stir up opposition to the oligarchy.

41. AD, *CP* Gênes, 168, f. 463, Tilly to the Commissioner of External Relations, Genoa, 1 Vendémiaire Year III [22 September 1794]:

You need to understand that we have only sixty or so true friends who, situated between the ordinary people and the upper orders enlighten the former about the perversity of the latter, that these sixty friends perform remarkable or at any rate extremely useful services for us on a daily basis, and that Bonomi, Frederici, Morando, and Lombardi are among them, and that is why they are being persecuted . . . *Everything I know comes through them*, and the consideration I show them, along with the issue of a supposed authorisation to five or six individuals who serve as *indispensable intermediaries*, is all I have done for them. If the Committee of Public Safety rules unfavourably in this apparently trivial but in reality important affair, they will be entirely downcast and despairing; if, on the contrary, it

expresses its surprise and discontent, and insists on the liberation of Bonomi, the democrats will take courage and double their zeal. Explain all this to the Committee of Public Safety, tell them that our army is on the move, that these men have friends on both sides, *and that independently of justice and generosity it is in our interest not to abandon them* [my italics].

42. AD, *CP* Gênes, 168, fol. 279, Note from the Genoese government on the subject of Tilly, 1 Thermidor Year II [19 July 1794]; fol. 394, Reply to the note from Citizen Tilly at Genoa, 6 Thermidor Year II [24 July 1794].

43. Constantin Parvulesco, *Secret défense: Histoire du renseignement militaire français* (Boulogne, 2007), 6.

44. On 7 Germinal Year IV [27 March 1796], just before the French forces entered Italy, Delacroix sent a circular to the diplomatic agents in which he asked for their opinion on what to do about Italy and whether it should be 'republicanized'. All the agents answered in the negative. See AD, MD Italie, 12, fol. 53, memoir entitled 'Italie, 7 Thermidor An IV' [25 July 1796].

45. For the 'betrayal' by the French diplomats, see Godechot, *Les commissaires aux armées*, vol. 1, 256–261.

46. AN, AF III 87, letter from Cacault to Deforgues, 3 Floréal Year II [23 April 1794]: 'The people of Italy is new to this great concern. This is an undertaking and a war different from others. It may not have the same horrors…Only through the exercise of virtue will we become liked and respectable.'

47. AN, AF II 63, d. 364, fol. 6, Memoir addressed by Soulavie, *chargé des affaires* of the Republic in Denmark, to Citizens Danton and Barère 'sur les affaires étrangères en ce moment-ci' [late April 1793].

3

Can a Powerful Republic Be Peaceful?

The Debate in the Year IV on the Place of France in the European Order[1]

Marc Belissa

Until late 1794, the coalition forces and the émigrés could still hope to topple the French Republic and restore the monarchy by the use of military force. After the victories of the summer of 1794, however, followed by the Basel treaties in the spring of 1795 that confirmed the withdrawal of Prussia and Spain from the coalition, the existence of the Republic seemed assured, at least for the medium term. That being so, the question of how the French Republic could cohabit with Europe's monarchies took on a new character: the presence of a strong and territorially ambitious republic posed a fundamental problem for a redefined European order. The republics of the eighteenth century were weak states, trivial elements in the system of monarchical powers upon which they depended for their security and survival. The arrival on the scene of a first-rank republican power with ideological foundations profoundly incompatible with those of the Old Regime European order prompted a reflection on the break with the past produced by the Revolution. Could the Republic be readmitted into a new European order of powers? Was it not forced by its very nature to wage permanent war? Could a strong republic ever be at peace in a Europe of monarchs?

Some contemporaries concluded that the Old Regime European order had ceased to exist and that the failure of the First Coalition proved the inability of its leaders to grasp the radically new conditions created by the Revolution. The Revolution had destroyed the consensus upon which relations between the powers were founded, and nothing could revive it. What kind of relationship could exist between a republic whose ideological foundations challenged the basic principles of the social and international order, and the monarchical states that had chosen the defence of those very same principles as their battle cry? Was the domestic stability hoped for by the architects of the constitution of the Year III compatible with the continuation of the

war, or was a general peace needed as quickly as possible in order to 'end the Revolution' and establish the 'republic of proprietors'? These were the central questions of the political debate over war and peace in the Year IV.[2]

They are questions that have seldom been addressed in historical writing on the period. The irreconcilably 'ideological' character of the struggle between the revolutionary and monarchical principles was an underlying assumption of much historical analysis following the German School of Ranke (1795–1886) and Sybel (1817–1895). With a few exceptions, most notably Raymond Guyot's work published in 1911, *Le Directoire et la paix en Europe*, this historiography considered that the depth of opposition between the French Republic and the European order of kings and princes precluded any attempt at compromise. Except for Guyot and Jacques Godechot in *La Grande Nation* (1956), the public debate on the coexistence of the French Republic and the European monarchies aroused little interest within this scholarly literature.

Works by Anglo-American historians over the last 30 years have tended to approach the period of the revolutionary wars from the perspective of the decline and emergence of powers in the medium term (the rise of Prussia, the arrival of Russia in European affairs, the position of the 'Eastern Question' in diplomacy, for example). As a consequence, they have neglected the impact of the political debate of 1795–1796 over the place of the French Republic in the European order.[3]

Paul Schroeder also situates the revolutionary wars in the general context of the breakdown of the European order in the final third of the eighteenth century, but he considers the question of the possibility for compromise and the construction of a European 'system of collective security'.[4] In his view, the revolutionary wars were but one moment in the much broader transformation of international politics between 1763 and 1848. For Schroeder, Europe in 1789 was experiencing a general crisis in the mechanisms for achieving and maintaining security between the powers. If the French Revolution was a contingent event, the European war that started in 1787 (with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war) was not. The revolutionary wars were the product not of the Revolution but of the convergence between a specific political dynamic and a structural context of a collapsing international system. For Schroeder, the Revolution did not, in its initial phase, set France against the other powers, though it did hasten the system's breakdown that had already started. Only when under threat itself from this breakdown did France, by that time a republic, become a decisive factor in the crisis. Schroeder argues that, despite the Revolution, France, at least initially, was defending traditional interests. Similarly, at that stage none of the powers was actively intent on overturning the Revolution. Once the dynamic of conflict had been set in motion, however, stopping it proved impossible, as did organizing a system of collective security, partly because

of the inability to find a conceptual framework for the coexistence between republican France and the monarchical powers.[5]

For Jeremy Black, the revolutionary wars can be seen both as a break with the past and as an extreme fluctuation within the Old Regime system of international relations.[6] According to Black, the fundamental change was the rejection by the French Revolution of the accepted rules of diplomacy as practised under kings. The subordination of treaties to the natural law of nations, and the subordination of foreign policy to legislative power, were significant new developments, for they challenged the bases on which relations within Europe were regulated. Black reassesses the importance of the ideological factor, inasmuch as the revolutionary dynamic made it harder to resolve diplomatic problems within the existing system of international relations, though his works do not examine the debates on the question.[7]

The exchange of views in the Years III and IV over the question of the French Republic's coexistence with Europe's monarchical powers has, in fact, gone largely unremarked. A number of interesting approaches to the subject have been suggested nonetheless by the political scientist David Armstrong.[8] According to him, one of the fundamental contradictions facing a revolutionary state is that of finding itself a *de facto* member of a system of states whose basic assumptions contradict, objectively or subjectively, entirely or in part, the revolutionary vision of that same system of states. Every revolution constructs its self-image in opposition to an 'Old Regime', one element of which is a particular conception of the relations between states. The leaders of the French Revolution—leaders of a state that was part of an international system—were loath to accept that in spite of the Revolution they were still required to have dealings with the former system. Whether they welcomed it or not, the revolutionaries faced what resembled an 'international society' possessing common codes, legal norms, interests, and patterns of conduct, and with which direct relations were unavoidable. The possible responses to this dilemma were rejection, retreat into isolation, and, in the longer term, the hope of overturning or at least seriously modifying the international system through political action at home and abroad. Initially the international system was rejected en bloc because the revolutionaries perceived it as unfair, oppressive, immoral, and serving the interests of the old state powers. Once some degree of stabilization has occurred, however, a revolutionary state encounters pressure from the society of states to adopt the established rules. In short, it finds itself faced with the option of joining the international society it repudiates. This, I suggest, was the case for the French Republic from 1795 onwards.

In what terms did contemporaries in the Years III and IV comprehend the conflict between integration into the society of states and upholding a republican identity within that same society? That was the crux of the debate over the relationship between the French Republic and the monarchies in the years 1795–1796.

'The modern republics will never be martial' (Marquis d'Argenson)

The relationship between republics and monarchies in Europe had been questioned by English republicans in the seventeenth century. They drew on Machiavelli, especially his *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius* (1517), to demonstrate that a free republic could be a conquering power with the potential to endanger declining monarchies. The experience of the Roman Republic had proved the superiority of virtue in the conduct of external affairs and of war. Algernon Sidney, in his *Court Maxims* (1665), wrote that the modern republics, England under the Commonwealth, Venice, and the United Provinces, also had shown that they could 'better employ their power in war than kings'.[9]

   In the seventeenth century, many monarchies were indeed weaker than the English or Dutch republics. By the eighteenth century, however, England had reverted to a monarchy since 1660, and the Venetian Republic and United Provinces were no longer among the major powers. This was the basis for the idea adopted by the Enlightenment philosophers of the weak and peaceful nature of the modern republican constitutions. For Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Montesquieu, the trading vocation of the republics guaranteed their peaceful behaviour.[10] Montesquieu, for example, wrote that conquest was contrary to the spirit of republicanism, which was rooted in 'peace and moderation'.[11] In the texts of the *philosophes* the modern republics were peaceful because of their mercantile occupations, but also because of their military and diplomatic weakness.[12] The coexistence between these republics and the monarchies within a homogeneous European order was thus not a key issue in political thought. In fact, it is questionable whether the contrast between republics and monarchies was as ideologically clear-cut as might be imagined. A number of the Old Regime republics had their own quasi-monarchs: the doge in Venice, the *stadtholder* of Holland, and the king in the Polish 'republican monarchy'. Conversely, Sweden continued to describe itself as a kingdom between 1718 and 1772 even though it was in many respects a republic in which the king was powerless. By ideology and by political organization, the republics of the Old Regime were closer to traditional monarchies than to the French Republic. The very idea of a republican power establishing itself at the heart of Europe ran counter to the conventional wisdom that associated extensive territories with monarchies: A state was either small, in which case its wealth derived from peaceful trade, or large, in which case it necessarily had a monarchical constitution. The only alternative model was a federal republic like the Swiss cantons or the United Provinces, but this federal form (defensive by its structure, according to Montesquieu), was in itself considered an obstacle to military power. That is why very few thinkers, at least until the American Revolution, postulated any structural opposition to the coexistence of monarchies and republics.[13]

The republic and peace

The men of 1795–1796, counterrevolutionaries and democratic republicans alike, all believed that an indissoluble bond linked war and the Revolution, and war and the Republic. For the counterrevolutionaries and cryptoroyalists, war was integral to the revolutionary destruction of the social order. Writing from exile in London, the former Controller-General of Finances, Charles-Alexandre Calonne, put it thus: 'The opposite of justice and the opposite of peace join up to each other. The revolution and war are friends. They are two inseparable allies.'[14] For the Thermidorians and the right-wing republicans, the revolutionary storm had been brought to a close by the adoption of the Constitution of the Year III (1795). With the social order based on property ownership stabilized, it remained to end the revolution outside France by making peace. For, despite the Basel treaties with the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Prussia, and, later, Spain, France was still at war with Austria, part of the Empire, and, most importantly, England. The 'glorious and enduring peace', a constantly recurring theme in speeches from the Directory period, was to foreign relations what the stabilization process was to domestic affairs. Until a general peace was concluded, there was a high risk that the repose so ardently desired by the elites would only be temporary. Peace was needed to end the Revolution and to stabilize the republic of proprietors and '*honnêtes gens*'. Democratic republicans, on the contrary, saw in war a protection for the Republic against the monarchical order. Peace could only be the fruit of a total victory for the republican order over the Europe of the kings, because the Revolution was unfinished and it was impossible for the republic to survive in the midst of monarchies.[15] In essence, therefore, any compromise would bring about the destruction of the Republic.

The debate over peace in the Years III and IV involved different perceptions of the Republic and the Revolution, and of their relationship to war and peace. The idea that only a *glorious* peace would be acceptable, and that the French people once again must take their place among the nations, occurred repeatedly in Thermidorian discourse. As early as 17 October 1794, Tallien told the Convention of his support for the opening of peace negotiations and for a change of direction in diplomacy: '*The Republic must at long last regain its rightful place in the European balance*; it must adopt an attitude commensurate with the greatness of its principles.'[16] A powerful republic could, and should, have a diplomacy other than that based on the cannon. His colleague, Boissy d'Anglas, a key figure in the Thermidorian period, took up the theme in his speech of 30 January 1795.[17] For him, the French Republic had positioned itself as the defender of all states, whether republican or monarchical, against the spirit of conquest associated with the coalition. Cambacérès' report of 3 March 1795 made the same points. The French Revolution that 'had given Europe a general impetus towards liberty' was

over. From now on, the Republic should represent the stabilizing power in a new peaceful order, and bring tranquillity to the world by showing that it was capable of working with any of the powers.

Reassuring Europe by negotiating with the monarchies was also the programme set out in an anonymous text from the same period found among the papers of Lazare Carnot, former member of the 'great' Committee of Public Safety.[18] The Republic not only could, but should, negotiate with the kings—so as to set its enemies against each other, for the kings in fact contributed to France's prosperity. The Republic would not be able to expand if it faced a German or Italian republic 'animated by the same patriotism and same energy as France'. So it was preferable that republican institutions did not become firmly established in the neighbouring countries before the frontiers were fixed, and 'before a lengthy waiting period has elapsed in which to assimilate the inhabitants of the annexed territories and to get foreign governments used to the new limits' of France.[19] This waiting period would encourage the spread of Enlightenment ideas and prevent a conflagration between the republics—a 'war of giants' that could only end with the extermination of one of the republican nations. An enlarged France would strengthen the European order, and ensure that conquest and convention would in future not be accepted as titles of property.

It was imperative, therefore, to convince the powers that France's rightful place was in the European system. According to Boissy d'Anglas, who again spoke in the Convention on the question on 6 Fructidor, differences in forms of government were not obstacles to the achievement of political agreements. What mattered most was not the regime's institutional form but its social content, which had to be founded on the 'safety of persons and the preservation of property'.[20] In fact, republics were naturally more peaceful than monarchies: Rome had been forced by its enemies to follow a system of conquests against its wishes. Switzerland, Venice, and Holland were more often the targets of attacks than the initiators. The treaties signed by France with Spain, Prussia, Tuscany, and Holland were proof of the Republic's 'moderation'. In his speech, therefore, Boissy advocated reconciliation with all the powers, even including England, which, he reminded his listeners, had been misled by its Prime Minister, Pitt.

The press was quick to enter the debate, in particular 'right-wing' organs such as *Le Censeur des Journaux* of Jean-Pierre Gallais (1756–1820) and *Les Nouvelles politiques, nationales et étrangères* of Charles de Lacretelle (1765–1855). Gallais noted that 'detestable principles, multiple errors and incredible crimes had almost isolated us from Europe' and that brigands in the pay of England had 'drawn a deep line of demarcation between us and the foreign powers'.[21] Now that the Republic had repudiated these principles, it could resume its natural position as arbiter of Europe and join the 'great chain of the social order'. Immediate peace was needed to end the Revolution and set in motion the virtuous cycle of prosperity and stability. This

was the constant refrain of right-wing journalists during this campaign. Time and again they highlighted the contradiction between renouncing the conquests of 22 May 1790, while justifying the annexations (of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, at that time occupied by French armies) by the Republicans of 1795. Lacretelle did not hesitate to use the argument that the republican spirit was incompatible with an overly large territory. France must give back the conquered territories so as not to weaken the public spirit by absorbing peoples who had no desire to be French. For the right in the Year IV, therefore, France could return to the European political system on condition that it unequivocally repudiate all republican spirit of conquest. The only way to 'reassure Europe' was to accept peace on the continent without any territorial gains for the republican side.

What response did these arguments draw from the side of the Directory and the 'progressive' republicans, partisans of a 'glorious peace'?

The Directory itself, accused by the right-wing press of doing nothing for peace, reiterated its wish for a 'glorious peace' in a public letter to the minister for war:

> The Executive Directory is not afraid to announce to all of Europe that its most ardent wish is to make peace based not on exaggerated pretensions, harmful to the security of the other powers, but on the enlightened self-interest of those powers and that of the French Republic and her allies; finally, on a peace worthy in every respect of the sacrifices the French have made for their own independence.[22]

It was a position taken up by the republican press. In the *Moniteur*, the editor Lenoir de la Roche opined that, while peace was of course what all the peoples wished for, the war waged by the French Republic was of a special kind. It was a war not of 'government' but of 'independence', a 'national war'.[23] The conditions for peace were thus necessarily new.

The idea defended by the royalists, that peace was linked to the restoration of the monarchy, was countered by Benjamin Constant (1767–1830), at this time supporting the government of the Directory, who pointed out that the allied powers themselves did not have the restoration as a political objective. Even if the Bourbons were reinstated, the coalition's conditions for peace would be no less harsh:

> It is impossible that any person should now believe that the allied powers have for their sole, or even principal object, the restoration of the monarchy. They have betrayed their secret themselves. The new King, whoever he may be, even had he the same power as the Directory . . . could not obtain a more honourable peace than the republic. The courage of the allies would naturally be revived by the inevitable and disorganizing consequences of a new revolution, and by the contempt which they

would not help feeling for the fickleness of the French people. They would demand satisfaction for the past, and perhaps even the dismemberment of France as a surety for the future: as they were not prevented from doing this before, by it being directly contrary to their interest, much less would they then now, when that interest no longer exists.[24]

For most republicans, the emergence and consolidation of the French Republic had totally disrupted the balance of power in Europe. There could be no going back to the frontiers of 1789, because bringing peace and political stability to the continent was unthinkable without far-reaching changes, in particular a redrawing of political frontiers. This was a view clearly expressed by Joseph Eschassériaux (1753–1824), a member of the Council of the Five Hundred, who presented the main lines of republican–directorial discourse in the Year IV in a pamphlet dated 18 Pluviôse [7 February 1796] that was widely reported in the press, notably in *Le Moniteur*.[25] According to Eschassériaux, the current war would determine the future of Europe for more than 20 generations to come. It was pointless to seek 'a vain equilibrium and false peace in alliances, or in the court intrigues, treaties or commercial interests' of the old Machiavellian politics. On the contrary, what was needed was a lasting peace, based on a respect for the interests of all the peoples of Europe; which is why it was absolutely indispensable that the peace be a 'glorious' one for the Republic. The aim was not to conquer Europe (the Basel treaties were proof that it was possible for the kings to have dealings with the Republic), but to prevent everyone from being enslaved under the iron rule of Austria and England. For Eschassériaux, therefore, the nature of the peace would determine the prosperity not just of the Republic but of all the peoples. He came back to the question a few months later in an article in *Le Moniteur*.[26] The treaty to end this war would be like no other before it, because the situation facing the parties was totally unprecedented. That was why the most important point in the forthcoming negotiations was to obtain recognition for the independence of the French Republic and the Batavian Republic (proclaimed shortly after the occupation of the United Provinces by French forces in January 1795). A European order that included the French Republic was possible and even desirable for the cause of liberty in the continent.

'Democratic' republicans, on the other hand, were far more sceptical about the prospects for a peaceful cohabitation of the Republic alongside the monarchies. Though strongly pro-Directory, the *Journal des Patriotes de 89* took a radical position in an article entitled 'On the project to divide Europe into a few large monarchies'.[27] A heterogeneous order was necessarily unstable. Instead, France should encourage weak and divided monarchies that could be eliminated over the long term. As was often the case among journalists, the reference model here is the Roman Republic, which had conquered the world by dividing kings while offering its protection to weak

states. To achieve this, the French Republic should not trouble itself unduly with philanthropic concerns about peace, for 'the law of nations exists only through force and necessity'. A very great monarchy 'must therefore either devour a great republic or become its prey', and the immediate interest of the kings was 'to destroy the republic which had just been established, in order to swallow it up'. In any case, even if all of Europe were to become republican, France would enjoy no durable tranquillity, because men, even republicans, sacrifice their interests to their passions. In the war of the kings against the peoples, it was impractical to 'conduct diplomacy using the *Entretiens de Phocion*', since 'it was not morality but terror which would dictate the peace treaty'.[28] If France negotiated for peace instead of imposing it, the peace would only be temporary.[29] It was the publicists in the pay of the kings who favoured a European order organized around a number of large monarchies and the French Republic. If all the second order powers were eliminated, the large monarchies would turn on France: 'There will never be peace between the republics and the kings, unless the former use their own strengths and the vices of the latter. There will never be a peace among nations, unless one or several of them are powerful enough to use force against the folly of the passions or the passions against themselves.'

The republicans who wrote in the *L'Orateur Plébéien* or the *Journal des hommes libres* were at the forefront of the campaign against the 'old frontiers faction'. According to Marc-Antoine Jullien, the recent peace agreements made with representatives of the powers were merely 'sticking plaster' peaces whose sole object was to get ambassadors and spies into France.[30] For Antonelle, replying to Gallais' *Censeur des Journaux* in the *Journal des Hommes libres de tous les pays*, the Republic must not buy peace at the cost of dishonouring itself and of discouraging the other peoples.[31] The well-proportioned body of the Republic must not be chopped about for the sake of a tyrant who would become a neighbour. The European political balance that the right wanted to re-establish was a 'Machiavellian court system', invented 'to perpetuate the slavery of peoples', and which republicans were under no obligation to respect:

Well! Was that balance not broken as soon as the French Republic rose on the wreckage of the throne? In our political balance, we place the rights and liberties of nations on one side, and the sceptres and crowns of a few potentates on the other . . . We shall see if the invincible sword and arms of free men do not triumph over the gold and trinkets of kings.[32]

The true republican policy is 'to preserve our liberty through war and, more importantly, through virtue'. The *Journal des hommes libres* reiterated the duty to assist all people who wanted to regain their liberty, and referred

to possible future unions of other peoples with the French Republic. Politics was 'the pendulum of kings, virtue was the regulator of republics'. The two regimes thus had no shared language, hence the impossibility of their coexisting in an order that admitted heterogeneity, unless kings began 'to speak French', that is, to be, for once, 'frank, just and reasonable'. The French were not waging war out of a hunger for conquest like the Romans, or to substitute 'a lion for a bird of prey' like the English and the Batavians in the seventeenth century. But, if the kings did not respect the treaties, the Republic would pursue the war, joined by any of the oppressed who broke their chains.

Marc-Antoine Jullien argued in favour of 'a solid and lasting peace in keeping with our honour and our interests and that would guarantee us the respect of other nations', not the admiration of kings. If France restored the conquered territories, it would still not increase her security, since her enemies would be her enemies 'for as long as they remain kings and we a republic'. France would gain the respect of kings only if it was powerful, and of nations if it was wise. Jullien turned around the coalition's own argument, according to which the French Republic did not respect its commitments: To abandon the liberated peoples would supply the proof of what the kings claimed, that commitments made by republics were unreliable. On the contrary, France must demonstrate impeccable constancy in its political system. The Republic must make itself feared and respected by Europe, since 'such is the true basis, the only condition for the peace that we wish to conclude with the kings'.

A synthesis of the democratic republican viewpoint was given by Filippo Buonarroti (1761–1837) in his anonymously published pamphlet entitled *La paix perpétuelle avec les rois*.[33] Here he restates the absolute impossibility of any heterogeneous European order. The French Republic and the kings could only coexist in an armed peace, for 'so long as there remains in France a single line of the declaration of rights, the kings and princes and "*les grands*" will inevitably be its enemies, either openly or covertly, ever ready to form coalitions and take up arms to destroy the liberty that they will always fear is going to find imitators among their slaves'.

Aspiring to take part in diplomatic intrigue, to play the kings off against each other, would be like joining the Europe of the princes, not that of the peoples. The cause of liberty depends on the 'quality of peace' that is now to be made with the enemies of the Republic. Liberty's most effective weapon is the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, and this cannot be rekindled at will. The kings are counting on peace and the cooling of national enthusiasm. Perpetual war would be preferable to the subjugation of Frenchmen. But that is not going to come about, because military victories prepare the way for 'the true peace', that is, the peace under which the kings will be 'powerless to attempt anything against the Republic made stronger by the increase in its prosperity and in its friends'.

The Directory's military victories in Italy (the armistice of Cherasco with Sardinia, 28 April 1796, 9 Floréal Year IV), relaunched the debate. The right-wing press was, or at least appeared to be, delighted by the victory, but used it to argue that what was required forthwith was a general peace and thus the end of the Revolution. Since the republicans were so fond of using the example of Rome, wrote Lacretelle, they should remember that the Romans succeeded in their conquests and in making peace on advantageous terms because they did not seek to republicanize their former enemies. Victories were dangerous, therefore, if they led to further conquests and not to general peace.[34] It was necessary to work with, and make sincere friends of, the kings, for there would be 'no peace, so long as we keep up this furious urge to spread the revolution. We cannot expect to find a true friend among any of the governments who work with us and even flatter us, so long as they believe we are still affected by this turbulent fanaticism.'[35] Power—even republican power—depends first and foremost on the reciprocity of relations within the European 'family'. Therefore, 'by spreading the revolution beyond our frontiers, we are perpetuating the war ... it is no longer one of those wars whose excesses can be limited by the law of nations that Europe makes part of its civilization; it is a civil war, a religious war, one that we are taking everywhere.' The war will stop the day it is merely a war between states, and not between the republican and monarchical systems.

The Directory had to defend the text of the treaty with Sardinia against the right, which criticized its harshness, and against the democrats, who found it too lenient on the 'Sardinian tyrant'. In September 1796, the *Décade Philosophique* took issue with the royalists and their claim that the Directory was only making proposals that were impossible for the powers to accept and that its goal was the republicanizing of Italy.[36] Absurd! replied the *Décade*, the Directory wanted peace and 'was clearly not intent on establishing republics everywhere'. Any state, whatever kind of government it had, that requested peace was sure to obtain it immediately. The Republic dealt with kings as it did with senates, and its ambassadors had no difficulty complying with the customs of the countries and courts to which they were sent. 'Have we attempted or are we attempting to turn Spain and Piedmont into republics? Do we not have several German princes at least as allies if not as friends under the terms of the treaties?'[37] The *Journal des hommes libres*, on the other hand, remained convinced that coexistence between the French Republic and the kings was impossible, 'unless almost insurmountable barriers and their similarity of interests, such as those which should unite us to Spain against England, our common enemy, are the guarantee of our peace'. As for the Sardinian king, 'his states must be bounded by the Alps to one side, and by the Swiss, Genoese and Lombard republics to the other, thus reducing him to an absolute nothingness in Europe's political balance; as neighbours we can have only republican governments or weak monarchs'.[38]

The debate on a 'regicide peace'

This debate was not restricted to France but went on in England, notably among the French émigrés who took refuge there. Edmund Burke's *Letters on a Regicide Peace* played a central role in the development of counterrevolutionary thought on this question. For Mallet du Pan, Burke, Francis d'Ivernois, Joseph de Maistre, Calonne, or Montlosier, any peace with the French Republic would be a 'regicide peace', in other words a peace that would subvert social relations across Europe.[39] This was behind their refusal of the proposed negotiations under discussion in Pitt's cabinet, and their strong defence of the war that they all saw as essential for the survival of civilization. Calonne, Burke, and d'Ivernois argued that the adoption of the Constitution of Year III made no fundamental change to the nature of the republican government, that no negotiations should be held with the regicide Republic, and that a restoration of the monarchy was indispensable to achieve a solid and lasting peace.[40]

   In Calonne's view, to maintain that the Constitution of Year III was moderate and allow the opening of negotiations was to admit the republican principle and thus become an apologist for the French doctrines against which the coalition had gone to war.[41] The spread of democratic systems was 'a consequence of their nature rather than the choice of their adepts, and sovereigns should not forget that the republican spirit harbours an essential hatred of kings'. Peace with the Republic was impossible, first and foremost because the Republic did not want it. All the counterrevolutionaries took up Mallet du Pan's refrain, according to which the Directory did not want peace because the war was the condition for its remaining in power. Furthermore, the French had been made fanatical by their victories. The people 'was proud of its superiority in battle' and believed it had 'become invincible by becoming republican'.[42]

   Calonne set out to refute the argument used by the Foxites in the British Parliament, that the form and principles of the French government were not obstacles to the opening of negotiations.[43] He did this by making a distinction between principles that were 'separate from the existence of a state' and those constituent of it. If the war was not about constituent principles, then it was perfectly possible to converse with an enemy who professed principles different from one's own. If, however, it was about

   maxims so close to the very essence of the government that to deal with the latter and thus recognize that essence would implicitly grant recognition to those maxims, and if it was a system proclaimed by a country's own constitution, with the clear intention of spreading it everywhere, then to ratify the political existence of this constitution, would be to abjure one's own in such conditions, negotiation was impossible.[44]

Only when the Bourbons had been restored to the throne could a general peace congress be held. The object, though, was not a return to the socioeconomic system of the Old Regime, but, rather, the return of the dynasty that could alone bring the revolutionary chapter to a close. Monarchy and peace were thus paired to form an alternative to the infernal duo of war and republic. This represented a complete reversal of the dominant perspective in Enlightenment thought, which associated war with the ambition of kings. Peace was guaranteed once France had a regular monarchical government, because such a government—the essence of which was to protect property— would have no interest in waging war. Peace in the international arena was thus inextricably linked to peace in the domestic arena. As Francis d'Ivernois put it, the French could never make peace 'without' if they did not first make it 'within'. Peace, argued Calonne, could not come about until France itself had a government that was 'compatible with the repose of the other nations'.[45] The only way to achieve peace in Europe,

> to ensure it is permanent and to spare public tranquillity an endless sequence of troubles and commotions, was to bring France within the general law of nations by adopting a fair government, that is to say a government based not on the chimerical rights of man in an ideal state, but on the essential rights in a state of society, on the inviolability of property rights that is its foundation, on the reciprocal duties which bind different peoples together and which constitute the law of nations. . . . [46]

At issue, therefore, was not the republican *form* but the *nature* of the Republic based on the rights of man and the citizen.

So why did the counterrevolutionaries think the very existence of the Republic was an insurmountable obstacle to peace on the continent? Mallet du Pan considered that, despite the changes in 'political' direction made by the revolutionaries, the Revolution itself had a single goal and a single motivation—the overthrow of every government in Europe and the sowing of the seeds of republicanism.[47] The regicides, 'rightly convinced of the incompatibility of [the Republic's] dogma with the survival of the other monarchical governments . . . want to establish their security on the ruin of foreign powers like the one they brought down in France'.[48]

Even after the signing of the peace with the King of Sardinia, Mallet du Pan refused to acknowledge any change in French strategy:

> The project to republicanize Europe is back on the agenda. If the talk is of peace, this is only insofar as it will make the sovereigns kneel before the Directory and supply a motive for destabilizing the foreigner; it is at the expense of peace that one prides oneself on compensating France for the losses of the Revolution.[49]

The first victories in Italy in 1796 reinforced Mallet du Pan's confidence in his prediction: The Directory wanted to republicanize the whole peninsula, and the French Republic's intentions could not be worked out using the traditional criteria of European politics.[50] There was no analogy between French republican policy and the policy that guided the 'legitimate powers', and it was this failure to understand the nature of French policy which had led the powers to disaster.[51] Mallet du Pan was another who thought that what mattered most was not the republican *form* of government as such, but the *nature* of this particular republic:

> That the government is republican or monarchical certainly does not exclude the possibility of reaching agreement with it; but so long as this government is *revolutionary*, that is to say independent of all laws, of all conventions, of all restraints; so long as it is merely a faction kept in power by violence and against the wishes and the rights of the nation … it is doubtful that any transaction with the fleeting ministers of such a regime could allow the slightest stability, or offset the danger from the example offered to the peoples of all countries from the acceptance and public legitimation of such a power.[52]

Any politically heterogeneous European order would necessarily be unstable. A premature peace would be a mortal danger for Europe, for 'the legalized triumph of the Revolution would give a license for insurrection to peoples everywhere' while in effect dethroning all the crowned heads.[53] This is why it was essential that the Republic did not survive the peace treaty.

Joseph de Maistre also employed this distinction between the Republic and France, placing the former outside the community of states. The Republic could not have proper allies, as 'by its nature it was the enemy of all governments: its tendency was to destroy them all, in such a way that they all had an interest in its destruction. Politics could no doubt provide the Republic with allies; but these alliances were contrary to nature, or, one could say, France had allies but the French Republic had none.'[54]

Independently of the revolutionary principles professed by the French Republic, the mere existence of a powerful and territorially ambitious republic was considered a sufficient obstacle to the reconstruction of a peaceful European order. For the author of the *Antidote au Congrès de Rastadt*,

> to believe that a great military republic could wish for peace, and voluntarily and suddenly renounce its main source of power, that is, war, that it would forego this essential and distinctive attribute of its nature; to believe that a state which organizes everything through force … would abruptly revert to peaceful ways; to believe such contradictions, is to force the circle of human probabilities and believe in moral impossibilities.[55]

Finally, for Calonne it was democracy itself that was in question, on account of its necessarily martial character:

> The French republic is by its very constitution the enemy of peace. It is a democracy in a great empire, and no powerful democracy has ever been peaceful ... The government of the multitude, invariably unruly and over-weening, moves by natural disposition ever further from the spirit of conciliation. What makes it averse to peace is its convulsive, effervescent and disorganized condition, its constitution on principles contrary to the fundamental law binding all peoples; its place outside the great association comprising all the empires; its severing of all bonds of common interest, and overturning of all that protects public safety by respecting neither the right to property nor the law of nations.[56]

Conclusion

Regardless of their position on the political spectrum, then, all contemporaries stressed the link that existed not between the republican *form* and war, but between the *nature* of the Republic—whether revolutionary or 'moderate'—and war. For the Thermidorians and conservative republicans, the moderate nature of the Republic, its wish not to republicanize other peoples, and its readiness to negotiate with the kings, were proof that a republic could be powerful, territorially extensive, and at the same time peaceful. Conversely, for counterrevolutionaries and cryptoroyalists, the Republic's necessarily revolutionary character—because founded on the rights of man and the citizen—made it a regime with a structural propensity to generate war. Finally, the democratic republicans also established a link between the Republic and war, but for them the link had a protective function. The permanent war against the kings guaranteed true republicanism by preserving the revolutionary *momentum*. A strong republic should always be wary of the kings, even when they were weak, and the project to republicanize Europe—at some future date—was consubstantial with the existence of the French Republic.

Notes

1. Translated from the French by Sylvie Kleinman, revised, with additional material, by Godfrey Rogers.
2. The debate is discussed in my *Repenser l'ordre européen 1795–1802* (Paris, 2006). The present chapter gives a modified and shortened review of some of the issues.
3. Derek McKay and Hamish M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers 1648–1815* (London, 1983); Paul Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York, 1987).
4. Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994).
5. Idem, *The Transformation*, 100.

6. Jeremy Black, *The Rise of the European Powers, 1679–1793* (London, 1990); Idem, *European International Relations 1648–1815* (London, 2002), 249.
7. Ibid. 255.
8. David Armstrong, *Revolution and World Orders* (Oxford, 1993).
9. Algernon Sidney, *Court Maxims*, ed. Hans Blom et al. (Cambridge, 1996), 18. Sidney (1622–1683) was one of the most influential English republican political theorists.
10. Charles Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, ed. Simone Goyard-Fabre (Paris, 1981), 200–201.
11. Charles de Secondat, Montesquieu, *L'esprit des Lois*, ed. Victor Goldschmidt (Paris, 1979), book 9, chapter 2, 267.
12. Marc Belissa, *Fraternité Universelle et Intérêt National, 1713–1795* (Paris, 1997), 112.
13. For an opposing view, see the entry on 'legislator' in the *Encyclopédie* written by Saint-Lambert, who identifies the possibility of a confrontation on ideological lines: 'What is yet to inflame Europe is the difference in governments: this fine part of the world is divided into republics and monarchies: the spirit of the former is active, and though it is not in their interest to expand, they may undertake conquests at the times when they are governed by men not guided by the interest of the nation; the spirit of republics is peaceful, but the love of liberty and the greater fear of losing it, will often lead republican states to wage war to reduce or repress monarchical ones; Europe's situation will maintain the emulation of strong and martial qualities, this diversity of sentiments and morals which are the fruit of different governments, will check the progress of ease and the excessive softness of morals that is the effect of commerce, luxury and long years of peace'. *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, 36 vols (Paris, 1986), vol. 2, 207.
14. Charles Alexandre de Calonne, *Tableau de l'Europe en novembre 1795* (London, 1795), 76.
15. Anna Maria Rao, 'L'expérience révolutionnaire italienne', *AHRF* 313 (1998): 387–408.
16. *Moniteur*, 30 Vendémiaire Year III [21 October 1794], 274 (my italics).
17. François Antoine Boissy d'Anglas, *Discours sur les véritables intérêts de quelques-unes des puissances coalisées et sur les bases d'une paix durable …* (Paris, Year III).
18. 'Observations sur les intérêts de la République française et de l'Europe et sur la marche progressive à suivre pour arriver à une paix générale, honorable et utile, quand le comité de salut public jugera que le temps d'y songer sera venu'. See M. Reinhardt, 'Les aspirations de la bourgeoisie française à l'hégémonie', in *Mélanges Pierre Renouvin* (Paris, 1966), 83–95.
19. Ibid. 86.
20. *Moniteur,* 12 Fructidor Year III [29 August 1795], 588.
21. *Le Censeur des journaux*, 11 Fructidor Year III [28 August 1795].
22. *Moniteur*, 13 Nivôse Year IV [3 January 1796], 96. Letter from the Directory to the Minister of War 10 Nivôse Year IV [31 December 1795].
23. *Moniteur*, 26 Pluviôse Year IV [15 February 1796].
24. Benjamin Constant, *Observations on the Strength of the Present Government of France, and Upon the Necessity of Rallying Round It.* trans. James Losh (Bath, London, 1797), 37–38.
25. Joseph Eschassériaux, *Des intérêts de la République française et de toutes les puissances de l'Europe* (Paris, Year IV). See also *Moniteur*, 18, 19, 20 Pluviôse Year IV [7, 8, 9 February 1796]).

26. *Moniteur*, 1 Floréal Year IV [20 April 1796], 812.
27. *Le Journal des patriotes de 89*, 24 Pluviôse Year IV [14 February 1796], 729–731.
28. *Les Entretiens de Phocion sur le rapport de la Morale et de la Politique* (1763) is one of the most important philosophical texts by Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, in which the *philosophe* argues for a non-Machiavellian conception of 'politics', that is, of the relations between states.
29. *Le Journal des patriots de 89*, 26 Pluviôse Year IV [17 February 1796], 742–743.
30. *L'Orateur Plébéien*, 9 Nivôse Year IV [30 December 1795].
31. See Pierre Serna, *Antonelle: Aristocrate révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1997).
32. *Le Journal des hommes libres . . .* , 14 Pluviôse Year IV [2 February 1796], 388.
33. Filippo Buonarroti, 'La paix perpétuelle avec les rois (1796)', in *Filippo Buonarroti: Contributi alla storia della sua vita e del suo pensiero*, ed. Armando Saitta, 2 vols (Rome, 1950), vol. 2, 238–243.
34. *Nouvelles politiques, nationales et étrangères* (hereafter *Nouvelles*), 6 Messidor Year IV [24 June 1796], 1103.
35. *Nouvelles*, 19 Messidor Year IV [7 July 1796], 1155.
36. *DP*, 30 Fructidor Year IV [16 September 1796].
37. Ibid. The writer is referring to the peace treaties with the King of Prussia and various Rhineland Principalities signed in 1795.
38. *Le Journal des hommes libres . . .* , 19 Messidor Year IV [7 July 1796], 1002.
39. Charles Alexandre de Calonne, *Tableau de l'Europe en novembre 1795*; Edmund Burke *Letters on a Regicide Peace*, in *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, ed. Paul Langford (Oxford, 1981–), vol. 9, *The Revolutionary War, 1794–1797; Ireland*, ed. R. B. McDowell; Joseph Mallet du Pan, *Correspondance avec la cour de Vienne*, 2 vols (Paris, 1884); Francis d'Ivernois, *Réflexions sur la guerre en réponse aux réflexions sur la paix adressées à M. Pitt et aux Français* (London, May 1795); Joseph de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France* (Genève, 1980); Dominique Abbé de Pradt, *Antidote au congrès de Rastadt ou Plan d'un nouvel équilibre de l'Europe* (London, 1798). Between 1794 and 1798, Jacques Mallet du Pan lived in Berne, then, after French troops entered Switzerland, he went into exile in London. Joseph de Maistre lived mainly in Lausanne, and was then sent on mission to Saint Petersburg by the Piedmontese king. Montlosier, Calonne, and Francis d'Ivernois had all fled to England.
40. Burke, *Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace*, 44–119.
41. Calonne, *Tableau de l'Europe en novembre 1795*, 22–23.
42. Ibid. 34.
43. The Foxites, followers of Charles James Fox and opponents of Prime Minister Pitt, favoured making peace with the French Republic.
44. Calonne, *Tableau de l'Europe en novembre 1795*, 34.
45. Ibid. 59.
46. Calonne, preface to the second edition, March 1796, Charles Alexandre de Calonne, *Tableau de l'Europe jusqu'au commencement de 1796, et pensées sur ce qui peut procurer promptement une paix solide* (London, 1796). In this Calonne expands on the text initially written in November 1795. The preface states that Calonne, a 'ministre d'État', had published the first version anonymously in his brother's newspaper, the *Courier* [*sic*] *de Londres*.
47. 25 May 1796, Mallet du Pan, *Correspondance avec la cour de Vienne*, vol. 2, 75.
48. 21 January 1795, Ibid. vol. 1, 59.
49. 7 May 1796, Ibid. vol. 2, 66.
50. 4 June 1796, Ibid. 90.

51. 3 July 1796, Ibid. 103–107.
52. 16 January 1796, Ibid. vol. 1, 408.
53. 28 December 1794, Ibid. 6.
54. de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France* (Genève, 1980), 168.
55. Abbé de Pradt, *Antidote au congrès de Rastadt ou Plan d'un nouvel équilibre de l'Europe*, iv.
56. Calonne, *Tableau de l'Europe en novembre 1795*, 75–76.

4

Tone and the French Expeditions to Ireland, 1796–1798: Total War, or Liberation?

Sylvie Kleinman

Shortly after landing on a remote spot of the Atlantic coast of Ireland and occupying the town of Killala on 23 August 1798, the small French expeditionary force under the command of General Humbert had hoisted a green flag to rally local rebels. On it was the slogan 'Erin go Bragh', the Gaelic for 'Ireland forever', and a Harp *without* a Crown, as a local eyewitness had described. Somewhat cynically, this loyalist had mocked its potency as a martial symbol by recycling key phrases in Humbert's landing proclamation, taking up the effusive phraseology which vindicated the republican mission of the liberators. The flag invited them to 'assert their freedom' from English tyranny, and join France's citizen soldiers who had 'come for no other purpose but to make them independent and happy'.[1] That the French had paid such attention to detail in their pre-deployment planning is corroborated in the diary kept by Theobald Wolfe Tone, revolutionary Ireland's most influential secret negotiator in Paris and an iconic figure in Irish nationalist history. He had proposed such a standard to the Directory in Paris on 23 June 1796 for the vanguard of the French invasion force for which he had successfully lobbied, essential to the success of Ireland's revolution. Its device, an uncrowned harp 'surmounted with the Cap of Liberty', was that of the United Irishmen, a radical society he had helped found in Belfast and Dublin in 1791.[2] The very same day, the Directory duly informed General Lazare Hoche (appointed to lead the expedition to Ireland) of this development, as they did not want to overlook anything which might contribute to his success:

> The Irish, like every nation in the world, have a sort of religious respect for certain emblems and principally those that led their ancestors into battle. It is possible to turn this respect and attachment for their ancient emblems to the advantage of the revolution which is being prepared in their country.... It will not be unprofitable to embark some musicians

destined to carry to Ireland the tunes of liberty which have stirred French republicans in battle.[3]

As commemoration fever grips the Irish collective consciousness in the countdown to the centenary of the 1916 Rebellion and independence, it is vital to relocate the historical foundations of Ireland's republican culture in two of its most defining realms of memory. This discussion will thus focus on both Tone's legacy in actions and words and the French invasion attempts of 1796 and 1798 in which he played an instrumental role, as they provide compelling insights into the late eighteenth-century republic and war paradigm. The 1798 Rebellion in Ireland, often generically and exaggeratedly referred to as 'Wolfe Tone's Rebellion' outside academia, was the first armed attempt at secession from Britain and resulted largely (but not exclusively) from the fused influences of the American and French Revolutions on the radicals of Ireland. Traditional narratives have presented 1798 as a heroic failure, often attributed to the poorly timed expeditions, launched by a hopelessly ineffectual Directory. Though the campaigns which did ensue ended as military disasters, the innumerable documents supporting the Franco-Irish alliance, many of which reference Tone's political agitation and service in the French army, are infused with the rhetoric so characteristic of Directorial political culture, and so contribute to our understanding of the inextricable link between republic and war which defined the age.[4] Furthermore, they illustrate the increasingly ideological underpinning of the political aims of warfare and merit closer scrutiny in the light of current debates on total war. Tone's eyewitness account, if at times highly subjective, also demonstrates how a classical cult of belligerence was reconfigured in the 1790s to celebrate the soldier, and exalt popular armed conflict as the only road to freedom from tyranny.

Early interest in Ireland prior to Tone's mission

Ireland's geographical position as an island gateway to the Atlantic made it England's weak point, and occupied the minds of French military strategists and buccaneers when contemplating the logistical challenges of launching amphibious landings in the British Isles. By the mid-eighteenth century, new political aims were bolstering geostrategic considerations in numerous invasion plans which would weaken Britain's commerce and disrupt domestic security. Logistically, it was more feasible to attempt several small diversionary raids to sow panic among local populations, and by the 1790s revolutionary Anglophobia would transform this subversive method of small warfare into an ideological crusade encompassing Ireland. On his arrival in the corridors of the Directory in early 1796, a somewhat naive Tone would discover (to his horror) the reprehensible methods of this strategy, as discussed below. As his lobbying was progressing, various plans devised over the years were being collated and copied; by June, Hoche was consulting them,

as would Napoleon a few years later. One, as early as 1767, had suggested seizing Ireland and there establishing a republic as soon as England committed any hostile act against France.[5] By the 1780s, it was argued that the face of war had changed entirely, but it was the English who had changed it by their aggressive descents on France's Atlantic coast during the Seven Years' War. Some of the rhetoric, and many of the strategic concepts, of these Old Regime plans would be taken up when Ireland resurfaced on the agenda of the Convention. France was interested in protecting its commerce, but it could lead the Irish people, in their quest for religious and political rights, into rebellion by providing the vital military assistance needed to shake off the yoke of England. Exploiting internal Irish disaffection by nurturing sedition, the French would even provide men and money to secret rural societies in order to foment a rising prior to a French descent. One of the arguments in the 1780s had been that Irish commerce was passive due to its subordinate status, and it was treated like a *conquered* province; Tone would not fail to speak frankly to French decision-makers on this point, especially after the 1796 campaigns in Italy. But these earlier plans used relatively muted language compared with the inflamed phraseology of Revolutionary Anglophobia discussed below.

Though disaffection in Ireland would be viewed with strategic interest after France's declaration of war on Britain in February 1793, a network of Irish agitators in Paris already had experienced their own 'intense spiral of radicalization' during those heady weeks between Valmy and the Convention's decree of November 1792 assuring protection to all nations at war with tyranny.[6] Paradoxically, it was the aristocrat and Whig Edward Fitzgerald, a cousin of Charles James Fox and close friend of Thomas Paine, who then emerged as one of the first, and most militant, of lobbyists. Fitzgerald, who had gained precious experience fighting—as a red coat—in America, lodged with Paine, joined the Jacobin club and famously relinquished his hereditary title at the White's Hotel banquet of British exiles and patriots on 18 November. He was cashiered promptly by the British Army, and, before leaving Paris, ensured that Paine would pursue the cause, though it was lesser-known players who would prove to be the most influential. Though nothing connects him to this first wave of lobbyists, Charles Étienne Coquebert de Montbret, who had been posted to Dublin in 1789 as consul and attaché for marine and commercial affairs, was one of the earliest sources of local intelligence on which Minister for External Relations Lebrun could presumably rely. Returning to Paris in late 1792, Coquebert reported that the 'ferment in Ireland was most certainly the precursor of a revolution', which a break between France and England would precipitate.[7] This could then tempt 'the Irish nation' to forge an alliance with the Republic to 'seek remedy against various forms of oppression'. Coquebert went on to suggest that four to five thousand men landed in the northwest with light artillery and a well-worded manifesto could form a rallying core for the 'friends of liberty'. The good intentions of the Irish could become advantageous to

France if it went to war with Britain; *inter alia*, the intrepid corsairs of Ireland serving in the British navy could help block ports and stifle commerce. He had moved in radical circles in Belfast, and, though he enthusiastically overstated the readiness for revolt of Irish discontents, it is surprising that this early and potentially influential call for French intervention was overlooked by most historians. Though no clear continuity can be established between petitioners, just one month after the declaration of war on Britain in February 1793 Lebrun wrote to an Irish officer in the French service in the most emphatic terms. The projected revolution in Ireland, he assured a Lt. Colonel André MacDonagh, concerned humanity as well as the French Republic, and, should the despotism in that island be overthrown, 'the French nation would see it as its duty to assist and make any attempts in its power to ensure liberty and equality would reign there'.[8] MacDonagh's former compatriots should heed the November decree assuring protection to all nations seeking fraternity with the French Republic. Lebrun was conveying these assurances privately and employing no overt military terminology, yet he was including Ireland in the Revolution's mission to assist 'the regeneration of all oppressed peoples', stressing France would stop at nothing to ensure 'the germination of righteous principles in Ireland'.

Simultaneously, Lebrun was being briefed by an obscure civil servant, much maligned by history due to his eccentricity and a damaging portrayal in Tone's diary, but who exerted an undeniable influence on French policy on Ireland for close to a decade. Nicholas Madgett, a long-standing Irish exile who had attended the banquet at White's, had been appointed head of a Translation Bureau in the Marine Department early in 1793; he probably had been requisitioned along with his nephew John Sullivan, who later served as a bilingual aide to Humbert in the 1798 invasion.[9] In March 1793, Madgett first suggested to Lebrun that the War Ministry sanction the dispatch to Britain of Irish patriots known to him in France, who could 'spread the principles of liberty and equality' in the press to enlighten English and Irish public opinion, but then in a 'field' phase proselytize in political clubs and gatherings.[10] Madgett was the handler for these missions, in parallel with his self-evident role as a language coordinator; he managed to secure finance for the translation and printing of seditious handbills for distribution among English seamen, a significant proportion of whom were Irish.[11] Wearing his translator's cap, he was also engaged in direct action targeting the enemy's combatants by facilitating a form of coercive psychological warfare, and it is likely he was the author of some of this propaganda. Sullivan, too, had helped smuggle patriotic tracts into England, some of which he had 'worked on himself', that is, composed; this bilingual communications task was facilitated considerably by his official presence in France's Atlantic seaports as an inspector and interpreter for British prisoners of war. In 1793, he had been dispatched on a 'special mission among the prisoners of war' and did much more than just facilitate interrogations for French officials; proudly he

related how, at Dinan, no fewer than 200 prisoners had 'offered' to serve in the Republic's navy, due to his 'zeal in preaching the principles of our revolution to the prisoners of war . . . and contempt and horror for King George and his ministers'.[12] Both were instrumental in assisting Tone in the spring of 1796, translating, advising, and providing vital local knowledge, and, though he denigrated (what he saw as) Madgett's scheming and interfering, his comments allow us to reconstruct the multiple ways in which they had served the Republic in the war against Britain before his arrival.[13]

Tone as 'minister plenipotentiary planning a revolution'

Following the arrest and trial for treason of one of Madgett's agents (Jackson) in Dublin in 1794, in which Tone was implicated, he was forced into exile. As he was crossing the Atlantic for America in June–July 1795, the Royalists had landed at Quiberon and triggered a new wave of Anglophobia, which would both help and hinder him when he came face to face with key officials of the Directory. Knowing his destination, the authorities in Dublin had totally underestimated Tone's potential as a conspirator: Within a week of his arrival in Philadelphia in August, he had called on the French Minister, Adet. By December, a false American passport had been negotiated to allow 'James Smith' to travel to France and directly take up his clandestine embassy with the Directory. From the very first memorandum he submitted to the French government, Tone had insisted on a few fundamental conditions to the alliance. Given the self-doubts and anguish he was to experience during his negotiations with the Directory in the spring of 1796, as the victories in Italy were shifting the laws of war and the practice of occupation and conquest, the clarity with which he initially had outlined the political guidelines of French military intervention in Ireland is noteworthy. In a vital communications exercise repeated in so many invasions right up to this day, the general (or 'deputy with the army', an interesting nod to the *représentant*) was immediately upon landing to publish a proclamation declaring that the French army: 'came not as enemies but as allies, to enable the people to redress grievances, assert their rights, subvert the ancient tyranny of their oppressors, and establish the independence of Ireland on the ruins of English usurpation'.[14] Tone addressed the major points of concern debated with fellow United Irishmen before his exile. Total freedom of worship must be promised: There would be no dechristianizing of Ireland, though 'oppressive establishments' were to be discouraged. Protection would be assured to the persons and properties of 'all good citizens and friends to the liberty of their country'. The people were to choose provisional deputies and form an interim government, under the protection of France and 'totally separated from and independent of England'. Exaggeratedly, he asserted that this proclamation would have the support of no fewer than seven-eighths of the population.

Before his induction into the complex and rapidly shifting realities of negotiating a military expedition, Tone's main strength had been his polemical writing. In the 1791 pamphlet, which had sealed his reputation as Ireland's most outspoken social reformer, he had stressed France's (then) laudable foreign policy, its National Assembly having 'renounced the idea of conquest', a principle 'engraven on the altar in the temple of their liberty'.[15] One wonders whether he could have imagined himself five years later eloquently framing the somewhat ambiguous conditions of a Franco-Irish military alliance:

> by establishing a free republic in Ireland...the French government...attach to France a grateful ally whose cordial assistance in peace and war it [France] might command.... It is for the glory of France...to establish one more free republic in Europe [enabling Ireland] to vindicate its liberty, to humble its tyrant, and to assume that independent station among the nations of the earth....[16]

Given the treasonable nature of his actions—Tone was still a British subject and now was conspiring with his sovereign's enemy in time of war—his diary for February to July 1796 is a subjective and emotive account of his solitary and frustrating petitioning, but also a well-observed chronicle of decision-making within the corridors of the Directory. Impatient, but also caught between diverging views on war, he had called on the American ambassador Monroe, and taken up his suggestion to bypass (what he perceived as) the inefficiency of External Relations. He also called on a cautious but receptive Carnot, who had then recommended him to General Clarke, son of an Irish officer and head of the Directory's topographical bureau and also a future war minister. In their discussions, Tone learned that the Directory shaped their policy on outdated notions of Ireland, due to weak intelligence gathering: Clarke had asked whether the Irish would wish to select one of their own native aristocrats to head the new independent government. Tone (astounded) politely redressed this, but privately mused that Clarke was as 'competent to regulate the affair as I am to be made Lord Chancellor of England'.[17] One significant pillar of war strategy fuelled by Carnot's obsessive Anglophobia, and which he could not dismantle, was a virulent impulse to retaliate for the devastation of the British-backed Vendée. The plan was to replicate it and ignite *chouannerie*—the uprisings in western France—on English soil, but also include this element in the plans for Ireland. As early as October 1793, Hoche had stated that the war should be transported to the English, *chez eux*; but, what 'rules of war could be followed when dealing with these barbarians', he had asked well before his legendary campaign pacifying the Vendée, 'who fight us with poison, assassination and arson?'[18] Framing the rhetoric for a new form of small and morally just war, he had

proclaimed famously that all that was needed was iron, fire, and patrio-
tism, and he wanted to be the first to set foot on the soil of these 'political
brigands'.

The provocation of Quiberon galvanized this resolve and justified any
strike at the enemy. Once the counterrevolution in the west was checked in
late 1795, the Directory again looked at plans being hatched for commando-
type raids to wreak havoc in the British Isles. Carnot drew up his own orders
to throw back at England 'the evil we suffered from the *chouannerie*'; this task
would be entrusted to intrepid men lured by booty, who would announce
themselves as 'the avengers of liberty and enemies of tyrants', and know how
to implant 'horror and death amongst the enemy'.[19] Here, as one historian
concluded nearly a century later, was truly the '*esprit* of 92' perpetuated.[20]
This mission logically extended to Ireland, and so Clarke had asked Tone
in early April 1796 to draw up his own proposal for such a guerrilla opera-
tion to rouse and stir local rebels in advance of the regular French troops.
Simultaneously, a firm plan was under foot to send General Humbert on a
raid to England commanding a unit of blackguards, renegades, ex-convicts,
and prisoners of war, to embarrass the authorities and distract them from
the Irish expedition. Humbert, a veteran of the Vendée who would achieve
briefly in 1798 what no other French commander would—to harass the
British enemy at home—duly laid down his own plan, which identified
Ireland as the destination. Overall, it focused more on tactics than ideology,
yet stressed that the political impetus to provoke *chouannerie* was mainly to
avenge the civil wars which the English had organized (Art. 20).[21] But, in
constantly reminding the French soldier that he was brave and courageous
(Art. 18), the most advantageous goal was to convince locals to demand
peace and change from their government, while bringing them closer to
France and the advantages of a republic (Art. 19). Though he had suc-
cessfully negotiated with *chouan* leaders behind enemy lines, Humbert has
been consistently denigrated as a near-illiterate brute suited for this type of
operation; yet his plan is clear and coherent, and overall displays far more
pragmatism than fanaticism.

Far more revealing of the prevailing mindset were the notes forwarded
by General La Barollière to Carnot, elaborating on the latter's views. The
commander, once landed, would discard any thoughts of fostering revolu-
tion and simply follow the same principles of *chouannerie* in France, despite
what he acknowledged was 'its immorality'.[22] Departing from the standard
behaviour of an armed corps supporting a cause, the troops (ex-convicts
themselves) were to open prisons and arm detainees. They would attack
and pillage public transport, unlock prisons and equip ex-convicts, pilfer
and appropriate as personal property anything and everything to create as
much desolation as possible. Tone certainly had other plans for Ireland than
unleashing such desperadoes. The recurrent incantation was employed to
remind the French officers of their proselytizing role: 'proclaim to the people

war to the castles and peace to the cottages . . . To speak much of liberty, but to have absolutely only one plan, to destroy, and not to edify.'[23]

Tone had responded immediately to Clarke by firmly rejecting the plan to '*chouannize*' Ireland in a brief, sharp memo: So incensed was he by the concept that he even imported the word and coined a new verb in English.[24] While France could not be blamed for wishing to retaliate against England for the abominations of the Vendée, it was hard that it should be at Ireland's expense. The local insurrections that French raids would trigger would be suppressed quickly, and—predicting with stark accuracy precisely what *did* occur when the rebellion broke out in 1798, but without the French— English militia and fearsome irregulars would be shipped over to Ireland. The existing government would only be strengthened. Ireland would be 'bound hand and foot', and there would be 'indiscriminate plunder'.[25] One can only savour the principled audacity with which this ad hoc Irish 'minister plenipotentiary planning a revolution' (as he mocked himself) urged Clarke on the need for clear military objectives: the French Republic should go over 'on more enlarged views and a *sounder* policy', Tone reprimanded.[26]

The *chouannerie* plan was partly tactical, due to the simple logistical difficulty of assembling, equipping, and transporting a single force of 20,000 troops (as per Tone's request), France's naval capacity being weaker than that of England. Minister for External Relations Delacroix had explained this problem to Tone in their first lengthy discussion, admitting that 'merely embarrassing England, and leaving Ireland to shift as it might . . . [was, indeed] a short-sighted policy'.[27] But the people of Ireland were prepared sufficiently, and would rise upon a French landing, Tone argued, so no advance *provocation* was needed. Such a raid would cause the most ardent of the peasantry to fall in sacrifice, which would only strengthen the enemy. Finally, in the phrase which may have turned French opinion, Tone appealed to reason while alluding to his country's separate identity: 'Ireland has never concurred willingly in any measure to distress France.' Why should it 'suffer for the crimes of its oppressors'? His diary was peppered increasingly with outbursts of Anglophobia, energized by his new political environment: England hated Ireland next to France, and would take pleasure in seeing the Irish cutting each other's throats. Though Clarke assured him the plan had been shelved, eight months later Tone would have little choice but to facilitate this unprincipled war as a staff officer under Hoche. Now, though, the purpose of Sullivan's earlier missions, and Madgett's comments to Tone about going among the British prisoners of war held in France, were beginning to make sense, as many of them were evidently Irish. France could rid itself of ordinary soldiers whom it would be difficult to exchange, and the Irish among them could join these new partisan units. If Tone cynically employed religious phraseology to mock what he saw as Madgett's glorified crimping, it was because he echoed Madgett's and Sullivan's own words as corroborated by internal French memos.[28] Even in 1796, the impact of the

school of Jacobinism which had so transformed military life was felt still. If, indeed, the republican struggle was 'an apocalyptic fight to the finish' waged by 'heroic free citizens' on behalf of 'miserable slaves', the religious metaphors were apt.[29] Madgett, Tone wrote, set off 'on a pilgrimage to root out the Irish prisoners of war . . . and to propagate the faith among the Irish soldiers and seamen'. Yet Tone, hoping his own brother Mathew would be found among them, could not be entirely dismissive of this 'scheme [for] debauching Irish prisoners'.[30] Madgett returned successfully, having got 51 Irish prisoners to declare they 'would fight blood to the knees against England'. Tone still despised the plan to 'smuggle ragamuffins' into Ireland, yet he was warming to its purpose and began to muse about leading his own unit as scouts after the landing, for which he had devised the green flag with which we began.

Some of the United Irishmen had been reluctant revolutionaries, hoping that reforms could be achieved solely by constitutional means and not armed struggle. The banning of the society in 1794 led them to regroup clandestinely; the more militant convinced the rest that only the *encadrement* of seasoned French military leaders could bring about the (somewhat utopian) bloodless revolution for which they hoped. News of various outbursts of disaffection and unrest in Ireland had been covered in the French press, and warmly interpreted in Paris as politicized protest. Yet, by early summer 1796 the long-awaited mass uprising to demonstrate Irish 'national' discontentment, signalling the need for the intervention of foreign liberators, still had not occurred. Tone continued to insist that it was only a French landing and the indispensable *point d'appui* of a substantial force of French troops, led by a prominent general, which would trigger the rising, without which there would be only local riots and sporadic outbursts. And so in June 1796 the Directory appointed Hoche, pacifier of the Vendée, to the following task:

> The aim, citizen-general, is to restore to a generous people ripe for revolution the independence and liberty they clamour for. Ireland has been suffering for several centuries under the odious yoke of England. The arrival . . . of assistance from the French Republic can only be the signal . . . of a general insurrection . . . . By detaching Ireland, England will be reduced to a second-rate power.[31]

Our understanding of Directorial policy on postinvasion occupation and governance is enriched by Tone's deconstruction of various discussions and negotiations in his diary, which can often be compared or corroborated with internal French documentation. One compelling example is his first thorough meeting with Hoche, who, as Clarke later explained, would be the person designated by the French to reside near the future Irish government, though Tone seems to have thought it should be a civilian. Would the disaffected groups in Ireland support him in forming a provisional government?

Hoche asked Tone. If sufficient troops were landed, Tone replied. But, would the '*priests . . . give us any trouble?*', Hoche continued.[32] Their influence on the people had diminished greatly, but at a minimum their neutrality could be secured, was the reply. In this and later discussions, Hoche repeatedly asked about the *type* of government the Irish wanted: France's 'main object was the independence of Ireland, under any form of government', though it would prefer a republic. Tone confirmed (exaggeratedly, as he was not speaking for the majority of his countrymen but for the revolutionary elite to which he belonged) it was 'most undoubtedly a republic'. Such vignettes of raw history, impressions of meetings with great men, and downright humour in the diary contributed to its infectious popularity as a canon of nationalist literature. This is well illustrated by his note of the fearless soldier's reaction to the potential opposition of the Irish militia: ' "Oh", said he, as to opposition, "*Je m'en fouts* [*sic*]!" ', which Tone alerted his readers he had no intention of translating literally.[33] Upon receiving his orders, Hoche retorted by formulating the pragmatic questions the '*pékins*' (civilian decision-makers) in Paris should have anticipated. His response illustrated how Directorial generals appropriated the political sphere, but in his case clearly had no choice but to do so.[34] It was urgent that precise orders be issued to the commanding officer, he reprimanded. If the Irish people rose as one in a massive insurrection, was *he* to take the lead, take charge of the general defence of the country, or act as an auxiliary? And would national dignity and the glory of Republican arms permit this? What if a national convention ensued and chose obscure and talentless leaders? Hoche continued. He deemed that the proper behaviour then would be to demonstrate the loyalty and generosity which characterized the French nation, and to conciliate the insurgents by directing minds towards a republican government. And then the vexed question was posed: If the insurgents did not assemble, the Irish forces in British pay did not dissolve, and London sent substantial reinforcements, was the country to be treated '*comme une conquête*?'[35]

Tone assimilated well into his privileged role as a staff officer under Hoche, and, stationed in Rennes and Brest in the autumn, was kept busy composing or translating no fewer than eight addresses and proclamations to be distributed in Ireland, individually targeting the Irish people, the peasantry, militia, and Irishmen in the British navy.[36] The French mission of regeneration was invoked, as the Republic's desire was, *inter alia*, 'to restore to a brave and suffering nation [Ireland] the enjoyment of her long lost rights'.[37] The language is arduous at times, but the political rhetoric mirrors that employed on other horizons of republican expansion discussed in this volume. A final version hastily drawn up by Tone as the fleet was tossed by the winter gales off the coast of Bantry was short, and clearly reiterated that the French came 'to emancipate, not to conquer your country', and would 'respect property, persons and religious practice'.[38] Tone, Delacroix, and Hoche had all agreed that in the first instance it would be essential to form a specifically *military*

government; accordingly the Irish militia were targeted to rally to it, as most of the rank and file were Catholics (the vast majority of whom, however, duly served the Crown forces in 1798). The '*Brave Soldiers*!' were enjoined (in the French stock phrases transposed into English) to 'quit the columns of your tyrants and joint the warlike and victorious standard of the French'.[39] Received as friends and as brothers, they could obtain 'promotion such as is due to the patriotism, talents and courage of brave men' serving so glorious a cause, and more: Settlements in land would be made. Seemingly Hoche was expected also to manage the reversal of no fewer than eight centuries of confiscations and seizures spanning the Norman, Tudor, and Cromwellian conquests!

