

WESTERN LITERATURE IN CHINA AND THE TRANSLATION OF A NATION

赫胥黎治功天演論序

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Shouhua Qi



WESTERN LITERATURE IN CHINA AND
THE TRANSLATION OF A NATION

Previous list of publications

Twin-Sun River: An American POW in China (2011)

*China Complex: From the Sublime to the Absurd on the
U.S.-China Scene* (2009)

*The Pearl Jacket and Other Stories: Flash Fiction from Contemporary
China* (editor and translator, 2008)

Literature (Western Literary Studies: Traditions, Trends, and Topics)
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
A Pair of Blue Eyes (translator, 1998)

The Well-Beloved (translator, 1994)

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“The world we live in today, the first and foremost way to strengthen our nation is book translation...translation of Western books—as many as possible.”

Liang Qichao: “On Translation of Books.”
Chapter 7 of *Bianfa tongyi* [A General
Discussion on Reform, 1897]

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PREFACE

On August 17, 2010, when the world's eyes were still riveted on Pakistan's flooding disasters and the two wars in the Middle East that the United States and its allies were still trying to win, and as much of the West, especially the United States, was still struggling to shake off the greatest recession since the Great Depression, or to avert a possible double dip into recession, and even as footages of the massive mudslides that had killed 1,500 people in northwestern China as well as the maddening 10-day, 60-mile, 10,000-vehicle traffic jam stretching from Inner Mongolia to west of Beijing were flashing across TV screens, a milestone had been crossed quietly.

China has surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world, second only to the United States.

It is poised, as predicted by many, to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy in another ten years or so if the current rate of growth can be sustained.¹

This milestone moment came only two years after Beijing had put on a spectacular show of its socioeconomic and technical achievements as well as its rich cultural heritages for the world to see during the 2008 Olympics. It came as the World Expo Shanghai (2010) was still dazzling in its futuristic glory under the hot late summer sky.

And the same success story is being written not only in Beijing and Shanghai but also in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Nanjing, Xi'an, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, and many other big and mid-sized cities across the country. New high speed trains,² new highways, new airports, new broadband Internet connections, new, glassy high-rises, new solar, wind, geothermic, and other alternative energy plants, and many other new infrastructures are being built just about everywhere. New television shows, new films, new books, in the hundreds and thousands, are being released every day. Everywhere you go, you see movie-screen sized, in-your-face billboards along the expressways vying for your attention—GE, Citibank, Lenovo, Microsoft, Euro-American styled residential compounds, and golf courses of lush green; you see automobiles, domestics alongside of BMWs, Audi Q7s,

and Lincoln town cars with tinted windows, all caught in the same endless streams, moving forward in uneasy, oftentimes fitful fashions. Minus the dominant presence of Chinese characters and you could fancy yourself in New York, Paris, London, and almost everyone you run into in China, from national leaders to average citizens, seems to have a sort of “swagger” about them, the way they walk and the way they talk, a newly found confidence, verging on cockiness.

The modernization, or Westernization,³ if you will, of China is more than skin deep, observable only by the massive infrastructural makeovers and the ubiquity of fancy cars, iPhones, large LCD televisions, and countless other Western-invented (albeit, mostly, made in China) gadgets and things, which are fast becoming necessities in people’s everyday life rather than luxuries. It also takes the tangible, tantalizing forms of big-budget Hollywood movies shown on screens across the country, jazz, rock ‘n’ roll, violin concertos, and symphonies played all day long from iPods, radios, department store intercoms, and, yes, Western-originated books—textbooks, readers, references, translations, bilingual editions, abridged, illustrated, simplified, or compact/pocket book editions, and editions for adolescent or young children’s bedside reading, not to mention English and other foreign languages and literatures being taught earnestly in classrooms from elementary schools up to colleges and universities.

More than anything, modernity has seeped, despite much audible unease, into the collective consciousness and psyche of the people and translated into a much more self-assured sense of personhood and a much more assertive attitude and, in many cases, bolder action (or activism) about equality, fairness, individual rights, and sociopolitical liberties.⁴ Would Emperor Guangxu (1871–1908), who sponsored the failed Hundred Days Reform to save China from its moribund fate, Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who ushered in the modern era in China with his 1911 republican revolution, or Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who led the Communist victory in 1949—if they awoke from wherever their respective resting place is now—recognize China today as the country they had known or had envisioned for the future?

The new milestone China has just passed, however, should not be overplayed because China’s per capita income is still about one fifth that of the United States, as has been duly noted by economists and by the Chinese themselves. Indeed, if you go by the United Nations Human Development Reports (2010)—which provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, adult literacy and gross enrollment in education, and purchasing power parity (PPP) income, China is ranked as low as 89th in the

world, far behind all Western nations, and even behind nations such as Mexico (56), Mauritius (72), and Dominican Republic (88).⁵

And China is hampered by the daunting challenges of its vast population size, rampant corruptions, ever widening gaps between the newly rich and the poor and between booming coastal cities and inland provinces, by dwindling natural resources and aggravated environmental crises, by so many other old, nagging problems, domestic and international, and by unforeseen disasters, man-made or God's will, that could strike at any moment without notice and rattle the lives of millions of people.

Yet, put in global and historical perspective, especially when considering where China was in socioeconomic development a bit over 100 years ago, at the dawn of the twentieth century, what has happened in China is a stunning success story if not exactly a miracle in human history.

Historians and other students of China can look every place for possible explanations, or secrets, if you will—cultural, political, historical, global, and even the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States that have given China a rare opportunity in recent times to focus and expend almost all of its resources and energies on “strengthening” (modernizing) itself. In so many ways, though, the “success story” of China today could be written as the history of Western literature in China⁶ and the significant role it has played in the shaping of modern China, its culture, its memories, its psyche, and every facet of its sociopolitical life. As Lydia H. Liu contends, it would not be possible to understand and appreciate modern Chinese history without taking “the history of translanguaging practice” into account thanks to the “translatedness” of China's modernity.⁷ Indeed, it would be no hyperbole to say that without translation of Western literature there would have been no modern China as we know it today.

And this is what the present book is concerned with: the reception history of Western literature in China from the 1840s to the present—the sociohistorical contexts and the contours of how Western literature was introduced in China, mostly through translation, its transformative impact in the cultural as well as sociopolitical life of modern China through periods of national crises and reform (1840–96), revolution and the May Fourth Movement (1897–1927), the war-torn decades (1928–49), continued revolutions (1949–76), all the way to the post-Mao, market-driven era (1977–present).⁸

China's experience with foreign texts can be traced back to the epic-scale Buddhism scripture translation projects that lasted from

the first century (AD) to about the thirteenth century. However, as André Lefevere suggested, the Chinese during those centuries and all the way to the early nineteenth century saw themselves as “central in the world” they inhabited and their culture was relatively “homogeneous;” therefore, they were in a position to acculturate the foreign through the “domesticating” method of translation, for example, using the native Daoist concepts as well as classical Chinese (the sanctioned style of language for formal and public communication by the literati, the scholar-official class, the court, and the monastery)⁹ to assimilate Buddhism into the Chinese culture.¹⁰ It was with the same elite readership in mind that Yan Fu, Lin Shu, and Liang Qichao in the late 1890s jumpstarted a translation campaign to strengthen and hence save China in a world in which the old view of China being the “Middle Kingdom” had been shattered by the West. From then on translation of Western literature has proved a mightier, double-edged sword, so to speak, because it did what Western Powers couldn’t have accomplished with their military might: “translating” the West into the sociopolitical and cultural life as well as the consciousness of the Chinese people; ironically, it has been a weapon wielded not only to subvert centuries-old native cultural traditions but also to write back, to fight back, really, the hegemonic powers where the source texts originated.

China’s “obsession” with Western texts continues in its full fury today, driven very much by the same profound memories of national humiliations and the same exigency to strengthen the country, and, paradoxically, to resist the West—and to reclaim past glories, real and imagined. There, not so incidentally, lies a fundamental explanation of China’s fitful, schizophrenic experimentation with Western ways since the New Culture and the New Literature Movement in the early twentieth century, and especially since China opened its door again at the end of the 1970s—the tug of war between preservation of what is essentially Chinese, i.e., values, beliefs, customs, and traditions of the native Chinese culture and the pursuit of Western-style modernization. The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s decision to award the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, who, among other things, has been an unapologetic advocate of full-scale Westernization of China’s sociopolitical systems and practices, and China’s not so thrilled responses despite its long-cherished hopes for Nobel and such prestigious international recognitions, are emblematic of the deep unease the Chinese feel about themselves even as they become stronger and more confident. The same deep unease triggered the tightening of ideological, sociopolitical, and media control

during much of the spring and summer of 2011, a learned reflex to the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and other parts of the Middle East. The Beijing municipal government's decree (March 17, 2011) to ban words such as "supreme," "royal," "luxury," or "high class" in billboards and other advisements of high-end commodities such as real estate, vehicles, and wines, ostensibly to curb the overzealous promotion of "hedonism" and "worship of foreign-made products," may appear to be silly, but speak voluminously of the same deep ambivalence toward all things Western.¹¹

The spirited debates of the same key issues have never ended; they are only rehashed in more theoretically self-conscious terms, with just as much at stake. The same debates will continue if only because there are no simple, easy answers to complex, momentous questions such as culture, nationhood, identity in an increasingly globalized world.

This book is a historical narrative that navigates and attempts to unpack the complex dynamics, or fault zones, of texts (literary and sociohistorical), contexts (Chinese and Western), intertexts (translations and creative writing), of dominance (language, culture, ideology) and resistance, and of tension and convergence. It is the story of Western texts in China and it is, in a nutshell, the story of China's uneasy march toward modernity.

1

THE RUDE AWAKENING (1840S–1896)

The world today is not to be compared with that of the Three Dynasties (of ancient China) . . . Now the globe is ninety-thousand *li* around, and every spot may be reached by ships or wheeled vehicles . . . According to what is listed on the maps by the Westerners, there are not less than one hundred countries. From these one hundred countries, only the books of Italy, at the end of the Ming dynasty, and now those of England have been translated into Chinese, altogether several tens of books. Those which expound the doctrine of Jesus are generally vulgar, not worth mentioning. Apart from these, Western books on mathematics, mechanics, optics, light, chemistry, and other subjects contain the best principles of the natural sciences. In the books on geography, the mountains, rivers, strategic points, customs, and native products of the hundred countries are fully listed. Most of this information is beyond the reach of our people . . .¹ [ellipses added]

This amazement at modern Western science came from Feng Kuei-fen (1809–74) in 1860, a man who had seen firsthand the military strength of the West while taking refuge in Shanghai during the last days of the Taiping Rebellion. A native of Suzhou, the city somewhere in between Nanjing and Shanghai, Feng had obtained *jìnshì* [“presented scholar,” comparable to the doctoral degree in the West] through the imperial examination (administered in the capital every three years) in 1840, the year the British warships sailed half way around the world to attack Guangzhou and other coastal cities in retaliation for the massive amounts of opium China had confiscated from British traders and dumped into the sea.

Feng Kuei-fen was not only well versed in Chinese classics but also very interested in mathematics, philology, astronomy, geography, agriculture, irrigation, and other subjects. While serving with Lin Zexu (1785–1850), the imperial commissioner who led the campaign

to stop the opium trade, and later with Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), whose name is forever associated with the series of treaties he signed as the Chinese government representative during the post–Opium War decades, Feng had had his share of direct contact with Westerners. It was at his suggestion while serving as Li Hongzhang’s advisor that a school of Western languages and sciences was established in Shanghai in 1863. As a wonderstruck Feng Kuei-fen mused aloud in the same 1860 essay alluded to earlier:

If we let Chinese ethics and famous (Confucian) teachings serve as an original foundation, and let them be supplemented by the methods used by the various nations for the attainment of prosperity and strength, would it not be the best of all procedures? ...² [ellipses added]

It is quite telling that the “best” procedure Feng Kuei-fen recommended is notably limited to the methods, or science and technology, to use today’s parlance, and that he dismissed books expounding Christianity, and by possible extension, all books expounding Western social sciences and arts and literature, as “not worth mentioning.” His idea of adopting Western (scientific and technological) knowledge to strengthen China was probably the first in the country. It anticipated the famous *zhongxue weiti xixue weiyong* [Chinese learning for the foundation and Western learning for use] slogan propagated a generation later by many in the reform camps.

Translation of “Western” texts in China was nothing new by this time in Chinese history. The first heyday of translation goes back to the year 65 AD, when a Chinese religious delegation was dispatched from Luoyang, a city in central China, to India where they copied Buddhist scriptures and brought them back to be translated into Chinese. Legend goes that one day during the Eastern Han dynasty, Emperor Ming (28 AD–75 AD) had a dream in which he saw a golden man with a shining halo flying around in his palace. The following morning when he asked about the golden man, Emperor Ming was told that there was a god in the West by the name of “Buddha” and the “golden man” he had dreamed of must be that god. So Emperor Ming put together an 18-member dispatch to the West to look for this golden man as if he were truly a god.³

The spread of Buddhism in China, however, might have begun well before Emperor Ming dreamed his golden man dream.⁴ Whether the Chinese were “forced to deal with the Other by the spread of Buddhism,” as Lefevre suggested,⁵ or went out of their way to learn

about this new, foreign religion, whatever began during the first century turned out to be a 700-year-long translation project. It involved the endeavors of some 186 dedicated Chinese and foreign translators and resulted in the rendition, from Sanskrit to Chinese, of 1,095 sets of scriptures in 4,749 volumes. This feat was followed by continued endeavors from 789 AD to 1285 AD, during which time another 1,306 sets of scriptures in 4,318 volumes were translated. The herculean determination to overcome the countless perils along the way to authentic scriptures are immortalized in the 1590 Ming dynasty epic novel *Journey to the West*, which features the much mythologized monk Xuan Zhuang (596 AD–664 AD) who led one of such decade-long “expeditions.”⁶

During those long centuries the Chinese, considering themselves “central in the great scheme of things” and their culture being relatively homogeneous, felt secure and comfortable with the arrival of texts produced by Others because they could always “naturalize” the foreign texts into the “superior” culture of their own to such a degree that the foreignness of the translated texts would all but disappear. Nonetheless, translation of the Buddhist scriptures did have a significant impact on the Chinese culture: the worldviews of its people, their philosophies and belief systems, as well as the Chinese language and literature.

For one, it significantly enriched the vocabulary of the Chinese language by “creating” thousands of neologisms, via word-formation methods such as combination (of radicals), to represent the new, foreign Buddhist concepts and terms such as *niepan* [nirvana], *yujia* [yoga], *fuzhu* [Buddha], *shijie* [world], *mogui* [demon]. It significantly enriched the prosody (with the introduction of the four-tone system), syntax (with introduction of inverted sentence patterns), and literary style (a mix of everyday speech and *wenyan wen*, classical Chinese). The Buddhist scripture translation also introduced a new subgenre into the Chinese literary landscape: the strange and fantastic tales, which feature ghosts and demons, heaven and hell, and good versus evil. It brought to China numerous fables, which would provide rich raw material for literary creations. All of this would help pave the way for the appearance of the prose novel during the Ming dynasty, the first significant literature written in *baihua* [the vernacular Chinese] as opposed to *wenyan wen* that had dominated the literary scene for centuries.

The grafting of the foreign religion upon the native Chinese culture, or the cross-fertilization, to use another metaphor, was so well advanced by the sixth century that when the emperor asked a

well-known scholar dressed in a Daoist cap, a Buddhist stole, and Confucian shoes what his religious beliefs were, the scholar pointed to each in turn by way of answering the question.⁷ Buddhism remains so much a part of China today despite the profound changes the country has gone through. Even after the ravages of wars and revolutions, especially the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76), Buddhist temples are still just about everywhere, in every city and atop so many famed mountains, attracting “pilgrims,” devout, casual, or merely curious (e.g., tourists), by the millions every day. Indeed, Buddhist teachings are in the DNA of almost every Chinese, whether he or she is an avowed, incense-burning believer or a professed atheist. To most people Buddhism is as Chinese as Confucianism or Daoism; many probably wouldn’t even know that this belief system, which is so ingrained in their cultural as well as individual identity, had originated in a faraway, foreign land.

However, the post-Opium War world the Chinese found themselves in was far different from that of the Eastern Han (23 AD–220 AD) or Tang dynasty (601 AD–907 AD), when the Chinese civilization reached one of its most glorious apogees, especially in arts, poetry, and architecture, or that of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), founded by the Mongol leader Genghis Khan (1162–1227) and vastly expanded by his grandson Kublai Khan (1215–94), who not only ruled most of China (while allowing themselves the luxury of being assimilated into the culture of the conquered) but also spread its influence as far as Eastern Europe. The post-Opium War world was a time of rude awakening for the Chinese, awakening from their millennium-old dream of glories past, real or imagined.

RUDE AWAKENING

When Queen Victoria’s fleet of warships sailed half way around the world to pay Guangdong a not so friendly visit and force the opium trade on China, this large country posited at the far eastern end of the Eurasia landmass, to the contrary of popular belief, had had a long tradition of being receptive to new ideas from outside its borders and in trading with other nations. The 1,000-year-long Buddhist scripture translation projects, as briefly outlined above, speak eloquently of the culture’s intellectual curiosity and open-mindedness to ideas from the outside world. The famed Silk Route, which began during the second century (BC) from Chang’an, capital of the Han dynasty, passing through the Gansu corridor and Dunhuang and trekking the thousands of miles of treacherous terrain through the Gobi, the

Pamirs, Persia, and parts of Eastern Roman Empire (later Byzantine Empire) territories before finally reaching the Mediterranean coast, a major conduit of silk and trade of other material and immaterial goods, is ample evidence of a long history of keen interest in international trade. It was by following this Silk Route that Marco Polo reached the court of Kublai Khan in the thirteenth century.

As a matter of fact, about a century before Christopher Columbus and Vasco de Gama made their voyages to discover new worlds beyond the edge of horizons, the Chinese had already ventured out into the blue seas to spread the “gospels” of the Middle Kingdom’s goodwill and to increase its tributary trade. Under the command of Zheng He (1371–1433), a eunuch admiral in the service of Emperor Yongle of the Ming dynasty, the first expedition (consisting of a 27,800-man crew and over 300 large—the largest being at least 500 feet long—and small cargo-carrying vessels) set sail in 1405 and visited Champa (southern Vietnam), Siam (Thailand), Malacca, and Java and reached as far as Sri Lanka. During a period of 28 years, Zheng He led seven epic voyages that took him and his vast fleet to Southeast Asia, India, Arabia, and the eastern coast of Africa and Egypt.

Unfortunately, these voyages were criticized as useless wastes of resources and were suspended upon Emperor Yongle’s death in 1424. One last such voyage was undertaken (1432–33), and Zheng died soon afterwards. And with him, the dream, if there had ever been such a dream at all, of China becoming a large seafaring nation. C. P. Fitzgerald mused that had the Chinese sustained the work so well begun by Zheng He, and indeed, had China “established permanent bases, maintained their sea power and founded an overseas empire, it is at least possible that the course of history would have been profoundly different.” However, as Fitzgerald pointed out, such was not to be and “China was to pay dearly for missing this opportunity.”⁸

Two unfortunate developments, according to Fitzgerald, changed the national character, so to speak, of China from that of intellectual curiosity and open-mindedness to insularity and from being a willing (albeit not very eager) partner in international trade to reluctance and eventually to resistance. For a long time, especially during the Tang and Song dynasties, China was freely opened to foreigners, mostly Arab and Persian merchants. Well aware that the nations from which these merchants came had their own religions, the Chinese did not mind foreigners practicing their faith as they pleased as long as the practice did not have any subversive intent or effect. When the Portuguese seafarers, first among the Europeans, arrived during the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were “accorded exactly the same liberties and welcome” as the Arab and other Asiatic traders had enjoyed for quite some time. However, their pirate-like behavior, according to Fitzgerald, soon alarmed the Chinese, who restricted the visitors from the Iberian nations to one single city and its immediate environs and prohibited them to travel or reside in any other part of the empire.⁹

When the seafaring Dutch and English came as the second wave of European traders, in the wake of the Portuguese, the Chinese had already formed very negative views of the Europeans, and there was already much mistrust and mutual suspicion. The first thing the Dutch did, upon arriving in China, was plundering rapaciously and then putting to sea again, in no better fashion than pirates. The English didn’t behave much better either. When John Weddel arrived at Guangdong with three ships, he was irritated by the cautious attitude adopted by the Chinese, thanks to their repeated negative experiences with the Portuguese. Losing patience quickly, Weddel launched an attack at a fort, and upon seizing it, he “[t]ook downe the China Flagge, hung it over the wall, and thereon advanced our King’s coullours.”¹⁰ It is no wonder that they thereafter were not kindly received either.

The Chinese had their share of the blame for the unfortunate development, too. In a way the Chinese were victims of the powerful resilience of their own rich culture. The story of how the Chinese had succeeded in “domesticating” Buddhism, a foreign religion, and absorbed it into the fabric of their own culture is one prime example of such powerful resilience as well as receptiveness. The (Han) Chinese, even today, often take pride in the fact that both the Mongol and the Manchu conquerors, by choice and by necessity, ended up adopting or adapting to the (Han) Chinese culture and were assimilated into the culture of the conquered. However, in the case of the Manchus—descendants of the Jurchen, a non-Han ethnic people who, historically, lived along the northeast border area of China—that success turned out to be a mixed blessing, or bad news, really, for the country in some crucial ways.

When the Manchus finally defeated the Ming rulers and conquered China in 1644, they wasted no time in consolidating their rule by embracing the dominant political and cultural ideology of the conquered. Although they did issue decrees to impose the Manchu dress and hairstyle (all Chinese men’s foreheads be shaved bare like the Manchus, their hair braided in the Manchu style queue) at the peril of death (“Keep your hair and lose your head” or “lose your hair and keep your head”), the Manchu rulers moved quickly to adopt

Chinese governmental and cultural institutions. They wooed the scholar-officials by offering them government positions for political allegiance and by reinstating imperial examinations based on the Chinese classics, awarding as many as 671 *jinsbi* degrees within three years of their rule,¹¹ and hence, reinstitutionalizing and perpetuating the Confucian classics-based curriculum and examination throughout the Qing dynasty. These significant policy moves seemed to be driven not only by political exigency but also by a profound sense of cultural inadequacy and insecurity, the need to (over)compensate. Indeed, as Fitzgerald put it, the Manchus, having no rich cultural traditions of their own, had overcompensated by becoming “more Chinese than the Chinese themselves” through adoption and enforcement of the most rigid of Confucian traditions.¹²

Kangxi (1654–1722), second emperor of the Qing dynasty, tried to strike a balance between maintaining his Manchu “martial vigor and political firmness” and showing his utmost admiration of Chinese classics, especially the Confucian canon, which, by this time, had evolved into a set of “sacred” texts, the famed “Four Books” and “Five Classics.”¹³ The moment he assumed the throne, Kangxi issued a series of 16 maxims, known collectively as the “Sacred Edict,” which emphasized, among other things, “hierarchical submission in social relations, generosity, obedience, thrift, and hard work.”¹⁴ Qianlong (1711–99), the fourth Qing emperor, shared his grandfather’s love of Confucian classics. Well read and intelligent, Qianlong launched a ten-year long *Four Treasuries* project to compile and organize China’s greatest literary and historical works in four main categories: classics, histories, philosophy, and miscellaneous literary works. The assembled result was a collection of 3,450 complete works and comments on 6,750 others, filling 36,000 manuscript volumes.¹⁵

Such massive, over 150-year long cultural endeavors should have led to some sort of revival of learning comparable to what had happened in the West from the fourteenth century to sixteenth century, hence preparing China for the brave new world they would find themselves in soon. Qianlong’s 60-year reign, instead, was followed by “a century of confusion and decline.” The empire of Qianlong turned out to be “a façade, splendid and imposing, but masking intellectual and artistic stagnation, and gross corruption in the official class.”¹⁶

More than anything, and most unfortunately, the long, massive cultural projects led to the entrenchment of a rather insular mindset. Qianlong, along with the other Manchu rulers and most of his Chinese scholar-officials, happened to hold such fundamental belief of China’s place in the world: China was the “central” kingdom and

that other countries were, by definition, peripheral, removed from the cultural center of the universe. Therefore, Qianlong's court and the mandarins had no real interest in knowing about countries beyond the Chinese borders. They were, to use a Chinese proverb, frogs sitting at the bottom of a well, albeit a sizable well with quite a good view. To them the sky was only as big as their naked eye could see. This Sinocentric, well-sized vision of the world was further fossilized by "an exotic blend of mystical tales and fantasy in which foreigners were often likened to animals or birds and were described in patronizing or deliberately belittling language."¹⁷

In contrast to the Tang and Song periods, the Manchu court felt no need to trade with foreign countries at all. They felt that the Chinese needed nothing that the European traders could bring them, as stated by Qianlong in reply to Lord Macartney, the first British ambassador to the Qing court (1792–94):

The Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own products.

To be fair, the Manchu court and high-ranking mandarins *were* pleased with the imported watches, clocks, and other ingenious gadgets presented them, but had no interest in knowing the science that went into the making of them because it was unworthy of them. They even failed to be impressed by the significantly improved size and seaworthiness of the ships coming to their shores from afar. "Completely dominated by Confucian pedantry the official world of the Manchu Empire closed its mind to all other knowledge and refused to believe anything valuable could possibly be learnt from foreigners."¹⁸

They were gleefully oblivious to the fact that by the time of the Opium War, the West had undergone a few centuries of profound transformations: the Renaissance (fourteenth to sixteenth century) that saw the humanistic revival of classical art, architecture, literature, and learning after the long reign of Dark Ages; the Age of Discovery, spearheaded by Christopher Columbus (1451–1506), Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521), Vasco da Gama (1469–1524), among others, that kept pushing geographical boundaries with bigger and stronger naval ships and much improved navigation methods, and led to the establishment of new colonies as well as trade routes; Johann Gutenberg's invention of movable type presses (1440) that made inexpensive mass-printing of books possible; the Copernican

Revolution (1543) that dethroned the Earth from the center of the universe and placed it instead on an orbit around the Sun along with the other planets, which forever changed our worldview as well as astronomy, and indeed all branches of natural science; other major, revolutionary changes in philosophy and advancements in science “instigated” by the likes of Galileo Galilei, René Descartes, Blaise Pascal, Isaac Newton; the Industrial Revolution, with new inventions and machinery fast replacing human labor and making inexpensive mass-production possible; the Enlightenment Movement that believed in reason more than in anything else, in humans’ ability to understand the universe and to perfect themselves, and in human’s control of their own destiny; the American Revolutionary War and the French Revolution, both predicated on the principles of liberty, equality, justice, and individual rights.

No wonder when the fleet of warships flying the Union Jack¹⁹ came to call, and when other uninvited visitors followed suit in droves in the decades to follow, the Chinese were woefully unprepared. And they had to pay a dear price for it.

WESTERN LEARNING FOR USE

When the surge in opium trade along China’s coastal areas had resulted in a mounting trade deficit for China and almost depleted its currency reserve of silver, causing widespread social and health problems (some addicts would not mind selling their houses and even wives and daughters to meet their addiction needs), Emperor Daoguang (1782–1850) dispatched Lin Zexu (1785–1850) to Guangzhou in early 1839 to exterminate the runaway opium trade.

Upon his arrival in Guangzhou on March 10 of that year, Commissioner Lin started gathering information on the trade situation and foreign instigators. Following *The Art of War* by Sun Zi and the stratagem of knowing the enemy as well as oneself to ensure victory, perhaps, Lin recruited four translators to be of special assistance to him. One of them was Liang Jinde, son of the evangelist Liang Fa, whose “translation” of the Christian Bible would provide Hong Xiuquan with the key to his haunting dream of heaven and hell.

These four worked diligently and provided Lin with Chinese summaries from English newspapers, such as *Eastern-Western Monthly Magazine*, foreign geographic journals, and *The Law of Nations (The Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns)*, written by the Swiss philosopher, diplomat, and legal scholar Emerich de Vattel (1714–67), and other books

published in the West. All of this formed the basis of a digest of translations of foreign books on China which Lin circulated among local officials. It was also on the basis of Liang Jinde's translation of *An Encyclopedia of Geography* by Hugh Murray (1834) that Lin drafted his *Sizhou zhi* [Geography of Four Continents].²⁰

Lin was the first among Chinese scholar-officials to realize that China must learn from the West and arm itself with comparable modern military might in order to resist the aggressions of the West. It was under such dire circumstances, when China was facing a major challenge from outside, when its way of life, and indeed, its very survival, was threatened by Others, that translation of foreign, in this case, Western, texts in modern times began. Translation of foreign, especially Western, texts for national survival (and revival) would be the dominant theme of all subsequent endeavors; indeed, this sense of exigency, of existential crisis, would shape almost all subsequent debates concerning what to translate, whether to "domesticate" or "foreignize" the source texts, and such momentous issues.

Unfortunately, a modern navy Lin Zexu was not to have. Although he did succeed in confiscating about 2.6 million pounds of opium, which took 500 or so workers 22 days to destroy, his navy was out-classed by the *Royal Saxon*, *HMS Volage*, *HMS Hyacinth*, and such British Royal warships in every possible measurement and proved no match. As a convenient scapegoat for the defeat, Lin was sacked and exiled to Xinjiang in northwestern China. On his way there Lin gave the manuscripts of his unfinished book *Sizhou zhi* as well as his collection of maps and blueprints of guns and ships to Wei Yuan (1794–1856), a close friend and a learned and patriotic man. All of this would form the basis of Wei's groundbreaking 50-volume *Illustrated Record of Maritime Nations* published in 1843. Materials from Lin Zexu and Wei Yuan, in turn, would become the starting point for the influential work in world geography *Yinghuan zhiblue* [A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit] to be prepared by Xu Jiyu (1795–1873). Not content, Wei Yuan went on to expand his work into a 60-volume book in the same year it was published, and finally a 100-volume book in 1852.²¹

By the time of Lin Zexu and Wei Yuan, translation of foreign scientific knowledge wasn't a phenomenon of much novelty any more although it had never been pursued with such a sense of crisis and urgency. For over a thousand years since the second century (BC) outside knowledge of agriculture and arts was introduced to China by way of the Silk Route just as the great inventions and other splendors of the Chinese civilization were spread to Europe by way of Persia and

Arabia. A considerable amount of outside science knowledge was carried over from translation of religious texts, too, for example, astronomy, calendric system, and medicine of ancient India via translations of Buddhist scriptures, and astronomy, mathematics, and medicine of the Arab world via translations of Koran and other holy texts of Islam.

Even during the decades immediately before the Manchu conquest of China there had been some significant translations of Western scientific knowledge. Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), for example, a high-ranking scholar-official in the Ming court, is credited with being a pioneer in introducing to China Western science and technology. He was well versed in Chinese classics and quite successful as a scholar-official. It was out of intellectual curiosity that he learnt mathematics, astronomy, and Christian theology from Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), one of the earliest and most important Italian Jesuit missionaries in China. As their friendship grew, they collaborated in the translation of the first six chapters of Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, the very first Western scientific book rendered into the Chinese language. With the help of Ricci and other Jesuits, Xu Guangqi continued to translate Western scientific and technological knowledge into Chinese, for example, trigonometry, Western system of water conservation and irrigation, and astronomy. The new system of the lunar calendar Xu designed was used as China's official calendar from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth century and is still used today to mark traditional seasonal changes and folk holidays such as the Spring Festival—the lunar New Year's Day. Among other things, Xu Guangqi also recommended that the court's Calendrical Bureau be transformed into a sort of Science Academy, to help bring China into the modern era in terms of science and technology. The recommendation, as can be expected, fell on deaf ears.

Li Zhizao (1565–1630), a contemporary of Xu Guangqi, a mathematician, astronomer, and geographer, also collaborated with Matteo Ricci in translating European scientific knowledge into Chinese, including Ricci's world map, Christopher Clavius's arithmetic primer *Selected Arithmetic Methods*, and 20 other Western scientific and religious titles.

Yang Tingyun (1557–1627), a good friend of Xu Guangqi and Li Zhizao, shared their keen interest in Western scientific knowledge.²² When in 1620 Nicolas Trigault (1577–1628), a French Jesuit missionary, brought to China some 7,000 copies of books, representing the highlights of Western achievements in literature, science, medicine,

law, religion, and ethics at the time, Yang tried to organize a team of several dozens of talented, like-minded friends to translate them all into Chinese. However, due to lack of interest and support, the ambitious plan did not materialize.²³

One can only speculate what would have happened if China had made good use of the substantial amount of Western scientific knowledge already existent in Chinese translations or available in China, had established its science academy and pursued new discoveries and inventions with the same fervor as their European counterparts, and indeed, had had at least one hundred years to prepare itself for the tidal waves of foreign aggressions coming to its shores in the 1800s. Unfortunately for the Chinese was not meant to be and such speculation, enticing as it may sound, would fall in the realms of historical fantasy and not much beyond.

By the time the dust of the Opium War had settled in the form of the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) that forced China to pay restitutions in the amount of 21 million dollars, to open the ports of Guangzhou, Jinmen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai to British trade and residence, and to cede Hong Kong to the British, which was soon followed by other Western powers forcing similar unequal treaties on China, translation of Western knowledge assumed an urgency unparalleled in China's history. Hanging in the balance was its survival as a sovereign nation. At least this was what many of the educated and patriotic Chinese felt was at stake.

One interesting and indeed ironic phenomenon during this period of massive science and technology translation is that much of it, as in the decades, if not centuries, immediately before, was the collaboration between Chinese scholars, who in most cases didn't speak the foreign languages in which the source texts were written, and Western missionaries, whose primary purpose in China was not to introduce the latest scientific and technological development in the West, but to spread the gospels of Christianity and convert the Chinese to the faith, albeit ever cautiously, one carefully chosen prospect at a time. Notable among such collaborative endeavors were two important translators of this time, Li Shanlan (1811–82) and Xu Shou (1818–84) and their missionary partners.

Li Shanlan, well educated in science as understood and practiced in China for centuries, and being a brilliant mathematician, appreciated how superior Western science and technology had become. Upon arriving in Shanghai in 1852, after leaving his hometown in Zhejiang Province, Li set to work on translating Western mathematics classics into Chinese right away. Partnering with British missionary

Alexander Wylie (1815–87), Li translated the last nine volumes of Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, thus completing the work Xu Guangqi and Matteo Ricci had left unfinished over two centuries before. This marked the conclusion of a 250-year-long effort—despite the frog-at-the-bottom-of-a-well vision and ideology of the dominant Qing culture—to introduce the Western mathematics masterpiece in China.

Following that *tour de force*, Li Shanlan and Wylie went on to translate the *Elements of Algebra* by English mathematician and logician Augustus De Morgan (1806–71), giving China its first mathematical textbook that used symbols to represent numbers. Then, with the help of another English missionary, Joseph Edkins (1823–1905), who would spend 57 years of his life in China, Li finished translating the 20-volume *Mechanics* by William Whewell (1794–1866), a brilliant English scientist, philosopher, and theologian. In all Li's translation works included a wide range of scientific subjects: astronomy, mechanics, physics, botany as well as mathematics. Even today Li Shanlan is remembered as the scientist translator who gave China the first complete introduction of Copernicus and Newton through his translation of the monumental *Outlines of Astronomy* by Sir John F. W. Herschel, the standard textbook on astronomy in the West during the second half of the nineteenth century.

A contemporary of Li Shanlan and a brilliant engineer, Xu Shou was one of China's first engineers to have mastered the design and construction of steam engines. His first contact with Western books was *Introduction to New Knowledge* by British missionary Benjamin Hobson (1816–73). Forever fascinated, Xu Shou would devote the rest of his life to reading and translating Western scientific works while engaging in one experiment after another of his own to test the new technology he had learned. During his 17-year association with the newly founded Jiangnan Arsenal (to be discussed below), Xu Shou was responsible for the translation of 13 Western books into Chinese and is credited with compiling China's first Periodical Table of Chemical Elements based on an English version translated by a British scientist. It was thanks to Xu's translation of the most essential Western works in chemical science of the late nineteenth century that chemistry became an independent academic discipline in China.

Aside from these self-initiated individual endeavors, translation of Western works during the second half of the nineteenth century was mostly carried out through three main channels: official agencies, the church, and the civilian sector. Two of the most noteworthy official agencies were the Tongwen Institute in Beijing and the Jiangnan

Arsenal in Shanghai, both established in response to the enormous pressure China found itself under in the post-Opium War world.

Article L of the Treaty of Tianjin signed in 1858 stipulated that “[a]ll official communications, addressed by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of Her Majesty the Queen to the Chinese authorities, shall, henceforth, be written in English.”²⁴ The unequal treaty had now resulted in a situation of “unequal languages,” to borrow from Talal Asad.²⁵ To meet this new demand of the United Kingdom and the increased demand for interpreters after Beijing, the capital was forced open to foreign diplomatic corps and to allow foreign envoys to have permanent residences there, Tongwen Institute, a language school, was established. J. S. Burdon (1826–1907), an English Protestant missionary, was hired as Tongwen’s first English instructor because the school could not find any Chinese with the right credentials to teach the foreign language. During the first year, the school had to make do with an English-only curriculum but soon expanded to French and Russian courses. In the end, some 54 foreigners were employed as instructors in English, French, German, Japanese, chemistry, astronomy, and medicine whereas some 32 Chinese instructors were employed to teach Chinese and mathematics.²⁶ Many of the Tongwen graduates went on to become capable interpreters and diplomatic personnel serving in Beijing and its first embassies abroad.

As can be expected, the school ran into fierce criticism from conservatives in the Qing court, who condemned it as capitulation to the foreign powers. China, they claimed, should stick to its own rich cultural traditions and rites rather than stoop to play the techniques and tricks of the Western culture. Tongwen Institute survived, however, with the full backing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Prince Gong (1833–98). In 1866 the institute developed from a foreign languages school into a polytechnic institute by adding an astronomy and mathematics department. Li Shanlan, the prominent mathematician and translator alluded to earlier, served as the dean of the new department and Dr. W. A. P. Martin of international law, an American missionary, was appointed president of the newly expanded institute. The enrollment increased to over one hundred, and the length of their study was extended to eight years: focusing on foreign languages during the first two years and then expanding to astronomy, mathematics, chemistry, physics, medicine, foreign history and geography; students were to begin practicing translation of books during the fourth year. As a publisher of translated books, Tongwen gave top

priority to books concerning diplomacy, current affairs, history, and geography, and published nearly 200 titles in these areas.

Another important official agency is the Jiangnan Arsenal founded in Shanghai in 1867 at the behest of Zeng Guofan (1811–77), known mostly as the scholar-official who led the military campaigns to crush the Taiping Rebellion with his well-trained, well-disciplined provincial armies. During the post-Taiping Rebellion years, Zeng served as governor general of Jiangnan, a geographic area in the south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, including the southern parts of today's Jiangsu and Anhui Provinces and the northern parts of today's Jiangxi and Zhejiang Provinces. Although a stout Confucianist, Zeng Guofan was in favor of strengthening China, in the face of Western encroachments, by learning from the West. In addition to the Jiangnan Arsenal, Zeng Guofan, together with his protégé and lieutenant Li Hongzhang, established a program to send bright Chinese boys to the United States to study.²⁷

One of the first actions taken by the Jiangnan Arsenal was to set up a translation agency in June 1868, and John Fryer, a British working in the Chinese newspaper *Shanghai Xinbo* was recruited to oversee the translation work. To have consistency and standards, the agency established a set of rules for rendering the brand new Western terminologies in Chinese: (1) use ready-made Chinese terms or consult businessmen and craftsmen for the commonly accepted usages; (2) create new terms, following Chinese rules of character formation; (3) compile glossaries, listing both the English terms and their Chinese equivalents, especially newly coined terms.²⁸ The first three books translated by the agency were *Theory of Mechanics* by the joint efforts of John Fryer and Xu Zhonghu, *Steam Engine* by Alexander Wylie and Xu Shou, and *Identification of Materials* by Daniel Jerome McGowan and Hua Hengfang.

The Translation Agency expanded to have its own publication arm in 1871 during the third year after its founding. The first two of its published titles were *Theory of Mechanics* and *Essentials of Coal Mining*. This was followed by a wide range of translation works in mathematics, survey, steam engine, chemistry, astronomy, navigation, medicine, industrial technology, military science, shipbuilding, and even books in history, international law, and annals—about 163 titles in total published over a period of 25 years until 1895. Many of its published translations were widely used as textbooks by both the nontraditional Chinese schools and the mission schools run by the Church in China.

When Anglo-American Protestant missionaries first came to the coastal provinces of China in the early 1800s, their religious activity was not protected by treaties and law. They most often operated, publically, in the capacity of tradesmen, physicians, or teachers. Some set up what came to be known as mission schools, offering free Western-style education to poor children by way of serving the true mission of their presence in China: proselytization. With the legalization of missionary activities in the post-Opium War China, many more mission schools emerged in the coastal cities and soon spread to the inland provinces, among them a women's school set up in 1844 by a Miss Alden from the Oriental Women's Education Society of Britain—a trailblazer, groundbreaking development because for centuries girls in China had been denied the opportunities for any formal education. More women's schools would be set up in Fuzhou, Beijing, Shanghai, Suzhou, and Nanjing.

According to a report in 1899, there was a total of 3,000 mission schools—mostly elementary schools, all with proselytization (of socioeconomically underprivileged children, sometimes pursued a bit heavy-handedly) at the core of their curricula. By the 1880s the first group of mission colleges, such as St. John's University in Shanghai, appeared in China, ushering the era of modern higher education in this ancient country.²⁹ The profound impact the tens of thousands of graduates from these mission schools had, using their newly acquired Western knowledge, literary, philosophical, religious as well as scientific and technological, on all facets of the country's socioeconomic, political, and cultural life during the decades of late Qing and early twentieth century can only be imagined.

In the meantime, several missionary-sponsored entities were active in translation and publication of Western scientific knowledge and books in other areas. *Mohaishuguan* [Ink Sea Book Society], for example, was set up by Dr. Walter Henry Medhurst (1796–1857) as early as 1843. Many of the books Li Shanlan translated were published by *Mohaishuguan*. Another such entity, *Guangxuehui* [Guang Institute], was established by the British missionary A. Williamson (1829–90) in 1887 in Shanghai. It was a well-staffed organization and the translation books it published had a big following among the educated people in China. Its total output even surpassed that of the Tongwen Institute and the Jiangnan Arsenal. Although the primary mission of such missionary-sponsored entities was to translate, publish, and hence promote Christianity in China, the large numbers of the books in scientific and other areas they published helped the Chinese to learn from the West and the rest of the world.

Intercivilizational, intercultural borrowing of knowledge, mostly through translation, has been a defining characteristic of human history. It would be no hyperbole to say that without such knowledge borrowing the world as we know and live and experience it today would not have been possible: The ancient Greeks borrowing from the Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations in mathematics, astronomy, and calendar; the Romans (who, Eric Jacobsen claimed, had invented translation)³⁰ borrowing almost everything from the Greeks—arts, literature, architecture, philosophy, medicine, astronomy, mathematics; Persia and Arabia borrowing from Greek, Indian, and other civilizations, with Baghdad as the center of significant translation endeavors; the Christian Bible, from the earliest Syriac, Coptic, Ge'ez, Latin, and Septuagint translations to Luther, Wycliffe, Tyndale, King James, and many other “modern” translations in the vernacular; the knowledge embodied in the great inventions of the ancient Chinese civilization being “translated” (carried across, literally) along the Silk Route; translations of Homer by the likes of Chapman and Pope; Dryden’s translation of Virgil; the rediscovery and translations of Greek and Latin classics that revived interest in humanistic learning during the Renaissance—the list can go on endlessly.

For a while, the massive translation of Western scientific and technological knowledge had the promise of strengthening China, as Lin Zexu and many others had hoped, and would deliver a credible countermeasure to the aggressions of the West. Such promise came in the person of Li Hongzhang (1823–1901).³¹

Li, well read in Chinese classics and quite intelligent, showed much promise early on. It was during his early career, when he helped Zeng Guofan crush the Taiping Rebellion, that Li Hongzhang came in direct contact with Westerners and gained a profound appreciation of the superior firepower of their military arsenal. Believing that all China needed, being superior in traditional culture, was to strengthen itself industrially and militarily (“there is no better way for China to strengthen herself than to learn Westerners’ sharp weapons; there is no better way to learn Westerners’ sharp weapons than to learn the machines to make them”), Li Hongzhang launched a massive Self-Strengthening Movement, a sort of Industrial Revolution for China.

To acquire industrial modernization, Li promoted new private enterprises in textile, ironworks, mining, machine manufacturing, and so on. He built China’s first railway in 1880, first telegraph lines in 1881, and the first cotton mill in 1882. To acquire military modernization, Li Hongzhang established several military arsenals and shipbuilding dockyards, among them the Jiangnan Arsenal referred

to earlier, all, ironically, with the help of Western advisors. The navy under his command, with some 20 warships, big and small, mostly imported from Germany, was among the biggest in tonnage in Asia and indeed in the world at the time. Unfortunately, this fledgling navy was dealt a fatal blow when combating the Japanese navy during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). The war ended with China's defeat and Li Hongzhang signing, on China's behalf, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which, among other things, ceded Taiwan, the Pescadores islands, Port Arthur, and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan.

Indeed, as the most eminent figure in the Self-Strengthening Movement, Li Hongzhang had the misfortune of representing the Qing government in signing some of the most infamous treaties imposed on China by foreign powers and has for a long time been denounced as a traitor of national sovereignty. Recently, however, some scholars in China have called for reappraisal and hence a more balanced, if not exactly laudatory, view of both Li Hongzhang and the Self-Strengthening Movement.

Li Hongzhang's decades long endeavors to strengthen China by establishing arsenals, forts, docks, new industries, military academies and by building up a modern army and seaworthy navy, failed to save China from the aggressions of foreign powers. It soon became clear that industrial and military modernization alone was, at the most, only half the story, a half measure toward accomplishing the daunting task of strengthening China in an increasingly hostile world. The Chinese would have to look elsewhere for the missing link, so to speak.

THE LITTLE BOOK THAT STARTED THE BIG, UNHEAVENLY KINGDOM

One February day in 1837, in a small village in the coastal province of Guangdong, a 23-year-old young man, having had to be carried back home in a sedan chair, sick and tired after failing the imperial examination a second time, was having a feverish dream. In the dream he is summoned by King Yan Luo in hell (otherwise known as the Dragon Demon of the Eastern Sea), an ominous sign that his earthly existence is coming to the end.

However, after bidding farewell to his wife and family and then falling back on the bed, ready to die, the young man drifts into another dream, in which, in the midst of heavenly music, he is carried into a gated, well-lit city where he is cleansed by a woman who calls him "son" and then sent on to his father. Tall, erect, and donning a black dragon

robe and luxuriant golden beard, his father breaks into an impassioned sermon about demon devils on earth that have led people astray. Aroused, the young man begs, repeatedly, to wage war against the demon devils on his father's behalf. He is granted the wish and given a golden seal and a great sword to carry it out.

With the big battle won, the young man begins to enjoy the heavenly life with his wife and his elder brother in his father's palace, until his father decides to send him back to earth where demon devils still reign and people continue in their false ways. The young man is thus given a new, more auspicious name, Hong Xiuquan (1814–64), bestowed the grand title of “Heavenly King,” and sent back to earth—to his earthly family who has been so worried watching over him day and night as he sleeps, deathlike—leaps from the sick bed, shouting battle cries, chasing phantom demons left and right, slaying them, and drops “dead” again.

The meaning of this haunting dream remained elusive until one day, five years later, when the young man, having failed the imperial examination for a fourth time, read a little book—a hodgepodge of translation, compilation, annotation, and social commentary—which he had received about seven years before near an imperial examination site. Once the key to the haunting dream was found, all “hell” broke loose and a new, rather odd chapter in Chinese history would be written on an epic and hence all the more tragic scale in the name of the Christian God.³²

Concerning the exact date when Christianity was introduced to China, historians do not agree. Among recent theories are that it came to China as far back as 65 AD, around the same time that Buddhism did. The earliest Christians, persecuted by Roman Emperor Nero, migrated to different parts of the world, some to the China of Eastern Han (23 AD–220 AD) and settled down here. These religious refugees brought with them the *Old Testament* (the *New Testament* was yet to be written at the time). One tangible evidence of the early entrance of Christianity in China was a 781 stone tablet unearthed in 1625, on which was inscribed the story of the fall of man, the birth of Jesus, the miracles Jesus performed, and a brief history of Christianity in China. Legend goes that the earliest Chinese translation of the Bible was actually carried out in the study of Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty (599 AD–649 AD), further evidence of the Chinese receptiveness to ideas coming from the outside world before the Manchu rule.³³

In fact, by making the strategic move of blending Christianity with Confucianism, the hegemonic cultural ideology of the Chinese

society—to “domesticate” the foreign religion for better reception in the target culture, Jesuits during the late Ming dynasty achieved remarkable success in converting prominent scholar-officials, among them, Yang Tingyun, Li Zhizao, and Xu Guangqi, the three famed scientist translators referred to earlier, also known as the Three Pillars of the early Christian Church in China.

Like all of the other “protagonists”—the ensemble of prominent figures in this epic historical drama of China’s attempt at modernization, all three scientist translator turned believers were well educated in the Chinese classics and all, when young, cherished ambitions for their future through imperial examinations. And like Hong Xiuquan alluded to a few paragraphs earlier, two of the three underwent tense religious experiences that led to their decision to be baptized. For Xu Guangqi, it was the crisis of failing the *jinsshi* exam in 1597 that made him more receptive to the proselytizing efforts of the Jesuit fathers. One day, not long after meeting Matteo Ricci, Xu dreamed of a temple with three chapels, the first chapel containing a shrine to God, the second a shrine to the Son, and the third—empty. As in the case of Hong Xiuquan, Xu Guangqi didn’t have the key to “decode” this dream until much later, when his relationship with Ricci deepened. At a rather low point in his life, when he had failed the *jinsshi* exam a second time, Xu Guangqi happened to be shown a painting of the Madonna and Child, was deeply moved, and shortly thereafter he embraced Christianity. Xu Guangqi was baptized in 1601, followed by Li Zhizao in 1610 and Yang Tingyun in 1611, although all three remained committed to Confucianism. As it turned out, all three eventually had a quite successful career, with Xu Guangqi being appointed to the position of grand secretary, the highest perhaps in the Ming court.³⁴ And all three did significant work in translating and introducing Western scientific knowledge to China, as briefly outlined in the section “Western Knowledge for Use.”

By the time of Yongzheng (1678–1735), the third emperor of the Qing dynasty, who imposed harsh restrictions on the presence of foreign missionaries, most of their religious activities went underground. The little book young Hong Xiuquan was handed outside an imperial examination site was prepared by a Liang Afa, who had had only four years of schooling. Liang had been a devout Buddhist and was introduced to Christianity while being employed by the Scottish Protestant missionary William Milne (1785–1822). Liang’s job was to help print a series of religious tracts and sections of the Bible Milne and his fellow missionaries were translating into Chinese. Shaken by the fiery sermons delivered by Milne, which, among other things,

denounced Buddhism as a false way to salvation, Liang Afa converted to Christianity and before long became an ordained preacher himself. In the nine-chapter hodgepodge of a booklet entitled *Quanshi liangyan* [Good Words for Exhorting the Age], which he wrote and expanded several times over, Liang retold the stories of the Genesis, of the fall of mankind (through the fall of Eve and Adam who failed to resist the temptation of the serpent), of Noah's Ark and the great flood, and of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. He also included the entire text of Jesus's Sermon on the Mount and the last chapter of the Revelation of John the Divine. The little book was fraught with apocalyptic visions of grand battles between good (the angels) and evil (the dragon, that old serpent, Satan, Devil), the glory of the throne of God, the promise of a new Jerusalem—the heavenly kingdom—on earth, and calling on the people to do God's commandments.

It was at such a low point in his life, having just failed the imperial examination for a fourth time, when the ambitions he had cherished for himself didn't seem to have any hope of being realized at all, that Hong Xiuquan picked up the little book he had all but forgotten for the last seven years since he received it from a traveling preacher. The key to the haunting dream he had had five years before suddenly presented itself:

He is "God's Chinese son" (and Jesus's younger brother) sent down to slay the "legions of demons" on earth and to rid the evil that has "infiltrated all the human race."³⁵

Was the dream the workings of an overstrung, stressed out, end-of-the-tether mind? Did Hong Xiuquan "dream up" the dream as a strategic move of mythmaking, to give himself some sort of heavenly mandate and the rebellion he was about to lead some sort of divine justification? After all, variations of the same stratagem had been employed by rebel leaders throughout Chinese history.

When army officers of the Qin dynasty (221 BC–6 BC), Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, were forced to take up arms against the harsh Qin rule, they arranged for a wild bonfire to be set in a temple near their camp in the middle of the night and had someone shouting "Great Shu Thrive! Chen be King!"³⁶ With this divine sanctioning (or blessing), Chen Sheng and Wu Guang were able to rally within days a band of brave rebels in the thousands. They fought hard and did score one major victory after another although the band of rebels eventually proved no match for the vast army of the Qin court. Nonetheless, the uprising did rattle the Qin rule and led to its eventual demise.

Only a few hundred years into the new Han dynasty another peasant uprising shook China. Called the Yellow Turban Rebellion (184 AD), thanks to the color of the scarves the rebels wore around their heads, this peasant uprising had strong religious connections. Their leader Zhang Jiao, along with his two younger brothers Zhang Bao and Zhang Liang, claimed that the Daoist deity Huang Lao had given them a sacred book called *Taiping yaoshu* [Keys to Heavenly Peace], which formed the ideological base for their uprising. Their rallying cry was “The Blue Sky [the Han dynasty] has Perished, the Yellow Sky [Yellow Turban Rebellion] will Rise; Peace and Prosperity in the World in this Very Year!”

And not too long before Hong Xiuquan, in the years 1796–1804, members of the White Lotus Society (1796–1804), a secret religious organization, invoked the deity of the Buddha Maitreya and promised personal salvation by way of rallying its followers in rebellion against harsh taxation of the Manchu rule. Although the widespread rebellion was finally crushed by the Manchu rulers, it did deal the Qing dynasty a heavy blow from which it never fully recovered.