Such displays of fraternity and republican virtue, however, had not repressed plans to export the small and dirty war. And so, in November, the dutiful Tone recycled the writing skills which had made him Ireland's most renowned pamphletist and feared radical when Hoche requisitioned his skills to translate orders for Colonel Tate. This American was to be dispatched on a 'buccaneering party into England' leading about a thousand men of an irregular unit, the infamous Légion Noire, a scheme intended to divert attention from the larger Irish expeditions.[40] This desperate operation (in effect, and remembered as, the last invasion of Britain) occurred at Fishguard in February 1797, and ended quickly with Tate promptly surrendering. His original instructions were seized, scrutinized, and reprinted to publicize the dangers Britons faced from this now exposed foe.[41] There are echoes of comments Tone made in his diary on the discomforting process of transposing Hoche's Anglophobic tactics into English, as well as his own clear discursive style. At first Tone seemed approving of the legendary *élan* Hoche expected in his envoy: 'if Tate be a dashing fellow with military talents, he may play the devil in England before he is caught'.[42] Embedded in the tactical orders was the omnipresent inducement of playing a role in the nation's glory. Should Tate have to engage the enemy while forging ahead with his troops, he was to remember he was 'now a Frenchman, inasmuch as [he commanded] Frenchmen', and this was to incite him to 'attempt a brilliant stroke'.[43] One may speculate how officials in Whitehall greeted such a textual display of the *furia francesa*. After amending and recopying the instructions, Tone confessed to his diary that he 'transcribed with the greatest *sang froid* the orders to reduce to ashes the third city [Bristol] in the British dominions in which there is perhaps property to the amount of five millions; but such a thing is war!'[44] Tate had been ordered to take Bristol, burn it to the ground or produce its total ruin, and thus to 'strike terror and amazement into the very heart of the capital of England'.[45] Sharply focusing on what later would comprise that fundamental definition of total war which blurred the divide between combatant and non-combatant, Tone was painfully conscious of 'what misery the execution of the orders' he had facilitated would have on innocent civilians, reducing thousands of families

to beggary. But political legitimization was easy: this was a just, provoked war, he contended. He hated the very name of England, which was keeping his country in slavery and his friends in prison, and which had burned without mercy in America. He could not blame the French, yet admitted that his morality was not much improved by being raised to the rank of adjutant general.

This response was partially because he had just experienced the mixed pleasure of being sent among the prisoners of war at Pontanezen (Finistère, Brittany) on Hoche's orders. Tone asserted he would make no constraint on the English who would not be tempted to 'fight against their king and country'.[46] Though money was an inducement, the 'half naked and half starved' Irish among the lot forgot all their cares 'the moment they saw wine before them'. Tone the jurist and self-proclaimed steady lover of justice did not comment on the conditions of their detention or his methods of indoctrination. The English prisoners were clearly less impressed with this tampering with their loyalty and conscience, and had insisted on food before drink. Some did sail with Tate, and testified during the subsequent inquest that they had suffered distress and oppression while detained in France, namely at Pontanezen, though it was not stated that a well-spoken and clever Irishman serving the French had induced them to join up.[47] Possibly the most fitting judgement of this episode is discreetly tucked away in a proverbial footnote of history. Général Gastey, a World War Two commander writing on Humbert's Irish expedition, clarified that he had *not* included the Tate descent in his exposition, as it was but 'a dishonourable affair led by a band of guttersnipes … which ended lamentably'.[48] Tate's descent had yielded no practical results, and it had been devoid of glory for French arms, in contrast to Humbert's brief occupation of Ireland, to which we now turn.

'Gallic invaders in their true colours'[49]

As an ill-judged and very brief campaign, the French invasion of Ireland in August 1798 has been relatively ignored outside Franco-Irish scholarship, or addressed only in traditional-style of Humbert's progress and eventual defeat at the Battle of Ballinamuck on 8 September 1798. Irish historians, understandably, have assessed it as futile, given the tragic outcome for the rebels who rallied to the French, and their scholarship has been tainted distinctly by a culture of defeat. Regrettably, there are no surviving accounts from the rebel side. Accounts by both civilians and soldiers, private and public, however, emphatically agree on one fundamental aspect: the behaviour of the French soldiers left stranded in a remote spot of County Mayo to manage a month-long occupation. Joseph Stock, the Anglican bishop of the locality invaded and a French-speaking Irishman, had his home and official see—known locally as the castle, which suits our purposes—occupied as the French headquarters for just over a month, and turned into an overcrowded

barracks. His writings provide an astutely observed and highly informative account of the necessary accommodations made between soldiers and civilians.[50] He attributed the panic which seized the local population to the fact that 'For a century past, Ireland had known nothing of the horrors of war, but from description.' A biting British cartoon summarizes what the Irish could expect from *Gallic Invaders in their true colours*, and possibly what Stock had meant. It depicted a dignified clergyman being ejected from his church by crazed, jack-booted, simianized Jacobin soldiers brandishing daggers while trampling religious objects, under the gaze of a spectre-like Director. Such a scene could describe aptly the panic which gripped Stock's neighbour, the Reverend James Little, when handed Humbert's landing proclamation (which echoed earlier versions discussed above). Cynical, he saw: 'they would do here as they had done in every other country; let loose the mob they would arm upon every person who should refuse to turn traitor to their country & apostate to his religion and join them...', spreading faction and warfare.[51] Yet, ten days into the occupation, Little noted with fairness in his diary: 'we found that the French had abstained from the plunder of houses, and preserved a very laudable discipline & a sort of police, contenting themselves with the requisition of provisions & of such articles as were necessary to them... [and] for the sick or wounded'.

Indeed, the self-restraint of the French soldiers is a constant thread running through Stock's account, and he even attributed quasi-Christian qualities to them when applauding their discipline and the absence of plunder. So convivial were the French officers billeted on Stock, messing daily with him and his numerous kin on requisitioned or pilfered food, playing cards with his wife despite the language barrier, that he came to refer to them as 'the castle family', where, evidently, a semblance of peace had reigned. When the Crown forces (including irregulars shipped in from Scotland, i.e. more 'desperadoes') arrived as liberators, Stock was scathing about their rapacity, predatory habits, and dexterity at stealing. Their acts surpassed those of the peasants who had 'risen' when the French arrived, among them many who simply aimed to loot and pillage their wealthier Protestant neighbours. Their deeds had forced the *commandant de place* Charost to mobilize, with general success, local peacekeeping, and he had made clear he was a *chef de brigade* and not a *chef de brigands*.

All had, in fact, followed verbatim the orders issued to Humbert, who was to maintain the tightest discipline as dictated by the laws of 'hospitality'.[52] Religious practices, property, and persons were to be respected. These stood out in italics in the printed proclamation, which stated France 'looked for no other conquest than [Irish] liberty'. The French came to 'join their arms and mix their blood' with the 'Brave Irishmen... in the sacred cause of liberty'. Official records prove that not only had the French *not* interfered with religious practice but also that some, namely the Irish captains, had prevented interconfessional strife and conflict. Humbert's proclamation, again

employing laborious phraseology, had stated clearly the desired political outcome of the military operations. France wished to avenge Ireland's wrongs and assure its independence, and Humbert reiterated the ideological justification: The 'peace of the world' would ever be troubled as long as 'the British ministry' made, with impunity, 'a traffic of the industry, labour and blood of the people'.[53] Stock recorded how the French always differentiated between Englishmen and Irishmen, who were to be regarded as brothers and citizens of the world persecuted by a ferocious government. Indeed, Humbert's private instructions had stressed that an ideological war was to be waged by energizing public minds, and seizing any chance to maintain the hatred of the English and make known 'their crimes'. The French delegated this proselytizing task to the Irish captains they had recruited before sailing, as per the statements of local prisoners later released, and Little's shrewd powers of observing the 'haranguing' that went on. Witnesses identified Tone's brother Mathew, and one insistent Captain 'Laroche', who reminded them they had long been slaves to the English and that their French 'brethren' had come to 'break off the tyrannical yoke'.[54] Laroche was the *nom de guerre* of John Sullivan, whose experience on various 'special missions' serving the French Revolution now could be employed in the liberation of his countrymen.

The 'soft' total war? Tone's depiction of French society and public space

As a self-avowed romantic, Tone acknowledged that the approval of females guided men's lives, but, as a quintessential Enlightenment man, his male identity was defined by that single, fundamental model, the soldier. In the memoirs he wrote in France (after being enlisted as a *chef de brigade d'infanterie* in July 1796), he claimed that since boyhood he had dreamt of nothing else but becoming a soldier, skipping school to watch military manoeuvres, begging his beloved father to allow him to enlist rather than attend college, and in the end having to go into exile and become a Frenchman to do so. He was an adolescent during the American Revolution, and the *rage militaire* of volunteering which was sweeping Ireland had convinced him that a uniform, 'cockade and gold epaulettes', could assist greatly 'in my approaches to the objects of my adoration . . . woman'.[55] Females in France—admired—were thus far *less* frequently mentioned in his diary than the innumerable soldiers and officers he observed, strolling in the former Palais Royal, mustering in the Tuileries, or, most importantly, supporting theatrical performances or civic *fêtes*, as key participants in the Realpolitik propaganda which the Revolution had officialized. From Tone's diary (especially for February–May 1796) emerges an unashamedly giddy but sharply observed and richly detailed eyewitness account of the cultural phenomenon Annie Crépin discusses, the martialization of public space and the French collective imagination.

Watching the changing of the guard in the Tuileries became a daily ritual for Tone. If, indeed, he now perceived 'the full import of the expression "*an armed nation*" ', it stirred him to conclude that, if given the chance, Ireland too could produce 'as many and as fine fellows as France', and it too could 'be formidable as an "*armed nation*" '.[56] Embedded in Tone's diary are frequent descriptions of theatre performances, such as an operatic re-enactment of the Champ de Mars celebrations of the Federations, the *Oath of Liberty*: 'As usual the spectacle all military.' To him, these choreographed but genuine military exercises performed on stage were 'the ballets of the French nation at present'.[57]

Tone was rediscovering also the model which had guided his youth, and which his life would come to embody, the *republican* patriot soldier guided by civic virtue. The mission of the United Irish—to convince a Protestant nation that Catholics and Presbyterians were worthy of political freedoms—sought to secularize Irish identity by replacing religious affiliations with 'the common name of Irishman', as the Americans had done. Thus the concept of an Irish citizen–soldier, which his own sons could become, must have been foremost in Tone's mind when he attended a Festival of Youth at the former church of St Roch (Paris, rue St Honoré), 'decorated with the national colours and a statue of liberty, an altar blazing before her'.[58] The youth of the district were presented to the *municipalité* to receive arms or be enrolled to vote, depending on their age. After the processions, addresses were made to the youths 'on the duty they owed their country and the honour of bearing arms in her defence'. Significantly, he had recorded a cultural manifestation that historians would later discuss as the Revolution's programme to appropriate 'patriotic sentiment' in order to mobilize 'an entire population in the service of an immeasurable collective ambition'.[59] After collecting their arms, the new citizen–soldiers were embraced by parents, siblings, and lovers, all generations and genders together. Tone now understood the miracles which the French army had performed in the contest for its liberties. Further impassioned accounts related the audience's reaction when officers directly saluted them, and described 'peals of applause when the ensign passed with the Tricolour flag', along with the rapturous response to communal singing of various civic hymns. When the word 'slavery' was pronounced and *Veillons au salut de l'empire* was sung, 'it operated like an electric shock', he claimed. Tone also conveyed how moved he was specifically by the female actresses, whose role was to chant and encourage the martial behaviour of the soldiers on stage, displaying their approval with telling gestures.[60] Tone was convinced 'of the powerful effects of public spectacles properly directed in the course of a revolution', and to him it was 'in the army that the nation exists'. His allusions to the cult of the military hero, his approval of the cultural programme to win the hearts and minds of this newly embodied nation, demonstrate the potency of what I suggest was the 'soft' total war. As an Irishman of his generation, dazzled as he was by the ethos of his new host

country, he was transported back to his youth when George Washington had been the hero to emulate. If ever Ireland could shake off its chains, it would be absolutely necessary, Tone thought, to adopt measures similar to the French ones 'which have raised and cherished this spirit here'.

Conclusion

Setting aside the logistical nightmare of administering a conquered territory or protectorate that was a separate island in the Atlantic shielded by Great Britain, it is safe to conclude that the Directory's military strategy was shaped continuously by rapidly shifting contingencies. While its policy on Ireland seems clearly fraternal, given the documents perused for this discussion, it never really envisaged that Ireland would become a ninth sister republic. Buried in an unpublished letter, and overlooked by generations of historians who expressed cynicism as to France's true intentions, is a revealing quip recorded by Stock, passed on by an exasperated French officer living under his roof:

> the real object of this invasion of Ireland by the French is merely to annoy England, and force us to a peace. As to forming a republic here similar to their own, they care not a farthing for it; neither do they expect to be able to effect a revolution with such a handful of men as they have sent, but look upon themselves as a forlorn hope, who will probably be forced at last to surrender themselves prisoners of war, after executing the duty imposed on them by their country.[61]

The arch-pragmatist Napoleon would make little effort later to veil his exploitation of the Irish cause for this very purpose, suing for an end to the war. Ireland's place in any discussion of republican war has allowed us to rediscover the *chouannerie* projects that are rare examples of Western literature on 'how to conduct' partisan warfare 'to avenge a wrong', and can inform further debates on the political underpinnings of total war.[62] Tone may never have learned the full extent of the counterinsurgency methods which the Crown forces applied to quash the Irish rebellion, but he certainly had anticipated their ferocity. Draconian measures were employed to disarm them, but the means aimed also to break the disloyal spirit of the people psychologically. Ruthless auxiliaries were shipped from Britain, and their route could be traced by the smoke and flames of burning cabins and trail of dead bodies. These were indeed infernal columns, and one commander had assured his superiors that the most mobilized and armed region of Ireland would be effectively dragooned:

> I look upon Ulster to be a *La Vendée* . . . . It will not be brought into subjection but by the means adopted by the republicans in power—namely

spreading devastation through the most disaffected parts . . . . Laws though ever so strict will not do, severe military execution alone will recover the arms from the hands of the rebels.[63]

Before his exile to America in 1795, Tone had joined with fellow United Irishmen on a windblown hilltop outside Belfast. Bound by a 'brotherhood of affection', the imagined republican community of Irishmen of all religions they had created, they swore as in a David painting 'a solemn obligation . . . never to desist in our efforts until we had subverted the authority of England over our country and asserted her independence'.[64] This oath became one of the most celebrated passages in Tone's brief autobiography, which he wrote within weeks of receiving his first commission in the French army in July 1796 as a staff officer under Hoche. Tone's posthumous pantheonization is easily understood, given the inseparable duality of his political agitation and military role as an officer in the French army of the First Republic. Arrested after the defeat of the final French invasion attempt in October 1798, he pleaded guilty at his trial for treason, but defiantly defended his honourable status as a French officer and asked to be shot by firing squad. When this was rejected, Tone slit his own throat in his prison cell and died a week later. This 'Roman death' boldly 'denied the legitimacy of English government in Ireland', and by 'choosing the republican way of death' Tone became a martyr of liberty, 'a characteristic product of the age of revolution'.[65]

One of the great ironies of Tone's legend is that he had visited the Pantheon in Paris with a genial aristocrat who had returned from exile to serve in the Republic's navy. Deeply moved, he thought: 'Certainly nothing can be imagined more likely to create a great spirit in a nation than a repository of this kind, sacred to everything that is sublime and illustrious and patriotic . . . . If we have a republic in Ireland, we must build a Pantheon . . . .'[66]

Yet, with characteristic humour, he had added that the Irish, unlike the French, must not be in too great a hurry to people it. Bodenstown, his final burial place in County Kildare, became a veritable republican pilgrimage throughout the twentieth century. The shuffling and jostling politicians and megaphone patriots ignored the fact that it had been Lucien Bonaparte who had first declared that the people of Dublin should gather annually to honour his memory. He had repeated to the Council of the Five Hundred Tone's last words to the martial tribunal, in which the 'martyr for liberty' had stated that the great object of his life had been the independence of his country, and for that he had sacrificed all that was dear to man.[67]

The leaders of the 1916 Rebellion launched their strike for Irish liberation with no external armed or political assistance, and yet ever present in *their* minds was the inspirational model of that first generation of Ireland's patriots who had undergone a process of heroization underpinning republican and martial culture, the late eighteenth-century roots of which are

forgotten today. Pádraig Pearse, the visionary military commander of the 1916 rising, was especially driven by the sacred memory of Tone and had delivered a seminal graveside oration at Bodenstown in 1913, declaring it the holiest place in Ireland. Though this hyperbole misreads Tone's modest aspirations to immortality, there can be no denying that Pearse's words aptly summarize the purpose of his hero's republican soldiering: 'Life springs from death; and from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations.'[68]

Notes

1. [Bishop Joseph Stock], *A Narrative of what passed at Killala in the county Mayo and the parts adjacent, during the French invasion in the summer of 1798, by an eyewitness* (Dublin and London, 1800), 23–24.
2. Theobald Wolfe Tone, *The Writings of Theobald Wolfe Tone 1763–1798*, ed. Theodore Moody et al., 3 vols (Oxford, 1989, 2001, 2007), vol. 2, 210.
3. SHD, Armée B5*, Armées des Cotes de l'Océan 1795–1797, fol. 78ᵛ, Lettre 218, Directory to Hoche, Paris 23 June 1796; cited and translated in François Van Brock, 'A Proposed Irish regiment and standard', *The Irish Sword* XI (1973–1974), 231.
4. For Tone's career in the French army 1796–1798, see my '*Un brave de plus*: Theobald Wolfe Tone, alias Adjudant-general James Smith, French officer and Irish patriot adventurer, 1796–8', in *Franco-Irish Military Connections, 1590–1945*, ed. Nathalie Genêt-Rouffiac and David Murphy (Dublin, 2009), 163–188; and '*Un brave de plus*': la carrière militaire de Theobald Wolfe Tone, héros du nationalisme irlandais et officier français, 1796–1798', *Revue Historique des Armées France-Irlande* 253 (2008): 55–65, http://rha.revues.org/index4602.html (Accessed 3 March 2013).
5. Discussed in Marcus de la Poer Beresford, 'Ireland in French Strategy 1692–1789', M. Litt. diss. (University of Dublin, 1975); AD, Mémoires et Documents, 54, 30–31, 'Nécéssités et moyens de diminuer les forces de l'Angleterre', Colonel Edmund O'Reilly to Choiseul, 7 October 1767, cited in Beresford, 'Ireland in French Strategy', 274–275, 286.
6. David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (Boston and New York, 2007), 136.
7. AD, Correspondence Politique Angleterre (hereafter CPA), 584, fos 214–217ᵛ, Coquebert to Lebrun, Paris, 18 December 1792, and following.
8. AD, CPA, 587, 9ʳ⁻ᵛ, Lebrun to Lt. Colonel André MacDonagh, 1 March 1793.
9. The Bureau, initially attached to the Marine Department, then External Relations, appears to have also been answerable to the Committee of Public Safety: AD, Personnel 1ère série, 47: Nicholas Madgett (1740–1813), and 65, John Sullivan (1767?–1802) respectively; CPA, 588–589; AN, MAR, G, 242, Papiers de Madgett secrétaire-interprète de la Marine 1799–1807; SHD, Armée, 2Yᵉ, Captain John Sullivan.
10. AD, CPA, 587, Madgett to Lebrun, 13 March 1793, fol. 20ʳ.
11. Ibid. 46ʳ, date unspecified but ca. March–April 1793. Secret expenditure records for the Conseil exécutif confirm that sums were allocated on 26 April 1793 for the translation of placards addressed to the 'braves matelots anglais': AN, AF II, 7ʳ. See also AD, CPA, 588, 480–481, undated but ca. late May 1794, Address to the

people of Ireland 'by citizen Madgett Head of the Translation Bureau before the Comité de Salut public … the purpose of which is to waken the hatred of the Irish against their eternal English oppressor'.

12. AD, Pers.1, 65, 58ᵛ, Sullivan to Minister for External Relations Delacroix, 30 October 1795.
13. The subject of Sylvie Kleinman, 'Translation the French Language and the United Irishmen 1792–1804', D. Phil. thesis (Dublin City University, 2005), undergoing revision for publication as *The War in Words: Translating Irish Freedom into French Military Strategy, Persuading, Invading 1792–1805*. My arguments are summarized in ' "Amidst Clamour and Confusion": Civilian and Military Linguists at War in the Franco-Irish Campaigns against Britain (1792–1804)', in *Languages and the Military Alliance, Occupation and Peace Building*, ed. Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly (Basingstoke, 2012), 25–46.
14. Tone to Adet, Philadelphia 10 August 1795, reprinted in Theobald Wolfe Tone, *The Writings of Theobald Wolfe Tone, 1763–1798*, ed. Theodore Moody et al., 3 vols (Oxford, 1998–2007), vol. 2, 4.
15. [Tone], *An Argument on behalf of the catholics of Ireland* (Dublin, 1791), reprinted in Tone, *Writings*, vol. 1, 108–128.
16. AN, AF IV, carton 1671, fol. 98ʳ, Tone, Second memorial to the French government, Paris, 29 February 1796. See AD, CPA, 589 f. 181 for the French translation; reprinted in Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 96.
17. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 153.
18. Hoche to the Comité de salut public, 1 October 1793, reprinted in Édouard Desbrières, *Projets et tentatives de débarquement dans les îles britanniques, 1793–1805*, 5 vols (Paris, 1900–1902), vol. 1, 31–32.
19. SHD, Armée, 11B¹, Première expédition d'Irlande, 'Instruction pour l'établissement d'une chouannerie en Angleterre', unsigned and undated but attributed to Carnot, fol. 1ʳ.
20. Ibid.; and Ernest Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande pendant la Révolution Hoche et Humbert* (Paris, 1888), 85–86, who also cites Carnot's instructions.
21. SHD, Armée, 11B¹, 'Idées pour établir une chouannerie en Irlande', Humbert, 1796; see also his personal file for this and later plans, 482 GB 84ᵈ 2e série.
22. 'Note pour le Général Clarke', attributed to Général La Barollière, reprinted in Desbrières, *Projet*, vol. 1, 64–66, and ff.
23. SHD, Armée, 11B¹, 'Note pour le Général Clarke', attributed to Général La Barollière, undated but ca. February to March 1796, and following.
24. AN, AF IV, 1671, 65ʳ–67ᵛ, 'Memorandum to General Henri Jacques Guillaume Clarke on the encouragement of *chouannerie* in Ireland, 4 April 1796', reprinted in Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 144–145. Tone and Clarke corresponded, and, so we can safely conclude, conversed, in English.
25. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 141, Diary for 3 April 1796.
26. Ibid. 140, my emphasis.
27. Ibid. 106, Diary for 11 March 1796.
28. AD, CPA, 598, fol. 182ʳ, Madgett to Delacroix, proposing that Sullivan be sent to 'endoctrinate the English seamen', 2 March 1796.
29. Bell, *Total War*, 138.
30. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 121 (22 March 1796), and 124. Mathew fled for France in 1794 hoping to enlist, but had been arrested. He later served as a captain–interpreter under Humbert during the 1798 campaign, was arrested by the Crown forces and executed on 28 September.

31. SHD, Armée, 11B^1, Directoire exécutif to Hoche, Paris, 19 June 1796.
32. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 234, Diary for 12 July 1796.
33. Ibid. 251: 'I don't give a damn.'
34. AN, AF III d.858, Hoche to the Directory, 6 July 1798; reprinted in Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande*, 193–195.
35. Ibid. 195, my emphasis.
36. Reprinted in Tone, *Writings,* vol. 2, based on his personal papers (Trinity College, Dublin).
37. SHD, Armée, 11B^1, *Proclamation to the people of Ireland* [Tone's copy for Hoche], transcribed in Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 196–198.
38. *To the people of Ireland* [22 December 1796], Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 422.
39. Ibid. '*To the militia of Ireland*', 421.
40. Ibid. 397, Diary for 25 November 1796.
41. *Authentic copies of the instructions given by Gen[eral] Hoche to Colonel Tate previous to his landing on the coast of South Wales at the beginning of 1797* (London, Wright, 1797) and appended to the *Report of the Committee of the House of Commons in consequence of the several motions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Including the whole of the examinations taken before the Committee the correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners; the instructions of Colonel Tate, &c.* (London, 1798). My efforts so far to locate the copy seized from Tate (presumably in Tone's hand) have been unsuccessful.
42. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 397.
43. *Authentic copies*.
44. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 371, Diary for 13 November 1796.
45. *Authentic copies*.
46. Ibid.
47. *Report of the Committee of the House of Commons* (London, 1798), 9: 'All efforts were used to inveigle them; they were frequently threatened to be starved … liquor was given to them, and advantage was taken of them when in a state of intoxication.'
48. Général Gastey, 'L'étonnante aventure de l'Armée d'Irlande [1798]', *Revue historique des Armées* 4 (December 1952): 20, n. 2.
49. 'Gallic invaders in their true colours, or the Republican mode of converting the people of Ireland', polychrome cartoon after Gillray, London 1798: [Polychrome Cartoon], Nr. inventaire Carnavalet 69060/Roger-Viollet 24976–4, reproduced in *France-Angleterre au Musée Carnavalet, face à la Révolution et l'Empire: caricatures anglaises (1789–1815)*, ed. Pascal Dupuy (Paris, 2008), 127. See my '*La paix au Chateau*? L'occupation française de l'Irlande en 1798: Traduction, accommodements, perceptions de l'autre', in *Le Temps des hommes doubles: Les arrangements face à l'occupation, de la Révolution française à la guerre de 1870*, ed. Jean-François Chanet et al. (Rennes, 2013), 213–230.: Peace in the castle?
50. [Joseph Stock], *Proceedings at Killala during the French Invasion, and the Subsequent Rebellion, from August 22 to October 27, 1798: In Letters from the Right Reverend Joseph Lord Bishop of Killala to his brother, Mr. Stephen Stock, of Dame street Dublin, and others* (Bath, 1799), and following, 15. I am currently finalizing an annotated edition of this text to be published ca 2014.
51. [James Little], 'Little's diary of the French landing in 1798', ed. Nualla Costello, *Analecta Hibernia* 11 (1941): 75, and following, 134, 137.
52. SHD, Marine, BB^4 122, fol. 165–167, Schérer [Minister of War] to Humbert, 19 July 1798.

53. National Library of Ireland, Manuscripts, Humbert's Proclamation; reproduced in Thomas Pakenham, *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798* (London, 1969/1997), between pages 288 and 289.
54. Richard Francis Hayes, *The Last Invasion of Ireland* (Dublin, 1937/1979), 278, citing Trinity College manuscripts, 'Account by James Fullam'.
55. Tone, Autobiography, *Writings*, vol. 2, 268.
56. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 55, Diary for 16 February 1796.
57. Ibid. 108, 13 March.
58. Ibid. 136, 30 March.
59. Bell, *Total War*, 84, 119.
60. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 50 (13 February), and following 136.
61. Stock, *Proceedings at Killalla*, 15.
62. Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge, 2010), 388–389.
63. General Thomas Knox to the Earl of Abercorn, 21 March 1797, cited in Thomas, *Rebellion*, ed. Thomas Bartlett et al. (Dublin, 1998), 69.
64. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 333.
65. Ian McBride, *Eighteenth-Century Ireland 'Island of Slaves'* (Dublin, 2009), 376, 346.
66. Tone, *Writings*, vol. 2, 102.
67. Lucien Bonaparte, Council of the Five Hundred, *Motion d'ordre faite par L. Bonaparte pour la veuve et les enfans de Téobald-Wolfe-Ton* [sic], Session of 9 Brumaire Year VIII [31 October 1799], 3.
68. Pearse oration at graveside of O'Donovan Rossa, Glasnevin cemetery (Dublin), 1 August 1915, cited in Kathleen Travers, 'The Tone of National Commemoration: The Annual Wolfe Tone Commemorations at Bodenstown', MA thesis (University College Dublin, 2002), 4–5.

Section II

Citizenship and 'Republican' War

5

A 'Black Declaration of Independence'?

War, Republic, and Race in the United States of America, 1775–1787

Marie-Jeanne Rossignol

The question of the connection between republic and race has come to the fore in the past decade, most particularly because new interpretations of the Haitian Revolution have incorporated the Caribbean experience decisively into the Age of Atlantic Revolutions. They have put forward the idea that universal republicanism as understood by French white revolutionaries did not include the slaves or even ex-slaves as equals in the new social compact, even after white leaders proclaimed the abolition of slavery in 1794.[1] In contrast, the rebellious slaves in Saint-Domingue are now presented provocatively by a number of historians as the real radicals of a newly defined Enlightenment, freedom fighters whose struggle managed to push the limits of liberty beyond the accepted meaning of the time and towards genuine universalism. Other historians, however, strongly oppose the idea.[2]

Given the historiographical prominence of Haitian revolutionary studies in recent years on both sides of the Atlantic, questions such as the scope of the republican goals of both black rebels and white revolutionaries during the Age of Revolutions, and more generally the challenge raised by slave revolts to modern republican citizenship, have moved to the centre of historical analysis.[3] Stemming from current Haitian revolutionary historiography, but also from Caribbean studies, these questions make it possible for us to reframe the issue of 'war, republic, and race' during the American War of Independence. In particular, they enable us to focus on early American republicanism, not only as a concept inherited from European intellectual traditions, as is usually done by North American historians, but also as a dynamic political process, as it has been defined by French anthropologist Syliane Larcher with regard to the French Caribbean. Her position is that, although citizenship was granted formally in postslavery societies, exclusion from the polity prevailed, thus leading certain categories of excluded citizens to fight for their rights.[4] Such forms of exclusion were the case in

Guadeloupe after news of the 1794 French abolition of slavery was brought to the island. There, black leaders such as Louis Delgrès supported French republican values, while insisting that those values include genuine racial equality. To Laurent Dubois, who wrote a history of those early years of emancipation on Guadeloupe, these demands clearly show that the leaders wanted to use the full potential of the Enlightenment and Atlantic Revolutions in shaping modern citizenship.[5]

As we shall see in the rest of this article, the period of the War of Independence fits into this new intellectual framework: By joining the Continental Army or fleeing to the British side, slaves stretched the limits of who could benefit from liberty as part of the white struggle for independence. Yet the fight was far from over at the end of the war, as free blacks gradually were excluded from the republican polity in the North, while those slaves who had chosen to join the British in the South often were led to an uncertain fate after the war ended. The war and its immediate aftermath thus stand out as a testing ground of the commitment of North American revolutionary leaders to universal republicanism, as well as the slaves' own political goals, as far as they can be fathomed.[6]

Such an approach is, in fact, quite compatible with a larger trend in United States scholarship, now placing race and slavery at the core of the history of the American Revolution. A growing spate of recent publications has highlighted the central role of race during the period, affecting all aspects of national life and politics: slavery became a debated issue throughout the British North American colonies, leading to a wave of collective and private emancipations on the occasion of the Revolution.[7] It was the pivotal argument during the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787, and an essential element in all early national public discussions, including fiscal and economic decisions.[8] Even military history has been affected: Whereas the social historians of the 1970s and 1980s left the narrative of military operations to specialists, since the 1990s the issue of race and slavery has become an important element in the understanding of the war for experts in military history as well as political and social historians.[9]

Thus, drawing on the notion of universal republicanism as developed by French Atlantic scholars, my point in this contribution is to question the position of those historians who have located the black revolution in the South of the United States and interpreted slave flight and opposition to the United States authorities as the ultimate form of liberation during the period of the American Revolution.[10] Such a position stems from an interpretation of the American Revolution as primarily conservative, which was prevalent in United States historiography in the 1970s and 1980s. Those ideas hold renewed sway in the profession today, even though they are contested by other scholars.[11] However much we may support and respect this point of view, it does lead to the neglect of the political goals of those blacks who joined the Continental Army on the side of the insurgents. Their

commitment built a strong basis for black citizenship in the new nation, and paved the way for all further civil rights struggles in the United States and the advent of a more universal republicanism.

Therefore this chapter will suggest that a return to a more inclusive narrative of the involvement of blacks in the military events, North and South, is needed in order to investigate the political motivations and goals of all slaves and ex-slaves within the framework of a radical Atlantic Enlightenment. In a seminal book published in 1979, Eugene Genovese, anticipating Dubois' analyses, suggested that slave revolts shifted in nature at the time of the Atlantic Revolutions, from 'restorationist revolts directed at withdrawals from the prevailing social arrangements, to revolts directed at a fundamental liberal-democratic restructuring of society'.[12] Following Genovese, we now take it for granted that slaves received further motivation from the language of natural rights during the War of Independence. We cannot know exactly, however, what objectives slaves in the South were trying to accomplish, given the utter complexity of events: Were the slaves merely pursuing personal liberation in combat and flight, or, if they were trying to reach specific political goals, what were those goals? In which sense was the 'Revolutionary War' 'a Black Declaration of Independence', as Benjamin Quarles put it in 1983? Sylvia Frey described the movement in the South as 'failure', although she agreed that it did bring about changes in Southern slave society.[13] One must consider, nonetheless, the failed insurrection in the South together with the much more successful movement by blacks, primarily in the North, who joined the insurgents' army and thus were given a far better opportunity to gain their freedom and to challenge later restrictions to their rights.

Consequently, this chapter will examine these questions by first taking stock of the existing historiography. It will then focus on the story of those African-Americans who chose to join the British, before dealing with those who rallied to patriot forces. A final section will be devoted to the place of freed slaves and free African-Americans in general in the new American nation in the wake of the War of Independence, and to how they played a key role in the ongoing struggle for a universal definition of republican citizenship.

War, Republic, Race, and United States historians

The question of the impact of the War of Independence on slavery and African-Americans has been one of the mainstays of the classic African-American historiography, as was analysed well by Gary Nash in his 1996 edition of Benjamin Quarles' 1961 *The Negro in the American Revolution*.[14] Nash noted that the earliest black historians, William C. Nell, William Wells Brown, and George Washington Williams, all had focused on the engagement of African-Americans on the patriot side in an attempt to highlight

black loyalty to the Revolution. Thus, their work could counter white racism by promoting black heroism on behalf of independence. They ignored black flight to the British lines, seeing it as implicitly treasonous.[15] A later generation of black historians could not overcome this supposed embarrassment, even though they did begin to acknowledge that slaves had joined the British lines. Their emphasis, however, remained on black patriotism.[16] A shift in the historiography came in 1940, when Marxist historian Herbert Aptheker published *The Negro in the American Revolution*, a book that did not discount the patriotic behaviour of a minority of blacks, but made it clear that a much larger number of African-Americans, in their search for liberation, had chosen instead to flee or to support the British army. This new approach to the question of black involvement in the war was felt in Quarles' 1961 opus, which dealt with both groups on an equal basis and tried to portray the collective experience of blacks during the War of Independence by also including two chapters on the progress of antislavery activity and decisions.[17]

Although published in 1996, Nash's introduction to Quarles' book did not take into account a new historiographical trend then developing, a more militant focus on black flight to the British, separate from the study of black patriots. This new direction presented the argument that black flight in itself was a revolutionary pronouncement on the American Revolution and its supposedly republican values.[18] Very much the heir to Aptheker's Marxist approach, the new approach could be sensed in a book chapter by Peter H. Wood in 1986 in which he described slave unrest on the eve of the American Revolution throughout the British North American colonies. Wood deliberately contrasted the 'black freedom struggle' in 1775 with the elite white one. Like 'workers and artisans', Wood suggested, the enslaved eventually were crushed by the conservative turn which the Revolution took.[19]

Although this new historiography followed in the wake of Eugene D. Genovese's 1979 *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World*, it was nonetheless distinct. It clearly defined the black freedom struggle as more radical, while revealing how greatly it differed from the elite white one. As suggested earlier, this position was exemplified best by Sylvia Frey's 1991 *Water from the Rock*, a monograph which gave blacks a central role in the narrative of the War of Independence in the South. Focusing on the large number of slaves who fled to the British lines during the war, Sylvia Frey questioned the connection of the 'ideology of equality and freedom and slave resistance'; she placed the 'dialectical relationship between slave resistance and Britain's Southern strategy, and between slave resistance, and the white independence movement' at the heart of her analysis. This political interpretation of black flight, together with the settlers' revolutionary creed, was anchored as well in her belief that resistance found 'its ideology, strategy and meaning in African patterns of

resistance and warfare'.[20] Frey's book thus heralded a period when slave resistance in North America and the Caribbean came increasingly to be studied as part of the Age of Revolutions, and yet as distinct from the white movement for independence, with no clear possibility of connection between the two. At the same time, her work did not delineate the nature and goals of the Southern black rebels' political actions. Although their movement was said to be more revolutionary, in her analysis, it still appeared to be very much at the mercy of British officers' change of policies and moods, as we shall see in detail below, and to lack an overall ideological purpose. Sylvia Frey did see a republican dimension to black flight, though: She estimated that the 'black émigrés of Sierra Leone' (where a small group of slaves freed by the British eventually found shelter in the 1790s) 'felt the revolutionary impact of republicanism. Like their white owners they viewed themselves as heirs of the Revolution, entitled therefore to its promises of liberty, equality, and happiness, which for former slaves translated into freedom from slavery for themselves and their families.'[21] Yet such a positive intellectual construction of the émigrés' experience can concern only the tiny minority who escaped, and it has to be contrasted with Jill Lepore's rendering of the collective peregrinations of all runaways in the South: 'During the war, tens of thousands of slaves left their homes, escaping from slavery to the freedom promised by the British, and betting on British victory. They lost that bet. They died in battle, they died in disease, they ended up someplace else, they ended up back where they started, or worse . . . .'[22]

Conversely, those blacks who fought on the patriot side during the American Revolution, through personal choice or geographical location (most of them lived in the North, which was then in the process of passing emancipation legislation), were involved directly in the creation of the new republican compact, their presence clearly challenging its original limitations.

Arming the Slaves: An Ambiguous British Strategy in the South, 1775–1783

When war broke out between Great Britain and most of its North American colonies in the spring of 1775, metropolitan authorities were keenly aware of the fact that the major part of their empire was at stake, in terms of men, goods, and territory. The population of Great Britain amounted to around 6.5 million people, whereas there were already almost 2.5 million people in the 13 insurgent colonies, a number which was growing rapidly.[23] Twenty per cent of this colonial population was made up of enslaved men and women of African origin—500,000 people in 1775—far more than there were in the other British American colonies put together.[24] Unlike Caribbean slaves, North American bondmen and women were spread out over the eastern seaboard, a stretch of 3,000 kilometres, and constituted a majority

only in South Carolina. Indeed, the percentage of blacks in the North was marginal (2 per cent in Pennsylvania), while it reached 40 per cent in the largest southern state, Virginia.[25]

The British had fought hard during the eighteenth century to prevail over France—mainly—and Spain on the North American continent, most particularly during the recent Seven Years' War, and they did not envisage losing their North American colonies. The controversy over taxation, which opposed the colonies and their mother country before the War of Independence (1765–1775), was characterized by violence (street demonstrations, attacks on representatives of British power such as customs officers, repression by British troops such as the Boston Massacre). It had provoked acute resentment on both sides. Yet, the rebellious colonists did not declare independence until the summer of 1776. Thus, the decision by the governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, on 7 November 1775 to offer emancipation to those slaves and free blacks who joined the British army off the coast of Virginia must be understood as one of the tools of metropolitan repression.[26] By then the governor of Virginia could not but have noticed the already numerous slave flights, as if bondmen and women had been anticipating the breakup between the colonies and the metropolis and had decided to side with the lesser of two evils by looking for shelter within the British army.[27] Aware of the disruptive power of such flights, Dunmore had welcomed the fugitives, against the advice of colonists.[28]

Although slaves did not rush to the British flag out of devotion to the Crown and Dunmore's apparent antislavery beliefs, some may have heard of the 1772 Somerset case which spelled the end of slavery on British soil, even though the actual wording of the legal decision was very prudent.[29] Indeed, Lord Dunmore's proclamation was no indication that Great Britain had decided to emancipate the slaves in its North American colonies or elsewhere. Abolition of the slave trade and slavery was of interest to only a small number of people in Britain, where Granville Sharp, the early advocate of British abolitionism, was seen mainly as an eccentric at the time; his personal antislavery campaign in the 1770s did not launch a broad-based movement.[30] At most, Dunmore's proclamation suggested that the British army merely wanted to assert imperial might over the colonists by seizing their property.[31] In the spring of 1775, as military hostilities were breaking out around Boston, the North ministry had tried to pass a bill in the Commons which would have made it possible to emancipate slaves in order to use them against the colonists. The bill was rejected, but obviously it made its way into the imagination of British military commanders in the field.[32] The very idea of British soldiers inciting slaves to rebel and arming them, together with Dunmore's initiative, however, caused a sharp reaction on the part of British merchants—many of whom were profitably involved in the Atlantic slave trade—in the autumn of 1775.[33] Throughout the war, British opponents of such a strategy claimed it could lead to a social revolution for

which no one was ready; in only a few minds did contact with the liberated slaves spark a genuine commitment to antislavery.[34]

Although many fled to the British lines in response to Lord Dunmore's proclamation, and many more may have been tempted to do so, the slaves probably saw through the governor's tactic and could understand that this measure was but a cynical way to flout their masters. As Sidney Kaplan has written: 'It was not that the blacks could not understand the hollowness of Dunmore's libertarian pretenses—he offered freedom only to the slaves of rebels and helped Tory masters to retrieve their runaways—or that he had blocked the colony's effort to halt the slave trade . . . .'[35] As was explained by Benjamin Quarles, the governor had been considering this measure for eight months. Immediately after the first fighting in April 1775 in Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, he had planned raising troops made up of 'Indians, negroes, and other persons' as he could not count on the British troops, who were then gathered around Boston. Slaves heard of the plan and visited him to be enrolled; only after fleeing Williamsburg (then the capital of Virginia), and finding shelter on a British ship, however, did Dunmore start raising a force in earnest. During the summer and autumn of 1775, he launched sloops against Chesapeake plantations, taking away slaves and other possessions.[36] By summer, settlers reacted by strengthening the protection of coastal areas. Only in mid-November did Dunmore make his intentions fully clear by issuing his proclamation.

Quite plainly the proclamation was bound to be counter-productive, as it united slave-owning Virginians against the Crown by threatening them with the loss of their slaves. It even offered a rationale for those willing to enrol blacks in the patriot forces.[37] Furious colonists reacted by making it known to the slaves in a counter-proclamation that the British liberation proposal was misleading: It only applied to men old enough to bear arms, and thus could rend apart families.[38] Moreover, the British were accused of eventually planning to sell slaves in the Caribbean.[39] In December 1775, the Virginia Convention officially reacted by offering to pardon the slaves if they returned to their masters within ten days, but it also outlined repressive measures.[40] In any case, around 300 slaves joined the British fleet and Lord Dunmore.[41] This 'Ethiopian regiment', as it was called, wearing the motto 'Liberty to slaves' on its uniforms, clashed with the Virginia militia in December and was crushed, a defeat which considerably alleviated the fears of planters, but also strengthened their anti-British resolve.[42]

However limited and ambiguous this first measure of emancipation may have appeared to many observers and participants, the fact remains nonetheless that Lord Dunmore's proclamation led to the first group emancipation in the British North American colonies (or any other colonial possession for that matter). Dunmore used the slaves who had flocked to the British flag primarily as soldiers, pilots, and sailors, not merely as labourers, which sent a positive message to slaves who still were considering

joining him. The cramped conditions on his ships led to the spread of disease, however, and only 150 black troops were left by June 1776, although new runaways were arriving every day.[43] At the end of July 1776, Lord Dunmore left for Bermuda with his fleet and 300 ex-slaves on board. All in all, Benjamin Quarles estimated that around 800 former slaves joined the governor.

Although Dunmore's proclamation had mixed results, on the battle-field and in London, resorting to slaves as soldiers and labourers nevertheless remained a central tenet in British strategy until the end of the war. To Sylvia Frey, the undisputable reason for such a strategic choice was the 'groundswell of resistance' which took place on the occasion of Lord Dunmore's procla-mation.[44] In other words, the slaves' own choices comforted the British governor's initiative, which was dependent on their deserting plantations and farms.

This deliberate strategy was implemented in Georgia when the British turned to that colony in their attempt to reconquer the South, starting in 1778. The ambiguities in the British policy of arming the slaves soon became obvious, however, as pro-British loyalists assumed that metropolitan forces would protect their property, and therefore slaves too, against patriot attacks. Thus in Georgia the British occupation did not lead to general emancipation: Only those blacks who served in the British army were freed. Slaves were also seized as war booty by both sides in the constant military operations. In the end, whatever their status, whether they were freed by the British or kept as slaves, the fugitives served mainly as labourers, an incontrovertible sign that the British might not have wanted to treat them as equals.[45]

Later proclamations by British commanders did not reflect the ini-tial generosity of Dunmore, simply because circumstances were by then more complex due to the enrolment of blacks in the Continental Army itself. Indeed, when Sir Henry Clinton issued a proclamation in July 1779 welcoming runaway slaves to the British side, he was merely responding to the presence of blacks in the Continental Army.[46] His proclamation itself no longer hinted at freedom and emancipation. When rampaging through Virginia and other Southern states in the second part of the war, Lord Cornwallis called for slaves to join him, but he and other British comman-ders also seized slaves, using them mainly as labourers, although they could sometimes be involved in combat as soldiers, sailors, or spies. Although 'the number of Negroes who fled to the British ran into the tens of thousands', it was unlikely that the British offered anything beyond an opportunity to escape slavery.[47] Indeed, from accounts of the war operations in the South, one mainly derives a sense of utter confusion. In South Carolina, for instance, the British alienated planters by promising to protect slaves who would abandon the patriot side and join them, but, in the end, the British army could not handle the flood of refugees.[48] In Virginia in the autumn of 1779, a British expedition even turned away slaves who wanted to join

them.[49] Those slaves who were accepted by other British corps were used as labourers, not as soldiers.[50] In the end, Cornwallis' army, before being defeated at Yorktown by a French–American corps in October 1781, relied on thousands of blacks who were used for the hard work of building buttresses before the engagement, and later were abandoned, hungry and sick, in the wake of the battle.[51] Indeed, on the British side, welcoming slaves was neither a consistent nor a carefully thought-out enterprise during the war. Lord Dunmore himself was, after all, a slave owner. As Sylvia Frey has written, 'Inhibited by inherited racial attitudes still intrinsic to British society, the army was never genuinely committed to a policy of liberation.'[52] A number of officers considered the slaves as destitute people in need of help; others treated them as prizes, or exploited them, feeding them badly.[53]

The preliminary articles of peace signed in Paris by the British and American commissioners on 30 November 1782 specified that the British should return the slaves who had found refuge with them when they evacuated New York, Savannah, and Charleston.[54] Although this provision was understood by the United States authorities as meaning that all those slaves who had found shelter in the British army should be returned to them, the British instead left with large numbers of slaves in tow. This support on the part of the British was due to the fact that officers wanted to honour their promises. Moreover, it signalled the determination of the ex-slaves who insisted on being evacuated, while putting pressure on the British commanding officers.[55] Equally important, by depriving North American masters of their slave 'property', the British were retaliating against the losses their loyalist allies were experiencing, as loyalists were forced to abandon their land and houses with little hope of ever recovering them.[56]

The first evacuation was that of Savannah, in Georgia, in July 1782, when between 3,500 and 6,000 blacks embarked on British ships bound for (then British) East Florida. Then came the evacuation of Charleston, South Carolina, which made it possible for as many as 6,000 blacks to flee North America in October.[57] The real figures of blacks detained by the British may have been much higher, but it is hard to figure out what exactly happened to them: Although a tiny minority were preserved from further harm and taken to safe havens, many more were moved to the Caribbean and East Florida, where they remained slaves. A large number of those slaves who had found shelter on the British side were sold even before the evacuation.[58]

Those African-Americans who had found shelter in New York City did not suffer a similar fate. Instead, they first were given a certificate of freedom and then transported to Nova Scotia, a slave-free part of Canada. George Washington and Sir Guy Carleton, who was then the commander-in-chief of all British forces in North America, had tense discussions on the matter in the spring of 1783. In order not to lead the African-Americans to despair, and thus to cause further flight on their part, Carleton preferred adding them to the British evacuation of New York City in the autumn of 1783, even if

that meant offering some form of compensation to the Americans later on.[59] Altogether 2,775 black loyalists reached Nova Scotia from New York.[60]

What is more important than the successful evacuation of 3,000 blacks away from New York City, or elsewhere, is the fact that British proclamations and the general disruption related to the war in the South inspired tens of thousands, who left farms and plantations in order to join British troops or to seek freedom more generally.[61] The total population in the Chesapeake (Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina) ran as high as 322,854 in 1770, with slaves accounting for 37 per cent of the inhabitants, Delaware being an exception (5 per cent). In the Lower South (South Carolina and Georgia), the slave population numbered 39,900 and represented 57 per cent of those states' people.[62] One-third of all Georgia slaves eventually fled.[63] In South Carolina one-fourth of all plantation slaves left.[64] Estimations vary. Following previous historians, Sylvia Frey considered that total slave losses must be estimated at between 80,000 and 100,000; Cassandra Pybus instead opted for lower figures, although her preoccupation seemed to be mainly with those slaves who actually were evacuated by the British.[65]

One could apply this quotation from Sylvia Frey to all Southern slaves: 'Perhaps because the liberator seemed surprisingly like the master, many black Virginians consciously chose neutrality . . . When division and confusion among whites improved their chances for success, when British prospects looked good, they took advantage of the opportunities offered and escaped in great numbers.'[66] Indeed, the political, economic, and social destabilization caused by the passage of British troops in the South made it possible for enslaved African-Americans to impose their own black revolution in the face of a war of independence led by white planters. For those blacks who effectively had been freed by the British army, and were to find a temporary refuge in Nova Scotia, liberty was 'British', a theme that was to become popular in the nineteenth century with those runaway slaves who fled the United States and had to go as far as British Canada to find shelter.[67]

Joining one's fate to that of the British army proved to be very risky during the war, however, as Britain was committed neither to the antislavery struggle nor to the rights of man and universal republicanism. By contrast, African-Americans could gain freedom more reliably as North American patriots in the Continental Army led by George Washington. In *Rough Crossings*, Simon Schama traced the story of those former slaves who eventually fled with the British army. Referring to the surnames adopted by the former bondmen in the wake of the War of Independence, he noted: 'If there was a British Freedom, there was also a Dick Freedom—and a Jeffery Liberty—fighting in a Connecticut regiment on the American side.'[68] Staking one's all on the patriot army, if one could, was probably a better choice in the long term for those African-Americans who wanted to secure their personal liberty and ground it firmly in the democratic principles of the

Age of Revolutions, thus setting the stage for a more inclusive universal republicanism.

Blacks in the Continental Army and the militias:
Freedom and citizenship

The new American states did not resort immediately to enrolling slaves in order to boost the numbers of combatants on their side. Yet free blacks as well as slaves served during the colonial wars in the eighteenth century, even if officially enlisting in the militias was made impossible.[69] African-Americans were present in the first military engagements that took place in the spring of 1775, even before the formal organization of the Continental Army (14 June 1775) and the designation of George Washington as commander-in-chief. Yet the presence of blacks did raise questions from a military point of view: It was said that the deliberate recruitment of African-Americans could prompt the British to proceed in the same way in order to raise the number of their troops.[70] From a social and political point of view, too, accepting slaves in the army was a debatable issue: Many runaways saw enlisting as a way to escape their bondage by passing as free blacks. There was no wish on the part of white authorities, however, to condone such actions. More significantly, arming slaves was rapidly seen as very risky, as it gave them the necessary tools to rebel.[71]

When the Continental Army was created, it was wondered whether blacks should be armed at all, whether only free blacks should be armed, or whether slaves should even be enlisted. The answer was a resounding 'no', whatever the proposed solution.[72] George Washington thus forbade the enlisting of black soldiers. By the fall of 1775, the issue was debated in Congress and a decision was made on 12 November to exclude blacks, children, and elderly men from enlisting, right at the time when Lord Dunmore was calling Southern slaves to join British ranks.[73] By December, as he was informed of the discontent expressed by Massachusetts free blacks who had served previously and now were excluded, George Washington had to relent and admit them into the army again. Was he, however, in any position at that time to refuse volunteers or to ignore Dunmore's proclamation, which had led to the formation of the Ethiopian regiment?[74] As we saw earlier, he was not: Thus Congress accepted the enlistment of blacks, but the measure was limited to former African-American soldiers. Beyond the specific matter of those Massachusetts soldiers, the states were left to decide for themselves at this early stage of the conflict whether they would enlist blacks or not. Most of the states reproduced the policy of exclusion initiated by the Continental Army.[75] Among the major 'founders' of the Revolution, some voiced their support during the congressional debates for the arming of slaves, either because they thought it would thwart Lord Dunmore's initiative, or because they considered that blacks would make good soldiers. Some, like James

Madison, believed that black enlistment and the status of blacks as combatants fitted well with the revolutionary principles of liberty.[76] Obviously, the issue of arming the slaves could cause the white elite to reconsider further the current limitations of their revolution.

In any case, enlisting black recruits proved irresistible: first, blacks joined the army of their own accord, making their strong political expectations explicit;[77] second, enlisting African-Americans was seen often as a last but vital resort by many states which could not send a sufficient number of recruits to the Continental Army.[78] Thus the New England states, with small percentages of African-Americans in their populations, and little fear of slave uprising, recruited slaves and free blacks to fill their allotted contribution to the Continental Army.[79] This pattern was the case in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. A Rhode Island regiment comprising only black recruits, therefore, was formed by the state assembly along the following lines: The slaves were freed and they earned the same pay as their white counterparts, while masters received a financial compensation, thus bringing slavery to an end in a state where the slave population was small.[80] An all-black unit served for the state of Massachusetts, too, while a company of black soldiers served for Connecticut.[81] A famous black unit—though not formed of North American combatants—was the '*Chasseurs volontaires*', which Admiral D'Estaing brought with him from Saint-Domingue during the siege of Savannah in 1779.[82] Like its New England neighbours, the state of New Hampshire enlisted slaves: their masters received a financial compensation, thereby leading to the eradication of slavery in that state as well. Connecticut, followed by Maryland and New York in 1781, equally enlisted former slaves.[83] Yet Maryland and the state of New York both had larger slave populations than their New England counterparts.[84] Maryland agreed to enlist both slave and free blacks. Virginia, with a large slave population, welcomed only free blacks in the militia initially, but slaves could also be found.[85]

As we can see from the example of Maryland, the Upper South states proved willing to embrace black enlistment once the war moved to the South and troops were in short supply. Enlisted slaves were promised freedom at the end of the war. The Lower South state assemblies, in Georgia and South Carolina, however, never approved of such plans.[86] Still, John Laurens, a young officer of a prominent South Carolina family, put forward a plan aimed at recruiting slaves in Georgia and South Carolina, 'in exchange for freedom at the end of the hostilities', at a time when Charleston was under threat in 1779.[87] Supporting the plan, Alexander Hamilton, Laurens' friend, and a future antislavery activist, summarized the hopes of the white elite, who were not yet in favour of universal republicanism:

An essential part of the plan is to give them their freedom with their muskets. This will secure their fidelity, animate their courage, and I believe

will have a good influence upon those who remain, by opening a door to their emancipation. This circumstance, I confess, has no small weight in inducing me to wish the success of the project; for the dictates of humanity and true policy equally interest me in favour of this unfortunate class of men.[88]

Although this plan never was adopted, it was regarded favourably by the Continental Congress, which suggested that Georgia and South Carolina should raise black battalions (3,000 soldiers in all) and offer financial compensation to their masters. The slaves themselves would not have received any pay during the conflict except for $50 at the end of the war.[89] George Washington, Hamilton's mentor, however, did not back the idea, which may have doomed it.[90]

Even though Georgia and South Carolina rejected slave enlistment, in the end, African-Americans were well represented in the armies of the new nation (mainly in the Continental Army, but also in the militia). They were all the more numerous as they often served as substitutes for white soldiers. They could be found as individual soldiers in mixed units or in separate black battalions. All in all, 5,000 black soldiers fought in the War of Independence, as arms-bearers as well as in many other positions.[91] Whether they were enlisted as slaves or as free men, they all fought for better lives. Slaves sought liberation while free blacks wanted to participate in the collective republican experiment. All tried to secure bounties.[92] This, at least, was the point made by Benjamin Quarles in 1961.

Charles Patrick Neimeyer offered a different argument in 1996. He contended that, because the Revolution and the War of Independence spurred the black population to look for freedom and equal citizenship, the white elite reconciled itself to the enlistment of slaves and free blacks—but only as a new way to control them. For the white elite, he suggested, enlisting blacks was a way to prevent massive slave flight and maybe massive rebellion.[93]

Yet this is a very partial way of looking at the period, as if the Revolution were not a moment when antislavery ideas penetrated deeply into American society, with regional differences, of course, as Benjamin Quarles has shown.[94] Slavery became extinct in the whole of New England, a law of gradual emancipation was passed in Pennsylvania in 1780, and the state of New York seriously considered planning the end of slavery as early as 1777.[95] A more nuanced interpretation would be that, given the general antislavery mood in the North and many other places, and given the British attempt at destabilizing the plantation economy in the South, the new leaders of the nation gradually started to conceive of black enlistment as a test of patriotism and citizenship. By granting slave soldiers freedom at the end of the war, and by granting free blacks citizenship in many states as part of new republican constitutions, the founders, like Alexander Hamilton, expected

African-Americans in general to make the cause of Revolution their own. By incorporating black veterans in the body politic, they hoped the remaining slaves would wait patiently until the time when emancipation would be total and all blacks incorporated in the body politic. Conversely, by seizing on this opportunity to share in the republican compact beyond what had originally been conceived by the white elite, blacks in the North and the Upper South put white revolutionary republicanism to the test and signalled their intent to move towards universal republicanism.

Challenges to universal republicanism for the black community

Indeed, the Revolution, being based on principles of universal equality for all men, if not a reality, offered a promise of collective emancipation that the British appeals to the slaves did not hold.[96] And this is probably a point that is lost when one focuses only on the slave flight to the British side. Those African-Americans who chose the American side, or who could choose it if they lived in the North or in the Upper South, knew that the Revolution portended potential change for their collective status.

For members of the nascent free black community, the experience of joining the Continental Army was part of a process of 'uplift' and a search for 'respectability' central to complete incorporation in the new republican body politic. A few black soldiers were rewarded for their bravery in combat, and the courageous presence of blacks in the military may have initiated or comforted a budding antislavery commitment in some officers, such as the young Lafayette.[97] Some veterans went on to thrive as entrepreneurs (like the sea captain and trader Paul Cuffe, or the successful sailmaker James Forten) and farmers (Agrippa Hull), thus forming a black elite in the North which also founded churches, and schools in the next decades, and which currently is being studied in a vibrant new historiography.[98] Keen on taking part in public debate, these patriots often were granted the vote during, or right after, the Revolution: Indeed, the revolutionary period caused intense debate regarding the franchise. During the colonial era, white property-holders alone were deemed worthy of taking part in the political process, but the war changed the parameters of the discussion, as it struck many as odd to exclude soldiers—who were often poor—from the vote. As a result, the postrevolutionary years coincided with an extension of the franchise from which free blacks benefited in all states except for Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia.[99] It was as if free male African-Americans were now part of the new nation's hard-won republican compact, on an equal basis with other men: But, of course, the mere fact of so many other black men being enslaved elsewhere thwarted that possibility. Indeed, the revolutionaries had not extinguished slavery, but merely put it on the road to extinction. Slavery died a 'slow death' even in the North, with the states of New York and New Jersey passing gradual emancipation legislation only in 1799 and 1804, respectively.[100]

Gradual emancipation legislation in those Northern states that had adopted it confused the issue of black citizenship, as most slaves remained in bondage.

Of course, the fear of slave insurrection, stirred up by Lord Dunmore's proclamation and subsequent slave flight, remained very present in the minds of many white leaders in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, long before the Saint-Domingue insurrection, however courageously blacks may have fought in revolutionary republican ranks, in the North as well as in the South. The massive slave flight to the British paradoxically undermined black claims of patriotism. In a famous text, drafted during the War of Independence, but published for the first time in Paris in 1785, Thomas Jefferson asserted that no slave could be a patriot, that all were internal enemies.[101] The question of black patriotism remained very sensitive for Southerners who could remember the very recent flights of their slaves to the British.

Jefferson's pronouncement probably resulted from his own destabilizing experience in June 1781 when, as the author of the Declaration of Independence but also governor of Virginia, he was forced to flee his plantation before the advancing British army, which some of his slaves followed. The question of black patriotism, and of how a republic could be built while maintaining slaves and slavery in many states, preoccupied Northerners equally in the wake of the War of Independence. This concern was exemplified by Gouverneur Morris, a Northerner with strong antislavery beliefs, during the federal constitution debates in 1787.[102] He raised the point that abolishing slavery in the North, but not in the South, might force Northern militias to come to the rescue of Southern states in the future in the case of a large slave insurrection, a paradoxical situation indeed. Gouverneur Morris did not envision the possibility that the Northern militias might include free blacks, who would then have to repress the uprising of their enslaved brothers. Still, this possibility in itself underlines how confused the status of blacks in general remained in the new nation in the years immediately following the Independence.

After the war, freed slaves (officially or unofficially) often moved to large cities like Baltimore or Philadelphia, where they could rely on an existing free African-American community, employment (on the docks, or as domestic servants), and the selective help of a growing number of antislavery societies.[103] Very sensitive to the fate of the growing number of free and recently emancipated blacks, the white elite leadership of these societies strongly believed that recently freed African-Americans, illiterate for the most part, and unused to city life, still had to conform to the very high expectations of the white population.[104] These philanthropists did not consider that white society had a special responsibility in supporting them, apart from education for the most talented. It was up to the recently freed blacks to show they could face the ambitious goals set for them. Their attitude

had to be unimpeachable, which was unrealistic, of course.[105] If some of them thrived in spite of the many obstacles in their way, yet numerous former slaves were led into a life of crime out of economic desperation or ignorance, making up a third of New York State's prison population in 1801.[106] As the years went by, urban blacks became 'a wholly distinct' and 'outcast class'.[107] This discrimination led to even further condemnation by the white population, and affirmed racism. As Joanne Pope Melish has written, 'the "degraded" condition of the majority of northern free people of colour served to support the racial argument and provided its context'.[108]

The early American Republic was meant by its founders to be a nation of independent yeomen and artisans, but freed African-Americans, as poor people, did not fit this profile, in most cases at least: Their relative poverty was used as a justification to exclude them progressively from the body politic in the decades after the American Revolution.[109] The black middle class could hardly counter the rising prejudice against poor blacks, and, by extension, themselves. By the 1820s legislatures started restricting access to suffrage for people of colour, just as they were extending it to new categories of white people.[110] Even when prosperous, all free blacks came to enjoy only a kind of second-tier citizenship. Gradually those states which had extended the franchise to blacks withdrew it from them. New states in the west limited the franchise from the very beginning, and by 1855 only four New England states with tiny black populations still made it possible for blacks to vote: Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island. The final blow came in 1857 when the Supreme Court 'ruled that blacks, free or slaves, could not be citizens of the United States'.[111] Yet at that time Northern blacks could counter this ultimate sign of rejection by reminding the public that their ancestors had earned their citizenship on the battlefields of the War of Independence.[112]

Conclusion

The War of Independence thus made it possible for a number of blacks to wage their own revolution, together with, or against, 'founding fathers' who did not all aim for universal republicanism, even if they wanted to establish a republic based on natural rights in North America.[113] The circumstances of the war, as well as the actions of blacks themselves, were instrumental in pushing forward a more inclusive definition of citizenship in the North, and in starting discussions on the issue in the South. That blacks and their supporters did not succeed immediately in imposing universal republicanism should not be read as evidence of their defeat. Was involvement in the war on the part of African-Americans a 'Black Declaration of Independence', whichever side they took? Certainly it was, but in more ways than one.

Notes

1. David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus (eds), *A Turbulent Time: The Greater Caribbean in the Age of the French and Haitian Revolutions* (Bloomington, 1997) was an early attempt at a new interpretation of the Age of Revolutions fully incorporating the Haitian Revolution.

2. Laurent Dubois posited that French republicanism was not inclusive enough to incorporate slaves and ex-slaves even after the French abolition of slavery in 1794. Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004). Since then Nick Nesbitt has insisted that the Haitian Revolution turned the universal ideals of the Atlantic Revolutions into a reality. Nick Nesbitt, *Universal Emancipation: The Haitian Revolution and the Radical Enlightenment* (Charlottesville, VA, 2008). Dubois developed his vision of the Enlightenment in 'An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic', *Social History* 31/1 (2006): 1–14. Jeremy D. Popkin, however, portrayed the insurrection as a confused slave revolt with no ambitious universal goals. Jeremy D. Popkin, *You Are All Free. The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (New York, 2010). Only the chance alliance between black rebels and French revolutionary commissioners turned it into a war of universal liberation based on French republican principles in 1793.

3. Marcel Dorigny celebrated the bicentennial of the Haitian Revolution with two collections of essays: Yves Benot and Marcel Dorigny (eds), *Rétablissement de l'esclavage dans les colonies françaises 1802: Aux origines d'Haïti, ruptures et continuités de la politique coloniale française, 1800–1830* (Paris, 2003); and Marcel Dorigny (ed.), *Haïti, première république noire* (Paris, 2003). Dorigny previously had edited volumes on key players in the Haitian drama, such as Sonthonax and the Abbé Grégoire. David Geggus also published collections of his essays on the eve of the bicentennial, *Haitian Revolutionary Studies* (Bloomington, IN, 2002) and *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Columbia, SC, 2001).

4. For republicanism as an overarching paradigm in United States intellectual history, most particularly in the history of the early American Republic, see Daniel T. Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', *The Journal of American History* 79/1 (1992): 11–38. For an analysis of republican citizenship as controversial and contested in French Caribbean postslavery societies, see Syliane Larcher, 'L'Autre citoyen: Universalisme civique et exclusion sociale et politique au miroir des colonies post-esclavagistes de la Caraïbe française (Martinique, Guadeloupe, années 1840–années 1890)', Thèse de doctorat (EHESS, 2011); also 'L'anthropologie politique des "nouveaux libres": post-esclavage, citoyenneté et ethnicité dans les "vieilles colonies" de la Caraïbe', in *Dissidence et identités plurielles*, ed. Jean-Paul Rocchi (Nancy, 2008), 227–242. Laurent Dubois pioneered the debate on universal republicanism and citizenship in his ' "Citoyens et amis!" Esclavage, citoyenneté et République dans les Antilles françaises à l'époque révolutionnaire', *Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 58/2 (March–April 2003): 281, 294.

5. Dubois, 'Citoyens', 301–303.

6. Geggus, *Haitian Revolutionary Studies*, 67: 'there is a need to investigate the impact on slave communities of the libertarian ideals of the Age of Revolution,

but also, as Hilary Beckles argues, to uncover what ideologies the slaves themselves fashioned'.

7. Slavery was not merely a political metaphor used by the colonists in opposition to 'liberty' in their quarrel against metropolitan authorities. This is the point developed by Peter A. Dorsey in *Common Bondage. Slavery as Metaphor in Revolutionary America* (Knoxville, 2009). For surveys of emancipation measures and initiatives, see Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 219–255; Gary Nash, *The Forgotten Fifth: African-Americans in the Age of the Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); Andrew Levy, *The First Emancipation: Slavery, Religion, and the Quiet Revolution of Robert Carter* (New York, 2005); and Melvin Patrick Ely, *Israel on the Appomatox: A Southern Experiment in Black Freedom from the 1790s through the Civil War* (New York, 2004).

8. A pioneer historian in demonstrating the centrality of slavery to the founding of the nation was Staughton Lynd, *Class Conflict, Slavery and the Constitution* (2nd edn, New York, 2009). An influential collection was Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman (eds), *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville, VA, 1983). Robin Einhorn has shown that the fiscal policies of the new nation were determined by slavery in *American Taxation, American Slavery* (Chicago, 2006). David Waldstreicher (*Slavery's Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification*, New York, 2009) has currently joined forces with Lynd to claim that the American Revolution was due primarily to economic fears on the part of the colonials, who did not believe Britain properly defended their slavery interests; see Staughton Lynd and David Waldstreicher, 'Reflections on Economic Interpretation, Slavery, the People Out of Doors, and Top Down versus Bottom Up', *William and Mary Quarterly* 68/4 (October 2011): 653. See also Matthew Mason, *Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic* (Charlottesville, NC, 2006).

9. Specialists include Michael Lee Lanning, *Defenders of Liberty: African-Americans in the Revolutionary War* (New York, 2000); and Glenn A. Knoblock, *'Strong and Brave Fellows': New Hampshire's Black Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolution, 1775–1784* (Jefferson, NC, 2003). One may wonder, however, whether general narratives of the war by military historians take this factor sufficiently into account. For an overview by a specialist who does not deal at all with the racial question, see Stephen Conway, 'War of American Independence', in *A Companion to American Military History*, ed. James C. Bradford, 2 vols (Malden, MA, 210), vol. 1, 23–38.

10. Sylvia R. Frey first studied the history of British soldiers during the War of Independence before moving on to a study of slave resistance and flight in the South. *The British Soldier in America* (Austin, TX, 1981); Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, NJ, 1991); and Cassandra Pybus, *Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and Their Global Quest for Liberty* (Boston, 2007). In the wake of Frey's and Pybus' books, there has been a tendency to forget black involvement on the patriot side, and historians equate slave rebellion with the slaves' embracing of the ideals of the Age of Revolutions; see Nathaniel Millett, 'Defining Freedom in the Atlantic Borderlands of the Revolutionary Southeast', *Early American Studies* 5/2 (2007): 14: 'North American slaves were aware of the language and ideals of republicanism and revolution; that those ideals could be made to apply to them was evidenced by the actions of tens of thousands of slaves during the American Revolution, by

the slave conspirators in Charleston in 1793, by Gabriel Prosser in 1800, and by the German coast rebels in 1811.'

11. For a brief but perceptive overview of the historiography of the American Revolution in French, see Elise Marientras and Naomi Wulf, *Révoltes et révolutions en Amérique* (Paris, 2005), 15–23. Radical historians in the 1970 insisted on social inequalities in the colonies at the time of the war, putting forward the people and minorities as active participants while contending that elite whites managed to channel popular discontent and muzzle it by the end of the war and the 1787 Constitutional Convention. The American Revolution as a field is characterized by strong oppositions today between historians who promote the history of 'Founders' (such as George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, etc.) and neo-progressives who go back to a class analysis of the conflict; Michael McDonnell, *The Politics of War: Race, Class, and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007).

12. Eugene D. Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1979); and Robert Paquette, 'Social History Update: Slave Resistance and Social History', *Journal of Social History* 24/3 (1991): 681.

13. Benjamin Quarles, 'The Revolutionary War as a Black Declaration of Independence', in *Slavery and Freedom*, 283. Frey, *Water*, 4.

14. Gary Nash, 'Introduction' to Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), xiii–xxvi.

15. William C. Nell published *The Services of Colored Americans in the Wars of 1776 and 1812* (Boston, 1851), followed by an expanded edition *Colored Patriots of the American Revolution* (Boston, 1855). William Wells Brown also wrote *The Negro in the American Rebellion* (Boston, 1867). George Washington Williams' *History of the Negro Race in America from 1619 to 1880*, 2 vols (New York, 1883) covers the question of the war in great detail.

16. Carter G. Woodson, *The Negro in Our History* (Washington, DC, 1922).

17. Quarles, *The Negro*, 33–50, 182–200.

18. Frey, *Water*, focuses on black flight in the South, while Pybus, *Epic Journeys*, retraces the travels of those slaves who managed to be evacuated to freedom by the British, first to Nova Scotia, Canada, and then to Sierra Leone. Graham Russell Hodges sees black flight as a slave revolt of massive proportions in 'Black Revolt in New York City and the Neutral Zone, 1775–83', in *New York in the Age of the Constitution*, ed. Paul Gilje and William Pencak (London and Toronto, 1992), 21.

19. Peter H. Wood, ' "The Dream Deferred": Black Freedom Struggles on the Eve of White Independence', in *In Resistance: Studies in African, Caribbean, and Afro-American History*, ed. Gary Y. Okihoro (Amherst, 1986), 166–181.

20. Frey, *Water*, 3, 51.

21. Ibid. 197.

22. Jill Lepore, *The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History* (Princeton and Oxford, 2010), 139.

23. For population figures, see Edward Royle, *Modern Britain: A Social History 1750–1997* (2nd edn, London, 1997), 43; H. T. Dickinson (ed.), *A Companion to Eighteenth Century Britain* (New York, 2002), 452–453.

24. See David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca, NY, 1966), 161–162. In 1790, the black population in North America was more numerous than that of other British colonies. There were 757,000 blacks in

British North America (92 per cent were slaves), or almost 20 per cent of the total population, versus 455,000 slaves in the British West Indies, or 86 per cent of the total population.

25. Tables showing population figures and percentages are available in Ira Berlin, *Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves* (Cambridge, MA, and London, 2003), 72–73. Only the state of New York had a large slave population, with 12 per cent on the eve of the Revolution. By contrast, only 2 per cent of the population in Pennsylvania were slaves in the same period.

26. The text of the proclamation is accessible at: 'Proclamation of Earl of Dunmore, November 7, 1775', http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part2/2h42t.html (accessed 8 August 2012). The text is compiled in *American Archives*, Peter Force, ed., 4th series, 6 vols (Washington, DC, 1837–46). On Lord Dunmore's proclamation, see Benjamin Quarles, 'Lord Dunmore as Liberator', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 15/4 (1958): 494–507. On the impact of Lord Dunmore's proclamation, see Berlin, *Many Thousands*, 257–258, 293–296. Lord Dunmore's proclamation and its effects are examined also in Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 141–161.

27. Sylvia Frey, 'Between Slavery and Freedom: Virginia Blacks in the Revolution', *The Journal of Southern History* 49/3 (1983): 376–377. Frey notes that slave unrest was more pronounced throughout the North American British colonies than at any other time, starting in 1765. This applied to both Northern and Southern states, where slaves started clamouring for freedom or planning insurrections. *Water*, 46–60.

28. Frey, 'Virginia Blacks', 377.

29. Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains: The British Struggle to Abolish Slavery* (London, 2005).

30. Ibid. 44–48; Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006), 195.

31. Brown, *Moral Capital*, 254. Brown replaces this British strategy within the larger context of a metropolitan centre dealing with the rights of colonists at the end of the eighteenth century. The metropole could erect itself as the protector of the rights of the weakest (the slaves) in the face of tyrannical settlers who focused only on their strictly pecuniary interests.

32. Frey, *Water*, 54–55.

33. Ibid. 69.

34. Ibid. 72. Brown explains that as late as 1778 the British government was still considering an investigation into Dunmore's decision; yet a few officers and officials came to value the ex-slaves' contribution and believed they deserved liberty. *Moral Capital*, 309–310.

35. Sidney Kaplan, *The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution (1770–1800)* (Greenwich, CT, 1973), 61. The reference to the governor refusing to block the slave trade connects Dunmore's hypocrisy to the fact that planters tried to limit the imports of slaves on the eve of the Revolution but were not heard by the Crown and its representatives. Limiting slave imports was seen as important at a time when tobacco cultivation was undergoing a crisis in the Upper South and fewer hands were needed in the fields.

36. Quarles, 'Lord Dunmore', 495, 497, 504.

37. Frey, *Water*, 77–79. Washington became convinced that 'the outcome of the war hinged "on which side could arm the Negroes the faster"'.

38. The text of this counterproclamation is to be found in Williams, *Negro Race*, vol. 1, 340. It is reproduced from Force's *American Archives*, 4th series, vol. 3, 1, 387.
39. Quarles, 'Lord Dunmore', 498–499.
40. Ibid. 500.
41. Ibid. 502.
42. Pybus, *Epic Journeys*, 11–12. The disaster is vividly described in Simon Schama, *Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves and the American Revolution* (London, 2005), 93–109.
43. Quarles, 'Lord Dunmore', 505.
44. Frey, *Water*, 80.
45. Ibid. 84–86, 91–92.
46. Frey, 'Virginia Blacks', 387. For the text of the proclamation, see Williams, *Negro Race*, vol. 1, 357.
47. Quarles, *The Negro*, 119.
48. Frey, *Water*, 108–142.
49. Frey, 'Virginia Blacks', 380.
50. Ibid. 388.
51. Ibid. 383, 394.
52. Ibid. 387.
53. Ibid. 390.
54. 'Preliminary Articles of Peace, November 30, 1782, Article 7', http://avalon. law.yale.edu/18th_century/prel1782.asp (accessed 10 July 2011): 'his Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States, and from every post, place, and harbor within the same'.
55. Frey, *Water*, 177.
56. The issue of compensation for the slaves who had been evacuated with the British troops and loyalist planters rankled for a long time in British–American relationships; see Arnett G. Lindsay, 'Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Great Britain on the Return of Negro Slaves, 1783–1828', *Journal of Negro History* 5 (October 1920): 418.
57. Frey, *Water*, 174, 177.
58. Nash, *Forgotten Fifth*, 43.
59. Sir Guy Carleton kept a registry of those previously enslaved blacks who were evacuated from New York City under his command, so that financial compensation could later be awarded to their masters. This 'Book of Negroes' was the original basis of Pybus' research. See Leslie M. Harris, Chapter 2, 'The Struggle against Slavery in Revolutionary and Early National New York', *In the Shadow of Slavery: African-Americans in New York City, 1626–1863* (Chicago and London, 2003).
60. Nash, *Forgotten Fifth*, 46. Their stay in Nova Scotia was not very long, as is now well documented. They formed one of the first contingents of blacks who eventually made their way to Sierra Leone under the aegis of the Sierra Leone Company. See Pybus, *Epic Journeys*.
61. Quarles, 'Lord Dunmore', 506.
62. Ira Berlin, *Generations*, Table 1, 272–275.
63. Frey, *Water*, 81–107.
64. Ibid. 108–142.

65. Ibid. 211; Pybus, 'Jefferson's Faulty Math', *William and Mary Quarterly* 62 (April 2005): 243–264.
66. Frey, *Water*, 156.
67. See William Wells Brown's slave narrative for this recurring theme: *Narrative of William W. Brown, an American Slave. Written by Himself* (London, 1849), http://docsouth.unc.edu/ (accessed 15 July 2011).
68. Schama, *Rough Crossings*, 17.
69. W. B. Hartgrove, 'The Negro Soldier in the American Revolution', *The Journal of Negro History* 1/2 (April 1916): 110–131, 110–111; Quarles, *The Negro*, 8.
70. Hartgrove, 'Negro Soldier', 112–113; Quarles, *The Negro*, 9.
71. Quarles, *The Negro*, 13–15.
72. L. D. Reddick, 'The Negro Policy of the United States Army, 1775–1945', *The Journal of Negro History* 34/1 (1949): 9–29, 12.
73. Hartgrove, 'Negro Soldier', 114–115.
74. Reddick, 'Negro Policy', 13.
75. Hartgrove, 'Negro Soldier', 117; Quarles, *The Negro*, 17–18.
76. Madison is quoted by Hartgrove, 'Negro Soldier', 118.
77. As mentioned above, they enlisted under names such as, 'Liberty', 'Freedom', etc. Quarles, *The Negro*, 51.
78. Manpower was a decisive issue during the War of Independence. As the states could never raise the required number of men decided on by Congress, the delegates urged them to 'use their militia, "and to pursue all every Means in their Power in order to forward the recruiting service" ', thus encouraging them to use slaves as soldiers. See Charles Patrick Neimeyer, 'Changing One Master for Another: Black Soldiers in the Continental Army', in his *America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army* (New York, 1996), 73.
79. Ira Berlin, *Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves* (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 272–273. Slave populations in the New England states ranged from 25 (Vermont, fewer than 1 per cent) to 3761 in Rhode Island (6 per cent).
80. Neimeyer, *America Goes to War*, 75; and Hartgrove, 'Negro Soldier', 119–120.
81. Neimeyer, *America Goes to War*, 76–77.
82. Quarles, *The Negro*, 82.
83. Hartgrove, 'Negro Soldier', 120.
84. Berlin, *Generations*, 272–273. In 1770, Maryland had 63,818 slaves (37 per cent of the population) and New York 19,062 (12 per cent), while there were only 4,754 slaves in Massachusetts (2 per cent), 5,698 slaves in Connecticut (3 per cent), 654 slaves in New Hampshire (1 per cent), and 3,761 slaves in Rhode Island (6 per cent).
85. Quarles, *The Negro*, 57–58.
86. Ira Berlin, 'The Revolution in Black Life', in *The American Revolution. Explorations in the History of American Radicalism*, ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb, IL, 1976), 354–355.
87. Neimeyer, *America Goes to War*, 78.
88. Alexander Hamilton, *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Harold C. Syrett, 27 vols (New York, 1961–87), vol. 2, 18.
89. Gregory D. Massey, *John Laurens and the American Revolution* (Columbia, 2000).
90. Nash, *Forgotten Fifth*, 13.
91. Hartgrove, 'Negro Soldier', 126–128.
92. Quarles, *The Negro*, 80.

93. Neimeyer, *America Goes to War*, 77.

94. Quarles, *The Negro*, 33–50.

95. 'An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery (1780)': http://www.ushistory.org/presidentshouse/history/gradual.htm (accessed 11 July 2011). As regards the 1777 Constitution of the state of New York, both John Jay and Gouverneur Morris suggested it should provide for the end of slavery, but that provision was not included; see Walter Stahr, *John Jay, Founding Father* (New York, 2005), 78.

96. This is the point made by Eugene D. Genovese in *From Rebellion to Revolution*.

97. For black soldiers who were rewarded, see the case of Salem Poor in Paul Finkelman (ed.), *Encyclopedia of African-American History 1619–1895*, 3 vols (New York, 2006), vol. 2, 526–527. Another famous black soldier in the early days of the conflict was Peter Salem; see *Encyclopedia*, vol. 3, 64–65. Lafayette's antislavery commitment was made fully clear as early as 1784, and continued throughout his life; see, for instance, Gary B. Nash and Graham Russell Gao Hodges, *Friends of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson, Tadeusz Kosziuszko and Agrippa Hull: A Tale of Three Patriots, Two Revolutions, and a Tragic Betrayal of Freedom in the New Nation* (New York, 2008), 88.

98. For the hopes of the Northern free black community, see James Brewer Stewart, 'Modernizing "Difference": The Political Meanings of Color in the Free States, 1776–1840', *Journal of the Early Republic* 19/4 (1999): 694, 696. Paul Cuffe was born free in Massachusetts in 1759 and he went on to become a blockade-runner on behalf of the patriots, also making sure that blacks were not denied the vote. See *Encyclopedia of African-American History*, vol. 1, 358–359. James Forten also was a sailor on the patriot side during the war, and he became a wealthy philanthropist afterwards; see *Encyclopedia*, vol. 2, 36–37. Julie Winch, in *A Gentleman of Color. The Life of James Forten* (New York, 2002), chronicles this major figure in early American life. Agrippa Hull is discussed in Nash and Hodges, *Friends of Liberty*. After service in the war, Hull's commitment to the new nation, its leaders, and its institutions was exemplified through his participation in the crushing of Shay's Rebellion. More generally, recent literature on 'black founders' as well as historiographical questions on the subject is synthetized in Richard S. Newman and Roy E. Finkenbine, 'Black Founders in the New Republic: Introduction', *William and Mary Quarterly* 64/1 (2007): 83–94.

99. Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York, 2000), 20, Table A5. Overall the Revolution did not open the franchise radically, since one-third of the states did not alter their regulations. It did point the way towards a better inclusion of the people in formal political activity such as voting, however.

100. Berlin, *Many Thousands*, Chapter 9 is entitled 'The Slow Death of Slavery in the North', 228.

101. Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1781–82), 'Query 18, Manners', http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JeffVirg.html (accessed 12 May 2009): 'And with what execration should the statesman be loaded, who permitting one half the citizens thus to trample on the rights of the other, transforms those into despots, and these into enemies, destroys the morals of the one part, and the amor patriae of the other. For if a slave can have a country in this world, it must be any other in preference to that in which he is born to live and labour for another.'

102. On 8 August, he said: 'And What is the proposed compensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse

of humanity. They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the defence of the S. States; for their defence agst. those very slaves of whom they complain,' http://www.teachingamericanhistory.com/convention/debates/0808.htm/ (accessed 14 January 2010).

103. To mention but a few of the numerous antislavery associations, the Pennsylvania Abolition Society was originally founded in 1775, but really revived starting in 1785. The New York Manumission Society was founded in 1785, and the Connecticut Society for the Promotion of Freedom, and for the Relief of Persons Holden in Bondage in 1790. In the South, the Delaware Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and for the Relief and Protection of Free Blacks and People of Colour Unlawfully Held in Bondage was created in 1788, while the Maryland Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, and the Relief of Free Negroes and Others Unlawfully Held in Bondage was founded in 1789. Those societies had no national governing body but did organize an annual convention as of 1794.

104. One of the earliest decisions of the New York Manumission Society was to start a school for black children. Yet they had to prove their worth and that of their families before being admitted. See New York Manumission Society *Papers*, Reel 1, 17 August 1787: 'That in the admission of children into the school, a Preference be given (other things being equal) to those of the Families which are most regular and orderly in their Deportment . . . ' Those children who were enrolled were asked to 'come to, and go from School soberly, without offending or hurting any Person or Creature'.

105. Joanne Pope Melish, *Disowning Slavery. Gradual Emancipation and 'Race' in New England, 1780–1860* (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 40, 53, 82, 88, 120, 121.

106. Duncan J. McLeod, *Slavery, Race and the American Revolution* (New York, 1975), 168. Venture Smith's narrative is a good example of how difficult it was to become successful in early national New York when one was illiterate and a former slave. Smith's narrative is a case in point which shows that most freed blacks could only be part of the urban working class. See *A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture, a Native of Africa: But Resident above Sixty Years in the United States of America, Related by Himself* (New London, 1798), http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/venture/venture.html (accessed 28 December 2011).

107. This is the thesis developed by Leonard P. Curry in *The Free Black in Urban America 1800–1850* (Chicago and London, 1981), xix, 81.

108. Joanne Pope Melish, 'The "Condition" Debate', in *Race and the Early Republic*, ed. Michael A. Morrison and James Brewer Stewart (Lanham, MD, 2002), 79.

109. On how important economic self-sufficiency was in the definition of the new republican citizenry in the United States, see François Furstenberg, *In the Name of the Father: Washington's Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a Nation* (New York, 2006). A classic reference on this point is Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1781–82), 'Query 19, Manufactures'. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jeffvir.asp (accessed 15 July 2011).

110. Stewart, 'Modernizing Difference', 701.

111. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 55.

112. Mitch Kachun, 'From Forgotten Founder to Indispensable Icon: Crispus Attucks, Black Citizenship, and Collective Memory, 1770–1865', *Journal of the Early Republic* 29/2 (2009): 249–286.

113. Alfred F. Young et al., *Revolutionary Founders: Rebels, Radicals and Reformers in the Making of the Nation* (New York, 2011).

6
The Army of the Republic: New Warfare and a New Army[1]

Annie Crépin

The French Revolution, in its struggle to survive, charted the historical course that forged the trinity of army, nation, and republic. It was a development unforeseen by the revolutionaries, who had no preconceived plan for these matters. The war hastened the coming of the Republic, but the survival of the Republic, both as a regime and even more as a model, came to depend upon military success. A circular phenomenon was at work—a new form of warfare, which the Revolution itself produced before being radicalized by it, brought into being a new army, which in turn altered the conduct and character of the war, though without necessarily leading to a military revolution.

This chapter begins by examining the process in which a bond was formed between national defence and citizenship that subsequently—though only subsequently—came to appear as an intrinsic and fundamental element of the French republican model. The second part of the chapter considers the points of overlap between the wars of the Revolution and a revolution in warfare. The issue is still a matter for historical debate, with disagreement notably over the extent of the mutation, but there is no denying that what emerged was a new form of war, one that created a close linkage between the military and political spheres in France. If this was not an entirely novel phenomenon, what was original was the irreversible, enduring nature of this linkage over the next two hundred years and beyond, as reflected in the progress of the ideal of a nation in arms, which forms the subject of the third section. The spread of this ideal across much of Europe was, I suggest, a key factor behind the trend towards total war, an evolution whose full effects would be demonstrated in the two world wars of the twentieth century.

The army, the revolution, and the republic

The political leaders of the Revolution founded a new army, not because that is what a majority of them wanted, but under the combined pressures of political radicalization inside France and the worsening course of the war

with the European powers. The new army was still taking shape in September 1792 when the Republic was born on the battlefield of Valmy. At the start of the Revolution, in the autumn of 1789, the Constituent Assembly already had debated the type of army that was needed, and a majority came down in favour of reforming the army but retaining the principle of professional soldiers. For the Constituents there was no incompatibility between this status and the role of a national army, on condition that the army respect the basic principles of the future constitution currently under preparation: liberty and equality (the liberty of fellow citizens, against whom it was never to use its arms; the liberty also of its own members, who were no longer to be subject to the degrading corporal punishments copied from the Prussian model and introduced after the defeats of the Seven Years' War).[2] The egalitarian principle would govern access to the officer corps and to promotion, henceforth based on talent, courage, and merit, thus halting the aristocratic reaction that had been particularly severe in the army, in which the nobility monopolized the officer corps.[3] In short, what the Constituents wanted was an army composed of career soldiers but motivated by the new principles; a force, that is, of soldier–citizens. Soldiers who were not active citizens would become so after 16 years of service.[4]

Reform along similar lines had earlier been recommended by Hippolyte de Guibert (1743–1790), the most famous of the French military philosophers. The renaissance of military theory in France in the first third of the eighteenth century, and even more the traumatic effect of Rossbach on France's elites, brought into being a school of thought that was part of the broader Enlightenment debate.[5] In his *Essai général de la tactique*, published in 1770, Guibert, a minor nobleman and an officer who had served in the Seven Years' War and in Corsica, studied the tactics used by the King of Prussia to secure his victories, and then delivered his political reflections on the modern army and on the society of his day.[6] While Guibert never failed to set the Enlightenment ideal of peace as his ultimate goal, he nonetheless looked forward, apparently without any sense of contradiction, to conducting 'rational' warfare. For maximum effectiveness, the battle tactics introduced by Frederick II required a perfect combination of obedience and independence from the soldier. He had to become the 'man of Reason', one who was educated and informed about the cause for which he was fighting. Equally, however, he still had to be a professional soldier, for Guibert was in no sense advocating personal military service for each citizen.

This policy was also the course urged on the new assembly in the *cahiers de doléances* where the question of army recruitment and organization was discussed. A majority rejected compulsory military service as an infringement of the citizen's liberty, as a servitude worthy of the barbarian period.[7] In the debate of the autumn of 1789, only a minority of Constituents, among them Dubois-Crancé (1747–1814), proposed a form of conscription in which compulsory personal service would become universal.[8] The idea was

rejected, and there was no more talk of conscription until the Jourdan Law of September 1798. The supporters of conscription invoked a Rousseauean conception of liberty, but most members of the Constituent Assembly opposed conscription in the name of liberty as defined by Montesquieu, close to the British principle of *Habeas Corpus*, and paraded the spectre of despotic states such as Prussia and the Ottoman Empire in which conscription was the favoured instrument. They also rejected it because of the threat to equality from the practice of *remplacement* or paid substitutes that would inevitably be used in such a system despite the prohibitions put in place by the legislator. In a particularly virulent anticonscription speech, the Duc de Liancourt predicted the triumph of local over national interests, since an inhabitant of Antibes or Perpignan would not fight for one of Brest or Dunkirk.[9]

At this point, it looked as if France were about to go down the path to a professional army that Britain and America took in the nineteenth century. By the decree of 17 December 1789, the Constituent Assembly preserved the old royal army, though with some accommodation of the new principles. The army was reformed, so that promotion and recruitment favoured talent and merit, and the operation of military justice lost its arbitrary nature. Although significant, however, these reforms fell well short of wholesale *régéneration* or renewal, and, moreover, they would take time to yield results. Most importantly, they did not address the deep-rooted crisis that was shaking the army to its foundations, and which in fact echoed the crisis in French society.[10] The result was a recruitment shortage at the crucial time when growing tensions with monarchical Europe, following the king's flight in June 1791, gave the Constituents real cause to fear an imminent outbreak of war. Somewhat paradoxically, while the Constituents had retained a career army, they equally, in the best Enlightenment tradition, remained suspicious of it as a potential instrument of the 'despot'. In this they were mistaken, as several episodes from the beginning of the Revolution should have shown them. During the storming of the Bastille and the *journées* of October 1789, for example, many soldiers had sided with the people, while the sharp decline in the number under arms up to mid-1791 reflected the tensions between soldiers sympathetic to the new regime and officers suspected of harbouring loyalties to the old order, and the mutinies and desertions that were the consequence.

So when the Constituents made the first *levée* and appealed for volunteers in 1791, thus while still at peace, what they envisaged was not an alternative force but a supplement to the existing one. The solution they turned to was the National Guard, which became the reservoir of manpower for the new force. Created by the Revolution, the Guard was one of the ways by which the citizen who was not a professional soldier could perform his duty of national defence. Initially this duty of defence was organized at the level of individual municipal authorities. In the summer of 1789, notably in Paris,

the setting up of the National Guard reflected the need to put down popular disorder and attacks on property as much as to combat the aristocratic plot and the king's attempts to disperse the National Assembly. At this stage, then, the Guard was a force for internal policing, although some people, including Robespierre, were keen for it to play a larger role and to replace the standing army. The Guard was likewise the instrument of a bourgeois revolution, as those who were not active citizens were, at least in theory, excluded from its ranks. In the minds of the Constituents, the citizen–soldiers of the National Guard, all of them active citizens or the sons of active citizens, were never intended to form the embryo of a new army that could become the new model. The declaration of war of 20 April 1792 changed nothing in this respect, and the Legislative Assembly held to the voluntary principle when it proclaimed *la Patrie en danger* and renewed the call to the French nation on 22 July 1792. With the fall of the monarchy, however, the distinction between active and passive citizens broke down completely, thus hastening the emergence of a new form of citizenship.[11]

The inadequacies of voluntarism were apparent from the summer of 1792. The war that began earlier in the year swallowed up men in great numbers, as the formation of the First Coalition early in 1793 and the failure of the French counteroffensive at Neerwinden on 18 March 1793 were to demonstrate with cruel clarity. In February and March 1793, however, the introduction of compulsory personal service was still taboo. If the levy of 300,000 men of 24 February 1793 showed that the Convention was now ready to accept requisitioning, the model was still recognizably that of the only recently abolished Old Regime militia,[12] rather than anything that anticipated the *levée en masse*.[13] It did not introduce compulsory universal military service, for 'only' 300,000 men were raised from among unmarried men and childless widowers. The obligation was not individual but collective, in that each municipality was required to supply a number of men fixed by the authorities, and the buying of replacements or substitutes was permitted.

While the *levée en masse* was the precursor of compulsory military service, it is clear from the characteristics of the measure that the Montagnards themselves had doubts. The decree of 23 August 1793 requisitioned men aged 18–25 who were unmarried or widowed and childless. The obligation now was not on the local community but on the individual, who no longer had the right to buy a replacement. It was an emergency measure—and in this sense can be qualified as 'terrorist'—a measure of public safety, a measure to save the Republic. Yes, the Montagnards elaborated the project for a mass mobilization of the people from an earlier sans-culotte idea that circulated in the Paris sections and clubs in the summer of 1793; yes, they channelled the spontaneous insurrectionary impulse to raise temporary reinforcements for the professional army—but still they did not intend the decree to apply once the Republic was established on a firm institutional basis. Thus, for

example, no provision was made for an annual rotation of age groups, an oversight that had the perverse effect of causing large-scale desertion from the armies of the Directory, once the young men aged between 18 and 25 in August 1793 refused any longer to shoulder the entire burden of the war. In contrast to the Third Republic's republicans and their reinterpretation of the Revolution's legacy, the Jacobins did not establish compulsory personal military service as a peacetime school for citizenship.

The testing ground of citizenship

It was, then, a historical process—not the development of a concept—that produced the identification between defence of the *patrie* and citizenship, making the former an essential component of the latter and one of the cornerstones of the French republican model. With military victories, what was merely fortuitous acquired a sacred and permanent status. The *levée en masse* became one with the spontaneous *élan* of the people, while the prestige of the volunteer soldier reflected back on his conscript counterpart, to the point that the texts from 1793 contain many examples of the expression '*volontaire requis*', the 'conscripted volunteer'. The oxymoron is significant. While the Constituents had refused conscription in the name of liberty à la Montesquieu, it was a Rousseauean conception of liberty that now won the day. During the debate at the end of the eighteenth century on the nature of the army, only Rousseau, with Mably, argued for a citizens' military service, though he thought it impossible to bring about in a state such as France.

The Republic of 1793 and the Year II, the archetype of the modern state, established new relations with the individual that were mediated by the *patrie* and the nation. The Old Regime state had required 'only' obedience from its subjects, a term taken in its passive sense. The modern state, by contrast, is more effective and adept in this respect, since it demands and obtains much more from the individual by treating him as a subject in the active sense of the term—a citizen—whose voluntary commitment it requires. The citizen of the modern state is made to believe that he is exercising his own supreme liberty, when in fact he is subject to the supreme constraint of sacrificing his own interests to the general interest, giving up his time, and perhaps even his life.[14] Nowhere did this key characteristic of the modern state operate with more powerful effect than in the new French army, where Napoleon Bonaparte exploited it to an extent never before seen. The army saved the Republic, ensuring its survival as a regime but also preserving the integrity of the model it represented: The army became the testing ground for citizenship. The army was where the principle of equality found a concrete expression, with equality of access to promotion and to officer rank, and ultimately equality too in the face of death.[15] The principle of liberty, as conceived by Rousseau, was embodied in the attempt to establish a new kind of discipline—a discipline that expressed the will of the

citizens at the same time as it educated them for that role. In reality, the representatives-on-mission whom the Convention members sent out to the armies were intent on restoring military discipline, which had been undermined by the unrest in the army in 1790 and 1791 and by the fluctuating dynamics of the Revolution in 1792 and 1793. From the standpoint of actual practice, there is no doubt that the new discipline shared many features of the traditional discipline that had governed the actions of the 'tyrant's satellites'. What cannot be denied, however, is the attempt to turn the army into a school of citizenship. This emerges clearly from the *Instruction pour tous les grades de l'infanterie* (1794), inspired by Guibert and based on the idea that training exercises should draw on the intelligence of future combatants and not be confined to military drill. The army of the Republic was thus a setting for implementing the politics of virtue. As Guibert had already argued, a soldier needed to demonstrate the dual qualities of initiative—not the same as laxity—and obedience, not the same as wooden docility. The close alliance of these two notions gave the combatant the power of ten men and was what in politics went by the name of virtue.[16] Guibert had sought this virtue only for the competent and motivated career soldiers he wished to see replace the '*misérables*' who, he claimed, not without exaggeration, currently made up the monarchical armies, notably that of the king of France. This has prompted claims that Guibert invented citizenship on the battlefield.[17] But, as just noted, his project concerned only a small number, and he stopped well short of envisaging a duty of defence imposed on everyone as the essential precondition for citizenship. Twenty-four years after Guibert's *Essai*, the citizen–soldier became the model citizen, indeed the model for the citizen—the same virtue expected of the soldier on the field of battle now was expected in the sphere of civic life from the militant of the Republic. The word 'militant', it may be recalled, derives from the Latin *miles*, the soldier.

The wars of the Revolution, a revolution in warfare?

In a further instance of the circular loop noted earlier, if the practice of battle brought into being a new type of soldier, the deployment of this new type of soldier renewed the art and conduct of warfare. The reason is that the combination of independence and obedience, whose political sense we noted above, was also required for the new pattern of battle tactics introduced during the revolutionary wars, a development that settled, and of course transcended, the debate over the respective merits of offensive shock versus defensive firepower that had divided eighteenth-century military theorists. It is important to remember that the background to this debate encompassed another difference, that between the so-called *ordre mince* or deployment of infantry in long thin lines, and the *ordre profond* or deployment in deep columns of attack. The revolutionary wars were accompanied by one clear

innovation relative to the tactics employed in eighteenth-century limited warfare. Specifically, the wars saw a broad application of the methods that Frederick II had experimented with during the Seven Years' War. The King of Prussia had then shown, with victorious effect, that the distinction between offensive shock and defensive firepower could be bridged by combining line and column formations in a synthesis of the two, an *ordre mixte*. To be successful this required soldiers with a high flexibility of manoeuvre, able to switch rapidly from one formation to the other, if necessary on the battlefield itself. This had formed the basis of Guibert's thinking.

It must be stressed that the victories of the revolutionary armies did not represent the triumph of shock over firepower; nor were they won by a mass of men who made up in wild, reckless enthusiasm and a shared cult of the bayonet or pike and violent offensive combat what they lacked in formal training and discipline. The battles of the period did not pit a disorderly rabble, let alone fanatical hordes, against the closely commanded troops of the Old Regime sovereigns, whose geometrical line wavered and then broke under the sheer weight of numbers in the revolutionaries' assault columns. These conventional, even caricatured, images were sustained by a revolutionary rhetoric that repeated an older *topos* attributing to the '*génie national*', the French national spirit, a particular affinity for combat with the *arme blanche*, the cold steel of bayonet and pike. That stereotype, associated with the myth of the *furia francese*, occurs in the writings of eighteenth-century military thinkers such as Folard. It also resurfaces in the *cahiers de doléances*, some of which declare military service to be pointless, since, as one of them puts it, the mere rumour of war would send Frenchmen flocking to the frontiers with the *élan* that characterizes the national temperament.[18]

The first point to note is that superiority in numbers, though a crucial asset, was not the only factor in play, as John Lynn points out with regard to the three greatest battles won by the Army of the North in Year II: Tourcoing on 29 Floréal (18 May 1794), Tournai (with a much less conclusive outcome) on 3 Prairial (22 May), and Fleurus on 8 Messidor (26 June)—in which French superiority was far from overwhelming, even non-existent.[19] In fact, numbers alone explain nothing. By the standards of the age, the armies of the Revolution were indeed mass armies, but they were also operational masses whose cohesion was reinforced by their organization into divisions.[20] The second point to note is that it was not the attack columns of the *ordre profond* that triumphed over the lines of the *ordre mince*, but, rather, the *ordre mixte*, in which troops switched from one formation to another on the battlefield. The *ordre mixte* recommended by Guibert in the French regulations of 1791, however, was not the one that so nearly led to disaster at Jemmapes on 6 November 1792.[21] The attack column formation of the revolutionary wars was invented in the field. This is evidence of the adaptability of the troops, who were better at manoeuvring and also better disciplined, and this from earlier on in the wars, than has generally been thought.[22] Or, to be more

accurate, their discipline was of a different kind, and it is here that the full effects of the new style of discipline can be measured. It produced a higher degree of cohesion and motivation—of what would nowadays be termed acquiescence—that rendered soldiers capable of deploying from column into line and vice versa on the field of battle, and, some of them at least, of showing personal initiative by fighting independently as skirmishers, harassing the enemy while the column was forming.[23] The officers, for their part, combined undeniable professional experience with a commitment to the new order; many were former rankers or junior officers from the old royal army, who owed their promotion to the new egalitarian principle.

The improved capacity for innovation and flexibility was thus the fruit of political and social transformations within the army. Through the action of the feedback process described above, it was both cause and consequence of major cultural transformations. The citizen–soldier was an historical construct. He now became a man of Reason and Enlightenment, which had not been his status for the eighteenth-century military theorists, notably Guibert. They saw that role as filled by the trained and motivated professional soldier, not by the civilian, who, if he were to remain under arms for long periods, would resemble a figure from the Middle Ages, or what was imagined as such. But was this invention of a new art of warfare not, rather, simply reinvention?[24] Can mere innovation legitimately be described as military revolution?

The revolutionary wars between two military revolutions

Since the 1950s, the nature of military revolutions has been the subject of a debate among historians. As regards the meaning of the concept, there is at least agreement that it cannot be reduced to the emergence of new military technologies; that these are not enough to bring about a 'qualitative leap' in the nature of warfare. For some historians, a military revolution—many prefer the term mutation—results from a combination of political, social, cultural, economic, even anthropological factors that have in common their irreversibility.[25] Many argue that no such qualitative leap occurred during the wars of the Revolution and the Empire. In this view, those conflicts were at most a transition between two mutations, the first coming in the late Middle Ages with the advent of firearms, the second starting in the mid-nineteenth century with the industrial and communications revolutions. The wars of the Revolution, it is suggested, had a greater debt to the former.[26] The merits of this line of argument can be judged when the elements upon which it rests are considered individually.

Taking the narrowly military factors, in terms of technological inventions, army size, or combat methods there is nothing to justify describing the revolutionary wars as a revolution in warfare. The Gribeauval artillery system introduced in 1776 had been used in earlier conflicts, and did not prove

as decisive during the battles of the Revolution as was once thought.[27] The increase in the size of armies was part of a long-term trend, even though the wars of this period did accelerate the phenomenon.[28] As for the use of offensive shock action, it was no more than the reinvention of the traditional *corps à corps* or close combat, though adapted and remodelled by a new ideology, a mystique even, that gave it an impetus that was equally new.[29] Turning to the ideological, political, and social factors, it is argued that the arrival of politicized masses on the field of battle and in the conduct of warfare itself, with their conviction of fighting for a legitimate cause—one that was sacred even if not uniquely religious—had occurred previously, notably during the English Revolution in the 1640s and during the American Revolution in the eighteenth century. If the minuteman of the American War of Independence had a fairly limited influence as a model, the Ironsides of Cromwell's New Model Army can be seen as precursors of the politicized soldier engaged in an ideological and/or religious crusade.[30] As that last term indicates, we need to recognize the 'transfer of the sacred' that also operated in respect of the war effort and facilitated the material and human mobilization now demanded not only of combatants but of the entire population. The famous decree of 23 August 1793 proclaimed the *levée en masse*, but also the general mobilization of the members of the nation, regardless of age or gender, albeit in roles consistent with the norms of the day.[31] Some historians of military revolutions identify precedents for this, however, notably in the War of the Spanish Succession, less in the numbers deployed on the battlefield than in the general mobilization of material, economic, and financial resources.[32] Precedents also exist for the state of mind that animated the combatants. André Corvisier has endorsed the remarks by the historian Albert Malet to the effect that Louis XIV's troops provided a splendid prelude to the heroic exploits of the soldiers of the Revolution and Empire.[33]

For the cultural and anthropological dimensions, the question is whether the violence and brutalization observed in the wars of the Revolution was indeed radically new, totally different from the limited warfare of the eighteenth century. For the historiographical current mentioned above, the vision of violence as inherent to the struggles of the Revolution and the conflicts of the Empire that ensued is one that was superimposed upon reality after the event—in the English-speaking world by the heirs of Burke, for whom the French Revolution was unqualified barbarity,[34] or by German reformers eager for additional arguments to reform the Prussian army after its disaster at Jena (1806), or by Clausewitz.[35]

In fact, there was no rapid shift away from the formal, chessboard manoeuvres that were eighteenth-century warfare, and towards the 'absolute' war of the kind predicted by Guibert and analysed by Clausewitz.[36] If the military philosophers, including Guibert, called for 'rational' warfare, this was because even the conflicts at the end of the Old Regime hardly fitted that description. The first point to note is that the attempt to impose

limitations was a response to the wars of the *Siècle de fer*, extending from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries, which had been anything but limited.[37] It can be noted equally that such limitations were transgressed regularly even during the wars in the age of the Enlightenment, particularly on their naval and colonial peripheries, as the Seven Years' War demonstrated. The latter witnessed episodes of exceptional cruelty, and was accompanied by an outpouring of propaganda that bears comparison to anything produced 30 years later.[38]

The principles of total war

One element, however, does point to a discontinuity with the potential to initiate the process that led to total war. This was the irreversible, or at any rate historically stable, relationship that now linked the military and martial spheres to that of national feeling through the ideal of the nation in arms—an ideal that progressively imposed itself in nineteenth-century Europe and then, except in the English-speaking countries, across much of the world. It is this political phenomenon that gives the vast numbers involved their significance, what the historian Geoffrey Best refers to as the nationalization of the war and the militarization of national feeling and activity.[39]

The concept of total war is currently the subject of debate among historians.[40] One of the issues under discussion concerns the relevance of the total war concept for understanding conflicts prior to the two world wars of the twentieth century. The emergence of the notion was shaped by experience of those conflicts, and historians have pointed out that it has meant different things to different writers. Thus, for Clausewitz, absolute war is an exploitation of all means towards a precise, politically defined goal, though this implies a driving to extremes and the annihilation of the enemy; for Ludendorff, all-out war is the extension of the struggle into every domain and every geographical theatre, to the point of entirely subsuming policy; for Goebbels, on the contrary, it was the exaltation of policy.[41] Despite these differences, it seems to the present writer that the concept of total war can still be useful, on two conditions. First, it should be distinguished from that of military revolution: the processes at work overlap but do not coincide completely. Second, we must keep in mind that the concept of total war relates to a process of which the French Revolution marked merely the start: 'It was the second military revolution that made possible the waging of total war, by providing its material foundations, but its moral foundations were supplied by the wars of the Revolution.'[42]

Army, nation, and republic

The moral foundation that war supplied was the ideal of the nation in arms that defined itself with a novel trinity of army, nation, and republic; the

result was the 'republicanization' as well as the nationalization of the military sphere. The mobilization of the entire French nation called for by the decree of 23 August 1793 went far beyond the war effort itself, for which, in quantitative terms, precedents existed. On the symbolic level, too, of course, when mobilization no longer signified mere passive acceptance of the constraints of the conflict but demanded the active support of the protagonists, continuities existed with earlier episodes (notably the War of the Spanish Succession). What was new—and contained the seed of total war—was that its extension into every area of economic and social life took the form of a sacred duty, as never before seen, since in the accomplishment of this duty was combined the construction of citizen, nation, and people. This is well illustrated by the example of the famous saltpetre factories.[43] From the summer of 1793, all householders were required to wash the walls of their cellars, outhouses, stables, and storerooms in order to extract the saltpetre used to make the gunpowder needed by the artillery. After extraction, the saltpetre had to be transformed, an operation that could only be performed in workshops. The law of 14 Frimaire Year II (4 December 1793) sought to coordinate the joint efforts of the local administrations, particularly the district authorities, the revolutionary organs, surveillance committees, and popular societies, and of the population as a whole (which was, of course, mobilized by the 23 August decree), to run the workshops. At the 'Régie des Poudres et Salpêtres', which the Committee of Public Safety renamed the 'Administration révolutionnaire des Poudres et Salpêtres', citizens who had been selected by the district authorities after nomination by popular societies attended courses given by scientists brought in by the revolutionary government. On their return, they passed on what they had learned to their fellow citizens. Six thousand such workshops operated until Germinal Year III. The results achieved were real, with 12 times more saltpetre produced in 1794 than before the revolutionary laws.[44]

The saltpetre workshops were revolutionary in every sense. This was an initiative that contributed to strengthening the identification between the people, the nation, and the state. That identification in turn motivated the introduction of a policy of assistance for the parents of the defenders of the fatherland, a distant precursor of the interventionist measures of the modern state.[45] Laws of 26 November 1792 and 4 May 1793 provided for payments to help needy families of the defenders of the fatherland. These early laws had no real application so long as the Convention was divided by the struggle between Girondins and Montagnards. But this changed when the Montagnards triumphed over their rivals and came to dominate the assembly. A new decree was passed on 21 Pluviôse Year II (9 February 1794), and the measures were extended gradually to *all* the defenders of the fatherland, whether they served as volunteers or as soldiers of the line. It is noteworthy that, while the main beneficiaries were the parents, wives, and children of combatants, siblings also could be helped if the soldier was their

only source of support. The popular societies and surveillance committees played a key role in running the scheme, since the commissaries responsible for checking the lists of dependents prepared by the communal authorities were drawn from their members, as were the men and women—typically their wives—who distributed the quarterly payments to families. The scheme remained in place until Year V, though it gradually sank into paralysis due to lack of resources.[46]

If the army and the war were held to be expressions of the general will, the will of the people, so in their turn the army and the war remodelled the people—an irrational rabble was not the virtuous people, and the nation in arms was not a rabble in arms.[47] With the formation of the Army of the Year II the conditions were created for transforming 'a people in arms into a people under arms'.[48] This transformation can be observed in the famous *amalgame*—the restructuring of the French Army undertaken by the Montagnards, principally Dubois-Crancé, which was voted on 21 February 1793, that is, before the *levée en masse*, but whose application did not begin until the spring and summer of 1793.[49] The forces that went into action against the First Coalition were disparate precisely because the modes of recruitment had until then been diverse, including professional service in the line army, voluntary engagement in the battalions formed in 1791 and 1792, and, before long, conscription in the levies raised in 1793. The solution adopted was to create a new unit, the *demi-brigade*, in which two volunteer battalions were brigaded with one line army battalion. Henceforth, all soldiers would have the same pay, wear similar uniforms, and be subject to the same discipline. Amalgamation was primarily a 'technical' measure, intended to ensure the coherence and efficiency of troops, and thus with the objective of military integration. At the same time, by combining the professionalism of regular soldiers with the enthusiasm or *élan* of the volunteers (and the conscripts grouped with them), it also had the objective of political integration. Last, it brought together men from every geographical, social, and linguistic background, and thus had potentially far-reaching implications, unforeseen by its architects, for cultural integration in French society. The lesson would not be lost on the leaders of the Third Republic.

The military remained distinct from the political and civilian spheres, however. Moves in that direction would have encountered resistance from within French society, and it was not an outcome sought by the Jacobins. The first steps towards waging total war were not taken in totalitarian conditions. Thus, the *fête révolutionnaire* or revolutionary festival under the First Republic was never a purely military affair—far less so, in fact, than the *fête nationale* under the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics. The soldier occupied no special place in the *fête révolutionnaire*, and in the fêtes held to celebrate Republican victories it was the citizen as defender of his community who was honoured, rather than the soldier as member of the army.[50] Before very long, of course, the war effort reverted to more traditional forms. Its sheer

scale, however, and above all the spirit of patriotic enthusiasm in which it was conducted, would be equalled only during the American Civil War and during the two world wars in Europe.[51] In France, no theoretical analysis of the revolutionary mobilization was conducted until after the First World War, from 1925 onwards, and then the focus was not its role in construction of the French nation but the mobilization of human and material resources it entailed.[52]

The new French army became *jusqu'au boutiste* in outlook, ready to fight to the bitter end, convinced as it was of the rightness of its cause, of fighting to defend 'civilization'—whose limits it was thus entitled to transgress—and of being engaged in a defensive war, which was a key feature of the process making war 'total' that now began.[53] Finally, the specifically 'French path to a national army' that emerged fortuitously in the early stages of the Revolution took on a permanent character when the requisition for the *levée en masse* culminated, under the Directory, in the creation of a conscription-based army by the Jourdan Law of 19 Fructidor Year VI (5 September 1798). Conscription or its early forms had, of course, already been used for recruitment purposes by monarchical states in Europe from the end of the sixteenth century. An organization was established at this time in Sweden, later remodelled by Gustavus Adolphus and again by Charles XI, who created the *Indelta*, which was to be much used by Charles XII. In Prussia, the Soldier King, Frederick-William I, introduced the canton system of recruitment in 1733 in some provinces. In Russia, 'embryonic' systems of conscription appeared, and were present from 1781 in some parts of the Habsburg Empire.[54] Just as the American minutemen, however, and Cromwell's Ironsides did not prevent adoption of the career army model in the English-speaking world, so none of these figures—the conscript soldier of Gustavus Adolphus, the cantonist of the Soldier King, or the French militia member of 1712—occupies the same symbolic and founding role as the French conscript in the definition of a new army, one which for the last 200 years has widely, and, in the case of the French people, exclusively, been identified with the national army.

Yet the states that followed France in adopting this model were anything but republican, most glaringly the Prussian monarchy; and the ideal of the nation in arms proved indispensable for other states looking to establish their relations with individuals on new, but not necessarily republican, bases. Indeed, even in nineteenth-century France the conscript army contributed to construction of the Nation rather than of the Republic, and was primarily an instrument of the centralizing nation-state (which is why successive regimes modified but never abandoned it). The system of conscription remained far from egalitarian. The neo-Jacobins responsible for the Jourdan Law instituted universal conscription, not universal personal service: all the young men from the same annual *classe* (age group) were recorded in a register, but there was no obligation for them to serve in

person.[55] In fact, the neo-Jacobins of the Directory years were as reluctant as the Constituents had been to see everyone under arms, something they claimed would turn France into a permanently militarized society. Nor, like the Montagnards in the Convention, did they want military service, at least not during peacetime, to become a school for citizenship. Not all of those eligible were ever actually incorporated into the army, however, so it was not long before the practices of drawing lots to decide who would serve and paying for substitutes came back into use.

French republicans in the nineteenth century saw this as a betrayal of the original intention and continued to fight for a national military service that recruited as widely as possible, or was even compulsory for every citizen. The conflict over this issue went together with a certain militarization of French republican sentiment, which in some quarters took extreme forms. There was the fantasy of the '*Jacobin botté*'—the Jacobin in military uniform, saviour of the Republic—visible in the late 1880s at the time of the Boulanger Affair, when support for the General came first from radical republicans, then from the antirepublican right; there was also the army as *arche sainte* or 'holy ark', the ultimate repository of virtue, no longer a passive reflection of society but its source of direction, its guide; this was dear to the new nationalist right of Maurras in the late 1890s, but could already be detected in certain texts written from very different ideological standpoints. The pressure from history, however—the twin blows of military defeat in 1870–1871, in a foreign war, and of the Commune, in a civil war—was sufficient for the mainstream politicians of the Third Republic to make universal military service one of the pillars of their model.

Conclusion

The historian Claude Nicolet, specialist in the republican idea and its different incarnations, perceptively remarked that historical circumstances in France have recast the trinity of army, nation, and republic on several occasions. Second only to religious metaphors are the military metaphors and terms used by republicans: civil wars, as in 1848 and 1871, and military disasters or crises, as in 1870, 1914, and 1940, have always linked, by some binding inevitability, the fate of the republic to the bearing of arms, the republic to the fatherland, especially for those who believe wholeheartedly in the universality of French experience. The fate of the republic has been played out before the eyes of mankind.[56]

Finally, it can be observed that, after the army–nation–republic trinity had been broken apart in 1940 by a marshal, Pétain, it was forged anew by a general, de Gaulle, who, in conjunction with a range of forces inside and outside France, the resistance networks and Forces Françaises Libres, rebuilt the Republic between 1940 and 1944.

Notes

1. Translated from the French by Sylvie Kleinman, revised, with additional material, by Godfrey Rogers.
2. The Seven Years' War (1756–1763) followed a switching of alliances in which France and Austria led a coalition that included Russia, the German States, and Sweden, against Britain and Prussia. It ended with France defeated and the Treaty of Paris (1763).
3. The aristocratic reaction in the army was signalled by the Ségur Edict of 1781, which set four generations of noble ancestors as the requirement for access to officer rank. The 1788 ordinance tightened the conditions still further, making it impossible for the commoner NCO to gain entry to the officer corps and removing all hope for the officer of non-noble origin to move into the higher echelons of the officer corps. Rafe Blaufarb, *The French Army 1750–1820: Careers, Talent, Merit* (Manchester and New York, 2002).
4. The Constituent set up a censitary or restricted franchise under which active citizens, those paying a certain amount in taxes, alone had the right to vote, while passive citizens did not. Not until the summer of 1792 and the fall of the monarchy did this distinction end. The Convention was elected by universal suffrage.
5. The Battle of Rossbach, fought in Saxony on 5 November 1757, was for the French a symbolic disaster of the Seven Years' War. By means of skilful manoeuvres, some 22,000 Prussians triumphed over 36,000 French supported by 10,000–12,000 Germans of the Holy Roman Empire, and produced a wholesale collapse among their adversaries. Because the defeat took place outside France, however, and did not lead to any loss of French territory, the shock it caused to the elites was not felt in the general population. In this sense, Rossbach is not fully comparable with the first battle of Sedan (September 1870) or with the second battle of Sedan (May 1940).
6. Significantly, in its full title the *Essai général de tactique* is preceded by a *Discours préliminaire sur l'état actuel de la politique et de la science militaire en Europe avec le plan d'un ouvrage intitulé la France politique et militaire*. Guibert was highly critical of the Old Regime, which explains why he first published the *Essai* anonymously and at Amsterdam in 1770.
7. Annie Crépin, *Défendre la France: Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Rennes, 2005), 52–55.
8. Originally from the Ardennes, Dubois-Crancé was an officer in the royal army and, like Guibert, was of minor nobility. Like many military theoreticians of the day, he supported the new Enlightenment ideas, and he was elected for the Third Estate to the Estates-General.
9. *AP*, vol. 10, 15 December 1789, 579–584. The town of Antibes in the south-east on the Mediterranean coast, Perpignan in Roussillon, the Breton port of Brest, and the North-Sea port of Dunkirk in northern France were at the time considered to be poles apart from each other.
10. Sam Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution: The Role and Development of the Line Army 1787–1793* (Oxford, 1978); Jean-Paul Bertaud, *La révolution armée: Les soldats-citoyens et la Révolution française* (Paris, 1979).
11. From 1791, the barrier was in fact often breached for volunteers, and even for the officers they elected to lead their battalions. See Annie Crépin, *La conscription*

en débat ou le triple apprentissage de la nation, de la citoyenneté, de la République (1798–1889) (Arras, 1998), 21.

12. Introduced by Louvois in 1688 as an auxiliary army, the *milice* (militia) performed duties at the land and sea frontier fortifications while the regular regiments were fighting. During the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the militia provided a reserve of recruits for the regular forces. This war was one of the few occasions when the institution was accepted.

   From 1693, members of the militia, whose number was set for each locality, were chosen by lot from among single men and childless widowers aged 20–40, and aged 18–40 after 1765. Although reduced to a largely theoretical existence by the end of the Old Regime, the institution became deeply unpopular on account of its unequal recruitment procedures, malpractices, and the arbitrary decisions of the intendants overseeing operations. The militia was universally denounced in the *cahiers de doléances* and was abolished on 20 March 1791.

13. Bruno Ciotti, *Du volontaire au conscrit, les levées d'hommes dans le Puy-de-Dôme pendant la Révolution française* (Clermont-Ferrand, 2001), 127.

14. Thomas Hippler, 'Service militaire et intégration nationale pendant la Révolution Française', *AHRF* 329 (2002): 1–16.

15. Thomas Hippler, *Soldats et citoyens: Naissance du service militaire en France et en Prusse* (Paris, 2006), 141–142.

16. Alain Ehrenberg, *Le corps militaire: Politique et pédagogie en démocratie* (Paris, 1983), 51–52.

17. Ibid. 37.

18. *AP*, vol. 3, cahier de doléances du bailliage d'Étampes, 288.

19. John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivations and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France 1791–1794* (Urbana and Chicago, 1984), 19.

20. Jean-Yves Guiomar, *L'invention de la guerre totale XVIIIᵉ–XX ᵉ* (Paris, 2004), 122.

21. John Lynn, *Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas and Institutions of Warfare, 1445–1871* (Urbana and Chicago, 1990), 161.

22. Lynn, *Bayonets*.

23. John Lynn, *De la guerre: Une histoire du combat des origines à nos jours*, trans. Guillaume Villeneuve (Paris, 2006), 266.

24. Daniel Reichel, 'Les guerres de la Révolution Française et la mutation du métier militaire', in *L'influence de la Révolution française sur les armées en France, en Europe et dans le monde*, ed. Commission française d'Histoire militaire (Vincennes, 1989), 42–43.

25. The terms and protagonists of the debate are discussed in Laurent Henninger, 'Military Revolutions and Military History', in *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, ed. Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (New York, 2006), Chapter 1.

26. Ibid.

27. For the background to the debate see Franco Cardini, *La culture de la guerre, Xᵉ–XVIIIᵉ*, trans. Angélique Lévi (Paris, 1992), 349–350; Lynn, *Tools of War*, 157.

28. Laurent Henninger, 'Les guerres de la Révolution ont-elles représenté une révolution militaire?', *Actes du Séminaire EHESS*, *Les révolutions militaires, 2006–2009*, forthcoming.

29. Reichel, 'Les guerres de la Révolution', 42–43.

30. Cardini, *La culture de la guerre*, 143.

31. Concretely, married men would forge weapons and transport supplies to the armies, women would care for the wounded, children would make dressings, and

old men would have themselves carried to public squares to inspire the courage of the warriors, and to preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic. *AP*, vol. 72, Decree of the National Convention, 23 August 1793, 674–675.

32. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) was fought over the accession of Philippe d'Anjou, Louis XIV's grandson, to the Spanish throne. In it, France was opposed to Britain, Holland, most of the German states, and the Emperor of Austria.
33. André Corvisier, *L'armée française du ministère de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère Choiseul: Le soldat*, 2 vols (Paris, 1964), vol. 1, vii.
34. Henninger, 'Les guerres de la Révolution'.
35. Indeed, the Prussian military reformers who aimed to transform the royal army into a national army, men like Scharnhorst with his measures for reorganization and Clausewitz with his writings, eager to draw the lessons of French experience for securing victory, placed more emphasis on the unleashing of irrational forces and how this was to be exploited than on violence as such. Reichel, 'Les guerres de la Révolution', 55–56.
36. Cardini, *La culture de la guerre*, 403.
37. Ibid. 126–129.
38. Edmond Dziembowski, 'Guerre en dentelles ou guerre cruelle? La représentation de la guerre de Sept Ans dans la littérature du XVIIIe siècle', in *Les malheurs de la guerre*, ed. André Corvisier and Jean Jacquart, 2 vols (Paris, 1996), vol. 1, 313–320.
39. Geoffrey Best, *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe 1770–1870* (Leicester, 1982), 65.
40. See Annie Crépin and Bernard Gainot, 'Regards croisés: Autour de la guerre totale', *AHRF* 366 (2011): 153–170.
41. See François Géré and Thierry Widemann (eds), *La guerre totale* (Paris, 2001); Louis Gautier, *Face à la guerre* (Paris, 2006), 33.
42. Guiomar, *L'invention*, 293.
43. Cardini, *La culture de la guerre*, 236–237.
44. Bertaud, *La Révolution armée*, 241; William Serman and Jean-Paul Bertaud, *Nouvelle histoire militaire de la France, 1789–1919* (Paris, 1998), 78.
45. Bertaud, *La Révolution armée*, 130–131; Alan Forrest, *The French Revolution and the Poor* (Oxford, 1981).
46. Annie Crépin, *Révolution et armée nouvelle en Seine-et-Marne (1791–1797)* (Paris, 2008); Isser Woloch, 'War Widows Pensions', *Societas* 6 (1976): 235–254.
47. Ehrenberg, *Le corps militaire*, 45; Hippler, *Soldats et citoyens*, 139–143.
48. Michel Auvray, *L'âge des casernes: Histoire et mythes du service militaire* (La Tour d'Aigues, 1998), 105.
49. AN, AD XVIII B, Convention, vol. 113, session of 21 February 1793.
50. Crépin, *Défendre la France*, 116.
51. Best, *War and Society*, 93.
52. Annie Crépin, *Histoire de la conscription* (Paris, 2009).
53. Thierry Wydemann and François Géré, 'Débat de synthèse', in *La guerre totale*, 205–206.
54. André Corvisier, *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789* (Paris, 1976), 63–70; Bruno Ciotti, 'Armées, révoltes et Révolutions à la fin du XVIIIe siècle (1773–1802)', in *Révoltes et révolutions de 1773 à 1802*, ed. Serge Bianchi and Philippe Bourdin (Nantes, 2004), 297–324.

55. In *1799, un nouveau jacobinisme? La démocratie représentative, une alternative à brumaire* (Paris, 2001), Bernard Gainot analyses this egalitarian and liberal political current that sought to preserve the principles of a democratic republic within the framework of a representative republic.
56. Claude Nicolet, *L'idée républicaine en France, 1789–1924: Essai d'histoire critique* (Paris, 1982), 396.