Perhaps it doesn't matter much whether Hong Xiuquan's dream was the workings of an overstrung mind or that of a deliberate game plan—mythologizing as ideological, sociopolitical preparation for the uprising he was about to lead, there is no mistaking the forces at work here, personal and social, native and foreign, earth and heaven, tangible and ethereal, all converging into this strange, haunting dream, and the biblical interpretation of the dream, triggered by a little book of religious tracts, a hodgepodge of translation, compilation and fiery social commentary. This convergence of forces led to a grand but tragic chapter in Chinese history written across the vast landscape from Guangdong to Jiangsu (where Hong Xiuquan eventually set up the capital of his Heavenly Kingdom in the beautiful city of Nanjing), written in hope and disillusion, victory and defeat, loyalty and in-fight and betrayal, dream visions and counter-dream visions (for subversion, for control and personal power), corruption and reign of terror. The overarching theme of this grand, tragic chapter in Chinese history is the populist political and ideological platform—an uneasy amalgam of half-digested Christian dogmas and myths, anti-Confucian sloganeering, and utopian egalitarianism that Hong Xiuquan pursued while retaining, wholeheartedly, harsh hierarchical control of social and gender relations, from the lofty Heavenly King to the lowly subjects...³⁷ a chapter that did not end until when some 20 million people had perished, the Taiping Rebellion had been crushed, and Hong Xiuquan himself had died of food poisoning.

The irony of Hong Xiuquan and his Taiping Rebellion is that although he was inspired by a heavily domesticated “translation” of the Bible and although he raised hopes among some missionaries of converting the great empire in the Orient to Christianity, the missionaries soon turned suspicious of this “insane” Chinese man who claimed to be Jesus’s younger brother. I. Jacob Roberts (1802–71), for example, an American missionary at the time, who had refused to baptize Hong Xiuquan when Hong came to him soon after finding the key to his haunting dream, welcomed Hong’s uprising as a god-send opportunity to spread the gospels of Christianity to the whole of China, the harbinger of a great age. Yet when he went to see Hong Xiuquan in Nanjing, the capital of the Heavenly Kingdom, and stayed there for 15 months, Roberts was shocked by the heretic nature of Hong, who by this time had claimed to be not only God’s Chinese Son but God himself. Upon returning to Shanghai, Roberts wrote to denounce Hong Xiuquan as the enemy of the missionaries, his rebels as a band of bandits, and called on their total annihilation by the Western forces.³⁸ It is not surprising that The Ever Victorious Army, trained and led by a European officer corps and under the command of British major-general Charles George Gordon (1833–85), was instrumental in crushing the Taiping Rebellion.

What would have happened if Hong Xiuquan hadn’t happened upon the “key”—Liang Afa’s little booklet of religious tracts? Would it have remained a haunting yet meaningless, incoherent dream and nothing more? Although, once again, questions like these would fall in the realms of historical fantasy, one thing seems clear: the enormous potency of the literariness of the Bible (written with such imaginative, narrative power), and of translation, for that matter, that could wreak quite a havoc between heaven and earth. However, when the Taiping Rebellion had fallen completely and Hong Xiuquan had moved on to some other realms of being, there seemed no reaction from his adopted heavenly, Christian family:

[I]f God, the Heavenly Father, is saddened at Hong’s passing, He gives no sign. Hong’s Elder Brother, Jesus, too, is mute. And even his Heavenly Mother, who cried out with such anguish at his birth, and fought to keep her infant from the seven-headed dragon’s jaws, stays silent in her realm.³⁹

Nonetheless, in his fall and the fall of the Taiping Rebellion, the fall of the Qing dynasty was already foretold. It was a matter of time only for the prophecy to transmute into reality.

THE FOX, THE CROW, THE TORTOISE . . . TAKING THE LEAD

Up to this point in China's literary history there had been no significant translation of Western literature in the narrow sense of the term (i.e., creative and imaginative writing with recognized artistic value) by any stretch, unless we consider the Buddhist scriptures or the Christian Bible as literature, as the latter, for example, is often studied and taught as such in high school and college literature curriculum, thanks to its extraordinary range of genres, character sketches, narrative interests, voices and styles, and powerful use of language, and to its extraordinary influence on Western literature as a whole.

Why was the output of "pure" literature translation relatively scant? Can it be attributed to the fabled insularity of the Chinese mind and lack of interest? Such doesn't seem to be the case. Although it is true that the Chinese had been proud of its splendid culture and its achievements in arts and literature, they were, as shown earlier, receptive to ideas from outside; at least they were so before the beginning of the Manchu rule in the 1700s. In fact, the millennium-long endeavors of Buddhist scripture translation had had significant impact on Chinese literature as well as language, as alluded to earlier.

Interesting enough, the very first "pure" Western literature translation was Aesop Fables (620 BC–560 BC) rendered into Chinese by the missionaries. As far back as 1608, Matteo Ricci, the Italian missionary referred to more than once already, cited several of Aesop's fables in one of his books written for Chinese readers. A few years later, in 1614, the Spanish Jesuit Didace de Pantoja (1571–1618) also cited Aesop's tales in a book of his. The first stand-alone translation, though, was rendered by the French Jesuit Nicolas Trigault (1577–1628), in collaboration with a Chinese bishop by the name of Zhang Geng. Entitled *Kuan Yi* [Moral Tales], this collection of 22 translated Aesop tales was published in 1625, with a total of 2,000 Chinese characters in word count. It marks the very first "pure" Western literature in Chinese translation.⁴⁰

As would be expected, the early translations of Aesop's tales were heavily domesticated, or acculturated, thanks to the translators' sensitivity to the literary tastes of the intended readership in the target culture and to the classic fables in the target culture going as far back as to Zhuangzi (369 BC–286 BC). In the 42 fables attributed to Zhuangzi, for example, 32 feature humans (76 percent), five feature animals (12 percent), while the remaining five (12 percent) do not

fall into any neat category. The same distribution characterizes fables by other authors around this time. Aesop's fables, on the other hand, present a contrastive picture, featuring animals in at least 70 percent of the fables. Not so incidentally, Trigault and Zhang Geng's book of translation, which has 22 Aesop's fables, presents an equal distribution of those featuring humans (10) and those featuring animals (10) with the remaining two not falling into any neat category, a compromise of sort between the native cultural traditions and those of the source texts.

Another notable influence of the target language and culture is in the actual rendition of the fables. Take for example "The Dog and the Shadow" tale. The original story goes like this:⁴¹

A Dog crossing a bridge over a stream, with a piece of meat in his mouth, saw his own shadow in the water and took it for that of another Dog, with a piece of meat double his own in size. He immediately let go of his own and fiercely attacked the other Dog to get his larger piece from him. He thus lost both: that which he grasped at in the water, because it was a shadow; and his own, because the stream washed it away.⁴²

Here is Trigault and Zhang Geng's rendition (translated back to English for the purpose of this book here):

A Dog crossing a bridge over a stream, with a piece of meat in his mouth, saw his own shadow in the water and took it for that of another Dog, with a piece of meat double his own in size. He immediately let go of his own and fiercely attacked the other Dog to get his larger piece from him. He thus lost both in the stream. *The crowd on the bank doubled up laughing and clapping.*

The moral: The dog, when going after another, lost what he already had. Greed can make one forget one's own shadow. [italics added]

The italicized portions are story elements added by the translators. The effect is that what happened to the Dog became more dramatic, with the crowd on the bank as audience of the event. It also makes the moral of the story more visible, both textually and topographically, perhaps to better deliver the "instructional" (didactic) function of such stories.

As has been indicated earlier, classic Chinese fables feature humans dominantly whereas Aesop's fables feature animals. A new collection of Chinese fables entitled *Wugang* [Things Inspired Thoughts] written by the late Ming/early Qing author Li Shixiong (1602–86) shows

discernible influence of Trigault and Zhang Geng's *Kuangyi*. Out of the 20 fables collected in the book, 19 feature animals. Moreover, five are direct adaptations from *Kuangyi*. Take for example the tale "The Fox and the Crow." Here is the story as rendered by Trigault and Zhang Geng, which (again translated back into English for the purpose of discussion here) is notably "domesticated":

A Crow, holding a piece of meat in her beak, perched in a tree. A Fox, seeing this, longed to possess the meat himself. By way of a wily stratagem he exclaimed: "They all say the crow is black and ugly, but you are so pure white and fair! The fairest in the animal kingdom. And yet, does your voice match your beauty?" Thrilled by the compliment, the Crow gave a loud caw and dropped the meat. The Fox quickly picked up the meat and ran away.

The moral: When someone flatters you, the flatterer must have a selfish motive. You will be fooled, if listening to such flattery, instead of benefiting from it.

Li Shixiong's version of the story goes like this:

A Crow, holding a piece of meat in her beak, perched in a tree. A Fox, seeing this, longed to possess the meat himself. By way of a wily stratagem he exclaimed: "They all say the crow is black and ugly, but you are so pure white and fair! The fairest in the animal kingdom. And yet, does your voice match your beauty?" Thrilled by the compliment, the Crow gave a loud caw and dropped the meat. The Fox quickly picked up the meat and ran away. *Upon seeing the Fox, the Pheasant denounced him furiously: "Calling the black white to steal the meat, you thief!" Upon seeing the row, the Peacock said, laughing, "Not knowing who you are, you eat up the Fox's flattery."* [italics added]

The italicized portions of the story elements are thinly disguised jabs at rampant corruption Li Shixiong saw in the society of his time. He intended his fables, original or adapted, to deliver direct and poignant social commentary rather than mere literary entertainment.

Indeed, ever since their first introduction to China, Aesop's fables—such as "The Ant and the Grasshopper," "The Boy Who Cried Wolf," "The Crow and the Pitcher," "The Fox and the Crow," "The Fox and the Grapes," "The Tortoise and the Hare," "The Wolf and the Lamb," "The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing," and many more—have become so "naturalized" into Chinese culture and collective psyche, thanks, in part, to their inevitable presence in (early) childhood moral education, that most Chinese today probably wouldn't

feel the “foreignness” of these tales at all, or know that they were originally told by an ancient Greek slave storyteller who lived between 620 BC and 560 BC.

The fact that “pure” literature translation had had such a poor show since Trigault and Zhang Geng’s *Kuanyi*, as compared to the Buddhist scripture translation and later the boom in the translation of Western scientific and technological knowledge, could perhaps be attributed to the overall sociopolitical and cultural climate under the Manchu rule, and to the more practical bent in the Chinese national character. Nonetheless, with translations of the animal-featuring Aesop fables taking the lead, burgeoning interest in “pure” Western literature did begin to show, albeit slowly, as evidenced in the instances catalogued below:

An article entitled “On Poetry” published in 1838, which introduced John Milton (1608–74) as a poet of extraordinary elegance and power—the earliest Chinese literary commentary on a Western poet; an abbreviated version (a total of 13 pages) of *The Pilgrim’s Progress* by John Bunyan (1628–88), trans-created by the British missionary William Muirhead (1822–1900) and published in 1851; the Lilliput portion of *Gulliver’s Travels* by Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), a total of about 5,000 Chinese characters in word count, published in a Shanghai newspaper in 1873; the first half of *Night and Morning* by Edward Bulwer Lytton (1803–73), translated by Hermit Li Shao,⁴³ the very first book-length “pure” literature translation rendered by a Chinese; a brief introduction of William Shakespeare, in an 1882 book entitled *Wanguo tongjian* [References for World Nations] written by an American missionary, the very first introduction of Shakespeare in Chinese; publication in 1896 of four detective stories by Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930), translated by Zhang Kunde; another introductory article about William Shakespeare as the best-known poet in an 1896 book entitled *Xixue lueshu* [An Overview of Western Learning] by a British missionary.⁴⁴

During the 50 or so years since the Opium War, the Chinese experienced a most unsettling awakening forced upon them by the coming of the Westerners. As they scrambled to figure out what was going on, they began to appreciate the necessity of learning from the West in order to save China from the West. The approach they adopted—limiting the learning to that of Western scientific and technological knowledge, via translation, while hanging on to the Confucianism dominated ideology and values in the native culture, did help modern industry set foot in China, but the measure was far from being potent enough. China, once again, proved no match for foreign powers, as

evidenced by the defeat of Li Hongzhang's fledgling army, particularly the navy that he had gone to such lengths building up and that he was so proud of, in its encounters with both the new (Japan) and old, established foreign empires. The biggest, and most destructive (in terms of human losses, at least), sociopolitical impact translation of Western literature (in the broad sense) had during this period would have to be the Taiping Rebellion led by Hong Xiuquan, whose haphazard exposure to Christianity via a heavily "domesticated" hodgepodge of a translation of the Bible provided him the sorely needed legitimacy and ideological rallying cry for the uprising. Translation of more sociopolitically oriented texts and, indeed, of "pure" Western literature, would have to wait till the turn of the twentieth century.

“*STURM UND DRANG*”
(1897–1927)

By the time the new century dawned, the future of China was as bleak as ever before. It was a patient sprawled on the table, to borrow from T. S. Eliot, not to be operated on, but to be carved out and then declared dead. At least this was how many of the educated and patriotic Chinese felt at the time. It was among the darkest days in modern Chinese history, especially when compared to the rest of the world—to the empires, established and emerging, to which the Middle Kingdom had not bothered to pay much serious attention, not until the warships of Queen Victoria’s navy rattled its rulers and the scholar-officials from their Sinocentric dreams of real and imagined glory of the past.

By this time the British Empire had secured its hegemonic presence in almost all corners of the world, the Union Jack flying the skies from Asia (including Hong Kong, the crown jewel it had acquired not too long ago) to Africa, from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. The United States, not content with being a regional power, had pushed its frontiers well beyond the coastlines and proved a rather assertive new player on the world scene. And Japan, the island country not far off from China’s northeastern coast, had risen in the short span of a few decades, wielding its freshly beefed up armament left and right, and had just dealt another stunning blow to the already fractured psyche of the Chinese by wiping out their fledgling navy during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95).

By this time the West had already witnessed a second industrial revolution, fueled by the inventions of usable electricity, steel, and petroleum products, its cities being connected by railways, locomotives, steam ships, its people—at least those who could afford it—relishing the benefits of dazzling new inventions that just kept coming: plastic, phonograph, gramophone, telephone, automobile, motorcycle, and

so many more, coming fast on the heels of inventions only days old. Radio and air-conditioning would arrive in just a couple of years; the Wright Brothers were readying their gas motored airplane for the sky over Kill Devil Hill, North Carolina; Albert Einstein was poised to unleash into the big, wide world his Theory of Relativity, epitomized by that time and space shattering equation, $E=mc^2$.

And where was China at this time, relatively speaking? Despite all the promise of sweeping institutional reforms trumpeted by none other than Emperor Guangxu (1871–1908) himself, the Hundred Days Reform (1898) had ended with a whimper, a coup d'état, really, pulled off by the young emperor's aunt, the powerful Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908); Guangxu would die in house arrest, Cixi following in her nephew's footsteps the very next day. In the meantime, stoked by fear and fiery sentiments against colonialism, opium trade, and missionary evangelicalism, the Boxer Uprising (also known as the Righteous Harmony Fists Movement), was laying siege to foreign embassies and the Legation Center in Beijing. The Boxers would soon be cracked down by the 50,000 strong joint forces of the Eight-Nation Alliance (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The soldiers of the triumphant armies would celebrate their victory with "an orgy of looting," as 400 million or so Chinese people, most of them illiterate, looked on helplessly.

It was true that the self-strengthening endeavors led by such as Li Hongzhang, in conjunction with the pressures and pressing presence of foreign powers, had led to a few steamboats plowing on the Yangtze River, a few trains hooting on rails connecting Nanjing, Guangzhou, Tangshan, Beijing, Shenyang, and a few colossal money-handling stone structures being erected in the Bund of Shanghai and a handful of other coastal cities in the last decade of the nineteenth century. However, there was not much more beyond that and there did not seem a glimmer of hope in sight.

TRANSLATION AS TRANSFUSION

It was in the days immediately after China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, when Li Hongzhang's fleet was all but wiped out by the newly modernized Japan, that the Chinese began to realize that merely learning the scientific and technological way of the West was not going to save China. It was a time that the Chinese—at least the most intelligent, educated, and patriotic among them—were forced to look both within and without. Many soon came to the conclusion

that Chinese culture that had long exulted tradition, authority, orthodoxy, loyalty, obedience, rites, rituals, familial ties and filial piety had not prepared them for the brave new world. China had lost over and again not just because it was technologically behind, but more importantly, it was because its culture and its social institutions were repressive. The most enlightened among the Chinese, such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, began to think and propose bold sociopolitical and institutional reforms. And much of the intellectual underpinning of their bold, grand reform proposals came from the West via the agency of Yan Fu, who introduced some of the most important Western political and sociological theories to China through his annotated translations. These foreign ideas and concepts, “domesticated” through both Yan Fu’s poignant commentaries and the elegant Chinese renditions, provided the much needed ideological weapons to fight the battles both within and without.

Born in a scholar-gentry family, Yan Fu (also Yen Fu, 1854–1921) would have followed a career in the officialdom through imperial exams had his father not died when he was young and left the family in financial predicament. Instead, Yan Fu continued his education (tuition free) at Fujian Arsenal Academy where he studied more “practical” subjects such as geometry, physics, mathematics, geology, navigation as well as English, excelled, and graduated at the top of his class at 15. In 1877 he was sent to England and studied at the Navy Academy in Greenwich for two years.

It was during his two years in England that Yan Fu was exposed to and became intrigued by the new theories and ideas still being debated in the West, especially Herbert Spencer’s concepts of evolution as applied to human societies, i.e., social Darwinism. Why and how had Great Britain and other Western nations become so strong while the once powerful and prosperous China had become so weak and hence suffered so many humiliating defeats? The answer, Yan Fu found, lay in the institutional differences between China and the West and in the two cultures’ contrary attitudes toward antiquity and present, social order, and progress. As a passionate idealist at this time in his life, Yan Fu was not convinced by the so-called “*zhongxue weiti xixue weiyong*” [Chinese learning for the foundation and Western learning for use] approach—the mantra of the Self-Strengtheners, which many still clung to at this time:

The foundation *ti* and the use *yong* mean the same thing. . . . Chinese knowledge has its foundation and function; Western knowledge has also its foundation and function. If the two are separated, each can be

independent; if the two were combined, both would perish. . . . If we consider that science consists of techniques, then the Western techniques are actually the foundation of Western government. If we say that science does not consist of techniques, then the two things, government and techniques, are both derived from science like the left and right hand. I have never heard that the left and the right hands can be considered, respectively, as the foundation and the superstructure.¹

Although Yan Fu, disillusioned with the 1911 Revolution (Xinhai Revolution), would reverse his position on the adoption of Western ideas, his translations provided the ideological weapons direly needed to instigate massive sociopolitical reforms to modernize China during the early decades of the twentieth century—Thomas Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* (1896–98), Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1901), John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1903) and *System of Logic* (1905), and Herbert Spencer's *Study of Sociology* (1903), Charles de Secondat Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* (1904), and Edward Jenks' *A History of Politics* (1904)—in addition to eight volumes' worth of translation of Western science and technology, introducing to the Chinese such important ideas as “natural selection” and “survival of the fittest.” To survive, China had to strengthen itself, and the way to strengthen itself was to adopt Western ways—comprehensively, instead of cherry-picking its material technology only.

Yan Fu's “translations” of Huxley, Smith, Mill, Spencer, and others, though, were usually amalgams of translations, adaptations, and commentaries aimed at acculturating and making them urgently relevant and applicable to the Chinese situation. For example, the title of Huxley's book *Evolution and Ethics*, which he translated as *tianyan lun*. The closest denotative equivalent in English for *tian* would be sky or heaven, but connotatively and culturally *tian* is such a rich and loaded term in Chinese, as can be evidenced in such Chinese expressions as *tianming* [destiny, fate, mandate of heaven], *tiandao* [way of heaven, destiny, fate], *tiangong* [master of heaven, god], *tianli* [ethics of heaven], *tianyì* [will of heaven] and many more. Therefore, in rendering the title *Evolution and Ethics* into *tianyan lun* [On Evolutions of Heaven] Yan Fu had not only acculturated the concept in terms that would be readily accessible to his intended readers but also injected in it a subtle but unmistakable message and sense of urgency applicable to what had happened and what was still happening to China: It had to gather the necessary courage to reform and renew itself; otherwise, it would be heaven's will, way, or law for the nation to devolve into extinction. It was out of the same consideration that Yan

Fu translated the concept “natural selection” as *wu jin tian ze* [things compete for heaven’s selection]. The word *tian* as an equivalent for “natural” is vested with the same cultural meaning of destiny, fate, or heaven’s will.²

The style of Chinese prose Yan Fu used for his translation, classy, belle-lettristic, helped further “domesticate” the new foreign concepts to make them more palatable, and appealing, really, to his intended readers: the literati, the intelligentsia, and the scholar-official classes, whose “awakening” and action would be critical for the kind of radical reforms he had envisioned. It lends the poignant sociopolitical content of the trans-created texts an irresistible eloquence and power of persuasion, to which Yan Fu’s intended readers and the educated among the Chinese responded enthusiastically. Again, take for example his translation of Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics*. Within just a few years of its first publication in 1898, the book had seen more than 30 editions in print, hence, reaching audiences far and wide across the country. The warning bell the book sounded about China’s moribund fate in this world if it failed to wake up and save itself and the rallying cry for hope if the Chinese people were willing to take the bitter medicine to cure the deep-rooted ills did not fall on deaf ears. With the popularity of this book and others trans-created by him, concepts such as evolution, natural selection, survival of the fittest, liberty, and individual rights, became well known among the educated in China,³ who took up the brand new ideological weapons in the struggle for modernization. The boldest and most influential among the champions for reform during the last decade of the nineteenth century were Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.

Born in a prominent scholar family and having received thorough grounding in Chinese classics, Kang Youwei (1858–1927) was a rebel who started the reform movement from within. Although he had been set for a career path in the officialdom through imperial exams, Kang Youwei, at the young age of 15, made known his displeasure with the eight-legged essay.⁴ At 17, Kang started to read Western geography made available by Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan, and others, and became a voracious, thoughtful reader of books both Chinese and Western, the latter being made available through translations. One day, as he would recall later, while shutting himself in a room to contemplate, Kang had a spiritual experience not too different from what Hong Xiuquan had had after repeated failures at the imperial exams:

While I was sitting in contemplation, all of a sudden I perceived that heaven, earth, and the myriad of things were all of one substance with

myself, and in a great release of enlightenment I beheld myself a sage and laughed for joy; then suddenly I thought of the sufferings and hardships of all living things, and I wept in melancholy. . . .⁵

Kang Youwei, as it turned out, didn't see himself as a savior sent down by his Heavenly Father to exterminate all the evils and demons on earth although this mystical vision of himself as a sage (in the tradition of Confucius) did inject in him a sense of special destiny to save his country through active involvement. During subsequent visits to Hong Kong and Shanghai, Kang Youwei was impressed with how prosperous and well governed the Western societies were and began to study the West with even more zeal. A sharp-eyed, imaginative, and bold scholar, Kang started the so-called New Text movement, which, essentially, reinterpreted the basic tenets of Confucianism as "progressive" rather than "conservative." Through a skilful analysis (or smart deconstructive, semantic gymnastics, if you will) of ancient sources, of which his knowledge was intimate, solid, and hence unquestionable, Kang Youwei tried to show that Confucius and other great sages were actually champions of social and institutional progress. By doing so, he tried to shake the ideological foundation of the old guards who were dead set against reforms and wield the newly (re)packaged, rather progressive Confucius as shield against their criticisms.⁶

Kang Youwei's Confucianism-based justification for basic institutional reforms was a significant step ahead of the so-called Self-Strengtheners who had thought Western weapons and techniques could be adopted without basic changes in Chinese government and society. What the Self-Strengtheners didn't realize was that Western power and prosperity rested on more than technology alone. In the memorial to the young Emperor Guangxu, Kang Youwei laid out his reasons for institutional reform, with a notable Darwinian sense of urgency:

A survey of all states in the world will show that those states that undertook reforms became strong while those states that clung to the past perished. The consequences of clinging to the past and the effects of opening up new ways are thus obvious. If Your Majesty, with your discerning brilliance, observes the trends in other countries, you will see that if we can change, we can preserve ourselves; but if we cannot change, we shall perish. Indeed, if we make a complete change, we shall become strong, but if we make only limited changes, we shall still perish. If Your Majesty and his ministers investigate the source of the disease, you will know that this is the right prescription.⁷

This sense of urgency was also fueled by his vision of the world in three stages of development: 1) disorder, 2) approaching peace and small tranquility, and 3) universal peace and great unity—a utopian vision of the highest state of human society. To reach the highest, utopian stage of development, which drew from both classical Chinese thoughts and the newly available theories of evolution as rendered into Chinese by Yan Fu, human society would have to abolish all barriers and borders between states, classes, genders, races, and families, where everyone would live in one big, happy, and care-free world.

In pursuing bold institutional reforms Kang Youwei had a kindred spirit and an enthusiastic, unflinching ally in his protégé Liang Qichao, who in 1897, about a year before the Hundred Days Reform, issued the call for translation of Western books as the first and foremost way to strengthen and save China. That, especially his call for translation of political fiction from the West, marked a watershed in the history of Western literature (in the narrow sense) in China. It was the first time ever that translation of Western literature had been officially drafted as a momentous agent of reform and had been vested with much power and hope to renew the people, to revive the culture, and hence to save the country.

Like Kang, Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was both a solid Confucian scholar and a bold advocate for reforms. Precocious when young, Liang Qichao started to learn the Four Books and other Chinese classics at the age of four under the tutelage first of his grandfather and then his father, was writing thousand-word essays at nine, passed the *xincai* [equivalent to the bachelor’s degree in the West] provincial exam at eleven, and the *jueren* [the master’s degree] exam at the age of 16. The official presiding over the *jueren* exam was so impressed with Liang Qichao that he arranged for Liang to marry his cousin, which Liang gladly did a few years later.⁸ Like Kang Youwei, Liang’s worldview was shaken during a visit to Shanghai in 1890 after he had failed the triennial *jìnshì* [the doctoral degree] exam in Beijing. While in Shanghai, Liang Qichao, out of curiosity, purchased a copy of *Yinghuan zhibilue* [A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit] by Xu Jiyu. The impact on him was comparable to that when John Keats read Chapman’s translation of Homer for the first time: China was not the center of the universe after all because “beyond the boundless Middle Kingdom there were five continents and many other thriving nations.”⁹ Liberated from the frog-at-the-bottom-of-a-well vision of the world, so to speak, Liang Qichao began to read voraciously translations of Western books published by the Jiangnan Arsenal of

Shanghai (by borrowing from friends because he couldn't afford such books himself yet). That year proved a turning point in Liang's intellectual and sociopolitical development, as he put it about six years later: "Since my seventeenth year I have known much anxiety over the signs of strength and the signs of weakness among foreigners and Chinese."

Before long that expanded vision would evolve into a view of the world not significantly different from the grand borderless, genderless, classless, and carefree utopia cherished by Kang Youwei, thanks, in part, to the influence of Robert Mackenzie's *Nineteenth Century: A History*, translated into Chinese by Timothy Richard, an English missionary. That was in the year of 1894, soon after the First Sino-Japanese War had begun. Liang, being Richard's Chinese secretary, must have been struck by the missionary's worldview as expressed in the introduction for his translation: "What is the cause of the foreign wars, indemnities, and repeated humiliations suffered by China in the last sixty years?" Richard asked. He went on to explain, "God was breaking down the barriers between all nations by railways, steamers, and telegraphs, in order that all should live in peace and happiness as brethren of one family."¹⁰

Before that utopian vision of all nations melting into one big, happy family became reality, however, Liang Qichao would have to help save one in particular, his native China. And to do so, he had to reconcile his emotional and intellectual allegiance to the native Chinese cultural traditions and his admiration for the new Western culture which appeared mighty and matchless in the world at the time. In a manner and spirit almost identical to that of Kang Youwei, his mentor, Liang convinced himself that "authentic teachings of Confucius had been obscured by textual falsifiers and by ignorant and dishonest commentaries" and that modernization in the West, as evidenced in its science, technology, democracy, and prosperity, had all been foretold in the Confucian classics. This "re-vision" of the teachings of Confucius, in essence, meant that modernization of China through learning the Western ways would not take away from the sacred, splendid cultural traditions of China. Once again, through a skillful—"postmodern," indeed—reinterpretation of the classics, Liang Qichao tried to not only defuse the opposition from the ideological and cultural conservatives, but also to appease whatever unease he himself might still have as a patriotic Chinese while pushing for bold sociopolitical and institutional reforms to bring China to the modern age. And he would vacillate between vehement defense of Chinese culture and unreserved exultation of the West as

his political fortune, and indeed, as the stocks of the reforms he passionately worked for, fluctuated.¹¹

A new and modern China would not happen, Liang Qichao believed, without first renewing the Chinese people. Of the hundred or so countries in the world, all inhabited by the same human race, sharing the same sun and moon, all having mountains and river, why do some “rise while others fall, and some become strong while others are weak”?

Why? . . . Ah, I know the reason. A state is formed by the assembling of people . . . It has never happened that a people could be foolish, timid, disorganized, and confused and yet the nation still stands. Therefore . . . , if we wish the nation to be secure, rich, and honored, we must discuss the way for renewing the people.¹² [ellipses added]

Liang Qichao himself would play an instrumental role in that “renewing the people” project. A walking encyclopedia, Liang studied and wrote elegantly, with sharp wit, on a range of topics in historiography, politics, philosophy, ethics, literary history, and literature, with a total output of over 14 million words (averaging over 300,000 words a year in his adult life).

And at the forefront in that ambitious people renewing project was the introduction of Western literature in China. Beginning in 1896 in *Shiwu bao* [China Progress], which he co-founded and edited, Liang Qichao published, in installments, *Bianfa tongyi* [A General Discussion on Reform], which laid out the principles justifying the call for sociopolitical and institutional reforms and the actual reforms to be implemented. The seventh chapter of the bombshell of a document was “On Translation of Books,” a salient piece on the critical importance of translation of Western books to the people renewal project and hence the project of strengthening and saving China. He believed that the source of strength for the Western Powers could be traced back to Greek and Roman classics (the humanities and ethics of the former and the legal and political philosophy of the latter), which they translated into their own languages, required all schools to teach and all officials to study, and drew as source of wisdom and guiding light: “The enormous benefit of such translations on their cultures is as visible today as ever.”¹³

The lesson Liang Qichao drew from the perceived European experience, and indeed the success story of European nations is: “The world we live in today, the first and foremost way to strengthen our nation is book translation . . . translation of Western books—as many

as possible.” He believed that within ten years of sustained efforts the benefits would present themselves.

Liang Qichao had a clear three-pronged strategy to go about saving China via translation: “First, selection of books to translate; second, standardization of terms and proper names; third, education of translation talents.”¹⁴ Of the three, selection of the kind of books to translate was critical because Liang, parting company with the earlier generation of reformers and many fellow travelers of his own times, believed that the strength of the West lay not only in its advanced science and technology, but more importantly in their culture and education. Therefore, what China needed urgently was translation of Western books in legal and political philosophy, history, and fiction.

He saw fiction as a vital force in shaping people’s consciousness and character and went so far as to call it “the soul of a nation.” In his eyes traditional Chinese fiction was filled with morally corrupting content such as pornography and banditry, to which he attributed much of the ills plaguing China. Given the enormous moral agency he assigned to fiction in a society, his call for the translation of Western fiction by way of reshaping the national consciousness and character did not come as a surprise at all. And of all subgenres of Western fiction Liang promoted political fiction the most for translation, which, given the overarching sociopolitical and institutional orientation of his reform agenda, is not hard to understand. Indeed, Liang was the first to introduce political fiction as a subgenre to readers in China, believing that it would help excite the consciousness and intelligence of the people and awaken their patriotic spirit. This, Liang Qichao believed, had been the experience of the European nations and the newly modernized Japan where leaders of sociopolitical movements wrote novels inspired by their visions and philosophies:

These novels, when published, would be read by people from all walks of life, peasants, smiths, soldiers, chauffeurs, housewives, children, so much so that oftentimes when a new novel was released the entire nation would be reading and talking about it. Therefore, sociopolitical progress in America, Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and Japan should first and foremost be attributed to the political fiction in these countries.¹⁵

What Liang Qichao had in mind were political novels by Benjamin Disraeli (1804–81) and Bulwer-Lytton (1803–73), which must have struck a chord with him. *Comingsby* by Disraeli, a politician and twice Britain’s prime minister (1868, 1874–80) who also “dabbled”

in fiction writing, is set against the background of political events surrounding the Reform Act 1832, which called for wide-ranging changes to Britain's electoral system, for example, giving representation to previously underrepresented urban areas and extending the qualifications for voting. The main narrative of Henry Coningsby's life from an orphan to being elected prime minister is punctuated with the author's commentaries on the political events and figures of his times and his beliefs in social justice. The same themes reappeared in some of his later novels such as *Sybil* (1845), which deals with the horrific plight of the working classes in a fast industrializing England. Of the many novels by Bulwer-Lytton, a prolific and popular writer credited with the adage “the pen is mightier than the sword,” *The Coming of Race* must have had special appeal to Liang Qichao, with its utopian, albeit science fictional, story of a highly civilized race living in a subterranean world.

Limited by not knowing English or any other European languages, Liang Qichao translated two Japanese political novels when he had barely acquired enough proficiency in the new language to survive during his exile in Japan after the Hundred Days Reform had failed. The two novels, *Kajin no kigu* [*Jiaren qiyan*, Romantic Encounters with A Beautiful Lady] by Shiba Shiro (1851–1922), and *Keikoku bidan* [*Jinguo meitan*, Saga of a Classical Country] by Yano Ryukei (1850–1931), must have resonated with him emotionally and sociopolitically. They both featured heroes who were persecuted and then exiled for pursuing sociopolitical reforms.¹⁶

Not content, Liang tried his hand at fiction writing and penned a political novel titled *Xin zhongguo weilai ji* [The Future of the New China]. Driven by his overarching sociopolitical agenda, the novel is half political commentary, half political fantasy, which today has more historical significance than literary value.

Nonetheless, thanks to the enthusiastic advocacy of Liang Qichao, a heat wave of political fiction swept across the landscape of China at the time. Altogether, between the year 1898 and the year 1911, the eve of the republican revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who succeeded in overthrowing the last emperor of the Qing dynasty, 1,145 titles of political fiction were published, about two-thirds of which were translations.

Although the attempted reforms blueprinted by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao and led by young Emperor Guangxu lasted for only 100 days and ended disastrously,¹⁷ the movement did inspire revolutionary forces to work outside the establishment and pave the way for the (partial) success of the 1911 republican revolution. The sociopolitical

impact of the translation of political fiction, which Liang Qichao promoted zealously, though hard to quantify, cannot be underestimated. At the least it would be the harbinger of the “perfect storm” that was to come—soon.

While Yan Fu was introducing Huxley, Smith, Mill, and Spencer to the Chinese through his important translations and commentaries and Liang Qichao, along with his mentor Kang Youwei, was attempting to modernize China’s sociopolitical institutions through reforms and to renew the people through translation of Western political fiction, Lin Shu, a contemporary of theirs, was engaged in another front: introduction of Western literature (in the narrow sense) to China with renditions of 180 some titles, mostly novels, in elegant, classically flavored Chinese. What made Lin’s achievements even more remarkable was the fact that Lin Shu himself knew no foreign languages, and his translations were results of long-term partnerships with foreign language speaking friends, much in the tradition of early European missionaries who, knowing limited Chinese, collaborated with their Chinese informants in translating religious and other books.

Like Yan Fu, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao, Lin Shu (also Lin Qinnan, 1852–1924) was quite precocious when a young boy and an avid reader. However, the encyclopedic knowledge of Chinese classics in history, philosophy, poetry, and other cultural heritages he had amassed didn’t lead to success at the imperial exams and a successful career in the officialdom. Like many of his educated and patriotic contemporaries, Lin Shu was worried about the sorry plight of China. He witnessed the defeat of Chinese naval forces by French warships near his hometown Fuzhou during the Sino-French War (1884). When, at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, the Qing court ceded Taiwan and Liaodong Peninsula to the victorious Japan, Lin Shu happened to be taking his last shot at the imperial exam in Beijing. Outraged, he joined Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and nearly 1,300 other exam-takers in Beijing to protest the terms of the peace treaty and memorialize Emperor Guangxu, impressing on him the necessity and urgent need for sociopolitical and institutional reforms.

It was around this time that Lin Shu’s career as a translator began although he had always been interested in translated books written by Euro-American authors. And it all began “innocuously” enough. One day, as the story is often told, not long after the death of both his mother and his wife, between tea and idle chat with friends (to help him cope with the losses), perhaps, the idea of cotranslation hit Lin’s fancy. Once started, there was no stopping him. One would be hard put to imagine the manner and method by which Lin Shu

and his friends (who had studied in France, England, or America) collaborated while translating a book: the English or French proficient friend(s) reading a sentence or passage in the original, relaying the content the best he could in plain, “spoken” Chinese, and then Lin Shu rendering what he had heard into expressive, elegant Chinese. For how many days Lin Shu and his collaborators (a total of 20 or so of them for his entire translation career) would have to sit at the same table and forge ahead one sentence, one paragraph at a time to complete the translation of a novel, and how many pots of tea had to be consumed, and indeed how many writing brushes had to be worn out, when considering his total output of more than 10 million Chinese characters in translation.¹⁸

Some scholars, however, are a bit skeptical of the story of the “innocuous” beginning of Lin Shu’s translation career as outlined above and dismiss it as more fiction than fact because he might have attempted translation before his first published translation, Alexandre Dumas’s *La Dame aux Camélias*, in 1899. One thing is not in dispute, though: this first published translation of Lin Shu’s turned out to be a huge success. The tragic love story of Marguerite Gautier and Armand, probably based on the novelist himself and his real-life lover, must have fascinated Lin Shu’s readers who were intimately familiar with similar stories in their own culture: Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai, known today in the West as the Butterfly Lovers; Miss Du Shiniang, a beautiful courtesan who drowned herself after being betrayed by her lover Li Jia, the son of a wealthy, powerful family; and Jia Baoyu and Lin Daiyu, from the classic novel *A Dream of Red Mansions*, dubbed the Chinese Romeo and Juliet. The “exoticness” of the names, locales, and cultural traditions of *La Dame aux Camélias*, it seemed, only added to the appeal of the story’s universal themes of true love attempting, albeit not always successfully, to overcome social class and other insurmountable barriers.

Also adding to the charm of the story in a rather significant way is the prose style Lin Shu perfected in his translation, the “*nigu wenti*,” according to Zhou Shuren, a quasi-classical Chinese style (classical Chinese mixed with everyday, colloquial expressions and neologisms) that is elegant, expressive, yet easy to follow.¹⁹ This quasi-classical prose style seemed a perfect fit for someone who was psychologically as well as politically posited at the threshold of modernity and conducted his literary ventures around the turn of the new century. It would prove a rather convenient spot from where to retreat and entrench himself literarily as well as politically when Lin Shu felt that the younger generation of New Culture and New Literature Movement were taking

things a bit too far for his comfort. The quasi-classical style turned out to be quite appealing to Lin's educated contemporaries who had grown up suckling, so to speak, not only on the canon of classical learning but also on popular Chinese fiction written in a style close to the living language of everyday speech. The translated book was such a hit that within a year of its publication it saw more than two dozen reprints and editions.

The combination of a tragic love story, popular but not such a heavy and hence intimidating classic, and Lin Shu's charming, quasi-classical style in the first book-length translation of Western fiction, proved auspicious for the introduction of Western literature in China, for, as one critic commented: "Had they [Lin and other early translators] begun with an all exclusive focus on introducing [more serious] Western classics, they might have scared away Chinese readers who would be happy to retreat to [Chinese classics such as] the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *Water Margin*."²⁰

It seemed, though, the Lin Shu had no explicit political or cultural agendas other than satisfying his love of the stories and that he was not too discriminate, or picky, when taking on titles to translate. He translated whatever came into his hands: English, French, Russian, Japanese, German, Spanish, Greek, as long as he took a fancy to the stories recommended by his collaborating friends. So much of it, indeed, depended on the literary tastes of his collaborators and on the randomness of whatever books were available. His first collaborator, for example, is Wang Shouchang, who happened to have studied language and law for six years at the University of Paris. Dumas's *La Dame aux Camélias* was among the loads of books Wang Shouchang brought back to China upon completing his education in France. It took Lin Shu and Wang Shouchang half a year to complete their collaboration. Another important collaborator was Wei Yi, who had studied at St. John's University in Shanghai (founded by two Anglican bishops of Shanghai), whose main language of instruction was English. Together Lin and Wei translated some 50 titles, including Charles Dickens's *Oliver Twist* and *David Copperfield*, Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe*, Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, and Robert Louis Stevenson's *New Arabian Nights*. The most prolific of Lin Shu's collaborator was Chen Jialin (who happened to be the first Chinese translator of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*). Between the two of them they translated Shakespeare's *Richard II*, *Henry V*, *Henry VI*, *Julius Caesar*, Cervantes's *Don Quixote*, and quite a few titles by Leo Tolstoy, such as *The Death of Ivan Illyich*, via English translations of the original. It is said that not long after diving into the translation

venture Lin Shu had acquired such facility for the collaborative endeavor that the moment his foreign language “interlocutor” finished his oral translation of a passage Lin Shu had already finished his written “trans-creation,” all in his hallmark quasi-classical style.²¹ It was “simultaneous translation” of sort indeed. And Lin Shu was working at a speed of 1,500 words per hour and would, typically, keep at it for about four hours on any given day, which meant a daily output of 6,000 some words. It was quite impressive when considering the pre-computer age technologies he had to work with: the writing brush, ink, and rice paper.

Along with these Western classics Lin Shu had also put out translations of many “second-rate” works by writers who have been all but forgotten by literary history. For example, H. Rider Haggard (1856–1925), a Victorian novelist whose stories of dashing adventures in exotic lands were quite popular in his own days but have not received much serious critical attention since. Whether it was the influence of his collaborator, mostly Chen Jialin, or Lin Shu took a particular fancy to cliffhanging adventure stories, between the two they put out more than a dozen of Haggard’s stories in translation, which invited quite a bit of criticism from the younger generation of translators soon to arrive on the scene and from many literary and cultural critics later.

Lin Shu’s translation was free, in the freest sense of the term; all he needed was to hear the gist of a line or passage from his collaborator and he would let his mind search in his vast stock of Chinese idioms to find the most expressive “equivalents,” regardless of whether they were loaded with historical and cultural specific connotations. A sampling of the Chinese titles (in *pinyin* and English notations, for the purpose here) Lin Shu gave to the translated works would indicate that Lin worked very much in the tradition of classical Chinese novels:

Uncle Tom’s Cabin

heinu hutian lu
black slave crying out heaven recorded

Ivanhoe

sakexun jiehou yingxiong lue
Saxons post-ordeal heroic story

Les Misérables

gu xing lei
lone star tears

Old Curiosity Shop

xiaonu *nai'er* *zhuan*
 filial daughter enduring son biographies

Oliver Twist

zei *shi*
 thieves history

David Copperfield

kuairou *yusheng* *lu*
 a piece of flesh staying alive record

Ghosts

mei *nie*
 venereal sins

He wouldn't even mind rendering several plays by Shakespeare and Ibsen into novels as long as they would make good reads. However, being a Chinese man of letters, the long tradition of *wen yi zai dao* [writing as vehicle for the way—although the exact meaning of the way, i.e., moral message, changes with the times] being in his DNA, Lin Shu could not have helped being fired up by an enormous sense of responsibility during a time when China's future was much in doubt. Viewed from that angle, Lin Shu's translation of Western literature would be more than a diversion from personal losses, a need to escape to exotic time and place, but served a sociopolitical—and moral—purpose too, whether such a purpose was explicit or not. And indeed, in almost every one of the prefaces to his translations, Lin would give his take on the subject matter addressed by the foreign text. For example, after giving a brief history of slavery in the United States in his "Translator's Note" to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Lin Shu went on to make a connection between the plights of the blacks and the Chinese:²²

[T]he yellow people [in the United States] are probably treated worse than the blacks. But our country's power is weak, and our convoys are cowardly and afraid of arguing with the Americans. Furthermore no educated person has recorded what has happened, and I have no way to gain factual knowledge. The only precedent I can rely on is *A Black Slave's Cry to Heaven* [Uncle Tom's Cabin].

... In this book the miseries of the blacks are depicted in detail. This is not because I am especially versed in depicting sadness; I am merely transcribing what is contained in the original work. And the prospect of the imminent demise of the yellow race has made me even sadder.²³ [ellipses added]

For those who had any “erroneous illusion” about the white race, Lin Shu suggested, *A Black Slave’s Cry to Heaven* “should serve as a warning.”

Such sociopolitical as well as literary commentaries are present in almost all of his translator’s notes or prefaces. From today’s point of view some of these commentaries are somewhat off the mark, but they do reflect a considerable level of social consciousness on his part as a literary translator. In the preface to his translation of *Oliver Twist*, Lin states that if Dickens had not described the social ills in his novel no one would have suspected them existent in such a powerful country being admired by all countries around the globe:

And yet the reason for England’s strength lies in its ability to accept good advice and reform accordingly. If we Chinese could also accept good advice and reform ourselves, it would also be easy for our society to change. What I regret is that there is no one like Dickens who can cite age-old malpractices and dramatize them in novels in order to inform the governments of their existence. If there were, the transformation of the Chinese society might be possible.²⁴

Nonetheless, thanks to his sometimes indiscriminate choice of Western literature to translate, the quasi-classical style he used for his translations, and particularly his later about-face turn to conservative stance in politics, a younger generation of activist/writer/translators had to “slay” this literary father of theirs when they arrived on the scene, although many of them, for example, Lu Xun and his brother Zhou Zuoren, Guo Moruo, had grown up reading Lin Shu’s translations and were heavily influenced by him.

Indeed trans-created Western texts, literary and otherwise, had acquired a rather broad readership and were quite in vogue among the educated during the late Qing years. To join the elite ranks of those few who could translate foreign texts, one would have to learn foreign languages first, as remarked by a man of letters character in *Niehai hua* [A Flower in the Sea of Sins], a major historical and political novel published in 1903:

The way I see it, one would be best served if one could read foreign languages directly. Then, one would know the real reasons underlying the wealth and power of foreign countries. One would also be able to learn about sound, light, chemistry, electricity, and the manufacturing of ships, guns, and cannons. To have learnt all of this is to have acquired a true way of life.²⁵

An irony worth noting is that Kang Youwei, known for his fervent admiration of the West, based on his exposure to translations of Western books, would become quite disillusioned after extensive travel to Europe and the United States during his exile years after the aborted Hundred Days Reform. In fact he made an about-face turn and became an arch-conservative and zealously supported the restoration of the monarchy and old Confucian ideology dominated dynasty.

For a while Liang Qichao parted ways with his intellectual and political mentor and supported the republican revolution led by Sun Yat-sen. However, as the result of a trip to the United States in 1903, Liang became disillusioned with the ability of the Chinese people to reform and renew, so he rejoined his mentor in the conservative cause of establishing a constitutional monarchy.

Yan Fu, whose translations of Huxley, Mill, and Spencer had inspired so many, including Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and provided them with sorely needed ideological tools in their campaigns for sociopolitical and institutional reforms, would make the same about-face turn politically. And like Kang and Liang, Yan Fu joined the cause of restoring the old monarchy and went so far as to support warlords who put the imperial crown on their own heads.

“STURM UND DRANG”

To bring China into the modern era, one would have to wait for the republican revolution in 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who had been educated in Hawaii and Hong Kong and influenced by Abraham Lincoln’s ideals of government of the people, by the people, and for the people. The revolution did succeed in overthrowing the last emperor of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) but failed to lead to a strong and united China as many had hoped. The future looked rather bleak again when, with the death of Yuan Shikai (1916), the military strongman turned first president of republican China, the country fragmented into several pieces, each controlled by a warlord supported by a foreign power. The ensuing years were a time of chaos, a time when “all sorts of ideological conceptions, movements, fads, and experiments bubbled forth, stimulated by the strenuous political events of the period,” which led to the May Fourth Movement (1917–19) and ushered in a new era of Chinese history.”²⁶

There is not much dispute over the direct cause of what is known since as the May Fourth Movement.²⁷ During the course of the First World War, the Republic of China, newly established after the

demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and still weak, joined the Allied Triple Entente in 1917 with the condition that all German controlled areas, such as the Shandong Peninsula, would be returned to China. However, instead of rewarding China for its contributions to the victory,²⁸ the Allies at the Versailles Conference, led by the United States, yielded to Japan’s territorial demands out of geopolitical calculations: the West needed Japan, which had adopted rather aggressive, expansionist foreign policies, to counterbalance Russia where the Bolshevik had just won victory.²⁹ Outraged by the betrayal and the weakness of the Chinese government, thousands of Beijing students took to the streets to protest. They were soon joined by tens of thousands of workers, merchants, teachers and people from all walks of life and the protests spread to Shanghai and more than 100 other cities across the country. Although the month-long protests and boycotts (of Japanese products) didn’t achieve all of the goals, they did force the Chinese government to refuse to sign on the Treaty of Versailles.

The disagreements scholars of the May Fourth Movement have had are over interpretations of its historical significance. Many in the “canon” have celebrated May Fourth as “the awakening movement of radical iconoclasm, revolution, humanism, science and democracy, progress, individualism, and nationalism—a Chinese Enlightenment or Renaissance.” Others, however, while not denying the rich contributions of the May Fourth Movement, have argued, essentially, that the historical and cultural significance of the event had been exaggerated and oversimplified at the expense of intrinsic development in the native culture, and that the transformation of literature and language was already underway during the nineteenth century and would have occurred, albeit at a slower pace, without the catalyst of Western ideas.³⁰

A more tenable view, it seems, would be that forces of change within the Chinese culture had been long at work. They could be traced as far back as to the time when the first religious delegation was sent out to seek true Buddhist scriptures in the “West” in 65 AD, the millennium-long project having had transformative impact on Chinese culture, literature, and language. In fact it could be argued that the Chinese culture and literature had not stopped changing and evolving even during the most “stagnant” periods, when the Confucian ideology held hegemonic power over the society. Even *baihua*, or *baihua wen* [writings in the vernacular Chinese], a hallmark of the New Literature, didn’t suddenly burst on the literary scene as a direct result of the catalyzing influence of Western literature. The first

baihua prose novel appeared at least a few centuries earlier, during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The most significant of the Ming novels are *Sanguo yanyi* [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 1321–23], *Shuihu* [Water Margin, mid-1500s], and *Xiyou ji* [The Monkey King, or Journey to the West, 1590s]. The revolutionary change during the first decades of the twentieth century “would have been very difficult,” Fitzgerald contends, “and perhaps far longer delayed if there had not already existed a literature in *baihua*, which enjoyed an established popularity, particularly among the common people.”³¹

To further complicate things, the term *baihua*, when applied to the May Fourth Movement, as Lydia H. Liu cautions, should not be confused with the *baihua* used by the Ming prose fiction that has just been referred to. The *baihua* of the May Fourth Movement, a new medium for writing, is actually “an extraordinary hybrid form deriving from at least four main sources: 1) *wen-yen* [*wenyan*, Classical Chinese], 2) premodern written vernacular Chinese speech (based on the northern dialects of the past, 3) contemporary colloquial speech (Mandarin or northern dialects), 4) European or Japanese loan words, neologisms, syntactical structures.” It is on that basis that modern *baihua wen* “can be taken to refer to a rich variety of linguistic and stylistic innovations in modern Chinese and to forms of writing that attempt to embody modern, and largely urban, experience in a highly hybridized language of native and foreign sources.”³²

Indeed, the inflow of Western ideas that began before the Opium War, through the agency of Jesuit missionaries and merchants, but gathered momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century, provided not just the catalyst, but seminal ideas and basic instruments for transformative changes. It would be hard to imagine the Hundred Days Reform, the 1911 Revolution, or the May Fourth Movement, without the gushing in of Western ideas, via translation, without the massive transfusion of fresh, foreign blood into the body politic of China, so to speak, during those decades. And without the ground-shaking attempts at reform and revolution, and indeed without the continued influx of Western ideas, the rise of China today as a powerful modern nation would be unimaginable although, granted, the march to modernity has never been smooth and has been punctuated with false starts and pitfalls as China continues to negotiate between preserving its essential Chinese identity and modernizing all facets of its social, cultural, and material life, a rather precarious, perilous balancing act indeed.

The standard bearers of the May Fourth or New Culture Movement were a younger generation of activist/writer/translators. These were passionate, idealistic young men who were being or had been educated

at Euro-American universities, or at least were receiving Westernized education in the newly modernized Japan, having been exposed to both Western intellectual traditions and current trends (e.g., democracy, anarchism, pragmatism, Marxism) and literature. For them, as for Yan Fu and Liang Qichao of the earlier reform-minded generation, translating Western texts was much more than a pure literary act; it was, rather, the forefront of a campaign to wake up and enlighten the Chinese people—who, they thought, had slumbered in the “iron house,” to cite Lu Xun, too long—for national survival; it was front and center of a campaign to create a new Chinese culture liberated from the confines of traditions. A critical difference this younger generation had with their immediate precursors is that they came in such strength and volume and velocity and that they were so much fierier, more iconoclastic, and uncompromising that it was a Chinese “*Sturm und Drang*” indeed, only that what was at stake was not just unbound, unhindered personal expressions, but more importantly, the survival of a nation.