7

A Patriotic School: The Recruitment of the Italian Legion in France, 1799–1800[1]

Katia Visconti

It is something of a commonplace to say that Napoleon Bonaparte played a decisive role in the transformation of the offensive war—launched by France in April 1792—from a truly revolutionary undertaking to one dominated by mere power politics. It is difficult to explain his extraordinary success, however, without recalling that Bonaparte consistently stressed the concept of a crusade—one that became less concerned with liberty over time and instead increasingly became a civilizing mission—in relation to his repeated military operations. He was never able to understand these as something wholly separate from the revolutionary aggression to which he owed all his fortune. His Italian excursions remain exemplary in this regard: From the very first campaign, he brought together the concepts of the venture's subversive nature with its intent to enlighten the peninsula. In this context, at least on a formal level, he included full recognition of the principle of Italian nationalism and insistently promoted himself as a figure concerned with the establishment, through arms, of liberty. And, as is known, Bonaparte in fact would develop this particular political argument on the occasion of his second advance into Italy, when, with the Cisalpine Republic restored, he promoted its transformation into the Italian Republic, installing himself promptly as its president. At the same time, however, and this is equally well known, during the transformation of the First Cisalpine Republic into the Second, and thence into the Italian Republic, Bonaparte, by this time First Consul, reformulated the terms of the federative links between the revolutionary state and France. He converted it from a sister republic into a subordinate one—all a part of that grand Parisian hegemonic design in the European arena that led to total war with Habsburg Austria. This alteration strongly amplified the significance of the war on the peninsula, turning soldiers—first Cisalpine, and then Italian—from armed patriots into a professional elite for whom devotion to country, while still present, did not, however, exclude a complete acceptance of French hegemony. Although this was immediately clear to Bonaparte himself, it was an insight granted, in

the short term, to only a few in his Italian entourage. Confirmation was found in the role carried out by the Italian Legion. The Legion was formed in France at the end of 1799 in order to contribute to the revolutionary return of France to the peninsula. It was disbanded shortly after the second Italian campaign, when it came to be considered as of little use—if not, in fact, positively harmful—as a military organism in the new political scenario created by Bonaparte's definitive consolidation of power. Although the story of the Italian Legion, in some aspects, has been recounted already, most notably by Anna Maria Rao, it is still worth further consideration in the light of the above facts. The Italian Legion offers a useful means to identify breaks, as well as continuities, in the vocation of arms that was restructured by Bonaparte's triumph.[2] The antecedents are well known: Following the collapse of the peninsula's sister republic, at the beginning of November 1799, Giuseppe Lechi published a proclamation entitled *Amor di patria*, a call to arms to the Italian patriots scattered around France.[3] Lechi was a soldier from Brescia whose past political record demonstrated deep democratic leanings. This appeal from his headquarters in Genoa perfectly captured the general climate which, since the spring of that year, had featured in the debate about the fate of the Italian exiles, who had been forced by the war to seek refuge in the 'mother republic'. It was a heated confrontation that involved a variety of voices, forces, and political actors: the refugees, the Paris Directory, the French foreign and war ministers, Talleyrand and Bernadotte, the general-in-chief of the Italian army, Championnet, the Cisalpine ambassador in Paris, Giovanni Galeazzo Serbelloni, and the Directory of the Cisalpine Republic itself. In exile in Chambéry, the Directory of the Cisalpine Republic, from the precipitous flight of April 1799 to the victory at Marengo, considered itself to be the only legitimate representative of the Cisalpine people.

From the first days of June 1799, the continuous arrival of exiles had caused numerous problems for the French government—in terms not only of basic hospitality, but also, and perhaps above all, of public order. They first responded with assistance equivalent to 200,000 francs, but this was in favour only of the Cisalpine refugees in Grenoble, Chambéry, Marseille, Nice, and Paris.[4] The decision aroused much serious controversy, which minister Talleyrand handled by providing other funds for the non-Cisalpine exiles. This measure, however, decreed on 15 August 1799, was revealed quickly to be insufficient to confront a situation that would worsen with the fall of the Roman Republic and would explode with the political conflict that shook France in the summer of 1799.[5] The French 'peace party' was intent on reducing the losses suffered and on pursuing a diplomatic agreement with the coalition powers. With regard to relinquishing the territories that had been conquered already, the Italian ones above all, the 'peace party' locked horns with the 'war party', which, in contrast, saw the renewal of revolutionary expansionism as the only way to overturn the outcome of the

conflict with the European monarchies. Of these two parties, it was obvious to which one the exiles looked.

The exiles, in fact, were determined not only to denounce past failings and errors and to advise the French government on the best way to regain the support of the population in Italy. They were concerned also, and perhaps chiefly, with claiming their right to military involvement. This participation was strictly connected with, if not dependent on, a political programme that ensured the unity and independence of the reconquered territories. In order to realize this aim, the French generals of the moment were deemed to be the most suitable and trustworthy leaders. Thus, certainly not by chance, minister Talleyrand had affirmed in a 9 July report to the French Directory that the help given to the Italian patriots who had fled to France would be completed by further measures. This policy would lead to the formation of a battalion composed of all those Italian citizens of an age to bear arms, to be attached to the Army of Italy being raised at that moment.[6] Further, in a report to Minister of War Bernadotte on 31 July, regarding the first approaches between the exiles and General Joubert and their eventual incorporation in the French army, Talleyrand not only reiterated that the requests of the patriots fitted well with the real interests of the French Republic, but he also outlined the organizational stages. Divisional General Grenier had been gathering the Cisalpine and Piedmontese soldiers and refugees in the area of Nice throughout the first half of July, entrusting the direction to General Lechi. Nice, therefore, would represent the first meeting point for Italian refugees intent on enrolling in the battalion.[7]

Talleyrand's suggestion was taken up quickly by Bernadotte. With a proclamation entitled *To all Italian refugees*—of 21 August, but certainly drafted before 15 August, the date of General Joubert's death at Novi—the minister of war called on the exiles to join the Army of Italy and the 'Italian legions' that generals Joubert and Championnet intended to organize. The reaction of the Italians in Grenoble was an excited one. In a letter signed by 65 exiles, Piedmontese and Cisalpine refugees lamented Joubert's death, calling him 'Italy's true republican friend'. They further stated that their acceptance of the call to arms depended on the guarantee that Italy would enjoy 'complete independence' and would no longer be prey to the 'avidity and ambition of a new Flaminius'.[8] They would agree to fight in the Legions' ranks only if the French government established the independence and unity of Italy as their prime objective.

It was in this climate that Representative Talot presented the text of the law regarding the formation of the Italian Legion to the Council of Five Hundred on 25 August, arousing much discontent among the various parties of refugees in France. In the first place, they felt it left unresolved, or, rather, did not even attempt to consider, the problem of the future political organization of the peninsula. Less significantly, the enrolment of the Italian exiles

into a single body, separate from the French army, alarmed the Piedmontese, who feared that military unification heralded a unified political future.[9] Thus, alongside the Neapolitan and Tuscan parties—'the most passionate and zealous supporters of an Italy united in a single Republic', wrote the Cisalpine diplomatic agent Luigi Bossi to the Cisalpine Directory—a faction in favour of the independence of Piedmont and its unification with Liguria began to assert itself among the exiles. Many Cisalpine men, commented Bossi,

> believe to overturn everything in this way [...] and employ great skill and cunning, flattering themselves that they will succeed in the aim of uniting Italy into a single republic. Their desire could not be more praiseworthy, but I do not know if they have calculated all the various relationships and viewpoints of this great object, and if they have reflected on the circumstances of the moment. Whatever the case, their claim does them honour.[10]

Tensions and a wide range of opinions inevitably thrived in the ranks of the Cisalpine company, divided between the enthusiastic feelings of the patriots and the more measured stance of the authorities in exile. Furthermore, it was no coincidence that during the autumn of 1799 a heated argument broke out between Chambéry and Paris involving the Minister of War of the Cisalpine Republic Bianchi D'Adda, ambassador Serbelloni, the Directory, and, not least, the organizer of the Italian Legion, General Lechi. The main reason for this conflict was the guidelines for the recruiting operations of the men, and the military corps for which they were intended, especially the arrangement that merged the officers and soldiers of the corps of the Cisalpine infantry with the ranks of the Legion.[11] This measure, Bianchi D'Adda underscored, was 'injurious to the rights of, and gravely prejudicial to', the Cisalpine Republic that was to be rebuilt.[12] Faced with the hesitations of the Directory and the reticence of ambassador Serbelloni, the logic driving Bianchi D'Adda's fears was reiterated a few days later, in a further peremptory report from his hand:

> I may not, Citizen Directors, delay even one moment in bringing to your attention...the importance of making clear to ambassador Serbelloni how irregular it would be to permit the uniting of our military corps with that of the Italian Legion which, being enlisted by the French Republic, has no form of relationship with our own Republic, as may be recognised by the spirit of the law which prescribes its formation, jointly with other Legions.... It clearly appears from this law that the French legislative body has raised this Legion solely to assist all the Italians who were forced to take refuge in France and who, rightly burning with the desire to see their homeland free, are ready to show themselves willing to take part

with all their might. This law does not regard those already existing corps that pertain to our Cisalpine Republic, which is allied with France. Those corps, if they do not remain intact, and are not considered absolutely separate from the Italian Legion, will be disbanded at the reestablishment of the Republic, which would in that case find itself totally lacking in military force.[13]

Bianchi D'Adda was firmly convinced that the Legion should be composed of all the Neapolitan, Roman, Tuscan, and Piedmontese officers or soldiers who had taken refuge in France and only those Cisalpine men who were not already part of a specific body of troops, such as the Mountain Infantry, the Flying Columns, and the active National Guard. But the aspect that worried the minister most, perhaps, concerned the future: He feared that, at the moment of the Cisalpine Republic's reconstitution, 'apart from the present superabundant number of officers, the republic will be obliged to recognise as such all those from other parts of Italy who would now be serving in the Legion itself'.[14] In the light of these observations, Bianchi D'Adda therefore asked the Chambéry government to inform the ambassador in Paris that, until 'warned of the danger to which the republic may be subject, in terms of the reduction of its troops and the disbanding of its corps', he would act as spokesman to the French minister of war concerning the interests of the allied republic.[15]

Serbelloni's interpretation of events was, however, utterly different: 'while appreciating the prudence and caution of the minister', he wrote to the Directory of Chambéry, he considered that the highest priority was the subsistence of the soldiers, a problem that the formation of this Legion seemed to solve.[16] Helping to strengthen the ambassador's conviction in this matter was the news of the almost certain 'joining of Bonaparte with the Army of Italy', which could only generate, he wrote, 'a happy and inevitable outcome'.[17] Further support for the ambassador's point of view came from General Lechi. Well informed about the humour of the troops, given to his position as organizer of the soldiers and refugees gathered in Nice, the general did not hesitate to express reservations in relation to Bianchi D'Adda's fears.[18]

Even following the critical events of Eighteen Brumaire, the arguments put forward by the various parties continued to enflame the debate and to intensify the divisions between the patriots, without, however, arriving at any concrete results. Bianchi D'Adda persisted in predicting scenes of a future heavily mortgaged to the Cisalpine Directory in Chambéry, with a military organization overloaded with officers, given the number who had flowed into the depots and who had been requested to enter the Legion's ranks. This arrangement was, in his opinion, unsuitable, and would only aggravate an extremely precarious financial situation with useless expenditures.[19] Serbelloni, however, continued to downplay the minister's observations

and—in light of the interest that the 'new government of France' was displaying concerning the fate of the fallen Cisalpine Republic—highlighted instead the potential damage that could be caused by these preoccupations. Thus, if in his official guise the ambassador limited himself to following procedure and communicating the 'representations' of the Cisalpine minister to the requisite French authorities in a lukewarm manner,[20] in his private correspondence with the directors, especially Marescalchi, he emphasized 'Bonaparte's unceasing and positive zeal for all things Cisalpine', and presented the arrival in Italy of the First Consul, 'that Italic-Egyptian hero', as a certainty.[21] A hero, furthermore, who already, at the news of his return from the deserts of the East in the month of October, had been proclaimed by the president of the Cisalpine Republic Directory as the nation's 'father and saviour'.[22] Remarks such as this, however, still did not unite the Chambéry government. It was divided between those who considered the prospect of an armed return to Italy with some anxiety and who took care to obtain guarantees in defence of their prerogatives, such as the directors Sopransi and Vertemate Franchi, and others, such as Marescalchi, who looked with hope upon 'the preparations for war that are being made in France, the change of generals, the French government's involvement of the Cisalpine Directory in the changes made to this same government and the assurances of friendship given at this meeting with our republic'.[23]

These were signs—continued Marescalchi in his outburst to his friend Tassoni, in exile in Marseille—that filled him with 'the firmest of hopes that, whether in peace or at war, the next spring we shall return to our homes'.[24] The months that followed the law of 22 Vendémiaire Year VIII (14 October 1799) and, even more significantly, the *Amor di patria* proclaimed by General Lechi on 9 November 1799 were, therefore, both highly convulsive and inconclusive. The concrete launch of operations that brought about the realization of the Italian Legion over a period of two months had to await the breakthrough of February 1800. At this time, General Lechi, definitively confirmed by Bonaparte—who meanwhile had taken power—as commander and organizer of the Legion, became the primary contact for the government in Paris and its minister of war Berthier.[25] These events, furthermore, recall an aspect that has been somewhat neglected: The Italian Legion, so fervently desired by the French Directory in the aftermath of the *coup d'état* of 30 Prairial Year VII (18 June 1799), became a concrete reality following Brumaire, when the French political circumstances had undergone a massive upheaval. At least at the beginning, however, no one appeared to register any profound differences of opinion regarding the future of the relationship between the French Consulate and Italy. Indeed, almost all the exiles were convinced that the events of Brumaire indicated, in the context of a renewal of the war, revolutionary continuity.

The coup of Eighteen Brumaire, in fact, had aroused general enthusiasm: Moderates and radicals were almost all united in seeing Bonaparte as the

man who would decide the fate of the peninsula. For this reason—with the announcement of the plan for an armed return to the peninsula—the Italian Legion soon moved to the centre of the political debate. The method of its formation makes it possible to sketch out an interesting angle of interpretation of the terms through which the First Consul intended to orchestrate, not so much the military campaign itself, but, rather, the political organization of an Italy he was certain to reconquer.

With the resistance that had marked the first months after Brumaire overcome (in particular the oscillation between the desire to create an efficient, motivated military force and the fear of gathering together all the officers of Italian origin into one single body), and an end to the confusion caused by the continual shifting of recruitment centres (from Toulon to Lyon to Grenoble), Bonaparte established that all the Cisalpine, Piedmontese, Neapolitan, Tuscan, and Roman troops scattered around French territory should be assembled in the general headquarters at Dijon.[26] This measure, at General Lechi's request, was combined with two new orders from Minister Berthier during the first half of February 1800: One obliged all Italian soldiers who no longer formed part of an active corps to move to Dijon; the other, of 27 Pluviôse Year VIII (16 February 1800), addressed all the Italian refugees in France and commanded them to go to the same general headquarters in order to enrol. Only the elderly, the sick, and those who could demonstrate themselves to be civil functionaries would be excused from this decree: They still would be able, however, to claim the right to the payments established during the course of the previous year.[27] Lechi suggested two other further measures—as emerged clearly from his correspondence with the French minister of war—which greatly helped to move things along.[28] The first proposal concerned the appointment by the First Consul of the Milanese Pietro Teulié as adjutant general of the Legion's General Staff.[29] The second suggestion was the institution of a commission, effectively starting its activity in the early days of March, charged with examining the documentation provided by those who declared themselves 'exempt' and the certifications of rank and qualifications of the officers who would gradually amass in Dijon.[30] Concomitant with these actions, on 23 February, a further solemn proclamation followed from General Lechi, this time significantly addressed *Ai militari italiani*.[31] Here, he announced the beginning of a new era which, through arms, would lead to the rebirth of liberty. He indicated how the soldiers were also, to a certain extent, assuming a political role which the civil authorities, starting with the Cisalpine Directory in exile, did not seem capable of adopting.

Work went ahead quickly: On 27 March 1800, Lechi and Teulié presented the *Tableau d'organization* of Italian officers (304 in all) who would make up the Legion, and, after just a little less than two weeks, the list of petty officers and soldiers was completed. The force, destined to form the vanguard of the Army of the Reserve (consisting of six infantry battalions, four

cavalry squadrons, and one of light artillery), totalled 3,835 men.[32] That number showed how the Cisalpine government—and within it the position of Bianchi D'Adda—had not been given much consideration. The Cisalpine troops, in fact, were amalgamated with the rest, and the officers were Cisalpine, Piedmontese, Neapolitan, Roman, and even French. More troubling, as Lechi himself pointed out in a letter, its names had been reduced by half with respect to a first version, for the commission had excluded the majority of refugees who either lacked commissions or were furnished with unverifiable documentation.[33] Bianchi D'Adda's repeated observations concerning Lechi's ambiguity on the organization of the Legion, therefore, had been set aside.[34] It was the same with the continuous complaints of Serbelloni, who, with the general arrived in Paris, saw himself passed over and excluded from the decision-making table.[35] The situation, however, was fairly clear by now, as the laconic response from the Cisalpine Directory demonstrated: 'perhaps military victory shall be more useful than diplomacy'.[36]

When the Legion set off on 27 March 1800 for Bourg-en-Bresse, where it would be given its final shape, the Dijon depot—wrote Lechi to his friend Paribelli—was in fact 'athrong with more than a thousand individuals, almost all of them officers'.[37] These men, most of them coming from the National Guards of the fallen sister republics, had been organized by General Teulié into a battalion which, like the Italian Legion (but clearly distinct from it), would form the vanguard of the Army of the Reserve led by General Berthier.

The events that followed the French victory at Marengo in 14 June 1800 are well known. In the middle of May, the Legion had left for Italy and took part in the military operations of the French army. No later than 19 June, just ten days after entering Milan and not even a week after the triumph at Marengo, it ceased—exactly as minister Bianchi D'Adda had predicted—to be in the pay of the French Republic and became the responsibility of the reconstituted Cisalpine Republic. The following August, the prophecy of the Legion's organizer and commander came to pass: On 26 August, General Brune disbanded the Legion as an independent force and turned it into an 'Italian Division', to be combined with the Cisalpine army under the leadership of Giuseppe Lechi.

Thus, the project of an Italian Legion, conceived at the time of the last Directory as a testament to the revolutionary valour of armed commitment, was realized finally through the will of the First Consul after Brumaire, and in a context both comparable and different. In fact, if the exiles were gathered officially into a valid military organization that was able to take its place alongside France's regular armed forces, for many this very result ended up depriving the Italian Legion of any real political significance. Instead, it became evidence of a disinterested Italian commitment to the cause of Bonaparte. In other words, the First Consul, through the profession of arms,

though presenting the Legion officially as an example of patriotism, eliminated its political role and transformed it into a military body within the French power structure. Every premise of the Legion's position as a political intermediary was sacrificed, a situation that essentially sanctioned the burial of that Chambéry government which—as we have seen—still held itself to be the legitimate representative of the Cisalpine population. The Eighteenth Brumaire, however, and even more so the successive consular Constitution, had, in fact, paved the way for its inevitable disappearance. In this way, Bonaparte, breathing life into the patriotic hopes of the exiles, was able to eliminate the last vestiges of Cisalpine executive power and subdue the entire armed organization of Italian activity through a wholly political manoeuvre. It was no accident, moreover, that the organization of the Italian Legion proceeded hand in hand with the removal of the Chambéry government. After Brumaire, this body was never again to be called—as Marescalchi, certainly not by chance, was prompt to point out— the Cisalpine Directory in official documents. It found itself reconfigured, rather, as a simple assembly of private citizens. The definitive proof of this decision would emerge in the summer of 1800. In Milan, newly liberated by the First Consul, the Cisalpine Directory was first disbanded officially. Then, an attempt was made to construct the problem of an armed citizenry as a financial obligation of the new Cisalpine executive. This strategy was extremely clear to Bonaparte, who pursued it determinedly in order to dispense with any Cisalpine political effectiveness. In a single blow, it eliminated the right, represented by the Cisalpine Directory, and the left, through the military enrolment of its main patriotic exponents. It was a scheme, however, that escaped its intended victims.

After summer 1800, in the Milanese atmosphere of enthusiasm over the possibility of political unity for the peninsula, which the ongoing war seemed to announce, the organization of a national army appeared to be a crucial issue. Indeed, only the birth of an autonomous all-Italian army, involving enrolment by compulsory military service, would demonstrate that the new Cisalpine had the political authority to defend its recently acquired independence. These two matters—a national army and compulsory military service—proved essential for those who, from all over Italy, had experienced exile in France in 1799 and come back to participate in the reconstituted republic. Cisalpines, Piedmontese, Romans, Tuscans, and Neapolitans arrived in Milan and swelled the ranks of the Army of Italy, which included many from the Italian Legion. Together, they strove to obtain rank and recognition within the new Cisalpine army.[38] The procedure turned out to be laborious, as the new authorities established that a commission should scrutinize the requests and identify those worthy of being assigned to the new army. There was no lack of resistance from those arguing that only the Cisalpines could be given rank, though the interest of the French to keep (all) exiles dependent on the young republic, along

with pressure from patriotic circles to include all Italians, prompted a large enrolment. It was clear, nevertheless, that the criterion for selection that the commission used was a political one, for the enrolees had to demonstrate a sound revolutionary pedigree.

The new army, therefore, was formed by a large number of officers (certainly far more than necessary) who openly favoured national unity and who did not conceal their intention to support the extension of the Cisalpine to the whole peninsula. Ugo Foscolo, whose intertwined military and political commitments reached their apotheosis towards the end of 1801, provided brilliant testimony to this particular situation on the eve of the Assemblies of Lyons, the councils which, with Bonaparte himself as a president (and Francesco Melzi d'Eril as a vice-president), led to the birth of the Italian Republic. Foscolo publicly addressed the First Consul, suggesting how to procure political and cultural stability and, hence, independence for the Cisalpine. In his *Orazione a Bonaparte*, the soldier–poet recalled how the 1799 failure could be ascribed to specific reasons related to the first Cisalpine's lack of independence. He pointed out, furthermore, that it shared the same constitution as France, did not provide for compulsory military service, and was enfeebled by an incompetent and extremely corrupt ruling class. For this reason, Foscolo advised Bonaparte to support the development of a national political culture that could guarantee the creation of a new ruling class in both civil and military terms.[39]

It was an issue that touched the hearts of many other soldiers. In this regard, it is well worth drawing attention to figures such as Pietro Grisetti from Lombardy and the Neapolitan Giuseppe Rosaroll. The former had taken up a military career after the arrival of Bonaparte. When the Cisalpine collapsed in April 1799, he moved to Genoa along with the French brigades, fought at Novi Ligure (15 August 1799), and then took refuge in Nice. From early 1800, he served in the French army, fighting in Bonaparte's second Italian military campaign, before returning to the Cisalpine in September 1800. Rosaroll, on the other hand, in line with family tradition, had been groomed for a military career since early youth. After taking part in the Bourbon expedition against Rome in 1798 and fighting against the French of General Championnet, he went over to the Neapolitan Republic to combat the *Sanfedisti*. Rosaroll was then deported to France, joined the Transalpine troops and fought at Marengo in the French ranks. He finally entered Milan, where he was enrolled in the Cisalpine army in 1801. Grisetti and Rosaroll both had experienced exile in France before re-entering the peninsula in the ranks of the Army of Italy. And from the summer of 1801 onwards, together with a number of other leading figures among the Italian officers, both men regularly frequented a Milanese armoury, which became a meeting place for those sharing ideas regarding moral and political regeneration. It was in this context that Rosaroll and Grisetti deemed it fundamental to insist on the supremacy of the Italian fencing style, as well as the need for the

reconstituted Republic's newly born army to acquire men and equipment that would distinguish an Italian identity from the overwhelming model of their powerful ally. This effort, which became a concrete reality with the publication of a manual on fencing, was certainly not limited to the military sphere alone.[40] On the contrary, it was an undertaking that demonstrated the importance of arms in contributing to the development of an independent national identity.[41]

Given these premises, it should be no surprise that national sentiment went hand in hand with a pronounced political radicalism in the new Italian army. A good example of this fervour is provided by the recruiting policy of the School of Modena (founded in 1798 on the model of the French *École Polytechnique*), where the Engineering Corps and Artillery officers were trained. The school, which only reopened in July 1801 after the Austrian–Russian invasion, had a student body that hailed mostly from families whose political pasts revealed profoundly democratic profiles.[42] This orientation was demonstrated also by the regular attendance of an armoury that reopened in Milan: Not only did the Italian officers' top figures begin to meet there, but they were joined by all those advocating moral and political regeneration.[43]

Such opinions, which made the Italian army to all intents a political body, were suppressed in 1803 as anti-French and anti-Napoleonic murmurings grew ever more widespread. The turning point was the scandal caused by the publication of some lines written by Giulio Ceroni, a young Veronese officer, and distributed to popular acclaim to well-known patriots. Vice-president Melzi, forced to yield to French pressure, initiated a purge that began in the ranks of the army and expanded to encompass the civil service. An alarming account was sent to the First Consul by the French Army's General-in-Chief Gioacchino Murat in March 1803. It described a deeply troubled peninsula, where a 'permanent conspiracy' was underway, involving public functionaries and high-ranking military officers calling for independence and British support. Bonaparte's response was not long in coming. With a dispatch that brooked no argument (11 March 1803), the president of the Italian Republic condemned the conduct of Vice-president Melzi and the Italian authorities and, in a letter addressed to the State Council, ordered the arrest of Giulio Ceroni and his accomplices, who included his friends Leopoldo Cicognara (the pamphlet's dedicatee) and Pietro Teulié, as well as the prefect Pio Eusebio Magenta. Soon afterwards (11 April 1803), the Council, acting as a court of justice, sentenced Ceroni to three years in prison and to expulsion from the army. Cicognara and General Teulié were removed from their positions as state councillor and minister of war respectively and placed under house arrest outside Milan. Prefect Magenta, however, was acquitted. Things did not end there: The change in political climate that followed the Ceroni case and Bonaparte's furious reaction triggered a whole chain of events.[44] Melzi took advantage of the situation to move most of the democratically

inclined Southern patriots away from Milan, having already tried—without much success—to cut them loose through the Citizenship Act promulgated in July 1802.[45]

The criteria adopted for cadet recruitment to the Military School of Modena once again suggests the shifting political winds described above. While it was true that admission to this institute was based on meritocratic values, with candidates required to pass an entrance examination, it was equally true that admission requests were screened by the Ministry of War. As in the past, these requests often were accompanied by letters of introduction compiled by prefects, which included fairly explicit comments regarding the applicants' families. It is, therefore, no coincidence that, starting in 1804, the list of those admitted—a fact which applied to the political–administrative arena as well as the military[46]—tended mainly to include the sons of 'notables'.[47]

It was a policy that Bonaparte did not support—he preferred to make peace between factions rather than drive them further apart—and it proved to be short-lived, ending as the politics of conciliation were established more firmly. As indicated before, in the aftermath of Marengo, Bonaparte, summoned to reorganize the Cisalpine region, worked carefully to ensure that everybody would have faith in his figure, even those from right and left who had been in conflict previously with one another. His return at the head of his army was designed to show the way forward to a new era, where factions would come together in the name of the collective interest. During the transition from the Italian Republic to the Kingdom of Italy, this tendency became increasingly dominant. It was certainly no coincidence that, just a few short months after the new regime was in place, those who had suffered under the repressive measures following the Ceroni scandal returned to public life and were reinstated to their ranks and offices.[48]

This policy of *ralliement* has to be understood against the complexity of the ever-changing political background, where, most significantly, the threat of war was once again in the air. After the Treaty of Amiens was broken definitively in 1803, the possibility of conflict revived: Rather than being eliminated from the political scene, the most radical and patriotic groups, in fact, found their own arguments reinforced. It has been stressed that the Italian political and military elite's support for Bonapartism during the years of Empire constituted both a secure bulwark against the danger of a return to the past and also a guarantee that the arrival of better times would place the national question on the agenda again.[49] The new era that began involved most political and military personnel considering the problem with a marked gradualism; but not all aspirations to nationhood and independence were abandoned. One significant sign in this regard seems to lie in the destiny that befell the officers of the Italian Napoleonic army when the Austrian authorities, between 1814 and 1817, worked on the organization of a new army in Italy. Out of the (about 700) officers declared fit for

admission to Austrian service, two-thirds were accepted into the ranks of the new army; the rest were excluded. Some refused to take the oath; others paid the price for not being from the Lombardy or Veneto regions; the majority asked explicitly to resign.[50] Though far from exhaustive, this is certainly a representative sample of a generation of men's reaction to the Napoleonic era—a generation that played a large part in forging the significant features of Italy's national identity during the Restoration period.

Notes

1. Translated from the Italian by Stuart Wilson.
2. For a reconstruction of the climate that led to the constitution of the Italian Legion, see Anna Maria Rao, *Esuli: L'immigrazione politica italiana in Francia (1792–1802)* (Naples, 1992), 208–223, 264–275, 326–336; Bernard Gainot: 'Aspects particuliers des relations militaires entre la France et la Péninsule italienne, 1796–1814', *Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes en Histoire de la Défense (Troisièmes rencontres franco-italiennes d'Histoire militaire)* 2 (2006): 33–44; Idem, 'Vers une alternative à la Grande Nation: Le projet d'une confédération des Etats-Nations en 1799', in *Républiques-sœurs: le Directoire et la Révolution atlantique,* ed. Pierre Serna (Rennes, 2009), 75–86.
3. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, 'Amor di patria. Lechi Generale di Brigata Comandante le Truppe Italiche. Agli Italiani' Proclamation of General Lechi, from the headquarters of Genoa, 19 Brumaire Year VIII [10 November 1799].
4. Rao, *Esuli*, 162–163. According to several notes compiled by the director Marescalchi, most probably drafted at the start of 1800, there were 301 Cisalpine refugees, distributed in this way: 159 in Grenoble, 36 in Chambéry, 32 in Nice, 25 in Marseille, and 53 in Paris. The 200,000 francs—as later confirmed in 'Conto generale del cittadino direttore Marescalchi quale depositario delli 50.000 franchi pagatili dal Commissario pagatore del Dipartimento del Mont Blanc che fanno parte delli 200.000 franchi assegnati ai Cisalpini rifugiati in Francia dalla legge 28 pratile anno 7 repubblicano [16 June 1799]'—were divided in the following way: 50,000 to representatives, directors, and staff (81, according to the director's notes) and 150,000 to all the other Cisalpine refugees. ASMi, Marescalchi, b. 48, 22 Pluviôse Year VIII [11 February 1800].
5. For the decrees of 28 Prairial Year VII [16 June 1799] and 28 Thermidor Year VII [15 August 1800] directed respectively at the Cisalpine and other Italian citizens who had taken refuge in France, see Rao, *Esuli*, 162–165.
6. SHD, B³ 63, Armée d'Italie, Correspondance 1799.
7. SHD, B³ 63, Armée d'Italie, Correspondance 1799. With regard to the depot at Nice and its organization, see also the report on the condition of the Cisalpine troops that the Minister of War Bianchi D'Adda drafted, at the explicit request of ambassador Serbelloni, a few weeks after the implementation of the law of 22 Fructidor Year VII [8 September 1799], which established an Italian Legion. Apart from the soldiers directly engaged in the ranks of the Army of Italy, and therefore subject to the orders of the general in chief of this army, the minister noted that 'other soldiers, who for various reasons have remained isolated, have taken refuge in France, and every time some of these present themselves to me, or become known to me, I order them either to rejoin their respective corps or to go to Nice where the General in Chief has ordered the organisation of some provisional

battalions. These men', the minister continued, 'in my opinion deserve to be treated in the same way as the soldiers of the army; given that as soon as they form part of an organised battalion or company, they are considered as actively attached to that same army.' ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Bianchi D'Adda to the Cisalpine Directory, Chambéry, 4 Brumaire Year VIII [26 October 1799].

8. Quoted in Rao, *Esuli*, 219.

9. In relation to this, see again Rao, *Esuli*, 220–223.

10. ASMi, Testi, b. 311, Bossi to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, 2 Vendémiaire Year VIII [24 September 1799].

11. According to what was established by article 15 of the law, it should have consisted of four infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, and a company of light artillery. See SHD, XL22, *Article 15 de la loi du 22 fructidor portant création de la Légion Italique*.

12. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Bianchi D'Adda to the Cisalpine Directory, Chambéry, 29 Vendémiaire Year VIII [21 October 1799].

13. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Bianchi D'Adda to the Cisalpine Directory, Chambéry, 7 Brumaire Year VIII [29 October 1799].

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Serbelloni to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, 8 Brumaire Year VIII [30 October 1799].

17. ASMi, Testi, b. 318, Serbelloni to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, 4 Brumaire Year VIII [26 October 1799].

18. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Serbelloni to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, 7 Brumaire Year VIII [29 October 1799].

19. ASMi, Testi, b. 318, Chambéry, Bianchi D'Adda to the Cisalpine Directory, Chambéry, 14 Frimaire Year VIII [5 December 1799]. Such ideas were in fact fairly widespread and shared throughout the Cisalpine circles, as is shown by a heartbroken letter that the exile Compagnoni wrote from Paris to his friend Marescalchi; see Carlo Zaghi, *Il Direttorio francese e la Repubblica cisalpina* 2 vols (Rome, 1982), vol. 2, 441–442.

20. See, for example, ASMi, Testi, b. 318, Serbelloni to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, 14 Brumaire Year VIII [5 November 1799], and Paris, 3 Nivôse Year VIII [24 December 1799], 7 Nivôse Year VIII [28 December 1799].

21. In relation to this, see BCA, Fondo Pia e Carlo Zaghi, B., b. 12, Serbelloni to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, 28 Vendémiaire Year VIII [20 October 1799], and also the communication of the same again to the Cisalpine Directory of 16 Brumaire Year VIII [7 November 1799].

22. The reference here is to the proclamation that the Cisalpine Republic's Director Vertemate Franchi sent to Bonaparte on 23 Vendémiaire Year VIII [15 October 1799], ASMi, Testi, b. 318.

23. In this regard, there is an emblematic note made by the director Marescalchi in his *Giornale*: '29 Frimaire, Year VIII [20 December 1800]. The New Constitution arrived yesterday. The discontent of my colleagues has no limits. Vertemate flung himself into a torrent of sarcasm to vent his rage. Sopransi read and reread the Constitution that was presented.' BCA, Fondo Pia e Carlo Zaghi, B, b. 13

24. For this and the preceding quote, see BCA, Fondo Pia e Carlo Zaghi, B, b. 13: Marescalchi to Tassoni, Chambéry, 29 Nivôse Year VIII [19 January 1800].

25. See *Le Publiciste*, 23 Nivôse Year VIII [13 January 1800], quoted in Rao, *Esuli*, 327–328.

26. SHD, Vincennes, B³ 67, 'Lechi Général de Brigade Commandant la Légion Italique au Ministre de la Guerre', Paris, 6 Pluviôse Year VIII [26 January 1800]; a note which confirms another note made by the French authorities some days before. See SHD, Vincennes, XL22, 'Etat de situation des Troupes Italiques qui se trouvent en France', Paris, 28 Frimaire Year VIII [19 December 1799].

27. According to a note made by General Lechi at the end of January, this involved about 5,000 men: more than 3,500 Cisalpines, 420 Romans, 700 Neapolitans, and 260 Tuscans, scattered between Toulon, Nice, Grenoble, Poitiers, and Marseille. See SHD, XL24, 'Refugiens italiens, toscans, cisalpins, romains, napolitains an VIII'; and ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Chambéry, 23 Ventôse Year VIII [14 March 1800].

28. SHD, XL22, 'Demandes soumises à la sanction du Ministre de la Guerre par le general Lechi, comnandant la Legion Italique', Paris, 19 Pluviôse Year VIII [8 February 1800].

29. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Pietro Teulié to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, General Headquarters, 30 Pluviôse Year VIII [19 February 1800].

30. ASMi, Ministero della guerra, b. 385, Lechi to Citizen Trombetta, Brigade General, Dijon, 21 Ventôse Year VIII [12 March 1800].

31. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Lechi, Brigade General, commander of the Italian Legion to the Italian soldiers, Dijon, 5 Ventôse Year VIII [24 February 1800].

32. Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes (SHD), XL22, 'Tableau d'organization', 27 March 1800.

33. SHD, XL22, 'Légion Italique. Etat alphabétique des officiers titulaires et attachés d'après l'organisation prov. du 24 ventôse an 8 [15 March 1800]'. See also the letter from General Lechi to Paribelli, sent from the Dijon headquarters on 6 Germinal Year VIII [27 March 1800], published in Benedetto Croce, *La rivoluzione napoletana del 1799: Biografie Racconti Ricerche* (Bari, 1968), 351–352.

34. ASMi, Testi, b. 317, Bianchi D'Adda to the Cisalpine Directory, Chambéry, 23 Pluvôse Year VIII [12 February 1800].

35. ASMi, Testi, b. 319, Serbelloni to the Cisalpine Directory, Paris, 1 Ventôse Year VIII [20 February 1800].

36. ASMi, Testi, b. 319, the Cisalpine Directory to Serbelloni, Chambéry, 9 Ventôse Year VIII [28 February 1800].

37. Letter from Lechi to Paribelli, Dijon, 6 Germinal Year VIII [27 March 1800] quoted in Croce, *La rivoluzione napoletana*, 351–352.

38. On the return to Milan of the Southern exiles, see Renato Soriga, 'Per la storia dei rifugiati meridionali sotto la prima Cisalpina', in *Le società segrete: l'emigrazione politica e i primi moti per l'indipendenza*, ed. Renato Soriga (Modena, 1942), 158–161; on the general climate that characterized Milan in the Year IX, see Antonino De Francesco, *Vincenzo Cuoco: Una vita politica* (Rome, Bari, 1997), 38–57.

39. For the Foscolian text, see Ugo Foscolo, *Orazione a Bonaparte pel Congresso di Lione*, ed. Lauro Rossi (Rome, 2002); for considerations on the political–cultural climate this work refers to, see the introductory essay by Umberto Carpi, 'Il programma nazionale di un intellettuale post-giacobino', in Foscolo, *Orazione*, 9–42, and, again, see De Francesco, *Vincenzo Cuoco*, 38–57 and Idem, 'Costruire una identità nazionale: Politica culturale e attività editoriale nella seconda Cisalpina', in *Universalismo e nazionalità nell'esperienza del giacobinismo italiano*, ed. Luigi Lotti and Rosario Villari (Rome, 2003), 339–354; and Idem, 'Costruire la nazione: Il dibattito politico negli anni della Repubblica', in *La formazione del primo Stato*

italiano e Milano capitale 1802–1814, ed. Adele Robbiati Bianchi (Milan, 2006), 614–616.

40. Pietro Grisetti and Giuseppe Rosaroll Scorza, *La scienza della scherma* (Milan, 1803).

41. See Antonino De Francesco, 'Tirar di scherma nell'Italia napoleonica: Giuseppe Errante, Pietro Grisetti, Giuseppe Rosaroll e la storia della loro amicizia', in *Studi in onore di Cesare Mozzarelli* (Milan, 2010), vol. 2, 1045–1069.

42. See Bruno Giordano, *Gli ufficiali della Scuola militare di Modena (1798–1820): Una ricerca prosopografica* (Soveria Mannelli, 2008), 53–74.

43. See De Francesco, 'Tirar di scherma'.

44. See Stefano Levati (ed.), *L'affaire Ceroni: Ordine militare e cospirazione politica nella Milano di Bonaparte* (Milan, 2005), 14–20; for a reconstruction of the peculiar political climate that spread after the scandal, see in this volume the essay by Umberto Carpi, *Odi slanci e sciolti di Timone Cimbro*, 121–201.

45. See 'Legge relativa al titolo II della Costituzione. Del diritto di Cittadinanza, 27 July 1802', in *Bollettino delle leggi della Repubblica italiana, dalla Costituzione proclamata nei Comizi in Lione al 31 dicembre 1802. Anno I* (Milan, 1802).

46. See, in this regard, Livio Antonielli, *I prefetti dell'Italia napoleonica* (Bologna, 1983).

47. See Giordano, *Gli ufficiali della Scuola di Modena*, 77–86.

48. See *L'affaire Ceroni*.

49. Vincenzo Cuoco's cultural achievement in his *Platone in Italia* bears extraordinary witness to this new phase: see the reprint Vincenzo Cuoco, *Platone in Italia:Traduzione dal greco*, ed. Antonino De Francesco and Annalisa Andreoni (Rome, Bari, 2006). The author began compiling the work in 1804, in particular during those months when strong repressive measures were being taken against the supporters of national unity, and concluded it only two years later, in 1806. For a political–cultural contextualization of this work, see Antonino De Francesco, *Leggere il "Platone in Italia" agli inizi del XXI secolo*, in Cuoco, *Platone in Italia*, xvii–lxxiv.

50. See ASMi, Ministero della guerra. Matricole degli Ufficiali dell'esercito italiano all'epoca 1797–1817, registro 147, 'Manuale degli ufficiali nazionali riconosciuti cittadini', 1814–1821.

8
From Individual to Collective Emancipation: War and the Republic in the Caribbean during the French Revolution[1]

Frédéric Régent

The Caribbean during the French Revolution was the theatre for a series of armed conflicts, in the form of civil wars or confrontations between the colonial powers (Map 2. *The Caribbean in 1789*). For the European-origin population in the French West Indies, who made up no more than 5 to 10 per cent of the total, the temptation was strong to use their own slaves to bolster their military strength, and to promise freedom in return for armed service. As the slave revolt took hold in Saint-Domingue from August 1791, the insurgent slaves came to represent a reserve of manpower for the warring factions, who outbid each other in promises of freedom to attract the rebel slaves to their side.

The role played by the slaves themselves in the first abolition of slavery has been the subject of historiographical debate. Some historians see the slaves as the principal agents in producing the conditions for abolition, and relate the process of slave insurrection to *marronage*—slave flight from the plantations—and to the voodoo cult. This is the position of the 'indigenist' current, epitomized by the Haitian historian Jean Fouchard, which systematically plays down the role of the revolution in metropolitan France as a factor in the revolutionary upheavals in the French colonies. Within this 'indigenist' current, Franklin Midy places the emphasis on the religious origins of the uprising, which he traces to the memory of Makandal, a slave burned alive in 1758 for poisoning and who was credited with semi-magical and religious powers. For Midy, the collective imaginative charge that grew up around this event acted to unite a large number of slaves behind the idea of an independent Afro-Creole nation. For Cyril James and Eugene Genovese, the French Revolution radicalized the longstanding resistance of the slaves, whose Creole acculturation gave them access to revolutionary doctrines from Europe and America, most importantly to

ideas that conferred legitimacy and coherence on their struggle against the slave system.

Other historians see the spread of conflicts, and especially the war between European powers, as the decisive factor behind the first abolition of slavery. David Geggus argues that the impact of the French Revolution on the revolution in Saint-Domingue was political rather than ideological, and affected the free mulattos or *hommes de couleur* more than the slaves. If it opened the way to the slave revolt, this was because it weakened the power of the white and coloured masters, though more through the political struggles than by spreading ideals of liberty. The question needs to be addressed of the role played by the war, or, more precisely, the wars, in the process leading to the liberation of slaves in the French West Indies in the revolutionary era. The spread of civil wars gave rise to a competitive bidding over enfranchisement for slaves prepared to fight on the side of this or that group. The war with the European powers led to the victory of the Republic and the freeing of all slaves. This victory through the force of arms, however, resulted in the '*caporalisation*' of society—authoritarian rule by the military—and ultimately to setbacks for the Republic and the cause of slave liberation.

Civil wars and raised hopes for freedom

The civil war that raged in the French Caribbean colonies during the revolutionary period encompassed conflicts of four kinds. The first was between the French colonists favourable to self-government, a group that dominated the colonial assemblies, and the central authorities represented by the governor in Saint-Domingue. A second conflict was that of patriots versus aristocrats in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Saint-Domingue.[2] The third and fourth conflicts both took place in Saint-Domingue alone, and pitted free coloureds against whites in the first instance and insurgent slaves against their masters in the second. It was in this context that slave freedom was promised in return for armed service—in fact, perpetuating an Old Regime practice.

In September 1790, a civil war broke out between aristocratic planters led by the governor of Martinique, Damas, and patriots of the towns of Saint-Pierre and Fort Royal under the leading merchants. The balance of power appeared to lie in favour of the urban patriots who could count on the support of the regular army, the whites of the National Guard, and the patriots of Guadeloupe commanded by Coquille Dugommier. On the opposing side, the aristocrats allied themselves with the free coloureds (13 of whom had been lynched by patriots in Saint-Pierre on 3 June 1790), and recruited urban slaves led by free coloureds. The aristocrats' forces routed the patriots at Lamentin on 24–25 September 1790. A runaway or maroon slave by the name of Compère Fayence, who styled himself the 'General

of the Negro Army', commanded a militia of 900 slaves and a company of coloured freemen. He took part in the blockade of Saint-Pierre on the side of the aristocrats.[3] This civil war ended in March 1791 and the slave soldiers were disarmed. The main leaders were granted their freedom, while the rest received assurances of good treatment by their masters. In 1793, Fayence fled from Martinique with the royalists, later taking part in their attempt at armed reconquest, before returning with the royalists in the British-backed invasion in 1794.

Similar methods were used by the aristocrats in Guadeloupe. On 17 July 1791, their supporters, at the head of blacks and slaves, marched on the patriot municipality of Basse-Terre. On 1 May 1792, the aristocrats entered Basse-Terre to enforce the suspension of the patriot municipality decreed by the colonial assembly on 26 April. This time the large landowners were 'at the head of their armed work gangs ... a prodigious number of slaves from both town and country'. Dupuch, a patriot, was reported as having affirmed 'that money has been distributed to the Coloured; that freedom has been promised to the slaves'. The aristocratic party successfully seized administrative buildings and forced the patriot municipality to stand down. The latter, too, had recruited slaves, and these took part in the street fighting that broke out between the two factions. The aristocrats triumphed in both Guadeloupe and Martinique, victories they owed to having armed the slaves.

On 24 September 1792, a false report emanating from the English colony of Montserrat claimed that Louis XVI had fully re-established his royal authority with help from the Austrians and Prussians. The aristocrat party in Guadeloupe reacted by burning the tricolour flag and hoisting the white flag. On 16 October, when the colonial assembly of Guadeloupe learned of what had really happened on 10 August, it protested against the suspension of the king's powers, declaring its firm resolve to remain loyal to the monarch. The counterrevolution needed troops to repulse the patriotic national guards dispatched from France. The captains of some counterrevolutionary militia decided to recruit slaves into their companies, but the royalist colonial assembly banned this type of enlistment on 27 November 1792.[4] On 30 November, however, it decreed that 'any coloured man who through legal means can prove that he has fulfilled a military service for eight years shall be declared free as of this day'.[5] Many slaves who enlisted in the militia to obtain their freedom in fact served for considerably longer than eight years. A further measure followed on 1 December 1792 when a volunteer corps was created with the name of the Free Volunteer Battalion of Guadeloupe, made up of free coloured men and of slaves who, though they were candidates for manumission, had not yet served for eight years. The latter were expected to enlist in this battalion in order to make up the shortfall.[6] A battalion had been formed along similar lines during the American War of Independence.

Outnumbered by patriots, the aristocrats in Saint-Domingue also recruited slaves to fight for a particular cause. During the summer of 1791, the free coloureds organized an army under the command of Louis-Jacques Bauvais and André Rigaud, with the aim of obtaining equality with the whites and to which slaves were recruited with the promise of freedom.[7] For free coloureds to recruit slaves to their cause was a new departure, as free coloureds were not entitled even to be officers in the militia. Before long they went further, seeking to poach slaves who were fighting for the whites by granting them freedom, an initiative that led 300 slaves to switch sides. These mercenaries, whose payment was freedom, became known as the 'Swiss'.[8] In early September 1791, free coloureds routed a troop of patriot *Petits Blancs* (lower-class whites) near La Croix-des-Bouquets. This victory owed something to the defection of the whites' slaves, but more important was the military experience that the coloured freemen had acquired in the militia and in the American War of Independence.

On 11 September 1791, the aristocrats from the western part of Saint-Domingue led by Hanus de Jumécourt concluded agreements with the free coloureds at Croix-des-Bouquets. But the question remained of what to do about the 'Swiss' who had risen against their masters, and to whom the free coloureds had promised freedom. In the end, the latter reneged on their promise: some of the 'Swiss' were enrolled in the police force with the promise of freedom after eight years, while the rest were disarmed and then deported to Nicaragua. They were taken back aboard a British ship to Le Cap Français, where 60 of them were executed and the rest died of starvation and neglect.[9]

The civil war continued into 1792, however, essentially as a conflict between the self-styled patriots and the aristocrats. Reacting against the radicalism of the patriots, who had not balked at assassinating Colonel Mauduit, head of the garrison and defender of the central authorities, on 5 March 1791, the aristocrats allied themselves with the free coloureds. The patriots, for their part, were townsmen—merchants, seamen, soldiers, and artisans. In Port-au-Prince, headed by Borel, they recruited urban slaves to fight the aristocrats who were blockading the town, and created a special company of black servants called 'the Africans'. The armed force of the patriots outnumbered that of their aristocrat opponents, and the latter sought to make up for this by joining forces with the free coloureds and by continuing to enlist slaves, to whom they promised freedom after eight years of service. The Comte de Jumeaucourt, head of the aristocrats in Saint-Domingue, armed his own slaves, and each owner was required to report for duty with ten armed slaves.

The use of slave soldiers in return for a promise of enfranchisement was an Old Regime practice long used in times of war or as a means of freeing individuals without having to pay an official tax. Initially applied to

small numbers of slaves who were 'good subjects', the practice became more widespread as the conflicts between the parties intensified. Moreover, the belligerents' need for manpower was such that before long they raised the stakes higher still and included recruitment of maroon or runaway slaves.

Incorporating maroon slaves

After recruiting their own slaves and attempting to enrol those of their adversaries, the belligerents did not shrink from recruiting slaves who were not subject to a master, the maroon, or runaway, slaves. One more boundary was being crossed through this expansion of slave enlistment, as maroon slaves were a symbol of the enemy. *Marronage* was punished severely by colonial society—at the third escape the runaway slave was sentenced to death. From a very early point, however, the belligerents were recruiting maroon slaves, men like Fayence, who served the aristocrat party in Martinique from September 1790 to March 1791. He remained loyal to them and was granted his freedom. In 1793, Fayence fled with the royalists from Martinique, took part in their attempt to take back the island by force, and returned with them under British protection in 1794.[10] We can observe the same process of maroon slave enlistment in Saint-Domingue. Beyond forming an alliance with soldiers of the Artois regiment garrisoned at Saint-Domingue, Borel, the patriot leader, responded to the recruitment of slave soldiers by aristocrats and free coloureds by joining forces with the maroon slaves under their commander, Mademoiselle, himself a slave. In March 1792, Borel's army went on the offensive and attacked the headquarters of the free coloureds at Croix-des-Bouquets. His men pillaged the plantations and forced a number of slaves to join their side. Outraged by these actions, some slaves offered their services to the free coloureds. Armed with sabres and sticks, they were led by the slave Hyacinthe, who would later serve the British. These reinforcements added between 10,000 and 15,000 men to the free coloured army. During the battle of Croix-des-Bouquets (31 March 1792), they fought a bloody hand-to-hand combat against Borel's troops, notably the 'Africans' company. In July 1792, the army of the coloured freemen entered Port-au-Prince. To demobilize the slave soldiers, 243 manumissions had to be granted. The remainder were put back to work on the plantations, in part due to Hyacinthe's energetic efforts.[11]

By recruiting maroon and insurgent slaves, the belligerents in these civil wars further upped the stakes in the struggle for freedom. They were prepared to let the outlaw slave legalize the freedom he had acquired completely illegally, provided that he served their armed cause. In their pursuit of victory the actors in the civil wars took the process of liberation a step further—encouraging revolt among their opponents' slaves in order to incorporate them into their own forces.

Encouraging revolt among the enemy's slaves

There are several conflicting theories as to what triggered the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue that started in August 1791. For some historians, like Jacques de Cauna, the partisans of the governor and free coloureds encouraged the slave uprising with the aim of eliminating the patriots. Jeannot, a leader of the slave insurrection, reported that revenge for Ogé, the coloured leader broken on the wheel following the 1790 uprising, was among the insurrection's goals, but that the most important objective was the re-establishment of Louis XVI on his throne. The background to this belief was the rumour circulating in Saint-Domingue that the National Assembly had suspended the king following the flight to Varennes in June 1791. Such a response to Louis XVI's attempt to flee France had been called for by the Cordeliers and some of the Jacobins, that is, by the most revolutionary factions; the National Assembly, however, had not adopted it. The thesis accrediting the free coloureds and aristocrats with arming the slaves is thus entirely plausible. On 25 August 1791, the colonial assembly, composed mainly of autonomist patriot colonists, was due to meet in Le Cap. A number of clues point to a link between this session of the colonial assembly and the meeting of slave leaders, the black slave drivers, on 14 August 1791. Apparently encouraged by the governor's supporters, this meeting prepared the ground for the mass slave revolt and may have included promises of emancipation to the slave leaders. News of the plot leaked out, however, and the insurrection erupted prematurely during the night of 21–22 August 1791, rapidly growing beyond the control of its instigators.

The revolt spread to the northern plain, the most fertile region on the north-western part of the island, where it resulted in the destruction of 200 sugar and 1,200 coffee plantations, the death of 1,000 whites, and the escape of 15,000 slaves. In November 1791, Jean-François and Biassou emerged as the most prominent leaders in the northern insurrection. On 5 December 1791, they decided to negotiate with the colonial authorities. A text signed by them, and by Toussaint Louverture, presented their demands for an unconditional amnesty for all insurgents, the abolition of punishments like the whip and the dungeon, and the freeing of 400 insurgent leaders and officers. At this stage their grievances contained no reference to the general abolition of slavery, but the patriot colonial assembly refused to consider their demands. From this point on the insurgents wore royalist badges when fighting.[12]

From the summer of 1791 onwards, free coloureds in the south went to the plantations belonging to their adversaries and urged the slaves to join their forces by promising them freedom. In some cases, slave soldiers were recruited by force from plantations belonging to whites. The whites riposted by freeing their own slaves and enrolling them as soldiers. At Les Cayes, in the southern part of Saint-Domingue, a local ordinance actually stipulated

that one slave in ten should be recruited to fight against the free coloureds.[13] The first clashes between free coloureds and whites occurred there in May 1792, but the conflict did not last long, since the law granting equal rights to free coloureds and whites had been passed by the Legislative Assembly in France on 28 March 1792 and was ratified by the Colonial Assembly of Saint-Domingue on 27 May 1792. The civil war between whites and free coloureds came to an end, but there remained the task of demobilizing the large numbers of slave soldiers recruited by both sides. Slave chiefs Armand and Martial proposed enfranchisement for several hundred ringleaders, three days of freedom for all slaves, and the abolition of the whip, in return for surrendering. Faced with refusal of the colonial authorities to accept these demands, they did not lead their troops back to their plantations but instead took refuge in the Platons region on the southwestern peninsula, where more insurgents joined them.[14] Governor Blanchelande sent Rigaud at the head of forces comprising whites and free coloureds against the insurgents. But the expedition ended in complete failure on 6 August 1792, leaving the insurgent slaves in control of the Platons. When Armand threatened to attack Les Cayes, the Provincial Assembly of the South offered to grant freedom to 700 of the leading figures. Half of them accepted this offer, but the remainder stayed on in what came to be known as the 'kingdom of the Platons', where they adopted the camp-based life of the maroon communities and carried out numerous raids against the plantations.

On 17 September 1792, the new civil commissioners Sonthonax, Polvérel, and Ailhaud arrived in Saint-Domingue. After giving assurances that they were there to guarantee the rights of free coloureds and to uphold slavery, the commissioners received the backing of the free coloureds. Thus, when news of the establishment of the Republic reached Saint-Domingue, the free coloureds continued to side with the Republic, which undertook to preserve both their newfound equality with whites and the institution of slavery. Most of the free coloureds in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Saint Lucia also rallied to the Republic. The free coloureds who went over to the republican side explained their earlier alliance with the royalists as merely a strategy for obtaining equal rights. The republican successes of 1793 can be explained by the rallying of the free coloureds to the Republic, and to the arming of slaves who received a promise of freedom.

The insurrections of slaves and coloured freemen differed depending on sociopolitical conditions. In the north of Saint-Domingue, the slaves revolted in the name of the king. In early 1792 they formed six groups, three of them under the control of coloured freemen. In the west, the slaves revolted to fight alongside the free coloureds, while at Port-au-Prince maroon slaves took up arms for the patriot *Petits Blancs*. Slaves in the south were armed by whites and by free coloureds. In Martinique, the coloured freemen made common cause with the aristocratic planters against the patriots of the towns. This coalition was formed after the massacre of 13 coloured freemen

and one slave on 3 June 1790 by the patriot *Petits Blancs* of Saint-Pierre in Martinique, incensed that a majority was emerging in favour of granting political rights to free coloureds.[15] In addition to free coloureds, the army of the aristocratic planters included slaves who were promised their freedom, plus maroon slaves like Fayence, who served on their side from September 1790 to March 1791. Fayence stayed loyal to the aristocratic side, in return for which he was freed.[16] There was no insurrection in the other French colonies. The coloured freemen in Guadeloupe limited themselves to making petitions.[17]

During the civil wars, all the actors showed a readiness to recruit slaves with promises of freedom. They surpassed each other in their offers of liberation. From a traditional practice of enlisting for individual emancipation, the belligerents progressed to large-scale recruiting in which the prospect of freedom was used to encourage rebellion among the slaves of their enemies. Those who hesitated to raise the stakes in this way were defeated, but the resulting escalation represented a real danger for slavery as a system. In late 1792, the republicans helped by the coloured freemen were close to crushing the rebel slave armies in the north and south. The latter were saved by France's entry into war against Great Britain and Spain.

The war, republican expansion, and the end of slavery

The decision of France to go to war with Great Britain and Spain in early 1793 pushed troop requirements to new heights, especially since this period also saw an intensification of the conflicts generated by the civil war. In January 1793, the aristocrat planters De Curt, Dubuc, and Clairfontaine proposed an agreement with the British under which Guadeloupe would become a British protectorate. When France declared war on 1 February 1793, Great Britain accepted the proposal of the émigré planters. Guadeloupe was ceded to the British crown on the condition that it reverted to the Bourbons once they were restored and after payment of the costs of occupation.[18] On the strength of this treaty, De Curt, Dubuc, and Clairfontaine urged the planters who had remained in the islands to rise up and do what they could to facilitate future British military operations. A further treaty was concluded between the representatives of the Saint-Domingue settlers and Great Britain on 25 February 1793; absent from this second treaty, however, was any clause providing for Guadaloupe's restitution to France in the event of a Bourbon restoration.[19]

Slave soldiers saved by the internationalization of the war

The end of the civil war between the whites and free coloureds had the effect of weakening the insurgent slave armies. From September to December 1792, the insurgents in the north suffered defeats, losing their stronghold on the

Spanish frontier at Ouanaminthe in early November. Soldiers from France, however, were vulnerable to illnesses, and within two months half of them had died. In January 1793, Laveaux, heading a force composed of whites and free coloureds, defeated Biassou at Milot, and the insurgent slaves of the north sought refuge in the mountains. In February 1793, the republican forces led by Laveaux and Desfourneaux won several further victories and destroyed the insurgent strongholds near Grande-Rivière. Victory over the slave insurrection seemed at hand for Sonthonax. In the south, Polvérel, helped by Rigaud, triumphed over the 'kingdom of the Platons'. Armand and Martial moved out of their camp, leaving behind several hundred women, children, elderly, and sick to be massacred by the republican troops who destroyed the insurgent camp. The success of the expedition against the Platons was linked to the recruitment of several hundred slaves. In the north, too, slave recruits played a central role in putting down the insurrection.[20]

A state of war between French Saint-Domingue and the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo existed well before the official declaration of war in March 1793. The marquis de Hermonas, Spanish military commander of Santo Domingo, sent supplies from the Spanish territory and allowed refugees to cross to the Spanish side of the border. The authorities offered slaves the freedom, and the land, denied to them by the French colonists. In July 1793, Jean-François and Biassou, commanding several thousand insurgent slaves, were made lieutenant generals in the army of the king of Spain. In a separate negotiation, Toussaint Louverture was made a colonel, with 600 men under his command. In total, some 10,000 former slaves entered the service of the Spanish monarch, and Spanish and royalist French officers were assigned to them as advisors.[21] This help from Spain was decisive in preventing the destruction of the insurgent slave army. Jean-François, Biassou, and Toussaint Louverture were able to go back on the offensive, and inflicted defeats on the republican forces.

The Lesser Antilles: The rejection of the recruitment of slaves and the defeat of the Republic

In April 1793, the British occupied Tobago. Encouraged by this success, from April until June 1793, they gave support to the royalist settlers and their armed slaves and the émigrés, in preparation for taking over Martinique.[22] Rochambeau retaliated by recruiting a battalion of light infantry made up of slaves and free coloureds, which included Magloire Pélage, Delgrès, and Louis Bellegarde, the latter even becoming battalion leader. On 2 May, the Jacobins of Martinique adopted a motion to allow the arming of slaves in order to stop the royalists. Two slave battalions were raised of 800 men each. By April 1793, the royalists controlled the whole of the eastern part of Martinique. On 11 May, Bellegarde captured Fort Lamentin, and on 9 June, Rochambeau captured Le Gros Morne. On 15 June, the British landed to

give support to the royalists, but the hastily executed offensive failed, and on 21 June both British and royalists left the island. It was, in fact, a slave battalion commanded by the free coloured Bellegarde that repelled the attack by British and royalist forces led by Gimat and regained possession of Fort Lamentin. The Anglo-royalists also had slaves, men like Fayence, fighting on their side.

On 29 June 1793, Rochambeau ordered that the slave recruits be disarmed and sent back to their plantations. Despite this order, however, the mulatto Bellegarde continued to recruit. To ensure their food supplies, some of the infantrymen kept gardens on their home plantation, which was a source of indiscipline. On 25 October, Rochambeau accepted the emancipation of 1344 soldiers. The Representative Assembly of Martinique elected on 17 September made manumission easier by abolishing the tax on enfranchisement; within a few months 600 had been registered.[23] On 10 October 1793, the revolutionary assembly that administered Guadeloupe facilitated the enfranchisement procedure; recruits to the militia, which was now the National Guard, were also covered by the decree—the result was to transform large numbers of *de facto* freemen into *de jure* freemen.

Rochambeau announced on 22 November 1793 that the slave soldiers would in future be paid like troops of the line, and he granted several hundred of them their freedom. Bellegarde and his men backed the request for three days for working on gardens, but Rochambeau and the colonial assembly of Martinique refused. Rochambeau was, in fact, becoming increasingly suspicious of Bellegarde and the slave soldiers. He refused to sanction a large expansion in recruitment during the British offensive of February 1794.

The question of arming slaves also arose in Guadeloupe. Around this time the new governor Collot reported having at his disposal only 144 men of the Guadeloupe regiment and 27 of the Forez battalion.[24] A force totalling 1,200 men in 1789 had been sharply reduced through death, desertion, banishment of patriot soldiers, and emigration of royalists. The National Guard appears to have been in a scarcely better state. To defend the colony, the governor proposed on 10 April 1793 the formation of four remunerated battalions.[25] Collot recommended an extensive use of coloured citizens in the armed force. The extraordinary general commission, however, the assembly with regulatory power in Guadeloupe, agreed to create only one battalion.

Volunteers for the National Guard were recruited among whites, the new citizens, but also among slaves. Citizen Jean Louis Taillandier from Vieux-Habitants, wishing to reward a 23-year-old mulatto called Charles and 'wanting to demonstrate his patriotism and provide the Republic with a subject who could be useful to it at this time of crisis', authorized him to enlist in the National Guard.[26] Thus, continued the procedure of slave enfranchisement though militia membership that had gone on under the Old Regime. An incorporated slave did not become a citizen immediately,

however: 'Coloureds who must serve the fatherland for a period of time that has been reduced to eight years, provisionally enjoy civil rights, but have not yet acquired the political rights attached to liberty, to obtain which they are performing a service that is the finest way to achieve this goal.'[27]

This decision led to the creation of a new class of men—no longer slaves, because they had civil rights, but not yet citizens, because they did not have political rights. These full rights were granted on 18 May 1793 to any slave having served eight years in the militia or the National Guard.[28] The recruitment of slaves remained at low levels, limited to individuals whose *de facto* freedom already allowed them considerable autonomy. On the other hand, it was proposed to use large numbers of slaves for repair and maintenance works on the colony's forts and batteries, and on 5 April 1793 Collot requested 300 men for this purpose.[29] Another decree went further in the use of the slave population for military purposes, stipulating that 50 slaves in each of the 31 parishes, a total of 1,550, were to be made available for the defence of the colony. Though unarmed, they were to be involved closely in military operations.[30] On 1 August 1793, the remaining regular troops of the Guadeloupe regiment were amalgamated with the National Guard and formed into two remunerated companies.[31] In January 1794, faced with the threat from the British, Collot decided to form a second battalion of paid Guards; 500 slaves were to be recruited, in a proportion of one in 10 or 15 adult males, depending on the type of plantation.[32] Although the soldiers were slaves, the officers were all citizens, many of them coloureds. This measure had numerous critics nonetheless, and, of the 500 slaves planned for, only 200 were in fact levied, and of these, according to Collot, most either were not able-bodied or had been ordered by their masters not to fight.[33] The sans-culottes pointed to the example of the revolt in Saint-Domingue to denounce the dangers of this kind of measure. But it did have some keen supporters, notably among the members of the Popular Society of Basse-Terre. Addressing the Society on 5 February 1794, citizen Lacharière-Larery argued that the only way to save the Republic was to arm its slaves: 'Let us create new defenders of liberty', he declared, and proposed that slaves be turned into citizens through armed service:

> It will be said that political liberty cannot be granted to people who have done nothing to get it; perhaps not, but one can show them what is expected and help them to achieve it. That he who can show three wounds be free with immediate effect, that he who has shot down three enemies be free, that he who has saved the life of a citizen become a citizen himself on the spot; finally, the reward for all such types of actions and virtues will give you the means to awaken honour in the souls of these new men, and to prepare them to be admitted into the great class of free men . . . To make war effectively, one needs two things, men and money, and men we can certainly make.[34]

When the British attacked on 11 April 1794, the colony of Guadeloupe had no army capable of resisting, and the surrender was signed on 20 April. Martinique had surrendered the previous month in similar circumstances. Rochambeau's distrust of Bellegarde's slave soldiers had led to the colony's downfall. The Lesser Antilles and part of Saint-Domingue were lost due to fears about arming large numbers of slaves. Yet, in May 1793, the British had been driven out of Martinique by coloured citizens and armed slaves, who were then immediately set free by Joseph Leborgne, Rochambeau's second in command, who was sent back to France in late 1793. Would the arming of slaves have allowed France to hold on to the Lesser Antilles colonies? For Leborgne the answer was yes. In a pamphlet entitled *Enfin la vérité sur les colonies*, published in October 1794, he explained that, if the English had been victorious the second time, it was because of the refusal to use the blacks, and because of the rumour put about that the Convention had come down in favour of maintaining slavery. He added: 'I declare that had I been there in 1794, the English would have found nothing but ashes and free men.'[35]

The proclamation of abolition and the expansion of the Republic in the Caribbean

The republican regime was seriously threatened by the Anglo-royalists and the Spanish, who continued to use slave soldiers. Among the latter was Jean Kina, a slave soldier in the service of the southern whites in 1792. In June 1793, a new conflict was added to the existing ones when a new governor, Galbaud, arrived at Le Cap. Originating from Saint-Domingue, he was a plantation owner and presented himself as a defender of the colonies. Galbaud was hostile to the commissioners Sonthonax and Polvérel, and when his supporters took control of Le Cap on 20 June 1793 it was a black African-born officer, Jean-Baptiste Belley, who saved the two commissioners. On the following day, 21 June 1793, the latter proclaimed the enfranchisement of all slaves fighting for the Republic and granted them full rights as French citizens.[36] This first large-scale emancipation involved 10,000 slaves, from whom 1,000 were recruited and enlisted into a battalion with the title 'Guard of the Agents of the National Convention'. Enfranchisement now came before entry into military service. Pierrot, at the head of several thousand insurgent slaves, rallied to the Republic. Strengthened by this support, Sonthonax and Polvérel regained control of the town of Le Cap, which had been torched during the troubles. The episode of Galbaud's *coup de force* marked a sharp increase in the number of insurgent slaves rallying to the Republic.