The first shot of this New Culture Movement was fired by Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), the founder of *Xin qingnian* [the *New Youth* magazine, 1915] and later the New Youth Society (1920). Born in a wealthy family, Chen Duxiu received traditional Chinese education (his own grandfather tutored him in Chinese classics such as the Four Books) early on, but did not have much luck with imperial exams. So he turned to pursue a more modern education first in China, and then in Japan, where he soon embraced Western ideals of democracy, equality, and science.³³ What China needed to save itself, Chen Duxiu came to believe, was not the “old and rotten” relics of Confucianism, but *de xiansheng* [Mr. Democracy] and *sai xiansheng* [Mr. Science], as he later wrote for the *New Youth* magazine: “We are convinced at present that only those two gentlemen can cure the dark maladies in Chinese politics, morality, learning and thought.”³⁴

In 1915, not long after returning to China, Chen Duxiu issued the famous “Call to Youth” published in the inaugural issue of the *New Youth* magazine, which he framed in the by now familiar evolutionary concepts of natural selection and survival of the fittest. Lamenting how the Chinese admired the old whereas the Westerners admired the young, he went on to expound what youth, as opposed to age, meant to the society:³⁵

Youth is like early spring, like the rising sun, like trees and grass in bud, like a newly sharpened blade. It is the most valuable period of life. The function of youth in society is the same as that of a fresh and vital cell in a human body. In the processes of metabolism, the old

and the rotten are incessantly eliminated to be replaced by the fresh and living... If metabolism functions properly in a human body, the person will be healthy; if the old and rotten cells accumulate and fill the body, the person will die. If metabolism functions properly in a society, it will flourish; if old and rotten elements fill the society, then it will cease to exist.

He went on to call on the young people in China to be “independent, not servile,” “progressive, not conservative,” “aggressive, not retiring,” “cosmopolitan, not isolationist,” “utilitarian, not formalistic,” and “scientific, not fanciful.”

Among the many grand beliefs and ideals proclaimed in the manifesto for this inaugural issue of the radically new literary journal were the necessity of destroying the old in order to create the new, and a utopian vision of a future “ideal new era and new society,” which “are to be honest, progressive, positive, free, equal, creative, beautiful, kind, peaceful, full of universal love and mutual assistance, and pleasant labor; in short, happiness for the whole society.” The manifesto also issued a call “to give up the useless and irrelevant elements of traditional literature and ethics because we want to create those needed for the progress of the new era and new society.”³⁶

The *New Youth* magazine, which Chen Duxiu ran in the foreign concessions in Shanghai, became one of the earliest and most important platforms for translation of Western literature and a leading voice of the New Culture Movement. Among the translations published by the *New Youth* magazine from 1917 to 1921 are Ivan Turgenev’s *Torrents of Spring*, Oscar Wilde’s *An Ideal Husband*, *De Profundis*, *Lady Windermere’s Fan*, the Goncourt Brothers’ *Germinie Lacerteux*, Guy de Maupassant’s “Two Friends,” “Minuet,” “Madame Baptiste,” and “Monsieur Parent,” Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Little Match Girl,” and Anton Chekhov’s “The Darling” (or “Angel”).

The most noticeable work of the *New Youth* magazine, as far as translation of Western literature is concerned, is a Henrik Ibsen special issue in 1918, which included *Nora* (*A Doll’s House*) jointly translated by Hu Shi and Luo Jialun (a student of Beijing University then), *An Enemy of the People* translated by Tao Fugong, *Little Eyolf* translated by Wu Ruonan, a biography by Yuan Zhenying, and not the least, an article entitled “On Ibsenism” by Hu Shi. It was the first time in Chinese literary history that a special issue was devoted to a single author, foreign (Western) or Chinese.

More importantly, the translation of Ibsen in the *New Youth* (and hence his introduction to the Chinese readers) challenged traditional

Chinese literature and brought with it a new kind of literary tradition that was highly socially conscious yet would not compromise in artistic principles. Traditional Chinese literature, Luo Jialun complained in a *New Youth* magazine article, had not played any positive role in society:

Western literature is about human life whereas Chinese literature avoids human life as far as it could; Western literature is to arouse human sympathy whereas Chinese literature is so self-absorbed; Western literature is truth-seeking whereas Chinese literature is full of falsehood; Western literature is natural and about the common people whereas Chinese literature is aristocratic, affected; Western literature nurtures development of individuality whereas Chinese literature favors breathing through the noses of the ancestors.³⁷

Such unreserved adulation of Western literature at the expense of traditional Chinese literature may sound naïve and simplistic today, yet back then such unmitigated zeal was needed to push forward the literary revolution deemed a critical and central part of the New Culture Movement.

For Hu Shi, who was culturally and literarily as iconoclastic as Chen Duxiu and others at the time, introducing Ibsen to China was not too different from introducing a newer, sharper tool in diagnosing the ills of Chinese society. For him, Ibsen stood for a kind of hard-eyed realism that refused to “cater to the greatest human weakness, people’s inherent reluctance to confront the truth about themselves and their society”:

Ibsen described actual social and familial conditions in order to move readers, to make us feel how dark and corrupt our families and society are and to make us understand that our families and society must be reformed—this is what is meant by Ibsenism. . . . Ibsen knows that society’s diseases are many and complex and there is no panacea, so he can only take a blood test, describe the illness, and let each patient seek out his or her own medicine.³⁸ [ellipses added]

Indeed, not only the subject matter of the translations published in the *New Youth* was revolutionary, for example, gender roles and other social problems in Ibsen’s plays, but also the style with which such translations was rendered. Whereas Lin Shu before them preferred the elegance of quasi-classical, belle-lettristic prose in translation (and in writing his fiery articles in the culture war he would be engaged in, albeit reluctantly and on the losing side), the younger generation

favored the much plainer style of *baihua* to reach much broader audiences, among other things. Since the younger generation of activist/writer/translators, almost to a person, had had the benefit of formal education in Europe or America or Westernized schools in Japan, fluent in English, French, German, or Japanese, their translation tended to be much less “freewheeling” than Lin Shu’s, and much more faithful to the original not only in content but also, as in the case of Lu Xun and others, in style, for example, using somewhat “Europeanized” syntax in their renditions.

A note is in order here about Japan as a source of influence on the New Culture Movement. It may seem odd that in a book about Western literature in China, the neighbor to its northeastern shores has appeared rather frequently. This can be justified, to a degree, by a definition of the term “West” as understood and typically used today, not as a geographical term, but as a geopolitical term in the discourse of international relations. A more pertinent explanation, however, would be the fact that during the early decades of the twentieth century, Japan, a newly modernized (or Westernized) country, proved quite a shortcut for many Chinese to receiving a Western-style education. In the academic year of 1906–07, for example, more than ten thousand young Chinese were studying in Japan. Among the tens of thousands studying medicine, English, French, Western literature, and other subjects in Japan were Lu Xun and his brother Zhou Shuren and Guo Moruo, who would play key roles in the New Culture Movement.

In addition to the geographical proximity, Japan proved attractive thanks to the long cultural and linguistic kinship. The Japanese language, which had borrowed significantly from Chinese and was still using many *kanji* [Chinese-character] words in the writing system and in translation of Western texts, was much easier to learn. Many, such as Liang Qichao, who had fled to Japan after the Hundred Days Reform had aborted, could acquire enough proficiency to live, read, and translate within months of setting foot on the island country. Since many of the most important Western texts (originally written in French, German, Russian, as well as English) already had Japanese translations, Liang Qichao encouraged his like-minded expatriates to translate the Japanese translations of the Western texts—secondhand translations, indeed—as an expedient way to access Western ideas. And this was what many young Chinese students did. Such secondhand translations, according to Lydia H. Liu, proved “a convenient way of appropriating and disseminating Western knowledge from a third party.”³⁹

A particularly interesting phenomenon of such second-hand translations, a bonus indeed, is that a sizable number of Chinese words, which had been borrowed by the Japanese in the long past and had been very recently used in Japanese renditions of Western texts, now found their way back to China through secondhand translations; these words that were now finding their way back home, so to speak, loaded with newly acquired meanings, were put to new use as approximate “equivalents” to Western concepts. Such “Sino-Japanese-European hybrids” or neologisms, for example, *guoji* [international], *jingji* [economy], *geming* [revolution], are close to two thousand in total, which injected quite a bit of fresh energy into the Chinese language and helped give it a new life.

Gathered under the banner of the *New Youth* magazine were some of the boldest vanguards of the New Culture Movement. One of the early trailblazers of the movement is Hu Shi (also Hu Shih, 1892–1962), who has been mentioned a few times already. Though iconoclastic in matters of culture and literature at the time, Hu Shi’s ideas for literary revolution were as deeply rooted in his intimate knowledge of the Chinese classics as they were profoundly shaped by the Western culture—its philosophy and literature—that he came to admire passionately. Born in a scholarly family, his father being a Neo-Confucianist, Hu Shi grew up being drilled in the canon of Chinese classics. A voracious reader when growing up, Hu often let himself loose in the fictitious world of *baihua* classic novels, for example, *Water Margin*, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, *A Dream of Red Mansions*, and as a result he acquired a quite impressive facility of the vernacular without much conscious effort. This language facility enabled him to assume the editorship of a newspaper in Shanghai at the young age of 15.

It was while studying in Shanghai that Hu Shi stumbled upon Yan Fu’s translations of Huxley, Mill, and Spencer, as well as Liang Qichao’s essays on Western history and thought. The impact was so electrifying that Hu changed his given name from *Sumen* to *Shi* (meaning “fit,” as in the concept of “survival of the fittest”). Liang Qichao’s ideas of new citizenship and his illuminating studies of history inspired Hu Shi as he developed a life-long passion for historical studies and for renewing Chinese literature through learning from the West.

Like some of the best and brightest of his generation, Hu Shi won a Boxer Indemnity scholarship⁴⁰ to the United States and hence had the good fortune of studying at Cornell University (first in the College of Agriculture and then in the College of Arts and Sciences to study philosophy) and Columbia University, where he pursued advanced studies in philosophy. Hu Shi completed his PhD dissertation under

the supervision of John Dewey, a prominent philosopher and one of the key expounders of pragmatism. Later, while a professor at Beijing University, Hu Shi invited Dewey to lecture in China, a lecture tour that would last for almost two years (1919–20). For Hu Shi, the new cultural and literary revolution he and others had launched to free “Chinese thought of the bondage of the classical style” and to create “a new literature of the spoken tongue” was but “the practical application of evolution and pragmatism.” Indeed, according to Wing-Tsit Chan, much of the spirit of the literary revolution, or intellectual renaissance, as Hu envisioned, came from pragmatism, for example, the emphasis on problems (instead of theories), the insistence on results, the treatment of ideas as instruments to cope with actual situations, the critical approach, and the scientific method.⁴¹

In 1917, while still studying at Columbia University, Hu Shi sounded the first call for literary revolution in an essay published in the *New Youth* magazine. In this essay Hu proposed an “eight-point programme for a reform of literature,” which takes the form of eight don’ts:

1. Don’t write anything that is “without substance.”
2. Don’t write anything which is “groaning without being sick.”
3. Don’t use clichés and worn-out phrases.
4. Don’t use classical allusions.
5. Don’t pay attention to parallelism—prose should not be written in four- or six-character form, poetry should not be written with rhyme and meter.
6. Don’t write without following grammar.
7. Don’t imitate ancients.
8. Don’t avoid colloquial words and phrases.⁴²

Although there is disagreement as to the degree and depth of his indebtedness to the literary trends of the West at the time, more specifically, the influence of the imagist movement in the United States led by Ezra Pound, the correspondence between Hu’s “eight-point programme” and Pound’s “A Few Don’t’s” (published in the first issue of *Poetry* in March 1913) is striking and hard to miss:

1. Use no superfluous word, no adjective, which does not reveal something.
2. Go in fear of abstractions. Do not re-tell in mediocre verse what has already been done in good prose.

3. Don't allow “influence” to mean merely that you mop up the particular decorative vocabulary of some one or two poets whom you happen to admire.
4. Use either no ornament or good ornament.
5. Naturally, your rhythmic structure should not destroy the shape of your words, or their natural sound, or their meaning.

There is also a striking correspondence to Amy Lowell's Imagist Credo stated in the preface of the anthology *Some Imagist Poets* published in April 1915. The credo consists of six principles which, Lowell believed, “are essentials of all great poetry, indeed of all great literature.” These principles, in essence, are as follows:

1. To use the language of common speech, but employ always the exact word, not the nearly-exact, not the merely decorative.
2. To create new rhythms—as the expression of new moods—and not to copy old rhythms, which echo only old moods.
3. To allow absolute freedom in the choice of subject.... We believe passionately in the artistic value of modern life....
4. To present an image (hence the name, “Imagist”). We are not a school of painters, but we believe poetry should render particulars exactly and not in vague generalities.
5. To produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite.
6. Finally, most of us believe that concentration is of the very essence of poetry. [ellipses added]

Hu Shi, a voracious reader of poetry, fiction, as well as philosophy and history, had dabbled in poetry writing in English even when a student of agriculture at Cornell University. He had also experimented in imagist poetry while studying at Columbia University in New York. One of such poems is a free verse about a night outing on the Hudson River, hearing “the slow waves beat against the metropolitic shores,” and seeing the symbol of freedom:

There—
 Pedestalled upon a sphere of radiancy,
 One light stands forth pre-eminent.
 And my comrade whispers to me,
 “There is ‘Liberty’!”⁴³

More significantly, Hu Shi had had entries in his diary noting the main principles of the imagist movement. Therefore, there is no mistaking the indebtedness of Hu Shi's program for literary revolution to the imagist movement raging in the realms of American literature at the time, although the extent and depth of the indebtedness may not be easy to ascertain. It would be interesting to note that one of the important sources of inspiration for the imagist movement, particularly for Pound, was classic Chinese poetry, of which Hu Shi had massive and intimate knowledge.

Another possible source of influence for Hu Shi is Renaissance in Europe, the humanistic revival of arts and literature and architecture between the fourteenth century and the sixteenth century that transformed the entire continent. It'd be hard to imagine Hu Shi completing his studies at Cornell University as a student of philosophy without having taken any compulsory or selective course(s) in the history of Western philosophy or classic modern philosophy or philosophers, which would inevitably cover the Renaissance period. Indeed it'd be hard to imagine Hu Shi not having been introduced to the Renaissance, as some scholars seem to suggest, until as late as 1917 when he noted in his diary, on his way back to China (having completed his doctoral studies in philosophy at Columbia University), his reading of Edith Helen Sichel's *Renaissance* (H. Holt and company, 1914). What is clear from his diary entry is that he thought that there was much to draw from the European movement to effect a revival of Chinese literature. In that same diary entry Hu Shi particularly noted how critical the development of the vernaculars (such as Italian) for the various nations, as opposed to the classical Latin (the *lingua franca*), was to the birth of national literatures and their significant achievements such as Dante's *Divine Comedy*.⁴⁴

It is from these Western as well as Chinese literary and intellectual sources that Hu Shi drew ideas to hopefully effect a renaissance of Chinese literature. One of such ideas is translation of Western literature using *baihua*, the living, spoken language of the people because, he declared, "the Chinese classical style was already a dead language two thousand years ago:"

The vernacular style not only is an instrument for 'enlightening the people's minds,' but also is the only instrument for the creation of Chinese literature. The vernacular style is not a bone fit only to feed the underdog, but a treasure which the people of the entire country should appreciate.⁴⁵

There is also an aesthetic side to his preference of *baihua*:

In other words, *pai-hua* [*baihua*] is more beautiful than *wen-yen* [*wenyan*, the classical style]. The aim of the literary and language revolution is on the one hand to create *pai-hua* or *kuo-yu wen-hsueh* ([literature in a national vernacular language] and on the other hand, to create a *wen-hsueh kuo-yu* [a national vernacular language which may be used as literary medium]).⁴⁶

Hu Shi believed that “*pai-hua* is a gift from our ancestors, our forefathers, who used their vernacular to tell stories, which later were compiled into novels. The vitality of a language is due to the common people. Our present *pai-hua* is given us by these common people, and not created by professors.” Like Liang Qichao before him, Hu Shi believed that novels were great teachers and standardizers of language. Moreover, Hu did not think much of the classical regulated verse forms which, he felt, had little value because it was “restricted by strict rules of prosody” and whatever beauty such poetry had was not too different from the perverted “beauty” of bound feet.

In April, 1918, Hu Shi published in the *New Youth* magazine his famous essay “On a Constructive Literary Revolution,” whose main theme, as stated by Hu Shi, can be summed up in four words, “Vernacular literature, literary vernacular.” “The literary revolution we advocate,” Hu Shi explained,

aims only at the creation of a vernacular literature for China. Only after there is a vernacular literature can there be a literary vernacular. Only after there is a literary vernacular can our vernacular become the real national spoken language. . . . [ellipses added]⁴⁷

Translation of Western literature would provide the fresh ideas and forms critical for the creation of a new vernacular literature and the literary vernacular. It is from an evolutionary, pragmatic, as well as historical point of view that Hu Shih, along with other iconoclastic young writer translators, rejected not only Lin Shu’s translations of many “second-rate” authors but also the quasi-classical style he and Yan Fu had so perfected. The younger generation of writer translators would instead devote their energies to such first-rate Western writers as Victor Hugo, de Maupassant, Zola, Balzac, Dickens, Hardy, Shakespeare, Shaw, Goethe, Heine, Dante, Cervantes, Ibsen, Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov, Twain, Whitman, O’Neill, among others.⁴⁸

Hu Shi's total output in translation is not voluminous. In addition to co-translation of *A Doll's House*, he translated a dozen or so short stories by Alphonse Daudet, de Maupassant, August Strindberg, Anton Chekhov, O. Henry, Bret Harte, all possibly based on texts in the *Harvard Classics* (1909), as well as Lord Byron's poem "The Isles of Greece." *Harvard Classics*, all 50 volumes in the series, was among the books Hu Shi bought during his first year as a student in the United States, which he would read and review quite often.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, Hu Shi's spearheading, instrumental role during the New Culture Movement, especially the literary revolution, was second to none. Temperamentally and intellectually, Hu Shi was a revolutionary only in so far as culture and literature were concerned. He was more comfortable with the role of a scholar, who, bold yet meticulously attentive to detail, drew from the West whatever was pragmatically useful for the revival of his native culture, and had an aversion to violent revolutions. Which would explain why not long into the New Culture and New Literature Movement he parted company with Chen Duxiu and others, who had turned more radical in their politics, retreated to, or remained in, to be more accurate, the "ivory tower" of literary studies, and tried to stay as far away from politics as possible, albeit not always successfully.

Iconoclastic yet a skeptic temperamentally and intellectually, Lu Xun (pen name for Zhou Shuren, also Lu Hsun, 1881–1936), was a fiery, sharp-witted, albeit oftentimes reluctant, warrior with a touch of cynicism about him. Though deified as the greatest writer in modern Chinese history, Lu Xun has often been (ab)used atrociously by various political and ideological camps at various times in the turbulent political life of modern China. More recently, especially since the end of the 1990s, his "deified" status has been challenged by a few "rash" young writers (compelled by a need to slay their literary ancestors, perhaps). Indeed his literary fortune has been undergoing a critical reappraisal by even cool-headed, "well-intentioned" Lu Xun scholars. Nonetheless, Lu Xun's position as a major player and a most fearless, prominent standard-bearer during the New Culture Movement remains firm.

Like many of his generation, Lu Xun was well grounded in the Chinese classics but did not follow the usual path to join the elite scholar-official class by way of imperial exams. Hearing the call to strengthen China by learning practical, Western knowledge and skills, Lu Xun left his hometown in Zhejiang province in 1898 and went to Nanjing to study science, geology, German, and other modern subjects first at the Jiangnan Naval Academy and then at the School of

Railways and Mines. It was during the five-year stay in Nanjing that Lu Xun, a voracious reader, came in contact with Yan Fu’s translations in social sciences, Lin Shu’s translations of Western literature, as well as Liang Qichao’s reform-oriented polemics. It was an eye-opening experience for young Lu Xun. He would recall years later how wonderstruck he was when reading for the first time Yan Fu’s translation of Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics* and other books:

Ah! The world once produced a man like Huxley, who sat in his study and thought such refreshing thoughts. Thus as I read on breathlessly, ‘survival of the fittest,’ ‘natural selection,’ Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics all appeared one by one.⁵⁰

Lu Xun left for Japan in 1902 on a government scholarship. Having acquired language proficiency in two years Lu Xun began his medical studies at the Sendai Provincial Medical School to help cure the physical ills of his weak and sickly countrymen. While taking such required courses as biology and chemistry in preparation for a medical career, Lu Xun kept up his broad-ranged extracurricular reading and became fascinated with the philosophies of Schopenhauer (1788–1860), Kierkegaard (1813–55), and Nietzsche (1844–1900), among others. He must have been struck by Schopenhauer’s belief in the powers of intuition, the irrational, and the blind will (instead of human spirit, intellect, and reason) as the absolute master of human destiny, by Kierkegaard’s belief in the individual (as opposed to the collective) “existing before God,” albeit a rather lonely and miserable state of being verging on despair, and especially by Nietzsche’s belief in the modern world having devolved into a meaningless, Godless state, from which only the ideal man, the “superman,” indeed, who has truly mastered his own will, passion, and entire being, can save. This would help explain why Lu Xun would appear to be a reluctant warrior of sort, both during the New Culture and New Literature Movement and thereafter; the fierce, selfless, and uncompromising champion that he was, in the manner of a Nietzschean superman, or the Byronic hero, driven by his passionate worry about the future of China, Lu Xun would often fall into bitter despair, having no confidence in human nature and having not much hope for the common masses that he was willing to sacrifice his own life fighting for.

The story of how Lu Xun gave up medicine after seeing a news reel and returned to his first love, literature, is well-known,⁵¹ but it is important to note that the decision was not that easy and was tempered with quite a bit of skepticism, a gnawing sense of futility. When

he was invited to write for the newly founded *New Youth* magazine, Lu Xun felt reluctant, sensing the futility of doing anything at all:

Imagine an iron house without windows, absolutely indestructible, with many people fast asleep inside who will soon die of suffocation. But you know since they will die in their sleep, they will not feel the pain of death. Now if you cry aloud to wake a few of the lighter sleepers, making those unfortunate few suffer the agony of irrevocable death, do you think you are doing them a good turn?⁵²

However, what if those few awake would rise and start to destroy the iron house? Lu Xun did hang on to that thread of hope, despite his profound sense of loneliness and despair, and gave his best cry, “sad, repellent or ridiculous” cry that it was.

Lu Xun is one of the few among the standard-bearers whose achievements in either translation of Western literature or creative writing in the vernacular would have secured him a permanent place in the history of modern Chinese culture. Lu Xun, along with his brother Zhou Zuoren (1885–1967), another brilliant translator and writer of the May Fourth period, might have gotten into translation of Western literature to earn some money to help with their financial situation because the government scholarship was barely enough to cover the brothers’ expenses in Japan. It is not too hard to imagine the thrill the two brothers experienced when their first joint translation, *The World’s Desire* (a fantasy novel by H. Rider Haggard and Andrew Lang), was sold to the big Commercial Press and earned them 200 dollars.⁵³ It may also be true that Lu Xun’s selection of Western literature to translate was limited by what had already been translated, by what was already available to readers, and by the fact that he knew German and Japanese but no English or French. However, that alone could not explain why Lu Xun focused on Russian and eastern European authors and on literature of the “oppressed peoples.” The fiction, drama, and poetry of the *ruoxiao minzu* [small and weak peoples] had a special appeal to the Zhou brothers and other translators of the time because these literatures “explored new literary techniques and themes, and experimented with language directed at as wide an audience as possible.” For Lu Xun and others, “works that dealt with social injustice and oppression, national identity and emancipation, the urban poor and the toiling peasants were particularly attractive.”⁵⁴

Of the many writers from the literatures of the “small and weak peoples,” three proved the most appealing to Lu Xun: Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), a romantic poet and playwright who devoted his life

fighting for Polish independence from the Russian Empire, Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846–1916), who received the Nobel Literature Prize in 1905 for his epic historical novels recapturing Polish heroism against foreign dominations, and Sándor Petőfi (1823–49), whose poems might have inspired the Revolution of 1848 to free Hungary from the Habsburg rule. These three, along with Byron, Shelley, and Pushkin, were inspiring “superman-like” role models for Lu Xun.⁵⁵ They were among the first Western writers he translated.

In his essay “*Moluo shili shuo*” [On the Power of Mara Poetry], a sort of literary manifesto published in June 1908, Lu Xun reviewed some of the ancient civilizations, for example, Indian, Egyptian, Iranian, that had lapsed because they had basked in the past glories for too long and hadn’t continued to evolve and develop, and lamented the sorry, pitiable state China found itself in. He went on to explain why he borrowed the term “Mara” (“celestial demon”) from India, which meant Satanic or Byronic hero in Europe:

I apply it to those, among all the poets, who were committed to resistance, whose purpose was action but who were little loved by their age; and I introduce their words, deeds, ideas, and the impact of their circles, from the sovereign Byron to a Magyar (Hungarian) man of letters. Each of the group had distinctive features and made his nation’s qualities splendid, but their general bent was the same: few would create conformist harmonies, but they’d blow an audience to its feet, these iconoclasts, whose spirit struck deep chords in later generations, extending to infinity.⁵⁶

And for Lu Xun, the future of China lay in abandoning the old ways and adopting the Western trends of “constant innovation in thought and action” so that it could stand tall on earth again.

In the meantime, Lu Xun was also attracted by Russian writers, especially Gogol’s ironic representation of reality and Andreyev’s psychological realism. The bitter satire that permeates the rather pessimistic works of Gogol, such as the short story “Diary of a Madman,” the play *The Government Inspector* (1836), and the novel *Dead Souls* (1842), seemed to strike a strong emotional and philosophical chord with Lu Xun. Andreyev’s stories and plays are filled with melancholy, irrationality, hysteria, despair as well as bitter protest of social injustice and oppressions. All of these would have notable influence on Lu Xun when he set to write his own short stories.

For his entire literary career, Lu Xun translated over 200 titles by 100 or so authors from 14 countries, with a total output of more than 3 million words.⁵⁷

In addition to contributing to the *New Youth* magazine, edited by Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi, Lu Xun started a literary society of his own in 1925, *Weiming she* [The Unnamed Society] whose primary mission was to publish and promote literary translations by patriotic and promising young writers. Although it was formed rather late in the New Culture and New Literature Movement and it was among the smallest of such literary organizations, its members were talented and hard workers and had an impressive show for their work. Among their translations were Gogol's "The Overcoat," Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*, Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Stevenson's *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, Chekhov's *The Boor and the Three Sisters*, and Dostoevsky's *The Insulted and the Injured*.

Another important literary society during the New Culture and New Literature Movement, the largest and most active on the literary scene, is *Wenxue yanjiu hui* [Chinese Literary Association] which was inaugurated in 1921. Its founding members such as Mao Dun, Ye Shengtao, Zheng Zhenduo, Zhou Zuoren, and more than a dozen others, were among the most prominent writers, translators, and critics in modern Chinese literary history. The association took over *Xiaoshuo yuebao* [Short Story Monthly], which was created in 1910 and published by the Commercial Press, and launched it again with a completely new mission and focus:

[T]ranslation of fiction by well-known Western writers, introduction of recent trends in world literature, and discussion of directions for Chinese literary revolution. . . . Translation of works by well-known Western authors will not be limited to a particular country or style, open to narrative, dramatic, and poetic works—all three.⁵⁸ [ellipsis added]

However, the association was particularly interested in literature of the "realism" (or "art for life's sake") tradition and Russian literature. Mao Dun (penname for Shen Yanbing, 1896-1981), the leading figure of the association, would write a year later, once again emphasizing the importance of translation of Western literature:

Literary translation and creative writing are equally important. In countries such as our own where there is yet no mature *ren de wenxue* [literature for humanity], translation is particularly important because without it what else could we use to cure the impoverished souls and remedy the flawed human nature?

Mao Dun made a list of 21 foreign authors that had the top priority as translation projects, including Zola, Gogol, de Maupassant, Chekhov, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and 43 works, such as *A Doll's House* and *War*

and Peace, with an emphasis on realism, naturalism, Russian literature, as well as literature of the “insulted and oppressed peoples.” For the year 1920 alone Mao Dun translated more than 30 titles; for 1921, his translation grew to more than 50 titles. In the meantime, he was busy writing articles and essays commenting on Western authors and their works. During the years immediately after the May Fourth Movement, Mao Dun wrote and published about 100 such articles and essays, among them, “Tolstoy and Today’s Russia,” “Bernard Shaw and *Mrs. Warren’s Profession*,” “Suggestions for Introducing Western Literature in a More Organized and Efficient Manner,” “New Irish Literature: the Countercurrent in Modern Literature,” “Bjørnson: A Precursor of Realism in Norway,” “Ibáñez: The Quintessential Spanish Realist Author.”⁵⁹ He also engaged in spirited discussions, or debates, to be more exact, concerning translation theories, methods, and practices. Mao Dun’s achievements in creative writing were just as impressive. One of the most prestigious literature awards in China today is the Mao Dun Literature Prize, an annual award given to the best novel(s) published in mainland China.

During the eight years since the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese Literary Association, with at least 130 members and three publishing platforms (*Literature Biweekly*, *Literature Weekly* as well as *Short Story Monthly*), published about 186 books or chapbooks in foreign literature translations, with special issues for the literature of “the insulted and the oppressed” peoples, Russian literature, French literature, Tagore, anti-war, and so on. It played an instrumental role in translation and publication of Western literature and hence in nurturing the birth of a modern, new Chinese literature.

About the same time that the Chinese Literary Association was inaugurated, another important literary society was born, *Chuangzao she* [The Creation Society], which proved quite a formidable, high-achieving rival. Temperamentally as well as literarily the founders of the Creation Society, Guo Moruo (1892–1978), Chen Fangwu (1897–1984), Yu Dafu (1896–1945), and others, were quite different partly because they had not been involved with the *New Youth* magazine. In fact they disagreed with Hu Shi, Lu Xun, and Zhou Zuoren on many literary issues. Unlike Lu Xun and Mao Dun, the leading members of the Creation Society were particularly drawn to romanticism, symbolism, futurism, and expressionism instead of the more established realism or naturalism traditions. And their primary goal, in translation of Western literature, as indicated by the name of their association, was the creation of exciting new literature. As a result of the differences, Guo Moruo and other Creation Society members engaged in long,

spirited, occasionally nasty debates with Mao Dun and the Chinese Literary Association, which enlivened the literary scene and helped hasten the birth of a new modern Chinese literature.

Although his primary interest was in creative writing, a topic which will be addressed below, Guo Moruo was the author of some of the most important and influential translations of Western literature. While studying medicine at Kyushu Imperial University (today's Kyushu University) in Japan,⁶⁰ Guo finished the translation of Goethe's *Faust* (Part One), *The Sorrows of Young Werther*, and Omar Khayyam's long poem *The Rubaiyat*. Guo Moruo's choice of Goethe as one of his first translation projects was not accidental. He saw in Goethe, especially Goethe of the *Sturm und Drang* period, as an inspiration for the youth of the May Fourth Movement in their struggle to break free from the old cultural and literary traditions and to create a new culture and literature. It'd take him another 30 or so years to complete the translation of Part Two of *Faust* in 1947. His translation of *The Sorrows of Young Werther* struck such an emotional chord among the young readers at the time that within years of its publication it was reprinted more than 30 times by several publishers.⁶¹ Among other noteworthy Western literary works Guo Moruo translated during the 1920s were the complete plays by John Millington Synge, Galsworthy's *Strife*, *Justice*, *The Silver Box*, a collection of Shelley poems, Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and Sinclair's *King Coal* and *The Jungle*.

Other members of the Creation Society made important contributions too. Tian Han (1898–1968), for example, was among the first to translate Shakespeare into Chinese. His translation of *Hamlet* and *Romeo and Juliet* in *baihua* in the early 1920s were quite influential.⁶² Other members of the society, for example, Chen Fangwu, Yu Dafu, and Mu Mutian, all did their respective share of work on Western literature. The Creation Society ran three noticeable publications: *Creation Quarterly*, *Creation Weekly*, and *Creation Daily*. Their massive translations, impassioned creative writings, as well as the spirited debates with the Chinese Literary Association and others, injected quite a bit of vitality and excitement into the literary life of China at the time.

Other notable literary organizations among the tens of dozens include the *Xinyue she* [New Moon Society], *Taiyang she* [the Sun Society], *Yusi she* [the Yusi Society]. It was indeed a time when a "hundred schools of thought" contended and a "hundred flowers" bloomed. Each of these literary organizations claimed a group of talented young writers and translators; each had its own publications,

devoted to publishing translations of foreign literature. According to incomplete studies, in between 1917–27, about 500 translations of foreign literary works were published. The impact of such massive translations on the burgeoning new culture, and indeed, on the burgeoning sense of modernity in China, can only be imagined.

As far as translation of Western literature is concerned, the “hundred schools of thought” during this period fought battles over a few key issues, among them, selection of Western literature to translate, methods of translation (and hence the criteria for “good” translation), and dynamic relationships, indeed, tensions, between translation of Western literature and original, creative writing in the vernacular (as opposed to the stylized form and diction of the “dead” classics).

As alluded to earlier, the battle over what Western literature to translate was fought mainly between the more established, Realism-oriented *Wenxue yanjiu hui* [Chinese Literary Association] led by Mao Dun and the younger (temperamentally at least), bolder, and more Romantically bent *Chuangzao she* [the Creation Society] led by Guo Moruo.⁶³ It was ignited by a July 1922 letter to the editor of the *Short Story Monthly* (run by the Chinese Literary Association), which disagreed with the journal’s position that it would not be worthwhile to translate such heavyweight Western classics as *Faust*, *Divine Comedy*, and *Hamlet*, and argued, instead, for their translation because such works, though written a long while before, possessed “ever-lasting values.” Mao Dun, in the capacity of the journal’s editor, replied that translation of Western classics such as *Faust* “is not something urgently needed at this time. It’d be fine if such works were studied for personal pursuit of truth; however, to introduce them to the broad masses [via translation] would be a different matter and would have a rather low priority, given what is going on in the world today.”

This reply from Mao Dun proved just what Guo Moruo and others needed to vent some pent-up sentiments and to give expression to some long-held views. Guo’s response came toward the end of the month, published in another journal, which can be paraphrased as follows:

Literary studies, whether studies of individual authors or works, are completely a matter of personal choice and freedom. It is true that introduction of Western literature [to the broad masses] is a bit more complicated, involving three extra factors: (1) literary works; (2) introducers [translators]; (3) the readers. However, of the three, the introducer plays a pivotal role because he is entitled to choosing what literary works to introduce [to the broad masses] and because he has the responsibility of being a guide to the readers. If a translator

feels inspired (to a high level of creativity) by his choice of Western literary works and has deep and accurate appreciation of the texts, then, his translation is bound to have broad appeal and profound effect on the readers.

In such a case the translator will be more likely to perform his duty as the readers' guide with zeal and to the utmost of his abilities whereas the readers, on their part, will respond by becoming even more enthusiastic and interested in literature. Such translations are urgently needed regardless of times and circumstances, and are worthwhile.

Therefore, it'd be misguided to dismiss efforts to translate *Divine Comedy*, *Hamlet*, and *Faust* as time misspent. After all, whether a piece of literary work is good or bad has nothing to do with when it was written, but lies solely in whether it tastes rich or not and whether it rings true.

In a rejoinder published within days, Mao Dun laid out what he believed to be worthwhile and urgently needed literary endeavors, translation or original writing:

Mao Dun agrees, in principle, that everyone is entitled to study any literary works old and new, Chinese or foreign, and to introduce any such literary works following his own will, preference, and sense of importance and value. However, he wonders whether the translator should also be motivated by, or should be concerned with, the needs of the broad masses, and the ideal of "curing the ills of our times" [via literature].

Mao Dun states that he subscribes to the art for life's sake school because good literature should not only have aesthetic value but, more importantly, it should have something to say about eternal human nature and to inspire people to envision an ideal world in the future. He feels strongly that literature should function as a protest and correction of its times and that unless a writer is completely isolated from the society, and unless he is completely devoid of any sense of social sympathy and responsibility, he cannot help but protest the rottenness of his times through his works. The same is true with any translator: If he is disgusted with the rottenness around him, and the death of spirit, he should feel obligated to take on the worthwhile task of using foreign literature to lodge social protest and to awaken people's spirit.

Living in such sociopolitical conditions of our times, Mao Dun contends, being warm-blooded, but neither blind nor deaf, how can we not call for literature written in "blood and tears" to fight for the cause of freedom? The urgent task facing the writers and translators is to reform people so they become real human beings and it would

be completely irresponsible to indulge in one's own dreams of ideal beauty with so much rottenness and death of spirit around.

As is apparent, this battle was rooted in the seemingly polar opposite answers each side would give to the question: Why translate (and write) at all—to intervene in life (“art for life's sake”), as advocated and practiced by Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and others, which can be traced back to the long held belief in “writing as vehicle for the way,” or to give personal expressions, in the most pleasing literary form possible and of the artist's own choice (“art for art's sake”). Neither side won a clear victory from these debates because there were (and are) no simple, easy, straightforward answers to such complex questions. In fact, as they were drawn deeper into the debates, both sides, albeit occasionally, proved not above name calling and trash talk to score cheap points. Nonetheless, that should not take away from the serious nature and significance of the debates.

Such battles between “schools” or camps of divergent agendas and persuasions were not rare on the cultural and literary scene. A somewhat earlier battle had been fought between Lin Shu and writers and translators associated with the *New Youth* magazine. After Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu issued their call for literary revolution in 1917, one of the *New Youth* members, Qian Xuantong (1887–1939),⁶⁴ under the guise of a pseudonym, sent the *New Youth* magazine a letter to the editor in which he pretended to praise Lin Shu's translations for his facility in using the elegant style of Tang dynasty fiction to translate Western fiction stories, and for *xiang* [fragrant], *yan* [striking beauty], *qing* [love-struck] and many more such names (characteristic of cheesy traditional Chinese romantic stories) given to foreign characters. His co-conspirator, Liu Bannong (1891–1934),⁶⁵ responded right away, to stir things up, and denounced Lin Shu's translated texts as having not a shred of literary worth. Among Lin Shu's “literary offenses,” according to Liu Bannong, were his careless selection of foreign literary works, including completely worthless ones, for translation, his “bowdlerized” renditions filled with errors, and not the least, his use of the classical Tang dynasty prose, which, regrettably, was Lin Shu's worst “offense” because the translator was supposed to bring the style of the translated text as close to that of the foreign text as possible instead of imposing the style of the translator's culture upon it. In other words, Lin Shu should have been “faithful” to the source foreign texts in his renditions instead of “domesticating” them in such a heavy-handed manner.

After a few rounds of feigned, but earnest exchanges between Qian Xuantong and Liu Bannong, the heavyweights joined in and

threw more punishing punches. When Hu Shi in his famous “On a Constructive Literary Revolution” published in April 1918 called for translation of first-rate writers and works only and for use of *baihua* prose instead of the dead classical prose, he had Lin Shu very much on his mind. Hu Shi recommended that foreign literature scholars hold a national conference and come up with a five-year plan of sort for translation, which, for example, would include 100 best foreign novels, 500 short stories, 300 plays, and so on. The kind of “bowdlerization” of foreign texts, according to Hu Shi, as Lin Shu had apparently committed, was worse than not translating at all. Indeed, in Hu Shi’s eyes, Lin Shu turning Shakespearean plays into novels in classical prose was a big crime against the greatest English playwright.

Other younger *New Youth* members jumped in too and denounced Lin Shu’s translations as worthless distortions of the original foreign texts. They argued for selecting for translation socially oriented foreign literature that had truthful representation of human nature, such as Charles Dickens’ novels, to better serve the cause of social reforms. As to the style of translation, it had to be *baihua* because, they contended, it would be absolutely absurd to have a poor, illiterate Russian peasant speaking in belle-lettristic, quasi-classical Chinese, as was the case in Lin Shu’s translations. Moreover, the translator had to respect the integrity of the original text and should not feel free to cut, add, or embellish irresponsibly. Above all, he should not impose old Chinese values such as filial piety and ancestral worship upon Westerners in the translated text. They went on to dismiss translations by Lin Shu (as well as those by Yan Fu) as crimes committed against both the readers and the authors of the original texts.

As the “shadow boxing” intensified, Lin Shu could not hold his silence any more. He threw his hat in to defend himself by arguing that just as in the West where, despite the flourishing of the vernacular languages, the classical Latin (the lingua franca) had not been abolished, so the classical Chinese should be preserved rather than be declared dead because it was the root and spring from where *baihua* had grown. Beyond the analogy with classical Latin, however, Lin Shu could not come up with anything else by way of defending the value of the classical style. Sensing that he was fighting a losing battle, Lin Shu changed tactics for counterattack by writing up two satiric short stories. In one story, three main characters, thinly disguised stand-ins for Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, and Qian Xuantong, received a good beating from a tall, handsome, and righteous man for their trashy talk against classical Chinese and Confucianism. At the end of

the story the author rubbed salt into the wound by stating that for such vicious noises made by these vicious attack dogs, the good and righteous hero shouldn't even have bothered to dirty his hands by beating them. In the other story the main character roamed a *baihua* school in the underworld and witnessed the school's principal and his associates being swallowed by a ten-foot tall monster for their anti-Confucianism and anti-classical prose crimes. When the main character woke up at the end of the story, he wished that what he had dreamed of were true because he hated those criminals so much. By this point in his life Lin Shu had already made an about-face turn from his earlier support of reforms.

It seems that most scholars today, judging from the Chinese sources cited for this brief account, recognize Lin Shu's important contributions to the modernization of Chinese culture and literature through his massive introductions of Western literature despite their apparent imperfections. They also agree that while the wholesale denunciation of Confucianism and traditional Chinese learning, including the classical style in writing by Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, and their younger associates, was a bit excessive, it was driven by the exigency of their times, by their sense of the urgent need to jumpstart cultural as well as sociopolitical reforms, and therefore, is understandable, too.

As the dust more or less settled with the defeat of Lin Shu and victory of *baihua* as the preferred literary language, another battle, closely related, took the center stage concerning the method of translation, between those who advocated *zhíyì* [direct translation] and those who advocated *yìyì* [free translation]. If Yan Fu and Lin Shu can be viewed as the quintessential practitioners of the “free,” “domesticating” method, their translations having been so acculturated, even “bowdlerized,” to fit their sociopolitical agendas or literary tastes, Lu Xun and his brother Zhou Zuoren were then the most noteworthy of those who pushed for and practiced the “direct,” “foreignizing” translation. Although the definitions of what is meant by *zhíyì* and *yìyì* were fuzzy at best, the former tends to follow the source text in style, syntax, and even diction as closely as possible without trying to “naturalize” it in the target language whereas the latter tends to follow only the gist or spirit of the source text and take the liberty to render it in expressive, full-flavored target language, for example, not minding at all sayings and set phrases loaded with culture-specific connotative implications. The latter, *yìyì*, or its more extreme version, *hǎojié yì* [wild-spirited translation], as advocated by Liang Qichao, is exactly what Lin Shu did when translating Dumas and Dickens and other Western authors recommended by his foreign-language

speaking collaborators. Lu Xun, Zhou Zuoren, and other younger writer translators were unhappy with this and preferred *zhìyì*, even if it meant that the style and syntax of their translations would have such a distinct foreign, European flavor to it that it tasted rather puckery to many readers. In fact, Lu Xun and Zhou Zuoren went so far in their use of the direct method when translating stories for their *Yuwai xiaoshuo ji* [Collection of Stories from Abroad], published in Japan in 1909, that they experimented with *yīng yì* [phonetic translation], which resulted in a style of translation text that, refreshing as it was, proved not easy to read. For this the Zhou brothers were criticized by many of their contemporaries.

Indeed, the more “radical” members of the New Culture and New Literature Movement leaned toward the “Europeanized” style not only for the translated text but also for creative writing in the vernacular. For them, the hope for creating a refreshing *baihua* for literature lay in the creation of a new, Europeanized literary language that would transcend the language that had been long in use. This refreshing, brand new literary language, as suggested by Fu Sinian (1896–1950), a founding member of *Xinchao she* [the New Tide Society], should be a synergetic fusion of the speech patterns of the native tongue in real life and elements of European languages, for example, word-formation, syntax, figures of speech, style, structure, and the entire stock of their rhetorical strategies. This idea was well received by Mao Dun, Zheng Zhenduo, and others. They argued that a main task of the New Literature Movement was to change the old mindset about literature and the style of writing that had been in use for thousands of years and stifled free expressions of thoughts and feelings. They cautioned, though, that Europeanizing the language in both translation and creative writing should go only so far so that the resulted text would still be intelligible to the typical, average reader. An excessively Europeanized style, they felt, would leave the average reader confused, which would be a disservice to the New Culture and New Literature Movement. Nonetheless, as the movement gained momentum, the Europeanized style gradually gained acceptance and the literary language used for writing and translation began to show visible changes, for example, the sentences were becoming much longer, more complex, with introduction of modifying phrases and clauses; the patterns became more varied with use of the passive voice and moods (real condition versus subjunctive). Some did go too far and thus left behind all but a few like-minded readers.⁶⁶

The push for Europeanizing the literary language and for the “foreignization” method of translation was driven by the overarching

sociopolitical and cultural agenda of the New Culture and New Literature Movement. Interculturally speaking, the Chinese language, though having its great traditions and splendid achievements in literature and other writings, was the dominated language, to borrow from Pascale Casanova, whereas the European languages, riding on the hegemonic powers of their host countries, were the dominating language and culture.⁶⁷ The irony, it seems, is that many iconoclasts in the dominated language and culture were eager to adopt, or at least adapt, the dominating language and culture in order to renew their own, to renew their nation, and ultimately, to resist the hegemonic powers of the dominating language and culture. Intraculturally, the position of dominance and resistance shifted as the New Culture and New Literature Movement gained momentum. The traditional classical (or quasi-classical) style that had dominated for centuries gradually yielded ground to the new, Europeanized *baihua*. Although the debate has never been settled completely, *baihua* has enjoyed unchallenged dominance ever since. Few, if any, has openly advocated complete Europeanization of the Chinese language, either.

THE MATCHMAKER VS. THE MAIDEN

Since one of the main purposes of translating Western literature was to create a new, modern Chinese literature, tensions between the two sides of the equation would arise inevitably. Although the debates were not phrased in the sharpened consciousness of postcolonial criticism about the inequality of the translation relationship, about translation being used “as an instrument of colonial domination, a means of depriving the colonized peoples of a voice,”⁶⁸ there was concern that the exultation of translation of Western literature came at the expense of original creative writing in the vernacular; the latter, according to many, was and should be the ultimate purpose and function of translation.

Guo Moruo, one of the leaders of the Creation Society discussed earlier, famously likened translation to a matchmaker and original creative writing to a maiden. He complained, in the letter to a literary journal (paraphrased below), that there was too much attention to the former while the latter was being neglected:

I feel folks in our country nowadays pay so much more attention to the matchmaker than to the maiden, i.e., they pay so much more attention to translation than to creation. People in literary circles take so much pride in showing off the neighbors’ peaches and plums yet they won’t bother to work in their own orchards so they can taste and

share fruits of their own labor. Most literary journals nowadays are giving preferential treatment to translation of foreign literary works, too; any translation, good or bad, is always given the front page treatment and prominent place, whereas original poems and such creative writings are relegated to the fate of space filler. This by no means is good, inspiring news to the creative spirit! Indeed, the value of literary translation is no more than a report to the readers, which goes something like this: There is such a flower in the world's orchard or a new flower is blooming there, so be sure to enjoy it! That is all there is to it. Translation has no other positive value than inspiring people and arousing their own creativity.⁶⁹

Guo Moruo's complaint about the dominance of translation did not go unanswered. In an article titled "Maiden vs. Matchmaker" (paraphrased below), Zheng Zhenduo defended the role translation was playing in the New Literature Movement as much more critical than that of a matchmaker:

When a new literary work is born, and then translated into other languages, it not only means that a new flower is blooming in the orchard of literature but also means there now glows a new lamp that warms the human spirit and shines on humanity's way toward a bright future. Since the world we live in today does not have a universal language, we have to rely on translation so that the lamp of the new literary works not only warms and shines on the place of its origin but also on places well beyond. In this regard, translation of a literary work is the same as creation of the same literary work: It has the same inspiring impact on the human spirit the world over.

Despite, or perhaps, because of, all these debates and controversies, translation not only brought in so many schools of fresh thoughts and trends of ideas, which helped awaken the consciousness of the Chinese people and find cures for the ills, but also proved a potent force in the birthing of a new, modern literature.

Guo Moruo, who had complained loudly about creative writing being neglected, who did a massive amount of first-rate translations himself, wrote prolifically in every major literary genre—poetry, fiction, drama, autobiography, as well as historical and philosophical treatises. Upon reading Whitman's *Leaves of Grass*, for instance, Guo Moruo was so captivated by its pantheistic sentiments and the torrential, avalanche-like force of verse lines that he set to translate the collection into Chinese right away. And inspired, he proceeded to write Whitmanesque poems of his own, which were collected in his book of poetry *Nu Shen* [The Goddesses], the first important New Poetry written in the vernacular. The prefatory poem for

Nu Shen strikes a note that had been hitherto unheard of in Chinese poetry:

I am a proletarian
 Because except for my naked self
 I possess nothing else.
The Goddesses is my own creation
 And may be said to be my private property,
 Yet I want to be a Communist,
 Therefore I make her public to all.
Goddesses!
 Go and find the one with the same vibrations as me
 Go and find the one with as many kindling points as myself.
 Go and strike the heartstrings
 In the breasts of my dear young brothers and sisters,
 And kindle the light of their wisdom!⁷⁰

At the time Guo Moruo wrote *Nu Shen* (1920), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was yet to be founded (a year later) and Guo's declaring himself a Communist was more an expression of his utopian ideal than that of his faith in a political ideology although he did become a card-carrying member of the CCP years later. His new and refreshing poems are not only Whitmanesque (Guo has since been dubbed “the apostle of Chinese Whitmanism,” among other things) but also in the same youthful and rebellious vein of Shelley, whose poems Guo Moruo also translated, and in the same prophetic spirit that, among other things, invokes the West Wind as the harbinger of revolution.

Indeed, in the unapologetic celebration of the individual and the self, in calling for the destruction of the old and envisioning the dawn of a new era for humanity, and in the outpouring of passion and volcanic rhapsodies, as manifested in such powerful poems as “The Heavenly Hound,” “The Nirvana of the Phoenixes,” and “Earth, My Mother” in *Nu Shen*, Guo Moruo showed remarkable indebtedness to Whitman, Shelley, Goethe, and Tagore. Nonetheless, no matter how profoundly inspired he was by Western literature, Guo's poems were deeply rooted in the culture he had been born into, as evidenced by one of his best known poems, “The Heavenly Hound”:

I am the Heavenly Hound!
 I swallow the moon,
 I swallow the sun,
 I swallow all the stars,

I swallow the universe,
 I am I!
 I am the light of the moon,
 I am the light of the sun,
 I am the light of all the stars,
 I am X-ray beams,
 I am the amassed *Energy* of the entire universe!⁷¹

While the spirit of the poem is Whitmanesque and Western elements, for example, X-ray beams, the amassed Energy (Guo injected this English word, in its original spelling, in this Chinese poem of his) are profuse, the concept of *tiangou* [heavenly hound] can be traced back to the classic Chinese book of mythologies *Shanhai jing* [Mountain River Myths, 200 BC]. In *Shanhai jing*, the heavenly hound is described as a fox-like animal, which looks quite fierce, yet is auspicious. Gradually, however, its meaning degenerated and became negative as the Chinese used *tiangou chi taiyang* [the heavenly hound swallowing the sun] and *tiangou chi yueliang* [the heavenly hound swallowing the moon] to describe the sun eclipse and the moon eclipse respectively. The Chinese used to (and many still do even today) regard the eclipses as ill-omens. Whenever the sun or the moon eclipse was about to happen, they would beat the gongs fiercely and explode loud fireworks in an attempt to scare away the heavenly hound. In “The Heavenly Hound” Guo Moruo turns the folklore/mythology on its head and instead celebrates *tiangou* as a rebel and Satanic hero. In this sense, Guo Moruo’s poems are much more a “match” made in heaven, so to speak, of the Chinese and the West than a pure “maiden;” they are all the more potent thanks to the symbiotic and semiotic fusion of ideas and energies from both native and foreign sources.

Speaking of fusion or convergence of the Chinese and West in the creation of new, refreshing modern Chinese literature, we have to turn to Lu Xun, whose work in translation of Western literature is just as massive, and whose trailblazing work in Chinese fiction is as significant as Guo Moruo’s in the realms of poetry.

Lu Xun’s short story “*Kuangren riji*” [Diary of a Madman] was first published in the *New Youth* magazine in 1918 and then reappeared in his first short story collection *Nahang* [Call to Arms] published in 1922. It immediately established the author as an important voice of the New Culture Movement still gathering momentum then, and it has since been recognized as the “prototypical text of social protest and criticism in modern Chinese literature.”⁷² The bulk of

the story is the diary a young man keeps as he becomes increasingly paranoid about the cannibalism believed to be routinely practiced by those around him, including his own family. The profound Western influence in the story cannot be mistaken.

The title of the story, for example, is a direct adaptation of Gogol’s story “Diary of a Madman,” which Zhou Zuoren translated into Chinese as “*Fengren riji*.” In Gogol’s story, Poprishchin, the petty official protagonist, devolves into insanity as he becomes increasingly obsessed with the beautiful daughter of a senior official and will not achieve greatness until he has gone completely insane. In Lu Xun’s story, however, the protagonist already shows unmistakable symptoms of madness at the outset of the story, although the bright lunar image (“Tonight the moon is very bright,” thus begins the “first” entry of the madman’s diary—in English translation) can be read as an opaque insinuation of both “lunacy” and “illumination,” or enlightenment of sort.

Its use of layered narration (as exemplified in such Western classics as Boccaccio’s *Decameron*, Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*, Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein*, Emily Brontë’s *Wuthering Heights*, and Washington Irving’s “Rip Van Winkle”) gives the story a narrative sophistication and thematic depth rarely seen in traditional Chinese fiction. When the madman’s brother, who tells the frame narrator that his brother has been cured and has since taken a position offered by the government, it seems to imply that the madman, a trope for a revolutionary rebel, has capitulated and forsaken his sharp-tongued criticism of Chinese history and Confucianism:

[M]y history has no chronology, and scrawled all over each page are the words: “Virtue and Morality.” Since I could not sleep anyway, I read intently half the night, until I began to see words between the lines, the whole book being filled with the two words—“Eat people.”⁷³

The story ends with the madman diarist crying out “Save the Children!” and hence saving the future of China. However, whether he had capitulated or not, the madman seems bound to fail to live up to the role of a Nietzschean hero capable of saving the children, much as Ah Q, the main character of Lu Xun’s novella *The True Story of Ah Q*, fails to become the kind of revolutionary rebel he imagines himself to be. It is entirely possible to also read the story told by the brother about where the madman is now as a cover-up because the brother, as can be reasonably suspected, may have sold the madman out in the same

manner that the young rebel Xia in “Medicine,” another important short story by Lu Xun, is betrayed by his own family.⁷⁴

Nonetheless, much of the story is rooted in the native Chinese culture. Lu Xun, or at least the implied author, went to lengths not only to “document” the cannibalism, another overarching trope of the story, in the main narrative but also to provide extensive quasi-historical footnotes to show, ostensibly, that cannibalism did occur in Chinese history. The allegorical significance of the names of people inhabiting the world the madman lives, whom he suspects of being card-carrying cannibalists, such as Mr. Zhao, Mr. Chen (both Zhao and Chen are on the top of China’s *baijiaxing* [Hundred Family Names], so they represent both the Everyman and those in power positions), Gujiu [Old Relic], whose account sheets the madman might have trodden on accidentally 20 years before, is hard to miss. If such “respected” members in the village, a microcosm of Chinese society, and indeed, if almost everyone, men, women, even members of the madman’s own family, participates in the business of people eating, what does that have to say about this world that prides itself of Confucianism-based virtues and morality?

Even the title of the story, “*Kuangren riji*,” is Lu Xun’s thoughtful adaptation rather than mindless imitation of Gogol’s story which had inspired him. As has been pointed out by Lu Xun scholars, there is a range of subtle yet significant semantic differences between *feng* as in “*Fengren riji*,” the Chinese title Zhou Zuoren gave to his translation of Gogol’s story, and *kuang* as used in the title of Lu Xun’s story, “*Kuangren riji*,” despite their synonymic relations. Both describe an abnormal, deranged mental condition. However, the word *feng*, denotatively, has a more clinic ring to its description of the condition of “madness,” whereas *kuang*, which, etymologically, describes a hound gone wild, has, through at least 2,000 years in usage, acquired a wide register of meanings. It includes “mad,” “ecstatic,” and “wildly unrestrained,” as evidenced in such common expressions in Chinese as *kuangbao* [fierce, wild, brutal], *kuangcao* [a free-spirited, wild style of calligraphy, especially in brush work], *kuangfang* [wildly unrestrained], *kuangfeng* [fierce wind, storm], *kuanghuang* [wild, unrestrained celebration, carnivalistic], *kuangwang* [extremely arrogant], *kuangxi* [ecstatic, rapturous], and *kuangxiao* [unrestrained, hearty laugh]. In choosing the word *kuang* for the title, Lu Xun was positing a rebel against an oppressive society, a “Nietzschean” sort of hero who proudly led the charge knowing too well that he would fall for the cause.⁷⁵

Finally, by the time of writing “Madman’s Diary,” Lu Xun had delved deep into the study of classic Chinese fiction with sharp

insights. He was actually teaching classic Chinese literature at Beijing University. Indeed, as Leo Ou-fan Lee contends, the “modernity” of Lu Xun’s story draws from both Chinese cultural and literary roots and Western influences and is worthy of its fame as the first major “modern” short fiction in Chinese literary history.⁷⁶

The same is true of Lu Xun’s novella *The True Story of Ah Q* published in 1922. The story is about the quasi-quixotic adventures of Ah Q, an illiterate peasant drifter, who relishes “spiritual victories” even when suffering defeat or humiliation. Delusional as he is, Ah Q proves a bully to those weaker than he (e.g., harassing a nun to please a cheering crowd) and a coward to those who are stronger. When the tide of revolution hits the town, Ah Q declares himself a revolutionary, but misses the action for having overslept. Nonetheless, he is arrested for looting and is sentenced to death after a perfunctory trial. The story ends with Ah Q struggling earnestly to draw a full circle in lieu of signing his name on the confession before his execution. Satirically portrayed, Ah Q is a sort of Everyman emblematic of what Lu Xun perceived was wrong with the Chinese national character.

The story caused quite a stir and controversy over its interpretations in the 1920s. Lu Xun’s writer brother Zhou Zuoren penned a couple of articles to help explain the story in its proper context: The technique used in *The True Story of Ah Q* is irony, which is very rare in Chinese fiction. It is inspired by foreign short stories, most notably stories by Gogol (“Overcoat” and “Diary of a Madman”), Sienkiewicz (“Charcoal Sketches” and “Sachem”), Mori Ogai (“Tower of Silence”) and Natsume Soseki (“I Am a Cat”). It is worth noting that Lu Xun and Zhou Zuoren had translated or co-translated most of the aforementioned stories as well as Jonathan Swift’s ironic, mock-serious “A Modest Proposal.”⁷⁷

One may argue that Western influence is far deeper than what the term technique can describe and all the Western texts, literary, philosophical, scientific, and sociopolitical, that Lu Xun had been exposed to, was at work, in full force, when Lu Xun was writing his story. It lent him the lens to see what was wrong with China and its people at the time and it lent him the form, the technique, and indeed, the language, to capture what he saw. Nonetheless, *The True Story of Ah Q* is, fundamentally, a Chinese story. Its subject is Chinese; the people inhabiting the fictional world are Chinese; it is the perceived ugliness in the Chinese national character that is being satirized; it was written with a hope (against hope) to awaken the millions in the “iron house.”

Although scholars such as C. T. Hsia, coming from the New Critical traditions, among other things, were not very enthusiastic

about Lu Xun as a writer, thanks largely to Lu Xun's intense involvement in the political struggles of his times,⁷⁸ it wouldn't seem fair or, indeed, reasonable, to underestimate the significance of his pioneering work both as a translator and as a writer in his own right and hence deny him a prominent place in modern Chinese cultural and literary history. Lu Xun's pungent use of the absurd, for example, as evidenced in "Madman's Diary," *The True Story of Ah Q*, "Medicine," and "Kong Yi-ji," was almost contemporary of stories by Franz Kafka (1883–1924); they anticipated the fictional work of Albert Camus (1913–1960) by a few decades. Even today Lu Xun's best stories can still bear close reading from Marxist, psychoanalytic, deconstructionist, postcolonial, feminist as well as the New Critical approaches and would still yield rich, meaningful interpretations.

Indeed, the New Culture and New Literature Movement saw the boom not only in Western literature translations but also in original creative writing using the vernacular. The orchard of literature was blooming with all kinds of flowers. Particularly vibrant were those graphed or hybridized species nourished by the rich native cultural and literary traditions (despite, or rather, because of, the rebellious, iconoclastic positioning of most of the new writers), and by the vigorous influx of Western ideas through translations. Soon, a new literature written in the vernacular became dominant although within the movement long-held ideological, stylistic as well as personal differences became more visible and entrenched and a united new cultural front was hard to maintain, if it had ever existed. .

In the meantime time, as Western literature was being translated in massive amounts and as new Chinese fiction, poetry, and drama were being written and published, new Western approaches to literary criticism began to be introduced into China. Traditional literary criticism in China had been dominated by impressionistic commentary and textual studies. It lacked the rigor of systemic attention and theoretical self-awareness. Among the pioneers in adopting Western concepts and methodologies in literary studies was Wang Guowei (1877–1927), a talented and versatile scholar. Educated in Japan, Wang Guowei devoted much of his life to the study of German philosophies. Although he was politically conservative, remaining loyal to the Manchu emperor even after the 1911 republican revolution, Wang Guowei was a bold pioneer when it comes to literary as well as historical and archeological studies.

Wang was the first in using the Aristotelian concepts of tragedy to study *A Dream of Red Mansions*, generally viewed as the greatest classic Chinese novel. This was in 1904, at least ten years before

the New Culture and New Literature Movement officially got on its way. Wang Guowei paid particular attention to the tensions between the main characters in the epic novel and identified the tensions or conflicts as the cause of tragedy. He compared *A Dream of Red Mansions* favorably to Western classics such as Goethe's *Faust*. Wang's tragic vision, or sense of life, can be traced to an uneasy fusion of the Buddhist concept of life as misery and Schopenhauer's belief in the irrational and the blind will as the absolute master of human destiny. For Wang Guowei, the greatness of tragedy such as *A Dream of Red Mansions* is its power to produce the cathartic effect expounded by Aristotle because the ultimate purpose of morality and literature is purgation.⁷⁹

Wang Guowei went on to apply the same concepts and methodologies to his study of other classic Chinese novels and plays as well as Shakespeare, Goethe, Byron, Tolstoy, and Stevenson. In doing so Wang Guowei would have huge influence on Hu Shi and Lu Xun in their studies of both Chinese and Western cultures and literatures.

Western influence in literary studies can also be seen in other trailblazers in the early decades of the twentieth century. Liang Qichao, for example, devoted a decent amount of his time to literary studies, especially after the failure of the Hundred Days Reform. He classified literature into three basic types: symbolic, romantic, and realistic. The indebtedness of such labeling to Western literary studies is apparent. Zhu Ziqing (1898–48), an original and accomplished author in his own right, was one of the first to apply Russian formalism, New Criticism, and Saussurean structuralism to his studies of literary texts. Other writers and scholars preferred historical and biographical approaches.⁸⁰ It was the first time in Chinese literary history that literary criticism began to acquire the rigor and discipline of systemic and theoretically self-aware endeavors, whether the subject of study was domestic or Western (via translation) literary works.

THE DOOR SLAM AND THE CANNON FIRING HEARD ALL AROUND CHINA

Given the overarching sociopolitical agenda of this generation of trailblazing translators and writers, the *sturm und drang* in the culture and literature would soon burst into the much larger sphere of the society in general and have far-reaching repercussions there. Among translated Western literary texts, Ibsen's *A Doll's House* had perhaps the biggest sociopolitical impact. Lu Xun's reviews of Ibsen's plays in as early as 1907, the *New Youth* magazine special issue devoted to

Ibsen in 1918, with biographical introductions and reviews by Hu Shi and others, and translation of *A Doll's House*, created a hitherto unseen momentum for a Western literary work. The play was first staged in 1918, the same year the *New Youth* magazine special issue was published. Soon the play became a rallying cry for the Chinese women's liberation movement although Ibsen himself might not have intended the play as a weapon in any sociopolitical struggle despite his deep concern for the women issues of the time. Nonetheless, Hu Shi, Lu Xun, and others of the New Culture Movement saw in the play, and in the character of Nora, something they wanted to see out of exigency of their moral, sociopolitical as well as cultural agendas: to awaken the spirit of the Chinese people so they would join the struggle for individual freedom, liberation from cultural traditions, as well as gender equality.

At the time Ibsen was introduced to China, the women rights movement was already under way in this large country of the Orient where women for centuries had been bound by the repressive "Three Obediences and Four Virtues,"⁸¹ the worst emblem of the patriarchal control and domination of women being the millennium-long institution of foot-binding. In fact, articles advocating gender equality began to appear in Chinese newspapers as far back as 1870s, calling on the Chinese women to follow the role models of Mu Lan, Florence Nightingale (1820–1910), Madame Roland (1754–93), Joan of Arc (1412–31), and so on.⁸² Many women responded. The boldest among them at the turn of the century, such as Qiu Jin (1875–1907), stepped forward to challenge the social institution of arranged marriages and to seek individual freedom, equality, and opportunities for education. Qiu Jin died for that.⁸³ The opportune arrival of Ibsen's play in China provoked many to think about what would be the real path to women's liberation. Lu Xun in an essay of his famously asked the question: "What happens after Nora left?" He felt that without socioeconomic independence women could never be truly free. This theme he would explore further in his short story "Sadness," in which the love between two young people fails thanks to nagging socioeconomic pressures.

Not incidentally, Ibsen's play inspired the performance of many noteworthy problem plays written in *baibua* and helped hasten the birth of *huaju* [the spoken drama], which is quite different from the traditional operatic theater.⁸⁴ Many of these new problem plays featured a Nora-like protagonist. Hu Shi's *Zhongshen dashi* [The Greatest Event in One's Life, 1919], one of the earliest of such plays, tells the story of a young woman who elopes with her Japan-educated lover in defiance of her parents' will. Another Nora-themed play is

Tian Han's *Huohu zhiye* [The Night a Tiger was Captured, 1924], the story about a woman whose hope to marry her lover is crushed when he is entrapped as a “tiger” and kills himself in protest against the oppressive patriarchal traditions.

Ouyan Yuqian's *Pofu* [A Shrewish Woman, 1922], however, presents an interesting twist to the new Ibsen-esque *huaju*. The protagonist of the play, Yu Shuxin, has married a modern-minded man of her own will and out of love, but now finds herself trapped in an untenable situation: her husband has regressed and acquired a concubine on the sly. Instead of succumbing to the pressures of tradition and people around her, Shuxin chooses divorce and encourages the young concubine to leave home with her.

Huijia yihou [Homecoming], another play by Ouyan Yuqian, gives the new problem play an even more ironic twist. Lu Zhiping, a U.S.-educated man, returns home with his new wife Mary Liu, who is modern and also U.S.-educated. Before long Lu finds himself attracted to his original wife, Wu Zifang, an uneducated but virtuous, filial woman who has taken good care of his parents in his absence. The ending of the play leads one to believe that Lu will divorce Mary Liu (the modern woman who, upon finding out the existence of Wu Zifang, has reacted “shrewishly”) instead of Wu Zifang (illiterate, but a living example of all the virtues of the old, idealized Chinese womanhood) as he had originally planned for homecoming. As can be expected, this positive portrayal of the traditional but virtuous Wu Zifang and less than flattering portrayal of the modern, educated Mary Liu caused quite a stir and controversy at the time.⁸⁵

The early decades of the twentieth century proved to be the first heyday of *huaju*, modern, spoken drama, especially the problem plays. Indeed, Nora's story has become so much a part of China's modern consciousness and narrative that as recently as 2006 China's National Experimental Theatre staged a new version of *A Doll's House* with a Chinese twist. In this production Nora follows her *Chinese* husband to his ancestral home in the China of the 1930s, a “homecoming” that proves more dramatic than festival and celebratory, the themes of women's liberation and gender equality being further complicated by transcultural and interracial tensions. More interestingly, the play is now a Peking opera and an English-Chinese bilingual production, with the Norwegian actress Agnete Haaland starring as Nora, delivering all her lines in English, while the rest of the cast, all Chinese, speak in their native tongue.⁸⁶ What would Ibsen say to this highly indigenized, domesticated adaptation (or translation) of his play staged in a culture far different from his own?

Although some scholars in China today feel that the May Fourth generation had deliberately “misread” Ibsen and “appropriated” *A Doll’s House* for sociopolitical use while paying inadequate attention to the literary aspects of his work,⁸⁷ it would be fair to note that most members of the May Fourth generation were not ivory tower scholars and writers by any stretch. Driven by the long-held belief in *wen yi zai dao* [writing as vehicle for the way], and more than anything, by a burning sense of crisis and mission to renew the Chinese people through literature and hence to save the country, they had no time to lose in dwelling on the finer things such as irony, paradox, imagery in Western literary works by Ibsen and others. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine where women in China would be today, sociopolitically and economically, regardless of whether they now truly hold half of the sky, without them having seen Nora leaving the doll house with a door slam.

During the early decades of the twentieth century, three currents of intellectual, cultural, and literary forces were crisscrossing, convolving, and colliding until they went separate ways. The old-style scholars and translators such as Yan Fu and Lin Shu, along with Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, eventually became disillusioned with the ideal and project of Western knowledge for use to renew China and retreated to the their cultural and ideological base: Confucianism and old classics. They would prove “unfit” and lose influence during the New Culture and New Literature Movement and disappear from the scene although the impact of their massive earlier and bolder work is still felt today. Hu Shi, on the other hand, persisted in his belief in Western liberalism although he never outgrew his aversion to “politics” or political activism. He would devote his life to literary studies almost exclusively (despite his stint as Ambassador to the United States 1938–42).⁸⁸ Still others, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao,⁸⁹ not content with fighting the cultural war alone, and inspired by the Russian Bolshevik Revolution (1917), went on to found the CCP in 1921, which eventually won victory in China in 1949.

Sociopolitically speaking, the translation of Marxism and its introduction to China was the single most important event in modern Chinese history. During the late Qing decades and the early years of the republican revolution, Marxism was only one of the many Western intellectual trends and ideological currents fluxed into China, for example, anarchism, pragmatism, democracy, Darwinism, capitalism, liberalism, individualism, with anarchism being the most popular among the intellectuals. Marx and his writings were mentioned in Chinese newspapers and magazines as early as 1899, but did not

receive serious attention until 1917, when the cannon firing of the Bolshevik Revolution was heard in this faraway, ancient country and reverberated across its land. In a 1918 article titled “The Victory of Bolshevism,” Li Dazhao celebrated the Bolshevik victory as harbinger of an irreversible worldwide movement (with buoyant fervor and imagery reminiscent of Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind”):

In the course of such a world mass movement, all those dregs of history which can impede the progress of the new movement—such as emperors, nobles, warlords, bureaucrats, militarism, capitalism—will certainly be destroyed as though struck by a thunderbolt. . . . The bell is rung for humanitarianism! The dawn of freedom has arrived! . . . The victory of Bolshevism . . . is the victory of the spirit of common awakening in the heart of each individual among mankind in the twentieth century.⁹⁰ [ellipses added]

Translations of Marxist writings began to be undertaken more seriously as study groups began to appear on college campuses in various cities. Within a couple of years, *Communist Manifesto*, *The Civil War in France*, *An Explanation of the Materialistic Conception of History*, *An Overview of Social Problems*, and *the Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx*, were translated into Chinese (mostly based on existent Japanese translations). And as was the case with Yan Fu’s translations a decade or so earlier, these early, secondhand translations of Marxist writings were often edited and abbreviated to better suit the domestic needs. The complete translation of the *Communist Manifesto*, for example, didn’t happen until 1920, the eve before the founding of the CCP. This translation was so popular that by 1926 it had seen 17 reprints by one press alone.⁹¹ In May 1919 the *New Youth* magazine also put out a special issue devoted to “Marxist Studies,” in which appeared Li Dazhao’s seminal article titled “My Marxist Views.”

There has been disagreement over whether Chinese Marxism or Communism originated from domestic conditions or was brought to China by the Comintern from the outside, or whether Marxist theory, which had been developed both from and for industrialized societies, would apply to China, a predominantly agrarian society at the time without a sizable industrial base and urban labor force to organize and launch liberation campaigns.⁹² The historical fact is that Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Mao Zedong, and a group of other young revolutionaries did choose Marxism, out of all the competing ideologies, and make a run with it.⁹³ It has turned out to be a long, fitful march punctuated with pitfalls and tragic blunders. The Communist government

in China today likes to claim that they have finally found the right “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” model that best fits China’s historical, cultural, and socioeconomic conditions, yet whether this model is sustainable in the long run, without meaningful, systemic political reforms, as envisioned, ironic enough, by the founders of the CCP 80 years ago, remains a question mark. The jury is still out on this one. Nonetheless, China has come a long way in translating itself into a modern nation despite the heavy prices its people have had to pay.

Ironically, as far back as in the late 1800s there had been some unease in the West about the possible rise of China, about China adopting Western ways and then becoming a threat to the West. While there had been sympathetic as well as, in some cases, contemptuous, feelings for the post–Opium War plight of China, many Westerners were apprehensive of the sleeping giant one day waking up.

It was, indeed, “with both a sense of exhilaration and apprehension that many Americans looked toward the twentieth century” as it loomed in the horizon. If China, which housed one-quarter of humanity, would eventually awake, which seemed inevitable, could it “challenge the world order the West had created” and start a contest between East and West and what Josiah Strong, a leading religious and social voice at the time, termed “the final competition of races”? Arthur Judson Brown, an influential missionary and religious figure, sounded his warning in a 1904 book titled *New Forces in Old China: An Unwelcome but Inevitable Awakening*:

There is something fascinating and at the same time something appalling in the spectacle of a nation numbering nearly one-third of the human race slowly and majestically rousing itself from the torpor of ages under the influence of new and powerful revolutionary forces.⁹⁴

The old stereotypical views of the Chinese, the old prejudices, and indeed the apprehension of their inevitable rise, and hence the “Yellow Peril,” were best personified in the fictional character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the popular supervillan created by Sax Rohmer. Echoes of the mixed feelings of a strong and modern China can still be heard today, and perhaps even louder.

The massive translations of Western texts were instrumental in awakening a new consciousness—national, sociopolitical, as well as cultural—of the Chinese people around the turn of the twentieth century and during its first few decades. Yan Fu’s trailblazing, much “domesticated” translation of Adam Smith, Thomas Huxley, and Herbert Spencer introduced to the Chinese a brand new, albeit

unsettling, lens through which to view the world and to appreciate China's place relative to that of Western Powers. It provided Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and others the sorely needed ideological tools to attempt broad sociopolitical reforms, as opposed to the earlier Self-Strengthening Movement, which focused narrowly on learning the Western technological and industrial ways (while sticking to traditional Confucianism-based Chinese culture as foundation).

With Lin Shu's prodigious translation of Western literature, despite all the “crimes” he had allegedly committed, China's fitful march toward modernity opened up an exciting new front: culture and literature. His translations of Dickens and Dumas and numerous other Western authors shook the long-held belief in China's cultural and literary superiority. Even translations of love stories by “second-rate” authors, such as H. Rider Haggard's *Joan Haste* (1895), had their share of subversive impact on traditional cultural values. Translations of political novels, which Liang Qichao promoted most zealously, detective stories such as those by Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930), which feature Sherlock Homes, and science fiction, such as *A Journey to the Center of the Earth* (1864), *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea* (1870), and *Around the World in Eighty Days* (1873) by Jules Verne, all very popular at the time, opened up whole new ways to see and experience the world.⁹⁵

However, the most significant work in the early decades of the twentieth century was carried out by a new generation of bold, iconoclastic activist translators and writers—Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, and many others. The *sturm und drang* they instigated challenged almost everything that had hitherto been perceived as sacred in the cultural as well as sociopolitical life at the time, for example, filial piety, gender roles, authority of traditions, classical literary language, and even translation methods used by Lin Shu and Yan Fu who were barely a generation older than them. This group of young, Western-educated people were inspired by and borrowed liberally from Western literature (classic and contemporary, English, French, German, Russian, as well as literature of the “insulted and oppressed peoples,” mostly through translations or secondhand translations) in creating a new, modern Chinese literature—new fiction, new poetry, and new drama, which had far-reaching impact on the society as a whole. Many of the Western literary works they translated, such as Ibsen's *A Doll's House*, have remained an important part of the modern Chinese narrative and cultural memory as they have remained so in the source languages and cultures. This generation of activist translators and writers could be faulted for being overzealous,

even a bit nihilistic, in their impatient, herculean attempts to overthrow cultural and literary traditions, but the significance of their accomplishments in the creation of a new, vigorous modern literature by drawing from both Western and—ironically—Chinese sources, should not be underestimated.

Nevertheless, the old adage that “between heaven and earth there is neither permanent alliance nor permanent antagonism”⁹⁶ applies here too. As the New Culture and New Literature Movement, triumphant as it was, began to taper off in the late 1920s and develop in new directions, alliances and fault lines between different groups were being redrawn and new battles would be fought. In the meantime, Western ideas continued to flow in through translations as well as other means and Western literary works continued to have significant impact on the new novels, plays, and poems created during the turbulent years of wars before 1949.⁹⁷

THE NOT-SO-UNITED FRONTS (1928–1949)

By the mid-1920s, a new political reality had emerged in China with the Guomintang-Communist alliance more or less in place, an alliance that had been brokered by agents of Comintern (Communist International).¹ It was an uneasy, difficult alliance from the get-go because the two parties in this “marriage of convenience” had very different political ideologies and national platforms. Guomintang (Nationalists, Kuomintang, KMT), founded in 1912, right after the 1911 republican revolution, was based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s *San min zhuyi* [Three People’s Principles], i.e., *minzu* [nationalism], *min-zhu* [democracy], and *minshen* [people’s livelihood]. The Chinese Communist Party (the CCP, founded by Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and others in 1921), still in its formative stage, subscribed to the ideals, as stated in its founding manifesto, of a classless (actually, working-class dominated) society predicated on common ownership of economy and production, abolition of the existent oppressive government and institutions, and liberation from the hegemonic control of capitalistic foreign powers. These ideals, the Communists believed, could only be achieved through class struggle, i.e., mobilization of the proletariat and its close allies, peasants, soldiers, and so on.² While the two parties shared some broad national platforms, i.e., to build a new, strong, and democratic China—whatever that meant—they parted company when it came to who would provide the leadership, who would be the core forces and allies, and what would be the best paths toward achieving those goals.

One of the most significant joint endeavors of this early alliance was the Northern Expedition—military campaigns launched in 1926 to reunite China, which had fallen into warlordism yet again despite the victorious 1911 revolution. The campaigns, commanded by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887–1975), a Guomintang general who

had won the confidence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, were successful as the revolutionary forces advanced from Guangdong (Canton) northward to the warlord-controlled Beijing government. In the spring of 1927, they reached the industrial powerhouse Shanghai, where tens of thousands of workers—the proletariat, many armed—had been mobilized by the Communists to ready the city for revolution. Jiang Jieshi, however, worried about the infiltration of Communists within his ranks, the financial interests of powerful capitalists whose money Jiang needed badly to replenish his war chests, and the anxiety of foreign powers (which at the time had over 20,000 troops and police stationed in Shanghai and 42 warships at anchor in its harbor), turned his troops against the workers, his hitherto allies, killing them by the hundreds and arresting thousands. This about-face and bloodshed led to the breakdown of the Guomindang-Communist alliance during this period, known in history books as the First United Front.³

What followed was a ten-year long Guomindang Extermination Campaigns against the Communists, that, among other things, forced the latter on the run, or to embark on a strategic retreat, as the Communists would call it in their history books, the legendary, much mythologized Long March (1934–35).⁴ The relentless campaigns did not end until 1937 when the Marco Polo Bridge incident happened and the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out.⁵ The Guomindang-led government and the Communists were forced to put aside their ideological differences again and joined forces in fighting the Japanese aggressions. However, tensions between the two partners and in-fighting, which sometimes took the forms of large-scale, bloody ambushes, never completely stopped; they jockeyed for position and dominance even as they faced a greater, common threat from outside.

This alliance, known as the Second United Front, lasted until the end of 1945, when the Japanese surrendered and World War II ended. Old animosities and struggle for control of the country became front and center again and full-scale civil war soon broke out. Cease-fires, brokered by a not-so-impartial United States that had been backing Jiang Jieshi with generous funding and modern military arsenal, proved untenable as neither side truly believed in a coalition government or had genuine interest in being a junior partner in such a government. The Communists gained ground steadily and soon were ready to come out of their rural base to advance to the cities and other hitherto Guomindang-controlled areas. As Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing, and other major cities fell, in domino fashion, Jiang Jieshi had no choice but to flee to Taiwan in 1949. Communist victory in

China, a fantasy dreamed up by a group of young idealists during the *sturm und drang* of the May Fourth Movement not too long back, had finally morphed into reality.

A JIGSAW PUZZLE OF THE SOCIOCULTURAL LANDSCAPE

It was against this sociopolitical backdrop, sketched above, that battles in the cultural fronts were being fought, or rather, the sociopolitical and the cultural and literary were but different flanks of the very same battles that had been waged since the late 1800s for the soul of the country as it continued on the long and difficult march toward modernity.

During the post-May Fourth Movement decades, especially since the collapse of the First United Front at the end of the Northern Expedition in 1927, China was roughly divided into the Guomindang-controlled cities, the Communist-controlled poor, rural areas, and the vast mountainous and border regions, which, not easily accessible due to their geographical attributes, were controlled by no central government, political party, or anyone else other than local tribesmen, lords, and other de facto rulers. An aerial view of the country then, both culturally and sociopolitically speaking, would reveal a jigsaw puzzle of twinkling Red Stars,⁶ blazing Blue Sky White Suns,⁷ and a myriad of other emblems of various colors and stripes, all scattered here and there, as if randomly, but all as dictated by the whims of history and the wills of its key players during these decades.

In the Blue Sky White Sunned areas, mostly cities, controlled by the Guomindang, modernity had strut forward with all its glamour and not so glamorous baggage. In big cities such as Shanghai, an unassuming small town before the Opium War but having recently acquired the notoriety of “Paris of the Orient,” life was almost as cosmopolitan as could be experienced in any comparable metropolis at the time in Europe or America. Electricity, streetcars, trolleybuses, automobiles, trains, cinemas, Hollywood movies, film stars or starlets, fashion and entertainment magazines, radios, phonographs, billboards, short skirts and high-heels, cigarettes and cigars, shopping complexes, nightclubs—all of these and much more, made good, comfortable living for the rich among the Chinese and for Western expatriates, diplomats, merchants, adventurers of all kinds; decadent, sensual indulgences could be had readily all day and all night long if one had the money to pursue his (or her?) heart’s desires.⁸ Even in walled and gated ancient cities such as Nanjing, life was not the

same anymore. Nanjing, capital city of the Guomindang government (1927–37, 1945–49) as well as several dynasties before, boasted at least ten modern colleges and universities, hundreds of secondary and elementary schools, temples, churches, and mosques, and numerous business offices, marketplaces, eateries, hotels, and art and antique shops. And even traditional cultural havens such as the Confucian Temple in the southeastern corner of the city proved no proof against the lures of modernity, where modern and ancient, Chinese and foreign, old and new, rich and poor, beautiful and ignoble, were all living side by side, jostling along uneasily.

Indeed, there was so much “decadence” in the much Westernized cities that the Guomindang government launched a nationwide *Xin shenghuo* [New Life] movement in the mid-1930s. This movement, ostensibly reminiscent of the New Culture Movement a mere decade or two back, was supposedly predicated on a synthesis of the Three People’s Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the strategies employed by foreign missionaries to rectify social ills such as poverty, illiteracy, and prostitution, and the central tenets of the much battered Confucianism, an uneasy, incoherent fusion of divergent ideologies, to say the least. In practice it translated into national campaigns against such “antisocial behavior” as spitting, urinating, or smoking in public, casual sexual liaisons, and provocative clothing. It also, among other things, went after the women rights’ movement, admonishing young women against following the feminist ideas of freedom, equality, social activism; instead, it urged them to cultivate the “four virtues” of “chastity, appearance, speech, and work,” and to focus their life on taking care of the household through chores, sewing, cooking, arranging furniture.⁹ Apparently, this New Life movement, despite the repackaging in new, pretentious language, was a retreat to the old ways, a retraction of the progress that had been made (arguably not without some overzealous excesses) during and since the May Fourth Movement.

Indeed, for Guomindang leaders such as Jiang Jieshi, the goals of the New Life movement were to restore the Confucian virtues of *li* [social propriety], *yi* [justice], *lian* [integrity], *chi* [self-respect]. Moreover, the sponsors of the movement had an “ulterior” motive other than cultural life itself, as Jiang had stated:

What is the New Life movement that I now propose? Stated simply, it is to militarize thoroughly the lives of the citizens of the entire nation so that they can cultivate courage and swiftness, the endurance of suffering and a tolerance of hard work, and especially the habit and

ability of unified action, so that they will at any time sacrifice for the nation.¹⁰

The desire to strengthen the people was understandable, given the post-Opium War world, and the fact that Japan had annexed Manchuria only a few years back and was now maneuvering to take its imperialist ambitions to the rest of China, however, the unmistakable fascist elements in the program and, more than anything, its regression to old, repressive traditions that had been faulted for the sorry plight of China in modern times, didn't sit well with many people, especially the progressives and those in the Red-Starred, Communist-controlled areas. As it turned out, the movement had little traction and gradually "trickled away in a stream of trivia"¹¹ while modernity kept strutting forward, carrying on, as if oblivious to the wars that were being waged across the scarred landscape of the nation.

In the Red-Starred areas controlled by the Communists, however, modernity, or its poor, rural cousin, was having a much more modest time. In the so-called Shaan-Gan-Ning region,¹² for example, there were no neon lights, night clubs, cinemas, or shopping plazas. Life was at its most austere as the Communists were trying to make do and improvise with whatever was available. Nonetheless, modernity, in its various incarnations, and for better or worse, persisted as a formidable force both to be wielded and to be wrestled with.

As a countermeasure to the Guomindang sponsored New Life movement, for example, the Communists in their controlled areas, especially the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region with Yan'an as its capital, launched a *Dazhong yu* [Mass Language] and *Xin qimeng* [New Enlightenment] movement to promote a sort of New Democratic (as distinguished from the "old" democratic doctrines promoted by the Guomindang) culture, with the same anti-imperialistic, anti-feudal revolutionary themes, although the emphasis would shift somewhat during the Second United Front period when facing the common enemy of Japan and would shift again during the Civil War years when the Communists and Guomindang would be fighting to the death for the control of the country. Almost from the get-go, the Communists, regarding themselves as the legitimate heirs and hence champions of the May Fourth, had appropriated the right to interpret the legacies of the movement and adopted art and literature as weapons in the epic life-and-death struggles for victory in China.

The culmination of the Communist cultural policies was Mao Zedong's "Yan'an Talk" in 1942, in which Mao, while recognizing the necessity and benefit of drawing from both foreign and classic

literatures, called on the artists and writers to go to the common people for both inspiration and material:

Art and literature of all levels have their root in human beings' reflection upon the masses' lives. Books and existing artistic products are only the streams from this source; they were born as our ancestors and foreigners created upon the foundations of the people's literature and art. We should critically learn from these traditional and foreign elements while we reshape the raw materials we take from people's present arts and literature. . . . Such learning determines the difference between naiveté and refinement, and distinction between crudeness and elegance.¹³

Further, Mao asked artists and writers to focus on the "brightness" of the revolutionary causes (instead of dwelling on the darker sides). He went on to issue the decree that all art and literature must serve the workers, peasants, and soldiers and be subservient to politics—the objectives of the Communist revolution and the Party.

While mobilization of arts and literature in such a dictatorial fashion might indeed have helped propagate the ideological and political agendas of the Chinese Communist Party, the dampening impact on the creative spirit and energy that had been unleashed by the *sturm und drang* of the New Culture and New Literature Movement could not be overestimated. When such control of arts and literature and indeed of almost every other facet of socioeconomic life became iron-clad and repressive, as during the decades between 1949–1976, especially the ten-year long Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the cultural as well as human cost would be beyond measurement.

As an important part of the Mass Language and New Enlightenment campaigns, the Communist Party rigorously promoted its educational programs to spread literacy and introduce new ideas to the villages. Take the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region for example. In 1937 there were only 320 elementary schools with 5,600 pupils. By 1941 the number had grown to 1,198 elementary schools with 40,366 pupils. In 1938 there was only one normal school, but by 1942, ten normal schools had been established. Such educational programs played "an integral role in the social, economic, and cultural transformation of rural society."¹⁴ In the meantime, more than two dozen institutions of higher learning, the better known among them being the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Studies Academy, Northern Shaanxi Public College, Lu Xun Arts Academy, were busy training and graduating hundreds and thousands of cadres direly needed for the revolutionary causes.¹⁵ In 1941 a foreign language school was

established, whose mission was as practical and pragmatic as that of Tongwen Institute and Jiangnan Arsenal established in late Qing: training young foreign language personnel to do translation work on the enemies' war operations and weaponry.

One of the direct beneficiaries of the common people-oriented cultural as well as sociopolitical campaigns was the young peasants.¹⁶ As reported by Edgar Snow in *Red Star over China*, when an elderly man complained about the new life bubbling all around him, a bare-foot young peasant stood up in its defense:

You call these things crimes, grandfather? [Joining the Poor Peasant League, voting for the district Soviets, having children in the Red Army or Red schools, etc.] These are patriotic acts! Did we have a free school in [our village] before? Did we ever get the news of the world before the Reds brought us wireless electricity? Who told us what the world is like? . . . You say it's bitter, but it isn't bitter for us young people if we can learn to read! It isn't bitter for us Young Vanguarders when we learn to use the rifle and fight the traitors and Japan!¹⁷ [ellipses added]

Throbbing in this fiery speech was palpable modernity of young people undaunted by the "authority" of age and tradition and buoyant by hope for a better future.

And there was palpable modernity in the cultural life, basic and unrefined as it was by any standard, of the Communist-controlled areas, as evidenced in a theater event Snow attended during his first visit to the Red Army University in Yan'an in 1936. It was an open-air, make-shift stage (from an old temple). The admission was free and there were no "dress circle" or preferred seats for generals and ranking cadets. The absence of subtlety and refinement in performance was more than compensated by robust vitality, sparkling humor, and lively interaction between actors and audience. As could be expected, the programs were dominated by anti-Japan and other pertinent political themes. The first performance was a short play called *Invasion*, which was about Japanese atrocities in a Manchurian village and how the entire village, having had it, eventually mobilized to "fight to the death" against the "Japanese devils." This was followed by a harvest dance by barefoot girls from the Dramatic Society, and then a "United Front Dance," "Dance of the Red Machines," and so on. Between the acts, enthusiastic extemporaneous signing arose from the audience as one "faction" commanded another "faction" to perform and even Snow could not escape from being "commanded" to sing a song (he managed a rendition of "The Man on the Flying

Trapeze,” although he knew fox trots, waltzes, *La bohème*, and “Ave Maria” much better).

Wasn’t all this “propaganda in art” a bit too much? Snow pondered on this question years later and came to the conclusion that what he had seen in Yan’an *was* art “in its broadest sense,” because it was made from “living material” and it appealed to the “living men”:

For the masses of China there was no fine partition between art and propaganda. There was only a distinction between what was understandable in human experience and what was not. [...] However badly [the Communists] had erred at times, however tragic had been their excesses, however exaggerated had been the emphasis here or the stress there, it had been their sincere and sharply felt propagandist aim to shake, to arouse, the millions of rural China to their responsibilities in society; to awaken them to a belief in human rights, to combat the timidity, passiveness, and static faiths of Taoism and Confucianism, to educate, to persuade, and, no doubt, at times to beleaguer and coerce them to fight for “the reign of the people”—a new vision in rural China—to fight for a life of justice, equality, freedom, and human dignity, as the Communists saw it.¹⁸ [ellipses added]

Snow’s report and indeed his assessment could be faulted as a bit too sympathetic, yet it would be hard to dismiss the truth of what he had observed firsthand during those difficult years.

As a multi-ethnic nation (albeit not exactly a “melting pot”), China has more than 50 *shaoshu minzu* [national minorities]. With the notable exceptions of the *Hui* (mostly of the Islamic faith whose ancestors were Arab soldiers sent to China in the eighth century to help crack down a rebellion) and the *Man* (descendants of the Manchus who had conquered China in 1644), these “national minorities” have been inhabitants in the “geographic periphery” of China. The Tibetans, Mongolians, Koreans, Uighers, Tatars, Dais, Miaos, Yaos, Zhuangs, and so on, all had their distinctive cultural and linguistic identities as well as complex sociopolitical relations with the Han Chinese. From the post–Opium War years up to 1949, at least four “civilizing projects” had been attempted to bring these culturally “inferior” and “peripheral” peoples into the “hegemonic” folds of the “center” by the Han Chinese government(s) and Western missionaries (who, ironically, were attempting to “civilize” the Han Chinese at the same time) respectively. All of these projects met with varying degrees of resistance, success, and failure.¹⁹ Modernity, therefore, “infiltrated” these and other hard-to-reach regions of the country at a much slower pace.

ALL NOT QUIET ON THE LITERARY FRONT

During the post–May Fourth decades, as wars were being waged one following the heels of another, translation of Western literature and other creative literary endeavors maintained a rather brisk pace and delivered rather impressively although writers and translators, individually and as groups, driven by their literary predilections as well as sociopolitical and ideological orientations, had much to “fight” amongst themselves. A truly united front could not be had in the realms of arts and literature as it was impossible to have in politics and in the struggle for national sovereignty and indeed for national survival.

On the left of the sociopolitical and ideological spectrum were writers and translators in the Communist-controlled areas, whose work, as could be expected, was primarily political—translation and publication of works in the Marxist canon. In the early 1940s Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who had been established as the undisputed leader since the end of the Long March, instructed that despite the economic and technological difficulties the Party should establish a translation and publication corps to make Marxist classics broadly available for the education of the rank and file; Mao deemed this “one of the most important tasks of the Party.”²⁰ The direct result of this translation campaign was the publication of a total of more than 500 titles, over 90 percent of which were political—works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Plekhanov,²¹ and others.

The few dozens of literary works that did get translated were mostly by Russian authors. The most noteworthy of these were *Quietly Flows the Don* by Sholokhov (1905–84), a monumental novel, on the scale of Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*, concerned with the life of a Cossack family during the early twentieth century and considered a prime example of socialist realism.²² Another such literary work was the novel *How the Steel Was Tempered* by Ostrovsky (1904–36), whose young protagonist, Pavel Korchagin, grew to be a staunch fighter for the Soviet cause and remained unshaken in his faith despite the devastating illnesses that hit him one after another—typhoid, loss of eyesight, and paralysis.²³

Another translation worth mentioning was the “Internationale” by Eugene Pottier, a member of the Paris Commune, that had become the anthem of the international Socialist movement and had been played and sung on so many grand and solemn occasions in China until the end of the Cultural Revolution that many middle-aged and elderly Chinese (cadres and intellectuals) today can probably still

carry the tune and the lyrics, at least the opening stanza and the refrain, without much effort, although the spirit of the song seems quite out of sync with what has been going on in China for the last several decades.²⁴

The second important flank of the literary and translation front during the decades since the May Fourth Movement was the significant amount of work carried out by members of the League of Left-Wing Writers in the Guomindang-controlled areas, mostly big cities.²⁵ True to its name, the league was a Communist-front organization formed in 1930 whose mission was to create “the revolutionary literature of the Chinese proletariat.” The league called on its members to “stand on the battle line of the proletariat’s struggle for emancipation” and to “assist and engage in the birth of the proletarian art” by way of paying attention to “the large number of subjects from the realities of Chinese social life,” by way of observing and writing about such subjects “from the proletarian standpoint and outlook,” and by creating a new kind of literature “simple and understandable to the workers and peasants,” using their dialects if necessary. This writers’ league, though, was only one of several such organizations in drama, film, art, social science, education, and journalism, all under the umbrella organization Left-Wing Cultural Coalition.

Although Lu Xun, a prominent figure of the May Fourth Movement, was honored as its nominal head, the League of Left-Wing Writers was actually controlled by Communist Party members Xia Yan, Zhou Yang, Yang Hansheng, and Tian Han,²⁶ sent to operate the cultural and literary frontlines of the Communist movement in the Guomindang-controlled areas. Indeed, the league soon engaged in ideological fights with “fellow-travelers” and enemies of all stripes, within and without. The first of the enemies it took on was the Crescent Moon Society, whose prominent members included Liang Shiqiu, Xu Zhimo, and Hu Shi,²⁷ all educated in Anglo-American schools and fallen under the influence of New Criticism and other Western literary trends of the times, all more or less subscribing to the “art for art’s sake” philosophy and hence critical of the revolutionary, proletarian art and literature programs. Next came the so-called “free men” and “third category” of writers, who were ideologically somewhat sympathetic to the Left-Wing writers but felt they went too far in having politics—no matter how justified its causes—in-vade excessively and dictate art and literary creativity. Then, the Left-Wingers half-heartedly went after independent men of letters such as Lin Yutang,²⁸ who had no overt “political” agendas, were focused

primarily on literary issues such as good-humored satire, and hence posted no particular challenge to the dominant position of the Left-Winger's ideology.

Within the ranks of the league itself there were spirited debates about "mass language" (whether writers should use the real language of the masses, as advocated by Qu Qiubai,²⁹ because the *baihua* that had emerged from the New Literature Movement had itself become "elitist" and hence unintelligible to the workers and peasants), about "Latinization" of the Chinese language, and about the so-called "defense literature," advocated by Zhou Yang, i.e., all literature should serve the overarching theme of national defense against Japan. The debates ended inconclusively, but the key issues, for example, the relationship between art and politics, artistic freedom, never went away.

The phenomenon of the League of Left-Wing Writers, and indeed, of the Communist-sponsored art and literature activities should be viewed not only against the backdrop of the sociopolitical realities of China in the 1930s–40s, but also in a much broader, international context of the socialistic movements (led by the Soviet Union and the Comintern) as well as national liberation wars that were sweeping across Asia and Africa like tidal waves and maintained their momentum well beyond World War II. Literarily, during much of the first half of the twentieth century, many prominent American writers, such as Jack London, Ernest Hemingway, Sinclair Lewis, Richard Wright, John Steinbeck, Langston Hughes, John Dos Passos, to name just a few, disillusioned with capitalism and the West (thanks to the Great Depression, wars, and racism, among other things) also leaned toward the left, searching for viable alternatives—albeit only to be disillusioned again.

Given the sociopolitical and literary agendas of the league, translation by its members focused almost exclusively on the works by Russian or Soviet authors, for example, Maxim Gorky, M. A. Sholokhov, Alexander Fateyev,³⁰ and Marxist literary theories and criticism written by Soviet scholars. There were exceptions, though.

Dai Wangshu (1905–50), a member of the League of Left-Wing Writers, showed remarkable "independence" in his choices for translation, mostly French literature: Charles Perrault (1628–1703), François-René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848), Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–98), and Charles Baudelaire (1821–67). The latter two were prominent figures in the French Symbolists movement, known for their "decadent" art for art's sake stand. Dai's translations of Mallarmé and Baudelaire who had influenced early twentieth century literary movements such as Dadaism, Surrealism, and Futurism would not by

any stretch fit the revolutionary, proletarian literary agendas of the league and the Chinese Communist Party.

From a literary standpoint, the most important translations during the war decades were carried out by a number of talented, but more or less “apolitical” writers living in the Guomindang-controlled areas:

Lin Yutang (1895–1976), known in the West for his English renditions of classic Chinese literature, translated works by the Italian philosopher, historian, and critic Benedetto Croce (1866–1952), Oscar Wilde (*The Critic as Artist*), and Joel Spingarn (1875–1939; *the New Criticism*), and wrote the long essay “On Translation” (1933), which expounded his thoughts on translation methods and standards.

Zhu Shenghao (1912–44), a young and talented writer, single-handedly took on the task of translating the complete works of Shakespeare into Chinese. Zhu started the herculean project in 1935, when the Japanese aggressions in China began to escalate and lost precious manuscripts while on the run after the fall of Shanghai in 1937. Despite the stress of war, unemployment, and poor health, Zhu Shenghao managed to complete the translation of 31 Shakespearean plays, which were published three years after his premature death. Zhu’s work is a monumental *tours de force* that remains unsurpassable even today.

Among notable translations of Western literature during this period were Chekhov’s *Sea Gull*, *Cherry Orchard*, *Uncle Vanya*, Gogol’s *Inspector General*, Pushkin’s *Eugene Onegin*, Margaret Mitchell’s *Gone with the Wind* (only four years after its publication in the United States and one year after the release of the Hollywood epic directed by Victor Fleming and starring Vivian Leigh and Clark Gable), Dante’s *Divine Comedy*, Flaubert’s *Madame Bovary*, Aeschylus’s *Prometheus Bound*, Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*, *Anna Karenina*, *Resurrection*, Dostoyevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*, *Notes from the Underground*, Romain Rolland’s *Jean-Christophe*, Balzac’s *Le Père Goriot*, and Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*. Other important Western authors who received translation included William Blake, Daniel Rossetti, the Brontë Sisters, Thomas Hardy, D. H. Lawrence, John Galsworthy, James Joyce, Joseph Conrad, Virginia Woolf, and W. B. Yeats. The Commercial Press, the biggest of its kind at the time, even launched a *World Classics Series* in 1928, which included 154 titles and was not completed until 1950.

Several important literary figures came to lecture in China, among them I. A. Richards, Bernard Shaw, and W. H. Auden. It would be of interest to note that from his first visit in 1929, to teach at Qinghua

University, to his last visit in 1950, months after the Communist victory, to give a lecture on Homer's *Iliad*, I. A. Richards spent about five years of his life in China, mostly to promote the teaching of Basic English. Richards believed that World War I "was the consequence of a gross breakdown in rational communication," and that Basic English, a streamlined version of the language consisting of only 850 words, uncluttered, logical, would foster "better understanding between different cultures." While from the point of view of post-colonial criticism Richards's zealous promotion of Basic English in China could be read as being driven by a sense of cultural superiority and even "ulterior" motives, his intentions seemed innocuous, charitable enough: to help the Chinese access "a whole range of Western ideas and values" as it was scrambling to "modernize and enter an emergent global, industrial economy as an independent player."³¹

The achievements in translation, though not as groundbreaking or magnificent as during the *sturm und drang* of the May Fourth Movement, were even more amazing given the turbulent, war-plagued sociopolitical realities and given the ideological control in the realms of art and literature in the Red Starred areas and within the League of Left-Wing Writers. Interesting enough, even those powerful ideologues and Party activists in the league did their share of impressive translation work. Xia Yan, for example, was the translator of Gorky's *The Mother* and a number of other works by Russian and Japanese authors.

On another flank of the literary front—original creative writing in the vernacular, the achievements were just as impressive and multifaceted. Shaped as much by the sociopolitical and psychological realities of the times and the native literary traditions as by Western literature that kept fluxing in through translations, the war-torn decades saw a galaxy of gifted poets, fiction writers, and playwrights, for example, Xu Zhimo, Dai Wangshu, Wen Yiduo, Mao Dun, Yu Dafu, Lao She, Shen Congwen, Zhang Tianyi, Ding Ling, Xiao Hong, Zhang Ailing, Ba Jin, Zhao Shuli, Cao Yu, Tian Han, Guo Moruo, Qian Zhongshu; many were first-rate translators themselves.

Among these gifted writers Zhao Shuli (1906–70) was perhaps the lone exception, a truly indigenous writer nurtured in the rural culture of his childhood. Zhao's fictional world was inhabited by simple, country folks whose stories of hopes and struggles were told in their own earthy, living language.³² Most other writers, in contrast, showed visible influence of Western literature. Dai Wangshu, for example, who had majored in French during college and studied in France, wrote some of the best modern Chinese poems that

had notable intertextual chords with French Romantic and Symbolist poetry as well as classic Chinese poetry and philosophy. The musicality, image, and sentiment captured in his 1928 poem “Yu Xiang” [Rainy Alley], that begins with:

Holding up an oil-paper umbrella,
I loiter aimlessly in the long, long
And lonely rainy alley,
I hope to encounter
A lilac-like girl
Nursing her resentment.³³

and ends with a somewhat varied refrain lingers in the reader’s mind long afterwards.

Ba Jin (penname for Li Yaotang, 1904–2005), born in a big upper-class family that was falling apart (very much like the Jia family in *A Dream of Red Mansions*) as he grew up, rebelliously, embraced anarchism, Russian populism, and the French Revolution although he was first and foremost an artist. He was so taken by anarchism that when studying in France he adopted the “kin” in the name of the foremost figure of anarchism, Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), transliterated in Chinese as *jin* [gold], as one half of his penname. He also corresponded many times with Emma Goldman (1869–1940), another prominent figure in the anarchist movement, and considered her his “spiritual mother.” Literarily, Ba Jin came under the influence of Turgenev, Zola, de Maupassant, and Romain Rolland although the fountain for his literary outbursts remained his passionate concerns about what was going on in the world around him. From his early novella *Destruction* (1927) to his highly acclaimed *The Torrent Trilogy*, which consists of *Family* (1931), *Spring* (1938), and *Autumn* (1940), Ba Jin was fired up by the ideals of anarchism, romanticism, and individualism, by his outrage against this “moribund system,” the microcosm of which being the big, degenerate, and hence dysfunctional family he was born into, and by his love for the younger members of the family, his brothers and cousins, who struggled to break free, some crushed, others, though bruised, hanging on to hope for the future.³⁴

Even when a middle school student in Tianjin, Cao Yu (also Ts’ao Yu, 1910–96), considered by many to be the “Shakespeare of China,” was actively involved in the school’s Western-styled theater troupe. While attending Qinghua University in Beijing, Cao Yu majored in Western literature and was an avid reader of Aeschylus, Shakespeare,

Chekhov, Ibsen, Shaw, and O'Neill as well as Chinese classics, all of which would have profound impact on his artistic as well as social visions. In 1933, still a young college student, Cao Yu wrote and published his first and perhaps one of the greatest of modern Chinese plays *Thunderstorm* (1933), which was followed by two other major plays, *Sunrise* (1934) and *Wilderness* (1935). All three have since been staged numerous times both in China and abroad and have been made into films too.

In *Thunderstorm*, women's pursuit of free love and independence (a theme of the New Culture and New Literature Movement inspired in part by Ibsen's *A Doll's House*) and their failure are dramatized through the lives of Fanyi, young wife of the rich and powerful German-educated mine-owner Master Zhou; Lu Ma, a maidservant who had been kicked out after giving birth to two sons of Master Zhou's almost 30 years before the curtain rises and had been thought dead; and Sifeng, Lu Ma's daughter, also a maidservant of the Zhou's. The pursuit of love is doomed to failure because it is forbidden love between a maidservant (Lu Ma) and a young master (Master Zhou), between a stepmother (Fanyi) and a stepson (Zhou Ping, son of Master Zhou and Lu Ma), and between a half-brother (Zhou Ping) and a half-sister (Sifeng). The sense of doom, of inevitable tragedy, reminiscent of Greek tragedies and O'Neill's plays such as *Desires Under the Elms*, arises from the almost seamless interweaving of several important themes: tensions between husband and wife (Master Zhou and Fanyi, Lu Ma and Lu Gui), father and son (Master Zhou and his sons), old and new, past and present, authority and rebellion, and between the striking miners led by their representative Lu Dahai, son of Lu Ma and Master Zhou, and the capital as embodied by Master Zhou. All of these tensions are gathering momentum, like the thunderstorm simmering menacingly in the background, until they come to a head and erupt toward the end of the play with devastating consequences for all.