In Saint-Domingue, the commissioners called on the other insurgent slaves to follow Pierrot's example. They accused Biassou and Jean-François of trading in slaves, but offered them the chance to rally to the Republic. The

two chiefs refused, claiming to be in the service of three kings, those of Spain, France, and the Congo. In July 1793, Jean-François and Biassou launched a new series of attacks in the northern plain. Sonthonax tried to win further support for the Republic, but, in granting freedom to his combatants, he was offering no more than the Spanish, who did the same. This is why, on 11 July 1793, Sonthonax decided to emancipate also the families of the Republic's soldiers. Polvérel extended this measure in the west and the south, and with Rigaud's approval he invited the survivors of the 'kingdom of the Platons' to rally to the Republic on 25 July. This time, many accepted, and Armand and Martial were made captains.[37] Sonthonax finally proclaimed the abolition of slavery in the northern province of Saint-Domingue on 29 August 1793, and Polvérel did the same two days later for the western and southern provinces. The abolition of slavery enabled the commissioners to raise new recruits, but it precipitated the defection of many whites, who gave a warm welcome to the British when they landed at Jérémie (southern province) and at Môle Saint-Nicolas (northern province) at the end of September 1793. The western ports, Saint-Marc and Arcahaye, also gave themselves up to the British, with the approval of the free coloureds who rejected the abolition of slavery.

Despite the abolition of slavery, by April 1794 the situation of the Republic was bordering on desperation. All the Windward Islands and a large part of Saint-Domingue were occupied by British and Spanish forces. The plantation owners, white and coloured alike, welcomed the foreign occupiers as liberators. Moreover, they had the support of the army of insurgent slaves led by Biassou, Jean-François, and Toussaint Louverture. The British employed 15,000 slave soldiers belonging to the royalist settlers. Faced with this powerful coalition, the republicans could still count on small numbers of regular troops, some free coloureds under Rigaud and Villatte, and a few bands of insurgent former slaves who had come over to the Republic. Most importantly, on their side they had the official decree of 4 February 1794 abolishing slavery in all French colonies.

The British and Spanish occupations of Saint-Domingue opened the way for the return of large numbers of émigré settlers who wanted to go back to the former social order based on the plantations. This situation was a source of tensions between the black insurgents and the Spanish, and, when the latter brought back the whip, the slaves in the north and the free coloureds left the Anglo-Spanish side. After serving Jean-François, Toussaint Louverture became the independent leader of a large force of insurgents. He did not rally to the Republic as soon as the commissioners proclaimed an end to slavery, however, for in his view the Republic was on the verge of defeat by the European coalition. Furthermore, Toussaint enjoyed considerable autonomy under Spanish authority, with an influence that extended over the entire northwest of Saint-Domingue from the Spanish border to the port of Gonaïves. From March 1794 onwards, Toussaint Louverture was in open conflict with his superior Biassou and was increasingly suspected of

dealings with the republicans. His *volte-face* was facilitated when the Convention ratified the abolition of slavery. On 5 May 1794, Laveaux invited Toussaint to join the republican side, an offer he accepted on 18 May. He had a force of 4,000 soldiers and as seconds-in-command the black '*libre avant le décret*' (the contemporary term for those 'free before the decree' of abolition) Henri Christophe, and Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Moïse. Within a few days, Toussaint had raised the tricolour flag at Gonaïves and taken control over a large part of the northern province. The British took Port-au-Prince on 1 June 1794, and in July Sonthonax and Polvérel were recalled to France, leaving the reins of power with General Laveaux. From October to December 1794, Rigaud liberated the southern province from the British occupation, and in December, Toussaint Louverture's commanders retook the Grande-Rivière region.[38]

A military expedition led by Victor Hugues was sent with the task of abolishing slavery in the Lesser Antilles islands of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Saint Lucia, currently occupied by the British. On 7 June 1794, he proclaimed the abolition of slavery in Guadeloupe, and by December had reconquered the island by incorporating large numbers of former slaves into the army. The Guadeloupe army then went on to take Saint Lucia, Grenada, Saint Martin, Saint-Eustache, and Saint Vincent in 1795, though an expedition the same year to reconquer Martinique was unsuccessful. In total, by the end of 1795, recruitment had raised the number under arms to 11,000 men divided between eight islands: Guadeloupe, Marie-Galante, Désirade, Saint-Eustache, Saint Martin, Grenade, Saint Vincent, and Saint Lucia.[39] This figure represented a substantial increase, given that Victor Hugues had arrived with only 1,000 sans-culottes in June 1794.

The signature of the Treaty of Basel in 1795 with Spain put an end to action by the armies of Jean-François and Biassou. For a time Biassou considered working for the British, but decided against this because he would have been under the orders of white generals. He went into exile in Florida, and Jean-François went to Spain. The abolition decree, together with the skill of the French envoys (Sonthonax, Laveaux, and Hugues), had created the conditions for a massive recruitment of former slaves to drive out the British. The expansion of the republican armies—made up principally of freed slaves—in the Caribbean reached its peak in 1795. The arming of the slaves was a key factor in keeping the colonies for the Republic and in guaranteeing freedom. Indeed, when reviewing his troops Toussaint Louverture would often grab a rifle and shout 'Here is our freedom!'[40]

Military control of society, setbacks for the Republic and for abolition

French revolutionary expansion in the Lesser Antilles came to a halt in 1795. In 1796, the British regained possession of Grenada, Saint Vincent, and Saint

Lucia, where they restored slavery. They too resorted to large-scale recruitment of slave soldiers, raising eight regiments of blacks, into which were enrolled the Africans,[41] and in 1801 they occupied Saint Martin and Saint-Eustace. These French failures were both political and military in origin. Regarding the latter, the French did not have command of the seas, and head winds made difficult the sending of reinforcements from Guadeloupe to the southern islands. Moreover, these islands were sparsely populated and offered limited scope for the recruitment of black soldiers. As regards the political reasons, the argument of abolition and of liberty in general was not used to the same advantage or with the same energy and conviction as it was in Guadeloupe.[42]

During the civil war, the slaves in Saint-Domingue, who had not taken part in the fighting, enlarged their gardens by taking over land left vacant by colonists who had emigrated. In February 1794, Polvérel intimated that land remained the property of the former masters. For his part, Toussaint Louverture took strenuous measures to force former slaves who were not in the army to return to work. In 1795–1796, a number of cultivators revolted, claiming that Toussaint Louverture wanted to re-establish slavery. Toussaint put down these revolts using his well-disciplined forces of former slaves.[43] For Toussaint, a prosperous agriculture was the only basis upon which to consolidate the freedom of the blacks. In Guadeloupe from 1794 to 1798, Victor Hugues forced former slaves to continue working for their former masters, or for the Republic in the cases where confiscations of property had been accompanied by a promise of remuneration for the labour. Slavery was abolished, but the former master still owned the work time of his former slaves. In protest against this state of affairs, two revolts by cultivators in Guadeloupe were organized, but were put down by the black army in 1797. Hugues, moreover, refused to apply the constitution of 1795. When the Republic's military expansion halted, the recruitment of new citizens to the army ceased. Indeed, the tendency now was demobilization, notably of the men working on the privateers in Guadeloupe in 1799.

Little by little, the military tightened its control over society. In Saint-Domingue, Toussaint Louverture sent the Directory's civil agent, Hédouville, back to France in 1798. The military in Guadeloupe sent back a succession of civil agents: Desfourneaux in 1799, Laveaux in 1800, and Lacrosse in 1801. In 1801, the black officer Magloire Pélage became president of the provisional governing council of Guadeloupe. The fullest freedom was restricted to former slaves engaged in the army, those freed before abolition, and the bands of maroon slaves described by contemporaries as vagabonds or strays ('*divagants*').

With his victory over André Rigaud following a bloody civil war, Toussaint Louverture controlled the south of Saint-Domingue by 1799–1800. At this stage his concern was no longer with liberation of the people but with possession of the territory. In particular, he wished to occupy Santo Domingo

with its 125,000 inhabitants made up of 50,000 whites, 60,000 free coloureds, and 15,000 slaves. Control over the Spanish part of the island was an insurance against any attempt to restore French authority. In addition, the Spanish sector contributed to the food supplies, notably livestock, for the French sector. Santo Domingo had been nominally French since the Treaty of Basel in 1795. But, although it was governed officially by a French resident, the Spanish administration remained in place. Toussaint Louverture entered Santo Domingo on 26 January 1801, having assured the Spanish authorities before the start of his offensive that property would be respected. Furthermore, he stated that general emancipation only applied in the French part of the island, and decided not to abolish slavery in the Spanish sector.

By the end of 1801, therefore, Saint-Domingue and Guadeloupe were under the control of armies composed mainly of former slaves and officered by men 'freed before the decree'. As clashes between the Republican armies and the British gradually became less frequent, so recruitment declined. The cultivators were subject to increasingly authoritarian military control. Toussaint Louverture's army was used to repress the cultivators' revolts as well as the troubles caused by armed bands of Africans living in the mountains. As peace gradually returned, so the possibilities for freedom of movement and employment for the new citizens decreased.

A further step towards the curtailment of liberties and the military takeover of society had, in fact, been taken on 8 July 1801, when Toussaint Louverture proclaimed the autonomous constitution of Saint-Domingue. Under this document he was appointed for life as the first governor, with the option of choosing his immediate successor. The governor also appointed all civilian and military personnel.[44] The constitution restated the earlier regulations for agriculture by institutionalizing an authoritarian agrarian policy or '*caporalisme agraire*' and assigning the cultivators to their former plantations. Article 17 left open the way for 'bringing in cultivators indispensable for the re-establishment and expansion of agriculture', a provision that Victor Schoelcher was to see as re-establishing the slave trade.[45] The autonomous constitution of Saint-Domingue institutionalized the authoritarian organization of society under military control.

The peace of Amiens and the challenge to abolition

Peace gradually returned to the Caribbean. A peace agreement was signed with Spain in 1795, and in 1798 Toussaint Louverture signed an armistice with the British. Finally, the preliminaries of peace were ratified between France and Great Britain on 1 October 1801. The signature of the preliminary agreements led to a modification in Bonaparte's policy towards the coloured leaders of the French colonies. With the British naval blockade lifted, two expeditions were dispatched to put down the coloured officers who had seized power in 1801. The British and French cooperated in this

venture.[46] The British feared a new upsurge of support for revolution and slave freedom in the Windward Islands. They did, in fact, have to put down an insurrection in Dominica led by the Fourth West Indian Regiment, a black regiment at the Fort of the Grande Anse known as Prince Rupert's Bay (10–13 April 1802).[47] The soldiers who mutinied were all black.[48]

General Leclerc sailed from Brest on 14 December 1801 at the head of 22,000 soldiers and with instructions to disband Toussaint Louverture's colonial army. In 1802–1803, a further 55,000 soldiers were sent as reinforcements. Rigaud and Pétion, who had been beaten in the southern war, were officers in the expeditionary corps. Against them, Toussaint Louverture, whose chief of staff was the white general Agé, disposed of 20,650 soldiers. In the north, Christophe, seconded by Vernet and Maurepas, was at the head of 4,800 soldiers. To the west and south, 11,650 men were under Dessalines, seconded by Charles Bélair and Laplume. Finally, 4,200 soldiers were stationed in Santo Domingo under the command of the coloured officer Augustin Clerveaux, who had Paul Louverture, Toussaint's brother, as his second in command. Of these troops, 700 to 800 were whites, while the rest of the army comprised mulattos and blacks,[49] added to which were 10,000 militia men and armed cultivators. There were also bands of armed Africans, over which Toussaint Louverture had no control. Toussaint still had most of the 60,000 rifles that the civil commissioners had brought in May 1796, and he had purchased a further 30,000 from the United States.[50] On top of this, there were the 60,000 rifles the British had deliberately left behind when they evacuated the island in 1798.[51]

The French landed at Le Cap on 4 February 1802. One after the other, Toussaint Louverture's field commanders surrendered to Leclerc: the generals Pierre Agé, a white and commander of Port-au-Prince, Dieudonné Jambon, a black in command at Jacmel, and Laplume, a former slave in charge in the south. So too did Paul Louverture, commander of Santo Domingo, tricked by Leclerc into thinking that his brother had asked him to give himself up. The troops who ended up under Leclerc's command—with a promise from him that they would keep their rank and position in the army—were used against Toussaint Louverture.

Toussaint Louverture made two mistakes. First, he based his system of defence entirely on the military and refused a wholesale arming of cultivators. Furthermore, especially proud of his army trained in European methods, he made it use these measures against Leclerc's expeditionary force, which had numerical superiority following the defection of Toussaint's commanders. Toussaint was, in fact, left to fight with only a quarter of his former army. The pitched battles and sieges, like that of Crête-à-Pierrot, went against Toussaint, and, despite fighting heroically, he was forced to surrender on 6 May 1802. A month later, he was deported to France.

In Guadeloupe, two-thirds of the coloured army surrendered on 6 May 1802. Important in producing this outcome was the fact that all the coloured

officers who rallied to Leclerc kept their commissions. The coloured offi-
cers who took power in Guadeloupe did not opt to create a mass army
of cultivators. On the contrary, they had put down the movements of
cultivators in favour of greater liberty. Roughly one-third of the coloured
forces in Guadeloupe held out, resistance that was a response to insensi-
tive behaviour from some of Richepance's troops. Delgrès failed to bring
about a general rising of the cultivators, who distrusted the soldiers, not least
because there were some 600 coloureds among the forces fighting against the
thousand men under Delgrès. Using the methods of European warfare and
outnumbered by three or four to one, he was defeated on 28 May 1802.

In rallying to Leclerc and Richepance, the coloured soldiers were acting
on their assessment of the relative strength of each side and their conclu-
sion that the expeditionary corps was the stronger. The coloured soldiers
believed they could keep their individual freedom and their arms. It can
also be said that, since the beginning of the Revolution, these soldiers had
become used to switching sides. They looked on the conflict as a new civil
war between generals, and few of them saw it as a threat to the abolition of
slavery.

In Saint-Domingue, the bands of armed Africans refused to lay down
their arms. Led by Sans-Souci, Noël Prieur, Macaya and Sylla, and Lamour
Derance, they waged a guerrilla war against Leclerc's army, which was allied
with the colonial army of Dessalines and Christophe.[52] Leclerc used the
colonial army to attempt to disarm the African bands, with Dessalines and
Christophe leading the campaign, which featured intensely violent combats
between Creole blacks and Africans. Leclerc wrote: 'Dessalines is currently
the butcher of the blacks, it is through him that I carry out all the odious
measures.' Some 30,000 rifles were recovered. The presence of coloured
troops in Leclerc's army was the main reason the expedition lasted so long.
The soldiers who went over to Leclerc and Richepance continued to act in
the belief that they could defend their freedom as individuals.

Spread of conflicts, independence for Haiti

Following Toussaint Louverture's deportation in June 1802, and up to the
independence of Haiti on 1 January 1804, Saint-Domingue became the
theatre for multiple conflicts, of which four can be distinguished: first,
between Leclerc's expeditionary corps and the bands of armed Africans;
second, between Dessaline's colonial army and the bands of armed Africans;
third, between Dessaline's force and Leclerc's expeditionary corps; finally,
that of Great Britain against France.

In June 1802, Leclerc and Richepance's expeditions appeared to have been
victorious. The coalition between Leclerc and the creoles (mulattos and
blacks) of Dessalines and Christophe collapsed, however, when the news
reached Saint-Domingue that the coloured army of Guadeloupe had been

deported, including the men who had fought alongside Richepance. The *Cocarde* and the *Cerf*, ships transporting the Guadeloupe coloured soldiers, anchored at Saint-Domingue.[53] Another ship, the *Berceau*, sold deportees from Guadeloupe in Santo Domingo.[54] In October 1802, fears among black or mulattoes officers and men of being disarmed and deported led to a split with Leclerc's expeditionary corps. The black Dessalines and the mulatto Péthion, enemies during the war between Louverture and Rigaud, now became allies. At this stage Leclerc had only 4,000 men fit for combat. Despite Maurepas' loyalty, Leclerc suspected him of betrayal, and he was drowned along with his daughter early in November 1802.[55] This act marked the final rupture between the creole soldiers and the expeditionary corps. Faced with the defection of his coloured soldiers, Leclerc issued a proclamation guaranteeing the freedom of all men freed under the 1793 abolition who would fight on his side against the insurgents. Planters promised legally binding contracts guaranteeing freedom to their former slaves who volunteered to fight in the expeditionary force. Leclerc was still reasoning in terms of granting freedom to individuals.

Leclerc died on 2 November and was succeeded by Rochambeau. The atrocities committed by Rochambeau caused the defection of his most loyal supporters among the coloured officers. The insurgents styled themselves the army of '*indigènes*' and in March 1803 tore out the white section of the tricolour flag. The conflict continued, however, between the creoles of the colonial army and the armed bands of Africans. The black creole Christophe had the African Sans-Souci assassinated, and in reprisal the latter's supporters executed Paul Louverture. The African chiefs Macaya and Lamour Dérance were eliminated. Leaderless, the armed bands of Africans dispersed or were incorporated into Dessalines' army. Dessalines' object in eliminating the African leaders was to avoid a further switching of alliances, and above all to ensure the supremacy of his group. Despite these internal conflicts, the insurrection developed under Dessalines' command. He had no qualms about recruiting white soldiers, among them a number of Poles: Ultimately colour mattered little for Dessalines, whose forces included creoles, Africans, mulattos, and a few whites; what mattered was that his army alone could uphold freedom.

The resumption of the war between France and Great Britain in May 1803 confirmed the failure of the expeditionary force by depriving it of reinforcements and supplies. The British navy blockaded the ports where Rochambeau's soldiers had sought refuge. On 18 November 1803, Rochambeau was defeated by Dessalines at Vertières, near Le Cap. He negotiated the terms of his surrender and was allowed to leave Le Cap with the soldiers and the white population. The upsurge and extension of the war ensured that slavery remained abolished in Saint-Domingue. But the full fruits of liberty were appropriated by the military on the winning side.

Conclusion

The armed conflicts in the French Antilles during the Revolution, both civil wars and wars between the European powers, were fought with ever-larger numbers of coloured (black or mulattoes) soldiers. If using former slaves in the armed forces was not new, recruiting them in massive numbers was an innovation. Military actions now involved tens of thousands of men. The belligerents outbid each other in their efforts to enlist slaves, and the more slaves were freed, the higher the stakes became. The envoys of the French Republic finally outbid everyone with their proposition for the immediate abolition of slavery. The spread of the war made general emancipation possible. The collective liberation of slaves derived from the sum total of individual enfranchisements for service under arms.

By their action, the envoys of the French Republic—Sonthonax, Polvérel, and Victor Hugues—allowed abolition to develop. This movement came to a halt, however, once the civilian agents of the Republic were replaced by the military. The spirit of abolition was subordinated to successful pursuance of the war effort. The growing political weight of the coloured military proved an impediment to full freedom for the other groups in society. The coloured military in power in Saint-Domingue and Guadeloupe refused to envisage a mass arming of the cultivators. Many of the coloured soldiers happily went over to Leclerc and Richepance; they were not reasoning in terms of abolishing the institution of slavery, but were still imbued with the mentality of individual emancipation through armed service. This is what lay behind the bloody fighting between Dessalines' colonial army and the armed bands of Africans.

Not until after the deportation of the coloured army of Guadeloupe, and as Leclerc began to implement his repressive measures, did the coloured military of Saint-Domingue become aware of the potential threat to their position. They resumed the armed struggle, first against Leclerc's troops, then against Rochambeau's. The abolition of slavery was upheld, but it was now placed under the authoritarian control of the victorious army of creoles, blacks, and mulattos. This difference, the gap between collective abolition and individual emancipations, was the background to the difficult construction of the Haitian state and nation.

Notes

1. Translated from the French by Sylvie Kleinman, revised, with additional material, by Godfrey Rogers.
2. The patriots were largely from the urban white populations, such as merchants, lawyers, and skilled artisans. They resented the power of the planters, who were often French aristocrats.

3. Yves Benot, 'Quand les esclaves combattent pour leurs maîtres...', in *Miliciens et soldats d'origine servile XIIIe–XXIe siècles*, ed. Carmen Bernand and Alessandro Stella (Paris, 2006), 191–192.

4. Auguste Lacour, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe*, 5 vols (Basse-Terre, 1857), vol. 2, 115.

5. Musée de Chartres, Fonds Bouge, Register of the Proceedings of the Colonial Assembly, Decree of 30 November 1792.

6. AN (Archives Nationales) DXXV 125, doss. 992, doc. 9. Proceedings of the Committee of the Colonial Assembly, 1 December 1792.

7. Carolyn Fick, *The Making of Haïti* (Knoxville, 1990), 119–120.

8. An allusion to the Swiss mercenary guards who traditionally protected the French royal family.

9. Gérard Barthélemy, 'Les esclaves révoltés à Saint-Domingue: Supplétifs, mercenaires et combattants', in *Miliciens*, 180.

10. Benot, 'Quand les esclaves combattent', 191–192.

11. Ibid. 198.

12. Carolyn Fick, 'La révolution de Saint-Domingue: De l'insurrection du 22 août 1791 à la formation de l'Etat haïtien', in *L'insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue*, ed. Laënec Hurbon (Paris, 2000), 61; and Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World* (Harvard, 2004), 130.

13. Fick, *Haïti*, 133.

14. Dubois, *Avengers*, 66–67, 138.

15. Yves Benot, 'La chaine des insurrections d'esclaves dans les Caraïbes de 1789 à 1791', in *Les abolitions de l'esclavage de L. F. Sonthonax à V. Schœlcher, 1793, 1794, 1848*, ed. Marcel Dorigny (Vincennes, 1995), 183.

16. AN DXXV 124, doss. 981, doc. 2, Address from the Guadeloupe Regiment, 14 January 1791.

17. Frédéric Régent, *Esclavage, métissage, liberté, la Révolution française en Guadeloupe (1789–1802)* (Paris, 2004); and *La France et ses esclaves, de la colonisation aux abolitions (1620–1848)* (Paris, 2007).

18. David Geggus, *Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint-Domingue, 1793–1798* (Oxford, 1982), 83.

19. Ibid. 395–399.

20. Dubois, *Avengers*, 147–151.

21. Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776–1848* (London, 1988), 205.

22. Léo Elisabeth, 'La République dans les Iles du Vent', in *Révolutions aux colonies* (Paris, 1993), 57–58; and Pierre Pluchon, *Histoire Générale des Antilles et de la Guyane* (Toulouse, 1982), 304–305.

23. Elisabeth, 'Les Iles du Vent', 55–60.

24. Georges Henry Victor Collot, *Précis des événemens qui se sont passés à la Guadeloupe* (Philadelphia, 1795), 4.

25. ANOM (Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer) C7A46. fol. 62, letter from Collot to the Minister of the Marine and the Colonies, 10 April 1793, written from Basse-Terre.

26. ADG Gourbeyre, Notariat Dethunnes, Minute 24, 'Abandon fait à la République par le citoyen Taillandier de son mulâtre Charles', 10 May 1793.

27. AN DXXV 123, doss. 973, doc. 108. Proclamation of the law of 4 April 1792 by Lacrosse in Guadeloupe, 29 January 1793, Pointe-à-Pitre.

28. ANOM C7A46, fol. 137, Extract from the register of the proceedings of the extraordinary general commission of 18 May 1793, and decree concerning men

with eight years' service, approved by Collot. This decree was in response to a peti-tion submitted by citizens Antoine, Sicile, Félix (known as Magoti), and Julien, who had served more than eight years in the militia and then the National Guard.

29. ANOM C7A46. f. 78, letter from Governor Collot to the general and extraordinary commission, 5 April 1793, Basse-Terre.

30. ANOM C7A46. f. 103, 'Instructions provisoires du citoyen gouverneur à toutes les municipalités and commandans de la force armée, pour le moment de la guerre seulement', Collot, 1 May 1793, Basse-Terre.

31. ANOM C7A77 fol. 49.

32. ANOM Bibliothèque Moreau de Saint-Méry, 2nd series, volume 31, doc. 6t. Extract from the registers of the proceedings of the provisional administrative organizing Assembly, 20 Ventôse Year II [10 March 1794].

33. Collot, *Précis des événemens*, 23.

34. AN AD VII 21C, n. 45. Extracts from the registers of the Société des Amis de la République française, 17 Pluviôse Year II [5 February 1794].

35. Yves Benot, *La révolution française et la fin des colonies* (Paris, 1989), 175–176.

36. Jeremy Popkin, *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (Cambridge, 2010).

37. Dubois, *Avengers*, 157–161.

38. Ibid. 177–182.

39. AN C7A 48, fol. 39–40, letter from the deputy commissioners to the Committee of Public Safety of Port-de-la-Liberté, 30 Brumaire Year IV [21 November 1795].

40. Pamphile de Lacroix, *La Révolution de Haïti* (1819; repr. Paris, 1995), 357.

41. Roger Norman Buckley, *Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments, 1795–1815* (New Haven, 1979), 76–77.

42. Jacques Adélaïde-Merlande, *La Caraïbe et la Guyane au temps de la Révolution et de l'Empire* (Paris, 1992), 85.

43. Dubois, *Avengers*, 185–190.

44. François Blancpain, *La colonie française de Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 2004), 184.

45. Adélaïde-Merlande, *La Caraïbe et la Guyane*, 138–139.

46. Anne Perotin-Dumon, 'Guerre et Révolution dans les Petites Antilles: Le prix du sucre ou de la liberté', in *La Révolution Française et les colonies*, ed. J. Tarrade (Paris, 1989), 244.

47. AN C7 A57. fol. 112, letter from Lescallier to the minister, 24 Germinal Year X [14 April 1802], Roseau.

48. Buckley, *Slaves in Red Coats*, 76–77.

49. Antoine Henri Jomini, *Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution*, 4 vols (Brussels, 1842), vol. 4.

50. Blancpain, *Saint-Domingue*, 203; and Dubois, *Avengers*, 202.

51. Barthélemy, 'Saint-Domingue', 184.

52. Blancpain, *Saint-Domingue*, 204.

53. ANOM C7A56 fol. 220. Lacrosse to the minister, 11 Frimaire Year X [2 December 1802].

54. AN AF IV 1212. Memoir to the Emperor by Monseigneur Mauviel, Bishop of Saint-Domingue, 23 July 1805.

55. Dubois, *Avengers*, 288–289.

Section III
Rejecting 'Republican' War

9

Fratricide: Tragic Brothers, Masculine Violence, and the Republic on the French Stage, 1799[1]

Judith A. Miller

> The title of brother is a bond so sacred that in daring to break it, one insults heaven, a brother is a friend given by nature.[2]

Gabriel Legouvé, the only son of a Parisian barrister, wrote often—even insistently—about fratricide and civil war. His first success was his 1792 *The Death of Abel*, a setting of the tale from Genesis.[3] During the 1790s, Legouvé's writings confronted the most momentous form of fraternal strife, civil war. He returned repeatedly to Lucan's epic on the conflicts between Caesar and Pompey that destroyed the Roman Republic. While Legouvé never published a complete translation of Lucan's *Civil War*, a work of staggering complexity and bloodshed, he struggled with it throughout the Revolution, presenting several public readings of his efforts.[4] In 1799 *Étéocle*, an examination of the murderous brothers in ancient Thebes, and the focus of this chapter, appeared. It was an adaptation of Racine's *Thébaïde* (1664) as well as tragedies by Aeschylus and Euripides.[5] It traced the rivalry between Oedipus' sons that left a brother's dead body to dogs and birds of prey outside the walls of Thebes. Legouvé's decision to extend the final scenes as the two brothers sank their swords into each other stunned the audience; some thought it a 'monstrosity'.[6] He justified the theme, explaining that 'the hatred between two brothers is more furious than between other men'. Why be 'surprised that [the hatred] of Eteocles and Polynices surpasses common horrors'.[7]

The play premiered on 19 October 1799 in the midst of the crisis that preceded Napoleon Bonaparte's *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire Year VIII (9 November 1799). Already, three post-Terror coups had purged the legislative and executive branches: in 1797, in 1798, and, most recently, on 18 June 1799. A revived Jacobin movement in 1799 demanded a return to a more egalitarian form of republic; its deputies attacked the authoritarian, even illegitimate, turns that the government had taken.[8] Acrimony over

the spring's failed military campaigns deepened conflicts in the legislature. Desertion and resistance to conscription were crippling the war effort.[9] In the west, the counterrevolutionary *chouannerie* had reignited. Its royalist leaders set 15 October 1799 for the start of their operations. On the evening the play opened, *chouans* took Le Mans. It was not yet clear that the Republican forces would be able to respond.[10] 'What merciless Fury breathes the ardour for combat [into you]', what foreigner 'gives the signal for that fratricidal war?' asked a poet who condemned that insurrection.[11] Indeed, in October 1799 the French could appreciate the destructive power of brothers' hatred.

One might dismiss this playwright and his engagement with failed masculine bonds. Like so many late-eighteenth-century dramatists, his tragedies contained passages of genuine artistry and many of only modest merit. His generation represented the final breath of French classical culture. Yet, in the context of the French Revolution, Legouvé's theme was arresting. The French Republic was founded in 1792 on the concept of brotherhood.[12] Fraternal bonds, whether in the home or the *Cité*, constituted a vital source of political unity. 'You must make a city,' the radical leader Saint-Just declared in 1794, 'that is to say citizens who are friends, who are welcoming and who are brothers'.[13] 'Let us be brothers, let us be friends, peoples of all the earth', counselled a hymn for soldiers.[14] Among the greatest threats to the Revolution were the 'false brothers' in the legislature who feigned to be 'friends of liberty'.[15] For all the invocations of *fraternité*, however, those ties were not holding the country together. The legislatures had generated factional and ideological animosities that had led to rounds of trials, exiles, and executions. (Even friendships had yielded to betrayals and purges.)[16] As early as 1793, a number of regions had taken up arms against the Revolution. More would follow, causing at least one scholar to suggest that the Revolution was instead a civil war.[17] After the Jacobins fell in July 1794, the enthusiasm for the slogan 'liberty, equality, fraternity'—always just one of many revolutionary expressions—had waned.[18] The words were dusted off for ceremonies, proving statesmen's continued support for the sympathetic ties of the Republic, but they no longer described the political reality of the limited franchise and arguably unconstitutional measures of the state. Yet, even in the aftermath of the electoral scissions and the coup of May 1798, the rhetorical recourse to *fraternité* as a balm for the Republic's wounds endured. 'Return to us', a departmental official in Strasbourg entreated, 'that mutual trust . . . and that sweet *fraternité* that give the entire Republic the posture of a family united by the same interests. . . . '[19] Thus, the literary qualities of Legouvé's achievements aside, his focus on fratricidal brothers in the last weeks of the Republic beckons.

The place of male bonds in Legouvé's life suggests personal sources for his dramatic preoccupations. After his death in 1812, the members of the National Institute, a leading academic body of the period, gathered to

remember him. Alexandre Duval, who received Legouvé's chair, made the first of the customary addresses.[20] His speech offered many of the commonplaces of these occasions. 'The Muses', for instance, 'surrounded his cradle' at his birth in 1764; Legouvé had written with his 'eye fixed on posterity'.[21] The affective elements of the *éloge* signalled a special concern for male friendship. Mentioning Legouvé's life-long ill health, Duval explained that the author had not been meant for the 'duties of society', but instead was 'born for letters and friendship'.[22] Regnaud de Saint-Jean-d'Angély provided a fuller picture of those ties.[23] Legouvé's father, the imposing Old Regime lawyer and amateur dramatist Jean-Baptiste Legouvé, died when Gabriel was not yet 20. The son was not abandoned, however, Regnaud explained: 'if [he] lacked a paternal family, he found one among the friends, the rivals [*émules*] of his father'. The fatherless student was surrounded by the highest figures of Old Regime erudition, obligated by 'the pious solidarity that called us to protect his childhood . . . so that he would become worthy of both the father, for whose loss we cried, and the adoption that repaired it, if the loss of a father can ever be repaired'. Of those friends, Regnaud noted Jean-François Ducis, known for his sombre adaptations of Shakespeare.[24] Ducis, Regnaud insisted, should have been the one to 'pronounce the last *adieux* in his touching voice on the tomb of his student'. The example of Legouvé was a reminder of the fellowship to be found in societies like the Institute. '[T]his family, absent or lost, or refused by nature . . . , can it not at least be supplemented in favour of the unfortunate who lack it?', Regnaud asked. He encouraged them to see the community of letters as a consolation and even a substitute for family. A 'man without family will no longer be an old orphan, miserable and left aside, he will not have lost everything: He will find the friendship of some, the affection of several and the help of all in the breast of the society that will adopt him.' Legouvé's example of a second family, reconstructed in the republic of letters, provided one possible foundation for his concern with masculine ties on the stage.[25]

An obscure playwright and an obscure play—two brothers determined to kill each other rather than share the throne of an ancient city in far-away Greece—might seem an unusual choice for a volume such as this one, focused on the wars of the Revolutionary era. Yet, its author was hardly obscure. His circle's senior figures, like Ducis, had won chairs in the Old Regime's academies. The men of Legouvé's generation came to prominence in the 1790s and entered the National Institute, the Collège de France, and the Académie Française. If one remembers the tight connections between these established cultural institutions and the state, the role of these writers takes on greater weight.[26] Poet–statesmen, such as Marie-Joseph Chénier and Nicolas François de Neufchâteau, passed smoothly from the corridors of the state to the podiums of the academies. Legislator–*philosophes* like Pierre Daunou drafted constitutions while they polished historical works. Broadly republican in their politics—although often appalled by the Terror, even

if they had been involved in it—and independent in temperament, they numbered among the intellectual elite of their era.[27]

While the politics of Legouvé's tragedy are of most concern to us here, we must pause to appreciate the new aesthetics he and his *confrères* were creating. Their heroes wrestled with emotions, their settings were gloomy, and their work was suffused with memories—of transgressions, of friends and families lost. Their characters heard walls and even ghosts whispering of crimes and secret identities. They experimented with visual effects and violence to intensify the audience's reactions.[28] Ducis gathered his friends regularly as the *Déjeuner de la Fourchette*. Innovative projects drew them together—the composer Etienne Méhul and Legouvé collaborated on *Doria, ou la Tyrannie détruite*, which appeared—and flopped—in March 1795.[29] Their networks extended to the Salons and the Académie des Beaux-Arts, including Jacques-Louis David and the many competitors in the studios, such as Pierre-Narcisse Guérin.[30] This aesthetic renewal revolved around the reinvigoration of tragedy, whether classical, Shakespearean, or Venetian. Equally significant—an idea to which we will return at the end—was the strained relationship between fathers and sons in many of these works.[31] It was not by chance that their patriarchs so often were consumed with anger, or that their sons' anguished responses led to bloodshed and tragedy.

The classical culture of the Directory, 1795–1799

Given the way in which the Revolution had broken with the past, we might not expect classical tragedies, so much a part of Old Regime culture, to have survived in any but the palest form. Yet, however true it was that the lighter fare of the boulevards drew throngs of spectators, classical theatre and oratory still held a substantial place in a playwright's ambitions. To do battle with Racine or Corneille was to have a giant for a rival. Moreover, in the last decades of the Old Regime, classical drama had found new life. Greek tragedies, generally known only through Latin translations, had become available in French through the mid-century collections by Pierre Brumoy and his successors.[32] Even more important were the ways the editions intersected with Enlightenment concerns for humankind, both its happiness and its suffering. Greek myths presented a rich arena for contemplating those philosophical issues.[33] The problem of sacrifice, for instance, so often an element of tragic plotlines, opened eighteenth-century considerations of the value of human life. The vision of Iphigenia on the altar, her father's blade above her neck, now brought shudders rather than praise. Adaptations took up the new *ethos*, showing individuals who intervened to halt the anger of the gods and to spare their fellow creatures. The gods would not have the last say: Human sympathies and morality instead were the focus of many pre-Revolutionary adaptations.

Thus, with the end of the Terror, it is not surprising that many classical *érudits* returned to their work. There was still much to be done: translations to complete, as well as pressing ethical and political problems to explore through ancient texts.[34] It was fitting that the first session of the reopened Collège de France in November 1794 included a lecture on Greek tragedy by Levesque.[35] The creation of the National Institute in 1795, with chairs in fields of literature and history, provided further platforms for scholarship.[36] On his release from prison, for instance, lawyer and administrator J.-B. Billecocq republished his *Conspiracy of Catiline* and issued a new edition of Lucan's *Civil War*.[37] Legouvé read his translations of Lucan's epic poem at the National Institute.[38] It was no coincidence that they looked to works that depicted the factions and civil wars that had destroyed the Roman Republic. Within weeks of Robespierre's fall, theatrical life too revived, and, with it, classical tragedy. Marie-Joseph Chénier's *Timoléon* and Arnault's *Quintius Cincinnatus* were among the first to appear. Livy's *History of Rome* remained an inspiration for many, among them Le Prévôt d'Iray's 1797 *Manlius Torquatus*. The same year, L. J. N. Lemercier's *Agamemnon* won applause, while Cherubini's *Medée* received a less enthusiastic response. The *Magazin encyclopédique* and the *Décade philosophique* offered reviews and commentary. The *Décade*, in particular, had political aspirations: It sought to rally the country to the Republic through its scientific, political, and artistic coverage. Much in official post-Terror culture, then, reassured these writers about the enduring value of their classical learning and of the important role they were to play in the revitalized Republic.

The tragedy of Thebes: Aeschylus to Alfieri

An early modern author who sought to use the Theban brothers had primarily two models on which to draw—those of Aeschylus and Euripides, although certainly two Latin works, Seneca's *Phoenician Women* and Statius' epic *Thebaid*, were known to them.[39] The Greek tragedies have achieved an almost transcendent status in Western culture. The choruses, for example, cry out against warfare, offering apparently eternal expressions of grief. Yet, their petitions take on greater specificity when one realizes that the dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides were written in the larger context of war and military expansion, with both victories and defeats, and periods of peace and alarm.[40] Not only military combat, but also the city's agonistic politics, especially the coup that led to the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 BCE, lay under the surface of these plays, in particular Euripides' *Phoenician Women*.[41] Buried deep within their mythical portrayals were the still-seething animosities of civil war and Athenian democracy.[42]

Together, with varying emphases and elements, these classical texts traced the stories of the children of Oedipus. Born of incest, the offspring were destined to continue the Theban family's fall. The sons, Eteocles and

Polynices, were to have shared the rule of Thebes—the city of seven gates and the site of generations of sexual licence and violations, of divided rule and animosities—alternating years on the throne. The sons, however, had been disrespectful to Oedipus; he cursed them, proclaiming that they would kill each other in their struggle for power. Eteocles, who reigned first in most versions, refused to turn power over to his brother. Outraged and exiled, Polynices married into an enemy dynasty, gathered a foreign army, and laid siege to the city. The intercessions of their mother, Jocasta, and their sister, Antigone, could not bring peace. In some versions, their uncle Creon stoked their animosities. (He had his own designs on the crown.) The brothers decided that the war's outcome would be determined by contests between pairs of warriors at each of the gates of the city. Swords clashed, blood flowed, the brothers fell, and the curse was satisfied. Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*, one of the most important Athenian versions, focused on Eteocles, the city's protector, and his calculations of his soldiers' strengths as he placed them one by one at the city's gates. The tragedy followed him as he stoically accepted that fate had stationed him at the seventh gate against his brother.[43] Aeschylus paid little attention to the accord that had been broken, and only hinted at Polynices' motives for attacking his former home, giving him a shield on which the figure of Justice led a young man home. The questions of who had the greatest right to rule were left aside. Instead, the play ended with a dreadful equilibrium: neither peace nor resolution, only two men's bodies and a chorus that mourned. Here was the repressed political strife—the city's 'terrible gestation of murders between fellow citizens'—that Nicole Loraux's work has made visible.[44]

If Racine—and later authors such as Legouvé—looked to Euripides rather than Aeschylus, it was surely because Euripides offered powerful material that appealed to early modern sensibilities. His characters showed touching feelings and his women often were more prominent in the plot's progression than those of Aeschylus' tragedies. Euripides' Polynices, who venerated tradition and the gods, was rendered sympathetically, contrasting with the ambitious, impassioned tyrant, Eteocles.[45] Moreover, Euripides' works were profoundly political, raising questions about the wellbeing of the *Cité* and the devastation of wars. He invented a minor character, Creon's second son, Menoeceus, who alone was willing to sacrifice himself to save his city.[46] His selfless act was so unlike the actions of the other men. An important Euripidean innovation, the *agon*, presented even greater dramatic potential.[47] The *agon*, a debate between the characters in which their philosophies were pitted against each other, lucidly and elegantly, stimulated early modern playwrights. While one can find elements of Aeschylus' Eteocles—the warrior defending his city—in Racine's *Thébaïde*, the play's meditations on kingship expose still greater debts to Euripidean *agones*. The characters clashed over problems that were integral to seventeenth-century absolutism. A king's anger, his capacity for revenge or pardon—his 'well-managed

passion' as well as his laws—were central dilemmas in the monarchy of Louis XIV.[48] Racine's characters pondered the dangers of divided rule, warning of the chaos that would ensue if the brothers' rotation allowed them to reverse each other's laws. Polynices, however just his grievances, nonetheless had sought foreign allegiances and invaded his homeland. It would not have been difficult to recognize the anxieties of early modern politics in the stage quarrels. Racine's tragedy, exploiting the Euripidean *agon*, was weighing the benefits of absolutism, the limits of sovereign justice, the perils of dynastic marriages, and the fragility of geopolitical balances of power as those systems were being born.[49]

One last example from just before the Revolution, *Polinice* (1775) by the Piedmontese Vittorio Alfieri, exerted a strong influence on Legouvé's play. Alfieri provided a classical republican rendering of the brothers' conflict and infused it with the aesthetic associated with the dramatist Ducis and painter David.[50] Alfieri became a well-known figure at the 1780s salon of his companion, Louise of Stolberg-Gedern, the countess of Albany. (She had separated from the Jacobite Young Pretender, Charles Edward Stuart, in 1784 with the Pope's permission—and a pension from Marie-Antoinette!—and settled in Paris.)[51] Her gatherings, which welcomed David, Beaumarchais, Jacques Necker, Germaine de Staël-Holstein, and the brothers Marie-Joseph and André Chénier, suggest Alfieri's probable contributions to the Ducis circle and discussions of more visually arresting forms of tragedy.[52] Those cultural figures mingled with many French reformers, moderate monarchists and even future revolutionaries, among them the republican *Idéologues* who would be so instrumental in the founding of the National Institute and in the revival of dramatic culture.

Alfieri was famous for his commitment to freedom, especially Italian liberty, and for his tragedies' condemnations of tyrants and their uncontrollable emotions. The staccato rhythm of his dialogues—esteemed as a welcome innovation in masculine address—and the histrionics of his characters marked his works.[53] Alfieri sought to portray 'a manly strength of mind, of stoical principles and free opinions, and…to depict the horrors and enormities of despotism…'.[54] Alfieri warned, as classical republicans often did, that soldiers were the tools of kings. The army was but the 'most infamous basis of arbitrary authority', he declared.[55] The fifth acts of his tragedies intensified with the hurried speeches of his dying heroes and as much violence as decency would permit.[56] Alfieri's patriarch–tyrants—Philip II of Spain and Creon, for example—end up alone with blood on their hands, allowing the audience to contemplate the consequences of unrestrained power. The villains' incoherent soliloquies revealed their volatile minds in a way that was typical of the new psychological approach. Alfieri's *Polinice* denounced the Theban leaders and depicted the savagery of their emotions.[57] Creon stoked Eteocles' fury, urging him to retain the crown. Polynices' resolution to recover the throne vacillated unpredictably between

tenderness and rage. As Eteocles lay dying, for instance, Polynices impulsively refused the crown, planning to commit suicide to atone for his fratricide. He assured Eteocles that 'you will always be my king'. Eteocles stabbed him, however, crying, 'I am revenged—I die and still I hate thee.' Alfieri's Eteocles was a tyrant, unforgiving and unmoved by any law or affectionate feeling, an archetype that Alfieri explored throughout his career. 'My primary passion', he wrote, 'is the hatred of tyranny; the only aim of all my thoughts, words and writings is to combat it always in every form. . . .'[58]

Two decades later, Legouvé used his *Etéocle* to indict late Revolutionary politics and the catastrophic impact of war on the French Republic.[59] In the play's magnified emotions, especially the carnage of its last scenes, and in the enraged paternal figure, one can discern Legouvé's engagement with the regeneration of tragedy, and its use of violence and unbalanced psyches. Of course, he and his associates were exploiting themes that had been central to the works since antiquity. In order for the *polis* to survive, the ancient examples demonstrated, aggression had to be mastered. Greek legends recounted, in a veiled and uneven ways, the civilizing process whereby hostilities were vanquished and became part of an archaic past, allowing society's passage to the rule of reason and law. While in the Greek sources both men and women could be violent—remember Clytemnestra standing over the body of the husband whom she had murdered—male bellicosity was the most endemic. Euripides' depiction of Jocasta, her futile attempt to negotiate peace for both her city and her family, her powerful arguments for political harmony, contrasts starkly with her sons' destructive anger. Classical scholars have shown that the damaging forces of aggression, especially male animosities, were fundamental challenges explored by the tragedies.[60]

Playwrights of the revolutionary era brought common contemporary views of human violence to their works: men could become ferocious; women were supposedly gentler. In such formulations, men's and women's essential characteristics were divided by their distinctive biologies.[61] The 'voice of nature' spoke in Enlightenment literature and stages, reflecting the new regime of incommensurable, gendered selves. Female feelings—at least on the stage and in the pages of fiction—were being channelled towards the household. While men could be effusive within the family, their behaviour in public ought to be more moderate. When provoked to righteous anger, however, male emotions were useful in the defence of their families and cities.[62] These models were, of course, subject to negotiation and exception; several decades of research have made the 'separate spheres' of men and women far less easily demarcated.[63]

The wars of the revolutionary era pushed these concepts further and divided the family and city along gender lines, mobilizing them for combat and raising new anxieties about male violence.[64] Manhood, warfare, and citizenship were fused in the configuration, while idealized womanhood was contained in the household in a supporting role, and denied full equality

in the state. Across Europe and the Atlantic, the combination of patrio-tism and military service generated forms of masculinity that emphasized valour, heroism, and physical prowess. The man's 'natural' love of family could be extended beyond the home; his protective 'instincts' stood ready to be deployed by the state against the enemy. The alignment of gender roles and the summoning of male violence in service to the state were not with-out risks. Robert A. Nye described the paradox of modern manliness: 'the citizen must carry within himself the qualities of a warrior, but as a warrior must also remain the citizen he will become again at conflict's end'.[65] Thus, immoderate emotions—the combatant's anger that overflowed or endured after conflicts subsided—posed profound problems for societies in the age of mass conscription and revolutionary warfare.

Etéocle, 1799

We come finally to Legouvé's adaptation of *Etéocle*, his study of the con-nections between violence, ruptured male bonds, and the destruction of the *patrie*. In his preface, Legouvé identified Euripides as his primary inspi-ration. A reader familiar with the *Phoenician Women* would recognize lines and even occasionally complete passages in Legouvé's play.[66] His characters, too, resemble their ancient models—the more sympathetic and tradition-bound Polynices; the ruthless Eteocles; Antigone's regard for convention; and Jocasta, a mother whose attempts to bring peace to her city and her family fail. Legouvé omitted Creon and Menoeceus, which allowed the two brothers to attack each other more directly, first with words and then with weapons. He excluded, too, the opening to Jocasta's *agon* in Euripides, where she described 'an orderly and intelligible universe', divinely created and a model for humans.[67] 'Night's dark face', she explained, 'shares equally | With the bright sun the traveling of each year round; | Each yields in turn, and nei-ther burns with jealousy.'[68] Without such philosophical passages, delivered with authority, even if futilely in Euripides' tragedy, Legouvé's Jocasta was restricted to her maternal expressions of sorrow, and the action emphasized the brothers' anger and the women's helplessness.

To demonstrate the law's inability to restrain tyrants, Legouvé expanded the discussion of the agreement by which the brothers should have shared their rule. Antigone pressed Eteocles to see the illegitimacy of his actions. 'Recognize those rights [that are] contested too long,' she demanded; '[c]rown your bother and follow your treaties, you will serve glory and your country much better'. (16)[69] Eteocles, however, held the throne through force. Agreements were 'nothing to me', he proclaimed. (19) As for the compromise of divided rule, echoing lines from Racine's *Thébaïde*, Eteocles objected that 'a throne is lost as soon as it is shared'. (54) He asserted that the people were 'assembled in the square, ready to swear [allegiance] to me, consecrating my rights to keep this throne where its voice has placed me'. (15) These were unbearable claims to Antigone: 'The Thebans, you say! Say

your partisans.' 'You have all the authority in your hands', she continued, 'You can compel their will easily, and from a trembling people, avow it without pretending, love will crown you much less than fear.' (18) 'What do I care about the methods I used', he exploded, 'if my fortunate effort is followed by success! What does it matter whether I am loved or feared in these walls! I have the right to reign, my sister, because I reign.' (19) He made no apologies. 'I know', he insisted, 'how to keep the rank that I knew [first] how to conquer.' (15) Polynices countered that he had not only the law but divine sanctification on his side: Eteocles had acted 'with disdain for the oath heaven heard. . . . ' (26) 'My cause is equity', Polynices reproached Eteocles. 'And yours', he continued, 'is perjury.' (49) Dismissing such charges, Eteocles raged, 'I will avow him as king when he is the victor.' (20) If Polynices felt himself wronged, 'let him avenge it on the field of valour'. (20) Where sheer force held the throne, law had no empire.

Legouvé used the impasses in the legal debates to explore the futility of fraternal feelings to reunite the brothers and spare Thebes, and thus revealed a profound violation of the supposed 'natural order' of society. Legouvé inflated the expressions of tenderness, especially by the women. Jocasta's deepest sentiments were maternal: Even if Eteocles was more culpable, she admitted, 'despite all his wrongs, I am still his mother'. 'In judging my sons this unfortunate heart must divide itself between them,' she wept. (12) Legouvé included Polynices in such declarations.[70] Reunited with the women, he exclaimed, 'Oh sister, always dear, oh mother, whom I adore, throw yourselves into my arms if you still love me.' (31) He had 'missed' them 'more than Thebes and power'. (34) Jocasta wished to bring her sons together and to revive their sympathies: 'It is to me to awaken the pity in their hearts; they will hear my voice, they will see my pain.' (12) The women's hopes were not unfounded. Polynices, the gentler brother, retained enough warmth to offer his brother a new accord: They could reign together. 'May our blood, may the throne all at once reunite us', he appealed. (53)

Even if more kind-hearted, however, Polynices was no man of even temperament. Here again was the psychologically unhinged figure of late eighteenth-century tragedy. Legouvé's Polynices was fragile and weepy, 'the sad plaything of an injurious fate'. (31) No dreadful commander of foreign armies, he had been 'delivered . . . to regrets, sorrows and terrors, which a famous exile (*proscrit*) always drags after him . . . '. (12) Each room of the dark palace—its altar, its walls—reminded him of some past transgression. His guilt about locking his father away made him doubt the justice of his claims to the throne.[71] He had 'lost [his] crown, and deserved that well', because he had allowed fear to drive him 'to insult the misfortunes of a virtuous father'. (29)

If Legouvé accorded Polynices some moments of regret, he rendered Eteocles' psychology as the most dangerous to the city. No familial feelings, no doubts disturbed him. Power supplied his only pleasures. Jocasta's 'tears

twenty times' and Antigone's 'pleas' 'have painted absent Polynices' sorrows' and have found 'nature mute in his anxious soul'. (13) He was equally void of filial respect. He no longer cherished the 'sacred name of father'. (23) He had become his father's 'executioner' by dispatching Oedipus to a dungeon. (14) There was but one passion that burned in him: 'The sceptre,' he snarled at his brother, 'do not think that one can give it up. You would realize that, if your hand could one day take it.' (47) He was consumed by power: 'Would any man having earned fame by the courage that sets the warrior above humans, betray his good fortune by sinking back without *éclat* into the ranks of common crowd?'(19) Who would not be 'dazzled to see thousands of subjects at his feet, offering their services, guessing his desires, adoring his caprices?'(43)

More troubling was Eteocles' propensity to transform words into insults and actions into offences. Questions of law and family metamorphosed into attacks on his rightful pride and manly courage. He explained his mother's opposition to his rule as her 'bitterness' towards him. (17) He declared that his brother 'attacks the walls of his birth without respect'. (15) Eteocles resolved 'to punish their imprudent audacity'. (15) If he were to step down, he 'would appear to allow that brazenness to triumph. . . .' (16) His mother outraged him with her 'unworthy counsel' that he should 'abandon my hereditary sceptre to that inhuman prince without fighting, with cowardice'. (16) He would not give way to fear: 'It will be enough to say, I believe, that by trying to frighten me, one receives nothing. . . .' (16) Impertinence, effrontery, and insolence: Such were the wounds of the tyrant.

When provoked, Polynices showed the same troubling susceptibility to turn legal matters and familial dynamics into lists of grievances. His resentments deepened, making the brothers twins not only by birth but in the way they clung to their pain. Polynices rebuffed Jocasta's suggestion that he let go of his suffering. 'You order me to forget his deeds!' he wailed. 'You feel sorry for the oppressor and not for the victim!' (37) After Eteocles rejected his offer of joint rule, a bitter Polynices recast their entire relationship as a story of ill-treatment. 'I take you as a witness,' he complained, 'always disdained, I spared nothing to obtain peace. That if I finally give the signal for carnage, it is he who has forced me to do so through a final outrage.' (55) Jocasta tried to slow his anger: 'If your brother is criminal, do you want to be like him?' (37) He was filled with disgust for Eteocles. 'Yes, I go!', he warned. ' . . . But I will return soon terrible, bloodied. I come . . . to seize my crown from your guilty head.' (55) His mother interceded: 'My son, remember that he is your brother'; but Polynices retorted: 'I no longer have one; I yield to my just anger.' (55) We hear the full measure of his agony and how much he blamed Eteocles: 'You, before all the Gods [who are] terrible to the guilty, I make you responsible for the horrors of this day. Your refusal forces me to fly to combat.' (56) Each, holding fast to his belief that his sufferings were the more grave, was incapable of forging peace.

The volatility of the men's emotions was remarkable. In only a few lines, rivalry became anger, then hatred, soon murder, and finally fratricide. Passions might be tempered momentarily, but ultimately they were irrepressible. Revelling in the coming bloodshed, Eteocles crowed that 'one will see soldiers engulfed in blood under my blows'. (16) '[Polynices'] soldiers will soon find their funerals...and the Ismenus [Thebes' spring] will roll their bloodied corpses', he gloated. (16) His goal was to 'fight, triumph or die at the head' of his troops, 'rather than [let] another king rule inside these walls, may Thebes perish, whole, with me'. (57) So great was his hatred that he wished apocalypse on his city if he lost. The brothers' loathing infected their troops and the city. When Eteocles flew from the ramparts, the young men followed: 'The Theban youth, enclosed in our walls, leaves, joins Eteocles, and swells his army.' Immediately, 'it is Thebes whole attacking Argos'. (61) Soon 'all appear to share the hatred of the two brothers'. The fields were covered with 'murdered horses and shattered chariots'. Quickly, 'blood succeeds blood, carnage [succeeds] carnage and even the skies exploded in rolls of thunder'. (61) Jupiter had sent lightning to stop the butchery. The flames 'devour[ed]' a pair of powerful combatants, attacking 'the still smouldering members, and making them disappear in a gulf of fire that, bellowing thrice, closes tight on them'. The warriors 'draw back and disperse...dismal, pale, not daring to turn away their eyes'. (62) The battlefield fell silent.

Jupiter's intervention led the brothers to settle the conflict by fighting each other alone. Polynices digested the meaning of his brother's challenge: fratricide. He accepted nonetheless. In a scene that was purely Legouvé's invention, Polynices insisted on a condition, however: Eteocles must release Oedipus from the dungeon. The creation of this scene further demonstrated Legouvé's use of the new theatrical aesthetic. Though Legouvé considered Racine's *Thébaïde* 'empty of action', an unnamed friend—perhaps Ducis?—offered a suggestion: Might he intensify the drama by 'daring to stage the elderly Oedipus, coming out of the prison where his oldest son had held him'?[72] If only for a moment, filial affection swelled in Polynices. (66–67) He sought victory, so that '[my father] will see what remorse rips my heart; I know the respect by which a son should convince him'. (35) No reunion came of Oedipus' return, though. Oedipus remembered only that his sons had been the source of his imprisonment and issued his curse. Even when Polynices threw himself at his father's feet, Oedipus rejected him. The father was unmoved at the news that the twins were to fight to the death. (70–71) He called on the gods to condemn them. Dismayed, Polynices announced: 'Oedipus thus no longer has the tenderness of a father!'(73) The last bond broken, mortal combat would commence.

Bereft of their father's love—as were so many of the sons in the plays of Ducis' associates—they departed for their final contest. Legouvé extended the scene, but finally word came that Polynices had prevailed. The fatally wounded Eteocles was carried onto the stage, dramaturgically, a bold,

indeed, scandalous scene. Polynices, yielding momentarily to 'nature', forgot 'the charms of the throne' and offered to share his rule. (85) As Polynices embraced him, as Jocasta and Antigone wailed in shock, Eteocles thrust his sword into his chest, exulting, 'I die avenged of a brother, and I die still king'. (87)

The French *Thebaid*: The Republic in 1799

Each telling of the *Thebaid* has balanced between the transcendence of myth and the ideological crises of its era. Legouvé continued the tradition. He denounced the late French Republic, emphasizing its factional conflicts, its wars, and the illegitimate and destructive power of its generals. He was no stranger to strategic provocation in the cause of liberty. If the story is to be believed, he attacked Robespierre at the height of the Terror. In January 1794, while one group of actors from the former Comédie-Française suffered in prisons, those who had been freed founded the Théatre de la République. Among the first performances was Legouvé's *Épicharis et Néron*, set in the court of the Roman emperor Nero. The audience understood the parallels—plots, torture, betrayals, executions—between the play and the Terror.[73] Robespierre attended the opening on 3 February 1794. Danton waited for 'Death to the tyrant' to be spoken on stage. Rising, Danton urged the audience to repeat the phrase, gesturing to a shaken Robespierre. Legouvé's colleague, the dramatist Lemercier, recollected that only the tragedy's success saved Legouvé.[74] Thus, *Étéocle* was but one instance of his theatrical challenges to political authorities.[75]

As Legouvé polished *Étéocle*, the *patrie* was tearing itself apart. The Year VII [1798–1799] was a year of generals. Throughout the Directory, the power of the military had been expanding. Increasingly it represented itself as the last repository of republican values—of merit, manhood, and zeal for representative government.[76] Bonaparte had begun addressing his troops as 'soldiers' rather than 'citizens'.[77] Civilian France was, in the military's judgement, a disappointment and even a threat to the Republic. Electoral politics had proved fallible. In 1797, the vote sent many royalists to the legislatures. The Executive Directory relied on the army to carry out the *coup d'état* of 4–5 September 1797 in favour of a re-energized Republic. Bergasse-Laziroule later praised the army's role in those events: 'Republican virtues, exiled from our cities took refuge in our camps. That was where the patriotic enthusiasm was in all its purity.'[78] The 1797 coup created the more authoritarian and republican regime known as the Second Directory. It purged both national and local governments of suspected conservatives, sending 328 to French Guiana. It passed laws against émigrés and priests, reviving some of the measures of the Terror. The policies of the Second Directory, however, brought neither stability nor peace. The elections in the spring of 1798 returned a majority that leaned too far to the left, provoking the Directory to reject

127 of those elected. The following year, the elections returned deputies who opposed the Directory, including many neo-Jacobins, leading to more ousters and only marginally constitutional measures. Here were the all too real parallels to Eteocles' refusals to surrender his rule according to the laws of the state. What hope was there for the Republic if political succession would not—or could not—obey the constitution? Unending impasses in the legislatures allowed the five-member Executive Directory to gain more power, a formation that Pierre Serna termed the 'extreme centre'.[79] Civil war and brigandage were endemic, causing the government to place many areas 'outside the Constitution' and under military justice.[80]

If French domestic politics were tumultuous, the diplomatic crisis worsened them. Since late 1797, European ambassadors had been gathered in the German city of Rastatt to pursue an end to war. French ambitions had been strengthened by the victories of 1797, in particular Bonaparte's invasion of Austrian holdings. The French were ready to trade hard-won territories for a legitimized balance of power. After over a year of discussions the enemy countries could not agree, however.[81] The War of the Second Coalition (1798–1800) was near, and each party—the opposing nations and the French political factions—excelled in blaming the others. One would hear such accusations echoing a few months later in the disputes of Legouvé's Eteocles and Polynices.

In ancient Thebes, as in 1799 Rastatt, there would be no peace. An extraordinary breach of international law then occurred. Austrian troops surrounded Rastatt. The French delegates, the plenipotentiary ministers Roberjot, Bonnier, and Debry, were ordered to leave the city and denied an escort. As their carriages departed on 28 April 1799, the Szeckler *hussards* surrounded them. The ministers were dragged out and stabbed. Roberjot and Bonnier died; the screams of their children and their wives, one of them pregnant, could be heard inside the city walls. Debry, pushed into a ditch, escaped. The assassinations escalated the war effort and amplified the battles inside the Councils and with the Executive Directory.[82] Speeches portrayed the Austrians as 'barbarians', who were 'outside humanity'.[83] The proclamations displayed a willingness to 'instrumentalise' the murders.[84] The Executive Directory used the assassinations to rally the war-weary nation. The Law of 21 Floréal Year VII [10 May 1799] linked conscription to the commemorations of the martyred ministers. The deputies in the Councils outdid themselves with patriotic demands that simultaneously attacked directors, ministers, and competing factions for their inadequate prosecution of the war. Dubois-Dubais exposed the 'devouring ambition' of Britain and Austria. 'Avenge the blood of these unfortunate and respectable victims,' he called, 'avenge the humanity obviously outraged in their persons, avenge your rights...! Avenge, finally, avenge your own injury, so that the monsters who ordered and committed this odious attack cannot find an impenetrable asylum to your implacable and constant pursuit...!'[85] Even the more restrained

Dominique Joseph Garat focused on Austria's falsely wounded dignity and the savagery of its desire to destroy France. 'The House of Austria', he alleged, was 'drunk with the pride that comes from so many humiliations' at French hands. It wished to 'end the war by drowning the republics in the blood of republicans. . . .'[86]

As demands for retribution became more pitched, news of French military reversals in the spring of 1799 shook Paris.[87] The once triumphant Republican armies were pinned down, routed and suffering badly. (How many families would have understood Jocasta's tears: 'All those Thebans, those Greeks, blossoms cut off by Bellone in their prime. Have they not some part in my secret fight! How many mothers must cry like me!') (59) The Executive Directory's opponents in the legislature found ample material for their purposes. Charges of financial and military irresponsibility—and even of treason—flew from all sides. On 18 May 1799, shouts to declare the *Patrie en danger*—a constitutional measure that brought with it martial law— rocked the Council of the Five Hundred.[88] That body's nominations for the upcoming elections to the Executive Directory contained many prominent generals. The five Executive Directors were as divided as was the legislature. On 18 June, as General Joubert's troops circulated in Paris, the last pre-Bonaparte *coup d'état* occurred. A group of disgruntled generals and neo-Jacobins was behind it. The new governing coalition then passed legislation against royalism and counterrevolution—the Law of Hostages and a forced loan. (One critic warned that the laws would allow neo-Jacobins 'to slit throats of the best citizens, or leave them to perish in misery; which will flood France anew with tears and blood'.)[89] Later that summer, however, frustrated with factional strife and the increasing neo-Jacobin resurgence, Emmanuel Sieyès and his 'revisionist' allies sought a general for a bolder plan.