And all of the characters are trapped in an invisible web of socio-economic, cultural, and supernatural forces (e.g., it is indeed bad karma that of all the possible places in the world, Sifeng should have found employment as a maidservant in the household of her mother's former lover and should have fallen in love with her half-brother and been impregnated by him) bent on destroying them. One cannot but feel pity and fear on account of them all, including the repressive, authoritarian Master Zhou, who is redeemed—somewhat—by the lingering feelings he has for Lu Ma, or more exactly, her memories, and by the loneliness that enwraps him as the curtain falls. Of all the

characters, Lu Ma, tragic as her life is, calls for admiration for her Hecuba-like strength even as the sky falls on her and her children.

The other two plays of the trilogy, *Sunrise* and *Wilderness*, were also inspired by Western classics as well as the sociocultural realities of China at the time. *Sunrise* is a study of a twisted, Nora-like character, Chen Bailu, a young, urbane woman who desires freedom, independence, and love, but is so entrapped in the parasitic life of a high-class prostitute or courtesan that the more she struggles the more entangled she becomes. She has neither courage nor real desire to leave the “cage” and go out and make a real life of her own. The only decent and courageous act she can do to redeem herself is to help a much younger girl escape the fate of being destroyed.

Carrying the same theme of an individual fighting a losing battle against a hostile world, *Wilderness* focuses on the story of Qiu Hu [Revenging Tiger], a fugitive convict who returns to his native village to revenge against an old rich farmer who had wrongfully accused him and put him in jail. As it turns out, the old farmer is already dead and his son has taken Qiu Hu's former bride Jinzi [Gold] as his second wife. Consumed by hatred and a burning desire for revenge, Qiu Hu kills the young farmer and his son by his dead first wife. Horrified by what he has done, Qiu Hu and Jinzi, still very much in love with each other, flee and soon lose their way in the wilderness of the Black Forest, where they are haunted by eerie voices and hideous apparitions, very much in the manner that O'Neil's Emperor Jones experiences when running into the forest, the dark wilderness signifying the depravity of Qiu Hu's soul, his fear, and the hostile world closing in on him. Driven by despair, Qiu Hu kills himself. The play is as much a study of love, hate, jealousy, and such primal human passions as the social forces that conspire to force such tragic developments on individuals.³⁵

Cao Yu's other plays, for example, *Fire*, another trilogy about the War of Resistance against Japan, carry more overt political themes. These plays may have served important sociopolitical functions but their literary achievements seem to pale when compared with *Thunderstorm*, *Sunrise*, and *Wilderness*.

The impact of overt political and ideological positioning, by choice or involuntary, on one's creativity and critical fortune can be illustrated briefly by the story of two unlikely literary sisters: Ding Ling and Zhang Ailing, who took divergent paths during these turbulent years of revolutions and wars.

Like Cao Yu and many other modern Chinese writers, Ding Ling (also Ting Ling, 1904–86) wrote some of her best works during

the early decades of the twentieth century. In her daring short story "Miss Sophia's Diary" (1928), Sophia, the first person narrator, keeps a journal of her contradictory emotions about herself and the people around her, especially young men who are romantically interested in her, and her confused sense of her sexuality. It is as frank and honest a treatment of such a topic as Yu Dafu's short story "Sinking" (1921), in which a young Chinese student in Japan, caught between loneliness in an alien culture, sexual frustration, and nationalistic sentiments, struggles with his overblown self-consciousness and hypochondriac self-doubt and second-guessing. The fact that Ding Ling's protagonist is a young woman and the "confessional" tone in which the story is written make "Miss Sophia's Diary" stand out even more. The story reads so much more urbane and Western than one would expect, and indeed, as Ding Ling herself recalled in 1984, having survived the ordeals of the Cultural Revolution, that without the influence of Western literature she would "not have been able to write fiction, or at any rate not the kind of fiction" during the early days of her literary career:

It is obvious that my earliest stories followed the path of Western realism, and not only in their forms: the thinking behind them was to some extent influenced by Western democracy.³⁶

This is also true of stories that feature rural, rustic folks. At the time when she wrote stories such as "In the Xia Village" (1941), Ding Ling was already a card-carrying member of the Chinese Communist Party, having survived the death of her husband, Hu Yeping, a poet and Communist activist, in the hands of the Guomindang government, and years of house arrest herself. Nonetheless, she persisted, or rather, insisted on, her independence as an artist and the integrity of a writer. "In the Xia Village," for example, written about one year before Mao's "Yan'an Talk," Ding Ling didn't focus on the "brightness" of things in the Red-Starred area, as Mao would expect writers and artists to do.

The first-person narrator, a young Ding Ling like writer, is sent to a village to recuperate from her unnamed sickness or wound. There, looking from outside in, she is gradually drawn to a young village girl, Purity, who has mysteriously returned, and into the girl's confidence as the 18-year-old, tormented by the loath of self-righteous villagers and by self-loath, struggles to maintain innocence, sanity, and hope. As it is revealed in the story, Purity had been sent to gather intelligence from the Japanese army under the cover of a "comfort

woman” and hence has contracted a sexually transmitted disease from having slept with countless Japanese officers and soldiers. Although the narrator evolves from being a curious observer to being a confidant and advocate of sort, the author refuses to compromise by offering easy, propagandistic solutions to complex sociopolitical, moral, and psychological problems. The narrator’s voice is sympathetic, but measured enough to let the story flow and carry itself, its grey-toned ambience touching without being overly sentimental.

The same cannot be said about Ding Ling’s later fictional works and for that she would pay a dear price on the scales of modern Chinese literary history, especially in the eyes of critics such as C. T. Hsia.³⁷

A near contemporary of Ding Ling, Zhang Ailing (also Eileen Chang, 1920–95) offers a very different story. Zhang Ailing, whose literary fortune has risen sharply in recent decades, thanks, in part, to the work of C. T. Hsia, didn’t join the revolution or put her writing in the service of any explicit political or nationalistic causes, for example, War of Resistance against Japan, the civil war between the Communists and the Guomindang. Unlike Ding Ling and many other modern Chinese writers, Zhang Ailing focused almost exclusively on the everyday life, the mundane, the tensions between men and women caught in hopeless love. In a way she never outgrew the Ding Ling of the “Miss Sophie’s Diary” phase.

As a descendent of powerful modern Chinese figures such as Li Hongzhang of the Self-Strengthening Movement, Zhang lived through a troubled childhood: abandonment by mother at age three, violence from a drug addicted father, parents’ ugly divorce, and turbulent relationship with her stepmother. This intimate knowledge of the ugly side of human nature and life, coupled with a sharp literary sensitivity nurtured from being a ferocious reader of Chinese classics and Western literature (having attended a Christian high school and studied English Literature at the University of Hong Kong), gives her writing an urbane, Western, almost “decadent,” sickly kind of beauty, reminiscent of Emily Brontë, a favorite author of hers. Her name itself, Ailing, given by her mother, a transliteration of Eileen, seems to have “predestined” her to be a hybrid of Chinese and Western cultures, a Chinese Emily Brontë who stayed out of overt politics but had her fingers on the pulse of the tormented human souls.³⁸

The stories written by the early Ding Ling and those by Zhang Ailing may have longer lasting literary values. However, whenever anyone feels the urge to dole out dismissive judgments on Ding Ling of the later phase—the choices she as well as many other modern

Chinese writers were forced to make, he or she should remember the turbulent history of modern China she was so (helplessly) caught up in.

TRANSLATION OF SCHOOLS AND SCHOLARSHIP

By the time I. A. Richards was visiting China for the last time in 1950, intending to lecture about Homer's *Iliad* using the Basic English he had co-invented (instead of the much more elegant dactylic hexameters), tens of thousands of Chinese, especially young Chinese from elementary school up to the top-notch universities in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Guangzhou, would have been able to follow him, more or less—the abduction of Helen, the wrath of Achilles, the fall of Troy, the meddling of gods and goddesses, and fate, freewill, and human destiny. However, sociopolitical developments in China after the 1949 Communist victory, the tightening of ideological control of school curriculum, and the mounting anti-West atmosphere thanks to the outbreak of the Korean War, cut short his stay.

Nonetheless, by this time in China schools and scholarship had already been highly Westernized, the logical outcomes of developments since the late 1800s. In fact, by the late 1930s Western-style institutions of higher learning had been quite established. Born during the difficult post-Opium War decades, these institutions of higher learning had been the sites where sociocultural, ideological, pedagogical tugs-of-war had been fought, as the traditionalists tried to hang on for relevance and indeed for survival while the “modernists,” big on Western subjects, gradually gained dominance. Even where Western subjects were taught and English was the language of instruction there were the inevitable tensions between the “translationists,” those who favored the translation method, and “compositionists,” those who favored writing in English.³⁹

These institutions of higher learning fell into four main types: state-sponsored universities created during the late Qing period, Western missionary colleges, private colleges, and Guomindang government-sponsored universities. In terms of prestige and quality they fell into the elite national institutions such as Beijing (Peking), Qinghua (Tsinghua), and Yanjing (Yenching) Universities, all based in Beijing; the interregional institutions such as Fudan and St. John's Universities in Shanghai; regional universities such as Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, Zhongyang University in Nanjing, Wuhan University in Wuhan, and Sichuang University in Chendu; and at the lower rungs,

provincial institutions, such as normal schools and institutes of specialized subjects. The elite national colleges and universities, which drew students of the most privileged socioeconomic backgrounds from all over the country, focused on Western languages and learning in the liberal arts tradition whereas provincial institutions, which drew students from well-to-do (middle and upper-middle class) families, stressed Chinese subjects and practical, professional training.

Back in the late 1800s, when the Qing court first allowed Western-style schools (such as Tongwen Institute) to open, it met with fierce opposition from traditionalists. However, by the early decades of the twentieth century, the teaching of foreign languages and learning had found, or rather fought, its way into the curricular mainstream of the elite national schools, where English and Chinese, Western science and Chinese classics would be taught side by side. From there on this new curriculum would spread to provincial and other local schools. Before long, with the exception of courses in traditional Chinese learning (Chinese language, literature, history, and philosophy), almost all other courses in humanities and professional studies were, predominantly, following the curriculum of their Western counterparts, using English textbooks and references. Oftentimes the language of instruction for these courses, taught by Chinese professors who had received education abroad or from Westerners, was English. This trend spilled over to secondary schools in major metropolis and from there to small towns where the teaching and learning of English began to be emphasized, especially for the highly competitive college entrance exams. Even schools in out-of-the-way, rural areas tried their best to be on the bandwagon despite the fact that almost none of them had teachers proficient in English or any other foreign language. So they had to make do with working on grammar books and translation exercises. Many of the English lessons were actually taught in Chinese by teachers who themselves were hardly proficient in English.

As a result of such developments, proficiency in foreign languages, especially English, became key to academic success, very much at the expense of traditional Chinese learning, so much so that interest, and hence enrollment, in Chinese programs declined sharply. Classical scholars who had profound ambivalence about the West did resist such trends the best they could, but it was a losing battle because the tide of history, it seemed, was not on their side.

Emphasis on foreign language proficiency for academic success naturally drove a wedge between the elite national schools which had the faculty and other resources to deliver Western-oriented curricula

and the provincial and local schools which were not so fortunate. It also drove a wedge between missionary colleges and universities and their Chinese counterparts because the former, whose faculty were predominantly native-speakers of English and other European languages, emphasized conversation and composition, whereas the latter, whose faculty were predominantly Chinese, had to rely on grammar drills and translation exercises. This would be reflected in college entrance exams, curricula, and even career choices: Graduates from missionary schools gravitated toward exciting new professions such as business, economics, medicine, journalism, trade, and finance; even two-thirds of graduates from Chinese schools, where traditional learning was emphasized, flocked into those exciting new fields, too.

Inevitably, a hierarchy, or caste system, so to speak, resulted from these developments as Western learning gained prestige and as English secured dominance in the curriculum nationwide from secondary schools to colleges and universities. It is emblematic, or symptomatic, of China, a traditional society, as it struggled along the path to modernity. Would the trajectory be further interrupted with the Communist victory in China in 1949?

THE STRANGE INTERLUDE (1950–1976)

Winter 1959. Nankai University in Tianjin—one of the top universities in China. A man in a gray jacket, pale, bespectacled, was busy in and outside the grand Western-style university library, sweeping the grounds littered with dead leaves, dusting the tables and chairs, mopping the floors, cleaning the lavatories, and, when all such janitorial duties had been completed hours later, putting loads of returned books back on shelves. He would be doing such labor all day long under the vigilant eye of authorities because not too long ago officials of the Tianjin People’s Court had come to the campus and declared him a “historical counterrevolutionary.”

What was the crime he had committed against the Chinese revolutionary cause to warrant being thus condemned?

Because 17 years before, during the toughest days of the Burma campaign (1942–44), the man, a young college student then, had answered the call and volunteered to serve as an English interpreter for the joint expedition forces of Chinese (Guomindang), American, and British armies, all under the command of General Joseph Stilwell; he had had a narrow escape from death when the allied forces, crushed by the Japanese, went on a death march like retreat through the jungles that lasted several months, sometimes staggering on for days without food.

Because five years before as an associate professor of English who had recently returned from graduate studies at the University of Chicago, he had had the audacity to be sympathetic to a few of his colleagues who at a meeting had spoken up, critically, about the “authoritarianism” of the department head—although he had been silenced before a word had barely left his tongue—an audacity for which he had been forced to “confess” and “self-criticize” over and again and barely escaped being condemned.

Because only two years before, in 1957, “inspired” by the “Let A Hundred Flowers Bloom” and “Let A Hundred Schools of Thought Contend” movement sponsored by Mao Zedong and the Communist Party, he had published a poem titled “Elegy,” to mark the burial of his old timid, petty-bourgeois self, and another poem titled “A Tale of Ninety-Nine Schools Debating” to ridicule those who did not have the guts to *daming defang* [cry out loud; let out steam], to speak their minds publically, without reserve—to criticize the government and the Party.

After a day of hard labor that winter, he would return to his home, to his wife and two- and four-year-old children, and sit down to work again: to translate and polish his translations of “The Prisoner of Caucasus” (Pushkin), *Prometheus Unbound* (Shelley), “Ode to a Nightingale” (Keats) . . . until late into the night.

He would be doing so day after day for three years until 1962, when some level of normalcy was returned to China (not before tens of millions had perished from famine), his punishment was somewhat lightened and he could now spend more time doing the kind of work ostensibly more befitting his education and talent—indexing, cataloguing, putting loads of returned books back on shelves—than the menial labor of dusting, mopping, and sweeping although by this time, by force of habit or by a desire to have more time for the “librarian” work, he would arrive at least half an hour earlier every morning to jumpstart the janitorial portions of his daily assignments.

The man’s name is Mu Dan or Cha Liangzhen (1918–77)—the former, a penname forever identified with what is now regarded as some of the most potent and promising modern, or rather modernist, Chinese poetry, and the latter, his real, legal name, with some of the greatest and most influential literary translations.

The “respite” from watched hard labor, however, would turn out to be shorter lived than anyone could have expected. What had already happened to Mu Dan/Cha Liangzhen would prove only a prelude to what was to come when the storm of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution hit China in 1966.¹

FROM HERE TO DYSTOPIA

On October 1, 1949, when Mao Zedong, in the dual capacity of the Chairman of the Communist Party and the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,² declared on the forum of Tiananmen Square that the Chinese people had stood up and that the new socialist People’s Republic of China had just been established,

he, as well as those top CCP leaders (e.g., Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai) and leaders of the dozen or so democratic, non-Communist parties, probably genuinely believed that a new age was dawning on a nation that had seen so many civil wars and foreign aggressions in the last hundred years and had suffered so much bloodshed and hardship, a new socialist China wherein the people, the broad masses, would begin to live and work as *guojia zhuren* [masters of the country]. Indeed, Mao and the top leaders of the Communist Party had long believed that socialism was the right choice for China:

For Mao, as for many Chinese intellectuals, the appeal of Western socialist doctrines was closely bound up with alienation from traditional Chinese value and opposition to the Western imperialist threat. To become a socialist was a way to satisfy both needs. Socialism, inherently iconoclastic, reinforced an intellectual's rejection of traditional culture and also reaffirmed the May Fourth Westernizing inheritance—but at the same time it rejected the West in its contemporary capitalist and imperialist form.³

In the early days of the new people's republic there were unmistakable signs of China entering a new age as it was campaigning to rid off prostitution, opium addiction and gambling, oppression of women through the institutions of forced or arranged marriage, child brides, and concubinage, and other such old, debilitating ills, and as it was rebuilding the economy on the ruins of wars. In the first three years of the new republic both agriculture and industry saw double-digit annual growth and people's overall living conditions improved visibly.⁴ Few, if any, in the top leadership could have doubted at the time of dizzying euphoria of victory and optimism for the future that the political and ideological tool box that had worked for the Communist Party in the decades of harsh, armed struggle against enemies both in and outside China to gain power might not work for them again during socialist construction. Most important among the tools that the Communist Party had hammered in shape and wielded on its way to power, especially during the 1940s, was Mao Zedong Thought, a sinolized version of Marxism that had become the dominant ideology dictating all things sociopolitical, economic, and cultural.

Although the exact content of Mao Zedong Thought had never been precisely formulated or consistently expounded and its application often depended on circumstances and the calculations of Mao himself, it contained several themes and core ideas pertaining to ideology, class struggle, egalitarianism and utopianism, mass line, and anti-intellectualism.⁵ Mao, along with other top leaders in the

Party, had placed enormous emphasis on the importance of ideology. Throughout its history from its humble beginning to 1949 and beyond, the Communist Party had always tried its utmost, through relentless study sessions, massive campaigns, and brutal purges, if necessary, to shepherd the rank and file into toeing whatever line the Party had drawn for the moment. Such massive campaigns were often orchestrated along class lines.

Mao Zedong, going back to the 1920s when he was not yet in the top leadership of the Communist revolution, had long believed in the division of people into “classes” according to their socioeconomic status in the entire production process, for example, bourgeoisie (high, middle, petty), proletariat and semi-proletariat, landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, lower-middle peasant, poor peasant. The proletariat and poor peasants would remain the trusted core in the Communist revolution and whomever else to be “invited” to join whatever united fronts to be formed would depend on the exigency of the moment. In the post-1949 decades, class division would also be drawn according to the political attitudes or ideological inclinations of individuals, for example, whether they supported or questioned the Communist Party’s policies or monopoly of power. Large numbers of intellectuals, thanks to their outspokenness, would be denounced as *de facto* class enemies. Their lives and careers would be ruined. Misfortunes would befall their families too.

Much of the Communist victory in China in 1949 could also be attributed to the Party’s extraordinary ability to mobilize the broadest possible masses to achieve the set goals, for example, to pressure the Guomindang government into forming a united front in the 1920s to fight the warlords and then in the late 1930s to fight the Japanese aggressions (which happened to give the Communist forces the direly needed space to recuperate from Guomindang’s extermination campaigns and to expand). The Communist victory in 1949 would not have been possible without the mobilization of millions of the common people, especially peasants, as foot soldiers or as porters transporting food, ammunitions, and other supplies using carrying poles, donkey-drawn carts, whatever means available.

The rallying cry for such mobilizations had been a brand of egalitarianism and utopianism (both homebred and informed by Marxist ideology) as well as freedom, democracy, and other anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism platforms. The vision of an egalitarian, utopian society, albeit not as exactly articulated or theorized as its counterpart in the West, and indeed, not much beyond the simple, immediate goal of “every tiller has his land,” had been at the heart of almost

every peasant uprising from the earliest to the Taiping Rebellion led by Hong Xiuquan in the late 1800s. The introduction of orthodox Marxist theory of the surplus value and the ideal of a communist society based on the principles of “from each according to abilities” and “to each according to need,” a classless society in which the distinctions between mental and manual labor, between town and countryside, and between worker and peasant, were abolished, made the vision of a utopian society even more appealing not only to Mao and his associates⁶ but also to the broad masses.

Anti-intellectualism, a notable streak in Mao, or Mao Zedong Thought, which has direct bearing on the subject of this chapter and proved bad news for Chinese intellectuals and indeed for China as a whole, might seem self-contradictory or counterintuitive because Mao himself was a *zhishifengzi*, loosely translated as “intellectual,” by any estimate or definition of the term as used in the context of China.⁷ Mao’s profound distrust of the intellectuals, however, was characterized by both personal coloration and intellectual rationalization. Intellectually and politically, Mao regarded the proletariat and the poor peasants as the most reliable hard core of the revolutionary cause and everyone else, including the intellectuals, as more or less temporary allies. Emotionally and psychologically, Mao, though intelligent, well read in both Chinese classics and the Marxist canon (through translations by the intellectuals, of course), and having had the benefit of college-level education, remained, unapologetically, the country bumpkin of the small town of Shaoshan in the inland province of Hunan. He did not belong to the cultural and intellectual elite. In fact, he had made only so far as to an assistant position in the library of the famed Peking University (where Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, the other two would-be founding members of the Communist Party, were high-profile professors). He didn’t get to travel to France and other European countries to work and study as Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and dozens of others in the Party top leadership had done, experiencing both the culture and workers movement in the West firsthand. Neither had he gone to study in Moscow, as Liu Shaoqi and many others had done, and received direct instructions from Stalin and other Comintern leaders. Mao felt right at home with the rank and file of the revolution, the overwhelming majority of whom being poor peasants, illiterate or semi-illiterate. He had intimate knowledge of them, understood them, trusted them, and knew how to mobilize them for the revolutionary cause.

To breed a new generation of “intellectuals,” Mao and the newly established government set out to reform and restructure schools,

especially institutions of higher learning, right away. At the time illiteracy rate in China stood as high as 80 percent, with only 25.77 million (out of a populace of about 500 million) in school. Of these only 0.3 percent (120,000) were college students and 3 percent were attending middle school. The new government started the campaign to set up new schools and all kinds of “illiteracy annihilation” programs all over the country. By 1952, the school population had increased to 54.43 million, with 191,000 college students.

However, in the zeal to promote and popularize education the government nationalized all private schools, including the famed Yanjing (Yenching) University, Furen (Fu Jen) Catholic University, Fudan University, and the University of Nanking, dumped the hitherto dominant Western-style curriculum and programs and replaced them with Soviet Russian models of education, which placed lopsided emphasis on science and technology (at the expense of humanities and social sciences) and on training narrowly specialized technical professionals instead of laying a well-rounded foundation through liberal arts education.

Meanwhile, Mao and the Communist Party wasted no time in launching “thought reform” campaigns directed at the intellectuals, especially the intellectual elite at the higher end. Some of the intellectuals had already joined the Communist revolution in Yan’an and other Red-Starred regions. Others were “fighting” in Guomindang controlled cities. Many, however, had been independent and politically nonaffiliated. The first of the thought reform campaigns started within days of the establishment of the new republic, when some of the most prominent scholars, philosophers, and scientists were forced to self-criticize, publicly, over and again, in national newspapers. Among them were Zhu Guangqian (1897–1986), founder of modern aesthetics study in China, who had studied in Hong Kong, Edinburgh, London, and earned his doctorate from the University of Strasbourg; Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005), one of China’s finest and most influential sociologists and anthropologists; Zhou Peiyuan (1902–93), a prominent scientist who had studied and carried out research work at some of the top universities in the United States and Europe. Under the mounting pressure and out of a genuine desire to begin afresh, they publicly pledged to renounce their bourgeois, petty-bourgeois thoughts, to seek rebirth through thorough and careful study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and to dedicate their lives to serving the Socialist new China and the working-class people.

These thought reform campaigns, typically, would escalate into “thought struggle” and Mao himself would “weigh in” and lead the

charge, as in the case of *Wu Xun Zhuang* [The Life of Wu Xun], a 1951 film about a late Qin citizen educator who raised funds through begging to set up schools for the rural poor. The film, when first screened, was widely praised for its celebration of a noble spirit who sacrificed himself for the salvation of the poor and downtrodden although some criticized Wu Xun for being spineless in begging for money from the rich and powerful. When Mao himself weighed in, in the form of a *People's Daily* editorial (penned by himself) denouncing Wu Xun for not joining the late Qin anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism struggle and for becoming a shameless running dog for the rich landlord class, the case was shut and closed. Wu Xun would eventually suffer the ultimate indignity of having his bones dug from the grave during the Cultural Revolution.

Another such case in the early 1950s was the denunciation of Yu Pingbo (1900–90), a renowned literary scholar and critic who authored some paradigm-shifting study of the classic novel *A Dream of Red Mansions* from a textual and philosophical approach. Yu was criticized by a couple of young and upcoming scholars for having missed the novel's subversive yet overarching theme of class struggle and the inevitable fall of the old, feudalistic society. When Mao threw his weight in, in the form of letters and *People's Daily* editorials, to support the younger critics, an otherwise scholarly debate quickly escalated, or deteriorated, into a nationwide denunciation campaign, which spilled over to the entire field of arts and literature and social sciences. The persecution would continue until the Cultural Revolution when Yu Pingbo was sent to a farm to "reform through labor."

Even worse plight befell Hu Feng (1902–85) in 1954. A talented and free-spirited writer and art and literature critic, Hu Feng had the "audacity" to write and send Mao a "30,000-word" report criticizing the Communist Party's policies and tight control in art and literature. For this Hu Feng was denounced as a counterrevolutionary; more than 2,000 intellectuals sympathetic to his views were implicated; 92 of them, along with Hu himself, were arrested and put in jail. Refusing to bow his proud head, Hu Feng would languish in jail and eventually become insane.⁸

In the immediate aftermath of the denunciation of Hu Feng (and his alleged "counterrevolutionary clique"), Mao and others in the top leadership seemed to have a moment of self-reflection. They seemed to sense that watertight control of ideology and repressive sociopolitical atmosphere could be counterproductive and lead to major political trouble, as evidenced in the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev

in the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Uprising in the spring of 1956. So they encouraged artists, writers, and other intellectuals to speak freely and to criticize government policies.

However, when the boldest as well as the politically naïve (such as Mu Dan and his colleagues alluded to earlier) among them took the bait and began to let out some serious steam, when the criticism became more pointed, directed more at the CCP's monopoly of power, at the lack of freedom of speech and other civil liberties, Mao and the Party couldn't take it any longer and struck back. In the ensuing campaign to identify and purge the "rightists" (hence the so-called Anti-Rightist Campaign), those who had spoken out, each work unit, for example, school, library, artist troupe, publishing house, government agency, had to meet the quota set by Mao and the central government.⁹ Some people, out of naiveté, not knowing what repercussions would befall them and their families, once they were labelled a "rightist," nominated themselves for the dubious honor; some were "volunteered" by others, as dramatized in a 1993 film *The Blue Kite*: During a marathon meeting in a smoke-filled room that has not led to naming anyone as the "rightist" to meet the quota, Lin Shaolong, a librarian, unable to bear the mounting bladder pressure any longer, leaves for the bathroom for a quick relief. When he returns, all eyes in the room are on him. He knows right away that he has just been "anointed" in his absence and for that dubious honor he and his family will pay dearly.¹⁰

While the dust of the Anti-Rightist Campaign was still falling, Mao Zedong, inspired by the Soviet sputnik, the first satellite launched into space, jumpstarted the Great Leap Forward campaign to launch "satellites" of his own—to unleash the hitherto unimaginable enthusiasm and power of the broad masses by setting sky-high quotas for steel and grain production. The goal was to overtake Britain in ten years and the United States in 15.¹¹ As the feverish Communist wind gusted across the country, steel-making furnaces were set up haphazardly in every courtyard and public square, pots and pans from every household were collected and tossed into the furnaces, peasants were persuaded or coerced, once again through massive campaigns, into People's Communes where farmland was being plowed and dug at least three feet deep to ensure harvests ten, twenty, or even one hundred times higher than hitherto humanly possible. When parts of the country were hit by bad weather, when the Sino-Soviet rift was complete and the Soviet Union withdrew its support, and indeed, when the attempts to launch impossible production "satellites" crashed,

disaster—great famine—struck. By the time it was over three years later, about 40 million of people had lost their lives.¹²

In the aftermath of the Great Famine, Mao and the Communist Party went through another short period of self-reflection and adjustment of policies, which led to the recovery of a sort of socioeconomic life, not without launching a nationwide Socialist Education Movement, aka, the Four Clean-ups. It all started in the countryside, to clean up the division of labor, the accounts, the properties, and the warehouses, but soon expanded into a bigger, more serious nationwide campaign to clean up politics, economics, organization, and thought. From here to the disaster of disasters, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was just a matter of time.

The fall of Khrushchev in 1964, which aroused fear in Mao that the same might happen to him, the growing distrust of his Long-March-comrade lieutenants who he feared might band together to topple him despite the personality cult they had helped promote since the 1940s, and his obsession with ideology and class struggle—all of this drove Mao toward pursuing continued revolutions even more relentlessly. In Mao's estimate, this was a life-and death struggle for the Party and for the future of China.¹³

After much ideological, propagandistic, and organizational maneuvering, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on August 5, 1966, with a big poster of his own, scribbled on the corner of a newspaper, "Bombard the Headquarters—My Big Character Poster," another canon firing heard all over China. Emboldened by the enthusiastic support of the Great Leader, tens of millions of young and overzealous Red Guards swam across the country to rebel, to do revolution, to smash all things they condemned as old, bourgeois, Western, feudalistic—books, music, painting, architecture, subjecting anyone associated with such, teachers, artists, poets, scholars, officials, to endless psychological as well as physical abuse. The whole country was turned into a sea of Red Guards, of Mao's Little Red Book, and of red terror. Once unleashed, even Mao himself could not have put the genie back into the bottle even if he had wanted to. By the time the ten-year ordeal was over in 1976, when Mao died and the Gang of Four (Madame Mao and three of her closest associates) were arrested, millions had perished, including some top leaders of the Communist Party, China was on the brink of socioeconomic and cultural bankruptcy, and people were dying for another revolution—once again, to save the nation from its moribund fate, largely self-inflicted, and indeed, to save it from itself.¹⁴

In the decades from 1950s to the 70s, the West was going through some tough, tumultuous times of its own too. The United States, for example, fought two costly wars (Korean and Vietnam), skirted on the edge of a nuclear war (during the Cuban missile crisis), lived under the long shadow of Cold War and nuclear annihilation, and was shaken by the witch-hunt of McCarthyism, Civil Rights movement, anti-war protests, the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., Watergate, oil crises, and other troubles big and small. It wasn't exactly a picture of utopia, either. It was a time a nation's faith in capitalism was being tested too.

However, in terms of the magnitude, depth, and intensity of human suffering and of literary, artistic, and cultural destruction resulted from ironfisted control of state and ideological apparatus, what happened in the West didn't come anywhere close to what the Chinese people were going through. The plight of the intellectuals in China, teachers, artists, writers, scholars, especially during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, had no parallel in the long history of China and probably in the history of any other country in the world.

Indeed, from Xuan Zhuang in the seventh century through the Jesuit missionaries and their Chinese collaborators all the way to Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, Lin Shu, Hu Shi, and Lu Xun in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century, no translators had ever experienced anything close to such ruthless control of their minds as well as their work. The translators in the decades from 1949 to 1976, some of them having been prominent figures in the Chinese revolution since the New Culture and New Literature Movement, had been relegated to the position of the Party's handmaids. By launching one massive, relentless campaign after another Mao and his cohorts might have been trying to propel China into the orbit for fast-track social and economic development, but in reality their draconian rule and mostly misguided policies had sent it a gigantic step backwards and turned the country into a dystopia. Intellectually speaking, China was even a far cry from the days when Chen Duxiu and other iconoclastic young people could call—more or less freely—for Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science to help save and renew China. It was a strange, twisted interlude indeed.

“THE HANDMAID’S TALE”

When the first ever National Translation Work meeting convened in Beijing on November 5, 1951, sponsored by the State Publication

Bureau of the new government that came to power only two years before, it all seemed innocuous enough. About 160 governmental translation agency officials, publishers as well as well-known translators, attended. The stated purpose of convening such a meeting was to better plan and organize translation activities nationwide so as to remedy the “chaotic, disorderly, and wasteful” situations of the translation front. The titles of the keynote speech (“Strive toward Well-Planned and High Quality Translation Work”) and several plenary talks (“On Translating Marxist-Leninist Works,” “Why Does the Soviet Union Do Translation Work?” “On Government Translation Agencies’ Translation Work,” “People’s University’s Translation Work”), however, gave a clear indication of the ideological orientation of the meeting.¹⁵

The week-long meeting concluded with the adoption of two documents, “Regulations Concerning Public and Private Joint Publications of Translation” (draft) and “Regulations Concerning Translation Work by Government and Civic Translation Agencies” (draft). The operative word here is “regulation.” These documents aimed at regulating nationwide translation work by both government agencies and civic organizations at two levels. Ideologically, the stated mission for all such agencies and organizations was to continue to translate and improve the quality of translation of works in the Marxism-Leninism canon, especially the experiences, achievements, and scientific and technological advancement in the Soviet Union, to educate the people, and to promote the political and economic construction of the new, socialist republic. The key to success was to institutionalize translation work through centralized planning and regulation. As a direct result of such thinking, a new Translation Department was set up within the State Publication Bureau to centralize and streamline all translation work. At the more technical level, the meeting advocated standardization of translation of proper names, places, and concepts and establishment of national criteria concerning good translation and translation methods, issues about which the May Fourth generation had debated spiritedly. Finally, the meeting wanted to promote a positive atmosphere and attitude toward translation work and encouraged criticism and self-criticism in order to improve the quality of translation.

This new development on the translation front was meant to harness all translators and their energy toward serving the dominant ideology of Mao Zedong Thought and the stated socioeconomic goals of the Communist Party, all under one centralized command. It, interestingly enough, anticipated the first Five-Year Plan for national

economic development that would be drafted and implemented soon.¹⁶ This urge to centralize, to plan, and to regulate could at least be traced back to certain streaks in the temper of the May Fourth Movement, as evidenced in Hu Shi's call for holding a national conference to develop a five-year plan for a set number of Western authors and texts to be translated, and Mao Dun's top-priority list of a similar nature.¹⁷ It came from the same vein of the long-held "writing as vehicle for the way" belief in Chinese cultural traditions although in this case the way of the Communist Party, and indeed, the way of Mao, was the only way. And it came from the same drive to save and renew China through translation of Western books although Yan Fu, Lin Shu, Liang Qichao, let alone Hu Shi and Lu Xun, might not have wished for such tight control. Now, for the first time in Chinese cultural history, translation as well as all other aspects of artistic, literary, and intellectual life, had to be institutionalized under one central command.

To follow up, the Chinese Writers Association convened a national meeting on the subject of literary translation two years later on August 1953. The stated purpose of the meeting was to promote the agenda established at the 1951 meeting in the field of literary translation. Also a first of its kind, the meeting called on all literary translation workers to appreciate literary translation as "a cause of paramount importance" in the socialist construction and as "an indispensable and important weapon in the international political struggle as well as domestic cultural construction." This, apparently, was very much in line with the spirit and the stated purpose of the National Translation Work meeting two years before. Many prominent figures in modern Chinese literary and cultural life, for example, Mao Dun, Guo Moruo, Lao She, Zheng Zhenduo, attended the meeting.

Mao Dun, a vanguard from the May Fourth era, gave the keynote speech entitled "Strive toward Further Development of the Cause of Literary Translation and Improvement of the Quality of Translation!" Guo Moruo, another prominent May Fourth figure, gave a plenary talk, in which he emphasized that through literary translation "we can not only learn about the life and customs of people in other countries and their wishes, but also, more importantly, help inspire our own creative work and excite our writers' desire to create, and moreover, help improve our language." The proud, free-spirited Guo Moruo who had argued vehemently for the freedom of choices for literary translation could still be seen in such a talk even as he tried hard to toe the Party line. Nonetheless, he had traveled, or retreated, quite a bit of distance voluntarily or not so voluntarily

and was fast becoming a mouthpiece of the Party, a much humbled, obsequious handmaid.

Like the National Translation Work meeting two years before, Mao Dun and his literary associates wanted to establish a centralized system to plan, organize, and regulate all literary translation to avoid redundancy and to improve quality. At the more technical level, they also aimed at reaching consensus concerning the criteria of good translation and the methods of translation, although, to the credit of many attending the meeting, including Mao Dun, they tried to strike a balance between content (politics) and form (art) instead of letting the former completely supersede or overrule the latter. Guo Moruo, for example, advocated going back to the tripartite “golden rule” advanced by Yan Fu half a century back: “faithfulness, expressiveness, and elegance,” which, as discussed in [Chapter 2](#), bears affinity to what Lawrence Venuti would call the “domestication” method. The spirited debate between the “direct” translation camp (led by Lu Xun and others) and the “free” translation camp since the May Fourth Movement ended—for now—with the latter being officially sanctioned through the arbitration of a semi-governmental body at a national meeting, a rare development in the history of translation just about anywhere in the world.

Translators, from the days of Yan Fu, Lin Shu, Lu Xun to the 1940s, had been mostly “free agents,” so to speak, free to pursue their own literary endeavors, and free to associate themselves with whatever literary organizations and camps of their own choice. Now they all became foot soldiers in the same army corps or (mental) laborers in the same production brigade, all regimented under the banner of the sociopolitical and ideological priorities of the country at the moment.

The geopolitical reality of the first few years since the new CCP government came to power was a brutal, costly war fought with the West (led by the United States) in Korea and China’s reliance on the assistance of the Soviet Union in its socioeconomic and technological development. The Chinese government, therefore, had no choice but to throw itself into the camp dominated by its benefactor. Indeed, during these years until the complete fallout in the early 1960s, China looked up to the Soviet Union as the “big, elder brother,” as the “teacher,” and the Soviet Union’s today as China’s tomorrow. It would not be surprising, under such circumstances, that literary translation would be favoring, lopsidedly, Soviet literature too.¹⁸

As discussed in [Chapters 2](#) and [3](#), Russian literature had always been well represented in Chinese translations. Almost every major

nineteenth and early twentieth century Russian author, for example, Gogol, Chekhov, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Pushkin, had been translated (by the capable hands of Lu Xun and many others) and had been enthusiastically received. For a very short period of time after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the leaders of the Communist Party flirted with letting the artists freely express themselves, but acted to rein it all in as soon as they began to appreciate arts and literature as an important and effective weapon in educating the masses so they would move in sync with the Party spontaneously, out of their own volition. By means of propaganda, persuasion, purgation, and a complex system of sticks and carrots, the Party effected a web of tight control to ensure that it would be a learned habit of every artist to toe the Party line, to serve the top priority of the Party at the moment. As a result, the bulk of Soviet Russian literature became a sheer mess of mass art with little artistic merit.¹⁹

For the decades from the 1920s all the way to the 1950s the dominant ideology for Soviet Russian literature was the so-called “socialist realism,” a rather vague and dogmatic doctrinaire. All artistic and literary work under the banner of socialist realism was governed by these four principles: “party-mindedness,” which decrees that every artistic act is a political act and the Communist Party is the ultimate source of all knowledge; “idea-mindedness,” which decrees that “idea” (or content) of all artwork should embody and promote whatever was the Party’s top priority at the moment, socioeconomic or moral; “class-mindedness,” which decrees that all artwork should serve the cause of the proletariat; “people- or folk-mindedness,” which decrees that all artwork should draw from the masses in both matter (traditions and values) and manner (e.g., language) in order to be accessible and appealing to them.²⁰

One notable result of the push for such mass art literature is an “ideal type of man,” the “New Man,” who “of his own accord and without pressure by the state will observe the elementary rules of society.” For such heroes and heroines there is no serious conflict between personal life and social task; they are so completely identified with their public functions—political commissar, party secretary, chairman of a revolutionary committee, that there is little that is individual, individualistic, or quirky; they are a (stereo)type rather than an individual; their laser-sharp focus is always on the public, collective work, with almost total self-denial.²¹

And socialist realism, as can be expected, became the official, obligatory style for all Chinese writers too and Soviet Russian writers of the socialist realism brand was what got translated. Indeed,

it would be all but impossible to find another case wherein one culture's literature had been so slavishly followed, out of admiration, obligation, or a mix of both, through centralized, planned, and regulated translation endeavors. Whatever was hot in the Soviet Union at the moment, especially those that had won Stalin Prize medals, would be translated into Chinese almost instantaneously. No independent judgment of the literary merits, or lack thereof, was necessary.

One such Soviet writer was Semyon Petrovich Babayevsky (1909–2000), the recipient of several Stalin Prize medals. His “best-known” fictional works were *Cavalier of the Golden Star* (also translated as *The Knight of the Golden Star*, 1947) and its two-volume sequel *Light over the Land* (1950), whose heroes exhibit the same attitudes and attributes that characterize the “ideal type of man” briefly sketched above. In addition, as embodied by the young Party secretary of a *kolkhoz* [collective farm] in *Light over the Land*, these heroes show exceptional talent in communicating with people and insight into human nature. The young agriculturalist Party secretary in *Light over the Land*, for example, “can speak in such a way that people lay bare their hearts for her,”

She not only succeeds in re-educating the lazy chairman of the *kolkhoz*, but also the workers: she is interested in each of them personally, gives advice in difficulties at home, makes up quarrels between married couples and lectures women-hunters. The moral ascendancy over her surroundings is . . . much more stressed than her technical abilities.²²

After Stalin's death in 1953, however, works such as these two Babayevsky novels were relegated to the limbo. Although Babayevsky continued to write well into his old age, today his works garner little more than a passing mention in Soviet Russian Literary history.²³

With Stalin's death and the precarious (and perilous) process of de-Stalinization instigated by the new Soviet leader Khrushchev there came a temporary “thaw” on the literary scene, as harbingered by the publication of Ilya Ehrenburg's novel *Thaw* (1954). In this novel Ehrenburg was rather critical of the Stalin era although his earlier works such as *The Fall of Paris* (1941), *The Storm* (1946–47), and *The Ninth Wave* (1951–52) had conformed to the dominant agendas of the Soviet Russia. The explicit message from *Thaw* was that “in times of conformism imposed by terror the only honourable course for the individual is to try to maintain, at least privately, some kind of personal integrity of intellectual and moral judgement.”²⁴

The de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union also marked the beginning of a new, icy phase of Sino-Soviet relations because Mao and the Chinese Communist Party were caught off guard by the development and because they disagreed with many of the new policies, domestic and international, adopted by Khrushchev. The translation machinery in China shifted gears accordingly. Before long anything having to do with the “Soviet Revisionism” (a new label Mao and the Chinese Communist Party threw at their erstwhile “big, elder brother” and “teacher”) as well as American, Western Imperialism would be looked upon with suspicion, as a matter of reflex. Now, instead of blindly following whatever was hot in the Soviet Union, only a select few literary works would be translated and distributed “internally,” meaning, only officials and intellectuals of certain political credentials and ranks could have access to them. This started the new practice of limited and controlled publication of translations of Soviet Russian and other foreign literatures “for internal reference only” that would last for years to come. Indeed for many years during the 1960s and 70s, having access to such “for internal reference only” publications was quite a status marker although this practice could also be read as a “sneaky,” camouflaged way to stay in touch with literary activities outside China.

Altogether, from 1949 to 1966, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, a total of 3,526 titles of Soviet Russian literature translations were published, which constituted about 65.8 percent of the entirety of foreign literature translation publications. The print run was about 82 million copies, about 74 percent of the entirety of the foreign literature translation publications. An interesting irony of it all is that many Russian writers and critics would later feel too embarrassed to even talk about much of the Soviet Russian literary work that had been so zealously received in China. One such work is *Far from Moscow*, a novel written by Vasili Azhayevev (1915–68) that had won the Stalin Prize in 1949. Set in Russia in 1942 (during WWII), the novel tells the story of the construction of a major oil pipeline (to deliver oil to the Red Army on the front) under heavy bombings by the Germans. It was the base for several film, stage, TV, and opera adaptations. In 1985, when the novel’s Chinese translator, a member of the first post-Cultural Revolution Chinese Writers Delegation visiting Moscow, asked to meet the author, his host “had confusion written all over his face” and then explained that even during the Stalin period the novel “was not a highly respected work.”²⁵

One silver lining, if there was any at all during this period of lopsided focus on Soviet Russian literature, was the quality of the

translation. Back in the early decades of the twentieth Century, Lu Xun and others had mostly translated Russian literature by way of English and Japanese translations. Theirs were second-hand translations (of translations). Almost all of the translations during the 17 years (1949–66), in contrast, were direct translations from Russian, carried out by a new generation of translators fluent in Russian, many having been educated at Soviet Russian universities.

Another silver lining was that some of the classic Russian literature that had already been translated by way of English or Japanese a generation before received brand new renditions from Russian directly, mostly during the 1950s. Among these new translations were 229 short stories and novellas by Chekhov, *Cherry Orchard* and other Chekhov plays, Leo Tolstoy's *Resurrection*, Gogol's "The Overcoat," *The Government Inspector*, and *Dead Souls*, Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, *The Brothers Karamazov*, *The Idiot*, and the complete works of Dostoyevsky by a talented translator who was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and died in 1978.

TRANSLATION—THE SURVIVOR'S SONG

Among titles of Western literature that were translated during the first 17 years of the people's republic were *Aesop Fables* (1955), Euripides's tragedies (1957–58), Aristophanes's comedies (1954), Dickens's *American Notes* (1963), Hardy's *Jude the Obscure* (1958), Aristotle's *Poetics* (1962), Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (1950s), Cervantes's *Don Quixote* (1956–78), Shikibu's *The Tale of Genji* (1961–65), Scheherazade's *The Arabian Nights* (1957–58), Mark Twain's *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1955), *The Prince and the Pauper* (1956), *The Gilded Age* (1957), *The Mississippi River* (1958), *The Tragedy of Pudd'nhead Wilson* (1959), and *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1959).²⁶

Most of these translation endeavors were carried out by the translators themselves, of their own volition, rather than as assignments from any central planners out of ideological and geopolitical calculations. However, the fact that translations of Western literary works, albeit not nearly as voluminous as in the earlier decades, did get published indicates that there was still breathing room, limited as it was, for public expression of individual artistic and literary pursuits during this period. Once the storm of the Cultural Revolution hit in 1966, such pursuits would come to a jarring halt. For many artists, writers, translators, and other intellectuals, life became a daily struggle for survival—literally. Prominent translators and writers such as Lao She,

Fu Lei, Feng Zikai, Ba Jin, Guo Moruo, Cao Yu, were persecuted. Quite a number of them didn't survive.

Lao She (Shu Qingchun, 1899–1966), author of *Rickshaw Boy*, *Four Generations under One Roof*, *Teahouse*, and other important works in modern Chinese literature, was among the first to fall victim to the latest red storm. On August 23, 1966, having been tormented by the Red Guards in Beijing for a full day and having been subjected to relentless verbal and physical abuse from them (sometimes using leather belts), Lao She threw himself into the Taiping [Heavenly Peace] Lake that night to end it all.

Fu Lei (1908–66), a gifted writer known for his elegant translations of Balzac's *Eugénie Grandet*, *Le Père Goriot*, Romain Rolland's *Vie de Tolstoi*, *Vie de Beethoven*, *Jean-Christophe*, Mérimée's *Colomba*, and Taine's *Philosophie de l'art*—his literary endeavors from 1930s all the way to the eve of the Cultural Revolution, had already been denounced as a “rightist” in the late 1950s for having taken the bait and spoken up during the “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign. On September 2, 1966, after a full day of verbal and physical abuse from the Red Guards, Fu Lei and his wife, Zhu Meifu, hanged themselves from the window of their bedroom.

Even Zhou Yang (1908–89), who had been at the top leadership position since the League of Left-Wing Writers of the 1930s, who had been a leading figure in the denunciation of Hu Feng and the Anti-Rightist Campaign, couldn't escape being persecuted. Although gravely ill with lung cancer, Zhou was thrown in jail and did not see daylight again until 1978 when he was “liberated”—two years after the Cultural Revolution was over. At least 80 other renowned writers, translators, and artists, such as Ding Ling, Tian Han, Xia Yan, were implicated and accused of being members of Zhou's anti-Party, anti-Socialism, anti-Mao clique; they were tormented endlessly, paraded in streets, thrown in jail, and subjected to numerous other physical, verbal, and mental abuses.

As the reign of red terror raged everywhere, all journals and magazines devoted to foreign literature translations, such as *Fanyi Tongxun* [Translation Gazette], *Yiwen* [Translation Literature], were shut down. From 1966 to 1971, the first five years of the Cultural Revolution, not a single foreign literature translation was published. For the entire duration of the Cultural Revolution, a total of 34 titles were published. Among them were Gorky's *In the World* and *Mother*, Fadeyev's *The Rout* and *The Young Guard*, Ostrovsky's *How the Steel Was Tempered*, and Serafimovich's *The Iron Flood*. Regarding itself as the lone beacon of true, authentic (orthodox) Marxism-Leninism and

the lone true, selfless supporter to the national liberation struggles of the Third World countries, China, or Madame Mao and her cohorts who were in charge at the time, favored literature from the few Socialist brothers and third-world friends such as Albania, Vietnam, the Laos, and North Korea. The titles of some of the translations, *The Story of Transporting the Guns*, *The Young Fighters of South Vietnam*, *Poems from Mozambique Fighters*, *Poems from the Palestinian Fighters*, would give unmistakable indications of their content and style and why they were chosen to be translated. To be consistent with the spirit of the Cultural Revolution, the translation work was typically carried out by a team of people who would sign off as “Workers of the Daqing Oil Refinery Factory,” “Worker-Peasant-Soldier Students,” “Revolutionary Teachers,” “China-Albania Friendship Commune Art and Literature Review Team,” and so on. It was, typically, printed on poor quality paper and was tastelessly bound.

In 1974, a tiny window was cracked open in an otherwise airtight “iron house” to let in a thread of light from the outside world. This was in the form of a new publication called *Yizhai* [Translation Digest], published by Shanghai People’s Press. This journal, which covered subjects ranging from economics, history, and philosophy to arts and literature from outside of China, was strictly “for internal distribution only,” ostensibly to provide material for anti-imperialistic and anti-Soviet Revisionist research and denunciation. For years, however, it was the only window, tiny as it was, by which intellectuals in China kept informed of the latest developments in the outside world. And for years, it was the only window by which some of the most intelligent among *zhiqing* [sent-down youths], hungry for knowledge, were exposed to Western ideas; some of them were to join the ranks of notable post-Cultural Revolution writers, artists, and intellectuals. Today old, yellowed copies of *Yizhai*, like so many other Cultural Revolutionary memorabilia, for example, Mao’s Little Red Book, Mao badges, are put out for sale on the Internet.

The ten-year Cultural Revolution was a period of stifled creativity and silenced voices. If during the 17 years prior to the Cultural Revolution there was still some room, albeit very limited, for creativity, imagination, and individual expressions—at least many writers tried their best within the confines of socialist realism and succeeded in producing novels and films with some artistic value,²⁷ the same cannot be said about the Cultural Revolution. Other than the sound and fury of the Red Guards, a few Mao-as-the-never-set-red-sun hymns and marching songs, and the “eight model Peking operas” and two ballets handpicked by Madame Mao,²⁸ the whole country

was an artistic, literary wasteland. Whatever little that did get published as literature was overtly propagandistic with no pretension to literary subtlety—assuming subtlety to be a desired literary value.

Take for example “Yan’an Seeds,” a short story published in 1971. At the time one of the top priorities of Mao and the government was to rein in the Red Guards, mostly high school and college students, and to return the country to some degree of normalcy. However, schools were closed nationwide and there was no employment to hand out to them either. So Mao, resorting to his old tool box, called on the youths to go to the masses, more specifically, go to the countryside to receive re-education from the peasants. With one slogan, or decree, Mao dumped two million former Red Guards onto rural China, especially poor, inland provinces, which created another chapter in the tragic saga of the Cultural Revolution.

“Yan’an Seeds” features one such former Red Guard, daughter of a WWII revolutionary veteran, who is receiving re-education in the Red Flag People’s Commune in the historically poor Anhui Province. As the story unfolds, it soon becomes apparent that Yanfeng, meaning Yan’an wind, is an in your face stand-in for the spirit of Yan’an, the wartime capital of the Communists. With the nurturing guidance of Uncle Tian, a veteran Party member, Yanfeng grows to be a righteous, worthy offspring of her father’s generation. The other hard to miss, recurrent vehicle for the overt political message is Yan’an seeds, or pumpkin seeds, which is inspired by one of Mao’s remarks in the 1940s that likens “[W]e communists” to seeds and “the people” to the soil and so on. The story ends with a vista of the young Yanfeng and the “old guard” Uncle Tian charging into the sunset:

Uncle Tian cracked the whip and the cart sped forward. Yanfeng, “the Spirit of Yan’an,” sat in the cart and looked at the distant mountains, her body bathed in the brilliant sunshine of early spring. . . .²⁹

If anything, the story could not be accused of the literary offense of being a bit too subtle or opaque.

Nonetheless, in this unprecedented reign of red terror, when survival, psychological as well as physical, could be a daily struggle, especially for the tens of thousands (if not millions) of intellectuals, artists, and writers, the fight for individual expression never stopped, and the marching of modernity, in the form of translation of Western literature, at least, faltering and muffled as it was, could still be heard, although such daring endeavors were mostly undertaken underground, at the peril of worse misfortunes befalling those “daredevils.”

One of such courageous artists was Feng Zikai (1898–1975), a highly accomplished painter, a prolific writer on literary and artistic topics, a devout follower of Buddhism, and a gifted translator of Russian and Japanese literature. Feng suffered much indignity in the hands of the Red Guards—his home being ransacked and smashed, collections of his own painting taken away, his treasured long silvery beard shaved by force, his old, 70-year-old person kicked, whipped, then wrapped in inky big-character posters to be paraded through streets. Then he was sent to a farm to be reformed through hard labor. There he soon fell gravely ill with tuberculosis. This latest misfortune turned out to be a blessing in disguise because now he couldn't be forced to go outside and do physical labor any more. Feng made best use of this respite by resuming his beloved art and literary work that had been interrupted for years. He treaded carefully by focusing his translation endeavor within the relatively safe territory of classic Japanese literature. Between 1970 and 72, Feng Zikai completed the translation of *Taketori Monogatari* and two other tenth century Japanese novels, all three considered the precursors of *The Tale of Genji*, as well as some important Buddhist scriptures. Not knowing whether these translations would ever see the light of day, Feng Zikai sent the manuscripts to his children to be kept in a safe place. In the early 1980s, several years after the Cultural Revolution was over, all three novels, along with *The Tale of Genji*, which he had already translated in the 1960s, were edited by his daughter and published. Feng himself, however, had died of lung cancer in 1975.³⁰

Ji Xianling (1911–2009), a renowned linguist, Indologist, and historian, suffered the same fate of being tormented, beaten, and paraded by waves of Red Guards. When such torture became unbearable, Ji decided to end his own life, but circumstances prevented that from happening and he lived on. In 1973, at the risk of being discovered and having more punishment visited upon him, Ji began the “clandestine” project of translating the Indian epic poem *Ranmyan* from Sanskrit into Chinese. He chose the 300,000-word epic poem not only out of his appreciation of the beauty and power of the poem itself but also out of a desire that the project would last him long, very long so he could hang on to his sanity; he had no way of knowing whether and when a light would appear at the end of the seemingly endless dark tunnel.

Feng Zhi (1905–93), a gifted poet, translator, and literary scholar, who had studied at the University of Heidelberg and the University of Berlin and received a PhD from the latter in the 1930s, also had his

home ransacked, his collections of valuable artwork burned, and was subjected to endless struggle sessions in the hands of the Red Guards, and then sent to a farm to be reformed through hard labor. To survive even as insanity closed in, Feng Zhi in 1973 undertook a secret project of his own: translating Heine's long poem "*Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen*" [Germany: A Fairy Tale in Winter] into Chinese.

In 1974, Ba Jin, the author of *Family* (1931), *Spring* (1938), and *Autumn* (1940), and other important novels in modern Chinese literature, who had suffered the same fate as Feng Zikai, Ji Xianling, Feng Zhi, and many others, and had just lost his wife, retranslated Turgenyev's last novel *Virgin Soil* and then took on Aleksandr Herzen's *My Past and Thoughts* (1861–67), an eight-volume monumental work that Ba Jin considered to have had huge influence on his own thinking and writing. He undertook this translation as possibly the last work of his life, a work he carried out with "blood and tears" in his heart just as Herzen had done in writing it over a hundred years back.

It was around this time that Mu Dan/Cha Liangzhen, who has been briefly introduced at the beginning of this chapter, put his "blood and tears" into translating modernist Western poets W. B. Yeats (1865–1939), T. S. Eliot (1888–1965), and W. H. Auden (1907–73).

Mu Dan, the poet, had been a trailblazer in modern or modernist poetry in China. As far back as in the 1930s, when he was still a young college student, Mu Dan had developed a passion for the English Romantic poets and the poems of Walt Whitman. He was then introduced to Yeats, Eliot, and Auden through William Empson (1906–84), the British poet and critic who was teaching at the wartime Xi'nan Lianda [Southwestern Associated University]. Young Mu Dan was an avid reader not only of their poems but also of books such as *Axel's Castle* by Edmund Wilson (1895–1972) and *The Sacred Wood* by Eliot. And he became fascinated. Mu Dan's poems of this period show visible influence of the modernist poetry and throb with an anxiety that is both personal and symptomatic of the age and of a nation caught in a deep existential crisis,³¹ as embodied by the "self" in a poem titled "*Wo*," [Self, 1940] that is "severed from the womb," "severed from the whole," and is "forever locked in the wilderness."³²

Mu Dan, who barely survived the brutal jungles of Burma during WWII, would give voice to this fractured self of his, to the joy as well as pain of body and soul, in poems after poems. Not long after his return to China in 1953, however, the poet would gradually lose

his voice until, when the Anti-Rightist Campaign hit China in the late 1950s, he was completely silenced. As a condemned “counter-revolutionary,” Mu Dan had to reform through janitorial labor under the vigilant eye of the authorities. It was then that he went through a metamorphosis and became “born” again as Cha Liangzhen, a gifted translator of Russian (he had acquired proficiency of the language while studying in Chicago) and English poems.

Although Cha Liangzhen turned to translation out of the necessity of sociopolitical circumstances, his accomplishments are quite impressive and second to none. During the ten years or so before the Cultural Revolution, he translated two volumes of Pushkin’s lyrics and the long narrative poems *Poltava*, *The Bronze Horseman*, *The Gabrieliad*, *The Prisoner of the Caucasus*, and *Eugene Onegin*, as well as many poems by Percy Shelley, John Keats, Lord Byron, and William Blake.

In 1962 Cha Liangzhen took on Byron’s long dramatic poem *Don Juan*, which he continued to work on even during the most difficult years of the Cultural Revolution. One day in 1966, after the Red Guards had ransacked his home and gone, he saw among the big mess of torn clothes and books and everything else on the floor a stack of paper—the *Don Juan* manuscripts he had been working on for years. With pain and joy he hastened to pick it up and hide it in a safe place. He would trudge through a daily living hell in the next several years—“yin yang” haircut, confinement, homelessness, forced separation from wife and children, reform through hard labor—until he was “semi-liberated” in 1972. Upon returning home in Tianjin, he dug out the manuscripts and set to work again.³³

In 1973, after Nixon’s visit to China, a friend’s relatives came to visit from the United States and gave him a copy of an anthology of contemporary Western poems, which the friend gave to Cha Liangzhen. For survival Feng Zikai, Ba Jin, Ji Xianling, and Feng Zhi, all chose to translate Western classics. If that was risky enough, imagine anyone in the China of the early 1970s undertaking the translation of Western modernist poets, an unchartered, perilous enterprise for anyone, let alone someone badly bruised, a thick dark cloud still hanging over his head. But Cha Liangzhen couldn’t help plunging in, against the wishes of his wife who had suffered alongside of him. It was a truly secret, underground project because he had to hide his work not only from the vigilant eye of revolutionaries but also from his own family.

Among the modernist poems Cha Liangzhen translated from the anthology were Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” the *Wasteland*, Yeats’s “Easter 1916” and “Sail to Byzantine,” and

55 poems by Auden. One could only imagine what it felt like as the poet translator was rendering these lines into Chinese:

Too long a sacrifice
 Can make a stone of the heart.
 O when may it suffice?³⁴

Would it have been worth while,
 To have bitten off the matter with a smile,
 To have squeezed the universe into a ball
 To roll it toward some overwhelming question,
 To say: "I am Lazarus, come from the dead,
 Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you all"—

Indeed it would not be overly melodramatic to describe the world Mu Dan/Cha Liangzhen lived through during those years as one wrecked, crazed place, wherein

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
 The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
 The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
 The best lack all conviction, while the worst
 Are full of passionate intensity.

Did he see "a shape with lion body and the head of a man" slouching across from a vast waste of desert sand? Did he wish the bitter cold wind blow his "deadly thoughts" over the universe and harbinger a new birth? Or did he wish to simply sail away with the mermaids, "riding seaward on the waves..." If so, he must have known that whatever pain-free fantasyland he could escape to with the mermaids or on the wings of a nightingale, he wouldn't be able to linger there long. He'd be tossed back to reality. He would wake up to drown again.

Mu Dan, the poet, however, did find his voice again in 1975, one year before the long nightmare of the Cultural Revolution was finally over. He wrote poems again, his swan songs, although he had told his children to stay away from poems that had caused him so much trouble, and although he had told young aspiring poets, who had sought him out for advice, guidance, or simply to talk, to stay away from poetry because they could and should pursue much safer careers for their own good. The 28 or so poems he wrote that year—"Song of Wisdom," "After Power Outage," "Metamorphosis of God," "Spring," "Summer," "Autumn," "Winter"—turned out to be his last.

One of these poems, titled “*Ziji*” [Self], which he gave his daughter, along with all of his manuscripts (probably knowing that he wouldn’t be in this world much longer), goes like this:

On the wall of another world is a missing person poster,
He being missing shocks the empty room,
There another dream awaits him to sleep in,
There many more rumors await him to manufacture,
All signifying an unwritten biography:
Not knowing whether that is my true self.³⁵

Despite the misgivings, Mu Dan/Cha Liangzhen remained true to himself. He kept working even during the days right after the great Tangshan Earthquake (1976). And even days before his death, when he was gravely ill and getting ready for a major surgery, he was still busy organizing and polishing the manuscripts. The poet/translator refused to be silent. He insisted on giving expressions to the self, badly fractured as it was, in a voice that cut through the wilderness loud and clear.

THE TSUNAMI (1977–PRESENT)

If China's long history of experience with texts from the outside world could be described in terms of waves, then the millennium-long (seventh century to the 1200s) Buddhist scripture translation projects could be thought of as the first wave, which brought about profound sociocultural changes that reshaped the national character of China; the translation endeavors from the late 1800s to the early decades of the twentieth century, driven by the exigency to strengthen and save the ancient civilization by borrowing from the West, could be thought of as the second wave; and what has happened since the end of the 1970s when China reopened its floodgate to the outside world and all things Western—ideas, ideologies, fads, as well as new and not so new science and technology—gushed in, could be thought of as the third wave, which has so transformed China in every facet of its socioeconomic, cultural, and technological life that many intellectuals, among others, have become once again concerned with the identity and future of this ancient yet newly reinvigorated civilization. Some of the same issues that were debated spiritedly around the turn of the twentieth century are being debated over and again, only rehashed in more theoretically self-conscious terms, with very much the same high stakes hanging in the balance.

Not so incidentally, this tsunami-like third wave of translation of the outside world came tumbling in at around the same time that Alvin Toffler, the renowned futurist, published his new book *The Third Wave* (1980). Toffler, of course, was describing civilizational developments from the Neolithic to the Agrarian and Agricultural (the First Wave, which stretched over a span of several millennia) to the Industrial Society (the Second Wave, which began to sweep across much of the West in the 1700s) to the Postindustrial, Information Age (the Third Wave, which began to emerge in the second half of the twentieth century). As far as China is concerned, however, the Second Wave did not wash ashore until the ill-fated Self-Strengthening

Movement engineered by Li Hongzhang in the late 1800s, which had since followed a rather fitful path of development frequently derailed by foreign aggressions, civil wars, and ill-advised policies and campaigns, and had never had a chance to run its full course. Therefore, developmentally speaking, what China has been experiencing since the end of the 1970s is the simultaneous onslaught of the Second Wave and the Third Wave not only in science, technology, and economic development but also in ideas and isms and fads of all colors and stripes in arts and literature and popular culture as well as in sociopolitical theories and philosophies. The impact has been breathtaking, mindboggling, and unsettling. The socioeconomic, cultural, as well as physical landscape of China has been so transfigured, or rather, so “Westernized,” that many people have begun to question what it all means for the future of China, its people, and its cultural identity.

Also not so incidentally, this tsunami-like new wave of translation of Western texts began in the wake of a series of major seismic events that had rocked China as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, having run its course of sound and fury, was about to end with a whimper.

On January 8, 1976—a Year of the Dragon according to Chinese zodiac,¹ Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), the well-beloved premier, died. Massive crowds of people from all walks of life, especially intellectuals and college students, spontaneously gathered in Tiananmen Square and squares big and small and university campuses across the country to mourn the death of Zhou, who had gone to France to study Marxism and labor movement in 1920, whose revolutionary credentials went as far back as the Northern Expedition and Long March, and who, during the worst days of the Cultural Revolution, had used his position to protect—as many and as much as he could—high-ranking officials and intellectuals from the brutality of the radicals. As the tide of sentiments quickly turned into anger at the Gang of Four and all but open defiance against Mao himself, all poured into mountains of fiery, satirical poems and pamphlets, and reached its deafening crest on *Qingming* (April 5), the Chinese Memorial Day, the radical leftist-controlled government sent in a million-strong militiamen and police to crack down in Tiananmen Square.²

Before things had a chance to quiet down, sociopolitically, a massive earthquake of 7.8 on the Richter scale hit Tangshan, an industrial hub of approximately one and a half million inhabitants and about 90 miles to the west of Beijing and Tianjin, during the wee hours of the morning of July 28. The quake flattened the entire city, killed

over 250,000 people (the official figure), and seriously injured more than 160,000—one of the deadliest in recorded human history.³ This natural disaster was happening at a time when power and ideological struggle between the moderates and the radical leftists in the central government was intensifying to white heat.

Then, in the midst of all this, on September 9, Mao Zedong died at the age of 83. The long revolutionary career of the man who had been venerated, or idolized, to be more exact, as the Great Mentor, the Great Leader, the Great Marshall, the Great Helmsman, and the sun in the people's heart that would never set, had finally come to an end, leaving behind a mixed record of triumphs and tragic blunders and an uncertain future for China poised on the brink of socioeconomic and cultural bankruptcy, and an unprecedented opportunity to change the course of the country and turn things around. Barely a month after Mao's death, on the evening of October 6, Madame Mao and her cohorts were arrested. They would soon be put on a public trial (to take blame for all the bad things that had happened during the Cultural Revolution) and were sentenced to long jail time. The Maoist era was over, more or less, and a new era of reform and revival began.⁴

The massive currents for change have since been sweeping across the country from coastlines to the heartland and from urban centers tumbling out to rural, mountainous villages and back, and have, despite fierce resistance and tugs-of-war fought along ideological fault lines, so transfigured the nation's cultural, psychological as well as physical landscape that a Chinese Rip Van Winkle, upon waking up after having fallen asleep on a proverbial hillside a couple of decades ago, would have a hard time finding his way back to town. Much of this change can be attributed to the potent agency of translation—translation of Western texts.

WESTERN LEARNING FOR REVIVAL—AGAIN

Almost everyone who was in college in the late 1970s and the early 1980s—the first generation of college students after the ten-year ordeal of the Cultural Revolution, mostly the best and brightest from the tens of millions of *zhìqīng* [sent-down youths, some already in their mid- to late-twenties, married with children], who had had to sit through incredibly competitive national entrance exams to fight for the few berths in the freshly reopened institutions of higher learning—would still remember the feverish renaissance of learning, the burning hunger for knowledge, the rush to campus, municipal bookstores to buy a copy of the latest book with money saved

from the meager stipend (four or five *yuan* a month, less than two US dollars), and the thrill in reading, sharing (literally, passing the book around), discussing, and, yes, debating. Books that were mostly reprints of classics that had been condemned as poisonous weeds and hence banned during the Cultural Revolution: *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, *Water Margin (Outlaws of the March)*, *Journey to the West (The Monkey King)*, *A Dream of Red Mansions*, *Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio (Strange Tales of Liaozhai)*, *The Travels of Lao Can*, *The Scholars*, *Flower in the Sea of Evil*, *Three Hundred Tang Poems*, *Book of Songs*, *Romance of the West Chamber*.

And many Western classics.

In 1977, as the curtain of the Cultural Revolution had barely fallen, Madame Mao and her cohorts were yet to be tried, and as colleges and universities were still cleaning up campuses (overgrown with weeds and disfigured with fiery revolutionary slogans) to welcome the first batch of students (many still having the aroma of rice fields, tea leaves, and cow manure on their persons), Western classics—mostly reprints of earlier translations—were being rushed out to feed, or to whet the appetite of, long-starved readers: Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and *Timon of Athens*, Gogol's *Dead Souls*, Scheherazade's *Arabian Nights*, and a book of Greek myths and legends. This was followed, in 1978, by another 35 reprinted titles of Western classics to meet the mounting demands, among them: Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, Honoré de Balzac's *Eugénie Grandet* and *Père Goriot*, William Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, Leo Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, Charles Dickens's *Hard Times*, Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, Mark Twain's *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer*, Howard Fast's *Spartacus*, Ethel Lilian Voynich's *The Gadfly*, and collections of short stories by Anton Chekov, Guy de Maupassant and plays by Henrik Ibsen—mostly “safe” classics because they had been more or less sanctioned by orthodox Marxist critics.

In the same year, with the blessings of the Communist Party's Propaganda Department and spearheaded by the Literature Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, national flagship publishing houses People's Literature Press, and Shanghai Translation Press resumed the ambitious *Foreign Literature Classics* project, which included 200 titles, covering epics, lyrics, drama, and fictional works from ancient and medieval times all the way up to the nineteenth century. By 1981, 53 of select titles had already been completed and released.

It was at this time, in 1981, that these two flagship presses joined hands to push the envelope and test the hitherto rarely touched,

potentially treacherous territory of modern and contemporary Western literature. Their first bold, ambitious translation and publication project was *Twentieth-Century Foreign Literature Series*, which included Ernest Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, William Faulkner's *Sound and Fury*, D. H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, and Gabriel García Márquez's *Hundred Years of Solitude*.

During the first few years after the Cultural Revolution was over, the publications of these foreign (mostly Western) literary works, reprints or new translations, helped create such a feverish carnival of reading [*dushu re*] across university campuses and among the educated all over the country that few who had been caught up in it during those days could ever forget.⁵

This carnival of reading sprang from a pent-up longing of millions of people for knowledge, for understanding, for revival, and for change. As the country reopened its door, all kinds of Western philosophical and intellectual schools and trends gushed in, from the classic to the contemporary. The “trendiest” of them all, perhaps, was Sartre and existentialist philosophy. The concepts of angst, freedom, despair, and absurdity resonated with the Chinese intellectuals, especially young college students, who had been battered in a ten-year-long nightmare and still had scars to show for the trauma. This first encounter with Sartre and existentialism whetted their interest in Western philosophy. So they explored further in the early 1980s and went to Hegel, Kant, and all the way to Plato and Aristotle. There they found a very different system of philosophical traditions—ontology, epistemology, and hermeneutics. By the mid-1980s they had made a full circle and returned to the twentieth century.

By then, over 100 books and series on Western philosophy—translations and studies—had been published, for example, *Toward the Future Series*, *Twentieth Century Western Philosophy Translation Series*, *Western Scholarship Translation Series*, *Western Schools of Philosophy Translation Series*. Among modern and contemporary philosophers translated and studied were Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), Carl Jung (1875–1961), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Jean Piaget (1896–1980), John Dewey (1859–1952), Jacques Lacan (1901–81), Louis Althusser (1918–90), Michel Foucault (1926–84), Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), representing a dazzling array of theories and trends: Neo-Hegelianism, Neo-Kantianism, naturalism, new realism, positivism, idealism, pragmatism, process philosophy, phenomenology,

structuralism, poststructuralism, semiotics, hermeneutics, deconstruction, and more.

Also helping to shake up the Chinese views and visions of the world were Alvin Toffler's *The Third Wave* (1980), alluded to earlier, and *Future Shock* (1970), and John Naisbitt's *Megatrends* (1982); all were enthusiastically introduced, through translations, and received. Lest they would be left further behind by the relentless waves of change, the intellectuals among the Chinese embraced new Western scientific and technological theories with a vengeance: control theory, system theory, dissipativity structure theory, synergetics, catastrophe theory, which provided them with new paradigms not only for scientific and technological research, but also for studies in social sciences and humanities.

Jin Guangtao (1947–), a college student majoring in chemistry when the Cultural Revolution started, who had been reading Marx, Engels, and Hegel, and other classic Western political philosophers voraciously on the sly as the Red Guards were wreaking havoc, now turned to the system theory in his study of Chinese history. He came to the conclusion that China had been “an ultrastable structure,”

a closed system in which a unified ideology preserves social cohesion. When such a system is confronted by another system (in this case, the Western civilizational “system”), attempts to change the ideology to cope with the new situation must necessarily fail, for a closed system does not have the ability to adapt.

This, according to Jin Guangtao, would essentially explain what had happened when China encountered the West from the late-Qing to the early decades of the twentieth century.⁶ Jin's theory would become the philosophical underpinning for the controversial six-part documentary *River Elegy* [*heshang*, 1988] which interrogated the long, closed, and repressive Yellow-River based Chinese civilization (as emblemized by the Great Wall, the dragon, the river, and such potent icons) and called for the “great flood” of the open, “blue-water, maritime civilization” best represented by the West (as embodied in its science, culture, and democratic system),⁷ much as the earlier May Fourth generation had called for Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. Heated debates over this polemic documentary would prove a very short prelude to Tiananmen Square 1989.⁸

Back in 1977–78, as China had just reopened its door to the outside world, the country was caught up in a huge political as well as intellectual debate over “Truth Criteria” [*zhenli biaozhun*], i.e., whether

practice [*shijian*] or whatever Mao Zedong had said was the ultimate criteria of truth. This debate, or thought liberation [*sixiang jiefang*] movement, marked by practice triumphing over dogma, paved the way, ideologically, for the massive socioeconomic reforms that have been happening in China ever since.

One of the unintended developments was the democracy movement started by a group of young people in Beijing, some of them, ironically or not, having been Red Guards “making revolution” at Chairman Mao’s bidding only a few years before. They put out big-character posters on the Xidan Wall in a well-known shopping center of the ancient capital city, calling for a more accurate reassessment of Mao Zedong (a sort of reckoning of his tragic blunders) and the Cultural Revolution and a more open, liberal, and democratic society where individual dignity and human rights were respected. These “democracy walls” would arise in other major cities, as new publications such as *Quests*, *May Fourth Forum*, *Fertile Soil*, *Today*, *Beijing Spring*, and new organizations, such as Chinese Human Rights Alliance and Shanghai Democracy Discussion Society, were put forth to spearhead discussions and debates over human rights, democracy, and liberalization of Chinese society and political institutions.⁹

At first, Deng Xiaoping (1904–94), who had suffered in the hands of the radical leftists, approved of such yearnings for democracy and moved accordingly by dropping “class struggle” from the platform of the Communist Party and reorienting the energies of the entire nation toward modernizing agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology (hence, the “Four Modernizations”). When the young activists, unimpressed, went on to direct criticism at Deng himself and the monopoly of power by the Communist Party and to demand the “Fifth Modernization”—a free and democratic sociopolitical system—Deng and the central government hit back with the arrests of Wei Jingsheng and other leading activists of the “Beijing Spring” (thus dubbed as a nod to the “Prague Spring” that had occurred in the former Czechoslovakia in 1968) and “Democracy Wall” movement and with reaffirmation of the “Four Cardinal Principals:” socialist path, people’s democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought.

All of these massive, large-stake intellectual debates and ideological battles were being engaged at the same time as other massive, large-stake sociopolitical, economic, and geopolitical developments were unfolding: the public trial of the Gang of Four, with live television coverage—the first ever in China’s history; reforms marked by

decollectivization of agriculture, influx of foreign capital and technology, emergence of private business enterprises, and bold experiments with capitalism via the establishment of special economic zones in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces; a border war with Vietnam; and the normalization of relations with the United States—the beginning of a new chapter in the Sino-US relations. Although it would be impossible to pin down the exact causal relationships between and among these complex developments pulled by various historical, socioeconomic, and ideological forces, the trajectory toward a more liberal, or liberalized society, was as dogged as it was slow and crooked.

By the end of the 1980s, when economic reforms had become the dominant ideology and agenda for the country, when many more semi-capitalistic special economic zones had been established, and when many more books, Chinese and Western (in translations as well as in foreign languages, predominantly English), and numerous literary journals and magazines had become readily available, the carnival of reading began to cool off. It is not that people don't read any more, but that the feverish intellectual curiosity as well as quest for sociopolitical change, especially in the years since Tiananmen Square 1989, has morphed into something of a markedly different character. Somehow the whole country has turned into a colossal construction site, a vast sea of commerce, as everything, literary, artistic, political, cultural, and economic, has become commoditized with negotiable market value, and as material success, in the form of money, power, and extravagant lifestyle, has assumed dominion just about everywhere.

Looking through the lens of Toffler's wave theories of civilizational developments, especially against the backdrop of modern Chinese history since the Opium War, it seems clear that the massive developments in China in the last few decades are not accidental but the workings of seismic forces both within and from outside that follow a logic and trajectory of their own instead of, or rather, in spite of, the volitions of those in power and their "best laid schemes."

BREAKING WAVES

By mid-1980s, as momentum for new developments was gathering and overt sociopolitical and ideological consideration as the sole standard in arts and literature was being replaced by artistic, literary, and philosophical considerations, "safe" Western classics gradually yielded ground to the much "edgier" modernist, postmodernist

literature: Leo Tolstoy and Maxim Gorky to Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Chinghiz Aitmatov, and Boris Pasternak; Charles Dickens, Charlotte Brontë, and William Thackeray to D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and James Joyce; Mark Twain, Theodore Dreiser, John Steinbeck, and Jack London to Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, Saul Bellow, and Joseph Heller; Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Honoré de Balzac, Victor Hugo, Stendhal, Roman Roland to Franz Kafka, Hermann Hesse, Heinrich Theodor Böll, Marcel Proust, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Marguerite Duras...¹⁰

It is not that publications of hitherto banned modern or modernist writers did not meet any resistance or suffer any setbacks. A case in point would be D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (1928), a novel that, thanks to its use of "obscene" language and frank treatment of sexuality and sexual intimacy, had run into trouble with censors even in its home country, the United Kingdom, where the ban for the open publication of an unexpurgated edition was not lifted until 1960, after a much publicized trial involving testimonials of more than a dozen prominent literary critics and writers. When, in 1986, the editors at Hunan People's Press hit upon the idea of publishing a reprint of a 1930s translation of the novel, their motive was more "capitalistic" than "philobiblistic." Their game plan, to give the financially strapped press a jolt of life, was to get on the caravan of the carnival of reading by gambling on the novel's subject and its notoriety in the West.¹¹

Somewhat earlier, a proposal to publish a reprint of the same Chinese translation of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* submitted by Lijiang Press, based in Guilin, Guangxi, had been rejected by censors at the central government's Bureau of Publications. The irony is that when D. H. Lawrence's novel first came to China back in the 1930s, through several translations published in installments in journals and magazines or in book forms, it met with mostly positive reviews. Chinese writers and critics such as Yu Dafu, in their reviews published in *World Literature* and *Short Story Monthly*, praised the novel for its honest treatment of sex as wholesome expression of human nature, which, they believed, should have positive impact on Chinese readers long repressed by rather backward, unenlightened mores on such matters. Even the Guomindang government did not feel the need to intervene despite the fact that it was, at the time, in the thick of a rather conservative "New Life" movement based on Confucianist ideology.¹² The novel had been banned in the decades since 1949, as could be expected, and only a select few, who, despite the high "security clearance" they enjoyed, had had to secure the joint signatures of

several top-ranking cultural officials to have access at all for “research” purposes. The story of Lady Chatterley and her gamekeeper lover did get leaked out, in polymorphous, hand-copied forms, and eagerly circulated among some sent-down youths during the 1970s.¹³ However, as recently as 1985, mainstream literary studies books still dismissed the novel as pornographic and hence decadent.

Therefore, for the editors at Hunan People’s Press to take on the venture, albeit emboldened largely by a monetary motive, it showed quite some guts. The first print run was 360,000 copies. For days trucks hummed outside the press waiting to load the freshly printed and bound copies and carry them to eager bookstores. Any self-congratulatory euphoria the editors experienced as the apparent success promised to lead them singing all the way to the bank didn’t live long. The manager of one big bookstore in the City of Wuhan, who had not had the foresight to put in any order and was rebuffed when he approached the press for a slice of the action, reported the matter directly to a friend of his in Beijing, a powerful leftist ideologue in the Communist Party and central government. Word came down fast. The book was banned. Copies already sold were recalled. Disciplinary punishments to officials in charge and to the culprits at the press were doled out.

One veteran party chief at the provincial Department of Publications, who hadn’t had the benefit of college education and hence didn’t have an ear for the fine acoustic differences between the Chinese transliterations of Chatterley [*chatelai*] and Thatcher [*saiqie’er*] when uttered in the thick local accent, thus reprimanded the editors at the press: “Why on earth, out of all possible books, you wanted to publish one about Madame Thatcher’s lover? Didn’t you know that might rock the Sino-UK relations?!”

The farce over the publication of *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, though, did have a “happy ending” of sort. Although the order from the central government had been “to burn and destroy” [*xiaohui*], as had been done to the opium confiscated in the Canton of the late 1830s, Hunan People’s Press managed to sell all of the quietly warehoused copies—on the sly. In 1988, Lijiang Press, whose request to publish *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* had been tersely rejected, moved rather nimbly to another novel to make up for the lost time and profit: Vladimir Nabokov’s *Lolita*. By then, mores of the society in matters of sex had been loosened up so much that even the censors in the central government did not bother to mumble a word of disapproval. In fact, since the late 1980s, there has been quite a bit of unapologetic, unabated academic interest in *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, which expresses itself

in numerous journal articles and book length studies from various critical approaches, many comparing Lawrence's novel to *Jin Ping Mei* [Plum in the Golden Vase, or The Golden Lotus], the seventeenth-century Chinese novel that had been banned for most of its existence due to its sexually explicit descriptions. In 2004, when the People's Literature Press put out another translation of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, with a print run of 50,000, it barely caused a stir.

Interest in "safe" Western classics, though, never faded away. In fact, almost every major, self-respecting press in China has since put out its own foreign or world literature series, which would include most of the classic authors, who remain staples in the core curricula of both undergraduate and graduate programs offered by departments (or recently expanded schools/colleges of comprehensive universities) of (foreign) languages and literature. However, the focal point of excitement has shifted to the twentieth century Western literature and the myriad of trends and isms associated with it: symbolism, expressionism, futurism, dadaism, cubism, surrealism, existentialism, absurdism, stream of consciousness, black humor, postmodernism, metafiction.

Modernist Western literature had landed in China as early as during the New Culture and New Literature Movement of the early twentieth century, through the agency of Mao Dun, Lu Xun and his brother Zhou Zuoren, Hu Shi, Guo Moruo, Tian Han and others, in the form of translations and/or introductory articles. Influence of modernist literature could be seen in the New Sensationalist Fiction of the 1920s–30s,¹⁴ and in the poems written by Dai Wangshu of the 1930s, and Mu Dan of the 1940s.¹⁵ Even the first 17 years of Communist rule (1949–66) saw a few modernist works, for example, Jack Kerouac's *On the Road*, Samuel Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*, J. D. Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*, John Osborne's *Look Back in Anger*—being translated and published although strictly for "internal" circulation, reference only. Mostly, however, they were banned as being decadent and poisonous.

In 1978, scholars of the Institute of Foreign Literature Research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences broke new ground with articles reassessing modernist literature published in flagship publications such as *Arts and Literature Research*, *Foreign Literature Research*, and *Translation*, which were followed by many more such articles published in journals such as *World Literature*, *Arts and Literature Gazette*, *Foreign Literature*, *Foreign Arts and Literature*, and *Contemporary Foreign Literature*. In the same year, *Foreign Arts and Literature*, freshly established, published Jean-Paul Sartre's play

Dirty Hands, the very first “publically,” as opposed to “internally,” published Sartre’s work in China. With 170,000 copies sold and a public performance to be mounted soon, *Dirty Hands* didn’t seem to experience much existential crisis, if any, in China. All of these bold endeavors created a momentum and paved the way, intellectually as well as logistically (with the emergence of new journals and presses devoted exclusively to publication of foreign literature) for an avalanche in modernist literature publications: *Catch 22*, *The Castle*, *The Plague*, *Contemporary British Short Stories*, *Contemporary American Short Stories*, *Anthology of Absurdist Plays*, *Select Euro-American Modernist Literature*, and so on. In 1983, Foreign Literature Press started a *Foreign Modernist Literature Series*, which, when completed, appeared in four volumes and eight books, featuring postsymbolism, expressionism, futurism, surrealism, existentialism, lost generation, stream-of-consciousness, black humor—altogether about 500 titles by 80 some important Western modernist writers.

Of the 7,000 or so titles in foreign literature published in the first ten years after the Cultural Revolution was over, modernist literature claimed the lion’s share. In the meantime, voluminous books devoted to the study of modernist, contemporary Western literature were being published by big players in China’s publishing world such as Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, People’s Literature Press, and Shanghai Arts and Literature Press. Among the titles published were *Contemporary Western Literary Criticism* (1979), *Sartre Studies* (1981), *Western Modernist Literature References* (1981), *30 Lectures on Euro-American Modernist Literature* (1982), *Western Modernist Literature Topics and Issues* (1984), *Introduction to Western Modernist Literature* (1985), *Western Modernist Literature Reviews* (1987), *Introduction of Euro-American Modernist Literature* (1993).¹⁶

One interesting development in the influx of Western modernist, contemporary literature in China happened in 1983 in the form of Arthur Miller (1915–2005) going to Beijing to direct his play *Death of a Salesman*. By this time, translations of major, representative Western modernist, contemporary drama had become available in China. As early as in 1978, Zhu Hong, a literary scholar based at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, led the way with a critical survey of the Theater of the Absurd and a translation of Harold Pinter’s *Birthday Party*. This was followed by the publication, in 1980, of an anthology of absurdist plays, including in it Samuel Beckett’s *Waiting for Godot*, Eugène Ionesco’s *Amedée, or How to Get Rid of It*, Albert Albee’s *The Zoo Story*, and Harold Pinter’s *The Dumb Waiter*. In the same year also appeared an anthology of modernist drama

that included August Strindberg's *The Ghost Sonata*, George Kaiser's *From Morn to Midnight*, Ernest Toller's *Masses and Man*, and Eugene O'Neill's *The Hairy Ape*. A second volume, containing in it Jean-Paul Sartre's *Morts sans sepulture*, appeared in 1981. Such modernist and contemporary plays, with their themes of angst, alienation, and absurdity, resonated with intellectuals and a younger generation of playwrights and opened up for them new possibilities for both formal and thematic experimentation in the post-Mao China.¹⁷

In fact, by the time of Miller's visit, bold young Chinese playwrights had already started to experiment with (post)modernist theatre. Gao Xingjian (1940–), for instance, a literary translator who had received five years of “re-education” in rural China during the Cultural Revolution and who would, in 2000, be awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, co-wrote the play *The Alarm Signal* [*juedui xinbao*] in 1982, which breaks the walls of reality, dream, and memory in dramatizing a young man's struggle to find himself again—the first of such bold experiments in China. It was mounted by the People's Art Theater [*renyi*] in the same year. In the following year Gao wrote *Bus Stop* [*chezhan*], in which an old man, a girl, a mother, a carpenter, and a bespectacled man have to wait for ten years for a bus to finally arrive. In theme, form, and even storyline a Chinese response to Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*, Gao's *Bus Stop* was mounted by the same People's Art Theater in 1983, one month after Miller's *Death of a Salesman*, although it was banned after only ten performances due to its not so opaque satire directed at the Communist Party.

Arthur Miller, with his then wife Inge Morath, had already visited China in 1978 and discussed with Ying Ruocheng (a talented actor who had suffered persecution during the Cultural Revolution) and Cao Yu (author of *Thunderstorm* and other modern Chinese classics) the possibility of having one of his plays staged in China. The idea began to take shape in 1982 when Ying Ruocheng, a visiting scholar in Kansas City then, met with Miller again. Miller recommended *The Crucible*, which would have been an apt choice given the eerie, shocking parallels between the Salem witch hunt (1690s), McCarthyism (1950s), and the reign of red terror during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), but Ying, as he would recall years later, had his heart set on *Death of a Salesman*—to realize a dream he had cherished ever since, when still a college student, he read the play for the first time.

What fascinated him the most was not only the subject matter and the characters but more importantly the surrealist form, the fluid, wall-less concurrences of past/present, and reality/dream/trance/memory, which significantly expand the psychological as well as

physical space of the story. Ying translated the play, using the richly flavored Beijing dialect to give a “faithful” rendition of the New York dialect spoken by Willy Loman and other characters in the play. He managed to stay so close to the original that the eventual performance time was almost exactly the same as the English original in America. Instead of using makeup, wigs, and false noses to attempt an illusion of “Americanness,” as they had used to do when staging foreign plays, the actors had to win the audiences over with nothing but authentic, credible, convincing performance.

And Ying, who would play the leading role of Willy Loman, had to sell the idea of staging the play as he and Miller envisioned to the somewhat skeptic leadership of the theater, too, who tended to micro-manage. For example, the leadership wanted to cut the “Requiem” and instead let the curtain fall right after Willy has committed suicide for fear that audience members might not only lose interest but also miss the late night bus ride home. As it turned out, *Death of a Salesman*, as mounted by a cast who looked Chinese, spoke Chinese, and acted Chinese (other than kissing on stage, something that had never been done before), was a stunning success in Beijing.

Although the Chinese were not as artistically backward and as ignorant of the contemporary, postmodern Western theater as Miller had thought, the success of *Death of a Salesman* in Beijing did prove an impetus in breaking new grounds for the Chinese theatre. The banning of Gao Xingjian’s *Bus Stop* in 1983 did not stop playwrights from experimenting and pushing the boundaries of the theater. Jin Yun’s *Nirvana of Grandpa Doggy* [*gou eryl niepan*], for instance, which was staged by the People’s Art Theater in 1986, makes good use of fluid, wall-less psychological time-space to tell the tragic story of a peasant who is obsessed with farmland and whose dream of success (acquiring as much land and wealth as the landlords of the old society) is crushed by the push for collectivization in the new society. Indeed the Chinese theater would never look the same again—despite resistance from various groups out of ideological as well as cultural concerns. In fact, influence of Western (post)modernist theatre can be seen in several of “the six traditions” in post-Mao China: 1) illusionist (realist); 2) indigenous (traditional, folk drama); 3) modernist; 4) epic; 5) suggestive; 6) Greek, all drawing, to varying degrees, from both Western and native Chinese traditions.¹⁸

Western modernist literature has become so ubiquitous that it has even made its way into high school curriculum, for example, Kafka’s “Metamorphosis,” Woolf’s “The Mark on the Wall,” Beckett’s *Waiting for Godot*, and Márquez’s *Hundred Years of Solitude*. For

most of the high schoolers, lacking the necessary knowledge about the West, especially the modern history of the West—its science and technology, philosophy, arts and literature, as well as socioeconomics and politics, despite the Internet, Hollywood, NBA, and the “invasion” of other pop culture and mass media, reading Western modernist literature (through translations, of course) can be perplexing and therefore boring, as many teachers have found out.¹⁹

Teaching Western literature, classic, modern, or (post)modern, even at the college level, can be challenging, too, if not exactly frustrating. According to a Qinghua University study, about 80 percent of students were not satisfied with overall classroom instruction by their professors, and the percentage of students dissatisfied with foreign literature could be higher thanks to lack of background knowledge, difficulty arising from transliterated foreign names, and the method of teaching used by many professors who tend to lecture from beginning to end, spoon-feeding the students preprocessed “knowledge,” i.e., background information, themes, characterization, symbolism, without opening it up for discussions. To better engage students, some instructors have begun to experiment with a more open, discussion-driven, student-centered approach, involving the students in teaching, assessing, grading, and trying to engage them in the entire learning processes. Some have experimented with multimedia and other new methods and technology, too.²⁰

The West, as a glamorous Other, looms large in the minds of tens of millions of high school and college students as they struggle with its literature in its multifarious forms. No matter how a particular lesson in classic or (post)modernist Western literature is taught, certain messages are transmitted and certain influence, explicit, visible, or subliminal, is being exerted. The same “old” tensions get to be played out here too, for example, how to naturalize or indigenize Western literature through instruction so that knowledge and appreciation of Western literature would not be achieved as the expense of native Chinese culture. Indeed, for many educators in China, the challenge is how to bring Western literature instruction into the orbit of “socialist spiritual civilization construction” so it will serve, centripetally, instead of pulling away from, the dominant cultural, ideological, socioeconomic as well as educational agendas, and so it will, more specifically, help students develop positive values and attitudes during their formative years.²¹

Traditional literary criticism in China, as noted in [Chapter 2](#), was dominated by impressionistic commentary and textual studies. It was intuitive, experiential, and lacked the rigor of systemic attention and

theoretical self-awareness. Wang Guowei (1877–1927), a talented and versatile scholar, was one of the earliest among Chinese scholars who adopted Western ideas and methodologies in literary studies. During much of the decades before 1949, various schools of Western literary theory and practice did find their way into China: formalist, sociohistorical, New Critical, linguistic, structuralist. The continuity of this development was interrupted during the decades since the 1949 when the dogmas of class struggle and socialist realism became the dominant ideology and dictated literary studies. With the end of the Cultural Revolution and reopening of China in the late 1970s, a concurrent of literary theories and critical methodologies flooded in—realism, humanism, psychoanalytic criticism, narratology, structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, reader response, neo-Marxism, feminism, postcolonial, New Historicism, cultural studies, ecocriticism. The intellectuals in China were amazed and dazed and barely had time to chew and digest before they went out applying these newly borrowed lenses, to switch to a different metaphoric gear, to texts, authors, and perplexing issues of literary studies. They were caught off guard, so to speak, almost in the same manner that young idealistic iconoclasts in the early decades of the twentieth century had been when they had had no luxury of time to study Marxism at a leisurely pace; rather, they took a quick glance, liked what they saw, and, driven by the exigency of saving China, decided to apply it, especially its Leninist variation, to China, only to find out soon enough that they had to learn—the hard way—how to adapt based on the socio-economic, cultural, and historical realities of China.

The enthusiastic adoption of Western theories and methodologies in the 1980s did produce an exciting amount of new sight and sound in literary studies. Some scholars, however, would later describe much of what was “fresh” in literary studies then as more parroting than speaking in one’s own voice. It was a period of aphasia, they would thus categorize it, as far as the traditions of literary studies in the native culture were concerned. Although the initial, awestruck phase has long passed and much new ground has been gained in digesting Western literary theories and methodologies and in establishing something “original” that would work for the Chinese, the same tensions between domestication and foreignization, to borrow from translation studies, remain.²²

Take for example, the development of narratological studies in China.²³ During the May Fourth era, Zhou Zuoren, adapting the Aristotelian taxonomy of genres, did some preliminary work on the generic characteristics of fiction, poetry, drama, and the essay

(something close to today's literary nonfiction), but narratology as a branch of literary studies was never established or developed in China. During the 17 years from 1949 to 1976, there were only a dozen or so published articles on the art or craft of fiction and even these were primarily reflective, personal essays on writing experience rather than sustained scholarly inquiries; their dominant themes were political, populist (how to serve the workers, peasants, soldiers, and such broad masses), and nationalistic.

The 1980s witnessed a myriad of Western theories being introduced and tested in China. Among the translations and collections of various schools of narratological studies published during the 1980s–90s were: E. M. Foster's *Aspects of Novel* (1981), Ray Benedict and Edward West's *The Art of Modern Fiction* (1984), Wayne C. Booth's *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (1987), *Narratological Studies* (which includes representative essays by Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov, Gérard Genette, Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Claude Bremond), Shlomith Rimmmon-Kenan's *Narrative Fiction* (1989), Gérard Genette's *Nouveau discours du récit* (1990), Wallace Martin's *Recent Theories of Narrative* (1990), and Mieke Bal's *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (1995). This was followed by more translations of contemporary narratological theories and studies: J. Hillis Miller's *Reading Narrative* (2002), Susan S. Lanser's *Fictions of Authority: Women Writers and Narrative Voice* (2002), James Phelan's *Narrative as Rhetoric: Technique, Audiences, Ethics, Ideology* (2002), David Herman's *Narratologies: New Perspectives On Narrative Analysis* (2002), Mark Currie's *Postmodern Narrative Theory* (2003), and James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz's *A Companion To Narrative Theory* (2007), all published by Beijing University Press, through the dedicated endeavors of Shen Dan, who did her doctoral studies at the University of Edinburgh (1982–87).

The influx of Western theories provided Chinese scholars with the necessary tools to develop their own fictional studies. Tentative at first and basing their endeavors mostly on classic Western theories, scholars soon grew bolder, and more confident. Shen Dan, for example, has authored and coauthored several book length studies in narratology, for example, *Literary Stylistics and Fictional Translation* (1995), *Studies in Narratology and Narrative Stylistics* (1998), *Studies in British and American Narratological Theories* (2005), and *Narrative, Text, and Subtext—Rereading Classic British and American Short Stories* (2009). Whether the Chinese scholars will succeed in establishing a distinctive Chinese school of narratology, the ambiguous goal set by many of them, it is apparent that the influx of Western

theories, classic and contemporary, has inspired much more serious and systemic scholarly endeavors in fictional studies.

As (post)modernist Western literature and literary theories were setting up beachhead in the post-Mao China, something else came crashing ashore too and soon established a ubiquitous presence in the cultural landscape of China with a take-no-prisoner swagger.

Back in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century, Lin Shu had been faulted by many younger, more idealistic activist/writer/translators for having wasted his time and talent on second-rate writers such as Alexandre Dumas and H. Rider Haggard, who were popular enough but could barely live up to the mantra of “writing as vehicle for the way” [*wen yi zai dao*]. When the Hollywood film *Gone with the Wind* was released, it was such a hit in China that it was shown for 40 consecutive days in Shanghai alone. However, when Fu Donghua, the talented translator of Cervantes’s *Don Quixote*, Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, and Homer’s *Iliad*, was contacted to do a translation of Margaret Mitchell’s novel, so as to ride the wave of the film’s stunning success all the way to the bank, he wasn’t sure at first whether he should take it on because, he felt, for all the stir the film had caused, *Gone with the Wind* remained a popular novel rather than serious literature.²⁴

Such was still the case in 1979, when the first “new” foreign film was screened in China—*Death on the Nile* (1978), based on the novel of the same title by Agatha Christie (1890–1976) and directed by John Guillermin and starring Peter Ustinov as Hercule Poirot. The film was a hit all across China, which hadn’t seen any foreign films for a very long time other than Soviet Union’s *Lenin in October*, *Lenin in 1918*, North Korea’s *The Little Floral Girl*, *Apple-Picking Season*, *Village of Blooming Flowers*, Albania’s *Underground Fighters*, *Harbor Thunderstorm*, *A Heroine’s Death*, and Romania’s *The Waves of the Danube*, although Madame Mao had had frequent “internal” screenings of the latest Hollywood films for a select group of radical leftist cohorts and voluntary and involuntary artist/intellectual collaborators. It is, therefore, understandable that the Chinese people, having been forced on a strict diet of gray, lifeless, propaganda-driven songs, books, and films for so long, now were hungering for anything new, different, exotic—highbrow, middlebrow, lowbrow, no matter.

The 1979 inaugural issue of the foreign literature journal *Yilin* [Translation Forest] published a translation of *Death on the Nile* with a print run of 400,000, which was sold out within days.²⁵ Vexed in no small ways by this development, “highbrow” critics reproved the

press for wasting precious time and space on Christie and other popular authors. *Yilin* respectfully disagreed and followed up the success of *Death on the Nile* with Daphne du Maurier's *Rebecca*, translated as *Lubeika* or *Hudie meng* [Butterfly Dream] in the second issue of the journal, which also featured an impassioned plea titled "Let's Open the Window Even Wider!" penned by Ge Baoquan (1913–2000), a prominent literary scholar and translator of Russian literature. By 2008 *Yilin* had published translations of 172 popular novels, 111 of them by American authors, 19 by British authors, 14 by French authors, and so on.²⁶

Other presses followed suit. In the same year that *Yilin* published *Death on the Nile*, Zhejiang People's Press published Christie's *Murder on the Orient Express* and a reprint of a *Gone with the Wind* translation while Jiangsu People's Press put out a translation of Arthur Hailey's *The Moneychangers*. In 1980 alone, nine of Christie's novels were published; another 14 of her novels were published in 1981. In 1998 Guizhou People's Press published the *Complete Works of Agatha Christie* in 80 volumes. It is worth noting that all of these people's presses are flagship publishing houses of their respective provinces (e.g., Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guizhou) whose primary mission had been, for a long time, the propagation of the Communist Party's ideology and policies. Among other popular novelists that have been translated into Chinese are Michael Clayton, John Grisham, Danielle Steel, Stephen King, Dan Brown, and J. K. Rowling.

The Chinese publishing industry was caught off guard, somewhat, when in the late 1990s the story of a young wizard at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry dreamed up by a single mother of a small English town first took the world by storm. When it realized what was happening, the People's Literature Press lost no time hopping onto the global bandwagon of Pottermania by putting out Chinese translations of the first three books in the series—*Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone*, *Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets*, *Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban*—all in the same year of 2000. When the fourth book in the series, *Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire*, was published in 2000, there was still a five-month "jet lag," so to speak, before its Chinese translation reached the eager hands of tens of thousands of young readers (and their parents). From then on, though, for each of the remaining three books in the series—*Harry Potter and the Order of Phoenix* (2003), *Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince* (2004), *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows* (2007)—the translators and editors and everyone else in the "assembly line" would kick into high gears working their magic, nonstop, for

two to three months until the Chinese translation of the latest book had been delivered to the millions of Potterheads left cliffhanging by the preceding book in the series. With the hotly expected release of each new book and each new Hollywood film adaptation, a new wave of frenzy swept across the country, just as it was the case in J. K. Rowling's home country, in the United States, and just about anywhere else in the world where the wizardry of the young, bespectacled protagonist could reach.²⁷

And, as can be expected in the market-driven China today, a cottage industry would arise from nowhere to profit from the insanely lucrative Pottermania by conjuring up all kinds of "Harry Potters" that could hardly be described as fan fiction or mentioned in the same breath as Daphne du Maurier's *Rebecca* or Jean Rhys's *Wide Sargasso Sea* (both inspired by Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*). Among the many "Harry Potter" want-to-bes are *Harry Potter and the Leopard Woke up the Dragon*; *Harry Potter and the Chinese Porcelain Doll*; *Rich Dad, Poor Dad and Harry Potter*; *Harry Potter and the Golden Vase*. In *Harry Potter and the Leopard Woke up the Dragon*, the boy wizard is transformed into a fat hairy dwarf whereas the "author" of *Harry Potter and the Golden Vase* ratchets up the story a notch by giving Hermione a stormy love affair almost worthy of her namesake in the Greek mythologies.²⁸

All of this is happening in a post-Mao, market-driven China where many people seem to have been driven by a desire to (over)compensate for whatever they feel they have long been deprived of, as they tumble into the "sea of commerce," into this frenzied pursuit of success, this indulgence in material comfort and sensual pleasures (partly because the sociopolitical liberties are still limited and freedom in other areas is still restricted). It is no wonder that when bestselling Western popular fiction of all stripes—mystery, detective, romance, science fiction, when *Titanic*, *Avatar*, *Friends*, *Prison Break*, *Lost*, *24*, the Internet, social networks (although Facebook is still being blocked, many have figured out ways to "jump the firewall," so to speak, and show up), rock'n'roll, Michael Jackson, Madonna, Britney Spears, Lady Gaga, NBA, Kobe Bryant, NCAA, Pinot Noir, Hennessy X.O., Starbucks, along with a myriad of isms and fads in arts and literature and political philosophies—when they all come crashing ashore and keep pushing inland and changing the cultural, psychological, as well as physical landscape of the country along the way, many Chinese intellectuals "grow gray" with concern and fear, to borrow from Percy Shelley, and want to resist and preserve whatever is still left that is native and Chinese.

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF A NEW LITERATURE

The publication of Liu Xinwu's short story "The Class Teacher" [*banzhuren*] in 1977 and Lu Xinhua's short story "Scar" [*shanghen*] in 1978 heralded a profusion of new literature which tells heartrending stories of trauma and tragedy during the Cultural Revolution, more a direly needed expression of pain and sorrow of a deeply scarred psyche, a cry for the healing of wounds, and a collective cathartic experience than a statement out of any overt political agenda, as was the case with the "Beijing Spring"/"Democracy Wall" movement. Nonetheless, its impact on the dominant sociopolitical and literary discourse was just as subversive. Ever since then, according to some scholars, contemporary Chinese literature has undergone two transformative developments: "elitization" [*jingying hua*] of the 1980s and "de-elitization" [*qu jingying hua*] since the 1990s, which dovetails with the larger trends in arts, literature, and intellectual developments as outlined in the preceding sections.²⁹

The first phase of "elitization" is the "enlightenment literature" [*qimeng wenxue*] of the first half of 1980s, including "scar literature" [*shanghen wenxue*], "reflection literature" [*fansi wenxue*], "reform literature" [*gaige wenxue*], all dominated by the enlightenment spirit in the vein of the May Fourth Movement aiming toward establishing a free and democratic society and cultural values. The typical themes of the new "enlightenment literature" were denunciation of the dominant sociopolitical and literary ideologies and practices of the Cultural Revolution and advocacy of new ideologies and practices that emphasized creative freedom and humanistic values. The primary concerns of writings during this phase were more sociopolitical than literary.