The parallels between the turbulence of the French Republic and the action on the stage in *Étéocle* were striking. At its simplest level, the conflict between brothers could be applied to any of the hostilities that had wracked French politics in the preceding months. Brother against brother, the political class was fractured. The routines of elections brought no peaceful rotation of rule. Beyond the ideological philosophies that divided the country, however, was each side's representation of itself as the victim. Jocasta's anguish would have been understood in the theatre: 'If it is true that blood cannot move you, the voice of the *patrie* at least should speak to you . . . Do you claim to reign over debris within our walls?' (48, 52) Haemon, too, pressed the interests of the country. 'You are tearing apart your *patrie*', he warned. (29) From the stage, Legouvé's characters were exposing the hollowness of the clamour to declare '*la patrie en danger* during the months before his play. This parliamentary claim was no unequivocal statement of patriotism or danger, but was, instead, a weapon deployed by rival blocs against their political enemies. Even as Legouvé polished his verses, General Jean-Baptiste

Jourdan, elected to the legislature in 1799, pressed again for a declaration of the *patrie en danger*.[90]

Legouvé's greatest condemnation, however, concerned the way in which military glory was distorting legitimate forms of republicanism. Like Eteocles, the factions were exploiting the war effort. Worse, the Directory's reliance on military expansion was allowing generals to overtake civilian rule. The stakes in the stage debate between Antigone and Eteocles become evident. If Eteocles would not respect the law, his sister charged, then what of 'ambition?' 'I have some no doubt,' he growled, 'and I glory in it. It is the virtue of hearts destined for victory.' (19) Legouvé's targets were clear: Bonaparte and the generals who were flaunting their victories in Paris and the press. Bonaparte was an adept manipulator of the symbolism of military triumph and martial dedication to the Republic.[91] He used the practice of sending captured enemy flags to Paris with his soldiers; they reminded the deputies where the real force of the state lay.[92] Without victories and the spoils of war, the Republic would fall. In the midst of factional battles and military campaigns, the Directory increasingly exploited such soldierly imagery in its own commemorations of political events. In 1797, an official speech praising the uprising of 10 August 1792 called on the country to remember that 'You are all under the same banners, you defend the same cause.'[93] The stage protests of Jocasta now seem more urgent: 'Those flags, the forerunners of terrible carnage, I wanted to prevent the horrors of combat.' (21)

More troubling, by the summer of 1799 officers had been lurking close to the deputies, ministers, and directors known to oppose the Directory. There were too few generals who, like Jourdan or Bernadotte, were prepared to defend the Republic and resist, if only briefly, the incursion of the military into civilian power. All eyes were focused on Bonaparte. Since his first appearance in 1793, he had been polishing his aura as a commander. In the many reports, odes, and speeches that the war effort produced— often encouraged or circulated by Bonaparte—the fellowship of anonymous soldiers was being eclipsed by the individual feats of their commanders.[94] While a few eulogies still presented the egalitarian concept that 'generals, soldiers are citizens; they have no other rank than that assigned them by their courage, their talents or their virtues', such ideals were fading.[95] The funerals of generals in the late Directory celebrated their superior heroism, rather than any collective equality in arms.[96] Moreover, such pronouncements were becoming devices to advance Bonaparte's cause. Boulay de la Meurthe, president of the Council of the Five Hundred, who supported Bonaparte, made one of the addresses at the services held for Joubert in September 1799. Joubert had died at Lodi, Boulay declared, 'on the field of honour, a hero who lived enough for his glory, and not enough for ours'.[97]

While Boulay extolled Joubert's valour, he kept Bonaparte in the foreground. He assured the Council of the Five Hundred that Bonaparte 'himself' had designated Joubert as his successor to command the army in Italy. As 1799 wore on and despair deepened, Bonaparte emerged as the sole hero to save France. He alone, some argued, could avenge the assassinations at Rastatt and the military reversals. He alone could unite the political classes. He returned to Paris on 16 October 1799, three days before Legouvé's play opened, provoking more rumours.

Legouvé's depictions of Eteocles challenged the late Directorial celebrations of its military heroes and the elevation of Bonaparte in the speculation about the Republic's future.[98] In the context of the weeks before the coup of 18 Brumaire Year VIII, Eteocles' words were ominous. Soldiers, he maintained, were superior to civilians. Had he not said that they had 'ambition', for it was 'a virtue of hearts formed for victory'? 'Would any man,' he had told Antigone, knowing that a 'warrior' was placed 'above humans', willingly…'sink back without *éclat* into the ranks of the common crowd?' (19) Military strength would merge necessarily with political authority—a formulation of Legouvé's invention. 'Contemplate those heroes,' Eteocles advised Antigone, 'those dead, whose altars share the tributes offered to the immortals; they all have joined laurels to diadems, resting their worth upon supreme power.' (19) Within the French government, those who were turning away from the constitution and putting faith in the military had been burnishing the image of the disinterested warrior–philosopher, the '*républicain à l'antique*'.[99] Garat praised Bonaparte at the National Institute in 1798 as 'a *philosophe* who had appeared for an instant at the head of the armies'.[100] In 1800, the death of General Desaix at Marengo would bring loftier outpourings of official grief. 'Let us follow our warriors' generous example', François de Neufchâteau intoned. 'Existence is nothing, glory everything for them.'[101] Legouvé's Eteocles was a clear rebuttal to the aesthetic processes through which state officials were neutralizing and even celebrating the military's infiltration of civilian rule. The Republic, Legouvé seemed to say, had summoned the forces of war, the violence and ambitions of its men, but was unable to contain those Furies. 'The throne', as Eteocles prophesied, 'belongs to he who knows how to ascend it.' (20)

Legouvé presented a desolate vision of the Republic in 1799. A political crisis had swept away the Old Regime, but France, like Legouvé's Thebes, was not yet able to generate steady rotations of power based on the law. The fatherless and quarrelsome sons of the late-century tragedies—here equals, even twins—were proving unfit to establish that new polity. Legouvé was making no call for a monarch, for a general, for an emperor, or for fathers. He was, however, building a case for an indictment, exposing the damage wrought by those who put ambition before the common good, and power before the *patrie*. With Jocasta and Antigone, he was preparing

the audience to don the garb of mourning for the Republic that might have been.

Notes

1. Fellowships from the Emory University Center for Humanistic Inquiry and the Newberry Library made this research possible. The article has benefited from comments from T. J. A. Le Goff, the Newberry Library Fellows' Seminar and the Emory Ancient Mediterranean Studies Seminar, especially Cynthia A. Bouton, Cynthia Burchell Patterson and Louis A. Ruprecht, Jr.
2. [Gabriel] Legouvé, *La mort d'Abel* (Paris, 1793), 56–57.
3. Legouvé, *Abel*; *L'Esprit des journaux* (hereafter *EJ*) 21 (May 1792): 306–308. It was inspired by Salomon Gessner's *Tod Abels* (1758).
4. *La Décade philosophique* (*DP*), 30 Brumaire Year IV [21 November 1795], 359–360; *Magasin encyclopédique* (*ME*) (1797): 350–355. Portions of his translation are available also in his *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Jean Nicolas Bouilly et al. (hereafter *OC*), 3 vols (Paris, 1826–1827), vol. 2, 203–216, 249–257.
5. Legouvé, *Etéocle, tragédie en 5 actes* (Paris, Thermidor Year VIII [July–August 1800]).
6. Bruno Villien, *Talma, acteur favori de Napoléon Ier* (Paris, 2001), 138. In *La Mort d'Abel* not only did the murder take place on stage, 'which the audience barely could tolerate', but Abel's body remained in full view for the last three scenes of the tragedy. *EJ* 21 (May 1792): 307–308; Bouilly, 'Notice', *OC*, vol. 3, iii–iv.
7. 'Avertissement', in *Etéocle*, v–vii.
8. Bernard Gainot, *1799, un nouveau Jacobinisme? La démocratie représentative, une alternative à brumaire* (Paris, 2001).
9. Annie Crépin, *Défendre la France: Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Rennes, 2005), 133–138.
10. Howard G. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon* (Charlottesville, VA, 2006), 259–262.
11. Blanchard, *Ode sur la reprise de la guerre civile* (Nantes, Year VIII [1799–1800]).
12. Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1993); Michel Borgetto, *La Devise: 'Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité'* (Paris, 1997).
13. Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just, 'Rapport', 26 Germinal Year II [15 April 1794], *Œuvres de Saint-Just* (Paris, 1834), 303.
14. *Recueil d'hymnes patriotiques* (N.P., 1793), 32.
15. Jean-Baptiste Louvet de Couvray, *Accusation contre Maximilien Robespierre . . . du 29 octobre 1792* (Paris, 1792).
16. Marisa Linton, 'Fatal Friendships: The Politics of Jacobin Friendship', *French Historical Studies* 31 (2008): 51–76.
17. D. M. G. Sutherland, *France 1789–1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (New York, 1985).
18. Marcel David, *Fraternité et Révolution française, 1789–1799* (Paris, 1987), 202–263.
19. Sébastien Bottin, *Discours . . . 26 messidor an VI . . .* (Strasbourg, Year VI [1798]), 18.
20. Alexandre Duval, 'Extrait du Discours', in *OC*, vol. 2, i–viii.
21. Legouvé, *Épicharis et Néron, ou la conspiration pour la liberté* (Paris, Year II [1793–1794]).

22. An early testament to such relationships is the volume that presented poetry by Legouvé and Jean-Louis Laya, a future *immortel. Essais de deux amis . . .* (London, 1786).
23. Regnaud de Saint-Jean-d'Angély, 'Extrait du discours', in *OC*, vol. 2, 4–15.
24. Legouvé dedicated *Quintus Fabius* to Ducis, 'a friend as much as a model'. 'Au citoyen Ducis', in *OC,* vol. 1, 176. See also Mark Ledbury, 'Visions of Tragedy: Jean-François Ducis and Jacques-Louis David', *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 37 (2004): 553–580.
25. See also the discussion of 'sons left fatherless' in Thomas Crow, *Emulation: Making Artists for Revolutionary France* (New Haven, 1995).
26. Emile Gaillet, *La tradition littéraire des Idéologues* (Philadelphia, 1943), 244–264; and Dominique Margairaz, *François de Neufchâteau: Biographie intellectuelle* (Paris, 2005), 375–401.
27. For example, Martin S. Staum, *Minerva's Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution* (Montreal and Buffalo, NY, 1996).
28. See the preface of Pierre Laurent de Belloy, *Gaston et Baïard, tragédie* (Paris, 1771), where he justified an on-stage fight.
29. *DP*, 10 Germinal Year III [30 March 1795], 45–48.
30. Ledbury, 'Ducis'. A chapter of my book, 'The Stoic Voice of the Late French Revolution', will treat these works in the context of Directorial politics.
31. See also Ledbury, 'Ducis'.
32. An important early adaptation in French was Jean de Rotrou, *Antigone* (Paris, 1639), which combined passages from Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* and Euripides' *Phoenician Women*. That work inspired Racine's *Thébaïde*. Brumoy's publications, however, offered the first lengthy translations and summaries for a wide audience. Pierre Brumoy, *Le Théâtre des Grecs*, 3 vols (Paris, 1730). See the issue devoted to him: *Anabases* 14 (2011).
33. Among others, Jacqueline de Romilly, *La Grèce antique contre la violence* (Paris, 2000); Danièle Cohn, 'La compassion d'Iphigénie comme formule du pathos des Lumières', *Images Re-vues* hors-série 1 (2008): 2–12; and Jérôme Brillaud, *Sombres lumières: Essai sur le retour à l'antique et la tragédie grecque au XVIIIe siècle* (Laval, 2010).
34. These include F[rançois] J[ean] G[abriel] de La Porte Du Theil, *Théâtre d'Aeschyle,* 3 vols (Paris, Year III [1794–1795]); and Jean-Marie-Louis Coupé, *Théâtre de Sénèque* (Paris, 1795).
35. *DP*, 10 Frimaire Year III [30 November 1794], 400. Presumably the scholar was Pierre-Charles Levesque, author of *Études de l'histoire ancienne et de celle de la Grèce . . .* , 6 vols (Paris, 1811).
36. Staum, *Minerva's Message*.
37. Jean-Baptiste-Louis-Joseph Billecocq, *Souvenirs de J.-B. Billecocq (1765–1829): En prison sous la Terreur*, ed. Nicole Felkay and Hervé Favier (Paris, 1981); *Conjuration de Catalina...* (Paris, 1795); and *La Pharsale de Lucain* (Paris, 1795).
38. *DP*, 30 Brumaire Year IV [21 November 1795], 359–360; *ME* (1797), 350–355.
39. Recent editions included Statius, *La Thébaïde de Stace*, trans. Pierre Louis Cormiliolle, 3 vols (Paris, 1783); and Coupé, *Théâtre de Sénèque*.
40. They appeared during the century that contained the Greco-Persian War (499–449 BCE) and the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE). The dates of their performances appear to be: Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* (467 BCE); Sophocles, *Oedipus the King* (429 BCE); and Euripides, *The Phoenician Women* (ca. 410 BCE).

41. Jacqueline de Romilly, 'Les Phéniciennes d'Euripide ou l'actualité dans la tragédie grecque', *Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire anciennes* 39 (1965): 28–47.

42. Nicole Loraux, *The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens*, trans. Corinne Pache and Jeff Fort (New York, 2002), 197–213.

43. Stuart Lawrence, 'Eteocles' Moral Awareness in Aeschylus' *Seven*', *Classical World* 100 (2007): 335–353.

44. Loraux, 65.

45. I have relied on: Euripides, *Orestes and Other Plays*, trans. Philip Vellacott (London, 1973); Donald J. Mastronarde, *Euripides: Phoenissae* (Cambridge, 1994); and Christine Amiech, *Les Phéniciennes d'Euripide: Commentaire et traduction* (Paris, 2004).

46. Mastronarde, *Phoenissae*, 28.

47. Michael Lloyd, *The* Agon *in Euripides* (Oxford, 1992), 71–93.

48. Emma Gilby, ' "Émotions" and the Ethics of Response in Seventeenth-Century French Dramatic Theory', *Modern Philology* 107 (2009): 52–71.

49. Éric Méchoulan, 'Revenge and Poetic Justice in Classical France', *SubStance* 35 (2006); 20–51; Eric Heinze, ' "This Power Isn't Power If It's Shared": Law and Violence in Jean Racine's "La Thébaïde" ', *Law & Literature* 22 (2010): 76–109. Mitchell Greenberg, *Racine: From Ancient Myth to Tragic Modernity* (Minneapolis, 2010), 43–47.

50. Recent scholarship on late-eighteenth-century classical republicanism includes: Raymonde Monnier, *Républicanisme, patriotisme et Révolution française* (Paris, 2005); and Andrew Jainchill, *Reimagining Politics after the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism* (Ithaca, 2008).

51. Marc Fumaroli, *When the World Spoke French*, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 2001), 428–447; Gilberto Pizzamiglio, 'Vittorio Alfieri', in *A History of Italian Theatre*, ed. Joseph Farrell and Paolo Puppa (Cambridge, 2006), 195–204.

52. Christian Del Vento and Guido Santato (eds), *Quand Alfieri écrivait en français: Vittorio Alfieri et la culture française* (Paris, 2003); and Fumaroli, *World*, 437–439.

53. Le Beau le Cadet, 'Mémoire sur les tragiques grecs', *Histoire de l'Académie royale des inscriptions et belles-lettres* 35 (1770): 458–460. Also, Gaudence Megaro, *Vittorio Alfieri: Forerunner of Italian Nationalism* (New York, 1975); Vittorio Alfieri, *On Tyranny*, ed. Julius A. Molinaro and Beatrice Corrigan (Toronto, 1961).

54. Quoted in the 'Preface' to *The Tragedies of Vittorio Alfieri*, trans. Edgar Alfred Bowring, 2 vols (Westport, CT, 1876; repr. 1970), vol. 1, vii–viii.

55. Quoted in Megaro, 25. Also Molinaro and Corrigan, 'Introduction', in *On Tyranny*, xxiii.

56. Franco Betti, *Vittorio Alfieri* (Boston, 1984), 12, 15.

57. Vittorio Alfieri, *Tragedie di Vittorio Alfieri da Asti Alfieri*, ed. Carlo Milanesi, 2 vols (Florence, 1855); *Œuvres dramatiques du comte Alfieri*, trans. C. B. Petitot, 4 vols (Paris, 1802); and *The Tragedies of Vittorio Alfieri*.

58. Quoted in Megaro, 41.

59. Alfieri's *Polinice* influenced the structure of Legouvé's play and some of its dialogue. Lemercier's 1797 *Agamemnon*, too, drew many elements from Alfieri's play of the same name.

60. Simon Goldhill, *Language, Sexuality, Narrative: The Oresteia* (Cambridge, 1984); Froma Zeitlin, *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature* (Chicago, 1995); Daniel Mendelsohn, *Gender and the City in Euripides' Political Plays* (Oxford, 2002); and Denise Eileen McCoskey and Emily Zakin (eds), *Bound*

by the City: Greek Tragedy, Sexual Difference, and the Formation of the Polis (Albany, 2010).

61. The standard reference is Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, MA, 1990).

62. My discussion has flattened the complexities of eighteenth-century gender in the interest of brevity. Key works include Janet Todd, *Sensibility: An Introduction* (London, 1986); G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago, 1992); and William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001).

63. See especially Sarah Knott and Barbara Taylor (eds), *Women, Gender, and Enlightenment* (New York and Basingstoke, 2005).

64. Stefan Dudink et al. (eds), *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History* (Manchester, 2004); and Karen Hagemann et al. (eds), *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775–1830* (Basingstoke, 2010).

65. Robert A. Nye, 'Western Masculinities in War and Peace', *American Historical Review* 112 (April 2007): 417–438.

66. Like Racine, however, Legouvé omitted the last section of Euripides' play in which Antigone and Oedipus departed Thebes together.

67. Mastronarde, 297, discussing her *agon*, lines 528–585.

68. Euripides, lines 544–545, in Vellacott, 254.

69. The parenthetical page numbers refer to the 1799 publication of the play.

70. Those outpourings were characteristic of Ducis' style, too, known for 'that beautiful genre of the *pathétique* based on the affections of blood, on the sentiments of family'. L. S. Auger, 'Avertissement', in *OEuvres de J. F. Ducis*, ed. L. S. Auger, 3 vols (Paris, 1819), vol. 1, v.

71. One sees similarities with Act Three of Ducis' 1778 *Œdipe chez Admete* (Paris, 1780).

72. *Etéocle* was hailed as 'one of the most notable productions of the modern era'. The sight of Oedipus 'covered in the tatters of poverty [*lambeaux de la misère*] produced a deep impression'; Ducis applauded wildly, embraced Legouvé and 'honoured him with the title of worthy *confrère*'. Bouilly, 'Notice', vii–viii.

    Julie Ellison, in particular, has studied these male expressions of emotion in British tragedies, although the men—both fathers and sons—in many late-century French tragedies were more vengeful. *Cato's Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotions* (Chicago, 1999).

73. Madeleine and Francis Ambrière, *Talma, ou l'histoire au théâtre* (Paris, 2007), 184; Laurent Tiesset, 'Une réécriture de la tragédie du complot: Gabriel Legouvé, *Épicharis et Néron*', in *Le théâtre sous la révolution, politique du répertoire*, ed. Martial Poirson (Paris, 2008), 381–393.

74. Bouilly, 'Notice', v; Ernest Legouvé, *Soixante ans de souvenirs*, 4 vols (4th edn, Paris, 1886), vol. 1, 192–193.

75. Under the Empire, Legouvé dared to put the first Bourbon monarch on the stage, the still much-loved Henry IV. Bouilly, 'Notice', ix–xi.

76. John A. Lynn, 'Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789–1815', *French Historical Studies* 16 (1989): 159–161; Wolfgang Kruse, 'La formation du discours militariste sous le directoire', *AHRF* 360 (2010): 77–102.

77. Gilles Candela, *L'armée d'Italie: Des missionnaires armés à la naissance de la guerre napoléonienne* (Rennes, 2011), 302.

78. Council of the Five Hundred, *Rapport fait par Bergasse-Laziroule,* 29 Thermidor Year VI [17 August 1798].

79. Pierre Serna, *La République des Girouettes–1795–1815 et au-delà, une anomalie politique: La France de l'extrême centre* (Seyssel, 2005).

80. Brown, *Ending the Revolution*.

81. Marc Belissa, *Repenser l'ordre européen (1795–1802): De la société des rois aux droits des nations* (Paris, 2006), 135–142, 197–199.

82. Belissa, *L'ordre européen*, 142–147.

83. Jean-Luc Chappey, 'L'assassinat de Rastadt et les enjeux du "cri de vengeance" sous le second Directoire', in *La voix et le geste: Une approche culturelle de la violence socio-politique*, ed. Philippe Bourdin et al. (Clermont-Ferrand, 2005), 69–96.

84. Chappey, 'L'assassinat de Rastadt', 79–84.

85. 'Conseil des Anciens', 16 Floréal Year VII [5 May 1799], *Moniteur,* 20 Floréal Year VII [9 May 1799].

86. 'Conseil des Anciens', 16 Floréal Year VII [5 May 1799], *Moniteur*, 21 Floréal Year VII [10 May 1799].

87. Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (Basingstoke, 2005), 41–50.

88. Gainot, *1799*, 217.

89. [Auguste] Danican, *Appel au Peuple français de la Loi du 23 Messidor an VII* [11 July 1799] (Hamburg, 1799).

90. Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, *Discours...*, Council of the Five Hundred, 28 Fructidor Year VII [14 September 1799].

91. Serna, *Girouettes*, 450–451; Candela, *L'armée d'Italie*, 307–310; Jean-Yves Guiomar, 'La grande nation, est-ce encore la nation?', in *Du Directoire au Consulat*, 4 vols, ed. Jacques Bernet et al. (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 1999–), vol. 2, 15–25.

92. Kruse, 'Discours', 87.

93. *Moniteur*, 27 Thermidor Year V [14 August 1797].

94. On earlier forms of heroism, see Philippe Goujard, 'Une notion concept en construction: l'héroïsme révolutionnaire', *Dictionnaire des usages sociopolitiques (1770–1815)*, 2, *Notions concepts* (Paris, 1987), 9–44.

95. Pierre Botte, *Eloge funèbre du général Hoche* (Ghent, [1797]).

96. Military funerals soon would present the ideal of national unity around the figure of Bonaparte. See especially Bernard Gainot, 'Les mots et les cendres', *AHRF* 324 (2001): 127–138; and Annie Jourdan, 'Bonaparte et Desaix, une amitié inscrite dans la pierre des monuments?' *AHRF* 324 (2001):139–150.

97. [Antoine Jacques Claude Joseph] Boulay de la Meurthe, *Discours...*, 25 Fructidor Year VII [11 September 1799].

98. Legouvé had long been wary of generals. In 1794, as Parisian celebrations of Bonaparte's victory in Toulon were still being staged, Legouvé had signalled his concern in his tragedy *Epicharis*. 'I fear only Galba, that old warrior', Pison confided. 'Aided by his soldiers, of whom he has made himself master, [he] hastened to arm himself against the republic.' *Épicharis*, 41. On the commemorations, see Philippe Bourdin, 'La voix et le geste révolutionnaires dans le théâtre patriotique (1789–1799)...', in *La Voix*, 313–314.

99. Gainot, 'Les mots'.

100. *DP*, 20 Nivôse Year VI [9 January 1798], 111.

101. Quoted in Gainot, 'Les mots', 127.

10
War and Citizenship: Central Italy 1798–1799[1]

Bernard Gainot

This topic of war and citizenship can be approached in a number of ways. From the perspective of military history, the focus could be on tactical and strategic innovations in the Italian campaign, or on the French regime of occupation.[2] The reference as regards the latter remains the major conference held in Brussels in January 1968, *Occupants/occupés (1792–1815)*.[3] It is significant, however, that, while the Batavian Republic, Switzerland, Spain, Prussia, the Duchy of Warsaw, and indeed the '*pays vendéen et chouan*'— areas of western France that resisted the Revolution—were all the subject of contributions, there was none dealing specifically with Italy. The introduction to the proceedings by Jacques Godechot does, it is true, contain an explicit reference to the Italian situation: 'almost all of Italy in 1799' is considered as 'occupied territory', but by 'the adversaries of France', which could be construed as meaning that Italy was not one of the 'foreign territories occupied by French troops'. But what accounts for this special treatment? Was it because Italy did not exist as a political entity? Yet the occupation regime applied to a given territory. Was it because the *republican* nature of both the French and Italian regimes gave them a particular status? Still, not all the regions of the peninsula were 'republicanized' at this time. Sicily and Sardinia excepted, the Piedmontese territories and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany were never established as republics. It is necessary, likewise, to ask whether anything in the military situation could have justified a special treatment. The answer is that nothing did, either from the perspective of international law (*de jure*) or from that of the practices of the military authorities (*de facto*). A political approach will thus be adopted here. Without undertaking a lengthy historiographical review, it can be said that the political approach has proved particularly rich.

The contextual framework used here for applying this approach is in two parts: first, the Roman Republic; second, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. The Roman Republic was created in 1798 in response to the call for help addressed by the patriots of Rome to the French army. It was at this point that Pope Pius VI went into exile in Tuscany. Was this 'sister republic' in

fact a 'fictional republic', whose civilian authorities, some would argue, were merely puppets controlled by the French military command?[4] Innovative scholarship in recent years has done much to redress the balance and restore to local 'patriots' their historical complexity and autonomy of action,[5] and, while the reality of military tutelage should not be underestimated, its effectiveness was limited by deep divisions over political alliances.[6]

My article is situated at the intersection of these two approaches. First, it is important not to be bound by a narrowly institutional interpretation in which the local authorities, keen to preserve their freedom of action, are faced by a monolithic military command, mechanically following orders from Paris. This period was particularly rich in new initiatives, originating among local patriots but also from within the military command, and whose political projects were significantly different from, or indeed at odds with, the instructions issued by the Directory.[7] The institutional situation must nonetheless be considered, if only to identify the sources, but also to articulate the underlying general question: Did the process of establishing a given territory as a republic in any way affect how the local population experienced the violence and conflicts engendered by a military occupation? Or, looking at it from the opposite side, did the French command change its attitude depending on whether it was dealing with civilians subjected to a military occupation or with the citizens of a sister republic? My comparison is based on a study of the relations between the French army under General MacDonald, which moved through some of the Tuscan territories after suffering defeats in southern Italy, in the spring of 1799, and the provisional civilian administrators in these occupied territories. A contradiction seems to exist between strategic and political imperatives. For the former, 'holding' a territory meant controlling the main lines of communication and points of passage, and securing supplies and billets. The local population was not required to support the occupant; it was enough that it remained neutral. As for political imperatives, however, the granting of citizenship implied a more positive allegiance, a deeper involvement of soldiers in local conflicts, and a control of the territory that was determined largely by the demands of controlling the population.

How well does this distinction between strategic and political conceptions stand up to the test of historical experience? To facilitate analysis, the present study focuses on a single year, from the summer of 1798 to the summer of 1799, and observes the conduct of the French army towards the local populations in two ostensibly distinct, institutional contexts: first, the crisis of the Roman Republic from the summer of 1798; second, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, where the withdrawal of French forces following their defeats in the spring of 1799 opened a phase of acute instability.

The war led to the establishment of an occupation regime defined by legal and diplomatic norms. This regime forms the subject of the first

section. Under the occupation regime, regular troops were required to take responsibility for law enforcement operations, that is to say, for intervening in violent situations, which I illustrate in the second section using the examples of the sacking of cities. The third and final section considers the relationship between citizenship and armed service as it developed in central Italy. This article draws on research by some of my postgraduate students on these regions of central Italy,[8] as well as on material from the registers of correspondence of the Army of Italy at the Service historique de la Défense[9] and unpublished memoirs at the Archives Nationales.

The military occupation regime was defined by precise legal norms. These derived from a *jus bellum* codified at the time in a natural law of nations (*jus gentium*) that laid down the constraints and safeguards for the populations of occupied territories.[10] According to Vattel's *Droit des gens, ou principe de la Loi naturelle appliquée à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains* (1758), still an authoritative text at the time of the Revolution, armies of occupation could only in exceptional circumstances be fed directly by the populations of the countries where they were stationed. For this purpose it was necessary to put in place a logistics service, and to rely on the administrations of the states maintaining the forces. Thus, the initial phase of conquest, the act of taking over a territory, was followed soon afterwards by the setting up of provisional administrations with the object of liaising with representatives of the occupying countries.

The exact responsibilities and the nationality of the various actors in the transitional period were not clearly specified, however. In Rome, the Directory delegated its powers to a civil commission made up of Monge, Daunou, Florent, and Faipoult, whose tasks included drawing up a constitution but also exercising 'complete superior authority...over the commanding generals and other commanders in chief'. The relations between the military authorities, civil commissioners, and Rome's republican authorities were constantly evolving and conflictual, as was reflected in the frequent changes of incumbents in the Consulate (executive) of the Roman Republic and at the top of the main ministries. In Tuscany, the arrival of the French forces in March 1799 did not lead to a transfer of sovereignty, and Grand-Duke Ferdinand III kept his position. But domestic policing was entrusted to a single civil commissioner, Reinhard, a Frenchman. A decree of the Directory dated 4 April 1799 granted him 'full authority in political and civilian matters' in order to guarantee 'the interests of the Republic'.[11] But this applied only to the French Republic, for Reinhard made no changes and worked with the existing structures of the Grand Duchy, keeping the courts and the other police and judicial organs. Policing was placed under the authority of a single magistrate based in Florence, *Il Presidente del Buon Governo*. Alessandro Rivani was appointed to this post, assisted by local *vicaires* and *podestes*, as well as lower-ranking judges (*giusdicenti*). The regular army under the command of General Gaulthier, seconded by Montrichard, had its role

limited, in theory, to defending the routes leading from the Apennines. Tuscany was thus under a transitional regime in the immediate postconquest phase.

The Roman territories, now formed into a republic, were, in theory, at the next stage in the process. A diplomatic instrument, an alliance treaty, that specified the constraints and safeguards for the inhabitants in respect of the occupying authorities, defined relations with the military authorities. The occupation regime was to remain in place for as long the war lasted, and until local troops were able to ensure their own security. In his thesis on the *Commissaires aux armées*, Jacques Godechot characterized the Roman Republic as a 'military dictatorship'. Yet the general-in-chief was subject to the authority of the civil commissioners, who likewise appointed the members of the legislative councils. Article 369 of the Constitution of the Roman Republic (17 March 1798) stipulated that all decisions, measures, and laws adopted by the civil commission or the Councils of the Republic were subject to the prior authorization of the general-in-chief.[12] It was not, perhaps, a military regime, but neither was it a constitutional regime.

France benefited from the right of conquest, and as such could insist that the Roman Republic's resources be used for the maintenance of French troops, leaving only their pay to be met by the French Republic. Lastly, there were the secret agreements by which the Roman Republic took on the costs of maintaining the army, modelled on the agreement between the administrator for contributions and finances of the Army of Italy (Haller) and Camille Corona, interior minister of the Roman Republic.[13] This agreement was supposed to remain secret, but was approved by the Consuls. It awarded France three million *piastras* in coin or paper money (*cedulas*) at the prevailing rate, and a million *piastras* in Church properties plus the estates of the Pope, of his family, and of several cardinals. In all, this agreement was worth around 35 million francs.

Thus, the term 'occupation regime' encompassed a transitional regime that was relatively indifferent towards the existing structures of local government. There was the 'military regime' in the strict sense, the constitutional regime that was embedded in a situation of generalized conflict, and finally this 'interim regime' that did not constitute an occupation in the strict sense but equally was not a peaceful, constitutional form. This organization was, in fact, comparable to the situation in France's western departments—where counterrevolution had been prevalent and military action had been needed—at the beginning of the Directory.[14]

Popular insurrections (*insorgenze*) broke out against the republican authorities and against the French forces. From April 1798 onwards they were endemic in the new departments of Trasimene (northeast), Cimino (northwest), and Circeo (south). The task of crushing these insurrections from now on would tie up the bulk of the French forces. It is, nevertheless, important to characterize this *insurrection* in order to understand the nature of the

regime it was directed against. Was it a *rebellion*? In that case the rising's political motivation is clear and the key issue concerns the legitimacy of the Republic. Or was it a variant of traditional *brigandage*, which received a new lease of life from the power vacuum and the acute economic and financial difficulties? If so, the main emphasis would be on the social dimension, given that patriotic motivations—the struggle against the foreign force of occupation—played only a marginal role, despite the exploitation of the risings in nationalist historiography.[15] It is no less important to characterize the operations of repression as the resistance to which they were a response. Debate on this aspect, however, has generated nowhere near the same level of interest. To avoid the risk of anachronism, I use the term *guerre de police*, that is, a situation in which the army assumes police functions, and which had been used since 1796 for the military operations to pacify the departments of western France. The term *guerre de police* would be applied to the operations carried out against 'rebels'. A state of war justified equating the *brigands* (refractory to the laws of the Republic) with external enemies.

The comparison with conditions in the departments of western France was made spontaneously by General Girardon, who led the counterinsurgency repression in the Circeo department to the south of Rome:

> The insurrection is of a serious nature; it is fuelled by fanaticism but is led by former nobles, and to excite the people they have put it about that France is at war with the emperor, that the English are before Civita-Vecchia, and finally that the French have abandoned Italy ... I have no intelligence on the number of the rebels; it is the whole country, the woods are full of them. It is exactly like the Vendée! The mountain area has dense cover, so you can tell the kind of war I am forced to wage.[16]

The insurrection spread rapidly and several towns declared themselves in a state of rebellion, though Piperno remained loyal to the Republic. French troops occupied Velletri, then Anagni, where they arrived just in time to prevent a revolt from breaking out in the town. This was the basis from which the expeditionary corps commanded by Girardon began the work of reconquest, using flying columns and garrisons. The main urban centres to fall into the hands of the rebels were Ferentino (an important communications centre), Frosinone, then Terracine (a border locality). The sacking of the town of Frosinone can be described in more detail. The fighting took place at night, at three in the morning. The townspeople, together with a large group of *sbirri*, fortified the approaches to the town. It was first bombarded with shells, whereupon sharpshooters were deployed towards the first line of fortified houses while the main street was subjected to a cannon firing in enfilade. When this first line of houses was at last overrun, the rebels fell back towards the centre of the town, protecting their retreat with carts formed into barricades. A sabre-wielding priest commanded the operations,

which ended when he was cut down on the barricades by a bayonet thrust. The rebels broke up, 'each to his own village'. Girardon counted 22 corpses, and limited reprisals to the torching of eight houses.[17]

The treatment inflicted on the rebel towns had to be exemplary. Girardon deplored this manner of handling the cities as impolitic, but he was referring to republican Piperno, and he accepted that the spectacular punishment of rebellious Frosinone had dissuaded localities like Veroli from insurrection. At the level of the command structure, imposing severe sentences on rebellious towns was accepted as a tactical weapon in this type of war. In a letter of 13 Thermidor Year VI (31 July 1798), General MacDonald had stressed to Girardon the importance of setting an example. Congratulating him on the 'terrible lesson that he had inflicted on the rebels of Ferentino, he hoped it would have the desired effect on the other insurgent towns'. In another letter of the same day, he was more specific about the punishment of Frosinone, hoping Girardon was moving to attack the town, for it was important that the insurgents there were taught a 'horrible lesson' as had been those of Veroli.

A year later in Tuscany, the exemplary value of punishment was again invoked to deter the local population from entering into insurrection. There the command highlighted the terrible example of the firing of Città del Castello in the Roman department of Trasimene. Local notables, headed by the elite and the clergy, recognized the authority of the Republic, and the priest of San Giovanni made efforts to calm his parishioners: 'Once again this morning … before an armed mob, I felt the need to recall the example of Citta di Castello and other towns and villages, and the levels of ruin and carnage to which the insurrection had reduced them.'[18]

Under the laws of war, which still applied, harsh measures were authorized when a town fell after a siege, but the military authorities sought to limit their responsibility when performing this type of policing activity. The threat of reprisal had to be preventive, and the locals would be treated as during any wartime military operation; if they did take hostile action, however, it meant that the dissuasive mechanism had not worked.[19] A comparison with internal policing operations was unavoidable, as the population subjected to violence was not an enemy population and therefore should enjoy the same constitutional safeguards for people and property as any citizen. The priority was to find those guilty of the violence. In the case of Frosinone, Girardon accused the Poles and requested that they be sent back to Rome: 'In the Frosinone affair, they committed atrocities that one's pen refuses to write; they heed no one, and at the sight of the corpse of one of their comrades they become enraged.' No further details of the atrocities are given, though we learn that when disarming the population 'they wrench the guns from those bringing them to the depots and resell them to the first peasant they meet'. The general wrote to Nadolski, commander of the Frosinone garrison: 'There have been complaints that the grenadiers are mistreating

the inhabitants of Frosinone.' He issued orders that a stop be put to these 'dishonourable barbarities'. MacDonald asked Girardon to investigate the conduct of the Polish officers who had given the example of disorder and looting in Frosinone and Ferentino.[20]

In Tuscany, it was Cisalpine troops (comprising one-third of the Tuscany division) who were implicated in military violence. Rivani long held back from using the Cisalpine troops because of the complaints about their misconduct towards civilians.[21] The bishop of Fiesole echoed public anger against these troops levied by a republic that was supposed to be the model for Italian unity: 'Despite repeated assurances that the population would have nothing to fear, no one could feel safe, knowing the character of these new Greeks.'[22]

Despite these criticisms, the overall verdict of the authorities on the military value of the Poles was positive, and included no reference to behaviour likely to lead to outbreaks of violence:

> Nothing compares to the worth shown by the Poles in this affair; six of their officers were wounded, forty junior officers or soldiers killed, and as many rendered incapable of fighting. If, as I said when speaking of the taking of Fiorentino, this troop does not possess quite the flexibility needed for a war of repeated small-scale operations, I must also say that they are incapable of retreating a single step.[23]

Furthermore, the Poles were not responsible for all of the theft. On 20 Thermidor, after noting that 'order is being re-established in Frosinone and that its inhabitants are returning', he admitted that the Poles had not been the only ones plundering, as 'poor inhabitants pillaged the houses of the wealthy'.

The undisciplined actions of the Poles appear to have stemmed from their dislike for the missions of law enforcement that they were called upon to perform with increasing frequency. The Polish Legion was originally formed to fight the Austrians. Dislike for policing work may explain their behaviour at Arezzo, when, sent to march against the rebel town, they circumvented the insurgents' positions in order to reach army headquarters at Florence as quickly as possible. Uncertainty over how to treat rebels reflected a broader uncertainty or even a contradiction over how to govern the civilian populations. The latter were potentially subject to manipulation by the enemy, and securing their support remained a basic aim. This then raised the question of citizenship.

What form of citizenship? With the advent of the democratic regimes, the citizen was no longer only the bourgeois. He was an actor, for whom possession of arms could not be dissociated from political rights. The symbolism of bearing arms was rooted in classical republicanism: A free man was an armed man. For their own safety, however, the military authorities decided

to disarm the population. To maintain order in Tuscany, the provisional administration confiscated the *carte de sûreté* from foreigners (who could thus be deported at any given time) and ordered the population to surrender its weapons. The only people allowed to keep arms were the police and local administrators.[24]

Disarming was clearly an essential condition for pacifying the insurgent territories. Girardon issued orders for the inhabitants of Veroli to surrender their weapons to the local commander, failing which they would be treated as rebels, brought before the military commission, and sentenced to death. The same order was issued in the commune of Monte San Giovanni and at the abbey of Casamari, and to the townspeople of Alatry. There the National Guard was suspended until further orders.[25] The National Guards symbolized the change in regime and were found wherever new municipalities were set up. Although the French authorities had no plans for Tuscany to become a future sister republic, nearly a dozen municipalities were established there in the main towns, and a National Guard or *Guardia Civil* was set up on 10 April 1799. Where there were not sufficient numbers of Guards, the locality was placed under a state of siege, as in Sienna under Ballet's command on 13 May, or Livorno under Miollis. Initially, and contrary to what happened in the neighbouring Roman Republic, there was no intention to democratize institutions: 'In the same way that it is not for the sake of the patriots that the French will have conquered the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, so it is not for their sake that they will give up those arrangements that may be preferable for reasons of general policy.'[26]

The French distrusted the Tuscan patriots and preferred to work with the local elites. Should this be interpreted as a position of principle, which distinguished the military commanders who opted for general democratization from the more 'moderate' commanders who, by obeying the instructions of the Directory, adhered to a conservative social policy? Matters were not that straightforward, although the military power was indeed divided between different political orientations. Emergency situations often dictated having recourse to the traditional intermediaries, the local notables, whose mediation was unavoidable to save lives and property. In addition to their rhetoric of law and order, the French authorities exploited an antiforeigner rhetoric, directed in this case against the Neapolitans and English: 'An insurrection has just broken out, Citizen General, in the department of Circeo, bordering the state of Naples, and everything leads us to believe that it is the Court of Naples that has excited and fomented it.'[27]

The Bourbons of Naples, in fact, intervened more directly in the affairs of the Roman Republic, taking advantage of the deepening divisions within the Consulate, and with the open support of the British, recently victorious at Aboukir. The Neapolitan army under the Austrian General Mack invaded its neighbour. In November 1798, with Austrian and Neapolitan troops advancing, the French authorities evacuated Rome.

It was during this retreat that a young French diplomatic agent, Alexandre Méchin, together with his wife and a few compatriots, became caught up in the rebellion at Viterbo. The members of the French party were driven from their inn, attacked by a mob intent on massacring them, and finally saved by Count Zelli, a patrician who had put himself at the head of a rebel municipality. Explaining this seizure of power, which eventually saved his life, Méchin writes: 'The honest folk had recognized the importance of taking control of matters, and of putting down the anarchy that threatened proprietors with imminent pillage.'[28] The French were sheltered and protected by Zelli. Méchin noted that all the good men wanted a military occupation of the town, be it French or Neapolitan: 'The state of anarchy that reigned in the town was intolerable.'[29] After a short and not particularly glorious Neapolitan military occupation, it was the turn of the French to be at the town gates. Some of the bourgeois approached Zelli to express their indignation at the 'persistent revolt of the peasants', referring to the section of the population that wanted to fortify the town to resist the French. Méchin and his compatriots acted as intermediaries between the besieged and the besiegers, and issued the notables with passes or '*sauvegardes*' authorizing movement. Kellermann issued an ultimatum and recalled the fate of the neighbouring town of Neppi, which just had been completely destroyed by fire and sword. Going to such extremes proved unnecessary, however, as the mediation of Méchin's group eventually succeeded. Kellermann entered the town, which was declared guilty, 'though the magnanimous behaviour of several of its notable inhabitants saved it from the terrible punishments that it deserved'. On 27 December, the entire Zelli family set off with the French party in the direction of Rome, 'as they feared individual acts of vengeance'.[30]

In many cases it was the National Guards who were the vanguard of the insurrections.[31] Caught between the rhetoric that attributed the unrest to the hostility of the traditional local notables, the clergy and nobility, and the necessary mediation of these same notables, the authorities placed more and more responsibilities with the local patriots, although they distrusted them. As the commissioner Reinhard conceded, they could not ignore the need to 'entrust civil authority to men committed to [our] cause'.[32]

Partial conscription was introduced in Sienna by Commandant Ballet with the aim of forming paid companies, modelled on the French auxiliary battalions. A gendarmerie was set up;[33] so, too, were volunteer corps that would form an auxiliary Etruscan legion.[34] Similar measures were taken on the territory of the Roman Republic, where a Roman legion was established under the command of Matera, who had been appointed by the Consuls.[35] General Gouvion Saint-Cyr alone decided the appointment of officers to the Roman gendarmerie. The contradictions persisted, for the situation was complex. At stake was control of the civilian population, and the republican ideal was one element—among others—in what was an essentially military

apparatus. The 'republicans' on whom the French increasingly came to rely had lost credibility and were hated by the local population. At the same time, it was practically impossible to dispense with the traditional elites as mediators. General Garnier complained about the reluctance of the local authorities to supply the army with food, yet he also sought to protect the local civilian population from the soldiers:

> I am informed of the thefts and misdemeanours that are committed daily by a few rotten individuals attached to the division in Rome who seek only to dishonour the French nation by going into the homes of local people and taking by force the little money they possess. The duty of those in command is to repress by a severe example these types of excesses, which are contrary to the Constitution and the law of nations, and it is not within the dignity of a commander to suffer that soldiers, despite the salutary advice he has given them, not only destroy property but rob from churches . . . [36]

Conclusion

War was the seedbed for the modern republican experience in the Italy of the Triennio, and it was the French army, not the Italian people, that was the protagonist in this historical moment. The regime set up at this time, though not strictly speaking an emergency regime, was nevertheless one of transition, an interim regime—no longer a military occupation regime, but not yet a constitutional regime. The central explanatory factor of this regime was mediation, yet in a different sense from the traditional forms of mediation that had characterized conflicts in the previous period, conflicts that were codified and whose ultimate goal was negotiation. The new forms of mediation induced by the phenomenon of citizenship led to a reconfiguration of the social actors. This was the case for the traditional elites, who could be confirmed as cadres of the new regime, but above all for the military, who were required to become political actors, sociocultural mediators.

The conclusion from this brief comparison between a proclaimed republic, the Roman Republic, and a provisional administration, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, is that the similarities between them outweigh the differences. What appears to connect them is the concept of an interim regime. Strategic considerations outweighed political ones. But there seems to be no evidence that the conflicts intensified solely because, in one case, the authorities had a more demanding attitude towards local people, while in the other remaining content with their neutrality. Conversely, there is also nothing to indicate that the status of sister republic afforded civilian populations any particular protection from military violence. This had implications for how this new citizenship was envisaged as a mode of government for populations and territories. Full and unrestricted citizenship implied that the people themselves adhered voluntarily to the new institutions. These

institutions, municipalities or National Guards, however, fell prey to conflicts in which the underlying issues are often hard to identify, and in which it is difficult to establish any clear dividing line between republicans and counterrevolutionaries or between pro-French patriots and the defenders of local liberties.[37]

Yet, in making citizenship the factor that legitimized the military presence, the perception of administrative practices changed and made them a target for criticism. The civil commissioner Faipoult, one of the key figures from the period, expressed this contradiction in the following terms: 'We should not on the one hand attribute the sentimental title of sister or daughter to the new republics, while on the other acting as if the French are superior to their brothers in liberty and can expect to receive from them preferential tributes and arbitrary and onerous pleasures.'[38]

In a similar vein, Charles Mangourit, one of the diplomats caught up in the Viterbo rising mentioned earlier, highlighted the importance of establishing legitimacy for an armed presence that could no longer be based solely on the deployment of force:

> The thieving, pillaging and violent requisitioning have alienated the Romans from us as they alienated the Lombards, but what makes them far more bitter still is the profound contempt shown for them by the soldier. They are treated like degraded beings, instead of helping them recover the rank which they have lost. They are referred to as *pékins*. Would it not be better to call them brothers? And is there not a danger that bitter disdain will make them into our irreconcilable enemies? The Directory should correct all these evils as soon as it can.[39]

Ideally, a transitional regime involved a progressive and proportional deployment of force, which is the exact hallmark of a *guerre de police*. In fact, it came down to a matter of conscience and culture.

Notes

1. Translated from the French by Sylvie Kleinman, revised, with additional material, by Godfrey Rogers.
2. Gilles Candela, 'L'armée d'Italie (1792–1797): Des missionnaires armés à la naissance de la guerre napoléonienne', thèse de doctorat (University of Aix-Marseille, 2007).
3. *Occupants et Occupés (1792–1815): Colloque de Bruxelles, 29 et 30 janvier 1968* (Brussels, 1969).
4. Howard G. Brown, 'The Search for Stability', in *Taking Liberties: Problems of a New Order from the French Revolution to Napoleon*, ed. Howard G. Brown and Judith A. Miller (Manchester, 2002), 34. Advocates of the theory of military as puppet master are in fact repeating the argument put forward by Albert Dufourcq in *Le Régime jacobin en Italie (1798–1799): Etude sur la République romaine* (Paris, 1900).
5. Annie Jourdan, *La Révolution batave, entre la France et l'Amérique (1795–1806)* (Rennes, 2008); Maria Pia Donato, et al., *Una rivoluzione difficile: La Repubblica*

romana del 1798–1799 (Pisa and Rome, 2000); and Antonino De Francesco, 'La question de la nationalité dans l'Italie révolutionnaire 1796–1801', in *La plume et le sabre: Hommages offerts à Jean-Paul Bertaud*, ed. Michel Biard et al. (Paris, 2002), 443–454.

6. Bernard Gainot, 'I rapporti franco-italiani nel 1799: Tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare', in *Società e Storia* 76 (1997): 345–376.

7. *L'Italie du triennio révolutionnaire (1796–1799),* special issue of *AHRF* 313 (1998).

8. Gwenaëlle Bodard, *Ronciglione*, mémoire de master (University of Paris I, 2007); Julien Lefebvre, *Un printemps en Toscane,* mémoire de maîtrise (University of Paris I, 2005); Dominique Sforza, *Influences françaises sur la République romaine*, mémoire de mâitrise (University of Paris I, 2001).

9. Standardized throughout this collection as SHD, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes.

10. Marc Belissa, *Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713–1795): Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens* (Paris, 1998); Eugenio Di Rienzo, *Il diritto delle armi: Guerra e politica nell'Europa moderna* (Milan, 2005).

11. AD, Archives diplomatiques, Paris. Political correspondence, Tuscany, 152/118.

12. Carlo Ghisalberti, *Le costituzioni 'giacobine', 1796–1799* (Milan, 1957).

13. AN Archives nationales, Paris, AF III 77, doss. 1, fol. 10.

14. Bernard Gainot, 'La guerre de police contre les brigands: Une innovation tactique sous le Directoire', in *Les brigands*: *Criminalité et protestation politique (1750–1850)*, ed. Valérie Sottocasa (Rennes, 2013,), 153, 175

15. Antonino De Francesco, *1799: Una storia d'Italia* (Milan, 2004).

16. SHD, B3/54, Army of Italy: Girardon to MacDonald, 11 Thermidor Year VI [29 July 1798]; Maria Pia Critelli and Georges Segarini, 'Une source inédite de l'histoire de la Révolution romaine: Les registres du commandant Girardon: L'insorgenza du Latium méridional et la Campagne du Circeo', in *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome* 104/1 (1992): 245–453; SHD 1/M 457, 'Summary of the operations of General Girardon'; Georges Segarini and Maria Pia Critelli (eds), *Le patriotisme et le courage: La Repubblica Napoletana del 1799 nei manoscritti del generale di brigata Antoine Girardon* (Naples, 2000).

17. SHD, 1/M 457, 'Summary of the operations', Report from Girardon of 15 Thermidor Year VI [2 August 1798].

18. 'Stamane di nuovo..., al pieno concorso degli armati Popoli mi son fatto sentir perorare con portar l'esempio di Città di Castello, ed altre Città e terre a qual rovina, e strage erano ridotte dalle insurrezioni'. Roberto Rosa, 'Il 1799 a Fiesole: L'occupazione francese e le insorgenze attraverso documentari inediti dell'archivio capitlare e vescovile', in *La Toscana e la Rivoluzione francese*, ed. Ivan Togarini (Naples, 1994), 51.

19. Vincent Denis and Bernard Gainot, 'De l'art du maintien de l'ordre chez Sieyès, 1791', in *Les mémoires policiers, 1750–1850: Ecritures et pratiques policières du Siècle des lumières au Second Empire*, ed. Vincent Milliot (Rennes, 2006), 219–233.

20. SHD, 1/M 457, 'Summary of the operations of General Girardon', Report from Girardon of 17 Thermidor Year VI [4 August 1799].

21. ASFi Archivio di Stao di Firenze, *Buongoverno*, filza 2, 156. Rivani al comandante Espert.

22. 'Nonostante le assicurazioni date più volte che la popolazione non avrebbe dovuto aver nulla da temere, nessuno sapeva starsene tranquillo, sapendo qual era il carattere di questi nuovi greci'. Rosa, 'Il 1799 a Fiesole', 39–40. The allusion

to the Greeks comes from Virgil's *Aeneid*: 'Timeo Danaos dona ferentes' ['I fear the Greeks especially when they come bearing gifts'].

23. AG, 1/M 457, 'Summary of the operations of General Girardon'; and in Segarini and Critelli, *Le patriotisme*, 12.

24. 'Proclamation of General Gaulthier', 8 May 1799, *Monitore fiorentino*, 20 Floréal Year VII [9 May 1799].

25. SHD, B3/55, Register of the correspondence of the Army of Italy, August 1798.

26. *Monitore fiorentino*, 18 Floréal Year VII [7 May 1799]. 'Proclamation of Reinhard to the inhabitants of Tuscany', 16 Floréal Year VII [5 May 1799].

27. SHD, B3/54, 'The commissioners of the Executive Directory of the French Republic sent to Rome'; 19 Thermidor Year VI [31 July 1798] in Register of the correspondence of the Army of Italy.

28. BNF, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Alexandre-Edme Méchin (1762–1849), 'Relation des évènements qui ont eu lieu à Viterbe depuis le 27 novembre 1798 jusqu'au 28 décembre suivant' (Laon, 1808), microfilm M/3858, 37.

29. BNF, Méchin, 'Relation des évènements', 47.

30. Ibid. 87.

31. Giovanni Turi, *Viva Maria, Riforme, rivoluzione, e insorgenze in Toscana (1790–1799)* (Bologne, 1999).

32. AN, AB XIX, fol. 2833; Reinhard to Gaulthier, 17 Floréal Year VII [6 May 1799].

33. ASFi, *Buongoverno*, doss. 707, fol. 6, Cittadino Facchinei: 'Progetto della forma di un corpo di Gendarmi al servizio della Polizia di Firenze'.

34. SHD, B3/322*, MacDonald to Reinhard, 14 Prairial Year VII [6 June 1799].

35. AN, AF III 77, Decree of 19 Prairial Year VI [7 June 1798]; SHD, B3/54, Letter from the commissioners to the Directory, Rome, 9 Messidor Year VI [17 June 1798].

36. ASRo, Archivio di Stato di Roma, *Repubblica Romana*/2, doss. Garnier, Order of the day of divisional General Garnier, Army of Naples, Division of Rome, Rome headquarters, 18 Prairial Year VII [6 June 1799].

37. Bernard Gainot, 'I paradossi della democratizzazione delle repubbliche sorelle', in *La democrazia alla prova della spada: Esperienza e memoria del 1799 in Europa*, ed. Antonino De Francesco (Milan, 2003), 33–43; Maria Pia Donato, 'La questione dell'estremismo', in Ibid. 45–59; Marita Gilli, 'Independence ou annexion; une république mort-née, la République cisrhénane', in Ibid. 61–82; Francesca Fausta Gallo, 'Le insorgenze abruzzesi in prospettiva; il caso di Teramo', in Ibid. 151–162; Antonio Lerra, 'Le Municipalità democratiche e popolari nella Basilicata del 1799', in Ibid. 431–460.

38. Letter from Paypoult to La Reveillère, Rome, 21 Prairial Year VI [9 June 1798], in Louis-Marie La Reveillère-Lépaux, *Mémoires*, ed. Ossian La Revellière-Lépeaux and Robert David d'Angers, 3 vols (Paris, 1895), vol. 3, 441.

39. AN, AF III 72, Letter from C. Mangourit, *chargé d'affaires* in Naples to the Executive Directory, 14 Vendémiaire Year VII [5 October 1798].

11

Force of Arms, Force of Opinions: Counterrevolution in the Papal States, 1790–1799[1]

Mario Tosti

Those investigating the historical roots of modernity, who seek to uncover its origins and explore the development of secularization, cannot overlook the late revolutionary period under Napoleon Bonaparte. This truth extends equally to Italy. It is certainly no accident that over the last two decades scholarship has poured forth a wealth of material concerning the period's ideological debates, its journalism, the formation of consensus, the forces massed against the democratic ordering of state and society, and state measures regarding welfare and military organization. As far as religious history is concerned, certain aspects of belief and behaviour have been studied in essays on revolutionary and counterrevolutionary activities. The varying reactions of bishops and other church members to occupying forces and alternating regimes have been scrutinized, for instance. The analysis of civil democratic celebrations has led to an understanding of the rituals and behavioural patterns that constituted the prelude to secularizing processes in Italy as well as in France.

One particular point to emerge is that a relationship existed between the ideological baggage introduced by the commissioners who accompanied the French revolutionary forces, and the cultural and institutional history—including the ecclesiastical and religious aspects—of the occupied countries. In a certain sense, it seems fair to state that, in the European countries, a single French military occupation actually did not exist. Instead, there were many forms of occupation, and they varied according to the historical–institutional situations of the individual countries.[2]

It does not seem possible, therefore, to speak of uniformity with regard to the local responses of the countries under French occupation. Even within the French Directory itself, the conflict between those supporting war as the continuation of revolutionary liberation and the creator of free republics, and those supporting the system of annexations pure and simple, militated

against the idea of the State as a political centre. Yet, it is true as well that, where the enlightened reformer-tradition was stronger and more deeply rooted, the reactions to the Revolution appear more as mere confrontations than as open conflicts. These attitudes, then, generated responses that ranged from collaboration to resistance to outright opposition, depending on a region's social and cultural circumstances. Stronger antagonism to the Revolution arose, however, in regions where enlightened reforms had little or no influence on the country's economic structures and ruling class.

Those more conservative conditions persisted in the Papal States. The establishment of republics in papal cities provoked widespread hostility: It was not the oaths sworn against the monarchy and absolutism that represented the greatest difficulties for the clergy, but the introduction of ten-day weeks, the complete transformation of the calendar, and the abolition of religious holidays. Events in Rome demonstrated how resistance, sometimes violent, arose where the revolutionary presence was viewed as an ideological and religious assault. Jacobin demands for the 'purification' of faith—that is, the abolition of all the rituals that constituted the foundations of Catholic devotion and which were perceived as 'superstitions'—inevitably came into conflict with the social structure of a city like Rome. The city was managed through pious works, societies, colleges and hospitals, all run by a complex confraternal organization that, under the auspices of cardinals and men of the Papal Curia, gave the impression of an urban model still conforming to the principles and spirit of the Council of Trent. This religious dimension seems to have exerted the greatest influence on opinion throughout most of the population and was one of the factors that, at least in the Papal States, contributed powerfully to the shaping of beliefs regarding the events and the ideology of the French Revolution.

The most salient feature of these religious convictions was the deep penetration of the anti-Enlightenment, anti-Jansenist perspective, which soon became anti-Revolutionary. It seems as if there were no library in the papal provinces that did not possess, and no parish priest who had not read, one of the many pamphlets printed by the two Umbrian publishers of Foligno and Assisi, Tomassini and Sgariglia—the 'forge of Italian anti-Jansenism', as Codignola described Sgariglia.[3] After the Society of Jesuits had been expelled from Spanish territories in 1767, many former Jesuits had sought refuge in the Papal States and, between 1780 and 1783, enthusiastically assisted the two Umbrian publishers in printing (or reprinting) works by leading Jesuits such as Carlo Borgo, Emanuele Mariano Iturriaga, Francesco Antonio Zaccaria, and Lodovico Patouillet.[4]

In 1784, however, this anti-Jansenist publishing programme came into conflict with the Roman Curia. The episode is fairly well known, and concerned Sgariglia's anti-Jansenist publication of the *Lettera di un Arcivescovo scritta a Monsignor Scipione Ricci.* . . .[5] The Jesuit Diego Josè Fuensalida, a theologian who would be in the service of cardinal Chiaramonti, Bishop of

Imola, from 1788 onwards was the most likely author of the work, which violently attacked Ricci, the prelate of Pistoia, a Jansenist sympathizer.[6] At that time, however, Rome was pursuing a policy of moderation towards Ricci. When Sgariglia learned of the Roman attitude, he immediately tried to contact the Secretary of State. The response of the Jansenists and the Tuscan government was even swifter. Consequently, Pope Pius VI, through Cardinal Pallavicini, ordered the Bishop of Assisi to remove the canon Alessandro Patrignani from his position as editor. Patrignani was accused of having given his approval to a publication 'profligate with terms and expressions contemptuous of the person of Monsignor Bishop of Pistoia'.[7] The canon, in turn, placed all the blame upon the publisher from Assisi.[8] However, unlike the cases of the publishers Luigi Perego of Rome and Achille Marozzi of Forlì—respectively exiled and arrested just a few years before—no further legal action was taken against Sgariglia.

Although the printer lost work as a result of this episode, one can imagine that he was forced to adopt a publishing policy that flirted with controversy.[9] In this way, in the period between the Habsburg reforms and the birth pangs of the French Revolution, when Pavia and Pistoia became the main centres of Italian Jansenism, Rome remained the Italian and the European anti-Jansenist stronghold. The city was cautious, however, particularly with regard to the courts in Pistoia, which tended to discourage any publication of condemnation, at least until the synod in Rome had concluded its investigations. This did not occur until 1794, when the bull *Auctorem fidei* effectively condemned many of the Pistoian courts' propositions. This meant that the anti-Pistoia and anti-Ricci press could undertake its activities only in outlying cities, including Assisi and Foligno. As a result, the fortunes of Ottavio Sgariglia in Assisi and his father-in-law Giovanni Tomassini were made.

The events in France were largely responsible for the transition from anti-Jansenism to anti-Jacobinism, but a contributing factor was the acceptance of 'refractory elements'—those priests and religious persons who, refusing to swear an oath to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, had been forced to emigrate from France. One can conceive that certain individuals, whether lay or religious, might infiltrate the 'refractory' ranks of this migratory clergy, if only to escape France. Sometimes it was the French priests themselves who reported these illicit interlopers.[10]

The common imagination tended, in fact, to merge the concepts of 'Jansenist' and 'Jacobins', and, indeed, the author of the *Dizionario ricciano ed antiricciano*, published in 1793 by Francesco Eugenio Guasco—described by Luciano Guerci as 'the Voltaire of the counterrevolution'—actually employed the term 'Jan-Jacobins'.[11] This fear of Jansenism appeared to be still another element that reduced, or even wholly did away with, the credibility of the French clergy. This anxiety focused on those of the 'refractory' party, who presented themselves at the borders of the Papal States burdened by the suspicion of Jansenist sympathies.[12]

Texts that deal with the Catholic counterrevolution in Italy, compared with those in the rest of Europe, seem interested primarily in the anti-Jansenist debate. Because they rejected an historical analysis of the revolutionary events, polemicists excitedly promoted the mysterious origins of the crisis, encouraging belief in the legend of the Bourg-Fontaine conspiracy. As the historian Vittorio Emanuele Giuntella wrote: 'The thesis of the great conspiracy of philosophers and Jansenists, who merely pretended to be Christians in order to better deceive the masses with the fool's gold of a pure, austere Christian faith, is both unreservedly accepted and promulgated even by our own counterrevolutionaries.'[13]

According to the former Jesuit Francesco Gustà, 'the main authors and instigators of the revolution' were the Jansenists, who even excelled the philosophers 'in promoting Jacobinism'.[14] Extending this idea, many declared the Jansenist the greatest danger of all, a 'hidden enemy' who 'surprises and wounds without opposition'.[15] The recurring image is that of 'a wolf in sheep's clothing, concealed by a cassock and a meek expression of humility'.[16] Despite the appearance of doctrinal rigour, 'the love of Jesus Christ always on their lips and the pomp of their sublime moral theories', it was all 'mere artifice to cover their evil plans'.[17] Counterrevolutionary texts depicted Jansenists in ways that were designed to arouse suspicion. The emphasis on the Jansenists' talent for opportunism helped increase the apprehension that the stream of migrants already had spread throughout large sections of the population.