When the Cultural Revolution was over, the new patrons for literature was not only the Party and the state ideological apparatus but more importantly the society as a whole and the broad masses as readers. There was quite a bit of reshuffling between "center" and "margin" instigated by the new demands as the society moved on to a new era. Writers who were "favorites" of the leftist establishment, now without the patronage of Mao, Madame Mao, and their cohorts, were soon marginalized. The "new" writers favored by the society and readers were of two groups. The first were talented writers who had been active in the 1950s, but had often been criticized, even silenced, for their less than "politically correct" writings, and hence marginalized, who now returned to the center with rekindled hope and vitality. The other were "sent-down youth writers" [*zhiqing*

zuojiā], who, while being “re-educated” on the farms and in factories, had kept up a haphazard reading program of great, forbidden books (e.g., books meant for “internal distribution only”) and hazardous writing activities, mostly “underground,” under the radar of the leftist literary and cultural establishment, distributing among themselves their own stories, poems, and essays in hand-copied manuscripts, and who now burst on the literary scene with their “Red Guard” like daredevil attitude and explosive energy.³⁰

This was followed by a phase of “experimental literature” [*shiyān wénxué*] in the second half of 1980s, which witnessed a group of young, avant-garde writers who experimented with narrative forms, techniques, and themes, having fallen under the influence of Western modernist and postmodernist writers such as Kafka, Borges, Márquez that had become available through the bold agency of translations alluded to earlier in this chapter.³¹

Most in this group of experimental writers, for example, Yu Hua, Su Tong, and Ge Fei, are separated from the typical “sent-down youth writers” not only by their age—they are, typically, ten years or so younger—but more importantly, by their intellectual upbringing and the trajectory of their literary career. By the time the Cultural Revolution was over and the new age of reform and revival began, the typical “sent-down youth writers” were already in their late 30s, if not 40s, and their writings, as they struggled to “cast aside the rigid strictures” of Maoist sociopolitical and literary ideologies that had shaped their growth, were “indelibly marked by their experiences of revolutionary disillusionment and internal exile.” In contrast, most experimental writers like Yu Hua, Su Tong, and Ge Fei, were still young children during the Cultural Revolution. By the time they reached adolescence and became voracious readers, the post-Mao age had already begun; books, new and classic, Chinese and Western (in translations), literary, philosophical, and sociopolitical, had all become readily available.³²

The commodification of culture, the gradual dominance of pop culture and consumerism, and the ubiquity of the new media such as the Internet inevitably led to the “de-elitization” of literature since 1990s, a development that, to the horror of many intellectuals and critics, has all but blown away the “halo” of moral seriousness and cultural elitism that for centuries have been associated with literature. When the onslaught of writings that indulged in nihilism, everyday trivia, incoherent interior mumble jumbo, body writing, or sexual escapades began, the “elites” responded by dismissing them as “ruins in the wilderness” and “internet trash,” yet it seems a losing battle

they have been fighting. Indeed, just as the young and bold authors of “trashy literature” have been awarded richly by the market, so they have been gradually accepted by the “mainstream,” out of recognition of its relevancy in the society, its inevitability, or a combination of both.³³

Notable among the new “trashy literature” is a semi-autobiographical novel *Shanghai Baby* [*shanghai baobei*, 1999] by Wei Hui, a young female author. Set in Shanghai, as the jacket of its English translation (Simon & Shuster, 2001) describes it, the novel follows “the days, and nights, of the irrepressibly carnal Coco,” also a young female writer, as she treks in “a frenzied, orgasmic world of drugs and hedonism,” bolting between the drug addict of a boyfriend and a “boisterous Westerner, a rich German businessman with a penchant for S/M and seduction,” and as she sinks deeper in a quicksand “of love and lust across the borders between two cultures—awakening her guilt and fears of discovery, yet stimulating her emerging sexual self.” The novel took the country by storm. Within half a year of its release in September 1999, over 100,000 copies were sold (not counting numerous pirated “publications”). Alarmed, literary ideologues and cultural officials moved quickly to condemn *Shanghai Baby* as a “poster girl” of victimization by the decadent, poisonous Western culture and banned it in May 2000.³⁴

And not surprisingly, the novel has fared much better in the West, its author being praised, among other things, for her talent and for her boldness in testing hitherto tabooed moral as well as literary grounds in a fast-changing China. Simon & Shuster, however, the first Western publisher of the novel’s English translation, had more “serious” things on its mind than pure literary and moral considerations, as revealed by the tantalizing, sensually crazed young woman in the cover art (albeit somewhat offset by a more proper, wholesome picture of the author herself in the back cover) and by the titillating language employed in the sales pitch on the jacket: “[d]ark and edgy, deliciously naughty, and intoxicating cocktail of sex and the search for love . . .”

Shanghai Baby has since been adapted into a film (2007) produced by Ling Bai (featuring herself as Coco), a US-based actress who played Richard Gere’s love interest in the controversial 1997 film *Red Corner*. It was followed by at least two other semi-autobiographical novels by young female authors, Mian Mian’s *Candy* [*tang*, 2000] and Chun Sue’s *Beijing Doll* [*Beijing wawa*, 2002]; both have stirred up their respective share of controversy in China and both, or their “reincarnations” in English conjured up by capable

translators, have met comparable “literary” as well as market success in the West.³⁵

Of all the modernist Western writers who were introduced into China in the early 1980s, Franz Kafka seemed uniquely fit and was bound to exert significant influence on a generation of emerging new writers. From early on Kafka had shown keen interest in Chinese culture, classic poetry, and philosophies. Having read some Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Confucius, Kafka had this to say about these classics: “This is a vast sea in which one can sink easily. With Confucius’s *Analects* one can be on firm ground, initially, but the book will soon get more and more mystifying and elusive. Laozi’s aphorisms are like hard nuts. I am fascinated although their kernels remain tightly closed to me.” He was particularly fascinated by this quote from Zhuangzi: “If life brings not life to death, and death brings not death to life, why then wait for life or death at all? They are one and the same.” For Kafka, this “is the first and foremost question for all religions and philosophies. The key here is to master the inner links between things and time, know oneself, and dive deep into the process of one’s own formation and death.”³⁶

Given such keen interest, it would not be surprising that China would figure in Kafka’s fictional work. His “The Great Wall of China” (1917), a fragmentary story, exemplifies such “fictional treatment of the Orient as a cultural projection of the European imagination.” In this story, the narrator, a Chinese historian, tries to “reconstruct two interrelated aspects of his country’s history: the building of the wall and the institutional problems of the imperial rule.” The story, though, is not just about China despite its culturally specific source material. Indeed, the Great Wall of China, or rather the short story “The Great Wall of China,” becomes a site where several of Kafka’s key topics are tested and explored:

the embodiment of patriarchal authority in an arbitrary institution that disenfranchises those who submit voluntarily to its power machinations; the pessimistic view that history is not driven by reason and progress but, even on the brink of modernity, reverts to myth and cyclical sameness; the inability of the individual to comprehend, or alter, the workings of politics and society through individual action; and the alienation of human subjects whose collective unity and social values are based on an illusory sense of national pride.³⁷

Kafka, who could wear a number of hats under the umbrella of modernism or postmodernism (e.g., expressionism, existentialism, absurdism, surrealism, symbolism), was bound to have a “game-changing”

impact on contemporary Chinese writers. Zong Pu, Can Xue, Yu Hua, Mo Yan, and many others, once impacted, would never write the same again. Upon reading Kafka for the first time, Zong Pu couldn't help exclaiming: "Never thought fiction could be written in such a way!" Can Xue, one of the contemporary Chinese writers who is well-known and critically acclaimed in the West (more so than in her home country), found in Kafka a kindred spirit. She wrote a book devoted exclusively to the study of Kafka: *Soul's Castle—Understanding Kafka*, published in 1999. Yu Hua, best-known in the West as the author of *To Live* [*huozhuo*;1993], which was adapted into a film in 1994 (directed by Zhang Yimo and starring Ge You and Gong Li), had this to say about Kafka's impact on him: "Kafka liberated me!"

Born into a prominent intellectual family and well-educated in both Chinese and Western literatures, Zong Pu (1928–), who had suffered a lot during the Cultural Revolution, was already a published fiction writer, essayist, and literary critic when she "discovered" Kafka. Its transmogrifying impact can be seen in the new stories she would write in the years immediately after China reopened its door, for example, "Who Am I," "Living Like a Snail," and "A Skull in the Mud."

In "Who Am I," the main character Wei Mi, a US-educated scientist who has returned to help build her motherland, is so battered by the insanity raging around her during the Cultural Revolution that she becomes disoriented and eventually loses the sense of who she is. Having been denounced as a monstrous "cow ghost snake demon" [*niu gui she shen*], a murderer, and a venomous insect, she falls into a trance in which she has indeed become an insect that "contracted its lower body, humped its back, and crept forward," in the same manner that Kafka's Gregor Samsa wakes up one morning and finds himself to have become a gigantic insect. Similarly, the first-person narrator in "Living Like a Snail" is on a futile search for a home in the dark wilderness. Exhausted and disheartened, "I" wander through a stone door only to find crowds of half-snail half-human creatures, their faces mask-like, the two "antennas" on their heads quivering incessantly to sense danger nearby. "I" also stumble upon heaven, where survival necessitates betrayal of fellow creatures, and then hell, where a queue of corpses hold their severed heads up in the air. The picture conjured up in "A Skull in the Mud" is just as horrific.

Despite the obvious Kafkaesque elements in Zong Pu's short stories, their primary concerns remain sociopolitical (e.g., the reign of red terror during the Cultural Revolution) rather than literary and psychological. One of the earliest to truly break away from the long

traditions of literature being vehicle for overt sociopolitical and moral interventions, to fully plunge into the experimental mode in fiction writing would be Can Xue (meaning “residual” / “cruel” snow,” pen-name for Deng Xiaohua, 1953–). Her parents were prominent journalists who were condemned during the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Her education was interrupted when the Cultural Revolution started. So she worked in a small neighborhood factory, practiced as a “barefoot doctor,” and then married a “sent-down youth” who returned to the city in the late 1970s. Can Xue not only finds in Kafka a kindred spirit but also has a unique take on his fictional works. For example, Can Xue reads *Amerika*, an early incomplete novel of Kafka’s published posthumously in 1927, as more a journey of the soul than the adventures of an individual (Karl Rossmanna, the protagonist) in the United States; *The Trial* (1925), as much a story of Joseph K. (the protagonist) being tried by his own conscience as by an absurd, unjust court; and *The Castle* (1926), which Kafka started to write in 1922 but died two years later before finishing it, more as a castle of the soul, a symbol of the ideals of humanity than a simple stand-in for the capitalistic bureaucracy, as was the typical reading in China then. Indeed, Can Xue thinks of herself as someone who writes from the soul, or soul-writes, so to speak: “The conventional mores of good and bad do not exist in my writings because my subject matter is not social, but soul; I have always been searching in the vast, boundless soul exploring the tensions between desire and reason, which are as old as time.”

One of the results of this “soul-searching” is her short story “Hut on the Mountain” published in 1985. In this story the first-person narrator, who lives with her Father, Mother, and Little Sister, busies herself by trying to tidy up her desk drawers day after day, but to no avail. She lives in a world of overstrung nerves, profound distrust, and paranoia, as she says to Mother, who constantly snoops and pokes “her small dark green face” into the narrator’s presence:

“There are so many thieves wandering about our house in the moonlight, when I turn on the light I can see countless tiny holes poked by fingers in the window screen. In the next room, Father and you snore terribly, rattling the utensils in the kitchen cabinet. Then I kick about in my bed, turn my swollen head on the pillow and hear the man locked up in the hut banging furiously against the door. This goes on till daylight.”³⁸

In this sickly, nightmare-plagued world of jumpy, fractured psyches, everyone acts creepily, like rats, wolves, or ghosts. The desk drawers

that can never be tidied up, the well in which Father did or did not drop a pair of scissors 20 years ago, the nocturnal attack Mother complains about by a “huge swarm of hideous beetles” flying in through the window, and the hut on “the bleak and barren mountain” behind their house that has loomed large in the narrator’s mindscape and haunted her very being—all of these, and indeed, all of the descriptive and narrative elements in the story, are tropes for a world that has gone awry, a world wherein people are yet to recover (if they will ever) from some unnamed trauma that happened 20 years ago or only recently, and breathe the existential crisis every moment of their being.

Can Xue’s works, though, draws from both Chinese and Western sources; they are a near perfect fusion of East and West, no matter whether such fusion results from conscious or unconscious efforts on her part, as exemplified by her novellas *Yellow Mud Street* (1985) and *Old Floating Cloud* (1985):

[Can Xue’s] stories have a sense of menace and a fear of petty officialdom that many readers will associate with Kafka, and the absurd, illogical, despair-informed humor typical of Beckett. *Yellow Mud Street*, with its chorus of alternating voices and its attention to seasonal and poetic rhythms, contains echoes of Virginia Woolf’s *The Waves*, first published in China in the early 1980s. And her dream symbolism surely draws on Freud. As her most satirical, however, she sounds more like Lu Xun in *The True Story of Ab Q*, and in her interweaving of reality and illusion, she harks back to *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, the great Chinese novel of the eighteenth century. Yet there are moments, especially in *Old Floating Cloud*, when Can Xue appears closer to, and is as lyrical and allusive as, the eighth-century poet Tufu.³⁹

Unlike Zong Pu and Can Xue, Yu Hua (1960–) wasn’t born into a family of books and didn’t grow up breathing in the aura of intellectually stimulating dinner table conversations. When he reached school age, the Cultural Revolution started, which, basically, deprived him of the benefit of formal education during the most formative years of his life. However, young Yu Hua did learn to read somehow and when, upon “graduation” from elementary school, he obtained a membership card from the county library, he started to read voraciously just about any books he could lay hands on, especially novels, although at the time all he could read were politically sanctioned novels featuring socialist realist themes and revolutionary heroes: *Sunny Days* [*yan yang tian*, 1962], *Golden Road* [*jinguan dadao*, 1972], *Glittering*

Red Stars [*shanshan de hongxing*, 1972], *Storms Over the Coal Mines* [*kuangshan fengyun*, 1972], and *The Gadfly* by Voynich (1897).

By the time Yu Hua stumbled upon Kafka in 1986, he had been writing in the more conventional, realistic fashions. It was a time when Yu Hua felt he had hit a plateau in his literary career and his creativity had run dry. Upon reading a translation of Kafka's *The Country Doctor*, a collection of short stories written during the World War I years, Yu Hua was stunned by how freely the imagination could soar in Kafka's fictional world. He felt being saved, in the nick of time, from the "slaughtering sword" of conventionality and from becoming a sacrificial lamb at the altar of literary myths. Tossing aside all the things he had learnt so far as "trash," Yu Hua let his imagination "soar like a kite over wild fields, unburdened, free." Instead of "imitating" Kafka, though, Yu Hua drew inspirations from him (and other modernist Western writers such as Jorge Luis Borges and Alain Robbe-Grillet), staged a "creative rebellion" against conventions, and became one of the most avant-garde writers of contemporary Chinese literature.⁴⁰

In his short story "On the Road at Eighteen" (1986), which is frequently anthologized and taught in (modern) Chinese literature, history, or humanities courses in the West, a young man is told by his father to get on the road with a "red backpack" and find himself in the world out there. His encounters along the way, i.e., the hitchhiking mishaps with a truck driver, are nothing but Kafkaesque. Failing to get anywhere and to find an "inn" at the end of a long "eventful" day, the 18-year-old crawls into the cabin of the "miserable" truck that has been robbed (of its loads of fruit) and battered by mobs, including the driver himself. Now, sheltered from the absurdities of the "real" world outside, the young man nurses his "miserable" and "battered" self as he regresses, allegorically, into the safety and warmth of the womb, albeit a metallic, mechanic, and battered one:

I open the door and hop in. I'm comforted by the fact that they didn't pry away the seat. I lie down in the cab. I smell leaking gas and think of the smell of the blood that leaked out of me. The wind's getting stronger and stronger, but I feel a little warmer lying on the seat. I think that even if the truck's battered, its heart is still intact, still warm. I know that my heart's warm, too. I was looking for an inn, and I never thought I'd find one here.⁴¹

The irony with Can Xue, Yu Hua, and other experimental writers is that while some Chinese critics find them short, when measuring

their works against the “gold standard” of modernity as embodied by Kafka, Borges, and other Western “master writers,” Western critics (as well as readers) do not see them as shabby imitators or their works as uninspired derivatives; they, instead, appreciate Can Xue, Yu Hua, and others as refreshingly bold and creative writers who have effected a potent fusion of culturally specific source material and topics and universal themes, of native literary traditions, and Western influences.

THE SPECTER OF PRE/PSEUDO MODERNITY

According to some scholars, the mode of political and institutional control of literary production in the post-Mao era has not been markedly different from the mode enforced from 1949 to the end of the 1970s. It has been the same policy of “stick and carrot,” i.e., punishment for those who are deemed “trespassers” of the preset boundaries and reward for those who respect the boundaries and don’t try to challenge them. In the immediate days after the Cultural Revolution was over, for instance, the newly emerged sociopolitical and ideological establishment approved the denunciation of the ten-year ordeal and hence tolerated, if it did not exactly encourage, the new literature that bore the label of “scar” [*shanghen*], “reflection” [*fansi*], or “reform” [*gaige*]. The new Party leadership actually led the “thought liberation” [*sixiang jiefang*] movement that paved the way for the reforms the country was embarking on.

However, once such reckoning and reflection went so far as to question the monopoly of power and legitimacy of the system of control itself, the Party leadership responded, almost as a reflex, with the codification of the Four Basic Principles, to rein in free expressions, as has already been alluded to earlier. In 1979, there was the organized criticism of *Flying the Sky* (novella), *In the Archives of the Society* (screenplay) and *If I were Real* or *The Swindler* (play), because they were too focused on exposing the dark side of the society; in 1980, the publication ban of *Today*, a literary journal by Bei Dao (1949–) and other upcoming young poets; in 1981, the organized criticism of the screenplay *Bitter Love* [*kulian*]; in one of the scenes the daughter of the protagonist asks him: “You love this country, you’re so loyally in love with this country, but does this country love you back?”] by Bai Hua (1930–) and shutdown of the film project based on the screenplay; in 1983, the campaign against “spiritual pollution” [*jingshen wuran*] and denunciation of the views held by Zhou Yang, Wang Yuanhua, and Wang Ruoshui concerning humanism and alienation;

in 1987, forced shutdown of the literary journal *China* [*zhongguo*] edited by Ding Ling and others; in 1989, forced shutdown of literary journals *New Observations* and *Wenhui Monthly*. The recurrent theme in all of these crackdowns was an attempt to curb the enthusiasm for “liberalization” or “Westernization,” although most officials and intellectuals participated in these campaigns half-heartedly; many even resisted—the scarred memories of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution remaining as fresh as ever.⁴²

Debates, however, have never stopped—even within the society of intellectuals and writers. Indeed, ever since the early 1980s, debates concerning “modernity,” “humanism,” and other related hot topics have occurred concurrently or one in the wake of the other. All has never been quiet as different schools of thought fight over the same issues that the May Fourth generation had wrestled with (although under very different circumstances with different exigencies), with the same high stakes: the nation’s cultural identity and its sociopolitical future.⁴³

As translation of Western literature, especially modernist, post-modernist literature surged in the early 1980s, some intellectuals began to question whether there was an inherent logic between “modernization” and “modernism.” It all started with a short article “Modernization and Modernism” by Xu Chi published in the journal *Foreign Literature Research*, the first issue of 1982, ostensibly to sum up the discussions of Western modernist literature in the last couple of years. It, instead, triggered off a contentious debate between those who held on to the ideological positioning that had dominated the cultural and literary scenes since 1949, who claimed ownership of and still wanted to champion “our proletarian literature,” “our socialist literature,” our “revolutionary literature,” on the one side, and those who wanted to strike out for a new path by creating “our modern literature,” and “our realist literature,” on the other side—a debate from two divergent sociopolitical and ideological positions: class, party, politics versus progress, modernization, evolution.

The class/party/politics camp contended that Western modernism was a decadent, opaque, and pornographic literature resulted from the Western capitalist system that had been in deep socioeconomic and spiritual crisis and was therefore fundamentally incompatible with the dominant political and literary ideology of China. They advocated resistance to the “invasion” of Western modernism in modern Chinese literature. The progress/modernization/evolution camp, on the other hand, tried to separate or extricate the advanced

techniques from the bourgeois content of modernist/postmodernist literature for “our use”—a variation of the “Chinese learning for the foundation and Western learning for use” [*zhongxue weiti xixue weiyong*] theme from the late 1800s—because, as some from this camp argued, modernist techniques themselves had no class identity and could be used effectively by anyone of any political persuasions and aesthetic penchants. They advocated half-measured adoption, or rather, adaptation of Western modernism (techniques) to help revive modern Chinese literature.

Just when this debate was about to run out of steam, a wave of new literature in the modernist/postmodernist mode came splashing on the literary scene, for example, Liu Suola’s “You Have No Choice,” Xu Xing’s “Theme-less Variation,” Hang Shaogong’s “PaPaPa,” Can Xue’s “Hut on the Mountain,” and Mo Yan’s *Red Sorghum*. This exciting group of young experimental writers caught the country off guard, and realizing what was happening, some rushed to cheer and celebrate the new fictional works as “true” modernist literature whereas others wasted no time issuing denunciations. This, almost instantaneously, started another round of debate, this time arguing and counterarguing over true or pseudo “modernism.”

Some critics dismissed the works alluded above as “pseudo-modernist” because they failed to achieve the state of quintessential modernism as embodied in the West. These critics, such as Liu Xiaobo (1955–), whose literary as well as political career would lead him to a Nobel laureateship in 2010, believed that the “true,” “orthodox” modernist literature in the West, such as *Waiting for Godot* and *Lord of Flies*, was a sublimation of the misery of personal existence, or personal existential crisis, so it would speak to the collective, universal misery and existential crisis of mankind as a whole whereas the Chinese “modernist” works were too socially, rationally, morally conscious and confined in their content to be organically coupled with modernist techniques, hence a disconnect or dissonance between form and content. They contended that Chinese “modernists” were such only in so far as techniques were concerned because they failed to reach the philosophical depth and height of their Western counterparts (or predecessors).

Some naysayers, on the other hand, dismissed the experimental writers from an almost polar opposite vantage point: They argued that modernism, which was born in the highly industrialized or postindustrial society of the West, had little to no relevance in China which was far from having achieved industrialization or modernization.

Since “modernism” did not grow from the native soil, but a far-fetched horizontal or lateral borrowing from the West, these critics concluded, the use of stream of consciousness by Wang Meng (“The Night’s Eye,” 1979; “The Butterfly” and “The Sound of Spring,” 1980) and Ru Zhijuan (*A Mis-edited Story*, 1979) and other writers was more a rational patchwork about the sociopolitical realities and confusions than exploration into the deep, messy subconscious following a disorienting psychological time; the use of allegory, metaphor, or symbolism by writers such as Hang Shaogong and Can Xue were expressions of sociopolitical criticism and national introspection rather than metaphysical and philosophical contemplations of the misery and fate of humanity as a whole; the absurdity and black humor by Liu Suola and Xu Xing and others were cynical angst of the misfit, the superfluous, and the dispensable who could not find their place in society rather than the attitude of “outsiders,” or “spectators” who observed the existential crisis in a detached, aloof manner; and the “sexual consciousness” [*xing yishi*] by Zhang Xianliang (e.g., his 1985 novella *Half of Man is Woman*) and others as sexual repression and abnormality under oppressive mores rather than detached observations of human existential crisis. In a word, Western modernism is true, authentic, orthodox whereas Chinese modernism is pseudo, heretic.

Those who disagreed with Liu Xiaobo and others in the “purist” camp countered by arguing that literary works by the authors alluded to above reflected the sociopolitical and cultural realities of China and that it would make more sense to evaluate their works in terms of how truthfully they had captured the “modernity” of our own times than to label them as “modernist,” to measure them in the Procrustean bed of Western modernism, or to chase the “true, authentic, orthodox” modernism of the West. While the “apologists” appreciated the need to borrow from the West and the fact that modern Chinese literature started as a sort of imitation or borrowing from the West, they emphasized that the ultimate goal, for Chinese literature to have a place in the world, was not to chase whatever was in vogue in the West—stream of consciousness, black humor, existentialism, magic realism, but to create “our own” modern or “modernist” literature with “our own” characteristics.

Such debates over whether literary works by a group of writers were “truly” and “authentically” “modernist,” almost by necessity, would spill over or expand to the larger question of whether “modernity” [*xiandai xing*] or “pre-modernity” [*jindai xing*] would be the appropriate characterization of twentieth century Chinese literature,

including the new literature of the 1990s. Coming from the same position of using the West as the ultimate measurement of “modernity,” scholars in the “purist” camp argued that twentieth century Chinese literature lapsed behind that of the West because its dominant modes were realism, classicism, and neorealism and therefore didn’t show the same interest in individual spirit, break through the confines of reason and norms, and show a preponderance of irrationality that characterized Western modernist literature. Viewed through this lens, modern and contemporary Chinese literature would be more appropriately characterized as “pre-modern,” more in the vein of the nineteenth century Western literature.

Those from the “apologist” camp, as would be expected, defended the “modernity” of the twentieth century Chinese literature, especially works published since the mid-1980s, by arguing that it would be wrong to use Western modernism to cookie-cut Chinese writers who had to both adapt from the West and to resist it at the same time for complicated historical reasons; that it would be wrong to equate the “modernity” of twentieth century Chinese literature with “modernism” because the former was not necessarily embodied in the pursuit of the latter; rather, it would be more appropriate to adapt “modernism” and everything and anything else out there to fit the needs of China’s modernization. Indeed, they further argued, it would be wrong to identify irrationality as the primary attribute of “modernism” because even in the West irrationality was a complement to, instead of rejection or substitution of, reason. One of the focal points of the debate, as it became apparent, was whether to use Western “modernism” as the sole, definitive frame of reference whereby to assess twentieth century Chinese literature, and, by extension, to define “modernity”—its core properties.

Around the same time, in the early 1990s, a separate but thematically related debate was raging concerning the “reconstruction of humanism” [*renwen jingshen chongjian*]. The question was raised in 1993 by an article titled “Ruins in the Wilderness—Culture and Humanism in Crisis,” which essentially argued that the grave crisis in literature—cynicalism, nihilism, commodification, and the gradual dominance of pop culture, was an unmistakable symptom of the society’s cultural and spiritual deterioration that had been going on for several generations, but had been further aggravated as China was shifting to a more market-driven economy. Therefore there was an urgent need to reconstruct humanism (or humanistic spirit).

The ensuing debate centered on a few core questions: What does the concept of humanism mean (e.g., self-reflections on human existence,

concern about the meaning and misery of human existence, affirmation of the value and dignity of being human, moral idealism...?); whether humanism is actually lost in China (e.g., as evidenced by the fact that intellectuals, the proverbial embodiment and righteous spokespeople of humanistic values, have been “dethroned” from the position of “teacher”/“mentor”/“guide” of the broad masses; and by the commodification of almost everything); how to reconstruct humanism if it has indeed been lost, or rather, to reconstruct with what (e.g., humanistic traditions in the native culture, humanistic beliefs and practices borrowed from the very West where, ironically, humanism has been in deep crisis anyway, or to create something new and fit for the times by drawing from both native and Western humanistic traditions).

This debate over “reconstruction of humanism,” as it happened, was also topically entangled with another heated debate between “neo-enlightenism” [*xin qimeng zhuyi*] and “neo-conservatism” [*xin baoshou zhuyi*] or “neo-Confucianism” [*xin ruxue*].

In the days immediately following the end of the Cultural Revolution, the agenda of the “neo-enlightenism,” as was the new literature during the “elitism” phase (see above), dovetailed with the agenda of the dominant ideology of the country, i.e., reform, thought liberation, and modernization. Therefore, it soon became the dominant discourse in the intellectual and cultural life of the country too. What separated this “neo-enlightenment” from the “old” enlightenment, i.e., the New Culture and New Literature Movement of the early decades of the twentieth century, was the latter’s urgent mission of renewing the people and the culture by having “blood transfusion” from the West, so to speak, so as to be better able to resist the West. The “neo-enlightenment,” in contrast, happened after decades of the Communist rule; its mission, urgent as it was, was more internal: to repair and reconstruct culture as well as the gravely battered collective psyche of the nation.

The “neo-conservatism” or “neo-Confucianism,” as distinguished from the “old” conservatism of the turn of the twentieth century that was characterized by its dogged resistance to sociopolitical and cultural changes, was actually willing to accept and accommodate “modernity” as embodied in the socioeconomic and technological life. However, it strove to preserve traditional cultural heritage and values and to reduce the destructive impact of modernism to the minimal. The younger and more “radical” of the “neo-conservatism” camp would go so far as to completely reject modernist narrative modes and discourse as theme-less, marginal, and shallow, and hence

without any real value for China as it is engaged in the modernization project. Their agenda is to replace “Westernization” and “modernity” with “Chinese-ity” [*zhongguo xing*] and “Eastern-ism” [*dongfang zhuyi*].

Such a debate would, inevitably, also lead to a reassessment of the May Fourth Movement of the early twentieth century—whether the movement was too radical in rejecting the traditional Chinese culture (see [Chapter 2](#)). Ironically, the introduction of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and poststructuralist theories from the West provided the “neo-conservatism” camp the much needed ideological and critical tools in its attempt to establish “Chinese-ity” to counter or resist the hegemonic discourse of “modernity” from the West. “Chinese-ity,” thus promulgated, would both build on and transcend classicism and modernity; it would be a sort of synthesis of both; and it would emphasize uniqueness, difference, diversity, and synchronicity of culture as opposed to modernity’s perceived emphasis on hierarchy, uniformity, and diachronicity of culture.

Interesting enough, those of the “neo-enlightenism” camp rebutted by pointing out that although the ostensible agenda of “neo-conservatism” was to counter and resist the West, it was actually appropriating, wholesale, theories from the West and mechanically applying them to China while disregarding its sociocultural and historical conditions, and the harsh verdict, based on such intellectual and ideological self-contradictions, the “neo-conservativists” delivered on the struggle for democracy and science by the May Fourth generation as well as the modernization and democratization project for China today looked rather disingenuous. “Neo-enlightenists” further argued that given the sociopolitical and cultural conditions of China today—market driven economy, commodification of culture and almost everything else, and the dominance of mass, pop culture—there was all the more urgent need to continue the enlightenment project.

While the debate over pre/pseudo modernity will carry on, in one form or another, striking one variation or another of the dominant theme(s), most on both sides of the argument seem to agree that it would be unwise to adopt—wholesale—cultural and intellectual modes from the West at the expense of native cultural traditions and values, just as it would be wrong to use preservation of native cultural identity, or “Chinese-ity,” in the face Western cultural onslaught, as grounds to reject change and pursuit of “modernity” out of narrow nationalistic considerations. The key, and hence, the challenge, is how to navigate and balance between enlightenment and preservation,

Western and Chinese, and to figure out a path forward to “modernity” that will work for both China and the world at large.

A NATION LOST IN TRANSLATION?

With the ubiquity of the Internet and half a billion users of email, blog, and a myriad of other social networks, many fans of popular fiction don't want to wait passively at the receiving end as mere consumers any longer. They, instead, take the “business” of translation into their own hands and become “freelance” translators, so to speak, on their own. To use *Harry Potter* as an example again, by 2007, the Chinese translations of *Harry Potter* had sold over 9 million copies, averaging 1.5 million for each of the first six books. When the “officially” sanctioned translations were released, some readers posted their own translations, rendered individually or collectively, to challenge or compete with the “published” versions. Within seven days of the release of the original English version of Book 7, “Hogwarts College of Translation,” a loosely organized group of young enthusiasts, had already completed a Chinese translation of the 700-page book and “published” it on the Internet, about three months ahead of the “official” translation published by People's Literature Press. In addition, translations of games, cartoons, sports, popular science and technology (such as made available via the global network Pop!Tech) are often carried out online by a loosely organized community of fans and enthusiasts for recognition and approval of like-minded peers rather than for monetary gains. Sometimes, the voluntary, grass roots, “mass” translation turns out to be such a hit in the cyberspace that it catches the attention of regular, conventional presses and gets picked up, as in the case of Sandra Cisneros's *The House on Mango Street* (1984) and Harper Lee's *To Kill a Mocking Bird* (1960).⁴⁴

In so many ways China has become a nation of translators—literally as well as metaphorically. Although the earliest Buddhist translation projects were sponsored with imperial blessings, although the decades of translation endeavors from the late 1800s to the early twentieth century were mostly organized through quasi-official institutions such as Tongwen Institute in Beijing and the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai, although from the 1920s to the end of the 1940s, translation work was more or less “overseen” by a myriad of literary associations and publishers, and although all translators since 1949 had come under the “guidance” of the central government as its cultural and literary foot soldiers, translation had never been “professionalized”

as that of teaching, journalism, medicine, and engineering. Spurred by the professionalization of translation and interpretation outside of China (since the formation of FIT—International Federation Translators—in 1953), China's National Translation Association [*zhongguo yixie*], which was established in 1982, joined FIT in 1987, followed by China's Association of Scientific and Technological Translation in 1990. The Chinese Translation Association has subcommittees or conferences on social sciences, arts and literature, science and technology, military science, national languages, diplomacy, international communication, translation theory and pedagogy, translation services, with branches in 50 or so provinces and major cities.⁴⁵

China today claims more than a dozen national universities of foreign languages and literature. Notable among them are Beiwai (Beijing Foreign Studies University), Bei'erwai (Beijing International Studies University), Shangwai (Shanghai International Studies University), Guangwai (Guangdong University of Foreign Studies), Xiwai (Xi'an International Studies University), Tianwai (Tianjin Foreign Studies University), and Dawai (Dalian University of Foreign Languages). In addition, there are 300 schools or departments of foreign languages and literature housed in comprehensive universities and other institutions of higher learning which offer undergraduate and graduate programs in foreign languages studies. And all college students in China (the annual enrollment figure is between 3–4 million⁴⁶) are required to be proficient in at least one foreign language, usually English.

The training of translation professionals used to be housed in foreign languages departments as an add-on or afterthought owing to a quite prevalent assumption that anyone fluent in a given foreign language would be up to the task of using that language to translate and/or interpret. Now, such training has been specialized, or rather, institutionalized, mostly through the creation of a department of its own in a newly expanded college of foreign languages and literature (at a comprehensive university). Quite a few universities have established graduate programs for advanced literary and scientific translation and simultaneous interpretation. In 1979, Beijing Foreign Studies University started a center to train interpreters for the United Nations, which became the basis for the Graduate School of Translation and Interpretation established in 1994. The very first of its kind in China, the graduate school offers MA in English/Chinese Translation (theory and practice and simultaneous interpretation concentration), English/Chinese plus German, French, Russian, Spanish, Korean, or Thai (theory and practice and multiple language

simultaneous interpretation concentration), and PhD in comparative translation and linguistics studies. The school also runs a newly established Asia-Pacific T&I Training Center, whose mission is to promote training, research, and exchange in the field of translation in the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁷

Another graduate program that stands out from its peers is Shanghai International Studies University's Graduate Institute of Interpretation and Translation. It has three departments: interpretation (training advanced interpreters for United Nations, European Union, and other high-level international conferences, negotiations, and such transactions); Master of Translation and Interpreting (a newly established graduate degree promoted as equivalent of MBA in the field of translation, with a focus on written translation, training advanced translators for important international documents and transactions); translation research (sponsoring international conferences on translation studies and training graduate students for research).⁴⁸

One school that is especially worth noting is Xi'an Fanyi [Translation] University, a private institution that was established in 1987 and now claims under its wings colleges of foreign languages, international relations, business management, communications engineering, humanities (or liberal arts), and advanced translation studies. The College of Foreign Languages, which was established in 2000, has four undergraduate programs (English, Japanese, German, and French) and several certificate programs (English education, business English, tourist English, practical Japanese, and practical German). For the spring semester of 2011 this college alone has an enrollment of 13,000 students. The College of Advanced Translation Studies (established in 2003) offers a five-year program, using an English-specialization-ability educational philosophy: the first year focuses on fluency of language (basic listening and speaking and reading and writing abilities, as is the case of the traditional English majors); beginning with the second year, the content of language instruction is shifted to special areas: finance, international trade, business, diplomacy, international conferences and exhibitions, tourism, science and technology, arts and culture, news and advertisements, plus a second foreign language, modern Chinese, Chinese classics, arts and music appreciation. With an enrollment of 300, the college has formed exchange programs with Monterey Institute of International Studies (United States), Middlesex University (United Kingdom), University of Ballarat (Australia), Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and the Open University of Hong Kong, regularly sends groups of its

undergraduate and graduate students to these partnered institutions through exchange programs.⁴⁹

Other notable colleges of translation include Dalian College of Translation, Congqing Nanfang Translation College of Sichuan International Studies University, School of Interpreting and Translation Studies of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Shangdong International University, Nanjing Jinling Institute of Translation, School of Translation Studies of Jinan University, and Sun Yat-sen University's Fanyi Xueyuan (School of International Studies). Established in 2005, Fanyi Xueyuan has English as the core in the curriculum and offers three areas of specialization: translation, business and trade, and international Chinese language education. The English translation program, for example, aims at educating advanced bilingual professionals for administrative, business, and mass media in the globalized world. Among the courses in its curriculum are consecutive interpreting, written translation, specialized interpreting, machine-assisted translation, simultaneous interpreting (for international conferences), translation theory and practice, news reading and translation.⁵⁰

A Google search with the Chinese term *fanyi gongsi* [translation company] on March 21, 2011, resulted in 7,050,000 hits. Although it would be impossible to imagine China having over 7 million translation companies, it wouldn't be too much a stretch to put a more realistic figure in the hundreds, if not exactly thousands. These companies offer a wide range of "translation" services, for example, translation (technical, publication, website, software, subtitle), interpreting (simultaneous, consecutive, conference, technical, business), localization (website, software, multimedia, game, voiceover, graphics), desktop publishing (multilingual, multiformat), language translation (70 or so languages), industry translation (business, telecom, chemistry, engineering, manufacturing, medicine, IT, finance, healthcare, transportation, games). Some of these companies have offices in several cities, for example, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen.

There are approximately one million full and part-time translators in China, with about one thousand editors working at various literary presses, journals, and magazines and about 10,000 literary translators spread out across the country. Sometimes these literary translators work independently, but the trend is to work collectively so that a challenging translation project, for example, a difficult, monumental, multi-volume book, can be completed much faster than if it is undertaken by a lone translator. The translation of Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*, for example, which was published in

1991 by Yilin Press, was the collective work of 15 well-known translators. *Nobel Prize Literature Series* (in more than 90 volumes) put out by Lijiang Press involved the work of over 300 translators.⁵¹

As far back as the earliest days of Buddhist scripture translation endeavors, there had been numerous ideas and comments concerning the nature and method of translation. However, the establishment of a Chinese school of translation theory had not been an explicit goal until 1983, with the inaugural issue of *Translation Gazette* [*fanyi tongxun*]. By the early 1980s, Western translation theories from classics to the contemporary were introduced to China: Eugene A. Nida (based on structuralism, linguistics, and scientific methods); John Catford (partial translation, total translation, literal translation); Peter Newmark (cognitive meaning, communicative meaning, associative meaning, plus expressive function, informative function, vocative function, aesthetic function, and so on); Itamar Even-Zohar (polysystem theory: canonized versus non-canonized, centers versus peripheries, primary versus secondary); Gideon Toury (systems of rules, norms—preliminary norms, initial norms, and operational norms—and idiosyncrasies); André Lefevere (translation as rewriting theory and the controlling factor of patronage, ideology, and poetics); postcolonial theorists such as Tejaswini Niranjana and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Since then, by drawing from both the long traditions in the native culture and current theories from outside of China, scholars have researched and published voluminously on a series of subjects, for example, the nature of translation (it is an art or science or a mix of both?), criteria (“faithfulness, expressiveness, elegance,” formal equivalent, thematic equivalent, spiritual equivalent), method (direct versus free, foreignization versus domestication), style, translation criticism, translators (case studies), translation history, literary translation (or arguably, translation literature, *fanyi wenxue*) history.⁵²

At any given moment in China today, tens of thousands, if not millions, of people are engaged (and engrossed) in translation, literally, using the old technology of pen and paper, or more likely, the modern technology of the computer, going solo or partnering up via the medium of the Internet with people one has never met and will probably never meet in person, for school or work assignments, for literary magazines or publishers under the pressure of pending deadlines, or for the sheer joy and adrenaline rush. Culturally, China is being transmuted day by day as it continues in the century-long project of strengthening and modernizing itself, as waves of things from outside, especially from the West—artistic, literary, sociopolitical,

technological, keep gushing in and pounding the walls, great and small, cultural as well as psychological. Would China lose its way in this epic quest? That may not be the right question to ask because it implies that there is a predetermined, foolproof way to go about it. The story, though, of where China is going and how far it will go is being written at this very moment, and rewritten, and remains to be told.

POSTSCRIPT

This book is a critical narrative of the reception history of Western literature (in both its broad and narrow senses, but primarily the latter) in China from the 1840s to the present—the sociohistorical contexts and the contours of how Western literature was introduced in China, mostly through translation, its transformative impact in the cultural and sociopolitical life of modern China through its major periods of national crises, wars, revolutions, and reforms. It is an attempt to navigate and unpack the complex dynamics, or fault zones, of texts (literary and sociohistorical), contexts (Chinese and Western), intertexts (translations and creative writing in the native language), of dominance (language, culture, ideology) and resistance, and of tension and convergence.

China's "obsession" with the West, its texts as well as technologies and other material or immaterial manifestations, which began in the late 1800s, continues in its full fury today, driven very much by the same profound memories of national humiliations and the same exigency to strengthen China and, paradoxically, to resist the hegemonic powers where the source texts originate—and to reclaim China's past glories, real and imagined. The dual, seemingly self-contradictory nature of this quest is a key reason why China's experimentation with Western ways since the New Culture and the New Literature Movement in the early twentieth century, especially since China reopened its door to the outside world at the end of the 1970s, has been fitful, even schizophrenic. It is why the tug of war between preservation of what is essentially Chinese, i.e., values, beliefs, customs, and traditions of the native Chinese culture, and the pursuit of Western-style modernization has never ended. Indeed, the spirited debates of the same key issues will continue because there are no simple, easy answers to complex, momentous questions such as culture, nationhood, identity in an increasingly globalized world. Only the future can tell what kind of "new" China will emerge 50 or 100 years from today as the nation continues to morph and (re)translate itself.

In researching and putting together this critical narrative of Western texts in China, I am deeply indebted to all the scholarly work available on this and pertinent subjects. I am particularly indebted to the numerous pertinent journal articles and books that have been published in China in the last few decades, which I have consulted and cited (in my English renditions in the forms of summaries, paraphrases, and direct quotations) numerous times. They prove essential to the writing of this book.

I am also deeply grateful to the reviewers of the book proposal and sample chapters for their expert assessment of the book project; to my fellow panelists at the 2011 Modern Language Association Conference in Los Angeles, Erin Riddle, Andrés Aluma-Cazorla, and respondent Gisela Brinker-Gabler for their presentations and discussions on translation and the construction of trans-cultural memory; to Rui Shen, Zhang Longxi, and June Grasso for taking time out of their busy schedule to read the complete manuscript and for their discerning, constructive comments; and finally, to Palgrave Macmillan, especially my editor Brigitte Shull and her assistant Joanna Roberts for their guidance as I journeyed from concept to manuscript to book; to Candice Adams Roma, my copy editor, for combing through the manuscript to make sure everything is as correct and accurate as can be; and to Ciara J. Vincent, Deepa John, and other production staff for their diligent work.

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NOTES

PREFACE

1. China's new status as the second largest economy became official after Japan on February 14, 2011, released its final GDP figures for 2010 at US\$5.47 trillion, as compared to China's US\$5.88 trillion GDP for the same year. For IMF forecasts of China overtaking the United States as the largest economy, see Chrystia Freeland's *New York Times* story "Chinese Capitalism: Irony Is Gone," April 28, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com>; and Song Jingli's *China Daily* story "China's Economy to Surpass US in 2016," April 26, 2011, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn>.
2. The disastrous collision between two high speed trains in Zhejiang Province on July 23, 2011, leaving 39 dead, along with a series of other minor accidents in the same month, has caused "political shockwaves" and called in question the Chinese government's pursuit of the glory of speed at the expense of quality and safety. See "China's high-speed train crash: Interrogating the Party," *Economist*, July 25, 2011, <http://www.economist.com>.
3. It makes sense to differentiate the two concepts and to insist, as many do in China, that to pursue modernization does not necessarily mean to remake oneself, wholesale, in the model of the West. Nonetheless, China's pursuit of modernization has almost always necessitated interaction with, albeit oftentimes involuntarily, and adaptation (if not down-right adoption) of the ways of the West, where both the concepts and technologies of modernity have originated.
4. Although a very pervasive term that pertains to almost every aspect of the "modern" world or the "modern" life, there is little agreement as to what "modernity" means, its precise historical boundaries as well as philosophical and ideological properties. However, a set of generally accepted core values does emerge from the many definitions of "modernity," which distinguishes "modern" societies (or Western "modern" societies, to be more precise, that burgeoned during the fourteenth to sixteenth century) from those of "premodern" times; this would include freedom, individuality, democracy, and sociopolitical liberties. Avijit Pathak in his book *Modernity, Globalization and Identity: Towards a Reflexive Quest* (Delhi: Aakar Books, 2006) cautions though that "modernity," when applied in international relations and global

contexts, has been a “double-edged phenomenon” and its implementation could entail “arrogance and violence.” See also Harvie Ferguson, *Modernity and Subjectivity: Body, Soul, Spirit* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000).

5. See United Nations Development Programme, *United Nations Human Development Reports 2010*, 20th Anniversary Edition, 151–55, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>.
6. The “West” (or “Western”) is used in this book as a cultural and geopolitical term to refer to European and North American countries. Similarly, the term “Western literature” as used in this book is understood both broadly as the body of works—scientific, technological, sociopolitical, and literary—originated in the West and narrowly as its creative and imaginative writing with recognized artistic value. The two senses of the term are sometimes used interchangeably although the focus is on the latter.
7. Lydia H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity-China, 1900–1937* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27–28.
8. Various methods have been used in demarcating periods in China’s history of translation. For the purpose of this book, the decades from the Opium War to the Hundred Days Reform, wherein the Chinese, having experienced a rude awakening, began to translate Western scientific, technologic, and other practical knowledge to strengthen their nation, are treated as prologue to the *sturm und drang* of the New Culture and New Literature Movement in the early decades of the twentieth century. The remainder of the book follows watershed events such as the Communist victory in 1949 and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 respectively as approximate demarcations between major periods of development in the subject under study.

As is apparent, the scope of this book is limited to mainland China because the story of Western literature in Hong Kong or Taiwan, especially since 1949, is unique enough in its richness and complexity to deserve being told fully in its own right.

9. According to Christoph Harbsmeier, there were at least three profoundly distinct traditions of prose style in premodern Chinese: the popular folkloric, the professional scientific, and the literary (which, for a long time, at least up to the late Qing decades, had meant the classical Chinese, which tended to be ornate, suggestive, and indirect). See Christoph Harbsmeier, “The Rhetoric of Premodern Prose Style,” in *The Columbia History of Chinese Literature*, ed. Victor H. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
10. André Lefevere, “Chinese and Western Thinking on Translation,” in *Constructing Cultures: Essays on Literary Translation*, ed. Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere (Bristol, UK: Multicultural Matters, 1998), 12–24. The concepts of “domestication” vs. “foreignization” in translation methods were first used by Lawrence Venuti in his *The Translator’s*

Invisibility: A History of Translation (London and New York: Routledge, 1995). Briefly, by the “domestication” method is meant rendering the foreign text in fluent, “natural” language of the target culture so the translated text is “transparent” and the translator remains “invisible,” whereas by the “foreignization” method is meant retaining a considerable degree of “foreignness” of the source text, for example, the terminology and syntax, without trying to “naturalize” or acculturate it for readers in the target culture.

11. See Louisa Lim, “In Beijing, Even Luxury Billboards Are Censored,” *NPR*, April 7, 2011, <http://www.npr.org>; and Wang Wen, “Ads Promoting Wealthy Goods, Lifestyles Banned,” *China Daily*, March 21, 2001, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn>.

1 THE RUDE AWAKENING (1840S–1896)

1. Ssu-Yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 51–52.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi* [A Brief History of Translation in China and the West] (Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, 2009), 46.
4. The Chinese people might have had their first contact with Buddhism through Central Asians who were already Buddhists by the second century (BC). See “Spread of Buddhism Among the Chinese,” *Buddhist Studies*: <http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/buddhistworld/china-txt.htm>.
5. André Lefevere, “Chinese and Western Thinking on Translation,” in *Constructing Cultures: Essays on Literary Translation*, ed. Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere (Bristol, UK: Multicultural Matters, 1998), 13–14. Some scholars believe that when Buddhism began to arrive in China shortly before the Christian era, Confucianism had enjoyed supremacy for well over a hundred years and the teachings of Laozi (the sixth century, BC) and Zhuangzi (369 BC–286 BC) were going very strong too. See Wing-Tsit Chan, “Transformation of Buddhism in China,” *Philosophy East and West* 7, no. 3–4 (Oct. 1957–Jan. 1958): 107–16.
6. For a fuller account of China's early encounters with “Western” texts see Shen Fuwei, *Cultural Flow Between China and Outside World Throughout History* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1996), 100–13, and Xie Tianzhen, *A Brief History of Translation*, 141–48.
7. Kenneth J. Saunders, “Buddhism in China: A Historical Sketch,” *The Journal of Religion* 3, no. 2 (Mar. 1923): 157–69.
8. C. P. Fitzgerald, *China: A Short Cultural History* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 473–74.
9. *Ibid.*, 475–76.
10. *Ibid.*, 483.

11. Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1990), 38–40.
12. Fitzgerald, *China: A Short Cultural History*, 548.
13. The Four Books: *Lunyu* [The Analects, containing Confucius's sayings as noted down by his disciples], *Daxue* [Great Learning, containing Confucius' ideas of spiritual cultivation], *Zhongyong* [Harmony of the Middle, or The Golden Mean], and *Mengzi* [the book by Mencius, the greatest Confucian philosopher right after Confucius].
 The Five Classics: *Shijing* [Classic of Poetry—ceremonial and popular songs and poems from antiquity], *Shujing* [Classic of History—official historical documents], *Liji* [Classic of Rites—Confucius's notes on state and family rites], *Yijing* [Classic of Changes], and *Chunqiu* [Springs and Autumns—The Annals of Confucius home state Lu].
14. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 60. The moral codes dictating social and familial relations, in their formulaic forms, were the “Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues.” The three cardinal guides: ruler guides subject, father guides son, and husband guides wife. The five constant virtues: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity. For women, though, there was added another layer of moral control, the so-called “Three Obediences and Four Virtues.” The three obediences: obedience to father before marriage, obedience to husband after marriage, and obedience to son after the death of husband. The four virtues: moral in behavior, proper in speech, modest in manner, and diligent in needlework.
15. *Ibid.*, 100.
16. Fitzgerald, *China: A Short Cultural History*, 552.
17. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 119–20.
18. Fitzgerald, *China: A Short Cultural History*, 557–58.
19. The decision to go to war with China to obtain full compensation for the destroyed opium was that of Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary. Queen Victoria, barely 20 years old at this time, had just ascended to the throne and momentous decisions such as going to war could not yet have been entrusted into her inexperienced, untested hands.
20. Jessie Gregory Lutz, *Opening China: Karl F. A. Gutzlaff and Sino-Western Relations, 1827–1852* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008), 202–14.
21. Much of the factual information for this section and the section immediately following draws from Shen Fuwei, *Cultural Flow*, 298–318; Xie Tianzhen, et al., *A Brief History of Translation*, 19–139; and Meng Chaoyi and Li Zaidao, eds., *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi* [History of Chinese Translation Literature] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005), 13–38.
22. The trio (Yang Tingyun, Xu Guangqi, and Li Zhizao) is known as the Three Great Pillars of Chinese Catholicism. Their conversion to Catholicism will be addressed briefly later in this chapter.

23. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *A Brief History of Translation*, 113.
24. A treaty was signed in Tianjin in June 1858 at the end of the Second Opium War (1856–60). With the victorious France, United Kingdom, Russia, and United States as signatories, this treaty opened 11 more Chinese ports to the foreign powers, allowed foreign legations in Beijing, the capital, and lifted the ban on Christian missionary activity and opium trade. See Article L of “Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Her Majesty the Queen of the Great Britain and Ireland and the Emperor of China,” in William Frederick Mayers, *Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 11–20.
25. Talal Asad, “The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology,” in *Critical Readings in Translation Studies*, ed. Mona Baker (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 21–24.
26. Wang Kefei and Fan Shouyi, “Translation in China: A Motivating Force,” *Meta: Journal des Traducteurs/Meta: Translators’ Journal* 44, no. 1 (1999): 19.
27. Known as the Chinese Educational Commission and organized by Yung Wing (1828–1912), the first Chinese student in the United States, who had studied and graduated from Yale University, the program sent 120 young Chinese students to study in the New England region beginning in 1872. Bowing to mounting pressure from conservative forces in China, who, among other things, were alarmed by reports of how fast these young boys were losing their Chinese-ness and becoming Westernized, the Educational Mission was disbanded in 1881. Many of the students who returned became China’s first generation of Western-trained scientists and engineers and made marked contributions to China’s self-strengthening endeavors during the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. Some, such as Zhan Tianyou (1861–1919), who became the chief engineer of the first railway ever built in China, are still remembered today as national heroes. See Teresa Brawner Bevis and Christopher J. Lucas, *International Students in American Colleges and Universities: A History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 42–53.
28. Wang Kefei and Fan Shouyi, “Translation in China,” 20.
29. Shen Fuwei, *Cultural Flow*, 312–14.
30. Susan Bassnett, *Translation Studies*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 48.
31. This section of discussion draws from Mao Guotao and Hu Hui, “Li Hongzhang wei zhongguo jindai hua de diyi ren” [Li Hongzhang as the First Mastermind of China’s Modernization: Toward a Reappraisal of Li Hongzhang and the Self-Strengthening Movement], *Nanchang jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Nanchang College of Education] 23, no. 1 (2008): 4–28, and Ma Xuelei, “Chongping Li Hongzhang” [Reappraising Li Hongzhang], *Lanzhou jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Lanzhou Institute of Education] 26, no. 1 (Feb. 2010): 20–26.