In certain areas of the Roman Curia, partly as a result of its slow response to 1789 in France, prudence and dialogue were overtaken by a radical refutation of the ideas behind the Revolution. At this point, it was the former Jesuits who were identified as 'the most faithful and most useful irregulars' in the shift from information to propaganda.[18] Famously, in these pages, the Revolution was not viewed as a rationally understandable and verifiable political and historical phenomenon. Instead, it was deemed a 'plot', 'intrigue', or 'conspiracy'—elements not yet fused into an organic, consistent perspective. At times, indeed, these were terms that drew on conceptions already expressed in the Catholic world regarding the limits of an absolute sovereign's jurisdiction, ecclesiastical reform, the suppression of the Jesuits, and Enlightenment philosophy's proclamation of the principle of religious freedom. This conceptual framework presented the Revolution as the final result of a long series of errors that began with the emancipation of the individual from the power of Rome. The Revolution, then, was a punishment visited upon man—and in particular the Church—by Divine Providence, to chastise his feeble attempts to resist impiety in the modern world.[19]

The historian Luciano Guerci recently emphasized the fundamental role that Italian counterrevolutionary texts attributed to the Jansenists, 'those implacable enemies of the altar and the throne'. Moreover, he insisted on presenting the pairing of 'uniqueness' and 'overthrow' as a combination

peculiar to the Italian writers of the counterrevolution. 'The French Revolution', wrote Guerci, 'was a unique phenomenon in the history of humanity (or at least unique in the history of revolutions) and turned the world on its head: a world turned upside down, in contrast with the Old Regime, which was the only order our writers could consider and accept.'[20]

Naturally, the authorities of the Papal States attempted to organize an armed defence of their borders. A budgetary deficit, however, worsening from 1789 onwards, and the consequent reduction of funds for military expenses, made these attempts fairly ineffective. They were, as the Venetian ambassador Antonio Capello pointed out, 'more a matter of appearance than reality and certainly a mere waste of expense'.[21] In fact, Rome was always hesitant to commit its forces to the field. Any military venture enjoined by the Pope alongside other powers was rendered difficult not only 'by the weight of the moral requirements to which his actions as temporal sovereign should aspire' but also by the modest size, archaic trappings, and inadequate training of the Papal armies. He was thus well advised to refrain from any form of military operation.[22]

The soundness of this strategy was experienced at first hand by the party of intransigence, with Cardinal Gianfrancesco Albani at its head. This faction wanted to establish a civil militia at all costs and re-equip the regular army in order to confront the French, who had by then arrived in Romagna. Bonaparte's war was a wholly new phenomenon, and one that departed entirely from eighteenth-century manuals of correct military conduct.[23] The French military was dedicated to the idea of bringing change and was inspired by a progressive pedagogical mission to seize and transform history. The peoples and the cities it conquered were saturated with novel expressions such as 'human rights', 'liberty', and 'democracy'.[24] Once Rome understood this revolutionary aspect, it retired from the field of battle, while nevertheless offering moral support to those governments prepared to maintain an antirevolutionary position. The city thus evolved into 'one of the main reference points for counterrevolutionary forces'—a religious identity that also, inevitably, became a political one.[25]

Gradually within the Curia the idea grew that this combat needed to be undertaken in a completely new way. It was, as Giovanni Marchetti explained, 'a war of an exceptional character, and its outcome may not be decided in the light of those other, more common sorts of war, that we have seen in our own lifetime, or read about in history books'.[26] An anonymous document, kept among the Secretary of State's papers in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, and brought to light by the historian Massimo Cattaneo, 'clearly displays how aware Rome's governing body was regarding the need to win the battle against the French Revolution, not only in military terms but also, and above all, on a cultural level'.[27] The document, dated 15 November 1792 and entitled *Della fuga nei presenti pericoli alla Santità di N. S. Pio Papa VI*, advised the pontiff on how to react with regard to rumours

of an imminent French invasion of the territories of Saint Peter, suggesting strategies to counter not only their military strength 'but also...their opinions'. The central concept was the creation of strong preventive measures against those ideas that the Enlightenment and the Revolution had stirred up in France. The anonymous author wrote:

> Once it might have seemed true that the last resort of kings was the cannon. Yet today, when an idea has proved mightier than the cannon and Europe's most powerful monarch has been destroyed, who can now doubt that the first concern of a Prince must be the skilful moulding of opinion, and trust more in this, rather than in force of arms. No longer will it be possible to conquer a state of more than a hundred thousand subjects if these subjects should maintain a firm and unanimous opinion against the conqueror. It is as if this multitude were one single being...If opinion is truly in opposition and generally accepted, what is an army of one hundred thousand men that threatens to march to Rome? Children, women, and the elderly of all ages make formidable soldiers.[28]

According to Cattaneo's analysis, this document already displayed 'many of the elements that were to characterize the subsequent strategy deployed by counterrevolutionary propaganda with the aim of discrediting the French and their Italian sympathizers on the basis of impiety in religious terms and the "deceitful" use of expressions such as "liberty" and "equality" '.[29] It was a tactic that gave a decisive role to Rome and the party of zealous agents that gravitated around the journal *Giornale Ecclesiastico di Roma* while assigning former Jesuits to a position of conscious support.

To win the battle against the Revolution it was necessary to create a mass movement, and this was only possible through methods such as agitation, propaganda and persuasion. The techniques employed by the counterrevolutionaries demonstrated a singular talent in not only using the means of communication that were available at that time, but also initiating a two-tiered action. First, they published a series of texts and pamphlets aimed at a limited group of readers. Then, once debate was underway and the matter suitably aired, they addressed themselves to the faithful as a whole and called upon them to participate directly in the controversy. Pamphlets and texts designed for the cultivated classes were joined by songs, dramas, and ballads, composed in the style of popular culture, which promulgated the principles of the counterrevolution.[30] With the help of mediators, parish priests and preachers, this form of literature was disseminated to the lower classes, creating a mass movement that went beyond the constitution of a regular army and establishing pockets of armed, popular opposition throughout the territory.[31]

It was in the 1794 works of one former Jesuit—Francesco Gustà, whose writings were featured heavily in the catalogue of the two Umbrian publishers mentioned earlier—and especially in his *Saggio critico sulle crociate*

that the idea was advanced that the Church and the papacy should play the same civilizing and leadership roles in this crisis as they had in the Middle Ages. They should encourage people 'from every rank of society' to rise up as volunteers in a holy crusade against France. This proposal, although greeted enthusiastically by the press, provoked firm opposition from the Holy See itself, as we have seen.[32] In 1794, the political climate favoured an anti-French crusade but in the end interest waned, partly due to the diffidence of Pius VI, only to be rekindled in 1796 during Bonaparte's Italian campaign.[33] Gustà's plan for a call to arms of the entire population gained new adherents, revealing just how he perceptive was with regard to the circumstances generated by the Revolutionary army. 'Ordinary military force against such extraordinary violence is not enough', he wrote.

> Neither are the usual measures suitable against such awesome ferocity. If defence must be established in proportion to offence, then no other means exists except a mass uprising in order to combat these Revolutionaries. Mass conscription was the great solution decided, and partially carried out, by the Jacobins, in order to send such a formidable force against their enemies. They did so by requiring all men between the ages of 15 and 60 capable of bearing weapons to enlist in the militia, and thereby they created a veritable host of armies.[34]

Such ideas led him to reinforce the notion of a 'popular crusade' against the French: 'The mass conscriptions of the French are of the type that have spread terror amongst the neighbouring countries . . . It is necessary, therefore, to arm every rank of person, above all farmers and tradesmen, who, used as they are to manual labour, can more easily bear the hardships and unavoidable torments of a military campaign.'[35]

This call for exceptional, widespread popular mobilization was advocated again, especially in the Papal States, in several pamphlets and vernacular poems when the Revolution swept over the Alps and into Italy. It is widely held that this literature contained the ideal motivations for an armed anti-French uprising, that is, the religious fervour that distinguished the three-year period of popular revolts. A further strategy that the clergy's ruling echelons deployed along with their propaganda, however, appeared equally important: the 'reinvigoration of religious practice'. This effort promoted 'all those forms and moments of religiosity most capable of capturing the attention of ordinary people, of communicating with their hearts, of impressing upon their minds a sense of inseparable belonging, both in a religious and political sense'.[36] Towards that end, popular missions and processions proliferated, in Rome itself to an almost ridiculous extent. Figures such as Benedetto Labre and Leonardo da Porto Maurizio were sanctified and deemed capable of addressing the challenge presented by the Enlightenment and the Revolution. Such saints were proposed especially as models

for women and the poor, 'two categories of people to whom the Church, dis-illusioned and betrayed by the élites, turned its attention more and more'.[37]

This prevailing historiographic perspective, therefore, has hypothesized the development of a pre-planned strategy, which sought to re-establish control over the minds and souls of the urban and rural working classes. Such a plan not only would incite popular anti-French revolts, but also would foreshadow the social alliances of nineteenth-century Catholicism. Obviously no one would deny the cultural and religious factors involved in the revolts. Both the republican press and the accounts of the French generals often cited parallels with the Vendée, thus recognizing similar religious and legitimist roots in the Italian rebellion. And yet this does not imply automatically that such revolts were a Catholic and monarchical phe-nomenon, as has been asserted.[38] Nor does it mean that popular religion may be employed as an instrument to unite counterrevolutionary resistance at every level, as a synonym for reaction, from the Papal States down to Calabria. The reference to religion in the language and symbolism of the revolts, and in particular to Marian worship, cannot be underestimated, of course. In fact, it seems to be one of the main causal links between upris-ings that otherwise often occurred through very different local dynamics and that followed very different sequences of events. It is necessary, how-ever, to agree on the meaning of this religious dimension: It was the places and practices of popular religious life—places both formal and informal, from holy shrines to confraternities—that the rebels defended from attack, for the new government did not interfere with the normal course of reli-gious life on the sacramental level.[39] It should be cautioned, however, that no single popular religion existed that manifested itself everywhere in the same manner. Every popular religion was shaped not only by local cultural traditions, but also by the particular institutions around which it devel-oped. For instance, a more urban form of popular religion existed, which was 'influenced by opinions [regarding the boundaries of civil and religious powers], which adapts to the situation, involving collaboration with the French authorities, in the hope of achieving a purified faith, free from the burden of paraliturgical traditionalisms and from intermingling with superstitious practices'.[40]

It does not seem possible to us, therefore, in many cases, when attempting to establish a history of popular religiosity in such a complex context as that of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic age, to avoid references to local ecclesiastical habits and institutions, to their relationship with the families of the area, and to the nature of patrimonies and benefices. The old idea that, with the Enlightenment and the Revolution, the Church transformed its pastoral strategy, abandoning the city for the country, equally requires correction. If, during the Restoration, popular missions among the 'uncouth' and the 'idiots'—to use the terminology of the time—became more numer-ous, these missions had been in operation in the seventeenth century and

were renewed and enlarged in the eighteenth century, as the examples of the Passionists and the Redemptorists of Saint Alphonsus demonstrated.[41]

It would not be fair to interpret the discourse regarding popular missions as seeking consensus around the Church in rural areas, or as a use of religious devotion in antiurban or antienlightened bourgeois terms. Such an approach would apply a political methodology that explains relatively contemporary circumstances to one that was very different historically, and that featured pre-political mentalities and little social mobility— situations in which areas were economically unrelated and lacked uniformity with regard to law, culture and tradition. The eighteenth-century mission tended to replace devotion and devotional practices with a 'popular religion', which was the same faith for the bourgeois and the 'poor', but was explained and intensified in the dramatic language—more mystical than catechistic—of the late Catholic Reformation.[42] Popular religion could be used as a catalyst for collective emotion, but never as the source of law and public order, and certainly not as the lasting basis for any modern state.

The Italian scholarship seems to be lagging behind somewhat in this field of research, lingering as it has over the attractions of forms of popular and magical 'subcultures', envisioned as a flight from history. The analysis of the literature, in other words, relating to, or resulting from, the political events that stretch from Enlightenment reforms to the French Revolution, all too often confirms the impression of a marked politicization of Catholicism. Thus, when read in this political light, the new saints appear to be the Roman answer to the cult of the Revolutionary martyrs, which exploded in France at the time of the *sanculotterie*. Alternatively, they can be interpreted in a psychological and social light as the Church's 'clear design' to keep the popular classes under its sway just as emancipation was drawing away the intellectual élites and the middle classes. In reality, a close analysis of the theological, spiritual and religious practices in Italy at the time of the French Revolution would endorse a reading of the reasons for beatification and the corresponding hagiographical literature between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century 'in its proper religious sense, that is, as documents of a culture and religious mentality becoming aware of sanctity as a gift that God bestowed upon every walk of life'.[43]

In other words, the change in attitude, the transformation towards a more optimistic and caring spirituality more accessible to everyone—which is visible in the last 30 years of the eighteenth century in the books of Alfonso de Liguori, and in the reclamation, in the ten-year Revolutionary period, of Saint François de Sales—bears witness to the belief that a Christianity finally experienced in terms of its *beauties* (the term appears in the subtitle of Chateaubriand's work) and its *delights* (a term that would enjoy a certain popularity in the religious literature of the Romantic Age) might be able to

halt the general apostasy. The processes of beatification, therefore, could be read as the hierarchy's compliance with a sort of 'push from below', which had become more and more forceful.[44]

In reality, even appeals designed to conquer public opinion were not unprecedented strategies. We know that in the period immediately following the Council of Trent the Church had played an important role in the promotion of sacred works, from catechism to the lives of the saints, as an anti-protestant manoeuvre. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, came the crisis of the Inquisition and the growing realization that it had become impossible to block the circulation of prohibited books by applying the coercive methods of the Catholic Reformation. These events, together with the new entrepreneurial strategies of publishing houses and the discovery of the press's enormous educational potential in relation to every social class, forced the Church to alter its policy, as Patrizia Delpiano recently demonstrated, 'from the level of repression to that of persuasion'. In the eighteenth century, wrote Delpiano, a new war of books began: a battle that was no longer fought, however, around what was allowed or not allowed to be read, but one which dealt with the far more complex mechanisms of the government of ideas.[45] Qualification is necessary, however, with regard to the idea that the invitation contained in certain counterrevolutionary texts to launch a new war of religion against France and the French stimulated a 'general arming of the people' to 'attack the enemy from all sides'.[46] And this qualification must be extended to the notion that this encouragement was taken up by the rebels in the first, more spontaneous and fragmentary phase of the revolt (spring–summer 1798), and then inspired the spring 1799 revolt led by Austro-Russian and Neapolitan troops together with the 'Viva Maria' groups from Arezzo. While the religious component of the anti-French revolts should not be discounted, documents do suggest that seeking a 'single cause' explanation, at least in the early stages, is hardly fruitful. No one would deny, even with reference to these early phases, that the revolt was an act of resistance against the profanation of a certain type of religious sentiment. But this becomes far clearer in the last, decisive, period of the rebellion, with the overthrow of the Republic, when the insurgents formed part of the regular troops of the anti-French coalition or the 'Viva Maria' group from Arezzo. This was, after all, the aim of Francesco Gustà's book: not to urge the people towards a sort of 'guerrilla warfare' against the French, but to launch an appeal to the European powers to join them and take the war directly to France and the French-occupied territories. The former Jesuit frequently emphasized that his observations regarded 'the Princes and their Ministers' and that he had nothing to instil in the people but 'subjection, respect and love for their government'. He knew that an appeal for a general arming of the populace might have a disconcerting effect on 'certain timid and over-cautious politicians' and added:

the multitude is like a blind man incapable of holding himself upright. He needs a guide for his every movement, his every action. The same dependence that can be observed in civil order must be maintained in the execution of such an arming … Obedience and military discipline must be the constitutive essentials, indispensable to this great movement.

This was a guarantee that only religion could offer, and he therefore concluded: 'Let a standard be raised and let a Crucifix be woven therein, that it shows the soldiers to what they pertain.'[47]

Abbé Giovanni Marchetti, in his work *Che importa ai preti …*, published in 1797, illustrated the uniqueness of the Revolutionary phenomenon at some length.[48] He then examined the possible steps to take when dealing with a war that he described as 'of a completely new type of ferocity, with no respect for the ancient rights of nations, with no sense of humanity', for it was fought by people without religion.[49] Considering the question whether it was justifiable 'to animate the threatened or occupied peoples by openly declaring this to be a war of religion', he answered that it was.[50] He never employed the term 'crusade' in relation to war against the French, however. The abbé stated that it was certainly a war of religion, but with characteristics that meant it was not necessary to resort to the mass conscription so keenly recommended by Gustà in 1794 and that was greeted once again with fresh approval in 1796, as the French army swept into Italy.[51] This was openly taking a stance against Gustà's work. Curiously enough, Marchetti claimed in a note that he was not familiar with the former Jesuit's writings, as if they had never been reviewed favourably by the *Giornale Ecclesiastico di Roma*, where the abbé from Empoli was chief editor.[52] Marchetti did not seem convinced at all that it would be a good idea to arm entire peoples in a general fashion. At the very least, he felt, it would be an imprudent action, and one which no 'legitimate church authority' had until then pronounced upon. There was the risk of creating all that chaos 'relating to a tumultuous invasion of the new Republic'. His desire, rather, was for Church and throne to find themselves united once again in the re-establishment of order and religion: 'Let it be announced to the people … that the reason for this war is to defend the Faith and that how this defence should be enacted will be decided by those who command.'[53]

In another pamphlet, of some relevance to the matter under discussion, the Papal States made a direct and heartfelt first-person plea to the other Italian states to form a common front in order to push back the imminent invasion.[54] After having listed all the wrongs suffered and emphasizing that the Papal States wished to reach an agreement—as, according to the anonymous author, the signing of the treaty of Tolentino demonstrated[55]—the States claimed the right to exist in the new European geographical map that France had redrawn, and to defend their people: 'I shall raise my people from ignominy and fight to defend both them and my holy possessions, for

it would be better for me to die in battle than to see my people exterminated and these possessions lost.'[56]

It was an appeal to fellow states not to leave the Papal territories to their fate, and stated that this was no traditional war. It was not necessary to take sword in hand 'for warfare's ancient reasons, that is, to increase or defend one's dominion', but only for 'the honour of my God, of my nation and of you my fellow States yourselves'. And the text continued:

> This is a common cause. When was there ever seen a more threatening and more important war than this? This concerns the general overthrow of all order; this concerns the undermining of Religion, property, persons, customs, prerogatives, opinions, national honour, everything. It is a truly new type of war—a war of swords, of precepts, of division. No other expedient exists than to arm one's self with resolution and courage.[57]

The appeal seemed to demonstrate an awareness that the new coupling of 'war' with 'republic' that had appeared on the political scene at the end of the eighteenth century was forcing the pontiff to abandon the pursuit of his policies using the same instruments as his neighbouring states. It saw him turning to them for the defence of his own temporal power, in the knowledge that his own capacity to act on the world stage had assumed a new dimension that could not be compared with that of the Old Regime. It was clear by then that political work consisting of concrete choices in the European power game was no longer viable and that the figure of the pope could be no longer that of a chancellor of a European state.

The pope's diminished position appears to be a truly crucial point, though one that the scholarship often overlooks. The literature tends to favour an interpretation overly concerned with the destinies of hegemonic power, and, according to this particular perspective, the strategy pervading the ecclesiastical apparatus was in any case a reactionary one. It pursued a generalized, deeply rooted design, which it carried out with great skill and purpose, aimed only at defending the dominant power. In reality, in post-French Revolution Europe, the Church ceased to be history's driving force, the historical pack leader of times gone by. It increasingly became, rather, the shore on which the waves of time broke. After the Revolution, the Church was forced to amass its troops along a line of resistance. It was a moment of profound discontinuity compared with the past, the importance of which cannot be overemphasized. And this leads to another and more significant discontinuity: the expulsion of the Church from public space in western societies, and in particular sites of power, especially from the political arena.[58] All over Europe, as the modern era dawned, the ties that bound Christian truth and political power—which in various ways had been such a profound feature of the old continent from Constantine onward—first loosened, and then broke. This gave rise to a problem of social repositioning. The rationales provided

by orthodoxy and ecclesiastical organization were no longer capable of guiding the actions of the Church. Under constant fire from beyond its walls, the Church was forced to elaborate a detailed strategy of containment and response. It had to decide how and where it could seek to be present in society, in which strongholds to organize its resistance, and which social strata it should endeavour to hold together.[59]

As had never happened before, except, perhaps, at certain moments during the Reformation, the Church was compelled to place itself at the very centre of its own considerations, a participant in an all-out struggle against a context that was, on the whole, hostile. The result was only paradoxical in appearance, as this drastic reduction in the Church's political role, so typical of modern times, forced the Church to politicize its actions. It had to contend politically with its adversaries for every inch of ground, and it became, in ideological and social terms, ever more modern.[60] Moreover, it was widely held that the increase of State interest in ecclesiastical matters remained the most common and most widespread effect of French domination. This development brought profound institutional changes, not only in the Catholic custom of confession, but also in the confession of other Christian denominations. Current opinion, now almost a commonplace, that, under the influence of parish priests, the rural populace was antagonistic to every type of change, should, perhaps, be revised. In reality, a sense of expectation with regard to the Revolution, an aspiration—which took various forms—for change, was already in the air.

The Italian populace did not rebel immediately or demonstrate at once against the new regime. The revolts took place only later on, with the growing climate of disillusionment when no change was, in fact, perceived to have occurred. Perhaps it is necessary to substitute an unambiguous reading of popular sentiment, viewed as a single granite mass of conservatism and hostility, with a more dynamic reading, in which some initial positive expectation is visible. Antagonism arrived later on, when the general atmosphere became one of disenchantment with the lack of change. It was this kind of disappointment that led to the outburst from the citizen Pietro Pregari, a resident of Piegaro, a small hilltop village in the Perugian countryside to the right of the upper course of the river Nestore: 'Better to have been governed by the French', he exclaimed, 'than by you Republicans!'[61]

Notes

1. Translated from the Italian by Stuart Wilson.
2. Gabriele De Rosa, 'Mutamenti rivoluzionari e tradizioni confessionali nei paesi occupati dalle armate napoleoniche', *Ricerche di Storia Sociale e Religiosa* 35 (1989): 7–19.
3. Ernesto Codignola, *Carteggi di giansenisti liguri* (Florence, 1941), lviii. Regarding the works of Ottavio Sguariglia, see Fernando Morotti (ed.), *Tipografia ed editoria*

in Umbria: Assisi (Perugia, 1966); for the works of Giovanni Tomassini, a type-written list is available at the Biblioteca Comunale di Foligno. On the production of the two publishers with reference to the anti-Jansenist debate: Stanislao Da Campagnola, 'Giansenismo e antigianenismo in Umbria', in *Storia e cultura in Umbria nell'età moderna (secoli XV–XVIII)* (Perugia, 1972), 271–319. On the activity and the publishing strategies of the two publishers from the point of view of European and Italian book circulation, see Mario Tosti, 'Strategie editoriali e famiglie di tipografi alla fine del Settecento: Le stamperie di Ottavio Sgariglia e Giovanni Tomassini', in *Vita Religiosa, problemi sociali, e impegno civile dei cattolici: Studi Storici in onore di Alberto Monticone,* ed. Angelo Sindoni and Mario Tosti (Rome, 2009), 129–142.

4. On the significance of this Jesuit presence in Italy, see Miguel Batllori, *La cultura hispano-italiana de los jesuitas expulsos: españoles, hispanoamericanos, filipinos, 1767–1814* (Madrid, 1966); with particular reference to Spanish Jesuits, see Niccolò Guasti, *L'esilio italiano dei gesuiti spagnoli: Identità, controllo sociale e pratiche culturali (1767–1798)* (Rome, 2006); for the relationship between Ottavio Sguariglia's publishing business and expelled Iberian Jesuits, see Mario Tosti, 'La fucina dell'antigiansenismo Italiano: I gesuiti iberici espulsi e la tipografia di Ottavio Sgariglia di Assisi', in *La presenza in Italia dei gesuiti iberici espulsi: Aspetti religiosi, politici, culturali*, ed. Ugo Baldini and Gian Paolo Brizzi (Bologna, 2010), 355–365.

5. *Lettera di un Arcivescovo a Monsignor Scipione Ricci vescovo di Pistoia e Prato su la sua pastorale del 3 giugno MDCCLXXXI pubblicata contro la Devozione del Santissimo Cuore di Gesù,* ed. Ottavio Sgariglia (Assisi, 1784).

6. Giuseppe Pignatelli, *Aspetti della propaganda cattolica a Roma da Pio IV a Leone XII* (Rome, 1974), 32. On the polemic regarding the Sacred Heart cult, see Daniele Menozzi, *Sacro Cuore: Un culto tra devozione interiore e restaurazione cristiana della società* (Rome, 2011).

7. Morotti, *Tipografia*, xix.

8. Pignatelli, *Aspetti della propaganda*, 33, see note 55 particularly.

9. An examination of this publisher's activity shows that in the decade 1780–1790 a peak of 12 publications came out in 1783, whereas in 1785 there was only one; five editions came out in 1786, six in 1787 and 1788, and ten in 1789, with a return to a 1783 level of production in 1790; see Morotti, *Tipografia*.

10. Mario Tosti, ' "Gli Atleti della fede": Emigrazione e controrivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa (1792–1799)', in *La Chiesa italiana e la Rivoluzione francese*, ed. Daniele Menozzi (Bologna, 1990), 233–285.

11. Luciano Guerci, *Uno spettacolo non mai più veduto al mondo: La Rivoluzione francese come unicità e rovesciamento negli scrittori controrivoluzionari italiani (1789–1799)* (Turin, 2008), 188.

12. René Picheloup, *Les ecclésiastiques français émigrés ou déportés dans l'Etat Pontifical 1792–1800* (Toulouse, 1972), 74.

13. Vittorio E. Giuntella, *Le dodici catene: Testi della controrivoluzione cattolica in Italia* (Rome, 1988), xii.

14. Francisco Gustà, *L'antico progetto di Borgo Fontana dai moderni giansenisti continuato e compito* (Assisi, 1795), 229.

15. Idem, *Dell'influenza dei giansenisti nella rivoluzione di Francia aggiuntevi alcune notizie interessanti sul numero e qualità dei preti costituzionali: Seconda edizione corretta ed accresciuta* (Ferrara, 1794), 37.

16. Alfonso Muzzarelli, *Delle cause de' mali presenti e del timore de' mali futuri e suoi rimedi: Avviso al popolo cristiano* (Foligno, 1793), 107.
17. Gustà, *Dell'influenza*, 33–34.
18. Pignatelli, *Aspetti della propaganda*, 148.
19. Giuntella, *Le dolci catene*. On the outcomes of this interpretation: Daniele Menozzi, 'Tra riforma e restaurazione: Dalla crisi della società cristiana al mito della cristianità medievale (1715–1848)', in *Storia d'Italia: Annali 9: La chiesa e il potere politico* (Turin, 1986), 793–800.
20. Guerci, *Uno spettacolo*, 6.
21. Mario Caravale and Alberto Caracciolo (eds), *Lo Stato Pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX* (Turin, 1978), 559.
22. Luigi Fiorani and Domenico Rocciolo (eds), *Chiesa romana e Rivoluzione francese 1789–1799* (Rome, 2004), 305–306. On the papal army's weakness, compared with modern military organizations, see Lajor Pasztor, 'Un capitolo della storia della diplomazia pontificia: La missione di Giuseppe Albani a Vienna prima del trattato di Tolentino', *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 1 (1963): 295–383.
23. A brief outline of the pontifical military operations against the advancing Napoleonic army is found in M. Marotta, ' "Terrore" e "rimedio" sulle operazioni militari dello Stato della Chiesa 1789–1799', in *La Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa 1789–1799,* ed. Luigi Fiorani (Pisa, Rome, 1997), 231–250.
24. Gabriele De Rosa, '1789–1799: La Chiesa di fronte alla Rivoluzione', in *La Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa*, 37–44.
25. Fiorani and Rocciolo, *Chiesa romana*, 307.
26. *Che importa ai preti ovvero l'interesse della religione cristiana nei grandi avvenimenti di questi tempi: Riflessioni politico-morali di un amico di tutti dirette a un amico solo da G.M.D.E.: Edizione seconda con qualche aggiunta* (Cristianopoli [Rome], 1797), 146, where the abbreviation G.M.D.E. refers to Giovanni Marchetti da Empoli. See Guerci, *Uno spettacolo*, 24, which summarizes the pamphlet's editorial history (see particularly page 309, note 102).
27. Massimo Cattaneo, 'L'opposizione popolare al giacobinismo a Roma e nello Stato Pontificio', in *Folle Controrivoluzionarie: Le insorgenze popolari nell'Italia giacobina e napoleonica*, ed. Anna Maria Rao (Rome, 1999), 255–256.
28. Ibid. 256.
29. Ibid.
30. See the pamphlet *Eccitamento a' popoli della Italia ad amarsi, e a difendersi da' Francesi, e a detestarne le massime distruttive della Religione, de' Governi, e della Società* (Cosmopoli, 1796). More generally, see Giuseppe Pignatelli, 'Il dibattito sulla Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa', in Fiorani, *La Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa*, 52–53. Much of this abundant material, spread throughout so many different libraries, has unfortunately still largely to be studied, especially in terms of the dynamics of its penetration and its means of diffusion, conceived, as it was, to reach all levels of society and the most remote areas. Most are simple texts, vernacular poems that, often through highly colourful language and argument, repropose the theme of the crusade against the Godless French. An example of the widespread diffusion that such propaganda managed to achieve are two sonnets composed by 'trasteverini' ('those from the other side of the Tiber') copied in 1795 in ms. F49 of Perugia's *Biblioteca Augusta: Sonetto fatto contro i Francesi dai trasteverini, in Roma nel 1792: Altro sonetto contro li stessi, fatto dalli medesimi trasteverini*. Regarding the characteristics and dynamics of the Rione Trastevere revolt,

see Massimo Cattaneo, *La sponda sbagliata del Tevere: Mito e realtà di un'identità popolare tra antico regime e rivoluzione* (Naples, 2004).

31. Cattaneo, *L'opposizione*, 186.
32. Francisco Gustà, *Saggio critico sulle crociate se sia giusta la idea invalsane comunemente e se sieno adattabili alle circostanze presenti fattovi qualche cambiamento: Seconda edizione ricorretta e accresciuta* (Foligno, 1794). The first edition, in the same year, 1794, had come out in Ferrara.
33. On the hypothesis of the holy war, see Fiorani and Rocciolo, *Chiesa romana*, 301–309; see also Tosti, 'Gli Atleti della fede', 280–282.
34. Gustà, *Saggio critico*, 79.
35. Ibid. 88–89.
36. Cattaneo, *L'opposizione*, 188.
37. Ibid.
38. I refer to Massimo Viglione, *Rivolte dimenticate: Le insorgenze degli italiani dalle origini al 1815* (Rome, 1999); and Idem, *Le insorgenze: Rivoluzione e controrivoluzione in Italia 1792–1815* (Milan, 1999).
39. Cattaneo, *L'opposizione* and Idem, 'Controrivoluzione e insorgenze', in *Una Rivoluzione difficile: La Repubblica romana del 1798–1799*, ed. David Armando et al. (Pisa, Rome, 2000), 179–242.
40. De Rosa, *Mutamenti rivoluzionari*, 7.
41. Ibid. 14.
42. Ibid.
43. P. Stella, 'Teologia, spiritualità e pratica religiosa in Italia nel periodo rivoluzionario (1789–1815)', in *Deboli progressi della filosofia: Rivoluzione e religione a Roma, 1789–1799*, ed. Luigi Fiorani (Rome, 1992).
44. Ibid. 13–31.
45. Patrizia Delpiano, *Il governo della lettura: Chiesa e libri nell'Italia del Settecento* (Bologna, 2007), 213–230.
46. Gustà, *Saggio critico*, 90.
47. Ibid. 98–100.
48. Partially published also in the anthology by Giuntella, *Le dolci catene*; curiously, however, he does not reproduce pp. 172–173 of the text, in which the controversy with the former Jesuit was present.
49. Quoted in Guerci, *Uno spettacolo*, 241.
50. Ibid.
51. *Che importa ai preti*, 72: 'Can they, with all the rigour of truth, rouse the peoples, whether threatened or attacked, by declaring openly to them that this is a war of religion? This is the point, with which Christian sentiment may say that it is in moral agreement, but which until now legitimate ecclesiastical authority has not precisely defined; and this has raised doubts, which some wish to promote. Since we have no clear idea regarding a war of religion other than that recounted in the History of the Crusades, many have fallen into the error that to declare this a true war of religion necessarily leads therefore to an active general rising of all the peoples of Christianity, to expose them to the chaos linked to a tumultuous invasion of the new Republic: thus, with reflections advanced to this extremity, surely an unnecessary one, some conceive difficulties, for which they believe that this declaration shows little conformity with the laws of prudence at least.'
52. Guerci, *Uno spettacolo*, 241. 'These things were in the press, when a pamphlet appeared which, although undated, showed signs … of having been written after

the year 1794: *Saggio critico su le crociate . . . se sieno adattabili alle circostanze presenti.'*

53. *Che importa ai preti*, 173.
54. *Lo Stato pontificio agli altri incliti co-Stati d'Italia* (Assisi, 1796), reproduced in Giuntella, *Le dodici catene*, 409–434.
55. Ibid. 428: 'His peaceful soul is in fact alien to hostility and at the cost of painful sacrifices he has tirelessly endeavoured and will even now continue to endeavour to maintain his State in the same tranquillity.'
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ernesto Galli Della Loggia, 'Cristianesimo e modernità', in *Storia del Cristianesimo: Bilanci e questioni aperte*, ed. Giovanni Maria Vian (Vatican City, 2006), 68–91.
59. Ibid. 71.
60. Ibid. 72.
61. Perugia State Archives, Comune, Amministrativo, 1797–1816, b. 36, f. d, Pietro Pregari to Luigi Ciuffetti, administrator, Piegaro, 10 October 1798.

12
International War, National War, Civil War: Spain and Counterrevolution (1793–1840)[1]

Pedro Rújula

Between 1793 and 1840 three major wars, and some of less importance, took place in Spain. The first war was waged against the French National Convention between 1793 and 1795; between 1808 and 1814, the Peninsular War—the *Guerra de la Independencia* in Spanish—occurred; and finally there was the Carlist Civil War, best known as the First Carlist War, which lasted seven years, from 1833 to 1840. All these conflicts can be interpreted as part of a cycle characterized by the clash between revolution and counterrevolution. While this dynamic endured and can explain the battles, important changes nonetheless occurred in the nature of the struggle during those 50 years of constant conflict. What had started as an international war at the end of the eighteenth century would become a civil war by the middle of the nineteenth century. It never lost its main characteristic, however. It remained a battle between the forces of revolution and counterrevolution. That struggle produced nearly half a century of strife, involving several generations of Spanish people whose first apprenticeship in contemporary politics was through war.

To highlight this general dynamic of counterrevolutionary wars in Spain, which began with the war against the French Republic and ended in an internal civil war between supporters of liberalism and supporters of absolute monarchy just before the middle of the nineteenth century, we will focus on three aspects. First, we will investigate the discourse used by the authorities and their intermediaries to justify and promote the war. Second, we will analyse the type of social mobilization that in each case provided the rank and file of the Spanish armies. Finally, this article will explore the identification process between monarchy and people, which developed through forms of warfare for which popular participation had become necessary. All these elements place us in a field of study where war and politics converge: This domain cannot be understood if we do not study the complex relationships established between war and politics in armed conflicts, which assume a heightened significance for the beginnings of the contemporary world.

Counterrevolutionary war

The triumph of the French Revolution in 1789 provoked distrust and fear in Spain. Authorities reacted by closing the frontiers and putting an end to the period of Enlightenment-inspired reforms that had characterized previous years. The very existence of the revolutionary process was denied, and censorship was established forcefully over what was written, accompanied by strict vigilance over any news arriving from abroad.[2] 'Our revolution', Urtubize wrote from Madrid to Count Montmorin, 'provokes here a terror you would not believe; every Frenchman is regarded as somebody who wants to stir up a revolt'.[3] Distrust and censorship characterized the aftermath of the revolutionary events in the summer of 1789.

The relationships between Spain and France worsened notably in 1792 with the trial and subsequent death sentence of Louis XVI. Spain recognized neither the French Republic nor the ambassador it had sent, and chose to ally itself instead with the absolutist powers. The greatest factor in the explosion of the relationship between Spain and France, however, was the Spanish monarchy's attempted negotiation to save the king's life. Speaking to the French Convention, Danton showed his outrage at the Spanish government's daring. The French refusal of Spanish mediation, as well as the king's execution by the Republican authorities, set both countries on the path to war. According to the historian Andrés Muriel, 'because of the kinship between its king and the ousted family in France, and because of the antiquity of its monarchic and religious institutions, Spain was one of the powers against which the Jacobins were most prone to raise arms. Moreover, hatred against the French regicides was intense in Madrid.'[4] The escalation of insults then led to two declarations of war. The French declaration took place on 7 March 1793. On 23 March, the Spanish declaration of war was announced. Manuel de Godoy, First Secretary of State, said he had 'issued all the appropriate orders to stop, reject and fight the enemy through sea or through land, wherever [the enemy] presents himself'.[5] The news of the declaration of war on France was received enthusiastically by the population when it saw that, as Faustino Casamayor put it, 'our Catholic monarch was so interested in punishing the perfidy and wickedness of such rebel subjects'.[6]

The war against France was motivated as much by opportunity as by an honest counterrevolutionary impulse. The myriad of interior and exterior conflicts that confronted the French Convention made the moment ideal to harass the French Republic successfully, to ally with Great Britain (which threatened Spanish colonies), and even to obtain some territorial advantages on the other side of the Pyrenees. Testimonies like that of the plenipotentiary minister to the Vatican, José Nicolás de Azara, confirm the impression that the uprising against France was going to be widespread. 'The tragedy which has put an end to Louis XVI's life', he wrote, 'is the most horrendous and

hideous ever committed by men, and will produce a universal war, where all nations will try to avenge it. Here [Rome] it has been so sensational that the people have agitated against the French more fiercely than last month, trying to kill them all.'[7] From the beginning the Revolution had stirred distrust on the part of Spanish institutions, social orders, and corps, for whom the basis of the political system and society as they conceived it was threatened by the events in France. They feared not only the ideas, but also the express purpose of the revolutionaries, who wanted to go beyond French boundaries and to export their principles to the surrounding countries. It seemed that the time had come finally to end the revolutionary threat definitively.

Neither the army nor the treasury was in a position to launch such an undertaking, however. 'By mid-1792, seeing an unavoidable war coming', Godoy wrote, 'our foot soldiers barely comprised 36,000 men in active service, the cavalry was almost totally dismantled, the arsenals were empty, our military factories were in a miserable state, and the military service all but extinct, except for the Navy, which, because of the fear of England, received all the treasury could give.'[8] Moreover, he added that 'the state of a long stillness caused idleness and a disastrous forgetfulness of the art of war. In half a century, Spain did not have but partial militia operations. . . . In that period, there was no schooling for an all-out war.'[9]

In such circumstances, the monarchy had to mobilize the country in order to generate the resources the treasury could not provide. The efforts to gather resources took place on very different levels, with specific forms for each one. The great demonstration of support was led by the principal bodies of the Old Regime, precisely those which had more reason to fear that the revolutionary tide might wash over Spain. The main voluntary donations, whose objective was to pay for army expenditures, came as much from the cities as from the employees of the royal administration, the church, the army, or the clergy.[10] The subsidies were public, and thus the support for the war acquired an enormous propagandistic dimension. According to Teófanes Egido, 'seldom in the history of Spain had there been such identification between government policy and public opinion, inflamed and encouraged by its leaders, who knew how to use knee-jerk resources like xenophobia, misoneism [a hatred of change], orthodoxy adeptly, all of them mixed and united against the demonized French'.[11] The newspaper *Gaceta de Madrid* published lists of donors daily, exposing the value of their patriotism for all to see. One day it was the city of Seville that proved its willingness to sustain two cavalry regiments; the next day the general of the religious order San Juan de Dios offered up all those in his employ to work as doctors, surgeons, and nurses. A few days later, two cobblers from Chinchilla offered a pair of shoes to every recruit from their village; the marquise of San Juan donated all the income from her estates, and the duke of Medinaceli volunteered to raise an infantry regiment at his own expense. Among these sectors—the most powerful within the Old Regime—support was great,

which constituted a good indication of the atmosphere surrounding the declaration of war.[12]

Those lacking wealth to help with the war effort were called to contribute with their own hands. The squalid ranks of the royal army had to be reinforced in all possible ways. To this end levies were organized, introducing compulsory recruitment of the idle and the delinquent, as well as the mobilization of provincial militias, which normally only gathered in extraordinary circumstances. Volunteer recruitment was especially encouraged and, in order to communicate the idea of a common effort to every part of the country, these lists too were published in the press. The institutions organizing the mobilization were city governments (*justicias*) and priests (*curas*), who had to assemble the neighbours in each village and promote volunteer enrolment.[13]

The mobilizing discourse made the case for a defensive war. This rhetoric provided the popular justification for the beginning of a military campaign and effectively activated a national response, stirring feelings of provocation and threat. Developing from this defensive impulse, a confident discourse about the future was constructed. Like the French, the Spanish armies were motivated by three general principles. They appeared in the grand official proclamations and folk songs, and they could be read on flags, like the one calling for the enrolment of volunteers from Barcelona: 'Religion, King and Homeland.'[14]

The presence of God, or of Religion, was central to this discourse. The distrust of Enlightenment ideas that the ultraconservative sectors of the clergy had expressed now appeared to be confirmed first by the outbreak of the Revolution, then by the French Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and finally by Louis XVI's execution. The Spanish war against the French Republic was a religious one, a true crusade against the hordes who wanted to destroy the foundation of society: religion. As the counterrevolutionary writer *fray* (friar) Diego José de Cádiz explained in his famous pamphlet *The Catholic Soldier in the Religious War*, 'God, his Church, his Faith, his Religion, his laws, his Ministers, his Temples, and all the most sacred things, the *ius gentium* [the law of nations], the respect due to the Sovereigns, and even the always inviolable law of humanity are unjustly violated, godlessly ignored and blasphemously abused.' These claims allowed him to argue that the situation forced 'every Catholic, every good vassal, and even every rational being to work for the extermination of such people, within the limits of their means and abilities, and to ensure their name will disappear from the surface of the earth'.[15]

The king, whose power had been contested seriously from the beginning of the Revolution, had received a deadly blow the day Louis XVI was imprisoned. France, once the model and beacon of monarchies, became the example for those who wanted to get rid of thrones. The danger of contagion was obvious. It was necessary to defend the Spanish monarchy by attacking

its most imminent threat, the French Republic. 'For the Spanish king', Muriel wrote, 'the purpose of the war was to take revenge for Louis XVI's death, and to detain, if possible, the avalanche of nonsense which came from France, threatening the Spanish monarchy.'[16]

The territorial aspect of the conflict was reflected in the word 'Homeland'. As Lluís Roura explained, in Spain, 'the limits of the Enlightenment, and the absence of a bourgeois nationalism caused the national-patriotism that exploded at the beginning of the war to be associated only with xenophobia and the defence of tradition (religion being the symbol of the latter) without any other counterbalance'.[17] The notion that French aggression had started the war was used to justify the argument of territorial defence. The main point of this defensive position is that it inevitably created Spain's identity as that of a victim. As subjects of Charles IV's monarchy and as Catholics, the Spanish people found themselves in a war whose primordial objective was to curb the aspirations of revolutionary France. Official rhetoric would communicate the image of a collective cause backed by the population's enthusiasm.

Thus, the war against the French Convention started because of the interests of the monarchy; yet from the beginning it was expected to obtain wide popular mobilization. The unmistakably counterrevolutionary charac- ter of the campaign dissolved the authorities' fear of a revolutionary turn in the populace's participation. Their calculation proved correct. The war drew the population into the Crown's enterprise, ideologically articulated according to the monarchy's discourse. Moreover, this popular engagement took place within the context of an intense war experience. The result was that, between 1793 and 1795, Spain saw the birth of a type of patriotism tied to the monarchy and—contrary to the French model—not the republic. The war was instrumental in universalizing this idea, which became pow- erfully rooted in society through an intense and—as we will see—lasting experience.

The war years were a period of politicization that took place without freedom of the press. Therefore, the monarchy was able to control the dis- course. This domination was achieved through the official media and, espe- cially, through the church, which had every interest in the efficacy of this process of 'ideologizing' Spanish society in support of counterrevolution.[18]

Militarily, the war was a failure. After the first campaign, in which the Spanish army enjoyed some success and advanced into French territory in the Roussillon, came the defeats of 1794 and 1795. The optimism and a certain euphoria that had surrounded the beginning of the war and those first victories now turned to fear. The revolutionary threat, so often bran- dished in the official proclamations, had become a reality that everyone could understand because the republican troops were already advancing into Spanish territory. French progress on both sides of the Pyrenees, towards Pamplona and Barcelona, forced Spain to find an acceptable solution that

allowed a peace treaty—it would be signed in Basel in July 1795—and to stop the enemy's progress.

Politically, however, the war reinforced the monarchy's relationship with the people, as the monarchy had presented itself as the main defender of the collective interest. The monarchy had been able to transform its cause and that of the privileged sectors of the Old Regime into the nation's cause. This undertaking was not understood in revolutionary terms, but instead confirmed the monarchy's ability to generate and lead a popular move-ment in support of its own territorial interests. Thus, counterrevolution became a common effort, reinforcing the Crown's leadership and refurbish-ing its hegemony in the country. The war was instrumental in bolstering the identification between population and monarchy. Moreover, both—the population and the monarchy—consolidated their territorial definition. The fact that the war took place near the frontier and that the peace treaty included no territorial losses was helpful.

National war

The Treaty of Basel renewed the French–Spanish diplomatic alliance, which had been the norm throughout the eighteenth century. Thus, Spain aban-doned the First Coalition and the following year signed the Second Treaty of San Ildefonso (19 August 1796) with the French Directory, establishing the basis of an alliance against Great Britain. How was it possible to justify this diplomatic about-face, in which yesterday's enemies were today's allies? The main argument was that the objectives of the war had been achieved. After the Thermidor *coup d'état* in 1794, it could be claimed, the French Republic itself had revised its positions and returned to order and moderation. It was not necessary to reject counterrevolutionary principles in order to defend such behaviour publicly, but the Spanish had to accept that the Bourbon dynasty's return to the French throne was unlikely.[19]

The alliance between Spain and France, whose main strength was a shared rivalry against England, lasted, with some ups and downs, for more than a decade. During this period, the European situation changed signif-icantly. The alliance with the moderate Republic in 1795 became a pact with the Empire and, in 1807, the Iberian Peninsula was in Napoleon's sight. According to Grandmaison, the Emperor 'hoped to use Spain in his external action against the English. After Tilsit he had instructed [the ambas-sador] Beauharnais to offer the government in Madrid a secret agreement in case Portugal's regent rejected joining the Continental Blockade. His father-in-law, Charles IV, would force the regent to do it, and 20,000 French would cross the Peninsula to support the Spanish armed intervention.'[20] At the end of 1807, French troops needed to traverse Spanish soil to reach Portugal, which was becoming a weak point in the continental blockade policy designed to hurt British interests.

For some months, the presence of imperial troops in Spain continued without conflicts worth mentioning. General Lejeune wrote in his *Memoirs* that they had been greeted warmly in the cities. 'The Emperor's armies', he explained, 'had been received as friends throughout the Peninsula, where they already occupied Pamplona, Burgos, Madrid...and Barcelona. Our soldiers were welcomed and treated as liberators everywhere. As I advanced I found villages and towns, and even isolated houses, ready to celebrate the imminent arrival of the Emperor.'[21] The Spanish people were following their authorities' instructions faithfully.

King Ferdinand VII's trip to Bayonne to meet Napoleon was a key factor in the change in attitude from the cordiality towards the French allies to the uprising at the end of June 1808. For the new king of Spain, the purpose of this interview was to be recognized by the Emperor and thus strengthen his position on the throne. It must not be forgotten that Fernando had just become king after a popular movement—the Mutiny of Aranjuez, on 18 March 1808—had forced his father to abdicate so that order could be restored. This risky and almost desperate journey outside the Spanish border was a failure, however, and, far from achieving his objectives, Ferdinand VII was dispossessed of his crown. His crown was handed instead to Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's elder brother.[22]

It was then that Ferdinand VII's allies in Spain decided to oppose this dictate. In the absence of an army capable of facing the situation, it was necessary to mobilize the civil population. Thus, 13 years after the peace Treaty of Basel, the Spanish took up arms against the French.[23] Reaction had to be fast; there was no time to create new and complicated arguments to justify war. Thus, they adopted the old refrain, which had been used successfully to fight against the Republic. 'God, King and Homeland' once more became the banner to rouse the population.

The press published pieces such as 'May God allow no one to be seduced by French Machiavellianism, and that the Spanish People, who so love their dignity, listen to nothing but the penetrating voice of Religion, King and Homeland.'[24] Proclamations addressed to the inhabitants of the country repeated the same principles, similar to this one, published in La Mancha: 'What matters is that we elect a Chief who directs us and knows how to lead us to victory; that we offer him our total and unalterable submission and obedience; that we swear for the last time to shed our blood in defence of our homeland, Ferdinand VII and our religion, and being thus united to all the other kingdoms of Spain, we shall be invincible.'[25] The same principles were present in satirical pamphlets destined to counter French propaganda, as is shown in a brochure published in 1808 under the title *Counterproclamation to the proclamation addressed to the Spanish people and published in Madrid by a committee which wanted to be called supreme government of the nation, presided and ruled by Murat, where ideas contrary to the spirit which inflames us and which unites us in defence of religion, Ferdinand VII and our homeland are*

noted.[26] After the first few months, when the French advance was impeded momentarily, an anonymous text signed by '*el madrileño*' ('the Madrilian') thought this discourse about Religion, King, and Homeland had established the foundations for success:

> Distinguished Aragonese people, how we cherish your memory! Your bravery has broken, undone and thrown into the abyss numerous phalanxes of enemies of God and men. Brave Catalan and Valencian people, your heroism has scared the thieves of Europe, and has forced them to flee in disgrace. Stout people from Extremadura, your sword has won you glory, fighting off the devastating locust which haunted your fertile countryside. Invincible people from Andalusia, you have covered the godless Dupont and his villainous henchmen in opprobrium. Warriors, all of you who have fought for your religion, your King and your homeland, you have earned your glory and your names will be cherished forever.[27]

The old counterrevolutionary message had proved its mobilizing efficacy again. Throughout the country *juntas* (committees) were formed, and they started to enrol and arm civilians in order to oppose the French armies. The officials leading the Spanish troops—La Romana, Gregorio de la Cuesta, Francisco Javier Castaños, and Joaquín Blake—had fought in the war against the Convention and played a very important role in the political articulation against Napoleon.[28] Even though the discourse was basically the same, however, the conditions had changed dramatically over the course of a few years. First, the king, and with him a large part of the royal bureaucracy, had disappeared from the scene; the former was not on the throne and the latter was not backing orders or operations. Moreover, the emaciated army was scattered and unable to respond to the circumstances. Finally, in these conditions, the popular initiative and its prominence, both politically and militarily, were decisive.

The episodes of resistance, from 2 May in Madrid to Gerona through Bailén, Zaragoza, or El Bruch, demonstrated the population's engagement in the struggle. The conflict that the Spanish had embraced acquired the quality of a national war; this struggle, however, did not defend the principles of revolution but instead was waged against them, under the slogan of 'God, King and Homeland'. The campaign began as an uprising in defence of the previous order, fundamentally articulated by the privileged sectors of the Old Regime. Nobility, clergy, and other members of the existing political institutions were the main actors of the committees that assumed power when the monarchy collapsed after the king was imprisoned.[29]

Surprisingly, the fact that the king was swept from the scene in the first moments did not imply his elimination as a political factor. On the contrary, Ferdinand VII's dethronement was an attack on the social order, a freak of politics. 'Monarchy is headless, a strange head has been placed on its body, which has turned it into a monster, as if an ass' head was placed

on a human body.'[30] The king became the key element in the restoration of the lost order, and this placed him at the centre of the mobilizing discourse. The declaration of war issued by the committee of Cádiz proclaimed: 'we will not surrender arms until the Emperor Napoleon I restores our King and Lord Ferdinand VII'.[31] In such circumstances, it was not hard to build a messianic case around which everybody worked in those years: The replacement of the king on the throne would end the cycle of disorders and misfortunes started by the arrival of imperial troops. This desire would turn the war, which would be called the War of Independence in Spanish, into a war of a profoundly royalist character, and would lend it, in its origins, a counterrevolutionary quality. The clergy would play a very important role in the transmission of this interpretation, as it had done in the previous war against the French Republic. Its interest concentrated on Ferdinand VII's restoration to the throne, which was the only situation that could ensure the re-establishment of the church's position before the French invasion.

The movement's focus on the king's recovery of his throne thus generated a form of patriotism with monarchic roots in Spain. This royalist patriotism would be interpreted in two very different ways, however. On the right hand were those who saw the defence of the monarch as counterrevolutionary, that is, as the recovery of the previous order and the return of the situation under the Old Regime. This was the 'foolish patriotism' the *servil* (absolutist) author of the *Reasoned Dictionary* described, albeit ironically, because it was the side that he favoured. He termed it 'foolish' because of its spontaneous and selfless character, whereas he thought the liberals' patriotism was led by calculation and interest. He defined it as

> the patriotism of those truly stupid good old Spaniards, who in exchange for keeping their religion pure and being loyal to their sovereign Ferdinand VII, were not even curious to see the moustaches of the French, and have abandoned everything, risking starvation. It is called foolish because this patriotism has become similar to the *bis bis* game, where he who gambles more, loses more, and at the end he who loses, or gives, everything, parts with everything.[32]

Defence of the king and religion on one hand, and repudiation of any French influence as a way to recover the previous order on the other, formed the foundation of this mentality.

The Peninsular War made possible the emergence of other interpretations of patriotism that were closer to the spirit of revolution, however. They acquired political solidity after 1810, with the meeting of the *Cortes* (parliamentary body) in Cádiz. There, when previous attempts towards the institutional reconstruction of the monarchy through the *juntas* had failed, and when the French armies prevailed over almost all the country, the liberals consecrated a new conception of power based on national sovereignty.[33] From this idea, the 1812 Constitution would construct a new

political structure, whose foundation would not be theocratic and in which the king would have limited power. Thus, with the appearance of liberals in the Spanish political scene, a new project emerged. In this case it had a revolutionary nature, but shared its national and monarchic character with the counterrevolutionary one. This common denominator made it possible for the *serviles* and *liberales* to remain united until the end of the war and for the figure of the King, Ferdinand VII 'The Desired', to continue as a very important element. Both sides had many hopes pinned on the moment when, once the war was over, the king might set his foot on Spanish soil again. They hoped for two very different, and even contrary, outcomes, however. In the political landscape of parliamentary Cádiz, the existence of both political projects was visible, as well as the quarrel between them to proclaim themselves as the true defenders of the realm.

The war had been responsible for an unexpected transformation of the Spanish political scene. On the basis of a conception belonging to the Old Regime, which had inspired the early mobilization against the French, a new language, other principles, and another conception of public matters emerged. Despite the tension, the need to offer a united front against the invader and their shared trust in a monarchic solution kept both parties allied until the king's return. The War of Independence, the same war that had allowed the exemplary reaction of the Spanish national community against imperial troops, nonetheless had been responsible for the erosion of the foundation of the Old Regime and had allowed the fast emergence of the liberal project, which would be essential in the offensives for political change in Spain in the following decades.

Civil war

On 4 May 1814, Ferdinand VII, backed by a group of loyalist members of parliament, decided to overturn the 1812 Constitution and all actions undertaken by the *Cortes*. That action exposed the fracture that the national nature of the Peninsular War had concealed. There were important tensions in Spanish society that would eventually lead to civil war.

The first signals of this rupture were apparent when the Peninsular War had started, and relevant figures of the administration, the clergy, and the nobility had placed themselves in the service of José I.[34] From the patriot position, however, the problem posed by these *afrancesados*—those who had supported the French—was solved by expelling them, as traitors, from the core of the national community. A nation could not be formed by turncoats: the *afrancesados* had placed themselves in the service of foreign interests, which made possible their complete exclusion from the patriot side.

In 1814, when the war was over and the Napoleonic armies had left Spanish soil, the king's decision took a further step towards the exclusion of a new group in the national community—in this case, the liberals.

Their expulsion could not be based on their lack of commitment during the war or attributed to their surrender to foreign interests. The process through which they were declared illegal, then persecuted and imprisoned, was related directly to their defence of a revolutionarily inspired project, the 1812 Constitution. Once again, the conflict between revolution and counterrevolution reappeared, but for the first time both terms of the confrontation developed on Spanish soil. The enemies were neither the 1793 French republicans nor the 1808 Imperial soldiers, but the Cádiz liberals, who had supported the country during the invasion. As before, the king and the monarchy took their place among the counterrevolutionary ranks, but this time the royal position condemned Spanish society to civil war. The terms of the new confrontation were already established. On one side were the king and religion, and in the background was the preservation of Old Regime society. On the other side were the liberals and the Constitution, willing to transform the basis of the status quo. Both sides made claims on the country, but their very different ideas of what the country was or should be would be a cause of armed conflict for the coming decades.

From the 1814 point of view, it is obvious that during the Peninsular War the absolutists had fought a double enemy in the French, the foreigner, and the revolutionary, whereas the liberals had fought only the invaders while pursuing their own interior revolution. When the war was over, the *serviles* considered that the struggle on the first front was over—not so for the second. The war against the revolutionaries, in this case the Spanish *liberals*, went on fiercely until they were extirpated from the country's political sphere. This new configuration signalled the end of the national struggle; a new internal and civil conflict had emerged.

From that moment onwards, liberalism, both underground and in exile, would continue to aspire to return to power. It succeeded, temporarily, in 1820, as a result of a revolutionary process that started the Liberal Triennium (1820–23). During this short period, the political system defined by the 1812 Constitution was implemented. With it, a whole new concept of nation based on popular sovereignty emerged. Recognizing a wide set of rights and liberties, in practical terms, it amounted to the judicial and institutional dismantling of the Old Regime. The king maintained certain control over the executive power, but lost almost all of his influence over the legislative and judicial affairs.[35] Thus, royal power was curtailed severely and became subordinate to the assembly's initiative. The reduction in royal functions was interpreted by the absolutist sector—not unreasonably—as the end of an era when the alliance of Altar and Throne dictated social and political norms.

From the beginning, Ferdinand VII placed himself at the centre of all conspiracy operations aimed at restoring the complete power of the monarchy.[36] Though the agitation against the Constitution spread throughout the whole three-year period, it reached its peak in the summer of 1822. In July, the royal guard's uprising, supported by the king and combined with a countrywide

insurrection, sought to overthrow the regime. Once the coup failed, armed parties scattered throughout different areas of the Peninsula, fighting constitutional authorities and demanding the return of absolutism. These men, led by figures such as the priest Merino, Santos Ladrón, and Joaquín Capapé, called themselves *realistas.* The constitutional limitations imposed on the king's will were interpreted by his partisans as an act of kidnapping. This principle led them to gather in Urgel, near the French border, and to proclaim themselves as 'The Committee of the Supreme Regency of Spain during Fernando's captivity'.[37]

The same argument of the captive king was laid out before the members of the Holy Alliance, which gathered at the Congress of Verona that same year. The partisans of the 'Supreme Regency' demanded an intervention to obtain his liberty. When French troops, the Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis led by the Duke of Angoulême, invaded Spain, the aim of the expedition was to eliminate the Spanish revolutionary threat, which seemed capable of igniting Europe. Though it was an image-driven operation of the French monarchy, it was presented as an action undertaken to free the king. 'I have asked my ambassador to return,' Louis XVIII announced to the assembly on 23 January 1823. 'One hundred thousand French men, commanded by a prince of my family, are willing to take action, invoking Saint Louis' God, to keep a grandson of Henry IV on the throne of Spain.'[38]

The clearest proof that the national war (which the Peninsular War had been) had turned into a civil war that divided the country between revolution and counterrevolution was the lack of resistance met by this new French invasion.[39] The military writer baron Jomini tried to explain this change in behaviour by declaring that 'if the first war in Spain, in 1808, had been totally national, the war in 1823 was a partial conflict of opinions with no nationality; this explains the enormous difference in results'.[40] Hardly a decade after having left the country as irreconcilable enemies, the French came back to Spain as saviours. It would be worthwhile to wonder from what threat the troops commanded by the Duke of Angoulême were going to save the Spanish people. The answer does not leave much room for hesitation: They would save them from revolution. The foreign armies, efficiently supported by the royalist rebel troops operating inside the country, were coming to put an end to the constitutional regime and to restore the king's power.

Paradoxically, despite the king's and the royalists' support for absolutism, the liberals did not cease to be monarchists. Their notion of a constitutional state required obtaining the king's collaboration—highlighting the legitimate and traditional character of their proposal—instead of establishing a republican regime. In this respect, the weight of the monarchist origins of Spanish liberalism, which considered the Peninsular War as its foundational episode, was too great to eliminate.[41] The same applied to the moment that had allowed the renewal of the pact between society and the monarch, this time on a constitutional basis. This monarchist conviction did not dissolve

even after the absolutist military victory in 1823, or during the period of persecution and exile suffered by liberals in the following decade.[42]

The conflict in 1822–1823 was merely a rehearsal of the civil war, though it worked as a bridge towards the future for many of the military and political behaviours that had been established during the Peninsular War.[43] The true internal confrontation would take place a decade later. During the ten years that separated these two conflicts, the distance between the pure absolutist sectors and those who conceived different degrees of acceptance of liberal forms of government continued to grow.[44]

Under the circumstances, the king's death on 29 September 1833 was a long-awaited signal for the absolutists to take up arms again and start an uprising that would provoke the First Carlist War (1833–1840). Once again, the monarchy was at the centre of a war, but this time it took a step further than it had taken during the Liberal Triennium. The disagreement did not revolve around the function the monarch assumed—that is, absolute or constitutional—but around two candidates who embodied two very different conceptions of political power and society itself.

Isabella II, the daughter of Ferdinand VII, apparently held a more solid position, because she had been recognized officially as the legitimate heir and had the government institutions and army on her side. Her tender age, however—hardly three years—and the long provisional situation that presented itself under the government of the widowed queen, Maria Christina, cast serious doubts about the likelihood that she would remain on the throne. This impasse led her to search for support in sectors of moderate liberals who would allow her to widen the political and social basis of her power. Opposing her was the *Infante* Don Carlos, Ferdinand VII's brother, a heavyweight in the Spanish political scene, whom everybody knew and who had always been on the king's side, even in his worst moments. Don Carlos declared female succession to the Spanish throne as illegal and threw himself into civil war in order to conquer the crown. Behind his candidacy lay an entire project to restore the monarchy to the supremacy it had enjoyed under the Old Regime.

The Carlists, displaced from power by the succession regulations established by Ferdinand VII, took up arms, following a long tradition of battles against revolution that had existed in Spain since the end of the eighteenth century. It was like picking up the thread of an old interrupted struggle, adjusted for the new situation. 'People from Castile,' the *guerrilla* Jerónimo Moreno said in his first proclamation, alluding to his participation in previous conflicts, 'two glorious campaigns prove that I always joined the defence of our homeland, when it was threatened by the plots and boldness of exterior and interior enemies that wanted to drive it to misfortune, ruining the foundations of the altar and the throne. For the third time I go out to the field of honour, leading the loyal Castilian troops. . . . '[45] For him it was the same war all over again.

The First Carlist War was connected to a long experience and to a discourse that everyone understood, a discourse that sounded familiar because it had been used in many of the previous conflicts. The English adventurer C. F. Henningsen, who fought on the Carlist side, wrote in 1836: 'It is worthwhile noting that all the classes that have embraced the king's cause are precisely the same ones that so vigorously rejected the French invasion during the Peninsular War.'[46] Obviously, now the difference was that the experience and ideas from the past would be used to foster not a national war against an exterior enemy, but a civil war.

Carlism was the arrival point of a counterrevolutionary movement which, as we have seen, had been developing over time. Its name was born out of a new political ingredient that added to the previous ones: legitimism. The *Infante* Don Carlos' exclusion from the throne and his denunciation of Isabella II's illegitimacy allowed him to claim all counterrevolutionary struggles as his own, charging the queen with having diverted the monarchy's interests towards liberalism. Few would have been able to make this accusation with more reason than Don Carlos, who had been a prisoner with Ferdinand VII in Valençay and afterwards faithfully accompanied him in his defence of monarchy against the assaults of revolution. The discrepancies that had emerged between both brothers in the latter years of Ferdinand VII's reign arose from the ultra-absolutist position adopted by the *Infante*. Moreover, we could mention his quality as a pious Catholic, which made him a good candidate for many sectors in the church.

Thus, with the outbreak of the civil war in 1833, the old slogan 'God, Homeland and King' started to wave again on the flags guiding the Carlists towards the battlefields. The true birth of Carlism took place in that moment, when political claims acquired a military dimension. The wide uprising that occurred in the weeks following the king's death ended up being consolidated in three main areas: the Basque Country and Navarra, Aragón and the North of Valencia, and the interior part of Catalonia. From then on, the triumph of Carlist ideas, and of the political model they defended, was connected profoundly to the outcome of the war. To defeat the government army was, from that moment, a vital matter. Lacking their own army, Carlists hoped to incite a popular movement. To summon old companions to arms, and to fall back on old mobilizing discourses known by everybody and old irregular war tactics, proved decisive in consolidating Carlism, especially in the first phase of the uprising.

Beyond the military aspects, the development of the war had two important political consequences. The first one was that, once the Carlists had taken the counterrevolutionary positions, the regent Maria Christina was pushed unwillingly to the left and forced to seek alliances with some sectors of liberalism. This need grew as the war lengthened and became more difficult. Thus, the revolutionary process that took place during the 1830s, which would lead to the re-establishment of the Cadiz Constitution in 1836

and to the approval of a new Constitution in 1837, was, in good measure, a consequence of the civil war that had exacerbated the dynamics between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements.

Second, one must emphasize the social dimensions of the Carlists' military mobilization. Wherever their army arrived, it recruited soldiers and integrated them in a structure specifically designed to achieve its military goal, to defeat the government army. A Carlist victory, then, would bring about its political goal, to install Charles V on the throne. There was no true separation between these two objectives, so a gradual identification of the military and political aspects took place among the rebel ranks, as had happened in previous counterrevolutionary wars. Seven years of combat helped to forge a political identity that would overrun the conflict's national borders.[47] The Carlists remained Carlists in exile after their defeat in 1840, and fought again years later—in the Matiners' War (1847–1849) and the Second Carlist War (1872–1876)—under the same flag. Obviously, they were not always identical. New generations joined Carlist political culture, built out of their own experiences, but also out of the past—the memories, symbols, ideals, and principles that were being reproduced as central elements of their identity. The factor that gave the movement continuity was legitimism, that is, the defence of the Bourbon branch that represented counterrevolution. The unifying moments of Carlism, however, were always related to war: a war that, for more than a century, would keep its counterrevolutionary dimension and its character as a civil war.

Conclusions

For half a century, from the war against the French Convention in 1793 to the First Carlist war, which ended in 1840, Spain went through a series of counterrevolutionary wars. During this same period, however, political modernity emerged in the country. Therefore, these conflicts played an essential political role in the origins of contemporary Spain. It would be useful to offer a set of conclusions concerning the relationship between war and politics, and the fraught experience in which the Spanish people had been immersed since the end of the eighteenth century.

1. Popular war: In Spain, the monarchy did not shy away from making war a popular cause. The lack of resources to finance a professional army forced the royalist cause to depend on popular support. This backing was used as a source of legitimacy for the struggle, a sort of plebiscite confirming the bonds between people and monarchy.
2. Political initiation: For many Spanish people, war was their first contact with the political sphere. Their incorporation into the ranks was a fast immersion in the concepts that justified mobilization and, at the same

time, included the demonization of political enemies, as one can see in the period's political propaganda.

3. War and counterrevolution: War determined that this political initiation developed from the counterrevolutionary ranks. The experience of war and arms, the ideological apprenticeship, the identification with one side … all these elements caused the first war experience against the Republic to condition future political behaviour.

4. Monarchy and nation. The royalist cause took on the defence of the realm, understood as a historical community subordinated to the crown, instead of a sovereign community of citizens. Therefore, the people's active participation in those conflicts, or the fact that they considered themselves important actors in the confrontation, was not rejected, but it was assumed that previous hierarchies and order had to be respected.

5. Monarchic revolution: Aware of the monarchy's centrality to any viable political ideology, the liberal revolution did not even consider following the French model or abolishing the crown. Liberals were content to submit the king to the constraints of a constitution that would recognize the new principles and the citizens' rights which the revolution had proclaimed.

6. The reduction of counterrevolutionary political space. The identification between monarchy and revolution was undermined severely by the experience of the Peninsular War. During this war, liberalism gained terrain and defined its model of constitutional monarchy. It was then that the conflict between revolution and counterrevolution moved to the interior of the country.

7. Politics and civil war. The struggle between the counterrevolutionary and revolutionary projects led to a civil war. The viciousness of the confrontation—and its cyclical recurrence over time—reveal the power of a long tradition in which arms and politics had become commingled. It demonstrates as well the political difficulty of banishing from public life the unrelenting violence that had accompanied that tradition for so long.

Notes

1. Translated by Daniel Gascón, including passages from Spanish-language sources.
2. Lucienne Domerge, *Le livre en Espagne au temps de la Révolution Française* (Lyon, 1984), Chapters 1–2; Antonio Elorza, 'El temido árbol de la libertad', in *España y la Revolución Francesa*, ed. Jean-René Aymes (Barcelona, 1989), 71–74.
3. Transcribed in Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *L'ambassade française en Espagne pendant la révolution (1789–1804)* (Paris, 1892), 51–52.
4. Andrés Muriel, *Historia de Charles IV*, 2 vols (1893–1895; repr. Madrid, 1965), vol. 1, 151.
5. Manuel Godoy, *Memorias*, ed. Emilio Laparra and Elisabel Larriba (Alicante, 2008), 183.

6. Archivo de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 30 March, 1793. Faustino Casamayor, *Años políticos e históricos de las cosas más particulares ocurridas en la Imperial y siempre augusta ciudad de Zaragoza. Tomo X. Contiene lo sucedido en el año de 1793*.

7. Letter to Cardinal Lorenzana, Rome, 13 February 1793, in José Nicolás de Azara, *Epistolario (1784–1804)*, ed. María Dolores Gimeno (Barcelona, 2010), 239.

8. Godoy, *Memorias*, 138.

9. Ibid.

10. The offerings to the king can be seen in *Gazeta de Madrid* 18 (1 March 1793).

11. Teófanes Egido, *Charles IV* (Madrid, 2001), 151. The same idea of popular zeal can be found in Gabriel H. Lovett, *La Guerra de la Independencia y el nacimiento de la España Contemporánea*, 2 vols (Barcelona, 1975), vol. 1, *El desafío al viejo orden*, 26.

12. The offerings to the king can be seen in *Gazeta de Madrid*, from the beginning of March 1793.

13. The order, from 4 February 1793, was published in *Gazeta de Madrid* on Tuesday, 26 February 1793.

14. See the proclamation published on 20 June 1793 in the supplement of *El Diario de Barcelona* (the date of the proclamation was 9 June). An example of a folk song would be the lyrics: 'Valerosos catalans | anem tots à la Campanya, | à defensar nostre Deu, | Ley, Patria, y Rey de España' from the 'Novas coblas a la nació catalana per animarlos a pendrer las armas, en defensa de nostre, Deu, Ley, Patria, Rey, Peronas, bens, Familias, y Casas. Contra los malvats Francesos', facsimile reproduction in Angel Ossorio, *Historia del pensamiento político catalán durante la guerra de España con la República francesa (1793–1795)* (Madrid, 1913), 177. On the flags, see Antonio Manzano Lahoz, *Las banderas Históricas del Ejército Español*, Ministerio de Defensa (Madrid, 1997), 130. On the elements that were part of the discourse, see Jean-René Aymes, *La guerra de España contra la Revolución francesa (1793–1795)* (Alicante, 1991), 419–424.

15. Diego José de Cádiz, *El soldado católico en guerra de religión. Carta intructiva, ascético-histório-política, en que se propone a un Soldado católico la necesidad de prepararse, el modo con que lo ha de hacer, y con que debe manejarse en la actual guerra contra el impío partido de la infiel, sediciosa y regicida Asamblea de Francia* (1794; repr. Málaga, 1812), 6–7.

16. Muriel, *Historia de Charles IV*, vol. 1, 152.

17. Lluís Roura, *Guerra gran a la ratlla de França* (Barcelona, 1993), 28. The territorial aspects are also studied in José Antonio Ferrer Benimeli, *El conde de Aranda y el frente aragonés en la guerra contra la Convención (1793–1795)* (Zaragoza, 1965), 53.

18. Aymes, *La guerra de España . . .* (Alicante, 1991), 414–418.

19. André Fugier, *Napoleón y España, 1799–1808* (Madrid, 2008), 46–47. First edition in French (Paris, 1930).

20. Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *L'Espagne et Napoléon 1804–1809* (Paris, 1908), 90.

21. Louis-François Lejeune, *Mémoires du general Lejeune,* 2 vols (Paris, 1895)*,* vol. 1, *De Valmy à Wagram*, 89. We have approached the matter in Pedro Rújula, 'El pintor de los Sitios de Zaragoza', introduction to Louis-François Lejeune, *Los Sitios de Zaragoza: Historia y pintura de los acontecimientos que tuvieron lugar en esta ciudad abierta durante los dos sitios que sostuvo en 1808 y 1809* (Zaragoza, 2009), xiv–xv.

22. See Vincent Haegele, *Napoléon et Joseph Bonaparte: Le Pouvoir et l'Ambition* (Paris, 2010), 342–344; and Manuel Moreno Alonso, *José I, un rey republicano en el trono de España* (Madrid, 2008), 199–206, 208–213.

23. Jean-René Aymes addressed the issue of the relationship between the war against the Convention and the Peninsular War in 'La "Guerra gran" (1793–1795) como prefiguración de la "Guerra del francés" (1808–1814)', in *España y la Revolución Francesa*, ed. Jean-René Aymes (Barcelona, 1989). According to Juan Franciso Fuentes, the war of the Convention was 'a dress rehearsal of the Peninsular War', 'Los afrancesados', in Juan Francisco Fuentes, *Madrid 1808: Ciudad y protagonistas* (Madrid, 2008), 121.

24. 'En que se da puntual noticia de la expedición del exército francés contra dicha Ciudad y del resultado que tuvo', Correo de Gerona, Tuesday, 28 June 1808.

25. A. D. H., 'Proclama de la Mancha', in *Colección de papeles interesantes sobre las circunstancias presentes: Quaderno Quinto* ([Madrid], 1808), 335–336.

26. Announced in *Diario de Madrid,* n. 34, Saturday, 10 September 1808, 186.

27. M. A., 'El madrileño a sus heroicos hermanos los vencedores de los enjambres de vándalos que intetaban subyugar la hermosa Monarquía Española', in *Colección de papeles interesantes*, 382.

28. Brian R. Hamnett, *La política española en una época revolucionaria, 1790–1820* (Mexico, 1985), 44; and Ronald Fraser, 'La guerrilla', in *Madrid 1808*, 2 vols (Madrid, 2008), vol. 2, *Ciudad y protagonistas*, 105.

29. This was proved by Richard Hocquellet in *Resistencia y revolución durante la Guerra de la Independencia: Del levantamiento patriótico a la soberanía nacional* (Zaragoza, 2008), 168.

30. Published in *Diario de Valencia*, 6 June 1808, reproduced in *Demostración de la lealtad española: colección de proclamas, bandos, órdenes, discursos, estados de exército, y relaciones de batallas publicadas por las juntas de gobierno, o por algunos particulares en las actuales circunstancias*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1808), vol. 1, 66.

31. 'Declaración de Guerra al Emperador de la Francia Napoleón I', Cádiz, 6 June 1808, *Demostración de la lealtad española,* vol. 1, 82.

32. *Diccionario razonado, manual para inteligencia de ciertos escritores que por equivocación han nacido en España* (Cádiz, 1811), 16.

33. José Álvarez Junco, *Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2001), 130–136.

34. Artola, *Los afrancesados* (Madrid, 2008), 64; Juan López Tabar, *Los famosos traidores: Los afrancesados durante la crisis de Antiguo Régimen* (Madrid, 2001).

35. Juan Ignacio Marcuello Benedicto, 'Las Cortes de Cádiz: Monarquía y gobierno de asamblea: Valoraciones historiográficas sobre la "forma de gobierno" en el sistema constitucional de 1812', in *1808: Controversias historiográficas*, ed. Antonio Rodríguez de las Heras and Rosario Ruiz Franco (Madrid, 2010), 146–172.

36. Ramón del Río, *Orígenes de la guerra carlista en Navarra, 1820–1824* (Pamplona, 1987); Félix Llanos Aramburu, *El Trienio Liberal en Guipúzcoa (1820–1823): Antecedentes de las Guerras Carlistas en el País Vasco* (San Sebastián, 1998); Pedro Rújula, *Constitución o Muerte: El Trienio Liberal y los levantamientos realistas en Aragón (1820–1823)* (Zaragoza, 2000); Ramón Arnabat, *Visca el rei i la religió! La primera guerra civil de la Catalunya contemporània (1820–1823)* (Lleida, 2006); and Nuria Sauch Cruz, *Guerrillers i bàndols civils entre l'Ebre i el Maestrat: la formació d'un país carlista (1808–1844)* (Barcelona, 2004).

37. Ramón Arnabat, *La revolució de 1820 i el Trienni Liberal a Catalunya* (Vic, 2001), 260.

38. François-René de Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone: Guerre d'Espagne: Négociations: Colonies espagnoles*, 2 vols (Brussels, 1838), vol. 1, 254.

39. I have addressed the issue in 'La expedición militar del duque de Angulema en España (1823)', in *1823: Los Cien mil hijos de San Luis: El mapa olvidado de la Expedición*, ed. Pedro Rújula (Zaragoza, 2010), 14–18.

40. Barón de Jomini, *Précis de l'art de la guerre, ou nouveau tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la stratégie, de la grande tactique et de la politique militaire* (Paris, 1838), 69.

41. Ricardo García Cárcel, *El sueño de la nación indomable: Los mitos de la Guerra de la Independencia* (Madrid, 2007), 90–91.

42. Jean-René Aymes, *Españoles en París en la época romántica, 1808–1848* (Madrid, 2008), chapter 3.

43. Pedro Rújula, 'La guerra como aprendizaje político', in *El Carlismo en su tiempo: geografías de la contrarrevolución* (Pamplona, 2008), 41–63.

44. Jean-Philippe Luis, *L'utopie réactionnaire: Épuration et modernisation de l'état dans l'Espagne de la fin de l'Ancien Régime (1823–1834)* (Madrid, 2002).

45. Proclama a los 'Castellanos', Salas de los Infantes, 23 October 1833 in Antonio Pirala, *Historia de la guerra civil y de los partidos liberal y carlista*, 6 vols (1854; repr. Madrid, 1984), vol. 1, 658.

46. C. F. Henningsen, *Campaña de doce meses en Navarra y las Provincias Vascongadas con el general Zumalacárregui* trans. Roman Oyarzun (Madrid, 1935), 141–142; English original edition, *The Most Striking Events of a Twelvemonth's Campaign with Zumalacarregui, in Navarre and the Basque Provinces* (Philadelphia, 1836).

47. Jordi Canal, *El carlismo: Dos siglos de contrarrevolución en España* (Madrid, 2000).

Bibliography

Published primary sources (journals and newspapers)

Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des Chambres françaises: Première série, 1787 à 1799 (Paris, 1865–).
Columbia Centinel.
L'Esprit des Journaux.
Décade Philosophique.
Le Censeur des Journaux.
Le Journal des Hommes Libres.
Le Journal des Patriotes de 89.
L'Orateur Plébéien.
Magasin Encyclopédique.
Le Moniteur Universel.
Monitore Fiorentino.
Le Patriote François. Journal libre, impartial et national, par une Société de Citoyens et dirigé par J.P. Brissot de Warville.
La Tribune des Patriotes, ou Journal de la majorité.

Published primary sources

Alfieri, V. *The Tragedies of Vittorio Alfieri*, 2 vols, trans. E. A. Bowring (Westport, 1876; repr. 1970).
——. *On Tyranny*, ed. J. A. Molinaro and B. Corrigan (Toronto: 1961).
Azara, J. N. de, *Epistolario (1784–1804)*, ed. M. D. Gimeno (Barcelona, 2010).
Billaud-Varenne, J. N. *Discours sur cette question: Comment doit-on faire la guerre, au cas qu'il faille la déclarer?* (Paris, 1791).
Billecocq, J. B. L. J. *Souvenirs de J.-B. Billecocq (1765–1829): en prison sous la Terreur*, ed. N. Felkay and H. Favier (Paris, 1981).
Blanchard de La Musse, F.-G.-U. *Ode sur la reprise de la guerre civile dans les départemens insurgés.* (Nantes, Year VIII [1799–1800]).
Boissel, F. *Les entretiens du père Gérard sur la Constitution politique et le Gouvernement révolutionnaire du peuple françois* (Paris, 1793).
Boissy d'Anglas, F. A. *Discours sur les véritables intérêts de quelques-unes des puissances coalisées et sur les bases d'une paix durable . . .* (Paris, Year III [1794–1795]).
Bonaparte, L. *Motion d'ordre faite par L. Bonaparte pour la veuve et les enfants de Téobald-Wolfe-Ton.* [sic] Séance du 9 brumaire Year VIII [31 October 1799] (Paris, 1799).
Botte, P. *Eloge funèbre du général Hoche* (Ghent, 1797).
Bourdon, L. and Thibaudeau, A. C. (eds) *Recueil des actions héroïques et civiques des républicains français, contenant les trois premiers numéros, précédés de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme, et de la Constitution* (Paris, Year II [1793–94]).
Brissot, J. P. *Discours sur la nécessité de déclarer la guerre aux princes allemands qui protègent les émigrés, prononcé le 15 décembre 1791* (Paris, 1791).

——. *A Discourse upon the Question whether the King shall be tried? Delivered before the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, at Paris, at a Meeting, July 10th, 1791*, trans. P. J. G. de Nancrede (Boston, 1791).

——. *Nouveau voyage dans les États-Unis de l'Amérique septentrionale fait en 1788* (Paris, 1791).

——. *Second discours sur la nécessité de faire la guerre aux princes allemands* (Paris, 1792).

——. *Troisième discours sur la nécessité de la guerre* (Paris, 1792).

Buonarroti, F. 'La paix perpétuelle avec les rois (1796)', in Saitta, A. *Filippo Buonarroti. Contributi alla storia della sua vita e del suo pensiero*, 2 vols (Rome, 1951).

Burke, E. *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, ed. P. Langford and W. B. Todd, 9 vols (Oxford, 1981–2000).

Calonne, C. A. de, *Tableau de l'Europe en novembre 1795* (London, 1795).

——. *Tableau de l'Europe jusqu'au commencement de 1796, et pensées sur ce qui peut procurer promptement une paix solide* (London, 1796).

Cambacérès, J. J. de, *Mémoires inédits. Eclaircissements publiés par Cambacérès sur les principaux événements de sa vie politique*, présentation et notes de L. Chatel de Brancion 2 vols (Paris, 1999).

Casamayor, F., *Años políticos e históricos de las cosas más particulares ocurridas en la Imperial y siempre augusta ciudad de Zaragoza*, ed. P. Rújula (Zaragoza, 2010).

Castel de Saint-Pierre, C. I. *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, ed. S. Goyard–Fabre (Paris, 1981 [1st edn 1713]).

Chateaubriand, F. R. de, *Congrès de Vérone; Guerre d'Espagne; Négociations: Colonies espagnoles*, 2 vols (Brussels, 1838).

Cicero *Les livres académiques, traduits et éclaircis par M. de Castillon*, ed. J. L. M. Coupé, 2 vols. (Paris, 1796).

Collot, G. H. V. *Précis des événements qui se sont passés à la Guadeloupe pendant l'administration de Georges-Henry-Victor Collot, depuis le 20 mars 1793 jusqu'au 22 avril 1794. Présenté à la Convention nationale* (Philadelphia, 1795).

Constant, B. *Observations on the Strength of the Present Government of France, and Upon the Necessity of Rallying Round It*, trans. J. Losh (Bath, London, 1797).

Constitution des républiques française, cisalpine, et ligurienne avec l'acte d'indépendance des Etats-Unis d'Amérique dans les quatre langues française, anglaise, allemande et italienne (Paris, Year VII [1798–99]).

Cuoco, V. *Platone in Italia. Traduzione dal greco*, ed. A. De Francesco and A. Andreoni (Rome-Bari, 2006, 1st edn 1804–1806).

Delacroix, *L'intrigue dévoilée, ou Robespierre vengé des outrages et des calomnies des ambitieux* (Paris, 1792).

Demostración de la lealtad española: colección de proclamas, bandos, órdenes, discursos, estados de exército, y relaciones de batallas publicadas por las juntas de gobierno, o por algunos particulares en las actuales circunstancias, 2 vols (Madrid, 1808).

Desmoulins, C. *Discours sur le parti que l'Assemblée nationale doit prendre relativement à la proposition de guerre, annoncée par le pouvoir exécutif* (Paris, 1791).

——. *Jean–Pierre Brissot démasqué* (Paris, 1792).

Diccionario razonado, manual para inteligencia de ciertos escritores que por equivocación han nacido en España (Cadiz, 1811).

Diego José de Cádiz, B. *El soldado católico en guerra de religión. Carta intructiva, ascético-histórico-política, en que se propone a un Soldado católico la necesidad de prepararse, el modo con que lo ha de hacer, y con que debe manejarse en la actual guerra contra el impío partido de la infiel, sediciosa y regicida Asamblea de Francia* (Málaga, 1812, 1st edn 1794).

Eschassériaux, J. *Des intérêts de la République française et de toutes les puissances de l'Europe* (Paris, Year IV [1795–1796]).

Foscolo, U. *Orazione a Bonaparte pel Congresso di Lione*, ed. L. Rossi (Rome, 2002, 1st edn 1802).

Godoy, M. *Memorias*, ed. E. Laparra and E. Larriba (Alicante, 2008).

Guibert, J.-A.-H. de *Stratégiques*, ed. J. P. Charnay and M. Burgos (Paris, 1977).

Gustà, F. *Dell'influenza dei giansenisti nella rivoluzione di Francia aggiuntevi alcune notizie interessanti sul numero e qualità dei preti costituzionali. Seconda edizione corretta ed accresciuta* (Ferrara, 1794).

——. *Saggio critico sulle crociate se sia giusta la idea invalsane comunemente e se sieno adattabili alle circostanze presenti fattovi qualche cambiamento. Seconda edizione ricorretta e accresciuta* (Foligno, 1794).

——. *L'antico progetto di Borgo Fontana dai moderni giansenisti continuato e compito* (Assisi, 1795).

Hamilton, A. *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. H. C. Syrett and J. E. Cooke, 27 vols, (New York-London, 1961–1987).

Henningsen, C. F., *The Most Striking Events of a Twelvemonth's Campaign with Zumalacarregui, in Navarre and the Basque Provinces* (Philadelphia, 1836).

Ivernois, F. d', *Réflexions sur la guerre en réponse aux Réflexions sur la paix adressées à M. Pitt et aux Français* (London, 1795).

Jomini, A. H. de, *Précis de l'art de la guerre, ou nouveau tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la stratégie, de la grande tactique et de la politique militaire* (Paris, 1838).

La Reveillère-Lépaux, L.-M. de *Mémoires* 3 vols (Paris, 1895).

Legouvé, G. *La Mort d'Abel* (Paris, 1793).

——. *Épicharis et Néron, ou la conspiration pour la liberté* (Paris, Year II [1793–94]).

——. *Étéocle* (Paris, 1800).

——. *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Jean Nicolas Bouilly et al. 3 vols (Paris, 1826–27).

Lejeune, L. F. *Mémoires du general Lejeune*, 2 vols (Paris, 1895).

——. *Los Sitios de Zaragoza: Historia y pintura de los acontecimientos que tuvieron lugar en esta ciudad abierta durante los dos sitios que sostuvo en 1808 y 1809* (Zaragoza, 2009).

Lemercier, L.-J.-N. *Agamemnon* (2nd edn, Paris, 1797).

Lettera di un Arivescovo scritta a Monsignor Scipione Ricci vescovo di Pistoia e Prato su la sua pastorale dei 3 giugno MDCCLXXXI pubblicata contro la Devozione del Santissimo Cuore di Gesù (Assisi, 1784).

Little, J. 'Little's Diary of the French Landing in 1798', ed. N. Costello in *Analecta Hibernica* 11 (1941): 57–174.

Louvet, J. B. *Discours sur la guerre, prononcé à la Société le 9 janvier 1792* (Paris, 1792).

——. *Accusation contre Maximilien Robespierre . . . du 29 octobre 1792* (Paris, 1792).

Lucan, *La Pharsale, traduite en vers français par Brébeuf, accompagnée du texte . . . avec la vie de deux poëtes et des réflexions critiques, par J.-B.-L.-J. Billecocq* (Paris, Year IV [1796]).

Mably, G. Bonnot de, *De la législation, ou principe des lois* (Amsterdam, 1776).

Machenaud, F. *Second discours sur la guerre et les moyens de sauver l'état* (Paris, 1792).

Maistre, J. de, *Considérations sur la France* (Geneva, 1980 [1st edn 1796]).

Mallet du Pan, J. *Correspondance inédite avec la cour de Vienne, 1794–1798* (Paris, 1884).

Marchetti, G. *Che importa ai preti, ovvero l'interesse della religione cristiana nei grandi avvenimenti di questi tempi. Riflessioni politico-morali di un amico di tutti dirette a un amico solo da* Giovanni Marchetti da Empoli. *Edizione seconda con qualche aggiunta* (Rome, 1797).

Montesquieu, C. L. de Secondat, *L'esprit des Lois* (Paris, 1979 [1st edn 1748]).

Muzzarelli, A. *Delle cause de' mali presenti e del timore de' mali futuri e suoi rimedi. Avviso al popolo cristiano* (Foligno, 1793).

Plutarch, *Les vies des hommes illustres, traduites du grec par D. Ricard, avec des remarques à la fin de chaque vie*, 13 vols (Paris, 1798–1803).

Pradt, D. Dufour de, *Antidote au congrès de Rastadt ou Plan d'un nouvel équilibre de l'Europe* (London, 1798).

Recueil d'hymnes patriotiques, chantés aux séances du Conseil Général de la Commune, par les citoyens de la première réquisition et de l'armée révolutionnaire (Paris, 1793).

Report of the Committee of the House of Commons in Consequence of the Several Motions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Including the Whole of the Examinations Taken Before the Committee, the Correspondence Relative to the Exchange of Prisoners; the Instructions of Colonel Tate, &c. (London, 1798).

Robespierre, M. *Œuvres de Maximilien Robespierre*, ed. M. Bouloiseau et al., 11 vols (Paris, 1950–2011).

Rousseau, J-J. *Principes du droit de la guerre. Ecrits sur la paix perpétuelle*, ed. B. Bachofen, and C. Spector (Paris, 2008).

Saint-Just, L. A. *Œuvres de Saint-Just, représentant du peuple* (Paris, 1834).

Sallust, *Conjuration de Catilina contre la République romaine, nouvellement traduite…par J. B. L. J. Billecocq* (Paris, 1795).

Seneca, *Théâtre, traduction nouvelle, enrichie de notes historiques, littéraires et critiques, et suivie du texte latin corrigé d'après les meilleurs manuscrits, par L. M. Coupé* (Paris, 1795).

Sidney, A., *Court Maxims*, ed. H. W. Blom et al. (Cambridge, 1996).

Stock, J. *Proceedings at Killala during the French Invasion, and the Subsequent Rebellion, from August 22 to October 27, 1798: in Letters from the Right Reverend Joseph Lord Bishop of Killala to his Brother* (Bath, 1799).

Stock, J. *A Narrative of what Passed at Killala […] during the French Invasion in the Summer of 1798, by an Eye Witness* (Dublin, 1800).

Tone, T. W. *The Writings of Theobald Wolfe Tone (1763–1798)*, ed. T. W. Moody et al., 3 vols (Oxford, 1998–2007).

Secondary sources

Adélaïde-Merlande, J. *La Caraïbe et la Guyane au temps de la Révolution et de l'Empire* (Paris, 1992).

Albertini, G. *Le parti de la guerre depuis 1789* (Paris, 1944).

Álvarez Junco, J., *Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2001)

Ambrière, F. and Ambrière, M. *Talma, ou l'histoire au théâtre* (Paris, 2007).

Arendt, H. *On Revolution* (New York, 1963).

Antonielli, L. *I prefetti dell'Italia napoleonica* (Bologna, 1983).

Armstrong, J. D. *Revolution and World Order: the Revolutionary State in International Society* (Oxford, 1993).

Arnabat, R. *La revolució de 1820 i el Trienni Liberal a Catalunya* (Vic, 2001).

——. *Visca el rei i la religió! La primera guerra civil de la Catalunya contemporània 1820–1823* (Lleida, 2006).

Artola, M., *Los Afrancesados* (Madrid, 2008)

Aulard, A. 'La diplomatie du premier Comité de Salut Public', *La Révolution française* 18 (1890): 125–166.

——. *Histoire politique de la Révolution française. Origines et développements de la Démocratie et de la République, 1789–1804* (Paris, 1901).

Aymes, J.-R. (ed.) *España y la Revolución Francesa* (Barcelona, 1989).

——. *La guerra de España contra la Revolución francesa* (*1793–1795*) (Alicante, 1991).

——. *Españoles en París en la época romántica, 1808–1848* (Madrid, 2008).

Auvray, M. *L'âge des casernes: Histoire et mythes du service militaire* (Paris, 1998).

Barker-Benfield, G. J. *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth–Century Britain* (Chicago, 1992).

Barthélemy, G. 'Les esclaves révoltés à Saint-Domingue: supplétifs, mercenaires et combattants', in *Miliciens et soldats d'origine servile: XIIIe–XXIe siècles*, ed. C. Bernand and A. Stella (Paris, 2006).

Batllori, M. *La cultura hispano-italiana de los jesuitas expulsos: españoles, hispanoamericanos, filipinos,(1767–1814).* (Madrid, 1966).

Belissa, M. *Fraternité universelle et intérêt national, (1713–1795). Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens* (Paris, 1997).

——. *Repenser l'ordre européen (1795–1802). De la société des rois aux droits des nations* (Paris, 2006).

Bell, D. A. *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (Boston, 2007).

Bely, L. *L'art de la paix en Europe: naissance de la diplomatie moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle)* (Paris, 2007).

Benot, Y. *La révolution française et la fin des colonies* (Paris, 1989).

——. 'Quand les esclaves combattent pour leurs maîtres…', in *Miliciens et soldats d'origine servile XIIIe–XXIe siècles*, ed. C. Bernand and A. Stella (Paris, 2006).

Berlin, I. 'The Revolution in Black Life', in *The American Revolution. Explorations in the History of American Radicalism*, ed. A. F. Young (DeKalb, 1976).

——. *Many Thousands Gone. The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).

——. *Generations of Captivity: A History of African–American Slaves* (Cambridge, MA, 2003).

Bertaud, J.-P. 'Voies nouvelles pour l'histoire militaire de la Révolution', *AHRF* 219 (1975): 66–94.

——. *La Révolution armée. Les soldats–citoyens et la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1979).

——. *1799, Bonaparte prend le pouvoir* (Bruxelles, 1987).

——. *Guerre et société en France de Louis XIV à Napoléon 1er* (Paris, 1999).

——. *Quand les enfants parlaient de gloire: l'armée au coeur de la France de Napoléon* (Paris, 2006).

Best, G. *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe (1770–1870)* (Leicester, 1982).

Biard, M. 'Comment vivre la politique en député de terrain ?' in *Dire il Politico, Dire le politique. Il "discorso", le scritture e le rappresentazioni della politica*, ed. B. Consarelli (Padua, 2001).

——. *Missionnaires de la République: Les représentants du peuple en mission (1793–1795)* (Paris, 2002).

——. and Serna, P. (eds) *Une Révolution du pouvoir exécutif ?* special issue of *AHRF* 332 (2003).

Bidussa, D. 'Gli intellettuali e la questione della pace, (1938–1941)', in *Vichy, 1940–1944*, ed. D. Peschanski (Milan, 1986).

Biet, C. *Œdipe en monarchie, tragédie et théorie juridique a l'âge classique* (Paris, 1994).

Blackburn, R. *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776–1848* (London, 1988).

Blancpain, F. *La colonie française de Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 2004).

Blaufarb, R. *The French Army (1750–1820): Careers, Talent, Merit* (Manchester, 2002).

Bloch, M. *L'étrange défaite. Témoignage écrit en 1940* (Paris, 1946).

Brian, E. *La Mesure de l'Etat: Administrateurs et géomètres au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1994).

Brillaud, J. *Sombres lumières, Essai sur le retour à l'antique et la tragédie grecque au XVIIIe siècle* (Québec, 2010).

Broers, M. *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, (1796–1814): Cultural Imperialism in a European context?* (Basingstoke, 2005).

——. 'The concept of "Total war" in the Revolutionary–Napoleonic Period', *War in History* 3 (2008): 247–268.

Brown, C. L. *Moral Capital. Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill, 2006).

Brown, H. G. *War, Revolution and the Bureaucratic State: Politics and Army Administration in France (1791–1799)* (Oxford, 1995).

——. 'Pouvoir, bureaucratie et élite d'Etat: la politique révolutionnaire du contrôle et de l'administration de l'armée (1791–1799)', *AHRF* 303 (1996): 119–138.

——. 'The Search for Stability', in *Taking liberties, Problems of a New Order from the French Revolution to Napoleon*, ed. H. Brown and J. A. Miller (Manchester, 2003).

——. *Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon* (Charlottesville, 2006).

Brown, W. W. *Narrative of William W. Brown, an American Slave. Written by Himself* (London, 1849).

——. *The Negro in the American Rebellion* (Boston, 1867).

Buckley, R. *Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments (1795–1815)* (New Haven, 1979).

Bukovansky, M. *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture* (Princeton, 2002).

Burrows, S. 'The Innocence of Jacques-Pierre Brissot', *Historical Journal* 46 (2003): 843–871.

Canal, J. *El carlismo: Dos siglos de contrarrevolución en España* (Madrid, 2000).

Candela, G. *L'armée d'Italie: des missionnaires armés à la naissance de la guerre napoléonienne* (Rennes, 2011).

Caravale, M. and Caracciolo, A. *Lo Stato Pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX* (Turin, 1978).

Cardini, F. *La culture de la guerre, X–XVIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1992 [1 edn 1982]).

Caron, J.-C. *Frères de sang: La guerre civile en France au XIXe siècle* (Seyssel, 2009).

Cattaneo, M. 'L'opposizione popolare al "giacobinismo" a Roma e nello Stato Pontificio', in *Folle Controrivoluzionarie. Le insorgenze popolari nell'Italia giacobina e napoleonica*, ed. A. M. Rao (Rome, 1999).

——. *La sponda sbagliata del Tevere. Mito e realtà di un'identità popolare tra antico regime e rivoluzione* (Naples, 2004).

Cawthorn, K. *Becoming Female: The Male Body in Greek Tragedy* (London, 2008).

Chappey, J.-L. 'L'assassinat de Rastadt et les enjeux du "cri de vengeance" sous le second Directoire', in *La Voix et le Geste. Une approche culturelle de la violence socio–politique*, ed. P. Bourdin and B. Gainot (Clermont–Ferrand, 2005).

Chinard, G. *Volney et l'Amérique d'après des documents inédits et sa correspondance avec Jefferson* (Baltimore, 1923).

Ciotti, B. *Du volontaire au conscrit. Les levées d'hommes dans le Puy-de-Dôme pendant la Révolution française* (Clermont-Ferrand, 2001).

——. 'Armées, révoltes et Révolutions à la fin du XVIIIe siècle (1773–1802)', in *Révoltes et révolutions de 1773 à 1802*, ed. S. Bianchi and P. Bourdin (Nantes, 2004).

Codignola, E. *Carteggi di giansenisti liguri*, 3 vols (Florence, 1941).

Cohn, D. 'La compassion d'Iphigénie comme formule du pathos des Lumières', *Images Re-vues* hors-série 1 (2008): 2–12.

Corvisier, A. *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789* (Paris, 1976).

Cottret, B. *La Révolution américaine. La quête du bonheur* (Paris, 2003).

Coudreuse, A. *Le goût des larmes au XVIIIᵉ siècle* (Paris, 1999).

Crépin, A. *La conscription en débat ou le triple apprentissage de la nation, de la citoyenneté, de la République (1798–1889)* (Arras, 1998).

——. *Défendre la France. Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Rennes, 2005).

——. *Histoire de la conscription* (Paris, 2009).

Croce, B. *La rivoluzione napoletana del 1799: Biografie, racconti, ricerche* (8th edn, Bari, 1968).

Curry, L. P. *The Free Black in Urban America 1800–1850* (Chicago, 1981).

Da Campagnola, S. 'Giansenismo e antigiansenismo in Umbria', in *Storia e cultura in Umbria nell'età moderna (secoli XV–XVIII)* (Perugia, 1972), 271–319.

Davis, D. B. *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (New York, 1988).

De Francesco, A. *Il governo senza testa: Movimento democratico e federalismo nella Francia rivoluzionaria. 1789–1795* (Naples, 1992).

——. *Vincenzo Cuoco: Una vita politica* (Rome-Bari, 1997).

——. 'La question de la nationalité dans l'Italie révolutionnaire 1796–1801', in *La plume et le sabre, Hommages offerts à Jean–Paul Bertaud*, eds M. Biard et al. (Paris, 2002).

——. *1799: Una storia d'Italia* (Milan, 2004).

——. 'Costruire la nazione: Il dibattito politico negli anni della Repubblica', in *La formazione del primo Stato italiano e Milano capitale 1802–1814*, ed. A. Robbiati Bianchi (Milan, 2006).

——. 'Tirar di scherma nell' Italia napoleonica: Giuseppe Errante, Pietro Grisetti, Giuseppe Rosaroll e la storia della loro amicizia', in *Studi in onore di Cesare Mozzarelli* (Milan, 2010), 1045–1069.

——. 'Daniel Guérin et Georges Lefebvre, une rencontre improbable', *La Révolution française* 2 (2010), http://lrf.revues.org/index162.html accessed 22 February 2013.

Delpiano, P. *Il governo della lettura: Chiesa e libri nell'Italia del Settecento* (Bologna, 2007).

Del Río, R., *Orígenes de la guerra carlista en Navarra, 1820–1824* (Pamplona, 1987)

Denis, V. and Gainot, B. 'De l'art du maintien de l'ordre chez Sieyès, 1791', in *Les mémoires policiers, (1750–1850). Ecritures et pratiques policières du Siècle des Lumières au Second Empire*, ed. V. Milliot (Rennes, 2006).

De Rosa, G. 'Mutamenti rivoluzionari e tradizioni confessionali nei paesi occupati dalle armate napoleoniche', *Ricerche di Storia Sociale e Religiosa* 35 (1989): 7–19.

——. '1789–1799. La Chiesa di fronte alla Rivoluzione', in *La Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa 1789–1799*, ed. L. Fiorani (Pisa, Rome, 1997).

Desbrière, É. *1793–1805. Projets et tentatives de débarquement dans les îles britanniques*, 5 vols (Paris, 1900–1902).

Dickinson, H. T. (ed.) *A Companion to Eighteenth Century Britain* (New York, 2002).

Di Rienzo, E. *Marc-Antoine Jullien de Paris (1789–1848): Una biografia politica* (Naples, 1999).

——. *Il diritto delle armi, Guerra e politica nell'Europa moderna* (Milan, 2005).

Domerge, L. *Le livre en Espagne au temps de la Révolution Française* (Lyon, 1984)

Donato, M. P. 'La questione dell'estremismo', in *La democrazia alla prova della spada. Experiena e memoria del 1799 in Europa*, ed. A. De Francesco (Milan, 2003).

——. et al. *Una rivoluzione difficile. La Repubblica Romana del 1798–1799* (Pisa, 2000).

Dorsey, P. A. *Common Bondage. Slavery as Metaphor in Revolutionary America* (Knoxville, 2009).

Dubois, L. ' "Citoyens et amis !". Esclavage, citoyenneté et République dans les Antilles françaises à l'époque révolutionnaire', *Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 2 (2003): 281–294.

——. *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004).

——. *Avengers of the New World. The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Harvard, 2005).

Dudink, S. et al. (eds) *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History* (Manchester, 2004).

Dupuy, P. (ed.) *France–Angleterre au Musée Carnavalet, face à la Révolution et l'Empire: caricatures anglaises (1789–1815)* (Paris, 2009).

Egido, T., *Carlos IV* (Madrid, 2001).

Ehrenberg, A. *Le corps militaire. Politique et pédagogie en démocratie* (Paris, 1983).

Elisabeth, L. 'La République dans les Iles du Vent', *AHRF* 293 (1993): 373–408.

Ellery, E. *Brissot de Warville. A Study in the History of the French Revolution* (Boston, 1915).

Elliott, M. 'Religious Polarization and Sectarianism in the Ulster Rebellion', in *1798: A Bicentenary Perspective*, ed. T. Bartlett (Dublin, 2003).

Ellison, J. *Cato's Tears and the Making of Anglo–American Emotion* (Chicago, 1999).

Elorza, A. 'El temido árbol de la libertad', in *España y la Revolución Francesa*, ed. J. R. Aymes (Barcelona, 1989).

Ely, M. P. *Israel on the Appomatox. A Southern Experiment in Black Freedom from the 1790s Through the Civil War* (New York, 2004).

Ferrer Benimeli, J. A. *El conde de Aranda y el frente aragonés en la guerra contra la Convención (1793–1795)* (Zaragoza, 1965).

Fick, C. *The Making of Haïti* (Knoxville, 1990).

——. 'La révolution de Saint-Domingue. De l'insurrection du 22 août 1791 à la formation de l'Etat haïtien', in *L'insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue (22–23 août 1791)*, ed. L. Hurbon (Paris, 2000).

Finkelman, P. (ed.) *Encyclopedia of African American History: from the Colonial Period to the Age of Frederick Douglass*, 3 vols (Oxford-New York, 2006).

Fiorani, L. and Rocciolo, D. (eds) *Chiesa Romana e Rivoluzione francese, 1789–1799* (Rome, 2004).

Foley, H. P. *Female Acts in Greek Tragedy* (Princeton, 2001).

Forrest, A. *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London, 2002).

——. *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars. The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory* (Cambridge, 2009).

Förster, S. 'The First World War: Global Dimension of Warfare in the Age of Revolutions (1775–1815)', in *War in Age of Revolution 1775–1815*, ed. R. Chickering and S. Förster (Cambridge, 2010).

Foucault, M. *Surveiller et punir* (Paris, 1975).

Frey, S. R. 'Between Slavery and Freedom: Virginia Blacks in the Revolution', *The Journal of Southern History* 49 (1983): 375–398.

——. *Water from the Rock. Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, 1991).

Friguglietti, J. *Albert Mathiez historien révolutionnaire (1874–1932)* (Paris, 1974).

Fuentes, J. F. *Madrid 1808: Ciudad y protagonistas* (Madrid, 2008).

Fugier, A. *Napoleón y España, 1799–1808* (Madrid, 2008)

Furstenberg, F. *In the Name of the Father. Washington's Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a Nation* (New York, 2006).

Gainot, B. 'I rapporti franco–italiani nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico–militare', *Società e storia* 76 (1997): 345–376.

——. *1799, Un nouveau jacobinisme? La démocratie représentative, une alternative à Brumaire* (Paris, 2001).

——. 'Les mots et les cendres', *AHRF* 324 (2001): 127–138.

——. 'I paradossi della democratizzazzione delle repubbliche sorelle', in *La democrazia alla prova della spada. Experienza e memoria del 1799 in Europa*, ed. A. De Francesco (Milan, 2003).

——. 'Sieyès directeur et la question italienne en 1799', in *Figures de Sieyès*, eds P.-Y. Quiviger et al. (Paris, 2008).

——. 'Le livre du soldat français par le général Championnet, 1799', In *Héros et héroïnes de la Révolution Française*, ed. S. Bianchi (Paris, 2012).

Gallo, F. F. 'Le insorgenze abruzzesi in prospettiva; il caso di Teramo', in *La democrazia alla prova della spada. Experienza e memoria del 1799 in Europa*, ed. A. De Francesco (Milan, 2003).

García Cárcel, R. *El sueño de la nación indomable: Los mitos de la Guerra de la Independencia* (Madrid, 2007).

Gaspar, D. B. and Geggus, D. P. *A Turbulent Time: The Greater Caribbean in the Age of the French and Haitian Revolutions* (Bloomington, 1997).

Gastey (Général). 'L'étonnante aventure de l'Armée d'Irlande [1798]', *Revue historique de l'Armée*, 8 (1952): 19–32.

Gautier, L. *Face à la guerre* (Paris, 2006).

Geggus, D. P. *Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint-Domingue (1793–1798)* (Oxford, 1982).

Genovese, E. D. *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro–American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Chapel Hill, 1992).

Geoffroy de Grandmaison, C. A., *L'ambassade française en Espagne pendant la révolution (1789–1804)* (Paris, 1892).

——. *L'Espagne et Napoléon 1804–1809* (Paris, 1908).

Géré, F. and Widemann, T. (eds) *La guerre totale* (Paris, 2001).

Gilby, E. ' "Émotions" and the Ethics of Response in Seventeenth–Century French Dramatic Theory', *Modern Philology* 107 (2009): 52–71.

Gilli, M. 'Independence ou annexion; une république mort–née, la République cis-rhénane', in *La democrazia alla prova della spada. Experienza e memoria del 1799 in Europa*, ed. A. De Francesco (Milan, 2003).

Giordano, B. *Gli ufficiali della Scuola militare di Modena (1798–1820): Una ricerca prosopografica* (Soveria Mannelli, 2008).

Girard, P. 'Napoléon Bonaparte and the Emancipation Issue in Saint–Dominigue, 1799–1803', *French Historical Studies* 32 (2009): 587–618.

Giuntella, V. E. *Le dolci catene: Testi della controrivoluzione cattolica in Italia* (Rome, 1988).

Godechot, J. *Les commissaires aux armées sous le Directoire. Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre pouvoir civil et militaires*, 2 vols (Paris, 1941).

Goldhill, S. *Language, Sexuality, Narrative: The Oresteia* (Cambridge, 1984).

Gough, H. 'Total war? Revolutionary France and United Irish strategy in the 1790s', in *Franco–Irish Military connections, 1590–1945*, ed. N. Genêt-Rouffiac and D. Murphy (Dublin, 2009).

Goujard, P. 'Une notion concept en construction: l'héroïsme révolutionnaire', in *Dictionnaire des usages sociopolitiques (1770–1815). 2: Notions, concepts* (Paris, 1987).

Goya, F. *Los desastres de la guerra*, in Goya F *L'œuvre gravée* (Paris, 1948).

Grimsley, M. and Rogers, C. J. (eds) *Civilians in the Path of War* (Lincoln, 2002).

Guasti, N. *L'esilio italiano dei Gesuiti spagnoli: Identità, controllo sociale e pratiche culturali (1767–1798)* (Rome, 2006).

Guerci, L. *Uno spettacolo non mai più veduto nel mondo: La Rivoluzione francese come unicità e rovesciamento negli scrittori controrivoluzionari italiani (1789–1799)* (Turin, 2008).

Guillon, E. *La France et l'Irlande pendant la Révolution. Hoche et Humbert. Documents inédits* (Paris, 1888).

Guiomar, J.-Y. 'La grande nation, est-ce encore la nation?', in *Du Directoire au Consulat*, ed. J. Bernet et al., 4 vols (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 1999).

——. *L'invention de la guerre totale, XVIIIe–XXe siècle* (Paris, 2004).

Guyot, R. *Le Directoire et la paix de l'Europe, des traités de Bâle à la deuxième coalition (1795–1799)* (Paris, 1911).

Haegele, V. *Napoléon et Joseph Bonaparte: Le Pouvoir et l'Ambition* (Paris, 2010)

Hagemann, K. et al. (eds) *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives. 1775–1830* (Basingstoke, 2010).

Hall, E. and Macintosh, F. *Greek Tragedy and the British Theatre, 1660–1914* (New York, 2005).

Hammersley, R. *French Revolutionaries and English Republicans: The Cordeliers Club. (1790–1794)* (Woodbridge, 2005).

——. *The English Republican Tradition and Eighteenth-Century France* (Manchester, 2010).

Hamnett, B. R. *La política española en una época revolucionaria*, *1790–1820* (Mexico City, 1985).

Hartgrove, W. B. 'The Negro Soldier in the American Revolution', *The Journal of Negro History* 1 (1916): 110–131.

Heinze, E. ' "This Power isn't Power if it's Shared": Law and Violence in Jean Racine's "La Thébaïde" ', *Law & Literature* 22 (2010): 76–109.

Henninger, L. 'Military Revolutions and Military History', in *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, ed. M. Hughes and W. J. Philpott (New York, 2006).

Hippler, T. 'Service militaire et intégration nationale pendant la Révolution Française', *AHRF* 329 (2002): 1–16.

——. *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany. (1789–1830)* (London, 2007).

Hochschild, A. *Bury the Chains: The British Struggle to Abolish Slavery* (London, 2005).

Hocquellet, R. *Resistencia y revolución durante la Guerra de la Independencia: Del levantamiento patriótico a la soberanía naciónal* (Zaragoza, 2008).

Holton, W. *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 1999).

Hunt, L. *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1993).

Ingram, N. 'Repressed Memory Syndrome: Interwar French Pacifism and the Attempt to Recover France's Pacifist Past', *French History* 18 (2004): 315–330.

Jainchill, A. *Reimagining Politics after the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism* (Ithaca, 2008).

Jaurès, J. *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, 6 vols (Paris, 1971; 1st edn 1900).

Jomini, A. H. *Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution* (Paris, 1842).

Jourdan, A. 'Bonaparte et Desaix, une amitié inscrite dans la pierre des monuments?' *AHRF* 324 (2001): 139–150.

——. *La révolution batave, entre la France et l'Amérique (1795–1806)* (Rennes, 2008).

Kaplan, S. *The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution (1770–1800)* (Greenwich, 1973).

Kennedy, P. M. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London, 1987).

Keyssar, A. *The Right to Vote. The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York, 2000).

Kleinman, S. *Translation, the French language and the United Irishmen, 1792–1804*, D. Phil. thesis (Dublin City University, 2005).

Kleinman, S. 'Un brave de plus: Theobald Wolfe Tone, alias Adjudant-general James Smith, French officer and Irish patriot adventurer, (1796–1798)', in *Franco–Irish Military connections, 1590–1945*, ed. N. Genêt-Rouffiac and D. Murphy (Dublin, 2009).

Kleinman, S. 'Libérer ou exploiter? L'Irlande dans la stratégie diplomatique et militaire de la France (1792–1805)', in *Les Horizons de la politique extérieure française: Stratégie diplomatique et militaire dans les régions périphériques et les espaces seconds (XVIe–XXe siècles)*, ed. F. Dessberg and É. Schakenbourg (Brussels, 2011).

——. 'L'Irlande dans la stratégie diplomatique et militaire de la France, 1792–1804', in *Les Horizons de la politique extérieure française: Périphéries et espaces seconds XVIe–XXe siècles*, ed. F. Dessberg and É. Schakenbourg (Berne, 2011).

Knott, S. and Taylor, B. (eds) *Women, Gender, and Enlightenment* (New York, 2005).

Kruse, W. 'La formation du discours militariste sous le directoire', *AHRF* 360 (2010): 77–102.

Lacour, A. *Histoire de la Guadeloupe*, 3 vols (Basse-Terre, 1855–1858).

Laqueur, T. *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, 1990).

Lawrence, S. 'Eteocles' Moral Awareness in Aeschylus' Seven'. *Classical World* 100 (2007): 335–353.

Legouvé, E. *Soixante ans de souvenirs*, 2 vols (Paris, 1886).

Lerra, A. 'Le Municipalità democratiche e popolari nella Basilicata del 1799', in *La democrazia alla prova della spada. Experienza e memoria del 1799 in Europa*, ed. A. De Francesco (Milan, 2003).

Levati S. (ed.), *L'affaire Ceroni: Ordine militare e cospirazione politica nella Milano di Bonaparte* (Milan, 2005).

Levy, A. *The First Emancipator: Slavery, Religion, and the Quiet Revolution of Robert Carter* (New York, 2005).

Lindsay, A. G. 'Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Great Britain on the Return of Negro Slaves, (1783–1828)', *Journal of Negro History* 5 (1920): 391–419.

Linton, M. 'Fatal Friendships: The Politics of Jacobin Friendship', *French Historical Studies* 31 (2008): 51–76.

Llanos Aramburu, F. *El Trienio Liberal en Guipúzcoa (1820–1823): Antecedentes de las Guerras Carlistas en el País Vasco* (San Sebastián, 1998).

Longhitano, G. 'Industry, Government and Europe: From the Mercantilists to Saint Simon', in *Rethinking the Atlantic World: Europe and America in the Age of Democratic Revolutions*, ed. M. Albertone and A. De Francesco (Basingstoke, 2009).

López Tabar, J., *Los famosos traidores: Los afrancesados durante la crisis de Antiguo Régimen* (Madrid, 2001).

Loraux, N. *The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens* trans. C. Pache and J. Fort (New York, 2002).

Lotti, L. and Villari R. (eds) *Universalismo e nazionalitá nell'esperienza del giacobinismo italiano* (Rome, 2003).

Lovett, G. H., *La Guerra de la Independencia y el nacimiento de la España Contemporánea*, 2 vols (Barcelona, 1975).

Luis, J. P., *L'utopie réactionnaire: Épuration et modernisation de l'état dans l'Espagne de la fin de l'Ancien Régime, 1823–1834* (Madrid, 2002).

Luzzatto, S. *La Marsigliese stonata: La sinistra francese e il problema storico della guerra giusta, 1848–1948* (Bari, 1992) (French trans. *L'impôt du sang: la gauche française à l'épreuve de la guerre mondiale, 1900–1945* (Lyon, 1996).

Lynn, J. A. *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivations and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France 1791–1794* (Urbana, 1984).

——. 'Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, (1789–1815)', *French Historical Studies* 16 (1989): 152–173.

——. *Tools of War: Instruments*, *Ideas and Institutions of Warfare. 1445–1871* (Urbana, 1990).

——. 'Le discours sur la guerre et la réalité de la guerre: un modèle culturel', in *Combattre, gouverner, écrire. Études réunies en l'honneur de Jean Chagniot* (Paris, 2003).

——. *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder, Oxford 2003), French trans. *De la guerre: Une histoire du combat des origines à nos jours* (Paris, 2006).

Manzano Lahoz, A. *Las banderas Históricas del Ejército Español* (Madrid, 1997).

Marcuello Benedicto, J. I., 'Las Cortes de Cádiz: Monarquía y gobierno de asamblea: Valoraciones historiográficas sobre la "forma de gobierno" en el sistema constitucional de 1812', in *1808*: *Controversias historiográficas*, ed. A. Rodríguez de las Heras and R. Ruiz Franco (Madrid, 2010).

Margairaz, D. *François de Neufchâteau, biographie intellectuelle* (Paris, 2005).

Marotta, M. ' "Terrore" e "rimedio" sulle operazioni militari dello Stato della Chiesa, (1789–1799)', in *La Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa 1789–1799*, ed. L. Fiorani (Pisa, Rome, 1997).

Martin, J.-C. (ed.) *La guerre civile entre histoire et mémoire* (Nantes, 1995).

Martin, V. *La Diplomatie en révolution: Structures, agents, pratiques et renseignements diplomatiques. L'exemple des diplomates français en Italie, 1789–1796*, thèse de doctorat (Université Paris 1 Panthéon–Sorbonne, 2011).

Massey, G. D. *John Laurens and the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC, 2000).

Mathiez, A. *Danton et la paix* (Paris, 1919).

McBride, I. *Eighteenth-Century Ireland*: *The Isle of Slaves* (Dublin, 2009).

McCoskey, D. E. and Zakin, E. (eds) *Bound by the City: Greek Tragedy, Sexual Difference, and the Formation of the Polis* (Albany, 2010).

McLeod, D. J. *Slavery, Race and the American Revolution* (New York, 1975).

Méchoulan, E. 'Revenge and Poetic Justice in Classical France', *SubStance* 35 (2006): 20–51.

Megaro, G. *Vittorio Alfieri: Forerunner of Italian Nationalism* (New York, 1975; 1st edn 1930).

Melish, J. P. *Disowning Slavery*: *Gradual Emancipation and "Race" in New England, (1780–1860)* (Ithaca, 1998).

Mendelsohn, D. *Gender and the City in Euripides' Political Plays* (Oxford, 2002).

Menozzi, D. *Tra riforma e restaurazione. Dalla crisi della società cristiana al mito della cristianità medievale (1715–1848) in Storia d'Italia, Annale 9: La chiesa e il potere politico* (Turin, 1986).

——. *Sacro cuore: un culto tra devozione interiore e restaurazione cristiana della società* (Rome, 2001).

Michon, G. 'Robespierre et la guerre, 1791–1792', *Annales révolutionnaires* 12 (1920): 265–311.

——. *Essai sur l'histoire du parti feuillant. Adrien Duport* (Paris, 1924).

——. *Robespierre et la guerre révolutionnaire, 1791–1792* (Paris, 1937).

——. *Le rôle de la presse en 1791–1792: La déclaration de Pillnitz et la guerre* (Paris, 1941).

Monnier, R. 'Vertu antique et nouveaux héros', *AHRF* 324 (2001): 113–125.

Montarras, A. 'Le renseignement sous Napoléon', in "*Il n'est point de secrets que le temps ne révèle*". *Etudes sur l'histoire du renseignement*, ed. M. Vaisse (Panazol, 1998).

——. 'Espionnage', In *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, ed. J. Tulard (2nd edn, Paris, 1999).

Moreno Alonso, M., *José I, un rey republicano en el trono de España* (Madrid, 2008).

Morotti, F. (ed.) *Tipografia ed editoria in Umbria: Assisi* (Perugia, 1966).

Muriel, A., *Historia de Charles IV*, 2 vols (1893–1895; repr. Madrid, 1965).

Nash, G. B. 'Introduction', in Quarles B. *The Negro in the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1996; 1st edn 1961).

——. *The Forgotten Fifth: African–Americans in the Age of the Revolution* (Cambridge, 2006).

——. and Hodges, G. R. G. *Friends of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson, Tadeusz Kosziuszko and Agrippa Hull: A Tale of Three Patriots, Two Revolutions, and a Tragic Betrayal of Freedom in the New Nation* (New York, 2008).

Nell, W. C. *Services of Colored Americans in the Wars of 1776 and 1812* (Boston, 1851).

Neimeyer, C. P. 'Changing One Master for Another: Black Soldiers in the Continental Army', in Neimeyer C. P. *America Goes to War. A Social History of the Continental Army* (New York, 1996).

Nye, R. A. 'Western Masculinities in War and Peace', *American Historical Review* 112 (2007): 417–438.

Occupants et Occupés 1792–1815. Actes du Colloque de Bruxelles des 29 et 30 janvier 1968 (Bruxelles, 1969).

Ossorio, A., *Historia del pensamiento político catalán durante la guerra de España con la República francesa (1793–1795)* (Madrid, 1913).

Pakenham, T. *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798* (London, 1972; repr. 1997).

Palmer, R. *Twelve Who Ruled: The Committee of Public Safety During the Terror* (Princeton, 1941).

Paquette, R. L. 'Social History Update: Slave Resistance and Social History', *Journal of Social History* 24 (1991): 681–685.

Parvulesco, C. *Secret défense. Histoire du renseignement militaire français* (Boulogne-Billancourt, 2007).

Pasztor, L. 'Un capitolo della storia della diplomazia pontificia. La missione di Giuseppe Albani a Vienna prima del trattato di Tolentino', *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 1 (1963): 295–384.

Perotin-Dumon, A. 'Guerre et Révolution dans les Petites Antilles: le prix du sucre ou de la liberté', in *La Révolution Française et les colonies*, ed. J. Tarrade (Paris, 1989).

Picheloup, R. *Les ecclésiastiques français émigrés ou déportés dans l'État Pontifical 1792–1800* (Toulouse, 1972).

Pignatelli, G. *Aspetti della propaganda cattolica a Roma da Pio VI a Leone XII* (Rome, 1974).

——. 'Il dibattito sulla Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa', in *La Rivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa (1789–1799)*, ed. L. Fiorani (Pisa, Rome, 1997).

Pirala A., *Historia de la guerra civil y de los partidos liberal y carlista*, 6 vols (1854; repr. Madrid, 1984).

Pizzamiglio, G. 'Vittorio Alfieri', in *A History of Italian Theatre*, ed. J. Farrell and P. Puppa (Cambridge, 2006).

Pluchon, P. *Histoire générale des Antilles et de la Guyane* (Paris, 1982).

Pybus, C. 'Jefferson's Faulty Math', *William and Mary Quarterly* 62 (2005): 243–264.

——. *Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and Their Global Quest for Liberty* (Boston, 2007).

Quarles, B. 'Lord Dunmore as Liberator', *William and Mary Quarterly* 15 (1958): 494–507.

——. *The Negro in the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1996, 1st edn 1961).

Ranzato, G. (ed.) *Guerre fratricide: Le guerre civili in età contemporanea* (Turin, 1994).

Rao, A. M. *Esuli. L'emigrazione politica italiana in Francia (1792–1802)* (Naples, 1992).

——. 'L'expérience révolutionnaire italienne', *AHRF* 313 (1998): 387–407.

——. *'Le patriotisme et le courage': La repubblica napoletana del 1799 nei manoscritti del generale di bigata Antoine Girardon* (Naples, 2000).

Rapport, M. 'Robespierre and the Universal Rights of Man', *French History* 10 (1996): 303–333.

Reddick, L. D. 'The Negro Policy of the United States Army, 1775–1945', *The Journal of Negro History* 34 (1949): 2–29.

Reddy, W. M. *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001).

Régent, F. *La France et ses esclaves*: *De la colonisation aux abolitions. 1620–1848* (Paris, 2007).

Reichel, D. 'Les guerres de la Révolution Française et la mutation du métier militaire', in *L'influence de la Révolution Française sur les armées en France, en Europe et dans le monde* (Paris, 1989).

Reinhardt, M. 'Les aspirations de la bourgeoisie française à l'hégémonie', in *Mélanges Pierre Renouvin*: *études d'histoire des relations internationales* (Paris, 1966).

Rosen, R. M. and Sluiter, I. (eds) *Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity* (Leiden, 2003).

Roura, L., *Guerra gran a la ratlla de França* (Barcelona, 1993).

Royle, E. *Modern Britain. A Social History (1750–1997)* (2nd edn, London, 1997).

Rújula, P. *Constitución o Muerte: El Trienio Liberal y los levantamientos realistas en Aragón (1820–1823)* (Zaragoza, 2000).

——. 'La guerra como aprendizaje político', in *El Carlismo en su tiempo: geografías de la contrarrevolución* (Pamplona, 2008).

——. *1823: Los Cien mil hijos de San Luis: El mapa olvidado de la Expedición* (Zaragoza, 2010).

Sauch Cruz, N. *Guerrillers i bàndols civils entre l'Ebre i el Maestrat: la formació d'un país carlista (1808–1844)* (Barcelona, 2004).

Schama, S. *Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves and the American Revolution* (London, 2005).

Serna, P. *Antonelle, aristocrate révolutionnaire (1747–1817)* (Paris, 1997).

——. 'Rigomer Bazin et la Restauration: Penser la République dans la Monarchie', *AHRF* 325 (2001): 53–76.

——. *La République des Girouettes. 1795–1815 et au-delà, une anomalie politique: la France de l'extrême centre* (Seyssel, 2005).

——. (ed.) *Républiques sœurs: Le Directoire devant la Révolution atlantique* (Rennes, 2009).

——. 'Every revolution is a war of independance' in *The French Revolution in Global Perspective*, ed. S. Desan et al. (Ithaca, 2013).

Sorel, A. *L'Europe et la Révolution française*. 8 vols (Paris, 1885–1904).

Soriga, R. *Le società segrete, l'emigrazione politica e i primi moti per l'indipendenza* (Modena, 1942)

Stahr, W. *John Jay, Founding Father* (New York, 2005).

Staum, M. S. *Minerva's Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution* (Montreal, 1996).

Stella, P. 'Teologia, spiritualità e pratica religiosa in Italia nel periodo rivoluzionario (1789–1815)', in *"Deboli progressi della filosofia". Rivoluzione e religione a Roma, 1789–1799*, ed. L. Fiorani (Rome, 1992).

Stewart, J. B. 'Modernizing "Difference": The Political Meanings of Color in the Free States, (1776–1840)', *Journal of the Early Republic* 19 (1999): 691–712.

Stuart Jones, E.H. *The Last Invasion of Britain* (Cardiff, 1950).

Sullivan, M. G. 'Rapin, Hume and the Identity of the Historian in Eighteenth-Century England', *History of European Ideas* 28 (2002): 145–162.

Sutherland, D. M. G. *France (1789–1815): Revolution and Counterrevolution* (New York, 1985).

Thiéry, R. (ed.) *Jean Jacques Rousseau: Politique et Nation* (Paris, 2001).

Tiesset, L. 'Une réécriture de la tragédie du complot: Gabriel Legouvé, *Épicharis et Néron*', in *Le théâtre sous la révolution, politique du répertoire (1789–1799)*, ed. M. Poirson (Paris, 2008).

Todd, J. *Sensibility: An Introduction* (London, 1986).

Tosti, M. ' "Gli Atleti della fede": Emigrazione e controrivoluzione nello Stato della Chiesa (1790–1799)', in *La Chiesa italiana e la Rivoluzione francese*, ed. D. Menozzi (Bologna, 1990).

——. 'Strategie editoriali e famiglie di tipografi alla fine del Settecento: Le stamperie di Ottavio Sgariglia e Giovanni Tomassini', in *Vita religiosa, problemi sociali, e impegno civile dei cattolici. Studi storici in onore di Alberto Monticone*, ed. A. Sindoni and M. Tosti (Rome, 2009).

——. 'La fucina dell'antigiansenismo italiano: I gesuiti iberici espulsi e la tipografia di Ottavio Sgariglia di Assisi', in *La presenza in Italia dei gesuiti iberici espulsi. Aspetti religiosi, politici, culturali*, ed. U. Baldini and G. P. Brizzi (Bologna, 2010).

Travers, K. 'The Tone of National Commemoration: the annual Wolfe Tone Commemorations at Bodenstown', D. Phil. thesis (Dublin University College, 2002).

Turi, G. *Viva Maria: Riforme, rivoluzione, e insorgenze in Toscana (1790–1799)* (Bologna, 1999).

Viglione, M. *Rivolte dimenticate: Le insorgenze degli italiani dalle origini al 1815* (Rome, 1999).

——. *Le insorgenze: Rivoluzione e controrivoluzione in Italia 1792–1815* (Milan, 1999).

Villien, B. *Talma, l'acteur favori de Napoléon Ier* (Paris, 2001).

Williams, G. W. *History of the Negro Race in America from 1619 to 1880*, 2 vols (New York, 1883).

Winch, J. *A Gentleman of Color: The Life of James Forten* (New York, 2002).

Wood, G. S. *The Creation of the American Republic* (Chapel Hill, 1969).

Woodson, C. G. *The Negro in Our History* (Washington, 1922).

Zaghi, C. *Il Direttorio francese e la Repubblica cisalpina*, 2 vols (Rome, 1992).

Zeitlin, F. *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature* (Chicago, 1995).

Index