32. For a fuller and more vivid account, see [Chapters 1–5](#) of Jonathan D. Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York: Norton, 1996), 3–55.
33. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *A Brief History of Translation*, 71–77. Some scholars believe that frequent reference to “the fabled insularity of the Chinese” doesn't square with the fact that many Chinese did respond to the information brought them by the European missionaries. See David E. Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West: 1500–1800* (2009), 17.
34. David E. Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West: 1500–1800*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 20–21.
35. See Spence, *God's Chinese Son*, 51–65.
36. “Chu” refers to one of the states/kingdoms during the Warring States Period (475 BC–221 BC) of early Chinese history, corresponding to the mid-sections of the Yangtze River Valley. One of the seven states, Qin, defeated the others, one by one, including Chu, and established the Qin dynasty, the first time ever China being united into one country.
37. For a fuller discussion of Hong Xiuquan's cultural and ideological confusions and contradictions, see Philip A. Khun, “Origins of a Taiping Vision,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, no. 3 (July 1977): 350–66, and Chen Yongkui, “*Bai shangdi jiao zhongguo hua tedian fenxi: jianping taiping tianguo de fankong xianxiang*” [On the Chinese Characteristics of the God-Worship Society and the Anti-Confucius Predisposition of the Heavenly Peace Uprising], *Huanggang shifan xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Huanggang Normal University] 29, no. 4 (Aug. 2009): 104–07.
38. Eugene P. Boardman, “Christian Influence upon the Ideology of Taiping Uprising,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (Feb. 1951): 115–24.
39. Spence, *God's Chinese Son*, 332.
40. This discussion on the introduction of Aesop's fables in China and their intertextual links with classic Chinese fables draws from Mei Xiaojuan, “*Kuang yi de fanyi yu zhongxi yuyan de zaoqi jiechu*” [The Translation of *Kuan Yi* and the Early Encounter between Western and Chinese Fables]. *Nanjing ligong daxue xuebao: shehui kexue ban* [Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology: Social Sciences Edition] 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2008): 71–74.
41. For the purpose of this book I am adapting from George Tyler Townsend's *Aesop's Fables: Complete, Original Translation from Greek* ([1887; Charleston, SC: Forgotten Books, 2007], available at <http://www.forgottenbooks.org/>) instead of using the original texts circulating at the time—which is all but impossible to find—and Trigault and Zhang Geng's renditions in classic Chinese available in Mei Xiaojuan, “The Translation of *Kuan Yi*,” 71–74.
42. Townsend, *Aesop's Fables*, 32.

43. Which, literary historians today believe, is the penname for Jiang Qizhang, an editor for the first literary magazine in China entitled *Yinghuang suoji* [World Miscellany]. See Zhou Guoyi, “*Diyi bu fanyi xiaoshuo xinxi xiantan yishi kaozheng*” [An Inquiry into the Authorship of the First Novel Translation Night and Morning Idle Talk], *Zhonghua wenshi luncong* [Chinese Literary History Forum] 4 (2008): 285–348. In the preface to the book, Hermit Li Shao made it clear that his purpose of translating political novels was to spread Western ideas of democracy because there was no way to save and strengthen China other than serious political reforms. He was probably the first one to have put forth such a “radical” idea at the time.
44. Ge Guilu, *Zhongying wenxue guanxi biannian shi* [The Annals of Sino-British Literary Relations] (Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Press, 2004), 87–116.

2 “STURM UND DRANG” (1897–1927)

1. Ssu-Yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 150–51.
2. Zhu Anbo, *Guibhua yu yibua: zhongguo wenxue fanyi yanjiu de bainian liubian* [Domestication and Foreignization: 100 Years Development in Literary Translation Studies in China] (Beijing: Science Press, 2009), 48.
3. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi* [A Brief History of Translation in China and the West] (Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, 2009), 150–52.
4. An institutionalized style of essay writing formulated around a rigid, eight-part structure: *poti* [opening], *chengti* [amplification], *qijiang* [preliminary exposition], *qigu* [initial argument], *zhonggu* [central argument], *hougu* [latter argument], *shugu* [final argument], and *dajie* [conclusion]. It formed the core of the imperial examination which tested the examinee's knowledge of the Four Books and Five Classics rather than the ability in original, independent thinking, problem-solving, or governance.
5. William Theodore de Bary and Richard John Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the 20th Century*, 2nd ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 260–61.
6. See John K. Fairbank, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 228, and June M. Grasso, Jay P. Corrin, and Michael Kort, *Modernization and Revolution in China: From the Opium Wars to the Olympics* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2009), 55–56.
7. Bary and Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, 267–72.
8. For a fuller account of Liang Qichao's formative years and early reform endeavors, see Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), 15–26.

9. Tang Xiaobing, *Global Space and the Modernist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 1.
10. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao*, 17.
11. *Ibid.*, 1–5.
12. Bary and Lufano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, 289.
13. Meng Chaoyi and Li Zaidao, eds., *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi* [History of Chinese Translation Literature] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005), 39–41.
14. See Zhu Fang, “*Cong Liang Qichao xiaoshuo fanyi shijian de shijie guankui qingmo minchu xiaoshuo fanyi zhi deshi*” [Toward an Appraisal of Novel Translation during the Late Qing and Early Republic China Based on Liang Qichao’s Novel Translation Practice], *Congqing jiaotong daxue xuebao: shehui kexue ban* [Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University: Social Sciences Edition] 10, no. 3 (June 2010): 118–21, and Li Fengwei, “*“Xixue dongjian’ yu xifang wenxue lilun yinjie de yuanqi*” [The Introduction of Western Literary Theories in the Context of The Spread of Western Learning in China]. *Henan jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao: zhixue shehui kexue ban* [Journal of Henan Institute of Education: Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition] 29, no. 3 (2010): 52–56.
15. Meng and Li, *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi*, 41–47.
16. See Ching-mao Cheng, “The Impact of Japanese Literary Trends,” in *Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era*, ed. Merle Goldman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 63–88, and Horace Z. Feldman, “The Meiji Political Novel: A Brief Survey,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (May 1950): 245–55.
17. During the 104 days (June 11 to September 21, 1898), the young Guangxu Emperor issued some 40 decrees aimed at wide-ranging reforms to modernize government, the legal system, education (so that students learn not only Confucian classics but also math and sciences), civil service examination, the military, and the industry. Thanks to the inexperience of the reformers and the fierce opposition of archconservatives led by Empress Dowager Cixi, the movement ended in the house arrest of Guangxu in the Forbidden City until his death and the execution of six core members of the movement. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao fled to Japan and became conservative in their politics. See Li Chien-Nung, *The Political History of China: 1840–1928* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1956), 144–63.
18. See Meng and Li, 50–58, and Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 153–55.
19. Meng and Li, *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi*, 53.
20. Chen Pingyuan, *Zhongguo xiaoshuo xushi moshi de zhuanbian* [Evolution of Narrative Modes of Chinese Fiction] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1988), 114, qtd. in Meng and Li, *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi*, 52.
21. Meng and Li, *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi*, 51.

22. Among other things that Lin Shu most likely had in mind was The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which was implemented to suspend immigration from China, the only law of its kind in U.S. history that was targeted exclusively at a specific nationality or ethnic group. The law was repealed in 1943 when China was regarded as an ally during the Second World War. See Andrew Gyory, *Closing the Gate: Race, Politics and the Chinese Exclusion Act* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
23. R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee, eds., *Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from The Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 77–78.
24. Kirk A. Denton, ed., *Modern Chinese Literary Thought: 1893–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 82–83.
25. Luo Aihua, “*Wanqing wenren wenhua de zhuanxiang yu wenxue fanyi huodong*” [Cultural Reorientation of Late Qing Men of Letters and Literary Translation], *Chuanshan Xuekan* [Chuanshan Journal] 60, no. 2 (2006): 102.
26. Teng and Fairbank, *China’s Response to the West*, 231.
27. Although the narrower sense of the term May Fourth Movement refers to what happened on May 4, 1919, first the student and then broad-based protests triggered by the Versailles Peace Conference, the broader sense of the term refers to the New Culture Movement that began in the mid-1910s and lasted at least to mid-1920s. The two terms, May Fourth Movement and the New Culture Movement, are often used interchangeably.
28. For example, in 1917, 140,000 Chinese laborers, who formed the Chinese Labor Corps under the command of the British Army, were sent to France. See Judith Blick, “The Chinese Labor Corps in World War I,” *Papers on China* 9 (1953): 111–45, and Nicholas J. Griffin, “Britain’s Chinese Labor Corps in World War I,” *Military Affairs* (Oct. 1976): 102–08.
29. Known as the Twenty-One Demands, which essentially gave Japan control of the Shandong Peninsula (German concessions, as part of the unequal treaties ensuing from the Opium War), Manchuria (the northeastern provinces of China), among other things. See Ge-Zay Wood, *The Twenty-One Demands: Japan versus China (1921)* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
30. For a “canonical” view of the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-tung, *The May 4th Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); for a challenging view, see Milena Doleželová-Velingerová, et al (eds.), *The Appropriation of Cultural Capital: China’s May Fourth Project* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002); for a more “balanced” approach, see Merle Goldman, ed., *Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Center, 1977), and Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986).

31. C. P. Fitzgerald, *China: A Short Cultural History* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 500–01.
32. Lydia H. Liu, “The Translator’s Turn,” in *The Columbia History of Chinese Literature*, ed. Victor H. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1056.
33. During his *New Youth* (or *La Jeunesse*, the French title on the magazine’s cover) period, Chen Duxiu was known as an “ardent Francophile” although he himself had not gone to France to study. See Lee Feigon, *Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 82–84.
34. Teng and Fairbank, *China’s Response to the West*, 239.
35. *Ibid.*, 240–246. Quoted extensively here to give full flavor of the sense of crisis and the Shelleyan passion (minus the Romantic poet’s religious exultation of imagination).
36. Chow Tse-tsung, *The May 4th Movement*, 174–75.
37. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 72.
38. Martson Anderson, *The Limits of Realism: Chinese Fiction in the Revolutionary Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 32–33.
39. This discussion of second-hand translations draws from Liu, “The Translator’s Turn,” 1060–62.
40. A scholarship program funded by Boxer Rebellion indemnity money the defeated Qing Empire paid to the United States that provided modern education to over 1,000 Chinese students, mostly in American colleges and universities. A number of the U.S.-educated Chinese students returned to China and became prominent scholars and scientists.
41. Wing-Tsit Chan, “Hu Shih and Chinese Philosophy,” *Philosophy East and West* 6, no.1 (April 1965): 3–4.
42. See Yoon-wah Wong, *Essays on Chinese Literature: A Comparative Approach* (Singapore University Press, 1988), 28–51.
43. Yoon-wah Wong, 36.
44. Duan Huai-qing, “*Hu Shi wenxue gailiang zhuzhang zhong sange shang-dai chengqing de wenti*” [Three Unresolved Issues in Hu Shi’s Plan for Literary Reform], *Zhejiang daxue xuebao: renwen sheke ban* [Journal of Zhejiang University: Humanities and Social Sciences Edition] 37, no. 3 (May 2007): 114–17.
45. Teng and Fairbank, *China’s Response to the West*, 255–56.
46. This quote and the quotes in the paragraph immediately below are from Vincent Y. C. Shih, “A Talk with Hu Shih,” *China Quarterly* (April–June, 1962): 151, 158, and 161.
47. Teng and Fairbank, *China’s Response to the West*, 257.
48. Shen Fuwei, *Cultural Flow between China and Outside World throughout History* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1996), 352–59.
49. Duan Huai-qing, “*Hu Shi wenxue gailiang zhuzhang zhong sange shang-dai chengqing de wenti*,” 117–18.

50. Quoted in Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 10–11.
51. The news reel, shown by the Japanese professor at the end of a class, was about the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), fought to decide whose imperialistic ambitions over Manchuria and Korea would prevail. Japan emerged victorious from the war. See Lu Hsun, Preface to “Call to Arms,” in *Selected Stories of Lu Hsun*, trans. Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang, 1994 (San Francisco, CA: China Books & Periodicals, 1994), 2–3.
52. *Ibid.*, 5.
53. Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Voices from the Iron House*, 22.
54. Irene Elber, “Images of Oppressed Peoples and Modern Chinese Literature,” in *Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era*, ed. Merle Goldman (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press), 127.
55. *Ibid.*, 127–30.
56. Quoted in Denton, *Modern Chinese Literary Thought*, 99.
57. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 131.
58. See Ren Shukun, *Wusi shiqi waiguo wenxue fanyi yanjiu* [Foreign Literature Translation During the May Fourth Movement] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), 29–32. The discussion of the Chinese Literary Association also draws from Meng and Li, *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi*, 104–06; and Michel Hockx, “The Chinese Literary Association,” in *Literary Societies of Republican China*, ed. Michel Hockx and Kirk A. Denton (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 79–102.
59. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 146–47.
60. Guo Moruo later attributed his foreign languages proficiency and life-long interest in foreign literature to how foreign languages were taught in Japan at the time:
- The way the Japanese were teaching foreign languages, English, German, no matter, they liked to use literary works as readers. That’s how, while a college student in Japan, I came in contact with European and American literature. I got to know Tagore, Shelley, Shakespeare, Heine, Goethe, Schiller, and had opportunities to become acquainted with Northern European, French, and Russian literatures as well. All of this would help lay in a deep foundation in literature.
- See Ren Shukun, *Wusi shiqi waiguo wenxue fanyi yanjiu*, 32.
61. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 155–62.
62. The literary ambition and sense of mission cherished by the kindred-spirited Guo Moruo and Tian Han are captured by a picture they took together in 1920, while both were studying in Japan, standing shoulder to shoulder, in the manner of the famous bronze Goethe und Schiller Monument. See Denton, *Modern Chinese Literary Thought*, 106. Multi-talented, Tian Han was a major playwright (for both drama and opera),

- musician, film-maker, translator and poet. He wrote the lyrics for the patriotic “March of the Volunteers” in 1934, which became the national anthem of the People’s Republic of China. Tian Han was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and died in prison.
63. This portion of the discussion draws from Ren Shukun, *Wusi shiqi waiguo wenxue fanyi yanjiu*, 25–34, and Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 113–15.
 64. Although trained in traditional Chinese philology (credited with being the first to reconstruct the vowel system of classical Chinese in International Phonetic Alphabet, Qian Xuantong advocated the abolition of classical Chinese and suggested replacing it with Esperanto.
 65. An accomplished linguist and poet, Liu Bannong is credited with playing a key role in the standardization of simplified Chinese characters used in the mainland China today.
 66. Ren Shukun, *Wusi shiqi waiguo wenxue fanyi yanjiu*, 93–99.
 67. Pascale Casanova, “Consecration and Accumulation of Literary Capital: Translation as Unequal Exchange,” in *Critical Readings in Translation Studies*, trans. Siobhan Brownlie, ed. Mona Baker (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 286–303.
 68. Susan Bassnett, *Translation Studies*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 4.
 69. This portion of discussion draws from Ren Shukun, *Wusi shiqi waiguo wenxue fanyi yanjiu*, 66–75.
 70. Quoted from Gay Wilson Allen and Ed Folsom, *Walt Whitman and the World* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1995), 409–10.
 71. Quoted from Kirk A. Denton, et al., *The Columbia Companion to Modern East Asian Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 367.
 72. Tang Xiaobing, “Lu Xun’s ‘Diary of a Madman’ and a Chinese Modernism,” *PMLA* 107, no. 5 (Oct. 1992): 1222–34.
 73. Lu Hsun, Preface to “Call to Arms,” 10.
 74. This interpretation of the madman’s brother having sold him out, and hence proving the madman’s suspicion of him as a cannibalist, and indeed, the speculation of what happened to the madman beyond the abrupt, but open-ended ending of the story, was suggested by Katherine Collins, a student in a Modern Chinese Literature course taught at Western Connecticut State University fall 2007.
 75. Tang Xiaobing, “Lu Xun’s ‘Diary of a Madman’ and a Chinese Modernism,” 1226–27.
 76. Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Voices from the Iron House*, 49–57.
 77. Patrick Hanan, “The Technique of Lu Hsun’s Fiction,” *Harvard Journal of Asian Studies* 34 (1974): 56–57.
 78. In *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction* (1961; 1999), for example, C. T. Hsia compares Lu Xun to the “true satirists” in European literature (as well as a select few of Lu Xun’s contemporaries) and finds him lacking:

In the long perspective, therefore, while Lu Hsun is capable of true indignation and can be truculently self-assertive when aroused—this spirit of defiance is perhaps the most valuable legacy he has left among his many disciples who have to live in an age of increasing intellectual conformity [referring to what was going on in the social and political life of China in the 1960s, when Hsia was writing this book—my note]—his self-imposed sentimentality disqualifies him from joining the ranks of true satirists from Horace to Ben Jonson to Aldous Huxley, who have no compunction in lashing alike the vices of old and young, rich and poor. Inasmuch as Lu Hsun focuses his attention upon the apparent faults of the tradition and connives at, and later in his career, actively encourages the operation of the raw and irrational forces, which in the long run have prove to be more destructive of civilization than mere stagnation and decadence, he appears to be largely the victim of his age rather than its self-appointed teacher and satirist. (53–54)

79. You Huisheng, “*Wang Guowei de xiaoshuo yanjiu*” [Wang Guowei’s Fiction Studies], *Zhongguo wenxue yanjiu* [Research of Chinese Literature] 4 (2001): 77–78.
80. Li Guoying and Hu Penglin, “*Bainian wenxue piping: jiangou zhuti xing he bentu hua de huayu tixi*” [Hundred Years of Literary Criticism: Toward Constructing a Dominant Domestic Critical Discourse], *Shenyang shifan daxue xuebao: sheke ban* [Journal of Shenyang Normal University: Social Sciences Edition] 28, no. 4 (2004): 42–46.
81. The repression of the Chinese women under the much “celebrated” virtues of loyalty, obedience, industry, and unselfish sacrifice reminds one of their European sisters who had been put on the pedestal of idealized femininity “celebrated” in such works as Coventry Patmore’s long poem “Angel in the House” (1854), only that they seemed to have fared worse and that “liberation” came to them much later.
82. See Zhang Chuntian, “*Fanyi de zhengzhi yu jieshou de keneng*” [Politics of Translation and The Possibility of Reception], *Yunmeng xuekan* [Journal of Yunmeng] 29, no. 4 (July 2008): 103–07. A legendary folklore heroine (first recorded in the sixth century), Hua Mulan volunteered to go (in place of her father who had no sons) and fight in China’s frontier wars. One of the earliest of such Chinese stories to support gender equality, the story of Mulan has inspired many books and theatrical and film adaptations, including the popular Disney animated movie released in 1998.
83. Unhappily married, Qiu Jin (1875–07) left her hometown in Xiamen, Fujian Province and travelled to Japan to study. There she joined the anti-Qing movements. Upon returning, Qiu Jin started a women’s magazine to promote women’s independence through education and professional training and encourage them to resist oppression from social institutions such as family, arranged marriage, government, and foot-binding. During a failed uprising in 1907, Qiu Jin was arrested and beheaded soon after. A feminist known for wearing Western male dress as well as her

- fiery, uncompromising spirit and eloquence in her essays and poetry, Qiu Jin seems China's answer to George Sand (1804–76) and more.
84. Traditional Chinese operatic theater combines singing, dancing, acting, and acrobatics, whereas the new *huaju* [spoken drama], as is its Western counterpart, features speaking and acting. The spoken drama began to appear in China in the late 1800s. It was not until the turn of the twentieth century, though, that it began to pick up momentum. One of the earliest and most noteworthy spoken drama plays was an adaptation of Lin Shu's translation of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. See Chen Xiaomei, "Twentieth-Century Spoken Drama," in *The Columbia History of Chinese Literature*, ed. Victor H. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 848–77.
 85. Zhang Yantong, "*Ouyang Yuqian juzuo huijia yihou de renwen yiyun*" [The Humanistic Significance of Ouyang Yuqian's Homecoming], *Sichuang xiju* [Sichuang Drama] 6 (2007): 37–39.
 86. See "A Doll's House." *This Month Beijing* 53 (April 1998): <http://www.cbw.com/btm/issue53/doll.html>.
 87. Zhang Chuntian, "*Fanyi de zhengzhi yu jieshou de keneng*," 103–07.
 88. Hu Shi appeared in a feature story in the Dec. 15, 1941, issue of *Life* (122–24), only a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and was called "China's Greatest Living Scholar."
 89. Li Dazhao (1888–1927), chief librarian and professor of history at Beijing University, was an important figure in the May Fourth Movement. One of the earliest in China to study and convert to Marxism, Li was a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party. For his revolutionary activities Li was arrested and later hanged by the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin.
 90. Teng and Fairbank, *China's Response to the West*, 246–49.
 91. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 203–04.
 92. See Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Andrian Chan, *Chinese Marxism* (London and New York: Continuum, 2003).
 93. The first plenary meeting of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Shanghai in July 1921. At first the 13 delegates met in the French Concession, on the top floor of a girls' school. Concerned about being spied on by government agents, they moved to a boat on a lake in a neighboring province. See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1990), 308–23. Today the CCP claims a membership of over 80 million although the Party itself—its mission, organizational structure, and membership—has been transformed significantly as it struggles to lead the country toward the goals of modernization.
 94. Jonathan Goldstein, et al., eds., *America Views China: American Images of China Then and Now* (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1991), 114–26.
 95. In Haggard's novel, Joan, a village girl, and Henry, a young sailor from a more "respectable" family, fall in love and eventually die for their love due to social pressures against the union. Lin Shu was attacked by

conservatives for having kept in his rendition the fact of Joan's out-of-wedlock pregnancy, which they feared would have corrupting influence on the morality of young readers.

The suspense-packed stories of Sherlock Holmes, known for his sharp wit and analytic mind, were quite a hit among Chinese readers. His science-based, methodical approaches to solving crimes were refreshingly different from old Chinese judicial practice, which primarily and indeed, precariously, relied on the judges' righteousness (or lack thereof) and intuition and occasionally had to resort to astrological assistance.

Translators at the time also felt that science fiction novels such as those by Jules Verne were the most efficient way to promote science education in China, broaden the readers' horizons, so to speak, and help renew the people. See Xie Tianzhen et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 1149–161.

96. The opening line of the classic novel *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* by the early Ming dynasty novelist Luo Guangzhong.
97. See Tang Guilin, et al., *Ersbi shiji zhongguo wenxue de zhongxi zhizheng* [Tensions between East and West in 20th Century Chinese Literature] (Baihuazhou Arts and Literature Press, 2006), 232–43.

3 THE NOT-SO-UNITED FRONTS (1928–1949)

1. The stated mission of the Communist International (Comintern) was to “mobilize the forces of all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world working class, and thereby facilitate and hasten the victory of communist revolution throughout the world.” See Duncan Hellas, *The Comintern* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2008), 10. Its membership consisted of Communist party organizations from almost all European nations, the United States, China, and elsewhere. It was officially dissolved in 1943 as the nations represented by the various Communist parties were drawn deeper into the Second World War.
2. Tony Saich and Benjamin Yang, *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 11–13.
3. See Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search of Modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1990), 323–74, for more elaborate account of the Northern Expedition and the “fractured alliance” between Guomindang and the Communists.
4. By the time the main forces of the Red Army reached Shaanxi, south-western China, after a 10,000-kilometer or so forced march across some of the toughest terrain, only 8,000 men and women had survived. One of the most significant outcomes of the Long March was the emergence of Mao Zedong as the Communist Party's undisputed leader.
5. The incident that happened near the Marco Polo Bridge [*Lugouqiao*] outside of Beijing had resulted from increased aggressions by the Empire

- of Japan, which had already annexed Manchuria (northeastern China) in 1931 and established a puppet state there. The skirmish between the troops of the two sides stationed there soon escalated to a full-scale war, known as the War of Resistance against Japan, or the Second Sino-Japanese War, which did not end until eight years later in 1945.
6. Edgar Snow, for example, titled his groundbreaking book about the Communist-controlled areas in the early 1930s *Red Star over China* (1938). The red flag of the Chinese Communist Party featured (and still does) a hammer and sickle emblem, which is supposed to symbolize the unity or alliance of the industrial proletariat and the rural peasantry, an emblem used by almost all communist parties in the world. At its founding in 1949 the People's Republic of China adopted the red flag with a five-star emblem as its national flag, which is supposed to symbolize national unity under the leadership of the Communist Party.
 7. "The Blue Sky with a White Sun" has been the party flag of Guomindang since the early days of the republican revolution and the national emblem of the Republic of China. With 12 rays of the white sun shining in a blue sky, the flag is supposed to symbolize China arising in the East as a beacon of democracy, freedom, and peace.
 8. Indeed, in its spectacular prime Shanghai had no rival in the Orient or in the world, for that matter, as the most "pleasure-mad, rapacious, corrupt, strife-ridden, licentious, squalid, and decadent." See Stella Dong, *Shanghai: The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City 1842-1949* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), 1.
 9. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 356-57.
 10. See John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, *The Cambridge History of China, 1912-1949*, Part 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 144-47.
 11. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 357.
 12. The Shaan-Gan-Ning border region, one of the two main Communist bases from the mid-1930s to 1949, included the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia in the relatively poor and mountainous north-western China. The other Communist base was the Jin-Cha-Ji region, consisting of the provinces of Shanxi, Chahar (nonexistent today), and Hebei in northwestern China.
 13. Quoted in Hung-yok Ip, *Intellectuals in Revolutionary China, 1921-1949* (New York: Routledge 2005), 145.
 14. Mark Selden, *China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited* (Socialism and Social Movements) (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 170-71.
 15. See Wang Jipeng and Xing Ruijuan, "Luelun yan'an shiqi de wenhua jiaoyu he wenyi gongzuo" [On Cultural Education and Art Work during the Yan'an Period], *Chongqing keji xueyuan xuebao: shehui kexue ban* [Journal of Chongqing University of Science and Technology: Social Sciences Edition] 12 (2008): 141-42, and Cao Dianzhen, "Yan'an shiqi de wenhua yu zhongguo xianjin wenhua de qianjin fangxiang" [Culture during the Yan'an Period and the Orientation of China's Progressive

- Culture], *Xinxiang xueyuan xuebao: shehui kexue ban* [Journal of Xinxiang University: Social Sciences Edition] 22, no. 3 (June 2008): 19–21.
16. See Selden, *China in Revolution*, 99–143.
 17. Quoted in Selden, *China in Revolution*, 74.
 18. Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, First Revised and Enlarged Edition (Random House, 1938; New York: Grove Press, 1968), 119–25.
 19. Steve Harrell, ed., *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1996), 3–36.
 20. This part of the discussion draws from Meng Chaoyi and Li Zaidao, eds., *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi* [History of Chinese Translation Literature] (Beijing University Press, 2005), 87–267.
 21. Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856–1918), Russian Marxist theorist.
 22. Socialist realism is the “[o]fficially sanctioned theory and method of artistic and literary composition in the Soviet Union from 1932 to the mid-1980s.” (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia online). This also happened to be the guiding principle of Mao Zedong’s “Yan’an Talk,” which dominated China’s art and literary discourse until the early 1980s. For more on this, see [Chapter 4](#).
 23. *How the Steel Was Tempered* was an inspiration for generations of Chinese Communists, especially among the young, and its popularity has not completely faded even today. As recently as 1999, a Chinese film adaptation of the novel was released with a Ukrainian cast, which was followed by a 2001 Chinese-Russian joint production of a TV series based on the novel.
 24. The Chinese translation of the “Internationale” was rendered by Xiao San (1896–1982), a poet who had studied in Paris and Moscow and had been a leading figure in the cultural and literary life of China until his death in 1982.
 25. This portion of discussion draws from Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee, eds., *An Intellectual History of Modern China* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 203–20.
 26. Xia Yan (1900–95), a prominent figure in modern Chinese theater and film industry. Among his well-known works are his 1930s screenplays *Turbulent Currents*, *Children of Winds and Clouds*, *Spring Silk Worm*, and spoken drama *Qiu Jin* and *Under the Eaves of Shanghai*. He was vice-minister for culture in the 1960s and was prosecuted during the Cultural Revolution.

Zhou Yang (1908–89), a prominent Marxist literary theorist, one of the founders of the League of Left-Wing Writers. Zhou Yan had held many important positions in art and literature since the 1930s, but couldn’t escape the fate of being persecuted during the Cultural Revolution either.

Yang Hansheng (1902–93), founder of the League of Left-Wing Playwrights, a prominent figure in the progressive art and literature movements, and the author of 17 screenplays, eight spoken drama

works, and many other writings. He spent nine years in prison during the Cultural Revolution.

Tian Han has already been introduced in [Chapter 2](#).

27. Liang Shiqiu (1903–87), a renowned writer, translator, literary theorist, and lexicographer. While studying at Harvard University, he came under the influence of Irving Babbitt and his New Humanism tenets. Among his important translations are George Eliot's *Silas Marner*, Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights*, George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, and the complete works of Shakespeare.

Xu Zhimo (1897–1931), one of the most important early twentieth-century Chinese poets, known for his unfaltering pursuit of love, freedom, and beauty both in art and in life. He studied at Columbia University and King's College and is credited with having successfully “naturalized” Western Romantic and Symbolist spirit and forms into modern Chinese poetry. He died in a plane crash in 1931.

Hu Shi has already been introduced in [Chapter 2](#).

28. Lin Yutang (1895–1976), a renowned philosopher, translator, and prolific writer of works in Chinese and English, known to Western readers for his books such as *My Country and My People* (1935), *The Wisdom of China and India* (1942), as well as many highly acclaimed English translations of Chinese literary masterpieces. He studied at Harvard University and was one of Irving Babbitt's most notable students. Lin participated in the May Fourth Movement although his interests remained primarily literary and his philosophy humanistic.
29. Qu Qiubai (1899–1935) was an early leader of the Communist Party, an active participant of the May Fourth Movement, and a Marxist literary theorist and critic. He was caught by the Guomindang government during the Extermination Campaigns in 1934 and was later executed by a firing squad.
30. Chinese renditions of *The Mother* (1906), *My Childhood* (1913–14), *In the World* (1915–16), and *My Universities* (1923) by Maxim Gorky (1868–1936), and *Razgrom* (1926), *Last of the Udegs* (1929–40), *The Young Guard* (1946) by Aleksandr Fadeyev (1901–56) have been among staples in the history of literary translation and have had significant influence.
31. See Rodney Koenek, *Empires of the Mind: I. A. Richards and Basic English in China, 1929–1979* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
32. Among Zhao Shuli's best known stories are *The Marriage of Young Blacky Fortunes of the Li Village*, and *Three-Mile Bay*. Although Zhao was promoted as an exemplary peasant writer by the Communist Party since the 1940s, he was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and died in 1970. In response to negative assessment of Zhao Shuli by C. T. Hsia, Liu Zaifu (1941–), an important contemporary literary critic and philosopher, defended Zhao as a talented writer coming from a rich rural, oral culture whose achievements do not pale when stacked next to those of much more urbane writers such as Zhang Ailing.

- See Liu Zaifu, “Eileen Chang’s Fiction and C. T. Hsia’s A History of Modern Chinese Fiction,” *Shijie* [Scope] 7 (2002): <http://mclc.osu.edu/rc/pubs/liuzaifu.htm>.
33. Translated by Gregory B. Lee and quoted from Joseph S. M. Lau and Howard Goldblatt, eds., *The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 510–11.
 34. See Ba Jin, “My J’accuse Against This Moribund System,” in *Modern Chinese Writers Self Portrayals*, trans. by W. J. F. Jenner, ed. Helmut Martin (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 277–83, and Olga Lang, “Introduction” to *Family* by Ba Jin (Boston: Cheng & Tsui Company, 1972), vii–xxvi.
 35. See Bernd Eberstein, *A Selective Guide to Chinese Literature, 1900–1949* (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 1997), 60–63.
 36. Ding Ling, “Foreword” to *Miss Sophie’s Diary* by Ding Ling, trans. by W. J. F. Jenner (Beijing: Panda Books, 1984), 7–8.
 37. C. T. Hsia in his *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction*, 3rd ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), for example, dismissed the later fiction of Ding Ling (Ting Ling) as part of the “proletarian literature in China” written to serve the agendas of the Communist Party (272). On Hsia’s scales of literary values, Ding Ling weighed much less than Zhang Ailing, whom he praised as the “most talented writer to appear in Shanghai” and possibly “the greatest Chinese writer since the May Fourth Movement” (322). See also Jiangshang Xingzi (Sachico Kawakami), “Xiangdai zhongguo de ‘xin funu’ huayu yu zuowei ‘moden nulang’ daiyanren de Ding Ling” [The “New Woman” Discourse in Modern China and Ding Ling as the Spokesperson for the “Modern Woman”], *Zhongguo xiandai wenxue yanjiu congkan* [Modern Chinese Literature Research Series] 2 (2006): 68–88; and Xu Zhongjia, “Geming shiqi ziwo dingyi quan de sangshi yu nuxing zhuyi xiezuo de shibai: yi Ding Ling ji pian xiaoshuo wei zhongxin de fenxi” [The Loss of the Right for Self-Definition during the Revolutionary Period and the Failure of Feminist Writing: the Case of Ding Ling], *Nanjing shida xuebao: shehui kexue ban* [Journal of Nanjing Normal University: Social Sciences Edition] 1 (January 2008): 142–47.
 38. See Hsia, *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction*, 322–24, 389–431.
 39. See Wen-HsinYeh, *The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China 1919–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000).

4 THE STRANGE INTERLUDE (1950–1976)

1. This brief account of the life of Mu Dan/Cha Liangzhen in the days before the Cultural Revolution is based on Chen Boliang, *Mu Dan zhuang* [Biography of Mu Dan] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press, 2004).

2. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (the CPPCC) is a Communist Party-controlled advisory body consisting of delegates from a number of political parties and organizations as well as independent members. The conference held its first meeting in September 1949 as the Communist Party was readying itself for victory and governance of mainland China. It approved, among other things, *Gongtong Ganglin* [the Common Program, a *de facto* Constitution], the new national anthem, flag, capital city, and elected the first government of the People's Republic of China. The first People's Political Consultative Conference served as a *de facto* constitutional convention and it continued to serve as the *de facto* legislature until 1954 when the National People's Congress was established. It has since served as an advisory legislative body.
3. Maurice J. Meisner, *Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007), 23.
4. Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ershi shiji zhongguo shi* [The 20th Century History of China], 2 vols (2003 reprint; Xi'an, China: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 1–30.
5. For Mao's journey from a country youth to the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist Party, see Meisner, *Mao Zedong*. See also Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform* (New York and London: Norton, 1995), 59–76. For a comprehensive reassessment of Mao in the context of the socioeconomic developments of China in the decades since the end of the Cultural Revolution, see Nick Knight, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong's Thought* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007).
6. Meisner, *Mao Zedong*, 141.
7. The term *zhishifengzi*, loosely translated as “intellectual,” would apply to almost anyone who had received a college education, for example, professors, teachers, doctors, journalists, engineers. Even those who had received a middle school or even elementary school education were sometimes referred to as *xiao zhishifengzi* [small intellectuals]. Apparently Mao's anti-intellectualism was directed more at the higher end of the spectrum, the cultural and intellectual elite.
8. This portion of discussion draws from Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ershi shiji zhongguo shi*, 30–40, 104–108. The same flip-flop would repeat itself in the case of a Beijing opera featuring Hai Rui, a righteous Ming dynasty minister who was dismissed from office and put in jail for having criticized the emperor's indulgence in astrology and witchcraft while neglecting his imperial duties. When Hai Rui died, people from a one-hundred-*li* radius came to mourn him. Mao, during the difficult years of the Great Famine (resulted from his misguided policies), called on officials and intellectuals to speak their minds, but soon changed his own when he felt threatened by the criticisms. This prolonged denunciation campaign proved a prelude to something even worse: the Cultural Revolution.

9. A central government estimate in 1956 put the population of intellectuals at 384,000. Of these, about 40 percent were deemed enthusiastic supporters of the Communist Party, 40 percent lukewarm supporters, 10–15 percent intellectually unreceptive to socialism, 5 percent die-hard counterrevolutionary and enemies of socialism. In 1957, during the Anti-Rightist campaign, Mao estimated that about 1–10 percent of the intellectuals in and outside the Communist Party were counterrevolutionary “rightists.” When the dust settled, 552,877 intellectuals were denounced as “rightists.” See Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ershi shiji zhongguo shi*, 109, 125–27.
10. *The Blue Kite [Lanfengzheng]*, dir. Tian Zhuangzhuang, starring Lu Liping, Pu Quanxin, Chen Xiaoman, Li Xuejian, Guo Baochang, 1993.
11. See Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward 1955–59* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999). Much of this is captured in the 1994 film *To Live [Huozhuo]*, dir. Zhang Yimo, starring Ge You and Gong Li.
12. Although it may be impossible to pin down the exact numbers of people who had perished during the famine, estimates had put the figure at about 40 million. See Frank Dikötter, *Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe* (New York: Walker & Company, 2010), and Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ershi shiji zhongguo shi*, 151.
13. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 12. See also Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume III, The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961–1966* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), and Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution*, trans. and ed. D. W. Y. Kwok (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996).
14. Other important events during the decades from 1949–1977 include the Korean War in 1950–53, the uprising of Tibet and its crackdown in 1959, the Sino-Indian Border War in 1962, and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969.
15. This portion of discussion draws from Meng Chaoyi and Li Zaidao, eds., *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi* [History of Chinese Translation Literature] (Beijing: University Press, 2005), 280–94.
16. The first Five-Year Plan (1953–57) proved quite successful in jumpstarting the development of national economy after decades of war. The second Five-Year Plan (1958–62), which coincided with the Great Leap Forward, led to disastrous failure. This method of planning is still being used today (2011 marks the beginning of the twelfth Five-Year Plan) even though China’s economy has undergone seismic change since the 1980s and the power of decision has since shifted in no small measure from the central command toward the market, hence the hybridized brand of “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.”
17. See discussions of Hu Shi and Mao Dun in [Chapter 2](#).

18. Even during the Yan'an Years, Mao was interested in forming some sort of united front with the United States in the fight against Japanese aggressions. Toward the end of WWII the "diplomatic" relations between Yan'an and the United States was all but institutionalized with normal channels of communication and consultation. On the eve of the Communist victory in China, however, the CCP's overtures went unanswered and other domestic and geopolitical developments—the Cold War, US support to the rearmament of Japan as part of its global geopolitical strategies, and the outbreak of the Korean War—tilted China over into the Soviet Camp completely despite Mao and the CCP's complex and uneasy relationship with Joseph Stalin. See Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ershi shiji zhongguo shi*, 43–47.
19. Ernest J. Simmons, *Russian Fiction and Soviet Ideology: Introduction to Fedin, Leonov, and Sholokhov* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 1–8.
20. Caryl Emerson, *The Cambridge Introduction to Russian Literature* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 200.
21. A. M. Van Der Eng-Liedmeier, *Soviet Literary Characters: An Investigation into the Portrayal of Soviet Men in Russian Prose 1917–1953* (The Hague: The Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1959), 7–9.
22. *Ibid.*, 130.
23. Anne C. Hughes, "Babayeysky and the 'Imitation of Il'ich,'" *The Slavonic and East European Review* 59, no.1 (Jan. 1981): 62–70.
24. Anthony Kingsford, *Companion to Russian Studies: Volume 2, An Introduction to Russian Language and Literature*, ed. Robert Auty and Dimitri Obolensky (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 200.
25. This portion of the discussion draws from Chen Nanxian, "Shiqi nian ersu wenxue zuopin de fanyi zai dangdai zhongguo wenxueshi shang de yingxiang" [Seventeen Years of Soviet Russian Literature Translation and Its Impact on Modern Chinese Literary History], *Wenyi lilun yu piping* [Arts and Literature Theory and Criticism] 2 (2006): 45–49.
26. This portion of discussion draws from Zhang Guojun, "Quanli huayu yu wenge shiqi de waiguo wenxue fanyi" [Power Discourse and the Translation of Foreign Literature during the Period of Cultural Revolution.], *Huanan nongye daxue xuebao: shehui kexue ban* [Journal of South China Agricultural University: Social Sciences Edition] 7, no. 4 (2008): 99–103, and Ma Zikui, "Wenge shiqi de waiguo wenxue fanyi" [Foreign Literature Translation during the Cultural Revolution], *Beijing daxue yanjiusheng xuezhì* [Beijing University Graduate Studies Gazette] 1 (2003): 76–83.
27. Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ershi shiji zhongguo shi*, 72.
28. Jiang Qing (1914?–91), Mao's wife, took it upon herself to "reform" and "modernize" the traditional opera to better entertain and educate the workers, peasants, and soldiers and promote the hegemony of the Communist Party. The eight *yangban xi* [model operas]—*The Red Lantern*, *Shajia Village*, *Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategies*, etc., along

- with two ballets—*Red Detachment of Women* and *White-Haired Girl*, so permeated the very air people breathed that a generation of people who grew up during that decade or so can still sing off whole passages of the lyrics even today without much prompting. Another irony of it all is that the eight operas and the two ballets, despite their clumsy, heavy-handed storytelling to promote the dominant revolutionary ideology, were not a complete failure when it comes to the hybridization of the East and West in terms of musicality, with their extensive use of Western music instruments, for example, the violin, the flute, the clarinet, the cello, in an otherwise quintessential Chinese art genre.
29. Hua Tong, “Yan’an Seeds,” in *The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature*, 2nd ed., ed. Joseph S. M. Lau and Howard Goldblatt (New York: Columbia University Press), 251–61.
 30. Based on Liu Ying, “*Feng Zikai de wannian*” [The Last Years of Feng Zikai], *Duzhe wenzhai* [Reading Digest] 1 (2005): <http://www.51dh.net/magazine/article/1671-7724/2005/01/2818.html>; and Meng Chaoyi and Li Zaidao, eds., *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi*, 351–60.
 31. Wang Jiaxin, “*Mudan: Fanyi zuowei shengcun*” [Mu Dan: Translation for Survival], *Jiangnan daxue xuebao: renwen kexue ban* [Journal of Jiangnan University: Humanities and Social Sciences Edition] 28, no. 6 (Dec. 2009): 6.
 32. Translated from Zhang Liqun and Liu Xianlong, “‘*Shidai jiaolu’ xia de geti renga: Lun 30 zhi 50 niandai Mu Dan de shiren renga*” [Personality and ‘the Anxiety of the Times’: On Mu Dan’s Poetic Mentality from 1930s to 1950s], *Liaoning daxue xuebao: zhexue shehui kexue ban* [Journal of Liaoning University: Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition] 38, no. 3 (May 2010): 67–68.
 33. This portion of the discussion draws from Chen Boliang, *Mu Dan zhuang*, 127–63.
 34. This quote from W. B. Yeats’s “Easter 1916” and the subsequent quotes from T. S. Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and Yeats’s “The Second Coming” are from Stephen Greenblatt, ed., *The Norton Anthology of English Literature, Vol. F, The Twentieth Century and After*, 8th ed (New York: Norton, 2006), 2032, 2292, 2037.
 35. Translated from Wang Yong, “‘*Lishi ceng zaici zougou*.’” *Ping Chen Boliang Mu Dan zhuan*” [Touched by History: Comment on the Biography of Mu Dan by Chen Boliang], *Jingmen zhiye jishu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Jingmen Technical College] 22, no. 8 (Aug. 2007): 13–16.

5 THE TSUNAMI (1977–PRESENT)

1. According to the Chinese zodiac, 1976 was the Year of the Dragon, which Chinese folklore or superstition associates with calamitous events such as natural disasters and social upheavals. A full 12-year cycle later, in 1988, China stared another Year of the Dragon in the face and saw

- many disastrous traffic and coal mine accidents, plane crashes, pandemics, drought, floods. This, however, would prove only an ominous prelude to 1989, the Year of the Snake (or Little Dragon), which saw massive student protests, social unrest, and the bloody crackdown in the Tiananmen Square. See Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ersbi shiji zhongguo shi* [The 20th Century History of China], 2 vols. (1993; repr. Xi'an, China: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 326–46.
2. Wooden clubs were used for this crackdown instead of tanks and guns as would be the case in the same square in 1989. See Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, “The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited,” *Pacific Affairs* 77, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 211–35.
 3. See Yong Chen, *The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976: An Anatomy of Disaster* (Oxford, UK: Pergamon, 1988). The city of Tangshan has since been rebuilt. A film about the event titled *Aftershock* [Tangshan dadizhen], dir. Feng Xiaogang, was released in 2010.
 4. See Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution 1972–1976* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2008).
 5. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi* [A Brief History of Translation in China and the West] (Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, 2009), 258–59.
 6. Ye Xiaoqing, “Patriotism vs. Intellectual Curiosity,” in *Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry*, ed. Gloria Davis (Lanham: MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 185–95. See also Jin Guangtao, Interview, “*Jin Guangtao huiyi bashi niandai sixiang yundong*” [Jin Guangtao Recalling the Grand Thought Movement in the 80s], *Jingji guancha bao* [Economic Observers Post], (March 4, 2010): <http://www.bjznmw.cn/viewnews-6715.html>.
 7. Longxi Zhang, *Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 196–201.
 8. Li Yunfeng, ed., *Ersbi shiji zhongguo shi*, 296–98.
 9. *Ibid.*, 275–76.
 10. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 262–63.
 11. See Xiaoping Chen, “*Yibu jinshu de zhongguo zaoyu: Chatailai furen de qingren zai zhongguo de jingli, cengjing wei zhongguo guangnian kaifang de mouzhong zhibiao*” [A Banned Book’s Fortune in China: Reception of *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* in China as an Index of China’s Openness], *Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan* [China News Weekly] (January 28, 2008): 82–84, and Yu Jianjun and Li Famin, “*Chatelai furen zai zhongguo de jieshou*” [The Reception of *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* in China], *Yichun xueyuan xuebao: shehui kexue* [Journal of Yichun University: Social Sciences Edition] 25, no. 1 (Feb. 2003): 60–61.
 12. See [Chapter 3](#).
 13. Hand-copied manuscripts [*shouchaoben*] were quite a literary as well as social phenomenon during the Cultural Revolution. These “banned

- books” were clandestinely circulated in hand-copied forms, which, in many cases, had been passed around from hands to eager hands for so many times, their racy, titillating scenes having been consumed over and over again, that the pages had grown fat, creased, with visible signs of deterioration. The most notorious among the dozens of such “banned books” were *Shaonu zhixin* [A Young Girl’s Heart], or *Manla huiyi lu* [Memoirs of Manla], which, in explicit language, tells the story of a young college girl’s sexual encounters with her cousin and other men, and *Di’erci woshou* [The Second Handshake], which, when the Cultural Revolution was over, was exonerated, became a bestseller when openly published, and saw a film adaption that was quite a hit at the time.
14. The New Sensationalist Fiction [*Xin ganjue paixiaoshuo*], by authors based in Shanghai, was the first fully developed modernist fiction in China. Its fictional space is interiorized; the narrative trains its scrutinizing lens not on the chaotic world outside, but inward, on the minute feelings of boredom, loneliness, and despair as the characters drift through everyday routine. A direct source of influence was the New Sensationalist School of modernist fiction in Japan at around the same time.
 15. See discussions on Dai Wangshu in [Chapter 2](#) and Mu Dan in [Chapter 4](#), respectively.
 16. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 449–53.
 17. This portion of discussion draws from Belinda Kong, “Traveling Man, Traveling Culture: *Death of a Salesman* and Post-Mao Chinese Theater,” in *Arthur Miller’s Global Theater*, ed. Enoch Brater (Ann Arbor: MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 35–56. *The Crucible*, variously translated as *Lianyu*, *Yanjun de kaoyan* [A Grave Test], or *Salamu de nuwu* [The Salem Witches], was staged by many theaters in China. See also Ying Ruocheng, “Ying Ruocheng *tan tuixiaoyuan zhisi zai zhongguo*” [Ying Ruocheng on *Death of a Salesman* in China], *Xiju wenzhai* [Theater Digest] (October 16, 2009): http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_59dc7a600100fejq.html.
 18. See Xiaomei Chen, “Twentieth-Century Spoken Drama,” in *The Columbia History of Chinese Literature*, ed. Victor H. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 876.
 19. Yang Hongyan, “*Yuwen jiaocai li de xiandai zhuyi wenxue shijie*” [A Tentative Approach To Teaching Modernism in High School Chinese Curriculum], *Zhongxue yuwen* [High School Chinese] 5 (2009): 51–53.
 20. Jin Qiong, “*Waiguo wenxue jiaowang shi jiaoxue de celue*” [Interactive Strategy in Foreign Literature Teaching], *Wenxue jiaoyu* [Literature Education] 23 (2005): 021–023.
 21. Xia Lachu, “*Lun waiguo wenxue jiaoxue jiaodu de bentu xing*” [Toward a Native Culture Approach in Foreign Literature Teaching], *Wenxue jiaoyu* [Literature Education] 8 (2005): 19–21.
 22. See Li Guoying and Hu Penglin, “*Bainian wenxue piping: jiangou zhuti xing he bentu hua de huayu tixi*” [Hundred Years of Literary

- Criticism: Toward Constructing a Dominant Domestic Critical Discourse], *Shenyang shifan daxue xuebao: sheke ban* [Journal of Shenyang Normal University: Social Sciences Edition] 28, no. 4 (2004): 42–46.
23. This portion draws from Zhao Yanqiu, “Gongheguo xushi lilun fazhan liushi nian” [The Republic’s Sixty Years of Narratological Studies], *Lilun yu chuanguo* [Criticism and Creation] 129, no. 4 (2009): 4–7, 30.
 24. See Fu Donghua, “Yixu” [Translator’s Note], *Piao* [Gone with the Wind, 1940] <http://baike.baidu.com/view/26932.htm>.
 25. This inaugural issue also published several short introductory pieces on Western modernist literature, for example, stream-of-consciousness, the Lost Generation, expressionism, black humor, Angry Young Men, all written by prominent Western literature scholars. The second issue would continue the practice with short pieces on existentialism, surrealism, symbolism, impressionism, magic realism, absurdism. Since its inception in 1979, *Yilin* has proved an unflinching force in introducing contemporary foreign literature—serious and popular alike.
 26. This portion draws from Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 253–58.
 27. Chinese Potterheads, though, will have to wait until *Beginning of the Great Revival* [*jian dang wei ye*], a two-hour film telling the story of the Communist Party’s heroic rise to power (made to mark the Party’s ninetieth anniversary on July 1, 2011), has made 800 million yuan (about US\$124 million) at the box office before they can flock in to see *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part Two* (released on July 15, 2011 in the United States and everywhere else in the world). See Xijun Yang, “People, You will See This Film. Right Now,” *New York Times*, June 24, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com>.
 28. See “11 Amazing Fake ‘Harry Potter’ Books Written in China,” *11 Points*, http://www.11points.com/Books/11_Amazing_Fake_'Harry_Potter'_Books_Written_In_China; and Louisa Lim, “Rush Is on for Harry Potter Knockoffs in China,” *NPR*, July 13, 2007, www.npr.org.
 29. See Joshua S. Mostow, *The Columbia Companion to Modern East Asian Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 527–32; and Pang-Yuan Chi and David Der-wei Wang, *Chinese Literature in the Second Half of a Modern Century: A Critical Survey* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), xxiv–xxvi.
 30. Hong Zicheng, *Zhongguo dangdai wenxue shi* [History of Contemporary Chinese Literature] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2010), 242–50.
 31. Tao Dongfeng and He Lei, *Zhongguo xinshiqi wenxue 30 nian* [Chinese Literature since Reform and Opening Up (1978–2008)], ed. Wang Weiguang (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2008), 3–6.
 32. Andrew F. Jones, trans., Translator’s Postscript to *The Past and the Punishment* by Yu Hua (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 263–65.

33. Tao Dongfeng and He Lei, *Zhongguo xinshiqi wenxue 30 nian*, 6–26.
34. See Wei Hui, *Shanghai Baby*, trans. Bruce Humes (New York: Pocket Books, 2001); and *Shanghai baobei* [Shanghai Baby], <http://baike.baidu.com/view/1401877.htm>.
35. See Mian Mian, *Candy: A Novel*, trans. Andrea Lingenfelter (New York: Little Brown, 2003); and Chun Sue, *Beijing Doll: A Novel*, trans. Howard Goldblatt (New York: Riverhead Books, 2004).
36. The discussion on Kafka and China and Kafka's influence on Zong Pu, Can Xue, and Yu Hua draws from Jiang Zhiqin, *Dang dongfang yu xifang xiangyu* [When East Encounters West: Studies in Comparative Literature] (Jinan, Shandong: Qilu Press, 2008), 10–16, 71–72, among other sources.
37. Richard T. Gray, et al., *A Franz Kafka Encyclopedia* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 32–34.
38. Can Xue, “Hut on the Mountain,” in *The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature*, trans. Ronald R. Janssen and Jian Zhang, ed. Joseph S. M. Lau and Howard Goldblatt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 325–28.
39. Charlotte Innes, Foreword to *Old Floating Cloud*, trans. Ronald R. Janssen and Jian Zhang (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1990), ix–xvii.
40. Jiang Zhiqin, *Dang dongfang yu xifang xiangyu*, 13–16.
41. Yu Hua, “On the Road at Eighteen,” in *The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature*, trans. Andrew F. Jones, ed. Joseph S. M. Lau and Howard Goldblatt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 439–44.
42. Hong Zicheng, *Zhongguo dangdai wenxue shi*, 240–41.
43. This portion on debates over “modernity” draws from Tang Guilin, et al., *Ersi shiji zhongguo wenxue de zhongxi zhizheng* [Tensions between East and West in 20th Century Chinese Literature] (Baihuazhou Arts and Literature Press, 2006), 162–256. See also Hong Zicheng, *Zhongguo dangdai wenxue shi*, 233–452, and Tao Dongfeng and He Lei, *Zhongguo xinshiqi wenxue 30 nian*.
44. Xie Tianzhen, et al., *Zhongxi fanyi jianshi*, 257–58, 327–30.
45. *Ibid.*, 302–04.
46. According to the United Nations Human Development Report 2010, during the 2001–2009 period, 22.1 percent of college age population matriculated at the more than 3,000 institutions of higher learning, which translates to over 20 million college population. See United Nations Development Programme, “United Nations Human Development Reports 2010,” 20th Anniversary Edition, 151–55, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>; and “*Zhongguo daxuesheng shuliang biao sheng*” [Chinese college population skyrocketed], *DW-World*, July 9, 2010, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5981728,00.html>.
47. See the university Web site: <http://gsti.bfsu.edu.cn/>.
48. See the university Web site: <http://giit.shisu.edu.cn/>.

49. Xi'an Fanyi University (Xi'an University of Translation), <http://www.xfuedu.org/>.
50. See the university Web site: <http://sti.sysu.edu.cn/Intro.asp>.
51. This paragraph and the one immediately following draw from Meng Chaoyi and Li Zaidao, eds., *Zhongguo wenxue fanyi shi* [History of Chinese Translation Literature] (Beijing University Press, 2005): 404–12.
52. See also Liu Yang, *Ershi shiji xifang fanyi lilun zai zhongguo de jieshou* [The Reception History of the 20th Century Western Translation Theories in China] (Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, 2009).

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